NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COLLEEN YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-15828 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01952-JDP 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Jeremy D. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 6, 2024**

Before: D. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. 

Colleen Young appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 6 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

We review de novo a district court’s order affirming a denial of Social 

Security benefits. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 653–54 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015)). We may reverse a 

denial of benefits only when the decision is “based on legal error or not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 654 (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. 

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)).

On appeal, Young claims that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in 

evaluating the medical opinion evidence. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision to afford great weight to the opinions of Dr. van Dam and Dr. Dennis

because of Young’s lack of specific treatment during the relevant period, and 

because the opinions were supported by and consistent with the record. See 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to generally afford

substantial weight to the opinions of Dr. Williams and Dr. Gerson. Dr. Williams 

and Dr. Gerson provided supporting rationales and were entitled to substantial

weight based on Young’s limited treatment during the relevant period. See

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111; see also Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 

996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015).
 3 

The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount speechlanguage pathologist Kinney and Dr. Teasdale’s opinions. As the ALJ determined, 

the opinions were speculative with respect to Young’s functioning well before 

treatment, and the opinions concerned Young’s functioning well after the date she 

was last insured. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111; see also Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 

599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998).

Finally, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount 

Young’s symptom testimony. The ALJ cited specific inconsistencies between 

Young’s testimony and the opinions of medical consultants, Young’s limited 

treatment during the relevant period, and record evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 

2008); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).

We decline to consider the issues Young raises for the first time on appeal. 

See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.