T h is c a se w a s su b m itt e d to the trial c o u rt o n jo int stip u la tio n s o f f a c t. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 263. 1 

# NO. 12-07-00314-CV

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

CENTRA L MUTUAL INSURANCE § APPEAL F ROM THE 114TH CO MP ANY d/b /a C EN TRA L I NSU RAN CE CO MP AN IES A NDCMI

LL OYD S, APPELLANT V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF

KPE FIRS TP LAC E LA ND , LLC, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY, T EXAS

OPINION Central Mutual Insuranc e Company d/b/a Central Insuranc e Companies (“ Central Mutual”) and CMIL loyds (“L loyds”) ( col l ec t i vely “Centra l”) a

ppeal the trial court’s summar y judgme nt enter ed in favor of Appe llee KPE F irstplace L and, LL C (“KPE”) as well as the trial cour t’s denial of Centra l’s motion for summary judgme nt. In two issues, Central argues that the trial c ourt err ed in gr antingpartial summary judgme nt in KPE’s fa v o r against L loyds and deny ing its motion for
summa ry judgme nt. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND 1 

## On De c e mbe r 2 9, 20 04 , KPE p ur c ha se d r e a l e state loc ate d o n L oo p 3 23 in Tyle r Te xas. KPE
a lso owne d a

90 ,0 00 sq

ua refo ot b uil din gloc ate d o n th e prop e rt y . At so me tim e prior

toT h e s t i pu l at i on doe s n ot e x pr es s l y a ddr es s t h e dat e on w h i ch t h e ai r c on di t i on i n g u n i t be ca me dama g ed by 2 the ft. It d o e s, ho w e v e r, sta te tha t K P E d isc o v e re d the lo ss o n D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 a n d tha t t h e lo ss w a s re p o rte d to C ent r al on Febr uar y 13, 200 6. I n i t s mo t i on f or par t i al s ummary j udgment , K P E not ed t hatne i t her par t y ca n d e m o n stra te the d a te up o n w h ic h the a ir c o n d iti o n ing un it b e c a m e d a m a g e d a n d a rg u e d tha t i t wa s e n tit le d to s ummary j udgment becau s e Cent r al coul d not meet i t s bur den of proof as t o t he appl i cabi l i t y of t he vac anc y e x c lus io n . See T EX
. I NS
. C O D E A NN
. § 554. 002 ( V er n on Su pp. 2008) ( I n a n y s u i t t o r ec ov er u n der a c on t r ac t of i n s u r an ce , t h e i n s u r er h as t h e bu r den of pr oof a s t o a n y a v oi dan ce or a f f i r mat i v e def

en s e i n cl u di n g a n y l an g u ag e of e x c lus io n in the p o licy a n d a n y e x c e p tio n to c o v e ra g e c la im e d b y the insu re r) . In its m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t, C e n tra l re sp o n d e d to K P E ’s p o sitio n c o n c e rn ing the d a te o f th e the ft a n d c o n te n d e d tha t t h e a rg u m e n t m u st fail b ecause l o ss , f

o r i nsur ance p urpo ses , i s d eem ed t o oc cur when i t m ani f est s i t sel f

or i s d i scovered

. C o nsi d eri ng t he a fo re m e n tio n e d sta te m e n ts in the p a rtie s’ stip u la tio n in c o n ju n c tio n w ith b o th K P E ’s ar g u m e n t t h a t ne ithe r p a rty k n ows w h en t h e t h ef

t t ook pl ac e an d Cen t r al ’ s c on t en t i on t h atK PE ’ s pos i t i on mu s t f ai l be ca u s e of

t h e appl i ca t i on of t he m ani f

est at i o n rul e, we co ncl ud e t hat i t i s necessar i l y i m p l i ed f rom t he exp res s f

act s i n t he st i p ul at i o n and t he a rg u m e n t o f t h e p a rtie s’ re sp e c tive c o u n se l t h a t t h e d a te o n w h ic h the the ft to o k p la c e is un k n o w n to e ithe r p a rty. 

## 2 Dec ember

31, 2005, thieves re moved the coppe r coils from the air conditioningequipment locate d

2


## on thero of of thebu ild ing , whic h c a

us e d th e a ir c on dit ion ing e qu ipm e nt to b e c omedama g e d. KPE dis c ov e re d th e dama g e d air c on dit ion ing e qu ipm e nt on De c e mbe r 31, 20 05 and repo rt e d th e los s to theTyle r P oli c e Depa

rtme nt t hat sa me da y . KP E’s ins ur anc e a g e nt, B os wo rt h &As so c iate s, repor ted the loss to Central on Februar y 13, 2006. At the time KPE discovere d the damag e to its air conditioning equipment, the prope rty was insured through a policy issued by L loyds and eff ective through September 15, 2 0 0 6

. T h e p olicy
c onta ins a pr ov isi on

e nti tle d “ L os s Co nd iti on s, ” wh ic h s tate s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

6. V acan cy

a. Des c r i pt i on of

T e r ms 1) A s used i n t hi s V acancy C o nd i t i o n, the t erm buil d i ng and t he t er m vaca nt ha ve t he meani ng s s et f ort h i n 1) a) and 1 ) b) bel ow: a) W h e n this p o licy i s issu e d to a ten a n t, a n d w ith re sp e c t t o t hat t enant ’ s i nt eresti n C o vere d P ro p ert y , buil d i ng m eans t he u n it o r su ite re n te d o r le a se d to the ten a n t. S u c h b u ild in g is vac antwh en i t does not cont ai n e noug h bus i nes s pe r s onal p ro p erty t o co nd uc t cu st o m ary o p era t i o ns. b) W hen t hi s pol i cy i s i s s ued t o t he owner or genera l l es s ee o f a buil d i ng, buil d i ng m eans t he ent i re bui l d i ng. Such b ui l d i ng i s vac an t unless at l ea st 3 1 % o f i t s t o t al sq ua re fo o t ag e is: i) R ent ed t o a l es s ee or s ub- l es s ee and u s ed by t he l es s ee or s u b- l es s ee t o c on du cti t s c u s t omar y ope r at i on s ; a n d/ orSee T EX
. I NS
. C O D E A NN
. § 5 4 1

. 0 6 0 (a) (V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). 3
See T EX
. I NS
. C O D E A NN
. § 5 4 2

. 0 5 8 (V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). 4

See n .1 . K P E m o v e d fo r p a rtia l sum m a ry j u d g m e n t o n it s b re a c h o f co n tra c t cla im a g a ins t C e n tra l. 5 

## 3 ii ) U sed b y th e b u il d i ng ow ner t o co nd uct cust o m ary o p era t i o ns. 2) B ui l di ng s un der cons t r uct i on o r ren ovat i on are not cons i dere d v a c a n t.
b . V acancy P rovis i o ns

I f t he bui l di ng wh er e l oss o r d amage occur s has b een vacan t f or more t han 6 0 co nse cu t i ve d ays b efo re that l o ss o r d am ag e o cc urs:

1) W e wi l l not p ay f

o r any l o ss or d am age caused by any of t he f o l l o w i ng ev en i f

t he y are C o ve red C au ses o f L o ss:

a ) V a n da l i s m; b) Spri nk l er l eak age , unless y ou ha ve prot ect ed t he s y s t em agai nstf reezi ng; c) B ui l di ng gl as s bre aka ge; d) W at er damage; e) T h ef t ; or f) A ttem p te d the ft.


## KPE’s proper

ty had bee n “vac ant” as that term is defined in the a fore mentioned policy section for

more than sixty

consec utive day s at the time the loss wa s discovere d on Dec ember 31, 2005. On or a

bout March 6, 2006, K

PE ’s cl aimwas de nied. On or a bout J une 5, 2006, KPE, through its attorney s, made a nother formal demand for pay ment of the loss. After

rec eivingKPE’s demand, L loyds took the examination under oath of KPE’s represe ntative, Kevin Eltife, a nd attempted to re ach a

settlement of the matter

with KPE. W hen the pa

rties wer e not able to settle the matter, on or about Oc tober 5, 2006, Appe llants sent a letter to KPE’s attorney reje ctingthe June 5, 20 06 de mand

fo r p ay me nt o f t helos s. KPEfi le d th e ins tant laws uit on Oc tob e r 25 , 2 00 6 s e e kin gre c ov e ry fo r b re a c h o f c ontr a c t, unfair se ttlement prac tices, and fa ilure to c omply with the prompt pay ment statute. Both pa

rties 3 4


## su bs e qu e ntl y

mov e d f or summa ry judgme nt o n agre e d fa c ts. In its moti on fo r s umm ary judgme nt, 5 

## KPEargue d th at Ce ntr a l c ou ld n ot p ro vethat it s c la im w a s e xclu de d und e r t he“ Va c anc y” c la

us e

## 4

be c a us e it c ou ld n ot d e mon str ate tha t the pr op e rt

y ha d be e n va c ant fo r sixty da y s at the tim e thelos s

“ o c c ur r e d , ” i

. e . , th e d at e o n wh i c h th e a i r c o n d i t i o n i n ge qu i p m e ntw a s d am a g e d

. T o th e c o ntr ar y, in its m otion for summary judgme nt, Central argued that the “ Vac ancy” cla use excluded KPE’s claim bec ause theproper

ty had bee n vaca

nt for six ty day s at the time the loss “ occur red,” that is, the date on whic h the loss “manife st[ ed] itself or [was] discovere d.” As pa rt of their joint stipulation of fa c ts, thepa

rt ie s a gre e d a s f

oll ow s:

I f t he vac anc y provi s i on . . . d o es no t a p p l y, t hen D ef endan t [ Ll oy ds] i s obl i gat ed t o pay K P E t he am o un t o f

t he L o ss ($ 1 0 7 ,61 8 .90 ), l ess the $ 1 ,00 0 d ed uc t i b l e u nd er the p o l i cy, plus i ntere st on t h e amou n t du e att h e r at e of 6% per annum fr o m a n d a f t er J u n e 5, 2006 t h r ou g h t h e dat e of j u d g m e n t

. I f

t h e v a c a n c y p r o v i s i o n . . . d o e s a p p l y , t h e n De f e n d a n t [ L l o y d s ] i s n o t o b l i g a t e d t o KPE f o r t he l o ss. 

## Ultimately , the trial cour

t gr anted KPE’s moti on for partial summary judgme nt ag ainst L loyds and denied C e ntr a l’ s mo ti o nf o r s umm ar y ju d gme nt. T h e r e a f

te r , u p o nKPE ’ s mo ti o n , th e tria l c ourt dis mis se d KPE’ s r e ma ini nge xtra c ontr a c tua l caus es and e nte re d a fi na l ju dgme nt a g a ins t L loyds

. This appea l followed.

L IAB ILI TY O F 

## C ENTR A L 

## M UT UAL 

## As part of

its first issue, Central arg ues that th e tri al co urt err ed in grantingsummary judgme nt ag ainst Central Mutual bec au s e C en tral Mutual is not a party to the insurancecontra ct involved in this matter. Ba sed on our review of the record, neither the trial c ourt’s orde r granting pa rt ia l summa

ry judgme nt nor the tria l cou rt ’s fi na l ju dgme nt gra

nts re lie f i n f

avo r o f K PE a g a ins t any party other than L loyds. As such, the e rror of which Central complains with reg ard to Centra l Mutual is not supported by the re cord.

W HE N 

## L OS S OR 

## D A M A GE 

## “O CCURS 

## ” In the re mainder of

its first issue, Central argues that the trial c ourt err ed in grantingsummary judgme nt i n KPE’ s f

avo r. Whe n c omp e tin gmot ion s f or summa ry judgme nt a

refi le d, and

on e is grante d while the oth er is denied, wefirst revie w the orde r grantingsummary judgme nt. See Hartford Cas. In s. Co. v. Morton , 141 S.W .3d 220, 225 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, pet. denied)

. I f we

## 5

deter mine the orde r wa s err oneous, werevie w the trial c ourt’s ac tion in o v errul ing thedenied motion. Id. We deter

mine all questions prese nted and may reve rse the trial court’s judgment a nd rende r such judgment as the trial court should have rende red, including re nderingjudgme nt for the oth e r m ov ant. See Jo ne

s v . St ra uss , 745 S.W .2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1988). Whe n pa rt ie s to a laws uit su bmi t matte rs in c ontr ov e rs y up on an a gre e d s tate me nt o f f

a c ts,
no evidenc e is admitted or conside red by the trial cour

t. See Trevino & G

onzalez Co. v. R.F. Mul

ler Co. , 949 S.W .2d 39, 41 (Tex. A pp.–San Antonio 1997, no writ). Rather, the trial court’ s decision is based upon the papers on file and thearguments of counse l. Id. We i nd ulg e no pr e sumpt ion s in favor of the judgment in such a c ase be causethe trial cour t had no fa ctual issues to resolve

. Id. Moreove r, the parties’ pleading s areimmaterial. See State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler , 932 S.W .2d 732, 735 (Tex. App.–For

t Worth 1996, writ denied). The only issue on appea l is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the agree d fac ts. Id. We r e vie w d e no vo wh e the r t hetria l c ourt

c or re c tly applied the law

to the admitted fac ts. See City of Corpus Chri sti v. Gom ez , 141 S.W .3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.). W e ar e limited to those facts unless ot her f acts a re
nece ssarily

implied from the express fac ts in the statement. Id. Ins ur anc e c ontr a c ts are su bje c t to the same ru le s of c on str uc tio n a s ordin ary

con tr a c ts. Trinit y Uni versal Ins. Co. v. Cowan , 94 5 S.W. 2d 81 9, 82 3 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Phill ips Petroleum Co. v. St . P a ul Fi re & M a rin e I ns. Co. , 11 3 S .W. 3d

37 , 4 0 ( Te x. Ap p–Ho us ton [1st Di st. ] 200 3, pe t. denied)

. Acc ording ly , when a contra ct per

mits onl y one interpr etation, we c onstrue it as a matter of law and enf

orceit as written. Upsha w v . T rini ty Cos . , 8 42 S.W. 2d

63 1, 63 3 ( Te x. 19 92 ); Phill ips Petroleum Co. , 113 S.W .3d at 40. We must strive to effe ctuate the co n tra ctas the written expression of the par

ties’ intent and must attempt to giveeff ec t t o al l co n trac t provisions, so that none will be re ndere d meaning less. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. v. Highlands I ns. Co. , 980 S.W .2d 462, 46 4 (T e x. 19 98 ); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston , 90 7 S.W. 2d 43 0, 43 3 (T e x. 19 95 ). To thi s end, weconstrue theterms of the c ontrac t as a wholeand conside r all of its ter ms, not in i solation, but w ithin the context of the contrac t. Beaston , 9 07 S.W. 2d at 43 3; Forbau v. Aetn a Life Ins. Co. , 87 6 S. W.2 d 1 32 , 1 33 –3 4 ( Te x. 19 94 ); Hartrick v. Great Am . Lloyds Ins. Co. , 62 S.W .3d 270, 274 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Whether a c ontrac t is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to de cide by looking at theT h e p o licy d e fine d “o c c u rr e n c e ” a s “a n a c c id e n t, inc lud ing c o n tinu o u s o r re p e a te d e x p o su re to 6
s ubs t ant i al l y t he s ame ge ner al ha r mf ul condi t i ons . ” I

d. 

## 6 contra ct as a

whole in light of

the circ umstances pr esent whe n the contra ct was e ntere d. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. , 9 8 0 S

. W

. 2 d at4 6 4 (c i t i n g Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. C BI In dus., In c. , 907 S.W .2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) ). An ambiguity does not a rise mer ely

beca use the pa rties adva nce conflictingcontra ct interpre tations. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. , 980 S.W .2d at 465. Only when, a fter applying theapplicablerules of c onstruction, a contr act ter m is susce p tible of two or more
rea sonable interpre tations w ill the term be considere d ambiguous. Id. ; Phill ips Petroleum Co. , 113 S.W .3d at 40. Policy terms are g iven their ordina ry and commonly

understood mea

ning unle ss the policy itself shows that parties intended a diffe rent mea ning. Gonzales v

. Mission Am . Ins. C

o. , 795 S.W .2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1990). In the ca se at ha

nd, the par

ties disagree about the meaning of the term “occ urs” as it is used in the policy ’s vac ancy

provision. KPE argues that Centra l could not prove that its claim was excluded under the vaca

ncy provision beca

use i t could not demonstrate tha t the proper

ty had bee n
vaca nt for six ty

day s at the time the loss “occ urre d,” that is the date on which the a ir conditioner be c ame dama g e d. To thec ontr ary , Ce ntra l argue s th at the va c anc y pr ov isi on e xclu de d KPE’ s c la im beca use the prope rty

had bee n vaca

nt for six ty

day s at the time the loss “ occur red,”that is, when the loss manifested itself or w as discover ed. Th e Te xas S up re me Court ha s r e c e nt ly

c on sid e re d th e iss ueof

wh e n p ro pe rt

y dama g e oc c ur s, when the sa

me is not specified by

the re levant policy , for pur poses of a

n o cc urre nce ba sed
commerc ial g ener al liability insurancepolicy

. See Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeac on In s. Co. , 5 1 T e x . S u

p . C t

. J

. 1 3 6 7 , 2 0 0 8 W L 3 9 9 1 1 8 7 , at* 1 ( T e x . A u g . 2 9 , 2 0 0 8 )

. In that case , the policy provided that p ro p erty

damag e wa s cover ed only if such dama g e “oc cur[red] duringthe policy period.” Id. , at *2. The c ourt noted that several Te x as cour ts of appea ls ha

ve followed the so ca lled 6 

## “manife station rule,” whic h trig g ers t h einsurer’ s responsibility only if the prope rty

damag e bec omes evident or discove rableduringthe policy term. See id. , at *3 . H ow e ve r, thec ourt decl in ed to fashion or a dopt a universa lly applicablem an i fe s t at i o n rule notingthat, in the casebefor e it, the policy made no pr ovision for it. Id. , at *4 . T hec ourt e la bo ra te d a s f oll ow s:M uch l i ke i n D on’s Bl dg . Sup pl y, I nc. , 2008 W L 3991187, a t * 4, t h e pol i cy i n t h e i n s t an t c as e does n ot 7 mak e an y ot h er s u g g es t i on t h att h e dama g e be man i f es t , pa t en t , v i s i bl e, a ppar en t , obv i ou s , pe r ce pt i bl e, di s cov er ed, d i scoverab l e, cap ab l e o f de t ect i o n, or anyt hi ng s i m i l ar. 

## 7 W hat ever practi cal ad vant ages a manif est at i o n rul e wo ul d off

er t o t he i nsur ed or t he i nsur er, t he co nt roll i ng po l i cy l anguage d o es not pro vi d e t hat t he i nsur er’ s d ut y i s t ri ggered only wh e n t he i njury m ani f

est s i t sel f

duri ng t he p o l i cy t erm , or t hat co verage i s l i m i t ed t o cl ai m s where t he d am age wa s di s cov er ed or di s cov er abl e du r i n g t h e pol i cy pe r i od.

. . . . A gai n, t he po l i cy provi des cover age i f t he “ ‘ propert y damage’ occu r s dur i ng t he po l i cy per i od. ” T h e pol i cy doe s n ot s t at e t h at cov er ag e i s av ai l abl e i f pr oper t y i s , du r i n g t h e pol i cy pe r i od, e x p o se d to a p ro c e ss, e v e n t, o r su b sta n c e tha t l a te r re su lts i n . . . inj u ry to tan g ib le p ro p e rty.

. . . . P inp o intin g the m o m e n t o f in ju ry re tro sp e c tive ly i s so m e tim e s d iff ic u lt, b u t we c a n n o t ex a lt ea se o f p ro o f o r a d m i nist rati ve c o nv en i en ce o ve r fait hfulness to the p o l i cy l an gu ag e; o ur c o nfi ne d t ask i s t o re vi ew t he cont r act , not r evi s e i t

. O ur p r eva i l i ng co nce r n i s not one of pol i cy but of

l aw, an d we mus t honor t he part i es ’ ch ose n l ang uag e. . . . T he po l i cy ask s when t he damage happened, not wh et her i t w as man i f

es t , pat en t , v i s i bl e, appa r en t , obv i ou s , per ce pt i bl e, di s cov er ed, di s cov er abl e, c apa bl e of d et ect i o n, o r anyt hi ng si m i l ar. O ccurred m eans when da m ag e o ccurred, no t when d i sco ve ry oc cu r r ed. 

## Id. (e mph a sis in orig ina l)

. Th e c ourt ult imate ly

he ld t hat un de r t

hefa c ts o f t

hat c a se , th e pr op e rt

y damag e occ urre d when the homesuffe red da mag e. Id. T h e i n s t antc a s e c o n c e r n s ane x c l u s i o n ar

y p r o v i s i o ni na

p r o p e rty i n s ur an c e p o l i c y. Nonethele ss, th e court’s analy sis in Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. is i ns tr uc tiv e . H e re , th e po lic y

se ts forth that Centra l will not p ay for a ny loss or damag e ca

used by vandalism or thef

t if the building wh e relos s o r d ama g e oc c ur s h a s b e e n v a c ant f or mor e tha n s ixty c on se c uti ve da

y s bef or e that lo ss or dama g e oc c ur

s . The policy does not de fine the term “occ ur.” As such, since there is no indication from the po lic y that the pa rt ie s int e nd e d oth e rw ise , we wi ll g ivethete rm its ordin ary

and c omm on ly understood mea

ning. See Gonzales , 795 S.W .2d at 736. The primar

y definition of “oc cur” i s “[t] o take plac e” or “comeabout.” T HE 

## A MER I C AN 

## H ER I TA GE 

## D I CT I O N A RY 

## 86 0 ( 2n d Co lle g e e d. 19 82 ). Ho we ve r, a se c on da ry me anin gof

“ oc c ur ” is “[t] o be found to e x ist or appea r.” Id. We b e lie ve , h ow e ve r, that th e ordin ary and mor e c omm on ly understood mea

ning of “occ ur” is “to take place .” Such a mea ning of occur is consistent with the entirety of the c ontrac t in the instant case. There fore , we c onclude that, when the la nguag e of the 7W e d o not d i scount t hat t he p ri m ary and s eco nd ary de f i ni t i o ns o f

“ o ccur” supp o rt t he o p p o si ng po si t i o ns 8
o f t h e p a rtie s. T H E A M E R I C A N H ERI TAGE D I CT I ON ARY 860 ( 2n d Col l eg e ed. 1982)

. B u t e v en a s s u mi n g a r g u en do, t ha t t he t erm “o cc ur,” in i t s co m m o n usa ge , i s eq ua l l y s usc ep t i b l e to t he se c o nfl i cti ng m ea nings a nd i s, t hu s, a m b igu o u s, the re su lt w o u ld no t ch a n g e . See Ur et hane I nter n. Pr oduc t

s v . M i d- Conti ne nt

Cas . Co. , 187 S. W

. 3d 1 7 2 , 17 6 (T ex. A p p . – W aco 20 0 6 , no p et

. ) ( ci t i ng Stat e Fa r m Fi r e & Ca s . Co . v. Reed , 87 3 S.W

. 2 d 69 8 , 69 9 (T ex. 1 9 9 4 ) ( “[ I] f

a co nt ract of i nsur ance i s sus cep t i b l e t o m o re t han o ne reasonab l e i nt erpret at i o n, [court s] m ustres o l ve the un c e rta inty b y a d o p ting the c o n stru c tio n m o st fav o ra b le to the insu re d .” ); s ee al s o Nat ’ l Uni on F i r e I

ns . Co . v. H uds on Ene r

gy Co. , 81 1 S.W

. 2 d 55 2 , 55 5 (T ex. 19 9 1 ) ( “ T he C o urt m ustad o p t t he co nst ruct i o n of an excl usi o nary cl ause ur ged by t he i nsur ed as l o ng as t hat co nst ruct i o n i s no t unreas o nab l e, even i f t he co nst ruct i o n urged b y t he i nsur er app ears t o be m o re r easona b l e o r a mo re accurat e ref l ect i o n of t he p art i es' i nt ent

. ”).
H av i n g de t er mi n ed t h att h e t r i al c ou r t pr oper l y g r an t ed s u mmar y j u dg men t f or K PE a g ai n s t Ll oy ds , w e do 9
n o t re a c h C e n tra l’s sec o n d issu e p e rta inin g to the trial c o u rt’s d e n ia l o f i ts m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t. 

## 8 instant contra ct i s properly construed, damag e “occur s” when the proper ty become s damag ed. As 8


## su c h, c on sid e ri ng the te rm s of the c ontr a c t in light of thestipu late d f

a c ts a nd tho se fa c ts n e c e ssa

ri ly implied there from, we conclude that Central could not meet it s burden of proof with re g ard to the exclusionary

vaca ncy provision at issue. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly applied the law to the agree d fac ts in gra

nting summary

judgme nt for KPE. Central’s f

irst issue is overruled.

D I S P OS I T I ON 

## Havingoverr

uled Central’ s first issue, we af fi rm thetria l c ourt ’s judgme nt. 9



# S AM GRI FF I T H Justice

Opinion delivere d November 26, 2008. Pane l co ns is t ed of

Wor then , C. J. , Gri

f f i th, J. , an d Hoyle, J.



## (PUBLI SH)