Filed 12/15/21 P. v. Jones CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHANGA JONES,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B306128

(Super. Ct. No. NA036778)

(Los Angeles County)

Changa Jones appeals the denial of his petition for 

resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, the Three 

Strikes Reform Act.1 We affirm.

FACTS

Danny Mosley, a Montebello automobile detailer, hired 

Jones. It was a bad employment decision. On the same morning 

he hired Jones, Jones left the business with a car without 

permission.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated.
2.

Mosley found Jones driving the car in Long Beach. He told 

Jones nothing would happen if he returned the car. Jones replied 

that he was going home and drove away. Mosley called the police 

who took up the chase.

In an attempt to elude the police, Jones drove at speeds in 

excess of 70 miles per hour. He hit a police van, but drove on. 

Later he failed to negotiate a left turn, jumped the curb, and hit a 

building. He proceeded down a crowded sidewalk at speeds

nearing 50 miles per hour. He nearly struck a number of 

pedestrians before killing Ricard Nolbert.

The chase ended when Jones hit a parked van, setting off 

the car’s airbags. Jones abandoned the car and fled on foot before 

he was arrested.

Conviction and Sentence

A jury found Jones guilty of evading the police causing 

death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3), a serious felony; driving or taking a 

vehicle without consent (id., § 10851, subd. (a)); and hit and run 

causing death (id., § 20001, subd. (a)). The trial court found that 

Jones had suffered two prior strikes (residential burglary) within 

the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subd. (e),

1170.12, subd. (c)), and that he had suffered a prior prison term 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The trial court sentenced Jones to 25 years to life for 

evading the police causing death, a consecutive 25 years to life for 

taking or driving a vehicle without consent, plus one year for the 

prior prison term for a total of 51 years to life. The court stayed 

the hit-and-run count under section 654.

Section 1170.126 Petition

Jones filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 

1170.126 on the taking or driving without consent count. The 
3.

trial court denied the petition on the ground that Jones was 

armed with a deadly weapon, the car, during the commission of 

the offense.

DISCUSSION

I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jones contends there is insufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding that he was armed with a deadly weapon 

during the commission of the offense.

In 2012, the electorate enacted section 1170.126 as part of 

Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act. The purpose of the 

act is to exempt certain third strike nonviolent and nonserious

offenses from the imposition of a life sentence under the three 

strikes law. (See People v Brimmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 782, 

791.) Instead, the nonviolent or nonserious offense will be 

sentenced as a second strike. (Ibid.) The act allows a prisoner 

who has already been sentenced to a life sentence for a 

nonviolent or nonserious offense as a third strike to petition to be 

resentenced as a second strike. (Id. at pp. 791-792.)

A defendant is not eligible for relief under section 1170.126 

if he is armed with a deadly weapon “[d]uring the commission of 

the current offense.” (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii), 667, subd. 

(e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.126, subd. (e)(2).) “During the commission of 

the offense” requires a temporal nexus between the arming and 

the underlying felony. (People v. Hicks (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 

275, 284.) It does not require that the deadly weapon be used to 

facilitate the felony. (Id. at pp. 283-284.) 

The exclusion from relief under section 1170.126 applies to 

defendants who are armed with weapons that are not deadly per 

se, so long as the objects are “used in a manner capable of 
4.

producing and likely to produce great bodily injury.” (People v. 

Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1068.) A defendant’s use of a vehicle 

in a manner likely to produce great bodily injury during the 

commission of the offense is sufficient to render the defendant

ineligible for relief under section 1170.126. (Id. at p. 1065.)

The prosecution has the burden of proof to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant is ineligible for relief under 

section 1170.126. (People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 235.) 

We review the trial court’s determination for substantial 

evidence. (People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 661.)

Here Jones was convicted of driving or taking a vehicle 

without the consent of the owner. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) He was 

armed with a vehicle at the time he was driving and was driving 

the vehicle in a manner capable of and likely to produce great 

bodily injury. It is incontrovertible that he was armed with a 

deadly weapon during the commission of the crime of driving a 

vehicle without the owner’s consent.

Jones argues that the taking of the vehicle and driving to 

avoid the police were two separate acts. (Citing People v. Strong

(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366; People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 

880 [a defendant who steals a vehicle and continues to drive it 

after the theft is complete commits separate and distinct

violations of section 10851].) But whether Jones intended to steal 

the car or just drive it, he violated section 10851. (People v. 

Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395 [section 10851 can be 

violated in two ways by theft or by driving].) No matter how 

Jones tries to divide his activities, he cannot escape that he drove 

a car without the owner’s consent while armed with a deadly 

weapon.
5.

The evidence shows Jones is not entitled to relief under 

section 1170.126.

II

Section 667.5

Jones contends the one-year enhancement for a prior prison 

term under section 667.5 must be stricken. He claims he is 

entitled to the benefit of a change in the law.

Effective January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

was amended to apply only to a defendant who served a prior 

prison term for a sexually violent offense. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, 

§ 1.) Jones’s prior prison term was for burglary, not a violent 

sexual offense.

The benefit of a change in legislation applies retroactively 

only to judgments that are not final on the date the change 

becomes effective. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323.)

Jones’s judgment became final in June 2002. Jones argues 

his judgment is not final because this case is currently pending 

before this court. But if all it takes to change a judgment from 

final to not final is an unmeritorious petition for resentencing, no 

judgment would ever be final.

Jones argues that not giving him the benefit of a change in

law violates equal protection. As a threshold for establishing an 

equal protection violation, Jones must show the state has adopted 

a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups 

in an unequal manner. (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 

591-592.) Jones has failed to make the required showing. Those 

whose judgments are final are not similarly situated with those 

whose judgments are not final. The state has an interest in the 

finality of litigation by treating judgments as final.
6.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
7.

William C. Ryan, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.