alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 0227

_____________________________ G REG D. M C F ARLANE , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court fo r Alachua County

. William E. Davis , Judge

. January 16, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OWE , R AY , and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.33 1

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Greg D. McFarlane,
pro se , Appellant.

Ashley Brooke Moody , Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7469

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus GEORGE WILSON, a/k/a Fat George, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge. (CR-95-198, CA-98-2-6) Submitted: December 29, 1998 Decided: January 12, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. George Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:George Wilson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we denya certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Wilson , Nos. CR-95-198; CA-98-2-6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 1998). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           3,463
<SECURITIES>                                     2,075
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,806
<ALLOWANCES>                                       119
<INVENTORY>                                     16,039
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                30,177
<PP&E>                                           3,724
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,204
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,245
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,466
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        18,354
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,504
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,245
<SALES>                                         21,911
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,911
<CGS>                                           13,313
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,313
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,355
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  16
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,618
<INCOME-TAX>                                       716
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,902
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,902
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .63
        

</TABLE>
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 23, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MONTGOMERY CARL AKERS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JAMES KESZEI,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 10-4067

(D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00034-DB)

ORDER

The captioned appeal is dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to 10th Cir. R.

42.1.

A copy of this order shall serve as and for the mandate of this court. 

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-4067 Document: 01018408529 Date Filed: 04/23/2010 Page: 1
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                           to
                  Certificateholders

                                                                    Ending
Class            Interest             Principal    Losses           Balance
<S>               <C>                  <C>            <C>           <C>
A1                    6240446.13       7302965.32                0       969038021.26
A2                    2856373.97       6162380.55                0       567414589.55
A3                        580000                0                0           96000000
R1                             0                0                0                  0
R2                             0                0                0                  0
XIO                   1115441.13                0                0                  0


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                      78,541,792
<SECURITIES>                                 2,091,962
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,059,216
<ALLOWANCES>                                    56,371
<INVENTORY>                                    688,494
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            87,320,058
<PP&E>                                       3,828,186
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,032,266
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             102,534,118
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,191,685
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       271,543
<OTHER-SE>                                  98,070,890
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               102,534,118
<SALES>                                      6,326,268
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,326,268
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,476,233
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,056,718
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (30,691,494)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (30,691,494)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (30,691,494)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.45)


</TABLE>
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 11, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT E. COTNER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA; RON

ANDERSON, Attorney; JUSTIN JONES,

Director, ODOC; DYANNA PRICE;

OKLAHOMA BOARD OF

CORRECTIONS; PAROLE BOARD;

STATE COURTS; and GENESE

MCCOY, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-6004

(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00239-HE)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER

Appellant-Plaintiff Robert Cotner seeks to appeal the district court’s December 14,

2009 and December 23, 2009 Orders. However, Plaintiff is under filing restrictions in

this circuit. See Cotner v. Boone, 48 F. App’x 287, 290, 2002 WL 31045393, at *3 (10th

Cir. Sept. 13, 2002). Per these restrictions, Plaintiff can not proceed pro se in this court

unless he first obtains leave to do so.

In a February 11, 2010 Order, this court directed Plaintiff Cotner to follow the

required procedures set forth by this court in Cotner v. Boone for obtaining leave to

proceed pro se. The February order advised Plaintiff that failure to fully comply with the

Appellate Case: 10-6004 Document: 01018382963 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 Page: 1
-2-

order would result in immediate dismissal of this appeal, without further notice, for

failure to prosecute. 

In response to the February order, Plaintiff submitted a document entitled “motion

to correct record and stay,” which the court has construed as a petition for leave to

proceed pro se. This petition, however, in not in compliance with the court’s 2002 order

imposing filing restrictions. See Cotner, 48 F. App’x at 290. 

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. See 10th Cir. R.

42.1. The motion to correct record and stay is DENIED.

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-6004 Document: 01018382963 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 Page: 2
**Exhibit 99.1**

March 27, 2009 

Rainmaker Systems, Inc. 

900East Hamilton Ave. 

Campbell, California 

95008 

Dear Sirs/Madams: 

Asstated in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements of Rainmaker Systems, Inc. (“the Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2008, the Company changed the date of its annual goodwill impairment test under Statement ofFinancial Accounting Standards No. 142, *Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets*, from January 31st to October 31st. 

The Company states that the newly adopted accounting principleis preferable in the circumstances because the impairment test procedures may be carried out during the fourth quarter and up to the filing of the Company’s Form 10-K, which will better align with the Company’s annual planning andbudgeting process, resulting in efficiencies and savings in professional fees. The change will not delay, accelerate or avoid an impairment charge. In connection with our audit of the above mentioned financial statements, we have evaluated thecircumstances and the business judgment and planning which formulated management’s basis to make the change in accounting principle. 

It should beunderstood that criteria have not been established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board for selecting from among the alternative accounting principles that exist in this area. Further, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountantshas not established the standards by which an auditor can evaluate the preferability of one accounting principle among a series of alternatives. However, for purposes of the Company’s compliance with the requirements of the Securities andExchange Commission, we are furnishing this letter. 

Based on our audit, we concur with management’s judgment that the newly adopted accountingprinciple described in Note 3 is preferable in the circumstances. In formulating this position, we are relying on management’s business planning and judgment, which we do not find to be unreasonable. 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ BDO Seidman, LLP 

San Francisco, California
#### Roella *v.*Follow.

*Thursday, May*29.

The words, “He” (meaning the plaintiff) “took a false oath,” are not in themselves actionable.

In a suit for such words, there must not only be in the declaration the requisite inducement and *colloquium,*but there must also be an *innuendo*explaining the defendant’s meaning by reference to the previous matter.

But if the words laid do, of themselves, import a crime, there is no occasion for an *innuendo*explaining their meaning.

ERROR to the *Allen*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.'

— This was an action of slander brought by the plaintiff in error. The declaration contains six counts.

The first count states that before the committing of the grievances, &c., a certain complaint had been pending before a certain justice of the peace, wherein the State of *Indiana*was plaintiff, &c.; and that, on the trial, the plaintiff was sworn and gave evidence as a witness on behalf of the state; yet the defendant well knowing the premises, in a certain discourse, &c., of and concerning the plaintiff, &e., falsely and maliciously spoke of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning his said evidence at said trial, the false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following, that is to say, “He” (meaning the plaintiff) “took a false oath.”

The second, third, and fifth counts, are similar to the first.

The fourth count alleges that in a certain other discourse, which the defendant then and there had of and concerning the plaintiff, &c., he, the defendant, then and there spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, &c., the false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following, that is to say, “You” (meaning the plaintiff) “are a thief.” The words laid in the sixth count are, “ He ” (the plaintiff meaning) “ is a thief.”

*378*D. Wallace,*for the plaintiff.

*L. P. Ferry,*for the defendant.

The declaration concludes by alleging general damage in the usual form.

There was a general demurrer to each of the counts; and the demurrers were sustained. Judgment for the defendant.

The first, second, third, and fifth counts are insufficient. The words here complained of are not in themselves actionable. They amount only to a charge that the plaintiff was forsworn, which is not in itself actionable. *Holt*v. *Scholefield,*6 T. R. 691. These counts, it is true, contain the requisite inducement- and *colloquium,*but they omit the *innuendo*which is necessary, in such cases, to explain the defendant’s meaning by reference to the previous matter. There is no objection to the other counts. The words there laid do, of themselves, import a crime; and there was consequently no occasion for an *innuendo*explaining their meaning.

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JOSE JESUS ROMAN JR., Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0195 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-430684-001

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert E. Prather

Counsel for Respondent

Jose Jesus Roman Jr., Kingman

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr., Judge Cynthia J. Bailey, and Judge 

Brian Y Furuya delivered the decision of the Court.

FILED 12-12-2023
STATE v. ROMAN

Decision of the Court

2

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Petitioner Jose Jesus Roman Jr. seeks review of the superior 

court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is his fifth petition.

¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will 

not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to 

show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition 

for post-conviction relief. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538, ¶ 1 (App. 

2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review).

¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior 

court’s order denying the petition for post-conviction, petition for review, 

response, and reply. Petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.

¶4 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.
**Exhibit 10.1**

 

**AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENT**

 

ThisAMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, effective December 1, 2004, amendsthe EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT effective December 1, 2000, by and betweenSPORT-HALEY, INC., a Colorado corporation (the “Company”) and PATRICK W. HURLEY(the “Executive”).

 

WHEREAS,the Company and Executive entered into an Executive Employment Agreementeffective December 1, 2000 (the “Executive Employment Agreement”);

 

WHEREAS,the Company and Executive desire to amend the Executive Employment Agreement incertain respects, as set forth herein;

 

NOW,THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, theparties agree as follows:

 

1.                                       **Amendment**. Except for the amendments to the Executive Employment Agreementcontained herein, all of the terms and conditions of the Executive EmploymentAgreement shall remain in full force and effect.

 

2.                                       **Base Salary**.  TheBase Salary as set forth in Section 2.1 of the Executive Employment Agreementis amended to be $110,000 per year. Schedule 1, referenced in the ExecutiveEmployment Agreement, is also amended to reflect thisamended Base Salary.

 

3.                                       **Termination by the Executive Without Cause**.  Section 3.5 of the ExecutiveEmployment Agreement is amended and superseded in its entirety as follows:

 

**Section 3.5 Termination by the Executive Without Cause**. The Executive, without cause, may terminatethis Agreement upon 90 days’ written notice to the Company. In such event, inaddition to compensating the Executive during such 90-day notice period, theCompany shall be obligated to compensate the Executive with severance pay equalto 90 additional days’ compensation as of the date of such termination.Accordingly, in the event the Executive terminates this Agreement without causeor chooses not to renew this Agreement upon its expiration, the Executive shallreceive an aggregate of six months’ salary from and after the date of theCompany’s receipt of notice of termination. In addition to the foregoing, theExecutive shall receive a bonus which shall be equivalent to 50% of the annualbonus last received by the Executive. Such bonus provision shall be in additionto the compensation and severance package hereinabove specified. Compensationfor vacation time not taken by the Executive shall be paid to the Executive atthe date of termination.

 

1

----

 
|   | SPORT-HALEY,  INC. |
|--------|--------------------|
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   | By:                | /s/  Mark J. Stevenson |   |
|   |               | Mark  J. Stevenson, Chairman of the |
|   |               | Compensation  Committee |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   | EXECUTIVE:         |
|   |               |
|   |               |
|   |               | /s/  Patrick W. Hurley |   |
|   |               | Patrick  W. Hurley |

 

2

----
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 211 (Tuesday, November 2, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 67380]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-27625]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke; Notice 
of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable materials, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Neurological Disorders 
and Stroke Special Emphasis Panel, Epilepsy Clinical Trials Review.
    Date: November 19, 2010.
    Time: 12 p.m. to 6 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 
Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852. (Telephone Conference 
Call)
    Contact Person: William Benzing, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Administrator, Scientific Review Branch, Division of Extramural 
Research, NINDS/NIH/DHHS, Neuroscience Center, 6001 Executive Blvd., 
Room 3204, MSC 9529, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-496-0660, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#9ddff8f3e7f4f3faeaddf0fcf4f1b3f3f4f5b3faf2eb"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="dc9eb9b2a6b5b2bbab9cb1bdb5b0f2b2b5b4f2bbb3aa">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.853, 
Clinical Research Related to Neurological Disorders; 93.854, 
Biological Basis Research in the Neurosciences, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: October 27, 2010.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2010-27625 Filed 11-1-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1919 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1919

To designate a portion of the United States courthouse located at 2100 
 Jamieson Avenue, in Alexandria, Virginia, as the ``Justin W. Williams 
                  United States Attorney's Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 21, 2003

   Mr. Allen introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate a portion of the United States courthouse located at 2100 
 Jamieson Avenue, in Alexandria, Virginia, as the ``Justin W. Williams 
                  United States Attorney's Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    (a) In General.--The building and structure described in subsection 
(b) shall be known and designated as the ``Justin W. Williams United 
States Attorney's Building''.
    (b) Description.--The building and structure to be designated under 
subsection (a) is that portion of the United States courthouse located 
at 2100 Jamieson Avenue, in Alexandria, Virginia (commonly known as the 
Albert V. Bryan United States Courthouse), that is attached to the 
courthouse main tower structure, described as ``A-Wing'' in the 
architectural plans, and currently occupied by the Office of the United 
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria 
Division.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the building and structure described in 
section 1(b) shall be deemed to be a reference to the Justin W. 
Williams United States Attorney's Building.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary 
for--
            (1) appropriate identifying designations to be affixed to 
        the building and structure described in section 1(b); and
            (2) an appropriate plaque reflecting the designation under 
        section 1, and honoring Justin W. Williams and his service to 
        the United States, to be affixed to or displayed in that 
        building and structure.
                                 <all>
```