Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Keaton, 2019 IL App (2d) 180285

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF AMY E. KEATON, Petitioner, and MICHAEL 

J. KEATON, Respondent-Appellant (K&R Family Legal Services, 

LLP, and L. Steven Rakowski, Appellees).

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-18-0285

Filed March 11, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 15-D-1410; the 

Hon. Raymond Collins, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Keaton, of Waukegan, appellant pro se.

L. Steven Rakowski, of K&R Family Legal Services, LLP, of 

Northbrook, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Jorgensen and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent, Michael J. Keaton, appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate an order of 

the circuit court of Lake County awarding attorney fees to K&R Family Legal Services, LLP 

(K&R), and L. Steven Rakowski for work performed in Keaton’s divorce proceeding. Keaton 

contends that the hearing on K&R’s fee petition should not have been held because the petition 

did not comply with the controlling statute’s filing requirements. He also challenges the circuit 

court’s findings and fee award. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Keaton, an attorney, represented himself in the divorce proceeding, which was initiated by 

petitioner, Amy E. Keaton. Keaton engaged attorney Rakowski of K&R to assist him. Keaton 

and Rakowski executed a written engagement agreement providing for a $2500 retainer, which 

could be exceeded only by executing a further writing. 

¶ 4 Following the judgment of dissolution of marriage, K&R filed a petition to set final 

attorney fees and costs against Keaton, pursuant to sections 508(a) and 508(c)(2) of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a), (c)(2) (West 2016)). The 

petition sought an award of $33,422.86. Keaton filed a response to the petition, objecting on 

the ground that, because the petition did not include a copy of the engagement agreement and 

therefore did not comply with the requirements of section 508(c)(2), the circuit court should 

not hold a hearing on the petition. Keaton relied on the following provisions of section 

508(c)(2): 

“(2) No final hearing under this subsection (c) is permitted unless: (i) the counsel 

and the client had entered into a written engagement agreement at the time the client 

retained the counsel (or reasonably soon thereafter) and the agreement meets the 

requirements of subsection (f); (ii) the written engagement agreement is attached to an 

affidavit of counsel that is filed with the petition or with the counsel’s response to a 

client’s petition ***.” Id. § 508(c)(2). 

Keaton also argued that awarding K&R $33,422.86 of the $291,586.90 total costs incurred for 

legal services would be excessive because Keaton performed “over 88% of the work” and 

K&R had already received interim fee awards. 

¶ 5 K&R filed a reply acknowledging that the engagement agreement, although discussed in 

the petition and referenced as “Exhibit A,” was not attached to the petition, due to 

“administrative oversight.” A copy of the agreement and a “Statement of Client’s Rights and 

Responsibilities,” as required under section 508(f) of the Act (id. § 508(f)), were attached as 

“Exhibit A” to the reply. K&R also noted that it had attached to the petition an “Affidavit of 

Counsel Supporting Petition for Final Attorney’s Fees and Costs.”

¶ 6 A hearing on the fee petition was set for December 13, 2017, at 9 a.m. Keaton did not 

attend. The court found that K&R had satisfied the requirements of section 508 of the Act and 

had established by “credible evidence the reasonableness of [Rakowski’s] rate and the 

necessity of all services performed.” The court entered a judgment against Keaton in the 

amount of $33,422.86. The record on appeal contains no report of the hearing. 

¶ 7 Keaton filed a motion “to vacate or for rehearing on the judgment order,” in which he 

stated that he was absent from the hearing because he had incorrectly docketed the time. 
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Keaton again argued that the hearing should not have been held, due to K&R’s failure to file a 

copy of the engagement agreement with the petition for fees. Therefore, Keaton asserted, the 

judgment should be vacated “in its entirety.” At the hearing on the motion, Keaton 

acknowledged that the engagement agreement was on file when the hearing was held, but he 

argued that, under the statute, it had to have been filed with the fee petition. The court 

disagreed, stating, “I think it has to be attached before the judgment is entered,” and denied the 

motion. The court’s written order included a finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) 

(eff. Feb. 26, 2010). 

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 “[A] trial court’s decision to award or deny fees will be reversed only if the trial court 

abused its discretion.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005). “A trial court 

abuses its discretion only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial 

court.” Id. at 173. Moreover,“[a]ll reasonable presumptions are in favor of the action of the 

trial court, and, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, the reviewing court will assume 

that the trial court understood and applied the law correctly.” In re Marriage of Kane, 2016 IL 

App (2d) 150774, ¶ 24. To the extent that a resolution of the issues involves statutory 

interpretation, our review is de novo. In re Davontay A., 2013 IL App (2d) 120347, ¶ 24.

¶ 10 The gist of Keaton’s first argument is that the trial court improperly allowed K&R to file its 

Exhibit A, containing a copy of the engagement agreement and “Statement of Client’s Rights 

and Responsibilities,” with its reply to Keaton’s response to its fee petition, rather than with the 

petition itself. A decision to allow an amendment to a pleading, however, rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing of an 

abuse of that discretion. Century-National Insurance Co. v. Tracy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 639, 646 

(2000). In determining whether to permit an amendment to a pleading, a trial court considers 

“(1) whether the amendment cured a defective pleading; (2) whether the amendment 

prejudiced or surprised the other parties; (3) whether the amendment was timely; and 

(4) whether previous opportunities to amend were identifiable.” Id.

¶ 11 Here, the record supports K&R’s explanation that omitting Exhibit A from its initial filing 

was an “administrative oversight.” The engagement agreement is referenced in the petition as 

“Exhibit A,” and several of its provisions are discussed in the petition. Amending the petition 

to add the missing exhibit cured the petition of an obvious defect. The amendment could not 

have prejudiced or surprised Keaton, as Keaton was a party to the agreement and had executed 

it two years before it was added to the petition. The amendment was timely in that it was filed 

and served a week before the scheduled hearing. It was also filed at the first identifiable 

opportunity, five days after Keaton pointed out its omission in his response to the petition. We 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting K&R to amend its petition by 

including the missing Exhibit A. 

¶ 12 In its brief, K&R posited that Keaton’s statutory argument was actually a challenge to the 

circuit court’s jurisdiction to hear the fee petition. At oral argument, Keaton, who did not file a 

reply brief, agreed with K&R that the circuit court properly exercised subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the petition. Because we have “an independent obligation to consider matters 

that go to the jurisdiction of the circuit court” (Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 

140267, ¶ 13), we confirm the parties’ position. 
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¶ 13 “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and determine cases of the 

general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12. With the exception of the circuit court’s power to 

review an administrative action, “the jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the 

constitution, not the legislature.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

199 Ill. 2d 325, 336 (2002) (rejecting case law suggesting that the legislature may impose 

nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction). Moreover, the filing of 

a fee petition “is a procedural requirement of section 508 of the Act, not a jurisdictional 

requirement.” In re Marriage of Baniak, 2011 IL App (1st) 092017, ¶ 16. “[P]rocedural 

matters may be corrected in the trial court whereas questions of jurisdiction cannot.” In re 

Marriage of Pagano, 181 Ill. App. 3d 547, 554 (1989). Accordingly, in this case, we cannot 

say that omitting the engagement agreement when the fee petition was filed divested the circuit 

court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. 

¶ 14 Keaton also challenges the circuit court’s findings at the hearing and its award of fees to 

K&R. Keaton, however, has failed to provide this court with a transcript (or substitute) of the 

hearing. As the appellant, Keaton had the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of 

the proceedings to support his claim of error. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 

(1984). In the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by 

the trial court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Id. at 392. Any 

doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. 

Id. Accordingly, “under Foutch, we must presume that the trial court’s order here is in 

conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.” In re Marriage of Baniak, 2011 IL 

App (1st) 092017, ¶ 30. 

¶ 15 Finally, Keaton argues that the circuit court’s award to K&R in excess of the $2500 

retainer amount stated in the engagement agreement was an abuse of discretion because the 

engagement agreement contemplated a further writing in order to exceed the retainer amount 

and the record contains no such writing. We disagree. 

¶ 16 During the 14 months that preceded the final fee award, K&R received interim fee awards 

totaling $30,000. Keaton did not object to these fee awards; in fact, he, as well as Amy’s 

attorney, received interim fee awards in the same amounts as K&R. At oral argument, Keaton 

volunteered that the orders entering the interim fee awards were “agreed orders.” We further 

note that, with the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage, the interim fee awards 

became final. Smolinski v. Vojta, 363 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755 (2006). In our opinion, Keaton’s 

voluntary accession to interim fees that exceeded the amount stated in the engagement 

agreement, as memorialized in the agreed orders granting the interim fee awards, together with 

the finality of the dissolution order, suffice to satisfy the engagement agreement’s writing 

provision. Finally, we note that the judge who signed the interim fee orders and final 

dissolution order also presided at the hearing on K&R’s final fee petition and entered the final 

award. Without a record of the hearing, we presume that he was aware of Keaton’s and K&R’s 

intent to exceed the retainer amount and of any additional efforts of K&R on behalf of Keaton. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s $33,422.86 fee award to 

K&R. 
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¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County. 

¶ 19 Affirmed.