COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CHARLES AARON ARTHUR 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1609-95-1 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 FEBRUARY 4, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Robert W. Stewart, Judge 

 I. Lionel Hancock, III (Robert L. Bohannon; 

Bohannon, Bohannon & Hancock, P.C., on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Charles Aaron Arthur (appellant) was convicted of murder. 

He contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the 

motion to suppress his confession where he gave an inculpatory 

statement only after the police created and showed him falsified 

fingerprint and DNA reports implicating him in the crime. We 

disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 I. 

 Catherine Benson was beaten to death on August 24, 1993, in 

the home of Jerry Hartley, where she worked as a part-time 

housekeeper. Police discovered blood in a bathroom sink, and, 

although neither Benson nor Hartley smoked, a red Bic cigarette 

lighter was found near the body. No identifiable fingerprints, 

other than the victim's and the homeowner's were found at the 

scene, and no signs of forcible entry were evident. 
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 At 2:30 a.m. on August 25, police stopped appellant as he 

drove Benson's pickup truck. Appellant identified himself as 

Benson's boyfriend and said he was driving to her job because she 

had not returned home the previous evening, as expected. 

Appellant told the police that he had been to Hartley's home at 

9:00 p.m., had seen Benson's car in the driveway, and had assumed 

she was out to dinner with Hartley. Appellant said he had never 

been inside Hartley's home. Police did not suspect appellant of 

the murder and made arrangements to take him to the medical 

examiner's office to identify the body. 

 At the medical examiner's office, appellant, contrary to his 

earlier statement, said that he had been inside Hartley's house 

the day before, to use the bathroom. Detective Myers told 

appellant that he was a suspect, that forensic evidence had been 

sent for analysis, and that the police would contact him again. 

Appellant denied that he killed Benson. 

 On November 9, 1993, appellant again was interviewed by the 

police. He continued to deny involvement in the murder. 

Although some of the lab reports had been returned, they did not 

implicate appellant. Myers told appellant only that all of the 

forensic reports had not come back from the lab. The remaining 

reports, however, did not implicate appellant in the murder. 

 Police prepared "dummy" reports, indicating that a 

fingerprint on the Bic lighter was appellant's and that hair 

found in a drop of blood at the scene was his. Police kept the 
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false documents in a file separate from the actual investigative 

documents and lab reports. At an interview on March 24, 1994, 

Myers told appellant that lab reports showed his hair had been 

found at the scene, in the victim's blood, and that his 

fingerprint had been identified on the lighter. Myers put the 

false documents where appellant could read some of their 

contents. 

 The detective asked appellant how his hair and fingerprint 

could be at the scene, and suggested that either appellant had 

found Benson's body, become frightened and left, was present when 

Benson was killed, or was the killer. Appellant, reiterating his 

earlier statements to the police, denied that he had been at the 

murder scene. 

 Myers then told appellant that the police believed that he 

loved Benson and that the killing was unintentional. The 

detective said that the victim's family knew appellant was a 

suspect, knew he loved the victim, but wanted to know why the 

killing had happened. At that point, a teary-eyed appellant 

described how he had killed Benson. Police tape-recorded 

appellant's confession. Appellant initialed each page of the 

transcription of the tape and signed the last page. At the 

detective's suggestion, appellant, alone in the interrogation 

room, wrote a letter to Benson's parents, in which he apologized 

and asked for forgiveness. 

 The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion to 
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suppress his statements. Applying the totality of the 

circumstances test, the judge found the confession was voluntary 

and denied the motion. 

 II. 

 The Commonwealth must prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that an accused's confession was freely and voluntarily 

made. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 554, 413 S.E.2d 

655, 658 (1992). If the accused's "'will has been overborne and 

his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,' the 

confession is considered involuntary and its use is 

unconstitutional." Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 262, 268, 

462 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1995) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). 

 The test of voluntariness is whether, 

considering the totality of the 

circumstances, the confession was "the 

product of an essentially free and 

unconstrained choice by its maker." In 

assessing the surrounding circumstances, 

courts will consider the defendant's 

background and the details of the 

interrogation. 

Id. at 269, 462 S.E.2d at 116 (citation omitted). 

 The voluntariness of a confession "is a question of law, 

subject to independent appellate review." Id. at 268-69, 462 

S.E.2d at 116. This Court must "conduct an independent review" 

of the question. Wilson, 13 Va. App. at 551, 413 S.E.2d at 656. 

 We are bound, however, by "the trial court's subsidiary factual 

findings unless those findings are plainly wrong." Id. 
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 Virginia appellate courts consistently have held that a lie 

by a law enforcement officer "does not, in and of itself, require 

a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary." Rodgers 

v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616, 318 S.E.2d 298, 304 (1984). 

See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 469, 248 S.E.2d 

135, 144 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Novak v. 

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 380, 457 S.E.2d 402, 405 (1995). 

 In Wilson, we stated: 

 A deliberate falsehood by a police officer in 

the course of his duties may undermine the 

respect that significant segments of the 

public may have for law enforcement and the 

system of justice. This concern, however, is 

not the basis upon which we must determine if 

the police have obtained an involuntary 

confession. 

Wilson, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658. A falsehood by 

the police "is only one factor that must be considered in 

determining whether [the defendant's] will was overcome and his 

capacity for self-determination critically impaired." Id. 

 Appellant concedes that a verbal lie by the police does not, 

in itself, invalidate a confession. He invites us, however, to 

draw a "bright line" where false documents are used. We reject 

that invitation in favor of application of the totality of the 

circumstances test.1

 

 1In Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618 (Nev. 

1996), the Nevada Supreme Court refused to draw such a "bright 

line" in a case involving falsified reports of semen stains. 

Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court found 

Bessey's confession was voluntary. But see State v. Cayward, 552 

So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review dismissed, 562 So. 
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 III. 

 As the trial judge observed, appellant was a man of normal 

intelligence, serving in the Navy, and living on his own. There 

was no indication that he was under the influence of any 

substance of any kind at the time of the confession. The trial 

judge noted that appellant had been advised of his rights on more 

than one occasion, including at this interview, and had not 

requested an attorney. He was fully able to make choices; he had 

been interviewed several times prior to the March 24 interview, 

had refused to incriminate himself, and each time had been 

permitted to leave. 

 The officers did not threaten appellant, make promises to 

him, or deprive him of food, water or use of restroom facilities. 

 The officers did not emphasize the evidence they had, their 

ability to get a conviction, or the punishment appellant might 

receive if convicted. Myers testified that he deliberately 

suggested ways which the evidence might be at the scene without 

appellant having been the actual killer. 

 Furthermore, appellant did not immediately confess after 

being shown the "dummy" reports, but admitted his involvement 

only after the detective later told him that the victim's parents 

wanted to know why the killing had happened. Finally, appellant 

confessed several times. He made a statement orally to the 

2d 347 (Fla. 1990) (court drew "bright line" between verbal lie 

and false written report and found that latter offended 

traditional notions of due process). 
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police, gave a taped statement, signed the written transcription 

of his statement, and wrote a letter, in private, to the victim's 

parents. 

 Upon our independent review of the voluntariness of 

appellant's confession, we conclude that the use of the 

fabricated fingerprint and DNA reports did not overcome 

appellant's will or critically impair his capacity for 

self-determination. Therefore, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.