UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DALE GROSS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

GUILLERMO SAMUDIO, Community 

Parole Officer, in his personal capacity; 

ANTHONY YOUNG, Chairman of the 

Colorado Parole Board, in his personal 

capacity; ED THOMAS, Member of the 

Parole Board, in his personal capacity; 

DENISE BALAZIC, Member of the Parole 

Board, in her personal capacity; 

PATRICIA BAN WAAK, Member of the 

Parole Board, in her personal capacity; 

JOHN O’DELL, Member of the Parole 

Board, in his personal capacity; IAN 

SWEENEY, Community Parole Officer, in 

his personal capacity; JENNIFER 

DUNCAN, Community Parole Officer, in 

her personal capacity; MICHAEL 

ANDERSON, Member of the Parole 

Board, in his personal capacity; REBECCA 

OAKES, Member of the Parole Board, in 

her personal capacity; JOHN DAVIS, 

President of RSA, Inc.; JOHN DOES, 

Numbers 1-2, unknown officers of RSA, 

Inc.; JOHN DOES, Numbers 3-4, unknown 

officers of Progressive Therapy Systems, 

P.C.; FREDERICK E. TOLSON, President 

Sexual Offense Resource Services, LLC; 

JOHN DOES, Numbers 5-6, unknown 

officers of Sexual Offense Resource 

Services, LLC; WALTER T. SIMON, 

Ph. D., President of Progressive Therapy 

Systems, P.C.; 

No. 14-1248 

(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-02594-RPM) 

(D. Colo.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

October 27, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

GREIG VEEDER, President and Director, 

Teaching Humane Existence Treatment 

Program, Inc.; JOHN DOES, Numbers 7-8, 

unknown officers of Teaching Humane 

Existence Treatment Program, Inc., 

 Defendants. 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Dale Gross, a former Colorado inmate and parolee, appeals from the district 

court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against numerous 

Colorado state parole officers and members of the Colorado Parole Board (the State 

Defendants), and officers of several private entities that provide sex offender 

treatment programs in Denver, Colorado, namely John Davis, president of 

Redirecting Sexual Aggression, Inc. (RSA); Walter Simon, president of Progressive 

Therapy Systems, P.C. (PTS); Frederick E. Tolson, president of Sexual Offense 

Resource Services, L.L.C. (SORS); and Greig Veeder, president of Teaching Humane 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

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Existence Treatment Program, Inc. (THE) (collectively, the Private Defendants). 

Gross alleged the parole conditions imposed by the State Defendants relating to the 

requirement that he obtain sex offender treatment from one of the Private Defendants 

violated his constitutional rights, and that the Private Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights by refusing to enroll him in their treatment programs. The 

district court dismissed the complaint, ruling Gross failed to show the State 

Defendants violated any clearly established constitutional right or that the Private 

Defendants were acting under color of state law. We exercise jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the dismissal, but on different grounds as to the State 

Defendants because the claims against them are time barred. 

I. Background 

Gross was convicted after a jury trial of first degree criminal trespass, first 

degree burglary, retaliation against a witness or victim, second degree assault, third 

degree assault, two domestic violence counts, and one crime of violence count. 

People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1280 (Colo. App. 2001). Based on information in 

Gross’s pre-sentence report that he had engaged in sexually violent behavior with his 

girlfriend, and following an administrative review hearing, the Colorado Department 

of Corrections (DOC) classified Gross as an S–4 sex offender when he entered prison 

in 2000. An S-4 sex offender classification applies to inmates who were not 

convicted of a sex offense but for whom sex offender treatment has been 

recommended. See Chambers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 205 F.3d 1237, 1240 n.8 

(10th Cir. 2000) (describing the S-4 sex offender classification). Colorado law then 

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in effect gave the DOC complete discretion to determine an inmate’s sex offender 

classification, notwithstanding any contrary prosecution stipulation or court finding. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-103(1)(d) (2005); see also Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 

1211, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that an inmate not convicted of a sex offense 

may be classified by the DOC as a sex offender if it affords him procedural 

protections). Gross filed a § 1983 action challenging his sex offender classification 

in 2002, which was dismissed. See Gross v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 75 F. App’x 702, 

704-05 (10th Cir. 2003) (ruling that Gross received adequate due process in the 

classification administrative hearing, and that he did not state a cognizable Equal 

Protection or Fifth Amendment violation). 

Gross was first released from prison in August 2008, subject to five years of 

mandatory parole. He was required as a condition of his parole to enroll in and 

“actively participate in” a sex offender treatment program. Aplt. App. at 221.1

 The 

parole conditions defined “participation” in treatment as including a requirement that 

Gross admit responsibility for his offense. Id. Gross alleges in his complaint that it 

is impossible to admit responsibility for a sex offense that never took place. Gross 

was directed to contact PTS. Gross enrolled, but his PTS therapist terminated him 

from treatment in January 2009, because of Gross’s “adversarial presentation in 

 1

 Although this was a term and condition of his parole, Gross was not 

statutorily required to participate in sex offender treatment under Colorado’s Sex 

Offender Lifetime Supervision Act because he was not convicted of a sex offense. 

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11.7-105 (requiring persons convicted of a sex offense to 

undergo appropriate sex offender treatment). 

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treatment and his inability to accept responsibility for his offense.” Id. at 317. 

Following a hearing, Gross’s parole was revoked in 2009 for failure to submit a urine 

test and failure to participate in sex offender treatment. 

Gross was again paroled in August 2009. His conditions of parole again 

included the requirement that he actively participate in sex offender treatment and 

admit responsibility for his offense. Gross was directed to contact SORS, but 

according to the parole revocation investigation report, he repeatedly failed to 

schedule appointments, was found to be deceptive on a SORS polygraph 

examination, and continued to deny any sexually inappropriate behavior. Aplee. 

Supp. App. at 97. SORS informed Gross’s parole officer that he was not amenable to 

treatment. Gross’s parole officer then referred Gross to RSA. According to the 

parole revocation investigation report, Gross failed to schedule his required 

appointments with RSA or to comply with RSA’s treatment directives, and was found 

to have been deceptive on an RSA polygraph examination. Gross sought a 

restraining order against RSA to prohibit it from requiring him to admit 

responsibility or take a polygraph examination, which was eventually dismissed as 

moot. Finally, Gross’s parole officer referred him to THE, the only remaining sex 

offender treatment program available in Denver, where Gross lived. According to the 

parole revocation investigation report, Gross failed to schedule an appointment with 

THE. 

In February 2011, Gross was charged with violating parole based on his failure 

to schedule appointments with RSA or THE and for associating with a convicted 

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felon. At the March 2011 revocation hearing, the parole board directed Gross’s 

parole officer to contact PTS, RSA, SORS, and THE to determine if any would 

accept Gross into treatment, but all declined to accept Gross based on his previous 

unwillingness to comply with their treatment programs. Gross’s parole was revoked 

in April 2011 based on his failure to obtain sex offender treatment and for associating 

with a convicted felon. 

Gross filed his § 1983 complaint in October 2011. He alleged the State 

Defendants violated his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by ordering 

him to participate in sex offender treatment as a condition of parole with treatment 

providers who could arbitrarily or capriciously refuse him treatment. He alleged the 

Private Defendants violated his constitutional rights when, following the March 2011 

parole revocation hearing, they refused to accept Gross into their sex offender 

treatment programs, allegedly in retaliation for Gross’s exercise of his First 

Amendment right to challenge their acceptance-of-responsibility treatment 

requirement. Gross was released on parole in November 2011, but petitioned to have 

his parole revoked. He was unconditionally released from custody in November 

2012. 

The State Defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that Gross’s claims 

were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that they were entitled to 

qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The 

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). The district court granted summary judgment to the State 

Defendants on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district 

court dismissed the claims against the Private Defendants on the grounds that Gross’s 

complaint failed to allege any facts showing they were acting under color of state 

law, as is required for liability under § 1983, when they refused to accept him for 

treatment.2

 

II. Discussion 

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the 

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). We review de novo the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment to the State Defendants. Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 

1250 (10th Cir. 2007). We also review de novo the district court’s dismissal of the 

claims against the Private Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). Peterson v. Grisham, 

594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). 

 2

 John Davis, president of RSA, and Walter Simon, president of PTS, filed 

separate Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, both 

of which were granted by the district court. Frederick Tolson, president of SORS, 

did not respond to the complaint, but the district court denied Gross’s motion for 

default judgment, ruling the claims against Tolson were the same as those against 

Davis that it dismissed for failure to state a claim. It does not appear that Greig 

Veeder, president of THE, ever entered an appearance, but the district court 

dismissed all claims against all defendants in its final judgment, and Gross does not 

appeal Veeder’s dismissal. 

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A. State Defendants 

The State Defendants argued in their motion for dismissal, in their motion for 

summary judgment, and now on appeal that Gross’s claims against the State 

Defendants were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Gross failed to ever 

assert any responsive argument to the statute of limitations arguments before the 

district court or before this court on appeal. We conclude from our independent 

review of the record that Gross’s claims are time-barred as a matter of law. 

See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding we 

may affirm on alternative grounds if “there is a record sufficient to permit 

conclusions of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Reed v. Bennett, 

312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (requiring court to determine if summary 

judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 even if the opposing party does not 

respond to the summary judgment motion). 

“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two 

years from the time the cause of action accrued.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 

1258 (10th Cir. 2006). While state law governs the applicable statute of limitations, 

federal law determines when the claim accrues and when the limitations period starts 

to run. Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). “A § 1983 

action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be 

apparent.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Since the 

injury in a § 1983 case is the violation of a constitutional right, such claims accrue 

when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have 

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been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The claim accrues when the 

constitutional injury occurs, “not when the consequence of that constitutional 

injury . . . manifested itself.” Id. 

We have reviewed Gross’s allegations in his complaint, as well as the 

undisputed evidence presented in the motion for summary judgment, and conclude it 

is undisputed that Gross knew or should have known when he was paroled in August 

2008 and re-paroled in August 2009, the exact terms and conditions of parole on 

which his constitutional claims are based. See Aplt. App. at 221; 224-25. Gross has 

known since he was first paroled in 2008 and again in 2009 that he was required to 

undergo sex offender treatment, and that the conditions of this treatment would be 

decided by the treatment provider. His August 2009 parole conditions stated: 

You must actively participate in offense specific mental health treatment 

approved by the Department of Corrections which may be at your own 

expense. . . . You will sign and abide by the conditions of a treatment 

program as defined by the treatment provider. Program participation is 

defined as attendance at all meetings, prompt payment of fees, admission of 

responsibility for your offense, and progress toward reasonable treatment 

goals. Unsuccessful termination from treatment will be considered a 

violation of this directive. Subsequent treatment referrals, if any, will be 

at the discretion of your Community Parole Officer. 

Id. at 225 (emphasis in italics added). 

Gross signed and initialed these requirements, and therefore knew he had to 

attend a treatment program offered by the approved treatment providers, accept 

responsibility for his offense, submit to polygraph examinations, and follow whatever 

conditions of treatment the treatment providers dictated. Gross argues that he is not 

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challenging the constitutionality of the parole condition that he undergo sex offender 

treatment. Rather, he asserts the focus of his complaint is that he had a protected 

liberty interest in being able to participate in this treatment, and that the State 

Defendants violated his due process rights by arbitrarily delegating the duty to treat 

him to treatment providers who could arbitrarily determine whether to accept him for 

treatment or to terminate him. See Opening Br. at 14-15. This alleged injury, 

however, was clear at the time Gross was released on parole in August of 2008 and 

2009, when he knew the treatment providers could dictate the terms of his treatment 

and knew he was required to follow those conditions or have his parole revoked. 

Gross knew or should have known then that the State Defendants had delegated 

authority to the treatment providers to dictate the terms of his treatment, which would 

include terminating him from treatment, or refusing to accept him for treatment based 

on their own determination that he was not suitable for the treatment they offered. 

The fact that the treatment providers ultimately refused to enroll or re-enroll him was 

merely a consequence of the stated terms of his parole. The April 2011 revocation 

decision was not a separate and distinct constitutional injury, but simply a direct 

consequence of the 2008 and 2009 parole conditions. As in Smith, “the constitutional 

injury . . . which trigger[ed] the statute of limitations for purposes of § 1983, 

occurred when [the terms and conditions of Gross’s parole were imposed], not when 

the consequence of that constitutional injury . . . manifested itself.” 149 F.3d at 

1154. Thus, we conclude that all of Gross’s claims against the State Defendants are 

time-barred. 

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B. Private Defendants 

A plaintiff asserting that a private actor deprived him of a constitutional right 

while acting under of color of state law must rely on more than conclusory 

allegations to state such a cause of action, but must include in his complaint 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Gross’s complaint alleged the Private Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights when, after the March 2011 revocation hearing, the treatment 

providers they operated refused to re-enroll or accept him into their programs.3

 But 

his complaint only made conclusory allegations that the Private Defendants were 

state actors simply because Colorado had contracts with the treatment providers they 

operated. The district court ruled there was no allegation in Gross’s complaint that 

any decision by the Private Defendants related to Gross’s admission into a treatment 

program was an exercise of any right or privilege created by the state, or that the 

state in any way dictated any decision by the treatment providers whether to accept 

Gross for treatment. Thus, it ruled Gross failed to satisfy the essential § 1983 

requirement that a defendant be acting under color of state law. 

 3

 In particular, he contends that Davis and Simon declined to accept him for 

treatment in retaliation for Gross’s First Amendment activities challenging the terms 

and conditions of his parole. In addition to asserting they were not acting under color 

of state law, the Private Defendants also moved to dismiss on the ground that Gross 

failed to allege a cognizable First Amendment violation. Because we agree Gross 

failed to allege facts showing the Private Defendants acted under color of state law, 

we need not address these alternative grounds for dismissal. 

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On appeal, Gross argues he alleged sufficient facts to show the Private 

Defendants were acting under color of state law. He cites to his allegations that the 

treatment providers operated by the Private Defendants had contracts with the State 

of Colorado to provide sex offender treatment to parolees, and to his assertion that 

the State delegated parole revocation authority to those treatment providers because 

they could reject a referred parolee for treatment. These allegations are insufficient 

to show the Private Defendants acted under color of state law. 

For a deprivation of a constitutional right to be committed under color of law 

for purposes of § 1983, it “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege 

created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for 

whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a 

person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 

457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). “[M]erely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory 

or wrongful,” cannot provide the grounds for a claim brought under § 1983. 

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The Tenth Circuit has set forth four tests under which a private actor may be 

held accountable as a state actor for a constitutional deprivation: (1) the nexus test, 

(2) the public function test, (3) the joint action test, and (4) the symbiotic relationship 

test. See Gallagher v. “Neil Young Freedom Concert,” 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 

1995) (citations and quotations omitted). Delegation of authority to a private actor is 

insufficient to create state action under § 1983 without meeting one of these tests. 

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Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 780 (10th Cir. 2013). Gross argues only that 

he alleged sufficient facts to show the actions of the Private Defendants met the 

public function test. The facts alleged in his complaint do not satisfy any of the tests. 

 A nexus exists only when a state has exercised “coercive power” over the 

challenged activity. Id. at 775. Gross did not allege any facts to suggest the State 

exercised any such coercive power over the Private Defendants’ treatment decisions 

with respect to Gross. “The ‘public function’ test asks whether the challenged action 

is a traditional and exclusive function of the state” and looks at whether the services 

provided by the defendants—here, sex offender treatment and therapy—are 

traditional and exclusive functions of the state. See id. at 776-77. Gross did not 

assert any facts or cite any authority indicating that operating a sex offender 

treatment program is a traditional and exclusive function of the state. 

The “joint action” test asks “whether state officials and private parties have 

acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. at 

777 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gross did not allege any facts suggesting the 

State Defendants conspired with or acted jointly with the Private Defendants in 

making any decision not to admit him into their treatment programs. “Action taken 

by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state 

action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). Finally, the “symbiotic 

relationship” test asks if the state “has so far insinuated itself into a position of 

interdependence with a private party [that] it must be recognized as a joint participant 

in the challenged activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The “mere 

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private purchase of contract services” or “[p]ayments under government contracts . . . 

are insufficient to establish a symbiotic relationship between the government and a 

private entity.” Id. at 778 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In 

summary, then, Gross failed to state a claim that the Private Defendants were state 

actors for purposes of § 1983. 

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Circuit Judge 

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