United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 2012 Decided April 19, 2013

No. 11-1444

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

No. 11-1251

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSN., INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Barbara J. Chisholm argued the cause for petitioners 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. With her on the 

briefs were Stephen P. Berzon, Jonathan Weissglass, Diana S. 

Reddy, and Scott L. Nelson. 
2

Paul D. Cullen, Sr. argued the cause for petitioner 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc. With him 

on the briefs were Joyce E. Mayers and Paul D. Cullen, Jr. 

Michael P. Abate, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were 

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General at the time the brief was 

filed, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, David C. 

Shilton, John L. Smeltzer, and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, 

Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration, and Peter J. Plocki, Deputy 

Assistant General Counsel.

Randolph D. Moss and Brian M. Boynton were on the brief 

for amicus curiae California Agricultural Issues Forum in 

support of respondents. Seth T. Waxman entered an 

appearance.

Stephan E. Becker and Daron T. Carreiro were on the 

brief for amicus curiae The United Mexican States in support 

of respondents.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to statute, the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration recently 

authorized a pilot program that allows Mexico-domiciled 

trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United 

States, so long as the trucking companies comply with certain 

federal safety standards. Two groups representing American 

truck drivers, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 
3

Association and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

contend that the pilot program is unlawful. We disagree and 

deny their petitions for review. 

I

Before 1982, trucking companies from Canada and 

Mexico could apply for a permit to operate in the United 

States. In 1982, concerned that Canada and Mexico were not 

granting reciprocal access to American trucking companies, 

Congress passed and President Reagan signed a law that 

prohibited the U.S. Government from processing permits for 

companies domiciled in those two countries. The trucking 

dispute between the United States and Mexico has lingered 

since then.

The United States and Mexico attempted to resolve the

impasse when negotiating the North American Free Trade 

Agreement. After NAFTA took effect in 1994, the U.S. 

Government announced a program that would gradually allow 

Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate throughout

the United States. Soon thereafter, however, the U.S. 

Government announced that Mexico-domiciled trucking 

companies would be limited to specified commercial zones in 

southern border states. 

Mexico then complained to a NAFTA arbitration panel

about that limited access. The panel ruled that the United 

States had to allow Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to 

operate throughout the United States. But the panel also 

explained that the United States could require those companies 

to comply with the same regulations that apply to American 

trucking companies. The panel also ruled that if the United 

States failed to allow Mexico-domiciled trucks to operate 
4

throughout the United States, Mexico would be permitted to 

impose retaliatory tariffs.

In response, Congress passed and President George W. 

Bush signed a law that authorized the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration, part of the Department of 

Transportation, to grant permits to Mexico-domiciled trucking 

companies so long as the trucking companies complied with 

U.S. safety requirements. See Pub. L. No. 107-87, § 350, 115 

Stat. 833, 864 (2001). As the U.S. Government worked to 

establish a permitting regime, Congress passed and President 

Bush signed another law requiring the Department of 

Transportation to implement a pilot program to ensure that 

Mexico-domiciled trucks would not make the roads more 

dangerous. See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act 

of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 6901, 121 Stat. 112, 183 (2007). 

In 2007, the FMCSA instituted a pilot program, but 

Congress passed and President Obama signed a law that 

expressly defunded the program before it was completed. See 

Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 

§ 136, 123 Stat. 524, 932 (2009). After Mexico imposed $2.4 

billion in retaliatory tariffs in response, Congress passed and 

President Obama signed a law reinstating funds for the 

program. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009). In 2011, 

the agency again instituted a pilot program, see 76 Fed. Reg. 

40,420 (July 8, 2011), which the Drivers Association and the 

Teamsters now challenge on multiple legal grounds. 

II

The initial question is whether the Drivers Association and 

the Teamsters have standing to challenge the pilot program. 
5

The Government argues that the groups lack Article III 

standing, prudential standing, and organizational standing. 

We disagree. 

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff or petitioner 

must demonstrate that it has suffered injury in fact; that its

injuries are fairly traceable to the allegedly unlawful conduct; 

and that a favorable ruling would redress its injuries. See 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 

Here, both the Drivers Association and the Teamsters have

suffered an injury in fact under the doctrine of competitor 

standing. The competitor standing doctrine recognizes that 

“economic actors suffer an injury in fact when agencies lift 

regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow 

increased competition against them.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 610

F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Because the pilot program allows 

Mexico-domiciled trucks to compete with members of both 

these groups, the Drivers Association and the Teamsters have

suffered an injury in fact. The causation and redressability 

requirements of Article III standing are easily satisfied 

because, absent the pilot program, members of these groups 

would not be subject to increased competition from 

Mexico-domiciled trucks operating throughout the United 

States.

The Drivers Association and the Teamsters also meet the 

prudential standing “zone of interests” test. To establish 

prudential standing under the zone of interests test, the groups’ 

asserted injuries “must be arguably within the zone of interests 

to be protected or regulated by the statute[s]” that they allege 

were violated. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) 

(quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently 

emphasized, the prudential standing test “is not meant to be 
6

especially demanding.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). It 

“forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so 

marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit 

in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that 

Congress intended to permit the suit.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). 

In authorizing the pilot program, Congress balanced a 

variety of interests, including safety, American truckers’ 

economic well-being, foreign trade, and foreign relations. 

These trucking groups are plainly within the zone of interests 

of the statutes governing the pilot program.

Finally, the Drivers Association and the Teamsters both 

have organizational standing. An organization has standing to 

seek injunctive relief if at least one of its members would have 

standing and if the issue is germane to the organization’s 

purpose. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 

Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977). Both groups 

satisfy these requirements: Their members are hurt by 

increased competition, and the groups exist to protect the 

economic interests of their members.

We therefore conclude that both groups have standing to 

challenge the pilot program.

III

On the merits, we first consider the Drivers Association’s 

arguments. 

The Drivers Association advances seven distinct

arguments that the pilot program violates various statutes and 

regulations. We find none to be persuasive. 
7

First, the Drivers Association contends that the pilot 

program unlawfully allows Mexico-domiciled truckers to use 

their Mexican commercial drivers’ licenses. The Drivers 

Association says that the pilot program thus violates a federal 

statute that provides: “No individual shall operate a 

commercial motor vehicle without a valid commercial driver’s

license issued in accordance with section 31308.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 31302. Section 31308, in turn, requires the Secretary of 

Transportation to set “minimum uniform standards for the 

issuance of commercial drivers’ licenses . . . by the States.” 

Id. § 31308 (emphasis added). The Drivers Association

contends that, working together, Sections 31302 and 31308 

require all truck drivers operating in the United States to have 

commercial drivers’ licenses issued by a State, and Mexico 

obviously is not a state.

The relevant portions of Sections 31302 and 31308 were

initially enacted in the 1990s. See Transportation Equity Act 

for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 4011, 112 Stat. 

107, 407 (1998); Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(d), 108 Stat. 745, 

1020 (1994). Even if Sections 31302 and 31308 alone might

prohibit Mexican truckers from using their Mexican 

commercial drivers’ licenses, two subsequent statutes made

clear that Mexican commercial drivers’ licenses are 

permissible. A statute enacted in 2001 requires the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration to verify that each 

Mexican truck driver has the proper qualifications, “including 

a confirmation of the validity of the Licencia de Federal de 

Conductor [the Mexican-issued commercial driver’s license] 

of each driver.” Pub. L. No. 107-87, § 350(1)(B)(viii), 115 

Stat. 833, 864 (2001). A second statute enacted in 2007

requires the Secretary of Transportation to publish “a list of 

Federal motor carrier safety laws and regulations, including the 

commercial drivers[’] license requirements, for which the 

Secretary of Transportation will accept compliance with a 
8

corresponding Mexican law or regulation as the equivalent to 

compliance with the United States law or regulation.” U.S. 

Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 

Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. Law. No. 

110-28, § 6901(b)(2)(B)(v), 121 Stat. 112, 184 (2007) 

(emphasis added). Those two statutes – enacted in two 

separate public laws directly addressing the issue of Mexican 

trucks – reflect Congress’s decision to allow Mexican truckers 

with Mexican commercial drivers’ licenses to drive on U.S. 

roads. 

The Drivers Association would have us find that those two 

laws are worthless surplusage. Reading all of the relevant 

statutes together, as we must, we think the more sensible 

conclusion is that Congress decided that Mexico-domiciled 

truckers with Mexican commercial drivers’ licenses could 

drive on U.S. roads and that a Mexican commercial driver’s

license would be considered the essential equivalent of a state 

commercial driver’s license for purposes of this statutory 

scheme. We therefore conclude that the pilot program allows

Mexican truck drivers to use their Mexican-issued commercial 

drivers’ licenses. 

 

Second, the Drivers Association argues that the pilot 

program violates a statute governing medical certificates for 

truckers. Under that statute, the Secretary of Transportation 

must ensure that “the physical condition of operators of 

commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to 

operate the vehicles safely” and that the physical exams 

required of truckers are performed by examiners who have 

received adequate training and are listed on a national registry. 

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 31149(c)(1)(A)(i), (d). The Secretary has 

fulfilled that requirement by finding that issuance of a Mexican 

commercial driver’s license, which requires a physical 

examination every two years, provides “proof of medical 
9

fitness to drive.” 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a)(1)(i). Moreover, the 

requirement that the examiner be listed on a national registry 

has not yet taken effect. See 77 Fed. Reg. 24,104, 24,105

(April 20, 2012). 

Third, the Drivers Association contends that the pilot 

program violates federal regulations establishing procedures 

for drug testing. By regulation, all drug tests must be 

processed at certified laboratories. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.81. 

The Drivers Association contends that the pilot program 

violates this regulation because the program allows for 

specimens to be collected in Mexico. But nothing in the 

regulation prohibits collection of the specimens in foreign 

countries so long as they are processed at a certified lab. 

Because the specimens collected under the pilot program must 

be sent to certified labs for processing, the pilot program 

complies with the cited drug testing regulations. 

Fourth, the Drivers Association claims that the three 

previously discussed parts of the pilot program allow 

Mexico-domiciled trucks to comply with Mexican law instead 

of U.S. law. And because trucking companies may receive a 

permit to operate in the United States only if they comply with 

applicable U.S. law, see 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a)(1), the Drivers 

Association argues that the Secretary may not grant a permit to 

any company participating in the pilot program. However, as 

we have already explained, U.S. law permits Mexican truckers 

to use their Mexican commercial drivers’ licenses and to rely 

on those licenses as proof of medical fitness to drive. And the 

pilot program’s drug-testing rules are valid under U.S. law. 

The pilot program therefore does not substitute compliance 

with Mexican law for compliance with U.S. law; as a result, 

this catchall argument by the Drivers Association is 

unavailing. 

 
10

Fifth, the Drivers Association asserts that the agency

granted “exemptions” to Mexico-domiciled trucking 

companies without following the proper statutory procedures. 

The statutory procedures cited by the Drivers Association for 

granting exemptions from safety regulations are contained in 

subsection (b) of 49 U.S.C. § 31315. But the statute makes 

clear that pilot programs such as this one need not go through 

the separately listed procedures for exemptions. See 49 

U.S.C. § 31315(c). Therefore, this argument fails. 

Sixth, the Drivers Association argues that the agency

failed to meet its obligation to publish a list of safety laws and 

regulations for which it “will accept compliance with a 

corresponding Mexican law or regulation as the equivalent to 

compliance with the United States law or regulation” and that 

the agency failed to explain “how the corresponding United 

States and Mexican laws and regulations differ.” U.S. Troop 

Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 

Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, 

§ 6901(b)(2)(B)(v). But the agency in fact published such an 

analysis in the Federal Register. See 76 Fed. Reg. 20,807,

20,814 (April 13, 2011). The agency therefore satisfied that

requirement.

Seventh, the Drivers Association contends that the pilot 

program is not “designed to achieve a level of safety that is

equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety that would 

otherwise be achieved through compliance with” applicable 

safety laws and regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 31315(c)(2). The 

Drivers Association claims that the pilot program fails that 

requirement because it allows Mexico-domiciled truckers to 

rely on their commercial drivers’ licenses, accepts those 

licenses as proof that a driver is medically fit to drive, and 

includes less stringent drug-testing procedures. However, as 

previously explained, federal statutes, not the pilot program, 
11

enable Mexico-domiciled truckers to use their commercial 

drivers’ licenses, and the pilot program complies with 

applicable U.S. drug-testing regulations. And the agency 

reasonably concluded that those requirements are designed to 

achieve an equivalent level of safety. Hence, the Drivers 

Association’s arguments fail.

IV

Having concluded that the pilot program withstands all of 

the Drivers Association’s challenges, we now turn to the six 

additional arguments advanced by the Teamsters. 

First, the Teamsters argue that the pilot program is 

unlawful because not all Mexico-domiciled trucks are required 

to display a decal certifying that the truck complies with 

American safety standards. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112, 30115. 

But that decal requirement applies only if the trucks are 

“import[ed] into the United States” or are “introduce[d] . . . in 

interstate commerce” within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle 

Safety Act. 49 U.S.C. § 30112(a)(1). The agency concluded 

that the requirement does not apply to this class of Mexican 

trucks because the trucks are regularly driven into and out of 

the United States; they are not, in the agency’s view, either 

imported or introduced in interstate commerce. We must 

uphold the agency’s interpretation of “import” and “introduce

. . . in interstate commerce” unless Congress has 

unambiguously spoken to the contrary or unless the agency’s 

interpretation is an unreasonable interpretation of an 

ambiguous statutory provision. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842-43 (1984). 

In our view, the agency reasonably concluded that the 

ordinary meaning of “import” is “to bring (wares or 
12

merchandise) into a place or country from a foreign country in 

the transactions of commerce.” WEBSTER’S NEW 

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY SECOND EDITION 1250 (1945). 

That definition would apply to Mexico-domiciled trucks only 

if the trucks – not the items they carry – were brought into the 

country as commercial goods. That interpretation conforms 

to the longstanding rule that “vessels have been treated as sui 

generis, and subject to an entirely different set of laws and 

regulations from those applied to imported articles.” The 

Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 118 (1897). Because the trucks 

themselves are the instrumentalities of commerce and not 

wares or merchandise, it was reasonable for the agency to 

conclude that the trucks are not imported within the meaning of 

this statute. 

The agency also reasonably concluded that the trucks are 

not introduced in interstate commerce within the meaning of 

the Act. The Act defines “interstate commerce” as 

“commerce between a place in a State and a place in another 

State or between places in the same State through another 

State.” 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(4). That definition does not 

include cross-border traffic between Mexico and the United 

States. Congress could have included foreign commerce in 

this definition, but it did not. 

The Teamsters cite National Association of Motor Bus 

Owners v. Brinegar, where this Court interpreted a definition 

of interstate commerce in a different statute to include all 

vehicles “on a public highway upon which interstate traffic is 

moving.” 483 F.2d 1294, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Robinson, 

J., controlling opinion). But Brinegar did not interpret the 

statute at issue in this case and did not involve foreign 

commerce and thus that case did not reach the question 

presented here. See id. at 1305. As a result, Brinegar does 

not foreclose the agency’s interpretation of interstate 
13

commerce, and the agency’s interpretation is otherwise 

reasonable. Therefore, we uphold the agency’s interpretation.

Second, the Teamsters contend that the vision tests given 

to Mexican truck drivers require them to recognize only the 

color red while American truck drivers are required to 

recognize red, yellow, and green. However, the Teamsters’ 

argument is foreclosed by International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters v. Peña, where this Court upheld the determination 

that Mexican medical standards need not be identical to

American standards. See 17 F.3d 1478, 1484-86 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). Here, the agency adequately explained its 

determination that the Mexican medical standards, some of 

which are more stringent than the American standards, would 

provide a level of safety at least equivalent to the American 

standards taken as a whole. 

Third, the Teamsters assert that the pilot program is 

unlawful because Mexico has not granted U.S.-domiciled 

trucks “simultaneous and comparable authority” to operate in 

Mexico. See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina 

Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 

2007, § 6901(a)(3). The Teamsters acknowledge that Mexico 

has granted U.S.-domiciled trucks legal authority to operate in 

Mexico, but complain that, as a practical matter, it is very 

difficult for American trucks to operate in Mexico. Because 

the statute requires Mexico to grant only legal authority to 

American trucks, the Teamsters’ argument fails.

Fourth, the Teamsters argue that the pilot program 

impermissibly grants credit to trucking companies that 

participated in the 2007 pilot program. Under the relevant 

regulation, the agency may “grant permanent operating 

authority to a Mexico-domiciled carrier no earlier than 18 

months after the date that provisional operating authority is 
14

granted.” 49 C.F.R. § 365.507(f). The agency credits any 

time spent in the previous pilot program toward the 18 months 

required under this pilot program. The Teamsters argue that 

interpretation is impermissible. But the text of the regulation 

does not prohibit the agency from crediting a company for time 

that it participated in the 2007 program. We therefore cannot 

say that the agency’s interpretation is incorrect, much less 

unreasonably so.

Fifth, the Teamsters contend that the pilot program does 

not include a “reasonable number of participants necessary to 

yield statistically valid findings.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 31315(c)(2)(C). But this argument fails because an 

unlimited number of trucking companies may participate in the 

program. Whether Mexico-domiciled trucking companies

ultimately avail themselves of the opportunity is outside the 

agency’s control. The agency has therefore met its obligation 

to include a sufficient number of participants so as to yield 

valid results. The Teamsters also argue that the program 

cannot yield statistically valid findings because it focuses on 

the number of inspections rather than the number of 

participants, and because it presumes that Mexico-domiciled 

trucking companies are as safe as their American counterparts. 

However, the Teamsters do not explain why the agency’s

approach is flawed, and in light of the degree of deference we 

give to the agency’s statistical methodology, we cannot 

conclude that the program will yield invalid findings. See

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Security 

Administration, 588 F.3d 1116, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

Sixth, the Teamsters contend that the agency violated the 

National Environmental Policy Act, which requires agencies to 

analyze the environmental impact of “major Federal actions 

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). In this case, the Act required the agency
15

to prepare a document called an Environmental Assessment. 

See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). The agency did so.

In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, the 

Supreme Court held that the agency was not responsible under 

NEPA for evaluating the environmental effects of the 

President’s decision to allow Mexican trucks on U.S. roads. 

See 541 U.S. 752, 765-70 (2004). The Teamsters accept that 

holding. But they try to argue that the agency still had 

discretion to restrict the pilot program so as to mitigate the 

environmental impacts. The Teamsters identified several 

alternatives the agency should have pursued. But, as the 

agency has explained, the short and dispositive answer to the 

Teamsters’ argument is that the agency lacks authority to 

impose the alternatives proposed by the Teamsters and those 

alternatives would go beyond the scope of the pilot program. 

See Final Environmental Assessment of the Pilot Program on 

NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, Docket No. 

FMCSA-2011-0097, at 6, 7-10 (Sept. 2011) (describing 

agency’s discretion and rejecting alternatives the agency lacks 

discretion to implement).

In addition, the Teamsters contend that the agency 

released its environmental analysis too late. An agency’s 

analysis must be released “before decisions are made and 

before actions are taken.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). The 

Teamsters argue that the agency violated this requirement 

because it published its Environmental Assessment after it had 

already issued a final notice of intent to proceed with the pilot 

program. However, the Teamsters have not identified any 

aspect of the pilot program that the agency could have designed 

differently to reduce the environmental impacts, and the 

agency completed its Environmental Assessment before 

authorizing any Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to 

operate under the program. Any technical error was therefore 
16

harmless and not grounds for vacating or remanding. See 

Nevada v. Department of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 90 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). 

* * *

We deny the petitions for review.

So ordered.