ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

OP 22-0135 

JOHN and HEATHER STENSON, individually 

and on behalf of minor child, R.L.S., 

FILED 

APR 19 2022 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State n1 Mnntana 

Petitioners, 

v. ORDER 

MONTANA SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT, HON. RAY J. DAYTON, Presiding 

Respondent. 

Through counsel, Petitioners John and Heather Stenson, individually and on behalf of 

minor child R.L.S., seek a writ of supervisory control over the Second Judicial District 

Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, and Honorable Ray J. Dayton, to direct the District Court 

to enter a protective order to prevent the deposition of R.L.S. in the underlying Cause No. 

DV 20-252. 

Stensons are the parents of 17-year-old R.L.S., who was a student at Butte Central 

Catholic High School. One of his teachers, Brad Kadrmas, lived with his wife Amy and 

their son D.K. in an apartment in the school building. Stensons allege that the Kadrmases 

invited R.L.S. to the apartment multiple times, where Amy provided him alcohol, cigarettes, 

and marijuana. Stensons filed a negligence action against the Kadrmases and Butte Central 

Catholic High School, Butte Central Schools, Roman Catholic Diocese of Helena, and 

Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena (collectively "Religious Entities"). They claim that 

R.L.S. suffered severe emotional distress arising frorn Amy's alleged conduct and that after 

public exposure of the activity he was branded a "narc", leading to ostracism, isolation and 

additional mental health and substance abuse issues. 

The Religious Entities noticed the deposition of R.L.S., and Stensons sought a 

protective order to preclude it. After considering the parties' arguments, the District Court 

04/19/2022

Case Number: OP 22-0135
denied Stensons' request, concluding that they had not met their burden to show that 

"good cause exists to prevent the harm or prejudice that will result from taking the 

deposition of R.L.S." Stensons now seek this Court's intervention, arguing that the 

District Court ignored the physical risks identified by Dr. Roy Lubit, who conducted a 

forensic psychiatric evaluation of R.L.S. and whose opinions they allege were 

uncontroverted. At our invitation, the Religious Entities have responded and urge the Court 

to deny supervisory control. Amy Kadrmas also has filed a response adopting and joining in 

the arguments the Religious Entities advance. 

Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes justified when 

urgency or emergency factors exist making the nonnal appeal process inadequate, when the 

case involves purely legal questions, and, applicable to the Stensons' arguments, when the 

other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice. 

M. R. App. P. 14(3). In that regard, supervisory control is appropriate when the district court 

is proceeding based on a mistake of law which, if uncorrected, would cause significant 

injustice for which an appeal is an inadequate remedy. Truman v. Mont. Eleventh Judicial 

Dist. Court, 2003 MT 91, ¶ 13, 315 Mont. 165, 68 P.3d 654 (citing Park v. Sixth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 1998 MT 164, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 367, 961 P.2d 1267). Whether to assume 

supervisory control is a "case-by-case decision that depends on the presence of extraordinary 

circumstances and a particular need to prevent an injustice from occurring." Truman, ¶ 13 

(citing Park, ¶ 13). Pretrial discovery disputes typically are not appropriate for exercise of 

supervisory control. USAA Cas. Inc. Co. v Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 19-0139, 

396 Mont. 547, 449 P.3d 793 (Apr. 23, 2019). 

Stensons acknowledge our strict standards for discretionary intervention but argue 

that extraordinary circumstances exist here that render an appeal inadequate to remedy the 

District Court's alleged error. They claim that R.L.S. already has provided extensive 

information through two forensic interviews with law enforcement, that there is no new 

information to be gained, and that the Religious Entities' "purported need to 'assess the 

psychological damages. . . claimed in this case' can and will be done" when R.L.S. meets 

2 
with Dr. Michael Biitz for an Independent Medical Examination on June 10, 2022. Stensons 

maintain that the District Court abused its discretion in denying a protective order because it 

provided no analysis and made no findings of fact in the face of the uncontroverted affidavit 

from Dr. Lubit. They conclude that this Court's exercise of supervisory control is necessary 

to "prevent additional emotional and psychological harm to a juvenile." 

Religious Entities respond that the facts the Stensons allege are highly contested and 

depend on the testimony of R.L.S., whose truthfulness they dispute. Without R.L.S.'s 

testimony at trial, they argue, Stensons have no adrnissible evidence of their claims that the 

Kadrmases provided him with any illicit substances or that Religious Entities breached any 

duties. They contend that R.L.S. also is the sole source of key information related to 

causation and damages and that Stensons did not put forth any credible evidence that R.L.S. 

will suffer harm if the deposition proceeds. Religious Entities maintain that they should be 

afforded the opportunity to question R.L.S. under oath about his allegations before trial. 

They dispute Stensons' characterizations of Dr. Lubitz's report and conclude that the 

District Court's ruling is not based purely on a question of law appropriate for supervisory 

control. Religious Entities argue that the trial court did not in any event abuse its discretion 

in refusing the protective order Stensons requested. 

Noting a trial court's "inherent power to control discovery by denying a motion for 

protective order and allowing a deposition to proceed," we recently declined to exercise 

supervisory control over a district court's refusal to stop the deposition o.f a party who 

claimed it would cause him severe anxiety that could lead to his suicide. Henderson v. Third 

Jud. District Court, No. OP 22-0069 (Feb. 15, 2022). We observed that the trial court's 

decision was based on the evidentiary record before it and drew conclusions from its 

consideration of that evidence in ruling to deny the motion for protective order. In the same 

vein, the District Court here had evidence that R.L.S. had told his counselor, Mr. Valentino, 

that R.L.S. was willing to speak to the lawyers and would testify so long as the people 

involved were not present. Both parties presented the trial court, and again this Court, with 

substantial background and docurnentation to support their positions. The materials we have 

3 
reviewed in conjunction with Stensons' petition convince us, as in Henderson, that the 

petition for writ does not raise an issue that is purely one of law but involves a matter of 

discretion based on determination of facts. It therefore fails to satisfy the standards for 

supervisory control. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of supervisory control is 

DENIED and DISMISSED. 

The Clerk is directed to provide notice of this Order to all counsel of record in the 

Second Judicial District Court's Butte-Silver Bow County Cause No. DV 20-252 and to the 

Honorable Ray J. Dayton, presiding District Court Judge. 

DATED this I c i day of April, 2022. 

Chief Justice 

A?-4', 41,1& 

4 

Justices