J-S32016-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: V.L.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.E.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2980 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000670-2015, 

FID# 51-FN-002194-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2019

J.E.S. (Father) appeals from the decree granting the petition of T.P. 

(Mother) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to V.L.S. (Child), 

born in February 2007. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the background of this matter as follows:

Mother and Father have been engaged in a lengthy custody battle 

long before this case arrived in [the trial] court. Mother and 

Father were previously married.[1] Both Mother and Father had

substance abuse issues.

[2]

In 2008, Mother left the home that she 

____________________________________________

1 Mother and Father were married in 1999 and divorced in 2010. N.T., 

11/14/17, at 22. Mother subsequently remarried, and her spouse, M.P. 

(Stepfather), filed a petition to adopt Child concomitant with Mother’s petition 

to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child. 

2 Mother reported that she has been sober since July 2009. N.T., 9/12/17, at 

18, 21.
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was sharing with Father and took [] Child with her.[3]. . . Child 

was one year old at the time. 

Around 2010, when . . . Child was around [three] years old, 

Mother started dating [Stepfather]. On September 25, 2012, 

Mother married [Stepfather]. Child has been living with [Mother 

and Stepfather] since they got married.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/19, at 1-2 (record citations omitted).

By way of further background, on February 18, 2009, the court presiding 

over the custody matter (the custody court) granted Father unsupervised 

visitation, but directed Mother and Father to submit to drug and alcohol testing 

that same day. Father did not report for testing that day. As a result, Father 

began supervised visitations with Child. 

On November 12, 2009, the custody court granted Mother primary 

physical and legal custody of Child, with Father having supervised visitation 

with Child at the Family Court nursery every other Sunday. See Order 

11/12/09. The custody court suspended Father’s visitation from October 2012 

to October 2013 and again on February 11, 2015.4 See Order, 10/2/12; 

Order, 10/30/13; Order, 2/11/15. 

____________________________________________

3 Mother testified to leaving the home with Child in March 2008. Id. at 17. 

4 Child had difficulties with the visits with Father. Moreover, Child reported 

that Father threatened to kill Mother with a big knife and that Father touched 

and kissed Child inappropriately. The custody court directed Robert 

Tanenbaum, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to evaluate Child and Father. Child 

also referred to Father as “bad dad.” N.T., 6/5/18, at 24-25; see also N.T., 

2/20/18, at 59. 

We also note that Father was arrested for possession of marijuana in Maryland 

in 2013 or 2014. See N.T., 9/11/18, at 73, 87. Father also tested positive 
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In the February 11, 2015 order, the custody court stated:

Based upon the court’s observations of Child . . . as regards her 

testimony and demeanor while discussing her custodial time with 

Father, the court finds that presently supervised physical custody 

of Child . . . with Father is not in Child[’s] . . . best interest. 

Father’s supervised physical custody of Child . . . is suspended 

until further order of court.

Order, 2/11/15, at 2 (full capitalization omitted). The custody court also 

suspended telephone contact between Father and Child and prohibited Father 

from posting pictures of Child. Id. 

Additionally, the custody court directed Father to seek drug and alcohol 

treatment and follow any treatment recommendations. Id. The custody court 

also ordered Father to participate in any mental health treatment and therapy

recommended by a licensed psychologist “to work towards improving his 

ability to interact with and relate to children of [Child]’s age.” Id. 

On October 5, 2015, Mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and 

(b),

5 and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption. While a termination hearing 

was initially scheduled for December 2015, and then April 2016, pursuant to 

order dated April 5, 2016, and entered April 7, 2016, the proceedings were 

____________________________________________

for opiates and marijuana on July 3, 2014. See Ex. M-2; N.T., 9/12/17, at 

24-25.

5 Amended petitions for involuntary termination were filed on January 13, 

2016 and July 11, 2017. 
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stayed pending resolution of the custody matter, which included Father’s filing 

of a petition to modify custody on November 20, 2015. Order, 4/7/16. 

In November 2016, the custody court found that Father did not comply 

with “important components” of its February 2015 order and that it was not

in Child’s best interests to further delay the matter.6 Order, 11/8/16, at 1-2. 

The custody court dismissed Father’s outstanding petition to modify custody 

without prejudice and transferred the matter to the trial court for disposition 

of the petitions to involuntarily terminate parental rights and for adoption. Id.

at 2. 

The trial court thereafter held hearings on the petition to terminate

Father’s parental rights on September 12, 2017, November 14, 2017, 

February 20, 2018, June 5, 2018, September 11, 2018, and September 13, 

2018. Mother and Stepfather testified in support of the petition. Mother also

presented testimony from three expert witnesses: (1) Dr. Tanenbaum, the

clinical psychologist appointed by the custody court, see note 4, supra; (2)

Dolores Berk, Ph.D., Child’s therapist at Care Connection Counseling Center; 

and (3) Thomas Kenney, a court psychologist who conducted mental health 

assessments of Mother and Father at the request of the custody court. 

Father, who was represented by counsel, testified on his own behalf. 

Child, who was represented by a child advocate, Marilyn Rigmaiden-DeLeon, 

____________________________________________

6 The custody court did “commend [Father] for the efforts he made.” Order 

11/8/16, at 2.
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Esq., also participated in the proceedings.7 The trial court also spoke with 

Child, in camera, on September 13, 2018, and Child indicated that she 

supported termination of Father’s parental rights.

8

 

By decree entered September 13, 2018, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of Father to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

____________________________________________

7

It appears that the trial court appointed Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon on 

November 5, 2015, to represent both Child’s best interests and legal interests. 

Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon stated, “Unfortunately, I wear the hat of the 

attorney who has to argue what’s in the best interest of this child and what 

the child wants. As the [c]ourt knows, that task is usually split between two 

attorneys, but I feel confident that I can point the [c]ourt in the right 

direction.” N.T., 9/13/18, at 31. Attorney Rigmaiden-DeLeon argued in 

support of terminating Father’s parental rights. Id. at 31-34.

Here, Child was eleven years old at the conclusion of the hearings. At the 

time she spoke with the court, Child was vocal and unwavering as to her desire 

for Father’s parental rights to be terminated and to be adopted by Stepfather. 

Id. at 14, 18, 22. We determine that there is no conflict between Child’s best 

interests and legal interests. As such, we find the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2313(a) were satisfied. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174-

75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (stating that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), 

a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary termination proceeding 

has a statutory right to counsel who discerns and advocates for the child’s 

legal interests, defined as a child’s preferred outcome); see also In re T.S., 

192 A.3d 1080, 1089-90, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (finding the preferred outcome 

of a child who is too young or non-communicative unascertainable in holding 

a child’s statutory right to counsel not waivable and reaffirming the ability of 

an attorney-guardian ad litem to serve a dual role and represent a child’s nonconflicting best interests and legal interests).

8 All counsel were present during the court’s questioning of Child. N.T., 

9/13/18, at 11-14.
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2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).9 On October 10, 2018, Father filed a timely 

notice of appeal, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, Father claimed:

[1]. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it 

terminated [F]ather’s parental rights because termination was not 

in the best interest of [C]hild.

[2]. The trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily 

terminated [F]ather’s parental rights without giving primary 

consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the 

developmental physical and emotional needs of the child as 

required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(b).

Father’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/10/18. 

Father raises the following issues on appeal:10

____________________________________________

9 The decree memorialized the decision placed by the court on the record at 

the conclusion of the hearing on September 13, 2018. N.T., 9/13/18, at 34-

36. 

10 We note that Mother and Stepfather filed a motion to quash for failure to 

file a reproduced record, which was denied without prejudice and subject to 

be raised in a new motion once the matter was assigned to a merits panel 

pursuant to order of this Court on May 10, 2019. Order, 5/10/19. This issue 

has not been raised in a new motion. Regardless, we would find this issue 

without merit. The failure to file a reproduced record will not result in 

dismissal where there has been no prejudice to the parties and where effective 

appellate review has not been precluded. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (failure to take 

any step, other than filing of a timely notice of appeal will not provide grounds 

for dismissal of the appeal); Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 

A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1980) (Pa.R.A.P. 902 provides that the extreme action 

of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly and clearly 

would be inappropriate where there has been substantial compliance with the 

rules and when the moving party has suffered no prejudice); Hagel v. United 
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[1]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 

under the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), and 

(a)(5)?

[2]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental physical and emotional needs of the 

child as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.[C.S. §] 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4.

Father first argues that the record reveals his continued attempts to 

obtain custody of Child. Id. at 7. Father notes that he “tried vigorously to 

contact and communicate with [Child], but his efforts were continually 

thwarted by [Mother]. Father filed custody petitions and contempt petitions

because [Mother] would withhold [Child] from [Father].” Id. at 6. 

Father further asserts that he remedied his drug problem and has

remained sober for ten years.11 Id. at 7. Father states:

In the instant matter, evidence demonstrates [F]ather’s attempt 

at trying to gain custody of [Child], although [Child] was not in 

his care. The trial court noted that Father continued to fight for 

custody of [Child]. Father even remedied his drug problem which 

was an issue when [Child] was younger. He had been clean for

ten years and still attends [Narcotics Anonymous] meetings.

____________________________________________

Lawn Mower Sales & Service Inc., 653 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2151(b), a party who is in forma pauperis, 

as Father is, is not required to file a reproduced record.

11 Although Father asserts that he has been sober for ten years, the trial court 

noted that Father was arrested for possession of marijuana in 2013 or 2014. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/19, at 7; see also note 4, supra. Additionally, as 

noted above, Father tested positive for opiates and marijuana on July 3, 2014. 

See note 4, supra.
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Id. (record citations omitted). In sum, Father contends that he “has 

demonstrated his commitment to [remain] close to [Child] because he had a 

good relationship with her” and “[M]other has not proved that he could not 

remedy” the conditions causing any incapacity to parent. Id. (record citations 

omitted). 

At the outset, we reiterate that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Father

challenged the trial court’s rulings on “the best interests of the child” and 

Section 2511(b). See Father’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/10/18. Father 

did not specifically take issue with the trial court’s analysis of Section 

2511(a).12 Therefore, we could find Father’s argument waived. See In re 

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Nevertheless, Father’s argument would merit no relief. In matters 

involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our standard of review is 

as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

____________________________________________

12 The trial court, however, did address its rulings under Section 2511(a) in 

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
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multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 

855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 

387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights requires a bifurcated analysis of the 

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 
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C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We have long held that, in order to 

affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court 

as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, we 

first consider whether termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(2). See 

id. 

Sections 2511(a)(2) provides as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2), we have indicated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 
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causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

This Court has stated that Section 2511(a)(2)

does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s present and 

future need for essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being. Therefore, the 

language in subsection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts 

to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong, continuous 

parental ties, which the policy of restraint in state intervention is 

intended to protect. This is particularly so where disruption of the 

family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect 

for reuniting it.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted).
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Here, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated the following:

Applying [M.E.P.] and the elements set forth under 2511(a)(2) to 

the instant case, it is clear that [Mother and Stepfather] met their 

burden of demonstrating that termination was proper. The 

evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under 

2511(a)(2) existed given that Father repeatedly failed to inquire 

about [Child] or reach out to [Child]. Father failed to contact 

[Child’s] therapist to ask how she was doing. Father did not make 

any attempts to send Christmas cards to [Child]. Moreover, the 

evidence established that once Father found out that he was not 

listed as the father of [Child] by the school, no efforts were made 

by Father to remedy that situation. Once his supervised visits 

were suspended in 2015, he did not reach out to [Child]. 

Doctor Tanenb[a]um (“Doctor”), a child psychology and an adult 

child assessment expert, who was appointed in prior proceedings, 

testified that the relationship between Father and Child “had never 

been solid” and that no matter what Father tried . . . Child would 

react negatively for the most part “and it would just be impossible 

for them to form a relationship.” The Doctor further testified that 

based on his observations, he diagnosed Father with antisocial 

personality. The Doctor noted that people diagnosed with an 

antisocial personality are usually insensitive to the needs and 

feelings of others, they can be very “self[-]centered and may 

neglect or otherwise misuse what would be helpful in forming 

relationships with children and adults.”

* * *

Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt found that competent 

evidence existed to justify the termination of Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (record citations omitted).

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Although Father vigorously litigated 

his custody and visitation rights, the record shows that Father did not 
J-S32016-19

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demonstrate a significant interest in the day-to-day affairs of Child’s life, a 

capacity to parent Child appropriately, or the awareness or skills to reconcile 

with Child. Father has taken steps to address his addictions and remain in 

contact with Child. However, the trial court was entitled to credit Dr. 

Tanenbaum’s opinion that there was a “tremendously uphill battle in terms of 

imagining any kind of relationship, healthy relationship between [Child] and 

[Father].” See N.T., 2/20/18, at 46-47. Similarly, the trial court was entitled 

to consider how Father’s antisocial personality disorder affected his capacity 

to parent and his ability to develop a healthy parent-child relationship with 

Child.13 See id. at 40-43. Therefore, we conclude that the record supports 

the determination that Father was incapable of parenting Child and could not 

remedy the situation. See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Accordingly, we will 

not disturb the trial court’s findings that termination was justified under 

Section 2511(a)(2). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. 

Father next argues that the trial court failed to consider the bond 

between himself and Child, noting that he and Child had a “great relationship” 

and “fun times when they were together.” Father’s Brief at 8. Moreover, 

Father asserts “Mother continually blocked [Father] from strengthening his 

____________________________________________

13 As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while 

a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s 

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope 

for the future.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Z.P., 

994 A.2d at 1117.
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bond with his child. Mother impugned her ill feelings toward [Father] onto 

their child. Ultimately, she had the child adopt a negative attitude toward 

[Father].” Id. at 12 (citation to record omitted).

Section 2511(b) states, in part:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 

485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently 

severing the parental bond. However, as discussed below, 

evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Moreover, 

[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. . . . 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (citation omitted).

In finding that Child’s emotional needs and welfare favor termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court reasoned as follows:

In the instant matter, this [c]ourt determined . . . Child would not 

suffer irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental rights were 

terminated. There was compelling testimony offered at the 

[termination of parental rights] hearings that . . . Child is not 

bonded with Father. Father failed to offer any evidence 

establishing the existence of a parent-child bond. The testimony 

demonstrated that . . . Child’s primary bond is with [Stepfather]. 

[] Child calls [Stepfather] dad and Father[ by his first name].

Furthermore, this [c]ourt found Father’s significant gap in 

visitation and lack of contact with . . . Child insufficient to foster a

meaningful and healthy parental connection. Additionally, in 

determining that termination would best serve the needs and 

welfare of . . . Child, this [c]ourt considered that Father has not 

been able to meet . . . Child’s emotional, physical, and 

developmental needs.[14]In fact, [Stepfather] is the one that has 

been performing fatherly duties. For the foregoing reasons, this 

____________________________________________

14 Notably, Dr. Berk testified that Child is “flourishing” absent visitation with 

Father. N.T., 6/5/16, at 29-30, 41. When asked to describe Child’s progress 

approximately three years since Father’s visitation ended, Dr. Berk stated, 

“She is flourishing, she is thriving, she is a different child. She is involved in 

school activities, she has friends at school, she has cheerleading and other 

activities. She has her animals that she loves. She is a child that is coming 

from a well-adjusted, loving family.” Id. at 41.
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[c]ourt properly granted [Mother and Stepfather’s] petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father pursuant to 

Section 2511(b).

Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (record citations omitted).

Our review reveals that the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor 

termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. While Father loves Child, his own feelings of love and 

affection for Child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. See

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.

Here, at the time of the conclusion of the hearings, Father’s visitation 

with Child had been suspended for three and a half years, and Child is entitled 

to permanency and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s 

basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s 

parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/19