alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6650

NOBLE DREW ALI, a/k/a Joseph Lee McElveen Bey,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of Virginia Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (2:17-cv-00340-MSD-LRL)

Submitted: October 23, 2018 Decided: October 26, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Noble Drew Ali, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Noble Drew Ali seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ali has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a 

certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We also deny Ali’s motion for an 

injunction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
1 The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-1940

___________ Alverne C. Bush, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Western District of Missouri. * L-3 Communications/Titan Group, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: November 25, 2010 Filed: December 13, 2010

___________ Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Alverne Bush appeals following the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in her employment discrimination action. After careful de novo review, see Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. , 372 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2004), we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted. Even assuming Bush made a prima facie case of discrimination on any of the bases asserted in her complaint, she failed to create a jury issue on whether her unsatis factory job performance – the reason given for her termination – was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Richmond v. Bd.-2- of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. , 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment also was proper on Bush’s claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act, because she did not provide the re quired notice to her employer. See Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 409 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, see8th Cir. R. 47B, and deny Bush’s pending motion for appointment of counsel.

______________________________
#### Jas. L. Renfroe *v.*Eliz. Underwood.

Estoppel.

A purchaser of land with notice of renunciation of title by vendor, and of a prior sale of the same land with the concurrence of the vendee under a parol sale, is estopped from claiming title by subrogation.

APPEAL PROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT OOURT.

April 22, 1867.

OPINION OE THE CouRT BY

JuDGE ROBERTSON!

It seems to this court that the judgment of the Circuit Court is sustained by the law on preponderating facts.

Caleb Underwood’s right to the land in contest was matured into the legal title by at least twenty-five years adverse occupancy by those under whom he entered fifteen years before this suit was brought, and by himself, and by his son J ames either as his tenant -or his vendee by an oral contract never enforcible, and the rescission of which made him his father’s tenant by relation. The disavowals of title by Caleb while James was holding as his vendee *24do not affect bis title when, after the rescission and the recognition of tenancy by James, Caleb for a vanable and meritorious-consideration conveyed the land to the appellee, and consequently, whether the testimony of witnesses for verifying those-disavowals was competent or not, the rejection of it as incompetent was not prejudicial to the appellant who, having bought from James with notice of his renunciation of all claim of title- and notice also of the sale to the appellee with the concurrence of James, has no semblance of available equity against the title o£ the appellee.

Whereupon, the judgment in her favor is affirmed.
No. D-666.

#### In re Disbarment of Keehan.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 484 U. S. 999.]
Exhibit 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Paritosh K. Choksi, certify that:

1.  I  have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report  on  Form  10-QSB  of  ATEL  Cash
Distribution Fund V, LP;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and  I  are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material  information  relating to the registrant is made known
     to us by others within the entity,  particularly during the period in which
     this report is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls and
     procedures  and  presented  in  this  report  our  conclusions   about  the
     effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of
     the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
     over financial  reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
     fiscal  quarter that has  materially  affected or is  reasonably  likely to
     materially   affect  the  registrant's   internal  control  over  financial
     reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,  based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a) all significant  deficiencies  and material  weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
     likely to adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability to record,  process,
     summarize and report financial information; and

     b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls
     over financial reporting.



Date:
November 11, 2004

/s/ Paritosh K. Choksi
----------------------------------------
Paritosh K. Choksi
Principal Financial Officer of Registrant, Executive
Vice President of General Partner
Sierra Nevada Corporation Commercial Crew Development Round 1 (CCDev1) Space Act Agreement

NNJ10TA04S

SNC CCDev1 Space Act Agreement

SNC SAA Amendment 01
Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Byron White United States Courthouse

1823 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80257

(303) 844-3157

June 22, 2010 

Douglas E. Cressler

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Nathan Eric Scanlon

FCI - La Tuna 

P.O. Box 3000

Anthony, TX 88021

#32699-013 

RE: 10-1135, United States v. Scanlon

Dist/Ag docket: 1:06-CV-01975-REB , 1:04-CR-00224-REB-MJW 

Dear Appellant:

Enclosed is a copy of the order and judgment.

Please contact this office if you have questions.

Sincerely,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of the Court 

EAS/sds 

Appellate Case: 10-1135 Document: 01018445032 Date Filed: 06/22/2010 Page: 1
#### Vermilya and Another *v.*Davis.

Thursday, *June*6.

If a defendant appear to an action before a justice of the peace without objecting to the process, he cannot object to it on appeal in the Circuit Court.

ERROR to the *Huntington*Circuit Court.

Dewey, *J.*

— Vermilya and *Stewart*commenced an action of assumpsit against *Davis*before *W. G.*Johnson, a justice of the peace, and recovered judgment against the defendant by default. On the application of the defendant, the judgment was opened and a new trial granted. A ' change of venue was awarded on the affidavit of the defendant, transferring *159the cause before *J.*Johnson, another justice of the peace. He issued a summons to the defendant, returnable on the 16th day of September, 1842, “ at 10 o’clock, p. m.” On that day the parties appeared ; and the defendant making no defence, judgment went for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, moved the Circuit Court to dismiss the action on account of irregularity in the proceedings before justice *J.*Johnson, and the motion prevailed. Judgment for costs against the plaintiff.

*T. Johnson*and *R.*Brachenridge, for the plaintiffs.

*W.*Wright, for the defendant.

The irregularity complained of is, that the summons was returnable at an improper time of the day, to wit, 10 o’clock, p. m.

We think the appearance of the defendant before the justice, without objecting to the process, was a waiver of all right to object to it in the Circuit Court; and that an error was committed by dismissing the action.

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           3,211
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    197,043
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          38,989
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 492,144
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       242,320
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,937)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   492,144
<SALES>                                        109,634
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               123,959
<CGS>                                           31,324
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  131,047
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   191
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,613
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (10,866)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,335)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (9,531)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  (519)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (10,050)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.48)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.48)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of ATEL Cash Distribution Fund V, L.P. (the Partnership) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Dean L. Cash, President and Chief Executive Officer of ATEL Financial Services, LLC, General Partner of the Partnership, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: August 12, 2009



|                                              
|----------------------------------------------
|/s/ Dean L. Cash                              
|Dean L. Cash                                  
|President and Chief Executive Officer of      
|ATEL Financial Services, LLC (General Partner)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Partnership and
will be retained by the Partnership and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Rubottom and Another *v.*Shank.

*Saturday, May*25.

A party may apply to the Circuit Court in term time, or to the president judge or the two associates in vacation, for a change of venue on account of the opposite party’s undue influence, &c.. And the application may be made in Court in presence of the adverse party, *without notice ; but if*made in vacation, ten days’ notice is necessary.

APPEAL from the *Franklin*Circuit Court.

Dewey, J.

Assumpsit for goods sold, and money had and received. During the' term of the Circuit Court to which the process was' returnable, both parties being present, the defendants below'by petition verified by oath, setting forth that they conceived they could not have a fair trial of the cause in that Court, owing to the undue influence of the plaintiff and to local prejudices, prayed the Court for a change of venue. The Court overruled the petition, and proceeded to a trial which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants excepted to the decision of the Court refusing a change of venue.

Whether that decision be correct or erroneous must depend entirely upon the construction of the statute of this state regulating change of venue ; for neither the common law, nor any *English*statute in force here, authorises such a measure. The practice of changing the venue in *England,*is the result of rules adopted by the Courts founded upon the equity of some ancient statutes, the object of which was to compel the plaintiff tp sue out his writ in the county in which the cause of action originated. 1 Tidd’s Pr. 519.' — 2 Bl. Rep. 1032. These rules have not been adopted by our legislature, and of course are not obligatory in this state.

The reasons for a change of venue set forth in the petition, namely, undue influence of the adverse party and local *123prejudices, are expressly within the provisions of our statute. R. C. 1831, p. 533. But the question arises, whether the act authorises a change of venue in open Court in any event? It is true that its enactment's, taken literally, seem to relate exclusively to applications for a change of.venue made in vacation to the president judge alone, or to the two associates. But as we conceive it could not have been the design of the legislature to give a single judge, out of Court, a power which they meant to withhold from the Court in session, we think the spirit of the law. embraces petitions for change of venue made either in vacation or term, — with this difference, however, that when the application is made in vacation, ten days’ notice is necessary, and that when made in Court in the presence of the adverse party, no notice is required. ■ ■ ■

*J. M. Johnston*and *G.*Holland, for the appellants.

*J.*Ryman, for the appellee.

The Circuit Court erred in refusing the change of venue.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed, and the proceedings subsequent to the petition for a change of venue set aside, with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
EXHIBIT 11.1

                                 WORLDTEX, INC.
                        COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                 (Dollars in thousands except per share amounts)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                       Six Months Ended              Three Months Ended 
                                            June 30,                       June 30,      
                                      1998            1997             1998        1997
                                      ----            ----            ----        ----
<S>                                   <C>             <C>             <C>         <C>
  
Net income                        $     2,899         4,695           748         2,029
                                  ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========
Shares:
  Weighted average number
    of shares outstanding          14,430,693    14,410,785    14,432,693    14,416,660
                                  ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========
  Basic earnings per share (1)    $       .20           .33           .05           .14
                                  ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========
  Shares:
  Weighted average number
    of shares outstanding          14,430,693   14,410,785   14,432,693      14,416,660
  Assumed exercise of options         327,246      424,745      301,975         323,783
                                  -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------
  Total average number of common
    and common equivalent shares
    used for diluted computation   14,757,939   14,835,530   14,734,668      14,740,443
                                  ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========
Diluted earnings per share (2)    $       .20          .32          .05             .14
                                  ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========

</TABLE>

(1)  Basic  earnings per share are  calculated  based upon the weighted  average
     number of common shares outstanding during the year.

(2)  Diluted  earnings per share are calculated  based upon the weighted average
     number of common shares and common equivalent shares outstanding during the
     year.
VERNON ROBINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-4552

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 15, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Steven B. Whittington, Judge.

Vernon Robinson, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WETHERELL, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
Exhibit 31.2

Certifications

I, Edward Escudero, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Petro Holdings Financial Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure
controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: March 30, 2006



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Edward Escudero                  
|(Edward Escudero)                    
|Chief Financial Officer and Secretary