A CHRONOLO
APOLLO SPACEC

VOLUME IV 

January 21, 1966-July 13, 197

by 

Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. N

with 

Courtney G. Brooks 

Scientific and Technical Information Office 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SP
y 

The Apollo spacecraft. 

(The NASA historical series) (NASA SP-4009) 


CONTENTS: v. l. Ertel, I. D. and Morse, M. L. Through Nov. 7, 1962.-v

M. L. and Bays, J. K. Nov. 8, 1962-Sept. 30, 1964. [etc.) 

Includes bibliographical references. 

l. Project Apollo. I. Ertel, Ivan D., 1914- II. Title. III. Series: Uni

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA historical series. 

United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA SP

TL789.8.U6A5135 629.47 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Stock Number 033-000-00732-9 

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 69-60008 
y 

pp

nearly 40200 kilometers per hour; and the first test of Lau

As time for the first manned Apollo flight neared, a dec

to use a 60-percent-oxygen and 40-percent-nitrogen atm

spacecraft cabin while on the launch pad and to retain 

environment in space. By March 14, 1968, testing of the re

of the vehicle demonstrated that hardware changes in

minimized possible sources of ignition, and materials ch

reduced the danger of fire propagation. 

During the beginning of the period covered by this c

March through November 1966) the last five Gemini space

The objectives of the Gemini program that were appli

included: (1) long-duration flight, (2) rendezvous an

111 
engineering test of a manned lunar modu

docking of two manned space vehicles. 

In May 1969 Apollo 10 journeyed to th

rehearsal for the landing mission to follo

designed to be exactly like the landing missi

the landing, which were not attempted. Th

the command module and descended to wi

surface, proving that man could navigate 

moon's gravitational field. 

With the flight of Apollo 11, man for 

lunar surface on July 20, 1969. The mission 

lV 
Although Apollo 17 was the last of the manned flig

was not the last of the Apollo spacecraft. Apollo paved th

to follow. The next program using an Apollo command 

(May 14, 1973-February 8, 1974), occurring within the 

chronology, as studies of lunar samples and data retu

Apollo continued in laboratories throughout the world

most ambitious and organized scientific probing of his 

the value of manned scientific space expeditions. Sky lab p

in space as a manufacturer, an astronomer, and an earth 

most sophisticated instruments in ways that unmanne

match. Sky lab also demonstrated man's great utility as a r

v 
pp

written communication for corrective action. 

that in spite of the failures, the moon w

unparalleled path of success for an undertakin

fire at Cape Kennedy had given the Apollo pr

when Apollo 7 was launched, the first manne

was a success. Every spacecraft since that tim

with the exception of the problems experience

consider the Apollo 8 spacecraft and booste

million parts. If those parts had been 99.9 perc

have been 15 000 failures. But it had only fiv

parts. 

Vl 
management approach to accomplish an almost impos

task of going to the moon required a government, indus

team which, at its peak, organized 400 000 people, hundre

and 20 000 separate industrial companies for a common 

was accomplished in full public view of the world. Th

techniques are available to our country to use again on w

almost impossible tasks. 

The Apollo photographs of the entire earth in one fr

realize how small and finite and limited are the resources o

Apollo not only brought home to us more clearly the prob

in protecting this tiny planet, but it also suggested solu

Vll 
viii 
8. Block II vs. Block I Apollo Spacecraft . . . . . . . 

9. Apollo Experiments 	 

10. Organization Charts 	 

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ix 
"Tiger Team" results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

X-ray inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LM-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CM unified hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo 4 recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo Mission Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo 6 liftoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CSM 2TV-l checkout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CM 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Block II CSM cutaway view . . . . . . . . . . 

AS-503 rollout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo 7 activities ..................

X 
XI 

"Man Circles the Moon, the Eagle Lands, and Manne

tion," covers October 23, 1968, through July 13, 1974. 

Volume IV is more extensive than the three precedin

of both the nature of events during the period covered and 

period. 

As far as possible, primary sources were used to doc

with the main documentation coming from the archives 

Center Historian James M. Grimwood. These primary 

congressional documents, official correspondence, govern

tor status and progress reports, memorandums, work

minutes of meetings. Additionally, a relatively few ent

NASA and contractor news releases and newspaper and 

Xlll 
XlV 

December 13: Lunar landing research vehicle No. 1 was receiv

December 22: NASA announced names of crews selected for s

January 19: Numerous deficiencies were noted in the AS-20

Downey, Calif., and KSC. 

January 20: The S-IVB stage for Saturn launch vehicle 503 expl

Sacramento, Calif., Test Facility. 

January 23: The Lunar Mission Planning Board held its first m

from Lunar Orbiter missions and application to Apollo la

January 27: During a simulated countdown for the AS-204 mi

module 012, taking the lives of the crew, Virgil I. Grissom, 

2 


1967 
3 


p

informed by the Flight Crew Operations Director tha

request for "our desires for altitude chamber runs on Ap

definitely feel three runs are mandatory on CSMs 012 and 

purposes I think we should assume this is a steady

although it should be a subject for review as we accum

Runs on backup crews had been deleted in several ins

already flown and the mission was essentially the sa

chamber runs in terms of crew confidence was great and 

no one would care to make a manned run without a p

run. 

Memo, Donald K. Slayton, MSC, to Chief, Checkout and Test Div., MSC

runs on manned spacecraft," Jan. 28, 1966. 

5 

2 

edge-no hardware." 

Memo, Slayton to Chief, Guidance and Control Div., MS

1966. 

MSC awarded $70 000 contract to Rodana 

emergency medical kits that would "satis

requirements for the Apollo Command Mod

Module.'' Under terms of contract, two trainin

each flight, in addition to one mockup and six 

kits would contain loaded injectors, tablets, c

adhesives, and compressed dressings. 

MSC News Release 66-8, Feb. 2, 1966. 

6 
pppq

rendezvous, with about seven service propulsion s

including terminal phase initiation. 

MSC Memos, Mayer to Assistant Director for Flight Operations, "Dual Ap

2, 1966; Hodge to Technical Assistant for Apollo, "Simultaneous Launch 

208," Feb. 4, 1967: Tindall to distribution, "Apollo AS-207/208 

planning," Feb. 24, 1966. 

Alfred Cohen, head of the ground support equipment (

Resident Apollo Spacecraft Office (RASPO) at Gr

Engineering Corp., objected to the unrealistic production 

Grumman Manufacturing for LEM GSE. Cohen p

Grumman had been notified many times that NASA di

7 
investigated in the study of the possibility of 

the heatshield, a maximum weight of 5296 ki

manned spacecraft. Bullard had discussed 

weight with James M. Peacock of the System

earth-landing-system subsystem manager bu

Bullard said it was imperative that a firm wei

the weight could not grow, before any weigh

considered. It appeared that 90 to 136 kilogra

from the spacecraft, and that the reduction 

primarily by removing items. 

Memo, Bullard to Chief, Systems Engineering Div., "C

8 
NASA announced conversion of its contract with G

Engineering Corp. for development of the LEM to a c

agreement. Under the terms of the new four-year contract 

deliver 15 flight articles, 10 test articles, and 2 mission 

change added 4 flight articles to the program. The c

incentive for outstanding performance, cost control, and 

well as potential profit reductions if performance, co

requirements were not met. 

TWX, NASA Hq. to MSC, MSFC, Western Operations Office, KSC, Attn: 

Officers, NASA Converts Apollo Contract to Cost-Plus-Incentive," Feb. 

9 

Spacecraft communications 

was initiated with a space-fix

structure and heatshields pe

from the Atlantic about 72 k

point. (Mission objectives ar

Missions Operations Div., MSC, " P

May 6, 1966. 

March Recent discussion between A

1 MSC concerning the possibi

Research Facility (LLRF) a
The 1/6-g simulator, developed at 

the Manned Spacecraft Center, i s 

shown in action as a suited subject 

crosses the "lunar landscape" at 

the Center in March 1966. The 

simulator was designed to giv e 

astronauts experience in the activ ­

ities they would perform during 

missions on the moon, with 

gravity one-sixth earth's. 
16-17 

CSM007-March 31, 1966. Headquarters 

American Aviation Inc.] contract delivery d

for each and that "every effort should be m

early as possible, since completion of each is 

major activity." 

TWX, Samuel C. Phillips to Joseph F. Shea, "Block I C

The Atlas-Agena target vehicle for the Gemin

launched from KSC Launch Complex 14 

Gemini VIII spacecraft was launched from 

a.m., with command pilot Neil A. Armst

aboard. The spacecraft and its target vehicle 

12 
cost of the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract negotiated wit

the presentation by the Source Evaluation Board to Webb a

$17.3 million. 

Memo, NASA Deputy Associate Administrator to Associate Administrator f

Flight, "Selection of Contractor for PhaseD (Phase II) for Apollo Lunar Sur

Package," March 17, 1966. 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips informed 

Robert R. Gilruth of specific NASA Hq. management assig

been implemented in connection with the ALSEP program. 

he had asked Len Reiffel to serve as the primary focus of H

13 
timecritical abort and both LEM propul

return, reducing the total time to return by 

example, if the time of abort was 10 hours af

this method would require about 36 hour

return time would require about 96 hours

He added that the LEM/CM-only configur

constraints that would preclude initiating 

Some of the factors to be considered should 

environmental control system could suppo

return; (2) maximum time the CM el

minimum power-up condition; (3) tim

powering down the CM and using the LEM 

14 
Ltrs., Director, MSC, to Director, LaRC, March 29, 1966, "Use of Lunar 

Approach Simulator (LOLA)"; Director, LaRC, to Paul E. Purser, April2

pilotage study using interim LOLA simulator." 

NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 

reflecting on network coverage for Apollo, as a result of 

experience. He recognized that Apollo had more weigh

and stowage space than Gemini and that as a consequence 

spacecraft might be a good possibility. This coverage 

extensive TV during travel to and from the moon as wel

landing, disembarkation, and lunar exploration. The TV e

not be solely for news purposes but he felt "all manner of 

15 
gg, 

members of the Headquarters staff. Th

Directorate would combine the functions o

Programs and the Center Medical Office, a

functions currently performed in the Crew 

Directorate. The Offices of Chief of Center 

Medical Office would be abolished by the c

The Space Science Division had been di

Administrator for Space Science and Appl

would consolidate into a single organizat

activities of MSC, including those under 

Environment in Advanced Spacecraft Tech

16 
Performance and application of the Apollo TV system are b

part of the review." He added that he expected to be in posi

to discuss plans with Seamans in some detail. 

Memo, Mueller to Seamans, "Potential TV Coverage on Apollo," April 7

Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., receivedale

Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineer

pleasure that the agreement between the Department of De

on extraterrestrial mapping, charting, and geodesy sup

consummated. He was returning a copy of the agreement fo

Ltr., Foster to Seamans, April 8, 1966. 

17 
in experiments. If experiments are to be ca

Pallet both by concept and experience 

approach.'' Gilruth said the following pla

22-receive documentation and cost pro

evaluate four proposals and negotiate four 

manner as for ALSEP. ( 3) May 23-24-Sour

May 25-June 1-Center and Headquarters 

incurrence for selected contractor. Gilruth 

pallet program be implemented as planne

approval to proceed as planned. (See Aug

Ltrs., Gilruth to Mueller, April 15, 1966; Mueller to 

18 
or Engineering that would yield new knowledge or impro

art; Type 11-0perational, which would be required in 

major manned flight programs such as Apollo. 

Members appointed to the Board were George M. Low, c

Gillespie, Jr., executive secretary; Maxime A. Faget; R

Charles A. Berry; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Sl

Kleinknecht; and Joseph N. Kotanchik. The Board woul

on the first Friday of every even month, with called meetin

of the chairman when necessary to expedite experiments

MSC Announcement 66-47, MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board, A

19 
g pp

a major part of the program but a necessary 

U.S. Army Resrrvation at Fort Hood, Tex., w

required variet~ of landing obstacle sizes and 

unplanned-area tests. Scale-model tests h

continued at Fort Hood without interferen

completed a local agreement that would 

reservation but required no fiscal reim

responsibility by MSC. This action was in re

July 8, 1965, directing that MSC give care

parachute test activities to WSMR. 

Ltr., Gilruth to Mueller, "Parachute landing test area

tests," May 3, 1966. 

20 
y p

environment. 

Grumman LEM Engineering Memo to distribution, "LEM Consumable C

to Earth from Translunar Coast," May 9, 1966. 

MSC Deputy Director George M. Low recommended to M

MSC, that, in light ofAir Force and Aerospace Corp. studie

MSC plans for a general study on space rescue be discontin

request be made to OMSF to cancel the request for proposa

yet been released. As an alternative, Low suggested th

cooperate with the Air Force to maximize gains from the US

rescue requirements. 

Memo, Low to Faget, "Space rescue," May II, 1966. 

21 

19 

gp

mission rules should provide other miss

planning information for design, engineer

decisions. Christensen requested that develo

be given emphasis in planning, to min

modification of spacecraft telemetry system

ground-based data-processing schemes, and 

I . 

Ltr., Christensen to Kraft, May 19, 1966. 

As a result of a fire in the environmental 

AiResearch Co., a concerted effort was und

materials as well as other potential fire probl

22 
The high and low bay areas of the Vehicle 

Assembly Building at Kennedy Space Center 

provided vast space for assembling the 

Saturn launch vehicles and Apollo spacecraft. At right, the first full-scale ApolloSaturn V, AS-500-F, rolls out from the VAB 

on the crawler-transporter May 25, 1966, five 

years after President Kennedy set a goal of a 

manned landing on the moon within the 

decade. 
participation in discussions of scientific ex

Deputy Director George M. Low informed 

Manager Robert 0. Piland. NASA Assoc

Science and Applications Homer E. Newe

OSSA Senior Council meeting at MSC, th

comment on technical and operational fea

OSSA divisions and subcommittees acted o

Robert R. Gilruth had agreed. Because of 

refused a request to be represented on all the s

send representatives to all meetings devot

experiments and would contribute to other 

Memo, Low to Piland, "Feasibility review of manned sp

24 
The board's evaluation, an analytical presentation by Do

weight-and-power comparison by R. W. Williams, and a 

by the two contractors were given MSC management May 

recommended that RCA's radar be continued as the main 

backup optical tracker program be continued by Hug

reduced level. The recommendations were made to 

Director Samuel C. Phillips and NASA Associate Admin

Mueller at KSC on May 25. Phillips and Mueller concurr

that the optical tracker program was to be completed on 

and that MSC would qualify the optical tracker using th

MSC laboratories. Mueller expressed concern abou

25 
23 

pp

pq

weeks for each spacecraft). 

Ltr., Kotanchik to McCoy, "Apollo Spacecraft parachu

A memorandum for the file, prepared by J

proposed a two-burn de boost technique that 

lunar parking orbit and, after a coa'St phas

change to attain the final lunar parking 

technique would make a much larger lu

provided by the existing Apollo mission pro

place the CSM and LM directly in a circul

landing site and would permit accessibility 

26 
Program Control Office. 

The next week Evans made the following appointments: 

was relieved as Program Manager and appointed Assist

President George F. Titterton; William Rathke was reliev

Manager and named Program Manager; Thomas Kelly w

Assistant Engineering Manager to Engineering Manager

was relieved as corporate Director of Quality Assurance an

Subcontract Manager, reporting to Gavin. 

Memos, Frank X. Battersby to Chief, Apollo Procurement Br., Procurement 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report, BMR Bethpage, Week Ending July 1, 196

"Weekly Activity Report, BMR Bethpage, Week Ending July 8, 1966," J

27 
5 

for Apollo-Saturn 203, AS-203 Mission Directors Post 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight to Administra

AS-203, Post Launch Report No. 1" (Mission Operation 

NASA requested assignment of three addition

Public Health Service. Pointing out that one 

detail to NASA since 1964 and that his effort 

the control of outbound contamination, NAS

back contamination had reached propor

intensified effort. NASA would reimburse th

contract. 

Ltr., Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., toW

July 5, 1966. 

28 
cutoff capability should not be included in the LM desi

TWX, James L. Neal, MSC, to Grumman, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "LM L

Logic," July II, I966. 

MSC Director of Flight Crew Operations Donald K. Slayto

Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., told ASPO M

Shea: "A comprehensive examination of the Apollo missi

lunar landing indicates that there is a considerable disco

missions AS-205 and AS-207 /208. Both missions AS-204 

essentially long duration system validation flights. AS-207 

a series of very complicated missions. A valid operational re

to include an optical equal-period rendezvous on AS-205

29 

ppyg

the prime mission objectives, by the Office o

recommendations from Associate Administ

The Office of Space Science and Application

for selecting scientific experiments for mann

ter teams for data reduction, data analysis, a

provide to OMSF complete scientific requ

selected for flight. 

The Office of Advanced Research and Techn

overall responsibility for the technology co

program and for selecting technology exp

OART would provide OMSF complete tec

30 
g pg

identified a number of areas which warranted fur

authorized ACED to perform necessary additional revie

indeterminate design analyses and to resolve any discrep

ACED and MIT positions. At the time Bellcomm prepar

of the problem areas had been or were in process of b

resolved. However, several still remained: (1) MSC 

opportunity to review an approved version of the final 

Block II/LM computer and as a result there was no offi

for computers at that point, although the first of 

computers had left the factory and the second was in fina

(2) The Design Review Report classified the timing mar

computer as indeterminate, since the team was unable 

31 
3 

restricted but brightness was considerably re

c. heat transfer through the glass would 

from glass used in other windows at MSC. 

Memo, Program Manager, LRL, to Deputy Director, M

Receiving Laboratory," Aug. 3, 1966. · 

MSC requested LaRC to study the visibility of 

from the left-hand couch in the command m

docked position. (Two positions could be att

and rendezvous position that moved the seat i

the left-hand window.) LM and CM mockups 

the CM-active moving-base docking simulati

32 

1966. 

MSC requested Ames · Research Center to conduct a 

simulation of the Saturn V upper stages with displays 

planned in the spacecraft. On August 5, Brent Creer and 

Ames had met with representatives from ASPO, Guida

Division, and Flight Crew Operations Directorate to disc

tion of a modified Ames simulation which would determ

manual control from first stage burnout, using existing s

and control interfaces. Simulations at Ames in 1965 had 

Saturn V could be manually flown into orbit within d

meters in altitude, and 0.1 degree in flight path angle. 

33 
During the photo-acquisition phase of the f

Orbiter I photographed the 9 selected prim

sites, including the one in which Surveyor I la

landing sites; the east limb of the moon; and 

moon. Lunar Orbiter I also took photos of 

view of the earth from the vicinity of the moo

widely publicized). A total of 207 frames 

resolution pictures) were taken, 38 while the 

the remainder while it was in the final cl

achieved its mission objectives, and, with 

resolution camera, the performance of the 

spacecraft subsystems was outstanding. At 

34 

Five F-1 rocket engines, above, are 

installed in the massive first flight S-IC 

stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle at 

NASA's Michoud Operations plant in 

New Orleans. At right, an F-1 engine is 

tested in the NASA High Thrust Test 

Area, Edwards, California. The rockets 

were developed under Marshall Space 

Flight Center direction by Rocketdyne 

Division of North American. Rocketdyne photos. 
22 

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth requested o

Director William H. Pickering that JPL fir

vernier engine after the Surveyor landed on mo

much erosion could be expected from an LM 

engine was to operate until it was about one n

on the lunar surface; after the Surveyor lande

the same distance from the surface. Gilruth to

testing a reaction control engine to establish s

surface pressures, and back pressure sources, an

obtained. 

Ltr., Gilruth to Pickering, "Surveyor spacecraft experime

36 
Administrator, "Apollo Saturn Flight Mission AS-202, Post Launch R

Operations Report M-932-66-03), Sept. I, 1966. 

The Bethpage RASPO Business Manager and Grumm

met to choose a vendor to produce the orbital rate d

Apollo and LM (ORDEAL). Three proposals were recei

of American Bosch Arma Corp., $275 000; Kearfott Pr

General Precision, Inc., $295 000; and Bendix Corp., 

proposal was evaluated as offering a more desirable w

delivery, and smaller size within the power budget an

selected although it was not the low bid. Evaluators b

approach would not be easy to implement, that its de

37 

31 

report on the status be submitted on each ite

Memo, Shea to Manager, Apollo Mission Simulator Progr

Modifications," Aug. 30, 1966. 

MSC Director of Flight Crew Operations D

ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea that total m

vacuum testing of spacecraft 008 was inadeq

standings between personnel and organization

test. Slayton offered a number of suggestions 

• Overall planning policies and practi

further defined before commitment of future 

38 
Funding for the analyses could be determined only after 

made, but budget estimates for that purpose had been m

FY 1968 and $6 million in FY 1969, exclusive of labora

funding of the LRL. As a part of the continuing 

laboratories had received support during 1966 for upgra

handle and examine lunar material. Newell added tha

handling lunar material had been received and were u

Memo, Newell to Seamans, "Lunar Sample Analysis Program," Sept

MSC Deputy Director George M. Low submitted inf

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Ge

manpower requirements and operating costs for test

39 

gp

unmanned Lunar Orbiters, Surveyors, and m

tion. The first phase, consisting of Ranger, Sur

Apollo landing was under way. The second ph

Applications program and would extend sur

mapping beyond the walking capability of a 

recommended this phase launch one 14-day 

beginning in 1970, with one or two Surveyors

per year. The third phase would consist of one t

year. The final phase would consist of semip

Memo, Edgar M. Cortright, Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., james C

Cochairmen, Planning Coordination Steering Group, to 

"Preliminary Reports of Working Groups," Sept. 23, 196

40 
reaffirmed that permission to exceed approved month

granted only by the LM Program Office. He said, "Unle

enforced throughout the Grumman in-house and subco

work packages could turn out to be interesting piec

contain the information as to what might have been do

basis for program management." 

Ltrs., Shea to Gavin, Apr. 14, 1966; Shea to Evans, Sept. 19, 1966; Shea 

1966; Nov. 18, 1966. 

The second planned manned Apollo flight crew was 

Pr.ime crew members were Walter M. Schirra, Jr., comm

Eisele, senior pilot; and R. Walter Cunningham, pilo

41 

at the conclusion of the AS204 Design C

requested each NASA manager to reexamine 

and subsystems upon substantial completio

actions and to file an updated certificatio

Certification Board. 

On November 16, Apollo Program Director Sa

Manager Joseph F. Shea tb submit the updated 

supporting data to him by December 14 to 

statements and his affirmation to the Board bef

Space Flight Review. He pointed out that 

should affirm: ( 1) that the reservations previous

appropriate action; (2) that design problems 

42 

mission was essentially as planned except that the co

touched down about 370 kilometers short of the planned 

detailed study indicated that the command module ha

predicted angle of attack and a correspondingly lower lift-t

retrospect, it appears that our wind tunnel testing di

complete understanding of ... hypersonic aerodynamic c

the command module." Plans were being made to fly AS-

with the lower lift-to-drag ratio. 

Memo, Mueller to Deputy Administrator, "205 Nautical Mile Error in AS-2

1966. 

43 
12 

that LM-1 would no longer be capable of b

flight and that it would be configured and che

only. In addition, LM-2 would no longe

unmanned flight, but would be configured 

manned flights, such as the planned AS-27

final depletion burn of the ascent stage) a

propulsions unmanned). 

Memo, Shea to distr., "Change in policies for LM-1 and 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillip

President and Assistant to the President of 

environment control unit, developed and pro

44 

Ltr., Phillips to Bradley, Oct. 12, 1966. 

KSC proposed to MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth tha

Electric Co. efforts at KSC supporting automatic che

(ACE) for spacecraft operations be consolidated. KSC po

a supplemental agreement with MSC for General Electri

engineering support to ACE/spacecraft operations. Bot

Program Manager and the Director of Launch Operatio

merging the two GE efforts into a single task o

administrative control would have advantages. The pro

45 
19 

that the existing ACE/spacecraft manageme

assure optimum fulfillment of the Apollo pr

Ltrs., Debus to Gi1ruth, Oct. 13, 1966; Gilruth to Debus

Marshall Space Flight Center Director We

Director Robert R. Gilruth that MSFC had 

planning the transfer of study and deve

exploration program to MSC. Von Braun sai

the MSF Hideaway Management Council 

15, 1966, to consider the majority of our Luna

for transfer to MSC in consonance with B

designates MSC as the Lead Center for lunar 

46 

launch vehicle on its earth-orbital mission to demonstr

crew operations and evaluate spacecraft hardware perf

orbit." 

TWX, NASA Hq. M-N-311 to KSC, MSC, MSFC, Oct. 19, 1966. 

MSC's ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea proposed to KSC 

Manager John G. Shinkle that-because the program wa

flight phase and close monitoring of the hardware c

important-they should plan work methods in more de

Shinkle that he had named Walter Kapryan Assistant Prog

provide the technical focal point ... to maintain the disc

spacecraft''; therefore Shea would like to transfer the chair

47 
tested a short time (a matter of minutes) 

centimeter (320 pounds per square inch). 

A team was set up at North American Aviation 

possible impact on the Saturn IB and Saturn 

two observers on the team, which was to ma

dations available by November 4. 

North American Aviation identified the 

cracking resulting from use of methanol as a 

above threshold stresses. No tanks subjected t

would be used. Freon and isopropyl alcoh

mended for test fluids in the oxidizer and fue

48 

at Cape Kennedy, to photograph possible landing sites on 

Apollo program. The Atlas-Agena D booster placed the 

earth-parking orbit and, after a14-minute coast, injected i

trajectory toward the moon. A midcourse correctio

November 8 increased the velocity from 3051 to 3133 kilom

that time the spacecraft was 265 485 kilometers from the 

The spacecraft executed a deboost maneuver at 3:26 p.m

while 352 370 kilometers from the earth and 1260 kilomete

and traveling at a speed of 5028 kilometers per hour

permitted the lunar gravitational field to pull the spa

planned initial orbit around the moon. On November 15, a 

hit was detected by one of tlie 20 thin-walled pressurized 

49 
conversion from the Apollo format to th

would be required as well as a communica

mission, implementation at Goldstone and 

percent TV coverage with an estimated initi

operating cost of $12000 000 per year, based 

year with 8 to 14 hours a day possible cov

• The most optimistic minimum pro

for the first unit would be 10 months and, 

first lunar mission, the system should be exe

AS-504. Mueller recommended approval 

communication services necessary for live T

Calif., and Madrid, Spain, stations. 

50 
Interested engineers watch as the 

LM ascent stage of TM-2 is 

readied for tests in the thermal 

vacuum chamber at Grumman's Bethpage, New York, 

plant in 1966. 
December 

5 

In response to a request from Apollo Progr

on November 21, MSC reported its evalu

Ocean prime recovery areas for all Saturn V 

a change of recovery area to the Atlantic for 

some schedule slip and compromise of mi

necessarily save recovery ship effort. For 

missions, adjustments could be made to t

prime recovery in the Atlantic area. Secon

in the Pacific, however. The report stresse

Atlantic area for lunar missions would seve

windows available. 

52 
MSC Director of Flight Crew Operations Donald K. Slayto

ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea that LM-to-CSM c

impossible. Slayton said ( 1) there was no way for the port

system and crewman to traverse from the LM front hatch 

hatch in zero-g docked operations, because there was no re

tether attach points in the vicinity of the CSM hatch to per

to stabilize himself and work to open the hatch; and (2) the

control the Apollo inner hatch ( 35-43 kilograms) to ensure 

inadvertently damage its seals, the spacecraft wiring, 

53 

7 

MSFEB, the following experiments would b

manned space flight: SOlS (Zero g, Single H

Particles Asymmetry); S018 (Micrometeorit

Otolith Function). 

Memo, Mueller to Phillips, "Experiment Assignments

Associate Administrator for Manned Spa

requested Leonard Reiffel, NASA Hq., 

appropriate name for the Lunar Receiving 

of name rather than one that doesn't signif

Note, Mueller to Reiffe1 (telecon), "Lunar Receiving L

54 
1. Continued efforts to develop clearer definition of ta

initiated to ensure the LRL would be ready for operation 

returned lunar·samples. 

2. Creation of a task group at MSC to prepare for in

the LRL. The task group would consist of MSC personne

hires in critical skill areas. 

3. Extension of the existing MSC support cont

minimum LRL technical and engineering support neede

few months. 

4. Development of a clearer definition of the role 

operation of the U.S. Public Health Officer to provide for m

of his recommendations for quarantine requirements. 

55 
23 

NASA News Release 66-326, "NASA Names Crews for 

Handling and installation responsibilitie

scientific equipment (SEQ) were defined in a 

Aircraft Engineering Corp. The descent sta

basic packages: ( 1) the Apollo Lunar 

(ALSEP) compartment 1, which included 

associated lunar surface experiments; (2)AL

of the radioisotope thermoelectric genera

surface drill (ALSO); and (3) the RTG fuel c

RTG fuel element. The following definitio

and installation had been derived: 

56 
your effort to support the Agency and the scientific c

exploration of space...." 

Organization Chart, MSC, Dec. 23, 1967; ltr., Mueller to Gilruth, Jan. 

Donald K. Slayton said there was some question 

extrave.hicular activity on the AS-503 mission, but he fe

maximum contribution to the lunar mission, one period 

i:nocluded. Slayton pointed out that during the coast p

lURar orhit) in the current flight plan the EVA opportun

hetweetl :Rour 90 and hour 100. Two primary propulsi

wou.ki have been accomplished and the descent stage of th

he attached. 

57 

atmosphere as the result of the combin

magnetometer, solar wind spectrometer, an

MSC Deputy Director George M. Low, in 

thanked him and said he would discuss th

fully after receiving a complete review of the 

0. Piland. 

Low wrote Newell on April10, 1967, that th

the program plan devised in March 1966-p

the lunar surface magnetometer, the supra

central station receiver and transmitter. "I

programmatic workaround plan, the eleme

58 
from earth." 

• "The LM should always be in a position to get bac

in the minimum time. Specifically the merits and feasibili

the LM platform powered up and aligned should be eval

LM systems requiring start up time after powering 

identified." 

• "The constraints affecting the minimum time r

around and launch after LM landing and the time line 

mined. This time was estimated to two CSM orbits. The e

Space Flight Network (MSFN) support should be consid

• The first EVA should be allocated to LM post lan

immediate lunar sample collection, lunar environment 

59 

10 

ASPOs requirement for thermal and vacu

system design, but felt that it was of equal im

equal priority in planning the test. To ac

requested that specific conditions be met in 

planning, and test conduct. 

Ltr., Slayton to Manager, ASPO, "2TV-l Manned Te

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. P

Administrator for Manned Space Flight Geo

been completed on the use of "direct translu

into a trajectory to the moon) as a mode o

missions. The principal advantages would 

60 
ruled the existing communications assembly unsafe for fli

that the biomedical tee adapter, cobra cable, sleep ad

eliminator be combined into one new cobra cable for CS

Memo, Slayton to Manager, ASPO, "Communications cal>les for Spacecraf

The Saturn 503 S-IVB stage exploded and was destroye

Sacramento, Calif., Test Facility at 4:25p.m. PSTduring a 

P.xercise had progressed to 10 seconds before simulated 

minutes before S-IVB ignition) when the explosion occu

day the countdown had progressed to about 6 minute

launch when a problem with the GSE computer tape carri

hold and a recycling in the countdown. No one was inju

61 

vehicle at the time of the accident? 

2. What feasible methods were th

capabilities to escape such an explosion? Wh

be evolved beyond existing system capabilit

3. How would the EDS (emergency det

if the accident had occurred on a manne

changes to the EDS? 

4. Should any changes be made to AS-2

a safe escape? 

Phillips said the panel's recommendations 

help assess any impact on AS-204 and sub

TWX, NASA Hq. to addressees, "S-IVB Stage Accide

62 
TWX, Shea to NASA Hq., Attn: Apollo Program Director, Jan. 28, 1967

11," Report of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Ae

Administration, Apr. 5, 1967, p. D-11-13. 

The Apollo 204 Review Board was established by 

Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., to investigate the A

that had killed the 204 prime crew January 27. The Boar

the NASA Administrator. 

Appointed to the Board were: 

• Floyd L. Thompson, Director Langley Research C

• Frank Borman, astronaut, MSC. 

• Maxime A. Faget, Director of Engineering and De

63 
The Board was told it could 

assistance, and information, 

• Review the circumsta

probable cause or causes an

recommendations being deve

contractors. 

• Direct any further spe

• Report its findings 

Administrator as expeditiou

through the Office of Public 
task panels to make the accident investigation syst

committee was composed of John J. Williams, KSC; E. Bar

Charles W. Mathews, NASA, Hq.; John F. Yardley, Mc

Corp.; George Jeffs, North American Aviation, Inc.; and C

USAF. 

"Board Proceedings," p. 3-13. 

Robert W. Van Dolah of the Bureau of Mines, I. Irving 

Research Center, and Thomas G. Horeff of the Federal A

joined the Apollo 204 Review Board as consultants. Me

special ad hoc committee established January 29 to rec

panels for the investigation was changed to Frank ~orman 

65 
31 

In addition, Panel 19, Safety of Investigati

"Board Proceedings," pp. 3-14, 3-15; Astronautics an

1968), p. 29. 

A TWX from NASA Headquarters to M

checkout and launch preparation of AS-50

that the CM would not be pressurized in an 

further direction. If AS-501 support, facilit

with the activities of the AS-204 Review B

priority. 

TWX. Samuel C. Phillips .to MSC, MSFC, and KSC, 

66 
The task of removing the launch escape system from A

until retrorockets and other ordance devices could be 

launch vehicle and spacecraft. 

Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman Floyd L. Thomp

committee of two Board members and three consultants t

activities and to bring to the attention of the Board the 

specific approval. This Panel Coordinating Committe

present daily activity reports to the Board. Thompson a

executive session (Board members) would be held at 4 p

"Board Proceedings," p. 3-15. 

67 
3 

TWX, MSC to distr., "MSC Posture on Apollo 204 Inve

NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. 

Administrator James E. Webb on progress of 

investigation of the January 27 spacecraft fire

not been determined from the preliminary rev

for the three crew members listed cause of d

smoke inhalation due to the fire." Webb relea

the press. 

Associate Administrator for Manned Space 

nounced that the unmanned flights AS-206 

68 

maintained memoranda records covering areas of poss

Memos, Seamans to Apollo 204 Review Board, Feb. 3, 1967. 

The Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman requested th

written to establish procedures for entry into CM 012

requirements and priorities would be controlled by the P

Committee, and entry into the CM by Frank Borman, MS

representative. 

A display showing the sequence of events immediat

following the accident was prepared from telemetry dat

Mission Briefing Room. Time span of the display was fro

69 

Representatives: C. H. Bolender, NASA H

Program Director; Charles W. Mathews, D

Program, NASA Hq.; Rocco A. Petrone, D

KSC; Joseph F. Shea, ASPO Manager, MSC

USAF, Chief, Range Safety Office, Air Forc

Kelly, Flight Medicine Branch, Center Medi

Consultants: Frank A. Long, Vice Presiden

Studies, Cornell University; John Yardley, T

tics Co., Division of McDonnell Co.; Geor

Apollo Program, North American Aviation, I

Assistant Chief Engineer, Apollo Program, N

Irving Pinkel, Chief, Fluid Systems Resear

70 

January 27 fire had been transcribed. George Jeffs of 

Aviation announced that an NAA and AiResearch tea

inspect the 012 command module and to propose furt

environmental control unit and system. 

Col. Charles F. Strang, USAF, said Board Chairman Flo

asked that the "Life Sciences" portion of the final report i

of the escape system, with redesign recommendations

within the purview of the Ground Emergency Procedures 

In-Flight Fire Emergency Provisions Review Panel, th

Panel, and the Medical Analysis Panel. G. Fred Kelly, M

coordinate findings. 

"Board Proceedings," p. 3-18. 

71 

7 

the structural loads of reentry into the atm

moon. Danger of a fast-opening escape ha

space-as the Mercury program's Libery 

splashdown in July 1961-had to be co

accessibility, ongoing before the 204 acciden

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, A

1st sess., pt. 1, Feb. 7, 1967. 

Irving Pinkel, of Lewis Research Center an

presented a preliminary report to the Apollo 

described the areas of the command module 

27 fire, the most probable fire paths, and th

72 

No. Panel Title Panel Chairman 

1 SIC and GSE Configuration J. Goree, MSC J. 

2 Test Environments W. Hoyler, MSC G

3 Sequence of Events D. Arabian, MSC M

4 Disassembly Activities S. Simpkinson, MSC F

5 Origin & Propagation 

of Fire F. Bailey, MSC R

6 Historical Data T. J. Adams, MSC G

7 Test Procedures Review D. Nichols, KSC J. 

8 Materials Review W. Bland, MSC M

9 Design Reviews R. Williams, MSC G

10 Analysis of Fracture 

Areas P. Glynn, MSC B

73 

y 

in spacecraft 017. Certain diodes-intended 

single-point failure into redundant circuitr

flight unit. The diodes appeared on MCP sch

from the hardware because of problems in g

mandatory before flight. The MCP unit in spa

modified before final integrated tests, to confir

not introduced other problems. 

Shea requested a full explanation from Nor

schematics and/or drawings being used by 

engineers did not reflect the as built conditions

holes in North American procedures that pe

74 

KSC, "Pressure Limitation on Titanium Alloy Pressure Vessels," Feb. 

Teir, MSFC, to MSC, Attn: Joseph F. Shea, "Titanium Pressure Vesse

Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman Floyd Thompson re

Office of Manned Space Flight, MSFC, KSC, and MSC to 

description of their responsibilities, organizational r

alignment in the Apollo program. Robert W. Van Dolah 

Chairman of the· Origin and Propagation of Fire Pa

prepare a report on fire propagation by February 15 for su

Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 

Specially built tables had been placed in the Pyrote

Building to display items from CM 012 for inspection 

75 

16 

angle of the inertial measurement unit, whic

the command module. The Board asked add

"Board Proceedings," p. 3-22. 

NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Sea

Administrator for Manned Space Flight Geo

the interim nature of schedule outlook for m

Saturn V missions, he had decided to show th

in the Official NASA Flight Schedule for F

approved dates for the missions were avai

updated. He said that all participants in th

advised that~except for unmanned missio

76 

tion Control Panel in the Apollo Spacecraft Program 

would have authority to approve CSM changes within th

the ASPO Configuration Management Plan. 

Memo, Manager, ASPO, to distr., "CSM Configuration Control Panel 

1967. 

Apollo program officials were briefed on significant info

findings, and preliminary recommendations developed 

Review Board. Those present included George E. M

Phillips, C. H. Bolender, Frank A. Bogart, and Julian 

NASA Hq.;· Robert R. Gilruth, George M. Low, and Ch

Jr., all of MSC; Kurt H. Debus, KSC; and Wernher v

77 

Spacecraft Program Office, to Manager for t

would be responsible for the management of 

including MSC relations with Grumman and 

concerns. Lee would report to ASPO Manag

assist him ip the following areas: 

1. Directing the design, development

contracted by NASA with Grumman. 

2. Directing and planning detailed sys

integration functions for the project, inclu

design work and system engineering studies 

3. Development of the program of grou

Sands Missile Range, MSC, and KSC. 

78 
conducted with a mockup of each new configuration. 

• A more rapidly and more easily operated CM 

designed. 

• On-the-pad emergency procedures should be revis

possibility of cabin fire. 

The Board also suggested some subsystems and pro

improved for safety. It did not recommend that cab

operations in space be changed from pure oxygen at pres

per square centimeter (5 pounds per square inch), but d

tradeoffs between one-gas and two-gas atmospheres be re

pressurized oxygen no longer be used in prelaunch op

"Board Proceedings," pp. 3-55 through 3-59; NASA News Release 67

79 
2 

Board material. 

Maxime Faget, MSC, presented a plan for s

from the CM. The plan was intended to reduc

to investigate and analyze the equipment. Th

Coordination Committee would establish an 

the screening. 

"Board Proceedings," p. 3-25. 

MSC ASPO reported to NASA Hq. tha

discrepancies found in Apollo spacecraft 017

was required, with 12 main display control pa

80 

(2) testing in oxygen chambers, and (3) testing within 

would probably include such things as the exact enviro

outside the exclosure; the type of flammable material; 

and procedures; and emergency procedures." 


Memo, Low, MSC, to A. C. Bond, MSC, "Resumption of testing in an o

March 6, 1967. 


During a House Committee on Science and Astron

NASA's FY 1968 authorization, NASA Administrato

replied to questions by Congressmen John W. Wydler, 

and Emilio Q. Daddario about the impact of the Apo

schedules for accomplishing the lunar landing. Webb 

81 

I would like to say one other thing. In order 

everything fit together, we have prepared sche

them, and the target date for flying the fou

summer or early fall of 1968. So many people 

time you could go, isn't that really your targe

go as soon as we can, and obviously if eve

vehicle would be fully equipped to go. But m

get this done by the end of 1969, we will be 

chance that we will do so, the odds that we wil

all the work necessary is less this year than it 

table last year that it was less at that time than 

So we have had in my judgment some accu

make the problem of doing it in this decade m

82 
capability for the overall systems, as well as the unique sub

potentials that might need to be retained. He requeste

prepared for his review by April 3. 

Memo, Markley to John B. Lee, R. W. Williams, and J. G. McCli

"Sustaining Engineering," March 10, 1967. 

The Apollo 204 Review Board met with chairmen of Panel

(see February 7 and following entries) for critical review 

reports. The reports were accepted subject to editorial 

Witness Statements Panel (Panel 12) task had been to co

witnesses of the 204 accident, including both eyewitne

monitors, and to prepare the data for publication as appe

83 

around 

tion of 

Between 6:31:15 and 

6:33 p.m. EST 

Witnesses on Levels 	 Repeat

A-7 and A-8: 	 White 

Fought 

Room 

TV monitors: 	 Observ

8. Prog

84 
"Board Proceedings" and Append. D, "Panels 12 thru 17," Report ofApo

to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, A

3-29, and D-12-3 through D-12-12. 

The report of the Apollo 204 Review Board's In-fligh

Provisions Review Panel (No. 20) listed seven findings a

determinations. The panel had been charged with revie

of planned inflight fire emergency procedures and other 

as determining that emergency procedures existed fo

activities. Among findings and determinations were: 

85 

anomalies due to SM systems and there was n

were responsible for initiating the January 2

Panel21 had been charged with planning and 

Apollo 204 investigation, beginning at the 

command module demate. The task was carr

organizational elements in accordance with 

and identifying documentation and control 

The panel's major activities had been: 

• Demating the service module and se

adapter from the launch vehicle and moving t

Operations Building. 

86 
CSM 017 was in hold because of numerous discrepan

spacecraft (see also March 2). Of 1368 "squawks" c

wiring, 482 had been resolved by March 14. Spacecraft m

with the launch vehicle was projected for April29 (but s

June 20). 

Ltr., Assistant Manager, ASPO, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn: Samuel C. Phi

Status Report to MSF," March 15, 1967. 

MSC informed Kennedy Space Center that, on release 

module from further investigation, the MSC Apollo S

Office would use it for program support. ASPO was es

87 

18 

LeRoy E. Day, NASA OMSF, suggested to Apo

C. Phillips that, "if we are going to achieve a t

test activity as a result of AS-204 [accident], 

mode of operation may be necessary.'' He reco

systematize and discipline the scheduled repo

ASPO, and the contractor. Day further sugges

Reviews" by ASPO with OMSF participat

detailed and cover all spacecraft activities and 

same set of baselines as all program reviews. 

would have to be thoroughly reviewed and a 

Note, Day to Phillips, "Spacecraft redesign/test activity,

88 
Panel findings and determinations included: 

Finding-Spacecraft data during the Plugs-Out T

from which a spacecraft pressure history could be esti

Determination-(a) The CM cabin structure had ru

(±0.1) p.m. EST January 27 at an estimated minimum 

newtons per sq em (29 psia). 

(b) The CM cabin structure had sustained cabin pre

designed ultimate pressure of 8.9 newtons-per-sq-cm ( 1

(19 newtons per sq em; 27.6 psia). Cabin pressure a

reached 20 to 26 newtons per sq em (29 to 37.7 psia). 

(c) The estimated average gas temperature at ru

kelvins (700°F). 

89 
pyp

flammability requirements. The direction 

configuration verification record as of the star

Out Integrated Test and was not accomplished 

was considered as possibly significant in term

medium for flame propagation. 

• Polyethylene bags covered the hose fit

dispenser and the battery-instrumentation 

transducer, which were placed on the aft bulk

bags were made of nonflight materials. 

• Two polyurethane pads, covered with 

couch struts. The pads were placed in the spa

wiring, and aft bulkhead during the planned e

90 

Determination-Procedures for controlling entry 

spacecraft were not strictly enforced. 

"Board Proceedings" and Append. D, "Panels l thru 4," Report of Apo

pp. 3-30 and D-l-5 through D-l-19. 


The Apollo 204 Review Board accepted the final rep

Operations Panel (No. 14). The panel had been assigne

security practices at KSC and supporting areas 

recommend any needed changes. Practices includ

personnel sign-in requirements, buddy systems, and bac

tion requirements. 

91 
in its final report, including: 

Finding-Severe damage to wiring was 

lower equipment bay along the aft bulkhead. E

and damage was less severe in the right-hand 

Determination-Electrical arcing in the ex

of this bay could have provided a primary ig

Finding-Right-hand portions of the le

severely damaged. Wiring, tubing, and comp

absorber compartment and oxygen/water pan

and melted. Penetrations in the aft bulkhead 

observed. The carbon dioxide absorber com

92 
operation. 

Determination-The absence of any significant e

ning indicated that the test configuration (pressurized 

cabin atmosphere) was not classified as potentially haz

Finding-The propagation rate of the fire in the acci

rapid. Removal of the three spacecraft hatches, from eith

outside, for emergency exit required a minimum of 

respectively, under ideal conditions. 

Determination-Considering the rapid propagatio

time constraints imposed by the spacecraft hatch c

doubtful that any amount of emergency preparation wo

injury to the crew before egress. 

93 
19 

DeterminationThe scope of contrac

participation in test procedure development w

documented. Post-procedure-release approval 

not ensure positive and timely coordination 

"Board Proceedings"; Append. A, "Board Minutes"; an

in Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, pp. 3-28 through 

D-13-13. 

The Materials Work Panel (Panel 8, also re

Panel) in its final report accepted by the Apo

number of findings on flammable materials i

task had included the following, from its de

94 
varied from melting and blistering of aluminum allo

Velcro, and burning of Teflon wire insulation to slight s

melting of nylon fabrics. 

Determination-The fire filled the spacecraft interio

heat was in the lower left front area around the environm

Surface temperatures in excess of 800 kelvins (1000°F) we

such as the front and left side of the spacecraft. Surface 

less than 500 K ( 400°F) in isolated pockets above the ri

Finding-The rate of flame propagation, the rate o

the maximum pressures achieved, and the extent of co

newtons-per-sq-cm (5-psia) oxygen boilerplate tests wa

than observed in the 11.4-newton (16.5-psia) oxygen 

95 
more stringent, were not contractually impo

tor. 

Determination-Materials were evaluate

012 using different criteria. Application o

command module would have reduced the am

materials (Velcro and Uralane foam). 

Finding-Alternate materials that are n

less flammable than those used on spacecraf

applications. 

Determination-The amount of com

command modules can be limited. 

96 
engineering personnel of North American Aviation, 

concerning solder joints in the CM. 

"Board Proceedings," pp. 3-30, 3-31. 

Final report of the Disassembly Activities Panel (No.4) w

Apollo 204 Review Board. Panel 4 had been assigned to d

for disassembly of spacecraft 012 for inspection and 

Disassembly was to proceed step by step in a manner per

information to be obtained without disturbing the evi

cockpit and the area outside the pressure hull. Catalo

information within the spacecraft and disolaying the rem

part of the required procedures. 

97 
2. Astronaut equipment room and work 

spacesuits and other government furnished c

gated. 

3. Bonded display area-an area in w

displayed under controlled conditions to pe

CM 012 components visually. 

4. Command module 012 work area-

placed in a supporting ring within an exist

remained in this area until the aft heatshield w

transferred to a standard support ring in th

Technicians continued the disassembly activi

areas. 

98 
Finding-Not all crew compartment equipment 

explosion proof. 

Determination-Testing of possible ignition source

cient. 

Finding-Some CM equipment exhibited arcing 

during certification or during spacecraft 012 testing. The

way to determine from the records reviewed whether sp

(possibly caused by an arc or a short) were reviewed by sy

the test conductor before a test. 

Determination-Review of possible ignition sourc

testing was inadequate. 

99 
Aviation, and certain Headquarters personn

Administrator for Public Affairs on Apr

Designation Committee had approved the Of

recommendations and that Mueller had b

designations. 

On April 24, OMSF further instructed the C

officially recorded as Apollo 1, "first manned A

ground test.'' AS-20 1, AS-202, and AS-203 w

"Apollo" series, and the next mission woul

TWX, Mueller, NASA OMSF, to KSC, MSFC, MSC, "Ap

March 25 and April 24, 1967; ltr ., Low to Mueller, March 

Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, to distr., Ap

100 
p

Maxime A. Faget, MSC, advised the Board that the l

cartridge had been sent to MSC for analysis. Hubert D. Ca

appointed courier to handcarry the item to MSC and Ric

MSC, was designated the Board's witness for the anal

Systems Laboratory was to make the analysis and report 

analysis was to identify contaminants to determine the q

dioxide in the lithium hydroxide. 

William D. Mangan, Langley Research Center, join

supporting the Board. 

"Board Proceedings," pp. 11-32, 3-33. 

101 
30 

whether they could be repaired in place. O

Kleinknecht that time had not been sufficie

status of the wiring. A superficial inspectio

had indicated some serious discrepancies, 

recommendations, but they recommended a m

spacecraft 101 wire bundles. 

Memo, Creighton, Goldenberg, and Witherington to Kl

101 Wire Bundles," April 4, 1967. 

The Apollo 204 Review Board accepted the r

Panel (No. 3), which had been charged 

immediately before and during the Janua

102 

(OCP) were revised and released on the day before the t

than 25 percent of the line items were changed. Approxim

of the change was due to errors in technical content in th

the procedure. In addition, 106 deviations were written 

Determination-Neither the revision nor the deviatio

have contributed specifically to the incident. The late tim

release, however, prevented test personnel from beco

familiar with the test procedure before use. 

Finding-During the altitude chamber tests, the cabi

at pressures greater than sea level with an oxygen enviro

half times as long as the cabin was pressurized with o

accident during Plugs-Out Test. 

103 
p

Historical Data Panel (Panel No. 6). The 

assemble, summarize, and interpret his

spacecraft and associated systems pertinent t

were to include such records as the spacecraf

quality engineering and inspection docum

prepared narratives to reflect the relationship 

and acceptance points and substantiating d

brief history of prelaunch operations per

Kennedy Space Center. 

In its final report to the Review Board the H

eight findings and determinations. Among 

104 
evaluate the system design characteristics and potenti

requirements to prevent recurrence of fire. 

The panel's final report to the Review Board contained fin

and flammability, cabin atmosphere, review of egress proc

the flight and ground voice communications. Among th

Finding-Flammable, nonmetallic materials were 

the spacecraft. In the Block I and Block II spacecraft de

materials were contiguous to potential ignition sources. 

Determination-In the Block I and Block II s

combustible materials were exposed in sufficient quantiti

fire hazard. 

105 
spacecraft. 

Determination-Even under optimum 

egress from Apollo 204 spacecraft could n

sufficient time. 

Finding-During the January 27 Ap

experienced in communicating from grou

ground stations. 

Determination-The ground system de

operational requirements. 

"Board Proceedings" and Append. D, "Panels 6 thru 10,

pp. 3-33 and D-9-3 through 3-9-13. 

106 
The final report of the Medical Analysis Panel (No. 11) t

Review Board was processed for printing. The panel had 

provide a summary of medical facts with appropriate me

investigation of the January 27 fire. Examples were 

pathological evidence of overpressure, and any other areas 

in determining the cause of accident or in establishing c

The panel report indicated that at the time of the acc

physicians were in the blockhouse monitoring data from 

Upon hearing the first voice transmission indicating fire, 

physician turned from the biomedical console to look 

television monitors. When his attention returned to 

bioinstrumentation data had stopped. The biomedical 

107 

approximately 6:45 p.m. and decided that r

no avail. 

Determination-Time of death could 

finding. 

Finding- "The cause of death of the A

due to inhalation of toxic gases due to fire. C

thermal burns." 

Determination-It could be concluded 

that unconsciousness preceded death by so

that an equilibrium had not been establish

system indicated that blood circulation sto

equilibrium could be reached. 

108 

ppgg9 wp

according to the test to be conducted. 

Required leak check operations were also requested at a m

of 142 newtons per sq em (206 psia), with a design limit o

sq em (270 psia). The test fluids would be compatible with 

at the test pressures. The test would be conducted in the Al

where adequate protection existed for isolating and con

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth approved the request t

Memo, Shea to Gi1ruth, "Request for authorization to conduct a pressure t

In reply to a request from NASA Hq., CSM Man

Kleinknecht told Apollo Program Director Samuel 

109 

the CM and the entire system involved in it

common to both safety and mission success. O

environment the occupants were totally dep

followed that protection from fire as a haz

quick egress. Egress was useful only during 

CM was being readied for its mission and no

risk of fire had to be faced, but that risk was on

reliability that must receive adequate consi

operating procedures intended to reduce th

other serious risks to mission success and s

The House Committee on Science and A

NASA Oversight held hearings on the Revie

110 
qpy 

instrumentation power wiring led into the area between t

control unit and the oxygen panel. No evidence wa

suggested sabotage. 

2. Finding-(a) The CM contained many classe

material in areas contiguous to possible ignition source

conducted with a 1 00-percent oxygen atmosphere at 11.5 

( 16.7 psia). 

Determination-The test conditions were extrem

Recommendation-The amount and location 

materials in the CM must be severely restricted and con

111 

given regularly and reviewed before a haz

structures and umbilical towers should be m

operations. 

6. Finding-Frequent interruptions a

enced in the overall communication system d

the accident. 

Determination-The overall comm

factory. 

Recommendation-(a) The ground c

be improved to ensure reliable communicati

soon as possible and before the next manne

review should be conducted on the entire spa

112 
control unit failures. The design and installation feature

mental control unit made removal or repair difficult. (b) C

solder joints had been a chronic problem. (c) The coolant w

and combustible. (d) Deficiencies in design, manufactu

rework, and quality control existed in the electrical wiring

test was made of a complete flight-configured spacecra

design and operating procedures required the disconnec

connections while powered. (g) No design features for fire 

incorporated. 

Determination-These deficiencies created an unne

ous condition and their. continuation would imperil an

operations. 

ll3 
responses to changing program requireme

Recommendation-Every effort m

maximum clarification and understandin

organizations in the program, the objectiv

efficient program. 

Report of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administr

Administration, AprilS, 1967, transmitta1letter and pp

Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA O

Accident: Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., vols. 1-3, A

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apo

sess., pts. 3-7, April 11, 13, and 17, May 4 and 9, 196

114 


1968 

]an.ary 2: The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Fli

certify the Apollo system·design for manned flight. 

]an.ary 17: Eberhard Rees, Director of the Apollo Special T

Downey, told ASPO Manager George M. Low he had foun

deficiencies." 

]an.ary 22: NASA launched Apollo 5, the first LM flight (unman

]an.ary 24: CSM Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht listed what 

the program. 

Febrt~ary 5: The Senior Flammability Board decided on action t

cent nitrogen prelaunch attnosphere in CSM 101. 

Febrt~ary 28: Priorities for scientific objectives vs mission ope

were established. 

116 

117 


MSC Announcement 6751, Key Personnel Change, April 7, 1967. 

A flash report sent to the NASA Apollo Program Director b

George M. Low at MSC informed him that all the fuel-cell 

titanium-alloy tanks were suspected of having contamin

problem was detected during an acceptance test. Prelimin

revealed the weld had become contaminated during gi

because of incomplete purging of the tank's interior. Al

were therefore liable to be contaminated and records we

identify which tanks had been rewelded. The following 

directed by Low for use on spacecraft 017 and 020: ( 1) 

pressure test at pressures well above normal operating follo

dye penetrant inspection on replacement tanks for spacecr

119 

harnesses on spacecraft 2TV-l and 101 an

determine actions needed to save the harn

"Can a sufficient number of nylon wire bun

requirements of our new materials speci

padding and chafing guards be replaced? Wh

meet requirements of the recent inspection 

mistreated in recent months, as was men

astronauts? How about water glycol spillag

include members from the Engineering and 

Operations Directorates, the Flight Safe

Quality, and Test Division. Low asked firm 

the harnesses in spacecraft 2TV-l and 101 

120 
representatives from SMD, the Instrumentation and El

Division, and the Flight Safety Office to work with him. L

let him know by April 12 when it would be possible 

recommendations as to what needed to be done. 

Memo, Low to Jones, "Task Team assignments," April 10, 1967. 

George Low requested William M. Bland, MSC, to ta

recommendations made by MSC Director Robert R. Gilru

color photos of all spacecraft areas before they were 

procedure had been invaluable during the Apollo Review 

121 
14 

CM mockup tests by the Structures and M

Thermochemical Test Area had shown that 

oxygen environments at a pressure of 11.4 

(16.5 psia). The tests, in which most of the 

been replaced by Teflon or Beta cloth, consis

bay materials sequentially in two places. T

operation with oxygen at 11.4 newtons 

eliminated and that either air or oxygen at 3

used. In reply, the ASPO Manager poin

indicated a strong desire to avoid the use o

subsequent spacecraft purges. Accordingly, 

122 
ASPO Manager George M. Low pointed out to 

Engineering and Development Maxime A. Faget that ap

person at MSC was responsible for spacecraft wiring. L

like to discuss naming a subsystem manager to follow 

including not only the wiring schematics, circuitr

protection, etc., but also the detailed design, engineerin

installation of wiring harnesses. 

Memo, Low to Faget, "Subsystem manager for spacecraft wiring," Apr

NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips 

defining the requirements, responsibilities, and inter-C

123 

21 

TWX.s, Low to NASA Hq., Attn: Apollo Program Directo

May 3, 1967. 

NASA Associate Administrator for Manned S

instructed NASA Apollo Program Directo

Director Robert R. Gilruth, and KSC Directo

findings and recommendations of the Apollo 

responsibility to an appropriate person for (a

the findings and recommendations, (b) the 

finding or recommendation, (c) the date on 

completed, and (d) the preparation of a rep

124 

MSC decided to purge these two spacecraft on the p

nitrogen. The total amount of oxygen in the spacecraft 

would not exceed 14 percent. No tests would be co

spacecraft with hatches closed when men were in the sp

TWX, ASPO Manager to NASA Hq., Attn: Apollo Program Director, A

NASA Task Team-Block II Redefinition, CSM, was esta

The.team-to be in residence at North American Av

redefinition period-was to provide timely response to que

on detail design, overall quality and reliability, test and c

specifications, configuration control, and schedules. 

125 

on that mission. I also stated that I would lik

Spacecraft 101 that is no later than No

constraining tests on 2TV 1 should be com

flight of 101. I further stated that the propos

103 and subsequent spacecraft were not goo

strive to achieve earlier dates. 

"In summary, we did not agree with the ba

April23, 1967, letter. These ground rules ess

be limited to a six-orbit mission, and to be del

expense of all other spacecraft. Instead, we st

to achieve a balanced program involving 

when all spacecraft are considered and not 

126 
TWX, North American Aviation Space Div., Downey, Calif., to NASA H

KSC, "Redesignation of S&:ID as Space Division," May 9, 1967. 

George C. White, Jr., NASA OMSF Director of Apoll

Quality, told Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phil

presentation on April 29 had restored confidence in Ap

three areas caused him concern as possible compromise

and mission success in the interest of near-term schedule 

ations. They were: 

• Soldered joints in coolant system plumbing. Desig

basically wrong; the insertion of the tubing into the sleev

tube diameter. Shear strength of the solder had to be de

127 

2-4 

con.sideration be given to release of certain i

Apollo Mission Simulator program. Board C

notified Low on June 22 that the CM mocku

required by the Review Board and that 

determined by the ASPO Manager. 

Memo, Low to Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board, "Re

2, 1967; TWX, Thompson to MSC, Attn: George M. L

NASA Block II Redefinition Task Team gro

Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht arrived at N

Division at Downey May 2, followed by Task

the next day. Borman met with North Am

128 

followed by a discussion of spacecraft 2TV -1 Downey te

related to the Houston tests for the spacecraft 101 missi

9. The Test Group of the Task Team planned to wo

Oleckout Working Group and would be represented in i

Downey on May 11. 

10. Rework resulting from the wiring inspection of 

not proceeding as rapidly as desired; however, Borman r

efficient procedures were being prepared and would be car

possible. 

11. The Apollo spacecraft quality requirements we

and the North American Quality Plan would be chec

requirements in detail. 

129 
5 

the right time to start using the designa

appropriate internal documentation. Muell

Note, Phillips to Mueller, May 4, 1967. 

Circuit breakers being used in both CSM a

ASPO Manager George Low told Engineer

Maxime A. Faget. Low said that althoug

Division was developing a coating to be appl

a solution was not the best for the long 

Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Di

breakers for Apollo-ideally, circuit breaker

would fit within the same volume as t

130 

g, vgp

Cong., 1st sess, vol. 3, May 10, 1967; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1

1968), pp. 144-148.). 

MSC responded to a March 29letter from NASA Hq. con

of Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) 

said it had reviewed schedules, cost, and integration aspe

configurations and that four areas of the project app

modified to allow proper inclusion of the configuration

mission support efforts by Bendix Aerospace Systems Div

fourth ALSEP mission; (2) extensio:..1 of KSC's support ef

fourth ALSEP mission; (3) extension of the ALSEP prot

to encompass three distinct system configurations rather 

131 

12 

g

the date would be difficult to meet. 

TWX, Low, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn: Lee James, "LM

Anthony W. Wardell of the MSC Flight Safety 

Manager Low that "the May 10 inspecti

previous recommendation to replace, rather th

wiring] harness. In addition to the visual evi

book contaj.ning about 100 outstanding w

Review Board) actions was noted on a work 

did, however, list seven recommended sugg

event the harnesses were reworked rather th

132 

assignments effective immediately. The prime crew for th

flight mission was to consist of Walter M. Schirra, Jr., co

Eisele, CM pilot; and R. Walter Cunningham, LM pilot

was Thomas P. Stafford, commander; John W. Youn

Eugene A. Cernan, LM pilot. Names had been repo

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on 9 M

Memo, Astronaut Office to distr., "Astronaut Technical Assignments," 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hea

sess., pt. 6, May 9, 1967. 

A Block II spacecraft vibration program was begun to pr

CSM integrity and qualify the hardware interconnecti

within the spacecraft. A test at MSC was to simu

133 

26 

the LM and CM be monitored and recorded du

with hatch open or closed, and tests in the 

launch pads, and altitude chambers. A facili

propellant-utilization gauging system duri

specified that the field of view of the TV c

shoulder and torso and portions of the legs of 

stations in both the CM and the LM. 

Lrr., Owen G. Morris, MSC, to KSC, "Continuous Televis

Apollo Tests at KSC," May 25, 1967. 

ASPO Manager George Low told Charles A. B

Research and Operations, that it had been det

134 

BEFORE 

REVIEWED & CORRECTED 

• WIRE ROUTING & SLACK •IMPROPER INSTAllATION 

OF CLAMPS
 • WIRE DAMAGE 

• RELOCATED WIRE BREAKOUTS 
, 

covered copper wires exposed to glycol/w

spontaneously and burn in oxygen. Copper 

wire under identical conditions did not ignit

confirmed in work at the Illinois Institute 

memorandum, the Chief of the Structur

recommended that if additional testing ver

were free of the hazard, consideration sho

substitution of nickel-coated wires for silver-

understood that the Block II CSM already had 

20 memo to the ASPO Manager, the D

Development pointed out that silver-plated p

would offer the same hazards. He added tha

136 

Memo, W. B. Atchison to C. W. Rathke, 

Harness Board Design2D v

George M. Low told Joseph N. Kotanchik, Chief of MS

Mechanics Division, that actions were pending on Pratt & 

vessel failures. The pressure vessels were used in the Apol

Kotanchik had spelled out a list of problem areas in con

the vessels and management interface between MS

contractor North American Aviation, and between North 

subcontractor Pratt & Whitney. 

Memos, Chief, Structures and Mechanics Div., to Manager, ASPO, "C

Whitney Aircraft (PWA) on pressure vessel failure analysis," May 18, 1967

"Pratt 8c Whitney pressure vessel failures," May 31, 1967. 


137 
6 

Bendix Corp. demonstrated the operation 

prove that the Apollo Lunar Surface Experim

be removed from the LM at various attitudes

the demonstration at Ann Arbor, Mich., were 

Paul Gerke, Don Lind, and Harrison Schm

mockup was crude but indicated that the co

Grumman and NASA. Design refinement, q

structure would have to be looked into. It wa

kilograms of weight would be added to the L

problems were defined at the meeting: (1) B

maximum and minimum attitude position 

design of ALSEP handling equipment. (2) 

138 

Module Earth Landing System modification," Sept. 29, 1967. 

In a memorandum to the Chief, Systems Engineering Div

Manager George M. Low pointed out the weight proble

LM was critical. Low called for a detailed review ofweight 

any proposed design change. The weight estimate was t

the affected contractor as a part of his change proposal, an

be verified by the subsystems manager and Systems Eng

To provide timely weight status to the Configuratio

Systems Engineering Division was given the responsibi

CSM and LM weight status at each weekly Board me

(1) control weight, (2) current weight, and (3) estimated 

139 

13 

by conducting a lunar-orbital flight bef

recommended Phillips consider that seq

consideration be given to including it as a pr

Mission Assignments Document. "Identifyi

said, "would initiate the necessary detailed 

Memo, Aller to Phillips, "Apollo Flight Program," Jun

The purpose of spacecraft 105 testing was t

between the primary and secondary struc

interconnecting hardware (wiring, tubing 

regulators, etc.) and demonstrate structural 

when subjected to qualification vibration 

140 

X-ray inspection seeks to 

ensure that weldments, 

wires, and spacecraft components are free of cracks 

and other damage that 

could jeopardize crew safety 

and mission success. 
20 

20 

IVB Rendezvous," June 19, 1967. 

Apollo spacecraft 017 was mechanically m

vehicle at KSC in preparation for the Apollo 

scheduled for the third quarter of 1967. 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 

Leonard Reiffel of the NASA Hq. Apoll

Program Director Samuel C. Phillips that 

[Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Packa

because: 

142 
A committee was established to conduct an operational read

(ORI) of the MSC Space Environment Simulation L

inspection would supplement the original ORI of the fa

would be placed on reviewing modifications since the prev

and upon readiness to perform the test series on LTA-8 a

committee was made up of Martin L. Raines, Chairm

Talbert, Executive Secretary; Edward L. Hays, Alan H

Powell, John W. Conlon, Armistead Dennett, and Joseph P

MSC; Dugald 0. Black, KSC; and E. Barton Geer, LaRC

Memo, Director, MSC, to distr., "Operational Readiness Inspection of 

Environmental Simulation Laboratory," June 22, 1967. 


143 
28 

The Apollo Program Director requested 

experiments to AS-205, spacecraft 101: M

MOll-Cytogenic Blood Studies, M023-L

S005-Synoptic Terrain Photography, 

Photography. Experiment 0008, Radia

included in the above list at the option of A

George M. Low informed CSM Manager 

was approving reinstatement of Experimen

the same date Low informed the Apollo P

S006 would be carried on AS-205. He pr

MOll, and M023, which required pre- an

144 
spacecraft access arm until needed. 

Ltr., Donald K. Slayto~, MSC, to ASPO Manager, "Emergency air supply 

crew during a spacecraft emergency egress," July !J, 1967. 

A board was appointed. by MSC White Sands Test Facility 

L. Raines to determine the cause of a fire that had occurred 

on July 3. The board was to submit its findings by July 

Ltr., Raines to distr., "Appointment to Investigation Board," July 5, 1967

A CSM shipment schedule, to be used for planning throug

program and as a basis for contract negotiations with N

Aviation, was issued by NASA Hq. The schedule covered C

145 

21 

g, pg 

Ltr., Gilruth to Phillips, July 19, 1967. 

The RTG Review Team-established to 

radioisotope thermoelectric generator's f

mission safety and success-submitted 

Program Director Samuel C. Phillips had es

was expressed over the design and safety of 

at NASA Hq. of the Apollo Lunar Surface 

The team's preliminary report was based o

of the LM at Grumman that indicated the 

spacecraft-LM adapter (SLA) presented a p

146 

The ASPO Manager summarized the lunar module ox

design requirements for the lunar mission and made 

decision to leave both portable life support systems (PL

surface. He recommended that NASA OMSF accept 

philosophy as well as the design capacity for lunar mo

Ltrs., George M. Low, MSC, to Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., July 24, 1

Aug. 10, 1967. 

ASPO Manager George M. Low issued instructions tha

actions to be carried out by MSC as a result of the 

investigation were the responsibility of CSM Man

147 
27 

operations more difficult. KSC had provided s

Long Island, and had also provided support 

Gemini vehicles. The aid of the KSC inspectio

beneficial in ensuring a smooth transition of t

the field. 

Ltr., Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, to Kurt H. Debus, KSC, J

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth wrote MSFC 

that MSC had two lunar landing research 

training and three lunar landing training 

procured from Bell Aerosystems Co. Gilruth e

of welds on ·the LLTVs at both Bell and 

148 

American organize a team of engineers with broad desi

make an independent assessment of component design e

would identify actions to reduce spacecraft weight and 

methods to prevent future weight increases. The team 

under the leadership of a North American employee wit

of Apollo hardware. 

To deal with Apollo weight problems, North American 

accurate and timely weight visibility was of paramoun

provide this visibility, North American used system 

directly in weight prediction and reporting. As part 

engineering-design-change documentation would cont

effect that would be reviewed and approved by enginee

149 

15 

tangible alternatives. 

Memo, Webb to Phillips, "Review of Apollo Program," 

ASPO wrote Lewis Research Center about stu

the pressure suits worn by the astronauts. In 

tions and biomedical circuits inside the suit a

panel through the crewman electrical u

determine the ignition characteristics. Stu

various materials used ~n the suit loop had 

compiled. 

Memo, G. M. Low, MSC, to I. I. Pinkel, Lewis Research 

suit," Aug. 15, 1967. 

150 
g

Administrator on back contamination and the protecti

and chemical integrity of lunar samples, on when and 

lunar samples might be released from quarantine, and 

Interagency Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Spac

Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Educatio

Department of Interior, and the National Academy of Sciences on the Pr

Biosphere from Lunar Sources of Contamination, Aug. 24, 1967. 

Grumman proposed a procurement for a study of 

projector, to assist Grumman with an item that had been 

by Farrand but did not meet the established specifi

solicited assistance of qualified firms in the optomech

151 

September 

1 

6 

An Apollo test flow study group was formed to 

spacecraft, launch vehicle, and space vehicle te

composed of aerospace industry and NASA p

Memo, R. 0. Middleton, KSC, to G. M. Low, MSC, "Apoll

1967. 

Apollo Program Directive No. 31 established 

System Safety program and defined program 

with NASA Management Instruction 1138

directive was applicable to all Apollo Head

Safety activities and it spelled out Headq

152 

LM-1, fitted inside spacecraftlunar module adapter 7, is raised 

to position at Kennedy Space 

Center in preparation for the 

Apollo 5 mission. 
9 

ASPO Manager George Low 

Aviation, emphasized that th

most serious problem in the 

weight estimating problem wa

made in March 1967 to incorp

estimated at 185 kilograms, bu

actually 558 kilograms. Neith

ballast, which doubled the req

inadequate, making a workab
would be, in order, minimum lunar sample, ALSEP, 

survey including sample collection. (2) The first EVA o

during the first lunar mission would consist of a set of si

independent activities and the timeline would permit r

each activity. The minimum lunar sample would be c

first EVA but the ALSEP would not be deployed. ( 3) A se

included for planning purposes and would include A

The second EVA would not be considered a primary m

For mission planning purposes the 22~-hour lunar surf

be pursued as the prime candidate for the first lunar la

Memo, George M. Low, MSC, to distr., "Surface activity during first lu

Sept. 18, 1967. 

155 

with the current configuration of the ECS. I ho

that the recommendations were meant to 

improvement rather than constraints of Cre

nature.... If you agree with the need for this 

Review Board, I will arrange such a meeting 

Board.'' 

Low replied to Myers on October 30, saying

should give serious consideration to each of 

tions and that a joint NASA/NAR Safety Re

means of accomplishing this. I would be ple

with you. . . . '' Low asked Myers to set up the 

4 mission. 

156 
(House) and January 1968 (Senate). 

Ltr., Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., to George M. Low, MSC, "AS-2

Report," Sept. 21, 1967. House Committee on Science and Astronauti

NASA Oversight, Status of Actions Taken on Recommendations of the 

Review Board, 90th Cong, 2d sess., Committee Print, Serial L, 1968; 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 90th C

January 1968. 

C. H. Bolender, ASPO Manager for the lunar module

Gavin, Jr., Grumman LM Program Director, that recen

weight growth trends during the past several months esta

identify actions that would reduce weight and preclu

growth. He pointed out that the Configuration Contr

157 

26 

and Robert E. Johnson, Subcommittee on Ma

September 28. 

Ltrs., Adams to Gilruth, Sept. 25, 1967; Gilruth to Adam

The Flammability Test Review Board met at 

vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin i

that the ignition points, configuration, instr

were acceptable for verifying the fire safety o

The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately 

LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that th

testing. The Board was composed of Robert R

H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Fag

158 

pursued as a flight fire detection system, but that it not b

on the Apollo program. ASPO Manager George M. Low 

recommendations September 28 and MSC Director 

concurred October 7. 

On October 26, the Director of Flight Crew Operati

Directorate was formulating and implementing a tra

flight crews to give them experience in coping with fire 

spacecraft. "In total, the crew training for cockpit fir

Review of BP 1224 and M-6 'burn test' film; demonstrat

fire extinguishers and their most effective use; p

simulating cockpit fire situations in conjunction w

craft/mockup/Apollo Mission Simulator walkthrough

159 

29 

q

are stringent and uncompromising.... Eve

schedule challenge is substantial, we are c

qualification testing is scheduled to start durin

1967 we will have a flawless operation ...." 

Ltrs., Low to Horner, Sept. 29, 1967; Horner to Low, Oct. 2

Kleinknecht, "Parachute packing," Sept. 1, 1967; Low 

parachutes," Sept. 23, 1967. 

An Apollo Entry Performance Review Board 

Director to review and validate the analytica

operational corridor. The Board was set up be

ablation heatshield in the Apollo spacecraft, 

160 

, 

; g 

redundant circuits, +4.9; fuel cask and support i

+ 14.9; guidance and navigation equipment

instrumentation, .+ 9.9; communications, + 1.8; 

laneous changes, +2.2. 


Net change from March to September was +230

• Lunar module injected weight status September 

Command Module Significant Weight Ch

March-September 1967 


• Command module injected weight status March 

161 
5 

An exchange of correspondence between 

Rockwell emphasized the seriousness of the 

Accurate and timely weight visibility was o

weight control and resulted from proper im

weight prediction, weight control from design 

reporting. To ensure visibility, North Americ

program that would use system design person

reporting. Preliminary design personnel i

Group were designated to integrate the effor

Ltrs., George M. Low, MSC, to Dale D. Myers, North Ame

Low to Myers, Aug. 17, 1967; Myers to Low, Oct. 5, 196

162 
was incorporated into the OPS design. 

• Manual actuation was preferable to automatic ac

reflected in the design. 

Memo, Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to ASPO Manager, "Oxygen purge system 

10, 1967. 

Key MSC and NASA Headquarters management changes 

at a press conference at MSC. GeorgeS. Trimble, Jr., was 

NASA OMSF to serve as Deputy Director of MSC. Eberh

MSFC would be temporarily assigned as a Special Assistan

ing Problems to George M. Low, ASPO Manager. Edgar 

named as Deputy to George E. Mueller at OMSF. Particip

163 

13 

would chair the panel that passed on gov

items (see October 18), and probably Christ

the Software Control Panel (the last positi

An additional step to gain a better under

baseline was taken by appointing Jes

configuration management. 

Ltr., George M. Low, MSC, to Samuel C. Phillips, N

A proposal to use a Ballute system rather th

the main chutes on the Apollo spacecraft w

the Ballute system would slightly reduce d

164 

LRL was justified to Congress on the basis of a need for a qu

Memo, V. R. Wilmarth, NASA Hq., to distr., "Conference on Lunar Sample 

1967. 

MSC's Director of Engineering and Development Maxime 

request of the ASPO Manager, established a Configuratio

(CCP) for government furnished equipment (GFE). Th

integrate control of changes in the GFE items supplied 

spacecraft. "Authority to bring change recommendations t

will be invested in Division Chiefs. Changes rejected by the 

need not be reviewed by the GFE CCP," the memorandum 

panel said. Membership on the panel was as follows: Chair

165 

Mercury Program was also plagued with a 

the facts presented in the report by Mr. Ral

that positive action must be taken to tighten 

North American Rockwell Corporation 

vendors that supply the parts for the Apoll

done to consistently bring the contaminat

acceptable level. The numerous problems w

are occurring so frequently that it is pos

procedural failure modes that are hidden b

failure modes associated with contaminati

Kleinknecht added that he expected to rece

notice from North American that it was imp

166 

The process control investigation that revealed the cau

the helium valve was being expanded to include a re

suppliers involved with cleaning valves, regulators, etc., u

CSM. In addition to a fresh look at the suppliers fabrica

activities, the process evaluation is a comprehensive 

American and supplier specifications for compatibi

requirements for one assembly and the next, and a re-surv

facilities to assure he has the technical capability and equi

stringent Apollo CSM quality requirements. The plan 

process study is being developed, and action to the pla

within a week." 

Memo, Taeuber to S. H. Simpkinson, MSC, "SIC 101 SM RCS Checkout,

Kleinknecht to Myers, Oct. 26, 1967; Myers to Kleinknecht, Dec. 4, 1967

167 

for monitoring hazardous tests. 

• In recent weight-saving exercises, tho

and a conclusion was reached that no TV c

CSM. This would not only save four kilog

reduce the required stowage space and r

minimizing the number of required contain

• A decision was made to stow the Bloc

stage during the lunar mission. There wo

checking out the lunar TV camera in earth 

work on the lunar surface. For that reason

camera in the ascent stage on the LM-3 miss

subsequent vehicles. 

168 
investigated.' 

TWX, George M. Low to Director, Apollo Program Office, NASA Hq., Oc

Milton A Silveira to Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, "Failure which occurred on 

84-l," Oct. 31, 1967; "Further information on Apollo Drop Test 84-l fail

and "Results of Preliminary Analysis of Apollo Drop Test 84-l Failure," 

Maxime A. Faget, MSC Director of Engineering and Devel

ASPO Manager that he had reviewed the LM insula

concluded that "the present design is susceptible to degrad

leakage during pressurized conditions. The present insu

unacceptable for the lunar landing mission." He agreed wi

that design changes wer~ required and specified that the in

169 

4 

Ltrs., Debus to Gilruth, Nov. 3, 1967; Gilruth to Debu

Phillips, NASA Hq., Nov. 16, 1967; Phillips to Debu

NASA announced an Apollo mission sched

and five in 1969. NASA Associate Adminis

George E. Mueller said the schedule an

schedule under which a limited number o

modules and lunar landing modules, config

launched on test flights toward the mo

Apollo/uprated Saturn I flights were iden

Saturn V flights were identified with a 500 s

was: 

170 
It is my hope that Airtek will take every action to 

manufacturing cycle time for these tanks is held to an abso

In preparing background information for Gilruth, Flight C

Director Donald K. Slayton had pointed out that the first set 

eight) had been scrapped because of below-minimum 

Qualification testing of a tank from the second set revealed 

mismatch of welded tank fittings, and this set was also s

Ltr., Gilruth to Hayes, Nov. 7, 1967; memo, Slayton to MSC Director, "

President, Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation," Nov. 3, 1967. 

The MSC Director of Engineering and Development point

scale CSM would soon be tested to evaluate the hazard of 

171 
The S-IC stage cutoff occurred 2 minutes 

altitude of about 63 kilometers. The S-1

minutes 32 seconds and the burn lasted 6 mi

S-IVB stage ignition and burn of 2minutes 2

vehicle operations placed the S-IVB and spa

parking orbit with an apogee ofabout 187 

kilometers. After two orbits, which require

stage was reignited to place the spacecraft 

This burn lasted five minutes. Some 10 min

IVB burn, the spacecraft and S-IVB stage 

minutes later the service propulsion subsyst

The spacecraft was placed in an attitude w

172 

addressees, AS-501 Flight Results (10 day report), 

 Nov. 21 , 1967; Saturn A

Bulletins No. 1 and No.2, Nov. 14 and Nov. 22, 1967; NASA, "Apollo Progr

Report," Nov. 10, 1967. 


Tests of sample constant-wear garments (underwear) fabr

fabric were reported as showing the garments were a source 

and irritated the skin. Efforts were being made to fabricate a 

that would overcome these problems. Other flame resista

flame retardant treatments were also being investigated. 

delivery schedules of training and initial flight items requir

173 
gGg

w p

strengthen the Configuration Control Boa

felt it was "very desirable to have senior man

present for our Board meetings." The m

North American Apollo CSM Manager Dal

17 that he, Charles Feltz, or George Jeffs w

alternate schedule. Myers informed Lo

implementing new requirements designe

MSC's Kenneth S. Kleinknecht had been inv

weekly Tuesday meetings when possible an

was invited to attend routinely. 

Ltrs., Low to Myers, Nov. 14, 1967; Myers to Low, N

174 
pp

would be delayed until wind measurements indicated a t

allow a safe launch. And (5) if at any time after flight crew 

ured wind conditions indicated a beach impact for a pad 

arm would not be retracted until after the winds were deter

as confirmed by a balloon release. 

Memo, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., to Manager, ASPO, "Mission Rules con

beach impact for the Spacecraft 10llaunch," Nov. 16, 1967; telecon with Ch

Flight Control Div., by Ivan Ertel, Aug. 31, 1970. 

Robert R. Gilruth, George M. Low, and Maxime A. Faget, 

personnel and North American Rockwell management 

AiResearch to review the status of the Apollo environmen

175 

17 

pg,

, 

Eberhard F. M. Rees of MSFC sent MSC AS

results of a brief survey he had made at Nor

a preliminary step to plans agreed on by 

Webb, Associate Administrator for Manned 

MSFC Director Wernher von Braun, MSC 

Low. Rees was to head a special task group

concerned largely with planning contro

development, and design; manufacturing 

methods, and process control; quality 

procedures, c;onfiguration control, etc. 

176 
responsive levels of management, two examples will serve 

point. The SIC 101-RCS [reaction control system] quarte

hole mismatch was initially reported on January 9 within a 

not get management attention until late October. Impac

requires attention. Again, the SIC 020 heat shield requi

remove interference with the umbilical. This, too appare

other spacecraft. . . . " 

Speaking of the field of controls and prompt display of prob

"I feel that the so-called 'Problem Assessment Room' is a 

but that it requires much refinement. For example, it cu

inform management of repetitive non-conformances or de

Also, I learned that the previously mentioned improperly fi

177 
December 


1 


component level; and (3) the Grumman 

designated for the lunar mission to more te

was unacceptable. Past experience had sho

always have more testing than later ones. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for Mr. Webb," week 

NASA Hq. requested MSC to forward by D

providing qualified LM ascent engines with 

manned LM flights. The plan was expect

established in July when a NASA team went 

current BAC engine would be the prime effo

(North American Rockwell) injector develo

178 

contractor teardown inspection could be made to assess 

static-firing the flight spacecraft. A firing date of Januar

accomplish those objectives. 

Memo, Kapryan to Apollo Program Manager, KSC, "SM-102 Static Fir

1967. 

Astronaut Charles (Pete) Conrad's concern about an an

control problem in the LM was reported. Conrad had sai

sporty when in a light weight configuration." Minim

expected to produce about 0.3 degree per second rate, whic

be about four times too fast. A memo on the problem poss

by Howard W. Tindall, Jr., Deputy Chief of MSC's Miss

179 

11 

Rocketdyne was already manufacturing injec

program. 

Ltr., Low to Phillips, "Ascent engine program plan," D

NASA Hq. asked further MSFC studies of o

during an Apollo mission, the period betwe

launch umbilical tower clearance. Failures o

cause a vehicle collision with ground equip

major elements of potential danger. Problem

difficult to cope with from a crew safety or a

posed the double jeopardy possibility of losi

mobile launcher. 

180 
Readiness Review of SCM 101-Case 320," Dec. 29, 1967. 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips wrote to 

space flight Centers: 

"I am sure that you are keenly aware of the importance o

series of Apollo manned flights and the requirement th

actions are taken to assure the success of each mission

Design Certification Review, established for manned 

important role. Shortly our program of progressive De

Reviews leading to certification for the manned lu

commence; A significant part of the effort requires 

supporting analysis of critical hardware to assure that 

181 

15 

Ltr., Phillips to Directors, MSC, MSFC, and KSC, "Ap

ReviewI Apollo Mission Assignments," Dec. 14, 1967. 

The Apollo Site Selection Board met at MSC 

topography, landing approach path topogra

ations, among other topics. The board heard 

sites for the first and second missions, and ap

meeting, and Apollo Program Director Samu

three launch opportunities should be provi

Board members, in addition to Phillips, wer

Stevenson, Charles W. Mathews, and Oran 

182 

I. Replace all coax cable. 

2. Wrap all coax cable with aluminum tape. 

3. Partially wrap the cable to provide fire breaks. Tes

ican indicated that a 102-millimeter segment of wrappe

layers of aluminum foil would provide a fire break. MSC te

a fire break was not adequate for multiple cables. 

4. Leave the installation as it was. 

The following factors were considered in reaching a decis

101: 

1. The wiring in that spacecraft had been comp

months. All subsystems had been installed and protectiv

183 

p

of the coax cables, the lack of external ignitio

done in cleaning up the spacecraft from the f

of igniting the coax cables is exceedingly sm

less than would likely be incurred throug

installations had a decision been made to r

The installation in spacecraft 2TV -1 woul

was made fully recognizing that more fla

2TV-1 than in 101. However, the burnin

demonstrated as very slow, and it was reas

sufficient time to make an emergency exit 

2TV-1 long before any dangerous situatio

184 
Headquarters, making changes in OMSF. On January 2

Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mu

OMSF changes: ( 1) The Deputy Associate Administrator 

Flight would continue with "across the board" respons

Mueller when he was absent or not available; (2) the 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight (Management) w

ble for the supervision of all administrative aspects of ma

the manned space flight organization; and (3) the D

Administrator for Manned Space Flight (Technical) wou

as the technical director and chief engineer of the ma

programs. 

Memo, Mueller to OMSF Employees, Jan. 26, 1968. 

185 

4. Although connectors used with co

compatible with black boxes in the spac

available, there were not enough in stock to 

cables for spacecraft 103, 104, and 106. 

5. Testing at North American and MSC 

wrapping with aluminum tape would preclu

ignition of the coax should occur. 

Kleinknecht decided, with concurrence of M

Craig, to accept the proposal and Myers was 

to concurrence by Program Director Samu

Manager George M. Low. Kleinknecht receiv

and Phillips on December 20; then, in confir

186 

December 8 and 9, which had examined potential sites for 

beyond Apollo based on scientific objectives and 

considerations. He pointed out that during the GLEP gr

Cruz, Calif., in the summer, scientists had strongly recom

orbital mission be flown before manned landings, t

photographic information for more effective mission pla

remote-sensing measurements to detect anomalies on 

Hess said this position had changed to some extent. 

Hess pointed out that lunar exploration was the respon

Lunar Exploration Office at NASA Hq. (see December 

further been subdivided into the Lunar Science Offic

science and experiment planning, and the Flight 

187 

116 through 119 could exceed the parachu

would like to establish a single set of con

production vehicles. For product improvem

pound deleted for every pound added. For a

configuration, it is the responsibility of NASA 

performance implication of the change and 

control values...." 

Ltr., Phillips to Low, Dec. 21, 1967. 

The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully 

Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test config

the test cell pressure immediately before the 

188 


22 
The LM ascent engine program plan submitted to NASA 

9 had been approved, Apollo Program Director Samue

ASPO Manager George M. Low. Phillips was concerne

the impact of recent unstable injector tests at Bell Aerosy

plan. He said, "Resolution of these failures must be exp

maintain present schedules. Also of concern, is the poss

tion of the contractual and integration problems that 

Rocketdyne [Division] injector should be chosen." Phillip

areas receive special attention and that he be kept informe

of both injector programs. 

TWX, Phillips to Low, Dec. 28, 1967. 

189 
5 

and longer staytime, (3) a lunar orbital surve

remote sensors and photographic equipment 

a lunar surface rendezvous and exploration p

to deposit the increased scientific equipmen

extend Apollo's manned lunar capability to 

N. W. Hinners et al., Bellcomm Technical Memo 68-1012

Jan. 5, 1968. 

Apollo Special Task Team (ASTT) Director 

Raines, and Ralph Taeuber of MSC, and J. 

Rockwell, visited Rocketdyne Division to rev

engine backup program. The presentation 

190 

propulsion system for manned flight on AS-205. 

3. A successful launch vehicle test of AS-502 (Apoll

that the Saturn V design be certified ready for manned fl

1968. 

4. A decision to certify the Block II CM design f

should be essentially complete by early May 1968. 

5. Launch Complex 34 design should be certified fo

later than early June 1968. 

Ltr., Mueller to Gilruth, Jan. 9, 1968. 

Apollo Data Coordination Chief Howard W. Tindall

mission planning for the first two hours on the lunar sur

191 

g

gCS

to North American's inability to ensure that fi

forth in engineering documents, a weakne

functions of manufacturing: planning, fabri

MSC recommended a check procedure of 

installed equipment to the "as designed" part

concluded, "I think that we should tolerate no 

a simple 'as built' versus 'as designed' check

and including the first manned spacecraft." 

North American began a more nearly 

accountability system, which provided an ac

the "as designed" to the "as built" configur

192 

q

"Senior Flammability Review Board Meeting," MSC, Jan. 13, 1968; me

"Senior Flammability Review Board Meeting, January 13, 1968," Jan. 

ASPO Manager George M. Low outlined for the NASA 

Director MSC plans to static-fire the service propulsion 

complete unit. Houston officials maintained that at least 

complete system was necessary to prove the adeq

manufacturing, assembly, and testing. However, b

potential adverse effects that might accrue to testing the 

system (that for the 101 SM), MSC proposed to test-fire 

193 

17 

qualification tests, receiving inspections, pr

manufacturing operations. He urged Low t

Houston to determine how many persons M

with those from MSFC and GE) to plug the

Ltr., Rees to Low, Jan. 17, 1968. 

Eberhard Rees, Apollo Special Task Tea

Rockwell, participated in a failure review at N

parachute test failure (see January ll) and in 

plan. Others at the review included Dale M

North American and W. Gasich and W. 

Apollo Program Manager at Northrop-Ven

194 

, g, , , g, , g 

regarding contamination of CM 103 plumbing," Jan. 19, 1968; ltr., Klein

19, 1968; memo, Manager, CSM, ASPO, to distr., "Spacecraft Plum

Control Board," Jan. 19, 1968; ltr., Myers to Kleinknecht, Feb. 20, 1968

Rolf Lanzkron and Owen Morris, Chiefs of MSC's CSM 

Engineering Divisions, led a review of the 2TV-l and 

vacuum test article and lunar module test article) the

programs at MSC. Chief concerns expressed during the 

the heavy concentration of testing during the summer o

simultaneous operation of test chambers A and B, and the 

trained chamber operations support personnel for dual t

disclosed that maintenance of testing schedules for 

195 

22 

Launch Report #1," Feb. 12, 1968 (MOR M-932-68-05)

Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., LM Program Director 

Manager George M. Low of steps under way 

corrosion in the LM. (Low had expressed MS

danger on December 20, 1967.) While stating 

Gavin believed that stress corrosion would no

the LM mission. However, his organization w

LM's design and fabrication to determine to w

be ameliorated. (Gavin denied that such metal 

eliminated using present materials as dictate

LM design.) Gavin stated that he had created 

196 


Since all aluminum lines except for three were 

lines the resolution for cleaning and flushin

accomplished. 

2. Cleaning and flushing of water glyco

a. Pressure integrity of the water glycol s

hydrostatic check to 248 newtons per squar

square inch). Leak integrity would be confirm

helium at 41 newtons per sq em (60 psi). 

b. A resolution was obtained on the che

and flushing fluids to be used on CM 103. 

c. Agreement was reached on verificatio

flow paths. 

198 
that circumstances "could create a problem not anticipat

that his company's efforts in this direction had been "ent

beyond the requirements of the contract and good practic

and he stated his belief that additional efforts in this area w

measurable results. 

Ltr., Myers to Low, Jan. 26, 1968. 

MSC CSM Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, in a letter t

Rockwell's Dale D. Myers, protested lack of North Am

written MSC direction concerning parachute test vehi

pointed out that MSC had "considerably modified our u

in supporting the boilerplate 19 task being performed f

199 

3 

Ltr., Rees to Low, Feb. 2, 1968. 

ASPO Manager George M. Low advised Apo

C. Phillips that, in accordance with an ac

spacecraft environmental testing review at M

reexamining the design, fabrication, and ins

systems of the spacecraft to determine what f

ensure the integrity of those systems. Low had 

MSFC to direct this effort, using a small task 

spacecraft wiring and plumbing systems, t

assurance and inspection techniques. 

Ltr., Low to Phillips, Feb. 3, 1968. 

200 
The Board concluded that the material changes mad

resulted in a safe configuration in both the tested atmosp

agreed "that there will'always be a degree of risk associ

space flight," but the risk of fire "was now substantially 

risks inherent in manned space flight." 

Among decisions reached were: ( 1) the CSM 2TV-1 and 

configuration would be tested in the 60-percent-oxyge

nitrogen atmosphere; (2) material improvements and 

continued and changes would be phased in, pending t

proved materials; and ( 3) action would be taken to be pre

percent-oxygen and 40-percent-nitrogen prelaunch atm

201 

8 

Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote AS

stating his agreement with NASA's decision 

LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new 

earlier strongly urged such a second flight-

with Low and LM Manager C. H. Bolender 

flight data was presented at the Februa

Management Council.) Although the decisi

subject to further investigations by both cont

now were geared for a manned flight on th

Evans cited several spacecraft functions not c

that would have to be demonstrated before 

notably control by the primary navigation 

202 

(counter clockwise) was chosen over an inboard rotati

being the more unnatural of the two motions....Crew t

aborts in the Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator ha

design to be a problem." 

Memos, Low to Slayton, "Apollo Command Module abort handle," Feb. 

Manager, ASPO, "Apollo Command MOdule abort handle," Mar. I, 196

NASA Hq. asked MSC's support for the effort under wa

Review Board (created at Apollo Program Director Sa

request several weeks earlier) to reexamine software req

lunar mission. A specific concern of the Board (which inc

tives from the major support contractors, IBM, TRW, an

203 

pp

spacecraft CCB." Kraft replied April 12 that 

"various MSC organizations are represented o

[SCB]. These representatives identify related 

elements of the program during the disc

the ... meeting. Also, we have taken action t

of software and spacecraft changes prior to p

F. Gibson, Jr., Flight Operations Directorat

have resolved working arrangements to assur

by the Configuration Management Manual 

that the Change Integration Group in ASPO 

actions to either software or spacecraft hard

impacts.... Changes involving interfaces 

204 

16 and another at KSC on February 13, had failed to resolv

Low thus instructed Broome's team to reach a "f

agreement" on acceptable water specifications and lo

Much unnecessary time and effort had been expended on 

said, and he expected the team "to put this problem to res

Memo, Low to distr., "Apollo water requirements," Feb. 19, 1968. 

Reflecting the climate of scientific thinking at his Cen

Robert R. Gilruth responded to inquiries from Homer 

Associate Administrator, concerning vocal commu

exploration of the lunar surface. While he termed c

undesirable, Gilruth stated an astronaut's running comm

205 

analysis of the entire structure of the space

Grumman had determined that widespread s

was highly unlikely. Also, inspection of more 

exposed surfaces of lunar module test article 

had failed to discover a single instance of stres

no major changes would be made to the stru

Regarding the window problem (a window h

pressure test of LM-5 on December 17, 19

windows on the LM were made from the 

manned spacecraft. The most important f

scratches on the window surface. According

instituted a new acceptance test procedure 

206 

)

• The first extravehicular activity excursion was to c

of simple, mutually independent activities. 

• A small lunar sample would be collected on the 

• The Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (A

be deployed on the first excursion. 

• For planning purposes, a second excursion was a

ALSEP deployment as the primary scientific objective. 

Deployment of the ALSEP during the first EVA operat

appeared precluded by safety considerations (no object

1 

than the astronauts' initial familiarization with /6 gr

gravity operations turn out to be simpler and less tim

207 

1 

Ltr., ASPO Manager George M. Low to Apollo Program 

1968. 

John D. Stevenson, Director of Mission 

requested that MSC Flight Operations Dire

prepare an analysis of the potential ter

uncontrolled reentry of the Apollo 6 spacecra

a possible danger should a service propul

malfunction preclude a controlled reentry

include the debris hazard in MSC's Abort an

Apollo 6 then under preparation. 

Ltr., Stevenson to MSC, Attn: Kraft, "Terrestrial Threat 

March I, 1968. 

208 
subcontractor's plant (Dalmo Victor) at Belmont, Calif.

optimistic status reports on the entire system, including qu

delivery schedules. Shortly thereafter, when Dalmo Victo

testing, the company encountered serious technical diff

delivery schedule, as Rees put it, "collapsed completely." H

several efforts by analytical teams to pinpoint the technical 

put the program back into shape (including reviews in m

again on March 1, when very little progress could be seen

inability to remedy technical problems, said Rees, ind

weakness among Apollo contractors regarding visibility o

as well as their analytical engineering capability. 

Ltr., Rees to Myers, March 8, 1968. 

209 
14 

more contractor involvement in decision-

primes; and greater emphasis on the m

program. 

Memo for record, Cortright, "Apollo subcontractor re

NASA announced to the public that progra

60-percent-oxygen and 40-percent-nitroge

spacecraft cabin while on the launch pad 

environment in space). This technical de

tragedy with Apollo 204 over a year earlier

scrutiny than perhaps any comparable dec

space program. The change affected only 

210 

Rockwells suggestion of added spacecraft delivery delay

February letter from North American CSM Program 

Myers-suggesting further slips in delivery of 2TV-1 a

103, and 104-Low reminded Myers that at the close of 

Control Board meeting on February 23 he had cited a m

delivery of CSM 101. Since that time, Low said, KSC 

preparing for an early summer launch based on that mid-A

circumstances therefore made that date most important. 

American must deliver CSM 103 by the end of June 1968 

meeting Apollo's end-of-the-decade goal. He reminded 

pursued this point on several occasions with him and wit

They both had told Low that they had found ways to deliv

time frame, and Low now suggested that this target da

2ll 
22 

whatever North American Rockwell resource

program objectives. 

Ltr., Myers to Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, MSC, March 21

Eberhard F. M. Rees, Director of the Apoll

American Rockwell, wrote to the company'

D. Myers to express his concern over persist

ball valves for the service propulsion syste

progress was being made, stating that t

relaxations in leakage criteria and that qua

occur. Rees described a review of the prog

General Corp. as lacking in factual depth. Al

212 

launch atmosphere, March 27, 1968, with encl., memo, Cohen to Low, 

a diluent," March 25, 1968. 

A LM prelaunch atmosphere selection and repressuriz

held at MSC, attended by representatives of MSC, M

American Rockwell, and Grumman. The rationale for M

percent oxygen as the LM cabin launch atmosphere w

factors: use of other than 100 percent oxygen in the LM c

additional crew procedural workloads at transpositi

excessive risk to crew due to depletion of the CM e

consumables would be added; and it would require use o

onboard CM oxygen. Two problems were identified with 

oxygen in the LM cabin at launch: LM cabin flammabil

213 

April 

2 

still desired for scientific, operational, and co

of the CSM in orbit during manned landing m

said, would be a valuable opportunity, howe

operations. MSC was asked to evaluate these 

hardware and operational changes in Apollo 

upon this opportunity. 

Ltr., Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director, NAS

MSC, "Lunar Photography from the CSM," March 29, 

NASA Hq. confirmed oral instructions to M

oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen to pressu

prelaunch checkout operations and during m

214 

p

reignite the S-IVB engine for the translunar injection 

Reentry speed was 10 kilometers per second rather than 

and the spacecraft landed 90.7 kilometers uprange of th

point. 

The most significant spacecraft anomaly occurred at ab

seconds after liftoff, when abrupt changes were ind

vibration, and acceleration measurements in the S-IVB

adapter, lunar module test article, and CSM. Appar

induced by the launch vehicle exceeded the spacecraft d

The second-stage (S-11) burn was normal until about 4 m

after liftoff; then difficulties were recorded. Engine 2 cu

215 

sion, and the CSM separated 

A service propulsion system 

second burn and an accom

kilometers. Since the SPS wa

was insufficient propellant le

the entry. For this reason, a c

that the thrust was inhibited

Parachute deployment was n

50 minutes after liftoff, in the 

predicted landing area. A nor

with waves of 2.1 to 2.4 met
Memo, Tindall to distr., Mission techniques for the LM lunar stay go/no 

Astronauts James A. Lovell, Jr., Stuart A. Roosa, and Cha

participated in a recovery test of spacecraft 007, condu

Landing and Recovery Division in the Gulf of Mexic

reported that while they did not "recommend the Apollo 

extended sea voyages they encountered no serious habit

during the 48-hour test. If a ·comparison can be ma

configurations and seaworthiness make the Apollo spacec

vessel than the Gemini spacecraft." The following c

reached: (1) The Apollo spacecraft, as represented by sp

under ambient conditions tested, was suitable for a 

recovery. (2) The interference between the survival radio 

217 

12 

activities but would be incorporated in the m

would permit. 

Ltr., Director, Apollo Program, NASA OMSF, to Man

April 10,1968. 

A number of decisions were made at the com

Northrop-Ventura: (1) The spacecraft 101 p

without further changes. (2) A higher drogue

be planned, with a possible effectivity for s

Rockwell would determine what ground t

hardware would be ready, and what addi

needed. (3) Proposed Northrop-Ventura ch

riser length would be considered only f

218 

percent-oxygen and 40-percent-nitrogen atmosphere. (Bot

Dolah had been members of the Apollo 204 Review Board. 

were Jerry Craig, Richard Johnston, and George Abbey, 

George Gill and Fred Yeamans, both of GE.) The total boi

program was reviewed as .well as test results at 11 newtons 

in 60 percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen and also in 95 

Both Pinkel and Van Dolah agreed with the MSC posit

proved the spacecraft was qualified for testing and flight i

ronment. They expressed the opinion that the 60-40 atmo

reasonable compromise between flammability, physiolog

tional considerations. 

Memo, Chief, Thermodynamics and Materials Br., to Chief, Systems 

"Review of BP 1224 test data with I. Pinkel and R. Van Dolah," April 19

219 

22 

Ltr., Low to Phillips, April 18, 1968. 

ASPO Manager George M. Low advised 

MSFC, and KSC that he was recommending 

the cabin of the LM at launch. MSC had r

after thorough evaluation of system capabi

crew procedures. The selection of pure 

important factors: reduced demand on the 

2.7 kilograms; simplified crew procedure

return to earth during earth-orbital missi

formed; and safe physiological characteristi

Chief stated, outweighed the flammability 

220 

CSM 2TV -1 (thermal vacuum 

test vehicle No. 1) in integrated 

checkout testing at Manned 

Spacecraft Center in 1968. The 

vehicle was manufactured and 

ready for test later than 

planned, placing a constraint 

on the Apollo program. 
(\), 

that only flight safety changes would b

understandings with the two prime space

responsibilities for schedule slips, Low had 

Dave W. Lang to negotiate new contract d

since the last round of negotiations. These n

can Rockwell were now completed. (Tal

started.) Despite a leniency in the negotiatio

results clearly indicated that most schedule d

American and not to NASA. On 2TV-1, for 

late, analysis proved that less than three w

customer-dictated changes. The situation 

delivered, was comparable. Moreover, a sim

222 

However, the first E2CA injector that was bomb-tested show

instability. Low emphasized that he was not charging t

welding technique had caused the instability. Nevertheless

ly minor change [has] again served to emphasize the impor

no changes, no matter how small, in the configuration of th

Bolender had set up the requested baseline configuration

change either in design or process should be made withou

Configuration Control Board. 

Phillips followed up his conversation with Low a week 

deep concern regarding the ascent engine program, pa

improvements in the engine, which could very likely delay 

program beyond the present goal. The sensitivity of the 

223 

()y

with several of the Center's Associate Dire

Donald K. Slayton, and Maxime A. Faget) to 

time, Faget stated that, although desirable, 

objective. Most important, he said, was obt

of the ascent engine following the burn. In 

because the fire-in-the-hole test added great

the D mission at the time the engine was 

others agreed not to include such an ascen

asked Faget to analyze ascent engine test exp

ascent engine burn before making any dec

mission. 

Memo, Low to Faget, "Fire-in-the-Hole Test," May 

224 
sion priorities and in "apply[ing] adjectives to the object

ly, he advised a realistic allowance of delta V limits at vari

rendezvous portion of the mission, to ensure safe terminati

if required. Also, he saw little value in a fire-in-the-hole b

engine at stage separation of the LM. He believed that g

adequate to provide answers on pressure and temperature ri

stage during launch from the lunar surface. The situatio

indicative of the engineer's desire to test fully all systems 

normal and backup modes. However, reliance must be plac

wealth of ground testing and analysis carried on to dat

program. 

Memo, Kraft to Manager, Apollo Program, "Apollo Flight Test Program,

225 

24 

ZAP gun, 

which controls the heat properly 

present LM wire splices can be realized," 

improve ourselves into a new set of probl

instructed Bolender to proceed with the ZA

Memo, Owen E. Maynard, Chief, Systems Enginee

"Evaluation of the twist-and-solder wire splice," May 

Engineering Div., to Low, May 22, 1968; Urgent Acti

note, Simpkinson to Low, May 23, 1968; note, Low t

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillip

Robert R. Gilruth a recommended program 

achieve greater astronaut maneuverability. T

for lunar landing mission~, because ex

226 

injectors to Bell for installation in the engine. After what L

siderable discussion," he dictated the course to be follow

• The LM ascent engine would comprise Bell's 

Rocketdyne injector. Rocketdyne would be responsible f

complete engine, and would thus become a subcontract

(Bell could either remain as subcontractor to Grumm

subcontractor to Rocketdyne.) 

• An engine with the Rocketdyne injector would 

installed in LM-3, as well as in LM-4 and LM-5, with mi

impact. 

• Grumman was to proceed forthwith on contract n

Bell and Rocketdyne to cover these procurements. 

227 

the strength of the LM to withstand the im

with all subsystems functioning. (The LM 

Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify th

LTA-3 contained no operational subsyste

therefore could not verify the total flight 

possible uses for the vehicle examined but re

the craft into a manned configuration for 

Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was uns

tives, he stated, because of the extensive stru

make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft-a

vehicle flow within the Grumman produc

many fire-proofing changes that would be 

228 

In view of these changes, Phillips said, a freon extinguish

be better than the present jelled water extinguisher (quick

reduced equipment damage). He asked that Low not overlo

improvement in crew safety, which could be of particular 

high-risk period of launch, when the crew was essentially 

the forces of acceleration. 

Ltr., Phillips to Low, "CBrF3 (Freon 1301) as a Fire Extinguishing Agen

George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Sp

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth to express his personal 

extravehicular activity (EVA) training for the Apollo crew

missions (i.e., the initial lunar landing and subsequent fli

229 

pg 

MSC completed thermal-vacuum testing 

including 45~ hours of manned testing. A

hormally, and preliminary results indi

objectives had been realized. (2) Engin

completed receiving inspection of CSM 1

revealed fewer discrepancies than had been 

delivered to the Cape. Pre-mate inspection o

were leakage and functional tests on the 

control systems. SM 101 was in the altitu

combined systems testing. 

Memo, Mueller to NASA Administrator, "Manned Spa

June 10, 1968. 

230 
techniques, Myers explained, the Block II pilot chute and 

be a marginal-strength item. Investigations had determin

ufacturing processes had allowed a differential length 

plies of nylon webbing in the pilot-chute riser which ca

distribution between the two plies and low total riser st

the earlier test failures, Myers said, the pilot chute riser ha

The two-ply nylon webbing had been replaced by cont

lines (i.e., 12 nylon cords) and the 5.5-millimeter-di

changed to 6.3-millimeter cable. He then cited a series 

verified the redesigned pilot-chute riser's strength to meet 

worst-case operational conditions. 

Ltr., Myers to K. S. Kleinknecht, MSC, june ll, 1968. 

231 

1o-11 

during the flight; what was the probabilit

engine's failing and thereby imposing high 

abort limits should be established for an en

Memo, Low to Cohen, "Saturn V single engine out pro

The Apollo Design Certification Review (D

examine CSM 101 and the Block II CSM for 

ment maturity and to certify the designs for 

flight safety. (Three earlier reviews directly 

scrutiny of the vehicle's development: the C

Review March 6-7, the Block II environmenta

DCR May 8, and the DCR covering the CM

232 

recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pog

enced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to a

testing beyond the red line values initially set for the space

in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment 

available for an unmanned flight, should such a second u

mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans 

• For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upp

inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary. 

• Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the d

decks would probably be replaced. 

233 
17 

(ppg

y 

President, but formal documentation had to 

Administrator, the AEC Commissioners, the 

National Aeronautics and Space Council.) 

Memo, Phillips to George M. Low, ASPO, MSC, "Ato

July 15, 1968. 

NASA Associate Administrator George E

Director Samuel C. Phillips, and other high

officials from Headquarters visited Bethpage 

program. Greatest emphasis during their revi

problems, and qualification of the space

Mueller and Phillips cited several areas tha

234 
vehicle and the specific mission to be flown. But he imp

Manager George M. Low and Lee B. James, Saturn V Pro

MSFC, to work toward this balance between spacecraft a

and to avoid any hardware changes in the Saturn V solel

payload interface weight. 

Ltr., Phillips to James and Low, "Saturn V Payload Interface Definition

F. A. Speer, Mission Operations Manager at MSFC, advi

plans for S-IVB and spacecraft separation and employmen

trajectory following insertion into the trajectory tow

Residuals in the S-IVB, said Speer, could be used to pla

235 

7 

Program Director Samuel C. Phillips inst

changes that produced additional work at KS

flow. Phillips stressed the extraordinary imp

the requirement that only mandatory chan

control boards at MSC and MSFC. The volu

way at KSC constituted a major concern. Ke

were in jeopardy. 

TWXs, Phillips to distr., Aug. 2 and 19, 1968. 

The Apollo Design Certification Review (DC

examine LM-3 further for proof of design an

assess and certify the design of the LM-3 

236 

Apollo 6 seemed headed toward resolution; work on the 

progress was satisfactory; delivery was scheduled at KSC d

week in August and the spacecraft was exceptionally cle

required a lot of work and chances were slim for a 1968 

On August 7, Low asked MSC's Director of Flight Operat

C. Kraft, Jr., to look into the feasibility of a lunar orbit mi

without carrying the LM. A mission with the LM looked 

until February or March 1969. The following day Low tr

an AS-503 review, and from the work schedule it looked li

launch. 

August 9 was probably one of the busiest days in Georg

activities of that and the following days enabled the Unit

237 

Still on August 9, in another meeting at M

Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, George Abbey, an

Dale Myers, North American Rockwell. 

Bethpage, N.Y., to find a substitute for the L

Calif., to get the CM going. 

On the following day there were still no obv

that might block the plan. Kleinknecht 

between spacecraft 103 and 106, where the 

problem. It seemed possible to use LM-2 to 

Kotanchik, MSC, suggested flying a simple c

event the pogo oscillation problem remain

pogo was solved the LM would not be ne

238 

making a decision whether to man 503, and now they were 

mission. He then asked for comments by those around the 

the following responses: von Braun-Once you decided 

not matter how far you went. Hage-There were a numb

mission where the decision could be made, minimizing t

Only chance to get to the moon before the end of 1969. D

technical reservations. Petrone-I have no reservations. 

in the arm for manned space flight. James-Manned s

following flights enhanced. Richard-Our lunar ca

enhanced by flying this mission. Schneider-My whole

ment. Gilruth-Although this may not be the only way to 

enhances our possibility. There is always risk, but this is i

In fact, the minimum risk of all Apollo plans. Kraft-Flig

239 

next day for Apollo 8 to go lunar orbit. Fol

Committee members: Walter Burke, McDon

ready but McDonnell Douglas favored circum

Hilliard Paige, GE-favored lunar orbit; Pa

and navigation hardware was ready, lu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology-we 

IBM-go; George Bunker of Martin, T. A. W

North American, Bob Hunter of Philco-

Chrysler-lunar orbit. 

At the Manned Space Flight Management Co

Mueller reported that the proposal had be

Executive Committee, Department of Defens

240 

Testing was being conducted simultaneously at the Wyl

Huntsville (under contract to North American Rockwell

loading and referred to as shell stability tests); and dynam

MSC (called the "short stack" dynamic tests). In effect, eac

the task of overseeing the complete test article (spacecraft

and S-IVB forward skirt) being tested at its own locatio

Ltr., Grau to Raines, Aug. 12, 1968, with encl., memorandum of agreement

of POGO Structural Testing," Aug. 12, 1968. 

George M. Low, MSC, in a letter to Samuel C. Phillips, OM

Design Certification Review (DCR) for spacecraft 101 had 

that assigned action items had been resolved; and most of th

been closed. Several open issues would be closed at the 101 

241 

19 

later, Phillips approved Low

s recommenda

velopment. 

Ltrs., Low to Phillips, Aug. 17, 1968; Phillips to Low

In a Mission Preparation Directive sent to 

Centers, NASA Apollo Program Director Sa

following changes would be effected in p

Apollo flights: 

Apollo-Saturn 503 

• Assignment of Saturn V 503, CSM 10

canceled. 

242 
lunar orbit mission would include mission planning

spacecraft hardware, and software to support the missio

support, top priority would be assigned to the lunar orb

memo indicated that following TLI, simulated transposit

maneuvers would be conducted; midcourse corrections a

star landmark sightings would be performed during the t

lunar orbit insertion would be accomplished and a lunar 

tablished for 20 hours. 

On September 13, MSC Director of Flight Operations Chr

affirmed that the impact of supporting the described missio

assessed and no constraints were seen to prevent mee

readiness date. He added that the lunar parking orbit wou

243 

28 

would affect pogo performance. Because NA

503 with a heavier payload-i.e., originally 

reason to be concerned about the decision m

and more symmetrical LTA-B." 

Memo, Low to Joseph N. Kotanchik, MSC, "Use of 

NASA asked Grumman to make a detailed 

constraints that might prevent accomplishm

such constraints were to be defined in suff

review, and NASA expected Grumman-re

The information was requested before th

Readiness Review. Grumman was further a

244 

that the LGI (with the exception of the contingency sample 

sample portion) and the ALSEP be deleted from the first lun

sion." 

With reference to television coverage, Gilruth cited Housto

"it would be extremely desirable to provide adequate tele

during the extravehicular excursion. Coverage can be obtai

LM steerable antenna and the Goldstone 210-foot [64-meter

in view of Goldstone." MSC proposed to provide "the capab

the television signal directly through the high gain antenn

also like to maintain the capability to carry the erectable 

event that it will not be feasible to adjust the timeline to pro

coverage for all planned extravehicular activities ...." 

245 
work on action items assigned as a result of 

Board presentation on June 17. Among th

1. Switching procedures for the emerg

would manually disable the automatic abo

after liftoff. 

2. High-altitude abort procedures-

reevaluated by the CSM 101 crew on the 

completion (scheduled for September 2

whether to retain the procedure for optio

3. Rescue of an incapacitated crew-em

being demonstrated at Downey using CSM 

required would be made accordingly. 

246 
missions: 

• During the first mission, extravehicular activities (

limited to three hours, with the spacecraft manned by 

crewmen at all times. 

• The Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package s

from the earliest missions (although the present prelimin

be improved scientifically). 

• Television must be carried aboard the LM, for b

operational and public information. 

• To realize the maximum scientific return on t

subsequent flights, MSC must, during the first landing mi

astronauts' capabilities to conduct lunar surface activit

247 
ENVIRONMENTAl. CONTROL SYSTEM 

SPACE AADIATOR PANEL 

A cutaway view of the Block II 

som
Evaluation Panel, sent to MSC Marshall's requirements fo

debriefing for the AS-205 mission. Generally, these require

the crew's visual and sensory evaluation of the launch ve

ance and behavior. 

Ltr., Nathan to Helmut A. Kuehnel, MSC, Sept. 17, 1968, with encl., "M

Debriefing Requirements, AS-205/SC-101 Mission." 

Dale D. Myers, Apollo CSM Program Manager at N

Rockwell, wrote to CSM Manager Kenneth S. Kleinkn

apprise him of the company's response to an earlier review 

systems development program. During February a small 

MSFC, headed by William A. Mrazek, had surveyed the 

249 

24 

levels at both MSC and MSFC. And drawin

Apollo program, the task force recommend

during any advanced manned programs and 

perienced personnel be assigned early in th

underestimated area. 

Ltr., Mueller to Harold T. Luskin, Apollo Applicati

1968, with encl., "Final Report: Apollo Guidance So

Samuel C. Phillips announced members

Selection Board, which was to meet Septem

R. Scherer, OMSF, secretary; John D. Ste

both of OMSF; Oran W. Nicks, NASA 

250 

acceptance of operational checkout procedures would be 

contractual action initiated. An annotation to George Lo

Kleinknecht, MSC's CSM Manager, indicated the letter 

with the concurrence and at the suggestion of Kleinkne

Myers replied: "I regret that NASA feels any lack of con

test results .... For the past year, there has been a cons

program carried out in Test Quality Assurance to (I

evaluation and acceptance of test results in real time and (

discipline to be consistent with good quality practice. 

improvement program has been effective and is evidenc

efficiency of test and expedient manner in which test pa

closed out. While there is naturally some cost benefit exp

251 

W•k 

Ending 

September 

27 

ments." 

Ltr., Gilruth to Rees, Sept. 26, 1968. 

The Allison descent-stage propellant tank

Division of Sargent Industries to a "lidless" 

qualification test at Airite. The crew noticed 

tightened fittings and repressurized. As the p

into several pieces. Grumman dispatched a t

cause and the necessary corrective action. 

Memo, Frank X. Battersby, RASPO, Bethpage, to Chief, A

and Contracts Div., MSC, "Weekly Activities Report, BM

ber 27," Oct. !1, 1968. 

252 
pp, ,p, 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips asked ASPO 

M. Low to investigate the feasibility of using data fr

missions to increase NASA's knowledge of and co

operational capabilities of the extravehicular mobility uni

included in his request specific recommendations for addi

tation to obtain the necessary data. His action stemme

concern about the extent and complexity of surface oper

lunar landing flight (which might substantially red

successful completion). For this reason, he and other pro

stringently limited the number of objectives and the exten

activities. But to plan confidently for surface EVA during 

253 

3 

4 

Senior management from NASA Hq. an

conducted the Apollo 7 flight readiness revie

and all supporting elements were ready for 

sequence had started on October 6, and flight 

for launch readiness at 11 :00 a.m. EDT on 

OMSF, NASA Hq., to NASA Administrator and Deputy 

Weekly Report-October 7, 1968," Oct. 7, 1968. 

MSC spacecraft and mission planning ex

techniques for the D mission, specifically the 

the slow progress in reviewing a draft o

254 

NASA officials watch the rollout of the 

AS-503 space vehicle at Kennedy 

Space Center October 9, 1968. In 

December the vehicle would launch 

Apollo 8 on the first manned mission 

to orbit the moon. Left to right are 

George E. Mueller, NASA Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space 

Flight; MSC Director for Flight 

Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; 

and Charles J. Donlan and Charles 

W. Mathews, both deputies to 

Mueller. 
qpy

g 

issues examined by the Council still were unr

EVA, use of television, and timeline allo

development by the crew. During the discuss

M. Low recommended attempting televisio

stone antenna (although the operational pro

an already heavily constrained mission). The 

be carried and used if the landing site and EVA 

Goldstone antenna. Charles W. Mathews a

voiced concern that the EVA timeline did 

learning about EVA per se in the one-sixth

moon. The astronaut must perform some spe

some time for personal movements and eval

256 

produce the control of changes needed to ensure an ope

Apollo space vehicle, yet allow the secondary-level CCB 

and critical judgment" of the change decision proces

flexibility within the overall program. 

Ltr., Phillips to Low, '"Change Policies and Procedures," Oct. 10, 196

Apollo 7 (AS-205), the first manned Apollo flight, lifte

Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy Oct.ll,carryingWalterM

F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham. The countdo

smoothly, with only a slight delay because of addition

chill the hydrogen system in the S-IVB stage of the Satu

Liftoff came at 11 :03 a.m. EDT. Shortly after insertion in

257 

grin after splashdown and rec

October 22, 1968. Later the 

nauts examine their spacecraf

aboard the Essex. 
TWX, William C. Schneider to distr., "Apollo 7 Mission, Mission Director's 

Oct. 22, 1968; memos, George E. Mueller to Acting Administrator, "Man

Weekly Report-October 14, 1968," Oct. 14, 1968, and "Manned Space Fligh

October 21, 1968," Oct. 21, 1968. 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips ordered th

program be placed in a standby status pending any future r

Apollo or the Apollo Applications program. Phillips' act

shift in Apollo to the Saturn V vehicle, effective with AS

TWX, Phillips to distr., "Saturn IB Program Planning," Oct. 16, 1968. 

259 
19 

capability with the CSM, the goal could no

told Low, was to accept the risk inherent in t

not be avoided in an early launch abort-ac

and to plan rescue operations on the premi

the spacecraft. "If we do not officially reco

Pendley said, "this will place us in an unten

occur, and will further prejudice the safety 

feeling of security on the subject." 

Memo, Pendley to Low, "Land landings," Oct. 18, 

NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel 

Administrator for Manned Space Fligh

260 

pp

ry to demonstrate its suitability to accomplish its mission. J

MSC was appointed Chairman of the ORI and Peter J. 

Executive Secretary. Other members were Aleck C. Bond, J

D. 0. Coons, Joseph P. Kerwin, Paul H. Vavra, and Earle 

MSC; E. Barton Geer, LaRC; A. G. Wedum, Ft. Detrick, M

U. Wise, NASA Hq. 

Memo, Gilruth to distr., "Operational Readiness Inspection of the 

Laboratory," Oct. 21, 1968. 

While the flight ofApollo 7 was still in progress, ASPO Ma

Low ordered that CSM 101 be returned to Downey as quick

261 

262 


1970 

January 5-8: Detailed reports on the Apollo 11 sample analy

Conference at MSC. 

March 7: The President listed six specific objectives for the spa

Apri/11: Apollo 13 was launched on a lunar landing mission b

explosion in an SM oxygen tank required an abort. The astro

the CSM, and used the LM propellant for a free-return trajecto

to earth, and landed in the mid-Pacific on April 17. 

April 17: NASA Hq. established an Apollo 13 Review Board to 

264 

265 


the pad. These requirements were to be included in the n

overall test and checkout requirements documents at KS

came largely as a result of discussions at the AS-503 Cr

Board meeting at KSC on August 20-21, 1968.) Burns re

KSC prepare a contingency plan specifying various stage a

test and checkout procedures that would satisfy MSFC's r

most immediate assessment must be the overall safety of th

Electronic and electrical components headed the list of 

systems to be assessed. 

Ltr., Burns to KSC, Attn: A. G. Smith, "AS-503-10 Launch Vehic

Requirements Following a Lightning Strike on the Saturn V Launch V

Oct. 24, 1968, with encl., same subj. 

267 
8 

contractor plants during checkout and test o

crew support team at KSC. Although not i

formal procedures for recording hardware 

contain such items as switching anomalie

termed "bona fide 'ghosts'" which had 

explanation, as well as audible and visual 

operation. 

Memo, Low to Slayton, "Spacecraft crew log," Nov. 7

ASPO Manager George M. Low asked 

Operations Director at KSC, to set up a 

paperwork and to inspect visually all hardw

268 

py pg

during the boost phase of the flight through the atmosp

weakened the structural bonding either directly or by ha

through the holes in the honeycomb material. Low aske

precautions that no water be allowed to enter the adapter

material should be sealed with a waterproof tape even b

down demonstration test and should remain on the vehicl

flight, so that the adapter would absorb no moisture even i

the final count before launch. On the other hand, the tape 

stand boost phase heating and must not impair spacecra

panel jettisoning. (North American Rockwell, in complia

August 10, 1968, Master Change Record 7727, modified th

drilling vent holes in the inner skin of the panels of all sub

269 

22 

Memo to distr., Tindall, "LM DPS low level light fix

In a memorandum for the record, ASP

summarized results of November 19 and 2

astronaut training runs with the Apollo 

(EMU) under simulated space conditions. 

vacuum test chambers of the Center's Sp

Laboratory. MSC Director Robert R. Gilru

Training runs were always to be preceded 

conditions and using a gas umbilical from 

facility itself. Although connected to the c

would not be used as a gas supply under norm

270 

of LM-11 Midsection Assembly during Manufacturing Phase, this date," 

The need to flight-test manual control of the light LM asc

had been discussed at the October 15 MSC Flight Progra

Director Robert R. Gilruth informed NASA Apollo P

Samuel C. Phillips. There was an implication that a contr

exist for this configuration. Gilruth said he had stated tha

able to establish manual control handling qualities of 

proper simulation and be confident about the adequac

system. 

Subsequently, Gilruth had reviewed the operating characte

control system and the status of the simulation program r

271 

• 


Weekly Report

December 9, 1968, Dec. 9, 1968; 

Reconvened," Jan. 8, 1969. 

Launch preparations for Apollo 8, schedul

on schedule, the NASA Associate Adminis

reported. Recent significant steps included 

service propulsion system on November 

reaction control system and the SPS on 

loading on November 30, and loading of th

December 2. All testing of the Mission Con

Manned Space Flight Network had also 

systems were ready for full operational supp

given to the flight crew and the final flight p

272 

on all the remaining Apollo spacecraft. In particular, the 

sought Low's advice on the feasibility and usefulne

transmissions for engineering, operations, scientific, and 

tion purposes. (See December 24.) 

Ltr., Phillips to Low, "Apollo On-board TV," Dec. 16, 1968. 

Apollo Program Director Phillips described to MSC Di

Gilruth two reviews of testing and checkout procedures, c

Apollo Test Office and MSC's Crew Systems Division, at Ha

September 23-26 and at International Latex September 30

reviews were a follow-on to similar test and checkout r

American Rockwell and at Grumman earlier in the year

273 

19 

Ltr., Phillips to Low, Dec. 17, 1968. 

Crew briefings on flammability tests and fire 

be expanded, ASPO Manager Low recomm

Operations Donald K. Slayton. Short briefi

of spacecraft 101 and 103, Low said, but th

expanded to ensure further a fire-safe space

review of all flammability deviations in

flammable crew storage items, review of 

propagation paths, and review of emergenc

fires. The chief objective of this expande

274 

All launch and boost phases were normal and the spacecra

stage was inserted into an earth-parking orbit of 190.6 by 

above the earth. After post-insertion checkout of spacecra

IVB stage was reignited and burned 5 minutes 9 seco

spacecraft and stage in a trajectory toward the moon-and 

became the first men to leave the earth's gravitational fie

The spacecraft separated from the S-IVB 3 hours 20 min

and made two separation maneuvers using the SM's reactio

Eleven hours after liftoff, the first midcourse correction inc

26.4 kilometers per hour. The coast phase was devot

sightings, two television transmissions, and system che

275 

E
launch. Bolender called on Tripp to revamp his failure clo

with several objectives: all closeout packages must c

documentation to permit NASA approval of the actio

should be available as a reference for any future rev

definition, analysis, and correction; and the contracto

improve the discipline applied to technical resolution of o

the preparation of closeout packages. Bolender anticipated 

actions to meet these objectives would greatly reduce the 

failure closeout disapprovals by NASA. But when a disagr

both parties must act quickly to resolve the issue. "Pro

NASA disapprovals has been a problem," noted the LM Pr

Ltr., Bolender to Tripp, Dec. 27, 1968. 

277 
15-17 

Ltr., Samuel C. Phillips, NASA OMSF, to Robert R. 

The final flight program for Apollo 9 was ve

with the prime and backup crew was 

integration test between the lunar modul

MSC, was completed on January 15. On Ja

Control Center-Houston integration testin

a critical design review of the Launch Com

conducted on January 17. Launch prepara

proceed on schedule. 

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Repor

278 
The Apollo 9 flight readiness test began on January 19 and 

completed January 22, in preparation for a February laun

13). A one-day delay in the testing was caused by a loss of 

for the RCA-llOA computer. The hatch and side windows 

were being modified to overcome the fogging effect experi

Apollo 8 mission. 

Ibid. 

The CSM Flight Readiness Review Board convened at M

Raines presented the Reliability and Quality Assurance 

pointed out the improvement in discrepancy reports betwee

279 


During integrated testing of the Apollo spacecraft, a well-q

accidentally threw two guarded switches marked "CM/

instead of the intended adjacent switches marked "CSM/L

separate the lunar module from the command and service 

error occurred in a lunar flight, the CM would have separa

with a high probability of leaving the crew stranded in lu

of methods to preclude such an accident in actual fl

provisions for visual differences in switch covers. 

Memos, Robert R. Frazer, MSC, to Resident Manager Apollo Spacecraft P

Erroneous Switch Closure," Jan. 31, 1969; David B. Pendley, MSC, to 

Spacecraft Program, "CM/SM separation switches," Feb. 17, 1969. 

281 

• Proceed with the 1

/6 -g special test eq

scope, schedule, and cost estimates for this s

to Apollo Program Director by 1 March. 

• Proceed with the engineering defini

. required to precision-land the LM at sites a

the moon. 

Lunar Exploration: 

• Submit a plan for the buildup of th

experiments to be included, the estimated 

• Submit a plan for the procurement o

proposed quantities, estimated costs, and e

282 
Three members of the Interagency Committee on Back Co

at MSC to review Apollo operational plans and procedur

was expressed about the lack of a bacterial filter on the spa

ing system. However, the committee representatives in

approach was reasonable in terms of the tradeoff on ope

problems. The full committee was scheduled to meet in 

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report-February 17, 1969

George M. Low, MSC, told Maxime A. Faget, MSC, tha

learned the Apollo Operations Handbook (AOH) was 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate by prime contract

283 

27 

mission plan to progress from one step to th

success. 

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report-

Maxime A. Faget, MSC Director of Enginee

believed the Preliminary Lunar Landing Ph

Plan was seriously deficient in meeting its 

standpoint of public information and h

terribly disappointed to find that although 

film has been set aside for lunar surface use 

intent of providing first-class visual appreci

on the moon during this singularly historica

284 

program. Faget also noted he felt that, from a historica

the lunar module pilot and the commander should be ph

the Hasselblad camera while on the surface. 

Memo, Faget, MSC, to Chief, Mission Operations Br., "Comments on 

Landing Phase Photographic Operations Plan," ' Feb. 27, 1969. 


The Apollo Program Director expressed concern abou

obtain adequate data on the expenditure of energy by 

lunar exploration. The problem was discussed with the 

systems personnel. The consensus was that the only meani

285 
On March 7, with McDivitt and Schweickar

separated the CSM from the LM and fired 

thrusters to obtain a distance of 5.5 kilomete

McDivitt and Schweickart then performed 

vous. The LM successfully docked with the 

kilometers away from it during the six-and-o

McDivitt and Schweickart returned to the C

jettisoned. 

During the remainder of the mission, the cre

meteoroid detection satellite that had been 

multispectral photos of the earth; exercise

prepared for reentry. 

286 

The Apollo 9 CM splashed down in the Atlantic 290 kilo

Bahamas at 12:01 p.m. EST. The crew was picked up 

flown to the recovery ship U.S.S. Guadalcanal withi

splashdown. Primary objectives of the flight were su

plished. (Objectives of all Apollo flights are listed in A

MSC, "Apollo 9 (AS-504) Flight Summary," undated; MSC, "Apollo 

(MSC-PA-R-69-2), May 1969; NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight We

4, 17, 1969. 

287 
7 

our managers deem to be necessary in their 

Program in the most effective manner." 

Ltrs., Mueller to Gilruth, March 6, 1969; Gilruth to M

In a report to the Administrator, the Associ

Space Flight summed up the feeling of ac

problem of the space program: "The phenom

flawless performance of the Apollo 9 lun

engines on March 7 were major milestones 

manned landing on the moon, and tributes 

government effort that brought these two c

safe and reliable manned space flight. T

288 

pgy p

The additional direct cost to the Apollo research and deve

from the January 27, 1967, Apollo 204 fire was estimate

principally for spacecraft modifications, NASA Associate 

Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller testified in congr

The accident delayed the first manned flight of the space

months. "During this period, however, there occur

unmanned test of the Lunar Module and two unmanned 

V vehicle." 

House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned 

NASA Authorization: Hearings, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, Feb. 28, Marc

and 25, 1969, pp. 183-85. 


289 
20 

our capability to create useful lunar explor

Ltrs., George E. Mueller to Gi1ruth, Feb. 14, 1969; Gi1ru

to Gi1ruth, March 28, 1969. 

ASPO Manager George Low wrote NASA 

George Low at Downey on October 25, 196

possibility of deleting the CSM boost protec

that deletion ... would require the followin

new thermal coating would have to be dev

environment. b. Protective covers would 

windows, EVA handholds, vent lines, etc .

that a resulting overall weight reduction 

290 

Memo, J.P. Lindberg, MSFC, to Addressees, "Special Bulletin on S-IC/S-1

AS-504," March 28, 1969. 


ASPO requested a plan for flight crew tests of sleeping pills 

The plan was to include number of tests to be perform

member; time of the test with respect to the last sleep peri

kind of food and drink taken during a specified time before 

physical activity by the crew before taking a drug; and, 

purpose, any available statistical information on the effect o

being taken. 

Memo, George M. Low, ASPO Manager, to Charles A. Berry, Medical Resear

Directorate, MSC, "Use of sleeping pills," April 3, 1969. 


291 
14-21 

p[g]

Module require additional weight growth i

will have to once again reduce the scienti

kilograms].... I wanted to be sure that we 

45 pounds [20.4 kilograms] of scientific payl

weight to be deleted ...." Hess concurred 

Memo, Manager, ASPO, to Hess, "Increased weight al

April 12, 1969. 

Twenty-two astronauts trained in the MS

during the week, for lunar reentry. Closed

crews to control the centrifuge during 

292 
Apollo II crewmen would use it on targets of opportun

surface exploration. Because of the unrealistic schedule 

required to certify the flight worthiness of the aseptic sampl

decided not to fly it on Apollo II. 

TWX, Phillips to Low, "Assignment of Priority for Aseptic Sampler and Cl

Apollo G-1 Mission," April 25, 1969; ltr., Low to Phillips, April 26, 1969

A power outage, required to permit maintenance work at t

Control Center, was relayed to the pneumatic controls of t

the Apollo lO launch vehicle, causing the prevalves to ope

5280 liters of RP-1 fuel to drain from the vehicle. This, in 

negative pressure in the RP-I tank, which displaced the u

293 
7-8 

frozen food study appeared promising, then 

heater, similar in concept to that used by the 

also be required. 

Ltr., Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, MSC, to George W. Je

1969. 

The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was m

tests had been made to establish the prope

after a lunar landing. The fifth test was ma

the pyrotechnics after landing. On Ma

separating the ascent stage, was conducted

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Repor

294 
MSC forwarded a plan for the Apollo 15 Lunar Surface 

NASA Hq. The plan provided for replacement of the 

central station and lunar geological equipment, along 

Passive Seismic Experiment. Total cost of the project w

million excluding the cost of surveying instrument an

With a May 15 go-ahead, delivery could be made by one 

Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips in a messa

Robert R. Gilruth approved the plan, saying that a June 

the array would be acceptable and requesting procureme

a definitive Bendix contract be submitted by June 20, 1

Ltr., Gilruth to George E. Mueller, NASA Hq., "Apollo 15 Lunar Sur

1969; TWX, Phillips to Gilruth, June 12, 1969. 

295 

midcourse corrections were canceled. During t

TV transmissions totaling 72 minutes were m

earth. 

At 4:49p.m. EDT on May 21 the spacecraft wa

110.4 by 315.5 kilometers. After two revoluti

updates, a maneuver circularized the orbit a

Astronaut Cernan then entered the LM, checke

the CM for the scheduled sleep period. 

On May 22 activation of the lunar module 

EDT. At 2:04p.m. the spacecraft were undoc

was inserted into a descent orbit. One hour la

296 

Astronaut John W. Young in the A poll a 10 command module 

above unnamed craters on the far side of the moon while Th

Eugene A. Cernan descend in the separated LM to within 

surface. The returning LM-its descent stage jettisoned

from the CSM before the spacecraft redocked in orbit. On 

moon, Triesnecker Crater was photographed from the CSM

typical of the northeastern Central Bay area and highlands 

Central Bay. The smooth floor of the Sea of Vapors extends f

the horizon, 600 kilometers from the spacecraft. Triesneck

kilometers in diameter. The intersecting linear features 

Triesnecker Rilles. 

297 
19 

Negotiations were also under way with th

provide a modified indoctrination course i

number of astronauts, to ensure their safety 

Immersion Facility. 

Memo, Director of Flight Crew Operations to Director 

"Vision distortion while training in the Water Immersio

D. K. Slayton, MSC, to B. J. Semmes, Jr., Department 

In a telephone conference, MSC personnel an

Committee on Back Contamination agreed 

for a postlanrling ventilation filter for Ap

sterilization of the CM in the Lunar Receiv

298 

Apollo Program Office Change Control Board (CCB) D

assigned Experiment S080, Solar Wind Composition, t

landing mission. CCB Directive No. 156 requested MSC to 

experiment on the second lunar landing mission. 

TWX, S. C. Phillips, NASA Hq., to G. M. Low, MSC, June 4, 1969. 

The early engineering evaluation of the Apollo 10 launch 

AS-505, indicated that the major flight objectives wer

Indications were that all detailed test objectives were also 

The basic performanre of the Saturn V was satisfactory, b

problem areas were identified for more extensive invest

299 

7 

Memos, Benjamin Milwitzky, NASA Hq., to Apollo Lu

Hq., "Biasing Apollo Missions to Land Near Surveyor S

Chief, Systems Engineering Div., MSC, to ASPO Mana

report-June 3, 1969," dated June 10, 1969; TWXs, G. 

Hq., "Lunar Landing Sites for H -1 Mission," June 12, 

Sites for H-1 Mission," June 16, 1969. 

ASPO Manager George Low suggested to 

Operations Donald K. Slayton that begi

applications should be "in a spacecraft conf

the past, Velcro applications had presumab

conform to the configurations used in trai

Memo, Low to Slayton, "Velcro Changes," June 7, 19

300 
In establishing a task force for hardware development, 

Director Samuel C. Phillips stated: "We have recently 

approval on our plans for continuing the lunar mission

20. We have given authority to the field centers to issue CC

and the procurement of long lead time items for modific

and CSM. We have also authorized the procurement of a w

lunar surface transportation. We are in the process of e

proposals for lunar orbital experiments, and have given M

procure an already approved experiment group. In short, 

very rapidly involved in the definition and managem

exploration missiops. '' 

Ltr., Phillips to distr., "Task Force for Hardware Development," June 11, 

"Manned Space Flight Weekly Report-June 16, 1969." 

301 
20 

Sigurd A. Sjoberg, MSC Deputy Director o

MSC management of a list of records that cou

Plans were made to file claims with t

lnternationale for: 

Class records for lunar missions 

1. Duration of stay on the surface of th

2. Duration of stay inside the spacecra

3. Duration of stay outside the spacecr

4. Greatest mass landed on the moon. 

5. Greatest mass lifted to lunar orbit f

302 
identified. A second mobile quarantine facility was being 

the Hornet to provide backup support on the bioprotoc

milestone was reached June 18 when the scientific inve

Apollo 11 astronauts went through a successful simulati

(Early Apollo Surface Experiments Package) activities, r

data plans and procedures to the use of the facilities. 

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report-June 23, 1969." 

The status of the Apollo 11 crew training program as 

reported to NASA Headquarters by MSC. The summary in

had completed more than 70 percent of the briefing and rev

total of 143 hours on procedures against a programmed 100 

303 
July 

1 

Ltr., Low to B. M. Duff, MSC, "Press Inquiry," june 

Preparations continued on schedule for a 

Edwin Aldrin, Neil Armstrong, and Michae

condition and on schedule for their train

Descent and landing simulations were succe

ship U .S.S. Hornet was prepared for the reco

64-meter dish antenna was ready to suppo

Mariner requirements. [Mariner VI and- V

March 27, were on their way to July 31 an

Mars]. Mission control and the world

304 


18-24 

Ltr., Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, MSC, to George W. Jeffs, 

9, 1969. 

Apollo 11 (AS-506)-with astronauts Neil A

and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., aboard-was la

Complex 39, KSC, at 9:32a.m. EDT July 

orbit checkout, translunar injection, CSM 

spacecraft ejection, and translunar coast we

(See entry for May 18-26, 1969.) 

At 4:40 p.m. EDT July 18, the crew bega

transmission of the CSM and LM interiors, 

and drogue removal, spacecraft tunnel hat

306 

The LM ascent stage was jettisoned into lunar orbit. Th

and prepared for the return trip to the earth. 


The CSM was injected into a trajectory toward the earth 

July 22. Following a midcourse correction at 4:01p.m., a

television transmission was made, in which the astronauts 

weightlessness of food and water and showed shots of 

moon. 

At 12:15 p.m. EDT July 24 the Apollo ll's command m

splashed down in the mid-Pacific, about 24 kilometers 

ship U.S.S. Hornet. Following decontamination procedu

307 

The Apollo 11 space vehicle th

1969, on the flight that fulfill

land man on the moon and re

On the lunar surface July 

reflects the LM and Neil A

Armstrong also photographe

Experiment and as he paus

footprints behind in the lunar 

CSM and pilot Michael Coll

over the lunar horizon. 
splashdown, the astronauts were carried by helicopter to th

they entered a mobile quarantine facility to begin a perio

under strict quarantine conditions. The CM was recovered 

quarantine facility. Sample containers and film were flow

309 
lunar mission support equipment, spacec

(however insignificant it might seem) from 

Hq. specified the following steps: All reco

recorded, and inventoried as soon as qua

deactivation activities permitted. All ite

storage, under guard if necessary. No rem

would deface exterior portions of the spa

visible through the hatch or windows. N

permitted. Items returned to contractors f

Preparation for public display would be e

Ltr., Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., to George M. L

Apollo 11 Hardware," July 28, 1969. 

310 
uncomfortably hot and its visor fogged. The crew observed 

of about one per minute in the command module at nig

Memo, George M. Low, MSC, to Donald D. Arabian, MSC, "Apollo 

debriefing," Aug. I, 1969. 

George Low, James ~cDivitt, Neil Armstrong, and Edwin 

lunar exploration that could be carried out by astrona

spacesuits or riding roving vehicles. The following c

reached: "a. A possible mode of exploration would be to w

miles [5 to 8 kilometers]) to an exploration site; spend 1 t

site; and then return to the L~. b. It would be easy to car

need be carried, provided that it did not require the hands 

311 
18 

19 

Ltr., G. M. Low, MSC, to J. A. McDivitt, MSC, "Discus

1969. 

The Lunar Roving Vehicle Task Team, 

MSFC on April 7, was reconstituted as the 

function would be to direct and coordinate M

and develop various modes of lunar transp

MSFC Organization Announcement, "Lunar Roving V

Lunar Mobility Task Team," Aug. 18, 1969. 

The Apollo 11 seismic experiment packag

Indications were that the unit was fully fun

312 

NASA OMSF, Manned Space Elight Weekly ReportSeptember 2, 1969

After the preliminary examination of Apollo 11 lun

Department of the Interior made a number of recom

processing samples to be brought from the moon by the Ap

Memo, E. C. T. Chao and R. L. Smith, Dept. of Interior, toW. Hess, A.]. Ca

MSC, "Recommendations and suggestions for preliminary examination of A

lunar samples," Sept. 6, 1969; ltr., R. S. Johnston, MSC, to Chao and Smi

The first reported weights of Apollo 11 lunar samples 

because of a number of variables that could not be elimin

quarantine was lifted, MSC told NASA Hq. Because of t

inaccuracy had generated, procedures were being devel

313 

25 

25-26 

Ltr., George M. Low, MSC, to Norris D. McWhirter, 

James A. McDivitt was appointed ASPO Ma

former ASPO Manager was temporarily on 

plan future MSC programs and work on o

MSC News Release, 69-66, Sept. 25, 1969. 

A Manned Space Flight Awareness seminar 

attended by some 500 industry and governm

the need for maintaining the dedication 

success of Apollo 11. 

NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report

314 
Memo, James A. McDivitt, MSC, to distr., "Apollo 12 Surveyor III safety 

mendation," Oct. 18, 1969; Apollo 12 Surveyor III Safety Report, Oct. 10

Apollo 12 film from the onboard cameras would be deliver

to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory for decontamination 

hours after recovery, MSC reported. Decontamination was 

an additional 4 7 hours for each batch. Film would then be r

essing at the Photographic Technology Laboratory. Photo

ing earth views would be prepared at once, but would not 

authorized by the MSC Director. The flight crew logs w

graphically copied from outside the crew reception area o

procedures previously developed and agreed on. Origina

315 

leaving only 17 months for vehicle developm

LRV project was managed at MSFC by Save

the Saturn Program Office. The Boeing Co

project in Huntsville, Ala., under Henry Ku

Electronics Defense Research Laboratories 

furnish the mobility system (wheels, motor

Co. in Seattle, Wash., would furnish the ele

Vehicle testing would take place at the Boe

the chassis manufacturing and overall ass

Boeing facility in Huntsville, Ala. 

Memo, James A. McDivitt, MSC, to distr., "Lunar R

OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report-Nove

316 
a walkaround inspection of CSM

110 (Apollo 14 hardwar

July 8, 1969.) Cooperation of North American Rockwell a

Apollo Spacecraft Program Office was excellent during the p

implementation of the inspection. No significant discrepan

by the inspection team during the several hours of inspec

Memo, Scott H. Simpkinson, MSC, to ASPO Command and Service M

"Action items resulting from CSM-110 engineering walkaround inspection

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC Director of Flight Operations

an in-house review reevaluate the Apollo secondary life 

because of its complexity and cost of development, and a

317 
10 

navigational control system targeting for de

the automatic guidance would land LM-6 

point offset 305 meters east and 153 meters 

Memo, James A. McDivitt, MSC, to distr., "Apollo 

changed," Nov. 10, 1969; TWX, McDivitt to C. Lee and 

NASA announced the resignation of Assoc

Space Flight George E. Mueller effective De

W. Mathews was named Acting Associate A

Flight until a successor for Mueller was ap

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969 (NASA SP-4014, 1

69-151; NASA Announcement, Dec. II, 1969. 

318 
Storms, about 163 meters from the Surveyor III spacecraf

April19, 1967. Conrad, shorter than NeilArmstrong(first

July 20), had a little difficulty negotiating the last step from 

the lunar surface. When he touched the surface at 6:44a.m

19, he exclaimed, "Whoopee! Man, that may have been a sm

but that's a long one for me." 

Bean joined Conrad on the surface at 7:14 a.m. They 

kilogram contingency sample of lunar material and late

selected sample. They also deployed an S-hand ante

composition experiment, and the American flag. An Apol

Experiments Package with a SNAP-27 atomic generat

about 182 meters from the LM. After 3 hours 56 minu

319 

1969 

November 

surface, the two astronauts 

the next EVA. 

The astronauts again left th

the second EVA, Conrad and 

return to earth for a failur

core and trench samples, a 

17 

, pgy p

NASA discontinued the use of names such "

Lunar Exploration Program" that had been 

the lunar exploration phase of the Apollo p

word title "Apollo" would be used when refe

additional descriptive language, such as 

Apollo" and "Apollo lunar exploration" w

for defining the Apollo program activity. T

uniformity and eliminate misunderstandin

Ltr., George E. Mueller, NASA Hq., to Robert R. Gilrut

McDivitt, MSC, to distr., "Identification of the current 

Program," Nov. 26, 1969. 

322 
active research to desk-and-meetings career. 

Many scientists were reluctant to accept the long times bet

design and data gathering in space experiments-often 6 

question was not only of patience, graduate student supp

continuity, but also of scientific obsolescence. 

Scientists felt that science was not as well represented 

management as were engineering and project manageme

level decisions were often made without considerati

viewpoints. While recognizing that the space program also 

objectives-such as advancement of technology, nation

applications, earth resources, and "bringing the world cl

323 

3 

15 

pp

Ltr., von Braun, MSFC, to Gilruth, MSC, Dec. 3, 196

MSFC, to von Braun, "Notes on 'Science in NASA,"' 

George M. Low was sworn in as NASA De

0. Paine, NASA Administrator. (See Nove

NASA News Release 69-159, Dec. 3, 1969. 

NASA was considering incorporation of a m

LM-8, LM-9, and LM-10, to help with p

astronauts had in carrying hand tools, sa

camera, and other equipment on the luna

324 

gpgy 

1969"; ltr., Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, to Rocco A. Petrone, NASA Hq., "Lan

13," Dec. 18, 1969. 

MSC announced the appointment of Sigurd A. Sjoberg as 

Operations, replacing Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., who ha

MSC Deputy Director Nov. 26. Sjoberg had been Deputy 

Operations since 1963. 

MSC News Release 70-1, Jan. 1, 1969. 

NASA had canceled the Apollo 20 mission and stretched o

seven missions to six-month intervals, Deputy Adminis

Low told the press in an interview after dedication of th

325 

6 

experiments for the Apollo f

policy on changes in exper

clearing house. 

Memo, James A. McDivitt, MSC, to 

North American Rockwell an

operating divisions, streamli

more direct responsibility for 

Ltr., J. Leland Atwood, North Ame

1970. 
The scientific debriefing of the Apollo 12 astronauts in

areas of strong interest for which there was no data and 

have been provided by an Apollo lunar surface closeup s

included three distinct kinds of soil noticed by the as

patterned surface in certain areas, glazings in craters, 

certain rocks. To assist the Apollo 13 astronauts in 

judgment of targets to be documented, the following ph

established: unexpected features, glassy features, r

undisturbed surface, surface patterns, rock surface, and 

Memos, Anthony). Calio, MSC, to James A. McDivitt, MSC, "Experim

Apollo Lunar Surface Close-up Photography," Jan. 14, 1970; Richard

LeeR. Scherer, NASA Hq., "Close-up stereo camera utilization on Apo

327 
17 

portions of the agreements were being incor

Program Specification and in Apollo Progra

Memo, Rocco A. Petrone, NASA Hq., to MSFC, MSC, 

Requirements," Feb. 6, 1970. 

MSC appointed a panel to investigate a Febru

General plant in Fullerton, Calif., that had dam

tank beyond repair. Panel findings were repor

the month, which recommended needed safet

Ltr., 0. G. Morris, MSC, toR. H. Tripp, Grumman, Feb

Simpkinson, MSC, "LM descent tank incident at Aerojet-G

February 13, 1970," March 6, 1970. 

328 
which interior and exterior views of the spacecraft wer

At 8: 13 p.m. EST a 217 -second S-IVB auxiliary prop

aimed the S-IVB for a lunar target point so accurately th

not required. The S-IVB/IU impacted the lunar surface 

April 14 at a speed of 259 meters per second. Impact w

from the Apollo 12 seismometer. The seismic signal gene

lasted 3 hours 20 minutes and was so strong that a gro

necessary to reduce seismometer gain and keep the rec

The suprathermal ion detector experiment, also deploy

crew, recorded a jump in the number of ions from zero a

up to 2500 shortly thereafter and then back to a zer

theorized that ionization had been produced by 6300 K to 

329 



quarters press conference. 

The Apollo 13 Review Board was established 

NASA Deputy Administrator, and Thomas 0

who appointed the Director of Langley 

Cortright, as Review Board Chairman. On 

Board were named. In addition, by separ

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was requeste

findings of the Board and the Associate Adm

Flight was directed to provide records, da

requested by the Board. The investigation ind

by a combination of mistakes and a som

following sequence of events led to the acci

332 
been serving as president of North American's Space 

become a corporate vice president with the title Group 

Aerospace and Systems. This was one of a number of k

337 

be compatible with 65-volt de. 

i. The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detec

or Beech in their review of documentation, nor did 

incompatibility of the switches with the ground support 

at KSC, "since neither qualification nor acceptance testi

cycling under load as should have been done. It was a se

which all parties shared." 

j. The thermostatic switches could accommodate th

tank pressurization because they normally remained 

However, they could not open without damage with 

applied. They were not required to open until the special 

this procedure, as the switches started to open when they r

333 

Apollo 14 entered lunar orbit at I :55 a.m. EST on Februa

the separated S-IVB stage and instrument unit struck the 

kilometers southeast of the planned impact point. 

seismometer, left on the moon in November 1969, registere

continued to record vibrations for two hours. 

After rechecking the systems in the LM, astronauts Shep

separated the LM from the CSM and descended to the lu

Antares landed on Fra Mauro at 4:17a.m. EST February 

short of the planned landing point. The first EVA began a

intermittent communications problems in the portable 

tem had caused a 49-minute delay. The two astronauts 

kilogram contingency sample; deployed the TV, S-band an

341 

The CM and SM separated, the parachute

events went as planned, and the Kitty Hawk 

4:05 p.m. EST February 9 about 7 kilomete

New Orleans. The Apollo 14 crew returne

where they remained in quarantine until F

All primary mission objectives had been me

had lasted 216 hours 40 minutes and w

achievements : 

• Third manned lunar landing missi

• Use of mobile equipment transport

• Payload of 32 500 kilograms placed 

• Distance of 3.3 kilometers traversed 

342 
MSC, Apollo l4 (AS509) Flight Summary,  undated; MSC, Apollo 14 M

(MSC-04112), Aprill971; NASA OMSF, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Repo

1971 "; TWX, F. A. Speer, MSFC, to C. M. Lee, NASA Hq., "Apollo 14 (

Report," Jan. 31 , 1971 ; ltr., Chester M. Lee, NASA Hq., "Mission Director'sS

Apollo 14," Feb. 9, 1971; NASA Hq., Apollo 14 Preliminary Science Report 

1971). 

MSC requested removal of sharp corners from the lunar 

(LRV) seat. During a recent series of LRV / EMU (extraveh

unit) tests, a nicking or tearing of the portable life support 

cover had been discovered. Observation revealed that the the

343 
y

was directed to stop all further effort on t

Lu., Richard G. Smith, MSFC, to Rocco A. Petrone, 

System," March I, 1971. 

10 	 Action was initiated to determine the feasib

coverage of a lunar eclipse from the lunar 

Apollo 15 mission. The eclipse would occu

after the scheduled Apollo 15 mission lun

TWX, Rocco A. Perrone, NASA Hq., to James A. M

Apollo 15 mission," March 10, 1971. 

344 
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971 (NASA SP-4018, 1972), pp. 56-57, 59, 

Lee B. James, Director of Program Management at MSFC, 

position in the academic community effective May 31, M

On June 1, J. T. Shepherd would assume the duties as 

Program Management. James had been active in the spac

1947. 

MSFC Key Personnel Announcement, April 30, 1971 ; ltr., Eberhard F. M

Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, May 3, 1971. 

345 


p

placement of heat flow experiment probes

deployed the American flag. They then stow

film in the LM, completing a second EVA 

The third EVA began at 4 :52 a.m. August 2

ended 4 hours 50 minutes later, for a total Ap

of 18 hours 35 minutes. 

While the lunar module was on the moon, a

lunar orbits in the CSM operating scienti

ments and cameras to obtain data concern

ronment. X-ray spectrometer data indicated 

348 

November 

18 

geophysical stations and Apollo orbital scie

Ltr., William W. Rubey and Robert A. Phinney, Cochair

John E. Naugle, NASA Hq., Oct. 21, 1971. 

A detailed objective assessment of the lunar 

the Apollo 15 mission indicated: 

• The LRV was successfully deplo

Deployment took 26.5 minutes instead of th

• LRV systems were successfully pr

steering was inoperative during EVA-1, but f

and EVA-3. 

350 
potential candidates, and guide them through appropriate 

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC Deputy Director, was n

MSC. Both Kraft and Gilruth were original members of 

Task Group established in 1958 to manage Project Mer

NASA News Release 72-11, Jan. 14, 1972; MSC News Release 72-15, Ja

Sigurd A. Sjoberg was named Deputy Director of Manned 

Sjoberg succeeded Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., who was n

MSC January 14. 

MSC News Release 72-16, "Sjoberg Named Deputy Director of MSC," J

351 

identified as shredded thermal paint. Other a

coast included a cislunar navigation exerci

the earth and moon, an electrophoresis demo

of the visual light-flash phenomenon noted 

Duke counted 70 white, instantaneous light 

Apollo 16 entered a lunar orbit of 314 by 107

19. After separation of LM-11 Orion from C

rendezvous kept the two vehicles dose togethe

on the service propulsion system was evalua

the redundant system to be still safe and usabl

again separated and the mission continued o

the 5*-hour delay. 

352 
Apollo 16 astronaut Charles M. Duke, Jr., above left, collects l

surface rake and tongs. John W. Young, standing on the ed

uses a geological hammer for more samples, having left the R

side of the 40-meter crater. An oblique view of the mo

photographed from lunar orbit by a camera in the scientific i

bay of the CSM. The most conspicuous feature is th

Kohlschutter Crater at upper center of the photo; about two-th

is at bottom right. Back on earth in MSC's Mission Contr

Program Director Rocco A. Petrone (standing) and Dr. Gary L

from Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory, examine a sei

Saturn's third-stage impact on the lunar surface. 

353 
mission. The total distance traveled in the 

kilometers. The crew remained on the lunar 

collected 96.6 kilograms of lunar samples. 

While the lunar module crew was on the s

moon in the CSM, was obtaining phot

properties of the moon and deep space, an

Essentially the same complement of instrum

was used on the Apollo 15 mission, but diff

were flown over and more comprehensive 

made, providing scientific data that could b

Apollo 15 as well as add to the total store of 

atmosphere, the solar system, and galactic 

354 

was placed in a non

optimum orbit that resulted in a muc

than the planned year. Loss of all subsatellite tracking and 

the 425th revolution (May 29) indicated that the subsate

lunar surface. 

The mass spectrometer deployment boom stalled during a 

was jettisoned before transearth injection. The secon

maneuver and some orbital science photography were 

transearth injection could be performed about 24 ho

originally planned. 

355 
June 

26 

completed its report on the accident June 

oxidizer being detanked had been too low 

retained in the CM tanks as a result of the 

Changes were made in ground support equip

to prevent future overpressurization. 

Ltr., Scott H. Simpkinson, MSC, to Thomas J. Walker I

Pacific Fleet, June 30, 1972; "Apollo 16 Mission Anom

Tank Failure" (MSC-07032), June 1972. 

NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Lo

for Manned Space Flight Dale D. Myers 

foreseeable mission for CSMs 115 and l15a; 

356 

briefing at the mission reviews, would provide the medi

mission operations control room, would assume t

responsibilities in the operations team, and would 

surgeons to take part in the change-of-shift press briefin

Ltr., Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Dale D. Myers, NASA Hq., Sept

Apollo 17 (AS-512), the final Apollo manned lunar land

launched from Pad A, Launch Complex 39, KSC, at 

December 7. Crew members were astronauts Eugene A. C

Evans, and Harrison H. Schmitt. The launch had been d

minutes by a countdown sequencer failure, the only s

Apollo program caused by a hardware failure. 

357 
photographed. Samples collected totaled 34 

and 37 minutes of the second EVA. 

The third and final EVA began at 5:26 p.m

sampling objectives were accomplished. S

breccias, fine-grained vesicular basalts, cru

soils-weighed 66 kilograms. Nine traverse g

made. The surface electrical properties expe

reentering the LM, the crew selected a breccia 

represented by students visiting the Mission 

the landing gear of the lunar module, com

lunar landings, was then unveiled. After 7 ho

EVA on the lunar surface ended. Total 

358 

North Massif during their third 

EVA. Mter their liftoff to rejoin 

the CSM and Ronald E. Evans in 

orbit, and just after they entered 

the return path for home, the 

receding full moon was photographed with one-third of its far 

side visible. Behind them at Taurus-Littrow, the astronauts left a 

plaque attached to the LM Challenger's descent stage. 

IXI'lOIAIJONS Of IH

IIICIM1Uif72

MAY IHI _,lin Of 'IACI IN 

II IIHKfiD IN IHl UVIS O

j4_Q..a....., R--"1 <!: ,

_.. .. ct...... 
8 

"Apollo, of course, was an absolutely unp

history, one whose ultimate importance is im

at such close range," NASA Associate Adm

Flight Dale D. Myers wrote the Administrato

contributions have far exceeded the expectat

but even of its proponents. It has virtually cre

well as added a brilliant new chapter in the 

Myers, NASA Hq., to the NASA Administrator, "Scope o

Dec. 8, 1972. 

360 
among nations which has proved to us all what can be d

together with our eyes on a glorious goal. 

"I rate Apollo as one of the real wonders of the world and 

country, through the exercise of great ability and dari

given it as a legacy to mankind." 

Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1973, p. AI; Congressional Record-Senate, Ja

transcript of proceedings, "Salute to Apollo, " Jan. 22, 1973. 


Ames Research Center requested that six R4D rocket en

use in the Apollo program be transferred from MSC to A

361 
27 

Apollo missions. The library would be used 

planning and updating scientific parts of ex

Ltr., Collins, to Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Director, JSC, 

Apollo Soyuz Test Project Program Direc

Manned Space Flight, NASA Hq., was assign

to take actions necessary for the final phaseo

Apollo program inquiries, activities, and a

delegations of authority would be referred to 

and disposition. 

NASA Notice 8020, "Apollo Program Phaseout Activiti

362 
Universal Studios filmed a program for the ABC TV N

"Houston, We've Got a Problem." Although fictitious, t

around mission control and the flight controllers duri

mission. The production was televised March 2, 1974. 

Memo, John P. Donnelly, NASA Hq., to Deputy Administrator, Feb. 21 

Of the 134 Apollo 17 lunar plaques, 93 were presen

embassies to the countries in which the embassies were 

Memo, John P. Donnelly, NASA Hq., to the Administrator and Deputy Ad

Report on Presentation of Apollo 17 Lunar Plaques," March 4, 1974. 

363 
364 



CARR 

CASE 

cc 

CCB 

CDR 

em 

CM 

CMP 

cps 

CSM 

cum 

DCR 

DFI 

Customer Acceptance Readiness Review 

Coordinated Aerospace Supplier Evalua

cubic centimeter(s) 

Configuration Control Board 

commander 

centimeter(s) 

command module 

command module pilot 

cycles per second (see Hz) 

command and service modules 

cubic meter(s) 

Design Certification Review 

development flight instrumentation 

367 

ICBC 

IMU 

ITT 

J 

JPL 

JSC 

K 

kg 

km 

km/hrs 

KSC 

LaRC 

Interagency Committee on Back Contamin

inertial measurement unit 

International Telephone and Telegraph Co

joule 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Johnson Space Center (Manned Spacecraft 

kelvin(s) 


kilogram(s) 


kilometer(s) 


kilometers per hour 


Kennedy Space Center 


Langley Research Center 


368 

MMH 

MOL 

MRB 

MSC 

MSFC 

MSFN 

MSOB 

M&SS 

Mw 

NAA 

NAR (NR) 

monomethylhydrazine 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

Material Review Board 

Manned Spacecraft Center (became Joh

Marshall Space Flight Center 

Manned Space Flight Network 

Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 

Mapping and survey system 

megawatt(s) 

North American Aviation, Inc. (until Se

North American Rockwell Corporation 

Rockwell International Corporation) 

369 

RTG 

RTV 

SAMSO 

SIC 

SEB 

sec 

SEQ 

SESL 

SEVA 

S-IB 

S-IC 

radioisotope thermoelectric g

room temperature vulcanizin

Space and Missiles Organizat

spacecraft 

Source Evaluation Board 

second(s) 

scientific equipment 

Space Environmental Simula

Stand-up extravehicular activ

Saturn IB launch vehicle first 

Saturn V launch vehicle first 

Saturn second stage 

37

S-II 
371 

Honeywell Company 

Stabilization, control

Collin s Radio 

Telecommunications 

Link 

Spacecraft mission 

simulators 

S

s

Allison and Airite 

Products 

Fuel components 

Radiation Inc. 

Telemetry data 

processing for Apollo 

S-I I stage 

Simmonds Precision 

Products 

Propellant mixture 

controls 

T

c

a

Elgin National Watch 

Sequencer 

RCA 

Radar, engineering 

services 

MIT 

Associate primeguidance, navigation 

*STL named sole contractor January 1965. 

372 





























Apollo-Saturn 203 (July 5, 1966) 

Primary Objectives (all achieved) 

1. 	 Evaluate performance of the S-IVB/IU stage under orbital c

flight information on: 

a. 	 Venting and chill-down systems. 

b. 	Fluid dynamics and heat transfer to propellant tanks. 

c. 	 Attitude and thermal control systems. 

d. 	Launch vehicle guidance. 

e. 	 Checkout in orbit. 

401 

operations to high post-injection altitudes. 

10. 	Demonstrate structural and thermal integrity of the launch ve

powered and coasting flight and determine inflight structural lo

characteristics. 


ll. Determine inflight launch vehicle internal environment. 


12. 	Demonstrate the launch vehicle guidance and control system d

and S-IVB powered flight, achieve guidance cutoff, and evaluate 

13. 	Demonstrate launch venicle sequencing system. 

14. 	Evaluate the performance of the emergency detection system 

configuration. 

15. 	Demonstrate compatibility of the launch vehicle and spacecraf

402 

14. 	Demonstrate the performance of CSM/MSFN S-hand comm

15. 	Measure the integrated skin and depth radiation dose within th

up to an altitude of at least 3700 km. 

Apollo 5 (AS-204/LM-1) (January 22, 1968) 

Primary Objectives (all achieved) 

1. 	Verify operation of the following LM subsystems: ascent pro

descent propulsion ·system (including restart), and structure. 

2. 	 Evaluate LM staging. 

3. 	Evaluate the S-IVB/IU orbital performance. 

403 

b. CSM navigation, communications, and midcourse correct

c. 	 CSM consumables assessment and passive thermal contro

Apollo 9 (AS-504) (March 3, 1969) 

Primary Objectives (all achieved) 

1. 	Demonstrate crew-space vehicle-mission support facilities perf

manned Saturn V mission with CSM and LM. 

2. 	 Demonstrate LM/crew performance. 

3. 	Demonstrate performance of nominal and selected backup LOR 

including: 

404 

perception (accomplished). 

9. 	 Demonstrate procedures and hardware used to prevent back c

earth's biosphere (accomplished). 

10. 	Deploy the Early Apollo Scientific Experiments Packag

included: 

a. 	S031, Passive Seismic Experiment (accomplished). 

b. S078, Laser Ranging Retro-Reflector (accomplished). 

11. 	 Deploy and retrieve the Solar Wind Composition Experi

plished). 

12. 	Perform Cosmic Ray Detector Experiment (helmet portion), S

13. 	Perform Lunar Field Geology, S059 (partially accomplished

405 

3. 	Develop mans capability to work in the lunar environment. 

4. 	 Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. 

Apollo 14 (AS-509) (January 31, 1971) 

Primary Objectives (all achieved) 

1. 	Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of 

preselected region of the Fra Mauro formation. 

2. 	 Deploy and activate ALSEP. 

3. 	 Develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. 

4. 	Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. 

406 

407 

Apollo 12: 	 Prime crew: 

Backup: 

Support: 

CapComs: 

Lovell 

Haise 

Schmitt 

Conrad 

Scott 

Carr 

Carr 

Scott 

Warren• 

Lind 

Gordon 

Irwin 

Weitz 

Gibson 

Worden 

Rippey• 

Garrio

Bean 

Worde

Gibso

Weitz 

Irwin 

Lewis
NOTE: CapCom (capsule communicator) assignments are listed as t

manning documents (by shift), not as they might have been heard in ch

during flight. 

*On this four-shift flight, Dickie K. Warren, James 0. Rippey, James L. L

Wash were backup CapComs. This was the first time in the American 

program that this position was filled by non-astronaut personnel. 

**Swigert moved from the backup to the prime crew at the last minu

module pilot Mattingly was exposed to a contagious disease. 

souRcE: Mission reports, news releases, NASA Astronauts (NASA EP-34

and manning documents issued before each mission by the JSC 

Directorate and written, for the most part, by Cecil E. Dorsey. 

409 

SatuV: 

Engine development: 

Apollo mission suppor

1968 

Original budget re- NASA: $4 324 500 Command and service 

quest including Fis- Apollo: 2 606 500 modules: 

Lunar excursion modul

cal Year 1967 supplemental Guidance and navigatio
1971 


Original budget request 

Fiscal budget appropriation 

NASA: 


Apollo: 


NASA: 


Apollo: 


Manned Space Flig

Operations: 


$2 606 100 Flight modules: 


956 500 Science payloads: 


Ground support: 


2 555 000 Saturn V: 


913 669 Manned Space Fligh

Operations: 


Advance developme
412 

Scientific airlock available 

Service moaule Propellant tanks 

Empty bay 

Internal rearrangement 

Structural redesign 

Radiator areas 

RCS mounting panels 

413 

Stabilization and 

control system 

Atmospheric entry and 


touchdown: 


Heatshield 


Revised interface 


Electronics repackaged 


Redundant attitude displ

Redistributed ablative thi

Truncated apex 


Umbilical locatiolll 


Flush antennas 


414 
7. Emergency detection system 

8. Earth-landing system 

Launch vehicle malfunc

Atmospheric descent· 

Uprighting at impact 

Backup System Capabilities for Earth-Orbital Flight 

Subsystem 

Service propulsion system 

Command module reaction 

control system 

Major Function 

Deorbit 

Attitude control 

SM-RCS

SM-RCS 

separa

reentry 

415 

1. Add armor plating to exposed solder joints. 

2. Change soldered-aluminum oxygen lines to stainless steel. 

3. Rapid cabin repressurization. 

4. Improve accessibility of selected ECS controls. 

5. Shields for plumbing lines. 

6. Optional use of air in cabin during launch. 

7. Emergency breathing masks. 

8. Add quick disconnects to environmental control unit. 

9. Replace selected materials. 

416 

BP-6 

BP-12 

BP-23 

Boilerplate-LES pad abort flight 

test 

Boilerplate-LES transonic abort 

flight test 

Boilerplate-LES high-dynamicpressure abort flight test 

Demonstrate l

system's pad 

Demonstrate l

system's tran

performance 

Demonstrate l

system's ma

pressure-reg

performance 

417 

CMS 2S-2 

CMS 2TV-l 

Static structural testing 

Complete systems spacecraft thermal vacuum testing 

Static-test CM and 

(ultimate) 

Demonstrate struc

subsystems, crew 

and life suppor

vacuum environ

418 

419 

s 034 Lunar Surface Magnetometer X 	 X 

s 035 Solar-Wind Spectrometer X 	 X 

s 036 Suprathermal Ion Detector X X 	 X 

X 

s 037 Heat Flow 


X
 s 038 Charged Particle 

s 058 Cold Cathode Gage X 	 X X 

s 059 Lunar Geology X 	 X X 

s 078 Laser Ranging Retroreflector X 	 X X 

420 

g y pg 

Apollo Orbital Experiments 

Apollo M

Number Experiment 

12 14 15 

s 160 Gamma-Ray Spectrometer X 

s 161 X-Ray Fluorescence X 

s 162 Alpha-Particle Spectrometer X 

s 164 S-Band Transponder (subsatellite) X 

421 

s 203 Lunar Seismic Profiling 	 Stanford University 

s 034 Lunar Surface Magnetometer 	 Palmer Dyal 

Ames Research Center 

Charles P. Sonett 

Lunar and Planetary La

University of Arizona 

s 035 Solar-Wind Spectrometer 	 Conway W. Snyder 

Jet Propulsion Laborat

s 036 Suprathermal Ion Detector 	 John W. Freeman 


Rice University 


422 

s 201 Far UV Camera/Spectrograph 

s 202 Lunar Ejecta and Meteorites 

G. R. Carruthers 

E. 	0. Hurlburt Center 

Research, Naval Res

Laboratory, Washing

Thornton Page 

Johnson Space Center 

Otto E. Berg 

Goddard Space Flight 

423 

s 170 Bistatic Radar 

s 171 Infrared Scanning Radiometer 

s 173 Subsatellite Particles and Shadows 

Johns Hopkins Univers

H. Taylor Howard 

Stanford University 

Frank J. Low 

University of Arizona 

W. W. Mendell 

Johnson Space Center 

Kinsey A. Anderson 

University of California 

424 

425 



NAT

OFFICER 

EXECUTIVE 

OR

AND 

STAFF ASSISTANTS 

ASSOCIA

CONSULTANTS 

L.W.Vogtl 

OFFICE OF 

INDUSTRY AFFAIRS 

ADMINISTRATOR 

ASSISTANT 

8.l.D0«11111 

00 

OFFICE OF 

ADMINISTRATION 

ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR 

W.E.lilly 

I 

MANNED 

OFFICE OF 

SPACE FLIGHT 

G.E.MUII!ar ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 

GEORGE C. MARSHALL MA

SPACE FLIGHT CENTER SPACECRA

Huatlviiii,AI1. Koul

w._..,_ R.R


America. See Apollo 17 and CSM 114. 

American Bosch Arma Corp., Arma Div., 37-38 

American Broadcasting Co., 363 

Ames Research Center, 9, 33-34, 161, 269, 361-62 

Anders, William A., 56, 224, 243, 275, 374, 386, 408 

Anderson, Sen. Clinton P., 340 

Anderson, Frank W., Jr., xiv 

Anderson, Robert, 338 

Ann Arbor, Mich., 138 

Antares. See Apollo 14 and LM-8. 

Apollo 1. See AS-204 and Apollo 204 Review Board. 

Apollo 1-A (rejected number). See AS-201. 

Apollo 2 (rejected number). See AS-202. 

Apollo 3 (rejected number). See AS-203. 

Apollo 4 (see also AS-501), 156, 191, 217, 222 

ad hoc Safety Group, 146 

checkout and readiness, 143 

Hurricane Gladys, 259 

integrated system testin

launch, 117, 257-59, 3

objectiv.es, 88, 240, 25

CSM/S-IVB rend

142, 258, 404 

operational philosophy, 

optical rendezvous, 259 

orbital rendezvous man

reaction control system, 

records, 3 7 4 

recovery, 258 il., 259, 

results, iv, vi, 240, 259, 

service propulsion syste

flight combustion s

S-IVB stage (see also 

TV, live, 117, 218, 25

439 

launch preparations, 237, 262, 273, 278, 279, 281, 

285 il. 

LM Spider. See LM-3. 

LM-CSM separation, rendezvous, and docking, iv, 

264, 286, 287 il., 289, 388 

mission, manned orbital, iv, 171, 243-44, 264, 282, 

284, 286-87 il., 291, 387-88 

modifications, 279 

objectives, iv, 243-44, 264, 287, 404-05 

records, 374 

results, 264, 288-89, 291, 387-88 

rollout, 278 

schedule, 170-71, 282 

software integration test, 278 

thermal vacuum test, 278 

training, 278, 281 

TV, 273, 277, 286 

363 

analyses, 264, 313, 326 

management debriefing, 311 

mission activities, 155, 246, 2

il.-10, 324, 389 

mobile quarantine facility, 30

Nixon, President, talk with, 

objectives, v, 261, 264, 282, 

oscillations, 294 

quarantine, 305-06, 309, 310

records, 302-03, 314, 375 

recovery, 264, 282, 304, 307, 

results, 310, 389 

stereo camera, 293, 311 

Tranquility Base, 307-08 il., 

translunar insertion dispersion

TV, color, 264, 302, 306-07 
lunar sample photography list, 327 

objectives, v, 406 

oxygen tank failure, v, vi, vii, 264, 330 il.-339 

il.-40, 392 

records, 375 

recovery, v, 264, 282, 331 il., 332, 392 

results, 392 

S-IVB lunar impact, 329 

schedule, 171, 282, 293, 311, 325 

soil thermometer, 318 

TV, 329, 363 

Apollo 13 Review Board 

established, 264, 332 

findings, 332-34 

recommendations, 334-35 

actions initiated, 336-40 

MSC actions, 338-40 

mission activities, v, 34

objectives, v, 350, 407 

photography, 344, 346, 

quarantine, 265, 345 

records, 376 

recovery, 265, 350 

results, 350-51, 395-96 

schedule, 311, 325, 338 

scientific instrument mo

seismometer, 349, 352, 3

subsatellite, 349, 362, 3

televised lunar liftoff, 2

Apollo 16 (AS-511), v 

ALSEP, 354, 361 il., 3

anomalies, 352 

Apollo 15 experiment v

441 

records, 376 


recovery, 265, 360, 400 . 
 redesignated Apollo 16 (Apollo 16 redes1gnated 17), 


338 

results, 360, 400 

8-IVB lunar impact, 358 

schedule, 311, 325, 338 

scientific instrument module, v, 328, 358, 360 

spacesuit improvement, 315, 345 il. 

special instrumentati?n, ~· 346 . . Taurus-Littrow landmg s1te, 265, 358-59 d., 361 1l., 

399 

Apollo 18 

lunar orbital science experiments, 328 

redesignated Apollo 17, 338 

schedule, 311, 325, 338 

No. 5, Origin and Prop

72-73, 75, 76, 92-93 

No. 6, Historical Data, 

No. 7, Test Procedures 

No. 8, Materials Review

No. 9, Design Review, 

No. 10, Analysis of Frac

No. 11, Medical Analysi

No. 12, Witness Stateme

No. 13, Ground Emerge

93-94 

No. 14, Security Operati

No. 15, &ard Administ

89 

No. 16, Special Tests, 7

No. 17, Final Board Rep

442 

mass spectrometer, 355 

passive seismometer, 9, 58, 102, 256, 272, 295, 

310, 312, 321, 329, 332, 341, 342, 348, 349, 

352, 358, 360 

solar wind spectrometer, 9, 58, 256, 272, 299, 

319, 332, 342 

suprathermal ion detector, 9, 58, 102, 272, 332 

first flight model, 291 

funds, 9, 302 

geological tools, 56, 143 

LM ascent stage, 56-57, 138 

management assignments, 13-14, 30-31 

mission assignments, 9, 59-60, 143, 207, 229-30, 

245-46 

modified design, 302 

prototype test program, 131-32 

56, 5, 5, 6

test flight program, iii, 

TV. See Television. 

vacuum chamber tests, 

Apollo-Saturn. See AS-201, 

Apollo Site Selection Board

346 

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, v

Apollo Spacecraft Program 

33, 139, 149, 315 

Apollo Spacecraft C

Control Board (CCB

174, 204-05, 211, 2

288, 295, 304 

CSM Panel, 164, 

Government Furn

(Board), 164, 16

443 

31-32, 70, 120, 127, 155, 161, 240 

launch escape (LES), 10 il., 66, 67-68, 71, 175 

ORDEAL, 37 

oxygen purge, 147, 161, 163, 318, 319 

parachute. See Parachute. 

portable life support (PLSS), 161-62, 274, 294 

stabilization and control, 70 

suit. See Spacesuit. 

water sterilization, 130, 215 

Apollo Special Task Team, 116, 117, 176-78, 190-91, 

194-95, 197, 250 

effectiveness, 252 

mission ended, 117, 245 

problems, 197, 199-200, 209, 212-13, 215, 219 

Apollo System Safety program, 116, 152-53 

Apollo telescope mount (ATM), iv, 31, 324 

crew debriefing requirements, 

experiments, 52, 144-45 

launch vehicle test history, 25

schedule, 170-71 

spacecraft/S-IVB rendezvous, 

system validation flight, 29, 17

tracking ship support, 44 

AS-205/208, 52, 56 

AS-206, 68-69, 76, 162, 170-71, 

AS-206/207, 28 

AS-207, 6, 7, 12 

AS-207/208, 6, 7, 12, 28, 29-30, 

AS-208, 6, 7 

AS-258, 60 

AS-278A, 44 
AS-515, 326 


Aseptic sampler, 293 


ASPO. See Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. 


Associated Press, 304 


Astronaut training 


Apollo 11, 229-30, 273, 301, 303-05 


biology, 116, 119 


Block U Training Plan, 119 


C prime mission, 243 


centrifuge, 292-93 


CM simulator, 304 


egress, 53 il., 94-95, 269, 278, 280 il. 


EVA, 304, 329-30 


experiments, 38, 116, 119, 273, 303-04 


extravehicular mobility unit, 270-71, 278 


fire, 159-60, 274-75 


Test Center, Porter, N

Test Facility, Wheatfie

Bellcomm, Inc., 18, 26-27, 

326 


guidance computer, 31

Belmont, Calif., 209 


Bendix Corp., Aerospace Sy

Systems Div.), 13, 37, 57

Benner, R. L., 70 


Beregovoy, Georgy T., 386 


Bergen, William B., 201, 21

Berkebile, M. John, 87 


Berry, Charles A., 19, 60, 6

158, 165, 193, 201, 246, 

Bethpage, N.Y., 28, 35, 51 

Billings, Charles R., 280 il. 


Binghamton, N.Y., 53 


445 

Burt, Robert P., 195 

Bush, Leon R., 185 

Butler, P. A., 7 

Byington, Harry W., 48 

c 

C-133A aircraft, 169 

Calahan, Hubert D., 101 

Calio, Anthony J., 313, 327 

Camera 

contract, 36 

lunar closeup stereo, 275, 293, 311, 324, 327 

television 

CM, CSM, 134, 168-69, 218, 277, 341-42 

flammability testing, 79, 80, 

145-46, 168, 171-72, 203 

fire extinguishers, 101, 129, 1

fire hazard (see also A5-204 a

Board), iii, 23, 66, 72-73, 

203 

hatch, 72, 79-80, 85, 93-94

154 il., 162, 217' 286, 292 

heatshield, 8, 10, 37, 160-6

260, 340, 380 

CM 012, 8, 77, 83, 89-9

lift-to-drag ratio, 43 

mockup, 32, 48, 79, 99, 113, 

reentry, iii, iv, 10, 72, 160

258-59, 277, 332, 380, 38

sea-qualification test, 45 il. 

446 
Cohen, Aaron, 126, 138, 213, 232, 269-70 

Cohen, Alfred, 7, 8 

Cohen, Jack H., 195 

Collins, Duncan, 71 

Collins, Michael, 42, 56, 304-10, 362, 373, 375, 389, 

Collins Radio Co., 372 

Colonna, Richard A., 222 

Columbia. See Apollo 11 and CSM 107. 

Columbia University, 9 

Command and service module. See CSM. 

Command module. See CM. 

Communications, iv, 15, 49, 50, 209, 217, 256 

CM 012, 61, 70, 76, 102-07, 112 

Computer, 117, 185, 203-05, 238, 250, 288, 372 

flight test support, 7, 138, 288 

Certification Review 

DITMCO (inspection p

dynamic load testing, 2

electrical power system

120-21, 123, 162, 24

circuit breakers, 6

wiring, 37, 79-83

111, 113-14, 1

132-133, 135 il

87' 200-02, 208 

coax cable, 1

emergency detection sy

emergency egress, 80, 1

entry monitor system, 

environmental control 

145, 156, 161, 175-7

447 


408 
testing, 120, 125 

wiring, 80--81, 87, 110 

CSM 020 (modified Block I), 216 il. 

Apollo 6, 179, 215-16 il.-17 

data storage equipment, 207 

delivery schedule, 136, 145-46 

emergency detection system, 217 

Flight Readiness Review Board, 207 

fuel cell tank, 119-20 

hatch, 136, 217 

heatshield, 177 

mission control programmer, 74-75 

operational checkout, 155 

reaction control system, 211 

service propulsion system, 216 

special inspection, 125 

high-gain antenna, 238, 244 

operational checkout, 251-52 

parachutes, 218, 277 

plumbing system, 199 

service propulsion system, 268

Special Task Team for Space

tion Control, 195, 198-99 

CSM 104 (Gumdrop) 

Apollo 9, 264, 282, 286-87 il

checkout, 251-52, 262 

coax cable, 183-84, 186-87 

crew, 239, 243, 286-87 

delivery schedule, 186-87, 21

docking with LM, 264, 286, 

TV, 273, 277, 286 

CSM 105, 140--41, 145-46 

448 

, , 

Davin, Edward M., 14 


Davis, Don D., Jr., 161 


Davis, Lt. Gen. Leighton 0. (USAF), 44 


Day, LeRoy E., 27, 88, 196, 267, 293 


Debus, Kurt H., 46, 62, 71, 77, 124-25, 146, 148, 170, 


237, 238-39, 281, 299, 317 il. 


Deep Space Net Tracking Station, Woomera, Australia, 


150 


Defense, Department of (DOD), 17, 240 


Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 17 


Manager for Manned Space Flight Support Opera­


tions, 44 


mapping agencies, 1 7, 35 


Secretary of Defense, 234, 311 


Dennett, Armistead, 143 


Denver, Colo., 37 


J-2, 215, 222, 232, 24

R4D, 361-62 


reaction control (see 

177-78, 206 


vernier, 36 


England, Anthony W., 409 

Engle, Joe H., 336 il., 408

Ernull, Robert E., 123 


Esenwein, George F., 357 


EVA. See Extravehicular ac

Evans, B. 0., 240 


Evans, Brian, 27 


Evans, Llewellyn J., 27, 41, 

· Evans, Ronald E., 357-60, 3

Experiments (see also Apoll

Package and Appendixes 

139, 226, 301, 310, 328 


449 

T033-Contrast Perception on Moon, 280, 348 

T034-Color Perception on Moon, 280, 342 

T035-Distance Estimation on Moon, 280, 348 

Explorer 35 (IMP-E), 383 

Extravehicular activity (EVA; see also Apollo 9, 11, 12, 

14-17), 205 

AS-204, 59 

AS-503, 57-58, 168 

Block I CSM, 59 

Block II CSM, first flight, 139 

Gemini, iii-iv, 208, 379, 381 

planning for lunar landing mission, 59-60, 155, 

168, 187-88, 202, 207, 207-08, 256-57, 260-61,. 

275, 284-85, 311-12, 316, 340-41 

pre-lunar landing, 168 

Soyuz, 387 

175-76, 372 

Garrett-AiResearch Safety A

156-57 

Garriott, Owen K., 408 

Gasich, W., 194-95 

Gates, Sally D., 408 

Gavin, Joseph G., Jr., 27, 41, 137

212, 227, 236, 256, 313 

Gay, C. C., Jr., 196 

Geer, E. Barton, 64, 65, 73-74, 

Gemini V, 373 

Gemini VII, 12, 30, 373, 377 

Gemini VIII, 2, 12-13, 15, 373, 

Gemini IX-A, 269, 278-79 

Gemini X, 373, 379 

Gemini XI, 7, 373, 380 

450 
Gray, Edward Z., 159, 187 


Gray, Wilbur H., 174, 177 


Green, Richard J., 14 


Griffin, A., 74 


Griffith, ]. G., 32 


Grimwood, Hilda J ., xv 


Grimwood, James M., xiv, xv 


Grissom, Virgil I., iii, 2, 47, 63, 67, 68, 100, 112 


Group for Lunar Exploration Planning (GLEP), 187, 


300 


Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. (GAEC) 


contract, LM, 9, 41, 372 


cost control, 9, 17, 27, 41 


delivery schedule, 9, 10, 14, 132 


government-furnished equipment, 10 


ground support equipment, 7-8, 14, 17 


egeso, 

. ., 

Helicopter, 173 il., 277, 28

Henize, Karl G., 409 


Hess, Wilmot N., 145, 183

273, 282, 292, 295 


High Energy Astronomy O

Hinchman, K., 74 


Hinners, Noel W., 190, 32

Hjornevik, Wesley L., 55, 6

Hock, Robert C., 356 


Hodge, John D., 7, 14-1

253, 261, 299, 313 


Holcomb, John K., 20 


Holzapfel, Richard H., 224 

Honeywell, Inc., Computer 

Horeff, Thomas G., 65, 70 


Horner, Richard E., 160, 1

451 

K 

Kapryan, Walter j., 47-48, 179, 317 il. 

Kaskey, B., 59 

Kearfott Products Div., General Precision, Inc., 37 

Kelly, G. Fred, 70-71, 74 

Kelly, Thomas J., 27, 222, 230 

Kennedy, President John F., xiv, 23, 82, 264 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), xv, 2, 6, 23 il., 45-46, 

148, 153 il., 255 il., 293, 338 il. 

Apollo Configuration Control Panel, 47-48 

AS-204 accident (see also Apollo 204 Review Board 

and AS-204), 63 


crawler-transporter, 23 il. 


Design Engineering Office, 280 


Kubat, Jerald R., 177 

Kudish, Henry, 316 

Kuehnel, Helmut A., 249 

Kupperian, James E., 146 

Kurtz, Herman F., Jr., 350 

L 

Lamont-Doherty Geological Observ

Langley Research Center (LaRC), 

161, 185, 261, 332 

Apollo Block II CM/LM docki

custodian of Apollo 204 Revie

97 

452 
AS-204-related changes, 157-58 

AS-208, 7 

ascent stage, 51 il., 262, 286, 301, 305 il. 

cabin, 169-70, 213-14, 220-21, 282 

engine, 35, 117, 149, 178-80, 189-91, 199, 

223-25, 227-28, 252 

manual control, 271-7~ 

propulsion system, 14, 15, 123, 196, 202-03, 

206, 286, 288-89 

TV camera, 168-69 

windows, 185, 190, 206-07 

budget, 41, 127, 205, 235 

capacity, 147 

communications, 15, 49, 205-06, 312 

contract, 7-8, 9-10, 14 

guidance system, 196, 2

performance, 199 

plumbing rework, 234 

schedule, 132, 153 il.-5

special inspection, 125 

unmanned flight only, 

windows, 190 

LM-2 

alternative uses, 227, 2

Apollo 8, possible use, 

delivery schedule, 44, 1

drop test, 233, 294 

fire-in-the-hole test, 11

fire safety, 158-59 

flight requirements mee

mannability, 44, 123, 14

453 
TV camera, 169, 277 

window failure, 116, 185, 190, 206 

LM-6 (Intrepid) 

Apollo 12, 282, 316, 318-20 il.-21 

changes, 164, 290 

delivery date, 290 

guidance, 312, 318 

propellant tank test failure, 267 

scientific payload weight, 292 

stress corrosion, 290 

TV camera, 169, 277, 319-20 

LM-7 (Aquarius) 

Apollo 13, 282, 329-30 il.-32, 336, 339 

changes, 290 

delivery date, 290 

propellant tank test failure, 267 

LTA3, 206, 227, 228 

LTA-4, 239 

LTA-8, 143-44, 158-59, 170, 195

LTA-10, 42 

LTA-10R (on Apollo 4), 172 

Lucas, William R., 299 

Luna 9, 377 

Luna 10, 378 

Luna 11, 379 

Luna 12, 380 

Luna 13, 380 

Luna 14, 385 

Luna 15, 389 

Luna 16, 340, 392-93, 397 

Luna 17, 340, 393 

Luna 18, 396 

454 

Lunar Mobility Task Team, 312 

Lunar module. See LM. 

Lunar module test article. See L TA. 

Lunar Orbiter I, 2, 34-35, 42, 62, 379 

Lunar Orbiter II, 2, 49-50, 62, 102, 381 

Lunar Orbiter Ill, 62, 381 

Lunar Orbiter IV, 382 

Lunar Orbiter V, 102, 116, 148, 150, 383 

Lunar Orbiter Project Office, 34-35, 42, 50 

Lunar polar orbit science package, 283 

Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL), 17, 22, 26, 31, 32, 

38, 41, 54-56, 165, 261, 264, 279, 298, 302, 312, 314, 

Lunar roving vehicle (Lunar Rover), 328 

Apollo U, v, 265, 346 il., 347 il., 348, 350-51 

Mallick, Donald L., 224 

Mangan, William D., 101 

Manned Flight Managem

03, 249, 290 

Apollo 8 decision, 24

Apollo 15 anomalies, 

Apollo capability aug

282-83 

first lunar landing ac

"Hideaway" meeting

Manned Orbiting Laborat

Manned space flight aware

Manned Space Flight Ex

130 

Manned Space Flight Net

455 


315 
Flammability Test Review Board, 158 


Flight Acceleration Facility, 292-93 


Flight Control Div., 7, 14, 25, 60 


Flight Crew Operations Directorate, 5, 25, 33, 88, 


119, 120, 158-60, 202, 283-84 


Flight Crew Support Div., 34, 38 


Flight Experiment Selection Board, 19, 26 


Flight Operations Directorate, 22, 123 


Flight Program Review, 271-72 


Flight Safety Office, 120-21, 153, 163, 225 


Guidance and Control Div., 6, 33 


Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Div., 121, 


130-31 


Landing and Recovery Div., 217 


Lunar and Earth Sciences Div., 57 


Director of Program Manageme

Director of Quality and Reliabi

LRV simulator, 338 


manned space flight mission res

31, 35 il., 46--47, 316, 318 


Mission Operations Manager, 2

planetary vehicle experiments, 

Propulsion Div., 142 


Research Projects Laboratory, 4

Saturn IB Program Manager, 2

Saturn Program Office, 35, 83, 

Saturn V Program Manager, 2

Saturn V Test Management Of

scientific survey module, 47 


Martin Co., The, 18, 37, 240 


456 

HadleyApennine region, 265, 347 il., 348, 361 il., 

396 

Hipparchus, 300 

Hyginus Rille, 311 

Kant region, 346 

Kohlschutter Crater, 353 il. 

Marius Hills, 311 

Mills Crater, 353 il. 

Ocean of' Storms (Oceanus Procellarum), 25, 311, 

319, 320 il., 391, 393 


Plum Crater, 353 il. 


Ray Crater, 398 


Schroter's Valley, 311 


Sea of Crises, 397 


Sea of Fertility, 393, 397 


Sea of Rains, 393 


see also Appendix 10), 

Acting Administrator

Administrator. See W

0.; and Fletcher, 

Associate Administrat

Technology, 158 

Associate Administra

See Mueller, Georg

Deputy, 116, 185 

Associate Administra

Applications (see 

Naugle, John E.,)

Chief Scientist (prop

Deputy Administrato

Jr.; Paine, Thoma

Deputy Administrator 

457 

NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science 


and Applications, 9, 16, 24, 26, 29, 35, 39, 


55-56, 58-59, 102 


Nichols, Donald D., 73 


Nicks, Oran W., 5, 182, 250 


Nields, James F., 220, 265, 288, 307, 319, 329, 345, 


363, 364 


Nikolayev, Andrian G., 393 


Nixon, President Richard M., 265, 288, 307, 319, 329, 


345, 363, 364 


Nolan, James P., Jr., 203 


North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA; until Sept. 22, 


1967). See North American Rockwell Corp. 


North American Rockwell Corp. (NR; 1967-1973; 


Rockwell International Corp. after Feb. 16, 1973), 


69, 71, 121 il., 240 


O'Brien, B. J ., 9 


O'Bryant, William T., 14, 58-59 


Ocean of Storms (Oceanus Procella

320 il., 391, 393 


O'Connor, Edmund F., 20 


Odyssey. See Apollo 13 and CSM 1

Oliver, Lt. Col. Jeptha D., 225 


Orbital debris hazard, 208 


Orbital rate drive electronics for 

(ORDEAL), 37 


Orbiter program, 6 


Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 

Orion. See Apollo 16 and LM-11. 


Orlando, Fla., 81 


Ould, J. Wallace, 225 


Overmyer, Robert F., 409 


458 

267-68, 271-74, 277-302, 311-13, 315, 331 il. 

Phinney, Robert A., 350 

Pickering, John E., 165 

Pickering, William H., 36 

Piland, Joseph V., 26 

Piland, Robert 0., 16, 19, 24, 47, 58, 62, 102, 183 

Pinkel, I. Irving, 65, 70, 72, 150, 219 

Pioneer (space probe), 324 

Pitman, Clarence, 185 

Platt, William E., 59 

Pogue, William R., 408-09 

Pohl, Henry 0., 48 

Polifka, Robert W ., 48 

Porcher, Arthur G., 280 il. 

Portable life support system (PLSS), 60, 274, 282, 

294, 315, 327, 343-44 

y 

Rocchio, J. J., 31-32 

Rocketdyne. See North A

Rockwell-Standard Corp., 

Rodano Research Corp., 

Roosa, Stuart A., 217, 

408-09 

Rose, Rodney G., 59-60, 

Ross, I. Miles, 31-32, 22

RTG. See Apollo Lunar 

radioisotope thermoelec

Rubey, William W., 350 

Rudolph, Arthur, 173, 17

Rukavishnikov, Nikolay N

Russell, Harold G., 125 

Ryker, Norman J., Jr., 1

459 

wind constraint, 251 

Saturn V launch vehicle (see also AS-500-F, AS-501, 

etc. and S-IB and S-IVB stages), iv, 82, 216 il., 

255· il., 308 il. 

A-J missions, 157 

abort, 163, 254 

bending loads, 232, 254 

budget, 150 

design, 191, 232, 247 

emergency detection system, 247 

engine, 35 il., 43 il., 215, 222, 232, 247, 254 

manning, 123, 179, 191 

manual-control simulation, 33-34 

OMSF responsibility, 315 

performance, 61, 83, 217, 235, 249, 384, 386-89, 

392, 394, 395, 397' 399 

py, 

, , 

Shatalov, Vladimir A., 387, 390, 3

Shea, Joseph F. 

ASPO Manager, 6, 11, 12, 1

38-39, 41-44, 47-49, 53-5

74-75, 77-78, 109, 119 

NASA Deputy Associate Admin

Space Flight, 119 

Sheparo, Alan B., Jr., 338 il., 340 

375, 394, 409 

Shepherd, James T., 345 

Sheridan, Robert B., 318 

Shinkle, John G., 44, 47-48, 71 

Shonin, Georgy S., 390 

Sieppert, Albert F., 71 

Silveira, Milton A., 169 

460 

SM 017 propellant tank failure, 4849, 109 

SM 020, 211 

SM 101, 48, 166-67, 179, 193-94, 208, 230 

SM 102, 179, 191, 193-94, 208 

SM 105, 227 

SM 111, 219 

Smith, Arlin G., 267 

Smith, Francis B., 55 

Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, 32 

Smith, R. L., 313 

Smith, Richard G., 338, 344, 351 

Smylie, Robert E., 195 

SNAP-27. See Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment 

Package, radioisotope thermoelectric generator. 

Snedeker, John C., 14 

Snyder, Conway W., 9 

Stoops, Gordon J., 74, 13

Strang, Col. Charles F. 

74 

Strickland, Arthur T., 5 

Structures Advisory Board

Stuhlinger, Ernst, 47, 182

Sunnyvale, Calif., 37 

Super Guppy (transport a

Surveyor I, 2, 24, 34, 36, 

Surveyor II, 40, 380 

Surveyor Ill (Surveyor C

318, 320 il., 321, 382, 3

Surveyor IV, 141, 384 

Surveyor V, 383 

Surveyor VI, 383 

Surveyor VII, 311, 384 

461 

University of Maryland, 130 


U.S. Air Force, 71, 78, 148, 213 


Bioastronautic Operational Support Unit, 63, 78 


Brooks AFB, Tex., 66, 68 


Eastern Test Range, 66, 70, 150, 170 


Ellington, AFB, Tex., 19 


Manned Orbiting Laboratory Systems Program Of­


fice, 128, 220 


Norton, AFB, Calif., 225 


Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAM SO), 


311 


space rescue studies, 21 


Space Systems Div., 128 


Systems Command, AFSC, 21 


Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 101, 220 


U.S. Army, 63 


Wade, Donald C., 222 


Wagner, R. L., 27, 283 


Wake Island, 37 


Walker, Thomas J., III, 356 


Walton, Bruce H., 59 


Wardell, Anthony W., 132-33, 136 

Warren, Dickie K., 408-09 


Warzecha, Ladislaus, 176 


Wash, Michael R., 408-09 


Washington .Cathedral Space Wind

Washington, D.C., 15, 63, 78, 79, 

350, 361 


Watkins, Allen H., 48 


Watkins, J. S., 9 


Weaver, Charles H., 36 


462 

463 


Georgia (1939), he received his B.A. degree from Huntin

Montgomery, Alabama (1964), and his M.A. (1966)andPh.D

in history from Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisian

ygy, , , 

Van Nimmen,Jane,andLeonardC. Bruno, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, NASASP

1976, NTIS. 

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie E. Karegeannes, Origins of NASA Names, 

•GPO: Order from Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D

tNTIS: Order from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161. 

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRIN