By Harold D. 

NASA SP-4311 


WALLOPS STATION 


AND THE CREATION OF AN AMERICAN 


SPACE PROGRAM 


HaroldD. Wallace Jr. 

The NASA History Series 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASA History Office 

Office of Policy and Plans 

Washington, D.C. 1997 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Wallace, Harold 0., 1960­

Wallops Station and the Creation of an American Space Program/ 

Harold D. Wallace Jr. 

p. cm.- (The NASA history series) (NASA SP: 4311) 

Includes bibliographical references ( p. ) and Index. 

1. Wallops Flight Facility-History. 2. Astronautics-United 

States-History. I. Title. IL Series: NASA SP: 4311. 

TL862.W35W35 1997 97-30983 

629.4'09755' 16-dc21 CIP 
To the Memory of Florence C. Andersonwho always believed that an education was something that 

could never be taken away. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter 

Acknowledgment ........................................................................................... v 


About the Author............................................................................................ vii 


List of Acronyms............................................................................................. ix 


Maps of Wallops ............................................................................................. xi 


I. 	 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1 


Notes...................................................................................................... 17 


II. 	 SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE....................................... 23 


Notes...................................................................................................... 42 


III. PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT..................................................................... 	 55 


Notes...................................................................................................... 71 


IV. SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH.............................................................. 	 79 


Notes...................................................................................................... 97 


V. 	 CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY......................................................... 107 


APPENDIX 1. RESEARCH VS. DEVELOPMENTAL LAUNCHES, 


NACA ERA ............................................................................ 125 


APPENDIX 2. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS ......................................... 127 


APPENDIX 3. WALLOPS' COMPLEMENT.............................................. 137 


APPENDIX 4. SELECTED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE 


PROGRAMS........................................................................... 139 


APPENDIX 5. WALLOPS' FUNDING........................................................ 141 


NOTE ON SOURCES..................................................................................... 143 


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................... 145 


INDEX.............................................................................................................. 149 


THE NASA HISTORY SERIES ..................................................................... 163 


Notes...................................................................................................... 120 


iii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

This thesis marks the culmination of my master's program at the University 

of Maryland, Baltimore County, and I owe thanks to a number of people for 

its successful completion. 

I wish first to thank the mentor of this work, Joseph N. Tatarewicz, for his 

encouragement, advice, and constructive criticism. His optimism and 

support kept this endeavor on track, and his willingness to work with my 

sometimes inconvenient schedule was greatly appreciated. 

Also deserving of thanks are the members of my review committee in the 

History Department of UMBC: Sandra Herbert, Joseph L. Arnold, and Gary 

L. Browne, all of whom waded through the review copy of this work on 

short notice, and provided pertinent and instructive comments. 

The research for this work would have been vastly more difficult if not for 

the assistance of Keith Koehler, Public Information Officer at NASA's Wallops 

Flight Facility. His guidance regarding Wallops' record collection, and his 

assistance in arranging interviews was indispensable. I also wish to recognize 

the aid rendered by Roger D. Launius and Lee D. Saegesser at the NASA 

History Office in Washington. Their comments and counsel helped me to 

maximize scarce research time. Similarly, Richard T. Layman and Garland 

Gouger at NASA's Langley Research Center kindly took time from other 

duties to facilitate my research during my visit there. 

I would especially like to thank Robert T. Duffy, J.Chris Floyd, Marvin W. 

McGoogan, Joyce B. Milliner, Joseph E. Robbins, and Abraham D. Spinak, 

all of whom graciously consented to provide the oral history that was needed 

to fill in the gaps in the written record. 

Finally, I thank my family, friends, and co-workers for their understanding 

and support during this project. Their patience during those times I was 

consumed with this work is greatly appreciated. Thanks particularly to 

Catherine Anderson for help with the tables, and Michelle Wallace for the 

map and chart. Responsibility for errors of fact or interpretation, of course, 

rests solely with the author. 

v 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 


Harold D. Wallace Jr. is an historian working in the Electricity and Modern 

Physics Division of the National Museum of American History. Current 

projects include an exhibit studying invention in modern lighting and 

research into historic aspects of restructuring in the electric power industry. 

A native of Baltimore, Maryland, Mr. Wallace received an M.A. in the 

history of technology from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. 

Prior to employment with the Smithsonian, he enjoyed a successful 

management career in the retail and wholesale hardware trades. He is a 

member of the American Historical Association, the Baltimore County 

Historical Society, and the Society for the History of Technology. 

vii 

LIST OF ACRONYMS 


ABMA: Army Ballistic Missile Agency 

AEC: Atomic Energy Commission 

AFRS: Auxiliary Flight Research Station 

AGARD: Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research 

AMPD: Advanced Materials and Physics Division 

AMR: Atlantic Missile Range (Cape Canaveral, Patrick AF Base) 

AO: Administrative Operations 

ARC: Ames Research Center 

ARDC: Air Research and Development Command 

ARPA: Advanced Research Projects Agency 

CAA: Civil Aeronautics Administration 

CNAS: Chincoteague Naval Air Station 

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations 

CoF: Construction of Facilities 

DOD: Department of Defense 

DOVAP: Doppler Velocity and Position 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 

FRC: Flight Research Center (HSFS) 

GEOS: Geodynamics Experimental Ocean Satellite 

GSFC: Goddard Space Flight Center (Beltsville Space Flight Center) 

HSFS: High Speed Flight Station (FRC) 

IBM: International Business Machines 

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IGY: International Geophysical Year 

IQSY: International Year of the Quiet Sun 

IRD: Instrument Research Division 

JPL: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

La RC: Langley Research Center (LMAL, LAL, LRC) 

Le RC: Lewis Research Center 

MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

MSC: Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston) 

MSFC: Marshall Space Flight Center 

MSFN: Manned Space Flight Network 

MSTS: Military Sea Transport Service 

NACA: National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBS: National Bureau of Standards 

NRL: Naval Research Laboratory 

OLVP: Office of Launch Vehicle Programs 

OSFD: Office of Space Flight Development 

ix 
OSFP: Office of Space Flight Programs 

OSO: Orbiting Solar Observatory 

OSSA: Office of Space Science and Applications 

OTDA: Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 

PARD: Pilotless Aircraft Research Division 

PMR: Pacific Missile Range (Vandenberg AF Base) 

PSAC: President's Science Advisory Committee 

RAM: Radio Attenuation Measurement 

R&D: Research and Development 

RAND: Research And Development Corporation 

RCA: Radio Corporation of America 

S&E: Salary and Expenses 

Scout: Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test System 

Spandar: Space Ranging Radar 

SRB: Solid Rocket Booster 

SSUA: Special Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere 

STADAN: Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network 

STG: Space Task Group 

TAGIU: Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit 

Tiros: Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite 

TOS: Tiros Operational System 

UARRP: Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel 

USNS: United States Naval Ship 

VPI: Virginia Polytechnic Institute 

x 
--Salisbury 

' ' 'Wallops Island 

- - Assateague Island 

Atlantic 

Ocean 

~. 
 NASA's Wallops Station on the Delmarva 
~: 

Wallops Flight Facility 

Main Base 

(formerly Chincoteague ~-- Naval Air Station, 

' ' ' 

' ' 

INSET 

1 - Baltimore 

2 - Washington 

3 - Hampton 

4 - Wallops Station 

5 - Salisbury 

NASA's Wallops Station (in three sections) 
Scout 

MercuryLittle Joe 

Javelin 

k 

Mercury-Atlas 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

2 

Areas 

Nike CajunApache 

NikeTomahaw

Selected NASA Launch Vehicles (scale in meters) 

Cliapter1 

INTRODUCTION 

The course of the Space Age underwent a fundamental shift during the 

decade of the 1980's. The heady era of Sputnik, Apollo, and the Cold Warfueled space race shifted to an era of more methodical activities as space 

operations became popularly mundane. Similarly, seminal works pertaining 

to the history of conspicuous early space projects have been joined on the 

library shelf by words examining less glilmorous, but still important topics. 

The big, visible space projects e'<i:-ted its much for reasons of politics and 

national prestige as for scientific research, and thus attracted the ear!v 

attention of historians. The c1dvancement of human knowledge and skill, 

however, owed at least as much and perhaps more to smaller projects and 

research conducted out of the spotlight. 

A facility devoted to such projects still operates on the East Coast of the 

lower Delmarva Peninsula. The National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration's Wallops Flight Facility has, since its establishment in 1945, 

launched over 14,000 rockets, milking it one of the most prolific launch sties 

in the world as well as one of the least known. 1 Currently a subsidiary of 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Wallops has always been among the smaller 

of America's aerospace research facilities. Despite, and possibly because of, 

the administrative and budgetary chaos that often characterized this nation's 

space effort, Wallops evolved from a highly specialized, test facility to a 

more generalized, multi-faceted research center. The history of the base 

reaches back to the early days of U.S. involvement in space research, and 

reflects most of the major controversies encountered therein. An historical 

examination of the base, therefore, has \'alue not only because of the 

comparative lack of such attention, but ,1lso because it allows a unique 

vantage point from which to view \vhat is, to paraphrase policy historian 

John Logsdon, "the great adventure of our lifetime." 2 

Due to the limitations of size and time inherent in a thesis, this work vvill 

not be a detailed, all-encompassing history of the Wallops Station. This thesis 

will focus on the political, administrative, and social history aspects of the 

base from 1957 to 1966. This period began with the launch of the Soviet 

Union's Sputnik 1, continued through the creation of NASA, and culminated 

at the height of the Project Apollo escalation. A fast-paced era, it also includes 

the second of the three most important periods in Wallops history to date. 3 

The thesis is arranged in five chapters, with this first serving to provide 

background information on the base, relate events leading up to the creation 

of NASA, and introduce most of the themes that run through the body of 

1 
WALLOPS STATION 

the work. The second chapter discusses the founding of NASA, the 

subsequent expansion of Wallops, and the organization of the base as an 

independent administrative entity. During this immediate post-Sputnik era 

the differing prioritization of aeronautical and space science research within 

NASA began to fundamentally alter Wallops' mission. The sudden 

appearance of a space race, combined with the unexpected closure of a nearby 

military base, also shifted the relationship between the station and the local 

community. 

Chapter three provides a look at Wallops' involvement with the U.S. piloted 

space flight effort. This involvement, heavy during Project Mercury, declined 

throughout the period until almost nil during Project Apollo. The staff's 

reaction to the novelty of press coverage and public interest in its operations, 

a side effect of the piloted programs, is also examined. 

Chapter four traces the course of space science research at Wallops by 

discussing not only programs and facilities located at the Virginia base, but 

also those operations that occurred off-range at various locations. Wallops' 

significant role in NASA's program of international cooperation coalesced 

during this early period, and is also examined. 

The final chapter explores how the period of relative stability at Wallops 

through the following decade, extended from changes (and non-changes) 

that occurred during the transition era. The roles of Wallops' various 

customers are summarized, as is the role of the Station within both the local 

environment and within NASA. Before launching into the account of such 

an active era, however, it would be well to set the stage. 

Langley Aeronautical Laboratory originally established the facility at 

Wallops Island in 1945 to fulfill an urgent wartime requirement for a test 

range to provide militarily vital aeronautical engineering data. Today the 

base serves scientists as the nation's only civilian controlled launch range 

supporting a wide assortment of research projects; a radical change. 

Conversely, the primary method utilized by the researchers at Wallops, the 

launching of solid-fueled rockets, remains little changed from the early days. 

Defined, founded, and operated by Langley engineers, the island base 

initially reflected its parent lab in many ways. Thus, a review of the 

backgrounds of both Langley and the National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics (NACA), of which it was a part, becomes necessary. This account 

begins in the opening years of the twentieth century, at the dawn of heavierthan-air flight. 

Aviation existed in the embryonic state until the onset of this century. The 

lighter-than-air craft of the late nineteenth century exhibited little 

improvement over that flown by the Montgolfier brothers in 1783. 

Advancement came slowly until the success of the Wright brothers in 1903. 

The early years of powered flight found the pioneers of aviation struggling 

to understand both the physical properties of the atmosphere and the basics 

of aeronautical engineering. The experience of the First World War 

2 
INTRODUCTION 

demonstrated that European researchers had advanced more quickly in 

comprehending and utilizing the new arena than had their American 

counterparts. The miliary, and to a lesser extent commercial, implications of 

this American aeronautical deficiency prompted the U.S. government to take 

action. 

In March of 1915 Congress passed, appended to a naval appropriations 

bill, a law establishing the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 

The somewhat general wording of the law empowered the Committee, "to 

supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight with a 

view toward their practical solution ... "4 Established despite misgivings from 

the military (worried about a civilian agency syphoning off resources), and 

bureaucratic squabbling common in Washington, the Committee met for the 

first time on 23 April 1915 in the offices of the Secretary of War. Though 

ostensibly civilian in nature, five of the original twelve seats on the Main 

Committee were held by military aviation personnel. This set a pattern for 

the special relationship that existed between the NACA and the services. 

No matter how busy, the Committee remained responsive to the needs of 

this prime customer throughout its existence. 0 

Once organized, the first priority of the Committee was the construction of a 

research laboratory. They believed modern facilities and motivated personnel 

would give them the ability to compete with Europeans who owed much of 

their technological lead to such state sponsored concerns. The War Department, 

already directed by Congress to select a site for such a facility, recommended a 

site near the town of Hampton, Virginia. The NACAconcurred with this choice 

which offered reasonable proximity to Washington headquarters and Virginia 

industry, a variety of "experimental flying conditions," the promise of an adjacent 

military airfield, and enough isolation to ensure both safety and security. 6 

Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory, dedicated in 1920, became the 

foundation of the NACA, and profoundly influenced national and international 

research for decades to come. 

The early days at Langley were far from comfortable. Located in the midst 

of farmland just off the Chesapeake Bay, conditions bordered on the 

primitive. Scarce housing, an isolated location, and a disagreeable climate 

prompted more than a few resignations at the beginning. 7 As time passed 

and conditions slowly improved, however, a formidable research institution 

grew. Some of the world's most advanced wind tunnels and test equipment 

went into operation despite the lean budget years of the Great Depression. 

This allowed the engineers at the lab to do pathfinding work in aeronautical 

engineering. It should be noted that "engineering" and "science" do not 

always mean the same thing. The Langley engineers concentrated on 

designing and improving flying equipment rather than attempting to conduct 

research into atmospheric phenomena for its own sake. This focus on 

inventing and refining hardware was, of course, their job, but it would lead 

to problems later on. 8 

3 
WALLOPS STATION 

A relaxed, scholarly atmosphere prevailed at the lab, informality being 

viewed as a stimulus to creativity. The comment made by a senior engineer, 

"Let's try the damn thing and see if we can make it work," illustrated a true 

understanding of the nature of experimentation, which required a tolerance 

for occasional failures. 9 Situated at a distance from the NACA's Washington 

headquarters sufficient to escape stifling managerial scrutiny, Langley 

prospered and came to regard its relative independence as a fundamental 

necessity. Most research work was performed "in-house" rather than 

contracted out, and many Hampton residents found jobs at the lab. As time 

passed, the lab and the community adjusted to each other. 

The advent of World War II did not take the NACA completely by surprise. 

Indications of advancing German aeronautical research abounded for several 

years prior to American military involvement. In an effort to accelerate the 

pace of U.S. research, the NACA persuaded Congress to authorize two new 

laboratories. Ames Laboratory, in Sunnyvale, California, opened in 1940 and 

provided testing facilities close to the West Coast aircraft manufacturers. 

Less than a year later, Lewis Laboratory, built in Cleveland. Ohio, began 

providing data on aircraft engines. 10 In both cases Langley personnel were 

dispatched to plan, oversee, and operate the new labs. Thus, the Langley 

methodology spread through the growing NACA field organization. This 

methodology combined a commitment to the research ethic (intellectual 

freedom and systematic procedures), a certain level of administrative 

independence, and an aversion to contractors. While promoting the desired 

research standards, this methodology also promoted its share of tension 

between the field personnel and a Headquarters staff trying to maintain 

control over an expanding organization. 11 

The war served to intensify the military's claim of pre-eminent access to 

the NACA's facilities. From the beginning, the Committee gave specific 

military projects priority over the general research it preferred doing. 12 The 

"clean-up" work performed during the war contributed greatly to the allied 

victory as almost every U.S. combat aircraft-type flown spent some time in 

an NACA wind tunnel. NACA leaders found this developmental role 

distasteful, but the needs of a nation at war left them with little choice.13 

Aircraft manufacturers working on non-military projects found themselves 

unable to obtain similar services for their commercial designs. The NACA 

viewed its role as one of providing general data that all manufacturers could 

use. They worked carefully to avoid any charges of interfering with freemarket competition, or allowing publicly funded facilities to assist private 

gain, while trying to be responsive to industrial needs. 14 

Two important fields of inquiry rose to the top on the research agenda 

during the years of the Second World War: high-speed flights, and missile 

development. Dealing with these topics required new techniques and new 

facilities, all planned and built with war-time haste. With Ames and Lewis 

still in the very early stages of operation, the burden of this research fell 

4 
INTRODUCTION 

largely on Langley. Aircraft speeds rose steadily throughout the 1920's and 

30's as more powerful engines and more efficient designs came into service. 

The speed of sound became a tangible milestone. Goal to some, barrier to 

others, respected scientists and engineers argued about the possibility of 

exceeding Mach 1. Not subject to debate, however, were the real aerodynamic 

effects created by aircraft approaching this velocity. Air piled up in the front 

of a fast moving plane, causing severe buffeting and loss of control. These 

"compressibility effects" began to cause slips in manufacturing schedules 

and cost pilots their lives. Research into the transonic speed range became 

vitally necessary and the NACA began its research. J5 

Unfortunately, strange things happened in wind tunnels during tests at 

these speeds. Data readings, accurate above and below the transonic range, 

grew inaccurate within that range. A condition engineers referred to as 

"choking" occurred when shock waves generated by air moving over a test 

model rebounded off the tunnel walls, interacting with the model. These 

frustrating difficulties led NACA researchers to consider new methods of 

obtaining test data. One such method, designing and flying experimental 

research aircraft, led to the establishment of the High Speed Flight Station. 

Opened in 1946 adjacent to Edwards Air Force Base in California, this station 

gave Langley researchers a place to test-fly new designs, resulting in the 

famous X-series of aircraft. Two other methods, propelling instrumented 

models to high speeds by use of a rocket motor, and dropping instrumented 

devices from a high-flying aircraft, also required the establishment of a 

specialized facility. 16 

Concurrent with the need to conduct transonic flight research came the need 

to test early missile designs that began to appear late in the war. Several missile 

designs underwent testing in the Langley tunnels during the war, but there 

existed some question as to the status of this new device. Were they "pilotless 

aircraft" and subject to the NACA's research mandate, or ordnance, a glorified 

bullet, and out of the NACA's purview? Though solely a military device at the 

time, the NACA adopted the former position and started looking for a range 

from which they could test missile guidance and propulsion systems.J 7 

In December 1944, Langley's Acting Engineer-in-Charge, John W. Crowley, 

organized a Special Flying Weapons Team to "oversee all missile research" 

at the lab. This team, led by Crowley himself, recommended the 

establishment of an Auxiliary Flight Research Station for the conduct of both 

high-speed flight and missile tests. The proposed base needed clear, 

unpopulated space downrange, a series of locations parallel to prospective 

flight paths suitable for radar tracking stations, and a reasonable proximity 

to Langley. Safety and security considerations dictated an isolated spot 

and a nearby military airfield was deemed a must.J 8 

A site near Cherry Point, North Carolina, drew the attention of the Langley 

engineers. Launches could be directed out over the Atlantic with flight paths 

parallel to Cape Hatteras. Less than an hour away from Hampton by air, 

5 
WALLOPS STATION 

with a nearby Marine air base, this site seemed ideal. However, anticipated 

difficulties getting to tracking sites on the barrier islands combined with 

unanticipated objections to this civilian plan from the officers at the Marine 

base and eliminated Cherry Point from consideration. 19 Crowley's team then 

re-examined a site originally rejected as too remote: Wallops Island. 

Home to an old Coast Guard station and owned by a group of Pennsylvania 

sportsmen, support facilities for both people and experiments left much to 

be desired. Yet the lure of a base near Langley, with a clear range out over 

the Atlantic, good locations south along the coast for tracking stations, and 

the adjacent Chincoteague Naval Air Station, proved irresistible. In April 

1945 Congress appropriated funds for the research station, and an 

accompanying facility at Langley. Navy plans to use the north end of the 

island as an ordnance test site, which included missile launches, settled the 

matter. On 11 May, 1000 acres on the south end of the island were leased by 

the NACA, clearing the way for the hiring of employees and the shipment 

of materials. 2

°Crowley pulled engineer Robert Gilruth out of Langley's Flight 

Research Division and put him in charge of the new organization. 21 Gilruth 

and his associates tackled the job of preparing the site for rocket operations, 

organizing the facility, and commencing launches. 

The hectic pace of activities did not slow with the end of the war in Europe. 

Launch operations from hastily constructed temporary facilities on Wallops 

commenced on 27 June 1945. With no experience in the conduct of rocket 

operations, Langley relied on the assistance on the Navy's Bureau of 

Ordnance, their neighbors on the island, until their own personnel gained 

proficiency. Gilruth delegated the tasks of assuring that the Langley 

personnel achieved such proficiency to engineer William J. O'Sullivan; 

Gilruth himself was busily coordinating a variety of other tasks. 22 

Like the military facilities at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and White Sands in 

New Mexico, the civilian range at Wallops quickly became host for a number 

of research projects and capabilities promoting aeronautical research. The 

southern tip of the island served as a drop zone for free falling models. 

Though not utilized to the same extent as the rocket model method, drop 

models did provide useful data. Balloon launches relayed atmospheric data 

in support of flight operations, an important function since the atmosphere, 

unlike the environment inside a wind tunnel, could not be carefully 

controlled. A desire to experiment with ramjet designs led to the early 

construction of a wind tunnel facility known as the Preflight Jet, the only 

one of its kind at that time. 23 

The establishment of Wallops paralleled in many ways the establishment 

of Langley Lab. Engineers from the NACA came together in a remote location, 

supported by the military, assisted by local workers, to conduct pathfinding 

research into a highly technical enterprise of vital and urgent interest to a 

country at war. Early conditions at Wallops also recall the early days at 

Langley. The sparsely populated area contained little save farmland and 

6 
INTRODUCTION 

The kitchen wing of Wallops quonset hut hotel, August 20, 1945. 

marshes, demanding a measure of endurance form those assigned there. 

Scarce housing, few social diversions, and a general lack of amenities made 

working there an unappealing prospect. The island itself was barren of 

facilities. No road connected it to the mainland, so reaching it required a 

ferry or seaplane. Portable generators provided power. Supplies as basic as 

water needed to be ferried in. Food prices in the area soared, and the nearest 

hospital facilities lay forty miles away in Salisbury, Maryland, as the naval 

base at Chincoteague could only provide emergency services. An abundance 

of mosquitoes and horseflies sufficed to round out a very uncomfortable 

duty station. 24 

The remoteness of the location served its purpose, however. It satisfied 

the engineers who wanted to conduct hazardous operations safely and 

without interruption, and pleased a military clientele concerned with 

maintaining a shroud of secrecy around an emerging class of weapons. The 

existence of the station was not publicly acknowledged for over a year, and 

the research results during the early period quite often were released only 

on a need to know basis. 25 The isolation also fostered the Langley traditions 

of a relaxed atmosphere and relative freedom from managerial scrutiny. 

The rudimentary nature of the facilities at the Station began to change the 

day the war ended. The process of constructing a permanent plant 

7 
WALLOPS STATION 

commenced with the opening of bids at Langley. The post-war scale back in 

government spending slowed the construction process, as did the Navy's 

oft-stated plans to purchase the entire island for the Bureau of Ordnance. 

While the Navy professed no objection to sharing the island with the NACA, 

they delayed. By law the government agencies could only build on 

government owned land, and the Bureau of the Budget refused to allow the 

NACA to purchase parts of an island scheduled for acquisition by the Navy. 

Therefore, the temporary facilities first erected saw use for several years 

longer that anticipated, with permanent construction limited to the few acres 

already purchased. 26 

The administrative organization coalesced somewhat more quickly during 

this period. On 10 June 1946, the Auxiliary Flight Research Station became 

the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division of Langley Laboratory (PARO). 

Wallops remained the operational site of the group and officially received 

the name Pilotless Aircraft Research Station, though the acronym PARS never 

found widespread use and the base continued to be called simply: Wallops. 

Robert Gilruth, designated division chief, started to refine his team, a task 

largely completed by 1950.27 

For Wallops, the most profound effect of this reorganization turned out to be 

the assignment of Robert L. Krieger to the post of Engineer-in-Charge, Wallops 

Island, a position he held until his retirement from NASA in 1980. A Hampton 

native, Krieger worked at Langley in his youth, performing various unskilled 

and semi-skilled tasks. He eventually found himself working for engineer 

Edmund C. Buckley in the Photo Lab. Buckley persuaded Krieger to seek an 

engineering degree, and after taking this advice Krieger graduated from the 

Georgia Institute of Technology in 1943. He returned to Langley and was 

assigned to the Instrument Research Division, now headed by Buckley, and 

proceeded to work on radar tracking and photographic data collection 

techniques. When Buckley accepted the position of Assistant Chief of PARO in 

1948 he called upon his protege to take charge of operations at Wallops. Krieger's 

appointment served to highlight the importance of the tracking and data 

acquisition function of the PARO operation. Launching the rockets was only a 

part of the research process. New radar tracking, radio telemetry, and 

photographic techniques played an indispensable role in conducting a successful 

project, and Krieger had specialized in that area. He did not just bring technical 

experience and a background steeped in the Langley tradition to the base, he 

proceeded to make Wallops his own. 28 

Other personnel shifts of importance to Wallops occurred during this 

period. John Crowley moved to NACA Headquarters, becoming Assistant 

Director of Aeronautical Research. He worked closely with both Dr. George 

W. Lewis and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, the NACA's last two research directors. 

When Crowley's transfer became permanent in July 1947 Floyd L. Thompson 

succeeded him as Langley's Research Department Chief with Ira A. Abbott 

and Special Flying Weapons Team veteran Hartley A. Soule as his assistants. 

8 
INTRODUCTION 

Within a year, Abbott transferred to Headquarters to assist Crowley. 29 It is 

apparent that even though the NACA had, by 1950, grown into an 

organization far larger than any of its founders could have foreseen, upper 

management remained a tight little group. They knew each other, shared 

common backgrounds, and knew intimately how the NACA functioned. 

Most of them also knew Wallops, an important consideration given their 

prominent role in the creation of NASA. 

During the first phase of operations at Wallops, the transonic period, the 

predominant number of tests fell into the category of basic research. This 

included launches to investigate drag, control, and stability characteristics 

of assorted generic aerodynamic shapes. Interspersed with these general tests 

were examinations of specific military aircraft and missile models, but the 

relative numbers indicate the weight Langley engineers gave research over 

development. 30 (See appendix 1) 

Regardless of the manner of the test or the customer, the overall frequency 

of testing rose steadily. The value of the data generated at Wallops prompted 

an industry request in 1948 for the NACA to expand and accelerate the PARD 

program. The simultaneous growth of operations at the Naval Air Ordnance 

Test Station, on the other end of the island, caused concerns about potential 

range interference. The issue came to a head in late 1948 and early 1949, and 

resulted in the Navy acceding the "primary interest" of NACA activities on 

the island. The establishment of test ranges at Point Mugu and Point Arguello, 

California, lowered the Navy's interest in Wallops and cleared the way for 

NACA purchase of the island. 31 By use of condemnation proceedings the 

government took possession of the island on 7 November 1949, and later 

paid $93,238.71 in compensation to the previous owners. This finally allowed 

the needed construc_tion to proceed. 32 

This construction centered mostly on replacing the old temporary 

structures, and erecting the shops and control facilities needed to handle an 

increasing workload. A test apparatus known as a helium gun was 

transferred from Langley to Wallops at this time, adding to the research 

arsenal at the base. The number of employees assigned to the station 

stabilized at around 75 during this period, however, a situation which did 

not change appreciably until the creation of NASA. The internal organization 

of the base also stabilized with the assignment of personnel to either the 

Mechanical Services Unit, the Research Section, or the Administrative Unit. 

"In the daily operations at the island, however, organizational lines were 

not rigidly drawn -all personnel helped in any way they could to get the 

job done". 33 

The rough local conditions continued to stress those at the base. The scarcity 

of community facilities caused hardships for all, even those at the top. In 

1951 Robert Krieger requested permission to move his office back to Langley. 

He retained his position in the Wallops structure with little effect on the 

operations at the base since planning, budgeting, data reduction, and many 

9 
WALLOPS STATION 

of the test preparations took place at the Hampton lab. Engineer John C. 

Palmer assumed responsibility for overseeing the daily operations on the 

base. This would solidify the administrative pattern that would prevail for 

the rest of the decade. Researchers, inside or outside of the NACA, who 

wished to use the facilities at Wallops went to PARO at Langley, because the 

decision-making process operated there. Wallops performed the same 

function as any of Langley's wind tunnels, researchers traveled to the Station 

only to conduct their tests. Wallops provided services, PARO provided 

direction, and Langley provided support. 34 

The focus of the research performed at Wallops began to shift in the early 

1950's. Transonic research remained important for several more years, but 

equipment designers discovered a way around the choking problem. The 

new fixtures, slotted-throat wind tunnels, could provide transonic data 

without the necessity of watching an expensive, highly instrumented model 

vanish into the ocean. A major source of contention between advocates and 

opponents of rocket model testing lay in the waste inherent in the method. 

Models required money and, more importantly, time to produce and outfit 

with equipment. Proponents justified the tests by pointing out that they 

lacked a less-expensive method. The slotted-throat tunnels removed this 

argument, which was one of the major reasons for Wallops' existence. In 

addition to the quality of tunnels, the quality of equipment capable of 

conducting transonic research at Ames and Langley made the rocket model 

technique less necessary. At this point however, another research program 

arose to supplant transonic research in importance. Despite the execution of 

specific projects for various customers, the NACA felt that their primary 

mission remained basic, fundamental inquiry into the unexplored areas of 

flight. So, PARO found other uses for the Wallops range. 35 

Since the vivid German demonstration of the ballistic missile's military 

potential late in the war, American planners had slowly begun to investigate 

this weapon. The revolution represented by combining atomic bombs and 

pilotless aircraft started generating concern, especially after the Soviets broke 

America's nuclear monopoly in September 1949. The explosive force of an 

atomic bomb could compensate for the inaccuracies of early missile designs 

to a point. As the distance from the target increased however, the inaccuracies 

became unacceptable. The Communist victory in China, increasing tensions 

in Europe, and a war in Korea, all spurred U.S. missile research to overcome 

the technical difficulties. 

By 1950 Wallops was conducting tests of the sub-sonic Snark cruise missile 

and its supersonic follow-on, the Boojum. 36 Cruise missiles, even if 

supersonic, suffered from the same vulnerabilities that endangered all combat 

aircraft. Again the Germans provided the lesson. The Allies shot down V-1 

cruise missiles in droves, but could not devise a defense against the ballistic 

V-2 missile once it took off. Ballistic missiles presented much more complex 

problems by operating at higher speeds, reaching greater altitudes, and 

10 
INTRODUCTION 

experiencing more heating than any weapon system previously designed. 

The research questions concerning drag, stability, control, and performance 

were old ones, while the territory being opened, the hypersonic speed regime, 

was virtually unexplored.37 

The nature of the NACA's hypersonic program grew from its response to 

the earlier transonic problem. Again, wind tunnels could provide little data, 

requiring an alternate approach. Researchers at Ames and the High Speed 

Flight Station proposed extending the experimental aircraft program, while 

Langley and Lewis advocated increasing Wallops capabilities. NACA 

Headquarters, under political fire for having failed to exploit such advances 

as rocketry, swept wings, and jet engines during the war, needed a program 

that would put it back on the forefront of research. Transonic and supersonic 

research had been first steps. A hypersonic program provided the next logical 

step, especially since it coincided with emerging military needs. 38 

The PARD's experience at Wallops put the NACA in a very good position. 

Deriving accurate data using the rocket model technique required some 

expertise. One Ames engineer noted, "Most of the missile manufacturers 

are engaged in obtaining aerodynamic data from firings of their missiles. 

Almost without exception they would like to know the secret of PARD's 

success in getting reliable data from such firings." 39 After a 24 June 1952 

meeting at Wallops, the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics adopted a 

resolution calling on the NACA to, "increase its program dealing with 

problems of unmanned and manned flight in the upper stratosphere at 

altitudes between 12 and 50 miles, and at Mach numbers between 4 and 10," 

and to, "devote a modest effort to problems associated with unmanned and 

manned flights at altitudes from 50 miles to infinity, and at speeds from 

Mach number 10 to the velocity of escape from the Earth's gravity." 40 The 

NACA Executive Committee adopted this position the following month. 

Desiring to take no chances, Headquarters elected to pursue a balanced 

program. One path led to the X-15 and ultimately the Space Shuttle, the 

other led to Projects Mercury and Apollo-4 1 

Despite the completion of construction on the island in 1952, the redirected 

research effort called for new equipment and facilities. The boosters in use 

at that time could not easily reach hypersonic speeds. Bigger, more powerful 

boosters required larger launching equipment and more spacious shops. 

Also, better tracking and data acquisition hardware capable of supporting 

higher speeds and altitudes were essential. The final stumbling block 

concerned limitations placed on Wallops' range clearance. Even though the 

Navy curtailed operations on the island, the general area remained busy. 

Fleet training areas lay offshore, civil air routes passed nearby, and both 

Navy and Air Force conducted supersonic flight training over the ocean. 

Electronic, as well as physical interference posed difficulties. With a plethora 

of land based, shipboard, and airborne radars and radios close at hand, 

Wallops began to seem much less isolated. 

11 
WALLOPS STATION 

The increasing traffic posed little problem early on as test rockets did not 

fly too high and ended their flights only a few miles offshore. The hypersonic 

program, with a reliance on multi-stage rockets, dictated sea and air 

clearances to much greater distances. 42 Early attempts to extend the sea range 

met with the determined opposition of the Navy's Commander-in-Chief, 

Atlantic Fleet. After several years of negotiations, the Navy and the NACA 

reached agreement on coordination of activities around Wallops Island. 

Although it occasionally needed fine tuning, this coordination worked well 

for the rest of the decade. Fortunately, cooperative use of military training 

areas meant that Wallops only rarely conflicted with civil air routes at this 

timeY 

Though still somewhat spartan, the living conditions around the area began 

to improve. Part of the completed construction program included a building 

that functioned as cafeteria, lounge, and bunkhouse for both varieties of 

personnel: residents and transients. The permanent employees who operated 

and maintained the Station found housing in the local area, if indeed they 

were not already living there. The transient personnel, who came to the base 

only to participate in tests, usually stayed in the service building on the island. 

Social activities, aside from fishing, remained hard to find for these visitors, 

and many of them spent their spare time working on their projects. 44 

By mid-1953, projects, especially those from the military started running into 

serious delays. Attempting to increase the workload without significantly 

increasing the workforce, something Congress refused to allow, partially 

accounted for the growing backlog. The NACA's refusal to allow Ames to set 

up a Wallops-like facility on the West Coast added to the problem. The intricate 

and time consuming process of model preparation, the envied "secret" of PARD's 

success, completed the morass/' Langley engineers preferred to build their 

models in Langley's own shops, as industry-supplied models frequently failed 

to meet flight standards. Similarly, the lab's Instrument Research Division (IRD) 

had "hand-tailored" telemetry systems to the point where nothing available 

outside the lab gave suitable results. PARO adopted a policy of returning to the 

manufacturer models needing redesign or corrective work, and IRD gave the 

military models priority over the ones devoted to general research. It took over 

a year to get the test schedule back on track, and a tight pace remained the norm 

at Wallops.41, 

In late 1953 the NACA commenced a new program at the Station in 

response to a military request. The survivability of aircraft subjected to severe 

and sudden wind gusts, like those produced by an atomic blast, constituted 

an unknown factor in designing new aircraft. Langley developed a method 

of simulating such blasts by means of conventional explosives and measuring 

the aerodynamic loads exerted on scale models placed nearby to provide 

the needed data. After determining that accurate testing could not be safely 

conducted indoors at Langley, researchers began testing outdoors at Wallops. 

The engineers exploded charges as large as 650 pounds in the course of this 

12 
INTRODUCTION 

"Blast Research Project," which provided increased experience with both 

models and explosives at the station. 47 

The higher performance motors required for the hypersonic program 

started tests from Wallops in 1954. The Deacon rocket, produced by the 

Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory specifically for use as a research rocket was 

the booster of choice during Wallops' transonic phase. Fired singly or in 

clustered groups the Deacon remained a valuable tool for many years, but 

military Nike and Honest John rockets propelled the redirected research 

program. By late 1954, a four stage vehicle utilizing the Nike reached Mach 

10, a significant advance. Engineers placed the speed of a re-entering 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICI3M) warhead c1t i'vfach 20, however, which 

called for more rocket power to meet test objecti ves.4' 

The Honest John promised to pn)\'ide the desired performance but the 

destruction of a launcher during the first firing of the bigger booster 

emphasized the need for new launch equipment. New support facilities were 

also required. A second round of construction began which gave Wallops 

the ability to carry out its part of the hypersonic program. The local economy 

also derived some benefit from the expansion. While NAC A personnel built 

the new launcher, for example, a local firm received the contract for the 

concrete pad. The new pad went into operation by the end of 1955. After a 

number of component tests, a five stage vehicle, the first ever launched, flew 

on 26 August 1956. PARO researchers calculated that this vehicle attained a 

speed of Mach 17.49 

As Wallops gained experience with its new boosters, the engineers began 

obtaining valuable data on the flight characteristics of objects moving at reentry velocities. Raw speed, of course, was not the end goal of the program. 

Dealing vvith the heat generated by objects traveling at such speeds provided 

the main impetus for the researchers. The quest to understand such a 

phenomena involved more that just rocket flights. The Pre-flight Jet Facility, 

modified at this time, allowed the Wallops engineers to conduct hightemperature testing in a laboratory setting. They tested a viide variety of 

shapes and materials at a range of temperatures and pressures. While not 

capable of producing the extremes found in actual flight, the tests of nose 

cones, fins, and scale models in the new Ethylene Jet refined the rocket model 

process. This combination of wind tunnel and rocketry put PARO and 

Wallops in the fore of hypersonic research. "1 Indeed, the high-temperature 

research became so important that the PARO altered its internal organization 

to promote the efficiency of the work and reflect the changing program. A 

High-Temperature Branch replaced the old General Aerodynamics Branch 

with engineer Paul Purser as its head. 01 

The mid-fifties also saw another novel type of research come to Wallops 

Station. Amid the flights of military models and general aerodynamics 

vehicles, scientific sounding rockets began to rise from the ocean-front 

launchpads. 

13 
WALLOPS STATION 

After the war, a group of U.S. scientists formed the V-2 Upper Atmosphere 

Research Panel in order to probe the atmosphere with captured V-2 missiles. 

The number of V-2s being limited, the group turned to other vehicles to 

carry their instruments, and changed their name to the Upper Atmosphere 

Rocket Research Panel (UARRP). 52 In June 1947, Assistant to the Chief, 

PARO, WilliamJ. O'Sullivan became the NACArepresentative to the UARRP. 

In December, O'Sullivan also became the NACA member of the (NACA) 

Aerodynamics Committee's Special Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere 

(SSUA). This dual membership allowed O'Sullivan to keep both groups 

abreast of the current state of hypersonic research. 53 Dr. James Van Allen, of 

Johns Hopkins, held the chair of the UARRP. The NACA Special 

Subcommittee was chaired by Harry Wexler of the U.S. Weather Bureau, 

and included as members Van Allen, future NASA Associate Administrator 

Homer Newell then of the Naval Research Laboratory, and Joseph Kaplan, 

who later chaired the U.S. International Geophysical Year Committee. Several 

other people served both groups, "In fact, many meetings were held 

consecutively with practically the only changes being the presiding officer 

and the secretary."s 4 

In early 1953, Langley established a study group to consider the details of 

a hypersonics program. The three-man group included O'Sullivan, and their 

report recommended that a hypersonic research aircraft be built, supported 

by rocket model tests from Wallops with the test vehicles to be recovered 

from the Sahara Desert.ss Given his connection with Langley's management, 

his seat on an NACA subcommittee, and his association with military and 

university scientists outside the NACA, the fact that O'Sullivan (one of those 

responsible for the early organization of Wallops Station) could facilitate 

PARD's entry into atmospheric science research came as no surprise. 

It is interesting to consider that in April 1958, Smith J.Defrance, Langley 

veteran and long-time head of Ames Laboratory, wrote a letter to Robert 

Gilruth stating that, "the staff of Ames Laboratory is anxious to take 

advantage of the powerful research technique afforded by the rocket flighttest facilities at the Wallops Island field station," and asking for basic 

information about the base and PARD's operations. 56 In November, Ames 

engineers paid a visit to the station.s 7 Ames had little contact with Wallops 

during their early existence. Though originally staffed by Langley trained 

personnel, Ames' situation on the West Coast made utilization of the Virginia 

range impractical. Also, the growth of an institutional culture at the California 

lab created occasional frictions between Langley and Ames, though generally 

the relationship was one of "friendly rivalry."s 8 It thus seems likely that, 

through O'Sullivan and others, the planners of the International Geophysical 

Year knew more about Wallops' and PARD's capabilities at an earlier date 

than did some researchers within the NACA itself. 

During the first years of the upper atmosphere research effort the scientists 

used the converted V-2s, the Naval Research Laboratory's Viking and Aerobee 

14 
INTRODUCTION 

rockets, and the Rockoon system to conduct their experiments. 59 As the three 

former operated with liquid fuel and the latter proved too inaccurate to 

launch from land, Wallops contributed little to this phase of the research. By 

1958, though, budget constraints forced the consideration of a less expensive 

booster. L.M. Jones, of the University of Michigan, consulted with O'Sullivan 

who pushed the Nike-Deacon combination already in use at Wallops. Jones 

wanted a system that could reach 250,000 feet with a 50 pound payload. 

O'Sullivan had previously done the necessary calculations and promised 

Jones 400,000 feet."0 

On 8 April 1958, the first atmospheric sounding rocket launched from 

Wallops flew for the University of Michigan. Though the project was funded 

by the Air Force Cambridge Research Center, this military interest did not 

hinder project access to the base." 1 The I.G.Y. Committee took quick notice, 

especially since the use of the Nike-Deacon reduced by a factor of 10 the 

cost of an experiment previously conducted with an Aero bee. Two successful 

test flights thus put Wallops into the I.G.Y. program and on the road to an 

entirely new mission. 62 

The U.S. Weather Bureau also quickly capitalized on this new research 

capability. Assisted by the Office of Naval Research, the Bureau was looking 

for a new hurricane detection method. The accidental discovery of such a 

storm during a rocket flight from White Sands inspired the idea, and the 

economy of PARD's Nike-Deacon attracted the attention of Bureau Chief 

Francis W. Reichelderfer, also a member of the NACA Main Committee." 1 

He arranged a 20 October meeting with O'Sullivan, and the NRL's John 

Townsend and Leslie Meredith. The result of this meeting was Project Hugo, 

a plan to launch Nike-Cajun rockets with a camera package as payload. After 

taking a series of pictures, the camera package would descend by parachute 

for recovery by the Navy. The film could then be examined for hurricanes, 

providing advance notice of their approach. The system sounded good, but 

for a number of reasons, proved unreliable. Despite an effort watched over 

by Robert Krieger himself, the first and only successful test of Project Hugo 

did not occur until 5 December 1958. The pending development of orbital 

weather satellites promised an easier way to do the job, a vehicle out of 

Wallops' field, but the Weather Bureau would return to the Station later." 4 

Not all of PARD's early forays into cooperative scientific research went 

smoothly. In mid-1955, Dr. S. Fred Singer of the University of Maryland 

proposed a series of research flights sponsored by the National Security 

Agency. The design of the new Terrapin rocket caused some friction between 

Singer and PARO, as did the lack of requisite paperwork between the NSA 

and the NACA. Several memos buzzed back and forth within Langley, and 

although the project was satisfactorily concluded, it pointed out the need 

for a new set of procedures at Wallops to facilitate the nascent scientific 

program. 65 

15 
WALLOPS STATION 

Most of Wallops efforts in the pre-Sputnik era came at the behest of 

American organizations. U.S. military, industrial, or collegiate customers 

monopolized the resources of the PARO. Few foreign projects came to the 

base. Two projects of interest to the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations's 

Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research (AGARD) were conducted in 

1951 and 1954. Joseph Shortal, who replaced Gilruth as PARO Chief in 1951 

reported that he, "presented a paper on the rocket model and Helium Gun 

[testing] techniques at the Fourth General Assembly of AGARD meeting in 

the Netherlands in May 1954." 66 Representatives of AGARD did not receive 

an invitation to visit Wallops until 1959.67 

It appears that the only non-American group to use the Station during the 

NACA era was a team from the Canadian Armament Research and 

Development Establishment Test Range. These engineers encountered 

difficulty tracking rocket model tests of the CF-105 fighter aircraft. They 

received permission to launch two CF-105 models at Wallops and came away 

"impressed" by the Wallops radar operators' ability to quickly acquire and 

track the model. 68 With all of the military tests underway at the base during 

this period, especially ICBM and other nuclear related research, cooperative 

work with international organizations did not rank highly on PARD's priority 

list. 

The increasing speeds and distances associated with the hypersonic 

program pushed capabilities of the tracking and data acquisition equipment 

to their limit. The first several years of the program resulted in such an 

increase in booster performance that, "minimum improvements and a loss 

of accuracy had to be accepted ... " 69 The problem not only concerned 

increasing the range and sensitivity of the radars involved in tracking the 

test flights, but also focused on the sensors aboard the models that generated 

the data, and the telemetry systems that relayed the data to the engineers on 

the ground. Wallops received most of their radar equipment either from the 

military as surplus, or directly from the military's suppliers. As radar systems 

constantly changed to meet increased levels of military needs, those increased 

abilities found their way into Wallops' equipment, requiring minor IRD 

modifications. The telemetry systems retained the complexity that had 

become a trademark of the IRD's specialized work, however, and this 

equipment continued development on a largely in-house basis. The unique 

requirements of the hypersonic program called for devices not easily found 

from industry. The program sparked "an instrument development program 

for high-speed and high-altitude measurements that was to continue far into 

the space age." 70 

That age commenced sooner than expected. 

16 
INTRODUCTION 

NOTES 


1. 	 Due to the fact that each research flight requires the launch of several small 

rockets to calibrate tracking systems, the absolute total number of launches 

from Wallops is impossible to state exactly. The number stated here is from 

Berl Brechner, "Space Island," Air & Space Smithsonian, April/May 1989, 62. 

The figure is corroborated by calculations from several sources including: Jane 

Van Nimmen, Leonard C. Bruno, and Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data 

Book,vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

1988), 480 (hereafter cited as Data Book I); Table by Wallops Public Affairs Office, 

June 1979, in file box "J. S. Palmer's Old Records - Historical," in the Wallops 

Flight Facility Records Collection, Wallops Island (collection hereafter cited as 

WFFRC). This file box contains assorted typed and handwritten tables depicting 

yearly launch records, most of which agree generally if not exactly. 

2. 	 John Logsdon, "Opportunities for Policy Historians: The Evolution of the U.S. 

Civilian Space Program," in A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spacefliglzt, 

ed. Alex Roland (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1985), 81. 

3. 	 The first important period, 1944-1951, involved the establishment of the base 

and its early development. The third important period, 1979-1983, centered on 

the merger of Wallops with Goddard Space Flight Center, and the retirement of 

many NACA veterans. 

4. 	 Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aerona11tics, 

1915-1958, vol 2 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1985), 394-95. Unless otherwise 

noted, citations for Roland hereafter will refer to either volume one or two of 

this work. 

5. 	 Roland, I: 5-29. See also, James R. Hansen, Engineer In Charge: A History of Langley 

Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1987), 1-5. 

6. 	 Hansen, 9-16; quote is on page 11. See also, Roland, I: 79-81. 

7. 	 Hansen, 58-62. Hansen also notes that, "forty-six Langley workers died of 

influenza between September 1918 and January 1919," (page 18). 

8. 	 Hansen, xxxii-xxxiii. 

9. 	 Ibid., 325. See also, Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: Higlz Teclmoloqy and 

Organizational Clzange in the U.S. Space Program, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1993), 25-34. 

10. 	 Roland, I: 147-66. 

11. 	 Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures In Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 

1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1970), 32. See also, Roland, I: 249-50; 

McCurdy, 25-60. 

12. 	 Hansen, 159. 

13. 	 Roland, I: 196. 

14. 	 Ibid., 108-23. 

15. 	 "The transonic region refers to that area between mach .7 and mach 1.3 where 

a plane encounters mixed subsonic and supersonic airflow." Richard P. Hallion, 

On The Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 

1984), 4. See also, Roland, I: 199; and Hansen, 220, 249-56. Hansen gives a good 

account of the forces encountered at Mach 1. 

17 
WALLOPS STATION 

16. 	 Joseph A. Shortal, A New Dimension: Wallops Island Fliqht Test Range: The First 

Fifteen Years (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1978), 4-6. See also, Hansen, 257-58. 

The fourth method used to obtain transonic data did not find wide spread use. 

The wing-flow method involved mounting a small model atop the wing of an 

aircraft which would then fly close to Mach 1. The airstream close to the wing 

would go supersonic allowing the research model to experience what the aircraft 

carrying it could not. 

17. 	 Shortal, 9; Roland, I: 252-53. 

18. 	 Ibid., 23-4. 

19. 	 Ibid. 

20. 	 Ibid., 25-32. 

21. 	 Shortal, 29. 

22. 	 Ibid., 48. See also, Doug Garner, "Seeking Guidance," in Air & Space Smithsonian, 

October /November 1993, p. 80-83; for an account of early operations at Wallops. 

23. 	 Shortal, 60-66, 98, 107, 118-22. 

24. 	 Ibid., 66-69. 

25. 	 "Victory reveals existence of secret missile base," New York Times, 24 September 

1946. Shortal, 146. See also "Spinak, et al.," Oral History Interview, Tape la: 

140. 

26. 	 Shortal, 73, 104-5, 115-16. 

27. 	 Hansen, 269-70; Shortal, 93-7. 

28. 	 Biographical file #001246, "Robert L. Krieger," in the Biographical Collection of 

the NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. (This repository hereafter cited as 

NHO). See also, Shortal, 94-95. 

29. 	 Shortal, 93-95; on page 68 there is a photograph from October 1945 showing Ira 

Abbott and John Stack, among others, at Wallops "for a flight operation." 

30. 	 Roland, I: 197-98. 

31. 	 Ibid., I: 498; Shortal, 104-6. 

32. 	 Shortal, 115. 

33. 	 Ibid., 141-43, for the helium gun, an apparatus that launched small models 

with a blast of pressurized helium. On page 183 Shortal relates that 20 people 

were assigned to the Research Section "which handled all flight operations and 

the Preflight Jet;" 45 were assigned to the Mechanical Services Unit which 

maintained the equipment and the base; and 10 were assigned to the 

Administrative Unit to handle paperwork. 

34. 	 Ibid., 186. 

35. 	 Ibid., 237-40; Hansen, 269-70. 

36. 	 Shortal, 160, 202. 

37. 	 Hansen, 348. On page 344 Hansen notes, "Generally speaking, aerodynamicists 

considered speeds above Mach 5 as hypersonic, since this was the supersonic speed at 

which aerodynamic heating seemed to become vitally important in aircraft design." 

18 
INTRODUCTION 

38. 	 Ibid., 356, 362; Roland, I: 200-06. Roland notes on page 253 that the NACA's 

lack of a clear mandate to pursue rocket research left the investigation of this 

device largely in the hands of the military. 

39. 	 Shortal, 237, remark is attributed to Harry J. Goett, who later became the first 

director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. 

40. 	 Ibid.,241. 

41. 	 Ibid., 237-41. Note that unlike the earlier X-series aircraft, no models of the X15 appear to have been tested at Wallops. 

42. 	 Ibid., 116-18, 293-4. 

43. 	 Ibid., 170, as to Naval opposition to Wallops increased range, "Langley was 

informed privately that no relief could be expected as long as the incumbent 

CINCLANT was in command." See also pages 293-4; and for conflicts with 

civil air routes, page 116. 

44. 	 Ibid., 297-8. "Spinak, et al.," OH!, Tape la: 140. For a more detailed description 

of the housing problem early on at Wallops see: Memorandum, R. R. Gilruth 

for E. H. Chamberlin, 28 February 1946; Memorandum with enclosures, W. 

Calvert Roberts to H.J. E. Reid, 9 May 1946; Memorandum,_ W. White for 

files, 23 May 1946; Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid to NACA Headquarters, 17 

May 1946; Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid for R. E. Ulmer, 9 September 1957; 

Memorandum, Kurt Berlin for the record, 4 March 1959. All are in folder 

"Wallops, January - June 1946 [sic]," Record Group A181-1 "Correspondence 

Files, Wallops Island," in the Langley Research Center Historical Archives. Date 

on the file should read 1965. This collection hereafter cited as RGA181-l(C). 

45. 	 Shortal, 302; Hansen, 270; Roland, I: 264-65. A very revealing insight into NACA 

- Congressional relations can be seen in: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 

Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1957, Hearinqs before a 

S1tbcommittee of the Ho1tse Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 

5602-03H, p. 984. Subcommittee Chairman Albert Thomas accused NACA 

Director Hugh L. Dryden of having "people hanging out of windows and on 

the roof." Unless otherwise noted, all Congressional records cited hereafter are 

in the "Congressional Records Collection" in NHO. 

46. 	 Shortal, 302; Hansen, 270. 

47. 	 Shortal, 427. 

48. 	 Ibid., 83, 441. 

49. 	 Ibid., 442, 446. For additional information on the needs of the hypersonic 

program see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings 

before S1tbcommittee #3 of the Committee on Armed Sen,ices on H.R. 2581 and H.R. 

2123, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 5502-07H, p.360; U.S., Congress, House, Committee 

on Appropriations, Hearings before a subcommittee of tile Committee on 

Appropriations on the 2nd Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1955, 84th Cong., 

1st sess., 5503-03H, p. 325. Memorandum, Joseph E. Robbins to Langley, 30 

April 1957, "1959 Budget Estimates," in folder "September 1956 - April 1957," 

in Record Group A181-1 "Special Files - Wallops Island," in Langley Research 

Center Historical Archives. This collection hereafter cited as RGA 181-l(S). 

50. 	 Shortal, 447-50. 

51. 	 Ibid., 387-90. 

19 
WALLOPS STATION 

52. 	 Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy (Indianapolis: 

Indiana University Press, 1991), 48. Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton 

Lomask, Vanguard: A History (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1971), 6. 

53. 	 Shortal, 251. As NACA committee were populated by people representing many 

different institutions, the need to assign a NACA employee to represent the 

organization on its own subordinate committees was common. 

54. 	 Bulkeley, 48, 92; Shortal, 252. 

55. 	 Hansen, 351-53. 

56. 	 Letter, S. J. Defrance to R. R. Gilruth, 25 April 1958, In folder "Wallops, March 

- December 58," RGA181-I(C). This file also contains a reply to the letter from 

H.J. E. Reid. (Shortal notes this letter in a different context on page 669.) For 

DeFrance's background see: Hartman, 26. 

57. 	 Memorandum, Charles B. Rumsey for Floyd L. Thompson, 25 November 1958, 

in folder "September - December 1958," in RGA181-l(S). 

58. 	 Hallion, 14. It should be noted that Ames eventually developed a closer 

relationship with the High Speed Flight Station at Muroc Dry Lake, though 

this took time. Unlike the relation between Langley and Wallops, the one a part 

of the other in a subordinate position, Ames and HSFS were administratively 

separate until 1981. Indeed Ames lost its flight research program to HSFS in 

1959. See also: Hartman, 315. 

59. 	 The Rockoon consisted of a Deacon rocket with payload suspended beneath a 

balloon. Once the balloon reached a given altitude the Deacon ignited and 

launched. Unfortunately, there was no way to tell in what lateral direction the 

rocket would fly, so it could not be launched anywhere near a populated area. 

Shortal, 252, 401. 

60. 	 Shortal, 401-3. 

61. 	 Ibid., 400, "Funding for most of the upper atmospheric research was provided 

by the Armed Forces." 

62. 	 Ibid., 403. 

63. 	 Roland, II: 433. Recall that the Bureau's Harry Wexler chaired the SSUA. 

64. 	 Shortal, 459-64. Memorandum, William J. O'Sullivan to Associate Director 

Headquarters, 12 March 1956, in folder "January - December 1956," in box #4 

"Reference Material for the Book Entitled A New Dimension," in WFFRC. This 

box hereafter cited as Wallops box #4. The Nike-Cajun was an uprated version 

of the Nike-Deacon. 

65. 	 Shortal, 504-7. The Terrapin rocket was a new configuration of the Deacon and 

a T-55 motor. Memorandum, William J. O'Sullivan for Associate Administrator, 

10 January 1956; Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid for NACA Headquarters, 13 

January 1956; Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid for NACA Headquarters, 5 March 

1956, all in folder "January - December 1956," in Wallops box #4. For the NACA 

desire for regimented paperwork, a by-product of Executive Secretary John 

Victory's style, see Hansen, 24, 28-33. 

66. 	 Shortal, 220, 369. 

67. 	 Ibid., 617. 

20 
INTRODUCTION 

68. Ibid., 457-58. 

69. Ibid., 292. 

70. Ibid., 292, 302. 

21 

Cfiapter2 

SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

The dawn of the Space Age, and the start of the Space Race, occurred in 

the darkness of the Russian night on 4 October 1957. The successful launch 

of Sputnik 1 opened a new front in the Cold War and turned the idea of 

space operations from science fiction into science fact. The expressions of 

"shock" by American politicians, scientists, engineers, and the public at large 

seem almost cliche through repetition. However shocking to the public and 

politicians, the Soviet achievement should not have been too big a shock to 

knowledgeable professionals. The Soviets announced their intent to orbit a 

scientific satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year more than 

two years before the fact. 1 American researchers realized that "going orbital" 

not only involved a relatively simple extension of emerging technology, but 

also that someone would do it soon. ABMA, NRL, RAND, various groups 

within the NACA (including PARO), and others, all nursed orbital visions 

of varying priority. 2 Of course, they generally assumed that the first beeps 

from space would be generated by an American transmitter, but after the 

demonstration of Soviet technical capability represented by Russia's nuclear 

program they largely took the success of Sputnik in stride. 3 

President Eisenhower also evinced little concern about the Soviet 

accomplishment. He placed a greater value on the program to develop an 

operational ICBM and, supported by a slowly growing number of military 

officers, determined that nothing should stand in the way of obtaining this 

new weapon. The importance of speedily executing this program was 

emphasized by the launch of Sputnik 2 on 5 November. Weighing more than 

half a ton and carrying a dog as one-way supercargo, this new satellite 

exhibited a launch capability beyond expectations. 4 The possible substitution 

of a nuclear warhead for Laika the dog generated concern nationwide as 

Americans realized that the wide oceans no longer provided security from 

sudden attack. In a televised address two days later, Eisenhower attempted 

to calm nerves by calling attention to the strength of American forces, citing 

progress in the ICBM program, and appointing Dr. James Killian, Special 

Assistant for Science and Technology. Later that month, Eisenhower put 

Killian in charge of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 

and appointed William Holaday Director of Guided Missiles. 5 Generally, 

though, Eisenhower down played the significance of the Russian satellites, 

and recommended only moderate funding increases for missile research. 6 

Political adversaries were quick to utilize the Sputniks to criticize the 

President and further their own agendas. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon 

23 
WALLOPS STATION 

Johnson emerged as the most visible figure on Capitol Hill during the postSputnik scramble. Looking toward the 1960 presidential campaign, Johnson 

saw the opportunity to push for a boost in defense spending while playing 

to a national audience. On the day after Sputnik 1 went into orbit, he began 

organizing an "Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs," by the 

Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 7 

During the Subcommittee's hearings Johnson examined a wide range of 

defense and space related issues, cultivating the idea that Sputnik represented 

a dangerous challenge to American security, and attacking Eisenhower's 

conservative fiscal policies. Though Johnson took care to conduct the hearings 

in a bipartisan manner, they clearly portrayed the Administration in an 

unfavorable light. 8 

Despite Eisenhower's best efforts and personal feelings, public concern 

with the space and missile issue grew. On 6 December 1957, in the full glare 

of the media spotlight, a Vanguard rocket exploded just after liftoff during 

the first U.S. attempt to orbit a satellite. This failure, despite the fact that the 

Vanguard system was still undergoing tests, combined with the previous 

Russian successes to confirm the nation's worst fears. The Soviets, naturally, 

made the most of the propaganda opportunity, and Eisenhower began to 

realize that the political situation could not be safely ignored. 9 Several groups 

within the Administration set to work. 

Widely blamed for letting interservice rivalries permit the Russians to 

obtain their technological lead, the Defense Department took steps to correct 

the problem by creating the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). 

This agency began the difficult task of coordinating the various military space 

programs. 10 The Air Force portrayed space as just an extension of its 

operational arena. The ongoing program of heavy booster development for 

ICBMs and its involvement with the X-series aircraft gave the airmen 

powerful arguments for the assumption of all U.S. space endeavors. The 

Army maintained their argument that missiles represented a form of longrange artillery, and used the Vanguard accident to showcase their space 

abilities. On 31 January 1958 Explorer 1 ascended into orbit atop a Jupiter-C 

booster designed by Wernher von Braun's rocket team. This group of 

transplanted German scientists, a large part of the group that designed the 

V-2, had been working for the U.S. Army since the end of the war and 

represented one of the most technically advanced cadre of rocket engineers 

in the country. The Navy, while interested in the potential usefulness of 

applications satellites for its far-flung operations and stung by the Vanguard 

failure, seemed more interested in its Polaris program and in not allowing another 

service to monopolize space. Indeed, this mutual jealousy characterized all three 

services; none wished to be shut out of the role of space defender, a role certain 

to entail an increase in funding. 11 All jockeyed for position. Both President 

Eisenhower and Senator Johnson, however, had other ideas. 

24 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

Eisenhower, already wary of the growing "military-industrial complex," 

intended that there be separate military and civilian space programs. 

Johnson, with an eye toward political ramifications (both at home and 

abroad) concurred. While riding herd on various Congressional proposals, 

Johnson waited for Eisenhower to make the first move.12 The task of crafting 

the Administration's civilian space program rested with Killian and PSAC. 

The upper echelons of the NACA, long opposed to any "Buck Rogers" 

projects, initially felt no more concern over Sputnik than did Eisenhower. 

The Executive Committee had met at the Wallops Base on 19 September 

1957 and obtained the latest information on the hypersonic research 

program. 13 The Main Committee held its annual meeting on 10 October, one 

week after the Soviet launch, and did not discuss the matter. 14 This lack of 

high level concern stemmed from a combination of factors. 

For years the notion of space operations, piloted or not, received the label 

of science fiction from the public, politicians, and many professionals alike. 

An in-depth, publicly financed, space research program would not have been 

approved by the fiscally conservative Eisenhower or a Congress that reflected 

the opinions of its largely unimaginative pre-Sputnik constituency. PARO 

and the other interested groups within the NACA fought to justify their 

limited forays into astronautics to their own Headquarters, who in turn never 

forgot that the NACA's budget underwent severe scrutiny before the often 

critical Albert Thomas and his House Subcommittee on Independent Offices 

Appropriations. 

The primary reason the hypersonic program received funding stemmed 

not from its scientific and engineering potential but from its obvious military 

significance. The military monopoly on missile research, and the attendant 

political maneuvers between the services, served to keep the NACA's official 

goals within the atmosphere, a situation not necessarily to the disliking of 

ranking Committee members. Technically "innovative" but by nature 

methodical and by necessity politically conservative, most NACA decision 

makers regarded space as primarily a military area, and likely to remain so 

for the foreseeable future. If research eventually led the NACA into space 

the subject could be dealt with at that time; meanwhile why irritate the 

military, a prime customer and powerful political ally? 15 Not all within the 

organization viewed the situation in this light however. 

Many throughout the NACA disliked the clean-up research necessitated 

by their close relationship with the military. Some saw space research as a 

way to return NACA to its roots by emphasizing basic engineering research. 

There also existed the increasing perception that aeronautical research "was 

reaching a point of diminishing returns," and that if the NACA could not 

expand into astronautical research Congress might just decide that expanding 

military and industrial research capabilities made the NACA superfluous. 16 

Years of declining budgets and escalating criticism made many nervous. 

25 
WALLOPS STATION 

Several groups within the NACA labs quietly crafted plans for space 

research. Abe Silverstein and his associates at Lewis Lab began experimenting 

with liquid hydrogen and other potential chemical rocket fuels, and 

unobtrusively studying electric and nuclear propulsion 17 . Ames and Langley 

studied lifting bodies and hypersonic successors to the X-15 that incorporated 

space flight capabilities. 18 PARO also looked to space with some of its 

engineers already having done "back of the envelope calculations" pertaining 

to obtaining orbital velocities with their rockets. 19 Robert Gilruth later wrote, 

"I can recall watching the sunlight reflecting off the Sputnik 1 carrier rocket 

as it passed over my home on the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia. It put a new 

sense of value and urgency on the things we had been doing." 20 

The 18 November meeting of the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics (held 

aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Forrestal) paid much more attention to 

Sputnik than had the Main Committee the previous month. "The big question 

to be answered now is how can these views [on accelerating space research] 

be put across to the NACA and to the Government in order that the NACA 

be recognized as the national research agency in this field, and be provided 

with the necessary funds .... the NACA should act now to avoid being ruled 

out of the field of space flight research." The Committee suggested 

spotlighting the hypersonics program in general and the X-15 project 

specifically in order to make the case. 21 

This committee, at least, recognized the need for alacrity. Eight days after 

this meeting, NACA Chairman James Doolittle testified before Johnson's 

Preparedness Subcommittee. Interestingly, Doolittle referred to Wallops as 

"a missile-testing laboratory," during his testimony, in contrast to a 1951 

NACA press release that emphatically stated that "this is an aerodynamics 

range, not a proving ground for missiles." 22 Throughout this period, in 

testimony before mahy committees and in public statements, Wallops was 

rarely referred to directly. The programs in progress there received much 

attention, but the potential offered by the facility and its staff seldom 

appeared in print. This should not be taken as a sign that Washington knew 

nothing of Wallops. For example, on 19 November, Acting Engineer-inCharge John Palmer received a phone call "at quitting time," from the 

Executive Officer at Chincoteague Naval Air Station. He advised Palmer that 

a committee from Washington had conducted an inspection of the Navy base 

that day and wished to inspect the NACA facility next. Not familiar with 

the "Special Committee on Range Facilities," Palmer called Krieger. After 

failing to contact Gilruth, Krieger contacted Buckley and the two travelled 

to Wallops and met the committee on 21 November. The visitors turned out 

to be a high-level group from the Office of the Secretary of Defense studying 

the "long-range, over-all situation in regard to adequacy of test ranges in 

order to assure that facilities were available when needed and to prevent 

duplication, conflicts, etc." The group's mission also included scouting a 

location for a new test range as, "the services are being forced out of the 

26 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

Delaware - New Jersey coastal area because of the density of population." 

This was one of several groups that visited the Station during this time. 23 

The Main Committee established a Special Committee on Space 

Technology on 21 November chaired by H. Guyford Stever from MIT, 

included such luminaries as von Braun and Van Allen, and also placed 

Gilruth on the roster. This committee served to coordinate and champion 

the NACA's attempt to expand into the new arena. The perception began to 

grow within the organization that space research might be an all or nothing 

proposition. If they could not win the civilian space mission, they might be 

absorbed by the group that did; one way or the other, changes loomed on 

the horizon. 2

~ A number of studies appeared promoting the NACA and 

setting forth its qualifications and requirements for assuming the space 

program. One such study noted that, "the Pilotless Aircraft Research Station, 

... , is now being used almost exclusively on hypersonic and space flight 

problems. 25 In testimony before Congress witnesses estimated PARO 

activities to be "90% Space Research." 26 

The NACA won round one by convincing Killian's Advisory Committee 

on Government Organization that it should be assigned the space mission. 

"We recommend that leadership of the civil space effort be lodged in a 

strengthened and redesignated National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics." 27 The NACA's history of close relations with the military and 

the applicability of its programs and facilities to space research led Killian's 

Committee to recommend NACA over other contenders such as the Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC), a proposed "Department of Science and 

Technology," or p~ivate contractual arrangements. On 5 March 1958 

Eisenhower gave the recommendation his approval. The NACA prepared 

for round two of the contest: winning Congressional approval. 28 

In early February Senator Johnson oversaw the creation of the Senate 

Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, of which he became chairman, 

to provide an organizational vehicle for Senate input into the issue. The 

House established a similar committee, chaired by Majority Leader John W. 

McCormack, the following month. 29 When the administration's bill 

proposing the expansion of the NACA into a National Aeronautics and Space 

Agency went to the Hill, these committees conducted the requisite hearings. 

After addressing concerns about the NASA's relation to military space 

programs and patent rights, among other issues, the bill passed both Houses 

and was signed into law on 29 July 1958.30 The NACA had won the space 

assignment, but not quite in the form it had desired. 

Against their objections the Space Act replaced the old committee system 

with an administrative system subject to tighter executive branch control 

and legislative branch oversight. NACA Research Director Hugh Dryden, 

everyone's expected nominee for the post of Administrator, failed to impress 

Congress during the hearings on the Space Act and was passed over in favor 

of T. Keith Glennan, president of Case Institute of Technology and former 

27 
WALLOPS STATION 

member of the AEC. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

comprised more than just the NACA. The Vanguard division of the NRL 

soon transferred in, and NASA assumed the Army's contract with the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory in California. After a bureaucratic struggle, the von 

Braun team came over from the ABMA. The addition of these organizations, 

each with their own backgrounds and institutional cultures, and the 

assignment of an outsider to the top post (though Dryden accepted the #2 

position), virtually guaranteed that NASA would not be simply a renamed 

NACA. 31 

The early days of any organization usually involve a fair amount of chaos, 

and NASA's proved no exception. Integrating established components into 

a new structure while in the public spotlight and under the pressures of a 

perceived, if undeclared, space race with national survival seemingly at stake, 

promised to make Glennan's task a difficult one. His early impression of the 

NACA seemed consistent with that of many outside the agency." Although 

NACAhad on its roster some very fine technical people, it had been an agency 

protected from the usual in-fighting found on the Washington scene." 

Management he described as, "reasonably able," but they, "had relatively 

little experience in the management of large affairs. "32 An Ad Hoc Committee 

on NASA Organization, chaired by Ira Abbott, had been instituted in April 

1958 to formulate the NACA's vision of the new space agency. Glennan 

reviewed the Committee's report with Dryden and the top NACA leadership, 

then let a contract to a management consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., to 

review and expand upon it from a perspective outside the agency.33 The 

McKinsey Report took fire as having "rubber-stamped" the Abbott 

Committee report, a critique not altogether unwarranted. One of the many 

similarities turned out to be the role of Wallops in the new organization. 34 

In order to minimize interference with ongoing aerodynamic research 

(especially the militarily vital heat transfer and hypersonics projects) by the 

new space agency, the organizational plans called for placement of Langley, 

Ames, Lewis, and HSFS, under one branch of NASA specializing in 

aeronautical research. A new space research center, staffed by the Vanguard 

group and a substantial portion of NACA's "space enthusiasts," including 

Gilruth and many PARO veterans, would carry out the civil space program. 

Toward this end the plans called for the separation of Wallops from Langley 

and its situation as an appendage of this new center. 35 Indeed, the possibility 

of locating the new center at Wallops was briefly discussed. However, the 

lack of sufficient local infrastructure to support the proposed large facility, 

and the desire to keep the center close to Washington (for political and 

logistical reasons), doomed this prospect. Nevertheless, a facility "90%" 

devoted to space research could only be placed within the space portion of 

the agency. 36 

The perception of Wallops' role within NASA differed from that of either 

the old aeronautical centers or the new space centers. Wallops and both the 

28 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges constituted "service centers" in the eyes 

of NASA leaders, bases at which the research centers could conduct 

experiments, rather than independent centers conducting research of their 

own. Wallops and the NASA facilities at Cape Canaveral therefore appeared 

in the organizational charts directly under the space research center's 

supervision. 37 

NASA located the new space lab on a parcel of land outside Washington 

obtained from the Department of Agriculture. Operating first as Beltsville, 

then as Goddard Space Flight Center, the facility existed for several years 

largely as a paper organization, until the physical plant could be built. The 

Vanguard group continued to operate out of the Naval Research Laboratory, 

and Gilruth's Space Task Group remained at Langley. Though nominally a 

part of Goddard, "You'll find very few people today who'll realize they were 

working for Goddard back then, because they weren't." 38 Goddard, with 

buildings under construction and attempting to integrate disparate research 

programs in one organization, could not begin to direct and support Wallops 

operations as well. As late as April 1959 Space Center personnel were still in 

the process of planning their own "future activities at Wallops," and even 

though many researchers officially at Goddard, especially Gilruth, knew 

Wallops well, administration of the base could not efficiently be done from 

Beltsville. 39 NASA could not put its programs on hold to allow Goddard 

time to mature, and the projects at Wallops required expedition. 

The first NASA staff conference, held in April 1959, devoted one session to 

"A Critical Examination of the Organizational Requirements of NASA." A 

part of this sessio:1 examined the "Place of Wallops and NASA Staff at 

Canaveral in the Organization." NASA recognized that, "both Wallops and 

Canaveral will be concerned with firing the products not only of Beltsville 

but of other NASA activities." However, "it has not yet been firmly decided 

where in the organization Wallops and the NASA activity at Canaveral will 

report." 40 Perhaps, but the matter surely drew attention. The organizational 

chart released the following month shows Wallops as an independent entity, 

coequal with Goddard, under the direct jurisdiction of Abe Silverstein's Office 

of Space Flight Development at Headquarters. 41 (See appendix 2) 

While Wallops thus occupied a new place in the organization, Langley 

continued to provide administrative, logistical, and engineering support to 

Wallops for several years. Officially separate, Wallops for all practical 

purposes continued to operate much as it had all along, as an appendage of 

Langley. 42 The effect of Sputnik and the NACA to NASA upheaval therefore 

proved to be a curious mixture of transformation amid business as usual at 

the Wallops Station. It has been observed that the people who left work 30 

September 1958 NACA employees, returned to work on 1 October NASA 

employees. The launch log at Wallops does not reflect this change though; 

projects continued as before. 43 

29 
WALLOPS STATION 

Personnel from Langley and Wallops laid plans for a massive expansion 

of the facilities both on the island and on the Virginia mainland opposite it. 

The Station represented a prime national space asset at a time when such 

facilities seemed scarce. Congress appeared willing to fund almost anything 

to get the suddenly urgent program on track. PARO took advantage of this 

opportunity by preparing a wish list that included a causeway providing 

direct access to the island, launch equipment for Thor and Jupiter class liquidfueled boosters, and service and administrative buildings requiring the 

purchase of over 1000 acres of land. The estimated cost of the program ran 

to $24 million. 44 The House quickly appropriated $1,000,000 for enough 

rockets to maintain the schedule of operations at Wallops, and more seemed 

forthcoming. 45 

Reality soon intruded. Neither President Eisenhower or Representative 

Thomas intended to allow space projects to bust the budget. Despite the fact 

that, in these early days, "Congress always wanted to give us more money," 

NACA officials in April 1958 found themselves in a familiar setting: before 

the Senate Subcommittee on Independent Offices asking for a restoration of 

funding cuts made by the House. 46 Apparently some in Congress believed 

an incremental approach preferable to a crash program. Also, the military 

began to realize that NASA would not be just a re-named NACA, subservient 

to the armed forces' desires. Military planners originally worried that the 

creation of the NACA might draw funds away from their programs. NASA 

ignited those same concerns, only magnified, in a new generation of senior 

officers, who began to view the space agency as a competitor.47 

The first thing deleted from PARD's list was the capability to launch large 

liquid-fueled boosters from the island. The work load at Wallops remained 

heavy and showed httle sign of abating anytime soon. The plan called for a 

new launch complex consisting of two pads and a centrally located 

blockhouse from which to control firings. If one of these pads possessed the 

capability to support Thor or Jupiter rockets the civilian range would gain 

an immediate access to orbital spaceflight without having to coordinate 

activities with the military controlled ranges. Purely civilian science projects 

could be conducted without interference with, or from, sensitive activities 

at the Cape. 

Both the Congress and the military balked at this plan. Duplication of 

facilities, especially those requiring significant amounts of money to build, 

remained intolerable to most legislators, and with expensive complexes rising 

at the Cape and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Congress saw little need for 

such a large scale increase in Wallops' capacity. 48 Military witnesses 

reinforced this argument. In response to a direct question about approval of 

the Wallops expansion one admiral replied, "If they want to keep it on the 

small sized rockets scale-fine; but if they want to put satellites into space, 

it should not be done from Wallops Island." 49 The officers did not want small 

projects, like those that generally utilized sounding rockets, interfering with 

30 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

the operations of the large ranges, but, they also did not want Wallops to 

expand into a competitive position.' 0 

The Stever Committee, in the course of its evaluation of the NACA's space 

resources, examined Wallops and considered the role the base might play. 

They recognized that a launch site situated at a latitude of 37.5 degrees would 

not be practical for lunar or interplanetary flights. Though supportive of the 

plan to equip Wallops for boosters "up to the size of the Redstone," the 

Committee believed the range best suited "for special work on techniques 

and components in support of the [civilian space] program." The Atlantic 

and Pacific Missile Ranges (the Cape and Vandenberg) would serve as the 

nation's primary spaceports.s 1 This less than enthusiastic endorsement did 

not offset Congressional and military concerns, and the expansion underwent 

"re-evaluation. "s2 

Another reason for the re-evaluation came in the person of the 

Administrator of the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Elwood 

Quesada. In May 1958 the Air Force Special Weapons Center approached 

PARO requesting help with the ARGUS program. Briefly, this experimental 

program sought to determine the radiation characteristics of small atomic 

explosions in near space; how the radiation generated by an explosion would 

interact with the Earth's magnetic fields, rates of decay, and questions of 

that nature. The program required the detonation of a series of bombs at an 

altitude of 300 miles. Sounding rockets launched from three locations were 

needed to record the data. The nature of the experiment required a tight 

launch schedule as environmental readings just prior to, and immediately 

following the explosions (as well as a third launch after a predetermined 

period of time) were needed. The five stage rocket developed by PARO for 

the hypersonics program fit the needs of the Air Force, and Wallops set to 

work training launch crews and assembling rockets. Originally not intended 

to serve as a base for launchings during the operation, the fast approaching 

deadline mandated by an international ban on atomic air bursts (scheduled 

to go into force in September 1958) forced planners to forgo a second launch 

site outside the continental U.S., and included Wallops with Canaveral and 

Puerto Rico in the firing plan.s 1 

The program, conducted in August and early September, fulfilled Air Force 

expectations, and impressed the officers involved with the speed and skill 

of the Wallops operation. During the course of the launches, however, the 

military ordered civil air traffic rerouted to ensure safety and security. The 

usual procedures for obtaining range clearance for Wallops firings included 

plenty of advance notice to air traffic controllers, notice that this project could 

not provide. Because of this, "the pilots and the airlines 'raised the roof,"' 

and incited a backlash not against the Air Force, but against Wallops. 54 

Difficulties concerning clearance for long-range firings had been occurring 

for some time as Wallops' capability grew, and the imminent expansion of 

the base intensified the problem. The diversion of flights during the ARGUS 

31 
WALLOPS STATION 

support launches brought the matter to a head. Administrator Quesada 

suggested restricting future long-range operations to the Cape and scaling 

back the expansion at Wallops. PARO dealt with this problem in a time tested 

way; they invited their critics to take a tour of the facilities at the base. 55 

Civil Aeronautics Administration head James T. Pyle and a group of his 

associates visited the island on 24 November 1958, observed two launches, 

and listened to Shortal and Krieger detail NASA's plans for Wallops. 56 On 8 

December a NASA group which included Buckley met with Quesada and 

an FAA contingent which included three CAA members who had taken the 

tour. "The CAA decidedly was on NASA side during this discussion, ... One 

of the CAA men stayed after the meeting to tell General Quesada that the 

use of AMR for the Civilian Space Program would be far worse a problem 

for the CAA than if the load was divided by the use of Wallops Island." 

Quesada, described as "versed on missile operation, aerodynamic research," 

relented saying, "he was not going to oppose NASA programs," but indicated 

that a workable system of coordinating long-range firings must be 

developed. 57 Such an agreement was reached in January 1959.58 

While NASA secured an amicable solution to the problem of range 

interference with both the FAA and the Navy (concerned about interference 

with their training areas), the combination of this problem and economic 

factors led to a decision to drop the large liquid-fueled boosters from Wallops' 

expansion program. 59 The planned administrative separation of the base 

from Langley, and the increase in programs on tap still required a large 

acquisition of land for offices, shops, tracking stations, and housing, even 

without the Thors and Jupiters. 

Even before NASA's debut, procedures commenced to appropriate acreage 

on the mainland opposite the island. Station personnel made contact with a 

number of residents to obtain permission to conduct surveys, and with local 

lawyers to conduct title searches. 60 Wallops' Administrative Officer Joseph 

Robbins recalled the bad feelings generated at the time: "These people were 

principally farmers, and they would tell us point blank, 'We don't want you 

here."' Not only "unhappy" about losing land, the farmers believed that an 

expansion of Wallops operations would drive up the cost of labor in the 

area. 61 

While the Wallops personnel tried to smooth ruffled feathers, several 

people contacted their Congressional representatives and wrote letters to 

the local newspapers. A series of polite letters passed back and forth between 

Administrator Glennan, various other NASA officials, and concerned 

politicians, including powerful Virginia Senator Harry Byrd. 62 The staff both 

at Headquarters and at the base understood the situation and sympathized 

with the local resident's problems, but the NASA program lacked firm 

definition. No one knew for sure how much land would ultimately be needed 

for the Station, and though assured that, "we would not be hiring farm help," 

rumors about the effect of the expansion on the local economy ran wild. 63 

32 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

On 9 December 1958 letters went out to twelve individuals notifying them 

that NASA intended to take possession of plots of land ranging from 11 to 

450 acres in size. 64 

At approximately the same time these letters went out, Wallops personnel 

received the unexpected news that the Navy intended to close the 

Chincoteague Naval Air Station (CNAS). An outpost of the Norfolk Naval 

Air Station, CNAS had been expanded by the Navy in November 1942 as 

part of the early war build-up. In October 1943 the Bureau of Ordnance 

arrived, and by 1946 added their Naval Air Ordnance Test Station to the 

base. After World War II the base served mainly as a carrier aircraft training 

facility. 65 

Spread out over 2000 acres, CNAS was in the midst of renovation when 

the Sputniks flew. The Navy lengthened one of the three runways from 8,000 

to 10,000 feet and constructed several new test facilities, buildings, and a 

new hangar. A fiscal 1957 appropriation allotted $170,000 for continuing the 

upgrades. 66 The Bureau of Ordnance requested permanent transfer of the 

north end of Wallops Island on 5 May 1958 in reciprocation for the naval 

transfer of an NACA used portion of Moffett Field to the Ames Lab, a request 

which the NACA denied. 67 Congress refused to allocate a requested $770,000 

in fiscal 1958 for CNAS, however, and the Navy decided to economize by 

closing the base. 68 

The potential effects of the closure on Wallops' operations and the 

surrounding community concerned all in the area. PARD relied on CNAS to 

provide emergency medical, air terminal, and weather fax services. The 

military maintained a restricted airspace zone around Chincoteague which 

not only covered the NACA operations, but gave PARD an ally when 

attempts to alter civil air routes occurred. 69 One of the primary factors for 

choosing the Wallops site had been the presence of CNAS. The loss of jobs 

and money understandably worried local residents, and served to mute 

criticism of the expansion of the rocket range. 70 

The advantages offered by acquiring the Navy base did not take long to 

dawn upon planners at NASA Headquarters. The administrative facilities, 

shops, and needed acreage, to say nothing of the airfield itself, could be 

obtained for the proverbial song. After all, the Space Act authorized the 

transfer of facilities needed for the space program to NASA, and the obvious 

economy of recycling CNAS, and saving at least some local jobs would 

undoubtedly impress Congress. Glennan and his staff moved quickly, and 

found the Navy receptive to the transfer. 71 On 22 January 1959 Glennan 

formally requested transfer of the base to NASA. At first, the Navy wished 

to make continued access to the airfield a prerequisite for the transfer. Fearing 

potential electrical interference with the new, highly sensitive radars planned 

for Wallops, NASA refused this stipulation, the Navy relented, and the 

transfer officially took place on 30 June 1959.n 

33 
WALLOPS STATION 

Robert Krieger, acting for NASA, accepts Chincoteague Air Station from Navy 

Captain Toth in change of command ceremonies, June 30, 1959. 

The acquisition of CNAS shifted the perspective of many local residents. 

"The local newspapers were optimistic about a large influx of industry and 

the possibility of a second Cape Canaveral on the Eastern Shore." 73 Two 

days after the public announcement of the impending transfer NASA sent 

letters to most of those expecting to lose land, notifying them that, due to 

the transfer, NASA no longer needed their land. 74 "We changed [after the 

announcement of the transfer] from somebody who was no good, to 

somebody who was real good, because all these people who got laid off all 

of a sudden were looking for jobs." 75 Unfortunately, many of the high 

expectations of the community proved premature and too optimistic. NASA 

already realized that a "second Cape -Canaveral" would not be built at 

Wallops. Agency officials discussed the transfer during their weekly staff 

meeting on 6 February 1959: "A number of private and public bodies are 

concerning themselves with the full utilization of Chincoteague in order to 

minimize the economic impact on the community .... The consensus was 

that NASA should firm up the specific restrictions which must be placed on 

other uses as required by the technical requirements of our operations. To 

the extent other proposed uses are consistent with these requirements, NASA 

should be as cooperative as possible." 76 

Some resistance to the transfer arose at Wallops itself, as the amount of 

land and facilities to be acquired far exceeded the amount required. 77 

Everyone involved knew that, for the short-term at least, NASA operations 

would not rival the Navy's in scope. Accordingly, Headquarters authorized 

Wallops "to make firm commitments for the hiring of not to exceed twenty-five 

34 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

(25) of the Navy employees of [CNAS]." The civilian complement of the base 

numbered around 76078 • This small number of hires disappointed residents, 

and generated a formal complaint charging racial discrimination to boot. 

The complaint, filed on behalf of an "anonymous individual" by the 

Worchester County (Maryland) Civil League, came to the attention of both 

Administrator Glennan and the President's Commission on Government 

Employment Policy. Maryland Congressman Thomas Johnson also took an 

interest in the case. 79 An investigation and subsequent report satisfied the 

Committee, as well as the Civic League and Johnson, for no appeal seems to 

have been made. Most likely the expansion of Wallops' operations created a 

sufficient number of jobs, "NASA 1960 plans contemplate an increase of 

about one hundred in the staff at Chincoteague," to ameliorate the situation. 80 

At the least, no other such charge against Wallops appears in the 

Administrator's Monthly Progress Report during the duration of that 

document's publication. A number of such charges regarding other NASA 

facilities do appear, and the Headquarter's Office of the General Council 

developed an employment non-discrimination policy program in 1960. On 

28 September 1960 the Administrator, "submitted a report to the Secretary 

of the Cabinet and wrote a personal letter to the head of each NASA field 

installation commenting on NASA's program and urging continued effort 

in this area." 81 

The acquisition of CNAS served to bring about the return of Robert Krieger 

to offices at the Station. The imminent separation of Langley and Wallops 

(after the loss of many of its "space enthusiasts" to the Space Task Group, 

Langley reorganized the remnants of PARO into the Applied Materials and 

Physics Division in December 1959), and the improving local conditions 

brought Krieger back to the Eastern Shore. He moved into the commanding 

officer's quarters of Chincoteague immediately following the transfer of the 

base, and set to work reorganizing his charge. 82 

The Mechanical Services Unit, which formerly reported to the Mechanical 

Services Division at Langley, became the Technical Services Division with 

William Grant as Chief. The Administrative Unit, which likewise previously 

reported to Langley's Administrative Officer, also became an autonomous 

Division under Joseph Robbins. The Research Section, prior to the separation, 

the only unit under Krieger's direct control, became the Flight Test Division 

with John Palmer serving as Chief.BJ While these new divisions continued 

to rely on Langley for an uninterrupted flow of support, they gradually 

became capable of functioning on their own. "Langley didn't just shed us, 

they supported us completely, ... , they didn't divorce us until we picked up 

our own capability, .... " 84 This continuity of support proved crucial to 

Wallops. Events moved quickly and many important projects accelerated 

their pace during this period. 

The expansion project at Wallops came under the general heading of 

"Project 2080." This project, one of the earliest commenced by NASA, covered 

35 
WALLOPS STATION 

almost all aspects of the physical buildup of the Station. 85 The inheritance of 

CNAS allowed the reprogramming of funds from land acquisition, 

construction of mainland facilities, and architect's services, to road 

improvements around the Station, and completion and modification of 

buildings at the naval base. 86 This reprogramming resulted in an overall 

savings of $2.25 million. Scrapping plans for the large boosters saved 

approximately $1 million, and "lower estimates of instrumentation costs," 

spared another million. The cost of the expansion project finally settled at 

$21 million. 87 Wallops' portion of NASA's construction and equipment budget 

for fiscal 1959 far exceeded that of any other field center, a situation that 

never again occurred. 88 

Two urgent parts of project 2080 began almost before the project was 

approved. A causeway allowing paved access to the island remained an 

unfulfilled dream from the establishment of the base in 1945. Wallops 

planners became determined that come what may, the causeway would be 

built, and the ferries (one of which caught fire in 1953, injuring 14 people) 

and seaplanes (one of which crashed in 1954, slightly injuring the pilot, and 

engineer Marvin McGoogan) would be retired. 89 The other task concerned 

the extension of the seawall protecting the equipment on the island. Only a 

few feet above sea level, storms easily damaged facilities on the island. The 

NACA fought an on-going battle against the sea and held their own. The 

expansion of launch facilities and damage to the existing seawall required 

NASA to move fast to protect their investment. 90 Despite the funding increase 

to implement Project 2080, local contractors did not experience quite the boom 

they had anticipated. The scale of many of the tasks involved in building up 

the Station simply proved too large for local businesses to handle. While 

smaller contracts often did go to local companies, the big construction 

contracts by necessity went to large engineering firms not located on the 

Eastern Shore. 91 Also the window of opportunity for funding big contracts 

at Wallops turned out to be brief. NASA requested no funds for construction 

at the base in the fiscal 1960 budget. Hugh Dryden testified that, "At 

Chincoteague there are, ... , buildings way beyond anything we can foresee 

for the use of NASA." 92 

Expansion at the base involved more than just expansion of the physical 

plant. Plans also called for modernized, more capable equipment. The 

important tracking and data relay equipment figured prominently in the 

extension of Wallops' space role. Indeed, the sensitivity of the new equipment 

called for carefully controlling growth in the immediate vicinity in order to 

ensure optimum performance. 93 Three radars incorporating dishes 60 feet in 

diameter arose on the mainland opposite the island. Designed and built by 

MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, two of the three belonged to MIT and operated 

with funding from ARPA, while NASA operated the third. The NASA dish, 

designated "Spandar," provided an increased tracking capability required 

by the continuing hypersonics program and the new space projects. 94 

36 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

Telemetry effectiveness improved with the addition of FM/FM, high-gain, 

and digital systems which vastly increased the amount of data recovered 

from each flight, and also streamlined the data reduction process. 95 New range 

control equipment included a refined launch timing system, an enhanced 

safety command destruct system, and better optical tracking equipment 

(telescopes and cameras). 96 

Despite the cancellation of the large boosters from Wallops' plans, 

construction of the new launch complex proceeded. The pad intended for 

Thor and Jupiter use retained its importance, albeit in a different way than 

originally intended. The need to meet the accelerated launch schedule 

provided sufficient justification for building the pad. The second pad in the 

new complex, intended for a different vehicle, also became an integral 

component in the program. 

PARO researchers working on the hypersonics program successfully 

utilized more powerful booster designs. Their success with the five stage, 

Mach 15 vehicle led to a Mach 18 vehicle and studies on ways to expand 

capabilities further. 97 As a matter of routine PARO engineers kept abreast of 

new solid motor designs under development by different manufacturers. 

Unlike many of the payloads, Langley personnel could not produce the solid 

motors they depended upon. They installed electrical systems, aerodynamic 

structures, and coupled the motors together in a multitude of combinations, 

but they lacked the facilities to cast the propellant. They obtained motors, 

usually with the help of the military, from commercial producers. When one 

of these companies produced a new or uprated design, PARO checked its 

characteristics for applicability to the flight research program. In late 1957, 

after analyzing several modified motors (including the X-248, slated for the 

Vanguard launcher), the engineers realized that a four stage combination of 

these existing motors could give them an orbital capability. The payload 

would be small, true, but in these early days the ability to put anything into 

orbit meant advancing knowledge. The fact that some questioned the ability 

of any solid-fueled vehicle to reach orbit also provided a challenge. 98 

Though inexpensive compared to the large liquid-fueled systems, the new 

solid design represented a substantial increase in cost over the usual boosters 

in use at Wallops. The public competition between the Army (von Braun, 

Jupiter) and the Navy (NRL, Vanguard) teams working to launch a satellite 

made the PARO design unwelcome. 99 It stayed on Langley's drawing boards 

until mid-1958 when the Air Force showed interest in a new sounding rocket 

to exceed the performance of the existing Javelin booster. 100 PARO proposed 

the new solid booster, which could perform as either a sounding rocket or 

an orbital launcher, and the Air Force accepted. Although not all in NASA 

greeted it with enthusiasm, the "Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test System," 

or Scout, became a long-term member of the agency's stable of boosters. 101 

The Air Force eventually decided to launch their version of the "poor man's 

rocket" (known as the Blue Scout) from Canaveral, but field level interest in 

37 
WALLOPS STATION 

the booster's potential, especially among the space science planners at 

Goddard, solidified the program at Langley and Wallops. Work on the island's 

Launch Area #3, the control center, and the upgraded tracking systems 

necessary to control a launch to orbit, culminated with the 1 July 1960 launch 

of the first Scout test vehicle. A minor problem gave this first shot a "partially 

successful" rating, but moving from initial contracts to first launch in about 

twenty months represented an accomplishment in itself. The Langley 

engineers soon fixed the problem, and Wallops obtained a significant increase 

in its operational capability. 102 

As a result of this new capability, a dispute arose within NASA 

Headquarters over just who should have operational control of the Wallops 

facility. NASA's original structure included an Office of Aeronautical and 

Space Research, to which the old NACA centers (except Wallops) reported, 

and an Office of Space Flight Development to which the space centers 

reported. The transfer of von Braun's team from the Army to NASA, a 

decision made by President Eisenhower on 21 October 1959, caused a 

reorganization of the Space Flight Office. Abe Silverstein, Director of the 

new Office of Space Flight Programs (OSFP), retained three of his 

subdivisions while the fourth separated to become the Office of Launch 

Vehicle Programs (OLVP) under Don Ostrander, an Air Force general 

formerly associated with the ARPA. 103 The Administrator and his deputies 

felt that booster development in general, and the Saturn program in 

particular, needed a more prominent position within the NASA organization. 

The new Marshall Space Flight Center with the von Braun team, the Saturn 

program, and NASA's facilities at Cape Canaveral (directed by one of von 

Braun's associates), became Ostrander's responsibility. Silverstein controlled 

Goddard, the Space Task Group (Project Mercury), and administered NASA's 

contract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Wallops' position in this structure 

became a matter of debate. 104 

A 13 July 1959 Headquarters "Summary of Budget Policy Decisions" 

seemed to leave little doubt about Wallops. "It should be completely 

understood at all levels that the Wallops Station is an operational service 

facility and that engineering development program~ are not a part of the 

station's mission. In view of the fact that Wallops is a service installation 

under the management of Space Flight Development, it is NASA policy that 

requirements for Wallops operation and support from A&SR or from outside 

NASA will be made through the SFD headquarters channel." The assumption 

was made that, "after the first few test Scouts, Wallops will be responsible 

for the assemble check out and launch of Scout vehicles. Payload check out 

will be accomplished by the cognizant development group." 105 

When Ostrander organized OLVP in November, however, the imminent 

acquisition of an orbital capability at Wallops indicated to him that the Office 

having responsibility for such launch vehicles, as well as NASA launch 

operations at the Cape and coordination of NASA operations at the Pacific 

38 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

Missile Range, should also take charge of NASA's other range. Silverstein 

disagreed, and a 22 December meeting between the two attempted to ironout the question of Wallops' position. "DSFD made a strong plea that W.I. 

operations remain research oriented and, therefore, should remain under 

his cognizance .... Agreement on the assignment and responsibility for W. I. 

was not completely agreed to without reservation by DVD0." 106 

Silverstein acquiesced on Scout and agreed that the Langley-developed 

booster, and the Goddard-developed Delta, would be transferred to the 

Marshall center after test flights were complete. Prior to this Scout was slated 

to go to Goddard after the fourth test flight. Additionally, he agreed that, 

"all sounding rocket developments [are] to be the responsibility of DVD0." 107 

The research oriented Silverstein, formerly of Lewis Lab, suddenly had to 

contend with a challenge from the non-NACA portion of NASA interested 

more in development. Though consigning such developmental issues to 

Ostrander, Silverstein insisted that, "Sounding rocket launchings would 

remain the responsibility of [Goddard]." 108 He fought to keep Wallops, and 

utilized an interesting argument in the process. "Dr. Silverstein pointed out 

that the launch facilities are a small part of the Wallops installation and that 

the installation primarily exists as an instrumented range." 109 Wallops 

neighbors, anticipating another Cape Canaveral at the base, and many 

civilian researchers looking to Wallops for access to space, would have found 

that statement curious. 

Wallops remained within the OSFP jurisdiction and continued the process 

of establishing an independent administration. The close ties with Langley 

continued throughout this transition, despite the situation of the "mother 

lab" in a separate NASA division. Appointment of budget, claims, and safety 

officers, as well as officers to certify various formal actions, took precedence 

during the transfer. Recently hired staff from the naval base filled many of 

these positions. no Wallops also received the manuals, rate schedules, forms, 

and other paper paraphernalia that fuel a bureaucracy. While the NASA 

employees of today may complain about the increase in their paperwork, 

such red tape did not spring into existence overnight. Administrative 

independence required the Wallops staff to execute procedures previously 

left to Langley. 111 The two staffs, used to working with each other, 

accomplished the transfer with a minimum of disruption to the research 

program. Langley Director H.J.E. Reid set the tone of relations in a memo to 

his former employee, Krieger. "Langley shares your desire, ... , to effect an 

orderly transitional period .... We shall be pleased to render whatever support 

we can during this period and for as long as necessary to insure continuance 

of your programs in the most efficient manner possible." 112 To be sure, 

Wallops remained small enough to escape the full onslaught of bureaucracy, 

and informal lines of communication still provided a quick means of 

resolving problems in these pre-Apollo days. Issues regarding patent and 

legal councils, for example, continued to be handled at Langley as Krieger 

39 
WALLOPS STATION 

deemed the need for such services at Wallops insufficient to warrant fulltime positions at the base. 113 In March 1964, five years after formal separation 

of the facilities, Langley agreed to assist Wallops in the evaluation of the 

proposals for automatic data processing equipment. 114 

Adding to the administrative jumble was the fact that Wallops received 

operational direction and funding from multiple sources. While Silverstein's 

OSFP provided nominal oversight of the base and its flight operations, the 

tracking and data relay functions came under the purview of Edmund 

Buckley. In 1959 Buckley moved from Langley's IRD to NASA Headquarters 

to oversee the important tracking and data acquisition function for the space 

agency. As Assistant Director of Flight Operations under Silverstein, Buckley 

became "the contact for Wallops" at Headquarters. 115 Buckley's office grew 

more autonomous until, in 1961, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 

became an separate Headquarters division. All the while Buckley, ever "a 

great friend" of Wallops, watched over the radars and telemeters at the base, 

cleared their funding, defended them before Congress, and generally saw to 

it that the equipment was kept modern and fully utilized. 116 

This meant that the Wallops staff not only provided services to a plethora 

of customers, but also answered to multiple segments of the NASA hierarchy, 

just as they had previously answered to differing divisions within Langley. 

They prepared proposed budgets, and justifications, in components at the 

base, then worked with the appropriate Headquarters office to finalize a 

given component. Then Headquarters would clear the budget with the 

Executive branch Bureau of the Budget. Once approved by the President, 

the Headquarters staff went before Congress. In this early period, Wallops 

personnel rarely testified before Congress, hence the value of friends like 

Dryden and Buckley who did. 117 The loose informal procedure (at their level) 

gave Wallops flexibility in planning operations. This promoted efficiency 

but impressed some in the established bureaucracy as an undisciplined way 

to operate. 

Executive and Legislative desire to reign in the NACA constituted one 

consideration during the planning for NASA. 118 The General Services 

Administration conducted a "preliminary review ... of stores operations," at 

several NASA installations, including Wallops, in July and August 1959.u9 

In August Headquarters audited radar usage at the base, and in December 

surveyed use of overtime.12° In February 1960, an inventory control 

conference was held and included Ames, Lewis, and Wallops, which became 

the first to enact NASA's inventory control system. 121 During the NACA era, 

Wallops would have taken little notice of such proceedings, leaving them to 

Langley. Now, independence required Wallops to deal with these affairs. 

The continued support of Langley, and the respect of highly placed" friends" 

helped Wallops through this hectic time. 

Krieger and company needed all the support they could get. A flood of 

research projects, released and made respectable by Sputnik, began to pour 

40 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

into NASA, and many of them required the utilization of the Station. The 

customer base, and staff, were growing so quickly that by late 1960 former 

PARO Chief Shortal sent Langley engineers to Wallops to acquaint the 

personnel at the rocket range with, "the type of research being conducted 

by AMPD at Wallops." 122 Langley projects like Scout and Trailblazer were 

joined by projects from other sources. Goddard initiated its space science 

program, Project Mercury testing began, and NASA encouraged universities 

to utilize the range. 123 Military projects did not suddenly disappear with the 

formation of the civilian NASA. While the creation of ARPA and the general 

elevation of the country's missile research facilities served to make Wallops 

somewhat less vital to the armed forces, military programs continued to 

come to the base. In 1958 the blast loads program (which utilized large 

explosive charges to simulate atomic airbursts) started testing an upgraded 

facility, which commenced operations in 1960.124 Preflight Jet ran tests of B58 bomber models for the Air Force, and tests of the Navy's Polaris missile 

also required this facility, as well as both rocket model and helium gun tests. 125 

Sonic boom research flights offshore used the new radar systems that were 

coming on line. 126 

During Congressional testimony, NASA Director of Business 

Administration, Albert Siepert, answered questions concerning possible 

adverse effects of the civilian program at Wallops on military testing by 

stating, "If they [the DOD] wish to use [Wallops] we would be happy to 

work out arrangements." 127 It would appear that NASA had plenty of 

practice making such arrangements. However, in November 1959 the Air 

Research and Development Command (ARDC, an Air Force organization) 

liaison at Langley recommended stationing a liaison at Wallops, and 

throughout this period the military continued to supply boosters and other 

equipment to the Station. 128 

Not all proposed projects actually flew from the base, though. Safety 

continued to be a prime consideration in spite of the rapid pace. A Lewis 

proposal to test an engine utilizing hydrogen-fluorine fuel at Wallops posed 

a serious danger due to the toxic nature of the chemicals. Lewis researchers 

felt using the isolated island minimized the hazards of investigating the 

potential of this engine, hazards which would require the complete 

evacuation of the island during each test and a westerly wind to carry the 

dangerous exhaust gasses offshore. Concerns voiced by Krieger, and 

increasing research into hydrogen-oxygen engines led Abe Silverstein to 

cancel these test plans. 129 

The culmination of Wallops expansion came with the launch of Explorer 

IX on 16 February 1961. An inflatable sphere designed to study atmospheric 

density, this satellite became the first to ride into orbit atop an all solidfueled vehicle, and made Wallops the third U.S. range with an orbital 

capability. 130 Enlarged, modernized, and independent, Wallops, like the rest 

of NASA, entered the 1960's anticipating a bright future. 

41 
WALLOPS STATION 

NOTES 


1. 	 Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space 

Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), 60. 

2. 	 The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA, the von Braun team) placed high 

priority on orbital flight, and pursued Project Orbiter. See: Frederick I. Ordway 

and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979), 

374-76. The Naval Research Laboratory represented the U.S. in the IGY effort 

with their Project Vanguard; see Green and Lomask, 25-56. RAND Corporation, 

originally an Air Force study group that became an independent research 

corporation, produced a series of reports detailing differing types of satellites 

throughout the 1950's. See, for example, Merton E. Davis and William R. Harris, 

RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and 

Related U.S. Space Technology (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1988). Different 

NACA space aspirations will be discussed later in this chapter. It should be 

noted, however, that none of these projects created much interest outside of 

their 	own project offices. 

3. 	 Bulkeley, 67-9 for the Soviet nuclear program. Green and Lomask, 192 97; 

McDougall, 131; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 376; for professional reaction to 

Sputnik. The reaction of those in the business seems to have been more irritation 

and frustration than unanticipated, out-of-the-blue shock. 

4. 	 Not only the satellites went into orbit on the Russian shots, but also the spent 

final stage of the launch vehicles. Green and Lomask, 194; McDougall, 150. 

5. 	 Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Knowledge and 

Power: Essays on Science and Government, ed. Sanford A. Lakoff (New York: The 

Free Press, 1966), 190. See also, McDougall, 150-51. PSAC had been part of the 

Office of Defense Mobilization until the Sputniks caused Eisenhower to move 

it into the White House. Killian, from MIT, had headed a Technological 

Capabilities Panel for the Science Advisory Committee in 1954 (Roland, I: 280); 

and Holaday, "had been responsible for the missile programs of the Department 

of Defense, ... ," (Bulkeley, 10-11). 

6. 	 Schoettle, 191; McDougall, 138-48, 

7. 	 Schoettle, 185-86; McDougall, 149-56. 

8. 	 Schoettle, 222-23. 

9. 	 Green and Lomask, 203-12, for the Vanguard failure. McDougall, 153-64, for 

Eisenhower's reactions during this period. 

10. 	 Roland, I: 296-99; Schoettle, 193-99. 

11. 	 Schoettle, 199-212, covers the services' differing points of view. Ordway and 

Sharpe, 382-86, for Explorer 1. Von Braun's team lost the IGY assignment to the 

Navy's Vanguard team, but quietly continued working toward the goal of 

launching a satellite. After the Vanguard explosion, they received permission 

to proceed on the project. The term applications satellite refers to a spacecraft 

with a specific, non research mission, such as communications or navigation 

satellites. The Polaris program involves the development and deployment of a 

submarine-launched nuclear missile. 

42 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

12. 	 Schoettle, 228-29; McDougall, 173. For Eisenhower's Farewell Address, in which 

he warns against the "military industrial complex," see U.S., President, P11blic 

Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal 

Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1953- ), Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, 1960 61, 1035-40. 

13. 	 Shortal, 523; Roland, I: 290. 

14. 	 Roland, I: 290. 

15. 	 Virginia P. Dawson, "The Push from Within; Lewis Research Center's Transition 

to Space," in A Spacefaring Nation: Perspectives on American Space History and 

Policy, ed. Martin J.Collins and Sylvia D. Fries, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 

Institute Press, 1991 ), 168. See also: Roland, I: 252-54; Hansen, 376. 

16. 	 Schoettle, 219, for quotation. See also, Roland, I: 259 81, 290-92. 

17. 	 Dawson, 172-75. 

18. 	 Hansen, 367-81; Hartman, 266-70. A lifting body is an aerodynamic shape that 

integrates the fuselage and wings in the production of the lifting force; the 

Space Shuttle is an example of a lifting body. 

19. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape la: 380. 

20. 	 Robert R. Gilruth, "From Wallops Island to Project Mercury, 1945-1958: A 

Memoir," in History of Rocketry and Astrona11tics, American Astronautical Society 

History Series, vol. 7, part 2, ed. R. Cargill Hall (San Diego, CA.: American 

Astronautical Society, 1986), 462. Dr. Hansen also noted this quotation on page 

373 of his work. 

21. 	 Minute of Meeting, NACA Committee on Aerodynamics, 18-20 November 1957, 

in folder "Preliminary Space Flight Expansion Notes," Floyd L. Thompson 

Papers, Langley Research Center His tori ca 1 Archives. Quotation is on page 17. 

This record group is hereafter cited as FLT Papers. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James 

M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project 

Merrnry (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), 56, describes the Committee on 

Aerodynamics as "the most influential of NACA's various technical 

committees." 

22. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, lnq11iry into Satellite and 

Missile Programs, Hearings before a s11bcommittcc of tile Senate Co11m1ittec on Armed 

Services, 85th Cong.1st sess., 5711-255, p. 127, for Doolittle's testimony. Ml'mo 

for the Press, "The NACA's Pilotless Aircraft Rl'search Station, Wallops Island, 

Virginia," 17 May 1951, in folder "Wallops and Related Material," in the Milton 

Ames Collection, Langley Research Center Historical Archives. This record 

group is hereafter cited as MA Collection. 

23. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Associate Administrator Langley, 12 

December 1957, in folder "Wallops, January 55 - February 58," in RCA 181-l(C). 

Robert Gutheim, Chair of the Committee, "repeatedly gave assurances that 

because of the 'well recognized uniqueness and importance of NACA's work' 

nothing would be done to interfere with the NACA." For other groups see: 

"Robbins," Oral History Interview, Tape la: 170. 

24. 	 Roland, I: 292, II: 458; Hansen, 376-77. There is a photograph of the Stever 

Committee on Wallops Island in Shortal, 592. The Committee inspected the 

base on 28 October 1958. 

43 
WALLOPS STATION 

25. 	 Report, "NACA Research into Space," 10 February 1958, in folder "NACA 

Documents - 1958," in box "Administrative History: Pre-NASA Documents, 

NACA/DOD," in NHO. Quotation is on page 6. This report is an extract from 

an originally classified report with the same name issued in December 1957. A 

copy of this earlier report is in folder "January- December 57," Wallops box #4, 

WFFRC. Other pertinent reports include: "A National Research Program for 

Space Technology," "Resolution on the Subject of Space Flight," (both in FLT 

Papers); "A Program for Expansion of NACA Research into Space Flight 

Technology with Estimates of the Staff and Facilities Required," (reprinted in 

Roland, II: 730-64); and Air Mail, Floyd L. Thompson to Paul Purser, 29 January 

1958, "Contemplated Expansion of Langley and W.I. Facilities Related to Space 

Flight Research Programs," (in folder "January - May 58," Wallops box #4). 

26. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, 

Hearings before the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration on H.R. 

11881,85th. Cong., 2nd. sess., 5804-15H, p. 404. The chart on this page gives the 

90% figure. This figure recurs throughout the period and was arrived at by 

classification of all rocket launches, regardless of mission, as "space related 

activity." See also, Shortal, 593. 

27. 	 Memorandum for the President, "Organization for Civil Space Programs," The 

President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, 5 March 1958, 

reprinted in James R. Killian, Sputnik. Scientists, and Eisenhower (Cambridge, 

MA.: MIT Press, 1977), Appendix #3, quotation on page 281. See also, McDougal, 

171. 

28. 	 Ibid. 

29. 	 Schoettle, 229-31; McDougal, 169-76. These special committees later became 

standing. 

30. 	 Schottle, 260-61. This work provides an in-depth examination of the passage of 

the Space Act. The Space Act is reprinted in Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative 

History of NASA. 1958-1963 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), Appendix A. 

31. 	 Rosholt, 40-48; Roland, I: 299-300; McCurdy, 11-25. 

32. 	 T. Keith Glennan, The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration: Events and Impressions as Recalled by T. Keith Glennan. 1st 

Administrator of NASA (Cleveland: 1964), I: 6, in folder 002967 "Glennan Diary 

(1958-January 1960)," in file "Administrators, Glennan," in NHO. 

33. 	 Rosholt, 39-42, 48-50. Copies of both the Abbott Committee and McKinsey & 

Co. reports are in the NASA History Office. Neither directly discusses Wallops. 

34. 	 Rosholt, 33, for rubber-stamp criticism. It would be interesting to determine 

whose copy of the McKinsey Report found its way into NASA's archive. There 

are many, often critical, handwritten marginal notes apparently written by 

whomever reviewed the report, one of which states, "This is text book stuff ­

and not worth paying McKinsey to summarize for us." (Opposite page 2-2). 

35. 	 Shortal, 615. Also, charts in the Abbott and McKinsey reports depict Wallops 

under the space center's jurisdiction. See also, Rosholt, 48-50. 

36. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 190; Shortal, 616-17. 

44 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

37. 	 Rosholt, 334-37, reprints eight organizational charts dated 18 July 1958 to 23 

March 1959, all of which show Wallops listed under the space projects center. 

The final two charts, dated 29 January and 23 March 1959, also place operations 

at the Cape under this center (at this time NASA rented facilities at the Cape 

from the Air Force). The original charts are in NHO. 

38. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 497, statement made by Abraham Spinak. See 

also Rosholt, 54-55. The Space Task Group will be discussed in further detail in 

Chapter 3, below. 

39. 	 Letter, G. E. MacVeigh to R. W. Hooker, 2 April 1959, requesting "various 

prints of different Wallops Island activities," so that the Beltsville Space Center 

could "plan our future activities." In folder "Special Files, April - June 59," in 

RGA181-l(S). 

40. 	 Minutes of Session IV, NASA Staff Conference 2-5 April 1959, in box "NASA 

Staff Conferences," in NHO. The list of attendees at this conference includes 

Reid and Thompson from Langley, Defrance from Ames, Sharp from Lewis, 

Williams from HSFS, Pickering from JPL, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Research and Development (Horner). None of the staff from Wallops 

were invited despite the fact that the meeting was held in Williamsburg, 

Virginia. 

41. 	 Rosholt, 338, for reprint of chart dated 1 May 1959. 

42. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 415-580; "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 182 390; Shortal, 

597-615. 

43. 	 Rosholt, 44, for observation about NASA employees. The launch log consists 

of two ledger books found in the Wallops Public Information Office. The entries 

are handwritten by John (Jack) Palmer. 

44. 	 Shortal, 596. Supporting documentation can be found in folder VIII "NASA 

Budget: FY 1959, FY 1960," in file tray "Budget, General Policy Planning, 

Chronologic, miscellaneous, FY 1959, FY 1960, FY 1961," in NHO. This file tray 

hereafter cited as "file tray NASA Budget." See also: U.S., Congress, Senate, 

Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, Construction of Aeronautical and 

Space Research Facilities by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, S. 

Rept. 2076 to accompany H.R. 13450, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5807-315. 

45. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental 

Appropriations Bill for 1958. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 5801-27H. On page 138-9 Dryden notes 

that prior to Sputnik the military services had been providing motors to Wallops 

"without reimbursement." However, just when PARO needed more motors, 

"an internal accounting system in Defense," made it necessary for NACA to 

pay for the rockets. 

46. 	 McDougall, 201, for quotation from Glennan's diary. U.S., Congress, Senate, 

Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations,for Fiscal Year 

1959. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 

11574, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 5804-305, 170-79. 

47. 	 McDougall, 195-206. For concerns about NACA's creation see Roland, I: 5-25. 

45 
WALLOPS STATION 

48. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, 

Authorizing Construction for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

Hearings before the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration 

on H.R. 13619, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5808-0IH, 28-29; U.S., Congress, House, 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1961 NASA Authorization. Hearings 

before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R.10246, 86th Cong., 

2nd. sess., 6002-17H, 46-47, for examples of testimony regarding facilities 

duplication. Shortal, 147, for NACA refusal to establish a West Coast range. 

49. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Astronautics and Space Science, 

Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities, hearings before a 

Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Astronautics and Space Science, S. Rept. 

806, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5908-255, 310-11. 

50. 	 Ibid. 

51. 	 Stever Committee Working Paper, "Launching Sites for Space," 17 March 1958, 

in folder "NACA Committee on Space Technology Working Group Papers," in 

box "Administrative History: Stever Committee Report 1958/Minutes," in NHO. 

Note that the table of launch sites in this report does not include Wallops. 

52. 	 For evidence of the re-evaluation of Wallops' expansion see Glennan's testimony 

before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Organization for Space 

Activities, page 49 of 5803-245 as cited in note 49 above. See also: Shortal, 626. 

53. 	 Shortal, 573-80, for details of "Project Jason," Wallops' portion of the ARGUS 

program. The atomic explosives were launched from a ship at sea, and timed 

to explode so that readings could also be obtained from the orbiting Explorer IV 

satellite. 

54. 	 Shortal, 580. 

55. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 508-30. 

56. 	 Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to Associate Director Langley, 24 November 

1958, in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). 

57. 	 Memorandum with attachments, J. Thomas Markley for the Record, 23 

December 1958, in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). Se 

also in same folder, Memorandum, Clotaire Wood to Administrator, 18 

December 1958. 

58. 	 Letter of Agreement, Wallops Station and New York Regional Center, 1 March 1959, 

in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). See also in this file 

letters dated 12 February, 12 June, and 9 July 1959 regarding this subject. For 

communications between the Navy and NASA on Wallops clearance see: Letter, 

Thomas B. Combs (Chief of Naval Operations) to NASA, 21 November 1958; 

Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to Associate Director, 24 January 1959: Letter, 

Edmund C. Buckley to CNO, 20 March 1959; all in folder "Special File, January ­

March 1959," in RGA181-l(S). An interesting overview on the topic is found in 

Memorandum, H. R. Brockett for Files, 19 September 1960, in chronologic file "July 

- December 1960," in box "NASA Headquarters Organization, O.A.R.T. (cont.), 

0.T.D.A., O.S.C.," in NHO. Paragraph 5 states, "A final coordination procedure 

which Wallops handles is that of fallouts outside of U.S. control. Tab D Presents 

the procedure followed which is based on methods followed by the Russians. As 

can be seen, this has the sanction of the FAA and is followed by Wallops when it 

applies." This box in NHO is hereafter cited as "NASA HQ box #1." 

46 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

59. 	 See Buckley's letter to the CNO, cited Ibid. 

60. 	 There are a number of handwritten form letters dated 30 June 1958 granting 

the director, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory permission to conduct surveys 

on land near state highway 680, in Wallops box #4. For contact \Vith local lawyers 

see: "Robbins," OH!, Tape la: 208. 

nl. 	 "Robbins," OH!, Tape la: 208-40. 

62. 	 Letter, E. Almer Ames to Harry Flood Byrd, 31 July 1958; Letter, Harry F. Byrd 

to H.J.E. Reid, 5 August 1958; Letter with enclosure, !-!.J.E. Reid to Harry F. 

Byrd, 7 August 1958; in folder "Special File, Mily - August 1958," in RGA181­

l(S). See illso: Letter, J .F.Victory to Howard W. Smith, 12 September 1958; Letter, 

T. Keith Glenniln to A. Willis Robertson, 24 September 1958; Letter, T. Keith 

Glenniln to A. Willis Robertson, 7 October 1958,: Letter, T. Keith Glennan to 

Harry F. Byrd, 8 October 1958; in folder "Reading File, July - December 1958," 

in box "1958-59 Chron. Files," in NHO. "Willlops Island Project Opposed," 

Norfolk-Virginia Pilot #17, 24 September 1958. Not illl correspondence was 

negiltive, one man wrote offering to sell property to NASA for housing ilt 

Wallops; Letter, Paul J. Sterling to NASA, 14 October 1958; Letter, W. Kemble 

Johnson to Paul J. Sterling, 17 October 1958; in folder "Wallops, March ­

December 58," in RGA181 l(C). "What About Wallops Island," Worclzestcr 

Democrat, 18 September 1958. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger for Associate 

Director, 26 September 1958, in folder "January - December 1958," in Wallops 

box #4. 

63. 	 "Robbins," OH!, Ti1pe Iii: 208-40; Shortal, 617. 

64. 	 Copies of these letters are in folder "Reading File July - December 58," in box 

"1958-59 Chron. Files," in NHO. See illso: Letter, T. Keith Glenniln to U.S. 

Attorney General, 30 Januilry 1959, in folder "Reading file January 1959," box 

"1958-59 Chron. Files," in Nl-10. 

65. 	 U.S. Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War Tl 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 237-38. Paolo E. 

Coletta, ed., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic (West Port, 

CN.: Greenwood Press, 1977), 114-16. Shortal, 61n. 

n6. U.S., Congress, Conference, Military Construction Act (~f1956, Co11fcre11ce Report

to accompany H. R. 9893, H. Rept. 2641, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 5607-07C, p. 6. 

n7. 	 Letter, H.F. McKay to H.J. E. Reid, 5 May 1958; Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger 

to Associate Director, 13 May 1958; Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid to NACA, ln 

Mil)! 1958; Letter, Hugh L. Dryden to H. F. McKay, 18 June 1958; in folder 

"Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). The Moffett transfer was 

apparently unaffected by the denial; 1-lilrtman, 316. 

68. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, A Bill for S11pple111e11tal 

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1958, H.R. 9131, 85th Cong., 1st. sess., 5706-035, p. 

306, for funding deletion. Joseph Robbins indicated his belief that the Navy 

closed CNAS due to general budget cutbacks; "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 240. See 

also, "Anchors Aweigh," Tlze Washinaton Post and Times Herald, 14 January 1959, 

A 18. 

47 
WALLOPS STATION 

69. 	 Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to M. E. Phillips, 17 April 1959; 

Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Associate Director Langley, 7 April 1959; 

for the effect of the CNAS closure on Wallops, both are in folder "Wallops, 

January- December 59," in RGA181-l(C). For Navy-NACA cooperation on range 

clearance see: Letter (originally classified), H.J. E. Reid to Cmdr. John F. Betak, 

4 April 1958, in folder "Special File, March -April 58," in RGA181 l(S); Letter, 

John Betak to Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 5 August 1958, in folder 

"January 57 to December 57," in "Wallops box #4." Commander Betak was the 

Naval member of the New York Regional Airspace Subcommittee. See also a 

series of letters concerning meetings of this subcommittee in folder "Wallops, 

March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). 

70. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 240-323. 

71. 	 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, sec. 302, a. Letter, Thomas S. Gates, 

Jr. to T. Keith Glennan, 9 January 1959, in binder "December 58 January 59," in 

box "Administrator's Staff Meeting Minutes (October 58 December 59)," in NHO. 

Gates was Secretary of the Navy. This binder includes minutes of the meeting 

held 19 January 1959, and contains staff paper #59-4, "Acquisition of 

Chincoteague Naval Air Station." The box is hereafter cited as "Staff Meetings 

box." 

72. 	 See minutes of staff meeting cited Ibid. Letter, T. Keith Glennan to Thomas S. 

Gates, Jr., 25 February 1959; Letter, F. A. Bantz to T. Keith Glennan, 5 March 

1959; in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA 181 l(C). "License for 

Use of Real Property by other Federal Agencies," Noy(R) 65516, Department of 

the Navy to NASA, 11June 1959, in folder "June December 59," in Wallops box 

#4. 

73. 	 Shortal, 617. 

74. 	 NASA Press Release, "NASA Will Acquire Chincoteague Naval Air Station," 24 

January 1959, in folder OW-050000-02 "Wallops Island Flight Center (NASA)," 

in the Space History Collection, National Air and Space Museum. Copies of 

letters to seven of the twelve landowners who had received notification of 

NASA's intent to acquire portions of their land are in folder "Reading File 

January 1959," in box "1958 59 Chron. Files," in NHO. Not all of the landowners 

received the good news. NASA still needed some land on the mainland for the 

causeway and radar installations. 

75. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 250. 

76. 	 Minutes of Administrator's Staff Meeting, "Report on the Status of Chincoteague 

Transfer," 6 February 1959, in binder "December 58 - June 59," in Staff Meeting 

box. See also; Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to A. F. Siepert, 2 March 1959, in 

folder "Wallops January 58 - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). In "Wallops Made 

Key Space Site," The Washington Post and Times Herald, 13 September 1958, D 2, 

Krieger explicitly stated, "It won't be another Cape Canaveral." 

77. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 280; "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 130. 

78. 	 Memorandum, Albert F. Siepert to Wallops Station, 19 May 1959, in folder 

"Wallops January 59 - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). Siepert was Director of 

Business Administration at NASA Headquarters. For the complement of CNAS 

see: Press Release, J.E. Robbins to George McMath, 26 January 1959, in folder 

"January - May 1959," in Wallops box #4. 

48 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

79. 	 Letter, James F.Gleason to Thomas F.Johnson, 27 March 1959, in folder "Special 

File, January - March 59," in RGA181-l(S). See also; "NASA Administrator's 

Progress Report, August 1959," Part 1, 16.2; "NASA APR, October, 1959," Part 

1, 16.2; both in collection of "Administrator's Monthly Progress Reports," in 

NHO. Letter, Cecil A. Duverney to Samuel T. Daniels, 25 June 1959; Letter, Ross 

Clinchy to Paul G. Dembling, 16 July 1959; Letter, Paul G. Dembling to Joseph 

Robbins, 17 July 1959; all in folder "Special File, July- August 59," in RGA181­

l(S). Cecil A. Duverney, M.D. was President of the Worchester County Civic 

League. Samuel T. Daniels was Executive Secretary of the Maryland 

Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations. Ross Clinchy was Executive 

Director of the President's Commission on Government Employment Policy 

(which became The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 

on 6 April 1961). Paul G. Dembling was the Employment Policy Officer at NASA 

Headquarters. 

80. 	 For NASA hiring plans at Wallops see Gleason's letter to Congressman Johnson 

as cited Ibid. For hiring criteria in use at Wallops during this time see; "Robbins," 

OHi, Tape la: 240-323. Without compilation of a more complete set of records, 

such as the demographics of CNAS under Navy management or testimony from 

the individual making the allegation, determination of the validity of the charge 

can not accurately be made. Doubtless, few if any African Americans were hired 

from CNAS, (none of the photos that I have examined from this period show 

any black researchers or employees). To explain this situation as resulting from 

either: a conscious policy of discrimination (of which I have no evidence); an 

unconscious practice of discrimination (possible, owing to the nature of race 

relations in the U.S. in general at the time); or simply the unavoidable 

consequence of using a limited personnel budget to hire specialists from a few 

qualified applicants (few of whom would likely have been other than white 

due to the aforementioned tenor of racial relations) is a judgement that I can 

not make based on my current information. 

81. 	 "NASA APR, November 1960," Part 1, 16.2. The APR appeared monthly from 

July 1959 to December 1963, and hereafter will be cited by the initials APR and 

the date of issue. 

82. 	 Shortal, 599, 622-23. 

83. 	 Memorandum, T. Keith Glennan to Robert L. Krieger, 1 May 1959, in folder 

004681, file tray "Centers, Wallops Flight Facility," in NHO. 

84. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape la: 560; "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 345. See also: 

Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid to Robert L. Krieger, 12 June 1959, in folder "Special 

Files, April - June 59," in RGA181-l(S). 

85. 	 Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid to Paul G. Dembling, 30 October 1958; Shortal, 

624-31. 

86. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Ralph Ulmer, 21 July 1959; "Spinak, et al.," 

OHi, Tape la: 445-90; "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 392-410. 

87. 	 Shortal, 624-28. The implementation of Project 2080 was delayed briefly due to 

the range clearance controversy. One of Edmund Buckley's assistants passed 

an informal note requesting permission to proceed on 2080 to Hugh Dryden 

during an administrative meeting. Dryden wrote, "Yes, HLD," on the note, and 

2080 commenced. Shortal references this note, and Spinak produced a copy of 

it during our interview. 

49 
WALLOPS STATIOl\i 

88. 	 Data Book I, 168. 

89. 	 Shortal, 31-2, 71, 628, for causeway construction. Shortal notes that the causeway 

was constructed along the route chosen in 1945. See also; page 197 for the boat 

explosion, and 200 for the seaplane mishap (Engineer McGoogan was 

interviewed for this project). 

90. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices 

Appropriations for 1959, Hearings before a s11bcommitfcc of tlzc Ho11se Committee on 

Apprapriations, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5802-18H, 566-71. See also, Shortal, 624. 

91. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 150. 

92. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for Fiscal Year 1960. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on S. 1582 and H.R. 7007, 86th Cong., 

1st sess., 5905-215, 791-93, quotation is on page 792. See also: Memorandum, 

H.J. E. Reid to R. E. Ulmer, 18 March 1959, in folder "Wallops, January ­

December 59," in RGA181-l(C); U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 

Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1960, Hearings before a 

subcommittee of the Senate Committee 011 Appropriations on H.R. 7978, 86th Cong., 

1st sess., 5907-135, 26-29, during this hearing Senator Robertson questions 

Glennan, Dryden, Siepert, and Budget Office Ulmer about the affect of NASA's 

program on the communities surrounding Wallops. 

93. 	 Letter, E. C. Buckley to A. F. Siepert, 2 March 1959, in folder "Wallops, January 

58 - December 1959," in RGAI81-l(C). 

94. 	 MIT's Lincoln Lab was founded in 1951. "Funded largely by the Air Force, the 

Laboratory's field of work was to be the scientific and technical problems of air 

defense, and particularly of radar." Bulkeley, 33. "Spandar" stood for SPace 

r ANge raDAR, Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger, 31 October 1962, 

in folder "Special File October 1962 - April 1963," in RGA181-l(S). For good 

insights into the radar and tracking function at Wallops see: Memorandum, 

John C. McFall, Jr. to Associate Director, 4 May 1965, in folder "Wallops, January 

to June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C); Memorandum, Robert D. Briskman for the 

Record, 27 July 1960, in "Chron. File, July - December 60," in NASA HQ box #1; 

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices 

Appropriations for 1962. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 

Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 6104-19H, p. 1128-31. 

95. 	 Telemetry systems utilizing frequency modulation (FM) provided greater clarity 

than older systems using amplitude modulation (AM). High-gain systems 

allowed a large volume of data to be received, and digital recording systems 

began to replace old mechanical "syncro-data" recording systems allowing more 

data to be registered. Reduction of data took place at Langley during this initial 

period, with "computers" (personnel, usually female, who performed the 

tedious mathematics) using a mechanical calculator called a "Freeden" to convert 

the rect)rded information into usable form. The introduction of early electronic 

computers accelerated this process. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 1 b: 290-420. See 

also: Hallion, 10-11; Hansen, 84, 207; for "computers." 

96. 	 Report, "NASA Staff Conference, Monterey, California, 3 5 March 1960," 61, in 

box "NASA Staff Conferences," in NHO. Data Book I, 484-5. 

97. 	 Shortal, 706. 

50 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

98. 	 Shortal, 706-9. Ordway and Sharpe state that Hermann Oberth, Konstantin 

Tsiolkovsky, and Robert Goddard (the Big Three of rocketry), "proved that solidpropelled rockets could never be used to reach outer space," 380-81. 

99. 	 Shortal, 707. 

100. The 	 Javelin was a four stage vehicle capable of reaching nearly 1000 miles 

altitude. A design that developed simultaneously, designated Journeyman, was 

canceled by the Air Force, then revived by Goddard, but saw only limited use 

at Wallops. Ibid., 702-4. 

101. Linda 	 Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book. Volume II: Programs and Proiccts 

1958-1968 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1988), 61-67. Cited hereafter as Data Book 

II. The four stage Scout as originally developed could place a 130 pound payload 

into a 320 mile high orbit. Used as a probe, it could lift a similar payload to a 

height of nearly 2000 miles; lighter payloads could be lifted higher still. 

Presidential Science Advisor George Kistiakowski noted in his diary that the 

Scout "vehicle program looked sensible enough, although it is obvious that 

nobody wanted to use the relatively cheap Scout and so we will probably have 

this vehicle developed but not used .... When [NASA doesn't] have good ideas 

they build expensive equipment." George B. Kistiakowski, A Scientist i11The 

White Ho11sc(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 110. 

102. "Spinak, 	 et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 380-450; NASA Release #60-285, "Address by 

Maj. Gen. Don R. Ostrander, USAF," 25 October 1960, 6-7, in folder "Launch 

Vehicles, Office of," in box "NASA HQ. Organizations: O.L.V., O.A.S.T., 

0.A.R.T.," in NHO. This box hereafter cited as NASA HQ box #2. 

103. Rosholt, 115-16. 

104. 	Ibid., 223. See also: McCurdy, 17-20. 

105. Headquarters 	 Staff Report, "Summary of Budget Policy Decisions," undated 

(probably 13 July 1959), 3-4, in folder Vlll "NASA Budget: FY 1959, FY 1960," in 

file tray NASA Budget, in NHO. 

106. 	Memorandum, Abraham Hyatt for Files, 23 December 1959, 2, in folder "Launch 

Vehicles. Office of," in NASA HQ. box #2. DSFD refers to Director Space Flight 

Development (Silverstein), and DYDO is Director Vehicle Development and 

Operations (Ostrander). 

107. 	Ibid., 3. 

108. 	Memorandum, D. D. Wyatt for the Record, 23 December 1959, 2, in folder 

"Launch Vehicles, Office of," in NASA HQ box #2. This memo and the one cited 

Ibid., provide the interesting opportunity to examine the meeting from two 

differing points of view. Hyatt worked for Ostrander, and Wyatt worked for 

Silverstein. 

109. Ibid., 2. 

110. "Robbins," 	 OHi, Tape la: 182-208; Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to H.J. E. 

Reid, 3 June 1959, in folder ''June - December 59," in Wallops box #4; 

Memorandum, H.J. E. Reid to NASA Headquarters, 4 June 1959, also in that 

folder. 

51 
WALLOPS STATION 

111. For views of Wallops employees 	 on paperwork details see: "Spinak, et al.," OHI, 

Tape la: 95-140; "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 182, lb: 289-326; "Milliner," OHi, Tape 

la: 230-70, 456 98. For views of selected NASA personnel on this subject see: 

McCurdy, 180, questions 13 and 15. For administrative details transferred to 

Wallops see: Memorandum, Joseph E. Robbins to Norwood Evans, 7 May 1959, 

in folder "Special File, April - June 59;" Memorandum, T. Melvin Butler to Joseph 

Robbins, 1 July 1959, in folder "Special File, July-August 59," both in RGA181­

l(S). 

112. Memorandum, 	 H.J. E. Reid to Robert L. Krieger, 12 June 1959, in "Special File, 

April - June 59;" Memorandum, Joseph E. Robbins to Langley, 6 August 1959, 

in folder "Special File, July - August 59;" Report "Physical Inventory of Stock 

Stores," Langley to NASA Headquarters, 5 August 1960, in folder "Special File, 

May-August 60;" all in RGA181-l(S). Memorandum, J.E. Robbins to T. Melvin 

Butler, 26 March 1961, in folder "Wallops, January March 61," in RGA181-l(C). 

113. "Robbins," 	 OHI, Tape lb: 289. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to F. L. 

Thompson, 26 November 1962, in folder "Wallops, August 62- February 63," in 

RGA181-l(C). Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to F. L. Thompson, lOApril 1961, 

in folder "Special File, April - August 61," in RGA181 l(S). 

114. Memorandum,A. 	 D. Spinak to F. L. Thompson, 4 March 1964, in folder "Special 

File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

115. Data Book II, 522-24. Shortal, 615. 

116. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 190, for quotation. 	 For examples of Buckley's interest 

in Wallops see: Memorandum, C.R. Morrison to Assistant Director Space Flight 

Operations [Buckley], 5 May 1960; Memorandum, C.R. Morrison to Assistant 

Director, 17 June 1960, both in "Chron. File, January - June 1960," in box NASA 

HQ box #1. See also, Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to Directors, 19 July 1960, in 

folder "Special File, May - August 60," in RGA181-l(S). 

117. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 105-74; "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 289-326. 

118. Roland, I: 301-3. 

119. "NASA APR, July 1959," Part IV, 5.1-2; "NASA APR, September, 	 1959," Part IV, 

5.3, in NHO. 

120. Letter, H.J. E. Reid to James B. McElroy, 24 August 	 1959, in folder "Special File, 

July - August 59," in RGA181 l(S). NASA Staff Paper, "NASA Overtime Policy," 

1 December 1959, in binder "July - December 1959," in Staff Meeting box, in 

NHO. 

121. "NASA APR, February 1960," Section BA-5, 5.1; "NASA APR, April 1960," Section 

BA-5, 5.1. 

122. Memorandum, 	 Joseph A. Shortal for Files, 10 January 1960 [sic], in folder 

"Wallops, January - March 61," in RGA181 l(C). AMPD was PARD's successor 

at Langley, Shortal stayed with aeronautical research thus partially explaining 

why his book ends at this point. 

52 
SPUTNIK, NASA, AND INDEPENDENCE 

123. Trailblazer 	 was a project designed to launch an artificial meteor. This would 

provide data on both heating characteristics of materials, and a radar data base 

for tracking incoming objects (like warheads) travelling at high speeds. ARPA 

funded this project. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape lb: 340; Shortal, 673 p For 

Goddard projects see: Letter, G. E. MacVeigh to R. W. Hooker, 2 April 1959, in 

folder "Special Files, April - June 59," in RGA181 l(S). Project Mercury and 

university projects will be dealt with in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 

124. Shortal, 432-5; Memorandum, 	 Harold B. Pierce to Associate Director, 24 October 

1958, in folder "Wallops, March- December 58," in RGA181-l(C). 

125. Shortal, 	 668-9, for B-58 fuel tank tests; 557-61, for Polaris tests. Note that both 

Polaris and the B-58 were nuclear delivery systems. 

126. "NASA APR, July 1959," Part II, 1.1. 

127. U.S., 	 Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Missile 

Development and Space Science. Hearings before the House Committee on Science 

and Astronautics, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5902-02H, 56. 

128. Letter, Cecil B. Bailey to ARDC, Andrews 	 Air Force Base, 13 November 1959. 

"Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 498-520. Shortal, 542-3. 

129. "Milliner,"OHI, Tape lb: 380; "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape la: 470; Shortal, 610-12. 

130. "NASA APR, October 	 1960," Section SFP, 46.3; Data Book II, 239. Note: prior to 

launch Explorer IX was designated S 56a. 

53 

Cliapter3 

PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

The American response to the challenge proffered by the Sputniks consisted 

of more than just an increase in missile research funding and the promotion 

of space science. Wounded national pride required a more tangible response, 

as did the need to demonstrate to both allies and adversaries abroad U.S. 

ability to operate on the Cold War's new front. President Eisenhower 

recognized this when he indicated support for projects designed to assure, 

"the U.S. does not have to be ashamed no matter what other countries do." 1 

While not prepared to underwrite an exorbitant space spectacular, he did 

agree to a modest project that, if successful, would restore faith in American 

technical prowess. The perceived Soviet advantage could be nullified by 

putting a piloted satellite into space. NASA's Project Mercury proceeded 

with this "unstated," but widely held hope. 2 

The possibility of human space flight intrigued differing groups within 

the aeronautical community, and studies had been underway for several 

years. Military planners looked on space as the ultimate "high ground" in 

the Cold War. Some reviewed the theoretical work of German researchers 

Eugen Sanger and Irene Bredt, who had proposed a piloted craft that would 

skim the top of the atmosphere and possess intercontinental range. 3 Others 

thought of military bases on the moon. 4 Aerodynamicists working on the X15 for the NACA's hypersonic program considered the rocket plane a step 

on the road to piloted space flight. Flying as high as 62 miles, the X-15 

furnished the opportunity to test many items required for space flight while 

earning several pilots their astronaut wings. 5 A follow-on to the X-15 held 

out the promise of orbital flight and many NACA engineers believed that a 

winged spacecraft would be the ticket to the new frontier. 6 Political need for 

speed in putting a human in space dictated a program that would fly soon, 

but the complexities of winged spacecraft would take time to solve. 

In 1957 PARD's Maxime A. Faget began researching the potential of a 

simple ballistic design for space flight which drew heavily upon work already 

conducted concerning ICBM warhead design. Engineer H. Julian Allen, of 

Ames Lab, had demonstrated the effectiveness of a blunt shape in 

overcoming the problem of re-entry heating. The conical shape of a vehicle 

utilizing such a design also simplified the problem of aerodynamic stability. 7 

Another fundamental problem involved the limitations on the weight-lifting 

capacity of available boosters. The Atlas ICBM, the most powerful U.S. 

booster at that time, could only lift a weight of about one ton to orbit. A 

ballistic capsule would have to be designed within this weight restriction. 

55 
WALLOPS STATION 

On 24 January 1958 PARO submitted a confidential 10 page report, "A 

Proposed Simple Means for Manned Space-Flight Research," to Langley 

management. The proposal called for a series of sub-orbital missions to be 

launched from Wallops. A piloted capsule would be boosted to an altitude 

of 100 to 200 miles by a solid-fueled rocket, make a parachute-slowed 

splashdown in the Atlantic, and be refurbished and reused. The group 

suggested the rocket, a cluster of seven Sergeant motors, be fired in stages 

of four, two, and one, with the second and third stages to be fired "at the 

pilot's discretion." The program carried an estimated cost of $2.4 million 

and a preparation time of eighteen months. 8 

Fagzt presented this concept in a paper at what turned out to be the last 

NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics, held at Ames 18-20 March 

1958.9 Other papers presented discussed an Ames design for an orbiting 

lifting body, and Langley's plans for a winged design founded upon data 

derived from the X-15 program. 10 While not the only ballistic design under 

study (several industry designs had been discussed prior to the conference), 

and disparaged by some as a "stunt" and "undignified," PARD's design met 

the weight limits imposed by Atlas, and the time scale imposed by politics. 

"The choice involved considerations of weight, launch vehicle, reentry body 

design, and, to be honest, gut feelings. "11 

After approval of the NACA's assumption of the civilian space mission, 

Robert Gilruth, who had encouraged and assisted the ballistic capsule 

studies, went to Washington, and received the assignment to formulate a 

piloted space program. He assembled a small team that included engineers 

from Langley and Lewis Labs, and set to work. 12 Paget and Paul Purser were 

members of this team; understandably, as "although no official approval for 

the development of a manned capsule had been received, Paget was able to 

obtain the support of a large section of Langley through personal 

persuasion." 13 The NACA moved swiftly, motivated more by the military's 

strong push to monopolize human space flight than by the Soviets. In August 

1958 President Eisenhower directed that this endeavor be carried out by the 

civilian NASA, and several ARPA members were then integrated into 

Gilruth's planning group. 14 After roughing-out the program and receiving 

approval to proceed, Gilruth returned to Langley and organized a group of 

researchers to execute the project. The group became known, in November 

1958, as the Space Task Group (STG). 

The original membership of the STG contained a hefty percentage of PARO 

veterans, fourteen out of a total of thirty-six from Langley. Ten other 

researchers came aboard from Lewis. 15 Organized as an autonomous division 

of Langley, and reporting directly to Headquarters, the STG found itself 

involved in a highly complex, and highly visible, undertaking. The fact that 

so many of the STG came from PARO, and the group's location at Langley, 

guaranteed Wallops a major role in Project Mercury. Indeed, a very early 

program outline placed, "extension of the Wallops Island capabilities," as 

56 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

the first step in, "successful completion of the program.''16 Wind tunnels at 

Langley, and at several universities, were utilized, but the range at Wallops 

offered a convenient place from which to conduct flight tests without unduly 

disturbing military schedules at the Cape. The smaller Wallops base also 

received less notoriety than its Florida counterpart, allowing for a test 

program more reminiscent of NACA programs. Minor setbacks could be 

corrected without excessive criticism.17 

The very basic shape of the Mercury spacecraft had already been 

investigated, but the specific details of the design remained to be finalized 

and tested. Determination of the aerodynamic characteristics of differing 

shapes became one major area of research. Testing different materials for 

use on the craft's heat shield, and refining the parachute recovery system 

were others. A series of tests (started in the summer of 1958, before the official 

start of the project) involved dropping models of varying complexity from 

balloons, and later from C-130 aircraft to discover the motions of 

experimental shapes during descent. 18 These tests allowed engineers to study 

designs for both drogue and main parachutes, and gave radar and telemetry 

operators the opportunity to test equipment and hone their skills. 19 

Sounding rocket launches in support of Project Mercury included the 

launch of two-stage vehicles to determine the aerodynamic characteristics 

of models traveling at nearly Mach 3, and five-stage vehicles which provided 

data on aerodynamic heating. Given Wallops involvement in the hypersonics 

program, such test flights were relatively routine. 20 Also routine were tests 

in the Preflight Jet that investigated heat ablation characteristics of different 

materials. While Wallops' wind tunnel could not provide a full range of test 

data, information generated there added to data obtained from tunnels at 

Langley and outside NASA to fill out a complete picture. The testing may 

have been routine, but the goal of the tests, a human in space, sparked an 

enthusiasm for the project that pervaded the operations. 21 

As the pace of the project increased, administrative arrangements shifted 

to reflect early shuffling within NASA. On 26 January 1959 T. Keith Glennan 

formally designated Gilruth both an Assistant Director of the Beltsville Space 

Flight Center (Goddard), and Director of Project Mercury. "Mr. Gilruth will 

serve under the direction of and report to the Director of Space Flight 

Development, Dr. Abe Silverstein. "22 Glennan desired to bring all space 

related activities to one field center. Unfortunately, that center had yet to be 

built, so the STG (like Wallops) continued to rely on Langley for support. 

Tests at Wallops continued, and evaluations of the launch escape system 

occupied a prominent place in the work. The explosion of large boosters 

remained a common occurrence at the Cape, so Mercury planners conceived 

a way to lift the capsule and its crew away from danger should an emergency 

arise during launch. The system consisted of a solid-fueled rocket attached 

to the top of the spacecraft by means of a tower. If needed, the system could 

pull the capsule high enough to allow the pilot to activate the craft's 

57 
WALLOPS STATION 

parachute recovery system, and the STG deemed it an essential feature. The 

first tests of the escape system involved simply firing a tower and test capsule 

from a platform on the shore . These "beach abort" launches, conducted with 

both makeshift and production motors, proved that the system would work 

from a standing start. Obtaining in-flight performance data required a more 

elaborate series of tests, however, including a booster large enough to launch 

the tower and capsule combination, and simulate the aerodynamic conditions 

the Atlas would produce. 23 

To provide a vehicle for this task, one that would be operable from Wallops, 

Langley modified the booster design earlier proposed by PARD by reducing 

the number of solid-fueled motors from seven to four. The resulting "Little 

Joe" booster could hurl a production Mercury capsule and tower to a height 

of 100 miles and simulate the Atlas well enough to provide valid data. 24 The 

Little Joe also provided the means to flight test other capsule systems, and 

test the reactions of biological specimens (including monkeys) to the mission 

environment. 25 While not capable of providing orbital velocity, the booster 

allowed the execution of many preliminary tests without interfering with 

operations at the Cape, or necessitating the use of more expensive boosters. 

Not all of the tests succeeded, of course. The most disconcerting failure 

came with the first attempt to launch the Mercury-Little Joe combination. A 

Little Joe vehicle with prototype Mercury capsule on Wallops launchpad. 

58 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

short-circuit activated the abort system approximately thirty minutes prior 

to the scheduled launch. The escape tower pulled the capsule away from 

the booster, but the spacecraft's main parachute failed to deploy and the 

capsule was ruined. 26 On an earlier occasion a malfunction during a beach 

abort test caused a tower and capsule to somersault through the air and hit 

the water 1000 feet offshore.27 The NACA-experienced Space Task Group 

recognized these failures as an inevitable part of a learning curve. This official 

tolerance for failure began to wane as NASA developed into a more visible 

enterprise. The intense negative public reaction to the Vanguard explosion 

was a harbinger of things to come. 

Public relations constituted a novel trial for the space agency. "NACA was 

real low-key, they did not even have a public affairs officer, or division .... 

they just didn't believe in public relations very much, .... "28 Given that the 

data NACA generated dealt with highly technical engineering matters, a 

portion of which had military or proprietary value, this lack of official contact 

with the general public is understandable. Even the non-NACA portions of 

NASA (the Vanguard team, von Braun's group, and JPL) were more 

accustomed to military security than public relations. Wallops Station 

operated within this tradition. PARD once turned down the offer of a boresighted television camera as an accessory for their FPS-16 radar. "We said, 

we don't want that kind of stuff at Wallops, because we're not interested in 

showing this to the public. We thought that's what they were using it for at 

other places." 29 

The popular and politicized nature of the space effort did not give NASA 

the luxury of anonymity. The Space Act required the Administration to 

"provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of 

information concerning its activities and results thereof." 30 Though the 

public's attention focused on activities at Cape Canaveral, Wallops also 

attracted notice. These new responsibilities called for Wallops to expand 

this aspect of its operation as well. 

A March 1958 request from the Department of Air Sciences at Maryland 

State College for "Static displays of a type that would tend to give the local 

civilian population an idea of your organization's function and relationship 

to the Eastern Shore," at a one day event had to be turned down. Wallops' 

limited supply of such materials was in use elsewhere. 31 In August 1959 a 

sounding rocket experiment that released a sodium-vapor cloud, "visible to 

ground observers within a 700-mile radius of the launch site," provoked a 

flurry of calls from citizens and officials startled by the strange apparition 

in the sky. The Wallops team had not foreseen this reaction. 32 

The situation began to improve as NASA's increased funding moved 

through the system. In April 1959 Headquarters directed Langley, "to have 

installed at Wallops Island twenty (20) telephones for use of the Public 

Information Office and press representatives." 33 A 30 June staff meeting at 

Headquarters discussed the matter of public relations during Project Mercury 

59 
WALLOPS STATION 

and concluded, "It will be his [the Director of the Headquarters Office of 

Public Information] to determine the propriety of releases, interviews, tours, 

and spot coverage of activities at the W.I. launching site, the A.M.R., and 

elsewhere." This served to coordinate public relations for Mercury and 

showed an awareness of the importance of this feature of the project. 34 

Indeed, NASA's effort to disseminate information drew fire from Albert 

Thomas who berated Glennan and Dryden about the increased personnel 

cost this effort entailed, and the impression that this put "the pressure on 

the poor scientists," especially if a shot failed to launch. Glennan defended 

their public relations program as necessary to fulfill their legal requirements 

and pointed to Wallops as a place where publicity had been "controlled" 

(meaning, not excessive). 35 Thomas conceded the accuracy of this reference 

to Wallops, but Glennan still felt compelled to dispatch a memo to the center 

directors reinforcing NASA's launch policy. "I have stated many times, that 

the Test Conductor and Project Supervisor must understand that pressure 

from newspapers, distinguished visitors, or 'brass' from HQ. is not to 

influence a decision to attempt a launch. I want to reiterate my position on 

this matter." 36 

As Project Mercury progressed, public fascination with the space effort 

grew. The installation of bleachers on the mainland opposite the island 

provided ringside seats to rocket launches. 37 While the military generally 

exhibited a tolerant attitude toward security at Wallops, one military public 

information officer was somewhat taken aback at the sight of a grandstand 

full of people waiting to see a supposedly classified launch. 38 On one occasion 

it was decided to withdraw the base security guards for a weekend to 

demonstrate the open nature of the operation. However, "We had people 

wandering around where the rockets were stored, hitting on them, ... so ... , 

we said, you know, if they get blown up its going to be our fault. "39 The 

guards soon returned. That the experiment took place at all comes as 

something of a surprise given Krieger's feelings about safety. In an April 

1960 memo he issued a strong warning about "unauthorized people on the 

island," brought to the launch site by employees traveling over the new 

causeway. "It is absolutely necessary that the entire island be considered an 

explosive area." 40 More official visitors also prompted Krieger to look to the 

appearance of his charge. "During the rapid growth of the island in area, 

new facilities, and the heavy workload, of all, it is apparent that we have 

neglected our policing and sight appearance on the island." Individuals were 

assigned to clean up various buildings and areas. 41 

The public interest peaked near the end of the Little Joe program when 

two flights carrying monkeys were launched. The first of these tests flew on 

4 December 1959 and sent a number of specimens to an altitude of 53 miles. 

The second, on 21 January 1960, tested the monkey's reaction to the stress of 

a launch abort via the escape tower. Then Administrative Assistant Joyce 

Milliner recalled, "We had over a hundred photographers, I mean from every 

60 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

well-known news media," for the December launch . Even the stars of 

Mercury, the original astronauts, came to the island for the flight. While 

they were not to fly from Wallops themselves, nor participate in the test 

program there, they maintained a certain interest in the outcome of the test. 42 

"Miss Sam" gazes from her contoured couch prior to flight test from Wallops in 

Little Joe 1B on January 21, 1960. 

The final Little Joe flight launched on 28 April 1961, only one week before 

Alan B. Sheppard, Jr. flew Mercury-Redstone 3 to an altitude of 116 miles on 

a sub-orbital path to become America's first official space traveler. The 

disappointing part of the affair, for U.S. space enthusiasts, was the flight of 

Yuri A. Gagarin of the Soviet Union, who had completed one orbit around 

the Earth on 12 April. Round two of the space race went to the USSR. 43 

Wallops' role in Mercury did not end with the last flight of the Little Joe, 

however. Early in the planning process NASA realized that communications 

with a piloted vehicle represented a greater technical challenge than did 

communications with an automated satellite. Monitoring the pilot and the 

sophisticated craft during the experimental program necessitated high data 

transmission rates and nearly continuous contact. In 1956 construction had 

begun on the "Mini track" network of tracking and data reception stations to 

support the Vanguard project. Though this network came to NASA with the 

rest of Vanguard, the limited range of operations and the restricted volume 

of data they could process made them unsuitable for Mercury. 44 The task of 

61 
WALLOPS STATION 

coordinating the development of a system capable of supporting the piloted 

flights fell on Edmund Buckley. In 1959 he commenced to work, first at 

Langley where he headed the Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit 

(TAGIU, a Langley group separate from the Space Task Group), an then from 

Headquarters as an Assistant Director in Silverstein's Office. 45 

Like many of facets of the space program, the design, construction, and 

operation of the "Manned Space Flight Tracking Network" (MSFN) departed 

from previous NACA practice and relied heavily on contractors. Engineers 

from Western Electric, Bendix, RCA, IBM, and others, worked with experts 

from Goddard and Langley to prepare the network. 46 The desire to beat the 

Russians to the punch did not leave NASA time to effect a slow build-up of 

capabilities and equipment from within, and the avowed civilian nature of 

the program precluded excessive military involvement. NASA needed help 

fast and turned to the private sector to obtain it.47 

Additionally, the need for frequent ground to space contact dictated that 

NASA make arrangements for a global network that included specially 

equipped ships, and stations located on foreign soil. While most of the eleven 

Minitrack stations were situated outside the U.S., only one operated outside 

the Western Hemisphere. Placement of most of them along a rough "fence" 

running north to south provided contact with an orbiting satellite at least 

once each orbit so that the spacecraft could downlink information or receive 

instructions. 48 Mercury required a network encircling the globe in an 

equatorial fashion. Ships could cover open stretches of ocean, but NASA 

began negotiations with foreign governments to obtain permission to locate 

land stations where required. An important aspect of these negotiations 

rested on the civilian nature of NASA and Project Mercury. Many countries 

could not politically.accept U.S. military bases on their soil. If the proposed 

NASA tracking stations were perceived to carry a military stigma, the 

negotiations would have rapidly broken down. 

These departures from previous custom affected Wallops in several ways 

once the decision was made to locate the prototype Manual Spaceflight 

Network station at the island. Buckley needed a place where research, 

development, and testing of the new systems could be performed. With 

Goddard still under construction, TAGIU at Langley, and a wealth of radar 

and telemetry experience and equipment already in place at Wallops, the 

base offered a convenient site for the "Evaluation/Training" facility. It also 

provided a place where visiting diplomats could observe the type of 

equipment and operations being discussed, and a politically safe location to 

train foreign personnel while allowing NASA to emphasize the civilian and 

scientific character of the program. 49 This decision brought a steady increase 

in the population of research contractors working at the base, and brought 

in foreign nationals who came to inspect and learn how to operate the 

equipment to be used in their countries. 50 It also resulted in Wallops' 

assumption of responsibility for a facility outside its own fences. 

62 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

In March 1959 NASA received a request from Collins Radio Company to 

establish a communications link between Wallops and Bermuda. 51 Buckley, 

Krieger, and the other Wallops planners recognized that the increased range 

of the vehicles launched from the island, created a need for a tracking facility 

beyond the bounds of the existing installation. Scout, particularly, would 

require a downrange station as orbital insertion of the vehicle's payload 

would occur some distance away. In May 1959 NASA justified the Bermuda 

Station before Congress by pointing out that it would be used for both 

Mercury flights from the Cape, and Scout flights from Wallops. 52 On 13 

November James F. McNulty of the STG was "authorized to proceed to 

Bermuda to initiate and supervise the construction of the Project Mercury 

station," to be built by Western Electric. 53 

Operational responsibility for the tracking station had yet to be decided 

upon, however. Buckley suggested either operating the facility with civil 

servants or contractors reporting to Krieger; contractors reporting to Walter 

Williams at Headquarters; or, "of course, the undesirable [option] of the 

contractor reporting to General Yates [Maj. Gen. Donald N., AMR 

Commander] .... We have to decide it quickly to prevent Yates or someone 

else deciding it for us and also because the training of a few members of 

these crews start in the near future .... I don't think we ought to wait on 

this." 54 NASA, still engaged in fighting for a niche in the federal bureaucracy, 

definitely wanted to limit military encroachment on its operations. 55 The 

agreement reached in a meeting with Assistant Director Hartley A. Soule at 

Headquarters allowed Western Electric to operate the station under Wallops' 

supervision until 30 June 1961, when the situation would be re-evaluated. 56 

With a full flight schedule of his own to deal with, Krieger could not afford 

to dispatch scarce p~rsonnel to operate the station directly. The personnel 

involved with the MSFN Evaluation I Training facility at Wallops, it should 

be noted, did not report to Krieger. Instead, they reported to TAGIU, first at 

Langley, later at Goddard. Administering the contract and supplying flight 

controllers for non-Mercury launches constituted as much as Krieger could 

handle with his limited personnel budget. 57 

As the pace of several projects accelerated, the work-force shortage became 

more acute. In July 1960 a proposal surfaced to move the Blossom Point 

Minitrack Station from Maryland to Wallops. 58 The proposal was made 

despite a trip to Wallops, at which, "A discussion was held on the Wallops 

manpower situation. Apparently not only is there a serious shortage of 

personnel space, but there is also a severe limit on overtime. It was stated 

that Wallops had no idea how to man the NASA radar [Spandar], although 

a contract for this to an industrial organization was being considered. Also 

the amount of support from Langley IRD was in question. Wallops would 

like more IRD support, while Langley may tend to concentrate on only those 

Wallops projects that are of direct interest to IRD."59 In spite of the need, 

after reviewing NASA's budget request for fiscal year 1961, Thomas' 

63 
WALLOPS STATION 

Subcommittee, "denied salaries for 373 of the requested 962 new employees 

.... The majority of the increase in staff being requested in 1961 is required 

for the Goddard center and the Wallops station, where the impact of new 

and expanding duties and responsibilities is most urgently felt." 60 

Wallops complement did increase during this period (see appendix 3), but 

the commensurate increase in work-load stressed the Station's capabilities. 

In a communication to Shortal, Krieger related the situation during the 

summer of 1960: "Of course the trouble is that you guys, with a 3,000-man 

organization behind you, can put together a three-shift operation when you 

want to, whereas Wallops simply does not have, for instance, three shifts of 

radar people. As a result, on anything like Scout when your people need 

radiation checks or telemetry checks, or command-destruct checks at 11 

o'clock at night and 2 o'clock in the morning, and start wind weighting at 

noon the next day to fire at 7 o'clock the following night, it means that my 

radar people do not have time between these various functions to go home 

and get a reasonable amount of sleep and get back. Although they may work 

only a matter of five or six hours out of 24, they cannot manage to get home 

for a period of 24 hours or more sometimes. The best we have been able to 

do so far to solve this problem is to put beds around the various places on 

the island and encourage our people during these two or three hour breaks 

to go climb in bed and get as much sleep as they can. This is not a solution at 

all, of course, but until I get more people and get some of them trained, I do 

not see how we can do any better." 61 

One labor problem Wallops mostly evaded centered on the difficulties 

experienced by other NASA, and Air Force, launch facilities with work 

stoppages. Strikes hampered construction efforts at operational missile bases 

as well as at test ranges. These job actions resulted in delays so severe that 

the Senate convened hearings on the issue. The Air Force estimated that by 

March 1961, 195 strikes at their 19 operational sites caused the loss of 50,500 

worker-days, and 132 strikes at the three test sites lost 112,322 worker-days. 62 

"Work stoppages in connection with organizational efforts and negotiations 

for new collective bargaining agreements account for more than half of the 

total man-days lost. A large portion of this occurred at Patrick [Cape 

Canaveral]. Jurisdictional disputes of all kinds are the second most important 

cause, accounting for more than a fourth of the total." 63 A June 1961 NASA 

staff meeting reported that, "The President has issued an executive order 

establishing an 11-man commission ... to deal with labor disputes at the three 

launch facilities, AMR, PMR, and Wallops. The Commission will have 

persuasive authority only, but the executive order has the effect of enforced 

arbitration. "

64 

Despite this reference to Wallops, there seems to be no evidence of labor 

problems of this nature at the Station. The only strike at Wallops noted during 

this era involved a three-day walkout by the security guards starting on 28 

August 1963, for higher wages. After Wallops administrators explained that 

64 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

the contract for security services was let after a competitive bid (a bid over 

which they had no control), the strike ended. 65 The small size of the expansion 

of the facilities at the base, relative to the massive build-up at other sites, 

mitigated many of the factors causing the strife. The slow economy of the 

Eastern Shore also made striking an unattractive option. 66 

Generally speaking, relations with both research and maintenance 

contractors seem to have been smooth. "Once we got into the mode of 

contracting for these services, they became a part of our team and we just 

sort of thought of them as Wallops employees .... They were local people 

and friends, .... "67 To comply with federal regulations prohibiting 

"fraternization" between civil servants and contract personnel, separate jobs 

and facilities were supposed to be provided. Wallops had neither the time 

nor the resources to always comply with this though. "We brought the 

contractors in and they were assimilated with the civil servants, and we 

caught the devil for that several times along the way. So every now and then 

we'd have to isolate the contractor and give him a radar to operate." 68 "Until 

they got really formal with the [Inspector General] and we had to sort of 

abide by the rules, we were lax on that." 69 Efficient accomplishment of urgent 

tasks called for bending the rules. 

The lack of problems with organized labor was fortunate, as the pace of 

action did not slow as Mercury testing gave way to the operational phase of 

that program. While the Mercury effort focused on support for the tracking 

network, after the final Little Joe tests research work at the base reverted to 

an emphasis on sounding rockets. Programs like Scout and Trailblazer mover 

to the forefront of the agenda. In October 1960, Preflight Jet, inactive since 

February, was formally deactivated, its personnel having already been reassigned. Several new tunnels coming on line at Langley rendered the unit 

surplus and obsolete. 70 At the same time the Helium Gun, in storage for 

"several years," also went. Useful for transonic tests, the needs the hypersonic 

and space programs exceeded its ageing capabilities. 71 

As if the hectic pace of activities was not enough to try the endurance of 

the Wallops personnel, Mother Nature contributed more excitement. In midSeptember 1961 the approach of Hurricane Ester compelled Krieger to report, 

"Now battening down station .... Will keep you informed if we can." 72 Though 

Ester missed the island, many local residents evacuated to the safety of the 

main base. Krieger noted afterward, "Handling more than 2400 refugees in 

755 automobiles very interesting exercise. Seems any town has certain 

number of aged, sick, pregnant, and otherwise incapacitated citizens 

requiring doctor's care. Ended up operating 26-bed hospital complete with 

doctor, six nurses, etc. No births, deaths, or injuries to report." The Station 

itself escaped with only minor damage. 73 The previous December, Technical 

Services Division Chief William Grant had organized a Damaged Control 

Branch in his division. This Branch prepared contingency plans and a team 

to deal with potential catastrophic emergencies. 74 Planning of this nature 

65 
WALLOPS STATION 

undoubtedly facilitated readying for, and recovering from, the hurricane. 

Ester proved to be only a dress rehearsal, however. On 7 March 1962 (Ash 

Wednesday) a severe winter storm pounded the East Coast, flooding Wallops 

and Chincoteague Islands. The Main Base again played host to numerous 

refugees. Far enough removed from the coast to escape the sea's assault, the 

old Navy base provided a haven where relief efforts could begin. The 

magnitude of the storm was such that, for the first few days, the NASA 

personnel were on their own in the humanitarian work. One remembered it 

"as the time 5000 people came to dinner, and went home two weeks later." 75 

The leaders at Wallops divvied-up their responsibilities: Grant oversaw 

damage control efforts on the island; Robbins saw to the needs of the civilian 

population; and Krieger coordinated contacts with local political leaders and 

NASA. 

The task of providing for the refugees called for fast action on Robbins' 

part. After contacting the Red Cross and the Army, he set his staff to 

registering everyone who came off the helicopters that were evacuating 

Chincoteague, "so we could catalog who was here and who wasn't here." 

Feeding several thousand people in a cafeteria facility designed for only a 

few hundred also provided a challenge. 76 "Joe Robbins went out and started 

telling these companies to bring us food. We didn't know where we were 

going to get the money to pay, but we'll pay you. We had no authority to do 

it from Headquarters. We got authority after the fact." 77 By providing a 

centralized location for the effort, and "taking charge," the Wallops personnel 

kept a bad situation from deteriorating into a total disaster. 78 

The damage to the launch facility was heavy, but could have been worse. 

The storm breached the recently authorized, but incomplete, section of the 

seawall, flooding the island. The older section of the seawall had been 

stressed to the limit. The Ground Blast Apparatus was damaged so severely 

Langley decided not to rebuild it. The storm also completely destroyed 

Goddard's DOVAP radar facility, "including the steel mat approach road." 79 

Sand clogged the underground infrastructure and lay several feet deep on 

the launch pads. Equipment and electronics had been thoroughly immersed 

in salt water, and several buildings sustained structural damage, including 

one housing a number of rocket motors. 80 

Many installations escaped with only minor damage, though. Grant's team 

began cleaning equipment and digging out. The Scout complex, only slightly 

battered, was repaired quickly enough so that the launch of Scout 9 took 

place on 29 March, only three weeks after the storm. Similarly, most of the 

Station soon returned to normal operation. 81 An immediate transfer of funds 

into "Project 3512," provided $1 million to initiate repairs at the Station. An 

additional million was required to complete the repairs, add to the seawall, 

and replace equipment that failed prematurely due to exposure to the 

elements. 82 For their efforts after the storm, the staff of Wallops Station 

received a NASA Group Achievement Award. 83 

66 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

As the operations at Wallops began to recover from the effects of the Ash 

Wednesday Storm, decisions involving the post-Mercury direction of the 

piloted spaceflight program, began to affect the base. President Eisenhower 

had not authorized any piloted program to succeed Mercury, but after 

Gagarin's flight dashed American hopes of putting a human in space first, 

something more substantial became necessary. The new Kennedy 

Administration, picking up the pieces of the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco, turned to 

NASA to reassure nervous allies and demonstrate Yankee competence to 

critics foreign and domestic. The chosen course of action was a highly 

publicized goal to send an American expedition to the moon before the end 

of the decade. NASA rose to the challenge by elevating its lunar plans from 

a low-priority, futuristic aspiration to the high-priority Project Apollo. 84 

After President Kennedy's decision to expand the piloted program into a 

major national effort, NASA implemented plans to establish a field center 

dedicated to human operations in space. The Mercury team worked at 

Langley, reported to Goddard, and operated as a semi-autonomous 

organization within NASA, largely independent of any existing field center. 

Since aeronautics, Langley's specialty; space science, Goddard's 

responsibility; and piloted space flight all presented differing and unique 

problems, Headquarters felt that a field center devoted to the latter would 

minimize interference and facilitate oversight. Located in Houston, the 

Manned Spacecraft Center provided Gilruth and company a place to call home. 85 

Detailed planning for the complex lunar endeavor could not begin in 

earnest until Mercury answered some basic questions. Indeed, it soon became 

apparent that an intermediary program would be required prior to any 

attempt to reach the moon; thus came Mercury Mark II, or Project Gemini. 

Certain general asp~cts of Apollo were immediately evident, however, and 

some of them related to the role Wallops would play in the mission. A piloted 

lunar mission entailed the launch of large payloads. This meant large, liquidfueled boosters beyond the capabilities planned for Wallops. While plans 

existed for the development of large, solid-fueled boosters (larger even than 

the current Space Shuttle's solid boosters) these plans operated under Air 

Force auspices until late 1963. NASA concentrated primarily on the liquidfueled systems familiar to most of its people in the interest of saving time. 

Any decision to utilize large launchers of either stripe from Wallops would 

have required an additional expansion of facilities that a cost-conscious 

Congress, adamant about avoiding duplication of facilities, would not have 

funded. 86 More importantly, Wallops suffered from the physics of its 

geographic location. Apollo required a launch site within 28.5 degrees of 

the Earth's equator. Cape Canaveral barely satisfied this requirement; 

Wallops, situated just shy of 38 degrees north, simply sat too far out of range 

to launch a piloted lunar mission. 87 

But what of Apollo research and development? Even though no astronauts 

ascended into orbit from Wallops during Mercury, the base unquestionably 

67 
WALLOPS STATION 

played a valuable role in testing hardware and training support personnel. 

The more advanced Apollo hardware would obviously require testing no 

less rigorous and thorough, while new techniques were needed for the 

ambitious lunar mission. Plans coalesced and in the Spring of 1962 NASA 

announced that Apollo equipment testing and evaluation would take place, 

not at Wallops, but at the Army missile range at White Sands, New Mexico. 88 

At first, one wonders why NASA eschewed using facilities totally under its 

own control, or why Congress permitted such an apparent duplication. Why 

not modify and reuse the Little Joe equipment and employ the experienced 

personnel at Wallops instead of constructing new facilities and training new 

people at White Sands? 

As with most decisions of this type, several factors played a role. The first 

involved the desire by many, both inside and outside NASA, to change 

spacecraft recovery modes from the splashdown of Mercury's water landings 

to a touchdown on dry land for Apollo. A splashdown utilizing a large, 

expensive naval fleet and the danger of losing a small spacecraft in the vast 

ocean was deemed a necessary evil for Mercury because of the relative ease 

of designing a capsule capable of providing a survivable water landing, and 

the wide margin for targeting error contained in those miles of empty ocean. 

Political pressures left insufficient time to overcome the engineering and 

navigational problems associated with a dry touchdown; Mercury had to 

fly, and quickly, so mission planners went with a water-based recovery mode. 

The Soviet Vostok capsules, however, came down on dry land. This gave 

the Russian hardware an aura of technical superiority, and provided 

ammunition for NASA's critics. If part of NASA's job consisted of advancing 

astronautics the way the NACA advanced aeronautics, then Apollo better 

be able to land in Kansas; especially since the need to best the Soviets 

propelled the program. 89 

The sight of all those recovery ships did not sit well with Congress, and 

the vision of an Apollo capsule laden with precious moonrocks, and possibly 

moon walkers, going the way of Gus Grissom's sunken Liberty Bell 7 sat even 

less well with NASA planners. Many techniques were proposed to provide 

a safe touchdown, from an inflatable paraglider to retro-rockets that would 

fire just prior to landing. One factor common to all these schemes was the 

need for open land in which to conduct tests. Wallops provided access to 

lots of salt water, but little open land. 90 

The other major factor in choosing White Sands lay with the relocation of 

Gilruth's team. Moving the STG to Houston simply made it more convenient 

and cost-effective to use the facilities in New Mexico instead of traveling to the 

Eastern Shore to conduct tests. White Sands, opened by the Army in 1945, 

conducted sounding rocket firings and provided the Army with the same 

general capability that Wallops provided the NACA and NASA. Additionally, 

most of the major Apollo contractors were located either in California or 

Louisiana, and White Sands would be more accessible to them as well. 91 

68 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

Unlike the Mercury spacecraft, Apollo needed a significant orbital 

maneuvering capability, requiring new test apparatus. These liquid-fueled 

engines and thrusters, especially the Service Module engine, remained out 

of Wallops purview. The final determinant came when wind tunnel tests at 

Langley indicated that the proposed Apollo Command Module and Launch 

Escape Tower combination would be aerodynamically unstable if flown on 

the Little Joe booster. A newly designed, somewhat larger booster designated 

"Little Joe II" met the test criteria, leaving the original Little Joe facilities at 

Wallops unusable without extensive modifications. Little Joe had come off 

the drawing boards at Langley, but most of its designers, hard at work on 

the Little Joe II, now labored in Houston. The combination of geographic 

locations, new designs, and desire for both a consolidated test facility and 

for solid ground for test articles to land upon, eliminated Wallops from the 

site selection process. 92 

Testing of flight hardware at Wallops for Project Gemini was limited to 

experiments relating to the flexible-wing landing concept. Designed by 

Francis M. Rogallo of Langley, and considered a prime contender for both 

Gemini and Apollo touchdown systems, the device resembled a modern 

hang-glider. A short series of launches from Wallops in late-1959 tested basic 

features of the system. These flights proved that a folded para-glider could 

successfully be ejected from a canister and deployed at supersonic speeds. 

Most testing of the "Rogallo Wing" occurred in wind tunnels and at the Flight 

Research Center (the old HSFS), where rudimentary piloted tests flew. 

Technical difficulties with the system, and serious cost increases in Project 

Gemini as a whole, led to the adoption of conventional parachutes to recover 

the new spacecraft. 93 

While flight hardware testing for the piloted program waned, operations 

at the MSFN Evaluation/Training facility resumed. Gemini called for orbital 

mission durations of up to fourteen days, the expected length of a lunar 

mission, and several new tracking and data relay stations were required to 

cover this increased time on orbit. Five new land bases and two new 

shipboard stations came on line to augment the former Mercury network, 

and replace two that went out of service. 94 The Wallops facility, deactivated 

in December 1960, was reactivated the following July and evaluated 

improved instrumentation and trained new crews. 

Preparing the facility for the new program proceeded in two stages. First, 

new classrooms were built to accommodate more students, and new courses 

reflected the improved equipment and the experience garnered from 

Mercury. Secondly, the updated instruments were installed and tested. 

Operation of the facility continued throughout the retrofit period, and both 

phases of the upgrade were largely complete by November 1963.9

" 

In the Fall of 1961 the Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit moved 

from Langley to Goddard. Headquarters felt that consolidation of two of 

NASA's three tracking networks at one center would promote economy and 

69 
WALLOPS STATION 

efficiency. Goddard, already home for the unpiloted satellite network, seemed 

a logical place to host the consolidation, more so than the aeronautically 

oriented Langley. 96 In 1964 NASA carried the consolidation one step further. 

"With the advent of the Apollo Program, it is apparent that the training area, 

established for the Mercury-Gemini programs, will be unable to cope with 

the increased demand of the more advanced program and its new 

equipments." 97 Therefore, NASA sought $356,000 to relocate the facility to 

Goddard. Harry Goett, Director of Goddard, explained to Albert Thomas, 

"In order to train the crews that go out to the worldwide stations, we send 

them down initially to Wallops and train them there in the operation before 

they go out. We figure that there will be a considerable cost saving if we 

move them nearer to Goddard." 98 

The completion of construction at Goddard made it feasible to take the 

training center there, and despite the improvement in conditions around 

the Delmarva, the infrastructure around Wallops remained limited. Trainees 

sent to Wallops for "Gemini Phase I Training," had to reserve rooms at the 

Lord Salisbury Motel, over forty miles away. Tourists filled the local motels, 

and "other NASA commitments," filled quarters on the base itself. 99 So, just 

as most piloted space flight testing left Wallops when the STG left Langley 

for Houston, the major portion of the Island's participation in the MSFN left 

when TAGIU moved to Goddard. 100 

After relocation of the training facility Wallops' relation to the piloted space 

flight program became one of occasional support. Tracking facilities at the 

range assisted in tracking Saturn I - Pegasus, and Saturn V test launches. 

Scout flights supported Apollo heat-shield materials testing. 101 Helicopters 

performed a series of model drops to test the possibility of using para-gliders 

to recover lifting bodies, a support for early Space Shuttle research. 102 Wallops 

personnel would travel to other facilities to assist with piloted shots. 103 As 

the piloted programs and the space flight centers matured, however, tasks 

that once came to Wallops by necessity and convenience, went to more 

specialized installations. The result was a certain increase in specialization 

at Wallops. The program became more focused on the conduct of economical 

space science, with occasional forays into aeronautical research. Legacies of 

Project Mercury: contractors, public relations, and foreign researchers, did 

not wane with the piloted programs at the Station, though. These influences 

grew stronger as Wallops moved through the final phase of the transition 

era, the phase that saw the base move from simply carrying out the programs 

of others to planning some of their own. 

70 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

NOTES 


1. 	 McDougall, 202. 

2. 	 Ibid., 200. 

3. 	 Richard P. Hallion, "The Antecedents of the Space Shuttle," in History of Rocketry 

and Astronautics, vol. 10, of the American Astronautical Society History Series, ed. 

A. Ingemar Skoog, (San Diego: A.A.S., 1990), 228-31. See also, Hansen, 350. 

4. 	 William E. Burrows, "Securing the High Ground," Air and Space I Smithsonian 

(December 1993/January 1994): 64-69. 

5. 	 Hallion, On the Frontier, 106-29. Systems needed in space that were tested on 

the X-15 included: reaction control jets, heat resistant materials, and a pilot 

pressure suit. 

6. 	 Gilruth, "Memoir," 463-67; Hansen, 377-81. The X-15 follow-on, known as Project 

HYWARDS, was an Air Force proposal that NACA personnel studied. 

7. 	 Hansen, 349-50; Shortal, 675-7. Allen perceived that a blunt shape moving 

rapidly through the air would create a shock wave that would keep much of 

the generated heat away from the nose-cone. 

8. 	 Langley PARO, "A Proposed Simple Means for Manned Space-Flight Research," 

24 January 1958, in folder "January- May 58," in Wallops box #4. Shortal credited 

PARD's Max Paget and Paul Purser with this "scheme," page 650. 

9. 	 Hansen, 377-81, The paper Paget read was co-authored by Benjamin J. Garland 

and James J. Buglia. 

10. 	 Ibid. 

11. 	 Gilruth, 465-67. 

12. 	 Ibid., 467; Data Book II, 102. 

13. 	 Shortal, 437. Recall that, at the time, Shortal, PARO Chief, was Faget's boss. 

14. 	 Gilruth, 469; Data·Book II, 98-99. 

15. 	 Ezell, Data Book II, 102n lists the Langley members of the STG by their prior 

affiliation. 

16. 	 NACA-Langley, "Facilities required for the development and test of manned 

space vehicles," undated, in folder "Preliminary Space Expansion Notes," FLT 

Papers. Quote is from "Summary" on page 8. 

17. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 50-80. Shortal, 646. 

18. 	 Shortal, 637-38, 643-46. 

19. 	 Ibid., 643-46. The drogue parachute was small, designed to stabilize the 

spacecraft rather than slow it. It also served to extract the larger main parachute 

from storage. 

20. 	 Ibid., 638, 660. 

21. 	 Ibid., 636, 647. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 560. 

22. 	 Memorandum from the Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, 26 January 1959, in 

folder 3390 "Goddard Space Flight Center," in file tray "Administrators, 

Glennan," in NHO. See also: "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 560. 

71 
WALLOPS STATION 

23. 	 Shortal, 647-49. 

24. 	 Langley PARO, "Proposed Simple Means," as cited in note 8; Data Book II, 48-9; 

Shortal, 647-9. 

25. 	 Shortal, 199-200; "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 20-80. 

26. 	 Shortal, 656; "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 50. 

27. 	 Shortal, 647. 

28. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 84. In mid-1957, the NACA received a request from 

the publication Missiles and Rockets for information pertaining to solid-fueled 

motors. Headquarters forwarded the request where H. Lee Dickinson, the 

"Employee Relations Officer," was directed to deal with it. Memorandum with 

enclosures, H. Lee Dickinson to Walter T. Bonny, 28 June 1957, in folder "Wallops 

and Related Materials," MA Collection. 

29. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 450, speaker is Marvin McGoogan. A bore-sighted 

camera was designed to be mounted on the radar and aligned with the radar's 

dish so that controllers could see what they were tracking. McGoogan stated 

that the partial failure of the first Scout might have been averted if trackers 

could have seen that their radar readings were in error. 

30. 	 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, sec. 203a, 3. 

31. 	 Letter, Lionel R. Booth to John C. Palmer, 19 March 1958; Letter, H.J. E. Reid to 

Maryland State College, 9 April 1958; both in folder "Special File, March -April 

58," in RGA181-1 (S). Note that this institution is now the University of Maryland, 

Eastern Shore. 

32. 	 Letter, Thomas S. Combs to Director, Langley Research Center, 25 August 1959, 

in folder "Special File, July-August 59," in RGA181-l(S). See also: U.S., Congress, 

House, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental NASA Appropriation for 

1960, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

86th 	 Cong., 2nd sess., 6002-0lH, 16. 

33. 	 Memorandum, NASA Headquarters to Langley Research Center, 17 April 1959, 

in folder "Wallops, January- June 46 [sic]" in RGA181-l(C). 

34. 	 Minutes of Administrator's Staff Meeting of 30 June 1959, page 3 and annex 2, 

in binder "December 58 - June 59," in Staff Meetings box, NHO. 

35. 	 Supplemental NASA Appropriation for 1960, 16-17, as cited in note 32 above. 

36. 	 Memorandum from the Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, 10 March 1960, loose 

in binder "NASA Staff Conference, Monterey, CA., 3-5 March 1960," in box 

"NASA Staff Conferences," in NHO. It is interesting to note, that even after this 

admonition, during the Administrator's staff meeting of 3 November 1960, "The 

problem of scheduling launches in a highly charged political climate was 

discussed. Flight dates during this period, as at all other times, will of course 

be governed by technical considerations only." Minutes of Administrator's Staff 

Meeting of 3 November 1960, 2, in book #1, in box "Administrator's Staff Meeting 

Minutes, October 60 - June 61," in NHO. 

37. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape 18: 120. NASA Wallops News Release, "Wallops Station 

Contract Awards During November," 3 December 1962, lists a contract for 

bleachers with Evans Construction Company in the amount of $26,400; in file 

tray "Wallops Flight Facility (cont.)," in NHO. 

72 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

38. 	 Ibid., Tape la: 350. The incident occurred in the late-60's or early 70's, but 

accurately reflects the situation at Wallops throughout the era. See also: "Spinak, 

et al.," OHI, Tape la: 140, for low level of security at the base. 

39. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 535. 

40. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Staff, 14 April 1960 in folder "Special File, 

January - April 60," in RGA181-l(S). 

41. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Staff, 7 June 1960, in folder "Wallops, January 

- June 60," in RGA181-l(C). 

42. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 120; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 25-50. For technical 

details of these flights see, Shortal, 656-9. 

43. 	 McDougall, 243. See also: Data Book II, 139-43 for tables 2-28 and 2-29. 

44. 	 Data Book II, 534-38; Rosholt, 45. 

45. 	 Data Book II, 521-24. 

46. 	 Ibid., 546-47. Old ways die hard, though. In February 1959 John Crowley sent a 

memo to Floyd Thompson at Langley: "It is suggested that Langley make use, 

wherever practical, of the personnel and facilities of the Pacific Missile Range, 

the White Sands Missile Range, Eglin Gulf Test Range, and the Atlantic Missile 

Range." Notice that he apparently felt it unnecessary to suggest using Wallops. 

Memorandum, John W. Crowley to Floyd L. Thompson, 20 February 1959, in 

folder "January - May 59," in Wallops box #4. 

47. 	 McCurdy, 34-40, 134-36; McDougall, 200; Rosholt, 156. 

48. 	 Data Book II, 534-36, 540. The 11 Minitrack stations included 3 in the U.S. 

(Blossom Pt., MD., Ft. Stewart, GA., San Diego, CA.); 3 Caribbean sites (Antigua, 

Grand Turk, Havana); 4 in South America (Anzofagasta and Santiago, Chile; 

Lima, Peru; and Quito, Ecuador); and 1 in Woomera, Australia. 

49. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA 

Authorization for 1965, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on 

Science and Astronautics on H.R. 9641, 88th Cong. 2nd sess., 6402-18H, part 4, p. 

2129. See also: Data Book II, 546. For the influence of foreign observers see: 

Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for the Record, 5 July 1960, in "Chron. File, 

July - December 60," in NASA HQ box #1. This memo describes the fourth 

meeting of "The Mexican - U.S. Commission for Space Tracking Observations ­

Project Mercury." On 27-30 June 1960, the Commission met at Wallops, toured 

the base, and viewed the equipment. Buckley was Chairman of the U.S. section 

of the Commission. See also: Letter, Edmund C. Buckley to General Antonio 

Perez-Marin, 14 December 1962, in "Chron. File, January - December 1962," in 

the same box. This letter describes the arrangements to be made for the training 

of Spanish personnel for the tracking station at Las Palmas (Grand Canary 

Island). That NASA could cooperate with Francisco Franco's government 

without drawing severe Congressional fire is probably a testament to the 

perceived importance of the space program. 

73 
WALLOPS STATION 

50. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 545, notes that the influx of contractors was not 

abrupt. For foreign nationals see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science 

and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1964, Hearings before the House 

Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 5466, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6303­

12H, part 4, 2845. It should be noted that many of the foreign stations were 

operated by contract to Bendix, while employing local people. 

51. 	 Letter, Robert C. Miedke to G. B. Graves, 12 March 1959, in folder "Special File, 

January - March 59," in RGA181-l(S). 

52. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for 1960, Hearings before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences on S. 1582 and H.R. 7007, 86th Cong. 1st sess., 

5905 215, 787. 

53. 	 Letter, E. C. Buckley to J. F.McNulty, 13 November 1959, in "Chron. File,January 

- June 1960," in NASAHQbox#l. This directive reminds McNulty that NASA's 

agreement with the Bermuda Government remained informal, and thus he was 

to keep a low profile while there and avoid the press, until a formal agreement 

could be signed. 

54. 	 Memorandum, E. C. Buckley for F. B. Smith, 16 November 1959, Ibid.; Walter 

Williams was STG's Associate Director for Operations at this time. 

55. 	 Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 

1982), 211-37, for NASA - military relations. 

56. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger for Wallops Station Files, 15 March 1960; 

Memorandum, Hartley A. Soule for Files, 23 March 1960; both in folder "Special 

Files, January - April 60," in RGA181-l(S). 

57. 	 Ibid.; Data Book II, 545-47. 

58. 	 Memorandum, Robert D. Briskman for Assistant Director, Space Flight 

Operations, 13 July 1960, in "Chron. File, July - December, 1960," in NASA HQ 

box #1. The Blossom Point Minitrack Station was the prototype facility. 

59. 	 Memorandum, Robert D. Briskman for the Record, 13 July 1960, Ibid. Quote is 

on page 2. Notice that Briskman was also the person recommending placing 

the Blossom Point Station at Wallops, even after seeing the situation firsthand. 

The Minitrack station eventually moved to Goddard. 

60. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices 

Appropriations for 1961, Hearings before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations on H.R. 11776, 86th Cong, 2nd sess., 6005-165, 238. 

61. 	 Letter, Bob Krieger to Joe Shortal, undated, attached to Memorandum, C. C. 

Shufflebarger for Associate Director, 1 August 1960, in folder "Wallops, July ­

August 60," in RGA181-l(C). 

62. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Work Stoppages 

at Missile Bases, Hearings before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on 

Government Operations pursuant to Senate Resolution 69, 87th Cong. 1st sess., 6104­

255, part 1, 12. The three test sites, Patrick, Vandenberg, and Edwards Air Force 

Bases, all hosted NASA operations. 

63. 	 Ibid., 13 for quote, 250-51 for statistics. 

74 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

64. 	 Minutes of Administrator's Staff Meeting, 1 June 1961, p. 1, in book #2, in box 

"Administrator's Staff Meeting Minutes, October 60 - June 61," in NHO. One of 

the alleged reasons for the strikes was dissatisfaction with the Davis-Bacon Act 

of 1931 that established guidelines for compensation of labor used in 

government construction projects. While a review of the Act, conducted in 1963, 

concluded that the Act, "is badly in need of a general overhaul and updating," 

it also stated that "the allegation that the Davis-Bacon Act was the cause of 

work stoppages ... at missile bases, [was] not generally substantiated by other 

testimony received." Perhaps. Two years later, however, "Wallops Island is still 

concerned about labor rates under the Davis-Bacon Act and the classification 

of employees working on Wallops Island contracts." For the D-B Act see: U.S., 

Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Administration of the 

Davis-Bacon Act, Hearings before a House general subcommittee of the Committee on 

Education and Labor, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6306-00H, 13. For Wallops' concern 

see: Memorandum, J.B. Sollohub for File, 5 February 1965, in folder "Special 

File, January- May 65," in RGA181-l(S); quote is on page 3. 

65. 	 NASA Historical Staff, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: 

NASA, 1964), 325 (this annual chronology is hereafter cited in the form "A&A, 

date");"Robbins," OHi, Tape 1 b: 150. It is interesting to note that the company 

listed in Wallops' telephone directories during 1962 and 63 (Plant Security Inc.) 

as providing guard services, was replaced in the 1964 directory by a new entry 

(Metropolitan Security Services, Inc.), at the 2-319 phone number. Telephone 

directories are in box "Center Telephone Books; Stennis Space Center (1990 - ); 

Wallops Flight Center (1962 - 1979)," in NHO. See also: "Floyd," OHI, Tape la: 

450. 

66. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 160-200, for Wallops' relative size in NASA. "Milliner," 

OHI, Tape la: 360, for economic conditions on the Eastern Shore. 

67. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 152. It should be noted that contractors were classed 

as either "service" contractors, providing operational services (such as security 

or grounds maintenance); or "research" contractors, fulfilling program contracts 

for various segments of NASA (such as operating a radar). This distinction 

was emphasized during the course of each oral interview. 

68. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 545. 

69. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 152. 

70. 	 Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Langley, 6 October 1960; Memorandum, 

Floyd L. Thompson to Wallops, 1 November 1960, both in folder "Wallops, 

September - November 61," in RGA181-l(C), (note that they are misfiled). For 

tunnels coming on line at Langley during this time see Data Book I, 356-7. The 

deactivation of Preflight Jet at this time is somewhat ironic in view of a strongly 

worded memo written by Krieger in August 1957 in response to a "ridiculous" 

proposal to relocate the wind tunnel to Langley. Memorandum, Robert L. 

Krieger for Associate Director, Langley, 6 August 1957, in folder "Wallops, 

January 55 - February 58," in RGA181-l(C). 

71. 	 Memorandum, Wallops Station to Langley, 6 October 1960, in folder "Wallops, 

September - December 60," in RGA181-l(C). 

72. 	 Teletype, NASA Wallops Station VA to Langley Research Center - Director, 19 

September 1961, in folder "Wallops, September - November 61," in RGA181-l(C). 

75 
WALLOPS STATION 

73. 	 Teletype, NASA Wallops Station VA to NASA HQ - DR Abe Silverstein, 21 

September 1961, Ibid. See also: "NASA APR, September 1961," section SFP, 27.4. 

"The Main Base," or simply "the Base," usually refers to the old Navy base in 

the lexicon of the Wallops Station. 

74. 	 Memorandum, William E. Grant for All Concerned, 16 December 1960, in folder 

"Wallops, September - December 60," in RGA181-l(C). 

75. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 216-275. Quote is near 220. 

76. 	 Ibid. 

77. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 310-80, quote is near 340. 

78. 	 Ibid. See also: W. Corlett Galvin, "Report of Storm Damage Suffered by Wallops 

Island During the Period March 6-9, 1962," p. 3, in "Chron. File, January ­

December 1962," in NASA HQ box #1. 

79. 	 W. Corlett Galvin, "Report," Ibid. Memorandum with attachments, Floyd L. 

Thompson for NASA - Code RTM, 5 April 1962; Teletype, NASA LRC Langley 

AFB VA to NASA HQ Wash DC, 11 March 1962, both in folder "Special Files, 

January - April 62," in RGA181-l(S). Teletype, NASA Wallops Station VA to 

NASA Headquarters, 12 March 1962, in folder "Wallops, January - March 62," 

in RGA181-l(C). DOVAP stands for DOppler Velocity And Position. Shortal's 

work ends prior to the Ash Wednesday Storm, but on page 630 there is a picture 

of the breached seawall. 

80. 	 Memorandum, N. Pozinski for Files, 9 March 1962, in "Chron. File, January ­

December 62," in NASA HQ box #1. 

81. 	 "NASA APR, March 1962," page D 2.4, for Scout 9. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 

lb: 430-75. 

82. 	 Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley to Director, Office of Programs, 15 March 

1962; Report, "NASA Project No. 3512: Wallops Station, Storm Damage Repairs, 

undated; Memorandum, W. C. Galvin for Files, 21 March 1962; Report, "Cost 

Breakdown on Instrumentation Damage at Wallops Island, undated; 

Memorandum, W. Corlett Galvin for File, 2 May 1962; Memorandum, Edmund 

C. Buckley for the Associate Administrator, 17 May 1962; Memorandum, W. 

Corlett Galvin for the Record, 22 May 1962; Letter, Milton E. Stevens to G. S. 

Brown, 5 April 1962; all in "Chron. File, January - December 1962," in NASA 

HQ box #1. 

83. 	 Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for the Associate Administrator, 12 March 

1962; Letter, James E. Webb to Robert L. Krieger, 13 March 1962; Memorandum, 

Edmund C. Buckley to the Associate Administrator, 21 March 1962; 

Memorandum, Robert C. Seamens, Jr. to Patrick Gavin, undated; all in "Chron. 

File, January - December 62," in NASA HQ box #1. See also: Letter, Robert L. 

Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 2 July 1962, in folder "Special File, May ­

September 62," in RGA181-l(S); and "Wallops Station Staff To Receive NASA 

Award," The Salisbury Times, 21 June 1962. 

84. 	 John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National 

Interest (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1970), 100-30. U.S., President, Public 

Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal 

Register,National Archives and Records Administration, 1953 - ), John F. Kennedy, 

1961, pp. 396-406. 

76 
PILOTED SPACE FLIGHT 

85. 	 Rosholt, 213-14; Levine, 19, 33; Data Book I, 390-94. 

86. 	 Levine, 227-28 for the advanced solid motor project. This motor measured 21.6 

feet in diameter as compared to the Shuttle SRB's 12.1 feet. See also: U.S., 

Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Development of Large 

Solid Propellant Boosters, Hearings before a House Special subcommittee of the 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6208-08H. No 

mention of Wallops appears in this record. 

87. 	 NACA Report, "Launching Sites for Space," 17 March 1958, 1-3, in folder "NACA 

Committee on Space Technology Working Group Papers," in box 

"Administrative History, Stever Committee Report 1958 I Minutes," in NHO. 

See also: James E. Oberg, ''Rendezvous in Space," in Air and Space I S111itlzsonian 

(August/ September 1993), 44. 

88. 	 Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots 

for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1979), 

91 92. 

89. 	 Memorandum, Robert F. Freitag to Distribution List, 27 February 1964; 

Memorandum, Robert F. Freitag to Distribution, 5 March 1964; both in folder 

007153 "Land Landing Files," in collection "Project Apollo," in NHO. See also: 

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Manned 

Space Flight Programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Projects 

Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, S. Staff Report, 6209-045. A drawing on page 149 

depicts an Apollo capsule touching down on land. In truth, the Vostok capsule 

could not provide a "survivable" landing. Gagarin and his fellow Vostok 

cosmonauts left their ships after re-entry and parachuted to Earth separately. 

For reasons of propaganda and prestige the Soviets could not officially admit 

this fact, and it took awhile for the nature of the Vostok landing system to become 

widely known in U.S. policy circles. When the fact did become known, it 

combined with the unforeseen cost and complexity involved in designing a 

touchdown system, and the desire not to lose the (perceived) close lunar race 

over the issue, to quiet demand for the system. Apollo flights, like Mercury 

and Gemini before them, ended with a splash. James E. Oberg, Red Star in Orbit 

(New York: Random House, 1981), 54-5; A&A, 1963, 268. 

90. 	 Grissom's Mercury capsule sank in the Atlantic after landing when the hatch 

prematurely jettisoned; Grissom almost went with it. Data Book II, 144. For 

alternate landing methods see: Memorandum, Edward Z. Gray to Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 18 August 1964. "Apollo Testing to 

Begin at White Sands," Aviation Weck and Space Technology, 22 July 1963, 281. 

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964, Hearings before the Senate Committee 011 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6306-125, 1045-45. 

91. 	 Rosholt, 213-14; Levine, 19, 33; Data Book I, 395-97. 

77 
WALLOPS STATION 

92. 	 Ivan D. Ertel and Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Vol. I, 

(Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1969), 141. NASA News Release, "Apollo at White 

Sands, by J. Thomas Markley," 11 September 1962, in folder 007215, in file tray 

"XII Manned Space Flight: Apollo - Little Joe II," in NHO. Interestingly Wallops 

had borrowed some equipment for Little Joe from White Sands. See: Letter, R. 

L. Barber to Commanding General, White Sands, 22 May 1959, in folder "Special 

Files, April - June 59," in RGA181-l(S); and Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to 

Director, Space Flight Programs, 31 October 1960, in "Chron. File, July ­

December 1960," in NASA HQ box #1. 

93. 	 Memorandum, Langley to Wallops, 14 September 1960, in folder "Wallops, 

September - December 60," in RGA181-l(C). Table, "Chronology of FlexibleWing Research, NASA-LRC," 8 June 1971, in folder "Flexible-Wing," MA 

Collection. Shortal, 662-63; Hallion, 137-40. 

94. 	 The station at Woomera was moved to Carnarvon, and the Zanzibar station 

was evacuated after a revolution on the island. Data Book II, 548, 593-94. See 

also: "Gemini Trackers Training At Wallops Facility," Goddard News, 18 November 

1963, 6. 

95. 	 Teletype, NASA GSFC Offices to ADE/NASA et al.," 21 November 1963, 2, in 

folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). Memorandum, E. 

J. Stockwell for the Record, 15 November 1963; Letter. Edmund C. Buckley to 

General Antonio Perez-Marin, 14 December 1962, both in "Chron. File, January 

- December 62," in NASA HQ box #1. 

96. 	 Data Book II, 547. NASA's third network, the Deep Space Network, was operated 

from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. In 1972 the satellite network and the manned 

space flight network were merged at Goddard. 

97. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Authorizing 

Appropriations to NASA, House Report 1240 to accompany H.R. 10456, 88th Cong. 

2nd sess., 6403-18H, p. 66. 

98. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices 

Appropriations for 1965, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, 88th Cong. 2nd sess., 6404-07H, 1239. 

99. 	 Teletype, W G Burton to BDA/STADIR M&O, et al., 11 July 1963, in folder 

"Wallops, January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C). 

100. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA 

Authorization for 1965, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and 

Astronautics on H.R. 9641, 88th Cong. 2nd sess., 6402-18H, part 4, 2129. 

101. For Saturn 	 I - Pegasus see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1966, Hearings before the House Committee 

on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 3730, 89th Cong. 1st sess., 6502-17H, 203; 255 

for Scout. The Saturn I launches also supported Apollo testing, Data Book II, 

58. For Saturn V see: "Schedule of Firings," 10 March 1965, in folder "Wallops, 

January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C). 

102. 	Langley Researcher, 31 May 1968, 8; Table "Chronology of Flexible-Wing Research, 

NASA-LRC," 8 June 1971, in folder "Flexible Wing," in MA Collection. 

103. "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 555. 

78 
Cliapter4 

SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

The nature of the service provided by Wallops Station shifted during the 

transition era as the scope of research broadened and the customer base 

grew. Under the NACA, Wallops existed to serve the program needs of 

Langley, and occasionally Lewis, Labs. The research examined a range of 

aeronautical engineering issues, but whether delving into fundamental 

principles or focusing on a particular airframe, the program came through 

Langley. NACA Headquarters consisted primarily of administrative staff, 

not the centralized program offices that characterize NASA. Due to this 

management structure, Wallops really had to answer only to Langley. The 

military was a regular customer at Wallops, but again, the projects came 

through the "Mother Lab." The establishment of NASA, and the growth of 

the Space Race, provided stimulus for the expansion of the base. These factors 

also brought the new programs and clients that allowed the Wallops 

personnel to expand their niche within the organization. 

As transonic and supersonic wind tunnels became more effective, the focus 

of military testing shifted. Hypersonic and high-temperature research for 

all areas of DOD soon replaced the launching of model airframes. 1 Most of 

these tests were conducted in a generally open manner, as such things go. 

The raw data held little value for anyone prior to reduction (the process of 

converting data readings into useable form), and truly sensitive hardware 

rarely appeared at the base, so the need for oppressive security measures 

seldom arose. 2 Many of the tests involved small pieces of larger puzzles, 

providing incremental progress to the researchers in a relatively short period 

of time. Occasionally, longer term projects like Trailblazer or RAM occupied 

the Station's attention, but since even the Scout had weight limitations 

compared to boosters available at the Cape and Vandenberg, small projects 

were the norm. 3 

One somewhat ironic exception to this norm resulted in both a Thor and a 

Jupiter missile coming to Wallops for tests in 1963. While still prohibited 

from developing the capability to fire the liquid-fueled boosters, the 

engineers erected the vehicles, filled them with water to simulate fuel, and 

began measuring how the winds at ground level stressed the airframes. The 

goal was to provide full-scale data to validate wind tunnel readings. Wallops 

could perform the tests with meteorological equipment already in place, 

without the need of tying-up an active launch pad at the Cape. 4 

Experiments also continued to come to the Station from within the parent 

organization. Langley remained a primary customer, and Lewis also 

79 
WALLOPS STATION 

continued to utilize the range. In addition, there were new members of the 

team to accommodate. Goddard became as large a source of projects as 

Langley, and even the Marshall Center, occasionally came to Wallops. 5 As 

with the military projects, NACA/NASA projects shifted from being almost 

exclusively aeronautical, to a mix of hypersonic and space science research. 

As time passed the shift became more pronounced, especially as three new 

types of customers began to arrive at the base: universities, non-military 

government agencies, and researchers from other countries. 

It is important to realize that the term "space science," refers to more than 

just astronomical research focusing on celestial bodies. According to one 

NASA definition the term "space science" included, "theoretical and 

experimental research on the ground and in the earth's atmosphere," ... , [and] 

"also includes instrumentation development and directly-related supporting 

research and technology required for carrying out [these] investigations."6 

The wide range of topics that could be included under this broad definition 

attracted many research proposals. The NASA leadership, concerned with 

both facilitating basic research, and demonstrating practical applications of 

these publicly funded activities to Congress, developed a detailed 

organizational structure to coordinate space science research. 

Under the leadership of Homer E. Newell, Jr., first as an Assistant Director 

of Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Development and later as an Associate 

Administrator in charge of the Office of Space Science and Applications 

(OSSA), a series of program offices was established at Headquarters to pursue 

research in differing fields. 7 A Space Science Steering Committee with 

associated subcommittees, reminiscent of the old NACA organizational style, 

worked to bring NASA personnel and researchers from outside the 

organization together to evaluate research proposals, and set priorities. The 

Space Sciences Board of the National Academy of Sciences played a similar 

role from a position outside of NASA. 8 Field centers had a voice in this 

planning function, but projects required OSSA approval in order to proceed, 

especially given that the November 1963 NASA reorganization placed the 

space science centers (Goddard, JPL, and Wallops) under Newell's 

cognizance. 

From Wallops' stance this represented only a minor change from past 

practices. NACA projects came to the Station through PARO. For NASA, 

though field centers could "initiate proposals for scientific investigations 

and flight projects," approval from above was still mandatory, just from a 

different location. 9 "Since endorsement of the scientific objectives of any 

proposal must be obtained by the appropriate Headquarters Program 

Director, you should refer requesting organizations to deal directly with the 

cognizant program offices in Headquarters. This procedure is necessary to 

ensure the evaluation of a proposal not only in terms of the proposal's 

scientific validity but also in terms of its compatibility with on-going and 

planned NASA program efforts .... Final approval for the implementation of 

80 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

any [research] program will be by the Administrator. In no case will any 

commitment of NASA resources or facilities take place prior to such 

approval. 10 Wallops' background as a service center lent an air of normalcy 

to this type of relationship with higher authorities, perhaps helping the 

Station to avoid the type of frictions that arose between Goddard and JPL, 

and OSSA. 11 

An October 1960 planning document, "Long Range Thinking in Space 

Sciences," listed nine areas of scientific investigation to be pursued from 

Wallops. These areas included meteorology, atmospheric motions, and solar 

studies. 12 Flights investigating atmospheric electron density and atmospheric 

probes joined the heat-transfer and materials research on the island's flightline. Add the Mercury and Scout work to the roster and the result is a very 

busy schedule. While early research, like Shotput which supported William 

O'Sullivan's Project Echo, came from within NACA/NASA, an increasing 

number of universities began to avail themselves of the emerging scientific 

sounding rocket program at Wallops. 13 Just as World War II opened the way 

for physicists to receive major government funding for their research, Sputnik 

and the Cold War resulted in increased government funding for space 

science. 14 Unlike the investigations of the past, conducted mostly with passive 

devices like telescopes, the development of the sounding rocket allowed 

instruments to be lifted to altitudes unreachable by air-breathing vehicles 

and balloons. Also, while satellites promised to provide a powerful new 

tool for researchers, orbital altitudes could not drop much below 100 miles 

or the atmosphere would drag the vehicle down. Sounding rockets, often 

based on military designs, provided access to this intermediate zone. Since 

the government controlled most of the affordable hardware, and requisite 

facilities, universities looked to Washington for both logistic and financial 

support. 15 

The research projects conducted by the Universities of Michigan and 

Maryland in 1958 paved the way for other universities to conduct 

experiments at Wallops. These projects resembled the earlier NACA projects 

in variety, if not in subject matter. Some concerned "pure," fundamental 

research while others pertained to applied research of interest to both 

scientists and the military. 16 The military, of course, provided financial 

support for many programs pertaining to their needs. Wallops provided a 

few research grants, however a large portion of the basic research grants 

came from NASA Headquarters, through OSSA. 17 The research team "would 

produce their own hardware, and they'd interface with us here at Wallops, 

... , so it would fit into the rockets, and we'd figure how high they wanted to 

go and what they wanted to do, and guide them so they could get the 

experiments [accomplished] .... "18 The size and civilian orientation of the 

facility allowed professors to launch small projects and train graduate 

students without interfering with operations at the large ranges. This 

educational aspect of Wallops' operation helped not only to advance the 

81 
WALLOPS STATION 

cause of science, but it also provided a supportive clientele that would "rise 

up in arms" in response to later attempts to close the base. 19 

Another new group of customers at the Wallops base during the early 

1960's consisted of government agencies outside the Defense Department 

and NASA. These organizations began to apply space age technology to 

their missions and found sounding rockets to be a valuable tool for certain 

tasks. In May 1963 Langley collaborated with the Atomic Energy Commission 

on a payload launched by Scout from Wallops. The Re-entry Flight 

Demonstration Experiment - 1, provided data relating to NASA-AEC efforts 

to build reactors for spacecraft that, in the event of an emergency, would be 

safely destroyed upon re-entry into the atmosphere. 20 While this "model" 

reactor carried little radioactive material, Krieger saw the need to formalize 

procedures for dealing with such substances. "In the past, this station has 

had negligible opportunities for support of research efforts in which 

radioactive sources were involved; however, in anticipation of increased 

contact with radioactive material, definite radiological safety regulations, 

procedures, and requirements applicable to all radioactive sources and 

experiments will be established .... "21 

In June 1964 a researcher with the National Bureau of Standards proposed 

cooperation with NASA on Project RAM, through use of equipment the NBS 

already had in place at Wallops, "in support of most of the rocket-probe 

experiments conducted there." 22 The runways at the Main Base were utilized 

in cooperative projects with the FAA, which included research on tires, and 

landing aids. 23 

The Weather Bureau became a frequent, then a permanent, customer at 

the base. Even though Project Hugo proved impractical, the Bureau's 

hurricane research benefitted from work at Wallops. In August 1958 the FPS16 radar at the base tracked Hurricane Daisy as the storm moved along the 

coast. 24 NASA planners conceived a two-front approach to meteorological 

research. The first involved building on past programs with balloon launches 

and sounding rockets to probe the atmosphere. Both systems offered 

advantages. Balloons could remain aloft for a long period of time, while 

sounding rockets could reach to the fringes of space. A combination of the 

two systems resulted in sounding rockets that could release a balloon at a 

high altitude, allowing data to be taken during the balloon's long, slow 

descent. The establishment of a "meteorological network," gave atmospheric 

researchers the opportunity to obtain data from several areas around the 

world. 25 

While participation in this network acquainted Wallops with a novel type 

of rocket, and tied into Langley's investigation of wind shear phenomena, 

Krieger was not overly enthusiastic about the quantity of launches the 

weather program would entail. "Mr. Krieger says that participation in the 

Meteorological Network does not provide material assistance to his 

operations and therefore, as far as Wallops is concerned, it has no interest in 

82 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

the network once the present program is completed. However, if some group 

within NASA felt that further participation was justified for meteorological 

research he would be willing to continue although it does represent a fairly 

heavy workload for Wallops." 26 

These misgivings did not fade easily. Seventeen months later Krieger 

reported, "It should be pointed out from a range's viewpoint that the present 

operational status of meteorological rockets requires considerable range time; 

and launching, tracking and data facilities in addition to range clearance 

and surveillance of impact areas. Therefore, much range effort is required 

with the present state of the art, and should be considered in the selection of 

rockets, payloads, number of firings and scheduling." 27 A month later he 

added, "Being on the operational end of this business, we have been 

somewhat disappointed for it seems to us that this program turned from a 

research and development effort into an operational effort almost 

immediately after its initiation." 28 

Despite the early problems Wallops, and Krieger, adjusted to the 

meteorological program. In March 1963 developmental launches of a NikeCajun meteorological rocket began, and by April 1965 "a regular launch 

schedule [had] been established," for the smaller rockets that performed most 

of the weather flights. 29 By late 1965, perhaps because of the usefulness of 

the program for both science and justification of budgets, Krieger accepted 

that the meteorological research occupied a prominent place in the Station's 

agenda. 30 

The second portion of NASA's weather program involved the construction 

and launch of an orbiting satellite. Inherited from the Army Ballistic Missile 

Agency when NASA was established, a meteorological satellite program 

contracted to RCA ca,me under Goddard's jurisdiction. The resulting TIROS 

(Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite) revolutionized weather research 

and forecasting, and provided a high-profile example of an everyday 

application of space technology. After successful launches of the first two 

TIROS, plans were made to move the data reception station from the Army 

base at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Wallops Island. 31 RCA already held 

the contract for operation and maintenance of Wallops' FPS-16 radar, and 

could thus easily expand on its existing activities there. 32 NASA hoped to 

relocate the data reception equipment in time for the launch of Tiros 3 in 

July 1961, but the work went faster than anticipated and the facility became 

operational a month early, in time to support Tiros2, already on orbit. Though 

most of the funding came from the Weather Bureau, Edmund Buckley 

requested funds to cover the extra personnel costs incurred in running the 

radar and processing the received photographs. In December the facility 

underwent an overhaul. 33 

By late 1962, in keeping with its research and development mission, NASA 

was planning a second generation weather satellite called Nimbus. The 

Weather Bureau, pleased with Tiros however, began planning the "Tiros 

83 
WALLOPS STATION 

Operational System" (TOS), and in 1964 pulled out of the expensive Nimbus 

effort. 34 Wallops saw both sides of the controversy as NASA considered the 

base for a backup Nimbus station, while simultaneously upgrading the Tiros 

facility. 35 Whatever difficulties the NASA-Weather Bureau spat caused at 

higher levels of the organizations, working relationships at Wallops seem 

unimpaired. In September 1964 NASA recommended that the East Coast 

Command and Data Acquisition station for TOS be located at the base. The 

presence of this operational system required some balancing of projects at 

the test range, but "The Director of Wallops has indicated that he will 

cooperate to the fullest in order to prevent conflicts between [different 

projects'] operations." By this time, the meteorological sounding rocket 

program had provided Wallops with experience in the conduct of an 

operational program supporting Weather Bureau needs, so this work 

integrated into the Wallops program without too much trouble. 36 

The increase in Wallops' obligations and range users brought about a new 

round of construction funding. The initial post-Sputnik infusion of money 

into the base, $20 million for Project 2080 in fiscal 1959, was followed in 

fiscal 1960 by $0 in the "Construction of Facilities" account. NASA's request 

for fiscal 1961 contained a modest $2.03 million in Wallops CoF for a 

computing station and a vehicle check-out building. 37 The $13 million request 

in fiscal 1962 represented a hefty boost in the Station's budget. $1 million of 

this money went to complete repairs to damage caused by the Ash 

Wednesday Storm, the remaining amount bought improved tracking 

equipment and better vehicle handling facilities. 38 

In addition to more fixtures the Station also doubled the size of its workforce within three years, growing from 229 paid employees in mid-1960 to 

493 by mid-1963. 39 The number of contract personnel grew in roughly equal 

fashion. "When we became NASA we realized that, some of us, we were not 

going to get as many people as we thought we needed .... The magic number 

has always been 1000 to 1100 employees. When we would cut back the civil 

servants we seemed to be able to fill in with contractors. 40 While these 

personnel and funding increases might have drawn serious Congressional 

scrutiny in other years, during the early stage of the Project Apollo expansion, 

it constituted a drop in the bucket. The construction budget for Cape 

Canaveral in fiscal 1962 topped $115 million. The same three years in which 

Wallops doubled its complement saw the in-house employment at the 

Manned Spacecraft Center rise from 668 to 3345.41 Granted these are extreme 

examples, but they illustrate the point; the growth at Wallops was in the 

"enviable position" of being overshadowed by other, more visible growth in 

the space program. 42 

Coordination of the rising launch rate with the incorporation of new 

facilities into the Wallops infrastructure called for efficiency in the Station's 

operations. As early as April 1960 Abe Silverstein felt compelled to issue a 

memorandum that addressed the subject of, "Launching Schedule Problems 

84 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

at Wallops Station." Directed to the two primary range users, Langley and 

Goddard, the memo emphasized the need to maintain firm flight schedules. 

"Continual changes to the established monthly schedules is becoming a 

source of embarrassment to Wallops and NASA Headquarters .... "43 To help 

alleviate these problems, and refine the processing flow of projects, the 

Wallops staff issued a four volume "Wallops Station Handbook," in December 

1961. The cover letter that accompanied the first edition stated, "This 1961 

edition of the WSH is the station's first attempt to outline the policies, procedures, 

facilities, and organization of the station for the guidance of prospective range 

users." These policies and procedures went promptly into effect. 44 

One potential extension of Wallops' capabilities that NASA decided not to 

authorize resulted in limiting the growth of the Scout program on the island. 

The question of launching into high-inclination or polar orbits from Wallops 

had been considered, and in April of 1961 two studies recommended against 

the proposal. The primary reasons involved range safety issues. Such 

launches would come too close to inhabited areas, so Scout payloads 

requiring these orbits continued to fly from Vandenberg Air Force Base. 45 

Coordination with the military ranges did not always prove easy, as the 

civilian range often found itself overlooked. 46 In May 1962 Buckley sought 

to correct this situation by proposing, "that the appropriate agreements and 

policies be established which would allow the NASA Wallops Station to be 

included in [the] lead range concept." This concept served to facilitate 

operations by giving the designated "lead range" the assignment of planning, 

coordinating, and controlling the requisite facilities for a particular launch. 

Acceptance of this proposal allowed Wallops easier access to components of 

the Atlantic Missile Range (and vice-versa), and also gave the Station more 

credibility as an "integrated range," rather than as simply a "launch site." 47 

The designation of Wallops as a lead range occurred as the Scout launch 

facility completed a refurbishment in July 1962. This refurbished pad still 

did not provide the base enough capacity. "A two per month Scout launch 

capability is required by the summer of 1963 to meet the NASA launch 

schedule and additional Department of Defense missions." 48 To meet this 

need NASA took advantage of its ability to reprogram certain appropriated 

funds and sidestepped Subcommittee Chairman Albert Thomas by allocating 

$1.5 million to begin construction of a second Scout pad. 49 Even though its 

program financially paled in comparison to larger space initiatives, Wallops 

did not always get what it asked for. The Senate removed $2 million from 

the fiscal 1964 budget, having deemed a planned sounding rocket launch 

facility (intended as Wallops' #6 launch pad), "desirable, but not essential at 

this time." 50 The previous year both House and Senate Authorization 

Committees had imposed a 5% cut in funding at several field centers, 

including Wallops. 51 Still, with the pads built during Project 2080, the Scout 

pads, and an Aerobee launching tower that had commenced service in 1960, 

the total launch capacity at the Station was now varied and ample. 52 

85 
WALLOPS STATION 

The tracking and data acquisition program at Wallops diversified as the 

variety of experiments increased. In June 1961, while Wallops oversaw the 

operation of the Mercury tracking station in Bermuda, Langley requested 

permission to build and operate, "a temporary base for ... mobile tracking 

trailers," at Coquina Beach on North Carolina's Outer Banks. This station 

would provide down-range support for longer flights such as RAM. Abe 

Silverstein agreed to the proposal, but stipulated that, "when certain range 

instrumentation now under development at Langley becomes operational, 

and is assigned to Wallops for integration with other equipment ... as a part 

of a continuing requirement in support of Wallops launchings, it appears 

logical and necessary that Wallops assume full responsibility, with, of course, 

continued co-use by Langley as required." 53 In May 1965 contracts relating 

to the North Carolina facility were transferred from Langley to Wallops. 54 

Tracking operations continued to migrate off the Wallops base when, in 

May 1962, Wallops contracted with the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) 

for the operation and maintenance of a tracking and recovery ship, USNS 

Range Recoverer. Acquired and outfitted with assistance from Langley, 

Wallops personnel handled the tracking equipment while leaving the nautical 

tasks to an MSTS crew. As Buckley told Congress, "we do feel it's necessary 

for us to operate the instrumentation on a ship, so that the whole ground 

system works together as an integrated system." 55 Equipment aboard 

included helix antennas, recording systems for data, and a communications 

suite with direction finders to help locate and recover payloads. Wallops 

had used shipboard tracking systems before, calling on the Navy for 

assistance and occasionally renting ships. The accelerated launch schedule 

called for a level of support that made it practical for Wallops to have a ship 

of its own. 56 

The increased range of the vehicles launched from Wallops also meant 

that a greater area of ocean had to be cleared of shipping. "Range safety 

regulations dictate that the probability of impacting a ship shall be less than 

1 in 100,000." An SPS-12 radar at the base could search areas out to around 

thirty miles. A shot travelling much further than that required personnel to 

go out and verify that the range was clear. The Range Recoverer helped with 

this task, but the ship's slow speed and the limited range of its surface search 

radar minimized its effectiveness in this role. To fill in the gaps in ocean 

surveillance Wallops relied on aircraft supplied by different organizations. 

Also useful for calibrating tracking systems, finding sources of radiofrequency interference, and locating downed payloads, surveillance aircraft 

became a vital tool in Wallops' arsenal. So much so, that in September 1964, 

Krieger requested that Headquarters transfer two Langley planes to Wallops, 

and acquire a Lockheed C-121 to meet the Station's needs. NASA met Krieger 

halfway, they arranged for a Lockheed contract for two C-121's to cover 

Wallops. 57 

86 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

The Navy provided much support to Wallops at this time. Aircraft for range 

surveillance , divers to reco ver test components, and ships for track ing 

purposes. 58 There was even a proposal to use Na vy airships from Lakehurst, 

New Jersey, to recover missile nose cones. A nose cone and parachute were 

sent to Lakehurst in 1961 so airship crews could practice recovery techniques, 

but the plan fell through when the Navy retired its airship fleet later that 

year . Soon after that, Wallops contracted for the Range Recoverer.

59 

Aerial view of the Range Recoverer. 

One facet of the space program new to many in NASA stemmed from 

section 102, paragraph c (7) of the Space Act . "The aeronautical and space 

activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially 

to ... : Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of 

nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of 

the results thereof; .... "60 Since a high-lev ,el concern revolved around the 

possibility that some nations might react to \ 

Sputnik by strengthening their 

ties with the Soviet Union, both Executive and Legislative decision makers 

wanted NASA to include foreign governments in selected portions of the 

space program. This would provide the opportunity to showcase U.S. space 

technological prowess, highlight Soviet secretiveness, and permit other 

nations to advance their scientific and political stature . 

A study of the political motivations of NASA's international program 

characterized official sentiment toward this issue as being either "innovative," 

or "conservative." 61 Innovators believed that cooperation could lead to more 

87 
WALLOPS STATION 

peaceful international relations, an opening of the Iron Curtain, and the 

creation of a new political reality. Conservatives saw the opportunity to wield 

a potent propaganda tool, and stimulate research and the creation of 

scientists, engineers, and technologies needed for more effective 

maneuvering within the existing reality. Cooperative projects were therefore 

useful to both ideological camps, only for different reasons. An examination 

of four areas of cooperation concluded that although NASA, on the whole, 

spoke the language of cooperation like an "innovator," the agency followed 

a "conservative" path out of political necessity. 62 

No matter how well this conclusion applied to NASA as a whole, it does 

not adeqately describe Wallops. While "conservative" motivations, 

particularly propaganda value, were recognized at the Station and Wallops' 

major role in the program provided NASA with ammunition to fight later 

proposals to close the base, the value of the science performed and a 

perception of being NASA ambassadors seemed to have also been consistent 

"innovative" motivations. 63 The explanation for why this should be the case, 

and why Wallops received a large share of the program, stemmed from 

several roots. 

The NACAhad almost as little experience with cooperative foreign projects 

as it had with public relations. Established specifically to advance the state 

of aeronautical research in the U.S., in response to European progress, the 

Committee usually saw competition when it looked abroad. Also, the NACA 

did not hold the near monopoly on aeronautical technology that NASA later 

held on space technology. NACA officials traveled to Europe to learn and 

observe rather than to teach and the NACA era was almost at an end before 

any non-American researchers came to Wallops. 64 

Through their experience with the International Geophysical Year, many 

of the Project Vanguard researchers who constituted the core of Goddard 

had at least some grounding in the organization and conduct of international 

cooperative ventures. The success of the IGY's wide ranging research 

program of atmospheric and geophysical studies, performed under the 

auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions, demonstrated that 

such ventures could produce good scientific results. Scientists like Homer 

Newell and Milton Rosen had both influential positions within NASA and 

recognition in the international scientific community. The growing role of 

the research techniques in use at Wallops, relatively inexpensive rockets 

familiar to these scientists, made the Station a logical place from which to 

launch cooperative projects. 65 

One NACA veteran who had gained some experience in international 

relations, and also occupied an influential position within NASA, was 

Edmund Buckley. His long association with Wallops provided the base with 

a friend at Headquarters who would look-out for its interests. The decision 

to locate the Mercury demonstration tracking facility at Wallops, for the 

convenience of both the Space Task Group, and Tracking and Ground 

88 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

Instrumentation Unit at Langley, resulted in many foreign nationals visiting 

the area during the course of this program. The negotiations Buckley 

participated in no doubt familiarized several governments with Wallops' 

overall potential for science research. 66 

NASA Headquarters established the Office of International Programs on 

1 April 1959 and assigned it the task of coordinating NASA's cooperative 

ventures. This included assisting Buckley in locating sites for Mercury 

stations, and coordinating the international use of the Wallops range. 67 In 

December they reported to the Administrator an agreement reached with 

Canada for cooperative launches from Wallops. Since the Canadians had 

been the first non-US group to use the base, this hardly represented a political 

breakthrough. 68 As the differing components of NASA settled into their roles, 

however, the program made more progress. Though an earlier House 

committee report on the subject of "International Cooperation in the 

Exploration of Space," made no reference to Wallops, by May 1960 Hugh 

Dryden told Congress that, "This station will be the scene of launchings made 

in cooperation with other nations in our program of international cooperation 

in space activities." 69 

From 28 to 30 June 1960 the "second working group meeting," for the 

International Ionospheric Satellite (a joint US-UK project) was held at 

Wallops. The resulting Ariel 1 satellite represented NASA's first joint satellite 

project and was launched from the Cape in 1962. Two of four subsequent 

Ariel missions launched from Wallops. 70 In January 1961 a French professor 

and a Norwegian engineer both arrived at the Station to work on separate 

tracking systems. In March, France announced plans to launch soundings 

from Wallops, and a joint US-Italian agreement was formalized. Over the 

course of the next several years, researchers and trainees from Australia, 

Japan, Sweden, India, and Pakistan came to the Station in association with a 

variety of projects. (See appendix 4).71 

The introduction of people from different cultures and backgrounds into 

the local Virginia communities caused some frictions at first, as might be 

expected. "We had a few problems, like getting haircuts and motels, but we 

worked it out behind the scenes, and most people were pretty decent about 

it. This is back in the time before integration, you know, and these people, a 

lot of them, were dark-skinned, but they spoke beautiful English, most of 

them, ... , each country sent its best." 72 As time passed and people came to 

know some of these visitors, the problems eased. Indeed, during the three 

years the Italian team was here, "some were married to some of the local 

girls around here and they had started families." Krieger noted that the 

Italians, "really got to be a part of the family here. We almost had tears in 

our eyes when they left." 73 

One method the staff used to educate the public about the programs, 

foreign and domestic, in progress at the base was a series of annual "Open 

House" events. The first of these events took place in October 1962, included 

89 
WALLOPS STATION 

self-guided tours, literature describing the Station and its programs, and 

the opportunity to talk to NASA employees and witness rocket launchings. 

Besides helping to strengthen ties between the base and the community, the 

open houses allowed Wallops to showcase the open, civilian nature of its 

work. 74 The ability to demonstrate such accessibility without compromising 

either national security or the launch schedule of a multi-million dollar 

project provided one of the major justifications for bringing the international 

guests to Wallops. The issue of appearances counted for much, especially as 

the US endeavored to score propaganda points against the USSR. Joe Robbins 

stated, "We had to be very careful, that when foreign people came here, ... , if 

we had any military, I instructed my people to go around and tell every one 

of them, 'Don't come on this base wearing a uniform; if you do you're not 

going to be admitted. You're going to be dressed in civilian clothes.' As a 

matter of fact, I had to tell a general that too .... What would it look like if 

you were bringing a foreigner in and you had half the people you see on the 

base were military? Going back to their own country, 'Well, they just say it's 

civilian, but it's all military.' ... We tried to keep a clean slate." 75 

Specific cooperative research projects covered a wide range of services. 

Projects that utilized flight hardware included launches of foreign payloads, 

coordinated launches from Wallops and other ranges, and the study of rocket 

preparation and launch techniques. Researchers also studied and received 

training on the assorted tracking and data acquisition equipment. Using 

surplus radars Wallops put together an "instrumentation lending library," 

where foreign customers "could borrow a radar, borrow a telemetry system, 

.... " Some visitors simply came to tour the Station and observe a portion of 

the American space program close-up. 76 

These projects permitted the participating countries to conduct space flight 

research and advance their technological base without having to expend the 

enormous, or (for some) impossible, sums of money required to build a 

massive space transportation infrastructure. Sounding rockets, balloons, and 

the Scout were comparatively cheap, and the operation of these vehicles 

entailed small, low-budget facilities similar to Wallops in scale if not in 

diversity. This should not be taken to indicate that the scientific data 

generated had little use. The establishment of sounding programs at several 

points around the globe gave researchers the ability to study atmospheric 

conditions at a variety of locations, and helped create a comprehensive 

picture of the Earth's climatic system. NASA's concentration on high-priority 

missions like Apollo, Tiros, and the Orbiting Observatories, prevented the 

agency from establishing a large number of small facilities to gather this 

data. By cooperating with interested governments, they could at least obtain 

access to the data coming from these smaller programs. 

The most prominent example of this mutually beneficial international 

cooperation was the San Marco Project conducted with Italy. After a series 

of sounding rocket launches from both Wallops and Sardinia, the Italian 

90 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

Space Research Commission expressed a desire to utilize the Scout booster 

for satellite research. Arrangements were completed by April 1962, and the 

US-Italian team went to work. 77 On 15 December 1964 a group of Italian 

technicians launched San Marco 1 from Wallops, "the first satellite entirely 

designed and constructed in Europe," on a mission to analyze the fringes of 

the atmosphere. 78 

Not content with launching only from Wallops, the Italians commenced 

construction of a mobile launch facility in Formosa Bay, off the East Coast of 

Africa to provide a Scout launcher near the equator. The San Marco Equatorial 

Mobile Range contained two platforms anchored to the sea-floor, and an 

on-shore base in Kenya. One platform provided for assembly, testing, and 

launch of the Scout, the other served as the launch control facility. A tracking 

station, integrated into NASA's STADAN network, supported operations 

from the Kenyan base. Owned by the University of Rome, and operated by 

the Italian Aerospace Research Center, the facility was completed in 1967 

and launched San Marco 2 into orbit on 26 April of that year. On 12 December 

1970 the range launched Explorer42, the first satellite launched for the U.S. 

by another government. 79 

In 1965 Wallops began to coordinate its meteorological soundings with 

those of Argentina and Brazil to create the Experimental Inter-American 

Meteorological Rocket Network (EXAMETNET). With OSSA at Headquarters 

overseeing the project, and Langley providing the hardware, Wallops 

participation in this project enabled, "comparative analysis of the structure 

and behavior of the atmosphere in both hemispheres." 80 

Not only did foreign researchers come to Wallops, but Station personnel 

traveled abroad to assist in establishing ranges, and launching rockets. In 

addition to helping the Italians with both sodium vapor launches from 

Sardinia, and the San Marco Project, Wallops people travelled to Sonmiani 

Beach, Pakistan, to help set up that launch site. 81 Cooperation with Canada 

included launches by Wallops personnel from the Ft. Churchill range in 

Manitoba. In a cost sharing arrangement with the U.S. Air Force, which also 

used the range, Wallops maintained facilities at that launch site. After a fire 

heavily damaged the facility, Canadian engineers brought their Black Brant 

test program to Wallops for a time, while the US participated in the 

restoration of Ft. Churchill. 82 As a result of the international programs, 

"Wallops is better known overseas, in a way, than it is here in this country, 11 83 

Intimate knowledge of Scout procedures took Wallops engineers to other 

American launch ranges to provide assistance. A meeting held at Wallops 

on 14 April 1961 with representatives from Headquarters, Langley, Marshall, 

and Vought Corporation, discussed the requirements of the Scout facility at 

the Point Arguello (Pacific Missile Range) launch site. Marshall's involvement 

did not last long, as in August the decision to transfer "technical cognizance" 

of the Scout from Langley to the Huntsville facility was reversed. Werner 

91 
WALLOPS STATION 

von Braun, working on the Saturn booster for the recently accelerated Apollo 

Project, probably lost little sleep over this decision. 84 Wallops dispatched 

personnel to the Pacific Range several times over the course of the next few 

years to help with problems like "pyrotechnic procedures," or to "provide 

technical consultation on the dynamic balance" of various Scout missions. 85 

In mid-1964 Wallops engineers participated in the investigation into the 

cause of a fatal accident at Cape Canaveral. While attaching an Orbiting 

Solar Observatory to an X-248 rocket motor (the third stage of the Delta 

booster assigned to loft it into orbit) static electricity activated the motor's 

ignitor. The solid-fueled motor fired inside the test building, injuring eleven 

technicians, three of whom later succumbed to their wounds. Since the X248 also served as the fourth stage of the Scout, Goddard (responsible for 

the Delta) included representatives from both Wallops and Langley in the 

fact finding board. 86 Those assigned to the board lent their experience with 

the X-248 to the investigation, and learned all they could to prevent a similar 

accident from happening at Wallops. 87 

The operation at Wallops was not accident free during this period, though 

fortunately no-one died. On 8 June 1964, a meter measuring the flow of 

nitrogen gas in a test apparatus exploded under pressure, injuring the 

Langley engineer running the test. While directly caused by the improper 

installation of a valve, the accident report cited a number of contributing 

factors that added up to trying to do too much, too fast. 88 The acceleration of 

the space program, and especially the influx of experimenters inexperienced 

with the rocket operations, made "keeping track of everything that was going 

on ... sometimes pretty difficult." "[Krieger's) philosophy was you don't do 

anything unsafe, ... , even if you're handling rockets you never do anything 

unsafe because they're not safe devices; ... , and assume that you're going to 

screw-up, because humans do make mistakes. "89 This philosophy, combined 

with the experience of a rocket misfire in 1951 that had cost a technician his 

right hand, created a safety consciousness that spread throughout the 

Station. 90 In 1962 Goddard and the University of Michigan brought the ARGO 

D-8 radio noise probe to Wallops for launch. "A launch was set for the last 

week in July, but the Range Safety at Wallops postponed the launch to an 

unspecified future date so that they can evaluate the ARGO D-8 performance 

limits as related to a Wallops launch." ARGO D-8 flew on 22 September. 91 

The off-range experience served the Wallops engineers well when, in May 

1964, they began to conduct Nike-Cajun firings from a new launch site at 

Point Barrow, Alaska. Situated near the Arctic Research Laboratory, the new 

site gave NASA a launch range in the far north, especially beneficial to the 

meteorological sounding program. A survey team from Headquarters, 

Goddard, and Wallops considered several sites and decided that, "Point 

Barrow was by far the most favored by reason of its desirable location, and 

the presence of an active research laboratory housing upwards of 350 

scientists and technicians, a DEW line station, an NBS ionosphere sounding 

92 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

station, a W.B. station and adequate commercial air service." 92 Working out 

of Quonset huts, and restricted to setting up equipment only during the 

brief Arctic summer, the Point Barrow program was reminiscent of the early 

years at Wallops. While OSSA and Goddard handled the program 

management, OTDA and Wallops constructed the NASA facility. Wallops 

also had the responsibility for, "preparation and launch of vehicle," and, 

"training of launch crew." 93 Support and year-round maintenance was 

furnished by the Arctic Research Lab "on a cost-reimbursable basis." Though 

the operations "up north" put "a strain on the travel budget," it did not cause 

exceptional administrative headaches for the Wallops staff; "just a logistic 

problem of getting things there, we were used to doing [off-range launches] 

anyhow, ... , it didn't make that much difference." 94 

By far the most ambitious off-range operation conducted by Wallops during 

this era was the Mobile Sea Launch Expedition of 1965. From the beginning 

of serious U.S. space planning the concept of launching rockets from ships 

at sea attracted attention. 95 Launching from sea complicated missile 

navigational planning, but it would provide mobility, thus allowing the 

launch platform to be placed in an advantageous spot. The Navy made use 

of this advantage by launching sounding rockets from a ship positioned in 

the path of a solar eclipse in 1958.96 The open expanses of water would also 

provide a margin of safety, especially for the larger or nuclear powered 

boosters then under consideration. In 1961, the House Committee on Science 

and Astronautics convened hearings on the concept as it related to the 

possible establishment of an American launch range along the equator. 

During these hearLtgs, NASA depicted the use of ships to launch large 

boosters as uneconomical and unnecessary, but, "a continuing requirement 

exists for shipboard launch of sounding rockets in the equatorial regions 

and the extreme southern latitudes." 97 No direct connection to Wallops 

appears to have been made during these proceedings, however. 

The Office of Space Flight Programs made a request in August 1961 to use 

the tracking ship Coastal Sentry Quebec, then on station in the Indian Ocean 

supporting Project Mercury, in conjunction with the sounding rocket project 

underway with Pakistan. The desire was to utilize the ship's equipment for 

tracking launches, and for the ship itself to conduct rawinsonde operations. 98 

Wallops' association with this project, through its assistance in training 

personnel from both Pakistan and India, meshed with their acquisition of 

the Range Recoverer. "The whole space science thing generated a lot of interest, 

and as young people we jumped on the bandwagon, and thought up 

projects. "99 

By November of 1962, the engineers at Wallops had formulated a plan to 

lease a small aircraft carrier from the MSTS, and outfit it with "roll-on 

instrumentation and bolt-down rocket launchers." "It will also be used to 

provide downrange telemetry tracking of rockets launched from Wallops 

Island, a platform to launch small two-stage rockets for obtaining 

93 
WALLOPS STATION 

meteorological data in the upper atmosphere, and a take-off and landing 

area for helicopters to be used for recovery operations." 100 The rockets utilized 

would be reliable Nike-Cajuns, and others of that, or smaller, size. The cost 

of contracts to prepare the ship and equipment was estimated at $191,050, 

and the operational cost placed at $3,700 per day. 101 

Unlike the other programs which came to Wallops, this one originated 

there. While Langley, Goddard, and other segments of NASA supported the 

plan, "this was one of the first jobs we went out and sold .... , and they 

[Headquarters and Goddard] bought it, they bought it solid." 102 One of the 

reasons the project "sold" was the impending multi-national research effort 

for the International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY), which provided the ideal 

opportunity to use the mobile range concept. One of the motivating factors 

in the organization of the IGY was the occurrence of a period astronomers 

refer to as solar maximum in 1957 and 1958. Variations in the number of 

spots visible on the sun, and thus the amount of solar magnetic activity, 

exhibit an eleven year cycle. A period of many sunspots during the IGY 

permitted researchers to obtain information about the atmosphere and nearEarth environment, then repeat their experiments during the following 

period of minimum solar activity, and compare the two sets of data. The 

international scientific community organized the IQSY to coordinate the 

research activities associated with this 1964 to 1965 solar event. 103 

On 21 November 1963, OSSA's Director of Physics and Astronomy 

Programs, John Naugle, wrote to Stanley Ruttenberg, Executive Secretary 

of the US-IQSY Committee, informing him that, "NASA is considering a 

mobile balloon and sounding rocket expedition, to be carried out during 

the second half of 1964, in the broad ocean area of the southern hemisphere," 

and asking for research proposals. The attached distribution list indicates 

that copies of this letter went out to over seventy researchers in NASA, 

various groups associated with the DOD, and numerous universities. 104 

Positive responses proposed meteorological soundings, studies of the Earth's 

magnetic field, and a few flights to support classified DOD programs. 

Preparations for the expedition commenced. 105 The game plan for the 

expedition included outfit of the carrier at the Port of Baltimore, followed 

by a shakedown cruise to a position off Wallops Island, where launches from 

both ship and shore would provide research data as well as practice operating 

the mobile range. 

The plan almost received a serious setback when the Military Sea Transport 

Service reported that the carrier intended for use had suffered "extensive 

damage," precluding an East Coast shakedown. 106 Quick action by the service, 

however, gave Krieger "reason to hope that a Card class carrier can be 

supplied for the shakedown cruise." 107 The Service supplied USNS Croatan 

for NASA's use, an escort carrier that had seen use during World War II. 

MSTS provided the crew for the ship, Wallops provided most of the 

94 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

instrumentation and engineers, and various researchers and their NASA 

sponsors provided the payloads. 108 

The November 1964, shakedown cruise of the ship demonstrated the 

efficacy of the mobile range concept and the ability of the Croatan to perform 

its new mission. Twenty-five Wallops personnel conducted a series of rocket 

launches during the two week cruise, flying payloads provided by Goddard 

and the Universities of Michigan and Illinois. 109 Coordinated launches of 

sodium vapor rockets from both ship and shore launch sites took place from 

10-12 November, followed by tracking tests on the 17th, and a launch to 

investigate electron density in the ionosphere two days later. After removing 

equipment back to Wallops, Croatan returned to Baltimore to be prepared 

for its mission to the PacificY 0 

In January a convoy of vehicles left Wallops bound for Baltimore where 

the equipment was reinstalled, and preparations finalized. Croatan departed 

on 15 February 1965, spent two days off Wallops Island calibrating 

equipment, then headed for the Panama Canal. 111 After transiting the Canal, 

the ship left Balboa, Panama, on 6 March bound for Lima, Peru, and launched 

a series of ten sounding rockets while on route. ll2 While in port, more 

equipment and personnel came on board, and "we opened it up so the public 

could go aboard and see what was going on." Local officials and media also 

toured the ship. This followed NASA's policy of demonstrating openness, 

while generating support for space science research, and touting the ship's 

peaceful mission. 113 The experience of conducting the open house events and 

hosting international researchers at Wallops served the engineers well here, 

as they already had practiced this type of public relations affair. 

The ship sailed from the Port of Callao two days later and began the 

principal scientific portion of its mission .. Experiments were launched over 

the following three 'weeks for Langley and Goddard; the Universities of 

Illinois, Michigan, and New Hampshire; the Naval Ordnance Test Station, 

Air Force Cambridge Research Lab, and Sandia Corporation. Meteorological 

work conducted by the Weather Bureau, in support of the mission as well as 

for research, took place on a daily basis, and the National Bureau of Standards 

launched ionospheric soundings.ll 4 The ship then returned to Callao, offloaded the equipment and personnel who had boarded at that Port, and 

departed for another three weeks of launchings.m The last launch of the 

mission occurred on 16 April, and the expedition officially ended later that 

week when Croatan made port at Valparaiso, Chile, where the engineers again 

conducted an open house. The NASA personnel then disembarked to fly 

back to the U.S., while Croatan returned to Baltimore where the mobile launch 

equipment was removed. The expedition had launched over eighty payloads, 

and numerous weather balloons and small meteorological sounding rockets. 

Five of the major launches occurred north of the equator, one on it, and the 

remainder from southern latitudes. 116 

95 
WALLOPS STATION 

The ship returned to carrying cargo, but the mobile launch equipment 

became a feature of the Wallops program. Engineer Robert Duffy stated, 

"That really led to the campaigns, nowadays Wallops is doing a campaign a 

year someplace. Up to that time space science was done at existing launch 

ranges, ... , we really cut our eyeteeth on that." 117 While the aircraft carrier 

turned out to be a little too expensive for regular use, Wallops used the Range 

Recovererfor similar missions, if on a somewhat smaller scale. The Wallops 

tracking ship travelled to Greece in May of the following year to conduct 

coordinated research on a solar eclipse. While in port there, Engineer 

Abraham Spinak and the other Wallops personnel met the Greek royal family; 

and, while only a part of the American contingent present, they continued 

to fulfill their dual roles in NASA's international program, science, and public 

relations. 118 

The influx of new customers, and the expanding role of the space science 

program in NASA, thus served to alter the scope of Wallops' operations. 

While still participating in aeronautical engineering research, the Station's 

mission changed to one of support for science research. The staff also became 

familiar with coordinating the activities of diverse groups in the performance 

of its mission. By the end of 1965, Wallops had changed in many ways, yet 

in other ways remained very similar to the place it had been in 1957. 

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SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

NOTES 


1. 	 Letter, Abe Silverstein to Dr. L.A. Del[eceso?], 7 August 1961, in "Chron. File, 

July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1, for example of an Army request 

for two sounding rocket and five balloon launches. For examples of work for 

the Navy at this time, see: Flight Plan, LRC E135 3111, 13 December 1960, in 

folder, "Wallops, August 62 - May 63;" Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Commander 

U.S. Navy Ordinance Lab, 24 March 1964, in folder "Wallops, November 63 ­

March 64," in RGA181-l(C). For examples of Air Force projects see: Letter, Trygve 

Blom to NASA, 27 January 1961, in Chron. File, January- June 1961," in NASA 

HQ box #1; and chapter 2, above, for work on the Blue Scout then underway. 

2. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 140-60. 

3. 	 Project RAM (Radio Attenuation Measurement) investigated the radio 

"blackout" that occurs when a spacecraft re-enters the atmosphere. It involved 

seven launches from 1961 to 1968: Data Book II, 464-66. For Trailblazer see chapter 

2, note 125, above. 

4. 	 Memorandum, Wilmer H. Reed III and Robert M. Henry to Associate Director, 

LaRC, 5 October 1962, in folder "Special File, October 62 April 63;" 

Memorandum, Jerome T. Foughner Jr. to Associate Director, LaRC, 27 May 1963; 

Memorandum, Jerome T. Foughner Jr. for Aeroelasticity Branch Files, 13 June 

1963, both in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64;" all in RGA181-l(S). 

Here we see another idea that died hard; there are several references throughout 

this period to field level hopes of outfitting Wallops for the large, liquidfueled boosters. See, for example: Memorandum, Carl A. Sandahl for Associate 

Director, IO December 1962, in folder "Wallops, August 62 - February 63," in 

RGAl81-l(C). 

5. 	 See "NASA APR, April 1961 ", section arp, pp. 1.5, 1.6, 6.1, 8.2, for examples of 

Langley projects. For the O Gravity fuel experiments in support of Centaur 

engine development see "NASA APR, February 1961," section arp, p. 1.6; "NASA 

APR, April 1961," section apr, p. 1.5; "NASA APR, June 1962", c, 1.2; "NASA 

APR, July 1962," c, 2.10; and "NASA APR, June 1963," c, 2.4. Letter, Robert L. 

Krieger to Gerhard Heller, 11 May 1961, in folder "Special File, April - August 

61," in RGA181-l(S). U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1962, hearings before the House Committee 

on Science and Astronautics on H.R.3238 and 6029, 87th Cong. 1st sess., 6103-13H, 

part 1, 24; for Robert Seaman's testimony regarding projects underway at 

Goddard, which include quite a few (Echo, Tiros, sounding rockets) that involve 

Wallops. 

6. 	 NASA Management Instruction #7100.1, 29 April 1964, attachment A, 2, in box, 

"NASA HQ Organizations, O.S.S.A. (con't)," in NHO. 

7. 	 Data Book II, 197-202. Some of the fields included: Lunar and Planetary Programs, 

Bioscience Programs, Geophysics and Astronomy, and Meteorological Systems. 

8. 	 Levine, 167-68. See also: NASA Management Instruction cited in note 6 above. 

9. 	 NASA Management Instruction as cited in note 6, above. On attachment A of 

this instruction is stated, "For the purposes of this Instrnction, the term field 

center includes: ... (11) Wallops Station," [emphasis in original]. 

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WALLOPS STATION 

10. 	 Letter, Thomas F. Dixon to Robert L. Krieger, 31 January 1962, in folder 005065 

"15.1 Sounding Rockets to 1963," in file tray "Sounding Rockets - General," in 

NHO. 

11. 	 Levine, 16, 167-72. "At Goddard the differences between Director Harry Goett 

and Headquarters officials became so serious that he was dismissed in July 

1965." Levine also points out that the contractual relationship between NASA 

and JPL was a source of difficulties. 

12. 	 NASA Headquarters, "Long Range Thinking in Space Sciences," October 1960, 

in box "NASA HQ Organizations, O.S.S.A. (con't)." The areas either directly 

referring to Wallops, or to Wallops related programs are: Meteorology, Upper 

Atmosphere, Ionosphere, Atmospheric Motions, Magnetic Fields and Particles, 

Solar Studies, Stars, Interstellar Matter, Shipboard Launchings. No role for 

Wallops is forecast in Lunar and Planetary Studies. 

13. 	 Shortal, 685-95, for Shotput and Echo. 

14. 	 Nathan and Ida Reingold, ed.s, Science in America: A Documentary History, 1900­

1939 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), 1-6. 

15. 	 Data Book II, 270-72. 

16. 	 For an example of a pure research launch see: Memorandums (2), Ernest J. Ott 

for the Files, 20 September 1962, both in folder 005085 "15.6 Journeyman," in 

file tray "Sounding Rockets General (con't) Alphabetical Aerobee thru Javelin," 

in NHO. This was a Univ.of Michigan radio astronomy launch. For an applied 

research project of Ohio State University, with Air Force sponsorship, see: Letter, 

Ross Caldecott to E. A. Brummer, 7 August 1963; Letter, T. R. Patterson to Mr. 

Littell, 5 September 1963, both in folder "Special File, May 63- February 64," in 

RGA181-l(S). 

17. 	 "Robbins," OH!, Tape lb: 445. Joseph Robbins notes that problems arose when 

scientists would move to different universities and attempt to take their grant 

money along. The grant, having been made to the given institution, stayed 

with that institution wherever the research went. 

18. 	 Ibid. 

19. 	 Ibid. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 505, for quotation; lb: 420 for education. 

20. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Director, Langley Research Center, 20 May 1963; 

Letter, U. M. Staebler to Floyd Thompson, 7 June 1963, both in folder "Special 

File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). See also: A&A, 1963, 208. 

21. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Langley Research Center, 20 September 1963, in 

folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

22. 	 Letter, J. W. Wright to S. L. Seaton, 10 June 1964 in folder "Special File, March ­

December 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

23. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 440-80; "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 250. 

24. 	 Letter, F. W. Reichelderfer to Director Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 15 

September 1958, in folder "Special Files, September December 58," in RGA181­

l(S); the 17 October reply is also in this file. See Shortal' 544, for a radar image 

of the hurricane. 

25. 	 Data Book II, 346-48. Letter, Earle F. Cook to Director Langley Research Center, 

12 January 1959, in folder "January- May, 1959," in Wallops box #4. 

98 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

26. 	 Memorandum, H. R. Brockett for Dr. Tepper, 18 October 1960, in folder 005065 

"15.1 Sounding Rockets to 1963," in file tray "Sounding Rockets - General," in 

NHO. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Willis L. Webb, 21 December 1961, in folder 

"Wallops, January - March 62," in RGA181-l(C). The "NASA ARP, April 1961," 

page arp 8.2, lists other firing sites as Pt. Mugu (CA), Eglin Field (FL), White 

Sands, and Tonapah (NV). 

27. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Morton J. Stoller, 9 April 1962, in folder "Special 

File, May - September 62," in RGA181-l(S). 

28. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Morton J. Stoller, 24 May 1962, Ibid. 

29. 	 Airmail, Herbert A. Wilson Jr. to E. Whitney, 14 March 1963, in folder "Special 

File, October 62 - April 63," in RGA181-l(S); Memorandum, Harold N. Murrow 

for Associate Director Langley Research Center, 30 April 1965, in folder "Wallops, 

January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C). 

30. 	 Letter with enclosure, Robert L. Krieger to Director of Meteorological Programs, 

15 December 1965, in folder "Special File June - December 65," in RGA181-l(S). 

31. 	 "NASA APR, March 1961," page sfp 27.5. 

32. 	 Shortal, 543, for the FPS-16 radar; "NASA APR, June 1962," page A 40.0 for 

NASA contract NAS6-386 to RCA, "Services necessary to operate and maintain 

the Wallops Station AN/FPS-16 radar and Tiros ground data acquisition 

systems." Contract was for $216,000. 

33. 	 "NASA APR, April 1961, page osfd 1.2, for the transfer of the station. 

Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for Director Space Flight Programs, 10 July 

1961, in "Chron. File, July- December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. "NASA APR, 

December 1961" page B 1.4, for station overhaul. 

34. 	 Pamela Mack, "Satellite and Politics: Weather, Communications, and Earth 

Resources," in Spacefaring People, Roland, ed., 32-34, for NASA-Weather Bureau 

controversy. 

35. 	 "NASA APR, Sept.ember 1962," page B 1.1, for Tiros, B 2.2, for Nimbus. 

36. 	 Letter, Gerald M. Truszynski to Homer E. Newell, 21 September 1964, in folder 

"July thru December, 1964," in NASA HQ box #1. 

37. 	 See chapter 2, above, for Project 2080. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 

Astronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for 1960, Hearinqs before a 

Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Astronautics and Space Sciences on S. 1582 

and H.R. 7007,86th Cong. 1st sess., 5905-215, 792, for FY 1960 Wallops funding 

wherein Administrator Glennan told the Senators that the build-up at the island 

was "essentially complete." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 

Appropriation, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1961, Hearings before a House 

subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong. 2nd. sess., 6003-0lH, 

353-55 for FY 1961 funding. See also: Data Book I, 491, table 6-147 for "Funding 

by Fiscal Year;" and 168, table 4-28 for "Construction of Facilities Direct 

Obligations, by Installation." The figures in these charts differ somewhat due 

to the fact that the money requested in a given year might be spent over several. 

99 
WALLOPS STATION 

38. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA 

Authorization for 1963, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and 

Astronautics on H.R. 10100, 87th Cong. 2nd. sess., 6203-06H, 944, 948. U.S., 

Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices 

Appropriations for 1963, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6203-13H, part 3, 882-87. By comparing 

the figures from these two hearings I noticed that Wallops figures on page 948 

of the former are misprinted, someone copied the number above the summation 

line instead of the total. 

39. 	 Data Book l, 489, table 6-145 "Personnel". 

40. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 545. This 50/50 mix of contract/in house personnel 

was unusual compared to NASA's average of 3 to 4 contract personnel to each 

NASA employee during this time. See: Data Book I, 118, table 3-26 "Total NASA 

Employment, Selected Characteristics." 

41. 	 Data Book I, 345, table 6-54 "Funding by Fiscal Year," for the Cape's budget; 415, 

table 6-94 "Personnel," for employment at Houston. 

42. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 300-20. 

43. 	 Memorandum, Abe Silverstein for Directors, 6 April 1960, in folder "Wallops, 

January to June 1960," in RGA181-l(C). 

44. 	 Cover Letter, Robert L. Krieger, 8 December 1961, in folder "Wallops Station 

Handbook, DTD 12-8-61," in RGA181 l(C). This folder contains a copy of all 

four volumes of the Handbook. I: General Information; II: Flight Test and 

Support Facilities; III: Range Users Information; IV: Safety. Letter, Robert L. 

Krieger to Langley, Goddard, and Lewis Centers, 8 January 1962, in folder 

"Special Files, January - April 62," in RGA181-l(S), for 1 January effective date 

for the Handbook's procedures. 

45. 	 "NASA APR, October 1960," page lvp 51.3; "January 1961," page lvp 51.3; "April 

1961," page lvp 51.3, follow the course of the decision on this issue. 

46. 	 Memorandum, Paul A. Price for File, 25 September 1961, in "Chron. File, July ­

December 61," in NASA HQ box #1. This memo describes the "September 

Meeting of the DOD Inter-range Communications Planning Committee." Price 

lists 3 representatives from AMR, 2 from PMR, and 1 each from White Sands, 

Defense Communications Agency, and NASA (Price himself). No one from 

Wallops seems to have attended. Recall, also, that the investigations of labor 

problems at missile bases ignored Wallops. In "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 

380, Engineer Robert Duffy states that Wallops "has always been an Associate 

Member," of the DOD's "Range Commander's Council," but it seems that most 

of the contact between Wallops and the other ranges took place on an informal 

basis in the early days. 

47. 	 Letter, Edmund C. Buckley to Brigadier General Paul T. Cooper, 4 May 1962, in 

"Chron. File, January thru December 1962," in NASA HQ box #1. Memorandum, 

Andrew G, Swanson for Associate Director, 10 July 1962, in folder "Special File, 

May- September 62;" Memorandum, Carl A. Sandahl for Associate Director, 10 

December 1962, in "Special File, October 62 - April 63," both in RGA181-I(S). 

48. 	 "NASA APR, May 1962," page D 2.4, for Scout pad refurbishment. For increase 

in Scout capacity see: Memorandum, Floyd L. Thompson to Wallops, 27 

September 1962, in folder "Special Files, May - September 62," in RGA181 l(S). 

100 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

49. 	 Levine, 183. Levine notes that Congress tightened-up NASA's ability to use 

this technique in 1965. See also: "NASA APR, September 1962," page A 4.4; U.S., 

Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for FY 1964, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical 

and Space Sciences on S. 1245, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6304-245, 67. 

50. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for FY 1964, S. Report 385, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6308-025, 331-2, 

for quotation. For NASA planning for this budget see: Report, "Wallops Island 

Fiscal 1964 Estimates Supporting Facilities," 19 December 1962, in "Chron. File, 

January - December 1962," in NASA HQ box #1. U.S., Congress, House, 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Autlzorization for 1964, Hearings 

before tlze House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 5466, 88th Cong. 

1st sess., 6303-12H, part 4, 2897-2898. While I have no direct evidence that this 

denial of funding was in retaliation for the reprogrammed bypass of normal 

channels, it should be noted that the Senate Authorization Committee was 

usually the most lenient committee NASA had to appear before, and Wallops 

tried again for the funding (apparently without success) in fiscal 1966. 

51. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 

Autlzorizing Appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

H. report 1674 to accompany H.R. 11737, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6205-15H, 145; 

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for FY 1963, Hearings before tlze Senate Committee on Aeronautical 

and Space Sciences on H.R. 11737, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6206-135, 745. 

52. 	 The Aerobee is a small, liquid-fueled sounding rocket, one of the few liquidfuel vehicles Wallops handles. For operational status of the tower see: "NASA 

APR, February 1960," page sfp 65.3. 

53. 	 Memorandum, Charles J. Donlan to NASA- Code RTM, 30 June 1961, for first 

quotation. Memorandum, Abe Silverstein to Director Advanced Research 

Programs, 9 August 1961, for Silverstein's quote, emphasis in original. Both 

memos are in "Chron. File, July- December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. 

54. 	 Memorandum, T. Melvin Butler to Robert L. Krieger, 17 May 1965, in folder 

"Wallops, January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C). 

55. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA 

Authorization for 1964, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on 

Science and Astronautics on H.R. 5466, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6303-12H, part 4, 

2890, for Buckley's testimony. See also: Memorandum with enclosure, W. J. Boyer 

to R. L. Rrieger, 9 May 1962, in folder "Special File, May - September 60," in 

RGA181-l(S); "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 330-80. 

56. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 330-80. Data Book I, 485, table 6 141. There is a 

photo of Range Recoverer in A&A, 1966, 186. 

57. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to NASA Headquarters (Code T), 25 September 1964, 

in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). Data Book I, 485, 

table 6-141. C-121 was the military designation for the Lockheed Constellation 

passenger airliner. See also: "Floyd," OHi, Tape la: 250. 

101 
WALLOPS STATION 

58. 	 Memorandum, G. T. Ragon to Commander Service Squadron 8, 6 August 1962, 

in folder "Special File, May - September 62," in RGA181-l(S), for Navy diver 

service. Memorandum with enclosure, Abe Silverstein for Associate 

Administrator, 14 April 1961, in "Chron. File, January- June 61," in NASA HQ 

box #1, for "NASA request to CNO to extend Navy support of Wallops Island 

Operations." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

NASA Authorization for 1963, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and 

Astronautics on H.R. 10100, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6202-27H, part 1, 118, for 

funding for naval support. 

59. 	 Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Commanding Officer ZW-1, 11 January 1961; Letter 

with enclosures, Floyd L. Thompson to Wallops Station, 11 January 1961, both 

in folder "Special Files, January - March 61," in RGA181-l(S). 

60. 	 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Section 102, c(7). 

61. 	 Don E. Kash, The Politics of Space Cooperation (West Lafayette, IN.: Purdue 

Research Foundation, 1967), 1-23. 

62. 	 Ibid., 50-76. The four areas of cooperation are: information exchange, personnel 

exchange, operations support, and cooperative projects. See also: Draft #2, "A 

statement of responsibilities of the Director of the Office of International 

Programs," 13 February 1959, in folder 11.2 "International Affairs, Office of," 

in box "Office of International Affairs; Office of U.N. Conference (OUNC); Office 

of Policy Coordination and International Affairs," in NHO. Hereafter cited as 

"folder 11.2 in box OIA." Logsdon, "Opportunities. 

63. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 520-lb: 50. 

64. 	 Roland, I: 4-5. For Canadian and NATO projects at Wallops see chapter 1 above. 

65. 	 Green and Lomask, 18-26. 

66. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 190; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 195, for Buckley's 

relationship with Wallops. Data Book II, 546, for MSFN negotiations. 

67. 	 Statement, "International Programs of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Aaministration," 9 February 1961; Memorandum from the Administrator, T. 

Keith Glennan, 1 April 1959, both in folder 11.2 box OAI. See also: Data Book II, 

524. 

68. 	 "NASA APR, December 1959," page OIP 17.2. For the CF-105 program see 

chapter 1 above. 

69. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Exploration, 

International Cooperation in the Exploration of Space, H. Report 2709, 86th Cong. 

1st sess., 5901-036. Statement, Hugh L. Dryden before the Subcommittee on 

Independent Offices of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 19 May 1960, 

13, in folder "VIII Budget: Background Briefings, Supplemental Material (FY 

1961)," in file tray "Budget, FY 1961, FY 1962," in NHO. Aside from noting that 

"sounding rockets and Scout satellites," were functions of Wallops, the reference 

to international cooperative projects provides the bulk of the Wallops mission 

definition that Dryden gave the Committee. 

70. 	 "NASA APR, July 1960," page IPP 52.3, for meeting. Data Book II, 291-93 for 

Ariels 1, 2, and 3; Data Book III, 184 85, for Ariels 4 and 5. 

102 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

71. 	 The NASA APR gives a good running record of foreign researchers at Wallops 

each month. For examples see January 1961, page GA 17.4 for French professor, 

"utilizing specialized optical equipment," and page 17.6 for the Norwegian 

engineer, "studying range telemetry systems.' 

72. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 520. 

73. 	 "Rockets' Red Glare Lights Up Remote Island," The Washington Post, 9 August 

1980, 87, first quote is from Joyce Milliner, second is from Robert Krieger. 

74. 	 Public brochure, Robert L. Krieger, undated (for Open House 28-29 September 

1963), in folder 004680 "Wallops General (1958-1963)," in file tray "Centers, 

Wallops Flight Facility," in NHO. 

75. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape la: 535. 

76. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 250. Data Book I, 482, indicates that equipment 

was on loan to India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Spain. See also: Library 

of Congress Staff Report, "Meteorological Satellites," for the Senate Committee 

on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 6203-295, 112, for the November 1961 visit 

of delegates to the "International Meteorological Satellite Workshop," to 

Goddard and Wallops. 

77. 	 Minutes, Administrator's Staff Meeting, 18 January 1961, 3, in book #2, in box 

"Administrator's Staff Meeting Minutes, October 60 - June 61," for an account 

of the Sardinia launches, "Two Wallops people were there." For Italian interest 

in Scout see: "NASA APR, October 1961," page A17; "NASA APR, April, 1962," 

page A 17.1. 

78. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Proceedings of 

the Panel on Science and Technology, 6th Meeting, before the House Committee on 

Science and Technology, H. Report, 89th Cong. 2nd sess., 6501-26H, 13, for the 

statement, "European Progress in Aeronautics by Professor Luigi Broglio, 

President Italian Space Research Commission." 

79. 	 Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali of Roma, Italy, San Marco Range, undated (early 

1972) leaflet, in folder "FLT /Scout," in FLT Papers. See also: Data Book II, 64-65, 

299-300. 

80. 	 Letter, Robert F. Garbarini to Langley Research Center, 26 August 1965; Letter, 

Sidney Teweles to Morris Tepper, 17 August 1965; Letter, Robert F. Garbarini to 

Wallops Station, 26 August 1965, all in folder "Special File, June - December 

1965," in RGA181-l(S). 

81. 	 Minutes, and "NASA APRs" as cited in note 77 above. A sodium vapor rocket 

dispensed the chemical at a programmed altitude creating a very visible cloud. 

The motions of this cloud provided data relating to atmospheric motions. 

82. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 430. Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for Dr. 

Silverstein, 6 October 1961, in "Chron File, July- December 1961," in NASA HQ 

box #1. Data Book I, 487, table 6-143. 

83. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 530. 

84. 	 "NASA APR, April 1961," page LVP 51.3, for 14 April meeting. "NASA APR, 

August 1961," page LVP 51.4, for the reversal of the Scout transfer. Vought Corp. 

was the prime contractor for Scout. 

103 
WALLOPS STATION 

85. 	 Memorandum, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger, 6 March 1962, in folder 

"Special Files,January-April 62," in RGA181-l(S). NASA Wallops News Release 

#63-12, "Wallops Station Personnel Participate in West Coast Launching," 12 

February 1963, in folder 005085 "15.6 Journeyman," in file tray "Sounding 

Rockets General," in NHO. Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger, 21 

May 1963, in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

86. 	 Memorandum, R. B. Morrison to SD /Deputy Associate Administrator, 14 April 

1964, in folder 006255 "Documentation OSO," in file tray "Earth Satellite Probes, 

Open - 050," in NHO. Minutes, Administrator's Staff Luncheon, 22 April 1964, 

5-6, in folder #4 "January - November 1964," in box "NASA Administrator's 

Policy Meetings, (1962-1965), Action Items (1962-1968)," in NHO. A&A, 1964, 

135, 141, 147, 166. The fatalities were Sidney J. Dagle and L. D. Gable of Ball 

Brothers Co., and John W. Fassett of Goddard. 

87. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 382. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to List, 19 June 

1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

88. 	 "Report of accident at Wallops Island on June 8, 1964," Hubert K. Clark, 12 June 

1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

"Contributing factors," noted are: "a. Too many organizations making decisions 

without proper designation of single point of authority; b. Requirement for 

meeting tight schedules on a non-interference basis; c. Inadequate review of 

technical requirements of proposed systems." 

89. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 400-20, first two quotes are from Abraham Spinak, 

last quote ("and assume that...") is from Robert Duffy. 

90. 	 Shortal, 193-96, for accident involving Durwood A. Dereng. Spinak refers to 

this accident in OHi, 2a: 400. For Krieger's vehemence on range safety see letter 

cited in note 87, above. 

91. 	 "NASA APR, July, 1962," page D 2.4. It is interesting to note that,"Wallops has 

requested Langley review the ARGO D-8 aerodynamics and structure. GSFC 

has supplied Langley with a number of reports on the ARGO D-8 vehicle." 

92. 	 Memorandum with enclosure, G. M. Truszynski for Associate Administrator 

for Space Science and Applications, 24 June 1964, enclosure page 2, in folder 

005064 "15.1 Sounding Rockets 1964-69," in file tray "Sounding Rockets General," 

in N80. DEW is Defense Early Warning, a series of radar sites to detect incoming 

missiles; NBS is the National Bureau of Standards; W.B. is the Weather Bureau. 

93. 	 Memorandum, Facilities Engineer to E. C. Buckley, 16 October 1964, Ibid. 

"Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 525. 

94. 	 Memorandum, Ibid, for ARL support. "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 525, for travel 

budget. "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 420, for logistics. See also: Data Book I 482 

table 6-138. 

95. 	 Staff Study, "An Accelerated NACA Space Flight Program (Langley Version)," 

undated (early 1958), in folder "NASA - Space Flight Program 1958," in FLT 

Papers. This study includes "cost breakdowns" for: "Conversion of each of 3 

ships for down-range tracking and instrumentation and for the launching of 

small (100 lb.) satellites," and "modifying and equipping one large ship for 

launching and monitoring flight of manned satellite." 

96. 	 "The Sun's Awesome Impact," Life,28 November 1960, 78, for a photo of Navy 

ship launching eclipse research rocket. 

104 
SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH 

97. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Equutorial 

Launch Sites - Mobile Sea Launch Capability, H. Report 710, 87th Cong. 1st sess., 

6107-12H, quotation is on page 6. 

98. 	 Memorandum, H. R. Brockett to E. P. Odenwalder, 15 August 1961, in "Chron. 

File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. See also in the same file: 

Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to H.J. Goett, 5 December 1961, on the same 

subject. Rawinsonde [RAdar-WINd-radioSONDE] operations entailed using the 

ship's tracking and telemetry equipment to support weather balloon launches, 

some of which launched from the ship, some from shore. 

99. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape lb: 170. 

100. Memorandum, 	 Robert P. Rhinehart for Associate Director, 11 December 1962, 

in folder "Special File, October 62 - April 63," in RGA181-l(S). Memorandum 

with enclosure, Hugh S. Fosque for Range Engineering Branch Files, 5 February 

1963, in folder 005105 "Mobile Launch of Sounding Rockets from Shipboard 

(1963-64), in file tray "Sounding rockets (con't) Prometheus thru Wasp." 

101. Ibid. 

102. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape lb: 180, first part of quote is from Robert Duffy, second 

part (and they bought it..) is from Abraham Spinak. 

103. National 	 Academy of Sciences, International Geophysics Bulletin #69, March 1963, 

"Provisional Programme International Years of the Quiet Sun, 1964-65," in folder 

OJ 391400-01 "International Q. S. Year," in Space History Collection, NASM. 

Wallops participated in the IQSY with several launches, including ExplorerXXX 

on 19 November 1965. In regard to the solar cycle, it should be noted that the 

polarity of sunspot pairs reverses with each 11 year cycle, so that astronomers 

usually speak of a 22 year cycle. A given source might refer to either. 

104. Letter, John E. Naugle 	to Stanley Ruttenberg, 21 November 1963, in folder 005105 

"Mobile Launch of Sounding Rockets from Shipboard (1963-64), in file tray 

"Sounding rockets (con't) Prometheus thru Wasp," in NHO. 

105. Memorandum, 	 Harold N. Murrow to Associate Director, 7 April 1964, in folder 

"Wallops, April - June 64," in RGA181 l(C). This memo states, "The Sandia 

Corporation has a requirement for high altitude wind measurements near the 

equator both for fallout studies and other classified projects." See also: "Carrier 

to Serve as Rocket Launch Range," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 October 

1964, 33. 

106. Memorandum, 	 Robert L. Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 29 June 1964, in folder 

"Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). 

107. Memorandum, 	 Robert L. Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 28 July 1964, in folder 

"Wallops, July - December 64," in RGA181-l(C). 

108. Escort carriers 	were small ships with a limited number of aircraft that provided 

air cover for convoys, protecting them primarily from submarines. Croatan's 

small size combined with its designed ability to handle aircraft made it a 

suitable platform for sounding rocket operations. 

109. Memorandum, 	 Abraham Spinak to Floyd L. Thompson, 19 November 1964, in 

folder "Special File, March- December 64," in RGA181-l(S). See also: A&A, 1964, 

384-5, 391, 393. 

105 
WALLOPS STATION 

110. NASA 	 Wallops News Release #64-86, "Sounding Rocket Ship Completes 

Shakedown Cruise," 23 November 1964, in folder 005104 "Sounding Rockets 

IQSY Program, 1964-65 (also USNS Croatan)," in file tray "Sounding rockets 

(con't) Prometheus thru Wasp," in NHO. 

111. "Spinak, 	 et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 157-240. In folder 005106 "Shipboard Sounding 

Rockets," in NHO, there are a number of photos of the preparations for this 

voyage. In folder 005104 "Sounding - Rockets IQSY Program," photo G-65 4787 

shows Croatan in Baltimore Harbor. Interestingly this photo was issued by the 

Goddard public information office. 

112. A&A, 1965, 110, 121. 

113. "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 390. NASA Wallops News Release #65-22, "NASA SeaGoing Platform Completes Launch Expedition," 22 April 1965, in folder 005104 

as cited in note 110 above. 

114. 	A&A, 1965, 163. NASA Wallops News Release #65-23, "NASA Sea-Going 

Expedition to Sail in Mid-February," 11 February 1965, in folder 005104, as cited 

in note 110 above. 

115. i, 169. Chart, 	 "Launch Schedule for Mobile Launch Facility Expedition No. l," 

undated, in folder 005106 "Shipboard Sounding Rockets," in NHO. This preexpedition schedule is not completely accurate for retrospective dates, but is 

useful in showing the general itinerary of the mission. See also: NASA Wallops 

News Release #65-23, as cited in note 114 above. 

116. NASA Wallops News Release #65-22, as cited in note 113 above. Report, Robert 

L. Krieger to Langley Research Center, 26 November 1965, in folder "Wallops, 

July - December 65," in RGA181-l(C). This report lists the following numbers of 

major rocket launches during the mission (keeping in mind that small rockets 

were launched on virtually a daily basis): Langley (18), Univ. Michigan (14), 

Goddard (13), Naval Ordinance Test Station (9), Univ. New Hampshire (8), 

Sandia Corp. (7), Air Force Cambridge Research Lab (6), Univ. Illinois (5). 

117. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape lb: 200. 

118. Ibid., Tape 2b: 360. "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 545. A&A, 1966, 87, 178, 185-87. 

106 
Cfiapter 5 

CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

The flight facility that "sold" the Mobile Sea Launch Expedition to NASA 

in 1964 differed noticeably from the test station of the NACA era. The most 

visible difference was the growth of the physical plant. The Pilotless Aircraft 

Research Station consisted of a couple of simple launch pads, a few buildings, 

and World War II surplus radar equipment located on one half of a small 

island, and a minor number of diminutive tracking sites downrange. In the 

span of seven years Wallops Station's resources grew to include five launch 

areas, an airfield, sophisticated rocket handling and check-out facilities, and 

expensive tracking and data acquisition equipment, while encompassing 

three separate locations at the Virginia site. 1 Wallops personnel no longer 

conducted operations solely from the island and for select customers; they 

ran or oversaw facilities in Alaska, Bermuda, Manitoba, and North Carolina, 

as well as aboard various ships, and provided services to a wide range of 

customers foreign and domestic. 

The acceleration of the American space program brought a steady increase 

in the number of NASA employees assigned to the base, and the introduction 

of a significant number of contract personnel for both research and support, 

essentially quadrupled the overall size of the workforce within the same 

period. The shift of the Station's administrative functions from Langley, and 

the incorporation of the NACA in NASA, resulted in new missions and more 

challenges for the staff. The higher level of public interest and visibility forced 

the staff to establish policies and procedures to deal with both the observers 

and the new range users attracted to the base. Despite the occasional miscue, 

the public, Congress, and Headquarters generally supported the Station, 

and its position within NASA and the space program solidified. 

The main source of the changes at the base stemmed from the difference 

in the nature of the old aeronautical research as opposed to the new space 

endeavors. NASA was not just the NACA renamed. The elder institution 

focused on a narrow facet of engineering research, with some (largely 

unwanted and politically inspired) developmental work mixed in. NASA, 

to be sure, conducted such engineering research, but the new organization 

gave as much weight to developmental work and science research and spread 

its resources out over a broader range of ventures. 2 Also, the inclusion in 

NASA of groups and institutions that had cultures and operational 

philosophies different from the NACA served to fundamentally alter the 

style of the space agency. The perceived importance of the space program to 

107 
WALLOPS STATION 

the national interest, by most of the public and political leadership, led to an 

infusion of funds and a sense of purpose rare in peacetime. 

All this having been said, an old adage comes to mind: the more things 

change, the more they stay the same. Even with all of the transformations to 

the mission and make-up of the base, many features of the original facility 

survived the transition era. As the focus of the research conducted at the 

base moved from transonic through hypersonic to space research, the variety 

and complexity of the equipment, and the sheer number of experiments, 

increased apace. In the face of this variety and complexity Wallops' raison 

d'etre remained the launch, tracking, and acquisition of data from small 

rockets and balloons using radar and radio-telemetry techniques. These 

projects could have been, and often were, conducted from other facilities, 

but Wallops remained a part of most of them so that the larger, more complex 

launch facilities at the Cape and Vandenberg could concentrate on the highpriority, expensive missions, and not suffer interference from the low-budget, 

unspectacular portion of NASA's program. 

The value of Wallops as a civilian owned range increased as NASA's 

mission became more publicized, and open to international participation. 

And even while it carved out an independent administrative niche for itself 

amid NASA's changing goals and internal organization, the Station 

continued to be insulated, able to operate with an "informal procedure that 

was formalized." 3 Personal contacts and informal discussions continued to 

be the common procedure for budget and research planning throughout the 

period. 

Regardless of the expansion of the base and its increased visibility, Wallops 

remained a relatively isolated NASA outpost. The surrounding area grew 

only slowly during this period, and certainly differed from Cleveland, 

Houston, Washington, or the other metropolitan areas that hosted the 

majority of NASA facilities, in terms of accessibility, population, and 

economic resources. The distinctly rural flavor of the area was not for 

everyone. "I know sometimes we had trouble recruiting engineers and 

scientists because you either have to like a rural area or, you know, you're 

just not happy. And we did have some that came, and their families didn't 

like it and they left; but most of them came and liked it and stayed." 4 Though 

the Station was integrated into the NASA communications network, could 

be easily reached by air, and played host to visiting researchers from all 

over the world, the nature of its environs played a major role in shaping the 

composition of the permanent staff. 

During this formative era NASA reorganized several times. The first 

reorganization occurred in 1959 in response to the absorption of the Army 

Ballistic Missile Agency group. As discussed earlier in chapter two, this 

reorganization caused a brief debate between the Office of Space Flight 

Programs and the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs over the position of 

Wallops within NASA. In 1961 the structure of the space agency was altered 

108 
CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

in response to both the installation of James E. Webb as Administrator (he 

replaced T. Keith Glennan in February), and the announcement of the lunar 

landing goal in May. The effects of this reorganization included the abolition 

and restructuring of the old program offices (including both OSFP and 

OLVP), the creation of a separate Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 

(under Edmund Buckley), and the situation of the field centers directly under 

the control of Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans. Wallops and the 

other field centers thus had coequal status within NASA and, theoretically, 

could bring their problems, proposals, and requirements directly to the 

attention of upper management." The idea was to remove the layers of 

insulation that existed between the top levels of Headquarters and center 

managements, make it easier for the centers to perform multifaceted tasks, 

and ease coordination between related projects such as spacecraft and launch 

vehicle development. The centers still received "program direction" from 

the new Headquarters program offices, but received funding and support 

through Seamans. 6 Also, Webb wanted a "flexible organizational and 

administrative framework," for the acceleration of the space program. 7 

Unfortunately, this plan did not work out as expected. The centers were 

too many and their work too diverse to allow Seamans to adequately oversee 

all of them. Center directors could not get sufficient access to the Associate 

Administrator, and they and the program directors could not efficiently 

coordinate their efforts. 8 It also seems that the scale and speed of the Apollo 

program exceeded expectations. In June 1962 "a meeting involving the field 

administrative officials and selected headquarters representatives," was 

organized and scheduled to take place at Wallops. Director of Administration 

Albert F. Siepert selected the site because it was one "which most of you 

have not visited." 9 This meeting and other "adjustments" could not 

sufficiently remedy the situation and in November 1963 NASA's structure 

again shifted. This time the field centers returned to the control of various 

Headquarters program offices, and Wallops again found itself grouped with 

Goddard and JPL under the space science section of NASA, Homer Newell's 

Office of Space Science and Applications. 10 

These administrative shuffles had little effect on the day-to-day operations 

at Wallops. Being a "service center," the base operated differently from most 

of the other field centers. Wallops engineers did not manufacture payloads; 

they launched, tracked, and sometimes recovered equipment brought to 

them. They trained launch and tracking crews and participated in many 

projects, but until the Croatan operations in 1964-65, they played a support 

rather than a leading role in these projects. Therefore, these reorganizations, 

"didn't make a who[le lot of difference.] I knew the people, ... , you had to 

sort of learn how they operate. You know, when you make a new organization 

like [OSSA), if you can get in there first and let them know you want to 

work with them, and all, they feel happy about this so it sort of greases the 

way for later on." 11 Even under the 1961 structure, budget and operational 

109 
WALLOPS STATION 

planning at Wallops involved contact with different parts of the Headquarters 

organization. 12 

The multiple reorganizations of NASA's Headquarters structure stemmed 

in part from the youth of the agency. The internal structure at Wallops, an 

older, more well established facility, remained relatively stable during this 

period. The two changes of note which did occur involved adjustments to 

meet the changing priorities at the base, rather than the need for any 

wholesale administrative renovation. The Range Engineering Branch, 

originally a part of John Palmer's Flight Test Division, became a separate 

Division in response to the increased variety of the tracking and data 

acquisition programs underway at the base, and as a reflection of the separate 

status of Buckley's OTDA in Headquarters. Secondly, a Program Management 

and Liaison Branch, placed within the Flight Test Division and headed by 

Cary F. Milliner, served to coordinate the many projects coming to the range 

from its diverse customers. An examination of Wallops' organizational charts 

reveals, however, a continuity in the personnel occupying the top positions 

at the base. The Division Chiefs and most of the Branch Heads listed in a 

March 1961 chart are still listed in June 1967. This continuity provided 

stability at the base throughout a hectic period and contributed to the 

development and propagation of a Wallops culture at the Station. 13 

The continuity and stability at Wallops proved fortunate as Krieger and 

his staff soon had to deal with an unforeseen administrative headache. The 

rapid pace of the space program's expansion brought forth the issue of how 

efficiently the expansion of the various NASA facilities was proceeding. "The 

objective of orderly introduction of uniform NASA standards in the 

construction of facilities was expressed by the House Committee on Science 

and Astronautics in the NASA Authorization Act for the fiscal year 1963."14 

In October 1964 the Committee notified Administrator Webb that, "For its 

information and guidance, the committee is undertaking a review of Federal 

Government policy regarding the planning of base facilities required for the 

space program. The NASA field installations, of course, are of particular 

interest." 15 

The Committee desired to learn how well "master planning" at the field 

centers adhered to accepted government procedures. This included 

examination of the status and maintenance of planning documentation, 

timing and requirements for such planning at various bases, and the relative 

efficiency of the agency-wide expansion at those bases. 16 The Committee 

first examined the planning practices of the Army, Air Force, General Services 

Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission, as "representative of 

the standards and criteria applied in the Federal Government. "17 Then they 

began to visit NASA field centers. 

Goddard Space Flight Center, "influenced" by its relationship with the 

National Capital Planning Commission, possessed master planning 

documentation and activities the Committee found acceptable. Marshall 

110 
CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

Space Flight Center had the planning inherited from its Army origins. The 

Kennedy Space Center shared its planning tasks with the neighboring Air 

Force base and several companies under contract. Five other facilities also 

passed muster with varying grades. Two, however, did not. Lewis Research 

Center and Wallops Station drew fire from the Committee, which noted that 

these two, "avoid [master planning] with disdain." 18 

The Committee recognized that Wallops consisted of an amalgamation of 

NACA, Navy, and NASA construction, but were unsympathetic. "The 

absence of a master plan is deliberate. Two reasons are given: (1) Wallops, it 

is explained, doesn't really have a program of its own; it implements the 

programs of other NASA Centers and, therefore, must wait upon their 

decisions before being able to identify facility needs .... (2) Rapid changes in 

technology require flexibility of development which, in the view of a staff 

officer, would be circumscribed by a long-range master plan. The station 

policy on facility planning and construction is summed up in this official's 

concluding observation: 'We build no monuments here. "'19 

The Committee report argued that given the fact, "many buildings on the 

island and at the main base appear to be approaching structural obsolescence, 

... , the view advanced at Wallops that facility planning must await authorized 

development is open to question." Continuing expansion at the base, and a 

need to "convert, demolish, or replace," many facilities presented a need for 

master planning." 20 It concluded that the process of master planning was 

economical, "as illustrated by the confused and congested layouts at Lewis 

and Wallops." 21 While conceding that NASA Headquarters had not, until 

prodded by the Committee, paid much attention to this issue, they stated 

that master planning needed to be an integral part of the operation, "at all 

NASA installations.'? 2 Needless to say, Krieger got the hint. 

On 3 August 1965, Wallops contracted for $33,400 to American Engineers, 

of Richmond, for "services and materials for a master site plan." 23 It was 

beneficial for the Wallops staff to move quickly because the representatives 

of the House Committee revisited the base later that month in the course of 

preparing a follow-up report. 24 This time the Committee found, "There has 

been a substantial change since December 1964 in the Wallops Station policy 

and practice of master planning." They reported that the staff had reviewed 

several older studies done by Langley, the Navy, and private companies, 

and followed with the preparation of a three phase plan. 25 The report noted 

that, "Obviously the Wallops Station management in the last 8 months has 

taken a long step forward in the direction of master planning of the base 

facilities .... The new Wallops planning program, in its three phases, appears 

to be well conceived. "26 It also praised Headquarters, Lewis, and Wallops, 

"for modifying contrary policies of a year ago." 27 

Krieger and company had no desire to antagonize Congress. The death of 

Representative Albert Thomas in February 1966 and the general success of 

the Wallops program did not lessen Congressional scrutiny. Thomas' 

111 
WALLOPS STATION 

successor as chair of the Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, 

Joseph Evins, questioned the need for Wallops and the sounding rocket 

program in 1966 hearings but did not press the issue in the face of strong 

support given by Webb and Newell. 28 In spite of questions of this nature, 

Wallops did not receive a serious challenge to its existence during this time. 

The margin of safety provided by being clearly ensconced in the space 

program was demonstrated by the House attempt, in 1963, to close the NASA 

Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force Base. Similar in size, budget, 

and complement to Wallops, the California facility had for years hosted 

research aircraft from the X-1 to the X-15. The House, operating under the 

perception that a facility dealing most visibly with aeronautical research 

constituted an anachronism in the space age, proposed closing the base to 

save money. Quick work by NASA saved the base, but Wallops apparently 

took little notice of the plight of the future Shuttle landing facility. 29 

The important factor was the general decline in the status of aeronautical 

research in NASA. While it continued to be a part of the agency's program, 

there is no question that it received a decidedly lower priority than the space 

programs, especially when Project Apollo appeared. 10 Indeed, some 

aerodynamicists, like Langley veteran John Stack, left NASA to pursue 

research elsewhere. 11 While Wallops' program continued to include some 

aeronautical projects, principally through the use of the runways, its primary 

task had become support of space science. This identification with "new" 

space research, as opposed to "old" aeronautical research, staved off threats 

to the installation's existence until the novelty (and perceived importance) 

of space research waned in the 1970's. 12 

The three year span of 1964-66 turned out to be a high-water mark for 

NASA. Though the lunar landings still lay in the future, funding and 

employment levels began to drop. The completion of major construction of 

Apollo infrastructure and the award of contracts for flight hardware marked 

the end of the massive space expenditures of NASA's early era. The Johnson 

Administration's guns and butter approach to the dual commitments of 

Vietnam and the Great Society began to absorb more of the federal budget. 

Also, Apollo became the focus for the whole of NASA, and other programs 

received less attention. 11 As it fulfilled President Kennedy's challenge, the 

agency found itself in a period of "retrenchment."" 

Unaware, of course, of the lean years to come, Krieger wrote a letter in 

July 1965 to Olin E. Teague, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on NASA 

Oversight, in response to a Congressional staff investigation into, "Future 

National Space Objectives." The letter set out Krieger's view of Wallops' role 

in the U.S. space effort and his hopes for the future, as well as providing a 

good insight into not only the changed nature of the research at Wallops but 

also into the appearance Station management wished to assume before 

Congress. From this perspective, what Krieger does not mention is as 

interesting as what is cited. 15 

112 
CHANCES AMID CONSTANCY 

He began by providing Teague with a synopsis of Wallops' background 

which explains that, "Never having been involved in missile development, 

or in very large projects where operational aspects overshadowed scientific 

objectives, the station's 20-year experience has been in experimental, 

exploratory flight testing. We have, therefore, developed a viewpoint and 

operating philosophy which is, perhaps, more closely akin to a laboratory 

than a missile range." 10 

Wallops, as has been shown, was partly established for the purpose of 

testing early missile designs, and the station playpd a major rolP in Langley's 

Scout development program and conducted many tests relating to ICBM 

development. Additionally, by 1965 the various meteorological programs 

conducted from the base had reached a point where the "operational aspects" 

at least equaled "scientific objectives.'' 17 Krieger's view of the facility remained 

one of a service center; and in an era when the lines between research, 

development, and operations, were sometimes fuzzy \vithin NASA, he 

wanted Congress to have no doubts about Wallops. The Station's role 

consisted of assisting research "customers" in obtaining data in many areas, 

not just simply firing rockets or tinkering with hardware." 

Krieger next spelled out seven "unique capabilities" that advertised 

Wallops' ability to work with, coordinate, and service a wide range of users 

and contribute to various research agendas in a timely and economical 

fashion. He then explained the "needs of the scientific community," both 

foreign and domestic, for continued and improved sounding rocket 

programs. He concluded that, "Certainly there will be no decrease in the 

workload involved with scientific sounding rockets, and almost surely there 

will be a significant increase in this activity."'" He predicted an "increase !in] 

the emphasis on the university Explorer class satellites," a coming need to 

assist "international groups in their second and third generation 

experiments," and "increased sophistication and technological complexity," 

in the payloads sent to Wallops for launch. "Wallops Station will, of course, 

make every effort to absorb the increased workload .... It would be unrealistic, 

however, to believe that the total increase ... can be absorbed without a 

gradual and orderly growth in the station." 41' 

Brevity was a watchword in communications of this type; certainly Krieger 

could not provide a detailed manifest of all Wallops' projects. What he chose 

to cite in his limited space were the programs he felt most apt to bring funding 

to the base, while keeping within established policy. Aeronautical 

engineering projects would not, by definition, be included in a letter dealing 

with "space objectives," even if Congress and NASA held them to be high 

priority. Krieger does not, however, talk about aerodynamic research as it 

might apply to space vehicle development, the kind of research performed 

at the base in support of Project Mercury. He writes little about engineering 

development work of any kind, save a brief mention of "the development," 

and "flight qualification," of devices for "large orbiting laboratories," via 

113 
WALLOPS STATION 

sounding rockets. He says nothing about military space research, noting only 

that Wallops could call upon the DOD for support, and that they had 

conducted research "for the more scientific arms of the Department of 

Defense." He quite deliberately focused on space science research as practiced 

by universities, international partners, and (by implication) NASA. 41 

By concentrating on the needs of organizations outside of direct federal 

control, he emphasized the broad base of applicability and usefulness of 

Wallops' facilities, while making cuts in Station funding seem more a policy 

and less an economic decision. This also prominently displayed the civilian 

nature of Wallops, one of NASA's prime reasons for maintaining the base. 

Interestingly, Krieger did not feel it necessary to justify the basic concept of 

space science research by invoking specific applications or in the general 

terms of advancing human knowledge. He apparently took for granted that 

such efforts had Congressional backing as being in the national interest and 

enjoyed public support as well. He proceeded from a premise that space 

science research was both important and necessary and put forth arguments 

for increased funding, not a plea for institutional survival. It would appear 

that Wallops was perceived to be in no immediate danger of closure, only 

hampered by an insufficient rate of growth. 

While it might be interesting to compare this 1965 view with one from an 

earlier era, recall that before mid-1959 Wallops existed as an extension of 

Langley; therefore, funding and planning depended upon the aeronautical 

laboratory's programs and budget. During the early 1960's when, "only a 

blundering fool could go up to the Hill and come back with a result 

detrimental to the agency," the entire space effort proceeded in such a state 

of fluidity that coherent long-range planning was next to impossible.42 

"Future space objectives" meant Mercury, Apollo, and the first generation 

applications satellites, not to mention boosters that wouldn't blow-up with 

such disconcerting frequency. Added to these generalities, the specifics at 

Wallops of the expansion of the base, its newly independent status, and the 

influx of new range users made it necessary for the situation to settle 

somewhat before planning for future programs could rationally proceed. 

The letter to Teague, and the master planning episode provided the Wallops 

staff with their first real opportunity to look beyond the immediate program 

needs of an approaching fiscal year. Until this time political and technological 

developments dictated the nature and pace of operations at Wallops, and 

planning centered on specific projects or customers. 43 Now, with the initial 

surge giving way to a more steady effort, thought could be given to directing 

the flow of the program, rather than just hanging on for the ride. Most projects 

and programs continued to come to the base from outside sources, yet 

Wallops began to make some grants and sponsor programs. Though not often 

in the driver's seat, Wallops settled into a secure nook "on the bandwagon." 44 

The declining NASA budget affected the Station's operations, but not as 

drastically as at some other installations. Since much of the scale-back 

114 
CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

-
 ----:--;:--,­ The 1970's marked the expansion of oceanic studies, including the management of 

the Geodynamics Experimental Ocean Satellite (GEOS 3). 

involved the completion of Apollo, and Wallops had little direct stake in the 

piloted program, "we never had that fluctuation, it was just sort of steady. "45 

The size of the civil.service workforce fell by approximately 100 positions, 

and operational funding stabilized. (See appendix 5)46 Construction funding 

at the base reflected a trend toward maintenance of existing facilities rather 

than the construction of new ones, and research and development funding 

remained stable as well. 47 The fact that Wallops provided access to space for 

a large number of organizations provided it with allies to fight the budget 

cutters. "That's ... one of the advantages they have; so many universities, so 

many military organizations, the foreign countries use it, and you've got all 

these people saying, 'oh, you can't close Wallops, we've got to have it,' .... "48 

This diffuse research program also provided no single, big-ticket line items 

to attract Congressional attention. 

Some cutbacks did occur. Range Recoverer was "eventually" retired due to 

both economic factors and declining need for its capabilities. Scout launches 

from Wallops dropped by 50%. For the most part, however, the pace and 

level of support of the projects brought to the Station stabilized and generally 

continued the pattern established during the transition era. 49 Projects, either 

from or of interest to, the military continued to fly from the base. The 

expressed civilian nature of the Station kept these projects low-key but did 

115 
WALLOPS STATION 

not result from their exclusion from the launch schedule. The relative 

isolation of the base, favorable funding arrangements, and the fact that, 

despite the open atmosphere of the facility, the press and public paid little 

attention to the activities there served to keep the services active at the base. 50 

Space science projects from universities, international partners, NASA, 

and other federal agencies remained Wallops' primary stock-in-trade, 

however. Amid cooperation with Goddard, Langley, and other sponsors, 

Wallops provided project leadership for some ventures like the Explorer 44 

satellite. 51 A program of oceanographic research commenced in cooperation 

with university scientists who took advantage of Wallops' location on the 

Virginia shore to study interactions between land, marsh, and sea. In the 

same vein, Wallops managed the Geodynarnics Experimental Ocean Satellite, 

GEOS 3, in 1975.52 While Goddard managed the International Cooperative 

Program, a large portion of the foreign visitors continued to come to Wallops. 

Even the Soviets visited the base in 1977 and conducted research by 

coordinating launches from their ship, stationed off-shore, and the Station.'' 

The specific experiments changed, but the overall pattern of research at the 

base continued. 

Another area which saw change amid deeper continuity concerned 

Wallops' relation to its surrounding communities. Initial local grumbling 

over the expansion of the base settled down after the integration of the 

disestablished naval base into the NASA operation. Even though growth 

never reached the levels that some community leaders had hoped for, by 

1965, "NASA [became] one of the biggest ernployers." 54 Aside from the 

transient researchers, who came to the island only for the duration of their 

projects, the permanent staff settled in the general vicinity of the base. Even 

before the creation of NASA they began to take an active interest in local 

affairs. In 1958, Albert P. Kellam, of the Flight Test Division, requested 

permission "to run and if elected, serve as councilman for the Town of 

Wachapreague." The election being non-partisan, Kellam was allowed to 

participate. 55 

Joseph Robbins indicated that this kind of civic activity was encouraged 

by the leadership of the Station."This was a way to get in with the community, 

to let the community know that we were a part of them .... One fellow was 

mayor of a town, oh I guess, ten or twelve years." 56 He also related that the 

town of Chincoteague was allowed to make use of the excess capacity of the 

sewage treatment plant on the old Navy base for their own waste disposal 

needs. In 1965 the Virginia Bureau of Public Roads came to the Station to 

shoot a "driver's education film on hydroplaning." 57 Community interactions 

like these, in addition to the open houses and the leading role the Station 

played during the Ash Wednesday Storm, indicate a conscious effort to fit 

into the local environment. This effort did not stern from any ulterior motive 

so much as it arose as a consequence of the residential status of the staff. 

They lived in the area, so they were dealing with friends and neighbors. 

116 
CHANCES AMID CONSTANCY 

Of course, being an active rocket range meant that Wallops could not 

always remain quietly in the background. Research requirements sometimes 

dictated launches at odd hours, or infrequent intervals. "Which was hard 

for the local people to understand, that you couldn't launch anything with 

the wind blowing a certain [way], or you couldn't launch anything if there 

were any ships out there you might hit, and this type of thing .... You're 

sitting back in you're home, 'well boy, they're just goofing-off up there 

today."'' 8 In January 1965 Wallops personnel began to seek permission to 

gain access to nearby property in order to set up acoustic sensors needed for 

a project.'" The aircraft research, which included supersonic flights offshore, 

and the use of guns to launch probes, also caused occasional difficulties. 

Despite these side-effects, "We had a good relationship, I think. There were 

a few farmers that blamed us for the weather conditions, you know, there 

are always a few superstitious people, ....""n The openness of the base, with 

its grandstands and unobtrusive security, contributed to this generally good 

rapport. 

The community did not react to the base with quite the same exuberance 

shown by other communities that played host to NASA facilities. The 

residents of Hampton, Virginia, for example, renamed their main highviay 

"Mercury Boulevard" and local bridges bore the names of astronauts. Quite 

a few retail establishments around Cape Canaveral took names with space 

program connotations. One does not see this around the Accomack area, 

though. The roads, villages, and geographic features all seem to retain the 

names originally bestowed upon them. Names influenced by Native 

American terms or religious references occur often. Businesses use 

commonplace names unrelated to space and rocketry. An attempt to rename 

the island after local native Hugh Dryden, fell through when, "a lot of people 

got upset, ... Wallops Island had been known as Wallops Island since the 

1600's."" 1 Even today, if one does not pay attention, it's easy to miss the road 

that leads to the base. This casual acceptance of the Station probably stems 

partially from the relative lack of glamorous projects (like the piloted space 

flight projects), and partially from the routine nature of the operations. 

Wallops has become just another part of the local scene. 

A major concern of Krieger's was the matter of education in support of the 

space program. During NASA's fifth semiannual management conference 

in 1961, he participated in a working group study on "Improving NASA's 

Weight Lifting Capability," in which he commented on the problem of 

"obtaining the type and depth of engineering evaluation needed," for the 

task under study. As a part of the solution he recommended, "a strong 

education program by NASA, sponsoring of courses in universities, 

sponsoring the preparations of textbooks." 62 Krieger had a two-fold problem 

on his hands. First, he needed to attract and retain quality engineers, 

professionals who would expect the opportunity to further their education. 

Secondly, he noted that, "Many jobs at this Station ... appear to be somewhat 

117 
WALLOPS STATION 

beyond the technical capability normally expected of a mechanic or 

craftsman, however skilled or dedicated. On the other hand, such a job would 

not seem a very challenging one for a good engineer, .... "63 

"Bob and I conducted surveys of ... practically the whole Delmarva 

Peninsula. What are the needs of the people? We knew what our needs 

were." 64 The results of these surveys indicated that the area needed a boost 

in higher education: engineering for the Wallops base, agricultural for the 

local residents. To help meet these needs, the Station leaders sought to 

convince Virginia authorities to locate a branch college on the Eastern Shore. 

"We were courted by both the University of Virginia and VPI to request that 

we be made a branch of them. Well, we had no say in it, but we went up to 

Richmond and appeared before the Council of Higher Education, and we 

were assigned to the University of Virginia." 65 The branch college, originally 

situated in "surplus" housing just outside the base, provided services to both 

the local communities and to Wallops. 66 "They would fly in professors, and 

we had started our own technician training courses on the base, ... , rather 

than having our own electrical engineers teaching the courses, we contracted 

over with this new 'branch,' ... , to do all this." 67 Abraham Spinak recognized 

the importance of this concern for education by noting, "We kept our 

engineers that way." 68 

The residents of the area also profited. Course offerings not only included 

technical subjects like Trigonometry and "Advanced Engineering Math II" 

but also liberal arts classes such as American History and "Principles of 

Organization and Management," and "general studies" such as Art and "Basic 

Grammar Review." 69 This type of program almost certainly would not have 

come to the Eastern Shore during the early 1960's if not for the efforts of 

Krieger and the staff at Wallops. Given that university students with small 

projects comprised one of the new groups of customers coming to the base, 

and Krieger's conviction that, "If the national space program is to capitalize 

on this resource ... , one must think in terms of experiments that can be 

performed by Ph.D. candidates," the interest in higher education locally 

meshed well with Wallops' activities. 70 

One such activity entailed a program in August 1965 sponsored by NASA 

and the University of Virginia, that brought 32 biologists to Wallops. A three 

week course was conducted, designed to teach "operational and engineering 

aspects of space flight." 71 Biological payloads were not new to the base; the 

biggest press draw had been the flights of the monkeys (which had included 

"insect eggs, larvae, bacteria cultures, and cell tissue") during Project 

Mercury. 72 The current program incorporated launches of white rats in order 

to train the biologists in investigative techniques pertaining to researching 

the impact of space flight on living organisms. 73 

Wallops maintained its reputation for being a versatile research facility. 

While the biologists practiced with rats, the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 

Laboratory came to the base to investigate "clear air turbulence" for NASA 

118 
CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

and the Air Force. Satellites, meteorological soundings, military tests, 

balloons, and "gun probes," all launched from the island in 1965, 418 in all. 

Add to that 7 flights from Pt. Barrow and 80 from the Croatan, and its easy to 

see that Wallops kept up a fast pace. 74 The failure rate for 1965, where a 

malfunction caused little or no data to be gathered, was around 13%, nominal 

and tolerable for low-budget, unpiloted experiments. 75 This proved to be a 

valuable part of operations from Wallops. With so many flights each year, if 

one failed, another could usually be arranged. The sounding rockets had 

minimal backup systems in order to keep both weights and costs low. The 

inexpensive and unspectacular nature of the program made it easy for NASA 

to continue the NACA's attitude toward failure and look upon these 

misfortunes as learning experiences. 76 

The "unique" character of the operations at Wallops, the interactions with 

the local communities, and the pastoral location all served to foster a definite 

"esprit de corps" at the Station. 77 The old Langley methodology, as brought 

to the base by Krieger and the other NACA veterans, set the tone for the 

environment there. Informal ("anybody, from the lowest laborer, could walk 

into [Krieger's] office and talk to him"), independent ("we didn't get 

permission, we just did it, period. I'm one of those people, you do it, and 

you tell [Headquarters] what you're doing, and tell them the attributes, ... "), 

and committed to the task at hand, this atmosphere prevailed at least until 

the late 1970's. 78 At that time the NACA veterans began to retire; NASA 

"bureaucratized," and economics finally brought about the absorption of 

Wallops by Goddard. 79 Within a few years people who had thought of 

themselves as NACA/Langley personnel came to view themselves as 

NASA/Wallops personnel. Whether a similar shift took place in the early 

1980's is a subject open to question. 

The underlying theme in this important period of Wallops' history, 

therefore, is change amid constancy. The variety and scope of the experiments 

conducted at the base, the physical size and economic investment there, and 

its relations with the public, press, and scientific community all changed 

markedly during the 1957-1965 time frame. During that same era, however, 

the general nature of the research tools used, the Station's role in the larger 

organization of which it was a part, and the "operational philosophy" and 

methodology prevalent remained consistent. The most significant changes 

involved the shift from primarily aeronautical to a more varied research 

program with a heavy emphasis on space science investigations and the 

diversification of the customer base. The stability of the staff, equipment, 

and methodology provided a foundation of experience upon which the new 

programs could be built. Both of these factors allowed Wallops to stay useful 

to a range of programs and researchers that might otherwise have been 

overlooked due to the relative size and mundane nature of their experiments. 

Thus, Wallops, despite its small stature and uncelebrated role, contributed 

significantly to the early U.S. space effort. 

119 
WALLOPS STATION 

NOTES 


1. 	 The growth of the base is dramatically illustrated by looking at the figures 

relating to total plant value. FY58: $3,661,000; FY63: $24,173,000; FY65: 

$42,978,000; FY68: $103,388,000. Figures for 58 and 68 are in Data Book I, 26, 

table 2-b. Figure for 63 is from, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1963, 

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on H.R. 

11737, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6206-135, 174. Figure for 65 is from, U.S., Congress, 

House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1966, 

Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong. 

1st sess., 6502-04H, 1232. 

2. 	 Note, for example," As NASA matured, so did the aerospace industry - in no 

small part due to the efforts of Glennan and James Webb, ... , to build it up." 

McCurdy, 167. This ultimately affected the old custom of performing work on 

an in-house basis, rather than contracting out. 

3. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 300. 

4. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 335-425, quote is near 425. 

5. 	 Rosholt, 197-227. 

6. 	 Ibid., 289-302. 

7. 	 Ibid., v. 

8. 	 Levine, 34-43. 

9. 	 Letter, Albert F. Siepert to T. Melvin Butler, 1 June 1962, in folder "Special File, 

May to September 62," in RGA181-l(S). "Most of you" refers to the 

aforementioned field administrative officials and HQ representative. See also 

in the same folder Butler's reply to Siepert of 14 June recommending items for 

the agenda. 

10. 	 Levine, 43-46. Note that this reorganization is unrelated to JFK's assassination. 

11. 	 "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 275. 

12. 	 Memorandum, G. M. Truszynski for the Staff, Office of Tracking and Data 

Acquisition, 8 January 1962, in folder "Functions and Authority OTDA," in 

NASA HQ box #1. This memo lists, among other Office responsibilities, 

"Wallops Station Overall Operations and Budgeting." See also: "Spinak, et al.," 

OHi, Tape 2a: 180, Abraham Spinak: "We never worked directly for Buckley, 

except we did." 

13. 	 Charts, "NASA Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Virginia," March 1961, 31 

August 1964, and 1 June 1967. 

14. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Master Planninq 

of NASA Installations, H. Report 167, 89th Cong. 1st sess., 6503 15H, 7. 

15. 	 Ibid., 35. 

16. 	 Ibid. 

17. 	 Ibid., 3-6. 

120 
CHANCES AMID CONSTANCY 

18. 	 Ibid., 28. The other five facilities examined were: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 

Flight Research Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, Michoud Plant, and 

Mississippi Test Facility. 

19. 	 Ibid., 17-18. See also: "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 326. 

20. 	 House Report, Master Plannins, 29. 

21. 	 Ibid., 32. 

22. 	 Ibid., 33, emphasis in original. 

23. 	 NASA Wallops News Release, "Contract Awards During August 1965, 3 August 

1965, in folder004696 "Wallops - Contract Awards," in file tray "Wallops Flight 

Facility (con't)," in NHO. 

24. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1st lllleri111 

Report on Master P/a1111i11q of NASA lnstallatio11s,H. Report 1220, 89th Cong. 2nd

sess., 6601-24H. Page 3 notes that Wallops was the first base re\·isited. The others 

were: Lewis, JPL, and the Manned Spacecraft Center. 

25. 	 [bid., 8. Phase one of the plan mappPd and inventoried the existing plant. Phase 

two dealt with "demolition, renovation, or new construction," concerning the 

phase one structures. Phase three listed plans for "future programs." Note, the 

staff still hoped for programs, "possibly including facilities for large launch 

vehicles." 

26. 	 Ibid., 14. 

27. 	 Ibid., 17. The report ends on a somewhat self congratulatory note: "There is 

profit in congressional attention to the development and utilization of master 

plans by NASA. Periodic oversight of the policy and practice should be 

continued by the committee." 

28. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Apprnpric1tion, llldepcndrnt Offices 

Appropriations for 1967. Hcarillgs before a House s11bco111111ittcc of the Committee oil 

Appropriations, 89th Cong. 2nd sess., 6602-0lH, part 2, 1533-4. 

29. 	 Hall ion, 134. "Spinak, et c1l.," OHi, Tape 2b: 15S. "Robbins," OHi, Tilpe lb: 360. 

30. 	 Data Book/, 11, figure 1-2. "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tc1pe 2b: 235. Levine, 255-6. 

31. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 23S; Hansen, 376n. 

32. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2b: 235; "Robbins," OHi, Tape lb: 360. 

33. 	 Levine, 202-09, 254. 

34. 	 McCurdy, 101-6. 

35. 	 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Future Natiollal 

Space Obiectivcs, a Staff Study of a House s11bcon1111ittcc of the Co111111ittec Oil Scicllce 

and Astronm1tics, 89th Cong. 2nd sess., 6607-26H, 354-56. Teague's letter went 

out on 29 June 1965; Krieger's reply is dated 27 July. 

36. 	 Ibid., 354. 

37. 	 Recall Krieger's complaint about the meteorological program going too soon 

operational in chapter 4 above. Also, "very large program" in Wallops terms 

seems to refer to "billion dollar satellites." Several of those interviewed used 

that or a similar phrase. 

121 
WALLOPS STATION 

38. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 15 December 1961, in folder 

"Special File, September - December 1961," in RGA181-l(S), for Krieger's 

reference to "customers." This is not the only example of the term, and that fact 

provides insight into how the staff viewed their relationship to those who came 

to the base. Remember, dissatisfied customers will either complain to the 

management or take their business elsewhere. 

39. 	 Staff Study, Space Objectives, 356. 

40. 	 Ibid. 

41. 	 Ibid., 354-55. 

42. 	 McDougall, 201. 

43. 	 Memorandum, Carl A. Sandahl for Associate Director, 10 December 1962, in 

folder "Wallops, August 62 - February 63," in RGA181-l(C). This memo on "Visit 

of Wallops personnel to discuss future requirements" demonstrates one type 

of planning: that involving a specific customer's near-term needs. Joseph 

Robbins clearly states the station management's feelings toward master 

planning (ie.Iong-range planning), in "Robbins," OHI, Tape lb: 236. 

44. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 170. Note that the Mobile Sea Launch Expedition, 

the Master Planning Report, and the Teague letter all occur around 1965. 

45. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 300. 

46. 	 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Science, NASA 

Authorization for Fiscal Year 1962, S. Report 475 to accompany H.R. 6874, 87th 

Cong. 1st sess., 6106-075, 129, notes that Project Apollo will result in 100 new 

positions at Wallops. Perhaps coincidentally, the number of NASA employees 

at the base went from 530 in FY 1964, to 420 in FY 74.Contract personnel stood 

at 400 in FY 63, and dropped to 209 the next year due to the relocation of the 

MSFN Evaluation/Training facility to Goddard. Figures are from various 

budget hearings cited and Marquis Academic Media, NASA Factbook: Guide to 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Proqrams and Activities, 2nd ed. 

(Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1975), 327. 

47. 	 NASA Factbook, 324, 326; Data Book I, 491-2. 

48. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 280. 

49. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 370, for Range Recoverer. Andrew Wilson, "Scout 

- NASA's Small Satellite Launcher," Space Fliqht 21, no. 11 (November 1979): 

446-59. This article includes a list of the first 98 Scout launches with pertinent 

data. 25 of the first 50 launches occurred at Wallops (1960-67). Only 12 of the 

next 48 flew from that base (1967-78). 

50. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 498, noted that Wallops has always played host to the 

military, "They just don't talk about it." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 

Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1962, Hearings before the House 

Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 3238 and 6029, 87th Cong.1st sess., 

6104-18H, part 2, 861, for an interesting exchange: Rep Bell:" Are you performing 

any work at Wallops Island for the Department of Defense now?" Mr. Wyatt: 

"Yes, sir, a great deal. We supply the facilities and the services in terms of 

tracking and recording of data and furnish the data then back to the user agency. 

No charge." [Emphasis mine). The Navy maintains a training facility for their 

Aegis radar system at Wallops, and (according to the 21 March 1994 issue of 

122 
CHANGES AMID CONSTANCY 

Aviation Week) plans to launch targets for tests of ballistic missile interceptors 

from the base in late 1994. 

51. 	 Data Book III, 156, for Explorer 44. Table 3-4 on page 133 shows that NASA 

funding for the sounding rocket program stayed around $19 million throughout 

the 1970's. 

52. 	 Ibid., 343, for the GEOS, which was managed by Wallops but launched from 

Vandenberg on a Delta booster. 

53. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 520 - lb: 50. 

54. 	 Ibid., Tape la: 335. 

55. 	 Memorandum, Albert P. Kellam for Personnel Officer, 25 April 1958, in folder 

"Special File, March - April 58," in RGA181-l(S). See also in this folder; Letter, 

A.G. Clement to Mrs. A. P. Kellam, 17 April 1958, and Letter, Joseph Robbins to 

Langley, 29 April 1958, on the same subject. 

56. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 460. 

57. 	 Ibid., for sewage treatment plant. For film see: Memorandum, C. C. 

Shufflebarger for Associate Director, 28 May 1965, in folder "Special file, June 

- December 65," in RGA181-l(S). 

58. 	 Ibid., la: 495. 

59. 	 Memorandum, W. Latham Copeland to Albert J. Saecker, 19 January 1965, in 

folder "Wallops, January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C). 

60. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 350. See Shortal, 670-73 for problems stemming from 

sonic boom test flights. 

61. 	 "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 300, for attempt to rename the island. Hansen, 391, 

for Hampton nar.1es which are still in use today. 

62. 	 Staff Report, "Summary of Presentations and Discussions, 5th Semi-Annual 

Conference, Luray Va., March 8-10 1961," 36, in box "NASA Staff Conferences," 

inNHO. 

63. 	 Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Distribution List, 6 December 1963, in folder "Special 

File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). See also: "Spinak, et al.," OHI, 

Tape 2b: 80. 

64. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 410. 

65. 	 Ibid. VPI is Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Note that in July 1963, U.Va., VPI, 

and William and Mary formed the Virginia Associated Research Center in 

Newport News and began working under a NASA contract; A&A, 1963, 288. 

66. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 100. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 423, notes that the 

college, reconstituted as a community college, later moved south to the town 

of Melfa. 

67. 	 "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 440. 

68. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 130. 

69. 	 NASA Wallops News Release #63-2, "Extension Classes Offered at Wallops," 7 

January 1963, in folder 004680 "Wallops General (1958-63)," in file tray "Centers, 

Wallops Flight Facility," in NHO. 

123 
WALLOPS STATION 

70. 	 Staff Study, F1il11reSpace Obiectives, 355, as cited in note 35 above. 

71. 	 NASA Wallops News Release #65-255, "Biologists to Begin Technology Training 

Program at Wallops," 8 August 1965, in folder OW-0500000-01 "Wallops Island 

Flight Center (NASA)," in Space History Collection, NASM. 

72. 	 Shortal, 656-57. 

73. 	 Ernest Imhoff, "Astrorats To Teach Biologists," The Baltimore Evenin:,; Sun, 

Tuesday, 13 July 1965, Bl. 

74. 	 Letter, Isadore Katz to Possible Participants in Wallops Clear Air Turbulence 

Project, IO August 1965, in folder "Special File, June December 65," in RGA 181­

l(S). Memorandum, John R. Holtz to M. W. Rosen, 30 December 1965, in folder 

005064 "15.1 Sounding Rockets 1964-69," in file tray "Sounding Rockets 

General," in NHO. This memo lists the sounding rocket launches for the 

calendar years 64 and 65. Recall, however, that a number of small calibration 

rockets w'ere fired in association with each research launch, thus adding to the 

total number of firings. 

75. 	 My figure for the failure rate is based on the launches recorded in A&A, 1965. 

32 launches (out of 418 listed in the memo cited Ibid.) are listed in the 

chronology. 4 of these are listed as failures, roughly a 13% failure rate or an 

87% success rate. This sampling agrees with the figures given for a "tolerable" 

failure rate by several sources including "Milliner," OHi, Tape lb: 455. 

76. 	 McCurdy, 70-1, 149-55. 

77. 	 "Spinak, et al.," OH!, Tape 2a: 540. 

78. 	 "Milliner," OHi, Tape la: 320, for Krieger's accessibility. "Robbins," OHi, Tape 

la: 470, for independent attitude. 

79. 	 McCurdy, 1, for NASA "bureaucratization." For views on the Goddard/Wallops 

merger see: "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape 2a: 245; "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 230. 

124 
APPENDIX 

APPENDIX 1 


YEAR DEVELOPMENT LAUNCHINCS RESEARCH LAUNCHINCS 

l'-145 4 12 

l '-146 8 l'-15 

l'-147 'PL/ 241 

1'-148 32 282 

1'-14'-I 18 406 

1'-150 26 301 

1'-ISl 23 231 

l'-152 75 22'.\ 

1'-153 30 305 

1YS4 45 275 

1955 27 219 

1956 9 114 

Data from, Shortal, Nc7PDi111c11sio11, 736-741,

Developmental launches were almost exclusively military in nature, 

125 

APPENDIX 

APPENDIX2 

Date Chart Page 

3 March 58 NACA Organization [Wallops part of Langley) 128 

21 March 59 NASA Organization [Wallops part of Goddard] 129 

1 May 59 NASA Organization [Wallops equal to Goddard) 130 

4 April 60 NASA Organization [Addition of OLVP] 131 

1 November 61 NASA Organization (1961 Reorganization] 132 

1 November 63 NASA Organization (1963 Reorganization] 133 

18 December 61 Wallops Station Organization 134 

1 June 67 Wallops Station Organization 135 

All Charts from files of NASA History Office 

127 
WALLOPS STATION 

Organization Chart: NACA (3 March 1958) 

National Advisory Committee 

for Aeronautics Special Committee 


on Space Technology 


Committee on Aircraft, 

Missile, and Spacecraft 

Aerodynamics 

Subcommittees 

Committee on Ac., M., and 

Sc. Construction 

Subcommittees 

Pilotless Aircraft 

Research Station 

(WallOj)S Island) 

Director 

Executive Secretary Associate Director for Research 

Assistant Director 

for Research 

(Aerodynamics) 

Ames 

Aeronautical Lab. 

Assistant Oirecior 

for Research 

(Propulsion) 

Lawis 

Propulsion Lab. 

Subcommittees 

Assistant Director 

for Research (Aircraft Construction) 

High-Speed 

Flight Station 

Committee on Ac., Industry Consulting 

M., and Sc. Propulsion Committee 

Subcommittees Committee on Aircraft 

Operating Problems 

Wright-Patterson estem Coordlnatlo A.F. Base Lialson Office Office 

128 
APPENDIX 

Organization Chart: NASA (21 March 1959) 

Office of the Administrator 


Administrator 


Deputy Administrator 


Associate Administrator 


Office of 


Business 


Administration 


Administrative 


Divisions 


West em 

Coordination 

Office 

Office of Aeronautical 

and Space Research 

Aerodynamics and 


Flight Mechanics 


Structures, Materials, 

and Aircraft Operating 

Problems 

Power Plants 

Office of University 


Research 


Langley Center 

Ames Center 

Lewis Center 

High Speed 


Flight Station 


Office of Space 


Flight Development 


Advanced Technology 

Propulsion 

Space Science 

~ace Flight perations 

Jet Propulsion 


Lab. 


Beltsville 


Space Center 


Wallops Station 

Calif; Canaveral 
 Director of 


NASA Activities) 


(Abbreviated for clarity) 

129 
WALLOPS STATION 

Organization Chart: NASA (1 May 1959) 

Office of the Administrator 


Administrator 


Deputy Administrator 


Associate Administrator 


Office of 


Business 


Administration 


Administrative 
 Divisions 


Western 


Coordination 


Office 


(Abbreviated for clarity) 

Office of Aeronautical 


and Space Research 


Aerodynamics and 


Flight Mechanics 


Structures, Materials, 


and Aircraft Operating 
 Problems 


Power Plants 


Office of Research 


Grants and Contracts 


Langley Center 


Ames Center 


Lewis Center 


High Speed 


Flight Station 


Office of Space 


Flight Development 


Advanced Technology 

Propulsion 

Space Sciences 

88iace Fligh1 

perat1ons 

P~ram Coo ,nation 

Goddard Space 


Flight Center 


Jet Propulsion 


Lab. 


Wallops Station 

NASA-AMR 


Operations Office 


130 
APPENDIX 

Organization Chart: NASA (4 April 1960) 

Office of the Administrator 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Western Operations 

Ott ice 

Headquarters Ottices 

and Committees 

Associate Administrator 

Ottice of Business 
 Administration 


Administrative Divisions 

Office of Life 
 Sciences Programs 


Assistant Directors 

Office of Launch 


Vehicle Programs 


Vehicles 

Launch Operations 

Propulsion 

Marshall Space 

Flight Center 

NASA· AMA 

Operations Office 

(Abbreviated for clarity) 

Office of Advanced 


Research Programs 


Structures and Operating 


Problems 


Power Plants 

Office of Research 


Grants and Contracts 


Langley Center 

Ames Center 

Lewis Center 

Flight Research 


Center 


Ottice of Space 


Flight Programs 


Applications and Manned 


Flight Programs 


Space Flight 


Operations 


Satellite and Sounding 


Rocket Programs 


Lunar and Planetary 


Programs 


Goddard Space 


Flight Center 


Wallops Station 

Jet Propulsion 


Lab. 


131 
WALLOPS STATION 

Organization Chart: NASA (1 November 1961) 

Office of the Administrator 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Office of 

Programs 

Program Directors 

Office of Tracking and 


Data Acquisition 


Office of 


Administration 


Administrative 
 Divisions 


western Coordinating 

Office 

Associate Administrator 

Office of 


Applications 


Directors 

Office of Advanced 


Research and Technology 


Directors 

Office of 


Space Sciences 


Directors 

Office of Manned 


Space Flight 


Directors 

Headquarters Offices 

and Committees 

Langley Center 

Ames Center 

Lewis Center 

Flight Research 


Center 


Wallops Station 

Goddard Space 


Flight Center 


Jet Propulsion 


Lab. 


Marshall Space 


Flight Center 


Manned Spacecraft 


Center 


(Abbreviated for clarity) 

132 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

I 


t ·-- Novefflbw 1, tlU 

a {.._JJJ. Administrnw

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Assistant Deputy Administrator I I I I I I T.chnology uii•latlw lntomaUonol I PubUc ft•lrs Program• O.rw.-.1 EHcutlve , ,s~~-nml I Executive Utilimtlon •nd Afflllra Policy 

CounHI Oft ... , S.cr.tary ... :=:'my Polley Planning Planning 

"-••• Au.•mnt ,.,....... .......... Boonl of Scienc.a 

AdMINStrMOr ....... MOf Adfflinie.•MOr ........ .._ 

Associate 

Administrator I lnduot,yI Prog ... mming I ~n-1 Aft•irs dmlnlotmionl Deputy 

_... .;;;. ......... - ,=:"... "'*"""•lnlDr Admin'-trllklf -­ ............. I 

I I -·­ Tr11cldng I w-­ - and O.ta -~­- Acquisition °"""' .....-­ ~­ °""""' 

Manned Space Science Advanced R-ch Space Flight and Applications and Technology 

Associate Administrator Associate Administrator Associate Administrator 

I I 

Goo,ve c. Mo.wholl Man Md Goddonl Jet Propulllon AmH FlightRe ... n:h Sps~ Flight Center SpKKl'llft c.nter Space~ Center (~"=mcf) RuMrch Center Center

_

Otrector Dine .. .,.,... .,.,.. . .. HoouMooo,Tn 

__.. _.,... __.,... 

--­ I I 

Launch Pacific Launch 

Re.;-~~nter I.owl• ()pera!lon1 Cent•r Ope~otflc. Wolll\t!.::'lon Re ... n:h C.n1er Ol,..lo< """""' ""'"" c­ ......... l.....,C,C..­ ....,......v. ......-.v. c-­ U.l.~PrlllllnlDMm1"30,·100,4'I 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Wallops Station 


Wallops Island, Virginia 


Director 

Robert L Krieger 

Executive Assistant and Resident Construction 

Budget Officer Engineer 

Roy F. Dunn GennainS. Brown 

Flight Test Division 


John C. Palmer 


Range Engineering 


Branch 


Abraham D. Spinak 


Range Instrumentation 


Branch 


Robert R. Westfall 


Vehicle Preparation and 


Launching Branch 


Eldred H. Helton 

Adminlatrative Management 


Division 


Joseph E. Robbins 


Flacal Branch 


Arnett R. Knapp 


Management Services 


Branch 


William H. Hilliard 

Personnel Branch 


George A. Matzner Ill 


Procurement and Supply 


Branch 


Louis T. Birch 

Approved 


Technical Services 


Division 


William E, Grant 

Safety Support Services 

Office Planning Unit 

Thomas M. MacComb James W. Quillen 

Range Support 


Branch 


Roben T. Holdren Ill 


Facilities Operations 


Branch 


Paul C. Mears 

Damage Control 


Branch 


Hennan J. Whealton 

by Y~ 

I Roben L. Krieger, Directo 

~ r 

r 

0 

;:g 

(fl 

~ ;:j 

0 

z 

Date I? 
 -/R-p/ 
-- --

-- ---

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Wallops Station 

Wallops Island, Virginia 

Director 

Rot>.rt L. Krieger 

Associate Director Abraham D. Spln.k 

I 

l I Budget Office 

I Roy F. Dunn,.Budget Officer I 

I I I I 


FMght T NI Divialon 

I Ran~ Engi.-ng Dlviaion John C. P•lrMr, Chlilf llmrvln w.llcGoopn, ChW Robert T. Duffy, Aut. ChW 

~ Progn,m u._.,_,1 and Lialoon Bnnch 

C...,F.llllnof.­ ..........
 ~_..........,.~._._
 .._.......~..__..,..... ........ 


Experlm«1tal F .. 11- Brsnoh ~R.W..u.11,H..:t 

~~--COnlNIISedon

·-­==---

Vehlole lnteyj!':t, and Launch 

Eldr_. H. Helon, H.-1 ~--Qulty...__ ....... 


v ..... ~Mdl.MI_,,._._ .... f ..... ~ 

I 


Reliability ond O..llty Asaurnco Office 

J. Ind MfQn, H..t 

Anloly8ls and Compullltlon Bnnch 

JohnH.CWM,""-:1

:--...:::.-:::~,_._ 

Experlmantal Fadl- Branoh Robert H .......... HNd 

lNcflHI .,. ....... ---­

===~ 

lnatrumentation Development Bnnoh WN1'9m H. WHt, Hllm 

......................... o.•c-....._..,_.,__._... ........ ~., .............. ,_.....,.......... ,.._..,..,..... ...... 

R•nge LaydC.P ___ S.t.ty Branch

====~leo-..n lnatrument Servi~ •nd 

C.llbrsdon Labc>nllor/ 

CecM 8, Ctwnben, H.-:t 

T ec:hnlCIII ServlCN Divt.lon I Admini•tnitive U.Mg«Mnt Dtvlaion 

JoMptl E. Robblne, Ch611f Wlltwn E. Gnni., ChW I Ftwlk LT~, Aul ChW I 

rl Security Office J.,..... c. Aoyd, S.Curtly Offlc• 


PubUo Affairs Office 
 rl aw- s.Jaimu,, HNd 

~ FiaoalBrw,Gh

..... V_,_s.chn 

.......... 
 -R-~.­

-I Managament Satvi.. Branoh WI...,., H. HIHlan:I, HNd 

~ Penonnel Brsnoh George A. Meaner. HNd 

,,...._.......
 =--­

Procurement and Supply Branch 


l.OUNT. Birch. HNd 


C-99G19hcllon 


~Md~SCllon 


H 
 Solely Office 
 ThomN 11.llcComb, Jr., Offlc« 

Contractual •nd Support ServlCM er.nch 

JMIHW.Oulu.n,H.-1 

Contrac~AUII T~ SK11on DllqgeC- ......... 


~ Ran~ Support Brsnoh 

Robert T. Holdren, Hem 

Ex~ 1nnu-1C-due .... !kiclktft

:,';:" .:::'s.c.,,, 

F•cllltiea Openition• Branch 

Paul C. IIMr•, H11m 

9ulldlntT!NN-,.d ......... aSM: .... 

~-­ lltclrtcell«vlc9S. ... 

Date: __ ___,J::.:u:.:ne~1:.,..:1c::96,.7,....__ _____

APPENDIX 

APPENDIX3 


YEAR NASA EMPLOYEES CONTRACT EMPLOYEES 

1956 78 

1957 83 

1958 83 

1959 97 

1960 228 

1961 292 

1962 407 

1963 493 400 

1964 530 209 

1965 555 

1966 497 

1974 430 

Data from, Data Book 1, 498 table 6-145; various Congressional hearings; 

NASA Factbook,327. Information on contractors is scarce. 

137 

APPENDIX 

APPENDIX4 


NATION lST MISSION DATE # OF PROJECTS 

Canada 12/56 3 

U.K. 6/60 2 

France 1/61 4 

Norway 1/61 3 

Italy 1/61 3 

Sweden 5/61 2 

Japan 8/61 3 

Pakistan 9/61 3 

Australia 2/62 3 

Denmark 7/62 2 

ESRO 11/62 1 

Bermuda 12/62 2 

India 1/63 2 

1.N.C.O.S.P.A.R. 11/63 1 

W. Germany 9/64 1 

Selected International Cooperative Programs 

NASA Adminstrator's Monthly Progress Report 

ESRO: European Space Research Organization 

INCOSPAR: International Committee on Space Research 

Some projects were multi-national, all were civilian in nature and utilized a 

variety of equipment. 

139 

APPENDIX 

APPENDIXS 


YEAR R. and D. C.O.F. A.O. 

1959 0 16.14 1.36 

1960 1 0 2.65 

1961 2.6 2.03 4.99 

1962 0.6 11.32 7.14 

1963 2.7 4.16 8.9 

1964 4.3 0.51 8.78 

1965 6.2 1.7 11.13 

1966 7.5 1.05 9.35 

Wallops Funding in $ millions 

Rand D: Research and Development 

COF: Construction of Facilities 

AO: Administrative Operations 

Data Book 1, 491, table 6-147. 

141 

NOTE ON SOURCES 

NOTE ON SOURCES 


A: 	 Langley Research Center Historical Archives 

The sources used in this thesis that were examined at Langley Research Center, 

Hampton, Virginia, are contained in four Record Groups. These are: 

Record Group Al81-l "Special Files," cited herein as RGA181-l (S); 

Record Group Al81-l "Correspondence Files," cited herein as RGA181-l (C); 

Floyd L. Thompson Papers, cited herein as FLT Papers; 

Milton Ames Collection, cited herein as MA Collection. 

I was informed by the staff at Langley that RGA181-l{S), and RGA181-l (C), 

were scheduled to be retired to the National Archives in late 1993. These two 

record groups, therefore, may no longer be located at Langley. 

B: 	 National Archives and Records Administration 

There are essentially two types of NASA records at NARA, those that have 

been transferred to NARA's control, and those that are still under NASA's 

control. Both types are labeled as Record Group 255. Those under NARA control 

were examined, but provided little assistance with this project. Those under 

NASA's control can be accessed through the NASA History Office, which keeps 

a series of binders listing the accession forms. However, the records are 

organized by accession date, not the date they were generated, therefore, after 

examining the binders, I decided that the expenditure of time needed to peruse 

this rather large group could be more profitably spent on other sources. 

C: 	 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters 

Several collections in the NASA History Office, Washington, DC (herein cited 

as NHO), provided information for this thesis. Record collections used that are 

contained in filing trays include: 


Administrator's Collection; 


Biographical Collection; 


Budget Materials Collection; 


Field Centers Collection; 


Program and Projects Collection. 


Records contained 	 in file boxes include: 

"NASA Headquarters Organization, OART (can't), OTDA, OSC," cited herein 

as NASA HQ box #1; 

"NASA Headquarters Organizations: OLV, OAST, OART," cited herein as 

NASA HQ box #2; 

"NASA Administrator's Monthly Progress Report," cited herein as NASA 

APR, (date). 

The Congressional Records cited herein are all contained in the files of the NASA 

History Office. For the sake of clarity I have utilized the numbering system 

employed by that Office in my citations. This numbering system, based on the 

printing date of the document in question, allows one to quickly retrieve a 

desired record from the files, as well as saving some space in already crowded 

endnotes. For example: 6601-l 7H, indicates a House document dated 17 January 

1966. NASA's Congressional Collection is organized in ascending numerical 

order. 

143 
WALLOPS STATION 

D: 	 National Air and Space Museum 

Several documents for this thesis were found in the Space History Collection at 

the Washington, DC museum. 

E: 	 Joseph A. Shortal, A New Dimension 

This 1978 reference tome, the only published work of substance dealing 

exclusively with the Wallops Station, has not generally been used as a secondary 

source during the course of this thesis. Shortal for many years included Wallops 

as part of his Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at Langley, and thus produced 

a work that is as much memoir and chronicle, as it is history. He participated 

in much of the early history of the Station (until approximately 1961), and knew 

the people and issues involved, so I have utilized his work (outside of the 

introductory chapter) in much the same fashion in which I have utilized the 

oral histories. 

F: 	 Oral History Interviews 

I have conducted a series of four interviews with six employees of the Wallops 

Station. These are: 

Interview #1, conducted 21 December 1993, with Abraham D. Spinak, Marvin 

W. McGoogan, and Robert T. Duffy, on two 90 minute cassette tapes; cited 

herein as "Spinak, et al.," OHi, Tape [number, side: tape counter reading]. 

Interview #2, conducted 11 January 1994, with Joseph E. Robbins, on one 90 

minute cassette tape; cited herein as "Robbins," OHi, Tape [number, side: 

tape counter reading]. 

Interview#3, conducted 25 January 1994, with Joyce B. Milliner, on one 90 

minute cassette tape; cited herein as "Milliner," OHi, Tape [number, side: 

tape counter reading]. 

Interview 	 #4, conducted 19 April 1994, with James Chris Floyd, on one 90 

minute cassette tape; cited herein as "Floyd," OHi, Tape (number, side: 

tape counter reading]. 

G: 	 Wallops Flight Facility 

Documentary material examined at Wallops are situated in two locations. Much 

general information and public relations information are contained in the office 

of the Public Information Officer (currently Kieth Koehler). Jack Palmer's 

logbooks and several radar logbooks are also in this office. The Wallops Flight 

Facility Records Collection (cited herein as WFFRC) yielded several boxes of 

general information, and 12 boxes of research material Joseph Shortal used in 

writing his reference volume. Box #4 of this group of 12 proved very useful 

and is cited herein as Wallops Box #4. 

144 
_____

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 


DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS 

Hampton, VA Langley Research Center. Floyd L. Thompson Papers . 

. Milton Ames Collection. 

 ____Record Group Al81-1. Correspondence Files. 

 _____Record Group Al81-1. Special Files. 

_____.

_____.

Suitland, MD. National Archives and Records Administration. Record Group 

255. NACA Records. 

Wallops Island, VA. Wallops Flight Facility. Records Collection. 

Washington, D.C. National Aeronautics and Space Administration History 

Office. Biography File. 

__________ Congressional Records Collection .

NASA Administrators File . 

NASA Centers File. 

____ NASA Chronologic File.

____ NASA Headquarters File.

_____Organization and Management Collection. 

_____ Project Files. 

. 

. 

. 

_____. 

_____. 

_____. 

. 

Washington, D.C. National Air and Space Museum. Space History Collection. 

INTERVIEWS 

Floyd, James C. Interview. 19 April 1994. 

Milliner, Joyce B. Interview. 25 January 1994. 

Robbins, Joseph E. Interview. 11 January 1994. 

Spinak, Abraham D.; McGoogan, Marvin W.; and Duffy, Robert T. Interview. 

21 December 1993. 

BOOKS 

Anderson, Frank W. Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 

1915-1980. Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1981. 

Augenstein, Bruno W. Evolution of U.S. Military Space Program, 1945-1960: 

Some Key Events in Study, Planning, and Program Development. Santa 

Monica, CA.: Rand Corp., 1982. 

Brooks, Courtney G.; Grimwood, James M.; and Swenson, Loyd S. Jr. Chariots 

for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. Washington, D.C.: NASA, 

1979. 

Bulkeley, Rip. The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. 

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 

Coletta, Paolo E., ed. United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic. 

West Port, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1977. 

145 
WALLOPS STATION 

Collins, Martin J.,and Fries, Sylvia D., eds. A Spacefaring Nation: 

Perspectives on American Space History and Policy. Washington D.C.: 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: An Historical 

Summary. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1971. 

Davies, Merton E., and Harris, William R. RAND's Role in the Evolution of 

Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology. 

Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., 1988. 

Ertel, Ivan D., and Morse, Mary Louise. The Apollo Spacecraft: A 

Chronology.Vol 1: Through November 7, 1962. Washington D.C.: NASA, 

1969. 

Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book. Vol 2: Programs and 

Projects, 1958-1968. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1988. 

__________ . NASA Historical Data Book. Vol 3: Programs and Projects, 1969-1978. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1988. 

Gilruth, Robert R. "From Wallops Island to Project Mercury." In History of 

Rocketry and Astronautics. American Astronautical Society History 

Series, Vol 7, part 2. San Diego, CA.: American Astronautical Society, 

1986. 

Glennan, T. Keith. The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration: Events and Impressions as Recalled by T. Keith Glennan, 1st 

Administrator of NASA. Cleveland: by the Author, 1964. 

Green, Constance McL., and Lomask, Milton. Vanguard: A History. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1970. 

Hallion, Richard P. On The Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1984. 

Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History of Langley Aeronautical 

Laboratory, 1917-1958. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1987. 

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research 

Center, 1940-1965. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1970. 

Hirsh, Richard, and Trento, Joseph J.The National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. New York: Praeger, 1973. 

Kash, Don E. The Politics of Space Cooperation. West Lafayette, IN.: Purdue 

Research Foundation, 1967. 

Killian, James R. Jr. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First 

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA.: 

MIT Press, 1977. 

Kistiakowski, George B. A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of 

President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Cambridge, 

MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976. 

Levine,Amold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. Washington D.C.: NASA, 

1982. 

Logsdon, John M. The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the 

National Interest. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1970. 

146 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

McCurdy, Howard F.Inside NASA: Tlze Changing Culture of the American Space 

Program. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 

McDougall, Walter A. Tlze Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space 

Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985. 

Moger, Allen W. Virginia: Bourbonisnz to Byrd, 1870-1925. Charlottesville: 

University Press of Virginia, 1968. 

NASA. Astronautics and Aeronautics. Chronology. Washington D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, Annual, 1961-1979. 

Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1980. 

Neustadt, Richard E., and May, Ernest R. Thinking in Time: The Uses of 

History for Decision Makers. New York: The Free Press, 1986. 

Oberg, James E. Red Star in Orbit. New York: Random House, 1981. 

Ordway, Frederick I. III, and Sharpe, Mitchell R. The Rocket Team. New 

York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979. 

Pisano, Dominic, and Lewis, Cathleen S., eds. Air and Space History: An 

Annotated Bibliography. New York: Garland, 1988. 

Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1985 . 

. ...... ·Model Research: The National Advisory Co111111ittee for Aerona11tics, 1915­

1958. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1985. 

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight 

Center. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1985. 

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963. 

Washington D.C.: NASA, 1966. 

Schoettle, Enid Curtis Bok. "The Establishment of NASA." In Knowledge and 

Power: Essays of Science and Government. Edited by Sanford A. Lakoff. New 

York: The Free Press, 1966. 

Shortal, Joseph A. A New Dimension, Wallops Island Flight Test Range: Tlze 

First Fifteen Years. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1978. 

Skoog, A. Ingemar. History of Rocketry and Astronautics. American 

Astronautical Society History Series, Vol 10. San Diego, CA.: Univelt, Inc., 

1990. 

Swenson, Loyd S.; Grimwood, James M.; and Alexander, Charles C. This 

New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. Washington D.C.: NASA, 1966. 

United States Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks. Building the Navy's Bases in 

World War II. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947. 

U.S. President. 	 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 

Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and 

Records Administration, 1953-. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61; John F. 

Kennedy, 1961. 

Van Nimmen, 	 Jane; Bruno, Leonard C.; and Rosholt, Robert L. NASA 

Historical Data Book. Vol 1: NASA Reso11rces 1958-1968. Washington D.C.: 

NASA, 1988. 

147 
WALLOPS STATION 

JOURNAL ARTICLES 

Hetherington, Norriss S. "Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space 

Science Program." Prologue7 (1975): 99-107. 

Koppes, Clayton B. "The Militarization of the American Space Program: An 

Historical Perspective." Virginia Quarterly Review 60 (Winter 1984): 1-20. 

McDougall, Walter A. "Sputnik, the Space Race, and the Cold War." Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists 41 (May, 1985): 20-25. 

Mack, Pamela E. "Space History." Technology and Culture 30 (1989): 657- 665. 

148 
INDEX 

INDEX 

Abbott, Ira A.: 8, 18n, 28 

Accomac, VA: 117 

Ad Hoc Committee on NASA Organization: seeNACA 

Advisory Committee on Government Organization: 27 

Aegis (Training Center): 123n 

Aerobee (Rocket): 14, 85, lOln 

Agriculture, U.S. Department of: 29 

Air Force, U.S.: 11, 24, 37, 42n, 45n, 51n, 64, 67, 71n, 91, 98n, 110, 118 

Air Research and Development Command (ARDC): 41 


ARGUS Program: 31, 46n 


Cambridge Research Center: 15, 95, 106n 


Special Weapons Center: 31 


Airships: 87 

Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory: 13 

Allen, H. Julian: 55, 71n 

American Engineers, Inc.: 111 

Ames Laboratory (Ames Research Center): 4-5, 10-12, 20n, 26, 28, 40, 45n, 

55,56 

Moffett Field: 33, 47n 

and Wallops: 14-15 

Antigua Island: 73n 

Anzofagasta, Chile: 73n 

Apollo Project: 1, 11, 67-69, 70, 84, 90, 109, 112, 114 

Land vs Water Landing Mode: 68, 77n, 89, 122n 

Arctic Research Laboratory: 92-93 

Argentina: 91, 103n 

ARGO D-8 Probe: 104n 

Ariel 1 Satellite: 89 

Army, U.S.: 24, 37, 66, 68, 97n, 110 

Ballistic Missile Laboratory (ABMA): 23, 28, 38, 42n, 83, 108 

Orbiter Project: 42n 

Ash Wednesday Storm: 66-67, 76n, 84, 116 

Atlantic Missile Range: seeCape Canaveral 

Atlas (Booster): 55-58 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): 27, 82, 110 

Atomic Weapons: 10, 12, 23, 31, 46n 

Australia: 89 

Auxiliary Flight Research Station: seeLangley Laboratory 

B-58 (Bomber): 41, 53n 

Balboa Panama: 95 

Balloon Launches and Projects: 6, 57, 90, 94, 97n, 105n, 118 

149 
WALLOPS STATION 

Baltimore, MD: 94-95, 106n 

Bay-of-Pigs, Cuba: 67 

Beltsville Space Flight Center: seeGoddard Space Flight Center 

Bendix Corp.: 62, 74n 

Bermuda: 63, 74n, 86, 107 

Betak, John: 48n 

Biological Research: 58, 60, 118 

Black Brant (Rocket): 91 

Blast Facility: 12, 41, 66 

Blossom Point, MD.: 63, 73n, 74n 

Blue Scout: seeScout 

Boojum (Missile): 10 

Brazil: 91, 103n 

Bredt, Irene: 55 

Briskman, Robert D.: SOn, 74n 

Buckley, Edmund C.: 8, 26, 32, 40, 62, 63, 73n, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 109, 110, 120n 

Buglia, James J.: 71n 

Bureau of the Budget, U.S.: 8, 40 

Byrd, Harry F.: 32 

C-121 (Aircraft): 86, lOln 

Cajun (Rocket): 15, 20n, 83, 92, 94 

Callao, Peru: 95 

Canada: 16, 89, 91 

Cape Canaveral (Atlantic Missile Range, Kennedy Space Center): 6, 29, 30, 

31, 34, 37,38,45n,57-59,63,64,67, 73n, 74n, 79,84,85,89,92, lOOn, 111, 

108, 117 

Carnarvon, Australia: 78n 

Case Institute of Technology: 27 

Centaur (Booster): 97n 

CF-105 (Aircraft): 16 

Cherry Point, NC: 5, 6 

China: 10 

Chincoteague, VA: 66, 116 

Chincoteague Naval Air Station (CNAS): 6-7, 26, 33, 34, 35, 47n, 48n, 49n, 66, 

76n 

Civil Aviation Administration (CAA): 32 

Civil Aviation Research: 2, 11 

Clinchy, Ross: 49n 

Cold War: 1, 23, 55, 81 

Collins Radio Company: 63 

Compressibility Effects: 5 

Congress, U.S.: 4, 6, 12, 25, 27, 30, 33, 40, 67, 68, 80, 86, 89, 112, 113 

House Committee on Science and Astronautics: 93, 110, 121n 

150 
INDEX 

House Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations: 25, 64, 85, 

111, see also: Thomas, Albert 

House Subcommittee on NASA Oversight: 112, see also: Teague, Olin 

and NACA: 2, 4, 19n, 27, 40 

and NASA: 27, 34, 40, 41, 63, 67, 68, 73n, 111-115 

and Navy: 33 

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences: 85, lOln 

Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics: 27, 44n 

Senate Subcommittee on Independent Office Appropriations: 30 

and Space Issues: 24-26, 27, 30, 44n, 80 

and Wallops: 6, 12, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40, 50n, 84, 85, 89, 102n, 111, 113, 115 

and Work Stoppages: 64 

Contractors: 4, 36, 62, 65, 70, 74n, 75n, 84, lOOn, 120n 

Coquina Beach, NC: 86 

Crowley, John W.: 5, 6, 8, 9, 73n 

Dagle, Stanley J.:104n 

Daniels, Samuel T.: 49n 

Davis-Bacon Act of 1931: 75n 

Deacon (Rocket): 13, 15, 20n 

Deep Space Network (DSN): seeJet Propulsion Laboratory 

Defense, Department of, U.S.: 24, 41, 45n, 79, 85, 94, 113 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA): 24, 36, 38, 41, 53n, 56 


Defense Communications Agency: lOOn 


Inter-range Communications Planning Commission: lOOn 


Range Commanders' Council: lOOn 


Special Committee on Range Facilities: 26, 43n 


Defrance, Smith J.: 14, 45n 

Delta (Booster): 39, 92, 123n 

Dembling, Paul G.: 49n 

Dereng, Durwood A.: 104n 

Dickinson, H. Lee: 72n 

Distant Early Warning Station (DEW): 93, 104n 

Doolittle, James: 26 

DOVAP: see Goddard Space Flight Center 

Dryden, Hugh L.: 8, 27, 28, 36, 40, 49n, 60, 89, 102n, 117 

Duffy, Robert T.: 96, lOOn 

Duverney, Cecil A.: 49n 

Echo Project: 81, 97n 

Edwards Air Force Base: see High Speed Flight Section 

Eglin Gulf Test Range: 73, 99n 

Eisenhower, Dwight 0.: 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 38, 42n, 55, 56, 67 

Ethylene Jet: see Pre-Flight Jet 

151 
WALLOPS STATION 

Evans Construction Company: 72 

Evins, Joseph: 111 

Experimental Inter-American Meteorological Rocket Network: 91 

Explorer I (Satellite): 24, 42n 

Explorer IV (Satellite): 46n 

Explorer IX (Satellite): 41, 53n 

Explorer XXX (Satellite): 105n 

Explorer 42 (Satellite): 91 

Explorer 44 (Satellite): 116 

Faget, Maxime A.: 55, 71n 

Fassett, John W.: 104n 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): 31, 32, 46n, 82 

Flight Research Center: see High Speed Flight Station 

Formosa Bay: 91 

Fort Churchill, Manitoba: 91 

Fort Monmouth, NJ: 83 

Fort Stewart, GA: 73n 

FPS-16 (Radar): seeTracking and Data Acquisition 

France: 89, 103n 

Franco, Francisco: 73n 

Gable, L. D.: 104n 

Gagarin, Yuri A.: 61, 77n 

Garland, Benjamin J.: 71n 

Gates, Thomas S.: 48n 

Gemini Project: 67, 69., 77n 

General Services Administration (GSA): 40, 110 

Geodynamic Experimental Ocean Satellite (GEOS 3): 116, 123n 

Georgia Institute of Technology: 8 

Germany: 4, 10, 55 

Gilruth, Robert: 6, 16, 28, 29, 57, 67, 68 

and MSC: 67-68 


and PARO: 6-8, 26, 29, 56 


and STG: 29, 56-57, 68 


Glennan, T. Keith: 27, 28, 32, 34, 57, 60, 99n, 109 

Goddard, Robert H.: 51n 

Goddard Space Flight Center (Beltsville Space Flight Center): 1, 19n, 29, 39, 

40,5ln,57,64,67,80,83,85,92,93,94, 103n, 109, 110, 116 


DOVAP: 66, 76n 


and Space Science Research: 40, 80, 88, 97n, 106n 


and Tracking/Data Acquisition: 61-63, 69-70, 74n, 78n 


and Wallops: 17n, 29, 92, 95, 97n, 109, 116, 119 


Goett, Harry J.: 19n, 70, 98n 

152 
INDEX 

Grand Canary Island: see Las Palmas 

Grand Turk Island: 73n 

Grant, William: 35, 65, 66 

Great Depression: 3 

Great Society: 112 

Greece: 96 

Grissom, Virgil I. (Gus): 68, 77n 

Ground Blast Apparatus: see Blast Facility 

Gutheim, Robert: 43n 

Hampton, VA: 3, 4, 117 

Havana, Cuba: 73n 

Helium Gun: 9, 18n, 16, 41, 65 

High Speed Flight Station (Dryden Flight Research Center, Flight Research 

Center): 5, 11, 20n, 28, 45n, 69, 112 

Edwards Air Force Base: 5, 74n, 112 

Holaday, William: 23, 42n 

Honest John (Rocket): 13 

House of Representatives: seeCongress, U.S. 

Hugo Project: 15, 82 

Hurricane Daisy: 82, 98n 

Hurricane Ester: 65-66 

Hypersonic Research: 13, 18n, 28, 31, 36 

HYWARDs Project: 71n 

Illinois, University of: 95, 106n 

India:89,93, 103n 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): 13, 23, 24, 55, 113 

International Business Machines (IBM): 62 

International Council of Scientific Unions: 88 

International Geophysical Year (IGY): 14, 23, 42n, 88, 94 

U.S. Committee for IGY: 15 

International Ionospheric Satellite: see Ariel 1 

International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY): 94, 105n 

Italian Space Research Commission: 91 

Italy: 89 

Japan: 89 

Jason Project: 46n 

Javelin (Rocket): 37, 51n 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL): 28, 38, 45n, 59, 80, 81, 98n, 109, 121n 

Deep Space Network (DSN): 78n 

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory: 118 

153 
WALLOPS STATION 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 23, 24, 26, 27, 112 

Johnson, Thomas: 35 

Jones, L.M.: 15 

Jupiter (Booster): 24, 30, 32, 37, 79 

Kaplan, Joseph: 14 

Kellam, Albert P.: 116 

Kennedy, John F.: 64, 67, 112 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC): sec Cape Canaveral 

Kenya: 91 

Killian, James: 23-25, 42n 

Korean War: 10 

Krieger, Robert L.: 8, 9, 15, 26, 32, 35, 39, 40, 41, 60, 63, 64, 65, 75n, 82, 83, 86, 

89,92,94, 110, 111, 112, 11~ 11~ 118, 119 

Laika: 23 

Lakehurst, NJ: 87 

Langley Laboratory (Langley Memorial Aeronautical Lab, Langley 

Aeronautical Lab, Langley Research Center): 11, 28, 39, 41, 45n, 56, 62, 67, 

69, 70, 73n, 79,82,85,91,95, 111, 119 

Advanced Materials and Physics Division (AMPD): 35, 40, 52n 

and Ames Lab: 4, 14, 20n 

and A.E.C.: 82 

Auxiliary Flight Research Station (AFRS): 5, 8 

Computers: 50n 

Establishment of: 3, 17n 

and Hypersonic Research: 11, 13-14, 18n, 25, 26, 31, 37, 56, 65 

Instrument Research Division: 8, 12, 40, 63 

Methodology of: 4, 7, 116 

Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARO): 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 25, 26, 28, 

31,33,35,37,40,52n,55,58,59,80, 107 

and Space Research: 56-57, 86, 106n 

Special Flying Weapons Team: 5, 8 

and Wallops: 2, 6, 9, 10, 28, 35, 39-40, 57, 59, 66, 85, 95, 104n, 113-116 

Las Palmas: 73n 

Lead Range Concept: 85 

Lewis, George W.: 8 

Lewis Laboratory (Lewis Research Center): 4, 11, 25, 28, 39, 40, 41, 45n, 56, 

79, 111, 121n 

Liberty Bell 7 (Spacecraft): see Project Mercury 

Lima, Peru: 73n, 95 

Lincoln Lab: see Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Little Joe (Booster): 60, 61, 65, 68, 69 

Little Joe II (Booster): 69 

154 
INDEX 

Lockheed Corp.: 86 

Lord Salisbury Motel: 70 

McCormack, John W.: 27 

McGoogan, Marvin W.: 36, 50n, 72n 

McKinsey & Co.: 28, 44n 

McNulty, James F.: 63, 74n 

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC, Johnson Space Flight Center): 67, 84, 12ln 

Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN): see Tracking and Data Acquisition 

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC): 38-39, 80, 91, 110, see also: Army, von 

Braun 

Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations: 49n 

Maryland State College (UMES): 59, 72n 

Maryland, University of: 15, 81 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): 27, 42n 

Lincoln Lab: 36, SOn 

Master Planning of Facilities: 110, 111, 120n 

Mercury Mark II (Spacecraft): seeGemini Project 

Mercury Project: 2, 11, 38, 41, 55-63, 65, 68-70, 77n, 81, 86, 88, 93, 113, 118 

Mercury-Redstone 3 (Freedom7): 61 

Mercury-Redstone 4 (Liberty Bell 7): 68, 77n 

Meredith, Leslie: 15 

Meteorological Research: 82-83 

Metropolitan Security Services, Inc.: 75n 

Michigan, University of: 15, 81, 92, 95, 98n, 106n 

Michoud Plant: 121n 

Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS): 86, 93, 94 

Milliner, Cary F.: 110 

Milliner, Joyce B.: 60 

Minitrack Network: seeTracking and Data Acquisition 

Missile Research: 5, 9, 24, 41, 55, 112 

Missiles and Rockets: 72n 

Mississippi Test Facility: 121n 

Mobile Sea Launch Expedition: 93-96, 106n 

Moffet Field: seeAmes Lab 

Montgolfier Brothers: 2 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS): 

Space Science Board: 81 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA): 2, 4, 10, 11, 19n, 

20n,25,26,27,28,36,40,62, 79,88, 107 

Ad Hoc Committee on NASA Organization: 28 

Committee on Aerodynamics: 11, 14, 26, 43n 

Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics, March 1958: 56 

155 
WALLOPS STATION 

Executive Committee: 11, 25 

Headquarters: 4, 8-9, 11, 79 

and Industry: 3, 9, 12, 59 

Main Committee: 3, 15, 25-27 

and Military: 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19n, 20n, 25, 27, 30, 33, 41, 43n, 56, 59, 62, 

63 

Public Relations: 59, 88 

and Space Research: 25, 27, 42n, 56-7 

Special Committee on Space Technology: 27, 30-31, 43n 

Special Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere: 14 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): 1-2, 28, 34-37, 39, 

40, 41, 62, 63, 67, 68, 79, 80, 85, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114 

Budget (Funding): 36, 40, 63, 85 

Establishment of: 9, 28, 40, 42n, 79 

and FAA: 31, 32 

Headquarters:32,34,38,40,41,49n,59,70,80,85,89,91,94,97n, 107, 109­

111 

International Relations: 62, 80, 87-91, 102n 

and Military: 30, 32-33, 56, 62-63, lOOn 

Office of Aeronautical and Space Research (OASR): 38 

Office of the General Council: 35 

Office of International Programs: 89 

Office of Launch Vehicle Programs (OLVP): 38, 107 

Office of Space Flight Development (OSFD): 29, 39, 57, 62, 80 

Office of Space Flight Programs (OSFP): 38, 93, 108 

Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA): 80, 81, 91, 93, 94, 109 

Office of Tracking q.nd Data Acquisition (OTDA): 40, 93, 109, 110 

Organization of: 29, 38, 57, 67, 80, 107 

and Piloted Space Flight: 2, 55, 66, 67, 68 

Public Relations: 59, 60, 72n, 74n, 96 

and Space Research: 29, 40, 79, 80, 83, 107 

Space Sciences Steering Committee: 80 

Space Task Group (STG): 29, 35, 38, 56-63, 68, 70, 89 

and Strikes: 64, 75n 

University Relations: 41, 56, 79, 81, 94, 98n 

National Bureau of Standards (NBS): 82, 93, 95 

National Capital Planning Commission: 110 

National Security Agency (NSA): 15 

Naugle, John: 94 

Navy, U.S.: 6, 9, 11, 24, 32, 33, 41, 86, 87, 93, 123n 

Bureau of Ordnance: 6, 8, 33 

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT): 12, 19n 

Office of Naval Research: 15 

Naval Air Ordnance Test Station (NAOTS): 9, 33 

156 
INDEX 

Naval Ordnance Test Station: 95 


Naval Research Laboratory (NRL): 14, 23, 27, 29, 42n 


Norfolk Naval Air Station: 33 


Newell, Homer E. Jr.: 14, 80, 88, 109, 112 

New Hampshire, University of: 95, 106n 

Nike (Booster): 13, 15, 20n, 83, 92, 94 

Nimbus (Satellite): 83, 84 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 

Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research (AGARD): 16 

Norway: 89, 103n 

Oberth, Hermann: 51n 

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM): 42n 

Offices, NASA Headquarters: seeNational Aeronautics and Space 

Ad ministration 

Ohio State University: 98n 

Orbiter Project: seeArmy, U.S. 

Orbiting Observatories: 90 

O'Sullivan, William J.: 6, 14-15, 81, 94 

Organized Labor: 64, 75n 

Ostrander, Don: 38, 51n 

Pacific Missile Range (PMR): seeVandenberg AFB 

Pakistan: 89, 93, 103n 

Palmer, John C. (Jack): 10, 26, 35, 45n, 110 

Paraglider: see Rogallo Wing 

Patrick Air Force Base: seeCape Canaveral 

Pickering, William H.: 45n 

Pilotless Aircraft: 5, 10 

Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARO): seeLangley Laboratory 

Plant Security Inc.: 75n 

Point Arguello, CA: seeVandenberg AFB 

Point Barrow, AK: 92, 118 

Point Mugu, CA: seeVandenberg AFB 

Polaris (Missile): 13, 24, 41, 42n, 53n 

Pre-Flight Jet: 6, 13, 18n, 41, 57, 65, 75n 

President's Commission on Government Employment Policy: 34, 49n 

President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC): 23, 25, 42n 

Price, Paul A.: lOOn 

Puerto Rico: 31 

Purser, Paul: 13, 56, 71 

Pyle, James T.: 32 

Quesada, Elwood: 31-32 

157 
WALLOPS STATION 

Quito, Ecuador: 73n 

Radio Attenuation Measurement Project (RAM): 79, 82, 86, 97n 

Radio Corporation of America (RCA): 62, 83, 99n 

RAND Corp.: 23, 42n 

Rawinsonde Operations: 93, 105n 

Red Cross: 66 

Redstone (Booster): 31 

Re-entry Flight Demonstration Experiment #1 (RFDE 1): 82 

Reichelderfer, Francis W.: 15 

Reid, Henry J.E.: 39 

Robbins, Joseph E.: 32, 35, 66, 98n, 116 

Rockoon {Launcher): 15, 20n 

Rogallo, Francis M.: 69 

Rogallo Wing: 68, 69 

Rome, University of: 91 

Rosen, Milton: 88 

Ruttenberg, Stanley: 94 

Sahara Desert: 14 

Salisbury, MD: 7 

Sandia Corp.: 95, 105n 

San Diego, CA: 73n 

Sanger, Eugen: 55 

San Marco Project: 90, 91 

San Marco 1: 91 

San Marco 2: 91 

Santiago, Chile: 73n 

Sardinia: 91 

Saturn (Booster): 38, 70 

Scout(Booster):37,40,5ln,63,65,66,70, 72n,79,81,85,91, 102n, 103n, 113, 

115, 122n 


Blue Scout: 37, 97n 


Scout 9: 66, 72n 


Seamans, Robert C.: 109 

Secretary of War: 3 

Senate Committees and Subcommittees: seeCongress, U.S. 

Sergeant (Booster): 56 

Sharp, Edward R.: 45n 

Sheppard, Alan B. Jr.: 61 

Shortal, Joseph A.: 16, 32, 40, 52n, 64, 71n 

Shotput Project: 81 

Siepert, Albert: 41, 109 

Silverstein, Abe: 25, 29, 38, 41, 5ln, 57, 62, 84, 86 

158 
INDEX 

Singer, S. Fred: 15 

Slotted Throat Wind Tunnels: 10 

Snark (Missile): 10 

Sodium Vapor Experiments: 39, 91, 95, 103n 

Sonic Boom Research: 41, 123n 

Sonmiani Beach, Pakistan: 91 

Soule, Hartley A.: 8, 63 

Sounding Rockets: 13, 15, 39, 57, 59, 81, 82, 84, 90, 93, 94, 95, 102n, 111, 113, 

118-119, 123n, 124n 

Space Ranging Radar (SPANDAR): seeTracking and Data Acquisition 

Space Shuttle: 11, 43n, 67, 70, 77n, 112 

Space Task Group (STG): seeNational Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN): seeTracking and 

Data Acquisition 

Spain: 103n 

Special Committee on Range Facilities: seeDefense, Department of 

Special Committee on Space Technology: seeNational Advisory Committee 

for Aeronautics 

Special Flying Weapons Team (SFWT): seeLangley Laboratory 

Spinak, Abraham D.: 86, 118 

Sputnik Program: 1,25,29,33,40,42n,55,81,84,87 

Sputnik 1 (Satellite): 1, 23-24, 26 

Sputnik 2 (Satellite): 23 

Stack, John: 18n, 112 

Stever, H. Guyford: 27, 30, 43n 

Sweden: 89 

T-55 (Rocket): 20n 

Teague, Olin E.: 112 

Terrapin (Rocket): 15, 20n 

Thomas, Albert: 25, 30, 60, 63, 70, 85, 111 

Thompson, Floyd L.: 8, 44n, 73n 

Thor (Booster): 30, 32, 37, 79 

Tiros (Satellite): 83-84, 90, 97n 

Tiros Operational System (TOS): 83 

Tonapah, NV: 99n 

Townsend, John: 15 

Tracking and Data Acquisition (T&DA): 8, 16, 34, 36, 40, 41, 50n, 61, 69, 74n, 

84,86, 104n 

Data Reduction: 50n, 79 

FPS-16 Radar: 59, 82, 83, 99n 

Manned Space Flight and Tracking Network (MSFN): 62, 69, 70, 78n, 86, 

122n 


Minitrack Network: 61-63, 74n 


159 
WALLOPS STATION 

SPANDAR: 36, 50n, 63 

STADAN: 91 

SPS-12 Radar: 86 

Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit (TAGIU): 62-63, 69-70, 89 

Trailblazer Project: 40, 53n, 65, 79 

Transonic Flight: 5, 17n 

Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin: 51n 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 10, 23-24, 42n, 46n, 61, 77n, 87, 

90, 116 

see also: Sputnik Project 

United Kingdom (UK): 89 

USNS Coastal Sentry Quebec: 93 

USNS Croatan: 94, 95, 106n, 109, 118 

USNS Range Recoverer: 86-87, 93, 96, lOln, 115 

U.S.S. Forrestal: 26 

Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel (UARRP): 14 

V-1 (Missile): 10 

V-2 (Missile): 10, 14, 24 

V-2 Upper Atmosphere Research Panel: 14 

Valparaiso, Chile: 95 

Van Allen, James: 14, 27 

Vandenberg Air Force Base (PMR): 28, 30, 38, 73n, 74n, 79, 85, 91, 108, 123n 

Vanguard Project: 24, 27-28, 37, 42n, 59, 61, 88 

Victory, John: 20n 

Vietnam War: 112 

Viking (Booster): 14 

Virginia: 

Bureau of Public Roads: 116 


Council of Higher Education: 118 


University of: 118, 123n 


Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI): 118, 123n 

Von Braun, Wernher: 24, 27, 28, 37, 42n, 59, 92 

Vostok Project: 68, 77n 

Vought Corp.: 91, 103n 

Wachapreague, VA: 116 

Wallops Station (Wallops Flight Facility): 10, 29, 35, 39, 40, 57, 59, 79, 80, 85, 

86,89,91,92,94, 104n, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116 

Administrative Division: 35 

Administrative Unit: 9, 18n, 35 

Aeronautical Research at: 2, 6, 8, 26, 41, 70, 79, 112 

Aircraft: 86 

160 
INDEX 

Community Relations: 2, 9, 32-36, 48n, 65, 116-119 

Damage Control Branch: 65 

Establishment of: 1-2, 6-9, 12, 17n 

Expansion of: 13, 29, 30-33, 35-36, 41, 49n, 84-86, 108 

Flight Test Division: 35, 110, 116 

Group Achievement Award: 66 

Handbook:85, lOOn 

Independendence of: 2, 29, 35, 39-41 

International Relations: 2, 16, 62, 70, 88, 89-91, 93-94, 103n, 108, 116 

Labor Relations: 64, 75n 

Launch Scheduling Difficulties: 12, 63, 85 

Local Conditions: 9, 28, 39, 64, 69, 75n, 108 

Mechanical Services Unit: 9, 18n, 35 

Meteorological Research: 79, 82-84, 91-95, 118 

Military Relations: 5-7, 9, 12, 31, 33-35, 41, 46n, 60, 79, 81, 85, 87, lOOn, 113, 

115, 118, 123n 

and NACA: 26, 40, 79 

and NASA: 20, 26-27, 35, 40, 41, 46n, 65, 79, 80, 107, 108, 113, 114, 119 

Off-range Operations: 2, 63, 92-96, 107 

Organization of: 8, 35, 39-40, 63, 65, 109, 110, 115 

and Piloted Space Flight: 2, 55-59, 61, 67-70 

Pilotless Aircraft Reseach Station (PARS): 8, 27, 43n, 107 

Program Management and Liaison Branch: 110 

Project 2080: 35,36,49n,84,85,99n 

Project 3512: 66, 76n 

Public Relations: 59-60, 70, 73n, 89, 96 

Range Engineering Branch: 110 

Range Interference: 9, 12, 19n, 32-33, 46n 

Range Safety: 41, 60, 85, 86, 92, 104n 

Research Section: 9, 18n, 35 

Security Guards: 60, 64, 75n 

Space Science Research at: 2, 15, 29, 41-43, 70, 79, 81, 95, 97n, 112, 114, 120n 

Technical Services Division: 35, 65 

University Relations: 13-16, 41, 81, 113, 115, 117 

War Department, U.S.: 3, see also: Defense, Department of 

Washington, DC: 3 

Weather Bureau, U.S.: 15, 20n, 44n, 73, 82, 83, 84, 95, 121n 

Webb, James E.: 108, 109, 110, 112 

Western Electric Co.: 62, 63 

Wexler, Harry: 14, 20n 

White Sands Missile Range: 6, 15, 68, 73n, 99n 

Williams, Walter C.: 45n, 63, 74n 

Williamsburg, VA.: 45n 

Woomera, Australia: 73n, 78n 

161 
WALLOPS STATION 

Worchester County Civic League: 34, 49n 


World War I: 2 


World War II: 2, 4, 10, 33, 81, 94 


Wright Brothers: 2 


X-15 (Aircraft): 11, 19n, 26, 55, 71n, 112 


X-248 (Rocket): 37, 92 


X-series aircraft: 5, 11, 19n, 24, 112 


Yates, Donald N.: 63 


ZanzibarTracking Station: 78n 

162 

NASA HISTORY SERIES 

THE NASA HISTORY SERIES 

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167