SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1429-16T1

JENNIFER SOWA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL SOWA,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted October 31, 2017 - Decided 

Before Judges Reisner and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-1237-13.

Michael Sowa, appellant pro se.

Daly & Associates, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Carolyn N. Daly and Amy Kriegsman, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Michael Sowa appeals from a November 3, 2016 

Chancery Division order denying his motion for reconsideration. 

Defendant requested reconsideration of the Chancery Division's 

order dated May 27, 2016, denying his request to modify alimony 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 5, 2017
2 A-1429-16T1

and rescinding a previously scheduled plenary hearing. We affirm

in part and reverse and remand in part. 

Defendant and plaintiff signed a Marital Settlement Agreement 

(MSA) finalizing their divorce on November 19, 2013. The MSA 

required defendant to pay alimony and child support. The MSA 

provided: 

[I]n the event the husband, who recently lost 

his job as a result of a reduction in 

workforce, does not have another job within 

six (6) months of the entry of the Judgement 

of Divorce he may make an application to the 

court to modify his alimony and child support 

obligations. 

In accordance with the MSA, modification of defendant's alimony 

or child support obligation was contingent on defendant's 

satisfaction of the criteria set forth in Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 

139 (1980). 

Defendant, who was unemployed as of the date of the divorce, 

remained unemployed for twenty months after the divorce was 

finalized. On or about December 24, 2014, defendant filed a motion 

to terminate alimony and modify child support.1 On January 9, 

2015, a family court judge denied defendant's motion. The judge 

found that defendant had not engaged in the requisite exhaustive 

 

1 Technically, defendant filed a cross-motion. However, 

plaintiff's motion precipitating the cross-motion is not the 

subject of this appeal and is irrelevant to our disposition of 

this matter.
3 A-1429-16T1

job search to substantiate changed circumstances, since he 

"narrowed his job search to positions in his chosen field offering 

minimum salaries of $100,000" near Albany, New York. Under the 

then newly amended alimony statute, the judge concluded that 

defendant failed "to explore employment opportunities at any level 

in any field" to justify a modification of his alimony obligation. 

Similarly, the judge determined that defendant's limited job 

search efforts failed to demonstrate substantial changes 

warranting a downward adjustment of child support. Nor did the 

judge deem a reduction in child support to be in the best interests 

of the children. Defendant then moved for reconsideration of the 

January 9, 2015 order, which was denied on March 26, 2015. 

In August 2015, defendant filed another motion to terminate 

alimony and modify child support. In that application, defendant 

also sought to suspend life insurance and college tuition 

obligations based on his unemployed status. However, a few weeks 

after filing that motion, on August 26, 2015, defendant began a 

new job. 

Two months after he began working, and while his August motion 

was pending, defendant wrote to the court to advise that he 

obtained full-time employment. Defendant requested an adjustment 

in alimony and child support based on his earning approximately 
4 A-1429-16T1

$50,000 less than he earned prior to the divorce. Defendant failed 

to amend his pending motion based on his new employment and salary. 

On February 26, 2016, another family court judge ruled on 

defendant's August 2015 motion. The judge's statement of reasons 

accompanying that order noted that the MSA addressed defendant's 

continued unemployment. Although the judge found that defendant

had filed a partially complete Case Information Statement (CIS) 

in support of his motion, based on the parties' conflicting 

certifications raising factual disputes, he ordered the matter to

proceed to a post-judgment early settlement panel for review and 

disposition. The judge denied all other requested relief. 

After the post-judgment early settlement panel, the parties 

reported to the motion judge. By order dated May 16, 2016, the 

judge scheduled the matter for a plenary hearing in June. The 

next day, plaintiff's attorney wrote to the judge explaining the 

"matter can't be set for a plenary hearing as all of the relief 

sought in the motion and cross-motion were denied." Plaintiff's 

attorney argued that since both motions were denied without 

prejudice, there was nothing pending before the court, and both 

sides were required to re-file their motions. In response, 

defendant stated that his motion was not denied and a plenary 

hearing should be held. Plaintiff's attorney countered that 

defendant had not met his burden of proving changed circumstances. 
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On May 27, 2016, the judge rescinded his order scheduling a 

plenary hearing. The judge noted that because defendant failed 

to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, he was 

not entitled to a plenary hearing until he met that burden. In 

rescinding the order scheduling a plenary hearing, the judge 

incorporated his written statement of reasons attached to the 

February 26, 2016 order. 

In June 2016, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration 

of the May 27, 2016 order. Plaintiff cross-moved to enforce 

litigant's rights and compel payment of arrears.

On November 3, 2016, the judge denied defendant's 

reconsideration motion and granted plaintiff's cross-motion for 

relief in aid of litigant's rights. The judge found that 

defendant's June 2016 motion only argued that defendant's 

unemployment status entitled him to a modification of his financial 

obligations. Because defendant's first motion, decided on January 

9, 2015, requested the same relief as did defendant's June 2016

motion, the June motion was really a reconsideration of the March 

26, 2015 reconsideration order. The judge denied defendant's June 

2016 motion finding that "a reconsideration of a reconsideration" 

is not permitted. The judge also awarded counsel fees to plaintiff 

based on defendant's bad faith. 
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On appeal, defendant raises three issues. First, he argues 

that the judge mistakenly denied defendant's motion for 

reconsideration. Second, he claims the judge erred in deciding 

defendant's motion without a plenary hearing. Third, he contends 

the judge improperly awarded counsel fees to plaintiff.

We defer to a Family Part judge's decision unless the court 

has abused its discretion. See Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super.

17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). "An abuse of discretion arises when a 

decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible 

basis." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 

2012) (citations omitted). 

Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2. The 

Rule requires that a reconsideration motion "state with 

specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement 

of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the 

court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." R. 4:49-2. In 

addition, a court may, in its discretion, reconsider a matter "in 

the interest of justice." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super.

392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). Reconsideration is reserved for those 

limited circumstances in which the court's decision was based upon 

a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or the court failed to 

consider the significance of probative, competent evidence. Id. 
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Reconsideration is not appropriate "merely because a litigant is 

dissatisfied with a decision of the court." Palombi v. Palombi, 

414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (2010). Nor is reconsideration a 

mechanism for "unhappy litigants [to] attempt once more to air 

their positions and relitigate issues already decided." Michel 

v. Michel, 210 N.J. Super. 218, 224 (Ch. Div. 1985). 

Defendant's original motion to modify alimony and child 

support was denied by order dated January 9, 2015. Reconsideration 

of that order was denied on March 26, 2015. In August 2015,

defendant filed a motion for modification of alimony and child 

support substantially similar to his original modification motion. 

The August motion set forth the same facts in support of downward 

modification of defendant's support obligations as proffered in 

defendant's original motion. Significantly, defendant procured 

employment after filing his August modification motion but did not 

seek to amend his pending motion. Further, defendant's August 

motion failed to provide a complete CIS in accordance with Rule

5:5-4.

2 Thus, defendant's June 2016 motion sought reconsideration 

of his August 2015 motion, which sought the same relief on the 

same grounds as both the December 2014 motion and the first 

reconsideration motion.

 

2 Defendant's CIS attached to his August motion did not include a 

tax return with W-2, 1099s, or paystubs.
8 A-1429-16T1

We agree with the motion judge that defendant's motion was 

an improper reconsideration of an earlier reconsideration order. 

Defendant failed to set forth evidence that the judge's reasoning 

was plainly incorrect or that the judge failed to consider relevant 

evidence. Moreover, as a result of defendant's failure to file a 

complete CIS with his August 2015 modification motion and provide 

information substantiating his new salary, we find the judge 

properly denied defendant's August 2015 motion. 

Next, defendant argues that he was entitled to a plenary 

hearing in connection with his August 2015 motion. Plenary 

hearings are only required when "a prima facie showing has been 

made that a genuine issue of fact exits bearing upon a critical 

question." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 445 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (2016) 

(citations omitted), aff’d in part, 230 N.J. 309 (2017). Plenary 

hearings may not be necessary if the family court is "familiar 

with the parties through extensive motion practice." Id. at 213. 

We agree with the judge that defendant failed to make a prima 

facie showing of substantial changed circumstances warranting a 

plenary hearing on defendant's motion to reduce his support 

obligations. Defendant merely reargued his original motion for 

modification of alimony and child support without raising new 

facts. A significant new fact was defendant's employment as of 

August 2015, yet defendant did not provide this information as 
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part of his August motion. Under the circumstances, the judge, 

who reviewed the file, including the documents related to the 

January 9, 2015 and March 26, 2015 orders, and met with the parties 

in May 2015 after the post-judgment early settlement panel, 

correctly observed that defendant failed to demonstrate changed 

circumstances.

Lastly, defendant argues that the award of counsel fees to 

plaintiff was improper as the judge failed to articulate findings 

in support of the awarded fees. A court must clearly state "its 

factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal 

conclusions." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980); see

R. 1:7-4. Without such findings, it is impossible for us to decide

whether the determination below is supported by substantial 

credible proof on the record. See Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 

9 (App. Div. 1977). A recitation of the factors for awarding 

counsel fees is insufficient. Grayer v. Grayer, 147 N.J. Super.

513, 516 (App. Div 1977). 

The judge awarded counsel fees to plaintiff based upon his

finding that defendant acted in "bad faith." While the judge 

listed the factors that he considered in awarding counsel fees, 

he did not set forth any specific findings as to why or how 

defendant acted in bad faith. Nor did the judge explain how the 

factors he considered in awarding counsel fees applied in this 
10 A-1429-16T1

case. As such, we are required to remand this issue to the judge 

to set forth his factual findings and correlate them with the 

relevant law to support the award of counsel fees to plaintiff.

Affirmed as to denial of defendant's motion to modify alimony 

and child support without a plenary hearing. Reversed and remanded 

as to the award of counsel fees to plaintiff. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.