Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-3009| August 7, 2019 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. O’Connor

O’Connor & Auersch 

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carl Smith,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 7, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3009

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G08-1705-CM-17562

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-3009| August 7, 2019 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] In May of 2017, a vehicle being driven by Carl Smith was stopped by police 

after committing multiple traffic infractions. After it was determined that 

Smith’s driver’s license was suspended, officers decided to have the vehicle 

towed. Prior to being towed, officers searched Smith’s vehicle and discovered a 

handgun, for which Smith did not have a license to carry. In October of 2018, 

Smith was convicted of Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a 

license and Class A infraction driving while suspended. Smith does not contest 

his conviction for driving while suspended but contends that the purported

inventory search was not conducted pursuant to established departmental 

routine or regulation, violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution. Finding his contention dispositive and agreeing 

with it, we affirm his conviction for driving while suspended and reverse his 

conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 10, 2017, a vehicle being driven by Smith was pulled over by 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Aaron Trotter for committing multiple 

traffic infractions. After Smith admitted to not having a driver’s license, Officer 

Trotter requested Smith’s name and date of birth. Smith replied that he did not 

have a date of birth and asked for Officer Trotter’s supervisor. Once Officer 

Trotter’s sergeant arrived, Smith was removed from the vehicle and placed in 

handcuffs. Officer Trotter eventually obtained a document containing Smith’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-3009| August 7, 2019 Page 3 of 10

name and social security number. After identifying Smith by searching the 

police database, a cross-search of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles’s records 

revealed that Smith’s driver’s license was suspended. While Officer Trotter 

began filling out paperwork to arrest Smith for driving while suspended and 

failure to identify, two other officers searched the vehicle, discovering a 

handgun in the glove box. At some point, an acquaintance of Smith arrived on 

scene with a valid driver’s license and was permitted by the officers to drive 

Smith’s vehicle home.

[3] On May 12, 2017, the State charged Smith with Class A misdemeanor carrying 

a handgun without a license, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, 

and Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify. On October 10, 2018, a bench 

trial was held, at which Smith moved to suppress evidence discovered during 

the search, claiming that the search was unconstitutional. The State solely 

argued that the search was a valid inventory search. The trial court denied

Smith’s motion and found him guilty of Class A misdemeanor carrying a 

handgun without a license and Class A infraction driving while suspended. The 

trial court sentenced Smith to 365 days with 357 days suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Smith contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence obtained 

during the search of his car because said search violated his rights pursuant to 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Smith 

contends that the State failed to establish that the impoundment was done 
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pursuant to the police department’s established routine or regulation. The 

admission of evidence is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and we will only reverse its ruling if it is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances. Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 

2013) (internal quotations omitted). However, we review the trial court’s ruling 

on the constitutionality of a search or seizure de novo. Campos v. State, 885 

N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008). 

[5] The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right “to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures[.]” “[W]hen police impound a vehicle and inventory its contents, they 

effect a search and seizure, and both measures must be reasonable—that is, 

executed under a valid warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement.” Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016). A wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement is a valid inventory search. 

Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “The rationale for the 

inventory exception is three-fold: 1) protection of private property in police 

custody; 2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and 3) 

protection of police from possible danger.” Id. Thus, the inventory search serves 

an administrative rather than investigatory purpose. Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 375. 

The State bears the burden of proving that the inventory search was reasonable. 

Id. The threshold question in determining the validity of an inventory search is 

proper impoundment, and impoundment is reasonable if authorized by statute 

or the police’s discretionary community-caretaking function. Id. at 374–75. 
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Because neither party contends that the inventory search was authorized by 

statute, we focus on whether the search was reasonable pursuant to the police’s 

community-caretaking function. 

[6] The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “police may discharge their 

caretaking function whenever circumstances compel it, but also that a decision 

to impound must be exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of 

something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 375 

(internal citations omitted). The rule that the standardized criteria or established 

routine must exist as a precondition to a valid inventory search is designed to 

ensure that an inventory search is not a pretext “for general rummaging in order 

to discover incriminating evidence.” Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 435 (Ind. 

1993) (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). Thus, in order for the 

State to prevail on the question of whether an impoundment was warranted in 

terms of the community-caretaking function and was not pretextual, it must 

establish that (1) consistent with objective standards of sound policing, the 

officer believed that the vehicle posed a threat of harm to the community or was 

itself imperiled, and (2) the officer’s decision to impound the vehicle adhered to 

established departmental routine or regulation. Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 376. 

[7] We conclude that the State failed to establish that Officer Trotter’s decision to 

impound Smith’s vehicle adhered to established departmental routine or 

regulation. While we do not require evidence of the department’s written 

procedure, we do require more than conclusory testimony from an officer. Id.

An officer’s testimony provides adequate evidence of the department’s 
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impoundment procedure if “it outlines the department’s standard impound 

procedure and specifically describes how the decision to impound adhered to 

departmental policy or procedure—as opposed to an officer’s generalized 

assertion.” Id. at 377 (internal quotations omitted). Here, Officer Trotter 

testified that the inventory search of Smith’s vehicle was pursuant to a “typical 

tow policy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. Officer Trotter also testified that it would be 

typical for him to request a tow of a vehicle when there is no licensed driver 

present. Officer Trotter’s testimony regarding impoundment is at best a 

generalized assertion that the impoundment and search were conducted

pursuant to the department’s procedure; however, it fails to specially describe 

how the impoundment decision adhered to the department’s procedure. 

Moreover, the State acknowledges that “there was not sufficient evidence of the 

[Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department] inventory policy admitted at 

trial.” Appellee Br. p. 14. Given the conclusory nature of Officer Trotter’s 

testimony and the State’s concession, we conclude that the trial court 

erroneously admitted the evidence obtained from the inventory search. 

[8] The State argues that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, another 

established exception to the warrant requirement. While Officer Meyer testified 

that it was his belief that this was a search pursuant to a lawful arrest, the State 

never adopted or made that argument at trial. Therefore, the State has waived 

that argument for appellate review. See Whitfield v. State, 699 N.E.2d 666, 669 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that an argument raised for the first time on 

appeal is waived and will not be considered), trans. denied. 
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[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, vacating 

Smith’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a 

license. 

Crone, J., concurs.

Tavitas, J., concurs in result with opinion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-3009| August 7, 2019 Page 8 of 10

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carl Smith,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3009

Tavitas, Judge, concurring in result with opinion.

[10] I concur in result with the majority’s opinion. I write separately, however, to 

emphasize the unusual circumstances here.

[11] In Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 375-76 (Ind. 2016), our Supreme Court noted 

that the State is required to satisfy both of the following elements to prove that 

the decision to impound a person’s vehicle without a warrant was reasonable:

(1) Consistent with objective standards of sound policing, an 

officer must believe the vehicle poses a threat of harm to the 

community or is itself imperiled; and

(2) The officer’s decision to impound adhered to established 

departmental routine or regulation.
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Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 375-76.

[12] It is perfectly clear that the first prong of the test was met here. The officer 

observed multiple traffic violations and stopped the vehicle that Smith was 

driving. An adult female and four children were also in the vehicle. Smith, 

who adheres to the sovereign citizen ideology, repeatedly refused to identify 

himself. The officer was eventually able to identify Smith and learned that 

Smith’s driver’s license was suspended. The female passenger also lacked a 

valid driver’s license. The officer testified that Smith’s vehicle posed a hazard 

to public safety because it was parked in the single travel lane of the road, 

which had no on-street parking lane, and the officers decided to tow the vehicle. 

The officers then completed an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered 

the handgun. As the vehicle was parked in the travel lane of a road and neither 

adult in the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s license, towing of the vehicle was 

clearly consistent with sound policing.

[13] As for the second element, it seems clear that the officer’s decision to impound 

would have complied with any department’s impoundment policy. Our 

Supreme Court, however, has held that “[o]fficer testimony provides adequate 

evidence of departmental impound policy if it outlines the department’s 

standard impound procedure and specifically describes how the decision to 

impound adhered to departmental policy or procedure.” Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 

377. On appeal, the State concedes that “there was not sufficient evidence of 

the IMPD inventory policy admitted at trial.” Appellee’s Br. p. 14. Because 

the State failed to present sufficient evidence at the trial that the officer’s 
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decision adhered to established departmental routine or regulation, I am 

constrained to find that the trial court erroneously admitted the evidence 

obtained during the search of the vehicle.

[14] The State also argues that the evidence was admissible under the search 

incident to arrest exception because it was reasonable to believe that evidence 

relevant to the crime of arrest would be found in the vehicle.1 Specifically, the 

State contends the officers were looking in the vehicle for Smith’s identification. 

The majority holds that the State waived this argument. I disagree that the 

State waived this argument. We may affirm a trial court’s ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence “on any theory supported by the evidence.” Satterfield 

v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). I conclude, however, that the State 

failed to present sufficient evidence at the trial to establish that the search 

incident to arrest exception is applicable here. At the time of the search, the 

officers had already identified Smith and already learned that his driver’s 

license was suspended. A search of the vehicle would not have revealed 

evidence that Smith refused to identify himself or drove while suspended. For 

these reasons, I concur in result.

 

1 Under the search incident to arrest exception, “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's 

arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or

it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 

332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (emphasis added). The State does not argue that Smith was within 

reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search; rather, the State argues only that it 

was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest.