In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 07-3903

JONATHAN A. CATLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF WHEATON, a municipal corporation of the

State of Illinois, BILL COOLEY, ANDREW UHLIR,

EDWARD FANNING, MATTHEW HALE & MARK FIELD,

employees and agents of the City of Wheaton,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

COUNTY OF DUPAGE, a political subdivision of the

State of Illinois, JOHN ZARUBA, Sheriff of DuPage County,

Illinois, DUPAGE COUNTY MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 2590—Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 11, 2009—DECIDED JULY 21, 2009
2 No. 07-3903

Before CUDAHY, POSNER, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Catlin was arrested

and briefly detained when members of the Wheaton Police

Department mistook him for the ringleader of a local drug

operation. Catlin subsequently sued for false arrest and

excessive force. The district court granted summary

judgment for the defendants on the basis of qualified

immunity. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2003, the DuPage County Sheriff’s Narcotics Unit conducted a major operation to arrest numerous

members of a drug conspiracy in Wheaton, Illinois.

The operation involved over seventy-five officers from

neighboring jurisdictions, including the defendants in

this case, who are members of the Wheaton Police Department. The DuPage Narcotics Unit assigned the defendants the task of executing an arrest warrant for Robert

Ptak, the kingpin of the drug conspiracy. The defendants

were told that Ptak’s arrest warrant was for Class X

felonies—the highest class of felony under Illinois

law—that Ptak was armed and dangerous, that he had

resisted arrest on several prior occasions and that he

had threatened violent resistance if the police attempted

to re-arrest him.

At about 12:30 in the afternoon, the defendants were

dispatched to the Red Roof Inn in Downers Grove, Illinois,

where Ptak was believed to be staying. They were given

a photograph and physical description of Ptak, and told
No. 07-3903 3

“Crotch rocket” is apparently a slang term for a sport-motor- 1

cycle. The foot pegs and shifters on this type of motorcycle are

placed farther back than usual, causing the rider to lean

forward and assume an aerodynamic position. See http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sportbike (visited 6/11/09).

Our duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 2

Catlin is complicated somewhat by the fact that Catlin’s statement of material facts contains admissions that cast doubt on

his allegation that the defendants did not identify themselves

(continued...)

that he had recently been seen riding a yellow, “crotch

rocket” style motorcycle. Upon arriving at the scene, 1

the defendants observed a person matching Ptak’s

physical description who was operating a yellow sportmotorcycle in the parking lot adjacent to the Red Roof

Inn. As it happened, however, this person was not Ptak.

Rather, it was the plaintiff, Jonathan Catlin. Further,

Catlin was not actually leaving the Red Roof Inn. Instead,

he was leaving his workplace, which was located about

100 yards from the Red Roof Inn. Nevertheless, thinking

that they had located Ptak, the defendants drove past

Catlin in their unmarked S.U.V., Catlin pulled out behind

them and the parties drove a short way until they both

came to a stop at a traffic light.

For the purposes of this appeal, we credit Catlin’s

version of what happened next. According to Catlin,

while the parties were stopped in traffic, defendants

Uhlir and Fanning jumped out of the S.U.V. and ran

toward Catlin. Uhlir and Fanning were dressed in plain

clothes and did not identify themselves as police officers.2
4 No. 07-3903

(...continued) 2

as police officers. First, Catlin admits that the defendants

were wearing their badges around their necks when they

approached him. Second, and more significantly, he admits

that Officer Hale heard his fellow defendants identify themselves as police officers. (No. 1:04-cv-02590, Doc. No. 43, at 2, 5

(admitting Uhlir ¶¶ 43-44 and Hale ¶ 69).)

While these admissions may well undermine Catlin’s claim

that the defendants did not identify themselves as police

officers prior to arresting him, the defendants have not argued

this, and therefore any such argument they might have made

is waived. At any rate, as we discuss below, the defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity even if they did not

identify themselves as police officers before restraining Catlin.

(A third defendant, Hale, was unable to exit from the

car with the other two as planned because the child safety

locks were activated on the back door.) Uhlir and Fanning

approached Catlin from either side, grabbed him and

threw him onto the grass by the side of the road. While

the defendants were attempting to restrain him, Catlin

admits that he began to struggle “really, really hard” and

managed to break free. Subsequently, Fanning tackled

him and Uhlir held him in place by placing his knee on

Catlin’s lower back. The defendants told Catlin to “stop

struggling,” but they still did not identify themselves

as police officers. By then, Hale had managed to unlock

the back door of the S.U.V. and join the other officers.

Hale handcuffed Catlin while Uhlir and Fanning held

him down.

Almost immediately, the defendants realized their

mistake. While he was being restrained, Catlin protested
No. 07-3903 5

The court also granted summary judgment on Catlin’s state 3

law claims and on his Monell claim against the City of Wheaton.

Catlin does not challenge this portion of the district court’s

judgment on appeal.

that the defendants “have the wrong guy.” After successfully restraining him, the defendants checked Catlin’s

identification, confirmed their mistake and released

him. Catlin estimates that he was detained for approximately 20 minutes. Although there was some damage

to his motorcycle, he was able to drive himself home.

Catlin commenced this Section 1983 action, alleging

that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment

rights by unlawfully seizing him and using excessive

force in the course of restraining him. The district court

granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding

that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity

with respect to both Catlin’s false arrest claim and his

excessive force claims.3

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the decision granting summary

judgment for the defendants on the basis of qualified

immunity. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons, 531 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir.

2008). Qualified immunity protects public officials from

liability for damages if their actions did not violate

clearly established rights of which a reasonable person

would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982); Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 2008). The
6 No. 07-3903

purpose of the doctrine is “to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129

S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009).

To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must

show that (1) the facts make out a violation of the plaintiff’s federal rights, and (2) the right at issue was

clearly established at the time of the defendant’s

alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001);

see also Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).

We may address these issues in the order we deem

most expedient. See Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818. Thus, where

it is apparent that the alleged right at issue is not

clearly established, we may decide the case on these

grounds without first deciding if there was an underlying constitutional violation. Id.

Catlin argues that the defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity because they did not take reasonable steps to verify his identity prior to the arrest, and

because there are triable issues of fact as to whether the

force they used in effecting the arrest was reasonable.

We are unpersuaded by either of these arguments. However, the second argument presents a closer question.

A. False Arrest

When police officers mistake a person for someone

they seek to arrest, the arrest is constitutional if the

officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the person

sought, and (2) reasonably believe that the person arrested
No. 07-3903 7

Ptak was a 30 year old white male with closely cropped brown 4

hair, standing 6’1” and weighing 208 pounds. Catlin was a

27 year old white male with closely cropped brown hair,

standing 6’ and weighing about 190 pounds. Further, our

review of the photographs contained in the record persuades

us that the facial resemblance was strong.

is the person sought. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802

(1971); United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69 (7th Cir.

1996).

In the present case, the arrest warrant gave the officers

a basis for arresting Robert Ptak. The only issue, therefore,

is whether they were reasonable in thinking that Catlin

was Ptak. We think that they were. Catlin physically

resembled Ptak, was observed in the precise area 4

where the defendants expected to find Ptak and was

driving the same distinctive sort of motorcycle as Ptak.

Catlin’s argument that the defendants should have

checked his license plates prior to arresting him is unavailing for two reasons. The defendants believed that they

were confronting a dangerous felon on a racing motorcycle in an area adjacent to a state highway. The defendants were under no constitutional obligation to dither,

especially since additional efforts to verify Catlin’s

identity could have given him an opportunity to flee. E.g.,

Marshall, 79 F.3d at 69 (“Requiring a higher level of verification or corroboration at this point risked allowing a

golden moment to pass—[the suspect] could have fled

while more evidence was gathered.”).

Further, the defendants are required to show only the

reasonableness of their belief that the person they arrested
8 No. 07-3903

was the person they were seeking; they are not required

to show that they knew with certainty that the person

they arrested was the person they were seeking. Often,

there will have been more that an officer could have

done to confirm a suspect’s identity. This will not

render an arrest unconstitutional so long as the officer’s

actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

B. Excessive Force

Catlin also argues that the defendants used excessive

force when they arrested him. Because the arrest was

valid, the defendants were allowed to use some force in

the course of effecting the arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“[T]he right to make an arrest . . .

carries with it the right to use some degree of physical

coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”). Our assessment

of whether the defendants’ use of force in the present

case comports with the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement requires us to balance “the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id.; Abdullahi v. City of

Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2005). Particular

factors we consider include “the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 768.

In the present case, Catlin alleges that the defendants

confronted him without identifying themselves as police
No. 07-3903 9

The district court disregarded Catlin’s allegation that at 5

least one defendant drew his gun in the course of the arrest,

finding that this allegation was contradicted by Catlin’s deposition testimony. Catlin has not challenged this finding on appeal.

officers, forced him off his motorcycle and “tossed him”

to the side of the road.

5

 He alleges that subsequently—

and still without identifying themselves as officers—the

defendants tackled him, held him face down by placing

a knee in his lower back and told him to “quit resisting”

as they handcuffed him.

Most of the defendants’ actions on this narrative strike

us as reasonable: the defendants thought they were

confronting an armed and dangerous felon who had

announced his intention to flee or fight rather than be

arrested. They were under no constitutional obligation

to carry out the arrest in a way that would have given

Ptak an opportunity to make good on his earlier threats.

In what follows, we analyze what seem to us Catlin’s

two strongest arguments that the defendants’ use of

force was excessive: first, he argues that the reasonableness of the force the defendants used to subdue him is

inherently a jury question; and second, he suggests that

it was unreasonable for the defendants to fail to identify

themselves as police officers prior to completing the arrest.

1. The amount of force the defendants used to

restrain Catlin

Again, the reasonableness of a particular use of force

depends on the circumstances of the case. Graham, 490
10 No. 07-3903

U.S. at 396. Catlin’s principal argument is that when

officers use more than a de minimis amount of force in

carrying out an arrest, the question of whether the use

of force was reasonable is for the jury. Catlin relies

heavily on our decision in Abdullahi, where we said “since

the Graham reasonableness inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions,

and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on

many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as

a matter of law in excessive force cases should be

granted sparingly.” 423 F.3d at 773 (quoting Santos v.

Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Catlin focuses on the conclusion of this remark—namely,

that summary judgment should be granted sparingly in

excessive force cases—while disregarding the premise on

which it was based. The reason that summary judgment

is often inappropriate in excessive force cases is that

the parties typically tell different stories about what

happened. Here, by contrast, there are no material

factual disputes. According to both parties, Catlin was

tackled, at which point Uhlir held him in place by

forcibly placing his knee on Catlin’s back while Hale

handcuffed him. In the light of the fact that Catlin admitted that he “struggled really, really hard” and managed

temporarily to break free, these actions were reasonable

as a matter of law.

Further, while there are superficial similarities between

the facts of the this case and those of Abdullahi, the facts

and the issues presented by the two cases are different.
No. 07-3903 11

In Abdullahi, three officers took the arrestee to the

ground, at which point one of the officers testified that

he placed his right knee on the arrestee’s back and increased the pressure until he stopped struggling. 423 F.3d

at 765. When the arrestee was fully subdued, the officers

realized that he had stopped breathing. Paramedics were

unable to resuscitate him, and he was later declared

dead. Id. at 766. Four doctors testified that the arrestee

suffered from injuries consistent with strangulation, and

that his chest had been crushed. Id. Based on this record,

we reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that,

[t]he reasonableness of kneeling on a prone individual’s back during the arrest turns, at least in part, on

how much force is applied. Kneeling with just enough

force to prevent an individual from “squirming” or

escaping might be eminently reasonable, while dropping down on an individual or applying one’s full

weight (particularly if one is heavy) could actually

cause death.

Id. at 771.

Viewed at a high level of generality, Abdullahi stands

for the rather unsurprising proposition that a knee-to-theback restraint may or may not be reasonable depending

on the circumstances. While this may seem to lend some

support to Catlin’s excessive force claim, Abdullahi is

distinguishable from the present case for two reasons.

First, in Abdullahi, the officers used deadly force. Cases

involving deadly force will often present more difficult

questions concerning the reasonableness of the force
12 No. 07-3903

Catlin argues that medical records show that he suffered 6

serious injuries as a result of this incident. But these medical

records post-date the incident by two years. Whatever Catlin’s

2005 MRI results show, they do not show that the defendants

used excessive force when they arrested him in 2003.

that was used than cases like this one, where the arrestee

was able to leave the scene without assistance and apparently required no immediate medical attention. Second,

and most significantly, Abdullahi presented disputed

factual issues concerning the type of force that the defendants used: although the defendants testified that they

merely placed a knee on the arrestee’s back, the plaintiff

introduced medical evidence that the arrestee had

been strangled and his chest crushed. Here, by contrast,

there is no evidence—direct or circumstantial—that

contradicts the defendants’ version of events.6

In short, in the present case, unlike Abdullahi, there are

no factual disputes the resolution of which could make it

reasonable to conclude that the defendants’ use of force

was disproportionate given the threat they reasonably

believed they faced.

2. The defendants’ failure to identify themselves as

officers

Catlin also argues, somewhat more plausibly, that it was

unreasonable for the defendants to fail to identify themselves as police officers at some point during the arrest.

Here, it is helpful to distinguish between the defendants’
No. 07-3903 13

failure to identify themselves initially, and their failure

to identify themselves after they had forced Catlin from

his motorcycle but before they had fully restrained him.

It seems to us that there was nothing unreasonable

about the defendants’ initial failure to identify themselves. The defendants believed that Catlin was armed and

that there was a high probability that he would fight if he

were given the opportunity. Having concluded that they

needed to act quickly in order to minimize the risk to

themselves and to bystanders, the defendants could

have reasonably concluded that they needed to use the

element of surprise to their advantage.

The defendants’ continuing failure to identify themselves after they forced Catlin from his motorcycle seems

to us more problematic. On Catlin’s version of events, the

defendants told him to “quit resisting” when they had

him face-down on the grass, but they did not identify

themselves as police officers until after he was handcuffed. Assuming, as we must, the truth of these allegations, the risk the defendants ran in failing to identify

themselves is that Catlin would think that he was being

attacked by common criminals and that this would

make him more likely to resist. Indeed, this may have

been what actually happened. Catlin admitted that after

he was forced from his motorcycle, he struggled and

managed to break free. Had the defendants identified

themselves as police officers, it is conceivable that Catlin

might haven given up without a fight, thus obviating

the need for the defendants’ final show of force. At any

rate, a reasonable jury might so conclude.
14 No. 07-3903

While we decline to decide whether the defendants’ failure 7

to identify themselves as police officers violated Catlin’s

Fourth Amendment rights, we note that “[p]olice officers who

unreasonably create a physically threatening situation in the

midst of a Fourth Amendment seizure cannot be immunized

for the use of deadly force.” Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d

230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993). Presumably this is equally true

when police officers unreasonably contribute to a situation

in which they are forced to use non-deadly force.

On the other hand, we must make allowances for the defendants’ split-second judgments. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.

Accordingly, our sister circuits have been reluctant to hold

that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment where his or her

split-second judgments exacerbate the need for force. See Grazier

ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir.

2003); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993); Fraire

v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992).

It seems to us a close question whether the defendants’

failure to identify themselves was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. However, even if we 7

assume that the defendants’ failure to identify themselves

as officers after wrestling Catlin from his motorcycle was

objectively unreasonable, they would still be entitled to

qualified immunity unless the putative unlawfulness of

their conduct was apparent in the light of pre-existing

law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see

also Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009)

(“Public employees are not required, at their financial

peril, to anticipate developments in constitutional law.”).

Even where a plaintiff can show that an officer’s use of

force was objectively unreasonable, qualified immunity
No. 07-3903 15

Without reaching the question of whether such a constitu- 8

tional obligation exists, the First Circuit held that this putative

obligation would not have been clearly established in 1990.

See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1995).

affords the officer an additional layer of protection. See

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Specifically, while the substantive constitutional standard protects officers’ reasonable

factual mistakes, qualified immunity protects them from

liability where they reasonably misjudge the legal standard. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 583, 650-51 (1998); Teressa

E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should

Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983

Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 135, 156 (2007).

In the present case, it is far from clearly established that

the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to

identify themselves in the course of carrying out an

arrest in a public place. To the contrary, while the

Supreme Court has held that police officers usually must

announce their identity before carrying out an arrest in a

private dwelling, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934

(1995), we are aware of no court of appeals decision that

has recognized a constitutional obligation on the part of

the police to announce their identity when they carry out

an arrest in a public place. Further, the district courts

8

that have considered this issue are, if anything, divided.

Compare Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889, 905 (W.D. Mo.

1996) (“a seizure outside the home may be unreasonable

because the officers involved were not identified or
16 No. 07-3903

identifiable as such, and the seized person suffers

injuries because of the officers’ lack of identification.”) and

Newell v. City of Salina, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155 (D. Kan.

2003) (holding that a seizure “without having identified

themselves as law enforcement officers, may not be

objectively reasonable.”) with Sanchez v. City of New

York, No. 96-C-7254, 2000 WL 987288, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

July 17, 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claim because it “assumes the uncertain proposition

that the reasonableness of a seizure outside the home

depends on whether the police officer made an announcement or identification”).

If there is a legitimate question as to the existence of

the right at issue, then qualified immunity attaches.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985). In the

present case, even if the defendants had consulted a

casebook prior to formulating their plan, they still would

not have had fair notice that they had a constitutional

obligation to announce their identity prior to completing the arrest. Thus, they are entitled to qualified

immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

It is conceivable that the defendants’ failure to identify

themselves as officers after initially restraining Catlin

increased the likelihood that he would resist, and thus

increased the amount of force they had to use in order to

effect his arrest. Nevertheless, it is not clearly established

that the defendants have a constitutional duty to identify
No. 07-3903 17

themselves as officers after they initially immobilize

an arrestee but before they fully restrain him.

AFFIRMED.

7-21-09