alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, Martin Hernandez, Chief Financial Officer of Rainmaker Systems, Inc.
(the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) the Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Martin Hernandez   
|Martin Hernandez       
|Chief Financial Officer
|March 18, 2004
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6240

AUGUSTINE PEREZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES C. TURK; JACKSON L. KISER; NORMAN K.

MOON; SAMUEL GRAYSON WILSON; GLEN E. CONRAD;

J. HARVIE WILKERSON, III; H. EMORY WIDENER,

JR.; FRANCIS D. MURNAGHAN, JR.; SAM J. ERVIN,

III; WILLIAM WILKINS, JR.; PAUL V. NIEMEYER;

CLYDE H. HAMILTON; J. MICHAEL LUTTIG; KAREN J.

WILLIAMS; M. BLANE MICHAEL; DIANA GRIBON MOTZ;

WILLIAM B. TRAXLER, JR.; JOHN D. BUTZNER;

KENNETH K. HALL; JAMES DICKERSON PHILLIPS,

JR.; ROBERT B. KING; RUSTY B. FITZGERALD;

UNKNOWN LAW CLERKS; UNKNOWN COURT CLERKS;

UNKNOWN STAFF ATTORNEYS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. James P. Jones, District

Judge. (CA-99-82-6)

Submitted: September 14, 2000 Decided: September 26, 2000

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Augustine Perez, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Augustine Perez appeals the district court’s orders denying

relief on his complaint under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West Supp. 2000)

and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinions and find that this appeal

is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. See Perez v. Turk, No. CA-99-82-6 (W.D. Va.

Jan. 12 & Jan. 27, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### Richard A. Spuhler et al., Respondents, v Mohammad R. Khan et al., Appellants-Respondents, and Nancy A. Zayas, Respondent-Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[789 NYS2d 228]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Mohammad R. Khan and Muhammad Ekram Khan appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oliver, J.), dated August 25, 2003, as denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff Richard A. Spuhler did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and the defendant Nancy A. Zayas cross-appeals from so much of the same order as denied her cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against her.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The defendants Mohammad R. Khan and Muhammad Ekram Khan (hereinafter the Khans) failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff Richard A. Spuhler (hereinafter the plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 *694NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The affirmed medical reports of the Khans’ examining physicians indicated the existence of limitations in movement of the plaintiffs cervical and lumbar spine. Since the Khans failed to meet their initial burden, it is unnecessary “to consider whether the plaintiffs’ papers in opposition . . . were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact” *(Coscia v 938 Trading Corp.,*283 AD2d 538 [2001]; *see Chaplin v Taylor,*273 AD2d 188 [2000]; *Mariaca-Olmos v Mizrhy,*226 AD2d 437, 438 [1996]).

We note that in this hit-in-the-rear case involving four vehicles, one behind the other, the defendant Gary M. Gent, who was driving the first vehicle, had come to a safe stop behind a line of traffic. The Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment to the remaining defendants, as the deposition testimony of those parties raises a triable of issue of fact as to the role of each of them in the happening of the accident *(see Reed v New York City Tr. Auth.,*299 AD2d 330 [2002]; *Barberena v Budd Enters.,*299 AD2d 305 [2002]; *Krakowska v Niksa,*298 AD2d 561 [2002]; *Vidal v Tsitsiashvili,*297 AD2d 638 [2002]). H. Miller, J.P., S. Miller, Goldstein, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.2
                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Dean L. Cash, certify that:

1.  I  have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report  on  Form  10-QSB  of  ATEL  Cash
Distribution Fund V, LP;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and  I  are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material  information  relating to the registrant is made known
     to us by others within the entity,  particularly during the period in which
     this report is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls and
     procedures  and  presented  in  this  report  our  conclusions   about  the
     effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of
     the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
     over financial  reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
     fiscal  quarter that has  materially  affected or is  reasonably  likely to
     materially   affect  the  registrant's   internal  control  over  financial
     reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,  based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a) all significant  deficiencies  and material  weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
     likely to adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability to record,  process,
     summarize and report financial information; and

     b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls
     over financial reporting.


Date:
November 11, 2004


/s/ Dean L. Cash
----------------------------------------
Dean L. Cash
President and Chief Executive
Officer of General Partner
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY AARON MOORE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COCKS, LT - Administration at MCADF; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

JIM McCABE, DON BISCHOFF; et al., 

Defendants.

No. 19-15569 

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-08244-DLR-JZB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Former Arizona state pretrial detainee Jeffrey Aaron Moore appeals pro se 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 19-15569 

from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force, sexual assault, 

and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 

1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Moore failed 

to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”) and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (the PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which 

means “using all steps the agency holds out, and doing so properly” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860 

(2016) (describing the limited circumstances under which administrative remedies 

may be effectively unavailable). 

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.35

Summary of 2011 Executive Officer Compensation

The following shows the current and
anticipated annual salary for each of eLoyaltys current executive officers:



|                                                                               |  |         |         |  |                       |   |         | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |  | ------- | ------- |  | --------------------- | - | ------- | 
|                                                                               |  | Current |         |  | EffectiveAs of 4/1/11 |  
|Kelly D. Conway, President and Chief Executive Officer:                        |  | $       | 425,000 |  |                       | $ | 425,000 | 
|William B. Noon, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer:                   |  | $       | 200,000 |  |                       | $ | 200,000 | 
|Steven C. Pollema, Vice President, Integrated Contact Solutions Business Unit: |  | $       | 300,000 |  |                       | $ | 300,000 | 
|Christine R. Carsen, Vice President, General Counsel And Corporate Secretary:  |  | $       | 175,000 |  |                       | $ | 175,000 | 

Mr. Conway and Mr. Pollema
have target bonus percentages as set forth in their employment agreements with eLoyalty. Additional information concerning the compensation of these executive officers is set forth in the Proxy Statement on Form 14A filed by eLoyalty Corporation
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH S. COSTA.

May 16, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
**Exhibit 23.1**

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 

Wehave issued our report dated March 10, 2010, with respect to the consolidated financial statements, schedule, and internal control over financial reporting included in the Annual Report of eLoyalty Corporation and Subsidiaries on Form 10-K forthe year ended December 26, 2009. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the Registration Statements of eLoyalty Corporation on Forms S-3 (File No. 333-100051 effective September 24, 2002) and FormS-8 (File Nos. 333-150671 effective May 6, 2008, 333-143114 effective May 21, 2007, 333-101031 effective November 6, 2002, 333-68530 effective August 28, 2001, 333-68540 effective August 28, 2001, 333-42284 effectiveJuly 26, 2000, 333-96473 effective February 14, 2000, 333-30374 effective February 14, 2000 and 333-96473 effective February 9, 2000). 

/s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP 

Chicago, Illinois 

March 10, 2010
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Steve Valenzuela, Chief Financial Officer of Rainmaker Systems, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period
ending December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/    STEVE
VALENZUELASteve ValenzuelaSenior Vice President, Finance, Chief Financial Officer and Corporate Secretary (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)


Date: March 31, 2010
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2638
LARRY A. SHIRLEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FAIR PLAY WILDERNESS CAMP SCHOOL, WESTMINSTER, SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at And erson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-96-2813-8-3AK) Submitted: January 23, 1997 Decided: February 6, 1997 Before RUSSELL, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Larry A. Shirley, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Larry A. Shirley appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewedthe record and the district court's opinion accepting the magistrate judge's recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Shirley v. Fair Play Wilderness , CA-96-2813-8-3AK (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2079 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

  2d Session
                                S. 2079

To suspend temporarily the duty on electron guns for cathode ray tubes 
    (CRT's) for high definition televisions with a high definition 
                television screen aspect ratio of 16:9.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 12, 2004

  Mr. Santorum (for himself and Mr. Specter) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To suspend temporarily the duty on electron guns for cathode ray tubes 
    (CRT's) for high definition televisions with a high definition 
                television screen aspect ratio of 16:9.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELECTRON GUNS FOR CATHODE RAY TUBES FOR HIGH DEFINITION 
              TELEVISIONS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

      

``      9902.85.25       Electron guns        Free       No change        No change        On or before 12/
                          actually used for                                                 31/2006           ''
                          cathode ray tubes                                                                    .
                          (CRT's) for high
                          definition
                          televisions with a
                          high definition
                          television screen
                          aspect ratio of
                          16:9 (provided for
                          in subheading
                          8540.91.50).......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### City of New York, Respondent, v Long Island Power Authority, Appellant.

[789 NYS2d 309]

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the defendant is subject to the obligations of the Long Island Lighting Company to support, protect, and relocate the transmission and distribution system of electrical power to the Rockaway Peninsula, the defendant appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Plug, J.), entered July 21, 2003, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and declared that it is subject to the obligations of the Long Island Lighting Company to support, protect, and relocate the transmission and distribution system of electrical power to the Rockaway Peninsula and is responsible for all costs of future utility interference work on the subject transmission and distribution system.

*643Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Public Authorities Law created the Long Island Power Authority (hereinafter LIPA) and empowered it to acquire all or part of the assets of the Long Island Lighting Company (hereinafter LILCO) *(see*Public Authorities Law § 1020 *et seq.).*

Pursuant to its rights and obligations, LIPA entered into a merger agreement to acquire LILCO’s assets, including “all franchise and utility service responsibilities for all ultimate consumers of gas and electricity within LILCO’s former service territory” (Public Authorities Law § 1020-g [n]). The Public Authorities Law also empowered LIPA to enter into contracts with municipalities, and thus the entity was able to assume the franchises (see Public Authorities Law § 1020-f [h]). The franchises at issue included the responsibility to pay all costs associated with removal, protection, and relocation work for LIPA’s utility equipment during municipal public works projects (see *Matter of Diamond Asphalt Corp. v Sander,*92 NY2d 244 [1998]). Contrary to LIPA’s contention, there is no indication that the Legislature intended that it be exempt from this obligation based on its status as a corporate municipal instrumentality and political subdivision of the State of New York (see Public Authorities Law §§ 1020-c, 1020-f [h]; § 1020-g [n]). Florio, J.P., Adams, S. Miller and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7354

CARSON W. MUNGO, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus JOHN SIMPSON, Director of United States Parole Commission; KATHY HAWK, Director of Bureau of Prisons; F. COLLINSWORTH; GRETCHEN ROBINSON; STEVE CONRAD; BEN HUGER; WALTER E. BLACK, JR., Probation Officer; BILL COX, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carol ina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CA-93-593-1) Submitted: November 7, 1996 Decided: November 20, 1996 Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Carson W. Mungo, Appellant Pro Se. John Warren Stone, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have sixty days withinwhich to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).The district court entered its order on March 28, 1995; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on July 31, 1996. Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain either an extension or areopening of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We deny Appellant's objections to the application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 11.1

                                 WORLDTEX, INC.
                        COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                   (In thousands except per share amounts)



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                         Three Months Ended
                                                              March 31,
                                                          1999        1998

<S>                                                      <C>          <C>  
Net income                                               $  815       2,151
                                                         ======      ======
Shares:
Weighted average number of
shares outstanding                                       14,271      14,429
                                                         ======      ======

Basic earnings per share <F1>                            $  .06         .15
                                                         ======      ======
Shares:
Weighted average number of
shares outstanding                                       14,271      14,429
Assumed exercise of options                                   -         353
                                                         ------      ------
    Total average number of common and
       common equivalent shares used for
       diluted computation                               14,271      14,782
                                                         ======      ======
Diluted earnings per share <F2>                          $  .06         .15
                                                         ======      ======

-------------------
<F1> Basic earnings per share are  calculated  based upon the  weighted  average
     number of common shares outstanding during the year.

<F2> Diluted earnings per share are calculated  based upon the weighted  average
     number of common shares and common equivalent shares outstanding during the
     year.  Common stock equivalents for the  three  months ended March 31, 1999
     are anti-dilutive and therefore excluded from the computation.

</TABLE>