If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MV HALE, LLC, by its registered agent, MICHAEL 

NUNEZ, JOHN BARBAY and ANN MARIE 

BARBAY, STEVEN BROSTEK and CATHERINE 

BROSTEK, JEAN M. HARDESTY and JACK E. 

HARDESTY, MICHAEL E. THOMPSON and 

CAROL M. THOMPSON, FRED TRIPLETT and

MELINDA TRIPLETT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

July 13, 2023

v No. 360904

Iosco Circuit Court

CHRISTOPHER D. MULDOON, LAURIE 

MULDOON, LEON A GRIBECK AND NANCY A. 

GRIBECK, WALLACE E. ACKLEY AND 

PATRICIA L. ACKLEY,

LC No. 21-2905-CH

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In 1989, plattors dedicated two waterside lots within the Iroquois Sands subdivision for use 

by Iroquois Sands residents. Since then, for more than 30 years, some residents of Iroquois Sands 

have used those lots for seasonal docking of their boats. Recently, however, plaintiffs filed suit to 

enjoin that use of the two lots, known as Floyd Park and Sand Park, by residents of Iroquois Sands. 

The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants, who are all residents of Iroquois Sands, 

thereby permitting their continued use of the lots for docking. On appeal, we affirm that decision, 

which allows docking to proceed unhindered at Floyd Park and Sand Park.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 26, 1989, 55 lots were created to form the Iroquois Sands subdivision between 

Floyd Lake and Sand Lake in Iosco County. Plaintiffs and defendants all own property within the 

Iroquois Sands subdivision. Iroquois Sands includes a dedication of two areas—Floyd Park and 
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Sand Park—for exclusive use by the property owners. Although the dedication expressly provides 

that “Floyd Park and Sand Park are private and for the use of Iroquois Sands lot owners and any 

future contiguous subdivision where title is traceable to this proprietor[,]” the dedication does not 

say anything about the lot owners’ riparian rights of erecting docks, hoists, and/or the mooring of 

boats or other vessels on the beach. In recent years, several property owners, including defendants, 

have erected a dock and a boat hoist, and they have moored boats, jet skis, and pontoon vessels on 

the beach and in the waters along the parks.

On October 27, 2020, plaintiffs’ counsel sent correspondence to each lot owner within the 

subdivision requesting cooperation in using the parks for their designated purposes and refraining

from engaging in marina-type activities. But when the use of private docking continued unabated, 

plaintiffs filed this suit against the property owners who were purported transgressors. Defendants 

moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), (C)(7), and (C)(8), contending that 

the dedication does not operate simply to benefit plaintiffs or only to restrict defendants. Instead, 

they insisted the dedication operates to convey to all subdivision co-owners an unrestricted right 

to use Floyd Park and Sand Park. Additionally, because defendants were not expressly prohibited

from using docks and boats, plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed for lack of an actual controversy. 

In response, plaintiffs reiterated that the land was dedicated for “parks,” so all marina-type activity

was inconsistent with that concept of a “park.”

On March 2, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendants’ motion for summary 

disposition. The trial court acknowledged that it was limited to the language of the dedication and 

if that language is clear and unambiguous, the court had to apply the language as written. Plaintiffs 

argued that the clear language of the dedication limited the permissible use of Floyd Park and Sand 

Park to that of a “park.” After hearing oral argument, the trial court granted defendants summary 

disposition from the bench and dismissed the action on March 18, 2022, thereby allowing docking 

to continue at Floyd Park and Sand Park. This appeal of right followed.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s rulings that all Iroquois Sands lot owners have riparian 

rights to maintain and use docks at the two parks and that doing so constitutes a reasonable use of 

those rights. The trial court rendered those rulings in awarding summary disposition to defendants, 

and “[w]e review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-Khalil 

v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Applying that standard,1

we must address defendants’ claim of riparian rights to maintain and use docks at the parks.

Riparian land refers to land bounded by a natural water source.2 2000 Baum Family Trust 

v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 166; 793 NW2d 633 (2010). One exclusive right afforded to riparian land 

 

1 Although the scope of a dedication of property has been described as a question of fact, see, e.g., 

Dyball v Lennox, 260 Mich App 698, 703; 680 NW2d 522 (2003), the summary disposition award 

in this case requires us to apply de novo review to the trial court’s rulings.

2

 “Strictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian, while land which 

includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral[,]” Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 288 n 2; 380 
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owners is the right to erect and maintain docks along the owner’s shore. Id. Riparian rights cannot 

be transferred to a non-riparian land owner. Thompson v Enz, 379 Mich 667, 682, 686; 154 NW2d 

473 (1967). The scope of a dedication of land is defined by the language of the dedication and the 

facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the dedication. Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 

293; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). To define the permissible uses of dedicated land, a court must answer

two questions: (1) whether the dedication includes or allows for that disputed use; and (2) whether 

that use is reasonable. Dobie v Morrison, 227 Mich App 536, 541; 575 NW2d 817 (1998). Here, 

both of those questions are in dispute, so we must answer each of the two questions in turn.

A. DEDICATION

On many occasions, courts have addressed riparian rights of land owners under Michigan 

property laws in general and the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq., in particular. In 

2004, our Supreme Court issued opinions explaining how to interpret dedications made before and

after the effective date of the LDA, i.e., January 1, 1968. “[D]edications of land for private use in 

plats before [the LDA] took effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land.”

Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 553, 564; 677 NW2d 319 (2004). But dedications of land for private 

use in plats after the LDA took effect convey a fee simple interest to the donees. Martin v Beldean, 

469 Mich 541, 548; 677 NW2d 312 (2004). Thus, as we have explained, “a private dedication in 

a plat made before January 1, 1968, conveys an irrevocable easement, whereas a private dedication 

in a plat after January 1, 1968, conveys a fee interest.” Redmond v Van Buren Co, 293 Mich App 

344, 354; 819 NW2d 912 (2011).

One provision of the LDA, MCL 560.253(1), figures prominently in this case. According 

to that statute:

When a plat is certified, signed, acknowledged, and recorded as prescribed in this 

act, every dedication, gift or grant to the public or any person, society or corporation 

marked or noted as such on the plat shall be deemed sufficient conveyance to vest 

fee simple of all parcels of land so marked and noted, and shall be considered a 

general warranty against the donors, their heirs, and assigns to the donees for their 

use for the purposes therein expressed and no other.

Pursuant to that statute, “a dedication is not presumed to be broad, requiring express words in the 

dedication to limit its scope.” 2000 Baum Family Trust, 488 Mich at 159-160. “Rather, in all its 

versions, the statute has taken the opposite approach.” Id. at 160. “The scope of the dedication is 

strictly limited to the words expressly conveyed,” which means “the purposes ‘therein designated’ 

and ‘no other use or purpose whatever.’ ” Id.

In this case, the language of dedication from 1989 states:

Floyd Park and Sand Park are private and for the use of Iroquois Sands lot owners 

and any future contiguous subdivision where title is traceable to this proprietor . . . 

 

NW2d 463 (1985), but “the term ‘riparian’ is often used to describe both types of land,” id., so we 

will use that term in framing the dispute in this case.
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Lots and parks embracing any waters of Sand Lake, Floyd Lake and the shallows 

or the channel between said lakes are subject to the correlative rights of other 

riparian owners and to the public trust in these waters . . . .

Plaintiffs insist that because that dedication does not expressly refer to either maintaining docks or 

docking boats at Floyd Park and Sand Park, such uses are not within the scope of the dedication, 

as interpreted under the LDA, MCL 560.253(1). In contrast, defendants claim that the dedication 

conveyed a fee simple interest to them (and all other lot owners in the Iroquois Sands subdivision), 

so they enjoy “all the attendant riparian rights[,]” including the right to maintain and use docks.

Riparian-rights cases usually involve dedications of easements for access to water, and our 

Supreme Court has noted that those who benefit from such easements are entitled to exercise some 

rights that are ordinarily exclusively riparian. Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685, 686; 86 NW2d 816 

(1957). Riparian rights are property rights, 2000 Baum Family Trust, 488 Mich at 166, and those 

“exclusive rights . . . include the right to erect and maintain docks, as well as to permanently anchor 

boats off the shore.” 2000 Baum Family Trust, 488 Mich at 166. We have issued an unpublished 

decision that favors defendants on this matter. See Hi-Lo Heights Lakefront Prop Owners Ass’n 

v Columbia Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 15, 

2009 (Docket No. 286493), p 2.

3

 There, we ruled that when a lakeside park is conveyed to all lot 

owners of a subdivision, the lot owners are riparian-rights holders with the right to maintain docks. 

Id. As we stated, “because the lot owners owned the park, they have the right to use the park in a 

reasonable manner, which includes placing docks and mooring boats, as long as they do not deviate 

from the intentions of the grantors.” Id. We find the reasoning in that decision persuasive, so we 

shall apply that principle in this case to conclude that Floyd Park and Sand Park were dedicated as 

riparian land in fee simple to all the Iroquois Sands lot owners, so all the Iroquois Sands lot owners 

have riparian rights that encompass the rights to maintain and use docks at those two parks.

B. REASONABLE USE

Use of the water by riparian owners is governed by principles of reasonableness. Pierce v 

Riley, 81 Mich App 39, 45; 264 NW2d 110 (1978). Uses permitted by a dedication’s scope “must 

not unreasonably interfere with [other lot owners’] use and enjoyment of their property.” Dobie, 

227 Mich App at 541; see also Thies, 424 Mich at 289. The concept of “reasonable use” turns on 

the facts of the case. Hoover v Crane, 362 Mich 36; 106 NW2d 563 (1960). In Three Lakes Ass’n 

v Kessler, 91 Mich App 371, 377; 285 NW2d 300 (1979), we devised a three-part test for assessing 

reasonable use:

First, attention should be given to the size, character and natural state of the 

water course. Second, consideration should be given the type and purpose of the 

uses proposed and their effect on the water course. Third, the court should balance 

 

3

“Although unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding precedent, they may be considered 

instructive or persuasive.” Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v Allegan Co, 316 Mich App 122, 137; 892 NW2d 

33 (2016).
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the benefit that would inure to the proposed user with the injury to other riparian 

owners.

Application of that three-part test confirms that defendants are engaging in reasonable use of Floyd 

Park and Sand Park by maintaining and using docks there.

 First, Floyd Lake is approximately 40.7 acres, so it is much smaller than Sand Lake, which

is approximately 244 acres. Correspondingly, Floyd Park is much smaller than Sand Park, which 

has approximately 300 feet of beachfront. Permitting docks to be maintained and used at parks on 

lakes of that size and natural state seems eminently reasonable. Second, those two lakes have other 

access points. Floyd Lake has a boat launch and Sand Lake has another park that is not designated 

for private use by the Iroquois Sands subdivision residents. Moreover, defendants point to a letter 

from the original proprietor, Fred McAndrew, to establish that both parks were intended for boats. 

Beyond that, permitting maintenance and use of docks has no demonstrated harmful impact. Third, 

balancing the benefits of docks against the burdens placed upon other lot owners militates in favor 

of docks. Docks provide landlocked lot owners with seasonal access to the lakes. There are fewer 

than 15 lot owners in the Iroquois Sands subdivision who do not own lakefront lots. All the other 

lot owners can erect docks on their own lots. Affording a few landlocked lot owners access to the 

lakes seems perfectly reasonable. Therefore, in the absence of proof that the longstanding practice 

of maintaining and using docks at the two parks unreasonably infringes on the rights of the other 

lot owners, those actions can properly be deemed reasonable in accordance with the dedication.

Plaintiffs call it unreasonable to afford all lot owners the right to erect docks in Floyd Lake 

and Sand Lake. Plaintiffs assert that there is only enough room at Sand Park for 11 docks and only 

enough room for 4 docks on Floyd Park, as illustrated by the following photographic evidence:

Plaintiffs also insist that docks not only reduce the available beach space for those who would like 

to enjoy the parks without boat traffic, but also increase the risk of accidents. Plaintiffs thus argue 

that no lot owner should have controlling rights to the two parksthat disadvantage other lot owners. 
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But the record contains no evidence that allowing docks infringes on the rights of other lot owners. 

For more than 30 years since the dedication, there has never been full occupancy of docks erected 

in a single season. Accordingly, with history as our guide, we conclude that the trial court correctly 

deemed defendants’ use of Floyd Park and Sand Park reasonable.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Christopher P. Yates