UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARLON WALKER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

SUSAN WHITE, DOC Division of Adult 

Parole, in her personal capacity for 

damages; GUILLERMO SAMUDIO, DOC 

Division of Adult Parole, in his personal 

capacity for damages; DANA MADRID, 

DOC Division of Adult Parole, in her 

personal capacity for damages; BRIAN 

STRUZESKI, DOC Division of Adult 

Parole, in his personal capacity for 

damages; ED THOMAS, Member of the 

Parole Board, in his personal capacity for 

damages; DENISE BALAZIC, Member of 

the Parole Board, in her personal capacity 

for damages; PATRICIA VAN WAAK, 

Member of the Parole Board, in her 

personal capacity for damages; JOHN 

O'DELL, Member of the Parole Board, in 

his personal capacity for damages; 

MICHAEL ANDERSON, Member of the 

Parole Board, in his personal capacity for 

damages; REBECCA OAKES, Member of 

the Parole Board, in her personal capacity 

for damages; ANTHONY YOUNG, 

Member of the Parole Board, in his 

personal capacity; BRANDON SHAFFER, 

Member of the Parole Board, in his 

personal capacity; ALFREDO PENA, 

Member of the Parole Board, in his 

personal capacity; JOE MARTIN 

MORALES, Member of the Parole Board, 

in his personal capacity; BECKY 

LUCERO, Member of the Parole Board, in 

No. 14-1380 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02142-RPM) 

(D. Colo.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

October 27, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 1 
2 

her personal capacity for damages; JOHN 

DOE, Arkansas Valley Correctional 

Facility, in his personal capacity for 

damages, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Marlon Walker, a former Colorado inmate and parolee, appeals from the 

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against numerous 

Colorado state parole officers and members of the Colorado Parole Board (the State 

Defendants). The district court dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), ruling Walker failed to allege facts showing the State Defendants violated 

any clearly established constitutional law and therefore failed to state a § 1983 claim. 

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm the dismissal, but on 

different grounds because Walker’s claims are time barred. 

I. Background 

The following factual allegations are from Walker’s complaint. Walker was 

charged in 2005 with second degree burglary, second degree assault, criminal attempt 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 2 
3 

to commit sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact, and he pleaded guilty to 

second degree assault. He alleges that his plea agreement included the state’s 

stipulation that there was no factual basis for a sex offense conviction. In February 

2006, following an administrative review hearing, the Colorado Department of 

Corrections (DOC) classified Walker as an S-4 sex offender, which applies to 

inmates who were not convicted of a sex offense but for whom sex offender 

treatment has been recommended. See Chambers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 205 F.3d 

1237, 1240 n.8 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing the S-4 sex offender classification). 

Colorado law then in effect gave the DOC complete discretion to classify inmates not 

convicted of a sex offense as a sex offender notwithstanding any contrary prosecution 

stipulation or court finding. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-103(1)(d) (2005); see also

Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that an inmate not 

convicted of a sex offense may be classified by the DOC as a sex offender if it 

affords him procedural protections).1

 Walker was informed in 2007 that he was 

required to undergo sex offender treatment in prison. The DOC concluded in 2009, 

that Walker committed a disciplinary violation that further justified his sex offender 

classification. 

 1

 Walker makes many assertions on appeal that he was wrongfully classified as 

a sex offender and that the DOC did not afford him the requisite due process in so 

classifying him, even though he now claims he is not challenging the 

constitutionality of the DOC’s determination to classify him as a sex offender. The 

State Defendants dispute those allegations, and included in their motion to dismiss 

the evidence of sexual misconduct that the DOC relied upon to classify Walker as a 

sex offender. These disputes are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal, 

however. 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 3 
4 

In January 2011, Walker was first released from prison on parole. He was 

required as a condition of his parole to enroll in a sex offender treatment program 

with a state contracted therapy provider, as part of which he was required to admit 

and accept responsibility for sexual misconduct, including passing a polygraph 

examination. In addition, he was required not to have contact with minors and to 

participate in Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous.2

 He was referred to a Denver 

treatment program, Sexual Offense Resource Services, L.L.C. (SORS). On 

August 10, 2011, SORS terminated Walker because he failed to accept responsibility 

for sexual abuse and failed a SORS polygraph examination. He alleges he was 

arrested for violating parole that day, and that his parole was ultimately revoked in 

September 2011 based on his termination from the sex offender treatment program. 

Walker was later released on parole, under the same terms and conditions as 

his January 2011 terms and conditions of parole. He was referred to treatment with a 

second treatment provider, Teaching Humane Existence Treatment Program, Inc. 

(THE). In November 2011, THE terminated Walker from its program because he 

refused to admit to and accept responsibility for sexual misconduct. The therapist at 

THE concluded Walker had a “high risk to reoffend.” Aplt. App. at 22 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). On December 19, 2011, his parole was again revoked 

 2

 Although these were the terms and conditions of Walker’s parole, he was not 

statutorily required to participate in sex offender treatment under Colorado’s Sex 

Offender Lifetime Supervision Act because he was not convicted of a sex offense. 

See Colo. Stat. § 16-11.7-105 (requiring persons convicted of sex offenses to undergo 

appropriate sex offender treatment). 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 4 
5 

because THE terminated him for his refusal to admit and accept responsibility for 

sexual misconduct. 

Walker filed his § 1983 complaint on August 11, 2013. He alleged that the 

terms and conditions of his parole violated his First, Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. Id. at 27-28. He also claimed that the State Defendants violated 

his constitutional rights by revoking his parole when he failed to comply with these 

unconstitutional terms and conditions. Id. at 28. 

The State Defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds 

that Walker’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as well as the 

favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); that 

they were entitled to qualified immunity; and that Walker failed to allege the 

requisite personal participation of the State Defendants. The district court dismissed 

on the ground that the State Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity 

protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

II. Discussion 

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the 

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). We review de novo the district court’s 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 5 
6 

dismissal of the State Defendants’ claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Peterson v. 

Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). 

The State Defendants argued in their motion for dismissal, and now on appeal 

that Walker’s claims against the State Defendants were barred by the two-year statute 

of limitations. Walker argues his claims are not time-barred because he is only 

challenging the State Defendants’ actions on and after August 2011 of revoking his 

parole when he did not comply with the parole terms and conditions obligating him to 

participate in sex offender therapy. Opening Br. at 10. He argues his § 1983 claims 

accrued on December 19, 2011, when his parole was revoked for a second time. We 

disagree with Walker, and conclude it is clear from the allegations in his complaint 

that his claims are time-barred as a matter of law. See United States v. Sandoval, 

29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding we may affirm on alternative grounds 

if “there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law”), and Aldrich v. 

McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding a statute 

of limitations question may be appropriately resolved under Rule 12(b)(6) when the 

dates given in the complaint make clear that the claim is time-barred). 

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years 

from the time the cause of action accrued. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 

(10th Cir. 2006). While state law governs the applicable statute of limitations, 

federal law determines when the claim accrues and when the limitations period starts 

to run. Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). “A § 1983 

action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 6 
7 

apparent.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Since the 

injury in a § 1983 case is the violation of a constitutional right, such claims accrue 

when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have 

been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The claim accrues when the 

constitutional injury occurs, “not when the consequence of that constitutional 

injury . . . manifested itself.” Id. 

It is clear from his complaint that Walker knew the exact terms and conditions 

of parole on which his constitutional claims are based when he was paroled in 

January 2011. He knew then that he was required to undergo sex offender treatment 

with a state-contracted therapy provider, that he had to admit and accept 

responsibility for his sexual misconduct, submit to polygraph examinations, and 

avoid minors. Though he asserts he is only challenging the constitutionality of 

revoking his parole on and after August 2011, his complaint makes clear revocation 

was based solely on his failure to comply with these terms and conditions. The fact 

that parole was revoked after his treatment providers terminated him because he 

failed polygraph examinations and refused to admit and accept responsibility for his 

sexual misconduct was merely a consequence of the stated terms of his parole. The 

August 2011 decision to issue a revocation complaint, and the September and 

December 2011 revocation decisions were not separate and distinct constitutional 

injuries, but simply direct consequences of the January 2011 terms and conditions of 

his parole. As in Smith, “the constitutional injury . . . which trigger[ed] the statute of 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 7 
8 

limitations for purposes of § 1983, occurred when [the terms and conditions of 

Walker’s parole were imposed], not when the consequence of that constitutional 

injury . . . manifested itself.” 149 F.3d at 1154. Thus, we conclude that all of 

Walker’s claims against the State Defendants are time-barred. 

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 14-1380 Document: 01019513914 Date Filed: 10/27/2015 Page: 8