This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 2 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13
- 2244 In re the Marriage of: Christina Lynn Clark, petitioner,

Respondent,

vs. Shon Raymond Clark, Appellant.
Filed July 21 , 2014 Affirmed Reyes , Judge Sherburne County Distr ict Court File No. 71FA10341 Diane B. Bratvold, Elise L. Larson, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Kelly A. Boyd, Bolt & Hoffer Law Firm, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Michael D. Dittber ner, Linder, Dittberner, Bryant & Winter, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Smith , Judge; and Reyes , Judge

. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N REYES , Judge In this appeal from the district court’s grant of respondent

- moth er’s motion to move the parties’ children to Georgia, appellant

- father argues that the district court erred2

by basing its decision on the Auge presumption and misapplying the relevant statute. We
affirm.
FACTS Appellant

- father Shon Raymond Clark and respo ndent

- mother Christina Lynn Clark married i n February 2004. They have two children: a daughter born in 2006 and a son born in 2010. In 2010, mother obtained an ex parte order for protection after father allegedly bit her on the arm during an argument and disciplined daughter by hitting her on the head. Mother commenced marital

- dissolution proceedings shortly thereafter , and the marriage was dissolved in January 2011. D aughter was later diagnosed with r elated post

- traumatic stress disorder. The dissolution decree granted mother and father joint legal custody of the children but gave sole physical custody to mo ther. The decree included a residency restriction prohibiting either party from moving the chi ldren out of Minnesota without the other party’s written cons ent or a court order. After the dissolution , the parties began receiving services from a parenting consultant who recommended that father and daughter participate in reu nification therapy. For s even months , mother resisted reunification efforts by reject ing the therapists proposed by the parenting consultant. But mother eventually selected a reunification therapist and father and daughter started reunification therapy in October
2011. Father also met with a parenting coach and received counseling for anger management and gaming addiction

. Meanwhile , daughter’s therapist expressed concern that mother was trying to sabotage father ’s relationship with the children, especially daughter

. F ather s tarted unsupervised parenting time with both child ren in December3

2011 ; s everal of the therapists involved noted that father ’s r elationships with the children improved as his parenting time increased

. In March 2012, mother began a romantic relationship with a man who lives in Georgia. Mother visited him several times during the following months, taking the children with her on two occasions. In May, mother asked father for permission to move the children to Georgia, stati ng that her employer was training her for a position there and that she might lose her job if she did not relocate

. She also told the parenting consultant about the proposed move, representing it as an employment opportunity and falsely
stat ing that daugh ter’s therapist was in favor of it

. She did not disclose her romantic relationship to father or the pa renting consultant. I n June , father informed mother that he would not consent to her request to move the children to Georgia, and mother told father and the reunification therapist that her employer was requiring he r to move to Georgia. In fact, mother’s employ er had put her on a performance

- improvement plan

. Mother’s employer terminated her e mployment later in June, but m other concealed her job loss for several months. Mother married the man in Georgia in September 2012 but concealed the marriage from father until April 2013 , when she moved for a court order granting her permission to move the children

. At the hearing on her removal motion , mother asserted that she would have better employment opportunities in Georgia, that the cost of living is lower there, and that the children would attend better schools

. She proposed several concessions, including increased pare nting time for father during school breaks and weeke nd visits in Georgia , reduction of father ’s child

- support obligation to offset travel expenses, and reduction of4

h er childcare costs to reflect lower cost s in Georgia. Father opposed the motion, arguing it would have a detrimental i mpact on his relationship s with the children, that mother would use the move to inhibit those relationship s , and that the children have better educational opport

unities in Minnesota.
I n October 2013 , the district court granted mother ’s motion to change t he ch ildren’s residence. While noting concerns about mother ’s dishonesty and the difficulties facing father in his efforts to maintain his relationship s with the children, the district court also noted that mother had recently c ooperated with father ’ s par enting

- tim e schedule and decided that mother had succeeded in showing that the move would be in the children’ s best interests. The district court stayed implementation of its order pending appeal.
D E C I S I O N
“A ppellate review of custody modifications and removal cases is limited to considering whether the [district] court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Goldman v.
Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008 ) (quotati ons omitted). We “set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility. ” Id. (citation omitted). “ Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an ap pellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotations omitted).5 I. Father argues that the district court erred by basing its decision on the outdated Auge presumption. The presumption provided that a sole physical custodian’ s motion to remove a child to another state should be granted unless the opposing party establishes , by a preponderance of the evidence , that the mo ve i s not in the child ’ s best interest. Auge v. Auge , 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 ( Minn. 1983)

. In 2006, the legislature eliminated the Auge presumption by amend ing Mi nn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 . 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 280, § 13, at 1110

– 11 . In its amended form, the statute plac es the burden of proof on the moving party unless the court finds that the moving party has been the victim of domestic abuse at the hands of the opposing party. 1 Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (c) (2012). The statute also pr ovides that courts considering removal motions “shall apply a best interests standard,” and provides a non

- exclusive list of eight best

- interests factors. Id

. , subd. 3 (b). Father highlights three passages from the district court’ s order in which the court , he argues, used language that “gives unwarranted vitality to the Auge pr esumption” by “ignor[ing] the intent of the 2 006 amendments.” A full reading of the district court ’ s memorandum reveals a different picture. The memorandum begins with a n express acknowledgment of the applicable statute and the best

- interest s analysis it requires, and later use s the referenced language within a thorough, six

- page analysis of the statutory best

- interest s factors

. The court concluded its analysis by stating that “[u]pon consideration of the statutory factors, [ mother ] has demonstrated that the proposed

1 Although an order for protection had been issued in 2010 , mother did not claim that she was a victim of domestic abuse for purposes of her removal motion

.6

move
. . . is in the children ’ s best interests

. ” Thus the district court correctly placed the burden of proof on mother as the moving party and not on father as the opposing party. Additionally, the district court cor rectly based its decision on a detailed, fact

- specific analysis of the best

- interests factors, as required by the statute. Because the district court completed a thorough, detailed, fact

- specific analysis of the statutory best

- interest s factors , and put th e burden of proof on mother as the moving party, we conclude that the district court did not base its decision on the Auge presumption. Instead, it properly rooted its decision in the process required by the applicable statute.
II. Father also argues that the district court erred by improperly applying the law , taking issue with the district court’s analysis of the statutory best

- interest s factors. District courts applying best

- interest s factors are entitled to broad discretion, and the l aw “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to q uestion the [district] court’ s balancing of best

- interests considerations.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000). We view the record in the light most favorable to the distr ict court’ s findings and defer to the district court’ s credibility determinations. Id. at 472.
As noted above, the district court analyzed the statutory best

- interest factors in detail. It expressed serious reservations about the conduct of both parents

. The court characterized father ’ s relationship with the children as “difficult ” but noted that father had “worked hard to rehabilitate his rel ationship” with them. The court expressed concern about the children’s separation from father , but noted that the parenting

- time7

schedule mother proposed gi ve s father significantly more parenting time than he previously enjoyed. The court looked poorly on mother ’s attempts to block reunification therapy and observed that mother had “done little to promote [ father ’ s] relationship with the children. ” The court also detailed mother ’ s dishonest and manipulative conduct, but noted that she had “recently cooperated with [ father ’ s] par enting time schedule.” These findings are not clearly erroneous. Read as a whole, t he court ’ s analysis of the best

- interest factors shows that none

was resoundingly in favor of either party, some favored neither, and some marginally favored one or the other. The tone of the opinion suggests that the district court had substantial diffic ulty reaching its decision and was deeply concerned about what it called “the stark reality of these children ’ s lives.” Yet , the district court decided mother had demonstrated that the move was in the chil dren ’ s best interests. That decision was not an abuse of discretion

. W

e conclude that the district court, in a very difficult case, properly applied the la w and acted within its discretion.
Affirmed.