. . . I believe that thiS' nation should commit itself to achieving 

the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the 

moon and returning him safely to the earth. 

25 May 1961 
... july 1969 A.D. We came in peace for all ma
Frontispiece: 


Astronaut Edwin Aldrin walks on the surface of 


the moon near a leg of the lunar module after 


the 20 july 1969 Apollo II landing. He was pho­

tographed by fellow crewman Neil Armstrong. 

by 

CouRTNEY G. BROOKS 

JAMES M. GRIMWOOD 

LOYD S. SWENSON, JR. 

The NASA History Series 

Scientific and Technical Information Branch 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRAT

Washington, 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Brooks, Courtney G. 

Chariots for Apollo. 

(NASA his·toryseries) (NASA SP-4205) 


Bibliography: p. 


Includes index. 


I. Project Apollo-History. I. Grimwood, James M., joint author. II. Swenson, Loyd S., 

joint author. Ill. Title. IV. Series: United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The NASA history series. 

TL789.8.U6A5239 629.45'4 79-1042 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 


Washington, D.C. 20-102 


Stock Number 033-000-00768-0 

FoREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • 

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 

I. CoNCEPT TO CHALLENGE •.................................

2. PROJECT PLANNING AND CoNTRACTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • • 

3. CONTENDING MODES • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . • . • . • 

4. MATCHING MODULES AND MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • . . . 

5. CoMMAND MoDULE AND PRoGRAM CHANGES . . . . . • • . . . • • . • • . 

• • . . . . . . • • • . . . • • 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

...................

. • . . . . . . • . . . • . • . 

. . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . 

. . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • 

 . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • 

6. LuNAR MoDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. SEARCHING FOR ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. MoviNG TOWARD OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9. 1LRAGEDY AND REcovERY.............. 

10. RACE WITH THE DECADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

II. 1lASTES OF 1LRIUMPH . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 

I2. 1LHE 1LRAILBLAZERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I3. 1Lo LAND ON THE MOON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I4. 1LRIP TO 1LRANQUILITY . . . . • . . . • . • . • • • . . . . . 

El'ILOGUE 

vii 
Illustrations 

"We came in peace" ....... . . . ..... . .... . .. . .. .. .. .. .... . . ... . . . . . ... . .. . . . 

Lunar mission concepts, 1959 . . . . ... . .. .. .... . .. .. .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. ... ... . . 

Administrator Glennan visits Langley Research Center ....... . . .. .. .. .... . . . . 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency concept of lunar landing vehicle ... . .. . ... .. . .. . 

Lenticular vehicle operation .. .. . .. .. .... ..... . . . ... .. . ..... ......... . . . .. . 

Launch vehicles leading to Saturn C-1 and proposed C-2 .... ... .. .. . . .. . . .... . . 

Robert Gilruth and aides discuss contractor selection for Apollo studies .. . .... . . 

Sketch of command module seating ........ ... . . .. .. .......... . ..... ... ... . . 

Spacecraft models proposed by industry ...... . ...... . .. .. ..... . . .. . ..... .... . 

Crew positions sketched by STG engineers in 1960 ..... ... .. . .. .... .. . ..... . . 

Spacecraft modules, mid-1961 . ......... . . . ....... . . . ..... ... . . ...... . . .. .. . 

Guidance and control system mockup and MIT Director Draper .. . ..... ... .. . 

Inertial measuring unit and technical design director Hoag, MIT . . . .. . .. .. ... . 

Static-firing facility, Redstone Arsenal .... . ......... . .......... .... . . . . . . ... . 

Mississippi Test Facility ..... . . . . .. . ...... ... . . . .. ............... . . . .. .. . . . 

Michoud Assembly Facility ... . . . . .. .. . ..... ... ......... .... . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . 

Vehicle Assembly Building, Kennedy Space Center .. .. ... .. . ... ........... . . . 

Groundbreaking for MSC Opera tions and Checkout Building at the Cape . ... . . . 

Manned Spacecraft Center .. .... ...... . . . ..... ... . . .. ... ....... . .. . ..... . . . 

Launch of SA-I ...... ..... . .... .. .. . .. ... . ... .. . ...... . ..... . . . 

Comparative sizes of Atlas, Titan II, Saturn C-5, and Nova ...... . . . .. . .. ..... . 

Three techniques for lunar landing . . .. . . ... . . .. . ......... . . . . .. . .. .... .... . 

Two ways to land on the moon by direct ascent . . .... . . . .. ... .. . ... . ... .. ... . 

Earth-orbit rendezvous . . .. .. .. . ..... ... . ..... .. . . . ........... .. .... . ... .. . . 

Lunar-surface rendezvous ..... ... . .. . ..... .. .. ... ..... .. . . . . . .. . .. .... . . . . . . 

Early lunar lander concepts .... . .. . ... ....... . . . ..... . ... . .... . .. .... ... .. . 

Spacecraft configuration changes, May 1960-.July 1962 . . .. . . .. .. . . . ........... . 

Page 


ii-iii 


2 


3 


5 


10 


12 


16 


18 


28 


36 


36 


40 


40 


54 


54 


54 


55 


55 


55 


56 


59 


63 


63 


63 


64 


68, 74 


86 


VllZ 
Apollo tracking network, Canberra radar antenna, and communications 


with the moon ............. . ... . ........ ............. ......... . 

George Mueller briefs President Kennedy ... ........ . ...... .. . .... .. .... .

Lunar module extraction from adapter ....................................

Full-scale model of command module ....... ... ... . ..... . .... ... ..........

Launch escape system and jettison ........ . ................ ... ..... . .....

Full-scale mockup of service propulsion module .. . .. . . .. ...................

Probe and drogue assembly for docking ................... . ..............

Command and service module mockup review ....... . ......................

SA-6 and Boilerplate 13 ready for launch ....... ....... .. ... ................

Lunar module evolution, 1962-1969; docked models; and Ll\f components .....

Proposed LM crew positions for landing, sleeping ..... . ................... 

Lunar module adds ladder and other improvements, fits into adapter ...... . .

Test model I, lunar module mockup, with propulsion system engines .........

Cutaway drawings of command module ...................................

Probe sensor on LM landing gear ................................. .. . ... 

Spacesuit and backpack, 1965 version ............... .... .. . .. ............ .

F-1 engine at Rocketdyne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 

Saturn V first stage at Michoud, arriving at Marshall, and fired in ground test 

Mission Control Center, the mission operations control room, and 


Manned Spacecraft Center, 1965 ..... ...... ......... .... ....... .. ..... .

Apollo program funding, fiscal I 960-I 967 ............. . ....................

Apollo-Saturn 201 mission ................. .. .... ... ......................

J-2 engines and Saturn's S-II and S-IVB stages .......................... .. .

First Saturn V rollout ............ ..... ....................... .. . . .. .. .. 

Spacecraft 012 at North American and arriving at Kennedy Space Center ....

Workchart for CM-012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .... .

Astronauts Grissom, Chaffee, and White check headgear for AS-204 .... .. .... 

Command module 012 after January 1967 fire ......................... .. .. 

Command module dual hatch and unified single hatch ... .. ... .... .. . .. .....

X-ray inspection of harness wiring ... , ... .... . .......................... .

Tools are replaced in accountability kit ................... ..... ..........

Apollo 4 poised for first Saturn V mission .......... . ..... . .......... .. .... 

Super Guppy . .. ..... .... ............... .. .. .... .. .. . ............ . .. . 
lunar landing training vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 


Plaque on lunar module landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 


Off-loading rehearsal of the Mobile Quarantine Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 


Lunar Receiving Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 


Apollo 11 lands men on the moon .. .. .. ... .... .. . ... . . .... .. . . .. . . . . . . .. .. 350- 351 


Travelers to the moon return . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . .. . .. . .... . . . . . . 356-357 


Launch Complex 39 dedication plaque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 


X 
The story of Apollo is a remarkable chapter in the history of m

How remarkable will be determined by future generations 

attempt to assess and understand the relationship and significanc

Apollo achievements to the development of mankind. We hope 

book will contribute to their assessments and assist in their judgm

Writing the history of Apollo has been a tremendous und

There is so much to tell; there are so many facets. The story of A

filled with facts and figures about complex machines, comput

facilities, and intricate maneuvers-these are the things with w

Apollo objectives were achieved. But a great effort has also been 

tell the real story of Apollo, to identify and describe the decis

actions of men and women that led to the creation and operation 

complex machines. 

The flights of Apollo were the focus of worldwide reporting a

tion. The success of these flights is directly attributable to the 

reported and less visible work of nearly 400 000 people in hundred

ferent organizations. That the efforts of so many could be organ

coordinated so effectively is a tribute to American ingenuity and 

ment abilities. Moreover, only those who were directly involved 

appreciate the dedication, competence, courage, teamwork, and h

of those people. 

It is not possible to single out any one or even a few of t

people and the countless decisions, actions, and key events in the 

as being more critical or important than the others in determining 

mate success. Nor is it appropriate to do so since that success c

have been achieved without having first succeeded in building effect

work in an environment where every task, no matter how seemin

nificant at the time, in some way affected the ultimate outcom

program. 

xi 
.December 197 8 SAMUEL c. PHILLIPS 

General) USAF (Ret.) 

Xlt 
Apollo was America

s program to land men on the moon and 

safely back to the earth. In May 1961 President Kennedy 

signal for planning and developing the machines to take men 

body. This decision, although bold and startling at the time, was n

at random-nor did it lack a sound engineering base. Subcomm

the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), pr

of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), h

larly surveyed aeronautical needs and pointed out problems for im

resolution and specific areas for advanced research. After NASA's 

in October 1958, its leaders (many of them former NACA offici

tinued to operate in this fashion and, less than a year later, set up 

to study what the agency should do in near-earth and deep-spa

ration. Among the items listed by that group was a lunar landing, a 

also discussed in circles outside NASA as a means for achieving an

strating technological supremacy in space. From the time Russia 

its first Sputnik in October 1957, many Americans had viewed t

as a logical goal. A two-nation space race subsequently made tha

tion America's national objective for the 1960s. 

America had a program-Project Mercury-to put man in 

orbit and recover him safely. In July 1960 NASA anounced plans 

Mercury with a program, later named Apollo, to fly men around t

Soon thereafter, several industrial firms were awarded contracts 

the feasibility of such an enterprise. The companies had scarcely 

this task when the Russians scored again, orbiting the first space 

Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, on 12 April 1961. Three weeks later th

cans succeeded in launching Astronaut Alan Shepard into a subor

These events-and other pressures to "get America moving"-prov

popular, political, and technological foundations upon which 

Kennedy could base his appeal for support from the Congress 

American people for the Apollo program. 

XIII 
cosmonauts to make the first international space rendezvous. 

The Apollo story has many pieces: How and why did it start? What 

made it work? What did it accomplish? What did it mean? Some of its 

visible (and some not so visible) parts-the launch vehicles, special facilities, administration, Skylab program, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, as examples-have been recorded by the NASA History Office and some have 

not.* A single volume treating all aspects of Apollo, whatever they were, 

must await the passage of time to permit a fair perspective. At that later 

date, this manuscript may seem narrow in scope-and perhaps it is. But 

among present readers-particularly those who were Apollo program participants-there are some who argue that the text is too broad and that their 

specialties receive short shrift. Moreover, some top NASA leaders during 

Apollo's times contend, perhaps rightly, that the authors were not familiar 

with all the nuances of some of the accounts set down here. 

Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft begins 

with the creation of NASA itself and with the definition of a manned space 

flight program to follow Mercury. It ends with Apollo 11) when America 

attained its goal of the 1960s, landing the first men on the moon and 

returning them to the earth. The focal points of this story are the spacecraft-the command and service modules and the lunar module. 

The 14 chapters cover three phases of spacecraft evolution: defining and 

designing the vehicles needed to do the job, developing and qualifying 

(or certifying) them for the task, and operating them to achieve the objective. Like most large-scale research and development projects, Apollo 

began haltingly. NASA, with few resources and a program not yet approved, 

started slowly. Ad hoc committees and the field centers studied, tested, 

reported, and suggested, looking for the best way to make the voyage. Many 

• See "The NASA History Series" at the back of this book. 

Xtv 
The first two chapters are devoted to these discussions. 

Resolving the mode question was perhaps the most difficult de

the entire program. The debate occupied NASA (and touched 

ments from other governmental agencies and from industry) for 18 

General agreement on this pivotal part of the Apollo mission was 

for the selection and development of both the Saturn V launch ve

the lunar module that completed the Apollo hardware "stack." 

among the participants in the mode battle appeared violent, even 

but when the lunar orbit rendezvous mode was eventually selected

1962, the centers and Headquarters groups closed ranks behind the 

Chapter 4 concludes the difficult definition phase of the program. 

Apollo's middle years are covered in Chapters 5 through 9. W

development and qualification phase began, the lunar module w

behind the command module, even though there were two versio

CM: "Block I," limited to earth-orbital operations, and "Bl

equipped for lunar-orbital rendezvous. At the same time, NASA wa

and organizing to manage the complex program and drafting 

specifications, from the smallest component to the largest subsyste

craft development took two years, lasting much longer and meet

difficulties than expected, and caused manufacturing delays. By 196

managers were able to spell out the tests and reviews needed t

the spacecraft and get it to the launch site. All this time, the 

were fighting the extra kilograms that engineering improvements w

ing to the two machines. Toward the end of the year and through

Apollo moved ahead, with Gemini and NASA's unmanned lunar r

sance programs supplying some answers to Apollo planners, especia

astronauts living and working in space, the ability to rendezvous

composition of the lunar surface. Just when mission planning an

schedules had assumed some firmness, a spacecraft fire on the lau
challenge, brought two flights in quick succession-one in earth orbit and 

the other in lunar orbit-employing all the lunar-oriented vehicles an<~ 

certifying that Apollo was ready to land men on the moon. The world then 

watched-via television-as its first representatives walked on the surface of 

the moon in July 1969. These dramatic missions are discussed in Chapters 

10 through 14. 

This book is the work of three authors: Courtney Brooks, James Grimwood, and Loyd Swenson.'*' Brooks focused on the history of the lunar 

module, the mode issue, the search for an adequate launch vehicle, and 

the selection and training of astronauts (including spacesuits and training 

devices). Swenson examined the command module story, guidance and 

navigation, the command module fire, and scientific concerns. Grimwood 

wrote the five chapters on the Apollo missions and revised the drafts. 

Sally D. Gates, Johnson Space Center History Office Editor-Archivist, 

served indispensably in many capacities in preparing this history: research 

assistant, editor, coordinator of the comment draft, compiler of the appendixes, typist, proofreader, and critic. Contributions en route were made by 

Billie D. Rowell, Corinne L. Morris, and Ivan D. Ertel, all former members 

of this office. Rowell and Morris worked on the archives, and Ertel selected 

the illustrations. Verne L. Jacks, an employee of the University of Houston, 

transcribed some of the taped oral history interviews and typed several 

trial draft chapters. 

As may be seen in the source notes, the text rests on primary Apollo 

program documentation on the spacecraft. The archival base (about 25 

cabinets of documents) was extensive, and the authors owe the program 

participants a great debt for heeding the admonition, "Don't throw away 

history!" Melba S. Henderson provided the Apollo Spacecraft Program 

• See Authors page at the back of the book for biographical sketches. 

xvi 
tion should also be made of the help received from the NASA 

Office-Monte D. Wright, Frank W. Anderson, Jr., Lee D. Saegess

E. Karegeannes, and Alex F. Roland; from former NASA Historian 

M. Emme; and from the Chief of Management Analysis at the 

Space Center-Leslie J. Sullivan. But the authors alone must sho

responsibility for any defects the text may still contain. 

Houston 

September 1978 

Concept to Challenge 

1957 to Mid-1961 

T he orbiting of Sputnik I in October 1957 stirred the imagina

fears of the world as had no new demonstration of physics 

since the dropping of the atomic bomb. In the United States the e

amplified by realization that the first artificial satellite was Rus

American. Yet the few scientists and engineers working in Project V

and other U.S. space projects were surprised only at the actua

Indeed, they had already considered means of sending man around t

Modern rocket technology dates from the Second World War

velopment of intercontinental ballistic missiles in succeeding years 

in machines that could eventually launch vehicles on space mis

this same time, man's flying higher, faster, and farther than eve

suggested that he could survive even in space. Sputnik I caus

throughout the United States and the ensuing public clamor dem

response to the challenge. 1 During the next year, many persons in 

ment, industry, and academic institutions studied means and p

proposals for a national space program beyond military needs. Afte

of science fiction, man himself, as well as his imagination, moved t

active role in space exploration. 

Concurrently with the formation of the National Aeronau

Space Administration (NASA) in late 1958-a year after the first 

-a proposal (which became Project Mercury) was approved to fly 

near-earth orbit. 3 

1 
London, 31 August 1959. Above, astronauts 

leave the spacecraft to investigate the lunar 

surface. At right, the return vehicle takes 

off from the moon; below, the reentry 

vehicle begins to enteT the atmosphere 

after jettisoning the propulsion unit. 

FoRGING A NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY 

The National AeronautiC~=S and Space Act of 1958, passed by Congress 

in July of that year, said nothing about the moon or manned space flight. 

In its declaration of policy and purpose, however, the general objectives 

were to improve and use aeronautical and space capabilities "for the benefit of all mankind." If achieving international leadership in space meant 

that this nation would have to fly men to the moon, the Act encouraged 

that ambition. 4 Clearly NASA, as the nonmilitary agency of the United 

2 
President and the Congress could turn it loose on a task requirin

acceleration of activity and a large commitment of national resou

Much of the preliminary planning for Project Mercury had b

by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 

predecessor. NASA's first Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, pre

Case Institute of Technology (on leave), set about organizing a

the heritage of experience and resources that had carried Merc

the planning stage into actuality. His deputy, Hugh L. Dryden 

Director of NACA), planned and executed policy decisions during 

first few years. Abe Silverstein, who came from NACA's Lewis Fl

pulsion Laboratory in Cleveland, was assigned by Glennan to m

coordinated program for a stable of rocket boosters to suit a v

space missions. 5 

The White House had approved plans to develop big boos

Glennan knew that would not be enough. He wanted organizations 

participated in developing these vehicles, and toward this end he l

for the eventual transfer of the California Institute of Technol

Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and of the Army's Wernher von Br

(Army Ballistic Missile Agency; ABMA) into the NASA family

uary 1959, Wesley L. Hjornevik, Glennan's assistant, pressed the 

trator to "move in on ABMA in the strongest possible way ... b

is becoming increasingly clear that we will soon desperately nee

an equivalent competence." Although JPL came into the fold s

the agency opened for business, a year and a half passed before 

persuaded the Eisenhower administration to consign a portion o

and some of its facilities, later named the George C. Marshall Spa

Center, to NASA. 6 

In addition to the oldest NACA laboratory-at Langley Field, 

across Hampton Roads from Norfolk-and the other two NACA lab

-Ames, at the lower end of San Francisco Bay, and Lewis, in Cl
and Air Force (F-1 engine). 8 These' were worthwhile additions to the new 

agency; to comply with the language and intent of the Space Act, however, 

NASA had to plan a long-range program that would ensure this country's 

preeminence in space exploration and applications. 

THE STARTING 

As part of its legacy NASA inherited the insight of an ad hoc Space 

Technology Committee into what some of its research goals should be. At 

the behest of James H. Doolittle, Chairman of NACA's Main Committee, 

in February 1958 H. Guyford Stever of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had headed a group that examined a wide variety of possible space 

projects, giving NACA needed guidance for research into space technology. 

Exploration of the solar system was seen as an arena where man, as opposed 

to mere machines, would definitely be needed. When NASA opened for 

business in October 1958, this recommendation in the Stever Committee's 

final report gave the new agency a start on its basic plans. 9 

Sending men beyond the earth's gravitational field, however, required 

launch vehicles with weight-lifting capabilities far beyond that of the Atlas, 

the only American missile that could lift the small Mercury spacecraft into 

earth orbit. Moreover, there was nothing being developed and very little 

on the drawing boards that could carry out the Stever Committee's suggestion. Glennan was therefore willing to listen to anyone who might provide a sensible booster development plan. On 15 December 1958, he and 

• In May 1959, Glennan also appointed Gilruth Assistant Director for Manned Satellites at 

Goddard. Ha·rry J. Goett was named Director of the new center in September. 

4 
his staff sat in their headquarters in the Dolley Madison House 

ington to be briefed by missile development leaders from ABMA. 

von Braun and two associates, Ernst Stuhlinger and Heinz H. Ko

veyed the capabilities of current and planned boosters, their u

various space missions, and ABMA's work on launch vehicle de

operation. In essence, they described how their agency might play 

role in America's national space program.10 · 

The theme of these presentations was manned landings on t

Koelle emphasized the need for a few versatile space vehicles, ra

a plethora of different models. ABMA offered a program for b

family of these rockets. Koelle predicted that perhaps by the sprin

"we will have developed a capability of putting . . . man on th

And we still hope not to have Russian Customs there." He stre

neatly ABMA's launch vehicle program complemented NASA's 

manned space flight activity. "The man-in-space effort," he said 

with the lunar and cislunar activities because you simply can't la

on the moon before you have established a man-in-space capabilit

quite clear." 11 

Von Braun said ABMA preferred clustering engines in launch 

emphasizing that the multiengine concept of aviation was direct

able to rockets. Next he talked about plans for a multistage Jun

gesting different propellants for particular stages-the most ambitio

ABMA then contemplated. 

To answer, "What will it take to get people to the surface of 

and back?" von Braun described five techniques, direct ascent 

kinds of rendezvous en route. Assuming the feasibility of hi

(liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen) upper stages and a capsule 

tively estimated at 6170 kilograms, for direct ascent "you woul

seven-stage vehicle which weighed no less than 13.5 million po
from Earth. 

He catalogued the unknowns of space vehicle components and research objectives in materials and in protection against space hazards. What happens, 

for instance, to metals, plastics, sealants, insulators, lubricants, moving parts, 

flexible parts, surfaces, coatings, and liquids in outer space? How could we 

guard men and materials from the dangers of radiation, meteorites, extreme 

temperatures, corrosion possibilities, and weightlessness? ·what kinds of test 

objectives, in what order and how soon, should be established? "We .. . are 

of the opinion that if we fail to come up with answers and solutions to 

[these] problems, then our entire space program may come to a dead end, 

even though we may have the vehicles to carry our payloads aloft." 13 Although Glennan was impressed, he knew that NASA's first tasks were 

Mercury and the giant F-1 rocket engine. 

Congress had been seeking some consensus of what the nation should 

do in space. At the beginning of 1959, the House Select Committee on 

Astronautics and Space Exploration released a staff study, The Next Ten 

Years in Space, reporting a poll of the aerospace community on the direction of America's space program through the 1960s. Prominent among 

projected manned programs beyond Mercury was circumlunar flight. Those 

queried spoke confidently of this goal, saying it was only a question of time. 

Not a single spokesman doubted the technical feasibility of flying around 

the moon. Predictions spanned the latter half of the decade, with expectations that manned lunar landings would follow several years later.

14 

Glennan and Dryden, responding to congressional inquiry, subscribed 

to this belief. They outlined NASA's plans in space sciences, the application of space capabilities to the national welfare, and research and development in advanced space technology. "There is no doubt that the Nation 

has the technological capability to undertake such a program successfully," 

6 
of their envisioned power, only the highenergy Centaur and th

staged and clustered Saturn systems were to be developed. During 

and February of 1959, the von Braun team's Juno V gained su

backing and emerged with a new name, becoming the first in th

family of rockets. 16 

NASA's research centers also had done some preliminary 

about what should follow Project Mercury. In the spring of 1959 G

wanting to encourage that thinking, created a team to study 

missions and to report its findings to him. The Goett Committee 

one of the foremost contributors to Apollo. 

THE GoErr CoMMITTEE 

On I April 1959, NASA Headquarters called for representati

its field centers to serve on a Research Steering Committee for 

Space Flight, headed by Harry Goett, an engineering manager 

who became Director of the new Goddard center in September. G

• Vega and Centaur were upper stages for launch vehicles. The Vega was either 

stages (depending on the payload to be lifted or moved about in space) and used c

fuels. Toward the end of 1959, Vega was canceled because it was too similar to the 

Agena. NASA continued development of the Centaur upper stage because of its m

propellants, hydrogen and oxygen, which promised lifting power far beyond the w

fuel load- about 40 percent greater than possible with conventional rocket fuels lik

It was not until 1966 that the agency had some confidence that the vehicle could be 

manned flights. 

Saturn and Nova were multistage launch vehicles, not clearly defined during N

three years and often described in ways that made it difficult to tell which was 

page 47) . Some Apollo program participants contend that the Saturn V, eventual

was very close to what would have been a Nova had the agency chosen it. 
Dryden had done, Lundin took a broad view of space exploration, reminding the committee that a manned lunar landing was merely one goal, leading ultimately to manned interplanetary travel. 

It was apparent that NASA leaders intended to aim high. Faget, one 

of the inventors of the Mercury capsule, and George Low urged manned 

lunar landings as NASA's next objective. Low stressed study of ways to 

perform the mission, using several of the smaller Saturns in some scheme 

besides direct ascent to avoid total dependence upon the behemoth that 

Nova might become. The Goett Committee then recorded its consensus 

on the priority of NASA objectives: 

1. Man in space soonest-Project Mercury 

2. Ballistic probes 

3. Environmental satellite 

4. Maneuverable manned satellite 

5. Manned space flight laboratory 

6. Lunar reconnaissance satellite 

7. Lunar landing 

8. Mars-Venus reconnaissance 

9. Mars-Venus landing 18 

The next meeting of the Goett Committee was at Ames 25-26 June. 

Going into details about technical problems and their proposed solutions 

as seen from different pockets of experience around the country, the members heartily endorsed moon landing and return as NASA's major longrange manned space flight goal. As Goett later remarked: 

• Goe~t's committee consisted of Alfred J . Eggers, Jr. (Ames), Bruce T . Lundin (Lewis), 

Loftin (Langley), DeElroy E. Beeler (High Speed Flight Station), Harris M. Schurmeier (JPL), 

Maxime A. Faget (Space Task Group) , and George M. Low, Milton B. Ames, Jr., and Ralph 

W . May, Jr., secretary (Headquarters) . Ames was a part-time member. 

8 
the moon, propulsion needs were staggering. Even with cryogenic 

lants in the upper stages of the launch vehicle, the combined w

rocket and spacecraft would be about 4530 to 4983 metric tons-a 

able size. He also noted that prospects for earth-orbital rendezvous 

little brighter; such a procedure (launching more than a dozen 

boosted Centaurs to form the lunar vehicle) required complex ren

and assembly operations. Lundin ticked off several areas that wou

further study, regardless of which mission mode was chosen: c

storage in space, a throttleable lunar-landing engine, a storable-pr

lunar-takeoff engine, and auxiliary power systems.* 20 

On 8 and 9 December 1959 at Langley, Goett's group met for t

(and apparently last) time. The main discussions centered on lunar 

heat protection, all-the-way versus assembly-in-orbit, parachute rese

vironmental radiation hazards, and the desirability of or necessi

manned orbiting laboratory. Most of the field center studies were pr

on a two-man, 14-day circumlunar flight, boosted by some sort o

vehicle and protected by ablative shielding. Very little specific 

however, had been given to the actual lunar landing. 21 

Opinion within the committee on what NASA's next (as oppos

long-range) program should be had been far from unanimous, 

Langley, which by this time had begun extensive studies of spac

• Cryogenic fuels are corrosive and are difficult to store for any length of time 

the low temperatures required to maintain the proper state of the oxidizer-in 

liquid oxygen. This fuel, moreover, requires the extra complication of an igniter to 

throttleable engine is one that can be started and stopped as needed. Storable prop

hypergolic fuels that ignite on contact with the oxidizer, demand no special tempe

trois, are not corrosive, and can remain in &torage indefinitely. The power system

talked about were fuel (or solar) cells that could generate the electrical energy need

flights without the weight penalties attached to the more conventional batteries used i
Using a lenticle-shaped spacecraft for a reentry vehicle. 

concepts and related problems including rendezvous, strongly favored earthorbital operations.* Faget was allied with Langley, because the Space Task 

Group was greatly concerned about the unknowns in lunar operations, 

especially radiation. But Goett and Low remained unswerving in their 

advocacy of lunar flight. They insisted that the technology for flying to the 

moon could be applied to near-earth missions, but not vice versa. Indeed, 

Low perhaps more than any other pushed for landing rather than just circumlunar flight, but neither the committee as a whole nor the chairman 

• On the instigation of E. C. Braley and Loftin, Langley had held a conference on 10 July 

1959 to study the aspects of placing a manned space laboratory in operation. This project was 

seen as a step to the eventual landing of a man on the moon in 10 to 15 years. 

10 
FocusiNG THE AIM 

The Goett Committee did only what it was set up to do-study 

options and suggest objectives that NASA might pursue-but its 

did focus attention on manned circumlunar flight. Well before t

mittee discontinued its meetings, small groups at nearly all of 

centers had taken the initiative and started research toward that go

For example, during the summer of 1959, Gilruth formed 

Projects Panel within the Space Task Group under H. Kurt Strass

ing twice in August, the panel members identified a number of a

research and recommended that work begin immediately on an a

manned capsule, a second-generation spacecraft crewed by three m

capable of reentering the atmosphere at speeds nearly as great 

needed to escape the earth's gravitational pull. The group was 

planning a lunar spacecraft. Convinced that this should be the Spa

Group's next major project, the members further agreed that 

lunar landing should be the goal to design toward, and they assum

as a suitable target date. 24 

At the third meeting of the panel, on 28 September, Alan Ke

sented some ideas for a lenticular reentry vehicle. (Later, he and 

W. Petynia worked out enough details to apply for a patent on a 

that appeared to be formed by two convex lenses and looked like 

saucer.) 25 

The thinking of the New Projects Panel-and that was all Gi

tended it to do, think-may have been premature, but it pointed 

• The members of .the S.trass group were Alan B. Kehlet, William S. Augerson, 

Chilton, Jack Funk, Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr., Harry H. Ricker, Jr., and Stanley C. W
Ell JUliO ll 

Evolutionary launch vehicles leading to the Saturn C-1, 

left, and proposed Saturn C-2, right. On 18 january 1960, 

the Saturn project was accorded the government's highest 

priority rating for development and hardware procurement. 

need to raise the level and amount of manpower invested in planning advanced spacecraft systems.* At a Space Task Group management meeting on 

2 November 1959, Gilruth assigned Robert 0. Piland, Strass, John D. 

Hodge, and Caldwell Johnson to delve into "preliminary design of a multiman (probably 3)" circumlunar spacecraft and into mission analyses of 

trajectories, weights, and propulsion needs. 26 

Piland's group focused on circumlunar flight as NASA's immediate objective. The team members ·dealt mostly with spacecraft design, but they 

also dipped fairly deeply into mission analyses. They adopted the idea of 

flying directly from the earth to the moon's surface. Again, however, these 

studies by the Space Task Group at Langley were only part of similar efforts 

going on concurrently at NASA Headquarters, at Langley, at Ames, at 

Lewis, and at several industrial contractors' plants. After the thinking, the 

task of picking and choosing what to do would begin. 21 

At Headquarters, toward the end of 1959, the Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, headed by Homer J. Stewart, drew up a "Ten Year 

• By June of 1959 the original Space Task Group complement of 45 had grown to 367. 

Gilruth anticipated that the personnel requirements for fiscal year 1961 would be 909; most 

of the new employees would be assigned to a maneuverable manned satellite, a manned 

orbiting laboratory, and a manned lunar expedition. 

12 
oe pecsey just wat woud ae up te Satuocet syste

Abe Silverstein as chairman, this group consisted of Colonel Nor

Appold of the Air Force, Abraham Hyatt and committee secretar

W. Hall of NASA, von Braun of the Army's ABMA, George P. S

the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agen

Thomas C. Muse of the Office of the Director of Defense Resea

Engineering. There had been a lot of talk about what kinds of pro

to use in the vehicle's upper stages. The Lewis laboratory had re

the potentials of liquid hydrogen in combination with liquid 

throughout the mid-1950s. Department of Defense and NASA rese

aimed at prototypes of the Centaur rocket to prove the worth of the

energy, low-weight propellant systems. The most important resul

committee was that Silverstein and his team hammered out a un

recommendation that all upper stages should be fueled with hy

oxygen propellants. This determination, like many others, was a si

piece of the launch vehicle puzzle. 29 

Calendar year 1959 had been fruitful for those who saw the 

manned space flight's next goal. NASA's leaders were coming ar

that viewpoint and, on 7 January 1960 in a meeting with his staff, 

concurred that the follow-on program to Project Mercury should 

end objective of manned flight to the moon. 3 0 NASA had its ten-y

to present to Congress and a reasonable assurance of getting P

Eisenhower's approval to speed up the development of a large 

vehicle. 

PRIMING THE PIPELINE 

"You are hereby directed ... to accelerate the super booster 

for which your agency recently was given technical and manage
studies. 38 

Silverstein, one of those leading the charge toward more fa

flights than Mercury, had been looking for a suitable name for a 

for the Saturn rockets. None suggested by his associates seemed app

One day, while consulting a book on mythology, Silverstein found 

wanted. He later said, "I thought the image of the god Apollo r

chariot across the sun gave the best representation of the grand 

the proposed program." Occasionally he asked his Headquarters c

for their opinions. When no one objected, the chariot driver Ap

cording to ancient Greek myths, the god of music, prophecy, m

light, and progress) became the name of the proposed circumlun

ships. At the opening of the conference on 28 July 1960, Dryden an

that "the next spacecraft beyond Mercury will be called Apollo." 

On 28 and 29 July 1960, 1300 representatives from governm

aerospace industry, and the institutions attended the first in a 

NASA-industry planning sessions. During these two days, 20 NASA 

outlined the agency's plans for launch vehicle development and 

projects for manned and unmanned spacecraft. Many of the in

turned on 30 August to learn about plans for a circumlunar mann

craft program and three six-month feasibility contracts to be awar

Briefings by the Space Task Group's top officials and planners, 

Gilruth and Piland, emphasized that Apollo would be earth-orb

circumlunar and would directly support future moon landings

wound up the afternoon with particulars of the Space Task Gro

curement plan. Any interested company would be invited to a 

conference in two weeks; formal proposals would be required fo

later; and the study contracts would be awarded by mid-Novembe

Following the same general format, the bidders' briefing at La

13 September included a formal request for proposal, a statement 
Piland in August 1960 discuss selection of contractors to study feasibility of a manned circumlunar mission. 

and some definite guidelines. Essentially, these ground rules were based 

upon the assumption that the Saturn booster could launch a lunar reconnaissance spacecraft that would support three men for two weeks. 

Piland laid out four mission and vehicle guidelines: manned lunar 

reconnaissance; earth-orbital missions in conjunction with a space laboratory 

or space station; Saturn booster compatibility (spacecraft weight not to 

exceed 6800 kilograms for lunar missions); and a 14-day flight time. 

Faget stressed return, reentry, and landing: safe recovery from aborts; 

ground and water landings (with a capability for avoiding local hazards); 

72-hour postlanding survival period; landing in preplanned locations; and 

auxiliary propulsion for maneuvering in space. 

Richard S. Johnston presented three demands: "shirt-sleeve" environment, three-man crew, and radiation protection. He discussed the need of 

the crews for a safe environment and for atmospheric control. 

Finally, Chilton presented guidelines for onboard command, emphasizing man's role as an active participant in the mission and its influence on hardware design, and for communications tracking, discussing the 

ground facilities needed for flights beyond earth orbit. Altogether, these 

guidelines constituted what the Space Task Group would demand of the 

Apollo spacecraft. 41 

THE FEASIBILITY STUDIES 

The Space Task Group had published the formal Request for Proposal on 12 September 1960. Eighty-eight firms sent representatives to the 

16 
), 

(p

Programs), Alvin Seiff (Ames), John V. Becker (Langley), and 

(Marshall). 43 

On 25 October, after the panels had compared the bidders' pr

in trajectory analysis, guidance and control, human factors and ra

onboard systems, and systems integration, Goett announced the w

the teams led by Convair/Astronautics of San Diego, General Ele

Philadelphia, and the Martin Company of Baltimore. Contracts of $

were awarded to each of the three. 

Convair/Astronautics operated under a more complicated arran

than the other two winners, using its Fort Worth division for radiat

heat protection, its San Diego plant for life support studies, the L

Foundation and Clinic in Albuquerque for aerospace medicine, a

Avco Corporation's Research and Advanced Development Division 

mington, Massachusetts, for data on reentry vehicle design. Gener

tric's Missile and Space Vehicle Department teamed with Bell Aero

Company. Martin decided to go the whole route alone.•• 

Members of the Space Task Group who monitored the thre

contracts developed into a fourth group, working out their own ad

designs just as the contractors were doing. Jack Funk, Stanley H 

and Alan Kehlet, for example, concentrated on trajectory analysi

ton, Richard R. Carley, and Howard C. Kyle studied guidance and 

Johnston, Harold I. Johnson, C. Patrick Laughlin, James P . Nolan, 

Robert B. Voas investigated the human factors area; and John 

Richard B. Ferguson, and Ralph S. Sawyer looked into designs for o

• From Boeing; Convair;Avco; CornelljBeii;Raytheon; Douglas; General Electric; B

year; Grumman(ITT; Guardite; Lockheed; McDonnell; Martin; Norbh American; 

and Vought. 
hands: where to locate the center that would conduct future manned space 

flight activities. Glennan had begun to question the wisdom of moving the 

the Space Task Group to Goddard after Mercury ended. The new center 

was becoming more and more occupied with unmanned space science programs, which Glennan did not want to see diluted and engulfed by manned 

space flight. On l September 1960, Robert C. Seamans, Jr. , replaced 

Richard Horner as Associate Administrator. That same day, Seamans 

talked with Glennan about the future home of manned space flight. Goett 

and Gilruth had discussed the matter and had concluded that Gilruth 

should ask for separate center status for his group.

47 

Caldwell C. johnson's October 1960 

sketch proposed the seating arrangement that was developed and 

adopted for the Apollo command 

module. The fourth figure illustrates 

the sleeping position. 
, 

, gg jgp, 

administrative, political, and technical compromises, recommended 

weakly that manned space flight activity should probably be reloc

1961 to Ames in California. 48 

Gilruth, his technical assistant Paul E. Purser, and others lead

Space Task Group, who may not have been enthusiastic about the p

of being uprooted from their Virginia homes, had little time to worr

a move. Mercury-Atlas I had exploded in mid-air on 29 July, and 

among its managers was at its nadir. Unless these troubles could b

come there might be little point in moving-there might not eve

Mercury program, much less a more advanced project. Gilruth w

pressed to spare even enough of his experts to proceed with the fea

studies for Apollo.

49 

The three successful bidders began discussions with the Spac

Group on the technical aspects of their tasks almost immediately

General Electric visiting its Langley-based monitors first. Donlan ap

three liaison engineers to act as single points of contact for the 

Herbert G. Patterson for General Electric, John Lee for Marti

William Petynia for Convair. Monthly meetings between these 

monitors and the contractors kept Donlan and Piland informed of pro

The industry conferences and the awarding of the feasibility c

attracted the attention of the White House staff. George B. Kistiak

Eisenhower's special assistant for science and technology, assigned 

F. Hornig of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PS

the chairmanship of a six-man ad hoc Panel on Man-in-Space.* This 

would investigate both NASA's activities thus far and its goals, m

and costs in the foreseeable future. After several field trips, H

" Panel members were Malcolm H. Hebb, Lawrence A. Hyland, Donald P. Ling, 

McMillan, J. Martin Schwarzschild, and Douglas R. Lord (technical assistant). 
gest t

at ateatve etods .. . oaccopsg te aed ua

landing mission could not be expected to alter substantially the over-all 

cost." In addition to its analysis of America's booster program in relation 

to a lunar landing objective, Hornig's panel summarized the worldwide 

significance of an expanded national space effort. "We have been plunged 

into a race for the conquest of outer space," the group said: 

As a reason for this undertaking some look to the new and exciting scientific discoveries which are certain to be made. Others feel the challenge to 

transport man beyond frontiers he scarcely dared dream about until now. 

But at present the most impelling reason for our effort has been the international political situation which demands that we demonstrate our technological capabilities if we are to maintain our position of leadership. For 

all of these reasons we have embarked on a complex and costly adventure. 52 

Early in 1960 Glennan had established a Space Exploration Program 

Council to oversee program planning and implementation. Near the end 

of the year, Seamans thought it wise to convene that body. Goett, von 

Braun, William H. Pickering, Ira H. Abbott, Silverstein, Major General 

Don R. Ostrander, and Albert F. Siepert met with Seamans on 30 September for a briefing by George Low on "Saturn Requirements for Project Apollo." Low posed five questions and defended his answers to them 

as proof of the realism of the proposed schedule for Apollo: ( l) Will the 

spacecraft be ready in time to meet the Saturn schedule? (2) Will the 

spacecraft weight be within Saturn capabilities? (3) Are there any foreseeable technological roadblocks? (4) Will solar flare radiation prevent 

circumlunar flights by men? (5) What are the costs for this program? 

To each of the five questions, Low made positive assertions of competence and capability. He argued that an Apollo circumlunar prototype 

20 
It has become increasingly apparent that a preliminary program 

manned lunar landings should be formulated. This is necessary . .

provide a proper justification for Apollo, and to place Apollo sche

and technical plans on a firmer foundation. 

To this end, said Low, he and Eldon Hall, Oran W. Nicks, an

Disher would try to establish ground rules for manned lunar 

missions, to determine reasonable spacecraft weights, to specify launc

cle requirements, and to prepare an integrated development pl

cluding the spacecraft, lunar landing and takeoff system, and 

vehicles. 54 

The Space Task Group, although still having difficulties with M

(in an attempted launch on 21 November, the first Mercury-Redsto

risen only a few centimeters off its pad), also moved to support a p

that would be more than just a circumlunar flight. Gilruth had reor

his people in September, setting up an Apollo Projects Office in 

Flight Systems Division. After getting the feasibility study contracts 

Faget, Piland (head of the new office), and J. Thomas Markley atten

Apollo-Saturn conference in Huntsville, at which they reported p

on the contracts. Later that afternoon, Faget and von Braun agreed 

together on a plan to place man on the moon and not just in orbit 

it. 55 

Gilruth assigned Markley as liaison with Marshall. Spending 

his time in Huntsville, Markley learned the opinions of many of von 

group on future vehicles and mission approaches and became well ve

their preference for rendezvous in earth orbit rather than direct flight

would require vehicles much bigger than Saturn as then planned. 

cember, Markley reported to Donlan that Marshall was studying 

assembly and refueling techniques and was planning to let contr

industry for further studies on these subjects. 56 
estimated Apollo would cost, Glennan wanted the reasons for going to 

the moon-international prestige or whatever they might be-laid out more 

clearly. 

With the coming of the new year, then, there was a measure of uncertainty. Assuming that maimed space flight would have some part in 

John F. Kennedy's "New Frontier," however, Glennan strengthened the 

chances for an Apollo program by announcing that the Space Task Group 

was a separate autonomous field element, responsible for all civilian manned 

space flight programs. Although the location of its permanent home was 

still unsettled-and Glennan favored Ames in California-Gilruth's position was affirmed. On the heels of this move, Glennan called the Space Exploration Program Council together again, to talk with many of those who 

had been at Williamsburg. He still warned that an Apollo hardware contract lacked presidential endorsement, but he also conceded that NASA 

seemed to be inevitably headed toward a lunar landing mission. 57 

During the first week of January 1961, Glennan waited in vain for some 

member of the incoming administration to get in touch with him about 

the transition. Meanwhile, Dryden and Seamans discussed the coming 

congressional budget hearings for fiscal 1962.* At this time, they decided 

to formalize Low's committee as the "Manned Lunar Landing Task Group." 

The expanded team was to prepare a position paper to answer, in some 

depth, the questions, "What is NASA's Manned Lunar Landing Program? 

... How much is it going to cost to land a man on the moon and how 

long is it going to take?" 58 

• Budget estimates drafted in September 1960 placed Apollo costs at $100 000 for FY 1960 

and $1 000 000 for 1961; NASA intended to ask for $35 500 000 for the program for FY 1962. 

22 
cocuet deveopet ospacecat ad aucvece soud 

financially supported, almost inevitably to a manned lunar land

1968 to 1970, they thought. Its costs ought to peak around 1966 an

about $7 billion. The big Saturn and bigger Nova boosters would b

and tested anyway, the group reasoned, and a manned space station i

orbit would probably be extant by then. Low conceived Apollo 

phases: first, extended earth-orbital missions; second, circumlunar, 

to lunar landing missions. 

The Low Committee stated that lunar landings could be m

using either direct-ascent or earth-orbital-rendezvous modes. Laun

hicle development would determine how large a step NASA could 

space at any given time. Moon landings demanded launch vehicl

could lift from 27 200 to 36 300 kilograms into space fast enough to 

the earth's gravitational pull. (The C-2 Saturn in the agency's fisc

budget request would be able to boost no more than 7000-8000 ki

to that velocity. It could thus send manned flights to the vicinity 

moon, but i~ could not land there and then return its cargo to the 

The committee cited two ways of getting this booster capability for m

landings, either refueling a number of C-2s in earth orbit or bui

vehicle large enough to perform the mission directly from the grou

though both appeared feasible, the earth-orbital-rendezvous scheme 

probably be quicker. Accordingly, NASA must develop orbital ope

techniques; refueling in orbit would probably be possible by 1967 or 

And there the matter rested. Early 1961 was an unsettled per

NASA. With the country acquiring a new President and the agency 

Administrator, the prospect for moon flights was highly uncerta

Kennedy was deeply interested in space. Before his inauguration, 

appointed an ad hoc committee, headed by .Jerome B. Wiesner 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to review the entire miss

space effort. The Wiesner Committee's report, quite critical of t
g, py p

preside over the agency. ·when he was named to head the powerful National 

Aeronautics and Space Council, Johnson won. 

Glennan's resignation from NASA was effective 20 January, but Kennedy did not announce his successor until the end of the month. In the 

interim, at the request of the White House staff, Dryden was Acting Administrator. On 30 January, the President ended a spate of speculation by 

naming James E. Webb as NASA's new head. Quickly confirmed by the 

Senate, Webb was sworn in on 15 February. Dryden, whose continued 

service the new Administrator solicited, remained as Deputy Administrator, 

personifying scientific interests within the agency. 

Dramatic changes for NASA seemed likely. Webb was a man with a 

long and varied background in government, industry, and public service. 

During the Truman era he had first been Director of the Bureau of the 

Budget (1946-1949) and later Under Secretary of State (1949-1952). With 

forceful demeanor, grandiloquent style, and a genius for extemporization, 

Webb soon became a familiar figure on Capitol Hill as champion of the 

space program and defender of the agency-and its fiscal interests-before 

Congress. 62 

Webb met with his key officials from Headquarters and the field centers at NASA's fifth semiannual retreat, in Luray, Virginia, 8-10 March 

1961. He announced that Seamans would be the "operating vice president" 

of the agency and that the field centers would, in future, report directly to 

Seamans rather than to the major Headquarters staff offices, as in the past. 

There were hints of other significant changes that would be needed to 

manage a program the size of Apollo, once it was approved. Webb's ideas 

were not hatched overnight but were founded, in part at least, on documents passed on to him by Glennan. The principal contribution was a 

study led by Lawrence A. Kimpton, Chancellor of the University of 

Chicago. Contained in the "Kimpton Report" were recommendations that 

24 
said bluntly on 14 April, "My objective, and this is speaking indi

is to beat the Russians." Seamans reminded the committee that W

told them only the day before that the cost of Apollo, without a c

gram, would be between $20 billion and $40 billion over the 

years. With an accelerated program, that figure could go even hig

President Kennedy had begun strengthening the space program 

March. He sent Congress a revised fiscal 1962 budget for NASA

the agency's funding more than $125 million over Eisenhower'

mended level of $1 .11 billion. Much of this increase was earmarke

Saturn C-2 and the F-1 engine and was expected to speed up deve

of these important items significantly.* 65 

Seamans suggested even greater increases than NASA actually 

Given the funding levels he proposed, manned circumlunar flight 

C-2 would be feasible in 1967 rather than 1969. The F-1 engine, 

to an even larger launch vehicle, was the key to manned landing

• Kennedy and Webb held budgetary discussions on 22 March, in which they 

actions NASA would have to take to accelerate the space program: (I) increase the 

Mercury flights to learn more about man's behavior in space; (2) initiate pos

duration Mercury flights with intermediate launch vehicles; (3) accelerate explorati

vide da:ta for manned flights; (4) speed up studies of manned reentries at lu

velocities; (5) begin development of solid-propellant rockets for first or second stage

(6) start design work on clustered F-1 engines for Nova; (7) commence design 

of Nova, using clustered F-1 engines for the first stage; (8) begin developing ta

engines for Nova's second stage; (9) expedite supporting technology required for 

of lunar goal; (10) start construction of launch pads and other facilities; and (l

additional vehicles and spacecraft to hasten the Tiros meteorological program. Budg

David E. Bell later wrote the President that Webb and his associates had presente

for an accelerated space program very well. But, he warned, the United States migh

advised to concern itself with "men on earth" rather than with putting "men on th
March, the industrial teams came to Langley one by one and stood before 

a large audience who had come to hear what the contractors had to tell. 

Each company followed roughly the same agenda: trajectory analysis; 

guidance and control; configuration and aerodynamics; heating; structures 

and materials; human factors; onboard propulsion; mechanical systems; and 

instrumentation and communications. 

The NASA auditors commented on the presentations, each of which 

seemed a bit too general and lacking in the technical information the NASA 

planners wanted. Martin Company's team, for instance, led by E. E. Clark 

and Carlos de Moraes, was complimented for its briefing on mechanical 

systems but chided for neglecting structures and materials analyses related to 

Apollo design requirements. The General Electric group, headed by George 

R. Arthur and Ladislaus W. Warzecha, scored high on human factors but 

low in its discussions of mission abort studies, instrumentation, and 

communications. 67 

Faget was especially irritated that none of the contractors had proposed 

modifying and expanding the blunt-body, Mercury-style spacecraft. Some 

theoreticians had predicted that the hot gas radiation heating caused by 

Apollo's greater reentry speeds would make this shape unacceptable, but 

experiments by Clarence Syvertson at the Ames Research Center indicated 

that these predictions would not materialize. In addition, Caldwell Johnson, 

Faget's chief design assistant, had recently finished a study on the advantages of the conical, blunt-body command module over the designs of any 

of the three contractors. Willard M. Taub, of the same office, later recalled 

that the contractors, after the midterm review, "had to jump in real fast 

and come in with a new vehicle based on the [Space Task Group] version." 

Conversely, Mel Barlow of Convair looked on the modified Mercury as 

only a slight technological advance. He said he was shocked to learn that 

NASA intended to keep that configuration. 68 

26 
vehicle design. A total Apollo cost of $1.25 billion over about 

was estimated. 

The San Diego-based company had selected a lifting-body 

much like one conceived several years earlier by Alfred Eggers 

for the return vehicle. The command module, with an abort towe

through launch, would nestle inside a large mission module. W

nautics proposed was similar in its mode of operation to the com

service modules that ultimately evolved for Apollo. Convair/As

envisioned mission planning as building progressively upon ma

orbital flights before attempting circumlunar and then lunar-or

sions. Earth landings would be by glidesail parachute near San 

Texas. Elementary experiments that would evolve into rendezvous

artificial gravity, maneuverable landing, and an eventual luna

were foreseen. The study cost the .contractor about $1 million, f

what NASA paid the company. The other two contractors spent e

of their own money.

70 

General Electric's study cost twice as much as Convair's and 

a semiballistic blunt-body reentry vehicle. Had this configura

selected, the payload sent to the moon would have resembled the 

flown on the early Saturn C-1. General Electric's design capital

hardware already almost ready to fly, but it did offer one inn

cocoonlike wrapping for secondary-pressure protection in case of c

or meteoroid puncture. Although General Electric did not est

final costs in its summary, the company was confident of achievin

lunar flight by the end of 1966 and lunar-orbital flight shortly th

The Martin Company produced the most elaborate study of 

Martin not only followed all the Space Task Group guidelines

went far beyond in systems analysis. Focusing on versatility, 

safety margins, and growth, this was the only study that detaile
Using a model at upper left, William Rector of General Dynamics Corp. describes the design his company 

pmposed for the Apollo lunar mission. NASA's 

second Administrator, james E. Webb (at center 

above), and George M. Low (right above) of NASA 

Headquarters receive a model of General Electric's 

proposed vehicle. At lower left, E. E. Clark and Carlos 

de Moraes of the Martin Company display three of a 

dozen command module configurations considered 

before the choice of the one to the right. De Moraes' 

hand rests on volumes containing about 9000 pages 

that the company submitted as its Apollo study. 

gression of steps from lunar orbiting to lunar landing. Martin's spacecraft 

would have been similar to the Apollo spacecraft that ultimately emerged. 

Later, when the hardware contract proposals were evaluated, Martin scored 

first on configuration design. 

Martin recommended a five-part spacecraft. The command module was 

a flat-bottomed cone with a rounded apex and a tower for a tractor-rocket 

28 
toward the moon became intense. 

THE CHALLENGE 

In the aftermath of Gagarin's flight, President Kennedy 

President Johnson to find a way to regain American technologic

through space flight. NASA top management was i!l almost con

munication with the White House staff, Bureau of the Budget o

congressional leaders. Apollo was about to pass from planning to 

than a month and a half after the Russian feat, NASA's new ma

flight project was approved. 

Now it is time to take longer strides-time for a great new A

enterprise-time for this nation to take a clearly leading role 

achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future 

. . . I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving 

before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and 

him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period 

more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range 

tion of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomp

With these words, on 25 May 1961, President Kennedy 

before Congress and the world that manned lunar landing belon

forefront of an expanded American space program.

73 And Co

viously agreed with him. With almost no internal opposition

Senate and the House of Representatives responded to Kennedy

by increasing funds for the agency that was to undertake this 
y qp, p

ticularly Nova, the key to manned lunar landings. Nova was so crucial to 

Apollo, Webb declared, that the agency planned a parallel approach to the 

development of propellants for the big booster. NASA would continue its 

work on liquid propellants, while the Department of Defense would pursue 

solid-fueled-rocket development as an alternative for Nova's first stage. "As 

soon as the technical promise of each approach can be adequately assessed," 

he said, "one will be selected for final development and utilization in the 

manned space program." 7 5 

Dryden expanded on Webb's statement. Asked if the agency considered orbital rendezvous a serious alternative to use of Nova, he replied, 

"We are still studying that, but we do not believe at this time that we 

could rely on [it]." He stressed that Kennedy's decision had forced NASA 

to begin work on Nova prematurely: 

This illustrates the real nature of the decision. We could make some of 

these decisions better two years from now than we can now, if the program 

had gone along at the ordinary pace. But if we are going to accelerate this 

we have got to do some parallel approaches, at least for a time. The solid 

and the liquid propellant are going to be carried forward full steam. We 

have a certain amount of effort on rendezvous. If it looks like this presents 

any opportunity, we will certainly take advantage of it. 76 

Both Dryden and Seamans freely admitted that NASA lacked the immediate scientific knowledge needed for lunar landings. Another use of the 

• The first astronauts were military test pilots: from the Navy, Lieutenant Commanders 

Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Alan B. Shepard, Jr., and Lieutenant M. Scott Carpenter; from the 

Air Force, Captains L. Gordon Cooper, Virgil I. Grissom, and Donald K. Slayton; and from the 

Marines. Lieutenant Colonel John H . Glenn, Jr. 

30 
the mode question shaped the whole of Apollo. Many possible 

were carefully considered, and a Pandora's box of problems was op

the time, however, technical thinking had not matured to that deg

United States was just on the threshold of manned space flight, an

flights around the earth were in themselves mind-boggling. A pro

land men on the moon, 400 000 kilometers away, and bring the

home was nearly too stupendous for serious contemplation. 

One participant charged with transforming the concepts dr

committees and study groups to hardware later described his r

Acutely aware that NASA's total manned space flight experience wa

to one ballistic flight and that he was being asked to commit men to 

trip to the moon and back, Robert Gilruth said he was simply agha

May through December 1961 

By the end of April 1961, NASA's three top executives-Jam

Hugh Dryden, and Robert Seamans-knew that Apollo wo

become an approved project aimed at landing men on the m

agency's engineers had done some thinking but little planning 

particular step, which they viewed only as a possible objective for 

When President Kennedy's challenge in late May abruptly ma

landing a goal for the 1960s, adjustment within NASA to meet 

charge was not an easy task. Although transfers from other agenc

few recently created offices had resulted in a relatively strong and 

organization, in May 1961-and for months thereafter, for that 

NASA was not really prepared to direct an Apollo program desig

its spacecraft around the moon. New and special facilities would 

and the aerospace industry would have to be marshaled to develo

not easily adapted to production lines, even though no one had y

just what Apollo's component parts should be or what they should 

Despite all the committee and task group work done sin

opened for business, not one of the vehicles, from the ground 

sufficiently defined for an industrial contractor to develop and 

cause of the time limitation imposed by Kennedy, Administra

asked Associate Administrator Seamans to get the pieces of A

were nearly defined under contract. With no appropriate projec

implement this order, ad hoc committees and task groups still 

the work. For the remainder of 1961, until NASA could recru

33 
Once Fleming had selected the direct route, Seamans realized that he 

needed more options, so he formed a second committee, headed by Bruce 

Lundin from the Lewis Research Center, to study the choices. The eightman committee t looked at rendezvous, mostly earth-orbit rendezvous, in 

which two or more vehicles would link up near the home planet and 

journey to the moon as a unit, and lunar-orbit rendezvous, which required 

a single vehicle to fly to the moon, orbit that body while one of its sections 

landed on the surface and returned, and then travel back to earth. 

Lundin's group believed that rendezvous offered two attractions: deciding on launch vehicle size-Nova or several proposed versions of an advanced Saturn-would not restrict future growth; and rendezvous would 

permit lunar landings to be made with smaller boosters, using rocket engines already under development. The Lundin team favored earth-orbit 

rendezvous, with two or three of the advanced Saturns. They considered it 

safer, although they conceded that lunar-orbit rendezvous would require less 

propellant and, in theory, could be done with a single Saturn C-3, one of the 

versions under consideration. 2 

NASA officials gathered on IO June 1961 to hear what both Fleming 

and Lundin had to report. Although the audience asked a few questions after 

each presentation, it was obvious that neither commitee had made real 

progress. They did root out some difficulties that lay ahead and present 

• The Fleming Committee, composed of about 20 members from both Headquarters and the 

field <:enters, concluded that "it is not unreasonable to achieve the first attempt of a manned 

lunar landing in 1967 provided there is a truly determined National effort." Reaching this goal 

would depend on the development of an adequate launch vehicle. 

t Lundin's team consisted of Alfred Eggers (Ames) , Walter J. Downhower (Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory), Lieutenant Colonel George W. S. Johnson (Air Force), Laurence Loftin (Langley), 

Harry 0 . Ruppe (Marshall), and William J. D. Escher and Ralph May, secretaries (NASA 

Headquarters) . 

34 
During a meeting with Abe Silverstein and his Space Flight 

staff, a consensus developed on the six areas in which major 

would be needed: (1) launch vehicles; (2) the spacecraft comma

which would double as the return vehicle; (3) the propulsion mo

extra duty as the lunar takeoff section; (4) the lunar landing st

would be both a braking rocket and a lunar launch pad; (5) 

munications and tracking network; and (6) the earth launch fac

get these projects under way, Silverstein said, Seamans had approv

the spacecraft development contract.

5 

Gilruth took this good news back to Virginia, but he and 

still had a question. What would industry be bidding on? The S

Group favored a modified Mercury capsule (a bell shape exte

a conical pyramid) and had worked on that design. Its chief 

was a lifting-body design, with trims and flaps, championed 

Eggers and his colleagues at the Ames Research Center. 

Max Faget, leading spacecraft designer at the Space Task G

said that one of his major objectives was to make the Apollo 

module big enough ; they were just finding out all the problems c

too-small Mercury capsule. He set the diameter at the base of t

craft at 4.3 meters, as opposed to Mercury's 1.8 meters. When F

Wernher von Braun, at Marshall, to fly some models of the craft

a problem. Since early Saturn vehicles did not have a payload

had used spare Jupiter missile nose cones on the first test flight

Aircraft Company had resized the Saturn's S-IV stage to fit th

body, which was smaller than the Apollo command module. Ma

tended that enlarging the S-IV would cost millions of dollars, 

Task Group did not argue the point. Until this time, the desig

for the Apollo heatshield had called for a sharp rim, as in Mercury

creased the total drag and gave more lifting capability. Rathe
Space Task Group engineers sketched 

crew positions in the command module 

for an October 1960 configuration study LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM 

of the "Apollo-Control Capsule." The COMMAND MODULE 

command module with airlock retracted 

is 

crewman 

ment 

at 

sketched 

the center, 

in the 

below 

the 

extended 

it. 

bathing 

At left 

airlock 

compartcenter, 

re­


a 9

moves the hatch. At upper and lower 


right, legs of the third takeoff and re­SERVICE MODULE_/ 


entry seat, rigged in the companionway, 


are folded away in flight and moved 


back into place for landing. At upper 
 LUNAR LANDING MODULE_/ left, parachutes begin to deploy after 

rocket jettison for reentry. Spacecraft 

modules in the drawing at right were 

identified in the Space Task Group's 

request for proposals from contractors 

mand 

for developing 

module. 

and producing the com­
none too sure that anyone else in NASA liked it. George Low

found merit in both the blunt- and lifting-body configurations 

gested to Silverstein that two prime spacecraft contractors be h

to work from a different set of specifications. 

7 

Space Task Group engineers wanted no part of this dual app

early July, Caldwell Johnson summarized for Gilruth their r

insisting on the blunt-body shape. Johnson emphasized mainly 

tional advantages and the experience gained from Mercury that 

crue to Apollo. He confined his discussion to the trip to the 

back, making no mention of landing the craft on its surface. 8 T

concerned with the command module's basic configuration were st

at the problems connected with circumlunar flight: a vehicle 

fly around the moon and back to earth, sustain three men for t

and reenter the atmosphere at much higher speeds than from ear

Gilruth's Apollo planners pressed on, drawing up a hardwar

ment contract for their chosen craft. This vehicle could be ada

lunar landing later, but that problem was shunted to the backg

the time being. Jack Heberlig, a member of Faget's design tea

Mercury capsule, drafted the hardware guidelines for the Apollo 

center spacecraft. While Heberlig's procurement plan was in fina

NASA Headquarters the first week in July, Robert Piland and Jo

were setting up a technical conference to apprise potential con

NASA's requirements. Invitations were sent to 1200 representa

industry and 160 from government agencies. 

9 

From 18 to 20 July 1961, more than 1000 persons (repres

companies, the White House staff, Congress, and other govern

partments) attended a NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Con

Washington. The first day, NASA engineers talked about spa

design, mission profiles, and navigation, guidance, and contro
AsTRONAVIGATION-THE FIRST APOLLo CoNTRACT 

The guidance and navigation (or "G&N") system was a central concern in spacecraft design. To get to the moon and back to earth was a 

monumental task. NASA and its predecessor, NACA, had little experience 

in this field; but neither had anyone else. When NASA opened for business 

in 1958, more work had been done in celestial mechanics for trips to Mars 

than to the moon. MIT, in fact, had an Air Force contract that included 

research on interplanetary guidance and navigation. Out of this came a 

relatively extensive study for an unmanned probe to pass by and photograph Mars. By the time it was finished, however, this kind of role in 

space belonged exclusively to NASA. 

With the blessing of the Air Force, MIT engineers took the results 

of their study to NASA Headquarters on 15 September 1959. Their timing 

was bad; only two days earlier the Russians had crash-landed Lunik II on 

the moon (the first man-made object to reach that body) and had impressed 

the American space community by having built a launch vehicle powerful 

enough and a guidance system sophisticated enough to get it there. In this 

atmosphere, the MIT presentation netted only a small study contract. And 

when feasibility contracts for the Apollo spacecraft were awarded in November 1960, how to get the crew to the moon and back was still a 

question.14 

Like other phases of Apollo, the G&N system drew on the past. The 

foundation had been laid by Kepler, Newton, and Laplace in theoretical 

celestial mechanics and had been advanced as a practical science by such 

devices as Foucault's gyroscope (an instrument Sperry later made almost 

synonymous with his name). These and other achievements in aerial navi38 
essed daily in its computer banks and transmitted to such agenc

Weather Bureau and the Geological Survey. Guidance and con

nology shared the same evolutionary roots as tracking and commu

but it also drew on advances in avionics, gyroscopics, maritime a

navigation, antisubmarine and antiaircraft fire control syst

cybernetics.

16 

MIT was the obvious place for NASA to look for help in 

astronavigation problems. For many years, Charles Stark Draper, D

MIT's Instrumentation Laboratory, had been recognized as the 

directly responsible for the application of automatic pilots an

guidance systems.

17 Achievements in such second-generation interc

ballistic missiles as the Polaris made Draper's laboratory the lo

source choice for the Apollo system. 

Draper appointed Milton B. Trageser as project manager a

G. Hoag as technical director. These new Apollo leaders consu

guidance theoreticians at Ames Research Center,* 1 8 before starti

contract. Reassured by these talks and by the in-house MIT work 

Lanning in 1958 on preliminary designs for a Mars mission an

Miller and Richard H. Battin in 1960 on studies of applied ma

Draper's laboratory was convinced that it had no near rivals in t

When the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory signed a lette

for Apollo on 10 August 1961, NASA officials assumed they had p

complicated task in good hands. From the outset, there was a cle

• Before and during ·the Apollo feasibility studies, the Ames center had focused 

and navigation as the area where h could be most useful to Apollo. Stanley F. 

looked at midcourse guidance; Dean R . Chapman and Rodney Wingrove had con

reentry guidance; and G. Allan Smith had worked on instrumentation for th

onboard operations. 
Navigating to the moon: MIT 

Instrumentation Laboratory Director C. Stark Draper inspects 

a mockup of the Apollo guidance and control system in the 

September 1963 photo above. 

David G. Haag, technical design 

director at the laboratory, examines the inertial measuring 

unit that would measure changes 

in Apollo spacecraft velocity 

when pmpulsion systems were 

fired. 

standing that MIT would do only the technical design and prototype development; when the manufacturing phase commenced, industrial contractors would take over. NASA monitors anticipated some problems in 

employing separate firms to make the guidance, control, and navigation 

equipment-but that worry could wait. In the meantime, Draper's men 

were not completely sure that NASA people really understood the differences between the three terms. 20 

"Guidance," to MIT, meant directing the movement of a craft with 

particular reference to a selected path or trajectory. "Navigation," in space 

as on the seas, referred to determining present position, as accurately as 

possible, in relation to a future destination. "Control," specifically in astronautics, was the directing of a craft's movements with relation to its attitude 

(yaw, pitch, and roll) or velocity (speed and direction, a vector quantity). 

MIT's expertise centered on the first two of these factors; NASA engineers 

(particularly those who had worked with earth-orbital flight) emphasized 

the first and third. 21 

40 
will lead to success .... let me know what application blanks I 

fill out....22 

Draper's offer to serve as an astronaut caused a ripple of 

throughout NASA Headquarters, but only for a moment. There w

problems to resolve. The basic rocket booster for the moon mis

still in question, and NASA's administrators were in the process of 

a spacecraft manufacturer. 

CoNTRACTING FOR THE CoMMAND MoDULE 

The attention devoted to guidance and navigation did not halt 

tions for a contract on the command module. Data from the feasibili

and from Space Task Group's in-house work were used to prepar

ment of work, detailing the contractor's responsibilities and the 

his obligations in designing, building, and testing the spacecraft. 23 

Project Apollo would have three phases: earth-orbital, circuml

lunar-orbital, and lunar landing. The prime spacecraft contract

develop and build the command module, service propulsion module

(to fit the spacecraft to a space laboratory for earth-orbital flight

the lunar landing propulsion section for lunar missions), and gro

port equipment. Although the prime spacecraft contractor would 

the lunar landing module, he would integrate that system into 

• On 10 May 1960, the U.S.S. Triton completed a 66 800-kilometer submerged cr

the globe. 
Working arrangements for the development contract followed very 

closely those evolved for the feasibility studies. The deadline for the submission of proposals was set for 9 October 1961, giving prospective bidders 

more than ten weeks to work out their proposals. A conference was held 

on 14 August so NASA could explain the guidelines for the contract in 

detail. Almost 400 questions were asked at the meeting and answered; the 

answers were recorded and distributed. Seamans then appointed an 11-man 

Source Evaluation Board, headed by Faget and including one nonvoting 

member from Headquarters (James T. Koppenhaver, a reliability expert). 

The board consisted of six voting members from the Space Task Group 

(Robert Piland, Wesley Hjornevik, Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, Charles W. 

Mathews, James A. Chamberlin, and Dave W. Lang), one from Marshall 

(Oswald H. Lange), and two from Headquarters (George Low and Albert 

A. Clagett). Faget's board directed the technical assessment teams and a 

business subcommittee to work out and submit a numerical scoring system 

for comparative analyses of the proposals.

2 6 

On 9 October 1961, five hopeful giants t of the aerospace industry 

brought their proposals to the Chamberlain Hotel, Old Point Comfort, 

Virginia. During the first two days of a three-day meeting, these documents 

were distributed among the members of the NASA assessment teams. The 

massive technical proposals, separated from those on business management 

and cost, were scrutinized and evaluated by more than a hundred specialists. 

• The 14 firms were Boeing, Chance Vought, Douglas, Astronautics Division of General 

Dynamics, General Electric, Goodyear Aircraft, Grumman, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, 

Ma11tin, McDonnell, North American, Radio Corporation of America, Republic Aviation, and 

Space Technology Laboratories (STL) . 

t General Dynamics/ Astronautics with Avco; General Electric, with Douglas, Grumman, and 

STL; McDonnell, with Lockheed Aircraft, Hughes Aircraft, and Chance Vough·t; Martin; and 

North American. 

42 
(30%) 

(30%) 

(

Martin Co. 

General DynamicsfAstronautics 

North American Aviation 

5.58 (out o£10) 

5.27 

5.09 

6.63 

5.35 

6.66 

General Electric Co. 5.16 5.60 

McDonnell Aircraft Corp. 5.53 5.67 

This step led to a summary rating, with Martin scoring 6.9, Gene

namics tied with North American at 6.6, and General Electric match

McDonnell at 6.4 for final grades. The board was unequivocal in 

recommendation: 

The Martin Company is considered the outstanding source for the A

prime contractor. Martin not only rated first in Technical Approa

very close second in Technical Qualification, and second in Business 

agement, but also stood up well under further scrutiny of the board

If Martin were not selected, however, the board suggested 

American as the most desirable alternative. 

North American Aviation [NAA] ... rated highest of all proposers i

major area of Technical Qualifications. North American's pertinent e

ence consisting of the X-15, Navajo, and Hound Dog coupled wi

outstanding performance in the development of manned aircraft 

and F-86) resulted in it[s] being the highest rated in this area. The 

personnel proposed showed a strong background in development pr

and were judged to be the best of any proposed. Like Martin, NAA 

posed a project managed by a single prime contractor with subsy

obtained by subcontracting, which also had the good features desc

for the Martin proposal. Their project organization, however, did 
Martin employees were informed over the public address system on 27 

November 1961 that they had won the contest to build the moonship. The 

next day they learned the truth.

29 

North American won the spacecraft development sweepstakes. Webb, 

Dryden, and Seamans apparently chose the company with the longest record 

of close association with NACA-NASA and the most straightforward advance 

into space flight. The decision would have to be defended before Congress 

and would be the cause of some anguish later. 30 When it was announced on 

28 November, shouts of joy rang through the plant at Downey, California, 

as John W. Paup broke the news over the "squawk box." 3 1 

During December 1961, Space Task Group (renamed Manned Spacecraft Center on l November) and North American program directors and 

engineers met in Williamsburg, Virginia, to lay the technical groundwork 

for the spacecraft development program and begin contract negotiations. 32 

The spacecraft portion of Apollo had entered the hardware phase, although 

the launch vehicle (or vehicles) and the lunar lander had not. 

INFLUENCES ON BOOSTER DETERMINATION 

Concurrently with the agreement that Gilruth should get started on the 

spacecraft development. contract, Associate Administrator Seamans realized 

that it was time to decide what the rest of the Apollo stack should comprise. 

The method chosen for the lunar trip-rendezvous or direct ascentwould affect Apollo's costs and schedules, as well as the launch vehicle 

configuration. 

A launch vehicle to support the moon landing was a big question mark 

when the President issued his challenge in May 1961. The Space Task 

Group wanted to get its opinions on the record-not really sure how big 

44 
move from the casting pit to the launch pad. They also argued, he 

solids had poor burning characteristics and were unstable. So th

vehicle question dragged on, although pressure to make some so

cision did not lessen. 33 

After the Fleming and Lundin Committee study reports had 

tributed, Seamans met with several Headquarters program dire

discuss whether the advanced Saturn, called the C-3, recomme

Lundin's team could make the voyage to the moon if the eart

rendezvous approach were chosen. Silverstein warned that the 

upper stages were simply not well enough defined as yet. 34 Seaman

On 20 June 1961, he asked Colonel Donald H. Heaton to hea

force* to study the C-3 and its possible employment in a mann

landing mission using rendezvous techniques. 35 

Heaton's group followed Fleming's lead in narrowing the sco

investigations to a single mode-in this case, earth-orbital rendezvo

way to go. Most of the members agreed that this mode offered th

chance for a landing. Either the C-3 or its next larger version, a C

be used. But the team urged that NASA begin work on the C-4, b

"should offer a higher probability of an earlier successful mann

landing than the C-3." Moreover, a rendezvous capability would e

C-4 to cope with future payload increases that the direct-ascent, N

booster, with its fixed thrust, would be unable to handle. 36 

• Heaton's committee was made up of Commander L. E. Baird (Navy) ; Richard B

Norman Rafel, Joseph E. McGolrick, L. H. Glassman, John L. Hammersmith, 

Briskman, James Nolan , Warren North, and William H. Woodward (NASA Hea

Wilson B. Schramm, R. Voss, Paul J. DeFries, Heinz Koelle, and Harry Ruppe 

William H . Phillips and John Houbolt (Langley); Hubert M. Drake (Flight Resear

and J. Yolles (Air Force Systems Command). 
Early in July, Seamans appointed a Lunar Landing Steering Committee,* with himself as chairman, to meet every Monday afternoon until 

an impending Headquarters reorganization was completed. During its three 

meetings in July, the committee considered the facilities and organization 

needed to manage Apollo and then turned its attention to launch vehicles. 

But nothing tangible emerged from these discussions, either, certainly no 

hardbound decision on a launch vehicle for Apollo. 39 

HELP FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Top-flight officials both in NASA and the Kennedy administration, 

when they recommended a moon landing program as the focus of America's 

space effort, saw Apollo as a central element of a broad national space program. The United States needed not only to develop more powerful 

boosters, to match Russia's, but to plan that development with a minimum 

of unnecessary duplication among agencies. 40 

Early in July 1961, Seamans and John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary 

of Defe1se and Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 

agreed on the need for joint NASA-Defense planning. Seamans informed 

Webb that the two agencies would try to determine what boosters would 

best meet the requirements of both the Department of Defense (DoD) and 

• The steering committee attendance was flexible; the only members who met regularly were 

Seamans, Don Ostrander, Ray Romatowski, and Fleming (committee secretary) . Less frequent 

attendees were Silverstein, Ira AbboH, Hyatt, DeMarquis D. Wyatt, Nicholas E. Golovin, Alfred 

Mayo, G. Dale Smith, John D. Young, Charles H. Roadman, Low, Milton W. Rosen, and 

Wesley Hjornevik (all of Headquarters); Eberhard F. M. Rees and Hans H. Maus (of 

Marshall) ; and Gilruth (STG) . 

46 
Saturn C-2. Four-stage configuration: S-1 booster, S-11 second stage 

defined), 5-IV third stage, and s-v fourth stage. 

Three-stage configuration: S-1 booster, S-11 second stage (not defin

and 5-IV third stage. Plans for the C-2 were canceled in June 1961 in f

of the proposed C-3. 

Saturn C-3. Configuration: booster stage (two F-1 engines with a 

bined thrust of 13.3 million newtons [3 million pounds]), second stage 

J-2 engines with a 3.6-million-newton total [800 000 pounds]), and 

third stage. Plans for the C-3 were canceled for a more powerful la

vehicle. 

Saturn C-4. Configura>tion: booster stage (four clustered F-1 engines 

26.7-million-newton [6-million-pound] combined thrust) and a second s

(four J-2 engines with combined thrust of 3.6 million newtons [800 

pounds]). The C-4 was briefly considered but rejected for the C- 5. 

Saturn C-5 (renamed Saturn V).* Configuration: 5-IC booster (five 

engines, clustered, with total thrust of 33.4 million newtons [7.5 m

pounds]), S-11 second stage (five J- 2 engines with total of 4.5 million new

[1 million pounds]), and S-IVB third stage. 

Saturn C-8. Configuration: First stage (eight F-1 engines, clustered, 

a combined 53.4 million newtons [12-million-pound thrust]), second s

(eight J-2 engines with total of 7.1 million newtons [1.6 million pounds]), 

third stage (one J-2 engine with 889 600 newtons [200 000 pounds]). 

Nova. Configuration: several proposed, all using F-1 engines in the 

stage. One typical configuration consisted of a first stage (eight F-1 eng

clustered, with 53.4-million-newton [12-million-pound] total thrust), a se

stage (four liquid-hydrogen M-1 engines with combined thrust of 21.4 m

newtons [4.8 million pounds]), and a third stage (one J-2 engine with 889 

newtons [200 000 pounds]). Nuclear upper stages were also proposed. 

• Only the three vehicles indicated by an asterisk were actually developed and 

in the Apollo program. 
gy

py y p

of rendezvous-earth-orbit, lunar-orbit, or lunar-surface-and prepare a report for the Golovin group. Hall's own office would study direct ascent. 44 

Worried that this latest in the series of Headquarters committees established to select a launch vehicle for Apollo would also get bogged down 

in the mode issue, Gilruth wrote Golovin about the degree to which rendezvous had pervaded recent thinking. "I feel that it is highly desirable," 

he said, "to develop a launch vehicle with sufficient performance and reliability to carry out the lunar landing mission using the direct approach. 

. . . I am concerned that rendezvous schemes may be used as a crutch to 

achieve early planned dates for launch vehicle availability, and to avoid the 

difficulty of developing a reliable NOVA class launch vehicle." 45 

Just as Gilruth had feared, Golovin's group did get mired in the mode 

issue, leaving the choice of an Apollo launch vehicle still unsettled. On 18 

September, one committee member said the group preferred rendezvous 

rather than direct flight, because smaller vehicles would be available earlier 

than the large boosters. Preliminary conclusions indicated that the manned 

lunar landing might be made with the C-4 more safely than with the Nova. 

Moreover, the C-4 would be more useful to other NASA and Defense 

Department long-range needs. 46 

• The Golovin Committee originally comprised 14 member and alternate positions, equally 

divided between DoD and NASA. By the end of the study, these had expanded to 18 and 

included personnel from Aerospace Corp. (acting as advisers to DoD) . The final roster listed 

Golovin (chairman), Eldon Hall, Harvey Hall, Milton W. Rosen, Kurt R. Stehling, and 

William W. Wolman (NASA Headquarters); Laurence Kavanau (cochairman and Director of 

Office of Defense); Warren Amster and Edward J. Barlow (Aerospace); Aleck C. Bond (Space 

Task Group); Seymour C. Himmel (Lewis); Wilson B. Schramm and Francis L. Williams 

(Marshall) ; Colonel Mathew R. Collins (Army) ; Rear Admiral Levering Smith and Captain 

Lewis J. Stecher, Jr. (Navy); and Colonel Otto J. Glasser, Lieutenant Colonel David L. Carter, 

and Heinrich J. Weigand (Air Force). James F. Chalmers, Aerospace, was secretary. 

48 
gg

jected strongly to any assumption that rendezvous in space would 

Weigand contended that his fellow committeemen were underestima

difficulty of rendezvous and docking. He wanted a Nova with larg

fueled rocket engines in its first stage. Collins also urged that direc

be given first priority. 

Cochairman Kavanau warned that "lunar orbit rendezvous or 

the only way to beat the Russians," adding that he believed the C

do the job either way. Golovin countered that "competition with t

sians is a permanent thing." He insisted that both orbital operations 

development of large boosters would have to be studied for at least t

before any mode choice was possible. 

After listening to the cochairmen express opposing views, Colli

bluntly: "Are we going to recommend rendezvous or direct?" Re

that this was not in their charter-they were supposed to be sel

launch vehicle to support either rendezvous or direct flight-the g

turned to the arguments over four versus five engines for the a

Saturn's first stage and the Nova's configuration.48 

And there the issues lay. Once again nothing was settled, a

the October sessions wound up the Golovin Committee meetin

group's greatest value had been as a forum for discussions on vehicle 

and possible configurations for Apollo. The committee's conclusion

of them-reflected compromises and conflicting opinions. Afte

months' intensive study of numerous vehicle combinations and mis

proaches, the question of a launch vehicle for Apollo was still unre

On 16 November, Webb and McNamara reviewed the areas 

by Golovin's group and made several policy decisions. They agreed 

the development of large solid rocket motors (6.1 meters or larg

backup for the F-1 liquid engine, although the Defense Departmen

"continue to carry out advanced state-of-the-art technical develop
the Cape. The first thing NASA needed was a more adequate spaceport. To 

fabricate and assemble the lower stages of whatever rocket was selected 

would require a huge manufacturing plant, preferably one already in existence. The agency would need additional land, separate from the spaceport 

but near the factory, to static-test the booster. Safety and noise considerations demanded an immense area that could contain not only the test stands 

but a buffer zone as well. And, finally, if Gilruth's team was to manage all 

manned space flight projects, as it had been assigned to do in January 1961, 

there would have to be a site for spacecraft engineering and development 

facilities. 

The monstrous size envisioned for the launch vehicle and the need for 

these installations to be accessible to each other brought an additional factor 

into play. Since the booster would have to be transported by water, the 

agency would need ice-free waterways for year-round operations. NASA 

planners looked, logically, at the Gulf Coast, which had a temperate climate 

and an intercoastal waterway system. Two of the five states, Florida and 

Alabama, already had Apollo-oriented centers, which led to the reasoning 

that the new facilities should be situated nearby."2 

Kurt H. Debus, as leader of NASA's launch operations (first for 

Wernher von Braun, then for all of the agency's flights from Cape Canaveral, Florida), had long dreamed of building a spaceport. In July 1961, he 

and Major General Leighton I. Davis, Commander of the Air Force Missile 

Test Center at the Cape, endorsed a report on eight proposed sites. Led by 

Major Rocco A. Petrone, Colonel Leonard Shapiro, and Colonel Asa B. 

Gibbs, the Debus-Davis study group evaluated Cape Canaveral (offshore); 

Cape Canaveral (onshore-Merritt Island); Mayaguana (in the Bahama 

Islands); Cumberland Island (off the southeastern coast of Georgia); Brownsville, Texas; Christmas Island; Hawaii; and White Sands, New Mexico. 

Only White Sands and Merritt Island were economically competitive, 

flexible, and safe enough to be considered further. 53 On 24 August, NASA 

50 
planned for the lunar voyage. Von Braun would need land and 

elsewhere, but with access to the navigable waters of the Tennesse

Authority. A survey of government-owned war surplus plants reve

near St. Louis and another (named Michoud) near New Orleans th

suitable for building the huge boosters. But the Mississippi River 

St. Louis often froze over during the winter months. So Michoud

mammoth building that contained 0.17 square kilometers under o

as part of a 3.5-square-kilometer complex along the water's ed

selected on 7 September 1961.* Designed as a shipyard, it had b

cargo aircraft factory in 1943 and a tank engine plant during the 

conflict. Here the Chrysler Corporation and The Boeing Compan

construct the first stages of the Saturn C-1 and, later, of the C-3, 

C-5 (or whatever model was chosen). 5 5 

Influencing the Michoud decision was the need for a test op

area nearby where acoustics could be managed and controlled, as 

logistics. Von Braun's team had always worried about the noise an

tion generated during static-testing (and so had the citizens of Hun

As boosters became larger, they became louder, and their low-fr

resonances threatened all kinds of structural damage. Using statistics 

from Saturn C-1 decibel and vibration levels, acoustics experts e

that the advanced Saturn would require a much larger buffer zone

• Although the Saturn versus Nova debates continued, the selection of Michoud 

chances of clustering eight F-1 engines in the first stage-unless <the plant roof were r

fact that only four or five barrels could be put together did not worry Marshall, as th

would be more than enough to support assembly in earth orbit, that center's favo

Proponents of direct flight had essentially lost their vehicle; but they continued to 

another year, anyway. 
of condemnation, under the law of eminent domain, in the United States 

District Courts in both states. The area, largely flat pine forest, was on the 

Pearl River, only 56 kilometers northeast of Michaud. Well suited to 

NASA's needs because of its deep-water access and low-density population, 

the Pearl River site was bought for about $18 million. While engineers at 

Marshall drew up specifications for static-test stands, canals, and storage 

areas, nearly 100 families, including the whole community of Cainsville, 

Mississippi, had to sell out and relocate. There were few complaints, as most 

of the residents were pleased at the prospect of new economic opportunities. 57 

Meanwhile, Ralph E. Ulmer and Paul G. Dembling, facilities and 

legal experts at NASA Headquarters, were saddled with most of the worries 

connected with the whirlwind activities of site scouting and selection for 

the manned space flight center. For example, Ames Research Center Associate Director John F. Parsons, who led the search for the spacecraft development center, reported to Dembling and Ulmer, and no one else, on 

the whereabouts of his team and its need for advice and support. Webb, 

Dryden, and Seamans referred all inquiries to Dembling, in an effort to 

avoid undue pressures from persons and groups trying to advance local 

prospects. 58 

On 13 and 14 September 1961, Webb and Dryden reviewed all the 

factors in selecting the site for manned space flight activities and decided 

to move that NASA function to Houston.* NASA announced the decision 

on 19 September 1961. Gilruth and his Space Task Group would soon have 

a home of their own to manage, a place in which to develop the payloads 

for future rockets. Webb called it "the command center for the manned 

lunar landing and follow-on manned space flight missions," intimating that 

• For details of procedures and the criteria on which the decision was based, see Appendix A. 

52 
Houston had the utilities, transportation, and weather, as well a

cultural, academic, industrial, and recreational specifications.59 

Webb knew that facilities and construction were critical to 

landing on the moon during the 1960s. He called on the Army 

Engineers for assistance, rather than face the costly and time-c

struggle of staffing a NASA office for this one-time task. The Cor

be invaluable in acquiring land at both Merritt Island and Mic

in constructing new facilities at the Cape, at Michoud, and at 

Webb asked Lieutenant General W. K. Wilson, Chief of Engineer

him in this enterprise almost as a partner. 60 

Although the acquistion of real estate had demanded his cl

tion, the Administrator had never lost sight of the urgency of th

launch vehicle and lunar landing mode questions. These needed 

solved before the Corps of Engineers and NASA's facilities engine

do very much about designing the supporting installations. 61 

THE LAUNCH VEHICLE: QuEsTioN AND DECISION 

Late in September 1961, Webb announced a major reorgan

NASA, effective 1 November. Technical issues had to be reso

leadership to be improved. Committees-no matter how many-co

• Webb had written Gilruth in June 1961 that he seriously doubted NASA wo

mitted to establish any large activity including several thousand more people in 

area. Although no commitment had been made, Webb had learned from Congressm

that Rice University in Houston had set aside 15 square kilometers of land for 

institution. Its location near the Houston ship channel made it highly desirable 

Earlier, Don Ostrander had recommended to Seamans that the Space Task Grou

to and combined with Marshall in Huntsville. 
Booster stages for Redstone, jupiter, 

and Saturn vehicles were tested at 

Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, 

Alabama. Above, in 1960, Saturn 

C-1 first-stage engines are static-fired 

for the first time. When the Saturn 

booster grew in size, NASA obtained 

land in a less populated area, in 

Mississippi on the Pearl River near 

the Gulf of Mexico. In the 1968 

photograph at upper left, test stands 

appear beside the waterways. To 

assemble the large Saturns, NASA 

needed a plant, preferably one already built. The Michaud facility 

(at lower left), close to New Orleans, 

suited the requirements. Inside 

Michaud in 1968 (below), Saturn 

IBs are on the assembly line. 
Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (above; earlier called the Vertical Assembly 

Building) stands high on Florida's Atlantic coast; 

the Saturn 500-F launch vehicle rides on a mobile 

crawler toward the launch pad in the 1966 photo. 

Modules of the Apollo spacecraft were tested in 

Florida in the Manned Spacecraft Operations 

Building. At right, NASA officials Walt Williams, 

Merritt Preston, Kurt Debus, Brainerd Holmes, 

and Wernher von Braun-assisted by Col. E. Richardson (Air Force) and Col. H. R. Parfitt (Army 

Corps of Engineers)-are ready to spade dirt, to 

mark the beginning of construction of the building in january 1963. Below is a 1964 photograph 

of the new Manned Spacecraft Center at Clear 

Lake near Houston. 
Canaveral, 27 October 1961. 

problems and recommend solutions, but they could not make decisions or 

run a program. 

Webb, Dryden, and Seamans had scoured the country for the right man 

to take charge of the Office of Manned Space Flight and Apollo. On 21 

September, Webb appointed D. Brainerd Holmes as Director of OMSF, 

to head all manned space flight activity for Headquarters. Three days later, 

the Administrator announced a major shakeup at NASA's top levels that 

saw Silverstein return to Cleveland as Director of the Lewis Research 

Center. 

Holmes was an electrical engineer who had been project manager for 

the ballistic missile early warning system across the Arctic Circle. He came 

to NASA from the Radio Corporation of America's Major Defense Systems 

Division. Webb and Holmes intended for Headquarters to take a larger 

part in Apollo than it had in Mercury. To strengthen this position, they 

hired Joseph F. Shea, from Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., as Holmes' 

deputy, to concentrate on systems engineering. 

Apollo's acceleration brought an administrative change for the Space 

Task Group, in addition to the physical move from Virginia to Texas. Redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center, it dropped its one-program image 

as a task force for Mercury and assumed its role as the center for all manned 

space flight programs. Gilruth continued as Director. 62 

By November 1961, then, the agency had been reorganized to conduct 

the program more efficiently; sites and facilities had been identified to build, 

check out, support, and launch the lunar vehicles; and contracts had been 

awarded for the command section of the spacecraft, the guidance and navi56 
vehicle development program. Although he admitted that he 

repeating much of the work of Golovin's Large Launch Vehicle 

Group, Seamans and Holmes encouraged Rosen to proceed, ho

committee might produce some tangible results. 

The committee members* came almost entirely from Rose

Noticeably lacking were spacecraft people, with only John Disher 

sent them until David Hammock, of Gilruth's center, belatedly j

group. The team examined specific areas-problems of orbital re

configuration of the advanced Saturn, plans for Nova, future po

solid-fueled rocket motor development, and NASA's possible us

Defense Department's Titan IIJ.G4 

Rosen's committee spent most of its two weeks of concentra

closeted in a motel room in Huntsville, near the Marshall cent

when Rosen reported to Holmes on 20 November, he had to con

there were still differences within the committee on rendezvous ver

flight and on solid versus liquid motors. He nonetheless contende

group as a whole was in accord: 

We took the view that the Golovin Committee had opened doo

room which should be explored in order to formulate a progra

report consists of a finer cut of the Golovin recommendations-it 

specific with regard to the content and emphasis of a program. 66 

The Rosen Committee concluded that rendezvous (preferabl

operational maneuver) could be performed in either earth or lu

• The commi.ttee consisted of Milton Rosen, Richard B. Canright, Eldon 

Mitchell, Norman Rafel, Melvin Savage, Adelbert 0. Tischler, and John Disher 

quarters); William A. Mrasek, Hans H. Maus, and James B. Bramlet (Marshall)

M. Hammock (Manned Spacecraft Center) . 
vous mode-earth or lunar orbit-was possible. 

Actually, Rosen himself favored direct flight; he believed it was a 

safer and surer way to reach the moon within the decade. He recommended 

the development of a Nova with eight F-1 engines in the first stage, which 

would be no more difficult, technically, than a five-engined Saturn. 

Rosen's group opposed large solid-fueled rockets for manned lunar 

landing. There were too many technical problems to ensure a reasonable 

degree of reliability. Since the liquid-fueled F-1 and .J-2 engines would be 

built for the Saturn C-5 anyway, why not use them in the Nova? The S-IVB 

stage should be used for the third stage of both the C-5 and Nova. 67 

On 4 December 1961, Holmes learned that Seamans essentially agreed 

with the committee's recommendations. 68 Later in the month, Holmes established the Manned Space Flight Management Council-composed of himself, 

his principal subordinates at Headquarters, and senior officials from the 

manned space flight centers*-to set high-level policy for all manned space 

activities. 69 At its first meeting, on 21 December, the council voted to develop the Saturn C-5. 70 

Early in .January 1962, Holmes prepared a preliminary plan for the 

super-Saturn. He urged Seamans to release some of the money that had been 

authorized for an advanced Saturn, since negotiations with the three prospective contractors t were being delayed by the indefinite status of 1962 

funding. 71 

In deciding on the C-5 , the planners endowed the Apollo launch 

• The Management Council comprised Holmes, Low, Rosen , Charles H . Roadman , William 

E. Lilly, and Joseph F. Shea (H eadquarters); von Braun and Eberhard F. M. Rees (Marshall); 

and Gilruth and Walter C. Williams (Manned Spacecraft Center). 

t The three were Boeing, first stage; North American, second stage; and Douglas, third 

(S-IVB) stage. 

58 
concurrently, were perhaps beyond NASA's-and the country's-e

ability. 74 

When Holmes became chief of NASA's manned programs, he h

confronted with two pressing technical problems-mission approach 

launch vehicle for Apollo. Within a few weeks the management 

had settled the vehicle configuration. Holmes then assigned Jose

to investigate the mode question further. 75 Although earth-orbit ren

was gaining ground in Washington, the devotees of direct flight w

giving in easily. And in the field elements things were no better: 

was united on earth-orbit rendezvous, but the Manned Spacecraf

was split between direct flight and lunar-orbit rendezvous. Actu

mode issue had smoldered almost from the day NASA opened for 

creating camps that favored one route or another and raising pa

individual promoters to the point of conducting evangelical mis

gather converts. The next chapter explores some of the dee

prejudices. 

Comparative sizes of manned space 

(fight launch vehicles: Atlas for 

Mercury earth-orbital flight; Titan SATURN C-S 

II for Gemini earth-orbital flight 

to perfect rendezvous procedures 

and study long-duration flight; 

Saturn C-5 chosen for Apollo; 

Nova, which would have been required for a direct flight landing 

on the moon. ATL~l

1959 to Mid-1962 

Politically setting a goal of manned lunar landing during th

meant little technologically until somebody decided on the b

to fly there and back. Numerous suggestions had been made as 

to make the trip. Some sounded logical, some read like science fict

each proposal had vocal and persistent champions. All had been 

to with interest, but with no compelling need to choose among them

President Kennedy introduced a deadline, however, it was time to 

of the two basic mission modes-direct ascent or rendezvous-and, 

one of the variations of that mode. The story of Apollo told here 

has only touched on the technical issues encountered along the tang

to selecting the route. 

PROPOSALS: BEFORE AND AFTER MAY 1961 

NASA Administrator James Webb in early 1961 had inhe

agency assumption that direct ascent was probably the natural way 

to the moon and back. It was attractive because it seemed simple 

parison to rendezvous, which required finding and docking with 

vehicle in space. But direct flight had drawbacks, primarily its need 

large rocket called Nova, which would be costly and difficult to 

And the direct flight mission, itself, had been worked out only in 

general terms. At a meeting in Washington in mid-1960, the firs

61 
Ritland, Commander of the Space Systems Division of the Air Force Systems 

Command, viewed L UN EX as a way to satisfy "a dire need for a goal for our 

national space program. " When President Kennedy announced on 25 May 

1961 that a lunar landing would be that goal, the Space Systems Division 

offered to land three men on the moon and return them, using direct 

flight and a large three-stage booster. SSD believed the mission could be 

accomplished by 1967 at a cost of $7.5 billion. 

2 

Rendezvous appeared dangerous and impractical to some NASA engineers, but to others it was the obvious way to eliminate the need for 

gigantic Nova-size boosters. Foremost among the variants in this approach 

was direct flight's chief competitor, earth-orbit rendezvous (EOR). The 

von Braun group had revealed an interest in this mode when it briefed 

Glennan in December 1958-long before its transfer from the Army to 

NASA. Von Braun had made a strong pitch for using EOR and the Juno V 

(later Saturn) booster, painting a pessimistic picture of developing anything large enough for direct ascent. Agreeing that direct flight was basically 

uncomplicated, von Braun nevertheless said he favored earth-orbit rendezvous because smaller vehicles could be employed. He sidestepped the problems of launching as many as 15 Saturns in rapid succession to rendezvous 

and dock in orbit to do the job. 3 

While working for the Army, the von Braun team published a study 

called "Project Horizon." Billed as a plan for establishing a lunar military 

outpost, Horizon justified bases on the moon in terms of the traditional 

military need for high ground, but it emphasized political and scientific 

gains as well. Again, the operational techniques would require launching 

several rockets and refueling a vehicle in earth orbit before going on to 

the moon. 4 

On 18 June 1959, NASA Headquarters had asked the Army Ballistic 

Missile Agency (ABMA) for a study by the von Braun team of a lunar 

62 
above center; and lunar

orb

vous. Sketched at the left 

landing techniques proposed 

direct ascent mode. 

5 

~ 1 . Place propulsion unit in parking orbit 

2 . Place manned spacecraft in chasing elips

3. Launch assembled vehicle into lunar orbit Earth-orbit rendezvous 4. Brake vehicle for lunar landing 

5. Return to earth 

exploration program based on Saturn boosters. In its report of 1 

1960, ABMA indicated there were several possibilities for a lunar 

but only two-direct flight and earth-orbit rendezvous-seemed feas

affirming its authors' belief in rendezvous around the earth as the 

tractive approach, the report continued: "If a manned lunar lan

return is desired before the 1970's, the SATURN vehicle is the onl

system presently under consideration with the capability to ac

this mission." 5 

After transferring to NASA and becoming the Marshall Spa

Center, the von Braun group continued its plans for developing 

fecting its preferred approach. In January 1961, Marshall awarded 

tracts for studies of launching manned lunar and planetary ex

from earth orbit and for investigations of the feasibility of refu
earth. 

orbit. 6 By mid-year, Marshall engineers were gathering NASA converts to 

help them push for earth-orbital rendezvous. 

Across the country from Huntsville, another NASA center had different 

ideas about the best way to put man on the moon. Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, suggested a link-up of vehicles on the moon 

itself. A number of unmanned payloads-a vehicle designed to return to 

earth and one or more tankers-would land on the lunar surface at a preselected site. Using automatic devices, the return vehicle could then be refueled and checked out by ground control before the crew left the earth. 

After the manned spacecraft arrived on the moon, the crew would transfer 

to the fully fueled return vehicle for the trip home. One of the earliest 

proposals for this approach was put together by Allyn B. Hazard, a senior 

development engineer at the laboratory. His 1959 scheme laid the groundwork for JPL's campaign for lunar-surface rendezvous during the Apollo 

mode deliberations. 7 

Even before the President's May 1961 challenge, Pickering had tried 

to sell lunar-surface rendezvous to NASA's long-range planners. Earlier that 

month, he had met in Washington with Abraham Hyatt, Director of Program Planning and Evaluation, to discuss this method of landing men on 

the moon. "We seriously believe," he later wrote, "that this is a better approach to getting man there quickly than the approaches calling for a very 

large rocket." Pickering favored this mode because the Saturn C-2 would 

be adequate for the job, unmanned spacecraft could develop the techniques 

of vertical descent and soft landings, NASA could space the launches months 

or even years apart, and the agency need not commit the manned capsule to 

64 
ton on 6 December 1960. After a discussion of the physical aspect

kind of rendezvous and an analysis of fuel consumption and weigh

the visitors were told that NASA was not interested. Three mont

on 14 March 1961, AstraCo took its case through another congre

the NASA Administrator, and Webb asked his staff to take a seco

William Fleming and Eldon Hall calculated that rendezvous whil

way to the moon would save very little more weight and fuel tha

orbit rendezvous and would be "far less reliable and consequently 

hazardous." Fleming recommended that this scheme be turned do

and for all. Webb concurred. 10 

Another approach was the proposal to send a spacecraft on a 

trip to the moon. In this concept, the astronaut would be del

stranded on the lunar surface and resupplied by rockets shot at 

conceivably, several years until the space agency developed the c

to bring him back! At the end of July 1961, E. J. Daniels from L

Aircraft Corporation met with Paul Purser, Technical Assistant to 

Gilruth, to discuss a possible study contract on this mode. Purser 

Daniels to NASA Headquarters. Almost a year later, in June 19

N. Cord and Leonard M. Seale, two engineers from Bell Aerosystem

in a paper presented at an Institute of Aerospace Sciences meetin

Angeles that the United States adopt this technique for getting a 

the moon in a hurry. While he waited for NASA to find a way 

him back, they said, the astronaut could perform valuable scientif

Cord and Seale, in a classic understatement, acknowledged that th

be a very hazardous mission, but they argued that "it would be 

faster, and perhaps the only way to beat Russia." 11 There is no 

that Apollo planners ever took this idea seriously. 

Amid these likely and unlikely suggestions for overcoming the 

limited booster capacity came yet another plan, lunar-orbit re
share in any program that might follow Project Mercury. From mid-1959, 

the group concentrated on lunar missions, including a lunar landing, as 

the most probable prospect for future aerospace business. Dolan and his men 

soon came up with a plan they called MALLAR, an acronym for Manned 

Lunar Landing and Return. 

Dolan's group recognized very early that energy budgets were the keys 

to space flight (certainly no radical discovery). It conceived of a modular 

spacecraft, one having separate components to perform different functions. 

Dolan said, "One could perceive that some spacecraft modules might be 

applied to both Earth-orbital and lunar missions, embodying the idea of 

multimanned arid multimodular approaches to space flight." With this as 

the cornerstone o'f a lunar landing program, Dolan concluded that the best 

approach was to discard the pieces that were no longer needed. And he 

saw no reason to take the entire spacecraft down to the lunar surface and 

back to lunar escape velocity. MALLAR therefore incorporated a separate 

vehicle for the landing maneuver. 13 

At the end of 1959 the Dolan team prepared a presentation for NASA 

Early in January 1960, J. R. Clark, Vice President and General Manager 

of Vought Astronautics, wrote Abe Silverstein about Dolan's concept. The 

MALLAR proposal, Clark said, considered not only costs and vehicles but 

schedules. He also cited the advantages of the modular approach, mission 

staging, and the use of rendezvous. 14 

Nothing came of the proposal, although Dolan tried to interest NASA 

in MALLAR for the next two years. He found many technical people sympathetic to his ideas, but he was signally unsuccessful in winning financial 

support. He did get several small contracts from Marshall, but these were 

intended to bolster Marsh.all's stand on rendezvous in earth orbit. Vought 

tried in vain to win part of ,Apollo, first competing for the feasibility study 

contracts in the latter half of 1960 and then, a year later, teaming with 

66 
Langley during 1960, largely through the efforts of Clinton E. Bro

of the Theoretical Mechanics Division. The Lunar Trajectory Gro

Brown's division made intensive analyses of the mechanics in a m

Papers on the subject were presented to the steering group and th

disseminated throughout Langley. 18 

One of these monographs, by William Michael, described the 

of parking the earth-return propulsion portion of the spacecraft 

around the moon during a landing mission. Michael explained th

this unit, which was not needed during the landing, in orbit w

a significant weight over that needed for the direct flight met

lander, being smaller, would need less fuel for landing and takeof

cautioned that this economy would have to be measured against t

plications involved in requiring a rendezvous with the componen

the parking orbit." 19 

Brown's steering group looked closely at total weights an

vehicle sizes for lunar missions, comparing various modes. Arthur 

in particular, concentrated on safety, reliability, and potential dev

programs; Max Kurbjun studied terminal guidance problems; a

Bird worked on designs for a lander. They concluded that lunar re

was the most efficient mode they had studied.20 

Work at Langley then slackened somewhat, since NASA's man

landing plans seemed to be getting nowhel1e. On 14 December 1

ever, personnel from Langley went to \Vashington to brief Asso

ministrator Robert Seamans on the possible role of rendezvou

• Most deeply engaged in Langley's rendezvous studies were John Bird, Max 

Ralph W. Stone, Jr., John M. Eggleston, Roy F. Brissenden, William H . Michael, 

J. Queijo, John A. Dodgen, Arthur Vogeley, William D. Mace, W. Hewitt Phillips

Brown, and John C. Houbolt. 
qf

direct landing on the moon or other suggested modes. The reduced size was seen by 

many engineers as the great advantage of 

lunar orbit rendezvous over the other 

techniques. 

An early lunar excursion 

model was designed on a Friday afternoon in early 1961 

by john D. Bird and Ralph 

W. Stone, Jr., of Langley Research Center for project 

MALLIR. 

national space program. When he first joined NASA, three months earlier, 

Seamans had toured the field centers. At Langley, Houbolt had given him 

a 20-minute talk on lunar-orbit rendezvous, using rough sketches to illustrate his theory. Seamans had been sufficiently impressed by this brief 

discussion to ask Houbolt and his colleagues to come to Washington in 

December and make a more formal presentation. At this meeting, Houbolt 

spoke on the value of rendezvous to space flight; Brown presented an 

analysis of the weight advantages of lunar-orbit rendezvous over direct 

flight; Bird talked about assembling components in orbit; and Kurbjun 

gave the results of some simulations of rendezvous, indicating that the 

maneuver would not be very difficult. 

Houbolt closed the session, remarking that rendezvous was an undervalued technique so far, but NASA should seriously consider its worth to 

the lunar landing program. Several members of Seamans' staff viewed the 

weight-saving claims with skepticism,21 but Seamans was understanding. He 

68 
dezvous and docking maneuvers. Their findings were distributed 

nical reports throughout NASA and in papers presented to profess

ganizations and space flight societies. 24 

In the spring of 1961, these Langley engineers compiled a pa

posing a three-phase plan for developing rendezvous capabilities th

ultimately lead to manned lunar landings: (1) MORAD (Manned 

Rendezvous and Docking), using a Mercury capsule to prove the 

ity of manned rendezvous and to establish confidence in the tec

(2) ARP (Apollo Rendezvous Phase), using Atlas, Agena, and Satu

cles to develop a variety of rendezvous capabilities in earth or

(3) MALLIR* (Manned Lunar Landing Involving Rendezvous), em

Saturn and Apollo components to place men on the moon. Houbo

that NASA implement this program through study contracts. 25 

EARLY REACTION TO LOR 

When the special NASA committees in 1961 (see Chapter 2) 

ing to get the Apollo program defined, Houbolt made the rounds

certain that everyone knew of Langley's lunar-orbit rendezvous stu

a meeting of the Space Exploration Program Council on 5 and 6 

his arguments for lunar rendezvous were lost in the attention bei

to direct flight and earth-orbit rendezvous. 26 

In Washington on 27 and 28 February, when Headquarters s

an intercenter rendezvous meeting, Houbolt again summarized 

• MALLIR embodied lunar-orbit rendezvous and a separate landing craft. Becau

had no launch vehicle large enough to send a craft to the moon with only one ea

it also required an earth-orbital rendezvous before the spacecraft departed on a luna
the group about his concept. Although the Lundin Committee initially 

seemed interested in Houbolt's description of lunar-orbit rendezvous, only 

lunar-surface rendezvous scored lower in its final report. 29 

During July and August, Houbolt had almost the same reaction from 

Donald Heaton's committee. Although this group had been instructed to 

study rendezvous, the members interpreted that mandate as limiting them 

to the earth-orbit mode. Houbolt, himself a member of the committee, 

pleaded with the others to include lunar-orbit rendezvous; but, he later 

recalled, time after time he was told, "No, no, no. Our charter [applies 

only to] Earth orbit rendezvous." Some of the members, seeing how deeply 

he felt about the mode question, told him to write his own report to 

Seamans, explaining his convictions in detail. 

Growing discouraged at the lack of interest, Houbolt and his Langley 

colleagues began to see themselves as sole champions of the technique. They 

decided to change their tactics. "The only way to do it," Houbolt said later, 

was "to go out on our own, present our own documents and our own 

findings, and make our case sufficiently strong that people [would] have to 

consider it." 30 

Houbolt felt that things were looking up when the Space Task Group 

asked him to prepare a paper on rendezvous for the Apollo Technical 

Conference in mid-July 1961. At the dry run, however, when he and the 

other speakers presented their papers for final review, Houbolt was told to 

confine himself to rendezvous in general and to "throw out all [that] 

LOR." 31 

The next opportunity Houbolt had to fight for his cause came when 

Seamans and John Rubel established the Golovin Committee. Nicholas 

Golovin and his team were supposed to recommend a set of boosters for 

the national space program, but they found this an impossible task unless 

they knew how the launch vehicles would be used. This group was one of 

70 
report, describing the concept and outlining in detail a program b

the lunar-orbit mode. Langley's report was submitted to Golovin 

October 1961. After it had been thoroughly reviewed, its highligh

discussed, favorably, in the Golovin report. 33 

Instead of resting after his labors with the Golovin Committee

bolt went back to Langley and the task of getting out his minority re

the Heaton group's findings. He submitted it to Seamans in mid-Nov

with a cover note that said, in part, "I am convinced that man will 

foot on the moon through the use of ideas akin to those expressed he

His report to Seamans, a nine-page indictment of the planning for Am

lunar program to date, was a vigorous plea for consideration of L

approach. 

"Somewhat as a voice in the wilderness," he began, "I would 

pass on a few thoughts on matters that have been of deep concern 

over the recent months." Houbolt explained to Seamans that he w

ping the proper channels because the issues were crucial. After rec

his attempts to draw the attention of others in NASA to the lun

rendezvous scheme, Houbolt noted that, "regrettably, there was little 

shown in the idea." 

He went on to ask, "Do we want to get to the moon or not?" If 

not develop a lunar landing program to meet a given booster ca

instead of building vehicles to carry out a preconceived plan? "

NOVA, with its ponderous [size] simply just accepted, and why is 

less grandiose scheme involving rendezvous ostracized or put on 

fensive?" Noting that it was the small Saturn C-3 that was the paci

in the lunar rendezvous approach, he added, parenthetically, "I wo

be surprised to have the plan criticized on the basis that it is not gr

enough." 

A principal charge leveled at lunar-orbit rendezvous, Houbo
were being carefully weighed and that lunar-orbit rendezvous would be 

given the same impartial consideration as any other approach. 36 

ANALYSES OF LOR 

Most of the early criticism of the lunar rendezvous scheme stemmed 

from a concern for overall mission safety. In the minds of many, rendezvousfinding and docking with a target-would be a difficult task even in the 

vicinity of the earth. This concern was the underlying reason for the trend 

toward larger and larger Saturns (C-2 through C-5) to lessen the number 

of maneuvers required. (After all, von Braun had once suggested that as 

many as 15 launchings of the smaller launch vehicles might be needed for 

one mission.) During earth-orbital operations, the crew could return to the 

ground if they failed to meet their target vehicle or had other troubles. In 

lunar orbit, where the crew would be days away from home, a missed 

rendezvous spelled death for the astronauts and raised the specter of an 

orbital coffin circling the moon, perhaps forever. And all this talk about 

rendezvous came at a time when NASA had only a modicum of space 

flight experience of any kind. It is not surprising, therefore, that Houbolt 

had trouble swinging others away from their advocacy of direct flight or 

earth-orbit rendezvous. 

Fears for crew safety and lack of experience were not the only factors; 

the Langley approach was criticized on another score-one as damning as 

the danger of a missed rendezvous. One of the principal attractions of 

Houbolt's mode was the weight reduction it promised; but he and his colleagues, in trying to sell the mode, had oversold this aspect. Many who 

listened to the Langley team's proposals simply did not believe the weight 

72 
Langleys brochure for the Golovin Committee described lan

varied sizes and payload capabilities. There were illustrations and 

a "shoestring" vehicle, one man for 2 to 4 hours on the moon; an "ec

model, two men and a 24-hour stay time; and a "plush" module, t

for a 7-day visit. Weight estimates for the three craft, without fu

580, 1010, and 1790 kilograms, respectively. Arthur Vogeley pictu

shoestring version as a solo astronaut perched atop an open rocket p

with landing legs. To expect Gilruth's designers to accept such a 

Rogers space scooter" would seem somewhat optimistic.39 

The same sort of minimal design features extended to subsyste

structural weights further reflected Langley's drive toward simpli

February 1961, at NASA's intercenter rendezvous conference, Lin

Lina and Vogeley had described the most rudimentary navigat

guidance equipment: a plumb bob, an optical sight, and a doc

three-component system was feasible, they said, "only because m

advantage is taken of the human pilot's capabilities." Even some 

on the Langley team criticized this kind of thinking; John Eggles

one, labeled it impractical.'0 

Despite Houbolt's frustration, his missionary work had stimul

terest outside Langley. Within the Office of Manned Space Flight, 

Low, Director of Spacecraft and Flight Missions, commented th

'bug' approach may yet be the best way of getting to the moon and 

And Houbolt had finally struck a responsive chord when giving 

talk to the Space Task Group in August. At this briefing, James C

lin, Chief of the Engineering Division, had been very attentive 

requested copies of the Langley documents. All during the year, Cha

and his team had been working on a study of putting two men 

in an enlarged Mercury capsule (which later emerged as Project G

Although this successor to Mercury had been conceived as earth
The sketch (top) is an artist's concept of a small lunar lander during descent to 

the surface of the moon, as proposed by Langley Research Center employees in 

October 1961. 7 he engineering drawings were made by Harry C. Shoaf (Space 

Task Group Engineering Division) 15 November 1961 of a proposed lunar lander 

to be used with an advanced version of the Mercury spacecraft. 
enough fuel left to get back to earth. The command section it h

contract was designed as an earth-orbital, circumlunar, and reentr

It could not fly down to the surface of the moon. Lunar rendezvo

called for a separate craft designed for landing, became more invi

Gilruth's engineers had worked on several designs for a braki

for lunar descent. In a working paper released in April l9p l, Ap

ners had tried to size a propulsion system for landing, even th

booster had yet been chosen to get it to the moon. Two methods fo

were explored. The first was to back the vehicle in vertically, usin

to slow, then stop, the spacecraft, setting it down on its deployed 

second technique was to fly the spacecraft in horizontally, like an 

In this case, the legs would be deployed from the side of the cra

of from the bottom. 45 

In the summer of 1961, when the command module contract 

advertised, Max Faget described some of the problems he anticip

the landing itself. All other phases of the mission could be anal

a fair degree of certainty, he said, but the actual touchdown could 

there was no real information on the lunar surface. Exhaust fro

engines on loose rocks and dust might damage the spacecraft, inte

radar, and obstruct the pilot's vision. Faget said the final hov

landing maneuvers must be controlled by the crew to ensure la

the most desirable spot. The Apollo development plan, in its 

visions, merely said that the lunar landing module would be 

braking, hovering, and touchdown, as well as a base for launching 

mand ship from the moon. 46 

About the time of the contract award, Abe Silverstein le

Headquarters to become Director of Lewis Research CenterY I

come increasingly apparent that Apollo would probably use one r
y jppg

systems, which decreased the technical interfaces required and minimized 

Lewis' role in the hardware portion of Apollo. Faget based his proposal 

on some sound technical reasoning. The crasher engines would be pressurefed, no pumps would be needed, and the vehicle could be controlled by 

turning the engines off and on as long as the propellant lasted. Pump-fed 

engines, on the other hand, depended on complex interactions to vary the 

thrust. Faget and Gilruth liked the pressure-fed system, and so did 

Silverstein. 48 

Although relations with Lewis were easier after the adoption of the 

crasher, the Houston engineers were still worried about the complexities of 

an actual landing. As Faget later said, "We had all sorts of little ideas 

about hanging porches on the command module, and periscopes and TV's 

and other things, but the business of eyeballing that thing down to the 

moon didn't really have a satisfactory answer. ... The best thing about 

the [lunar rendezvous concept] was that it allowed us to build a separate 

vehicle for landing. " 49 Caldwell Johnson, one of the chief contributors to 

the Apollo command module design, had much the same reaction. He said, 

"We continued to pursue the landing with a big propulsion module and 

the whole command and service module for a long, long time, until it 

finally became apparent that this wasn't going to work." 50 

By the end of 1961, the newly named Manned Spacecraft Center had 

virtually swung over to the lunar-orbit rendezvous idea. Gilruth, Faget, and 

the other Apollo planners conceded that this approach had drawbacks: a 

successful rendezvous with the mother craft after the bug left the lunar surface was an absolute necessity, and only two of the three crew members 

would be able to land on the moon. But the stage had been set for an intensive campaign to sell the von Braun team on this mode. At Headquarters, 

Director of Manned Space Flight Holmes wanted the two manned space 

76 
approach, Holmes laid down a second and broader objective. She

use the task to draw Huntsville and Houston together, building 

unified organization with greater internal strength and cooperation

In mid-January 1962, Shea visited both the Manned Spacecraf

Marshall Space Flight Centers. He found Houston officials en

about lunar-orbit rendezvous but believed they did not fully un

all the problems. He reported their low weight estimates as und

mistic. Marshall, on the other hand, still favored earth-orbit ren

Shea did not think the Huntsville team had really studied lu

rendezvous thoroughly enough to make a decision either way. 

From these brief sorties, Shea recognized the depth of the 

disagreement between the centers. He decided to bring the two 

together and make them listen to each other. During the next few 

Shea held a series of meetings at Headquarters, attended by repres

from all the centers working on manned space flight. At these brie

advocates presented details of their chosen modes to a captive audie

first of these gatherings, featuring earth-orbit rendezvous, was held 

15 February 1962.53 

Headquarters may not have realized it, but the sense of urg

rounding the mode question was shared by the field. Recognizing 

need for choosing a mission approach was crucial, Gilruth's men 

to strengthen their technical brief. The Houston center notifie

quarters in .January that it was going to award study contracts 

methods of landing on the moon, with either the entire spacec

separate module, hoping one of the contractors would do a good 

job to be chosen as a sole source for a development contra

Washington moved before the center could act. 

Holmes and Shea had decided that lunar rendezvous needed 

investigation. A contract supervised by Headquarters would tend to 
Shea, having promised Holmes a preliminary recommendation on the 

mode by mid-June, increased the pressure on the field centers to continue 

their research for the coordination meetings. On 25 May Holmes asked the 

Directors of the three manned space flight centers to submit cost and 

schedule estimates for each of the approaches under consideration. 68 Shea 

began collecting his material for final review, although there was still no 

agreement between Huntsville and Houston. Despite Frick's road show, the 

Marshall center persisted in its preference for earth-orbit rendezvous. The 

mode comparison meetings had obviously been less than successful in 

bringing the two opponents together. "I was pretty convinced now that you 

could do either EOR or LOR," Shea later said, "so the choice ... was really 

... what's the best way." 6 9 

Holmes and Shea, in addition to deciding on the best approach, were 

still determined to settle for nothing short of unanimity. They scheduled 

yet another series of meetings at each center, "in which we asked them to 

summarize their studies and draw conclusions" so everyone would feel like a 

real part of the technical decision process. 70 

Shortly before these summary meetings in May and June of 1962, the 

mounting tide of evidence favoring lunar-orbit rendezvous reached its flood. 

Shea and Holmes became convinced that this was indeed the best approach. 

But, if they were to have harmony within their organization, Marshall 

must be won over. Holmes asked Shea to discuss lunar-orbit rendezvous in 

depth with von Braun and to explore his reaction to the crimp this mode 

would put in Marshall's share of Apollo. Since lunar rendezvous would 

require fewer boosters than the earth-orbital mode and since Marshall would 

have no part in developing docking hardware and rendezvous techniques, the 

Huntsville role would diminish considerably. Also, with the Nova's prospects definitely on the wane , Marshall's long-term future seemed uncertain. 

For some time von Braun and his colleagues had wanted to broaden 

the scope of their space activities, and Holmes knew it. He and Shea de80 
Huntsville. 71 

Huntsville was not the only center that faced a loss of busi

lunar-orbit rendezvous were chosen. Lewis would also be left stan

the gate, since that mode would eliminate the need for the lunar crashe

Cleveland group did hope to capitalize on liquid hydrogen and 

oxygen technology for other pieces of the Saturn propulsion require

although this, of course, would mean a contest with Marshaltf2 

The Management Council met in Huntsville on 29 May, two wee

the confidential talk between Shea and von Braun. Perhaps in com

with his implied promise to the Marshall Director, Shea opened the 

of an unmanned logistics vehicle to deposit supplies on the moon, inc

the time that a manned spacecraft could remain on the lunar surface. 

Low warned that developing a logistics vehicle should not be a prere

to a manned lunar landing. 73 Houston questioned the usefulness 

manned supply craft "because of the reliability problems of unm

vehicles, and ... whether supplies [previously deposited] on the 

could be effectively used." Gilruth's men argued that any such vehicle 

not simply be an Apollo lunar excursion vehicle modified for unm

operation. The best approach would be a "semisoft" lander, similar 

manned spacecraft like Surveyor. And Gilruth's engineers were q

point out that logistic support could be obtained by attaching a "

module" to a manned lunar module, since the Saturn C-5 should eve

be able to handle an additional 1600 kilograms of supplies and equip

Shea's special m~etings on the centers' mode studies resumed i

June. By far the most significant was an all-day affair at Marshall on 

where von Braun's lieutenants catalogued the lastest results of their re

"The tone of everything [throughout the day] in the presentat
flight with a Nova or Saturn C8. Von Braun continued: 

I would like to reiterate once more that it is absolutely mandatory that we 

arrive at a definite mode decision within the next few weeks . ... If we do 

not make a clear-cut decision on the mode very soon, our chances of accomplishing the first lunar expedition in this decade will fade away rapidly. 

The Marshall chief then explained his about-face. Lunar rendezvous, 

he had come to realize, "offers the highest confidence factor of successful 

accomplishment within this decade." He supported Houston's contention 

that designing the Apollo reentry vehicle and the lunar landing craft were 

the most critical tasks in achieving the lunar landing. "A drastic separation 

of these two functions into two separate elements is bound to greatly 

simplify the development of the spacecraft system [and] result in a very 

substantial saving of time." 

Moreover, lunar-orbit rendezvous would offer the "cleanest managerial 

interfaces"-meaning that it would reduce the amount of technical coordination required between the centers and their respective contractors, a major 

concern in any complex program. Apollo already had a "frightening number" 

of these interfaces, since it took the combined efforts of many companies to 

form a single vehicle. And, finally, this mode would least disrupt other 

elements of the program, especially booster development, existing contract 

structures, and the facilities already under construction. 

We ... readily admit that when first exposed to the proposal of the Lunar 

Orbit Rendezvous mode we were a bit skeptical. ... 

We understand that the Manned Spacecraft Center was also quite skeptical 

at first, when John Houbolt of Langley advanced the proposal, ... and it 

took quite a while to substantiate the feasibility of the method and finally 

endorse it. 

82 
Von Braun's pronouncement in favor of lunar-orbit rendezvo

aligning his center with Gilruth's in Houston, signaled the acco

Holmes and Shea had so meticulously cultivated. Von Braun's con

brought the two centers closer together, paving the way for effective 

tion. "It was a major element in the consolidation of NASA," Shea 

Thereafter, ratification of the mode question-the formal d

making process and review by top management-followed almost as 

of course. The Office of Systems began compiling information from 

center studies, adding the result of its own mode investigations. S

his staff also listened to briefings from several aerospace companies w

studied lunar rendezvous and the mission operations and hardware 

ments for that approach. These firms, among them Douglas and 

from Grumman and RCA, believed that such work might enhan

chances of securing the additional hardware contracts that would 

shift to lunar rendezvous. 7 8 

Shea's staff then compared the contending modes and prepared 

schedule estimates for each. It appeared that lunar-orbit rendezvous 

cost almost $1.5 billion less than either earth-orbit rendezvous o

flight ($9.2 billion versus $10.6 billion) and would permit lunar 

six to eight months sooner. 79 

The Office of Systems issued the final version of the mode com

at the end of July. This was the foundation upon which Holme

defend his choice. Comparison of the modes revealed no significant t

problems; any of the modes could be developed with sufficient ti

money, as von Braun had said. But there was a definite pre

ranking. 

Lunar rendezvous, employing a single Saturn C-5, was the m

vantageous, since it also permitted the use of a separate craft designe
"By then," the Associate Administrator recalled, "I was thoroughly convinced myself, and everybody agreed on it." This was a technical decision 

that, from a general management position, he had refused to force upon 

the field organizations, even though he had long thought that lunar 

rendezvous was preferable. 82 

On 28 June, Webb listened to the briefing and to the recommendations 

of the Management Council. He agreed with what was said but wanted 

Dryden, who was in the hospital, to take part in the final decision. That 

night, Seamans, Holmes, and Shea called on Dryden in his sickroom. 

Dryden had opposed lunar rendezvous because of the risks he believed it 

entailed, but he, too, liked the unanimity within the council and within 

NASA and gave lunar-orbit rendezvous his blessing. 83 

Although acceptance of lunar rendezvous by the agency came before the 

end of June 1962, it was not announced until the second week in .July. 

The delay was caused by outside pressure. PSAC, the President's Science 

Advisory Committee, headed by Jerome Wiesner, had developed an interest 

in NASA's launch vehicle planning and the mode selection for Apollo. 

Wiesner had formed a special group, the Space Vehicle Panel, to keep an 

eye on NASA's doings, and Nicholas Golovin, no longer with NASA, worked 

closely with this panel. Wiesner had hired Golovin for PSAC because of 

his familiarity with the internal workings of the agency and his knowledge 

of the country's space programs, both military and civilian. Golovin led a 

persistent and intensive review of Apollo planning that caused considerable 

turmoil within the agency and forced it into an almost interminable defense of its decision to use lunar rendezvous. Concurrently with Shea's drive 

for field center agreement, the PSAC panel was holding meetings in Huntsville and Houston, demanding that the two centers justify their stand on 

lunar-orbit rendezvous. The panel then insisted on meeting with Shea and 

his staff in Washington for further discussions. 84 

84 
pp

Holmes, however, struck a more definite note on the finality 

decision. Anything so complex, so expensive, as Apollo had to be 

at length, he said. "However, there is a balance between studying a p

. .. and finally implementing it. There comes a point in time, and 

the point in time is now, when one must make a decision as to how 

ceed, at least as the prime mode." 

Webb concluded the press briefing: 

We have studied the various possibilities for the earliest, safest missio

and have considered also the capability of these various modes .. 

giving us an increased total space capability. 

We find that by adding one vehicle to those already under develop

namely, the lunar excursion vehicle, we have an excellent opportun

accomplish this mission with a shorter time span, with a saving of m

and with equal safety to any other modes. 8 6 

Early the next morning, Holmes and Shea appeared before the 

Committee on Science and Astronautics to explain NASA's seemingly 

abandonment of earth-orbit rendezvous. Holmes said, "It was q

parent last fall this mission mode really had not been studied in 

depth to commit the tremendous resources involved, financial an

nical, for the periods involved, without making ... detailed sys

gineering studies to a much greater extent than had been possi

viously." Nor had there been any agreement within the agency on 

proach; "further study was necessary for that reason," as well. But 

gations could go on forever, he added, and "at some point one mu

a decision and say now we go. It has been really impossible for us 
0 

D 

\b ~I NASA announced selection of the lunar-orbit-rendezvous landing technique at 

an 11 july 1962 press conference. At the conference table, left to right above, 

are NASA Administrator james E. Webb, Associate Administrator Robert C. 

Seamans, ]r., Office of Manned Space Flight Director D. Brainerd Holmes, and 

OMSF Director of Systems joseph F. Shea. At lower left are major configuration 

changes in the Apollo spacecraft from May 1960 to july 1962. The inset reentry 

bodies illustrate shapes that received the greatest amount of study. At right, 

Shea uses models to demonstrate how the lunar module would dock with the 

command module. 

program manage [Apollo] until this primary mode decision had been 

made." Although several modes were workable, lunar-orbit rendezvous was 

"the most favorable one for us to undertake today." Equally important was 

the new rapport that had been achieved within the manned space flight 

organization "to get the whole team pulling together." 8 7 

"Essentially," Holmes told an American Rocket Society audience a 

week later, "we have now 'lifted off' and are on our way." 88 But the PSAC 

challenge to NASA's choice still had to be dealt with before the decision 

became irreversible. While fending off this outside pressure, NASA had to 

keep North American moving on the command and service modules, watch 

MIT's work on the navigation and guidance system, and find a contractor 

for the lunar landing module. 

86 
1962 

During 1962, NASA faced three major tasks: keeping North A

moving on the command and service modules, defending its 

to fly the lunar-orbit rendezvous mode, and finding a contra

develop the separate landing vehicle required by that approach. 

North American engineers spent the opening months of the 

desks 1 at ~:lrawing boards, and in conference rooms. Although not 

pieces of the Apollo stack had been defined, the first job was obvi

build a three-man earth-orbital spacecraft. This Phase A or Block I 

already worked out by NASA in considerable depth, still required 

analyses, precise engineering specifications, and special manufacturi

The contractor also had to make scale-model spacecraft for win

tests and full-size mockups of wood and metal for study and demon

uses. 1 

THE TEAM AND THE TOOLS 

Harrison A. Storms, Jr. (widely known as "Stormy"), Vice P

of North American and President of its Space and Information 

Division, was a forceful leader in advanced design and developme

and a vigorous decision-maker who got things done. He had studi

nautical engineering under Theodore von Karman at the Califo

stitute of Technology during the 1940s. Subsequently, at North A

87 
F-86, and the F-100. Feltz had been project leader on the X-15 rocket 

research aircraft, coming into close contact with NACA and then NASA 

leaders with whom he would work on Apollo. Feltz was considered by his 

peers to be one of the best manufacturing managers in the airframe 

business. 5 

In the days before Project Mercury, North American, with General 

Electric, had been under contract to the Air Force for "Man-in-SpaceSoonest. " When the Air Force lost the manned space flight mission to 

NASA, North American had put in a bid for Mercury. After losing to the 

McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in 1959, North American officials in 1961 

were not eager to chance another defeat in a major NASA competition. But 

Storms and Paup, after combining forces with Ryker and Feltz, were determined to try for Apollo. When NASA picked North American on 11 

September 1961 to build the S-II second stage of the advanced Saturn, J. 

Leland Atwood, President of the corporation, and Samuel K. Hoffman, 

A team and a goal: officials of 

North American Aviation, Inc., 

study a replica of the moon shortly 

after the announcement that NASA 

had selected NAA as prime contractor for the Apollo command 

and service modules. From left to 

right are Harrison A. Storms, president of North American's Space 

and Information Systems Division; 

john W . Paup, program manager 

for Apollo; and Charles H . Feltz, 

Apollo program engineer. 
Dog missile, among other projects, the newcomers for the most p

hired to develop the Apollo command and service modules. 7 

One of the first structures built at Downey specifically for Apoll

to take shape early in 1962. The Impact Test Facility, 46 meters high

like a gigantic playground swing. It was a swing of sorts-one des

hold and drop a command module so the Apollo team could stud

improve structural strengths of the heatshield, honeycomb shock ab

inner and outer shells, afterbody, and astronaut couches. At one en

swing was a pool of water, at the other a sandpile that could be ba

pitted with gravel and boulders. To return men safely from the m

quired a knowledge of the exact limits they and their machine could 

at the final landing on earth. 8 

As expected, structures, heatshields, and radiation protectio

primary concerns during the first year or so. Unexpectedly, howe

manufacture of mockup modules, initially considered of less imp

quickly grew into a major program to supply boilerplate spacecraf

models designed to be used in testing) . North American's struc

sembly department had begun tooling up for extensive work on m

in January 1962. By the end of the year, this shop employed 305 per

three shifts, tooling, drilling, welding, and assembling custom-bui

D. W. Chidley, a 14-year veteran of North American's prototype m

turing and head of the department, reported at year's end that hi

had built six test vehicles and two full-scale mockups, which h

featured in NASA-North American reviews during the year.

9 

To keep key personnel ready for the frequent meetings with 

and aware of daily plant operations, Storms, Paup, Ryker, and Fe

ten-minute briefings for all plant supervisors at the beginning 

morning shift. Agendas were carefully controlled; no interruptio

permitted; and everyone was required to speak for his section. Thu
Marquardt Corporation had been chosen for the command and service 

modules' reaction control system, Aerojet-General for the service module's 

main engine, and Avco Corporation for ablative coatings and the spacecraft 

heatshield. In April, Thiokol Chemical Corporation was named to work 

with Lockheed on the launch escape system.U 

While NASA was trying to decide on the mode during the first half of 

1962, John Paup and his North American engineers were getting restive. 

Although repeatedly warned by his own people not to bend tin or cut 

metal too soon, Paup insisted that hardware production should get under 

way. He did have his model shops turn out a mockup of a lunar excursion 

The North American Aviation plant (below) at 

Downey, California, developed and produced the 

Apollo command module. The impact facility 

(right) at North American was used to drop-test 

the CM on water, sand, gravel, and boulders to 

check structural integrity and impact loads. 
lower equipment bay. At left

, astronauts Scott Carpenter, jo

••-­ Walter Schirra in 1963 inspect a 

up of the Apollo CM, designed 

module-which looked like a helicopter cab atop thin spidery le

of a lunar braking module, just in case a direct route to the moon 

be chosen. On the first of June, Paup wrote Houston that sched

spacecraft delivery were slipping further and further behind. How 

they build the service module, he asked, if they did not know 

would be used for? 12 

But there was at least one area where work could start immediatel

in the contract, North American and Houston engineers had agre

flight-test program, putting boilerplate command and service m

through structural tests and checking out the abort escape system. 

1961, while he was still with NASA (before joining North Amer

1962), Alan Kehlet had suggested using a fin-stabilized, clustered

solid-propellant booster for these tests. The "Little Joe II" (nam

the Project Mercury test vehicle) would be able to propel a f

Apollo reentry spacecraft to velocities as great as those in the critical 

of the Saturn trajectory and to altitudes of 60 900 meters. The test

be a simple and fairly inexpensive way of determining-in flight-t

scale spacecraft configuration concepts, systems performance, and st

integrity. Tests of the launch escape system at maximum dynamic 

would be most important. In May 1962 the Convair Division of 

Dynamics was selected to develop the vehicle.13 

Although launch sites at Wallops Island, Virginia; Eglin Ai

Base, Florida; and the Cape were considered, the New Mexico dese

of El Paso, Texas, was picked early in the spring of 1962 as the Li
engineers were also dropping test vehicles on a simulated lunar surface to 

study landing gear designs and possible structural damage on impact.16 

Ames had a close relationship with its Navy neighbors at Moffett Field. 

Navy flight surgeon Harald A. Smedal, who had been in aviation medicine 

for years, was a logical consultant to NASA's research engineers. Interested 

in physiological instrumentation as well as pilot performance during flight, 

Smedal worked on spacecraft cabin designs, especially on cockpit layouts 

that emphasized pilot convenience in spacecraft control.17 

Another example of Ames' applied research that fed into North American was the work of test pilots and life scientists in ground-based simulations of the characteristics of spacesuits, restraint harnesses, work-rest 

cycles, and isolation conditions. North American and Ames were intent on 

making certain that the cockpit was designed to take full advantage of the 

pilots' capabilities in performing and sharing their duties. 18 

The Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, also took a hand in 

getting spacecraft development on a good footing by putting Marquardt's 

reaction control jets through a test program. These small motors-used to 

turn the spacecraft right or left, up or down, or in a roll maneuver-were 

cooled regeneratively (in a process in which the expansion of part of the 

hot gas cools the remainder). When tests showed that the engines would 

burn up during reentry heating, Houston directed North American to use 

Marquardt motors only on the service module (since it would be jettisoned 

before reentry) and to make or buy command module jets similar to the 

ablative engines developed for Gemini. In August 1962, the command 

module thruster contract was transferred to North American's Rocketdyne 

Division, which produced Gemini's attitude control and maneuvering 

engines and reentry control system.19 

Even though the Manned Spacecraft Center had gained its independence and had moved away, the ties between NASA-Langley and NASA92 
(holding book above) discusses 

development and production 

plans with NASA officials (left to 

right) Walter Williams, Robert 

Piland, and james Elms at the 

San Diego plant in May 1963. 

Selection of Little joe II completed the Apollo family of 

launch vehicles. A desert area at 

White Sands Test Facility, New 

Mexico, was used for testing 

the spacecraft propulsion system 

module. A pad abort test at White Sands, left, 

helped determine that the launch 

escape system could propel the Apollo 

command module away from danger 

if a Saturn launch vehicle explosion 

should threaten. A model of the CM, 

below, launched by a Little joe II in 

1965, is recovered after impact on the 

New Mexico desert. 
lunar reentry. McDonnell's Gemini heatshield was made of a Fiberglas honeycomb material; the ablator, developed by Dow-Corning, was poured into 

it and allowed to harden. The Apollo ablative heatshield, however, was 

bonded to an inner brazed stainless steel honeycomb shield, and the 400 000 

honeycomb cells in its plastic outer shield were filled by hand using a 

caulking gun,2° with an ablator developed by Avco. 

While the heatshield was going through its growing pains, the earth 

landing system for the command module was beginning to mature. Apollo's 

preliminary plan had included either water or land landing. John W. Kiker, 

a landing system specialist in Houston, had studied several alternatives: a 

rotating wing (like a helicopter's), a flexible wing (similar to a paraglider), 

or traditional parachutes (such as were used in Mercury). Kiker, working 

with experts at Langley and Ames, ran the proposed models through windtunnel tests and then asked the Flight Research Center to put the equipment through free-flight tests at Edwards Air Force Base.

21 

But by the middle of 1962 hopes for a touchdown on land were beginning to fade. At a meeting in Houston on 10 May engineers of NorthropVentura (the recovery system subcontractor) described their designs for a 

cluster of three ring-sail parachutes for the main landing system. North 

American liked Northrop's proposal better than the system being tested, 

which deployed the parachutes through the heatshield cover on the conical 

top of the command module. In the proposed system, the cover would be 

jettisoned before the parachutes were released. On 16 May Houston told 

North American to go ahead with the development of this multiple-parachute 

system and to set the paraglider aside for further review. 22 

At that time, North American was developing a paraglider landing 

system for the Gemini spacecraft. In Houston, Max Faget noted that the 

contractor was having trouble with the Gemini system and became skeptical 

of the paraglider's value for Apollo. In June 1962, he recommended water 

94 
The drawing outlines major parts of the command module structur

photo at top right, the cabin section (or primary structure) of the CM 

bled at North American in 1965. Technicians (in the center left photo

the central heatshield, the two men on the sides applying heat-protec

tive material with caulking guns. A completed central heatshield in th

right photo is lowered into place over the primary structure in May 

the bottom left photo, technicians prepare aft heatshields to attach 

CMs. These shields were made of fiberglas for test vehicles that did n

heat protection; the finished versions were of the same materials as t

heatshield. 
unit (similar to that used to help guide the Polaris missile), but digital 

computer development and the space sextant were not well defined. 24 

Manned Spacecraft Center engineers had questioned whether an astronaut in a pressurized suit could operate a sextant or the other delicate 

pieces of navigation equipment. The Apollo contract had specified a shirtsleeve environment. For this reason, North American had been told not to 

include in its design a hatch that opened by explosives, like Mercury's. An 

accidentally blown hatch would cause an instant vacuum and certain death 

for a crewman not wearing his pressure suit. But on some occasions, such 

DROGUE CHUTES (2) 

e CONICAL RI890N TYPE 

e MO RTAR-DEPLOYED (REEFED FOR 8 SEC) 

e 13.7 FT DIAMETER 

PI LOT CHUTES (3) 

e RING SLOT 

e MORTAR - DEPLOYED 

• 7 . 2 FT DIAM ETE R 

PILOT CHIJTt 

MAIN CHUTES (3) 

e RING SAIL 

• 	 DEPLOYED BY PILOT 

CHUTES (REEFED FOil: 8 SEC) 

Parachute recovery system 
navigation techniques and the procedures for reducing the unc

connected with these operations. Ames speakers recommended ma

course corrections early in flight to avoid the wider dispersions an

fuel use that might result from making trajectory changes clos

moon. Studies by Ames on atmospheric entry guidance-anothe

operation-indicated that a man could indeed steer his spacecraf

the narrow reentry corridor to a safe landing on the earth. 27 

When some components of the command module's guidance 

gation system were ready for development and fabrication by subco

NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans appointed a Sourc

tion Board in January 1962, headed by Robert G. Chilton,* of 

select industrial supporters for MIT. NASA chose the AC Sp

Division of General Motors to build the inertial platform, Ray

make the digital computer, and the Kollsman Instrument Corpo

manufacture the optical systems. By May 1962, most of these co

arrangements were complete. 28 

NASA's top officials had been concerned about MIT's ability 

guidance and navigation system that would take a crew to the m

back to the earth. As the system began to take shape, another worr

up. Would the Instrumentation Laboratory be able to manage the 

contractors once the design evolved into development? To be ce

the subcontractors understood the arrangement, Seamans visited t

field Laboratory of AC Spark Plug in July, where he was assured 

and MIT could work together just as they had on the Titan I

• Chilton's board members were Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr., Charles F. Bingman

Garrison, and Carl D. Sword of MSC; Richard C. Henry and Earl E. McGinty of N

quarters; Merrill H. Mead of Ames; and two nonvoting participants, Ralph Rag

and James T. Koppenhaver of NASA Headquarters. 
come together-systems with spacecraft, spacecraft with launch vehicles, 

launch vehicles and spacecraft with launch facilities, and all these systems 

and craft with the crew and with launch and mission control centers! 9 

All in all, during 1962 good progress had been made in getting command module development under way. Contractors were working together, 

and cooperation among the NASA field centers had improved. One of the 

underlying factors in this advancement had been the establishment of a 

formal Apollo spacecraft management office at the Manned Spacecraft 

Center. 

In January 1962, when Charles Frick became manager of the new 

Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, he assumed responsibility "for the technical 

direction of North American Aviation and other industrial contractors assigned work on the Apollo Spacecraft Project." Frick arrived at Langley 

Field, Virginia, just in time to meet the 45 persons that his deputy, Robert 

Piland, had gathered into the new project office before they moved to 

Houston on 1 February. The new organization settled into the Rich Building, one of the center's 13 rented sites scattered around the Gulf Freeway. 3 0 

But, even before Frick's arrival and the establishment of the formal spacecraft office, the Apollo workers in Gilruth's center had taken on an expanded 

responsibility. 

PRELIMINARY DESIGNS FOR THE LUNAR LANDER 

Work at NASA's lead Apollo center on the excursion vehicle had 

started in late 1961, when designers began looking at the advantages of 

lunar-orbit rendezvous. But these had been analyses of general rather than 

specific configurations. Wernher von Braun's researchers in Huntsville had 

98 
for these engineering studies, Gilruth's men realized that there were 

views among scientists about the lunar surface characteristics, espec

depth of the dust layer. 32 

By early 1962, spacecraft specialists had begun to move bq

study phase. While others fought for their chosen mode, they wo

details for building the lunar module and started preparing for its 

ment. The newly created Houston Apollo spacecraft office drafted a 

document in April defending the hardware and operational feas

lunar rendezvous and the excursion vehicle. Basic concepts of the 

profile and docking and of storage arrangements for the lander in

spacecraft adapter were fairly firm. Many aspects of guidance and n

and of operations in lunar orbit were well understood. Several th

vehicle shapes were depicted, velocity requirements were delineated

weights (up to 9200 kilograms, including a 25-percent contingency 

were estimated, and mission development plans, using the Little Jo

the Saturn C-1 B and C-5, were considered. 33 

William Rector was assigned to Frick's project office staff 

worrying about the LEM." Using command module documentat

guide, he wrote a work statement. Rector drew on technical exper

within the project office and from other center organizations, pa

Max Faget's research and development directorate. He relied he

advice from the Spacecraft Research Division in preparing the proc

documents. Rector began with "a real shoestring operation," a sm

of specialists for communications, propulsion, and overall configura

for assembling information and writing the request for proposals. 

Early in May, Rector and his team finished the preliminary s

of work and started on the formal proposal request. ''I'll never fo

said later, "all we did was just sort of turn the command modul

down and put a window and a propulsion stage in it." From th
door open for future negotiations. To avoid further delay in procurement, 

he had inserted a clause that obligated the contractor to study the advantages and drawbacks of automatic versus manned modes and to assist the 

agency in coming to a final decision. The procurement documents were 

approved and issued to ll aerospace firms* during the latter half of July. 35 

While Houston was getting ready to procure the lander, Shea's Office of 

Systems was defending the agency's choice of lunar-orbit rendezvous before 

the President's advisers and the public. This was a time-consuming and 

harried process, a grinding day-by-day burden, that began even before the 

official announcement in July. 

PRESSURES BY PSAC 

The Space Vehicle Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) was apprehensive about lunar-orbit rendezvous well before 

NASA picked that approach. After the decision was made public in July 

1962, Nicholas Golovin, at the behest of Jerome Wiesner, probed deeply 

into NASA's planning activities. If NASA was to reverse its decision, pressure would have to be applied before the development contract was awarded. 

Once that had been done, the course of Apollo would be virtually impossible to change. 

PSAC's interest in manned space flight had begun with the Mercury 

program and had led to the establishment of the Space Vehicle Panel in the 

fall of 1961. Headed by Franklin A. Long of Cornell University, the panel 

• Companies invited to submit proposals were Lockheed, Boeing, Ling.Temco·Vought, Nor· 

throp, Grumman, Douglas, General Dynamics, Republic Aviation , Martin·Marietta, North 

American, and McDonnell. 

100 
closely at the mode comparison studies then in progress. They grew 

of NASA's refusal to supply them with every draft document, both 

ment and industry, the agency had on the subject. NASA, on t

hand, chafed at the panel's snooping into internal and contractual 

ships, insisting that these activities lay outside PSAC's advisory au

During May and June, Golovin asked for detailed inform

launch vehicles and spacecraft for all approaches under considera

also requested progress reports from all Apollo spacecraft contrac

on engine development programs. Shea did not want to release this 

while the mode comparison studies were in progress, and he sen

member to tell Golovin that schedules were not firm and that his 

was premature. Golovin was, as a matter of fact, at something of a 

disadvantage in his pursuit of NASA information. He had stirred 

troversy during the 1960-1961 period of Project Mercury with his s

reliability analysis methods, which many Mercury engineers co

merely a "numbers game." 38 

Just before the lunar rendezvous selection was publicly endo

Space Vehicle Panel met with NASA officials in Washington on 

.July. In preparation for this meeting, Golovin again asked Shea 

draft documents that had been used to produce the mode co

studies. Shea advised Golovin that this material was still subject 

editing. Golovin said that all the panel wanted was a preview of 

nical data and analyses of various mode alternatives, their feasibi

advantages. 

On 3 .July, after examining some papers Shea had sent the da

Wiesner and Golovin thought they had found a flaw. One table s

higher probability of disaster for lunar rendezvous than for eith

rendezvous or direct flight. Wiesner called Webb, who, in turn, te

Shea and suggested that he see \Viesner immediately. 
from the California Institute of Technologys Guggenheim Aeronautical 

Laboratory, was a paid consultant to North American, which did not favor 

lunar rendezvous. Shea was convinced that this was the reason for his 

antagonism to lunar-orbit rendezvous.) Lees agreed that all four mission 

modes were technically feasible. But, he asked, "which of these risky adventures involves the least risk to the astronauts, provides the greatest growth 

potential for the manned space program, and at the same time gives us the 

best chance of fulfilling the President's [goal] to land an American on the 

moon by 1970?" Lees recommended earth-orbit rendezvous with the Saturn 

C-5 as the prime mode and direct flight using an uprated C-5 as backup. He 

disputed NASA's claims that the lighter, more maneuverable landing craft 

was significantly better than the command module for being set down on 

the moon. Lees also discounted NASA's demands for extensive visibility 

for the hover and touchdown maneuver, which was looked on by some 

pilots, he said, as "probably similar ... to landing 'on instruments' here on 

Earth." 40 

The Space Vehicle Panel's reservations about lunar-orbit rendezvous 

were reemphasized by Wiesner in Webb's office on 6 July. Shea, Brainerd 

Holmes, and Robert Seamans listened as Webb was forced to equivocate, to 

agree that the lunar rendezvous decision was only tentative. Later in the 

year, following additional mode studies, NASA would either reaffirm its 

July preference or pick one of PSAC's favored approachesY 

During the last half of July, the formal positions of the two sides were 

staked out. On the 17th Wiesner wrote to Webb spelling out PSAC's 

opinions of NASA's manned programs, particularly lunar rendezvous in 

relation to booster capabilities and America's military posture in space. 

Wiesner accused NASA of not adequately assessing such hazards as radiation and the potential problems of weightlessness. He had, Wiesner told 

Webb, "assured [President Kennedy] that there is ample time to make the 

102 
views presented here.  

Thus, in July, President Kennedy found the space agency and h

tific advisory body firmly entrenched in separate camps. The situ

mained static until lunar module procurement activities accelerate

Wiesner and his panel tried once more to block lunar rendezvous. 

Golovin knew that the Manned Spacecraft Center was gettin

to let the lander contract. In mid-July, he asked NASA to arrange a 

at Downey so he could review the technical details of North Am

studies of direct and rendezvous mission modes. Most North A

officials favored almost any mode except lunar-orbit rendezvous, wh

the command module from actually landing on the moon. A h

cartoon on the company walls during August 1962 depicted a rath

and disgruntled man-in-the-moon eyeing an approaching command 

with lander attached. The caption read, "Don't bug me, man." 

hoping for a negative response from these contractor studies, insi

NASA allow the briefing. Webb complained to Wiesner that NA

rather complex relationships with North American" and "did no

disturbing influence brought to bear." When Wiesner offered to w

the request for the visit, however, Webb declined, saying he just w

be sure that Wiesner was aware of his concerns. 

Golovin had his California briefing at the end of July. On 

back to Washington, he stopped off at Cleveland to see what the L

search Center was doing on the mission mode comparisons. Asso

rector Bruce Lundin told Golovin that if he wanted this kind of 

tion he should ask NASA Headquarters for it. 44 

In August, Wiesner told Webb of the Space Panel's convict

NASA had not selected lunar-orbit rendezvous because of any ov

technical reasons and had not satisfactorily justified its decision t

The Administrator admitted that he saw "some real value [in 
gp y p

again wrote Webb, reiterating his concerns about lunar-orbit rendezvous 

and this nation's inferiority to Russia in the big booster field. PSAC, he 

assured Webb, stood ready to assist NASA in gathering "the best talents 

nationally available" to study the mode question. Wiesner sent a copy of 

this letter to the President, perhaps hoping that Kennedy might step in to 

settle their differences. 47 

President Kennedy did, in fact, become involved while on a two-day 

visit to NASA's space facilities on 11 and 12 September 1962. After viewing 

the Apollo spaceport being built in Florida, Kennedy flew on to Huntsville, Alabama. There, during a tour of Marshall and a briefing on the 

Saturn V and the lunar-rendezvous mission by von Braun, Wiesner interrupted the Marshall director in front of reporters, saying, "No, that's no 

good." Webb immediately defended von Braun and lunar-orbit rendezvous. 

The adversaries engaged in a heated exchange until Kennedy stopped them, 

stating that the matter was still subject to final review. But what had been a 

private disagreement had become public knowledge. Editorial criticism 

stemming from the confrontation-including the question, "Is our technology sound?"-forced NASA to justify its selection of lunar-orbit rendezvous to the public, as well as to PSAC.48 

Accusations by Wiesner that lunar rendezvous had not been thoroughly 

studied particularly galled Shea. He compiled material for Webb to use 

in refuting this charge, outlining the many studies leading to the selection. 

Shea estimated that more than 700 scientists and engineers at Headquarters, 

at the field centers, and among contractors had spent a million man-hours 

working on the route comparisons.' 9 

In early August, Shea formed a team to monitor contracts awarded to 

Space Technology Laboratories and McDonnell to rehash the feasibility of 

a direct flight by two men in either a scaled-down Apollo or a modified 

Gemini spacecraft. Gilruth worried that these studies might impede Me104 
alterably opposed to cryogenics, which required complicated equip

special handling, for the lunar takeoff stage. 

Another indictment of PSAC's choice was that the panel mem

sisted in claiming that lunar rendezvous had no time advantage 

other modes. NASA was equally obdurate in its belief that adoptin

the other modes would mean a lag of ten months. A space tank

have to be developed, critical refueling techniques would have t

fected, and changes in the S-IVB stage would have to be made t

long-term storage of cryogenic propellants. All of this would me

money, perhaps as much as an additional $3 billion. 5 1 

The Office of Manned Space Flight assembled the meat of the

into another "final" version of the mode comparison, which was 

24 October 1962. Earlier arguments for lunar rendezvous, the repo

were as valid in October as they had been in July. That approach 

"the best opportunity of meeting the U.S. goal of manned luna

within this decade." 5 2 

The day NASA released this report, Webb wrote Wiesner th

the science adviser had objections serious enough to be taken to t

House for arbitration, a contract would be awarded for developme

lunar excursion module. He told Wiesner: 

My understanding is that you ... and your staff ... will exami

and that you will let me know your views as to whether we shou

for an appointment with the President. 

My own view is that we should proceed with the lunar orbit plan, 

announce our selection of the contractor for the lunar excursion v

and should play the whole thing in a low key . ... 
mission success and crew safety, with a craft specifically designed for lunar 

landing and the need for only one Saturn C-5. 

Wiesner now wanted to examine these contractor documents in full, 

which Webb refused to allow because of the proprietary information they 

contained. Next, Wiesner asked that certain material be given Golovin 

without identification of the contractors. What the pair was seeking, Webb 

confided to Seamans, were the lunar weight estimates, but "I cannot see how 

the contractors' estimates can help [them] decide whether you, I, and 

Dryden have made the correct decision." 54 

Holmes did send Wiesner those sections of the proposals that dealt 

with estimated weights for the lander. Most of the figures assumed a target 

weight of around lO 000 kilograms. But, Holmes pointed out, estimates of 

the different subsystems had varied widely. More knowledge of the lunar 

surface and of radiation and meteoroid fluxes would probably "force weight 

increases in the landing gear and shields. " Both Mercury and Gemini had 

demonstrated the need for keeping a margin of weight for additional equipment and redundancy, Holmes added.

55 

On 2 November, Wiesner and Golovin met with Webb and his staff 

once again. It was obvious that the two organizations still occupied opposing 

camps. Golovin presented a detailed re-analysis of the 24 October mode 

study, challenging both payload margins and reliability and safety considerations. He still contended that, of the two modes capable of using only storable propellants, earth-orbit rendezvous had a somewhat higher performance margin. Moreover, with cryogenic propellants in the landing stage 

(and for this he cited research done at Lewis), two-man direct flight was 

quite feasible. 

But Golovin found more serious faults in NASA's stance on reliability 

and crew safety. As he wrote Shea later that day, "It has been surprising to 

[read in the report] that the Direct Ascent case is less likely to be successful, 

106 
gq

President Kennedy, Webb would have insisted that NASA alone m

crucial program decisions. The Chief Executive almost certainl

have backed the man he had appointed to run NASA. So, pre

Wiesner decided to let the issue die. At the end of the first 

November 1962, NASA announced its selection of a manufacture

lunar module.5 8 

FITTING THE LUNAR MODULE INTO APOLLO 

Since responsibility for the Apollo command and service mo

ready rested with Gilruth's Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA 

Houston to procure and manage the lunar excursion vehicle. NASA 

decided to hire a separate contractor to develop the lunar landing sp

North American had made a strong bid for the lander when t

travel mode became a hot issue. Although the company was sent a 

for proposals in July 1962, it was first discouraged, and then preclud

bidding on this contract. NASA evidently believed that North A

already had all the Apollo development work it could handle. 59 

Facing the loss of the glamor associated with landing its own 

the moon, North American did not give up gracefully. Harrison 

carried his case to Administrator Webb, suggesting that his com

selected as sole source contractor for the lander, farming out mo

actual hardware work. This arrangement would have made North A

the systems manager, responsible for integrating all the payload 

Legal and procurement officers within NASA warned Webb agains

proach. The agency should contract the lander directly, they urged

mit an industrial firm to take over this task without competiti
in October, officials from Houston presented their findings and recommendations to NASA Headquarters. Holmes wanted the selection completed, approved, and announced by the middle of the month. But the last-minute 

demands by PSAC postponed the contract award for three weeks. On 7 November, NASA formally announced that the Grumman Aircraft Engineering 

Corporation of Bethpage, New York, would build the excursion module. 62 

Several bidders had been very close, both technically and managerially, 

William Rector later said. Any of them could have done the job-"Grumman didn't turn in the only good design." A major factor in Grumman's 

selection had been its facilities: spacious engineering design and office accommodations, ample manufacturing space, and a clean-room complex for 

vehicle assembly and testing. 

The Manned Spacecraft Center continued its studies, even after the 

requests had been issued. Rector remembered that "our designs were really 

beginning to take shape .... We were getting a much better feel for what 

we wanted this thing to look like." The Apollo Spacecraft Project Office 

had been realigned on I August, to give the lunar module an organization 

of its own. Rector became project officer for the lander and Thomas Markley 

for the command and service modules. Rector and Markley then revised the 

North American statement of work to reflect Grumman's and the lunar 

module's place in the Apollo-Saturn stack, particularly in the arrangements 

for docking and for stowage within a protective adapter section. 

Rector's office began defining the lander's subsystems: propulsion, 

guidance and control, reaction control, electrical power, and instrumentation. The planners hoped to use Mercury and Gemini spacecraft components as well as Apollo command and service module parts ("common usage" equipment) in the new vehicle. The guidance and navigation system 

in the command module received the closest initial scrutiny for common 

usage parts. MIT studies indicated that the inertial measurement unit, the 

108 
Simulating lunar landings to train the crews would require in

imitating one-sixth g within the earth's gravitational field is com

difficult. Three methods were considered, the simplest being a f

simulator like those built for the Mercury and Gemini programs. M

plicated were plans for tethered flights of a model of the lunar 

Langley on a huge A-frame structure that used cables and rigging t

the descent engine of most of the vehicle's weight. 

The third method, which would simulate in free flight the act

ing on the moon, employed a unique and specially fitted flying 

called the lunar landing research vehicle. Dubbed the "flying bed

"pipe rack," this was a complex combination of rocket motors an

tical jet engine designed to accustom the astronauts to flying in t

gravity of the moon. Work on the vehicle, based on concepts pro

Bell Aerosystems, had already begun at NASA's Flight Research C

Edwards Air Force Base in California. After awarding a contract t

The Bell A

landing res

manufactured 

trainer for th

was frequentl

the news med

the "flying be
scientific programs to the manned programs brought considerable criticism 

during the next few years. 

NASA leadership was confronted during the summer and fall of 1962 

with the dual tasks of informing Congress of the status of Apollo and of fitting its fiscal plans to the lunar-rendezvous approach. Defending Apollo's 

budget request for fiscal 1963 before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 10 August 1962, \Vebb and Low reiterated that technical considerations had been important in choosing that approach, but so had costs. Lunar 

rendezvous for Apollo, although not lessening the agency's needs for the 

upcoming year, would be cheaper in the long run. But NASA must get 

started on both the lunar vehicle and a C-lB version of the Saturn booster, 

Webb pointed out, to develop and test rendezvous procedures in earth orbit 

before attempting them in lunar orbit. 6 7 

In late 1962 and early 1963, financial resources for NASA were uncertain, particularly the funds needed for development of the lunar module. 

Houston needed to know when the money would be available. On 9 October, 

Holmes asked Seamans to request a supplemental appropriation from Congress, but Seamans refused. For the next year and a half, the fiscal 1963 and 

1964 funds, set at $2.058 billion and $3.402 billion, would cover research 

and development and construction of facilities. This should be enough, Sea· 

mans said, to keep on schedule and meet a 1967 landing date. 68 

On 21 November 1962, Webb, Holmes, and others met with the President to explore the possibility of an Apollo landing earlier than 1967 and to 

discuss NASA's budget. Kennedy asked the Administrator for a policy statement on the priority of the moon landing within the overall civilian space 

effort. On 30 November, in a lengthy letter, Webb replied: "The objective 

of our national space program is to become pre-eminent in all important 

aspects of this endeavor and to conduct the program in such a manner that 

our emerging scientific, technological, and operational competence in space 

110 
space flight area aimed at a target date of late 1967 for the lunar lan

Although a steady flow of money during the succeeding years w

tial to the success of Apollo, it was not the rnajar concern in late 19

lunar module contractor had been selected, but there was still a lot 

to be done. And the lander was, potentially, the pacing item-the fa

would determine when the United States might land astronauts 

moon. 

NASA-GRUMMAN NEGOTIATIONS 

When Grumman was selected for Apollo, the company expand

an aircraft producer into a major aerospace concern. This trans

flected a long-term resolution, and a considerable investment of f

the part of the firm's senior management to penetrate the Americ

market. 

The story of Grumman's drive for a role in manned space flig

rags-to-riches, Horatio Algerlike quality. The company had comp

every major NASA contract and, except for the unmanned Orbi

tronomical Observatory satellite, had never finished in the money. 

1958, when NASA was looking for a contractor for the Mercury sp

Grumman had tied with McDonnell in the competition. But only 

time before, the Navy had awarded several new aircraft developm

grams to Grumman. For almost three decades the words Grumm

carrier-based aircraft had been virtually synonymous. To avoid di

Navy scheduling and to ensure its contractor's concentration on M

NASA had selected McDonnell. 70 

Nevertheless, board chairman and company founder Leroy R

man and president E. Clinton Towl had continued to support st
Manned Spacecraft Center.

72 

Grumman officials had begun to realize just what a massive undertaking 

the Apollo program would be. After much soul searching, the company 

decided not to bid alone for the command module contract, joining with 

General Electric, Douglas, and Space Technology Laboratories in submitting a proposal. Grumman's chief contribution was cockpit design and layout. A strengthened space working group was now headed by Joseph G. 

Gavin, Jr., a Grumman vice president. On three floors of a commercial 

building near Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the teams, sometimes 

numbering 200 persons, from the four companies worked day and night to 

put its proposal together.

73 

When NASA announced that North American had won the Apollo 

spacecraft contract, at the end of November 1961, the prevalent feeling at 

Grumman was, as one tired engineer recalled, "What do we do now?" One 

segment of the combined proposal, however, gave them some ideas and provided a reason to continue. The four firms had examined many aspects of a 

lunar landing mission beyond what was called for by NASA. One central 

feature the team explored was the mission mode, only lightly touched on in 

the proposal request. At the outset of work on the contract bid, each of the 

companies had studied a different mode. By chance, Grumman had drawn 

lunar-orbit rendezvous. After the studies had been compared, this approach 

was recommended in the joint proposal. 74 In the fall and winter of 1961­

1962, Gavin turned full attention to lunar rendezvous and to the separate 

vehicle that would be needed. 

Under the leadership of Gavin as Program Director and Robert S. 

Mullaney as Program Manager, the study group had achieved formal status 

in the corporate structure of Grumman and had acquired a number of 

Grumman's most experienced engineering and design experts. The team 

studied configurations of staged versus unstaged vehicles, subsystem require112 
tract could be written immediately, instead of (as with North Ameri

interim, or "letter," contract followed by interminable negotiations 

to final agreement. For the lunar module, Rector said, "we negotiat

whole program], even though we didn't understand [it] that well 

time." 

Grumman officials did not really know what NASA ;wanted. It 

Kelly's words, "an example of ignorance in action, ... at least on ou

Neither side fully appreciated the size of the development they were 

taking. The Grumman group entered negotiations under the impress

it was simply going to build the vehicle it had proposed, but "tha

what the NASA people had in mind." NASA expected that, once 

tions were concluded, Grumman would begin a preliminary design 

redefining the complete spacecraft item by item. In the long run, the 

tion phase took longer than either party had anticipated. But Grumm

submitted a preliminary design of the lander, and "we were still so

enthralled with [it]," Gavin recalled. "It took some time for this 

down." 76 

Conferences between NASA and Grumman began on 19 No

About 80 persons from Grumman traveled to Houston for the tal

Bethpage contingent was broken into a dozen technical teams and 

program management, reliability, and support groups. Grumman's N

tion Management Team comprised Gavin, Kelly, C. William Rath

gineering Manager), and John Snedeker (Business Manager). Th

agement team obviously had more authority than North Am

negotiating group had on the command and service modules, wh

hardly surprising in view of Gavin's position as vice president of t

pany and director of Grumman's space activities. 77 

The customer and contractor teams sat down to define contrac

tails, review subcontracting plans, work out a technical approach, a
gpg

signed until early March, at a revised cost figure of $387.9 million.

79 

END OF A PHASE 

Fitting Apollo's final two jigsaw pieces, the mode and the lunar landing vehicle, into the picture had closed a phase for NASA. For four years, 

the space agency had been planning, defining, or defending some facet of 

what led up to and became Apollo. NASA now faced a period of developing 

and testing hardware and then a time of attaining the operational experience needed to land men on the moon. The past year, 1962, had been the 

most strenuous, not only because of Apollo's crowded activities but because 

Mercury and Gemini had demanded so niuch attention. 

Project Mercury enjoyed a banner year in 1962, with three manned 

earth-orbital flights: John Glenn in Friendship 7 (Mercury-Atlas 6) on 20 

February, Scott Carpenter in Aurora 7 (MA-7) on 24 May, and Walter 

Schirra in the six-orbit flight of Sigma 7 (MA-8) on 3 October. These, plus 

a good Saturn I flight on 16 November, gave the operations people experience in conducting actual missions. 

It was becoming clear to Walter Williams and Christopher C. Kraft, 

Jr., Houston's mission and flight directors, that something larger and better 

equipped than the Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral would be 

needed for Projects Gemini and Apollo, with their longer and more complex missions. Flight controllers were spending a disproportionate amount 

of time traveling from Houston to the Cape- time that could more profitably be used for discussing ways of getting better performance from the 

spacecraft systems, training a larger cadre of flight controllers, and studying 

methods for handling Apollo missions. 8 0 

114 
The Houston group began pushing hard for an "Integrated 

Control Center" at the new Clear Lake site southeast of the city

grated" meant not only transferring flight control from the Cape 

moving computer programming and operations to the Texas cente

puter functions, including tracking and communications, had be

dard's responsibility during Mercury. Harry Goett's team at the M

center had worked out plans for expanding the Manned Space Fli

work developed for Mercury to several times the size it was then. 

team, it seemed logical to keep this function in its own capable han

ministrator Webb, however, agreed with Williams and Kraft, at 

part, and announced on 20 July 1962* that the main Apollo contro

would be in Houston. But the location of the primary computer 

and the division of labor for the manned space flight tracking a

munications network was still unsettled at the end of 1962. 81 

Project Gemini operations in 1962 essentially paralleled those 

A-earth-orbital-for the Apollo spacecraft. The Gemini team was b

detailed systems and subsystems definition and subcontracting. McD

engineering mockup of the Gemini spacecraft was ready for review b

ton officials on 15 and 16 August. As the inspection began, Russ

monauts Andrian G. Nikoleyev in Vostok III and Pavel R. Popo

Vostok IV landed safely after flights that, at first glance, seemed to 

complished two Gemini objectives designed to gain experience for 

long duration and rendezvous. 

"'At a celebration given on 4 July 1962 by •the Houston Chamher of Commerce t

Manned Spacecraft Center employees and their families to Texas, Gilruth had intim

the new control center would be built at the Clear Lake site. 
Although the cosmonauts did log a combined time of nearly 166 hours, 

contrasting with less than 20 hours total time for the three Mercury pilots 

during the year, it soon became obvious that the Soviets could not maneuver 

their craft to rendezvous in space. Because the two Russians came within 

five kilometers of each other, however, Gemini engineers wanted to see if 

the Mercury spacecraft could be modified to rendezvous with a passive target. 

After intensive study, Kenneth Kleinknecht, the Mercury project manager, 

reported that the modifications would add too much weight-the spacecraft 

might not even reach orbital altitude. 82 

The Gemini announcement in late 1961 had declared that "NASA's 

current seven astronauts will serve as pilots in this program. Additional crew 

members may be phased in during later stages." In April 1962, the agency 

began selecting a new group of pilots. Six months later, eight of the nine 

"astronaut trainees"* watched from the Florida shoreline as Schirra began 

his six-orbit flight. Across the ocean, people in 17 countries viewed the first 

European television broadcast, via the communications satellite Telstar, of 

a space launch in "real time." 83 

Amid these and many other activities-such as building offices and 

training, checkout, and test facilities and erecting launch pads-the feasibility 

and definition phases of Apollo ended for NASA Headquarters and the 

three manned space flight field centers. The next step, design and development, promised to be equally strenuous and demanding. 

• The nine new members of the astronaut corps were Neil A. Armstrong, Frank Borman, 

Charles Conrad, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, Elliot M. See, Jr., Thomas P. 

Stafford, Edward H. White II, and John W. Young. All except Armstrong and See were 

members of one of the armed services. See did not attend the launch because he was clearing 

up some personal business before reporting to the Houston center. The designation "trainee" 

soon disappeared, except in some official documentation. 

116 
Command Module and Program Chan

1963-1964 

0 nee all the vehicles in the Apollo stack had been decided o

already being developed would have to be changed to fit 

concept of Apollo. Most immediately affected was North America

mand module. The shape of this craft, a conical pyramid much like 

shaped Mercury, had been set very early. This blunt-body vehicle, h

had been designed only for earth-orbital and circumlunar flight, wi

thought given to attaching propulsion stages to make a direct-fligh

surface landing sometime in the future. Adoption of lunar-orbit ren

eliminated the need to land the command module on the moon bu

the inclusion of some means for docking that vehicle with the lunar 

and transferring two astronauts into the lander for the trip down. 

Command module development, then, took two routes. Configu

systems, and subsystems had to be qualified and astronauts had to be 

in Apollo operations, which could be done in earth-orbital flight

therefore unnecessary to make any major changes on what came to b

the "Block I" spacecraft. But the time limitation set by the Presid

not permit waiting for the first version of the spacecraft to be co

and tested before starting on an advanced model, Block II, that co

form the new docking operation. The two spacecraft had many com

in common, but development had become infinitely more complicat

uty Administrator Hugh Dryden termed the Apollo program "the 

most complex research and development effort ever undertaken." 1 

All three of NASA's manned space flight centers-at Hu

117 
• 


Comparison of spacecraft and launch vehicle configurations. 

Canaveral, and Houston-had their hands full during 1963 and 1964. Marshall was wrestling with the mammoth Saturn V development program; 

neither of the propulsion systems, the F-1 and the J-2 engines, could be 

simply picked off the shelves and fitted with appropriate oxidizer and fuel 

tanks. There were troublesome days ahead before the contractor, Rocketdyne, succeeded in developing and qualifying these engines so they could be 

trusted to boost astronauts toward the moon.

2 At the Cape, the Launch 

Operations Center was doing some educated guessing about the flight preparation facilities needed for the spacecraft and launch vehicles. And the 

Manned Spacecraft Center was working on three major programs: flying the 

last Project Mercury spacecraft (Mercury-Atlas 9) in May 1963 and getting 

spacecraft development under way in both Project Gemini and Project 

Apollo. Because of its modular configuration, Apollo had no immediate 

need for day-to-day coordination among the centers, which freed the program offices to work independently in solving their more pressing problems. 

But the program needed to be centrally managed-technically as well as administratively-far differently from Mercury, and it would have to be armed 

with a larger force to accomplish this. NASA Headquarters had, therefore, 

118 
the centers wanted all the help they could get in these areas. But the 

tion that a contractor should tell government employees how to p

vehicles together (the integration clause of the contract) to fly a 

was resisted. Edward S. Miller of General Electric said: "The contrac

in Houston was not very firm. Frankly, they didn't want us. The

two things against us down there. No. 1, it was a Headquarters contr

it was decreed that the Centers shall use GE for certain things; and 

they considered us Headquarters spies." For some time after the 

award, just exactly what General Electric would do was not exactly 

In February 1962, General Electric engineers began holding 

review meetings, but they met w\th little success in selling their p

spacecraft and launch vehicle integration. After several of these gat

contractor officials complained in August that there was "little und

ing by NASA people as to the role of GE." That same month, 

Electric nevertheless transferred 15 of its engineers to Houston. To 

contractor into Huntsville operations, the manager of the Headqua

fice for integration and checkout accompanied several General 

employees to Marshall to explain "GE roles in [the] Apollo prog

the center and Saturn contractor officials. Neither Boeing nor 

wanted any "unannounced visits" by General Electric engineers, e

since the two principal Saturn contractors could not foresee any 

which General Electric could be of assistance to them. Marshall and 

tractors were assured that all visits would be arranged in advance. 4 

General Electric's other major task, however-designing, setting 

operating gTound equipment to check out the flight vehicles-was 

at the field centers. Manned Spacecraft and Launch Operations Cen

resentatives said they were satisfied with the contractor's work in th

and Marshall asked for more help. Even here, however, there we

reservations about turning General Electric loose. The Apollo man
erick R. Kappel, President of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 

to form a group to provide this talent for Apollo. Bellcomm, Inc., the new 

AT&T division, began operating alongside Holmes' NASA Headquarters 

manned space flight engineers in March 1962. Holmes immediately directed 

the contractor engineers to work with Joseph Shea, his Office of Systems 

chief, first on the study of the mode issue and then on the defense of NASA's 

decision to land on the moon via the lunar-rendezvous method. 

Once the route studies were completed, Shea decided that Bellcomm 

engineers should dip into mission planning and produce some "reference 

trajectories"-a careful analysis of everything involved in flying the space 

vehicles from the earth to the moon and .back. But when he took his newly 

formed Apollo Trajectory Working Group to a meeting in Texas, Shea met 

with resistance. John P. Mayer, speaking for the mission planners in Houston, said that his group had been doing this kind of work for the past two 

General Electric employees 

monitor activities of a spacecraft 

test in the automatic-checkoutequipment spacecraft control 

room in 1965. 
first to push for the pinpoint lunar landings that were so successfull

out after the first landing mission. 8 

Along with the mounting strength in contractor personnel, the 

Space Flight Office in Washington (only a handful of people in M

early days) also increased in number. By February 1963, Holme

400-man force, presided over by himself and his deputies, Geo

and Joseph Shea. Low managed space medicine, launch vehicles, a

operations; Shea concentrated on engineering matters. 9 

Much of the energy of the Headquarters office and its contrac

ing 1963 was devoted to drafting an Apollo Systems Specification bo

aim of this document was to lay out the objectives, to define the 

approach for implementing these objectives, and to establish per

requirements. The task was difficult because many systems, especia

in the lunar module and the advanced command module, simply 

been studied in enough detail for anyone to state positively wha

pected. Numerous pages were stamped "TBD"-to be determin

there was some clarification of policy for Apollo. Up to this time, 

objective had been expressed only as landing a man on the m

returning him safely before the end of the decade. The specificat

intimated, for the first time, that exploration of the moon woul

limited to a single mission. 10 

A number of interesting specifications in the manual-intende

as the Headquarters "bible" for all parties in the development of 

remained valid throughout the program. For example, all part

spacecraft would be designed to minimize the fire hazards inhere

use of pure oxygen atmosphere that North American had been di

incorporate in the command module in August 1962. North Amer

instructed to design the command module so a single crew memb

return the craft safely to earth from any point in the mission. 
Electric into vehicle integration. On top of that, each center had a great 

many questions that needed to be answered by the other field elements. And 

they were working together on policies and mission rules that became the 

foundation for the lunar landing program. At a mission planning panel 

meeting, some of these ground rules emerged: two crewmen would land 

on the moon and one man would remain with the command module in 

lunar orbit; the lunar lander could stay on the moon from 21 to 48 hours; 

launch from the earth would take place in daylight to simplify recovery 

operations in the event of an abort; launch to the moon from earth orbit 

would begin within 4Y2 hours because of the boil-off characteristics of 

liquid hydrogen in the S-IVB stage; and the first lunar mission would be 

only a loop around the moon and return, since too little was known about 

the start and restart capabilities of the service module engine.13 

Most of these committees-and there ~ere many, many of them-took 

turns meeting at Houston, Huntsville, and Canaveral. By May 1963, the 

panels were so numerous that Holmes realized that something had to be 

done to keep track of them. He told Shea to form a Panel Review Board* 

• Board membership consisted of: from the Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight 

(OMSF), Deputy Director, Systems, and Deputy Director, Programs; from Marshall (MSFC), 

Deputy Director, Research and Development, and two Associate Directors; from the Manned 

Spacecraft Center (MSC) , Deputy Director, Development and Programs, and Deputy Director, 

Mission Requirements and Flight Opera.tions; and from the Launch Operations Center (LOC) , 

Assistant Director, Plans and Project Management. The authorized panels and their cochairmen 

were : Crew Safety, Joachim P. Kuettner (MSFC) and Alfred D. Mardel (MSC) ; Electrical 

Sy~tems Integration, Hans J . Fichtner (MSf"C) and Milton G. Kingsley (MSC); Flight 

Mechanics, Rudolf F. Hoelker (MSFC) and Calvin H . Perrine (MSC) ; Launch Oper·a.tions, 

Rocco A. Petrone (LOC) and Walter C. Williams (MSC) ; Mechanical Design Integration, Hans 

R. Palaoro (MSFC) and Lyle M. Jenkins (MSC); Mission Control Operations, Fridtjof A. Speer 

(MSFC) and John D. Hodge (MSC) ; and Onboard Instrumentation, Otto A. Hoberg (MSFC) 

and Alfred B. Eickmeier (MSC) . 

122 
Laboratory vying for control of the tracking network. The eart

band of stations-about a dozen and a half-used in Mercury 

equipped for the deep space communications of Apollo, but by 19

bility was developing in the unmanned spacecraft programs that 

to be suitable. Jet Propulsion Laboratory intended to build tw

26-meter dish antennas, with two antennas at each of three sites-G

California; near Canberra, Australia; and near Madrid, Spain-th

provide continuous communications coverage of the moon. One 

be equipped with the more advanced unified S-band system (a sy

tied the signals for tracking, telemetry, voice, television, and comm

a single radio carrier) for controlling, tracking, and acquiring d

unmanned spacecraft, like Mariner and Surveyor, in deep space. Th

consolidated the functions of the many transmitters and receive

teristic of Mercury into one. 

The Mercury tracking stations, with 9-meter dishes and the ne

radar, would communicate with the Apollo spacecraft in earth-orb

Once the vehicle had traveled 16 000 kilometers into space, the 

antennas-spaced equidistantly at 120 degrees longitude around 

so one of the three always faced the moon-would take over. Late

Propulsion Laboratory was to build a 64-meter antenna at Goldston

then became the Goldstone Mars station) that gave Apollo cle

munications, especially in television reception. The laboratory w

construct two more of these stations, but the costs were too g

British government, however, had a radar station with a 64-mete

at Sidney, Australia, that might be used. 

Although some of the finer points on communications an

were haggled over for the next 15 months, in March 1963 NASA 

Administrator Robert Seamans settled the basic issue of who was 

and when. He assigned Goddard as the technical operator of the 
' 

Apollo tracking network in 1966, above. 

Radar stations with large antennas for continuous tracking and communications 

were at Goldstone, California; Madrid, 

Spain; and Canberra, Australia. At left, 

the "big dish" at Canberra points toward 

space. Below, communications with the 

moon as the earth turned. Astronauts on 

the moon's surface also could talk to one 

another. 
the lunar spacecraft.

16 But there was one area in which the scien

be of more immediate assistance. How to land Apollo on the 

been decided; how to get it there would be worked out by the 

experts. Where to land it and what the astronauts could do afte

there was still unsettled. 

Shortly after President Kennedy had issued the lunar landing 

Homer Newell of the Headquarters science office had asked Haro

of the University of California at San Diego to suggest the bes

sites for lunar landings. Urey told Newell of five kinds of lunar 

particular scientific interest: 

High latitudes-to check for possible temperature differences fro

torial areas. [Professor Harrison Brown had theorized, Urey add

water might exist beneath the surface there.] 

Maria-to try to determine the depth of holes where great collis

taken place and, on a second landing, to discover the compositio

material in such places as the Sea of Tranquility. 

Inside a large crater-to look at an area, probably Alphonsus, w

servers had seen gases rising from the interior. 

Near a great rille, or "wrinkle," in a maria-to attempt to find o

had caused it. [It had been suggested that water, rising from the 

had cracked the surface as it dried.] 

In a mountainous area-to observe crater walls.H 

In 1962, a two-month summer study conference in Iowa w

sored by NASA and the National Academy of Sciences. The re
Five fundamental areas emerged as having the greatest potential: 

Studies of the lunar lithosphere, the solid moon itself, its chemical and 

physical constitution, and the implications this should have for its origin 

in history. 

Investigations of the gravitational and magnetic fields and forces around 

the moon, including experiments for the possible detection of gravitational 

waves. 

Considerations of particles like solar protons and cosmic radiation, together 

with their effect on the lunar gravitational field and magnetosphere. 

Establishment of astronomical observatories on the moon. 

Studies of proto-organic matter, including the possibilities for exobiology.19 

Realistically, everyone realized that the first manned visit to the lunar 

surface, limited to no more than 24 hours, would hardly satisfy the desires 

of most scientists. With proper planning, however, a bonanza of scientific 

results could be gleaned even from that first landing. In .June 1964, the 

mineralogy and petrology planning team underscored these hopes by drawing an analogy between the lunar voyage and another historic event: 

Some time before the year 1492, a group of workmen were standing in a 

shipyard looking at a half-constructed craft. One of them said "It won't 

float"; another said "If the sea monsters don't get it first, it will fall off 

the edge"; a third, more reflective than the others, said "What do they 

want to go for, anyway?" 

126 
was how much space to allow-and this would be minimal-and 

idea of the future plans. When the time came to fly the missions, 

the planners, astronauts, and flight preparations technicians would 

pay more attention. The outline of what Apollo could contribute t

had been sketched; the details would be filled in later. 

Perhaps the Headquarters action that had the most signific

on Apollo was a change of leadership in the Office of Manned Spac

When NASA had signed Grumman in 1962 to develop the lunar 

Holmes had wanted the agency to ask for a supplemental appropri

Gemini and Apollo costs (see Chapter 4), but NASA's top admini

Webb, Dryden, and Seamans-had refused. Webb also refused to 

funds from other programs to manned space flight. Holmes and W

different views of management methods and of the priority of the 

program versus the rest of the space effort. The Administrator f

all-out effort to land a man on the moon-one that subordinated 

would endanger NASA's balanced program of seeking U.S. preem

space science and technology. The Manned Space Flight Directo

had an overriding mandate from the President to win a race to t

The question of funds and priorities was taken to the White Hous

President Kennedy cited the importance of the lunar landing, Web

that it was important but said that he would not take responsibi

program that was not properly balanced. Kennedy accepted his p

Then in the first half of 1963 came the realization that Projec

was suffering from more technical troubles than had been anticipate

would push the costs of that program past the billion mark, almo

the original estimates. Gemini schedule stretchouts followed. Holm

fied in March congressional authorization hearings that the admin

refusal to ask for a supplemental appropriation had delayed the 

and Apollo programs four or five months. In the renewal of Holm
missile and spacecraft programs. 

Mueller had worked on Air Force manned space flight studies as 

early as 1958; later his laboratory had provided NASA with data that helped 

in making the Apollo mode decision. Furthermore, Mueller was familiar 

with NASA's relations with industry, both at Headquarters and the field 

centers, and had studied ground support equipment problems and tracking 

network issues as a system analysis contractor. But most useful to NASA 

was his recent work with the Air Force on performance, schedule, and 

budget constraints for the Minuteman missile. Derivatives of this background-program control offices, schedules and resources planning, and the 

subsystem manager technique-were to be incorporated into Apollo to 

strengthen Headquarters and field center control over cost, configuration, 

and schedules. 22 

Soon after joining NASA, Mueller asked Air Force Brigadier General 

Samuel C. Phillips to help him apply to Apollo the kind of configuration 

and logistics management procedures established for Minuteman. Phillips 

brought with him about 20 officers to fill key positions. Mueller realized 

that this sudden infusion of Headquarters-level personnel might be detrimental to relations between his office and the field activities. To forestall 

any resentment, he invited center directors Gilruth, Wernher von Braun, 

and Kurt Debus to be his houseguests, to get to know them informally and 

to discuss with them his plans for Apollo. Mueller then visited Huntsville, 

Houston, and Canaveral. After completing the circuit, he began pressuring 

the field elements to conform to a long-range plan of program management. 2 3 

In his attempts to inaugurate effective Headquarters control of Apollo, 

Mueller still faced vestiges of field center autonomy. The intercenter 

groups had gone far in working out system specifications and planning for 

vehicle integration; in Mueller's view, however, they had not gone far 

enough. To get to the moon by the set time, he told von Braun, Gilruth, 

128 
, ppppy 

problems. 25 

Webb, Dryden, and Seamans recognized in mid-1963 that NA

Apollo) had grown too large for Seamans to continue as "opera

president," which he had been since 1961. They decided to give 

three "Associate Administrators" for specific activities: Mueller wo

age the Office of Manned Space Flight and the three centers wo

manned missions-Huntsville, Houston, and Canaveral. Homer Ne

Raymond L. Bisplinghoff would hold similar positions for the 

Space Science and Applications and the Office of Advanced Rese

Technology. Mueller revamped his own office, dividing it into 

offices (the five-box system)-(1) program control, (2) systems eng

(3) test, (4) flight operations, and (5) reliability and quality-

major program, Apollo and Gemini, reporting to a program dire

would in turn answer to Mueller. Mueller kept the job of actin

manager for himself and gave Gemini responsibility to Lo

manned spacecraft centers were directed to organize their progra

accordingly. 26 

While the reorganization was going on, Mueller asked two ve

• The council, established on 21 December 1961 , originally consisted of Holmes, h

in OMSF (Charles H . Roadman , Aerospace Medicine; Milton W. Rosen, Launch V

Propulsion; and William E. Lilly, Program Review and Resources Managem ent

deputies (Shea, Systems Engineering, and Low, Spacecraft and Flight Missions) ; W 

Braun, Director, and Eberhard F. M. Rees, Deputy Director (MSFC) ; and Gilruth

and Walter C. Williams, Associate Director (MSC). By 27 February 1962, J ame

Holmes' Director of Integration and Checkout, and Kurt Debus, Director, LOC

added. On 26 and 27 February 1963, three new names appeared on the council roll

Elms, Deputy Director, Development and Programs (MSC); Albert F. Siepert, Depu

(LOC); and Robert F. Freitag, Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (OMSF

Rosen). During 1963, George M. Knauf took over from Roadman as Director of 

Medicine. 
, gp

Mueller added that there was a much better chance of beating the deadline 

if NASA had to man-rate only two boosters, the Saturn IB and V, instead of 

three! 7 

Hard on the heels of the Saturn I decision came another pronouncement that was just as startling-if not more so-to the field centers. At a 

late October meeting of the Management Council, Mueller told Debus, 

von Braun, and Gilruth that "we can now drop this step-by-step procedure" 

of flight-testing. All parts of the spacecraft and launch vehicle would be 

developed and thoroughly tested at manufacturing plants and test sites 

before being delivered to the Cape as ready-to-fly hardware. There would 

no longer be any need for piece-by-piece, stage-by-stage qualification flights 

of the vehicles. Each launch was to be prepared as though it were the ultimate mission, to avoid dead-end testing, with its narrow objectives and 

hardware components not intended for the lunar missions. 28 

Although the chances for getting to the moon within the allotted time 

may have improved, Apollo now had more launch vehicles and pads than 

were needed to do the job. When contracts were awarded, from late 1961 

through 1962, step-by-step testing had been .the norm. Hardware was purchased and facilities were built to carry out this time-tested practice. 

Mueller's all-up decision changed the rules, limited the number of Saturn I 

launches, and made it likely that not all of the Saturn IBs contracted for 

would be flown in mainline Apollo. These results raise an interesting, 

though moot, question. If this decision had been made before the contracts 

• The astronauts in the third group (announced 18 October 196·3) were Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., 

William A. Anders, Charles A. Bassett II, Alan L. Bean, Eugene A. Cernan, Roger B. Chaffee, 

Michael Collins, R. Walter Cunningham, Donn F. Eisele, Theodore C. Freeman, Richard F. 

Gordon, Jr., Russell L. Schweickart, David R. Scott, and Clifton C. Williams, Jr. As in the 

second group, only two (Cunningham and Schweickart) were not members of the military 

services. 

130 
ggpg p

Although caught up in the grief of the times, the Apollo 

manager, engineer, technician-had been and still was deluged by 

plex tasks inherent in developing and qualifying the vehicles. 

CoMMAND MoDULE: PROBLEMS AND PROGREss· 

The lateness of the decision on how to fly to the moon had f

Manned Spacecraft Center and the contractor, North American, 

work on the command and service modules. Once the choice was m

On 16 November 1963 in Cape Canaveral's Blockhouse 37, NASA's new 

space flight chief George Mueller briefed (left to right, fmnt row seate

Low, Kurt Debus, Robert Seamans, james Webb, President john 

Hugh Dryden, Wernher von Braun, Gen. Leighton 1. Davis, and Senat

Smathers on Apollo program plans. The models on the table-Vehicle 

Building, Saturn V launch vehicle on crawler, and mobile service tow

sented key elements in the Apollo mission. 
in its temporary locations along the Gulf Freeway. Markley and his govern

ment team therefore met the contractor representatives in 16 rooms on the 

13th floor of the Rice Hotel in downtown Houston. Signaling the start and 

finish of 15-hour work days, Monday through Saturday, with a cow bell, 

Markley and the groups completed the "basic contract package" on 26 

January. The proposed contract then had to travel through administrative 

levels until it reached Webb for final approval or refusal. As the document 

journeyed through channels, the cost figures on the subsystems were revised. 

On 24 June, the estimated value was $889.3 million (without fee). When 

it was finally approved in August, the price, with $50-million fixed fee, 

was $934.4 million. For this sum, NASA was to receive 11 mockups (facL:,--·----­

---- -~~~ Once the S-IVB stage pla

the spacecraft on a trajec

to the moon, the spacecr

lunar module adapter pa

would blossom outward 

degrees (later they were 

carded by explosion). 

Apollo command and ser

modules would separate f

the stage, pull away, 

around, dock with the lu

module, and then pull the 

away from the stage. 
the Skybolt missile development program and to keep using H

missiles, which were manufactured in Downey. When the Air For

more Hound Dog vehicles and demanded that production in Do

tinue, some Apollo work had to be done elsewhere. 32 

One chief aim of the 1963-1964 period was to get both vers

command module far enough along for a formal mockup review 

accept them as the final configuration. With a great deal of this w

done simultaneously, the task was extremely onerous. John Paup, 

module manager at North American who had fretted over the s

the mode decision, wanted to get the systems of the earth-orbit

spacecraft set so he could begin production on that vehicle. At 

time, he was anxious to get the exact differences between the tw

delineated. Joseph Shea, who had by now replaced Frick as Apoll

in Houston, told Paup that Block II definition was not going to 

arrive at, with the Block I configuration still not settled. 

Paup contended that several areas of common interest be

two vehicles had to be resolved immediately. One of the de

whether to use strakes, tower flaps, or canards to stabilize. the 

module in the event of a launch abort. Whichever was used, 

was to get the spacecraft down in what was called the "BEF" 

forward) position. Strakes were semicircular devices near the 

heatshield that would keep the vehicle from landing on its no

changes in the subsystems had shifted the vehicle's center of grav

forced a lengthening of the strakes to handle the aerodynamic cha

• The lunar module nestled inside the adapter (SLA) from launch through 

the service module from the S-IVB. The honeycomb panels o.f the adapter were th

fired to allow the command and service modules, after turning around and dock

lunar module, to pull the lander from the booster's third stage. 
module, above: the strake aerodynamic devices may be seen at either 

side of the spacecraft just above the 

aft heatshield. On the drawing of the 

launch escape system at upper right, 

the canard aerodynamic devices are 

near the top of the escape tower. jettison of the launch escape system 

(right), after successful launch, also 

pulls away the boost protective cover 

that protects the windows from flame 

and soot. 

Full-scale model of the service module, resting on a 

mockup of a spacecraft-lunar 

module adapter, with panels 

off to reveal part of the internal arrangement. 
module subsystems that were common to both versions of the c

cause space missions would be of longer duration, a concept had d

very early that the astronauts would repair or replace a malfunctio

in the spacecraft during flight. This plan would require tools and sp

to be carried on the missions and created another weight proble

subsystems discussion in April 1964, Shea told the North Ame

gineers that NASA no longer favored this method of ensuring go

ing components in space. Instead, the contractor was to work to

liability through manufacturing and test processes and by inst

dundant systems. If something did go wrong, the crew should b

shift to another system that could perform the same function as 

functioning one. Houston also wanted the contractor to upgrad

liability program by improving its failure reporting practices, 

turing schedules, engineering change controls, test plans, tr

methods, means of standardizing interface control documents, an

support equipment provisioning. 35 

Houston had already taken measures in late 1963 to increase i

over and improve on subsystem development, chiefly to get the 

vanced Block II command module under way. Shea asked Max Fa

of the Engineering and Development Directorate at the Manned S

Center, to pick experts in the engineering shops to act as subsys

agers. The managers were directed to oversee their components fro

through manufacture and test. They were responsible for cost, s

and reliability. When changes in one unit became necessary, othe

had to be considered, and any conflicts resolved, before alterations 

made. The subsystem manager concept was therefore an excelle

for restraining engineers eternally eyeing good hardware for ch

make it better. 36 

North American and Grumman also made significant contrib
pqg

in the lunar mission concept made it impossible for the design and development engineers to decide what components they needed. The general outline of the mission was pretty well set, but the haziness about specific refinements was playing havoc with attempts to design hardware to cover all 

normal and contingency operations. Shea told Grumman to see if it could 

get the requirements pinned down. North American and MIT crews soon 

joined the lunar module contractor team to come up with a "Design Reference Mission." 

First the group looked at what Apollo was supposed to accomplish: 

"Land two astronauts and scientific equipment on the near-earth-side surface of the moon and return them safely to earth." A second major objective was to carry more than 100 kilograms of scientific equipment to be set 

up on the moon and to bring back more than 30 kilograms of lunar soil and 

rocks. To make sure this was understood, the study group would have to 

analyze every moment of a hypothetical mission-on the ground, in space, 

on the moon, and during the return to the earth-from the time the stacked 

vehicles were rolled toward the launch pad until the command module was 

recovered in the Pacific Ocean. In other words, the North American-led 

study concentrated on getting reliable hardware to the launch pad; the 

Grumman-sponsored task aimed at making sure that the equipment would 

be able to handle the job of getting to the moon and back. 

The group soon realized it had to pick out an arbitrary mission launch 

date-it chose 6 May 1968-to give realism to the plan and to focus attention 

on every move, every procedure, in the minutest detail. Working out the 

specific position of the moon on that date in relation to the earth, members 

drew up a precise launch trajectory. Then, assuming a given number of 

hours spent in flight and on the moon, they calculated the corrections in the 

return trajectory that would have to be made to accommodate changes in 

the moon-earth position. The task was not an easy one. It took four months 

136 
ever, new mission rules gave them a clearer picture of what they 

signing toward: the crew members would be able to stay in the

during docking and the connection between the command and lu

ules would be rigid enough to maintain a pressurized pathway 

which the astronauts could travel between the craft. 39 

By mid-1963, North American engineers had begun work 

tendable probe on top of the command module that would fit in

shaped drogue on the lunar module. They considered three pos

of docking: (I) soft docking (latching with enough separation be

craft to make sure that pilot errors could not impair flight safety 

reeling the vehicles together), (2) hard docking (going straigh

latching without preliminaries) as a backup mode; and (3) transf

crew by extravehicular means (getting out of one spacecraft in 

and climbing into the other vehicle) in an emergency situation. I

apparent that the main difference between the Block I and Block 

Command module North American engineer

probe and drogue devices t

command module with 

module. The CM probe w

into the LM's dish-shape

and 12 latches on the do

would engage, to lock the 

together, airtight. The 

could now remove a hatch

the docking devices, and 

tween the two spacecraft. 

erations were finished, they 

turn to the CM, reinsert th

install the hatch, and r

latches to disengage from t
operating the vehicle. Next came a walk-around for a general examination 

of the spacecraft mockup and such special displays as wiring, cutaway models 

of subsystems, parachute packing, and electrical connectors. Managers and 

counterpart engineers from NASA and the manufacturer then split up into 

small groups to examine minutely and evaluate each piece. More than a 

hundred requests for changes (RFCs) were written on the spot for consideration by the board; 70 were a:pproved, 14 were designated for further 

study, and 26 were rejected. 

The spacecraft couches worried the board members a great deal, 

since the crewmen, wearing pressurized suits, fitted too snugly into their 

seats. As a matter of fact, an astronaut lying in a couch could not move 

easily, even in an unpressurized suit. Three pilots lying side by side in the 

couch area would be virtually immobilized. By July, adjustments had been 

made to alleviate this situation and to cover other suggestions by the board 

and its assistants. After a second mockup review, in September, NASA told 

North American to begin production of the Block I, earth-orbital command 

and service modules. 41 

After Project Christmas Present and the decision to use redundant systems rather than making repairs en route to the moon, work on the Block II 

spacecraft began to move a little faster. Since two large vehicles, the command-and-service-module combination and the lunar module, would be 

boosted into space, a weight-reduction program became of major importance. 

North American met this challenge principally by shaving kilograms off the 

command module heatshield and the service module structure. 42 

During the spring of 1964, continuing problems with the Block I and 

• Christopher C. Kraft, Donald K. Slayton, Caldwell C. Johnson, Owen E. Maynard, and 

Clinton L. Taylor would act for NASA, and H. Gary Osbon and Charles H. Feltz for the 

contractor. 

138 
command and service modules. While several 

engineers on the platform inspect the CM recovery system, the forward heatshield waits to 

be lifted into position. Groups of engineers of 

the various specialties (right) meet to discuss 

and list requests for changes for consideration 

by the NASA Review Board. 

Astronaut james McDivitt (left) 

tance with a shoe cover befor

command module to check out 

a pilot's viewpoint. One of the m

items astronauts found in the CM 

was an "elbow-shoulder cleara

Four years later, in 1968, this 

vexed astronauts Walter Schirra

and Walter Cunningham, the f

an Apollo spacecraft. 
t· was to say no 

requirement for it--take it out. So we took it out. Then the astronauts came along and said, 

148 

and touchdown could be flown manually and so that no single failure of the 

controls or displays could cause a mission abort. 11 ' 

Because the lunar module was a means of transportation, as well as 

shelter and living quarters for the crew while on the moon, cockpit design 

presented interesting problems to human factor engineers. The man-machine interface embraced such items as stowage of space suits and personal 

equipment and room for the pilots to move about within the cabin. In a 

mockup in mid-1964, two crewmen demonstrated that they could put on 

and take off their portable life support systems with suits either pressurized 

or deflated, reach for and attach umbilical hoses, and recharge their backpacks. The MSC Crew Systems Division drew up a document governing 

spacecraft-spacesuit interface and change procedures. This was used by 

NASA to supplement spacecraft specifications and interface control documents. It was also an important managerial tool between Grumman and 

North American and their major associates, MIT and Hamilton Standard 

(developers of the guidance and navigation system and the life support 

system). 12 

The astronauts were an essential "subsystfm" on the lunar module, and 

they were very much in evidence at Bethpage, as well as at Downey, where 

they helped in the design of the command module. Scott Carpenter, Charles 

Conrad, and Donn F. Eisele drew the lunar module as their special assignment, and William F. Rector, the lunar module project officer, frequently 

called upon them for help. He also urged other astronauts to take part in 

the periodic mockup reviews and significant design decisions: "They should 

be [part] of it," Rector said. "They're going to fly it." This was not an unusual arrangement; astronauts, being both engineers and test pilots, have 

played an active role in the design and development of every manned American space vehicle.* 

Conrad probably worked more on the vehicle's basic design than any 

other pilot, as the configuration evolved. Rector relied on him to sound out 

• An interesting example of pilot preference influencing spacecraft design revolved around 

including an "eight-ball" (an artificial-horizon instrument used for attitude reference) in the 

lunar module. Grumman had proposed an eight-ball, assuming that the astronauts would want 

it. Arnold Whitaker ecalled, "The first thing NASA did that there's operational 
pg

and discarded. Then an idea dawned. vVhy have seats in the lande

Its flight would be brief, and the g loads moderate (one g during 

flight and about five on landing). Since human legs were good s

sorbers, why not let the crew fly the lunar module standing up? 

This concept was bandied about rather casually at first by two 

engineers, George C. Franklin and Louie G. Richard. Franklin th

with Conrad to talk to Howard Sherman and John Rigsby at B

These Grumman employees, in turn, passed the idea along to K

Robert Mullaney. At this point, the seat and window problems 

Standing up, the crew would be close enough to the windows to get 

field of view (one engineer estimated it at 20 times greater) than w

seating arrangement yet suggested. Moreover, since cockpit designer

not have to worry about knee room, the cabin could be shortened

27 kilograms and improving the structure. Conrad called it a "tro

configuration," and said, "We get much closer to the instruments 

our knees getting in the way, and our vision downward toward the 

surface is greatly improved." 

Grumman technicians later devised a restraint system to hold t

in place during weightless flight and prevent them from being jostl

the cabin during landing. Resembling the harness used by window 

and linked to a pulley and cable arrangement under constant tensio

augmented by handholds and arm rests and by Velcro strips to 

pilots' feet on the floor.H 

'That's ridiculous. We must have it.' So we put it [back] in. By this time, we're la:t

had a program review and said, 'What's holding you up?' And we said, 'This is 

things... .' And he said, 'Take it out. I'll accept the responsibility for it.' The astron

out about it and said, 'We won't fly a vehicle until you put it in.' And NASA put 

time with a kit [for easy removal later]." 
lunar module cabin during the trip 

to the lunar surface. Note triangular 

windows. 

Proposed sleeping posztzons 

for astronauts on the moon. 

HATCHES AND LANDING GEAR 

The lander originally had two docking hatches, one at the top center 

of the cabin and another in the forward position, or nose, of the vehicle, 

with a tunnel in each location to permit astronauts to crawl from one pressurized vehicle to the other. (Extravehicular transfer between craft remained an emergency backup method.) After injection into a translunar 

trajectory, a course toward the moon, the command module pilot would 

turn his ship around, fly up to and dock with the lander's upper hatch, and 

then back the two vehicles away from the spent S-IVB third stage. This topto-top docking arrangement aligned the thrust vector of the service module 

propulsion engine with the centers of gravity of the two spacecraft, thus 

avoiding adverse torques or tendencies to tumble during firings for midcourse corrections and injection into lunar orbit. The crew would enter the 

lunar module through this hatch. When the lander returned from the moon, 

150 
Grumman to remove the forward docking interface but to leave th

for the astronauts to use as a door while on the moon. 1 6 

Once the location of the hatches was settled, getting the astron

and onto the lunar surface had to be investigated. Using a cable con

called a "Peter Pan rig" to simulate the moon's gravity, Grumman 

cians looked into ways for the crews to lower themselves to the lu

face and to climb back into the spacecraft. When astronaut Edward 

among others, scrambled around a mockup of the lander, using a bl

tackle arrangement and a simple knotted rope, he found that both w

practical. In mid-1964 a porch, or ledge, was installed outside the ha

a ladder and handrail on the forward landing gear leg. When the as

discovered they had trouble squeezing through the round hatch 

pressurized suits and wearing the bulky backpads, the hatch was squ

to permit easier passage. 17 

All these design features, although unusual, appeared to be com

with the lunar environment-at least the engineers did not enter

special worries. But the landing gear was different. The design of 

and foot pads depended on assumptions about the nature and charac

of the lunar surface. In the absence of any firm knowledge and wi

tific authorities differing radically in their theories, how should on

legs to support a craft landing on the moon? 

Grumman had first considered five legs but, during 1963, dec

four. The change was dictated by the weight-versus-strength trade

had produced the cruciform descent stage, with its four obvious att

points. The revised gear pattern also greatly simplified the structura

ing of the vehicle within the adapter. Four legs set on the orthogo

of the lander (forward, aft, left, and right) mated ideally with the 

of four reaction control "quads" (the basic four-engine package). Th

were rotated 45 degrees so the downward-thrusting attitude contro
by drop tests of lander models at Houston, Bethpage, and Langley. There 

were also plans to drop-test full-sized test articles to check out the new 

designs. 19 

During 1963 Grumman engineers continued to worry about the nature 

of the lunar surface and to carry on theoretical and simulation studies of 

lunar geology and soil mechanics, with the support of such consulting firms 

as the Stevens Institute of Technology in New York and the Arthur D. Little Company in Massachusetts. Much of this work covered the interaction 

between vehicle and surface at the moment of landing. What would happen 

to the landing gear at touchdown? Would the lunar dust that might be 

kicked up by the descent engine exhaust obscure the landing site? Would 

soil erosion affect the stability of the lander? Washington also assisted in 

this research. In mid-1963, Bellcomm surveyed all that was being done inside 

and outside NASA and suggested that a backup gear be developed, in case 

the surface should be more inhospitable than it appeared. 20 

But Grumman could not wait on the outcome of these studies. At 

meetings in Houston in October and November, contractor engineers described gears that tucked sideways (lateral folding) for stowage in the 

adapter; a tripod arrangement (radial), with three struts meeting at the 

base just above the footpad, that tucked inward; and a cantilevered device, 

with secondary struts for extra strength that folded inward against the 

vehicle for stowage and braced the leg when deployed for landing. Houston 

and Bethpage selected the cantilevered version. Somewhat narrower than 

the radial one, it was, in many ways, more stable. It had other advantages: 

less weight, shorter length for easier stowage, and a simpler, and therefore 

more reliable, folding mechanism. 

A landing gear for the lunar surface had to be designed for varying 

landing conditions, such as protuberances, depressions, small craters, slopes, 

and soil-bearing strength. To achieve the necessary stability, the landing 

152 
FORWARD 

ENTRANCE HATCH---A~ 

Astronauts found a knotted rope from the lunar module 


difficult to climb down (or up); the addition of a ladder 


on a landing gear leg made the task much easier. The 


drawings show improved lunar module features (left)­

ladder, porch, hatch, and rendezvous window (above the 


triangular window)-and the fit of the LM inside the 


adapter during launch. 


gear had to be able to absorb a diversity of · impact loads. Hou

Bethpage met this challenge by using crushable honeycomb mater

struts, so the gear would compress on impact. A principal adv

honeycomb shock absorbers was their simplicity. Since they had to 

once, the more common hydraulic shock absorbers and their com
small attitude control engines clustered in quads and pointing up, down, 

left, and right, around the ascent stage. 22 

During the spring of 1963, Grumman hired Bell to develop the ascent 

engine, basing the selection on Bell's experience in Air Force Agena development and hoping that the technology from that program might be applicable to the lunar module. Grumman placed heavy emphasis upon high 

reliability through simplicity of design, and, in fact, the ascent engine did 

emerge as the least complicated of the three main engines in the Apollo 

space vehicle (the descent and service module engines were the other two).* 

Embodying a pressure-fed fuel system using hypergolic (self-igniting) 

propellants, the ascent engine was fixed-thrust and nongimbaled, capable of 

lifting the ascent stage off the moon or aborting a mission should a landing 

not be feasible. 

There was one major concern about the ascent engine, and that was 

the usual worry about the ablation material burning off too fast and 

causing damage to the thrust chamber. Some ablative material eroded during firing tests at Bell's plant near Niagara Falls and at the Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tennessee. But this erosion was not severe 

enough to warrant changes in the combustion chambers. In late 1964, 

Arnold was also the site of a fire-in-the-hole (FITH) static firing test on a 

full-scale vehicle to supplement Grumman's previous scale-model test. The 

FITH flight test had to wait for later trials at White Sands. 

• The rocket engine of the ascent stage developed about 15 500 newtons (3500 pounds) of 

thrust, which produced a velocity of 2000 meters per second from lunar launch to docking. 

The descent stage, a throttleable engine, reached a maximum of 43 900 newtons (9870 pounds) 

and operated at a minimum of 4700 newtons (1050 pounds) for delicate maneuvers. Con· 

siderably larger than the two lunar module engines, the service module motor attained !H 200 

newtons (20 500 pounds) of thrust. 

154 
oa totteabe ege was ew to aed spacecat. Vey tte 

research had been done in variable-thrust rocket engines-NASA's 

effort in this field, the hydrogen-fueled RL-10 used in the S-IV sta

Saturn, antedating work on the lunar module engine by only a few 

Rocketdyne proposed a method known as helium injection, int

inert gas into the flow of propellants to decrease thrust while ma

the same flow rate. Although Bethpage and Houston agreed that thi

a plausible approach to throttleability, it would be a major advan

state of the art, and the MSC Apollo office directed Grumman to ca

parallel development program and select the better design. 

On 14 March 1963, Grumman held a bidders' conference, att

representatives from Aerojet-General, Reaction Motors Division of 

United Technology Center Division of United Aircraft, and Space 

ogy Laboratories, Inc. (STL). In May, STL (which had lost ou

original bidding for the engine) was selected to develop the co

motor. STL proposed a pressure-fed hypergolic system that was gim

well as throttleable. The engine's mechanical throttling system u

control valves and a variable-area injector, in much the same manne

a shower head, to regulate pressure, rate of propellant flow, and th

of fuel mixture in the combustion chamber. 

With two subsystem contractors working on such radically 

throttling techniques, NASA planners, as Rector later said, "tho

or the other would stub his toe real quick ... , that it would be 

that we should go one [way] or the other-but it wasn't happenin

were both ... pretty good...." STL and Rocketdyne continued t

to-head competition for the final-and lucrative-engine developm

qualification contract through the end of 1964." 24 

In November 1964, Joseph Shea, Apollo spacecraft manager in 

told NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel Phillips in Washing
boad t to wegGuas ecoedatos, evew te dgs ote 

earlier committee, and study a technical comparison prepared by Houston's 

Propulsion and Power Division. On 18 January this review board, in a 

surprising move, reversed Grumman's action and named STL instead of 

Rocketdyne. The board said that the 

recommendation of STL is based upon the assessment that STL is in a 

more favorable position [and] is capable of supplying more management 

and superior resources to this program without interference of other similar 

programs. . . . there are potential benefits to be gained for the Gemini 

and Apollo attitude engine programs at NAA by the cancellation of the 

[Rocketdyne] descent engine development.t 

This decision, unusual because Houston rarely vetoed a recommendation 

for a subcontractor made by a prime contractor, was sustained by Phillips 

at Headquarters. Shea and Contracting Officer James L. Neal then directed 

Grumman to proceed with STL. 26 

Grumman chose Marquardt to build the lunar module's third engine 

system, the small 100-pound-thrust attitude control thrusters. In 1960, 

Warren P. Boardman and Maurice Schenk of Marquardt had visited Robert 

• Committee members were Max Faget (chairman) , Rector, Joseph G. Thibodaux, and C. 

Harold Lambert (MSC); Charles H. King and Adelbert 0. Tischler (NASA Headquarters); 

Leland F. Belew (Marshall); Irving A. Johnson (Lewis); P. Layton (Princeton University); 

Major W. R. Moe (Edwards Rocket Research Labora tory, USAF); and Jrn;eph M. Gavin and 

M. Dandridge (Grumman) . 

t Members of the Subcontractor Review Board for the LEM Descent Engine were Faget 

(chairman), Dave W. Lang (Procurement) , Andre J. Meyer, Jr. (Gemini) , Joseph G. Thibo· 

daux, Jr. (Propulsion and Power Division) , and Rector. 

t Gemini manager Charles W . Mathews was having trouble getting reliable engines for his 

spacecraft from Rocketdyne. In its decision, the board was obviously supporting both his 

program and Apollo. 

156 
system. Apollo officials had expected that the service module thrus

only slight modifications, could also be used in the lander, but co

proved difficult. The end results, though beneficial, fell far short 

ton's anticipations. Differing functional requirements, as well as u

vironmental and design constraints, precluded direct incorporati

service module thruster. Houston, however, complained that 

failed to take advantage of all the common-use technology availab

tributed delays in procurement of many thruster component

failure. 27 

After thruster tests at Bethpage and at Marquardt's Magic 

Facility in California during the first half of 1964, a technical 

emerged: the engine spiked, or backfired, at ignition, and a rap

temperature and pressure caused the engine to explode. The sp

peared so significant that Grumman wanted to develop a back

through another source, but Houston refused permission. Marqu

inated spiking by installing a small, tubular "precombustion" ch

side the engine. 2 8 

ENVIRONMENT AND ELECTRICITY 

Grumman selected Hamilton Standard to supply the envi

control system for the lunar module. Like AiResearch's unit in the 

module, it was a "closed-loop" atmospheric circulation system, us

critical oxygen and nonregenerative removal of carbon dioxide to 

pure oxygen atmosphere. The system also had a liquid-circulatin

and heat-absorbent panels to maintain a comfortable temperature 

cabin. By mid-1964, Hamilton Standard had finished the design 

begun fabrication and testing. Occasional problems arose during 
late, did not have the time to spare. 

Houston told Grumman in late 1964 to consider substituting batteries 

for fuel cells, and on 26 February 1965 Bethpage was ordered to make the 

change. Although the switch was not entirely welcome to the lunar module 

design team, it caused no appreciable delay. And to some it came as a distinct 

relief; the beauty of batteries lay in their simplicity, hence their reliability, 

in contrast to fuel cells. Some of the battery development cost would be offset by the cancellation of the Pratt & Whitney contract. 30 

THE "SuB-PRIME" AND THE RADAR PROBLEM 

Grumman contracted with Aerospace Communications and Controls 

Division of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in Burlington, Massachusetts, for engineering support, radars, an inflight test system, and components 

of the stabilization and control system. RCA, the "sub-prime" contractor, 

was also to design and manufacture ground checkout equipment for these 

items. Although the two companies had worked together for years, the 

Grumman-RCA experience with the lunar module was fraught with difficulties. Electronics components became a pacing item in the development of 

the lander's subsystems, causing unhappiness at NASA Headquarters and 

culminating in an investigation by the General Accounting Office. 31 

The extremely complex stabilization and control system was the source 

of much of the trouble. Design had to await definition of mission requirements and planning. To complicate matters further, Grumman did not buy 

the total system but merely procured parts, through RCA, from Minneapolis-Honeywell, which supplied similar items to North American for the 

command module. There was some commonality of parts, but the lander 

hardware had to be repackaged, often causing lengthy delays. Communica158 
stowed. When George Mueller took over as manned space fligh

Washington, he also had reservations about the plan. Inftight ma

was deleted from the program and the crew was to rely on operat

plays and the caution and warning system to detect malfunctions

dancy would be "wired in," with duplicate or backup components 

could switch to, and all electronics inside the cabin would be he

sealed to protect against moisture and contaminants.33 

Radar, tied into the guidance and navigation system, was o

hardest pieces of the lunar module to qualify. Two sets would be 

for landing, the other for rendezvous. Under its blanket subco

electronics, RCA was to design the system, manufacture the rendezv

and buy the landing subsystem. After evaluating proposals from 

ders, RCA picked Ryan Aeronautical Company, developer of land

for Surveyor. 34 

Development of the lunar module radar was not expected t

cult, since no technological breakthrough was demanded for eith

Integrating these sets with the guidance and navigation system, 

was another matter. There were also problems in properly placin

sulating the antennas. Getting the precise ranging accuracy ne

overcoming the weight increases that resulted from meeting thes

ments probably posed the biggest problem of all. A happy medium 

optimum weight and desired reliability was elusive, and pro

practically nil. 

During the final quarter of 1964, the chief of guidance and c

Houston warned Shea that the radar program was having trou

weight, accuracy, reliability, thermal characteristics, and costs. 

William A. Lee, chief of MSC's Apollo Operations Planning Divisi

to think about omitting the rendezvous radar from both the com

lunar modules. Lee believed these units were doubly redunda
officials wanted to use the basic command module arrangement in the lander 

to avoid developing an entirely new system. After Grumman was selected 

in November 1962, the contractor, the center, and MIT had tried to work 

out a configuration for the lander. In the middle of 1963, Houston asked 

Headquarters for permission to to procure lunar module guidance through 

existing agreements with MIT, AC Spark Plug, Kollsman, Raytheon, and 

Sperry. When Washington refused, time was lost in negotiating new 

contracts. 36 

The biggest delay came from a dispute over whether to use the MIT 

unit in the lunar module. Grumman's refusal to accept MIT's word about 

the reliability of its system sparked the controversy. Lunar module manager 

James L. Decker in Houston shared this skepticism and asked Grumman to 

look into a more advanced system than the three-gimbal platform (pitch, 

yaw, and roll referencing system) MIT used. Meanwhile, David W. Gilbert, 

in charge of navigation and guidance in Shea's office, insisted on getting the 

MIT unit into the lunar module. Grumman was caught between the two 

opposing factions. Neither of the Houston officials could get the other to 

change his mind-and the chasm deepened. Top management in Houston 

and in Washington then stepped in. Bellcomm would study the options, 

consult with all parties to the argument, imd recommend a solution. In due 

time, NASA decided to stick with MIT and announced its decision, based 

on Bellcomm's findings, on 18 October 1963. 

But the announcement did not completely clear the air, and some 

rather strained feelings developed between Grumman and MIT. Early in 

1964, however, the contractors recognized the necessity of working together 

on the areas where development progress affected both the lunar module 

and its guidance system. Set down in formal Interface Control Documents, 

agreements on these points would govern all future actions by both parties. 

At the end of February, Rector reported 29 meetings between the contrac160 
of Manned Space Flight in Washington and from the field cente

as a number of astronauts. The vehicle was thrown open for inspe

the astronauts were expected to climb in, out, over, and around

feel for the craft. 

The first of these reviews, on "M-1" (a wooden mockup o

compartment), took place 16-18 September 1963. In general, th

layout was acceptable, although the locations of some equipmen

arrangement of controls and instruments still had to be settled. 

nauts liked the visibility through the triangular, canted window

standup crew positions; but they wanted the instrument panel c

both flight stations would have identical displays. 38 

About six months later, 24-26 March 1964, Grumman showed 

model, "TM-1," a wooden representation of a complete vehic

... attention centered on the cockpit arrangement: support and re

tems, equipment layout, lighting provisions, location of displays 

trols, and general mobility within the cabin and through the ha

this occasion, a number of changes were suggested. After evalu

approval by the review board, these modifications were incorpo

the TM-1 to make up a "design freeze" for constructing an all-me

the final review mockup. 

TM-1 was far more than just a means to get to the next, 

vanced, mockup, however. For several months, Grumman desig

it to study astronaut mobility and spacecraft-spacesuit interfac

nauts and company personnel got into and out of suits inside 

practiced stowing and recharging backpacks, and checked out sui

nections with the spacecraft's environmental control system. 3 9 

The most important mockup review, in October 1964, ce

"M-5"-a remarkably detailed model of a complete spacecraft, 

some actual flight equipment inside the cockpit. Even before the 
ppqy 

peted with Rocketdyne's version, 

and botft- companies later participated in the development. 

its prospects for success were discussed in a senior staff meeting at Houston 

on 2 October. Comparing Grumman's planned M-5 review with a review 

held a few days before on the Block II command module at North American, which one official considered "a good display for a salesman [but] 

a poor engineering tool," Max Faget said that, in his opinion, North 

American representatives should go to Grumman to "see what a mockup 

should look like." M-5 was the product of two years of configuration 

studies and the lessons of two previous inspections. 

Formal review of M-5 led off with an examination on 5 and 6 October.. 

by the astronaut corps. On the following day, MSC Director Gilruth and 

virtually all the management, engineering, and Apollo leaders from Houston 

descended on Grumman to inspect the cabin, electrical wiring, plumbing, 

flight controls, displays, radars, propulsion systems (ascent, descent, and 

reaction control), environmental control system, communications system, 

structures and landing gear, and stowage for scientific equipment. No piece 

of the vehicle escaped the review party's scrutiny and evaluation. The Mockup Review Board* met on 8 October, examined the 148 proposed changes, 

and approved 120 of them. These were mostly minor, and none forced any 

major redesign. M-5 marked the culmination of the configuration 

definition. 40 

• Board members were Maynard, Rector, Faget, Kraft, and Donald Slayton from Houston 

and R. W. Carbee and Kelly from Bethpage. 

162 
approved, a center probe and drogue for docking. Stowage of the l

the adapter was settled in October 1963, when the contractors and 

agreed upon a truncated cone, 8.8 meters long, with the lunar 

mounted against the interior wall by a landing-gear outrigger truss

after, detailed design focused on the dynamic loads expected durin

and on the deployment of the four panels for removal of the lande

flight. Grumman sent North American a mockup to use in confirm

structural mounting and panel opening characteristics. 41 

Lunar module ground testing to prove the practicality of th

and flight testing to verify the spaceworthiness of the flight veh

had to be worked into overall Apollo plans. Gilruth had stated 

fundamental requirement for mission success was employing "the 

people who will not permit it to fail." The basic reliability philos

said, was "that every manned spacecraft that leaves the earth ... s

resent the best that dedicated and inspired men can create. We ca

for more; we dare not settle for less." As the lander grew larger a

complex, it became, in the eyes of some observers, the "most crit

of the [Apollo] vehicle." The many things that could doom the cr

ground testing all the more important. Reliability for the lander 

either redundant systems or, where that was impractical because o

and size, ample margins of safety. 

Grumman's basic plan for ground testing, set forth in May 196

for extensive use of test models and lunar test articles (called "TM

"LT As" by the engineers), as well as for propulsion rigs to test p

lines and for engine firing programs. Because the lander's flight w

• The two contractors had worked together amicably enough on the Project 

Present Report (detailed vehicle test plan) , led by North American, and on the Apo

Planning Task Force, headed by Grumman. Both are discussed in Ch apter 5. 
the training vehicle, which the astronauts would use to practice simulated 

lunar landings. Flight testing within the earth's atmosphere was finally 

ruled out when Langley discovered in wind tunnel investigations that the 

Little Joe II-lander combination would be aerodynamically unstable. 43 

Grumman had wanted some unmanned missions, using the Little Joe II 

and the Saturn IB launch vehicles, before men flew the lunar lander. 

Houston authorized the procurement of autopilots for unmanned spacecraft but did not actually schedule any such flights. After Mueller invoked 

the all-up concept, with each flight groomed as though it were the ultimate 

mission, Houston planners began to think about putting both the lander 

and the North American spacecraft aboard a single Saturn IB. One Houston engineer even went to Huntsville to ask von Braun about the possibility of increasing the launch vehicle's payload capacity. And there was 

some discussion about strapping Minuteman missile solid-fueled rocket 

stages onto the launch vehicle to provide the extra boost needed! 

In the meantime, ground testing would have to carry the burden of 

qualifying the lander until the Saturn was ready to fly the vehicle, which 

caused some realignment of the lunar module program. Eleven flight vehicles and two flight test articles were earmarked for Saturn development 

flights. NASA also decided that the first three flight vehicles must be able 

to fly either manned or unmanned. 44 

In November 1964, Shea, Mueller, and Phillips decided on a tentative 

flight schedule. Saturn IB missions 201, 202, 204, and 205 would be Block I 

command module flights. There was no assignment for 203 at this time. 

Shea told the Houston senior staff that it looked as though an unmanned 

lander might be flown on 206. The first flight of a combined Block II 

command module and lunar module would be Mission 207 in July 1967. By 

that time, the Saturn V was expected to be ready to take over the job of 

flying the missionsY 

164 
A difficult task at all locations, Bethpage included, was gettin

support equipment (GSE) ready to check out the lunar module su

Traditionally, GSE has been a problem, since it cannot be desi

built until the spacecraft design is fairly firm. Because the lande

first of its kind and changed from day to day as the mission req

changed, Grumman was even slower than other contractors in g

checkout equipment on the line. Shea complained that "the en

picture at Grumman looks quite gloomy." He insisted that Grum

some equipment that North American had developed for the 

module. The situation had improved by the end of 1964, but m

was yet to be done over the next two years before the equipment 

considered satisfactory. 47 

By mid-1964, both the lander and the command module we

ning to experience the weight growth that seems inevitable in 

development programs. Von Braun promised Mueller in May that 

try to get an extra 2000 kilograms of weight-lifting capability 

Saturn V, which eased some of the pressure on Gilruth's team in 

Even so, the lander was getting dangerously fat, moving steadily 

top limit of 13 300 kilograms. Most of the weight-reducing talent 

ton was busy with the command module , whose Block II configur

not as well defined at the time as the lander's. Several modificatio

landing vehicle were suggested, but any that limited either operati

bility or reliability were resisted. Moreover, the lander was so un

spacecraft that projections were almost useless in estimating futu

increases. Containing this growth would be a major project d

coming year. 48 

The years 1963 and 1964 had seen the lunar module move 

drawing boards to the manufacturing line. During 1965, hardwar

tion, assembly, and testing would begin. After that, it would ta
166 
Searching for Order 

1965 

For the most part, 1965 was a good year for manned space flight. 

astronauts flew five missions, all successful, one lasting two we

including the world's first rendezvous in space. A series of unmanne

banished many old specters of doom: three Pegasus satellites prove

meteoroids were not as hazardous in near·earth space as some had pro

and two Ranger spacecraft, before crashing on the moon, sent back 

that gave some assurance that Surveyor and Apollo could safely fly 

land on the lunar surface. Apollo's eventual success seemed cert

first all its far-flung pieces had to be brought together in some semb

order. For Apollo, therefore, 1965 was a trying, yet fruitful, year. 

PROGRAM DIRECTION AND THE CoMMAND MoDULE 

Administrator James Webb knew that the futures of NASA an

were interlocked and that the agency's peak in appropriations a

power would probably be reached in 1965 and 1966. But neither 

the other NASA officials who spent six months each year justifying 

needs before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress could pre

when funding requirements would taper off. On one hand, only $5.

of the $5.25 billion authorized for fiscal 1965 had been spent; on th

there were indications that the $5.2 billion in the fiscal year 1966 au

tion might not be enough. Apollo funding was more than $2.5 b

167 
would be evaluated, and how these changes, after approval, would be im

plemented. Its first section, Program Management, laid out the responsibilities for all participants in a pie-shaped chart, sliced to show each major 

piece of the program and the organization-industry or NASA (MSC, 

Marshall, Goddard, Kennedy, or Headquarters)-assigned to implement 

these duties. Other sections dealt with such items as scheduling, procurement, data management, configuration management, logistics, facilities, 

funds and manpower, and systems engineering. This directive pulled together, in one place, all the parts of Apollo and explained how the decisions 

to integrate them would be made. 2 

Mueller had revived the dormant Panel Review Board in late 1964,* 

hoping to get a tighter rein on configuration control management of the 

spacecraft and launch vehicles and to speed up the manufacture and qualification of flight vehicles. Houston had established a Configuration Control 

Panel in 1963, but spacecraft development was in such a fluid state that 

panel authority was limited. By late 1964, however, ASPO Manager Joseph 

Shea was able to set up a stronger, more effective, Configuration Control 

Board to review and manage changes in the spacecraft." 

After much correspondence between Washington and Houston, Shea 

issued a Configuration Management Plan, outlining his board's responsibilities and limitations and the functions of each of the program offices 

under his jurisdiction in carrying out the dictates of the board. But having 

a plan did not immediately turn the tide. Even after the document was 

published, Shea and his lieutenants tried in vain to stem mounting weights 

and slipping schedules. During a briefing at North American in April, Shea 

felt, as he had earlier, that engineering was getting out of hand and slowing 

• See Chapter 5. Members of the review board were Mueller and Phillips (NASA Headquarters) , George Low (Houston) , Eberhard Rees (Marshall) , and Rocco Petrone (Kennedy) ­

168 
l. 	Preliminary Design Review (PDR)-to review the basic design d

the detailed design phase; 

2. 	 Critical Design Review (CDR)-to check specifications and engine

drawings before their release for manufacture; 

3. 	 Flight Article Configuration Inspection (FACI)-to compare har

with specifications and drawings and to validate acceptance t

(FACI could be repeated to make sure that any deficiencies had 

corrected; it would also be repeated on every vehicle that dep

significantly from the basic design); 

4. 	 Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW)-to certify completio

flight-qualification of each vehicle stage or spacecraft module; 

5. 	 Design Certification Review (DCR)*'-to verify the airworthines

safety of each spacecraft and launch vehicle design (DCRs 

include all government and contractor agencies with major parts 

programs and would formally review the development and qua

tion of all stages, modules, and subsystems); 

6. 	 Flight Readiness Review (FRR)-a two-part review before each 

held by the mission director in Washington, to confirm the rea

of hardware and facilities (the mission period would then begin 

the commitment of support forces around the world). 

These six checkpoints charted the course for the step-by-step flow 

ware from drawing board and shop floor to flight-ready vehicles 

launch site. 5 

While Headquarters was working on configuration control and 

view plans, command module weight kept getting out of hand. C

• The first DCR had been conducted on Gemini Ill on a one·time basis; Muel

impressed with the resuLts that he continued the practice for all future missions. 
Johnson reminded Max Faget in August that, more than a year and a half 

earlier, he had pointed to weight control as the single most difficult technical problem. To "keep [the] spacecraft on its diet," Johnson proposed 

putting pressure on the subsystem managers to begin a rigorous system of 

checks and cross-checks down through the subsystem level. Faget passed 

Johnson's suggestions along to Shea, who, already aware that he had a fat 

spacecraft, was also being bombarded with warnings about the lack of reliability in Block I. Owen G. Morris, Shea's Chief of Reliability and Quality 

Assurance, listed 71 possible failure points that North American had evidently done nothing to eliminate. Morris was not the only one to raise the 

reliability issue. Shea's old adversary in the mode selection, Nicholas Golovin of the President's Science Advisory Committee, wrote that he had heard 

of 50 items that accounted for " perhaps 95 percent of the unreliability of 

the Apollo system." 6 

"EM

Not all the story was bleak, however. In November attention centered 

on a three-week Critical Design Review for the Block II command module. 

This event followed reviews of the lower equipment bay and upper deck in 

February; the guidance and control systems, crew compartment, and docking system in March; the extravehicular mobility unit in April; internal 

lighting displays and side access hatch in June; and the spacecra.ft-lunar 

module adapter in June and August. The major result of all these reviews 

was an entirely new inspection article called, in engineering shorthand, 3 " (for engineering manufacturing module mockup), which demonstrated that North American was making progress toward a finished Block 

II design. 

Alan Kehlet, North American's Block II project manager, and assistants 

Gerald R. Fagan and Louis W. Walkover made the contractor's presentation. Kehlet explained that the Critical Design Review was a formal, technical review of the Block II spacecraft as reflected in the program specification. The general format of the briefing was: "This is what the spec says 

170 
For several months, Shea had been critical of Block II progr

had complained in June that engineers, besides trying to develop th

craft, had adopted a stance of "as long as we are making the n

changes, we might as well introduce these [others]." Therefore h

the subsystem managers in Houston and Downey, who were causin

of the problems, to review both Blocks I and II and eliminate any u

sary changes. There were plenty of subsystem or component prob

wrestle with, Shea knew, without constantly redesigning the lowe

ment bay to fit changing components. In all fairness, however-an

knew this-the subsystem managers at North American and the 

Spacecraft Center were caught in the trap of changing concepts. 

ample, the cancellation of onboard maintenance in favor of redun

backup systems in the event of a malfunction resulted in modified p

subsystems that would no longer fit in the equipment section. 8 

But sometimes a change was dictated by troubles that croppe

supposedly uncomplicated areas. One such nagging problem that 

1965 was how to keep the command module windows clean. A fib

cap with a cork ablator, called a boost protective cover, was atta

the escape tower and fitted atop the spacecraft to protect the w

during tower jettisoning. When tests showed that the cover wou

and the plumes from the escape tower would deposit soot on the w

and possibly cause other damage, North American bonded Nomex 

material strengthened with Teflon) between the fiber glass and cor

of the cover to reinforce it. 9 

And in areas where problems were expected to arise, they did. 

the tanks-one holding oxidizer and propellant for the command and 

module's reaction control thrusters (with which the spacecraft was 

and the other housing reactants for the fuel cells that provided e
Shea found that the penchant for unnecessary changes in Block II was 

shared by some of the guidance and navigation system developers. On a 

visit to Honeywell in May 1965, he learned that 50 percent of the stabilization and control circuitry was new, 30 percent was slightly modified, and 

only 20 percent was identical with Block I wiring. Although he conceded 

that many of the changes were warranted, Block II had been used to justify 

nonessential circuits, as well. Shea believed that the Apollo office was inviting trouble; the changes had reached a point where more time would 

be lost in trying to eliminate them. Pressure was applied to make sure that 

North American kept its associate contractors on both the spacecraft and 

guidance and navigation systems up to date on changes; interface control 

documents would be used to prevent this kind of problem in the future.n 

LuNAR MoDULE REFINEMENT 

Lunar module activities also focused on configuration control, schedules, and funds in 1965. J. Thomas Markley, program control chief, directed 

the Apollo engineers to be more conservative in their proposals to the Configuration Control Panels. Changes in the spacecraft must correct design 

flaws, not improve hardware. But stemming the flow of changes in the lunar 

module was not an easy matter; many were required because of its mission.12 

An example was the installation of frangible probes on the base of 

each foot pad to tell the crew the lander was a meter and a half above 

the surface and to switch off the descent motor. If the motor were still 

firing when the craft touched down, the engine nozzle would be damaged, 

landing stability might be affected, and the ascent stage might be impaired 

by debris kicked up by the engine exhaust. 13 

One configuration issue, a carry-over from 1963-1964, remained un172 
pp, 

lander to accept either system and to slow down RCA's radar deve

program. Radar-tracker studies at the Manned Spacecraft Center w

completed by September, and a contractor would be selected to de

tracker. William A. Lee in Shea's office protested holding back R

delay would force the deletion of the radar from the first and second 

to be used on earth-orbital missions. This, said Lee, would be a 

of the all-up concept of flying only complete spacecraft. Change

radar program would be justified, he concluded, solely 

by the implicit assumption that we will cancel the program even

The logic of this is very questionable, since it clearly says that the 

being spent on this program is being wasted deliberately. We 

either pursue the radar in a manner which would permit its use 

LEM, or we should cancel it. I can find no middle ground.... The 

number of earth-orbital LEM flights can be justified only if we 

rigorously to the ground rules of all-up flights and qualification p

flight. It is too early in the LEM program to consider compromisin

requirements, and to do so for budgetary reasons will almost ce

prove to be false economy.16 

Probe sensor on luna

landing gear, to al

nauts that touchdow

lunar surface was im

I I I I I I I I I I 
y y

May, Shea persuaded Mueller to approve an increase in lander weight to 

14 850 kilograms, includiTlg crew and equipment. In June, Harry L. Reynolds warned Owen Maynard that it would be difficult to keep the spacecraft 

below even that figure . All that summer, the warnings continued. Caldwell Johnson wrote Shea in August that the lander might get too heavy to 

do its job. The next month Shea asked Houston management for help in 

solving the problem. He also formed a Weight Control Board (headed by 

himself) to act on reduction proposals.

1 8 

Really worried now, Grumman launched a two-pronged attack known 

as "Scrape" and "SWIP." Scrape meant just what the word implies, searching the structure for every chance to shave bulk off structural members. 

But SWIP (Super Weight Improvement Program) was Grumman's real 

war against weight. 

Grumman project engineer Thomas J. Kelly led a SWIP team of a 

dozen experts in structures, mass property, thermodynamics, and electronics, 

whose task was to second-guess the whole design. This same team had recently and successfully shaved weight off the F-lllB aircraft, and it knew 

what a tough job it was up against. When the SWIP campaign started, the 

engineering design was 95 percent complete. So designers pored over already approved drawings, looking for ways to lighten the craft. Grumman 

also pressured Houston officials to keep all government-furnished equipment for the lander within the specified weights. And Bethpage scrutinized 

parts supplied by its subcontractors and insisted that these weights be reduced wherever possible. Weekly reports and monthly meetings between 

Bethpage and Houston turned into forums for airing suggestions for further 

reductions and discussions of what had been done. The first such review, 

held at Grumman on 3 September, revealed that 45 kilograms had already 

been whittled from the structure by Scrape. The more extensive SWIP 

plan was outlined-what had been started, what was planned, and what 

174 
THE LEM TEST PROGRAM: A PACING ITEM 

Houston reviewed Grumman's testing program during 1965 t

sure it covered everything from small components to the big test 

On 15 April Grumman began test-firing the ascent engine at White 

Propulsion testing was also being conducted at Bell and STL. A

engine firing programs were behind schedule, Houston expected 

performance shortly. 22 

Six lunar test articles (LT As) formed the backbone of the grou

program. Bethpage shipped L T A-2 to Huntsville for vibration tes

see if it could withstand launch pressures, and L T A-10 to Tulsa, t

its fit in the adapter. L T A-1 was a "house" spacecraft, used to ir

problems during fabrication, assembly, and checkout. Three more 

were under construction: L T A-8 for thermal-vacuum testing in H

and L T As 3 and 5 for combined structural shakings, vibrations, and 

firings. 23 

Flight test plans for the early production landers were flexible 

commodate schedule differences with the command module. LEM-1 

ally received the lion's share of attention, since Grumman had to 

ready for an unmanned "LEM-alone" mission (Apollo-Saturn 

LEM-1 would have to be ready at least three months before the B

• Arnold Whitake1· described how the fabrication group was caught in the squeeze 

manufacturing requirements and schedule pressures. At a program management m

said that "one of the fellows in manufacturing came in [with] a light cardboard box

said, 'I'll show you why everything's late.' And he dumped out a whole box of 

parts ... , very complex fittings [too thin to be even] reasonably heavy sheet meta

wasn't any sheet metal, it was a complex machined fitting. And he said 'Man, we ne

parts like this before in any quantity like this and every fitting on the LEM looks like 
ypg

L T A-4, a vibration test article, and two flight test articles (FTAs). To replace the FTAs, two L T As would be refurbished when they finished 

ground tests. After trials with scale and full-sized models had been run at 

Langley and elsewhere, Houston also canceled a landing gear test model 

as an unnecessary expense. 26 

Grumman, at a program review on 6 July, then asked NASA to 

relax the rules on qualification testing and to permit delivery to the Cape 

of vehicles not fully equipped. Shea rejected this suggestion, ordering his 

subsystem managers to make sure that only all-up landers left the Grumman 

plant. Problems with some of the subsystems were a factor in this request. 

Bell in particular was having trouble with the redesigned injectors and 

tank bladders for the ascent engine, and manufacturing problems were 

harassing Hamilton Standard's environmental control system. Subsystem 

manager Richard E. Mayo asked Donald Sullivan (head of a manufacturing 

unit in the Apollo office) to find out what was wrong. When he visited the 

Windsor Locks plant, Sullivan noted that, although Hamilton Standard was 

turning out high-quality parts, good solid management in assembling and 

integrating the system was lacking. 27 

Electrical and electronics gear, where design changes persisted throughout 1965, was also lagging. The abort sensor assembly (part of the abort 

guidance system), for example, was redesigned to incorporate continuous 

thermal control, a programmable memory for the computer, and a dataentry-display assembly. In mid-August R. Wayne Young, who had succeeded 

William Rector as the lander's project officer, ordered Grumman project 

manager Robert Mullaney to stop making changes if the present system 

could do the job.ll8 

Program spending began to equal schedules in importance. Just as the 

lander got rolling toward flight hardware production, it was caught in the 

176 
p, 

fee, a turnabout in government dealings with industry, was contro

Critics pointed to lengthy delays in negotiations that tied up engine

otherwise could be working on program hardware and a "worse

government-industry relations by causing contractual bickering." 

and Mueller disagreed, insisting that incentives placed more respo

on the contractor. It did take time and talent to work out the pro

but it promised better performance.

3 0 

NASA had made only modest headway in this conversion duri

and 1964, but the agency intended to revamp the spacecraft cont

1965. Mueller wrote MSC Director Gilruth in April, stressing tha

tives must reflect schedules, cost, and performance, in that order. T

the way for incentive negotiations, Houston had to clear up a nu

unresolved contract change authorizations, which would be review

board made up of Houston and Bethpage officials. The review began 

March and ended in April with participants deadlocked.

3 1 

Houston and Bethpage kept trying to work out the individu

tract changes, but there was still no agreement in early June, aft

weeks of negotiations. Gilruth and Shea then discussed the impasse 

Clinton Towl, president of Grumman, and decided that it was p

to convert the contract at that time. Houston did impose a LEM 

ment Plan on Grumman, hoping to control cost, schedules, and perfo

Until the last quarter of the year, Grumman would be allowed t

only $78 million, which was less than the contract costs estimated 

the unsuccessful review. If Grumman could stay within this lim

quarter, however, negotiations for the incentive contract could resu

In the interval Grumman concentrated on bringing its subcon

into line and converting its agreements with them into incentive c

trying to demonstrate satisfactory control of the program. In Sep

Grumman submitted a proposal for contract conversion to NASA. 
Apollo spacesuit and backpack. Changes were made before man eventually stepped 

out of the spacecraft onto the 

lunar surface. 

tions lasted until December and culminated in a contract with enough incentives to spur the contractor to maintain costs and schedules and to meet performance milestones. This arrangement, announced in February 1966, carried the lander program through 1969 at a cost of $1.42 billion. North 

American's incentive contract was also negotiated (at an estimated $2.2 

billion) during the latter half of 1965. 33 

THE MANNED FACTOR 

While various organizations struggled to get the spacecraft through the 

development phase, human factors experts concentrated on the progress 

of the spacesuit and the selection of astronauts. For some time, the suit had 

met turmoil, schedule delays, and technical problems. Early in 1962, 

Houston had forced a marriage between Hamilton Standard (for a portable life support system) and the International Latex Corporation (for the 

suit). Hamilton Standard managed the whole system, known as the extravehicular mobility unit. From the beginning, the arrangement proved 

unworkable. 

Just how unworkable was revealed in the spring of 1964, when prototype suits used in the command module mockup review turned out to be 

incompatible with the Apollo spacecraft cabin. NASA officials had to fall 

back on Gemini suits for Block I earth-orbital flights. This substitution 

gave Hamilton Standard and International Latex a chance to straighten 

178 
In mid-September, Gilruth and Low told Mueller and Philli

Hamilton Standard would continue to manufacture the backpa

eliminate the integration problems of the past, Houston would 

the total system and International Latex would develop the suit u

separate contract. This arrangement was agreeable to NASA Headqua

The other major activity in human factors was the expansion 

astronaut corps. During 1962 and 1963, NASA had selected the seco

third groups of pilots. These 23, the Gemini generation, with the o

seven formed the basic pool for Apollo crews. In 1965, a new breed

"scientist-astronauts," joined the ranks in training at Houston. NASA 

quarters hoped to mollify some of the scientific grumblers and to stre

its ties with the scientific community by emphasizing Apollo's p

contribution to science-not only from the instruments that wou

back information from the moon but from the men who would fl

there. Surprisingly, some of the drive to enlist these scientist-c

came from engineering-oriented Houston. 

Robert B. Voas, human factors assistant to Gilruth and a key fi

setting up procedures for selecting Mercury pilots, had conferre

NASA Director of Space Sciences Homer Newell in Washington i

about Houston's views on scientists for the space program. Voa

met with Eugene M. Shoemaker (of Newell's office), Joseph She

George Low to discuss the most appropriate specialties. With an 

lunar-surface, long-duration, and earth-orbital activities, the quartet 

that the disciplines needed were geology, geophysics, medicin

physiology. 

At this September 1963 meeting, Voas emphasized that Houston 

qualified pilots, but Shea saw no need for any previous flying exp

Why not take this opportunity to introduce methods for selecting an

ing nonpilots? In the end, the consensus was that candidates with 
In June, NASA announced that 6 scientist-astronauts had been chosen 

from 16 nominated by the science board. In the group were one geologist 

(Harrison H. Schmitt), two physicians (Duane E. Graveline and .Joseph P. 

Kerwin), and three physicists (Owen K. Garriott, Edward G. Gibson, and 

F. Curtis Michel). Two of the men, Kerwin and Michel, were qualified 

jet pilots, but the others were not. These four reported to Williams Air 

Force Base, Arizona, on 29 .July for a year of flight training before joining 

their colleagues in Houston. 38 

Gilruth wanted another team of pilot-astronauts, and he sent Slayton 

to Washington to argue the case before Mueller on 15 January 1965. 

Mueller was cool to the idea, but he later told Gilruth that he might bring 

another group on board in the fall. On 10 September, NASA announced 

it would recruit a fifth set of astronauts to ensure "an adequate number 

of flight crews for Project Apollo and future manned missions." 39 

PoRTENTs FOR OPERATIONS 

While Phillips and Shea worked on Apollo spending, schedules, mission assignments, and crew selection, Wernher von Braun and his 

Marshall Space Flight Center colleagues launched a series of three satellites 

that calmed many of the fears about micrometeoroid hazards of manned 

space flight in earth orbit. Astronomers had warned about the dangers of 

space dust to extended spacecraft flights, but Project Mercury had encountered no insuperable difficulties. vVith Gemini plans for manned spacecraft 

spending as much as two weeks in space, however, it was imperative that 

NASA have data from unmanned missions. 

NASA's Office of Advanced Research and Technology and Marshall 

laid plans for a vehicle called "Pegasus" and hired the Fairchild Stratos 

180 
would cause few problems in earth orbit to the thinskinned service 

and much less to the command module wrapped in its protective he

cocoon. 41 

Pegasus provided near-earth data to Apollo; another unmanned 

Ranger, gave a view of the ultimate goal-the moon. After many 

and in July 1964 one resounding success, Ranger ended with two 

flights, one in February and one in March 1965-much to the rel

credit of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the parent organization. 

VIII) aimed at the moon's equatorial zone in the Sea of Tranquility

mitted more than 7000 pictures before it crashed. Engineers and s

had an opportunity to study features no more than 30 centimeters 

Ranger IX) heading for the crater Alphonsus, made the three-day tr

scarcely a course correction. Telemetry from this vehicle, transla

fed through commercial television, gave the public its first close-up 

the moon. 42 

Manned space flight was a beehive of activities in 1965, w

Gemini program recording five outstanding missions. The Soviet 

had twice flown its multimanned Voskhod spacecraft-in October 1

March 1965-and the United States was eager to rejoin the competit

23 March after a 22-month hiatus in American manned flight, Virg

som and John Young, in a three-orbit flight aboard Gemini III) fir

spacecraft thrusters and changed their orbit. For the first time, m

truly controlling a spacecraft and its direction and speed in space. B

was only a spacecraft qualification flight. More ambitious mission

ahead for Gemini, to test the abilities of the astronauts in space and 

• SA-9 was •the last of ·the eigh.t S-I first stages built by Marshall; SA-8 was the 

by Chrysler at the Michoud facility in Louisiana. Chrysler needed more time to d

stage, so SA-9 flew first. 
success oGemini VJ ceag te way oa twoweeeduace test, as 

assured us of man's capability to travel to the moon and return." 43 

Although Dryden did not live to see it (he died on 2 December), the 

year ended with the most exciting and ambitious space flight up to that 

time. Known to many as the "Spirit of '76," the concurrent flight of two 

manned Gemini spacecraft proved the feasibility of both long-duration flight 

and rendezvous. It began with the launch of Gemini VII} piloted by Frank 

Borman and James Lovell, on 4 December. Eleven days later, Walter 

Schirra and Thomas Stafford flew Gemini VI-A to a rendezvous with their 

orbiting compatriots to cap a banner year in space. 44 

Gemini's successes, although answering important questions, spawned 

some unwelcome suggestions for Apollo. White's spectacular extravehicular 

operation touched off plans for a similar exercise in the first manned Apollo 

flight; Shea vetoed that idea in a hurry. An even grander scheme pitted 

Gemini against Apollo. LEO, for "Large Earth Orbit"-all the way around 

the moon-was championed by Charles Mathews and Andre Meyer of the 

Gemini office and subsequently endorsed by Gilruth and Mueller. Since 

LEO could put Americans in the vicinity of the moon earlier than Apollo, 

it would be a big leap forward in the space race, which still loomed large 

in the minds of many people. Four Russian Luna missions had unsuccessfully attempted soft landings during 1965, demonstrating that the Soviet 

Union was still interested in the lunar target. Seamans vetoed LEO, believing Apollo needed no more competition. But Congress got wind of the 

plan and started asking questions. When Representative Olin E. Teague 

wanted to know if there would be any advantages to such a mission, Webb 

answered that it would be expensive and would still not guarantee success 

• Soviet Cosmonaut Aleksey Leonov had taken the world's first space walk when he left the 

confines of Voskhod II on 18 March 1965. 

182 
on 19 May to watch Mission A-003, an abort test of a boilerplat

craft at an altitude of 35 000 meters. At 6 that morning, the Littl

ignited and rammed its payload skyward. A few seconds after liftof

vane at the base of the booster stuck and started the 13-meter-ta

craft-booster combination spinning like a bullet. Twenty-six secon

the flight and still on a true course, the vehicle started coming apa

abort-sensing system signaled the launch escape tower rocket to fire 

the spacecraft away at an altitude of 4000 meters. While newsmen 

the fluttering remains of the Little Joe II, BP-22's parachutes low

gently to the desert floor. Apollo had another answer: the launch 

system worked in a real abort situation.'7 

Little more than a month later, on 29 June, the launch team 

Mexico prepared to test an abort off the pad. The year before, a 

test had proved the escape tower rocket could jerk the spacecra

away from an exploding launch vehicle. But both the spacecraft 

escape system had since gained weight. In the second test, the rocke

the spacecraft higher in the air and farther downrange than expected

Perhaps one of the more heartening events during 1965 was th

firing at the Mississippi Test Facility of the S-IC, the first stage 

Saturn V. The five F-1 engines, burning for six and a half secon

duced the designed 33.4 million newtons (7.5 million pounds) o

as much power as five Saturn Is lashed together. Going on up the 

• Some Apollo engineers did not agree with Tindall. James C. Church thought Ap

learn something about program control from Gemini, and Calvin H . Perrine wa

expert advice on ground test programs from the office that had just gone through th

ence. Duncan believed the Gemini sextant might be modified for use on Apollo

Lanzkron and Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., were anxious to learn anything they could from 

that they might apply to Apollo. And H. B. Graham of North American , who made 

son of Apollo and Gemini checkout procedures, assumed that further study might 

of ·the Gemini measures applicable to Apollo. 
and components, this ground 

test version-the first in the 

Saturn V development program-would be shipped by 

barge to Marshall Flight Center in Alabama. Marshall Director W ern her von Braun 

(at the microphone in the 

center photo) held a brief 

ceremony 26 September 1965, 

accepting the first flight S-IC. 

Below, S-IC-T is fired for 

20! minutes at Marshall in 

an August 1965 ground test. 
during space exploration had long been recognized; now the risk

turning materials to the earth after exploratory voyages had to be fac

United States Public Health Service was brought in to advise N

care of lunar samples and crews. Sharing the apprehensions, Congres

authorized the construction of a special quarantine facility in Houst

Lunar Sample Receiving Laboratory, hurriedly built during the n

years, was one of the most elaborately safeguarded biological fac

the world. 5 1 

Another indication that the operational phase of Apollo was a

ing was Mueller's creation in July of a Site Selection Board to rec

lunar landing areas. Gilruth sent William Lee and William E. Sto

to serve on this board, as well as on the Ad Hoc Surveyor/ Lunar 

Utilization Committee (which Gilruth believed belonged in t

basket, anyway). The next month, John E. Dornbach's Lunar Surfa

nology Branch compiled lists of candidate sites. In October, NA

nounced that ten areas had been selected and that they would b

graphed by Lunar Orbiter cameras during 1966. 52 

Picking sites and building a facility to handle samples and c

their return to earth were good starts toward operations, but so

munications and control systems problems remained to be ironed o

in its planning, NASA had seen the need for a "real-time compu

plex" (RTCC) for instantaneous information on and control of 

space missions. Located at Goddard during all of Mercury and t

part of Gemini, the complex linked 17 ground stations around t

and permitted observers to monitor manned flights on virtually a co

basis. In addition, Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo needed digital app

in six other areas: premission planning and analysis; space flight sim

to aid manufacturers and astronauts; launch operations, so data 

instantly checked and analyzed; physiological monitoring of crew
flight, using biosensors; postflight m1sswn analyses, so data on each flight 

could be catalogued and filed for future reference; and in the arena of 

worldwide testing, known to NASA by the fishy-sounding acronym CADFISS, for computer and data-flow integrated subsystems. 

After lengthy technical and administrative arguments, NASA moved 

the computer complex to Houston to form an "integrated mission control 

center." The center would have four main duties: processing global signals 

for display to flight controllers, computing and sending antenna-aiming 

directions to the global tracking stations, providing navigation information 

to the spacecraft, and simulating all mission data for personnel training and 

equipment checkout. By spring of 1965, Houston's computer complex was 

nearly ready, with five IBM 7094 model II computers on the line. Flight 

Director Chris Kraft assured Mueller the complex would be ready to control 

Gemini IV in June, and he was right. In September, a supplemental Univac 

1230 was added to the complex, and plans were laid to replace the 7094s 

with new IBM 360 model 75s. Although the 7094s remained in service 

186 
submarines, Raytheon produced a general-purpose prototype by m

The first Block I computer embodied significant advances o

computers. But it was soon discontinued because NASA decided 

inflight maintenance and because the design was not satisfactory 

malfunction detection or packaging. The next, or Block II, ve

ret:ted these weaknesses. Weighing 31 kilograms and consuming 

watts of power during normal operation, the Block II "brains" inc

redundant systems and had the largest memory of any onboard 

computer to that time (37 000 words) .

54 

THE COURSE AND THE FUTURE 

Two major questions faced NASA planners during 1965. W

on course, at what was essentially its midpoint, to meet the goal 

landing before the end of the decade? And what should follow 

the manned space flight arena? 

To find the answer to the first question, the House Subcom

NASA Oversight, led by Teague, set up a special staff in June 

schedules, funding, and spacecraft management. After three month

ing, a staff study published under the title Pacing Systems of the A

gram identified seven bottlenecks in Apollo. For the lander, pacin

were the descent engine, rendezvous radar, weight growth, and gr

port equipment; for the command and service modules, they were 

ing drawing releases, subassembly delivery and certification, and to

fabrication of the heatshield. The subcommittee concluded that N

applying its resources effectively to these problems and the pro

progressing on schedule. 55 

NASA leaders, meanwhile, were worrying about what would c
step leading to mans exploration of the planets. As structured, he said, 

AAP would simply maintain the status quo in the production and flight of 

Saturn-Apollo hardware. "Merely doing this, without planning for a new 

program, and without doing significant research and development as part 

of AAP, will not maintain the momentum we have achieved." 50 

Thus the total climate of opinion surrounding Apollo had altered. No 

longer did the moon seem the all-important-and all-consuming-goal it 

had been. Other objectives in the new ocean of space were taking shape. 

But conditions were not ripe: 1966 would be a year of progress for existing 

manned space flight programs, not a curtain-raiser for any major new 

projects. In one more flight, Little Joe II would complete its series of 

Apollo tests; after five more missions, which made orbital flight routine, 

Gemini would phase out and Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor would phase in; 

and Saturn and Apollo vehicles would taste the first fruits of success. 

188 
Moving toward Operations 

1966 

By 1966 Apollo had lost much of the emotional support of Con

the public that had welled up five years earlier in the wak

Soviet Vostoks. The drop was reasonable, since the successes of th

and Saturn I programs had led many Americans to believe the s

with Russia had been won. Moreover, domestic and foreign comm

made primarily in 1965, to President Johnson's "Great Society

Southeast Asia had placed more demands on tax dollars than 

foreseen. For fiscal 1967, NASA submitted a budget request of $5.5

the President cut it to $5.012, and Congress chopped it to $4.96

came through virtually unscathed; but its follow-on, Apollo App

felt the weight of the Budget Bureau's ax. 1 

Obtaining funds for space exploration might be becoming m

cult, but most NASA officials had no time to worry about future 

Apollo boilerplate flight tests had ended, and production spacecr

soon fly atop the Saturn IB. Manned Spacecraft Center Directo

Gilruth told Chris Kraft, Director for Flight Operations in Ho

get his people started on the job ahead. 

By January 1966, Kraft's group had drafted a preliminary "o

plan." In February it distributed a more complete version that p

the responsibilities and functions of everyone connected with f

ginning with Director Gilruth. The plan listed 19 specific d

ranging from the "mission directive" prepared by Joseph Shea

office to the "postflight trajectory analysis" compiled by Kraft's o

189 
QuALIFYING MISSIONS 

Before starting Apollo-Saturn IB launches, however, the operations 

people had to clean up one outstanding matter in New Mexico. NASA had 

hoped to finish the Little Joe II abort qualification program by the end of 

1965, but on 17 December the Flight Readiness Board refused to accept the 

booster and canceled a launch set for the next day. A month later, at 8:15 

on the morning of 20 January 1966, the last Little Joe II headed toward an 

altitude of 24 kilometers and a downrange distance of 14 kilometers. Then, 

as designed, the launch vehicle started to tumble; the launch escape system 

sensed trouble and fired its abort rocket, carrying the command module 

away from impending disaster. All went well on Mission A-004-the launch, 

the test conditions, the telemetry, the spacecraft (Block I production model 

002) , and the postflight analysis. The spacecraft windows picked up too 

much soot from the tower jettison motor, but the structure remained intact. 

Little Joe II was honorably retired, its basic purpose-making sure the launch 

escape and earth landing systems could protect the astronauts in either 

emergency or normal operations-accomplished. 3 

After the last Little Joe flight, the scene shifted to Florida, where a 

Saturn IB, the first of the uprated vehicles t slated to boost manned flights 

into earth orbit, was ready. AS-201 did not get a lot of publicity, but Dale 

Myers and his North American crew considered its spacecraft CSM-009 their 

''teething'' operation: 

• Glynn S. Lunney had already been assigned to direct AS·201, scheduled to fly 26 February 

1966. 

t The Saturn IB first stage differed from that of the Saturn I in ·that its eight engines had 

been uprated from 5.8 million to a total of 7.1 million newtons (from 1.3 million to 1.6 million 

pounds of thrust) . 

190 
p pp, 

drical service module, the conical command module, and the pylo

launch escape tower-had been North American's responsibility. O

were stacked together, NASA assumed control. It took two page

AS-20l's test objectives, but NASA's main aims were to check the 

bility and structural integrity of the spacecraft and launch vehicl

evaluate the spacecraft's heatshield performance as the vehicle 

through the atmosphere. 5 

Spacecraft 009 assembly began in October 1963 and continued 

out 1964, with the inner-shell aluminum-honeycomb pressure vess

shape concurrently with the stainless-steel-honeycomb outer shell 

ablative heatshield. By April 1965, 009 had reached the test di

Downey, where it spent the summer. After a review at the facto

October, NASA's Apollo engineers approved the spacecraft for shi

Cape Kennedy. Three months of servicing and checkout followe

AS-201 was ready for its voyage. 

On 20 February 1966, launch technicians at the Cape began a 

countdown, fully expecting some of the spacecraft's systems to d

launch. But weather turned out to be the chief problem, causing 

ponements. At 5:15 on the afternoon of the 25th, the countdown 

Three seconds before ignition-at 9:00 the next morning-a c

signaled that pressure in two helium spheres on the Saturn IB w

the danger line. The count was recycled to 15 minutes before lau

stopped. Discussions waxed hot between Huntsville and Cape e

Since no one could be sure how serious the problem really was, the 

was scrubbed at 10:45. Deciding that the drop in pressure was 

caused by either an excessive flow of oxygen in the checkout equip

leakage in the flight system, Wernher von Braun's Saturn team 

mended advancing the ground pressure regulator to maintain a hig
Apollo-Saturn 201 mission, 26 February 1966: launch, recovery (swimmers have 

attached a flotation collar, a device used in the Gemini and Mercury programs), 

and two views of the heatshield. 

sure in the spheres. Kurt Debus' Cape crew agreed, and the launch was 

back on the track by 10:57.6 

At 11:12 a.m. 26 February, AS-20l's first stage ignited and drove the 

combined vehicles up to 57 kilometers where, after separation, the S-IVB 

took over, propelling the payload up to 425 kilometers. The second stage 

then dropped off, and the spacecraft coasted in an arc, reaching a peak 

altitude of 488 kilometers. At the zenith, the service module engine fired for 

184 seconds, hurtling the command module into a steep descent. After a 

10-second cutoff, the rocket engine fired again, for 10 seconds, to prove it 

could restart. The two modules then separated. The command module, 

traveling at 8300 meters per second, turned blunt end forward to meet 

the friction caused by the growing density of the atmosphere. 7 

Both booster and spacecraft performed adequately. From liftoff in 

192 
manager) ordered an analysis of what had gone wrong. The eng

operated well enough to finish the mission, but Field and David h

sure that the Block II engine (undergoing ground testing) would 

into a similar situation during a lunar mission. They learned that a 

an oxidizer line had permitted helium to mix with the oxidizer, cau

drop in temperature and pressure. 

For all of Houston's insistence on redundancy, this was on

system that had no backup. And it was a vital system. Because of th

orbit rendezvous decision, it had a variety of jobs: midcourse correc

the way to the moon, lunar-orbit insertion, and transearth injection 

the spacecraft on the homeward path) on the return voyage. Weight 

forbade a second propulsion system; the service module engine 

carry its own built-in reliability. 9 

To allow time for studying and solving propulsion system p

and to prevent program delays, NASA managers shuffled the 

sequence. Since AS-203 was not scheduled to carry a payload, it w

flown before AS-202. Billed as a launch vehicle development flight, t

Saturn IB was to place its S-IVB stage in orbit for study of liquid-h

behavior in a weightless environment.* On 5 July 1966, AS-

launched from Kennedy to insert the 26 500-kilogram second stage in

Ground observers monitored the S-IVB by television during its f

circuits, watching the 8600 kilograms of liquid hydrogen remainin

• Langley Research Center made another study of liquid·hydrogen behavior u

gravity during 1966. On 7 June, Wallops Island crews launched a two·sta.ge Wasp 

Analysis Sounding Probe) , carrying a 680·kilogram scale model of an S·II fuel tank

minutes of weightless flight, television camera·s mounted on a tran!>parent tank transm

back to Wallops ·that added to the confidence of Houston engineers in launching 

following month. 
Saturn IB flights, for the most part, ran smoothly in 1966. Unfortunately, this was not true for all of Apollo. Early in the year, NASA Apollo 

Program Director Samuel Phillips and a cadre of analysts completed a survey 

of vehicles and management at North American, after several months of 

probing into activities at Downey, Seal Beach, and El Segundo. Phillips' 

group noted that organizational and personnel weaknesses were hampering 

the contractor's attempts to meet command and service module schedules, 

but the biggest problem was the S-II second stage of the launch vehicle, 

which threatened to block the chances of flying an all-up vehicle on the 

first Saturn V launch. 

Despite two successful ground tests, on 29 December 1965 and 12 

January 1966, the S-II was behind schedule and in trouble. North American 

realized this and hired a new manager, Robert E. Greer, a retired Air Force 

general, to get S-II development back on the track. By spring, Greer and 

his troops had gone to the Mississippi Test Facility, near the Pearl River 

north of New Orleans, to begin an intensive ground test program. For 15 

seconds on 23 April, the five J-2 liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen engines 

roared into action, producing the designed thrust of 4.5 million newtons 

(one million pounds).12 

Three more firings were attempted-on 10, 11, and 16 May-but the 

engines were cut off too soon by faulty instrumentation. In two more tests, 

on the 17th and 20th, the engines fired for 150 and 350 seconds. The next 

scheduled 350-second test, on 25 May, met problems when fire broke out 

in two places on the S-II. Three days later, while the stage was being removed from the stand, a liquid-hydrogen tank exploded, injuring five persons and damaging the test standY 

Although it was a gloomy day in Mississippi, 25 May 1966 was still a 

milestone for Saturn V. Two states away, in Florida, NASA ceremoniously 

194 
]-2 engines at the Ro

California. Five of 

pelled by liquid oxy

drogen, were used in 

second stage, and on

S-IVB third stage (the 

second stage of the Sa

Saturn S-IVB stage 

rolled out its 2700-metric-ton, diesel-powered, steel-link-tread craw

porter loaded with the 111-meter-tall, 196 000-kilogram * Apo

vehicle. Just before this impressive mass began moving at a snail's 

from the Vehicle Assembly Building, NASA Deputy Administrat

Seamans said: "I for one questioned whether a vehicle the size o

Saturn could get out to the pad ... or not." It could. 14 

However well the rollout augured for Apollo's eventual succ

then the S-II stage was in trouble. NASA Manned Space Flight 

George Mueller began sending weekly assessments of S-II pr

J. Leland Atwood, warning the president of North American tha

stood a good chance of replacing the lunar module as the pacin

Apollo. But Atwood already knew it. That was why he had hire

to bring the S-II more attention at a higher level of management.1 5 

Mueller also told Atwood that Phillips, on his return from 

Coast, had pointed out problems with the spacecraft. Both._ ear

(Block I) and lunar-orbital (Block II) versions of the comman

• Dry weight- fully loaded with fuel and oxidizer, it weighed 2 766 000 kilograms. 
As you might well guess he beat the living h-- out of us, spurring 

us on to more effective utilization of our previously mammoth efforts. 

Despite the bruises, we feel that we are a far more effective organization 

now as a result of his leadershipY 

And Lanzkron traveled elsewhere. On one occasion he went to Phoenix, 

where the Sperry Company was having a hard time with the guidance and 

navigation gyroscopes. For several years, Sperry had been using a commercial 

detergent, one that many housewives use for washing dishes, to remove 

grease from the gyro's bearings. Suddenly something went wrong-the grease 

was not coming off. Baffled at first, Lanzkron and Sperry's own troubleshooters finally discovered that Procter and Gamble had changed its product 

to include an additive that was supposed to make it better for dishwashing. 

The first Saturn V rollout, from the VAB, 25 May 1966. 
tractors. R. Wayne Young, MSC

s lunar module project officer, 

that by the end of June Grumman would spend $24 million mor

allotted funds. Moreover, since late 1965 Grumman's scheduling 

had been shaky, with delays indicated virtually across the board. 19 

In light of these severe overruns, Houston sent representative

page to discuss cost-reduction measures. This conference produce

items to either be reduced or chopped from the major subcontracto

ings were then held with project manager at each of the sub

plants to ram through cutbacks in requirements and manpower

views, lasting a month and a half, culminated in tightened test p

and performance requirements. To make sure that cost-reduction 

were enforced, Grumman switched from quarterly to monthly 

with its subcontractors, inviting the appropriate Houston subsys

ager to attend. 20 

Despite these actions, lunar module costs had not leveled o

spring. In-house cost control and forecasting had also begun to d

aggravating the problems already encountered. Against this back

ruth met with Grumman's new president, Llewellyn J. Evans, 

cost control and management of subcontractors. At Evans' reques

sent a management analysis group to diagnose and recommend 

remedy the company's weaknesses. The NASA Management Revi

headed by Wesley L. Hjornevik of Houston, was composed of 

from both Houston and Washington. 21 

Hjornevik's team assembled at Bethpage in June. After a t

view, the team reported its findings to company corporate officers a

officials. Looking upon the Hjornevik team as a "personal ma

analysis staff," Evans promptly carried out most of its recommend

program management, costs, subcontractor control, and groun

equipment. To make sure all orders were followed and all decis

relayed speedily to operating organizations, Grumman installed H
enforced, Shea warned Titterton on 18 November, the work packages could 

turn into so many worthless scraps of paper rather than effective management tools. 23 

Hjornevik's team also discovered that no one person had been assigned 

responsibility for overall subcontract supervision. As a result, this whole 

area suffered from splintered authority. Grumman appointed Brian Evans 

to the newly created position of Subcontract Manager, reporting directly 

to Program Director Joseph G. Gavin, Jr. Evans then assembled a staff of 

project managers and assigned each to a major subcontract, with jurisdiction 

over costs, schedules, and technical performance. The strengthened structure was a welcome tonic; hardware deliveries improved and subsystem 

qualification moved ahead. Titterton also instituted quarterly meetings with 

presidents of the major subcontractor firms, similar to those held by Mueller 

for NASA's prime Apollo contractors. 24 

The weaknesses in ground checkout equipment, which had been a 

millstone around the contractor's neck since the early days of the program, 

had developed because Grumman leaders simply had not recognized 

the immensity of the task. In February 1966 Phillips had pointed out to 

Shea that this equipment had paced the start of propulsion system testing at 

White Sands, had hampered in-house activity at Bethpage, and threatened to 

delay operational readiness of checkout and launch facilities at Kennedy 

Space Center.* Shea replied that Grumman had put checkout equipment 

• After attending a lunar module status review at Bethpage on 18 May, Harold G. Russell, 

Special Assistant to Phillips for Operational Readiness, expressed his mounting concern about 

Grumman's chances for meeting the operational readiness dates for facilities at the Cape. The 

company was reporting delays of two and a half months in suppor-t of LM-1, but, Russell told 

Phillips, "from an analysis of the GAEC internal reporting system (if they really have such a 

system), the slippages may be worse than they are reporting. I seriously question the GAEC 

management visibility into their critical problem areas." 

198 
lyn Evans named John Coursen to oversee ground

supportequipm

ufacturing and set aside a separate building for the fabrication 

whose numbers had grown considerably. Procurement was also stren

with Robert Brader heading a staff of a dozen purchasing peop

finally, a "GSE command post" was established to track day-by-day p

Actions at Bethpage were complemented by moves in Houston

July, Wayne Young appointed a team to meet with Grumman eve

to assess status and tackle problems. At the end of the summer, 

last Gemini flight mission scheduled before the end of the year

Mathews and William Lee shipped some surplus Gemini checkout 

Bethpage. 2 8 Collectively, these measures brought a dramatic turna

Grumman's checkout equipment progress. As Gavin later observ

tide was turned in midsummer. We were effectively on sch

mid-October." 29 

Successfully overhauling management practices and fighting ri

were commendable accomplishments, but the lunar module faced 

in other areas that were equally dangerous to Apollo. Downey 

command module had been the big technical worry during 1965, 

at a meeting in San Augustine, Texas. The lander, which had b

program a year late, must not be allowed to stumble into the sam

Echoing Shea's sentiments, William Lee commented that Apollo 

in deep trouble if the lunar module followed the pattern of Gemin

command module. 30 

A significant hurdle vaulted about mid-1966 was the final so

the long-overdue radar-optical-tracker question, the last of the lan

systems to be settled. Engineers in the Manned Spacecraft Center

office and in Robert E. Duncan's Guidance and Control Division 

moted an "olympics"-a contest that pitted the radar against the tra

performance trials took place in the spring uf 1966. After tests and 
independent, onboard source of range/range rate information ... with 

accuracy on the order of that provided by the existing LEM rendezvous 

radar." So Grumman, which had slowed down radar development, shifted 

RCA back into high gear. 31 

The lunar module engines, too, were still having technical troubles, 

troubles that seemed to defy solution, although none of them were grave 

enough to threaten eventual success. For the descent engine, these included 

rough burning; excessive eroding of the combustion chamber throat; burning of the throttle mechanism pintle tip, where fuel and oxidizer met and 

combustion began; and difficulty in getting presumably identical engines to 

operate alike. 

Design engineers at the Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW) Systems 

Group* made several changes in the pintle tip, the most significant being a 

switch to columbium to improve thermal characteristics. Other revisions included removing a turbulence ring around the interior of the chamber and 

realigning the flow pattern of the fuel that cooled the sides of the chamber 

wall. Although qualification testing was delayed six months, the problems 

seemed to be solved. 32 

Ascent engine technical problems were more fundamental. Bell was 

plagued by fabrication and welding difficulties and by severe gouging in the 

ablative lining of the thrust chamber. The injector, which had been fitted 

with baffles to combat combustion instability encountered during the shapedcharge bomb testing, was also a culprit. After an engineering review and 

resulting design revisions, including strengthening of the weld areas, Houston suggested that Bell begin work on a backup model. That would be expensive, but something had to be done. Subsequently, an improved injector 

• In 1966, TRW's Space Technology Laboratories (the familiar "STL") was renamed TRW 

Systems Group. 

200 
of LM-l. By late November, however, the earlier remedial actio

to be having some good effect and this continual slippage appeare

slowed. At a briefing for Olin Teague's congressional Subcom

NASA Oversight in Houston on 6 October, Shea had said that he 

the first lunar module to be shipped early in 1967. 34 

By the end of the year, LM-1 and LM-2 were in the test stand

page, and LM-3 through LM-7 were in various stages of fabric

equipment installation. But the coming of the new year did not 

progress Shea had looked for the previous October. Toward the e

uary, it was revealed that LM-1 would not reach the Cape in Fe

expected. 35 In short, the moon landing might be delayed because 

was not ready. But the mission planners could not wait for the A

gineers to iron out all the problems. They had to plan for a landin

and hope that the hardware would catch up with them. 

PLANS AND PROGRESS IN SPACE FLIGHT 

In mid-1966, Phillips asked Shea to set up a three-day sym

review the status of Apollo. At this 25-27 June conference, P

quested that the 75 NASA and contractor experts consider care

subjects as command and service module maneuvers, lunar modu

and ascent, lunar landing sites, and the length of the visit to 

surface. 

Shea opened the discussions by listing 23 steps, or rules, in d

operational philosophy (see accompanying list) that had evolved 

lunar-orbit rendezvous decision in 1962. Owen Maynard, deliber

plifying the many complexities of a lunar mission, described nine 

of which he said: 
, gy, () p, () pg , () , 

(4) lunar orbit before lunar module descent, (5) lunar module descent, 

(6) lunar surface stay, (7) lunar module ascent, (8) lunar orbit after rendezvous, and (9) trans-earth coast. Breaking the journey into these segments, 

with identified stopping places, made the Apollo mission seem less complex 

and fearsome to the planners. 

Near the close of the session, Shea commented that all stages of the 

Saturn V were at Kennedy, preparing for a flight test during 1967; that both 

the first Block II command and service modules and the lunar module 

should fly that same year; and that the time for the first lunar mission was 

rapidly closing in. Shea urged everyone at the meeting to review and 

comment on current plans and progress. 3 7 

It was also time to get an active experiments program under way. Mueller reminded Gilruth that, because of the limitations of 1966-1967 funding, 

NASA should generate as many of the experiments as possible, instead of 

relying on contractors. On 14 February 1966, however, Robert 0. Piland's 

Experiments Program Office (established at MSC in the summer of 1965) 

was asked by Homer Newell, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space 

Science and Applications, to contract for the development of an Apollo 

lunar surface experiments package (ALSEP). The following month, the 

Bendix Systems Division of Ann Arbor, Michigan, received a $17-million 

contract to produce four ALSEP units. Bendix was a good choice, having 

worked with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on experiments for the unmanned lunar exploration program. 38 

Getting started on what to take to the moon was fine; getting the facility 

ready to handle what was brought back from the moon was also important. 

Houston had to develop a new kind of facility, the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. Its two major jobs would be to protect against back contamination 

from the moon and to keep the lunar samples as isolated from earthly pollution as possible. Meeting these quarantine and control requirements re202 
9. 	 The service propulsion system will use the lunar module descent en

as a backup. 

10. 	 The spacecraft will travel on a free-return trajectory. 

11. 	 Landmark sightings by the onboard systems will reduce uncertain

about altitude and tie the MSFN to the moon. 

12. 	 Landings will be made in three types of areas-one general and 

specific. 

13. 	 The crew will be integral to the whole mission, particularly in site se

tion and landing maneuvers. 

14. The first mission will have an 18-hour staytime and two joint excurs

by the crew. 

15. 	 The LM will use a concentric flight plan for rendezvous with the C

after liftoff from the moon. 

16. If necessary, the CSM will be capable of rescuing the LM by descen

to a lower orbit for rendezvous and docking. 

17. 	 The prime recovery zone will be in the Pacific Ocean. 

18. 	 There will be a continuous abort capability throughout the m1ss1on. 

19. 	 There will be at least five places during the mission where the sp

craft can "mark time" to change mission planning in case of trouble

20. Redundant and backup systems will be available for most major syste

significant exceptions are environmental control, electrical power, 

service propulsion systems. 

21. 	 Continuous communications between spacecraft and ground will 

possible, except when the craft is behind the moon or in a thermal 

condition. 

22. 	 Design will incorporate reasonable precautions against contamina

of either the earth or the moon. 

23. 	 Major concerns still remaining are unforeseen environmental effe

calibration of guidance and navigation system, means of realistic sim

tion of lunar landing under the earth's gravity, and possibility of o

loading crew workload. 

From Manned Spacecraft Center, "Apollo Lunar Landing Mission Symposium: 

ceedings and Compilation of Papers," 25-27 June 1966 
Thus, by February 1966, George Low of NASA and James L. Goddard 

of the Public Health Service had presented Congress with a case for the 

construction of a lunar sample and quarantine facility with six functions: 

I. Microbiology tests of lunar samples to demonstrate to a reasonable 

degree of certainty the absence of harmful living organisms returned from 

the lunar surface; 

2. Biologically isolated transport of the astronauts and persons required 

to have immediate contact with them between the recovery area and the 

quarantine facility; 

3. Biological isolation of the astronauts, spacecraft, and other apparatus 

having a biologic contamination potential, as well as personnel required 

by mission operations to have immediate contact with these people and this 

equipment during the quarantine period; 

4. Biological isolation during all operations on the samples that must be 

carried out during the quarantine period; 

5. Biologically isolated processing of onboard camera film and data tape 

that had been exposed to a potentially contaminating environment; 

6. Performance of time dependent scientific tests where valuable scientific 

data would be lost if the tests were delayed for the duration of the quarantine period. 40 

Shortly after congressional approval of the laboratory, Headquarters 

reluctantly agreed that Houston should manage the design and development of the laboratory without the aid of the Corps of Engineers. Mueller 

wrote Gilruth on 13 May 1966 that the facility must be ready by November 

204 
the nose of their spacecraft into the docking cone, recording the first 

of two vehicles in orbit. Twenty-seven minutes later, Scott's inst

told him that the spacecraft was not in the planned attitude. The 

vehicles then began to gyrate. Armstrong steadied the two craft w

thrusters, and Scott hit the undocking button. Almost immediate

spacecraft started spinning at the rate of one revolution per secon

strong had to use the reentry control system* to straighten out his 

With the help of the flight controllers in Houston and along the 

Space Flight Network, the crew made a safe emergency landing in the 

Ocean-rather than in the Atlantic, as planned. 42 

Even before Gemini had chalked up the world's first docking, 

cessful rendezvous of Gemini VI-A with VII the previous Decem

affected the thinking of Apollo mission designers. The inability of 

turn IB to toss the command and service modules and the lunar mod

orbit together had forced planners to consider "LM-alone" flights. G

successful dual missions suggested that it might be possible to launch 

aboard a command module to hunt down a lunar module launch

different Saturn IB. Two of the crewmen would then transfer to the 

and carry out an earth-orbital operation previously planned for a S

flight. 

Although the dual flight for Gemini had been greeted with enth

the proposal for an Apollo tete-~t-tete met with resistance. John D. 

Kraft's chief lieutenant in the mission control trenches, said there w

problems in simultaneously tracking four booster stages and in o

two mission control rooms. Planning continued, anyway, and Howa

• A separate set of thrusters, used to orient the spacecraft for and to control it 

entry. Mission rules required the landing of the craft as soon as possible after they 
p

Flamstead, it was moving at a mere 5.6 kilometers per hour. The three footpads touched safely down within 19 milliseconds of each other. 

During the next two weeks, more than 10 000 detailed pictures were 

transmitted to the Goldstone antenna and processed at the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory. They showed rubble scattered over the surface in the Ocean of 

Storms region. The Surveyor craft scanned the horizon and sky better than 

had been anticipated; its pictures of the stars Sirius and Canopus gave 

triangulations for its exact location; and its solar cells, radars, computers, 

and test gear all worked well. The craft did not encounter either hard or 

porous rock; nor did it find a moon covered by a thick layer of dust. It 

landed, instead, on a surface composed of finely granulated material with 

particles that adhered to each other and not to the spacecraft. After all the 

doubts and waiting, Surveyor I demonstrated that a lunar module could land 

safely on the moon and that its pilots could get out and walk on the surface.44 

THE AsTRONAUTS AND THE GEMINI ExPERIENCE 

Because of the heavy workload in Gemini and the upcoming missions 

in Apollo, Robert Gilruth had convinced George Mueller the previous year 

that he needed more astronauts. On 4 April 1966, NASA announced that 

19 new flight candidates had been selected, bringing the roster up to 50.* 

Donald Slayton presided over the corps, selecting and training the crews that 

were flying Gemini missions almost bimonthly. 

• The 19 candidates were Vance D. Brand, John S. Bull, Gerald P. Carr, Charles M. Duke, 

Jr., Joe H . Engle, Ronald E. Evans, Edward G. Givens, Jr., Fred W. R a ise, Jr., James B. Invin, 

Don L. Lind, John R. Lousma, Thomas K. Mattingly II, Bruce McCandless II, Edgar D. 

Mitchell, William R. Pogue, Stuart A. Roosa, John L. Swigert, Jr., Paul J. Weitz, and Alfred M. 

206 
Apollo mission planners examined these flight results closely, look

better operations and training procedures, especially for extrave

activity.45 

Six weeks after the Stafford-Cernan flight, on 18 July, John You

Michael Collins pushed off aboard Gemini X to rendezvous with a 

Agenas, one launched for their own mission and the other left in o

Gemini VIII. They had trouble making the initial rendezvous and u

much fuel; but, once hooked up to their Agena, they found both hi

tude flight, to 763 kilometers, and a meeting with the second Agena 

simple. Using a hand gun, Collins had such a successful period outs

spacecraft that some NASA officials believed most of the extrave

problems had been overcome. 46 

But on 12 September, with Charles Conrad at the helm of Gem

Richard Gordon found that moving about in space was as difficult as C

had said. Gordon became totally exhausted trying to hook a line betw

spacecraft and target vehicle so the two craft could separate, spin, an

duce a small amount of artificial gravity. He managed to finish the jo

at great physical cost. Nevertheless, Gemini XI expanded manned sp

ploration to a distance of nearly 1400 kilometers above the earth t

onstrate that Apollo spacecraft could travel safely through the trapped 

tion zones on their way to the moon. More importantly, perhaps, th

carried out a first-orbit rendezvous, to simulate the lunar module lift

the moon to meet the command module in lunar orbit, and made t

computer-controlled reentry. Conrad checked his onboard data with m

control, cut in his computer, and flew in on what amounted to an aut

Worden. Actually this fifth set brough.t the total selected to 55, but the number o

status had been reduced for a variety of reasons: John Glenn had resigned to pursue a 

and business career; Scott Carpenter had returned to duty in the Navy; and Charles 

Theodore Freeman, and Elliot See had been killed in aircraft accidents. 
Flight control and tracking network personnel learned to conduct complex 

missions with a variety of problems, and mission planners understood more 

about what it would take to land men on the moon. Rendezvous was demonstrated in so many ways that few engineers remembered they had ever 

thought it might be difficult. Perhaps the biggest gain for the astronauts 

was that 16 of the 50 had flown , operated controls, and performed experiments in the weightlessness of space. 

Apollo astronauts, however, would rely more on simulators than on 

Gemini experience. There were, or soon would be, three sets of these 

trainers-two at Cape Kennedy and one in Houston-modeled after the command module and the lunar module. The simulators, constantly being 

changed to match the cabin of each individual spacecraft, were engineered 

to provide their riders with all the sights, sounds, and movements they would 

encounter in actual flight. Slayton had told George Mueller that the crews 

would need 180 training hours in the command module simulator and the 

flight commander and lunar module pilot an additional 140 hours in the 

lunar module trainer-about 80 percent more training time than the pilots 

of the early Gemini flights had required. 49 

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST MANNED APOLLO MISSION 

For a time, the mission called AS-204 had two flight plans. AS-204A, 

manned by Gus Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee,* was "to verify 

spacecraft/crew operations and CSM subsystems performance for an earthorbit mission of up to 14 days' duration and to verify the launch vehicle 

• NASA announced 21 March 1966 that these three astronaut~ would fly the first manned 

Apollo mission. 

208 
Walter Cunningham, with Frank Borman, Stafford, and Collins as ba

announced on 29 September, was scheduled for a heavier workload 

periments.51 As technical troubles came to the fore, however, empha

experiments shifted. 

North American should have shipped spacecraft 012 from Dow

Kennedy in early August, but "eleventh hour problems associated w

Command Module Environmental Control Unit water glycol pump 

resulted in a NAA/ NASA decision to replace the ECU with the uni

SC 014." The Customer Acceptance Review revealed some environ

control items that still needed to be corrected, but NASA allowed 

American to ship 012 to Florida on 25 August anyway. Once it a

John G. Shinkle, Apollo Program Manager at Kennedy, complained 

the amount of engineering work that still had to be done. More th

of it, he said, should have been finished before the spacecraft l

factory.

52 

While flight-preparation crews were having problems, Grissom, 

and Chaffee were finding bottlenecks in training activities. The chie

lem was keeping the Apollo mission simulator current with changes 

made in spacecraft 012. At the Cape, Riley D. McCafferty said, ther

more than 100 modifications outstanding at one time. Grissom, McC

later recalled, would "tear my heart out" because the simulator w

keeping up with the spacecraft. Eventually, the first Apollo comm

hung a lemon on the trainer.53 

Getting the spacecraft to the Cape did not really improve cond

The environmental control unit needed to be replaced again, whic

up testing in the vacuum chamber. AiResearch shipped the new uni

its West Coast plant to Kennedy on 2 November. Within two weeks, 

installed and testing was begun. It was then returned to California f

ther work. By mid-December, the component was back in Florida and 
Command module 012 and service module 

012 (upper left) in workstands at the North 

American Aviation plant, Downey, in 1965. 

The chart shows the factory checkout workdays (1966). At left, CM-012-"Apollo One"­

arrives at Kennedy Space Center, 26 August 

1966. Below, astronauts Grissom (left), Chaffee, and White check the communications 

headgear in preparation for what was to have 

been the first manned Apollo flight-ApolloSaturn 204, scheduled for 21 February 1967. 
trouble, and Houston set up a parallel test to verify the results. They 

that the methanol (methyl alcohol) employed as a test pressura

caused stress corrosion (or cracking) of the titanium alloy used for 

pellant tanks. Replacing the methanol with a fluid that was compati

titanium would eliminate this problem. In the meantime, the tan

removed from service module 012 and found to be free of any da

corrosion. 55 

In September, Mueller reminded Gilruth of the upcoming Des

tification Review. Board membership would, he said, include hims

ruth, von Braun, and Debus. The group met on 7 October and agr

the space vehicle conformed to design requirements and was fligh

provided several deficiencies were corrected. Phillips sent the list to 

James at Marshall, Shinkle at Kennedy, and Shea at the Manned Sp

Center, urging speedy clearance. Shinkle had already registered h

plaints about spacecraft 012; now he added that Houston should i

better spacecraft being shipped to the Cape. He pointed out the maj

lems that had been found: a leak in the service propulsion system, p

with the reaction control system, troubles in the environmental cont

and even design deficiencies in the crew couches that required Nort

ican engineers to travel from Downey to the Cape to correct them. 56 

In early December, NASA reluctantly surrendered its plans for 

ing the first manned Apollo flight before the end of 1966. Mueller 

mans then reshuffled the flight schedule, delaying AS-204 until Febru

and scrubbing the scheduled second mission. Experimenters w

planned to place their wares aboard Schirra's spacecraft were brushe

Following AS-204, NASA planned to fly the lunar module alone an

manned Block II command and service module, No. 101, in August 

rendezvous with unmanned LM-2, the LM being lofted into orb

Saturn IB in a mission dubbed AS-205/208. 
man was making headway in resolving them. The pathway to the moon appeared to be clearing, as NASA stood on the threshold of Apollo manned 

space flight operations. 

212 
Tragedy and Recovery 

1967 

N estled beside an umbilical tower, surrounded by a service struct

encased in a clean room at Cape Kennedy's Launch Complex 3

craft 012 sat atop a Saturn IB on Friday morning, 27 January 1967

thing was ready for a launch simulation, a vital step in determining 

the spacecraft would be ready to fly the following month. During thi

out" test, all electrical, environmental, and ground checkout cable

be disconnected to verify that the spacecraft and launch vehicle cou

tion on internal power alone after the umbilical lines dropped ou

By 8:00 that morning, a thousand men, to support three sp

astronauts-Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee-wer

ing systems to make sure that everything was in order before pu

plugs. In the blockhouse, the clean room, the service structure, th

arm of the umbilical tower, and the Manned Spacecraft Operation

ing, this army of technicians was to go through all the steps nec

prove that this Block I command module was ready to sustain th

in earth-orbital flight. Twenty-five technicians were working on lev

the service structure next to the command module and five more

North American employees, were busy inside the clean room at th

the swing arm. Squads of men gathered at other places on the servi

ture. If interruptions and delays stretched out the test, as often h

round-the-clock shifts were ready to carry the exercise to a co

Throughout the morning, however, most of the preparations went s

with one group after another finishing checklists and reporting rea

213 
ticipating in a multitude of critiques, reading numerous discrepancy reports, 

and going through several suited trials in the spacecraft in altitude chambers 

at Downey and the Cape, Grissom's group had learned almost all the idiosyncracies of spacecraft 012. The astronauts knew, if not every nut and bolt, 

at least the functions of its 88 subsystems and the proper positions for hundreds of switches and controls inside the cockpit. They also knew that the 

environmental unit had been causing trouble. Indeed, Grissom's first reports 

on entering the cabin were of a peculiar odor-like sour milk.* 3 

As all traces of sea-level atmosphere were removed from the suit circuit 

and spacecraft cabin, pure oxygen at a pressure of 11.5 newtons per squar:e 

centimeter (16.7 pounds per square inch) was substituted. The crew checked 

lists, listened to the countdown, and complained about communications 

problemst that caused intermittent delays. The men could speak over four 

channels, either by radio or telephone line, but the tie-in with the test conductors and the monitors was complicated and troublesome. Somewhere 

there was an unattended live microphone that could not be tracked down 

and turned off. Other systems, Grissom's crew noted, seemed to be operating 

normally. At four in the afternoon, one shift of technicians departed and 

another came on duty. 

Near sunset, early on this winter evening, communications problems 

again caused a delay, this time for ten minutes, before the plugs could be 

pulled. Thus, the test that should have been finished had not really started, 

• More than a week earlier, in an altitude chamber test at the Cape, the crewmen had 

complained that their eyes had smarted when they plugged the suit circuit into the environ· 

mental control unit. 

t Earlier in January, Douglas Broome of the Apollo office in Houston had recommended 

using heavier wire in the communications systems. The size North American had installed in 

spacecraft 012, he said, was too flimsy and too subject to damage. 

214 
y

cian. Reece was waiting to pull the plugs on signal. .Just outside on 

arm, Steven B. Clemmons and Jerry W. Hawkins were listening 

to call them to come and help. All of these men and several othe

vicinity at 6:31 heard a cry over the radio circuit from inside the 

"There is a fire in here." 5 

Stunned, pad leader Babbitt looked up from his desk and s

Gleaves: "Get them out of there!" As Babbitt spun to reach a squ

to notify the blockhouse, a sheet of flame flashed from the spacecr

he was hurled toward the door by a concussion. In an instant of te

bitt, Gleaves, Reece, and Clemmons fled. In seconds they rushed 

Reece and Clemmons searched the area for gas masks and for f

guishers to fight little patches of flame. All four men, choking an

in dense smoke, ran in and out of the enclosure, attempting to re

spacecraft's hatches. 

Meanwhile, Propst's television picture showed a bright glow 

spacecraft, followed by flames flaring around the window. For ab

minutes, he recalled, the flames increased steadily. Before the room 

the spacecraft filled with smoke, Propst watched with horror as 

arms behind the window fumbled for the hatch. "Blow the hatch, w

they blow the hatch?" he cried. He did not know until later that 

could not be opened explosively.t Elsewhere, Slayton and Roosa w

• Both Slayton and Joseph Shea had thought of joining the crew in the ~pacec

ticipate in the test so they could get more feel for actual operations. This was not 

procedure, but the time for the scheduled launch was too near. Instead, Shea had 

to Houston, and Slayton had elected to sit with the CapCom and watch. 

t After the loss of Grissom's spacecraft in Mercury, when a faulty mechanism ble

prematurely, Space Task Group designers had gone from an explosive W a 

operated hatch. This practice continued in Gemini and Apollo. 

I 
The environmental control system's instrumentation harness (above) after the command 

module 012 fire that took the lives of Grissom, 

White, and Chaffee on 27 january 1967. CM012 was disassembled for the investigation; 

the crew compartment heatshield (foreground) and aft heatshield are displayed at 

right above. CM parts were studied and catalogued in the Pyrotechnics Installation Building at Kennedy Space Center (below). 

television monitor, aghast, as smoke and fire billowed up. Roosa tried and 

tried to break the communications barrier with the spacecraft, and Slayton 

shouted furiously for the two physicians in the blockhouse to hurry to the 

pad. 6 

216 
sonnel, guards were posted, and official photographers were summ

through the night, physicians labored to complete their grim task. 

autopsies were finished, the coroner reported that the deaths were a

resulting from asphyxiation caused by inhalation of toxic gases. T

did have second and third degree burns, but these were not sever

to have caused the deaths. 7 

Most persons who had been connected with the space progra

way remember that the tragedy caught them by surprise. In six 

operation, 19 Americans had flown in space (7 of them, including 

twice) without serious injury. Procedures and precautions had 

signed to foresee and prevent hazards; now it was demoralizing 

the limits of human foresight. Several other astronauts had died, 

in duties directly associated with space flight. Airplane crashes had 

the lives of Elliot See, Charles Bassett, and Theodore Freeman. Th

traumatic experiences, but the loss of three men during a groun

the first manned Apollo flight was a more grievous blow. 

Memorial services for the AS-204 crewmen were held in Ho

30 January, although their bodies had been flown north from Ke

burial. Grissom and Chaffee were buried in Arlington National 

and White at the Military Academy at West Point. Amid these la

similar tragedy took the lives of two men in an oxygen-filled ch

Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio. Airman 2/ c William F. Ba

Airman 3/ c Richard G. Harmon were drawing blood samples fro

when a fire suddenly swept through the enclosure. The spacecraft a

ber tragedies pinpointed the dangers inherent in advanced space-s

work. 8 

The accident that took the lives of Grissom, White, and Ch

heartrending, and some still insist totally unnecessary; but NASA h

feared that, in manned space flight, danger to pilots could incr
North American had its "PRIDE" program, standing for "Personal Responsibility in Daily Effort," and NASA had "MFA" for "Manned Flight Awareness." The NASA program also featured what was called the "Lunar Roll of 

Honor"; the first lunar landing party would carry a microfilm listing 300 000 

names, honoring the exceptional service of those who had aided significantly 

in the achievement. After the fire, the idea was dropped. Just as it became 

obvious how difficult it was to fix the blame for failure, it would later be 

come apparent that it would be equally hard to pinpoint responsibility for 

success. 10 

In Washington on the day of the accident, an Apollo Executives' Conference was in session, attended by NASA leaders James Webb, Robert Seamans, and George Mueller and by top Gemini and Apollo corporate officials, 

to mark the transition from two- to three-man space flight operations. That 

morning the conferees had been invited to the White House to witness the 

signing of a space treaty. President Johnson described this event as the "first 

firm step toward keeping outer space free forever from the implements of 

war." Later, as the tragic news from Pad 34 spread, the executives considered 

disbanding. Administrator Webb, however, decided to carry on; Mueller 

would stay in Washington and Seamans and Samuel Phillips would go to 

the Cape. The next day, Mueller reported the first few meager facts to the 

meeting and then gave a paper that Phillips had intended to present. Ironically, Phillips had listed troubles with quality assurance among the top ten 

problems faced in Apollo." 

THE INVESTIGATION 

After the fire, amid all the grief and the shock that it could have happened, a thorough fact-finding investigation was conducted. Webb and Sea­

.218 
media representatives swarmed in to cover the story, and their 

investigations and semifactual innuendos filled newsprint and 

throughout the following weeks. Many looked for quick answers an

explanations, but by 3 February it was obvious to NASA officials, 

that no single cause for the accident could be isolated immediately. 

and Thompson set up 21 panels to assist the review board. When he 

that full-time participation was expected, Long asked to be excused

replaced by Robert W. Van Dolah, an explosives expert from the B

Mines. In other personnel actions, Seamans asked Jeffs to serve a

sultant rather than as a board member and George T. Malley, chie

at Langley, to act as legal advisor. 13 

Anticipating public clamor for answers and reforms, if not p

ment of Apollo, NASA officials asked leading members of Congres

off on a full-scale investigation until the review board finished it

Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, agreed to call the Senate 

tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences into executive session only

early investigations. And Representative George P. Miller, Chairm

House Committee on Science and Astronautics, said Olin Teague's 

mittee on NASA Oversight would not begin hearings until the Th

Board had submitted its report. Many newsmen charged that the f

would never be known, since most of the board members were NA

ployees; others conjectured that Apollo might be grounded al

Meanwhile, the Apollo 204 Review Board went systematically a

business. 14 

Seamans returned to Florida on 2 February to prepare a pre

report for Webb. Although this was made public just a few days 

cusations still swirled that the NASA investigation could not be 

since it was a probe of the agency by itself. There were also sensat

charges such as those in Eric Bergaust's book, Mw·der on Pad 34, a 
media criticism about the objectivity of the ongoing investigationY 

Spacecraft 014, nearly identical to 012, was shipped from California to 

Florida. There the Thompson Board and its panels had the vehicle dismantled for comparison with the remains of 012, which was being taken 

apart and every piece studied and analyzed. Thompson took advantage of 

the background and experience of his board members, assigning some to 

monitor several of the panels. While technicians worked around the clock 

for the first few weeks, the board held daily recorded and transcribed sessions 

to consider the findings. Strang was an effective vice-chairman, drawing on 

his background as an inspector to organize proceedings and prepare comprehensive reports. Van Dolah, the mining explosives expert, had only one 

panel-origin and propagation of the fire-to monitor, emphasizing the importance of finding that answer. Thompson reserved a single panel, medical 

analysis, for himself. 

Faget had the heaviest load of panels: sequence of events, materials 

review, special tests, and integration analysis. Borman drew the teams on 

disassembly, ground emergency provisions, and inflight fire emergency provisions. Williams monitored the spacecraft and ground support equipment configuration, test procedures review, and service module disposition. George 

White, quality and reliability chief from Headquarters, was responsible for 

investigations into test environments, design reviews, and historical data. 

An associate of Thompson's from Langley, Geer handled the groups on the 

analysis of spacecraft fractures, the board's administrative procedures, and 

the safety of the investigation operations themselves. Strang was left with 

the panels taking statements from witnesses, handling the security operations 

of the inquiry, and writing up the final report. 

When Seamans made a second preliminary report to Webb, on 14 February, it was clear that the fire was indeed a fire, and not an explosion leading to a fire. Physical evidence indicated that the conflagration had passed 

220 
That combustible materials now used be replaced wherever possible 

non-flammable materials, that non-metallic materials that are used 

ranged to maintain fire breaks, that systems for oxygen or liquid 

bustibles be made fire resistant, and that full flammability tests b

ducted with a mockup of the new configuration. 

That a more rapidly and more easily operated hatch be designe

installed. 

That on-the-pad emergency procedures be revised to recognize the 

bility of cabin fire. 18 

The astronaut member of the Thompson Board assured NAS

officials that he would not have been afraid to enter the Grissom crew

craft that January day. Working with the board, however, Borm

everyone else had come to realize the substantial hazards that had be

ent but not recognized before the fire.' 9 

As its final report was being put together, the review board re

that there had been ignorance, sloth, and carelessness, but the key 

all the detailed information was "oversight." No one, it seemed, rea

extent of fire hazards in an overpressurized oxygen-filled spacecraft c

the ground, according to the summary report the board issued on 5 

Although the Board was not able to determine conclusively the s

initiator of the Apollo 204 fire, it has identified the conditions which 

the disaster. .. : 1. A sealed cabin, pressurized with an oxygen atmos

2. An extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin. 3

nerable wiring carrying spacecraft power. 4. Vulnerable plumbing ca
; () pp; () y g

ment and organization; and (F) a schedule of visible evidence. 

But even before the board issued its report, its conclusions were essentially already public. For instance, a month after the fire Mueller had admitted to Congress that, after six safe years of manned flight experience, it 

was now obvious that NASA's approach to fire prevention had been wrong. 

Minimizing the possibility of ignition had not been enough. Safeguards 

against the spreading of any fire must also be developed. Since it would be 

nearly impossible to design equipment that would protect the crews both on 

the ground and in space,* any nonmetallic, and perhaps flammable, materials would have to be carefully screened. In particular, the "four Fs"­

fabrics, fasteners, film, and foams-required further investigation. Wiring, 

plumbing, and packaging must be reevaluated, even if it meant reviving the 

old debate about a one- versus two-gas environmental control system. 21 

As they delved deeper into the reasons behind the tragedy, NASA officials were confronted by some "skeletons in their closet." Senator Walter F. 

Mondale raised the question of negligence on the part of management and 

the prime contractor by introducing the "Phillips report" of 1965-1966. The 

implication was that NASA had been thinking of replacing North American. But the charges were vague; and, for the next several weeks, no one 

seemed to know exactly what the Phillips report was. In fact, Webb at first 

denied that there was such a report. (See Chapter 8.) Mondale also alluded 

to a document by a North American employee, Thomas R. Baron, that was 

"In August 1966, three fire extinguishers, weighing only 5.7 to 6 kilograms, were evaluated 

for spacecraft 012 and subsequent flights. The extinguisher selected would be stowed on liftoff 

for the first manned flights. On later missions, it would be mounted in brackets. All three 

used Freon FE 1301, a most efficient extinguishing agent on .the ground. Under space conditions, 

however, the chemical worked more slowly, required a higher level of saturation of the flamma,ble materials, and, even worse, generated a gas that might, in sufficient quantities, pro-ve 

fatal to the crew. Other chemicals would of course be tested, but this would take time. 

222 
tions. In the rebuttal, North American denied anything but parti

to Baron's wide-ranging accusations, although some company off

testified before Congress that about half of the charges were well-

When the tragedy occurred, Baron was apparently in the process o

ing his 55-page paper into a 500-page report. 

When his indictments were finally aired before Teague's subc

during a meeting at the Cape on 21 April, Baron's credibility was 

by one of his alleged informants, a fellow North American employ

Mervin Holmburg. Holmburg denied knowing anything about 

of the accident, although Baron had told the committee that H

"knew exactly what caused the fire." Holmburg testified that Ba

all his information from anonymous phone calls, people calling 

people dropping him a word here and there. That is what he tells m

ically, Baron and all his family died in a car-train crash only a w

this exposure to congressional questioning. 22 

Beyond the Phillips and Baron reports, however, recollections 

and warnings during the past six years made each Apollo manag

if he had really done all in his power to prevent the tragedy. In M

for instance, Shea and the crew systems people in Houston had wre

the question of the one- or two-gas atmosphere and the likelihoo

most of the studies were, admittedly, based on the possibility 

space-and concluded that a pure oxygen system was safer, less co

and lighter in weight. The best way to guard against fire was to k

mable materials out of the cabin. Hilliard W. Paige of General Ele

as a matter of fact, warned Shea about the likelihood of spacecra

the ground as recently as September 1966; and, just three weeks 

accident, Medical Director Charles Berry had complained that i

tainly harder to eliminate hazardous materials from the Apollo 

than it had been in either Mercury or Gemini.23 
Shepard, and James McDivitt had expressed their confidence in NASA's 

future safety measures, Borman answered a congressman's doubts by saying: 

You are asking us do we have confidence in the spacecraft, NASA management, our own training, and . .. our leaders. I am almost embarrassed 

because our answers appear to be a party line. Everything I said last week 

has been repeated by the people I see here today. The response we have 

given is the same because it is the truth.... We are trying to tell you that 

we are confident in our management, and in our engineering and in ourselves. I think the question is really: Are you confident in us? 24 

When Borman made a plea on 17 April to stop the witch hunt and get 

on with Apollo, both NASA and North American had responded to the 

criticisms of the Thompson Board and of Congress. Top-level personnel 

changes were direct outgrowths of the charges of negligence and mismanagement: Everett E. Christensen at NASA Headquarters resigned as Apollo 

mission director; George Low replaced Shea as Apollo Spacecraft Program 

Manager in Houston; and William D. Bergen (formerly of the Martin Company) took over from Harrison Storms as president of North American's 

Space and Information Systems Division. Bergen brought with him two associates from Martin: Bastian Hello to run the Florida facility for North 

American and John P. Healy to manage the first manned Block II command 

module at Downey. Healey was expected to set precedents in guiding a 

nearly perfect spacecraft through the factory.25 

Most North American officials weathered congressional criticism and 

pointed out that they agreed, in part, with the formal findings and recommendations of the Thompson Board.* But North American objected to the 

• The widows of Grissom, White, and Chaffee sued North American for negligence in spacecra•ft manufucture. In 1972, out-of-court rettlements •to the •three totaled $650 000. 

224 
test operations. North American would assign a spacecraft mana

personalized team to each vehicle, appoint an assistant program 

whose only concern was safety, place additional controls on chan

during modification and checkout phases, and assign personal resp

to specific inspectors. The company would also revise its fabric

inspection criteria; expand its quality standards, issuing a handb

better visual aids; install more protected wiring and plumbing; 

upon additional major inspections. Myers then discussed fire-rel

ware changes: the new unified hatch, materials reevaluation, f

plumbing reassessment, electrical system improvements, revised o

operations, and flammability tests. 27 

In Houston, Faget's engineering and development activity ra

of tests on materials and components, and Robert Gilruth sent Bo

a Houston "tiger team" to Downey in mid-April.* The astronaut w

on-the-spot decisions on contractual changes for the unified hat

wiring and plumbing techniques, and other improvements that 

planned even before the accident. Borman's tiger team watched clo

ing its assistance when necessary, as North American engineers 

the spacecraft piece by piece. 28 

What had happened to the command module, obviously, cou

well happen to the lunar module. Immediately after the fire, T

Kelly and a host of Grumman workers began a comprehensive 

materials in the lunar lander. Low sent Robert L. Johnston, a 

expert, to help Kelly's group. Grumman replaced nylon cloth in 

craft, relying mostly on Beta fiber (an inorganic substance develop

• Members of the tiger team were Douglas Broome, Aaron Cohen, Jerry W. Cr

E. Lindeman, and Scott H. Simpkinson. 
--

can, an electrical installer for CM-101-now scheduled for the first manned 

Apollo flight-carefully replaces tools in an accountability kit. (A wrench had 

been found embedded in the electrical wiring of CM-012, when it was taken 

apart after the fire.) 

~ I • 

,. --~~-=-- ¥'1." ~ " 

Corning Glass Works, that would not catch fire nor produce toxic fumes). 

Perhaps the most important application of this material was as "booties" 

around circuit breakers, to lessen the possibilities of electrical shorts. In 

other areas, Grumman worked on its forward hatch, to ensure a crew exit 

within lO seconds; the environmental control system; and a cabin and ex226 
... and ... North American Aviation [were] doing wrong .. . . But I 

to say this to you, Mr. Webb. Over the past few years . .. I probably 

been one of the most critical members on this committee of NASA

It appeared to me .. . that you have had it too easy for your own 

from this committee. This is not a criticism being directed at you 

Space Agency, but a criticism being directed inwardly at the Co

and this committee. I feel right now that you got less criticism tha

deserved [in the past, but nowJ you are getting more criticism tha

deserve. I don't intend to add to it for that reason. 

Wydler did not really stop there, of course, but the investiga

begin to fade away. NASA and North American began implemen

technical recommendations. To some degree, the accident actually 

time for some pieces of Apollo-the lunar module, the Saturn V, t

ance and navigation system, the computers, and the mission simul

catch up with and become adapted to the total configuration. 3 0 

Meanwhile, on 23 April 1967 the Soviet Union announced the 

ing of Vladimir M. Komarov aboard a new spacecraft. Soyuz I app

be functioning normally at first. On its second day of flight, howe

craft began to tumble, and Komarov had to use more attitude fuel 

wanted to get the ship under control. He tried to land during his 

cuit but could not get the proper orientation for retrofire. Koma

ceeded in reentering on the 18th revolution, but his parachute shro

entangled. The cosmonaut was killed on impact. So both Soyuz I an

I put their programs through traumatic reassessments. No one fo

consolation in a "rebalanced" space race. In fact, Webb took the occ

emphasize the need for international cooperation by asking: "Co

lives already lost have been saved if we had known each other's h

pirations and plans? Or could they have been saved if full coopera

been the order of the day?" 3 1 
could also be opened independently of internal overpressure and would be 

protected against accidental opening by a mechanism and seal similar to 

those used on Gemini. 

The management of all industrial safety offices within NASA was revamped, with responsibilities flowing directly to the top at each location. At 

the launch center, fire and safety precautions were upgraded and personnel 

emergency preparations were emphasized as never before. Also, at the launch 

complex itself, a sliding wire was added to the service structure to permit a 

rapid descent to the ground. Reliability and test procedures were more 

firmly controlled, making it difficult to inject any last minute or unnecessary changes. 

At the Manned Spacecraft Center, full-scale flammability testing continued, first to try to duplicate the conditions present on 27 January and 

then to find ways to improve the cabin atmosphere and the environmental 

control system. The tests led to replacing all aluminum oxygen lines that 

had solder joints with stainless steel tubing that used brazed joints. Aluminum tubing solder joints that could not be eliminated from the coolant 

system were armored with sleeves and seals wherever exposed. NASA decided 

to keep the water-glycol coolant fluid (covering it with flame resistant outer 

insulation) and added emergency oxygen masks for protection from smoke 

and fumes. 33 

At NASA Headquarters, Webb directed Mueller to revamp and reorganize the major supporting and integrating contractors to put more pressure on North American, as well as on those manufacturing the other Apollo 

vehicles. Boeing was given a technical integration and evaluation contract, 

to act as a watch dog for NASA; and General Electric was told to assume 

a much greater role in systems analysis and ground support. 34 

The contract situation with North American had reached a peculiar 

stage even before the fire. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract NASA had 

228 
that the learning phase of Apollo had cost $616 million. Furthermor

American agreed that there would be no charge for changes result

the AS-204 accident-such as the wire harnesses, environmental co

tem improvements, and the unified hatch. Changes that would enha

sion success or operational flexibility-changes in the reaction contro

revised inspection criteria, or features to increase mission longevit

cost money. 35 

After the uncertain days of February, NASA officials began to s

a recovery from the tragedy was under way. Drawing together, w

all NASA centers, representing a vast amount of technical stre

covered their morale through hard work more rapidly than mi

been expected. Much of Apollo's chance for recovery rested on the 

the Block II advanced version of the command module was well 

manufacturing and that most of its features were direct improveme

the faults of the earth-orbital Block I. Moreover, the Saturn V, afte

encing difficulties in the development of its stages, seemed on the tr

By early May, Webb and his top staff were looking for ways 

Congress that Apollo was on the road to recovery. Mueller proposed 

Saturn V as soon as possible. Phillips stressed the building and de

standard vehicles. Any modifications of support missions other than 

landing (such as Apollo Applications) should, he and Mueller ag

entirely separate from the mainstream of Apollo. Moreover, the sci

gram in Apollo should be carried strictly as supercargo. 36 

At the time of the accident, the flight schedule had listed a 

lunar landing before the end of 1968. After the impounding of 

evidence and the halting of oxygen chamber testing until the inve

was over, that Apollo schedule was obviously no longer valid. Seve

after the fire Seamans told Mueller to scrap all official flight sche

manned Apollo missions, using only an internal working schedule to 
the group. Low himself would make all final decisions, and his new board 

members had the authority to ensure that his decisions were carried out. 38 

If Apollo had seemed complicated before the fire, it appeared even 

more so afterward. If it gave an impression of being hurried in late 1966, it 

gathered still more momentum in late 1967. If an extreme level of attention 

had been given to aspects of crew safety and mission success before the 

deaths of Grissom and his crew, it rose yet higher after they were gone. But 

among the Apollo managers there were still nagging fears that something 

might slip past them, something might be impossible to solve. By mid-1967, 

however, they were so deep in their work that they could not avoid a growing confidence. 

Atwood said the biggest mistake had been locking the crew inside the 

spacecraft and pumping in oxygen at a higher than sea-level pressure. There 

was no way to eliminate fire hazards under such conditions. So NASA and 

North American substituted a nitrogen-and-oxygen atmosphere at ground 

level, replacing the nitrogen gradually with pure oxygen after launch. Bergen, who had taken over the leadership of North American's Downey division from Storms, moved into the factory while recovery work was going on. 

He made a practice of appearing on the plant floor, walking around asking 

questions, during each of the three shifts. Some of the workers wondered if 

he ever slept. During visits to Downey, Low was often to be seen watching 

plant activities on Saturdays. Many doubted, Bergen later said, that the recovery could be made in a reasonable time because "everything had come to 

• During fiscal 1970 budget hearings before the House space committee, Congressman J ames 

Fulton asked George Mueller on ll March 1969 to give a "statement in the record of the 

actual cost in dollars . . . and ac tual delay caused ... by the Apollo 204 fire . . .." Mueller's 

submitted reply said, "The estimated additional direct cost to Apollo ... resulting from the 

Apollo 204 accident is $410 million, principally in •the area of modifications to the spacecraft. 

The accident delayed the first manned flight test o f the Apollo spacecraft by approximately 18 

months." 

230 
tempted "on the first flight which leaves the earth's gravitational fie

There is much to be gained from the operations which could be cond

on the way to and in the vicinity of the moon. The many questio

thermal control away from the earth's environment, navigation and c

during translunar flight, communications and tracking at lunar dist

lighting conditions and other flight experiences affecting astronaut 

ties in the vicinity of the moon, lunar orbit and rendezvous technique

capability of the MSFN to provide back-up information and many 

operating problems will be revealed when we fly in this new environm

would be highly desirable to have had this experience when we are 

to commit to a lunar landing operation, thereby allowing a more r

able concentration on the then new problems associated with the d

to the lunar surface. 41 

Deputy Administrator Seamans and his aides made a swing aro

manned space flight circuit in June, visiting Kennedy, Huntsville

sippi Test, Michoud, and Houston. In the course of the tour, Seam

served a definite upsurge of confidence within the Apollo team, a

there were still worries. For example, at Kennedy, with planning pr

on a six-week checkout of the Apollo-Saturn in the Cape facilities an

during the seventh week, there was some feeling that the schedule 

launch of Apollo 4* was extremely tight. Huntsville was still worrie

• Grissom's crew had received approval for an "Apollo 1" patch in June 1966, 

time for the launch approached NASA Headquarters was leaning toward calling th

"AS-204." After the accident, the widows asked that Apollo I be reserved for the 

husbands would never make. Webb, Seamans, and Mueller agreed. For a time, missio

in Houston called the next scheduled launch "Apollo 2." In March 1967, Low wrote t

suggesting that, for his·toric purposes, the flights should be called "Apollo I" (AS-204

IA" (AS-201), "Apollo 2" (AS-202), and "Apollo 3" (AS-203). In April, Julian Schee
Birds, reptiles, and animals of higher and lower order that gathered at 

the Florida Wildlife Game Refuge (also known by the aliases of Merritt 

Island Launch Annex and Kennedy Space Center) at 7:00 in the morning 

of 9 November 1967 received a tremendous jolt. When the five engines in 

the first stage of the Saturn V ignited, there was a man-made earthquake and 

shockwave. As someone later remarked, the question was not whether the 

Saturn V had risen, but whether Florida had sunk. 

Apollo-Saturn mission 501, now officially Apollo 4-the first all-up test 

of the three-stage Saturn V-was on its way. On its top rested spacecraft 017, 

a Block I model with many Block II features, such as an improved heatshield and a new hatch. The aim of the mission, in addition to testing the 

structural integrity and compatibility of the spacecraft-launch vehicle combination, was to boost the command and service modules into an elliptical 

orbit and then power-dive the command module (in an area over Hawaii) 

into the atmosphere as though it were returning from the moon to the earth. 

Apollo 4 also carried a mockup of the lunar module. Weighing more than 

2.7 million kilograms when fully fueled with liquid oxygen and a kerosene 

mixture called RP-1, the Saturn V first stage generated 7.5 million pounds 

of thrust at liftoff.44 

The flight went almost exactly as planned, and the huge booster 

rammed its payload into a parking orbit 185 kilometers above the earth. 

Administrator for Public Affairs, notified the centers that the NASA Project Designation Committee had approved the Office of Manned Space Flight recommendation of "Apollo 4" for the 

first Apollo-Saturn V mission (AS-501), but there would be no retroactive renaming of AS-201, 

-202, or -203. Much correspondence followed, but the sequence of, and reasoning behind, mission 

designations has never been really clear to anyone. 

• In May, North American's Space and Information Systems Division in Downey had been 

renamed simply the "Spa:e" Division, to reflect its major mission. 

232 
Apollo 4: Command module 017 and Saturn 501 are assembled 

in the Vehicle Assembly Building, Kennedy Space Center, at left. 

The spacecraft stack at Launch Complex 39 (right) is poised for 

the first Saturn V mission and first use of LC 39. The umbilical 

tower on the launch pad to the left of the spacecraft feeds fuel 

and electricity to the launch vehicle-Spacecraft combination. 

The mobile service structure to the right may be moved to enclose the spacecraft with an office-workshop compartment and 

other work levels. 

After two revolutions, the S-IVB third stage propelled the spacec

ward to more than 17 000 kilometers, where it cut loose from the S-

started falling earthward. Then the service module fired, to send th

craft out to 18 000 kilometers for a four-and-a-half-hour soak in th

cold and hot radiation of space. Telemetry signals noted no degrad

cabin environment. With the spacecraft nose pointed toward the e

service module engine fired again. When the spacecraft reached the 

meter atmospheric reentry zone, it was blunt-end forward and trave

speed of 40 000 kilometers per hour. 

Seamen on the U.S.S. Bennington, the prime recovery ship in 

fic, watched the descending spacecraft, with its parachutes in ful

until it landed 16 kilometers away about nine hours after its laun

Florida. Swimmers jumped from helicopters to assist in the rec

spacecraft 017, which took about two hours. Technically, manageri

psychologically, Apollo 4 was an important and successful mission, e
ing seven types of missions that would lead step by step to the ultimate goal. 

He described these steps, "A" through "G," with G as the lunar landing 

mission. 

Phillips asked that the group consider carefully both the pros and cons 

of flying an additional Saturn V flight. Wernher von Braun and Low favored 

the flight-von Braun, because he felt the launch operations people would 

need the experience, and Low, because he believed that data from several 

flights would be needed to make certain that the big booster was indeed 

ready for its flight to the moon. Against these opinions, Phillips cited the 

tremendous workload an added flight would place on the preflight crews at 

Kennedy, and Mueller reminded the meeting of the already crowded launch 

schedule for 1968. An additional lunar module mission would be flown only 

if LM-1 were unsuccessful. 

Most discussion centered on the insertion of a lunar orbital flight into 

the schedule. Houston wanted "to evaluate the deep space environment and 

to develop procedures for the entire lunar landing mission short of LM 

descent, ascent and surface operations." Mueller remarked that he regarded 

the lunar orbit mission as just as hazardous as the landing mission. But the 

Texas group argued that they had no intention of flying the vehicle closer 

to the moon than 15 000 meters. They pointed out that the crew would not 

have to train for the actual landing, but it would give them a chance to 

develop the procedures for getting into lunar orbit and undocking and for 

the rendezvous that the lunar landing crew would need. Mueller said, 

"Apollo should not go to the moon to develop procedures." Low reminded 

him that crew operations would not be the main reason for the trip; there 

was still a lot to be learned about communications, navigation, and thermal 

control in the deep space environment. 46 Although a final decision on the 

lunar orbital mission was not made until later, Maynard's seven-step plan 

was generally adopted throughout NASA. 

234 
D " Lunar module evalua- Saturn V Low earth orbit Up 

tion f command and or 

service modules f crew dual IB 

performance combined 

operations 

E " Command and service Saturn V High earth orbit Up 

modulesflunar module 

combined operations 

F " Lunar missionfdeep Saturn V Lunar orbit Up 

space evaluation 

G Lunar landing 

• Mission number dependent on sua:ess in steps A and B. 

Plenty of wrinkles remained to be ironed out, but by the en

Apollo seemed to be rounding the corner toward its ultimate goa

the most tragic event that manned space flight had so far encounte

Race with the Decade 

1968: First Half 

N ASA officials faced 1968 with some satisfaction and a little tre

Apollo 4 the previous November had been a triumph, but th

team might have to do just as well six times in 1968 and five in 19

string of successes seemed to be a necessary prelude to a timely lu

ing.1 Against this backdrop of mounting schedule pressures, a spat

nical problems cropped up. The most worrisome were those conne

the lunar module. It had grown too fat again and still had probl

metal cracking and with the ascent engine during test firings. C

these faults played havoc with delivery schedules and posed a defin

to achieving Apollo's mission within the decade. 

The command module also had some unresolved worries, 

North American had made good progress in its redefinition and 

tion. Flammability testing and the question of cabin atmosphere o

and at launch carried over into the new year, as did the difficulti

ting systems to the spacecraft production line at Downey. 2 

WoRRIES AND WATCHDOGS 

Tardy deliveries by subcontractors were among the bigger 

blocks that North American faced in putting the command an

modules together. Eberhard Rees, an expert in manufacturing ma

from Marshall Space Flight Center, was lent to George Low, Apollo 

237 
not at all pleased with hardware or schedules. Cortright found that neither 

North American nor Grumman knew enough about the status of their subcontractors' work to be able to forecast deliveries with any degree of accuracy. The subcontractors, Cortright also said, should be more aware of the 

importance of their systems in the total program-they should not just deliver their products to the dock in Downey or Bethpage and walk away. He 

was upset about failures in electronic parts, especially when he found that 

the subcontractors were doing their best to solve their problems by themselves by trial and error. Low asked the Houston subsystem managers to 

look into these deficiencies and correct them. 5 

Just the barest hint of something wrong with electrical parts, anything 

that might be a fire hazard, captured the immediate attention of special 

guardian groups. Spacecraft wiring and materials, cabin atmospheres, and 

crew safety were the subjects of many meetings. Third-party groups, such as 

a Senior Flammability Board, a Materials Selection Review Board, and a 

Crew Safety Review Board, were set up to ensure extra safeguards. 

Late in 1967, Houston Director Robert Gilruth led a contingent of 

NASA officials to a meeting with William Bergen and his staff at North 

American* to discuss flammability problems of the coaxial cable in the command module. Under particular scrutiny was spacecraft 101, slated for the 

first manned Apollo mission. After visually inspecting the vehicle and watching motion picture films of tests, the group concluded that 23 meters of the 

coaxial cable might be flammable. There were several options on what to 

• On 22 September 1967, North American Aviation and the Rockwell-Standard Coq>oration 

had merged into a single company, North American Rockwell Corporation, which was then 

divided into two major elements.- the Commercial Products Group and the Aerospace and 

Systems Group. For consistency and brevity, this history will refer to the latter as "North 

American." 

238 
phere at the launch site, which also affected materials selection. Est

in September 1967, with Gilruth as chairman, the board directed 

series of tests under a variety of atmospheric mixtures and pressures 

operations. Thirty-eight tests had been completed by 7 January 1

the middle of the month, a second series began, using principally a 

cent-oxygen and 40-percent-nitrogen mix (normal atmosphere is 21 

oxygen and 78 percent nitrogen, with traces of other gases). Thi

ended on 25 January, and evaluations began. 

Max Faget, whose engineers in Houston ran many tests for G

board, said they used pure oxygen at a higher than normal pressure 

pad to check for air leaks from the cabin. After the Apollo 204 fire

one was aware that this was dangerous. They then ran pure oxygen 

one-third the pressure (which simulated orbital conditions). Wit

fans off and no other means of spreading the flames, they found t

would not propagate as rapidly in space. So Faget's group agreed tha

could make the spacecraft safe on the ground, it would be safe durin

But there was no way to put 100-percent-fireproof materials 

spacecraft, especially in the electrical system. Many persons began ca

ing for a two-gas atmosphere, with a higher concentration of nitrog

oxygen. Use of this mixture would have required completely rebuild

spacecraft to withstand the pressures of a sea-level atmosphere. Th

mand module could withstand only about half that pressure in spa

the lunar module even less. Moreover, a mixed atmosphere in spac

complicate the environmental system-Faget said the system "would 

fused and would put too much nitrogen in the cabin, a very insidiou

• Since they were not as far down the produNion line as 101, ~pacecraft 103 th

would have their coaxial cables removed and wrapped, which should not take longer 

days. Later spacecraft would be fitted with coaxial cables that met nonmetallic 

guidelines. 
factor: no structural changes were needed in the spacecraft to accommodate 

this combination of oxygen and nitrogen. 8 

Low promised Phillips a decision on the prelaunch atmosphere in time 

for spacecraft lOl's Design Certification Review. A third set of tests, using 

boilerplate 1224, confirmed conclusions drawn from the second series. Gilruth's Flammability Board met on 4 March and recommended the 60/40 

mixture for the launch pad. On 7 March, Mueller's Certification Board accepted this recommendation. In April, NASA's medical group, expressed 

"enthusiastic approval of the ... decision to adopt the 60/40 atmosphere:" 9 

For a while there was a good deal of discussion about the lunar module 

cabin atmosphere on the launch pad. Low recommended 100 percent oxygen 

for the LM, since there was no crew and little electrical power in the vehicle 

during launch. Moreover, the spacecraft-lunar module adapter, which held 

the lander, was filled with nitrogen, reducing flammability hazards to almost 

nothing. This procedure, Low pointed out, would save some of the lander's 

oxygen supply, as well as minimizing crew procedures in changing the mixture to pure oxygen after launch. Marshall, however, objected, because any 

oxygen escaping from the lander during the launch phase might come in 

contact with hydrogen leaking from the S-IVB into the adapter and start a 

fire. Houston conceded that the advantages of launching the lunar module 

with pure oxygen had to give way to Huntsville's concerns; the atmospliere 

in the lander's cabin at launch would not exceed 20 percent oxygen.10 

Another set of watchdogs, formed to consider manned operation of the 

machines, was the Apollo Crew Safety Review Board. Since Gilruth's team 

was investigating "spacecraft fire safety and air-on-the-pad," the new group, 

at its first meeting in March 1968, began looking for problems that might 

be missed by other specialized committees. Led by John Hodge in Houston, 

the board concentrated on operations-all activities from the time the crew 

boarded the spacecraft through the launch phase-searching for weak links 

240 
the way the Flight Operations Division in Houston viewed LM

coming trial in earth orbitY And the path to the launch pad for th

had been a long and arduous one. 

Apollo 5: THE LuNAR MoDULE's DEBUT 

A 1966 schedule called for LM-1 to be delivered to Cape Ken

16 November of that year, but the craft ran into difficulties in manuf

(see Chapter 8) and the months slipped by. Changes after the c

module fire (see Chapter 9) caused further delays, and LM-1 did no

in Florida until 27 June 1967 (three months beyond its original 

date). John J. Williams, a veteran of both Mercury and Gemini, h

400-man spacecraft operations activity at Kennedy Space Center. W

spacecraft arrived, Williams' men made sure that it met specificati

then watched the contractor during test, maintenance, and modifica

see that systems and equipment workedY 

The launch vehicle for the LM-1 mission was the one tha

have boosted the ill-fated Grissom crew into orbit. Saturn IB 204 h

at the Cape since August 1966. When it was taken down from Laun

plex 34 in March 1967, the launch preparation crew, under the dire

Rocco Petrone, inspected the booster for corrosion or any other da

might have sustained during its long stay on the pad and then e

on Launch Complex 37, getting it in place on 12 AprilY 

The Apollo stack for this mission was 55 meters high, but i

stubby, since the launch escape tower and the command and service 

were missing. LM-1-legless, because it would burn up on reentry 

no heatshield) and therefore needed no landing gear-rested in

spacecraft-lunar module adapter. 16 
yy, 

Webb that the launch would take place "no earlier than" 18 January 1968.18 

Rocco Petrone's launch team had difficulty loading the propellants, 

mainly because of procedural troubles, and small irritants such as clogged 

filters and ground support equipment problems further hampered the start 

of the mission. A simulated launch demonstration ended on 19 .January, 

and the 22-hour countdown to launch began on 21 .January. Back in Houston, lead flight director .John Hodge and his chief assistant, Eugene F. 

Kranz, listened from the mission control center to the activities at the Cape 

launch center and waited patiently to take over direction of the flight once 

Apollo 5 cleared the pad. 19 

.Just before dark, at 5:48 on the afternoon of 22 .January, after several 

hours' delay because of equipment problems, Apollo 5 lifted off. The 

powered phase of booster flight was uneventful, and LM-1, still attached to 

the S-IVBstage, went into orbit about 10 minutes into the flight. In less than 

45 minutes, its attitude control engines pulled LM-1 away from the S-IVB. 

After checking out the spacecraft for two revolutions, ground control signaled the descent engine to fire for 38 seconds. Four seconds later, LM-l's 

guidance system sensed that the vehicle was not going fast enough and 

stopped the engine. The cutoff was a planned feature-in a manned flight, 

it would give the crew time to analyze the situation and decide whether the 

engine should be restarted to continue the mission. Under normal conditions, the burn would have started with full tank pressurization and would 

have reached the proper velocity within four seconds. For this mission, however, the tank was only partially pressurized and it would have ta'ken six 

seconds to reach the required speed. Because of the premature cutoff, the 

flight controllers moved to a planned alternate mission. 

Ground control sent a switch-off signal to the guidance computer and 

cut in a mission programmer to command the lander's maneuvers. The descent engine was fired twice more (once for a full 33 seconds). There were 

242 
Ascent and descent st

Lunar Module 1, are m

spacecraft-lunar modu

the Manned Spacecraf

Building at KSC (left 

vember 1967. Because i

earth-orbital flight, L

landing gear. At right 

inside the adapter is h

top of Saturn launch v
the board agreed there was no reason for another unmanned lunar module 

flight. The first lunar module to carry men would be launched by a Saturn 

V later in 1968. 21 

The lander still had hurdles to clear, however, before anyone would be 

allowed to ride it in space. Ascent engine instability, for example, had been 

a matter of concern from August 1967 to June 1968. When Mueller and 

Phillips visited the builder of the engine in the summer of 1967, they 

agreed that Bell had a good chance of solving fuel-injector problems and 

getting a stable engine ready for the first manned lander. Nevertheless, 

NASA had hired Rocketdyne to develop an alternate injector, sending 

Cecil R. Gibson from the Houston center to work with Bill Wilson at 

Rocketdyne. This contract lasted for about a year, and Gibson and Wilson 

successfully stayed on schedule, held down costs, and got the job done.22 

One question that arose was whether a new and improved injector 

should be flown in a manned lander without a thorough revalidation test 

program. Joseph G. Thibodaux (Gibson's boss and chief of the Propulsion 

and Power Division in Houston, who had been asked to head a team to 

evaluate the injector) believed that it would be safe, so long as fuel did 

not enter the firing chamber before oxidizer. An Agena engine that had 

allowed the fuel to go first in the Gemini program had exploded during 

1965.

23 

Grumman and NASA officials met on 29 April to discuss the status of 

the injector. They were not happy with what they had discovered during 

visits to the subcontractor plants. Bell had been lax in configuration control, 

and Rocketdyne was having trouble getting engines to start and then to 

run smoothly. For some time, NASA Headquarters had considered asking 

Rocketdyne and Bell, even though they were competitors, to pool their 

knowledge to get the best possible injector. Rocketdyne might send its 

injector and some of its personnel to the Bell test cell for checkout. Al244 
discuss the alternatives they faced: (1) to use the Bell engine 

injector, (2) to ship Bell engines to Rocketdyne for fitting with Ro

injectors, or (3) to send Rocketdyne injectors to Bell for installati

Bell engine. Low finally decided to use a Bell engine and a Ro

injector, with the entire assembly being put together and furn

Rocketdyne. 26 

At 17 and 19 June program reviews at Rocketdyne and Bel

tively, Low learned that qualification tests were progressing with 

cellent results (the engine had gone through 53 good tests) that a

qualification by mid-August seemed possible. 27 Success now appe

tain, but the race with the decade was becoming very close. 

Although the ascent engine was the most serious lander proble

were others that created worries. For example, a window blew out 

during a test. On another occasion, a window fractured during a 

high-temperature test. Corning Glass Works immediately began im

the panes, producing what Mueller called the strongest windows 

in a spacecraft. And Grumman instigated a series of pressure tests t

the new windows. 28 All this took time. 

Still another area that raised a red flag of concern was the dis

stress corrosion cracks in the lander's aluminum structural memb

meant replacements and still more lost time, which angered George 

He reminded Gilruth that these aluminum tubes (made of an all

"7075 T6") had caused problems in the past. Mueller could not un

why the cracks had not been noticed earlier. He wanted a "stress 

team" to find out why detection had failed and to figure out how 

vent a recurrence. Gilruth replied that there was no need for 

team. Stress corrosion surveys had been conducted in 1964, but 

simply "was not handled properly on the last go-round." Low th

Joseph Kotanchik, a Houston structures expert, to investigate th
his resident Apollo spacecraft representative at the Grumman plant in New 

York to emphasize to Grumman's engineering team the need to assist manufacturing in the wiring of the spacecraft. Some improvement came from 

this move, but not much. During an inspection of LM-3, several broken 

wires were discovered, apparently caused by carelessness during rework after 

testing. Toward the end of April 1968, fixtures were installed to protect 

vulnerable wire bundles and technicians were ordered to be more careful 

when working in the confined spacecraft areas, easing the problem to a certain extent. But the lander's schedule was getting tighter and tighterY 

Apollo's lunar missions were not launched from Cape Kennedy. Launch Complex 39, where Saturn Vs were launched, 

was on Kennedy Space Center grounds. (Launch Complexes 

34 and 37 were on the Air Force Eastern Test Range, on 

the Cape itself.) Of the three launch areas planned for Complex 39 and shown in the 1965 drawing (the three right-hand 

areas below), the one at the extreme right, Area C, was not 

constructed; Areas (or Pads) A and B were built and used 

for all Saturn V launches. 
could be trusted to propel men into space. But NASA pushed on 

plans for a second unmanned booster flight, primarily to give the 

launch team another rehearsal before sending men into deep space 

Saturn V. 

Getting Apollo 6 to the launch pad was a lengthy process. Th

first stage of the Saturn V arrived at Kennedy Space Center* on 13 

1967. Four days later it was on a mobile launcher in the cavernous a

building, awaiting the S-11 second stage-which did not get to K

until May. On 6 February 1968, a Tuesday morning, a crawler carry

whole Apollo stack on its platform edged out of the building into 

driven rain and headed slowly down a track to the launch compl

kilometers away. En route, trouble with communications circuits f

two-hour wait. When communications were restored, the crawler resu

snail's pace. At 5:00 that afternoon, the rain stopped, and the Apol

arrived at the launch area an hour later. 33 

Although the spacecraft itself had no primary objectives to acco

a Block I version (CSM-020) with many Block II improvements 

the new hatch) was allocated to the mission. Kleinknecht, the co

and service modules manager in Houston, was pleased with the m

that North American sent to Kennedy, although he was upset w

learned that the protective Mylar film that covered the spacecraft 

• During Apollo 6 activities, a small intercenter irritation surfaced. Although almos

referred to the whole Florida launch layout ·as "the Cape," Albert Siepert, Deputy 

for Kennedy Space Center Management, wrote Wesley Hjornevik in Houston to poin

Launch Complex 39 was situated entirely within the geographical boundaries of 

known as the " Kennedy Space Center, NASA." Noting that the widespread use of "t

was a nostalgic hearkening back to Mercury and Cape Canaveral, Siepert nevertheless m

that "NASA report writers ought not to confuse geographic proximity to the Cape as 

thing as being on it." However tha•t may have been, the terminology "launched 

Cape . . . " continued to be used by the news media-and the present authors. 
gpj

Apollo 6 had been scheduled for the first quarter of 1968, but several 

brief postponements slipped it past that date. On 15 January, Mueller wrote 

Webb that the tank skirt of service module 008 had split during structural 

testing. The skirt on spacecraft 020 was strengthened to prevent a similar 

mishap. Then, after the stack had been trundled down the path to the 

launch area on a rainy day, water seepage was found in the Saturn's S-II 

stage, and some parts had to be replaced. And, finally, the countdown-tolaunch practice did not end until 29 March.

36 

At 7:00a.m. on 4 April 1968, Saturn V 502 rose thunderously from its 

Florida launch pad to boost Apollo 6 (AS-502) into orbit, but that was 

nearly the last normal thing the big rocket did. For the first two minutes, 

the five huge engines in the first stage roared, shook the ground, and belched 

fire evenly. Then there were thrust fluctuations that caused the vehicle to 

bounce like a giant pogo stick for about 30 seconds. Low-frequency modulations (known as the pogo effect) as high as ±0.6 g were recorded in the 

command module, which exceeded design criteria (0.25 g was the upper 

limit permitted for manned flight in Gemini) . Except for the bouncing and 

the loss of a piece of the panel in the adapter, the first stage did its job, 

however. 

Very shortly after the second stage ignited, two of its five J-2 engines 

stopped. The other three engines had to fire longer to compensate for this 

loss of power. The second stage did not reach the desired altitude and 

velocity before its fuel gave out and it dropped away. To reach the required speed, the S-IVB third stage also had to burn longer than planned, 

putting the spacecraft into an orbit of 178 by 367 kilometers, instead of a 

160-kilometer circular orbit. 

Mission Director Schneider and Flight Director Clifford E. Charlesworth left the vehicles in a parking orbit for two circuits of the earth while 

system checks were performed, operational tests were conducted, and several 

248 
Sonoran Desert, is to the right 

of the river's mouth. 

attitude maneuvers were carried out. Then flight control tried to re

S-IVB, to simulate translunar injection, but the third stage refused t

the call. The next step was to separate the command and service 

from the now useless S-IVB. 

While Apollo 6 had been whirling around the earth, the sp

special 70-millimeter camera had been clicking away, getting some 

ular color stereo photographs.* These were later found to be exce

cartographic, topographic, and geographic studies of continent

coastal regions, and shallow waters. 

Following the system checks and the photography, controller

to an alternate mission. The service module engine was fired 

seconds,t which exceeded lunar mission requirements, to produce t

lated translunar injection maneuver. Apollo 6 shot out to 22 200 kil

Although the spacecraft had enough altitude for a good simulatio

Apollo spacecraft returning to the earth from the moon, the service 

engine no longer had sufficient fuel to give it the correct speed for 

The command module reached a velocity of l 0 000 meters per secon

1270 less than planned, and splashed down in the Pacific, missing 

dicted impact point by 80 kilometers. The spacecraft was hauled ab

U.S.S. Okinawa to complete its 10-hour mission. 37 

• The camera photographed sections of the United States, the Atlantic Ocean, Afri

western Pacific Ocean. This camera had a haze-penetrating film and filter combin

provided better color balance and higher resolution than any photographs obtained 

Mercury a nd Gemini flights. 

t If the S·IVB had made its second burn, the service module engine would hav

only 21l0 seconds. 
NASA had flown only two "A" missions (Saturn V unmanned) and one "B" 

(Saturn IB with an unmanned lunar module). Now Huntsville had to find 

out why the Saturn V's S-IC first stage bounced, why the S-II second stage 

turned off two of its engines, and why the S-IVB third stage refused to fire 

a second time. Meanwhile, Houston had to determine exactly how much 

shaking the lander could stand and why a large piece of the spacecraft-lunar 

module adapter had blown out during launch. Without satisfactory answers, 

the Saturn V might have to make a third unmanned flight. 

Poco AND OTHER PROBLEMS 

The pogo bounce had been observed (although to a much smaller 

degree) on Apollo 4) so its appearance during Apollo 6 did not come as a 

complete surprise. Also, five years earlier, in 1963, pogo had threatened 

to end the Gemini program when the Titan II suffered this phenomenon on 

launch after launch. Its apparent cause was a partial vacuum created in the 

fuel and oxidizer suction lines by the pumping rocket engines. This condition produced a hydraulic resonance-more simply, the engine skipped when 

the bubbles caused by the partial vacuum reached the firing chamber. 

Sheldon Rubin of the Aerospace Corporation had finally suggested installing fuel accumulators and oxidizer standpipes, to ensure a steady flow of 

propellants through the lines. This had solved the Gemini launch vehicle 

problems, and NASA had this background experience to draw on when the 

Saturn V began having pogo troubles.* 39 

• The Gemini launch vehicle engines were hypergolic, that is, its oxidizer and fuel burned 

on contact to produce thrust. Since the Saturn first stage (S-IC) engines were cryogenic, the 

propellant and oxidizer needed an igniter to produce burning-and no one expected a similar 

pogo problem with the larger booster. 

250 
informed Saturn V Program Manager Arthur Rudolph that the

could not be tolerated. Marshall also asked whether the emergency d

system could be used to abort the mission automatically if such hig

tions again occurred. During Apollo 61 the system had cast one 

ending the mission. Had it cast a second vote, abort would ha

mandatory. Low and chief astronaut Donald Slayton did not wan

the system in an automatic pogo abort mode. Low met with Ge

Hage, Phillips' deputy, and they decided on the immediate develo

a "pogo abort sensor," a self-contained unit that would monitor an

spacecraft oscillations. From what the sensor told him, a spacecr

mander could decide whether to continue or stop the mission. 40 

Marshall Space Flight Center pulled an S-IC stage out of 

Assembly Facility, brought it to Huntsville, and erected it in a te

By May, Huntsville, Houston, and Washington Apollo officials we

to attack the pogo problem. Hage agreed to head the activity un

hard Rees could finish his task on the command module at Dow

take over. At one time during the pogo studies, Lee B. James (

replaced Rudolph as the Huntsville Saturn V manager) said, 1000 e

from government and industry were working on the problem. 41 

Out on the West Coast, at the rocket engine test site at Edw

Force Base, Rocketdyne started testing its F-1 engine in late May

first six tests, helium was injected into the liquid-oxygen feed lin

attempt to interrupt the resonating frequencies that had caused the u

able vibration levels. In four of the six tests, the cure was worse 

disease, producing even more pronounced oscillations. The Saturn 

at Marshall also tried helium injection, but their results were d

different. No oscillations whatsoever were observed. Tests using 

stage's prevalves as helium accumulators were then conducted at 

wards and Marshall. The prevalves were in the liquid-oxygen d
During ground tests, liquid air, sprayed over the exterior to cool it, damped 

out any vibrations. Vacuum testing revealed that the bellows vibrated furiously and failed immediately after peak-fuel-flow rates began. These lines 

were strengthened and modified to eliminate the bellows.42 

Another item noticed by the flight control monitors during the boosted 

flight of Apollo 6 (and later confirmed by photographs) was that a panel 

section of the adapter that housed the lander had fallen away just after the 

Saturn V started bouncing. The controllers had been amazed that the structural integrity was sufficient to carry the payload into orbit. James Chamberlin in Houston discovered that thermal pressure (and therefore moisture) 

had built up in the honeycomb panels during launch; with no venting to 

allow the extra pressure to escape, the panel had blown out. A layer of 

cork was applied to the exterior of the adapter to keep it cooler and to 

absorb the moisture, and holes were drilled in the adapter panels to relieve 

the internal pressure if heat did build up inside on future launches.43 

Although Marshall was responsible for stability and dynamic structural 

integrity throughout the boost phase, the Manned Spacecraft Center could 

not afford to sit on the sidelines and watch while its sister center wrestled 

with these problems. Houston had to get an Apollo payload stack together 

for structural testing. On 16 May 1968, Low and .James decided to use a 

"short stack" (the S-IC stage would be left out at this time but could be 

incorporated later).* Astronaut Charles Duke was sent to Huntsville to keep 

information flowing between the centers, and Rolf Lanzkron was assigned 

• The stack comprised an S-IVB forward skirt, launch vehicle instrument unit, spacecraftlunar module adapter, LM-2, a service module, a Block I command module, and the launch 

escape system from boilerplate 30. 

252 
the outcome of the pogo investigations. Mission planners in W

also revived the plan for launching two Saturn IB missions to give 

North American and the Grumman spacecraft a workout in earth 

another unmanned Saturn V had to be flown. 4 5 Even this plan was 

however, as the delivery date for LM-3 was still not firm. 

On the brighter side of the ledger at mid-year was North A

work in getting CSM-101 ready for the first manned Apollo mi

though the contractor was late in shipping the craft from its Calif

tory to the Florida launch site, improvements in the fabricatio

machine indicated that future spacecraft should be on time. Aft

matic and pressure-packed 18 months, North American was finall

ing satisfactory, flight-ready hardware. When 101 arrived at the C

May, the receiving inspectors found fewer discrepancies than on 

craft previously delivered to Kennedy. 46 

Mueller had told the Senate space committee in February 

the first manned Apollo mission would be flown in the last quar

year.H In June, this still seemed feasible. 

Tastes of Triumph 

1968 : Second Half 

The interval between the manned flights of Gemini and Apollo 

than two years (November 1966 to October 1968), about the 

that between Mercury and Gemini (May 1963 to March 1965). B

Apollo flew, the days were filled with more trauma, troubleshoo

toil. Asked by a former college classmate to give an address, 

Apollo manager George Low replied that he could not-he wa

spending so much time with Apollo that his own family hardly 

That was only a slight exaggeration. For more than a year, his staff 

had been crammed full of items that needed his personal attentio

Friday without fail there were spacecraft configuration control 

leaving only Saturdays to visit the Downey and Bethpage plants 

on progress. 

Shortly after midyear 1968, the feeling of dashing from one 

to another started to fade. George Mueller, manned space flight 

Washington, was told at a monthly management council meeting t

American's command module 103 was moving through checkout o

at such an excellent pace that it would almost certainly be able t

manned Saturn V mission before the end of the year. 1 

Now that such a flight seemed probable in 1968, there was so

well as elation, among Apollo workers. Apollo 7, they knew, wou

last of the Saturn IB missions in mainline Apollo. Saturn IB ve

through 212 were released to a follow-on Apollo Applications Pr

though that project was faring none too well in Congress for f

255 
When LM-3, listed as the first to be manned, reached the Cape on l4 

June, the receiving inspectors found more than 100 deficiencies. Many were 

major. After more than a month of inspecting, checking, and testing, George 

C. White, reliability and quality assurance chief at NASA Headquarters, 

reported 19 areas-including stress corrosion, window failures, and wire and 

splice problems-that Mueller's Certification Review Board would have to 

consider. Charles Mathews, former Gemini manager in Houston and now 

working for Mueller in Washington, made a quick trip to Florida. In 

Mathews' opinion, the work that Rocco Petrone's launch operations team 

at Kennedy Space Center would have to do was far beyond what should have 

been required. 4 This lack of a flight-ready lunar module forced Apollo planners to try for some short cuts on the route to the moon. 

PROPOSAL FOR A LUNAR-ORBIT MISSION 

Almost as soon as NASA adopted an alphabetical stairway for reaching 

the moon in progressive flights (see Chapter 9, pp. 234-35), with the 

seventh, or G, step representing the ultimate goal, mission planners had 

begun looking for ways to omit a letter. In late 1967, when the ABC-scheme 

evolved, Low and Flight Operations Director Christopher Kraft had pushed 

for a lunar-orbital mission as soon as possible to learn more about communi­

• Morale problems among agency workers arose at different points in the Mercury and Gemini 

programs. Mercury ended abrwptly in June 1963 (after six manned flights). Most of the personnel simply moved on into Gemini or Apollo -positions. Gemini suffered its morale drop after 

eight of its ten manned flights. and the scramble for new jobs in mid-1966 was mo1·e frantic 

than it had been three years earlier. The problems of hiring and firing in indus-try for sho(tterm programs such as space and wea·pon system projects have never really been resolved. And 

the same is essentially true for federal agencies. 

256 
August to talk with Phillips, Kennedy Director Kurt Debus, Petr

Roderick Middleton about the status of Saturn V 503. The Cape c

believed it could launch the big Saturn in January 1969.5 

Back in Houston the next day, 9 August, MSC Director Gil

hardly entered his office before Low began telling him his ideas fo

orbit mission. Gilruth, too, was enthusiastic, and he and Low start

Washington, Huntsville, and the Cape to set up a meeting that sa

noon at Marshall. Low next talked to Kraft, who said the mi

feasible from a ground control and spacecraft computer standpoint

Low, Kraft, and Flight Crew Operations Director Donald Slay

boarded a plane for Huntsville. At 2:30, they were joined by D

Petrone from Kennedy and Phillips and George Hage from Head

Making an even dozen were the Marshall hosts, Wernher von Bra

hard Rees, Ludie G. Richard, and Lee James. 

Low said that a lunar-orbit mission, if it could be flown in D

might be the only way to meet the fast-approaching lunar landing 

This remark sparked a lively discussion. The talk was mostly ab

each of the NASA elements would have to do to make the mission 

in the time remaining. Debus and Petrone considered Kennedy's 

and concluded that they could be ready by 1 December; von Bra

James, and Richard reported that they had nearly solved the pogo 

and Low and Gilruth talked about the differences between 

modules 103 and 106 (the first spacecraft originally scheduled to 

moon) and what to use as a substitute for the lander. 

Even as he joined in the discussion, Apollo Program Directo

had been taking notes. He said they should keep their plans secr

decision was made by NASA's top officials. In the meantime, while 

whatever information was needed, they would use the code nam

Budget Exercise" as a cover. The conferees would meet in Washi
should be carried, and Low decided on a lunar test article. 

Early on Monday morning, 12 August, Kraft told Low that the target 

date would have to be 20 December if they wanted to launch in daylight. 

If the flight had to be terminated for any reason shortly after launch, good 

visibility was necessary for recovering the spacecraft. In the meantime, Slayton had been thinking about which crew to pick for the flight. Frank Borman's team had been training for a high-altitude mission. Slayton talked 

with Borman over the weekend and decided to propose that crew at the 

meeting in Washington. 7 

The 12 men who had gathered in Huntsville were joined by William 

Schneider and Julian H. Bowman when they met with Deputy Administrator 

Thomas 0. Paine* at Headquarters on Wednesday, 14 August. Low reviewed spacecraft status, Kraft discussed flight operations, and Slayton talked 

about flight crew preparations. Von Braun reported that the Saturn would 

be ready for the launch, and he and Rees agreed that Low had made a good 

selection of a stand-in for the lunar module. Debus and Petrone said the 

Cape could launch the Saturn V by 6 December. 8 

After listening to the plotters, Paine decided to play devil's advocate. 

Not too long ago, he said, you people were trying to decide whether it was 

safe to man the third Saturn V (503) , and now you want to put men on 

top of it and send them to the moon. The Deputy Administrator then asked 

for comments. This is what he heard: 

• After being first Associate and then Deputy Administrator of NASA for more than seven 

years, Robert Seamans (who originally intended to stay only two years) resigned on 2 October 

1967 and left the agency on 5 January 1968. On 31 January, President Lyndon Johnson announced the nomination of Paine, a General Electric official, to replace Seamans. Paine was 

confirmed by the Senate on 5 February and sworn into office on 25 March. 

258 
gpj

kinds of priorities-it will not be easy to do, but I ha

fidence. But it should be a lunar orbit and not a circu

flight. 

Low: 	 Assuming Apollo 7 is a success, there is no other cho

So ended the round table vote, by the men who managed the d

details of the Apollo program, to commit the first crew to fly to t

Paine was impressed, but he was only the first of the three top 

had to be convinced. Webb and Mueller would not be so easy t

fact, when Mueller called Phillips from Vienna during the mee

learned of the plan, he was not receptive. He urged Phillips not to 

Vienna. By the next day, 15 August, he had warmed to the idea

wanted Phillips to keep it quiet until after Apollo 7. Webb was sh

the audacity of the proposal and was inclined to say no immediate

talking with Phillips and Paine, however, he asked for more inform

Paine called Willis H. Shapley, Julian Scheer, and Phillips in 

a text for Webb. Paine's cable to Vienna on 15 August underlined 

plete support and included an item-by-item schedule of necessary 

The cable also contained a draft of a statement for Webb to make i

and a draft of a press release to be issued in Washington. Altoge

cablegram covered seven typewritten pages.

10 

After discussing the proposal with Mueller, Webb cabled Pai

August that he believed it unwise for any announcement to origin

Vienna. Webb told his deputy to plan for the lunar-orbit flight bu

no public statement about it. In other words, NASA could not t

anything but an earth-orbital mission. Webb also asked Paine to n

White House and the President's scientific advisers about any drasti

in mission planning. This was not what the planners had asked f
Now Houston had to train crews to fly that mission, as well as the others that 

would follow. 

SELECTING AND TRAINING CREWS 

Early in 1961, Robert B. Voas at the Manned Spacecraft Center had 

written a paper on how pilots should train for a lunar mission and what 

they should do during the flight. Because of the hostile environment and 

the inability to return quickly to safety, Voas said, crews had to be prepared 

to stay with their ships and keep the protective systems operating. That 

made good sense. Moreover, since modifications were made in spacecraft 

systems almost until time of launch, a crew would have to follow its specific 

spacecraft through step-by-step testing in the factory and through preparations for flight at the launch site. 

Crew tasks in flight included steering the space ship, but this was not 

a constant duty. Steering was needed mainly during launch, lunar maneuvers, and earth reentry and landing. Navigating the ship from the earth to 

the moon and back required high-speed automatic computing, during which 

the crew would choose data fed into the computer and verify the results on 

the navigation system displays. In addition, the crew would make optical 

sightings, orient trackers on selected stars, and navigate manually, using 

prepared tables and a simple computer. The astronauts would maintain a 

continuous check on subsystems, which meant one crewman keeping watch 

while the others slept. This chore might include such things as switching 

to a redundant system if a component failed and keeping the ground informed on mission status. During early flights, scientific activities on the 

moon would be limited to observing systems (a primary task of a test pilot, 

260 
p y, y g

flight was canceled in December, and his team was assigned as b

Grissom's. McDivitt's and Borman's crews soon had new assignm

McDivitt trio (backed by Stafford, John Young, and Eugene Cern

the second flight, a complex dual mission with two launch vehicle

IBs 205 and 208) that entailed putting the command module a

module through maneuvers in earth orbit. Borman's threesome, 

liam Anders replacing Stafford (who now had a command of his o

Charles Conrad, Richard Gordon, and Clifton Williams backi

snared the first manned flight scheduled to be launched by a S

Borman's launch vehicle would be 503, the third in the series. A

of 1966 this was the pilot assignment picture.14 

Immediately after the fire in January 1967, Webb canceled 

assignments. On 9 May, however, as NASA began to recover 

tragedy, he told the Senate space committee that Schirra, Eisele, 

ningham (with Stafford, Young, and Cernan as backups) would fl

manned Apollo mission.t Schirra's group, Webb told the senator

its way to the Downey plant "to start a detailed, day-by-day, month-

association with Block II spacecraft No. 101." 15 

• There had been other names for the crew positions. In 1966, for example, wh

som and S<:hirra crews were in training, the terminology was command pilot, senio

pilot. 

tAn innovation for Apollo manned fli~hts was the support crew. For Apollo 7

be John Swigert, Ronald Evans, and William Pogue. Perhaps their most importa

coordinating and maintaining the Flight Data File, which included the flight pla

and mission ground rules, making sure that these were kept up to date and th

crews were informed of changes. The support crews used the simulators to work ou

especially for emergency situations. Thus, when t he prime and backup teams tra

simula-tors, procedures were ready and they could devote their ·time to masteri

countdown tests, •the support crews set up the cockpit, making sure that all swit

the proper positions. Swigert, Evans, a nd Pogue also s·tood by during spacecraft 

pad, to assist the prime or backup crew to get out in case of emergency. 
astronauts would have to stretch that distance to nearly 380 000 kilometers, 

but they would not have the lunar module to complicate their training. On 

the other hand, McDivitt's group appeared to have a tremendous task, 

training to put the lander through its paces for the first time. 

Collins, in his book Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut's journeys) said 

that Slayton asked McDivitt if he wanted to fly the circumlunar (or lunarorbit) mission, but McDivitt turned it down. He and his crew had spent 

hundreds of hours learning to handle the lunar module, and he would 

rather not see that time wasted. The crews would have to exchange command modules, though. Spacecraft 103, on which the McDivitt team had 

been training, would be ready for a flight in 1968 and 104 would not. Scott 

complained about that, since as command module pilot he had been living 

with his machine and knew its characteristics well. Collins, who had been 

similarly occupied with 104, had other, more personal, worriesY 

In the summer of 1968, two astronauts with flight assignments came up 

with medical problems that stimulated another rash of changes. Collins, 

from Borman's team, needed surgery to remove a bone spur from his spine. 

Lovell moved from the backup team to take over from Collins, Aldrin 

switched from lunar module to command module pilot on the backup team 

to replace Lovell, Haise shifted from the support group on McDivitt's team 

to backup lunar module pilot in Borman's group in place of Aldrin, and 

Jack Lousma joined McDivitt's support team as a substitute for Haise. So 

Collins' bone spur started a whole round of musical chairs in flight positions. And the game continued when Borman lost a member of his support 

team. Bull resigned from the corps because of a pulmonary problem, and 

Vance Brand filled his seat. 1 8 

Schirra's Apollo 7 group had remained intact. For almost a year, the 

• Clifton Williams, the ~hird member of McDivitt's backup crew, had been killed in a T-38 

aircraft crash on 5 October 1967 and was replaced by Bean. 

262 
reports, of the activities of other astronauts who were studying, part

in, or training on specific pieces of the Apollo systems. For exampl

CSM-101 left the factory at Downey, it went through a test to m

that its systems performed properly and in harmony. Astronaut Joh

attended this session and noted that, in some instances, the comp

verters, pumps, fans, and radios were in his opinion operated lon

was either necessary or good for the equipment. He also found th

deficiencies were uncovered, everything stopped while discrepanc

were written on the spot. On the positive side, however, Young tho

crew checklist for time-critical sequences was excellent. From there 

on, item by item, finally concluding "that S/C 101 is a pretty c

chine." Schirra, McDivitt, and Borman all were given copies of his 

The Schirra crew had practiced getting out of the spacecra

Gulf to simulate recovery, but Lovell, Stuart Roosa, and Char

made a more extensive test to find out how they and the craft w

if recovery were delayed as much as 48 hours. They especially want

how quickly the spacecraft could right itself if it flipped over in 

with its nose down-the "stable II" position. ("Stable I" was th

upright position.) So Lovell and the others were tossed into the w

side down. They had no trouble getting to the manual control sw

signaled three air bags to inflate and turn the ship over. During the 

hours, the crewmen were cool enough, but water sometimes sp

through a postlanding air vent. They used the urine-collection 

vacuum the water from the cabin deck and dump it overboard. A

they agreed, the craft was seaworthy enough for a prolonged w

recovery. 21 

Two days on the water might be a contingency exercise, but a 

the vacuum chamber was not. Except for weightlessness, the Space 

ment Simulation Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft Center cou
Manned Spacecraft Center, 

where Apollo astronauts practiced for their missions. Another 

simulator was at Kennedy Space 

Center. 

Command and service modules 2TV-1 

in the space environment simulation 

chamber at Manned Spacecraft Center. Hinges for the huge door to close 

the chamber are at extreme left. Astronauts Kerwin, Brand, and Engle 

spent a week in this craft under operational space conditions in 1968. 

duce most of the conditions of space. In a test vehicle called "2TV-l" 

(which, except for some flight-qualified equipment, was identical to Schirra's 

CSM-101), Joseph Kerwin, Vance Brand, and Joseph Engle looked for 

things that might be wrong with the craft. They found the vehicle satisfactory in most respects, but they still managed to fill 14 pages with comments. They noted particularly that the water lines sweated and drops 

puddled on the cabin deck. Otherwise the environmental system kept them 

264 
CSM-101 started through the manufacturing cycle early in 

July, it had been formed, wired, fitted with subsystems, and made 

testing. After the fire in January 1967, redefinition forced change

in the wiring, hatch areas, and forward egress tunnel. It was D

before the spacecraft came back into testing. CSM-101 passed t

three-phase customer acceptance review; during the third session

Downey on 7 May 1968, no items showed up that might be a "con

launch." North American cleared up what few deficiencies there w

and shipped the craft to Kennedy on 30 May. 23 

Low had spent a lot of time thinking about a flight to the mo

1968 ended, but Apollo 7 still was given his close attention. He 

worried about that flight more than those that followed because t

attempt to get a crew skyborne had ended in disaster. After rere

evaluations of the fourth, fifth, and sixth missions, Low asked Sim

one of his chief troubleshooters, to make up a "worry list" of th

might have been overlooked. He also asked John Hodge's Crew S

view Board to question all the "judgment decisions" that separ

made good sense, making sure that the sum of them still did. Aaro

who reviewed them for Low, concluded that, individually and co

these decisions had been sound. Out at North American, Dale M

doing the same soul-searching, looking specifically at the I 37 cha

had resulted from the spacecraft 012 fire. 24 

All this care paid off. At the Flight Readiness Review on 20 S

Myers reported that CSM-101 was "a very good spacecraft." W

Kapryan of Kennedy said the launch preparations people agreed. 

was up to the flight crew to prove them right. 

In October 1968, Schirra, a veteran of both Mercury and 

found himself facing a situation similar to some he had encou
manned flights in spite of the insistence of most engineers that it was not 

needed and the ambivalence of the test-pilot-oriented crews. This was the 

television camera. Ever since September 1963, when NASA had first directed 

North American to install a portable camera in the spacecraft, that device 

had been going in and out of the craft as though it were caught in a revolving door. Wrestling with the constant problem of overweight, many 

engineers viewed television cameras only as nice things to have. On occasions when kilograms, and even grams, were being shaved from the command module, the camera was among the first items to go. There were 

those, however, who persistently argued for the inclusion of television. 

NASA personnel in charge of public information activities-Julian 

Scheer in Washington and Paul P . Haney in Houston-naturally favored 

the use of television, but there was one management-level engineer in the 

Houston Apollo office who agreed with them. In the spring of 1964, William 

A. Lee wrote: 

I take typewriter in hand to plead once more for including in-flight TV. 

. . . Since [it] has little or -no engineering value, the weight penalty must 

be assessed against a different set of standards .... One [objectiveJ of the 

Apollo Program is to impress the world with our space supremacy. It may 

be assumed that the first attempt to land on the moon will have generated 

a high degree of interest around the world .... A large portion of the 

civilized world will be at their TV sets wondering whether the attempt 

will succeed or fail. The question before the house is whether the public 

will receive their report of this climactic moment visually or by voice 

alone. 27 

Four springs later, following more trips through the revolving door, television became part of Apollo when Phillips told Low to install a camera on 

CSM-101.28 

266 
II CSM) cleared the pad in Florida, a threeshift mission control te

by flight directors Glynn Lunney, Eugene Kranz, and Gerald D. Gr

Houston took over. Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham inside the co

module had listened to the sound of propellants rushing into th

chambers, had noticed the vehicles swaying slightly, and had felt th

tions at ignition. Ten and a half minutes after launch, with little bum

and low g loads during acceleration, Apollo 7 reached the first stag

journey, an orbital path 227 by 285 kilometers above the earth. 

A few hours later, as the spacecraft separated from the S-IV

and then turned back in a simulated docking approach, Cunningh

scribed the S-IVB, which would be used for rendezvous target prac

next day. The spacecraft-lunar module adapter panels, he said, had n

deployed-which naturally reminded Stafford, on the capsule commu

(CapCom) console, of the "angry alligator" target vehicle he had 

tered on his Gemini IX mission. This mishap would have been emba

on a mission that carried a lunar module, but the panels would be je

explosively on future flights. 30 

After this niggling problem, service module engine performanc

joy. This was one area where the crew could not switch to a redun

backup system; at crucial times during a lunar voyage, the engine sim

to work or they would not get back home. On Apollo 71 there we

nearly perfect firings out of eight attempts. On the first, the crew ha

surprise. In contrast to the smooth liftoff of the Saturn, the blast f

service module engine jolted the astronauts, causing Schirra to yell "

badoo" like Fred Flintstone in the contemporary video cartoon. Late

said, "We didn't quite know what to expect, but we got more than 

pected." He added more graphically that it was a real boot in the r

just plastered them into their seats. But the engine did what it was s

to do each time it fired. 31 
fairly good shape, although moisture was collecting between the inner panes 

of one window. On the seventh day, Schirra described essentially the same 

conditions. 

Even with these impediments, the windows were adequate. Those used 

for observations during rendezvous and stationkeeping with the S-IVB remained almost clear. Navigational sighting with a telescope and a sextant on 

any of the 37 preselected "Apollo" stars was difficult if done too soon after a 

waste-water dump. Sometimes they had to wait several minutes for the frozen 

particles to disperse. Eisele reported that unless he could see at least 40 or 

50 stars at a time he found it hard to decide what part of the sky he was 

looking toward. On the whole, however, the windows were satisfactory for 

general and landmark observations and for out-the-window photography.

33 

Most components supported the operations and well-being of the spacecraft and crew as planned, in spite of minor irritations like smudging 

windows and puddling water. For example, the waste management system 

for collecting solid body wastes was adequate, though annoying. The defecation bags, containing a germicide to prevent bacteria and gas formation, 

were easily sealed and stored in empty food containers in the equipment bay. 

But the bags were certainly not convenient and there were usually unpleasant odors. Each time they were used, it took the crew member from 45 to 60 

minutes, causing him to postpone it as long as possible, waiting for a time 

when there was no work to do. The crew had a total of only 12 defecations 

over a period of nearly ll days. Urination was much easier, as the crew did 

not have to remove clothing. There was a collection service for both the 

pressure suits and the inflight coveralls. Both devices could be attached to 

the urine dump hose and emptied into space. They had half expected the 

hose valve to freeze up in vacuum, but it never did. 34 

The astronauts finally had a spacecraft large enough to move about in. 

During Gemini, crewmen had gone outside the craft in an exercise called 

268 
but Schirra said the machine was flying well and he did not want 

any changes. So Eisele kept watch while the others slept, and then 

to bed. Two sleeping bags were underneath the outboard couches (

ter couch could be moved out of the way), and the crewmen could z

selves into them, wearing their flight coveralls. The bags were not p

because, they said, the restraints were in the wrong places. Cunn

preferred sleeping in the couch, strapping himself down with a s

harness and a lap belt. If two crewmen slept in the couches at the sam

however, one of them was always in the way of spacecraft operation

the third day, the crew had worked out a routine that allowed all of 

get enough sleep. 36 

Although the astronauts had more than 60 food items to choo

giving them about 2500 calories a day, they were not happy with th

The bite-size food crumbled and stray particles floated around th

They almost came to hate the high-energy sweets and tried to talk ea

out of the more satisfactory breakfast items. Following his Gemin

Schirra had said that if he flew on Apollo he was going to take som

with him. And he did. During flight and later, the crew emphasiz

space food was a long way from satisfying their normal table habits. 

The astronauts did use the controversial television camera to sh

colleagues in mission control and the public everywhere how they g

in their living quarters, operated the spacecraft, ate, and swam abou

weightlessness of space. When flight plan changes crowded their s

Schirra canceled the first of several planned television demonstratio

ton tried to change his mind, but the spacecraft commander told him 

that there_would be no show that day. The programs finally began, h

and the crew appeared to enjoy them, using cue cards-"Keep Thos

and Letters Coming In, Folks" and "Hello from the Lovely Apoll
Apollo 7, first manned Apollo fiight, 11-22 October 

1968. The Saturn IB, like earlier launch vehicles, was 

assembled at the launch pad. Above left, Saturn 205's 

first stage rests on the pedestal at Launch Complex 34 

before mating with other stages for launch. After launch 

and a rendezvous maneuver, the Apollo 7 crew examines 

the Saturn's S-IVB stage (above right) that had placed 

them in orbit. Meeting no problems in the maneuver, 

the crew concluded that future pilots would have no 

difficulty docking with the lunar module. Below left, 

Mission Control watches the first live television beamed 

by an American spacecraft, as Eisele and Schirra signal, 

"Keep Those Cards and Letters Coming in, Folks." At 

the end of the nearly 11-day mission, fiight controllers 

Gene Kranz, Glynn Lunney, and Gerald Griffin (left to 

right below with cigars) celebrate splashdown. 
Some of the crews grumpiness during the mission could be attr

to physical discomfort. About 15 hours into the flight, Schirra devel

bad cold, and Cunningham and Eisele soon followed suit. A cold is u

fortable enough on the ground; in weightless space it presents a di

problem. Mucus accumulates, filling the nasal passages, and does no

from the head. The only relief is to blow hard, which is painful to 

drums. So the crewmen of Apollo 7 whirled through space sufferin

stopped up ears and noses. They took aspirin and decongestant table

discussed their symptoms with the doctors. 

Several days before the mission ended, they began to worry abou

ing their suit helmets during reentry, which would prevent them from 

ing their noses. The buildup of pressure might burst their eardrum

ton, in mission control, tried to persuade them to wear the helmets, a

but Schirra was adamant. They each took a decongestant pill about a

before reentry and made it through the acceleration zone without an

lems with their ears. 39 

That "magnificent flying machine," as Cunningham called it, 

the earth for more than 260 hours. On 22 October, the crew broug

ship down in the Atlantic southeast of Bermuda, less than two kilo

from the planned impact point. On landing, the craft turned nose 

but the crew quickly inflated the air bags and the ship righted itsel

tired, but happy, voyagers were picked up by helicopter and depos

the deck of the U.S.S. Essex. 40 

Apollo 7 accomplished what it set out to do-qualifying the co

and service module and clearing the way for the proposed lunar-orb

sion to follow. And its activities were of national interest. A special 

• Produ<:er of the Bill Dana "Jose Jimenez in Orbit" record album in the 1960s and 

of many of the musk tapes broadcast to the Gemini crews from mission control. 
g 

turn IB, would not help them decide whether the Saturn V could make the 

lunar mission. 42 

Phillips formally set the plan into motion in a directive issued on 19 

August. Because of Webb's restrictions about waiting until the performance of Apollo 7 was known, earth-orbital objectives were still listed, but 

crew assignments were shifted and the mission was moved forward one flight. 

That same day, NASA publicly announced the flight as an expansion of 

Apollo 7, although agency spokesmen said that the exact content of the mission had not been decided.

4 3 

CSM-103 arrived at the Cape in mid-August, and testing began. Some 

modifications were necessary but, in most cases, no hardware changes that 

might cause delays were acceptable. Mueller kept Paine informed of the 

status, noting in detail how many days the work schedule lagged and why. 

These holdups were usually minor, although Hurricane Gladys did cause an 

additional two-day delay. 44 

Paine was still concerned about manning the Saturn V, because of the 

pogo problem. Phillips told him that the Apollo leaders had decided, about 

two weeks after Apollo 6, to plan for a manned flight but to revert to unmanned, if necessary. Paine also questioned the reliability of the service 

propulsion module. Mueller reviewed its test history and reported that a 

complete flight system of the "present configuration" had never failed to 

fire. Of all configurations, only 4 firings had failed in 3200 attempts, and 

Mueller assured Paine that none of the problems encountered were characteristic of the present engine. 4 5 

During a session of Mueller's Certification Board in Huntsville on 19 

September, the Saturn V was given a clean bill of health, and the members 

agreed that the launch vehicle was no longer a constraint to manned flight. 

In the meantime, Huntsville and Houston had worked out an agreement on 

272 
December, although there would not be a lunar launch window u

21st. Phillips said he recommended that NASA go for lunar-orbit. 

then asked Low and Phillips to list the things that were absolutely 

for a safe round trip. The program leaders replied that the service 

sion system had to work, to get the spacecraft out of lunar orbit, a

had to be at least 60 hours of oxygen remaining to get the crew 

earth. Redundancies could support the environmental system, b

major break of the main structure; and the fuel cells could handle th

demands with only one of the three working-unless, of course, the

complete electrical short. There were risks, yes, but these risks w

there on all missions; there was no way to ensure perfect safety. 

Next, Mueller asked for the views of the attending Apollo exe

Walter F. Burke (McDonnell Douglas): The S-IVB can do any 

missions described, but I favor circumlunar rather than lunar 

since there has been only one manned CSM. 

Hilliard Paige (General Electric): The checkout equipment is doin

same thing it has done before; there are no reservations from a re

ity standpoint; and NASA should go, and is ready to go, into 

orbit. 

B. 	P. Blasingame (AC Electronics): We have carefully examined the 

ance equipment and consider it ready for a lunar orbit mission

the right size step. 

Stark Draper (MIT): No reservations. 

B. 0. Evans (IBM): Go. 

R. W. Hubner (IBM): The instrument unit is ready. 

George M. Bunker (Martin Marietta): The presentation here today 

a persuasive case. Go for lunar orbit. 

T. A. Wilson (Boeing): We have confidence in the hardware. It is 

to go for lunar orbit. 

Leland Atwood (North American): This is what we came to the par
Gerald 	T. Smiley (General Electric): Morale is now high; less than lunar 

orbit would impact this morale. 48 

Thus on 10 November a second group voted yes on the proposition to 

send man on his first flight to the vicinity of the moon. 

The next day, Mueller told Paine he had discussed the proposal with 

the Science and Technology Advisory Committee and the President's Science Advisory Committee and both of these prestigious groups favored the 

mission. The manned space flight chief said he also agreed "that NASA 

should undertake a lunar orbit mission as its next step toward manned lunar 

landing." 

Paine listened to presentations by Phillips, James, Low, Kraft, and 

Petrone on II November. The same day, Paine asked Gerald Truszynski if 

the tracking network would be ready and Lieutenant General Vincent G. 

Huston if the Department of Defense could support the mission. He called 

in key members of his staff and the directors of the three manned space 

flight centers for their statements. The acting administrator also telephoned 

Frank Borman and learned that the astronauts supported the mission wholeheartedly. Paine then approved Phillips' recommendation. Phillips wired the 

field centers to be ready for a lunar-orbit flight on 21 December.' 9 NASA 

had crossed another Rubicon in its decision-making-a historic one. 

Apollo 8: THE FIRST LuNAR VoYAGE 

Invitations had been issued to watch departures before, but not for a 

trip like this one. For the first time, man would ride atop a Saturn V launch 

vehicle. And before he returned to the earth, he would travel in a region 

where the gravitational pull of another celestial body was stronger than that 

274 
of his home planet-a first in history that would endure no matt

mankind might go in the future. 

As soon as Borman's crew learned, on 10 August, that it mi

lunar mission, the men began to train for the moon flight. On 9 Se

sessions on the Cape simulator began. Six weeks before launch, thes

into day-after-day, ten-hour work periods. With the help of the 

team-Mattingly, Carr, and Brand, who followed the hardware, coo

the preparation of checklists, and worked out spacecraft stowage-

was ready on time. Shortly after 2:30 on the morning of 21 Decem

man, Lovell, and Anders rose and dressed for the launch day breakf

among others, George Low, the man who had hatched this scheme 

them into lunar orbit on Apollo's second manned flight. 50 

Many guests were in Florida for the send-off, thousands more 

crew had formally invited. In the chilly predawn, the visitors clo

roads, their headlights flashing, searching for the best vantage poi

loads of newsmen trundled through the gates, heading for the pr

and helicopter-borne groups of VIPs landed near the special viewi

All attention focused on Apollo 8, bathed in the glare of spotlig

made it visible for many kilometers. Radio announcers, television 

tators, and public address spokesmen told millions around the w

the thousands in the Cape area that soon three astronauts would l

globe to visit another. At 7:51, Borman, Lovell, and Anders, lying 

couches 100 meters above the launch pad, started on that journey.5

Riding the huge Saturn V, propelled by more power than m

ever felt pushing him before (33.4 million newtons, or 7.5 million 

of thrust), the crew had varied impressions. Borman thought it w

like riding the Gemini Titan II. Lovell agreed but added that it se

slow down after it left the pad. Rookie astronaut Anders likened 
looked for the fireworks high above them. 5

For five minutes, the S-IVB fired, increasing its speed from 7600 to 

10 800 meters per second. Borman, Lovell, and Anders now traveled at a 

greater speed than any human being ever had, shooting outward fast enough 

to escape the earth's gravitational influence. Asked later about impressions 

at translunar injection, Borman replied: 

Psychologically it was a far easier flight than Gemini 7. You adopt a philosophical approach after you burn TLI, and I wasn't really concerned about 

anything. When you are in earth orbit you are always aware that if something happens you have to react quickly to get down. Once you burn 

TLI, ... you really are not concerned with reacting swiftly because it is 

going to take you [at leastJ two or three days to get home anyway. 

The command and service modules separated from the S-IVB and 

flipped around so the crew could photograph the adapter, where the lunar 

module would be housed on future voyages. Borman commented that formation flying was no more difficult with the S-IVB than it had been with 

the Gemini Agena and that docking with the LM should pose no problems. 

Since they had no lander on this mission, they chose not to get too close to 

the S-IVB. The crew used the small reaction control engines on the service 

module to begin a separation maneuver with a velocity change of less than 

a meter per second. But Borman soon noted that the S-IVB was getting 

closer, instead of moving away. Both the crew and the flight controllers were 

puzzled. Communications crackled back and forth. Kraft and Bill Tindall 

talked with Carl R. Huss, who was manning the mission planning and 

analysis desk in the flight support area, demanding to know what to do. 

Huss held them off until his group had time to figure out that the crew 

had not made its maneuver exactly as it should. Studying the relative positions of the two vehicles, Huss soon gave the controllers new information to 

276 
pp

ness. Rapid body movements brought on nausea. Borman suffered t

There had been a rash of gastroenteritis cases at the Cape just before 

This "24-hour intestinal flu" might have caused Borman's illn

there was another possibility. Because it had taken longer to get aw

the S-IVB than had been planned, he was late getting to his rest pe

make sure he went to sleep quickly, he had taken a Seconal tablet

preflight testing of the medical supplies Borman had a slight reactio

sleep-inducing pill, so he blamed the medication for at least part o

tress. When he awakened, after very fitful rest, Borman retched and 

twice and had a loose bowel movement. The waste managemen

worked, but just barely. The crew reported their problems to the f

geon and, as Collins said later in Carrying the Fire) "the first hu

leave the cradle had called for their pediatrician." Next day, howe

man happily told flight control, "Nobody is sick." 55 

For the first six hours of flight, the round hatch window throug

Lovell watched the earth receding had been clear. Then it had clou

until it was almost useless. The clouding was caused, as it had bee

Schirra's flight, by a gas from the silicone oils used in a sealant co

The two side windows also fogged over, but to a smaller degree. 

rendezvous windows remained clear throughout the mission. On o

sion crew members complained that pictures of the sun taken thro

side windows would be of little value, and they could not even see 

through the rendezvous windows. They could not see the moon thro

of the windows. Navigator Lovell later recalled that 

we never really saw the moon. It was a crescent moon, and most of 

dark. I saw it several times in the optics as I was doing some sightin

and large the body that we were rendezvousing with, that was comin
py] gjg

A hundred thousand kilometers farther out and a day later, the crew 

again unstowed the television camera. This time the telephoto lens worked 

better. Lovell described what the audience was seeing: the Western Hemisphere was clearly in view and again he called out names-the North Pole, 

South America all the way down to Cape Horn, Baja California, and the 

southwestern part of the United States. Once, in a thoughtful vein, he 

turned to his commander: 

Frank, what I keep imagining is if I am some lonely traveler from another 

planet what I would think about the earth at this altitude, whether I think 

it would be inhabited or not. .. . I was just curious if I would land on the 

blue or brown part of the earth. 

Anders interjected, "You better hope that we land on the blue part." 58 

Following the second video presentation, the crew neared a new stage 

in manned space flight-travel to a place where the pull of earth's gravity 

was less than that of another body. At 3:29 in the afternoon on Monday, 23 

December, that historic crossing was made. At that point, the spacecraft was 

326 400 kilometers from the earth and 62 600 from the moon, and its velocity had slowed to 1218 meters per second. Gradually, as the ship moved farther into the moon's gravitational field, it picked up speed. 59 

Now the crew prepared for another event-again denoted by one of the 

abbreviations with which space flight jargon abounds, LOI (lunar-orbit insertion). Since the craft was on a free-return trajectory-a path shaped like 

a figure eight that would loop the ship around the back of the moon and 

return it to the earth-Barman wanted "a perfect spacecraft before we can 

consider the LOI burn." He would hate to leave that good trajectory and 

then find out that something was wrong. So far, the big service module engine had worked perfectly every time, but the path to the moon had been 

278 
()jy

see you on the other side." Eleven minutes later, traveling at 260

per second with their heads down so they could watch the lunar la

they fired the service module engine for four minutes to reduce th

by 915 meters per second and get into an orbit approximately Il

kilometers. Although the engine performed flawlessly, Lovell call

"longest four minutes I ever spent." While the engine was firing, Lo

Anders exclaimed about their fantastic view of the moon. Anders ad

he had trouble telling the holes from the bumps. Borman called th

to watch their dials. 

61 

Borman, Lovell, and Anders knew that the engine had fired suc

but nearly a billion persons in 64 countries (according to TV Gu

not. If the spacecraft had not gone into orbit, it would come back i

munications range 10 minutes earlier than planned. After what se

interminable wait, Paul Haney, on the public information console 

control, gleefully announced, "We got it! We've got it! Apollo 8 

lunar orbit." 62 

After 15 minutes of describing the first engine firing and getti

bers for the second firing (to circularize the orbit at 112 kilomete

the lunar surface), the crew members told their fellow men what t

looked like at this close range. Lovell said: 

Okay, Houston, The moon is essentially gray, no color; looks like pla

Paris or sort of a grayish deep sand. We can see quite a bit of detai

Sea of Fertility doesn't stand out as well here as it does back on 

There's not as much contrast between that and the surrounding 

The craters are all rounded off. There's quite a few of them; some o

are newer. Many of them .. . -especially the round ones-look like 

meteorites or projectiles of some sort. 
bumps and holes. 63 

As A polio 8 whirled around the moon on its ten two-hour circuits, the 

spacecraft location display seemed odd at first to those watching the map in 

mission control. In earth orbit, spacecraft had always gone from left to right 

on the display panels; on the lunar charts, however, this vehicle moved from 

right to left. And while it traveled the crew continued to talk about the view. 

Anders expressed the general opinion that the moon was an "unappetizing 

looking place"; nevertheless, it did have a kind of stark beauty. Astronauts 

commented on the hues of light and dark caused by earthshine and sunshine. They gave temporary names to some of the craters: names like (Harrison) Schmitt, (George) Low, (Robert) Gilruth, (Joseph) Shea, (Theodore) Freeman, (Gus) Grissom, (Ed) White, (James) Webb, (Thomas) 

Paine, (Elliot) See, (Alan) Shepard, (Donald) Slayton, (Samuel) Phillips, 

(Christopher) Kraft, (Roger) Chaffee, (Charles) Bassett, and (Gerald) 

Carr. Once, when flight controller John W. Aaron was the only one to notice in the general excitement that the environmental system needed an adjustment, Crater Aaron was named on the spot. 64 

NASA had been asked by some to postpone the December lunar-orbiting mission, lest some accident mar Christmas celebrations on earth. But 

now, as Apollo 8 circled the moon this Christmas Eve, there was additional 

rejoicing. Early in December, Borman and a friend had selected a prayer for 

the occasion. During the third lunar revolution, Borman asked, "Is Rod 

Rose there? I have a message for him," and sent the following transmission: 

To Rod Rose and the people of St. Christopher's, actually to people 

everywhereGive us, 0 God, the vision which can see thy love in the world in spite of 

human failure. 

280 
was told that its shows were being seen all over Europe, even in Mo

East Berlin; in Japan; in North, Central, and South America; and 

in Africa. Lovell, using his optical devices to get a better look, 

what was being photographed. Anders raced from window to wi

the best vantage points for photographing the lunar surface, espe

areas being considered for landing sites. By the seventh revolution

them were so tired that Borman put a stop to the observations. 

knew, they had to start thinking about transearth injection (TEl

of those important abbreviations) -entrance on the path for home

On the tenth lap of the moon, on Christmas morning, 3 days, 

and 17 seconds after earth launch, the service module engine fired to 

their speed by I 070 meters per second. Rounding the corner from 

of the moon, Lovell told Mattingly, who had taken over as CapCom 

shift, "Please be informed there is a Santa Claus." In mission con

holiday became a truly festive occasion. A Christmas tree was plac

the flight status board, which again showed an earth map with red a

lights, the traditional colors of the season. Schmitt, who had coa

crew for its geological observations, read a parody on Clement C. 

poem, "T'was the Night before Christmas." 67 

After leaving the moon, the crew was worn out. The astronau

letting "Isaac Newton" do most of the driving. Following their n

Com Carr gave them the latest earth news, with emphasis on th

their voyage had made on the world.

68 On the whole, Apollo 8's 

tions in December 1968 were acclaimed enthusiastically by the m

who looked at their world for the first time from thousands of kilo

space and at their moon from slightly more than a hundred. 

The trip back to the earth was uneventful. During the en

CSM-103 registered only such expected irregularities as fogging 
Earthrise on the lunar horizon greets 

the Apollo 8 crew coming from behind the moon after lunar orbit 

insertion. 

The crew caught a nearly circular moon in the photo above. 

The edge of the Sea of Tranquility is on the left, southwest 

of and close to the circular Sea 

of Crisis (Mare Crisium). Borman, Lovell, and Anders were 

the first men to see the back of 

the moon (left). Among prominent features are Mare Smythii, 

Mare Crisium, Mare Fecunditatis, Mare Nectaris, Crater Langrenus, and several rayed craters. 
watchers in Houston. Bill Tindall wrote to Jerome B. Hammac

of the Landing and Recovery Division: 

Jerry, I've done a lot of joking about the spacecraft hitting the a

carrier, but the more I think about it the less I feel it is a joke. The

reports that the C Prime command module came down right over th

craft carrier [stationed at 165°02.1' west longitude and 8°09.3' nort

tude] and drifted on its chutes to land [at 165°01.02' west and 8

north, only 4572 meters] away. This really strikes me as being too 

. . . The consequence of the spacecraft hitting the carrier is truly 

strophic. . .. I seriously recommend relocating the recovery force at 

[8 to 16 kilometers] from the target point. 


Astronauts Gerald Carr, Do

Neil Armstrong (seated left t

left. photo), and Harrison 

Edwin Aldrin (standing) com

of Lunar Orbiter photograph

televised from the moon to 

trol by Apollo 8 crewmen. 

At right, three jubilant astronautsLovell, Borman, and Anders (left to 

right)-back on the earth after their 

Apollo 8 mission, tell what they saw. 
Congress and the Supreme Court heard Bormans report. The theme of his 

talk was that Apollo 8 "was a triumph of all mankind." The three astronauts went to the Department of State auditorium for a press conference, 

to describe their trip and answer questions from the news media. New York 

City welcomed them with a ticker-tape parade on the lOth of January, 

Newark hailed them on the lith, and Miami greeted them on the 12th 

during the Super Bowl football game. They returned to Houston on the 

13th for a hometown parade. Incoming President Richard M. Nixon sent 

Borman and his family on an eight-nation goodwill tour of western Europe; 

they visited London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, Berlin, Rome, 

Madrid, and Lisbon. Everywhere they went, the moon travelers depicted 

the earth as a spaceship and stressed international cooperation in space. 70 

Now, 1969-the year President Kennedy had set for meeting his challenge-was here. North American's command and service modules had 

proved that they were ready to achieve that goal. It was time for Grumman's 

lunar module to be put through some strenuous rehearsals to prepare it 

for the last-and perhaps the most difficult-100 kilometers of the 380 000­

kilometer voyage. 

284 
1969: First Half 

A pollo's successes in the seventh and eighth missions augured 

..l'1. a manned landing on the moon during 1969. But program e

were not complaisant about even these demonstrations of the comm

service modules and the Saturn V. Nor did they exhibit any ten

depart from a systematic step-by-step plan and to stampede towar

landing earlier than scheduled, although President Kennedy's 

year had arrived. 

Frank Borman's Apollo 8 crew in its flight near the moon ha

major obstacles, but the need for trailblazing missions had not 

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George Mueller 

ington wrote Center Director Robert Gilruth in Houston after Ap

remind him, "It is essential that we not rest on our laurels, for we 

to land on the moon." Gilruth foresaw few chances for resting. O

days of the new year had passed when John D. Stevenson, Di

Mission Operations in Washington, projected five Apollo flights 

with launches on 28 February, 17 May, 15 July, 12 September

December. This schedule was essentially the same race-with-t

timetable outlined a year earlier.

1 

ScHEDULES AND LINGERING WoRRIES 

NASA had scheduled six missions in 1968 but had found 

necessary (see Chapters 10 and 11) . The agency could also om

m 1969, if the crew of the G mission listed for 15 July could tou

285 
little in return for the costs in time and money. The second idea, proposed 

by Apollo Program Director Samuel Phillips, was to ship the command and 

service modules to the Cape already assembled and mated, rather than 

separately. Houston's Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager George Low informed Phillips it would save time at Kennedy but would add time at 

Downey. It would also cost an extra million dollars. 4 

Good reasoning lay behind this paradox of both hurrying and holding 

back. Ever-present desk and wall calendars kept reminding the managers 

that time was running out, yet they had to guard against another terrible 

tragedy in the program. Two areas, however, were viewed with satisfaction-program costs and spacecraft weights. Both North American and 

Grumman were operating within fiscal 1969 financial limits. And, although 

fire-related changes in the command and service modules had increased the 

weight significantly, NASA and North American had reversed this trend in 

the latter half of 1967. In the succeeding months, the command module's 

bulk had actually been whittled down. Lunar module weight, however, 

did not stabilize until mid-1968, and that machine still had some lingering 

technical troubles. 5 

One of the more exasperating problems was the electrical wiring in 

LM-3. Kennedy Space Center engineers had complained about the vehicle 

ever since its arrival in Florida in June 1968. In late January 1969, Low 

asked Martin L. Raines, reliability and quality assurance chief in Houston, 

to find out just how bad the wiring was. Raines told the Apollo manager 

that he had found hundreds of splices in the vehicle, but it could still fly 

safely. Most of the broken wiring, Raines said, was caused by the low 

tensile strength of the annealed copper wire. The wiring in LM-4, ticketed 

for Apollo 10, should cause fewer problems, since a high-strength copper 

alloy would be used. 6 

Another recurring lander ailment was stress corrosion, or metal crack286 
flight program review in October 1968, Phillips asked about the pr

steering the lightweight ascent stage manually. Gilruth directe

J. North and Donald C. Cheatham to find out what the difficult

be. North and Cheatham reported that docking would requi

control but that this and other guidance tasks had been successf

lated at Bethpage, in Houston, and at Langley. 8 

Perhaps the biggest concern before Apollo 9 was the docking m

A 1972 report revealed that there was little confidence in th

system in early 1969. At a January program review, Phillips said 

lems encountered during probe and drogue testing worried him

eral occasions, when the command module's extendable probe ha

into the lander's funnel-shaped drogue, the capture latches had 

engage. In other tests, they had only partially caught, raising th

of "jack-knifing" and possible damage to one of the spacecraft, pro

lunar module. Phillips was also concerned that the sharp edg

probe might scar the drogue when the craft were reeled tog

prevent airtight sealing of the 12 latches on the command modul

ring. Low asked his deputy, Kenneth Kleinknecht, to investiga

January, Kleinknecht and six others* from the Manned Spacecr

went to Downey to see what was being done about correcting 

problem areas. North American personnel responded to each cr

the satisfaction of the team. 9 

Although the spacecraft occupied the center ring of concern

Space Flight Center focused on a nagging item a little lower in 

• The team members were Maxime A. Faget, Engineering and Development

Kotanchik, Structures and Mechanics; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Flight Operations; 

liability and Quality Assurance; Donald K. Slayton,. Flig·ht Crew Operations; and 

Brendle (secretary) , the Apollo Spacecr;J.ft Program Office. 
A DouBLE WoRKLOAD 

Apollo 9 gave the Kennedy launch preparations team its first opportunity to simulate the launch of a lunar landing mission all the way through 

liftoff. (Apollo 8, with only the command and service modules aboard, represented just half the spacecraft preparation task.) This time-in addition 

to checking, stacking, and rechecking the multistage Saturn V-the team had 

to get two spacecraft ready for flight and launch them. The beehive of 

activities, employing thousands of persons, grew more frenzied as hardware 

for several missions began arriving regularly from the factories. For example, before Apollo 8 left its launch pad on 21 December 1968, all the 

pieces of Apollo 9 and some of the parts for Apollo 10 were already in 

Florida. 

Spacecraft docking devices: the 

command module probe and 

docking ring at left; the lunar 

module drogue at right. 
tached to the service module, a cracked quad was found. Whil

being evaluated, the command module and the lunar module we

together for a docking test. The command module was then mo

altitude chamber for tests similar to those the lunar module h

gone, and the lander was hauled into a hangar for the inst

such components as the rendezvous radar, antennas, and pyrotech

time to time, the command and service modules, the lunar mod

launch vehicle were either a few days ahead of or behind the sc

mid-December, however, Mueller told Paine that all vehicle

time. 12 

On 3 January, the big stacked vehicle lumbered on its car

the assembly building and crawled toward Launch Complex 

flight simulations, linked with the control center in Houston, a

normal jobs at the pad-cabin leak checks, electrical power tests

ponent operations, among others-were going on, some engin

working on technical problems that had cropped up during pre

sions. One was the fogging spacecraft windows, particularly the 

in the hatch door. Samples of contaminants from CSM-101 and 

were studied, and the hatch window from 101 was tested by su

to the hot and cold extremes met in space. Some thought a bett

for curing the glass might eliminate the fogging, but others, ana

residue from thruster firings, were not at all sure that the spac

ment was the problem. If firings from the reaction control thrust

steered the spacecraft) were smudging the windows, there migh

a solution. 13 

As the work progressed, the accumulated information was fe

management reviews. The certification review, which covered 

hardware (including suits), was held at NASA Headquarters on 

Flight readiness reviews were later conducted for each of the veh
operations in earth orbit. Most Apollo mission planners wanted to avoid 

the extra tasks required for launching each vehicle on separate Saturn IB 

boosters, and by 1969 the big Saturn V rocket was all set to boost both 

spacecraft into earth orbit in a single launch. Although McDivitt and his 

crew would not have to search for the lunar module in the vastness of 

space for the. rendezvous, this was almost the only thing that made it an 

easier mission. 

From the perspective of early 1969, the manned shakedown cruise of 

the lunar module, even in earth orbit, was a venturesome journey. The 

thought of mission commander McDivitt and lunar module pilot Schweickart's flying away from the command module in this machine, which could 

not return to earth through the atmospheric shield, was a little frightening. 

In an emergency, however, command module pilot Scott could steer his ship 

to a rendezvous with a stricken lunar module. NASA officials hoped this 

would not be necessary; they wanted a smoothly operating lunar module 

that could simulate many of the steps in the lunar orbit missionY 

Flight planners had another key objective for Apollo 9: checking 

out what might almost be called the third spacecraft in the program 

(a combination of the extravehicular space suit and the portable life 

support system-the PLSS, or backpack) . As a matter of fact, this was 

the only flight scheduled for the backpack before the lunar landing mission, 

making it of prime importance in finding out how the equipment worked 

in the space environment. The commander and the lunar module pilot, 

• And this despite elaborate precautions taken to isoLate the crewmen and protect them from 

whatever virus might be making the rounds during the last few days before launch. This 

launch was the first to be delayed by crew illness. Since the mission simula·tors had been able 

to provide training for only the prime crew the last month before Apollo 9 was scheduled for 

launch, the backup crew was not ready to fly on 28 February. 

290 
crewman on Gemini VIII when it made the first docking in space. A

Schweickart had not flown a mission, he had participated heavily 

experiments program and in spacesuit testing. For two years the th

McDivitt and Schweickart (left to right in left photo) practice in th

module simulator for the Apollo 9 mission to evaluate the LM in ea

operations and the Apollo suit in the space environment. Although 

crewmen would be exposed to the space environment, where their live

depend on their suits, only Schweickart would don the backpack (righ

that provided independent life-sustaining oxygen and controlled temp

McDivitt and Scott would draw supplies through umbilical hoses attach

suits to the spacecraft. Schweikart's backpack is the same model that mo

ling astronauts would later use. 
7. But a single designation, such as Apollo 9, was no longer enough. 

Flight control would have to talk to McDivitt and Schweickart in the lunar 

module, as well as Scott in the command module. McDivitt's crew named 

the lander "Spider," for its long thin legs and buglike body. When North 

American shipped the command module to Florida, its candy-wrapped appearance and shape suggested the tag, "Gumdrop." 18 

Apollo 9: EARTH ORBITAL TRIALS 

For the 19th flight of American astronauts into space, Vice President 

Spiro T. Agnew, representing the new administration of Richard Nixon, 

sat in the firing control room viewing area on 3 March 1969. He and other 

guests listened to the countdown of the tall Saturn-Apollo structure several 

kilometers away at the edge of the Florida beach. Fully recovered from their 

stuffy heads and runny noses, McDivitt, Scott, and Schweickart lay in the 

mixed-atmosphere cabin of CSM-104. Breathing pure oxygen through the 

suit system, they tried to adjust an inlet valve that seemed to have two 

temperature ranges-too hot and too cold. That was their only problem. Less 

than one second after its scheduled ll: 00 a.m. EST liftoff time, Apollo 9 

rumbled upwardY 

In Houston, where more than 200 newsmen had registered to cover 

the mission, Flight Director Eugene F. Kranz and Mission Director George 

H. Hage* watched the displays on their consoles while McDivitt and CapCom Stuart Roosa called off the events of the launch sequence. There were 

• Hage had replaced William Schneider when Schneider was named to head the Apollo 

Applications Program (later Skylab) after the death of its director, Harold T. Luskin. 

292 
y

able to go about their duties, checking instruments and extending 

ing probe. After more than a circuit, 2 hours 43 minutes into th

Scott lit the pyrotechnics that separated the command and servic

from the S-IVB stage and began one of the critical steps in the l

concept. He fired the thrusters and pulled the command ship aw

the ship around, fired again, and drew near what he called the "b

Then he noticed that the command module's nose was out of lin

lander's nose. Scott tried to use a service module thruster to tur

that jet was not operating. The crew then flipped some switch

started the thruster working, and at 3 hours 2 minutes the 

module probe nestled into the lunar module drogue, where it wa

and held by the latches.21 

After docking, McDivitt and Schweickart began preparing 

eventual entry into the lunar module. First, they opened a valv

surize the tunnel between the two spacecraft. ',Yith Scott reading 

list aloud, McDivitt and Schweickart removed the command mod

and checked the 12 latches on the docking ring to verify the 

they connected the electrical umbilical lines that would provide 

module power to the lander while the vehicles were docked. 

checked the drogue carefully and found no large scars. Meanwhile, 

art glanced out the spacecraft window and failed to see the lunar 

the darkness, which scared him. "Oh, my God!" he exclaime

looked out the window and the LM wasn't there." Scott laughe

it would be "pretty hard [not to] have a LM out there .. . with 

tunneL" McDivitt put the hatch back in place until time to tra

the lander. About an hour later, an ejection mechanism kicked t

spacecraft away from the S-IVB. Apollo 9 backed away, and the Sa

stage, after firing twice, headed for solar orbit. 22 
their machines. And that was a good thing, since they next had to make a 

280-second burn, to produce an added velocity of 783 meters per second. 

This lightened the service module's fuel load by 8462 kilograms and made 

it easier to turn the vehicles with the reaction control jets. The firing also 

altered the flight path and raised the apogee of the orbit from 357 to 509 

kilometers, to provide better ground tracking and lighting conditions during the rendezvous. Scott later reported that they had the sensation that the 

docked vehicles were bending slightly in the tunnel area, but the maneuver 

produced oscillations only one-third to one-half as large as they had expected from training. As the big engine fired, McDivitt commented, "SPS 

... is no sweat." The astronauts were growing so used to the propulsion 

system that they hardly mentioned its fourth burn. Perhaps they were 

thinking of their next trailblazing chore, when two of them would crawl 

into the lunar module and check out its systems. 24 

After they woke in the morningt and ate breakfast, McDivitt and 

Schweickart put on their pressure suits. Schweickart suddenly vomited. 

Fortunately, he kept his mouth shut until he could reach a bag. Although 

he did not feel particularly nauseated, both he and McDivitt became 

slightly disoriented when getting into their suits. For a few seconds, they 

could not tell up from down, which gave them a queasy feeling. Scott, already dressed, removed the command module hatch, the probe, and the 

drogue from the tunnel so his colleagues could get into the lunar module. 

Schweickart slid easily through the 81-centimeter tunnel, opened the lunar 

module hatch, and went next door in the first intervehicular transfer in 

• John Young and Michael Collins a•board Gemini X and Conrad and Richard Gordon in 

Gemini 	XI had boosted their spacecraft to higher altitudes with the help of the Agena. 

t For the first •time in an Apollo mission, all three crewmen slept at the same time. 

294 
waving a red flag, causing repercussions and a spate of unfriendly 

On this second occasion, the impulse to vomit came on just as sud

as it had earlier, while Schweickart was busy flipping switches. A

he felt much better and moved around the cabin normally, bu

lost his appetite for anything except liquids and fruits for the r

of the voyage. 25 

As soon as he was sure the systems were operating properly, 

asked Scott to put the command module into neutral control, so 

check out the lunar module's steering system. McDivitt then ope

small thrusters to get the docked vehicles into the correct position 

the lunar module's throttleable descent propulsion system. Seco

starting the large descent engine, McDivitt shouted, "Look at t

tude] ball; my God, we hardly have any errors." Twenty-six seco

at full thrust, he reported that errors were still practically nonexi

fact, things were going so smoothly that halfway through the 371

exercise, the commander felt hungry-not an uncommon sensat

him. So he ate before crawling back into the command module. Sc

stayed behind to shut everything down and straighten up the cab

joining the others in Gumdrop. The lander appeared to be a de

machine. 26 

After Schweickart had vomited on two occasions, McDivitt w

ful that the lunar module pilot would be able to handle his chore

the spacecraft. The commander recommended to flight control 

exercise be limited to cabin depressurization. Flight control agreed 

• Since it had been over so quickly, leaving no aftereffects, Schweickart's first s

not been reported to the ground. When it happened again, four hours later, McDivi

medical advice, which started the controversy. 
art wearing the portable life support system and the lunar module umbilical 

hoses,* and with both the lunar module and command module hatches 

open. On the fourth day of flight, working his way into the lander to get 

it ready, Schweickart felt livelier than he had expected. By the time he had 

put on the backpack, McDivitt was ready to let him do more-to stand on 

the porch at least. Flight control told the commander to use his own judgment. So McDivitt fastened Schweickart to the nylon-cord tether that would 

keep him from floating away from the spacecraft.27 

Once Schweickart had entered this "third spacecraft," to become essentially a self-contained unit, flight control ran a communications check 

with PLSS, as they first called him. The four-way conversation-between 

Spider, Gumdrop, PLSS, and the Houston control center-was much clearer 

than they had expected. Lunar module depressurization also went smoothly. 

Schweickart could tell that his backpack was operating, since he could hear 

water gurgling while he watched his pressure indicator. He was quite comfortable. McDivitt had to use more force than he had anticipated to tum 

the hatch latch handle and more strength to swing the hatch inside. He 

was very careful to keep the door pushed back, fearing it might stick closed, 

leaving Schweickart outside.

28 

Once the lunar module hatch was opened, Scott pushed the command 

module hatch outward. Scheickart, who now called himself Red Rover because of his rust-colored hair, enjoyed the view and did so well outside on 

the platform in the golden slippers that McDivitt decided to let him try 

out the handrails. Hanging on with one hand as he moved about, he took 

• For operations outside the spacecraft, Apollo astronauts wore an extravehicular mobility 

uni't (EMU) , consisting of a pressure-garment a'ssembly with helmet and integrated thermal 

garment; gloves; visor assembly; boots; liquid-cooled undergarment; portable li-fe suppor,t 

system (PLSS, or back!pack) , with communicators and remote control unit; and oxygen purge 

system. Total cost of ·the EMU was $400 000. 

296 
Apollo 9 flight, 3-13 March 1969. 

After reaching earth orbit, the crew 

separated from the Saturn V's S-IVB 

stage and turned the command 

module around to face the lunar 

module, still attached to the stage 

(above). Command module pilot 

Scott maneuvered the CM probe 

into the dish-shaped drogue on the 

LM and pulled out the lunar craft. 

At top right, Schweickart stands 

with camera in hand on LM Spider's 

porch to be photographed from the 

CM by Scott. At lower right, Scott, 

standing in the open hatch of CM 

Gumdrop, is photographed in turn 

by Schweickart. Below, McDivitt 

and Schweickart show Spider's landing gear to Scott before they pull 

away to evaluate lunar module operations. Spider is flying upside 

down to the earth far beneath. 
had been behind the schedule. On 7 March, they got up an hour earlier 

than usual. They also obtained permission from flight control to move into 

the lunar module without helmets and oxygen hoses, which made it easier 

to go through the checklist and to set up the module for the coming 

maneuvers. Soon both spacecraft were ready. When Scott tried to release 

the lunar module, however, it hung on the capture latches. He punched the 

button again and the lander dropped away. McDivitt watched the widening 

distance between the two craft. Spider then made a 90-degree pitch and a 

360-degree yaw maneuver, so Scott could see its legs. 30 

After drifting around within 4 kilometers of the command module 

for 45 minutes, McDivitt fired the lunar module's descent propulsion engine to increase the distance to nearly 23 kilometers. The motor was 

smooth until it achieved 10-percent thrust. When McDivitt advanced the 

throttle to 20 percent, the engine chugged noisily. McDivitt stopped throttling and waited. Within seconds, the chugging stopped. He accelerated to 

40 percent before shutting down and had no more problems. McDivitt and 

Schweickart checked the systems and fired the descent engine again, to a 

10-percent throttle setting; this time it ran evenly. As they moved off in a 

nearly circular orbit 23 kilometers above the command module, they had 

no trouble seeing Gumdrop, even after the distance stretched to 90 kilometers. From the command module, Scott could spot the lander as far 

away as 160 kilometers with the help of a sextant. Estimating distances 

was difficult, but the radar furnished accurate figures. 

This new orbit, higher than that of the command ship, created the 

paradox associated with orbital mechanics of speeding up to go slow. Being 

higher above the earth (i.e., farther out from it) than the command 

module, the lander took longer to circle the globe. Spider gradually moved 

away, -hailing 185 kilometers behind Gumdrop. To begin the rendezvous, 

McDivitt and Schweickart flipped their craft over and fired the thrusters 

against the flight path to slow their speed enough to drop below the com298 
hard for Scott to spot. At that point, remembering the problem t

breaking away, McDivitt told Scott to make sure the command mod

ready for docking. As he approached the other craft, the commande

his machine in all directions so Scott could inspect its exterior. M

six hours after leaving the command module, McDivitt settled th

firmly back into place and then reported, "I have capture." The 12 

on the docking ring caught the lunar module and held it fast. 

stretch of the trail to the moon had been blazed. The lunar modu

leave the command module, find its way back to it, and dock safe

Even before crawling back into the command module, McDi

he was tired and ready for a three-day holiday. Another 140 hour

pass before touchdown in the Atlantic, but the crew had achiev

than 90 percent of the mission objectives. There were still things to 

as making more service module engine burns (a total of eight throug

flight) and jettisoning the ascent stage. Ground control radioed 

signal to park the lunar module in a 6965- by 235-kilometer orb

crew watched the departing craft a while and then settled down to t

mundane tasks of checking systems, conducting navigation sightin

taking pictures. 33 

After 151 revolutions in 10 days, I hour, and 1 minute, A

splashed safely down in the Atlantic, northeast of Puerto Rico

March 1969, completing a 6-million-kilometer flight that had cost 

mated $340 million. Less than an hour later, the crew was depos

helicopter, aboard the carrier U.S.S. Guadalcanal. Then the debriefi

celebrations began. At a ceremony in Washington, with an address 

President Agnew, lunar module development leaders Carroll Bol

the Manned Spacecraft Center and Llewellyn Evans of Grumm

given the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and NASA Public 

Award, respectively. NASA officials were stimulated by the path-
gg

control also wanted a chance to review operation, tracking, and communications procedures of both vehicles while they were actually in the vicinity 

of the moon. The crews and controllers had been through many simulations, but it would take a real mission to give them the confidence they 

needed. Apollo 10 was to be a dress rehearsal, complete with a cast that 

included a lunar module capable of a lunar landing. 35 

The basics of the mission plan had been conceived in the spring of 

1967. When, the next autumn, Low and his men outlined the alphabetical 

sequence of the route to the moon, Apollo 10 was assigned the "F" role, 

a lunar-orbit flight with all components. Toward the end of 1968, the mission planning and trajectory analysis people in Houston, led by John 

Mayer, Tindall, and Carl Huss (all veterans dating back to Mercury), 

buckled down to work out the refinements. 

One feature was a two-phase lunar-orbit insertion maneuver introduced on Apollo 8. The vehicle would begin the first revolution of the moon 

in an egg-shaped orbit, to avoid an unsafe pericynthion (known in earth 

orbit as a perigee-that is, the lowest point). If the service module engine 

fired too long and slowed the speed too much on the first burn, that part 

of the circuit must not be so low that the spacecraft would crash into the 

lunar surface. On Borman's mission the engine had fired for an excess of 

almost five seconds. On the next burn, to circularize the orbit, the duration 

of the firing was adjusted to keep the craft a safe distance above the moon. 

"Weren't we smart?" Tindall asked his colleagues, when this became a 

standing procedure for Apollo 10 and the lunar landing missions that 

followed. 

As first planned, the lunar module on Apollo 10 would simply pull 

away from the command module and return for rendezvous and docking; 

but in December 1968 Tindall and the mission planners began campaigning 

to put the descent propulsion system through a real test down near the 

300 
quite satisfied with CSM-106* and with North American's perform

its checkout and delivery to the Cape on 25 November I968. 3 7 

Although the contractors had shipped excellent spacecraft, prep

at Kennedy did not go lickety-split from the assembly building 

launch pad. Staying out of the way of Apollo 9 preflight activities 

testing several days. And during maintenance to the Launch Contr

ter, the electrical power was cut off to replace a valve. The Ap

launch vehicle's pneumatic controls sensed the power cutoff, opene

valves (the normal failure mode for these components), and dumped 

liters of fuel (RP-1-similar to kerosene) on the pad. Besides lo

propellant, the fuel tank bulkhead buckled. Technicians applie

pressure to the tank, which removed all but a few wrinkles. L

vehicle preparation team lowered a man inside to inspect the tank; h

find no further damage. Tests of the stage through the first week 

1969 revealed no loss of structural integrity. 38 

Actually, neither spacecraft nor booster preparations held 

launch a single day, although adjustments in the launch date fo

reasons probably helped the hardware teams to maintain schedules

January, NASA changed the anticipated sendoff from 1 to 17 Ma

the lunar launch window (optimum position of the moon in rel

earth for this mission) and to provide more time for crew training

on 17 March Phillips postponed the liftoff till the second day of the 

window (to 18 May), so the crew could get a better look at c

landing sites. 39 

LM-4 and CSM-106 went through their flight readiness review

same day, II April, with very nearly the same men passing on th

• CS>M-105 had been assigned as a ground test spacecraft in May 1968. 
The Apollo 10 crew had about 5 hours of formal training for each of 

the 192 hours it would spend on the lunar-orbital trip. Completely satisfied 

with the training program ("down to the nth degree," as Stafford later 

said) , the crew was especially pleased with the time spent in the simulators. 

Putting Stafford and Cernan in the lunar module simulator and Young in 

the command module trainer and then linking them with mission control 

provided situations remarkably like those faced during actual missions. 

They had four or five such sessions in the Houston simulators. When they 

arrived at the Cape, they would practice rendezvous maneuvers in no other 

way. During the more than 300 hours each man spent in the simulators, 

other tasks-such as reentry, launch abort, transearth injection, and translunar injection-were also studied. That this was a veteran crew was readily 

apparent in later remarks about such training aids as planetariums (Cernan 

said they had been looking at the stars for five years) and the centrifuge 

(Stafford said he had not been in one since Gemini III)Y 

Stafford's crew picked its flight patch in March. The patch displayed 

two craft flying above the lunar surface, with a Roman numeral X and 

the earth in the background. The astronauts also selected their call-signs, 

"Charlie Brown" for the command module and "Snoopy"t for the lander. 

Julian Scheer, NASA's public affairs administrator, greeted these nicknames, as well as those of Spider and Gumdrop for Apollo 9, with raised 

• During all phases of Apollo- seven more lunar flights, three Skylab miSSions, and one 

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight--there was only one other all-veteran crew: Neil Armstrong, 

Edwin Aldrin, and Michael Collins on Apollo 11 . 

t These names-of a small boy and a beagle- were borrowed from the popular comic strip 

"Peanuts," created by Charles L. Schultz. Schultz' drawings were also used by NASA to promote 

manned space flight safety awareness. Persons making nntable contributions in this field were 

given "Silver Snoopy Award" pins by the astronauts. 

302 
dropped off but he could not squeeze the words out. When the rem

of the stack steadied, the S-II second stage (already firing) had th

pogo tendencies. The three astronauts had begun to wonder if the v

would hold together, especially the lunar module below them, wh

S-IVB third stage fired, growling, rumbling, and vibrating as it sh

earth orbit. 43 

During the systems review period, the ride smoothed. Lunney c

the men at the monitors in the control room and they all voted 

for translunar injection. Stafford's crewmen considered not wearin

helmets and gloves but "chickened out," as Young phrased it, an

them on. They probably found the extra garb comforting when the 

fired, because the third stage again groaned and shook. None of th

were confident of being able to continue the trip much longer, and 

wondered how the mission could be safely aborted at this point in 

The guidance system kept Apollo 10 on a steady course, however, an

were on their way. 44 

When Young pulled the command module away from the S-IV

crew saw the panels that had housed the lunar module drift away

the command module was flipped around, it was 45 meters away fr

third stage, about three times farther than intended, but it would tak

a little extra gas to get back for docking. As the CM moved aroun

mission controllers on the ground watched the maneuvers, in "living 

Television had worked so well on other Apollo flights that NAS

decided to put a color system on Stafford's command module. W

only 5.5 kilograms, the Westinghouse camera included a 7.5-cen

monitor to show the astronauts what they were transmitting. Now flig

• King Baudoin and Queen Fabiola of the Belgians flew to KSC on Air Force One t

before liftoff. 
spotted a few dim orbs after he had traveled 190 000 kilometers into space. 

But not much navigating was needed; the course was so true that the 

service module propulsion system was used only once, to add 15 meters per 

second to their speed, at 26 hours into the voyage. This firing put the spacecraft on a lunar path that would lead the crew over the exact spot where 

the first landing might be made. The rest of the time the astronauts studied 

the flight plan, slept, ate, and beamed five excellent television transmissions 

back to the earth.46 

Stafford, Cernan, and Young were the first Apollo pilots to be free from 

illness during the mission, although Cernan experienced a slight vestibular 

disturbance. Like all their colleagues who had flown before, once they unbuckled from the couches they had a stuffy feeling in their heads. This 

lasted for 8 to I 0 hours for Stafford and Young; Cernan gradually lost 

the sensation over the next two days. He practiced "cardinal head movements" that the medics thought might help overcome his slight feeling of 

nausea. Although he was able to do the exercise for more than four minutes 

at a session by the seventh day of flight, when he returned to earth he 

lambasted the procedure, saying it must have been designed to bring on 

illness rather than to alleviate it. 47 

The crew slept well, although thruster firing bothered Cernan the first 

night. Later, when they were circling the moon, the men were glad that 

McDivitt's crew had suggested they carry a sleeping bag apiece. The spacecraft grew cold once the windows had been covered to darken the cabin 

for sleeping. 

One major complaint the astronauts registered was about their water 

supply. They were supposed to chlorinate it at night; because of an error in 

procedures passed to them by flight control, Stafford had a double dose of 

chlorine when he took a drink during the first breakfast of the trip. This 

was unpleasant, but it posed no major problem. Something else in the water 

304 
food on this diet. The sausage patties, for example, tasted like gr

rubber and left an unpleasant taste. With all the difficulties of pre

Arabian added, by the third day continuing the test was a chore

like the items that were closest to normal table foods. Stafford's c

found some of the newer dishes that could be eaten with a spo

palatable. But the men dreaded reconstituting the dehydrated meal

ing that the water contained so much gas.49 

Unlike Borman's crew, which could not see the moon with the 

eye until the spacecraft was almost upon it, Stafford's group spott

the second day of flight. On the earth, it looked like a waxing cres

Stafford and Young, with the help of earthshine, could see almo

moon. Although the moon was much bigger at 200 000 kilometers a

earth, landmarks on the lunar surface still could not be picked out

also asked flight controllers if they thought he could really recog

S-IVB stage 5600 kilometers away, because that was what he though

seeing. The CapCom told him that the men in the control roo

nodding their heads yes and that the distance between the two 

actually measured 7 400 kilometers. 50 

When Apollo 10 reached the lunar vicinity on 21 May, the co

informed the crewmen that at one time or another more than 

persons had watched their televised activities. But interest now fo

the exact moment when their craft would shoot around the moon 

communications with the earth. At 74 hours 45 minutes into the 

flight control predicted that loss of signal would come at 75 h

minutes, 24 seconds. The controllers had already determined that 

would reach the moon ll minutes later than scheduled, since th

been only one midcourse correction, rather than two. Its trajector

be 110 kilometers above the lunar surface. 51 

The crew was impressed by the lunar landscape, although 
They liked the slower pace, because on the first circuit they would pass 

directly over the area where Apollo 11 was due to land two months later. 

They had barely rounded the corner before Stafford and Ceman began 

describing the physical features down the highway they called "U.S. 1," 

leading to the landing site. By the third circuit, the world was sharing the 

view on color television. Watchers could see the gray, white, black, and 

brownish tints of the landing site, which seemed to be free from boulders, 

providing a smooth landing field. 53 

Six hours after reaching the moon, Cernan and Stafford began getting 

the lander ready. The hatches, probe, and drogue were easily removed. As 

he entered the lunar module, Cernan was greeted by a snowstorm of mylar 

insulation, apparently sucked into the vehicle through a vent from the 

tunnel. The insulating material had come loose in the tunnel, and the 

crewmen had spent some time capturing and cleaning it up in the command 

module. Now they had the same job to do in the lunar module. 

Cernan had floated head down through the tunnel into the lunar 

module. Because the two spacecraft were locked together from top to top, 

his own private world had a new orientation. He later commented that the 

best way to handle this psychologically was to slide through the hatch, look 

around, and then mentally assign an arbitrary up and down. Once he had 

accepted the new environment, he had no problems in checking, hauling 

in equipment, and getting things in order. The crew had intended to leave 

the passageway to the lander open after returning to the command ship, but 

the hardware was too bulky. It was simpler, and quite easy, to put the 

probe and drogue back into place. 54 

Flight control had planned to let the crew sleep until the last moment 

on 22 May, when Stafford and Cernan would leave Young and fly the lander 

down near the lunar surface. But, after playing "The Best Is Yet to Come" 

and sounding reveille, ground control found that the astronauts had 

306 
docking. Stafford and Cernan would be stranded in lunar orbit 

way back except by going out the lander hatch and making thei

the command module hatch-a dangerous undertaking. But Low, 

in the control room at the time, told Flight Director Lunney that 

as the misalignment was less than six degrees they could go ah

undock. 56 

Just before Apollo 10 rounded the corner to the back of th

flight control passed the good news to Stafford. The two crewmen 

Snoopy heard a "pow" as they broke free. Young, all alone in w

seemed to be an unusually large command module, turned on the t

camera so the flight controllers back on the earth could help him in

lander. Meanwhile the lunar module landing gear had deployed 

in place. The lander's systems checked out well, especially the ra

abort guidance system, the antennas, and the pressurization of the 

propulsion system. Everything looked good, and everybody was rea

Telling Young not to get too lonesome and not to go off and lea

Stafford and Cernan announced that they were ready to go do

snoop around the moon.

57 

Young had used his service module thrusters to pull Charli

nine meters away from the lunar module for the inspection. He t

the same jets a spurt to thrust downward toward the moon until 

vehicles were three and a half kilometers apart. Stafford and Cern

ready to try, for the first time, another of the operations with a si

• Getting into and out of the suits in the small lunar module would be difficult, th

realized, although they found that putting them on was not too great a chore. S

cedures would h ave to be worked out for crews that would remain in the lander 

periods. 
Apollo 10: dress rehearsal for the lunar landing. In the launch control room 18 May 1969, 

Apollo officials (below, standing left to right) 

George Low, Samuel Phillips, Donald Slayton, and (seated left to right) john Williams, 

Walter Kapryan, and Kurt Debus listen to the 

countdown for the launch that would send 

three astronauts toward the moon. At 66 600 

kilometers outward bound, the crew televised 

a near-ci1·cular view of the earth (right) to 

Mission Control and the public. They also 

photographed the view (above), showing 

much of the North American continent. 
Selected Apollo lunar landing sites (above). The Apollo 10 crew photo

Sites 1, 2, and 3. Site 1 area (left) was on the eastern side of the Sea 

quility. Site 2 (center) was on the southwestern part of the sea. And Site 

was on the lunar equator, in Central Bay; topographic features are acc

by the low-sun angle. 

Young, by himself in CM Charlie 

Brown, said that LM Snoopy 

carrying Stafford and Cernan 

close to the moon below looked 

like a spider crawling on the 

lunar surface. Young photographed the returning lunar 

module, which successfully demonstrated the lunar-orbit rendezvous operations. 
ppp, g , , gy 

went along. They appeared to be traveling exactly over the track they 

wanted, reaching a low point of 14 447 meters above the surface. They took 

many pictures; then Stafford's camera failed as the film started to bind. He 

described the landing site as much like "the desert in California around 

Blythe." If a lander touched down on the near end, it would have a smooth 

landing, he said; but, if it wound up at the far end of the zone, extra fuel 

would be needed for maneuvering to a clear spot. Their landing radar 

worked perfectly when they tested it, and the pilots remarked that they had 

no visibility problems with lighting and sun angles. 59 

Young caught sight of the lunar module at a distance of 120 kilometers; 

Snoopy appeared to be running across the lunar surface like a spider. At 

other times, using a sextant, he spotted the craft as far away as 550 kilometers. An hour after the first descent burn, Stafford and Cernan fired the 

engine again, to shape the trajectory for their return to the command 

module. Shoving the throttle forward for 40 seconds and 100 percent thrust, 

Stafford was happy to note that there was still no chugging. Young tried to 

see the flames from the engine but could not. Although the lander's speed 

had increased by 54 meters per second, the crew again had the impression 

that acceleration was slow. During these activities, the lunar module had a 

"hot [open] mike," which was fine with Young, since it kept him informed 

of what was happening in the lander. But whenever he talked, he had a 

feedback of his own voice. Somebody would have to fix that before the next 

mission, he said. 60 

After Stafford's camera failed, he and Cernan had little to do except 

look at the scenery until time to dump the descent stage. Stafford had the 

vehicle in the right attitude 10 minutes early. Cernan asked, "You ready?" 

Then he suddenly exclaimed, "Son of a bitch!" Snoopy seemed to be throwing a fit, lurching wildly about. He later said it was like flying an Immel310 
matic, the computer would take over the guidance and start looking 

command module, which was certainly not what the crew wanted to 

then. In correcting for a minor yaw-rate-gyro disturbance, the pi

accidentally switched the spacecraft to the automatic mode, and the 

gyrations resulted. From Cernan's startled ejaculation to Stafford'

that everything was under control took only three minutes. Flight 

told the crewmen they had made an error in switching, but the sys

fine. They could fire the ascent engine. After the firing, the lander fl

Stafford called a "Dutch roll," yawing and pitching and snakin

When the engine shut down, however, to the crew's surprise the attit

flight path to the command module were correct. From a maximum 

of 630 kilometers, the thrust from the ascent engine moved the lunar 

to within 78 kilometers of the mother ship. 62 

As the lunar module approached, Young saw it through his se

a distance of 259 kilometers. Stafford and Cernan got a radar lock 

command module shortly after the insertion burn and watched with 

as the instrument measured the dwindling gap between the vehi

demonstrated the theories of orbital mechanics in actual practice. 

especially liked the steady communications that kept both crews a

what was happening. After watching the command module from as 

as 167 kilometers and then losing sight of it at sunset, the lunar 

pilots saw Charlie Brown's flashing light with their unaided eyes at 

meters. At last, the two craft were only eight meters apart, and the 

speed between them was zero. Stafford did find the ascent stage a li

cult to hold steady, just as Conrad had suspected, but Young slid th

smoothly into the dead center of the drogue. Stafford rammed th

module forward, and the capture latches closed with a loud bang. 6

Stafford and Cernan had been gone for more than eight hou

they were ready to get back into the command module and rest. T
engine to fuel depletion (249 seconds) and sent the lunar module into solar 

orbit. The crew watched it move away; Snoopy was soon out of sight. Stafford and his crew went back to tracking landmarks on the surface below 

for the upcoming lunar landing mission. 6 4 

After 31 circuits, the crew fired the service module engine to begin the 

return to the earth. On 26 May 1969, Apollo 10 streaked through the early 

morning darkness like a shooting star, to splash down in the Pacific 690 

kilometers from Samoa and only 6 kilometers from the prime recovery ship. 

The journey had taken 192 hours, 3 minutes, 23 seconds. A helicopter picked 

the crew up and carried them to the U.S.S. Princeton within the hour. This 

fantastic voyage was over and had revealed absolutely no reason why Apollo 

11 could not negotiate the final few kilometers to the lunar surface. The 

trail had been blazed. 65 

312 
To Land on the Moon 

1960-July 1969 

W hen Apollo 11 stood on its launch pad in July 1969, NAS

tractor engineers had done everything they could to make 

ready for a lunar landing. In the eight years since President K

issued his challenge, thousands of persons had designed, develop

ured out how to use the millions of pieces that made up the lau

and spacecraft.

1 Confidence in this hardware had come from sev

one of them to within a few kilometers of the target. By and 

worries about the last stage of the journey should have been fe

expectation, however, did not prove true. 

Many of the prelaunch activities were peculiar to the Apollo 

Landing on the moon, walking on its alien surface, and then lea

new experiences) affected other areas. For example, the lack of 

about the problems a crewman might encounter as he moved a

gravity in the "third spacecraft"-a bulky suit and backpack

merous questions. What would he do? How long would he sta

would he explore? And what kind of experiments would he set u

tific interests? Some scientists worried that the astronauts might 

pathogens to contaminate the earth. So the Lunar Receiving Lab

came a quarantine facility as well as a place in which to store 

lunar soil and rocks. A precise protocol was drafted to keep the 

isolated from other Earthlings and to move them and their ca

Pacific splashdown to a special building in Houston with dispat

Crew training, already complicated by the need to master 

of two different and very complex spacecraft, took on new dimen

313 
of the lunar surface operations plan was completed.

3 2 

Armstrong and Aldrin also trained at other places, especially at Langley 

Research Center, where they worked on the suspended lunar landing trainer 

equipped with realistic surface views and lighting. On 12 June, NASA senior 

management agreed that the crew was ready for a 16 July launch. Less than 

a month later, on 7 July, Mueller told Paine that "if Apollo 11 continues to 

progress on plan, the first men will set foot on the moon two weeks from 

today." 33 

AFFAIRS FOR THE PUBLIC 

The coming flight of Apollo 11 captured more worldwide attention 

than any previous mission. Countless numbers of persons tried to identify 

with, seek a meaning for, and fashion or obtain some keepsake of mankind's 

first visit to a celestial neighbor. These desires were expressed in poetry, in 

prose, in symbolic articles, and in pictorial evidence. Whole issues of journals, sections of newspapers, brochures, television and radio specials, books, 

bric-a-brac, stamps, medallions, photographs, pieces of clothing, record albums, and magnetic tape records commemorated the occasion. Some persons 

made suggestions, some bluntly demanded a piece of the moon, and some 

sought to get as close as possible to the launch and flight control sites. Most 

of the millions relied on radio, television, and newspapers for a firsthand 

account of the manned lunar landing experience. 

NASA officials moved carefully and deliberately in meeting the demands brought on by Apollo 11. Early in 1969, Julian Scheer, Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs in Washington, wrote Gilruth, stressing past 

policy and operational philosophy. The agency, Scheer said, did "not seek 

coverage of space but [would] break our backs making our facilities and 

our people available," with "no free rides, no free meals, no glad-handing." 

The crux of Scheer's letter was his determination to get Gilruth's Public Affairs Officer, Paul Haney, out of a dual role as full-time mission commentator and as supervisor of the whole range of public affairs activities in 

326 
Public Affairs Office. 34 

Scheer then turned to another objective-making the Apollo 

nauts more available to the news media than past crews had been. He 

the public to see the pilots as human beings, to foster a better und

ing of their training and goals. In a letter to Slayton, Scheer warn

there would be changes. The practice of allowing one stilted cre

conference with each network, for a limited time and in sparse su

ings, had presented the astronauts as stereotypes. Scheer wanted ea

member to spend at least a full day with each of the networks, with 

services participating, in backgrounds selected by the media. If, for e

they wanted the commander in Ohio, his home state, then he shou

Ohio and give the reporters a more intimate glimpse of Armstrong, t

rather than Armstrong, the space flight technician. Scheer asked f

time with the astronauts for still and motion pictures. He also sugges

the wives of the Apollo 11 crews might attend a tea given for the 

of the press corps. Scheer reminded Slayton that the networks, on o

would cover the mission for 24 hours at a stretch and would nee

human interest stories as fillers. The public would be better able 

in the ventures of these men on the moon if it knew who they we

they were there, and what they were doing, a knowledge that c

achieved only through more time with the men and better trainin

mentation, films, and taped reports of the progress to the launch. 35 

Slayton gave in on a few points-some parts of training, for ex

but dug in his heels on the other demands. "Homes and wives are pe

he snapped, "and landing on the moon does not change that." Sla

marked that he did not think any "hard sell" was necessary for Ap

adding that "one rose does not make a summer (or something lik

He went on, "This is just another mission which may land on th

first, but definitely will not go anywhere on schedule if we cannot k
notes, and papers for technically oriented audiences-participate in drafting 

articles directed at the public for a New York Times project. In April, he 

asked these managers to make out invitation lists for the next two launches . 

and to choose a cross-section of guests who had no direct connection with 

aerospace activities and who had never seen a launch.

37 With the approach 

of Apollo 11, Scheer assumed a stronger, more aggressive role in NASA's 

.public affairs, and he used the pressures of the mission as a lever to get the 

agency to accept his thinking. 

One item of worldwide public impact-television-raised no issues whatsoever on this flight. Slayton even urged the need for some kind of erectable 

antenna. The crewmen could not, after all, be expected to wait patiently 

in the lander until the earth moved Goldstone, California, and its 64-meter 

radar dish into line with the spacecraft-before they climbed out onto the 

surface. There was also some question whether the Goldstone facility would 

be available, since it was needed for a Mariner flyby of Mars in July. At a 

management council meeting in March, the prospect of doing without the 

big California dish, as well as a similar one at Parkes, Australia, forced 

agreement on a contingency plan for a portable antenna. Eventually, both 

Goldstone and Parkes were free to cover Apollo 11, but proper alignment 

with Goldstone was still a problem. Low decided to delay the lunar module's 

descent by one revolution to make sure "that we will have Golds·tone coverage." If the launch was delayed and if Parkes was better situated to pick up 

the signals, the relay would travel from the lunar module to Parkes, to 

Sydney by microwave, across the Pacific Ocean via synchronous satellite 

Intelsat III, to the control center in Houston, to the television networks, 

and thence to television sets throughout most of the world. Goldstone would 

shorten that route. 38 

Some Apollo managers were worrying about the quality of the pictures 

they could expect. Looking at a photograph of a simulation, Phillips ob328 
pgpy pp

To him, it was "almost unbelievable" that the culmination of a $2

program "is to be recorded in such a stingy manner." Low explai

some of the scientists insisted on black and white film, because 

higher resolution than color film. Furthermore, with no atmosp

absorb the solar energy in the ultraviolet, color film might not turn 

on the lunar surface. 40 

In January 1969, NASA began work on plans to commemorat

11 symbolically. Phillips wrote Gilruth, Wernher von Braun, a

Debus that ideas discussed at Headquarters included planting Un

tions and United States flags, putting decal flags of U.N. member 

the lunar module descent stage, and leaving a capsule on the surf

information about the Apollo program and personnel and copies 

national agreements. Gilruth asked Johnston to canvass the top 

staff for suggestions. The consensus was that the American flag sh

raised in a simple ceremony. This proposal was supported by private 

from East Coast to West. Slayton said the pilots would probably c

sonal items, as had been done in the past, but most of these w

brought back. All they intended to leave on the lunar surface, be

descent stage, would be such things as the experiments, backpack, a

overshoes. Slayton added that he had no objection to anything th

be decided on as a symbol of the mission, but it must meet weight a

age requirements and place no additional training demands on the 

Paine assigned Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley 

man of a committee* to draft recommendations. Shapley's group 

• The committee comprised Homer Newell, Mueller, Lieutenant General Frank 

(alternate) , Phillips, Thomas E. Jenkins (alternate), Gilruth, .Johnston (alterna·te) , 

Debus, Paul G. Dembling, Scheer, Arnold W . Frutkin, and James L. Daniels, Jr. (secr
Shapley's committee released its decisions on 2 July. Only the flag of 

the United States would be unfurled and left on the moon. Miniature 

flags of all the United Nations, the United States, its 50 states, its territories, 

and the District of Columbia would be stowed in the lunar module and 

returned to the earth. Other items to be brought back included a stamp 

die, a stamped envelope (to be canceled en route by the crew), and two 

full-sized United States flags that had flown over the two houses of Congress 

(to be carried in the command module). Personal items would be carried 

by the pilots in their kit bags, after approval by Slayton. 

Two important items besides the flag were to be left on the moon. 

One was a microminiaturized photoprint of letters of good will from representatives of other nations. The other was a plaque affixed to the descent 

stage as a permanent monument, to be unveiled by the crew. It would depict 

the earth's two hemispheres, their continents and oceans, but no national 

boundaries. Bearing the words "Here men from the planet earth first set 

foot upon the moon. We came in peace for all mankind," it would be inscribed with the signatures of the three astronauts and the President of the 

United States. To forestall any charges that the United States was attempting to establish sovereignty over the moon, Robert F. Allnutt, NASA's Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs, prepared a statement containing 

the gist of a 1967 treaty governing all space exploration. The United States, 

one of the 89 signatories, had no intention of claiming the moon. 43 

Suggestions for honoring the landing, on both the moon and on the 

earth, came from throughout the country. One person thought the plaque 

should be inscribed with the names of the astronauts who had lost their 

lives during the program, one argued that the carrier john F. Kennedy 

should recover the crew after the journey, one suggested that a complete 

Apollo-Saturn stack be erected in the style of the Washington monument 

330 
branch before he touched down. Collins had his own problems in c

a name for the command module. He was still wrestling with the 

mid-June. He credits Scheer with suggesting the name "Colum

So the ceremonies and symbols of Apollo 11 were finally set. 

Plaque on the landing gear of 

the Apollo 11 lunar module. The 

descent stage would remain on 

the moon, a permanent commemoration of the first visit at 

the landing site. 
y 

p p

spection team* in October, headed by John Hodge, to check out the laboratory. In January 1969, Phillips added this Houston facility to the other 

items that would be reviewed by the certification board. He named five 

major aspects for study: landing and recovery procedures, laboratory operations, astronauts and samples release plans, sample processing and distributing plans, and scientific investigations. Gilruth set the review for 3 February, with an agenda that included briefings on all activities from the time 

the astronauts landed on the lunar surface until scientific results were 

reported. 46 

The Lunar Receiving Laboratory covered 25 300 square meters. Public interest focused on the crew reception area, which served primarily as a 

quarantine facility for astronauts and spacecraft, with their attending physicians, technicians, housekeepers, and cooks. Scientists were more concerned with the sample operations section, where the lunar materials were 

analyzed, documented, repackaged, and stored within a biological barrier. 

The third, and final, area contained support and administrative personnel, 

laboratories, offices, and conference rooms. Employees who worked here, 

outside the barrier, were free to come and go-unless they accidentally 

came into contact with the lunar materials or the astronauts. In February 

these teams went through a six-week rehearsal of the events that would 

take place from the arrival of the moon rocks to the end of the quarantine 

period. It was obvious that the laboratory teams were not ready. Gilruth 

sent Richard Johnston to take charge and to start a crash program to 

get the laboratory moving. Johnston ran practice tests of all laboratory 

• Hodge's team consisted of Peter J. Armitage, Aleck C. Bond, John W. Conlon, D. Owen 

Coons, Joseph Kerwin, Paul H. Vavra, and Earle B. Young (MSC); E. Barton Geer (Langley) ; 

A. G. Wedum (Fort Detrick) ; and Donald U. Wise (NASA Headquarters). 

332 
procedures.48 

A successful quarantine would depend on carefully worked ou

craft, lunar sample, and crew recovery procedures. In Novembe

Washington asked Kraft's recovery operations people to conduct "an 

end dress rehearsal simulation." This test began in January when 

bile Quarantine Facility, resembling a streamlined automobile hous

without wheels and capable of supporting six persons for ten da

passed between two ships near Norfolk, Virginia. About the time 

Apollo 9 recovery, four test subjects made a trial run in the qua

facility from the Pacific to Houston. 49 

There were a few hitches in working out the recovery plan. A

tamination that the command module might pick up from the lunar 

should be neutralized by the searing heat of earth reentry before the 

splashed into the Pacific. The planners intended to lift the comma

aboard the prime recovery vessel and park it next to the quarantine 

so the crew could move quickly into isolated quarters. This idea ha

abandoned because the attachment loop on the space vehicle was no

enough-it could have pulled loose and dumped the craft, crew and 

the sea. Crew system specialists then came up with what they 

biological isolation garment-BIG in the technicians' usual shorthan

crew would climb from the spacecraft into a raft, put on the g

(which really made them look like creatures from outer space), 

helicopter to the ship, deplane, and enter the trailer. Kerwin and 

tested the garments in a tank and discovered that the face mask fil

• The panel consisted of John!>ton (chairman), Walter W. Kemmerer, Jr. , Persa R

Bryan Erb, Bennie C. Wooley, John C. Stonesifer, James H. Chappee, and Herber

(secretary) . 
ascent stage carried a full propellant load and the descent tanks a small 

quantity of fluid; when the tanks were pressurized, this could be dangerous. 

Maximum safety precautions were taken, however, and the tests were completed successfully. 51 

Although the lander passed all its trials with good marks, Low still 

worried about single-point failures that could wreck a mission. He sent a 

"walk-down team" to the contractors' plants to inspect both spacecraft and 

told Rocco Petrone that he would like the same kind of inspection at the 

Cape by veterans in spacecraft flight preparations. Low even wanted someone to take a look at the landing gear to make sure the honeycomb shock 

absorbers had been installed. 52 

Most of the flight readiness reviews for Apollo 11-mission content, 

lunar module, command and service modules, government-furnished equipment (the extravehicular pressure garments and backpack, experiments and 

equipment, and cameras), back contamination, and medical status-were 

held from middle to late June. Carroll Bolender, Houston manager of LM5, found that the general quality had consistently improved, but the 

vehicle had more items for resolution on 23 June than LM-4 had at a 

comparable time. Martin Raines' flight safety team attended the reviews, 

keeping a close watch on the hardware, and admitted that the only great 

risk it could see was that Apollo 11 was to make the first lunar landingand that risk would be there no matter what vehicle made the trip. The 

Boeing Company also reviewed the mission and came to the same conclusion. The missions were coming so close together now that Mueller began 

to worry about possible fatigue overtaking the workers. When he wrote 

Gilruth of his concern, however, the gist of his message was "worry [along 

with me] but doo't allow [it] to interfere with driving your staff at full 

throttle until ... the Lunar Landing." And they did drive on. On 14 July, 

Director Phillips confirmed that Apollo ll was ready for flight. 53 

334 
Lunar Receiving Laboratory 

at the Manned Spacecraft 

Center, Houston. 

Trip to Tranquility 

1969: July 

I n the summer of 1968, a group led by John R. Sevier in Housto

hundreds of possible lunar landing sites. A lot was involved 

the lunar module down on the moon-keeping the vehicle stable

surface slopes and boulder distribution; controlling forward, la

vertical speeds during the 'final few seconds before committing to 

and finally cutting off the engine at the proper instant. The spac

equipped to make an automatic, hands-off landing, but analys

survey photographs indicated that in such a landing the vehi

overturn 7 out of 100 times. Sevier's group contended that a 

controlled touchdown by the astronauts faced better odds. Usin

surface model complete with craters and hills and illuminated t

particular time and date, the analysts demonstrated that the pi

recognize the high slopes and craters in time to fly over and lan

them and that there would be enough fuel to do this. Many o

gested areas were eliminated on the basis of these studies; the lis

date sites was pared to five for Apollo ll. When Site 2, in t

Tranquility,* was chosen for the target in the summer of 1969, 

world watched and hoped that the space team's confidence was wa

• Site 2 was on the east central :part of the moon in southwestern Mare Tran

was about 100 kilometers east of the rim of Crater Sabine and 190 west southw

Maskelyne- latitude o• 43' 56" north, longitude 23• 38' 51" east. 

337 
have realized the significance of their date with destiny, even though all 

three were seasoned space travelers. But the normal launch day routine 

was observed. Donald Slayton rousted the crew out of bed about 4:00 in the 

morning. Nurse Dee O'Hara recorded a few physical facts, physicians made 

a quick check, and the astronauts ate breakfast. Waiting to help them into 

their suits when they finished was Joe Schmitt, the astronauts' launch-day 

valet for the past eight years. After they arrived at the launch complex, 

still another old friend and veteran from Mercury and Gemini days, pad 

leader Guenter Wendt, assisted them into the spacecraft seats. Armstrong 

crawled in first and settled in the left-hand couch. Collins followed him, 

easing into the couch on the right side. As they wriggled into position, were 

strapped in, and checked switches and dials, Aldrin enjoyed a brief interlude outside on the white room flight deck, letting his mind drift idly from 

subject to subject, until it was time for him to slide into the center seat. 

When the hatch snapped to, the threesome was buttoned up from one world, 

waiting for the Saturn V to boost them to another. 3 

A Saturn V liftoff is spectacular, and the launch of Apollo 11 was no 

exception. But it didn't give the audience any surprises. To the three 

Gemini-experienced pilots, who likened the sensation to the boost of a 

Titan II, it was a normal launch. The 12 seconds the lumbering, roaring 

Saturn V took to clear the tower on the Florida beach did seem lengthy, 

however. At that point in the flight, a four-shift flight control team in 

Texas, presided over by mission director George Hage and flight director 

Clifford E. Charlesworth, assumed control of the mission. The controllers, 

and the occupants of the adjacent rooms crammed with supporting systems 

and operations specialists, had little to worry about. Unlike the three Saturn 

• Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy. 

338 
before they went charging off to the moon on a direct course wer

indication, they succeeded. Armstrong and Aldrin became drowsy b

the engine firing that thrust them onto the lunar path-translunar 

tion-although Armstrong did murmur a mild "Whew," when it b

Aldrin casually observed that the S-IVB stage was a "tiny bit rattly,

Collins uneasily eyed a camera overhead during the 1.3-g acceleration 

even though he knew it was fastened down securely enough not to ban

on the head. Like their predecessors, they had the upside-down sen

for a while, and Collins, who had to get out of his couch to work wit

navigation equipment in the lower bay, was careful to move his 

slowly, to guard against getting sick. But none of the three had any ph

problems. 5 

The trip to the moon was quite pleasant. The crewmen ate and 

well, lodging themselves comfortably in favorite niches about the 

What work there was to do they enjoyed doing. Collins loved flyin

spacecraft-no comparison with the simulator at all, he said-whe

pulled the command module away from the S-IVB stage and then t

around to dock with the lunar module. But he was miffed at havi

use extra gas from his thruster supply; it was like going through 

session on the trainer, he fumed. Armstrong was delighted that there w

one scratch on the probe. The command module pilot had a mome

scare when he unstowed the probe and noticed a peculiar odor i

tunnel, like burned electrical insulation-but he could find nothing w

They relaxed again and began taking off their suits. Armstrong and A

were especially careful to guard against snags; their lives would depe

these garments in a few days. 

Their path to the moon was accurate, requiring only one midc

correction, a burst from the service propulsion engine of less than 

seconds to change the velocity by six meters per second. Not having 
On Saturday, 19 July, almost 62 hours after launch, Apollo 11 sailed 

into the lunar sphere of influence. Earlier, television viewers in both hemispheres had watched as the crew removed the probe and drogue and opened 

the tunnel between the two craft. Aldrin slid through, adjusted his mind to 

the new body orientation, checked out the systems, and wiped away the 

moisture that had collected on the lunar module windows, while the world 

watched over his shoulder. The pilots were glad to get the tunnel open 

and the probe and drogue stowed a day early-especially Collins, who had 

worried about the reliability of this equipment ever since his first sight of 

it years before. 

As the moon grew nearer and the view filled three-quarters of the 

hatch window, Armstrong discussed lunar descent maneuvers with the Hight 

controllers. He was glad to learn that the service module engine had performed as well in flight as it had during ground tests. The last kilometers 

on the route were as uneventful as the first. The pilots maintained their 

mental ties with the earth, enjoying the newscasts radioed to them and the 

knowledge that their own voyage was front page news everywhere. Even the 

Russians gave them top billing, calling Armstrong the "czar" of the mission. 

(At one time, when flight control called for the commander, Collins replied that "the Czar is brushing his teeth, so I'm filling in for him.") Had 

• Luna 15 entered lunar orbit 17 July and made 52 revolutions of the moon before hard· 

landing on the surface. Unmanned Luna 16, launched by the U.S.S.R. on 12 Sept. 1970, soft· 

landed with an earth-operated drill and returned a recovery capsule containing a cylinder of 

lunar soil to the earth on 24 Sept. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 

Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, Staff Report prepared by Congressional Research Service, 

Library of Congress, vol. I, 30 Aug. 1976, pp. 145-49. 

340 
Seventy-six hours after leaving the earth, Apollo II neared its 

CapCom Bruce McCandless gave the crew the usual "see you on the 

side," as the spacecraft went behind the moon. Looking at the su

Collins said it looked " plaster of Paris gray." Like earlier comma

Armstrong had to remind his crew not to look at it because they h

concentrate on the first lunar orbit insertion maneuver to get into a 

elltptical flight path. The astronauts agreed that changing sun angle

duced different shades of gray and tan. Some of their descriptions o

back, as well as the front, of the moon were graphic. They also hop

new meteors like those that had caused the lunar craters would fall 

they were on the surface. Once Collins mentioned that the desolate S

Fertility had certainly been miscalled, and Armstrong gave him a sho

ture on how it got its name. They shared the view of the near-earth 

of the moon with television watchers back home. Pilots and observers 

could see that the planned landing area was still in darkness but g

brighter each time they flew over it. The astronauts commented tha

certainly realized they were circling a smaller body than the earth, bu

quickly became used to seeing "the moon going by." Collins comp

once that the "LM just wants to head down towards the surface,

McCandless answered, "that's what [it] was built for." * 

During the first two revolutions, the crewmen checked navigatio

trajectory figures and then fired the service module engine against the 

path to drop ,Apollo II into a nearly circular orbit. As they watche

landing area grow brighter and brighter, they rested, ate, slept, an

• The lunar module, which weighed more than the command and service modules co

was feeling the pull of the moon's gravity. 
floated through the tunnel and into the lunar module. Their preparations 

had been so thorough that they had little to do except wait for Collins to 

close off the two vehicles. Collins slipped the probe and drogue smoothly 

into place and then asked the lunar module crewmen to be patient while 

he went through the checklist. Feeling that he was part of a three-ring 

circus and appearing simultaneously in each ring, Collins raced around, 

setting cameras up in windows to photograph the separation, purging the 

fuel cells of excess water, and getting ready to vent the air pressure from 

the tunnel. On the back of the moon, during the 13th revolution, everything was ready, which gave him a short breather before the lunar module 

left. When he asked, "How's the Czar over there?" Armstrong replied, 

"Just hanging on-and punching [buttons]." Collins urged the lunar pilots 

to take it easy on the surface-he did not want to hear any "huffing and 

puffing." And so they parted, as Armstrong called out, "The Eagle has 

wings." 

Armstrong and Aldrin began checking the lander's critical systems. One 

of these made everyone a little nervous. They had to turn off the descent 

stage batteries to see how those in the ascent stage were operating. If they 

were not working properly, every electrically powered system in the cabin 

would be affected. But the ascent stage performed beautifully. Next they 

fired the thrusters and marveled at the ease with which the Eagle flew in 

formation with Columbia. Aldrin turned on the landing radar, and it also 

worked properly. Collins broke in to ask them to turn on their blinking 

tracking light, and Aldrin replied that it was on. 

Meanwhile, Collins found that the command ship was also stable. 

Sometimes the automatic attitude thrusters did not have to make corrections oftener than once in five minutes. Once his vehicle bucked when he 

inadvertently brushed against the handcontroller, but he quickly stilled the 

342 
pyg p

throttle, deceleration was not detectable; at 40- to 100-percent, how

there were no doubts. The lander was much more fun to fly than the s

lator. Then, five minutes into the maneuver, the crewmen began he

alarms. On one occasion, the computer told them a switch was in the w

position, and they corrected it. Another time, they could find no re

for the alarm, but they juggled the switches and the clanging stopped. 

Coping with these alarms, some of which were caused by com

overloads, lasted four minutes. Flight control was watching closely 

passing on the information that there was no real problem with 

vehicle. They could go on to a landing. But these nerve-wracking inte

tions had come at a time when the crewmen should have been looking 

suitable spot to sit down, rather than watching cabin displays. They 

reached "high gate" in the trajectory-in old aircraft-pilot parlance 

beginning of the approach to an airport in a landing path-where the E

tilted slightly downward to give them a view of the moon. When 

reached " low gate"-the point for making a visual assessment of the lan

site to select either automatic or manual control-they were still cle

alarms and watching instruments. By . the time they had a chance to 

outside, only 600 meters and three minutes' time separated them from 

lunar surface. 

Armstrong saw the landing site immediately. He also saw tha

touchdown would be just short of a large rocky crater with boulders, 

as large as five meters in diameter, scattered over a wide area. If he c

land just in front of that spot, he thought, they might find the area of 

scientific interest. But the thought was fleeting; such a landing woul

impossible. So he pitched the lander over and fired the engine with 

flight path rather than against it. Flying across the boulder field, 

strong soon found a relatively smooth area, lying between some si

craters and another field of boulders. 
set the vehicle down and risk landing on the rim of a crater. He was able 

to shift the angle of the lunar module and stop the backward movement, 

but he could not eliminate the drift to the left. He was reluctant to slow 

the descent rate any further, but the figures Aldrin kept ticking off told 

him they were almost out of fuel. Armstrong was concentrating so hard on 

flying the lunar module that he was unable to perceive the first touch on 

the moon nor did he hear Aldrin call out "contact light," when the probes 

below the footpads brushed the surface. The lander settled gently down, 

like a helicopter, and Armstrong cut off the engine. 

4 days, 6 hours, 45 minutes, 57 seconds. CapCom: We copy you down, 

Eagle. 

Armstrong: Houston, Tranquility Base here. THE EAGLE HAS LANDED. 

CapCom: Roger, Tranquility. We copy you on the ground. You got a 

bunch of guys about to turn blue. We're breathing again. Thanks a lot. 

And Armstrong started breathing again, too. He was not pleased with 

his piloting, but landing on the moon was much trickier than on the earth. 

He related the maneuver to his past experience in touching down during 

a ground fog, except that the moon dust had movement and that had interfered with his ability to judge the direction in which his craft was 

moving. Aldrin thought it "a very smooth touchdown," and said so at the 

time. They were tilted at an angle of 4.5 degrees from the vertical and 

turned 13 degrees to the left of the flight path trajectory. Armstrong agreed 

that their position was satisfactory for lighting angles and visibility. At first, a 

tan haze surrounded them; then rocks and bumps appeared. Man had 

landed successfully on the moon-and on his first attempt. 9 

344 
coeate to ay pot te sso. ey ted to tut baco. 

they could not, they left it alone to give the instrument a chance to re

flight control could keep track of the time in the interim. It soon b

apparent that they were going to be able to stay on the moon and ex

They wondered about their exact location, glancing out the w

and describing what they saw to give flight control and Collins som

to aid in the search. While waiting to be found, Armstrong relayed a

he could remember about the landing. They knew they were at le

kilometers beyond the target point, although still within the planned 

Colors were almost the same on the surface as from orbit: white, 

gray, brown, tan, depending on the sun angle. Armstrong noticed th

engine exhaust had apparently fractured some of the nearby boulde

glanced upward through the rendezvous window and saw the earth lo

above them. They also heard via radio some unpleasant sounds fro

planet, almost as though someone were moving furniture around 

back room. Flight control quickly silenced the racket, and the check

the moon continued. 

Because they had adapted so easily to the one-sixth-g environme

because the simulated launch countdown had so few problems, Comm

Armstrong decided to begin the extravehicular activity before the sch

rest period. As Slayton had suspected, the astronauts could not just si

They wanted to get out and explore. Flight control agreed, adding tha

movements would be watched on prime time television. Rigging up 

stroll took longer than during the training exercises on the earth, n

cause anything was wrong but because they took extra care to mak

that everything was right. About the only surprise they had was t

covery of a press-to-test button on the portable life support syste

neither could identify. But they did not bother flight control about i

backpack antennas were scraping the cabin ceiling, making communi
until he had safely reached the porch. Armstrong turned a handle to release 

the latch on the experiments' compartment and then went down as far as 

the footpad. He checked to see if he could get back up-that first rung was 

high. He did not expect any problems, although it would take a pretty good 

jump. Then the watching world saw what it had been waiting for-Armstrong's first step onto the moon. 

"That's one small step for [a]* man, one giant leap for mankind." 

With this historic moment behind him, Armstrong began to talk about 

the surface, about the powdery charcoal-like layers of dust, as he and the 

television camera looked at his bootprints in the lunar soil. One-sixth g was 

certainly pleasant, he said. He glanced up at the lunar module cabin, at 

Aldrin near the window. The lunar module pilot explained to the viewers 

what Armstrong was doing as he gathered the contingency sample and 

worked it into the pocket on his suit leg. Armstrong described the stark 

beauty of the moon, likening the area to the high desert country in the 

United States. 

When Aldrin asked, "Are you ready for me to come out?" Armstrong 

answered, "Yes." The commander realized that extravehicular activity on 

the moon was a two-man job at the minimum. From his position on the 

ground, he could not give Aldrin as much help in clearing the hatch as he 

would like, but he did the best he could. On reaching the porch, Aldrin 

commented on how roomy it was; there was no danger of falling off. "I want 

to ... partially close the hatch, ... making sure not to lock it on my way 

out." Eighteen minutes and twelve seconds after the first man stepped on the 

• Whether he actually uttered the article or not later caused considerable discussion. Armstrong, himself, later wrote: "I thought it had been included. Although it is technically possible that the VOX didn't pick it up and transmj.t it, my listening to the recording indicates 

it is more likely that it was just omitted." 

346 
detail they did not have an opportunity to investigate personally. N

able to get down on their hands and knees to examine items closely 

them; but the powdery soil, its tendency to adhere to their clot

the difficulty of regaining upright positions in the bulky space 

suaded them from trying to kneel. 

Shortly after Aldrin alighted, Amstrong unveiled the plaque o

of the LM, described the representation of the earth's two hemisph

read the words to a vast listening audience: 

Here Man from the planet Earth first set foot upon the Moo

1969 A.D. We came in peace for all mankind. 

Underneath were the crew members' signatures and the signatu

President of the United States (Nixon). 

A little later they held the flag-raising ceremony. The telesco

pole stuck and they could not pull it out to its full extent; afraid 

might lose their balance and fall on the rocky surface, they did no

hard. The ground below the surface was very hard, and they pu

pole in only 15 to 20 centimeters. Flight control told Collins, c

the command module above, of the ceremony, remarking that he w

bly the only person around without television coverage of the event

After another brief stint of evaluating their ability to move 

the crewmen were asked to step in front of the camera so the 

could speak to them. President Nixon said, "I am talking to you 

phone from the Oval Room at the White House, and this certain

• Armstrong even tried jumping straight up. When h e noticed a tendency to pitc

he stopped. 
He soon found that it was difficult to decide what was level ground by just 

looking at the surface. The laser reflector had a leveling device-a bubble, 

or "BB"-but Aldrin had trouble centering it. He finally gave up and went 

on to other tasks. Armstrong came over later to photograph the reflector, 

and the bubble was on dead center. They had no explanation for this. The 

commander wished he had some kind of a rock table on which to set the 

packages, to keep them from settling into the lunar soil, but there was no 

time for that kind of refinement. Aldrin set up the solar array experiment; 

one panel popped up automatically, but he had to pull on a lanyard with 

his gloved hand to get the other in place. 

Time was getting short, so Aldrin left the experiments and began collecting the documented samples. Reminded by flight control that scientists 

wanted two core-tube specimens, he pushed the tube about 10 centimeters 

into the ground and began tapping it with a hammer. When it did not go 

much farther, he beat on it until the hammer made dents in the top of the 

tube. Even then he could only get it about five centimeters deeper. He 

pulled the sampler out of the ground, meeting little resistance. He had an 

impression of moisture in the soil, because of the way the material adhered 

to the tube. He tried again about five meters away, but the results were not 

much better. During the rapping and tapping, the seismic package transmitted the vibrations back to the earth. 

Armstrong had been snapping pictures and filling sample boxes with 

lunar rocks and surface soil, describing what he was doing as he went from 

place to place. It took longer to gather the bulk samples than it had during 

earth simulations. He tried to keep as far from the engine exhaust blast area 

as he could. He operated the stereoscopic camera developed by scientist 

Thomas Gold, even though the trigger was difficult to pull with his gloves 

on. Once he wandered out about 100 meters, being careful not to get out of 

sight of the lander, to look at a crater and take some pictures. The trip took 

348 
the cabin. Armstrong did a deep knee bend and jumped straight 

two meters, to the third rung of the ladder. Neither crewma

trouble getting into the cabin. Once inside, they threw out a 

items that were just taking up space. For the most part, the crew 

touch with the earth at this time, because the backpack antennas 

scratching against the ceiling. Flight control told Collins that 

walkers had returned to their ship, and he shouted, "Hallelujah

Armstrong and Aldrin found the post-EVA check easier than 

arations for getting out, but there was a long checklist to wor

They were glad they had tossed out some of the equipment, bec

was still a "truckload" in the cabin. They ate during this period

no real attempt to relax, let alone sleep. They knew they could n

all the launch preparations were not finished. They wondered h

was faring, racing around upstairs getting ready for the rendezvou

Once they had finished their chores and were ready to call 

flight control began a question-and-answer session on the lunar 

erations. This came after they had already said "good night" tw

the questions began to require extensive answers, especially o

Aldrin asked Houston to postpone the discussion until later. Flig

agreed, and Owen Garriott (now at the capcom console) said he 

transmission would be the final good night. 

Armstrong and Aldrin found their lunar house dirty, noisy

and too brightly lit. They put on their helmets to keep from bre

dust, to muffle the racket, and to protect themselves in any unexpe

depressurization. Shutting out the light was not so easy. The s

the windows were little more than transparent sheets; even the lun

could be seen through them. When Armstrong noticed that the li

to be getting stronger, he opened his eyes to find that the earth w

its rays through the sextant. 
Aldrin descends the ladder (left). After 

years of questions as to whether the lunar 

soil would bear the weight of a vehicle 

without its sinking deep into dust) the 

footpads of Eagle (below) made only a 

slight impression. 

Apollo II lifts off for the moon. 
The view from the window (right)­

footprints and the flag, left behind on 

the moon. As Eagle (below) rose to dock 

with CM Columbia, "home Earth," the 

next target to land on, came into vzew 

on the lunar horizon. 
with them, but Collins did not think it would have helped much, anyway. 

He did complain that all this searching cut into the time he needed for 

taking pictures on each circuit, but he was philosophical about it. As he 

said, "When the LM is on the surface, the command module should act 

like a good child and be seen and not heard." 10 

RETURN FROM TRANQUILITY 

After their fitful rest period, the moon dwellers were roused by Houston and told to get ready to leave. Flight control and the crew discussed the 

most probable location of the lunar module, and Armstrong and Aldrin 

then aligned the guidance platform by the moon's gravity field. They had 

some difficulty finding enough stars to sight on, but the Eagle was ready to 

take off on 21 July-21 hours 36 minutes after landing and more than 124 

hours after leaving the earth on 16 July. Up above, Collins had been alone 

since the 13th revolution, and he did not expect to have company until the 

27th circuit, 28 hours after the lander had separated from the command 

module. As the time drew nearer for ignition of the ascent engine, Collins 

positioned his ship so its radar transponder would be pointing in the direction of the lunar module radar signal. Everything was ready for the next 

critical move. 

The Eagle lifted off the moon exactly on time, soaring straight up for 

10 seconds to clear its launch platform (the descent stage) and the surrounding ground obstacles. When its speed reached 12 meters per second, it 

pitched over into a 50-degree climbing angle. Armstrong and Aldrin heard 

the pyrotechnics fire and saw "a fair amount of debris" when they first detected motion. The onset of this velocity was absolutely smooth, and they 

had difficulty sensing the acceleration. But when the cabin tilted over and 

352 
slowed the lander's catchup speed at the proper moment. 

Eventually, Collins told his crewmates to turn off their trackin

he could see them fine without it. Later, as the lander turned th

corner and lost contact with the earth, Armstrong slowed his veh

stationkeeping 30 meters from the command module, so Collin

inspect the lander before docking. During the inspection, Collins a

shipmates to roll over a bit more, and they went straight into gimb

Armstrong blamed himself for "the goof," but it posed no real p

Like all the lunar modules, the Eagle was a sporty machine once it 

of its descent stage and much of its ascent engine fuel, and it took 

keep the skittish bird from dancing about. Four hours after lunar 

the two vehicles were ready to dock. 

Collins rammed the probe dead center into the lander's drogu

the ascent stage fuel tanks nearly empty, he met with little resistanc

almost as though he was shoving the command module into a sheet o

He had to look out the window to ma'ke sure they were docked. T

pressed the switch to reel the lander in closer and secure it with the 

latches. Suddenly there was a big gyration in yaw-perhaps becaus

retraction, perhaps because of a lunar module thruster that seeme

firing directly at the command ship. Collins used his handcontroller t

the vehicles. Just as he was wondering if he would have to cut loose 

again, Columbia grabbed the Eagle and held on. 

Collins hurried to get the hatch and probe out of the way, to 

returning companions. As he did, the same strong smell of burnt e

insulation met his nostrils. But, again, nothing seemed to be wron

strong and Aldrin began vacuuming the lunar dust from themselv

equipment, and the sample boxes. The dust did not bother the tri

and they began unloading, cleaning, and stowing. Their progress was 

that flight control considered bringing them home one revolution 
, y g 

asked when they would acquire the flight control signal, and Aldrin, now 

totally relaxed, answered that he did not have "the foggiest" notion. Soon 

the commander wanted to know if anyone had any choice greetings when 

they did talk to Houston, but no one volunteered. Aldrin readied a camera 

to photograph the earthrise. Coming around the corner, Collins called to 

CapCom Duke, "Time to open up the LRL doors, Charlie." 

Now they "mostly just waited," as Collins later said. Flight control 

passed up the usual newscast, telling them that only four nations* in the 

world had not told their citizens about the flight. President Nixon, in his 

White-House-to-Moon chat, had mentioned that he would meet them on the 

Hornet; now they learned that he was sending them on a world tour. After 

more news-about Vietnam, the Middle East, oil depletion allowances, and 

a drop in the Dow industrial averages-the astronauts knew they had truly 

returned from Tranquility. 

On television they, like the Borman and Stafford crews before them, 

philosophized about the significance of their voyage. Armstrong spoke of 

the Jules Verne novel about a trip to the moon a hundred years earlier, 

underscoring man's determination to venture out into the unknown and to 

discover its secrets. Collins talked of the technical intricacies of the mission 

hardware, praising the people who had made it all work. Aldrin spoke about 

what the flight meant to mankind in striving to explore his universe and in 

seeking to promote peace on his own planet. Armstrong closed the session, 

speaking of Apollo's growth from an idea into reality and ending with, 

"God bless you. Good night from Apollo II." 

The pilots watched the earth grow larger and larger. They televised 

more of life in a spacecraft. A day before landing, they checked out the 

• China, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam. 

354 
g p; 

chunks he had seen in Gemini. 

By now, the crew had turned the spacecraft over to its com

fourth crew member who had done a lot of the mission flying to 

and were watching the entry monitor. The computer held on 

downrange error for a while, decided it was wrong, and dumped 

The vehicle dipped down into the atmospheric layer, zipped up 

coaster curve out of the layer, and then came screaming back in. T

parachutes opened, and the ship steadied. Armstrong and his cr

jerk as the main parachutes came out; it seemed to take a lon

those three parachutes to blossom. Some good sounds came up 

as they heard the recovery forces trying to talk to them at the 

reentry communications blackout. Reentry was fairly comforta

crewmen, without their bulky suits, but splashdown came with 

June 1969-8 days, 3 hours, 18 minutes, 18 seconds after le

Kennedy.* 

Columb ia landed close to its reprogrammed target and flipp

its nose in the water, but a flick of a switch inflated the air bags 

turned upright. None of the crew were seasick, but they had tak

tive medication before the landing. They went through a length

of the things to be done to keep the world free from contaminat

been a long trip. 

A swimmer threw them the biological isolation garments, an

them on. Armstrong disembarked first, followed by Collins and t

As they passed through the hatch they inflated their water-wi

servers before jumping into the raft. Armstrong noticed that a sw

• Aocording to the command module computer, Columbia landed at 13• 19' nort

169•9• west longitude. 
. . 

} '}-, . "t" . "

' 

\\,:1 ~ i _, 

~(.. 

Looking like three men from another planet in their biological isolation garments, Aldrin, Armstrong, and Collins (left to right at left above) step from the 

helicopter onto the deck of the carrier Hornet on their way into the Mobile 

Quarantine Facility. After removing the isolation garments and freshening up, 

the three (Armstrong, Collins, and Aldrin, left to right at right above) are 

greeted by President Nixon. 

Scientists in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory, working 

through glove ports, examine 

a moon rock. 
that altered his looks) to the TV cameras. Years of study of th

ples lay ahead, and the crew had to spend their 21 days in quar

ing that period, they answered a formidable set of questions 

thing that had taken place, relying on both notes and memory, t

that they had done all they could to assist the crews that would 

to the moon. Collins closed these thomugh and exhaustive ses

ing, emphatically, "I want out." 

When they did get out, there was the swirl of a world tou

women from all walks of life, of varying colors, creeds, and poli

sions, both young and old, hailed the feat of mankind's represe

"For one priceless moment ...." 11 

One of the stops before Collins (at the speakers stand), 

Armstrong, and Aldrin left 

on a world tour was to report 

to a joint session of Congress. 
g 

Spacecraft ejection 


Separation maneuver (from S·IVB) 


First midcourse correction 


Lunar orbit insertion 


Lunar orbit circularization 


Undocking 


Separation maneuver (from LM) 


Descent orbit insertion 


Powered descent initiation 


Lunar landing 


Egress (hatch opening) 


Ingress (hatch closing) 


Lunar liftoff 


Coelliptic sequence initiation 


Constant differential height maneuver 


Terminal phase initiation 


Docking 


Ascent stage jettison 


Separation maneuver (from ascent stage) 


Transearth injection maneuver 


Second midcourse correction 


CM/SM separation 


Entry interface 


Landing 


0303

04:16:59.1 

04:40:01.8 

26:44:58.7 

75:49:50.4 

80:11:36.8 

100:12:00.0 

100:39:52.9 

101:36:14.0 

102:33:;05.2 

102:45:39.9 

109:07:33.0 

111:39:13.0 

124:22:00.8 

125:19:36.0 

126:17:49.6 

127:03:51.8 

128:03:00.0 

130:·09:31.2 

130:3'0:01.0 

135:23:4'2.3 

150:29:57.4 

194:49:12.7 

195:03:05.7 

195:18:35.0 

358 
CM hatch reopened 

Sample return containers 1 and 2 removed from CM 

Container 1 removed from MQF 

Container 2 removed from MQF 

Container 2 and film sent to Johnston Island 

Container 1, film, and biological samples sent to Hickam AFB, Hawaii 

Container 2 and film arrival in Houston 

Container 1, film, and biological samples arrival in Houston 

CM decontaminated and hatch secured 

MQF secured 

MQF and CM offloaded 

Safing of CM pyrotechnics completed 

MQF arriva·l at Houston 

Flight crew to LRL 

CM delivery to LRL 

Epilogue 


After eight years-May 1961 to July 1969-the Apollo program

ing obstacles and tragedy, accomplished the goal set by 

Americans had walked on the moon and returned to talk ab

eminence in space flight, an oftstated objective, had been achie

style that the two-nation space race was seldom mentioned again

those who doubted that the Russians had ever intended to send 

moon. What was achieved toward long-range progress and in co

to science or national interest will be argued for years, perhaps 

the outset, however, little but public support for the program 

The direction of the manned space flight program followed the 

of Congress, the people, and members of the scientific commu

tired of hearing about Soviet technological successes-reasoned th

needed to marshall its forces to catch up. Landing men on the m

the best way to demonstrate this nation's prowess to the world. T

ity that there might, or might not, be any long-range gains wa

considered until this country faced new pressures that pushed r

of priorities. But even during the turmoil of domestic troubles a

tional problems, there were those who insisted that manned spac

cluding walking on the moon, contributed materially to the w

mankind, citing especially the technological explosion that Ap

to trigger. 

Although mutterings against the need for such a program g

the later years, there was no change in the national objective t

on the moon. Apollo received what it needed in money and su

361 
commitment that will extend over 8 or 10 years." 1 At that time, Apollo's 

price tag was $3 billion a year; no matter how sound a long-range plan 

NASA might have presented, it is unlikely that the President, the Congress, 

and the American taxpayer, faced with the social and international pressures 

and turmoil of the middle years of the decade, would have supported a program to send men to the planets. 

NASA might have wanted to aim for a planetary voyage, but the agency 

consensus was that it was best to amortize a significant percentage of Apollo's 

costs in near-earth orbital operations. 2 This decision led to a series of program planning steps-from the Apollo Extension System to Apollo Applications and finally to Skylab. For some time, this planning included exploring 

the moon after the first landing. In late 1967, however, NASA officials decided that all lunar landing missions should be part of the Apollo program. 

These flights were therefore transferred to a Lunar Exploration Office, established on 19 December at Headquarters and headed by Lee R. Scherer, 

former Lunar Orbiter Program manager at Langley. 3 

Scherer's group first tried to determine the content and objectives of 

these forthcoming lunar landings. It studied the use of a lunar flying unit, 

roving vehicles of various kinds, an extended lunar module (ELM) to land 

larger payloads on the moon, and an unmanned logistics system, perhaps 

launched by a Titan III-Centaur, that could supplement the ELM payload 

or form a lunar base shelter, among other things. 

Director Robert Gilruth of the Manned Spacecraft Center favored upgrading Apollo's capabilities to support limited exploration and thought 

NASA should move more rapidly to this end. Gilruth wrote manned space 

flight head George Mueller at Headquarters of his concerns in March and 

again in April of 1968, pointing out that the President's Science Advisory 

Committee (PSAC) had gone on record that it would support no more than 

two or three lunar landings that met engineering goals only. PSAC wanted 

362 
the program-1961-Homer Newell had asked scientist Harold Urey to 

gest sites of interest. Urey submitted a list of areas that extended ove

face of the moon. But the lunar-orbit mode that was then becomin

accepted route confined the landings to within a few degrees of the 

equator. In early 1968, at Apollo Director Samuel Phillips' request, 

Eggleston and John Sevier, among others in Houston, began searchin

feasible areas outside the so-called Apollo zone. Wilmot Hess asked 

Kraft if his flight operations people could find some way to relax this 

torial zone restriction. Kraft answered that many of the constraints 

crew safety provisions that could never be entirely eliminated, but som

the trajectories might be modified to save fuel. If propellant capacitie

the vehicles could be increased, more sites on the face of the moon mig

visited. Studies were soon in progress on two target areas frequently 

tioned, lunar craters Copernicus and Tycho. 6 

Although the technologists realized by 1968 that scientific experim

could no longer be considered just "add-on pieces of equipment resulti

minimum modifications to space vehicles," so many unknowns remaine

the first lunar landing that the size of the Apollo lunar surface experim

package (ALSEP) was reduced. But the engineers agreed that a full

ALSEP should be flown on a later mission. Moreover, they had begun 

cept the idea that a successful first landing might warrant flying to a 

scientifically interesting spot on the second mission-but one still withi

ellipse of the Apollo zone. The procedure was called biasing the fligh

early 1969, the planners decided to bias a landing to the vicinity of a 

veyor spacecraft already resting on the lunar surface. 7 

By late 1968, there were indications that the lunar module would 

be accepted for flight. Hodge was then under pressure to get these ve

modified to support the lunar exploration program. By February 196

group had written and rewritten a statement of work for the task. In 
35 instead of 22 hours, provide for two walks by the crews for a total of 6 

hours rather than one walk for 3 hours, and permit a walking range of 900 

instead of 100 meters away from the lunar module. A Bellcomm study that 

month showed that, with modifications to the trajectories and procedures, 

"the entire face of the moon" could be considered as the Apollo zone. With 

this encouragement, and the near certainty that Apollo 11 would be successful, the Astro Geology Branch of the United States Geological Survey asked 

that the crews of the H missions visit both the "Eastern" (old) and "Western" (new) maria. The Apollo Site Selection Board heard a presentation on 

10 July for a Western mare landing, and Mueller told Paine on 29 July 

that the next flight would aim for a landing in that area, in Oceanus Procellarum, only about 200 meters from Surveyor III's landing point. In August, 

Andre Meyer was more than mildly upset that the mission planners were 

not giving enough priority to retrieving some Surveyor hardware. 9 

Mueller on 23 May 1969 had picked the lunar roving vehicle, to be 

housed in the descent stage of the lander, as the way to extend the range and 

capabilities of the exploration missions (later called J missions). All discussion of unmanned logistic landers for lunar shelters and bases ceased. Marshall Space Flight Center, directing the development of the rover, issued a 

request for proposals to industry on II July and followed that with a bidders' briefing at Michoud two weeks later. Low talked with Neil Armstrong 

and Edwin Aldrin after the Apollo 11 flight and learned that Armstrong 

thought it would be just as easy getting around on foot as on the roving 

vehicle. Moreover, the crew said it was easy to carry tools to wherever they 

were needed and bring them and the samples back. Meyer disagreed with 

the astronauts, pointing out that they had not trained on the one-sixth-g 

trainer, which had shown that fatigue would limit the distance moon walkers 

could travel. Tests had indicated that the loping gait suggested by Armstrong would produce some very tired crews. Marshall evaluated the pro364 
After Apollo 11, laboratories all over the country and in a num

others had stacks of data tapes and lunar samples to study, and the pr

of more of each from the later flights, but this abundance did not al

the discontent of some members of the scientific community. Their 

charge was that the scientists had no part in NASA's decision-makin

no effective representation among NASA's top management since the 

of Dryden in 1965. Urey complained to the President's Space Task G

headed by Lee A. DuBridge, that he did not know who was making 

sions on the landing sites nor why they were making these decisions. 

he was informed of the selections, he said, so many unfamiliar acr

were used that the text was undecipherable. When the scientists di

part in the selection process later, according to one NASA mission pl

the situation did not improve. Each scientist repeatedly voted for the 

his preference, frequently resulting in a stalemate. In the end, NASA 

step in and make the decision anywayP 

Urey was, however, just as critical of those who derisively call

lunar samples "a bag of rocks." 

What a magnificent bag! Rocks last melted 3.6.5 billion years ago! D

last chemically assembled 4.66 billion years ago back at the very begin

of the solar system and of our mother earth. We have those marve

pictures of old mother earth as she floats in space.l 3 

At the end of the sixties, then, Apollo had finished the job it w

signed to do: land men on the moon and return them safely withi

decade. 

Although Apollo 11 was the most remembered of all the flights a

primary source of arguments about whether America should have sen

to the moon at all, that mission was actually an engineering confirm
be "a first step, not into space alone, but into the disciplined and courageous 

use of enhanced human powers for man, ennobled as he is today, as the first 

men step on the moon." And afterward historian Arthur Schlesinger 

declared: 

The 20th Century will be remembered, when all else is forgotten, as the 

century when man burst his terrestrial bonds.15 

Five years later-16 july 1974­

Launch Complex 39 was dedicated as a national landmark. 
-Appendixes 


Manned Spacecraft Center 


Site Selection Procedure 


The procedure for selecting a site for a manned space flight laborat

of four major facilities required for the manned lunar landing missio

the President, was as follows: 

I. The selection of the site would be made by the NASA Admi

in conjunction with the Deputy Administrator. 

II. As the first step in collecting information to assist the Admi

in the selection, on 7 July I96I the Associate Administrator instructed 

rector, Office of Space Flight Programs, to establish preliminary site crit

to propose membership for a site survey team. The team, appointed on 7 

I96I, consisted of John F. Parsons, Chairman, Associate Director, Ames R

Center; N. Phillip Miller, Chief, Facilities Engineering Division, Godda

Flight Center; Wesley L. Hjornevik, Assistant Director for Administrat

I. Edward Campagna, Construction Engineer, Space Task Group. When 

vik was suddenly taken ill on I2 August I96I, he was replaced by M

Byrnes, Project Management Assistant, Space Task Group. 

III. The site survey team met on II August with the Director, Office 

Flight Programs; the Associate Director, Space Task Group; and the 

Director for Manned Space Flight, Office of Space Flight Programs. Du

meeting, tentative site requirements were developed. 

Abstracted from James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, "Memorandum for the 

14 September 1961, and attachment. 

369 
teepoe syste. 

3. Local Industrial Support and Labor Supply: An existing, well-established industrial complex, including machine and fabrication shops, to support 

a research and development activity of high scientific and technical content and 

to fabricate pilot models of large spacecraft. 

A reliable supply of construction contractors and building trades craftsmen 

to permit rapid construction of facilities without premium labor costs. 

4. Community Facilities: Close proximity to a culturally attractive community to permit the recruitment and retention of a staff with a high percentage 

of professional scientific personnel. 

Close proximity to an institution of higher education, with emphasis on one 

specializing in the basic sciences and in space-related graduate and postgraduate 

education and research. 

5. Electrical Power: Strong local utility system capable of developing up to 

80 000 KVA of reliable power. 

6. Water: Readily available, good-quality water system capable of supplying 

more than a million liters per day of potable water and the same amount of 

industrial water. 

7. Area: 4 square kilometers with an available adjacent area for further 

development. Suitable areas in the general location for low hazard and nuisance 

subsidiary installations requiring some isolation. 

8. Climate: Mild, permitting year-round, ice-free water transportation and 

out-of-door work for most of the year to facilitate operations, reduce facility 

costs; and speed construction. 

Desirable Criteria 

1. Impact on Area: Compatibility of proposed laboratory with ex1stmg 

regional planning and ability of community facilities to absorb the increased 

population and to provide the related industrial and transport support required. 

2. Site Development Costs: Consideration of costs for site development required for proposed laboratory. 

370 
p

Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgi

sonville, Miami, and Tampa, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; New Orle

Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Memphis, Tennessee; Houston and Corpus 

Texas; San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and San Francisco, Ca

Portland, Oregon; and Seattle, Washington. 

This list was then reviewed in light of the other essential site crit

through consultation with the General Services Administration, avail

plus Government property. The list was reduced on 16 August 196

following nine areas: 

Jacksonville (Green Cove Springs Naval Station) and Tampa 

Air Force Base), Florida; Baton Rouge and Shreveport (Barksdale A

Base), Louisiana; Houston (San Jacinto Ordnance Depot), Victoria (F

port), and Corpus Christi (Naval Air Station), Texas; and San Diego 

Elliott) and San Francisco (Benecia Ordnance Depot), California. 

To evaluate each area properly, a physical inspection by member

team was essential. Accordingly, arrangements were made to visit th

possible sites. In certain areas, additional possibilities were brought to t

tion of the team and these localities were also visited. Hence, the 9 s

increased to 23 by the inclusion of the following: 

Bogalusa, Louisiana; Houston (University of Houston site, Rice U

site, and Ellington Air Force Base), Liberty, Beaumont, and Harlengen

Berkeley, Richmond, and Moffett Field (Naval Air Station), California

Louis (Daniel Boone site, Lewis and Clarke site, Industrial Park s

Jefferson Barracks), Missouri. 

Visits to the 23 sites began on 21 August and ended on 7 September 

The team agreed that locations north of the freezing line were un

meet the requirements and planned no visits in these areas. While the t

visiting the sites, however, several presentations were made directly to 

ministrator, Deputy Administrator, and other NASA officials, notably 

ponents of sites in the Boston, Rhode Island, and Norfolk areas. It wa

that these cities would be considered in the final revi~w. 
part of the program. 

3. A mild climate would avoid the necessity of special protection of the 

spacecraft against freezing of moisture in the many complicated components 

while transferring to and from sites and between site facilities. Providing such 

protection would be time-consuming and costly. 

4. A mild climate would facilitate recovery-procedure training of the astronauts, as well as other activities that must be conducted out of doors. 

5. A mild climate would permit a greater likelihood of day-to-day access 

by air to and from other parts of the country. 

In summary, the selection of a site in an area that met the stated climate 

criterion would minimize both cost and time required for this project. A mild 

climate would also permit year-round construction, thereby accelerating the 

development of the project. 

372 
Astronaut Assignments 

1. 	 APoLLO AsTRONAUT AssiGNMENTS AS 

ANNOUNCED IN 1966 AND 1967 

Announced 21 March 1966 

First manned flight-orbital 

Prime crew: Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White II, and R

Chaffee 

Backup crew: James A. McDivitt, David R. Scott, and R

Schweickart 

Announced 29 September 1966 

Second manned flight-orbital 

Prime crew: Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and R

Cunningham 

Backup crew: Frank Borman, Thomas P. Stafford, and Michae

373 
Announced 20 November 1967 

First manned flight-Uprated Saturn I 

Prime crew: Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham 

Backup crew: Stafford, Young, and Cernan 

Support crew: John L. Swigert, Jr., Ronald E. Evans, and William R. 

Pogue 

Second manned flight-Saturn V 

Prime crew: McDivitt, Scott, and Schweickart 

Backup crew: Conrad, Gordon, and Alan L. Bean 

Support crew: Edgar D. Mitchell, Fred W. Raise, Jr., and Alfred M. 

Worden 

Third manned flight-Saturn V 

Prime crew: Borman, Collins, and Anders 

Backup crew: Neil A. Armstrong, James A. Lovell, Jr., and Edwin E. 

Aldrin, Jr. 

Support crew: Thomas K. Mattingly II, Gerald P. Carr, and John S. 

Bull 

2. APOLLO AsTRONAUT AssiGNMENTs 

AS FLOWN 

Apollo 7-Saturn IB, orbital flight 

Prime crew: Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham 

Backup crew: Stafford, Young, and Cernan 

Support crew: Swigert, Evans, and Pogue 

374 
Apollo 11-Saturn V, lunar landing 

Prime crew: Armstrong, Collins, and Aldrin 

Backup crew: Lovell, Anders, and Raise 

Support crew: Mattingly, Evans, and Pogue 

3. AsTRONAUT MissiON AssiGNMENTS 

BY GROUP 

Selected 9 April 1959 

M. Scott 	Carpenter: Backup pilot on Mercury-Atlas 6 (MA-6); 

MA-7. 

L. 	Gordon Cooper, Jr.: Backup pilot on MA-8; pilot on MA-9; c

pilot on Gemini V; backup command pilot on Gemini XII; 

commander on Apollo 10. 

John H. Glenn, Jr.: Backup pilot on Mercury-Redstone 3 (MR

MR-4; pilot on MA-6. 

Virgil I. Grissom: Pilot on MR-4; command pilot on Gemini 3; 

command pilot on Gemini VI-A; assigned as commander on A

killed in fire on pad. 

Walter M. Shirra, Jr.: Backup pilot on MA-7; pilot on MA-8; back

mand pilot on Gemini 3; command pilot on Gemini VI-A; com

on Apollo 7. 

Alan 	B. Shepard, Jr.: Pilot on MR-3; backup pilot on MA-9; com

on Apollo 14. 

Donald K. Slayton: Assigned as pilot on MA-7 and then withdr

cause of heart fibrillation; docking module pilot on Apollo-Soy
mander on Apollo 13. 

James A. McDivitt: Command pilot on Gemini IV; backup commander on 

Apollo 1; commander on Apollo 9. 

Elliot M. See, Jr.: Backup pilot on Gemini V; assigned as command pilot 

on Gemini IX, killed in aircraft accident. 

Thomas P. Stafford: Backup pilot on Gemini 3; pilot on Gemini VI-A; 

backup command pilot on Gemini IX-A (became prime crew command 

pilot after See was killed in aircraft accident); backup commander on 

Apollo 7; commander on Apollo 10; commander on Apollo-Soyuz. 

Edward H. White II: Pilot on Gemini IV; backup command pilot on Gemini 

VII; assigned as command module pilot on Apollo 1, killed in fire on 

pad. 

John W. Young: Pilot on Gemini 3; backup pilot on Gemini VI-A; command pilot on Gemini X; backup command module pilot on Apollo 7; 

command module pilot on Apollo 10; backup commander on Apollo 13; 

commander on Apollo 16; backup commander on Apollo 17 (replacing 

Scott, when Irwin resigned). 

Selected 18 October 1963 

Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr.: Backup pilot on Gemini X (moved to backup crew 

on IX after See and Bassett were killed in aircraft accident); pilot on 

Gemini XII; backup lunar module pilot on Apollo 8 (moved to backup 

command module position when Lovell became member of prime crew); 

lunar module pilot on Apollo 11. 

William A. Anders: Backup pilot on Gemini XI; lunar module pilot on 

Apollo 8; backup command module pilot on Apollo 11. 

Charles A. Bassett II: Assigned as pilot on Gemini IX, killed in aircraft 

accident. 

Alan L. Bean: Backup command pilot on Gemini X when Lovell moved 

to backup crew on IX after the deaths of See and Bassett; backup com376 
Russell L. Schweickart: Backup lunar module pilot on Apollo 

module pilot on Apollo 9; backup commander on Skylab 2. 

David R. Scott: Pilot on Gemini VIII; backup command modul

Apollo I; command module pilot on Apollo 9; backup com

Apollo 12; commander on Apollo 15; backup commander on 

(removed from flight status when Irwin resigned). 

Clifton 	C. Williams, Jr.: Backup pilot on Gemini X; killed 

accident. 

Selected 27 june 1965 

Owen K. Garriott: Science pilot on Skylab 3. 


Edward G. Gibson: Support crew on Apollo 12; science pilot on 

Joseph P. Kerwin: Science pilot on Skylab 2. 


Harrison H. Schmitt: Backup lunar module pilot on Apollo 

module pilot on Apollo 17. 

Selected 4 April1966 

Vance D. Brand: Support crew on Apollo 8 (replaced Bull, w

signed for health reasons); support crew on Apollo 13; ba

mand module pilot on Apollo 15; backup commander on Sk

4; command module pilot on Apollo-Soyuz. 

John S. Bull: Support crew on Apollo 8 (resigned from the pr

health reasons). 

Gerald P. Carr: Support crew on Apollo 8 and 12; commander on 

Charles M. Duke, Jr.: Support crew on Apollo 10; backup lun

pilot on Apollo 13; lunar module pilot on Apollo 16; bac

module pilot on Apollo 17 (replacing Irwin, who resigned). 
module pilot on Apollo 13 (replaced by Swigert after being exposed to 

a communicable disease); command module pilot on Apollo 16. 

Bruce McCandless II: Support crew on Apollo 14; backup pilot on Skylab 2. 

Edgar D. Mitchell: Support crew on Apollo 9; backup lunar module pilot on 

Apollo 10; lunar module pilot on Apollo 14; backup lunar module pilot 

on Apollo 16. 

William R. Pogue: Support crew on Apollo 7, 13, and 14; pilot on Skylab 4. 

Stuart A. Roosa: Command module pilot on Apollo 14; backup command 

module pilot on Apollo 16 and 17 (replaced Worden when Irwin 

resigned). 

John L. Swigert: Support crew on Apollo 7; backup command module pilot 

on Apollo 13 (replaced Mattingly on prime crew when the latter was 

exposed to a communicable disease). 

Paul J. Weitz: Support crew on Apollo 12; pilot on Skylab 2. 

Alfred M. Worden: Support crew on Apollo 9; backup command module 

pilot on Apollo 12; command module pilot on Apollo 15; backup command module pilot on Apollo 17 (removed from flight status when 

Irwin resigned). 

Selected 4 August 1967 

Joseph P. Allen IV: Support crew on Apollo 15. 


Philip K. Chapman: Support crew on Apollo 14 and 16. 


Anthony W. England: Support crew on Apollo 16. 


Karl G. Henize: Support crew on Apollo 16. 


William B. Lenoir: Backup science pilot on Skylab 3 and 4. 


F. Story Musgrave: Backup science pilot on Sk)'lab 2. 

Robert A. R. Parker: Support crew on Apollo 15 and 17. 

378 
MR-4: Control Center-Shepard. 

MA-6: Control Center-Shepard; Bermuda-Grissom; California-S

Muchea-Cooper. 

MA-7: Control Center-Grissom; California-Shepard; Muchea-S

Guaymas-Cooper. 

MA-8: Control Center-Slayton; Hawaii-Grissom; California-

Coastal Sentry Quebec-Shepard; Guaymas-Carpenter. 

MA-9: Control Center-Schirra; Guaymas-Grissom; Coastal Sentr

bec-Glenn; Hawaii-Carpenter. 

GEMINI 

Gemini 3: Cape-Cooper. 


Houston-Chaffee (monitor). 


Gemini IV: Cape-Williams. 


Houston-Grissom. 


Gemini V: Cape-Grissom. 


Houston-McDivitt, Aldrin, Armstrong. 


Gemini VIII 


VI-A: Cape-Bean. 


Houston-See, Cernan, Bassett. 


Gemini VIII: Cape-Cunningham. 


Houston-Lovell. 


Gemini IX: Cape-Aldrin. 


Houston-Armstrong, Lovell, Gordon, Aldrin. 


Gemini X: Cape-Cooper. 


Houston-Cooper, Aldrin. 


Gemini XI: Cape-Williams. 


Houston-Young, Bean. 


Gemini XII: Cape-Roosa. 


Houston-Conrad, Anders. 

Roosa, Young. 

SKYLAB 

Skylab 2: Truly, Crippen, Thornton, Hartsfield, Henize, Parker. 

Skylab 3: Truly, Crippen, Thornton, Hartsfield, Henize, McCandless, 

Musgrave, Parker. 

Skylab 4: Truly, Crippen, Hartsfield, McCandless, Musgrave, Thornton, 

Henize, Lenoir, Parker, Schweickart. 

ASTP 

Apollo-Soyuz: Bobko, Crippen, Truly, Overmyer (in Moscow). 

Note: During Mercury, the astronauts manned the remote stations; in Gemini, flight control 

specialists had these assignments and ·the astronauts manned consoles at Launch Control at the 

Cape and at Mission Control in Houston. For Apollo, Houston assumed control when the 

launch vehicle cleared the tower. The launch flight director handled communications up to 

that point, then the astronaut capsule communicators in Houston took over. The last plan 

was also followed for Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

380 
1. SATURN-APOLLO FLIGHTS 

(SATURN I) 

Saturn-Apollo 1 (suborbital) 

Launch: 27 October 1961, Complex 34, ETR, 01:00:06 p.m. 

Payload: Dummy second stage and Jupiter nose cone. 


Delays: Two holds totaling 54 minutes for cloud cover ove

Objectives: Flight-test eight clustered H-1 engines. Achieved. 


Flight-test S-1 stage clustered-propellant-tankage 

Achieved. 

Flight-test S-1 control system. Achieved. 

Measure performance of bending and flutter, p

sloshing, base heating, aerodynamic-engine torque

frame aerodynamic heating. Achieved. 

Saturn-Apollo 2 (suborbital) 

Launch: 25 April 1962, Complex 34, ETR, 09:00:34 a.m. ES

Payload: Dummy second stage and Jupiter nose cone. 


Delays: Hold for 30 minutes for ship in downrange area. 


Objectives: Prove first-stage propulsion system, structural de

control system. Achieved. 

Prove launch facilities and ground support e

Achieved. 

Confirm vehicle aerodynamic characteristics 

Achieved. 

381 
j

p

Saturn-Apollo 4 (suborbital) 

Launch: 28 March 1963, Complex 34, ETR, 03:11:55 p.m. EST. 


Payload: Dummy second stage and Jupiter nose cone. 


Delays: Three technical holds, totaling 102 minutes. 


Objectives: Same as Saturn-Apollo 2, with two exceptions: 


I) Programmed premature cutoff of one engine to demon­


strate that mission could be performed with one engine 


out. 


2) No Project High Water. 


All objectives achieved. 

Saturn-Apollo 5 (orbital) 

Launch: 29 January 1964, Complex 37B, ETR, 11:25:01 a.m. EST. 

Payload: Live second stage, functional instrument unit, and Jupiter 

nose cone ballasted to simulate spacecraft mass characteristics. 

Delays: Scrubbed on 27 January because of a test flange left in S-1 

stage liquid-oxygen (LOX) replenishment line, preventing 

flow of LOX to vehicle; 73-minute hold on 29 January because of interference in C-band radar and commanddestruct frequencies. 

Objectives: Flight-test launch vehicle propulsion, structure, and flight 

control systems. Achieved. 

Flight-test live S-IV stage. Achieved. 

Flight-test instrument unit. Achieved. 

Demonstrate S-1/S-IV stage separation. Achieved. 

Parameters: Apogee, 785 kilometers; perigee, 262 kilometers. 

382 
Objectives: 

Parameters: 

Demonstrate launch vehicle propulsion, structure, 

trol. Achieved, except for engine no. 8 p

shutdown. 

Flight-test closed-loop guidance. Achieved. 

First flight test of Apollo spacecraft/ launch vehicle 

tion. Achieved. 

Determine launch escape tower separation chara

Achieved. 

Evaluate S-1/S-IV stage separation. Achieved. 

Determine spacecraft launch and exit environment

eters. Achieved. 

Demonstrate LES jettison, using tower jettiso

Achieved. 

Apogee, 227 kilometers; perigee, 182 kilometers. 

Saturn-Apollo 7 (A-102, orbital) 

Launch: 18 September 1964, Complex 37B, ETR, 11:22:43 a

Payload: Boilerplate 15. 

Delays: Hold for 65 minutes caused by inadvertent activatio

ture firex system, which sprayed water on vehicle 

S-IV stage umbilical connectors; connectors remov

out, replaced, and rechecked. Planned 21-minute 

tended to 25 minutes after a malfunction was ind

the S-IV stage LOX-pressurizing-regulator circuit

tion false. Hold for 25 minutes because of appa

function in S-1 stage hydraulic pump tempera

prevented start of pump; malfunction found in 

bypassed. Hold for 49 minutes caused by interm

eration of Grand Turk radar; radar repaired a

resumed. 
meters; boilerplate jettisoned on insertion. 

Saturn-Apollo 9 (A-103, orbital) 

Launch: 16 February 1965, Complex 37B, ETR, 09:37:03 a.m. EST. 


Payload: Boilerplate 16 and Pegasus I. 


Delays: Hold for 30 minutes to discharge Pegasus battery, recharge, 


and certify proper operation (replaced usual, 30-minute 

hold at T- 30); 67-minute hold for power failure in range 

flight safety computer. 

Objectives: Same as for Pegasus II. Achieved. 


Parameters: Pegasus I: apogee, 743.4 kilometers; perigee, 495.4 kilometers. 


Saturn-Apollo 10 (A-105, orbital) 

Launch: 30 July 1965, Complex 37B, ETR, 09:00:00 a.m. EDT. 


Payload: Boilerplate 9 and Pegasus Ill. 


Delays: None. 


Objectives: Same as for Pegasus I and II. Achieved. 


Parameters: Pegasus III: apogee, 532 kilometers; perigee, 532 kilometers. 


2. PAD ABORT TESTS 

Pad Abort I 

Launch: 7 November 1963, WSMR, 09:00:01 a.m. MST. 

Vehicle: Boilerplate 6, with tower structure, launch-escape motor, 

pitch-control motor, tower-jettison motor, and towerrelease mechanism. 

384 
Pad Abort 2 

Launch: 

Vehicle: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

Parameters: 

A-001 

Launch: 

Payload: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

29 June 1965, WSMR, 06:00:01 a.m. MST. 

Boilerplate 23A, with launch escape system equip

canard subsystem and boost protective cover. 

None. 

Demonstrate capability of LES to abort from launch 

recover. Achieved. 

Maximum altitude, 1578 meters; landing point, 23

downrange. 

3. LITTLE JoE II TESTS 

13 May 1964, WSMR, 05:59:59 a.m. MST. 


Boilerplate 12, with escape system. 


Scrubbed on 12 May for unacceptable wind conditi

Demonstrate structural integrity of escape tower. A

Demonstrate capability of escape system to propel 

module to predetermined distance from launc

Achieved. Determine aerodynamic stability characteristics of 

figuration for abort conditions. Achieved. 

Demonstrate proper separation of command mo

service module. Achieved. 

Demonstrate satisfactory recovery timing sequenc

landing subsystem. Achieved. 
A-003 

Launch: 

Payload: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

Parameters: 

A-004 

Launch: 

Payload: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

Parameters: 

19 May 1965, WSMR, 06:01:04 a.m. MST. 


Boilerplate 22 and launch escape system. 


None. 


Demonstrate satisfactory launch escape vehicle (LEV) performance at altitude approximating upper limit for canard 

subsystem. Not achieved. Little Joe II booster experienced 

very high roll rate and disintegrated at low altitude. 

Demonstrate orientation of LEV to main heatshield forward 

attitude after high-altitude abort. Not achieved. 

Maximum altitude, 5944 meters; landing point, 5486 meters 

downrange. 

20 January 1966, WSMR, 08:17:01 a.m. MST. 

Production model CSM-002. 

Scrubbed on 18 January for low ceiling and poor visibility. 

Hold for 17 minutes on 20 January for loss of two WSMR 

telemetry stations; repaired before flight. 

Demonstrate satisfactory LEV performance of abort in poweron tumbling boundary region. Achieved. 

Demonstrate structural integrity of LEV air-frame structure 

for such an abort. Achieved. 

Maximum altitude, 22 600 meters; landing point, 34 630 

meters downrange. 

386 
helium pressure switch in Saturn IB ready circuit. H

30 minutes (during which flight was canceled and 

instated) for further information on helium p

problem. 

Objectives: Demonstrate structural integrity and compatibility of 

vehicle and spacecraft and confirm launch loads. Ac

Demonstrate separation of first and second stages of 

LES and boost protective cover from CSM, CSM f

strument unit/spacecraft/lunar module (LM) a

and CM from SM. Achieved. 

Verify operations of Saturn propulsion, guidance a

trol, and electrical subsystems. Achieved. 

Verify operation of spacecraft subsystems and adeq

heatshield for reentry from low earth orbit. P

achieved. 

Evaluate emergency detection system in open-loop co

tion. Achieved. 

Evaluate heatshield ablator at high reentry rate

achieved because of loss of data during maximum h

Demonstrate operation of mission support fa

Achieved. 

Parameters: Maximum altitude, 488 kilometers; landing point, 84

meters downrange, 8.18°S, 11.15°W; miss distance, 

meters; splashdown time, 11:49 a.m. EST. 

Recovery: On board U.S.S. Boxer by 02:20p.m. EST. 

AS-202 (suborbital) 

Launch: 25 August 1966, Complex 34, ETR, 1:15:32 p.m. ED

Vehicle: Saturn IB. 


Payload: Spacecraft 011. 

Vehicle: Saturn lB. 

Payload: Nose cone. 

Delays: Hold for 4 minutes to examine quality of signal from liquidhydrogen television cameras; 98-minute hold because of 

loss of signal from camera no. 2 (decision made to fly with 

one camera) ; !-minute hold because of loss of Bermuda 

radar. 

Objectives: Evaluate performance on S-IVB instrument unit stage under 

orbital conditions and obtain flight information on venting and chill-down systems, fluid dynamics and heat transfer of propellant tanks; attitude and thermal control system, launch vehicle guidance, and checkout in orbit. 

Achieved. 

Parameters: Apogee, 189 kilometers; perigee, 185 kilometers. 

Recovery: None. 

Apollo 4 (AS-501, orbital) 

Launch: 9 November 1967, Complex 39A, ETR, 07:00:01 a.m. EST. 


Vehicle: Saturn V. 


Payload: Spacecraft 017. 


Delays: None. 


Objectives: Demonstrate structural and thermal integrity and compatibil­


ity of launch vehicle and spacecraft; confirm launch loads 

and dynamic characteristics. Achieved. 

Verify operation of command module heatshield (adequacy 

of Block II design for reentry at lunar return conditions), 

service propulsion system (SPS; including no ullage start), 

and selected subsystems. Achieved. 

Evaluate performance of emergency detection system in openloop configuration. Achieved. 

388 
Delays: Hold for 228 minutes when spacecraft water boiler 

ture rose higher than planned, caused by problem 

freon supply, and a power supply in an output r

the digital data-acquisition system failed. 

Objectives: Verify operation of LM ascent and descent propu

tems. Achieved. 

Evaluate LM staging. Achieved. 

Evaluate S-IVB instrument unit performance. Achie

Parameters: Apogee, 222 kilometers (at insertion, LM/S-IVB se

and after first descent engine firing) and 961 k

(after first ascent engine firing); perigee, 163 k

(at insertion), 167 (at separation), 171 (after de

gine firing), and 172 kilometers (after ascent engin

Recovery: None. 

Apollo 6 (AS-502, orbital) 

Launch: 4 April 1968, Complex 39A, ETR, 07:00:01 a.m. E

Vehicle: Saturn V. 


Payload: CM-020, SM-014, LTA-2R. 


Delays: None. 


Objectives: , Demonstrate structure and thermal integrity and co

ity of launch vehicle and spacecraft; confirm laun

and dynamic characteristics. Achieved. 

Demonstrate separation of launch vehicle stages. Ac

Evaluate performance of emergency detection s

closed-loop configuration. Achieved. 

Verify operation of Saturn V propulsion, guidance 

trol, and electrical systems. Not achieved, because 
5. 	 MANNED APOLLO-SATURN FLIGHTS 


(SATURN IB AND SATURN V) 


Apollo 7 (AS-205, earth-orbital) 

Launch: 

Vehicle: 

Payload: 

Crew: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

Parameters: 

Recovery: 

II October I968, Complex 34, ETR, 11:02:45 a.m. EDT. 

Saturn lB. 

CSM-101. 

Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter 

Cunningham. 

Hold for 2 minutes 45 seconds to complete S-IVB thrust 

chamber jacket chilldown. 

Demonstrate CSMI crew performance. Achieved. 

Demonstrate crew/space vehicle/mission support facilities 

during manned CSM mission. Achieved. 

Demonstrate CSM rendezvous capability. Achieved. 

Apogee, 285 kilometers; perigee, 227 kilometers; landing 

point, 27°32'N, 64°04'W; miss distance, I4 kilometers•; 

time, 07: I2 a.m. EDT, 22 Oct.; mission elapsed time 

(MET), 260:08:58. 

Crew on board U.S.S. Essex at 08:20 a.m. EDT; spacecraft 

aboard ship at 09:03 a.m. 

• Onboard computer target point was 27°37.8'N, 64°10.2•W; onboard computer landing 

point was 27°37.8'N, 64°10.8'W. Recovery ship landing point was 27°32.5'N, 64.

0 04.0'W; indications are that the recovery ship may have been as much as ±13 kilometers in error and that 

the spacecraft may actually have landed very close to .the target point. 

390 
Parameters: 

Recovery: 

Achieved. 

Return high-resolution photographs of proposed Apo

ing sites and locations of scientific interest. Achie

Apogee, 190 kilometers; perigee, 180 kilometers; tr

injection, 02:56:05.5 MET; maximum distance fro

376 745 kilometers; lunar orbit insertion, 69:08:2

lunar orbit, 312 by 111 kilometers; transearth 

89:19:17 MET; landing point, 8°7.5'N, l65°l.2

distance, 2.5 kilometers; splashdown time, 27 Dec

10:52 a.m. EST; MET, 147:00:42. 

Crew 	on board U.S.S. Yorktown at 12:20 p.m. ES

craft aboard ship at 01:20p.m. 

Apollo 9 (AS-504, earth-orbital) 

Launch: 

Vehicle: 

Payload: 

Crew: 

Delays: 

Objectives: 

3 March 1969, Complex 39A, ETR, 11:00:00 a.m. 

Saturn V. 

CSM-104, LM-3. 

James A. McDivitt, David R. Scott, and Ru

Schweickart. 

None. 

Demonstrate crew fspace vehicle/mission support 

during manned Saturn V/CSMfLM mission. Ach

Demonstrate LM/crew performance. Achieved. 

Demonstrate selected lunar orbit rendezvous missi

ties including transposition, docking withdrawal

hicular crew transfer, EVA, SPS and DPS burns, 

active rendezvous and docking. All achieved exc

(because of Schweickart's illness, most EVA activ

canceled). 

Assess CSM/LM consumables use. Achieved. 
Crew: Thomas P. Stafford, John W. Young, and Eugene A. Cernan. 


Delays: None. 


Objectives: Demonstrate performance of LM and CSM in lunar gravita­


tional field. Achieved. 

Evaluate CSM and LM docked and undocked lunar navigation. Achieved. 

Parameters: Apogee, 190 kilometers; perigee, 184 kilometers; translunar 

injection, 02:39:21 MET; maximum distance from earth, 

399 194 kilometers; first CSM-LM docking in translunar 

trajectory, 03:17:37 MET; lunar orbit insertion, 75:55:54 

MET; first LM undocking in lunar orbit, 98: ll:57 MET; 

first LM staging in lunar orbit, 102:45:17 MET; first 

manned LM-CSM docking in lunar orbit, 106:22:02 MET; 

transearth injection, 137:36:29 MET; landing point, 15°2'S, 

164°39'W; miss distance, not available; time, 26 May at 

12:52 a.m. EDT; 	MET, 192:03:23. 

Recovery: 	 Crew on board U.S.S. Princeton at 01:31 p.m. EDT; spacecraft aboard ship at 02:28 p.m. 

Apollo 11 (AS-506, lunar landing) 

Launch: 16 July 1969, Complex 39A, ETR, 09:32:00 a.m. EDT. 


Vehicle: Saturn V. 


Payload: CSM-107, LM-5. 


Crew: Neil A. Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. 


Delays: None. 


Objectives: Perform manned lunar landing and return mission. Achieved. 


Parameters: Apogee, 186 kilometers; perigee, 183 kilometers; translunar 


injection, 02:44:26 MET; maximum distance from earth, 

389 645 kilometers; lunar orbit insertion, 75:50:00 MET; 

lunar landing, 102:33:05 MET (20 July at 04:17 p.m. 

392 

EARLY APoLLO SciENTIFIC ExPERIMENTS PACKAGE (EASEP) 

The Apollo 11 scientific experiments for deployment on the lunar surface 

near the touchdown point of the lunar module were stowed in the lander's 

scientific equipment bay at the left rear quadrant of the descent stage looking 

forward. 

The early Apollo scientific experiments package was carried only on this 

flight; subsequent Apollo lunar landing missions carried the more comprehensive Apollo lunar surface experiments package. 

EASEP consisted of two basic experiments: a passive seismic experiments 

package (PSEP) and a laser ranging retroreflector (LRRR). Both experiments 

were independent, self-contained packages that weighed a total of 77 kilograms 

and occupied 0.34 cubic meters of space. 

PSEP used three long-period seismometers and one short-period vertical 

seismometer for measuring meteoroid impacts and moonquakes. Data gathered 

would be useful in determining the interior structure of the moon; for example, 

does the moon have a core and mantle like the earth? The seismic experiment 

package had four basic subsystems: a structure/thermal subsystem for shock, 

vibration, and thermal protection; an electrical power subsystem generating 34 

to 36 watts by solar panel array; a data subsystem to receive and decode Manned 

Space Flight Network uplink commands and downlink experiment data and to 

handle power switching tasks; and a passive seismic experiment subsystem to 

measure lunar seismic activity and to detect inertial mass displacement. 

The LRRR experiment was a retroreflector array, made from cubes of 

fused silica, with a folding support structure for aiming and aligning the array 

toward the earth. Laser ranging beams from the earth were reflected back to 

their point of origin for precise measurement of earth-moon distances, motion of 

the moon's center of mass, lunar radius, and earth geophysical information. 

Earth stations that beamed lasers to the LRRR included the McDonald 

Observatory, Fort Davis, Texas; Lick Observatory, Mount Hamilton, California; 

and the Catalina Station of the University of Arizona. Scientists in other countries also bounced laser beams off the LRRR. 

394 
degrees C. Exposure to lower temperatures would have damaged the in

The heaters were 7.6 centimeters in diameter, 7.6 centimeters 

weighed 57 grams each, including multiple layers of shielding and 

materials. The complete seismometer package weighed 45 kilogra

heaters were mounted in the seismic package before launch. During 

surface walk, the lunar module pilot transported the package a shor

away and set up the equipment. There was no handling risk to the 

plutonium fuel was encased in various materials chosen for radiation 

and for heat and shock resistance. These materials included a tantalum

alloy, a platinum-rhodium alloy, titanium, fibrous carbon, and grap

an outer layer of stainless steel. 

Extensive safety analyses and tests were performed by Sandia La

at Albuquerque, New Mexico, to determine the effects of an abort o

ceivable accident in connection with the moon flight. The safety rep

Interagency Safety Evaluation Panel, made up of representatives of N

AEC, and the Department of Defense, concluded that the heater pre

undue safety problem to the general population under any accident 

9-eemed possible for the Apollo mission. 
Three categories of samples were brought back by the Apollo 11 crew: 

contingency, bulk, and documented (or core) samples. Neil Armstrong collected 

contingency samples first-about one kilogram of surface material-being careful 

to get far enough away from the lunar module that the soil would not have been 

contaminated by the residue from the descent engine exhaust. He sealed this 

sample in a plastic bag. 

For the second category, the bulk sample, one of the two special rock boxes 

was filled, using a scoop. Not much attention was given to varying selection, 

since the objective was merely to collect an adequate amount of material for 

investigation upon return to the earth. But even here, Armstrong did better 

than expected, gathering II rocks of more than a hundred grams each (the 

largest weighing nearly a kilogram) some distance away from the base of the 

lander. 

When the activity outside the lunar module fell 15 minutes behind schedule, 

the lunar sample investigators back on earth worried that the crew might not be 

able to obtain the documented sample, the third category. Fortunately, the 

smooth functioning of the life support system and the low metabolic usage of 

the pilots permitted the extension of the extravehicular period. While Edwin 

Aldrin collected the two core samples (to study the stratification of subsurface 

material), Armstrong hurriedly gathered 25 more rock specimens, using tongs 

to pick them up. 

The two boxes were sealed and placed in the lunar module, transferred to 

the command module after the docking, pulled out on the deck of the aircraft 

carrier, put in the mobile quarantine facility, and flown to Houston, arriving 

at the Lunar Receiving Laboratory on 25 July 1969. 

The bulk and documented samples were placed within a double biological 

barrier (vacuum chamber and special cabinets), which made handling and 

working with the materials difficult. (Contingency sample material was put in a 

nitrogen cabinet, where working conditions were not so restrictive.) Ordinarily 

396 
firmed during examination of the samples in the laboratory. 

Chemical composition of the fines (powdered material) and igne

(fire-made), according to the report, was different from that of any kn

restrial rock. The team was also of the opinion that there was a "goo

that the time of crystallization of some of the Apollo II rocks may dat

times earlier than the oldest rocks on earth." 

Apollo 11 had landed in the southwestern part of Mare Tranquillit

degrees north latitude and 24.39 degrees east longitude. This region 

by relatively faint rays, spreading out from large craters in that sect

moon. There is a possibility that these rays might contain fragme

Craters Theophilus, Alfraganus, and Tycho-although the closest of the

ganus, is 160 kilometers away. 

At the landing site, particles ranged from those too small to be se

naked eye to two-thirds of a meter in diameter. The surface material 

layer called the lunar regolith (mantle), porous and weakly coheren

surface but more densely packed underneath. The bulk of the mant

landing area was of fine particles, although there were rock fragment

of and in the soil. 

Around the lunar module, the crew observed that the rocks were 

shape and that most of them were embedded in the soil to some d

majority of the rocks examined had rounded tops, but the bottoms 

same rocks usually had either fiat areas or irregular angular shapes. 

strong, one rock (not brought back) resembled a distributor cap. He 

it with a kick and saw that the buried portion was larger than the 

end and was angular in shape. 

The evaluation team used the term "rock" for any fragment larger 

centimeter in diameter and "fines" for anything smaller. It divided th

into four types: 

A. 	 Fine-grained vesicular (with small cavities or bubbles probabl

by gas) crystalline igneous rock. 
have a metallic luster with multicolored reflections. In the laboratory, the team 

observed that some glass particles (the samples ranged in size from 10 millimeters to less than 10 microns) were colorless and others were brown, red, green, 

or black. The brown were the most abundant. 

One noticeable feature of the rocks was the rounding of one or more edges 

and corners. In the softer materials, the breccias, rounding was more pronounced 

than on the harder crystalline rocks. There were coarser grains poking out of 

the breccia formations, indicating that the surface had earlier been surrounded 

by finer grains that had subsequently eroded. 

Neither core sample showed any signs of stratification. One of the two 

did have a lighter zone about six centimeters from the top, but a megascopic 

(magnified) examination revealed little difference in the lighter and darker 

materials. 

During the preliminary examination, the team conducted microscopic 

studies, trying to find any living, previously living, or fossilized material. No 

such material was found in any case. Some of the samples were subjected to 

germ-free mice, fish, quail, shrimp, oysters, other invertebrates, tissue cultures, 

insects, plants, and paramecia. There was no evidence that any pathogens were 

present. 

398 
*STL named sole contractor January 1965.

control 

Aeronca 

Honeycomb panels 

Pratt and Whitney 

Fuel cell 

NAA 

IU/Apollo adapters 

Marquardt 

LM RCS 

Hamilton Standard 

Environmental control 

NAA/Rocketdyne 

and Space Tech Lab 

RCA 

Communications, instrumentation, 

VHF transponder power amp, VHF 

transmitter, omnidirectional, 

erectable antenna, TV, personnel 

(extravehicular) 

Marquardt 

S/M RCS 

NAA 

Service module 

Aerojet-General 

S/M engine 

Grumman 

LM 

Bell Aerospace 

and Rocketdyne 

LM ascent stage propulsio

RCA 

LM guidance 

AC Spark Plug 

Inertial measuring unit, power 

servo assy, ground support, 

system assembly, test, inertial 

reference integrating gyro 

Honeywell Company 

Stabilization, control 

Allison and Airite 

Products 

Fuel components 

Elgin National Watch 

Sequencer 

Collins Radio 

Telecommunications 

Radiation Inc. 

Telemetry data 

processing for 

Apollo S-II stage 

RCA 

Radar, engineering 

services 

Link 

Spacecraft mission 

simulators 

Simmonds Precision 

Products 

Propellant mixture 

controls 

MIT 

Associate primeguidance, 

navigation 

Beech Aircraft 

Supercritical gas 

storage 

RCA 

TV cameras, main 

communications 

antenna 

Raytheon 

Computer 

Bell 

Aerosystems RC

positive expulsi

fuel tanks Westinghous

Electric 

Static inverte

Kollsman Instru

Optics 

LM descent stage propulsion 
W

T

D A LM O

VICTOR 

G 

AIR

SP AC E 

T E C H n o l o 

TRW 

Apollo spac
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 

The Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, was responsible for 

development, fabrication, qualification, acceptance testing, and delivery 

Apollo spacecraft, associated wound support equipment, and assigned 

ments; planning all Apollo missions; controlling the flight phase of the m

including developing ground equipment necessary for mission control 

vided by other centers; selecting, training, and assigning flight crews; dev

procedures as needed for spacecraft guidance, checkout, and mission 

establishing prelaunch requirements for test, checkout, and inspection o

spacecraft; and planning the implementation of the lunar science progra

In carrying out these assignments, the center performed the followi

tions in the listed areas: 

I. Hardware 

a. Provided detailed specifications, design, manufacture, c

test, reliability and quality control, and acceptance of Manned Spacecr

ter- (Houston-) developed hardware, not including test and checkout f

at the launch site by the Kennedy Space Center. 

b. Developed and delivered to Kennedy flight-qualified sp

and listings or discussions of appropriate procedures, pertinent data, and 

equipment. 

c. Provided detailed specifications, design, development, 

tion, qualification, acceptance testing, and delivery of experiments flig

ware and associated specialized ground equipment for experiments appr

the Manned Spate Flight Experiments Board. 

d. Controlled the receipt and stowage of scheduled and a

flight crew personal equipment at the launch center and provided 

with a list of this equipment. 

Abstracted from "Center Responsibiltties in the Apollo Program," NASA Apollo 

Directive No. 3~. 8 Nov. 1967. 

401 
e. Provided requirements and criteria to Kennedy for ensuring 

flight readiness of experiment flight hardware. 

IV. Reliability and Quality Assurance 

a. Provided quality control requirements and inspection criteria for 

Houston-developed hardware for use at the factory, test, and launch. sites. 

b. Audited contractor factory and test site performance, in accordance with requirements and criteria, and participated, when appropriate, in 

audits conducted by Kennedy at the launch site. 

c. Determined corrective action for Houston-developed hardware 

that had failed, malfunctioned, or performed outside of specifications. 

V. Systems Engineering 

Provided technical representation on design and operations intercenter panels or working groups established by the Apollo Program Office. 

Vl. Operations 

a. Developed flight techniques, procedures, and hardware for the 

Mission Control Center. 

b. Developed objectives, plans, and rules to support Apollo mission 

assignments. 

c. Conducted flight operations. 

d. Obtained from Kennedy the necessary checkout and launch 

operational requirements for incorporation into Houston-designed hardware. 

e. Worked with the Department of Defense in planning recovery 

support. 

VII. Flight Crew 

a. Provided trained flight crews and personal equipment for manned 

miSSIOns. 

'402 
3. Developed and operated center facilities in support of 

4. Established detailed schedules for Houston-develope

ware, procedures, associated equipment, and operational activities to 

meeting Apollo program plans. 

b. Medical 

I. Provided medical surveillance and support for the as

during all phases of the Apollo program and at any location. 

2. Evaluated the medical data obtained during manned 

ensure that the acceptability of equipment performance was properly inte

and reflected in the postflight mission reports. 

3. Provided for the development and implementation of 

disaster plans associated with tests of Apollo hardware at the Houston l

c. Safety 

I. Provided written approval of Kennedy criteria for de

ing hazardous operations at the launch site. 

2. Reviewed and approved any Kennedy test and check

cedures in which flight crews participated. 

GEORGE c. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 

The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabam

responsible for design, development, fabrication, qualification, acceptan

ing, and delivery of the Saturn launch vehicles, including engines, as

ground support equipment, and assigned experiments; furnishing missio

ning data from the standpoint of overall vehicle performance; providing 

vehicle data and procedures for launch vehicle guidance and checkout

lishing prelaunch requirements for testing, checkout, and inspection of 

launch vehicles; and supporting launch and flight operations as reque

Houston and the Cape. 

In carrying out these assignments, the center performed the fo

functions in the listed areas: 
g, 

ware, associated procedures, and support equipment at each stage of preparation 

at the factory, test, and launch sites. 

b. Provided criteria to Kennedy for controlling equipment, tools, 

and materials entering or leaving the launch vehicle stages or the instrument 

unit during launch site preparations and operations. 

III. Test and Checkout 

a. Established and maintained test and checkout requirements, specifications, and criteria for factory or test site acceptance and launch site preparation of Marshall-developed hardware. 

b. Reviewed factory, test site, and launch site test requirements, 

checkout plans, and procedures to ensure adequate testing of Marshall-developed 

hardware. 

c. Reviewed the adequacy of Kennedy test procedures. 

d. Provided requirements and criteria to Kennedy to ensure readiness of experiments flight hardware. 

e. Determined the functional performance and readiness of flight 

hardware. 

f. Provided technical assistance or data needed by Kennedy in preparing hardware for flight. 

g. Determined the flight readiness of the launch vehicle. 

IV. Reliability and Quality Assurance 

a. Provided quality control requirements and inspection criteria for 

Marshall-developed hardware for use at the factory, test, and launch sites. 

b. Audited contractor factory and test site performance and participated, at its own option, in Kennedy-conducted audits at the launch site. 

c. Determined corrective action and disposition of Marshall-developed hardware that failed, malfunctioned, or operated outside performance 

limits. 

404 
from Kennedy for incorporation into Marshall-designed hardware. 

e. Identified Marshall operational support requirements. 

VII. Flight Crews 

Provided instructions and materials for training and famil

flight crews with Saturn launch vehicles. 

VIII. 	 Science 


None. 


IX. Management (General and Specific Responsibilities) 

a. General 

I. Ensured adequate reflection of Apollo manpower an

tutional support needs in Marshall's resource requirement plans, schedul

budgets. 

2. Ensured institutional support for Apollo on a timely 

3. Developed and operated center facilities in support of 

4. Established detailed schedules for Marshall-develope

ware, procedures, associated equipment, and operational activities to meet 

program plans. 

5. Provided liquid-hydrogen-fuel management for Marsh

Kennedy. 

b. Medical 

Developed and implemented medical disaster plans as

with tests of Saturn launch vehicle hardware at Marshall. 

c. Safety 

Provided written approval of Kennedy-developed criteria 

termining hazardous operations at the launch site. 
c. Developed and operated ground communications, computation, 

and instrumentation systems and equipment for conducting launch operations. 

d. Protected flight hardware and associated ground equipment from 

contamination, corrosion, or damage that might have resulted from environment, housekeeping, procedures, or human error. Reported any incidents of 

such damage to Houston or Huntsville centers, as appropriate. 

II. Configuration Control 

a. Established and controlled configuration of Kennedy-developed 

launch facilities and ground support equipment at each stage of preparation at 

the factory, test, or launch site. 

b. Maintained configuration control of Houston- and Huntsvilledeveloped hardware, obtaining approval from those centers before making any 

configuration changes to spacecraft, launch vehicle, or associated ground support 

equipment supplied by the centers. 

c. Secured, after testing, approval from Huntsville or Houston, for 

the replacement of any failed parts. 

d. Controlled everything entering or leaving the spacecraft during 

checkout at the launch site, in accordance with a list of acceptable items provided by Houston. 

e. Controlled all tools, equipment, and materials entering or leaving 

the launch vehicle stages ahd the instrument unit during operation at the 

launch site, in accordance with criteria provided by Huntsville. 

III. Test and Checkout 

a. Conducted assembly, checkout, and launch of flight hardware for 

Apollo missions, and assembly, checkout, and operation of necessary ground 

support equipment. 

b. Controlled all personnel participating in test and checkout activities, including representatives from Houston and Huntsville centers. 

c. Provided requirements, specifications, criteria, and procedures for 

test and checkout of Kennedy-developed equipment. 

406 
specifications, and criteria provided by those centers. 

I. Provided an assessment of the readiness of the launch c

flight hardware, and procedures to the Flight Readiness Review Board. 

IV. Reliability and Quality Assurance 

a. Provided quality control requirement and inspection crit

Kennedy-developed hardware for use at factory, test, and launch sites. 

b. Audited contractor factory and test site performance on K

developed hardware. 

c. Determined corrective action and disposition of Kenned

oped hardware that failed, malfunctioned, or operated outside perfo

limits. 

d. Generated quality control requirements to meet Hu

Houston, and Kennedy needs in verifying launch facility and launch 

readiness and range and safety requirements. Obtained approval from 

ville and Houston, if appropriate, before implementing quality control 

e. Conducted quality control inspections and audits of co

activities at Kennedy, inviting Huntsville and Houston representatives t

cipate where appropriate. 

f. Obtained approval from Huntsville or Houston to disa

any flight hardware that had been accepted at either the factory or tes

g. Advised the other two centers of any launch preparatio

lems involving flight readiness of hardware. 

h. Conducted failure analyses when requested by Hous

Huntsville. 

i. Participated in flight hardware acceptance reviews and 

recommendations to either Huntsville or Houston about accepting th

ware for shipment to the launch site. 

V. Systems Engineering 

Provided representation on design and operations intercente

or working groups established by the Apollo Program Office. 
I. Ensured adequate reflection of Apollo program needs for 

manpower and institutional support in the center's resource requirements plans, 

schedules, and budgets. 

2. Ensured timely institutional support for Apollo. 

3. Controlled activities of Apollo contractors at Kennedy, with 

the exception of those directly associated with astronaut training. 

4. Developed and operated center facilities needed for Apollo. 

5. Established detailed schedules for Kennedy-developed hardware, procedures, and associated equipment to meet Apollo program plans. 

b. Medical 

Developed and implemented medical disaster plans associated 

with assembly, checkout, and operations at launch site. 

c. Safety 

I. Served as NASA's single point of responsibility for safety at 

the launch center and provided range safety inputs to Eastern Test Range 

authorities. 

2. Developed criteria for hazardous operations at the launch site 

and coordinated the criteria with the Houston and Huntsville centers. 

408 
Funding-As of 30 June 1969 

(in thousands) 

Fiscal Year NASA Total Apollo Program 

1960 $ 523 575 Advanced technical development studies 

1961 964 000 Advanced technical development studies 

1962 1 671 750 $160 000 

Orbital flight tests 

Biomedical flight tests 

High-speed reentry tests 

Spacecraft development 

1963 3 674 ll5 $617 164 

Command & service modules 

Lunar module 

Guidance & navigation system 

Instrumentation & scientific equipment 

Operational support 

Supporting development 

Little Joe II development 

10 Saturn I launch vehicles 

1964 3 974 979 $2 243 900 

Command & service modules 

Lunar module 

Guidance & navigation system 

Integration, reliability, & checkout 

409 
1966 4 511 644 


1967 4 175 100 


1968 3 970 600 


Engine development 166 300 


Apollo mission support 170 542 


$2 967 385 


Command & service modules 615 000 


Lunar module 310 800 


Guidance & navigation system 115 000 


Integration, reliability, & checkout 34 400 


Spacecraft support 95 400 


Saturn I 800 


Saturn IB 274 185 


Saturn V 1 177 320 


Engine development 134 095 


Apollo mission support 210 385 


$2 916 200 


Command & service modules 560 400 


Lunar module 472 500 


Guidance & navigation system 76 654 


Integration, reliability, & checkout 29975 


Spacecraft support 110 771 


Saturn IB 236 600 


Saturn V 1 135 600 


Engine development 49 800 


Apollo mission support 243 900 


$2 556 000 


Command and service modules 455 300 


Lunar module 399 600 


Guidance & navigation system 113 000 


Integration, reliability, & checkout 66 600 


Spacecraft support 60 500 


Saturn IB 146 600 


410 




Source Notes 

Chapter I 

I. 	Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This N

A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP--4201 (Washington, 1966) , pp. 28-2

Wheeler George, "The Impact of Sputnik I: Case·Study of American Public Opin

Break of 'the Space·Age, October 4, 1957," NASA Historical Note 22, 15 July 19

2. 	 Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, National Aeronautics and 

Hearings on S. 3609, 85-th Cong., 2d sess. , 1958; House Committee of Conference

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 12

Gong., 2d sess., 15 July 1958; Public Law 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, An Act to prov

search into problems of fight within and outside the earth's atmosphere, and 

purposes (hereafter cited as the Space Act of 1958), H.R. 12575, 85th Gong., 29 

3. 	 NASA, First Semiannual Report to the Congress: October 1, 1958-March 31, 19

ington, 1959) . 

4. 	 Space Act of 1958, pp. 1-2. 

5. 	 Forty -fourth Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee for Aerona

(Final Report) (Washington, 1959); Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 

ences, Subcommittee on Government Activities, Investigation of Governmental 

tion for Space Activities: Hearings, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959. Silverstein, 

Cleveland, 1 May 1964. Cf. "Silverstein Memorial Dinner," tape recording, T

Paine, master of ceremonies, University Club, Washing·ton, 6 Dec. 1969. 

6. 	 T. Keith Glennan to Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson and Rep. John W. McCormic

1958; "Army-NASA Agreement," .ioin.t Army-NASA press release, 3 Dec. 1958; 

Hjornevik to Admin., NASA, "Utilization of ABMA," ·20 Jan. 1959. 

7. 	 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, p. 113; Alfred Rosenth

into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA SP-4301 (W

1968), pp. 27-29; Samuel B. Batdorf, memo for file, "Presentation of MIS Prog

Glennan," 14 Oct. 1958; Robert R . Gilruth to Assoc. Dir., Langley, " Space Ta

3 Nov. 1958; Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1

415 
15. 	 Ibid., pp. 118-22. 

16. 	 [Milton W. Rosen et al.], "A Na-tional Space Vehicle Program: A Report to the President," NASA, 27 Jan. 1959; John B. Medaris, Countdown for Decision (New York : Putnam, 

1960); David S. Akens, Saturn Illustrated Chronology: Saturn's First Eleven Years, April 

1957 through April 1968, 5th ed., MHR-5 (Huntsville, Ala.: Marshall Space Flight Center, 

20 Jan. 1971) , p. 3; General Dynamics/Astronautics, A Primer of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration's Centaur (San Diego, February 1964), pp. 1-29. 

17. 	 John W. Crowley, Jr., to Ames, Lewis, and Langley Research Centers and to High Speed 

Flight Station, "Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight," 1 April 1959; 

Crowley to Jet Propulsion Laboratory, subj. as above, 8 April 1959; Ralph W. May, Jr., 

secy., minutes of meeting of Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, 25-26 

May 1959. 

18. 	 May, minutes, Research Steering Committee, 25-26 May 1959. 

19. 	 May, minutes of meeting of Research Steering Committee, 25-26 June 1959; Harry J. 

Goett to Ira H. A. Abbott, "Interim Report on Operation of 'Research Steering Committee 

on Manned Space Flight,'" 17 July 1959. 

20. 	 U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command news release, 12 Feb. 1959; May, minutes, Research 

Steering Committee, 25-26 June 1959. 

21. 	 May, minutes of meeting of Research Steering Committee, 8-9 Dec. 1959. 't 

22. 	 Goett, interview, Palo Alto, Calif., 26 June 1968; George M. Low, interviews, Washington, 

I May 1964, and Houston, 7 Feb. 1967; Beverly Z. Henry, Jr., to Assoc. Dir., Langley, 

"Langley Manned Space Laboratory Effor•t," 5 Oct. 1959. 

23. 	 Goett and Low interviews; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swenson, 5 Aug. 1965. 

24. 	 H. Kurt Strass •to Chief, Flight Systems Div. (FSD), "First meeting of New Projects Panel, 

... Aug. 12, 1959," 17 Aug. 1959, and "Second meeting of New Projects Panel, ... August 

18, 1959,'' 26 Aug. 1959. 

25. 	 Strass to Chief, FSD, "Third meeting of New Projects Panel, ... September 28, 1959 (In· 

formation) ," I Oot. 1959. Application for a patent on a "Space and Atmospheric Reentry 

Vehicle" was filed on 13 April 1962 by Alan B. Kehlet, William W. Petynia, and Dennis 

F. Hasson; patent was issued 21 May 1963 (information from Marvin ·F. Matthews, 7 April 

1976). Petynia, interview, Houston, 9 Dec. 1970; Strass to Chief, FSD, "Fourth meeting of 

New Projects Panel, .. . October 5, 1959 (Aaion requested)," 7 Oct. 1959. 

26. Gilruth memo, "Organization of Space Task Group,'' 26 Jan. 1959; Paul E. Purser, "Space 

Task Group Complement Analysis," 8 June 1959; Gilruth to GSFC, Attn.: Bernard Sisco, 

"Langley Space Task Group FY 1961 personnel distribution,'' 12 June 1959, with enc.; 

Gilruth to staff, "Organization of Space Task Group," 3 and 10 Aug. 1959; Purser notes, 

"Summary of STG Organization and Mercury Management," n.d. (through 15 Jan. 1962); 

Purser to Gilruth, "Log for week of November 2, 1959," 10 Nov. 1959; Robert R. Gilruth 

416 
Activities," 2 Oct. 1959; Glennan and Acting Secy. of Defense Thomas S. 

President, subj. as above, 21 Oct. 1959 (approved by Eisenhower 2 Nov. 1959); 

mittee on Science and Astronautics, Transfer of the Development Operations 

the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to the National Aeronautics and Space Ad

Hearing on H .]. Res. 567, 86th Gong., 2d sess., 3 Feb. 1960. 

32. 	 ABMA, "A Lunar Exploration Program Based upon Saturn-Boosted Systems

TR-2-60, I Feb. 1960. 

33. 	 J. R. Clark, Vought Astronautics, to NASA, Attn.: Silverstein, "Manned Mo

Purpose Space Vehicle Program-Proposal for," 12 Jan. 1960, with enc., "Man

Multi-Purpose Space Vehicle"; John D. Bird, interview, Langley, 20 June 19

34. 	 John H. Disher, notes on meeting at Langley a;ttended by Silverstein, Gilru

Faget, 15 Feb. 1960 (emphasis in original) . 

35. 	 Space Task Group, "Guidelines for Advanced Manned Space Vehicle Pro

1960, esp. Charles J. Donlan, "Summary and Scheduling," pp. 47-50; STG

Advanced Vehicle Presentation," April 1960; Disher to Dir., Space Flight P

Center Briefings on Advanced Manned Space Flight Program," 10 May 1960. 

36. 	 John M. Eggleston, Langley Research Center, "Inter-NASA Research and Sp

ment Centers Discussion on Space Rendezvous, ... May l&-17, 1960," 25 May 

37. 	 John C. Houbolt, interview, Princeton, N.J., 5 Dec. 1966; idem, "Considera

Rendezvous Problems for Space Vehicles," paper presented at the Society of 

Engineers National Aeronautical meeting, New York, 5-8 April 1960; I. E

Emme, "Item for the historical record of the Apollo Program," 31 Oct. 196

Garrick to Chief, Dynamic Loads Div., Langley, subj. as above, 7 Oct. 19

Short History of the Lunar-Orbit-Rendezvous Plan at the Langley Researc

Sept. 1963 (supplemented 5 Feb. 1965 and 17 Feb. 1966). 

38. 	 Disher memo to Long Range Plan and Budget File, "Meeting with Dr. Glenn

to discuss long range plans for Saturn utilization by OSFP," II July 1960; 

"Long Range Plan: Manned Space Flight Program," 8 Aug. 1960. 

39. 	 Disher memo, II July 1960; Merle G. Waugh to Grimwood, 5 Nov. 1963; Lee 

NASA Historical Div., informal memo, "Apollo, naming of," II June 1969; 

McCann, "Dr. Abe Silverstein Certain to Rate in Space Hall of Fame," Cle

Dealer, 14 July 1969, as cited in Congressional Record, 17 July 1969, p. E6

interview, Langley, 20 June 1966; "Apollo Program Review, October 20, 1962," 

stein to GSFC, Attn.: Goett, "Official Name of the Advanced Manned Space 

gram," 25 July 1960; Hugh L. Dryden, "NASA Mission and Long-Range Plan

Industry Program Plans Conference, 28-29 july 1960 (Washington, 1960), 

"Manned Space Flight," ibid., p. 80; Grimwood, "Mercury, Gemini, Apollo: Ho

Their Names," Manned Spacecraft Center Roundup, 3 Oct. 1969; Felix G
Sept. 1960]; Donlan, Project Apollo Bidders Briefing, [ca. 13 Sept. 1960]; Glenn F. Bailey, 

"Request for Proposal No. 302, Feasibility Study for Project Apollo," 13 Sept. 1960, with 

attch. A and B and enc., "General Requirements for a Proposal for a Feasibility Study of 

an Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System," 12 Sept. 1960. 

42. 	 Disher to Admin., NASA, "Project Apollo Feasibility Study Bidders' Briefing," 14 Sept. 

1960, with enc.; STG, "Summary of Statement of Work of Advanced Manned Spacecraft 

and Systems," n.d.; Robert C. Seamans, Jr., memo, "Debriefing of Unsuccessful Companies 

in Competitive R&D Procurements," 27 Oct. 1960; Robert 0. Piland to Assoc. Dir., STG, 

"Visit of North American representatives -to discuss North American Aviation Apollo study 

proposal," 2 Nov. 1960; idem, "Apollo activities," 9 Nov. 1960; idem, "Boeing representatives' visit regarding Apollo proposal," 9 Nov. 1960; Robert G. Chilton to Assoc. Dir., STG, 

"Visi-t of Hughes Representatives on November 8, 1960," 15 Nov. 1960. 

43. 	 Bailey memo to Procurement and Supply Office Files, "Project Apollo-Proposed Feasibility Study Contracts," 30 Sept. 1960; STG, "Partial Set of Material for Evaluation Board 

Use," n.d.; STG, "Plan for the Evaluation of Contractors' Proposals for a Feasibility Study 

of an Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System," 6 Oct. 1960; Bailey to Project Evaluation 

Board, Attn.: Donlan, "Procurement Procedure," 12 Oct. 1960. 

44. 	 STG, minutes of meeting of Evaluation Board for consideration of contractors' proposals 

for Apollo systems study, 18-19 Oct. 1960; STG, "Select Three Firms to Study Project 

Apollo," news release, 25 Oct. 1960. In view of events a year later, o.f special interest are 

R. H. Rice to STG, Attn.: Bailey, "Proposal for Project Apollo, Request for Proposal No. 

302," 60LA 9327, 7 Oct. 1960, with enc.; and North American, "Feasibility Study for Apollo 

Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System," NA-60-1247, 7 Oct. 1960. 

45. 	 STG, "Partial Set of Material for Evaluation Board Use" and "Plan for Evaluation of 

Proposals"; Johnson interview. 

46. 	 J. Thomas Markley, interview, Houston, 17 Jan. 1968. 

47. 	 Goett interview; Seamans, interview, Washington, 26 May 1966; NASA Hq. TWX to field 

centers, 25 May 1961; Gilruth -to staff, "President's request for additional budget action," 

26 May 1961. 

48. 	 [Bruce T. Lundin et a!.], "Report of Special Working Group on Location of Manned 

Space Flight Activity," 14 Oct. 1960. 

49. 	 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 203-204, ch. 9. 

50. 	 Herbert G. Patterson, minutes of technical negotiations meeting with General Electric, 

27 Oct. 1960; John B. Lee, minutes of meeting with Martin Company, l Nov. 1960; William 

W. 	Petynia, minutes of meetings with Convair/Astronautics, 2 Nov. 1960. 

51. 	 George B. Kistiakowsky to Glennan, 28 Nov. 1960; Donald F. Hornig to Glennan, 28 

Oct. 1960; Hornig et a!., "Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space," 14 Nov. 1960. 

418 
3 Jan. 1961; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Aeronautical and A

Events of 1961: Report, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 7 June 1962, p. 1; Minutes of Spa

tion Program Council, 5-6 Jan. 1961; Heaton, "U.S. Lunar Travel Program," 

sented to the Society of Automotive Engineers, New York, 8 Dec. 1960. 

58. 	 Dryden, interview, Washington, 1 Sept. 1965; Dryden to Emme, "Eisenhow

transition," 27 Sept. 1965; NASA, "Fiscal Year 1962 Estimates, Manned Sp

Project Apollo," 5 Sept. 1960; anon., "Instructions to Manned Lunar Landing Ta

6 and 9 Jan. 1961. 

59. 	 Eldon W. Hall, "Manned Lunar Exploration Working Group, January 9, 1961." 

60. 	 Low to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Transmittal of Report Prepared by Manned L

ing Group," 7 Feb. 1961, with enc., "A Plan for Manned Lunar Landing," Ja

Hall, "Manned Lunar Exploration Working Group"; Hall to Rosen and Asst. 

of Launch Vehicle Prog., "Manned Lunar Landing Program," 20 Feb. 1961; Low 

1 May 1964. 

61. 	 Jerome B. Wiesner et a!., "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Co

Space," 10 Jan. 1961. For background to both Eisenhower's attitude toward m

and Wiesner's advice to Kennedy, see remarks of retiring PSAC Chm. and P

MIT James R. Killian, Jr., "Making Science a Vital Force in Foreign Polic

130 (6 Jan. 1961) . 

62. 	 Dryden, 27 Sept. 1965; Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 187-88; Jay Holm

on the Moon: The Enterprise of the Sixties (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962) 

92. 	 For Webb background, see Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Spa

Nomination: Hearing on the Nomination of ]ames Edwin Webb to Be Ad

of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 2 

pp. 2-7. 

63. 	 NASA, "Summary of Presentations and Discussions, Fifth Semi-Annual Staff 

Luray, Virginia, March 8-10, 1961," n .d.; NASA, "Transition Memorandum P

T . Keith Glennan, January 1961 ," n.d.; NASA, "Report of the Advisory Co

Organization, October 1960," [Kimpton Report], n.d. 

64. 	 Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Scientific and 

Programs: Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 131-80; House Committee 

and Astronautics and Subcommittees 1, 3, and 4, 1962 NASA Authorization: H

H.R. 3238 and 6029 (Superseded by H.R . 6874) , 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 

82; Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander. This New Ocean, pp. 309, 332, '335

Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the Nation

(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970); House Committee on Science and Astron

cussion of Soviet Man-in-Space Shot: Hearing, 87th Cong., 1st ses•s., 13 April 19
Operations Critique, 9 March 1961; Smith J. De :France to STG, Attn.: Donlan, Mid· 

term review of Apollo study contracts," 21 March 1961. 

68. 	 Caldwell Johnson, "Apollo Configurations: A Case for Selection of the Blunt Body- Semiintegrated Command Module for Concentra.ted Study," 9 March 1961; :Faget interview; 

Willard M. Taub, interview, Houston, 10 April 1967; Mel R . Barlow, interview, San Diego, 

28 Jan. 1970. 

69. 	 "Remarks by Mr. Robert R. Gilruth to the Apollo Technical Liaison Groups," 10 April 

1961; minutes of meetings of Apollo Technical Liaison Groups: Configuration and Aero· 

dynamics, Heating, Human :Factors, In~trumentation and Communications, Onboard Propulsion, Structures and Materials, Trajectory Analysis, and Navigation, Guidance, and 

Control, 10-14 April 1961; Ertel and Morse, Apollo Spacecraft Chronology, 1: 78-81. 

70. 	 Convair (Astronautics) Div., General Dynamics Corp., and Avco Corp., "Apollo: :Final 

Study Report," Rept. AEI0363, 15 May 1961, 5 vols.: I, "Summary" ; 2, "Selected Vehicle 

Design" ; 3, "Supporting Design Analyses"; 4, "Growth and Advanced Concepts"; and 5, 

"lmplementa·tion Plan." 

71. 	 General Electric Co., Missile and Space Vehicle Dept., "Project Apollo: A :Feasibility Study 

of an Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System, Final Report," 15 May 1961, 11 vols.: l, 

"Summary and Conclusions"; 2, "Systems Considerations" ; 3, "Trajectories, Navigation, and 

Guidance"; 4, "On-board Propulsion" ; 5, "Human Factors"; 6, "Aerodynamics, Configurations, Heating, and Structures and Materials"; 7, "Mechanical and Electrical Systems"; 8, 

"Preliminary Design"; 9, "Apollo Program Implementa~ion Plan"; 10, "Cost Information"; 

and 11, "Selected Studies Applicable to Apollo." 

72. 	 Martin Co., "Apollo: Final Report," ER 12001, May 1961, 18 parts: I, "System and Op· 

eration"; 2, "Support"; 3, "Trajeotory Analysis"; 4, "Configuration"; 5, "Mechanical Sys· 

terns"; 6, "Aerodynamic H eating"; 7, "Guidance and Control"; 8, "Life Sciences"; 9, 

"Onboard Propulsion"; 10, "Structures and Materials"; 11, "Instrumentation and Communications"; 12, "Test Program" ; 13, "Fabrication and Quality Assurance"; 14, "Program 

Management"; 15, "Business Plan" ; 16, "Preliminary Specifications"; 17, "Aerodynamics"; 

and 18, "Space Environment Factors." 

73. Rosen to Webb, "Reflections on the Present American Posture in Space," 19 April 1961; 

Webb to Kenneth O'Donnell, The White House, no subj., 21 April 1961; John F. Kennedy 

to the Vice-President, no subj ., 20 April 1961; L. B. Johnson to the President, "Evolution 

of the Space Program," 28 April 1961; DeMarquis D. Wyatt, "Research and Development," 

24 May 1961 , annotated "Prepared for use at press con£. 5j 25 J61 " ; White House, "John 

F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Special Message to Congress, May 25, 1961," 

news release. 

74. 	 Congress, An Act to authorize approp,·iations to [NASA], Public Law 87-98, 87th Cong., Js,t 

sess., 21 July 1961; NASA with National Institutes of Health and National Academy of 

420 
NASA Program,

 12 May 1961; NASA, A Feasible Approach for an Early M

ing," pt. 1, "Summary Report of Ad Hoc Task Group Study" [Fleming Repo

1961, passim, but esp. pp. 8-9, 27, 95-96. 

2. 	 Seamans to Dirs., Launch Vehicle and Adv. Research Progs., "Broad Study 

Ways for Accomplishing Manned Lunar Landing Mission ," 25 May !961; Bruce 

et al., "A Survey of Various Vehicle Systems for the Manned Lunar Mission," 1

passim, but esp. pp. 4, 13-16, 26. 

3. 	 John I. Cumberland to Dryden et al., "Notes on June 10, 1961 Task Force 

June 1961; Lundin to Seamans, 12 June 1961. See also "Composite Notes on Ju

Meeting with Administrator and Deputy Administrator concerning Manned L

ing, Communications, Meteorological, and University Support Programs," n.d

4. 	 Low to Dir., Space Flight Prog., "Report of Meeting with Space Task Gro

2, 1961," 6 June 1961. 

5. 	 Seamans memo for file, "Apollo procurement," 2 June 1961; Low memo, 6 June 1

6. 	 Willard M. Taub, interview, Houston, 10 April 1967; Maxime A. Faget, intervie

15 Dec. 1969. 

7. 	 Low to Dir., Space Flight Prog., "Apollo Configuration," 12 June 1961. See Iv

and Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, vol. I, Throug

7, 1962, NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1969), for illustrations of shapes propo

Apollo reentry vehicle. 

8. 	 Caldwell C. Johnson to Dir., STG, "A case for the selection of the semi-integ

body configuration for Apollo spacecraft," 5 July 1961, with encs. (final vers

dated 20 June 196!--See n. 11). 

9. 	 Robert 0. Piland to Jack C. Heberlig, "Space Task Group Review of 'Gene

ments for a Proposal, Project Apollo, Phase A' dated May 5, 1961 (First Dra

1961, with encs.; Robert R. Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Ernest Brackett, "Tr

Project Apollo Procurement Plan for Approval," 26 June 1961 , with encs.; Ab

to Herbert L. Brewer, "Comments on Project Apollo Procurement Plan," 3 

Piland to Charles J. Donlan, "Apollo Technical Conference," 8 June 196

Disher to STG, Attn.: Paul E. Purser, "NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Con

June 1961; Disher, "Progress Status Sheet," in Administrator's Progress Rep

July 1961, p . 25.4. 

10. 	 "Space Unit Details Plans for Apollo," Newport News (Va.) Times-Herald, !9 

Disher, "Progress Status Sheet"; NASA, "NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conf

18, 19, 20, 1961: A Compilation of the Papers Presented," 2 parts, n.d. 

11. 	 Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Low, "Preliminary project development plan 

pla·te' spacecrafts for the Sa·turn C-1 test flights SA-7, -8, -9, and -10," 16 June 

enc., Leo T. Chauvin to Dir., STG, subj. as above, and "Preliminary Project D

Plan for SA-7 Through -10 Payloads," 9 June !961; Johnson to Dir., STG, 
yy jp,; , , 

Institute of Technology Guidance System Study for Apollo," 16 Jan. 1961; Piland, "Apollo 

Programing-January 1961," n.d.; Chilton to Assoc. Dir., STG, "Visit to Massachusetts Institute of Technology Instrumentation Laboratory, March 23, 24, 1961," 3 April 1961. 

15. 	 Thomas P. Hughes, Elme1· Sperry: Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 

1971); Funk and Trageser interviews. 

16. 	 William R. Corliss, Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network 

(STADAN), the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA Communications 

Network (NASCOM), NASA CR-140390, June 1974. 

17. C. S. Draper, "The Evolution of Aerospace Guidance Technology at the Massachusetts 

Insti-tute of Technology, 1935-1951," paper presented at the 5th IAA History Symposium, 

Brussels, Belgium, 19-25 Sept. 1971; Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: 

William Morrow, 1970), p. 170. See also background and brief history of Draper in C. 

Stark Draper, Walter Wrigley, and John Havorka, Inertial Guidance (New York: Pergamon 

Press, 1960), pp. 14-23. 

18. 	 Chilton to Assoc. Dir., STG, 3 April 1961; Schmidt to Goett, 9 June 1961; Goett to Silverstein, 16 June 1961. 

19. 	 Richard H. Battin, Astronautical Guidance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). 

20. 	 David W . Gilbert, "A Historical Description of the Apollo Guidance and Navigation System Development," SG-100-153, 31 Dec. 1963, with encs.; William W. Petynia to Assoc. 

Dir., STG, "Visit to MIT, Instrumentation Laboratory on September 12-13, regarding 

Apollo Navigation and Guidance Contract," 21 Sept. 1961; idem, "Second Apollo monthly 

meeting at MIT, Instrumentation Laboratory, on October 4, 1961," 10 Oct. 1961. 

21. 	 Milton B. Trageser and David G. Hoag, "Apollo Spacecraft Guidance System," MIT-IL 

Rept. R-495, paper presented at the IFAC Symposium on Automatic Control in the Peaceful Uses of Space, Stavanger, Norway, June 1965; Richard H. Battin, "Apollo NGC in the 

Journals," Astronautics & Aeronautics 9 (January 1971) : 22--23; Robert G. Chilton, 

"Apollo Spacecraft Control Systems," in John A. Aseltine, ed., Peaceful Uses of Automation 

in Outer Space (New York: Plenum Press, 1966); Aaron Cohen, "Powered Flight Steering 

and Control of Apollo Spacecraft," paper presented to Nof'throp Nortronics Society of 

Automotive Engineers Committee, Houston, ll-13 Dec. 1963. 

22. 	 Draper, interviews, Cambridge, 23 April 1968, and Houston, 27 Aug. 1973; Draper to 

Seamans, 21 Nov. 1961; Eugene M. Emme, Aer·onautics and Astronautics: An American 

Chronology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960 (Washington: NASA, 1961), p. 123. 

23. 	 [Robert 0. Piland], "Apollo Spacecraft Chronology," n.d., [pp. 9-10]. 

24. 	 STG, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Development, Statement of Work, Phase A," 28 July 1961, 

pp. I-1 through I-3, III-2; [Disher], "Preliminary Project Development Plan for Project 

Apollo Spacecraft," 9 Aug. !961, pp. 19-20. 

422 
American Aviation," MSC Space News Roundup, 13 Dec. 1961; NASA, "Apollo 

Selected," news release 61-263, 28 Nov. 1961; Seamans memo for file , "The se

North American Aviation, Inc. as the prime contractor for the command a

module," 9 June 1967. 

31. 	 Paup interview; Harrison A. Storms, Jr., interview, El Segundo, 16 July 1970. 

32. 	 Minutes of Technical Panel Meetings for negotiation of spacecraft developm

Dec. 1961. 

33. 	 Faget, interview, comments on draft edition of this volume, Houston, 22 Nov. 1976. 

34. 	 DeMarquis D. Wyatt memo for record, "Discussions with the Associate Admini

June 15, 1961," 20 June 1961. 

35. 	 Seamans to Dirs., Launch Vehicle Prog., et al., "Establishment of Ad Hoc Ta

for Manned Lunar Landing by Rendezvous Techniques," 20 June 1961. 

36. 	 NASA, "Earth Orbital Rendezvous for an Early Manned Lunar Landing," pt. 

mary Report of Ad Hoc Task Group Study" [Heaton Report], August 1961. 

37. 	 Abraham Hyatt, "Proposed Items for Discussion at Meeting on 22 June 1961,

1961; Hyatt to Seamans, "Comments on Arthur Kantrowitz's paper very glamoro

'Space Strategy for America,' "20 June 1961. 

38. 	 "Composite Notes on June 22, 1961 Meeting"; MSFC, "Saturn Project Fact 

June 1961; David S. Akens, Saturn Illustrated Chronology: Saturn's First Ele

April 1957 through April 1968, 5th ed., MHR-5 (Huntsville, Ala.: MSFC, 20 Jan

4; James E. Webb memo for record, "Selection of Contractors to Participate 

Phase of SATURN S-II Stage Competition,'' 8 June 1961; Ertel and Morse, Apo

craft Chronology, 1: 234-35. 

39. 	 Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Proposed Interim Procedures for Implementing 

Landing Program,'' 7 July 1961; Maj . Gen. Don R. Ostrander memo, "Mann

Landing Program,'' 10 July 1961, with enc.; William A. Fleming, secy., "Discuss

First Meeting of Manned Lunar Landing Steering Committee,'' 6. July, "Second 

17 July, and "Third Meeting," 31 July 1961; Low to Dir., Space Flight Prog., "M

Manned Lunar Landing Coordination Group," 8 July 1961. 

40. 	 Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation,'' p. 27. 

41. 	 Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Planning of a DOD-NASA Program for Devel

Large Launch Vehicles,'' 7 July 1961; Seamans to John H. Rubel, 3 Aug. 1961. 

42. 	 Webb to RobertS. McNamara and McNamara to Webb, 7 July 1961. 

43. 	 [Nicholas E. Golovin], draft report of DoD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Plann

(LLVPG), 3 vols., [November 1961]; James F. Chalmers, minutes of special LLV

ing with Silverstein, 18 Aug. 1961; Golovin and Lawrence L. Kavanau to Laun

Panel, Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, "Report of the D

Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG) as of August 31, 1961,'' 31 Au
yy p

and Resources Req~.;ired at Launch Site to Support NASA Manned Lunar Landing Pro· 

gram," Phase I Rept., 31 July 1961. 

54. 	 Seamans TWX to all NASA field elements, 24 Aug. 1961; "Agreement between DOD and 

NASA Relating to the Launch Site for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," signed by 

Webb and Roswell Gilpatric on 24 Aug. 1961; Seamans to Lt. Gen. W. K. Wilson, Jr., 21 

Sept. 1961 ; Webb to Wilson, 22 Sept. 1961; Launch Operations Directorate, "Study: Feasibility of Relocation from Cape Canaveral to Merritt Island, NASA Launch Operations 

Directorate Industrial Facilities and Apollo Spacecraft Mission Support Facilities," December 1961; Francis E. Jarrett, Jr., and Robert A. Lindemann, "'Historical Origins of the 

Launch Operations Center to July 1, 1962," draft ed., KSC Historical Monograph 1, December 1964; [Gordon L. Harris], The Kennedy Space Center Story (Kennedy Space 

Center, Fla., January 1969); Angela C. Gresser, "'Historical Aspects Concerning the Redesignation of Facilities at Cape Canaveral," KSC Historical Note 1, April 1964. 

55. 	 Fleming notes, 31 July 1961; David S. Akens et al., "'History of the George C. Marshall 

Space Flight Center from July 1 to December 31, 1961," I, MSFC Historical Monograph 4, 

March 1962, pp. 37--41; "'Michoud Assembly Facility," MSFC fact sheet, 20 July 1965; 

NASA, "'NASA Selects New Orleans Plant for Space Vehicle Assembly," news release 61­

201, 7 Sept. 1961; William Zigler, "'History of NASA MTF and Michoud: The Fertile 

Southern Crescent: Bayou Country and the American Race into Space," NASA HHN-127, 

September 1972, pp. 15-16, 25. 

56. 	 Leo L. Jones, "A Brief History of Mississippi Test Facility, 1961-1966," pp. 1-11; NASA, 

"'NASA Selects Launch Vehicle Test Site," news release 61-236, 25 Oct. 1961. 

57. 	 NASA, "'NASA Selects Test Site"; Jones, "'Brief History." 

58. 	 Silverstein to Admin., NASA, "'Proposed site selection criteria and site survey team for 

the proposed manned spacecraft center," n .d.; John F. Parsons et al., "'Final Report of 

the Site Survey Team for a Manned Space Flight Laboratory," September 1961; Paul G. 

Dembling, interview, Washington, 25 Sept. 1969; U.S. Army, "'Army Engineers Award Contract for Initial Construction of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston," news release, 29 March 1962. 

59. 	 Webb, memo for the President, no. subj ., 14 Sept. 1961; ibid., 14 Sept. 1961, with enc., 

"'Site Selection Criteria"; T . Keith Glennan to Rep. Albert W. Thomas, "Construction of 

Laboratory near Houston, Texas," 3 Nov. 1958; Ostrander to Seamans, "'Reflections on the 

Present American Posture in Space," 21 April 1961; Webb to the Vice President, no subj., 

23 May 1961; Webb to Gilruth, 14 June 1961; Robert B. Merrifield, "'Men and Spacecraft: 

A History of the Manned Spacecraft Center (1958-1969) ," draft, pp. Ill-22 to III-33; 

Stephen B. Oates, "'NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas," Southwestern 

Historical Quarterly 67, no. 3 (January 1964): 350--75; Gilruth to staff, "'Location of new 

424 
gp

65. 	 Rosen interview. 

66. 	 Rosen memo, 20 Nov. 1961. 

67. 	 Rosen memo enc., "Report of Combined Working Group on Vehicles"; [Barton 

notes on interview with Rosen, Washington, 14 Nov. 1969. 

68. Seamans to Holmes, "Recommendations for NASA Manned Space Flight Vehicle 

4 Dec. 1961. 

69. 	 Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 274-75. 

70. 	 Minutes, meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management Council, 21 Dec. 1961. 

71. 	 Holmes to Seamans, "Advanced Saturn Preliminary Project Development Pla

1962, with enc. 

72. 	 Walter C. Williams, interview, El Segundo, 27 Jan. 1970. 

73. 	 Low interview. 

74. 	 Seamans, interview, Washington, 11 July 1969. 

75. 	 Joseph F. Shea, interview, Washington, 6 May 1970. 

Chapter 3 

l. 	Maxime A. Faget, interview, Houston, 15 Dec. 1969; Ivan D. Ertel, notes on 

Johnson interview, 10 March 1966. See aloo John M. Logsdon, "Selecting the W

Moon: The Choice of the Lunar Orbi•tal Rendezvous Mode," Aerospace Histor

2 (June 1971) : 63-70. 

2. 	 U.S. Air Force, "Lunar Expedition Plan: LUNEX," USAF WDLAR-S-458, May 196

3. 	 Wernher von Braun, Ernst Stuhlinger, and H[einz] H. Koelle, "ABMA Presenta

National Aeronautics and Space Administration," ABMA Rept. D-TN-l-59, 15 

pp. 113-15. 

4. 	 U.S. Army, "Project Horizon, Phase I Report: A U.S. Army Study for the Es

of a Lunar Military Outpost," 8 June 1959, vol. l, "Summary": l-3, 17-26; 2, 

Considerations and Plans," passim, but esp. pp. 4--{), 139-41. 

5. 	 Army Ballistic Missile Agency, "A Lunar Exploration Based upon Saturn-B

tems," ABMA Rept. DV-TR-2-60, l Feb. 1960, pp. 224-40. 

6. 	 House Committee on Science and As.tronautics, Aeronautical and Astronautica

1961: Report, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 7 June 1962, p. 3; idem, Orbital Rendezvou

Hearing, 87th Cong., lst sess., 23 May 1961, pp. 16-17; J. Thomas Markley to 

STG, "Trip report .. . on May 10, 11, and 12, 1961 to Marshall Space Fl

(Huntsville), Chance Vought (Dallas) and Douglas (Los Angeles)," 19 May 1

to Robert R. Gilruth, "Mid-term (6-month) Contractor Reviews on Orbital L

erations Study," 22 May 1961. 
pppy y y 

"Participa·ting Companies or Company Teams" in "Partial Set of Material for Evaluation 

Board Use," n.d. [ca. 7 Sept. 1960]; NASAJMSC, "Source Evaluation Board Report, Apollo 

Spacecraft, NASA RFP 9-150," 24 Nov. 1961. 

16. 	 MSC, Apollo Spacecraft Program Off. (ASPO) activity rept., 23 Sept.-6 Oct. 1962; H. Kurt 

Strass, interview, Houston, 30 Nov. 1966. 

17. 	 John C. Houbolt, interview, Princeton, N.J., 5 Dec. 1966; Houbolt, "Lunar Rendezvous," 

International Science and Technology 14 (February 1963) : 62-70; John D. Bird, interview, 

Langley, 20 June 1966. 

18. 	 Bird interview; Bird, "A Short History of the Lunar-Orbit-Rendezvous Plan at the Langley Research Center," 6 Sept. 1963 (supplemented 5 Feb. 1965 and 17 Feb. 1966); Houbolt, 

"Lunar Rendezvous," p. 65. 

19. 	 William H. Michael, Jr., "Weight Advantages of U!>e of Parking Orbit for Lunar Soft 

Landing Mission," in Jack W. Crenshaw et al., "Studies Related to Lunar and Planetary 

Missions," Langley Research Center, 26 May 1960, pp. l-2. 

20. John M. Eggleston, interview, Houston, 7 Nov. 1966; Bird, "Short History," p. 2; Bird 

interview. 

21. 	 Bird, "Short History," p. 2; list of attendees at Briefing on Rendezvous for Robert C. 

Seamans, Jr., 14 Dec. 1960; Bird and Houbolt interviews. 

22. 	 Seamans, interview, Washington, 26 May 1966. 

23. 	 Robert L. O'Neal to Assoc. Dir., STG, "Discussion with Dr. Houbolt, LRC, concerning 

the possible incorporation of a lunar orbital rendezvous phase as a prelude to manned 

lunar landing," 30 Jan. 1961. 

24. 	 For a listing of some of the results of these studies, see "Reports and Technical Papers 

Which Contributed to the Two Volume Work 'Manned Lunar-Landing through Use of 

Lunar-Orbit-Rendezvous,' by Langley Research Center,'' Langley Research Center, n.d.; 

William D. Mace, interview, Langley, 20 June 1966. See also John C. Houbolt, "Problems 

and Potentiali-ties of Space Rendezvous," paper presented at the International Symposium on 

Space Flight and Re-Entry Trajectories, Louveciennes, France, 19-21 June 1961, published 

in Theodore von Karman et al., eds., Astronautica Acta 7 (Vienna, 1961) : 406-29. 

25. 	 Langley Research Center, "Manned Lunar Landing Via Rendezvous," charts, n.d.; Bird, 

"Short History," p. 3; Houbolt interview; Houbolt, "Lunar Rendezvous," International 

Science and Technology, February 1963, pp. 62-70, 105. 

26. 	 Minutes, Space Exploration Program Council meeting, 5-6 Jan. 1961. 

27. 	 Floyd L. Thompson to NASA Hq., Attn.: Bernard Maggin, "Forthcoming Inter-NASA 

Meeting on Rendezvous,'' 4 Jan. 1961, with enc.; E. J. Manganiello to NASA Hq., "Agenda 

for Orbital Rendezvous Discussions," 5 Jan. 1961, with enc.; Bird and David F. Thomas, 

Jr., "Material for Meeting of Centers on Rendezvous, February 27-28, 1961: Studies Relating to the Accuracy of Arrival at a Rendezvous Point," n.d.; agenda, NASA Inter-Center 

426 
37. 	 Richard B. Canright to James D. Bramlet et a!., no subj., 27 Nov. 1961, with e

right, "The Intermediate Vehicle," 22 Nov. 1961; James F. Chalmers, minutes o

general meeting, 28 Aug. 1961; O'Neal memo, 30 Jan. 1961; Clark enc., " Manned 

Multi-Purpose Space Vehicle. " 

38. 	 [Houbolt et a!.], "Manned Lunar Landing through Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous"; 

interview. 

39. 	 [Houbolt et a!.], " Manned Lunar Landing through Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous"; 

Houbolt interviews. 

40. 	 Lindsay J. Lina and Arthur W. Vogeley, "Preliminary Study of a Piloted R

Operation from the Lunar Surface to an Orbiting Space Vehicle," Langley Researc

21 Feb. 1961; Houbolt and Eggleston interviews. 

41. 	 George M. Low to Dir., NASA OMSF, "Comments on John Houbolt's Letter to 

mans," 5 Dec. 1961. 

42. 	 Purser to Gilruth, "Log for Week of August 28, 1961 ," 5 Sept. 1961; Bird, "Short 

p. 4; Houbolt interview; STG, "Preliminary Project Development Plan for an 

Manned Spacecraft Program Utilizing the Mark II Two Man Spacecraft," 14 Aug

43. 	 Seamans interview, 26 May 1966; Harry C. Shoaf, interview, Cocoa Beach , Fla.

1968. 

44. 	 Seamans interview, 26 May 1966; Purser to Howard Margolis, 15 Dec. 1970. See 

D. Hodge, John W. Williams, and Walter J- Kapryan, "Design for Operations," in 

Industry Apollo Technical Conference," pt. 2, pp. 41-56. 

45. 	 H. K[urt] Strass, "A Lunar Landing Concept," in Strass, ed., "Project Apollo Sp

Group Study Report, February 15, 1961," NASA Proj ect Apollo working paper 

21 April 1961, pp. 166-74; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Scienc

Authorization for Fiscal Year 1961 : H earings on H.R. 6874, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 

71-75. 

46. 	 Maxime A. Faget, "Lunar Landing Considerations," in "NASA-Industry Apollo 

Conference," pt. I, pp. 89-97; STG, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Development, 

of Work, Phase A," 28 July 1961; STG, "Preliminary Project Development Plan f

Spacecraft," 9 Aug. 196•1, pp. 7-10; MSC, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Developm

ment of Work," 27 Nov. 1961, pp. 78-81. 

47. 	 Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-410

ington, 1966), p. 222. 

48. 	 Seamans, interview, Washington, 11 July 1969; Faget interview, 15 Dec. 1969; Fag

view, comments on draft edition of this volume, Houston, 22 Nov. 1976. 

49. 	 Faget interview, 15 Dec. 1969. 

50. 	 Johnson, interview, Houston, 9 Dec. 1966. 

51. 	 Purser letter, 15 Dec. 1970. 
MSFMC, 27 March 1962. 

59. 	 Shea to Rosen, "Minutes of Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Meeting, April 2 and 3, 1962," 13 April 

1962, with enc., Richard J. Hayes, subj. as above, n.d. 

60. 	 Frick, interview, Palo Alto, Calif., 26 June 1968. 

61. 	 Ibid.; Kehlet, interview, Downey, 26 Jan. 1970; Owen E. Maynard, interview, Houston, 9 

Jan. 1970. 

62. 	 Frick interview; Rector, interview, Redondo Beach, Calif., 27 Jan. 1970; MSC, "Lunar 

Orbital Technique for Performing the Lunar Mission," also known as "Charlie Frick's 

· Road Show," April 1962. 

63. 	 Low to Shea, "Lunar Landing Briefing for Associate Administrator," 16 May 1962; Holmes 

to Shea, NASA Hq. routing slip, 16 May 1962. 

64. 	 House Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee, Indep endent Offices Appropriations fm· 

1963: H earings, pt. 3, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 571. 

65. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 

1963 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R. 10100 (Superseded by H.R. 11737), 87th Cong., 

2d sess., 1962, pp. 528-29, 810. 

66. 	 Shea memo for record, no subj., 1 May 1962; Clyde B. Bothmer, minutes of OMSF Staff 

Meeting, 1 May 1962; Shea memo [for file], no subj., 7 May 1962, with enc., "Direct Flight 

Schedule Study for Project Apollo: Statement of Work," 26 April 1962. 

67. 	 Harold Hornby, interview, Ames, 28 June 1971; Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., interview, Washington, 22 May 1970; Hornby, "Least Fuel, Least Energy and Salvo Rendezvous," paper presented at the ARSfiRE 15th Annual Spring Technical Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio, 12-13 

April 196•1; Hornby, "Return Launch and Re-Entry Vehicle," in C. T. Leondes and R. W. 

Vance, eds., Lunar Mission and Exploration (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 

588-622. 

68. 	 [Bothmer], minutes of NASA OMSF Staff Meeting, 11 May 1962; Holmes to Dirs., LOC, 

MSC, and MSFC, "The Manned Lunar Landing Program," 25 May 1962. 

69. 	 Shea interview. 

70. 	 Ibid. 

71. 	 Ibid.; Holmes, interview, Waltham, Mass., 18 Feb. 1969. 

72. 	 Remarks on internal rivalries among NASA field centers are based largely on Apollo oral 

history interviews and on the minutes of the OMSF weekly staff meetings, 1961-1963, with 

Bothmer as secretary. 

73. 	 Bothmer, minutes of MSFMC meeting, 29 May 1962, p. 6. 

74. 	 Charles W. Mathews to Dir. , MSC, "Background MMerial for Use in May 29 Meeting of 

Management Council," 25 May 1962. 

75. 	 Agenda, Presentation to Shea, Office of Systems, OMSF, NASA Hq., on MSFC Mode Studies 

for Lunar Missions, 7 June 1962; Shea interview. 

428 
10 July 1962. Gilruth wanted the Saturn C-lB (consisting of the C-1 booster and 

stage) for development testing and qualification of the command and service mo

C-1 did not have the capability, and the C-V would be too expensive for such 

Frick to NASA Hq., Attn.: Holmes, "Recommendation tha,t the S-IVB stage be p

the C-1 program for Apollo earth orbital missions," 23 Feb. 1962; Gilruth to v

"Saturn C-lB Launch Vehicle," 5 July 1962. 

86. 	 NASA, Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: News Conference on Apollo Plans at NASA H

on july 11, 1962 (Washington, 1962), passim, but esp. pp. 7-9, 25, 30, 32. 

87. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Lunar Orbit R endezvou

Hearing, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 12 July 1962. 

88. 	 D. Brainerd Holmes, "Lunar Orbital Rendezvous for Apollo," paper presen

American Rocket Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 17 July 1962; "NASA Outlines Apo

MSC Fact Sheet 20, n.d. 

Chapter 4 

l. 	Ralph B. Oakley, "Historical Summary: S & ID Apollo Program," North 

Space & Info. Syst. Div., 20 Jan. 1966; North American, "Project Apollo, Pre-C

Documentation and Orbital Rendezvous: A Literature Survey," SID 61-470, 29 

2. 	 Harrison A. Storms, Jr., interviews, Downey, Calif., 6 June 1966, and El Segu

16 July 1970; Philip Geddes, "How NAA Won Apollo ... 'management,' " 

Management, 1962, no. 4, pp. 12-16; biographical sketch of Storms in Shirle

Men of Space: Profiles of Leaders in Space Research, Development. and Exp

(Philadelphia: ChUton Co., 1962); 206-32. See also Art Seidenbaum, "Quarterba

Moon Race," Saturday Evening Post, 5 May 1962, pp. 85-90. 

3. 	 John W. Paup, interview, Downey, 7 June 1966; Beirne Lay, Jr. , Earthbound 

The Builders of Apollo-Saturn (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p

4. 	 North American, "Norman J. Ryker, Jr., Vice President, Research, Engineering 

news release, 26 March 1970; Ryker, interviews, Downey, 9 June 1966 and 20 J

5. 	 North American, "Charles H . Feltz, Program Vice President, Space Shuttle O

gram," news release, 8 July 1970. 

6. 	 J. Leland Atwood, interview, El Segundo, 16 July 1970; Samuel K. Hoffman

Canoga Park, Calif., 17 July 1970. 

7. 	 Oakley, "Historical Summary," pp. 6, 7, 43-44. 
1962; Holmes to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Apollo Spacecraft Propulsion Development Facility Site," 13 June 1962, with enc .. "Site Recommendation for Apollo Spacecraft Propulsion 

Development Facility," p. 5; Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle to Robert R. Gilruth, 4 June 

1962; James E. Webb to Robert S. McNamara, 10 Aug. 1962; Robert P. Young to Webb, 

"Selection for site to test Apollo service module," 4 June 1962; idem, note, 7 June 1962; 

"Agreement for Construction and Operation of an Apollo Spacecraft Propulsion Development Facility at the White Sands Missile Range," approved by Hugh L. Dryden for NASA 

and Paul R. Ignatius for the Army, 19 Dec. 1962. 

15. 	 J. Thomas Markley, "Apollo at White Sands," MSC Fact Sheet 97, 11 Sept. 1962. 

16. Calvin H . Perrine to Apollo Spacecraft Project Officer, "Minutes of Meeting at Ames Research Center on Aerodynamics and Meteorite Impact Studies Applicable to Apollo," 5 

April 1962; Harold Hornby, interview, Ames, 28 June 1971. 

17. For a sampling of research by Harald A. Smedal, see Smedal, George R. Holden, and 

Joseph R. Smith, Jr., to Dir., Ames, "Ames Airborne Physiological Instrumentation Package," 11 "-pril 1960; Smedal, Brent Y. Creer, and Rodney C. Wingrove, Physio logical 

Effects of Acceleration Observed during a Centrifuge Study of Pilot Performance, NASA 

Technical Note (TN) D-345 (Langley Field, December 1960); Smedal, Holden, and Smith, 

Jr., A Flight Evaluation of an Airborne Physiological Instrumentation System, Including 

Preliminary R esults under Conditions of Varying Accelemtions, NASA TN D-351 (Langley 

Field, December 1960); Holden, Smith, Jr., and Smedal, "Physiological Instrumentation 

Systems for Monitoring Pilot Response to Stress at Zero and High G," Aerospace Medicine 

33 (1962), no. 4: 420-27. 

18. 	 Hubert C. Vykukal, Richard P. Gallant, and Glen W. Stinnett, "An Interchangeable, 

Mobile Pilot-Restraint System, Designed for Use in High Sustained Acceleration Force 

Fields," Aerospace Medicine 33 (1962), no. 3: 279-85; Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in 

Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965, NASA SP-4302 (Washington, 

1970) , pp. 479-80. 

19. 	 A. B. Kehlet et al., "Notes on Project Apollo: January 1960-January 1962," 8 Jan. 1962, 

p. 12; Jesse F. Goree to Caldwell C. Johnson, "Command Module RCS Engines," 20 July 

1962; Johnson TWX to E. E. Sack and George A. Lemke, "Command and Service Module 

Reaction Control System Engines," 31 July 196·2; Holmes to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Change 

in Subcontractors for Apollo Command Module Reaction Control Jets," 24 July 1962. 

20. 	 Axel T. Mattson to Charles J. Donlan, "Report on Activities (April 1-April 5, 1962) 

regarding Manned Spacecraft Projects," 5 April 1962; Clyde B. Bothmer, minutes of 

OMSF Staff Meeting, 29 June 1962; Falbaum interview; Robert L. Trimpi, interview, 

Langley, 21 June 1966; North American, "CSM CostsfSchedulefTechnical Characteristics 

Study: Final Report," 2, SID71-35, 30 April 1971, p. II-24; McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 

430 
Burrill III to Assoc. Dir., MSC, Visit to Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

December 19-29, 1961," 3 Jan. 1962. 

25. 	 Glenn F. Bailey, "Request for Proposal No. 302, Feasibility Study for Project 

[13 Sept. 1960], with attchs. A and B and enc., "General Requirements for a Pro

a Feasibility Study of an Advanced Manned Spacecraft"; Kehlet et al., "Notes on 

Apollo," p. 8; Johnson enc., minutes, Design Review Meeting No. 3; Thomas V

bers to Assoc. Dir., MSC, "Coordination Meetings with MIT personnel," 27 No

MSC, ASPO Management Repmt for 16-23 April 1964. 

26. 	 MSC, abstract of proceedings, Guidance and Control System Meeting No. 2, 7 Ju

Robert D. Weatherbee engineering memo to MSC, Attn.: Charles C. Lutz, "Tra

of NASA-MIT-Apollo Space Suit Assembly Contractor Meeting dated December 

HSER 2585-5," 22 Jan. 1963, with enc., minutes of spacesuit navigation system 

interface meeting between NASA, Hamilton Standard, Interna•tional Latex Conp., 

at Cambridge, Mass., 5 Dec. 1962; Project Apollo Quarterly Status Reports: no. 2

riod ending 31 Dec. 1962, p. 12, and no. 3, for period ending 31 March 1963, p. 

27. 	 H . E. Van Ness to STG, Attn.: Robert G. Chilton, "Apollo Navigation and 

Meetings," 13 Oct. 1961; Proceedings of the NASA.-Univenity Confe,·ence on th

and Technology of Space Exploration, Chicago, 1-3 Nov. 1962, NASA SP-11, 2 vols

ington, 1962), papers 27 through 32. 

28. 	 Robert C. Seamans, Jr., to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, "Appointment of Evaluation B

Jan. 1962; Webb, "Statement of the Administrator, [NASA], on Selection of Co

for Apollo Spacecraft Navigation and Guidance System MIT Industrial Suppo

NASA, "Contractors Selected for Negotiations-Apollo Guidance System," news re

112, 8 May 1962. 

29. 	 Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Trip report to 'v\iakefield Laboratory of A. C. Spark 

July 16," 25 July 1962; Aaron Cohen, interview, Houston, 14 Jan. 1970. 

30. 	 MSC, "E!;tablishment of the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office," Announcement 10

1962; "MSC Personality: C. W . Frick Heads Apollo Project," MSC Space News R

7 March 1962. For a description of the decentralized Manned Spacecraft Center 

first moved to Texas, see NASA-MSC booklet, "Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston

Interim Fac ilities," 1 Aug. 1962. 

31. 	 James P. Gardner, Harry 0. Ruppe, and Warren H . Straly, ··comments on 

Relating to the Lunar Landing Vehicle," ABMA Rept. DSP-TN-13-58, 4 Nov. 195

but esp. p. 36; Donald C. Cheatham to Chief, Flight Ops. Div., and Head, Apollo 

Off., "Conference with Langley Research Center personnel on problems related 

landing operations," 14 Nov. 1961; STG, "A General Description of the Apo

Systems," 11 Sept. 1961; Owen E. Maynard, "A General Description of the Lun
(PSAC) panel, Report of the Space Vehicle Panel, 3 Jan. 1962, p . l; Jerome B. Wiesner 

to Webb, 5 Jan. 1962, with enc., "Report of the Space Vehicle Panel." 

37. 	 Franklyn W. Phillips to Seamans, "Meeting of the [PSAC] Space Vehicle Panel ... at 

Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, Calif., February 23 and 24," 3 Feb. 1962; Webb to 

Wiesner, 22 Feb. 1962; agendas for PSAC Space Vehicle Panel meetings at MSFC, 5-6 

June 1962, and at MSC, 26-27 June 1962; Nicholas E. Golovin to Phillips, "Agenda for 

PSAC Space Vehicle Panel Meeting at Houston, Texas, June 26-27, 1962,'' ll JunJ 1962; 

Bothmer for record, "Relationships with PSAC (Dr. · Golovin)," 13 July 1962. I 

38. 	 Golovin to D. Brainerd Holmes, "Request for Schedule Information on the Manned 

Space Flight Program," 4 May 1962; Phillips to Holmes et al., "Request for Contractor's 

Reports on Major NASA Projects," 22 May 1962; Bothmer to Golovin, "Request for Schedule Information on the Manned Space Flight Program," 16 May 1962; memo, Golovin to 

Bothmer, "Your Memorandum dated May 16, 1962, Concerning Schedule Information 

Requested by this Office," 22 May 1962; Bothmer memo, 13 July 1962; Swenson, Grimwood, 

and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 266-67. 

39. 	 Agenda for PSAC Space Vehicle Panel meeting, 5-6 July 1962; Golovin to Phillips, "Data 

Relevant ·to Choice of Mission Mode for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," 29 June 

1962; Joseph F. Shea to Golovin, no subj., 2 July 1962; Golovin to Phillips, "PSAC Space 

Vehicle Panel Meeting, July ll-12, ..." 28 June 1962; Shea memo for record, no. subj., 5 

July 1962; Wiesner, interview, 7 July 1969, as cited in John M. Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation of the Lunar Landing Decision," NASA HHN-81, August 1969, pp. 73-74. 

40. 	 Lester Lees to Chm. and members, Space Vehicle Panel, "Comparison of Apollo Mission 

Modes," 2 July 1962; Shea memo for record, no subj., 9 July 1962; Bothmer memo, 13 

July 1962; Bothmer memo for record, "Relationships with PSAC (Dr. Golovin)," 27 July 

1962. 

41. 	 Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation," pp. 74-75; Bothmer memos, 13 and 27 July 1962. 

42. 	 Wiesner to Webb, 17 July 1962, with enc., Donald F. Hornig to Wiesner, "Summary of 

Views of Space Vehicle Panel," ll July 1962; Webb to Wiesner, 20 July 1962. 

43. 	 Hornig et al., "Report of the Space Vehicle Panel (On the Matter of Lunar Mission Mode 

Selection)," PSAC, 26 July 1962. 

44. 	 Golovin to Phillips, "Space Vehicle Panel Meeting Downey, Calif. July 23-24," 16 July 

1962; George M. Low to Eugene M. Emme, NASA Historical Off., 2 Sept. 1969; Webb to 

Phillips, no subj., 18 July 1962; Rector interview; letter, Bruce T. Lundin to Golovin, 

30 July 1962. 

45. 	 Webb to Holmes, no subj., 7 Aug. 1962. 

46. 	 Shea memo for record, no subj., 24 Aug. 1962. 

47. 	 Wiesner to Webb, 5 Sept. 1962. 

432 
Service Module Equipment, and Summation of Command Module and Servic

Equipment," 8 Oct. 1962. 

51. 	 William B. Taylor, "Feasibility of Two-Man Direct Flight and EOR Mann

Missions," 15 Oct. 1962; "Summary of Findings," unidentified collection of mi

items and charts, [ca. 3 October 1962]. 

52. 	 NASA OMSF, "Manned Lunar Landing Mode Comparison," 24 Oct. 1962. 

53. 	 Webb to Wiesner, 24 Oct. 1962. 

54. 	 Holmes to Wiesner, 26 Oct. 1962, with encs., abstracts of proposals submitted 

on the RFP; Webb to Seamans, no subj., 29 Oct. 1962. 

55. 	 Holmes to Wiesner, 30 Oct. 1962, wLth encs., LEM weight estimates contained i

proposals. 

56. 	 Golovin to Shea, 2 Nov. 1962, with encs., rough draft of material under head

formance Considerations and Payload Margins" and "Mission Success Proba

Crew Safety." 

57. Alper and Geoffrey Robillard to Shea, "OS + T Evaluation of the Mode C

Study Report, dated 24 October 1962," 5 Nov. 1962; Eldon W. Hall to Shea, "

on OS&T weight comparison (Table I)," 5 Nov. 1962; Shea to Seamans, "OST C

of Mode Feasibility and Reliability," 6 Nov. 1962; Lee to Shea, "Draft memo fo

mans on OST Calculations," 23 Nov. 1962; Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation," 

In his book Where Science and Politics M eet (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964

is surprisingly silent on all matters connected with space. 

58. 	 James L. Neal TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., 7 Nov. 1962; 

TWX to all NASA centers, "Grumman Selected to Build LEM," NASA ne

62-240, 7 Nov. 1962. 

59. 	 Seamans memo for file, "Apollo Procurement," 2 June 1961; Rector and Seamans 

60. 	 Ernest W. Brackett to Seamans, "Comments on North American Suggestion f

Excursion Contract," 18 July 1962. 

61. 	 Bothmer, minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 3 Aug. 1962; "Apollo Chronology," 

Sheet, p. 26; Ivan D. Ertel and Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft: A C

vol. l, Through N ovember 7, 1962, NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1969), p . 130; 

tivity reports, 2-8 Sept., p. 2, and 23-29 Sept. 1962, p . 2; Rector interview; Dave 

interview, Houston, 18 Nov. 1962. 

62. 	 Robert G. Ferris, minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 28 Sept. 1962; Bothmer, m

OMSF Staff Meeting, 5 Oct. 1962; Donald T. Gregory, recorder, minutes of M

Staff Meeting, 12 Oct. 1962, p. 2; William M. Allen to Webb, 12 Sept. 1962; NA

"Grumman Selected to Build LEM." 
of Lunar Landing, working paper No. 1052, MSC, 20 Dec. 1962; Seamans to Buckley C. 

Pierstorff, 2 Nov. 1962. 

65. 	 "Gilruth at Houston Explains Astronaut Training and Equipment at Manned Spacecraft 

Center," Data, 1963, no. I, p. 26; Kenneth Levin, interview, Buffalo, N.Y. , 8 June 1971; 

Gene J. Matranga, interview, Flight Research Center (f'RC) , Calif., 28 July 1971 ; Paul F. 

Bikle to MSC, Attn.: Walter C. Williams, "Transmittal of proposed Free Flight Lunar 

Landing Simulator Program," 9 Jan. 1962, with enc. , "Proposed Free-Flight Lunar-Landing 

Simulator Program," FRC, 9 Jan. 1962; Donald R. Bellman to those concerned with the 

Lunar Landing Research Vehicle, "Suggested areas for investigation based on a survey of 

proposals for the Lunar Excursion Module," 24 Sept. 1962. 

66. 	 Shea to all Hq. Dirs. and all Center Dirs., "Technological Data Required for Support of 

Project Apollo," 15 June 1962, with enc.; William H. Pickering to Seamans, "Ranger 

Project activities in support of manned lunar flight program," 15 Aug. 1962; Seamans to 

Pickering, 24 Sept. 1962; Oran W. Nicks memo for record, "Ranger Project Activities Discussion on II October 1962," 15 Nov. 1962; R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A H istory of 

Pmject Ranger, NASA SP-4210 (Washington, 1977), chap. 2 through 15. 

67. 	 Senate Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee, Independent Offices Appmpriations, 

1963: Hearings on H.R . 12711, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, pp. 87Q-77. 

68. 	 Bothmer, OMSF Staff Meeting, 5 Oct. 1962; Seamans to Dir., OMSF, "Guidelines for 

Preparation of Detailed Fiscal Year 1964 Budget Estimates- Section II," 9 Oct. 1962. 

69. 	 Webb, desk calendar of appointments, November 1962; NASA, " Preliminary History of 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration during the Administration of .President 

Lyndon B. Johnson , NoYember 1963-January 1969," 15 Jan. 1959, pp. I-49 through I-52; 

Richard Witkin, "Apollo Speed-up Is Being Weighed," N ew York Times, 1 Dec. 1962, p. 3; 

"In Earthly Trouble," Time, 23 Nov. 1962, p. 15; Webb, to the President, 30 Nov. 1962. 

70. 	 T. Keith Glennan, "Statement of the Administrator on the Selection of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation to Design and Construct a Manned Satellite Capsule for Project Mercury," n.d., as cited in Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 137, 543. 

71. 	 Thomas J . Kelly, interview, Bethpage, 3 May 1966; Ferdman interview; Paul E. Purser to 

Gilruth, "Log for week of May 2, 1960," 9 May 1960. 

72. 	 Kelly and Ferdman interviews; Herbert G. Patterson to Assoc. Dir., MSC, "Visit by the 

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, March 8, 1961 ," 31 March 1961; Grumman, 

"Project Apollo Feasibility Study Summary," Rept. PDR-279-2, 15 May 1961. 

73. 	 Kelly interview; Ladislaus W. Warzecha, interview, Houston , 14 Jan. 1970; Charles Bixler 

and Edward S. Miller, interviews, Valley Forge, Pa., 18 Feb. 1970; Gavin, interview, Bethpage, II Feb. 1970; Helen Highsmith, telephone interview, 23 March 1972. 

74. 	 Ferdman and Kelly interviews. 

434 
pg() 

Buckley, "Comments on June 19, 1962 draft of 'Management Plan for the Mann

Flight Network,'" 5 July 1962; Corliss, Histories of STADAN, MSFN, and NASC

mans to Admin., NASA, "Location of Mission Control Center," 10 July 1962; [M

marks by Dr. Robert R. Gilruth at Houston-Manned Spacecraft Center Welcome

1962"; "Gilruth Cites MSC Progress Despite Difficult Relocation," MSC Spa

Roundup, 11 July 1962; NASA, "NASA Mission Control Center to Be at Houston

news release 62-172, 20 July 1962; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., to Assoc. Dir., MSC, 

ment of responsibility for •the technical direction over the mission computer 

development for the IMCC (RTCC) ," 10 Dec. 1962. 

82. 	 McDonnell, "Project Gemini Engineering Mockup Review, 15-16 August 1962,'' R

n.d.; L. Lebedev, B. Lyk'yanov, and A. Romanov, Sons of the Blue Planet, ed. 

Kothekar, trans. Mrs. Prema Pande, NASA TT F-728 (Moscow, 1971: New Del

1973), pp. 75-79; Zavasky, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 24 Aug. 19

Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, p. 462. 

83. 	 Paul P. Haney, "NASA Plans Two-Man Rendezvous Spacecraft," draft NASA new

[8 Dec. 1961]; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Special Subcommitt

Selection of Astronauts, Qualifications for Astronauts: Report, 87th Cong., 2d s

p. 7; NASA, "Nine New Pilots Selected for Space Flight Training," news release 

17 Sept. 1962; "Some Day That Will Be Me," photo and caption from MSC Sp

Roundup, 17 Oct. 1962; "Millions in Europe Watch Launching via Telstar Relay

ington Post, 4 Oct. 1962. 

Chapter 5 

I. 	Hugh L. Dryden, foreword in Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology o

Technology, and Policy, NASA SP-4004 (Washington, 1964), p. iii. 

2. 	 J. Leland Atwood to '}ames M. Grimwood, 27 Oct. 1976. 

3. 	 MSC, "Manned Spacecraft Center, Atlantic Missile Range Operations: Facilities, 1

15 April 1963; NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1693, pp. 195-96; Barton C

and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gem

SP-4203 (Washington, 1977), chap. 6 through 9; House Committee on Science a

nautics, Astmnautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962: Report, 88th Cong., 1s

June 1963, p. 15; James E. Webb, "Statement of the Administrator, [NASA], R

Selection of a Contractor for Overall Checkout of the Project Apollo Space Ve

March 1962; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on 
original). 

6. 	 William Collins, Jr., to Walter L. Lingle, "Discussion of language changes under the General Electric contract at a meeting in Mr. Holmes's office on Friday, June 28, 1963," I July 

1963; George E. Mueller to MSC, MSFC, and LOC, Attn.: Dirs., "Realignment of General 

Electric Company Contract," 30 Sept. 1963; Stanley M. Smolensky, minutes of OMSF Staff 

Meeting, II Jan. 1963; Melvin E. Dell to Yschek, "NAA contractual change to establish 

the Apollo Support Department of the General Electric Company as an associate contractor for NAA," 30 Dec. 1963; J. Thomas Markley to Mgr., ASPO, "Present use of GE," 20 

Jan. 1964; General Electric Support Dept., "Apollo Support Program, Monthly Progress 

Report: March 1963," Daytona Beach, Fla., 10 April 1963 (cf. , e.g., idem, " ACE-Sf C Reliabi!Lty Quarterly Status Report, Third Quarter 1965," 15 Oct. 1965. 

7. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 

1964 NASA Authorization Hearings, pp. 372-73, 1076, 1091, 1098-1101; Paul E. Purser 

memo, "Operations of OMSF Office of Systems and Bellcomm," 14 Jan. 1963, with encs.; 

minutes of Apollo Reference Trajectory Working Group Meeting No. I, 3 Jan. 1963; 

John P. Mayer to Dir., MSC, "First meeting of Apollo Trajectory Working Group, January 3, 1963," 7 Jan. 1963, with encs. 

8. 	 Joseph F. Shea to Julian M. West, 7 Nov. 1963; Shea to Brig. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 25 

Nov. 1964; Purser memo, 14 Jan. 1963; Jay Holmes, minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 22 

Nov. 1963; Carl R. Russ to JSC History Office, "Comments on Draft Copy of 'Chariots for 

Apollo: A History of Lunar Spacecraft,' " 2 Nov. 1976. 

9. 	 NASA, "Holmes Names Two Deputies," news release 63-32, 20 Feb. 1963; George M. Low, 

interview, Houston, 7 Feb. 1967. 

10. 	 NASA, "Apollo System Specification," OMSF directive M-D M 8000.001, 2 May 1963, pp. 

1-l, 1-2. 2-1, 2-2. 

11. 	 Ibid., pp. 4.3-1, 4.3-2; letter, Carl D. Sword to North American, "Contract Change Authorization No. 1," 28 Aug. 1962. 

12. 	 Low to Robert R. Gilruth, 26 Dec. 1962, with enc.; Smolensky, OMSF Staff Meeting, II 

Jan. 1963; D. B. Holmes to Wernher von Braun, "Combustion Instability of F-1 Engine," 

26 Jan. 1963; von Braun to D. B. Holmes, II March 1963. 

13. 	 MSC-ASPO, "Consolidated Meeting Plan, Initial Issue," 18 Feb. 1962; Walter C. Williams 

to MSFC, Attn.: von Braun, "Flight Control Operations and Ground Support Requirements 

for Project Apollo," 1 March 1963; Williams to von Braun, 7 March 1963; "Mission Control Operations Panel (MCOP) ," n.d. (probably August 1963) ; Robert V. Battey, minutes 

of Apollo Mission Planning Panel organization meeting, 27 Feb. 1963; Mayer memo, 

"Charter for Apollo Spacecraft Mission Trajectory Sub-Panel," 26 March 1963; abstract 

of Apollo Mission Planning Meeting No. 1, 27 March 1963; R . A. Newlander to Actg. Mgr., 

436 
5 Feb. 1963; Seamans memo, subj., as above, 11 March 1963, with enc.; Dennis E

to Chief, Flight Operations Div. (FOD) , "Network management and control for 

space flight," 30 Oct. 1963; Henry E. Clements to Chief, FOD, "GSFC's presen

network control," 31 Oct. 1963; Gilruth to GSFC, Attn.: Goett, "Computation 

Flow Integrated Subsystem Testing Interface," 28 May 1964, with enc., "Computa

Data Flow Integrated Subsystem (CADFISS) Testing Interface between GSFC 

for the Gemini and Apollo Programs," n .d.; Mueller and Edmond C. Buckley 

MSC, MSFC, and GSFC, Attn.: Dirs., "Assurance of Compatibility between Apo

craft, Launch Vehicle and the supporting Tracking and Data Acquisition Netw

July 1964; Buckley to Dep. Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Division of Responsibility 

GSFC and MSC on Computation for the Manned Space Flight Network," 2 Oct. 1

enc.; Bernard Lovell, The Story of ]odrell Bank (New York: Harper and Row, 1

16. 	 Robert 0 . Piland to Dir., MSC, "Space Task Group representation on Lunar Scie

committee of the NASA Space Sciences Steering Committee," 7 July 1961; G

NASA Hq., Attn.: Low, "Designation of liaison member for the Lunar Sciences 

mittee of the Space Sciences Steering Committee," 11 July 1961. 

17. 	 Harold C. Urey to Homer E. Newell, 19 June 1961. 

18. 	 Leonard D. Jaffe, secretary, minutes of Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Scie

periments and Training, 27 March 1962; Vern C. Fryklund, Jr., to MSC, Attn.

"Scientific Guidelines for the Apollo Project," 8 Oct. 1963; National Academy of 

A Review of Space Research, NAS-NRC 1079 (Washington, 1962) , report of sum

under auspices of NAS at State Univ. of Iowa, 17 June-10 Aug. 1962; Edward M

ed., "Apollo Lunar Science Program: Report of Planning Teams," pt. I, "Summ

cember 1964. 

19. 	 Shea memo for record, no subj., 26 March 1962; Fryklund letter, 8 Oct. 1963; 

Foster to Dir., Program Review and Resources Management, "Submission for 1

dent's Annual Report," 30 Oct. 1964; Davin, ed., "Planning Teams Report," pp

20. 	 Eugene N. Cameron et a!., introduction to "Preliminary Report on the Sam

Examination of Lunar Surface Materials," 22 June 1964, in Appendix to D

"Planning Teams Report." 

21. 	 NASA, "Preliminary History of the National Aeronautics and Space Administrati

the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963-January 1

ed., 15 Jan. 1969, pp. I-49 through I-52; D. Brainerd Holmes, interview by Don N

Inc., 18 Jan. 1969; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcom

Manned Space Flight, 1964 NASA Authm·ization: Hearings on H .R . 5-166, 88th 

sess., no. 3, pt. 2 (a) , 1963 (March 7) , pp. 242-243; Robert Sherrod notes on in

David Williamson, Asst. Assoc. Admin., NASA, 10 April 1972; Hacker and Grim
news release 63-241, 28 Oct. 1963 ~ Jay Holmes, minutes of Special OMSF Staff Meeting, 24 

Oct. 1963, with enc., "Reorganization of the Office of Manned Space Flight," 24 Oct. 

1963; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for 

1965, pp. 471-73. . 

27. 	 Disher and Adelbert 0. Tischler, presentation to Mueller, 28 Sept. 1963; Disher interview; 

Tischler, interview, Washington, 7 July 1972; "Apollo Flight Mission Assignments," OMSF 

program directive M-D E 8000.005A, 9 April 1963; Alfred D. Mardel and Rob R. Tillett to 

Piland, "Trip Report to Washington, D.C.," 30 Sept. and 3 Oct. 1963; Mueller to Robert F. 

Freitag, "Replacement of Scheduled Manned Flights on Saturn I," 18 Oct. 1963; Mueller 

to Webb, "Reorienta!tion of Apollo Plans," 26 Oct. 1963, annotated, "Approved during 

telephone discussion with Dr. Mueller on Oct. 28, 1963 and later reviewed via telephone 

with Dr. Seamans," signed by Webb; NASA, "NASA Announces Changes in Saturn Missions," news release 63-246, 30 Oct. 1963; David M. Hammock TWX to North American, 

Attn. : E. E. Sack and Alan B. Kehlet, 4 Nov. 1963; Bellcomm, "Recommended Changes 

in the Use of Space Vehicles in the Apollo Test Program," NASA OMSF technical memo 

MD (S) 3100.180, 29 Oct. 1963; Webb to Col. C. J. George, no subj., 10 March 1964; MSC 

news release 180-63, 18 Oct. 1963. 

28. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1965 NASA Authorization: Hearings on 

H.R. 9641 (Superseded by H .R. 10456), 8Sth Cong., 2d sess., 1964, pp. 154-56; Bothmer, 

MSFMC meeting, 29 Oct. 1963; Hammock TWX, 4 Nov. 1963; von Braun to Mueller, 8 

Nov. 1963, with encs.; von Braun, interviews, Washington, 27 Aug. 1970 and 30 Nov. 1971, 

and Houston, 3 Feb. 1972; Shea, interview, Waltham, Ma~;S., 12 Jan. 1972; Jay Holmes, 

, minutes of Special OMSF Staff Meeting, 31 Jan. 1964. 

29. 	 See Philip H. Abelson's editorials in Science, late 1963 to early 1964; John Barbour, 

"Scientist Abelson Raps Race for Man on Moon," Washington Evening Star, 2 Sept. 1963; 

Amitai Etzioni, The Moon-Doggie: Domestic and International Implications of the Space 

Race (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964); Edwin Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the 

Space Age (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964). Cf. Robert Hotz, "Space Flight Enters New 

Period to Exploit Capabilities of Man for Probing Universe," editorial · in Aviation Week 

& Space Technology 79, Manned Space Flight ed. (22 July 1963) : 68-69. 

30. 	 Frick memo, "Reorganization of the Apollo Spacecraft Project," 11 Jan. 1963; Frick and 

Hjornevik memo, "NAS 9-150 Contract Negotiation," 4 Jan. 1963; Markley, interview, 

Houston, 17 Jan. 1968; Daniel A. Linn to William Risso, "Weekly Activity Report through 

Period Ending Monday, June 24, 1963," 25 June 1963; Frick to NASA Hq., Attn.: D. B. 

Holmes, "Apollo Spacecraft Delinitization Status," 29 Jan. 1963, with enc.; Henry W. Flagg, 

Jr., to JSC History Off., "Review of Comment Draft of Chariots for Apollo: A History of 

Lunar Spacecraft," 24 Nov. 1966. 

438 
and Flight Mechanics, Dynamic Tests of an Apollo Command Module in the 

Tunnel," l Aug. 1963; Hammock TWX to North American, Attn.: Sack, 12 

Perrine memo," Minutes of meeting on tower flap and canards, February 7, 

Feb. 1964; Perrine to Mgr., ASPO, "Recommended ASPO position on canard ve

flap," 24 Feb. 1964; Perrine to Asst. Chief, Systems Engineering Div. (SED), M

to NAA on February 24 and 25 to discuss tower flap vs canard," 26 Feb. 1964; m

NASA-NAA Technical Management Meeting, 25 Feb. 1964, pp. 2, 3; Perrin

Chief, SED, "Trip Report-Visit to NAA on 24 April on WSMR program," 27 A

34. 	 Minutes, Technical Management Meeting, 25 :Feb. 1964, p. 3; Raymond L. Za

corder, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 28 Feb. 1964; William E. Ston

Chief, Advanced Spacecraft Technology Div., MSC, "Apollo land landing," 10 M

Freitag memo, "MSF Position on Land versus Water LandingS--Apollo and G

March 1964; James C. Cozad, NAA, to MSC, Attn.: John B. Alldredge, "R&D f

Apollo Spacecraft, Design of Apollo Command Module for Earth Impact," 27 A

35. 	 Minutes of NASA-NAA Technical Management Meeting, 7-8 April 1964; Pila

"Sparing Concept," 19 Aug. 1963; David W. Gilbert to Mgr., ASPO, "Impleme

Built-in Redundancy for Spacecraft Sub-systems," 30 Oct. 1963. 

36. 	 MSC, "Apollo Subsystem Management Plan," 16 Dec. 1963; minutes of Struc

Mechanics Div. Apollo Subsystem Management Meeting, 29 Jan. 1964; MSC, "A

erating Procedures," 10 April 1964, signed by Shea and Maxime A. Faget. 

37. 	 Disher TWX to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, "Establishment of Guidelines for First Fo

for Development and Flight Schedules for the Manned Space Flight Program," 12 

Low to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, " Manned Space Flight Program Launch Schedule 

and Saturn Class Vehicles" [October 1962], with enc., subj. as above, OMSF dire

M 9330, 15 Oct. 1962; Storms to Low and Shea, 4 Sept. 1963; North America

Spacecraft Development Test Plan," AP 63-86, December 1963; North Americ

Characteristics Study," vol. 2. Cf. an earlier plan, MSC, "Command and Servi

Test Program through the First Manned Apollo Mission," 15 July 1963; Kehlet 

wood, 7 Jan. 1977. 

38. James L. Decker to Grumman, Attn.: Robert S. Mullaney; "Apollo Project Space

gration Review Action Items-Line Item 13," 24 Sept. 1963; idem, "Devel

Apollo Lunar Landing Mission Design Plan," II Sept. 1963; Hammock TWX 

American , Attn.: Sack, 3 Dec. 1963; D. R . Treffeisen to Apollo Mission Plan

Force Members, "Minutes of lst Direction Group Meeting-12f l6f63," 17 D

Thomas G. Barnes et al., "Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, Phase I Progres

Grumman LED-540-7, 4 May 1964, 3 vols., especially 1: 3-1 and 3·5, 2: 7-2, 3: A

B. Whitaker, interview, Bethpage, N.Y., 12 Feb. 1970; John Boynton, interview

27 April 1970. 
20 Aug. 1964, with encs., minutes, NAA Comments- Block I Definition, 9 July 1964, and 

"Block I Definition Milestones," 10 July 1964; minutes of NASA-NAA Technical Management Meeting, 17 Sept. 1964; Maynard memo, "Distribution of Block I Specification Negotiation Minutes, dated 28 September 1964 and Review of Negotiated Block I Specifications, 

dated 1 October 1964," 9 Oct. 1964. 

42. 	 Kehlet to Grimwood, 7 Jan. 1977. 

43. 	 Ralph B. Oakley, "Historical Summary: S&ID Apollo Program," 20 Jan. 1966, p. 10; NASA, 

"Dale D. Myers," biographical data, February 1971 ; Myers, interviews, Downey, Calif., 12 

May 1969, and Washington, 11 Sept. 1970. 

44. 	 Kehlet to Grimwood, 7 Jan. 1977. 

45. 	 Maynard memo, "CSM Block II changes transmitted to NAA for implementation," 19 

June 1964; MSC, "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of Block II Mock-up, 

Command and Service Modules, September 29-0ctober 1, 1964," especially app. I, Yschek 

letter to North American, ["Contract Change Authorization No. 224"], with enc., "Apollo 

C&SM Block II Changes," and Appendix 4; MSC, "Board Report for NASA Inspection and 

Review of M-5 Mockup, Lunar Excursion Module, October 5-8, 1964." 

46. 	 Maynard memos, "Mission A-001 preflight launch phase trajectory input data," 20 April 

1964, and "Launch Escape Vehicle trajectory input data for Mission A-001 (Boilerplate 12) 

flight test," 6 May 1964; MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-001 (BP-12) ," 

MSC-R-A-64-1, 28 May 1964, pp. 1-1, 3-1, 3-2, 4-111 through 4-118; MSC, "Apollo Boilerplate 

12," news conference, 13 May 1964; Emory F. Harris to Chief, Mgmt. Analysis Div., Attn.: 

Clarence Presswood, "Significant Accidents and Failures," 10 Dec. 1964; Carl R. Huss memo, 

2 Nov. 1976. 

47. 	 Perrine to Apollo Support Group, Attn.: John P. Bryant, "Request for trajectory analysis in 

support of the BP-23 Hight test," 19 May 1964; Paul E. Fitzgerald and Phillip L. Suttler, 

Jr., memo, "Minutes of meeting on BP-23," 25 May 1964; Fitzgerald memo, "Mission requirements for mission A-002 (BP-23) ," 16 June 1964; Taylor TWX to North American, 

Attn.: Sack, 16 June 1964; Fitzgerald and Zack H. Byrns memo, "Minutes of meeting on 

BP-23," 29 June 1964; MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-002 (BP-23) ," 

MSC-R-A-65-1, 22 Jan. 1965; General Dynamics, Convair Div., "Little Joe II Test Launch 

Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Report," 1, May 1966. 

48. 	 North American, "Project Apollo Flight-Test Report, Boilerplate 13," SID 63-1416-3, 

August 1964, pp. 2-1, 2-2; "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-101 (BP-13) ," MSC-R· 

A-64-2, 18 June 1964, pp. 2·1, 3-2 through 3-5, 4-1 through 4-3, 7-1; KSC, "Apollo Spacecraft BP-13: A Chronology of Technical Progress M Kennedy Space Center," SP-188, 7 

May 1965; MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-102 (BP-15) ," MSC-R-A-64-3, 

10 Oct. 1964 pp. 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2. 

440 
y 

p

Status," 10 July 1963; Jerry L. Modi~;ette to ASPO, MSC, Attn.: Robert L. O'Neal

on discussions of RCA and Grumman radiation work at Grumman, July 11 1963

1963; Decker to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Meteoroid Environment," 16 O

Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, "Use of LEM Propulsion Systems as Backup 

Module Propulsion System," 27 July 1964; Milton B. Trageser to MSC, Attn.: R

Young, " Impact of LEM Propulsion Backup to Service Propulsion System," 16 S

Owen E. Maynard memo, "Action items," 1 Dec. 1964; Dale D. Myers to Dep

NASA, "LM 'Lifeboat' Mode," 3 Aug. 1970, with encs.; Thomas J. Kelly and E

interviews, Bethpage, 3 May 1966; Mullaney interview; Rector, interview, Redon

Calif., 27 Jan. 1970; Kelly, "Apollo Lunar Module Mission and Development Statu

presented at AIAA 4th Annual Meeting and Technical Display, AIAA paper 67-

heim, Calif., 23-27 Oct. 1967, pp. 6-7; Stanley P. Weiss, "Lunar Module Struc

system,'' Apollo Experience Report (AER) , NASA Technical Note (TN) S-34

04932), review copy, June 1972. 

4. 	 MSC, LEM Mechanical Systems Meeting no. 2, "LEM Configuration," 17 Ap

Grumman, "Vehicle Configuration Study Briefing," 17 April 1964; Grumman 

Progress Report (hereafter cited as Grumman Report) no. 3, LPR-10-6, 10 May 

3-4, 7-8; notes, Maynard, "Design Approach Tentatively Agreed Upon" [ca. Ap

with encs. 

5. 	 MSC Director's briefing notes for 30 April 1963 MSFMC meeting; Kelly to M

Robert 0 . Piland, "LEM Propulsion Tank Sizing," 28 Feb. 1963; Zavasky, minute

Senior Staff Meeting, 3 May 1963, p. 4. 

6. 	 MSC Conoolidated Activity Report for Assoc. Admin., OMSF, NASA, 19 July

1964, p . 23. 

7. 	 Grumman Reports nos. 10, LPR-10-26, 10 Dec. 1963, p. 16, and 11, LPR-10-27, 10 

p . 1; Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report no. 6, for period ending 31 Dec. 1

Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM Program Review," 17 Jan. 1964; St

view; Rector to LEM Proc. Off., "Change from 4-Tank to 2-Tank Configurati

Stage," 24 March 1964. 

8. 	 Robert R. Gilruth and L[ee] N. McMillion, "Man's Role in Apollo,' ' paper pre

Institute of Aerospace Sciences Man-Machine Competition Meeting, IAS pape

Seattle, Wash., 10-11 Aug. 1962, pp. 5, 10-11 ; Robert W . Abel, "Lunar Excursio

Visibility Requirements," NASA Program Apollo working paper No. 1115, 15 J

[Grumman], "Some Notes on the Evolution of the LEM," typescri-pt by unknow

8 Aug. 1966, p. I; Orvis E. Pigg and Stanley P. Weiss, "Spacecraft Structural W

AER TN S-377 (MSC-07074), review copy. July 1973. 
12. 	 Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Stowage volume requirements for Lunar Excursion Module," 27 Nov. 1964; MSC, Consolidated Activity Report, 19 July-22 Aug. 1964, p. 

21; Richard S. Johnston TWX to Hamilton Standard, Attn.: R. D. Weatherbee, 17 July 

1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn. : Mullaney, "Memorandum of Understanding," 13 July 

1964. 

13. 	 MSC news release 64-125, 9 July 1964; Rector interview; Arnold E. Whitaker, interview, 

Bethpage, 12 Feb. 1970; Reetor TWX to Grumman, Attn.: C. William Rathke, "Inspeetion 

of Lighted LM-1 Mockup," 9 July 1964; Reetor to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Lighting 

Mockup Review," 4 Aug. 1964, with enc., abstract of LEM Crew Integration Meeting, 16 

July 1964; ASPO Weekly Management Report, 8-15 Oct. 1964; Howard Sherman, interview, 

Bethpage, 11 Feb. 1970; Charles D. Wheelwright, "Crew Station Integration: Volume VLighting Considerations," AER TN S-360 (MSC-07015), review copy, November 1972. 

14. 	 Sherman interview; Kelly, "Technical Development Status," p . 29; MSC news release 64-27, 

12 Feb. 1964; Kelly interview; "Some Notes on Evolution of LEM," p. 3. 

15. 	 Donald K. Slayton to ASPO, Attn.: William A. Lee, "Docking Operational Requirements," 

2 Dec. 1963; Kelly, "Teehnical Development Status," p. 29; "Some Notes on Evolution of 

LEM," pp. 1-2; Sherman interview. 

16. Joseph P. Loftus to Chief, Sys. Eng. Div. (SED) , "Disposition of TM-1 mockup review chit 

no. A9-4," 28 Apl"il 1964; Slayton to ASPO, Attn.: Maynard, "LEM overhead window 

experiment," 6 May 1964; LEM PO, "Accomplishments," 14-20 May 1964. 

17. 	 Sherman interview; Kelly, "Teehnical Development Status," p. 29; "Some Notes on Evolution of LEM," pp. 3-4. 

18. 	 Kelly, "Technical Development Status," p. 48; John L. Sloop to Dep Admin., NASA, "Com. 

parison of technology readiness at start of Apollo and Shuttle," 11 Feb. 1972, with encs.; 

Maynard, interview, Houston, 18 Feb. 1970; Grumman Report no. 1, LPR-10-1, 10 March 

1963, p. 5, and no. 3, LPR-10-6, 10 May 1963, p. 7. 

19. 	 Grumman Report no. 4, LPR-10-7, 10 June 1963, p. 13; Robert A. Newlander to John W. 

Small and Walter J. Gaylor, "LEM Landing Gear," 8 May 1963; Newlander to Mgr., 

RASPO, "Trip . .. to MSC on May 20, 21, 22, 1963 to attend Meehanical Systems Meeting," 

27 May 1963; MSC Director's briefing notes for 25 June 1963 MSFMC meeting; Deeker draft 

memo to Grumman, "Landing Gear," 21 Aug. 1963; ASPO Weekly Activity Report, 5-11 

Sept. 1963, pp. 7-8; Newlander to Gaylor, "1 (6 Scale Model Tests," 19 Sept.. 1963; Axel 

T . Mattson to MSC, Attn.: Shea, "Langley Research Center Tests of Interest to Project 

Apollo," 7 Aug. and 17 Nov. 1964; Maynard memo, "Notice of LEM Structures and Landing 

Gear meeting," 15 Dec. 1964; Kelly memo, "Re-definition of TM-5 Test Program," 15 Dec. 

1964, with enc., R. A. Hildermen to Rathke, Kelly, and Whitaker, "Elimination of Lift 

Systems for TM-5 and L TA-3, Drop Testing and Configuration of TM-5," 10 Dec. 1964. 

442 
1964; abstract of LEM Structures and Landing Gear Systems Meeting, 21-22 

with encs.; Bendix Products Aerospace Div., "Space Vehicle Landing Gea

brochure, November 1963; Raymond J. Black, "Quadripedal Landing Gear S

Spacecraft,'' reprinted from journal for Spacecraft and Rockets 1, no. 2 (M

1964) : 196-203; MSC news release 64-9, 15 Jan. 1964; William F. Rogers, "Lun

Landing Gear Subsystem," AER TN S·316 (MSC-04797), review copy, January 

22. 	 Neal TWX to Small, 29 Jan. 1963; MSC news release 63-14, 30 Jan. 1963; Grum

System Description,'' from information package •for Apollo 11, July 1969; Bell A

"Bell Aerosystems Company and Apollo II," news release, July 1969; Aero

"Fact Sheet about the Main Rocket Engine for the Apollo Command and Service 

news release, July 1969; William R. Hammock, Jr., Eldon C. Currie, and Arlie 

"Descent Propulsion System," AER TN S·349 (MSC·05849) , review copy, Oc

Clarence E. Humphries and Reuben E. Taylor, "Ascent Propulsion System," 

S-341 (MSC·04928), review copy, May 1972; Chester A. Vaughan et al., "Lun

Reaction Control System," AER TN S-315 (MSC-04567), review copy, Decembe

23. 	 Dave W. Lang TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Brackett, 5 Feb. 1963; Clyde B. B

George M. Low, "Bell Aerospace Contract for LEM Engine," II Feb. 1964; LE

Management Meeting, GrummanfNASA, 22 April 1964; Rector TWX to Grumm

Mullaney, 21 Aug. 1964; minutes of LEM Ascent Propulsion Subsystem Sc

Technical Status Meeting at Grumman, 16-17 Sept. 1964; ASPO Weekly Mana

ports, 23-30 July 1964 and 21-28 Jan. 1965; Rector TWXs to Grumman, Attn.: 

Sept. 1964; Rector and Gavin interviews; Alexander L. Madyda to LEM PO, "R

GAEC Propulsion to MSC Requests and Directions,'' 5 Nov. 1964. 

24. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Astronautical and Aeronautica

1962: Report, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 12 June 1963, p . 145; Neal to Grumman, Attn

"Descent Engine Subcontract,'' 12 Aug. 1963; Rector interview; Charles W. M

Asst. Dir., Research and Dev., "Procurement Plan for Apollo Supporting 

Throttleable Engine Development," 16 Aug. 1962; Robert H. Voight to Asst. M

"Parallel Development LM Descent Engine, Grumman Aircraft Engineering C

Audit Report MSC II-67A,'' 8 March 1967; RASPOfGrumman Activity Re

March 1963, p. 1; Carl D. Sword TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Snedeker, 27 May 

news release 63-92, 29 May 1963; R. F. Mettler TWX to Charles W. Frick, 20 

Gavin interview; Jack N. Cherne, "Mechanical Design of the Lunar Modu

Engine," paper presented at the 18th International Astronautical Congress, Belg

slavia, 24-30 Sept. 1967, p. I; Rector TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 5 

Roger D. Hicks to Chief, Propulsion and Power Div. (PPD) , "Report of trip to 

and STL, July 8 and 9, 1964," 10 July 1964; MSC Weekly Activity Report 

Admin., OMSF, NASA, 28 June--4 July 1964, p. 3; Rector and Mullaney interview
Apollo," 6 Dec. 1960; A. B. Kehlet et a!., "Notes on Project Apollo, January 1960-Jan.uary 

1962," 8 Jan. 1962, p. 12; D. Brainerd Holmes to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Change in Subcontractors for Apollo Command Module Reaction Control Jets," 24 July 1962; Caldwell 

C. Johnson TWX to North American, Attn.: E. E. Sack, "Command and Service Module 

Reaction Control System Engines," 31 July 1962; Decker TWX to Sack, 25 March 1963; 

Small to Decker, "Review of GAEC Specification ... for the Reaction Control System," 

30 April 1963; Neal TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Snedeker, 15 July 1963; Maynard to 

Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Reaction Control Subsystem, ... Bell Aerosystems Company 

Proposal, . .. dated November 1963," 3 Dec. 1963; Faget to Systems Evaluation and Dev. 

(SEDD) , Spacecraft Research, and Life Systems Divs., "Investigation of similar or near 

similar systems, subsystems and components on Mercury, Gemini and Apollo (including 

Lunar Excursion Module) s.pacecraf.t," 17 Aug. 1962; Rector to Decker and Neal, "Proposed Reply to GAEC TWX LTX-150-7," 2 July 1963; Rector to Maynard and Alfred D. 

Mardel, "Differences in Development, Environmental, Quality Assurance, and Reliability 

Requirements between NAAf S&ID and GAEC for Potential Common Usage Items," 17 Feb. 

1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM RCS Tank Specification No. LSP-310­

405," 16 March 1964; B. Darrell Kendrick to LEM PO, "LEM RCS Propellant Tanks," 23 

April 1964; abstract of Proceedings, LEM RCS Meeting on 9 April 1964; Witalij Karakulko 

to Chief, PPD, "Review of the problems associated with the common usage components of 

the LEM RCS," 22 May 1964; Rector to Neal, "Implementation of the common usage rule 

in LEM RCS components," 9 July 1964, with enc.; Shea to NASA Hq., Attn.: George E. 

Mueller, "Grumman," I Aug. 1964; Rector to Chief, SED, "LEM RCS Propellant Quantity 

Gaging System Design Approach," 30 Oct. 1964; Gaylor to Small, "Past RASPO Activity 

Report Status on C. U. RCS Components," 20 Oct. 1964. 

28. 	 ASPO Weekly Management Report, 30 July-6 Aug. 1964; Decker TWX to Grumman, Attn.: 

Mullaney, 26 Aug. 1963; LEM PO, "Problems," 14-20 May 1964; Richard B. Ferguson memo, 

"SM and LEM Reaction Control Engine Development," 8 June 1964; Gary A. Coultas to 

Chief, Design Integration Br., "Trip report Service ModulefLEM RCS engines, the Marquardt Corporation," 25 June 1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Thermal 

analysis of the SMfLEM RCS Engine," 20 July 1964, with encs.; Rector to LEM Proc. Off., 

"GAEC Request for Development of Backup Source for a 'Common Usage' RCS Engine," 

21 July 1964; Henry 0 . Pohl to Chief, PPD, " Meeting with The Marquardt Corporation 

(TMC) and North American Aviation (NAA) to discuss the ignition pressure spike prob· 

lem," 28 July 1964; Karakulko to Chief, PPD, "Trip report to The Marquardt Corporation (TMC) ," 2 Dec. 1964; Marquardt, Apollo Service Module Reaction Control Engines, 

Monthly Progress Report, TMC Project 279, A-1011-26, 30 Sept. 1964, pp. iii, 30. 

29. 	 Wilbert E. Ellis and D. William Morris, Jr., "Lunar Excursion Module Environmental and 

Thermal Control System Optimization," MSC working paper no. 1102, 8 Jan. 1964; LEM 

444 
Progress Review, 13 July 1964; (Grumman],  All Battery Investigation, 4 N

Clinton L. Taylor TWX to North American, Attn.: James C. Cozad, 11 Dec. 19

man Report No. 25, LPR-10-41 , 10 March 1965, pp. 1, 20; E. J. Merrick to E

Hamblett, Jr. , "Work Order 564-08, Apollo Electrical Systems Support Survey o

for LEM Application," 30 Oct. 1964, with enc.; Arturo B. Campos, "Lunar Mo

trical Power Subsystem," AER TN S-337 (MSC-05815), review copy, April 1972

31. 	 Lang TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Brackett, 13 June 1962; MSC news release 63-14

1963; Holmes to Dir., Proc. and Supply Div., "Selection of RCA for LEM Elect

systems Procurement," 21 June 1963; Frederick A. Zito ·to Gaylor, "Utilization of 

gineering Assistance on the LEM Program; Comments on," 2 April 1963; 

Decker, "Review of GAEC Proposed Utilization of RCA Engineering Assistance 

Program," 16 April 1963, with enc.; Donald G. Wiseman to Dep. Chief, Instru

and Electronic Syst. Div. (IESD), "Trip to GAEC," 18 March 1964; Zito to G

Small, "Termination of RCA Engineering Assistance on -the LEM Program, . . . 

on," 27 July 1964; Porter H. Gilber-t and Henry W. Flagg, Jr., interview, Housto

1970; Comptroller General, "Review of Procurement of Lunar Module Radars," 

Congress, B-158390, 17 April 1968. 

32. 	 Minneapolis-Honeywell, "Apollo Stabilization and Control by Honeywell," broch

330 5/ 15, July 1969; Gene T. Rice to Rector, "Cf M and LEM stabilization a

system interface," 27 Aug. 1962; Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report no. 5, 

ending 30 Sept. 1963, pp. 28-29; Lang TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: George J. 

and Daniel A. Linn, 17 March 1964; Ralph S. Sawyer to Mgr., ASPO, "LEMfC

munication Subsystem Commonality," 22 Dec. 1964; Clinton Taylor and Rector 

North American and Grumman, Attn.: Cozad and Mullaney, 10 Nov. 1964; Deck

Mgr. , ASPO, "TV," 24 July 1963; Grumman Report no. 11, p. 18; ASPO Weekl

ment Report, 28 May-4 June 1964. 

33. 	 Shea TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 25 Oct. 1963; Christopher C. Kra

Mgr., LEM Admin. Off., "Comments on LEM Maintenance Plan, GAEC Re

635-1, dated May 15, 1963," 2 July 1963; David W. Gilbert to Mgr., ASPO, "Im

tion of Built-in Redundancy for Spacecraft Sub-systems," 30 Oct. 1963; Henry 

to North American, contract change authorization no. 213, 9 June 1964; Rector 

man, Attn.: Mullaney, "Lunar Excursion Module Recommendation Concern

Emergency Detection," 3 June 1964; J. Danaher to LEM Syst. and Subsyst. E

Caution and Warning Subsystem Operating Philosophy," 30 Sept. 1964; Recto

Contr. Off., "Request for PCCP-Hermetic Sealing of All ElectricalfElectronic 

within LEM Cabin," 13 Nov. 1964, with encs. 

34. 	 Piland to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Minutes of Radar Coordination Me

March 1963, with enc., abstract of Meeting No. 2 of Technical Coordination 
Young TWX to MIT, Attn.: Trageser, 10 Dec. 1964. 

36. 	 Trageser, interview, Cambridge, Mass., 27 April 1966; J. Dahlen et al., "Guidance and 

Navigation System for Lunar Excursion Module," MIT R-373, July 1962; Robert G. Chilton, 

interview, Houston, 30 March 1970; Decker to Apollo Proc., Attn.: James W. Epperly, 

"Source Selection," 29 May 1963; Brackett to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Proposed Procurement Plan for Apollo Lunar Excursion Module Navigation and Guidance Systems and 

Associa·ted Ground Support Equipment," 28 June 1963; Holmes to Brackett, "Additional 

Information Justifying Recommending Approval of the Proposed Procurement Plan for 

Apollo LEM Navigation and Guidance Systems and Associated Ground Support Equipment," 3 July 1963, with enc.; James C. Church to Mgr., ASPO, "LEM Guidance and 

Navigation Contracts," 25 Oct. 1963. 

37. 	 David Gilbert, interview, Houston, 16 Dec. 1969; Gilbert, "A Historical Description of 

the Apollo Guidance and Navigation System Development," 31 Dec. 1963, with encs., 

Chilton to Proc. Off., "Selection of a contractor for Apollo guidance and navigation system 

development," I Aug. 1961, "Justification for Non-competitive Procurement, LEM Guidance System," signed by James E. Webb, 1 Aug. 1963, and Gilbert, "ASPO Guidance and 

Control Systems Office Comments Relative to the Adequacy of ·the Existing G&N System 

Configura·tion for the LEM," 2 Aug. 1963; Robert P. Young note to Webb, 20 Aug. 1963; 

Gavin and Trageser interviews; NASA, "NASA Negotiates for Development of LEM 

Guidance and Navigation System," news release 63-234, 18 Oct. 1963; LEM PO, "Management Accomplishments, Problems, and Plans- LEM," 20 Feb. 1964; LEM PO, "Problems," 

16-22 April 1964; Rector to Maynard , "Outstanding actions from Systems Engineering," 

10 April 1964; MSC, Action Documentation, Form 934, with problem stated and action 

needed described by Rector and disposition noted and signed by Lewis, 15 June 1964; 

Rector TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 23 June 1964; minutes of NASA Coordination 

Meeting with MIT and Grumman, No. L7A, 25-26 June 1964; Jesse F. Goree, telephone 

interview, 8 April 1975. 

38. 	 "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of M-1 Mock-up Lunar Excursion 

Module, September 16, 17, and 18, 1963," MSC LEM-R-63-l; Slayton to Mgr., LEM Eng. 

Off., "Requirement for Dual Flight Controls and Displays in the LEM," 27 Nov. 1963; 

Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report no. 5, p. 3. 

39. 	 MSC, "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of TM-1 Mock-up, Lunar Excursion Module, March 19-26, 1964"; MSC, ASPO Management Report for 16-23 April 1964. 

40. 	 M. Scott Carpenter, recorder, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meetings, 2 Oct., p. 2, and 

9 Oct. 1964, p. I; MSC, "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of M-5 Mockup, 

Lunar Excursion Module, October 5-8, 1964"; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 

"Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of M-5 Mockup, Lunar Excursion 

Module," 19 Nov. 1964. 

446 
43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

Attn.: Alvin Steinberg, "Determination of Reliability Achie,·ement," 23 Aug. 1963

Mueller, ["Discussion of Objectives of U.S. Manned Space Flight Goals"], addr

Annual Symposium on Reliability, San Francisco, 26 .Jan. 1966; Mueller, "Apoll

no. 3 in series of lectures at University of Sydney, Australia, 10-11 Jan. 1967

Shea, untitled luncheon speech, n.d. [probably April 1963], p. 7. 

Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report no. 3, for period ending 31 March 

Zavasky, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 29 March 1963, p. 4; Donald 

to Chief, Research Div., "Meeting of the LEM-LTA-9 committee at MSC, Hou

October 18, 1963," 21 Oct. 1963; Newlander to Small, "Trip ... to FRC on 

April 1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Use of Flight Research C

for LEM Flight Control System Testing and Programming of LTA-9 and W

Test Article," 4 June 1964; Rector to Shea, "Status Report, LEM LLRV," 20 

Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Use of Flight Research Center LLR

Flight Control System Testing," 12 Aug. 1964; Grumman, "LEM Requiremen

Little .Joe II Flight," 13 .June 1963; Aleck C. Bond to ASPO, Attn.: William 

"LEMfLJ-11 longitudinal vibrations," 24 June 1963; Chilton to ASPO, Attn.: P

gerald, "Performance study of the Little Joe II booster with the LEM as th

2 .July 1963, with encs.; Decker TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 21 .-\ug. 

man Report no. II , p. 42; Axel T. Mattson, LaRC, memo, 7 Aug. 1964; Shea m

cellation of LEMfLJ II Program," 10 Feb. 1964; Rector to Robert E. Vale, "

of LEM-LJ II Test Program," 25 Feb. 1964, with encs. 

Alfred D. Mardel to Mgrs., Syst. Integration et al., "Review of the Prelim

Flight Test Plan from Grumman," ll Feb. 1963, with encs.; Donald R. Seg

ASPO, "Trip Report to Grumman, February 5, 1963," 12 Feb. 1963; 'Rector to 

Proj. Off., "Comments on GAEC Preliminary LEM Flight Test Plan ," 19 

Thomas F. Baker to Frank W . Casey, Jr., "Mission Profile for a Saturn IB-Laun

11 .June 1964, with enc.; Small to Decker, ';Unmanned LEM Development Fligh

1963; Mueller to Dirs., MSC, LOC, and MSFC, "Manned Space Flight Sc

Nov. 1963; Rector TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM Flight D

Plans," 10 Sept. 1964; Baker memo for file, "Test planning direction prov

spacecraft contractors to date," 24 Sept. 1964. 

John B. Lee, recorder, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 6 No,·. 1964; W

to Apollo Trajectory Support Off., Attn.: Cohen, "Mission Objectives and Prof

ments for Mission 206A, LEM Development (Unmanned Launch)," 6 Nov. 19

Phillips, I Dec. 1964. 

Col. Jean A. Jack to MSC, Attn.: Baker, "FY 64--U5 Apollo Test Support at 

Nov. 1962; Frick to .Jack, 12 Dec. 1962; Goree to Dep. Mgr., LEM, "Visit to Arno

ing Development Center for Discussion of Potential LEM Test Requiremen
Weight Report (LED-490·8, dated May I, 1964) , I June 1964; Newlander to Small, 

"Trip . . . to MSC on 6( 12/ 64," 15 June 1964; Newlander to Small and Gaylor, "Weight 

control," 20 Aug. 1964; Maynard to Mgr. , ASPO, "Spacecraft weight status summary," 13 

Nov. 1964, with enc. 

Chapter 7 

1, 	 NASA Program and Special Reports Div., "Pocket Statistics: History," January 1971 (issued semiannually), pp. E-2 through E-4; Congress, An Act to authorize appropriations to 

[NASA]: Public Law 89-53, 89th Cong., 1st sess. , 28 June 1965; Congress, An Act making 

appropriations . . . for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1965 . . . : Public Law 89-128, 89th 

Cong., 2d sess., 16 Aug. 1965. 

2. 	 OMSF Apollo Program Office, "Apollo Program Development Plan," NPC C500, MA 

0001000·1, 15 Jan. 1965. 

3. 	 Kennedy Space Center, minutes of Panel Review Board Meeting 64-1, 28 Jan. 1964; 

Joseph F. Shea memo, "Configuration Control Board," 1 Dec. 1964; Aubrey L. Brady, 

secretary, minutes of Configuration Control Board Meeting no. 1, [13 Jan. 1965], with enc.; 

J. Thomas Markley to Gordon J . Stoops, "Critique of First CCB Meeting," 15 Jan. 1965. 

For a discussion of what configuration management really is, see Andrew Hobokan to 

Mgr., LEM, "Configuration Management," 15 July 1965. 

4. 	 MSC, "Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Configuration Management Plan," 1 March 1965, 

Revision B, 15 March 1965; North American, "Shea Briefing- April 15, 1965"; North 

American organization announcement, H . Gary Osbon and Dale D. Myers to Apollo Engineering Supervision, "Apollo Engineering Reorganization," 30 April 1965, with attached 

organization charts. 

5. 	 OMSF, "Sequence and Flow of Hardware Development and Key Inspection, Review, and 

Certification Checkpoints," Apollo Program Directive No. 6, 12 Aug. 1965. 

6. 	 Maxime A. Faget to Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo spacecraft weight control," 30 Aug. 1965, with 

encs., Caldwell C. Johnson to Dir., MSC, 29 Jan. 1965, and to Asst. Dir., Engineering and 

Development (E&D), 9 Aug. 1965, subj. as above; Clinton L. Taylor to North American, 

Attn.: James C. Cozad, "Control-display criteria for crew safety and mission success," 8 Jan. 

1965; Owen E. Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, "Single Point Failures," 17 Feb. 1965; Osbon 

to MSC, Attn.: Taylor, "Single-Point Failures in Controls and Displays," 5 Aug. 1965; 

Shea memo, "Apollo Spacecraft Failure Reporting and Corrective Action Follow-up and 

Display," 27 Oct. 1965; Owen G. Morris memo, "NAA Single Point Failures," 1 Oct. 1965; 

448 
enc., and "SpacecraftjLEM Adapter Critical Design Review," 5 Aug. 1965, w

"Critical Design Review for the Block II SpacecraftjLEM Adapter, 12-13 Aug

MSC, "Apollo Block 2 Critical Design Review (CDR) ," transcript of proceeding

1965; Maynard memo, "Block II CSM CDR Board Review, 6-10 December 196

1965; Jon H. Brown to David D. Ewart, "Quick Look Report on the Critical Des

(CDR) of the Block II Engineering-Manufacturing Mockup Module (EM3) 

1965; Taylor to North American , Attn.: Cozad, "Block II CSM Critical Desi

(CDR)," 30 Dec. 1965. 

8. 	 Shea to all Subsystem Mgrs. and w Chief, SED, "Changes between Block I an

spacecraft," 5 June 1965. 

9. 	 Williams to Chief, SED, "Boost Protective Cover Status," 27 Jan. and 5 Feb. 19

TWX to North American, Attn.: Cozad, 12 Feb. 1965; Taylor to North America

mentation of action items for BOOS>t Protective Cover Status Review Meeting

1965, with enc., abstract of Boost Protective Cover Status Review Meeting, 2 

Oscar 0. Ohlsson to Chief, SED, "Boost Protective Cover Status," 4 March 1965

to Chief, SED, "Boost Protective Cover (BPC) status," 11 March 1965; Maynard 

Structures and Mechanics Div. (SMD), "Minutes of NASAf NAA Review of Bo

tive Cover Problem Areas at NAA," 7 May 1965, with encs., minutes, 23 April 

Daniel A. Nebrig memo, "NASA Action Items Resulting from AFRM 009 D

Meeting," 28 April 1965; Taylor TWX to North American, Attn.: Cozad, "Pad 

Boost Protective Cover Presentations to MSC," 7 June 1965; Maynard to Ch

"Action Items Resulting from Boost Protective Cover Problem Area Review at 

11, 1965," 15 June 1965; Taylor TWX to North American, Attn.: Cozad, "S

RFC009-A-37," 4 Nov. 1965; Williams, telephone interview, 30 April 1975; Rober

"Spacecraft Heating Environment and Thermal Protection for Launch through 

phere of the Earth," Apollo Experience Report (AER), NASA Technical Note (

(MSC-04942), review copy, July 1972. 

10. 	 James C. Church to Chief, Program Control Div. (PCD), "Bell Review Repo

Positive Expulsion RCS Tanks)," 21 Jan. 1965; B. Darrell Kendrick to Chief, 

and Power Div. (PPD) , "Trip to Bell Aerosystems Company (BAC) on July 

1965, regarding SfM F (SfN 26) RCS Tank Shell Failure," 26 July 1965; Yo

to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 3 Aug. 1965; Ralph J. Taeuber and Dwayne 

"Command and Service Module Reaction Control Systems," AER TN S-336 (M

review copy, November 1972; Phillips to Dir., Research Div., OART, NASA, "Co

of Titanium Propellant Tanks with Nitrogen Tetroxide," 7 March 1965; Shea 

NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, 9 April 1965; Shea to William E. Rice, "Beech Airc

of cryogenic storage system," 16 Aug. 1965; Taylor TWX to North American, At
Contractor Direction, Rendezvous Radar/ Transponder (RRfT) Schedule Revision- LEM-2 

Constraint vs. LEM-1," 19 April 1965; Shea to Mueller, 28 April 1965; Young TWX to AC 

Spark Plug, Attn.: Hugh Brady, 28 April 1965; William A. Lee to Mgr., ASPO, "Proposed 

reduction in LEM radar expenditure," 11 May 1965. 

17. 	 Aubrey Brady, minutes, Configuration Control Board Meeting no. 17, 23 Aug. 1965; 

George C. Franklin to RASPO Mgr., Bethpage, "Light, LEM external tracking, evaluation 

of contract proposals," 27 Aug. 1965; Young TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM 

Action Item L-29," 30 Aug. 1965; Shea to Phillips, 31 Aug. 1965; Warren J. North to 

Chief, G&C, "LEM Exterior Tracking Light, LSP 340-409," 2 Sept. 1965; Young to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Selection of Rendezvous Radar or Optical Tracker for LEM Navigation Requirement," I Oct. 1965; Donald K. Slayton to Mgr., ASPO, "LEM rendezvous 

requirements," 14 May 1965, and "LEM optical tracker," I Oct. 1965, with enc., "Evaluation of LEM Optical Tracker in LEM Mission," n.d.; Maynard to Asst. Mgr. ASPO, "Incorporation of Direct Range Measurement Earth Orbital," 14 Dec. 1965, with enc., Frasier to 

Chief, G&C, "Direct range measurement in the LEM with LORS," 4 Nov. 1965; Duncan to 

Asst. Chiefs, E&D and Project Mgmt., "Competition of radar and optical tracker system 

for the LEM," 20 Dec. 1965. 

18. 	 Johnson to Shea, "CSM Weight-predicted growth," 10 March 1965, with enc.; Ohlsson 

to Chief, Systems Engineering Div. (SED) , "Comments on spacecraft weight status analysis," 

7 April 1965; Shea to NASA Hq., Attn.: Dir. , Apollo Prog., "Revised LEM Control 

Weights," 26 May 1965; Young to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Revised 6.V budget and 

LEM control weight," 4 June 1965; Harry L. Reynolds to Chief, SED, "LEM Weight 

Control," 25 June 1965; Maynard memo, "Weight reduction changes," 18 Aug. 1965; 

Maynard to LEM Subsystems Mgrs., "LEM mass properties data," 20 Aug. 1965; J. Leroy 

Bullard to Chief, SED, "Weight Control Program," 20 Aug. 1965; Lee memo, "Review of 

LEM weight status and recovery plans," 30 Aug. 1965; Maynard ·to Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo 

principal technical problems," 10 Sept. 1965; Shea memo, "Weight Control Board," 13 

Sept. 1965, and "Apollo Weight Control Program," 13 Sept. 1965, with enc., "Apollo 

Weight Control Plan," n.d. 

19. Thomas J. Kelly, "Apollo Lunar Module Mission and Development Status," paper presented 

at AIAA Fourth Annual Meeting and Technical Display, AIAA paper 67-863, Anaheim, 

Calif., 23-27 Oct. 1967, p. 9; Maynard to LEM Subsystems Mgrs., "LEM Super Weight 

Improvement Program (SWIP) ," 23 Nov. 1965, with enc., Kelly memo, subj. as above, 

16 Sept. 1965; Lee memo, "GAEC SWIP Program Review," 20 Sept. 1965, with enc., minutes, Grumman weight reduction effort, "SWIP," 3 Sept. 1965; Mullaney, interview, Bethpage, N.Y., 2 May 1966; Arnold B. Whitaker, interview, Bethpage, 12 Feb. 1970; Kelly, 

interview, Bethpage, 7 Dec. 1971. 

450 
25. Lee memo, "ASPO Action Items from the MSF Program Review, April 20," 

1965; William M. Speier to Edward B. Hamblett, Jr., "[Systems Engineering] effo

ing integration of GSE with CSM and LEM vehicles," 22 March 1965; LEM CEB

plishments," 21 April 1965. 

26. 	 Perrine memo, "Trip to GAEC, May 13 and 14, 1965." 17 May 1965; Shea, Week

Report, 6-12 June 1965; Young to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Requirements 

substitute hardware on Saturn( Apollo Missions 501 and 502," 9 July 1965; 

Report no. 31, LPR-10·47, 10 Sept. 1965, p. 1; Perrine memo, 21 Sept. 1965; Jam

to Grumman, Attn.: John C. Snedeker, "Substitute hardware on Saturn( Apoll

501 and 502 (Action Item L-17) ," 18 Oct. 1965; Shea to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phill

tion of TM-5 from LEM Ground Test Program," 23 Dec. 1965. 

27. 	 Shea to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM Development Program Requirements

1965; Shea to LEM Subsystem Mgrs., "Subsystem Qualification and Delivery 

31 July 1965; Duncan to Mgr., ASPO, "Subsystem Qualification and Delivery S

23 Aug. 1965; Shea memo, "Subsystem qualification and delivery schedules for 

23 Aug. 1965; LEM CEB, "Accomplishments," 1 Sept. 1965; Sullivan to Stoops a

"Manufacturing Problems with the LEM ECS," 11 Aug. 1965; Young TWX to 

Attn.: Mullaney, 16 Aug. 1965; Sullivan to Richard E. Mayo, "Comments on 

Standard's Manufacturing Effort on the LEM ECS," 1 Sept. 1965. 

28. 	 Rector to LEM Apollo Procurement, "Review of GAEC Subcontract No. 2-24

STL, Abort Guidance Section," 24 Feb. 1965; Markley memo, "Assignment of C

Contract Engineering Branch and Chief, G&N f ACE Contract Engineering Bran

Spacecraft Program Office," 4 May 1965; Young TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mu

Aug. 1965. 

29. 	 Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Autho1·ization for F

1966: Hearings on S. 927, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p . 840; Church to Chief, PC

NAA(GAEC SubcontractorS-Cost Comparisons," 8 Jan. 1965. 

30. 	 William D. Putnam, NASA Historical Staff, notes on interview of Robert C. Se

20 July 1967; S. Peter Kaprielyan, "NASA Management at the Crossroads," 

Management 1 (Summer 1966) : 8-9; House Committee on Science and As

1965 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H .R . 9641 (Superseded by H.R . 10456), 8

2d sess., 1964, pp. 59-60. 

31. 	 Church to Chief, PCD, "Potential Apollo Incentive Contracting," 30 Oct. 1964; 

MSFC and MSC, Attn.: von Braun and Robert R. Gilruth, "Prenegotiation Arr

for Incentive Conversions of Major Systems Contracts," 8 April 1965; Muell

ment ... before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences

June 12, 1967," pp. 1-2; Quarterly Activity Report, 31 July 1965, p. 25; "LEM 
1965; Slayton to Chief, Crew Systems Div., Apollo Suit Critique, CM CDR April 26-29, 

1965," II May 1965; Melvyn Savage to Dir., Apollo Prog., "Extravehicular Mobility Unit 

(EMU) Development," 10 Sept. 1965; Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn. : Mueller, "Procurement 

plan for the Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit and EMU ground support equipment 

development and fabrication ," 20 Sept. 1965. 

35. 	 Savage to Dir. Apollo Program, 10 Sept. 1965; Gilruth to NASA Hq., 20 Sept. 1965; NASA , 

"NASA to Negotiate for Apollo Suit, Support System," news release 65-346, 5 Nov. 1965. 

36. Robert B. Voas to Gilruth, 6 May 1963, with enc., Voas, "A Proposal for the Selection of 

Potential Scientist Crew Members," 25 April 1963; Voas for Dir., MSC, "Meeting with 

Drs. Eugene Shoemaker, Joseph Shea, and Mr. George Low regarding scientist-astronaut 

selection on September 4, 1963," 13 Sept. 1963, with enc. 

37. 	 Homer E. Newell to Harry H . Hess, 16 April 1964; Newell to Hess and Frederick 

Seitz, 19 Aug. 1964; Newell to Gilruth, 19 Aug. 1964, with enc., "Suggested Public Announcement of the Scientist-Astronaut Program" ; NASA, "NASA to Select Scientist-Astronauts for Future Missions," news release 64-248, 19 Oct. 1964, and "NASA Reports Some 

900 Persons Interested in Scientist-Astronaut Program," news release 64-315, 16 Dec. 1964; 

Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Mueller, "Astronaut selection," 6 Jan. 1965, with encs., 

"Schedule of Astronaut Selection" and "Pilot Selection Criteria"; idem, "Selection of 

scientists/ astronaut candidates," 4 Feb. 1965; MSC, "Astronaut Selection and Training," 

NASA Facts [1971]. 

38. 	 NASA, "NASA Selects Six Scientists-Astronauts for Apollo Program," news release 65·212, 

28 June 1965; MSC, "Scientist Astronaut Press Conference," 29 June 1965. 

39. 	 Gilruth letter, 6 Jan. 1965; Mueller to Gilruth, 25 Jan. 1965; MSC, "NASA to Select Additional Pilot-Astronauts," news release 65-79, 10 Sept. 1965. 

40. 	 John Beltz, Roger Bilstein, and Mitchell Sharpe, "The Saturn Project: A Technological 

History of the ApollofSaturn Launch Vehicles," comment ed., 2 Jan. 1973, pp. 676-720; 

Lee B. James memos, "Project Name for MMC," 3 and 13 Aug. 1964; Perrine to Maynard, 

" Meteoroid protection for LEM and Block II," 28 Aug. 1964; Shea to NASA Hq., Attn.: 

Mueller, "Apollo spacecraft requirements for definition of the micrometeoroid hazard," 

15 March 1965. 

41. 	 Leo L. Jones and A. Ruth Jarrell, "History of the George C. Marshall Space Flight 

Center, from January I through December 31, 1965," I, April 1968, pp. 32-33; NASA, 

"Project: Pegasus-Saturn I," press kit, news release 65-38, 11 Feb. 1965; Edward R. Mathews 

TWX to NASA Hq. et a!., "SA-9 Apollo Flash Report No. l," 17 Feb. 1965; Mueller and 

Raymond L. Bisp1inghoff to Admin., NASA, "Pegasus A f SA-9 Saturn I Flight Mission, Post 

Launch Report No. 1," 19 Feb. 1965, with enc.; NASA, "Pegasus I Relays Data on Meteor· 

oid Hazards in Space," news release 65-68, 26 Feb. 1965; NASA, "Project: Pegasus II 

452 
Memoirs 40 (New York and London, 1969). 

45. 	 Ohlsson to Chief, SED, "Block I extra-vehicular activity," 15 April 1965; La

Chief, SED, "EVA requirements for -012," 22 June 1965; Maynard to Lanzkron

Block I," 29 July 1965; Olin E. Teague to James E. Webb, 18 Aug. 1965; Webb 

10 Sept. 1965. 

46. 	 Howard W . Tindall, Jr., to Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Div., "Ca

contribute to Apollo?" 8 Jan. 1965; Church to Chief, PCD, " Program Control 

Re!tearch," 25 Jan. 1965; Perrine to Chief, SED, "Gemni Ground Test Program Ex

29 Nov. 1965; Duncan to Mgr., ASPO, "Air Force Gemini Space Sextant," 

1965; Lanzkron to Chief, Flight Crew Support Div., "Debriefing of GT-4 flight 

July 1965; Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., to Helmut A. Kuehnel, "Questions for GT-5 debr

Aug. 1965; H. B. Graham, "Spacecraft Checkout: Apollo vs Gemini," 16 Feb. 

47. 	 MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-003 (BP-22) ," MSC-A-R-65-2

1965; Mueller to Admin., NASA, "Apollo Spacecraft Flight Abort Test, Mission A

Launch Report No. 1," 24 May 1965, with enc.; "Apollo Abort System Dramaticall

North American's Skywriter, 21 May 1965. 

48. 	 MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission PA-2 (BP-23A) ," MSC-A-R-65-3

1965; Mueller to Admin., NASA, "Apollo Spacecraft Pad Abort Test, Mission 

Launch Report No. 1," 2 July 1965, with enc. 

49. 	 Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Po

SP-4006 (Washington, 1966) , pp. 188, 198, 368, 373. 

50. 	 Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo Radiation Reliability Goals," 14 Jan. 1965; 

C. Gordon Little, 27 July 1965; Little to Gilruth, 6 Aug. 1965; Adm. W . Fred Bo

for record, "Meeting to Discuss an Air Weather Service Plan for a Solar Ob!t

Forecasting Network," 16 Aug. 1965; Henry E. Clements to Asst. Dir., Flight Op

of Solar Particle Alert Network (SPAN) ," 17 Aug. 1965; Al'thur Reetz, Jr., e

Symposium on Protection against Radiations in Space, NASA SP-71 (Washing

held in Gatlinburg, Tenn., 12-14 Oct. 1964; Reetz and Keran O'Brien, eds., 

against Space Radiation: The Proceedings of the Special Session on Protecti

Space Radiation, presented at the thirteenth annual meeting of the America

Society, San Diego, California, June 11-15, 1967, NASA SP-169 (ANS-SD-5) (W

1968) 0 

51. 	 M. Scott Carpenter, recorder, minutes of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 26 Feb. 

Maynard to Asst. Mgr., ASPO, "Lunar Surface Contamination," 14 Sept. 1965; Yo

to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 30 Nov. 1965; Johnston to Mgr., Gemini Prog. 

Chief, Center Medical Off., "Biologic contamina.tion of the lunar surface," 14 

William E. Stoney, Jr., to Chief, Eng. Div., "Support information for FY 6
Board, 29 July 1965; Newell to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, Members of Ad Hoc Surveyor/ Or

biter Utilization Committee," 22 June 1965; Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Newell, subj. as 

above, 29 July 1965; Gilruth to Mueller, 5 Aug. 1965; NASA, "NASA Selects 10 Potential 

Photo Areas for Lunar Orbiter," news release 65-335, 20 Oct. 1965. 

53. 	 Allan E. Gamble, "Terrestrial, Lunar, and Celestial Companions: The Support of Manned 

Spaceflight by Computers" (term paper, University of Houston , 1 May 1972); MSC, 

"Statement of Work for Real Time Computer Complex," May 1963; NASA, "Mission 

Control Center at Houston to Handle GT-4, Subsequent Manned Flights," news release 

65-119, 9 April 1965; Earl D. Hilburn for Assoc. Admin. for Manned Space Flights, "Com· 

puting Equipment Requirements," 14 July 1965; Everett E. Christensen to James C. Elms, 

"Effect of Further Delay in RTCC Computer Decision," 27 Sept. 1965; Seamans to Assoc. 

Admin., OMSF, "RTCC Computer Requirements for Project Apollo," 7 Oct. 1965; Mueller 

to Gilruth, 21 Oct. 1965, with enc.. Seamans to Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "Procurement Plan for 

Revision of Real-Time Computer Complex, MSC," 19 Oct. 1965. 

54. 	 Gamble, "Terrestrial, Lunar, and Celestial Companions," pp. 9-15; Shea to NASA Hq., 

Attn.: Phillips, "Summary report of the Apollo guidance computer failure history," 21 

June 1965, with enc.; North American Space Div., Public Relations Dept., Apollo Space· 

craft News Reference, rev. ed. (Downey, Calif., 1969), p. 244. 

55. 	 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Pacing 

Systems of the Apollo Program: Staff Study, 89th Cong., lst sess., 1965, pp. 1, 6, II, 12. 

56. 	 Maj. Gen. David M. Jones to Apollo Executives, "Apollo Applications Goals," 22 Nov. 1965. 

57. 	 Gilruth to Mueller, 25 March 1966. 

Chapter 8 

I. 	Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy, NASA 

SP-4007 (Washington, 1967), pp. 23-24, 286, 328; NASA, "Transcript of Dr. [Joseph F.] 

Shea's Closing Remarks to the Apollo Industrial Team Seminar, October 29, 1966" ; Robert F. 

Freitag, NASA OMSF, to Robert R. Gilruth, Dir., MSC, 25 March 1966, with enc., MSF 

Staff Paper, "Cost of Manned Lunar Landing," n .d. 

2. 	 George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF, to Gilruth, 20 Jan. 1966; George M. Low, Dep. Dir., 

MSC, to James C. Elms, OMSF, 25 March 1966; MSC Flight Ops. Div. (FOD), "Manned 

Spacecraft Center Apollo Program Development Plan," January 1966; Christopher C. Kraft, 

Jr., MSC, memo, "MSC Apollo Operations Plan," 3 Feb. 1966, with enc., FOD, "Manned 

454 
(3-Day) Report for Apollo Spacecraft Mission AS-201 (SC-009) ," 1 March 196

"First Apollo jSaturn Flight Objectives Achieved," news release 66-51 , 7 March 196

to Admin., NASA, "Apollo Saturn Flight Mission AS-201, Post Launch Report 

March 1966, with enc. 

9. 	 Aerojet-General, "Dan David, Manager, Apollo Program, Space Systems Divisio

Rocket Operations, Aerojet-General Corporation," biography, April 1964; Cecil R

Neil A. Townsend, and James A. Wood, "History of the Apollo Service Propu

system," January 1970. 

10. 	 NASA, "Saturn IB Launch Schedule Is Revised," news release 66-78, 4 April 1966

Saturn Set June 30 at Cape Kennedy," news release 66-142, 4 June 1966; and 

Saturn / Apollo Uprated Saturn (Second Mission) ," press kit, news release 66-157 

1966. Mueller to Admin., NASA, "Apollo-Saturn Flight, Mission AS-203," 22 J

with enc., and "Apollo-Saturn Flight Mission AS-203 , Post Launch Report No. 1

1966, with enc.; NASA, "WASP Launch Tests Hydrogen Fuel Sloshing," news rele

7 June 1966. 

11. 	 Mueller to Admin., NASA, "Apollo Saturn Flight, Mission AS-202," 19 Aug. 

enc., and "Apollo Saturn Flight Mission AS-202, Post Launch Report No. 1," 1 S

with enc.; Clarence A. Syvertson, ARC, to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, " Preliminary exam

Apollo Command Module on Flight Mission AS-202 ," 22 Sept. 1966, with enc., G

win to Dir., Ames Research Center, "Preliminary Report on Apollo Spacecr

AS-202 Recovery Operation," 20 Sept. 1966; MSC, "Postlaunch Rep ort for Missi

(Apollo Spacceraft Ol!) ," MSC-A-R-66-5, 12 Oct. 1966. 

12. Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., to J. Leland Atwood, NAA, 19 Dec. 

enc.; North American news release N-2, 25 Jan. 1966; NASA, Astronautics and Ae

1966, pp. 14, 147. 

13. Phillips to Dep. Admin., NASA, "S-II All-Systems Static Firings," 17 May 1966, 

subj., 25 May 1966, with enc. , "S-II All-Systems Static Firing Information"; 

Esenwein, NASA Hq., to Dir., Apollo T est, "May 25, attempted S·II-T full dura

firing," 26 May 1966, with enc.; Savage note to Phillips, "Flash report from Mr

27 May 1966, with enc., Esenwein to Dir., Apollo Test, "S-Il-T Sta tus," 27 M

Leo L. Jones, "A Brief History of Mississippi T est Facility, 1961-1966," com

MSFC Hist. Off., 24 March 1967, pp. 75-77. 

14. 	 NASA, "Rollout Ceremony, Saturn V Facility Vehicle (500-F) ," press conferenc

1966. 

15. 	 Mueller to Atwood, 23 Feb. 1966, with enc., "S-II Stage Weekly Assessment," and 

1966; Atwood to Mueller, 17 Oct. 1966. 

16. 	 Phillips to Atwood, 19 Dec. 1965; Phillips datafax to Shea, 12 Oct. 1966, with enc

draft letter to Gen. Mark E. Bradley, 12 Oct. 1966; Atwood to Mueller, 17 Oct. 
exec. sess., 12 June 1967, pp. 2-3; Frank X. Battersby to Chief, Apollo Proc. Br., "Weekly 

Activity Report, BMR Bethpage, Week Ending June 24, 1966," 29 June 1966. 

22. 	 Mueller ~tatement , pp. 3-4, 6-7; Young memo, "LEM Management Meeting," ll July 

1966; Battersby to Chief, Apollo Proc. Br., "Weekly Activity Report, ... July I, 1966," 

6 July 1966, and "Weekly Activity Report, . .. July 8, 1966," 12 July 1966. 

23. 	 Mueller statement, pp. 4, 7, 8; William A. Lee memo, "GAEC Work Package Review," 

30 Aug. 1966, with enc.; Shea to Titterton, 19 and 28 Sept. and 18 Nov. 1966. 

24. 	 Mueller statement, pp. 5-7; Battersby to Chief, Apollo Proc. Br., "Weekly Activity Report, ... August 12, 1966," 17 Aug. 1966; Battersby memo for file , "Minutes of the Afternoon Session of the Grumman Subcontractors Senior Management Meeting, September 20, 

1966," 21 Sept. 1966. 

25. 	 Phillips to Shea, 21 Feb. 1966; Shea to Phillips, 30 March 1966; Col. Harold G. Russell to 

Phillips, "Site Activation for LEM-1," 23 May 1966. 

26. 	 Mueller note to Phillips, I April 1966; Phillips note to Mueller, 6 April 1966; Phillips to 

Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "Utilization of G.E., Boeing, etc. for Subcontracting of LEM GSE," 

5 May 1966. 

27. 	 Mueller statement, p. 5; Battersby to Chief, Apollo Proc. Br., 6 July 1966; "Manned Spacecraft Program Review, August 23, 1966, Apollo Spacecraft: Dr. Shea," briefing charts; John 

Coursen, interview, Bethpage, N.Y., 8 Dec. 1971. 

28. 	 Young TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "GSE Meetings at GAEC Bethpage," 18 July 

1966; William Lee to Mgr., Gemini Prog., "Transfer of Gemini aerospace ground equipment to Lunar Module," 30 Sept. 1966. 

29. 	 Hou~ Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1968 NASA Authorization: Hearings on 

H.R. 4450, H.R . 6470 (Superseded by H .R. 10340), pt. 2, 90th Cong., l&t sess., 1967, p. 647; 

Mueller statement, p. 5; Coursen interview. 

30. MSC, "Presentation Made at Apollo Program Planning Seminar, San Augustine, Texas, 

October 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1966." 

31. 	 MSC Quarterly Activity Report for Assoc. Admin., OMSF, for period ending 31 July 1966, 

p. 55; Robert C. Duncan to Chief, Astronaut Off., "Request for support: Evalua.tion Board 

for LORS- RR 'Olympics,' " 25 Jan. 1966, with enc., Young to Grumman, "Rendezvous 

Radar Testing," 25 Jan. 1966; Donald K. Slayton to Chief, Guidance and Control Div., 

"LORS-RR 'Olympics,' " I F"eb. 1966; Slayton to Mgr., Apollo Prog., "Requirements for 

Apollo rendezvous," 5 April 1966; MSC news release 66-38, 2 June 1966; James L. Neal 

TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Elmer W. Laws, "Contract ... with RCA for Rendezvous 

Radar(Transponder," 1 June 1966. 

32. 	 Joseph G. Thibodaux, Jr., to Mgr., Apollo Prog., "LEM descent engine program," 27 June 

1966; House, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Pace and Progress, pp. ll47-51. 

456 
39. 	 Willis B. Foster, NASA Hq., to MSC, Attn.: John M. Eggleston, 

Lunar Sampl

Laboratory," 23 Oct. 1964; Col. Jack Bollerud, NASA OMSF, to Dir., MSF Fiel

"Public Health Service Proposed Congressional Statement in Support of the N

Sample Receiving Laboratory," 14 Feb. 1966, with enc., "Statement by John 

Assistant Chief, Communicable Diseases Center, Public Health Service, on the c

of lunar samples, astronauts, and support personnel." 

40. 	 Gen. Frank A. Bogart, NASA OMSF, to Dep. Dir., Space Medicine, OMSF, "For

PHS-NASA working relationships re lunar sample receiving," 11 Jan. 1966; 

Griffith datafax to NASA Hq., Attn.: Angelo P. Picillo, " Project No. 7235, Lu

Receiving Laboratory," 4 March ' !966, with enc.; Bagby statement. 

41. 	 Bogart to Low, 25 March 1966; Mueller to Gilruth, 13 May 1966; MSC, "Estab

a Lunar Receiving Laboratory Policy Board and . . . Program Office," An

66-57, 9 May 1966; MSC, "Lunar Receiving Laboratory, Building 37: Apo

Operations," preliminary, 9 Dec. 1966; MSC, "Lunar Receiving Laboratory, B

Facility Description," preliminary, 9 Dec. 1966; MSC, "Lunar Receiving Labor

ing," 29 June 1967; J. C. McClane, Jr., et al., "The Lunar Receiving Labora

brochure, 25 Oct. 1966. 

42. 	 MSC, "Gemini Mission Report, Gemini VIII," MSC-G-R-66-4, 29 April 19

through 1-4; [Ivan D. Ertel], Gemini Vlll: Rendezvous and Docking Mission, MSC 

291-E (Houston, April 1966) , p . 4; Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwo

Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Washing

chap. XIII. 

43. 	 John D. Hodge, MSC, to Tech. Asst., Apollo, "Simultaneous launch for AS-207 a

4 Feb. 1966; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., MSC, memo, "Apollo AS-207 j 208 rendezv

planning," 24 Feb. 1966, with enc.; J. Thomas Markley, MSC, memo, "Progr

and revision to GSE requirements at KSC," 11 March 1966, with enc.; Tind

"Comments on the AS-207 j 208 Preliminary Spacecraft Reference Trajectory," 16 

"AS-207 / 208 operational rendezvous," 18 May 1966, "Apollo spacecraft compu

development newsletter," 31 May 1966, "Apollo spacecraft computer program-

of worms," 13 June 1966, and "Somebody up there likes us!" 5 July 1966; Jam

ander, MSC, memo, "Description of the AS-207 f208A mission," 19 July 1966, w

44. 	 Phillips TWX to MSFC, MSC, and KSC, "Saturn IB Dual Launch," 8 March 19

memo, "Work to Be Done," 7 March 1966; R. L. Wagner note to Phillips, 

Working Note- Use of Gemini Software for Apollo," 25 April 1966; NASA, "Mis

tions Plan, Apollo-Saturn 207 / 208," OMSF mission operations directive 11

2200.041 , 16 June 1966; NASA, Astronautics and A emnautics, 1966, pp. 122, 

203-04; JPL, "Surveyor A Press Conference," 2 June 1966; NASA Hq., "News 

Scientific Results of the Preliminary Findings of Surveyor I," 16 June 1966
50. 	 William Lee memo, 

Initial Mission Directive for Mission 204, 29 Jan. 1965; Maynard to 

Apollo Trajectory Support Off., "Revisions to Apollo Mission 204A objectives and mission 

requirements," 22 April 1965, with enc.; John H. Boynton to Asst. Dir., Flight Ops., "Definitions for various mission profiles," 4 Aug. 1965; TRW Systems, "Mission Requirements 

for Apollo Spacecraft and Saturn Launch Vehicle Development, Mission Apollo Saturn 

204B," 2132-HOOI-RU-000, 3 Sept. 1965; MSC, FOD, "Apollo Flight Operations Plan: 

AS-204A," 1 Dec. 1965; NASA, "Mission Operations Plan, Apollo-Saturn 204," OMSF 

mission operations directive 4, M-D MO 2200.019, 7 Dec. 1965; Shea memo, "Back-up Missions 

for Apollo," 12 Jan. 1966; anon., mission 204B outline notes, 14 April 1966; NASA, "Apollo 

Program Flight Mission Directive for Apollo-Saturn 204A Mission," OMSF Apollo program 

directive 20, M-D MA 1400.043, 15 July 1966; MSC, "Gemini and Apollo Crews Selected," 

news release 66-20, 21 March 1966. 

51. 	 Abstract of Meeting on Experiments for the Apollo AS-204 Mission, 12 May 1966; EXPO, 

"Apollo Earth Orbital Experiments," I Aug. 1966; Hodge memo, "Flight Control Experiments Operations Plan for AS-204," 18 Oct. 1966, with enc.; Maynard memo, "Objective 

Priorities for Mission AS-204,'' 23 Dec. 1966; Slayton memo for Mgr., EXPO, "AS-204 

Medical Experiments," 20 Jan. 1966; NASA, "Second Crew Named for Apollo Flight," news 

release 66-260, 29 Sept. 1966. 

52. 	 MSC, CSM CEB, "C and SM Schedules Engineering Report," 19 Aug. 1966; Lanzkron 

memo, "NAA CARR Action Responses- CSM 012,'' 4 Oct. 1966, wi·th encs.; Brig. Gen. 

Carroll H. Bolender to Phillips, NASA routing slip, with enc., Bolender memo for record, 

no subj., 11 Oct. 1966; Lanzkron to Mgr., ASPO, "EO's on Spacecraft 012," 8 Nov. 1966. 

53. 	 Riley D. McCafferty, interview, Cocoa, Fla., 15 Nov. 1969; Slayton to CSM Contracting 

Officer, "Acceptance of Apollo Mission Simulator No. 2," 12 Aug. 1966. 

54. 	 Edward R. Mathews and Hugh E. McCoy TWXs to NASA Hq. et a!., "Daily Status Report, AS-204, dated October 27, 1966," 28 Oct. 1966, and "Daily Status Report, AS-204, dated 

October 28, 1966," 29 Oct. 1966; Lanzkron TWX to KSC, Attn.: Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, 

28 Oct. 1966; Phillips to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "CSM ECS Status as of 28 October 1966," 

1 Nov. 1966; Phillips to Mueller, no subj., I, 2, and 15 Nov. 1966; James F. Saunders, Jr., 

to Chief, Apollo Spacecraft Test, "012/AS-204 KSC activity for 12 j 16 j66," 16 Dec. 1966, 

with annotations by Phillips and LeRoy E. Day, 18 Dec. 1966. 

55. 	 Markley to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "ASPO Weekly Project Status Report to MSF," 26 

Oct. 1966; Frank J. Magliato, NASA Hq., note to Webb and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., "Teli.t 

Failure of Service Module 017," 26 Oct. 1966; Robert R. Ridnour, MSC, RASPO-Downey, 

TWXs to MSC et a!., "Status Report Number One, Test Failure Investigation of SM 017," 

27 Oct. 1966, and "Status Report Number Two, Test Failure Investigation of SM 017," 

28 Oct. 1966; Shea TWX to NASA Hq. et a!., "Interim Problem Bulletin (Telegram)," 2 

Nov. 1966; Lanzkron TWX to KSC, Attn.: Chief, Manned Spacecraft Off., 14 Nov. 1966; 

458 
Jan. 1967; [Mueller] to Seamans, "Apollo Program Adjustment," 7 Dec. 1966, w

NASA, "NASA Names Crews for Apollo Flights,' ' news release 66-326, 22 Dec. 19

58. 	 House Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Pace and Prog1·ess, pp. 1137-1219. 

Chapter 9 

I. 	Much of this chapter is based on R eport of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Adm

National Aeronautics and Space Administmtion (Washington, 1967) , Floyd L. T

chairman, 5 April 1967, with appendixes A through G (hereafter cited as RAR

basic are Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: 

8 parts, 90th Cong., lst and 2d sess., 7 Feb. 1967 to January 1968, and House C

on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Investigation in

204 Accident: H earings, 3 vols., 90th Cong., lst sess., 10 April to 10 May 1967

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo 20-1 Accident: Rep

Cong., 2d sess., 30 Jan. 1968, S. Rept. 956. 

2. 	 RARB, pp. 4-1 to 4-8, and append. D, pp. D-6-1 to D-6-86. 

3. 	 Ibid.; Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, KSC, to NASA Hq., Attn.: Dir. Apollo Pro

Request for Results of CSM 012 Altitude Chamber Testing," 19 Jan. 1967. 

4. 	 Douglas R. Broome, Jr., -to Mgr., ASPO, "Communications Cables for Spacecraf

Block II Spacecraft," 23 Jan. 1967; William J. Cromie, "Apollo's Crew Not Ple

Craft," Houston Chmnicle, 30 Jan. 1967; "Problem-Plagued Apollo Worried 

Houston Post, 13 March 1967; Riley D. McCafferty, interview, Cocoa, Fla., 15 N

5. 	 RARB, append. B; "Apollo Tragedy Almost Claimed a Fourth," Washington Pos

1967; "The Ten Desperate Minutes," special report in Life, 21 April 1967, pp. 1

6. 	 RARB, append. B, passim, but especially pp. B-39, B-59 through B-63, B-161; a

pp. D-12-24 to D-12-29. 

7. 	 Ibid., append. B, p. B-162, and D, pp. D-11-23, D-11-25. 

8. 	 Phil Casey, "Grissom and Chaffee Are Buried in Arlington, White at West Poin

ington Post, I Feb. 1967, pp. A-1, A-4; "Science and Space: Apollo's Final Second

week, 13 Feb. 1967; Thomas O'Toole, "Oxygen Fire Kills 2 At Space School," W

Post, 1 Feb. 1967, A-1; William Hines, "Interpretation: 2 Oxygen-Fed Disasters 

Space Plans," Washington Evening Star, p. l, I Feb. 1967. 

9. 	 Lee D. Saegesser, "Cartoons on Space: 1963-1968," NASA Historical Div., Octo

unpaged. 
15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

Underground," Ho!Lston Chronicle, 3 Feb. 1967; William Hines, "Washington Close-Up: 

NASA Probe Value Doubtful," Washington Evening Star, 9 Feb. 1967. 

["Interim Report of Apollo 204 Review Board"], 22 Feb. 1967; "Text of the Report by 

Official of NASA on the Fatal Apollo Spacecraft Fire," New York Times, 5 Feb. 1%7; Erik 

Bergaust, Murder on Pad 34 (New York: Putnam, 1968), p. 212. NBC presented a television broadcast on 5 April, "Crossroads in Space," narrated by Frank McGee, that was 

critical of all facets of NASA and Apollo, according to an article by Harriet Van Horne 

in the New York World journal Tribune, 6 April 1967. 

"Space: To Strive, to Seek, to Find, and Not to Yield ... ," Time, 3 Feb. 1967; Virgil 

"Gus" Grissom, Gemini: A Personal Account of Man's Venture into Space, ed. Jacob Hay 

(New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 175. 

Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 1. 

RARB, pp. 3-23, 3-47 to 3-59, 5-2. 

Ibid., p. 3-62. 


Ibid., p. 5-12. 


Ibid.; House Subcommittee, Investigation, 1, pp. 1o-12, 17, 277-352; Senate Committee, 


Apollo Accident, pt. 3, pp. 192-266, pt. 4. pp. 307-13; William M. Bland, Jr., to Head, 


CSM Contract Eng. Br., "Allocation of Space for Installation of Fire Extinguishers Aboard 


SC 012 and Subsequent Manned Apollo Flights," 17 Aug. 1966; William L. Gill memo, 


"Evaluation of Freon 1301 fire extinguishing agent in 5 psia 0 2," 31 Aug. 1966, with enc., 


Andris A. Staklis, subj. as above, 22 Aug. 1966. 


Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 2, pp. 125-27, 130, 131, pt. 3, pp. 228-30; Samuel 

C. Phillips to J . Leland Atwood, 19 Dec. 1965, with encs.; Thomas Ronald Baron, "An 

Apollo Report," [ca. January 1967]; typescript, North American's rebuttal to the Baron 

report, [ca. January 1967]; House Subcommittee, Investigation, 1, pp. 379-84, 483-501; 

William Hines, "Apollo Had Poor Parts, Ex-Inspector Charges," Washington Evening Star, 

23 March 1967; Howard Benedict, "20,000 Failures Preceded the Tragedy of Apollo 1," 

ness 

Joseph 

tion, 

Washington 

Daily, 

29 

F. 

April 

Shea 

8 

Post, 

May 

1967

to NASA 

12 

1967; 

. 

March 

"Apollo 

Hq., 

1967; 

Attn

Critic, 

.: 

"NAA/

Phillips

Wife

Apollo 

, 

, 

"Apo

Daughter 

Critic 

llo atmosphere 

Dies 

Killed 

in 

in 

Car 

Crash," 

selection," 

Accident," 

Atlanta 

8 March 

Space 

ConstituBusi1965; 

R. Wayne Young TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Robert S. Mullaney, 23 May 1966; Clinton L. 

Taylor TWX to North American, Attn.: James C. Cozad, 25 May 1966; Gill to Chief, 

Apollo Support Office, Attn.: Donald F. Hughes, "Comparison of fire hazard in 95 ± 5% 

oxygen at 21.0 versus 14.7 psia," 11 Aug. 1966; Hilliard W. Paige to Shea, 30 Sept. 1966; 

Shea to Paige, 5 Dec. 1966, with enc., Bland to Mgr., ASPO, "Comments on Mr. H. W. 

Paige's letter to you concerning the fire hazard in our spacecraft," 23 Nov. 1966, with enc., 

460 
detection system development," 17 April 1967; Robert R. Gilruth to Mgr., W

Test Facility, "Flammability ·tests of non-metallic &pacecraft materials," 20 April 

neth S. Kleinknecht memo, "Block II redefinition, command and service modules,

1967, with enc., subj. as above, 24 April 1967; "Configuration Management Pla

Block II Redefinition," 8 May 1967, signed by Frank Borman and Wilbur H. Gr

knecht memo, "Block II redefinition, command and service modules," 8 May 

enc., "Task Team Block II Redefinition, Command and Service Modules," 5 

Low memo, "Nonmetallic Materials Selection Guidelines," 8 May 1967, with e

Craig and M. vV. Steinthal, subj . as above, n.d. 

29. 	 Thomas J. Kelly, "Apollo Lunar Module Mission and Development Status," p

sented at AIAA 4th Annual Meeting and Technical Display, AIAA paper 67-863, 

Calif., 23-27 Oct. 1967, pp. 11-12; Low memo for record, "NASA-GAEC meetin

1967," 11 May 1967; Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 6, pp. 546--48; 

Button to Roy M. Voris and Gil Perlroth, "Suggested Project-LM Flammabilit

1967; Maxime A. Faget to Owen E. Maynard, "Beta booties on the LM circu

panels," 7 Nov. 1967; Phillips TWXs to MSC et a!., 14 April and 1 May 1967; 

MSC and KSC, Attn.: Gilruth and Debus, "Audit of Apollo Lunar Module Q

Inspection Operations," 18 May 1967, with encs., Phillips TWX to MSC et a!., 1 

and Capt. Roderick 0. Middleton et a!., to Phillips, subj. as above, 17 May 1967

30. 	 Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 6; House Subcommittee, Investigation, 

"Astronauts Aided by Apollo Delays," Detroit News, 24 March 1967; "High Hop

Moon Shot," Business Week, 15 April 1967; "Saturn 5 Defects May Delay Ap

More," Houston Post, 24 May 1967; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., memo, "In which is 

the Apollo spacecraft computer programs currently being developed," 24 March 

31. 	 NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967, pp. 124-25; William Hines, "Soviet M

Imperiled," Washington Evening Star, 24 April 1967; Arthur Hill, "Parachut

Grows with Weight of Spaceship," Houston Chronicle, 24 April 1967; "Russian 

Killed," Houston Post, 25 April 1967; Julian Scheer TWX to all NASA elements

statement on Komorov's death"], 24 April 1967; Edward Clinton and Linda 

Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project, comment ed

1976, Chap. III. 

32. 	 Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 7, pp. 553-83; NASA, "NASA Contract

Fiber Study for Apollo," news release 67-90, 14 April 1967. 

33. 	 Senate Committee, Apollo Accident, pt. 7, append. 1 through 3. 

34. 	 MSC, "Exhibit A, [Boeing TIE Contract] Technical Work Scope," 16 and (app

May 1967; William H . Lohse datafax transmission to MSC, Attn.: Edward R. 

"Boeing letter contract," 31 May 1967; NASA, "Boeing-NASA Sign Contract fo
Programming Meeting, May 3, 1967," ~ May 1967; Seamans memo for record, "Apollo 

Program Decisions- unmanned flights of the 1/ 204, CSM 017 J501 , and CSM 020/502," 1 

May 1967; Biggs memo for record, "Apollo Reprogramming Meeting, May 4, 1967," 4 

May 1967; "Apollo Post-Accident Recovery Program: Webb Review, May 3-4, 1967," copy 

of handwritten document, 4 May 1967. 

37. 	 Seamans to Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "Official NASA Apollo Schedules for Manned Missions," 

16 Feb. 1967; Low memo for dist., "Apollo Program Review," 5 June 1967, with encs.; Carl 

R. Liebermann to Dir., Apollo Prog., "Minutes of Apollo Program Meeting at MSC on 2 

June 1967," 7 June 1967, with enc.; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 1970 NASA Authorization: Hem·ings on H.R. 4046, H.R. 

10251 (Superseded by H.R. 11271), pt. 2, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 183, 185. 

38. 	 Low memo, "Apollo Configuration Control Board," 17 June 1967. 

39. 	 Frank H. Samonski, Jr., and Elton M. Tucker, "Apollo Environmental Control System," 

proposed technical note, October 1970; Blount interview; Bergen to James, 6 Nov. 1967; 

Bergen, interview, Downey, 15 May 1969; Atwood, interview, El Segundo, 16 July 1970. 

40. 	 Statements by Webb, Seamans, and Mueller on Apollo Reprogramming before the Senate 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA special release, 9 May 1967, p. 10. 

41. 	 Rodney G. Rose to John P. Mayer, Henry E. Clements, and Jerome B. Hammack, "Proposed 

Apollo Flight Program," 9 May 1967, with enc., "Apollo Flight Program," May 1967; 

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., to Mgr., ASPO, "Requested comments on Apollo Flight Program 

Definition," 1 June 1967. 

42. 	 Carl R . Praktish to Seamans, "Report covering visits to KSC, MSFC, MTF, Michoud, and 

MSC- June 26-June 28, 1967," 24 July 1967; John Coursen to C. William Rathke, LM 

engineering memo, "Weight Increases to the LM Attributable to Actions Following the 

KSC Accident," 8 September 1967; Low memo for record, "Apollo weight changes," 29 

Sept. 1967, with encs.; Lt. Gen. Frank A. Bogart to Gilruth, 23 June 1966; Seamans to 

Mueller, "ApolloJSaturn Nomenclature," 6 Jan. 1967; Low to Donald K. Slayton, "Apollo 

204 patch," 20 Jan. 1967; Phillips to Dep. Assoc. Admin. (Mgmt.), NASA, "Apollo Mission 

Designations," date illegible; Mueller to Seamans, "ApolloJSaturn Nomenclature," 9 Feb. 

1967; Scheer to Seamans, no subj., 17 Feb. 1967; James to Phillips, no subj., 22 March 1967; 

Mueller TWX to KSC, MSFC, and MSC, "Apollo and AAP Mission Designation," 25 March 

1967; Low to Slayton, "Designation of Apollo spacecraft," 31 March 1967; James to Col. 

M. L. Seccomb, "Action Hem," 20 April 1967, with enc., Low to Mueller, 30 March 1967; 

Manfred von Ehrenfried to Chief, Mission Ops. Div., "Apollo 2 IVA Activity Consideration," 

24 Feb. 1967, and "Apollo 2 Mission Planning (SJC 101) ," 28 Feb. 1967; Mueller TWX 

to KSC, MSFC, and MSC, "Apollo and AAP Mission Designation," 28 April 1967; Low 

memo, "System for numbering Apol!o spacecraft," I May 1967; Phillips note to Mueller, 

462 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

Chapter 10 

Ralph E. Gibson, NASA Hq., TWX, "Apollo(Saturn Schedule," 4 Nov. 196

"Apollo(Saturn Schedule," news release 67-282, 3 Nov. 1967. 

Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, CSM Mgr. , ASPO, MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Notes and 

resulting from visit of Dr. George E. Mueller to North American Rockwell C

on November 13 and my activities during period from November 13 through 

17 Nov. 1967. 

NASA, "James Webb NASA Management Changes Press Conference," 12 Oct. 1

hard F. M. Rees to George M. Low, "Brief survey of CSM at NAR, Downey,

1967; Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. Newkirk with Courtney G. Brooks, The Apo

cmft: A Chronology, vol. 4, january 21, 1966-]uly 13, 1974, NASA SP-4009 (W

1978); George W . S. Abbey, ASPO Staff Meeting, 24 June 1968. 

Mueller, NASA OMSF, to Edgar M. Cortright and Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips

16 Dec. 1967. 

Cortright TWX to Low and Rees, 29 Jan. 1968; Cortright memo for record

subcontractor review," 12 March 1968; Cortright to James C. Elms, "Visits 

subcontractors," 13 March 1968; Low to William M. Bland, Jr., "Approval of c

test requirements," 26 April 1968; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Apoll

trac tor review," 30 April 1968; MSC Weekly Activity Report for week ending 17 

P· 3. 

MSC news release 68-3, 27 Jan. 1968; Low to Phillips, 7 March 1968; Low memo 

"Command Module coax cable flammability considerations," 19 Dec. 1967, MSC, 

Coax Cable Ignition Source Study," TDR 68-053, 1 March 1968; MSC, Alpollo 

Program Quarterly Status Report no. 23, 31 March 1968, p . 13; NAR, North 

Rockwell Corporation/A First Look, brochure (Calif., September 1967) ; Klei

Mgr., ASPO, "Command module coax cable decisions relative to spacecraft 103 

sequent," 9 Jan. 1968. 

Aleck C. Bond to Mgr., ASPO, "Unilateral approval of A·pollo spacecraft mate

deviations," 26 Dec. 1967; Low to Bond, "Approval of spacecraft materials usa

tions," 6 Jan. 1968; Abbey to Paul E. Purser, "Status of actions taken on t

Review Board repoPt," 7 Feb. 1968. 

Low to William B. Bergen, 19 Sept. 1967; Robert R. Gilruth , chm., Senior Fl

Review Board Meeting, 13 Jan. 1968; MSC news release 68-1, 15 Jan. 1968; Apo

StaJtus Report for week ending 26 Jan. 1968, p. 1; Richard W. Bricker, "Repor

mability Test Review Board: Results a£ BP-1224 Apollo Command Modul
12. Bass Redd to Mgr. , ASPO, "Analysis of a Saturn V pitch program modification (S-tilt), 

proposed as an aid to reducing the land impact probability after a low altitude launch 

escape vehicle (LEV) abort," 13 Dec. 1967; Middleton to MSFC, Attn.: Mgr. , Saturn V 

Program Office, "Saturn V Range Safety Problem," 7 Feb. 1968; Kurt H . Debus to Phillips. 

8 Feb. 1968; Phillips to MSFC, Attn.: Rudolph and Teir, "Apollo Lift-off Hazards," 11 

Dec. 1967; Phillips w Debus, 26 Feb. 1968. 

13. 	 MSC Flight Control Div., "AS-204/ LM-1 Mission Operations Review," 15 Nov. 1967, p. 3. 

14. Charles D. Benson and William Barnaby Faherty, Moonport: History of Apollo Launch 

Facilities and Operations, NASA SP-4204, 1978, pp. 435-37. 

15. 	 Ibid. , p. 435; Willis H. Shapley to Mueller et al., "Saturn IB Nomenclature," 2 Dec. 1967. 

16. 	 MSC, "Apollo 5 Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-68-7, 27 March 1968, pp. 13-30, 1~57; NASA, 

"Apollo 5 First Lunar Module Test in Space," press kit, news release 68-6, 11 Jan. 1968. 

17. 	 TRW Systems, "Apollo 5 Mission Requirements: 204/ LM-1 'B' Type Mission, LM Development," SPD7-R-002, rev. 5, 4 Dec. 1967; Apollo 5 press kit, pp. 2-4. 

18. William C. Schneider to MSC and KSC, Attn.: Chri~topher C. Kraft, Jr., and Rocco A. 

Petrone, "Apollo 5 Mission Rules," 28 Nov. 1967, with enc.; Capt. Chester M. Lee to Dir., 

Apollo Prog., "Apollo 5 (SA-204 JLM-l) Status," 11 Dec. 1967; Gilruth memo, "LM-1 MSC 

Flight Readiness Review," 1 Dec. 1967; MSC, "LM Headquarters Flight Readiness Review," 

3 Jan. 1968; Mueller to Admin., NASA, "Apollo 5 Mission (SA-204/ LM-1) ," 5 Jan. 1968, 

with enc. 

19. 	 Mueller Report, 15 Jan. 1968; MSC, "Mission Status Report," Apollo News Center release 

2. 20 Jan. 1968; Benson and Faherty, Moonport, p . 437; MSC, "Flight Controllers for Apollo 

5," Apollo News Center release 1, 19 Jan. 1968. 

20. 	 Phillips to Admin., NASA, "Apollo 5 Mission (SA-204/LM-1) Post Launch Report #1," 

12 Feb. 1968, with enc., and #2, 25 March 1968; Mueller to Webb, no subj., 23 Jan. 

1968; Mueller Report, 22 Jan. 1968; MSC, "Apollo 5 Mission Report," pp. 1-1, 1-2, 6.12-1; 

John D. Stevenson to Mueller and Cortright, "Decay of Apollo 5 Lunar Module," 12 Feb. 

1968. 

21. 	 Minutes, LM-2 Flight Requirement Meeting, 26 Jan. 1968; Phillips TWX to MSC et al., 

29 Jan. 1968; Abbey, ASPO Staff Meeting, 29 Jan. 1968; MSC news release 68-5, 30 Jan. 

1968; Phillips TWX to MSC et al., 12 Feb. 1968; Walter A. Pennino TWX to all NASA 

centers, 16 March 1968. 

22. 	 MSC news release 67-48, 2 Aug. 1967; Phillips to Low, 16 Aug. 1967; William G. Gisel to 

Gilrut-h, 20 Nov. 1967, with enc. , Gisel to Phillips, 20 Nov. 1967; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: 

Phillips, "Ascent engine program plan," 9 Dec. 1967; Phillips TWX to Low, 27 Dec. 1967; 

Quarterly Status Rept. no. 21, for period ending 30 Sept. 1967, p. 18; Faget interview. 

23. Quarterly Status Rept. no. 22, for period ending 31 Dec. 1967, p. 28; Martin L. Raines to 

Mgr., ASPO, "Trip Report- Rocketdyne- January 5, 1968," 8 Jan. 1968; Brig. Gen. Car464 
27. 	 Mueller Report, 21 June 1968. 

28. 	 Quarterly Status Rept. no. 22, p . 29; Low to Joseph N. Kotanchik, "CSMjLM 

Review," 21 Dec. 1967; Low TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Replacement of 

on LM-1 ," 28 Dec. 1967; RASPOfBethpage Weekly Status Report, 4 Jan. 1968; 

Shannon TWX to C. William Rathke, " Pressure Test of LM Windows," 16 J

Low to Bolender, "Actions resulting from Saturday's meeting," 19 Feb. 1968

Report, 26 Feb. 1968; Owen G. Morris to Mgrs., ASPO and LM, "Docking window 

6 May 1968; Orvis E. Pigg and Stanley P. Weiss, "Spacecraft Structural Windows

Experience Report (AER), NASA Technical Note (TN) S-377 (JSC-07074), rev

July 1973. 

29. 	 Low to Edward Z. Gray, 20 Dec. 1967; Low to Kotanchik, 21 Dec. 1967; Phillips 

Admin., OMSF, "LM Stress Corrosion," 27 Dec. 1967; Mueller to Gilruth, 8 Jan. 

·to Kotanchik, "Stress corrosion," 15 Jan. 1968; minutes of GAECfMSC Meeting a

17 Feb. 1968; Low to Dale D. Myers, 21 Dec. 1967; Gilruth to Mueller, 18 Jan. 

to Gray, 20 Dec. 1967, with encs. , William F. Rector III to Grumman, Attn.: 

Mullaney, "Stress Corrosion," 12 Oct. 1964, and Rathke to MSC, Attn.: Rector, "S

rosion," 30 Oct. 1964. 

30. 	 Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "Stress Corrosion Review," 25 Jan. 1968; Shannon 

Grumman, Attn.: Rathke, "LM Landing Gear Stress Corrosion Investigation,

1968; Stress Corrosion Review Progress Report, 16 Feb. 1968; Low to Bolender

1968; Mueller Report, 26 Feb. 1968; Stanley P. Weiss, "Lunar Module Structura

AER TN S-345 (MSC-04932) , June 1972. 

31. 	 Low to Bolender, no subj., 16 Feb. 1968; Bolender to Low, interoffice routing sli

1968; Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "Wiring," 28 March 1968, and "Wire problem o

15 April 1968. 

32. 	 J. C. Stark, interoffice memo, to Llewellyn J. Evans (Grumman President), Geor

terton, and R. Hutton, "LM Weight Status Report," 29 Jan. 1968; Low to 

March 1968; Owen E. Maynard, chm., LM Weight Reduction Task Force M

March 1968; Abbey, ASPO Staff Meeting, 29 Jan. 1968; Configuration Control Bo

ing, 5 April 1968; "LM Hardware Weight Reductions: Initial Submittal," Gru

April 1968. 

33. 	 NASA, "Project: Apollo 6," press kit, news release 68-54K, 21 March 1968, p. 

"Discussion of Information Regarding Apollo Launch Dates," Announcement 

March 1968; Mueller to Gilruth, 9 Jan. 1968; Benson and Faherty, Moonport, p. 4

terly Status Rept. no. 23, p. 50; Albert F. Seipert to Wesley L. Hjornevik, 19 Ap

34. 	 Phillips to Admin., NASA, "Apollo 6 Mission (AS-502) ," 20 March 1968, with 

40-41; Phillips TWX to MSC, MSFC, and KSC, Attn.: Low, Rudolph , and Mid

Nov. 1967; Phillips to MSFC et a!., "Apollo 6 and AS-503 Unmanned CSM Ass
gpy py 

1968; Sabels, "Preliminary Evaluation of AS-502 Color Photography of Earth Resources, 

Case 340," abstract of Bellcomm rept., 19 July 1968; John L. Kaltenbach, comp., ''Science 

Report on the 70-Millimeter Photography of the Apollo 6 Mission," NASA S-217, review 

copy, May 1969, p. ii, iii, 1-5. 

38. 	 MSC news release 68-30, 9 April 1968; Phillips to Admin., NASA, "Apollo 6 Mission (AS502) Post Launch Report #2," 27 Dec. 1968, with enc., "NASA Mission Objectives for 

Apollo 6," signed by Phillips 13 Dec. and by Mueller 27 Dec. 1968; Benson and Faherty, 

Moonport, pp. 440-43; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for Fiscal Year 1969: Repo1·t on H.R. 15856, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 20 May 

1968, pp. 4-14. 

39. 	 MSC, "Apollo 6 Mission Report," p. 1-3; MSC, "Apollo 4 Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-68-1, 

January 1968, p. 5.1-8; Scott H. Simpkinson, telephone interview, 28 Aug. 1975; Barton C. 

Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulder of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, 

NASA SP-4203 (Washington, 1977) , p. 136. 

40. 	 Sim.pkinson interview; Boone to MSC Mechanical Panel Cochm., Attn.: Jenkins, "Spacecraft (structurejman) limits for longitudinal oscillations on the manned AS-503 ," n.d. [ca. 

April 1968]; Low to Rudolph, KSC, 22 April 1968; Hodge, minutes of Fifth Apollo Crew 

Safety Review Board Meeting. 16-18 April 1968; Low to Hodge, "Apollo Crew Safety Review Board ac-tivities," 23 April 1968; Low to Maynard, "POGO abort sensor," 22 May 

1968; Armistead Dennett, minutes of Pogo Sensor Planning Meeting, 3 June 1968; minutes 

of 24th Crew Safety Panel Meeting, 19· June 1968. 

41. 	 Mueller Report, 29 April 1968; Lo-w memo for record, "Management meeting on POGO," 

18 May 1968; Abbey, ASPO Staff Meeting, 20 May 1968; MSC news release 68-50, [ca. 18 

July 1968]. 

42. 	 Mueller Reports, 15 April, 31 May, 7, 14, and 21 June, 8, 15, and 22 July 1968; 24th 

Cre-w Safety Panel Meeting; MSC release 68-50; Charles M. Duke, Jr., to Mgr., ASPO, 

"POGO activities," 12 July 1968; Astronautics and Ae1·onautics, 1968: Chronology on 

Science, Technology , and Policy, NASA SP-4010 (Washington, 1969) , p. 135; NASA Nineteenth Semiannual Report to Congress, ]anumy 1-]une 30, 1968 (Washington, 1969), pp. 

18-19. 

43. 	 "Apollo 6 Review," 21 April 1968; Lo-w presentation, "Manned Space Flight Management Council Review, Apollo Spacecraft Program," 7 May 1968; Low to Seymour C. 

Himmel, 14 Nov. 1968; MSC, "Revie-w of AS-502 S-tructural Anomaly Activities," 27 June 

1968; McClellan to Low, I July 1968; Donald D. Arabian to Low, "Summary of SLA 

Anomaly," 8 Oct. 1968; MSC, "Apollo Anomaly Status," PT-ASR-6, I Oct. 1968; JSC, 

"Apollo Program Summary Report," p. F-4. 

466 
1. 	 Configuration Control Board Meeting, 5 April 1968; George W . S. Abbey, AS

Meetings, MSC, 8 April, 20 May, 12 Aug., 9 Sept., 2 Dec. !968; William B. Berge

American, to George M. Low, MSC, 3 May !968; Low to Bergen, 7 May !968; S

Phillips, NASA OMSF, to Low, 21 May 1968. 

2. 	 Assoc. Admin., NASA OMSF, memo, "MSF Planning Guidelines #!," !4 June !9

enc., "Manned Space Flight Base Plan," 14 June !968; George E. Mueller, NASA 

to Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, Dir., 22 Jan. 1969; William F. Moore memo for record

Floor Action on FY !969 NASA Authorization," 3 May 1968; Paul P. Haney memo, 

action," 19 July !968; Low to George S. Trimble, Jr., "Personnel management eva

5 Sept. 1968; Mueller to Gilruth, 2 Oct. 1968. 

3. 	 Carroll H. Bolender to Mgr., ASPO, "Dr. Mueller's visit to GAEC on July 17, 

July 1968; anon. memo to Lunar Module Team, no subj ., 21 July !968. 

4. 	 MSC, Apollo Spacecraft Program Quarterly Status Rept. no. 24, 30 June 196

Joseph M. Bobik to Chief, KSC Apollo Spacecraft Office, "LM-3 Receiving Ins

18 July 1968; Bolender memo for record , "LM-3 certification status," 26 June !968; 

to Mgr., ASPO, "Critique of LM-3 receiving inspection at KSC," 26 June !968; G

White, Jr., NASA Hq., to MSC, Attn.: Mgr., Reliability and Quality Assurance, "LM

Areas of Concern," 2 Aug. 1968, with enc.; minutes of LM-3 Delta Design Cer

Review (DCR), 7 Aug. !968; Low to Bolender and Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, 

Mathews review of KSC activities," 14 Sept. 1968. 

5. 	 Low to Owen E. Maynard, "Apollo Flight Test Program," 21 May 1968, with enc.

E. Granger to Tech. Asst., ASPO, "E' Mission," 7 June !968; Jones W . Roach 

Chief, Flight Control Div. (FCD) , " Manpower Impact of Simultaneous E and E' 

Planning," 21 June 1968; Milton E. Windler to Actg. Chief, FCD, "Impact on 

adding an E lunar orbital mission planning effort," n.d., with encs.; Rodney 

memo, "Mission E Prime Task Force Report," 12 July 1968, with enc.; Low to Dir

Hist. Off., "Comments on History of NACA and NASA-Continued," 29 Sept. 19

encs., "Special Notes for AuguM 9, 1968, and Subsequent," pp. 1-2. and 

Notes for November 10 and 1!, 1968"; Jay Holmes, telephone interview, 10 Ja

Gilruth to Mueller, I May !968, with enc.; LM-3 Delta DCR, 7 Aug. !968; Low m

record, "Report of meeting at KSC," 10 Aug. 1968. 

6. 	 Low, "Special Notes for August 9," pp. 2-4; MSFC meeting for Gilruth, 9 Aug. 19

enc.; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology on Science, Technology, an

NASA SP-4010 (Washington, 1969) , pp. 189-90. 

7. 	 Low, "Special Notes for August 9," pp. 4-6; Joseph N. Kotanchik to Dir., Enginee

Development, and Mgr., ASPO, "Use of a LM, LTA-B or other unit in SLA of 

26 Aug. 1968; Low to Kotanchik, "Use of LTA-B for AS-503," 27 Aug. 1968. 
14. 	 MSC, Gemini and Apollo Crews Selected, news release 66-20, 21 March 1966; MSC release 

66-72; MSC news release 66-110, 22 Dec. 1966; Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: An 

Astronaut's Journeys (New York : Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1974), p. 267. 

15. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 8 parts, 

pt. 6, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 463-64, 517; "Webb Names Crew For Manned 

Apollo," MSC Roundup, 12 May 1967; MSC release 67-22, 9 May 1967; John J. Van Boeke!, 

telephone interview, 17 Oct. 1975; Borman to Myers, "Plan for Flight Crew Support Team 

Duties and Responsibilities during Spacecraft Checkout," 14 June 1967, with enc. 

16. 	 NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967, p. 350; MSC news releases 67-67, 20 Nov., and 

67-58, 5 Oct. 1967. 

17. 	 MSC, "Gen. Phillips Notes, 17 August 1968"; Collins, Carrying the Fire, pp. 296-97. 

18. 	 Collins, Canying the Fire, p. 288; MSC news releases 68-53, 22 July, 68-54, 23 July, 68-60, 

8 Aug., and 68-48, 16 July 1968; Quarterly Status Rept. no. 25, 30 Sept. 1968, p. 57. 

19. 	 NASA, Nineteenth Semiannual Report to Congress, January 1- June 30, 1968 (Washington, 

1969), p. 29; Borman to Myers, "Flight Crew Pavticipation in OCP's," 15 June 1967; JSC, 

Apollo Program Summary R eport, JSC-09423, April 1975 (published as NASA TM-X-68725, 

June 1975), p. 6-1; NASA Astronauts, NASA EP-34 (Washington, October 1967) , p. 40; 

Quarterly Status Rept. no. 25, p. 57; MSC news release 68-57, 31 July 1968; Quarterly 

Status Rept. no. 24, p. 1; Low to Julian Scheer, NASA Hq., 10 July 1968; Richard W. 

Undenvood to Chief, MSC Photogmphic Technology Lab., MSC, "Apollo VII crew briefing 

for Experiments S005 and S006," 20 Sept. 1968; Warren J. Novth to Chief, Procurements 

and Contracts Div., "Sole source justification for procurement of services and utilization 

of the Griffith Planetarium for Apollo flight crew celestial training," 22 April 1968, with 

enc.; MSC, "Establishment of Crew Systems Resident Office a-t KSC," Announcement 68-88, 

27 June 1968; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: William C. Schneider, "Apollo 7 suit planning," 

10 Aug. 1968; RichardS. Johnston to Nisson Finkelstein, 5 July 1968. 

20. 	 Kleinknecht to Scott H. Simpkinson, "Critique of spacecraft l()J integrated test (OCP0131) ," 14 May 1968, with enc., John W. Young memo for record, "Recommendations resulting from participation in OCP-0131 Integrated Systems Test in SfC 101," 29 April 1968. 

21. 	 Slayton to Dir., Flight Ops., "Crew report on 48-hour recovery test of spacecraft 007 on 

April 5-7 1968," 12 April 1968, with enc. 

22. 	 MSC news release 68-42, 10 June 1968; Joseph P. Kerwin, Vance D. Brand, and Joseph 

H . Engle memo, "Crew Report," 2 July 1968. 

23. 	 Quarterly Status Rept. no. 24, pp. 39-40; minutes of Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) Phase III Pre-Board Meeting, CSM 101 , 7 May 1968, p. 2; OMSF Weekly 

Rept., 31 May 1968. 

468 
Phillips to Admin., NASA, "Apollo 7 Mission (AS-205), Post Launch Report 

Dec. 1968, with enc., p . 3; MSC, "Apollo VII Technical Debriefing," 27 Oct. 1968, 

15-17; "Apollo 7 Mission Commentary," 10 Oct., tape 35-1, 11 Oct. 1968, tape 2

D. Stevenson to OMSF Safety Dir., "MCC Power Failure during Apollo 7 ," 29 

MSC, "Apollo 7 Air-to-Ground Voice Transcriptions," n.d., p. 28; JSC, Apollo 

Summary Report, p. F-5; Low to Rocco A. Petrone, 8 Nov. 1968. 

31. 	 MSC: "Apollo 7 Voice," p. 135; "Apollo VII Debriefing," pt. I, pp. 45, 47; 

Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-68-15, December 1968, pp. 3-2 through 3-5. 

32. 	 Phillips to Admin., NASA, 27 Dec. 1968, p. 3 of enc.; "Apollo 7 Mission Comme

Oct., tape 275-1, 21 Oct. 1968, tape 690-1; "Apollo 7 Mission Report," p. 5-169

VII Debriefing," pt. 1, p. 157; David Bell III and Fulton M. Plauche, "Power G

System," Apollo Experience Report (AER), NASA Technical Note (TN) S-3

04587), review copy, October 1972, pp. 13-14; Frank H . Samonski, Jr., and 

Tucker, "Command and Service Module Environmental Control System," AER 

(MSC-04374), review copy, May 1971, p . 26. 

33. 	 "Apollo 7 Mission Report," p. 5-185; "Apollo VII Debriefing," pt. 2, pp. 45-47

Carrying the Fi1·e, p. 286; "Apollo 7 Mission Commentary," 13 Oct., tape 179-

1968, tape 426-2; "Apollo 7 Crew Debriefing @ MSC 10 / 27/ 68 (C[arl R.J L

Notes) "; L[ubert] J . Leger and R[ichard) W. Bricker, "Window Contamination," 

S-284 (MSC-04332), review copy. September 1971 ; "Apollo 7 Voice," pp. 117, 44

617-18, 804-05, 852. 

34. 	 Phillips to Admin., NASA, 1 Oct. 1968, p. 53 of enc.; "Apollo 7 Mission Report," 

Willard R. Hawkins et al., "Biomedical Evaluation of the Apollo 7 Mission," MS

Note 70-DD-01, December 1970, p. 4-77; Samonski and Tucker, "CSM Envi

Control System," pp. 25-26. 

35. 	 "Apollo 7 Crew Conference," tapes 2-1, 2-2; Hawkins et al., "Biomedical Evalua

4-54, 4-55, 4-65; "Apollo 7 Voice," pp. 182, 250, 643. 

36. 	 Phillips to Admin., NASA, 1 Oct. 1968, pp. 53-54 of enc.; Hawkins et al. , "B

Evaluation," p . 4-62; "Apollo 7 Voice," pp. 18~82, 216, 497; "Apollo 7 Mis

mentary," 12 Oct., tape 151-1, 13 Oct. 1968, tapes 167-1, 167-2. 

37. 	 NASA, "Project: Apollo 7," press kit, news release 68-168K, 27 Sept 1968, pp. 

"Apollo VII Debriefing," Part 2, pp. 310-12; "Apollo 7 Mission Commentary," 11 

41-1, 16 Oct. 1968, tape 396-1; "Apollo 7 Voice," pp. 438, 445, 679. 

38. 	 Michael Kapp to Fred C. Durant, National Air and Space Museum, 26 March 197

7 Voice," pp. 115-16, 738; "Apollo 7 Mission Commentary," 12 Oct., tape 103-1

tapes 247-2, 247-3, 249-1, 249-2, 15 Oct., tapes 310-1 through 310-3, 313-1, 16 O

381-1 through 381-3, 17 Oct., tapes 435-2 through 435-5, 19 Oct., tapes 568-

568-3, 20 Oct. 1968, tapes 633-1 through 633-3. 
45. 	 Robert E. Pace, Jr., actg. exec. sec., meeting with Actg. Admin., NASA, to discuss process 

for selection of Apollo 8 mission, 23 Oct. 1968; Mueller to Actg. Admin., NASA, "Response 

to Question on Apollo Service Propulsion System Engine," 20 Nov. 1968. 

46. 	 Minutes of AS-503 Launch Vehicle Delta DCR, 19 Sept. 1968; Low to Kotanchik, "AS-503 

loads," 26 Aug. 1968. 

47. 	 MSC, Apollo 8 Mission DCR, 7 Nov. 1968; Phillips letter, "Apollo 8 Design Certification 

Review," 11 Dec. 1968; Phillips to Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "Comparison of Sj C 101 , 103 

and 106," 29 Oct. 1968; Schneider to Dir., Apollo Prog., "C-Prime Crew Safety Review 

Board," 7 Nov. 1968. 

48. 	 MSC, "Apollo Executives Meeting, November 10, 1968: Apollo 8 Spacecraft," slides for Low 

briefing; "Contractors' Views and Discussion," transcript of Apollo Executives meeting, 10 

Nov. 1968; Low, "Special Notes for November 10 and 11," pp. 1-5; J. Leland Atwood to 

James M. Grimwood, 27 Oct. 1976. 

49. 	 Mueller to Paine, no subj., 11 Nov. 1968, with encs., Mueller to Actg. Admin., NASA, 

"Request for Approval to Man the Apollo Saturn V Launch Vehicle," 5 Nov. 1968, and 

Phillips to Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "Apollo 8 Mission Selection," 11 Nov. 1968; Phillips TWX 

to MSC, KSC, and MSFC, "Apollo 8 Mission and Launch Schedule," n.d. [probably 12 Nov. 

1968]. 

50. 	 MSC, "Apollo 8 Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-69-1, February 1969, pp. 7-1, 7-15, 13-1; 

Slayton to NASA Hq., Attn.: Dir. Apollo Prog., "Apollo crew training," 9 Sept. 1968, 

with encs.; Marion W. Hix, "Crew Station Integra tion ," vol. 4, "Stowage and the Support 

Team Concept," AER TN S-364 (JSC-07008), review copy, July 1973; MSC, "Apollo 8 

Mission Commentary," 21 Dec. 1968, tape 10·1. 

51. 	 Charles D. Benson and William Barnaby Faherty, Moonpo1·t: A History of Apollo Launch 

Facilities and Operations, NASA SP-42@4, 1978, p. 456; NASA, Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress, July ]-December 31, 1968 (Washington, 1969), p. 22; NASA, "Project: 

Apollo 8," press kit, news release 68-208, 6 Dec. 1968, p. lOa; "Most of World to Get 

Reports on Apollo 8," Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1968; "Cheers Echo 'Round Globe for 

Apollo," Miami News, 24 Dec. 1968. 

52. 	 MSFC, "Saturn AS-503 Evaluation Bulletin No. 1," 27 Dec. 1968; MSC, "Apollo 8 Technical Debriefing," 2 Jan. 1969, pp. 2, 4; "Apollo 8 Mission Report," pp. 6-1, 6-2, 7-16; 

anon., "Summary Log of Apollo 8," MSC, n.d., p. I; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 21 

Dec. 1968, tapes 16-1, 20·1. 

53. 	 "Apollo 8 Log," p. 1; Apollo Progmm Summary Repo1·t, p. 2-31; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 21 Dec. 1968, tapes 26-1, 28-1, 31·1, 33-1, 35-3; MSC, "News Conference on 

Apollo 8," 9 Jan. 1969, pp. 3-4, 15-16; MSC, "Change of Shift Press Briefing #I," 21 Dec. 

1968, tapes liA·2, liA-3; "Apollo 7 Mission Report," p. 9-1. 

470 
Dec. 1968; "Apollo 8 Voice," tapes 38-6, 38-7; "A.pollo 8 Mission Commentary,

1968, tapes 117-2, 152-1, 165-1, 167-1, 168-1. 

60. 	 "Apollo 8 Mission Report," p. 5-2; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 23 Dec., t

24 Dec. 1968, tapes 202-1, 203-1, 204-1; "Apollo 8 Voice," tapes 38-4, 45-12, 46-1. 

61. 	 "Apollo 8 Log," p. 9; "Apollo 8 Voice," tape 46-5; "Apollo 8 Mission Comme

Dec., tapes 187-1, 191-1 , 24 Dec. 1968, tapes 211-1, 211-2, 212-1; "Apollo 8 Mission 

p. 3-1; "Apollo 8 Debriefing," pp. 31-32; "Apollo 8 Onboard Voice," pp. 73, 74, 

62. 	 Ivan D. Ertel and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks, The Apollo S

A Chronology, vol. 4, january 21, 1966-]uly 13, 1974, 1978; "Apollo 8 Mission Com

24 Dec. 1968, tapes 214-1, 216-1. 

63. 	 "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 24 Dec. 1968, tapes 218-1, 218-2, 219-1, 257-1; 

Debriefing," p. 34; "Apollo 8 Voice," tapes 46-5 through 47-5, 54-3. 

64. 	 "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 24 Dec. 1968, tapes 232-1, 232-2, 259-1; "Apo

briefing," p. 55; "Apollo 8 Log," p. 15; "Apollo 8 Onboard Voice," pp. 136, 149

65. 	 "Holiday Orbit a Time to Contemplate," Kansas City Star, 8 Dec. 1968; James E

"Moon Trip Adds a Strange New Element to Christmas," Washington Post, 23 

John J. Simeck postcard to NASA-MSC, n.d.; Low to Simeck, 4 Nov. 1968; Stewar

to Dir., Nat!. Space Agency [sic], 13 Nov. 1968; Gilruth to Atkinson, 2 Dec. 1

memo for record, "Chronology of Borman Prayer on Apollo 8," 29 Jan. 1969; 

Voice," tapes 50-7, 58-4; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 24 Dec. 1968, tapes 24

"Apollo 8 News Conference," p. 19. 

66. 	 "Apollo 8 News Conference," p. 19; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 24 Dec. 1

244-1, 247-1, 247-2, 248-1, 248-2, 264-1; Lee R. Scherer to Dir., Apollo Prog., "T

CSM Photography Experiment," 20 Sept. 1968, with enc.; "Apollo 8 Debriefin

"Apollo 8 Onboard Voice," p. 143; Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and Visual 

tions, NASA SP-201 (Washington, 1969). 

67. 	 "Apollo 8 Mission Report," p. 3-2; "Apollo 8 Onboard Voice," pp. 209, 246, 248; 

Voice," tape 60-1, 60-6, 60-7; "Apollo 8 Mission Commentary," 24 Dec., tapes 267-1

Dec. 1968, tapes 289-1, 290-1, 292-1, 292-2, 293-1, 293-2. 

68. 	 "Apollo 8 Voice," tapes 63-3 through 63-9, 64-3 through 64-7. 

69. 	 "Apollo 8 Voice," tape 96-2; "Apollo 8 Log," p. 19; "Apollo 8 Failure and Ano

ing," pp. 2-3; "Apollo 8 Mission Report," pp. 3-3, 3-4, 5-10, 6-42, 6-45, 9-4, 9-5; 

Mission Commentary," 27 Dec. 1968, ta,pes 381-1 and 421-1; "Apollo 8 Onboard V

2~6; Jerome B. Hammack to Dir., light Ops., "Apollo 8 preliminary recovery 

tion," 28 Dec. 1968, with encs.; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., to Chief, Landing and 

Div., "Let's move the recovery force a little," 7 Jan. 1969; "Apollo 8 Debriefing

72-73; MSC, "Second Post-Recovery Briefing," tapes 24A-1 through 24A-3. 
j, 

7. 	 [Grumman], "Statement of Stress Corrosion," 29 Jan. 1969; NASA, "LM Fittings Changed," 

news release 69-24, 31 Jan. 1969. 

8. 	 Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Re~ponse to Block II DCR [Design Certification Review] and LM-3 DCR action items concerning CSMfLM EMC (electromagnetic compatibility)," 26 Oct. 1968; Gilruth to DCR Boaro Members, "Spacecraft electromagnetic compatibility," 29 Jan. 1969, with enc., B. D. Cooperstein and R. H . Parry, "Apollo CSMfLM 

Computerized Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis," TRW III76-Hlll-RO-OO, 21 Jan. 

1969; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., memo, "Light weight LM attitude control is too sporty," 

7 Dec. 1967; Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Manual control of the light Lunar 

Module ascent configuration," 27 Nov. 1968, with encs.; Phillips to Gilruth, subj. as above, 

16 Dec. 1968; Chester A. Vaughan et al., "Lunar Module Reaction Control System," Apollo 

Experience Report (AER) NASA Technical Note (TN) S-315 (MSC-04567), review copy. 

December 1971. 

9. 	 Robert D. Langley, "The Docking System," AER TN S-325 (MSC-05137), review copy, 

March 1972, p. 19; North American Space Div., PR Dept., Apollo Spacecraft News Reference (Downey, Calif., rev. ed., 1969), p. II9; Low TWX to North American and Grumman, Attn.: Milton I. Drucker and Robert L. Tripp, "Pre-FRR [Flight Readiness Review] 

Docking Probe Review Board," 8 Jan. 1969; Kenneth S. Kleinknecht memo, subj. as above, 

8 Jan. 1969; Aaron Cohen memo, "CSM 104 Drogue and Probe Review," 17 Jan. 1969; 

OMSF Report to the Admin., NASA, signed by Mueller (hereafter cited as Mueller Report), 

13 Jan. 1969; Low to Phillips, 28 Jan. 1969, with enc., Harmon L. Brendle, secy., minutes 

of meeting, Pre-FRR Review of the Drogue and Probe, CSM 104, 15 Jan. 1969. 

10. 	 Donald F. Seaton, Jr., Apollo Program Weekly Status Reports, OMSF, 24 Jan. and 14 Feb. 

1969; Mueller Report, 27 Jan. 1969; David B. Pendley to Mgr., ASPO, "S-11 stage oscillation," 31 Jan. 1969, and "AS-504 Pre-Flight Review at MSFC on January 29, 1969," 31 

Jan. 1969; Donald C. Wade, telephone interview, 4 Feb. 1976; Sally D. Gates, NASA routing 

slip, to Wade, with Wade's annotation, 4 Feb. 1976. 

II. 	 Mueller Report, 7 Oct. 1968; Low TWXs to KSC, Attn.: Roderick 0. Middleton, "LM-3 

Descent and Ascent Engine Inspection," 23 Sept. 1968, and "LM-3 Descent Engine Propellant 

Line Inspection for Cracks and Dimples," 26 Sept. 1968; Clarence C. Gay, Jr., Weekly 

Activity Report for 25 Sept.-1 Oct. 1968. 

12. 	 Mueller Reports, 14 and 28 Oct., 18 Nov., and 16 Dec. 1968. 

13. 	 Seaton, Weekly Status Reports, 3 and 24 Jan. 1969; Owen E. Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, 

"Spacecraft window fogging," 29 Jan. 1969. 

14. 	 Seaton, Weekly Status Reports, 10 Jan. and 28 Feb. 1969; Phillips letter, "Apollo 9 Mission 

Delta Design Certification Review," 10 Jan. 1969; Brendle, minutes of meeting, CSM 104 

FRR Board, 24 Jan. 1969; Phillips to Apollo 9 FRR Board, "Confirmation of Flight Readi472 
medical Evaluation of Apollo 9, p. 91; Apollo 9 Debriefing, p. 12; Muelle

10 March 1969. 

20. 	 MSC news center, "Apollo 9 Accreditation List," n.d.; "Apollo 9 Mission Comm

March 1969, tape 10-1; MSC news release 68-87, 18 Dec. 1968; George H. Hage 

D. Arabian, 21 March 1969; MSC, "Apollo 9 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Tra

(GOSS Net 1) ," March 1969, p. 1; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Dir. Fligh't Operati

memo, "Flight Control Manning for Apollo 9," 6 Feb. 1969, with enc., "MC

Manning"; "Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 1·1, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3·17; J. B. Sterett, "A

Oscillations Status Report," 11 March 1969, with enc., "Spacecraft Responses duri

V Flight"; Hage memo, "Apollo 9 Daily Operations Report No. 1," 4 March 19

TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "AS-504 5 Day Report (Mission Comple

March 1969. 

21. 	 Hawkins et a!., "Biomedical Evaluation of Apollo 9," p. 9-2; "Apollo 9 Voice," 

Charles R . Lewis et al., "Apollo 9 Flight Control Final Mission Report," 2 Apr

4; "Apollo 9 Mission Commentary," 3 March 1969, tapes 24·1, 26·1; "Apollo 9 D

pp. 4-4 through 4-11; Hage memo, 4 March 1969; MSC, "Apollo 9 Mission Rep

PA·R-69-1, May 1969, p. 3-l. 

22. 	 Langley, "Docking System," p. 9; "Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-12 through 4-15, 4

"Apollo 9 Onboard Voice Transcription, Recorded on the Command Module 

corder Data Storage Equipment (DSE) ," April 1969, pp. 49-56, 58, 60; "Apollo 

Commentary," 3 March 1969, tapes 28-1, 30-1, 31-1, 31-2, 32-l. 

23. 	 "Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-21, 4-30 through 4-32; James M. Grimwood and 

Hacker, Project Gemini Technology and Opemtions: A Chronology, NASA SP-40

ington, 1969), pp. 251, 255; "Apollo 9 Voice," pp. 36, 69; Hage memo, "Apol

Operations Report No. 2," 5 March 1969; Lewis et al., "Final Report," pp. 5, 7-

9 Mission Commentary," 3 March, <tape 43-1, 4 March 1969, tape 74-1; "Apo

Voice," pp. 82, 17o-72; "Apollo 9 Mission Report," p . 7-7. 

24. 	 "Apollo 9 CM Voice," p. 177; Lewis et al., "Final Report," p. 8; "Apollo 9 Voi

"Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-32, 4-33, 4-35, 4-36; "Apollo 9 Mission Commentary,

1969, tapes 73-1 , 80-1, 80-2, 92-2, 101-2; NASA, Twenty-first Semiannual Report to 

January 1-fune 30, 1969 (Washington, 1970) , p. 6; Apollo 9 press kit, p. 19; H

5 March 1969. 

25. 	 "Apollo 9 Mission Report," pp. 10-10, 11 -7; Hawkins et a!., "Biomedical Eva

Apollo 9," pp. 9·2, 9-3; MSC, anon., "Some D Crew Comments," 18 March 19

Mission Report: Apollo 9, fact sheet MR-3 [Washington, 1969]; "Apollo 9 Mis

mentary," 4 March, tape 114-1, 5 March 1969, tapes 125·1, 144-1; Mueller to G

Dec. 1968; Thomas 0 . Paine, NASA Admin., memo, no subj., 13 March 1969; 

McElheny, "Behind Space Triumphs, Medical Dispute Grows," Boston Sunday 
Admin., NASA, Apollo 9 Mission (AS-504) Post Launch Report #1, 6 May 1969, with 

enc., p. 9; "Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-102 ·through 4-107, 4-120 through 4-136; "Apollo 9 

Mission Commentary," 6 March 1969, tapes 222-3, 223-1, 223-4, 223-5; Mission Report: 

Apollo 9, pp. 2-3; "Apollo 9 CM Voice," pp. 317-28; "Apollo 9 Mission Report," pp. 10-11 

through 10-14; Lewis et a!., "Final Report," pp. 12-13; JSC, Apollo Progmm Summary 

Report, JSC-09423, April 1975 (published as NASA TM-X-68725, June 1975), p. 2-32. 

30. 	 "Apollo 9 Voice," pp. 344, 350-52, 374-75, 381-85; Lewis et a!., "Final Report," pp. 15, 16; 

"Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-139, 4-181 through 4-185, 4-193; "Apollo 9 Mission Report," 

pp. 10-14, 10-15. 

31. 	 MSC, anon., "Some D Crew Comments," 18 March 1969; "Apollo 9 Debriefing," pp. 4-146, 

4-147, 4-154 through 4-160, 4-175 through 4-180, 4-200, 4-203, 4-204, 4-219; "Apollo 9 

Voice," pp. 387, 390-92, 398, 419; "Apollo 9 CM Voice," pp. 363, 365, 366, 368, 371; "Apollo 

9 Mission Commentary," 7 March 1969, tapes 272-1, 273-1, 278-3; William R. Hammock, 

Jr., Eldon C. Currie, and Arlie E. Fisher, "Descent Propulsion System," AER TN S-349 

(MSC-05849) , review copy, October 1972, p. 26; "Apollo 9 30-Day Report," pp. 11, 16; 

"Apollo 9 Mission Report," pp. 5-5, 5-10, 5-34, 5-35; Twenty·fi?"St Semiannual Report, p. 8; 

Mission Report: Apollo 9, p. 3; NASA, "News Conference: The Flight of Apollo 9," 25 

March 1969. 

32. 	 Twenty-{i1·st Semiannual Report, p. 8; "Apollo 9 Mission Report," pp. 5-9, 5-10, 9-69; 

"Apollo 9 Voice," pp. 398, 413-15, 419, 429, 431-32, 439-41, 446; "Apollo 9 CM Voice," pp. 

372-73, 376-77, 380-82, 385, 388; Clarence E. Humphries and Reuben E. Taylor, "Ascent 

Propulsion System," AER TN S-341 (MSC-04928), review copy, May 1972, p. 22; "Apollo 9 

Debriefing," pp. 4-162 through 4-165; Apollo 9 press kit, p. 21. 

33. 	 "Apollo 9 Voice," pp. 442, 468-69; Apollo 9 press kit, p. 35; "Apollo 9 Mission Report," pp. 

7-9, 13-2, 13-3; Astronautics and Aemnautics, 1969: Chronology on Science, Technology, 

and Policy, NASA SP-4014 (Washington, 1970), p. 64; Mueller Report, 10 March 1969. 

34. 	 Mueller Report, 17 March 1969; NASA, "Apollo 9 Awards Ceremony," 26 March 1969; 

"Remarks of the Vice President, Spiro T. Agnew, at the NASA Awards Ceremony, 26 

March 1969, for the Apollo 9 Astronauts"; NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969, pp. 

64-65. 

35. 	 Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, 26 Oct. 1968; Lewis R. Fisher, telephone interview, 10 

Feb. 1976; Robert V. Battey, telephone interview, 5 March 1976; Owen G. Morris, telephone interview, 5 March 1976; NASA, "Project: Apollo 10," press kit, news release 69-68, 

6 May 1969, p. 2; William J. Bennett memo, "Apollo Mission F Summary," 16 April 1968, 

with encs.; Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut's journeys (New York: Farrar, 

Strauss and Giroux, 1974), p. 326. 

36. 	 Carl R. Huss memo, "Abort considerations relating to LOI targeting for elliptical orbits," 

20 Sept. 1967; MSC, "Apollo 10 Technical Crew Debriefing," 2 June 1969, pp. 18-1, 18-2; 

474 
to KSC, MSFC, and MSC, "Apollo 10 and 11 FRR Planning Dates," 17 Feb. 196

40. 	 James A. York, secy., minutes of meeting, LM-4 FRR Board, 11 April 196

minutes of meeting, CSM 106 FRR Board, 11 April 1969; Low to Phillips, 12 

with encs., Maxime A. Faget to Mgr., ASPO, "Descent Propulsion System POG

ities," 12 May !969, and Joseph N. Kotanchik to Dir., Engineering and Develo

Mgr., ASPO, "Spacecraft POGO," 13 Sept. 1968; Phillips to Apollo 10 FRR B

firmation of Flight Readiness for the Apollo 10 Mission," 16 May 1969. 

41. 	 MSC news release 68-81, 13 Nov. 1968; Apollo 10 press kit, pp. 3, 65; Gilrut

Hq., Attn.: Mueller, "Flight crew training summaries," 12 May 1969; "Apollo 10 

pp. 20-1 through 20-15. 

42. 	 Donald K. Slayton to Dir., MSC, "Proposed Apollo X patch," 13 March 1969

NASA, "The Flight of Apollo 10, May 18-26, 1969," 2 June 1969, p. 3; Julia

Low, 18 April 1969. 

43. 	 Richard D. Lyons, "The Fashionable People Fly In to View Launching," New 

19 May 1969, p. 31; "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6; Willard R. 

al., "Biomedical Evaluation of the Apollo 10 Mission," MSC Internal Note 71-

1971, p. 8-1; Kraft memo, "Flight Control Manning for Apollo 10," 2 May 1969

"MCCfMOCR Manning"; MSC, "Apollo 10 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice T

(GOSS Net 1) ," May 1969, pp. 3-4, 18-19; MSC, "Apollo 10 Mission Report," 

August 1969, p. 9-2. 

44. 	 MSC, "Apollo 10 Mission Commentary," 18 May 1969, tapes 22-1, 26-1; "Ap

briefing," pp. 4-1, 4-4, 5-l through 5-3; "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 25 , 29; Glynn S

al., "Flight Directors Report, Apollo 10" [ca. June 1969], p. 5; "Apollo 10 Missi

p. 9-3. 

45. 	 "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 5-4, 5-6, 5-8 through 5-10; Lunney et al., "Fligh

Report," p . 5; Hage to Gerald M. Truszynski, "Apollo 10 Color TV," 9 April 

to Phillips, 9 April 1969; Hage to Truszynski, "Apollo 10 Color TV," 9 May 1

10 press kit, p. 33; 10:56:20 PM, EDT, 7f20f69: The Hist01·ic Conquest of th

Reported to the American People by CBS News over the CBS Television Net

York: CBS, 1970); Ann Hodges, "Unique TV System Nets Living Color Fr

Houston Chronicle, 19 May 1969; "Flight of Apollo 10," p. 5; "Apollo 10 Missi

pp. 9-3, 9-4, A-4; "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 31-35, 39, 41 , 42. 

46. 	 "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-14; "Apollo 10 Voi~e," pp. 44-45, 

221, 253-54; "Apollo 10 Mission Report," p. 3-1; Hage memo, "Mission Dire

mary Report, Apollo 10," 26 May 1969. 

47. 	 Hawkins et al., "Biomedical Evaluation of Apollo 10," pp. 1-1, 8-1 , 8-2; "Ap

briefing," pp. 4-5, 22-24 through 22-27. 
p

; pp,p

55. "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 387-88, 394; "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 6-3, 8-l, 8-2, 8-4, 8-6; 

"Apollo 10 Mission Report," pp. 9-8, 9-9. 

56. 	 "Flight of Apollo 10," p. 8; Apollo 10 press kit, p. 56; Lunney et a!. , "Flight Directors 

Report," pp. 14-17. 

57. "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 433, 435, 440-41; "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 8-9 through 8-ll, 8-20 

through 8-29; "Apollo 10 CM Voice," pp. 203-209; Mission Report: Apollo 10, NASA EP-70 

(Washington, 17 June 1969). 

58. Hage memo, 26 May 1969; Lunney et a!., "Flight Directors Report," p. 17; "Apollo 10 

Debriefing," pp. 9-1, 9-4; "Apollo 10 CM Voice," pp. 21()-..13; "Apollo 10 Mission Report," 

p. 8-30; Hammock, Currie, and Fisher, "Descent Propulsion System," pp. 27-28; "Apollo 

10 Voice," p. 458. 

59. 	 "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 9-6, 9-8, 9-9; "Apollo 10 Failure Listing," p. 30; "Apollo 10 

Voice," pp. 50, 457, 459-62, 500; "Apollo 10 Mission Report," p. 1-l. 

60. 	 "Apollo 10 Mission Report," p . 4-ll; "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 9-10 through 9-I2, 9-14, 

9-50; "Apollo IO Voice," pp. 466-67, 480. 

61. 	 "Apollo 10 Debriefing," pp. 9-I6, 9-IS through 9-20, 9-22; "Apollo IO Voice," pp. 483-85, 

490. 

62. 	 "Flight of Apollo IO, " pp. 9-IO; Hage memo, 26 May 1969; "Apollo 10 Mission Report," 

pp. 4-I, 8-34, I5-27 through I5-30; routing slip, Low to Gilruth, 2 July I969, with attch., 

Low, "Apollo 10 Attitude Excursions at Staging," I July I969; Lunney et a!., "Flight 

Directors Report," p. IS; "Apollo IO Debriefing," p. 9-24; "Apollo IO Mission 5-Day Report," MSC-PT-R-69-I4, May 1969, p. I2; "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 486-87, 499-508. 

63. 	 "Apollo IO Voice," pp. 499, 503, 506, 5ll-I2; "Apollo IO Debriefing," pp. 9-27, 9-3I, 9-36, 

9-43 through 9-47; "Apollo IO CM Voice," pp. 244-59; "Apollo IO Mission Report," p. 4-Il. 

64. 	 "Apollo IO Debriefing," pp. 9-52, 9-53; "Apollo IO Voice," pp. 527-28, 534-35, 575-78, 

59I, 597; "Apollo IO Mission Report," pp. 3-2, 8-34; "Apollo Summary Report," p. 2-34. 

65. 	 "Apollo 10 Voice," pp. 6ll, 656-57; Hage memo, 26 May I969; "Apollo IO CM Voice," 

pp. 459-62; "Apollo 10 Mission Report," pp. 3-2, 3-4; "Flight of Apollo 10," pp. I, ll. 

Chapter 13 

l. 	 Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data 

Book, 1958- 1968, vol. 1, NASA Resources, NASA SP-4012 (Washington, 1976), p. 10; "Interesting Information on Apollo Program and U.S. Space Programs," typescript by unknown author, 27 May 1969. 

476 
9. 	 Gilbert L. Carman and Moises N. Montez, MSC, 

Project Apollo Preliminary Lun

Dispersion Analysis," Internal Note 69-FM-20, 30 Jan. 1969; Tindall memo, "De

itoring at MCC," 10 April 1969. 

10. Tindall memo, "What's descent all about?" 30 April 1969, with enc., George W

MSC, Attn.: William R. Kelly and Tindall, "Lunar Landing Guidance and Contr

21 March 1969; Charles 0. Lewis, "LM Descent/ Ascent Summary Document, M

Subsequent: Final," MSC Internal Note MSC-CF-P-69-16, 22 May 1969, pp. 2-3. 

II. 	 Tindall memo, "G mission lunar descent is uphill-all the way," 12 May 1969; 

Low to Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 26 June 1969, with enc., John P. Mayer to 

Ops., "Review of Bellcomm's recommendations concerning Apollo II Lunar Mo

descent propellant margin ,'manual landing interactions," 20 June 1969; Ma

"Views from the CM and LM during the flight of Apollo II," II June 1969; 

Lunde, "Views from the CM and LM During the Flight of Apollo 11 (Mission 

Internal Note 69-FM-168, 12 June 1969; Tindall memo, "Some new ideas on h

the AGS during Descent," 3 July 1969. 

12. 	 Tindall memo, "G Lunar Surface stuff is still incomplete," 7 March 1969. 

13. 	 Tindall memo, "G Lunar Surface Phase Mission Techniques," II Feb. 1969; id

will be no VHF ranging data collected while tracking the LM on the lunar s

Feb. 1969; idem, "AGS alignments in lunar orbit and operations on the luna

4 April 1969, with enc., "First 2 Hours on the Lunar Surface After Touchdown 

Stay Decision," 2 April 1969; idem, "PGNCS operations while on the lunar surfac

1969, with enc., "LM IMU Alignment Sequence"; MSC, "Apollo Mission Techn

sion G, Lunar Surface Phase: Revision A," Internal Note S-PA-9T-050, 12 May 

3-7, 20; Tindall memo, "How we will h andle the effect of mascons on the LM 

face gravity alignments," 14 July 1969; General Electric, "Study of the Postla

Angle of the LEM," TIR 545-S64-03-006, 21 May 1964; Courtney G. Brooks an

Ertel, The Apollo Spacecmft: A Chronology, vol. 3, Octobe1· 1, 1964-]anuary 

NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1976) , p. 175. 

14. 	 Tindall memo, "Manual Steering for LM Ascent," 12 May 1969; idem, "Let's d

the lunar surface RR tests," 15 April 1969; idem, "Some things about Ascen

moon," 8 April 1969; Tindall memo, II Feb. 1969; idem, "CSM Rescue Mission 

are complete and clean," II June 1969; Carl R. Huss to JSC History Office, "Co

Draft Copy of 'Chariots for Apollo: A History ... ,' "2 Nov. 1976. 

15. 	 George E. Mueller to Robert R. Gilruth, 5 June 1968. 

16. 	 NASA, "Apollo II Crew Announcement," news release 69-9, 9 Jan. 1969; MSC n

69-2, 9 Jan. 1969; Michael Collins, Carrying The Fire: An Astronaut's journeys 

Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1974), pp. 297, 312-14; "Apollo XI--Flight Crew 
Phillips to Mueller, "Extravehicular Ac tivities for the First Lunar Landing Mission ," 19 

Oct. 1968. 

22. 	 Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Lunar EVA capability," 14 Oct. 1968; MSC, "Mission 

Review of the First Lunar Extravehicular Activity," I Nov. 1968; Low memo, "Minutes of 

November I, 1968, Monthly Mission Review (G Mission EVA)," 13 Nov. 1968; MSC, "Results of 13th Lunar Surface Operations Planning (LSOP) Meeting," 15 Nov. 1968; John H . 

Covington, "Reference EVA Procedures, Mission G (CMJ07 j LM5) ," 20 Dec. 1968, pp. 

3-22, 3-23, 3-24; John B. Lee memo, "Mission G timeline," II Feb. !969, with enc. 

23. 	 Collins, Carrying the Fire, p. 347; Robert Sherrod, "Men for the Moon ," in Edgar M. Cortright, ed., Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, NASA SP-350 (Washington, 1975), p. 160; 

Slayton and Raymond G. Zeclekar, telephone interviews, 18 March 1976; Grumman Aircraft 

Engineering Corp., Space Div., "Anatomy of the NASA/Grumman Apollo Lunar Module," 

in Apollo Spacecraft News Reference (Bethpage, N.Y., !969); MSC, "Results of 15th LSOP 

Meeting," 14 Feb. 1969; L. J. Riche, G. M. Colton , and T . A. Guillory, "Apollo II , Apollo 

AS-506 fCSM-107 fLM-5, Preliminary Flight Plan," 15 April !969, pp. 3-78, 3-79. 

24. 	 OMSF Weekly Report, 7 April 1969; Astronautics and Aemnautics, 1969: Ch,·onology on 

Science, Technology, and Policy, NASA SP-4014 (Washington, 1970), pp. 68, 100; MSC, 

"Apollo Program History," briefing, 14 April 1969, tape D-1; Low to .Brian M. Duff, "Press 

Inquiry," 27 June 1969, as cited in Ertel and Newkirk, Apollo Chronology, 4. 

25. 	 Collins, Carrying the Fire, pp. 327-28, 330; "Armstrong Unhurt in Ejection from Moon 

Lander Trainer," MSC Roundup, 10 May 1968; Mueller TWX to MSC and Flight and 

Langley Research Centers, Attn.: Gilruth, Paul F. Bikle, and Cortright, "LLTV Flight 

Readiness Review," 21 Nov. 1968; "There Comes a Time When It's Better to Go Than 

Stay," caption for photograph of LLTV crash on 8 Dec., MSC Roundup, 20 Dec. 1968; 

Mueller memo for LLTV-1 Review Board, "Investigation and Review of Crash of Lunar 

Landing Training Vehicle # !," II Dec. 1968; Mueller TWX to Langley, Flight Research, 

and MSC, Attn.: Dirs., "Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV) Review Board," 16 Dec. 

1968; NASA, "Review Board Reconvened," news release 69-5, 8 Jan. 1969; Mueller TWX 

to MSC, Flight Research , and Langley, Attn.: Gilruth, Gene J. Matranga, William H. Phillips, and James B. Whitten, "Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV)," 13 Feb. 1969; 

Mueller to Gilruth, 19 Feb. 1969. 

26. 	 MSC, minutes, LLTV No. 2 Flight Readiness Review Board (FRRB) , signed by Gilruth, 

I April !969; MSC news release 69-24, 3 April 1969; "Lunar Landing Trainer Resumes 

T est Flight Program at Ellington," MSC RoundufJ, 18 April 1969; Mueller TWX to MSC, 

Attn.: Gilruth, 3 April 1969; Slayton memo, "Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV) 

aerodynamic charac-teristics," 23 May 1969; Gilruth TWX to NASA Hq. : Attn.: Maj. Gen. 

John D. Stevenson , 31 May 1969; Flight Crew Ops. Dir., Weekly Activity Report, 7-13 

June 1969; OMSF Weekly Report, 16 June 1969. 

478 
p, g, , g

Carbon Dioxide Production during Lunar Exploration ," l March 1969; Low 

5 May 1969, with enc., Faget to Mgr. , ASPO, "Study of the Measurement of C

tion During Lunar Exploration," 25 April 1969, wi.th enc., subj. as above. 

31. 	 Edwin Samfield to Eng. Div. Files, "Lunar Gravity Simulator Test Setup, Buil

Feb. 1969; Mueller to Gilruth, 14 Feb. 1969; Gilruth to Phillips, 14 March 1969

"Lunar Gravity Simulation Program Plan"; Phillips to Gilruth, 28 March 196

Bond to Dir., Flight Crew Ops. , "!/6th G Simulator in Building 29," 25 Apri

ruth to Phillips, 20 May 1969; Bond to Dir., Flight Crew Ops., "1 f6th G vertic

in Building 29," 20 May 1969; Slayton to Asst. Dir. , Chern. and Mech. Sys., "O

simulator in Building 29," 29 May 1969. 

32. 	 Mueller to Gilruth, 10 Feb. 1969; Gilruth to Mueller, 24 Feb. 1969; Mueller 

26 March 1969; Phillips TWX to MSC, Attn.: Mgr. , ASPO, "Apollo II Lu

Activities Demonstration DCR," 8 April 1969; Richard S. Johnston memo, "N

mittee on EVA," 10 April 1969, with enc., "EVA Guideline"; OMSF Weekly 

April 1969; Low memo for record, "Action items resulting from lunar surface 

ular activity demonstration," 24 April 1969; Phillips to MSC, Attn.: Low, "Co

Lunar Surface EVA Demonstration," 14 May 1969; Low memo, "Lunar surface 

onstration," 2 June 1969; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Comments on lu

EVA demonstration," 9 July 1969; Johnston to Capt. William W . Wood, "Co

Apollo Preliminary Lunar Surface Operations Plan," 20 May 1969; John K. H

North, "Review of Apollo 11 Preliminary Lunar Surface Operations Plan (L

May 1969; William H. Wood, Jr., "Apollo II Lunar Surface Operations Plan: 

June 1969. 

33. 	 Low to Slayton, "Mueller's letter on lunar landing training," 17 March 1969, an

nighttime simulations," 23 June 1969; Cortright to Gilruth, 27 June 1969; Phi

"Apollo 11 Lunar Surface Operations Design Certification Review [DCR]," 29 

NASA, "Apollo 11 Launch July 16," news release, unnumbered, 12 June 1

Weekly Reports, 16 June and 7 July 1969. 

34. 	 Julian Scheer to Gilruth, 3 Jan. 1969; MSC news release 69-38, 22 April 1969; Pe

Whye to James M. Grimwood, 3 Oct. 1977, with encs., especially questions, W

Col. John A. Powers and Powers to Whye, 16 Dec. 1976, with enc.; Paul P. Hane

17 Oct. 1977, with encs., Gilruth to Haney, 21 April 1969, and Whye, "Heroes, N

Own Accord (An examination of the publicity concerning the United States 

from 1959 to 1972)" (Master's thesis, Iowa State University, 1977) , pp. 3

Haney's remarks. 

35. 	 Scheer to Slayton, 31 March 1969. 
Dishes," 29 May 1969. 

39. 	 Phillips to Low, "Lunar Surface Television," 10 April 1969; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: 

Phillips, "Lunar surface television," 18 April 1969; OMSF Weekly Report, 2 June 1969; 

Phillips to MSC, Attn.: Low, "Apollo On-Board Color TV," 13 June 1969; Haney to Dir., 

E&D "Lunar surface television proposal," 14 March 1969; Faget -to Public Affairs Officer, 

"LM ascent TV analysis," 20 March 1969; Low to Faget, "Proposed lunar ascent TV 

package," 26 April 1969. 

40. 	 Faget to Chief, Mission Ops. Br., "Comments on 'Preliminary Lunar Landing Phase 

Photographic Operations Plan,' " 27 Feb. 1969; Noel T. Lamar to Chief, Photo. Tech. 

Lab., "Apollo 11 lunar surface color photography," 10 June 1969; Low to Phillips, 20 June 

1969. 

41. 	 Phillips TWX to MSC, KSC, MSFC, Attn.: Gilruth, Kurt H. Debus, von Braun, 31 Jan. 

1969; Johnston memo, "Symbolic articles to be carried on first manned lunar landing," 11 

March 1969; Gilruth to Phillips, 13 March 1969; Gilruth to Luella Goodridge, 18 June 

1969; Gilruth to Mr. and Mrs. Stanley A. Jacques, 18 June 1969; Slayton to Spec. Asst. 

to Dir., MSC, "First lunar landing mementos," 28 March 1969. 

42. 	 Thomas 0. Paine to Assoc. and Asst. Admins. and Center Dirs., "Symbolic Articles to 

Be Carried on First Manned Lunar Landing,'' 25 Feb. 1969; Willis H. Sh~pley memo for 

record, "Meeting of the Committee on Symbolic Articles Related to the First Lunar Landing, April 1, 1969," 3 April 1969; Shapley to Mueller, "Symbolic Items for the First Lunar 

Landing," 19 April 1969. 

43. 	 Shapley to Mueller, "Symbolic Activities for Apollo 11," 2 July 1969; Alfred P. Alibrando 

memo, "Claims of sovereignty over the Moon," 11 June 1969. 

44. 	 Slayton to Ira Gallen, 1 April 1969; Low to Kraft, "Recovery of Apollo II," 5 April 1969; 

Jack A. Kinzler to Dir., MSC, "Permanent boosterjspacecraft Apollo 11 memorial," 6 June 

1!:16!!, with enc.; Gilruth to Mrs. Harold Bennett, 16 July 1969. 

45. 	 Scheer to Low, 18 April 1969; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Scheer, "Communications call 

signs for Apollo 11 spacecraft," 25 April 1969; Slayton to Dir., MSC, "Proposed Apollo 

XI patch," 28 May 1969, with enc.; Slayton to Jeffrey L. Barron, 18 June 1969; "Key Events 

in Apollo," in Cortright, ed., Apollo Expeditions, p. 306; Collins, Carrying the Fire, pp. 

332-35. 

46. 	 Col. John E. Pickering to Hess, 16 Sept. 1968, with enc.; Gilruth memo, "Operational 

Readiness Inspection of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory," 21 Oct. 1968; Phillips to MSC, 

Attn.: Gilruth, "Lunar Receiving Laboratory Readiness Review," 16 Jan. 1969; Gilruth to 

Phillips, 29 Jan. 1969, with enc., tentative agenda, Lunar Receiving Laboratory DCR. 

47. 	 MSC, "Lunar Receiving Lab," news release 69-9, 24 Jan. 1969; "Lunar Sample Area on 

Operational Status," MSC Roundup, 7 Feb. 1969; MSC, "Lunar Receiving Laboratory 

480 
17 Jan. 1969; OMSF Weekly Report, 23 June 1969; OMSF Report, 26 May 196

memo, "ICBC Meeting, June 5, 1969, Atlanta, Georgia," 11 June 1969; Hag

Hq., Attn.: General Counsel, "Back Contamination and Quarantine- A,pollo 

1969; Kraft memo, "Return of Apollo 11 flight crew, command module, and 

ples," 26 June 1969. 

51. 	 Bond to Mgr. , Flight Safety Office, "Suggested procedure for safety review of 

Test," 30 Jan. 1969; Faget memo, "Test Readiness Review Board for LM-2 D

14 Feb. 1969; Martin L. Raines to Asst. Dir., Chern. and Mech. Sys., "Safety 

of LM-2 drop tests," 5 March 1969; John M. Buxton to James J. Shannon, "Wo

Function Number 640: Test Readiness Review (TRR) Board Meeting Minute

Landing Simulation, LMM 4-8, dated 13 March 1966, Submittal of," with en

LM-2 Landing Simulation TRR Final Board Meeting, 13 March 1969; "L

Simulate Landing Accelerations," MSC Roundup, 21 March 1969; Low to Robe

16 May 1969. 

52. 	 Low to Hage, 13 May 1969, with enc., David B. Pendley to Mgr., ASPO, "LM 

failures for lunar landing mission," 8 May 1969; Low to Petrone, 8 July 1969

Mgr., ASPO, "LM-5 Landing Gear Honeycomb Review," 2 July 1969. 

53. 	 Headquarters Flight Readiness Reviews, Apollo 11 : Mission, Lunar Module, Co

Service Module, Government Furnished Equipment, Back Contamination, a

Status, 17 June 1969; James A. York, secy., minutes of LM-5 FRRB, 23 June 1

memo, " 'Apollo Spacecraft Safety Assessment CSM-107 jLM-5 Mission "G" Vo

preliminary, dated May 31 , 1969," 13 June 1969, with encs.; The Boeing C

Readiness Review Safety Assessment, Apollo 11 Mission ," 9 June 1969; Mueller 

3 April 1969; A. Duane Catterson to Spec. Asst., MSC, "Preparation of Repl

dated April 3, 1969 from Dr. Mueller to Dr. Gilru.th transmitting a report of 

human fatigue at KSC," 15 April 1969; Phillips to Apollo 11 FRRB, "Conf

Flight Readiness for the Apollo 11 Mission," 14 July 1969. 

Chapter 14 

1. 	 J. B. Hustler and T. J. Lauroesch , "Final Report, Phase IV: Lunar Photo S

November 1967-30 November 1968," Eastman Kodak Co. rept., 14 March 1969

John R. Sevier, telephone interview, 7 June 1971; Arthur T. Strickland mem

Lunar Landing Site Designation," 23 Dec. 1968, with enc., Lee R. Scherer to A

Dir., "Clarification of Nomenclature of Apollo Lunar Landing Sites," 5 Dec. 19
et al., Flight Directors Report, Apollo ll, n.d., p. 3; Collins letter, 13 Dec. 1976. 

5. 	 "Apollo ll Voice," p. 16; MSC, "Apollo ll Onboard Voice Transcription, Recorded on 

the Command Module Onboard Recorder Data Storage Equipment (DSE) ," August 1969, 

pp. 19, 32, 35, 38-40, 42; "Apollo ll Debriefing," I: 3-10, 4-4, 4-5, 6-32, 6-33; MSC, "Apollo 

ll Mission Report," MSC-00171, November 1969, pp. 1-1, 3-1, 4-1, 7-l. 

6. 	 "Onboard Voice," pp. 43 , 46-50; "Apollo ll Voice," pp. 9, 24, 30, 34, 50, 52, 66, 96, 101, 

106-ll2, 147, 154; Charlesworth et al., "Flight Directors Report," pp. 3-7; Hage memo, 

"Apollo ll Daily Operations Report No. 2," 18 July 1969; Hage memo, 24 July 1969; 

"Apollo ll Debriefing," 1: 5-5, 5-6, 5-9, 6-19 through 6-22; 10:56:20 PM, EDT, 7j20j69, pp. 

53-54. 

7. 	 Hage memo, "Apollo ll Daily Operations Report No. 3," 19 July 1969; Hage memo, 24 

July 1969; Hage memo, "Apollo ll Daily Operations Report No. 4," 20 July 1969; Charlesworth et a!., "Flight Directors Report," pp. 9-14; "Mission Report," pp. 3-1, 4-5, ·1-6; 

"Apollo ll Voice," pp. 157, 166-69, 171, 174, 183, 198, 200, 204-{)5, 210-ll, 217-18, 220, 224, 

227, 233, 235-38, 247; "Apollo ll Debriefing," 1: 6-30, 6-31, 6-33 through 6-36, 7-13 through 

7-18, 8-1; Collins, Carrying the Fire, pp. 339, 342; "Onboard Voice," pp. 58, 64, 65, 71, 

75-77, 85-86, 91, 93, 112, ll9-20, 125, 130-31, 136; Collins to Grimwood, 13 Dec. 1976; 

Kenneth A. Young, telephone interview, 7 Dec. 1977. 

8. 	 Hage memos, 20 and 24 July 1969; Hage memo, "Apollo ll Daily Operations Report 

No. 5," 21 July 1969; Charlesworth et al., "Flight Directors Report," pp. 12-14; "Apollo ll 

Debriefing," 1: 8-2, 8-5 through 8-7, 8-ll, 8-15, 8-26, 8-28, 8-29, 8-31; "Mission Report," 

pp. 3-l, 4-4 through 4-8; Mission Report: Apollo 11, p. 6; "Onboard Voice," pp. 144, 147-49, 

156, 158-59; "Apollo II Voice," pp. 293-95, 298, 300-01, 306, 307; Neil A. Armstrong to 

JSC History Off., 3 Dec. 1976. 

9. 	 "Apollo ll Debriefing," 1: 9-1, 9-4, 9-6, 9-17 through 9-28; "Onboard Voice," pp. 175-78; 

"Apollo ll Voice," pp. 308, 310, 312-17; Charlesworth et al., "Flight Directors Report," 

pp. 14-16; Hage memos, 21 and 24 July 1969; "Apollo ll Mission Report," pp. 1-1, 3-1, 

3-2, 4-8, 4-9, 5-4 through 5-6; Floyd V. Bennett, "Mission Planning for Lunar Module 

Descent and Ascent," Apollo Experience Report, NASA Technical Note S-295 (MSC-04919), 

review copy, October 1971, pp. 3, 8; Mission Report: Apollo 11, p. 6; Armstrong to JSC 

History Off., 3 Dec. 1976. 

10. 	 "Apollo ll Debriefing," 1: 10-1, 10-6 through 10-68, 10-72 through 10-82, Il-l through 

ll-6; "Apollo ll Voice," pp. 318-26, 331-36, 341-43, 352, 358-59, 368, 370-98, 400-ll, 414, 

422-30; Apollo ll Mi·ssion Report," pp. 1-1, 1-2, 3-2, 4-9 through 4-16, 5-7, 5-8, 9-1, 9-19, 

9-33, 10-1 through 10-4, Il-l through ll-5, 12-7; Mission Report: Apollo 11, pp. 2-5; Armstrong to JSC History Off., 3 Dec. 1976; Armstrong to Loyd S. Swenson, 2 Oct. 1975. 

11. 	 "Apollo ll Debriefing," 2: ll-3, 11-4, 11-6, 12-3 through 12-6, 12-10, 12-ll, 12-14, 12-20 

through 12-25, 12-32, 12-33, 12-38 through 12-43, 13-1 through 13-5, 14-1, 14-3, 14-5, 14-10 

482 
SP-4008 (Washington, 1968), p. 383; Philip E. Culbertson, NASA Hq., to Wilmo

MSC, 3 Jan. 1968. 

4. 	 Andre J . Meyer, Jr., minutes of Lunar Mission Planning Board meeting.-;, 13 an

1968; NASA OMSF, "The Plan for Lunar Exploration," February 1968; Robert R

Dir., MSC, to George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF, 4 March and 1 April 1968. 

5. 	 Jacob E. Smart, NASA Hq., to Mueller, 8 May 1968; MSC, "Establishment 

Exploration Working Group," Announcement 68-63, 14 May 1968; John D. Hodg

ASPO, "Lunar exploration support," 4 June 1968, with enc., Richard F. Bai

"ELM-Development," 23 April 1968; Hodge to NASA Hq., Attn.: Rodney W 

"Comments on Proposed FY 69 Advanced Lunar Missions Studies (981) ," 2 A

Hodge to NASA Hq., Attn.: Douglas R. Lord, "FY 1969 Advanced Manned Missio

for MSC," 6 Aug. 1968. 

6. 	 Jim R. Elk, MSC, to Lunar and Earth Sciences Div., Attn.: John M. Eggleston

bility of lunar science sites," 5 Feb. 1968; Hess to Dir., Flight Ops., "Operational c

for lunar landing missions after Mission 'G'," 6 F"eb. 1968; Christopher C. Kraft

Flight Operations, MSC, to Dir. Science and Applications, "Operational constrain

fourth lunar landing mission ," 19 March 196·8; Robert B. Bristow, "A Feasibility 

Advanced Missions to the Lunar Craters Copernicus and Tycho," draft MSC Inte

67-ET- , 18 April 1968. 

7. 	 Douglas R. Hendrickson to Dep. Dir., MSC, and Chief, Adm. Services Div., "Ab

of the MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board," 14 Aug. 1968, with em:.; MSC, 

ment of the MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board," Announcement 68-118

1968; Meyer, minutes of Lunar Mission Planning Board meeting, 23 Sept. 1968; 

Maynard to Mgr., MSC ASPO, "ASSB (Apollo Site Selection Board) Meeting-

port," 4 Oct. 1968; Benjamin Milwitzky to Dir., Apollo Lunar Exploration O

OMSF, and Asst. Dir., Automated Systems, "Bia•sing Apollo Missions to Land 

veyor Spa'Cecraft on the Moon," 10 Jan. 1969. 

8. 	 Hodge memo, "Extended Duration Gotl11llland and Service Module Study," 25 

with enc.; MSC, "Command and Service Module Sta-tement of Work ," 13 Feb. 196

20, and 28 Feb. 1969); Hodge memo, "Sta-tement of Work for Phase B Design

Study of Intermediate Size Lunar Landing Spa'Cecraft," 31 Dec. 1968, with en

memo, "Phase B Design-Definition Study of an Extended Lunar Module," 11 

wi.th enc., "Statement of Work for Phase B Design-Definition Study of an Ex,too

Module," 6 Dec. 1968; "LM Modification Study Statement of Work," 13 Feb. 196

and 28 Feb. 1969); George M. Low memo, "Discussions with General Phillips c

advanced lunar missions," 25 April 1969; NASA OMSF Report to 'the Admin., NA

by Mueller, 26 May 1969; William E. S-toney, Jr., NASA OMSF, to MSC, Attn.: 

Loftus, "CSM Orbi-tal Science Missions," 15 May 1969. 
,g; , gy , 

Technology, and Policy, NASA SP-4014 (Washington, 1970) , p. 353; Boeing, "The Boeing 

Lunar Rover," news release, 30 Oct. 1969. 

11. 	 John D. Stevenson TWX to KSC et a!., "MSC Mission Operations Forecast for January 

1969," 3 Jan. 1969; Mueller to Gilruth and Debus, 14 Feb. 1969; E. Dixon Murrah memo, 

"Lunar Exploration Program Newsletter," 20 Feb. 1969; OMSF, "Launch Readiness Flight 

Planning Schedule," April 1969; Hess to Dir., MSC, "Six-month center·s between lunar 

landing missions," 9 May 1969, with enc.; Mueller Report, 28 July 1969; Mueller to Llewellyn J . Evans, President, Grumman Aircrah Engineering Corp., 11 Aug. 1969. 

12. A. J . Dessler, "Discontent of Space-Science Community," MS for journal article, 30 Oct. 

1969; MSC news releases 69-54, 1 Aug., and 69-74, 27 Oct. 1969; President Richard M. 

Nixon to the Vice President et a!., no subj., 13 Feb. 1969; Milton W . Rosen, NASA Hq., 

"Activities of President's Space Task Group and NASA Internal Planning Groups," 7 April 

1969; Harold C. Urey to Charles H . Townes, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, and John Findley, 

National Radio Astronomy Observatory, 27 Oct. 1969; Carl R. Huss to JSC History Office, 

"Comments on Draft Copy of 'Chariots for Apollo . .. ,'" 2 Nov. 1976; NASA, "Lunar 

Science Corrference Jan. 5-8," news release 69-170, 23 Dec. 1969. 

13. 	 "A Scientist on Space Needs," Wash ington Post, 17 Sept. 1970. 

14. NASA, "Lunar Science Sta.tions Cease Functioning Oct. 1," news release 77-203, 27 Sept. 

1977; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968, NASA SP-4010 (Washington, 1969), pp. m, 

324-35; 1969, pp. iii, 2, 7, 20, 158-59, 198, 248-S2; 1972, NASA SP-4017 (1974), pp. iii, 

420-24, 426--39, 449. 

15. Margaret Mead in "Prize- or Lunacy?" Newsweek, 7 July 1969, p. 61; Arthur Schlesinger, 

Jr., quoted in House, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 30 Sept. 1976, p. H11946. 

484 
Bibliographical Note 

S

ix years before Apollo reached its goal in 1969, a cartoon depic

men standing atop two extremely tall stacks of paper. One ma

stepped out onto the lunar surface, said to the other: "I told you w

get to the moon." The cartoonist may not have been too far off t

when one considers the documentation generated by Apollo. So

linear meters of that paper, more than half of it covering the period 

the first lunar landing, came to rest in the History Archives of the 

Space Center in Houston, Texas. And this small percentage of th

represents what was left after numerous screenings and cullings 

torians, archivists, and editors. These materials were collected in a 

of ways over a period of years. 

While the research for this Apollo history was being done, gov

engineers connected with manned space flight evolved into three-

veterans-Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. Of these participants, many 

pack rats, collecting documents and creating what might be calle

archives." Much of this material contains engineering marginalia th

the researcher on to more and more documents, with a snow-ballin

As the engineers moved to new positions and were forced to c

their desks, many were happy to find a historical archives funct

might preserve some of their more treasured papers. Along with 

collected during research and documentary forays by historians, a

and editors to NASA Headquarters in Washington and to its othe

scattered over the nation and during visits to institutions and indust

cerns connected with Apollo, these holdings-covering the yea

485 
pppgg , g 

1960 through 1972 (17 five-drawer filing cabinets). This collection contains a cross-section of materials on almost every phase, event, or subject of 

the Apollo program. It includes matter from every organizational element 

in the spacecraft program office, as well as correspondence from other divisions of the Houston center, from other NASA centers, from NASA Headquarters, and from industry and institutions that worked on Apollo. Research in these files turned up information on technical problems in the 

program, from the time problems were discovered until they were finally 

resolved, and on program decisions, failures, and successes. A number of 

summary documents evaluated Apollo at specific times, to measure performance and progress against costs and schedules. 

Research in this extensive collection, by three historians with the help 

of an editor and an archivist, was a physical, as well as mental, task. Even 

with the mass of documentation, however, there was no mystery about what 

subjects would be important in the development of the Apollo spacecraft. 

For example, it was obvious from the start that the mode issue-how NASA 

intended to fly men to the moon and back-was a major influence on spacecraft, launch vehicle, and launch preparation, and facility designs. Subjects 

such as this had generated so much paperwork at so many locations that 

there is probably enough material to write lengthy monographs on each. 

Most of the source notes to this volume, therefore, form small bibliographies for the narrative discussions. Again, the historians had to make 

arbitrary selections of which documents to cite because of the physical 

limitations on the number of citations possible in one book. 

Another source, unique to the writing of contemporary (or near-contemporary) history, added to the archives collection: tape-recorded oral history interviews (two-thirds of them transcribed) of many key program participants. This research began before Apollo reached its goal, continued 

486 
would be "court history," presenting events too much from the p

participants' point of view. He did, however, complain that the hi

had become too intrigued with the mass of available information to 

their heads out of the files." Other reviewers contended that the hi

paid too much attention to outside influences on the program a

enough to the technical descriptions and development of the ma

These diverse comments were appreciated and responded to, in so

gree-although not, perhaps, to the satisfaction of either side. We h

have presented enough of the story of the program, as well as its te

problems and solutions, to capture the interest of the reader whose o

fall somewhere between the two extremes. At any rate, this history is 

based on a portion of the documents that the Apollo program ge

A listing follows of persons talked with, selected samples of the docu

tion, and other sources used. 

1. PERSONS INTERVIEWED 

[Asterisks indicate telephone conversations. Key to 

abbreviations of affiliations is at the end of the list.] 

I. Abbey, Gene, Gen. Precision 9. Anderson, Roger A., LaR

2. Adams, J. J., NAR 10. Andrews, Norman W., Gr

3. Africano, Alfred, NAR II. Appelman, Charles,* GE 

4. Algranti, Joseph S., MSC 12. Armstrong, William 0., 

5. Alldredge, J. Brooks, MSC Hq. 

6. Altneu, Irwin J., NAR 13. Atkinson, W. A., MSC 

7. Amman, Ernest A., KSC 14. Atwood, Donald J., AC 

8. Anderson, Robert C., TRW Electronics 
29. Bird, John D., LaRC 

30. Bixler, Charles, GE 

31. Blake, Dan, Gen. Precision 

32. Blount, Earl, NAR 

33. Boynton, John H., MSC 

34. Briggs, Glenn W., MSC-Downey 

35. Bromberg, Robert, Rocketdyne 

36. Brown, B. Porter, NASA Hq. 

37. Brown, Clinton E., LaRC 

38. Bruning, William, Grumman 

39. Buhler, Cary, Northrop-Ventura 

40. Burmood, R. 0 ., Collins Radio 

41. Butler, Gordon, Collins Radio 

42. Buxton, Jack,• Grumman 

43. Canning, Frank X., Grumman 

44. Canning, Thomas N., ARC 

45. Carbee, Robert M., Grumman 

46. Carroll, Robert E., NAR 

47. Case, Mel, Int'l Latex 

48. Casey, Francis W ., Jr., MSC 

49. Cathers, H. B., NAR 

50. Chamberlin, James A., MSC 

51. Charlesworth, Clifford E., MSC 

52. Cheatham, Donald C., MSC 

53. Chilton, Robert G., MSC 

54. Chop, Albert M., NASA Hq. 

55. Clark, E. E., NAR 

56. Clemence, Raymond R., MSC 

57. Clements, Henry E., MSC 

58. Cohen, Aaron, MSC 

59. 	 Collins, Maurice W ., 


MSC-Downey 


75. Dodge, Harold E., IBM 

76. Dolan, Thomas E., Martin 

77. Donlan, Charles J., NASA Hq. 

78. Draper, C. Stark, MIT 

79. Dryden, Hugh L., NASA Hq. 

80. Duggan, Orton L., KSC 

81. Edwards, J. J., NAR 

82. Eggers, Alfred J., Jr., NASA Hq. 

83. Eggleston, John M., MSC 

84. Ehricke, Krafft A., NAR 

85. Elverum, Gerard W., Jr., TRW 

86. Evans, Brian, Grumman 

87. 	 Ewing, Edgar G., 


Northrop-Ventura 


88. Ezell, William F., NAR 

89. Faber, Stanley, MSC 

90. Faget, Maxime A., MSC 

91. Falbaum, Sanford, NAR 

92. Feld, David, Bell Aerospace 

93. Feltz, Charles H., NAR 

94. Ferdman, Saul, Grumman 

95. Field, Robert E., NAR 

96. 	 Finkelstein, Nisson A., Int'l 


Latex 


97. Fisher, Lewis R., MSC-Bethpage 

98. 	 Fitzgerald, Charles, Gen. 


Precision 


99. Flagg, Henry W., Jr., MSC 

100. Forest, Casey, Bell Aerospace 

101. Freedman, Toby, NAR 

102. Frick, Charles W ., Philco-Ford 

103. Funk, Jack, MSC 

488 
121. Hahn, Jack R., Rocketdyne 

122. Haines, Richard F., ARC 

123. Hall, Albert C., OSD / DOD 

124. Hammack, Jerome B., MSC 

125. 	 Hammes, Ted, Hamilton 

Standard 

126. Hardy, Gordon H., ARC 

127. Hartung, Jack B., MSC 

128. 	 Hauenstein, Clifford A., 

Rocketdyne 

129. Healey, John P., NAR 

130. Heberlig, Jack C., MSC 

131. Hello, Bastian, N AR 

132. Hess, Wilmot N., MSC 

133. Highsmith, Helen,• Grumman 

134. Hoag, David G., MIT 

135. 	 Hobokan, Andrew, 

MSC-Bethpage 

136. Hodge, John D., MSC 

137. Hoffman, Arnold 1., TRW 

138. Hoffman, Samuel K., Rocketdyne 

139. Holden, George R., ARC 

140. Holland, Howard,• Grumman 

141. Holmes, D. Brainerd, NASA Hq. 

142. Holmes, Jay, NASA Hq. 

143. Hornby, Harold, ARC 

144. Houbolt, John C., LaRC 

145. Hudson, Lincoln, Honeywell 

146. Hughey, B. J., Aerojet-General 

147. Hurt, J . B., Gen. Dynamics 

148. Huss, Carl R., MSC 

165. 	 Knacke, Theodore W., 

Northrop-Ventura 

166. Kraft, Christopher C., Jr.

167. Kroupa, Charles E., Grum

168. Kupczyk, Richard R., Gr

169. Kupfer, Walker, MIT 

170. Lang, Dave W., MSC 

171. Lanzkron, Rolf W., MSC 

172. Larson, Howard, Gen. D

173. Larson, Raymond F., NA

174. Larson, Robert L., TRW 

175. Lawton, Richard W., GE 

176. Lee, William A., Raytheo

177. Lessing, Henry C., ARC 

178. Levin, Kenneth, Bell Aer

179. Levine, David S., NAR 

180. Linder, Harry S., MSC-D

181. Link, John, Int'l Latex 

182. Linton, Ted, Marquardt 

183. Lord, Douglas R., NASA 

184. Love, Eugene S., LaRC 

185. Low, George M., MSC 

186. McCafferty, Riley D., M

187. 	 McCarger, Charles G., 

Aerojet-Gen. 

188. Mace, William D., LaRC 

189. McGahey, Richard, Int'l 

190. McGee, Leonard A., ARC 

191. McKnight, Dick, Gen. Pr

192. 	 McLaughlin, Richard 1., 

Grumman 
209. Miller, Ford L., MSC-Downey 

210. Miller, John E., MIT 

211. Miller, Lowell, Rocketdyne 

212. Morris, Owen G., MSC 

213. Morse, Archibald E., Jr., KSC 

214. Mortimer, Robert, Bell 

Aerospace 

215. Mueller, George E., NASA Hq. 

216. Mullaney, Robert S., Grumman 

217. Muller, Donald E., GE 

218. Myers, Dale D., NASA Hq. 

219. Neal, James L., MSC 

220. Newhouse, C. W., Marquardt 

221. Nicks, Oran W., MSC 

222. Nicollelo, Henry, AiResearch 

223. 

224. 

Nitzberg, Gerald E., ARC 

North, Warren J., MSC 

225. 

226. 

Nugent, John, MIT 

O'Connell, J. J., Gen. Precision 

227. Olson, R. L., NAR 

228. O'Malley, Thomas J., NAR 

229. Oquist, Hal 0., Rocketdyne 

230. Ottinger, C. Wayne, FRC 

231. Owens, W. L., NAR 

232. Page, Thornton L., MSC 

233. 

234. 

Parker, John A., ARC 

Pastore, Dominick .J., Grumman 

235. Patton, Rollin Mark, ARC 

236. Paup, John W., NAR 

237. Perrine, Calvin H., Jr., MSC 

238. Pesman, Gerard J., MSC 

490 

254. Renzetti, Nicholas A.,• JPL 

255. Riehl, William, Grumman 

256. Rose, James T., McDonnell 

257. Rose, Rodney G., MSC 

258. Rosen, Milton W., NASA Hq. 

259. Ruseckas, Joseph, David Clark 

260. Russo, Raymond R., Grumman 

261. 

262. 

Ryken, John, Bell Aerospace 

Ryker, Norman J., Jr., NAR 

263. Salina, Salvatore, Grumman 

264. Samulon, Henry, TRW 

265. Sasser, James H., MSC 

266. Schmid, James E., Grumman 

267. Schneider, William C., 

NASA Hq. 

268. Schweickart, Russell A., MSC 

269. Scott, Hugh M., • MSC 

270. Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 

NASA Hq. 

271. Sharpe, Burton L., MSC 

272. Shea, Joseph F., Raytheon 

273. Shepard, Leonard, Int'l Latex 

274. Sherman, Howard, Grumman 

275. Shoaf, Harry C., KSC 

276. Short, Jack, Airlock 

277. Silverstein, Abe, LeRC 

278. Simpkinson, Scott H.,• MSC 

279. Skrydloff, Leon, NorthropVentura 

280. Skurla, George M., Grumman 

281. Slayton, Donald K., • MSC 
Precision 328. Williams, Lawrence G., • 

298. Thibodaux, Joseph G., MSC 329. Williams, Walter C., MS

299. Thompson, Floyd L., LaRC 330. Wingrove, Rodney, ARC 

300. Thompson, William D., AC 331. Wondka, Robert P., Nort

Electronics Ventura 

301. Thornsjo, Oreland 0., Honeywell 332. Woodling, Carroll H., MS

302. Tischler, Adelbert 0., NASA Hq. 333. Wright, Howard, Grumm

303. Trageser, Milton B., MIT 334. Wulfsberg, Arthur H., Co

304. Treinen, Terry, Rocketdyne Radio 

305. Trembath, Nathaniel W., TRW 335. Wyatt, DeMarquis D., NA

306. Trimble, George S., Jr., MSC 336. York, Herbert F., UCSC 

307. 

308. 

309. 

310. 

Trimpi, Robert L., LaRC 

Tripp, Ralph H., Grumman 

Truszynski, Gerald M., NASA 

Hq. 

Turantsky, Clem, Bell Aerospace 

337. 

338. 

339. 

340. 

Yost, Harold C., AC Elec

Yost, Michael, Rocketdyn

Zaitzeff, Eugene M., Bend

Zavasky, Raymond L., La

311. Underwood, Richard W., MSC 341. Zedekar, Raymond G., M

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS 

AC Electronics AC Electronics Division, General Motors Corp. 

Aerojet-General Aerojet-General Corp., Div., The General Tire 

Rubber Co. 

AiResearch AiResearch Manufacturing Co., The Garrett Co

Airlock Airlock, Inc. 

ARC Ames Research Center, NASA 

Bell Aerospace Bell Aerospace Co., Div., Textron Inc. 

Bendix Aerospace Systems Division, The Bendix Corp. 

Collins Radio Collins Radio Co. 

David Clark David Clark Co., Inc. 
LeRC 

McDonnell 

Marquardt 

Martin 

MIT 

MSC 

MSFC 

OSD/ DOD 

NAR 

NASA Hq. 

Northrop-Ventura 

Philco-Ford 

Raytheon 

Rocketdyne 

TRW 

ucsc 

Lewis Research Center, NASA 

McDonnell Aircraft Corp. (merged into McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. in April 1967) 

The Marquardt Corp. 

Martin Marietta Corp. 


Massachusetts Institute of Technology 


Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA (renamed Johnson 

Space Center in February 1973) 

Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

North American Rockwell (North American Aviation, 

Inc., before September 1967; Rockwell International 

from February 1973) 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Headquarters 

Northrop-Ventura, Northrop Corp. 

Philco-Ford Corp., Ford Motor Corp. 

Raytheon Co. 

Rocketdyne Division, North American Rockwell 

(formerly North American Aviation, Inc.) 

TRW Inc. 

University of California, San Diego 

492 
g, 

ppy 

a•t the Break of the Space-Age, October 4, 1957." NASA Historical Note 22. W

15 July 1963. 

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. "Project Apollo Feasibility Study Summary." P

Bethpage, N.Y., 15 May 1961. 

Hazard, Allyn B. "A Plan -for Manned Lunar and Planetary Exploration." Jet Propul

oratory, Pasadena, Calif., November 1959. 

Heaton, Donald H. "U.S. Lunar Travel Progmm." Paper presented before Society 

motive Engineers, New York, 8 Dec. 1960. 

Hornig, Donald F.; Hebb, Malcolm H.; Hyland, Lawrence A.; Ling, Donald P.; 

Brockway; and Schwarzschild, J. Mar.tin. "Repon of Ad Hoc Panel on Man-

President's Science Advisory Commi-ttee, Washington, 1960. 

[Houbol,t, John C., et a!.] "Manned Lunar Landing through Use of Lunar-Orbit Ren

2 vols. Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va., 31 Oct. 1961. 

Jet Propulsion La-boratory. "Some Interrelationships and Long-Range Implications o

Lunar Rendezvous and Solid Nova Concepts." TM 33-52. Pasadena, Calif., 2 Oct. 

Lina, Lindsay J., and Vogeley, Arthur W. "Preliminary S.tudy of a Piloted Rendezvo

tion from the Lunar Surface to an Orbiting Space Vehicle." Langley Researc

Hampton, Va., 21 Feb. 1961. 

Lundin, Bruce T.; Downhower, Walter J.; Eggers, A. J., Jr.; Johnson, Lt. Col. Geor

Loftin, Laurence K.; Ruppe, Harry 0.; Escher, William J. D.; and May, Ralp

"A Survey of Various Vehicle Systems for the Manned Lunar .Mission." NASA, W

10 June 1961. 

----; Hjornevik, Wesley L.; Pearson, E. 0.; and Rothrock, A. M. "Report 

Working Group on Location of Manned Space Flight Activ1ty." NASA, Washingto

1960. 

Maggin, B.; McGolrick, J.; Paraghamian, B.; Nelson, A.; Hall, E.; Disher, J.; and 

"Guidelines for a Program for Manned and Unmanned Orbital Operations." NAS

ington, May 1961. 

Martin Co. "Apollo: Final Report." Baltimore, Md., May 1961. 

Michael, William H ., Jr. "Weight Advantages of Use of Parking Orbit for Lunar Sof

Mission." In Jack W. Crenshaw et a!., "Studies Rela:ted to Lunar and Planetary 

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va., 26 May 1960. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "NASA-Industry Apollo Technical C

A Compilation of the Papers Presented, Washington, D.C., 18, 19, 2() July 1961." 

ton, 1961. 
----, Special Committee on Space Technology. "Recommendations Regarding a National 

Civil Space Program." 28 Oct. 1958. 

NASA, Goddard Space Flight Center. "A Ground Instrumentation Support Plan for the 

Near-Earth Phases of Apollo Missions." X-520-62-211. Greenbelt, Md., 23 Nov. 1962. 

NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center. "Lunar Orbital Techniques for Performing the Lunar 

Mission." Houston, April 1962. 

NASA, Marshall Space }'light Center. "MSFC Thoughts on the NASA Long-Range Plan 

(LPR63) ." M-CP-P(R-21). Huntsville, Ala., 4 Sept. 1962. 

NASA, Space Task Group. "A Lunar Landing Proposal Using Rendezvous." Hampton, Va., 

30 Aug. 1961. 

- ---. "Preliminary Project Development Plan for an Advanced Manned Spacecraft 

Program Utilizing the Mark II Two Man Spacecraft." 14 Aug. 1961. 

NASA and Department of Defense. "Joint Report on Facilities and Resources Required at 

Launch Site to Support NASA Manned Lunar Landing Program [Debus-Davis Report]: 

Phase I Report." Atlantic Missile Range, Fla., 31 July 1961. 

----, Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (Golovin Committee) . "Final Report." 

LLVPG 105. Washington, 1 Feb. 1962. 

North American Aviation, Inc. "Feasibility Study for Apollo Advanced Manned Spacecraft and 

System." NA-60-1247. Downey, Calif., 7 Oct. 1960. 

Powers, Thomas L. "Lunar Landing Dynamics." Bellcomm, Washington, 17 June 1963. 

President's Science Advisory Committee. "Report of the Space Vehicle Panel." Washington, 3 

Jan. 1962. 

U.S. 	 Air Force Systems Command, Space Systems Div. "Lunar Expedition Plan: Lunex." 

WDLAR-S-458. Washington, May 1961. 

U.S. 	Army Ordnance Missile Command, Army Ballistic Missile Agency. "A Lunar Exploration 

Program Based upon Saturn-Boosted Sy~tems." Red&tone Ar&enal, Ala., 1 Feb. 1960. 

----. "Project Horizon, Phase I Report: A U.S. Army Study for the Establishment of a 

Lunar Military Outpost." Redstone Ar&enal, Ala., 8 June 1959. 

[Voas, Robert B.] "Preliminary Material for the Selection and Training of A&tronauts for 

Advanced Space Flights." Space Task Group, Hampton, Va., 31 Oot. 1961. 

----. "Program for Scientist Astronaut Selection: A Presentation to the Administrator, 

May 17, 1963." Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 1963. 

Von Braun, Wernher; Stuhlinger, Ernst; and Koelle, H . H. "ABMA Presentation to the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration." ABMA Report D-TN-1-59. Huntsville, 

Ala., 15 Dec. 1958. 

Wiesner, 	Jerome B.; BeLieu, Kenneth; Gardner, Trevor; Hornig, Donald F.; Land, Edwin H .; 

Lehrer, Maxwell; Purcell, Edward M.; Rossi, Bruno B.; and Watters, Harry J. "Report to 

the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space." Washington, 10 Jan. 1961. 

494 
g, 

Draper, C. S. "The Evolution of Aerospace Guidance Technology at the Massachusetts 

of Technology, 1935-1951." Paper presented at ·the 5th IAA History Symposium, 

Belgium, 19-25 Sept. 1971. 

Ellis, Wilbert E., and Norris, D. William, Jr. "Lunar Excursion Module Environme

Thermal Control System Optimization." Apollo Working Paper 1102. Manned S

Center, Houston, 8 Jan. 1964. 

Ferguson, Richard B. "Propulsion Requirements for Lunar Landing Missions Emp

Detachable Lunar Lander." Apollo Working Paper 1038. Manned Spacecraft 

Houston, 19 Dec. 1961. 

General Electric Co., Apollo Support Dept. "Study of the Postlanding Tilt Angle of th

TIR 545-S64-03-00. Houston, 21 May 1964. 

Gilruth, Robert R., and Faget, Maxime A. "The Manned Lunar Mission." Paper p

before the American Rocket Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 17-19 July 1962. 

- - - - , and McMillion, L. N. "Man's Role in Apollo." Paper presented at Institut

Aerospace Sciences Man-Machine Competition Meeting, Seatde, Wash., 10-11 Aug

Haines, C. Dale, and Taylor, J. T. "Considerations toward the Selection of Electric

Systems and Thermal Control Systems for the Lunar Excursion Module." Apollo 

Paper 1055. Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 18 Dec. 1962. 

Kehlet, Alan B.; Smith, Richard F.; Mayo, Edward E.; and Canady, John E., Jr. "A Pre

Study of a Fin-Stabilized Solid-Fuel Rocket Booster for Use with the Apollo Sp

Apollo Working Paper 1020. Space Task Group, Hampton, Va., 7 June 1961. 

----; Franklin, M. R.; McMillion, L. N.; Winterhalter, D. L.; Reed, J. D. "N

Project Apollo: January 1960-January 1962." Manned Spacecraft Center, Hamp

[sic], 8 Jan. 1962. 

Kelly, Thomas J. "Apollo Lunar Module Mission and Development Status." Paper p

at AIAA Fourth Annual Meeting and Technical Display, Anaheim, Calif., 23-27 O

----. "Technical Development Status of the Project Apollo Lunar Excursion 

P<~~per presented at lOth Annual Meeting, American Astronautical Society, New Y

May 1964. 

Mason, Robert M. "A Preliminary Analysis of the Effects of Exhaust Impingemen

Lunar Surface during the Terminal Phases of Lunar Landing." Apollo Workin

1052. Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 21 Dec. 1962. 

Maynard, Owen E. "A General Description of the Lunar Excursion Vehicle's Systems 

cursions from Lunar Orbit to Lunar Landing and Back to Lunar Orbit." Apo.Jio 

Paper 1028. Space Task Group, Hampton, Va., 29 Sept. 1961. 
----, Flight Operations Div. "Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo Program Development 

Plan." January 1966. 

NASA, Space Task Group. "A General Description of the Apollo 'Bug' Systems." Hampton, 

Va., 11 Sept. 1961. 

Reid, Richard. "Simulation and Eva.luation of Landing Gear Probe for Sensing Engine Cutoff 

During Landing." MSC Internal Note MSC-IN-65-EG-10. Houston, 15 March 1965. 

Stra~s, H. Kurt. "A Lunar Landing Concept." In Strass, ed., "Project Apollo Space Task 

Group Study Report, February 15, 1961." Apollo Working Paper 1015. Space Task Group, 

Hampton, Va., 21 Apr.il 1961. 

Trageser, MiJ.ton B., and Hoag, David G. "Apollo Spacecraft Guidance System." MIT-lL 

R495. Paper pre~ted at the IFAC Symposium on Automatic Control in the Peaceful 

U= of Space, Stavanger, Norway, June 1965. 

U.S. 	 A.ir Force Systems Command. "Configuration Management during the Definition and 

Acquisition Phases." 375-l. June 1962 (rev. June 1964). 

4. PRIMARY SouRCEs: APoLLO REPORTS1 REVIEws, EvALUATIONS, 

ExPERIENCE REPORTS 

Baron, Thomas Ronald. "An Apollo Report." Typescript. Kennedy Space Center, Fla., ca. 

January 1967. 

Campos, Arturo B. "Lunar Module Electrical Power Subsystem." Apollo Experience Report 

(AER) TN S-337. Review copy. Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, April 19'72. 

Chandler, William A.; Rice, Robert R.; and Allgeier, Robert K., Jr. "The Cryogenic Storage 

System." AER TN S-321. Review copy. MSC, Houston, November 1972. 

Dotts, Robert L. "Spacecraft Hea-ting Environment and Thermal Protection for Launch 

through the Atmosphere of the Earth." AER TN S-350. Review copy. MSC, Houston, 

July 1972. 

Farkas, Andrew J. "Lunar Module Display and Control Subsystem." AER TN S-285. Review 

copy. MSC, Houston, May 19'71. 

General Dynamics, Convair Div. "Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: 

Final Report." GDC-66-042. San Diego, May 1966. 

496 
November 1965. 

- --- , Apollo Program Control. "Apollo Program Weekly Status Report." 1968-1

----, Office of Programs. "Program Review, Apollo, October 20, 1962." 1962. 

NASA, Johnson Space Center. "Apollo Program Summary Report." JSC-09423. Hou

NASA, Manned Spacecra~t Center. "Board Report for NASA Inspection and 

Block I Mock· Up Command and Service Modules, April 23-30, 1964." 1964. 

--- - ·"Board Repont for NASA Inspection and Review of Block II Mock·Up , 

and Service Modules, September 29-0ctober I, 1964." 1964. 

----. "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of M-5 Mockup, Lun

sion Module, October 5-8, 1964." 1964. 

- ---. "Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of TM·l Mock-U

Excursion Module, March 19-26, 1964." 1964. 

---- . "Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas: Interim Facilities." l Au

----. "Presentation Made at Apollo Program Planning Seminar, San Augusti

October 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1966." 1966. 

----, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) . "Apollo 7 Air-to-Ground V

scription." 1968. 

----. "Apollo 8 Technical Air-to·Ground Voice Transcription (GOSS Net 

cember 1968. 

"A•pollo 9 Technical Air-to·Ground Voice Transcription (GOSS Net l

1969. 

"Apollo 10 Technical Air-to·Ground Voice Transcription (GOSS Net 

1969. 

"Apollo ll Technical Air·to·Ground Voice Transcription (GOSS Net 

1969. 

"Apollo 4 Mission Report." MSC-PA-R-68-l. January 1968. 

"Apollo 5 Mission Report." MSC-·PA-R-68-7. 27 March 1968. 

----. "Apollo 6 Mission Report." MSC-PA-R-68-9: June 1968. 

----. "A•pollo 7 Mission Report." MSC-PA-R-68-15. December 1968. 

----. "Apollo 9 Mission Report." MSC-PA-R-69-l. May 1969. 

---- . "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Apollo Pad Abort 1." 13 Nov. 1

----. "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Apollo Mission PA-2 (BP-23A

A-R-65-3. 29 July 1965. 

"Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-001 (BP-12) ." MSC-R-A-64-

1964. 

"Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-002 (BP-23) ." MSC-R-A-65-

1965. 
- - --· "Postlaunch Report for Mission AS-201 (Apollo Spacecraft 009) ." MSC-A-R66-4. 6 May 1966. 

- ---, Mission Support Div. "Postlaunch Report for AS-202 (Apollo Spacecraft Oil)." 

MSC-A-R-66-5. 12 O<lt. 1966. 

North American Aviation, Inc. "CSM CostfSchedulefTechnical Characteristics Study: Final 

Report." SID7135. Downey, Calif., 30 April 1971. 

Phillips, Maj. Gen. S. C.; Shea, J. F.; Rees, E. F. M.; O'Connor, Brig. Gen. E. F.; and Keeling, 

Maj . Gen . G. F. "NASA Review Team Report." NASA, Washington, ca. December 1965. 

Pigg, Orvis E., and Weiss, Stanley P. "Spacecraft Structural Windows." AER TN S-377. Review 

copy. MSC, Houston, July 1973. 

Rogers, William F. "Lunar Module Landing Gear Subsystem." AER TN S-316. Review copy. 

MSC, Houston, January 1972. 

Rozas, Patrick, and Cunningham, ABen R. "Lunar Module Landing Radar and Rendezvous 

Radar." AER TN S-311. Review copy. MSC, Houston, November 1971. 

Rutkowski, Michael. "Structural Loads Due to Maneuvers of the Command and Service 

ModulefLunar Module." AER TN S-280. Review copy. MSC, Houston, May 1971. 

Ryker, N. J. "Technical Status of the Apollo Command and Service Modules." SID 64-698. 

North American Aviation, Downey, Calif., 3 April 1964. 

Samonski, Frank H ., and Tucker, Elton M. "Command and Service Module Environmental 

Control System." AER TN S-279. Review copy. MSC, Houston, May 1971. 

Sauer, Richard L., and Calley, David J. "Potable Water •System." AER TN S-363. Review copy. 

MSC, Houston, January 1973. 

Taeuber, Ralph J ., and Weary, Dwayne E. "Command and Service Module Reaction Control 

Systems." AER TN S-336. Review copy. MSC, Houston, November 1972. 

5. PuBLISHED PRIMARY SouRcEs 

Cong.ress, House, Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee. Independent Offices Appropriations for 1963: Hearings. 87th Cong., Zd sess., 1962. 

----, Comm.ittee on Science and A~tronautics. 1962 NASA Authorization: Hearings on 

H .R . 6874. 87·th Cong., lst sess., 1961. 

--- -. 1965 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H .R. 9641 (Superseded by H.R. 10456). 88th 

Cong., 2d sess., 1964. 

----. 1968 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R . 4450, H.R . 6470 (Superseded by H.R. 

10340). 90th Gong., 1st sess., 1967. 

498 
f gfypg p

of January 27, 1967. 8 parts. 90th Cong. , lst sess., 7 Feb. 1967 to January 1968. 

----. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1962: H earings on H .R . 6874 . 87th 

sess., 1961. 

----· NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1963 : H earings on H.R. 11737. 87·th 

sess., 1962. 

----. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964: Hearings on S. 1245. 88th Cong

1963. 

- - --. NASA Authorization fo!· Fiscal Year 1965: H earings on S. 2446. 88th. Gong

1964. 

----. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966: Hearings on S. 927. 89th Cong

1965. 

----· NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1969: Report on H.R. 15856. 90th 

sess., 20 May 1968. 

---- , Subcommittee on Governmental Activities. Investigation of Governmental 

tion for Space Activities: Hearings. 86th Cong., bt sess., 1959. 

----, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee. Independent Offices Appr

1963: Hearings on H.R. 12711. 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962. 

---- · Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year I967: Hearings on H 

89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966. 

Cord, John M., and Seale, Leonard M. "The One-Way Manned Space Mission." 

Engineering 21 (December 1962) : 60. 

[Ertel, Ivan D.] Gemini VIII: Rendezvous and Docking Mission . MSC Fact Sheet 291-E

Manned Spacecraft Center, April 1966·. 

Gemini IX-A: Rendezvous Mission . MSC Fact Sheet 291-F. August 1966. 

----· Gemini X: Multiple Rendezvous, EVA Mission. MSC Fact Sheet 291-G. 

1966. 

---- . Gemini XI Mission : High Altitude, Tethered Flight. MSC Fact Sheet 291-

1966. 

----. Gemini XII Flight and Gemini Program Summary. MSC Fact Sheet 291-1. 

1966. 

National Academy of Sciences. A R eview of Space Research. Summer study at 

University of Iowa, 17 June-10 August 1962. NAS Publication 1079, 1962. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: News Con

Apollo Plans at NASA Headquarters on July 11, 1962. Washington, 1962. 

---- . NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, July 28-29, 1960. 1960. 

----· Proceedings of the Second NASA-Industry Progmm Plans Conference, W

D.C., February 11-12, 1963. SP-29. 1963. 
Jones, Leo L. 

A Brief History of Mississippi Test Facility. Comment ed. MTF, La., March 

1967. 

- ---, and Jarrell, A. Ruth. "History of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, from 

January I through December 31, 1963." Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., 

April 1968. 

Lindeman, Richard Earl, "Configuration Management on Large-Scale Engineering Programs." 

M. Sc. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1970. 

Logsdon, John M. "NASA's Implementation of the Lunar Landing Decision." NASA HHN-81. 

Washington, August 1969. 

McClane, James C., Jr.; King, Elbert A., Jr.; Flory, Donald A.; Richardson, Keith A.; Dawson, 

James P.; Kemmerer, Walter W.; and Wooley, Bennie C. "The Lunar Receiving Laboratory." Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 2& Oct. 1966. 

Oakley, 	Ralph B. "Historical Summary: S & ID Apollo Program." North American Aviation, 

Inc., Space & Infonnation Systems Div., Downey, Calif., 20 Jan. 1966. 

Saegesser, Lee D. "Cartoons on Space: 1963-1968." NASA Historical Div., Washington, October 

1968. 

Zigler, William. "History of NASA MTF and Michoud: The Fertile Southern Crescent, Bayou 

Country and the American Race Into Space." NASA HHN-127. Washington, September 1972. 

7. PuBLISHED SECONDARY SouRcEs 

Akens, David S. Saturn Illustrated Chronology : Saturn's Fi?"st Eleven Years, April 1957 through 

April 1968. 5th ed., MHR-5. Huntsville, Ala.: Marshall Space Flight Center, 20 Jan. 1971. 

Aldrin, Col. Edwin E. "Buzz," with Warga, Wayne. Return to Earth. New York: Random 

House, 1973. 

Anderson , Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1976. 

NASA SP-4403. Washington, 1976. 

Ba-ttin, Richard H. Astronautical Guidance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 

Benson, Charles D., and Faherty, William Barnaby. Moonport: A Histo1-y of Apollo Launch 

Facilities and Operations. NASA SP-4204. Washington, 1978. 

Bergaust, Eric. Murder on Pad 34. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968. 

Brooks, Courtney G. , and Ertel, Ivan D. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, vol. 3, October 1, 

1964-January 20, 1966. NASA SP-4009. Washington, 1976. 

Bush, Vannevar. Pieces of the Action. New York: William Morrow, 1970. 

Byers, Bruce K. Destination Moon: A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program. NASA TM X-3487. 

Washington, April 1977. 

Chapman, Dean R. An Analysis of the Corridor and Guidance Requirements for Supercircular 

Entry into Planetary Atmosphe1·es. NASA Technical Report R-55. Washington, 1960. 

500 
Dra-per, C. Stark; Wrigley, Walter; and Havorka, John. Inertial Guidance. New York: P

Press, 1960. 

Emme, Eugene M. Aeronautics and Astronautics: An American Chronology of Scie

Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960. Washington: NASA, 1961. 

Ertel, Ivan D., and Morse, Mary Louise. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, vol. 1, T

November 7, 1962. NASA SP-4009. Washington, 1969. [See also Morse, Mary Lou

Bays, Jean Kernahan, vol. 2; Brooks, Courtney G., and Ertel, vol. 3.] 

----, and Newkirk, Roland W., with Brooks, Courtney G. The Apollo Space

Chronology, vol. 4, ]anumy 21, 1966-]uly 13, 1974. NASA SP-4009. Washington, 197

Etzioni, Amitai. The Moon-Doggie: Domestic and International Implications of the Spa

Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. 

Ezell, Edward Clinton and Linda Neuman. The Partnership: A History of the Apol

Test Project. NASA SP-4209. Washington, 1978. 

Faget, Maxime A., and Mathews, Charles W. "Manned Lunar Landing." Aerospace E

ing 21 Oanuary 1962) : 50. 

Goddard, Esther C., and Pendray, G. Edward, eds. The Papers of Robert H. Goddard

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 

Grimwood, James M. Project Mercury: A Chronology . NASA SP-4001. Washington, 1963

----, and Hacker, Barton C., with Vorzimmer, Peter J. Project Gemini Technol

Operations: A Chronology. NASA SP-4002. Washington, 1969. 

Grissom, Virgil "Gus." Gemini: A Personal Account of Man's Venture into Space. E

Jacob Hay. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 

Guirand, Felix, ed. New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology. Translated by Richard A

and Delano Ames. New York: Hamlyn Publishing Group, 1968. 

Hacker, Barton C., and Grimwood, James M. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of 

Gemini. NASA SP-4203. Washington, 1977. 

Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger. NASA SP-4210. Washingto

----. Project Ranger: A Chronology. JPLfHR-2. Washington: NASA, 1971. 

[Harris, Gordon L.] The Kennedy Space Center Story. Kennedy Space Center, Fla., Janua

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 19

NASA SP-4302. Washington, 1970. 

Holley, I. B., Jr. "The Evolution of Operations Research and Its Impact on the Militar

lishment; the Air Force Experience." In Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Pasz

Science, Technology, and Warfare. Proceedings of Third Military History Sympos,iu

Air Force Academy, 8-9 May 1969. Washington [1971]. 

Holmes, Jay. America on the Moon: The Enterprise of the Sixties. Philadelphia: Lip

1962. 
 Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy . 

NASA SP-4004. Washington, 1964. Also volumes for 1964 through 1969 and for 1972. NASA 

SP-4006 through 4008, 4010, 4014, and 4017. Wa-shington, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 

and 1974. 

----.Gemini Summary Conference. NASA SP-138. Washington, 1967. 

----. Mercury Project Summary, Including Results of the Fourth 1'1-fanned Orbital Flight, 

May 15 and 16, 1963. SP-45. October 1963. 

- ---. Mission Report: Apollo 9. NASA Fact Sheet MR-3. 1969. 

----. NASA Astronauts. NASA EP-34. October 1967. 

----. Proceedings of a Conference on Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space 

Flight, June 6, 1961. 1961. 

----· Proceedings of the Apollo Unified S-Band Technical Conference, Held at Goddard 

Space Flight Center, July 14-15, 1965. NASA SP-87. 1965. 

--- - . Proceedings of the NASA-Unive1·sity Conference on the Science and Technology of 

Space Exploration. Held in Chicago, 13 Nov. 1962. 2 vols. NASA SP-ll. 1962. 

Results of the First United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, February 20, 1962. 

1962. 

Results of the Second United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, May 24, 1962. 

NASA SP-6·. 1962. 

----. Results of the Second U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, July 21, 1961 . 1961. 

----· Results of the Third United States Manned Orbital Space Flight, October 3, 1962. 

NASA SP-12. 1962. 

----. Surveyor: Program Results. NASA SP-184. 1969. 

North American Rockwell Corp. A First Look. Los Angeles, September 1967. 

President's Science Advisory Committee. The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period: A Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Washington: The White House, February 1967. 

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center. NASA 

SP-4301. Washington, 1968. 

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963. NASA SP-4101. Washington, 

1966. 

Rynin, Nikolai A. Interplanetary Flight and Communications. 3 vols., 9 nos. Translation of 

Mezhplanetye soobscheniya, Len-ingrad, 1928-1932. NASA TT F-640 ·through TT F-648. 

Washington, I970--197l. 

Sherrod, Robert. "Men for •the Moon." In Edgar M. Cortright, ed., Apollo Expeditions to the 

Moon . NASA SP-3·50. Washi-ngton, 1975. 

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr.; Grimwood, James M.; and Alexander, Charles C. This New Ocean: A 

History of Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201. Wa-shington, 1966. 

Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics. New York: John Wiley, 1948. 

502 
simulation chamber, 217 


spacecraft, xvi, 215-26 ill.-227 


AC Spark Plug Div. (General Motors Corp.) , 


97, 160, 174 


Ad Hoc Surveyorf Lunar Orbiter Utilization 


Committee, 185 


Adams, J. J., 487 


Adapter, spacecraft-launch vehicle, 41 , 108, 


132 ill., 133, 153 ill., 163 


Apollo 6, 248, 250, 252 


Apollo 7, 267 


LM, 145, 152 


Advanced Saturn. See Saturn launch vehicle. 

Aeroembolism, 239-40 


Aerojet-General Corp. (General Tire & Rubber Co.) , 90, 155 


Aerospace Corp., 48, 250 


Africano, Alfred, 487 


Agena (upper-stage booster rocket), 7, 69, 


154-55 


Borman comments during Apollo 8, 276 


engine explosion, 244 


Gemini missions, 294 


Agnew, Spiro T ., 292, 296 ill., 299, 322 


Air Force, U.S., 4, 38, 62, 88, 89, 133, 154 


Arnold Engineering Development Center, 


154 


Space Systems Div., 62 


AiResearch Manufacturing Co. (div. of The 


Garrett Corp.), 90, 157, 196, 209 


lunar mode issue, 80 


lunar research studies, 8, 12, 26 

spacecraft configuration, 27, 35 

suggested site for manned spac

ter, 19, 22 


Amman, Ernest A., 487 


Amster, Warren, 48 


Anders, William A. (see also Ap

282 ill., 283 ill. 


Apollo 11 planning, 318-19 


AS-503, 212, 261 


National Aeronautics and Sp

319 


Anderson, Clinton P., 219-20 


Anderson, Frank W., Jr., xvii 


Anderson, Robert C., 487 


Anderson, Roger A., 487 


Andrews, Norman W., 487 


Antennas, space communications 

9-meter dish, 123 


26-meter dish, 123 


64-meter dish 123, 124 ill., 328 

portable lunar surface, 328 


spacecraft, 159 


Apollo I (AS-204), 227, 231 


widows' numbering request, 23

Apollo 1A (number rejected) , 23

Apollo 2 (number rejected) , 231 

Apollo 3 (number rejected) , 231 

Apollo 4 (AS-501) , 231-33 ill., 2

503 

Sll stage problems, 248, 252 


S-IVB stage problems, 249, 252 


SM engine firings, 249 


Apollo 7 (AS-205; Schirra, Cunningham, 


Eisele) 


cabin noise, 268 


crew illness, 271 


crew watch arrangement, 269 


factor in Apollo 8 decision, 260, 271-72 


flight, 267-70 ilL-71 ilL 


flight preparations, 262-64, ilL-67 


food, 269 


intravehicular activity, 268-69 


"magnificient flying machine," 271 


newsworthiness, 271-72 


objectives, 266, 271-72 


photography, 266, 268 


practice rendezvous, 267 


SM engine performance, 267 


sleep, 269 


support crew innovation, 261 


television, 266, 269, 270 ilL, 271 


visibility and windows, 268 


waste management, 268 


/lpollo 8 (AS-503; Borman, Lovell, Anders) 


A polio 7 results, 260 


Book of Genesis reading, 281 


comments about lunar surface, 279-80 


communications, 279 


crew illness, 277 


CSM 103 performance, 281, 283 


CSMfS-IVB separation, 276-77 


earth view comments, 277, 278, 366 


first gravitational crossing, 278 


flight, 275-82 ilL-83 ilL-84 


flight preparations, 272-75 


landing accuracy and recovery, 283-84 


lunar-orbit decision. See Lunar-orbit mission, first manned. 


effects on future flights, 364 


extravehicular activity, 295-97 ill.-98 


flight, 292-97 ill.-300 


flight preparations, 288-91 ill.-92, 296 ill. 


flight readiness reviews, 289-90 


Gemini VI/ VII, influence, 290 


Gumdrop (CM-104), 292, 295-97 ilL-99 


LM-CSM flight separation, 297 ilL, 298 


LM-CSM rendezvous and docking, 287, 290. 


293, 297 ill., 298-99 


mission duration, 299 


news interest, 292 


number earth-orbital re\"Olutions, 299 


objectives, 290-91, 299 


pogo,288,293, 299 


SM engine firings, 294, 299 


Spider (LM-3), 286-87, 295-97 ill.-300, 302 


descent engine chugging, 298, 300, 302 


checkout, 295 


flying qualities, 287 


separate flight, 297 ill., 298-99 


spacecraft/S-IVB separation, 293 


transfer of crew between craft, 293, 294-95, 


298,299 


Apollo 10 (AS-505; Stafford, Young, Cernan) 


between-spacecraft communications, 310, 


3ll 


between-spacecraft sightings, 310 


Charlie Brown (CM-106), 301, 302-{)4, 307, 


309, 3ll-12 


crew rest (sleep) , 304, 306 


crew selection and training, 302 


crew transfer between craft, 306, 307, 3ll12 


docking, 300, 303, 307, 3ll 


DOl, 310 


dressing and undressing, 307 


drinking water, food, 304-{)5 


504 
engine firings, 310, 311 


spacecraft rendezvous, 311 


spacecraft(S-IVB stage separation, 303 


spacecraft undocking, 307 


star sightings, 304 


television, 303--{)5, 308 ill. 


TLI, 303 


two-phase lunar-orbit maneuver, 300 


up-down orientation, 306 


Apollo 11 (AS-506; Armstrong, Aldrin, Col­


lins; see also Apollo 11 flight planning) 


adaptation to one-sixth gravity, 345-47 


Aldrin's lunar walk, ii-iii, iv, 346--49, 350 


ill.-51 ill. 


Armstrong's lunar walk, 346--50 ill. 


ascent from the moon, 352-53 


"bag of rocks" quotation, 365 


biological isolation garments (BIG), 355­

56 ill. 


Columbia (CM-107) 331 , 342, 345, 351 ill., 


352-57 


communications first, 344-45 


computer alarms, 343 


crew description of moon, 341, 345, 346-­

47, 348-49, 353 


crew rest (sleep) , 339, 342, 349, 352, 354 


CM-LM separation and docking, 339, 342, 


353, 358 


daily news summary, 340 


Eagle (LM-15), 331 , 341-50 ill.-51 ill.- 54 


earthshine, 341 , 349 


experiments (see also Appendix D) , 348­

49, 351 ill., 363, 365 


first manned landing on moon, 343-44 


flag raising, 347 


flight, ii-iii, iv, xiv, 338-50 ill.-51 ill.-56 


ill.-58 


flight preparations, 313, 338-39 


mission sequence, 358 


mobile quarantine facility (MQF) , 

357. 359 


modular equipment stowage 

(MESA), 341 


most remembered mission, 365-66 


Nixon phone call and world tour

354 


objectives, xiv, 314, 357, 365 


peculiar odor in tunnel, 339 353 


photography, 341 , 342, 347, 348, 

354, 355, 359 


plaque, 330, 331 ill., 347 


portable life support system (ba

345-46, 349, 350 ill., 351 ill. 


practice lunar-ascent countdown, 34

probe and drogue, 339, 340, 342, 35

public interest, 326, 338 340, 357 


quarantine, 333-35 ill., 357 


radar, 342 


reentry and reco,·ery, 355-56 ill.-59 

results, 365-66 


Sea of Fertility, 341 


SM engine firings, 339, 340, 341 , 354 

television, 340, 341 , 346, 347-48 

51 ill., 354, 357 


"That's one small step," 346 


"The Eagle has wings," 342 


"The Eagle has landed," 344 


Tranquility base. See lunar landing 

unidentified object, 341 


world tour, 357 


tfju>llo 11 flight planning, 313-34 


American flag, 314, 329-30 


Apollo lunar surface experiments 

(ALSEP), 319-21 ill., 363 


ascent from moon, 317-18 


back contamination provisions, 333
lunar landing approach procedures, 316­

17, 337 


lunar landing training vehicle (LLTV) , 


322-23 


lunar surface operations demonstration, 


319-20 


lunar surface stay decision, 324-26 


no claims on moon, 330 


objectives, 314 


photography, 328-29 


plaque, 330, 331 ill. 


public affairs activities, 326-31 


recovery and quarantine, 333-34 


Sea of Tranquility, 317, 337 


space exploration treaty, 330 


spacecraft "walk-down" team, 334 


special LM-2 tests, 334 


symbols and symbolism 314, 329-31 


television, 329 


walks, lunar surface. See Walks, lunar 


surface. 


Apollo 12 (Conrad, Bean, Gordon) , 365, 366 


Apollo 13-17, 366 


Apollo 204. See Apollo-Saturn 204. 


Apollo 204 Review Board, 218-25, 232 


findings, 221-22, 224-25 


investigation, 218-22, 224 


membership, 219 


panels, 219, 220 


report 221-22, 224, 228 


Apollo Applications Program (later renamed 


Skylab), 188, 189,229, 255, 362 


Apollo Back Contamination Control Panel, 


333 


Apollo CM Source Evaluation Board, 42-44 


Apollo Crew Safety Review Board, 238, 240­

41 


pg

contractor use, 19 


contracts. See Contracts, Apollo, and Ap· 


pendix F. 


costs, See Cost of Apollo program and 


Appendix H. 


flight intervals, 255, 286, 365 


flight numbering confusion 231-32 


follow-up program possibilities, 187-188, 


362 


"H" missions, 364 


"J" missions, 364 


management devices. See Management devices, space program. 


management personnel shakeup, 224 


objectives, 121-22, 125-26, 136, 361, 365-66 


priority, llO-ll 


-pros and cons, 131 , 361 


recovery from AS-204 accident, 228-30, 


231-32 


support, xiii, 34, 361-62 


to include all manned lunar landing mis­


sions, 362 


worker morale, 256 


Apollo Program Development Plan, 168 


Apollo Projects Office, 21 


Apollo-Saturn 201 mission, 190-92 ill.-94, 


209 


Apollo lA number rejected, 231-32 


countdown and flight, 191-92 ill.-93 


CSM-009, 190-91 


objectives, 191, 193 


recovery, 193 


results, 192-93 


Apollo-Saturn 203, 190, 193 


Apollo 2 numbering rejected, 231-32 


objectives, flight, and results, 194 


Apollo-Saturn 205, 190, 193 


Apollo 3 numbering rejected, 231-32 


objectives and flight, 193-94 


506 
Apollo-Saturn 205 (see also Apollo 7) , 209 


AS-208, 211, 261 


canceled, 211 , 229-30, 261 


crew named, 209, 212 


objectives, 209, 212 


rescheduled , 211 , 261 


Apollo-Saturn 206A, 175-76 


Apollo-Saturn 207 , 205-{)6 


A ?Olio-Saturn 208, 205-{)6 


AS-205, 211 , 261 


Apollo-Saturn 501 (see also Apollo 4), 231, 


232 


Apollo-Saturn 502 (see also Apollo 6) , 248 


Apollo-Saturn 503 (see also Apollo 8) , 212, 


261 


Apollo-Saturn 504. See Apollo 9. 


Apollo-Saturn 505. See Apollo 10. 


Apollo-Saturn 506. See Apollo 11 . 


Apollo Site Selection Board, 185, 364 


Apollo Soyuz Test Project, xiv, 131 


Apollo Spacecraft Development Test Plan , 


136 


Apollo Spacecraft Project (Program) Office, 


78, 98, 99-100, 108, 120, 256 


Configuration Control Board, 168, 230 


Configuration Control Panel, 168 


organization, 78, 98, 99 


Apollo Systems Specification Book, 121-22 


Apollo Technical Conference. See NASAIndustry Apollo Technical Conference, 

1961. 

Apollo Trajectory Working Group, 120 


Appleman, Charles, 487 


Appold, Norman C., 13 


Arabian, Dona ld D., 305 


Armitage, Peter J., 332 


Armstrong, Neil A. (see also Apollo II), 116 


ill., 351' 356 ill., 357 ill., 365 


ablative thrust chamber 154, 200

Apollo 5, 242, 244 


Apollo 9, 298-99 


Apollo 10, 311 


Apollo II , 352 


backup model, 200 


combustion instability, 154-55, 2

237,244-45 


contractor, 113, 1~4, 244-45 


description, 144, 146, 154 


fire-in-the-hole 146, 154, 242 


fuel injector, 176, 201, 244-45 


lunar launch, 146 


lunar orbit abort, 146, 154, 242 


reliability requirements, 154-55 

test program, 154-55, 175, 200-{)

Ascent stage, LM, 144, 146, 243 i

ill. 


cabin. See Cabin, LM, 


design, 144-46 


lunar orbit abort, 146 


Ascent trajectory analysis, lunar, 6

AstraCo, 65 


Astronauts (see also Appendix B

xvi, 30 


Apollo training philosophy 

tasks, 260-61 


deaths, xv- xvi, 207, 217, 262 


extravehicular operations, 137

207, 208, 29G-91 ill., 295-97 

5G-51 ill., 364 


fifth group, 180, 206 


first group, 30, 116 


first man on moon decision , 319

flight crew titles, 261 


fourth group, 180 


Gemini experience, 208 


lunar surface procedures, 151, 

ill., 323-25 ill., 326 

LM on la~mch pad, 240 


oxygen, 157, 223,230 


oxygen-nitrogen, 222, 223, 230, 239-40 


60-40 mixture, 239-40 


Attitude control motors. See Reaction con­


trol motors. 


Atwood, Donald J., 487 


Atwood, J. Leland, 88, 195-96, 225, 230, 273, 


488 


Augurson, Williams S., II 


Aurom 7 (Mercury-Atlas 7), 114 


Avco Corp., 17, 42, 90, 94 


Babbitt, Donald 0 ., 215, 217 


Back contamination. See Contamination. 


Backpack, astronaut. See Portable life support system. 


Bailey, D. K., 169 


Bailey, Glenn F., 17, 38 


Baird, L. E., 45 


Ballistic or blunt-body spacecraft, 26, 36 ill., 


37 


Barlow, Edward J., 48 


Barlow, Mel R., 26, 488 


Baron, Thomas R ., 222-23 


Baron report, 222-23 


Barr, William T ., 488 


Bartley, William F., 217 


Barton, Richard E., 488 


Bassett, Charles A., II, 130, 207 


death, 207, 217 


Gemini IX, 207 


Battersby, Frank X., 488 


Battey, Robert V., 488 


Battin, Richard E., 39, 488 


Batteries, spacecraft, 9, 158, 342 


Benjamin, Warren, 488 


Benner, R. L., 488 


Bergaust, Eric, 219 


Bergen, William B., 224, 230-31 , 238, 274, 488 


Berman, Kurt, 488 


Berry, Charles A., 220, 223, 230 


Berry, S. F., 52 


Beryllium shingles, spacecraft, 37 


Beta fiber. See Materials 


Bikle, Paul F., 110 


Bingman, Charles F., 97 


Biological isolation garment (BIG) , 333, 355, 


356 ilL 


Bird, John D., 67-69, 71, 488 


Bisplinghoff, Raymond L., 129 


Bixler, Charles, 488 


Blake, Dan, 488 


Bland, William M., Jr., 211 


Blasingame, B. P., 273 


Block I Apollo CM (earth orbital) , xv, 87, 


117, 133, 135, 138, 143, 229 


cost, 229 


CM-002, 190, 229 


CM-004, 169 


CM-007, 169 


CM-009, 190-91, 229 


CM-011, 229 


CM-012, xv-xvi, 209-10 ill.-11, 213-16 ill., 


220-22. 224-26, 229 


CM-014, 209, 220 


CM-017, 211, 231 


CM-020, 247 


difference from Block II, 137-38 


electrical circuits, 172, 225-26 


fire. See Apollo-Saturn 204. 


Gemini spacesuits, 179 


mockup review, 138, 139 ilL, 140 


reliability deficiency, 170 


508 
Blount, Earl, 488 


Boardman, Warren, 156 


Bobik, Joseph M., 301 


Boeing Co., The, 17, 42, 51, 58, 100, 119, 334 


LRV, 365 


TIE contract, 228 


Bogart, Frank A., 329 


Boilerplate spacecraft. See Mockups and test 


vehicles. 


Bolender, Carroll H ., 246, 257, 258, 299, 334 


Bond, Aleck C., 48, 239, 332 


Boost protective cover, CM, 134 ill., 142, 171, 


217,228 

Borman, Frank (see also Apollo 8) , 116 ill., 

262, 282, 283 ill. 


Apollo 204 Review Board, 219-21 , 224 


AS-204 hearings, 224 


AS-205, 209, 261 


AS-503, 212 


CSM-101, 231 , 263 


first manned lunar orbital mission, 258, 


262, 274 


Gemini VII, 182 


Bowman, Julian H ., 258, 259 


Boynton, John H., 488 


Brader, Robert, 199 


Braking rocket, lunar descent, 75, 76, 81 , 91 


Braley, E. C., 10 


Bramlet, James B., 57 


Brand, Vance D. , 206, 262, 264, 275 


Brendle, Harmon L., 287 


Briggs, Glenn W ., 488 


Briskman, Robert D., 45 


Brissenden, Roy F., 67 


Bromberg, Robert, 488 


Brooks, Overton, 25 


Broome, Douglas R., 214, 225 


Brown, B. Porter, 488 


ue, Wate., 73 

Bureau of the Budget, 25, 167, 168 

Burmood, R. 0 ., 488 


Butler, Gordon, 488 


Buxton, Jack, 488 


Cabin, LM, 144, 146-48, 150 ill. 


atmosphere, 157, 238, 240 


cockpit size, 147 


controls, 148, 161 


elimination of seats, 149, 150 ill. 

exit and entry hatches, 145, 

ill., 161 


instrumentation and displays, 14

lighting, 149, 161 


mockups, 150 ill., 161-62 


multiple uses, 147-48 


restraint system, 147 


tunnel, 150-51 


windows, 146-47, 149, 150 ill., 

161 


Cain, Darrell 0., 215 


California Institute of Technolog

Jet Propulsion Laboratory) , 87, 

Call signs, spacecraft 


Aurora 7 (MA-7), 292 


Charlie Brown (CM-106; Apollo 

Columbia (CM-107; Apollo 11)

Eagle (LM-5; Apollo 11), 331 


Faith 7 (MA-9) , 292 


Freedom 7 (MR-3), 30 


Friendship 7 (MA-6) , 114 


Gumdrop (CM-104; Apollo 9) , 

Liberty Bell 7 (MR-4) , 292 


"Molly Brown" (Gemini J) , 292 

Snoopy, (LM-4; Apollo 10), 302 

Spider (LM-3; Apollo 9), 292 

, , 

Casey, Francis W ., 488 

Cathers, H . B., 488 

Celestial mechanics, study of, 38, 39 

Centaur (upper-stage booster), 7, 9, 13 

Cernan, Eugene A. (see also Apollo 10), 130, 

207, 261 , 309 ill., 312 ill. 

AS-205, 212, 261 

Gemini IX-A, 207 

Certification of Flight Worthiness (definition), 169 

Chaffee, Roger B., 130, 210 ill. 

AS-204, 208, 209, 213, 214, 261 

death and burial, 217 

widow's court acti~n. 224 

Chalmers, James F., 48 

Chamberlain Hotel, 42 

Chamberlin, James A., 42, 73, 75, 252, 323, 

324, 488 

Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc., 14, 42, 67, 78 

Vought Astronautics, 14, 17, 66,73 

Chapman, Dean R ., 39 

Chapee, James H., 333 

Charlesworth, Clifford E., 248, 338, 488 

Charlie Brown (CM-106), See Apollo 10 

"Charlie Frick's Road Show," 79-80 

Chauvin, Clarence A., 215 

Cheatham, Donald C., 488 

Checkout equipment, spacecraft. See Ground 

support equipment (GSE) . 

Cherry, George W., 316, 317 

Chidley, D. W . 89 

Chilton, Robert G., II , 14, 16, 17, 97, 488 

Chop, Albert M., 488 

Christensen, Everett E., 224 

Chrysler Corp., 51 , ll9, 191 

Church, James, 183 

Circumlunar flight, manned, I 

·early Apollo goal, xv, 6-7, 13, 15 

, 

, , 

Collins, Michael (see also Apollo 11) , 130, 

262, 325 ill., 356 ill. 

Apollo 8, 276, 277 

Apollo 11 planning, 302, 318, 323, 325 ill. 

AS-205, 261 

AS-503, 212 

biological isolation garment, 333, 356 ill. 

Canying the Fire, 262, 277, 321 

first man on the moon decision, 321 

Gemini X , 207, 294 

medical factors, 262, 276 

spacecraft naming, 331 

Collins Radio Co., 90, 159 

Columbia (CM-107). See Apollo 11 . 

Command module (CM) , Apollo, xiv, 18 ill., 

36 ill., 86 ill., 90 ill., 91 ill., 95 ill., 118 

ill., 134 ill., 139 ill. 

"A toG" Apollo missions, 235 

BEF reentry and landing position, 133 

Block I. See Block I Apollo CM (earth 

orbital). 

Block II. See Block II Apollo CM (lunar 

orbital). 

boost protective cover, 134 ill., 142, 217, 

228 

cabin atmosphere, 157, 222, 223, 230, 237, 

238, 239-40 

canards, 133, 134 ill., 141 

CM-002, 190, 229 

CM-004, 169 

CM-007, 169 

CM-009, 190-91, 192 ill., 229 

CM-Oll , 229 

CM-012 (AS-204; Apollo 1) , 209, 210 ill., 

216 ill., 222, 229, 248 

Baron report, 223 

changes resulting from fire, 225, 226 ill., 

228, 239-40 

510 
flight readiness review, 265 


manager, 224, 231 


television, 266 


windows, 268, 289 


wiring, 238-39, 265 


CM-103 (AS-503; Apollo 8), 239, 276-84, 


289 


CM-104 (AS-504; Apollo 9), 292-97 ilL-99 


Gumdrop, 292 


mission switch, 262 


wiring, 239 


CM-105, 239, 301 


CM-106, (AS-505; Apollo 10), 257, 258, 


303-12 


delivery, 301 


Charlie Brown, 302 


flight readiness review, 301-02 


wiring, 239 


CM-107 (AS-506; Apollo 11), 338-51 ilL-57 


Columbia, 331 


computer, 96, 97, 187 


configuration, 26-28 ilL-29, 35-36 ilL-38, 


117-18 ilL, 143-45 ilL-47, 168-70 


contract, 44, 132, 228-29 


contractor proposal conference, 42-43 


control thrusters. See Reaction control 


motors. 


costs, 132, 167-68, 178, 190 ilL, 229 


definition and design, xv, 26, 27, 35, 37, 75, 


121-22, 133 


development, 35, 37, 87, 89, 117, 131-32 


development contract. See Contracts, 


Apollo. 


docking function, 133, 137 ilL, 138 


environmental control unit, 90, 157, 196, 


209, 210, 214, 216 ilL, 222, 223, 228, 229, 


230, 239-40 


stable I and II position in water, 263 

strakes, 133, 134 ill., 135 


structural tests, 89, 90 ilL 


subcontracts, 90 


subsystem delivery problems, 237-38 

tunneL See Tunnel, spacecraft. 


weight, 138, 165, 170 


wind-tunnel work, 92, 94 


windows, 171 


Common-usage concept, spacecraft 

ment, 108-09, 148, 157, 158 


Communications. See Tracking an

munications network, worldwide. 


Computer, 39 


Apollo 11 lunar landing, 343 


CM, 96, 97, 187 


Gemini spacecraft, 187 


real-time computer complex, 185 


Configuration Control Board, 168, 1

239 


first man on moon decision, 322 


1967 membership, 230 


panels, 168, 172 


Configuration Management Plan, 168 

Congress, U.S., 3, 6, 13, 24, 25, 29, 35

79, 110, 182, 185, 189, 357 ill. 


Apollo 8 joint session, 284 


Apollo 204 hearings, 219-25, 227 


House of Representatives, 29 


Committee on Sciences and Astro

25,85,219 


Subcommittee on Manned 

Flight, 79 


Subcommittee on NASA Oversi

201,219,223-24 


Independent Offices Approp

Committee, 53 


Select Committee on Astronaut

Space Exploration, 6 

333 


Contractor selection procedures, 42 


Contracts, Apollo (se e also Appendix F) , 15, 


33, 35 


CM, 35, 37, 38, 41-44, 67, 132-33, 178, 


228-29 


cost-plus-fixed-fee, 177 


feasibility study, xiii, 15-17 


guidance and navigation system, 38 


incentive, 177-78, 229, 247 


LM, 67, 113-14, 143, 177-78 


Control (definition of) , spacecraft, 40 


Convair/ Astronautics Div., General Dynamics 


Corp., 17, 19, 26-28 ill., 42-43 78, 91, 93 


ill., 100, 141 


Coons, D. Owen, 332 


Cooper, L. Gordon, 30, 182, 292, 302 


Cord, John N., 65 


Cornell University, 17 


Corning Glass Works, 226, 245 


Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 52, 53, 204 


Corrosion. See Stress corrosion. 


Cortright, Edgar M., 238 


Cosmonauts, xiii, xiv, 25, 29, 30, 115-16, 


182,227 


Cost of Apollo program, xiv, 20, 21, 22, 25, 


27, 44, 105, 110, 114, 168, 190 ill., 229 


A polio 9 mission, 299 


AS-204 accident, 230 


CSM, 132, 178,229 


EMU, 296 


FY 1969 experience, 286 


LM, 109, 114, 146, 168, 177, 178, 197 


per year expense, 167-68, 361-62 


Couches, 18 ill., 29, 36 ill. 


CM, 137, 138, 139 ill., 140, 211 


eliminated from LM, 149, 150 ill. 


Coursen, John, 199, 488 


Dandridge, Manning, 156, 488 


Daniels, E. J., 65 


Daniels, James L., Jr., 329 


David Clark Co., 179 


David, Dan, 193 


Davis, Hubert P. , 488 


Davis, Leighton 1., 50, 131 ill. 


Deans, Philip M. , 488 


Deaths 


astronaut, xvi, 207, 217, 262 


at Brooks Air Force Base, 217 


cosmonaut, 227 


NASA Deputy Administrator, 182 


President, 131 


Debus, Kurt H ., 55 ill. , 128-29, 131 ill., 192, 


211 , 308 ill. 


lunar orbit mission proposal, 257-58 


management council, 129 


Saturn launch safety, 241 


space launch facilities, 50- 51 


Debus-Davis study, 50 


Decker, James L., 160 


Decrevel, Ron, 488 


DeFries, Paul J ., 45 


Demarest, David, 488 


Dembling, Paul G. , 52, 329, 488 


De Moraes, Carlos, 26, 28 ill. 


DeNike, John, 488 


Department of Agriculture, 204 


Department of Defense, 9, 30, 46, 49 


Der Bing, William, 488 


Descent engine, LM, 109, 145 ill., 154-55, 


162 ill. 


Apollo 5, 242 


Apollo 9, 295, 298 


Apollo 10, 310 


Apollo 11, 343 


backup chore, 144 


competitive contractors, 113, 154, 155-56 


512 
CM. See Command module (CM) , Apollo. 

ConvairfAstronautics proposal, 27. 28 ill. 

General Electric proposal, 27. 28 ill. 

LM. See Lunar module (LM). Apollo. 

Martin Co. proposal, 27, 28 ill., 29 

Design Certification Review (definition) • 169 

Design Reference Mission, 136-37 

Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, 163 

Desjardin, Lee, 488 

Dessler, Alex J., 488 

Direct ascent (lunar flight mode proposal) • 

44, 51. 59, 61, 63 ill., 77. 82-84, ll7 

backup for EOR, 59, 79 

estimated cost, 83 

fa,·ored by Air Force, 62 

favored by Fleming Committee, 34 

favored by Piland (STG) study group, 12 

favored by NASA Headquarters, 31 

final rejected by STG (later MSC) • 75-76 

Golovin Committee study, 48-49 

Low Committee study, 23 

lunar landing problems, 61, 75, 76 

opposed by Langley group, 67, 68, 69, 72 

opposed by von Braun group. 9, 21 , 62, 63 

propulsion requirements for, 9, 45 

Rosen Committee study, 57, 58 

study of other options, 8, 46, 79, 80 

two-man proposal, 80, 84-85, 103-06 

Disher, John H ., 9, 15, 17, 37, 57, 130, 136, 

176, 488 

Ditke, Robert R ., 488 

Docking, spacecraft, 27. 58, 61, 62, 72. 80, 86 

ill., 99, 101 , 108, ll7, 132 ill., 133, 137 

ill., 144, 145 ill., 163, 288 ill. 

Apollo 9, 287, 290, 293, 297 ill., 299 

Apollo 10, 303, 307, 3ll 

Apollo 11, 339, 353 

Gemini VIII, 205 

y, g, , , , , , 

182. 488 

announces Apollo, 15 

Apollo mode issue, 30, 46, 79, 84, 8

choice of CM contractor, 44 

death, 182 

Deputy NASA Administrator, 3, 24 

insulating research from operatio

4 

lunar guidance and navigation, 41 

relations with scientific community

selecting manned space laboratory 

space program costs, 127, 362 

space program funding, 30, 31 

DuBridge, Lee A., 365 

Duff, Brian M., 327. 328 

Duggan, Orton L., 488 

Duke, Charles M.. Jr., 206, 252. 263

Duncan, Robert C., 174, 183, 199, 200 

Dust, lunar, 99, 109 

Apollo 11, 344, 346, 347, 349, 3

353 

LM design worries, 152 

Surveyor I pictures, 206 

Eagle (LM-5; Apollo 11) . 331 

Early Apollo Scientific Experiment

(EASEP) , 320 

Earth-landing sites proposed, Apoll

Earth landing systems, proposed, 94 

flexible wing (paraglider) , 94, 96 

parachutes. See Parachutes, spacec

rotating wing, 94 

Earth orbital flights. See Orbit

manned earth. 

Earth orbital operations, 9, 23, 67, 

IIO, ll7, 132 

Earth-orbit rendezvous (lunar fli

proposal) • 51, 59, 63 ill., 69, 85 
gg, 

, , , , , , , 

Eggleston, John M., 67, 73, 363, 488 

Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., 91 

Ehricke, Krafft A., 488 

Eickmeier, Alfred B., 122 

Eisele, Donn F. (see also Apollo 7), 130, 139 

ill., 148, 209, 261, 264 ill., 271 ill. 

AS-205, 209, 261 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 7, 13, 14 

Electrical system, spacecraft, 9, 238 

CM, 221-22, 225, 238 

LM, 108-{)9, 158, 171-72, 176 

Ellington Air l'orce Base, Tex., 108 

ELM (extended lunar module) , 362, 363, 

364 

Elms, James C., 93 ill., 129 

Elverum, Gerard W., Jr., 488 

EM• (engineering manufacturing module 

mockup) , 170 

Emme, Eugene M., xvii 

EMU. See Extravehicular mobility unit. 

Engle, Joe H., 206, 264 ill., 302 

Environment, spacecraft, 16 

launch pad test, 214, 230, 239 

one- versus two-gas system, 222, 223, 239-40 

pad and launch procedure, 230, 240 

"shirt sleeve," 16, 96 

two-gas system, 222, 223, 230, 239-40 

Environmental control unit, spacecraft 

CM, 90, 157, 196, 209, 214, 216 ill., 222, 223, 

225,228,229,230 

dangers of two-gas system, 239-40 

LM, 154, 157, 176, 240 

Erb, R. Bryan, 333 

Ertel, Ivan D., xvi 

Escape system. See Launch escape system. 

Escher, William J. D., 34 

Evans, B. 0., 273 

peets ogaOce, 0

Explorer (satellite and space probe program), 4 

Extended lunar module (ELM) , 362-64 

Extravehicular activity (EVA) , astronaut, 

137, 150-51, 153 ill., 269, 364 

Apollo 9, 290-91, 295-96, 297 ill., 298 

Apollo 11, 319-21, 321 ill., 322, 323, 324, 

325 ill. 345-49, 350-51 ill. 

Gemini program, 182, 207, 208, 268-{)9 

lunar surface walks. See Walks, lunar surface. 

post-Apollo 11 plans, 364 

Extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) , 178, 

296, 297 ill., 321 ill., 323, 324, 345, 346, 349, 

350-51 ill. 

Ezell, William F., 488 

F-l rocket engine, launch vehicle, liS, 184 

ill. 

clustered, 25, 46, 51, 183 

combustion instability, 122 

first successful clustered engine firing 

(static test) , 183 

funds for, 25, 45 

Golovin Committee study, 49 

key to manned lunar landing, 25 

launch vehicle stage descriptions, 47 

NASA-sponsored development, 6 

pogo problem, 248, 250, 251, 252, 303 

Rosen Committee study, 58 

transferred from Air Force, 4 

Faber, Stanley, 488 

Facilities, Apollo program, 46, 50, 51, 53, 54 

ill., 55 ill. 

construction, 53 

land acquisition, 50, 51, 53 

514 
Source Evaluation Board, 42 


spacecraft configuration control, 230 


spacecraft docking concerns, 287 


subsystem managers, 135 


Fairchild Stratos Co., 18Q-81 


Faith 7 (MA-9), 292 


Falbaum, Sanford, 488 


Feasibility studies and contracts, Apollo, 15­

19, 21, 26, 27, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 66, 112 


bidders, 17, 19 


contract awards, 17 


costs, 27, 29 


evaluation of proposals, 17, 26, 29 


guidelines, 16 


submissions, 27, 28, 28 ill. , 29 


Feld, David, 488 


}'eltz, Charles H., 88, 88 ill., 89, 138, 488 


Ferdman, Saul, 488 


Ferguson, Richard B., 17 


Fichtner, Hans J., 122 


Field, Robert E., 193, 488 


Finkelstein, Nisson A., 488 


Fire 


AS-204. XV, 215, 216 ill., 217, 220-25, 230, 


239, 261 


hazard, 221-25, 230,238 


prevention, 221-24, 239 


simulation chamber, 217 


S-11 stage test, 194 


Fire extinguishers, spacecraft, 222 


First manned landing on moon , 343-44 


First words from moon 


in spacecraft, 344 


from surface, 346 


Fisher, Lewis R ., 488 


Fitzgerald, Charles, 488 


Flag, 314, 329, 330, 347 


Flagg, Henry W., Jr., 488 


Frangible probes, LM landing gear

ill., 344 


Franklin, George C., 149 


Frasier, Cline W ., 173 


}'reedman, Toby, 488 


Freedom 7 (MR-3) , 30 


Freeman, Theodore C., 130 


death, 207, 217 


Freitag, Robert F., 129 


Frick, Charles W., 488 


Apollo CSM contract, 132 


"Charlie Frick's Road Show," 79-8

first Apollo spacecraft manager, 78

leaves NASA, 133 


LM design work, 99, 100 


Friendship 7 (MA-6) , 114 


Frutkin, Arnold W., 329, 330 


Fuel cell (generator of electrical e

158, 171,268 


Fuels, rocket. See Propellant. 


Fulton, James G., 230 


Funk, Jack, II, 17,488 


Funding. See Cost of Apollo prog

Appendix H). 


Gagarin , Yuri A., xiii, 25, 29, 30 


Cainsville, Miss., 52 J 


Galman, Barry, 489 


Garriott, Owen K., 180, 349 


Garrison, Arthur E., 97 


Gates, Sally D., xvi 


Gavin, Joseph G., Jr., 115 ill., 489 


Grumman Apollo prop<'>sals, 112, 

LM contract, 113 


LM development organization, 19

LM propulsion, 156, 245 


lunar orbit mission proposal, 274 
nautics Div., 17, 19, 2628 ill., 4243, 78, 


91' 93 ill., 100, 141 


General Electric Co., 17, 88, 121 


Apollo feasibility study, 17, 19, 26-28 ill. 


Apollo integration contract, ll9, 122 


bid on Apollo CM contract, 42-43 


space vehicle GSE role, ll9-20 ill., 196, 199, 


228 


Geological Suney, U.S., 39 


Gibson, Cecil R ., 244 


Gibson, Edward G., 180 


Gilbert, David W ., 160, 489 


Gilbert, Porter H., 489 


Gilruth, Robert R., 3 ill., 16 ill., 282 ill., 


489 


"all-up" decision , 130 


Apollo 8, 285 


Apollo CM contract, 35, 37, 43, 44 


Apollo CM design, 37-38, 165 


Apollo feasibility contracts, 17-18 


Apollo flight mode issue, 48, 65, 69, 70, 75­

77, 79, 81 


Apollo flight program, 130, 189, 285 


Apollo follow-on program, 188 


Apollo guidance system, 97 


Apollo launch vehicle question, 46, 48, 57 


Apollo lunar site selection, 185 


AS-204 Design Certification Review, 211 


AS-204 recovery, 225, 231 


astronaut corps, 180, 206 


autonomous field activity, 18, 50 


director of MSC, 56, 98, 107 


director of STG, 4 


impression of Apollo task, 31 


incentive contracting, 177 


LEO, 182 


LLTV, 323 


LM contract, 114, 177 


relations with NASA Headquarters and 


other centers, 4, 18, 21 , 97, 128, 286 


science and Apollo, 125, 202, 362-63 


Senior Flammability Board, 238, 239, 240 


spacesuits, 179 


STG organization and mission , 12, 21, 22 


symbols for Apollo 11, 329 


upgrading Apollo capabilities, 362 


Givens, Edward G., Jr., 206 


Glasser, Otto J ., 48 


Glassman, L. H., 45 


Glea,·es, James D., 215, 217 


Glenn, John H., 30, 91 ill., 96, 114, 272 


Glennan, T . Keith, 3 ill., 489 


Apollo flight mode, 62 


beginnings of Apollo program, 14, 15, 20, 


22. 24 


contracting procedures, 42 


framing a national space program, 4-8, 11. 


13-14 


launch vehicle development, 3, 6, 13-14 


leaves NASA, 22, 24 


manned space flight activity location, 18­

19, 22 


NASA Administrator, first, 3 


NASA-industry conference, 15 


organizing NASA, 3-4 


Goddard, James L., 204 


Goddard, Robert H., 4 


Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA, 4, 18, 


39 


real-time computer complex, 185 


tracking network responsibilities, ll5, 123 


Goett, Harry J., 4, 7-ll, 13, 17, 18, 20, 489 


Goett Committee, 7-ll, 13 


Gold, Thomas, 348 


Goldstone, Calif., 123, 206, 328 


Goldstone, N.J., 489 


516 
Graveline, Duane E., I80 


Gravitational field, earth's, 23, 23I, 274-75, 


278 


Gravity, lunar, I4, I09, 300, 340 


Aldrin and Armstrong, 345, 346, 347 


Apollo 11 concerns, 3I6-I8 


astronaut walking concerns, 3I3 


simulations, I09, I5l, 324, 325 ill. 


Gray, Wilbur H ., 489 


Green , Don J., 489 


Greer, Robert E., I94, I95 


Griffin, Gerald D., 267, 270 ill. 


Griffith Planetarium, 263 


Grimm, Dean F., 489 


Grissom, Virgil I., 30, 2IO ill., 261, 292 


Apollo I, 210 ill., 23I 


AS-204, 208-10 ill.-17, 241, 26I 


burial, 2I7 


CM-012 complaints, 2I4 


death, 216 ill., 2I7, 230 


Gemini 3 ("Molly Brown"), 18I, 292 


MR-4 (Liberty Bell 7), 292 


Mercury spacecraft hatch, 215 


space program quotes, 220 


widow's court action, 224 


Gross, Alexander, 489 


Ground support equipment (GSE) 


General Electric, 119-20 


LM, 165, 176, 198-99 


pacing item, 187, 198 


Grumman, Leroy R., Ill 


Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 17, 42, 


83, 100, 108, 111-14, 127, 135-36 


budget problems, LM, 197 


Design Reference Mission, 136-37 


facilities, 108, 113, 114, 165 


GSE problems, 165, I98-99 


Kelly, Gavin study groups, 111-13 


industrial contractors-MIT rela

98 


inertial measurement unit, 96-9

MIT development role, 40, 97-9

NAA-MIT relations, 96 


operation, 96-97 


reentry. See Reentry, spacecraft

sextant, 96-97 


LM, 73, 99, I08, 160 


Apollo 10, 309 ill., 310-11 


Apollo 11, 3I6-I8 343-44, 352-5

attitude reference ("eight ball"

computer, I09 


Grumman-MIT relations. I60, 

inertial measurement unit, I08 

radar linkage, 159 


selection controversy, 160 


stabilization and control syste

158-59 


telescope, 108 


Gumdrop (CM-104; Apollo 9), 292 

Gwinn, William P., 274 


Gyroscope, 38, 96, 196-97 


"H" missions, Apollo, 364 


H-1 rocket engine, launch vehicl

191 


Hage, George H., 251 , 257, 259, 260

Hahn, Jack R., 489 


Haines, Richard F., 489 


Raise, Fred W ., Jr., 206, 262, 318 


Hall, Albert C., 489 


Hall, Eldon W ., 13, 21, 23, 48, 57, 6

Hall, Harvey, 48 


Hamilton Standard (div. of Unit

Corp.) 


Apollo spacesuit, 178 ill.-79 

LM, 144, 150-51 , 153 ill., 226 


Hauenstein, Clifford A., 489 


Hawaii, 50, 276 


Hawkins, Jerry W., 21 5,217 


Hazard, Allyn B., 64 


Healey, John P., 224, 231, 489 


Heating, spacecraft reentry. See Reentry heat 


pmtection. 


H eaton , Donald H., 45 


Heaton Committee, 45, 70-71 


Heatshield, ablative, 9, 29 


Apollo CM, 35, 37, 89, 90, 94, 95 ill., 133, 


134 ill., 138, 139 ill., 181 


AS-201 , 192 ill., 193 


AS-202, 194 


AS-501 (Apollo 4), 232, 233-34 


Heeb, Malcolm H., 19 


Heberlig, Jack C., 37, 489 


Hello, Bastian, 224, 489 


H enderson, Melba S., xvi 


Henry, Richard C., 97 


Hess, Harry H., 180 


Hess, Wilmot N, 230, 320, 324, 363, 489 


High Speed Flight Station, NASA (see also 


Flight Research Center, NASA) , 8, 19 


Highsmith, Helen, 489 


Himmel, Seymour C., 48 


Hjornevik, Wesley L., 3, 19, 42 , 46, 197, 198, 


199, 247 


Hoag, David G., 39, 40 ill., 489 


Hoberg, Otto A. , 122 


Hobokan , Andrew, 489 


Hodge, John D., 12, 122,190, 205,489 


Apollo Crew Safety Review Board, 240, 


241 , 265 


extended LM (ELM), 363 


LRL readiness, 332 


lunar exploration working group, 363 


Hornby, Harold, 80, 489 


Horner, Richard E., 18 


Hornig, Donald F., 19 


Houbolt, John C., 15, 45, 67-73, 78-79, 82, 


489 


Hound Dog missile, 43, 89, 133, 140 


Houston, Tex., 53, 115 


Hubner, R. W., 273 


Hudson, Lincoln , 489 


Hughes Aircraft, 42, 200 


Hughey, B. J., 489 


Human factors, space flight, 17, 26, 92, 139 


ill., 148, 150 ill., 161 


Hunter, Robert B., 274 


Hurt, Jack B., 93 ill., 141, 489 


Huss, Carl R., 276, 300, 318, 489 


Huston, Vincent G., 274 


Huzel, Dieter K. , 489 


Hya tt, Abraham, 13, 25, 46, 64, 65 


Hyland, Lawrence A., 19 


Hydrogen, liquid. See Propellant. 


Hypergolic propellant. See Propellant. 


IBM (International Business Machines Corp. 


Mission Control and spacecraft computers, 


186-87 


Saturn instrument unit, 191, 273 


Incentive contracts. See Contracts, Apollo. 


Inflight spacecraft repair, 135, 140, 159 


canceled, 140, 159, 171 


CM, 135, 140, 159, 171 


LM, 159 


Instrument unit, Saturn, 191, 273 


Instrumentation, spacecraft pilot control, 40 


ill., 91 ill., 92, 161 ' 162 


Intercontinental ballistic missiles, I, 39 


Interagency Committee on Back Contami518 
Intransit rendezyous (proposed lunar flight 


mode) , 65 


"J" missions, Apollo, 364 


J-2 rocket engine (in Saturn S-II and S-IVB 


stages), 47, 49, 58, ll8, 191 , 194, 195 ill., 


248,252 


Jacks, Verne L., x\·i 


Jackson, Karl F., 489 


James, Lee B., 2ll, 251 , 252, 257, 259, 273, 


274 


Janis, Calvin R ., 489 


Jeffs, George W ., 219, 489 


Jenkins, Lyle M., 122 


Jenkins, Thomas E., 329 


Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA contrac­


tor), 3, 8 


Apollo flight mode, 48, 64 


lunar experiments program, 202 


Ranger program, 181 


Surveyor program, 206 


tracking and communications, 123-24 


Johansen, John H., 489 


Johnson, Caldwell C., Jr., 489 


Apollo flight mode, 76 


CM design, ll, 18, 18 ill., 26, 37, 97, 138, 


169-70 


LM weight problem, 174 


New Projects Panel, 12 


spacecraft control thrusters, 157 


Johnson, George W. S., 34 


Johnson, Harold 1., 17 


Johnson, Irving A., 156 


Johnson, Lyndon B. 


A polio 8, 284 


did not seek reelection, 250 


Gemini V and Apollo mission, 182 


location of manned space flight center, 53 


Kapryan, Walter J., 265, 308 ill., 48

Karegeannes, Carrie E., xvii 


Kavanau, Lawrence L., 48, 49, 489 


KC-135 aircraft, 324 


Kehlet, Alan B., 489 


Apollo feasibility studies, 17 


CM Block II design, 140, 170, 171 

Little Joe II, 91 


New Projects Panel, II 


Kelly, G. Fred, 217 


Kelly, Thomas J.. 489 


AS-204 aftermath, 225 


elimination of LM seats, 149 


LM design contract, ll3, 144 


LM mockup review board, 162 


LM weight reduction, 174 


space study work, ll2, 144 


Kemmerer, Walter W., Jr., 333 


Kennedy, John F., 22, 46, llO 


Apollo flight mode, 102-04, 107 


assassination, 51, 131 


Cuban missile crisis, 107 


lunar landing challenge, xm, 

62,104,125.284, 285,313 


NASA uncertainties, 22. 23 


Kennedy Space Center, John F., 

231 , 232. 288 


launch complex locations, 246 il

Merritt Island Launch Annex, 2

previous designation. See Lau

ations Center, NASA. 


Kerwin, Joseph P., 180, 264 ill., 332

Kiker, John W., 94 


Kimpton, Lawrence A. , 24 


Kimpton Report, 24 


King, Alan, 489 


King, Charles H ., 156 


King, Elbert A., Jr., 489 


King, Martin Luther, Jr., 250 

lunar orbit mission proposal, 256-59, 273­

74 

Mission Control Center, 114-15, 186 

recovery plans for A polio 11, 333 

spacecraft configuration control, 230 

spacecraft docking concerns, 287 

stretching Apollo landing zone, 363 

Kranz, Eugene F., 242, 267, 270 ill., 292 

Kroupa, Charles E., 489 

Kuettner, Joachim P., 122 

Kupczyk. Richard R., 489 

Kupfer, Walker, 489 

Kurbjun, Max C., 67, 68 

Kyle, Howard C., 17 

Laboratory, proposed manned space, 8, 9, 10, 

12, 13, 16, 23. 25, 41 , 67, 188 

Lambert, C. Harold, Jr., 156 

Landing, spacecraft, discussion of water and 

ground, 16, 89, 94, 96,135 

Landing and recovery, spacecraft, 16, 94, 96, 

135, 263 

Apollo 4, 233 

Apollo 6, 249 

Apollo 7, 271, 271 ill. 

Apollo 8, 283, 284 

Apollo 9, 299 

Apollo 10, 312 

Apollo 11, 355-56 ill.-59 

AS-201 , 193 

AS-202, 194 

Landing gear. See Legs (gear) , lunar landing 

Yehicle. 

Lang, Dave W., 42, 156, 489 

Lange, Oswald H., 42 

Langley Research Center, NASA, 3, 8 

Larson , Raymond F., 489 

Larson, Robert L., 489 

Laughlin, C. Patrick, 17 

Launch Complex 34, 191, 209, 267, 270 ill. 

AS-204 activities, 213-19, 241 

Launch Complex 37, 241 

Launch Complex 39, 233 ill., 275, 289 

true location, 247 

Launch escape system, 27, 28, 29, 90, 93 ill., 

94, 133, 134 ilL, 135, 268 

abon tower, 27, 94, 133, 134 ill., 142 ill., 

171 

Little Joe II tests, 93 ill., 141-42, 183 

rocket motor, 90 

Launch Operations Center, NASA (see also 

Kennedy Space Center, NASA) , 51 , 104, 

118, 119 

Launch pads, Saturn, 25, 50, 92 

"all-up" decision impact, 130-31 

launch complexes. See Launch Complex 34, 

37, 39. 

sliding wil-e safety device, 228, 263 

Launch \'ehicle concepts, multistage, 5-7, 47 

Launch vehicle development plans, 4-7, 25, 

44-53-54 ill., 57. 59, 130-31 

Lawton, Richard W., 489 

Layton, P., 156 

Lee, John B., 17, 19 

Lee, William A., 159, 173, 185, 199, 230, 266, 

489 

Lees, Lester, 102 

Legs (gear) , lunar landing vehicle, 62, 63 

ill., 68 ill., 69, 74 ill., 75, 86 ill., 92, 125, 

144, 145, 145 ill. 

Apollo 9, 295, 297 ill. 

crushable honeycomb, 153, 334 

design, 151-53, 153 ill. 

footpads, 99, 151, 152. 154, 172, 173 ill., 

344, 349, 350 ill. 

520 
yy

Liberty Bell 7 (MR-4) , 292 


Lifting-body spacecraft, 27, 35, 37 


Lilly, William E., 58, 129 


Lina, Lindsay J., 73 


Lind, Don L., 206, 319, 324 


Lindeman, Richard E., 225 


Linder, Harry S., 489 


Ling, Donald P., 19 


Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 100 


Link, John, 489 


Unton, Ted, 489 


Liquid hydrogen. See Propellant, launch 


vehicle. 


Little, Arthur D., Inc., 152 


Little Joe II launch vehicle, 91-93 ill., 141, 


188, 190 


Apollo A-003, 183 


Apollo A-004, 190 


BP-12 flight test, 141 


BP-22 flight test, 183 


BP-23 flight test, 141-42 


description, 141 


LM test programs, 99, 109, 164 


test program objectives, 92, 141, 190 


Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 17, 42, 100 


Lockheed Propulsion Co., 90 


Loftin, Laurence K., Jr., 8, 10, 34 


Loftus, Joseph P., Jr., 183 


Logistics vehicle, unmanned lunar, 81-82, 362 


Long, Franklin A., 100, 219 


Long-range planning, 4, 12-13 


Lord, Douglas R., 19, 489 


Lousma, Jack R., 206, 262 


Love, Eugene S., 489 


congressional testimony, 25, 110 


extending Apollo, 364 


first Low Committee, 20-21 


first man on moon decision, 322 


Goett Committee, 8, 10, 11 


headquarters steering committee

LM, 225,245,286,302,334 


LRL, 204, 205 


lunar orbit mission proposal, 2

74 


lunar surface operations, 319-2

364 


management council, 58, 129 


NASA-industry conference, 15 


1968 worker morale problem, 25

OMSF organization, 121, 129 


Panel Review Board, 168 


parachutes versus paraglider, 96 

planning for Apollo 11, 328-329

recovery from AS-204 accident, 

scientist-astronaut selection, 179 

second Low Committee, 20-21, 

spacesuit, 179 


spacecraft configuration control

spacecraft docking concerns, 287 

spacecraft names, 331 


space flight television, 266 


unmanned logistics vehicle, 81 


vehicle shipment proposal, 286 

LTA-1 (lunar test article), 175 


LTA-2, 175 


LTA-3, 175 


LTA-4, 176 


LTA-5, 175 

first mission possible, 231 

Goett Committee_7-ll, 13 

how-to studies, 9, 30-31 , 34 

Kennedy challenge, 29 

launch vehicle for, 44--50, 57-59 

Low Committee, 2(}-23 

mode issue. See Lunar orbit rendezvous. 

NASA ten-year plan, 12-13 

New Projects Panel, 11 

nine plateaus to, 201, 202 

objectives, ll(}-ll 

phased program, 41 

planning first, 314--18 

priority, llO, lll 

proposed as NASA's objective, xiii, 5, 8, 10, 

13,22 


schedule, 25, 26 


space goal, 8, 10. 11 


steps "A through G," 234, 235 


suggested landing sites, 125 


23 considerations, 203 


Lunar landing maneuvers, 62, 75, 76, 102. 

315-17 

Lunar landing methods, 62, 63 ill. 75-76, 109 

Lunar landing research vehicle (LLRV) , 109 

ill. 

Lunar landing stage (module, vehicle) , 2 

ill., 14, 34, 41, 64 ill.• 67, 68 ill., 69, 73­

74 ill.-76, 79, 86 ill., 106, ll5 ill., 145 ill. 

"lunar crasher," 76 


one-man, 73, 74 ill., 75 


proposed weights, 72-73 


two-man, 73 


Lunar landing training vehicle (LLTV) , 

164, 314, 322-23, 325 ill. 

Lunar landing steering committee, 46 

Lunar logistics vehicle, unmanned, 81-82, 

362. 364 

Lunar mission planning, 14 

configuration, 99, 144, 145 ill. 146--47 

contract, 105--Q8, ll2-14, 143, 177 

costs, 109, ll4, 146, 167--68, 176--78, 190 ill., 

197,200 

crew stations, 100, 147-48, 150 ill., 161--62 

delivery to Cape, 176 

descent engine. See Descent engine, LM. 

descent stage. See, Descent stage, LM. 

design, 98--100, 108, 109, ll2, ll3, 143--45 

ill.-53 ill. 174, 175 

development, 85, 146, 165--66, 256 

docking system, 99, 108, 133, 137 ill., 145 

ill., 288 ill. 

drogue. See Docking, spacecraft. 

electrical system, 108, 109, 158, 176, 286, 

342 

environmental control unit, 154, 157, 176 

evaluation of contractor proposals, 108 

extended lunar module (ELM) , 362--64 

fire-in-the-hole. See Ascent engine, LM. 

flight test planning, 164 

flying qualities, 287 

frangible probes, 172. 173 ill., 344 

fuel cells. See Fuel cell. 

FTA (flight test article) , 176 

GSE (ground support equipment), 165, 

176 

guidance and navigation. See Guidance, 

control, and navigation. 

hatches. See Hatch, spacecraft. 

inflight repair. See Inflight spacecraft repair. 

instrumentation, 108, 161 

landing gear. See Legs (gear) , lunar landing vehicle. 

launch position, 99, 108, 132 ill., 133, 134 

ill., 153 ill. 

LM-a1one flights, 205, 2ll , · 241, 243 ill., 

244 

522 
287 

Eagle, 331 

LM-6, 201, 246 

LM-7, 201, 246 

LM-8, 246 

LM-10, 364 

manufacturing, 147, 175-176 

mockups, 140, 161, 162 ill. 

NASA Management Review Team, 197-99 

operating en\'ironment, 144, 148 

optical tracker, 160, 173, 174, 199, 200 

pacing vehicle, Ill, 158, 176, 199,201,256 

porch, 151, 153 ill., 296, 297 ill., 346 

propellant tankage, 144, 145 ill., 146 

propulsion system. See Propulsion system, 

LM. 

radar, 99, 109, 158, 159, 173, 199, 200, 298, 

307 

stabilization and control system, 158 

stress corrosion (metal cracking) , 237, 

245-46,286-87 

television, 159 

test program, 108, 146, 152, 154, 163, 164, 

175-76 

thermal control. 109. 146-47, 151 , 175 

TM (test model), 163 

tunnel, 150-51 

unmanned version, 100, 286 

visibility, 100, 102, 144, 146-47, 149, 161, 

342 

weight, 99, 106, 146, 149, 151, 165, 173, 

174-75,200, 237, 247, 286 

windows, 145 ill., 146-47, 149, 150 ill., 151, 

153 ill., 161 ' 245 

Lunar orbit insertion (LOI) 

Apollo 8, 278-79 

Apollo 10, 305-{)6 

Apollo 11, 341 

352-54 

Lunar Orbiter program, 185, 188, 2

Lunar-orbiting spacecraft (see also 

Apollo 10, and Apollo 11), 2

110 

Lunar orbit rendezvous (Apollo l

mode) 

Ames Resea1·ch Center dislike, 80 

Apollo 10, 309 ill. , 311 

Apollo 11, 353 

Apollo flight mode choice, xv, 2

49, 59-63 ill.-68 ill.-86 ill., 1

114, 117, 137, 202 

"Charlie Frick's Road Show," 79-

defense of against PSAC, 87, 10

110, 120 

description , 65-67, 69 

Dolan study group, 66-67 

estimated cost, 20, 83, 110 

Fleming Committee, 34, 45 

foreseen dangers, 66, 72, 73, 80 

Golovin Committee, 48-49, 70-7

Heaton Committee, 45, 70-71 

Houbolt crusade, 67-73, 78, 82 

Langley studies, 67, 69 

Lundin Committee, 34, 45, 70 

Marshall and Lewis lpsses, 81 

Marshall switch to, 82. 83 

mode comparison studies, 59, 77-

NASA Headquarters switch to, 80

Rosen Committee, 57-58 

Space Task Gmup (later Mann

craft Center) switch to, 75-79 

Lunar receiving laboratory (LRL) 

202, 204, 332, 335 ill. 

Apollo 11, 332-33, 354, 356 ill., 35

construction, 204-05 

cost, 205 
McCandless, Bruce, II, 206, 341 , 349 


McCafferty, Riley D., 209, 215, 489 


McCarger, Charles G. , 489 


McClintock, John J., 229 


McCullough , Hugh, 197-98 


McDivitt, James A. (see also Apollo 9), 116 


ill., 262, 263, 291 ill., 297 ill., 322, 331 


AS-204, 224, 261 


AS-205, 212, 261 


Gemi11i IV, 182 


lunar-orbit mission, 262 


McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 17, 42, 43, 67, 88, 


94, 100, 104-05, 108, Ill, 115 


Mace, William D., 67, 489 


McGahey, Richard, 489 


McGee, Leonard A., 489 


McGinty, Earl E., 97 


McGolrick, Joseph E., 45 


McLaughlin, Richard 1., 489 


McLeaish, John E., 327 


McMillan, Brockway, 19 


McNamara, Robert ·s., 48, 49 


M-1 rocket engine, launch vehicle, 47 


Madrid, Spain, 123 


Maggin, Bernard, 490 


Makarian, Don, 490 


MALLAR (manned lunar landing and return) , 66-67 


Malley, George T ., 219 


Mallick, Donald L., 490 


MALLIR (manned lunar landing involving 


rendezvous) , 69 


Man-in-Space-Soonest, 62, 88 


Management devices, space program, 128 


"all-up" flight testing, 130, 164, 176 


Apollo executives committee, 129, 218, 273 


interface control documents, 98 


LEM Management Plan, 177 


lunar flight mode issue, xv, 77, 83 


Lunar Roll of Honor, 218 


Manned Space Flight Management Council, 58, 129 


Materials Selection Review Board, 238 


MFA, 218 


mockup review boards, 133, 138, 139 ill. 


NASA Management Review Team (LM) , 


197-99 


Panel Review Board, 122, 123, 168 


Preliminary Design Review, 169 


PRIDE, 218 


program control office, 129, 198 


resident project office, 143 


Senior Flammability Board, 238 


spacecraft manager, 224, 231 


subsystem managers, 135, 170-71, 175 


system review meetings, 122, 143-44 


Weight Control Board, 174 


work packages, 198 


Maneuverable spacecraft, 8, 12, 16, 29, 116, 


181 


Manned lunar flights. See Apollo 8, Apollo 


10, and Apollo 11. 


Manned Lunar Landing Task Group. See 


Low Committee. 


Manned Space Flight Management Council, 


58, 59, 78, 81 , 84, 130, 286 


established, 58, 129 


reorganized, 129 


Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) . See 


Tracking and communications network, 


worldwide. 


Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) , NASA 


(see also Space Task Group, NASA), 55 


ill., 186 ill. 


524 
Project Gemini, 118 


Project Mercury, 118 


reaction to AS-204 accident, 228 


t·elations with Langley, 92, 93 


search for location, 52 


selection criteria (see also Appendix A) , 53 


Space Task Group renamed , 44 


u·acking network question, 123, 124 


Manufacturing, spacecraft 


CM, 90 ill., 133, 135, 210 ill., 226 ill., 229, 


237, 238 


LM, 145 ill., 147, 172, 175,201,241,256 


Mardel, Alfred D., 122 


Mariner (space probe) , 123 


Mark II Mercury spacecraft, 72, 75 


Markley, J. Thomas, 21, 108, 132, 172, 230, 


490 


Marquardt Corp., The, 90, 92 


CSM attitude control thrusters, 90, 92, 157 


LM attitude control thrusters, 154, 156, 157 


Mars (planet), 7, 8, 38, 39, 362 


Marshall Space Flight Center, George C. , 


NASA 


"all-up" testing effects, 130-31 


Apollo flight test program, 35, 36 


banned as manned space flight location, 19 


facilities, 51, 52 


favot·ed EOR, 21 , 48, 51, 59, 63, 64, 66, 77­

82 


interface control documents repository, 123 


Launch Operations Directorate, 51 


launch vehicle development, 45-46, 78 


LOR defense against PSAC, 84, 102, 104 


LRV, 364 


manufacturing assistance to MSC, 147, 237 


Mississippi Test Facility, 52, 54 ill. 


opposition to GE contract, 119 


relations with Lewis, 122 


relations with STG (MSC) , 21 


160-161' 163 


Materials, spacecraft 


Beta fiber, 225, 228 


flammability, 221-225, 239 


guidelines on, 239 


Materials Selection Review Bo

nonflammable, 222, 225, 226 


Senior Flammability Board, 238 

space effects on, 6 


tests, 228, 239 


Materials Selection Review Board, 

Mathews, Charles W., 42, 78, 15

256 


Matranga, Gene J., 490 


Mattingly, Thomas K., II, 206, 262 

Apollo 8, 275, 281 , 283 


Apollo 11 planning, 318, 323 


Mattson , Axel T ., 94 


Maus, Hans H., 46, 57 


Maxwell, Arthur L., 490 


May, Ralph W ., Jr., 8, 34 


Mayaguana (Bahama Islands) , 50 

Mayer, John P., 120-21 , 300, 315, 

Maynard, Owen E., 490 


"A toG" Apollo plan, 234 


CM, 138, 140 


LM, 144, 145, 162, 174 


LOR, 69 


lunar mission feasibility , 17 


nine plateaus to moon, 201 


Mayo, Alfred M., 46 


Mayo, Richard E., 176 


Mead, Margaret, 366 


Mead, Merrill H., 97 


Medical factors, astronaut, 261 , 

277,290,293-95,304-05, 339 


Melancon, Paul S., 490 

Meteoroid hazard, spacecraft, 6, 27, 106, IIO, 


167, 180-81 


Mettler, Ruben F., 128 


Meyer, AndreJ., Jr., 156, 182, 364, 490 


MFA (manned flight awareness), 218 


Michael, William H., Jr., 67 


Michel, F. Curtis, 180 


Michoud (Saturn assembly facility) , 51, 53, 


54 ill. 


Micrometeoroids, 167, 180-81 


Midcourse guidance. See Trajectory analysis, 


Iunar flight. 


Middleton, Roderick 0 ., 227, 257 


Miller, Edward S., 490 


Miller, l'ord L., 490 


Miller, George P., l1 5 ill., 219 


Miller, J. S., 39 


Miller, John E., 490 


Miller, Lowell, 490 


Mills, C. V., 169 


Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 90, 


158, 172 


Minuteman missile, 128, 164 


Mission Control Center 


'Apollo, 52-53, l14-15, 186 ill., 267, 270 


ill., 356 ill. 


Gemini, ll4, 186 ill. 


Mission planning, Apollo, 121-22, 136-37, 


189,201, 211,231 , 23f-35 


"A to G" missions, 234-35, 250, 256-57, 315 


Apollo 11, 314-18 


flight numbering confusion, 231-32 


Gemini contributions, 208 


lunar-orbital flight, 234, 256-57 


nine plateaus to moon, 201-{)2 


steps to lunar landing, 234, 235 


23 considerations for first manned moon 


landing, 203 


SA-10 mission, 181 


LM, 90, 91, 140, 150 ill., 153 ill., 161 , 162 


ill. 


M-1, 161 


M-5, 161-62 


TM-1 , 161 


Mockup review boards, spacecraft 


CM, 133 


Block I, 138, 139 ill. 


Block II, 140-41 


LM, 162 


Mode questions and studies, Apollo flight, 


XV, 5-6, 27-31, 44, 48-49, 53, 57, 59-86, 101­

07, 120 


Modular spacecraft, 14, 66 


Moe, W. R., 156 


" Molly Brown" (Gemini Ill) , 292 


Mondale, Walter F., 222 


MORAD (manned orbital rendezvous and 


docking) , 69 


Morehead Planetarium, 263 


Morris, Corrine L., xvi 


Morris, Owen G., 140, 170, 257, 490 


Morrow, Thomas F., 274 


Morse, Archibald E., Jr., 490 


Mortimer, Robert, 490 


Motorola, Inc., 159 


Mrasek, William A., 57 


Mueller, George E., 128, 131 ill., 296 ill., 490 


"A toG" Apollo plans, 234 


"all-up" testing, 130-31 


Apollo 5, 242, 244 


Apollo 6, 248, 250 


Apollo 8, 285 


Apollo 9, 289 


Apollo 10, 302 


Apollo 11 planning, 318, 326, 328-29, 334 


526 
LLTV, 323 


LM, 176,198, 199, 244-246. 256 


LRL, 204 


lunar landing site selection, 185 


lunar orbit mission proposal, 258-59, 272­

74 


lunat· roving vehicle, 364 


lunar surface demonstration , 324, 326 


management council, 129 


Mission Control Center, 186 


optics versus radar, 174 


Panel Review Board, 168 


policy changes for Apollo, 128-30 


Saturn, 185, 195 


spacecraft atmosphere, 240 


spacecraft review steps. 168, 169 


spacesuit contract, 179 


special reviews, 286 


upgrading Apollo capabilities, 362, 364 


Mullaney, Robert S., 112. 115 ill., 149, 176. 


490 


Muller, Donald E. , 490 


Murder on Pad 34, 219 


Muse, Thomas C., 13 


Myers, Dale D., 140, 169, 190, 225, 258, 265, 


490 


Names, spacecraft. See Call signs, spacecraft. 


NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference 


(1961) . 37. 70 


NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference 


(1960) . 15 


National Academy of Sciences, 125. 180, 204 


National Advisory Committee for Aero­


nautics, xiii, 3 


National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 


2.4 

Office of Space Science and 

129 


public affairs. See Public A

NASA. 


reorganization, 129, 131 


role in Apollo program, 56, 

29 


Lunar Exploration Office, 362 


Lunar Landing Steering Comm

Lunar Role of Honor, 218 


Manned Space Flight Manag

cil, 58, 129 


MFA (manned flight awarenes

peak years, 167 


reorganization, 46, 53, 56, 57, 1

Space Exploration Program 

22.69 


National Aerona utics and Space 

National space vehicle pmgram, 

Navajo missile, 43, 88 


NaYigation (definition) • space, 4

Navy, U.S., 4, 92. 96, 111, 112 


Neal, James L., 156, 490 


New Projects Panel, 11 


New York Times, 328 


Newell, Homer E. , 125, 129. 

363 


Newhouse, C. W., 490 


Nicks, Oran W., 21 , 23, 490 


Nicollelo, Henry. 490 


Nikoleyev, Andrian G., 115 


Nitrogen foxygen space cabin 

230,239,240 


Nitzberg, Gerald E., 490 


Nixon , Richard M., 284, 292, 

48, 354, 356 ill. 


Nolan , J ames P., Jr., 17, 45 


North, Warren J.. 45, 287, 490 

pesoesaeup, 0, 

PRIDE, 218 


reaction to Apollo 204 Review Board report, 224-25, 232 


relations with Grumman, 163 


relations with MIT, 96 


Rocketdyne Div., See Rocketdyne Div. 


Saturn launch vehicle contracts, 58, 88 


Skybolt missile, 133 


SM. See SM (service module), Apollo. 


Space Div., 232 


Space and Inforri{'!tion Systems Div., 87, 


232 ( ' 


subcontractors, 90, 2,~7-38 

sued by astronauts' ·widows, 224 


Tulsa facility, 133 


Northrop Corp. (parachutes) , 90, 94, 100 


Nose cone, Saturn, 27, 35 


Nova launch vehicle (proposed for Apollo) 


Apollo direct ascent flight mode, 8, 9, 45, 


48, 49, 51 , 61 , 82, 84 


clustered F-1 engines, 25, 47, 49, 58 


description, 7, 20, 46, 47, 57, 58 


disadvantages foreseen , 8, 45, 48, 59, 62, 71 , 


77, 84 


facility assembly factor, 51 


funding, 25, 30, 45, 59 


NASA development plans, 7, 13, 20, 23, 30, 


34, 45, 48, 57, 80 


solid-fueled engines, 45, 49, 58 


Nugent, John, 490 


O'Connell, J . J., 490 


O'Donnell, Kenneth, 106 


O'Hara, Delores B., 338 


Olson, R . L., 490 


Ottinger, C. Wayne, 490 


Owens, W. L., 490 


Oxygen, liquid. See Propellant. 


Oxygen, spacecraft cabin, 157, 223, 230, 239­

40 


AS-204 launch pad test procedures, 239 


versus oxygen -nitrogen, 222, 223, 230, 239­

40 


Pacing Systems of the Apollo Program, 187 


Pad 34. See Launch Complex 34. 


Pad abort tests, CM, 92, 93 ill., 183 


Page, Thornton L., 490 


Paige, Hilliard W., 223, 273 


Paine, Thomas 0. 


Acting NASA Administrator, 267, 286 


A polio 9, 289 


A polio 11 planning, 326, 329 


back contamination question, 333 


extending Apollo capabilities, 364 


first man on the moon decision, 322 


lunar orbit mission (proposal and deci­


sion) , 258-59, 272-74 


NASA Administrator, 322 


NASA Deputy Administrator, 258 


Palaoro, Hans R., 122 


Panel Review Board, 122, 123, 168 


Parachutes, spacecraft, 9, 27, 29, 90, 94, 96 


ill. 


Apollo 4, 233 


clustered (3) , ring-sail, 94 


glide-sail, 27 


Little Joe II launch test, 141 


Paraglider earth-landing system, 94, 96 


Parker, John A., 490 


Parkes, Australia, 328 


Parsons, John F., 52 


528 
"A to G" Apollo plan, 234 

Apollo flight scheduling, 164, 180 

Apollo flights, 234, 250, 266, 301, 302, 328, 

329, 334 

Apollo Program Development Plan, 168 

AS-204 accident, 218, 229 

cabin atmosphere question, 240 

configuration control, 239 

enlarging the Apollo landing zone, 363 

extending Apollo capabilities, 364 

LM, 155, 156, 198, 199, 244, 245, 256, 287 

lunar mission symposium, 201 

lunar orbit mission proposal, 257, 259, 260, 

272,273,274 

lunar surface demonstration, 325, 326 

lunar surface walks, 320, 324 

"Phillips report," 194, 195, 196, 222-223, 

227 

"Sam's Budget Exercise," 257 

Saturn launch safety, 241 

space flight television, 266, 328, 329 

spacecraft docking concerns, 287 

spacecraft review steps, 168, 169 

spacesuit contract, 179 

vehicle shipment proposal, 286 

Phillips, William H., 45, 67, 490 

Photography, space 

Apollo 11, 329, 342, 347, 348, 350-51 ill., 

352. 355. 365 

Apollo missions 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, 248, 249 

ill., 266, 270 ill., 278, 282 ill., 283 ill., 

297 ill., 298, 308-09 ill., 310, 365 

Pickering, John E., 332 

Pickering, Richard F., 490 

Pickering, William H., 20, 62, 64, 65 

Piland, Joseph V., 205, 490 

Piland, Robert 0., 16 ill., 93 ill., 490 

Apollo Projects Office, 21 

pack) , 178 ill. 

A polio 9, 291 ill., 296, 297 ill., 

Apollo 11, 313, 321 ill., 345, 34

ills. 

cost and description, 296 

EMU. See Extravehicular mob

Powers, John A., 327 

Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (div

Aircraft Corp.), 158 

Preliminary Design Review (de

Presidential campaign of 1960, 22 

President's Science Advisory 

(PSAC) 

Apollo 8 decision, 274 

Block I CM reliability, 170 

desires for Apollo, 362-63 

opposition to LOR mode, 84, 8

Panel on Man-in-Space, 19-20 

Space Vehicle Panel, 100, 101, 

President's Space Task Group, 

Pressure-fed spacecraft engines, 7

Pressure launch test, maximum 

Preston, G. Merritt, 490 

PRIDE ("Personal Responsibil

Effort") , 218 

Probe and drogue. See Docking, s

Procter and Gamble, 196 

Production, spacecraft. See M

spacecraft. 

Project Apollo. See Apollo progra

"Project Christmas Present," 136, 

Project Gemini, xiv, 73, 114-15, 

189, 206 

contributions to Apollo, 182-83

costs, 127 

dual flight, 182, 205 

influence on Apollo mission pl

06 
move question, 18-19 

worker morale, 19, 256 

Propellant, launch vehicle, 5, 7, 9, 13, 25, 30, 

45, 47, 49, 57,81 , 99 

cryogenic, 9, 105, 106 

hypergolic, 9 

liquid hydrogen , 5, 7, 13, 47, 81 , 193, 194 

nuclear, 47 

solid, 25, 30, 45, 49, 50, 57, 58, 91 , 92, 141 

storable, 9, 105, 106 

Propellant tankage, spacecraft 

CSM, 134 ill., 171-72, 211 

LM, 144, 145 ill. , 146 

Propst, Gary W., 215 

Propulsion modules, spacecraft, 29 

Propulsion system, lunar landing, 75-76, 99­

100 

Propulsion system, LM, 108-09, 113 

ascent engine, 113, 144, 146, 154-55, 162 ill., 

200-01 , 244-45 

descent engine, 109, 113, 144, 154-56, 162 

ill., 200 

Propulsion system, SM main, 90, 109, 154, 272 

Propulsion system, spacecraft, 16, 26 

Public Affairs Office, NASA, 314, 326-28 

Public Health Service, 204, 333 

Pump-fed spacecraft engines, 76 

Purser, Paul E., 19, 65, 490 

Pyle, Ray W ., 169 

Quality assurance. See Reliability and safety, 

space vehicle. 

Queijo, Manuel J., 67 

Radar systems, spacecraft 

Apollo 9, 298 

Apollo 10, 301, 307, 310, 311 

Rathke, C. William, 113, 490 

Raytheon Co., 17, 97, 160, 187 

Reaction control motors, 90, 92, 94 

ablative, 92 

CSM, 90, 92, 94, 157, 171 

LM, 108, 151-52, 154, 156, 157 

test program, 92, 94 

Reaction Motors (Div. of Thiokol), 155 

Ream, Harold E., 323 

Record to 1967, manned space program, 217 

Recovery, spacecraft. See Landing and recovery, spacecraft. 

Recruit solid-propellant rocket motors, 141 

Rector, William F., III, 28 ill. , 176, 490 

Apollo mode issue, 79 

LM contract, 108, 113 

LM descent engine, 156 

LM design, 99, 100, 108, 148, 162 

LM guidance system, 160 

Recupito, Pasquale, 490 

Redstone Arsenal, Ala., 51 , 52, 54 ill. 

Redundancy, spacecraft subsystem, 106, 135, 

148 

Reece, L. D., 215, 217 

Reentry, spacecraft, 16, 25, 75, 91 

Apollo missions, 233, 249, 271, 283, 312, 

355, 358 

guidance, 97 

test program, 91 

Reentry control system, 92, 207-{)8 

Reentry corridor, earth, 97, 208 

Reentry heat protection, spacecraft, 9, 21, 26, 

37, 92, 94 

AS-201, 193 

CM. See Heatshield, spacecraft ablative. 

reaction control motors. See Reaction control motors. 

Rees, Eberhard F. M., 46, 58, 129, 168 

530 
first (Gemini Vl-A f Vll) , 167, 182 


first international, xiv 


Gemini IV worries, 182 


Gemini V practice, 182 


Gemini missions, 167, 182, 205, 207, 208 


lunar orbit. See Lunar orbit rendezvous 


lunar surface. See Lunar surface rendez­

,·ous. 


Rendezvous sensor olympics, 174, 199, 200 


Renzetti, Nicholas A., 490 


Repair concept, spacecraft onboard, 135, 140, 


159, 171 


Republic A\'iation Corp., 17, 42, 100 


Research Steering Committee for Manned 


Space Flight. See Goett committee. 


Restraint harness, spacecraft, 92, 149 


Reynolds, Harry L., 174 


Rice Hotel (Houston) , 132 


Rice University, 53 


Rich Building (Houston) , 98 


Richard, Ludic G., 257, 259 


Richard, Louie G., 149 


Ricker, Harry H., Jr., ll 


Riehl, William, 490 


Rigsby, John, 149 


Riley, John E., 327 


Ritland, Osmond J-, 62 


RL-10 hydrogen-fueled rocket engine, 155 


Roadman, Charles H ., 46, 58, 129 


Rock and soil, lunar (see also Apollo 11), 


126, 127 


Rocketdyne Div. (of North American Aviation, Inc.) , 89, 92 


CM thrusters, 92, 157 


F-1 engine, ll8, 184 ilL, 251 


Gemini spacecraft thrusters, 92, 157 


H-1 engine, 191 


J-2 engine, ll8, 195 ilL 


Russell, Harold G., 198 


Russia. See Union of Soviet S

publics. 


Russo, Raymond R., 490 


Ryan Aeronautical Co., 159 


Ryken, John, 490 


Ryker, Norman .J-, Jr. , 88 ilL, 8

490 


Saegesser, Lee D., X\'ii 


Safety and reliability. See Rel

safety. 


St. Louis, Mo., 51 


Salina, Salvatore, 490 


Salvo rendez\'OUS, 80 


Samples, lunar soil and rock, 1

185, 202 


Apollo 11 , 346, 348, 349, 353, 

359, 365 


" bag of rocks" quotation, 365 


Samulon, Henry, 490 


Sasser, James H ., 490 


Saturn (launch vehicle), xiv, 

20-21, 23, 34, 35, 45, 46, 4

62-63, 69, 79, 88, 92 


"all-up" decision impact, 130-3

development contractors, 58, 11

designations. See Saturn C

Saturn C-5, Saturn C-8, Satu

IB, Saturn II, and Saturn V. 

instrument unit, 191 


stages. See Saturn launch vehic

Saturn C-1 launch vehicle (see 

I) , 12 ilL, 27, 51,54 ilL, 70 


configuration, 47 


first launch, 56 ilL, 57 

Saturn-Apollo missions 


SA-6, 142 ill. 


SA-7, 142 


SA-8, 181 


SA-9, 181 


SA-10, 181 


Saturn I launch vehicle (see also Saturn 


C-1), 47, li4, 142, 181 , 189 


impact of "all-up" decision, 130-31 


manned flights canceled, 130 


Pegasus flights, 181 


Saturn-Apollo (SA) flights. See Saturn­


Apollo missions 


Saturn IB (see also Saturn C-1 B) , xvi, 47.. 


55 ill., 93 ill., 130, 190 ill., 192 ill., 194, 


195 ill., 205, 209 


"A to G " Apollo missions, 235 


"all-up" decision impact, 130-31 


AS-204, 241 


AS-205, See Saturn IB missions and program assignments. 


AS-205/ 208, 2li 


description, 47, 190, 191 


dual-launch missions, 205-{)6, 2li 


LM test flights, 164, 241 


vehicles released, 255 


Saturn IB missions and program assignments 


201 (see also AS-201) , 164 


202 (see also AS-202), 164 


203 (see also AS-203) , 164 


204 (see also Apollo 5 and AS-204) , 164 


205 (see also Apollo 7) , 164, 261 , 267, 270 


ill. 


206, 164 


207, 164 


208, 261 


Saturn II, 9 


S-I, 47, 93 ill. 


S-IB, 47, 93 ill., 190 


S-IC, 47, 93 ill., 183, 184 ill. 


AS-501 (Apollo 4), 232-33 ill. 


AS-502 (Apollo 6), 247-48, 250 


AS-503 (Apollo 8), 276 


pogo prevention testing, 251-52 


S-11, 47, 93 ill., 185, 194-95 ill., 232, 248, 


250,252,276 


contract award, 88 


fuel-tank model (WASP test) , 193 


S-IV, 35, 47, 93 ill. 


S-IVB, 47, 49, 58, 93 ill., 105, 132 ill., 133, 


150, 191, 195 ill. 


AS-201, 192 


AS-203, 193, 194 


AS-204 (Apollo 5), 242 


AS-205 (Apollo 7), 267-268, 270 ill. 


AS-501 (Apollo 4), 233-234 


AS-502 (Apollo 6), 248-50, 252 


AS-503 (Apollo 8), 276-77 


S-V, 47 


Savage, Melvin, 57 


Sawyer, Ralph S., 17 


Schedules, Apollo spacecraft, 91, 133, 136, 169 


CM, 133, 169, 171, 194, 195-96, 228-29 


LM, 146, 164,198,201,227,241,257 


Schedules, Apollo flight, 20-23, 26, 34, 44, 63, 


83, 105, llO-ll, 128, 131 , 187, 212 


"A to G" lunar landing plans, 234-35 


"all-up" decision impact, 130-31 


Apollo 5, 242 


Apollo 6, 248 


AS-204, 209, 2li, 220-21 


impact, 229- 30 


AS-205/ 208, 2ll 


AS-503, 212, 257 


Apollo pacing systems, 187 


532 
CSM-101, 261,263,264 


Gemini VI, 182 


Schmid, James E., 490 


Schmidt, Stanley F., 39 


Schmitt, Harrison H ., 180, 281, 283 ill., 316, 


319 


Schmitt, Joe W ., 338 


Schneider, William C., 242, 248, 258, 259, 


292, 490 


Schramm, Wilson B., 45, 48 


Schurmeier, H arris M. , 8 


Schwarzschild, J. Martin, 19 


Schweickart, Russell L. (see also Apollo 9) , 


130, 200, 291 ill., 297 ill., 490 


AS-204, 261 


AS-205, 212 


Science (magazine), 131 


Science role in Apollo, 125-26, 179 


Apollo 7, 266 


Apollo II postmission desires, 362-63 


experiments, 126, 202 


limitations, 125-27, 363 


National Academy of Sciences, 125 


not to interfere with Apollo's prime objective, 229 


objectives, 126, 136, 26Q-61 


scientist-astronauts, 179 


scientists' complaints, 365 


service module bay, 140 


Space Science Steering Committee, 125 


Scott, David R. (see also Apollo 9) , 130, 262, 


291 ill., 297 ill. 


AS-204, 261 


AS-205, 212 


Gemini VIII, 205 


Scott, Hugh M., 490 


"Scrape" (LM weight reduction) , 174-75 


Seale, Leonard M., 65 


incentive contracting, 177 


leaves NASA, 258 


LEO, 182 


location of manned space flig

18, 52, 53 


NASA Associate Administrator, 

NASA budget, 22, 23 


NASA Deputy Administrator, 25

tracking network, 123 


See, Elliot M., Jr., 116, 207 


death, 207, 217 


Gemini IX, 207 


Seiff, Alvin, 17 


Senior Flammability Board, 238, 23

Service module. See SM. 


Sevier, John R ., 337, 363 


Sextant, spacecraft, 96, 97, 173, 268

Shapiro, Leonard, 50 


Shapley, Willis H ., 259, 329-30 


Sharpe, Burton L., 490 


Shea, Joseph F., 86 ill., 490 


Apollo flight mode, 59, 77-85 


LOR defense, 1oo-o2, 104-05, 

Apollo flight planning, 164, 18

02 


Apollo SM problem, 211 


AS-204 accident, 215, 223-24 


astronaut corps, 179 


becomes Apollo spacecraft mana

CM-012 problems, 211 


CM development, 133, 135, 14

72 


LM design and development, 1

177' 198, 199, 201 


LM guidance system, 159-61 


LM propulsion system, 155-56 


LM radar system, 173-74 


man on the moon, 319 

Silverstein Committee, 13 

Simpkinson, Scott H., 225, 257, 265, 490 

Simulations (simulators) 

Apollo mission, 232-33, 249, 262-63, 275, 

302, 313-14, 323, 332-34 

astronaut water recovery, 263, 264 ill. 

celestial navigation , 263 

CM, 208, 209, 264 ill. 

Gemini, 109 

Grissom "lemon" award, 209, 215 

launch abort, 92 

LM, 208, 287, 291 ill., 325 ill. 

lunar abort, 242, 244 

lunar landing, 109, 109 ill., IIO, 242, 300­

01 ' 322, 325 ill., 326 

lunar surface operations, 92, 321 ill., 324. 

325 ill., 326 

Mercury, 109 

one-sixth gravity, 324, 325 ill., 364 

pilot spacecraft control, 92 

rendezvous, 68, 302 

slide wire, launch pad, 263 

,·acuum chamber, 263-64, 264 ill. 

Site selection, lunar landing, 109, 125 

Apollo zone, 363-64 

Site Selection Board, 185, 364 

suggested areas, 125, 363-65 

Sjoberg, Sigurd A., 140 

Skids, lunar landing vehicle, 62, 63 ill. 

Skrydlolf, Leon, 490 

Skurla, George M., 490 

Skybolt missile, 133 

Skylab program, xiv, 131 

Slayton, Donald K., 30, 138, 140, 162, 174, 

180, 200, 206, 209, 230, 283 ill., 308 ill., 

490 

Apollo 6 pogo problems, 251 

Apollo 7, 269, 271 

AS-203, 194 

AS-204, 2ll 

Block II, 193 

contract, 132 

docking functions, 132 ill., 133, 150 

flight-test program, 91 

function, 122, 193 

science experiments bay, 140 

weight reduction , 138 

SM-008, 248 

SM-012 (AS-204), 210 ill., 2ll 

SM-017 (Apollo 4), 2ll, 233 

Smedal, Harald A., 92 

Smiley, Gerald T., 274 

Smylie, Robert E., 324 

Smith, Donald W., 491 

Smith, G. Allan , 39, 491 

Smith, G. Dale, 46 

Smith, Gerald L., 491 

Smith, Joseph R., Jr., 491 

Smith, Levering, 48 

Smith, Margaret Chase, 220 

Snedekar, John, ll3 

Snoopy. See Apollo 10 

Soil and rock, lunar. (see also Appendix E) , 

126, 127, 136, 185, 202, 346, 348, 350-51 

ill., 356 ill., 357, 359, 365 

Solar cells (electrical energy generator) , 9. 

Solar Particle Alert Network (SPAN), 185 

- Solid propellant, rocket. See Propellant, 

rocket. 

Source Evaluation Board contract procedure, 

42, 97 

Soyuz I, 227 

Space Environment Simulation Laboratory, 

263, 264 ill. 

Space Exploration Program Council, 20, 22, 

69 

534 
y pg

move to Houston announced, 52 


New Projects Panel, 11 


renamed, 44, 56 


Space Technology Committee (Stever), 4 


Space Technology Laboratories (STL; see 


also Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge), 42, 


80, 104, 112 


LM descent engine, 1.55, 156 


Space walk, first, 182 


Spacecraft managers, 224--25 


Spaceport facilities, 50, 51 


Spare parts concept, spacecraft flight, 135, 


140, 159, 171 


Specifications, Apollo space vehicle, 18, 121­

22, 128 


Speer, Fridtjof, 122 


Sperry Rand, 88, 160, 196 


Spide1· (LM-3). See Apollo 9 


Sputnik l, xiii, 1, 25 


"Stable I" and "Stable II," CM, 263 


Stabilization and control system 


CM, 90, 172 


LM, 158 


Stafford, Thomas P. (see also Apollo 10), 


116 ill., 267, 309 ill., 312 ill., 331, 353 


AS-205, 209, 212, 261 


Gemini VI, 182 


Gemini IX,.207 


Stecher, Lewis J., 48 


Stehling, Kurt R., 48 


Stern, Eric, 491 


Stevens Institute of Technology, 152 


Stevenson, John D., 285 


Ste\·er, H. Guyford, 4 


Stever committee, 4 


Stewart, Homer J ., 12-13 


Steyer, Wesley L., 491 


Stinnett, Glen W., 491 


Stone, Ralph W., Jr., 67, 69 


313 


A polio 9, 291 ill., 296, 297 ill., 298 

Apollo Block II, 179 


CM mockup review, 139 ill., 17A 


extravehicular mobility unit (E

ill., 291 ill., 296, 297 ill., 321 i

345-46, 347 ill., 349, 350-51 ill. 


Gemini program, 178, 179 


Sullivan, Donald B., 176 


Su!liYan, Leslie J., xvii 


Surveyor (unmanned lunar soft la

88, 110, 167, 188 


Apollo landing near, 363, 364 


radar system, 159 


Surveym· I, 205, 206 


Surveyor Ill, 364 


Sutton, George P., 13 


Swigert, John L., 206, 261 , 318 


SWIP (super weight improvement 

LM, 174--75 


Sword, Carl D., 97 


Syvertson, Clarence A., 26, 491 


T-38 aircraft, 262, 265 


Tanner, Trie\'e A., 491 


Tash, Herbert L., 333 


Taub, Willard M., 26, 490 


Taylor, Clinton L., 138, 140 


Taylor, Richard L., 490 


Teague, Olin E., 182, 183, 187, 20

Telecommunications. See Tracking 

munications network, worldwide. 

Television (receivers and transmi

116, 123 


A polio 7, 266, 269, 270 ill. 


Apollo 8, 276, 278, 281, 283 


A polio 9, 29.5 


Apollo 10, 303, 304, 308 ill. 

Throttleable lunar-landing engine (see also 

Descent engine, LM) , 9 

Thrusters, spacecraft. See Reaction control 

motors. 

Tindall, Howard W ., Jr., 183, 205-06 

Apollo lunar mission plans, 276, 283, 300­

0l, 315-17 

LM flying qualities, 287 

"Tindallgrams," 206, 316 

Tiros meteorological satellite, 25 

Tischler, Adelbert 0 ., 57, 130, 156, 491 

Titan II missile, 59 ill., 97, liS ill., 275, 303, 

338 

Titan III missile, 57, 362 

Titterton, George F., 198 

Tow!, E. Clinton, Ill, 177 

Tracking and communications network, 

worldwide, 16, 26, 39, 90, ll5, 123, 124 

ill., 125, 160, 186 ill. 

antennas. See Antennas, communications. 

Apollo 8, 274 

Apollo 11 , 328, 345 

Apollo program stations. 123 

apportioned responsibilities, 185, 186 

competition among centers, 123, 125 

Gemini VIII, 205 

Gemini program stations, 185 

Goldstone, Calif., 123, 124 ill., 206, 328 

Mercury program stations, 123 

Parkes, Australia, 328 

realtime computer complex, 185 

S-band radar system, 123, 160 

space rendezvous role, 159-60 

Trageser, Milton B., 39, 491 

Training, astronaut, 260-61 

Apollo 7, 263, 264 ill., 265 

Apollo 8, 275 

Apollo 9, 291 ill., 292 

Apollo 10, 302 

Design Reference Mission , 136-37 

lunar landing, 109 

midcourse guidance, 39, 99 

onboard operations, 39, 260 

reentry guidance, 39 

Tranquility Base, 344, 350-51 ill., 365 

Transearth injection (TEl; insertion on 

trajectory toward earth), 281 , 312, 354 

Transearth voyage 

Apollo 8, 281 , 282 ill., 283 

Apollo 10, 312 

Apollo 11, 354-55 

Translunar injection (TLI), 267, 303, 339 

Translunar voyage 

Apollo 8, 276-78 

Apollo 10, 303-05 

Apollo 11 , 339-41 

Transporter, Saturn crawler, 55 ill., 195, 196 

ill., 247 

Treaties, space exploration, 218, 330 

Treinen, Terry, 491 

Treman, S. M., 169 

Trembath, Nathaniel W., 491 

Trimble, George S., Jr., 282 ill., 491 

Trimpi, Robert L., 491 

Tripp. Ralph H ., 491 

Triton (submarine) , 41 

Truszynski, Gerald M., 274, 491 

Tulsa, Okla., 133 

Tunnel, spacecraft, 137, 140, 150, 151, 170 

ill. 

A polio 9, 293, 294 

Apollo 10, 304, 306, 312 

Apollo 11, 339, 342, 353 

Turantsky, Clem, 491 

Ulmer, Ralph E., 52 

Underwood, Richard W., 491 

536 
312 


U.S.S. 	 Yo1·ktown (Apollo 8 recovery ship), 


284 


Vale, Dick, 491 


Vale, Robert E., 18, 491 


Valentine, Richard, 491 


Van Allen, Tames A., 37 


Van Boeke!: John J ., 491 


Van Dolah, Robert W., 219, 220 


Vanguard satellite, 4 


Vega (upper·stage rocket booster) , 7 


VaHa, Paul H., 332 


Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB; formerly 


Vertical Assembly Building), 55 ill., 131 


ill., 194, 196 ill. 


Venus, proposed manned flights to, 7-8 


Visibility, space flight, 268, 305 


Voas, Robert B., 17, 179,260 


Vogeley, Arthur W ., 67 , 71 , 73 


von Braun, Wernher, 50, 55 ill., 80, 81, 131 


ill., 164, 165, 184 ill., 2ll, 296 ill., 491 


"A to G" Apollo plan, 234 


"all·up" decision, 130 


Apollo flight mode, 62, 77-83, 104 


Apollo program management, 128-29 


AS·201, 191 


favored earth·orbit rendezvous, 6, 62-63, 


72, 80 


launch vehicle proposals, 5-6, 13, 20 


launch vehicle test facilities, 51 


lunar orbit mission proposal, 257-59 


management council, 58, 129 


Pegasus program, 180 


relations with STG, 18, 21 


spacecraft test program, 35 


symbols for Apollo 11, 329 


team, 3, 7, 9, 14, 21, 51, 62, 63, 70, 76, 98 


priorities during Apollo 11, 319-2

training for, 321 ill., 323-25 ill.-2

Walks, space. See Extravehicular 

astronaut. 


Wallops Island, Va. 91, 193 


Ward, Douglas K., 327 


Warzecha , Ladislaus W., 26, 491 


WASP (Weightless Analysis 

Probe), 193 


Waste management system, space f

277 


Water transportation, launch \'Chic

Water versus land landing spacecraf

Webb, James E., 28 ill., 86 ill., 13

ill. , 180, 228, 242, 244, 246, 266 


Apollo flight mode, 46, 61, 65, 

ill. , JOJ-{)7 


Apollo launch \·chicle, 46, 48, 49 


Apollo program apprm·al, 25-26, 

Apollo program development, 33 


Apollo program facilities, 52 


Apollo program management, 2

ll9-20, 127 


AS-204 accident, 218-22, 227-29, 2

cancels crew assignments, 261 


CM contract, 38, 44, 132, 228 


CM guidance system, 41 


concludes Project Mercury, 128 


cost estimate of Apollo, 25 


lea,·es NASA, 267 


LEO, 182, 183 


LM contract, 107 


LOR flight mode announced, 85, 

LOR mode choice defended, 101-{

lunar orbit mission proposal, 258

mission control center, ll5 


NASA budget, llO-ll , 127-28, 167 

NASA 1·eorganization, 53, 56, 129, 

second NASA Administrator, 24 

AS-204, 208-10 ill., 213-214 


death and burial, 216 ill., 217 


Gemini IV, 182 


widow's court action , 224 


White, George C., Jr., 219, 220, 491 


White, Stanley C., 11, 14 


White, Terry (Robert T .), 327 


White Sands, New Mex., 50, 92, 93 ill., 164 


Little Joe II flight tests, 92, 93 ill., 141. 


142. 183, 190 


LM engine tests, 109, 154 


Weisner, Jerome B. 


1960 space program evaluation, 23, 24 


opposition to LOR mode choice, 84-85, 


100-{)7 


Weisner committee and report, 23, 24 


Williams, Clifton C., Jr., 130 


AS-503, 212, 261 


death, 262 


Williams, Francis L., 48 


Williams, J. J., 169 


Williams, John J., 219, 220, 241 , 308 ill. 


Williams, Laurence G., 491 


Williams, Walter C., 55 ill., 58, 93 ill., 114­

15, 122. 129, 491 


Wilson, Bill, 244 


Wilson, T . A., 273 


Wilson, W . K., 53 


Wind-tunnel tests 


CM, 87, 92, 94 


earth-landing system, 94 


Worldwide tracking network. See Tracking 


and communications network, worldwide. 


Wt·en, Robert J., 334 


Wright, Howard, 491 


Wright, Monte D., xvii 


Wulfsberg, Arthur H., 491 


Wyatt, DeMarquis D. 46, 491 


Wydler, John W ., 227 


X-15 aircraft, 43, 88 


York, Herbert F., 491 


Yolles, J., 45 


Yost, Harold C., 491 


Yost, Michael, 491 


Young. Earle B., 332 


Young, John W . (see also Apollo 10) , 116 


ill., 261 ' 309 ill., 312 ill. 


AS-205, 212, 261 


CSM-101 , 263 


Gemini Ill, 181 


Gemini X, 207, 294 


Young, R . Wayne, 176, 197, 199 


Zaitzeff, Eugene M., 491 


Zavasky, Raymond L., 491 


Zedekar, Raymond G., 321, 322, 491 


538 
Houston, beginning in July 1969, and taught at Houston Commun

lege (1974-1976). Born in Savannah, Georgia (1939), he received 

degree from Huntingdon College, Montgomery, Alabama (1964), 

M.A. (1966) and Ph.D. (1969) degrees from Tulane University, N

leans, Louisiana. Brooks is coauthor of The Apollo Spacecraft: A 

ogy, volumes 3 (1976) and 4 (1978), and of Skylab: A Chronology 

James M. Grimwood has been NASA Johnson Space Center H

since 1962. He was born in Lincoln, Alabama (1922), receiving 

degree in history from Howard College, Birmingham, Alabama (19

his M.A. from the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa (1950). H

history in secondary schools (1950-1952) and at San Antonio Co

Texas (1958-1960) and was an Air Force historian in South Caro

Texas (1953-1960). Before joining .JSC, he was historian with th

Missile Command, Hunt.sville, Alabama. Grimwood is coauthor 

New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (1966), On the Shou

Titans: A History of Project Gemini (1977), and Project Gemini 

ogy and Operations: A Chronology (1969) and author of Project M

A Chronology (1963). 

Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., Professor of History at the University of H

has taught history of science and technology at the university sin

Born in Waco, Texas (1932), he received his A.B. from Rice 

(1954) and his Ph.D. in history from Claremont Graduate School a

versity College (1962). He taught at the University of California 

side) before moving to Houston. Swenson is coauthor of This New 

A History of Project Mercury (1966) and author of The Ethereal 

A History of the Michelson-Morley-Miller Aether-Drift Experiment

Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A 

Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203, 1977, GPO. 

Hall, R. Cargill, Lunar Impact: A Histm·y of Pmject Ranger, NASA SP-4210, 19

Hartman, Edwin P., Adventures in Research: A History of the Ames Resea

1940-1965, NASA SP-4302, 1970, NTIS. 

Link, Mae Mills, Space Medicine in Project Mercury, NASA SP-4003, 1965, NTI

Rosholt, Robert L., An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP

NTIS. 

Sloop, John L., Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959, NASA SP-

GPO. 

Swenson, Loyd S., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New 

History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201, 1966, GPO. 

REFERENCE WORKS 

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, annual volumes for 1975-1977, 

The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, NASA SP-4009, vol. 1, 1969; NTIS; v

GPO; vol. 3, 1976, GPO; vol. 4, 1978, GPO. 

Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology of Science, Technology, and Po

volumes 1961-1974, with an earlier summary volume, Aeronautics and A

1915-1960. Early volumes available .from NTIS, recent ones from GPO. 

Hall, R. Cargill, ed., Essays on the History of Rocketry and Astronautics: Pro

the Third through the Sixth History Symposia of the International Academ

nautics, NASA CP-2014, 2 vols;, 1977, GPO. 

Roland, Alex F., A Guide to Research in NASA History, HHR-50, 2d ed., 

looseleaf, available from NASA History Office. 

Skylab: A Chronology, NASA SP-4011, 1977, GPO. 

Van Nimmen, Jane, and Leonard C. Bruno, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-

SP-4012, vol. 1, NASA Resow-ces, 1976, NTIS. 

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie E. Karegeannes, Origins of NA

NASA SP-4402, 1976, GPO. 

• GPO: Order from Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, W

DC 20402. 

t NTIS: Order from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 2216

<>u.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980--320-907