### FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2017 In the Office ofthe Clerk ofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, 

### v. VICTORIA ASHLEE KNEZEVICH, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 33947-5-111

UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KORSMO, 

### J.

- VictoriaKnezevich appeals her conviction for possession ofa controlled substance, arguingthat the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. Thetrial courtproperlyrejectedboth ofher suppression arguments. We affirm. FACTS Ms. Knezevichwas apassenger in a vehicle that drew the attention ofa Cle Elum resident by speeding over 100 m.p.h. around 2:00 a.m. onthe morning ofMay 10, 2015. Theresident confronted the driver at a gas station andthenreportedthe incidentto Kittitas County Deputy SheriffNathanFoster who was sitting inhis patrol car outsidethe sheriffs substation. Theresident reported the vehicle's license number to Foster and told the deputy thatthe four occupants were "acting suspicious."No. 33947-5-111 State 

### v. Knezevich Deputy Fosterthen checked the license plate numberprovided throughhis car's mobile data center. Records indicatedthe vehicle's registration expired in 2013 andthe title to the vehicle had notbeen transferred within 15 days ofan April 2015 sale. 1 Deputy Fosterdecided to drive to the area where the vehicle had beenreported, latertestifying, "So at that point I decided to head up towards the gas station, number one,justto check them out. To see what was going, why they were acting suspicious." He soon located the vehicle, followed it for a short time, and noted thatthe license plate carried a 2016 registration tag that conflicted with the 2013 registration information reported by records. He activated his lights andpulled the vehicle over. The driver, Darwin Riedl, was placedunder arrest for driving with a suspended license.2 When Riedl exitedthe vehicle, Deputy Foster noticed an item sitting onthe ledge betweenthe car's door and the driver's seat: a hollow bluepentube, melted on one end, which in his training and experience herecognized as a tool commonly usedto smoke heroin or other drugs.

1 "Aperson who has recently acquired a motorvehicle
... who does not apply for a new certificate oftitle within fifteen calendar days ofdelivery ofthe vehicle is charged a penalty
... when applying for a new certificate oftitle." RCW 46.12.650. 2 Mr. Riedl's license was suspended inthe third degree. Further investigation revealed the 2016 tab onthe Acura's license plate was improper. The tab hadbeen issued for theplate ofa Honda Civic registered to Mr. Riedl. 2No. 33947-5-111 State v. Knezevich
There were three passengers in the car, with Ms. Knezevich seated directly behind the driver. After securing Riedl, the deputy returned to the passenger side ofthe car and noted a box offoil at Ms. Knezevich's feet, and a tan pentube with a melted end near the passenger door. In Deputy Foster's experience, he knew that aluminum foil is utilized when smoking heroin. At this point, Deputy Foster established a reasonable suspicion for possession ofdrug paraphernalia, since at least one suspicious item was within reach of all three passengers; he requested their identifications. Ms. Knezevich provided a false name in orderto avoid arrest on an outstanding warrant and was booked into thejail under that name. Her true identity was later discovered during a search ofthe car. The search also uncovered additional drug paraphernalia and a container ofmethamphetamine. Ms. Knezevich was charged with possession ofa controlled substance, possession ofdrug paraphernalia, and obstruction ofa law enforcement officer. Her counsel subsequently moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that it was pretextual. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. Written findings offact were subsequently entered. After losing the suppression motion, Ms. Knezevich waived herright to ajurytrial and proceeded to a stipulated facts trial. She was found guilty as charged. Findings in support ofthe bench verdict were also entered. Ms. Knezevich timely appealed to this court. 3No. 33947-5-III State v. Knezevich
ANALYSIS Ms. Knezevichpresents two arguments challengingthe traffic stop and subsequent search. Specifically, she argues thatthe traffic stop was pretextual andthatthe deputy unlawfully detained her at the scene. We considerthe two claims together. An appellate courtreviews de novo the trial court's conclusions oflawpertaining to a motion to suppress. State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284,291,290 P.3d 983 (2012). We review findings offact related to a motion to suppress under the substantial evidence standard. State v. Montes-Malindas, 144 Wn. App. 254,259, 182 P.3d 999 (2008), overruledon othergrounds byBrend/in v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficientto persuade a fairminded, rational person ofthe truth ofthe finding. 

### Id. Pretextual stops are prohibited by art. I, § 7, ofthe Washington Constitution. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d at 294. Pretextual stops occurwhen an officer stops a vehicle in order to conduct a speculative criminal investigation unrelated to enforcement ofthe traffic code. State v. DeSantiago, 97 Wn. App. 446, 451, 983 P.2d 1173 (1999). "When determining whether a given stop is pretextual, the court should considerthe totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent ofthe officer as well as the objective reasonableness ofthe officer's behavior." 

### Id. at 452. Everything the deputy was investigating up to the time ofthe stop was a violation ofthe traffic code-the expired 2013 registration ofthe car, the untimely reported sale of 4No. 33947-5-III State v. Knezevich
the vehicle in 2015, and the inexplicable appearance ofa 2016 tab on the vehicle. On its face, nothing was pretextual about this stop. An expired vehicle registration is an articulable suspicion ofa traffic infraction ( a violation ofRCW 46.l6A.0303), and a traffic stop based on an expired registration is not pretextual. State v. Santacruz, 132 Wn. App. 615, 621, 133 P.3d 484 (2006). Additionally, "there is no constitutional violation in allowing a police officerto assume a citizen's report has some basis when he is conducting an initial investigation ofthat complaint." State v. Glenn, 140 Wn. App. 627, 635, 166 PJd 1235 (2007). DOL keeps records that include information on vehicle registration and ownership, in part for use by law enforcement. State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 32, 60 PJd46 (2002). There is no protectedprivacy interest in the information contained in DOL records, and access ofthese records by law enforcement does not violate a person's rights. Id. Deputy Foster lawfully stopped the vehicle because the tip he had received, coupled with his initial investigation via mobile data center, indicated that the vehicle had
an expired registration, a traffic infraction per RCW46.16A.030(5). Glenn, 140 Wn. App. at 635; McKinney, 148 Wn.2d at 32. There is no evidence that Deputy Foster stopped the vehicle merely because the resident indicated the occupants ofthe vehicle

3RCW46.16A.030(5) reads, "Failure to renew an expiredregistration before operating a vehicle on the public highways ofthis state is a traffic infraction." 

### 5No. 33947-5-111 

### State v. Knezevich

were "acting suspicious." Deputy Foster's testimony indicated his desire to find the vehicle only arose after he learned ofthe expired registration. 

### Santacruz, 132 Wn. App. at 621. The deputy was then able to see, with his own eyes, a tab on the license plate that conflicted with the DOL information, providing him with further articulable suspicion for
atraffic investigation, rendering his decision to perform a traffic stop objectively reasonable. 

### DeSantiago, 97 Wn. App. at 452. Given the totality ofthe circumstances, Deputy Fosterreasonably acted to investigate an ongoingtraffic infraction. The traffic stop was not pretextual. The remaining question is whetherMs. Knezevich was unreasonably detained at the scene before she was arrested. She was not. An automobile passenger is not unlawfully detained or seized merely because an officer stops the vehicle she is riding in. 

### State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 222, 970 P.2d 722 (1999). However, there is an unconstitutional seizure ifan officerrequests identification from a passenger without independent cause, such as suspicion of additional criminal activity, to support the request. 

### State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980). By the time he requested identification from Ms. Knezevich and the other passengers, effectively seizing them, Deputy Fosterhad established cause, independent of the traffic stop, to ask the passengers for their identification. He had seen within reach of all ofthem items he immediately recognized as contraband-thehollow pentubes and

6No. 33947-5-111 State v. Knezevich
aluminum foil. Larson, 93 Wn.2d at 642. He therefore had a basis for investigating each passenger for possession ofdrug paraphernalia and possession ofa controlled substance. Ms. Knezevich was not seized or otherwise improperly detained before the deputy established cause to do so. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the motion to suppress. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will notbe printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:

Pennell, J.

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