Psyche IRB Recommendations

11/4/2022

Psyche

General

• Develop plan forward that prioritizes and completes development activities. 

• Establish a new launch date with sufficient margin to have high confidence in success. 

• Review work performed in last several months before the launch delay, to assure it is at the 

required level of excellence with no embedded problems. 

• Conduct a detailed review and assessment of “use-as-is” problem dispositions and “unverified 

failures.” 

NASA Response: NASA concurs. The Psyche project has developed a plan forward that would support a 

Launch Readiness Date of October 2023, with additional schedule margin, though many task details 

remain to be refined. NASA has accepted the new plan and will fund Psyche to continue development to 

the October 2023 launch date. The plan includes re-assessment of work completed to date and problem 

dispositions. The JPL institutional leadership will thoroughly review the progress against plans and

provide additional support as needed to ensure mission success. Likewise, NASA Headquarters, the 

Program Office, and the Standing Review Board will work closely with JPL and Psyche every step of the 

way to ensure mission success. Specifically, the PSD and PMPO staff will maintain close watch on the 

project’s progress against plan and provide support where appropriate to maintain schedule.

Management and Communications 

• Establish and implement processes to assure open, credible, and responsive communications both 

vertically and horizontally throughout the Psyche Project.

• JPL Director, senior management, and Line management must establish and implement processes 

that assure significant insight into flight-project execution and participation in resolution of 

problems and risks.

• The role of the Line management function in elevating concerns needs to be emphasized and 

strengthened.

NASA Response: NASA concurs. The Psyche project has implemented organizational changes to address 

communication barriers inside the team, added additional team feedback tools and venues for vertical 

and horizontal information flow to senior project management, and augmented the standard metrics 

and reporting. JPL will initiate revisions to its flight project oversight practices to assure the line 

management, senior management and the JPL Director achieve significant insight into ongoing project 

execution. JPL will provide a safety net to identify and elevate concerns related to flight project 

execution in a timely manner. NASA’s PSD and PMPO will increase their in-person presence at JPL and 
KSC going forward to work more closely as part of the Psyche team and gauge the team’s ability to 

communicate, and act on issues and concerns as they arise.

Staffing 

• Provide additional 10–12 full-time, experienced leaders at all levels of project.

• Adequately supplement and maintain project staffing to support the replan.

• Special attention should be given to assigning/maintaining a Project Chief Engineer, GNC Cognizant 

Engineer, and Fault Protection Lead Engineer.

NASA Response: NASA concurs. The Psyche project has added appropriately experienced leaders and 

project staff throughout the project, appointing a Project Chief Engineer, GNC Cognizant Engineer, Lead 

for Fault Protection, and has made improvements to the team structure to meet the work-to-go 

requirements. JPL is strengthening its existing process for managing staffing issues across multiple 

projects, with extra attention to ensure Psyche’s staffing needs are met while not risking higher priority 

missions. JPL is expected to regularly update NASA on staffing status on all projects in multiple forums at 

both project and portfolio levels.

COVID-19 Related 

• Reestablish informal communications, such as “walking the floor” and “drop-in discussions.”

• Remote and hybrid work must be minimized on Psyche to give the team the best opportunity to 

coalesce in a short time.

NASA Response: NASA concurs. The completion of Psyche requires increased simultaneous on-site

presence to facilitate informal communications and mission success. As many organizations struggle 

with how best to balance onsite and offsite work following the post-COVID societal changes, the Psyche 

project manager will set project hybrid work policy, within the bounds of JPL telework policy,

considering the need for in-person work during remaining phases of the project while also considering

team morale and equity across the staff.

Project Metrics

• Develop a detailed, integrated, resource-loaded, and adequately margined and verified schedules

for all remaining work.

• This must include sufficient task completion milestones in key areas like V&V, system integration 

and test, and mission ops preparations, such that progress in these areas can be readily tracked.

• Establish and implement a management information and reporting system that produces a credible 

and timely assessment of status, risks, and issues against this integrated baseline (described above).
NASA Response: NASA concurs. The Psyche team has created a detailed plan to ensure mission success

which is supported and endorsed by JPL leadership. A fully integrated, resource-loaded plan is expected

to be completed in the next two months. JPL and NASA will determine report content, frequency, and 

formats to more clearly convey regular, thorough assessments against the integrated baseline. At a 

minimum, the new format will not allow metrics to be rolled up in a way that conceals lower-level 

deficiencies or measurements against a moving plan.

SRB Review Process 

• The SRB process must be strengthened such that there is discrimination between “normal” activities 

and serious issues that will highlight critical factors impacting a project’s success.

• Guidelines given to projects for status reporting should be clear and unambiguous (e.g., for “green,” 

“yellow,” and “red” color-coding).

• The response to the SRB-reported issues and concerns must be thoroughly reviewed by the SRB, 

Management Center, and NASA authorities on a regular basis until satisfactory resolution is 

achieved.

NASA Response: NASA concurs with the intent of these recommendations, specifically that there are at 

least two areas of the SRB practices that need strengthening: clear communication and appropriate 

follow up to issues that should not be set aside until the next Life Cycle Review (LCR). NASA will 

consider changes to the expectations from SRBs and their reports, as well as implement appropriate 

follow up from Program Offices and Headquarters. NASA will also assess whether any LCR Success 

Criteria or other SRB approaches need to be modified.

JPL/MAXAR Relationship

• The Psyche experience provides an excellent opportunity to document best practices for future 

collaborations between NASA and commercial spacecraft providers in areas such as:

• Early and sustained in-depth interactions to develop mutual understandings of cultural and process 

differences

• Ensuring interfaces between the two organizations are correct, complete, and adequately 

documented and reviewed by subject-matter experts

• Contract structure

NASA Response: NASA concurs; clear communications and frequent in-depth interactions among all 

parties throughout the entire lifecycle are essential for developing effective working relationships across 

organizations, ensuring clarity and balance of expectations and capabilities, and for successful execution 

of the contracted effort. Early and careful consideration of contract structures and their implications, 

with clear roles and responsibilities documented for implementation, informs appropriate contract 

mechanism selection and aids in successful execution of the effort.
JPL Institution

Flight Project Workload

• Flight projects must be fully staffed with appropriately experienced personnel from the beginning, 

particularly in systems engineering, GNC, FSW, and Avionics.

• Balance must be achieved between the workforce needs of flight projects and the available JPL 

workforce.

• Timing of achieving this balance is critical.

• Psyche is an example of the major problems this imbalance is causing today.

• IRB believes that by the end of March 2023, significant corrective actions must be implemented to 

achieve balance.

• For any corrective actions requiring more time, a detailed plan of action must be developed and 

approved by JPL, Caltech, and NASA.

Response: JPL Concurs. JPL is committed to doing all that is necessary to fill critical roles on Psyche and 

other missions given the high levels of work related to several ongoing high priority large missions and is 

committed to meeting near-term milestones and upcoming launch dates. NASA intends to postpone the 

VERITAS launch readiness date to no earlier than 2031 (approximately a three-year delay). This 

postponement will provide some offset to both the workload/workforce imbalance for at least three 

years, and to the increased funding required to continue Psyche towards a 2023 launch. JPL is moving 

forward instituting new internal staffing approaches and working with industrial partners to support 

staffing needs.

Line Organization Issues

• Repopulate the Line organization with experienced leaders and engineers to reestablish the Line 

organization as an equal partner with flight projects during implementation.

• Add experienced people and include them in the effort to achieve balance.

• Address the Division 31 (Systems Engineering) /34 (Avionics) staffing, accountability, and 

coordination issues.

• Continually examine the issues between and within Divisions 31 and 34 because of the 

importance of these Divisions to the execution of flight projects.

Response: JPL Concurs. JPL will redouble its efforts to strengthen leadership at all levels of the line and 

project organizations. JPL is committed to strengthening its leadership in a purpose-driven, forwardlooking manner which recognizes that the future demands more in how the institution partners 

technically, and in how JPL supports our teams moving forward. 
Senior Management Engagement

• JPL Director must establish regularly scheduled meetings, formal and informal communications, 

and “drop in” visits to facilitate necessary engagement on major flight projects, communicate 

priority, and maintain cognizance of status.

• Prioritize the large number of activities competing for senior management’s attention to focus 

on those in greatest need and importance such that commitments to NASA and the various 

stakeholders are met.

• Senior management should develop and codify in JPL’s Flight Project Practices the metrics that 

will be employed for tracking progress during the critical prelaunch period.

Response: JPL Concurs. JPL has made changes in leadership, organizational structure and reviews, 

which along with other actions are designed to increase institutional insight and oversight of our 

missions, including but not limited to Psyche, Clipper and NISAR.

Hiring and Retention

• JPL must develop the capability to successfully hire and retain mid-level people in this new 

environment.

• JPL must develop approaches for the career growth and retention of critical and high-potential 

personnel.

• JPL must characterize problems with retention and develop incisive and decisive actions to 

address the problems identified.

Response: JPL Concurs. JPL’s established hiring, retention and development procedures will be 

strengthened to be more aggressive and efficient in the search for new talent and retaining our internal 

talent. Additional steps will be taken to identify industrial partners to engage with to support our work. 

Caltech is fully committed to our approach as we move forward.

Hybrid Work Environment

• JPL should immediately revisit its policy for hybrid work to make it more effective and better 

reflect the evolving needs of flight projects in different mission phases.

• Carefully consider which tasks, project phases, and circumstances permit hybrid and remote 

work arrangements.

• Any hybrid work arrangements should recognize the need for in-person interactions. In addition, 

it is critically important that early-career employees work alongside seasoned employees for 

their long-term development.

• Inefficiencies in productivity and communications associated with hybrid work must be included 

in the workforce, cost, and schedule plans for flight projects.
Response: JPL Concurs. The execution and completion of projects and the day-to-day operation of JPL 

requires communications and in-depth interactions that must occur with more onsite work across teams 

than was possible during the pandemic, while also respecting the strong desire of people everywhere 

for more flexibility in getting their work done. In support of this, JPL is developing an updated telework 

policy which will be released in the near future. This policy will have the endorsement of JPL’s managing 

organization, Caltech.

Caltech Governance

• Caltech should develop a more rigorous annual review and evaluation approach for the JPL 

Director and the performance of the Laboratory.

• Caltech should have a better understanding of the JPL institutional issues and play a supporting 

role in addressing them.

• JPL should strengthen the quality of flight projects status presentations to Caltech.

NASA Response: NASA concurs with the intent of these recommendations. NASA recognizes that as the 

primary operator and manager of JPL, it is prudent that Caltech have a thorough understanding of the 

challenges faced by the institution and, where appropriate, assist with finding solutions that promote 

mission success. JPL and Caltech have already strengthened Caltech’s review and awareness of 

institutional issues and insight into flight projects and will continue to do so in alignment with the IRB’s 

recommendations. NASA will coordinate further with Caltech management to implement these 

recommendations via the JPL contract.

During development, the Psyche Project team encountered a significant number of technical issues 

and worked to resolve them to meet the planned launch. In May 2022, the Psyche mission 

experienced a slip of the primary launch period. The project requested more time to prepare for 

launch, and the launch period officially slipped to the contingency period. However, in June 2022, it 

was determined that due to late delivery of Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) flight software 

(FSW); incompatibilities within the system testbeds; and additional issues, a 2022 launch was not 

viable with acceptable risk.

Following this decision, NASA and JPL jointly established the Psyche IRB to investigate the causes for 

the delay and recommendations for corrective action.

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November 4, 2022

Establishment of Psyche IRB*

• Psyche development problems resulted in significant schedule delays, making it impossible to 

launch in 2022 with acceptable risk.

• Psyche IRB was established by Thomas Zurbuchen, NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) 

Associate Administrator, and Laurie Leshin, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Director, to investigate 

the cause(s) for the delay and recommend corrective actions.

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* Independent Review Board (IRB)
The Psyche IRB charter is based on the Terms of Reference (ToR) jointly established by NASA and 

JPL.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche IRB Charter

• Determine project, institutional, and all other issues that were responsible for the Psyche launch 

delay.

• Determine why there was a lack of visibility into the factors driving this launch delay.

• Review Psyche’s path forward to maximize the probability of mission success.

• Identify lessons learned with utilizing the Maxar commercial bus.

• Determine if Psyche issues are unique to Psyche or indicative of broader JPL institutional issues.

• If broader institutional issues are identified, determine corrective actions appropriate for current and 

future missions.

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The Psyche IRB employed a deliberate and focused methodology to conduct the review. This process 

included multiple face-to-face meetings held at JPL to conduct structured reviews, organized 

presentations, formal and informal sessions, and interviews with over 77 project and institutional 

personnel representing various levels of responsibility. The personal and panel interviews were 

invaluable to understanding the perspectives of key Psyche and institutional participants. This 

coordinated effort helped to give the IRB members a good understanding of the issues leading up to 

the launch delay.

The IRB was asked to meet again in October 2022 to review the Psyche Project’s proposed replan for 

achieving an October 2023 Launch Readiness Date (LRD).

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November 4, 2022

Review Methodology

• IRB meetings on-site at JPL, over 15 full days during July–September 2022

• Structured reviews

• Informal sessions

• Personnel interviews

• Individuals and groups—77 people were interviewed

• Representing different levels of Psyche Project, Maxar, JPL, and Caltech organizations

• Extensive IRB deliberations and discussion

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November 4, 2022

Psyche IRB Schedule Summary

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Activity Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct.

Formulate IRB Charter 

and Membership

IRB Fact-Finding and 

Working Meetings

IRB Briefing to SMD 

and JPL Leadership

IRB Narrative Report 

Completion

Psyche Continuation/

Termination Review

ToR* Jul. 12

Jul. 19–21 Aug. 9–11

Aug. 16–18

Aug. 30–Sep. 1 Sep. 20–22

Oct. 13

Oct. 17–20

Oct. 25

July–October 2022

* Terms of Reference (ToR)
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November 4, 2022

Psyche IRB Membership

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• Allen Bacskay, Ex-Officio, NASA Retired, Psyche 

SRB Chair

• Steven Battel, Battel Engineering, President

• Doug Bernard, JPL, Deputy Chief Engineer

• Antonio Elias, Orbital ATK, Retired

• Orlando Figueroa, NASA, Retired

• Robyn Haleski, JPL, MSR SRL Avionics and Flight 

Software Product Delivery Manager

• Fiona Harrison, Caltech, Chair, Division of 

Physics, Mathematics and Astronomy

• Tom Jedrey, JPL, Europa Clipper Deputy Flight 

System Manager

• Gentry Lee, JPL, Chief Engineer for Planetary 

Science Directorate

• Fuk Li, JPL, Retired

• David Mitchell, NASA HQ, Chief Program 

Management Officer

• Ellen Ochoa, NASA, Retired

• James O’Donnell, NASA GSFC, NESC GNC 

Technical Discipline Team

• Jessica Samuels, JPL, MSR CCRS JPL Flight 

Segment Manager

• Janet Vertesi, Princeton University, Associate 

Professor of Sociology

• A. Thomas Young (Chair), former NASA, 

Lockheed Martin Corp., Retired

Karen Gelmis, NASA HQ, Review Manager

Sam Thurman, JPL, Associate Review Manager

Joan Salute, NASA HQ, Observer

William Knopf, NASA HQ, Observer
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IRB Acknowledgments

The IRB greatly appreciates the extraordinary support and 

professionalism provided by NASA and JPL. All requests from 

the IRB were positively acted upon in a timely manner. The 

planning of meetings and establishment of meaningful agendas 

were exceptional.

The people with whom the IRB interacted were open, honest, 

forthcoming, and dedicated to mission success.

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November 4, 2022 8

Psyche

General Observations
More information about the Psyche mission is available on the mission website. 

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Overview

• Competitively awarded, cost-capped, Principal Investigator (PI)–led Discovery class mission:

• PI: Lindy Elkins-Tanton, Arizona State University

• Selected for implementation in 2017

• Mission total cost approximately $1B

• Scientific objective is to study the unique metal-rich Psyche asteroid.

• Project management is performed by JPL, as proposed to NASA by the PI.

• Program management is provided by the Planetary Mission Program Office at Marshall Space Flight 

Center for NASA’s Planetary Science Division.

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More information about the Psyche mission’s science objectives is available on the mission website.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Science Overview

• The Psyche mission plays a unique role in NASA’s planetary science program that cannot be 

replaced by any other planned mission.

• Psyche will investigate a previously unexplored type of solar system small body—the largest metal 

planetesimal—with fundamental goals:

• Understand a building block of planet formation.

• Explore the interior of a differentiated body to understand the interiors of terrestrial planets like 

Earth.

• Examine a world made not of rock or ice but of metal.

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While many factors lead to mission success and the Lab’s excellence, the IRB developed this list of 

key attributes that, in the Board’s opinion, have historically led to JPL’s successes.

November 4, 2022

IRB View of JPL Historical “Formula for 

Project Success”

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• Experienced project team with capabilities necessary for project success

• Motivated and committed project personnel, dedicated to engineering and scientific excellence

• Engaged JPL senior leadership with detailed knowledge of project status and issues

• Engaged Line management providing both independent technical assessment and the assignment 

of properly experienced personnel

• Informal safety net provided by highly integrated and committed JPL workforce
While the IRB found the project team to be exceptionally hardworking and dedicated to Psyche’s 

success, the Board noted that the Laboratory fell short on the rest of these key practices. The IRB has 

noted in its findings that some of these issues were exacerbated by external events such as the 

COVID-19 pandemic.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Scorecard Up to Launch Delay

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• Experienced project team with capabilities necessary for project success............................................ X

• Motivated and committed project personnel, dedicated to engineering and scientific excellence............... P

• Engaged JPL senior leadership with detailed knowledge of project status and issues............................ X

• Engaged Line management providing both independent technical assessment and the assignment 

of properly experienced personnel.............................................................................................. X

• Informal safety net provided by highly integrated and committed JPL workforce.................................... X
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November 4, 2022 13

Psyche

Findings and Recommendations
The final GNC FSW build was delivered to the testbed in early 2022, approximately eight months late. 

This build had all of the necessary GNC algorithms, though there were hundreds of GNC control 

parameters and fault protection behaviors not yet determined. In addition, the integration of the Maxar 

bus simulation with the JPL testbeds was insufficiently robust to execute many of the GNC tests.

After the project added experienced GNC subject-matter experts to assess and resolve the problems, 

the subject-matter experts quickly raised concerns about the ability to make either the primary or 

contingency launch window due to GNC and verification and validation (V&V) problems. JPL 

commissioned an Institutional Tiger Team, and the project and Tiger Team personnel worked 

intensely, exploring all issues and identifying required tasks to make a 2022 launch opportunity with 

acceptable risk. Ultimately, with Tiger Team concurrence, JPL management and the Psyche Project 

made the formal recommendation to the SMD Planetary Science Division to stand down on the 2022 

launch opportunity.

During the push to prepare for a 2022 launch, it became clear that although the GNC FSW and its 

V&V were the most apparent problems, there were other serious issues that would have led to the 

launch delay. These issues included a large number of open FSW issues, incomplete definition of fault 

protection behaviors, incomplete V&V, and insufficient plans and preparation for mission operations.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• IRB agrees that late Guidance, Navigation, and Control software delivery and lack of testbed 

maturity are the proximate causes of the Psyche launch delay.

• IRB assessment is that additional issues could have led to a launch delay on their own: 

• Open flight software issues

• Incomplete verification and validation (V&V), including fault protection

• Operational readiness

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General
It is vital for the Psyche Project to make an objective assessment of all remaining development, 

testing, and mission operation planning activities, with all of these activities prioritized and completed. 

A detailed plan to complete all remaining activities necessary before launch and a thorough Integrated 

Master Schedule with realistic, credible task durations must be established. This will allow the project 

to select a new launch date with sufficient margin that will ensure a high probability of success.

During the effort to make the 2022 launch date, there were a number of problem closures that were 

given a “use-as-is” disposition. In addition, there were unverified failures (i.e., a failure that could not 

be duplicated). The project must conduct a detailed review and assessment of all issues that were 

accepted as “use as is” or unverified failures to ensure they do not result in unacceptable residual risk.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• Develop plan forward that prioritizes and completes development activities.

• Establish a new launch date with sufficient margin to have high confidence in success.

• Review work performed in last several months before the launch delay to assure it is at the required 

level of excellence with no embedded problems.

• Conduct a detailed review and assessment of “use-as-is” problem dispositions and “unverified 

failures.”

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General
The purpose of these work-to-go slides is to provide an illustrative (though inexhaustive) list of the 

technical work that needs to be performed in order to get Psyche ready for launch. As shown, while 

there is a significant amount of GNC work, there is also a large amount of work in other areas, 

including addressing FSW issues, V&V, fault protection, and mission operations.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Technical Work-to-Go for Launch (1/3)

• Problem/Failure Report (PFR) and Developmental PFR Closures:

• Revisit prior “use-as-is” PFR closures

• Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC):

• Multiple GNC scenario tests on system testbeds: nominal and off-nominal behaviors

• Support for multiple Operations Readiness Tests (ORTs), Scenario-Derived Tests, and Mission 

Scenario Tests 

• Ops procedure development (launch, initial checkout, cruise)

• GNC operations tool development

• GNC V&V for launch, cruise ops

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Technical Work-to-Go for Launch (2/3)

• Flight Software (FSW) Completion:

• Multiple FSW loads to be developed, as needed, to respond to PFR closures and regression 

tests

• Flight System V&V:

• Complete system testbed certification

• FSW V&V on testbeds, some selected testing on the spacecraft

• Complete burn-down of approximately 1,000 remaining requirements (encompassing system 

and all subsystems, including GNC and fault protection)

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The project identified possible hardware modifications that might be needed on either the Power 

Conditioning Unit or the Psyche Compute Element. If these are needed, the project needs to plan and 

execute the modifications to minimize the risk to both the hardware and schedule.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Technical Work-to-Go for Launch (3/3)

• Completion of Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations (ATLO)

• Remaining functional and system-level testing, launch vehicle encapsulation, and launch 

operations

• Mission System (Mission Ops/Ground Data System + Mission Design/Navigation) Completion and 

Operational Readiness

• Develop ground tools

• Complete flight rules, ops team training, various products and tools

• Develop GNC momentum management strategy and operations tools

• Complete confirmation of all days in selected launch period; establish Launch Readiness Date (LRD)

• Trajectory development, ORT, and other planning

• Sequencing and link management, initial spacecraft checkout, and cruise phase testing

• Potential Hardware Modifications

• Modifications to the Power Conditioning Unit and portions of the Psyche Compute Element; any 

mods planned for spring of 2023

• Complete Prelaunch Reviews (ORR, SMSR, KDP-E, FRR, LRR)

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The PI and Project Manager both endeavored to set the tone for a strong project culture with positive 

communication. However, limited staffing and lack of experienced personnel in key flight systems 

areas—particularly V&V, GNC, software, and fault protection—combined to create significant 

communications issues. 

The IRB observed deficiencies in both formal and informal channels of communication, and multiple 

failures to act decisively upon the information shared. A combination of factors including continued 

problems with staffing, budget pressure, and remote work caused by COVID-19, created an 

environment where working-level personnel were challenged to prove that a problem existed before 

schedule and/or budget relief was provided or to change baseline plans. Team members experienced 

the normalization of deviance with respect to understaffing, high stress, inadequate scheduling, and 

pushback against worker intuition. 

In this context, several of the workers raised issues and concerns to their project and Line managers, 

and felt their inputs were dismissed with little or no visible action taken. Line managers and Line chief 

engineers reported feeling they lacked the authority to solve these problems and therefore did not 

take any additional action. Concerns were also not elevated explicitly through the ITA to the 

appropriate levels to address with the project. 

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• Major communication failures on Psyche resulted in project management not recognizing the 

seriousness of issues until too late to resolve them in time for a 2022 launch.

• Psyche team members raised alarms but felt their concerns were not being heard and/or acted upon 

at multiple levels of management.

• No formal Independent Technical Authority (ITA) dissents were raised on Psyche. 

• A culture of “prove there is a problem” led to important issues raised by team members being 

disregarded.

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Management and Communications
The changes and transition in leadership in JPL’s Planetary Science Directorate (4X), coupled with the 

level of work and demands from high-visibility planetary missions (e.g., Europa Clipper, Mars Sample 

Return [MSR]) created an environment in which missions such as Psyche did not receive the attention 

necessary to deal with the staffing and experienced-personnel challenges they were facing.

Multiple layers of management, including senior management, did not make appropriate use of 

common indicators to penetrate and understand actual project status. Examples include timeliness of 

the testbeds, timeliness of closed-loop simulations, operational readiness, an integrated view of the 

software and hardware products being delivered to testbeds and/or the ATLO environment, and the 

increasing number of open Developmental PFRs and PFRs against flight articles. 

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Findings, cont’d

• Senior management changes in JPL’s Planetary Science Directorate, including three leadership 

changes and a reorganization within the last two years, had an adverse effect on Psyche.

• Senior and Line management did not recognize Psyche development problems in time to take 

corrective action to prevent the launch delay.

• Senior management did not penetrate project execution sufficiently to recognize seriousness of the 

development issues.

• High demands on management’s time to continually balance staffing requirements contributed to the 

launch delay.

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Management and Communications
Going forward, the role of the Line management function in elevating concerns, both technical and 

programmatic in nature, needs to be emphasized and strengthened. The reporting mechanisms and 

metrics also need to be strengthened to properly reflect status, risks, and issues. In addition, the 

workforce should be reminded that the ITA can and should be used to elevate unresolved issues of 

any nature, including programmatic.

The fresh perspective offered by external, expert oversight can combat the normalization of deviance 

and address issues of risk to flight-project execution. Projects must seek opportunities to bring in such 

experts, even if on a brief rotation, and incorporate their viewpoint in the resolution of problems and 

risks. 

Projects are also “imprinted” by their initial environmental, leadership, managerial, and resource 

conditions. Unless expressly addressed, these continue to resonate in project culture and organization 

long after such conditions have changed. The inadequate staffing and oversight that imprinted 

Psyche’s culture in this critical domain must be addressed with new processes, a fresh infusion of 

expert personnel, and renewed attention from managers and Lab leadership. 

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• Establish and implement processes to assure open, credible, and responsive communications both 

vertically and horizontally throughout the Psyche Project.

• The JPL Director, senior management, and Line management must establish and implement 

processes that assure significant insight into flight-project execution and participation in resolution of 

problems and risks.

• The role of the Line management function in elevating concerns needs to be emphasized and 

strengthened.

• The workforce should be trained that the ITA should be used for elevating unresolved issues of any 

nature, including programmatic.

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Management and Communications
Given the number of projects at JPL that required experienced personnel, the Lab was not able to 

staff the Psyche Project with either the number of personnel needed or individuals with the proper 

experience levels. Some (both management and technical) positions were staffed with inexperienced 

people. In some cases, individuals were experienced in roles different from those they were asked to 

fulfill on Psyche. While a few such “stretch assignments” can be positive, on Psyche there were too 

many stretch assignments, and there was inadequate mentoring from either coworkers or the Line.

The number of individuals on the project in key areas such as flight system engineering and GNC was 

inadequate and remained less than that required to keep on schedule for long stretches of time. This 

contributed to worker burnout. 

A Project Chief Engineer is a senior technical person on the project whose job is to detect and fix 

project-wide technical problems as they arise. The Psyche Project did not have a person filling this 

role. 

A GNC CogE takes intellectual charge of the end-to-end technical performance of the subsystem, 

including all interfaces with other subsystems, and assures that the ATLO and testbed testing will be 

adequate to validate that the subsystem (in the system) will perform as required in space. The GNC 

CogE position is one that needs to continue throughout launch and commissioning—and this person 

makes sure that the ops team is adequately trained on the subsystem. The Psyche Project did not 

have a person filling this role.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• Multiple staffing issues resulted from JPL having more project work than can be supported by the 

available workforce:

• Inexperienced managers and technical personnel in multiple project positions

• Worker burnout

• Inadequate staffing

• Excessive number in stretch assignments

• Lack of mentoring

• High turnover

• Key project positions were not staffed:

• Lack of a Project Chief Engineer

• Lack of a GNC Cognizant Engineer (CogE) contributed to late GNC subsystem technical 

definition, development, and testing

22

Staffing
The areas on Psyche that need attention are significant enough that the Psyche IRB recommends 

that additional experienced leaders be brought on to the project beyond the leaders in place when the 

slip was announced. In the IRB’s opinion, 10–12 such leaders are needed.

The project requires staff augmentation—particularly in GNC. The IRB recommends that JPL find the 

additional staff required to allow the replan to succeed. Key positions that the project must assure are 

staffed (and maintained) with capable people are Project Chief Engineer, GNC CogE, and Fault 

Protection Lead Engineer.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

23

Staffing

Recommendations

• Provide additional 10–12 full-time, experienced leaders at all levels of the project.

• Adequately supplement and maintain project staffing to support the replan.

• Special attention should be given to assigning/maintaining a Project Chief Engineer, GNC CogE, 

and Fault Protection Lead Engineer.
COVID-19 did not cause all the problems on Psyche, but it played a contributing role. Existing 

problems with staffing were heightened by significant turnover in key areas at JPL. Remote work 

conditions exacerbated the isolation of various teams, impeding team integration. The inability of the 

right group of people to be together in the testbed environment delayed uncovering problems and 

inhibited the ability to learn the spacecraft system. The Psyche Critical Design Review (CDR) also 

took place during the first weeks of lockdown in spring of 2020, impeding the Standing Review 

Board’s (SRB’s) ability to pick up on situational cues and accurately gauge project progress.

Important for these COVID-19–related findings was the lack of informal communication that the 

project team suffered in the absence of face-to-face interactions. In the past, JPL’s success typically 

relied on senior members of projects and technical line organizations “walking the floor,” dropping in 

for conversations at office doorways, or chatting in the cafeteria. Without these informal 

communication mechanisms, contextual cues and situational awareness were lost. Team members 

working the floor found it difficult to report problems up the chain over Webex, especially when 

attendees kept their cameras off. 

Research has found that the kind of team isolation and difficulties in team consolidation experienced 

on Psyche were common to other organizations during the lockdown period of the COVID-19 

pandemic. The lockdown conditions contributed significantly to the question of why Psyche and JPL 

leadership did not know of the severity of the problems with GNC and V&V until it was too late to 

correct course. As an example, it is notable that team members exchanged valuable project 

information at the Christmas party in 2021, the first time team members had been face-to-face in over 

a year and a half.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

24

COVID-19 Related

Findings

• COVID-19 is a contributing factor to the issues that led to a launch delay and the lack of visibility of 

these issues within JPL.

• Resulting remote work substantially reduced informal communications:

• “Walking the floor” and “drop-in discussions” did not happen.

• Various teams within Psyche became more isolated.

• Remote and hybrid work arrangements persist and pose a high risk to remaining Psyche Project 

development.
Informal communication is an important safety net for any project. In-person interactions that allow for 

informal communication produce multiple mechanisms and avenues for reporting and conveying 

important contextual information. Going forward, the Psyche leadership must take advantage of the inperson opportunities on Lab to “walk the floor” and engage with workers at all levels of the 

organization. Informal activities such as lunch gatherings and social events can support the transfer of 

key contextual information. Such opportunities should be proactively pursued to encourage 

information flow and exchange among project personnel.

Prior studies of hybrid and remote work arrangements indicate that trust can fray in remote settings, 

and working apart discourages integrative activities. Going forward, Psyche team members must 

reestablish trust and communication pathways, and conduct highly time-intensive, integrative work as 

a team. The IRB recommends that, given these exceptional circumstances, the team should minimize 

remote work conditions. 

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

25

COVID-19 Related

Recommendations

• Reestablish informal communications, such as “walking the floor” and “drop-in discussions.”

• Remote and hybrid work must be minimized on Psyche to give the team the best opportunity to 

coalesce in a short time.
On Psyche, the schedules and metrics were insufficient for project managers to identify and assess 

problems. Key Psyche non-hardware developments, in particular the GNC software, the testbed 

implementations, and the overall V&V effort, were never properly represented in either the Integrated 

Master Schedule or the progress metrics.

The specific schedules and metrics developed by the Psyche Project team for these non-hardware 

areas were often too general and/or unrealistically optimistic, and hence masked the true technical 

risks and schedule inadequacies. As a result, by the time the true statuses of the Psyche nonhardware issues were identified and understood, it was too late to mitigate the problems to achieve a 

launch in 2022 with acceptable risk.

26

November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

26

Project Metrics

Findings

• Lack of meaningful progress metrics and risk assessment hindered visibility into, and the ability to 

highlight and elevate, issues.

• Inadequate and unrealistic Integrated Master Schedule minimized the value of traditional 

“actuals vs. plan” metrics to assess progress.

• Risk assessments did not accurately communicate project health (i.e., many yellow risks, no red 

risks). Based on interviews, there was an aversion to “going red” by project management.

• Project schedule and progress-tracking metrics masked true development status.

• Project focused on hardware development and problem resolution, and neglected software and 

other non-hardware areas of activity.
A general problem with JPL schedule-management methods in the non-hardware areas becomes 

particularly problematic leading up to launch. Psyche and JPL must recognize this inadequacy and 

develop a solid, internal project schedule approach for these areas, with proper details and progress 

metrics, to make certain that all key elements necessary for launch are being properly tracked and 

that untoward items are identified quickly and mitigated on a timely basis.

Specifically, resource loading on the Psyche go-forward plan must recognize that some of the same 

people involved in completing GNC development and V&V work are also involved in development of 

the GNC operations tools. In addition, the schedule for V&V must go beyond a level-of-effort approach 

and include milestones that can be tracked so that the actual progress is evident.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

27

Project Metrics

Recommendations

• Develop a detailed, integrated, resource-loaded, and adequately margined and verified schedule for 

all remaining work.

• This must include sufficient task completion milestones in key areas like V&V, system 

integration and test (I&T), and mission ops preparations, such that progress in these areas can 

be readily tracked.

• Establish and implement a management information and reporting system that produces a credible 

and timely assessment of status, risks, and issues against this integrated baseline (described 

above).
The ToR document established by NASA to provide the high-level requirements levied on the Psyche 

IRB had a specific reference to the effectiveness of the SRB within the Psyche review process.

NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 7120.5 documents the requirements and process for how 

SRBs are infused into the overall project life-cycle review structure. SRBs are formed early in the 

project life cycle and are responsible for conducting the major project life-cycle reviews in accordance 

with NPRs 7120.5 and 7123.1. SRBs are populated with subject-matter experts who are independent 

of the project. The SRB is responsible for providing an independent assessment of the project’s 

readiness to proceed coming out of the life-cycle reviews. The SRB presents its assessment to the 

project, responsible institutional management, and NASA management.

The Psyche SRB reviewed the project at PDR (March 2019), CDR (May 2020), and SIR (December 

2020). Psyche schedule performance was cited as the largest risk coming out of the CDR and SIR. 

The SRB noted at SIR that schedule was the single most significant issue moving forward and had to 

be managed going forward to ensure the LRD. The long duration after the SIR precluded the SRB 

from following up on the schedule issue.

The project and JPL acknowledged the schedule issue; however, it was not clear to the Psyche IRB 

how the path forward to resolution was implemented or validated by NASA. 

28

November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

28

SRB Review Process

Findings

• Psyche Standing Review Board (SRB) reports for the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical 

Design Review (CDR), and System Integration Review (SIR) identified schedule performance as a 

risk to the LRD.

• Psyche agreed that schedule was an issue, noting that they had appropriately mitigated the 

identified concerns. The project’s position was accepted by all authorities, including the Psyche 

SRB, JPL, Program Office, and NASA HQ management.

• This SRB activity was consistent with the overall NASA/JPL review process for Psyche. The net 

result was that this concern by the SRB was not adequately mitigated in the go-forward plans for 

Psyche—an issue that was exacerbated by the excessive duration between SRB reviews post-SIR.
The Psyche problem exposed challenges inherent in the current SRB process. Technical status and 

programmatic updates between the current gate reviews will allow the SRB to achieve deeper insight 

into project technical and programmatic status.

The IRB recommends that NASA consider changes to the overall SRB process of how independent 

reviews are formed and conducted, with the goal of improving both rigor and depth of insight achieved 

through every step of the review, evaluation, and reporting process. Changes should be considered 

for providing definitive guidance on color-coded status reporting. Great care must be exercised in the 

color-coded (i.e., green, yellow, red) assessments to properly and consistently reflect the status. For 

example, red scores should never be aggregated with green and yellow to obscure the severity of a 

red score. 

While projects present plans to close issues, a closed-loop process needs to be put in place to ensure 

implementation.

29

November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

29

SRB Review Process

Recommendations

• The SRB process must be strengthened such that there is discrimination between “normal” activities 

and serious issues that will highlight critical factors impacting a project’s success.

• Guidelines given to projects for status reporting should be clear and unambiguous (e.g., for “green,” 

“yellow,” and “red” color-coding).

• The response to the SRB-reported issues and concerns must be thoroughly reviewed by the SRB, 

Management Center, and NASA authorities on a regular basis until satisfactory resolution is 

achieved.
Maxar is an experienced contractor with a proven and cost-effective product line specific to its core 

geosynchronous satellite business. Thus, when considering cost, schedule, and performance, there is 

a natural alignment of Maxar’s capabilities with a broad range of NASA interests, including Psyche. As 

would be expected, the business focus of Maxar and the mission focus of JPL for Psyche has resulted 

in some unique stresses on both the management side and technical side of the many interfaces 

required to achieve a successful mission.

The JPL and Maxar teams invested considerable time, energy, and effort in building their relationship, 

resulting in exemplary collaboration in many areas. However, there were differences in the definition 

and capabilities of testbeds and simulations that were uncovered late in the collaboration. Maxar also 

did not have the detailed knowledge of their heritage design that JPL expected. This significantly 

delayed V&V activities and contributed to the launch delay.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

30

JPL/Maxar Relationship

Findings

• Maxar supplied the spacecraft chassis for Psyche, including the structure, power, and electric 

propulsion subsystems, under a fixed-price contract; Maxar also provided simulation software, 

testbed equipment, and personnel for a joint ATLO campaign.

• Maxar has built and developed multiple spacecraft using electric propulsion for Earth orbital 

applications but no deep space applications prior to Psyche.

• JPL teamed with Maxar early during proposal development and continued a strong working 

relationship throughout the design phase, aided by frequent and extended face-to-face interactions 

between the two teams.

• The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the planned team-to-team immersion of ATLO personnel, 

scheduled to happen before the joint ATLO, and as a result, the early stages were inefficient and 

hindered the melding of culture, procedures, and expectations.

• Misunderstandings between the two partners about the details of the joint testbed simulations 

significantly delayed the V&V activities and contributed to the launch delay.
Use of an Earth-orbiter supplier—primarily commercial telecom and remote sensing—for NASA/JPL 

applications has clearly shown that there are significant differences in the developmental philosophies 

of the two types of organizations. One organization may be developing a one-of-a-kind spacecraft and 

mission nominally for deep space, while the other is focused on standard design and operations in 

Earth orbit. These are significant differences in business models that must be accounted for in the 

development process. For the contract vehicle, the ramifications for this type of development should 

be thoroughly evaluated.

Proper evaluation of supplier capabilities and comparison to the capabilities needed for the mission 

are mandatory for a teaming relationship like this. Critical capabilities assumed by the project (e.g., 

closed-loop simulation on the actual spacecraft and the Maxar simulation capabilities) may not be 

available and must be identified early to avoid issues.

Extensive team interactions on a continuing basis are also required to help maintain mutual 

understandings between the organizations and to ensure that cultural and process differences are 

identified and resolved, regardless of external factors like COVID-19. Residence of project personnel 

at the commercial vendor’s site is highly recommended.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

31

JPL/Maxar Relationship

Recommendations

• The Psyche experience provides an excellent opportunity to document best practices for future 

collaborations between NASA and commercial spacecraft providers in areas such as:

• Early and sustained in-depth interactions to develop mutual understandings of cultural and 

process differences

• Ensuring interfaces between the two organizations are correct, complete, and adequately 

documented and reviewed by subject-matter experts

• Contract structure
See text on previous page.

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November 4, 2022

Psyche Findings and Recommendations

32

JPL/Maxar Relationship

Lessons Learned

• JPL and other NASA Centers can partner with commercial providers but only if there is early and 

sustained in-depth interaction between personnel to develop mutual understandings of cultural and 

process differences. Good detailed interface documents are required but do not replace the face-toface meetings to ensure interpretation of the interface documents is clear.

• Contract structure is an important element of any partnership between a NASA entity and a 

commercial provider. The differences between supplying hardware and software/simulations or 

level-of-effort support must be clearly understood at the outset. A fixed-price contract can only work 

if what is to be supplied is clearly understood at the detailed level by both partners.
33

November 4, 2022 33

Psyche

Summary and Conclusions
34

November 4, 2022

Psyche Project Summary and Conclusions

• Psyche is a project with significant scientific merit, which can greatly contribute to our knowledge of a unique class of 

metallic asteroids and add to our understanding of the solar system.

• The PI set a commendable tone of collaboration from the project’s outset and continues to prioritize relationship building 

with project team members at all levels.

• Psyche’s issues are much more extensive than originally understood when the launch was delayed. These include but are 

not limited to:

• Significant staffing shortages and insufficient personnel with relevant experience

• Communications issues

• Hybrid work schedules

• Software and system testbed development

• V&V, including fault protection system

• Operational readiness

• Shortcomings in programmatic metrics

• Psyche issues require significant corrective action, including the addition of new, experienced personnel at all levels of the 

organization.

• Many Psyche issues are the direct result of JPL institutional issues.

• COVID-19 was a contributing factor in the various Psyche issues.

• The IRB has reviewed the go-forward plan and believes JPL has established an executable plan for a 2023 launch.

34
35

November 4, 2022 35

JPL Institution

General Observations
36

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution – General Observation

Many Psyche issues are not unique to Psyche and are indicative of broader institutional 

issues.

36
37

November 4, 2022 37

JPL Institution

Findings and Recommendations
JPL is unable to staff its flight projects with the requisite number of experienced personnel. The total 

number of personnel is also an issue. JPL’s current development flight project workload is the 

broadest and most demanding in the history of the Laboratory.

In addition to two Flagship planetary science missions (Europa Clipper and MSR), major flight projects 

currently in development include two planetary Discovery missions (Psyche and Venus Emissivity, 

Radio science, InSAR, Topography, and Spectroscopy [VERITAS]) and two missions for which JPL is 

providing large and complicated radar instruments (Surface Water and Ocean Topography [SWOT] 

and NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar [NISAR]), along with the necessary system engineering for 

the instruments. JPL has many other flight projects underway, including Spectro-Photometer for the 

History of the Universe, Epoch of Reionization and Ices Explorer (SPHEREx) and the upcoming radar 

instrument for EnVision.

All these flight projects require experienced personnel. Staffing challenges exist in key areas like 

GNC, FSW, avionics, and systems engineering.

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• JPL currently has an unprecedented workload with the concurrent implementation of 6 large 

spaceflight projects, plus numerous smaller missions and scientific instruments:

• Two projects are Flagship class (Europa Clipper, Mars Sample Return).

• Two projects are Discovery class (Psyche, VERITAS).

• Two projects have significant payload development efforts (SWOT, NISAR).

• Large imbalance exists between workload and available JPL resources:

• Most acute in lack of experienced managers; systems engineers; and GNC, FSW, and Avionics 

engineers

• Imbalance represents a root cause for the Psyche issues

• Adversely affects all flight project activity at JPL

38

Flight Project Workload
JPL workforce issues must be addressed, or there will be more launch delays and possibly mission 

failures. It is urgent that workforce balance be achieved in the near future to minimize negative 

impacts to future flight missions.

The IRB recommends that a major, focused effort be undertaken at JPL to achieve the required 

workforce balance on its flight projects. The IRB believes that this balance can be achieved by 

strategically selecting from the options noted on the next page. 

Because of the urgency of this issue, the IRB recommends that as many corrective actions as 

possible be in place by the end of March 2023 and that plans for additional corrective action be 

reported at the same time. The corrective actions to achieve workforce balance should be developed 

by JPL and approved by NASA and the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).

39

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• Flight projects must be fully staffed with appropriately experienced personnel from the beginning, 

particularly in Systems Engineering, GNC, FSW, and Avionics.

• Balance must be achieved between the workforce needs of flight projects and the available JPL 

workforce.

• Timing of achieving this balance is critical.

• Psyche is an example of the major problems this imbalance is causing today.

• IRB believes that by the end of March 2023, significant corrective actions must be implemented to 

achieve balance.

• For any corrective actions requiring more time, a detailed plan of action must be developed and 

approved by JPL, Caltech, and NASA.

39

Flight Project Workload
See text on previous page.

40

November 4, 2022

Options to Achieve Workforce Balance within JPL

• No new flight projects until balance is achieved

• Cancel, redirect, or delay a flight project

• Transfer required talent from non-flight projects within JPL to flight projects

• Focused personnel training and development in key areas

• Significantly increase use of industry prime and support services contractors

• Increase use of and collaboration with other NASA Centers

• Aggressive recruitment and hiring

• Accept the risk of layoffs

40
In the Line organization, there has been significant erosion in recent years of the technical ability to 

exercise good judgment and make sound decisions in various technical domains across all current 

projects. 

The source of this erosion is due to multiple factors: Foremost is the significant increase in the number 

of flight development activities (instruments and full missions) that JPL supports; this has required the 

experienced cadre to be spread thin on the various projects and has had a corresponding effect on 

the Line organization—that is, the transfer of Line leaders to projects. The spectrum of large and small 

projects has exacerbated this problem. Additionally, the rise of the commercial space industry in 

recent years has resulted in competition for experienced personnel, particularly in the systems 

engineering, GNC, and FSW areas. Finally, the IRB observed that in the systems engineering 

discipline, the employee-to-supervisor ratio has become high, resulting in difficulty in effective training, 

development, and personnel management.

This erosion of the experience base of the Line organization has led to the degradation of a critical 

and independent safety net for flight projects. It is important that this be addressed so that the Psyche 

issues do not become the norm.

41

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• Significant erosion of technical acumen in the Line organization:

• Prevents Line organization from adequately engaging with flight projects, independently 

assessing status, identifying problems, working with projects to develop solutions, and providing 

mentorship.

• Represents loss of critical safety net.

• Technical leadership has migrated from the Line organization to the flight projects.

• Without this Line organization capability/safety net, Psyche issues will become the norm and 

not the exception.

• The IRB recognizes the institutional need for more experienced managers and lead engineers 

is a primary cause of this erosion.

41

Line Organization Issues
Modern space exploration systems are complex with highly integrated functions. These systems 

demand strong system engineering and highly capable avionics systems with associated FSW. With 

the magnitude of these demands across multiple flight projects at JPL, these activities have been 

allocated to two technical divisions: the Systems Engineering Division (Division 31) and the 

Autonomous Systems Division (Division 34). The avionics activities, including GNC system and FSW, 

are performed by Division 34.

The activities between the two divisions, however, are highly interdependent, requiring strong 

collaboration, shared accountability, and clear definition of roles and responsibilities. Examples of 

interactions include development of requirements on avionics systems, capabilities for FSW, and the 

system V&V activities. Insufficient delineation of roles and responsibilities and the shift to hybrid work 

have increased ambiguity and confusion across the two divisions. These long-standing issues are not 

unique to Psyche and are likely affecting other missions.

These two divisions are critically understaffed, and there is an acute shortage of personnel with 

relevant flight project experience across JPL in the key disciplines of these two divisions. 

42

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings, cont’d

• Division 31 (Systems Engineering) and Division 34 (Autonomous Systems*) issues:

• Modern space systems are complex, highly integrated, and rapidly evolving, especially in the 

domains of these two divisions.

• The magnitude of responsibility in these technical areas has necessitated the partitioning of 

their work into two divisions.

• Ambiguity and confusion exists between the two divisions in terms of roles and responsibilities 

and accountabilities.

• The hybrid work environment has exacerbated these issues.

• Both are critically understaffed, especially in terms of engineers with flight project experience.

42

Line Organization Issues

* Division 34 includes the Avionics, FSW, GNC, and Robotics product areas for JPL.
The technical Line organizations must be strengthened to reestablish them as equal partners with 

flight projects. The Line organizations’ role in proper oversight of the technical activities provides a 

safety net to ensure the quality of the technical products for mission success.

It is, therefore, critical to add more experienced personnel to various technical line areas. These 

added personnel will further address any required development in the personnel in their respective 

areas.

The long-standing issues of the roles and responsibilities of Divisions 31 and 34 must be addressed 

promptly with clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and shared accountability. The Divisions 

should also examine and implement approaches to maximize collaboration among teams. As flight 

system technical design and project development practices evolve, these issues should be examined 

on a continual basis.

43

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• Repopulate the Line organization with experienced leaders and engineers to reestablish the Line 

organization as an equal partner with flight projects during implementation.

• Add experienced people and include them in the effort to achieve balance.

• Address the Division 31/34 staffing, accountability, and coordination issues.

• Continually examine the issues between and within Divisions 31 and 34 because of the importance 

of these Divisions to the execution of flight projects.

43

Line Organization Issues
The flight project reviews by senior management generally focused on the status as provided by the 

projects. The independent set of questions, templates, and progress indicators that the projects were 

required to address were inadequate to penetrate and uncover potential issues. Thus, as an example, 

when the Psyche Project focused on hardware issues, so did JPL management. JPL management 

failed to question the project on the status on software, testbeds, and V&V progress, which should 

have been done on a regular basis. The result was an inadequate understanding of Psyche status, 

illustrating that the management review process and tracking metrics weren’t satisfactory. In addition, 

the templates failed to adapt appropriately to the phase of the project. In later project phases, for 

example, operations, software, and V&V require extra attention.

A significant challenge for JPL leadership is that members of senior management have an enormous 

workload associated with both major flight projects and a myriad of smaller projects and instrument 

developments. Trying to stay up to speed on all of these, combined with failure to prioritize time 

proportionately to the project scale, leads to a lack of an appropriate level of engagement in the major 

flight projects.

44

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• JPL senior management did not adequately penetrate Psyche Project status.

• The large number of small projects, instrument developments, etc., dilutes JPL senior 

management’s attention, contributing to a lack of appropriate levels of engagement in the execution 

of major flight projects.

• JPL’s management review process and tracking metrics during the critical prelaunch period are 

inadequate.

44

Senior Management Engagement
Senior management, including the JPL Director, is accountable for the success of JPL’s flight projects. 

To maintain cognizance of the actual status of flight projects, senior management, including the JPL 

Director, must establish regular meetings, formal and informal communications, and “drop-in” visits to 

facilitate necessary engagement as well as communicate priorities.

Given the large number of activities that JPL is currently engaged in, senior management’s attention 

must be prioritized to focus on the major flight projects in order to meet commitments to NASA and 

other stakeholders. As noted elsewhere, by addressing the workforce issues aggressively, less time 

from senior management will be needed to move around key personnel.

Given that multiple levels of independent reporting paths failed to uncover the issues that led to the 

Psyche delay, JPL must review all independent lines of reporting from project personnel to senior Lab 

leadership, including ITAs, to strengthen communications and penetration of issues.

It is imperative that senior management develop and codify in JPL’s Flight Project Practices the 

metrics that will be employed for tracking progress, particularly leading to the critical prelaunch period. 

45

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• JPL senior management must establish regularly scheduled meetings, formal and informal 

communications, and “drop-in” visits to facilitate necessary engagement on major flight projects, 

communicate priority, and maintain cognizance of status.

• Prioritize the large number of activities competing for senior management’s attention to focus on 

those in greatest need and importance such that commitments to NASA and the various 

stakeholders are met.

• Senior management should develop and codify in JPL’s Flight Project Practices the metrics that will 

be employed for tracking progress, especially during system I&T and V&V.

45

Senior Management Engagement
46

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and 

Recommendations

• Hiring and Retention

• Remote and Hybrid Work

46

Workforce Issues
The explosion of commercial space activity is well documented and has occurred at a time when the 

engineering educational and training pipeline cannot expand fast enough to keep up with demand 

across the entire national space enterprise. In addition, many social media companies recruit and hire 

individuals from the same available pool of engineers. Commercial companies are offering 

substantially higher salaries and promise rapid advancement for top graduates while, in parallel, 

“poaching” experienced engineers from JPL and other NASA Centers.

Because JPL’s engineers gain unique experience and the ability to build complex robotic capabilities 

for space, they are even more attractive to companies that aspire to enter this domain. These 

companies enjoy physical proximity to JPL, easing the engineers’ decision to leave. Loss of expertise 

due to attrition, poaching, or other reasons is hard to replace without several years of training and 

mentoring.

The problem for JPL is especially acute in the GNC, FSW, robotics, avionics, and systems engineering 

areas, not only because of external competitive demands but also because all of JPL’s missions have 

parallel high internal demands for these critical disciplines. Thus, there is a perfect storm, with outside 

competitive pressures and inside demand pressures affecting the availability of these critical 

resources. These pressures also limit mentoring and training opportunities needed for less 

experienced staff and recent hires.

47

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• JPL is experiencing difficulty attracting and retaining necessary experienced workforce, especially in 

critical areas such as Systems Engineering, GNC, FSW, and Avionics.

• Local competition and aggressive hiring from commercial space firms and start-up firms have 

changed the position of JPL and its competitiveness in hiring, including compensation and remote 

work options.

• Incoming workforce has different expectations about career opportunities and mobility.

47

Hiring and Retention
To be successful in this highly competitive environment, JPL needs to offer timely, competitive salary 

and opportunity packages. Having an effective counter capability is critical for retaining expert staff.

As part of an effective retention strategy, JPL should address mentorship and stages of career 

advancement for Lab personnel.

48

November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• JPL must develop the capability to successfully hire and retain mid-level people in this new 

environment.

• JPL must develop approaches for the career growth and retention of critical and high-potential 

personnel.

• JPL must characterize problems with retention and develop incisive and decisive actions to address 

the identified problems.

48

Hiring and Retention
The current JPL policy for hybrid work has high heritage in the COVID-19 remote work period; 

however, hybrid work as performed under COVID-19 exacerbated well-known problems with 

distributed teams, as characterized in over 30 years of literature and study. This includes the 

escalation and personalization of task conflict, the exacerbation of team silos, and the poor 

performance of integrative tasks. Recent studies of the COVID-19 lockdown period indicated 

heightened barriers and the loss of innovative ties between groups. The Psyche case showed 

persistent miscommunications in attempts to report problems up the chain. Under hybrid work 

conditions, information asymmetry can accrue between in-person and remote participants.

Typically, these issues are remediated with appropriate degrees and judicious choices of in-person 

interaction, often around shared hardware, software, or other tasks. Without careful consideration 

about how, when, and under which conditions teammates come together, JPL cannot hope to 

leverage the strengths of both styles—in person and remote—to the benefit of missions. Additionally, 

information is lacking about the true impacts of hybrid or remote work. Because the COVID-19 

lockdown was such a dysfunctional situation, data from that period cannot be reliably interpreted to 

generate effective cost or schedule models.

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• The current JPL policy for remote and hybrid work will have an adverse impact on flight projects.

• Remote/hybrid work heightens barriers between sub-teams, which impedes communication and 

integration.

• Without appropriate in-person interaction, remote/hybrid work can increase miscommunications 

and create reporting problems up the chain.

• Physical access to shared resources, i.e., testbeds, helps build team rapport and familiarity with 

the spacecraft.

• At present, it is difficult to estimate the impact of remote/hybrid work on flight project schedule and 

budget planning.

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Hybrid Work Environment
Research indicates that remote work conditions are inefficient and more challenging when performing 

integrative tasks, communicating nuance and context, and exploring engineering and technical 

solutions. While there can be advantages to remote or hybrid work arrangements, collaborative 

teamwork is a fundamental aspect of implementing large-scale, multidisciplinary projects. Intensive inperson interaction is necessary to ensure timely and efficient delivery of flight projects.

The characteristics of the required work must match the advantages of remote, hybrid, or in-person 

arrangements. Design, assembly, hardware and software testing/verification, and initial operational 

periods of a flight project are critical moments where in-person collaboration is required. For areas or 

periods of time where hybrid work is appropriate, it is recommended that the project designate specific 

days of the week so that the workforce is on-site at the same time, as well as implement industryproven telework practices and promote research into best practices. JPL should augment hybrid or 

remote arrangements through periodic, intensive on-site activities to leverage the power of in-person 

work. 

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Recommendations

• JPL should immediately revisit its policy for hybrid work to make it more effective and better reflect 

the evolving needs of flight projects in different mission phases.

• Carefully consider which tasks, project phases, and circumstances permit hybrid and remote work 

arrangements.

• Any hybrid work arrangements should recognize the need for in-person interactions. In addition, it is 

critically important that early-career employees work alongside seasoned employees for their longterm development.

• Inefficiencies in productivity and communications associated with hybrid work must be included in 

the workforce, cost, and schedule plans for flight projects.

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Hybrid Work Environment
As the managing authority for the Prime Contract with NASA, Caltech has oversight responsibility that 

includes appointing the JPL Director and evaluating his/her performance on an annual basis. It is 

appropriate for Caltech, as part of their stewardship, to delegate leadership of JPL to a Director. 

As the managing authority, Caltech must have an in-depth understanding of the strategic needs and 

challenges of the Laboratory, as well as help the Laboratory identify strategic opportunities. Caltech 

must also maintain insight into the status and progress of JPL’s flight projects at a level that enables 

the Institute to help senior JPL leadership address issues and risks as they arise.

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Background

• To be a good steward of JPL, Caltech is responsible for:

• Appointing the JPL Director and evaluating his/her performance

• Developing an in-depth understanding and being proactive in addressing strategic challenges, 

risks, and opportunities for the Laboratory

• Maintaining insight into the status and progress of JPL’s flight projects

• Instituting corrective actions to address issues or deficiencies identified

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Caltech Governance
The IRB was provided a redacted sample of briefings given by JPL to the JPL Committee of the 

Caltech Board of Trustees. These briefings, as provided, are at an inadequate level for Caltech 

leadership to understand the challenges facing the Lab. Few briefings that address strategic 

challenges and risks were provided. Caltech should devise ways of improving the depth of insight into 

Lab-wide factors affecting flight project success.

Caltech should establish a more rigorous annual review process for the JPL Director. As is standard 

practice for NASA Center Directors, and generally for other individuals with similar executive and 

budgetary authority, this review should include input from direct reports. In addition, feedback from the 

NASA Associate Administrator for the SMD and others would enhance the effectiveness of the 

Director.

In the near term, to help JPL address its hiring and retention challenges, Caltech should help JPL to 

tailor hiring and compensation practices to meet the current needs of the Laboratory. Caltech should 

do what it can to support the JPL Director and leadership as the Lab navigates the current situation of 

its high workload.

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institution Findings and Recommendations

Findings

• There are deficiencies in Caltech’s awareness of flight project status and progress.

• Caltech hasn’t been sufficiently engaged in helping JPL address its workforce challenges.

Recommendations

• Caltech should have a better understanding of the JPL institutional issues and play a supporting role 

in addressing them.

• JPL should strengthen the quality of flight projects status presentations to Caltech.

• Caltech should develop a more rigorous annual review and evaluation approach for the performance 

of the Laboratory Director.

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Caltech Governance
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November 4, 2022 53

JPL Institution

Summary and Conclusions
The JPL institutional issues are serious and require urgent action. JPL, NASA, and Caltech must be 

engaged in the resolution of these issues.

While corrective actions will be challenging, successfully addressing these issues by March 2023 is 

critical. This will maintain JPL as a world-class space flight organization that is central to NASA and 

the U.S. space program. The IRB is optimistic that the necessary corrective actions will be 

implemented.

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November 4, 2022

JPL Institutional Summary and Conclusions

• JPL Institutional issues:

• Inadequate flight project staffing, in both number of personnel and experience

• Erosion of Line organization technical acumen

• Insufficient JPL senior management engagement in flight projects

• The post-pandemic work environment

• These issues are having a significant adverse impact on the implementation of JPL flight projects.

• Many of Psyche’s issues are a direct result of the JPL institutional issues.

• Corrective actions are urgently needed, and failure to act will result in more “Psyches” and 

potentially in-flight failures.

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November 4, 2022

Acronyms

ATLO Assembly, Test, and Launch 

Operations

ATK Alliant Techsystems

Caltech California Institute of Technology

CCRS Capture, Containment, and 

Return System

CDR Critical Design Review 

CogE Cognizant Engineer

FRR Flight Readiness Review

FSW Flight Software

GNC Guidance, Navigation, and 

Control

GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center

HQ Headquarters

I&T Integration and Test

IRB Independent Review Board

ITA Independent Technical Authority

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

KDP Key Decision Point

LRD Launch Readiness Date

LRR Launch Readiness Review

MSR Mars Sample Return

NESC NASA Engineering and Safety 

Center

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November 4, 2022

Acronyms

56

NISAR NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture 

Radar

NPR NASA Procedural Requirement

ORR Operational Readiness Review

ORT Operations Readiness Test

PDR Preliminary Design Review

PFR Problem/Failure Report

PI Principal Investigator

SIR System Integration Review 

SMD Science Mission Directorate 

SMSR Safety and Mission Success 

Review

SPHEREx Spectro-Photometer for the History 

of the Universe, Epoch of 

Reionization and Ices Explorer

SRB Standing Review Board

SRL Sample Retrieval Lander

SWOT Surface Water and Ocean 

Topography

ToR Terms of Reference

V&V Verification and Validation

VERITAS Venus Emissivity, Radio science, 

InSAR, Topography, and 

Spectroscopy