PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TYLER SANCHEZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOE RYAN HARTLEY, Detective, 

in his individual capacity; RYAN 

WOLFF, Detective, in his individual 

capacity; MIKE DUFFY, Detective, 

in his individual capacity; 

HEATHER MYKES, Detective, in 

her individual capacity; MICHAEL 

DICKSON, Investigator, in his 

individual capacity; BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 

DOUGLAS COUNTY, COLORADO; 

DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE, 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY FOR THE 

EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT, 

 Defendant. 

No. 14-1385 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01945-WJM-CBS)

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 11, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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Kelly Dunnaway (Christopher K. Pratt, with him on the briefs), Douglas 

County Attorney’s Office, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Mike Duffy, 

Detective Heather Mykes, The Board of County Commissioners of Douglas 

County, and Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, Defendants-Appellants. 

Keith M. Goman (Andrew David Ringel, with him on the briefs), Hall & 

Evans, LLC, Denver, Colorado, for Michael Dickson, Defendant-Appellant. 

Gordon L. Vaughan, and Ann B. Smith, Vaughan & DeMuro, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, on the briefs, for Joe Ryan Hartley and Ryan Wolff, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

John A. Culver (Seth J. Benezra, with him on the brief), Benezra & Culver, 

Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and BACHARACH, 

Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Mr. Tyler Sanchez sued state detectives and an investigator, alleging 

that they had used a confession to obtain legal process even though they 

knew the confession was untrue. The defendants moved to dismiss based in 

part on qualified immunity and expiration of the limitations period. The 

district court rejected both grounds, and the defendants brought this 

interlocutory appeal. We affirm the district court’s denial of the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity; and we 

dismiss the defendants’ appeal of the district court’s ruling on the statute 

of limitations, holding that we lack jurisdiction on this part of the appeal. 

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I. Mr. Sanchez’s Claim

This appeal grew out of an investigation into a 2009 burglary and 

sexual assault of an 8-year-old girl. Four detectives (Joe Ryan Hartley, 

Ryan Wolff, Mike Duffy, and Heather Mykes) and an investigator (Michael 

Dickson) participated in the investigation. In carrying out the 

investigation, the detectives and investigator interviewed Mr. Sanchez, an 

18-year-old with substantial cognitive disabilities. After lengthy 

interviews, Mr. Sanchez confessed to the burglary but not the sexual 

assault. The confession led the district attorney to charge Mr. Sanchez with 

burglary and sexual assault. Based in part on this confession, multiple 

judges found probable cause, resulting in pretrial detention. 

Mr. Sanchez alleges that his confession was false, explaining that he 

confessed only because his disabilities prevented him from understanding 

what was happening during the interviews. A subsequent medical 

examination supported Mr. Sanchez’s explanation, and the district attorney 

dropped the charges in April 2012. 

After dismissal of the charges, Mr. Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, arguing that the defendants had committed malicious prosecution 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment by using a false confession to 

institute legal process and cause continued pretrial detention. 

The defendants moved for dismissal, and the district court denied the 

motion. The defendants then brought this interlocutory appeal, arguing that 

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the district court should have ordered dismissal based on qualified 

immunity and the statute of limitations. These arguments do not justify 

reversal. Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations are sufficient to overcome 

qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, and we lack appellate 

jurisdiction on the issue involving the statute of limitations. 

II. We engage in de novo review of the district court’s denial of 

qualified immunity.

In considering the defense of qualified immunity, we engage in de 

novo review. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2004). 

This review is based on our standards for dismissal and qualified 

immunity. 

Under the standard for dismissal, we assume that all of the 

allegations in the complaint are true and view the reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to Mr. Sanchez. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 

1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007). In applying this standard to the defense of 

qualified immunity, we consider whether Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations 

and related inferences show the violation of a clearly established 

constitutional right. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of 

Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 2000). 

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III. Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of a clearly 

established constitutional right. 

Mr. Sanchez argues that the complaint stated a constitutional 

violation by alleging that the detectives and investigator had used a 

confession that they knew was untrue. We agree. 

A. Mr. Sanchez alleged the violation of a constitutional right.

In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez brings a § 1983 claim against the 

defendants for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. In our view, Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of 

a constitutional right.1

According to Mr. Sanchez, the detectives and investigator sought 

legal process based on the confession even though they either knew the 

confession was untrue or recklessly ignored that possibility. If Mr. 

Sanchez’s allegation is credited, it would involve a constitutional 

violation, for we have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers 

from knowingly or recklessly relying on false information to institute legal 

process when that process results in an unreasonable seizure. Pierce v. 

Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Mr. 

 

1

 “Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the 

following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued 

confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of 

the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued 

confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) 

the plaintiff sustained damages.” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 

(10th Cir. 2008). 

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Sanchez’s factual allegations, if proven, would entail a Fourth Amendment 

violation. 

 The defendants do not dispute that in the abstract, the Constitution is 

violated when an officer knowingly or recklessly uses false information to 

institute legal process. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 19 (conceding that the 

defendants “do not argue it is constitutional to knowingly use false 

statements”). Instead, the defendants present five reasons that the 

complaint fails to allege violation of a constitutional right for purposes of 

Section 19832

: 

1. Section 1983 does not permit recovery for malicious 

prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. 

2. In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez did not adequately allege 

knowledge or recklessness. 

3. Mr. Sanchez’s only possible claim is for false imprisonment, 

 not malicious prosecution. 

4. A malicious-prosecution theory could implicate the District 

Attorney, but not the detectives or the investigator because 

they could not have decided to prosecute Mr. Sanchez. 

5. Mr. Sanchez has not alleged conduct that would shock the 

 conscience. 

 

2

 The appeal was brought by all defendants, including the Douglas 

County Board of County Commissioners and the Douglas County Sheriff’s 

Office. But qualified immunity is available only to defendants sued in their 

individual capacities. Langley v. Adams Cty., 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th 

Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court’s ruling on qualified immunity affected 

only the individual defendants, not the board of county commissioners or 

the sheriff’s office.

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We reject each argument. 

1. Under § 1983, an arrestee can recover for malicious 

prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.

The defendants argue that § 1983 might allow recovery for malicious 

prosecution based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the 

Fourth Amendment. We disagree, for we have repeatedly recognized a 

cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 

2013) (discussing a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the 

Fourth Amendment); Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 

2008) (same); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (10th Cir. 1996) 

(same). 

The defendants point to two opinions in arguing that § 1983 does not 

allow recovery for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment: 

Mondragón v. Thompson and Rehberg v. Paulk. The defendants’ reliance 

on these opinions is misguided. 

The defendants first argue that under Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 

F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008), a malicious prosecution resulting in legal 

process is actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment as a deprivation of 

procedural due process, but is not actionable under the Fourth Amendment. 

It is true that Mondragón recognized the existence of a § 1983 maliciousprosecution claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Mondragón, 519 

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F.3d at 1083. In dictum, we questioned whether the same claim could also 

be based on the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1083 n.4. In subsequent cases, 

however, we squarely addressed this question, recognizing a cause of 

action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 

2013). Our dictum in Mondragón does not negate our more recent 

pronouncements recognizing such a cause of action under § 1983. 

The defendants also argue that reliance on the Fourth Amendment is 

precluded by Rehberg v. Paulk, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). But 

Rehberg does not bear on our issue. There the Supreme Court held only 

that “a grand jury witness,” including a law-enforcement officer, “has 

absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’ 

testimony.” Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506. Mr. Sanchez’s allegations relate 

to the defendants’ conduct before Mr. Sanchez was charged, not testimony 

before a grand jury. Thus, Rehberg does not undermine our precedents 

allowing recovery under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

In our view, a cause of action exists under § 1983 for malicious 

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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2. The complaint contains sufficient allegations of knowledge 

or recklessness.

To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, Mr. Sanchez 

bears the burden of alleging facts indicating not only that the confession 

was untrue, but also that the defendants either knew that the confession 

was untrue or recklessly disregarded that possibility. See Wolford v. 

Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (“It is a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment for an arrest warrant affiant to ‘knowingly, or with reckless 

disregard for the truth,’ include false statements in the affidavit.” (quoting 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978))). Relying on this burden, 

the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez failed to allege facts indicating 

knowledge that the confession was untrue or reckless disregard of this 

possibility. We disagree. 

On this issue, we must determine whether Mr. Sanchez has plausibly 

alleged the defendants’ knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth. See 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that to 

survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may 

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] 

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facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974)). 

Mr. Sanchez satisfied this standard. In the complaint, he provided 

factual allegations and details that would plausibly indicate that the 

defendants either knew the confession was untrue or acted in reckless 

disregard of the truth. For example, Mr. Sanchez alleged these six facts in 

the complaint: 

1. The victim of the sexual assault gave a description of her 

attacker that did not suggest Mr. Sanchez. According to the 

victim, the attacker was roughly 40 years old, weighed about 

190 pounds, had no tattoos, and had brown hair parted down the 

middle. See Appellants’ App’x at 109. Mr. Sanchez was only 18 

years old, weighed only about 130 pounds, had prominently 

displayed tattoos on both arms, and had buzz-cut red hair. See 

id. The detectives and investigator knew that Mr. Sanchez did 

not fit the victim’s description of the perpetrator. See id. at 111 

(Detectives Wolff and Hartley), 114 (Detectives Duffy and 

Mykes), 118 (Investigator Dickson). 

2. Mr. Sanchez has pronounced cognitive and developmental 

disabilities and IQ test scores in the 60s and 70s. These 

disabilities cause Mr. Sanchez to engage in noticeably unusual 

behavior. See id. at 108-09. 

3. In interviews with the defendants, Mr. Sanchez had significant 

difficulty understanding and responding to questions. See, e.g., 

id. at 110-12, 114-15. 

4. Mr. Sanchez’s unusual behavior in the interviews was amplified 

by fatigue. He had been awake for over 30 hours by the end of 

the interviews, and he repeatedly told the defendants that he 

was tired and spoke with his eyes closed. See id. at 113-14, 117. 

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5. The detectives and investigator noticed Mr. Sanchez’s unusual 

behavior. At one point, two detectives asked Mr. Sanchez if he 

was simply saying what they wanted to hear. See id. at 112 

(Detectives Wolff and Hartley). One of the detectives wrote 

that Mr. Sanchez had difficulty remembering details of his 

supposed crimes and had given vague answers. See id. 

(Detective Wolff). Two other detectives suspected 

intoxication, asking Mr. Sanchez to take a urine test to verify 

that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See id.

at 116 (Detectives Mykes and Duffy). And the investigator 

observed that Mr. Sanchez was behaving unusually and 

experiencing difficulty answering questions. See id. at 119 

(Investigator Dickson). 

6. Mr. Sanchez was unable to give any details regarding his 

involvement in the crime. Instead, Mr. Sanchez simply agreed 

to the details suggested to him. At one point, Mr. Sanchez 

agreed to an untrue detail that the investigator had posed (that 

Mr. Sanchez had climbed into the victim’s second-story 

window with a ladder). As the investigator knew, no ladder was 

found at the scene. See id. at 122. 

These alleged facts plausibly support the required inference of the 

defendants’ knowledge or recklessness. 

In oral argument, defense counsel suggested that the complaint does 

not contain sufficient factual allegations to support an inference of 

knowledge or recklessness against the investigator. Oral Argument at 

31:40-33:10. We disagree. The complaint alleges that (1) the investigator 

noticed Mr. Sanchez’s abnormal behavior and inability to provide any 

detail about the burglary and sexual assault and (2) Mr. Sanchez agreed to 

a detail about the crime that the investigator knew was untrue. These 

allegations plausibly support the required inference that the investigator 

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knew that the confession was untrue or recklessly disregarded this 

possibility.

3. The initial warrantless arrest of Mr. Sanchez does not ` 

 invalidate Mr. Sanchez’s claim of malicious prosecution. 

Our case law distinguishes between seizures based on whether they 

are imposed with or without legal process. Though both types of seizures 

implicate the Fourth Amendment, seizures imposed pursuant to legal 

process generally trigger claims for malicious prosecution, while seizures 

imposed without legal process generally trigger claims for false 

imprisonment. Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013). 

Based on this distinction, the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez could 

assert only a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested and 

detained without a warrant. 

This argument is foreclosed by Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790 

(10th Cir. 2008). There we recognized a cause of action under § 1983 for 

malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment for seizures 

that occur after a warrantless arrest. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 798. “If arrested 

without a warrant . . . a plaintiff can challenge the probable cause 

determination made during the constitutionally-required probable cause 

hearing,” which must occur after the initial warrantless arrest. Id. (citation 

omitted). A plaintiff who brings such a challenge “would state a Fourth 

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Amendment violation sufficient to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution 

cause of action.” Id. at 799. 

Our holding in Wilkins forecloses the defendants’ argument that Mr. 

Sanchez is confined to a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested 

without a warrant. It is true that the defendants initially arrested Mr. 

Sanchez without a warrant and, therefore, without legal process. But after 

this warrantless arrest, there were multiple judicial determinations of 

probable cause to detain Mr. Sanchez on all of the pending charges. Based 

on this legal process, Mr. Sanchez spent an additional 125 days in jail. 

Under Wilkins, Mr. Sanchez’s theory states a valid claim under 

§ 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

and Mr. Sanchez’s initial warrantless arrest is immaterial to the validity of 

this claim. See id.3

4. The malicious-prosecution theory is not confined to the 

District Attorney. 

The defendants also argue that the malicious-prosecution claim must 

be confined to the District Attorney because he was the official who 

decided to prosecute. The defendants provide no support for this argument, 

and it is invalid under Pierce v. Gilchrist. There we held that a malicious-

 

3

 After releasing Mr. Sanchez, the district court imposed pretrial 

restrictions. The defendants argue that restrictions on movement did not 

qualify as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We need not address this 

argument because the jailing for 125 days constituted a seizure. 

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prosecution theory would lie against a forensic analyst even though she did 

not (and could not) decide to prosecute: 

[The forensic analyst] cannot “hide behind” the fact that she 

neither initiated nor filed the charges against [the plaintiff]. 

The actions of a police forensic analyst who prevaricates and 

distorts evidence to convince the prosecuting authorities to 

press charges is no less reprehensible than an officer who, 

through false statements, prevails upon a magistrate to issue a 

warrant. In each case the government official maliciously 

abuses a position of trust to induce the criminal justice system 

to confine and then to prosecute an innocent defendant. 

Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 

Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1147 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Of course, 

the fact that a government lawyer makes the final decision to prosecute 

does not automatically immunize an officer from liability for malicious 

prosecution.”). 

 Like the forensic analyst in Pierce, the four detectives and 

investigator would incur liability under a malicious-prosecution theory if 

they knowingly or recklessly used false information to institute legal 

process. 

5. The shock-the-conscience standard does not bear on Mr. 

Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment claim. 

The defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez has not pleaded facts that 

would shock the conscience. But this argument is irrelevant because Mr. 

Sanchez did not need to plead facts that shock the conscience. 

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The “shock the conscience” standard governs claims involving 

substantive due process. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th 

Cir. 2002). Reliance on this standard is mistaken because Mr. Sanchez has 

not invoked substantive due process. Instead, he invokes the Fourth 

Amendment. For a claim under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Sanchez need 

not plead facts that shock the conscience. See Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 

F.2d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The due process standard is more 

onerous than the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard since the 

former requires, in addition to undue force, personal malice amounting to 

an abuse of official power sufficient to shock the conscience.”). 

* * * 

 Because Mr. Sanchez has pleaded facts reflecting a constitutional 

violation, we must determine if the underlying right was clearly 

established when the alleged violation took place. 

B. The underlying right under the Fourth Amendment was 

clearly established when the violation occurred. 

Mr. Sanchez alleges that the defendants either knowingly or 

recklessly used an untrue confession to initiate legal process. As we have 

explained, this conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment. But to 

overcome qualified immunity, Mr. Sanchez must also show that the 

underlying right was clearly established in 2009, when the events took 

place. He has made that showing. 

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1. The underlying constitutional right was clearly established 

 at the time of the alleged conduct. 

By 2009, our precedents had clearly established that the defendants’ 

alleged actions would have violated the Fourth Amendment. Five years 

earlier, we had held in Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004), 

that “[n]o one could doubt that the prohibition on falsification or omission 

of evidence, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, was firmly 

established as of 1986, in the context of information supplied to support a 

warrant for arrest.” 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). Under Pierce, 

the four detectives and investigator should have known by 2009 that the 

knowing or reckless use of a false confession would violate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

2. The defendants’ arguments to the contrary are invalid. 

The defendants present three arguments that Mr. Sanchez’s asserted 

constitutional right was not clearly established in 2009: 

1. The Fourth Amendment did not require accommodation of a 

cognitive disability. 

2. The contours of a malicious-prosecution claim were ill defined. 

3. It was not clearly established that a seizure imposed pursuant 

to wrongful legal process would violate the Fourth Amendment 

(as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment). 

Each argument is invalid. 

First, the defendants contend that the Fourth Amendment did not 

clearly require interrogators to (1) determine whether a suspect had 

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cognitive disabilities or (2) accommodate these disabilities. But this 

contention reflects confusion on Mr. Sanchez’s claim. Mr. Sanchez claims 

that the defendants either knew that his confession was untrue or recklessly 

disregarded that possibility. If that was the case, the defendants would 

have violated the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether they had a 

specific duty to ascertain and accommodate Mr. Sanchez’s cognitive 

difficulties. 

Second, the defendants argue that the contours of a § 1983 claim for 

malicious prosecution were not clearly defined in 2009. But this argument 

confuses the alleged constitutional violation with the underlying cause of 

action that provides a remedy for the violation. Section 1983 merely 

provides a cause of action; the substantive rights are created elsewhere. 

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Taylor v. 

Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ur circuit takes the 

common law elements of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ for 

the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches 

the ultimate question . . . of whether the plaintiff has proven a 

constitutional violation.” (emphasis in original)). As a result, the contours 

of a malicious-prosecution claim do not help resolve the material question 

in this appeal: whether the Constitution would clearly have prohibited the 

knowing or reckless use of a false confession in 2009. As discussed above, 

our precedents had clearly recognized this prohibition by 2009. 

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Third, the defendants argue that in 2009, it was not clearly 

established whether the underlying constitutional violation would involve 

the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to procedural 

due process. For this argument, the defendants rely on Mondragón v. 

Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008). In Mondragón, we held that if 

a defendant “has been imprisoned pursuant to legal but wrongful process, 

he has a claim under the procedural component of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause analogous to a tort claim for malicious 

prosecution.” Mondragón, 519 F.3d at 1082. In dictum we added that we 

did not “foreclose the additional, though unlikely, possibility” that such 

wrongful process could also give rise to a separate violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 1083 n.4. 

We reject the defendants’ argument for two reasons. 

First, we said in Pierce v. Gilchrist, which preceded Mondragón, that 

it was a Fourth Amendment violation to knowingly or recklessly use false 

information to initiate legal process when that process leads to an 

unreasonable seizure. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298-99 (10th 

Cir. 2004). 

Second, after our dictum in Mondragón, we held in Wilkins v. 

DeReyes that an arrestee can bring a malicious-prosecution claim when 

legal process is initiated and results in an unreasonable seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 

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2008).4

 Thus, by 2009, our holding in Wilkins would have provided notice 

to the detectives and the investigator that their alleged conduct would 

violate the Fourth Amendment. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987) (holding that for a constitutional right to be clearly established, 

“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”). 

In these circumstances, we conclude that the defendants should have 

realized that the knowing or reckless use of a false confession to institute 

legal process would violate a clearly established constitutional right. The 

purported uncertainty did not involve the constitutionality of the conduct; 

instead, the purported uncertainty involved whether the violation would 

● constitute malicious prosecution or false imprisonment 

and 

 

● involve the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s right to procedural due process. 

 

4

 The defendants characterize this conclusion in Wilkins as dictum 

rather than a holding. We respectfully disagree with this characterization. 

In Wilkins, the plaintiffs asserted a cause of action for malicious 

prosecution after the initiation of legal process. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 

F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008). In light of this characterization of the 

claim, we analyzed it as a malicious-prosecution claim under the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 797; see also Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194-

95 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying on Wilkins and holding that “[u]nreasonable 

seizures imposed with legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment 

malicious-prosecution claims”). Thus, our recognition of a Fourth 

Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, after the initiation of legal 

process, was necessary to Wilkins’s disposition. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. 

v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (distinguishing holdings from dicta). 

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In our view, the defendants misread our precedents, which by 2009 had 

clearly recognized malicious-prosecution claims under the Fourth 

Amendment after the initiation of a legal process resulting in an 

unreasonable seizure. 

* * * 

The district court properly held that Mr. Sanchez had adequately 

alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. As a 

result, we uphold the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 

basis of qualified immunity. 

IV. We decline to assert pendent appellate jurisdiction on the issue 

involving the statute of limitations.

The defendants also argue that the malicious-prosecution claim is 

barred by the statute of limitations. We have discretion over whether to 

address this argument at the interlocutory stage. Exercising this discretion, 

we decline to decide whether the claim is time-barred. 

The threshold issue is whether we can consider this issue. Although 

an interlocutory appeal is ordinarily available upon the denial of qualified 

immunity, an interlocutory appeal for the statute of limitations is 

ordinarily not appealable. See Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 796 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (“A statute of limitations defense is ordinarily not appealable as 

part of an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal.”). Therefore, we can 

decide whether Mr. Sanchez’s claim is time-barred only if we first exercise 

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pendent appellate jurisdiction over that issue. Moore v. City of 

Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995). 

But the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is both 

discretionary and “generally disfavored.” Id. Using this discretion, we 

decline to decide the issue of timeliness. 

Although we have rejected the defendants’ arguments for qualified 

immunity, our analysis of that issue may not fully resolve the defendants’ 

argument on the statute of limitations. See id. at 930 (holding that pendent 

appellate jurisdiction is appropriate only “when the appellate resolution of 

the [appealable issue] necessarily resolves the [otherwise non-appealable 

issue] as well” (emphasis in original)). 

Because we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over 

the defendants’ argument on the statute of limitations, we dismiss this 

portion of the defendants’ appeal based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

See Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1257 (10th Cir. 2015). 

V. Disposition

 We affirm the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity; and we dismiss the portion of 

the appeal relating to the statute of limitations, holding that we lack 

appellate jurisdiction. 

Appellate Case: 14-1385 Document: 01019551401 Date Filed: 01/11/2016 Page: 21