alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Hon. Paul T. Bolt County Attorney Travis County Austin, Texas Dear Sir: OpinionNo. O-2451 Re: Whether the tax assessor-collectormay, under the facts as stated,transfer the voting privilege. We are pleased to reply to your letter of recent date, in which you request the opinion of this department,touching the following question:

How can the tax assessor-collectortransfer the voting privilege of a person over sixtyyears of age, who did not reside in a city of 10,000 inhabitants, or more, on February lst, 1940, and was not required to securea Certificate of Exemption, upon suchperson removing to a new residencewithin a city of more than 10,000 inhabitantsafter February lst, @+O? Article 2960, Revised Civil Statutes,provides that a person over sixtyyears of age shallbe entitled to vote without being required to pay a poll tax.

Article 2968, Revised Civil Statutes, requiresevery person thus exempted from the payment of a poll tax, who resides in a city of 10,000 inhabitants,or more, to secure a Certificate of Exemption before the first day of February of the year when such voter shallhave become entitled to such exemption.

Article 2968a, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, in its requirement of a Certificate of Exemption of personswho do not reside in a city of 10,000, or more, does not by itsprovisions apply to a person who is exempt from the payment of a poll tax by reason of over age.

There is no statutoryrequirementthat a Certificate of Exemption, or any form of certificate,shallbe securedby a person over age, who does not reside in a city of 10,000 inhabitants or more, as a prerequisite to his right to vote.Hon. PaulT,.~Holtjpage 2 (O-2451)

Articles 2966 and 2967, Revised Civil Statutes, contain regulations relating to the citizenwho removes to anotherward, precinct or county,but apply only to the citizenwho has received a poll tax receipt or a Certificate of Exemption.

There is, therefore, no statutory regulationof the situation described in your letter;namely,where a citizenwho does not reside in a city of 10,000 inhabitants,or more, and who is not required to secure a Certificate of Exemption, removes, after February lst, to a city of more than 10,000 inhabitants. Absent which, there 

### isno authority for a tax assessor-collectorto make any transfer on his records touching the voting place of suchperson. Accordingly, you are respectfullyadvised that, inasmuch as there is no statutoryprovision or regulationwhereby the tax assessor-collectormay make any transfer on his records in the situation described,there is no way he may do so.

We are, of course,expressingno opinion as to the right of the described individualto vote, or as to the manner inwhich, or the place at which, he may be allowed to vote. Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

Ry /s/ Zollie C. Steakley

Zollie C. Steakley

Assistant ZCS:ob:lmAPPROVED JUN 27, 1940

IS/ Gerald C. Mann ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

APPROVED OPINION COMMITTEE BY /s/ EWE CHAIRMAN
```
       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit





No. 99-1281

                        SAMSON OMOSEFUNMI,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

          EDWIN MARTICIO; ROBERT LARCONE; UNITED STATES,

                      Defendants, Appellees.



           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

           [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]



                              Before

                    Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
                        Circuit Judges.
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
     Samson Omosefunmi on brief pro se.
     Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Rayford A.
Farquhar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.





November 16, 1999



                                
                                
  
            Per Curiam.  After a careful review of the record and
  the submissions of the parties, the court affirms the district
  court's dismissal of the complaint.  The district court lacked
  subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims under the
  Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. � 2674, as any claim
  appellant submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization
  Service did not comply with the requirement of 28 C.F.R. � 14.2
  that it include a demand for money damages in a sum certain. 
  See Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997). 
  Appellant's claim that he was deprived of his eighth amendment
  rights is more properly termed a violation of his due process
  rights.  Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1988).  And
  while one cannot argue that racial harassment of detainees
  could ever be reasonably related to a legitimate administrative
  goal, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979),
  appellant's claim still fails.  No protected liberty interest
  has been identified.  See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st
  Cir. 1991) ("Fear or emotional injury which results solely from
  verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient
  to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty interest.")
  (citations omitted).  Further, the alleged conduct, while
  deplorable, does not "shock the conscience."  See Brown v. Hot,
  Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1995)
  ("Although we have not foreclosed the possibility that words or
  verbal harassment may constitute "conscious shocking" behavior
  in violation of substantive due process rights, . . . our
  review of the caselaw indicates that the threshold for alleging
  such claims is high.") (citing Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427
  (1st Cir. 1995)).  No other basis for a constitutional violation
  appears in the complaint.
            Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
```
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. REGINALD WHITEHEAD.

May 30, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
Blue Origin Commercial Crew Development Round 1 (CCDev1) Space Act Agreement

NNJ10TA02S

Blue Origin CCDev1 Space Act Agreement

Blue Origin SAA Amendment 01
S. 2136

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the twentieth day of January, two thousand and four

An Act

To extend the final report date and termination date of the National Commission

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, to provide additional funding for

the Commission, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST

ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES.

(a) FINAL REPORT DATE.—Subsection (b) of section 610 of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law

107–306; 6 U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended by striking

‘‘18 months’’ and inserting ‘‘20 months’’.

(b) TERMINATION DATE.—Subsection (c) of that section is

amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘60 days’’ and inserting

‘‘30 days’’; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘60-day period’’ and

inserting ‘‘30-day period’’.

(c) ADDITIONAL FUNDING.—Section 611 of that Act (6 U.S.C.

101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

‘‘(b) ADDITIONAL FUNDING.—In addition to the amounts made

available to the Commission under subsection (a) and under chapter

2 of title II of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations

Act, 2003 (Public Law 108–11; 117 Stat. 591), of the amounts

appropriated for the programs and activities of the Federal Government for fiscal year 2004 that remain available for obligation,

not more than $1,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the

Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under

this title.’’; and
S. 2136—2

(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking ‘‘subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘this section’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
                                              
<ARTICLE>                                          5
<CIK>                                              0000892381
<NAME>                                     F-1000 FUTURES FUND L.P., SERIES IX
                                                    
<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                  DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                     JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                       SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                                   1,797,589
<SECURITIES>                                             5,072,202
<RECEIVABLES>                                               95,837
<ALLOWANCES>                                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         6,965,628
<PP&E>                                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           6,965,628
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                      195,416
<BONDS>                                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
<COMMON>                                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                               6,770,212
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             6,965,628
<SALES>                                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                           632,835
<CGS>                                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                            85,545
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            547,290
<INCOME-TAX>                                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                               547,290
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                  110.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                    0
        


</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-06-00701-CV

In re Sylvester Majors

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Sylvester Majors is serving the prison sentence imposed following his conviction

for aggravated robbery. In September 2005, he filed his pro se “Defendant Motion Requesting

Forensic DNA Testing” in the 299th Judicial District Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

64.01 (West Supp. 2006). On October 18, 2006, after the State filed its response in opposition to

the motion, the district court signed and filed a written order purporting to overrule “Applicant’s

Motion for Appointment of Counsel to file motion for DNA testing.”

Majors perfected an appeal to this Court urging that his motion for DNA testing was

erroneously denied. We dismissed the appeal with a memorandum opinion explaining that “[t]he

record before us does not reflect any ruling by the district court on [Majors’s] motion requesting

forensic DNA testing. Without a ruling in the record, there is nothing before us for review with

respect to appellant’s motion requesting forensic DNA testing.” In re Majors, No. 03-06-00091-CR

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 9, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
2

In November 2006, Majors filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. In his petition,

he complains that the district court has not ruled on his motion for DNA testing and asks the Court

to order the district court to act on the motion. Consideration of a motion properly filed and before

the court is ministerial. State ex rel Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

On January 30, 2007, the district court acted on Major’s motion for DNA testing. On

that date, the court signed a nunc pro tunc order purporting to correct the clerical error in the court’s

October 18, 2006, and overruling Majors’s motion for DNA testing. Majors may timely appeal

from the January 30 order. See Homan v. Hughes, 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);

Ex parte Curry, 712 S.W.2d 878, 880 Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no pet.).

Because the relief sought has been otherwise granted, the petition for writ

of mandamus is dismissed.

___________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop

Filed: March 14, 2007
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 1, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JEMAINE MONTEIL CANNON 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA;

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

RANDALL G. WORKMAN; CHESTER

MASON; JOHN MARLAR; ROBERT

MILLER; TRACY DAVIS, Unit Manager

OSP,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-7027

(D.C. No. 6:09-CV-00499-RAW-SPS)

ORDER

The court’s May 6, 2010 order directed plaintiff, Jemaine Monteil Cannon, to pay the

full $455.00 fee for this appeal. As of the date of this order, the filing fee has not been paid.

The captioned appeal is dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to 10th Cir. R.

3.3(B) (1) and 10th Cir. R. 42.1.

A copy of this order shall stand as and for the mandate of this court.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-7027 Document: 01018432145 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Page: 1
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-41211 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus MANUEL GUTIERREZ-SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-03-CR-338-1

-------------------- Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Manuel Gutierrez-Salazar appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gutierrez-Salazar contends that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional. He therefore argues that his conviction must be reduced to one under the lesser included offense found in 8 U.S.C. § 1362(a), his judgment must be reformed to reflect a United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## F I L E D June 23, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 03-41211 -2- conviction only under that provision, and his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing to no more than two years’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Gutierrez-Salazar acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION



<PAGE>



                                  Exhibit 32.1



                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  accompanying  annual  report  on Form  10-K of  Medina
International  Holdings,  Inc. for the year ended April 30, 2011, I, Madhava Rao
Mankal, Chief Financial Officer of Medina International  Holdings,  Inc., hereby
certify  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

a)   such annual report on Form 10-K of Medina International  Holdings, Inc. for
     the year ended April 30, 2011,  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

b)   the  information  contained  in such  annual  report on Form 10-K of Medina
     International  Holdings,  Inc.  for the year ended April 30,  2011,  fairly
     presents, in all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
     operations of Medina International Holdings, Inc.


Date:  August 1, 2010

                             /s/ Madhava Rao Mankal
                                -------------------
                               Madhava Rao Mankal,
                             Chief Financial Officer




This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Langley Research Center

100 NASA Road 

Hampton, VA 23681-2199

July 16, 2021

Reply to Attn of: 30/Office of General Counsel

TO: Distribution

FROM: Chief Counsel

SUBJECT: Ethics Determination: NASA Employee Attendance at Virginia Space Reception 

for Mr. & Mrs. Dale Nash, Chincoteague Island, Virginia, July 30, 2021

On Friday, July 30, 2021, Virginia Space will host a reception on Chincoteague Island, Virginia, 

honoring their departing Executive Director, Mr. Dale Nash, and his wife. The organizers have 

invited over 400 individuals plus guests to attend, including state and local officials, community 

leaders, representatives of the aerospace industry, and about 15 NASA employees. The 

reception will include food and beverages at an estimated cost of about $25 to $40 per person.

In accordance with 5 C.F.R. §2635.204(g) and 14 C.F.R. §1207.103, I find that the event meets 

the definition of a “widely attended gathering” and that there is an Agency interest in having 

NASA personnel attend this event, as it will further Agency programs and interests. NASA 

invitees will have the opportunity to discuss Agency activities and developments in space launch 

capabilities. I further conclude that NASA’s interest in its employees attending this event 

outweighs any concern that attendance may appear to improperly influence NASA personnel in 

the performance of their official duties. 

However, NASA employees in non-career positions who are required to sign the ethics pledge 

under Executive Order 13989 may only attend if they reimburse the hosts the value of the event. 

Additionally, NASA employees whose duties may substantially affect the sponsor, such as by 

way of procurement duties or administration of Space Act agreements, should seek an individual 

determination pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(4) regarding participation in the event from 

their NASA ethics office. Attendees are reminded to exercise COVID-19 precautions appropriate 

to their individual situation.

Questions about this determination may be addressed to Kenneth Goetzke, at 757-864-7390.

Charles A. Polen

Chief Counsel and 

 Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

*In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sport-Haley, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2006,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of theCompany, do each certify, to our respective knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:*

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

(2)                                  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

Dated:  February 12, 2007
| /s/ DONALD W. JEWELL                            |   |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Donald W. Jewell                                |   |
| Chief Executive  Officer                        |   |
| *(Principal  Executive Officer)*                |   |
| * *                                        |   |
| * *                                        |   |
| /s/ PATRICK W. HURLEY                           |   |
| Patrick W. Hurley                               |   |
| Chief Financial Officer                         |   |
| *(Principal Financial and  Accounting Officer)* |

####  

----