2020 IL App (4th) 180305-U 

NO. 4-18-0305 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

LUTHER J. SANDERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Clark County 

No. 94CF5 

Honorable 

Tracy W. Resch, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file his 

successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 2 In March 2018, defendant, Luther J. Sanders, filed pro se a motion for leave to 

file his third postconviction petition. In April 2018, the circuit court entered a written order 

denying defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, contending the circuit court erred by denying him leave to file 

a claim his de facto life sentence is unconstitutional because the sentence violated the eighth 

amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate 

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to 

him. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

FILED

July 20, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On March 25, 1994, defendant entered partially negotiated pleas of guilty to 

charges of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1992)) of Jerry Darling and 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder of Wesley Hall (720 ILCS 5/8-2(a) (West 1992)).

Other charges of murder were nol-prossed, and the prosecution agreed not to seek a capital or a 

natural life sentence in exchange for defendant’s agreement not to seek appellate review of the 

circuit court’s ruling or the applicability of the extended-term sentencing provisions. The 

prosecution reserved the right to seek both extended and consecutive terms of imprisonment with 

a maximum cap of 114 years, but the sentence to be imposed was left open pending presentence 

investigation. 

¶ 6 The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the guilty plea based partially on a 

confession by defendant given after his arrest. The court found the factual basis sufficient. The 

court inquired as to the free and voluntary nature of the plea, where defendant stated he 

graduated from high school but had limited ability to read and write. Defense counsel confirmed 

defendant was able to understand the proceedings and was competent to plead guilty, although 

he was functionally illiterate. Counsel disclosed to the court defendant’s school records and 

history of seizures. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and ordered the preparation of a 

presentence investigation report (PSI).

¶ 7 On May 24, 1994, defendant filed a motion for neurological testing. The motion 

referenced seizures defendant had suffered as a child and questioned “ ‘whether some of 

[defendant’s] behavior problems might not be temporal lobe related.’ ” A medical note dated five 

years earlier characterized defendant’s electroencephalogram (EEG) as “normal.” The motion 

requested the circuit court order EEG testing to determine “whether or not any type of ‘temporal 
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lobe abnormalities’ might relate in any manner to the judgment and behavior of [defendant]” in 

relation to his conviction. At a hearing held the same day, the court denied defendant’s motion, 

finding (1) there was no medical record of any seizures since December 1978, (2) a letter 

included from Dr. W. E. Scully suggesting the possibility of behavioral problems was 

speculative, and (3) medical testing would not produce evidence relevant to sentencing.

¶ 8 On May 26, 1994, defendant’s sentencing hearing commenced. Defendant 

renewed his motion for neurological testing, and the circuit court reserved ruling on the motion. 

In aggravation, the State presented evidence as to the nature of the murders, victim impact 

statements from relatives of the victims, and testimony from Clark County Sheriff’s Office 

investigator Jerry Lorton as to defendant’s lack of visible remorse when interviewed. 

¶ 9 In mitigation, Charles Shotts Jr., defendant’s neighbor, described defendant as 

helpful and cheerful, stating the murders were out of character for defendant where defendant 

had “never exhibited anything that would even lead to hurting somebody, let alone taking a life.” 

Peggy Sanders, defendant’s father’s wife, described defendant as a good person. She stated she 

could not believe defendant had been involved in the murders because he was not violent in any 

way. Betty Ortiz, defendant’s mother, testified defendant was raised by his grandmother and she 

did not have a relationship with him until after he graduated high school. Ortiz stated defendant 

would do anything asked of him, describing him as a follower. Gladys McManus, defendant’s 

sister, testified as to defendant’s childhood and living situation. McManus testified defendant 

was diagnosed with epilepsy. McManus also stated she “just couldn’t believe” defendant was 

involved in the murders. 

¶ 10 Defendant testified he had been diagnosed with epilepsy as a child and was 

prescribed Dilantin. At some point, the doctor no longer prescribed the medication, but defendant 
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could not remember when he stopped taking the medication. Defendant claimed to have a seizure 

in jail on April 18, 1994. Defendant described his childhood, including physically abusive 

behavior from his uncle. Defendant testified he had been placed in special education classes in 

elementary school and through high school. He had obtained a CDL license and attempted to join 

the military but could not pass the tests. Defendant described his relationship with his codefendant, Victor Phillippi, and discussed at length his involvement in the murders. Defendant 

expressed he was sorry for his involvement and found religion since his incarceration.

¶ 11 The State requested extended term and consecutive sentencing for a term totaling 

114 years in the Department of Corrections. Defense counsel argued extended term sentencing 

and consecutive sentencing were not appropriate, requesting a term of incarceration at the lower 

end of the possible term available.

¶ 12 The circuit court denied defendant’s renewed motion for neurological testing on 

the previously decided grounds. The court stated it observed defendant’s demeanor throughout 

the proceedings and reviewed the evidence presented. The court determined “while the 

Defendant may be in the low average range of intellectual functioning, he is not mentally 

retarded.” 

¶ 13 In sentencing defendant, the circuit court determined, “[T]hough this Defendant 

has some intellectual limitations, he is not mentally retarded, and any limitations he has did not 

cause or contribute to his involvement in these crimes.” The court found no mitigating factors 

applied “in a direct or significant way[,]” reviewing all the statutory mitigating factors 

individually. In aggravation, the court noted the physical harm of the crimes, as well as 

defendant’s prior criminal activity. The circuit court found the crimes “accompanied by 

exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” In addition, the court 
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determined consecutive sentencing should apply to protect the public and to avoid deprecating 

the seriousness of the crime. The circuit court sentenced defendant to consecutive, extended 

terms of 100 years’ imprisonment for murder and 14 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to 

commit murder.

¶ 14 This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. People v. 

Sanders, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1149 (1996) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

Defendant filed a postconviction petition, and the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. 

Defendant appealed. This court found defendant’s 14-year extended term sentence for conspiracy 

to commit murder void (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 1996)) and reduced the 14-year 

extended-term sentence to a 7-year term, otherwise affirming the dismissal. People v. Sanders, 

301 Ill. App. 3d 1111 (1998) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 15 On October 16, 2000, defendant filed a second postconviction petition alleging 

his extended-term sentences were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000). The circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit, 

and this court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Sanders, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1106 (2002) (table) 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 16 On March 22, 2018, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a third 

postconviction petition. In his motion, defendant first addressed the cause and prejudice test, 

asserting his issues were based on substantial changes in the rules of criminal procedure, noting 

the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the First District’s decision in 

People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, 72 N.E.3d 357, all of which were decided after the 

circuit court dismissed defendant’s second postconviction petition. Defendant thereafter argued 
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he was “maneuvered” into pleading guilty, his prior motion for neurological testing was 

improperly denied, and his de facto life sentence violated the United States and Illinois 

constitutions. In support of his final argument, defendant, who was 23 years old when he 

committed the crimes, cited (1) Miller, Graham, and Roper’s consideration of continuing brain 

development in adolescents, (2) the House decision to apply such considerations to a defendant 

over the age of 18, and (3) experts regarding the developing brain and neuroscientific evidence. 

The circuit court denied defendant’s motion, finding res judicata barred defendant’s first two 

claims and defendant’s final claim failed to allege a substantial denial of his constitutional rights 

in addition to being forfeited. 

¶ 17 This appeal followed.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 Defendant appeals, challenging only the circuit court’s denial of his request for 

leave to file his constitutional challenge to his de facto life sentence. 

¶ 20 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 21 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2016)) 

provides a means to collaterally attack a criminal conviction based on a substantial denial of a 

defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 912 N.E.2d 

1204, 1208 (2009). A proceeding under the Act is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal from 

the defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 71, 890 N.E.2d 500, 

509 (2008). Issues adjudicated on direct appeal or a previous collateral proceeding are barred by 

res judicata, and issues that could have been raised but were not are forfeited. People v. Tate, 

2012 IL 112214, ¶ 8, 980 N.E.2d 1100. The Act contemplates the filing of only one 

postconviction petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459, 793 N.E.2d 609, 621 
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(2002). A defendant must obtain leave from the circuit court in order to file a successive petition 

under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016).

¶ 22 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must do 

one of the following: (1) show cause and prejudice for the failure to raise a claim in his or her 

earlier petition or (2) set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 

459. Cause is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” that prevented the 

defendant from raising the claim in an earlier proceeding. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

at 460. Prejudice is an error so infectious to the proceedings that the resulting conviction or 

sentence violates due process. Id. at 464. We review de novo the denial of a motion for leave to 

file a successive postconviction petition. People v. Crenshaw, 2015 IL App (4th) 131035, ¶ 38, 

38 N.E.3d 1256. 

¶ 23 B. Cause and Prejudice

¶ 24 On appeal, defendant argues the circuit court erred in denying him leave to raise 

an as-applied constitutional challenge to his de facto life sentence based in part on Miller and its 

progeny in his third postconviction petition. Defendant makes no claim of actual innocence, so 

we limit our review to the cause and prejudice exception to the general rule against the filing of 

successive postconviction petitions. 

¶ 25 The cause-and-prejudice test establishes a higher standard than the 

frivolous-or-patently-without-merit standard used for first-stage proceedings. People v. Smith, 

2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35, 21 N.E.3d 1172. A defendant seeking leave to file a successive petition 

must “submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that 

determination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our supreme court has held, “leave of 

court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when it is clear, from a review 
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of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims 

alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting 

documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” Id. “In other words, the court must 

determine whether [the] defendant has made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice.” 

People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24, 102 N.E.3d 114. If such a showing has been made, leave 

should be granted and the petition “advances to the three-stage process for evaluating 

postconviction petitions,” at which point “the State [has] an opportunity to seek dismissal of the 

petition on any grounds, including the defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not 

having raised the claims in the initial postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 26. 

¶ 26 In a progression of cases involving the sentencing of juvenile offenders, the 

United States Supreme Court has held the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder (Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79), 

mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide 

offenses (Graham, 560 U.S. at 82), and mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole 

for juveniles who commit murder (Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the 

Court made clear “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 

Miller, 567 U.S. 471. Specifically, the Court noted three significant differences between 

juveniles and adults. First, a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, 

leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. “Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures” 

because of their limited control over their own environment and their lack of the ability to 

remove themselves from crime-producing settings. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Third, 

their characters are not as “well formed” as an adult’s, their traits are “less fixed,” and their 
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“actions [are] less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. Following Miller, courts sentencing juveniles must take into account “how children 

are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 

in prison.” Id. at 480. 

¶ 27 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), the 

Supreme Court held Miller applies retroactively. The Supreme Court made clear Miller did not 

merely create a procedural requirement but created a new substantive rule of constitutional law 

which applies to a specific set of individuals. Id. at 734, 736. The Court explained Miller

determined a life sentence without parole for a juvenile is “excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile 

offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 734 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 

573). The Court indicated Miller rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for the 

class of juvenile offenders “whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 734. 

Therefore, the Court held Miller created a substantive rule of constitutional law which applies 

retroactively because there was a significant risk the vast majority of juvenile offenders faced a 

punishment the law could not impose on them. Id. at 734, 736. 

¶ 28 Noting the language the Court used in Miller “is significantly broader than its 

core holding,” and “[n]one of what the court said is specific to only mandatory life sentences,”

(People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38, 91 N.E.3d 849), our supreme court has taken this line 

of cases even further, holding Miller applies both to discretionary sentences of life without 

parole for juvenile defendants (id. ¶ 40) and de facto life sentences of forty years or more for 

such defendants (People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, 137 N.E.3d 763).

¶ 29 Our supreme court has also raised the possibility the principles established in 

these cases might apply—on a case-by-case basis—to young adult offenders who were over the 
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age of 18 at the time of their offenses. In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 37, 53, 120 

N.E.3d 900, an 18-year-old defendant argued on direct appeal Miller protections for juveniles 

should be applied to all “young adults under the age of 21,” and his mandatory aggregate 

sentence of 76 years of imprisonment thus violated both the eighth amendment to the United 

States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court 

rejected the defendant’s facial challenge, noting the Supreme Court in Roper limited direct 

application to those under the age of 18, on the basis “a line must be drawn” somewhere. 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 45, 60. The court agreed a young adult offender could 

make an as-applied challenge to a life-sentence, but because the defendant in Harris had not 

raised such a challenge in the circuit court, no evidentiary hearing was held and the record 

included no findings regarding characteristics of the defendant specifically pertaining to his 

youth. Id. ¶ 46. The defendant’s challenge was premature because the record did not “contain 

evidence about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped 

form the basis for the Miller decision applie[d] to defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.” 

Id. ¶ 46. The court concluded the defendant’s challenge would be more appropriately considered 

in a postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 48. 

¶ 30 In Harris, the court largely relied upon its earlier analysis of these issues in 

People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 43 N.E.3d 984. In Thompson, a 19-year-old defendant 

attempted to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence 

for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of a petition for relief under section 2-1401 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1, 4. 

He argued eighth amendment Miller considerations should apply with “ ‘equal force’ to 

individuals between the ages of 18 and 21.” Id. ¶ 21. The defendant exclusively relied on the 
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evolving science regarding juvenile maturity and brain development in support of this position. 

Id. ¶ 38. The court held the defendant’s as-applied challenge under Miller was forfeited because 

it was not a type of challenge recognized as being exempt from the typical rules of forfeiture. Id.

¶ 39. The court noted in dicta, however, the defendant’s as-applied challenge was really a facial 

challenge because he relied exclusively on the evolving science of brain development, and the 

record contained “nothing about how that science applie[d] to the circumstances of [the] 

defendant’s case, the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 31 After the Harris and Thompson decisions, Illinois courts have had to examine at 

what age a young adult may make an as-applied Miller challenge in a postconviction proceeding. 

In People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 17, 23, 142 N.E.3d 765, the court 

considered the second-stage dismissal of a 19-year-old defendant’s postconviction petition, in 

which he asserted in part his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. 

After discussing the evolving science regarding brain development and considering our supreme 

court’s decision in Harris, the House court concluded the line drawn at 18 years of age 

demarcating adulthood for legal purposes was “somewhat arbitrary.” Id. ¶¶ 55-56. It held the 

defendant’s mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause and shocked the 

moral sense of the community because of the “defendant’s age, his family background, his 

actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and [his] lack of any prior violent 

convictions[.]” Id. ¶ 64. The court noted the defendant’s age, coupled with his relevant 

culpability, created questions regarding the “propriety of a mandatory natural life sentence for a 

19-year-old defendant convicted under a theory of accountability.” Id. ¶ 46. 

¶ 32 Courts faced with cases in which a defendant (1) played a more active role in the 

crime or (2) received a discretionary rather than a mandatory sentence have distinguished House
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on one or both of these bases. See, e.g., People v. Ramsey, 2019 IL App (3d) 160759, ¶¶ 22-23, 

143 N.E.3d 865 (rejecting an 18-year-old defendant’s proportionality claim and noting he was 

the sole actor who committed the offenses) and People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, 

¶¶ 1, 41 (finding an 18-year-old defendant was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because 

he was an active participant in the crimes and received a discretionary sentence). Here, although 

defendant did not pull the trigger himself, defendant’s role in the crimes was much more active 

than merely serving as a lookout, and defendant received a discretionary sentence. However, we 

need not consider whether these two factors are sufficient to distinguish defendant’s claims from 

House because we have found no support for application the of the Miller principles to 

defendants who were more than 20 years old at the time of their crimes. 

¶ 33 In People v. Hoover, 2019 IL App (2d) 170070, 131 N.E.3d 1085, for example, 

the court considered a 22-year-old’s as-applied sentencing challenge under the proportionate 

penalties clause and rejected the defendant’s claim, finding the defendant did not satisfy the 

cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test because the proportionate penalties clause was 

always in existence, therefore the defendant could have raised a proportionate penalties 

challenge at the time of his direct appeal. Id. ¶¶ 19, 37.While not necessarily agreeing with the 

Second District that evolving caselaw extending Miller’s application could never satisfy the 

cause prong, it is clear Hoover provides no support for the argument the law as it currently stands 

establishes individuals like defendant—who were 21 years of age or older at the time of their 

offenses—may bring as-applied challenges like those the Harris court was asked to consider for 

offenders between the ages of 18 and 20. 

¶ 34 In People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 30-44, 146 N.E.3d 892, the

court likewise affirmed the summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction 
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petition where the defendant, who was 23 years old at the time of his offense, raised eighth 

amendment and proportionate penalties challenges to his de facto life sentence. The Suggs court 

noted, although “society has drawn lines at ages 18 and 21 for various purposes,” the defendant 

failed to “point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years.” Id. ¶ 35. 

The court concluded while it may seem “but a short step” to apply the Miller factors to an 

18-year-old offender, “it is a much greater leap to extend [them] to a 21-year-old, and an even 

greater leap to apply [them] to a 23-year-old,” such as the defendant in that case. Id.

¶ 35 Additionally, in People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (2d) 160650, ¶¶ 86-89, the 

court ultimately did not address the as-applied proportionate penalties challenge of a defendant 

who was 22 years old at the time of his offense, finding instead his claim, made for the first time 

on direct appeal, was premature. None of these cases support the extension of the law defendant 

proposes. 

¶ 36 Moreover, the secondary source defendant references on appeal does not advocate 

for the extension of the Miller principles to young adults over the age of 21. See Elizabeth S. 

Scott et al., Young Adulthood As a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and 

Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 664 (considering the advantages of giving juvenile 

courts jurisdiction over young adults 21 years old or younger but concluding scientific evidence 

does not justify an institutional reform of that magnitude.)

¶ 37 We note further defendant’s arguments as to his particular mental development 

due to his intellectual limitations also do not support extending the law. After this case was fully 

briefed, our supreme court considered People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972. As defendant references, 

the First District determined the intellectually disabled defendant’s discretionary life sentence 

violated the proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. However, our supreme court reversed, 
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holding although Miller is based in part on the lesser culpabilities of youth, characteristics those 

with intellectual disabilities tend to share, “the Miller Court’s decision is founded, principally, 

upon the transient characteristics of youth, characteristics not shared by adults who are 

intellectually disabled.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 39. Therefore, where juveniles, through 

neurological development may grow out of such deficiencies, such growth was not a prospect for 

the 46-year-old intellectually disabled adult in question. Id. ¶ 40. We decline to extend the Miller

principles where “[t]he rehabilitative prospects of youth do not figure into the sentencing 

calculus” as with intellectually disabled defendants. Id.

¶ 38 Defendant is correct there have been changes in the law regarding sentencing 

“youthful offenders” and those with “intellectual disabilities,” and we have discussed those 

changes above. However, the law has not changed sufficiently for defendant to meet the high 

burden of establishing cause and prejudice to file a successive petition. We acknowledge the 

cases defendant relies on were not available to him at the time of his prior postconviction 

petitions, but their holdings do not establish defendant is entitled to the relief he seeks. Our 

supreme court has not recognized as-applied sentencing challenges seeking application of the 

Miller sentencing factors for defendants more than 20 years old at the time of their offenses and 

with intellectual deficits. 

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 We affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 41 Affirmed.