2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-22-2009

USA v. Johnson

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 07-2396

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Johnson" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 624.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 07-2396

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 v.

TIMOTHY JOHNSON

a/k/a SWIFT

a/k/a BANANNAS

 Timothy Johnson,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 05-cr-00211-8)

District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 17, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed September 22, 2009)

____

OPINION

 
2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Timothy Johnson challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea. We will affirm.

I.

Johnson was a leader in the “Sex, Money, Murder” subgroup of the “Bloods”

street gang, which engaged in drug distribution in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Between

2003 and August 2005, members of the gang brought 50 to 200 bricks of heroin from

Newark, New Jersey, to Williamsport for distribution. According to the Presentence

Report (“PSR”), on three occasions Johnson received a call for the purchase of heroin and

Baldwin delivered the heroin to a confidential informant. “Johnson contends that his

involvement was limited to permitting Baldwin to borrow his cell phone.” Appellant’s

Br. at 7.

A federal grand jury in Williamsport returned a 14-count indictment naming

Johnson and nine co-conspirators. Johnson was indicted on one count of illegal

membership in a street gang in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 521, one count of conspiracy to

distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, more than five grams of cocaine base,

heroin, ecstacy, cocaine, and marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute

heroin within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860, and

18 U.S.C. § 2. Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
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filed a Superceding Information against Johnson, charging a single count of conspiracy

“to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute [heroin] . . . in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1).” App. at 20.

Thereafter, Johnson entered into a written plea agreement in which he agreed to

plead guilty to the one-count information in exchange for the dismissal of the five counts

against him from the earlier indictment. The plea agreement expressly provided that

Johnson’s maximum possible sentence of incarceration was 20 years.

When Johnson entered his guilty plea before the District Court, the prosecutor

explained to him the terms of the plea agreement, and Johnson acknowledged, under oath,

that he had read the plea agreement, that he had discussed it with his counsel, and that he

had not been threatened or coerced into signing it.

The Court explained the elements of conspiracy and Johnson acknowledged that he

understood this explanation. In addition, the prosecutor described Johnson’s role in the

conspiracy, stating that Johnson “provided the telephone on [three] occasion[s] that was

used to make the phone call [to set up the controlled sales of heroin] and that [Johnson]

knew that when he was providing the phone there was going to be a transaction involving

the sale of heroin,” and that the conspiracy involved between 100 and 400 grams of

heroin. App. at 105. Johnson acknowledged that he agreed with that characterization.

Although the prosecution did not yet have Johnson’s complete criminal history, the

prosecutor stated that “[h]e could very well be a career criminal . . . , which would . . .
 Johnson was sentenced pursuant to the 2006 version of the 1

USSG. He was characterized as a career offender because (1) he

was at least eighteen when he committed the instant offense, (2) the

instant offense was a felony conviction for a controlled substance

offense, and (3) he had at least two prior felony convictions for

controlled substance offenses. See USSG § 4B1.1. 

 After the submission of the initial PSR, but before the 2

submission of the revised version, Johnson sent a letter to the

District Court requesting that “his counsel be replaced and his plea

‘pulled back.’” United States v. Johnson, No. 4:05-CR-211, at 1

(Jan. 9, 2007). Johnson’s counsel acknowledged that the

4

[make his range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG” or

“Guidelines”)] 151 to 188 months.” App. at 100-01. On four separate occasions during

his plea colloquy, Johnson was informed that the maximum penalty he faced was 20 years

incarceration. Moreover, each of the three times he was asked if he understood that he

could be sentenced to up to 20 years, he acknowledged that he did. 

After Johnson entered his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared an initial PSR

and later submitted a revised version. The revised PSR calculated a total offense level of

32 and a criminal history of VI because Johnson was found to be a career offender.1

Given these calculations, as well as the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years under 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846, Johnson’s Guidelines range was 210 to 240 months

imprisonment.

Shortly thereafter, Johnson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that

his Guidelines range was “unfair and unjust in light of the [lesser] sentences imposed

upon his co-defendants.” App. at 50. The District Court denied this motion, and 2
“attorney-client relationship [wa]s irretrievably broken, and

request[ed] that he be permitted to withdraw his appearance as

Johnson’s counsel.” Id. at 2. The District Court appointed Johnson

new counsel and denied without prejudice his pro se motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. 

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3

§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

5

sentenced Johnson to 140 months incarceration (almost six years below the Guidelines’

minimum of 210 months).3

II.

Johnson challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea on the basis that (1) his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he

did not understand its consequences until he reviewed the PSR and (2) that the

consequences of his plea were “unfair and unjust in light of the [lesser] sentences

imposed upon his co-defendants.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. We reject both arguments. 

Johnson argues that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because

he did not “fully understand[] the consequences or elements of the charge to which he

pleaded guilty.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. We review this argument for plain error because

he did not raise it before the District Court. See United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366,

370 (3d Cir. 1997).

Both the prosecutor and the District Court explained to Johnson the consequences

of his guilty plea. As noted above, Johnson acknowledged that he was involved in the

drug conspiracy, that he had read the plea agreement and understood its terms, that he had
6

discussed it with counsel, that he was not threatened or coerced into signing it, and that he

understood his maximum potential prison sentence to be 20 years. 

Indeed, Johnson was informed four times during his plea colloquy that he faced up

to 20 years in prison. First, the prosecutor advised him of that possibility and Johnson

acknowledged that he understood. Later, the prosecutor repeated the statutory maximum

and the District Court asked Johnson if he understood it, “[p]articularly the 20 years

incarceration?” App. at 93. Johnson acknowledged that he did. Then, for a fourth time,

the District Court advised Johnson that his statutory maximum was 20 years and Johnson

acknowledged that he understood. 

Thus, “[t]he record concerning [Johnson’s] plea colloquy demonstrates that [he]

had an adequate understanding of the charges to which [he] was pleading guilty,” United

States v. Tannis, 942 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1991), and of the fact that he faced as much

as 20 years in prison, see Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A plea

of guilty will not be found to be unknowing and involuntary in the absence of proof that

the defendant was not advised of, or did not understand, the direct consequences of his

plea.”), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90

F.3d 87 (3rd Cir. 1996).

Johnson also argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea because his co-defendants were permitted to plead to lesser offenses and

were sentenced to shorter terms of imprisonment. We reverse a district court’s denial of a
7

motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if the denial was an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001). Further, “[w]e look to three factors to

evaluate a motion to withdraw: (1) whether the defendant asserts [his] innocence; (2)

whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal; and (3) the strength of

the defendant’s reason to withdraw the plea.” Id. The District Court concluded that

Johnson failed to meet the first and third prongs of this test and that it need not determine,

under the second prong, whether the government would suffer prejudice. We agree.

As to the first prong, at no point has Johnson asserted his innocence. When he

entered his guilty plea, he acknowledged, under oath, that he was involved in a conspiracy

to distribute 100 to 400 grams of heroin. With respect to the third factor, the strength of

his reasons to withdraw his plea are inadequate. As the District Court observed,

“[Johnson’s] sole reason for withdrawing his plea appears to be that he is unhappy with

the guideline range set out in the PSR.” App. at 5-6. However, we have held that a

“simple shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not

adequate reasons to force the government to incur the expense, difficulty and risk of

trying a defendant, who has already acknowledged his guilt before the court.” United

States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992), superceded by statute as recognized by

United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999). 

III.

For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the denial of Johnson’s motion to
8

withdraw his guilty plea.