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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6521

WILLIAM ERNEST HOWARD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RONALD ANGELONE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District

Judge. (CA-95-807-R)

Submitted: July 25, 1996 Decided: August 12, 1996

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Ernest Howard, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Howard v. Angelone, No. CA-95-807-R (W.D. Va. Mar. 26,

1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

July 14, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00062

- CR

Ricardo ARREOLA , Jr., Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court

, Atascosa County, Texas

Trial Court No. 20

- 05

- 0097

- CRA Honorable Walden Shelton , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On January 31, 2022 , the district clerk filed the clerk’s record in this appeal. On June 7, 2022, the district clerk filed the supplemental record that was ordered by this court

.
On February 9, 2022, the court reporter filed the reporter’s record in this case. On June 7, 2022, the reporter filed the supplemental record that was ordered by this court.

On July 11, 2022, Appellant Ricardo Arreola moved for this court to abate the appeal
because he stated that his motion to dismiss and the related transcript were not made part of the
record and that he received no response after requesting the items.
Abatement in this situation, however, is unnecessary. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 34.6(d).

Therefore, we order the distric t clerk and the court reporter to file supplement al records within thirty days of this order containing the records requested by Appellant. See id. “The clerk may consult with the parties concerning the contents of the clerk’s record.” Id . R. 34.5(h).
The clerk’s record and the reporter’s record will not be deemed filed for purposes of Rule 38.6 (Time to File Briefs) until the revised record is submitted. See id . R. 38.6.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 14th day of July, 2022

.

_________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz , Clerk of Court
#### Heaston and Another *v.*Fulghum.—On appeal.

*Wednesday, May*29.

IN an action against three persons founded on contract, a judgment against two of them only is erroneous, unless there be a return of u not found ” as to the other, and a suggestion of the return entered of record. See *Lowe et al.*v. *Blair et al.,*6 Blackf. *282.*—Depew v. *Wheelan et al. Id. 485.*—Bell v. *The State, Ante,*33.
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2 min read

# Lewis Launched Lunar Orbiter 3 to the Moon in the 1960s

### Robert S. Arrighi

Feb 20, 2020

Article

            -   
            -   
            -   
            -   

Before Apollo missions landed on the Moon, NASA launched a series of orbiters to photographically explore the lunar surface to identify possible landing sites.

On February 4, 1967*, engineers from the Lewis Research Center (now Glenn) directed the launch of Lunar Orbiter 3. The nearly nine-month mission provided NASA planners with the imagery and data necessary to decide on the final landing sites.

A 25-person Lewis team traveled to Pad 13 at Cape Kennedy (now Cape Canaveral) in late January of that year to carry out the Lunar Orbiter 3 launch. The team had managed 18 prior launches of the Atlas-Agena launch system by defining the launch vehicle requirements and overseeing the design, fabrication, testing and integration of hardware.

At 8:17 p.m. ET, the Atlas-Agena lifted off the pad into the clear night sky and just over five minutes later, the Agena separated from the Atlas and fired its 16,000-pound thrust engine to enter a parking orbit for approximately 10 minutes.

It was critical that the spacecraft commenced its lunar trajectory at a very precise location 118 miles from Earth. The Lewis team timed the reignition of Agena’s engine nearly perfectly.  Lunar Orbiter 3 entered its translunar injection point within 7.5 mph of the intended 24,450 mph velocity. This resulted in a mid-course correction of a mere 3.3 meters per second as the spacecraft sailed toward the Moon.

The first two Lunar Orbiters photographically explored the surface of the Moon to identify possible landing sites for Apollo. Lunar Orbiter 3 successfully provided additional information on the 12 most promising sites and gathered scientific information from 32 additional locations. Lewis subsequently launched the final two Lunar Orbiters, which provided additional scientific data.

*Official NASA sites list the launch date as Feb. 5 when using Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

***Robert S. Arrighi**NASA’s Glenn Research Center***

## Explore More

2 min readGlenn Launch Vehicle HistoryArticle										16 years ago									

5 min readCentaur Launched a Generation of Interplanetary MissionsArticle										11 years ago									

4 min readNASA Glenn Had Key Role in NASA’s 1997 Return to MarsArticle										1 year ago
EXHIBIT
32.1





Certification
of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350


(Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, the undersigned officer of Sandston Corporation (the
"Company") hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's
Annual Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Daniel J. DormanName:
                    Daniel
      J. DormanTitle:
                    President,
      Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)Date:
                    May
      8, 2009





The
foregoing certification (i) accompanies the filing and is being furnished solely
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, (ii) will not be deemed "filed" for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise subject to the
liability of that section, and (iii) will not be deemed to be incorporated by
reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act,
except to the extent that the small business issuer specifically incorporates it
by reference.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to Sandston Corporation and will be retained
by Sandston Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1115

MISRAK HAILEMARIAM GEBREHIWOT, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A95-220-634) Submitted: August 17, 2005 Decided: December 13, 2005 Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Aragaw Mehari, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Sara Bugbee Winn, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Misrak Hailemariam Gebrehiwot, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2004); INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); Stewart v. INS , 181 F.3d 587, 595 (4th Cir. 1999). The denial of a motion to reopen must be reviewed with extreme deference, since immigration statutes do not contemplate reopening and the applicable regulations disfavor motions to reopen. M.A. v. INS , 899 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). A motion to reopen "shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2004). "A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing." Id. We have reviewed the record, the immigration judge's decision, and the Board's orders and find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions- 3 - are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Dale Jarrett Racing Adventure, Inc. (the
"Corporation"), hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the
Corporation's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Corporation.

                                 /s/ Timothy B. Shannon
                                 ----------------------
                                 Timothy B. Shannon
                                 Chief Executive Officer and
                                 Chief Financial Officer

October 14, 2003
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<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         595,694
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       1,646,704
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  3,381,906
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
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<LOANS>                                     88,693,103
<ALLOWANCE>                                    710,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              97,992,514
<DEPOSITS>                                  77,997,915
<SHORT-TERM>                                 4,900,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,437,635
<LONG-TERM>                                  1,250,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       946,730
<OTHER-SE>                                  11,460,234
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              97,992,514
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              3,952,268
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              132,706
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               127,725
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             4,212,699
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,923,795
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,084,547
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        2,128,152
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   37,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              1,963,828
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                525,874
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     525,874
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   349,574
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .38
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<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               688,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   15,000
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              710,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           710,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 29, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

 

PAMELA ANN KRIEL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KEITH JUDKINS, Individually; DAN

A. ERWIN, Individually; CINDY

KIRBY, Individually and as Clerk of

the District Court of the Twenty-Third

Judicial District within and for

Lincoln County Oklahoma; PAUL M.

VASSAR, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 10-6041

(D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00068-D)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER

Before TACHA, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

The appellant, Ms. Kriel, is appealing from the district court’s order

remanding a case to state court, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Remands that are based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the

removal procedure are not appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d); Quackenbush v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996). See also Powerex Corp v. Reliant

Appellate Case: 10-6041 Document: 01018392577 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 Page: 1 
-2-

Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007) (“We hold that when, as here, the

District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subjectmatter jurisdiction, appellate review is barred by § 1447 (d).”) The exceptions

found in 28 U.S.C. § 1443 are inapplicable here. Under § 1443 (1), the rights

protected must arise under federal laws which specifically protect civil rights and

are cast in terms of racial equality. Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F. 3d 757, 761-62

(10th Cir. 2006). The exception provided by § 1443 (2) is also inapplicable

because Ms. Kriel does not allege that “[s]he has been a federal officer or agent,

[or] that [s]he has been acting with or for one.” Miller at 761. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH SHUMAKER, Clerk of Court

by:

Christine Van Coney

Counsel to the Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-6041 Document: 01018392577 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 Page: 2
#### EDYTHE G. MASSA, LADDIE CIAFARONE, GENEVIEVE GOLDEN, ROMEO CIAFARONE, ANNE M. FUCCELLO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. JOHN LAING, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued April 10, 1978

Decided July 20, 1978.

*Mr. Rexford L. Lyon*argued the cause for appellants *(Messrs. Sobel and Lyon,*attorneys).

*Mr. John P. Dolin*argued the cause for respondent *(Mr. John B. Scott,*attorney and on the brief).

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the Appellate Division.

Hughes, C. J.,

dissenting. With respect, I dissent from the decision of the majority of this Court which would agree, on the basis of the Appellate Division majority opinion, with the reversal of Judge Antell’s trial judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. I would affirm the trial court decision for the reasons well stated in the Appellate Division minority opinion of Judge Horn.

As we held in *Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.,*74 *N. J.*588 (1977), following New Jersey precedents and particularly that of *State v. Johnson,*42 *N. J.*146 (1964) :

> The judgment of the initial factfinder then, whether it be a jury * * ***or a judge as in a non-jury case * **** is entitled to very considerable respect. It should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, *228that the continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice. The process of “weighing” the evidence is not to encourage the judge [the appellate court] to “evaluate the evidence as would a jury to ascertain in whose favor the evidence preponderates" (Kul*backi v. Sobchinsky,*38 *N. J.*435, 455 (1962) (I-Ianeman, J., concurring)) and on that basis to decide upon disruption of the jury’s [trial court’s] finding. “[T]he judge [appellate court] may not substitute his [its] judgment for that of the jury [the trial court] merely because he [it] would have reached the opposite conclusion; he [it] is not a thirteenth and decisive juror.” *Dolson v. Anastasia,*[55 *N. J.*2, at 6 (1969)]. Nevertheless, the process of evidence evaluation called “weighing” is not “a *pro forma*exercise, but calls for a high degree of conscientious effort and diligent scrutiny. The object is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.” *Id.*It is only upon the predicate of a determination that there has been a manifest miscarriage of justice, that corrective judicial action is warranted.

> The comparative strictness of these rules is historic in nature, with roots deep in the common law. * '■*' * [74 *N. J.*at 597-98 (some citations omitted)].

If these norms are still valid, I cannot see here a justification for nullifying the trial court’s decision on the merits based, as affirmed by Judge Antell, on “the clear and convincing evidence” before him. On the contrary, I would not disturb that decision.

Accordingly, I would reverse the Appellate Division.

*For affirmance*— Justices Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, Sohreibek and Handler and Judge Coneord — 6.

*For reversal*— Chief Justice Hughes — 1.
**Exhibit 23.1**

Independent Auditors’ Consent

The Board of DirectorsStonepath Group, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by     reference in the registration statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-64452, 333-91240,  333-104228, 333-108605 and 333-112609) and the registration statements on Form     S-8 (Nos. 333-74918, 333-103439, 333-109249 and 333-113052) of Stonepath    Group,  Inc. of our report dated February 24, 2004, with respect to the consolidated     balance sheets of Stonepath Group, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December    31,  2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’  equity and comprehensive income (loss) and cash flows for each of the years   in the three-year period ended December 31, 2003, and related financial statement  schedule, which report appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form   10-K of Stonepath Group, Inc.

/s/KPMG LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  March 15, 2004

81