alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 19, 2015

p0616

Order 

Clerk

June 19, 2015

149907 & (36)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149907

COA: 315193

Jackson CC: 10-006275-FH

ERIC D. MOORE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

By order of April 3, 2015, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the 

application for leave to appeal the June 24, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On 

order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is 

again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, 

we VACATE in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals erred 

in stating that insanity is not a defense to general intent crimes. The insanity defense 

statute, MCL 768.21a, does not limit application of the defense to specific intent crimes. 

Rather, the statute makes clear that insanity is a defense to all crimes, including general 

intent and strict liability offenses. Id. In stating otherwise, the Court of Appeals 

misinterpreted our decision in People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223 (2001). Relief is not 

warranted, however, because our review of the record indicates that the evidence which 

defendant claims was wrongly excluded would not have assisted defendant in proving the 

defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See MCL 768.21a(3). In all 

other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                          Independent Auditors' Consent

The Board of Directors
PLD Capital Asset (U.S.) Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (no.
333-5396) on Form S-3 of PLD Capital Asset (U.S.) Inc. of our report dated March
30, 1999, relating to the balance sheet of PLD Capital Asset (U.S.) Inc. as of
December 31, 1998, and the related statements of operations, shareholder's
equity, and cash flows for the year then ended, which report appears in the
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998 of PLD Capital
Asset (U.S.) Inc.

Our report dated March 30, 1999 contains an explanatory paragraph that states
that the Company's parent, PLD Telekom Inc. (PLD) does not presently have
sufficient funds on hand to meet its current debt obligations. PLD's failure to
make payment in full when required could result in a cross-default under and
acceleration of other debt obligations for which the Company is a guarantor.
These factors raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as
a going concern. The financial statements do not include any adjustments that
might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.

                                                     KPMG LLP

New York, New York
August 27, 1999
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of FC Banc Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
John R. Christman, President & Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|/s/ John R. Christman                  
|---------------------------------------
|John R. Christman                      
|President & Principal Executive Officer
|November 14, 2003                      



26
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2120 

To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prohibit 

the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the 

State of Oregon. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 25, 2004 

Mr. WYDEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act 

to prohibit the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the State of Oregon. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON OPERATION OF MEDICARE 

4 COMPARATIVE COST ADJUSTMENT (CCA) 

5 PROGRAM IN OREGON. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1860C–1(b) of the Social 

7 Security Act, as added by section 241 of the Medicare Pre8 scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2 

•S 2120 IS 

1 2003 (Public Law 108–173), is amended by adding at the 

2 end the following: 

3 ‘‘(3) NO CCA AREAS WITHIN OREGON.—A CCA 

4 area shall not include an MSA any portion of which 

5 is within the State of Oregon.’’. 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 this section shall take effect as if included in the enact8 ment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 

9 and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–173). 

Æ
Exhibit 13.1

Certifications required by Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b)

Certification

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
the undersigned officers of Trintech Group PLC (the Company), hereby certify that the Companys Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Cyril McGuireCYRIL MCGUIREChief Executive Officer/s/ Joseph SeeryJOSEPH SEERYVice President Finance, Group


Dated: May 7, 2010

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure to this statement.

A signed original of this written statement required by 18 U.S.C. § 1350 has been provided to
Trintech Group PLC and will be retained by Trintech Group PLC and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Borton *v.*Baxter, for the Use of English.

*Wednesday, December*4.

The sale of a promissory note secured by mortgage, is an equitable transfer of the mortgage to the purchaser of the note ;~and he should, therefore, be a party to a bill to foreclose, &e.

ERROR to the *Switzerland*Circuit Court.

Dewey, *J.*

— Baxter, suing for the use of English, brought a bill in equity, the object of which was the foreclosure of a mortgage, given to secure the payment of two promissory notes. The mortgage was executed by *Lewis*and wife, and the notes by *Lewis.*The defendants to the bill were the mortgagors and Burton, the latter claiming the mortgaged premises by a conveyance from Lewis, alleged to be of a date prior to that of the mortgage. - The bill alleges that the complainant, the mortgagee and payee of the notes, sold them to English, for whose use, and at whose request, the suit was commenced. On final hearing there was a decree of foreclosure, and sale of the mortgaged premises, and for costs against the defendants.

This decree cannot be sustained. The bill shows that the complainant had no equity. The sale of the notes, secured by the mortgage, to English, was an equitable transfer to him of the mortgage. Rob. on Frauds, 272, 275. See, also, *Clearwater*v. Rose, 1 Blackf. 137, and *Slaughter*v. *Foust et al.*4 Blackf. 379. The beneficial interest in the notes and *298mortgage being in *English,*he should have been a party to the bill. *Park*v. *Ballentine,*6 Blackf. 223.

*J. Dumont,*for the plaintiff.

*Per Curiam.*

— The decree is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

May 20, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ARTHER DEYKE KASONSO, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States

Attorney General, 

 Respondent.

No. 09-9557

ORDER

In an April 13, 2010 Order, counsel for Petitioner Arther Deyke Kasonso was directed

to file a response, within 21 days of the date on the order, i.e., by Tuesday, May 4, 2010, to

Respondent’s “motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively, motion for

summary disposition.” Petitioner failed to comply. In a letter dated May 5, 2010, counsel

for Petitioner was directed to file a response to Respondent’s motion, within 10 days of the

date on the letter, i.e., by Monday, May 17, 2010. Petitioner failed to comply.

Appellate Case: 09-9557 Document: 01018426294 Date Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 1 
2

Accordingly, the petition for review is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. See 10th

Cir. R. 42.1. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Kathleen T. Clifford

Attorney - Deputy Clerk

Appellate Case: 09-9557 Document: 01018426294 Date Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 2
Saunders' Motion to Extend Time to File PDR 1 of 3 Appellate No. 09- 14

- 00062 -CR

MARC RICHARD SAUNDERS §

§ IN THE TEXAS COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

§

VS. §

§

STATE OF TEXAS §

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME

TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

Now comes MARC RICHARD SAUNDERS, Appellant in the above styled and

numbered cause, and moves this Court to grant an extension of time to file

appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review and for good cause shows the

following:

1. This case is on appeal from the Ninth District Court of Appeals in

Beaumont

, styled MARC RICHARD SAUNDERS vs. STATE OF TEXAS

and was given Appellate No. 09- 14

- 00062 -CR.

2. The Court of Appeals' judgment was signed November 18, 2015.

3. The deadline to file Petition for Discretionary Review is December

18, 2015. PD-1640-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 12/17/2015 3:05:36 PM

Accepted 12/19/2015 9:41:55 AM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERKSaunders ' Mot ion to Extend Time to File PDR 2 of 3

4. A ppellant r equests an extension of time until January 18 , 201 6 o r

a time period of at least 30 days

.

5

. Appellant has not requested any prior extensions regarding

petition for discretionary review

.

6. Appellant relies on the following facts as good cause for the

requested extension:

Counsel is a solo practitioner and has been involved in or prepared for the

following criminal trials, appeals or motions:

(i) Montgomery County, Stat e of Texas v. Mike Angel Ulloa

,

221 st District Court, 14

- 02

- 02317

- CR , Tampering; Writ of

Habeas Corpus Appeal, Beaumont Court of Appeals, 9 th

District, 09

- 15

- 00398

- CR

(ii) United States District Court Southern District of Texas,

United States v. Darnell Menard

, 15cr296

- 01

, Judge Atlas

Houston, Conspiracy

, and multiple counts of fraud related

activity under 18 USC 1029 (a)( 2) ; (a)(3) ; and (b)(2)

.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED , Appellant prays that this Court

grant this Motion To Extend Time to File Petition for D i scretionary Review , and

for such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.Saunders ' Mot ion to Extend Time to File PDR 3 of 3 Respectfully submitted

/S/ Richard Martin P. Canlas

R ICHARD M ARTIN P. C ANLAS

Lawyer for Appellant

300 West Davis, Suite 560

Conroe, Texas 77301

Texas State Bar Number: 90001843

Tel: 936.788.6999

Fax Number: 936.788.5999

Certificate of Service

I certify that a true and correct copy of this motion was:

(a) faxed to Bill Delmore, Montgomery County District Attorne y’s

Office, 936.760.6940 , on December 17 , 201 5

/ S/ Rich ard Martin P. Canlas

Richard Martin P. Canlas
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALFRED A. PORRO AND THOMAS JONES.

June 27, 1978.

ORDERED that the within appeal is hereby dismissed. (See 152 *N. J. Super.*179)
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7573
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEROME DERRICK HARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (8:96-cr-00260-PJM) Submitted: December 14, 2006 De cided: December 22, 2006 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jerome Derrick Harris, Appellant Pro Se. Deborah A. Johnston, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.* In calculating the file date of his notice of appeal, we have given Harris the benefit of Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(c). - 2 - PER CURIAM: Jerome Derrick Harris seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). In criminal cases, the defendant must file the notice of appeal within ten days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); see United States v. Alvarez , 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and ten-day appeal period applies). With or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may grant an extension of up to thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes , 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985). The district court entered its order denying the motion for reduction of sentence on August 11, 2006. Harris filed the notice of appeal on August 31, 2006, * after the ten-day period expired but within the t hirty-day excusable neglect period. Because the notice of appeal was filed within the excusable neglect period, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and remand the case to the district court for the court to determine whether Harris has shown excusable neglect or good cause warranting an extension of the ten-day appeal period. The record, as- 3 - supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further consideration.

REMANDED
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2077 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit additional States 

to enter into long-term care partnerships under the Medicaid Program 

in order to promote the use of long-term care insurance. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 12, 2004

Mr. CRAIG (for himself and Mr. BAYH) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit 

additional States to enter into long-term care partnerships under the Medicaid Program in order to promote 

the use of long-term care insurance.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Long-Term Care In5 surance Partnership Program Act of 2004’’. 
2

S 2077 IS 

1 SEC. 2. PERMITTING ADDITIONAL STATES TO ENTER INTO 

2 LONG-TERM CARE PARTNERSHIPS TO PRO3 MOTE USE OF LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1917(b)(1)(C) of the So5 cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(C)) is amend6 ed—

7 (1) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘shall seek adjust8 ment’’ and inserting ‘‘may seek adjustment’’; and 

9 (2) in clause (ii), by striking ‘‘had a State plan 

10 amendment approved as of May 14, 1993, which 

11 provided’’ and inserting ‘‘has a State plan amend12 ment approved which provides’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment 

15 of this Act.

Æ
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1914

To prohibit the closure or realignment of inpatient services at the Aleda 

E. Lutz Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Saginaw, 

Michigan, as proposed under the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services initiative. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 21, 2003

Ms. STABENOW (for herself and Mr. LEVIN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL

To prohibit the closure or realignment of inpatient services 

at the Aleda E. Lutz Department of Veterans Affairs 

Medical Center in Saginaw, Michigan, as proposed under 

the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services 

initiative.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 1914 IS 

1 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT 

2 OF INPATIENT SERVICES AT ALEDA E. LUTZ 

3 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MED4 ICAL CENTER IN SAGINAW, MICHIGAN. 

5 The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall not carry out 

6 the closure or realignment of inpatient services at the 

7 Aleda E. Lutz Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 

8 Center in Saginaw, Michigan, as proposed under the Cap9 ital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) 

10 initiative.

Æ
#### John T. Pratt *v.*E. H. Samuels et al.

Pleadings — ’Sufficient Answer — Amended Petition.

Appellants deny that they were indebted to their eodefendant in any sum whatever, at the institution of the original action: *Held,*That this answer though filed in response to the original petition, should be held to sufficiently controvert the more specific averments of indebtedness, made in an amended petition, subsequently filed.

Evidence Taken Before Consolidation.

Where causes are consolidated without objection, the evidence taken before may be used on the trial of the consolidated ease.

APPEAL PROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT.

April 26, 1867.

Opinion or the Court by

Judge Hardin:

As the appellees, A. L. and J. Hardin, in their answer to the original petition of appellant deny that they were indebted to their codefendant Samuel in any sum whatever at the institution of the action, we think this answer, though filed in response to the original petition, should be taken to sufficiently controvert the more specific averments of indebtedness from them to Samuel *517made in the amended petition, subsequently filed, and that under the issue so formed the burden was on the appellant of proving an indebtedness from the Hardins to Samuel. The suits of Clarkson against Hardins which appear to have been consolidated with this, without objection, furnish the only evidence which was before the court as to the alleged indebtedness of said Hardins to Samuel and from that it appears that said Hardins’ notes for the balance of the price of property purchased by them of Samuel, and which embraced all they owed him, had been assigned and transferred to Clarkson before this suit was brought.

*Stevenson & Muers,*for Appellant.

*Simmons, and Pryor & Chambers,*for Appellee.

Therefore, perceiving no error in the judgment dismissing the appellant’s petition, the same is affirmed.

This court has repeatedly decided that the right to prosecute a cross-appeal as provided by section 895 of the Civil Code, is only allowed in behalf of an appellee against the appellant and not against a coappellee. Said Hardins’ cross-appeal against Clarkson is, therefore, dismissed.
#### In the Matter of Allstate Insurance Company, Appellant, v Arlene S. Massre et al., Respondents.

[789 NYS2d 206]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, the *611petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lodato, J.H.O.), dated February 24, 2004, which, after a hearing, denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the petition is granted, and the arbitration is permanently stayed.

The respondent Arlene S. Massre sustained injuries in a collision between a vehicle she owned and operated and a vehicle allegedly owned by a nonparty, Curol Mars, and insured under a policy issued by the respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm). State Farm disclaimed coverage of Massre’s injuries on the ground, among others, that the collision was intentional. Massre thereafter submitted a claim for uninsured motorist coverage to the petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate), which insured her vehicle. Allstate also disclaimed coverage and she requested arbitration. After a hearing, the Supreme Court denied Allstate’s petition for a permanent stay of arbitration.

The Supreme Court correctly concluded, based upon a fair interpretation of the credible evidence, that the collision was intentional and, in effect, determined that State Farm’s disclaimer was valid. However, since Massre’s injuries were not the result of an accident, she is precluded from recovering uninsured motorist benefits under Allstate’s policy *(see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre,*305 AD2d 490 [2003]; *Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Shaulskaya,*302 AD2d 522 [2003]; *Matter of Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. v Van Dina,*282 AD2d 680 [2001]; *Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co.,*293 AD2d 751 [2002]). Moreover, we note that State Farm was not required by Insurance Law § 3420 (d) to issue a disclaimer because its denial of coverage was based upon a lack of coverage and not a policy exclusion (see *Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre, supra*at 491; *Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., supra*at 752; *Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.,*90 NY2d 195, 201 [1997]). Florio, J.P., Adams, Cozier and Mastro, JJ., concur.
NASA Advisory Council Ad Hoc Task Force on

Science, Technology, Engineering

and Mathematics (STEM) Education

AGENDA

July 16, 2015

2:30 pm-4:00 pm

Call in or NASA Headquarters, 4U25

2:30 Open Meeting B. Girten

2:35 Opening Remarks by Chair J. Stofan

 

2:45 Selection of Task Force Vice Chair J. Stofan

2:50 Discussion of “Findings vs, Recommendations” D. Rausch

3:00 NASA Education Implementation Plan Update B. Girten

3:15 Performance Measurement P. Shaffer

3:45 Discussion and Recommendations Chair and Members

CONNECTION INFORMATION

Toll free access number: 844-467-6272 or toll access number 720-259-6462, and then the numeric 

participant passcode: 329152 followed by the # sign. 

To join via WebEx on July 16, the link is https://nasa.webex.com/, the meeting number is 997 384 

299 and the password is Educate1! (Password is case sensitive.)