## UNITED STATES ARMY COUR T OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before TOZZI, CELTNICKS and BURTON Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Sergeant MARCUS C. DANIELS

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20140538

Headquarters, U.S. Army Alaska

David L. Conn, Military Judge Colonel Tyler J. Harder, Sta ff Judge Advocate (pretrial) Colonel Erik L. Christiansen, St aff Judge Advocate (post-trial)

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles Loza no, JA; Major Andres Vazquez, Jr., JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colone l A.G. Courie III, JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, JA; Capt ain Linda Chavez, JA (on brief).

8 December 2016

---------------------------------- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

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Per Curiam:

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of dr unken operation of a vehicle and three specifications of service discrediting conduct when he misr epresented his rank on a credit union’s employment verification form in viol ation of Articles 111 and 134, Uniform Code of Militar y Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 911 and 934 (2006 Supp. V. 2012; 2012) [hereinafter UCMJ] . The military judge convic ted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of six specificat ions of violating a general order in violation of Article 92, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced appellan t to a bad-cond uct discharge, confinement for 180 days, an d to be reduced to the gr ade of E-1. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence.

This case is before us for review pursuant to Ar ticle 66, UCMJ. Appellate defense counsel assigns two errors to this court: appellant alleges his defenseDANIELS— ARMY 20140538

2 counsel was ineffective regarding submi ssion of Rule for Courts-Martial 1105 matters and excessive po st-trial delay. We will defer ruling on these issues as well as matters appellant has raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon

, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).

After appellant was convicted, his defe nse counsel was tran sitioning out of the Army. Appellant released his assi gned counsel and was assigned new defense counsel for post-trial matte rs. The newly assigned de fense counsel submitted posttrial matters and clemency matters on behalf of appe llant, which consisted of a

memorandum with two enclos ures: Memorandum for Reco rd (MFR), dated 25 June 2015, and a DCAP Form 6 (Det ail and Release of Milita ry Defense Counsel).

Appellant claims he suffere d prejudicial error because of the contents of the

MFR. “Effective assistance of counsel is especi ally important during the post-trial phase because it is the accused’s best hope for post-trial relief.” United States v. Howard , 47 M.J. 104, 106 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (cita tions omitted). To ensure appellant receives his “best hope for post-trial relie f,” we set aside the action and return the

record of trial for a new staff judge advocate recomme ndation and action by a different convening authority. Additional ly, the MFR dated 25 June 2015 will not be presented to this new convening authority unless appellant cons ents to its use.

CONCLUSION

The action of the convening authority dated 17 July 2 015, is set as ide. The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General for a new staff judge advocate recommendation and action by a different convening authority in accordance with Article 60(c)-(e). The ne w convening authority will not consider the MFR dated 25 June 2015 without appellant’s consent.

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court FOR THE COURT: