2015 UT App 299

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES INC.,

Appellee,

v.

RICHARD REULING JR. AND MARGARET REULING,

Appellants.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20141032-CA

Filed December 17, 2015

Third District Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Mark S. Kouris

No. 120416434

Edward T. Wells and David D. Bennett, Attorneys

for Appellants

Edwin B. Parry and Joshua R. Dunyon, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGES JAMES Z. DAVIS and J. FREDERIC 

VOROS JR. concurred.

1

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Richard Reuling Jr. and Margaret Reuling (collectively, 

Appellants)2 appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor of 

Express Recovery Services Inc. (ERS). We affirm.

 

1. Judge James Z. Davis participated in this case as a member of 

the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court on 

November 16, 2015, before this decision issued.

2. When referring to Appellants individually, we use their first 

names for clarity.
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¶2 In 2011, Richard was involved in a serious car accident, 

after which he was transported to the University of Utah Health 

Care (UUHC) emergency room.

3 Richard was admitted to the 

hospital, and over the course of the next three days, UUHC 

providers treated him by performing numerous medical 

procedures on him.4

¶3 After Richard was discharged, UUHC began to bill 

Appellants for the medical care and treatment that had been 

provided to Richard. Appellants failed to make any payments 

toward the amount owed to UUHC. Eventually, UUHC assigned 

its accounts receivable relating to Richard’s care to ERS. ERS

made numerous attempts to collect on the debt owed, but 

Appellants failed to make any payments.

¶4 In August 2012, ERS sent Appellants a demand letter, 

listing $27,600.78 as the remaining balance of the accounts. 

Again, Appellants failed to make any payments on the accounts, 

and they did not attempt to establish a payment plan with ERS. 

In December 2012, ERS filed suit to collect the owed debt.

¶5 Though Appellants admit that they are liable for the cost 

of Richard’s care at UUHC, they challenge the amount that ERS 

claims will satisfy the debt. The parties went to trial on the issue 

of damages, at which trial Appellants claimed that ‚the 

hospital’s bills are difficult to understand and potentially contain 

errors.‛ Appellants also claimed that ‚the hospital . . . failed in 

its duty to provide accurate and understandable billing 

 

3. ‚On appeal from a bench trial, we recite the facts in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s factual findings.‛ Jacob v. Bate, 

2015 UT App 206, ¶ 2 n.1, 358 P.3d 346.

4. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 

Act, UUHC was required to treat Richard, who was 

unresponsive when he arrived at the UUHC emergency room. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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statements and, based upon this, [Appellants] should not have to 

pay them.‛ At the close of evidence, Appellants moved for a 

directed verdict, which the trial court denied. On June 9, 2014, 

the trial court issued a minute entry ruling, wherein it found that 

‚all of the charges are reasonable and customary for the services 

provided, and are presented with the requisite detail to provide 

the payer sufficient understanding.‛ The court then ruled for 

ERS in the amount of $25,742.00, plus statutory interest in the 

amount of $1,153.00, for a total judgment of $26,895.00. Based 

upon this minute entry ruling, the trial court entered judgment 

in ERS’s favor on June 27, 2014. Three days after the court 

rendered judgment, Appellants filed a motion to amend the 

findings and judgment under rules 52(b) and 59(a) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion. 

Appellants appeal the denial of that motion.

¶6 As a preliminary matter, ERS contends that we lack

jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the trial court 

deemed Appellants’ motion to amend the findings and 

judgment to be a motion to reconsider, ‚which would not toll the 

time period for [Appellants] to file their appeal.‛ Appellants 

filed their motion to amend the findings and judgment on 

June 30, 2014. ERS opposed the motion. On September 18, 2014, 

the trial court entered an order denying Appellants’ motion. 

According to ERS, at a September 2, 2014 hearing on Appellants’ 

motion, the trial court found Appellants’ motion to be, in 

substance, a motion to reconsider. However, the recording of the 

September 2 hearing is not included in the record on appeal, and 

the court’s September 18 order does not mention anything about 

Appellants’ motion being a motion to reconsider. ERS filed a 

motion to correct the order on September 18, 2014, ‚to accurately 

reflect the decision made by the Court on September 2, 2014.‛ 

On October 31, 2014, the trial court entered an order correcting 

its September 18 order, in which the trial court stated that 

‚*Appellants’+ Motion for Amendment of Findings and 

Judgment is actually a Motion to Reconsider and the Court 

having ruled previously, [the] motion is DENIED.‛
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¶7 Pursuant to rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the time for filing an appeal from a final judgment is 

tolled by the timely filing of certain postjudgment motions, 

including a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact 

under rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or for a 

new trial under rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Utah R. App. P. 4(b). If a party files such a motion, the time for 

appeal runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 

postjudgment motion. Id. R. 4(b)(1). Regarding motions to 

reconsider, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the 

practice of filing postjudgment motions to reconsider and 

explained that ‚future filings of postjudgment motions to 

reconsider will not toll the time for appeal.‛ Gillett v. Price, 2006 

UT 24, ¶ 1, 135 P.3d 861. Thus, according to ERS, because the 

trial court considered Appellants’ motion to amend the findings 

and judgment to be a motion to reconsider, Appellants had 

thirty days from June 27, 2014, when the trial court entered its 

final judgment, to appeal. Appellants filed their notice of appeal 

on October 13, 2014.

¶8 Appellants filed their postjudgment motion as a motion to 

amend the findings and judgment under rules 52 and 59 of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions toll the time for 

filing a notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b); see Gillett, 2006 UT 

24, ¶ 7 (suggesting that a postjudgment motion tolls the appeals 

period if it is ‚titled‛ as a motion that would toll the appeals 

period, ‚regardless of the motion’s substance‛). Further, nothing 

in the record suggests that Appellants filed the motion in bad 

faith or with knowledge that the trial court would recast it as a 

motion to reconsider. Accordingly, the record suggests that they 

reasonably believed the motion tolled the time for filing an 

appeal until the trial court disposed of the motion. See Utah R. 

App. P. 4(b). As previously discussed, the trial court initially 

disposed of Appellants’ motion on September 18, 2014, and then 

corrected that order on October 31, 2014. Appellants filed their 

notice of appeal on October 13, 2014, within thirty days of the 

trial court’s first order denying their motion. Consequently, 

although the trial court ultimately determined that Appellants’ 
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20141032-CA 5 2015 UT App 299

motion was a motion to reconsider, we conclude that Appellants 

filed a timely notice of appeal when they filed their notice of 

appeal within thirty days of the trial court’s September 18 order.

We therefore address the merits of Appellants’ arguments.

¶9 Appellants first contend that the trial court ‚failed to 

follow the law and applied an incorrect standard of proof when 

it granted judgment to [ERS] in quantum meruit without 

requiring the proofs necessary for such a recovery.‛ According 

to Appellants, ‚*t+he lack of evidence on the specific services 

provided and their reasonable value is fatal to [ERS’s] claim of 

entitlement to a remedy under a theory of quantum meruit,‛ also 

known as unjust enrichment.

¶10 ‚Whether a claimant has been unjustly enriched is a 

mixed question of law and fact.‛ Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, 

Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶ 9, 12 P.3d 580. We will uphold the trial court’s 

findings of fact unless ‚the evidence supporting them is so 

lacking that we must conclude the finding is clearly erroneous.‛ 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

‚Furthermore, we afford broad discretion to the trial court in its 

application of unjust enrichment law to the facts.‛ Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶11 ‚Quantum meruit is an equitable tool that allows a 

plaintiff to receive restitution for the reasonable value of services 

provided to the defendant.‛ Emergency Physicians Integrated Care 

v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 1080. ‚Quantum 

meruit has two distinct branches—contracts implied in law and 

contracts implied in fact.‛ Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson 

& Ostler, 2015 UT 60, ¶ 44, 355 P.3d 1000. The branch applicable 

to this case is contract implied in law. ‚Contract[] implied in law, 

also termed quasi-contract[] or unjust enrichment, is a doctrine 

under which the law will imply a promise to pay for goods or 

services when there is neither an actual nor an implied contract 

between the parties.‛ Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). To prove the existence of a contract implied in law, the 

plaintiff must establish that the defendant ‚(1) received a benefit, 
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(2) appreciated or had knowledge of this benefit, and (3) retained 

the benefit under circumstances that would make it unjust for 

the defendant to do so.‛ Id. ¶ 45 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶12 In this case, the trial court observed that ‚both sides agree 

that Richard received valuable and necessary medical care that 

made him whole and Richard understood that he should pay for 

this care.‛ And on appeal, Appellants concede that Richard

‚received some benefit from the care received following his 

accident,‛ that ‚he had an appreciation or knowledge that he 

had received a benefit,‛ and that ‚he received the benefit under 

circumstances that would make it unjust for him to retain the 

benefit without paying for it.‛ Consequently, the parties agree 

that a contract implied in law exists.

¶13 They differ, however, on the existence—or at least the 

amount—of damages. Appellants contend that the ‚dispute is in 

[ERS] being unable to prove exactly what goods and services 

were provided to [Richard], or to prove the reasonable value of 

such.‛ According to Appellants, there is no evidence in the 

record to support the amount of the trial court’s judgment under 

quantum meruit. We disagree.

¶14 The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified ‚that when 

assessing damages for unjust enrichment, the court begins by 

looking to the value of the benefit conferred.‛ Jones, 2015 UT 60, 

¶ 57. Generally, the measure of recovery for an unjust 

enrichment or contract-implied-in-law claim ‚‘is the value of the 

benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant’s gain) and 

not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff.’‛ Id. (quoting Davies 

v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). However, 

‚where the defendant has requested professional services, either 

directly or impliedly, the proper measure of the defendant’s gain 

will normally be the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s services.‛

Id. ¶ 58. ‚In other words, in the case of professional services, the 

value of the benefit conferred is often the same as the value of 

the services rendered.‛ Id.
Express Recovery Services v. Reuling

20141032-CA 7 2015 UT App 299

¶15 In this case, in determining the value of UUHC’s services,

the trial court considered the trial testimony of UUHC’s 

collections office supervisor and all of the billing information 

submitted at trial. The supervisor testified at trial that UUHC’s 

‚charges are based on . . . regional amounts that . . . all the other 

hospitals in the region bill from,‛ and that the charges were

therefore ‚medically reasonable.‛ The supervisor also testified 

that UUHC gave Appellants a ‚30 percent contribution to care 

discount‛ because Richard was not insured.

¶16 In addition, the supervisor testified that the hospital 

assigned Richard two different account numbers—one ending in 

21 (Account 21) and one ending in 90 (Account 90). Account 21 

was for ‚charges associated with the hospital’s facility,‛ and 

Account 90 was for ‚charges associated with the different 

doctors.‛ The trial court found that the first bill for Account 21 

was issued on September 28, 2011, for $18,847.00, ‚and provides 

a breakdown of each of the hospital’s department’s portion of 

that bill.‛ Indeed, the September 28 bill includes charges for 

various hospital departments, including anesthesiology, CT 

imaging, clinical laboratories, diagnostic radiology, ‚distro 

inventory,‛ emergency room, general acute rehabilitation, 

‚Medicine/Surgery Unit 6 North,‛ pharmacy inpatient, 

respiratory therapy, surgical ICU, and trauma coordination. The 

bill also reflects the hospital’s contribution to care discount of 

$8,077.47. The court noted that the next bill, dated October 30, 

2011, added a $94.00 charge for ‚cardiac monitoring,‛ bringing

the total charge for Account 21 to $18,913.00. The October 30 bill 

also reflects UUHC’s contribution to care discount of $28.20.

¶17 The trial court then found that the first bill for Account 90, 

dated October 2, 2011, contained a balance of $3,638.00 and was 

broken down by each doctor’s charges.5 Several additional 

 

5. For example, one radiologist’s bill includes charges for 

‚Head/Brain CT Scan, Cervical Spine CT Scan, Lumbar Spine CT 

Scan, *and+ Thoracic Spine CT Scan.‛
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charges were added to the Account 90 bill on November 6, 2011, 

and on January 15, 2012, bringing the total charges for Account 

90 to $6,829.00. Finally, the trial court found that a $469.00 

charge for a chest tube insertion, dated July 7, 2012, some eight 

months after Richard’s hospital stay, was ‚excessively late and 

unreasonable.‛

¶18 Ultimately, the trial court concluded that ‚all of the other 

charges are reasonable and customary for the services provided, 

and are presented with the requisite detail to provide the payer 

sufficient understanding.‛ Therefore, the court ruled in favor of

ERS in the amount of $25,742.00 ($18,913.00 for Account 21 and

$6,829.00 for Account 90) plus statutory interest in the amount of 

$1,153.00, for a total judgment of $26,895.00.

¶19 Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s computation 

of damages but, rather, ‚the value to Richard‛ of the necessary 

goods and services provided to him.6 However, this is not the 

proper measure of damages because, as previously discussed,

‚where the defendant has requested professional services, either 

directly or impliedly, the proper measure of the defendant’s gain 

will normally be the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s services.‛ 

Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson & Ostler, 2015 UT 60, ¶ 58, 355 

P.3d 1000.

¶20 We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial court’s findings regarding the reasonable value of 

UUHC’s services. ERS submitted evidence, in the form of billing 

statements, that UUHC provided $25,742.00 worth of medical 

services to Richard. ERS also introduced testimony that 

established that the values UUHC placed on its services were

‚based on . . . regional amounts that . . . all the other hospitals in 

the region bill from‛ and that UUHC discounted its services for 

Richard because he lacked insurance. Cf. Jones, 2015 UT 60, ¶ 58

 

6. In any event, the record evidence supports the trial court’s 

award calculation.
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(observing that in contingency fee cases, ‚the best measure of the 

value of the benefit conferred upon the defendant law firm by 

the plaintiff lawyer’s services is the value of those services as 

determined by the standards applicable to contingency fee cases 

in the legal community‛). The trial court, sitting as factfinder, 

was free to accept ERS’s evidence on the reasonable value of its 

services as sufficient.

7

¶21 Therefore, we conclude that substantial record evidence 

supports the trial court’s calculation of damages under quantum 

meruit for the reasonable value of UUHC’s services provided to 

Richard. Consequently, we uphold the trial court’s award of 

damages under quantum meruit.

 

7. Appellants’ contention that ‚without an itemized statement, it 

is impossible to determine the reasonable value of the goods and 

services for which *ERS+ seeks to recover‛ is without merit. Even 

if the billing statements could have been more specific regarding 

the charges, this court has previously observed that ‚‘some 

degree of uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not relieve 

a defendant from recompensing a wronged plaintiff.’‛ Richards 

v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 41, 222 P.3d 69 (quoting Highland

Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 

1984)), aff’d on other grounds, 2012 UT 14, 274 P.3d 911; see also 

Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App 283, ¶ 23, 288 P.3d 1046 

(noting that on appeal the central inquiry is whether the 

evidence was sufficient and not whether it was perfect).

Moreover, although Appellants assert that ‚*i+t is 

undisputed that Richard never received an itemized statement 

for any of the goods and services for which he was billed,‛ we 

have reason to doubt the veracity of this assertion. Indeed, the 

record contains forty-seven pages of itemized statements 

provided by Appellants in their initial disclosures to ERS. These 

itemized statements are specific and include the service date, 

code, description, quantity, and amount charged for the goods 

and services provided. Nonetheless, for whatever reason, these 

itemized statements were not provided to the trial court.
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20141032-CA 10 2015 UT App 299

¶22 Next, Appellants contend that the trial court ‚failed to 

follow the law when it denied *Appellants’+ rules 52(b) and 59(a) 

motions to amend the findings and judgment.‛ According to 

Appellants, ‚there was insufficient evidence before the trial 

court . . . from which the court could reasonably make findings 

of fact necessary to support its judgment.‛ ‚We review the *trial+ 

court’s denial of a motion to amend a judgment for an abuse of 

discretion.‛ In re B.O., 2015 UT App 70, ¶ 4, 347 P.3d 455 (per 

curiam). 

¶23 Pursuant to rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

[u]pon motion of a party made not later than 14 

days after entry of judgment the court may amend 

its findings or make additional findings and may 

amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may 

be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to 

Rule 59.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Rule 52(a) provides that ‚*f+indings of fact, 

whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 

aside unless erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.‛ Id. R. 52(a). As previously discussed, the trial court’s 

minute entry ruling specifically set forth the facts upon which 

the court relied in determining the judgment amount, and the 

court found that the charges to Appellants were ‚presented with 

the requisite detail to provide [Appellants] sufficient 

understanding.‛ Because there was sufficient factual evidence 

submitted at trial to support the trial court’s factual findings, we 

conclude that its findings are not ‚clearly erroneous.‛ See Utah

R. Civ. P. 52(a).

¶24 Similarly, rule 59 provides that a new trial may be 

granted if the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

‚justify the verdict . . . or *the verdict+ is against law.‛ Id. R. 

59(a)(6). Because we have determined that there was sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s judgment, Appellants’ rule 
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20141032-CA 11 2015 UT App 299

59 argument necessarily fails. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to amend 

the findings and judgment. 

¶25 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.