### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove mb er 29, 200 7

ESTA TE OF HEN RY AT LAS QU ALL S A M OS E. QU A LL S v. H. J. Q. KL U TT S, EX EC U TR IX
Appeal from t he Probate C ourt forPer ry County No. PB-325 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2006- 02776-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Dece mber 27, 2007

This is the second appe al by the appe llant who again ha s asked this court to re view the Probate Court of Perry County’s denial of his petition. I n that petition, the appellant conte sted the manne r in which the Ex e c utrix o f h is la te fathe r’ s e state a dmi nis te re d th e e state . W e ha ve de te rm ine d th e iss ue is res judicata a ndthe re by a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt . W e ha ve a lso de te rm ine d th e app e a l is de vo id o f m e ri t and, ther efor e, the Exe cutrix is entitled to rec over he r re asonable expense s incurre d on appea l.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Pr obate Court A ffirm ed

F R ANK G. C LE MENT , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , P.J., M.S., and A NDY D. B ENNETT , J., joined.
Amos E. Qualls, Fayetteville, Tenne ssee, Pro Se.
Kimberly M. Hinson, Linden, Te nness ee , and La rry Joe Hinson, Hohenwa ld, Tennesse e, for the appellee , H. J. Q. Klutts, Executrix.

OP IN ION
This is the second appe al by Amos E. Qualls fr om an adve rse r uli n g b y the proba te court
conce rning the administration of his late father’s e state. The petition in the Probate Court of Per ry Cou nty fi le d b y M r. Qu a lls (“ the pe tit ion e r” ) c on te ste d th e ma nn e r i n w hic h h is sist e r, the Ex e c utrix of his late father’s e state, administere d the estate . The pet i t i o n er ch allenged his sister’ s ad mi n is tr a ti o n o f th e e s tate a n d s o u g h t to r e c o v e r p r o p e r ty h e c o n te n d e d th e E x ecutr ix was unlawfully withholding.
The probate court denied the petition and approved the Exec utrix’s final ac counting, which decisions the petitioner a

ppeale d to this court. We affirmed t he decision of the probate court in 2005 and rema nded the matter . Being dissatisfied with the decision of this court, the pe titioner filed an Application for Permission to Appea l to the Supre me Court of Tenne ssee, whic h was c onsidered a nd denied by the Court on De cembe r 27, 2005. Being dissatisfied with that result, the petitioner the n filed a “ Motion to R econside r” w hich was de nied on J an u ar y 26, 2006. There afte r he f iled an-2-

“Applic at i on for Permission t o Appea l,” which wa s denied by the Supre me Court on January 30, 20 06 . T he pe tit ion e r f

ile d y e t a no the r “Pe tit ion to Re c on sid e r, ” wh ic h w a s d e nie d b y th e Sup re me Court on Ma rc h 2 9 , 2006. Following t he Supreme Court’s fourth denia l of the petitioner’ s applications for

relief , the ca se wa s remande d to the Probate Court of Per ry County. On rema nd, the pe tit ion e r fi le d a “ Mo tio n fo r Im me diate Be nc h Tria l” se e kin g to re -t ry the iss ues prev iou sly de te rm ine d b y th e pr ob a te c ou rt a nd thi s cou rt

. Th a t motio n wa s den ie d by the pr ob a te c ou rt . T his appea l followed.
In this appea l the petitioner ra ises the issue of whe t h er t he trial c ourt err ed in denying the petitioner’s Motion for I mmediate Bench Trial. The answe r to the question pre sented is “no,” the trial court did not er

r i n denying t he mot ion beca use t he is sues t he petitioner sought to litigate wer e
re s ju dic ata

.
A N A L Y SIS

In the fir st appea l b y the petitioner, he filed with this court a Statement of the Evidence pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c ) in lieu of a ve rbatim transcri p t o f t h e testi mony. After the Appellee , the Exe cu t ri x , objected to the pe titioner’s Statement of the Evide nce, the probate court ruled that the pe titi o n er ’s s tatement of the evidenc e wa s inacc urate and incomplete. W e subsequently determined that without a sufficie nt rec ord, we could not adequat ely re view the decision of the probate court t o dismiss the petit ion, and, for that rea son, we a ffirme d the dec ision of the probate court.

Ou r d e c isi on wa s a

pp e a le d to the Sup re me Cou rt of Te nn e sse e

. Th a t c ou rt de nie d th e app e a l, there by aff

irming our decision, wherein we had af firmed the de cision of the Probate Court of Perry Cou nty . T hu s, the ma tte r w a s re ma nd e d to the pr ob a te c ou rt fo r fu rthe r pr oc e e din gs c on sis te nt w ith

our opinion. Unfortunately, the petitioner has misconstrue d our dec ision and the significanc e of the d e c i s i o n o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t i n t h i s m a t t e r

. F o r a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ma tte r, we wi ll conduct a summary re view of w hat has pre viously occurr ed in this matter.
The pe titioner’s fathe r, He n ry At l as Qua lls (“Dec edent” ) died a resident of

Perry County, Te nn e sse e , o n M a y 18, 20 00

. Th e De c e de nt wa s pre de c e a se d by his wif e a nd wa s su rv ive d b y th e ir three children: He nrietta Qua lls Klutt s (“Exe cutrix”) , Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Amos Eugene Qualls (“the petitioner”) . The Dec edent exec uted his La st W ill and T estament on August 5, 1998, wh e re in h e app oin te d h is d a ug hte r a s th e Ex e c utrix o f h is e state . Si gn if icant ly
, th e wi ll a lso contained an in terrorem c laus e , w hic h s ta te s: Every he ir, legate e, devise e, or be nefic iary unde r t his Will who s hall contest in any

c ou rt a ny pr ov isi on of thi s instru me nt sha ll not be e nti tle d to a ny de vis e s, le ga c ie s, or bene fits under this Will or any codicil her eto or a ny trust cre ated he reby, a nd any and all devise s, legac ies, and porti o n s o f t he income or corpus of

my estate, ot h er wi se provided to be paid to such per son, shall lapse and sha ll be paid, distributed and passed a s though such person ha d died prior to my death lea ving no liv ing la wf

ul d e sc e nd a nts . M y E xe c utrix h e re in n a me d a re sp e c if ic a lly a uth oriz e d toO n M ar ch 18, 2000, t he D ec ede nt exe cut ed a qui t cl ai m dee d conve yi ng hi s r ea l pr oper t y t o Ex ecu t ri x a nd 1

r es er vi ng i n hi m s el f

a l i f e e s t at e.
-3- de fe nda t th e e xp e ns e of

my e state a ny c on se nt or

a tta c k o f any natur e up on thi s W ill or any c odicil here to, or upon any pa ragr aph or pr ovision hereto.

The will of the De cede nt also provided that his r eal pr operty would go to the Exe cutrix, and 1 any mo n e y o r s e c u r it ie s h e ld b y th e D e c e d e n t w o u ld b e d iv id e d in e q u a l s h ar e s a mong his three

c hil dr e n. As fo r h is p e rs on a l pr op e rt y, the De c e de nt’ s w ill dir e c te d a s f oll ow s:

I h e re by dir e c t th a t a ll m y p e rs on a l pr op e rt y s ha ll b e dis po se d o f a s f oll ow s:
(A ) I fi rs t dir e c t th a t so muc h o f m y p e rs on a l pr op e rt y th a t c on sis ts o f I nd ia n r e lic s,
carvings, and art wor

ks that I have cre ated shall be divi ded in the foll owing manner :

Eac h of my children sha ll, in turn, (starting first with Amos Eugene Qu a lls , th e n s e c on d w ith Je rry Fr a nk lin Qualls , a ndthi rdwi th Henrietta Joy Klutts) pick an it em, and c ontinue in turns picking one item at a time until each of them shall have c hosen as many items a s the y d e sir e : pr ov ide d h ow e ve r th at if the re are a ny ite ms i n th is cate gory re maining after

eac h shall have ha d as many opportunities

a s p os sib le , o r the y de sir e , th e n th e de vis e of su c h r e ma ini ng ite ms sh a l l l ap s e a n d b e c o m e a p ar to f t h e r e s i d u e o f

m y e s t a t e

. ( I ti s my wish, although not a n absolute direc tion, that the Indian relics, so far as possible be kept together as a whole c ollection and not sold at any

a uc ti on or

sa le that my [s ic ] b e pa rt of the a dmi nis tr a tio n o f m y estate.)
(B) I dire ct sec ondly, that so much of m y persona l property that consists of items that

wer e given to myself a nd m y l ate wife as gifts fr om my children, Amos Eugene Qua ll s , J e rr y Fr a n k li n Q u a ll s , a n d H e n r ie tt a J o y K lu tt s , s h a ll b e d is trib u te d to the child which gave such item as a gif t in the first instance.
(C) Thirdly I dire ct that such items of pe rsona l t y as re main afte r the de vise and d i s t ri b ution shall become pa rt of the r esidue of my e state and disposed of as here inafter

described.

Fin a lly , th e wi ll d ir e c te d th a t a ll persona l pr op e rt y f a lli ng wi thi n th e re sid ue of his e state would be sold at auc tion and the net proc eeds w ould be d i v i d ed i n equal shares a mong his three children.

Th e Ex e c utrix t ime ly f

ile d a pe tit ion in the Pr ob a te Cou rt of Pe rry Co un ty s e e kin g to a dmi t the will to probate. The petition was grante d and the Exe cutrix proc eede d to administer the estate

. The De cede nt’s children a ppare ntly participated in the se lection of pe rsonal prope rty in acc ordanc e-4-

with the will. Therea fter, in August of 2002, the Executrix conducte d a publi c sale auctioning the

rema ining personal prope rty. The sa le produc ed $3,912.41 for the estate

. Subsequently, the Exec utrix filed a pr oposed final a ccounting, which w as met by the petitioner’s motion to reje ct the Exec utrix’s final ac counting. The pe titioner then submitted a

su pp le me nta l f

ili ng to the c ha nc e ry c ou rt se tti ng fo rth a his tory of a nim os ity wi th the Ex e c utrix, his sister, and a ccusations that the Executrix ha d failed to prope rly distribute the persona l property.

After conducting a he aring on the pe tition, t he Chanc el l o r dismiss ed the pe tition by order enter ed May 12, 2003, and approve d the final acc ounting that had been submitt ed by the Exec utrix. On Ju ne 11 , 2 00 3, the pe tit ion e r f ile d a pe tit ion fo r re c on sid e ratio n, wh ic h the Cha nc e llo r s umm ari ly de nie d. Th ereaft er, the p e tit ion e r f ile d th e fi rs t of

his app e a ls t o th is c ou rt , a sk ing thi s c ou rt to revie w the Chanc ellor’s May 12, 2003 or der.

The fir st appea l filed by the petitioner set f orth in exce ss of thirty issues. As this court noted in our first opinion,
Mr. Qualls conc edes the futility of t his approa ch by making the following statement in his brief:

As a practica l matter, the court is not expec ted to take the ne cessa ry tim e to r ule on a ll tho se i ss ues l ist e d h e re on a n in div idu a l ba sis

. [Appe lla n t ] woul d be happy to r ece ive the re medies re quested-and prays that the court rule in his favor

. Maybe some of the issues can be

c omb ine d a ndde a lt w ith in a mor e ge ne ra l ma nn e r, rathe r tha n w ith specific ity a s set forth here
, or maybe the court could choose w hich issues are most signi fica nt to rule on.
Qu all s v . Kl utt

s , No. M2003-01850-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1887121, at *3 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2005).

Af te r re vie wi ng the ple tho ra of iss ue s raise d, the c ou rt de te rm ine d “ the sin gle iss ue fo r this Court’s resolution can be stated as f ollows: wh et h er the trial court e rre d in dismi ssing the Appellant's petition contesting the Appellee ’s final acc o u n t ing and manner of administering the estate. For the following reasons, we must affirm the tria l court’s de cision.” Id. a t *4

. In ou r ana lys is set forth in the opinion following the first appe al we note d:

After evaluating the Appellant’s statement of the e vidence , the trial court entere d an order noting that, while it did contain some of t he evidence produce d at t he hea ring, it a ls o in c lu d e d th e A p p e ll a n t’ s u n s w o r n c o mm e n ts a n d p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a ti o n s and omitted the testimony of the Appellee o ff er ed under

direc t examination. The tria l court noted in its order

of Februa

ry 24, 2004, that the Appellee testified that some of the items of persona l pr operty reque sted by the Appellant we re e ither stolen or ha d been give n to her by the D ece dent or her m other prior to their deaths. Otherwise, she denied withholding the other items requested by the A ppellant. The tria l court found-5-

the Ap pe lle e ’s te sti mon y to be truth fu l, andwe fi nd no thi ng in the lim ite d r e c or d to subvert th i s fi nding. Se e We lls v . Te nn . B d. of R e ge nts , 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 19 99 ) ( “ [A ]p pe llate c ou rt s w ill no t r e -e va luate a tr ia l ju dg e ’s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss
cre dibilit y absent c lear

and convinc ing evidence to the contra ry.”)

. Qu all s , 2005 WL 1887121, a t *4

. In the a nalysis the court we nt on to note:
The Appe lla n t utilizes a significant portion of his brie f to argue that the trial court
err ed in applying the in terrorem clause in the Dec edent’ s will to hi s petitio n. Our Sup re me Cou rt

ha s p re vio us ly r

ule d a s f oll ow s:

This Court has rec ognized that a for feiture provision in a will is not void as aga inst publi c policy. Tate v. Camp , 147 Tenn. 137, 149, 245 S.W . 8 39 , 8 42 (1 92 2) ; Thompson v. Gaut
, 82 Tenn. 310, 314 (1884)

. Howeve r, it has bee n t h e ru l e si nce Tate v. Camp , that a for feiture provision will not be enforc ed whe re a contest is pursue d “in good faith and upon pr obable cause.” Af ter c onsidering dec isions from other jurisdictions, the Court in Tate v. Camp approve d the following fr om South Norw alk Trust C o. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961, 963 (1917), “ ‘Whe re the contest has not bee n made in good faith, and upon probable cause and re asonable justification, the forf eiture should be given full operative eff ect. Where the contrary appe ars, the legatee ought not to for feit his legac y.’” Tate v. Camp , 147 Tenn. at 155-56, 245 S.W. at 844.
Winningham v. Winningham , 966 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. 1998). We cannot de termine if the Ap pe lla nt’ s pet iti on wa s file d in goodfaith a ndup on pr ob able c a us e be c a us e our ability to review the fac ts nece ssary to making such de termination is hampere d by an incomplet e an d i nacc urate statement of the e vidence . Likewise, e ven if we

wer e inclined to a ddress eac h and every issue prese nted by the Appellant in his brief, the state of

the re c or d p re ve nts a n a de qu a te re vie w o f tho se iss ue s a s w e ll.
Qu all s , 2005 WL 1887121 at *5. From there
, the court concluded that “without a statement of the evidenc e which a ccur ately re flec ts the evidenc e pre sented to the trial court, we must presume tha t the re c or d, ha d it

bee n a c c ur a te ly p re se nte d to thi s Co urt, w ou ld c on ta in s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to support the trial co u rt ’s d ec i s i o n.” Id. For the fo re go ing re a so ns , th e c ou rt , in the fi rs t app e a l, aff irmed the probate court’s decision to dismiss t he petition, and re manded with costs of the appea l taxed to the pe titioner. Id.
In this, the sec ond appea l of the same a ction, the petitioner raises the issue of “ whether the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de ny ing [the pe tit ion e r’ s] ‘M oti on fo r Im me diate Be nc h Tr ia l.’ ” Th e a ns we r t o the question prese nted is “no,” the trial court did not er r in denying the motion.
The single issue in the first a ppeal wa s whether

the trial court erre d in dismi s s ing the petitioner’s pe tition contesting t he Exe cutrix’s f i n al accounting and manner of administering theT he pet i t i on er r ai s ed t w o add i t i on al i s s ues on app eal

. T here i s , ho w ever , no f act ual bas i s t o s up po r t t he i s s ues 2
raised

. T h u s, w e d ec l i n e to co n d u ct an an aly si s o f t h e w h o l l y u n su p p o rted i ssu es.
-6- estate. I n that appe al, this court af firmed the pr obate c ourt’s dec ision to deny the petitioner’s original petition. By making the moti on following remand of the ca se to the pro b at e court, the petitioner wa s seeking a trial on the m erits of the underlying petition as though it had not yet been de c ide d. It , h ow e ve r, ha d b e e n d e c ide d by the pr ob a te c ou rt , w hic h d e c isi on wa s a ff ir me d b y th is court. More over, w hen the petitioner sought f urther revie w by the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, that court de clined the pe tition. As a consequenc e, the original decision of the pr obate c ourt was
a ff ir me d in a ll r e sp e c ts a ndthe iss ue wa s no lon ge r su bje c t to t ri a l on the me ri ts. For

the se re a so ns , we a gain af

firm the probate court; this time affirming its decision to deny the pe titioner’s motion for another bench trial of the issue that is, and ha s been, re s ju dic ata

.
Ha vin g a dd re sse d the dis po sit ive iss ue on app e a l, we no w co ns ide r wh e the r thi s app e a l is 2 frivolous, as the Exe cutrix conte nds. A frivolous appe al is one that has no r easona ble cha nce of

succe ss. Lovelace v. Owens- Illinois, Inc. , 632 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. 1982) . A fri v olous appea l is one that is “devoid of me rit,” or one in which there is “littl e prospe ct that the appeal can ever
succe ed.” Morton v. Morton , 182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ( citing Industrial Dev. Bd. of the City of T

ullahoma v. Hancoc k , 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995))

.
Ou r Sup re me Cou rt ha s state d that su c c e ssf ul lit igants sh ou ld no t ha ve to be ar the e xp e ns e of groundless a

ppeals. Davis v. G ulf Ins. Group
, 546 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tenn. 1977) . The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly has also taken a stand on the issue by proc laiming:
When it appe ars to any revie wing court that the appea l from any c ourt of re cord w as frivolous or take n solely for delay, t he court may .

. . awa rd just damages a gainst the appellant, whic h may include, but nee d not be limited to, co s ts . . . and expe nses inc ur re d b y th e app e lle e a s a

re su lt o f the app e a l.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122.

A f ri vo lou s a pp e a l is on e that is de vo id o f me ri t, a nd we ha ve de te rm ine d th a t th is a pp e a l is

certainly devoid of merit. The ref ore, the Exec utrix is entitled to recove r h er re as o n able expenses incurre d on appea l.-7- I N C ONCL US I ON

Th e jud gme nt o f the pr ob a te c ou rt is a ff ir me d in a ll re sp e c ts, a nd thi s c a us e is re ma nd e d to the trial court for a determination as t o the damages due pursuant to the provisi ons of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. Costs of t his appea l are taxed to the petit ioner, Amos Eugene Qualls, for whic h

exec ution may issue if nece ssary.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE