[Cite as State v. Mapes, 2021-Ohio-257.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALLEN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-20-28 

 v. 

PETER B. MAPES, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Lima Municipal Court 

Trial Court No. 19CRB01421 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: February 1, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Zachary D. Maisch for Appellant 

 David Osborne, Jr. for Appellee 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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ZIMMERMAN, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Peter B. Mapes (“Mapes”), appeals the June 10, 

2020 judgment entry of sentence of the Lima Municipal Court convicting him of 

misconduct at an emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13(A)(1). For the reasons 

that follow, we reverse. 

{¶2} On May 28, 2019, at approximately 7:36 p.m., Lieutenant Shawn Cook 

(“Lieutenant Cook”), of the Ohio State Highway Patrol responded to a one-vehicle 

accident involving Bonnie Juras (“Juras”) in the northbound lanes of I-75, near the 

State Route 65 overpass, in Allen County, Ohio. (Dec. 10, 2019 Tr. at 5, 8). 

According to Lieutenant Cook, “this particular area is * * * known to have quite a 

few crashes. It’s kind of * * * a dangerous area * * * [a]nd this particular day it was 

raining, so the roads were wet.” (Id. at 8). Lieutenant Cook testified that his “first 

priority” when arriving at an accident scene is “to protect the scene” by ensuring no 

“secondary crashes happen.” (Id. at 8-9). “[D]ue to the unique location of this 

particular crash, it was important for [Lieutenant Cook] to keep [his] patrol car south 

of the crash area due to the incline of the roadway [because] vehicles * * * traveling 

northbound can have a difficult time seeing a crash that is on the overpass or just 

north of it.” (Id. at 9). Lieutenant Cook further testified that he “actually had to act 

as a traffic agent * * * to assure traffic was getting over [and] it was important for 

[him] to maintain * * * scene * * * control to ensure all of this traffic was going to 
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the right lane and staying in the right lane. So, what that required [him] to do was 

keep [his] patrol car near the exit ramp and [he] actually had to walk towards the 

bridges deck, so he was sort of another traffic control device [himself], with [his 

vest on with [his yellow] reflective vest * * * .” (Id. at 9). 

{¶3} According to Lieutenant Cook, his “intention was to get [Mapes] offscene as quickly as possible” “to maintain scene security” because “this particular 

stretch of road is * * * very dangerous when there is a crash [and he could recall] 

many scenarios where this same exact sequence of events has occurred and [Ohio 

State Highway Patrol] officers have nearly gotten hit where [Mapes] was parked 

at.” (Emphasis added.) (Id.). Indeed, Lieutenant Cook testified that his “idea is to 

get people out as quickly as possible” because he does not “want anyone to be north 

of that bridge deck because in [his] experience * * * cars [in] in that situation have 

become crash victims themselves.” (Id. at 11-12). 

{¶4} Lieutenant Cook testified that he requested dispatch to have Juras “walk 

back to [him],” but that Mapes “said that [Juras] was not going to come back to 

[him].” (Id. at 11). He testified that Mapes did not want Juras to walk back to him 

on I-75 over the State Route 65 overpass based on Mapes’s “medical field 

experience and injuries and * * * knowing that it was unsafe for [Juras] to walk back 

to [him].” (Id. at 17). He further testified that he again “asked [his] dispatch to tell 

[Mapes] to have [Juras] walk back to” him and “that request happened two or three 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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times and [Juras] never walked back to [him].” (Id. at 14). Thereafter, Lieutenant 

Cook and Mapes “had a conversation that was a long distance away” (while 

Lieutenant Cook was “still acting as sort of a * * * traffic control device”) during 

which Mapes told Lieutenant Cook that “he [was] going to take off * * * with [Juras] 

and come back around.” (Id.). He agreed that Mapes’s actions “add[ed] additional 

time * * * to complete [his] investigation of the scene[.]” (Id. at 21). 

{¶5} On cross-examination, Lieutenant Cook testified that there was a 

distance of approximately 400 feet between his cruiser and Mapes’s vehicle and that 

it was raining. (Id. at 25). Lieutenant Cook agreed “the danger was there inherent 

in the way that the design of that bridge was made, because it was in an area where 

there are many accidents.” (Id. at 28). Lieutenant Cook testified that, after Mapes 

returned, he parked “right behind [him].” (Id.). In sum, Lieutenant Cook testified 

that the accident scene “was pretty volatile and pretty extreme”; that Mapes “refused 

to let Mrs. Juras walk on her own back to [his] cruiser; and that Mapes “left and 

came back and parked behind [his] cruiser [and] ma[d]e sure that Mrs. Juras was 

safe.” (Id. at 35-36). However, when asked if Mapes’s “misconduct” could be 

summarized as “not listening to what [he] wanted him to do,” Lieutenant Cook 

disagreed and provided the following explanation: 

When officers are dispatched to a scene there are multiple things that 

must be done. * * * [S]cene security. I need to protect the integrity 

of the crash. Protecting the integrity of the people involved. * * * 

People can hide evidence. * * * [P]eople can put open containers some 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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place. They can put drugs places. Paraphernalia. * * * [T]hey can 

switch drivers. * * * I have to protect the integrity of the investigation. 

* * * [I]t’s not just about what Mr. Mapes [sic] intentions were * * * 

to provide safety. I ha[d] intentions too. And my intentions [were] to 

keep a crash scene safe. * * * [T]o protect the integrity of the crash 

scene. So, while * * * I understand * * * what he was doing, he was 

wrong. * * * I believe I have [sic] the conversation about the weather, 

it’s not a substantial point to me because I’m standing there too. * * 

* He didn’t present any qualifications about being a meteorologist. * 

* * So, those particular things don’t necessarily * * * dictate how I 

solve and investigate this particular crash [and] those aren’t the only 

things to protect at a crash scene. * * * [T]here’s a whole bunch of 

things that aren’t safe but you have to mitigate safety and * * * getting 

her to me quickly, and in my patrol car and safe is better than having 

someone else get hit on the side of the road. 

(Id. at 36-37). 

{¶6} On re-direct examination, Lieutenant Cook testified that the accident 

did not shut down all lanes of travel on I-75. (Id. at 40). 

{¶7} Mapes testified in his defense that he is a medical doctor and that he 

found Juras “standing on the other side of the wire barrier” of I-75 after her “vehicle 

had impacted the bridge abutment on the left side of the overpass.” (Id. at 52). 

Mapes testified that he assisted Juras with contacting 911 for emergency assistance 

and permitted her to wait inside his vehicle until law enforcement arrived. (Id. at 

52-53). 

{¶8} When Lieutenant Cook arrived at the scene, Mapes exited his vehicle 

to see if Lieutenant Cook “require[d] anything”; however, “[a]s [he] got about 

halfway across the bridge * * *, [Lieutenant Cook] shouted ‘keys’,” but Mapes 
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could not understand him because of the noise from the traffic and the rain. (Id. at 

56-57). Once Mapes understood that Lieutenant Cook wanted the keys to Juras’s 

vehicle, Mapes obtained Juras’s keys and gave them to Lieutenant Cook but did not 

“have any discussion with him,” “just gave him the keys, said here you go, and * * 

* went back and sat in [his] car.” (Id. at 57). Thereafter, according to Mapes, the 

dispatcher called him and said “you need to bring [Juras] back to [Lieutenant 

Cook].” (Id. at 58). In response, Mapes testified that he 

had a duty to tell [Lieutenant Cook] * * * that [he] could not walk her 

back. So, [he] got out of the car, [he] trotted back to [Lieutenant 

Cook], who was holding a broom and was trying to clear the * * * 

debris out of the street. [He] got within 4 feet of him and [he] said 

[he] could not bring her back because it wasn’t safe. And at this point, 

he goes into a tirade, * * * with a raised voice shouting at [him] saying 

that he would not tell [him] what to do in [his] emergency room and 

that [he] should not tell him what to do at the scene of an accident. 

(Id. at 58-59). According to Mapes, he told Lieutenant Cook, “‘Unless you have 

any objection, I’m going to drive Mrs. Juras up to the next exit, drive her back-down 

south and bring her over to you * * *,” to which Lieutenant Cook did not respond. 

(Id. at 59-60). Mapes testified that—had Lieutenant Cook listened to him—he 

would have told him that he 

had three concerns. The first concern was that we already had one 

accident at this location and that traffic was still flowing through at 65 

miles an hour and that we could run the risk of a second accident. * 

* * The second concern * * * was that * * * there was lightening * * 

* very close to the scene. * * * Lastly, * * * Mrs. Juras showed 

evidence of shock and her actions were delayed [and he] was worried 
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that if [he] brought her back to the scene or back past the scene 

towards the officers [sic] car that she would freeze. 

(Id. at 60-61). 

{¶9} Mapes called Juras to testify in his defense who testified that she “hit a 

dip right before the overpass[, which] was filled with water because it had just 

started to downpour” and caused her to hit the bridge embankment. (Id. at 66). 

Juras testified that she was “in shock” after the accident and stranded in the median 

(unable to call 911 for emergency assistance and her insurance representative 

because her cell-phone battery was too low) when Mapes stopped to offer her 

assistance. (Id. at 68). According to Juras, she never spoke with Lieutenant Cook 

until Mapes drove her to the rear of his cruiser. (Id. at 69). 

{¶10} On June 3, 2019, Mapes was charged with misconduct at an 

emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. (Doc. 

No. 1). On June 6, 2019, Mapes appeared and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. 

Nos. 4, 6). 

{¶11} After a bench trial on December 10, 2019, the trial court found Mapes 

guilty on June 9, 2020 of the misconduct-at-an-emergency charge and ordered him 

to pay a $50.00 fine and court costs. (Doc. No. 15).1

 

 

1

 The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 10, 2020. 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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{¶12} Mapes filed his notice of appeal on July 7, 2020. (Doc. No. 17). He 

raises four assignments of error for our review. We will begin by addressing his 

first assignment of error, followed by his second, third, and fourth assignments of 

error together. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The trial Court erred by finding against the weight of the evidence 

that the defendant knowingly hampered the lawful operations of 

a law enforcement officer. 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Mapes argues that his misconduct-atan-accident-scene conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Specifically, Mapes argues that weight of the evidence shows that he did not hamper

the lawful operations of a law enforcement officer at the scene of an accident. We 

agree. 

Standard of Review 

{¶14} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and 

determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

387 (1997). quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on 

matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 

State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the 

manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs 

heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s 

judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, 

quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. 

Analysis 

{¶15} Mapes was convicted of misconduct at an emergency in violation of 

R.C. 2917.13(A)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall 

knowingly” “[h]amper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer * * * 

engaged in the person’s duties at the scene of a * * * accident, * * * or emergency 

of any kind.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is 

aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably 

be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). 

{¶16} On appeal, Mapes argues only that weight of the evidence shows that 

he did not hamper Lieutenant Cook’s investigation at the accident scene. Because 

it is the only element that Mapes challenges on appeal, we will review the weight of 

the evidence supporting only whether Mapes hampered the lawful operations of a 

law enforcement officer engaged in his duties at the scene of an accident. 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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{¶17} The term “hamper” is not defined by the statute. “Any term left 

undefined by statute is to be accorded its common, everyday meaning.” State v. 

Blocker, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-313, 2007-Ohio-144, ¶ 51. A common 

dictionary definition of “hamper” is “to interfere with.” Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary 564 (11th Ed.2003). The term “interfere” commonly means 

“to interpose in a way that hinders or impedes.” Id. at 652. See also State v. 

Stephens, 57 Ohio App.2d 229, 230 (1st Dist.1978) (applying the plain meaning of 

the words “hamper” and “impede” to define the obstructing-official-business 

statute); State v. Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709, ¶ 19 

(defining impeding as a synonym of hampering under the obstructing-officialbusiness statute). 

{¶18} Our sister appellate district observed that “[t]here are only a handful 

of decisions that have discussed this offense. The common thread they share is that 

the defendant acted-out in a way that interfered with an official’s investigation of 

an accident or emergency.” State v. Bryant, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009736, 

2011-Ohio-4555, ¶ 12. In sum, the Ninth District Court of Appeals (after reviewing 

the way in which courts applied the offense) concluded that—to be guilty of 

misconduct at an emergency—“the defendant [must] engage[] in some meddlesome 

or obstreperous conduct.” Id. at ¶ 21. 
Case No. 1-20-28 

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{¶19} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trier of fact 

lost its way in concluding that Mapes hampered Lieutenant Cook’s duties at the 

accident scene. That is, we conclude that the weight of the evidence shows that 

Mapes did not interfere with (or impede) Lieutenant Cook’s investigation by not 

complying with Lieutenant Cook’s order in the way suggested because such would 

have potentially put Juras in peril, but, instead, found an alternative way to comply

that was safer under the facts presented. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates 

that Lieutenant Cook encountered Mapes—who was already assisting Juras—after 

she had been involved in a one-vehicle accident on I-75, near the State Route 65 

overpass. In other words, Mapes was not the “‘bystander [or] curiosity seeker[] at 

[an] emergency scene’” for which the rule is sought to be used “as ‘a specific tool 

for crowd control at emergencies.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting R.C. 2917.13, Legislative 

Service Commission Note (1973). 

{¶20} Moreover, the evidence in the record reflects that Mapes and Juras 

were subject to significant danger from the specific stretch of roadway—as revealed 

by Lieutenant Cook’s testimony—and Mapes’s rational decision to comply with 

Lieutenant Cook’s request in an alternative way that did not put Juras in potential 

peril was prudent under the facts presented. Specifically, the evidence in the record 

reflects that Lieutenant Cook ordered Juras to walk nearly 400 feet from Mapes’s 

vehicle—across the State Route 65 bridge without the safety of a median—against 
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moving traffic on I-75 during questionable weather conditions, which had produced 

heavy rainfall. Instead of permitting Juras to traverse the potential gauntlet—

without the aid of the yellow-reflective vest of which Lieutenant Cook was 

equipped—Mapes drove Juras safely to the rear of Lieutenant Cook’s cruiser. 

{¶21} Based on our review of that evidence, we cannot conclude that the 

conduct of which Mapes is accused of violating is the conduct prohibited under the 

statute considering Mapes complied with Lieutenant Cook’s order—albeit in a 

different manner—by ensuring the safety of Juras. See id. at ¶ 24. Mapes’s conduct 

in this case is not the meddlesome or obstreperous conduct sought to be prevented 

by the statute. Indeed, much like the obstructing-official-business statute—which 

requires a defendant to have hampered or impeded a public official in the 

performance of his or her lawful duties—“[b]oth * * * definitions make clear that 

there must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progress before one can say 

he was hampered or impeded.” Stephens, 57 Ohio App.2d at 230. 

{¶22} Based on our review of the record, the evidence presented in this case 

weighs against the conclusion that there was some substantial stoppage of 

Lieutenant Cook’s progress in his investigation. See Bryant at ¶ 24 (concluding that 

“Bryant’s allegedly false answers given well after the emergency had abated, 

however, did not knowingly hamper the operations of a law enforcement officer 

engaged in his duties at the scene of a fire”). See also Stephens at 230. In particular, 
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there is no evidence in the record that Mapes caused any disturbance or was 

disruptive at the scene. Compare Bryant at ¶ 23 (noting that “there was no evidence 

that she caused any disturbance or was disruptive”). Likewise, the evidence in the 

record weighs against the conclusion that Mapes interfered with (or impeded) 

Lieutenant Cook’s accident investigation in any way. Specifically, Lieutenant 

Cook’s testimony reflects his primary concern of accident-scene safety and the 

actions that he took to implement that concern. In other words, Lieutenant Cook’s 

testimony does not support that he was involved in the investigatory stage when 

Mapes drove Juras to his cruiser instead of permitting her to traverse I-75 on foot. 

{¶23} For these reasons, we conclude that the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

in concluding that Mapes hampered the lawful operations of a law enforcement 

officer engaged in his duties at the scene of an accident. Accordingly, we are 

persuaded that Mapes’s misconduct-at-an-emergency conviction must be reversed. 

{¶24} Therefore, Mapes’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The trial Court erred by finding against the weight of the evidence 

that the defendant had not proven the affirmative defense of 

necessity. 

Assignment of Error No. III 

The trial Court erred by denying the defendant due process and 

prohibiting defendant from testifying about his observations and 

conclusions the accident scene. 
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Assignment of Error No. IV 

The trial Court erred by applying Crim. R. 16(K) in an 

unconstitutional manner that violated the defendant’s right to 

remain silent pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the United States 

Constitution prior to trial. 

{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Mapes argues that his conviction is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because he acted out of necessity. In 

his third and fourth assignments of error, Mapes argues that the trial court erred by 

prohibiting him “from testifying about his medical opinion regarding the condition 

of [Juras]” under Crim.R. 16(K). (Appellant’s Brief at 9). 

{¶26} In light of our decision to sustain Mapes’s first assignment of error, 

his second, third, and fourth assignments of error are rendered moot, and we decline 

to address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). See State v. Copeland, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 

11-80-14, 1981 WL 6707, *4 (Nov. 2, 1981); Cleveland v. Schumann, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 95530, 2011-Ohio-741, ¶ 15. 

{¶27} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars 

assigned and argued in his first assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the 

trial court and remand for further proceedings. 

Judgment Reversed and 

Cause Remanded 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur. 

/jlr