alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 45.

#### H. McGlawn, administrator, &c. plaintiff in error, *vs.*David McGlawn, defendant in error.

[1.] An instrument, in form or deed, and conveying a female slave, for and in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars, to be delivered at the death of the seller, is not a testament, and therefore revocable: but is, to all intents and purposes, an absolute disposal of the remainder <in the negro, after the life estate has ended.

Trover, in Chattahoochee Superior Court. Tried before-Judge Worrill, November Term, 1854.

The sole question in this case was, whether the following instrument was a deed or a testamentary paper:

Georgia — Muscogee County :

Know all men by these presents, that J. Hardy McGlawn, of the said County of Muscogee, for and in consideration of the-sum. of Five Hundred Dollars, to me in hand paid, by my son, David McGlawn, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,, have bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do bargain, sell and convey to the said David, his heirs and assigns, a certain negro girl about 13 years old, of black complexion, named *Liz; to be delivered*to the said David at my death, and not before. And I hereby bind my heirs, executors and administrators, to warrant and defend the right and title in and.to the said negro girl, to the said David, from the claim of any person or persons whatsoever. In witness whereof, I have hereto set my' hand and seal, this the 9th day of November,. 1836.

Daniel M. Hall.

*235This instrument was recorded upon the probate of one of the witness.

The Court below held this instrument to be a deed, and this decision is assigned as error.

Harrison, for plaintiff in error.

Stubbs & Hill, for defendant in error.

*By the Court.*

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] This instrument is, to all intents and purposes, a sale, for a valuable consideration, ($500) of a slave, the seller reserving to himself a life estate in the property. In other words, it is the purchase of the remainder, after the life estate has terminated. We concur with the Circuit Court, that the ,paper was irrevocable and not testamentary in its character.
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FS-109.html
#### Stoeckel, Appellant, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio, Appellee.

(No. 6582

Decided November 13, 1945.)

*Mr. William Isaacs,*for appellant.

*Mr. Edward A. Schoil,*for appellee.

*Mr. Henry M. Bruestle,*for city of Cincinnati.

Hildebrant, P. J.

In response to the cry of a police officer ‘ ‘ Stop that man, ’ ’ plaintiff attempted to apprehend a man running along the street with a police officer in pursuit. The fugitive shot the plaintiff, who later filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission of Ohio on the theory that in responding to the cry of “Stop that man” he became an employee of the city within the meaning of Section 1465-61, General Code (114 Ohio Laws, 28), which read as follows:

“The term ‘employe,’ ‘workman’ and ‘operative’ as used in this act, shall be construed to mean:

“1. Every person in the service of the state, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, including regular members of lawfully constituted police and fire departments of cities and villages, under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except *160any official of the state, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein. * # # J J

The appeal is on questions of law from a judgment of the court below, denying the right of plaintiff to participate in the workmen’s compensation fund.

The sole question is whether, under the above facts, plaintiff was an employee of the city within the meaning of Section 1465-61, General Code.

Under the statutes of Ohio the sole power of creating the relationship of employer and employee of a police officer of a city lies with the director of public safety of the city by virtue'of Section 4368, General Code, subject to the civil service requirements. Cases cited under Section 2833, General Code, relating to county sheriffs have no application here, hence will not be discussed.

It is argued that Section 12857, General Code, somehow applies here. It reads:

“Whoever, when called upon by a sheriff, coroner, constable or other ministerial officer to assist in apprehending a person charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offense, or in securing such person when so apprehended, or in conveying him to prison, neglects or refuses so to do, shall be fined not more than fiftv dollars. ’ ’

If the police officer be an “other ministerial officer” contemplated by the section, it still appears to the court the section is purely a penal one directed to compelling all citizens to recognize their reciprocal obligations of citizenship and can not be the basis for creating the relationship of employer and employee.

The judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Hildebrant, P. J., Matthews and Ross, JJ., concur in the syllabus, opinion and judgment.
The Attorney General of Texas 

August 17, 1981 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Mr. Ruben M. Torres, Chairman Opinion No. w-361 

Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles 

Stephen F. Austin Building, Room 711 Re: Interpretation of article 

Austin, Texas 78711 42.12, 915(d) Code of Criminal 

Procedure 

Dear Mr. Torres: 

You have requested our opinion regarding the proper construction 

of section 15(d) of article 42.12, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 

That section provides: 

A prisoner who has not been released to 

mandatory supervision and has 180 calendar days or 

less remaining on his sentence may be released by 

order of the Board to mandatory supervision. 

Section 15(c) provides, in pertinent part: 

A prisoner who is not on parole, except a 

person under sentence of death, -- shall be released 

to mandatory supervision by order of the Board 

when the calendar time he has served plus any 

accrued good conduct time equal the maximum term 

to which he was sentenced. A prisoner released to 

mandatory supervision shall, upon release, be 

deemed as if released on parole. (Emphasis 

added.) 

You explain that the Board of Pardons and Paroles has heretofore 

construed the word "sentence" in section 15(d) to refer to the maximum 

term to which a prisoner was sentenced by the trial court, without 

taking into account any good conduct time under section 15(c). YOU 

ask whether the Board may interpret the word "sentence" to refer to 

the release date imposed by section 15(c), i.e., the maximum term less 

good conduct time. 

Crediting good conduct time is not discretionary, but is required 

by the clear language of section 15(c). Thus, for purposes of 

determining a prisoner's release date, a llsentencell in section 15(c) 

seems to refer to the prisoner's maximum term less good conduct time. 

We believe that the Board's proposed construction is in fact the most 

p. 1208 
Ruben M. Torres - Page 2 MW-361 

reasonable interpretation of the word "sentence" in section 15(d). 

The word "sentence" in section 15(d) of article 42.12 should be 

construed to refer to the release date imposed by section 15(c) 

thereof, i.e., the maximum term less accrued good conduct time. 

SUMMARY 

The Board of Pardons and Paroles should 

construe the word "sentence" in section 15(d) of 

article 42.12, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 

to refer to the release date imposed by 

section 15(c) of that statute, i.e., a prisoner's 

maximum term less any accrued good conduct time. 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

RICHARD E. GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman 

Jqn Bible 

Rick Gilpin 

Jim Moellinger 

p. 1209
Exhibit 23.1





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference
in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-55432, No. 333-61168 and No. 333-72730) and Form S-8 (No. 333-61248, No. 333-54976, No. 333-52634, No. 333-47020, No. 333-92619 and No. 333-81492) of SonicWALL, Inc. of our reports dated
January 18, 2002 relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule, which appear in this Form 10-K.





/S/    PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP





San Jose, California


March 28, 2002
EXHIBIT 32.2



CREDENCE SYSTEMS CORPORATION



CERTIFICATION



In connection with the periodic report of Credence Systems Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended January 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, John R. Detwiler, Chief Financial Officer, of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code,
that to the best of my knowledge:



(1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
the dates and for the periods indicated.



This certification has not been, and
shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



|                                        
|----------------------------------------
|Date: March 15, 2004                    
|                                        
|/s/ JOHN R. DETWILER                    
|                                        
|John R. Detwiler Chief Financial Officer
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#### JOSEPH VIERA v. TOWNSHIP COUNCIL OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS.

May 30, 1978.

Petition for certification denied. (See 156 *N. J. Super.*19)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-10222 

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LEWIS HENRY ANTHONY,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:03-CV-1236-A

USDC No. 4:00-CR-117-2-A

--------------------

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lewis Henry Anthony, federal prisoner # 29692-077, moves

this court for a certificate of appealability (COA) following the

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as

untimely. Anthony’s motion for bail pending appeal is DENIED. 

See Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974). 

Anthony seeks to challenge his 2000 conviction for conspiracy,

possession of stolen mail, and bank fraud. The district court

determined that although the certificate of service for the 28
No. 04-10222

-2-

U.S.C. § 2255 motion indicated that it was filed within the oneyear limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Anthony

had failed to submit further proof that his motion was timely

filed.

To obtain a COA, Anthony must make “a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2255

motion on procedural grounds, a COA may not issue unless the

prisoner shows that “jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)(§ 2254

case).

“A prisoner’s habeas application is considered ‘filed’ when

delivered to the prison authorities for mailing to the district

court.” Sonnier v. Johnson, 161 F.3d 941, 945 n.2 (5th Cir.

1998)(quoting Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir.

1998)). “Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in

compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(c)(1)

(prisoner appeal); see also Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401

(5th Cir. 1999)(noting that the rules regarding the timeliness of

a notice of appeal have been extended to the filing of habeas

petitions). The certificate of service for Anthony’s 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion, which was given in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 
No. 04-10222

-3-

§ 1746, reflects that the motion was timely. Accordingly, we

grant Anthony’s motion for a COA, VACATE the order dismissing the

motion as untimely, and REMAND the case to the district court for

further proceedings. See Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 388

(5th Cir. 1998). Anthony’s motion to amend his motion for a COA

is DENIED.

COA GRANTED; VACATE AND REMAND; OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

July 25, 2011 

y0718 

Order 

 

July 25, 2011 

142939 & (163) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 142939 

 COA: 291554 

Jackson CC: 08-004100-FH 

ANDREW LYNN BREEDING, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for 

peremptory relief is DENIED.
created on: November 2, 2012

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-12-00488-CR

Joshua Christopher JOSEPH,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 211th District Court, Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. F-2010-1821-C

The Honorable L. Dee Shipman, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 7, 2012

DISMISSED

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal by withdrawing his notice of appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). Appellant’s motion is granted and this appeal is dismissed. See id.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-1997   
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           94,750  
<SECURITIES>                                     20,415  
<RECEIVABLES>                                   186,813  
<ALLOWANCES>                                     11,915  
<INVENTORY>                                     141,434  
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                486,311  
<PP&E>                                           29,939  
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (43,791)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  606,176  
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           211,390  
<BONDS>                                             604
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0  
<PREFERRED>                                           0  
<COMMON>                                            344  
<OTHER-SE>                                      394,188  
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    606,176  
<SALES>                                       1,029,922  
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              1,029,922  
<CGS>                                           858,546 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 1,005,742  
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  3,229  
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1,008  
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  26,752 
<INCOME-TAX>                                     11,120  
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              15,632  
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0  
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0  
<CHANGES>                                             0  
<NET-INCOME>                                     15,632  
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      0.45  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      0.45
                                               


</TABLE>
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. VERGEAL GUY.

June 21, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1919

To designate a portion of the United States courthouse located at 2100 

Jamieson Avenue, in Alexandria, Virginia, as the ‘‘Justin W. Williams 

United States Attorney’s Building’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 21, 2003

Mr. ALLEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

A BILL

To designate a portion of the United States courthouse located at 2100 Jamieson Avenue, in Alexandria, Virginia, 

as the ‘‘Justin W. Williams United States Attorney’s 

Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The building and structure de5 scribed in subsection (b) shall be known and designated 

6 as the ‘‘Justin W. Williams United States Attorney’s 

7 Building’’. 
2

•S 1919 IS 

1 (b) DESCRIPTION.—The building and structure to be 

2 designated under subsection (a) is that portion of the 

3 United States courthouse located at 2100 Jamieson Ave4 nue, in Alexandria, Virginia (commonly known as the 

5 Albert V. Bryan United States Courthouse), that is at6 tached to the courthouse main tower structure, described 

7 as ‘‘A-Wing’’ in the architectural plans, and currently oc8 cupied by the Office of the United States Attorney for the 

9 Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. 

10 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

11 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

12 paper, or other record of the United States to the building 

13 and structure described in section 1(b) shall be deemed 

14 to be a reference to the Justin W. Williams United States 

15 Attorney’s Building. 

16 SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

17 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums 

18 as are necessary for—

19 (1) appropriate identifying designations to be 

20 affixed to the building and structure described in 

21 section 1(b); and 

22 (2) an appropriate plaque reflecting the des23 ignation under section 1, and honoring Justin W. 

24 Williams and his service to the United States, to be 
3

•S 1919 IS 

1 affixed to or displayed in that building and struc2 ture.

Æ
<PAGE>   1

                                  GARDEN BOTANIKA, INC.
                                 CALCULATION OF EARNINGS
                         PER COMMON AND COMMON EQUIVALENT SHARE
                                      (EXHIBIT 11)
                      (amounts in thousands, except per share data)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                        (Unaudited)
                                                                       Quarter Ended
                                                                   -----------------------
                                                                    29-Apr       01-May
                                                                     2000         1999
                                                                   ----------   ----------
<S>                                                                  <C>         <C>
PRIMARY:
   Earnings -
      Net earnings (loss) applicable to common and common
       equivalent shares                                             $(1,598)    $(10,478)
                                                                   ==========   ==========
   Shares -
      Weighted average common shares outstanding                       7,069        7,069
      Net effect of stock options, based on treasury stock
        method using average market price (1)                              -            -

                                                                   ----------   ----------
  Weighted average common and common equivalent shares                 7,069        7,069
                                                                   ==========   ==========

 Primary earnings (loss) per common and common equivalent share       $(0.23)      $(1.48)
                                                                   ==========   ==========
</TABLE>


FULLY DILUTED:
   Fully diluted earnings (loss) per share is not presented, as there were no
potentially dilutive securities.


NOTES:

   (1)In the calculation of weighted average common and common equivalent
      shares, nonqualified stock options and warrants to purchase common stock
      are considered common stock equivalents. Such options and warrants are
      converted using the treasury stock method, which assumes that the shares
      issuable upon exercise of the options or warrants were outstanding for the
      full period. In accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
      no common stock equivalents are shown for the first quarter of either
      fiscal 2000 or 1999, as their effect would have been anti-dilutive.







                                       15