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2023 IL App (5th) 230056-U 

NO. 5-23-0056 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-CF-689 

 ) 

MAURICE BROOKS, ) Honorable 

 ) Derek J. Girton, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Moore concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s untimely pro 

se motion for an “adjustment” in his sentence, and any argument to the contrary 

 would lack merit, this court grants the defendant’s attorney’s motion for leave to 

withdraw as counsel, vacates the circuit court’s order that “denied” the defendant’s 

pro se motion, and orders the defendant’s pro se motion dismissed. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Maurice Brooks, appeals from the circuit court’s order that “denied” his

pro se motion for an “adjustment” to his sentence of imprisonment. The defendant filed his motion 

nearly three years after he, pursuant to a fully negotiated agreement with the State, pleaded guilty 

to intentional first degree murder and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 32 years. The 

defendant’s appointed attorney in this appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD),

has concluded that this appeal lacks substantial merit. On that basis, it has filed with this court a 

motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)), along 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/14/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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with a memorandum of law in support thereof. OSAD gave proper notice to the defendant. This 

court gave him an opportunity to file a pro se brief, memorandum, or other document explaining 

why OSAD should not be allowed to withdraw as counsel, or why this appeal has merit, but the 

defendant has not taken advantage of that opportunity. This court has examined OSAD’s Finley

motion and the accompanying memorandum of law, as well as the entire record on appeal, and has 

concluded that this appeal does indeed lack merit. Accordingly, OSAD must be granted leave to 

withdraw as counsel. The judgment of the circuit court, which “denied” the defendant’s pro se

motion, must be vacated, and the pro se motion itself must be ordered dismissed, for the reasons 

given below. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The Charges and the Plea of Guilty

¶ 5 In 2017, the defendant was charged by information with three counts of first degree murder 

(intentional, knowing, and strong probability) and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon 

by a felon. The three murder counts alleged that in October 2017, the defendant had personally 

discharged a firearm, causing the death of Gerald Taylor. In February 2018, the information was 

superseded by an indictment, which charged the defendant with those same four offenses.

¶ 6 Proceedings were delayed for approximately one year after the defendant’s public defender 

filed a motion raising a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness to stand trial. The circuit court 

found the defendant unfit. Eventually, though, the court found that he had been restored to fitness. 

¶ 7 On September 9, 2019, the defendant, his public defender, and the prosecutor appeared 

before the circuit court, and the parties announced that they had reached a plea agreement. The 

prosecutor moved to amend count I of the indictment, charging intentional first degree murder, by 

removing the reference to the defendant’s personally discharging a firearm. The public defender 
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had no objection to that amendment, and count I was so amended. (This court notes that by 

removing the reference to personally discharging a firearm, a mandatory 25-years-to-life 

enhancement was removed from the defendant’s prison sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-

1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016).) 

¶ 8 The prosecutor then stated the terms of the plea agreement, to which the public defender 

concurred. The defendant would plead guilty to the amended count I, and he would be sentenced 

to imprisonment for 32 years, with credit for time served, to be followed by mandatory supervised 

release (MSR) for 3 years.

¶ 9 The prosecutor recounted the defendant’s prior criminal history, including: (1) a six-year 

prison sentence following a 1993 conviction for manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance; 

(2) a four-year prison sentence following a 1998 conviction for manufacture or delivery of a 

controlled substance; (3) a six-year prison sentence following a 2002 conviction for aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon; and (4) a six-year prison sentence following a 2012 conviction for 

unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The prosecutor also mentioned that the Cook County 

circuit court convicted defendant of trespass to land in 2008 and misdemeanor domestic battery in 

2010. 

¶ 10 The defendant confirmed both the terms of the plea agreement and that he wanted to plead 

guilty. The court thoroughly admonished the defendant about his rights, etc. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402 

(eff. July 1, 2012). The prosecutor recited a factual basis, viz., that on the parking lot of a publichousing complex in Danville, Illinois, the defendant and Gerald Taylor became embroiled in an 

argument, and the defendant demanded that Taylor move his car; as Taylor attempted to move his 

car, the defendant “caused severe bodily injury to the victim, which caused his death.” The 

defendant pleaded guilty to count I, and he signed a written plea of guilty. The court accepted his 
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plea, determining that it was knowing and voluntary, and it determined that there was a sufficient 

factual basis for the plea. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(b), (c) (eff. July 1, 2012). The court entered 

judgment on the plea on count I of the indictment, and it dismissed the other three courts. The 

parties waived a presentence investigation report. 

¶ 11 In accordance with the plea agreement, the court imposed a sentence of 32 years, with 

credit for time served, to be followed by 3 years of MSR. A written judgment and sentence was 

entered on October 4, 2019. 

¶ 12 Finally, the circuit court informed the defendant that he had a right to appeal, and it 

thoroughly admonished him about his appeal rights. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). 

The court’s admonishments included the following: “Prior to taking an appeal, you must file in the 

trial court within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed a written motion asking to have 

the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw your plea, setting forth the grounds for the 

motion.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c)(2) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). The defendant indicated that he 

understood his appeal rights. 

¶ 13 The defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. There was no appeal 

from the judgment of conviction. 

¶ 14 The Defendant’s Motion: The Subject of the Instant Appeal 

¶ 15 On August 23, 2022—that is, almost three years after the final judgment was entered in 

this case—the defendant filed a pro se “Defendant’s Request / Motion for the People and this Court 

to Consider a Possible Adjustment to Defendant’s Sentence Due to Recent Changes in Illinois 

Law.” In his pro se motion, the defendant quoted from the transcript of his guilty-plea hearing, 

where the circuit court inquired about the defendant’s prior convictions, and the prosecutor listed 

those convictions, including “a 2002 agg-uuw” for which the defendant was sentenced to “six 
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years Cook County.” The defendant then cited the decision in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, 

wherein our supreme court held, inter alia, that “the Class 4 form of section 24-1.6(a)(1), 

(a)(3)(A), (d)” of the aggravated unlawful use of weapons (AUUW) statute violates the second 

amendment right to keep and bear arms (U.S. Const., amend. II). Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. 

Reflecting Aguilar, the Cook County circuit court had recently “vacated” his 2002 AUUW 

conviction and issued an order granting him “[a] certificate of innocence” in regard to that AUUW. 

The defendant emphasized that “the filing of this request / motion does not in any way present a 

challenge to his plea of guilty, but merely brings to the attention of the people and the court that 

his 2002 conviction for AUUW has recently been vacated due to changes in Illinois law.” The 

defendant argued that “there is a strong assumption” that the State, as it formulated a plea offer in 

his case, considered the defendant’s criminal history, including his since-vacated AUUW 

conviction. Finally, the defendant asked the prosecutor and the circuit court to “consider a possible 

adjustment to defendant’s current sentence due to recent changes in Illinois law and/or facts the 

People may have considered and applied in determining a possible sentence in regards to 

defendant’s plea agreement.”

¶ 16 Attached to the defendant’s pro se motion was a copy of an order entered by the circuit 

court of Cook County, and signed by a judge on July 11, 2022. In that order, it was stated that the 

defendant’s conviction in Cook County case No. 02-CR-29816 had been reversed, and that the 

defendant’s acts charged in that case did not constitute a crime under Illinois law. 

¶ 17 On November 4, 2022, the circuit court of Vermilion County “denied” the defendant’s 

motion for an adjustment in his sentence. In a docket-entry order, the court stated that the 

defendant “cites no legal authority or alleges no facts” that would allow the court to adjust his 

sentence.
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¶ 18 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial, which the circuit court also denied. 

The defendant then filed a notice of appeal. OSAD was appointed to represent him. 

¶ 19 ANALYSIS

¶ 20 Approximately three years after the final judgment was entered in this case, the defendant 

filed a pro se motion for an “adjustment” in his negotiated 32-year prison term, and the circuit 

court entered an order that “denied” the motion. The defendant now appeals. As previously noted, 

his appointed attorney, OSAD, has concluded that the appeal lacks merit, and on that basis, it has 

filed a Finley motion to withdraw as counsel. This court concludes that the circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction to decide the defendant’s pro se motion. Accordingly, this court cannot consider the 

merits of the appeal. This court must grant OSAD’s motion, vacate the circuit court’s judgment, 

and dismiss the defendant’s pro se motion. 

¶ 21 Here, the defendant fully negotiated a plea agreement with the State. At a plea-andsentencing hearing, held on September 9, 2019, the State moved to amend the intentional first

degree murder count against the defendant (so as to remove the language that would have 

mandated a huge enhancement to the defendant’s sentence), and the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily pleaded guilty to that amended count. The circuit court, in accordance with the parties’ 

agreement, dismissed the three other counts against the defendant and imposed a 32-year prison 

sentence for murder. Finally, at the end of the plea-and-sentencing hearing, the court admonished 

the defendant under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). Admonishment under 

Rule 605(c) was appropriate, given that judgment was entered upon a negotiated plea. 

¶ 22 Where a case involves a negotiated plea, Rule 605(c) requires the court, at the time it 

imposes sentence, to advise the defendant “substantially” as follows: (1) that he has a right to 

appeal; (2) that prior to taking an appeal, he must file, within 30 days of sentencing, a written 
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motion to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, setting forth the 

grounds for the motion; (3) that if the motion is allowed, the judgment will be vacated, and a trial 

will be scheduled on the charge(s) to which he pleaded guilty; (4) that upon the State’s request, 

any charges that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement will be reinstated and also set for 

trial; (5) that if the defendant is indigent, he will be given a copy of the guilty-plea hearing at no 

cost to him, and counsel will be appointed to assist with the preparation of the motions; and (6) that 

in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty, any issue that is not raised in the 

motion to withdraw plea is considered waived. Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). 

¶ 23 In the instant case, the circuit court exceeded the requirements of Rule 605(c), thoroughly 

advising the defendant of his appeal rights by giving a nearly verbatim recitation of the rule. The 

defendant indicated his understanding of those admonishments. (The defendant has not alleged 

that the admonishments he received were, in any way, inadequate.) 

¶ 24 Contrary to the rule, and to the court’s admonishments, the defendant did not file, within 

30 days of sentencing, a motion to withdraw his plea. Instead, he irregularly filed—almost three 

years after sentencing—a pro se “Defendant’s Request / Motion for the People and this Court to 

Consider a Possible Adjustment to Defendant’s Sentence Due to Recent Changes in Illinois Law.” 

Without commenting on the nature or the content of the defendant’s pro se motion, this court notes 

that it was filed (far) beyond Rule 605(c)’s 30-day deadline for the filing of a motion to withdraw 

plea. The motion thus was untimely, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. 

¶ 25 “Generally, a circuit court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after 

entry of judgment.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skyrd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 40 (2011). Furthermore, the 

parties in this case did not do anything that served to revest the court with jurisdiction to hear the 

merits of the defendant’s motion. See People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 25 (how the parties 
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may revest a court with jurisdiction). This court’s review is limited to considering the issue of 

jurisdiction below. Id. ¶ 29. In other words, this court considers the lateness of the defendant’s 

pro se motion, and the effect of that lateness on the circuit court’s jurisdiction, and not the merits 

of the appeal. 

¶ 26 The final judgment in a criminal case is the oral pronouncement of the sentence. See 

People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378, 381 (1978). After his sentence was pronounced on September 9, 

2019, the defendant had 30 days in which to file a motion to vacate judgment and withdraw the 

plea. See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). He failed to do so, and consequently the 

circuit court lost jurisdiction. In the November 4, 2022, docket-entry order disposing of the 

defendant’s motion for an “adjustment” in his sentence, the circuit court did not explicitly 

acknowledge that it had lost jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, the circuit court’s order “denied” 

the motion; it did not simply dismiss the motion. Because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, its 

ruling on the merits of the motion was void. See People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993). 

Therefore, the circuit court’s judgment should be vacated, and this court should order that the 

defendant’s pro se motion should be dismissed. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 29 (where the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction over a defendant’s untimely motion, the appellate court “need not dismiss 

the appeal” but should vacate the circuit court’s judgment and order that the defendant’s motion 

be dismissed). 

¶ 27 CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, this court grants OSAD’s Finley motion to withdraw as counsel 

due to the meritlessness of this appeal. This court also vacates the judgment of the circuit court 

and, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), orders that the defendant’s 

pro se motion for an “adjustment” in his sentence is dismissed. 
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¶ 29 OSAD’s motion granted; judgment vacated; defendant’s pro se motion dismissed.