UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ANDRE J. TWITTY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 14-1173 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CR-00076-RBJ-1) 

(D. Colo.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before McKAY, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

 

 This matter comes before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court 

for further consideration in light of its decision in Elonis v. United States, 

___U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). Prior to Elonis, we affirmed 

Defendant-Appellant Andre J. Twitty’s conviction on two counts of making 

threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). See United States v. 

Twitty, 591 F. App’x 676, 677, 684 (10th Cir. 2015) (Twitty I), vacated, ___U.S.___, 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 1, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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136 S. Ct. 90 (2015) (Mem.). We denied his petition for rehearing and rehearing en 

banc and his motion to recall the mandate. 

Mr. Twitty subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme 

Court. On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Elonis, in which it clarified the 

mens rea requirement for convictions under a different threat statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 875(c).1

 In Elonis, the Supreme Court, while declining to consider any First 

Amendment issues, see 135 S. Ct. at 2012, determined that the mental state 

(mens rea) requirement under § 875(c) was satisfied where “the defendant transmits a 

communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the 

communication will be viewed as a threat,” id. On October 5, 2015, the Supreme 

Court vacated our judgment in Twitty I and remanded for further consideration in 

light of Elonis. 

BACKGROUND

 We previously stated the facts involved in this case, and will not repeat them 

here other than as necessary to address the issue before us. In Twitty I, we noted that 

Mr. Twitty had made reference to Elonis (which had not yet been decided) in his 

opening appeal brief, in support of an argument that his statements were entitled to 

 

1

 We note that § 876(c) contains different language than § 875(c). Most 

notably, § 876(c) contains express mens rea language concerning the delivery 

element, see 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (“Whoever knowingly . . . deposits or causes to be 

delivered . . . any communication”), but § 875(c) does not. The Supreme Court’s 

broad language in Elonis persuades us that a mens rea element concerning the 

defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, similar to that discussed in Elonis, must also 

be alleged and proved to sustain a conviction under § 876(c). 

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protection under the First Amendment. 591 F. App’x at 681 n.4. But we declined to 

consider an Elonis-based argument on the merits. We determined that Mr. Twitty 

had failed to show that he raised an issue in district court concerning his subjective 

intent to threaten the victims of his letters, and failed to satisfy the plain-error 

standard to obtain review of that issue. Id.

 After the Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded, we ordered the 

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Elonis requires reversal of Mr. Twitty’s conviction. Having reviewed these briefs 

and the applicable law, we vacate Mr. Twitty’s conviction and remand for further 

proceedings. 

DISCUSSION

The government argues that Mr. Twitty’s Elonis arguments should be 

reviewed only for plain error. “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is 

plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Frost, 

684 F.3d 963, 971 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of 

our decision in United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014),2

 which 

was issued before our decision in Twitty I, the government concedes that Mr. Twitty 

 

2

 In Heineman, this court determined that “a defendant can be constitutionally 

convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the 

threat to feel threatened.” Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978. 

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can demonstrate the first two elements: (1) an “error” (2) that was “plain” at the time 

of the appeal. 

But the government argues that Mr. Twitty cannot establish the third and 

fourth elements of the plain-error test: i.e., he has not identified an error that affects 

his substantial rights and that must be corrected to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The 

government contends that Mr. Twitty’s subjective intent to issue a threat, or 

knowledge that his statements would be viewed as a threat, was established at trial by 

sufficient evidence. 

In Mr. Twitty’s supplemental briefing, he argues that he has met all four 

elements of the plain-error test. He further argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause 

bars his retrial because the government put on no evidence at trial on the 

subjective-intent element. Finally, he argues that the indictment in his case was 

jurisdictionally defective because it failed to include an allegation that he sent the 

threatening communications with an intent to issue a threat or with knowledge that 

the communications would be viewed as threats. 

2. Plain Error Review

In Twitty I, we noted Mr. Twitty’s failure to show that he satisfied the 

plain-error standard concerning this issue, and concluded that we could treat his 

silence as forfeiture of the issue. See Twitty I, 591 F. App’x at 681 n.4 (citing 

Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 551 (10th Cir. 2013)). The government does not 

attempt to defend this approach to the plain-error problem. We will therefore 

consider the issues without consideration of this earlier forfeiture. See United States 

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v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that where defendant has 

forfeited a non-jurisdictional argument, the government may “waive the waiver” by 

failing to assert the forfeiture (brackets omitted)). 

A. Scope of the Issues 

The government urges us to treat Mr. Twitty’s argument solely as a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence. We agree that he has challenged the sufficiency of the 

evidence. But his Elonis-based contentions also target the faulty jury instructions given 

at his trial. This is clearly true of the arguments he makes in his supplemental brief, and 

at least implicitly true of the argument he made in Twitty I. See Aplt. Supp. Br. at 7-8 

(arguing instructions given at his trial were erroneous under Elonis); Aplt. Opening Br. at 

13-14 (addressing subjective-intent element in light of First Amendment requirements, 

citing Elonis); Aplt. Reply Br. at 13 (arguing that he preserved jury-instruction challenge 

concerning subjective intent); see also Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007 (noting case involved 

challenge to omitted jury instruction concerning subjective intent). We therefore 

construe Mr. Twitty’s pro se Elonis argument as encompassing both (1) a challenge to the 

omission of the subjective-intent element from the district court’s instructions to the jury, 

and (2) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. 

This construction of Mr. Twitty’s arguments is appropriate for another reason. In 

its supplemental brief, the government only argues elements three and four of the 

plain-error test. It concedes that Mr. Twitty can satisfy the first two elements of the test. 

See United States Supp. Br. at 4-5 (noting “error” that is “plain”). But if the only issue 

before us involves the sufficiency of the evidence, and if the government concedes that 

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such an error occurred, it is difficult to see how it can show that Mr. Twitty fails to meet 

the remaining plain-error requirements for reversal. See United States v. Gallegos, 

784 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[A] conviction in the absence of sufficient 

evidence will almost always satisfy all four plain-error requirements.”); United States v. 

Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that where evidence in case was 

insufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt one of the essential elements of 

crime charged, fourth element of plain-error test was satisfied); United States v. 

Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] conviction in the absence of 

sufficient evidence of guilt is plainly an error, clearly prejudiced the defendant, and 

almost always creates manifest injustice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In fact, we do not believe the government intended to concede that the evidence 

was insufficient. The government argues elsewhere in its briefing that there was

sufficient evidence to support Mr. Twitty’s conviction. We therefore conclude that the 

government’s concession that an “error” occurred that was “plain” should be viewed as 

an acknowledgement that the district court failed to correctly instruct the jury concerning 

Mr. Twitty’s subjective intent.3

 Such an understanding is also consistent with the 

government’s arguments concerning the third and fourth prongs of the plain-error test. 

See United States Supp. Br. at 7 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 

 

3

 It is possible that the government meant only to concede the isolated point that 

the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue was “plain” in light of Elonis. See United 

States v. Powell, 767 F.3d 1026, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014) (resolving issue of statutory 

interpretation in determining whether sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue was plain). 

But this does not explain its failure to contest the first plain-error element: whether 

an error occurred. 

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1251 (10th Cir. 2004) and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997), two 

cases holding that instructional error satisfied first two prongs of plain-error test, but 

failed fourth prong). Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we will consider both 

the jury-instruction and substantial-evidence issues in this decision. 

B. Jury Instruction Issue

As noted, the government skips to the third elements of the plain-error test 

concerning this issue. To satisfy the third element of the plain-error test, the appellant 

must show that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United 

States v. Kalu, 791 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2015). “To meet this burden, [he] must 

show a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Twitty has made 

the required showing. 

 We note, first, that determining the defendant’s subjective intent requires a jury to 

address considerations not directly relevant to an objective reasonable-person standard. 

The two inquiries involve separate and distinct elements. See United States v. Wheeler, 

776 F.3d 736, 743 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015). To satisfy the reasonable-person standard for 

what constitutes a true threat, a jury need only find that the defendant’s statement was 

“one that a reasonable person in the circumstances would understand as a declaration of 

intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict bodily injury on another.” Id.

(emphasis added) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, 

determination of a defendant’s subjective intent for purposes of mens rea often requires 

consideration of the mental state of an unreasonable person, whose words, though 

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objectively threatening, may involve “ranting and raving” and “venting . . . frustration” 

rather than subjectively intended threats. United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 668 

(6th Cir. 2015). 

The language of Mr. Twitty’s letters formed the primary evidence against him. 

On the issue of subjective intent, these letters are far from unambiguous. They contain a 

torrent of angry, hyperbolic, and bizarre statements couched in terms of dreams, hopes, 

and aspirations. See Twitty I, 591 F. App’x at 677-79 (quoting letters). To be sure, the 

dreams expressed in the letters are nightmares, and the hopes and aspirations they contain 

are twisted, violent, and frightening. The words certainly are sufficiently threatening to 

satisfy an objective standard. But even so, we cannot say that there is not a reasonable 

probability that a properly instructed jury could have concluded that Mr. Twitty did not 

subjectively intend his letters as threats, or (put another way) that Mr. Twitty would have 

had nothing to work with in contesting this issue before a properly instructed jury. See 

Houston, 792 F.3d at 669 (finding plain-error test on Elonis issue satisfied where “the 

defendant has plenty to work with in contesting the mental-state determination”). A 

reasonable jury might have determined, for example, that the crazed and demented tone 

of Mr. Twitty’s letters, together with his implausible claims such as an assertion that he 

had access to a grenade launcher and the toxin ricin, created a reasonable doubt 

concerning his subjective intent that his communication be viewed as an actual threat, or 

his knowledge that it would be so viewed. 

Appellate judges are poorly equipped “to evaluate states of mind based on a cold 

record.” Id. The issue of Mr. Twitty’s subjective intent is one “best left to the 

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determination of a properly instructed jury.” United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 

1465 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, we note that the jury in Mr. Twitty’s case, even though 

not instructed on the subjective-intent element, acquitted him of one of the three § 876(c) 

counts charged.4

Turning to the fourth element of the plain-error test, we find it satisfied as well. 

Given the importance of the subjective-intent issue to Mr. Twitty’s case, the importance 

of this element in true threat cases in general, the overriding importance of First 

Amendment concerns, and “the oddity of permitting a criminal conviction to stand based 

on a reasonable-person—which is to say, negligence—standard,” see Houston, 792 F.3d 

at 668, we conclude that the error is one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

Recent Tenth Circuit authority supports this result. In Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, the 

defendant was convicted of transmitting a threat in foreign commerce under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 875(c), based on his Facebook posts that called upon his “religious followers” to 

commit violent acts, including killing law enforcement officers, children, politicians, 

judges, district attorneys, public defenders and their children. Id. at 738. The district 

court erroneously refused to instruct the jury at his trial that in order to convict, it had to 

find that he subjectively intended the Facebook posts as threats. On appeal, the 

 

4

 Mr. Twitty did not testify at trial. The government points us to his pretrial 

admissions to a United States Marshal, admitted at trial, that “it may have been his intent 

to make people nervous” and that “people could infer a threat even though his letters did 

not contain a ‘direct threat.’” Gov’t Supp. Br. at 9 (quoting R., Vol. VI at 163). But 

these conditionally worded statements hardly constitute overwhelming evidence of 

Mr. Twitty’s subjective intent. 

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government contended that no rational juror could conclude that the defendant did not 

subjectively intend for his remarks to be threatening. We disagreed, noting among other 

things that a rational juror could have concluded that he honestly thought no one would 

see his posts, and that he had no religious followers. We also noted that the “revenge 

motive” evidenced by his subsequent statements to police constituted “circumstantial 

evidence relevant to a jury’s determination of whether [he] acted with the requisite 

intent,” but given that the omitted element was not “supported by uncontroverted 

evidence . . . the issue of intent must be determined by a jury upon retrial.” Id. at 741 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Although in Wheeler the threats were not personally 

mailed to the defendant’s victims, as Mr. Twitty’s were, the same sort of concerns about 

inferences to be drawn by a jury concerning the defendant’s subjective intent that made 

retrial appropriate in Wheeler are present here. 

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Twitty also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction under § 876(c). Although we have reversed his conviction, we must consider 

this issue as well, because if the evidence was insufficient, he cannot be retried under 

double-jeopardy principles. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and he may be 

retried. 

“The government may retry a defendant whose convictions . . . are set aside due to 

trial error without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Pearl, 

324 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003). This is because “reversal for trial error, as 

distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect 

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that the government has failed to prove its case.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 

(1978). 

In Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1464-65, we remanded for a new trial because we found it 

unclear due to a post-trial clarification of the law by the Supreme Court how a properly 

instructed jury might have determined an issue. We noted that this result was not 

inconsistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause. This was because the evidence was 

sufficient to have convicted the defendant under the standard in effect at the time of trial, 

and the government could not be held responsible for failing to muster evidence to meet a 

standard that did not exist at that time. Id. at 1465. Applying this standard to 

Mr. Twitty’s case, we look to whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him under 

the law in effect at the time of his trial. See also Houston, 792 F.3d at 670 (collecting 

cases indicating that sufficiency of evidence is determined under previous law, analyzing 

sufficiency of evidence in plain-error case using pre-Elonis standard, and concluding that 

evidence was sufficient); cf. Wheeler, 776 F.3d at 741-46 (finding instructional error 

under Heineman, but sufficient evidence for retrial under pre-Heineman standard). For 

the reasons we stated in Twitty I, 591 F. App’x at 680-83, sufficient evidence 

supported Mr. Twitty’s conviction under the standard in effect at the time of his trial. 

Therefore, under Wacker, he may be retried under the proper standard. 

Recently, the Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States, 

No. 14-1095, 2016 WL 280757 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016). In that case, the issue was 

whether, “when a jury instruction sets forth all the elements of the charged crime but 

incorrectly adds one more element, a sufficiency challenge should be assessed 

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against the elements of the charged crime [or] against the erroneously heightened 

command in the jury instruction.” Id., 2016 WL 280757, at *5. The Court held that 

sufficiency of the evidence should be assessed against the elements of the charged 

crime. Id. The issue of a change in the law that added an element that the 

government was required to prove was not before the Court in Musacchio. 

Nevertheless, to the extent that Musacchio suggests that (contrary to Wacker and the 

cases collected in Houston) the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured strictly 

by whether there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of all of the 

elements of the charged crime, separate from any cabining attributable to 

instructional error, we find that test satisfied here. 

To make a finding of sufficiency of the evidence, all that is required “is for the 

court to make a legal determination whether the evidence was strong enough to reach 

a jury at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On the evidence presented here, 

a properly instructed jury could have concluded (but was not required to conclude) 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Twitty subjectively intended his communications as a 

threat, or with knowledge that they would be viewed as a threat. The extreme and violent 

language contained in the letters, their reference to specific and detailed violent acts, and 

the fact that they were sent to specific, identified recipients, would permit a reasonable 

jury to find the necessary evidence to satisfy both the “true threat” and mens rea 

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requirements.5

 Thus, even if the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the “new” 

standard under Elonis, Mr. Twitty may be retried. 

3. Sufficiency of the Indictment 

In his supplemental brief, Mr. Twitty also challenges the sufficiency of the 

indictment due to its omission of the mens rea element. But he forfeited this challenge 

by failing to raise it in his opening appeal brief in Twitty I. See Bronson v. Swensen, 

500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating this court “routinely [has] declined to 

consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s 

opening brief”).6

 

Mr. Twitty contends that because failure to include the subjective-intent element 

in the indictment was “jurisdictional,” he could not forfeit the argument. He is wrong. In 

United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 2012), this court applied 

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-31 (2002) to hold that neither an omission of 

an element from an indictment, nor an argument that the indictment does not charge a 

crime against the United States, represents a jurisdictional defect. 

 

5

 To the extent Mr. Twitty relies on a one-sided recitation of portions of the 

testimony of certain government witnesses to argue that the evidence was insufficient 

to reach a jury, we find his argument unconvincing in light of the language of the 

letters and the entirety of the testimony at trial. 

6

 Although the statement of facts in Mr. Twitty’s opening brief included an 

allegation that the grand jury was “misled” by the government’s attorney into issuing “an 

indictment against Appellant for a crime that did not exist,” Aplt. Opening Br. at v, he did 

not tie this contention to the subjective-intent issue he now seeks to raise. He also argued 

that the indictment was procured by false testimony, see id. at 23, but this contention did 

not develop an argument concerning its facial sufficiency on the grounds he now raises. 

In sum, Mr. Twitty’s passing discussion of subjective intent, and occasional references to 

the indictment, did not sufficiently raise this issue in his opening brief. 

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In sum, the issue of the sufficiency of the indictment is not jurisdictional, and was 

subject to forfeiture. Mr. Twitty forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his 

opening brief.7

 That said, should the government elect to retry Mr. Twitty on the 

§ 876(c) counts, it will need to amend the indictment to include the subjective-intent 

element. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (noting as a general matter, that “a guilty mind is 

a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.” (emphasis added)). 

4. Pending Motions 

 Mr. Twitty filed numerous motions in this court both before and after the Supreme 

Court issued its decision. In particular, he has requested release pending appeal from this 

court, has unsuccessfully requested release pending appeal from the district court, and 

recently filed a motion in this case seeking review of the district court’s denial of his 

district court motion for release. Now that we have disposed of this appeal, his motions 

addressing release pending appeal are moot. To the extent he seeks release from 

incarceration pending further proceedings in his case, he may seek relief in the district 

court, which can consider his motion in the first instance and make an appropriate 

determination. We therefore deny his requests or motions for immediate release. All 

other pending motions are denied. 

 

7

 Mr. Twitty’s references to the indictment in response to a post-briefing 28(j) 

letter and in his second motion for bond did not timely and sufficiently present the 

issue of facial sufficiency of the indictment for our appellate review. 

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CONCLUSION 

 We reverse Mr. Twitty’s conviction and remand the case for further proceedings. 

All pending motions are denied. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Carolyn B. McHugh 

 Circuit Judge 

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