Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles

The NASA History Series

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of External Relations

Washington, DC 20546

2004

NASA SP-2004-4230
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Dawson, Virginia P. (Virginia Parker)

Taming liquid hydrogen : the Centaur upper stage rocket, 1958-2002 / Virginia P. Dawson

Mark D. Bowles. p. cm. (NASA-SP-2004-4230)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Centaur rocket—History. 2. Hydrogen as fuel—Research—United States—History. 3.

Liquid propellant rockets—Research—United States—History. I. Bowles, Mark D. II. Titl

TL783.4.D39 2004

621.43’56—dc21

200404209
Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

Chapter 1: Centaur’s Origins in Atlas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Chapter 2: Marshall’s Unruly Wards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Chapter 3: “Abe’s Baby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

Chapter 4: Heavy Lift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

Chapter 5: The Giant Titan-Centaur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139

Chapter 6: Centaur Reborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167

Chapter 7: Eclipsed by Tragedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189

Chapter 8: Like a Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

List of Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259

The NASA History Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267

Introduction

During its maiden voyage in May 1962, a Centaur upper stage rocket, mated to an At l a 

b o o s t e r, exploded 54 seconds after launch, engulfing the rocket in a huge fireball. In ve s t i g a t i o 

re vealed that Centaur’s light, stainless-steel tank had split open, spilling its liquid-hyd rogen fue

d own its sides, where the flame of the rocket exhaust immediately ignited it. Coming less tha

a year after President Kennedy had made landing human beings on the Moon a nationa

p r i o r i t y, the loss of Centaur was re g a rded as a serious setback for the National Ae ronautics an

Space Administration (NASA). During the failure investigation, Homer Newell, Di rector o

Space Sciences, ruefully declared: “Taming liquid hyd rogen to the point where expensive oper

ational space missions can be committed to it has turned out to be more difficult than anyo n 

supposed at the outset.”1

After this failure, Centaur critics, led by Wernher von Braun, mounted a campaign to cance

the program. In addition to the unknowns associated with liquid hydrogen, he objected to th

unusual design of Centaur. Like the Atlas rocket, Centaur depended on pressure to keep its paper

thin, stainless-steel shell from collapsing. It was literally inflated with its propellants like a footba

or balloon and needed no internal structure to give it added strength and stability. The so-calle

“pressure-stabilized structure” of Centaur, coupled with the light weight of its high-energy cryo

genic propellants, made Centaur lighter and more powerful than upper stages that used

conventional fuel. But, the critics argued, it would never become the reliable rocket that th

United States needed. 

Others, especially military proponents of Centaur, believed that accepting the challenge o

developing liquid-hydrogen technology was an important risk to take. Herbert York, Chie

Scientist for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), had urged NASA Administrator T

Keith Glennan to expedite the program in 1959 because Centaur was “the only vehicle that ha

the capability of meeting our payload requirements for high altitude orbits.”2 Six months afte

1 U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space Sciences of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, “The Centau

Program,” 87th Congress, 15 and 18 May 1962 (hereafter cited as Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings), 11.

2 Herbert York to T. Keith Glennan, 19 September 1959, Centaur files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
Centaur’s aborted first flight, President John F. Kennedy demanded to know what NASA h

to achieve with Centaur. Administrator James Webb’s response was unequivocal. With the A

program already committed to using liquid hydrogen in the upper stages of the giant S

vehicle, Centaur would prove the fuel’s feasibility.

3 The Agency was also counting on 

Centaur to launch Surveyor, a robotic spacecraft with a mission to determine whether the M

surface was hard enough to land future spacecraft with human beings aboard. 

Despite criticism and early technical failures, the taming of liquid hyd rogen prov

be one of NASA’s most significant technical accomplishments. Centaur not only succe

in demonstrating the feasibility of liquid hyd rogen as a rocket fuel, but it also went on 

brilliant career as an upper stage for a series of spectacular planetary missions in the 1

Iro n i c a l l y, this success did little to ensure the future of the Centaur rocket. Once the Sh 

became operational in the early 1980s, all expendable launch vehicles like Centaur 

slated for termination. Centaur advocates fought to keep the program alive. They 

funding for the redesign of Centaur as an upper stage for the Shuttle, spent nearly $1 b

integrate them, and then witnessed the cancellation of the program within weeks of the 

scheduled flight of Sh u t t l e / C e n t a u r.

Miraculously, Centaur survived into the commercial era of the 1990s and is still flying 

upper stage for the Atlas. Although unthinkable at the height of the Cold War, the idea of 

tizing the delivery of launch vehicle services gained currency in the early 1980s beca

dovetailed with the free-enterprise, small-government ideology of the Reagan administr

Now NASA is just a customer—albeit a favored one—of a new service that rocket manufac

offer to a variety of customers, including foreign governments. A competitor of the Euro

Ariane rocket and the Boeing Delta, Centaur continues as the upper stage for a redes

Lockheed Martin Atlas. 

C e n t a u r’s importance in the history of ro c k e t ry has escaped most historians of the 

p rogram. One reason is that upper stage rockets compose the murky middle phases of space

that rarely make news headlines. They do not create the dramatic plumes of fire that the publi

on the launch pads at Kennedy Space Center. Nor do they carry space probes all the way t

distant planets.The booster or first stage of a multistage rocket uses the brute force of its large r

engines to propel the stages and payload through the atmosphere. Once the booster has used 

p ropellants, it is jettisoned rather than burdening the remaining stages with the weight of a 

rocket. At this point, Centaur takes ove r. The role of the upper stage is brief—usually abo

minutes of glory between the shutdown of the booster engines and the release of the spacecr

satellite. Centaur’s final task is simply to get out of the way, while the payload—the spacecra

just beginning its (often multiyear) journey. 

3 Transcript of Presidential Meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House, 21 November 1962, 19, tape no. 63, 

Kennedy Library Pre s i d e n t’s Office files, NASA Historical Re f e rence Collection.
Despite this neglect, Centaur’s importance to the space program, and satellite communication

in part i c u l a r, is unquestionable. Centaur serves as the critical link between its booster stage (Atlas o

Titan) and the mission’s payload (satellite or spacecraft). The sole objective of the Centaur is to a d 

the extra speed needed to guide the payload into a desired orbit and to orient it before separa

tion. The more accurately Centaur does its job of positioning, the less need there is for th

payload to use its own fuel to make up for any inaccuracies in trajectory. With this extra fuel, 

spacecraft bound for a planet has more maneuvering capability both as it travels tow a rd its desti

nation and once it gets there. If the payload is a satellite, accurate positioning allows it to stay i

orbit for a longer period of time. The ability of Centaur to re s t a rt its engines in space allow 

mission designers greater flexibility in accommodating the re l a t i ve positions of the moving an

rotating Earth and moving payload targets, whether planetary or lunar. 

Though never identified with the dream of landing human beings on the Moon, or th

product of a massive military crash program like the Atlas, Centaur has enjoyed an unusually lon

and sometimes controversial career as an upper stage rocket. As our title suggests, Centaur is espe

c i a l l y notable because of its role in the development of liquid hydrogen as a rocket fue

Hydrogen—a light and extremely powerful rocket propellant—has the lowest molecular weight o

any known substance and burns with extreme intensity (5,500°F). In combination with a

oxidizer such as liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen yields the highest specific impulse, or efficiency i

relation to the amount of propellant consumed, of any known rocket propellant. 

Because liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen are both cryogenic—gases that can be liquefie

only at extremely low temperatures—they pose enormous technical challenges. Liquid hydroge

must be stored at minus 423°F and handled with extreme care. To keep it from evaporating o

boiling off, rockets fuelled with liquid hydrogen must be carefully insulated from all sources o

heat, such as rocket engine exhaust and air friction during flight through the atmosphere. Onc

the vehicle reaches space, it must be protected from the radiant heat of the Sun. When liqui

hydrogen absorbs heat, it expands rapidly; thus, venting is necessary to prevent the tank from

exploding. Metals exposed to the extreme cold of liquid hydrogen become brittle. Moreove

liquid hydrogen can leak through minute pores in welded seams. Solving all these problem

required an enormous amount of technical expertise in rocket and aircraft fuels cultivated over 

decade by researchers at the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Lewis Fligh

Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland. 

To d a y, liquid hyd rogen is the signature fuel of the American space program and is used by othe

countries in the business of launching satellites. In addition to the Atlas, Boeing’s Delta III and De l t 

IV now have liquid-ox y g e n / l i q u i d - h yd rogen upper stages. This propellant combination is als

burned in the main engine of the Space Shuttle. One of the significant challenges for the Eu ro p e a 

Space Agency was to develop a liquid-hyd rogen stage for the Ariane rocket in the 1970s. The Sov i e 

Union did not even test a liquid-hyd rogen upper stage until the mid-1980s. The Russians are now

designing their Angara launch vehicle family with liquid-hyd rogen upper stages. Lack of Sovie
liquid-hydrogen technology proved a serious handicap in the race of the two superpowers t

Moon.4 Taming liquid hydrogen is one of the significant technical achievements of twen

century American rocketry.

❖❖❖

From our study of Centaur history, we have identified three themes. The first is Centaur’s re m a 

s u rv i val in the face of three decades of attempts to cancel the program. The acceptance of liqui

h yd rogen as a rocket fuel demonstrates the truism that success or failure of an innovation never dep

on technology alone. Thomas Hughes, a prominent historian of technology, has argued that large-

technology organizations, whether public or private, often stifle innovation. But innovations somet

win acceptance for reasons that are external to the technology itself.

5 Other historians have expande

this theme, contending that technology has more to do with people, their values, and the external 

lenges they face than with the intrinsic superiority of one system over another.

6 We argue that liq

h yd rogen as a rocket fuel would never have been adopted by NASA without the strong advocacy o

Si l verstein and others who came out of a background in liquid-fuels re s e a rch at Lewis Re s e a rch Ce

Initially, during the development phase of Centaur at Marshall Space Flight Center (disc

in the first three chapters by Virginia Dawson), p roblems that put Centaur’s surv i val in jeo

included the novelty of its fuel, its controversial design, and poor management of the program. 

the first test of the rocket failed, the program narrowly missed cancellation. The transfer o

Centaur program in 1962 to Lewis Re s e a rch Center in Cleveland, Ohio, re p resented a decisi

He a d q u a rters to keep innova t i ve aerospace companies like General Dynamics in business. A

same time, former Va n g u a rd personnel at Cape Canaveral took over what was then 

“unmanned launch operations,” allowing them to develop independently of the von Braun team 

managed the Apollo program on the other side of the Banana Rive r.

In the 1970s, the proven technology of Centaur was almost cast aside during the se

phase of its history when new social and organizational priorities dictated a change in p

After a new reusable Space Tr a n s p o rtation System (STS) re c e i ved funding in 1972, expen

launch vehicles we re considered obsolete. Iro n i c a l l y, the upper stage’s most significant co

butions to NASA occurred while the nation awaited the Shuttle. Centaur’s service as an u

stage for Atlas-Centaur and Titan-Centaur planetary missions is discussed in chapters 4 a

by Ma rk Bow l e s .

4 This point is made at various points by Asif A. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-2000-4408).

5 Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Ce n t u ry of In vention and Technological En t h u s i a s m (London: Penguin Books

and Ne t w o rks of Power: Electrification in We s t e rn Society, 1880–1930, (Ba l t i m o re, MD: The Johns Hopkins Un i versit

1983). 

6 See essays by Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological System

Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
Sh o rtly before the Shuttle began flying, the Eu ropean Ariane rocket became available fo

launching communications satellites, ending a monopoly NASA had enjoyed since the 1960

NASA re c o g n i zed that in order for the Space Shuttle to become the all-purpose vehicle envisione

by NASA, the Shuttle re q u i red an upper stage to replicate the important job of positioning satellite

and spacecraft (already performed by Atlas-Centaur). The modification of Centaurto fit in the Sh u t t l e

cargo bay won a re p r i e ve for the Centaur program in the 1980s. Howe ve r, objections to the radica

n a t u re of its design and liquid-hyd rogen fuel threatened to scuttle the program.

The loss of Challenger in 1986 proved another turning point in Centaur’s tortuous caree

Chapter 8, by Virginia Dawson, describes how Atlas-Centaur again rose like a phoenix from th

ashes of Challenger. With NASA no longer controlling its fate, Centaur was reborn in the Atlas a

a commercial launch vehicle. Commercialization of Atlas-Centaur in the 1990s provides a

example of technology transfer from the government to the private sector of the economy—

policy promoted since NASA’s founding. It also challenges the theory that without the stimulu

of the government to pay for innovation, companies like General Dynamics (later acquired b

Ma rtin Marietta and now part of Lockheed Ma rtin) would have no incentive to develop new

t e c h n o l o g y. The Atlas rocket now faces the challenge of a highly competitive internationa

m a rketplace and declining demand for communications satellite launches. 

Another theme, closely related to the first, is how NASA’s changing tolerance for ris

influenced Centaur. How a rd Mc Cu rdy pointed out in his insightful study of NASA cultur

that risk tolerance diminished as NASA mature d .7 Yet even in the 1960s, most of NASA’s tech

nical decisions focused on minimizing risk. For example, Administrator T. Keith Glennan ha

p ressed Atlas into service for the Me rc u ry program because it was a “known technology.” H

thought the Agency should use alre a d y - d e veloped missiles for launch vehicles, “extending th

state of the art as little as necessary. ”8 Centaur was an anomaly because of its novel fue

Glennan strongly supported its development because liquid hyd rogen promised a leap i

p e rformance urgently needed to trump the Russians in space. Gl e n n a n’s successor, Ja m e 

We b b, also became an advocate of Centaur, willing to stand up to critics like von Braun an

p owe rful members of the U.S. House of Re p re s e n t a t i ves Committee on Science an

A s t ronautics, which controlled NASA’s purse strings. 

Tolerance for risk enters the Centaur story again in the 1980s. Chapters 6 and 7, by Ma r

B owles, present a critical examination of one of the most interesting episodes in NASA launc

vehicle history. The Shuttle/Centaur saga shows that the fate of technology can often rest upo

an unplanned-for contingency—the level of social acceptance of risk. Despite the enormou

a d vantages of sending the Galileo space probe to Jupiter on Sh u t t l e / C e n t a u r, the pro g r a m

e n c o u n t e red strong re s i s t a n c e from engineers at Johnson Space Center and the astronaut corp

7 Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore: Th

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 150.
located there. The astronauts thought that a liquid-hyd rogen rocket in the Sh u t t l e’s cargo ba

their lives at risk, despite the fact that the main engine of the Shuttle burned liquid hyd 

carried in a large external tank. Johnson Space Center engineers also questioned the capabil

the Lewis Centaur team to safely integrate Shuttle/Centaur into “t h e i r” vehicle. The C h a l 

disaster forced NASA to redefine the Agency’s risk limits and led to Sh u t t l e / C e n t a u r’s cancell

Risk also entered the commercialization story when General Dynamics saved Atlas-Ce

by pledging company funds to underwrite its manufacture and marketing. Commercializ

ended the company’s dependence on the cost-plus-fixed-fee government contract. Ge 

D y n a m i c s / A s t ronautics staked the future of the company on its ability to upgrade its rocke

launch pad and sell launch services to the communications satellite industry. The gamble pai

b u t — i ronically—not for General Dynamics, but for its former rival and new ow n e r, Ma rtin Ma

A third theme of the book is the collaboration between government engineers and 

i n d u s t ry counterparts. Few books, with the exception of Joan Lisa Bro m b e r g’s NASA and the 

In d u s t ry, have explored this re l a t i o n s h i p. Bromberg points out that Glennan did not appro

a l l owing the government to control the cre a t i ve aspects of design “while farming out to ind

only the re p e t i t i ve and straight production items.”9 His successor, James We b b, had also st

the Agency away from developing an exc l u s i vely in-house technical capability. He envis

g ove r n m e n t - i n d u s t ry collaboration in the management of the large-scale technology re q u i r

the space program. “These birds are going to fly,” Webb told President Kennedy in 1962

by what you put on the schedule or the amount of money you put in it, but the way this 

[NASA] is run.” He thought Centaur could “validate the capacity of the government to 

p rogram like this in partnership with industry. ”1 0 This was a depart u re from the top-dow

house Army model of working with contractors favo red by Wernher von Braun. The re l a t i o 

b e t ween General Dynamics and NASA under Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) ma

ment had been adversarial, but after the transfer to Cleveland, the relationship gradually be

m o re collegial. Members of the NASA-industry Centaur team believed that they we re o

f ront line of the Cold War and that Centaur held one of the keys to winning back the cou

lost prestige. Lewis engineers demanded that contractors meet specifications, but they 

w o rked closely with their industry counterparts to improve the vehicle. Despite the cont

t h reat of cancellation, the NASA-industry team introduced a new Teledyne avionics system 

d e veloped a re vo l u t i o n a ry steering program to adjust for upper atmosphere winds encoun

immediately after liftoff.

As NASA matured, the government-industry partnership became the foundatio

Centaur’s commercialization, described in chapter 8. Technology transfer from the governm

8 J. D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993), 13.

9 Quoted from Glennan’s diary by Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Un

Press, 1999), 40.
the private sector of the economy was realized in the 1990s. No longer held back by the govern

ment from improving Atlas-Centaur, General Dynamics made its launch vehicle comparable t

the European Ariane rocket in power and versatility. Ironically, although most of the upgrades t

the vehicle were made to the Centaur upper stage, the entire vehicle is now referred to simply a

the Atlas. Thus Centaur, still a vital part of the vehicle, has become invisible.

NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center engineers and procurement officers helped t

u n r a vel the gove r n m e n t’s complex contractual relationship with General Dynamics

Commercialization liberated General Dynamics from a culture of government dependency. Today

although human bonds formed over three decades are still strong, NASA Glenn no longe

manages Centaur. The limited oversight the government retains for NASA missions is currentl

carried out by Kennedy Space Center.

❖❖❖

Few secondary sources re c o g n i ze the role Centaur played in the controversies surrounding th

acceptance of liquid hyd rogen and its positive contributions to the unmanned space program. Fo 

example, in On Ma r s, Ed w a rd and Linda Ezell dismiss Centaur as “a genuine tro u b l e m a k e r” becaus

of the delays it caused for the Su rve yor and Mariner pro g r a m s .1 1 In Clayton R. Ko p p e s’s criticals t u d 

of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s early unpiloted projects, JPL and the American Space Pro g ra m, At l a s 

Agena and Atlas-Centaur re c e i ve scant notice,

1 2 while a major new encyclopedia of America’s gre a t e s 

space programs leaves out the Centaur program altogether.

1 3 An exception is the late John Sl o o p

whose engagement with high-energy liquid rocket propellants in the 1950s shaped his career at th

L ewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland, one of three laboratories for the NACA. Afte

N A S A’s formation, he became Abe Si l ve r s t e i n’s technical assistant at He a d q u a rters. Sloop re c o g n i ze 

the pivotal role of liquid hyd rogen in the American space program, and upon re t i rement, h

published Liquid Hyd rogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959, a detailed and insightful study tha

concludes in 1959, before NASA took over Centaur program management from the Air Fo rc e .

His interv i ews (now part of the NASA Hi s t o ry Collection) with former General Dynamic

e m p l oyees, notably Krafft Ehricke and Deane Davis, as well as other papers in the NASA

Historical Collection, provided an indispensable starting point for our study. Another source tha

p rovided essential background in understanding Centaur’s significance was Roger E. Bi l s t e i n

Stages to Sa t u rn.

1 5 Se veral superb papers by Richard Ma rtin, formerly of General Dynamics

contributed to our understanding of the unique stru c t u re of the Centaur.

1 6 A rticles by G. R

10 Transcript of Presidential Meeting, 20 November 1962, 45.

11 Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, On Mars (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4212, 1984), 47. 

12 Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 

13 Frank N. Magill and Russell R. Tobias, eds., USA in Space, three volumes (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, Inc., 1996).
R i c h a rds and Joel W. Powell, and Joseph Green and Fuller C. Jones are among the few sp

cally focused on Centaur’s origins and early history.

1 7 Our understanding of the developme

Pratt & W h i t n e y’s RL10 engine was enhanced by work of Joel Tucker and Dick Mu l re 

Fi n a l l y, the work by John Krige on the Eu ropean Space Agency provided valuable backgro 

for our chapter on commerc i a l i z a t i o n .1 9

One of the themes in Virginia Da w s o n’s earlier book, Engines and In n ova t i o n,

2 0 a history 

NASA Lewis Re s e a rch Center, was the tension between the re s e a rch side of the laboratory an

real-time demands of managing the Agena and Centaur missions for NASA. The managem

Centaur is arguably Lewis Re s e a rch Center’s most important contribution to the space progra

this book, we emphasize how the re s e a rch culture and test facilities of the Center mate

contributed to Centaur development. If, as some of the re v i ewers of our manuscript from Ge 

Dynamics have commented, we may have overstated the Lewis role, we can only offer the hop

a well-documented history of General Dynamics/Astro n a u t i c s2 1 can re d ress any imbalance th

may have created. Although we we re fortunate to be able to interv i ew some former Ge 

Dynamics employees, we we re disappointed that ve ry few company documents can be fou

publicly accessible arc h i ves.

This history of Centaur is the result of an association that began nine years ago when N

history first brought the authors together. We collaborated on an essay about NASA’s Adv

Turboprop Project in a book on Collier trophy winners.22 Since that time, we have coautho

variety of projects that have come to us through our company, History Enterprises, Inc. We 

14 John L. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel 1945–1959 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4404, 1978). A native o

Carolina, Sloop earned a B.S. in electrical engineering from the University of Michigan in 1939. Hired by the NACA in 

he moved to Cleveland in 1942 and remained at Lewis until his move to Washington, DC, in 1958. 

15 Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980). 

16 See Richard E. Martin, “The Atlas and Centaur ‘Steel Balloon’ Tanks: A Legacy of Karel Bossart,” 40th Congress 

International Astronautical Federation, Malaga, Spain, 8–14 October 1989, IAA-89-738, Cot 7-13m, reprint; “A Brief 

of the Atlas Rocket Vehicle, Part III,” Quest—The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 8 (2001): 48; “Atlas II and IIA Analy

Environments Validation,” Acta Astronautica 35 (1995): 771–791. 

1 7 G. R. Richards and Joel W. Powell, “The Centaur Vehicle,” Jo u rnal of the British In t e r p l a n e t a ry Society 42 

99–120; Joseph Green and Fuller C. Jones, “The Bugs That Live at -423o,” Analog Science Fiction/Science Fa c t 80 

8 – 4 1 .

18 See Joel E. Tucker, “The History of the RL 10 Upper-Stage Rocket Engine, 1956–1980,” in History of Liquid Rocket 

Development in the United States, 1955–1980, ed. Stephen E. Doyle, AAS History Series (San Diego: AAS, 1992), v

123–151. Also, Dick Mulready, Advanced Engine Development at Pratt & Whitney: The Inside Story of Eight Special P

1946–1971 (Warrrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 2001), chapters 3–4.

1 9 See J. Krige, A. Russo, and L. Sebesta, A Hi s t o ry of the Eu ropean Space Ag e n c y, 1958–1987 (ESA SP-1235 April 

vol. 2.

20 Virginia P. Dawson, Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (Washington, DC: 

SP-4306, 1991). 

21 A company history by Bill Yenne, Into the Sunset: The Convair Story (Lyme, CT: Greenwich Publishing Group, 1995)

be used as a starting point. 
enjoyed ferreting out the technology involved in developing and managing the Centaur rocket an

have tried to achieve a balance among the technology, the scientific goals of the missions them

selves, and the political aspects of the program. Our first essays on Centaur were published in T

Reach the High Frontier, edited by Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins.23

We bring very different perspectives to NASA history. Mark Bowles grew up reveling in th

achievements of the planetary probes of the 1970s. As a boy, he shared with his father the dee

sense of awe in the mysterious dark universe surrounding Earth’s tiny blue oasis of life. He recall

how they would gaze up at the Moon during the Apollo missions and imagine the activities of th

astronauts. 

Virginia Dawson’s engagement with NASA history came through the encouragement sh

received from the late Professor Melvin Kranzberg, founder of the field of the history of tech

nology, who served as chair of the NASA History Advisory Committee for many years. In hi

foreword to This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, he pointed out that the legislation creatin

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958 included not only the charge t

expand “human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space,” but also to provide fo

the widest possible dissemination of information about its activities. “NASA wisely interprete

this mandate to include responsibility for documenting the epochal progress of which it is th

focus,” he wrote. “The result has been the development of a historical program by NASA a

unprecedented as the task of extending man’s mobility beyond his planet.”24 Dr. Kranzber

strongly believed that professional historians working outside academe could make valuabl

contributions to the history of twentieth-century institutions. He was particularly impressed tha

NASA gave authors unrestricted access to participants and unclassified sources and encourage

them to examine Agency history critically.

We enjoyed the assistance and encouragement of many current and former NASA people

First, we would especially like to thank Joe Ni e b e rding, who enthusiastically took us under his win

in the early stages of the book and pushed the project along. He opened doors to interv i ews wit

people at Glenn Re s e a rch Center, Kennedy Space Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, an

Lockheed Ma rtin, as well as former employees of General Dynamics in San Di e g o. We would als

like to thank Me yer Reshotko for helping us get started on this project. J. Cary Nettles, Ro g e 

Lynch, and Richard Ma rtin gave us copies of key photos. We are greatly indebted to the people wh

patiently re v i ewed our draft of the manuscript. These included Joe Ni e b e rding, Frank Sp u r l o c k 

22 Mark D. Bowles and Virginia P. Dawson, “The Advanced Turboprop Project: Radical Innovation in a Conservativ

Environment,” in From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners, ed. Pam

Mack (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4219, 1998), 321–343. 

23 Virginia P. Dawson, “Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Saga,” 334–356, and Mark D. Bowles, “Eclipsed by Traged

The Fated Mating of the Shuttle and Centaur,” 415–442, To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, ed. Rog

D. Launius and Dennis Jenkins (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002).

24 Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercur

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4201, 1966), V.
R i c h a rd Ma rtin, Larry Ross, Ed w a rd Bock, and John Neilon. Hi s t o ry colleagues 

Hunley and Dwayne Day not only read our manuscript with extraord i n a ry care and in

but also shared with us documents and articles important to our story. Alan Lovelace, M

Wi n k l e r, Ron Eve rett, Cary Nettles, Art Zimmerman, Len Pe r ry, and Del Tischler re v i 

individual chapters. All their comments proved exceedingly helpful. Howe ve r, we 

responsibility for our interpretation of events and any errors of fact that might have 

u n c o r rected. We are also ve ry grateful to the many people we interv i ewed, either by 

phone or in person. They are listed at the end of the book. Our understanding wa

enhanced less formally by many others too numerous to cite here. Many of the peop

i n t e rv i ewed spoke of the extraord i n a ry dedication of St e ve Szabo. Because of his unt

death, we we re not able to interv i ew him, but we hope that we have captured some o

Centaur team spirit that he helped to create.

As colleagues in NASA history will appreciate, finding documentation for gove r n m e n t - f u 

studies is always a challenge. For this history, we we re fortunate to have the assistance of 

Coleman, in charge of the history program and re c o rds management at Glenn; he, along 

Deborah Demaline, proved to be a judicious and support i veally. We used Glenn re c o rds stored 

famous World War II bunkers at Plum Brook and at the National Arc h i ves and Re c o rd Cen

C h i c a g o. Bonita Smith made certain we had access to Centaur material in the NASA Glenn Arc 

Janice Nay and Lynn Patterson provided excellent transcripts of our oral interv i ews. Ro b e rt Arri

Hi s t o ry Enterprises assisted with re s e a rch. 

During the writing of Engines and Innovation, Virginia Dawson and historian of sc

colleague Craig Waff discovered a trove of records of the Launch Vehicles Division stored i

vault of the Development Engineering Building at Glenn. In looking for Centaur records 

than ten years later, we found that some boxes containing correspondence fortuitously we

behind in the move to Kennedy Space Center. Mark Bowles was able to use some of this ma

to document the Shuttle/Centaur story. The contents of these boxes, catalogued by Galen W

are referred to as NASA GRC Records to distinguish them from the NASA GRC Archives

ELV Resource Library, managed by Boeing at Kennedy Space Center, loaned us a selected 

historical Lewis documents. Robert Bradley made available Krafft Ehricke’s early Air Force re

now located in the archives of the San Diego Aerospace Museum. We also used Centaur re

in the NASA Historical Reference Collection in the NASA History Office in Washington, D

of Columbia, many of which were assembled through the efforts of the late John Sloop. W

grateful for the assistance and encouragement we received from Roger Launius, Steve Dick, 

Garber, Louise Alstork, and Jane Odom in the NASA History Office and Mike Wright at Ma

Space Flight Center.

Last, but certainly not least, many thanks are due to the professional graphic desig

editors, and print specialists who made this book and accompanying CD physical realiti

the NASA He a d q u a rters Printing and Design Office, Douglas Ortiz, Joel Vendette, and J
Gitlin expertly handled the layout of the book; Lisa Ji rousek carefully edited the book; an

Je f f rey McLean took care of the printing process. Special thanks are also due to Kristin Ja n s e 

of NASA Glenn Re s e a rch Center, who devised an innova t i ve format for the CD that accompa

nies the printed text.

Chapter 1

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas

“Going back to the old ideas of Oberth, I said I have a relatively dense

first stage. And it so happens that the second stage, because it is less dense,

fits just beautifully on the first stage. Now all we have to do is remove the

neck from Atlas and make it cylindrical all the way and we have a 10-

foot-diameter base. For a second stage, that’s just beautiful.”

—Krafft Ehricke, Centaur’s designer

In early 1956, the development of Atlas preoccupied Krafft Ehricke. Known for his enormous

capacity for work, he spent 18-hour days driven by the urgency of producing the country’s first

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). At the same time, Ehricke envisioned more peaceful

applications for Atlas. Why not add a second stage to produce a two-stage rocket capable of placing

communications or weather satellites into orbit, sending instrumented space probes to the Moon

and the planets, or installing an orbiting platform around Earth? He even calculated how the Atlas

itself could become a satellite when launched into low-Earth orbit. 

This was the kind of fantasy that Ehricke had entertained ever since his youth in Weimar,

Germany. Mesmerized by the 1929 Fritz Lang film Frau im Mond (Woman in the Moon), which he

saw more than a dozen times, he said, “I felt, ‘My God, it really must be possible to get to the

Moon,’ which for an 11-year-old boy is a kind of revelation.”1 The son of two dentists, Ehricke

tinkered with their dental apparatus and chemical compounds while he steeped himself in the ideas

of the early rocket pioneers. He recalled the inspiration for Centaur: “Going back to the old ideas

of Oberth, I said I have a relatively dense first stage. And it so happens that the second stage,

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 1

1 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History

Office, Washington, DC. On Ehricke’s biography and ideas, see Marsha Freeman, How We Got to the Moon: the Story of

the German Space Pioneers (Washington, DC: 21st Century Associates, 1993), 292–339; and “Krafft Ehricke’s

Extraterrestrial Imperative: A Memoir,” in History of Rocketry and Astronautics, eds. Donald C. Elder and Christophe

Rothmund (San Diego: American Astronautical Society, 2001), AAS History Series, vol. 23, 163–222. See also Al

Vinzant, “History of Centaur,” Exclusive (GD Space Systems Division Newsletter), August 1988; and Daniel A. Heald,

“LH2 Technology Was Pioneered on Centaur 30 Years Ago,” 43rd Congress of the International Astronautical

Federation, August 1992, Washington, DC. 
because it is less dense, fits just beautifully on the first stage. Now all we have to do is remove th

neck from Atlas and make it cylindrical all the way and we have a 10-foot diameter base. For 

second stage, that’s just beautiful.”2 Because the two-stage rocket he envisioned for spacefligh

needed a very powerful upper stage, he considered high-energy propellant combinations like liqui

hydrogen with fluorine as the oxidizer, hydrazine with fluorine, methane with ozone, and liqui

hydrogen with liquid oxygen.3 These studies smacked of science fiction in 1956, and Ehrick

expected James Dempsey, his boss at the Convair Division of General Dynamics, to put an end t

them. Instead, Dempsey urged him to continue.4

Ehricke championed the idea of space travel. He chaired the Space Flight Committee for th

American Rocket Society, which comprised some of the nation’s most prominent missil

2 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

2 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

3 Al Vinzant, “History of Centaur.”

4 Shirley Thomas, Men of Space, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1960), 2. 

Krafft Ehricke, Centaur’s designer and first program director (left), discusses advanced spacecraft designs with James Dempsey,

president of General Dynamics/Astronautics, early 1960s. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
designers, including Karel “Charlie” Bossart of Convair, Wernher von Braun of the Army

Ballistic Missile Agency, Milton Rosen of the Naval Research Laboratory, and Hubertus

Strughold of Randolph Air Force Base. Shortly before the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the

world’s first artificial satellite, the committee finished a report that they then submitted to

President Eisenhower less than two weeks after Sputnik’s launch. The report proposed a national

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 3

Diagram: Atlas-Centaur. (NASA E2283)
space agency to benefit all mankind.5 Ehricke thought the new space age would usher in a new

age of discovery and international cooperation. He envisioned space travel “as a serious, practica

and worthwhile effort—not at some future time, but right now, in this century and in this ag

of ours.” He thought space travel appealed to man’s highest aspirations and would promote inter

national peace and goodwill.6

In response to Sputnik, James Dempsey asked Ehricke to proceed with a design for an uppe

stage for the Atlas missile, transforming the weapon into a two-stage spacecraft for travel to the oute

reaches of the solar system. He was encouraged to move offsite with an elite team of the company

engineers that included Atlas veterans Charlie Bossart, William Patterson, Howard Dunholter, Fran

Dore, William Radcliffe, James Crooks, and Hans Friedrich, a German expatriate who had designe

the autopilot for the German V-2 rocket. After debating the merits of various propellant combina

tions, the group agreed that liquid hydrogen with the oxidizer liquid oxygen was the best propellan

for the high-energy upper stage Ehricke had in mind. Ehricke may have named Centaur for th

nearest star after the Sun, the Alpha Centauri, which might one day be approached by the vehicl

he envisioned.7 It has also been speculated that Ehricke chose the name because the mythic man

beast with the body of a horse and the torso and head of a man reflected the hybrid nature of th

Atlas-Centaur combination, with Centaur carrying the guidance and control for both vehicles. 

Despite the challenges of producing, storing, and handling liquid hydrogen, its distinct advantage

as a rocket propellant presented the rocket team at General Dynamics with a tantalizing opportunit

at a time when U.S. launch vehicle capability was well below that of the Soviet Union. Burning liqui

hydrogen with liquid oxygen produces the highest specific impulse or thrust of any known rocket fue

Theoretically, a liquid-hydrogen-powered rocket can lift approximately 35 to 40 percent more payloa

per pound of liftoff weight than conventional rocket fuels.8

Hydrogen had remained a laboratory curiosity until the late nineteenth century, when scientis

driven by the promise of industrial applications for gases began to investigate how to convert gases t

liquids. The British scientist Michael Faraday succeeded in liquefying chlorine, ammonia, and carbo

dioxide. Oxygen and hydrogen proved more difficult to liquefy because they are cryogenic—gases tha

can be converted to liquids only at extremely low temperatures. In the 1880s, a method was found fo

liquefying oxygen. Then, in 1898, Sir James Dewar succeeded in liquefying hydrogen for the fir

4 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

5 “ARS Urges National Space Flight Program,” Astronautics 2 (December 1957): 18–28.

6 Krafft A. Ehricke, “The Anthropology of Astronautics,” Astronautics 2 (November 1957) 28.

7 The Alpha Centauri suggestion is based on information from Harold Dunholter, former chief development engine

for General Dynamics. See Helen T. Wells, Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie E. Karegeannes, Origin of NASA Nam

(NASA SP-4402, 1976), 11–12. 

8 Centaur, a pamphlet prepared by the Convair Aerospace Division of General Dynamics, dated May 1973, provided th

35-percent figure. Generally, NASA press releases use 40 percent. Centaur files, NASA Glenn History Office. 
time. Dewar described the principle of regenerative cooling, a method that takes advantage of the

extreme cold of liquid hydrogen to cool hot metal surfaces during combustion. Dewar also invented

vacuum containers for safely storing liquid hydrogen.9

Liquid oxygen found applications in the 1920s as an oxidizer for alcohol or kerosene fuel, but

early rocket pioneers like Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy and Robert Goddard avoided liquid-hydrogen fuel

because of its well-known dangers.10 Hermann Oberth had calculated that liquid hydrogen was especially appropriate for an upper stage because in the near-vacuum of space, less pressure is required

to keep the sides of the rocket rigid.11 However, like Goddard and Tsiolkovskiy, Oberth had

avoided testing an oxygen/hydrogen rocket, presumably because of hydrogen’s volatility. The

tragic explosion of the hydrogen-gas-filled Hindenberg dirigible in 1937 seems to have reinforced

the general prejudice against hydrogen. 

Although Ehricke understood the theoretical advantages of liquid hydrogen, he had

grossly underestimated the difficulties of developing a liquid-hydrogen rocket. A rocket

enthusiast during his student years in Berlin, he had filed two rocket patents, helped organize

the German Society for Space Research in 1938, and written a series of articles for the

Society’s journal Space.

12 But he had avoided testing a liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen rocket

because of the fear that the mixture might explode prematurely.13 Graduate studies in nuclear

physics at Humboldt University under Werner Heisenberg were interrupted by the war.

Ehricke served at the Russian front as a tank driver before being recruited for work on the V2 at Peenemünde. There he came under the spell of Walter Thiel, Wernher von Braun’s rocket

engine expert. Thiel inspired Ehricke to imagine rocket engines with millions of pounds of

thrust. Learning of Heisenberg’s attempts to build a nuclear reactor, Ehricke and Thiel

dreamed of nuclear rocket propulsion with hydrogen as the working fluid.14

Thiel gave careful attention to the possibility of developing a liquid-hydrogen rocket. In a

significant memorandum written in 1937, Thiel made a survey of existing knowledge of the “pracCentaur’s Origins in Atlas 5

9 John D. Clark, Ignition! An Informal History of Liquid Rocket Propellants (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,

1972), 4–5.

10 See Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, vol. I (NASA SP-4218,

1995), 67–68; John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4404, 1978),

259.

11 In discussing hydrogen fuel, Hermann Oberth wrote, “The thinner the outside air, the smaller are the forces which

tend to cause the rocket to buckle or collapse and the smaller is the inside pressure necessary for rigid filling.” See Ways

to Spaceflight, tr. Wege zur Raumschiffahrt, originally published in 1929 (Washington, DC: NASA TT F-622, 1972), 343.

12 Marsha Freeman, “Krafft Ehricke’s Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 164. 

13 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

14 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
tical possibilities” for improving liquid rockets.15 Thiel drew attention to the very large energy gai

that could be obtained from using high-energy propellants such as liquid hydrogen/liquid oxyge

and stated that a research effort “appears definitely rewarding.” At the same time, he tempered h

enthusiasm for liquid hydrogen by pointing out the “strong obstacles” to the development of 

liquid-hydrogen rocket, such as the need for insulated tanks and ducts to compensate for th

extremely low temperatures of liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen. He pointed out that very little wa

known about the behavior of metals at extremely low temperatures, particularly the permeabilit

of light metals to liquid hydrogen. This influential rocket expert was killed in an Allied bombin

raid on Peenemünde, but his ideas probably took root in the fertile mind of Krafft Ehricke. Afte

Peenemünde, the possibilities of liquid hydrogen continued to intrigue him.

In 1945, Ehricke managed to obtain a contract from the Department of the Army and joine

the German rocket group at White Sands, New Mexico. Between 1947 and 1950, he worked o

ramjet and rocket systems at Fort Bliss, Texas. Because there was little information to guide rocke

designers in the selection of propellants, the Journal of the American Rocket Society devoted an entir

issue to the subject in 1947. A Journal paper by Maurice Zucrow argued that, in addition to thrus

propellant density must also be considered in assessing rocket performance, since it can affec

vehicle size and weight. In a chart, Zucrow showed that the liquid-oxygen/liquid-hydrogen comb

nation produced greater thrust but required a larger tank because the low density of hydrogen too

up more volume.16

Ehricke recalled being impressed by a paper by JPL researcher Richard Canright that urge

more research on high-energy liquid propellants, especially liquid hydrogen with the oxidize

hydrazine.17 In a 1974 interview, Ehricke said, “I had again run into hydrogen, from Tsiolkovski

through von Hoefft to Oberth to Thiel and through my nuclear investigation. So I said, ‘It’s to

often that it has looked good. I think we ought to do it.’” But von Braun thought they shoul

stick with the denser propellants they already knew how to handle.18

6 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

15 Walter Thiel, “Memorandum of the Practical Possibilities of Further Development of the Liquid Rockets and a Surve

of the Tasks to be Assigned to Research,” 13 March 1937, tr. D. K. Huzel, folder CT-168000-01, “Thiel, Walter

National Air and Space Museum Archives. Thanks to historian John Hunley for sending us a copy of this document.

16 Ehricke says the paper was published in Journal of the American Rocket Society in 1947 and authored by Jet Propulsio

Laboratory rocket researcher Richard Canright. There is no paper by Canright in the journal between 1947 and 195

We believe that the paper referred to here is by Maurice Zucrow in the 1947 issue devoted to liquid propellants: “Liqu

Propellant Rocket Power Plants,” no. 72 (December 1947): 28–44. 

17 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. A review of th

Engineering Index revealed that Richard Canright published “Problems of Combustion: Liquid Propellant Rock

Motors,” in Chemical Engineering Progress 46 (1950): 228–232. There is, however, no indication of a paper on a compa

ison of rocket propellants. 

18 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. See also Joh

Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 47–48.
In 1950, Ehricke moved with the German team to Huntsville, Alabama, where he joined the

Guided Missile Development Group at the Redstone Arsenal. He headed the Gas Dynamics Section

but chafed under von Braun’s authority and his conservative approach to rocket design.19 In a rocket,

where every excess pound reduces the size of the possible payload and increases cost, Ehricke paid close

attention to propellant weights. In a paper comparing propellants and working fluids for rocket propulsion, he compared the weight of propellants, their specific impulse, and their density. He argued that

for ascent in a gravity field, heavy or medium propellants were preferable. However, once a staged rocket

reached space, the performance of light, less dense propellants like ozone-methane, hydrogen-oxygen,

and oxygen-hydrazine increased. They beat the heavier propellants because in zero gravity, their high

specific impulse and low density offset the weight of the structures needed to contain them. He

suggested that liquid-hydrogen upper stages needed investigation.20

At the end of his contract with the U.S. Army in 1952, Ehricke moved to a job at the Bell Aircraft

Corporation in Buffalo under Walter Dornberger, another German expatriate who had worked on the

V-2. In 1954, Ehricke joined Convair in San Diego as a design specialist in the same year that it became

a division of General Dynamics. He headed the Preliminary Design and Systems Analysis group. He

later served as the director of the Centaur program for General Dynamics/Astronautics from 1958 until

January 1962, when he became the director of Advanced Studies.21

The Thin-Skinned Atlas

At Convair, Ehricke found an innovative engineering culture that had evolved under the technical direction of Charlie Bossart, an unassuming Belgian émigré. The “father of the Atlas” was born

in Antwerp. He had earned a degree in mining engineering from the Free University of Brussels in

1925. During his last year at the university, an optional course in aeronautical engineering earned him

a scholarship to study aeronautical engineering at MIT. After receiving a master’s degree in 1927, he

returned to Belgium for military service, then emigrated to the United States in 1930. He worked for

Sikorsky at General Aviation in aircraft structures before moving to Downey, California, to work for

Vultee Aircraft in 1941. The company became Consolidated Vultee, or Convair, in 1943.

Bossart’s background in structures gave him a different perspective from which to approach rocket

design. He conceived the innovative pressure-stabilized design of the Atlas while working on an early

Air Force missile project in 1946 called the MX-774. Like many postwar rocket designers, Bossart’s

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 7

19 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. See also John

Sloop’s Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel: 1945–1959, 191–195. 

20 Krafft A. Ehricke, “Comparison of Propellants and Working Fluids for Rocket Propulsion,” American Rocket Society 23

(1953): 287–296, 300.

21 Biography introducing article in Astronautics 2 (1957): 26. See also interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26

April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. In 1957, Convair became the Convair/Astronautics Division of

General Dynamics; in 1961, the name was changed to General Dynamics/Astronautics, a Division of the General

Dynamics Corporation.
group had taken the V-2 as their starting point. However, unlike the rocket team that worked unde

von Braun at White Sands, they were free of Peenemünde’s traditions and prejudices. 

Bossart’s design dispensed with the heavy rings and stringers of the V-2. Ring and stringer

were metal bands connected by longitudinal metal rods that reinforced the inside walls of th

rocket. This rigidity provided an extra margin of safety, but it also added unnecessary weight. Th

originality of the MX-774 lay in its lack of the internal buttressing. Pressure alone kept the side

of the rocket’s tank rigid when inflated like a balloon with its fuel. Its stainless-steel walls were n

thicker than a dime. Although it was not an entirely new idea, since Hermann Oberth in German

had discussed its theoretical possibility, Bossart was the first to demonstrate the feasibility of 

pressure-stabilized rocket design. Bossart always attributed his confidence in the thin-skinne

design to his background in aircraft structures. He wrote: 

You see most of my previous experience was in structures. So the first thing I did was to

decide what kind of a structure we’re going to use for this missile. Well, we knew that we

had to have a certain pressure in the tank to maintain the required net positive suction

head for the pump. So the first question was, how thin does the skin have to be to resist

that pressure? With the skin thickness thus arrived at and assuming the tank to be under

pressure, how much stiffening would you have to add to make this thing capable of

taking the compression and the bending anticipated in flight? And lo-and-behold, we

didn’t need to add any.22

Even after the Air Force canceled the MX-774 project in 1947, Bossart continued to pus

development of the rocket with missionary zeal. His tenacity paid off in the early 1950s after tech

nical advances allowed thermonuclear warheads to be scaled down to fit inside the nose of 

missile. The rocket now won the backing of two influential Air Force officials, Trevor Gardne

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and Lieutenant Colone

Bernard Schriever.23 Concerned that the United States was in a race with the Soviet Union i

ICBM development, Gardner and Schriever advocated setting up a crash program comparable i

scale and funding to the Manhattan project.

8 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

22 Interview with K. J. Bossart by John Sloop, 27 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. For 

superb article on Bossart and the balloon tank, see Richard E. Martin, “The Atlas and Centaur ‘Steel Balloon’ Tanks: A Legac

of Karel Bossart,” reprint by General Dynamics Corp., 40th International Astronautical Congress paper, IAA-89-738, 1989

23 See Frank L. Winter, Rockets into Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Edmund Beard, Developin

the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (NY: Columbia University Press, 1976); Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in th

United States Air Force, 1945–1960 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990); John Clayton Lonnquest, “Th

Face of Atlas: General Bernard Schriever and the Development of the Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 1953–1960

Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1996. See also Davis Dyer, “Necessity Is the Mother of Convention: Developing th

ICBM, 1954–1958,” Business and Economic History 22 (1993): 194–209; and TRW: Pioneering Technology and Innovatio

since 1900 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 167–194. A review of Atlas development to the present can b

found in Dennis R. Jenkins, “Stage-and-a-Half, The Atlas Launch Vehicle,” in To Reach the High Frontier: A History o

U.S. Launch Vehicles, eds. Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2002

70–102.
Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 9

Charlie Bossart, designer of Atlas, holds up a sketch of the missile, early 1960s. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
A blue ribbon committee of scientific, industrial, and academic leaders headed by Princeto

physicist John von Neumann endorsed the development of a long-range ballistic missile. Th

committee, unconvinced that the Air Force had sufficient technical depth to manage the projec

recommended that the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation assume the responsibility for technica

direction of the program, reporting directly to Schriever. Prior to approval of the design in Januar

1955, Ramo-Wooldridge put pressure on Bossart to abandon the pressure-stabilized desig

because of the tendency of the bulkhead to collapse if the tanks were not pressurized correctly. T

Bossart’s relief, Ramo-Wooldridge agreed that development was too far along to change to the typ

of reinforced structure favored by most rocket designers.24

Engineers at Convair were intensely proud of the originality of the Atlas design, which the

liked to call “the free world’s first ICBM.” However, not all rocket experts celebrated the succes

of Atlas. The group at Huntsville “looked askance at such lightweight structural innovations a

Bossart’s thin-wall, pressurized tanks for the Atlas ICBM, which they jokingly referred to a

‘blimp’ or ‘inflated competition.’”25

During Atlas development, the company built launch complexes at Cape Canaveral and stati

firing test facilities at Sycamore Canyon, northeast of San Diego. It also carried out a researc

program at Edwards Air Force Base near Boron, California. Originally, the group working on Atla

was based in the Lindbergh Field plant located next to the San Diego airport. As it grew from abou

20 employees in 1951 to 200 in 1955, the company began construction on a large plant about te

miles north of downtown San Diego at Kearny Mesa. Manufacture of the technically demandin

stainless steel tanks for Atlas (and later the even more stringent requirements for the Centau

tanks) initially was located at Kearny Mesa, but several years later was moved to Plant 19, owne

by the Air Force, near the Lindbergh Field plant. 

In 1957, to strengthen management, General Dynamics Convair set up a separat

Astronautics Division under James Dempsey, an Alabamian with a flair for handling bot

administrative and technical problems. A graduate of West Point, Dempsey had served i

World War II. After the war, he earned a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering at the A

Force Guided Missile School at the University of Michigan, served at the Pentagon and Patric

Air Force Base near Cape Canaveral, then accepted a position with the Convair Corporatio

in 1953.

10 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

24 Interview with K. J. Bossart by John Sloop, 27 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. On the Air Forc

approach to contracting, see also Joan Lisa Bromberg’s chapter, “Legacies,” in NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimor

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 16–44. 

25 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 208. See also G. R. Richards and Joel W. Powell, “The Centaur Vehicle,” Journal of th

British Interplanetary Society 42 (1989): 99–120. Missile concepts pioneered on Atlas included the “stage and a half

launch concept. After firing all three engines at liftoff, two were jettisoned after 140 seconds, leaving the main engine t

power the vehicle toward its target. Bossart introduced the idea of a separable nose cone to save weight and facilita

reentry. Other innovations included a radio-inertial guidance system, which increased the accuracy of the booste

swiveling rocket motors, and small vernier motors for greater accuracy and velocity control. 
With national security riding on the successful development of the Atlas, pressure on the

Astronautics Division was intense. Atlas failed during the first test on 11 June 1957, although the

controversial balloon structure was validated during its dramatic tumble earthward. Despite the

extreme lateral stresses placed on the tank, it did not break up until it was destroyed by the range

safety officer. The launch of Sputnik the following October struck a devastating blow to the

country’s sense of security. 

Looking back on NASA’s early years, Administrator T. Keith Glennan admitted, “In truth, we

lacked a rocket-powered launch vehicle that could come anywhere near the one possessed by the

Soviets. And it would take years to achieve such a system, no matter how much money we spent.”26

Without vehicles with adequate thrust, the space program could achieve none of its goals, which

included an ambitious program of planetary exploration. Moreover, the inability to launch even a

relatively light satellite seemed to indicate that the United States lacked a sufficiently powerful missile

to retaliate in the event of attack by the Soviet Union. 

In the politically charged post-Sputnik atmosphere, ARPA Director Roy Johnson asked Jim

Dempsey whether the company was capable of launching anything resembling a spacecraft.

Recalling Ehricke’s early studies of spacecraft, Dempsey bravely replied, “Sure, the whole Atlas.”27

This led to a top-secret crash program called Project SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting

Relay Equipment). Assured that the Atlas would not fail, Glennan convinced President Eisenhower

to use Project SCORE as a not-so-subtle proxy to demonstrate the country’s military prowess.

Glennan noted in his diary: “The recent successes of the Atlas launches would permit him [the

President] to portray dramatically—possibly by television or a demonstration for the press—the

effectiveness of the Atlas as a nuclear warhead carrier.”28 The Atlas, launched from Cape Canaveral

on 18 December 1958 with a pretaped Christmas message of peace on Earth from President

Eisenhower, carried the largest American payload placed in orbit up to that time.29

The increasing reliability of the Atlas encouraged NASA officials to press it into service for

the Mercury program, on the theory that to catch up with the Soviet Union, NASA should “use

known technologies, extending the state of the art as little as necessary.”30 Atlas would launch

Mercury astronauts John Glenn, M. Scott Carpenter, Walter Schirra, and L. Gordon Cooper, but

without an upper stage, it was consigned to low-Earth orbit. 

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 11

26 See Glennan’s comments on this issue in The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan, ed. J. D. Hunley

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993), 23.

27 William H. Patterson, “The Evolution of a New Technology Concept in the USA (America’s First ICBM—the Atlas),”

typescript, no date, 19. Copy courtesy of Charles Wilson.

28 J. D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA, 24.

29 Deane Davis, “The Talking Satellite: A Reminiscence of Project Score,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 52

(1999): 239–259. See also John L. Chapman, Atlas: The Story of a Missile (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960),

152–153.

30 J. D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA, 13.
For Dempsey, Centaur was the key to securing the company’s place in the emerging aerospac

industry. Though the Atlas missile became operational in 1959, it had severe limitations as a weapon

system. The company anticipated its replacement in the country’s arsenal with the Minuteman solid

propellant missile and the much larger Titan II. Atlas, fitted out with a new high-energy upper stag

later proved a commercial success for the company. However, development of Centaur into 

dependable launch vehicle would be neither inexpensive nor easy. The difficulties of developing 

liquid-hydrogen-fueled upper stage would prove a shocking revelation to the talented engineerin

team at General Dynamics.

The General Dynamics proposal, “A Satellite and Space Development Program,” was read

two months after Sputnik. The group pitched the idea to Dempsey, who immediately packe

Ehricke and William Patterson off on a sales mission to Washington, District of Columbia. The

12 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Abe Silverstein, Chief of Research at Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, 1950s. (C1963-63846)
submitted Krafft Ehricke’s first Centaur proposal to the Air Force in December 1957. The

company asked for $15 million to begin work on the high-energy upper stage.31

Although the Air Force did not accept the first proposal, Ehricke called on Abe Silverstein at

NACA Headquarters during the following June. Well known in the nation’s aerospace community,

Silverstein was among the nation’s most knowledgeable experts in aircraft and rocket propulsion. Born

in 1908 in Terre Haute, Indiana, Silverstein had graduated from Rose Polytechnic Institute in 1929

with a degree in mechanical engineering. After more than a decade in wind-tunnel design and operations at NACA’s Langley Laboratory, he transferred to the new engine research laboratory in

Cleveland during World War II. As Chief of Research for the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in

Cleveland in the 1950s, he aggressively supported the work of the rocket section and put pressure on

NACA Headquarters for greater research funding for the study of rocket propellants. 

Silverstein shared Ehricke’s enthusiasm for liquid hydrogen, but his hands were tied.

Congress had not yet passed the Space Act setting up the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration. He suggested that ARPA might be receptive. Ehricke presented the proposal for

a liquid-hydrogen upper stage to Herbert York, who was chief scientist for ARPA at that time.

Because of the well-known difficulties of developing a hydrogen pump, Ehricke had specified a

pressure-fed system with four 7,500-pound-thrust oxygen/hydrogen engines to be designed by

the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation.32 At this meeting, he was surprised and

delighted to learn of the Air Force’s prior funding for the development of a liquid-hydrogen

airplane for high-altitude reconnaissance.33 At the ARPA meeting, Ehricke was told that the Air

Force was so strongly committed to the development of liquid hydrogen that large liquefiers to

convert hydrogen gas to liquid hydrogen had already been built in various parts of the country. 

Early Liquid-Hydrogen Initiatives 

Ehricke and the design team at General Dynamics were unaware of earlier liquid-hydrogen

initiatives. Centaur brought together liquid-hydrogen research and development by academia,

the military, and NACA. The development of a national capability in liquid hydrogen began in

the 1920s with the pioneering research of William Giauque and his student Herrick L. Johnston

at the University of California at Berkeley. Their research contributed to the discovery of

deuterium, or heavy hydrogen, in 1931 by Nobel Prize winner Harold Urey. When Johnston

took a position at The Ohio State University (OSU) in the late 1920s, he continued this work

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 13

31 Patterson, 20.

32 Centaur Technical Handbook and Log, General Dynamics, 12 March 1963, “Old RL10 Records,” NASA Glenn

Research Center (GRC) Records.

33 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
in cryogenics. The hydrogen liquefier, or cryostat, he built at Ohio State provided a model fo

other cryostats built in the United States after World War II.34 With new methods to conver

hydrogen gas to liquid hydrogen, postwar rocket designers began to consider the tantalizin

possibilities of liquid hydrogen. Not only could liquid hydrogen be stored in a smaller spac

than hydrogen gas, but keeping hydrogen in its liquid state until just prior to ignition signif

cantly reduced the dangers of handling and storage. 

Liquid-hydrogen research found early support from the Department of Defense. The Air Forc

sponsored a series of liquid-hydrogen rocket experiments by Johnston and his students in which the

applied the principle of regenerative cooling by circulating liquid hydrogen in passages that surroun

the thrust chamber prior to injection and firing of the rocket.35 They also discovered that ball bear

ings cooled by liquid hydrogen did not require lubrication—a phenomenon rediscovered b

engineers at Pratt & Whitney during the development of the RL10 engine. 

In the late 1940s, experiments at the Aerojet Engineering Corporation in Azusa, California

contributed to solving problems associated with liquid-hydrogen supply. With help from Johnston

team at OSU, Aerojet built a hydrogen liquefier.36 When Aerojet lost Navy support, the work wa

continued by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, where a liquid-hydrogen rocket was teste

for the first time.37 The Navy also contracted with Martin Marietta and North American Aviatio

to design a hydrogen/oxygen rocket called the High Altitude Test Vehicle (HATV). This desig

featured pressure-stabilized tanks with a common bulkhead separating the two propellants. Non

of these projects enjoyed high visibility or lavish funding.38

In the early 1950s, after President Harry Truman authorized the development of a hydroge

bomb, generous support for basic and applied cryogenics research suddenly became available t

academic, government, and industry researchers.39 In 1952, the U.S. National Bureau of Standard

under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, set up a Cryogenics Engineering Laborator

in Boulder, Colorado, to produce liquid hydrogen in larger quantities. The discovery in 1953 of 

catalyst to take free hydrogen, a mixture of one isotope of regular hydrogen and one of deuterium

and convert it to a para-hydrogen molecule before liquefaction greatly speeded up the conversio

process.40 The Boulder laboratory established a data center and began to publish the results of exper

14 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

34 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 13–15.

35 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 23.

36 See H. L. Coplen, “Large-Scale Production and Handling of Liquid Hydrogen,” Journal of the American Rocket Socie

22 (November–December 1952): 309–322, 338. 

37 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 54–55.

38 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 44.

39 See Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 487–489.

40 See Joseph Green and Fuller C. Jones, “The Bugs That Live at -423o,” Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact, 80 (Januar

1968): 14. 
imental research conducted there. However, production capacity from all hydrogen liquefiers in the

United States was less than one-half ton per day as late as 1956.

An effort by NACA at the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland was among the

important early liquid-hydrogen initiatives that contributed to a national capability in high-energy

fuels. Members of the Rocket section of the laboratory studied the performance of various liquid

propellants and chamber and nozzle cooling.41 After study of German technical papers, as well as

reports produced by Aerojet and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, they decided to narrow their investigation to one of the least studied areas, that of high-energy liquid propellants. An important

1948 theoretical study by Paul Ordin and Riley Miller concluded that liquid hydrogen held

promise as a rocket fuel because of its high specific impulse.42

Because of the laboratory’s lack of rocket test facilities and its inability to purchase liquid

hydrogen in sufficiently large quantities, the group focused on then-exotic chemicals such as

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 15

John Sloop presents scope of NACA rocket research, 1947. (NASA G19785)

41 “Combustion Research Program, NACA Lewis Laboratory, Active as of September 1949,” NASA Lewis Research

Center Records, RG 255, Box 295, NARA, Chicago, IL. The Rocket Section was part of the Combustion Branch of the

Fuels and Lubricants Division.

42 R. O. Miller and P. M. Ordin, “Theoretical Performance of Rocket Propellants Containing Hydrogen, Nitrogen, and

Oxygen,” NACA RM E8A30 (1948), cited in John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 80.
hydrazine with oxidizers like hydrogen peroxide, chlorine trifluoride, liquid oxygen, nitroge

tetroxide, and liquid fluorine.43 Although a small research effort, this work on rocket fuels laid th

basis for the Cleveland laboratory’s rocket expertise.

By 1954, researchers had completed dozens of reports on various rocket fuels and compo

nents. They were experimenting with full-scale rocket engines and beginning to focus o

hydrogen/oxygen as a promising propellant combination in a 5,000-pound rocket, bu

funding was inadequate to carry out extensive testing. 

In late 1955, the Cleveland laboratory seized the opportunity to increase its expertise in th

storage, handling, and firing of liquid hydrogen by contributing to an Air Force project to develo

a more advanced spy plane than Lockheed’s U-2, which flew at very high altitudes over the Sovie

Union to avoid getting shot down. The low density of the atmosphere at high altitudes limited th

performance of the U-2’s engine, which used conventional kerosene-based fuel. Because hydroge

burned readily at extremely low pressures, it seemed a promising fuel for high-altitude reconnais

sance aircraft. To investigate the possibilities of liquid-hydrogen fuel, Silverstein and NACA

research engineer Eldon Hall produced a classified NACA technical report later published a

“Liquid Hydrogen as a Jet Fuel for High-Altitude Aircraft.”44 The report recommended a pressure

stabilized structure for the design of an airplane fuel tank filled with liquid hydrogen. Whethe

the Silverstein-Hall report stimulated the Air Force’s keen interest in liquid hydrogen or simpl

reinforced it is unclear. Silverstein won funding for a $1-million liquid-hydrogen test program a

Lewis called Project Bee. The Air Force supplied a B-57 bomber and two Curtiss Wright J-3

engines for this research. The laboratory was given one year to determine whether the aircra

could be adapted to fly with liquid-hydrogen fuel.

Project Bee gave Lewis engineers experience with problems such as the insulation

instrumentation, and pumping of an engine run on liquid hydrogen. They determined tha

even when the fuel tank was insulated, heat leaks caused the temperature of liquid hydroge

to rise. When it reached the boiling point, the liquid fuel changed to hydrogen gas, causin

the pressure in the tank to rise. Without proper venting, the fuel tank exploded. Too muc

venting, however, reduced the fuel available for completing the flight. They also discovere

that helium gas prevented the insulation from freezing to the exterior wall of the tank.

During the first flight over Lake Erie in December 1956, the pilot switched from JP-4 fue

to liquid hydrogen twice, but the aircraft failed to maintain its speed. During a subsequen

16 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

43 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 75.

44 NACA RM E55 C28a, 15 April 1955. See John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 98–102.

45 See “Experimental Study of Foam-Insulated Liquefied Gas Tanks,” by Thaine W. Reynolds and Solomon Weiss, NAC

RM-E56K08A.
flight, the engine operated for 20 minutes on liquid hydrogen at an altitude of 49,500 feet

and a speed of Mach 0.72.46 By the mid-1950s, the Lewis laboratory had become one of the

acknowledged leaders in cryogenic fuels research, but it lacked adequate facilities for rocket

testing.47

Centaur and Project Suntan

Project Suntan, the code name for a top-secret, high-altitude spy plane, directly contributed

to the development of Centaur.48 During Project Suntan, the Air Force funded the construction

of hydrogen-liquefaction facilities in Trenton, New Jersey (later canceled); Painesville, Ohio; and

Bakersfield, California. Two additional liquefiers were built adjacent to a new Pratt & Whitney

test center in West Palm Beach, Florida. Together, these plants increased the capacity of the United

States to produce liquid hydrogen from 500 pounds a day in 1956 to about 68,000 pounds a day

by 1959. This liquid-hydrogen infrastructure contributed to the national capability to develop a

liquid-hydrogen rocket.

Another important connection between Suntan and Centaur was its Air Force management.

John Seaberg, later one of Centaur’s champions, headed Project Suntan. A veteran of the U.S.

Army Air Corps, Seaberg had worked for Chance Vought Aircraft for five years as an aerodynamicist until the start of the Korean War, when he was recalled to active duty at

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Seaberg conceived and directed the U-2

program. A strong proponent of liquid hydrogen, Seaberg obtained funding for an advanced

spy plane designed by Clarence (Kelly) Johnson of Lockheed in 1956. Pratt & Whitney

Aircraft Engine Company received a contract to design Suntan’s liquid-hydrogen turbojet

engine. Pratt & Whitney’s design team, headed by Richard Coar, completed a prototype for

the innovative 304 turbojet engine in just sixteen months. 

In conventional turbojet engines, a small fraction of the propellants is burned in a separate

combustion chamber to begin the combustion process. This requires a separate propellant control

and ignition system, which adds complexity and weight. The Pratt & Whitney engine had an

“expander cycle” in which liquid hydrogen flowed through tubes into the combustion chamber

walls on the way to the turbine. In the process, the cryogenic propellant, now gaseous, picked up

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 17

46 Interview with Paul Ordin by John Sloop, 30 May 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. See also John L.

Sloop, “NACA High Energy Rocket Propellant Research in the Fifties,” AIAA 8th Annual Meeting, 28 October 1971,

NASA Historical Reference Collection.

47 Richard Canright, “Rocket Propellants: Views of an Airframe Manufacturer,” 31 July 1957, transmitted to members of the

NACA Subcommittee on Rocket Engines with a cover letter by Benson E. Gammon, 21 August 1957, quoted in Sloop, Liquid

Hydrogen, 85. 

48 See John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, on project Suntan, 141–166, and “General Discussion by Col. N. C. Appold, Lt.

Col. J. D. Seaberg, Maj. A. J. Gardner, Capt. J. R. Brill,” transcribed February 1959, 15, John Sloop Papers, NASA

Historical Reference Collection. 
heat and expanded, providing energy to turn the turbine and turbopumps; at the same time, 

cooled the thrust chamber walls. 

Despite the elegance of the Pratt & Whitney design for the engine, the design team a

Lockheed began to doubt that the proposed altitude and range for the new airplane could b

achieved. Kelly Johnson convinced Donald Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to cancel th

project. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Seaberg continued to champion liquid hydrogen. I

June 1958, he convinced ARPA officials to fund a project first known simply as the high-energ

upper stage. Thus, when Ehricke coincidentally presented his plans for a liquid-hydrogen uppe

stage for Atlas, the proposal won immediate support. John Sloop commented, “Two days afte

the ARPA order, Pratt & Whitney conducted the tenth and final series of tests with th

hydrogen fueled 304 turbojet engine. Suntan became a thing of the past and Centaur, 

hydrogen-oxygen rocket stage on top of Atlas, rose as its replacement. All the plant equipmen

and technology of Suntan could now be brought to bear in assuring that Centaur woul

succeed.”49

Project management was assigned to a special projects office at Wright Field under Colone

Norman Appold until Abe Silverstein, in charge of the Office of Space Flight Programs for th

newly formed space agency, insisted that NASA take over the program. However, the Air Forc

officers assigned to project continued to manage it under NASA’s direction. This arrangemen

later became a source of friction between the Air Force and Marshall Space Flight Center. 

Ehricke learned of Pratt & Whitney’s liquid-hydrogen engine at his first meeting wit

ARPA officials in the summer of 1958. The innovative expander cycle of the engine prove

a revelation to Ehricke and his colleagues at General Dynamics. Kenneth Newton, Directo

of Launch Vehicle Programs, recalled the excitement that the first set of Pratt & Whitne

drawings generated at the company. “We were so enthralled with their simplicity,” he said.

The expander cycle (also referred to as a “bootstrap cycle”) of the Suntan engine would serv

as the basis for the design of the Centaur RL10 engine (originally designated LR115). It wa

one of the keys to the striking efficiency and reliability of the RL10. Dick Mulready, secon

in command of the RL10 project, wrote:

It is hard to over-emphasize the significance of the cycle choice for the RL10. The

singular physical properties of pure hydrogen, which the cycle exploits, allow very large

margins of safety in design. The simple cycle completely eliminates many complex ancillary systems. This fact and the large design margins that are possible at low temperature

lead to unmatched reliability. Starting is accomplished by opening the propellant supply

18 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

49 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 196. See also Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, 135. The first public announcement of th

project was made by General Bernard Schriever in May 1959. See R. B. Scott, Technology and Uses of Liquid Hydroge

(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), 3.

50 Interview with the Aerospace Division of Convair/General Dynamics by John Sloop, 29 April 1974, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.
valves and admitting hydrogen into the thrust chamber cooling tubes. The sensible heat

residual in the tubes, even after many hours of coasting in space, is enough to spin up the

turbine.51

The unusual design of the RL10 engine, based on the unique properties of liquid hydrogen,

prompted Ehricke to propose a bold new design for Centaur to capitalize on the low density and

extreme cold of liquid hydrogen. Ehricke had first envisioned a more complicated design for

Centaur consisting of two large tanks—one for liquid hydrogen and the other for liquid oxygen.

Each had a smaller tank within the larger one. The inner tanks—intended to supply fuel to restart

the engines in space after a coast period—added weight and complexity.52

Ehricke simplified the design for Centaur. By adopting Pratt & Whitney’s hydrogen pump,

two of the four proposed engines could be eliminated. Rocketdyne, the country’s preeminent

designer of rocket engines, was outraged that the Air Force had awarded a sole-source contract to

Pratt & Whitney, a company without prior experience in the design of a rocket engine.53 The decision was based on Pratt & Whitney’s previous experience with liquid hydrogen and the

propellant’s ready availability at the Florida test site. 

Next, Ehricke eliminated the unnecessary complexity of the prior design. The new Centaur

was remarkably like the thin-walled, pressure-stabilized Atlas in structure. Centaur’s two propellants were separated by a double-walled bulkhead, consisting of two thin metal skins separated

by a quarter-inch layer of fiberglass insulation. The internal pressure of the two liquids kept the

outer wall of the tank rigid and pushed against the bulkhead to keep it from collapsing. Prior

to tanking with its cryogenic propellants, the bulkhead was backfilled with dry gaseous

nitrogen. When loaded with liquid oxygen on one side of the bulkhead and liquid hydrogen on

the other, the liquid hydrogen froze out the nitrogen to produce a near-perfect vacuum within

the hollow bulkhead. This thermal barrier greatly reduced heat transfer between the liquid

oxygen (-299°F) and the much colder liquid hydrogen (-423°F). Pratt & Whitney’s expander

cycle and Ehricke’s double-walled bulkhead design were both logical extensions of the special

properties of liquid hydrogen. Ehricke said: 

Using this design, we achieve a very high mass ratio for a vehicle of this size with lowdensity propellants. The membrane bulkhead design uses cryogenic vacuum formation as

the logical utilization of an existing extreme temperature environment; just like Pratt &

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 19

51 Dick Mulready, Advanced Engine Development at Pratt & Whitney, 60. See also Joel E. Tucker, “The History of the RL10

Upper-Stage Rocket Engine,” 126.

52 Interview with the Aerospace Division of Convair/General Dynamics by John Sloop, 29 April 1974, NASA Historical

Reference Collection. Ehricke also mentioned the earlier design in his 1962 congressional testimony. Neither the original

proposal nor a blueprint of the design is available to confirm inclusion of a pressure-stabilized structure.

53 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian

Institution Press, 2000), 25. 
Whitney’s bootstrap method of engine start [i.e., use of residual heat in the thrust

chamber cooling tubes to spin the turbine] was an ingenious and logical utilization of the

special physical characteristics of liquid hydrogen.54

The double-walled bulkhead, created late one night with the help of the company’s thermody

namicist, William Mitchell, was arguably the most fundamental part of the design. “We had tha

integral bulkhead before we even knew how many engines we had on the thing or how long the thin

was going to be. That was the kind of invention that sprung the whole thing,” Deane Davis, Centau

project engineer, recalled.55 The bulkhead restricted heat transfer between the relatively warmer liqui

oxygen and the liquid hydrogen. The double-walled bulkhead would not only be the most innovativ

feature of Centaur, but also the most technically demanding. Engineers would later discover tha

liquid hydrogen leaked through minute pores in the welds of the bulkhead.56

Another innovative feature involved putting the thrust structure, which distributes th

concentrated thrust load, inside the liquid-oxygen tank. This saved weight by shortening th

vehicle and reducing bending loads. The exterior of the liquid-hydrogen tank was protected b

four quarter-section fiberglass insulation panels. The insulation shielded the liquid hydroge

from aerodynamic heating, minimizing fuel boil-off. The panels remained bolted togethe

during the early portion of flight. As soon as the aerodynamic heating rate was no longer crit

ical, shaped explosive charges were fired to separate them from the vehicle. The design als

included explosive bolts to separate the two halves of the nose fairing. Small nitrogen ga

thrusters would propel the two sections of the fairing away from the vehicle.57

To make sure that nothing interfered with the General Dynamics focus on Atlas, ARPA

funded Centaur as an experimental program without a mission assigned to it. Ehricke’s new

proposal, accepted in August 1958, had modest goals. Considered a bridge between Atlas-Agen

and much larger future boosters, Centaur was intended to prove the feasibility of a liquid

hydrogen/liquid-oxygen rocket. The guidance system, test facilities, and launch complex were no

included in the bare-bones contract. Development was proposed to take twenty-five months, wit

the first flight to occur in January 1961. Cost was projected at $36 million for six vehicles. 

To keep down costs and prevent interference with the Atlas program, ARPA insisted tha

General Dynamics use Atlas hardware wherever possible.58 A member of the design team recalled

20 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

54 U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space Sciences of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, “Th

Centaur Program,” 87th Congress, 15 and 18 May 1962, 67.

55 Interview with the Aerospace Division of Convair/General Dynamics by John Sloop, 29 April 1974. 

56 Richard E. Martin, “The Atlas and Centaur ‘Steel Balloon’ Tanks: A Legacy of Karel Bossart,” reprint by Gener

Dynamics Corp., 40th International Astronautical Congress paper, IAA-89-738, 1989, 11.

57 Description from Centaur Capability Handbook, GD/A-BTD64-119-1, 1 October 1964, Kennedy Space Center EL

Resource Library.

58 Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings, 66.
Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 21

Centaur is raised into the “J” Tower for testing at Point Loma, early 1960s. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
“One of the ground rules to us was to use Atlas tooling wherever possible, and so really th

Centaur was, and still is, bits and pieces of Atlas put together.”59 These design constraints some

times interfered with achieving an optimal design. 

Although a NASA project, Centaur continued to be managed by the Air Force. Ehricke

monthly reports indicated the growing complexity of the project. Program costs increased to $4

million with the addition of a guidance system and construction of additional test facilities. B

June 1959, the company had awarded a subcontract for the inertial guidance system t

Minneapolis-Honeywell. In July, General Dynamics signed a contract for construction of a launc

complex, designated Pad 36, at Cape Canaveral. In August, it completed construction of a flow

test facility at Point Loma, located on a peninsula on the Pacific coast north of San Diego. A stati

test facility in Sycamore Canyon was activated in September shortly before the first test. Th

Centaur team then initiated liquid-hydrogen tanking tests at Point Loma. 

Glennan took steps to prevent any disruption of Centaur development when it was trans

ferred from ARPA to NASA in July 1959. He urged that the project office be located i

Washington, but he was overruled by officials of the Department of Defense who insiste

that Centaur management be coordinated by the Air Force from its Ballistic Missile Divisio

at Inglewood, near Los Angeles, California. 

Because the United States had no launch vehicle powerful enough to lift the heavy satellite

needed for a global military communications network, Centaur became one of the top priorities o

the military. Herbert York urged Glennan to expedite the program because it was needed fo

launching the Advent series of communications satellites assigned to Centaur in December 1959.6

A secret five-year $174-million research and development program, Advent included te

planned launches of communications satellites for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. ARPA wa

counting on the 1,200-pound satellites to provide instant point-to-point transmissions t

receiving stations within the line-of-sight beam of the satellite. The mission require

restarting the Centaur engines in space. After insertion into a nearly 1-hour parking orbi

Centaur would position the satellite for an elliptical 5-hour coast orbit. The final restar

would then place the spacecraft in a 24-hour circular orbit. Since Centaur was not yet ready

the first three satellites were supposed to be launched with the far less powerful Agena B a

the upper stage for Atlas. The Air Force planned to launch the remaining seven Advent sate

22 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

59 Interview with the Aerospace Division of Convair/General Dynamics by John Sloop, 29 April 1974, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.

60 Herbert York to T. Keith Glennan, 19 September 1959, Centaur files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. O

Advent, see David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, “From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challeng

of Military Satellite Communications,” in Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty years of Satellite Communication, ed. Andrew 

Butrica (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4217, 1997), 65.
lites in 1963 on Atlas-Centaur. Centaur’s development problems made meeting the demands

of this schedule impossible.61

By December 1959, General Dynamics had completed a metal prototype and moved it to the

final assembly area, where a mockup of the electrical and pumping systems could be added. At the

same time, the company began a flight program at Edwards Air Force Base to investigate the

behavior of liquid hydrogen under zero-gravity conditions using an Air Force KC-135. Ehricke optimistically predicted that the first Centaur flight article would be delivered in January 1961.62

Centaur and Saturn

In addition to the assignment of Advent to Centaur, another key decision of the early space

program took place in December 1959. Six months before the official transfer of the von Braun

team to NASA, Abe Silverstein chaired a committee to evaluate the Saturn vehicle and settle the

question of propellants for Saturn’s upper stages.63 Silverstein occupied one of NASA’s most important posts during NASA’s formative years. His Office of Space Flight Programs was responsible for

both human and robotic exploration of space. This office set the agenda for planetary exploration

and completed preliminary planning for a lunar landing well before it became a goal of the

Kennedy administration.

Silverstein had been determined to prove the competence of former NACA engineers to run

the new agency when he accepted the job at NACA Headquarters in 1957.64 He personally

recruited many of the NASA Headquarters staff, bringing a large contingent from Lewis Research

Center in Cleveland. Because the inadequacy of the nation’s launch vehicles was a source of

concern at all levels of government, Silverstein championed Centaur and called it “the kind of

thing upon which our whole future technology, I think, rests—that is, the development of an early

capability with these high-energy propellants.”65 Based on Silverstein’s advocacy, Congress authorCentaur’s Origins in Atlas 23

61 “Military Space Projects: Report of Progress for June–July 1960,” Office of the Director of Defense Research and

Engineering,” Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll et al., 1952–1961, Department of Defense

Subseries, Box 9, “Missiles and Satellites, Military Space Projects [June–August 1960],” Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

The authors thank Dwayne Day for providing a copy of this document. 

62 Centaur Progress Reports, 31 December 1958 through 31 July 1960, San Diego Aerospace Museum Archives.

63 See John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 230–243. Other members included Abraham Hyatt, NASA; George P. Sutton,

ARPA; T. C. Muse, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E); Norman C. Appold, U.S.

Air Force; and Wernher von Braun, Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). Eldon Hall, Silverstein’s close colleague at

NASA, served as secretary. See “Report to the Administrator on Saturn Development Plan by Saturn Vehicle Team,” 15

December 1959, Silverstein file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. The text of the report is partially reproduced in

John M. Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV: Accessing Space, document 1-29, 116–119.

64 Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA SP-4211, 1980), 100.

65 U.S. House of Representatives, 1960 NASA Authorization, Hearings Before the Committee on Science and

Astronautics, 86th Congress, H.R. 6512, April and May 1959, 391. 
ized additional funding and increased the contract with General Dynamics from six to ten veh

cles—“this being considered an absolute minimum to prove out a vehicle design upon which s

much of the national space program was beginning to depend.”66

Because of Silverstein’s strong faith in liquid hydrogen, he insisted that Saturn include a

least one liquid-hydrogen upper stage. The team, headed by Wernher von Braun, was adamantl

opposed to liquid hydrogen. At Kummersdorf in the 1930s, von Braun had witnessed th

demonstration of a small liquid-hydrogen engine designed by Walter Thiel and noted that “th

greatest impression he retained was of the numerous line leaks and difficulties of handlin

liquid hydrogen.”67

At a series of key meetings of the Silverstein committee, von Braun urged the use of conven

tional kerosene-based fuels. In Silverstein’s view, “The von Braun team was apparently willing t

take on the difficulties of the 1.5 million-pound thrust-booster stage rather than the hazards whic

they contemplated in the use of hydrogen as fuel.”68 Silverstein used data prepared by NACA

colleague Eldon Hall to beat down opposition to liquid hydrogen. For a week, the NASA team

and the von Braun group debated, until von Braun, to the astonishment of the other member

of his team, capitulated. The Saturn Launch Vehicle task team was unanimous in its endorse

ment of liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen in all Saturn upper stages. Their report concluded

“Current success in the Centaur engine program substantiates the choice of hydrogen and oxyge

for the high-energy propellants.”69 To Oswald Lange, project director for Saturn at Marshall, th

recommendations of the Silverstein committee for liquid-hydrogen upper stages represented 

“major milestone in the Saturn program.”70 The Saturn C-1 would use conventional fuel in its fir

stage but have liquid-hydrogen upper stages. The second stage (designated S-IV) was to use fou

RL10 engines uprated to 20,000 pounds thrust each. The proposed C-1’s third stage would be th

Centaur itself with two RL10 engines, each with 15,000 pounds of thrust. Silverstein said in 

1977 interview that he did not know exactly what led von Braun to accept liquid hydrogen, bu

in hindsight it had proved to be the correct action. “I believe that the decision to go wit

24 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

66 Centaur Program, 1962 hearings, 7. According to NASA Pocket Statistics for December 1961, research and develop

ment (R&D) funding for Centaur increased from $4 million in FY 1959 to $36.64 million in FY 1960 and to $62.5

million in FY 1961.

67 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 236. 

68 Abe Silverstein, “How It All Began,” speech at Kennedy Space Center Writers Conference, Cocoa Beach, Florida, 1–

September 1977, quoted by Virginia Dawson, Engines and Innovation, 167.

69 “Report on Saturn Development Plan B Saturn Vehicle Team,” 15 December 1959, Silverstein file, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.

70 Oswald H. Lange, “Development of the Saturn Space Carrier Vehicle,” in Ernst Stuhlinger et al., Astronautica

Engineering and Science from Peenemünde to Planetary Space (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), 

See also the letter from Abraham Hyatt to Thomas O. Paine, 24 November 1969, Silverstein family papers. NASA Glen

History Office.
hydrogen-oxygen in the upper stages of the Saturn V was the significant technical decision that

enabled the United States to achieve the first manned lunar landing,” he said. “The Russian effort

to accomplish this mission without high-energy upper stages was doomed to failure.”71

The decision of the Silverstein committee directly influenced the fortunes of Centaur. Centaur

moved into NASA’s mainstream as a stepping-stone to a piloted lunar landing. However, the von

Braun team, although convinced of the superiority of liquid-hydrogen upper stages, was never fully

committed to Centaur. Referring to the new designation of Centaur as the final stage (or S-V stage)

for the Saturn C-1, Krafft Ehricke joked that on top of Saturn’s “horrible tower,” at least there would

be one “decent vehicle.” He referred to the Saturn C-1 as the “Centaur-tipped Saturn,” to which

von Braun retorted, “Centaur-tipped Saturn, Hell!”72

Von Braun favored large, heavy structures to ensure reliability. His conservative design

philosophy, which Ehricke derided as comparable to the Brooklyn Bridge in its conservatism,

“mitigated against the use of liquid hydrogen which, more than conventional fuels, depended

upon very light structures to help offset the handicap of low density.”73 Though von Braun

agreed to Saturn stages powered by liquid hydrogen, he apparently did not approve of

Centaur’s balloon structure. His opposition may have influenced the NASA decision to award

the contract for the S-IV second stage to the Douglas Aircraft Company, ostensibly to provide

“some semblance of competition” among aerospace companies.74 The S-IV second stage, with

its cluster of six RL10 engines, produced an additional 90,000 pounds of thrust to the

1,296,000 pounds of thrust generated by the first stage. The choice of Douglas was controversial enough to merit an investigation by the GAO, since Douglas had no prior experience with

liquid hydrogen.75 Douglas avoided the balloon structure by adopting a honeycomb design

similar to that of the Douglas Thor missile.

Caught Between DOD and NASA

From July 1960 to early 1962, the Air Force continued to manage both the Centaur and the Agena

programs, reporting to Marshall Space Flight Center. D. L. Forsythe, the Agena program chief,

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 25

71 See note 68. 

72 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

73 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 208. See also G. R. Richards and Joel W. Powell, “The Centaur Vehicle,” Journal of the

British Interplanetary Society 42 (1989): 99–120. 

74 J. D. Hunley, The Birth of NASA, 129. See also Ray A. Williamson, “The Biggest of Them All, Reconsidering the

Saturn V,” in To Reach the High Frontier, 304. 

75 Ray Williamson, “Access to Space: Steps to the Saturn V,” in John M. Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, Volume

IV, Accessing Space (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407): 1–31.
lamented the lack of Marshall attentiveness to both Agena and Centaur, which he said received “onl

a few crumbs which have fallen from the banquet table of thought and effort at MSFC.”76

NASA had acquired the Agena rocket, manufactured by the Lockheed Missiles and Spac

Company, in early 1960. The engine, manufactured by Bell Aerospace Company, burned unsym

metrical dimethylhydrazine with inhibited red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer. As a secon

stage for Atlas, Agena could launch only about 500 to 750 pounds into an Earth-escape trajec

tory. Although the Air Force needed Agena to launch the early Advent satellites, the Agen

program proved an unwanted distraction to Marshall engineers whose energies were consume

by Saturn development. 

Although Marshall had little interest in Centaur, the RL10 engine figured prominently in i

plans because von Braun was counting on an uprated version of the engine for the Saturn S-IV

liquid-hydrogen upper stage. In February 1960, he began to lobby to take over RL10 engin

management from the Air Force. This made sense to A. O. Tischler, NASA’s Chief of Liquid Fue

Rocket Engines, because the Air Force seemed incapable of keeping development costs unde

control. The RL10 engine already had a project overrun of about $10 million. The danger i

allowing Marshall to take over the RL10 engine contract was that the engine for Centaur might b

neglected in the interest of the hydrogen engine for the Saturn stage. He urged that Headquarter

management be strengthened in order to minimize project favoritism.77

Major General Don Richard Ostrander, Director of NASA’s launch vehicle programs betwee

1959 and 1961, had similar concerns. He told von Braun that he was concerned that the high co

of RL10 engine development would draw funds away from other parts of the Saturn program

because of the Pratt & Whitney reputation for high costs. But he admitted that Pratt & Whitne

produced engines of unusually high quality.78 Immediately after Marshall won its bid to take ove

RL10 development, it contracted with Pratt & Whitney for a more powerful version of the RL1

called the LR-119. The Douglas S-IV stage specified a four-engine cluster producing 70,00

pounds of thrust. Later, the configuration was changed to a six-engine cluster producing 90,00

pounds of thrust.79

Centaur’s prominence within NASA increased when it was assigned two important plan

etary and lunar exploration programs, Mariner in 1959 and Surveyor in 1961. Engineers a

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, who managed both Surveyor an

Mariner, were skeptical of Centaur’s vaunted advantages over more conventional propulsio

26 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

76 Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet (NASA SP-4212, 1984), 47

77 A. O. Tischler to Abe Hyatt, 5 February 1960, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

78 Don R. Ostrander to Wernher von Braun, 20 June 1960, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection

79 See Joel E. Tucker, “The History of the RL 10 Upper-Stage rocket Engine, 1956–1980,” published in History of Liqui

Rocket Engine Development in the United States, 1955–1980, ed. Stephen E. Doyle, AAS History Series, vol. 13 (Sa

Diego: AAS, 1992), 133. See also Mulready, 78; Bilstein, 131–140, 188–190. 
systems. Their opposition to Centaur would grow as Centaur’s development problems became

increasingly apparent. 

NASA set up a Centaur Project Technical Team under Colonel Don Heaton to facilitate

technical support of NASA missions, although Centaur still remained under Air Force management because of its key role in the Advent Program for the Department of Defense. When

Milton Rosen took over as NASA’s Chief of Rocket Vehicle Development, pressure on Ehricke

increased. Rosen, who had served as project engineer for the Vanguard program, was not a fan

of Centaur. He demanded that General Dynamics develop Vega as an upper stage for the Atlas.

The Vega program, later canceled, siphoned off personnel and funds needed for the more technically challenging Centaur.80

General Dynamics began to build a flight-qualified Centaur, with the first launch now

projected for June 1961. Construction was initiated on the Centaur launch complex at the

Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral. A test program at the Tullahoma Vacuum Test Facility

at Arnold Engineering Development Center, additional nose-fairing development, and a zerogravity flight-test program with Aerobee rockets at Wallops Flight Research Station all added to

the increasing cost and complexity of the program. 

NASA relied on Lewis Research Center’s expertise in problems associated with the behavior

of hydrogen in zero-gravity. The urgency of the program made it necessary to place fifty-four

people at Lewis on a 48-hour week for a period of six months. The Center pressed the Propulsion

Systems Laboratory into service for tank insulation and pressurization tests. Testing brought the

disquieting knowledge that Centaur’s intermediate bulkhead would collapse without the maintenance of a 3-pound pressure differential. 

The Advent requirement that Centaur’s engines be restarted twice after two coast periods

posed questions for which there were not yet answers. During both periods, the longitudinal axis

of the vehicle would be pointed at the Sun with the oxygen tank exposed to the Sun’s heat. Also,

depending on the time of year, Centaur might encounter other problems, such as radiation from

the Earth. How would the propellants behave in the extreme environment of space, particularly

when Centaur tanks were only partially filled? Would liquid hydrogen continue to completely wet

the tank walls under near-zero-gravity conditions? Would the pressure buildup cause excessive

venting, resulting in the loss of sufficient fuel for the second burn? Everyone involved in the space

program—both NASA engineers and the people working under Krafft Ehricke at General

Dynamics—were attempting to pierce the veil of ignorance surrounding the problems to be encountered in the low gravity of outer space. 

One of the obstacles to piercing that veil was the design constraint of using Atlas tooling

rather than designing Centaur from scratch. Fred Merino, a scientist at General Dynamics with a

background in thermodynamics, recalls going to the design group headed by Daniel Heald.

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 27

80 Interview with Donald Lesney (former General Dynamics employee) by Virginia Dawson, 5 June 2000.
Merino asked the group to design a special valve system for venting hydrogen gas during the tw

coast periods. They refused until Merino insisted that without proper venting the rocket woul

fail. He recalled: 

The designer responsible for some of this hardware said, “You can’t do it because the

ground rules are we use off-the-shelf hardware and they said that means we are going to

take this Atlas valve, scale it down a little bit, mount the same valve on the liquid

hydrogen tank as the liquid oxygen tank, and we’re going to command the valve to open

when you have to vent. That’s all we’re going to do.” And I said, “You will never fly a

mission that way. It’s going to fail.” The guy said, “Those are my marching orders.” So I

had to write a report explaining why upper management had to alter their design guidelines. They agreed when they heard why you can’t do this.81

Denny Huber, an engineer hired by General Dynamics in 1960, recalled that the same bare

bones approach to Centaur tooling meant they had to use the Atlas liquid-oxygen propellant loadin

system. Although the new hydrogen system they had designed worked beautifully, the old oxyge

system was inadequate. They had to wait until a second pad was built to redesign the system. The

Pad 36A was retrofitted with the new technology.82

Another question centered on how to insulate the Centaur liquid-hydrogen tank. Insulatio

was necessary to keep the liquid hydrogen from vaporizing on the ground and during launch. Th

insulation was applied in four segments running the length of the tank and was held against th

tank by metal bands. At about ten times the speed of sound, explosive bolts on the bands wer

supposed to fire, allowing the insulation to fall away from the vehicle.83 Lewis engineers wer

skeptical that the proposed insulation would work. A March 1961 memo by Lewis enginee

Vern Gray stated, “The troubles with the insulation are delaying the test program, are poten

tially hazardous, and illustrate Convair’s apparent indifference to the peculiar problems o

hydrogen tank insulation.” The memo described how hard it was to “cajole” test data out of th

company. Gray observed on a visit to San Diego that the application of the insulation wa

uneven, leaving lumps. During tests, the insulation split open when the extreme cold of the tan

wall came into contact with the air. The loss of insulation increased the rate of hydrogen boi

off, raising pressure in the tank. There was danger that the tank might rupture, spilling volatil

liquid hydrogen. The effort to fix the problem with adhesive tape appalled Gray. He commented

28 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

81 Interview with Frederick Merino (former General Dynamics employee) by Virginia Dawson, 5 June 2000.

82 E-mail communication from Denny Huber to Ed Bock, 30 March 2002.

83 Memo from Irving Pinkel to Colonel D. H. Heaton, 25 January 1960, regarding “Meeting on Centaur insulation pan

flutter, 22 January 1960,” RG 255, NARA Box 254.
“Apparently, Convair has not grasped the importance of sealing off atmospheric air from a

hydrogen tank nor the knowledge of how to do it.”84

Representatives from the National Bureau of Standards Laboratory in Boulder, Colorado; Linde

Air Products Company (with extensive knowledge of the handling of liquid oxygen); and NASA all

voiced their frustration at “repeated refusals to accept suggestions for improvement.” They suggested

changing the type of insulation or applying an external seal coating, and purging beneath the shell

with helium gas in order to prevent air from contaminating the insulation. The memo from Gray

concluded, “Nothing being done now gives any real basis for optimism.”85

As the costs of the program mounted and the launch date slipped, Centaur’s troubles, both technical and managerial, became increasingly serious. Ehricke recalled his frustration with Pratt &

Whitney and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Both organizations blamed General Dynamics for

the delays in the Surveyor Program when, in fact, each had serious development problems of its

own.86 Up to this point, Marshall had left day-to-day management of the Centaur to the Air Force.

But as Centaur problems multiplied, Headquarters demanded greater accountability. Advent, an

important Department of Defense program, and two high-profile NASA missions, Mariner and

Surveyor, depended on Centaur. Even more important, Centaur was considered essential to proving

the feasibility of liquid-hydrogen upper stages for the Saturn C-1. Headquarters demanded that the

von Braun team assert greater control over one of NASA’s most innovative programs.

Centaur’s Origins in Atlas 29

84 Memo from Vernon H. Gray to Acting Director, 17 March 1961, RG 255, NARA 254.

85 Ibid.

86 Interview with Krafft Ehricke by John Sloop, 26 April 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

Chapter 2

Marshall’s Unruly Wards

“To the Huntsville people the methods and philosophies of the Atlas and

Centaur were as mysterious as the dark side of the Moon.” 

—Deane Davis, General Dynamics 

The Centaur had serious technical and managerial problems that proved an unwanted distrac

tion from the development of the Saturn C-1 at Marshall Space Flight Center. Administrator Keit

Glennan aptly captured Huntsville’s attitude when he remarked, “Saturn was a dream; Centaur wa

a job.”1 As the Centaur schedule slipped, tensions between Marshall and NASA Headquarter

surfaced. In January 1962, Headquarters insisted that von Braun become more involved in th

troubled program. The explosion of the first Centaur in May 1962, a scathing indictment of th

program by the House Subcommittee on Space Sciences, and bad press led to the transfer o

Centaur from Huntsville to Cleveland in the fall of 1962. Implicit in the Centaur failure hearing

was the tension between different philosophies of design and management of large-scale technolog

projects. 

Huntsville’s Indifference

As early as March 1961, Headquarters expressed increasing impatience with von Braun

indifference to the fate of Centaur. Don Ostrander, Director of NASA’s launch vehicle program

began to pressure von Braun to exercise greater oversight of the program. He presented him wit

a long confidential memo that almost certainly raised the hackles of the Huntsville team. 

included a management checklist. Ostrander called Centaur “the most urgent task before us a

this time.” It was needed not only for Surveyor and Mariner, but also for “its hardware contr

bution to Saturn.” Ostrander demanded that Centaur be “supported fully by the best talen

available at MSFC.” He instructed von Braun not only to submit informal monthly progres

reports to Headquarters, but also to deliver them in person. He wanted regular meetings set up

These were to be attended by the senior NASA oversight personnel at Pratt & Whitney an

General Dynamics: “Streamlined, effective management of the project must be considered essen

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 3

1 Oran Nicks, Far Travelers (Washington, DC: NASA SP-480, 1985), 90.
32 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

2 Don R. Ostrander to Wernher von Braun, 20 March 1961, Centaur files. See also Ostrander to von Braun, 29 March 

John Sloop Papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

3 Abe Silverstein to Associate Administrator, 6 September 1961, papers of John Sloop, NASA Historical Reference Colle

tial,” he wrote, “and any organization changes within NASA or within contractors’ p

deemed necessary to accomplish this must be immediately implemented.”2 It appears tha

Braun had no intention of assigning his best people to monitor General Dynamics. 

Ostrander also thought that Pratt & Whitney needed better supervision. He wanted 

program set up at Lewis Research Center to help solve engine ignition problems. In sho

thought that Marshall must provide more active management of all aspects of the pro

including a full-time project manager. To facilitate better management, the Air Force trans

all Centaur contracts (with the exception of those with Pratt & Whitney) to Marshall in 

1961. Von Braun named Hans Hueter Director of the Light and Medium Vehicle Office. Fr

Evans took over as Centaur program manager. 

These measures did not improve the performance of General Dynamics. In September 

the Centaur launch schedule continued to slip, while program costs rose to $100 million

confidential memo, Abe Silverstein informed Associate Administrator Robert Seamans 

Centaur had become “an emergency of major proportions.”3 Silverstein emphasized that N

had “a tremendous investment to protect.” He prophetically warned, “More serious prob

such as explosion on the pad or a fundamental vehicle or propulsion problem, could virtually 

out the robotic lunar and planetary program until 1965, except for the makeshift effort with 

Agenas.” Silverstein thought one of the main problems was that the Department of D

Advent satellite seemed to be taking priority over NASA missions. Because Advent weight re

ments were increasing, while the lunar and planetary requirements were holding steady, N

was “saddled with an improvement program which we don’t really need, one which will pro

lower the reliability of the early NASA vehicles.” He recommended that all changes to Survey

halted as soon as an injection weight of 2,500 pounds could be guaranteed. He also though

RL10 engine allocations to Saturn should be reviewed to see whether they were interfering 

Centaur. In November 1961, Homer Newell became head of a new Office of Space Science

Applications with responsibility for both Centaur and Surveyor. Newell, however, had li

time to coordinate the two extremely demanding programs. 

Oran Nicks, Director of NASA’s Lunar and Planetary Programs, was fully aware o

magnitude of Centaur’s problems. He was dubious that Centaur would be ready in time 

the Venus probe planned for August 1962. By the spring of 1961, he began to consider 

Agena as an alternative. After discussing the possibility with people at JPL, he return

Washington determined to find out whether the development of Centaur was as problema

he had heard from various sources, including Donald Heaton. A meeting attende
Administrator James Webb, Silverstein, von Braun, Nicks, Ostrander, and Edgar Cortrigh

Assistant Director of Lunar and Planetary Programs, confirmed his worst fears. Nicks recalled

“The meeting produced a formal position by Wernher von Braun that the future of Centaur wa

totally uncertain. We left the meeting with the clear understanding that our Centaur-based plan

etary missions were postponed indefinitely.”4

Originally, the payload capability of Centaur was set at 2,700 to 2,800 pounds for luna

missions. Based on the projected weight of Centaur, JPL’s contract with Hughes for Surveyo

called for a spacecraft weight of 2,500 pounds with a science payload of approximately 34

pounds. In the spring of 1962, Marshall managers informed JPL that Centaur could not lift th

weight and asked for a reduction in payload weight to 2,100 pounds. This weight change had 

demoralizing effect on JPL and Hughes engineers because they had to redesign the Surveyo

mission to accommodate fewer scientific experiments. 

Whether Surveyor was even necessary for the Apollo program was called into question i

1962. Nicks recalls in his personal memoir Far Travelers that Max Faget, one of the leading eng

neers on the Apollo program, gained the ear of Congressman Joseph Karth (D-Minnesota), th

powerful head of the Subcommittee on Space Sciences of the U.S. House of Representative

Committee on Science and Astronautics. Nicks claims that Faget flatly declared that not only wa

Surveyor superfluous as a prototype for the Lunar Excursion Module, but even the data Surveyo

was supposed to provide on the topography of the Moon could be obtained by other mean

Faget’s meddling with a powerful Congressman raised a furor at Headquarters. “Webb promptl

set the record straight about Surveyor’s importance to Apollo,” Nicks relates, but Apollo engineer

continued to believe they would never have data they needed from Surveyor. Although they wer

careful not to speak openly of doubts about Ranger and Surveyor, Nicks believes they wer

convinced that they could not depend on these questionable programs.5

Apollo designers may have refrained from directly attacking Centaur, but Karth felt no suc

compunction. Congressional hearings in March tackled the issue of the escalating costs of NASA

programs. Congress wanted to terminate the Centaur and Surveyor programs. Karth though

NASA should admit its mistake in developing Centaur. He was especially critical of the fuel-fee

system used in the RL10 engine. But NASA and the Air Force presented a unified front in defens

of Centaur.6 A decade later, policy analyst Erasmus Kloman speculated that although scientists ha

probably been fairly sure of the composition of the Moon’s surface by the time Surveyor wa

launched, it “provided a forcing mechanism for the development of Centaur as part of the spac

agency’s long-range launch vehicle program.”7 NASA evidently thought the space program neede

liquid-hydrogen fuel and that Centaur would prove its feasibility.

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 3

4 Oran Nicks, Far Travelers, 17.

5 Ibid, 91–92.

6 Brian Duff, “NASA Officials Defend Centaur,” San Diego Union (20 March 1962).
By December, the Centaur program was in crisis. With Atlas-Centaur already installed o

launch pad at the Cape, an extremely serious new problem had surfaced. An ambitious test pro

run at the company’s Sycamore Canyon facility revealed leaks in the intermediate bulkhead that 

rated the liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen tanks. Hydrogen was seeping through imperceptible 

in the welds. These holes seemed to open up only after the liquid hydrogen was loaded into the 

This hydrogen leakage was a serious problem because it destroyed the vacuum between the oxyge

hydrogen tanks and increased the transfer of heat across the bulkhead. The leaks called into qu

the basic design of the rocket. General Dynamics asked some of its best engineers to tackle the pro

including Atlas designer Charlie Bossart. 

Headquarters sent John Sloop, then NASA’s Deputy Director of Launch Vehicle

Propulsion Programs, to investigate exactly what was happening at the company. Sloop, a s

advocate of high-energy fuels, had worked in the rocket section at Lewis Research Center 

called to Washington by Silverstein. In a confidential memo to Homer Newell, writt

December 1961 after a visit to General Dynamics, Sloop revealed that the company consi

the problem of leaks across the bulkhead so serious that the integral tank design might have 

scrapped. He reported that the company thought that it might still be feasible to fly the Sur

and Mariner missions on Centaur because the hydrogen leaked so slowly. But because o

longer coast time of the Advent mission, liquid-hydrogen leakage might jeopardize the mi

“[General Dynamics/Astronautics] believes that the only safe way to meet all Centaur missi

to drop the integral tank design and to go separate fuel and oxidizer tanks,”8 Sloop noted

was a blow to the defenders of the integral tank design, particularly Charlie Bossart. The m

noted that Marshall had already requested General Dynamics to begin a design study using 

rate tanks. Sloop argued against abandoning the innovative tank design, urging a redesign 

bulkhead with greater wall thickness at the points of welding. Whether this would provide 

solution to the problem, however, was not yet clear. 

Sloop’s second report, filed a few days later, contained an indictment of General Dyn

management structure. At this time General Dynamics had a matrix structure with all the pr

drawing support from the operating divisions. Most of its 32,500 employees worked on the 

project, which commanded the lion’s share of the company resources. Ehricke was one o

program directors. He had only twenty-seven people assigned to the project, only five of w

reported directly to him. Deane Davis, the Centaur Project Engineer, had two that he di

supervised. Although the men assigned to Centaur had specialized knowledge of Centaur co

nents and subsystems, only Ehricke and Davis were concerned with overall performanc

34 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

7 Erasmus Kloman, Unmanned Space Project Management: Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter (NASA SP-4901, 1972), 10.

8 John Sloop, “Memorandum for Director of Space Sciences,” 18 December 1961, John Sloop papers, NASA H

Reference Collection.
systems. Sloop observed, “Mr. Ehricke is doing a Herculean task but Centaur is too big for on

man. What is badly needed is strength in depth; namely, give Mr. Ehricke a larger staff directl

under his control.”9 The small team of five Marshall engineers who were monitoring the contrac

in the Resident Office were powerless to effect the sweeping organizational changes that wer

needed to make Centaur a viable program.

At last, NASA acted to exert more direct control over the Centaur program. Marshall Spac

Flight Center set up a program office in Huntsville to provide greater oversight. In response t

pressure from NASA, General Dynamics/Astronautics President James Dempsey directed Gran

Hansen to replace Krafft Ehricke as head of the Centaur program. Krafft Ehricke became Directo

of Advanced Studies, charged with the company’s long-range plans and applications for Centau

hardware. Dempsey promoted Hansen to vice-president reporting directly to him, bypassing th

chief engineer of the company, Mort Rosenbaum, who had been at loggerheads with Ehricke. I

discussing the transition in leadership, Hansen explained, “And then finally came sort of a show

down and, as Dempsey explained it to me, they felt that Krafft was a tremendously imaginative

creative idea man, a hell of a good engineer, but that he wasn’t enough of an S.O.B. to manage 

program like this. He had functional department people who would tell him to get lost, and h

would be willing to do just that, and they needed somebody who wouldn’t.”10 Hansen proved to b

a skilled manager who possessed the authority and resources that Ehricke had lacked. The earl

months of his tenure would be marked by a major reorganization of the project, the failure of th

first flight, and a highly critical congressional investigation. Undeterred, Hansen headed Centau

through the end of the Surveyor program.

Born in Bancroft, Idaho, in 1921, Hansen had been brought up in California, where h

attended San Bernardino High School and Junior College. He had served in the Navy durin

World War II as an electronics technician and engineer. The G.I. Bill made it possible for him

to earn a B.S. in electrical engineering at Illinois Institute of Technology. He did graduate wor

at the California Institute of Technology while he worked in missiles and space systems eng

neering with the Douglas Aircraft Company from 1948 to 1960. At Douglas, he designed th

Nike launch control and test equipment and supervised test firings at White Sands Provin

Ground. He had responsibility for electrical systems for Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules, Hones

John, Sparrow, MB-1, Thor, Thor-Delta, Nike Zeus, and Skybolt missiles. Moving from

Douglas to General Dynamics in May 1960, Hansen became Chief Design Engineer, in charg

of all design and laboratory testing, and also became the production-engineering liaison on th

Atlas and Centaur programs.

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 3

9 John Sloop, “Memorandum for Director of Space Sciences, 20 December 1961, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Referen

Collection.

10 John Sloop interview with members of the Aerospace Division Convair/General Dynamics, 29 April 1974, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.
Hansen had known that Centaur was in trouble, but the promotion took him by sur

He read it in a memo that simply showed up in his mailbox.11 His appointment as vice-pre

in charge of the Centaur program coincided with the change in management structure fr

matrix to a project-type organization. In announcing the change to employees, a com

newsletter stated, “In arriving at the Project Centaur decision, two principal factors 

considered by management: the future of the company demands to a large degree on upgr

the Centaur effort to an exceptional level of efficiency, and also the company must 

Ehricke’s unique creative talents to the fullest degree possible for originating new products, j

he originated the Centaur.”12 Hansen’s integrity and calm leadership style earned the resp

those with whom he worked, both inside the company and within NASA.

The reorganization, called “projectization,” gave Hansen more direct control and freedo

build an organization from the ground up. “We had some very good engineers,” he said. “I 

hand-pick the best ones to be part of the Centaur project, and I did that. So we had peop

Red Lightbown and many others who were the best engineers that Convair had.”13 G

Dynamics assigned 1,000 employees to the project. They took over a building vacated by o

the Atlas groups. To assist Hansen in implementing the change to a project structure, the com

hired a consulting firm, Robert Heller and Associates. 

In a letter to Marshall program director Hans Hueter, Jim Dempsey emphasized ho

reorganization would improve Centaur operations: “Such an organization change cannot of 

automatically solve all the problems, but can serve as an effective tool for improving attent

the program, facilitating effective internal communications, clarifying responsibility and auth

speeding up program activity, and identifying team relationships and appropriate communic

channels with the Marshall Space Flight Center and the General Dynamics/NASA o

Dempsey assured Hueter that the new launch date would not be delayed by this reorganiza

In an appended memo to Hueter, Dempsey assured him that Atlas expertise would be 

able to Centaur. The Atlas launch team at the Atlantic Missile Range would not on

responsible for Atlas, but would also act as a subcontractor for Centaur. Dempsey further as

Hueter that engineers with Atlas knowledge and experience were being transferred to Ce

In addition, Hansen would participate in Dempsey’s daily staff meeting. Atlas reports wou

distributed to Centaur personnel, and Centaur personnel would participate in the Atlas 

neering change board reviews. Dempsey acknowledged that one of the weaknesses of a p

36 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

11 Interview with Grant Hansen (former employee of General Dynamics) by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2000.

12 “FYI: Reorganization for Project Centaur,” 29 January 1962, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

13 Interview with Grant Hansen by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2000.

14 J. R. Dempsey to Hans Hueter, 12 February 1962, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
organization, as opposed to one that was organized in functional groups, was its isolation withi

the company. He assured Hueter that Centaur top management would make a special effort t

stress a “cross feed of learning.” He wanted Marshall representatives to “have maximum vis

bility into [General Dynamics/Astronautics] Centaur operations so that they have ever

opportunity to aid in ferreting problems.”15

To implement more rational schedule planning and control, NASA insisted that Genera

Dynamics adopt Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Companion Co

reporting. PERT, a time-/cost-management tool first used by the Navy to develop the Polar

missile, was adopted by NASA in late 1961 to impose discipline on the management of large pro

ects by developing a master schedule for every task of the program and tracking progress. Eac

department head was responsible for accomplishing a specified task within an allotted timeframe

Dempsey assured Hueter, “We have adopted the attitude that any schedule slippages not directl

assignable to a[n] unforeseeable technical development problem are indicators of lack of compe

tence on the part of either the Schedule Planning and Control personnel or the responsibl

function line managers.”16

Dempsey expected everyone in the organization to think in terms of systems engineering

“Each part must be designed, each procedure written, each test planned and accomplished with fu

recognition of how that effort fits into the total picture and with concern for the implications upo

all other elements of the system.”17 To strengthen systems engineering at General Dynamics, Dean

Davis was given more control. As Deputy Program Director for Technical Control, he was respon

sible for all technical planning and integration. At the same time, design engineering under William

Radcliffe was broadened to include system design engineering. Centaur design personnel draw

from design groups throughout the company were organized into nine specialized design group

such as propulsion, structures, and guidance. Hansen believed that the move from matrix to projec

management was just in time. Without this reorganization, the program would have been canceled

“I knew that I had to get the problem solved, and get it working successfully, or NASA was goin

to slam the door on us,” he said.18

But the change from matrix to project management without any real effort to control th

program by Marshall could not solve all of Centaur’s problems. In Hansen’s view, von Braun “jus

sort of pushed it into a backroom and let it be handled by Hans Hueter.” Hueter had served a

Chief Test Engineer at Peenemünde, emigrating to the United States with the other members o

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 3

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Attachment to letter to H. Hueter from J. R. Dempsey, 12 February 1962, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Referen

Collection. 

18 Interview with Grant Hansen by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2000.
the von Braun team in 1945. His German background did not prepare him for the en

different engineering philosophy at General Dynamics. The two cultures inevitably clashed. 

Deane Davis’s perspective:

To the Huntsville people the methods and philosophies of the Atlas and Centaur were a

mysterious as the dark side of the Moon. On the Astronautics side, still riding the cres

of their brilliant success with the Atlas, and with no reason to believe that the Centau

would prove to be any different, the new Centaur people resented what they felt wa

undue interference in their established manner of creating, producing, and operatin

their product. After all, they said repeatedly, the Atlas and Centaur were their inven

tions.19

Unlike most of the Germans on the project, Hueter was actually loved and respected 

“unruly wards at Astronautics.” Hueter had the impossible task of reconciling what Davis co

ered to be two diametrically opposed design and administrative approaches. Shortly aft

program was transferred to Marshall, the Convair plant in San Diego was “deluged 

Huntsville personnel attempting to understand their new creature.” Apparently, whenev

Germans came to San Diego, Atlas designer Charlie Bossart always tried to keep a low p

During one visit, the Germans took a tour of the plant and visited the Sycamore Canyon hot-

testing facility. Then they all sat down for a late-day briefing. Trouble began when Bossart and 

Mrazek, von Braun’s Structural Section Chief, began to argue in loud whispers. Their voices 

to rise over the subject of the rocket’s structure. “Charlie was trying to explain its merits to a 

lieving Mrazek and from experience I knew that the only solution was to get those two gent

separated from the briefings so they could have at it.”20

Bossart led Mrazek out into the factory yard, where a Centaur tank stood gleaming 

sunlight. Mrazek asked, “What’s inside it?” To which Bossart responded, “Nitrogen.” Nit

was used for pressurization until the rocket was filled with its liquid-hydrogen/liquid-o

propellants just prior to launch. Without pressurization, the thin skin of the rocket would 

wrinkle, then collapse. Mrazek, familiar with the solid, reinforced walls of rockets designed b

von Braun team, was perplexed by Bossart’s insistence that nitrogen, kept at the relatively low 

sure of 8 to 10 pounds per square inch, was sufficient to keep the tank rigid. 

He also questioned how such a thin, unbuttressed structure could be strong enough to c

rocket aloft. To quell Mrazek’s doubts, Bossart invited him to take a sledge hammer and give th

a whack. Failing to put even the slightest dent in the tank, he tried again, this time giving th

of the tank a glancing blow that caused the sledge hammer to fly out of his hand, knocking his g

38 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

19 Deane Davis, “Seeing Is Believing, or, How the Atlas Rocket Hit Back,” Spaceflight 25 (5 May 1983): 196–198.

20 Ibid.
off, but again leaving the surface unscathed. Although this test may have proved the strength of th

balloon structure, it did nothing to endear General Dynamics to Mrazek or win the von Brau

group’s faith in the ability of Centaur to lift an expensive spacecraft into space.21

Shortly after the reorganization of the program, the Aerophysics Group at General Dynamic

began to tackle the aerodynamics of the integration of the two rockets. This was a major undertakin

that Don Lesney realized would be of enormous importance to the success of Centaur. In addition t

a big interstage adapter to connect Atlas with Centaur, the vehicle carried a 10-foot-diameter payloa

fairing. What concerned Lesney was whether the middle of the vehicle was strong enough to with

stand the aerodynamic stresses caused by flying through the wind. The vehicle was double the lengt

of the original Atlas ICBM. Questions such as how thick to make the skin on Atlas and how muc

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 3

21 Ibid.

Diagram of RL10 engine: Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen are pumped through tubes toward the engine’s thrust chamber. Liquid

hydrogen cools the walls of the thrust chamber while it picks up heat and becomes gaseous. The engine’s unique “expander cycle,” in

which a small amount of gaseous hydrogen in the exhaust stream flows backward to drive the pumps of turbine, can be seen in the

center of the diagram. (Courtesy of Pratt & Whitney)

Turbine

Expander Cycle

Thrust Chamser

Pumps
pressurization was necessary to keep it structurally intact could only be solved through testing. L

recalled that because his Huntsville counterparts never returned his calls, he was unable to get th

ahead for wind-tunnel studies.22 Management of RL10 engine development by the von Braun 

produced similar tensions, although it saw the potential of the RL10 as the propulsion system fo

of Saturn’s upper stages. In contrast, it seemed to want little to do with the upper stage launch v

for which the RL10 was originally designed.

Troubles at Pratt & Whitney

Pratt & Whitney’s engineers had developed confidence in handling liquid hydrogen 

during Project Suntan. They relished the prospect of contributing this new expertise to the 

program. However, Pratt & Whitney was a turbojet engine manufacturer and had no prior 

rience in designing a rocket engine. The company had signed a contract with the Air Fo

mid-October 1958 to develop the RL10 engine—an engine whose innovative design 

outstanding reliability would earn the designation of historic engineering landmark from 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1979. Since the 304 turbojet engine the

designed for Suntan was air-breathing, the first hurdle was the choice of oxidizer. Originall

company’s engineers favored fluorine because of its superior efficiency, but fluorine prov

corrosive and volatile that they settled on liquid oxygen. The turbopump designed for th

dictated the RL10’s original 15,000-pound thrust rating.23

Initially, Pratt & Whitney engineers did not try to adapt the unique expander cycle 

304 to the RL10. Early designs, based on the conventional gas generator cycle, required a 

rate combustion chamber to start the turbopumps. A suggestion from Perry Pratt

company’s chief engineer, led the design team back to the elegant simplicity of the 304. In

of fighting against the inherent properties of liquid hydrogen, the expander cycle made 

intrinsic to the design.24

The engine was designed and built at the company’s factory in East Hartford, Conne

Testing took place at the company’s new Florida Research and Development Center. The RL1

team reveled in the freedom from interference it enjoyed in this remote swampland near West 

Beach. By July 1959, they had completed 230 successful firings in a horizontal test stand. The 

started, stopped, and restarted with surprising reliability. By November, the technical pro

appeared to be nearly solved—not so the escalating costs of developing the new engine. 

Prior to contracting with NASA, Pratt & Whitney government contracts had always 

fixed-price. With this type of contract, any cost overruns had to be assumed by the company

40 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

22 Interview with Don Lesney, 5 June 2000.

23 Joel E. Tucker, “The History of the RL 10 Upper-Stage Rocket Engine, 1956–1980,” published in History of Liquid Rocke

Development in the United States, 1955–1980, ed. Stephen E. Doyle, AAS History Series, vol. 13 (San Diego: AAS, 1992), 123–

24 Mulready, Advanced Engine Development, 60.
Marshall’s Unruly Wards 4

NASA engineers Ali Mansour and Ned Hannum review test results of Pratt & Whitney’s RL10 engine at Lewis Research Center,

1963. (NASA C-64329)
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the RL10 allowed the company to bill for additional develop

costs when they ran into unforeseen problems. Initially, Mulready apparently neglected to s

all the design changes to NASA, simply addressing the problems as they arose. “We had not le

to wait and put changes into the contract. It was noticed that Convair, which was an old ha

the cost-plus business, tended to ‘keep its head down and point left’ in times of trouble.”25 

Pratt & Whitney began to bill for design changes, costs escalated. Mulready recalled how a

dressing-down at NASA Headquarters, he returned to Florida determined to cut costs. Con

after one hundred successful test firings that the engine was extremely reliable, he cancele

equipment for the ignition system—a decision he later regretted. Only one engineer chall

him, claiming that data revealed that the “engine was not lighting on the same spark every ti

Mulready dismissed this objection as ludicrous.

Meanwhile, Lewis Research Center became deeply involved in the development of the 

engine. Lewis had previously developed a regeneratively cooled fuel/oxidizer injector that s

as the basis for the engine’s injector design. Pratt & Whitney engineers added a textured s

of special aluminum mesh called Rigi-Mesh that facilitated cooling.27 NASA Headquarte

only asked Lewis engineers to assist Pratt & Whitney in troubleshooting, but also wanted th

develop an in-house competency that would be useful in monitoring the work of the contr

In March 1960, the Center initiated a 10-month test program with three RL10 engines. In 

tion to providing a check on contractor performance, this testing yielded a complete al

evaluation of the propulsion system.28 By November, Lewis engineers had completed 

successful firings of the engine in the altitude wind tunnel. In recognizing the contributio

Lewis Research Center, Ostrander wrote, “The Lewis staff assistance, which is based on an e

sive technical base and on unique experience in handling these propellants in similar equip

has been and is invaluable.”29

After a series of tests of the engine in the horizontal position, Pratt & Whitney ini

tests of two engines in October 1960 in a new vertical test stand called E-5 at the comp

Florida test center. The engine would actually be flown in the vertical position, so thes

tests were especially important. The first test went as planned, but during the second tes

engine exploded. Investigation suggested that the explosion could be attributed to a hum

procedural error. Nevertheless, the mishap caused the Centaur launch schedule to slip 

42 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

25 Mulready, 76.

26 Ibid. 

27 Mulready, 70. See also Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, 191–193; Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, 134–140; Tucker, “History of RL 10

28 Centaur Propulsion System Testing, Contract NAS9-2691, Pratt & Whitney, 7 December 1962, Vol. 1, Box 59, Ol

Records (Goette files), DEB vault, NASA Glenn.

29 General Don R. Ostrander to Eugene Mangeniello, 23 June 1961, Box 254, RG 255, NARA, Chicago, IL.
December 1961. At this point, the engine also had thrust-control problems, in addition t

hydrogen leakage rates in excess of specifications. Pratt & Whitney fixed the damaged tes

stand and resumed testing on 12 January 1961. 

After the engine exploded a second time during an important demonstration to Air Forc

and NASA officials in the spring of 1961, Mulready immediately ordered the igniter test rig h

had previously canceled. Testing determined that in the horizontal position, a small amount o

liquid oxygen, previously unnoticed, flowed back toward the spark, mixing with the hydroge

gas. In the horizontal position, this facilitated ignition, but in the vertical position, gravity cu

down the backflow of oxygen, thereby preventing the firing of the engine. The installation of a

oxygen feed line to the igniter solved the problem. On 24 April 1961, two RL10 engines success

fully completed their first full-duration test on the E-5 test stand. 

Von Braun used the two engine explosions as his cue to take a more assertive role in manage

ment of the contractor. (He called this “penetrating” the contractor.) Marshall engine speciali

Leonard C. Bostwick insisted on regular meetings and a formal development plan—something th

fiercely independent Pratt & Whitney engineers found disruptive and inappropriate. Mulread

wrote, “The rapid growth of the RL10 technology, which was totally new in so many dimension

could not have happened with the formality that NASA sought.”30

But working with NASA proved to be a positive experience for Pratt & Whitney in man

ways. Although its engineers were enormously competent turbojet designers, they benefite

from the rocket expertise of the Marshall and Lewis teams. For example, at Pratt & Whitney

turbojet engines were always given a manual countdown. NASA insisted on automated tes

stands. “The gentle nature of the RL10, which operates similarly to a jet engine, was the onl

reason that Pratt & Whitney was able to use the old system as long as it did,” Mulread

admitted.31

In November of 1961, the Air Force contracts with Pratt & Whitney were transferred t

Marshall. By May of 1962, the RL10 engine had completed over 700 hot firings. It proved to b

so reliable that Marshall chose to power the Saturn S-IV stage with six RL10 engines. When calle

to testify at the Centaur hearings in May 1962, Bruce Torel asserted proudly that all of the deve

opment problems of the “free world’s first liquid hydrogen rocket engine” had been solved.32 H

was correct, although Pratt & Whitney would have to wait more than a year for General Dynamic

to solve many of Centaur’s technical problems before the RL10 would fly.

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 4

30 Mulready, 83. 

31 Ibid. 

32 Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings, 111
Launch Operations at the Cape

At Cape Canaveral, launch operations for unpiloted vehicles were located at the At

Missile Range east of the Banana River. This area under Air Force control originally containe

launch pad for Atlas-Centaur, referred to as Pad 36A. In addition to the first pad, a second 

36B, was completed in the mid-1960s. A Central Control Building, situated a safe distance 

the launch sites, housed the Air Force range safety officers. They were responsible for all 

support, including destroying a vehicle if it suddenly veered off course. 

Initially, Marshall managed Atlas-Agena, Atlas-Centaur, and Thor-Agena launch oper

at the Cape. This included all robotic scientific and applications missions except Delta, whic

under the control of Goddard Space Flight Center. Goddard personnel at the Cape were all f

Vanguard rocket people. General Dynamics was responsible for integrating Centaur with 

while JPL was responsible for integrating the spacecraft with the launch vehicle. 

Building AE, previously a staging area for Air Force missiles, played an important r

prelaunch operations. Oran Nicks had the former hangar air-conditioned. Nicks rema

“While prelaunch checkout facilities steadily became less ramshackle, it was 1964 before we 

begin to treat our interplanetary travelers with the care they deserved.”33 A cleanroom was 

onto the rear of the building that was later used for the installation of Centaur shrouds.

Everyone at the Cape during the early NASA years was learning. James Womack, one of th

NASA staff at the Cape, recalled that he was familiar with more conventional propellants bu

never worked with liquid hydrogen. Because the Cape operations staff knew little about 

hydrogen, they attended the required safety lectures. They were cautioned that since hyd

produces no visible flames during combustion, they should take a broom along every time they 

near a hydrogen line. If the broom did not burst into flames, it was considered safe to proceed. 

quickly realized that this precaution was not necessary; although liquid hydrogen required atte

ness and respect, it was considerably less volatile than they had been led to believe.34

Roger Lynch was one of the first Convair employees assigned to Cape Canaveral in early 

A graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy who had joined General Dynamics in 

Lynch’s first job at the company was at Sycamore Canyon. He was asked by Ken Newton to go 

Cape to ready the Atlas-Agena launch site in preparation for the launch of the Ranger series of 

shots. He was transferred to Pad 36 in anticipation of the launch of the first Atlas-Centaur. 

During that time, Lynch observed the early maneuverings of the Marshall Space Flight C

engineers as they began to make their presence felt at the Cape. They were in the proc

installing the large Saturn bureaucracy on the other side of the Banana River (at the site la

be known as Kennedy Space Center) under Kurt Debus. Relations with the Air Forc

44 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

33 Oran Nicks, Far Travelers, 82.

34 Interview with Jim Womack by Virginia Dawson, 11 November 1999.
Marshall were strained because the Air Force was determined to maintain control of robotic oper

ations. General Dynamics managed a launch site under the distant supervision of Marsha

personnel. Initially, the Marshall people did not take much interest in the preparations at Pad 36

As the date of the first launch approached, Roger Lynch became aware of the contempt o

Marshall engineers for the pressure-stabilized design of Atlas and Centaur. 

We had come out of a very successful major ballistic weapons system program with technology that was foreign to Marshall. Our monocoque structure was considered high risk.

They took exception to all aspects of the vehicle design. It was different in every way

possible from what they were starting to design for Saturn. I was in a meeting at

Huntsville when it was admitted that even Saturn, for all of its structure, would collapse

in flight without internal tank pressure. Over drinks, they admitted that it made little

sense to fly all that structure. The real reason for their design was a passion for vertical

check-out.35

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 4

Wernher von Braun anxiously monitors the launch of a Pioneer 4 spececraft for a lunar flyby using a Juno II, 1959. 

(NASA 9131491)

35 Letter from Roger C. Lynch to Virginia Dawson, dated 4 June 2000.
Lynch observed that Marshall engineers were equally conservative with respect to ele

systems. They preferred old-fashioned relays and vacuum tubes. Their junction boxes w

heavy that he thought they belonged on a battleship, not a spaceship. General Dynamic

Honeywell designers were pushing the state of the art with much lighter solid-state electr

although components often proved unreliable. 

The von Braun team was also critical of the ground support equipment used by G

Dynamics. At this time, Atlas and Centaur were considered two distinct systems w

minimum interface. Servicing the two systems was more complicated than it would have 

if an integrated system had been designed from scratch. A whole new vacuum technolog

included the design of large valves and transfer lines had to be developed for liquid hydr

General Dynamics engineer Denny Huber recalled that the design of the vacuum insu

posed quality-control problems and limited the number of suppliers willing to bid on vac

system hardware. “If a potential supplier had no capability to handle liquid hydrogen, his d

approach was at risk.”36

Because it was the first time the two vehicles had been mated together, the General Dyn

launch team was inundated with “fierce and unpredictable” design changes.37 This was intol

to the Huntsville team, which worked from more detailed specifications and left little roo

adjustments by the contractor at the launch site. Von Braun may have been referring to the ch

situation at Pad 36 when he observed that it was “better to build a rocket in the factory th

the launch pad.”38

The Failure of F-1, the First Atlas-Centaur Launch

Liquid-hydrogen leakage, in addition to guidance and engine problems, kept Atlas-Ce

sitting like a lone sentinel over the Cape’s broad expanse of beach from October 1961 throug

following spring. Finally, it was ready. On 8 May, F-1 lifted off into the clear Florida skies 

maiden voyage. As an eyewitness in the crowded blockhouse reported, “While the elated eng

were shaking hands and congratulating each other the vehicle reached plus 54 seconds in

mission, and a sudden yell of ‘Missile blew up! Missile blew up!’ came from one of the obs

at the periscopes.”39 Two seconds later, the vehicle was completely obscured by a massive fi

fueled by thousands of gallons of liquid hydrogen and kerosene fuel. NASA quickly determ

that Centaur was the cause. Aerodynamic pressure on the cover protecting the insulation (

46 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

36 E-mail communication from Denny Huber to Ed Bock, 30 March 2002. 

37 Letter from Roger C. Lynch to Virginia Dawson, dated 4 June 2000.

38 Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990 (Wash

DC: NASA SP-4313, 1999), 39–51.

39 Joseph Green and Fuller C. Jones, 8–41. 
the weather shield at that time) had caused it to burst, ripping away the insulation and exposin

the walls of the fuel tank to the heat of the atmosphere. Pressure buildup in the tank from th

boiling off of the liquid hydrogen caused the fuel tank to rupture, spilling volatile liquid hydroge

down the sides of the rocket, where it was ignited by a spark from the engine. The loss of Centau

was a serious setback for NASA. 

The aborted first flight of Centaur put NASA on the defensive. The House Subcommittee o

Space Sciences, headed by Joseph Karth (D-Minnesota), called for a probe. Karth questione

whether Centaur was a key to the nation’s future rocket propulsion needs or simply an increasingl

expensive national liability. The troubled Centaur program had implications for national securit

Four and one-half years after Sputnik, American rocket propulsion technology still lagged behin

that of the Soviet Union.40 Centaur had been billed as an important new propulsion technology. I

failure reinforced the perception of American technical inferiority. Now, with Centaur considere

the key to a soft landing on the Moon, the subcommittee needed reassurance that the spac

program was still on track. Spokesmen for General Dynamics, Pratt & Whitney, and Marsha

Space Flight Center knew that this was by no means a routine investigation. The fate of th

Centaur program hung in the balance. 

Given the enormous technical and managerial challenges involved in developing this new

technology, the failure of F-1 seemed almost inevitable. However, the timing was unfortunate

The Soviet Union had already succeeded in crash-landing two lunar vehicles on the Moon, whil

five attempts by the United States Ranger vehicles had all failed. Both Ranger and Surveyor wer

needed to provide scientific data on radiation, magnetic fields surrounding the Moon, and th

Moon’s surface topography. The Ranger failures, compounded by the aborted flight of F-1, force

NASA to consider whether the beleaguered Centaur program should be canceled. 

Wernher von Braun and Hans Hueter admitted that Marshall had inadequately supervise

General Dynamics, but they blamed the laissez-faire approach of the Air Force, which had allowe

the program to evolve without adequate oversight. Von Braun thought that in-house competenc

by the government and complete control over contractors was the only way to avoid developmen

problems. He stated: 

I think the general lesson we have learned from Centaur management is probably that

one should never underestimate the magnitude of a program where so many new and

unproven ideas are tried out and I think we will always get in difficulties, as a

Government agency, unless we build up a competence in the Government that we can

really stay on top of the problems right from the outset and learn how to identify potential problem areas before we have explosions and fires and setbacks.41

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 4

40 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th edition (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc

1997), p. 192.

41 Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings, 59.
Marshall had taken over management from the Air Force after many of the important d

decisions had already been made. Von Braun admitted that they had not “penetrated” the pro

sufficiently. “The only excuse one can have for it is that it started out as a little explo

program and grew and grew and grew into a major program, and it wasn’t intended that way 

the outset.”42

Marshall’s approach to contracting with industry differed radically from that of th

Force. Von Braun was used to designing, building, and testing a rocket prototype before tu

it over to an industry contractor for closely supervised production.43 The “everything-under

roof approach” had prevailed at Peenemünde. It dovetailed with the U.S. Army arsenal trad

of weapons development. Von Braun believed that to manage contractors properly m

exerting control over every aspect of testing and manufacture. Marshall furnished its contr

with detailed design requirements and monitored their operations closely, assigning as mu

10 percent of its staff in the 1960s to resident offices.44 In contrast, the Air Force, beca

lacked extensive in-house expertise, allowed its industry contractors to develop designs and 

pendently work out solutions to problems. 

But more than management bothered von Braun. He had serious reservations about the 

design of Centaur. He made it clear that Marshall Space Flight Center would never have tol

the balloon structure. He called the approach that General Dynamics had taken imaginativ

risky. “In order to save a few pounds, they have elected to use some rather, shall we say, ma

solutions where you are bound to buy a few headaches before you get it over with. Ultimately 

you are successful you have a real advanced solution.” But von Braun did not believe 

Centaur would ever be successful. Referring specifically to the Centaur pressurized tan

said, “It is a great weightsaver, but it is also a continuous pain in the neck.”45 He poin

declared that industry contractors would not have the same design freedom when it cam

Saturn development. “We are really making an all-out effort to stick together wit

contractor before major design decisions are even made and have our men argue with his 

as to whether this is really the way to go.”46

Krafft Ehricke and Grant Hansen defended the technical decisions that determ

rocket structure and fuel choice. A modest person without the aristocratic pretension

confidence of von Braun, Hansen admitted that he was rather frightened when call

48 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

42 Ibid.

43 On the arsenal approach, see Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic 

Era (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 108.

44 Andrew Waring, Power to Explore, 39–51.

45 Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings, 58–59.

46 Ibid., 59.
Marshall’s Unruly Wards 4

testify. But he said to himself, “All I’ve got to do is tell the truth, and convince them tha

we’re understanding the problem and are working it and it should go away.”47 Given the cos

overruns and delays, he found the legislators’ concerns to be justified: “When a program 

that far behind schedule and costs that much money and blows up on the launch pad, the

owe it to the public to hold a hearing to find out what’s going on, and whether or not thes

programs should be continued or not.” Asked at the hearing about the difference in desig

philosophy between General Dynamics and Huntsville, Hansen agreed that Huntsville’s wa

more conservative. In contrast to the 35-percent margin of safety the von Braun team spec

ified in its contracts, the contract between General Dynamics and the Air Force allowed 

25-percent margin. He explained, “We are inclined, I think, to be willing to take a little b

more of a design gamble to achieve a significant improvement, whereas I think the

[Huntsville] build somewhat more conservatively.”48 To designers at General Dynamics, th

pressure-stabilized tank may have been a “design gamble,” but its advantages made it on

worth taking.

Although no longer in charge of the program, Krafft Ehricke vigorously defended th

design, pointing out that the pressure-stabilized tank was also used on Atlas, a rocket deeme

reliable enough to send Mercury astronaut John Glenn into orbit around Earth. In Centaur, th

pressure-stabilized tank design optimized the unique characteristics of liquid hydrogen—its low

density and extreme cold. The result was a dramatic savings in weight, always the driving facto

behind any successful rocket design. Ehricke also strongly defended the use of liquid-hydroge

fuel. He admitted that hydrogen leakage through minute holes in the welds had proved 

problem, but not an intractable one: “We have definitely in this particular case, if I might sa

so, gambled at a very low weight and found that we have to correct ourselves.”49 At anothe

point in his testimony, he said, “Hydrogen itself has turned out to be less of a culprit than man

thought initially. Hydrogen, like all chemical fluids behaves fine if you know its little ‘idiosyn

crasies’ and treat it correctly. But you have to go through a development program such as our

first.”50

To Ehricke, Centaur provided an example of a transition from the development of 

strategic weapon to a launch vehicle for the peaceful exploration of space.51 A launch vehicl

required far greater thrust and reliability than a missile. He pointed out that in addition to th

pioneering work by General Dynamics on liquid hydrogen, the company was breaking new

47 Interview with Grant Hansen by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2000.

48 Centaur Program, 1962 Hearings, 95.

49 Ibid., 97.

50 Ibid., 69.

51 Ibid., 67–68.
ground in important technical areas, such as restarting the vehicle after an extended co

zero gravity. Centaur also represented a transition stage in government contracting. Cen

management problems had proved that the Air Force’s hands-off model of contract ma

ment was not appropriate for a civilian agency. 

Ehricke thought that many of the troubles with Centaur could be attributed to the fact 

had never been accorded the national priority classification it deserved. Centaur was just as im

tant to the national space program as the piloted space programs—Mercury, Saturn 

Apollo—which all had DX priority (the highest national priority in the procurement of mate

Indeed, President Kennedy’s announcement in May 1961 that the nation would put a m

the Moon within a decade made it imperative that Centaur succeed in sending Surveyor to 

land on the Moon. Lack of DX priority had made it more difficult to obtain parts 

contractors in a timely manner. Ehricke said, “Like other space programs, Centaur was to 

as it went along. However, unlike Mercury and Saturn, Centaur could never attain DX pr

although its contributions are as much a cornerstone of our future space capability as th

a manned space capsule and a high thrust booster.”52 The other constraint was the limi

imposed on Centaur by the requirement that it be designed using off-the-shelf parts 

belonged to Atlas. Although this saved money, it led to design compromises.

After the Centaur hearings, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics issued a re

The committee emphasized Centaur’s importance to the space program: the new vehicle was n

to “fill the performance gap between the Atlas-Agena and the Saturn class vehicles for space miss

It had been assigned important programs by both NASA and the Department of Defense. A

twelve operational Centaurs a year had been planned to accomplish these missions. The comm

noted that in addition to mission responsibilities, Centaur had an important role in researc

development because “virtually all upper stages of large future space vehicles, both chemica

nuclear, are presently intended to utilize hydrogen as fuel.” Centaur would provide essential inf

tion on the handling, storage, and firing of liquid hydrogen. “In short, Centaur is perform

technical pioneering function which is considered vital to the future of much of the Nation’s 

effort.”54 That effort included the piloted flight to the Moon as the third stage of the Saturn 

Without liquid-hydrogen upper stages, the weight of the hardware needed to accomplish the A

mission would double. In reviewing the history of the program, the report revealed that in the su

of 1960, NASA had enhanced the importance of Centaur to the space program when it funded 

projects that used liquid hydrogen, such as the Rover nuclear rocket and the upper stages of the S

50 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

52 Ibid., 68.

53 House Committee on Science and Astronautics, “Centaur Launch Vehicle Development Program,” Report 1959, su

by George P. Miller, 87th Congress, 2 July 1962.

54 Centaur Report, 2 July 1962, 2.
and Nova vehicles. Given the program importance of Centaur, the committee demanded to know wh

it had not been assigned DX priority. 

The committee placed much of the blame for Centaur’s troubles on General Dynamics. 

concluded that because of General Dynamics’s preoccupation with the Atlas ICBM program

Centaur had not received the company’s full attention. Until the reorganization under Gran

Hansen, the company had resisted pressure from NASA to address managerial problems. Th

committee was especially critical of the company’s failure to anticipate the problem with th

liquid-hydrogen leakage in the intermediate bulkhead until after manufacture and shipment t

the Cape. This “fundamental mistake in cryogenics engineering” should have been discovere

much earlier through testing. The committee also criticized General Dynamics’s carelessness i

the location of test stands. A second Centaur had been damaged when an Atlas on a nearby tes

stand exploded. 

But the committee’s indictment was not limited to the contractor. It was also critical o

Headquarters and Marshall for “weak and ineffective” management. They had allowed personne

responsible for the program to rely on troubleshooting as difficulties arose, rather than antic

pating them. The delay of Centaur had compromised important missions like the Air Force

Advent Program. It was necessary to launch NASA’s Mariner payload on the less powerful Agena

Surveyor, originally to weigh 2,500 pounds, had to be redesigned for a lower weight of 2,10

pounds, at a loss of $20 million to taxpayers. 

What particularly galled the committee was the failure to reconcile the differences in desig

philosophy between Marshall and General Dynamics, especially as it related to the thickness o

the intermediate bulkhead. The report stated:

The subcommittee would not presume to decide the technical question of what constitutes a proper margin of safety in rocket construction, though the evidence seems to

indicate that a more conservative policy might have saved both time and money in the

Centaur development program. While it may not be possible to draw a final conclusion

to the effect that one design philosophy is right and another is wrong, it is obvious that

only one can prevail. The subcommittee considers it inconsistent for the major industrial

contractor to adhere to one approach while the Government agency responsible for direction of the same development program adheres to another. Further, the subcommittee

considers it important that industrial contractors follow agency specification, policies,

and recommendations immediately upon becoming aware of them.55

The subcommittee recommended a thorough reevaluation of the program by NASA, includin

a resolution of the question of DX priority. Finally, it ordered an investigation of General Dynamics

billing by the General Accounting Office to find out whether “the interests of the Government hav

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 5

55 Ibid., 13.
been adequately protected under the contracts.”56 Of all NASA programs at that time, only Ce

and Surveyor had received this level of intense scrutiny and censure.

A Key Decision

Although the House Committee Report stopped short of recommending cancellation 

Centaur program, pressure was building within NASA to abandon the troubled liquid-hyd

upper stage. Opposition to the Centaur program came chiefly from MSFC and JPL. Both C

had earned reputations as preeminent authorities in questions related to rocket propulsio

spacecraft development. Their opinions carried weight with Congress and the American p

Von Braun and Brian Sparks, Deputy Director of JPL, were working behind the scenes to m

a campaign for the cancellation of Centaur in favor the Saturn C-1-Agena. 

NASA Headquarters refused to give in to this pressure because of the high priority of Ce

within NASA. A memo from the Deputy Associate Administrator to Robert Seamans unequiv

stated that Centaur was needed to support Saturn development and carry out NASA’s robotic 

tary missions. The solution was not cancellation, but new management: “For the Centaur to su

52 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

56 Ibid., 12.

Centaur Assembly line at General Dynamics, 1962. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
NASA must have a capable project management team to direct its efforts and to direct the contractor.”

As a first step, NASA named Vincent Johnson Centaur program manager in June 1962. Johnson, 

graduate of the University of Minnesota, had served as a physicist at the Naval Ordnance Laborator

during World War II. After a career in the Navy Bureau of Weapons, he came to NASA in 1960 a

program manager for the Scout, Delta, and Centaur launch vehicles. In 1964, Johnson became directo

of the launch vehicle and propulsion programs in the Office of Space Science and Applications, wher

he remained until 1967. In Johnson, Centaur gained the undivided attention of a capable Headquarte

executive with a firm grasp of engineering. 

Johnson and Homer Newell immediately approached Abe Silverstein to see whether Lew

Research Center would be willing to take over the troubled program. Silverstein had played 

signal role in shaping NASA under Glennan, but when James Webb took over as NASA

Administrator in 1961, Silverstein’s influence at Headquarters began to wane. After the decisio

to fund the giant Saturn V rocket for a piloted lunar landing, Webb wrestled with the decision o

whom to choose to head the Apollo program. The two top candidates were Silverstein and vo

Braun. Webb passed over von Braun, reputedly because of the adamant opposition of his Deput

Administrator, Hugh Dryden. Put off by Silverstein’s autocratic management style and his insis

tence on having complete control of the Apollo program, Webb asked Brainerd Holmes of th

Radio Corporation of America to head the program. Silverstein accepted the post of Director o

Lewis Research Center.58

Silverstein returned to Cleveland in November 1961, shortly before fellow Ohioan John Glenn

historic flight. During the nearly four years Silverstein had been away, Lewis Research Center ha

vacillated between whether to go after a significant piece of the space program or continue to focu

on its forte—aircraft propulsion research. Many engineers feared that the quality and autonomy o

their research might be compromised by the pressures of managing space missions, while other

fumed that the Center would be left out of exciting developments in the new field of rocket propu

sion. One engineer warned that JPL was aggressively expanding its rocket activities, particularly i

cryogenics. “These programs,” he wrote, “smack of the same concepts as have been pursued b

[Lewis] with hydrogen-fluorine. JPL is also in a dither to get into development of electrical propu

sion devices.”59

Silverstein ended the debate through a sweeping reorganization. He divided the laborator

into two parts, making Bruce Lundin Associate Director for Development and Eugen

Manganiello Associate Director for Research. For the next fifteen years, Lundin played a pivota

role in the management of Center space programs. Lundin had served as head of the Engin

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 5

57 Thomas F. Dixon to Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 19 September 1962, Centaur file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

58 Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 108.

59 Report by Howard Douglass, “The NASA Advanced Technology Programs for Liquid and Solid Propellant Rocket Engines,”1

January 1962, RG 255, NARA, Box 254.
Research Division in charge of testing full-scale turbojet and ramjet engines from 1952 to 

He was enthusiastically behind the effort to win a major piece of the space program. The 

ganization was intended to keep research and development entirely separate. By March 

the development side of the laboratory was growing by leaps and bounds. Bruce Lundin se

centralized office to handle technical support for four chemical rocket development program

M-1 engine for a proposed giant Nova rocket by Walter Dankhoff, the J-2 engine for Satu

Ward Wilcox, the F-1 engine by Fred Wilcox, and the RL10 engine for Centaur by E

Baughman.60 

In August 1962, Vince Johnson called Silverstein and Lundin to Headquarters to ask wh

they were willing to take over management of the entire Centaur program. Lundin recalled 

they were not particularly enthusiastic: “Abe said, ‘Well someone’s got to do it,’ and I said, 

we’ll do our best.’”61 The decision to move Centaur from Marshall proved controversial. There 

technical, organizational, financial, and political problems. “Everybody at Lewis thought we 

crazy to take that on because it was such a headache,” said Bruce Lundin.62 The task was m

mental, and “everything that could be wrong was present.” 

Outsiders shared this opinion. An article in the Washington Evening Star viewed the transfer 

“action that smacked of desperation.”63 Journalist William Hines further wrote, “In its failure to 

deadlines, specifications and cost estimates, Centaur has poorly qualified for the title of Spac

Turkey No. 1.” He thought it unlikely that even with a DX priority could Centaur be develop

time to prove useful for either the robotic space program or the program in planetary sci

Because of Centaur program delays, NASA had to send the first Mariner probe on Agena

reduction in the amount of weight the launch vehicle could carry made Mariner “an engin

triumph but a scientific starveling.” Reflecting the “unspoken opinion” of many people i

aerospace community that Centaur would be “obsolete before it flies,” the journalist favored 

the Saturn C-1 for future scientific missions. He questioned whether another “stripped-d

Mariner would be worth flying to Mars. Bad press and skeptical Congressmen would contin

dog Centaur even after the first Surveyor touched down on the Moon.

Even after Silverstein had agreed to take over the program, von Braun and Sparks cont

to urge cancellation of Centaur. In correspondence with Headquarters,64 von Braun and S

54 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

60 Bruce Lundin to Associate Director, Lewis Research Center, “Centralization of the Center’s Technical Support to C

Rocket Development Program,” 7 March 1962, RG 255, NARA, Box 254. The J-2 and the M-1 engine for Nova bo

liquid-hydrogen fuel. Nova was canceled after it was decided to use the less energy-intensive lunar orbit rendezvous (LO

Apollo.

61 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Virginia Dawson, 7 March 2000.

62 Ibid.

63 William Hines, “Centaur or Saturn—Which?” Washington Evening Star (15 October 1962): 10.

64 Brian Sparks to Homer E. Newell, 21 September 1962, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
asked “clearly, strongly, and unequivocally” that the Saturn C-1-Agena be substituted for Atlas

Centaur in carrying out unpiloted lunar and planetary missions. Sparks contended that Centau

had created a “deplorable situation” for both the lunar and planetary programs. NASA needed th

Saturn C-1-Agena to counter the “doggedly determined effort of the Soviets” and restore nationa

pride and international prestige. In a detailed memo appended to his letter, Sparks compare

Centaur to C-1-Agena. Despite the fact that Centaur development was in full swing, while Satur

C-1 was only in the design stage, Sparks thought that Saturn C-1 personnel would be highly mot

vated by their association with the piloted flight program. In contrast, the fear of cancellation o

Centaur would demoralize the Centaur team and slow their efforts.

Newell patiently responded that projections for completing the development of Saturn C

1-Agena were overly optimistic. It had been considered and rejected. He agreed that Centau

development had been “fraught with difficulties,” but he expected that the transfer to Lew

would “breathe new life into it, and that it will be able to fill the vital needs of our lunar an

planetary program on a timely basis.”65 He thought it unlikely that the untested S-4 stag

could be adapted to the S-1 stage and integrated with Agena before Centaur could be mad

flightworthy. During this debate, the transfer to Lewis Research Center in October 1962 wen

quietly forward.

If the decision to transfer the program represented an ultimatum for General Dynamics, 

was an equally important turning point for Headquarters. In his detailed analysis of the Surveyo

and Lunar Orbiter programs in 1972, management consultant Erasmus Kloman provided som

useful insights into the change in Centaur management. He speculated that by refusing to cance

Centaur, Headquarters (heavily staffed by former Lewis Research Center engineers at this time

asserted its prerogative to determine launch vehicle policy. He wrote: 

Headquarters, after carefully reviewing the situation, confirmed its position that the

Centaur concept was both technically feasible and essential to the launch vehicle program

for the space effort. It thus rejected the recommendation of senior management at MSFC

and JPL. Responsibility for Centaur was transferred abruptly then to Lewis Research

Center. This was interpreted as a rebuke to MSFC and a signal to the other Centers that

they could not back out of major development commitments assigned by Headquarters.66

An even more convincing reason for keeping Centaur in NASA’s stable of rockets was it

role in the Apollo program—both as the upper stage for Surveyor and as a means to test liqui

hydrogen’s feasibility in the Saturn liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen upper stages. Only its asso

ciation with the Apollo program kept the Centaur program alive. 

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 5

65 Homer E. Newell to Brian Sparks, 23 October 1962, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

66 Erasmus Kloman, Unmanned Space Project Management: Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter (Washington, DC: NASA SP-490

1972), 32. See also an unpublished draft, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center archives, chapter 2, 62–64.
President Kennedy made this clear to NASA Administrator James Webb several times d

a meeting in November 1962 about supplemental appropriations. The meeting was attend

Webb, top NASA staff, and Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President. At several poi

this meeting, Kennedy emphasized that beating the Russians to the Moon was the only reaso

he was willing to contemplate the enormous appropriations requested by NASA. Space pro

contributions to science were a distinctly lower priority, for which reasonable sums of money 

be spent. “But we’re talking about these fantastic expenditures which wreck our budget,” he 

which could only be justified by the goal of overtaking the Russians, “and demonstrate that st

behind, as we did by a couple of years, by God, we passed them.”67

When Kennedy asked Webb what the nation could expect from Centaur, he responde

Centaur would save 50 percent of the cost of the planetary shots, presumably a reference 

high cost of developing the Agena D, the upper stage favored by von Braun. “This was 

fighting for,”68 he said. But knowing that Kennedy would not accept this as the sole justific

for keeping Centaur in the rocket lineup, Webb immediately added that Centaur would allo

government to work out problems on a small vehicle before testing the far larger liquid-hyd

Douglas upper stages for Saturn.69 Webb did not excuse the poor job of management o

Centaur program by Marshall or General Dynamics’s failure to recognize the magnitude 

problems associated with liquid hydrogen. However, he was obviously furious that von Brau

taken the unprecedented step of appealing by letter directly to Congress for the cancellati

Centaur in favor of the Saturn C-1-Agena.70 Other participants in the meeting emphasize

absolute necessity for Surveyor as the justification for the Centaur program. 

One of the questions that Surveyor was charged with solving was the composition o

Moon’s surface. Cornell scientist Thomas Gold had argued that billions of years of bombard

by asteroids had pulverized the Moon’s surface into a fine powder about thirty feet dee

speculated that the low bearing strength of the surface would cause the Apollo land

founder.71 Others questioned this thesis, but lack of actual data increased the risk of se

astronauts to the Moon. To emphasize the connection between Surveyor and the A

program, Jerome Wiesner told President Kennedy,

We don’t know a damn thing about the surface of the Moon. And we’re making th

wildest guesses about how we’re going to land on the Moon and we could get a terribl

56 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

67 Transcript of Presidential Meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House, 21 November 1962, John F. Kennedy 

President’s Office files, tape no. 63, NASA Historical Reference Collection, page 31 of transcript. 

68 Transcript, 19. 

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid, 18. This letter has not been found.

71 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Ins

Press, 2000), 29. 
disaster from putting something down on the surface of the Moon that’s very different

than we think it is. And the scientific programs that find us that information have to have

the highest priority. But they are associated with the lunar program. The scientific

programs that aren’t associated with the lunar program can have any priority we please to

give ’em.72

Despite the problems associated with the development of Centaur, the need to solve the ques

tion of the composition of the lunar surface gave Centaur the priority it needed to avoi

cancellation. Making Centaur an inextricable part of the lunar landing effort was a calculated ris

on the part of NASA Headquarters. Webb refused to yield to pressure exerted by Huntsville an

JPL for cancellation. Now he was depending on Abe Silverstein, with all the resources of a researc

laboratory at his disposal, to prove that it was the right decision. Silverstein’s stubborn advocac

of liquid hydrogen would now be put to the test.

72 Transcript, 29. 

Marshall’s Unruly Wards 5

Chapter 3

“Abe’s Baby”

“These guys had a capacity, an ability, an energy that is just not

describable . . . . They gave up their lives, their families, they gave up

everything. They had total commitment. It was an era, a period of

time, that was absolute, total commitment.”

—Harlan Simon, Lewis Research Center

At Headquarters, Abe Silverstein had experienced the risks and challenges of managing large

scale projects. He seemed to have no doubt that the NACA-trained engineers at Lewis could lear

how to monitor General Dynamics and deal with the prickly payload specialists at JPL—especiall

since Lewis already had a unique expertise in liquid-hydrogen technology and a Director wh

would let nothing stand in the way of Centaur development. A down-to-earth midwesterner wh

did not suffer fools gladly, Silverstein was known for his keen engineering insight. In contrast wit

the tepid efforts at Marshall, NASA under Silverstein would move heaven and Earth to tur

Centaur into a reliable launch vehicle. Harlan Simon, a young procurement officer, called Centau

“Abe’s Baby,” pointing out that both dedication and fear of Silverstein’s famous temper drove th

program: “You just didn’t dare let him down.”1

Management of Centaur would prove both a trial and a triumph for Lewis Research Cente

Silverstein announced that he would personally direct the project with J. Cary Nettles as actin

Centaur project manager. This was a temporary arrangement until permanent leadership could b

established. Initially, forty-one Lewis personnel were assigned to the project. Nettles, a graduate o

Louisiana State University with a degree in electrical engineering, had been among the contingent o

NACA engineers transferred from Langley to Lewis in 1941. As chief of the Flight Projects Branch

he was already serving as the Lewis representative on a NASA project to study the effects of zer

gravity on liquid hydrogen at Wallops Island, Virginia. Nettles immediately uncovered a chaoti

contracting situation. A large number of changes, not only in the contract with General Dynamic

“Abe’s Baby” 5

1 Virginia P. Dawson, Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (Washington, DC: NAS

SP-4306, 1991), 192.
but also with Minneapolis-Honeywell for the guidance, had driven up the cost of the program.

of the priorities was to get the escalating costs of the program under control.

A terse telegram from NASA Headquarters to Silverstein announced that the transfer of Ce

from MSFC to Lewis would occur between 8 October 1962 and 1 January 1963. About 

Marshall engineers assisted in the changeover. They were not inclined to linger in Cleveland

hastened back to the milder climate of Huntsville before the first snows flew. As Centaur docu

tation began to accumulate, a skeleton project office was set up in the hangar. 

NASA set an ambitious target date of late 1964 for the first Surveyor mission. 

Technology Laboratories (STL) agreed to conduct an independent guidance analysis. Th

apparently at the insistence of JPL, which did not trust the competence of either G

Dynamics or Lewis in this area.3 Many of the engineers at STL, a spinoff of the Ramo-Woold

Company, had served as technical monitors for Atlas. Silverstein pressed NASA to tr

management of the RL10 engine to Lewis at this time. Von Braun refused, presumably beca

60 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

AC-2, suspended by an overhead crane, is readied at the General Dynamics factory for shipment to Cape Canaveral in 1964.

(Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

2 Communication from J. Cary Nettles to Virginia Dawson, June 1999.

3 Interview with Richard Martin, 5 June 2000. 
the RL10 engine’s role in the development of the S-IV liquid-hydrogen upper stages for the Satur

C-1. Whether Atlas procurement would continue to be managed by the Air Force as governmen

furnished equipment also proved contentious.4 Silverstein placed Ed Baehr in charge of an Atla

office at Lewis.

Under Silverstein, for the first time, the government would take a strong role in managin

Centaur. Silverstein announced that the Research & Development phase for Centaur would us

eight test vehicles. This phase was expected to last through 1964 (it was not actually complete

until October 1966). Only after they had proven the reliability of Centaur would Silverstei

permit a series of eight Surveyor spacecraft to be launched. To reduce technical complexity an

interface problems, he decided that the first seven Surveyors would carry essentially the sam

payload with different experiment packages. This decision meant that many of the scientific exper

iments planned for Surveyor had to be sacrificed. 

Three months later, in December 1962, Lewis Research Center took over Agena, anothe

troubled launch vehicle program previously managed by Marshall. The transfer was precipitate

by the failure of the fifth Ranger spacecraft to reach the Moon. Headed by Seymour Himmel a

Lewis, the Agena program never received the same attention as Centaur, but its managemen

contributed to the growing launch vehicle expertise among NASA staff. Not only did the program

launch Atlas-Agenas from the Eastern Test Range, but it also launched Thor-Agenas from

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California for polar and Sun-synchronous orbits. Atlas-Agen

missions included the first closeup pictures of the Moon, Mars, Venus, early communication

satellites such as Echo, and large weather satellites like Nimbus. 

Atlas-Agena B could place about 5,000 pounds in Earth orbit and lift 750 pounds to escap

velocity. Atlas-Agena B launched the last series of Ranger spacecraft, which succeeded in sendin

back medium- and high-resolution photographs of the Moon’s surface. Between 1964 and 1968

Atlas-Agena D launched twenty payloads for NASA and the Department of Defense, keeping th

country’s lunar and planetary science program alive while the nation waited for the more powerfu

Centaur.5

In February 1963, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed its investigation of th

Centaur program. The report, based on an internal NASA Headquarters investigation b

William Fleming, was extremely critical. Fleming had worked at Lewis prior to accepting a pos

at Headquarters under Silverstein. His report reflected criticism of General Dynamics that cam

directly from the experience of various NASA staff, including what they perceived as th

contractor’s significant lapses leading up to the failure of F-1. The Fleming report conclude

that both NASA and General Dynamics should have predicted the rupture of the weather shiel

“Abe’s Baby” 6

4 Thomas Dixon to Robert Seamans, Jr., 4 October 1962, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

5 Lewis News (18 August 1967, 15 October 1965, 24 November 1967). NASA launched thirty-eight Agenas between 1961 an

1967. 
from available test data. The GAO’s report called this “not merely an indication of err

failure to anticipate a difficulty but rather a critical dereliction in management, sinc

problem was perceived, tests undertaken to resolve the problem, and a report on test resul

Ames Research Center] furnished but not completely utilized.”6 GAO qualified this sharp 

icism by noting that on average, twenty flights were usually needed to establish a 50-pe

reliability for a new launch vehicle. Less significant technical lapses, such as the failu

General Dynamics to provide an independent flight abort system for both Atlas and Ce

were also noted. Additionally, the GAO accused General Dynamics of improper billing 

tices, including failure to provide adequate documentation for fees. 

The GAO was equally critical of what it called Marshall’s “sloppy” method of contra

Marshall had allowed General Dynamics to set unrealistic launch dates and had failed to mo

how much weight Centaur could lift. The GAO concluded, “The most penetrating busines

icism related to the substantial number of uncompleted contractual actions and generally 

documentation which, though originally attributable to poor AF [Air Force] managemen

perpetuated under Marshall management and is only now being remedied by Lewis.”7

Building Confidence in Centaur

Silverstein insisted on a system-by-system review to help bring Lewis engineers up to 

and allow problems to surface. They found problems in every area. Their first task was to 

an effective working relationship with General Dynamics engineers. In February 

Silverstein appointed David Gabriel manager of the program. The project was first loca

the basement of the administration building, where Silverstein could check on it frequ

Under Gabriel, he assigned three assistant managers: Edmund Jonash, in charge of test 

neering, structures, and vehicle propulsion; Cary Nettles, oversight of guidance, relia

quality assurance, and ground support equipment; and Ronald Rovenger, head of field o

tions. Rovenger, one of the few Marshall staffers to transfer with Centaur, headed the N

field office at General Dynamics. Under Lewis management, his office increased to 

NASA engineers. Gabriel and Jonash, like Nettles, were old NACA hands. Gabriel, a nat

Lakewood, Ohio, had graduated from the University of Akron in 1943. He was al

familiar with Centaur problems through zero-gravity test work. At this time, he heade

Advanced Development and Evaluation Division, which was providing technical support 

joint Atomic Energy Commission-NASA nuclear rocket program called Project Rover.8 Jo

a native of Kenton, Ohio, with a degree from MIT in chemical engineering, had partici

62 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

6 Memo from Nathaniel H. Karol to Thomas W. Bugher, Acting Chief, Contract Management Branch, “GAO Exit Con

at NASA Headquarters, 7 February 1963.” Box 9, NASA Glenn History Office Archives.

7 Ibid. 
in testing the RL10 engine in Lewis’s Propulsion Systems Laboratory. Because the group spen

much of the week in San Diego, staff meetings were held on Saturdays, the only time mos

people could be expected to be in Cleveland. 

Lewis staff for the project increased to 150 people. By 1964, Centaur had a budget of $1

million for in-house support. Silverstein assigned more than forty engineers and support staff t

monitor the General Dynamics plant in San Diego and at Minneapolis-Honeywell. Under th

new management, Centaur became a major program for General Dynamics, approaching 5

percent of total effort in the Astronautics Division.9

“Abe’s Baby” 6

Meeting of the Centaur team at General Dynamics, early 1964. Standing, left to right: unknown; Dr. Drew Katalinsky, Director of

Engineering for Centaur; Grant Hansen, General Dynamics Vice-president and Centaur project head. Seated, left to right: Ed

Jonash, Dave Gabriel, and Cary Nettles, leaders of the team from Lewis Research Center; Major Joe Heatherly, U.S. Air Force

(USAF); and Ron Rovenger, head of the NASA Resident Office at General Dynamics. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

8 David Gabriel became Centaur Project manager in 1963. In 1965, he left NASA to take a job for Bell Aerosystems. In 1967, h

became Deputy Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-NASA Office Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO). 

9 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, H.R. 3730, pt. 3, Marc

1965, 1145.
A contingent of young NASA scientists and engineers recruited to work on the space pro

reveled in the opportunity to learn in an environment that pushed them intellectually and 

them responsibility early in their careers. This infusion of raw talent transformed Lewis Res

Center. Lawrence Ross, who became Director of the Center in the 1990s, began as a desig

test engineer for Centaur. He investigated Centaur from stem to stern, learning how to rew

design test equipment, and run tests. This early hands-on experience provided a unique fo

tion for his NASA career.10 Work on the sloshing of propellants brought Andrew Stofan, an

future Director, into the Launch Vehicles Division. Ross, Stofan, and other recent graduates 

trained and mentored by men who had NACA research backgrounds, as well as extraord

technical insight, stamina, and blind faith that Centaur would work. Harlan Simon, a thirty

year-old lawyer at the time he was hired in the Centaur Procurement Office, marveled 

dedication of Gabriel, Jonash, and William (Russ) Dunbar, who were then in their forties. “

guys had a capacity, an ability, an energy that is just not describable,” he recalled. “They ga

their lives, their families, they gave up everything. They had total commitment. It was an 

period of time, that was absolute, total commitment.”11

In December 1962, Centaur received DX priority because of its connection with the A

program. This made keeping contractors to strict deadlines much easier, since the program 

national priority in terms of supplies and personnel. The most pressing concern was the ne

untangle the complex contractual relationship between the government and General Dyna

NASA inherited Centaur cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts from the Air Force. This included s

Force contracts and one NASA contract; the latter contained 120 changes with 47 in progr

the time of the transfer. The process of making necessary NASA-directed changes needed 

addressed.12 Each design change required the approval of the Air Force System Project Office

Air Force resisted changes to Centaur because they often had an impact on the Atlas design, w

the Air Force considered “operational.” The Air Force complicated relations between G

Dynamics and Lewis, creating bottlenecks in Centaur development and causing friction be

the two government agencies. Ultimately, when the Air Force Centaur contracts were turned 

to Lewis, NASA was allowed to purchase a “bare bones” Atlas from the Air Force so that th

Force could still control Atlas manufacturing. Atlas could then be modified to support Ce

requirements. 

64 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

10 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 29 March 2000. 

11 Interview with Harlan Simon by Virginia Dawson, 20 March 1985.

12 Thomas F. Dixon, Deputy Associate Administrator to Robert Seamans, Associate Administrator, 4 October 1962, files 

Nettles. The GD Centaur contracts had about $98 million in changes, most of which occurred prior to the contracts’ 

to Lewis. Eighty-three percent of the changes were attributed to directed changes and about 17 percent classed as overru

1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings, March 1965, 1145.
Because Lewis Research Center had never managed large contracts with industry, it had few

procurement officers. The Center quickly hired about half a dozen lawyers from the Clevelan

Ordinance District, Department of the Army. Nettles insisted that Len Perry, a talented Africa

American graduate of Cleveland Marshall Law School, handle Centaur contract negotiations wit

General Dynamics. Perry worked under Edward Hicks, chief of procurement for Lewis. Th

procurement team included Harlan Simon, Richard Campbell, William Monzel, Marvin Clayton

Richard Proctor, William Brahms, and Robert Hill. Because Silverstein insisted that a new

contract would be necessary, Perry and his counterpart at General Dynamics, T. C. Courington

began at once to review the contracts.

Silverstein personally conducted Centaur negotiations. He insisted that no Centaur would b

flight-tested until “the probability of success approaches that necessary for manned space flight.”

Bruce Lundin recalled that General Dynamics, accustomed to Air Force weapons procurement, a

first objected to being held to a higher standard. “I said, ‘Naturally that’s impossible, but you won

get near it unless you require it.’ This is space flight and that requires perfection at every point.”

The new contract, hammered out over a period of two and a half years, became NAS3

3232, or “32 squared,” as NASA insiders called it. Jim Dempsey arrived in Cleveland t

personally meet with Silverstein as negotiations drew to a close. They ended with a walk in th

garden of Guerin House, a former private home converted to a center for meetings at Lewi

The two men agreed on the company’s fixed fee, or profit of $31,293,524. The new contrac

signed in April 1964, combined the hodgepodge of contracts inherited from the Air Force an

Marshall into one cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for fourteen vehicles and twenty-one test article

It included design, fabrication, and modification of ground-support equipment for the Genera

Dynamics factory, the Atlantic Missile Range Complex 36A, the Point Loma Test Site, th

Sycamore Canyon Test Site, the rocket site at Edwards Air Force Base, and NASA Lewis tes

sites at Plum Brook and its space power facility. The estimated cost of the contract wa

$321,058,005, plus the fixed fee. This contract covered known items, a specific number o

launch vehicles, and equipment. In addition, Silverstein insisted on a second contract to perm

greater flexibility in dealing with unforeseen problems that were likely to crop up during th

development of new technology under the pressure of a tight deadline. This Sustainin

Engineering and Maintenance (SE&M) contract covered modifications and improvements an

eliminated the need for costly change orders. The SE&M contract covered the costs of the wor

of about two hundred General Dynamics engineers. NASA paid the direct costs of “technica

“Abe’s Baby” 6

13 “New NASA Management Concept Aims for Higher Centaur Reliability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (21 Janua

1963): 37.

14 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Virginia Dawson, 7 March 2000.
directions” from Lewis to General Dynamics, plus an incentive fee that was determined un

ally by Lewis. Silverstein himself made the quarterly evaluation of the contractor’s perform

When Bruce Lundin became director of Lewis in 1969, he continued the practice.15

During the time it took to get the contracts straightened out, Lewis and General Dyn

engineers continued to drive the technical aspects of the program forward. Dave Gabrie

PERT to force the pace of development. PERT also found favor with Grant Hansen. 

article in Aerospace Management in 1963, Hansen noted that PERT had made determinin

costs of the program’s various subdivisions more realistic.16 Hansen liked the attitude of th

people in charge at NASA. He recalled that when contract monitors from Marshall had 

out to San Diego, they had made it clear that they were there to check up on them, wit

implication that they could not be trusted to do the job right. Lewis management simply 

“We’re here to help you do it.”17 General Dynamics engineer Denny Huber noted that whe

Lewis people took over Centaur, they “wanted to operate as a team with [General Dyna

and not act as Lord and Master over us; what a breath of fresh air.”18 By degrees, Lewis 

neers and their counterparts at General Dynamics learned to respect each other. As G

Dynamics launch conductor Roger Lynch put it, “What they did better than the Marshall 

is that they started to identify people they could trust.”19

Direct Ascent

Silverstein’s key technical decision was the abandonment of the requirement for a two

mission for Surveyor. He insisted that first the feasibility of a single-burn mission—a straight s

the Moon—had to be proven. Only after direct ascent was successful would he agree to atte

two-burn mission with a coast period and restart in space. He reasoned that with less tec

complexity, there was less chance of failure. Direct ascent would save weight because it di

require extra fuel and equipment to settle the propellants during the coast and for attitude co

The previous summer, while he was considering whether Lewis Research Center should tak

the program, Silverstein had sent Art Zimmerman on a reconnaissance trip to California to d

whether direct ascent was feasible. Zimmerman had contacted George Solomon, the head of 

tory analysis at Space Technology Laboratories in Redondo Beach. He called on Victor Clark, a sc

at JPL, and Frank Anthony, assistant chief engineer of flight mechanics at General Dynamics. N

66 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

15 Interview with Bruce Lundin. These contractor performance reports would be revealing if they could be found. They 

appear to be part of the NASA Glenn records. Congressman Karth did not think an SE&M contract for Centaur was appr

since $35 million for SE&M was actually for development costs. See 1967 NASA Authorization, Part 3, 583. 

16 Philip Geddes, “Centaur: How It Was Put Back on Track,” Aerospace Management (April 1964): 24–29.

17 Interview with Grant Hansen by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2001.

18 Communication to the authors from Denny Huber, 2 March 2002. 

19 Interview with Roger Lynch by Virginia Dawson, 5 June 2000.
the three were entirely convinced; it was fortuitous that the Moon’s orbit happened to be in a plac

within its eighteen-year cycle that made direct ascent possible in the mid-1960s.20

The decision by Silverstein to abandon the two-burn requirement initially shocked the ran

and file at General Dynamics, a contractor accustomed to the relatively hands-off managemen

style of the Air Force. At least two burns had previously been needed for both the Advent missio

and Surveyor. The company had focused on the more difficult approach. Now Silverstein tol

General Dynamics that the company had only one requirement on Centaur—to show that th

system worked. Deane Davis recalled that people at General Dynamics reacted as though they ha

been asked to give up one of the Ten Commandments. “It didn’t make any difference whether w

were receptive or not,” he said. “Abe had made up his mind.”21

This change to direct ascent also created consternation among scientists at JPL because 

reduced the number of launch windows, or available dates for launch. A January 1963 memo from

Benjamin Milwitzky, chief of the Surveyor program, to Oran Nicks, director of NASA’s Lunar an

Planetary programs, strongly recommended that the two-burn option be emphasized in the deve

opment phase of the program. He worried that if the Centaur program were delayed until the perio

between October 1965 and February 1966, Surveyor would have to land in the dark. “If thes

Surveyors have to land in the dark and survive until lunar daylight before beginning operations o

the Moon, the probability of completing the scientific mission will, most likely, be significantl

reduced. Also, the possibility of obtaining TV pictures on the way down will be eliminated,” h

wrote.22 Milwitzky told Nicks that JPL (probably reflecting reservations of Marshall engineers) als

questioned the reliability of the Centaur guidance system because the Minneapolis-Honeywe

hardware had not yet been tested under environmental conditions. Nevertheless, the tone of th

memo was positive. These problems could be solved.23

Although people at JPL and General Dynamics found Silverstein’s management style to b

heavy-handed, they soon discovered its benefits. Marshall and JPL had wrangled over the chang

of weight specifications for Surveyor made necessary by the continuing problems associated wit

the development of Centaur. The first order of business was to fix the weight specifications onc

and for all. Silverstein asked Hugh Henneberry to head a Performance Trajectory Group (PTG

made up of people from both Lewis and General Dynamics. Their charge was to make sure tha

the weight requirements were carefully negotiated and mutually acceptable. Other members from

“Abe’s Baby” 6

20 Interview with Art Zimmerman by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 5 August 1999.

21 John Sloop interview with Aerospace Division, Convair/General Dynamics, 29 April 1974, NASA Historical Referen

Collection. 

22 Memo, Benjamin Milwitzky to Director, Lunar & Planetary Programs, 21 January 1963, Surveyor files, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.

23 Ibid.
Lewis included Zimmerman, Jack Lee, Harold Valentine, Carl Wentworth, Jack Brun

Richard Flage. Jan Andrews, Frank Anthony, Robert Foushee, Joseph Garside, F. W. Koest

Rosin, and Richard Wentink participated for General Dynamics. Although Lewis took resp

bility for all assumptions and ground rules, the effort was clearly based on the greater expe

and expertise of General Dynamics. Out of this early government-industry collaboration cam

report “Estimate of Atlas-Centaur Performance Capabilities for the Surveyor Mission,” 

trajectory calculations and performance ground rules for both direct ascent and parking

ascent.24 The introduction to the document stated:

The philosophy adhered to throughout has been to provide a consistent set of rule

defining a vehicle as it is expected to exist in 1965 when the first operational launch 

anticipated. In many areas, insufficient data are available at present to allow a rigid def

nition of vehicle parameters. In spite of this, estimates have been made in all areas so tha

a complete configuration is defined. This, together with the assumptions and methods o

the analysis can then form the basis for future changes or re-evaluations as they becom

necessary.25

Based on weight and other assumptions agreed to by the group, nominal payload capabili

2,257 pounds for a two-burn mission and 2,317 pounds for direct ascent were calculate

Surveyor missions. The Centaur vehicle for the two-burn mission had to be heavier because 

need to carry more fuel and equipment. The group suggested that improvements in a num

areas might allow the payload weights to increase by about 150 pounds. These weights were en

aging. In fact, when the missions were flown, the Surveyor model weighed 2,070 pounds, wi

heaviest Surveyor carrying 2,295 pounds. 

This preliminary study represented an important first step toward preparing Centau

launch and gave Surveyor payload specialists at JPL definite figures on which to base spac

development. It was the first in a series of memoranda, issued monthly by General Dynamic

included all changes to the vehicle up to the time of publication. Changes that had occurre

previous month were printed in red. Since the monthly memorandum always had a centa

the front cover, the team began referring to the document as “The Horse” (a reference t

mythical Centaur—a horse with a man’s upper torso and head). Roy Roberts, General Dyna

principal guidance engineer on Centaur at that time, recalled that “The Horse” was a “very

critical document because it documented for a large number of people the environments an

trajectory that we were flying.”26 It was distributed widely to the allied disciplines, such as th

68 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

24 “Estimate of Atlas-Centaur Performance Capabilities for the Surveyor Mission,” 11 February 1963, Kennedy Space 

ELV Resource Library. (The authors thank Art Zimmerman for lending his copy of this report.)

25 Ibid. 

26 Interview with Roy Roberts by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
and loads. Under Marshall management, Centaur contractors and NASA managers had lacke

this type of cumulative up-to-date documentation. “The Horse” reflected Centaur’s contin

uing evolution and kept all participants informed and moving forward as a team. Bot

General Dynamics and Lewis engineers could run independent simulations. “It was a team

relationship without ever being adversarial,” Roberts remarked. “We were all in it togethe

and doing the same thing.”27 The effort to approach problems in a collaborative spirit is wha

distinguished the program under Lewis management from that of Marshall. What Lewis eng

neers lacked in training and experience in project management they made up for i

organizational and communication skills.

Although staff at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had once disparaged NACA-trained eng

neers as myopically focused on “pushing known principles to the next decimal point,

relations between members of the former research laboratory and employees of JPL becam

more cordial as Lewis engineers established their competence and won credibility.28 Surveyor

managers at JPL found the weight and performance summary called “The Horse” especiall

helpful. Bill O’Neil, a young scientist assigned to the Surveyor trajectory and performanc

group at JPL headed by Elliot Cutting, recalled that not only did “The Horse” prove to be “

model document that really spelled out all the ground rules for everything,”29 but it also influ

enced how JPL managed Hughes Aircraft, the contractor building Surveyor. JPL aske

Hughes to produce a companion document modeled on “The Horse” that spelled out th

spacecraft performance side. O’Neil said, “In fact, some people called it the pony. And othe

people called it the rider, because it was riding on it [Centaur].” 

JPL and Lewis established a working group with responsibility for the interface between th

launch vehicle and the payload. The group was charged with resolving problems related to inter

face design, interface testing, and system operations.30 Once JPL and Lewis reached agreemen

on weights, launch times, and mission goals, they provided them to General Dynamics, wher

they could be calculated in greater detail. Zimmerman recalled, “With our optimization capa

bility, we could design the trajectory and hand it over to them and show them this is the ideal wa

to fly the mission. Then they would take their huge program and tailor it to that flight mission

It usually came within 8 or 10 pounds of what we proposed.”31

“Abe’s Baby” 6

27 Ibid.

28 Clayton R. Koppes, The JPL and the American Space Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 97.

29 Interview with William O’Neil by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 9 June 2000. 

30 Technical Report 32-1265, Surveyor Project Final Report, quoted by Erasmus Kloman, typescript, 1971, Centaur chapter, 7

MSFC archives.

31 Interview with Art Zimmerman by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 5 August 1999.
70 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Centaur is offloaded from a C-133 transport plane at Lewis Research Center, June 1963. (NASA C-65194)
“Abe’s Commandment”

Silverstein’s emphasis on ground testing represented a shift from the relatively hands-o

approach of the Air Force. Greater supervision by NASA initially produced friction, especiall

since engineers at General Dynamics were far more experienced in rocket development than the

Lewis counterparts. Grant Hansen, head of Centaur for General Dynamics, questioned his new

Lewis managers’ “willingness to test until everything was absolutely locked down, without an

particular regard for an ultimate end date that had to be met.” Deane Davis called testing “Abe

commandment.” In order to enable General Dynamics to check the interface between Atlas an

Centaur before shipment to the Cape, NASA now agreed to the construction of a ten-story, $6.8

million facility adjacent to the Kearny Mesa Industrial Park, despite the fact that Genera

Dynamics already had an impressive array of test facilities.

Silverstein insisted that Centaur also be tested at Lewis. Testing began with component

followed by engine tests, then tests of the entire system, and, finally, full static tests of the entir

flight configuration. Separation tests, shake tests, structural tests, nose-fairing tests, and insulation

panel tests all contributed to growing confidence that the Center had the facilities and expertise t

“Abe’s Baby” 7

Drawing of the Centaur rocket placed in the Lewis Space Power Chamber, formerly the Altitude Wind Tunnel. (NASA Drawing

7709-EL)
monitor the contractor.32 In Silverstein’s view, even if there were only a one-in-a-thousand c

of failure of one component, it was better to test it than to risk failure. His technical perfectio

was legendary. To Silverstein, space vehicles required “not statistical accuracy but one hu

percent accuracy.”33 This could only be achieved by “extreme diligence and the concept that 

piece of equipment that is taken aboard, every component, must be proven—environme

checked so that it can live in the environment of space, the total environment of space, the va

of space, the temperatures of space.” Only after systematic ground testing was completed w

willing to allow Atlas-Centaur to be launched. 

Testing at Lewis not only provided independent verification of contractor performanc

also contributed new solutions to problems. The loss of F-1 had occurred within a tenth 

second after hydrogen gas had been vented from an opening at the top of the vehicle. A 

program in the 8-by-6-foot supersonic wind tunnel at Lewis revealed that the hydrogen-ve

system posed a fire hazard during flight. The solution was to design a vent fin or snout on th

fairing that extended about 50 inches from the tank, just far enough away to keep the hyd

gas from igniting along the hot surface of the vehicle. 

As General Dynamics people began to see the concrete results of these test programs, r

began to replace the adversarial relationship between General Dynamics and the governm

Testing applied to whole systems, as well as individual components. The laboratory hastily conv

the Altitude Wind Tunnel into a vacuum chamber in order to test a full-scale operational Ce

vehicle under environmental conditions to simulate spaceflight. Test engineers “soaked” a Ce

in the vacuum chamber to test the separation system by firing the retrorockets in the norma

failure modes. Lewis wind tunnels were also used to test the RL10 engine, while other l

hydrogen tests were carried out in the unique Rocket Engine Test Facility at the Center. Alth

needed for no more than 3 minutes, the flight gyros received 1,000 hours of testing, wit

rationale that if the gyros worked for 1,000 hours, they would run several minutes more in 

without a problem. Explosive bolts, which could not be tested, were carefully inspected for d

If, as Lewis engineers often pointed out, there were 1,000 single failure modes on Atlas-Ce

they were confident that many “bugs” could be uncovered with adequate testing.35

Silverstein believed that in addition to providing industry with test facilities, it was imp

for NASA to build extensive new facilities for rocket tests. Centaur presented special chal

because its engines had to fire in space. With the Centaur carrying one-of-a-kind multimillion-

payloads, how could engineers be sure that the Centaur engines would start in a near-vacuum 

72 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

32 Philip Geddes, “Centaur: How It Was Put Back on Track,” Aerospace Management (April, 1964): 24–29.

33 John Sloop interview with Abe Silverstein, 19 May 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

34 Personal communication to the author from J. Cary Nettles, 17 June 1999. See also Eugene Kloman, “Centaur,” typ

MFSC archives, 69–70. 

35 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Virginia Dawson, 7 March 2000.
being subjected at different times to extremely hot and cold temperatures? To answer these question

NASA appropriated funds for the construction of a unique facility called the Space Propulsio

Research Facility, or “B-2,” at the Plum Brook Station, located 55 miles from Lewis Research Cente

in Sandusky, Ohio. At the Plum Brook’s “E Site,” the Dynamics Research Test Center, an entir

Centaur test vehicle could be mated to the Atlas, along with a test model of the Surveyor spacecraf

Important “bending mode tests” performed by Ted Gerus, head of Dynamics, and Robert P. Mille

project lead engineer, involved tanking the vehicle with simulated propellants and shaking it hor

zontally and vertically to test its structural integrity. The Atlas also received axial load tests at 248,00

pounds to simulate the forces on its thin skin during liftoff. It passed with flying colors. 

These tests of the steel balloon tank structure provide another example of the cooperatio

between General Dynamics and Lewis engineers. David Peery, former head of the Aeronautica

Engineering Department at Penn State University and author of an important textbook on aircra

structures, had developed a theory for structural strength available after the onset of local skin buck

ling. At General Dynamics, he showed by analysis that the Atlas-Centaur tank design—thought b

many to be too radical—was actually unnecessarily conservative. According to his theory, it coul

withstand vastly greater stresses. As Richard Martin, author of several excellent articles on Atla

pointed out, “Peery used his famous bulldog tenacity to convince management at General Dynamic

and Lewis to test a full-scale Atlas-Centaur to the point of collapse.”36 Martin explained, “A bendin

moment about 80 percent greater than that at the outset of buckling was achieved before significan

nonlinear deflections occurred, but there were some worrisome local buckles around protuberance

like the liquid oxygen line outlet. Therefore, the analysis was adapted to allow only about a 6

percent increase in the applied load.” 

Collaboration began at this time between Martin and Gerus, leaders of dynamic analys

groups at General Dynamics and Lewis, respectively. These groups laid the foundation for a

innovative pitch and yaw program that was later implemented when a new Teledyne digita

computer was introduced after 1973. The Automatic Determination and Dissemination of Jus

Updated Steering Terms (ADDJUST) program allowed design loads from flight winds to b

reduced by about 40 percent.

Silverstein insisted on a program review at Lewis once a month. Contractors were expected t

spend two or three days at the laboratory. Vince Johnson, Centaur program manager from

Headquarters, attended these meetings but was careful not to come between General Dynamic

and its new Lewis managers. Johnson had the job of defending the program to Congress an

running interference at Headquarters. In Bruce Lundin’s view, Johnson “played the role o

“Abe’s Baby” 7

36 Communication to the authors by Richard Martin, 7 March 2002. See Richard E. Martin, “The Atlas and Centaur ‘Ste

Balloon’ Tanks: A Legacy of Karel Bossart, “40th International Astronautics Congress paper, IAA-89-738, Cot 7-13m, 1989; “

Brief History of the Atlas Rocket Vehicle, Part III,” Quest—The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 8 (2001): 48. See also David Peer

Aircraft Structures (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949).
program manager absolutely perfectly.”37 His levelheaded approach to program managemen

one of the keys to the program’s ultimate success. 

Deane Davis, General Dynamics Centaur project manager, recalled that General Dyn

grudgingly admitted that Lewis people knew somewhat more than they did about 

hydrogen. The old Centaur design had required the engines to be prechilled for a short time b

Centaur engines were ignited in space. This wasted some of the precious liquid-hydrogen 

One of the project’s important innovations was to “chill down” the vehicle on the ground, 

liquid helium as a precoolant for the engine. This was a direct transfer of knowledge from P

Bee, which included precooling the engine. Liquid helium was a relatively rare chemical a

time, but it was much less difficult to handle than liquid hydrogen. Engineers at G

Dynamics were skeptical that it could be procured in large enough quantities. Within minu

leaving a contentious meeting, Silverstein was on the phone ordering a dewar of liquid h

from the government cryogenics laboratory in Colorado. Liquid helium precooling w

perfectly.38 General Dynamics and the Lewis engineers also worked together on a new desig

the insulation panels—the source of failure on the first launch.

During this time, General Dynamics engineers also solved the critical problem of the le

of liquid hydrogen through minute pores in the welds of the liquid-hydrogen tank. Tests at G

Dynamics revealed that metal became brittle when exposed to the very low temperatures of 

hydrogen. It was found that by adding nickel in the weld area, the stainless steel could be stre

ened. New techniques for lap-welding the seams, followed by spot welds, provided addi

structural integrity. Factory technicians, already highly skilled builders of the Atlas tank, had to 

the standard even higher. The vehicle required more than 74,000 spot welds, 360 feet of resi

seam welds, and 400 feet of heliarc fusion butt welds. The welds were carefully monitored and x-

to make sure there were no imperfections.39 In the most critical area of the design—the int

diate bulkhead—where cracks as small as 1/10,000 of an inch could destroy the vacuum creat

freezing out the dry nitrogen gas in the space inside the double wall, the gores were fusion-wel

Advanced welding techniques ensured a high degree of structural integrity without adding 

sive weight. 

Getting to the bottom of the problem of leaks in the intermediate bulkhead led t

discovery of another potential problem. Small cameras placed in the hydrogen tank reveale

as soon as the liquid hydrogen was loaded, the bulkhead mysteriously wrinkled. “Everyone t

look at those pictures and just about fainted, me included,” Deane Davis recalled. “And of c

74 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

37 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Virginia Dawson, 7 March 2000.

38 John Sloop interview with Aerospace Division, Convair/General Dynamics, 29 April 1974, NASA Historical Re

Collection. 

39 Irwin Stambler, “Centaur,” Space/Aeronautics (October 1963): 74–75.

40 Ibid.
Abe Silverstein got all upset about it.”41 Testing determined that when the hydrogen was removed

the wrinkles disappeared. Through further testing and analysis, the team concluded that the stain

less steel experienced “cryoshock” from the very cold liquid hydrogen. The way to avoid cryoshoc

was to load the liquid oxygen first, allowing the system to chill down gradually. Then the liqui

hydrogen was slowly loaded. Wrinkles in the bulkhead no longer appeared. At the same time tha

they were solving these problems, engineers at General Dynamics and Lewis were building 

formidable expertise in liquid hydrogen that they freely shared with Douglas and Rocketdyne, th

contractors for the Saturn upper stages.42

New Regime at the Cape

Silverstein insisted on a major change in launch operations that had important implication

for the future of robotic operations at the Cape. Under Marshall’s management, responsibility fo

the rocket had ceased once it reached the launch pad. There, the Air Force director of launch oper

ations took over. As part of the reorganization to facilitate Centaur development, the Air Forc

agreed to allow NASA to manage launch operations. Goddard Space Flight Center Launc

Operations Branch at the Atlantic Missile Range had previously managed only the Delta launche

The branch, staffed by veterans of the Navy Vanguard Earth satellite program, now assume

responsibility for all robotic operations. (In 1965, all operations were consolidated under the Joh

F. Kennedy Space Center, although former Goddard personnel continued to be in charge o

robotic launches). 

Headquarters placed Robert Gray in charge of the Goddard staff at the Cape. Gray had grad

uated from Allegheny College in Meadeville, Pennsylvania, with a degree in physics after Worl

War II. After working at Bell Aircraft in rocket test instrumentation, he joined the Nava

Research Laboratory in 1956. He served as launch director for Vanguard launches from th

Cape, and when NASA took over, his group became part of Goddard. Gray named John Neilon

another Vanguard veteran, as his deputy. Neilon, a graduate of St. Anselm College i

Manchester, New Hampshire, had also worked at the Naval Research Laboratory, where he eva

uated the performance of precision location radars. Neilon would later take over as Director o

Unmanned Launch Operations in 1970, when Gray became Deputy Director of Launc

Operations at Kennedy Space Center. Gray also appointed John Gossett, another veteran of th

Naval Research Laboratory, as chief of the Centaur Operations Division. In this capacity

Gossett acted as liaison with Lewis for Centaur. As time went on, a standard checkout proce

dure evolved. Gossett was responsible for checking in hardware shipments, scheduling tests, an

“Abe’s Baby” 7

41 John Sloop interview with members of the Aerospace Division Convair/General Dynamics, 29 April 1974, NASA Historic

Reference Collection.

42 Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980), 153, 188–189.
76 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Technicians at Pad 36A gingerly lower Centaur into the interstage adapter on top of Atlas, August 1964. (KSC 64-16746)
“riding herd” on the contractors. He also worked with the range safety officers on documenta

tion and launch scheduling.43

Because Silverstein strongly believed that the unusual technical challenges of liquid hydroge

required Lewis engineers to participate in the launch, he sent Bruce Lundin down to the Cape t

make this clear to Kurt Debus, Director of the Launch Operations Center. Debus quickly agreed

presumably because he had little interest in robotic operations on the Air Force side of the Banan

River.44 The Goddard staff found working with hydrogen challenging. Gray said, “We spent year

really, and dozens of launches before we got all the strange little things that we didn’t understan

straightened out on that Centaur stage. Things like prestarts and in-flight ignitions and that sort o

stuff. We had all these chilldowns to run through and all that stuff was very, very critical.”45 Preparin

Centaur for launch was like fine-tuning a Jaguar sports car. “It had to be tweaked up all the time

Gray said, “and it was not tolerant to any kind of failures, or something not being just right. It ha

to be right, period, or else it wasn’t going to work.” Gray recalled that his launch team had to inven

the launch rules to meet the unique demands of liquid hydrogen.

Mating Centaur with Atlas proved a difficult and delicate maneuver. The first time they gingerl

lowered Centaur to sit atop the Atlas, the mechanical separation latches on the interstage adapter di

not line up with the latch receptacles. These receptacles were large tabs welded to the vehicle wit

slots designed to receive the latching mechanisms. Red Lightbown, General Dynamics Senio

Engineering Structures Manager for Atlas, was immediately summoned from San Diego. He discov

ered basic problems with the separation system and decided that the whole thing should be scrapped

A new system that used shaped charges was designed. The charge, placed inside a metal containe

attached to the interstage adapter, exploded with just enough energy to slice through the adapte

releasing Centaur from Atlas. To reduce the time it took to separate the two rockets from 45 second

to 6, the retrorockets on Atlas were redesigned to provide more power.46

Karl Kachigan, a longtime Centaur chief engineer, ran the launch support team for Gener

Dynamics. A graduate of Marquette University’s School of Engineering, Kachigan had made his repu

tation during Atlas development. He produced a major paper in 1955 that described force

oscillations of a fluid in a cylindrical tank. Because Atlas had no rings inside the tank to dampen th

oscillations of the liquid propellants, it needed baffles to prevent propellant sloshing. Kachigan

contributions to the problem of sloshing proved to be a major contribution to rocket theory. 

During the five or six weeks before a launch, the Cape swarmed with engineers from Genera

Dynamics and Lewis who worked closely with the Goddard robotic launch operations staff. A

that point, sleepy Cocoa Beach was not the vacation destination it is today. A few inexpensiv

“Abe’s Baby” 7

43 Interview with John Gossett by Virginia Dawson, 2 July 2002.

44 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Virginia Dawson, 7 March 2000.

45 Interview with Robert Gray by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999.

46 Letter from Roger C. Lynch to Virginia Dawson, 4 June 2000.
motels adorned its expansive beaches. Small restaurants like Fat Boy’s became hot spots whe

launch teams could grab a meal of chili and hamburgers at any hour.

Kachigan’s leadership helped shape the early General Dynamics Centaur culture. S

weeks before a launch, he sent a “tiger team” to the Cape. The members of the tiger team

people from the design and technical groups,47 were to “muck through” all the paper, look 

the hardware, and examine all the test procedures and analyze the data. They tried to fin

slightest flaw that might compromise the launch. Kachigan headed investigations when a f

occurred. Tough, analytical, and fair, he was universally respected for his ability to ferret out 

lems and make decisions under pressure.

Because the vehicle could not tolerate the slightest failure of a single component, every s

had to be checked out. Telemetry—the transmission of real-time data such as pressure, ve

and surface angular position by radio link from the vehicle to the ground—was an importan

for assessing whether various systems were functioning properly. Through telemetry, the go

ment could independently monitor prelaunch data to make sure that what the contracto

them was correct. 

Once Atlas and Centaur were mated, each was inflated with nitrogen and held rigid with 

suspension cables to prevent collapse. The Atlas-Centaur vehicle was then ready for ext

prelaunch testing. First, the tiger team ran the propulsion, guidance, and telemetry systems 

pendently. Then they simulated a launch without propellants. All this testing culminated 

so-called tanking test, when liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen were actually loaded. A simu

launch of the entire system, called a “wet dress rehearsal,” verified that the valves were wo

correctly, pressures and temperatures were right, and all other systems worked in the low-te

ature environment. NASA and General Dynamics carefully reviewed the data at a ser

preflight readiness reviews. Whenever a problem in the data was found, the affected system h

be taken apart and studied, then put back together and tested.48 As the launch day neared, a 

nician performed a coin-tap test, literally tapping the composite payload fairing and insu

panels of the Centaur to make sure no laminations of the skins had pulled away from the cor

left air pockets. Then, shortly before declaring the vehicle ready, launch director Robert Gray 

his ritual walk down the entire length of the vehicle and visually inspected it for any flaw

more sophisticated testing might have missed. 

On launch day, about thirty engineers huddled in Building AE, where the atmospher

thick with cigarette smoke and sweat. A launch erased the distinction between contractor an

servant, with everyone focused on the job of checking and rechecking every system. Buildin

housed the instrumentation support for all unpiloted launch vehicles. During the period be

78 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

47 Interview with Karl Kachigan by Virginia Dawson, 7 June 2000.

48 Joseph Green and Fuller C. Jones, “The Bugs That Live at -423 ̊,” Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact 80 (January 1968): 3
propellant loading and liftoff, all NASA engineers in the AE Building focused on telemetry dat

spewed out on a series of strip charts. If any of the data indicated an anomaly, an engineer woul

immediately inform the people in the blockhouse, who then might order the launch stopped. 

Pressure was especially intense in the blockhouse, where Dan Sarokon, the General Dynamic

launch conductor; Gray; Roger Lynch, Centaur launch operations manager; and representative

from Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney sat with about sixty other engineers. They checked th

vehicle’s vital signs on instruments that showed voltages, temperatures, and pressures. Saroko

pushed the button that began the final countdown. With Atlas-Centaur underway, the director o

the NASA Lewis Launch Vehicles Division, along with other NASA engineers, sat glued to the

monitors in Building AE. Telemetry data proved to be particularly valuable if a launch failed

Vanguard rocket veteran Skip Mackey, who served as head of the telemetry station for over fort

years, provided the blockhouse with real-time commentary on the data by telephone. “All the year

of preparation for a launch came down to the push of a button,” one engineer remarked: “If 

goes up you are a hero. If it doesn’t, you’re a goat.”49

“Abe’s Baby” 7

General Dynamics Launch Conductor Dan Sarokon (foreground) and Roger Lynch, Centaur Operations Manager, prepare for an

Atlas-Centaur countdown, 1964. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

49 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999.
Out of the Doghouse

It took eighteen months of intense preparation for the first test flight of Centaur 

the new Lewis management. To underline the importance of the Centaur connection 

Saturn, President John F. Kennedy visited the launch site as the launch date approach

November 1963. Several days later, Atlas-Centaur engineers and technicians were devas

to hear that the President had been assassinated in Dallas. NASA delayed the launch of A

Centaur 2 (AC-2) one day to allow the Atlas-Centaur launch team to mourn Kennedy a

refocus on the arduous job of preparing for launch. Because no launch vehicle had 

required jettisonable insulation panels, there was no knowledge to apply in their d

Uncertainty over how they would function induced Silverstein to order them bolted t

Centaur tank in what he called a “brute-force fix.” 

80 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Left to right, Krafft Ehricke, the first Centaur Project Manager; Roger Lynch, Centaur Launch Operations Manager; Roger L

President and Chairman of the Board of General Dynamics; Grant Hansen, the new Centaur Project Manager; and Ed Hein

Corporate Director of Technology, wait tensely before the launch of AC-2 inside the blockhouse during a planned countdown h

November 1963. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
“Abe’s Baby” 8

First tension (bottom), then cheers (top) erupt in the control room after the first successful launch of AC-2, 27 November 1963.

(Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
On 27 November 1963, the Atlas-Centaur lifted off from Cape Canaveral at 2:03 p.m. 

pushed Centaur to an altitude of 150 miles. The upper stage separated flawlessly from Atla

fired its two 15,000-pound-thrust RL10 engines. This first flight proved the compatibil

Atlas with the upper stage Centaur and also proved that liquid-hydrogen engines could be 

in space. The same day, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft issued a classified report entitled “RL10 E

for Advanced Space Missions.”50 The RL10, it announced, “is a mature engine with proven 

bility and reliability.” The company’s description emphasized the simplicity and controllabi

the operating cycle. 

On the heels of the Centaur launch came a test launch of the Saturn S-IV stage. I

powered by a six-engine cluster of RL10 engines with 90,000 pounds of thrust on 29 Ja

1964. This liquid-hydrogen upper stage had a more conventional reinforced structure w

insulation placed inside the rocket tank. The claim that Centaur was the first successful laun

a liquid-hydrogen upper stage was established just in time. 

Although Centaur showed results, Headquarters agonized over whether the United 

could win the race to the Moon. Lift capabilities of the United States still did not yet equal 

of the Soviet Union. Deputy Administrator Seamans asked William Fleming, Director of Pro

Review, to compare the ability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to land unpiloted spacecraft on the M

Using intelligence reports, he concluded that the total weight the Soviet Union could land o

Moon in 1964 was 850 pounds, compared to a weight of 750 pounds for Surveyors to be lau

in 1966. An improved Centaur, slated to be flightworthy in 1967, would be able to l

Surveyor payload weighing 1,000 pounds. He concluded, “It is felt that the Surveyor pro

complemented by flights of the Lunar Orbiter beginning late in 1966 and followed by an A

manned landing in 1969 would equal or exceed any program of lunar missions that the Ru

might accomplish over the corresponding period of time.”51 Fleming’s memo led Homer N

to strongly recommend the development of a Saturn 1 B-Centaur vehicle to cover the ne

larger lunar payloads and advanced planetary programs. Newell concluded, “Based on A

landings on the Moon in the late 1960’s, the sequence of technological and scientific ac

ments represented by Ranger, Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and Apollo should offset many 

‘spectaculars.’”52 However, just in case the Apollo program was delayed into the 1970s, N

thought that NASA might consider sending a larger unpiloted lunar spacecraft to explo

lunar topography and return lunar samples to Earth.

Despite the reassurance he provided to Seamans, Newell was clearly dissatisfied with the prog

the Surveyor program. To William Pickering, Director of JPL, Newell emphasized the importance 

82 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

50 “RL10 Engine for Advanced Space Missions,” Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 27 November 1963, Box 59, Old RL10 

(Goette files), DEB Vault, NASA Glenn. 

51 William Fleming, “Lunar Program Planning,” 27 May 1964, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collecti

52 Homer E. Newell to Associate Administrator, 3 April 1964, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collectio
Surveyor program to NASA. “Within NASA the Surveyor project is near the top of the overall priorit

list. Within the Office of Space Science and Applications, because of our commitment to provide th

needed support to the Apollo mission, as well as because of its scientific value, Surveyor is at the top o

our priority listing.”53 He did not think that JPL management was giving the program adequate suppor

He wanted closer monitoring of the contract with Hughes Aircraft for the spacecraft and bette

communication with Headquarters over Surveyor progress and needs. 

During this time, Surveyor earned a well-deserved reputation with Congress as “one of the lea

orderly and most poorly executed of NASA projects.”54 Many of the problems stemmed from poo

planning and lax management. Representative Joseph Karth, a vocal critic of the Centaur, admitte

that Surveyor had not received enough scrutiny when it was conceived in early 1960: “We were i

such a sweat to get going that we said, ‘Let’s not think about it, let’s do it.’ I was on the spac

committee then, and it’s true, we were impetuous.”55 The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract allowe

Hughes to run up huge project costs, charging them as NASA-directed changes without penalt

This was the first large space contract that NASA let to Hughes Aircraft. Hughes used it to learn th

problems and pitfalls of building a spacecraft. 

By 1964, the multiple problems associated with Surveyor development were so serious tha

NASA ordered a full review and concluded that the problems were both technical and manage

rial. Lack of supervision at Hughes, poor oversight by JPL, and neglect by NASA Headquarter

all contributed to the inability of the Surveyor project to meet standards. For example, tests o

the terminal descent guidance control system revealed problems. The vernier motors, designe

by the Reaction Motor Division of Thiokol Chemical Company, were so undependable tha

JPL sought an additional contract with Space Technology Laboratories to provide a backup

This added more costs to the program.56

Under Lewis management, Centaur was equally plagued with a concatenation of problem

that slowed development. AC-2’s bolted-down insulation panels had carried instruments tha

revealed that the panels were not sturdy enough to withstand the aerodynamic forces Centau

encountered during flight through the atmosphere. The redesign increased the weight of Centau

always a critical factor with respect to the amount of payload the vehicle could carry.

Ground tests revealed that the helium used to chill down the engines and purge the insulatio

needed to be released at a higher rate immediately prior to launch. In addition to cooling th

engines prior to starting them in space, helium prevented the insulation from freezing to the ski

of the liquid-hydrogen tank. It was decided that an additional helium tank needed to be carrie

“Abe’s Baby” 8

53 Homer E. Newell to William Pickering, 13 July 1964, Surveyor files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

54 H. R. Committee on Science and Astronautics Investigation, 1965. See also Clayton Koppes, The JPL and the American Spa

Program, 173. 

55 Ibid, 173.

56 Ibid, 173–183.
on board to continue the helium purge during liftoff.57 The next Centaur (AC-3), launch

June 1964, jettisoned the insulation panels and nose fairing successfully, but, almost immed

a freak failure of the hydraulic system caused the vehicle to spin out of control. Then A

launched in December 1964, tumbled wildly during the coast phase. 

Through a massive effort that involved both analysis and testing, engineers traced the 

of the AC-4 failure to uncontrolled propellant behavior after venting. Fred Merino of G

Dynamics and Lewis staffers Andy Stofan, Steve Szabo, and Ray Lacovic conducted some 

first investigations of zero-gravity propellant management. They initiated a test program usin

100-foot drop tower at Lewis for experiments. Later, an elaborate, state-of-the-art, 500-foot 

gravity facility was constructed for basic research on liquid hydrogen. Merino marveled 

openness of Lewis engineers. He often went to Lewis for a month to observe tests. “There 

times when I would come up with a problem,” he said, “and we would have to relate it 

people in Cleveland and give our rationale for why we thought there was a need for a d

change. And there were many times that they would run tests for us. It was their test, b

provided input as required to get the results that were needed to effect the design change to 

a mission requirement.”58 With this type of creative collaboration, program personnel made 

progress on resolving problems.

The test program focused on the problem of the sloshing of propellants in flight—inform

needed for designing the autopilot controls. Through tests and analysis, scientists discovered t

zero gravity, liquid hydrogen adheres to the sides of the tank with the ullage area (space whe

gas vapors collect) in its center. Because of the position of the ullage area, a large amount of l

hydrogen fuel had been released, along with hydrogen gas, when AC-4’s vent valve opened. A

liquid flowed overboard, it expanded with a tremendous amount of evaporation and formed 

of gas. This ball exerted a force on the vehicle that caused it to tumble. Merino and colleague 

Perkins developed a patented vapor sensor to signal to the system’s computer whether the valv

surrounded by liquid or vapor, and they redesigned the vent system. This knowledge was shared 

engineers designing a propellant-management system for the liquid-hydrogen stages for S

Confidence in liquid hydrogen as a propulsion fuel was building. 

The new knowledge of the ullage area also led to greater confidence in managing the p

lants during the coast phase. A Reaction Control System (RCS) was designed to pr

acceleration just before venting. The system consisted of a hydrogen peroxide supply bottle, 

valves, and small vernier motors called thrusters. Before the tank pressure reached a certain p

small thrusters in the tank were fired to reposition the propellants in the aft end of the ve

Then a valve could be opened to relieve pressure without danger of loss of liquid propellan

84 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

57 See Green and Jones, 27.

58 Interview with Fred Merino, 5 June 2000. See also Centaur Project Office, “Coast-Phase Propellant and Vehicle Be

paper presented to Low Gravity Cryogenic Fluid Mechanics Ad Hoc Committee Meeting, Convair/General Dynamics

March 1965.
same thrusters were fired in preparation for starting the engine, so that liquid rather than gaseou

hydrogen and oxygen entered the pumps. 

Continuing Doubts

Engineers were confident that the launch of AC-5 in March 1965 would succeed becaus

direct ascent was not as complicated. The checkout went forward without incident. Countdow

was equally flawless. The Atlas engines fired, the hold-down pins retracted, and Atlas-Centau

lifted off. At 5 feet off the ground, the Atlas engines suddenly shut down and the vehicle droppe

back to Earth, causing an explosion that extensively damaged the pad. An eyewitness provide

this understated report: “The burning gas cloud had an expansion velocity of over 3,00

feet/second, and furnished one of the best examples seen at the cape of why fragile human being

retreat to massively built blockhouses during a launch. No one was injured, other than feeling

but AC-5 was a mass of blackened rubble, and Pad A had suffered major damage and woul

require extensive rebuilding.”59 Failure analysis revealed that after liftoff, an improperly installe

instrumentation pressure transducer on Atlas had caused a valve to close, cutting off fuel to th

engines. Although it had nothing to do with Centaur, this explosion secured Centaur’s reputa

tion as the “hard luck bird” once and for all.60

The NASA Budget Authorization Hearings held the same month gave Representative Josep

Karth the opportunity to condemn General Dynamics for an “inordinately bad job” on Centaur.

Congress was unhappy about the enormous costs of the program—now between $600 and $70

million. The price of the rocket seemed to reflect NASA’s dependency on General Dynamics as 

sole-source supplier. Implicit in Karth’s aggressive questioning was the issue of the unique desig

of Centaur—the thin-skinned balloon structure and the intermediate bulkhead, in particula

Previously, when Centaur had run into troubles, NASA had attributed them to the difficulties o

developing a liquid-hydrogen rocket. Now Marshall had tested the S-IV stage for the Saturn C-

with the reinforced design favored by von Braun. Marshall engineers had also developed a new

Rocketdyne J-2 engine designated for the second and third stages of Saturn V. This engine burne

liquid hydrogen and produced 150,000 pounds of thrust, compared to the RL10 engine’s 15,00

pounds.62 Were the foibles of pressure-stabilized design, rather than the difficulties associated with i

“Abe’s Baby” 8

59 See Green and Jones, 30.

60 See Green and Jones, 31. See also William Hines, “Atlas Blast Laid to ‘Impossible’ Mishap,” Evening Star (5 March 1965).

61 Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings, H.R. 3730, March 1965, Part 

1143–1144. NASA had also planned to use Centaur as an upper stage for the Saturn 1-B to be flown on missions after 196

see p. 1138. Originally, in addition to the eight development flights for Centaur, seventeen flights of Surveyor were planned, plu

six for Saturn 1-B in support of Voyager. The Saturn 1-B/Centaur program was terminated in 1968.

62 On the J-2, see Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980), 140–153; Paul N. Fuller and Hen

M. Minami, Jr., “Rocketdyne Reborn,” Space 3 (1987): 55–58; W. R. Studhalter, “The J-2 Liquid Hydrogen Rocket Engine

National Aero-Nautical Meeting, Society of Automotive Engineers, April 1963.
liquid-hydrogen propellant, holding back Centaur development? Karth thought General Dyn

was the real problem and cited past problems with the intermediate bulkhead as evidence of a 

job. “This has been a very favored program. It has, if you please, had a DX priority for 3 yea

highest possible. Tremendous effort has gone into it.”63 He thought that NASA should consid

alternative source, such as Titan III with a high-energy upper stage. At this time, JPL was agi

for launching Surveyor on the Titan III with an upper stage called the Transtage. Congre

Weston E. Vivian of Michigan supported the idea of creating some competition among aero

companies:

It would seem to me you have a program heavily dependent on Centaur, specifically i

the unmanned spacecraft area. You are planning procurement of several hundred millio

dollars more equipment of this variety. You have a single contractor on whom your hope

rest totally, and whose dollar estimates will control your dollar estimates. I would frankl

feel a competitive program should be initiated, and even though the apparent co

initially might be higher, I would certainly consider that you should open bids fo

procurement of a given number of Centaur vehicles, say one-third of the total you ar

planning to buy, from an alternate source.64

In response, Homer Newell reaffirmed NASA’s commitment to General Dynamics an

company’s unique expertise in manufacturing the thin-skinned structure: “The capabil

building thin-wall pressure stabilized tankage to our extremely high standards has been h

developed at Convair and is not currently available elsewhere. Because of these considera

DOD and NASA have concluded that it is not practicable to consider alternate sources for 

Atlas or Centaur.”65

This congressional pressure for more competition was not lost on Martin Marietta-D

The president of the company, I. Nelvin Palley, had already offered its Titan IIIC to NASA 

alternative to Atlas-Centaur. The company had also raised this possibility with DOD and 

ested members of Congress.66 After the first flight of Titan IIIC proved successful in July, th

Force offered to carry Surveyor to the Moon on Titan’s next flight, scheduled for September

mention was made of the fact that Surveyor was far from being ready. 

86 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

63 Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings, H.R. 3730, March 1965, 

1143–1144.

64 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings, 1140.

65 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings, 1147.

66 Earl Hilburn to Robert Seamans, Jr., 22 March 1965, Surveyor files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

67 “Titan 3C Offered to Soft Land Surveyor,” Cocoa Tribune (21 June 1965). See also William J. Normyle, “Congress Ma

NASA Titan 3 Study,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (12 July 1965): 30.
“Abe’s Baby” 8

The spectacular explosion of AC-5 in March 1965 left Pad 34A a mass of blackened rubble. (NASA Glenn Research Center

unprocessed photo)
Because of the damage to the launch pad from the explosion of AC-5, launch comple

was rushed into service, making the launch of AC-6 possible on 11 August 1965. This w

last R&D flight of the direct-ascent program. The Atlas-Centaur operated flawlessly, su

fully injecting a dummy of the Surveyor spacecraft into a prescribed transfer trajector

simulated impact with the target, the so-called “paper Moon.” AC-6 flight-tested an imp

propellant control system. Cleveland’s Plain Dealer headline announced, “Paper Moon 

Gets Rocket Out of Doghouse.”68 The article pointed out that the Russians had failed twic

year in soft-landing attempts, then added that three of the previous five tests of Centau

also failed. The feasibility of Centaur was still a matter of opinion. In response to inquiries 

the ever-vigilant Representative Karth, Seamans responded defensively: 

The slippages in schedule and the increases in program cost are serious problems; but 

must be realized that this mission is one of the most difficult technical assignments w

have undertaken in the exploration of space. We are continuing to do everything we ca

to maximize the chances of successful engineering flights in 1966 and of scientific mission

in 1967. To accomplish these objectives, it may become necessary to reprogram additiona

funds in FY 1966 for the Surveyor project.69

The relentless criticism by the press and Congress continued. In March of 1966

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences again complained that generous funding for 

Centaur and Surveyor had produced less than spectacular results. Legislators questioned wh

the Apollo program’s need for Surveyor had passed. In his confidential testimony befor

committee, Newell responded that NASA still regarded Surveyor as important for verifyin

design concepts used in the Apollo Lunar Excursion Module (LEM). The first Surveyor w

also provide information on landing loads at surface impact. Its TV camera would locate p

berances and depressions in the lunar terrain, areas to avoid when selecting an appropriate la

site.70

What Surveyor could no longer guarantee was the quality of the science it would re

Narrow Apollo objectives had compromised plans by scientists to use Surveyor to acquire e

sive knowledge of lunar geography and geology. Ronald Scott, a scientist at Ca

complained that the scientists recognized that Surveyor “is now essentially a back-up m

for Apollo.”71 Milwitzky agreed that the “massive difficulties in getting the basic Sur

system to work” had drained both manpower and attention away from the scientific mi

88 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

68 Plain Dealer, 12 August 1965.

69 Robert Seamans, Jr., to James Webb, 10 November 1965, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

70 Confidential testimony, Homer Newell, 2 March 1966, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

71 Ronald Scott to Benjamin Milwitzky, 22 December 1965, Surveyor files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
and changed its basic goals. If Apollo remained on schedule, the role of Surveyor would b

limited to the determination of the Moon’s surface. Should it turn out to be a surface that woul

support a lunar landing, this would be an important contribution in view of the Apoll

program’s national importance. If they were to discover that the surface was relatively soft, mor

flights of Surveyor might be necessary to provide additional data. Milwitzky speculated that th

Apollo mission might be delayed sufficiently to allow the scientific flights to get to the Moo

first. He reassured Scott that the science missions were an essential part of NASA’s lunar explo

ration program: “there is no intent on our part to cancel these missions or let them slowly withe

away on the vine.”72

Although Centaur was ready for a direct shot to the Moon, Surveyor was still mired i

development problems. Silverstein decided to launch another R&D flight to test Centaur

restart capability. Unfortunately, AC-8, launched in April 1966, did nothing to dispel th

concerns of the scientific community and Congress. A leak in the hydrogen peroxide system

used to settle the propellants made it impossible to start one of the Centaur main engines afte

the coast phase. This unbalanced thrust sent the vehicle into a tumble. Space Daily dryl

reported, “The Centaur still has not demonstrated its parking orbit capabilities, the absolut

requirement to justify the development of the Centaur transportation system.”73 Yet to the eng

neers involved in the redesign of the baffles and vents, the system was finally satisfactory. Th

leak in the hydrogen peroxide system had nothing to do with the restart capability. They wer

convinced that the restart problem was solved. 

To increase its leverage with Pratt & Whitney, Lewis Research Center was finally able to tak

control of management of the RL10 engine from Marshall in May. A new office, managed b

William Goette with a staff of four, was set up. The office would be responsible for testing th

more advanced RL10A-3-3, qualified in November 1966. 

A Soft Landing on the Moon

At the end of May, Surveyor appeared ready for a first flight, although NASA acknowledge

that a large number of last-minute changes to Surveyor equipment increased the risk of failure

Although the mission might not achieve its primary objectives, it would yield enough useful dat

“to permit greater confidence in overcoming some of these uncertainties.”74 After a nearly flawles

launch on a bright Memorial Day morning, AC-10 hurtled skyward carrying the first Surveyo

The Centaur RL10 engines ignited 4 minutes 12 seconds after liftoff. They operated for 7 minute

“Abe’s Baby” 8

72 Benjamin Milwitzky to Ronald Scott, 17 January 1966, Surveyor files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

73 Space Daily (11 April 1966), Centaur files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

74 Earl D. Hilburn to Dr. Seamans, “Special meeting to ascertain launch readiness of Surveyor,” 25 May 1966, Surveyor file

NASA Historical Reference Collection. For a technical overview of the Surveyor Program, see J. Jason Wentworth, “A Survey 

Surveyor,” Quest (Winter 1993): 4–16.
90 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

The Fourteen Launches of the Atlas-Centaur for the Surveyor Program

(1963–1968)

Launch Date Mission Vehicle Payload Objective

27 November 1963 R&D AC-2 No payload Demonstrate separation.

(one-burn)

30 June 1964 R&D AC-3 No payload Demonstrate jettison of 

(one-burn) insulation panels and nose 

fairing. Failed.

11 December 1964 R&D AC-4 2,070 lb Demonstrate coast-phase 

(two-burn) propellant control.

2 March 1965 R&D AC-5 1,411 lb Demonstrate operational 

(one-burn) readiness. Failed.

11 August 1965 R&D AC-6 2,100 lb Demonstrate operational 

(one-burn) readiness in direct ascent.

7 April 1966 R&D AC-8 1,730 lb Demonstrate coast-phase 

(one-burn) propellant control. Failed.

30 May 1966 Surveyor 1 AC-10 2,193 lb First operational Atlas-Cent

(one-burn) flight. First controlled 

unpiloted landing on the 

Moon. First pictures from th

Moon.

20 September 1966 Surveyor 2 AC-7 2,204 lb Second soft landing on the 

Moon. Postlanding TV surv

26 October 1966 R&D AC-9 1,740 lb First engine restart of 

(two-burn LH2/LO2 engines. Centaur 

simulated operational for two-burn

lunar transfer) missions. 

17 April 1967 Surveyor 3 AC-12 2,281 lb Perform soft landing within 

(two-burn) Apollo landing zone. 

Manipulate lunar surface 

with soil sampler.

14 July 1967 Surveyor 4 AC-11 2,295 lb Perform soft landing at Sinu

(two-burn) Medii. Conduct vernier 

engine experiment.

8 September 1967 Surveyor 5 AC-13 2,217 lb Perform soft landing on Ma

(two-burn) Tranquillitatis. Determine 

chemical elements in soil. 

7 November 1967 Surveyor 6 AC-14 2,220 lb Perform soft landing at 

(two-burn) Sinus Medii. 

7 January 1968 Surveyor 7 AC-15 2,289 lb Perform soft landing at Tych

(two-burn) Last Surveyor mission.
18 seconds before engine cutoff and release of the spacecraft. Then engineers and scientists 3,00

miles away at JPL in Pasadena, California, took over. They monitored data in the JPL Space Fligh

Operations Facility (SFOF), where there were banks of computers for analyzing trajectories an

telemetry data and sending commands to the spacecraft. Their connection to the Deep Spac

Information Facility kept JPL engineers in radio contact with tracking stations around the world

The next day, the spacecraft made what was referred to as a “mid-course correction” to place it withi

9 miles of its target. Cary Nettles recalled that what the Surveyor actually performed was not a mid

course correction, but reverse and forward firings to dump extra fuel before the craft landed—th

result of a guidance miscalculation by JPL. He said:

The tracking stations were indicating that the Centaur guidance had performed perfectly

and the spacecraft was right on target. This situation came as a complete surprise to JPL

and they needed to do something to get rid of extra fuel they had loaded on for their own

estimate of what the guidance was going to do.75

“Abe’s Baby” 9

75 Letter from J. Cary Nettles to Virginia Dawson, 15 June 2002.

General Dynamics launch team members at Kennedy Space Center (left to right): Tom Henry, Roger Lynch, and Deane Davis hear

the good news of the successful touchdown of Surveyor 1 on the Moon, June 1966. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
No one had expected both Centaur and Surveyor to operate flawlessly on the first try

team at JPL scrambled to coordinate the landing as the spacecraft neared the Moon after 

eling 230,000 miles in 63 hours. Its braking rockets slowed it from nearly 6,000 miles per 

to a bare 3.5 miles per hour. Then, 14 feet from the lunar surface, the rockets cut off an

vehicle dropped to the Moon’s surface. All three footpads hit the surface at almost the 

time and penetrated to a depth of a few inches. The spacecraft rebounded once before co

to rest about 35 miles north of the crater Flamsteed in Oceanus Procellarum on 2 June 

After 40 minutes of suspense, jubilant cheers sounded at JPL, Hughes, General Dyna

Lewis Research Center, and Kennedy Space Center when the first pictures were flashed 

Silverstein’s decision to go with direct ascent was vindicated. 

Surveyor operated for two lunar days (about twenty-eight Earth days) before its batteries 

dead. During this time, Surveyor transmitted about 15,000 striking pictures of the solar sy

including the Sun’s corona out to at least three or four solar radii and other celestial b

including Sirius, Canopus, Jupiter, and Gemini. As the lunar night closed in, Surveyor rec

the rate of temperature decay. In their final positioning, Surveyor’s solar panels faced west s

the craft would cast a long shadow at lunar dawn for the Apollo astronauts to see during 

forthcoming mission. 

The performance of Centaur made the Surveyor mission possible. Placed in its trajecto

Centaur with near-pinpoint accuracy, Surveyor hit the Moon surprisingly close to its target. A 

from Deputy Administrator Seamans congratulated the Lewis team. Referring to the trans

Centaur to Cleveland three and a half years earlier, Seamans wrote, “The achievement o

Centaur organization, both government and contractor, is particularly striking when the tech

difficulty and complexity of the Centaur development is properly understood. At times, so

these difficulties must have appeared to be nearly insurmountable. However, the outstanding 

nical competence of the people and the dedication which they have given to the Centaur p

seems to have reduced all these difficulties to manageable size.”76

The United States had achieved its first soft landing of a spacecraft on the Moon, bu

Soviet Union’s Luna IX had already beaten Surveyor to the Moon by over three month

simpler mechanically than Surveyor, Luna IX had a crushable structure that was damag

impact. Thus, NASA could claim that Surveyor’s landing was the world’s first controlle

landing. From the few pictures that Luna IX sent back, scientists were relatively sure that a s

craft would not sink into lunar dust, but Surveyor’s thousands of pictures were sharper and c

Gone were doubts about whether the surface could support the weight of the Lunar Excu

Module. Because Surveyor was intended to demonstrate the soundness of the basic landing 

92 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

76 Lewis News (10 June 1966); The Orbit (24 June 1966) (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Florida Research and Development C
nique the LEM would use, astronauts Deke Slayton, Edwin (Buzz) Aldrin, Thomas Stafford, an

Eugene Cernan witnessed the first Surveyor’s touchdown from JPL’s control room. 

The next launch—AC-7 carrying Surveyor 2, an engineering test model—was launched from

the Cape in September 1966. This time, Surveyor’s vernier engines failed, causing it to tumble ou

of control. It crashed on the lunar surface at a velocity of 8,737 feet per second. Despite th

setback, Centaur’s increasing reliability enabled NASA to justify an order of five additiona

Centaurs from General Dynamics on 23 September 1966. This time, the new contract fo

$15,565,331 was fixed-price, a controversial but astute way to control Centaur’s costs. For the

superhuman effort in turning the troubled rocket into a reliable upper stage, Cary Nettles and E

Jonash (who took over as head of the Launch Vehicles Division when David Gabriel left) receive

NASA’s Distinguished Service Medal in early October as they readied AC-9 for launch. 

The next Centaur, launched on 26 October 1966 from Complex 36B, definitively prove

Centaur’s capability to restart its liquid-hydrogen engines in space. The vehicle carried a 1,750

pound dummy model of the Surveyor spacecraft. Centaur was able to compensate automaticall

for the shutdown of Atlas’ sustainer engine 6 seconds early. Boosted into a 90-nautical-mil

parking orbit by its first burn, AC-9 coasted in a circular orbit under low-gravity conditions fo

24 minutes. The main engines of Centaur ignited, propelling the vehicle into the proper simu

lated lunar intercept trajectory. Although the Agena upper stage had proved its restart capabilit

five years earlier, the ability to restart liquid-hydrogen engines in space was hailed as a

outstanding achievement. With a coast period, Centaur launches were no longer restricted t

the summer months but could take place throughout the year. The restart capability als

increased the amount of available launch time each day. 

The flight also verified the reliability of the inertial guidance system to control an indirec

ascent mission to the Moon. Homer Newell wrote to Abe Silverstein to congratulate the Cente

on this achievement: “Your Center may take justifiable pride in the aggressive manner in whic

this most difficult task was undertaken and the professional manner in which it has bee

completed.”77 Edgar Cortright’s congratulatory letter stated: 

Recalling the situation at the time you undertook to manage Centaur, I cannot think of

a single other group in the country which would have accepted that responsibility under

such dire circumstances. I can still recall your personal response to me when I asked you

to consider it—which was, in effect, ‘Someone has to do it.’ Having watched Centaur

development fairly closely, I am acutely aware of the personal sacrifice made by many

Lewis employees, not to mention their families, in completing this development.

Although it has been tough, I can’t help but feel that most of them will look back on these

“Abe’s Baby” 9

77 Homer E. Newell to Abe Silverstein, 10 November 1966, John Sloop papers, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
years in the way many of us look back on our military service—namely, they hope the

never have to do it again, but they wouldn’t have missed it.78

Newspapers jumped on the bandwagon. “A powerful Atlas-Centaur rocket shattered a 

time scientific jinx today and handed the United States new muscle to lift heavy payloads 

Moon and planets,” reported the Chicago Tribune on October 27. NASA hailed Centaur 

“world’s first operational rocket using liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen for propellants.”79

Behind the scenes, however, analysis of the data from this flight revealed some disqu

facts. Besides the premature shutdown of the Atlas sustainer engine, one of the Pratt & Wh

engines had experienced an unexplained drop in performance. Although it had not affecte

outcome of the mission, it was a bad sign. Another problem was that the hot exhaust 

Centaur’s nozzles was impinging on the turbine pumps, causing them to warm more than 

should. As a precaution, protective shields were added to prevent damage from exhaust gase

Surveyor III (AC-12), launched in April 1967, marked the first operational use of Cen

restart capability—once for initial boost after Atlas separation and again to launch the spac

into a lunar trajectory after a short parking orbit that lasted approximately 25 minutes. Afte

12 released Surveyor, the spacecraft received a command to lock onto the Sun and Canopu

largest star in the southern hemisphere. Surveyor coasted until it reached the point for its 

course correction. Then one of the tracking stations sent the command to orient the spac

into its landing position. It landed only 3 miles from its planned target—a point on a m

object 237,000 miles away from Earth. The spacecraft took several unplanned, very large 

before coming to rest at an angle inside a lunar crater strewn with rocks on the Ocean of St

Surveyor III sent back thousands of pictures, including a picture of its own footprints. In 

tion to a camera, Surveyor carried a “soil scratcher” to scoop up lunar soil and break lunar ro

By examining photographs of the digging operations of its tiny scoop, scientists were a

calculate the bearing strength of the Moon’s surface.

Surveyor V (AC-13), launched in September 1967 on an improved Atlas, landed on th

of Tranquility, 18 miles from its target. Experiments using an alpha scattering spectrome

device that bombarded the surface of the Moon with subatomic particles, proved that the 

surface consisted of volcanic rock basalt with high titanium content. This was similar to 

found on Earth. Surveyor V sent back 18,006 pictures of terrain under consideration fo

landing site for Apollo. Gone were any doubts that a controlled landing on the Moon cou

accomplished. Surveyor VI (AC-14) explored another potential landing site and confirme

94 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

78 Edgar Cortright to Abe Silverstein, 28 October 1966, and Chicago Tribune article, both reproduced in Centaur

Anniversary (Cleveland, OH: limited edition, 1972).

79 1968 NASA Authorization, Hearings, March 1967. 

80 Lunar Landmarks, Surveyor Project Newsletter (24 April 1967), NASA Historical Reference Collection.
composition of the lunar soil. Then the vernier engines were ignited and the spacecraft “flew” t

another location about 8 feet away. 

By the seventh and final launch of Surveyor (AC-15) in January 1968, NASA had alread

selected all the landing sites for Apollo. Since Apollo support was superfluous, NASA decided t

make the last Surveyor a completely scientific mission. The Surveyor team selected a site nea

Crater Tycho for the spacecraft’s long arm to scratch and dig. Geologists hailed the results. Despit

its many troubles, the Surveyor program, managed by JPL, proved to be a triumph for NASA an

a highlight in the careers of the people involved in this ambitious undertaking. In reflecting o

the significance of Surveyor, Oran Nicks wrote:

It was as recently as 1966 that Surveyor 1—a robot that, on its first flight, flawlessly made

a radar-controlled landing on another body in the solar system, and turned its television

eye to stare about with the insatiable curiosity of its creators—showed that men setting

foot on the Moon would not sink in a quick sand of Moondust. Since then we have

learned that our expendable machines can be asked to perform tasks of remarkable deli-

“Abe’s Baby” 9

Apollo astronaut Charles Conrad, Jr., examines Surveyor III (landed 19 April 1967) with the Lunar Module 600 feet away on the

Ocean of Storms, 1969. (NASA AS12_48_7136)
cacy, and that our astronauts can be sent off with higher confidence of safe return tha

the hardy sailors who had first crossed the unknown oceans.81

Beyond demonstrating that the surface of the Moon was hard enough for the astrona

land safely, Surveyor proved the usefulness of robotic spacecraft to perform complex tasks. 

controllers learned how to repair spacecraft by remote control. Surveyor also served as a prot

for more advanced spacecraft, such as the Viking Mars lander.82

Even more important, but far less heralded, the mission’s upper stage proved the feasibi

liquid-hydrogen fuel for transporting delicate spacecraft to a designated point in space

RL10 engine was the first liquid-hydrogen rocket engine to be successfully restarted in 

(October 1966). It proved that with a coast and restart, a spacecraft could be positioned f

optimal trajectory to another body in the solar system. With knowledge gained from Ce

the designers of Saturn’s J-2 engine for the upper stages of the Saturn V could move fo

with greater confidence. Among the most significant contributions to basic knowledge of l

hydrogen were the solutions to propellant sloshing and the venting of hydrogen gas in 

gravity. 

Silverstein’s advocacy of liquid hydrogen and his leadership proved to be crucial not on

the success of the Surveyor program, but also for the development of the Saturn rocket. Ref

to the first launch of a Saturn V on the Apollo 4 mission on 9 November 1967, von Braun 

ited Silverstein with “pioneering work in liquid hydrogen technology [that] paved the w

today’s success.”83 This was not an overstatement because Silverstein’s unflagging advocac

won von Braun’s support for liquid hydrogen upper stages for the Saturn V. When Apo

demonstrated the restart capability of the J-2, this decision was vindicated.84

At many points in Stages to Saturn, historian Roger Bilstein refers to the knowledge of 

hydrogen that the designers of the Rocketdyne J-2 engine and the Douglas S-IV and S-IV B 

received through contact with the engineers working on Centaur. Douglas designers were a

benefit from many of the concepts pioneered on Centaur because NASA required its contract

share their know-how with competitors.85 For example, Rocketdyne engineers tried to use a fa

flat-faced copper injector design for the J-2, but the high operating temperatures of l

hydrogen/liquid-oxygen propellants caused it to burn out. They resisted adopting the porou

injector design of Pratt & Whitney’s RL10 engine until a demonstration of its unique Rigi-

96 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

81 Oran Nicks, ed., This Island Earth (NASA SP-250, 1970), 166–167.

82 Jason B. Wentworth, “Survey of Surveyor,” Quest 2 (Winter 1993): 4–16. 

83 See signed photo in Virginia Dawson, Engines and Innovation, 194.

84 Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, 359. 

85 See Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, 188–189; and Oswald H. Lange, “Development of the Saturn Space Carrier V

in Ernst Stuhlinger et al., Astronautical Engineering and Science from Peenemünde to Planetary Space, 21.
“Abe’s Baby” 9

Surveyor’s Cold War context is reflected in a cartoon from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (22 April 1967): 135. (Courtesy of th

Urban Archives, Temple University, Philadelphia)
injector face at Lewis Research Center convinced them. The injector proved to be the solut

their problem.86 In considering the type and amount of insulation required to maintain 

temperatures at -432°F, S-IVB designers at Douglas consulted with people in the Convair Di

of General Dynamics. However, after thoroughly studying the Centaur external insulation

adopted the less technically complex but heavier solution of placing the insulation inside the t

Douglas and Rocketdyne engineers were forewarned of the propensity of liquid hydrogen t

through minute pores in metals. They also learned precious lessons on venting and settling prope

prior to a restart in space. Bilstein wrote: 

Although the liquid hydrogen engines were developed and built by two different contrac

tors, the government managed both programs so that information from one program wa

available to subsequent programs. Lewis Research Center, NASA’s facility in Cleveland

represented an interesting intermediary influence, providing a pool of knowledge abou

liquid hydrogen technology used by Pratt & Whitney and Rocketdyne alike. Just as earl

work at Lewis was a benefit to Pratt & Whitney’s RL-10, Rocketdyne’s later J-2 benefite

from both Pratt & Whitney and Lewis.88

This expertise in liquid-hydrogen technology might have been lost had Webb decid

yield to pressure for the cancellation of Centaur. In contrast to the American success with 

hydrogen, the Russian rocket designer Sergei Korolev had constantly urged the Soviet go

ment to support the development of liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen upper stages but 

received adequate funding. Author Asif Siddiqi makes the point several times in Challen

Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race that the Soviet Union had neither the tech

expertise nor the manufacturing resources in the early 1960s to develop a liquid-hydrogen r

It also lacked adequate ground-test facilities. Siddiqi considered the failure to develop li

hydrogen upper stages “a strategic mistake that cost the Soviet space program much in ter

capability and efficiency, but Korolev alone did not have the force to single-handedly create 

industry in the Soviet Union.”89 Siddiqi points out that the first ground test of a Soviet li

hydrogen/liquid-oxygen engine was not carried out until April 1967. The Soviet Union was a

six years behind the United States in developing what he considered a “critical area of rocket e

technology.”90

98 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

86 See Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn,145.

87 Ibid., 173.

88 Ibid., 153. 

89 Asif Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, 318. A similar point is made by Tom D. Crouch in Aiming for the Stars: The Dream

Doers of the Space Age (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), 179–180. 

90 Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, 548. Siddiqi notes on p. 840 that the actual launch of the Soviet liquid-hydrogen/liquid

rocket did not occur until May of 1987.
“Abe’s Baby” 9

On the tenth anniversary of the transfer of Centaur from Huntsville to Cleveland, Gran

Hansen reminded Bruce Lundin, then Director of Lewis Research Center, of how close Centau

had come to being canceled. He regarded the transfer to Lewis as the key decision in saving th

program. Reveling in the role they had played in pioneering the development of the world’s fir

liquid-hydrogen rocket, he wrote, “Were it not for its being overshadowed by the Moon landin

program, I believe that the Centaur story would have been the prime technical achievement of th

last decade.”91 Homer Newell linked Centaur with the end of the anxiety over America’s launc

vehicle capability. He wrote, “By 1966—when Centaur became fully operational—the Unite

States could at last launch spacecraft for just about any space mission . . . . Although the debat

over whether the United States could or could not match Russian launch capability still aros

occasionally, the subject no longer had the importance that it once did.”92

Left to right: Abe Silverstein; Fred Crawford, President of TRW; and former NASA Administrators T. Keith Glennan and James

Webb at the dedication of the Glennan Space Engineering Building at Case Institute of Technology, January 1969. (Courtesy of

Rebman Photo Service, Inc.)

91 Letter from Grant Hansen to Bruce Lundin, 7 October 1972, reproduced in Centaur’s Tenth Anniversary (Cleveland, OH

limited edition, 1972).

92 Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, 140. 
By the late 1960s, the Civil Rights movement and President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Po

had turned national attention away from the imperatives of a space race with the Soviet Union

war in Vietnam sapped the energies of the Johnson administration, leading to the President’s 

sion not to run for another term. At the same time, James Webb, NASA’s capable Adminis

lost President Johnson’s ear. He had kept alive Kennedy’s dream of landing human beings o

Moon, but he resigned before the historic flight of Apollo 11 in August 1969.

Krafft Ehricke still firmly believed in industrialization of the Moon and piloted flight 

planets. However, in the face of environmentalists and zero-growth advocates of the early 1

his enthusiasm for space tourism, orbiting hotels, and zero-gravity sports may have seemed 

eccentric than prophetic. He continued to promote space travel as a means of transcendin

petty divisions among human beings on Earth, but with the imminent cancellation of Ce

and diminishing support for NASA’s nuclear propulsion program (which he thought held th

to distant travels in space), he sensed “a new kind of disillusion” that eroded confidence in 

he referred to as man’s “extraterrestrial imperative.”93

Ironically, although Centaur’s close identification with the Apollo program had initially sa

from cancellation, the successful conclusion of the Surveyor program increased its vulnera

Centaur had won funding during a time when the urgency of the space race with Soviet Unio

provided the NASA with ample funding for facilities and personnel to support the developmen

radical technology. Centaur had proven not only the feasibility of liquid hydrogen, but als

viability of the concept of government partnership with industry in developing the space ag

technical competence. However, declining budgets for the space program and lack of unity a

scientists over long-term planning threw the planetary program temporarily into limbo.94 Wi

future orders for Atlas-Centaur, General Dynamics prepared to shut down its factory. 

February 1968, W. L. Gorton, Division Vice-President and General Manager of the Pr

Whitney Development Center, informed Abe Silverstein at Lewis Research Center that w

months, they would complete delivery of all RL10 engines on order. Key RL10 engine pers

would have to be reassigned and production space turned over to other projects. He lamente

the nation was about to lose a precious technical capability in liquid hydrogen. “Althoug

special manufacturing and testing facilities can be retained and stored in whatever fashion is 

practical, there is no way to mothball the know-how, the production team, and the factory sp

he wrote. “Previous experience with other engines has demonstrated that once the produ

team is dispersed, it is most difficult and costly to assemble and train a new team with the req

expertise.”95

100 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

93 Quoted by Marsha Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 314. 

94 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration: 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Ins

Press, 2000), xiv. 

95 W. L. Gorton to Abe Silverstein, 6 February 1968, Box 59, Old RL10 Records (Goette files), DEB Vault, NASA Gle
A Changing Vision of Space Travel

Had the Centaur rocket become superfluous? The Apollo years in the 1960s had focuse

single-mindedly on landing Americans on the lunar surface before their Soviet counterpart

In an era of nearly limitless funds for Cold War projects, the notion of a reusable rocket wa

not given a high priority.96 However, once the Moon missions were successfully completed

simply discarding rocket stages that cost millions of dollars to manufacture seemed extravagan

Faced with tightening budgets, NASA leaders decided that seemingly more economica

ferrying systems and reusability were the most important goals for the future. Apollo 11 astro

naut Michael Collins recalled that in the late 1960s, reusability “implied a technologica

maturity, a feeling that space was here to stay, that launching ships into Kennedy’s ‘new ocean

would become routine.” Collins concluded that for an aeronautical engineer, “the path t

reusability was glorious.”97

As the 1960s came to a close, NASA began to officially investigate designs for a reusable spac

vehicle called the Space Transportation System (STS) or Space Shuttle.98 In 1969, NASA awarde

contracts for the first phase of the project. General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell Dougla

and North American Rockwell each received $500,000 to conduct feasibility studies.99 B

September, NASA had pooled these recommendations together and appraised the possibl

designs. The approved plan was to develop a “reusable-rocket transportation system” that wa

capable of “routine access to space.”100 When the next phase began in July 1970, reusability wa

the primary goal, along with a piloted orbiter capable of at least one hundred missions. In earl

1972, after a meeting with NASA Administrator James Fletcher and his deputy, George Low

President Richard Nixon officially announced the plan to dramatically change the America

initiative in space.101 The main rationale for the Shuttle was the presumed low cost of a vehicl

that could be used many times compared to that of a launch vehicle that was used only once

“Abe’s Baby” 10

96 Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (Ne

York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 

97 Michael Collins, Liftoff: The Story of America’s Adventure in Space (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 202. 

98 T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: NASA, 1999). 

99 David Baker, “Evolution of the Space Shuttle, Part I,” Spaceflight 15 (June 1973): 202–210. 

100 Grey, Enterprise, 59. Space Task group, “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future,” September 1969, 

found in Exploring the Unknown, vol. I, 525–543.

101 Henry C. Dethloff, “The Space Shuttle’s First Flight: STS-1,” in From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Colli

Trophy Winners, ed. Pamela E. Mack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 286. See also White House Press Secretar

“The White House, Statement by the President,” 5 January 1972, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Files, NASA Historical Referen

Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, as found in “Nixon Approves the Space Shuttle,” Roger D. Launius, NASA: 

History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994), 232. 
What NASA did not count on was the exorbitant operational costs of sending people into 

as well as the extremely long time it took to turn the Shuttle around.102 

As plans for the Shuttle were finalized, General Dynamics and Lewis engineers reco

themselves to the idea that the Centaur Program would be canceled at some time in the no

distant future. Centaur won a reprieve after the transfer of Atlas-Agena missions to Atlas-Ce

in January 1969.103 Then Atlas-Centaur became the designated launch vehicle for NASA’s 

tious planetary program of the 1970s while the nation awaited the Shuttle. In the next dec

Centaur-launched spacecraft visited every large body in the solar system—the Sun, Earth’s M

Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and beyond.

102 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

102 See Introduction by Roger Launius to To Reach the High Frontier, 14.

103 Agena continued as an Air Force single and upper stage until 1985.
Chapter 4

Heavy Lift

“It was one of those rare moments in time. In the brief span of eight years,

from 1971 to 1978, Americans launched a fleet of robot spacecraft on

paths to the far corners of the solar system . . . undertaking what must

surely be the greatest burst of exploration in the history of mankind.”

—Robert S. Kraemer, NASA Office of Space Science

The 1970s became one of the most significant decades in the history of space science, 

branch of knowledge that received impetus after the launch of Sputnik in October 1957. In 1958

Eisenhower’s Science Advisory Committee defined space science in a pamphlet entitle

Introduction to Outer Space as “knowledge of the Earth, solar system, and the universe.”1 In h

book describing NASA’s early space program, Homer Newell made clear how space scienc

differed from the work of earlier earthbound astronomers who had trained their telescopes on th

heavens. The space program gave scientists new instruments and a new vantage point from whic

to see the heavens, a vantage point free from many of the optical distortions produced by Earth

atmosphere. Newell called attention to the important post-Sputnik role that rockets and space

craft played in the pursuit of new knowledge of the solar system. For Newell, space scienc

comprised “those scientific investigations made possible or significantly aided by rockets, satellite

and space probes.”2 NASA’s space science program had an enormous impact on the science

particularly the disciplines of geophysics, astronomy, physics, and geology. Robert Kraemer, 

former director of NASA planetary programs, recalled, “It was one of those rare moments in time

In the brief span of eight years, from 1971 to 1978, Americans launched a fleet of robot space

craft on paths to the far corners of the solar system . . . undertaking what must surely be th

greatest burst of exploration in the history of mankind.”3

Heavy Lift 10

1 Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (Washington, DC: NASA, 1980), xiii. 

2 Ibid., 11. 

3 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration: 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Institutio

Press, 2000). 
During the 1970s, Centaur technology advanced dramatically. The most significant tec

innovation during this period was a new Teledyne guidance and control system first tes

1973. With more advanced avionics, mission planners had more flexibility in the desi

missions. The new guidance and control system made possible the development of a re

tionary approach to programming vehicle flightpaths through the winds encountered d

liftoff. At the same time, a new rocket propulsion test facility at Lewis’s Plum Brook St

in Sandusky, Ohio, permitted more sophisticated ground-testing of Centaur’s restart 

bility. The missions themselves during this period provided opportunities for testing 

hardware and software in flight.

Like the spaceflights that sent human beings to the Moon, missions that contributed t

knowledge of the universe had propaganda value in demonstrating America’s technical and 

tific prowess. Mars and Venus were highly sought-after prizes for whichever nation could b

first to explore them.4 J. N. James, a JPL engineer during this period, commented, “Althoug

official U.S. position at that time was that we were not competing with the USSR, my fellow 

members and I felt otherwise.”5 The race to the planets put pressure on NASA to take risks. 

the benefit of hindsight, Newell wrote that because the Agency was “exposed directly t

outside pressures to match or surpass the Soviet achievement in space, NASA moved more ra

with the development of observatory-class satellites and the larger deep-space probes tha

scientists would have required.”6 These pressures probably contributed to early failures of mi

dedicated to the advance of NASA’s space science program. 

In the 1960s, NASA’s long-range plan was to send flyby missions to the closest plan

Earth. These missions would pave the way for more complex orbiting missions, eventually le

to landing on a planet. In 1960, JPL concluded that Centaur would make the ideal upper 

for Mariner but opted for the less powerful Atlas-Agena when Centaur development problems t

ened cancellation of the program. The lack of reliable launch vehicles “bedeviled the Am

space endeavor from the beginning,” wrote historians Clinton and Linda Ezell. “While thi

tionship between launch vehicle and spacecraft was apparent in any space project, it h

especially negative effect on Mariner.”7 With the American planetary program held back b

lack of a sufficiently powerful and reliable upper stage, the Soviet Union launched the first 

to Mars in 1962. Relief over the fact that the Russian probe never reached the planet probab

104 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

4 James Schefter, The Race: The Uncensored Story of How America Beat Russia to the Moon (New York: Doubleday, 1999); W

H. Schauer, The Politics of Space: A Comparison of the Soviet and American Space Programs (New York: Holmes & 

Publishers, 1976). 

5 J. N. James, “The First Mission to Mars,” in Mars: Past, Present, and Future, ed. E. Brian Pritchard, vol. 145: Pro

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1992, 30.

6 Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, 97. 

7 Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958–1978 (Washington: NA

4212, 1984), 25.
little to calm NASA’s sense of urgency. Mariner 1 attempted a Venus flyby in 1962, but rang

safety officials had to destroy it when it veered off course. A Mars flyby with Mariner 3 in 196

went silent 9 hours after launch. The second attempt at missions to each of these planets prove

more successful. Mariner 2 became the first spacecraft to encounter another planet when 

reached Venus in 1962, and Mariner 4 provided the first close view of the mysterious red plane

in 1964. 

However, mission specialists in the 1970s needed the heavy lift capability of Centaur. Rober

Gray, Director of Unmanned Launch Operations at Kennedy Space Center, captured the essenc

of this era in two words—“heavy science.”8 The high thrust capability of Centaur, achieve

through the use of liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen propellants, made it the upper stage of choic

for JPL’s scientific missions in the 1970s. As Centaur proved its reliability, JPL personnel forme

strong working relationships with their counterparts at General Dynamics and Lewis Researc

Center. Joe Nieberding attributed this change in perception to the increasing competence of Lew

Research Center Centaur managers. “They recognized that we knew what we were doing,” he said

“We really depended on each other to do our jobs.”9 Mission designer Charles Kohlhase of JP

chose Centaur because of the vehicle’s “enormous performance capability.”10 Norm Haynes of JP

recalled that in 1971, Atlas-Centaur was “the only way we could get a spacecraft into Mars orb

. . . we started out with a big mass and we started shaving a little in the spacecraft, but we got mo

of it out of the launch vehicle.”11

Atlas-Centaur sent very heavy orbiting observatories to circle Earth and record extensive dat

about the celestial sky. It also sent a variety of spacecraft on trips throughout the solar system.12 Titan

Centaur, to be discussed in the following chapter, launched six missions to the Sun and the inne

and outer planets. Two decades later, a redesigned Titan-Centaur launched the Cassini mission t

Saturn. NASA’s ambitious probes to the outer reaches of the solar system helped win the prestige rac

with the Soviet Union. Because the Russians used conventional fuel in their upper stages, their cra

were heavier and could not provide the same weight-carrying capacity as Centaur.

Heavy Lift 10

8 Interview with Robert Gray by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999.

9 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999.

10 Interview with Charles Kohlhase by Virginia Dawson, 8 June 2000.

11 Interview with Norm Haynes by Virginia Dawson, 9 June 2000.

12 The nine planetary launches, together with the six launches of Titan III-Centaur discussed in the following chapter, constitu

almost the entire history of Centaur launched probes to uncover the mysteries of our solar system. (The first of the seven Tita

III-Centaur launches was a mass simulator payload.) There were two later Atlas-Centaur launches: the Atlas-Centaur IIAS launc

of the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) for NASA by the Atlas commercial program in December 1995 (AC-121) an

the Titan IV-Centaur launch of Cassini for NASA in October 1997 (TC-21). SOHO was put into a LaGrange orbit to stud

the Sun, and Cassini was a science mission to the outer planets. 
In addition to its service to NASA’s space science program, Atlas-Centaur becam

preferred launch vehicle for the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiz

(Intelsat). During the 1970s, Atlas-Centaur launched nineteen commercial satellites (wit

failures) and the first of seven Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) satellites f

military. These satellites were the spaceborne portion of a global Department of De

communications system. The decade proved exceptionally busy for the Launch Ve

Division at Lewis, headed between 1971 and 1974 by Dan Shramo. As the Lewis role in la

vehicles expanded in 1974, Center Director Bruce Lundin created a Launch Ve

Directorate under Andrew Stofan. Henry Slone became manager of Atlas-Centaur, with 

Winslow replacing Stofan as project manager of Titan-Centaur. 

A Growing Expertise

A massive downsizing of Lewis Research Center in the early 1970s could not dampe

enthusiasm of the members of the Launch Vehicles Division for their bird. No longer Abe’s 

Centaur belonged to the new generation of men and women who had experienced the tr

tions of developing Centaur. The young engineers whom NASA had recruited in the early 

were just reaching their stride. Not part of the laboratory’s research tradition, they had ma

with the Centaur program, shaped by the constant pressure of a launch date dictated by the 

tion of Earth in relation to the other planets. From their common focus and physical iso

from the rest of the laboratory evolved a distinctive launch vehicles culture within Lewi

Nieberding, a graduate of local John Carroll University with a major in physics, had spe

entire life in Cleveland before he started work at NASA Lewis in the early 1960s. Within hi

month in the Launch Vehicles Division, he had seen both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans f

first time.13

People in the Launch Vehicles Division grew used to shuttling back and forth acro

country. They attended meetings, scrutinized the fabrication of Centaur tanks in San D

monitored tests at Sycamore Canyon and Point Loma, negotiated with the payload special

JPL, set up shake tests at the Lewis Plum Brook facility, and flew down to Cape Canave

prepare for launches. Some of the older “research men” at Lewis resented the privileges and 

salaries of the new recruits in the Launch Vehicles Division, but they wanted nothing to do 

the rough-and-tumble world of Centaur. The Development Engineering Building (

completed in the mid-1960s provided office space for several hundred engineers outside the 

ratory’s main gate. The location of the Launch Vehicles Division in the DEB emphasiz

separation from the research side of the laboratory.

Because of the importance of the interface between the payload and the launch ve

Centaur engineers became thoroughly familiar with the science of the missions. Most often

106 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

13 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999.
worked with mission planners at JPL in Pasadena, California. They also managed missions fo

Goddard Space Flight Center, Ames Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center durin

this period. Lewis and General Dynamics launch vehicle engineers were invited to the key scienc

meetings so that they could better understand the Centaur payload requirements. Andrew Stofa

said, “We attended all of their major reviews, so we were part of each science spacecraft and, o

course, that meant we had to have a lot of people in a lot of places, because we were part of ever

science project being put on the launch vehicle.” Scientists reciprocated by taking a hands-o

approach to Centaur’s technology. “They don’t sit back up in the ivory tower,” Tom Shaw of JP

remarked. “They’re out there kicking tires regularly.”14

Mission planning began two or three years before the actual launch. The Centaur team like

to joke that, almost without exception, the payload always started out heavier than the Centau

could lift. Mission interface, handled by a group working under Edwin Muckley of Lewis, tackle

questions such as how much can the spacecraft weigh? How much power does it need from th

rocket? What is the target? What is the mission? How fast does the rocket have to go? How muc

heat can the spacecraft take? How much vibration can it stand when the rocket lifts off? 

Another important way in which the Lewis launch vehicle team influenced a mission was throug

trajectory analysis. The team began its work by defining the key variables. Some of these were constan

among all missions. For example, Earth always rotated and revolved around the Sun with nea

constant speeds because of its almost circular orbit. Other variables were mission-specific. Differen

planets had vastly different trajectories. Once the destination was known, other variables could b

defined, such as the weight of Centaur, which changed with the differing fuel requirements, and th

weight of the payload, which depended on the type of science instruments to be flown.15

Because Centaur was launched from a revolving, rotating platform to a revolving, rotatin

target, trajectory calculations changed depending upon the time of launch. A two-day launc

opportunity required a trajectory for each possible minute of liftoff. Members of the Centau

trajectory team at Lewis pioneered many of the advanced trajectory calculation techniques neede

to handle planetary mission design. 

Lewis Omer (Frank) Spurlock, working under Fred Teren in the Lewis Performance Trajector

Group, became an expert in calculating trajectories. Spurlock had graduated from the University o

New Mexico and won a Woodrow Wilson fellowship to Western Reserve University (later rename

Case Western Reserve University) to study physics. Just twenty-one when he started at Lewis in 1961

he traded graduate work for the chance to contribute to the space program at a time when knowledg

of how to calculate the trajectory of a spacecraft was in its infancy.16

Heavy Lift 10

14 Interview with Tom Shaw by Virginia Dawson, 10 November 1999.

15 Richard T. Mittauer, “Mariner Mars 1971 Launches,” 30 April 1971, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Proje

Office, NASA GRC Records.

16 Oran Nicks, Far Travelers, 62.
Designing missions for expendable launch vehicles involves generating a mathematical m

that takes into account launch vehicle performance capabilities and trajectory characteristics 

range of mission requirements and launch periods. For this task, Spurlock started out with an 

computer with only 8 kilobytes of memory. He used an analog computer for the atmosp

portion of the trajectory. He then manually completed the upper stage calculations with th

digital computer. Lewis’s acquisition of an IBM 7090 computer with 32 kilobytes of memory g

increased Spurlock’s computational capability. At first, Spurlock turned the trajectory calcul

for each mission over to Harry Dempster at General Dynamics to work up into particular pa

specifications. Then Spurlock developed an optimization computer code known as DUK

(Pronounced “duck soup,” it was not an acronym but a reference to the ease with which it 

be applied.) DUKSUP provided an alternate, very accurate means of determining a mission t

tory. It allowed mission planners to model various mission scenarios. The analytic technique

in DUKSUP depended on an accurate vehicle model and the power of the calculus of varia

Early versions of the code were used on Surveyor, Mariners 6 through 10, Pioneers 10 an

Viking, Voyager, Helios, Pioneer Venus, the High-Energy Astronomy Observatory (HE

FLTSATCOM, INTELSAT, the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO), and Applic

Technology Satellites (ATS). DUKSUP also gave government engineers an analytic tool to 

uate contractor data.17

After Surveyor

The first assignment for Centaur after Surveyor was to launch two Department of De

satellites needed for meteorological and space environment tests. Although Atlas-Agen

launched the previous satellites in this series, Centaur was chosen for ATS 4 and 5 becaus

were too heavy for Agena to lift.18 Some key modifications were required to adapt Centaur 

nology for this new mission. Previous Centaurs were capable of a 25-minute coast period

the ATS needed a 60-minute coast. For attitude control and propellant settling during the 

coast period, engineers increased the supply of hydrogen peroxide. To compensate fo

extreme cold Centaur would encounter during the coast period, they developed better th

control sensors. However, the most significant change was to design a new satellite adap

replace the one that had attached Surveyor to Centaur. The modifications begun on 8 April were 

108 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

17 L. R. Balkanyi and O. F. Spurlock, “DUKSUP: A High Thrust Trajectory Optimization Code,” AIAA 93-1127, Irvi

16–19 February 1993; and an interview with Frank Spurlock by Virginia Dawson, 6 April 1999. Much of the docume

of its early applications has been lost. 

18 Donald H. Martin, Communication Satellites, 4th edition (California: The Aerospace Press, 2000), 18. For further in

tion on ATS, see R. H. Pickard, “The Applications Technology Satellite,” in Proceedings of the 16th International Astron

Congress (1965), vol. 4: Meteorological and Communications Satellites (1966); and Paul J. McCeney, “Applications Tech

Satellite Program,” Acta Astronautica 5 (March–April 1978): 299–325.
Heavy Lift 10

by 24 July 1968. In all, there were thirty significant changes. The Centaur Project Office at Lew

Research Center compiled the following summary of technical modifications to Centaur in prepara

tion for post-Surveyor missions.19

Centaur Technical Modifications After Surveyor Missions Were Completed

System Change from Surveyor Reason for Change

Mechanical Systems, Provide a dual-bottle H2

O2 Provide an additional H2O2

Airborne, Peroxide supply system and the supply to cover the extended 

System necessary support structure. coast period.

Mechanical Systems, Provide for improved thermal Required to compensate for 

Airborne, Peroxide control of the H2

O2 bottles the possible temperature 

System and the boost pump extremes resulting from the 

overspeed sensors. extended coast period.

Mechanical Systems, Requalify the 3-pound Required to meet the extended 

Airborne, Peroxide thrust H2

O2 motors for coast-period requirement.

System 65-minute operation.

Mechanical Systems, Redesign the vent valve friction General design 

Airborne, Pneumatics devices and controller bellows. improvement.

Mechanical Systems, Requalify the pneumatic Required as a result of 

Airborne, Pneumatics regulators to –45°F. possible lower temperature 

environment during the 

extended coast period.

Mechanical Systems, Propellant utilization Difficulties with subcontractor

Airborne, Propellants electronics package to be 

built and tested by GD/CC 

instead of subcontractor.

Mechanical Systems, Add two access ports on the + Provide access to the ATS 

Airborne, Structural, and – y axes. electrical connectors.

Nose Fairings

19 “Presentation of Launch Vehicle System in Support of the ATS-D Mission,” 16 April 1968, Glenn Research Center, DE

Archives, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office.
System Change from Surveyor Reason for Change

Mechanical Systems, Add two electrical disconnect Support spacecraft safe/arm 

Airborne, Structural, support arms. and power supply cabling 

Nose Fairings and withdraw the disconn

cards from the spacecraft 

during nose-fairing jettiso

Mechanical Systems, Add spacecraft T&C antenna Prevent the spacecraft 

Airborne, Structural, ramps and rub surfaces. antennas from 1) being 

Nose Fairings abraded and 2) hanging u

on the fairing longerons 

during nose-fairing jettiso

Mechanical Systems, Delete fiberglass air Make the ATS duct 

Airborne, Structural, conditioning ducts from the configuration common wi

Nose Fairings conical fairing and add that required for Mariner 

removable metal ducts. and allow removal of the 

duct for cleaning.

Mechanical Systems, Relief cuts made on thermal Provide sufficient clearanc

Airborne, Structural, bulkhead at nose-fairing between the thermal bulkh

Nose Fairings split line. and transition adapter dur

nose-fairing jettison.

Mechanical Systems, Delete Surveyor-peculiar Meet ATS requirements to 

Airborne, Structural, TV lights and add ATS TV check out spacecraft came

Nose Fairings target lights.

Mechanical Systems, Delete Surveyor forward Required to join the ATS 

Airborne, Structural, payload adapter and add an (HAC) adapter with the 

Payload Adapter ATS-peculiar transition adapter. Centaur field joint.

Mechanical Systems, Modify the electrical interface Accommodate the ATS

Airborne, Structural, island. destructor leads and the 

Payload Adapter payload separation and 

instrumentation connecto

Mechanical Systems, Install new air conditioning Conform to the design of 

Payload Adapter ducts in the transition new adapter and satisfy th

adapter. ATS thermal requirements

110 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
System Change from Surveyor Reason for Change

Electrical System, Delete Surveyor-peculiar Not required to support 

Airborne harnessing. ATS mission.

Electrical System, Provide a pyro harness from Meet ATS requirement for 

Airborne the pyro relay package to the Centaur to provide spacecraft 

adapter interface island. separation electrical power.

Electrical System, Add harnesses between Meet ATS requirements for 

Airborne Centaur umbilical and 1) spacecraft safe/arm and 

1) the spacecraft and power supply circuits and 

2) TV lights on the nose 2) nose-fairing TV lights.

fairing.

Electrical System, Install a larger capacity Meet need for additional 

Airborne (150 ampere-hour) battery Centaur electrical power 

with a voltage monitor required because of the 

resistor. extended coast and 

retromaneuver periods.

Electrical System, Delete Surveyor-peculiar Primarily provide for retrieval 

Instrumentation and instrumentation and add of data associated with the 

Telemetry Systems instrumentation for additional extended coast. Also provide 

Centaur data. for analysis of the spacecraft 

adapter interface vibrations 

during flight.

Electrical System, Add a second telepak. Provide for increased number 

Instrumentation and of measurements.

Telemetry Systems

Electrical System, Provide for two ATS Meet ATS requirement.

Instrumentation and acceleration measurements.

Telemetry Systems

Guidance and Autopilot, Remove pitch program Effect system simplification.

Atlas from Atlas programmer and 

place in Centaur computer.

Heavy Lift 11
System Change from Surveyor Reason for Change

Guidance and Autopilot, Revise the programmer Reduce the aerodynamic 

Atlas sequence to delay the nose- heating input to the space

fairing jettison event. and establish commonality 

with AC-19 and AC-20.

Guidance and Autopilot, Redesign rate gyro package Provide increased vehicle t

Centaur stability margin. provide additional levels a

switching for rate and pos

gains.

Guidance and Provide nonlinear position Enable the accomplishmen

Autopilot, Centaur gains during the reorientation of a large angle reorientati

interval. maneuver in a limited tim

interval and with a high 

degree of accuracy.

Guidance and Relocate the Spin Motor Provide room for the addit

Autopilot, Centaur Rotation Detector external components required in th

to the rate gyro package. rate gyro package to effect 

the above changes.

Guidance and Delete Surveyor-peculiar Required primarily to 

Autopilot, Centaur functions from the implement the reorientatio

programmer and add and retromaneuver sequen

the ATS discretes.

Guidance and Revise the timer logic to Enable more rapid 

Autopilot, Centaur reference spacecraft separation retromaneuver due to 

to the Main Engine elimination of fixed 

Cut Off event. time delays for burn-time 

dispersions.

Guidance and Revise programmer switching Compensate for anticipate

Autopilot, Centaur to effect a longer prestart higher temperatures result

sequence. from long coast.

112 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Since satellite technology was still in the experimental stage, the main goal for ATS 4 an

5 (AC-17 and -18) was to investigate how to maintain satellite stability while in orbit.20 Bot

launches were disappointing. In August 1968, Centaur separated from the Atlas and coaste

successfully for just over an hour, but its engines failed to restart. A year later, Centaur success

fully placed the satellite into transfer orbit after a 25-minute coast, then developed a

unplanned-for spin that compromised its communications experiments.21 Because of its poo

performance, Centaur was abandoned for the final ATS launch in 1974 in favor of the Tita

IIIC vehicle. 

After this inauspicious beginning, the Centaur launch of a revolutionary, very heavy Orbitin

Astronomical Observatory (OAO), managed by Goddard Space Flight Center, was mor

successful.22 The great weight of OAO was an unavoidable attribute because it required extremel

sophisticated optical instrumentation. Considerable weight was also taken up by basic equipmen

such as power supplies, temperature control, and tracking and telemetering equipment. The fir

OAO, launched by Atlas-Agena D in 1966, had failed.23

OAO-2, launched in December 1968, weighed 4,450 pounds.24 Its main objective was to mak

unprecedented, precise telescopic observations 480 miles above Earth, where the atmospher

produced fewer optical distortions. Because the payload was too large for the Atlas-Centaur nos

fairing, engineers used the Atlas-Agena fairing and connected the OAO to the front of Centau

with the Agena adapter.25 Four days after a flawless Atlas-Centaur launch, the OAO onboar

experiments immediately began showing the presence of star fields, returning thousands of uniqu

images and mapping the northern skies.26

An even heavier and more complex scientific satellite, OAO-3, was launched in November 197

but never reached orbit. When the Centaur computer attempted to jettison the nose fairing aroun

Heavy Lift 11

20 Daniel R. Glover, “NASA Experimental Communications Satellites, 1958–1995,” in Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years 

Satellite Communication (Washington, DC: NASA, 1997), 56–60.

21 Roy K. Hackbarth, “Atlas-Centaur AC-18 Performance Evaluation,” NASA TM X-2383, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Divisio

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

22 “AC-16 Centaur Flight Evaluation Report,” Glenn Research Center, DEB Archives, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centa

Project Office. See also Mike Reynolds, “The Orbiting Astronomical Observatories,” in USA in Space, eds. Frank N. Magill and Russe

R. Tobias (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, Inc., 1996), 471; and Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, 145. 

23 “The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory,” Sky and Telescope (December 1962): 339–340.

24 “Atlas/Centuar-16 Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2 Final Field Report,” 17 October 1969, Box AC-15 to AC-2

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

25 “AC-16 Centaur Flight Evaluation Report,” Glenn Research Center, DEB Archives, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Divisio

Atlas/Centaur Project Office. See also G. R. Richards and Joel W. Powell, “The Centaur Vehicle,” British Interplanetary Socie

42 (1 March 1989): 108.

26 Arthur Code quotation found in “OAO-B Launch,” General Release, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Proje

Office, NASA GRC Records. Arthur D. Code, ed., The Scientific Results from the Orbiting Astronomical Observato

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-310, 1972).
114 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Atlas-Centaur parking orbit mission delivering a spacecraft to synchronous apogee transfer. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin. See

Centaur: Mission Planners Guide, File 010216, NASA Historical Reference Collection.)
Heavy Lift 11
Atlas-Centaur Launches of Scientific Satellites

Date Mission Vehicle Payload Result

Weight

10 August 1968 ATS-4 AC-17 130 lb* Centaur failed

7 December 1968 OAO-2 AC-16 4,447 lb Success

12 August 1969 ATS-5 AC-18 130 lb* Success

30 November 1970 OAO-3 AC-21 4,698 lb Centaur failed

21 August 1972 OAO-4 AC-22 4,914 lb Success 

12 August 1977 HEAO-1 AC-45 5,549 lb Success

13 November 1978 HEAO-2 AC-52 6,866 lb Success

20 September 1979 HEAO-3 AC-53 6,321 lb Success

*The actual weights carried by Centaur to transfer orbit were approximately double these numbers.

Atlas-Centaur Launches of Planetary Science Missions

Date Mission Vehicle Payload Result

Weight

24 February 1969 Mariner 6 AC-20 850 lb Mars flyby

27 March 1969 Mariner 7 AC-19 848 lb Mars flyby

9 May 1971 Mariner 8 AC-24 2,192 lb Mars orbiter; Centaur fail

30 May 1971 Mariner 9 AC-23 2,201 lb Mars orbiter

2 March 1972 Pioneer 10 AC-27 568 lb Jupiter and the outer plan

5 April 1973 Pioneer 11 AC-30 562 lb Jupiter and the outer plan

3 November 1973 Mariner 10 AC-34 1,108 lb Venus and Mercury flyby

20 May 1978 Pioneer Venus AC-50 1,222 lb Venus orbiter

8 August 1978 Pioneer Venus AC-51 1,948 lb Venus Multiprobe mission

116 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Heavy Lift 11

the payload, one of the sixteen explosive bolts failed to release, and the rocket and satellite plunged t

Earth together.27 Because of this failure, the Centaur fairing was significantly modified. Full-scal

jettison tests, under the direction of William Prati, were conducted in the Altitude Wind Tunnel a

Lewis until the team had confidence in the new design. 

No unforeseen glitches occurred when Atlas-Centaur (AC-22) lifted Copernicus, the fourt

and final spacecraft in the OAO series, into orbit on 21 August 1972. OAO-4 carried telescope

designed by scientists at Princeton and University College of London. At 4,900 pounds, it wa

NASA’s heaviest satellite, and it continued to send data back to Earth for nine years.28 Despit

the two failures of the OAO program, the second and fourth satellites “were widely judged to b

technical and scientific successes, and that bolstered NASA’s confidence that a space telescop

much larger than the OAO series could be built.”29 They marked the beginning of above-the

atmosphere observatories that now include the Hubble telescope.30

First Centaur Interplanetary Missions: Mariners 6 Through 9

Although the Orbiting Astronomical Observatories had provided unprecedented obser

vations of the sky, this achievement paled in comparison with sending a spacecraft to th

vicinity of a planet. Earlier Mariner spacecraft had avoided using Centaur, but the next gener

ation needed the additional weight that only Centaur could carry. By using Centau

Mariners 6 through 9 carried heavy atmospheric and topographical instruments needed fo

gathering data in preparation for a future Mars landing.31 Because failures were so commo

in the early space program, NASA built two identical Mariner spacecraft for each mission an

launched them in pairs.32 

27 “AC-21 Flight Evaluation Report,” Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

28 Raymond N. Watts, Jr., “An Astronomy Satellite Named Copernicus,” Sky and Telescope (October 1972): 231–232, 23

Lyman Spitzer, Jr., Searching Between the Stars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 

29 Smith, The Space Telescope, 44. 

30 Although no comprehensive history of the OAO exists, several other articles from Sky and Telescope document some of i

achievements. For further information, see “Observing a Comet from Space,” Sky and Telescope 39 (March 1970): 143; “Th

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory,” Sky and Telescope 24 (December 1962): 339–340; Watts, “More About the OAO’s,” Sk

and Telescope 28 (August 1964): 78–79; and “Orbiting Astronomical Observatory,” Sky and Telescope 28 (August 1964): 78–7

31 “Project Mariner Mars 1969,” 14 February 1969, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GR

Records.

32 Mariner 6 was 271 pounds heavier than Mariner 4 and 399 pounds heavier than Mariner 2. For further information o

Mariners 6 and 7, see James Wilson, Two Over Mars: Mariner VI and Mariner VII, February–August 1969 (Washington, DC

NASA EP-90 Government Printing Office, 1971); Clark R. Chapman, Planets of Rock and Ice (New York: Charles Scribne

Sons, 1982); Scientific and Technical Information Division, Office of Technology Utilization, Mariner Mars 1969: A Prelimina

Report (Springfield, VA: NASA SP-225 Clearinghouse, Department of Commerce, 1969). 
Mariner 6 (AC-20) was nearly marred by a catastrophic accident ten days before its sche

liftoff. Atlas-Centaur and its Mariner payload were sitting on the launch pad at the Cape 

Atlas suddenly began to lose pressurization. A faulty relay switch had caused one of the main 

to open. As the Atlas began to slowly crumple, two General Dynamics mechanics ran und

twelve-story assembly with its deflating booster to seal off the pressure manually by closing a 

The Lewis News reported the heroic story:

Ignoring the shrill scream of the evacuation alarm, Billy McClure hastily removed th

liquid oxygen prevalve locking bolts to the Atlas vehicle on Pad 36A at the Cape. As h

did this, he heard the sound of metal buckling, and looking upward he saw the Atla

begin to lean under the weight of the Centaur and Mariner spacecraft as the pressur

leaked out of the vehicle. At the same time Charles Beverlin had run under the Atlas an

squirmed up into the Atlas thrust section to close the sustainer engine prevalve. Second

later both mechanics had cleared the area, and the vehicle began to right itself as the tan

pressure built up inside.33

Without their quick action, the mission would have been lost. They received a rare 

given by NASA, the Exceptional Bravery Medal.34 Liftoff in February 1969 went as sche

with a replacement Atlas. It flew by Mars in July at an altitude of 2,170 miles.35 Total fligh

was 156 days. 

Mariner 7 (AC-19), launched in March, had almost identical mission objectives to th

Mariner 6, except that it was to fly by the Martian southern polar cap.36 The relative locatio

Earth at launch and Mars at encounter allowed Mariner 7 to use a direct-ascent trajectory. Tog

the two spacecraft photographed twenty times more surface area of the planet than Mariner 4

included photographing the surface of the planet, studying the Martian atmosphere, and 

performing spectrometer studies to determine whether the conditions for life were prese

Mars. The atmospheric and surface data gathered by the spacecraft led scientists to conclud

life probably did not exist on Mars unless it was microbial.37 In discussing the significance of 

missions, Stuart Collins wrote, “Mariners 6 and 7, launched by the more powerful Atlas-Ce

118 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

33 “Mechanics Risk Lives on Launch Pad,” Lewis News, Box Awards Folders Through 1979, Folder Exceptional Bravery (N

NASA GRC Records.

34 Abe Silverstein to NASA Headquarters, 15 April 1969, Box Awards Folders Through 1979, Folder Exceptional 

(NASA), NASA GRC Records.

35 “Atlas-Centaur 20 Mariner Mars-6 Final Field Report,” 19 January 1970, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

36 “Atlas-Centaur-19 Mariner Mars-7 Final Field Report,” 19 January 1970, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

37 Henry W. Norris, “Mariner 6 and 7,” in USA in Space, 366–369.
Heavy Lift 11

Centaur D-1. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin. See Centaur: Mission Planners Guide, File 010216, NASA Historical Reference

Collection.)
rocket, were to greatly increase and improve the observations made by Mariner 4 and by E

based investigators. Thus scientists and engineers began to design a more ambitious explo

mission and to build larger, more sophisticated spacecraft to complete this mission.”38

What distinguished the two additional Mariner missions launched in 1971 from e

trips to Mars was that each spacecraft was intended to orbit Mars for a period of 90 day

merely perform a flyby of the planet. The weight-carrying capability of Centaur was again 

ical to the success of these missions. Each of the new Mariners weighed 2,197 pounds, 

than twice the weight of Mariners 6 and 7. When Mariner 8 (AC-24) lifted off on 9 May 

everything went as planned until moments after Centaur and Mariner separated from Atla

seconds into the flight. Robert Kraemer remembers that, as he sat next to Dan Schneide

at the consoles in the JPL Mission Control Center at the Cape, he gave the thumbs-up s

Schneiderman as soon as the Centaur engines ignited. Turning back to the console, he no

that the pitch recorder was showing unstable oscillations about the Centaur pitch axis.39 

Centaur began tumbling end over end and plunged, with the spacecraft, into the At

Ocean 350 miles north of Puerto Rico. 

Immediately, there was speculation that the guidance system was the culprit. Bill O’Nei

navigation chief for the spacecraft, quickly discounted the possibility that the entire gui

system was at fault. He suspected that the problem was merely a defective autopilot since 

occurred just at the point when the system was supposed to turn on.40 Investigation occur

breakneck speed under the leadership of George Low, NASA’s Deputy Administrator. Time w

the essence because if the next Mariner did not launch within a month, it would be two years b

the next opportunity. Ed Ziemba, an engineer on the Lewis Centaur team, and Chet N

Kennedy Space Center’s lead guidance engineer on Centaur, determined that O’Neil was righ

integrated circuit in the pitch rate gyro preamplifier had failed, not the entire guidance and c

system. This tiny, $5 integrated circuit, located in the autopilot system, had caused the fail

the $70-million rocket.41

With the malfunction corrected, Mariner 9 (AC-23) lifted off twenty-one days afte

Mariner 8 loss. Centaur operated flawlessly. Four months later, it began a Martian orbit—th

time a spacecraft had orbited another planet. Engineers were able to assign some of the tasks 

inally scheduled for the ill-fated Mariner 8, such as mapping the Martian surface, to Mari

120 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

38 Stewart A. Collins, The Mariner 6 and 7 Pictures of Mars (Washington, DC: NASA SP-263 Government Printing 

1971), 6.

39 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Ins

Press, 2000), 50. 

40 Interview with William O’Neil by Virginia Dawson, 9 June 2000.

41 Interview with Ed Ziemba by Virginia Dawson, 19 May 1999. See also “Atlas-Centaur 24 Mariner Mars-8 Final Field Rep

February 1973, Box AC-15 to AC-24, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 
Heavy Lift 12

Assembly of OAO shroud in the Space Power Facility at Plum Brook. (GRC C1965-1458)
However, during orbit around Mars, the spacecraft encountered a massive dust storm i

Noachis region, and all of its high-resolution cameras simply returned pictures of dust.42 A m

later, after the storm cleared, Mariner returned striking images of Martian volcanoes, canyons, 

caps, and the satellites Phobos and Deimos.43 Journalist Clyde Curry Smith reported that M

“revolutionized the understanding of a very old ‘New Mars.’”44

Despite the successful investigation into what had gone wrong with Mariner 8 and the br

achievements of Mariner 9, Congress remained extremely critical of NASA’s manageme

Centaur. In addition to the loss of Mariner 8, Centaur had caused the loss of an ATS in A

122 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

A technician makes final checks on Mariner 9, which was launched by Atlas-Centaur 23 to Mars on 30 May 1971. (NASA

KSC_71P_0366)

42 Interview with William O’Neil by Virginia Dawson, 9 June 2000. 

43 For further information on Mariners 8 and 9, see Exploring Space with a Camera, ed. Edgar M. Cortright (Washingto

NASA SP-168 Government Printing Office, 1968); William K. Hartman and Odell Raper, The New Mars: The Discov

Mariner 9 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-337 Government Printing Office, 1974); Patrick Moore and Charles A. Cros

(New York: Crown Publishers, 1973); and NASA Scientific and Technical Information Office, Mars as Viewed by Marin

Pictorial Presentation by the Mariner 9 Television Team and the Planetology Program Principal Investigators (Washingto

NASA SP-329 Government Printing Office, 1976).

44 Clyde Curry Smith, “Mariner 8 & 9,” in USA in Space, 370–374.
1968 and an OAO in November 1970. In June 1971, during congressional hearings into thes

failures, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low admitted that while every effort was made t

thoroughly check Centaur systems before launch, it was impossible to guarantee launch succes

no matter what level of caution. These losses, he said, served as “harsh reminders that space explo

ration is still a very difficult business, and, in spite of dedicated personnel and intense attentio

to details, failures must be expected occasionally.”45

The hearing reminded the Centaur team that they were still under the watchful eye of th

House Committee on Science and Astronautics and needed to improve Centaur performance

Members not only were critical of the three recent failures, but also questioned the overa

success rate of Atlas-Centaur. Congressman Joseph Karth stated that an 80-percent success rat

was “totally unacceptable for a vehicle on which we have spent about half a billion dollars o

more.”46 He thought NASA should consider a substitute launch vehicle. John Naugle, Associat

Administrator for Space Science and Applications, responded, “I think it would be an unmit

igated disaster too if we stopped the ongoing program.”47 Karth warned NASA that althoug

the Committee had strongly supported the launch vehicle and the planetary space program

future support was not a foregone conclusion. He said, “Unless the reliability number

change, Dr. Naugle, I don’t think we are going to be as kind in the future.”48 Despite th

scrutiny, Atlas-Centaur continued to serve as the launch vehicle of choice for NASA

program of planetary exploration. Indeed, the power of the Centaur stage made more elabo

rate missions possible.

To Jupiter and the Solar System: Pioneer 10

While interplanetary explorations of the early 1970s were limited to the nearest neighbors o

either side of Earth—Venus and Mars—scientists eagerly sought knowledge about more distan

planets. Fortuitously, in the late 1970s, the largest planets in the solar system lined up on one sid

of the Sun, a phenomenon that occurs once every 176 years. A carefully timed spacecraft sent from

Earth could take advantage of this configuration to make an unprecedented tour of the planets i

a single voyage. Although the first nine spacecraft of the Pioneer series did not use the Centau

Heavy Lift 12

45 George Low statement, “Review of Recent Launch Failures,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 15–1

June 1971, 8.

46 Joseph Karth statement, ibid., 26. 

47 John E. Naugle statement, ibid., 61.

48 Joseph Karth statement, ibid., 62. 
upper stage, Pioneers 10 and 11 needed the greater Centaur thrust capability to reach Jupite

other points in the outer solar system.49

Pioneer 10 (AC-27) arrived at Pad 36A in December 1971. One month later, 

shipped the Pioneer spacecraft to the Cape, and engineers began integrating the payload 

the spacecraft. High upper altitude winds and a loss of facility electrical power caused th

delay, and continued unacceptable upper altitude winds caused two further postponem

Then, after last-minute tanking difficulties almost aborted the launch, the spacecraft 

off on 2 March 1972, the beginning of one the longest voyages ever taken by a human

object.50

Pioneer 10 was unusual because, in addition to its second Centaur stage, it had a spin-

lized Delta third stage with a solid rocket propellant motor (Thiokol TE-M-364-4), w

124 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Atlas-Centaur in flight just prior to Centaur second stage’s separation from the Atlas first stage. (NASA Glenn Research Center

unprocessed photo)

49 Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994), 1

also “AC-27 Launch Operations Pioneer F Mission,” Box AC-25 to AC-32, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NAS

Records.

50 “AC-27 Flight Data Report,” Launch Vehicles Division, Lewis Research Center, 1 June 1972, Box AC-25 to AC-32, D

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 
allowed it to achieve an extremely high velocity of 32,000 miles per hour.51 The Delta stage wa

mounted on a spin table at the top of Centaur. Thruster rockets spun this craft at 60 revolution

per minute, and explosive bolts separated it from Centaur after a 7-minute Centaur burn. T

prevent Delta’s reflected motor exhaust from damaging Pioneer, Centaur performed a retroma

neuver to move it 25 feet from the Delta stage.52 Delta ignition lasted for 44 seconds. The

another explosive bolt firing took place, with compressed springs pushing the Pioneer spacecra

away from the Delta stage. Throughout all of these complex maneuvers, the Atlas, Centaur, an

Delta stages performed almost flawlessly. The Pioneer spacecraft entered into a successful Earth

escape orbit that required only a minor course correction. With Pioneer 10’s successful launc

bolstering the confidence of the launch vehicle team, they planned to replace the Atlas-Centau

computer system with one that was more advanced for Pioneer 11.

The Improved D-1A Centaur and Pioneer 11

NASA tested the improved Centaur D-1A with its new Teledyne avionics on Pioneer 1

(AC-30), one of the highest profile payloads of the United States. Although NASA had orig

nally planned to make an Intelsat satellite the first test of the new avionics system, Comsa

officials had objected. Everyone involved knew the risk—a failure would be a significan

setback to the space program. Pioneer 11 had the same destination as Pioneer 10. It was agai

carried aloft by an Atlas, Centaur, and Delta vehicle combination. This redundancy was espe

cially important because of the ambitious goals of the mission and the possibility that one o

the three might fail. 

Development of the D-1A improved Centaur began in 1968 with the goals of lowerin

costs associated with Centaur launches and increasing rocket reliability. There were twent

engineers assigned to the project, headed by Russ Dunbar. Long associated with the Centau

program, Vincent Johnson, now Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science an

Applications, stated to Congress that the reason for improving the Centaur was that man

of its features were becoming outdated. He said, “It was recognized that the technology o

which certain key systems of the Centaur was based was becoming relatively ancient.”53 Nearl

$40 million was spent in creating the new Centaur, with $8 million in development costs fo

a new Teledyne computer.

The improved Centaur was tested by NASA in its new Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facilit

or B-2, at the Plum Brook Station in Sandusky, Ohio. This unique facility consisted of a huge stain

Heavy Lift 12

51 Pioneer 10 and AC-27 Press Kit, Box AC-25 to AC-32, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

52 “Atlas/Centaur 27 Pioneer 10 Flash Flight report,” Centaur Operations Branch KSC-ULO, 20 March 1972, Box AC-25 

AC-32, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

53 Vincent L. Johnson statement, “Review of Recent Launch Failures,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversigh

15–17 June 1971, 83.
less steel vacuum chamber 38 feet in diameter and 55 feet tall—large enough to put an 

Centaur upper stage in the chamber, tank it with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, and f

engines. The B-2 facility could simulate the environmental extremes encountered at heig

approximately 100 to 125 miles and test Centaur’s ability to restart its engines in the vacuu

space. The issues that particularly concerned engine restart included the necessary “chilldow

the engine; making sure that liquid hydrogen, not hydrogen gas, entered the boost pump

ensuring that proper pressures in the engine propellant inlets were maintained. The l

nitrogen-cooled walls of the B-2 facility simulated the temperatures of 320°F found in space, 

quartz lamp thermal simulators mimicked the intense heat of the Sun. 

Checkout testing of the new facility began in October 1969 with the first successfu

firing of Centaur engines in the B-2 facility on 18 December 1970. Centaur was mo

vertically in the chamber with its nozzles facing down. After ignition, the engines fired th

a water-cooled exhaust diffuser and into a deep spray chamber. Thousands of gallons of wate

sprayed into the hot gas to cool it and turn it into steam. An exhaust system released the 

into the air while the heated water was returned to the spray chamber. Glen Hennings, ch

the rocket systems division at Plum Brook Station, recalled, “All systems performed prope

the test and we achieved most of our basic objectives.”54 Further testing of Centaur engines 

B-2 facility revealed that the RL10 engines could be run with a pressurized propellan

system, thus eliminating the need for boost pumps.55

The most important element of the improved Centaur was its new Teledyne computer. 

Patterson and Don Garman of NASA, along with David Geyer of General Dynamics, played key 

in the ultimate success of the new computer. In contrast to the serial drum-type Librascope com

it replaced, the new Teledyne computer was a true digital computer that could be reprogram

and updated with relative ease. It had a 16,384-word memory (24-bit)—five times the mem

the earlier Librascope computer. The new software gave Centaur complete control of Atlas f

first time. The new computer had fifteen different software modules to manage functions su

navigation, guidance, autopilot, propellant utilization, attitude control, sequencing, telemetr

data management for both vehicles.56 Previously, separate mechanical or electronic units cont

126 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

54 Glen Hennings, quoted in “First Test for New Facility: Centaur ‘Hot-Fires’ in B2,” Lewis News (2 January 1970). 

55 See Steven V. Szabo, “Centaur Space Vehicle Pressurized Propellant Feed System Tests,” NASA TN D-6876, October 197

56 A. B. Yanke, “AC-30 Preliminary Flight Analysis Report GDCA-HAB73-019,” Box AC-25 to AC-32, D

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. Some of the more important modules included Navigation (NAV)

provided position, velocity, and acceleration data to the guidance system; Powered Guidance (PGUID), which provid

to optimize trajectory and determine engine cutoff time; Coast Guidance (CGUID), which determined the next main 

start; Powered Autopilot (PAUTO), which maintained Centaur’s stability during main engine firings; Coast Phase Au

(CAUTO), which kept Centaur stable during the parking orbit; Propellant Utilization (PU), which maintained the 

ratio of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen in the tanks; and the Computer Controlled Vent & Pressurization 

(CCVAPS), which used redundant tank-pressure sensors to maintain liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen tank pressu

“Titan IIIE/Centaur D-1T Systems Summary,” September 1973, Joe Nieberding Personal Collection. 
Heavy Lift 12

Cross section of the B-2 Facility at Plum Brook shows the Centaur rocket mounted for test. (CD-93-64366)
functions such as propellant management and tank pressurization. Not only did the adv

computer system provide more integrated and customizable control over Atlas-Centaur, but 

allowed mission specialists greater flexibility in the design of a mission.57 Instead of the redesi

hardware, the computer could be reprogrammed to prepare the Centaur for different tasks.

The Teledyne guidance and navigation systems made possible one of the most signi

contributions to Centaur D1-A capabilities. Because the computer could be programme

before launch, a joint government-industry Centaur team created a new system to compe

for the winds the launch vehicle would encounter in its flight through the atmosphere. W

are dangerous for launch vehicles because they create side forces that can either damag

vehicle or knock it off course. For the earliest Surveyor flights, Atlas-Centaur had used sea

pitch and yaw programs based on historical data from sounding balloons. These early pro

served as rough estimates of the winds that a vehicle might encounter on a typical launch d

summer, fall, winter, or spring. Frequently, weather balloons released on launch day rev

wind profiles quite different from the seasonal expectations. In 1966, the number of pro

available expanded from four seasonal pitch and yaw programs to ten. Between 1966 and 

twenty-one Atlas-Centaur vehicles were launched using this protocol. 

However, despite the power of the vehicle, it was still susceptible to upper atmosphere win

high jetstream winds on launch day did not somewhat match one of the ten predesigned pitch an

programs, then the entire launch had to be “scrubbed” or delayed until the winds cooperated. De

a mission was costly. What was needed was an approach that tailored the trajectory to actual rea

wind data on the launch day itself. Lewis engineers recalled that after Pioneer 10 was scrubbed tw

1972 because of wind problems, Lewis Center Director Bruce Lundin demanded that the team 

up with a solution by the time they launched Pioneer 11 thirteen months later. Engineers fro

General Dynamics Aerodynamics Group, headed by Don Lesney, and a Lewis team, und

Nieberding, developed a revolutionary new real-time wind program called ADDJUST (Auto

Determination and Dissemination of Just Updated Steering Terms).59 The ADDJUST system

acronym coined by Frank Anthony—was incorporated into the D-1A Centaur launched in 197

cost just $250,000 (roughly the same amount for one scrubbed launch). 

The ADDJUST system dramatically increased the number of days available for launch. 

to ADDJUST, about 43 percent of the launch dates between December and March were un

able because of wind characteristics. After ADDJUST, even after allowing for uncertainties 

128 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

57 Interview with Roy Roberts by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.

58 Don Savage and Ann Hutchison, “Pioneer 11 to End Operations After Epic Career,” NASA press release, 29 September 199

59 Interview with Frank Anthony by Virginia Dawson, 6 June 2000.

60 “Concept Review ADDJUST System to Design Booster Steering Programs During Preflight Launch Operations,” 7 Jul

Joe Nieberding Personal Collection.
Heavy Lift 12

Mariner Venus/Mercury 10 is prepared for encapsulation on 21 September 1973 at Kennedy Space Center. (NASA

KSC_73P_0541)
actual winds encountered in flight, this percentage decreased to only 5 percent of launch 

The rest of the year, from April to November, Centaur achieved nearly 100-percent la

availability with respect to upper level winds. The ADDJUST system was used on all 

Titan-Centaur launches and has continued to play a vital role on all Atlas-Centaur lau

since that time. After 1973, a launch with a Centaur upper stage would rarely be scrubbe

to an upper level wind problem.61

The process of implementing ADDJUST began 125 minutes before a scheduled liftoff. A

point, the Air Force released specially designed weather balloons into the Florida skies ne

Eastern Test Range. As the balloons floated higher into the sky, they recorded wind velocit

direction at all altitudes, up to about 80,000 feet in about 60 minutes of rise time. After 20 mi

these balloons began to transmit the data on the wind patterns to a ground-based computer

minutes later, using 300-baud modems, computers at General Dynamics in San Diego and 

Research Center in Cleveland received the data. Using two Fortran programs, their com

processed the data for 10 minutes. Then the General Dynamics computer transmitted pitch an

data to the Eastern Test Range in Florida, while the Lewis Research Center computer validate

approach. Ten minutes later, General Dynamics sent Lewis Research Center the current pitc

yaw data, and their computer in Cleveland validated the information for the next 10 minutes. 

all the data were confirmed, they were sent to the onboard Centaur computer 15 minutes befo

scheduled liftoff. To ensure that the data were accurate, Centaur transmitted the same data b

the computer at the Cape for verification. 

All the Centaur engineers felt the anxiety of getting the improved Centaur ready on 

During tests of the new computer, its many glitches raised serious questions about relia

Lewis engineer Ed Ziemba recalled that every time Teledyne delivered a computer, G

Dynamics would test it and it would fail.62 Up to 15 minutes before the launch of Pioneer 1

computer was still giving the engineers trouble. Ground-based computers began spewin

strange data. Ziemba, who was assigned to the blockhouse, agonized over whether to postpon

launch. Because he was sure that the engineers had thoroughly checked out the new flight co

system, he gave the go-ahead. His decision was vindicated by the perfect launch of Pioneer 

5 April 1973. Atlas-Centaur (AC-30) cut through the Florida winds effortlessly wit

ADDJUST system and placed its payload in its proper trajectory.

Pioneers 10 and 11 gathered unprecedented knowledge of the solar system. Pioneer 10 b

the first spacecraft to travel through the asteroid belt, the first to make direct observations of Ju

and the first to venture outside the solar system. At a distance of 7 billion miles from Earth, i

held the distinction as the most remote human artifact. Pioneer 11, originally on a redundant 

adjusted its course to make observations of Jupiter as well as the first close observations of Satu

130 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

61 “ADDJUST Overview,” Lewis Research Center, undated, Joe Nieberding Personal Collection.

62 Interview with Ed Ziemba by Virginia Dawson, 19 May 1999.
1979. By 1995, the signal it sent back to Earth was so weak that scientists could only receive about 

hours of data per month. In 1996, all communications fell silent and Pioneer 11 now drifts as a gho

ship headed for the Aquila constellation that it will reach in four million years.63

The First Two-Burn Planetary Mission: Mariner 10 

Centaur’s association with the Mariner program came to an end in 1973 with th

Venus/Mercury launch (AC-34). Mariner 10’s objective was a flyby of both Venus and Mercury—

NASA’s first two-planet mission. The complexity of this mission required that the new Centau

D1 use two burns in the launch of its interplanetary spacecraft. Although the two burns had bee

tested during the proof flights for Surveyor and used to launch Intelsat IV missions, Mariner 1

was the first planetary mission that required Centaur to restart its engines in space. 

Deciding whether to use direct ascent or two burns depended on the geometry of Earth

location and the ultimate destination for the spacecraft. If Earth and the destination plane

were aligned in a way that allowed the voyage to be made with just one propulsive push from

the Centaur, direct ascent was selected. However, sometimes Earth and the destination plane

were aligned in such a way that it was impossible to make a straight shot. 

Prior to 1973, scientists had avoided the risk of the second burn and accepted the limitation

of the direct ascent. The four previous Mariner launches to Venus and Mars were accomplishe

without the two-burn option. However, the alignment of the two innermost planets with Earth fo

Mariner 10 necessitated the more complicated mission profile. Although NASA could have use

the more powerful Titan-Centaur for a direct ascent to Mercury, this option was more costly. Also

the greater speed of Titan-Centaur as it passed by the planets would have limited the time durin

which Mariner 10 could acquire data. Atlas-Centaur offered the best alternative. However, man

scientists objected that using two burns might jeopardize the mission.64

Despite the complexity of the mission, when NASA launched Mariner 10 in November 1973

there were no unexpected problems or countdown holds. The Atlas phase ended 254 seconds int

the launch. Centaur separated, and 10 seconds later, its engines fired. After 12 seconds, it jett

soned the nose fairing; 297 seconds later, the engines cut off and the rocket went into parkin

mode in a near-circular orbit of Earth. During its 1,540-second parking orbit, Centaur cruise

into position, moving one-third of the way around Earth. The second burn began within 

seconds of the predicted start. This sent Centaur, with its precious Mariner payload, on a cours

Heavy Lift 13

63 For information on the Pioneer 10 and 11 voyages, see William R. Corliss, The Interplanetary Pioneers, three volum

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-278 Government Printing Office, 1972); Richard O. Fimmel, William Swindel, and Eric Burges

Pioneer Odyssey (Washington, DC: NASA SP-396 Government Printing Office, 1977); Elizabeth A. Muenger, Searching th

Horizon: A History of the Ames Research Center, 1940–1976 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4304 Government Printing Offic

1985); Mark Washburn, Distant Encounter: The Exploration of Jupiter and Saturn (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983

Tom Gehrels, ed., Jupiter (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1976); Glenn S. Orton, “Pioneer 10,” in USA in Space, 490–49

and Manfred N. Wirth, “Pioneer 11,” in USA in Space, 495–499. 

64 Interview with William O’Neil by Virginia Dawson, 9 June 2000.
132 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Atlas-Centaur 34 undergoing a tanking test on NASA Complex 36B at Cape Kennedy. This launch was the first dual-planet flight,

Mariner Venus/Mercury 10. 19 September 1973. (NASA KSC_73P_0537)
opposite to the direction of Earth’s orbital motion around the Sun. Velocity at cutoff was greate

than statistical predictions because of a drifting Centaur gyro, but fortunately, Centaur’s compute

programming could compensate for this error and successfully place Mariner on its complicate

trajectory. After 133 seconds—just as it entered an Earth-escape orbit—the Centaur main engine

shut down for the final time. Centaur and Mariner stayed connected for another 95 second

before they separated. After 515 seconds, Centaur performed a maneuver to get out of the way o

the spacecraft.65 In addition to requiring two burns, the Mariner trajectory was significant fo

another reason: it was the first time that a spacecraft used the gravitational attraction of one plane

to catapult itself to another—a “feat requiring exceptional navigational accuracy and multipl

trajectory corrections” to be performed by the trajectory analysis team.66

Mariner 10 reached Venus in February 1974. One month later, it made its first of three flyby

of Mercury. After this first approach, Mariner 10 went into a solar orbit that permitted it to mak

two more encounters with the planet. It made its second Mercury encounter in September 1974

passing over the sunlit side of the planet and the southern polar region. Mariner 10 made its fina

pass by Mercury in March 1975—making its closest approach to the planet at 203 miles. It wen

silent eight days later when the fuel was depleted. Mariner 10 remains the only spacecraft to hav

visited Mercury. It made the first examination of the interplanetary space between Venus an

Mercury and returned the first close observations of the cloud cover over Venus.67

A Journey to the Mysterious Planet: Pioneer Venus 

While the previous two Pioneer spacecraft took long voyages away from the Sun and out int

deep space, two additional Pioneer probes in the late 1970s were launched toward the second plane

from the Sun. Venus, long known as the “mysterious planet,” was most like Earth, with a simila

mass, radius, and density. However, telescopic observations from Earth and data from the Marine

10 probe suggested some striking differences. Temperatures on Venus approached 850 degrees, an

its magnetic field was 1/3,000 of Earth’s. Its rotational motion was 1/243 of Earth’s and in th

opposite direction. Finally, Venus was thought to be extremely arid, with a water content o

1/10,000 of Earth’s biosphere. How could a planet so similar to Earth have surface conditions s

Heavy Lift 13

65 “AC-34 Atlas-Centaur Flight Evaluation Report,” Box AC-33 to AC-41, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GR

Records.

66 Pioneer used gravity-assist as well, but although it was launched first, it was the second spacecraft to use the gravity-assist tech

nique. See “Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973, Launch Operations and Flight Events,” Box AC-33 to AC-41, Divisio

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

67 For further information on Mariner 10, see James A. Dunne and Eric Burgess, The Voyage of Mariner 10: Mission to Venus an

Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA SP-424 Government Printing Office, 1978); Clark R. Chapman, Planets of Rock and Ice: fro

Mercury to the Moons of Saturn (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982); Bruce C. Murray and Eric Burgess, Flight to Mercu

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Robert G. Strom, Mercury, the Elusive Planet (Washington DC: Smithsonia

Institution Press, 1987); and Donna Pivirotto, “Mariner 10,” in USA in Space, 375–379. 
radically different? Space scientists wanted to make a comparative study of Earth and Venus 

hopes of not only solving these tantalizing questions, but also shedding new light upon the e

tion of our own planet.68

By the mid 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union had sent a total of eight mi

to study the planet. These included three Mariner flyby missions from the United States an

more complex missions by the Soviet Union with its Venera craft. The final two craft in this 

(Venera 7 and 8 in 1971 and 1972, respectively) each landed on the surface of the plane

conducted measurements. Scientists in the United States believed that they were slipping b

their Soviet counterparts and sought to catch up. Although Pioneer Venus did not beat 

accomplishments, it served as the first United States mission to send both an orbiter and an a

pheric probe on separate launches. 

NASA had originally chosen the Delta launch vehicle for Pioneer Venus. Howev

scientists began designing their experiments, they found themselves severely constrain

Delta’s weight capabilities. Either they could miniaturize and reduce the scope of their experim

or they could spend an additional $10 million on an Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle. They 

realized that the funds saved by not having to miniaturize their experiments would 

Centaur’s higher price tag.69

Atlas-Centaur (AC-50) launched the Pioneer Venus orbiter in May 1978.70 Ove

next fourteen years, the orbiter successfully carried out seventeen scientific experimen

maintained an orbit around the planet until fuel depletion in August 1992 and disinteg

upon entering the planet’s atmosphere. While Pioneer Venus yielded significant scie

results about the planet, these results were overshadowed by the excitement generated 

complicated Venus-bound spacecraft called the Multiprobe launched two and a half m

later. Like the Pioneer Venus orbiter, the Multiprobe trajectory required a two-burn a

with similar launch times and procedures. When the first orbiter arrived at Ven

December 1978, the Multiprobe was only five days behind. 

The Multiprobe carried four atmospheric-entry probes to gather data on the Ven

clouds, atmospheric structure, and circulation pattern of the atmosphere. One of 

probes managed to send back radio signals for an hour after impact with the surface o

134 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

68 “Atlas-Centaur D-1A AC-50 Launch Operations and Flight Events,” Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur 

Office, NASA GRC Records.

69 Richard O. Fimmel, Lawrence Colin, and Eric Burgess, Pioneer Venus (Washington, DC: NASA SP-461 Government P

Office, 1983), 26.

70 O. Frank Spurlock, “Trajectory and Performance,” as found in “Pioneer Venus Orbiter Mission Flight Data Report,” B

50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
Heavy Lift 13

The High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO-3) encapsulation in 1979. It was launched by Atlas-Centaur 53 on 20 Septembe

1979. (NASA 8003540)
planet.71 The Pioneer Venus Orbiter and Multiprobe missions attracted significant 

coverage, as well as kudos from NASA Headquarters. In a letter to Larry Ross, N

Administrator Robert A. Frosch recognized the “overwhelming success of Pioneer Venus 

ities” and contributions of the Lewis team. The program represented the “professionalism 

dedication of many groups of people at NASA, in universities, and in industry.”72

In Search of Cosmic Rays: The High-Energy Astronomy Observatory 

The earlier OAO series of heavy science satellites were followed by a new version of the or

satellite observatory called the High-Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO), manage

Marshall Space Flight Center. When the HEAO program began in 1970, NASA planned to l

the new satellites with two Titan IIIC boosters. In 1973, TRW won a contract to build the 

craft, but budget cuts threatened cancellation of the program. Marshall was forced to scale ba

program and reduced the weight of the satellites from 18,000 to 6,000 pounds so that they 

be carried aloft by Atlas-Centaur. At that time, the satellites represented the heaviest m

attempted by an Atlas-Centaur. 

The objective of the new class of HEAO spacecraft was to locate, identify, and analyze ce

high-energy radiation sources.73 HEAO spacecraft were designed to survey the sky for x rays, 

tigate the shape and structure of these x-ray sources, measure gamma-ray flux and determine s

locations, and increase the understanding of various cosmic phenomena.74 With a series of 

launches planned (all aboard the improved Centaur D1 with a single burn), scientists hope

the HEAO would help them begin to uncover answers to “the most intriguing mysteries 

universe—pulsars, black holes, neutron stars, and supernovae.”75

The HEAO program represented the first use of new in-flight Centaur retargeting software

feature could be used if Centaur lost power in flight. The software automatically changed the a

point for the vehicle to a lower orbit. Although this compromised the flight, it prevented com

mission failure. No HEAO required the retargeting software because all three Centaurs perform

expected; nevertheless, the advance was an important software feature for future missions.

136 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

71 For further information on the Pioneer Venus missions, see Eric Burgess, Venus: An Errant Twin (New York: Co

University Press, 1985); D. M. Hunten et al., eds., Venus (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1983); and Robert J. Para

“Pioneer Venus 1” and “Pioneer Venus 2,” in USA in Space, 500–508. 

72 Robert Frosch to Larry Ross, 10 April 1979, Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA 

Records.

73 J. R. Brown, “RL10A-33 Engine Performance Summary for Atlas Centaur Flight AC-45,” Box AC-42 to AC-49, D

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

74 Edwin Muckley, “HEAO Mission Objectives,” from the Director of Launch Vehicles’s report to the Director, Box AC

AC-49, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

75 “Atlas-Centaur D-1A AC-52,” Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
The mission of the first HEAO, launched on an Atlas-Centaur (AC-45) on 12 August 1977, wa

to map the sky broadly for x and gamma rays. The countdown was interrupted for electrical storm

and the brief failure of a payload ground computer. Then shrimp boats encroached upon the rang

safety area in the Atlantic Ocean. Once the computer was fixed, the storms over, and the shrim

boaters banished, liftoff occurred with 13 minutes to spare. Centaur completed its single-burn ascen

and placed the 5,581-pound HEAO-1 in its designated circular orbit 276 miles above Earth.76 Afte

separation from the HEAO, Centaur began a “deflection turn” 11 seconds later to minimize an

possible chance of contaminating the HEAO. This turn was a 90-degree pitch and yaw maneuver i

which Centaur pointed its engines towards the Sun. At the same time, Centaur engaged in a 45-degre

roll. When Centaur finished repositioning, the propellant tank’s settling and venting sequence wa

initiated. This procedure further increased the distance between Centaur and the HEAO. The fina

Centaur “blowdown” phase began 74 minutes after launch and continued for 305 seconds, lowerin

it below the HEAO orbit.77 (During blowdown, any residual propellants are vented from the Centau

tanks before the vehicle reenters the atmosphere.) HEAO-1 conducted nearly three full celesti

surveys and discovered 1,500 new sources of x rays in the sky. 

NASA launched the second spacecraft in this series, HEAO-2, in November 1978. Th

Atlas-Centaur (AC-52) launch sequence was similar to that of HEAO-1, but after payloa

separation, Centaur carried out two experiments designed to improve its own future perform

ance. The first experiment occurred 106 minutes into the flight. During the first orbital pass ove

Florida, Centaur began a special spin-up experiment to demonstrate its ability to spin a commer

cial spacecraft to 12 degrees per second before payload separation.

The second experiment occurred 109 minutes into the flight. Using newly implemente

Centaur tumble-recovery software made possible by the new Teledyne computer, the vehicle simu

lated a severe tumble of 329 degrees of pitch and 584 degrees of roll. The new software allowed 

controlled steering maneuver to realign Centaur. This was the first NASA vehicle to have tumble

recovery software encoded into its onboard computer software.78

The operational objectives of HEAO-2 were similar to those of the first craft in the serie

Again it searched the universe for x, gamma, and other cosmic rays and mapped their location

However, the HEAO-2 was larger and contained much more sophisticated observational equipmen

than its predecessor. At 6,866 pounds, it became the heaviest object ever lifted into space b

an Atlas-Centaur, and it orbited Earth at 333 miles. The centerpiece of all the instrumentatio

Heavy Lift 13

76 This was the first mission in which Centaur delayed its usual separation time because engineers wanted telemetry coverage ov

Ascension Island. “AC-45 Preliminary Analysis report,” 1 September 1977, Box AC-42 to AC-49, Division Atlas/Centau

Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

77 “Atlas Centaur Flight Evaluation AC-45,” Box AC-42 to AC-49, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Record

78 “Atlas-Centaur Postflight Analysis AC-52,” Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Record
was a large x-ray telescope that had the ability to isolate and point directly at the most 

esting stellar emanations that HEAO-1 identified in the sky.79 HEAO-2 made ove

thousand specific observations and also discovered that both Earth and Jupiter emit x 

HEAO-3 contributed to a better understanding of interstellar matter by detecting cosm

particles and gamma-ray photons. 

The final launch in the HEAO series occurred on 20 September 1979 with Atlas-Ce

(AC-53). At 6,321 pounds, HEAO-3 was actually significantly lighter than HEAO-

objectives were similar to those of HEAO-1.80 It was the last mission of Atlas-Centa

launch a low-Earth-orbiting satellite until the commercial era of the 1980s.

Despite all of their mission complexity, almost all of the Atlas-Centaur missions succ

during the busy decade of the 1970s. The team lost one Orbiting Astronomical Observator

one Mariner mission, caused by the malfunction of a tiny integrated circuit in the Ce

autopilot. Launches of two of nineteen Intelsat commercial satellites also failed. These set

did nothing to lesson the resolve or growing confidence among the government-ind

Centaur team. They continued a tradition of innovation on Centaur with the upgrade 

computer system. Centaur reliability was greatly enhanced by the ability to ground-test its r

capability in a new vacuum facility completed at Lewis Research Center’s Plum Brook Stat

the early 1970s. 

The early successes of the Atlas-Centaur planetary program paved the way for even 

ambitious missions in the service of heavy science. The Titan-Centaur program, with voya

the Sun, Mars, and the outer planets, continued the legacy of the Atlas-Centaur program. 

III-Centaur sent spacecraft to probe deeper into the secrets of Earth’s planetary neighbor

and enabled scientists to learn more about the evolution of Earth itself. Questions abou

future of expendable rockets seemed not to dampen the enthusiasm of the engineers and 

tists involved in the planetary science program for developing an even more powerful la

vehicle—the giant Titan-Centaur.

138 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

79 “Atlas/Centaur D-1A AC-52 HEAO-B Flight Data Report,” February 1979, Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

80 “Atlas-Centaur D-1A AC-53 HEAO-C Mission,” Box AC-50 to AC-57, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NAS

Records. For further information about the HEAO satellites, see James Cornell, Wendell Johnson, and Carroll Dailey, ed

Energy Astronomy Observatory (Washington, DC: NASA EP-167 Government Printing Office, 1980); Wallace H. Tuck

Star Splitters: The High Energy Astronomy Observatory (Washington, DC: NASA SP-466 Government Printing Office, 

Dave Dooling, “Window on Violent, Cataclysmic Universe Closes,” Space World (May 1982): 16–17; and Dooling, “Th

Energy Astronomical Observatory,” in USA in Space, 253–256.
Chapter 5

The Giant Titan-Centaur

“But when Viking came along—it was the first Mars lander—it was

too heavy for the Atlas-Centaur so we had to go with a bigger booster,

Titan . . . . All that effort spent to integrate the Centaur to the Titan,

[and] we only launched it seven times, because by the time we launched

Voyager the Shuttle was on the horizon and it was going to displace

expendable launch vehicles.”

—Joe Nieberding, Lewis Research Center

While Atlas-Centaur was proving its heavy lift capability, a giant launch vehicle that deliv

ered even more power emerged in 1974—Centaur coupled with a Titan IIIE booste

Titan-Centaur was capable of lifting unprecedented heavy science missions. The heavies

Atlas-Centaur planetary launch was the 2,201-pound Mariner 9 spacecraft; Titan-Centau

would more than triple this capability with the launch of the 7,767-pound Viking probe

Wernher von Braun, once skeptical that a liquid-hydrogen upper stage was even feasible, show

ered the new Titan-Centaur with high praise shortly before its first launch. In Popular Scienc

he announced the flightworthiness of a “new generation of heavyweight interplanetary spacecraft.”

Standing 160 feet tall, the Titan-Centaur launch vehicle would give scientists the capability to lear

more secrets about the solar system than ever before. With a hint of regret, von Braun further wrot

that the Titan “has the prospect of becoming NASA’s largest launch vehicle in active use since ou

two remaining Saturn V’s are unassigned and mothballed.” Wernher von Braun’s praise was just

fied. Bigger and more powerful than Atlas-Centaur, Titan III-Centaur proved to be one of the mos

powerful and flexible launch vehicle systems ever designed. 

Titan-Centaur launched key science missions to the Sun, Mars, and Jupiter with the Helio

Viking, and Voyager probes. Ironically, despite its dramatic impact on the planetary spac

program, NASA gave this Titan III-Centaur a life of only seven launches. Even before the Titan

The Giant Titan-Centaur 13

1 Wernher von Braun, “Our Biggest Interplanetary Rocket,” Popular Science (July 1974): 62.
140 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Centaur had a chance to prove itself, its grave was already being prepared. As the new la

vehicle rolled out to the launch pad for its inaugural flight, the expendable launch vehicl

marked as a dying breed. John Noble Wilford wrote in the New York Times, “The mam

rocket, the Titan III-Centaur, is expected to be the last new launching vehicle to be develop

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration until the advent of the reusable 

shuttle.”2 Despite its uncertain future, Centaur, mated so elegantly and powerfully with T

would make possible the acquisition of significant new knowledge of the solar system.

Integrating Titan and Centaur 

In the early 1960s, no one had predicted that Titan and Centaur would mate. N

long-range launch vehicle plan was to continue to use Atlas-Centaur until a reusable la

system or a nuclear-powered upper stage could be developed. The escalation of the Vie

conflict and President Johnson’s War on Poverty disrupted these plans. Congress drast

reduced expenditures for the civilian space program, and the development of a reusable la

vehicle was put on hold. Because NASA needed a launch vehicle more powerful than A

Centaur to send heavier unpiloted planetary probes like Viking and Voyager into space i

1970s, NASA began in 1967 to consider the possibilities of mating a Centaur upper stage 

the giant Titan III.3

2 John Noble Wilford, “Rocket for Exploration of Planets Rolled to Pad for ‘Proof Flight,’” New York Times (3 O

1973). 

3 Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III (Washington, DC: NASA, SP-4012, 1988), 38. 

The Seven Launches of Titan-Centaur for the Space Program

(1974–1977)

Launch Date Mission Vehicle Payload Objective

11 February 1974 Proof Flight TC-1 7,985 lb Simulated Viking launc

Sphinx spacecraft. Failed

10 December 1974 Helios 1 TC-2 1,093 lb Sent Helios 1 to the Sun

9 September 1975 Viking 2 TC-3 7,767 lb Sent Viking 2 to Mars.

20 August 1975 Viking 1 TC-4 7,764 lb Sent Viking 1 to Mars.

15 January 1976 Helios 2 TC-5 1,102 lb Sent Helios 2 to the Sun

20 August 1977 Voyager 2 TC-7 2,168 lb Sent Voyager 2 to Jupite

5 September 1977 Voyager 1 TC-6 2,171 lb Sent Voyager 1 to Jupite
Titan, an Air Force launch vehicle developed in the mid-1950s as an ICBM by the Glenn L

Martin Company (later Martin Marietta Corporation), was a behemoth. But the tons of liquid

oxygen oxidizer and RP-1 kerosene it required meant that it could not be readied for flight rapidl

enough in the event of a military emergency. To solve the propellant problem, the Marti

Company developed a new two-stage version called the Titan II that used storable, hypergoli

propellants. These propellants did not require the elaborate tanking procedures of Titan I. Tita

II’s power promised an unprecedented level of performance and cost-effectiveness as a launc

vehicle for NASA. Titan II’s first space mission to lift a two-person Gemini capsule was consid

ered a triumph.4

The Titan III program began in 1962 when the Department of Defense authorized th

development of a launch vehicle for heavy military satellites. Titan III had two solid rocket strap

ons for additional thrust. The Air Force tested the ability of Titan IIIA and IIIC to lif

13,000-pound payloads into low-Earth orbit in 1964. One of the most significant additions t

Titan was an upper stage rocket called Transtage intended to carry multiple satellites int

different orbits on a single mission. Because Transtage was plagued with development problem

NASA chose Titan-Centaur as an upper stage for its heavy science missions.

Lewis engineers confronted the daunting prospect of integrating Centaur with Titan III

Andrew Stofan, former head of the Propellant Systems Section, managed the Titan-Centau

project office at Lewis. His counterpart at General Dynamics, Russ Thomas, led the devel

opment of the Centaur D-1T and managed the industry team supporting the seven Tita

III-Centaur D-1T planetary launches. John Neilon, who headed Unmanned Launc

Operations at Kennedy Space Center between 1970 and 1975, recalled, “It was a distinc

break from our way of doing business on Atlas-Centaur and Delta.”5 All three organization

had to learn how to deal with a new contractor, Martin Marietta, as well as the Air Force

which owned both Titan and the launch pad. 

Titan was launched from the Integrate, Transfer and Launch (ITL), its own launch facility

The ITL consisted of the Vertical Integration Building (VIB), the Solid Motor Assembly Buildin

(SMAB), and two launch pads, 40 and 41. Pad 41 was modified for Titan-Centaur. All launche

for the Titan-Centaur were from Launch Complex 41, owned and controlled by the Air Force. 

Prior to reaching the launch pad, the vehicles went through several check stages. The Tita

was assembled and tested at Martin Marietta’s Denver, Colorado, plant. The Titan core vehicle wa

then sent by plane to Florida. United Technologies built the solid rocket motors in Sunnyvale

The Giant Titan-Centaur 14

4 Frank Winter, Rockets Into Space (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 91–93. See also Robert L. Perry, “The Atla

Thor, Titan, and Minuteman,” in The History of Rocket Technology, ed. Eugene M. Emme (Detroit: Wayne State University Pres

1964), 160; and Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemin

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4203, 1977). 

5 Communication from John Neilon to the authors, 7 July 2002.
California, and shipped them to Florida by rail. The Aerospace Division of General Dyn

assembled the Centaur in San Diego, California, with final preparations taking place at the K

Mesa facility. From there, Centaur was taken to Miramar Naval Air Station, with a final flig

a C-5A plane to Kennedy Air Force Station. At Kennedy, Titan was moved to the VIB, wh

was enclosed in a service structure. After checkout, a railroad locomotive pulled the core ve

consisting of the two Titan stages, on tracks to the SMAB, where the two solid rocket motors 

attached to the Titan core vehicle. The Titan-Centaur was moved by rail one last time to Com

41 to be mated with its payload.6

Since Pad 41 did not have a blockhouse, checkout and launch functions were carried out 

the Launch Control Center in the VIB, located several miles from the launch site. Neilon w

“Distance, rather than concrete provided safety. The same distance was also something 

inconvenience; one did not simply walk out to the pad as one could on Complex 36, but w

used to it. In summary, being different didn’t mean wrong or inferior, just different. We all w

together and made things work.”7

When erected on the launch pad, Titan-Centaur was an impressive sight. Together, th

vehicles stood 160 feet tall and were 10 feet in diameter, with a 14-foot-diameter sh

Flanking the Titan on either side were the two 10-foot Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) bu

the Chemical Systems Division of United Technologies. The SRMs were capable of 2.4 m

pounds of thrust. Each weighed 500,000 pounds and stood 85 feet tall. When the S

(considered stage 0) burned out, they were jettisoned and the Titan’s first and then its se

stage took over. These were called the “core vehicle.” Both burned liquid Aerozene-50 fue

red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) as an oxidizer. The first stage, 73 feet long and 10 feet in d

eter, provided 470,000 pounds of thrust. The 23-foot second stage delivered 100,000 po

of thrust. Aerojet manufactured both core vehicle engines. 

The Centaur D-1T (stage 3) was 23 feet in length and weighed 39,000 pounds, includi

liquid-oxygen and -hydrogen propellants. Its two Pratt & Whitney main engines each pro

15,000 pounds of thrust.8 Many features of the Centaur D-1T for Titan were the same as 

of the Centaur D-lA for Atlas. For example, Centaur remained the “brains” because of its Tel

Digital Computer Unit with its 16-K, twenty-four-bit capacity. The computer had a twenty

term instruction set, plus additional input and output instructions. The Titan version o

greater computational reserve memory and input/output functions.9

142 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

6 “Titan IIIE/Centaur D-1T Systems Summary,” September 1973, Joe Nieberding Personal Collection.

7 Ibid.

8 John F. Kennedy Space Center, “Titan/Centaur,” press release, 20 August 1977. 

9 “Titan IIIE/Centaur D-1T Systems Summary,” September 1973, Joe Nieberding Personal Collection. Unlike Atlas, wh

a one-and-a-half-stage booster, Titan was a two-stage rocket (stage 1 and stage 2) with two solid rocket motor strap-ons

SRMs (stage 0). Centaur became the third stage and the Delta TE-364 the fourth stage. 
The D-1T Centaur had an updated electrical system and a totally redesigned shroud assembl

called the Centaur Standard Shroud (CSS), manufactured by Lockheed Missiles and Spac

Company.10 It required extensive testing in the Space Power Facility at NASA’s Plum Brook Station

The shroud enclosed both Centaur and the payload, serving as environmental protection for th

payload on the ground and during the first few minutes after launch. It consisted of two halve

wrapped around Centaur and held in place by eight compressed springs mounted in pairs. The shrou

had a venting system that minimized the differences in structural pressures between the vehicle an

spacecraft during flight through the atmosphere.11 Once the vehicle left the atmosphere, the spring

forced the halves to separate and the shroud was jettisoned.12

The Titan-Centaur used a thermal radiation shield to reduce the heat that Centaur’s liquid

hydrogen fuel absorbed while it coasted in space. The radiation shield enabled Titan-Centaur t

coast in space for longer periods than Atlas-Centaur, which had a maximum coast period of abou

30 minutes. Titan-Centaur could coast for over 5 hours, providing improved synchronous-orb

capability and extended launch windows. Although Titan-Centaur payloads never needed thes

extended coast periods, these capabilities were tested on the two Helios missions. Technical infor

mation learned from these important experiments was later used in the development of Tita

IV-Centaur and the commercial version of Centaur in the 1990s. 

Integrating Centaur with Titan proved to be a significant technical challenge. When Seymou

Himmel, then Associate Director for Rockets and Vehicles at Lewis, took charge of the integration o

the two vehicles, he found that the procedure was flawed. There was a lack of clear and effective tech

nical communication between the two major aerospace companies involved. He directed that 

common database and set of definitions be established, documented, and maintained as the governin

Interface Control Drawings (ICD) for the integration activity. This was no minor task because th

two companies had differing cultures and design processes.13

In addition, he directed that complete structural and structural-dynamics analyses be conducte

for the combined vehicle. This effort underscored the nature of the integration problems because th

two companies did not use a common set of definitions for such analyses. Once a “dictionary” wa

developed and documented, the process went forward much more smoothly.14

The Giant Titan-Centaur 14

10 S. V. Szabo, Jr., and L. J. Ross, “Titan/Centaur 1 Post-Flight Evaluation Report,” April 1975, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Record

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

11 K. A. Adams, “Helios B Flight Data Report,” Box TC-5, TC-6 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GR

Records. 

12 Centaur Operations Division, Kennedy Space Center, “Titan-Centaur-2 Helios 1 Field Report,” 6, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-

Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

13 Interview with Seymour Himmel by Virginia Dawson, 1 March 2000, and his letter to her, dated 14 December 2002.

14 Interview with Seymour Himmel by Virginia Dawson, 1 March 2000.
An early problem was the difference between the diameters of the Titan core and the Ce

shroud; the latter was four feet wider. The solution was to taper the Centaur shroud at the jun

point between the two rockets. This created a bulge, which gave the launch vehicle its u

hammerhead shape. A more difficult problem resulted from the different temperatures of th

rockets. Heat transfer from Titan’s extremely hot engines might compromise the very cold tem

atures needed to keep Centaur’s cryogenic propellants from becoming gaseous during launch

Gossett, Centaur Operations division chief at the Cape, told Craig Covault of Aviation Wee

to design a system with just the right amount of insulation without sacrificing weight requ

major design effort. Installing insulation in the shroud and bulkhead between the stages sat

the different thermal requirements.15

In addition to the technical challenges, dealing with the different cultures of the Atla

Titan programs proved a challenge for Lewis project managers. Air Force personnel were ro

after a few years, a practice that prevented them from forming close personal relationships 

their counterparts at Martin Marietta. In contrast, years of working together had produ

seamless relationship between the Lewis and General Dynamics people.16

Karl Kachigan, chief engineer of General Dynamics, recalled that the main problem w

Force procedures that accounted for Martin Marietta’s glacial slowness in responding to requ

In addition to contending with the problem of protecting the proprietary technology of two 

aerospace companies, Lewis engineers also found it necessary to persuade Martin Marietta 

one of the innovations pioneered by General Dynamics—the ADDJUST wind program, 

oped shortly before the first Titan-Centaur launch. Once installed, the new wind tech

worked flawlessly for every Titan-Centaur launch.

Before a launch, in addition to the prescribed launch checkout procedures, another 

unofficial preparations typically occurred. These were various superstitions, traditions, and r

that NASA engineers brought with them to the Cape. For example, going back to Surveyor 

the launch vehicle team from Lewis Research Center all had to eat at Ramon’s at Cocoa B

and everyone had to order the Caesar salad. Joe Nieberding recalled, “I never liked Caesar 

but who was I to say, being new to the program at the time. We had a great success record

we just didn’t want to change anything.”18 Since Titan was an Air Force rocket, Air Force r

now entered the mix. Key personnel from the mission would gather on the beach the night b

a launch. A quiet, somber, reverent mood more befitting a séance room than an engineering

tary gathering would settle over the group. A designated individual took a long knife and b

144 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

15 Craig Covault, “Titan 3E to Fill Gap in Space Boosters,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (17 September 1973): 

Craig Covault, “First Titan 3,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (4 February 1974): 52–55.

16 Interview with Mike Benik by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999. 

17 Interview with Karl Kachigan by Virginia Dawson, 7 June 2000. 

18 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 
it in the sand with the knife pointing in the launch direction. “These were things you had to do,

Nieberding recalled. “It’s hard to believe, when you look back.”19 Other engineers had mor

private superstitions and rituals they performed before each launch. General Dynamics chief eng

neer Karl Kachigan admitted, “Whenever the launch was at T-minus 18 seconds, I would alway

cross my fingers. One of the fellows took a picture of that once and he gave it to me. He said, ‘W

don’t have a chief engineer, we’ve got a witch doctor!’”20

An Inauspicious Beginning: The Proof Flight

Before the first missions to the Sun and Mars could be flown, a Proof Flight, designated as Titan

Centaur 1 (TC-1), was necessary to demonstrate the flightworthiness of the vehicle. The Proof Fligh

would have the same trajectory as the Viking mission to Mars that was scheduled to be launched i

1975. The Proof Flight was to carry the Viking Dynamic Simulator (VDS), a model of the Vikin

spacecraft which was not intended to actually separate from Centaur. Its role was simply to deter

mine flight loads to which the real Viking would be subjected during its launch. 

Although the Proof Flight was not originally planned to carry any payload, Lewis engineer

responsible for the launch persuaded their colleagues at the Center to send an experimenta

package on it. Known as the Space Plasma High Voltage Interaction Experiment, or SPHINX, 

was designed to measure how space plasmas interacted with high-voltage surfaces on the space

craft. Lewis engineers planned to use this information to design better high-voltage systems t

operate in space environments. The year-long SPHINX mission would gather sample data from

many different types of plasma particles.21

The Proof Flight was a disaster.22 After a normal launch countdown on 11 February 197

(except for a 45-minute hold resulting from questionable data from the booster’s hydrauli

systems), the first Titan-Centaur lifted off at 9:48 a.m. Titan jettisoned its shroud and Centau

separated, but at this point, the Centaur engines failed to start. Without power, Centaur wen

into a freefall and was destroyed by Range Safety 748 seconds after liftoff.23 While the loss wa

devastating for the members of the launch team, it was even more tragic for those involved i

the Lewis SPHINX program. “They were looking for a ride,” Joe Nieberding recalled. “And w

said, ‘We have this perfectly good rocket. It will be a whole Lewis thing with a Lewis payloa

The Giant Titan-Centaur 14

19 Ibid.

20 Virginia Dawson interview with Karl Kachigan, 7 June 2000. 

21 “Proof Flight, Launch Operations and Flight Events,” Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Offic

NASA GRC Records. 

22 S. V. Szabo, Jr., and L. J. Ross, “Titan/Centaur 1 Post-Flight Evaluation Report,” April 1975, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Record

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

23 Kennedy Space Center report, “Titan/Centaur-1 Proof Flight (SPHINX) Field Report,” Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Record

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
and a Lewis rocket.’ They said, ‘Great!’ We put them in the water and they never forgave 

Despite the failure, many of the evaluation criteria for the Proof Flight were met.25 The 

Flight demonstrated the structural integrity of the new Centaur and its capability to jettiso

Centaur Standard Shroud.26

The reasons for the failure of the Centaur engines were not immediately clear even a

detailed investigation revealed that the problem had occurred in the boost pumps.27 The F

Review Board, chaired by Seymour Himmel, could not pinpoint the exact cause of the f

of the Centaur boost pumps. The Board concluded that the two most probable causes 

either 1) freezing of the hydrogen-peroxide-generated steam as it expanded through the b

pump turbine or 2) ingestion of a foreign object that jammed the pump, preventing it 

rotating. No obvious source of such an object could be identified, since no change had 

made in the way the Centaur propellant tanks were built. Tests conducted at the B-2 faci

the Plum Brook Station proved inconclusive. The best corrective action that could be de

was a verification procedure to make sure that the boost pumps were free to rotate just b

liftoff. Subsequent launches were successful despite the fact that the root cause of the 

Flight failure had not been indisputably determined. 

It took four years to solve the mystery. At General Dynamics, an employee that everyone 

the “little old winemaker” had been, for a long time, the only one to install the “clip” used to a

the propellant-utilization probe to the wall of the Centaur oxygen tanks. When he retired, th

person assigned the task had great difficulty in installing the clip using the materials and proce

specified in the shop instructions. Frequently, the clip fell off, but after several trials, he appa

succeeded in securing it. This difficulty was reported to the “little old winemaker,” who conf

the difficulty of anchoring the clip to the wall of the tank. He had concluded that the length 

rivet specified in the drawings was too short, so he had always obtained and used a longer rive

worked much better. Unfortunately, he had never reported the problem or his solution. Sin

new mechanic had installed the probe for the proof flight, it was concluded that the clip had 

off and jammed the boost pump.28 What was ironic was that none of the new Titan-Ce

components were at fault and the failure was part of the old, proven Centaur. Even though th

Titan-Centaur failed, both industry and government engineers learned an enormous am

146 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

24 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 

25 Craig Covault, “Centaur Failure Stirs Minimal Concern,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (18 February 1974): 20

26 A. B. Yanke, “TC-1 Flight Data Preliminary Analysis,” Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project 

NASA GRC Records.

27 General Dynamics report, “Titan/Centaur Flight Evaluation TC-1,” Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

28 Interview with Seymour Himmel by Virginia Dawson, 1 March 2000.
about the new rocket system. The next six Titan-Centaur launches were flawless. NASA’s mos

ambitious probes to the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune were hailed as impor

tant contributions to space science. 

A German Partnership To Explore the Sun 

In 1969, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) agreed o

their first joint space project to send two probes to explore the mysteries of the Sun, the star that ha

dominated human interest in the skies for millennia. These probes would provide unprecedente

observations of the Sun, reveal important data about the relationship between the Sun and Earth

and also gather key data about the solar wind, magnetic and electric fields, cosmic rays, and cosmi

dust.29 The spacecraft would also test Einstein’s theory of general relativity.30 The mission was calle

Helios, named in honor of the ancient mythological Greek god of the Sun.

Originally, the Germans had planned to use Atlas-Centaur, but as the design evolved, glas

plates and mirrors had to be added to dissipate the intense heat generated by the Sun. These add

tions brought the craft’s weight close to the limits of what the Atlas-Centaur could lift. Th

Americans convinced the Germans that by using the untested Titan-Centaur, they would not hav

to compromise the scientific objectives of the mission by eliminating valuable scientific equip

ment. The Americans also promised the Germans that the second Helios flight would occur afte

the Viking Proof Flight. Reassured that any system flaws would be worked out by the time Helio

was launched, the Germans agreed to use the untried vehicle. They were willing to tolerate thes

risks because of the payload weight opportunities that Titan-Centaur offered.31

Lewis Research Center managed the launch vehicle, Goddard Space Flight Center directe

the overall mission, and Kennedy Space Center managed operations at the launch site. I

Germany, the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (Bundesminister für Forschung un

Technologie) provided the spacecraft. The Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung controlled a

the technical facets of their construction. It also ensured that the prime contractor for the space

craft, Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm, as well as the other German contractors, worke

together to deliver the probes to NASA on schedule. Each Helios was a relatively short, sixteen

sided, cylindrical spacecraft with two solar arrays attached to its front and aft ends. Each Helio

carried seven German scientific experiments. The United States provided three additiona

experiments on each probe, along with tracking data from NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN)

The Giant Titan-Centaur 14

29 See Karl Hufbauer, Exploring the Sun: Solar Science Since Galileo (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Pres

1991); and “Titan-Centaur D-1T, TC-2, Launch Operations and Flight Events,” Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Divisio

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

30 Glenn Research Center report, “Titan-Centaur D-1T TC-5 Launch Operations and Flight Events,” Box TC-5, TC-6 Record

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

31 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Institutio

Press, 2000), 87.
148 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

A Helios spacecraft prototype is encapsulated in its payload fairing at Kennedy Space Center on 27 September 1974. This wor

in preparation for a future Titan-Centaur flight. (NASA KSC_74P_0222)
Most importantly, the Americans supplied the launch vehicles for these missions—two Tita

IIIE/Centaur/Delta TE-364 rockets. 

As the launch approached, however, tension grew in the relationship between the Germans an

the Americans. After the Viking Proof Flight failed, the Germans feared that NASA was simply usin

their Helios mission to test the Viking launch profile before launching the expensive Viking space

craft.32 Specifically, they objected to using their mission to test a two-burn capability needed fo

Viking when Helios did not require it. If the restart were not achieved, this high-profile interna

tional mission would be stranded in low-Earth orbit. 

Other concerns focused on the Centaur Teledyne digital computer. A circuitry problem withi

the computer was discovered in July 1974. During qualification testing, engineers found that 1 i

every 10,000 microelectronic modular assemblies failed. Since Centaur contained 2,400 module

this became a very serious concern. There was a possibility that the Helios mission, as well as 

scheduled Atlas-Centaur Intelsat launch, would be delayed. Vibrations caused chips to fall off th

computer circuit board.33 Teledyne worked around the clock and found a solution to the problem

By means of a different bonding technique, the chips remained securely fastened.

Despite the controversy over the two-burns (which NASA refused to give up) and the concern

over the Teledyne computer chips, the launch went forward. During the first launch attempt on 

December 1974, a malfunction was detected in the Centaur liquid-hydrogen pump. When th

cause of the problem was not resolved during the standard 10-minute delay, engineers postpone

the launch. They later discovered that the problem lay with a faulty transducer assembly, which the

easily replaced. Two days later, the giant vehicle lifted off. 

The first Titan core burn lasted 258 seconds, at which point the stage was shut down an

jettisoned. One second later, the Titan second stage engines started. The next major launc

event was the jettisoning of the Centaur Standard Shroud (CSS), which occurred 318 second

after liftoff. At 469 seconds into the launch, the Titan second stage engines shut down. Fou

seconds later, Centaur separated from Titan. At this point, both German and American eng

neers collectively held their breaths because this was the exact moment at which the Proo

Flight had failed. Eleven seconds later, Centaur passed the critical test when its main engine

started. This first burn lasted for 100 seconds. At this time, the Centaur, Delta TE-364, an

Helios were traveling at 25,600 feet per second. The main engines then shut down on schedul

and Centaur began a nearly 22-minute parking orbit. 

Toward the end of the parking orbit, Centaur’s thrusters reoriented the vehicle in preparatio

for the second burn. This burn also occurred on schedule and lasted for 273 seconds, giving th

rocket a velocity of 37,400 feet per second. The second main engine cutoff occurred at 36 minute

The Giant Titan-Centaur 14

32 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 

33 Daniel Shramo, quoted in Craig Covault, “Centaur Computer Trouble May Delay Helios, Intelsat,” Aviation Week 

Space Technology (5 August 1974): 48.
after liftoff, and the engine remained silent for 72 seconds after the end of the second Ce

burn. Then the Delta TE-364, mated to the Helios probe, separated from Centaur. The Delt

364 motor started 42 seconds later and burned for 44 seconds. Helios separated after 72 se

and journeyed alone the rest of the way to the Sun.34 The successful launch meant a great d

the Titan-Centaur teams. Writing in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Craig Covault 

“Launch of the Helios solar probe from Cape Canaveral last week is as much a success for N

Titan Centaur program as it is for the West German team that built the Helios spacecraft.”

With Helios safely on a trajectory to the Sun, Centaur began an additional set of experim

to improve future performance. After the Delta TE-364 separated, Centaur began a 1-hour 

period—double the length of the previous successful parking orbit. During this period, Ce

slowly turned itself to point toward Earth so that ground engineers could pick up more data 

the rocket. To assist in this procedure, data transmission was switched to two high-gain, na

beam antennas. At the end of the 1-hour coast, Centaur began its third engine start in space 

a burn of 11 seconds. This was followed by another coast period and included several 180

of the rocket (called thermal maneuvers, which kept one side of the rocket from overheati

vent sequence, and other thermal control operations. After 3 hours, the Centaur engine

their fourth and final burn, which lasted 47 seconds. This final coast phase lasted almo

minutes and included a boost-pump experiment to determine the rocket’s capability to re

from a severe cavitation condition (when the pump sucks gas rather than liquid propellan

well as a hydrogen peroxide depletion experiment. As a result of these post-Helios experim

Lewis Research Center engineers concluded, “All of the Centaur systems performed satisfac

the design parameters for zero gravity coasting were verified, and no significant problems 

encountered.”36

The post-Helios experiments proved that Centaur was capable not only of four

missions, but also of vastly extended parking orbits. This capability was accomplished thr

six key modifications to the basic Centaur design: a new three-layered aluminized Mylar 

ation shield that dramatically reduced the hydrogen tank sidewall heating, an improved 

vent control system that enabled the propellant tanks to vent only when necessary, the 

tion of new “purges” to keep key lines free of liquid, the ability to engage in a 180° th

roll every 28 minutes to keep a uniform temperature on the rocket, the capability t

hydrogen peroxide axial thrusters only to collect propellants during a tank vent or e

150 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

34 K. R. Krebs, “TC-2 Centaur Stage Post Flight Data Review at LeRC,” 28 and 29 January 1975, General Dynamics, B

1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

35 Craig Covault, “Helios Launch Verifies Titan Centaur,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (16 December 1974). 

36 A. B. Yanke, “TC-2 Centaur Stage Post Flight Data Review at LeRC,” 28 and 29 January 1975, General Dynamics, B

1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
restart, and, finally, the implementation of improved tank-pressurization techniques. Thes

experiments established a major new capability for future missions.37 Engineers at Lewi

predicted that more than 7 hours of coasting would have been possible before tank venting wa

necessary. 

The Helios probe contributed significantly to humankind’s knowledge of the Sun. Jus

over three months after liftoff, the spacecraft reached its closest point to the Sun, 28.7 millio

miles, on 15 March 1975. Data from Helios were sent back to scientists at the Germa

Control Center in Oberpfaffenhofen, West Germany. All of the scientific instruments func

tioned normally and sent back information from the closest point to the Sun to which an

craft had ever voyaged. The Helios craft produced new information about the solar wind, th

emission of a stream of plasma from the Sun, which distorts the magnetic field and produce

a shock wave similar to a wind. Study of the solar wind is important because every second, th

Sun expels roughly one million tons of ionized particles at great speeds. This wind is propelle

throughout the solar system, greatly affecting Earth’s environment. Helios voyaged to the oute

solar corona, where these particles picked up their final, massive accelerations. Scientists hope

that data gathered at this point would be very revealing about the nature of these particles. 

Scientists and engineers on the Viking program also celebrated the success of Helios. Becaus

Mars launch windows open every two years, any launch malfunction would have delayed for tw

years the planned Mars voyage that was scheduled to take place nine months after Helios. Walte

Jakobowski, Viking program manager, said that while watching the Helios launch, “We wer

holding our breath. That launch vehicle had to work for us. We were very pleased with the overa

performance.”38 Ironically, after the launch of the second Viking, a fire on the launch pad threat

ened to jeopardize the second Helios flight. With help from the Air Force, the launch facility wa

repaired in time for the launch of Helios 2 (TC-5) on 15 January 1976. 

This was the fifth Titan-Centaur launch, with two successful Viking launches occurrin

between the two Helios launches. The launch vehicle and launch sequence for Helios 2 wer

nearly identical to those of Helios 1. In April 1976, this probe passed 2 million miles closer t

the Sun than Helios 1. As a result of this close passage, the Helios craft was subjected to 1

percent more heat than Helios 1 and continued to operate through temperatures of over 700°F

the melting point of lead. Terry Terhune, Engineering Chief of the Centaur Operation

Division at Kennedy Space Center, called Helios 2 a perfect mission with flawless operation o

The Giant Titan-Centaur 15

37 Raymond F. Lacovic, “Centaur Zero Gravity Coast and Engine Restart Demonstration on the TC-2 Extended Mission,” Lew

Research Center, October 1975, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records

38 Walter Jakobowski, quoted in Victor K. McElheny, “76 Mars Landing Gains With Launching of Titan,” New York Times (1

December 1974): 15. 
all ten experiments (seven German and three American) and absolutely no problems wit

any of the spacecraft’s systems.39

As with the previous voyage, Lewis engineers were able to perform several post-Helios 

maneuvers. Centaur had about 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining after Helios separated. 

massive fuel supply enabled Centaur to make an unprecedented five additional engine re

These experiments demonstrated a high-altitude, synchronous-orbit injection capability w

parking orbit that lasted over 5 hours between the second coast and the third engine start. Ce

also tested a very short coast of 5 minutes.40

The German engineers who originally designed the Helios probes had set a specific defin

of what results would constitute a “success” for the mission. They had decided that if the 

returned data from its launch date to the end of the first perihelion passage, plus a mission e

sion of eighteen months, they would consider it a success. But the unexpected happened. 

greatly underestimated the abilities of their own craft. Helios 1 had a lifespan of eleven year

Helios 2 did not die until 3 March 1990, fourteen years after its initial launch. 

The decade-long gathering of data from the Helios probes continues to actively shape 

tific knowledge of the Sun. In 1984, at the ten-year anniversary of the program, the Ger

invited all of the American scientists who had participated in the project to Germany for a

expenses-paid trip. American scientist Al Opp summarized the significance of Helios. H

that Helios had “given the scientific world a detailed, close-in view of the Sun over 

differing solar conditions. It has enabled scientists to observe cosmic rays coming into the 

system from our galaxy, and when combined with results from deep space probes and e

orbiting satellites, has given a detailed picture of the structure of the solar system and o

characteristics of low energy galactic cosmic rays.”41

Interestingly, the number of scientists working on the Helios project has increased with 

Although several of the scientists who designed and ran the first experiments are still active 

program, there are many more scientists now studying the Sun with Helios data than wer

originally involved with the project. This expansion was made possible through the Helios 

national data centers, which provide information to the wider space science community. R

Schwenn and Eckart Marsch, two of the scientists working on Helios today, wrote that 

missions “shaped our current perception of the Sun and the inner heliosphere.”42 Equally si

152 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

39 C. A. Terhune, “Titan/Centaur-5, Helios 2 KSC Field Report,” 30 June 1976, Box TC-5, TC-6 Records, D

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

40 Raymond Lacovic, “Propellant Management Report for the TC-5 Extended Mission,” September 1977, Box TC-5

Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

41 Herbert Porsche, ed., 10 Years Helios (Munich: Wenschow Franzis Druck GmbH, 1984), 9. 

42 Rainer Schwenn and Eckart Marsch, eds., Physics of the Inner Heliosphere I: Large-Scale Phenomena (London: Springer

1990), 6. 
The Giant Titan-Centaur 15

Titan-Centaur 2 at Complex 41, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, with Helios 1 as its payload. The rocket lifted off on 10

December 1974 and was the first successful launch of a Titan-Centaur. (NASA KSC-74P-0298)
cant was the Helios contribution to the international approach to space science. Schwenn 

Marsch asserted, “It should be recognized in retrospect that the Helios mission at the time 

conception represented an unprecedented challenge to the . . . network facilities availab

national and international collaboration.”43 The significance of Helios remains not onl

knowledge of the inner solar system it reaped, but also the international cooperation it fost

The Search for Extraterrestrial Life: Viking 

The two Viking spacecraft launched in 1975 were massive spacecraft—each includ

orbiter and robotic lander. So large were these spacecraft—over 7,600 pounds—that 

dwarfed the 2,200-pound Mariner 9, the largest planetary craft yet launched by Atlas-Cen

With four scientific experiments packed into each orbiter and nine more aboard the lander

Viking missions represented the heaviest science ever undertaken in outer space. Centaur w

once again prove its heavy lift capability and make possible an unprecedented soft landin

the surface of another planet. 

Everyone involved with the Viking program knew the expense and prestige associated w

In the late 1960s, NASA had planned to launch Viking on a Saturn V, but after Saturn produ

was canceled, NASA selected Titan-Centaur for this important mission.44 In Beyond the M

Robert Kraemer described the repercussions for NASA should the mission fail. “Viking w

expensive that a mission failure would shake the entire agency down to its toes, and even a m

cost overrun, say, just 10 percent, could cause the cancellation of several smaller science proj

he wrote. “That would generate a science revolt against future planetary missions that could la

years.”45 With Viking’s cost nearing $1 billion, engineers at Lewis knew that the future of N

space science program was riding on their vehicle. 

Mars has been one of the most compelling objects in the sky throughout history. Beca

its strange red color, ancient astronomical observers associated it with fire and blood and n

it Mars after the Roman god of war. In 1608, Galileo had discovered the surface features o

planet, and in 1659, Christian Huygens made the first sketches of the planet’s dark region

known as Syrtis Major. With the ability to pinpoint a location on the surface, he was able to 

that Mars rotated like Earth. By the late nineteenth century, Giovanni Schiaparelli and Pe

Lowell had published theories that Mars was inhabited by intelligent creatures; they used 

appeared to be unnaturally straight lines of canals as evidence. But by the twentieth century 

tists were becoming increasingly skeptical of finding life on Mars. The Mariner flyby missio

the 1960s and also the Mariner 9 orbiter in the early 1970s had indicated that Mars was uni

154 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

43 Ibid.

44 Interview with Tom Shaw by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999. 

45 Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration: 1971–1978 (Washington: Smithsonian Ins

Press, 2000), 136. 
ited, yet they had also revealed a planet that was both dynamic and evolving. This new knowledg

made Mars a compelling location for further scientific study. The goal of the Viking missions wa

to learn more about the planet Mars with special emphasis on the search for extraterrestrial life.

The Viking missions were the third and fourth launches with Titan-Centaur. Viking 1 on TC

4 was launched on 20 August 1975, nine days later than originally scheduled. Within 2 minute

of launch on 11 August, one of the forty-eight valves in the thrust vector control system of one o

the two solid rocket boosters of the Titan indicated that it was leaking its propellant. The launc

was scrubbed because, as Seymour Himmel said, “You don’t commit to launch unless you under

stand what has happened.”47 The errant valve was removed and replaced. It was determined tha

the source of the leak was the pintle, a conical steel “plug” that acts to seal the valve outlet whe

fluid is not supposed to flow. Himmel directed Pratt & Whitney to conduct an x-ray examinatio

of the pintle. The x ray revealed a string-like contaminant in the pintle from base to tip. Havin

ascertained the nature of the failure and that the replacement valve’s pintle did not come from th

same production batch, Himmel approved the launch.

With the launch rescheduled for 14 August, technicians now discovered that the Vikin

orbiter’s batteries had dropped from 37 to 9 volts. A rotary switch that was supposed to be turne

on 7 minutes after liftoff had been mistakenly left in the “on” position for days. To fix th

problem, the entire Viking spacecraft had to be removed for detailed troubleshooting. During th

time, the Lewis launch team was also in the midst of managing other launches as well. An Atlas

Centaur Intelsat launch was scheduled sixteen days after Viking. “Our focus was intense,” Larr

Ross recalled. “We were launching a lot of Atlas-Centaurs right in the middle of the Voyage

Viking program on Titan-Centaurs, and that was daunting. And the penalty for missing the plan

etary window is severe. The time and money are extraordinary.”48

Finally, on 20 August, Titan-Centaur (TC-4), carrying the first Viking spacecraft, lifted off a

the opening of its 71-minute launch window.49 The vehicle functioned flawlessly through th

various intricacies of liftoff. Centaur separated from Titan at the 473-second mark. Centaur the

started its main engines 11 seconds later, and they burned for 127 seconds. Centaur, still carryin

the heavy Viking payload, then coasted in space for 918 seconds. When this parking mode ended

its main engines started a second burn that lasted for 316 seconds, from roughly the 25th to th

30th minute of the launch. At 2,066 seconds after the launch, Viking separated from Centaur o

The Giant Titan-Centaur 15

46 Viking Encounter Press Kit, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

47 Interview with Seymour Himmel by Virginia Dawson, 1 March 2000; and Himmel letter to interviewer dated 14 Decemb

2002.

48 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 29 February 2000. 

49 “TC-4 Centaur Stage Flight Data Preliminary Analysis,” 11 September 1975, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, Divisio

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
a perfect trajectory to Mars. Twenty days later, the second Viking (TC-3) was launched 3 m

before a potentially mission-canceling thunderstorm. This second launch was virtually identical e

for longer coast phases. The parking mode lasted for 1,092 seconds, 174 seconds longer than th

Viking, in order to put the spacecraft on an optimal trajectory to Mars.50

On 19 June 1976, Viking 1 first entered into Mars orbit. Although every effort was ma

put the lander on the surface of the planet in time to commemorate the United States’ Jul

bicentennial celebration, a safe landing site could not be found in time. Through examinati

the photos taken from orbit, scientists determined that the first site was unsafe. After stu

other options, they agreed on the western slope of Chryse Planitia. In July, Viking 1 tou

down on the Martian surface, with its sister ship landing in September 1976 at Utopia Plan

The mission was scheduled to last 90 days, but it did not officially end until November 

when the first lander (which was the last of the four craft to stop transmitting) made its 

communication.

The contributions of the Viking missions to humankind’s knowledge of Mars were 

possible by the ability of Centaur to lift the heavy payload containing the hardware needed f

planned scientific experiments.52 Although the knowledge gained by these missions did no

the fundamental understanding of the red planet established by the earlier flyby mission

results were considered significant. Two space scientists wrote, “The Viking mission did not 

lutionize our ideas about Mars as Mariner 9 had done, but building on the foundation 

Mariner and Mars precursors it far surpassed them in the variety, quality and quantity of it

because of four factors—the number of spacecraft, the number of experiments, the duration 

mission, and the telemetry rate.”53

The orbiters and landers returned thousands of images of the planet covering the 

Martian surface during all of its seasons. These photos also included both of the Mars moon

all the information returned from the Viking missions, the most controversial type was the b

156 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

50 “TC-3 Centaur Stage Preliminary Flight Analysis,” 26 September 1975, Box TC-1 TC-2 TC-3 Records, D

Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

51 Robert Godwin, ed., Mars: The NASA Mission Reports (Burlington, Ontario, Canada: Apogee Books, 2000), 175–183.

52 For further information on the Viking missions, see Eric Burgess, To The Red Planet (New York: Columbia University Press

Robert Zubrin, The Case for Mars (New York: The Free Press, 1996); Michael H. Carr, The Surface of Mars (New Hav

University Press, 1981); Henry S. F. Cooper, Jr., The Search for Life on Mars: Evolution of an Idea (New York: Holt, Rineh

Winston, 1980); NASA Viking Lander Imaging Team, The Martian Landscape (Washington, DC: NASA SP-425 Gove

Printing Office, 1978); Cary R. Spitzer, ed., Viking Orbiter Views of Mars (Washington, DC: NASA SP-441 Government P

Office, 1980); Mark Washburn, Mars at Last! (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977); Gerald A. Soffen and Conway W. Snyde

First Viking Mission to Mars,” Science (27 August 1976): 759; Philip J. Sakimoto, “Viking 1 and 2,” in USA in Space, eds. F

Magill and Russell R. Tobias, vol. 3 (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, Inc., 1996), 809–817.

53 Conway W. Snyder and Vassili I. Moroz, “Spacecraft Exploration of Mars,” in Mars, eds. Hugh H. Kieffer, Bruce M. J

Conway W. Snyder, and Mildred S. Matthews (Tuscon and London: The University of Arizona Press, 1992), 103. 
ical data.54 The key conclusion came from a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer experimen

that detected no organic material in the soil. 

Although the search for life on Mars had been one of the main reasons that the Vikings wer

designed and funded, the controversy continues. Pictorial evidence acquired from the Vikin

orbiter resulted in a perplexing mystery about life on Mars and, for some, evidence that it was onc

home to an intelligent civilization. On the thirty-fifth pass around the planet, as it was looking fo

a landing site for the second lander, the first Viking orbiter traveled 1,000 miles above th

“Cydonia” region. Photos from this region showed a strange collection of what some calle

“ruins,” including, most ominously, a hollow-eyed, human-like face. While NASA vehementl

discounted any extraterrestrial intelligence behind these “findings,” others claimed that th

truth was being covered up to prevent mass hysteria on Earth. According to science write

Richard C. Hoagland, “Either these features on Mars are natural and this investigation is 

complete waste of time, or they are artificial and this is one of the most important discoverie

of our entire existence on Earth.”55 What did the Viking orbiter really photograph from it

vantage point in the Martian sky? Although the debate continues, the Mars Global Surveyo

launched in November 1996, suggests that “wind erosion and some trick of light and shadow

probably account for the Sphinx-like face.”56

Saving the Grand Tour: Voyager 

The final two missions for Titan IIIE-Centaur were considered the pinnacle of NASA’s plan

etary efforts of the 1970s. Already the most productive era in the exploration of the solar system

the Voyager flights to Jupiter, Saturn, and beyond promised to yield the most exciting and signif

icant information yet about Earth’s largest planetary neighbors. That these probes would not die

but would slowly fade away into the darkness of the galaxy in the hopes of one day encounterin

intelligent life, also fueled the imagination of popular culture. For example, in the first Star Tre

movie, the crew of the Enterprise confronts a strange alien intelligence known only as VGER. B

film’s end, the audience learns that the entity is one of the Voyager probes, which has becom

self-aware over centuries of seeking knowledge in space, yet which incorrectly names itse

because certain letters on the craft have eroded over time. NASA’s own words helped fuel som

of these fantastic ideas. One JPL press kit stated that “the Voyagers are able to care for themselve

and perform long, detailed and complex scientific surveys without continual commanding from

the ground.”57 Planetary Programs Director Robert Kraemer said that project scientists “ha

The Giant Titan-Centaur 15

54 Hugh H. Kieffer, Bruce M. Jakosky, and Conway W. Snyder, “The Planet Mars: From Antiquity to the Present,” Mars, 15.

55 Richard C. Hoagland, The Monuments of Mars: A City on the Edge of Forever (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1987). 

56 John Noble Wilford, Mars Beckons: The Mysteries, The Challenges, The Expectations of Our Next Great Adventure in Space (Ne

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 111. 

57 “JPL Press Kit, Voyager,” Box TC-5, TC-6, TC-7 Records, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
158 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

The Centaur stage undergoes tests in the Vertical Integration Building at Kennedy Space Center on 19 October 1976. This Ce

was mated with a Titan for a Voyager launch one year later. (NASA KSC_76PC_0526)
designed a great deal of artificial intelligence into Voyager’s brain.”58 This type of rhetoric

combined with the imagination of science fiction, made it a short leap to conceive of Voyager

becoming self-aware.

Actually, with much less fanfare or fictional speculation, the computer intelligence of th

Centaur rocket literally saved Voyager 1 after a nearly fatal error by Titan. Voyager 2 launche

first because Voyager 1 traveled on a more efficient trajectory. Launched 16 days after Voyage

2, Voyager 1 was scheduled to beat its sister ship to Saturn. (NASA engineers place mor

emphasis on arrival date than liftoff order.) 

Titan-Centaur (TC-7) looked majestic next to the gantry as it sat poised for the launch o

Voyager 2 in August 1977. One day before liftoff, Bruce Murray, the Director of JPL, and his wif

stood on the gantry, 160 feet above Pad 41, gazing at the spacecraft. In the distance, lightning illu

minated an ominous sky, and they quickly planned their escape route if the storms came close

They were standing next to the largest United States launch vehicle, loaded with 700 tons o

volatile fuel. Murray recalled, “As we gingerly descended the winding stairway of the gantry towe

on that glorious Florida afternoon, a quick glimpse of a busy engineer working inside the Centau

surprised me. It was a reminder that unmanned rockets do indeed fly by the skill and dedicatio

of humans—on the ground. The engineer was checking this giant’s intricate computer brain . . 

. The lightening drifted harmlessly seaward into a darkening sky.”59

During liftoff into the morning skies off Cape Canaveral in Florida on 20 August 1977—

exactly two years to the day after the launch of Viking 1—the Titan stages operated flawlessly. Th

Centaur Standard Shroud was successfully jettisoned 265 seconds after liftoff, and 203 second

later, Centaur, carrying the Voyager 2, separated from Titan. The main engines of Centaur starte

4 seconds later, burning for a total of 101 seconds. At that point, Centaur coasted into a parkin

orbit around Earth and began its longest zero-gravity coast during an operational mission. Th

TC-2 and TC-5 postflight maneuvers proved that Centaur was capable of very long zero-gravit

coasts in space. The Voyager flight made use of this capability for a nearly 43-minute coas

Richard Geye of Lewis Research Center noted, “This ‘zero-g’ mode of coast was selected t

provide maximum Centaur performance to the Voyager missions.”60

At the end of the coast, Centaur realigned itself to place it in the exact position desired b

the trajectory engineers for the next phase of the flight. Centaur then began its propellan

settling procedure before the second main engine start. This second burn lasted 339 seconds

accelerating Centaur and Voyager beyond Earth-escape velocity conditions. After engin

The Giant Titan-Centaur 15

58 Kraemer, Beyond the Moon, 189. 

59 Bruce Murray, Journey into Space: The First Three Decades of Space Exploration (New York: W. W. Norton & Compan

1989), 143.

60 R. P. Geye, “Introduction,” “Titan/Centaur D-1T TC-7 Voyager 2 Flight Data Report,” Box TC-5, TC-6, TC-7 Record

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
cutoff, Centaur coasted for another 89 seconds. During this time, the computer inside Vo

initiated its separation sequence, and Voyager was deployed from Centaur. Fifteen se

later, the TE-M-364-4 solid rocket motor (the Propulsion Module) on the Voyager ignite

45 seconds and gave the spacecraft the additional 6,200-feet-per-second velocity beyon

46,000- to 48,000-feet-per-second velocity that Voyager needed to inject it into the Ju

transfer orbit. This Propulsion Module weighed approximately 2,700 pounds and was 

soned after its engines burned out.

What was left after all of these burn phases was the Voyager Mission Module spe

toward a rendezvous with Jupiter roughly two years in the future. The Mission M

contained all of the instruments, communication and data capability, command and co

functions, electrical power, and trajectory-adjustment features that were essential for car

out the scientific objectives. Engineers based its design on Mariner Mars 1971 and the V

Orbiter.61

While the Voyager 2 spacecraft had suffered some technical problems, Titan-Centau

performed perfectly. This was not the case for Voyager 1 (launched after Voyager 2) on L

Day, 5 September 1977. Titan’s final-stage engine shut down too soon. Over the co

room’s radio came the announcement, “Solid booster burnout and separation, Titan core 

tion . . . Titan burnout and separation.” Those in the room immediately knew that ther

a problem because the burnout came much sooner than anticipated. The problem had 

caused by a failure of Titan hardware, which choked off the propellant flow, leaving 

pounds of propellant unburned. Only if Centaur could make up for this failure durin

trajectory-insertion burn could the mission be saved. Bruce Murray, who was watching 

the control room, recalls, “This was serious. Titan had underperformed not propelling Ce

and Voyager fast enough.” It was the Centaur computers that recognized the deficiency and b

to correct the problem. In awe of the Centaur “brain,” Murray said that this was the “bri

part” because it could “compensate for any shortfall in the propulsion of the earlier s

Centaur extended its own burn and was able to give Voyager the additional velocity it ne

To the great relief of those in the control room, Centaur had saved the day with onl

seconds of burn time remaining. Murray could only shake his head and say, “Wow tha

pretty close.”62 Had this flawed Titan rocket been used on Voyager 2, with its more deman

trajectory, Centaur would not have had enough propellants to perform the corr

maneuver. Voyager 1 missed burning up in Earth’s atmosphere only because of the powe

capability of the Centaur rocket. Centaur had saved half of the Grand Tour.63 This occur

was never widely publicized because it was the last Titan IIIE-Centaur launch.

160 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

61 R. P. Geye, “Voyager Spacecraft,” “Titan/Centaur D-1T TC-7 Voyager 2 Flight Data Report,” Box TC-5, TC-6, TC-7 R

Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

62 Murray, Journey Into Space, 147.

63 Linda J. Horn, “Voyager 1: Jupiter,” in USA in Space, 823. 
The Giant Titan-Centaur 16

The Voyager spacecraft as it is encapsulated within its protective shroud at the Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Facility at

Kennedy Space Center on 2 August 1977. It would later be mated with Titan-Centaur 7 for launch on 20 August 1977. (NASA

KSC_77P_0201)
Both Voyager craft were safely on schedule with a mission to gather the most detaile

scientifically relevant knowledge ever assembled about Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, an

outer solar system. This was the first so-called “Grand Tour” of the solar system, and the p

were aligned in such a way as to make this possible only once every 176 years. With this 

planetary alignment, the Voyager spacecraft could use planetary assists (a maneuver that uses 

itational attraction like a slingshot to assist in propelling spacecraft between planets) to sav

and time in reaching the distant destinations. Without this technique, decades would have 

added to the overall flight time. 

Thirteen days into its mission, Voyager 1 turned its camera back toward home and too

first picture of Earth and the Moon in the same frame. Eighteen months later, Voyager 1 en

tered Jupiter, with its closest approach on 5 March 1979. Four months later, Voyager 2 re

the planet. The Voyagers then employed another slingshot maneuver, using Jupiter its

propel them toward Saturn, altering their elliptical orbit around the Sun. This maneuver 

cially began the Grand Tour, with a destination beyond the solar system. By the time 

reached Saturn, Voyager 1 was nine months ahead of its sister ship.

At this point, the paths of the Voyagers diverged. Voyager 1 sacrificed future plan

encounters for a close examination of Saturn’s largest moon, Titan. Voyager 2 continued its 

etary tour and made the first-ever encounter of Uranus on 24 January 1986. Three years la

visited Neptune and its moon Triton, officially ending the Grand Tour and marking the begi

of its interstellar mission. The Voyager missions were a great success, providing the first de

visual and scientific studies of the Jovian and Saturnian systems, as well as providing the first 

encounters with the planets of the outer solar system.64 Thus the Titan-Centaur launch com

tion once again played an essential role in the planetary space program, and even when 

experienced technical difficulties, the power and “intelligence” of Centaur were able to sav

mission. 

However, despite what should have been a time of great celebration for the Centaur team

team members faced the termination of the program that they had spent years of their liv

perfecting. Andy Stofan, reflecting on what he considered to be the shortsightedness of N

planners, commented, “After the launch of the last Voyager, there were no more Titan-Cen

162 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

64 For further information on the Voyager spacecraft, see David Morrison, Voyages to Saturn (Washington, DC: NASA 

Government Printing Office, 1982); David Morrison and Jane Samz, Voyage to Jupiter (Washington, DC: NASA 

Government Printing Office, 1980); Margaret Poynter and Arthur L. Lane, Voyager: Story of a Space Mission (New 

Macmillan, 1981); Henry S. Cooper, Imaging Saturn: The Voyager Flights to Saturn (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and W

1985); Joel Davis, The Interplanetary Odyssey of Voyager 2 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1987); Eric Burgess, Far Enc

The Neptune System (New York: Columbia University, 1991); Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Voyager 2 F

Neptune (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990); Rick Gore, “Voyager Views Jupiter’s Dazzling Realm,” N

Geographic 157 (January 1980): 2–29; Rick Gore, “Uranus: Voyager Visits a Dark Planet,” National Geographic 170 

1986): 178–195; L. Soderblom, “The Galilean Moons of Jupiter,” Scientific American 242 (January 1980): 88–100; and W

J. Kossman, “The Voyager Program,” in USA in Space, 819. 
ordered, and that was the largest lift capability this country had.”65 Joe Nieberding lamented, “A

that effort spent to integrate the Centaur to the Titan, and we launched it only seven times.”66 Th

concern was not just that Titan-Centaur was no longer going to fly, but that all expendable rocket

were to be phased out in favor of the Space Shuttle.

Approved in 1972 during an era of drastically reduced NASA budgets, the new reusable launc

system was presented to the Nixon administration and to Congress as a more economical launc

system than expendable rockets. Indeed, space science had never figured prominently in the wide

context of NASA funding priorities. As historian Roger Launius has pointed out, in the 1960s an

1970s, NASA’s extremely productive space science missions were unobtrusively folded into the larg

Apollo budgets.67 However, in the 1970s, the huge expense of projected planetary missions lik

Galileo, Cassini, and Magellan garnered unwanted congressional debate and scrutiny. Of the cance

lation of Titan-Centaur, Launius wrote, “Because the performance of the shuttle and it

The Giant Titan-Centaur 16

Mating Voyager 2 to Titan-Centaur 7 on 5 August 1977. (NASA KSC_77P_0209)

65 Interview with Andrew Stofan by Mark Bowles, 13 April 2000.

66 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 

67 Robert Kraemer, Foreword to Beyond the Moon, xvi.
164 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Titan-Centaur 7 lifting off from Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on 20 August 1977 with Voyager 2 as pay

(NASA KSC_77PC_0269_01)
then-planned upper stage were less than that of the Titan Centaur, the cancellation decreased the siz

of the payload that NASA could send to the planets.”68

Although the advance of technology often leaves well-designed systems in its wake, the large

issue was one of potential over-dependence on a single type of launching system. NASA was essen

tially forsaking two decades of service by reliable expendable rockets for an unproven system tha

promised only minor advantages (along with numerous disadvantages) over existing systems. Wit

astronauts to be unnecessarily involved in the future planetary program, significant safety issue

arose. From the point of view of mission specialists at JPL, the most unfortunate consequence o

the decision was the loss of Centaur, the upper stage upon which they relied to get their heavies

payload into space. Tom Shaw, a JPL engineer, recalled that in the “rush to divest ourselves o

expendable launch vehicles and go put all of our eggs in the Shuttle basket,” JPL came close t

getting an official reprimand from NASA Headquarters for its vociferous objection to the phasin

out of the expendable launch vehicles upon which it had relied for the decade’s most importan

scientific missions.69 But the decision had been made.

The Giant Titan-Centaur 16

68 Ibid., xvii.

69 Interview with Lutha (Tom) Shaw by Virginia Dawson, 10 November 1999. 

Chapter 6

Centaur Reborn

“At stake is the Shuttle’s viability as a launch vehicle for the massive new

communications satellites being developed for the latter half of the

decade—as well as the viability of new NASA plans to send spacecraft into

remote parts of the solar system.”

—M. Mitchell Waldrop, “Centaur Wars,” Science, 1982

The rebirth of Centaur in the early 1980s stemmed from a radical idea to redesign th

rocket to fit inside the Space Shuttle. Shuttle/Centaur was considered to be the most significan

new program at NASA in the early 1980s. Because the Shuttle was limited to flying in low

Earth orbit, it needed an upper stage. Shuttle/Centaur promised to solve this Shuttle limitation

Once in low-Earth orbit (621 miles above Earth), the astronauts could launch Centaur from th

Shuttle bay. Shuttle/Centaur was capable of either delivering its payload to upper-Earth orb

or placing it on a trajectory to other planets or the far corners of the solar system. Thes

payloads included communications satellites, Earth-orbiting scientific spacecraft for bot

NASA and the Department of Defense, and interplanetary probes.1

Shuttle/Centaur was hailed as the convergence of piloted and robotic spaceflight and th

next step in launch vehicle evolution. In an era of cost cutting and declining space budgets, th

combination of the Shuttle with the world’s most powerful upper stage promised to give th

United States a system of extraordinary power and versatility. Because of these benefits, NASA

Associate Administrator Jesse Moore believed that Shuttle/Centaur would become a “very inte

gral, longtime part of the space shuttle program.”2

Despite the hopes and dreams that surrounded the new rocket combination, it prove

extraordinarily controversial throughout the period of development. NASA suspended th

program after the Challenger disaster in 1986, then officially terminated it withou

Centaur Reborn 16

1 General Dynamics report, “Centaur/Shuttle Integration Study” (Contract NAS 3-16786, 1 August 1973), 2, Drawer 4-C

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Archives.

2 Robert Locke quotes Jesse W. Moore in “General Dynamics Shows Off New Probe-Launching Rocket,” San Diego Tribune (1

August 1985). 
Shuttle/Centaur ever having flown. Like the original Centaur first conceived in the late 1

Shuttle/Centaur was an innovative concept that was yet to be proven. However, unlike in 

era, when technical decisions were driven by the Cold War, Shuttle/Centaur was deve

during an era with a much lower tolerance for risk. 

Today, most people cite concerns over safety as the central reason that Shuttle/Ce

never made the journey into space. But according to the core group of engineers most re

sible for designing and building the new Centaur, all of the safety precautions were add

and all necessary emergency redundancy plans were in place. Although the safety concerns 

real, something more powerful was at stake in the decision to abort such an expensive and 

ical program. A more accurate explanation for why NASA prevented the launc

Shuttle/Centaur was that a devastating human tragedy forced the entire space program in

era of heightened risk sensitivity. 

Because Shuttle/Centaur promised to significantly increase its capability to launc

national security missions for the Air Force, the risks associated with liquid hydrogen 

initially appeared acceptable. However, détente with Soviet Union and a new Air Force 

mination not to depend exclusively on the Shuttle for launching its national security pay

made the need for Shuttle/Centaur less urgent. After Challenger exploded in January 

taking the lives of the entire crew, NASA decided that launching Centaur from withi

Shuttle was an unacceptable risk. 

The Shuttle/Centaur saga suggests that the subjective, yet changing, tolerance for risk 

ences technical designs, funding, and management. Everyone involved—politicians, ind

contractors, and NASA personnel—is willing to assume more risk when national security 

stake. The Apollo program is an example of a grand dream with significant risk that was un

tioned because it was ideologically important for America to beat the Soviet Union t

Moon. Without this incentive, it is impossible to say whether humans would have flown o

of a stack of rockets with volatile liquid-hydrogen upper stages. By 1986, with compe

between the superpowers diminishing and the horrific images of a Shuttle exploding o

Cape’s coast shown daily on the news, a decreasing risk tolerance spelled the en

Shuttle/Centaur.

In addition to the changing tolerance for risk, the story of Shuttle/Centaur illustrat

“colliding cultures” between the piloted and robotic space program. Although rivalry be

NASA Centers was not unusual, expendable launch vehicles and the piloted space program 

operated in distinctly different spheres since the beginning of the Apollo Program. For th

time, the manned and unmanned cultures collided forcefully in the contentious relatio

between Lewis Research Center (the home of Centaur) and Johnson Space Center (the ho

astronauts and the Space Shuttle). Although Lewis Research Center and General Dynamic

formed a collegial relationship with each other over a period of thirty years, neither ha

experience in dealing with the NASA bureaucracy that operated the Shuttle program. 

168 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Choosing Centaur for the Shuttle

Although the Shuttle promised a revolution, its technical capabilities left some concerned

Since it could only attain a low-Earth orbit, it needed an upper stage to push some payloads t

a geosynchronous transfer orbit—an extremely elliptical orbit with a perigee (closest approac

to Earth) of approximately 125 miles and an apogee (farthest distance from Earth) of abou

22,300 miles. One logical choice to fill this requirement was Centaur. But how difficult woul

it be to use the “old” robotic expendable workhorse on a new piloted space vehicle? 

Although the liquid-hydrogen upper stages of Saturn V had carried the astronauts to th

Moon, Centaur had never been “man-rated.” In 1961, the Space Taskforce Group at Langle

had considered the possibilities of using the rocket for piloted missions but decided tha

Centaur was not safe to carry astronauts.3 Ten years later, testifying before Congress after severa

failures of Atlas-Centaur, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low said that without majo

Centaur Reborn 16

3 James R. Hansen, Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo (Washington, DC: NASA SP

4308, 1995), 283. 

Shuttle/Centaur mission patch. (Glenn Research Center unprocessed photo)
and costly changes, the vehicle could not be expected to achieve reliabilities much greater 

about 90 percent.4

However, General Dynamics believed that not only could Centaur satisfy the new 

stage requirements for the Shuttle, but it also could be made safe enough to be carried i

cargo bay. By April 1972, the company had completed a compatibility study assessing safet

performance capabilities for using a liquid-hydrogen rocket with the Space Shuttle. Ce

had already flown thirty-seven missions and had a flight backlog planned through 1979

report concluded, “The Centaur can be adapted to Shuttle operation with a minimum of m

fication.”5

In 1973, the Convair Aerospace Division of General Dynamics issued a more det

eight-month “Reusable Centaur Study.” This study established the feasibility of modifyin

existing Centaur for upper stage launches from the Shuttle. It analyzed twelve key aspects 

program, including such important factors as safety, cost, schedule, weight, relia

reusability, and flight complexity. The report concluded that on a scale of 0 (low risk) 

(high risk), none of these factors were rated higher than 3. The final assessment of the r

was that the “Centaur programs are extremely low risk” and that no technology breakthr

were required to achieve a reusable Centaur.6

A heated controversy developed over whether Centaur was the answer for the Shuttle 

stage. Should NASA engineers redesign Centaur as General Dynamics proposed, or shou

entirely new upper stage be developed? An author in the journal Science reported, “A

though it sounds, the issue ignited a free-for-all between feuding congressional committee

aerospace lobby, the Reagan White House, the Air Force, and NASA, with the latter caug

the middle.”7 The way these issues were resolved would possibly shape much of America’s e

ration of space for the foreseeable future. These interactions included the growing mark

launching large new communication satellites, as well as NASA’s capability to send new p

further into the solar system. 

In the early 1970s, NASA planned to develop what it called a “space tug” for lifting S

payloads into higher altitude orbits or boosting spacecraft to other planets.8 In January 

170 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

4 George Low, “Review of Recent Launch Failures,” statement, Hearings before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight

June 1971, 8. 

5 Compatibility Study of a Cryogenic Upper Stage With Space Shuttle, 17 February 1972, Drawer H-D, NASA GRC Archiv

Compatibility Study of a Cryogenic Upper Stage With Space Shuttle, Final Report, April 1972, NASA GRC Archives, Dra

D. 

6 “Reusable Centaur Study,” General Dynamics report, Contract NAS 8-30290, 26 September 1973, 222, 233, Draw

NASA GRC Archives.

7 M. Mitchell Waldrop, “Centaur Wars,” Science 217 (10 September 1982): 1012–1014.

8 David Barker, “Economics of the Space Shuttle,” Flight International (29 August 1974): 244–246. 
NASA awarded a $1.3-million contract to Rocketdyne to design, build, and test liquid

hydrogen and oxygen pumps and gas generators that would eventually be used in the tug

NASA debated the actual design of the tug and whether it would be a modification of a

existing upper stage or an entirely new rocket. Four proposals were evaluated including the A

Force’s Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), a redesigned wide-body Centaur, Transtage, and the Interim

Orbital Transfer Vehicle (IOTV). 

Although all four of these stages could lift Shuttle payloads into geosynchronous orbit, eac

did so with very different levels of capability. A more powerful upper stage rocket permits th

launch of heavier, more complex spacecraft that help scientists conduct more sophisticate

research. Of all the options, Centaur was the most powerful, enabling spacecraft of up t

13,000 pounds to be sent into orbit. The IOTV, like Centaur, was a cryogenic rocket and wa

designed to give a similar performance. The next most powerful was the Transtage, which wa

Centaur Reborn 17

9 “Towards the Space Tug,” Flight International (3 January 1974): 13. 

Artist’s rendering of Shuttle/Centaur preparing to launch payload. The bay doors are open, and the payload is about to be released by

the Centaur Integrated Support Structure (CISS). (Glenn Research Center unprocessed photo)
a storable propellant system capable of lifting spacecraft of up to 8,000 pounds into 

followed by the IUS, which had a 5,000-pound lifting capability. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) gave the following assessment of each of these ro

They concluded that the IUS would be able to satisfy most defense needs and, with mod

tions, could also take on a limited number of basic science missions. The Transtage could s

all of the defense needs but did not have the potential for expanding into other typ

missions. DOD concluded, “Shuttle payload limits (65,000 pounds) will limit both th

and Transtage growth such that these systems can never capture a significant portion of the 

term defense needs.”10

The IOTV and Centaur were both powerful cryogenic rockets that DOD believed w

not only handle all existing military needs, but could also provide tremendous potenti

more difficult science missions. The problem with the IOTV was that it was a new 

involving a great deal of development complexity, as well as schedule and cost risks. As a r

NASA and the Department of Defense concluded, “The Centaur is the only vehicle capa

meeting near term NASA planetary requirements . . . [and] considerable enhancement of D

mission capabilities.”11

However, the development of the IUS continued. This upper stage eventually beg

launch smaller spacecraft, with a successful first flight on a Titan 34D booster in October 

The operational IUS was 17 feet long and 9 feet in diameter, and it weighed in excess of 3

pounds, including 27,000 pounds of solid rocket fuel. But problems occurred on the se

flight when the IUS was spring-launched from the Shuttle on mission STS-6. Designed to 

a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) satellite into orbit, the IUS rocket m

nozzle accidentally changed its position by 1°, causing the IUS and the satellite to tumbl

an incorrect orbit. It took two years to investigate and understand the failure to ensure t

would not happen again. 

Although Centaur development appeared promising at this point, the proponents o

IUS mounted a vigorous campaign for their rocket. Initially, several key people from N

opposed the General Dynamics Centaur plan and agreed with those who sought an altern

to the Centaur upper stage solution. They argued that the IUS, which was designed by th

Force, was a potentially better rocket. The first stage of the two-stage rocket was capa

launching medium-sized payloads at most. This limitation would be overcome by means 

addition of a second stage for larger payloads with destinations into deeper space. Specif

the Air Force asked NASA to develop an additional stage that could be used for plan

missions such as a proposed probe to Jupiter called Galileo. NASA made Boeing the 

contractor for developing the IUS.

172 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid.
Success for Boeing meant not only building a technically sound rocket, but also attackin

their competition—Centaur and General Dynamics. Boeing made every attempt to demon

strate that the IUS should replace Centaur for use on the Shuttle. Boeing argued that Centau

(they derisively referred to it as the “fat tank” instead of the “wide body”) was risky in the are

of safety considerations. They also thought it unlikely that Centaur could be ready by the 198

deadline and claimed that General Dynamics had significantly underestimated the risk assoc

ated with reconfiguring the craft. Boeing contended that its rocket offered a much greate

chance for overall success and argued that while Centaur required a major new developmen

program, the Boeing alternative was safer because it used solid propellants. The IUS minimize

risks for the crew, was mission-flexible, and was Shuttle-compatible. Boeing concluded, “Th

modified Centaur cannot satisfy the mission needs.”12

The White House and some members of Congress seemed to agree. The Office o

Management and Budget (OMB) was against Centaur because it believed that there were to

many modifications required to make the rocket fit in the Shuttle. If these modifications wer

Centaur Reborn 17

12 “Boeing Rebuttal to Shuttle/Centaur,” undated, Drawer 4-C, NASA GRC Archives. 

Artist’s rendering of the Shuttle/Centaur. The Centaur and its payload have separated from the Shuttle and are preparing to launch

after the Shuttle flies away to a safe distance. (Glenn Research Center unprocessed photo)
to be attempted, OMB also believed that they would be far too costly. Ronnie G. Flip

Democratic Congressman from Huntsville, Alabama, agreed with the White House’s de

and actively lobbied against Centaur. Flippo was the chairman of the House Subcommitt

Space Science and Applications, which was the committee that authorized all NASA f

Flippo attacked Centaur in a number of letters to his colleagues. His argument was that Ce

was too expensive (at least $634 million), was of limited usefulness (primarily for just two 

missions), and was an example of the faulty sole-source procurement model (with G

Dynamics being the prime contractor without competitive bids). Lurking strongly in the 

ground of Flippo’s argument was local politics. His Alabama district included Marshall 

Flight Center, which was designated as the Lead Center to manage any future NASA 

work.13 However, Centaur did have its supporters in Congress, most notably Bill Lowery

was a California Republican. But just as local politics influenced Flippo, so too did they 

major role in Lowery’s advocacy for Centaur. General Dynamics was located within hi

Diego district. Despite Flippo’s bias, NASA agreed with him over the protests of Lowery

they decided to utilize the Air Force-developed IUS.

In his Journey Into Space, Bruce Murray argues that this important subcommittee 

Flippo “looked at NASA through an Alabama prism.”14 Marshall was desperately lookin

ways to regain greater responsibility in the space program. During the Saturn V era i

1960s, Huntsville, Alabama, was a prime location for all the major aerospace contractors. W

the Apollo program ended in the 1970s and the charismatic leader of Marshall Space 

Center, Wernher von Braun, was stricken with cancer, the Center suddenly faced difficult t

Its rival, Johnson Space Center, was awarded the Space Shuttle program, and the Marshall 

neers were faced with taking direction from another NASA Center. As a result, the mo

Marshall became more and more defensive, and through Flippo, they vigorously rejecte

Centaur-in-Shuttle idea. 

Besides Flippo’s advocacy, NASA had other reasons for selecting the IUS as the best c

for the Shuttle. The consensus was that Centaur was too dangerous to fly in the Shuttle 

with humans. Centaur was never conceived as a human-rated machine. Its pressure-stab

tank design saved weight, but it was not necessarily seen as compatible with human flight. T

were two main concerns: Centaur’s lack of structure reinforcement and the inability o

Shuttle to land safely if Centaur could not be deployed and remained in the cargo bay. Ce

was essentially one continuous tank that had no internal reinforcement to give it added sta

A double-walled bulkhead kept the liquid hydrogen separated from the liquid oxygen. 

transfer between the two cryogenic liquids was prevented by a phenomenon known as “

174 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

13 M. Mitchell Waldrop, “Centaur Wars,” Science 217 (10 September 1982): 1012–1014.

14 Bruce Murray, Journey Into Space: The First Three Decades of Space Exploration (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 

213. 
genic pumping” that produced a vacuum between the two walls of the bulkhead when the muc

colder liquid hydrogen was loaded. The vacuum maintained the liquid hydrogen at -423°F an

the liquid oxygen at -297°F. 

The human-rated Saturn V’s upper stages had a very different design. Each had two sepa

rate propellant tanks. The entire structure was reinforced internally by a system of ribs. Lik

Saturn V, the Shuttle had a sturdy, reinforced structure, and it also carried liquid hydrogen an

liquid oxygen. Critics focused on Centaur’s pressure-stabilized tank design and feared tha

somehow the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen would prematurely come into contact wit

each other and explode. Reflecting on the structure, one engineer stated, “You would not b

able to sit down and in some rational technical way show that it was dangerous, but intuitio

and good engineering would dictate that you don’t want that feature.”15

The most challenging of the safety-related issues was what to do if the Shuttle mission wa

aborted before Centaur was deployed. With human beings involved, the safety issues became 

serious concern. What would happen if one of the crew became sick, or the bay doors woul

not open and Centaur was not deployed? The Shuttle could not land with the hazardous liqui

propellants in its cargo hold. The only option was a complicated fuel dump. This was techn

cally feasible, but the process was complex. On Atlas-Centaur or Titan-Centaur, the worst tha

might happen was that it might explode, resulting in a financial loss. Not only would it b

dangerous to try to land with Centaur still in the Shuttle, but also, even with Centaur prope

lants dumped overboard to lower the weight and the risk, the Shuttle itself might not surviv

the landing. The Shuttle is a very poor gliding machine because it loses one mile of altitude fo

every three miles of distance and because its landing gear and braking systems were not designe

for the 12 to 15 tons that Centaur would add to its weight.16 These factors initially made th

IUS the upper stage of choice. 

However, Boeing was unable to solve key problems with the IUS. Its main limitation wa

that it was not powerful enough to launch a payload to a distant planet like Jupiter in a direc

shot. To get to its destination, the payload would have to perform “mission design tricks” t

accomplish a slingshot maneuver around several planets in order to gain a gravity-assisted spee

boost. Most engineers considered this approach inelegant and too time-consuming. They di

not want to wait additional years for their probes to reach their destinations. Also, new concern

about the cost of the Inertial Upper Stage booster emerged. Robert A. Frosch, upon leaving h

post as NASA Administrator, argued that the possibilities of readying the IUS to send an orbite

and probe to Jupiter for its scheduled launch were remote. Frosch decided on 15 January 198

that the only alternative was Centaur. He argued that by allocating budget resources from 198

Centaur Reborn 17

15 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000.

16 Murray, Journey Into Space, 234. 
and 1982, modifications of the Centaur could result in a “powerful combination.

concluded, “No other alternative upper stage is available on a reasonable schedule or 

comparable costs. The Shuttle/Centaur would offer both to commercial customers a

national security interests a highly capable launch vehicle with growth potential.”17

Larry Ross, a Lewis Centaur engineer and project manager, agreed with this assessmen

argued that national security interests represented the key reason why the Centaur was c

over the IUS. Ross said that the main question was that if NASA “married Centaur wit

Shuttle for the planetary program, what does the nation end up with?”18 His answer wa

the nation ended up with a very significant capability. Of the two rockets—the Shuttle/Ce

and the IUS—the benefits of the former to the nation far outweighed the benefits of the 

As a result, Centaur was chosen, both because planetary missions needed the extra 

Centaur could provide and because it better suited missions controlled by the Departme

Defense and especially the Air Force. Thus, national security interests may have raised th

tolerance for the more dangerous rocket. 

In 1981, NASA withdrew support for the IUS and instead opted for General Dyna

redesigned Centaur. A number of technical factors made the Centaur option more attra

First and most important, Centaur was more powerful. It had the capability of deliverin

boost necessary to propel a payload directly to a planet in the deep solar system. Se

Centaur was a gentler rocket. Solid rockets had a harsh initial thrust that had the potent

damage their delicate payload. Liquid rockets generated their thrust more slowly, thus red

this threat. Finally, a rocket that used liquid propellants had one other tremendous adva

over one that used solid fuel—it could be turned off and on. Once ignited, solid fuel b

until used up, while the liquid was much more controllable.19 Centaur had already demons

the success of this capability with the various two-burn missions for Atlas-Centaur, in add

to the multiple restarts performed in the post-mission experiments for the two Titan-Ce

Helios missions. The only remaining advantage of the IUS over the Centaur was safety. L

hydrogen was a dangerous fuel and presented a significant risk to the rocket and the astro

flying with it. NASA decided to take the chance and go with Centaur. 

This decision was met with mixed reviews from the Air Force; on the one hand, i

disappointed in NASA’s decision to abandon the IUS in favor of Centaur. On the other 

the Air Force branch responsible for developing large military payloads was pleased wit

additional capabilities that Centaur provided. However, the White House Offi

Management and Budget mounted a more vocal protest and threatened to cut funding. F

176 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

17 Robert Frosch, “Frosch on Centaur,” Lewis News (30 January 1981): 1, NASA GRC Archives.

18 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

19 Waldrop, “Centaur Wars,” 1012. 
continued to attack the Centaur decision vigorously, and he launched an intense fight to revers

NASA’s Shuttle/Centaur decision when Congress began its next session in February 1981.

Eventually, NASA was forced into a compromise, relinquishing its payload role in th

International Solar Polar Mission (saving roughly $50 million) in exchange for the right to kee

Centaur and the Galileo mission to Jupiter. In August 1982, Congress officially gave it

approval to develop the new Centaur high-energy upper stage for the Space Transportatio

System. Only time would tell whether this decision was the correct one to make. 

While the IUS struggled in its early operational years, NASA was considering another crit

ical decision—which NASA Center would take the responsibility for redesigning Centau

Ultimately, the responsibility for managing the Centaur redesign fell upon the shoulders o

NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio.21 However, before the decision was made

engineers at Lewis had to withstand a political play by the powerful Johnson and Kenned

Space Centers to keep the contract out of Lewis’s hands and give it to Marshall. 

Internal Politics: The Push for Marshall

In the early 1980s, Lewis Research Center was a troubled organization. Over the pas

decade, the laboratory had weathered the closing of its nuclear rocket propulsion program an

a devastating Reduction in Force (RIF) that had affected over 700 engineers. At the same tim

that it was trying to secure a position in the mainstream of NASA—the piloted spac

program—it was fighting for its very survival. The Heritage Foundation, a conservativ

Republican think tank, recommended cutting federal spending by eliminating what it consid

ered unnecessary government research and technology. With Lewis Research Center on th

Reagan administration’s short list of Centers to be closed, the staff mounted an active campaig

to save the Center.22

Gaining a role in Space Shuttle missions was part of the strategy to reclaim the reputatio

of this once-proud laboratory. Throughout the 1970s, the engineers and research scientists a

Lewis had made important contributions to the Shuttle. They were NASA’s experts in propu

sion and energy conversion and had performed basic studies on rocket engine turbomachinery

reduced gravity phenomena, chemical energy conversion, and flight simulation testing.23 The

hoped that their greatest challenge lay ahead—redesigning the most powerful robotic rocket t

fit inside the piloted Shuttle. The difficulty lay not only in the redesign of the rocket, but als

in plans for failure contingencies, such as what would happen if Centaur had to be brought bac

Centaur Reborn 17

20 Murray, Journey Into Space, 214. 

21 In 1999, this Center was renamed NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field. 

22 See Virginia Dawson, Engines and Innovation, 212–213.

23 Martin J. Braun, “Technology Transfer: Lewis Contributions to Space Shuttle,” Lewis News (26 February 1982): 3–4, NAS

GRC Archives.
to Earth without having been deployed. For example, how could Centaur’s fuel be 

drained? Questions like these were not an issue for other rockets like Redstone, Atlas, or 

because they were all first stages with no option not to fire.

In 1979, John Yardley, Associate Administrator for Space Transportation Sys

instructed Lewis Research Center to determine the feasibility of integrating Centaur wit

Shuttle. By contracting with General Dynamics/Convair, Lewis engineers planned to dev

design that would minimize modifications to both vehicles. The main area of concern a

time was the “fulfillment of safety requirements imposed on all Shuttle cargo as a result of 

rating.’”24 Lewis concluded that a cryogenic upper stage would provide increased m

flexibility for the Shuttle and would meet the unique safety requirements. This positive fi

was very important for Lewis. The Space Shuttle threatened the expendable launch pro

including its own Centaur program. By proving the feasibility of Shuttle/Centaur, Lewis 

maintain its Centaur work and also significantly enhance its involvement in the 

program.25 Implicit in this preliminary work was the belief among Lewis engineers t

Shuttle/Centaur were approved, they would win the management of the Centaur convers

Lewis Research Center encountered strong opposition from within NASA. The leade

at Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Kennedy 

Center (KSC) all opposed a Lewis-led Centaur program for Shuttle, and they recomme

that Marshall should take the lead. In a dramatic display of unity and persuasion, the Dir

of these Centers (Chris C. Kraft, Jr., William R. Lucas, and Dick G. Smith, respectively) 

a confidential joint letter to Alan M. Lovelace, then-acting NASA Administrator, in Ja

1981. They marked this letter “eyes only,” meaning that they did not want their controv

position to leak out to the wider NASA community. Their argument was simple and str

forward—they did not want Lewis to take any leadership position with Centaur. They be

that Marshall represented the best choice. They wrote:

The Agency’s decision to proceed with the development of the Wide Body Centaur a

a planetary upper stage in lieu of the Inertial Upper Stage presents a most challengin

assignment for the Agency . . . . Recognizing this complexity, it is essential that th

Agency make the proper assignment of the management responsibilities for th

program . . . . Therefore, we believe, when consideration is given to all relevant factor

it is in the best interest of the program and the Agency that the existin

JSC/MSFC/KSC team be responsible for the Wide Body Centaur program.26

178 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

24 Lawrence J. Ross, “Launch Vehicles,” Lewis News (4 January 1980): 4, NASA GRC Archives.

25 Neil Steinberg, “Centaur Star Still Glows Brightly in Agency Plans,” Lewis News (15 August 1980): 4, NASA GRC Archiv

26 Chris C. Kraft, Jr., William R. Lucas, and Dick G. Smith to Alan M. Lovelace, 19 January 1981, Larry Ross persona

ment collection. 
Within this team, the directors believed that Marshall should specifically shoulder the burde

of managing Centaur for the following reasons. First, they argued that Marshall had a “uniqu

capability” for developing cryogenic rocket engines and propulsion systems. Also, because a signi

icant technical challenge for Shuttle/Centaur was in the area of structures and dynamics, the

believed that Marshall had the most experienced team to meet these demands. Second, the

argued that the Shuttle was a complicated piloted system and that only their Centers had th

“thorough understanding” of the technical and managerial relationships to integrate a new

element like Centaur. As a result, the three Directors concluded, “The JSC/MSFC/KSC STS team

clearly recognizes the necessity for utilizing the Centaur system as it now exists . . . and is prepare

to commit to the discipline required to implement this approach.”27 They also garnered suppor

for Marshall from other important NASA leaders such as John Yardley, who was the head of th

Shuttle program at the time. 

Despite Marshall’s desire to keep its latest recommendation private, some engineers at Lew

Research Center saw a copy of the confidential letter. Larry Ross, Director of Space Flight System

at Lewis, recalled, “I was outraged. I never showed [the letter] to the team.”28 Lewis engineer

believed that because of their experience in managing the Centaur Program, they should be th

ones to manage the development of Shuttle/Centaur. 

In March 1981, Lewis Director John F. McCarthy wrote his own highly persuasive letter t

Lovelace, making the argument for his Center to win the contract. McCarthy listed many reason

why Lewis was the right choice. First, Lewis had led the program to determine the feasibility o

modifying Centaur for the Shuttle. This experience would be invaluable in following these recom

mendations and building the new rocket. Second, Lewis engineers had the greatest Centau

experience among all the NASA Centers. Specifically, their experience with the successful Titan

Centaur program provided a model on which to base the Shuttle/Centaur program. The effort t

reconfigure the Atlas-Centaur for Titan included many of the same conversion issues that woul

arise with Shuttle. Third, Lewis had great experience with mission design and spacecraft integra

tion. With Atlas-Centaur; Titan-Centaur; Earth-orbital missions; lunar missions with Surveyo

and Earth-escape missions like Viking, Voyager, and Pioneer, this experience meant, according t

McCarthy, that “no other NASA center approaches the level of expertise in this area that Lew

has attained through the integration of such a wide variety of complex missions.” In fact, th

average number of years that each Lewis engineer had on the Centaur team was an impressive thir

teen. McCarthy concluded, “Our staff uniquely possesses both the knowledge and experience an

by virtue of its stability preserves an irreplaceable corporate memory . . . I strongly believe tha

Lewis continues to be the best choice for Centaur management.”29

Centaur Reborn 17

27 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

28 Ibid.

29 John F. McCarthy, Jr., to Alan M. Lovelace, 25 March 1981, Larry Ross personal document collection. 
One month later, in May 1981, Lovelace made his decision. In a letter to William R. L

Director of Marshall, he wrote that he had thoroughly reviewed his proposal for Mar

control of Centaur and acknowledged the support given to him by both Johnson and Ken

He wrote, “Although I recognize each of the considerations which you mention

contributing to this recommendation, I have concluded that they are outweighed by anoth

of factors stemming from the long and continuing management of the Centaur program b

Lewis Research Center.” Primarily, these factors included the Lewis experience and their 

lent track record with the rocket. It was clear that Lewis was the right choice. The auth

the history of Marshall pointed out that Lewis “had built the Centaur, and had staked out 

in advanced propulsion technology that Marshall could not expect to emulate.”30 Despi

significant competition, Lewis won the right to manage the Shuttle/Centaur program.31

Staking the Lewis Reputation on Centaur

Although ecstatic over its victory, the Centaur team knew it was staking its reputatio

the success of Shuttle/Centaur. NASA had a strong political commitment to 

Shuttle/Centaur program, and any failure at Lewis would lead to “embarrassment in extre

Larry Ross warned that if the Center “failed in this vital Agency effort, I would despair 

ever again being relied on to do important work for NASA!”32

The Center quickly began organizing contractors for the daunting task of integ

Centaur with the Shuttle. Lewis submitted to General Dynamics a request for a propo

provide materials, personnel, supplies, and services to create two versions of the new wide

Centaur—one for NASA and the other for the Air Force.33 By June, Lewis had awarded 

contracts totaling $7,483,000 to four different companies: General Dynamics to develo

modified Centaur vehicles; Teledyne Industries for a digital computer and several remote m

plexor units; Honeywell, Inc., for part of the automatic navigation and guidance system

Pratt & Whitney for four RL10A-3-3A rocket engines. All of these contracts were geared to

two key missions—the upcoming Galileo probe to Jupiter and the Ulysses (formerl

180 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

30 Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to Explore: A History of the Marshall Space Flight Center, 196

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4313, 1999), 138.

31 Alan Lovelace to William R. Lucas, 27 May 1981, Larry Ross personal document collection.

32 Larry Ross to Chief Counsel, 7 December 1983, Box 2142, Space Transportation Engineering Division (STED), 

Management Office, Folder General Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives. 

33 “Technical Evaluation of GDC Proposal, Shuttle/Centaur G Development and Production,” 15 December 1983, Bo

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Centaur G Program, NASA GRC Archives.
International Solar Polar) mission to the Sun.34 Despite the start of work and the flow of fund

uncertainties hovered over the project for over a year and constantly threatened to suspend th

project. Would the funding and support for Shuttle/Centaur continue? These questions coul

not yet be answered. 

Adding to the uncertainty was a change in leadership at Lewis Research Center. Directo

Dr. John F. McCarthy, Jr., announced that he planned to retire in July 1982 and return to MIT

as a professor of aeronautics and astronautics, where he had previously headed the Center fo

Space Research.35 Andrew Stofan then became director of Lewis. His experience in launch veh

cles would serve him well in the coming years. Stofan began his career as a research engineer a

Lewis in 1958. Four years later, he moved to the first Centaur project office, where he was par

of the Propellant Systems team. He continued to move up the launch vehicle ranks at Lewi

heading the Titan-Centaur Project Office. He served as director of Launch Vehicles from 197

to 1978. He was later promoted to Associate Administrator at NASA Headquarters; then h

returned to Lewis as McCarthy’s successor in 1982.36

Stofan’s arrival in his new position at Lewis coincided with the major announcement fo

the Shuttle/Centaur program. President Ronald Reagan signed an Urgent Supplementa

Appropriations Bill that allocated $80 million for the design, development, and procurement o

the Centaur upper stage. This was a dramatic increase over 1981 funding for this project, whic

had amounted to only $20 million. Stofan said that this new funding put “Lewis directly int

the mainstream of the Shuttle program.”37 In a memo to Lewis employees, he expressed h

enthusiasm over the fact that Congress had decided to continue this project. Stofan believe

that this congressional decision represented the overturning of the last potential threat to th

program and that they could at last “expect to carry on from this point without the specter o

precipitous cancellation.” Stofan considered the new connection with the high-profile Shuttl

program “a major step forward for Lewis.”38 Lewis budgets began to increase substantially fo

Centaur Reborn 18

34 Jim Kukowski, “Contracts Awarded for Shuttle Launched Upper Stage,” 2 June 1981, NASA Headquarters Press Releas

Linda Peterson, “NASA Lewis Awards $7.5 Million in Contracts for Shuttle/Centaur Development,” 2 June 1981, Lew

Research Center (LeRC) Press Release, GRC Public Affairs Archives; “Four Contracts Awarded for Modifying Centaur,” Lew

News (2 July 1981): 3, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

35 Mary Fitzpatrick, “Lewis Director to Leave NASA to Return to MIT,” 2 March 1982, NASA Headquarters Press Releas

NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

36 William O’Donnell, “Stofan to Head Lewis Research Center,” 19 March 1982, NASA Headquarters Press Release, NAS

GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

37 Paul T. Bohn, “NASA Lewis Gets Added Funding of $107.4 Million,” 27 July 1982, LeRC Press Release, GRC Public Affai

Archives; “Center in Mainstream of Shuttle Program,” Lewis News (30 July 1982): 1; “Additional Funds Resurrect Importan

Programs;” Lewis News (13 August 1982): 1, 6, NASA GRC Archives.

38 Andrew J. Stofan to Lewis employees, 17 September 1982, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

General Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives.
the project. In 1983, the Center received $133 million. In 1984, this sum increased to 

million, and it increased again to $188 million in 1985.39

Not everyone within Lewis was as enthusiastic over the Center’s new management re

sibilities. A large Lewis contingent believed that this work did not fall within the mission 

Center to do basic research. Joe Nieberding recalled, “To those folks, Centaur was a sink 

lot of resources, potentially distracting management attention and NASA resources from 

‘real’ Lewis charter: to do research. The research side saw little direct involvement for th

Centaur, and they were mostly correct.”40

Increased funding for Centaur allowed for an increase in the Lewis workforce for th

time in twenty years. In 1983, 190 new engineers were hired. Stofan said that this h

reflected “a strong Lewis effort to reinvigorate its professional staff, and the permission 

expand represents a vote of confidence from Washington in the Center’s future.”41 The 

area of activity for these new hires was in helping to transform the Centaur launch vehicl

a Shuttle upper stage. 

Lewis formed the Shuttle/Centaur Project Office to serve as the central point of integr

and management for the program. This office developed all Centaur project objectives and 

uated the progress of these goals. These goals included defining Centaur redesign requirem

creating the new vehicle design, determining how best to integrate it with the Shuttle

finally developing and producing the new Centaur. This office also controlled the budg

the program and was responsible for scheduling and coordinating all contractors and in

work related to the reconfiguration.42 This project office had extensive relationships with N

Headquarters; Johnson Space Center; Kennedy Space Center; and outside organiza

contractors, and other government agencies including the Department of Defense an

European Space Agency.43

While this office relied upon the expertise of all of its workers, there were several u

individuals who helped to shape its future. William H. “Red” Robbins took over as head 

Shuttle/Centaur project office. He was a longtime NASA engineer with experience in n

propulsion, and this was his first exposure to Centaur. Robbins served as project manage

was responsible for the administrative functions including budgets and schedules. Stev

182 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

39 “Director Reports ‘Very Good’ 1984 Budget,” Lewis News (11 February 1983): 1; “Stofan Charts Labs Future,” GRC A

Lewis News (4 November 1983): 1, NASA GRC Archives.

40 Joe Nieberding, correspondence with authors, 7 November 2001.

41 Paul T. Bohn, “190 New Engineer Hires Increasing Lewis Work Force for First Time in Two Decades,” 15 July 1983

Press Release, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.

42 Larry Ross, “Space Flight Systems,” Lewis News (4 February 1983): 2, NASA GRC Archives. 

43 Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, Functional Statements from the NASA Organizational Manual, 1 October 1983, Bo

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Shuttle/Centaur Organization—LeRC, NASA GRC Archives.
Szabo headed the engineering division and, in 1983, became the new chief of the Lewis Spac

Transportation Engineering Division. Another longtime Centaur engineer, Szabo began wor

in the original Centaur project office in 1963. In his new position, he led a one-hundred

member team responsible for keeping Atlas-Centaur operational and for implementing the new

Shuttle/Centaur program. 

As the program evolved, Steve Szabo became the critical cog in the development o

Shuttle/Centaur. As chief of the transportation and engineering division, he was directl

responsible for managing the myriad of technical activities required to integrate the Centau

with the Shuttle. His responsibility included all propulsion, pressurization, structural, electrica

guidance and control, and telemetry hardware systems, as well as the flight software systems an

the structural dynamics, controls, trajectories, and thermal analysis activities. Within th

Shuttle/Centaur project office, Edwin Muckley headed the Mission Integration Office. He ha

the complicated job of integrating each of the payloads assigned to Centaur. Frank Spurloc

managed trajectory mission design for Shuttle/Centaur.44 Joe Nieberding took charge of th

Shuttle/Centaur group within the Space Transportation Engineering Division responsible fo

development and management of all software and analyses. Spurlock and Nieberding hire

many of the young engineers who later became the division chiefs, branch chiefs, and program

managers.45 With an experienced team of veterans, supplemented by young, bright scientist

and engineers, Shuttle/Centaur moved forward. 

Building the New Horse

By the early 1980s, the Centaur boasted fifty-three successful payload launches into space

Centaur was heralded as reliable. It had sent payloads to destinations like the Moon, Mercury

Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; it had also successfully placed many communications sate

lites into geosynchronous orbit and several heavy telescopes into Earth orbit. Shuttle/Centau

promised Centaur a continued and long life of planetary exploration. However, reconfigurin

the “premiere upper stage” rocket to launch from inside the Shuttle was not an easy task.

Working from a limited budget and timeframe, the Shuttle/Centaur redesign team struggled t

keep changes to a minimum because each one increased the cost, decreased the reliability, an

lengthened the development period. 

The “first major milestone event” in building the Shuttle/Centaur was a meeting held a

General Dynamics in San Diego. On 30 August 1982, NASA and all Shuttle/Centaur contrac

Centaur Reborn 18

44 Charles Owens, “Five Space Flight Systems Engineers Promoted at NASA Lewis,” 27 July 1983, LeRC Press Release, NAS

GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

45 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 

46 W. F. Rector III and Don Charhut, “Centaur for the Shuttle Era,” May 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Project Managemen

Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Archives.
tors met to discuss a System Requirements Review (SRR) for the entire project. Har

Eastman III from the General Dynamics Shuttle/Centaur project office wrote, “The purp

the SRR is to assure that the Shuttle/Centaur project system level requirements are adeq

stated, and to determine that the elements can indeed meet the program requirements.”47 G

Lunney, the manager of the Space Shuttle program at Johnson Space Center, wrote tha

meeting would be of vital importance: “It is important that requirements that cannot be 

are of insufficient detail, or are in error, be addressed at this time.”48 With the completi

this milestone, NASA could commence building the “new horse.” 

There were similarities between the new Centaur and the old version. The propu

system was virtually the same. The avionics system was still mounted on the forward equip

module, and it still included the Teledyne Digital Computer Unit. This was a 16K, 2

computer that controlled guidance and navigation by integrating acceleration data to dete

position and velocity. The Centaur pressure-stabilized tank was still made of the same 

stainless steel that had served it well for over twenty years. However, the diameter o

hydrogen tank expanded to accommodate additional fuel for longer planetary voyages. The 

also required insulation. The forward bulkhead used a two-layer foam blanket and a three

radiation shield. 

Despite the similarity of Shuttle/Centaur to Atlas-Centaur, there were some signi

technical changes. Specifically, there were two main redesigns required for the Shuttle to 

the Centaur. First, Centaur and its payload had to fit into the 60-foot cargo bay. Eng

developed two different configurations (called versions G and G-prime). The Centaur G w

feet long and was capable of supporting a 40-foot payload to accommodate Departme

Defense requirements. By reducing propellant weight to 29,000 pounds, the G version 

carry additional weight. It was designed specifically for missions to place satellites into g

tionary orbit. The United States Air Force funded half of the initial $269-million ex

required to design and develop the Centaur G for use with the Shuttle.49 The other conf

tion, Centaur G-prime, was nearly 30 feet long and capable of handling payloads of up 

feet.50 It was optimized for planetary missions, and the payload space was smaller due t

184 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

47 Harry O. Eastman III, 30 August 1982, unprocessed Shuttle/Centaur records, NASA GRC Records. 

48 Glynn S. Lunney, 12 August 1982, unprocessed Shuttle/Centaur records, NASA GRC Records. 

49 NASA/DOD Memorandum of Agreement, November 1982, Box 2141, NASA GRC Records. After the cancella

Shuttle/Centaur, Centaur G became the upper stage for the Air Force Titan program.

50 Jeweline H. Richardson, “The Centaur G-Prime: Meeting Mission Needs Today for Tomorrow’s Space Environmen

1983, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM. See also “NASA 

Research Center/USAF Space Division Agreement for the Management of the Shuttle/Centaur Program 10/25/82,” Bo

NASA GRC Archives.
necessary increase in propellant weight (45,000 lb). NASA funded the G-prime configuration.

Both versions would fill the entire cargo bay, making it necessary to devote the entire Shuttl

mission to launching them. Overall, the two versions were very similar, with 80 percent of th

design detail being common.52 The second and most important new technical development wa

the mechanism needed to support Centaur in the Shuttle and deploy it from the bay.53 The new

deployment device was called the Centaur Integrated Support Structure (CISS), a 15-foot

diameter aluminum structure that attached the rocket to the Shuttle. This device was of centra

importance because it enabled the Centaur to fly in the Shuttle with a limited number of desig

modifications. The CISS was located within the cargo bay on rotating support structures. It wa

responsible for all of the mechanical, electrical, and fluid interfaces between Centaur and th

Shuttle, as well as most of the safety precautions for the rocket.54 The CISS was also full

reusable for ten flights.55 The development of the CISS was considered one of the “more exten

sive and challenging tasks” of the entire Centaur modification project.56

Along with these two main technical developments, there were hundreds, if not thousand

of smaller integration issues that engineers had to address. A small sample of these task

included internal thermal integration of the three machines (Shuttle, Centaur, and payload

during launch, deployment, and landing; avionics integration interfaces to monitor tank pres

sure, power, and computer software between the Shuttle and Centaur; and propulsio

integration, which detailed how the propellants would be loaded and also dumped in case of a

emergency abort. Countless personnel and general support issues also complicated the list o

technical needs. A business-management system was required to control accounting an

contract issues and a project office was set up to manage the entire integration process.

Estimates from Johnson Space Center indicated that, in total, there were between 500 an

1,500 separate items up for review in the integration process.58

Centaur Reborn 18

51 W. F. Rector III and David Charhut, “Centaur for the Shuttle Era,” May 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Proje

Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Records.

52 “Technical Evaluation of GDC Proposal, Shuttle/Centaur G Development and Production,” 15 December 1983, Box 214

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Centaur G Program, NASA GRC Records. 

53 Harold Hahn (General Dynamics), “A New Addition to the Space transportation System,” July 1985, Box 2142, Divisio

STED Project Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Records.

54 Omer F. Spurlock (aerospace engineer, Lewis Research Center), “Shuttle/Centaur—More Capability for the 1980s,” Box 214

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Records. This article is th

best technical overview of the entire Shuttle/Centaur. 

55 R. Wood and W. Tang, “Shuttle/Centaur Prestressed Composite Spherical Gas Storage Tank,” July 1985, Box 2142, Divisio

STED Project Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Records.

56 Larry Ross, “Space,” Lewis News (31 December 1981): 3, NASA GRC Archives. 

57 “Centaur Integration Task Summary,” 16 September 1983, unprocessed Shuttle/Centaur records, NASA GRC Records

58 Harry O. Eastman, 17 September 1981, Glenn Research Center, unprocessed Shuttle/Centaur records, NASA GRC Record
Once all of the integration procedures were worked out, the Shuttle/Centaur wou

ready for its first flight. The flight operation and the interactions between the Shuttle, Ce

and CISS worked in the following way. The Shuttle launch was itself a standard flight. D

the launch, engineers at Houston planned to monitor the Centaur through a Tracking and 

Relay Satellite (TDRS) via telemetry links to the ground. Once the Shuttle began its orb

a predeployment check, the bay doors opened. The rocket was then rotated 45° out o

orbiter bay by the CISS to a launch-ready position twenty minutes before it was to be rel

Special springs on the CISS (twelve compressed coil springs called a Super*Zip separation 

enabled the Shuttle crew to eject the Centaur from the deployment adapter into free fligh

foot per second.59 The Centaur then coasted for 45 minutes prior to its main burn, allowin

astronauts to take the Shuttle a safe distance away. For planetary missions, only a single 

was necessary. Once at the required velocity, the final maneuver was to separate the spac

from Centaur. After release, Centaur was capable of maneuvering so that it would not int

with the flight of the spacecraft and would also prevent planetary impact.

Safety was always a key concern with Shuttle/Centaur. Howard Bonesteel, Manufact

Director of the Space Systems Division at General Dynamics, remarked that “the big diffe

is the larger fuel tank for the liquid-hydrogen fuel, and a lot of additional safety systems be

it’s being carried on a manned spacecraft.”60 One of the major functions of the CISS w

address potential problems with the fluids and avionics systems. Increased safety mean

ability to tolerate multiple failures before some unwanted consequences take place.”61 S

redundancy features were installed to comply with stringent safety considerations. The 

neers believed that these would significantly reduce the dangers of losing liquid-hydrogen 

To minimize the risk, a unique propellant fill, drain, and venting system was installed o

of the Shuttles designated to carry Centaur.62 This system enabled the Shuttle crew to dum

dangerous propellants in case of an emergency, allowing the Shuttle, Centaur, and its pa

to return to the ground safely. The benefits of Shuttle/Centaur seemed to outweigh the 

Larger spacecraft could take longer voyages into the solar system, and much h

Department of Defense satellites would be able to reach geosynchronous orbits.63 In 

186 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

59 R. E. Martin (from General Dynamics Space Systems Division), “Effects of transient Propellant Dynamics on Deploy

Large Liquid Stages in Zero-Gravity with Application to Shuttle/Centaur,” delivered at the 37th International Astro

Congress, October 1986, Innsbruck, Austria, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Technica

Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Archives. (The separation system was built by Lockheed.)

60 Robert Locke, quoted in “General Dynamics Shows Off New Probe-Launching Rocket,” San Diego Tribune, 14 August 19

61 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

62 “Centaur for STS,” 8 January 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder General Correspo

NASA GRC Records. 

63 AP Press release, “General Dynamics,” 14 August 1985, Box 2141, NASA GRC Archives.
NASA was aware of the risks from the very beginning but decided that the risk was worth th

scientific and national defense rewards.

However, one important question always loomed over the enterprise: was NASA placin

too much of its hope for success on the Shuttle and the ideal of reusability? Launch systems lik

Titan-Centaur were taken out of production because they were expendable vehicles. In the new

era of reusability, these old rockets did not satisfy the new vision of spaceflight. However, if th

Shuttle’s development was halted before completion or the Shuttle was unsuccessful, how woul

other payloads, such as robotic planetary missions and satellites, make the voyage into space? I

1981, one reporter for the New York Times speculated that a Shuttle problem would confirm th

“worst fears of those who had criticized the agency for its failure to allow for backup systems t

be kept in production while awaiting the shuttle.”64 Little did this reporter realize how propheti

his words were. In five years, before the near launch of the new Centaur, a tragic Shuttle failur

left NASA without a launch vehicle.

Centaur Reborn 18

64 John Noble Wilford, “U.S. to Discontinue New Rocket System,” New York Times (18 January 1981). 

Chapter 7

Eclipsed by Tragedy

“It was considered to be probably one of the most hazardous projects that

NASA had ever attempted to fly . . . . The chief of the Shuttle office at the

time was John Young and he called Shuttle/Centaur ‘Death Star.’”

—Rick Hauck, NASA Astronaut

“I’m convinced to this day we would have made the launch window in

May of ’86, but it was a sprint to the finish. It was like the racehorse that

overtakes you at the end. Had not the Shuttle accident occurred, we would

have been ready for launch.”

—Marty Winkler, General Dynamics

With the infrastructure in place and the redesigns underway, Shuttle/Centaur was read

to take on a real mission. In the early 1980s, it was designated to launch two of the most signi

icant explorations of the solar system—one probe to Jupiter and the other to the Sun. But i

preparing for these payloads, significant and tragic problems arose. The first was in managin

Centaur. Project managers and engineers had to overcome significant time constraints becaus

both of these missions were scheduled to launch in May 1986. This complexity wa

compounded by the problems of making a rocket safe enough to ride with humans an

convincing the NASA community that the risks were minimized. The second obstacle was on

from which, ultimately, the Shuttle/Centaur could not recover—the tragedy of the Challenge

explosion in January 1986. In the wake of this disaster, the liquid-hydrogen propellant tha

coursed through Centaur’s veins appeared too risky, and ultimately the Shuttle/Centaur wa

grounded, eclipsed by a tragedy not of its own making.

The Shuttle tragedy resurrected questions concerning the decision to end the expendabl

launch program. The ill-fated Challenger was scheduled to deliver a Tracking and Data Rela

Satellite (TDRS) to a geostationary orbit. Journalist and historian William Burrows pointe

out how tragically unnecessary it was for seven people to lose their lives “trying to get a sate

lite into orbit that could have been sent there on an expendable.”1 Centaur, with either an Atla

Eclipsed by Tragedy 18

1 William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (New York: Random House, 1998), 556. 
or Titan booster, could have delivered this payload without the risk to human life. Bot

risks NASA accepted and those it rejected shaped the future of the Centaur program more 

the actual technical success and capability of the rocket itself. 

To the Sun and Jupiter

The destinations for the first two Shuttle/Centaur launches were both extremely im

tant in terms of the scientific knowledge they would uncover about our solar system. Th

and Jupiter, icons of mystery in the sky for as long as humanity has turned its gaze t

heavens, would relinquish some of their secrets to the probes to be delivered by Ce

Coupled with this importance was a significantly high level of mission complexity for th

Shuttle/Centaur launch system. With only a six-day launch window between the two laun

beginning 16 May 1986, there was no margin for error.2

In the 1980s, project Galileo was among NASA’s few planetary missions in produc

Named for the seventeenth-century Italian scientist who discovered Jupiter’s moons

project had its genesis at JPL in the late 1970s. Its objective was to send two spacecr

explore the Jovian planetary system. The Galileo team was frustrated by the difficu

securing a ride for their probe. They went back and forth, redesigning their probe for the 

then for Centaur. As late as 1982, this decision changed again when the NASA b

included funding for Galileo but not for Centaur. The IUS again emerged as the la

vehicle.4 When Centaur was returned to funding status, NASA again abandoned the IU

favor of a faster ride for the Galileo probe. Initially, the Galileo team was pleased with 

decision, although they never suspected that in just four years they would again have to s

for an alternate ride. 

Equipped with an orbiter and a probe, the Galileo mission would provide unpreced

observations of the fifth planet as well as the four Galilean satellites. It was also schedu

perform a flyby of the asteroid 29 Amphitrite.5 This was a large, 200-kilometer main

190 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

2 John R. Casani to William H. Robbins, 9 April 1985, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder 

Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives.

3 For further information on the Galileo probe, see C. M. Yeates, ed., et al., Galileo: Exploration of Jupiter’s System (Wash

DC: NASA Government Printing Office, 1985); David Leonard, “Free Fall to Jupiter,” New Scientist 147 (July 1995): 

C. T. Russell, ed., The Galileo Mission (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1992); Monish R. Chatterjee, “Galileo: Jupiter,” USA i

eds. Frank N. Magill and Russell R. Tobias, vol. 3 (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, Inc., 1996), 191–194. 

4 John R. Casani to Galileo Review Board, 6 January 1982, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office

Galileo Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives. 

5 M. K. Winkler to W. H. Robbins, 23 January 1985, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder 

Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives.
asteroid that was the most interesting of several encounter possibilities for Galileo. Howeve

the asteroid flyby was only considered an optional scientific objective. After launch, engineer

would assess the health of the spacecraft to determine whether this option would be exercised

This mission would not only gather scientific knowledge, but would also “significantl

enhance U.S. scientific prestige.”6 Once Galileo reached its final destination, the orbiter woul

become the sixth spacecraft to visit the planet and the first to be placed into orbit aroun

Jupiter.

While orbiting, it would gather scientific data concerning Jupiter’s atmosphere and th

physical attributes of the satellites. The probe also promised to be the first device to enter th

atmosphere of a planet more distant than Mars.7 Six months after release from the orbiter, 

would descend toward Jupiter and record information on the chemical composition of th

atmosphere, the structure and physical dynamics of the magnetosphere, and the chemica

composition of the Jovian satellites.8 Scientists hoped that this knowledge would provid

greater understanding of the evolution of the solar system, the origin of life, the weathe

system on Earth, and additional information about Jupiter itself.9

In November 1982, Lewis Research Center signed a Memorandum of Agreement with JP

for the Galileo project. Lewis maintained the Shuttle/Centaur project office; JPL held th

Galileo project office. The two Centers maintained close contact to ensure that the new

Centaur could meet all the specifications necessary for a successful flight to Jupiter. JPL wa

responsible for managing the entire mission, extending from design concept to missio

completion. To Lewis fell “all responsibilities necessary to integrate the Galileo spacecraft wit

Centaur and the Space Transportation System.”10 This work included coordinating wit

Johnson Space Center (JSC) and ensuring that there was engineering compatibility and ris

management between the Shuttle and Galileo.

The second Shuttle/Centaur mission, also scheduled to launch in May 1986, was a join

venture with the European Space Agency (ESA). Originally called the International Solar Pola

Eclipsed by Tragedy 19

6 James M. Beggs to Jamie L. Whitten, 24 December 1984, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

Galileo Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives; Jim Kukowski, “NASA May Fly by Asteroid with Galileo Spacecraft,” NAS

Headquarters Press Release, 27 December 1984, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.

7 Charles Redmond, Peter Waller, “Test of Jupiter Probe Spacecraft a Success,” NASA Headquarters Press Release, 11 Augu

1983, GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

8 “Payload Integration Plan Space Transportation System and Galileo Mission,” 24 August 1983, Box 2143, Division STE

Project Management Office, Folder Galileo Correspondence, NASA GRC Archives.

9 “Environmental Impact Statement for Project Galileo,” May 1985, Drawer H-D, NASA GRC Archives.

10 Andrew Stofan and Lew Allen, “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Lewis Research Center and the Jet Propulsio

Laboratory for the Galileo Project,” November 1982, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Galile

NASA GRC Archives. 
192 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Mission, the destination for this spacecraft was the Sun and the exploration of the solar 

ronment. It was renamed Ulysses in 1984 to allude both to Homer’s hero and to Dante’s 

to explore “an uninhabited world behind the Sun.”11 Ironically, in journeying to the Sun

probe would first travel to Jupiter (the same destination as Galileo) and then use the gr

tional mass of the planet to catapult it out of the ecliptic plane (the plane in which all p

orbit the Sun). It was necessary to fly out of this plane, with the associated high e

supplied by the Jupiter gravity-assist, to enable passage over the solar poles. Ulysses wa

designed for a close solar approach. In fact, engineers liked to joke that the closest Ulysse

got to the Sun was when it was sitting on the launch pad in Florida. Nevertheless, this m

would mark the first observations of the solar poles of the Sun. Scientists hoped to un

knowledge about the solar wind, the heliosphere’s magnetic field, the interplanetary mag

field, cosmic rays, and cosmic dust.12

Preliminary plans were also being made for Shuttle/Centaur to launch a third missio

Venus Radar Mapper, whose name was later changed to Magellan.13 Lewis Research Center h

the initial mission integration panel meeting on 8 November 1983.14 For this mission, sche

for launch in April 1988, a variety of different upper stage vehicles were examined as launch 

natives. These included the Orbital Sciences Corporation TOS/AMS, Astrotech Internati

Delta Transfer Stage, and Boeing’s IUS.15 NASA assessed the viability of all these alternative

considered trajectory, weights, schedule, and risk factors. The evaluators decided 

Shuttle/Centaur was the best alternative and sent notice to the competitors that “NAS

concluded that your system is not capable of meeting the VRM [Magellan] mission require

without imposing unacceptable technical and schedule risks on the program.”16 Once again

11 For further information on the Ulysses probe, see Craig Covault, “European Ulysses Fired to Jupiter, Sun as Discovery 

to Space,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 133 (15 October 1990): 22; Michael Mecham, “After Long Delay, Ulysses M

Begins 5-Year Voyage to Expand Solar Data Base,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (22 October 1990): 111; D

Hathaway, “Journey to the Heart of the Sun,” Astronomy 23 (1995): 38; Gordon A. Parker, “Ulysses: Solar-Polar Miss

USA in Space, 785–788.

12 Jim Kukowski, “Ulysses New Name for International Solar Polar Mission,” NASA Headquarters Press Release, 10 Sep

1984, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

13 Magellan Mission Design Panel Charter, 7 February 1986, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office

VRM Mission, NASA GRC Archives. 

14 Edwin T. Muckley, “Action Items from the First Venus Radar Mapper Shuttle/Centaur Integration Meetings,” 8 No

1983, NASA Archives, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder VRM Mission. 

15 Jesse W. Moore to David W. Thompson (Orbital Sciences Corporation CEO), 18 June 1984; Moore to Leonar

(Astrotech International Corporation Director), 22 June 1984; Moore to H. N. Stuverude (Boeing Aerospace Compa

President), 18 July 1984, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder VRM Mission, NASA Archive

16 Jesse W. Moore to Robert J. Goss (Astrotech Space Corporation), 15 August 1984, Box 2143, Division STED 

Management Office, Folder VRM Mission, NASA GRC Records. 
technical merits of Shuttle/Centaur had beaten out competition and won the right to launc

another prestigious planetary mission. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) also began scheduling missions for Shuttle/Centaur.

In 1984, it devised a launch plan for Shuttle/Centaur to put the Milstar satellite into orbit.

This military communication satellite was designed to operate under the worst condition

including jamming, interception, and nuclear attack.19 Plans to use Shuttle/Centaur for th

launch were complex. It proved difficult because the DOD required Centaur to perform

beyond its designed capability. Meyer Reshotko wrote, “This mission has some importan

requirements which exceed the Centaur G baseline specifications. Each of these requirement

has been requested by the Air Force.”20 For example, the Milstar required a direct attachmen

to Centaur with explosive bolts used to separate the two. Reshotko said that in order for th

to occur, the Centaur team had not only to redesign the satellite interface, but also to begi

testing to determine what effects the separation shock would have. Further requirements als

included a broader Payload Integration Plan for all DOD payloads destined for launch o

Shuttle/Centaur. These were all classified missions; the underlying security clause in eac

signed agreement between the Air Force and NASA stated, “There will be no public release o

information pertaining to payload.”21 This classification made the job of integration far mor

difficult. For example, if engineers at Lewis wanted to make a telephone call to Genera

Dynamics about the project, they had to go to a “safe” building with secure communication

lines. 

But again, some asked the question, “Why not send the deep-space planetary mission

with an expendable launch vehicle such as Titan-Centaur?” This launch vehicle had prove

that it was capable of delivering very heavy scientific missions into the deep solar system. Th

prowess of Atlas-Centaur as a launch vehicle for communications satellites was unquestioned

In addition to disdain for all things expendable in a new culture that valued reusability

another factor weighed against Titan-Centaur—its military connection. Marty Winkler said

“They [NASA] decided on Shuttle/Centaur which arguably may have been the wrong dec

sion, but that was the decision they took. The reason I believe they did not want to go wit

Eclipsed by Tragedy 19

17 Shuttle/Centaur Memorandum of Agreement, approved by Colonel Charles H. MacNevin and William H. Robbins, 17 Ma

1984, NASA GRC Records.

18 “Launch Base Test Plan for Milstar Processing at ELS,” NASA GRC Records, Box S/C Mission Integration, Division LVPO

19 Donald H. Martin, Communication Satellites, 4th edition (El Segundo, California: The Aerospace Press, 2000), 208. 

20 Meyer Reshotko to Steve Szabo, “Summary of Out of Scope Mission Unique Requirements,” Box S/C Mission Integratio

Division LVPO, NASA GRC Records.

21 “Shuttle/Payload Standard Integration Plan for DOD Deployable/Retrievable-Type Payloads,” May 1985, Box S/C Missio

Integration, Division LVPO, NASA GRC Records.
the Titan is that the Air Force owned the Titan, and [NASA] would have to go throug

Air Force to do that. Any relationship between the Air Force and NASA, historically, on la

vehicle matters, had been like oil and water.”22 NASA would still work closely with th

Force on their military communication satellites, but with Shuttle/Centaur, NASA was a

able to limit Air Force involvement to the Centaur G configuration. Whatever the mer

the decision, the Shuttle/Centaur was going into development. The responsibility fell to 

Research Center to pull off what many still considered impossible. 

Managing Centaur

With the mission objectives established, the main task became managing Centaur so 

it could become launch-ready for May 1986. Significant funding for the project did not 

until 1983, and the first planetary launches were scheduled for mid-1986. Larry Ross sai

was a very substantial development program. When we sold it, I don’t think we emph

how much substance there was to the development. I think we said, it’s a Centaur, we 

them all over the place, we will just make one that will fit in the cargo bay. It was a rela

straightforward technical job, but managerially it was extraordinarily demanding.”23

The management relations among the various institutions involved in the project 

complex. Although the responsibility for Centaur G was jointly shared between NASA an

Air Force, the project management lead fell upon the shoulders of Lewis Research C

while the Department of Defense and NASA Headquarters provided funding and o

direction for Shuttle/Centaur. The Air Force assigned Major (later Colonel) William Fi

the Air Force Deputy Shuttle/Centaur Project Manager and assigned a team of half a 

other key individuals to become part of the project office in Cleveland. Important intera

and communication were also maintained with other NASA Centers, including Johnson 

Center for the Space Shuttle and Kennedy Space Center for the cargo project office. M

management included the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the Galileo project, the Air For

DOD projects like Milstar, and the European Space Agency for the Ulysses project. The 

area of interaction for Lewis was with their contractors. These included General Dynami

the Centaur vehicle and the CISS, Teledyne for the computer, Honeywell for the gui

system, and Pratt & Whitney for the engines. William H. Robbins, manager o

Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, and Vernon Weyers, deputy manager of the 

Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, called this “complex management arrangement” a cha

that was a “dynamic and demanding assignment for all involved personnel.”24

194 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

22 Interview with Marty Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.

23 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000.

24 William H. Robbins and Vernon Weyers, “Shuttle/Centaur Project Stages Challenge,” Lewis News (22 March 1985): 

Archives. 
Lewis project leaders sought out exceptionally qualified individuals and gave them th

support necessary for achieving their goals. To bring together all these individuals from variou

locations and backgrounds required the development of a team environment. It was hope

that this sense of teamwork would unify the project members and direct their focus upon on

key goal—integrating Centaur with the Shuttle. This goal was extremely challenging due t

the inflexible time schedule and the number of “firsts” that needed to be accomplished. Ros

argued, “The bottom line is that we have a very tough job to do in a very short time and w

must succeed.”25

To help cultivate a team atmosphere, Ross dug deep into what he called his “senio

manager’s bag of tricks.” What emerged were trusted managerial and motivation techniques t

concentrate team attention on May 1986, a date three years in the future. Ross said that tim

was the “single most important aspect of the motivating theme.”26 The schedule was critical fo

Shuttle/Centaur because the Jupiter launch had only a twenty-one-day launch window. If th

launch window were missed, the entire mission would have to be delayed over a year.27 Th

cost resulting from such a delay was estimated at about $50 million. 

Ross relied on a motivational symbol to convey the urgency, focus, and sense of teamwor

required. He wrote, “My campaign centers on a graphic which is specially designed to visuall

portray the challenge and evoke an active sense of commitment to it.”28 The image itself wa

an ancient centaur, half-man, half-horse, emerging from the Shuttle, rotating backwards an

aiming his arrow into the sky. Ross insisted that the symbol become ubiquitous throughou

the various laboratories and offices so that all who worked on the project were visually awar

of their goal. Even contractors from industry agreed to display the symbol prominently in the

work environments. Ross confessed, “If I am to succeed in this, all team members from ou

own [Lewis] engineers to mechanics in the contractor’s shop will not be able to go through 

workday without seeing the symbol and being reminded, and inspired, by the challenge an

commitment it represents.”29

Ross also emblazoned the symbol across a variety of project memorabilia. Campaign-typ

buttons were printed, along with drink coasters and notepads. To reinforce the importance o

meeting all deadlines, the team members received a special Centaur pocket calendar. Unlik

most twelve-month calendars, this one covered an unusual twenty-eight-month duration. 

Eclipsed by Tragedy 19

25 Larry Ross correspondence, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, NASA Archives.

26 Ibid.

27 Vernon J. Weyers to Kevin L. Wohlevar, Cray Research, Inc., 16 August 1985, Box 2141, Division STED Project Managemen

Office, Folder General Correspondence, NASA Archives.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.
represented the months from January 1984 to May 1986, ending with the acceptable wi

of the Galileo launch. William H. Robbins printed his personal reminder on the first pag

wrote, “It is not possible to overstate the importance of fulfilling our commitment to this 

lenge . . . . This special calendar is offered as a way of keeping the schedule critical natu

what you do prominent in your daily planning.”30 For the front cover, he combined 

symbol with the trite but effective catchphrase from the popular movie Rocky: “Go for i

Optimism remained strong in 1985 for both the Galileo and Ulysses missions. Fabric

for the G-prime version was well underway, and the structural testing was being comple

the Shuttle/Centaur test facility in Sycamore Canyon, California. Slightly behind sch

were the avionics box and fluid system testing, but this delay did not threaten a major 

ponement of the program.31 However, despite this technical and managerial success, the 

concerns would not go away. While it was thought that the safety systems would remo

doubt about the dangers of using the highly explosive fuel, it was exactly this problem 

would start a bitter inter-Center conflict at NASA and cast the future of Shuttle/Centau

doubt. 

Centers in Conflict

One of the most significant factors slowing the development of Centaur was the nu

of interfaces that Lewis handled on a daily basis. The interfaces for Shuttle/Centaur inc

mission management, the Air Force, customers, systems management at NASA Headqua

element and cargo management at other NASA Centers, and finally the industrial contra

Engineers knew that the number of interfaces they encountered during a job increase

overall complexity by geometric proportions. This complexity was further compou

because most of these interfaces were “authoritative,” meaning that they had the pow

influence or to stop the progress of the overall mission. Marty Winkler, who took over as 

of the Shuttle/Centaur program at General Dynamics, recalled how difficult this program 

He said, “In the beginning of 1983 I took over the Shuttle/Centaur program, and spe

extraordinary long and painful three years—very, very pressure filled. There were 70

work weeks for three years. I was not a pleasant person to be around. And a lot of it was c

by the internecine warfare [between] the NASA Centers.”32 Specifically, Winkler said, 

people at Johnson Space Center hated the idea. They fought it all the way. It was misera

Of all the relationships, Lewis engineers believed that the most “difficult and domi

one was with Johnson Space Center. As Larry Ross lamented, “Johnson never wanted 

196 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

30 Ibid.

31 Harold Robbins and Vernon Weyers, “Shuttle/Centaur Project Stages Challenge,” Lewis News (22 March 1985): 1

Archives. 

32 Interview with Marty Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001. 
program.”33 Red Robbins agreed, “There was an attitude problem at Johnson. They didn’t wan

to fly Centaur. They didn’t want a big hydrogen tank sitting behind the astronauts becaus

they thought the risk was too great.”34 Many of the astronauts who were based at Johnso

Space Center felt the same way. General Dynamics aerospace engineer Edward Bock said, “Th

astronauts never became comfortable with the vehicle . . . . There were astronauts that just fla

out said, I will not fly the Shuttle with that thing in the payload bay.”35 Tom Shaw, wh

managed launch vehicle integration at JPL, also commented on the reluctance of astronauts t

fly with Centaur. He said, “The people that sit up there in the cockpit looked back over the

shoulder and listened to the gurgling and the rumbling of the vent valve opening and closing

and had some reservations. The astronaut office did not feel very kindly towards the use of tha

big liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen stage in the Shuttle bay.”36 But as was often pointed ou

the Shuttle itself was powered with liquid hydrogen and oxygen. Shaw noted that the astro

nauts were “sitting astride twenty-five Centaurs’ worth of liquid oxygen and liquid hydroge

in that external tank. So it’s just a question of whether it’s between their legs or behind the

back is the way I view it.”37

Why was the Johnson-Lewis relationship strained? The crux of the problem was th

understandably cautious attitude Johnson had toward its astronauts. As a Center, Johnso

essentially owned the human space program. They were the ones who took the awesom

responsibility of risking human life every time they sent a mission into space. Because of th

responsibility, crew safety was the first priority. When they faced the need to put a dangerou

rocket into their Shuttle, they became highly cautious and conservative. Furthermore, whe

the decision was made to allow Lewis Research Center to manage the building of this new

rocket, and not Marshall as Johnson had recommended, their reluctance increased further. 

was Marshall that had always been a member of the manned spaceflight team. Lewis wa

always on the outside. And when the decision was made to put Lewis squarely in the middl

of what was the most significant new space program in the early 1980s, the manned spac

establishment did not welcome them with open arms. 

Johnson Space Center and Lewis Research Center attempted to work together as a team

to make Shuttle/Centaur flight-ready, and there were some signs that the earlier disagreement

would be put behind them. There was some positive interaction between the two Centers. A

the project got underway, Andrew Stofan wrote, “cooperation between both centers continue

Eclipsed by Tragedy 19

33 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

34 Interview with William H. Robbins by Mark Bowles, 21 March 2000. 

35 Interview with Edward Bock by Virginia Dawson, 22 March 2001. 

36 Interview with Tom Shaw by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999. 

37 Ibid.
198 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

to be excellent.”38 However, under the strain of the short timeframe and high tech

complexity of the Shuttle/Centaur program, this relationship was to be severely t

Specifically, the Centers came into conflict over what was, predictably, the most conten

issue—safety. The dangers inherent in allowing a human crew to carry a liquid-hyd

rocket into space were significant. Although the safety of the crew and Shuttle wa

number-one priority for both Centers, there was often disagreement over the tradeoffs be

safety and mission success. Each Center had a different perception of risk.

The first question was how to integrate Centaur with the Shuttle. Would it be consi

an “element” or a “payload?” Elements were large, conceptual chunks of a launch vehicle

the Solid Rocket Boosters, the External Tank, and the orbiter itself. They were the resp

bility of Johnson Space Center, where all the safety, reliability, and quality-assu

requirements were developed and managed. A 1981 Memorandum of Agreement be

Johnson and Lewis identified Centaur as a “Level III Space Shuttle element.”39

Initially, Lewis engineers and managers believed that it was in their best interest to r

sify the Centaur as a payload because there was less bureaucracy and documentation asso

with this status. With Centaur classified as an element, Johnson would have had more 

control of the project and the budget, and Lewis engineers would have had to take 

orders from them. Classifying Centaur as a payload allowed Lewis to remain 

autonomous; the payload handbook guided the specifications. During the monthly 

reviews, Johnson’s payload people merely determined if the Lewis work was up to their 

fications. With time always a critical factor, Lewis engineers reasoned that the less energy 

in navigating Johnson bureaucracy, the more time they would have for ensuring that Ce

was flight-ready. Red Robbins, head of the Shuttle/Centaur Program at Lewis, argued, “

so much trouble with JSC the last thing I wanted them to do is muck around in my bu

so I picked the payload option, and it probably can be argued forever whether it was bet

be payload or element.”40 Though initially pleased with the new integration arrangemen

later regretted this decision, as did other engineers.41 Nieberding concluded, “I really b

that had we been an element from the beginning, and worked with the Johnson engine

staff side by side for four years so they could get some confidence in our vehicle, as op

38 Andrew Stofan correspondence, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, NASA GRC Records.

39 “Shuttle/Centaur Project Plan,” Drawer H-D, NASA GRC Archives.

40 Interview with William H. Robbins by Mark Bowles, 21 March 2000.

41 William H. Robbins to Johnson Space Center, 16 August 1983, Box 2142; “Mission Operations Directorate Systems D

Operational Role for Centaur Missions,” 27 March 1984, NASA Archives, Box 2142, Division STED Project Mana

Office, Folder Johnson Correspondence 1984; Glynn S. Lunney to Lewis Research Center, 15 June 1984, Box 2142, D

STED Project Management Office, Folder Johnson Correspondence 1984, NASA GRC Records.
to treating it as a payload . . . I think we would have had a lot more success.”42 Edward Bock

a member of the Shuttle/Centaur program office at General Dynamics between 1983 an

1986, said that the Shuttle payload criteria applied to satellites and spacecraft that were rela

tively inert while they were in the cargo bay of the Shuttle: 

When these rules were applied to a high energy upper stage such as Centaur, they

resulted in design solutions that were asinine in their complexity and cost. The

resulting reliability of these complex design solutions was poor. As these designs

matured, this became obvious to all parties involved, and criteria compromises had to

be reached to provide rational design solutions. This cost time and money, and the

resulting compromises were more akin to “element” design criteria. These “payload”

criteria could not have been reasonably applied to any of the other Shuttle “elements,”

which were designed to different standards. Centaur was an element of the Space

System, and should have been designed that way from the start.43

After Centaur was redesignated as a payload in 1983, responsibility for performance an

reliability for Centaur and CISS shifted to Lewis, with Johnson maintaining the power to over

ride any Lewis decision. Johnson Space Shuttle Manager Glynn S. Lunney (who himself ha

worked at Lewis Research Center until 1958) explained that this decision was made becaus

“the Centaur project has demonstrated reliability and performance history and the impositio

of Shuttle [element] requirements beyond those required to assure interface compatibility an

safety is neither cost effective nor consistent with the agreed responsibilities.”44

With payload status, Centaur was treated like any other piece of cargo, but, in fact, it wa

a “living, breathing rocket, full of hydrogen.”45 Because this payload was going to be launche

from within the Shuttle, it imposed a new reality upon Johnson payload-integration expert

When deployed, the payload influenced the trajectory of the craft and the amount of prope

lant Centaur required to adjust its course. Johnson Space Center engineers were responsibl

for this deployment decision, but Lewis had to negotiate with the Johnson payload expert

Frustrations and problems quickly mounted. 

Over the next few years, the correspondence between Robbins and Lunney revealed th

conflict that surrounded Shuttle/Centaur. Although Robbins initially indicated to Lunney tha

Eclipsed by Tragedy 19

42 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999.

43 Edward Bock communication to authors, 11 March 2002. 

44 Glynn S. Lunney to NASA Headquarters, 14 April 1983, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

Johnson Correspondence 1983, NASA GRC Archives; Henry C. Dethloff, Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . . A History of the Johnso

Space Center (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4307, 1993), 278.

45 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 
he was pleased with Johnson Space Center internal roles and responsibilities and the pl

organize the entire integration, the relationship soon deteriorated.46 Robbins always m

tained his great respect and admiration for Lunney, whom he described as a “no nonsense

get the job done without the politics kind of guy.”47 But these feelings never extended t

rest of Lunney’s team at Johnson. 

Complicating the payload-versus-element question was the decision by Johnson 

Center to add further requirements for Shuttle/Centaur that went beyond previous Sh

payloads. One of the most onerous was a fluid systems interface and the special requirem

for dumping the liquid-hydrogen propellant if the mission had to be aborted. In late 

Johnson released a Centaur Safety Waiver (WACR-1A) that requested a redesign of th

drain, and dump vent system. The problem it wanted addressed was the placement o

liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen vent line inlets below the propellant liquid level in c

a mission abort. The result, according to Lunney, was “potentially catastrophic to the O

and Crew.”48

Lewis engineers were greatly angered by this new request and believed these safety w

to be the “fundamental problem all the way through the Shuttle/Centaur program.”49 As 

as October 1982, just as the project was commencing, during a Shuttle/Centaur meet

Johnson, Lunney and others “expressed concern about the safety aspects of combinin

Centaur project with the Space Shuttle program.”50 At that meeting, Robbins gave a rep

ease the concerns about safety at Johnson. Again and again throughout the project, the 

issue came to the forefront of discussions. Thus, for the latest safety waiver in 1984 conce

the redesign of the propellant-dumping system, Robbins wrote to Lunney that althoug

request was “technically feasible” and might have been a “reasonably straightforward d

task a year ago,” now it would have a serious impact on the program.51 Robbins contende

the redesign would delay Centaur by eight weeks, which jeopardized the fixed launch wi

200 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

46 William H. Robbins to Glynn S. Lunney, 24 November 1982, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office

Johnson Correspondence 1982, NASA GRC Records.

47 Interview with William H. Robbins by Mark Bowles, 21 March 2000. 

48 Glynn S. Lunney to William H. Robbins, 10 October 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office

Johnson Correspondence 1984, NASA GRC Records.

49 Interview with William H. Robbins by Mark Bowles, 21 March 2000. 

50 Minutes for Shuttle/Centaur Board, 28 September 1982, from Melvin E. Dell, concurrence of G. S. Lunney, Glenn R

Center, unprocessed Shuttle/Centaur records, NASA GRC Records. 

51 William H. Robbins to Glynn S. Lunney, 25 October 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office

Johnson Correspondence 1984, NASA GRC Records.
of the next mission. Robbins concluded, “I am not in a position to add risk to the missio

launch schedule by accepting and implementing this new design requirement.”52

Lewis engineers also believed that engineers at Johnson were unresponsive to their need

The attempt to transition Centaur to a piloted rating was complex, and the engineers require

a vast amount of knowledge about the Shuttle. Lewis engineers often felt as if their request

were ignored. As Larry Ross said, “They almost deliberately debilitated the program by no

being responsive.”53 Although this lack of responsiveness was partly due to the strained rela

tionship, it was also caused by the fact that this was an extremely difficult time at Johnson

The effort to prepare the early Shuttles for flight was immediate and enormous, and often th

requests from engineers working on a payload not scheduled until 1986 took a back seat. Face

with a lack of information, Lewis engineers relied on their judgment to solve a problem

Often, when the Lewis engineers brought their solutions up for review at Johnson, they wer

rejected. The result was frequent requests for design changes throughout the project. 

One such disagreement concerned vehicle testing. Johnson wanted to perform the

harness testing on the vehicle itself, while Lewis wanted to test it before installation wa

complete. Robbins argued, “Our rationale for this position is based on over twenty years o

experience on Centaur where this method has been successfully proven and used.”54 Robbin

believed that performing the tests after installation would incur an additional cost of $500,00

and delay the project by two weeks. He was not willing to jeopardize the mission by failing t

meet the schedule.

In February 1985, Lunney articulated a problem he saw developing between the tw

Centers.55 He argued that the Lewis team believed that the problem stemmed from th

changing flight requirements at JSC. Others attacked Lewis engineers for their tardiness i

identifying problems with the rocket. Lunney proposed a solution of a one-week dedicate

effort between the Centers to iron out their differences. The idea was accepted, and Larry Ros

wrote, “It’s a good idea, and I’m sure it will go a long way in achieving closure on the naggin

STS/Centaur safety issues.”56

Eclipsed by Tragedy 20

52 William H. Robbins to Glynn S. Lunney, 25 October 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

Johnson Correspondence 1984, NASA GRC Records.

53 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

54 William H. Robbins to Glynn S. Lunney, 7 December 1984, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

Johnson Correspondence 1984, NASA GRC Records.

55 Glynn S. Lunney to Lewis Research Center, 7 February 1985, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

Johnson Correspondence 1985, NASA GRC Records. 

56 Larry J. Ross to Glynn S. Lunney, 21 February 1985, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Johnso

Correspondence 1985, NASA GRC Records.
The result was the development of a “Centaur flight decisions philosophy” in Ja

1986. This was a set of mission actions by which the Centaur would be jettisoned from 

Shuttle if it encountered any critical system failures such as loss of power from the Shut

Centaur, any propellant tank leaks, or any leaks in the helium tanks. Detaching Centa

these (and other) cases would help preserve the lives of the crew and protect the costly Sh

itself.57 These safety issues were still unresolved when NASA experienced one of its most 

and devastating catastrophes in its history, and one that would spell the end o

Shuttle/Centaur program: the loss of Challenger in January 1986. To provide a better u

standing of the events leading up to this calamitous event, the following account will tra

yearlong countdown to ready Shuttle/Centaur for launch. Built in San Diego, it left the h

of the contractor and journeyed from west to east to the launch pad in Florida, where 

the day of the Challenger disaster.

T Minus One Year: The Countdown Begins

In May 1985, one year before the first launch of Shuttle/Centaur, the astronaut crews 

named for the flight. Challenger was the designated Shuttle vehicle to launch the U

probe. The commander was to be Frederick (Rick) H. Hauck, on his third flight after 

ously piloting a mission in 1983 and commanding another in 1984. His crew included 

Roy D. Bridges and mission specialists David C. Hilmers and J. Mike Lounge.58 Pilots 

second in command and had the responsibility of controlling and operating the Shuttle

mission specialists coordinated all Shuttle onboard operations, experiments, and spacew

That same month, Johnson Space Center announced the Atlantis crew that would la

the Galileo probe. The commanding officer would be David M. Walker, a captain in the 

who had flown the Shuttle the year before. The pilot was to be Ronald J. Grabe, a lieut

colonel in the Air Force. The two mission specialists were James “Ox” Van Hoften 

Norman E. Thagard.59 These were high-profile missions, and everyone expected “the ass

crew members to become highly visible as soon as their scheduled flights are completed

Rick Hauck was a key member of the team because he was the Astronaut Office p

officer for Shuttle/Centaur integration. Hauck was a distinguished pilot and comma

After earning a master’s degree in nuclear engineering from MIT, he became a U.S. Nav

202 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

57 Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, National Space Transportation System, Johnson Space Center, 13 January 1986, Box 

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Johnson Correspondence 1986, NASA GRC Records.

58 Charles Redmond and Steve Nesbitt, “NASA Names Astronaut Crews for Ulysses, Galileo Missions,” NASA Headq

Press Release, 31 May 1985, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

59 Charles Redmond and Steve Nesbitt, “NASA Names Two Space Shuttle Crews,” NASA Headquarters Press Rele

September 1985, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.

60 Ken Nus, General Dynamics Space Program, general memo, 4 June 1985, Box 2142, Division STED Project Mana

Office, Folder Johnson Correspondence 1985, NASA GRC Records.
Eclipsed by Tragedy 20

Shuttle/Centaur rollout at General Dynamics, August 1985. (Courtesy of the San Diego Aerospace Museum.)
pilot. In 1978, NASA began training him as an astronaut for the Shuttle. He served as 

on STS-7 in June 1983 and commander of STS-51A in November 1984. Throughou

preparation of Shuttle/Centaur, the astronaut crews were heavily involved in many of the 

sions regarding the launch, particularly software and procedural development. Because o

risk factors associated with Shuttle/Centaur, Jesse Moore, head of human spacef

frequently invited Hauck and Walker to attend senior management meetings where key d

opment issues were discussed. While it was unusual to have astronauts attend these mee

Moore felt that it was essential for the astronauts to be involved as much as possible. H

said, “There was a tremendous amount of focus within the crew on working major issue

probably wasn’t typical of many of the other Shuttle missions.”61 These issues inc

concerns surrounding pushing the Shuttle engines to the 109-percent power level 

previous high was 104 percent). Another problem was that the Shuttle had to orbit a

lowest altitude possible, at 105 miles, because of its limited lift capability. Finally, there 

safety issues that the crew had to understand for an abort. If the Shuttle had to return to 

with Centaur still inside, the center of gravity for the spacecraft would be further aft than 

before, making landing particularly difficult. 

Kennedy Space Center was busy making plans for the Galileo and Ulysses launches

two Shuttles would be housed at Complex 39 on launch pads A and B. To complicate ma

there were only six days scheduled between the launches, with each launch having only 

hour window. Officials at Kennedy felt pressure from both the media and the pub

duplicate the success of the Viking and Voyager missions and to add to the dramatic im

and scientific data these spacecraft returned. A Kennedy briefing warned, “Remembe

public’s response to . . . pictures of Saturn and Jupiter. They will be looking for more. 

and the world will be watching.”62 Lewis Research Center also had the pressure of gettin

Centaurs ready for launch. With ten months to go before liftoff, they began their much p

cized “Centaur Countdown.” They reported that while “much remains to be done, all act

support the crucial schedule.”63

When scientists and engineers at General Dynamics triumphantly unv

Shuttle/Centaur (SC-1) in San Diego in August 1985, such excitement had rarely been 

since the glory days of the Apollo program. The theme from Star Wars accompanie

applause of more than 300 officials from the company, the Air Force, and NASA. 

Thompson, a General Dynamics operations representative, said, “I almost had tears in m

204 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

61 Interview with Rick Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001. 

62 “Charter Planetary Panel Galileo and Ulysses Mission, Kennedy Space Center,” Box 2142, Division STED 

Management Office, Folder Kennedy Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

63 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (9 August 1985): 2, GRC Records. 
when they rolled that thing out.”64 Alan Lovelace proclaimed it the “future of space probes i

our generation.”65 The vehicle then underwent three weeks of extensive checking to make sur

that all specifications and requirements were met. After passing all of the tests, SC-1 was flow

to Cape Canaveral, where the crucial CISS was waiting for its mate. The CISS had been flow

to the Cape two months earlier. It was placed on a converted Atlas-Centaur launch pad, wher

it received its final assembly and checks.

In September 1985, with eight months to go, Vernon Weyers, Deputy Manager of th

Lewis Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, wrote, “All activities are in high gear in preparation fo

the dual planetary launches in May/June 1986.”66 There were some minor delays in assemblin

and mating the SC-1 with the CISS-1. There was a shortage of parts that were supplied b

General Dynamics; this shortage resulted in about a one-month delay. However, Weyers wa

confident that this was not a problem because there was a two-month period built into th

schedule for such common delays. The only trouble was that this luxury was not available fo

the next launch. The SC-2 and CISS-2 were right behind the first vehicle and did not hav

this schedule slack, so future delays could not be tolerated.

A month later, progress was still on track, and Larry Ross reported, “A lot of hard wor

remains, but all of the tasks required to launch the first Shuttle/Centaur seven months from

today are doable.”67 General Dynamics sent the missing parts to Cape Canaveral, and the SC

1 and the CISS-1 were successfully mated together. A test rotation and separation of th

Centaur was also completed successfully. Engineers hoped that this was the last time that th

test would be performed before the real separation took place in orbit above Earth. SC-2 an

CISS-2 were continuing their final inspections at General Dynamics in San Diego and woul

be transported across the United States in November. To reduce the difficulty in housing bot

the SC-1 and SC-2 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at the same time, the Air Force made the

Shuttle Payload Integration Facility available between November and December. This gav

NASA the ability to process both vehicles simultaneously. Other good news included th

report of a 109-percent engine thrust level for the Galileo mission (100 percent was consid

ered the optimum safety level, and the previous high was 104 percent). This thrust capabilit

made it possible to launch a heavier Centaur that carried more propellant. With more energy

there were more available launch days. Marshall engineers were actually displeased by th

because they did not want to operate their engines at this risky thrust level. A higher thrus

Eclipsed by Tragedy 20

64 Michael L. Norris, quoted in “New Booster Rolled Out in San Diego,” The Los Angeles Times (14 August 1985).

65 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (6 September 1985): 3, GRC Archives. 

66 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (4 October 1985): 3, GRC Archives. 

67 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (1 November 1985): 5, GRC Archives. 
level pushed the engines past safe performance levels. The higher the accepted percentage 

the more powerful the thrust—and the higher the risk.

With six months to go, the SC-1 and the CISS-1 were still undergoing testing at the 

Center Eastern Test Range at Kennedy Space Center. Special attention was given to leak c

on the hydraulic system. A few minor leaks were detected, but all were tracked down 

repaired. The next key test was the cryogenic cold flow test that was held in mid-Nove

Two successful tests were performed for both the liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen sys

SC-1 and CISS-1 also passed the first two phases of the Design Certification Review. The 

stage was the presentation of the certification to NASA Associate Administrator Jesse Mo

While the first Shuttle/Centaur was being tested, its twin arrived in Florida. The CISS-

the first component to show up, and it waited for its mate. The SC-2 was still in Calif

where General Dynamics was performing propellant tank insulation and avionics s

checks. 

In January 1986, Centaur encountered two significant technical problems. During 

of the mounts that attached the Propellant Level Indicating System inside the liquid-o

tank, the mounts failed. Engineers quickly redesigned them, then fabricated and ins

them on the SC-1. The new mounts passed all subsequent tests. The second main pro

occurred during the liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen cold flow tests. Specifically, the 

on the CISS-1, which controlled the fill, drain, dump, and engine feed functions, experi

erratic operations. Using a simulated system, engineers located this problem as well and d

oped a redesign. New tests were scheduled, and 15 January became a “do or die” hurdle f

program.69 Both propellant tanks were completely filled and pressurized at 110 perce

flight pressure, and all of the major system procedures were tested. Vernon Weyers recou

“Nobody close to the program dared to predict the success which was achieved . . . the 

avionics system performed flawlessly.”70 Robbins was equally pleased with the performanc

concurred that a “very important milestone was completed.”71 Ross said, “The tankin

absolutely perfect.”72

The astronauts were not as enthusiastic. In early January 1986, they became conc

about whether the abort of a Shuttle/Centaur mission could be safely orchestrated. They 

tioned whether there was adequate helium pressure to activate the dump valves if some

went wrong. They worried that there were not adequate backup systems to ensure their s

206 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

68 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (29 November 1985): 4, GRC Archives. 

69 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (10 January 1986): 3, GRC Archives. 

70 Vernon Weyers, “Centaur Countdown,” Lewis News (7 February 1986): 3, GRC Archives. 

71 W. H. Robbins, “Shuttle/Centaur Weekly Status Report,” 13–17 January 1986, Box 2143, Division STED 

Management Office, Folder Status Reports, NASA GRC Records.

72 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000.
and they began to refer pejoratively to Centaur as “Death Star.”73 Astronaut Rick Hauck said

“This was a big issue for us. Very big.” Hauck and John Young, the head of the Shuttle office

took up the safety issue with the Johnson Space Center Configuration Control Board. The

were surprised when the Board ruled the system acceptable. Hauck recalled, “I went back t

my crew that day and said, ‘Things have changed at NASA. We are willing to take risks tha

we didn’t take before and if any of you want to resign from this flight I will support you.’”

However, when given a chance to withdraw, with no questions asked, from the crew that wa

assigned to fly Shuttle/Centaur, none of the selected crew accepted the offer. Three weeks late

however, the Challenger disaster radically altered the perception of risk. 

On 28 January, Challenger lifted off from Cape Canaveral; minutes later, it exploded ove

the Atlantic Ocean, thereby killing the crew. This was the worst disaster in NASA history u

until that time, and the first time that any American astronaut was ever lost in fligh

Immediately, the Shuttle/Centaur program was in jeopardy. Despite years of work, the rocke

quickly began to fall out of favor with both Johnson Space Center and NASA Headquarters

Fighting for Survival

The Centaur team at Lewis was devastated. Since Shuttle/Centaur was so close to the dat

of its first launch, many of the Lewis engineers working on the project were already at the Cap

and witnessed the Challenger explosion with their own eyes. They immediately realized tha

Shuttle/Centaur, along with Galileo and Ulysses missions, was in jeopardy. When Red Robbin

returned to Cleveland the next Monday morning, he went directly to the personnel office an

tendered his resignation. Already close to retirement, Robbins knew that at bes

Shuttle/Centaur would be years from launching, and he could not endure the wait.

Although the Shuttle/Centaur program was not immediately canceled, its future was ver

uncertain. On 20 February 1986, Jesse Moore sent out the order to postpone the Galileo an

Ulysses launches.75 The very earliest that the two missions could be rescheduled was thirtee

months away. This was the time when Jupiter would be on the direct opposite side of the Su

from Earth. Even the Ulysses mission was dependent upon the location of Jupiter because 

was going to receive a gravity-assist boost from the planet to catapult its way to the Sun. In th

meantime, the Galileo probe was moved to the Vertical Processing Facility at KSC, where 

was mated with the Centaur. Engineers continued to perform compatibility and separatio

tests in the hopes that the missions might still get a green light.76

Eclipsed by Tragedy 20

73 Interview with Rick Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001.

74 Ibid.

75 Jesse Moore, “Galileo and Ulysses Launch delay,” 20 February 1986, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Offic

Folder Status Reports, NASA GRC Records.

76 “Galileo, Centaur Milestone Tests are Underway,” Lewis News (16 May 1986): 2, NASA GRC Archives. 
Acting NASA Administrator William R. Graham said that his decision to postpon

not mean that the next Space Shuttle launch would be delayed until after the Galileo 

Ulysses launch opportunity the next May. The Shuttle might be back in operation earlier 

thirteen months, but he said that two key factors forced his hand to delay these missio

key personnel required to ensure the safe and successful launch of either Galileo or U

were preoccupied with the timely analysis of causes of the 51-L accident and 2) the c

quences of the accident had significantly eroded the schedule margins for launc

processing required prior to the first flight of the Shuttle/Centaur upper stage.77

Despite guarded optimism, even if an additional thirteen months of testing cou

performed, the hopes for an eventual Shuttle/Centaur launch were beginning to fade

reason for concern was the issue of weight and the ongoing disagreement between Lewi

Johnson. The Lewis research team had three key weight factors to consider: the weig

Centaur, the weight of its payload (Galileo), and the weight of the Centaur propellant. W

Johnson committed to a 65,000-pound lift capability for the Shuttle, Lewis knew that 

were slightly over the weight allowance. However, the actual lift capability of the Shuttl

never close to that commitment. To compensate, Centaur was able to decrease the amou

propellant carried in its tanks. This tradeoff meant that the launch window shortened be

Centaur would have insufficient fuel to hit the planetary target on those days that requ

higher spacecraft velocity at separation.

Early in the integration process, Lewis engineers struggled with the weight pro

because Johnson engineers kept decreasing their allowance for the Centaur w

Approximately two weeks before the Challenger launch, Lewis trajectory enginee

Nieberding made a presentation to Jesse Moore and to Lewis, KSC, JSC, and MSFC 

management sounding the alarm that the number of viable launch days had decreased to 

than six for Galileo, far too few to ensure a reasonable probability of launch. In the pres

tion, he demonstrated that using 109-percent Shuttle engine thrust (instead of the prev

high level of 104 percent) was the only potentially viable way of restoring a reasonable nu

of launch days. In fact, Jesse Moore had approved the higher thrust level on the spot, ov

strenuous objections of JSC and MSFC. So when Challenger exploded, Lewis engineers 

that any redundancies added to make the Shuttle safer would also make it heavier. It wou

able to carry even less than before. Although in no way related to the failure, the fac

Challenger exploded only a few seconds after its engines reached 104 percent of its no

thrust contributed to the perception that pushing the Shuttle engines to 109 percent o

208 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

77 James F. Kukowski, “NASA Postpones Galileo, Ulysses, Astro-1 Launches,” NASA Headquarters Press Release, 10 F

1986, GRC Public Affairs Archives; William R. Graham, “Galileo and Ulysses Missions Postponed for Year,” Lewis N

February 1986): 6, NASA GRC Archives.
Galileo mission would be unsafe.78 With the Shuttle getting heavier and able to lift less weigh

when it returned to flight, and with JSC and MSFC now vehemently opposed to pushing th

Shuttle engines above a 104-percent thrust level, Lewis engineers realized that the Shuttl

would never be able to lift Centaur and Galileo.79

Another issue was safety as it related to Centaur’s fuel. Following the Shuttle disaste

Lewis held meetings on the Centaur safety program in May 1986. The attendees include

representatives from General Dynamics, JSC, KSC, the Air Force, TRW, Boeing, Lockheed

Martin Marietta, and Analex, an aerospace industry service provider located in Brookpark

Ohio. The goal of the meeting was to prove that despite the risk presented by liquid hydrogen

the Centaur rocket was safe. Engineers described the entire safety organization for the Centau

at Lewis, reviewed recent hazard reports, and presented a revised abort/contingency plan.80 Bu

the effort was not enough to convince opponents. 

Even more serious, from the point of view of engineers at Lewis, was the realization tha

increased redundancy in Centaur and Shuttle systems meant that the Shuttle would no longe

be able to lift Centaur. They knew that the Shuttle engines would not be allowed to pus

beyond the 100-percent thrust level, significantly less than the 109-percent level needed. 

Another problem that contributed to the growing pessimism over the future of Centau

concerned General Dynamics. Despite a long and successful relationship, Lewis managemen

was coming to believe that General Dynamics no longer possessed the requisite skills to buil

and staff Centaur effectively. The astronauts were especially critical.81 When astronaut Davi

Walker went out to the plant, he was surprised at the conditions he found. Compared to th

Rockwell facility, where the Shuttle was meticulously assembled in a clean, white-glove env

ronment, there seemed to be less attention to manufacturing a quality product at Genera

Dynamics. Larry Ross recalled one incident when there was a lapse in common sense on th

part of workers moving a Centaur from the factory to a test site. “They took a Centaur G an

ran it into a bridge going up to Sycamore Canyon,” he said. “It was dumb. They hadn’t meas

ured the height.” He felt that some of the fault lay in Lewis’s management. “The lesson wa

that we should have fired some people at General Dynamics. That was a mistake.”82 Verno

Weyers also was aware of the problems at General Dynamics. He visited the plant once o

twice a month over the four-year Shuttle/Centaur program. He suspected that drugs were 

problem. He recalled, “I personally was out in the shop by myself at General Dynamics on

Eclipsed by Tragedy 20

78 Murray, Journey Into Space, 234. 

79 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999.

80 William E. Klein, “Minutes for Shuttle/Centaur G Safety Certification Process Briefing,” 2 June 1986, Box 2142, Divisio

STED Project Management Office, Folder Technical Paper Approvals by PM, NASA GRC Records.

81 Interview with Rick Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001.
day where they were working on a big piece of structure. I looked through the access hole

an engineer was sound asleep. It was very frustrating at times, because on the technical 

the production side, they did not seem to get their act together . . . . They just did not pe

well technically.”83

On 22 May 1986, Headquarters began to address the problems surroun

Shuttle/Centaur and consider what future action they should take. Rick Hauck gave an 

ential briefing citing risks to the Shuttle crew as the reason why the program shou

canceled. He concluded that “Shuttle/Centaur, even after satisfactory accomplishme

currently identified safety-related fixes, poses additional risk to crew and Shuttle s

Attempts to integrate an unmanned upper stage in the Shuttle have resulted in comprom

which caused undue risk to orbiter and crew. The ability to reduce these risks to an accep

level is questionable.”84 An independent study of safety concerns, conducted by the H

Committee on Appropriations and chaired by Edward P. Boland and Congressman W

Green, concluded that it was in the best interest of NASA to terminate the Shuttle/Ce

program. 

On 19 June, NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher gave the order to termina

program.85 After the country had spent nearly one billion dollars to transform Centaur fo

Shuttle, Lewis Research Center received this heartbreaking order: “You are directed to t

nate the Shuttle/Centaur upper stage program.”86 Fletcher stated, “Although 

Shuttle/Centaur decision was very difficult to make, it is the proper thing to do and this 

time to do it.”87 Astronaut and future NASA Administrator Richard H. Truly was direct

examine other alternatives for the Shuttle/Centaur planetary and scientific payloads. 

The result was catastrophic for the space program. Suddenly, the Galileo probe agai

its ride into space. Not only was it forced to wait until a solid rocket upper stage could be 

but also, the lack of power meant that the entire mission would take much longer. W

Centaur launch, Galileo would have arrived at Jupiter in two years. When Galileo final

launch in October 1989 with the less powerful Boeing-built Inertial Upper Stage, it too

years to arrive in the Jovian atmosphere.88

210 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

82 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000. 

83 Interview with Vernon Weyers by Mark Bowles, 8 April 2000. 

84 Interview with Rick Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001. 

85 John M. Logsdon, “Return to Flight: Richard H. Truly and the Recovery from the Challenger Accident,” in From Eng

Science to Space Science, 360. 

86 “Shuttle/Centaur Termination Status” NASA Headquarters, 4 September 1986, Box 2144, NASA GRC Records.

87 Sarah G. Keegan, “NASA Terminates Development of Shuttle/Centaur Upper Stage,” NASA Headquarters Press Rel

June 1986, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives. 

88 Barbara Selby, Leon Perry, and Terry Eddleman, “Upper Stage Selected for Planetary Missions,” NASA Headquarte

Release, 26 November 1986, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.
The loss of Centaur also dramatically changed the navigational course that Galileo took

With Centaur, the Galileo flightpath was to have been direct. With the solid IUS, Galileo wa

required to take a much more circuitous route with the help of gravitational assists. Galile

actually flew by Venus once and Earth twice, each time using the planet’s gravity to effectivel

“steal” some energy and direct it to the velocity of the craft. Although this reduced the dura

tion of the flight, the six years to arrive in the Jovian atmosphere still took three times as lon

as what Centaur was capable of delivering.

Not only did the Centaur cancellation result in nearly a decade’s delay of Galileo for dat

return, but it also significantly jeopardized mission success. In April 1991, Galileo attempte

to open the large high-gain antenna that was the primary mechanism by which the craft trans

mitted Jupiter data to Earth.89 Soon after the attempt, telemetry revealed to the JPL engineer

that something had gone wrong. The motors only partially opened the antenna, and then the

stalled. Over a period of weeks, more than a hundred experts at JPL analyzed the problem an

concluded that the antenna failed because of excessive friction between antenna pins an

sockets. Ironically, JPL engineers blamed this problem on the cancellation of Centaur. I

1985, Galileo and the antenna were shipped by truck from JPL to Kennedy. After th

Challenger explosion, Galileo was shipped back across the country in 1986, and then bac

again in 1989, when it was finally launched. The vibration that the antenna experience

during the cross-country trips by truck loosened the pin lubricant and caused the mai

antenna to fail. 

Although some important scientific observations were lost, the Galileo mission remaine

a success when engineers reconverted the low-gain antenna.90 In October 1991, Galile

performed a flyby operation of the 8-mile-diameter asteroid Gaspra. When Galileo passed b

at a distance of 1,000 miles, it was the first time a spacecraft had provided direct observation

of an asteroid.91

Like Galileo, the Ulysses mission also suffered from the cancellation of th

Shuttle/Centaur program. D. Eaton was the Ulysses project manager at the European Spac

Agency. Upon hearing news of the suspension of the Centaur program, he and his team reacte

with “deep disappointment.” Despite the wasted money and the delay to the Ulysses program

Eaton said that “the overriding thought is the bitter blow this must be to all at Lewis an

Eclipsed by Tragedy 21

89 Paula Cleggett-Haleim, “Galileo Antenna Deployment Studied by NASA,” NASA Headquarters Press Release, 19 April 199

GRC Public Affairs Archives.

90 “New Telecommunications Strategy Aimed at Maximizing Return from Galileo’s Low-Gain Antenna

http://cass.jsc.nasa.gov/publications/newsletters/lpib/lpib76/gal76.html.

91Paula Cleggett-Haleim and Jim Wilson, “Galileo To Set Course for Encounter with Asteroid Gaspra,” NASA Headquarte

Press Release, 28 June 1991, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.
General Dynamics who worked intensely long hours to achieve an impossible schedule o

have the goal posts taken away and the game abandoned at the last minute.”92 Like Ga

Ulysses also eventually made it into space. In May 1991, the spacecraft took its long jo

to Jupiter for an eventual slingshot to the Sun. While at the planet, it performed physics 

tigations such as taking measurements of the Jovian magnetosphere.93

To engineers at Lewis Research Center and JPL, however, the abandonment o

program was not in the national interest. Nieberding said, “To this day, the country is hu

for not having a liquid-hydrogen upper stage coupled with the Shuttle or with an equiv

expendable launch vehicle capability.”94 Tom Shaw at JPL recalled, “June 19, 1986, was a 

day as far as I was concerned. I felt that we suffered a truly significant setback in national 

bility, and specifically my own narrow purview of planetary exploration, where we 

high-energy vehicles to get there with any kind of significant payload . . . . You learn h

use a much, much smaller spacecraft.”95

Beyond their disappointment over the cancellation of Shuttle/Centaur, Lewis Res

Center engineers pointed out that many missions carried by the Shuttle in the 1

including the commercial satellite payload carried by the ill-fated Challenger, should have 

assigned to an expendable launch vehicle such as Atlas-Centaur. Red Robbins observe

think they sold their soul to the devil to fund the Shuttle . . . the expendable launch v

was a good animal and not nearly as expensive as the Shuttle program.” He said that whi

expensive Saturn V could deliver approximately 250,000 pounds of payload to low-

orbit, the Shuttle, which eventually cost as much, could deliver the same weight into s

The problem was that 200,000 pounds of that weight was the Shuttle itself. Thus, wit

Shuttle payload of only 50,000 pounds, “the cost per pound to fly into low-Earth orbit 

the Shuttle is up by a factor of 5. You don’t even need a rocket scientist to tell you that.

Terminating the Program

Ends can come for many different reasons. Technologies can evolve to the point w

older designs are obsolete. Mission objectives can change, making previous areas of explor

unnecessary. Costs can escalate to the point where funding no longer allows the continu

212 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

92D. Eaton to Larry Ross, 11 July 1986, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Galileo Correspo

NASA GRC Records. 

93 Paula Cleggett-Haleim and Robert MacMillin, “Ulysses To Begin Jupiter Physics Investigations,” NASA Headquarte

Release, 28 May 1991, NASA GRC Public Affairs Archives.

94 Interview with Joe Nieberding by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, 15 April 1999. 

95 Interview with Tom Shaw by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999.

96 Interview with Red Robbins by Mark Bowles, 21 March 2000.
of a project. Managerial and technical errors can jeopardize a mission. Although these are th

most common reasons for premature endings to NASA projects, Shuttle/Centaur did no

encounter any of these fates. The technology was still cutting-edge; planetary missions wer

still needed; the funding remained intact; and no uncorrectable errors were made in either th

design or the management of the program. Shuttle/Centaur met with one of the most devas

tating and uncontrollable problems—fear. After the Challenger explosion, a liquid-hydroge

rocket inside the bay doors of the Shuttle just looked too dangerous and too risky for NASA

to continue with the program. 

In June 1986, NASA sent out termination letters to their own Centers and to contractor

like General Dynamics, Honeywell, Analex, Teledyne, and Pratt & Whitney. Their order wa

“You are hereby directed to take those necessary steps for an orderly shutdown and cessatio

of all work.”97 Each of these organizations had to slowly bring Centaur work to a halt, resultin

in over 200 stop-work orders.98 With great remorse, Andy Stofan wrote, “Lewis is proceedin

with the orderly shutdown of the terminated Shuttle/Centaur program.”99 Throughout July

“closeout meetings” were held with all the contractors. Most of the work of the contractors wa

completed by 30 September 1986; all work was to be finished by the end of the year. Eac

contractor was expected to set a completion date for itself that would maximize the potentia

use of its work for the government. Because Centaur might be used again as an expendabl

launch vehicle, all contractors were also instructed to assess the impact that the end of th

Shuttle/Centaur program would have on future capabilities.100

The remaining resources from the Shuttle/Centaur program included documentation

technology, and people. The documentation was the easiest resource to relocate. Fortunately

in February 1986, NASA created the Centaur Engineering Data Center where all engineerin

paperwork associated with the project was sent. Besides increasing the speed in which infor

mation could be accessed, it was also designed to relieve engineers of filing chores an

promised to free up work space.101 This information included official files stored in personne

offices, the mailroom, contractor sites, and storage facilities.102 The Data Center received ke

Eclipsed by Tragedy 21

97 Termination letter 23 June 1986, “Shuttle/Centaur Termination Status” NASA Headquarters, Box 2144, NASA GRC Record

98 R. E. Jumont to W. H. Robbins, 16 July 1985, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Gener

Dynamics Correspondence, NASA GRC Records. 

99 Andrew J. Stofan memo to R. Truly, 8 July 1986, “Shuttle/Centaur Termination Status” NASA Headquarters, Box 214

NASA GRC Records.

100 Vernon J. Weyers to distribution, 1 July 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Gener

Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

101 James O. Rogers, Jr., to distribution, 20 February 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Fold

General Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

102 Thomas S. Banus to distribution, 11 June 1986, NASA Archives, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Offic

Folder General Correspondence; Thomas S. Banus to distribution, 2 July 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Managemen

Office, Folder General Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.
documents, and the information was entered into a database and then sent to a vault. 

materials were then destroyed as engineers cleaned out their offices. Saved materials inc

minutes of all reviews of the project, significant correspondence, and all engineering draw

Between October and November 1986, all the major contractors and NASA Centers bega

process of turning over their documentation. 

By the middle of 1987, most of the contractors had issued final reports on various a

of the Shuttle/Centaur development. In May 1987, Pratt & Whitney released a final repo

the “RL10 Ignition Limits Test for Shuttle Centaur.” Kennedy Space Center and 

Research Center summarized testing done to determine instability in the CISS an

Pneumatic Activated Valve Control System. United Technologies issued a final report 

“Shuttle Centaur Engine Cooldown Evaluation.” These three reports were representat

the type of work done to resolve technological questions that still surrounded the projec

Preservation of the technologies associated with the Shuttle/Centaur project was a 

difficult problem. Suggestions on how to use the technology were made by engineers 

could not accept the possibility that their years of work had been for naught. For exa

Floyd Smith, the chief of the structures and facilities branch at Lewis, believed that the go

ment should review all potential hardware uses and then store the equipment in a su

location. He hoped that it might still be possible to use one of the new Centaur vehicles 

later NASA mission. Even if NASA decided never to use the new rocket configuration, S

wanted other possible spinoffs from their work. He thought that one application m

support other payload mounting structures in the Shuttle.104

The Air Force also had to decide what to do with its Shuttle/Centaur hardware. Be

the Air Force was a full partner in the development costs, it was entitled to any of the re

hardware that might be used for other craft, like Titan-Centaur.105 In June 1986, their o

termination orders stated, “Through appropriate coordination with NASA Headquarter

in view of the needs of the DOD, you are to implement the shutdown in a manner wh

most advantageous to the U.S. Government.”106 To take greatest advantage of the work al

accomplished, NASA asked for additional funds to enable its contractors to take their 

ware development to a suitable stopping point. Thus, the completed technology would h

greater chance of being used on another spacecraft.

214 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

103 Final reports found in Box S/C Records, consignor Alan Willoughby, NASA GRC Records. 

104 R. C. Edwards for Floyd Z. Smith to Acting Manager, Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, 21 July 1986, Box 2142, D

STED Project Management Office, Folder General Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

105 C. Thomas Newman to Administrator, 29 September 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office

Air Force Correspondence, NASA GRC Records. 

106 Vernon J. Weyers, Acting Manager Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, to Headquarters Space Division, 26 June 1986, Bo

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Air Force Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.
In the process of terminating the program, Lewis Research Center received a number o

accolades from the Air Force. Larry Ross received a letter of appreciation from Colonel Davi

Raspet at the Department of Defense in recognition of the “exceptional performance” of h

laboratory. Raspet said that because of the efforts of Lewis, despite the cancellation of th

program, “We were on course with Centaur G and succeeded in laying foundations fo

Titan/Centaur.”107 In December 1986, Brigadier General Nathan J. Lindsay said that th

government had decided that it was in the government’s best interest to buy back all of th

flight hardware from NASA. He believed that the “termination has been difficult for all o

us,”108 but he offered his thanks to Lewis Research Center for helping to make the process a

smooth as possible. Ross appreciated the accolades given to him and his organization by th

Air Force and wrote, “Dispositioning these assets is a painful process, but I find consolation i

the potential for their use on other flight vehicles.”109

Centaur G-prime lived on when it was mated, with some modifications, to the Air Forc

Titan IV booster, first launched in 1994. In 1992, NASA chose Titan IVB/Centaur G-prim

as the launch vehicle for the Cassini mission to Saturn launched in 1997. This $3.4-billio

mission, a project managed jointly by NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and th

Italian Space Agency (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, ASI), carried a huge nuclear-powered prob

programmed to land on the surface of Titan, the largest of moon of Saturn. The return o

Titan-Centaur, the last and most expensive of NASA’s large spacecraft, underlined the appro

priateness of expendable launch vehicles for ambitious space science missions that required th

power and precision of Centaur.

A Changing Tolerance for Risk

President Nixon had closed his 1972 announcement of the Shuttle program with 

prophetic quotation from Oliver Wendell Holmes: “We must sail sometimes with the win

and sometimes against it, but we must sail and not drift nor lie at anchor.”110 Few other state

ments could have so accurately captured Centaur’s relationship with the Space Shuttle

Implicit within Holmes’s words was a notion of risk. Sailing is a dangerous endeavor. Whe

Eclipsed by Tragedy 21

107 David Raspet to L. J. Ross, 4 November 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Air For

Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

108 Nathan J. Lindsay to NASA Lewis Research Center, 9 December 1986, Box 2142, Division STED Project Managemen

Office, Folder Air Force Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

109 Larry Ross to Major General Ralph H. Jacobson and Brigadier General Nathan J. Lindsay, 30 October 1986, Box 214

Division STED Project Management Office, Folder Air Force Correspondence, NASA GRC Records.

110 White House Press Secretary, “The White House: Statement by the President,” 5 January 1972, Richard M. Nixo

Presidential Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, as found in “Nixon Approv

the Space Shuttle,” in NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, ed. Roger D. Launius (Malabar, Florida: Krieg

Publishing Company, 1994), 235. 
the wind blows at our back, the chance of safely completing the voyage is increased. How

when we set sail with the gusts directly in our face, churning the waters against the ship’s 

head, the conditions for ultimate success are reduced. Holmes said that inherent in the n

of humanity is the desire to raise anchors and explore the unknown. We endure the da

We accept the risks of what we do because we believe that the rewards ultimately justi

sacrifice. 

Holmes’s eloquent argument for the adventurous spirit suggests that risk is not a con

factor, equally endured by everyone. The tolerance for risk changes like the wind, dev

from one person, organization, or era to the next. What one person might consider an ac

able risk assumed to achieve some larger goal, a person with a more conservative outlook m

reject for one that yields less reward, but also less potential for failure. 

Safety concerns are now given as the official reason for termination of the Shuttle/Ce

program. One author reported in 1999 that this Shuttle configuration was “eventually sc

because of safety concerns stemming from the Centaur’s common-bulkhead tank desig

from the difficulties of dumping propellants in an abort situation.”111 However, blamin

entire failure upon technical issues related to safety obscures the engineering triumph

made Shuttle/Centaur flight-ready. These safety concerns were nothing new and di

emerge suddenly after the tragic Challenger loss. Instead, they were evident from the very 

of the program and were embedded in the Centaur design. Many engineers considered th

tank design and propellant dumping concerns were part of the acceptable risks of flight. 

worked many years to reduce the risks even further to meet NASA standards. In this they 

successful. Before the Challenger tragedy, General Dynamics confidently proclaimed, 

proven Centaur System can now provide maximum benefits to Shuttle users.”112 V

Weyers concluded, despite the technical challenges and problems encountered, “At the ti

the Challenger accident . . . there was little doubt that the Centaur would be ready on ti

support the 1986 dual planetary launches.”113 Marty Winkler of General Dynamics conc

with this assessment: “I’m convinced to this day we would have made the launch wind

May of ’86, but it was a sprint to the finish. It was like the racehorse that overtakes you 

end. Had not the Shuttle accident occurred, we would have been ready for launch.”114 

216 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

111 Ivan Bekey, “Exploring Future Space Transportation Possibilities,” in Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, ed. John M. L

(NASA SP-4407, 1999), 509.

112 General Dynamics, Box 2146, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder S/C Marketing Vugraphs from 

NASA GRC Records. 

113 Vernon Weyers, “Development of the Shuttle/Centaur Upper Stage,” paper delivered at the IAF Congress, Innsbruck, 

October 1986, Box 2143, Division STED Project Management Office, Folder IAF Paper, NASA GRC Records.

114 Interview with Martin Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001. 
technically the Centaur would have been ready, something beyond safety was at play in th

decision to terminate.

The first reason was a monetary issue. NASA management knew that the effort require

to return the Space Shuttle to flight-ready status would be enormously expensive. As a resul

there would not be enough left in the budget to work out any remaining technical issues wit

Shuttle/Centaur. Marty Winkler said, “it wasn’t canceled because of technical problem

although there were technical problems, because everyone agreed that the technical problem

were solvable. It was canceled because NASA had concluded internally . . . that they didn

have enough manpower, energy, and money to fix both the Shuttle’s return to flight and th

Centaur. That’s a little-known fact, but it’s absolutely true.”115 Also, a repaired Shuttle woul

never have had the lift capability to launch a “safer” and heavier Centaur. 

Another component was even more central to the cancellation of the program—

changing tolerance of risk. Liquid hydrogen was such an alluring fuel because of the capabil

ties that it gave to explore space. The tradeoff for greater power and control was heightene

safety concerns. Liquid hydrogen was dangerous, and there was never any question that it wa

more volatile than solid propellants. However, during the 1970s and early 1980s, these risk

were considered acceptable. Ironically, the Challenger explosion was caused by the failure o

one of the solid-propellant booster rockets—previously considered very reliable. The traged

brought with it a new era of conservatism and a diminished acceptance of risk. As Larry Ros

argued, “After Challenger the equation changed.”116 The design specifications that had bee

acceptable before Challenger were based upon theoretical and technical judgments. In the wak

of the explosion, new “emotional” judgments were added to the mix. Because of these stron

emotional factors, Ross concluded, “There was no crew that would fly it because they wer

staggered by Challenger. It was not rational; it didn’t have to be rational. It was human life.”1

The astronauts agreed that the level of acceptable risk changed, and that NASA had bee

willing to assume too many risks in the pre-Challenger days. Rick Hauck said that the changin

levels of risk tolerance were a part of NASA’s history. He said, “It is all part of the ebb and flow

of the desire to succeed and the desire to meet schedules. Probably there was a certain amoun

of confidence born of never having an in-flight failure before.”118 There was also a risk toler

ance difference in 1986 between Johnson Space Center and Lewis Research Center that h

called “cultural.” He said that the Lewis engineers were “highly motivated professionals wh

believed they were exercising as much caution as needed to be exercised.” But generally thes

Eclipsed by Tragedy 21

115 Ibid. 

116 Interview with Larry Ross by Mark Bowles, 1 March 2000.

117 Ibid.

118 Interview with Rick Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001.
engineers believed Centaur could fly in the Shuttle. As a whole, Lewis always believed tha

human spaceflight guys at Johnson were a bit too cautious.” Hauck concluded, “There 

natural cultural difference between the groups. The issues about risk are tied up in the cu

issues.”119 While Hauck was on the side that supported grounding Shuttle/Centaur forev

conceded that there was an irresolvable difference between the two sides. Eventually, th

risky solution won out. 

Richard Kohrs was right in the middle of the debate between the engineers and the 

nauts. Kohrs was the manager of the Technical Integration Office for the Space Shuttle 

1980 to 1985 at Johnson Space Center. He was also the main point of contact between 

Research Center and Johnson, so he understood both cultures. He conceded 

Shuttle/Centaur seemed like a good idea before they got to the “now let’s go make it w

phase. But when they began to go through all of the battles concerning weight issues, 

point failures, interfaces, redundancy, and so on, he and his colleagues at Johnson cam

realize that the plan was less desirable. Although initially the risks seemed worth takin

risk tolerance changed as the program progressed. Kohrs recalled, “I think a lot of these 

were accepted before . . . the [technical] guys had to go make it happen. Then of cours

got into the flight crew concern of this whole thing.” Johnson protected the astronauts

because the astronaut crews united against the Shuttle/Centaur plan, Kohrs and his colle

also withdrew support. Although Kohrs ultimately adopted the more conservative attitu

the astronauts, he still had faith that from a technical perspective, “I think it [Shuttle/Cen

would have flown.”120

Those engineers who devoted years of their lives to readying Centaur for the Shuttle 

part of a culture with a tolerance for risk. They knew their rocket and they believed the m

would succeed. To the engineers involved in Shuttle/Centaur, the rocket represented hop

a new era of space exploration. Their enthusiasm did not blind them to safety problem

they believed that they had reduced the risk to manageable levels for mission success and 

safety. These engineers also correctly pointed out that the human risk factor should never 

entered the equation in the first place. Joe Nieberding concluded, “These missions should 

flown on an expendable rocket. They needed no human crew. Again, the decision to fly e

thing on STS was a disaster.”121 Historian William Burrows agreed with this assessment 

tragic loss of life in the deployment of a satellite that could easily have been launched w

expendable rocket.122

218 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

119 Ibid.

120 Interview with Richard Kohrs by Mark Bowles, 13 July 2001. 

121 Joe Nieberding correspondence with authors, 7 November 2001.

122 William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (New York: Random House, 1998), 556. 
In 1990, a NASA advisory committee produced a report on the future of the United State

space program and discussed the significance of risk for the Agency. The committee conclude

that risk has always been a central feature of all of the greatest human adventures. Whe

Magellan first circumnavigated Earth in 1519, he started his voyage with five ships and a crew

of 280. After the three-year voyage, only one ship and thirty-four crewmen returned. Early tes

pilots in the 1950s faced a similar risk factor while pushing the limits of supersonic flight. Th

committee wrote, “Risk and sacrifice are seen to be constant features of the American exper

ence. There is a national heritage of risk taking handed down from early explorers . . . it is th

element of our national character that is the wellspring of the U.S. space program.”123

Despite this bold statement of our adventurous heritage, NASA worried that the “spark o

adventure is flickering. As a nation, we are becoming risk averse.”124 NASA knew this from

experience. Risk aversion had kept them from launching Shuttle/Centaur. Richard H. Truly

Associate Administrator for space flight and charged with the responsibility to return the Spac

Shuttle safely to flight, wrote, “I know that the business of space flight can never be made t

be totally risk-free, but this conservative return to operations will continue . . . .”125 But risk 

a subjective, ever-present force that waxes and wanes in the minds of all who step into a NASA

program. NASA and America would recover from the Challenger tragedy. They would neve

forget their fallen colleagues, but they would move on and again accept the risk inherent in th

exploration of space. Left behind was Shuttle/Centaur. It would forever remain an unteste

dream, eclipsed by a tragedy not of its own making. Marty Winkler expressed the unease tha

settled over the Centaur program in the wake of the Shuttle/Centaur cancellation. He said

“We were absolutely consumed through the early to mid-80s with Shuttle/Centaur. It sucke

up all our energy. And when the program was canceled, we said, ‘What do we do now?’”126

Eclipsed by Tragedy 21

123 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (NASA publication, December 1990), 16–17.

124 Ibid.

125 Richard H. Truly to NASA distribution, “Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status,” 24 March 198

in Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, ed. John M. Logsdon (NASA SP 4407, 1999), 378.

126 Interview with Marty Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.

Chapter 8

Like a Phoenix

“The sale of one commercial launch by a United States company is equivalent to the import of ten thousand Toyotas.”

–Congressman Bill Nelson

Like a phoenix, Centaur was reborn in the 1980s and would remain a dependable an

important upper stage launch vehicle into the new millennium. The source of this rebirt

came from the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles. Just as it had survived the en

of the Surveyor program in the 1960s and at the cancellation of the expendable launch vehicl

program at the end of the 1970s, Atlas-Centaur emerged once again after the loss o

Challenger. The impetus came this time from the communications satellite industry and th

military. 

In hindsight, it appears that NASA’s decision in the 1970s to phase out all expendabl

launch vehicles in favor of the Shuttle was seriously flawed. This decision made it easier fo

Arianespace, a corporation backed by a consortium of European governments, to break th

monopoly over space transportation that NASA had enjoyed since the 1960s. In the earl

1980s, Arianespace became NASA’s competitor for commercial satellite business, and othe

countries like China, Russia, and Japan followed somewhat later. The Europeans correctl

predicted that this market would grow in the 1980s and 1990s and that the Shuttle would no

be able to keep up with the demands of this market.1 Ariane had a competitive edge. Becaus

the new Arianespace launch facilities in Kourou, French Guyana, were closer to the equato

Ariane required a shorter trajectory to reach orbit than rockets launched from Cape Canavera

Moreover, unlike launch facilities at Cape Canaveral, which had been allowed to deteriorate i

anticipation of closing down expendable launch vehicle production, they were new an

designed to serve the customer. 

The reusable Shuttle was originally pitched to Congress as more economical than expend

able launch vehicles. By flying the Shuttle often, it was thought that the cost per launch woul

Like a Phoenix 22

1 See Andrew J. Butrica, ed., Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (NASA SP-4217, 1997), especial

Lorenza Sebesta, “U.S.-European Relations and the Decision to Build Ariane, the European Launch Vehicle,” 137–156. See al

Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Energizing the Space Launch Industry,” Issues in Science and Technology 6 (Winter 1989–1990): 77–83
be significantly lower than that of an expendable launch vehicle that is used only once

Shuttle, however, proved to be vastly more expensive than predicted and capable of far 

flights per year. Moreover, a two-stage expendable rocket like Atlas-Centaur (or Aria

vastly more efficient than the Shuttle because it can carry a satellite directly to a geosyn

nous transfer orbit. After separation, the satellite motor pushes it a relatively short distan

the desired geosynchronous orbit, where it moves at the same speed as the rotating Eart

contrast, because the Shuttle is limited to low-Earth orbit (about 200 miles from Ear

satellite launched from the Shuttle bay needs to use more of its own fuel to reach orbit

shortening its life as a communications relay.

Despite these significant drawbacks, NASA had pressed forward with its plans to mak

Shuttle the country’s only space transportation system. All three expendable launch v

manufacturers were in the process of closing down production. Termination of the A

Centaur program was forestalled in 1980 when Intelsat, concerned over delays in Sh

development, insisted on being able to use Atlas-Centaur for at least four more laun

Advocates of Atlas-Centaur urged NASA to articulate a formal policy stating that it was 

national interest to allow expendable rockets to coexist with the Space Shuttle.3 In the 

1980s, the Reagan administration took the first tentative steps toward the commercializ

of expendable launch vehicles by setting up an Office of Commercial Space Transport

However, expendable launch vehicle manufacturers found it impossible to compete again

highly subsidized Shuttle and the European Ariane rocket until the loss of Challenger pr

tated a change in national space policy. 

Global Communications Satellites: Intelsat, Comstar, FLTSATCOM 

Although science fiction writer and visionary Arthur C. Clarke had imagined an im

tant role for communications satellites as early as 1945, he had tempered this vision by c

attention to a technical hurdle that many thought might scuttle the dream of an artificial 

lite communications system—the lack of a rocket powerful enough to launch a satellite 

geosynchronous orbit.4 Despite his grand hopes for satellite communications, he thou

would be many decades before the world would have a rocket with sufficient power to 

the bonds of gravity. Twelve years later, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, pushin

United States to develop a new satellite communications industry that would dominate 

the next century. 

222 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

2 “Report of the Atlas/Centaur Review Board,” February 1981, NASA Glenn Records.

3 Ibid.

4 Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?” Wireless World (O

1945): 305.
The commercial satellite industry came into being when Congress passed th

Communications Satellite Act in 1962 and created the quasi-commercial America

Communications Satellite Corporation, or Comsat.5 Several large American telecommunica

tions companies such as AT&T equally owned Comsat, the corporate entity that managed th

emerging global satellite system for the International Telecommunications Satellit

Organization (Intelsat), organized in 1964. The system was designed to carry voice, telegraph

data, facsimile, and television transmissions. Although Intelsat was an international organiza

tion, it was heavily weighted to favor American interests. 

Date Mission Vehicle Payload Weight to Result

Synchronous Orbit*

25 Jan. 1971 Intelsat IV AC-25 1,600 lbs Success

19 Dec. 1971 Intelsat IV AC-26 1,600 lbs Success

22 Jan. 1972 Intelsat IV AC-28 1,600 lbs Success

13 June 1972 Intelsat IV AC-29 1,600 lbs Success

23 Aug. 1973 Intelsat IV AC-31 1,600 lbs Success

21 Nov. 1974 Intelsat IV AC-32 1,600 lbs Success

20 Feb. 1975 Intelsat IV AC-33 1,600 lbs Failed—Atlas 

22 May 1975 Intelsat IV AC-35 1,600 lbs Success

25 Sept. 1975 Intelsat IVA AC-36 1,820 lbs Success

29 Jan. 1976 Intelsat IVA AC-37 1,820 lbs Success

13 May 1976 Comstar I AC-38 1,787 lbs Success

22 July 1976 Comstar I AC-40 1,787 lbs Success

26 May 1977 Intelsat IVA AC-39 1,820 lbs Success

29 Sept. 1977 Intelsat IVA AC-43 1,820 lbs Failed—Atlas

6 Jan. 1978 Intelsat IVA AC-46 1,820 lbs Success

9 Feb. 1978 FLTSATCOM F1 AC-44 2,250 lbs Success

31 Mar. 1978 Intelsat IVA AC-48 1,820 lbs Success

29 June 1978 Comstar I AC-41 1,787 lbs Success

4 May 1979 FLTSATCOM F2 AC-47 2,250 lbs Success

17 Jan. 1980 FLTSATCOM F3 AC-49 2,250 lbs Success

30 Oct. 1980 FLTSATCOM F4 AC-57 2,250 lbs Success

6 Dec. 1980 Intelsat V AC-54 2,280 lbs Success

21 Feb. 1981 Comstar I AC-42 1,787 lbs Success

15 Dec. 1981 Intelsat V AC-55 2,280 lbs Success

23 May 1981 Intelsat V AC-56 2,280 lbs Success

6 Aug. 1981 FLTSATCOM F5 AC-59 2,250 lbs Failed

4 Mar. 1982 Intelsat V AC-58 2,280 lbs Success

28 Sept. 1982 Intelsat V AC-60 2,280 lbs Success

19 May 1983 Intelsat V AC-61 2,280 lbs Success

9 June 1984 Intelsat V AC-62 2,280 lbs Failed—Centau

Like a Phoenix 22

5 Public Law 87-624, 31 August 1962, as found in Exploring the Unknown, Volume III, ed. John Logsdon (NASA SP-440

1998), 77. See also Hugh R. Slotten, “Satellite Communications, Globalization, and the Cold War,” Technology and Culture 4

(2002): 315–350.
Date Mission Vehicle Payload Weight to Result

Synchronous Orbit*

22 Mar. 1985 Intelsat VA AC-63 2,420 lbs Success

29 June 1985 Intelsat VA AC-64 2,420 lbs Success

28 Sept. 1985 Intelsat VA AC-65 2,420 lbs Success

4 Dec. 1986 FLTSATCOM F7 AC-66 2,700 lbs Success

26 Mar. 1987 FLTSATCOM F6 AC-67 2,250 lbs Failed—ligh

25 Sept. 1989 FLTSATCOM F8 AC-68 2,700 lbs Success

*The actual weight carried by Centaur to transfer orbit was approximately double these numbers.

Because of the rapid development of satellite technology, communications satellites n

to be redesigned every four to five years.6 The Delta rocket, manufactured by the Do

Aircraft Corporation, launched the Intelsat satellites of the 1960s. However, as satellites incr

in weight from 85 pounds to 330 pounds, they reached the limits of Delta’s ability to lift 

The jump from Intelsat III to IV was a dramatic fivefold increase in weight from 330 poun

1,600 pounds sent to geosynchronous orbit. Centaur was the only upper stage available 

this fourth generation of Intelsat satellites in 1971. By 1985, Atlas-Centaur had laun

twenty-four Intelsat satellites with only three failures.

Driven by the popularity of telecommunications, the demand for satellites continu

grow. The weight of the next generation of satellites, Intelsat IVA, increased to 1,820 po

with a communications capability twice that of its predecessor. This new Intelsat was laun

by an upgraded Atlas-Centaur D-1AR. The new features of Centaur, the result of know

gained from the Titan-Centaur missions, included a computer-controlled vent and pressuriz

system to control tank pressures, new six-pound thrust attitude control engines, and a redu

hydrogen peroxide supply. The payload fairing was redesigned to accommodate the length

Intelsat IVA.7 Both the upgraded Centaur and the new Intelsat worked flawlessly. The next 

Intelsat V, developed by the Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation, promis

even greater capacity for global communications because of its improved relay capacity.8

The commercial success of Intelsat spurred the development of a series of four comm

satellites called Comstar, also launched between 1976 and 1981 on Atlas-Centaur. Rough

same size and design as the Intelsat IV, Comstar satellites had a longer life because of mor

cient solar cells.9 Comsat General, a subsidiary of the Comsat Corporation, owned the Co

224 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

6 Martin, “Intelsat V,” Communication Satellites, 62.

7 Launch Vehicles Directorate, Lewis Research Center, “AC-36 Flight Data Report,” March 1976, Glenn Research Cen

Flight Reports and Historical Data AC-33 to AC-41, Division Atlas/Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

8 For more information on the Intelsat V launches, see “Flight Reports” from Launch Vehicles Division, NASA GRC R

9 See “Flight Reports and Historical Data AC-33 to AC-41” and “Flight Reports AC-42 to AC-49,” Division Atlas/C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records.
satellites. Comsat leased the satellites to AT&T; this meant that GTE Satellite Corporatio

(GSAT), a subsidiary of General Telephone and Electronics, could also use them as a rela

between their networks of ground stations. AT&T had ground stations in New York, Chicago

San Francisco, and Atlanta, while GSAT served Tampa, Los Angeles, and Hawaii. Comsta

provided increased long-distance service in the United States without increasing the number o

telephone poles, overhead wires, or microwave towers.10

The military also depended on Atlas-Centaur to deliver heavy satellites to orbit. A serie

of eight satellites, the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system, designed an

built by TRW Systems, served the space communications network of the Navy, the Air Force

and the Department of Defense.11 It enabled ships, aircraft, submarines, and ground station

to communicate effectively with each other. 

Cost benefits to NASA were significant. Because national policy precluded satellit

companies from contracting directly with the launch vehicle manufacturers for launch service

NASA, which owned the vehicles, could charge the makers of commercial satellites for the us

of its vehicles, launch facilities, and services. In 1970, the cost of an Atlas-Centaur launch wa

fourteen million dollars.12 By 1980, the cost of launching one Comstar satellite had climbe

to over twenty-three million dollars. Only about half of this amount came from the launc

vehicle hardware. These hardware costs included $4,368,502 for the Centaur stage, $777,05

for the Centaur engines, $2,114,065 for Atlas-Centaur hardware support, $2,563,133 for th

Atlas airframe, $1,156,481 for the Atlas engines, $460,701 for guidance hardware, $675,17

for computer hardware, and $305,597 for government-furnished property and services. Th

other half came from various government support services, including $2,802,724 for contrac

launch services, $3,852,491 for contract support services, $556,816 for miscellaneou

program support, $151,671 for DOD contract administration, $1,519,000 for Air Force rang

support, $785,322 for NASA project management and engineering, $973,028 for Agenc

overhead, and $615,000 for use charges.13 Often it would take NASA up to three years to bi

companies for these additional costs. NASA anticipated that it could use revenues from sate

lite launches to help offset the enormous costs of a Shuttle launch, once all satellite launche

were transferred from expendable launch vehicles to the Shuttle. 

Like a Phoenix 22

10 “Launch Mission Summary Comstar D-3 AC-41,” 29 June 1978, Box FLTSATCOM 1978–1983, Division STED, NAS

GRC Records.

11 For more information on the FLTSATCOM launches, see “Flight Reports and Historical Data,” NASA GRC Records.

12 Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 111.

13 Charles J. Tiede to Chief, Launch Vehicles Division, “Final Government Costs for the Third Comstar I Launch,” 9 April 198

Box FLTSATCOM 1978–1983, Division STED, NASA GRC Records.
Old Centaur, New Ariane

The early 1980s proved to be an extraordinarily demanding time for Atlas-Ce

managers as they juggled the competing demands of industry, military, and comm

launches. For example, Lewis engineer James Patterson wrote to NASA Headquarters, 

will note that the Comstar vehicle could be launched 5 February 1981 from Pad A o

Intelsat would be willing to slip their AC-55 launch from 26 February to 5 March 1980

their AC-58 launch from 8 May to 4 June 1981. The new proposed schedule also take

account the Navy’s request to move up the AC-57 FLTSATCOM launch from 13 Nove

to 28 October 1980.”14

Despite this heavy use of Atlas-Centaur, Lewis Research Center began to prepare fo

termination of all engineering activities associated with its management in anticipation 

Shuttle’s taking over its payloads. Termination of the program was forestalled when In

concerned over delays in Shuttle development, insisted on being able to contract with Ge

Dynamics for four additional Centaurs to be launched prior to 1984. At the same 

NASA, recognizing the limitations of the Shuttle, began to consider using Centaur as an 

stage for the Shuttle (as discussed previously). 

This small glimmer of hope in the otherwise gloomy outlook for the Launch Ve

Division at Lewis permitted Centaur supporters to mount a campaign to keep Atlas-Ce

alive. NASA permitted an Atlas-Centaur Review Board to be convened at Lewis Res

Center in October 1980. The blue ribbon committee was composed of representatives 

Goddard, Langley, JPL, and the Air Force Space Division. Two significant individuals i

history of Centaur, retired Lewis Center Director Bruce Lundin and former Deputy Ass

Administrator for Space Science Vincent Johnson, were called out of retirement to serve 

chairs. The final report of the committee, submitted February 1981, strongly recomme

that Atlas-Centaur be continued as a program into the foreseeable future.15

The board emphasized the reliability of Centaur and the soundness of Lewis’s ma

ment of the program over a period of nearly two decades. The “technical penetration” of 

staff included supervision of both General Dynamics, the vehicle’s integrating contracto

associate contractors Honeywell, Teledyne, and Pratt & Whitney. The report recomme

against allowing the associate contractors to report to General Dynamics directly be

involvement of the Lewis project staff was invaluable: “This supplies both a ‘corp

memory’ and person-to-person familiarity with their counterparts among contracto

Despite the decade-long threat that the program would be phased out, morale at Lewi

226 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

14 James E. Patterson to NASA Headquarters, “AC-42 Launch Schedule,” 5 March 1980, Box FLTSATCOM 1978

Division STED, NASA GRC Records.

15 Report of the Atlas/Centaur Review Board, February 1981, 1, Box 10, NASA GRC Records.

16 Ibid., 5, Box 10, NASA GRC Records.
among the industry contractors remained high. They were “a true government-industry team

that “supports, stimulates, and challenges the other to produce a whole that [was] greater tha

the sum of the parts.”17 However, the board warned that Centaur reliability could be affecte

by a decrease in personnel assigned to Centaur and other cost-cutting measures. It was espe

cially important to keep Lewis Research Center in the picture because of its expertise i

software design and verification—an area that General Dynamics had been unable to sta

adequately because of imminent phase-out. Another reason was the significant Lewis Researc

Center role in postflight analysis. Because of their long-term involvement, Lewis engineers ha

become particularly skilled at uncovering subtle anomalies in test data. 

However, there were also significant drawbacks to keeping Atlas-Centaur flying. Th

board criticized Lewis management for casualness born of familiarity that was evident i

preflight checkout. Another shortcoming of the Launch Vehicles Division was its adversaria

relationship with Headquarters, a result of the protracted struggle to keep the program from

being terminated. The report noted the loss of skilled people both at Lewis and among th

contractors. At General Dynamics, the welding of pressure-stabilized tanks for both Atlas an

Centaur was a highly specialized skill that few technicians possessed. The same was true of th

special expertise needed to manufacture nose fairings and insulation panels. Investigatio

revealed that an increasing number of “workmanship discrepancies” had occurred since 1978

possibly due to the perception of the pending discontinuation of the program. At Honeywel

technical know-how had declined, along with the reliability of worn-out test equipment. I

response to this criticism, the head of the Lewis Launch Vehicles Division wrote, “This situa

tion demonstrates the classical dilemma of a program limping along on small size ‘buys.’ A

this rate our 1960 vintage test equipment will be seeing action cum bailing wire until it die

of exhaustion!”18

Even more worrisome was the loss of Pratt & Whitney’s expertise in hydrogen/oxyge

technology. Staffing at the company had dropped from a level of about 150 engineers in 196

to just 9. By 1982, the company expected to have only three engineers assigned to the RL1

engine. The technical know-how involved in fabricating thrust chambers, understanding th

design and performance margins of the engine, predicting the behavior of cryogenic prope

lants for cooling thrust chambers, and manufacturing turbopump bearings and injectors coul

never be replaced.19 Another area of concern was the anticipated retirement of long-time super

visors, technicians, and inspectors at the Eastern Space and Missiles Center at Cape Canavera

The ground-support infrastructure had been allowed to deteriorate, with worn-out equipmen

Like a Phoenix 22

17 Ibid., 1, Box 10, NASA GRC Records.

18 Memo from Larry Ross, Director of Space, to Center Director John F. McCarthy, Jr., 4 June 1981, Box 10, NASA GR

Records.

19 Report of the Atlas/Centaur Review Board, February 1981, 14, NASA GRC Records.
being repaired instead of replaced. The board recommended that NASA adopt a more fl

system of personnel management that would allow staff to be shifted between the Shuttl

expendable launch vehicle operations. NASA was urged to articulate a formal policy s

that it was in the national interest to allow expendable rockets to coexist with the 

Shuttle, with specific reference to the Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle as a “necessary eleme

the U.S. Space Transportation System into the indefinite future.”20

It must have come as a relief to the Launch Vehicles Division that a proposed redu

of the number of engineers from 123 to 65 might be averted. In his formal response, 

Ross, Director of the Space Division, outlined steps for implementing the report recom

dations. He believed that most of the division’s shortcomings noted in the report reflec

“going-out-of-business” mindset.21 Predictions of the “last launch” throughout the pre

decade had always proved to be mistaken. Although the future of Centaur remained in l

he recommended that the Launch Vehicles Division go resolutely forward with plannin

future launches. 

During the same decade that Atlas-Centaur was “limping along” on outdated rocket 

nology, a brand-new rocket was being developed by a consortium of European coun

Motivation for financing the building of Ariane differed from country to country; fo

French, it was a political decision driven by French nationalism. France contributed abo

percent of the development costs and wanted to be able to launch its own military sat

independently of the United States. The fact that Ariane proved to be an outstanding com

cial success came unexpectedly as a result of NASA’s policy blunders.22

Ariane, comparable to Atlas-Centaur in power and cost per launch, also had a cryo

upper stage. The development of this stage appears to have proved both difficult and co

versial, since the United States regarded cryogenic know-how as an issue of national secu

Despite NASA’s skepticism that the Europeans were capable of developing a launch 

nology, the European Space Agency pressed forward with development of the new la

vehicle. When Intelsat purchased a ride for an Intelsat V satellite on Ariane in 1978, i

hailed by the Europeans as a signal “that Europe, notwithstanding the threat of the Sh

228 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

20 Ibid., 2.

21 Memo from Larry Ross, Director of Space, to Center Director John F. McCarthy, Jr., 4 June 1981, Box 10, NASA 

Records.

22 John Krige, “The Decision Taken in the Early 1970s To Develop an Expendable European Heavy Satellite Launche

History of the European Space Agency, 1958–1987, vol. 2 (ESA SP-1235, April 2000), 389–421.

23 See references in Krige, 413, 421, and L. Sebesta, “The Availability of American Launchers and Europe’s Decision ‘T

Alone,’” History of ESA, vol. 2, 437.
was now perceived as having a viable, alternative launch service which was going to be compet

itive on the international launcher market.”24

The Contradictions of Shuttle Policy 

Although President Reagan announced in 1982 that the government would no longe

order Titan, Atlas, or Delta launch vehicles, his administration began to work behind th

scenes to prepare legislation to commercialize the American expendable launch vehicl

industry. An advocate of laissez-faire economics, Reagan championed competition and ma

have believed that, once liberated from its dependence on government contracting, th

expendable launch vehicle industry would be able to win commercial satellite business. Th

President’s Commercial Launch Directive (NSDD 94) set up a new Office of Commercia

Space Transportation within the Department of Transportation. Secretary of Transportatio

Elizabeth Dole organized the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committe

(COMSTAC) to facilitate communication between the industry and her new office.

COMSTAC included representatives of the big three launch vehicle manufacturers—Marti

Marietta, General Dynamics, and McDonnell Douglas—and about a dozen startup companie

seeking to get into the business of small expendable launch vehicles, the one market not serve

by the Shuttle. The charge to COMSTAC was to assist the government in drawing up th

Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984.26

The Space Systems Division at General Dynamics now began to take the first tentativ

steps toward commercialization. In July 1981, Alan Lovelace, who had served as actin

Administrator for NASA during the Carter administration, had become Corporate Vice-pres

ident and General Manager of the Space Systems Division. He had great credibility within th

aerospace community because of the many years he had spent as head of the Materia

Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D for the A

Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base, and then Deputy Assistant Secretary fo

R&D at the Pentagon. Lovelace recalled that as acting Administrator of NASA, he ha

strongly believed the Shuttle capable of handling all of NASA’s missions, and in this role, h

was responsible for informing Lewis Research Center of the imminent cancellation of NASA

Expendable Launch Vehicle Programs. 

After he joined General Dynamics, however, Lovelace began to see new opportunities fo

commercial launch vehicles. In his view, NASA’s monopoly of launch services had created 

“business of arrogance.” A commercial launch service offered customers more control ove

Like a Phoenix 22

24 J. Krige, “The Move from Ariane Development of Production and the Establishment of Arianespace,” History of ESA, vol. 

472. 

25 John M. Logsdon and Craig Reed, “Commercializing Space Transportation,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, Accessin

Space (NASA SP-4407, 1999), 411. 

26 For an insightful account of the entrepreneurial activity stimulated by the new legislation, see Bromberg, 114–131.
their payloads. He strongly believed that if General Dynamics were allowed to sell a la

service directly to the customer, it could manage indirect overhead and become compe

with Ariane.27 Standing in the way of commercialization was a government contracting 

ronment that stifled initiative. In his view, “the cost-plus mentality had to go.”28

A 1982 General Dynamics study determined that the company could anticipa

expanding market for commercial rockets. Liberated from dependency on govern

contracts, the company looked forward to exerting greater control over marketing, design

production. The study speculated that Atlas-Centaur had the potential to tap 90 perce

this market by upgrading Centaur to reduce costs and increase performance. Systems pro

for modernization included the Centaur avionics, nose fairing, and hydraulics system

Atlas vernier propulsion system was to be replaced with a simple hydrazine roll control m

mounted in the Interstage Adapter between Atlas and Centaur. This change would reduc

and improve reliability.29

In anticipation of commercialization, General Dynamics formed a new commercial 

called CommSpace in March 1983 to market the projected $10-billion international com

cial satellite industry. The company promoted the new commercial launch service as a ba

launch capability for the Space Shuttle—a capability for which the government would 

no additional costs. General Dynamics offered to assume the risk of a failed launch. It w

maintain existing launch facilities in danger of becoming obsolete. The company antici

that the new commercial initiative would contribute significantly to the U.S. economy.

One of the prime considerations in the move toward commercialization was the possi

of realizing the economies of scale inherent in continuous production. NASA’s procurem

Centaur rockets one or two at a time since the end of the Surveyor program had made it 

cult to maintain manufacturing expertise.30 For example, because welding the Atla

Centaur tanks was highly skilled labor, it took at least three months to get welders retr

after a layoff. Training new workers in the field of electronics was an even greater prob

Quality suffered when well-trained engineers and production workers were spirited aw

companies with better long-term prospects.

230 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

27 Interview with Alan Lovelace by Virginia Dawson, 19 July 2002. 

28 Ibid. 

29 D. E. Charhut and J. E. Niesley, “The Commercial Centaur Family,” paper to 34th Congress of the International Astro

Federation, IAA-83-233, 10–15 October 1983. See also W. F. Rector III and D. E. Charhut, “The Commercial Centaur F

Convair Division, General Dynamics Corp., 1983; M. C. Simon and O. Steinbronn, “The Economics of Space Develop

General Dynamics, 1984, Box 57, NASA GRC Records.

30 In the decade of the 1970s, there were only two large contracts: one for nine Centaur stages, dated 24 September 19

one for eight stages, dated 8 September 1976. See NASA Historical Data Book, vol. III (NASA SP-4012, 1988), 25–26.

31 Interview with Stanley Chamberlain by Virginia Dawson, 7 June 2000.
Although the Reagan administration encouraged commercialization in principle, manu

facturers of expendable launch vehicles were effectively shut out of the market by the heavil

subsidized price of a Shuttle launch once the Shuttle became operational in 1982. As histo

rians John M. Logsdon and Craig Reed have noted, “The reality was that the United State

during the 1983–85 period was pursuing two policy goals that were clearly inconsistent.”

Commercialization was not possible as long as artificially low Shuttle pricing made it impos

sible for the expendable launch vehicle manufacturers to compete for satellite business. 

NASA demonstrated formal compliance with the 1984 Commercial Launch Directive b

issuing a request for proposals for commercializing Delta and Atlas-Centaur. Initial agreement

with Transpace Carriers (which marketed Thor-Delta for McDonnell Douglas) and Genera

Dynamics were reached in December 1983. They were to go into effect for Delta in 1986 an

for Atlas-Centaur in 1987. Also, in September 1984, NASA set up an Office of Commercia

Programs focused largely on selling Delta launch services. The budget of this office for its firs

year was a mere $17.1 million, about 0.2 percent of NASA’s total budget.33

In the policy debates over the implementation of the 1984 Space Commercialization Ac

members of Congress and representatives of the expendable launch vehicle industry argue

that Shuttle pricing should at least approximate actual costs. NASA resisted with the rational

that a low Shuttle price was needed to remain competitive with Ariane, which was subsidize

by the European governments. The price question pitted the Department of Transportation

which represented the manufacturers of expendable launch vehicles, against both NASA an

the satellite makers, who wanted space transportation offered at the lowest possible cos

Cleveland’s local paper, the Plain Dealer, chided NASA for paying lip-service to space commer

cialization while working behind the scenes to maintain its monopoly. Since the governmen

contributed between half and three-quarters of the actual cost of a commercial Shuttle launch

expendable launch vehicles could not compete with the Shuttle.34 As the Wall Street Journa

reported in March 1985, “The shuttle price question has turned into a noisy bureaucratic tria

of strength between NASA and the Transportation Department, and will, in the end, b

decided by President Reagan himself.”35 Rudolph Penner, Director of the Congressiona

Budget Office, predicted that pricing would determine “what gets done in space, how it 

Like a Phoenix 23

32 Logsdon and Reed, “Commercializing Space Transportation,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, 412. 

33 Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry, 122.

34 Patrick Cox, “What Price the Shuttle?” Plain Dealer 3 (February 1985): Section B, 1.

35 Arlen J. Large, “Price Policy on Space Shuttle’s Commercial Use Could Launch—or Ground—NASA’s Rockets,” Wall Stre

Journal (21 March 1985): 54.
done and the fate of competing means of space transportation.”36 Ariane had a growing m

share, and Roland Deschamps, Secretary General of Arianespace, could gloat: “The big 

of NASA was to abandon the expendable launch vehicles to private companies and to com

with them through Shuttle.”37

At the same time, the Department of Defense questioned NASA’s insistence th

payloads, both civil and military, be sent aloft on the Shuttle. Concerned that a Shuttle f

might delay sensitive military payloads, the Air Force insisted on keeping at least one ex

able launch vehicle manufacturer in business.38 During congressional hearings, Adminis

James Beggs resisted the Air Force initiative, arguing that expendable launch vehicles 

obsolete and that support of the expendable launch vehicle industry would undermin

cost-effectiveness of the Shuttle. In the spring of 1984, an Air Force contract for ten upg

Titan IV rockets was the first indication that at least the Martin Marietta rocket bu

might survive.39

For General Dynamics, the future was more problematic. Prior to 1984, Centaur had en

its most successful record of launches—an impressive string of twenty-eight in a row with

failure. The magic was broken when the first flight of an improved Atlas G (AC-62, 81 i

longer than the previous Atlas), mated to an upgraded Centaur vehicle, failed.40 The failure 

tigation kept the next three Atlas-Centaur launches on hold. Investigations completed in A

1985 concluded that the failure was caused by a liquid-oxygen leak through a 4-inch crack 

intermediate bulkhead, which occurred during Centaur’s separation from the booster.4

company could ill afford this interruption in service because, by this time, Ariane had gain

impressive 30 percent of the world market for satellite launchers.42

232 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

36 Ibid.

37 “NASA Does Not Admit Its Error in Putting All Eggs on Shuttle,” Interspace: The European Satellite & Space News (11 January 1

38 The role of the Air Force is discussed by Craig Reed in “Factors Affecting U.S. Commercial Space Launch I

Competitiveness,” Business and Economic History 27 (1998): 229; Ragsdale, 150. 

39 See discussion by Joan Lisa Bromberg, 131–132. See also previous note. (The Air Force ordered another twenty-five T

vehicles at a total cost of more than $4 billion after the Challenger accident.) 

40 Mary Ann Peto and Roland Raab, “Stretched Atlas-Centaur Will Boost Payload Capacity,” 3 May 1984, NASA H

Reference Collection, Washington, DC. Improvements to the new “silver-throated Centaur” included a pressure-fed sy

replace the boost pumps, a new hydrazine attitude-control rocket system, and silver plating on the interior of the rocke

throat to increase thrust. The result was an extremely powerful unpiloted vehicle with the capability of placing an ex

pounds into geosynchronous orbit.

41 General Dynamics, “Atlas-Centaur AC-62 Failure Investigation Interim Report,” Report No. GDC-SP-84-045, No

1984, Box AC-62 Failure Investigation, Division Atlas-Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records; General Dynamics

Centaur AC-62 Failure Investigation Final Report,” Report No. GDC-SP-85-018, August 1985, Box AC-62 

Investigation, Division Atlas-Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

42 J. Krige, “The Move from Ariane Development of Production and the Establishment of Arianespace,” History 

vol. 2, 481.
A suit by Transpace Carriers, Inc. (which marketed Delta for McDonnell Douglas

claimed that Arianespace was unfairly and illegally engaging in “predatory pricing” of launc

services. This attack on Ariane pricing was indirectly an attack on Shuttle pricing, since bot

were heavily government-subsidized. Even after raising the price of a Shuttle launch from $3

million to $71 million, this price was still far below the actual cost of a launch. “U.S. pricin

policy on launchers in 1984/5,” historian John Krige wrote, “was thus torn between the funda

mental contradiction of trying to protect the Shuttle from Ariane while encouraging privat

industry to develop a viable commercial ELV service in parallel.”43

After Challenger

The Challenger disaster in January 1986 precipitated a complete reversal of Shuttle polic

and opened the way for the development of a viable expendable launch vehicle industry in th

United States. In December 1986, President Reagan issued National Security Decisio

Directive 254, stipulating that NASA would no longer launch satellites for private companie

or foreign governments, except those that required a human presence in space or involve

national security. This decision took the Shuttle out of competition with expendable launc

vehicles for revenue-generating business. 

Analysis of the Shuttle’s manifest after the loss of Challenger showed that of a total of 18

payloads scheduled for launch between 1986 and 1989, 103 were appropriate to be flown o

expendable launch vehicles. Lee R. Scherer, director of the commercial space systems divisio

for General Dynamics, pointed out that the Shuttle pricing policy had precipitated the closin

down of the production lines for Delta, Atlas-Centaur, and Titan 34D rockets. Now the hiatu

in Shuttle flights left commercial satellite customers with only one option—the Ariane rocke

He concluded that the Challenger tragedy had created many uncertainties, but one thing wa

clear: “Our country must never again allow itself to get into the current posture where we hav

been completely dependent on a single form of space transportation.”44

NASA’s Mixed Fleet Study, completed in May 1987, complemented the new policy. 

emphasized that in addition to the Shuttle, the nation needed expendable launch vehicles o

different sizes and capabilities. Richard Truly, Associate Administrator for Space Fligh

parceled out the management of NASA’s expendable launch vehicles among NASA Center

Lewis Research Center received the management of intermediate- and large-class expendabl

launch vehicles, namely Atlas-Centaur and Titan-Centaur. Goddard took over the manage

ment of small- and medium-class expendables, such as the Delta vehicle, as well as payloa

Like a Phoenix 23

43 J. Krige, 483.

44 L. R. Scherer, “Expendable Launch Vehicles as a Complement to the Space Shuttle,” paper presented to the AIA

Communications Satellite Systems Conference, March 1986. See also Keith Mordoff, “ELV Makers Gear for Productio

Restart,” Commercial Space (Spring 1986): 44–47 
processing at Wallops Flight Facility. Kennedy Space Center was assigned the assessme

expendable launch vehicle processing and launch countdown for launches involving NA

The Challenger disaster not only changed NASA policy, but also raised questions 

NASA’s managerial competence. While the problems related to the Challenger tragedy rec

wide media coverage, there were Agency concerns for NASA’s management of expen

launch vehicles. An Atlas-Centaur carrying a FLTSATCOM was struck by lightning du

driving rainstorm on 26 March 1987. Forty-eight seconds into launch, the Centaur com

ordered an incorrect yaw steering command that caused the rocket and its payload to ex

50 seconds later. This failure in the wake of Challenger precipitated a congressional inve

tion. NASA revealed that the lightning strike had caused the computer to issue an erro

command.46 But the failure involved more than just the weather. The Centaur team at 

Research Center was reprimanded for work practices that exhibited “inadequate empha

procedural rigor and discipline.”47 The Centaur team admitted that the obvious indicati

a lightning hazard “escaped the launch management team because of imprecise commu

tions, lack of awareness, or both.”48 Just six months before this accident, another NASA r

board had questioned procedures for making decisions that related to weather at 

Canaveral.49 Had the recommendations from this report been followed, NASA would 

waited for better weather to launch AC-67. Political cartoons satirized NASA weather 

casting, and one caption stated that even Ben Franklin would not have flown his kite d

such lightning conditions. An editorial in Aviation Week & Space Technology described th

67 accident in the context of the previous year’s Challenger tragedy. The editor wond

“What other time bombs are ticking away in the agency’s hidebound management stru

that need to be rooted out to prevent further loss of life, limb, and property?”50

The answer came four months later. During preparation for the last scheduled N

launch of an Atlas-Centaur, a workstand bounced against the empty but pressurized hyd

tank. It sliced a gash in the side of the tank, causing the vessel to rip violently apart. S

234 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

45 “Field Center Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Roles, Responsibilities, and Organizational Structure,” 17 Decembe

Box 57, NASA GRC Records.

46 General Dynamics, “Atlas-Centaur Postflight Analysis AC-67,” Report No. GDSS-SP-87-011, July 198

“Determination, Findings, Observations, and Recommendations,” report given before Congress, 30 June 1987, Box 

Failure Investigation, Division 6500 John Gibb, NASA GRC Records. 

47 “Atlas-Centaur 68 Investigation Board Report on the 13 July 1987 Centaur Liquid Hydrogen Tank Mishap,” Box 

Division Atlas-Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records.

48 Ibid. 

49 Craig Covault, “Atlas Accident Inquiry Board Finds Violation of Launch Commit Criteria,” Aviation Week & Space Tec

(16 May 1987): 25.

50 “Atlas Launch Follies,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (18 May 1987): 11.
workers sustained minor injuries. Investigation revealed a lack of discipline on the part of th

workers at Cape Canaveral, again attributed to poor NASA management.51

NASA was also criticized for the inefficiency of payload processing at the Cape and fo

allowing the launch infrastructure to deteriorate. Investigation revealed that about half of th

seventy-seven expendable launch vehicle payloads launched between January 1977 an

February 1988 had experienced delays of an average of two weeks. Sixty-five percent of th

delays were caused by payload or launch vehicle problems, with nearly 30 percent of th

payloads requiring a storage period.52 It took longer to process vehicles for launch because th

Air Force controlled the launch pads, while the ground-support equipment, including missio

control and the tracking stations, were NASA’s responsibility. The expendable launch vehicl

manufacturers and their satellite customers had to contend with NASA rules, practices, an

priorities, as well as those of the Air Force. Arianespace had the advantage of a streamline

launch facility without any kind of government oversight.

To address these and other problems, the Air Force drew up a Model Range Use Agreemen

and sought ways to keep the expendable launch vehicle manufacturers in business. In 1984, t

ensure that the military had access to space, the Air Force had contracted with Martin Mariett

for the ten Titan IV boosters. After Challenger, the Air Force increased this order to twenty-thre

vehicles at a cost of $5.1 billion. Secretary of the Air Force Edward (Pete) Aldridge wanted to en

Air Force dependency on NASA by creating a robust commercial industry. The new contrac

permitted Martin Marietta to market a commercial version of Titan III to ten satellite customer

In the spring of 1987, the Air Force contracted with McDonnell Douglas for eleven Delta I

medium launch vehicles with an option for twenty additional vehicles. At this point, of the thre

established manufacturers in the expendable launch vehicle business, only General Dynamic

lacked a significant new contract with the Air Force.53

Despite the loss of the medium launch vehicle competition to McDonnell Douglas, Ala

Lovelace forged ahead with a major financial commitment to commercialization. The cance

lation of Shuttle/Centaur after Challenger left General Dynamics with a cadre of experience

Centaur people to initiate the commercialization effort.54 Lovelace convinced the company

board of directors to finance the manufacture of eighteen Atlas-Centaur vehicles before the

actually had orders for them. The company granted the Space Systems Division $125 millio

to start up the assembly line. 

Like a Phoenix 23

51 “Atlas-Centaur 68 Investigation Board Report on the 13 July 1987 Centaur Liquid Hydrogen Tank Mishap,” Box AC-6

Division Atlas-Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

52 Creighton A. Terhune and Shirley P. Green, “Payload Processing Study for ELV Launches,” paper presented at the 26th Spa

Congress, 1989, AEDC Tech Library, Arnold AFB, TN. 

53 Ramon L. Lopez and Greg Waskul, “New Life for Expendable Launchers,” Space Markets (Spring 1987): 4.

54 Interview with Marty Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
In the fall of 1986, an Air Force Request for Proposal for twelve medium launch ve

once more pitted the three major expendable launch vehicle manufacturers, McDo

Douglas, Martin Marietta, and General Dynamics, against each other. The competitio

this Air Force contract created a make-or-break situation for General Dynamics. The se

Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV II) contract would give an edge to the winner over its com

tors because the military order would allow the company to leverage the Air Force co

against the startup costs of commercial production.55 At this time, at the urging of th

Force, General Dynamics dropped the name Centaur when referring to its commercial ve

In May 1988, Lovelace, who presided over the American Institute of Aeronautic

Astronautics (AIAA) that year, found a note from Pete Aldridge on his plate when he ret

to his seat on the dais during the annual banquet. It simply said, “Congratulations, you 

won the MLV II competition.” This welcome news vindicated Lovelace’s audacious decisi

start up production at company expense. The $340-million Air Force contract for ten la

vehicles represented an important step toward underwriting commercialization of the 

American expendable launch vehicle fleet. With commercialization, the contractor, no

government, was responsible for the integration of the launch process. To make sure eve

in the company focused on manufacturing a quality product, General Dynamics plann

self-insure the vehicles, offering customers a free ride should the booster fail. “This com

ment to a program with a value of more than $1 billion will create over 6,000 jobs fo

domestic work force,” Lovelace stated in congressional testimony on 5 October 1987.56

Because of his NASA background, Lovelace understood the cultural changes N

needed to make in order to transition from purchasing hardware to purchasing launch ser

but he was convinced that commercialization would result not only in greater reliabilit

also in significant cost savings for NASA. The company planned to offer launch servi

customers, including NASA, at a fixed price. Lovelace insisted that it was in the best in

of the government for NASA to become a customer of American companies in the la

vehicle business. He stated to Congress, “Advantages to the United States Governme

procuring launch services from a robust and competitive stable of domestic commercial la

vehicles are numerous. Effectively the United States Government can enjoy the advanta

a multiyear procurement and quantity buys with only limited financial obligation and 

Attendant lower cost, flexibility in scheduling, and resource management can all be realiz

236 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

55 See Theresa Foley, “U.S. Manufacturers Begin the Job of Rebuilding the U.S. Space Program: ELVs,” Commercial Spa

1986): 16–21.

56 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and S

October 1987, 60.

57 Ibid., 62.
NASA, however, resisted the idea of contracting for a launch service. The Commerc

Department, which operated the Geosynchronous Operational Environmental Satellit

(GOES) weather satellites, forced the issue. It insisted that NASA use a commercial vendor t

launch the three GOES weather satellites and, when NASA resisted, simply threatened to fin

another procurement agent. GOES became NASA’s first commercial contract and represente

a milestone in the effort to commercialize the launch vehicle industry.58

The Barter Agreement

One of the most important elements of the GOES contract was the successful negotiatio

of a barter agreement to turn over government property and equipment in exchange for launc

services.59 Government property involved in this agreement included all NASA-owned equip

ment—gantries, storage tanks, bunkers, etc—at Launch Pads 36A and B and test facilities, a

well as equipment owned by NASA and located on contractor property. Crafting the agree

ment took enormous contracting creativity on the part of procurement officers at Lew

because there was no precedent for turning over government property to the private sector a

fair market value rather than at cost. The launch pads were not part of the barter agreemen

because they were still owned by the Air Force, which leased them to General Dynamics. Bu

complicating the determination of value of NASA-owned facilities and equipment at the Cap

was the fact that they had been allowed to deteriorate in anticipation of cancellation of th

program. They were worth far less than the government’s initial investment. Another compl

cating factor was the unusual method of Lewis contracting. When Silverstein had taken ove

the Centaur program in 1962, he had insisted that General Dynamics be treated as an asso

ciate contractor. Contractors for subsystems like Pratt & Whitney and Honeywell had a

contracted directly with Lewis. By keeping Lewis at the center of all aspects of vehicle manage

ment, the government was able to control costs and leverage its considerable technica

expertise. However, this model for contracting made crafting the barter agreement mor

complicated. In 1987, instead of managing a single contract with General Dynamics as 

prime contractor, Lewis was managing about fifty-nine major contracts, valued in excess o

$1.5 billion.

The termination of the Shuttle/Centaur program in 1986 and the commercialization o

Atlas-Centaur called for the disposition of about $360 million in government-owned propert

that remained in contractor hands.60 This included vehicle components, special test equip

Like a Phoenix 23

58 Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry, 158–159.

59 Interview with Ronald Everett by Virginia Dawson, 17 December 2001.

60 Memo, “Report on Audit of the Disposition of Atlas and Centaur Property,” A-LE-88-002, 18 November 1988, part of th

Audit Report, Office of Inspector General, files of Ronald Everett, NASA GRC.
ment, tooling, ground-support equipment, raw materials, and partially finished work 

time of cancellation. NASA had to find a way to place a value on the government pro

involved in these contracts. Once General Dynamics owned this property, the company 

legally offer the entire Atlas-Centaur package as a launch service to commercial sa

customers and NASA. 

General Dynamics agreed to rehabilitate and provide launch services for AC-68, dam

extensively in July 1987 by the careless workstand accident. The company also agre

supply the entire vehicle and launch services for the Combined Release and Radiation E

Satellite (CRRES) mission (AC-69), originally scheduled for flight on the Shuttl

exchange, General Dynamics received the government-owned property from Honeywell, 

& Whitney, Teledyne, and Rocketdyne, as well as the legal rights to NASA-owned prope

company headquarters and at the Cape. It also received rights to the vehicle design. Than

the barter agreement, General Dynamics could proceed with the upgrade of the launch 

and changes to the vehicle design to lower costs and increase reliability. This was a major f

cial undertaking, but one that General Dynamics was willing to finance. One of the comp

immediate priorities was to reduce the inefficiencies that had crept into launch practice

a period of thirty years.

A significant problem remained. The loss of AC-68 was not only costly, but it also 

at a point when many NASA engineers with critical experience had been reassigned to 

projects. John Gibb, manager of the Centaur project office at Lewis, was assigned the dau

task of supervising the rebuilding of the last NASA-owned Centaur. For General Dynam

was an equally challenging undertaking that involved restarting the Centaur assembly line 

it had been shut down for several years. Because of the production hiatus and the loss o

personnel, NASA noted that the company “had difficulty in recapturing the formul

manufacturing Centaur.61 After two years, Gibb was able to accept delivery of a new ro

On 25 September 1989, the FLTSATCOM satellite was placed into orbit by AC-68.62 J

Womack, Director of Expendable Vehicles at the Kennedy Space Center, congratulated 

with appreciation mixed with relief when a week “plagued with uncertainties” ended w

flawless launch.63

238 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

61 Jean E. Klick to John Klineberg, 29 September 1989, Box AC-68 Flight Reports and Historical Data, Division Atlas-C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

62 “Atlas-Centaur Postflight Analysis AC-68,” Box AC-68 Flight Reports and Historical Data, Division Atlas-Centaur 

Office, NASA GRC Records.

63 John W. Gibb to James L. Womack, 5 October 1989, Box AC-68 Flight Reports and Historical Data, Division Atlas-C

Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 
Headlines in the Washington Times noted, “Nostalgic NASA launches last unmanne

payload.”64 After 448 launches, dating back to the Thor-Able on 11 October 1958, the Agenc

ended its management of expendable launch vehicle launches. From this point on, NASA

would have to purchase launch services from its former contractors. William B. Lenoi

NASA’s acting Associate Administrator for spaceflight, officially commemorated the end of th

old way of doing business in a letter to Lewis Director John M. Klineberg. Lenoir, a forme

astronaut, was responsible for developing, operating, and implementing all policy for th

Space Shuttle and all U.S. government civil launch activities. Lenoir congratulated John Gibb

Vernon Weyers, and the Lewis team for “exemplary management of the mission.”65 The succes

of the last Centaur mission, he said, was indicative of the outstanding cooperation betwee

government and industry that had been the hallmark of the Centaur program.

Congress, which saw commercialization as a means to reduce the enormous federal defic

and improve the balance of trade, fully supported the barter agreement. Amendments in 198

to the 1984 space commercialization act added guidelines for establishing insurance limits fo

loss or damage to government property, as well as U.S. government indemnification for third

party liability above $500 million, or what was reasonably available. The purpose of thes

amendments was to provide stability and support for a fledgling commercial space industry

Because one launch cost between $50 and $100 million, Congress focused on the fact that 

viable industry had the potential to affect the United States balance of trade significantly. Bi

Nelson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, stressed tha

nurturing this industry was in the national interest. “The sale of one commercial launch by 

United States company is equivalent to the import of ten thousand Toyotas,”66 he said on mor

than one occasion. 

Nelson was not satisfied with NASA’s apparent lack of effort to simplify its procuremen

guidelines. In a letter to Dale D. Myers, acting Administrator, on 3 May 1989, Nelson aske

why NASA seemed unwilling to work toward the modification of the Federal Acquisition

Regulations in order to expedite NASA procurement. Most of these guidelines were no

compatible with a fixed-price contract. “It is time that NASA recognized that it is not the onl

participant in our space program,” he said acerbically. “This nation has a mature commercia

launch industry that is fully capable of meeting the government’s launch requirement.”67

Like a Phoenix 23

64 “Nostalgic NASA Launches Last Unmanned Payload,” Washington Times (26 September 1989).

65 William B. Lenoir to John M. Klineberg, 10 October 1989, Box AC-68 Flight Reports and Historical Data, Division Atla

Centaur Project Office, NASA GRC Records. 

66 “Summary of November 9, 1989, House Subcommittee Hearing on Commercial Space Launch Activities,” 27 Novemb

l989, Box 57, DEB vault. See also discussion by Craig Russell Reed, “U.S. Commercial Space Launch Policy Implementatio

1986–1992” (Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1998), 21–24.

67 Bill Nelson to Dale Myers, 3 May 1989, Box 57, NASA GRC Records.
Asked to respond to this critique, Centaur staff at Lewis Research Center took issue 

the premise that the nation had a mature commercial launch vehicle industry, noting 

although there were at least thirteen firms that wanted to get into the business, there were 

three firms (General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Martin Marietta) with a de

strated technical capability to provide launch services. Although NASA was attempti

“widen as far as possible the gate of opportunity for all domestic launch service firms,”

Agency needed to balance its different obligations to itself, to industry, and to the tax

The issue was the degree to which NASA should risk expensive payloads on commercial la

vehicles. “Simplistically, the easiest approach from NASA’s perspective, and the most p

‘commercial’ would be to limit awards to only those pre-qualified firms with a proven 

record of successful performance and not risk NASA payloads on unproven designs.”6

Lewis staff emphasized that NASA payloads were “unique, one-of-a-kind, high cost, vir

irreplaceable spacecraft” that required unique launch services. In contrast, comm

launches were “more repetitive, less unique, and far less expensive to replace.” They cite

successful negotiation of the first NASA contract for General Dynamics launch servic

1988. During negotiations with General Dynamics for GOES for the National Oceani

Atmospheric Administration, they were able to waive the certified cost and pricing 

requirement. They believed that extreme caution and insistence on NASA oversight were 

fied. “While we have dramatically scaled back our oversight requirements wherever pos

prudence dictates that we cannot blindly accept assertions that all is being done properl

Members of COMSTAC pushed NASA to accept the new commercial mandate

example, Dennis Dunbar, Vice President of Programs and Technical Operations for Ge

Dynamics Commercial Launch Services, Inc., pointed out in testimony before COMST

Subcommittee on Procurement that commercialization entailed “a complete change of 

set on the part of those doing the procuring for the government.”71 To procure only one v

at a time could never be cost-effective. There were distinct advantages to the governme

procuring launch vehicles in blocks with common specifications. Over the previous de

the government had contracted for an average of one and a half vehicles per year. Wit

approach advocated by General Dynamics of eight vehicles per year, costs were projected 

reduced by 64 percent. 

240 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

68 “Talking Points on ELV Commercialization,” in draft of response to Bill Nelson, 22 May 1989, Box 57, NASA GRC R

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 “Testimony of COMSTAC Subcommittee on Procurement to Subcommittee on Space Science and Applicati

Implementation of the Commercial Space Launch Act and its Amendments and Space Transportations Services Purchas

1989,” 9 November 1989, ELV Program Planning, 1986–1989, NASA GRC Records.
Dunbar compared the General Dynamics first commercial contract with Eutelsat, 

French satellite company, with the GOES contract. The Eutelsat contract was 91 page

compared to 4,250 pages for the NASA GOES proposal. Nevertheless, Dunbar thought tha

the NASA contract represented significant progress. “After spirited negotiations, GD was abl

to convince the government that many of their usual requirements just did not fit in 

commercial buy. There were many arguments—we won some and lost some—but there wa

healthy movement in what we consider the right direction.”72 Subsequent requests fo

proposals were answered in an average of 500 pages, a great step forward for the industry an

NASA. The principal contracting officer on the NASA side of these negotiations, Thomas D

Tokmenko, incorporated numerous unique provisions that became a model not only fo

buying commercial launch services, but also for the purchase of commercial satellites by th

government. 

Officers of General Dynamics, however, continued to press the Office of Federa

Procurement Policy to simplify the Federal Acquisition Regulations. To facilitate this proces

the COMSTAC subcommittee presented the government with a model request for proposa

(RFP) and model contract to assist in the procurement process. Some of the recommendation

included a fixed payment schedule rather than progress payments. This change was neede

because the manufacturer now produced launch vehicles “on speculation, at contractor risk

and not allocated to specific missions until just before completion.”73 Second, since th

contract was for launch services, not hardware, the statement of work was limited to perform

ance requirements such as a peculiar orbit requirement, interfaces, and environments. Th

government no longer had the right to dictate how a contractor achieved that performance

Third, for the first time, the contractor could insist that the government adhere to a stric

schedule with penalties for unreasonable delays. The contractor was liable for costs associate

with termination. To allow the contractor to make a profit, the government permitted pricin

to be considered independently of the cost of a particular launch.

As a condition for bidding the MLV II contract, Lovelace succeeded in persuading th

directors of General Dynamics to increase planned production from eighteen to sixty-tw

vehicles. This increase was again internally financed. In fact, since the restart of the company

factory, Al Lovelace had asked the company’s board of directors for funding in increments o

$100 million so often that $100 million became known as the “Lovelace unit.” Fortunately

this significant investment began to show results. The next year, in addition to contracts fo

Intelsat VII and Navy ultra-high-frequency communications satellites, General Dynamics wo

Like a Phoenix 24

72 Ibid. 

73 Ibid.
business from the Italian Space Agency for its Satellite per Astronomia X (SAX) and 

NASA to launch the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) mission in August 19

was fortuitous for American companies that Arianespace experienced a failure of an Aria

carrying an Intelsat V satellite, the same year as the Challenger disaster. This worldwide h

in commercial launch services allowed General Dynamics and Transpace Carriers, In

entrepreneurial company set up to market the McDonnell Douglas Delta rocket, to break 

a market dominated by Ariane.74

An Evolving Family of Launch Vehicles

In the days when NASA had procured launch vehicles from General Dynamics one o

at a time, NASA had supplied the engines and the Centaur guidance system and compu

government-furnished equipment. In the new world of commercialization, the company 

responsibility for procurement. Roy Roberts commented that for the first time “people 

understood now what NASA was bringing to the table.”75 Faced with Ariane’s daunting 

start in commercialization, General Dynamics engineers dusted off NASA studies for Ce

improvements never implemented because of the “going out of business” mentality

company could no longer expect the government to finance development costs. How

contrary to the expectation that innovations would cease once NASA no longer fin

improvements to Centaur, commercialization actually promoted innovations.

To make Atlas-Centaur more appealing to the satellite market, General Dynamics 

to think in terms of a family of rockets that could be swiftly adapted to different cust

needs. Within six years of the decision to restart Atlas-Centaur production, the compan

developed four new designs: Atlas I, Atlas II, Atlas IIA, and Atlas IIAS. (These were all A

Centaur vehicles, but the company dropped the hyphenated name in favor of Atlas.) 

represented an advance in performance, reliability, and payload envelopes, and reduce

time it took to manufacture and launch the vehicle. All four models were included in the 

two vehicles built at company expense. Atlas-Centaur engineers emphasized that 

successive model had “evolved” from the previous one.

Building more than one or two vehicles at a time allowed the company to formu

strategic plan that included continuous improvements to the vehicle. This strategy requir

enormous investment on the part of the company. The philosophy of continuous imp

ment encouraged greater standardization, which in turn reduced costs and increased relia

The Atlas I, actually an improved Atlas G-Centaur D-1A, became General Dynamics’

commercial launch vehicle. A pressure-fed system replaced the Centaur boost pump

242 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

74 Craig Russell Reed, “U.S. Commercial Space Launch Policy Implementation, 1986–1992” (Ph.D. dissertation, 

Washington University, 1998), 306. 

75 Interview with Roy Roberts by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
improvement whose feasibility had been demonstrated by NASA years before. This chang

reduced complexity and cost. The avionics system was upgraded. Because it was less expensiv

to manufacture than a composite nose fairing, a new 14-foot-diameter metal nose fairing wa

developed to accommodate larger payloads originally intended for the Shuttle or Ariane. In th

Atlas booster, a computer-controlled pressurization system with redundant sensors replace

the old mechanical regulators. This innovation made the system not only more reliable, bu

also more versatile.

Atlas II represented an important evolutionary step. One key change in Atlas II and a

later versions was a fixed foam insulation system glued to the outside of Centaur’s hydroge

tank. This eliminated the mechanical complexity and weight of jettisonable insulation panel

Although the company had been working on the concept of foam insulation for almost 

decade using NASA contracted research and development funds, there was no incentive t

implement these changes under the old system. Up to this point, conventional wisdom in th

company dictated that change involved compromise. It was thought that increased reliabilit

would affect cost and performance. Edward Bock recalled that during the years when Atlas

Centaur vehicles were being produced one or two at a time, “the message was ‘don’t mak

changes.’”76 The switch to foam insulation, however, not only increased performance and rel

ability, but also reduced cost. As a result of successful implementation, the new philosophy o

continuous improvement permeated the company. 

A completely new solid-state avionics suite replaced the obsolete guidance and navigatio

system. The new avionics system, also the fruit of NASA contracted research and developmen

funds sponsored by Lewis Research Center in the 1970s, increased computing capability, rel

ability, and redundancy while it simultaneously reduced cost from approximately $8 millio

per vehicle to $2 million.77 At the same time, the company contracted with Rocketdyne t

upgrade the Atlas engine system to provide greater thrust. Atlas and Centaur were stretched 

feet and 3 feet, respectively. The first Atlas II launched Eutelsat II into geosynchronous transfe

orbit in December 1991. 

Quality control and on-time delivery improved dramatically after General Dynamic

established a mentoring program to encourage strong relationships with engineering peers i

supplier companies. Marty Winkler said, “The production line wound up being a real produc

tion line rather than a haphazard collection of things to do.”78 Suppliers learned in far greate

detail how their particular part was going to be used in the vehicle, and they began to tak

responsibility that went beyond the specified “form, fit, and function.” 

Like a Phoenix 24

76 Interview with Edward Bock by Virginia Dawson, 22 March 2001.

77 Interview with Martin Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.

78 Ibid. 
244 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

Atlas-Centaur 69, the first commercial launch of a NASA mission. The CRRES satellite, originally scheduled for launch from 

Shuttle, was part of the barter agreement that paved the way for commercialization of Atlas-Centaur. (NASA C-91-02792)
Greater standardization meant that the vehicle no longer had to be virtually taken apar

tested, and rebuilt at the Cape. This improvement had an enormous impact on how long 

took to prepare for launch. Management of the launch manifest changed significantly wit

commercialization. In the NASA era, launches were scheduled years in advance and Genera

Dynamics planned no more than three or four launches a year. After commercialization, th

number of launches averaged to 6.36 per year, with a peak number of launches occurring i

1995 when 11 Atlas-Centaur vehicles were launched. Even more important than the numbe

of launches was the new interaction between manufacturer and customer that commercializa

tion allowed for the first time. The manifest became dynamic—driven by customers. Th

company was able to reduce the time between the date of signing a contract and actual launc

from thirty months to about six. The need to be responsive to many different customer

demanded greater flexibility. Roy Roberts pointed out that because a commercial custome

regards an Atlas-Centaur simply as transportation, “they expect you to be ready, to go whe

they want to go and be successful.”79

For the next iteration, the Atlas IIA, Pratt & Whitney redesigned the RL10 to increas

thrust and added an extendable nozzle. The added length allowed the rocket to be more eff

cient at higher altitudes by holding in the exhaust plume, rather than allowing it to expan

rapidly. The Atlas IIAS featured four solid rocket boosters to increase overall booster capability

This was a major design change that the company had resisted for many years because of th

belief that a pressure-stabilized tank was too delicate to support solid rocket boosters. AC-69

the first commercial launch of a NASA mission, carried the Combined Release and Radiatio

Effects Satellite (CRRES) in July 1990. For the first time, no NASA official sat in the block

house at the Cape during the countdown. Even more startling, “General Dynamics” was now

emblazoned down the side of the rocket where “United States” had always been proudl

displayed before. It was indeed the end of an era.

Continuity and Change 

Despite an enormous General Dynamics investment in commercialization, it was not clea

by the early 1990s whether the company’s space division could survive. Most of the startu

companies in the launch vehicle business had already failed, but even the future of the thre

established manufacturers looked doubtful. NASA engineers Nieberding and Spurlock argue

that expendable launch vehicles should be considered a national resource. In an article fo

Space Commerce in 1990, they emphasized that although the government now purchase

launch services, NASA missions continued to be extremely expensive because NASA payload

were unique and required large-scale government involvement. They pointed out that whe

Atlas-Centaur was developed in the 1960s, reliability, not low cost, was the criterion. “From

Like a Phoenix 24

79 Interview with Roy Roberts by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
our experience with Atlas/Centaur and Titan/Centaur, these systems are unforgiving and re

scrupulous, expensive attention to detail to achieve a high probability of success.”80 They as

the value of continued government oversight of unique and costly NASA missions. They 

tioned whether the industry could afford the large investment required to develop a re

low-cost system, particularly when they were faced with government-subsidized foreign com

tion. Fierce international competition might drive American companies out of the expen

launch vehicle business, cutting off United States government access to space.

Continued government involvement, however, made it more difficult for U.S. comp

to compete with Ariane. Bruce Berkowitz, a policy analyst, pointed out that the expens

rigidity of specification systems used by NASA and the Air Force to ensure quality tend

discourage innovation. Government specifications controlled the design of vehicles bu

the commercial market because it was not economical to manufacture different mode

different customers. The use of the same launch facilities for both government and com

cial payloads also complicated operations and caused delays. NASA and Air Force mi

took precedence over commercial payloads, while Ariane’s manifest put the comm

customer first. Berkowitz found it ironic that a country that extolled the benefits of 

market system allowed the U.S. government to call the shots. “Unless we adopt policie

unleash the potential of the private sector,” he warned, “we are using only one leg to cat

in the race.”81

Of the three big manufacturers, the future of General Dynamics was the most pro

atic because of its large investment in commercialization. In 1990, the Atlas program lost 

million. During the next two years, the company lost more revenues when three A

launches of commercial payloads failed (AC-70, -71, and -74). These failures ma

extremely difficult for the company to sell its services to satellite customers. Two of thes

ures were attributed to the icing of a valve in the Pratt & Whitney RL10 engine. The valv

required when boost pumps were eliminated in 1984 and worked well for several flights. 

a slight reduction in valve clearance caused the valve to stick. The third loss of an A

Centaur was caused by the flawed design of a small screw in the Atlas Rocketdyne engine

faulty screw had been used without incident for thirty years prior to this failure, whose t

was especially unfortunate.82

After the redesign of the screw, the company launched Telstar-401 into geosynchro

transfer orbit in December 1993. The success of this launch did little to dispel the gloom 

246 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

80 J. J. Nieberding and O. F. Spurlock, “U.S. ELVs: A Perspective on Their Past and Future,” Space Commerce 1 (1990): 32

81 Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Energizing the Space Launch Industry,” Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 1989–1990): 7

82 Interview with Marty Winkler by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001. See also “Builder Suspects Engine Failure in 

Liftoff,” New York Times (20 April 1991). 
had settled over the company. By this time, the company had launched eighty-one Atlas

Centaur vehicles with a success rate of over 93 percent, but three failures in twenty-thre

months sealed the fate of the company.83 To the General Dynamics corporate headquarters, 

appeared that the enormous investment in upgrading the launch pads, incorporating new tech

nology into the launch vehicle, and starting up the assembly line could never be recovered

Former Shuttle commander turned insurance company executive Frederick Hauck recalle

that at this time, Atlas was virtually uninsurable.84 A three-year hiatus in sales resulted in larg

losses for the company and prompted the decision to sell the Space Systems Division of th

company. A new chief executive officer, Michael Wynne, was brought in to prepare th

company for sale. 

In March 1994, Martin Marietta, manufacturer of Titan, bought the Space System

Division of General Dynamics for $208.5 million. This was considered a bargain price for 

major company division with a backlog of twenty-nine Atlas-Centaur contracts and fiftee

upper-stage Titan-Centaur contracts through the end of the decade. The chairman and chie

executive of Martin Marietta, Norman Augustine, commented, “There just isn’t enough wor

to be done to justify all the companies in the business.”85 The deal included a large tax write

off of debt for General Dynamics.

Initially, many General Dynamics employees believed that Centaur as an upper stage for Tita

IV was the quarry that prompted the Martin Marietta purchase. After several unsuccessfu

missions with the Titan II-Transtage, the company had withdrawn from the commercial market.

However, the company soon recognized that the new Atlas family of vehicles had greater commer

cial potential than the powerful, but far less technically advanced, Titan. Martin Marietta woul

later decide to halt production of Titan II and III and declare them obsolete.87

The sale of the General Dynamics Space Systems Division to Martin Mariett

Astronautics included all of the Atlas-Centaur and Centaur for the Titan IV intellectual prop

erty, tooling, inventory, launch-site assets, and work in progress. Martin Marietta swiftl

relocated the Space Systems Division to its Waterton Plant south of Denver in the winter o

1995. Manufacture of adapters and fairings remained at the General Dynamics plant i

Harlingen, Texas. Tank manufacture, because of the advanced technical skills required fo

Like a Phoenix 24

83 Mike Patzer, Robert C. White, and Terry A. Bohlen, “Status and Review of the Commercial Atlas Program,” 15th AIA

International Communications Satellite Systems Conference, San Diego, February 1994.

84 Interview with Richard Hauck by Mark Bowles, 23 August 2001.

85 “Marietta Warns on Acquisition,” New York Times (19 February 1994); “Martin Marietta To Buy General Dynamics

Washington Post (23 December 1993).

86 Comments on manuscript by Ed Bock, 11 March 2002. 

87 The information in this paragraph is from comments on the manuscript by Ed Bock, 11 March 2002. 
welding, remained at Air Force Plant 19 in San Diego. Martin Marietta assumed the Ge

Dynamics lease. The entire Kearny Mesa plant in San Diego, including all manufacturing

and engineering facilities, was razed. 

Most of the engineers supporting these two programs were given job offers, and abou

of them chose to make the move. Approximately eight hundred former General Dyn

employees transferred to Denver in 1994. Surprisingly, Martin Marietta offered them m

the top jobs. Mike Wynne was named executive vice-president of all launch vehicles, wit

exception of Titan, and Edward Bock became the vice-president of the Atlas program. Ed

Squires became the vice-president of all Martin Marietta Astronautics operations, and R

DiNal became vice-president/division chief engineer. Only Tom Knapp, who became di

of the Atlas launch vehicle, came from the ranks of the Martin Marietta Titan program. K

played a key role in providing a smooth transition and helping former Atlas program p

deal with the Titan culture in Denver. Gene Fourney, a longtime member of NASA’s res

office in San Diego, worried that precious engineering expertise would be lost in the m

“You know you had this terrific organization back there, and it was really putting a 

successful flights together. And then you’d move them, uproot them, and wonder what y

going to do to that record.”88 He was soon reassured. 

Martin Marietta did not try to impose control over the program but gave the 

managers authority to hire additional people from the Denver area to fill vacancies. In 

1995, production began at the new Atlas and Centaur Final Assembly Building a

Waterton facility in Colorado. In September, the company’s International Launch Se

opened a new headquarters in San Diego, California. That same month, the last Atlas bo

to be built in San Diego came off the assembly line, commemorated by a mass signing 

aft end by former General Dynamics workers.

The takeover of General Dynamics by Martin Marietta, a long-time competitor i

launch vehicle business, proved more positive than many former General Dynamics and 

Research Center employees could have imagined. Air Force oversight of Titan had produ

distinctive Titan culture at Martin Marietta. Because Air Force personnel changed frequ

they had less time to become involved in the nuts and bolts of Titan-Centaur. In con

NASA had extensive in-house technical expertise and had always worked closely with Ge

Dynamics to solve engineering problems. Although commercialization would break this 

tie between government and industry, General Dynamics reaped the many benefits tha

unique association had produced over the course of more than thirty years. 

The forbearance of Martin Marietta management in allowing former General Dyn

employees to play an important role in the transition paid off for the company. Becau

first launches were successful, the company did not try to impose Titan processes and p

248 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

88 Interview with Gene Fourney by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
Like a Phoenix 24

No longer called Centaur, the upper stage for the Atlas II is raised to a vertical position on Pad 36A for a launch of a GOES satellit

for the National Weather Service system, March 2000.
dures on Atlas. Mike Benik, at that time head of the NASA resident office, observed, “

happened was the Atlas culture survived even though they were now in Denver at M

Marietta, and in effect, [NASA] ended up dealing with two different companies, all unde

roof.”89 Ed Bock commented, “I think if we’d had a failure shortly after we moved her

would have been Titanized at the drop of a hat.”90

Used to Air Force oversight, the Martin Marietta General Manager was at first v

uncomfortable when he was informed that it was not the customer’s responsibility to mak

decision to launch. Roy Roberts said, “We were making a decision on our own to pus

button, and all we had to know was that the spacecraft was ready.”91 By the end of 1995, 

Centaur had accomplished a record-breaking eleven successful launches. Far from 

discontinued, Atlas-Centaur became the division’s “cash cow.”92

A group of young engineers at General Dynamics, mentored by the small cadre of 

Centaur veterans, continued the tradition of innovation at General Dynamics. They des

the series of evolved commercial vehicles and persevered after the Atlas I engine failure

the move to Denver with Martin Marietta. Since the three engine failures, there has b

100-percent success record in all fifty-nine flights completed through February 2002, d

significant design modifications in each of the II, IIA, IIAS, IIIA, and IIIB versions of A

In 1995, further consolidation of the aerospace industry occurred with the m

between Martin Marietta and Lockheed. This set the stage for establishing the Lock

Martin International Launch Services (ILS), a joint venture owned by Lockheed M

Corporation Commercial Launch Services and Lockheed Khrunichev Energia Internat

with headquarters near Washington, District of Columbia. ILS markets both the Atlas f

of vehicles and the Russian Proton, built by Khrunichev State Research and Production 

Center in Moscow. 

This joint venture in marketing proved less difficult than the next step in collabor

with the Russians. Atlas III, completed in Denver in 1998, was the culmination of Ge

Dynamics’s ambitious ten-year development program. The company chose the Russian

RD-180 engine to power the Atlas III booster because of its superiority in terms of per

ance, technology, and cost to its nearest competitor. General Dynamics was so enthus

over its choice of the Russian engine that it was willing to put considerable time and e

into overcoming various objections from the U.S. State Department. (Atlas III had a per

250 Taming Liquid Hydrogen

89 Interview with Mike Benik by Virginia Dawson, 9 November 1999. 

90 Interview with Ed Bock by Virginia Dawson, 22 March 2001.

91 Interview with Roy Roberts by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.

92 Interview with Matthew Smith by Virginia Dawson, 21 March 2001.
ance capability of carrying 9,920 pounds to geosynchronous transfer orbit, or an increase o

1,720 pounds over the Atlas IIAS). It was so powerful that the Atlas booster could again b

stretched. The engine was throttleable, a feature that enabled it to provide a range of efficien

performance for different payloads. 

The Russian booster engines paved the way for utilizing the single-engine Centaur fo

many missions. Pratt & Whitney upgraded the RL10 engine in many steps to provide 20,80

pounds of thrust for both the dual- and single-engine versions of Atlas. Years earlier, Lewis ha

laid the foundation for this upgrade when Centaur had demonstrated a capability for lon

coasts and three, four, or five burns. Particularly significant were tests of Centaur’s multiple

restart capability in a zero-gravity environment in NASA’s Space Power Facility at Plum Broo

prior to the Helios (TC-5) mission in 1976.93

The single-engine Centaur increased the inherent reliability of the upper stage dramat

cally because rocket failures are often related to the engine. Half of the propulsion hardware

including the thrust vector control actuators, propellant feed ducting, pneumatic supply, purg

tubing, and controls, could be eliminated. The electromechanical engine control system

contributed to a leap in performance. Previously, Centaur engines had been chilled dow

during the coast phase, after separation from Atlas. Now the Centaur single engine could b

cooled down during the Atlas booster phase. This saved precious seconds and conserved fue

which in turn allowed the vehicle to reach orbit more efficiently.

To achieve a greater propellant load, the length of Centaur’s tank was stretched to fit o

either an Atlas III or a redesigned 12-foot-diameter Atlas V first stage. Carrying the satellit

Echostar, the new stretched Centaur was successfully flown on the first Atlas IIIB flight on 2

February 2002.

Atlas V, the culmination of the development program that began with commercialization

is also the company’s response to the Air Force demand in 1996 for a more efficient, les

expensive launch vehicle—an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, or EELV. Atlas V reflect

the global marketplace in which it operates. The first stage has Russian RD-180 engines. It ha

a thick, structurally stabilized aluminum tank, reinforced with rings and stringer for the firs

time. Its interstage adapter was built by Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) of Spai

and its composite fairings by Contraves of Switzerland. Its standardized features make 

extremely versatile. Depending on the weight of the payload and power requirements, up t

five large solid rocket motors can be attached to its common core or three boosters can b

strapped together. The boosters are identical to facilitate ease of production. 

Like a Phoenix 25

93 Interview with Bill Johns by Virginia Dawson, 22 March 2001. It should be noted that a 35,000-pound-thrust RL10 deriv

tive was developed for the new hydrogen/oxygen upper stage manufactured by McDonnell Douglas/Boeing for Delta III.
Atlas-Centaur, now simply called Atlas, remains one of the most efficient rocket sy

ever built. Systems engineering and technical management processes honed over three de

of NASA-industry collaboration are still used in the commercial Atlas program, althoug

role of NASA in the new world of commercialization is now greatly diminished. If A

Centaur is still flying, both the space systems division at General Dynamics and its counte

at NASA Glenn have vanished. Bought by Martin Marietta and then merged with Lock

all that remains of the famed missile maker’s Kearney Mesa complex in San Diego is a 

administration building. To complete the process of commercialization in 1998, NASA p

out the launch vehicles division in Cleveland. A few of the men and women in the divis

Glenn transferred to Kennedy Space Center; others retired or moved into other are

research and technology. Nevertheless, the unique rocket test facilities conceived and bu

NASA Lewis engineers continue to provide the nation with a unique capability. 

Taming liquid hydrogen is a striking example of how government research contribu

the development of a new technology. Fifty years ago, when engineers at the Lewis F

Propulsion Laboratory began experimenting with exotic rocket fuels, they could never 

imagined that their work would make a significant contribution to a race with the S

Union to land human beings on the Moon. Chance also played a role in the developme

liquid-hydrogen technology. Without the aborted development by the Air Force of a high

tude spy plane in the 1950s, the country would have lacked the technology infrastructu

produce liquid hydrogen in the enormous quantities needed for the space program. 

Research and testing of liquid-hydrogen rockets at Lewis Research Center directly 

enced the 1959 decision to use liquid hydrogen in the upper stages of the Saturn V. Onc

commitment to liquid hydrogen had been made, the development of Centaur becam

central importance to proving its feasibility. Because of their expertise in high-energy l

fuels, engineers at Lewis Research Center served as a clearinghouse between 1959 and 

for technical know-how vitally important to the design of liquid-hydrogen-fueled ro

General Dynamics, Pratt & Whitney, Rocketdyne, and Douglas all benefited from their 

action with Lewis rocket researchers, but whether a liquid-hydrogen upper stage could ac

perform with the flawless precision required of spacecraft remained unclear. This was s

doubt as late as October 1962, when management of Centaur was transferred to from Ma

to Lewis. 

With the benefit of hindsight, Marshall scientist Ernst Stuhlinger has called l

hydrogen “one of the most momentous innovations in the history of rockets during the se

half of the twentieth century.” He credits Abe Silverstein with the courageous decision t

it in Saturn’s upper stages. He writes: 

Hydrogen rocket technology played an absolutely decisive role not only in the Saturn

Apollo Moon Project, but also in the Shuttle Project that came to life during th

1970s. A new, high performance engine, the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), wa

252 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
developed in a joint effort by the G. C. Marshall Space Flight Center and the

Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation. By that time, hydrogen technology

for rocket engines had reached its full maturity.94

The Centaur saga illustrates how success or failure of a technology ultimately rests o

people—the decisions they make and their determination to influence the outcome. To adop

a new technology involved risk. That Centaur ultimately won the backing of Presiden

Kennedy himself demonstrates the national importance of this technology. A determined ban

of government engineers at Lewis persevered in the face of rancorous congressional criticism

bad press, and active opposition by Marshall Space Flight Center. A collaborative relationshi

built on mutual respect between NASA civil servants and government contractors kept th

program alive. 

However, if liquid-hydrogen technology moved into NASA’s mainstream, neither Centau

nor Lewis Research Center ever did. By the 1970s, Centaur was regarded as yesterday’s tech

nology, a dependable workhorse for launching planetary probes and commercial satellite

while NASA pushed forward with the development of a reusable Space Shuttle. When th

Shuttle’s technical limitations for launching planetary missions became clear, NASA turne

once again to Centaur. Ironically, while Marshall Space Flight Center actively campaigned fo

the termination of the Centaur program in the 1960s, it fought unsuccessfully for manage

ment of the Shuttle/Centaur program. 

Nowhere is the theme of NASA’s changing tolerance for risk more forcefully demonstrate

than in the tortuous history of Shuttle/Centaur. Lewis engineers had confidence in the system

they designed to protect the astronauts should a mission be aborted, but they had great diff

culty in negotiating the politics of the manned spaceflight establishment. After the loss o

Challenger in 1986, it was clear that the program was doomed. 

In the 1970s, when NASA decided to phase out its expendable launch vehicles, th

successful commercialization of Centaur was inconceivable. Yet global competition fo

commercial satellite business and the loss of Challenger precipitated a change in national prior

ities. Today, Atlas-Centaur remains one of the most efficient rocket systems ever buil

Although its identity is now submerged within the Atlas, Centaur has proven itself as an uppe

stage beyond the wildest dreams of one of the great visionaries of the space age. Someday 

probe powered by Centaur may yet reach Alpha Centauri, the star that tantalized the rocket

gifted designer Krafft Ehricke. 

Like a Phoenix 25

94 Ernst Stuhlinger, “Enabling Technology for Space Transportation,” The Century of Space Science, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluw

Academic Publishers, 2001), 73–74.

List of Interviews

Glenn Research Center

Brun, Rinaldo J., by Virginia Dawson, 17 June 1999

Everett, Ronald, by V. Dawson, 17 December 2001

Fourney, Eugene, by V. Dawson, 21 March 2001 (at Lockheed Martin, Denver)

Geye, Richard, by V. Dawson, 27 May 1999 

Himmel, Seymour, by V. Dawson, 1 March 2000

List of Interviews 25

Eighty-nine members of the Lewis Research Center Centaur team celebrate the fiftieth Atlas-Centaur Flight, June 1979: Joe

Kubancik, Gil Widra, Jack Herman, Steve Szabo, Norm Weisberg, Bill Groesbeck, Maurie Baddour, Dick Woelfle, Henry Synor,

Lillian Manning, Ed Ziemba, Larry Ross, Jim Patterson, Maynard Weston, Dick Heath, Tom Hill, Joe Nieberding, Sharon Huber,

Bob Edwards, Floyd Smith, Barbara Troyan, Konnie Semenchuk, Carl Wentworth, Ted Gerus, Jim Magrini, Don Garman, Paul

Kuebeler, Dean Bitler, Bill Kress, Sandy Tingley, Carl Monnin, George Schaefer, Harlan Simon, Peggy Schuler, Rita Hart, Irene

Blanchard, Steve Kiacz, Bob Firestone, Bill Misichko, Bill Hulzman, Harry Groth, Tom Seeholzer, Bob Reinberger, Jim Stoll, Baxte

Beaton, Merle Jones, Dick Kalo, John Kramer, Bill Middendorf, Gene Cieslewicz, Ed Procasky, Jack Farley, Pam Foerster, John

Feagan, Sandy Hanes, Pat Miller, Jack Estes, John Gibb, Ed Muckley, Bob Miller, Dick Flage, Dick Orzechowski, John Roberts,

Charley Eastwood, Ralph Kuivinen, Frank Gue, Janos Borsody, Ken Baud, Gene Fourney, Ray Salmi, John Nechvatal , Bob Jabo,

Ed Jeris, Al Hahn, Cecil O’Dear, Andy Dobos, Gus Delaney, Bob Lubick, Steve Szpatura, Ted Porada, Art Zimmerman, John Riehl

Ray Lacovic, Bob Rohal, John Bulloch, Jim McAleese, Chuck Tiede, John Catone, and Earl Hanes. (Glenn Research Center

unprocessed photo)
Kozar, Robert, by V. Dawson and Mark Bowles (at Plum Brook)

Lundin, Bruce, by V. Dawson, 7 March 2000

Muckley, Edwin, by V. Dawson and M. Bowles, 29 April 1999 

Nettles, Cary, by V. Dawson, 4 March 1999

Nieberding, Joe, by V. Dawson and M. Bowles, 15 April 1999, 9 May 

2000, 7 November 2001 

Reshotko, Meyer, by V. Dawson, 17 December 2001 (Cleveland Heights)

Robbins, Red, by M. Bowles, 21 March 2000

Ross, Larry, by M. Bowles, 1 March 2000

Simon, Harlan, by V. Dawson, 20 March 1985

Spurlock, Frank, by V. Dawson, 6 April 1999

Stofan, Andrew, by M. Bowles, 13 April 2000 (by phone)

Swavely, Jim, by V. Dawson, 16 November 1999

Weyers, Vern, by M. Bowles, 8 April 2000

Ziemba, Edmund R., by V. Dawson, 19 May 1999 

Zimmerman, Art, by V. Dawson and M. Bowles, 5 August 1999

Johnson Space Center

Hauck, Rick, by M. Bowles, 23 August 2001 (by phone)

Kohrs, Richard, by M. Bowles, 13 July 2001 (by phone)

Kennedy Space Center

Benik, Mike, by V. Dawson, 9 November 1999 

Carpenter, Mary Sue, by V. Dawson, 11 November 1999

Curington, Floyd, by V. Dawson, 9 November 1999

François, Steve, by V. Dawson, 9 November 1999

Gossett, John, by V. Dawson, 2 July 2002

Gray, Robert, by V. Dawson, 9 November 1999

Mackey, Arthur (Skip), by V. Dawson, 9 November 1999 

Neilon, John, by V. Dawson, 1 July 2002

Womack, James, by V. Dawson, 11 November 1999 

Former General Dynamics employees, San Diego

Anthony, Frank, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000 

Benzwi, Robert, by V. Dawson, 7 June 2000

Bonesteel, Howard, by V. Dawson, 7 June 2000 

Bradley, Robert, by V. Dawson, 7 June 2000

Chamberlain, Stanley, by V. Dawson, 7 June 2000 

Chandik, Thomas, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000

Hansen, Grant, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000 

Kachigan, Karl, by V. Dawson, 7 June 2000 

Kaukonen, Everett, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000 

Laird, Hugh, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000 

Lesney, Donald, by V. Dawson, 5 June 2000 

Lovelace, Alan, by V. Dawson, 19 July 2002 (by phone)

Lynch, Roger, by V. Dawson, 5 June 2000

Martin, Richard, by V. Dawson, 5 June 2000 

Merino, Frederick, by V. Dawson, 5 June 2000

256 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Perry, L. Charles, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000

Wilmot, Allan, by V. Dawson, 6 June 2000 

Wilson, Charles (Chuck), by 7 June 2000

Winkler, Martin, by V. Dawson, 21 March 2001 

Zeenkov, Seymour, by V. Dawson, 5 June 2000

Lockheed Martin, Denver, Colorado

Bock, Edward, by V. Dawson, 22 March 2001

Jensen, Michael, by V. Dawson, 22 March 2001

Johns, William, by V. Dawson, 22 March 2001

Owara, Vern, by V. Dawson, 22 March 2001

Reynolds, Robert, by V. Dawson, 21 March 2001

Roberts, Roy, by V. Dawson, 21 March 2001

Smith, Matthew, by V. Dawson, 21 March 2001

JPL 

Haynes, Norm, by V. Dawson, 9 June 2000

O’Neil, William, by V. Dawson, 9 June 2000

Barnett, Phillip, by V. Dawson, 9 June 2000

Kohlhase, Charles, by V. Dawson, 9 June 2000

Shaw, Lutha (Tom), by V. Dawson, 10 November 1999 (at Kennedy Space Center)

List of Interviews 25

About the Authors

Virginia P. Dawson is the author of Nature’s Enigma, Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laborator

and American Propulsion Technology and Lincoln Electric, a History and has contributed chapters i

several collections on aerospace history. She is founder and president of History Enterprises, Inc

http://www.HistoryEnterprises.com, and an adjunct professor of history at Case Western Reserv

University in Cleveland, Ohio. 

Mark D. Bowles received his B.A. in psychology and M.A. in history from the University o

Akron. He earned his Ph.D. from Case Western Reserve University in history in 1999. He has als

been a Tomash Fellow from the Charles Babbage Institute at the University of Minnesota. D

Bowles is the author of Our Healing Mission, a history of Saint Francis Hospital and Medica

Center in Hartford, Connecticut. He is currently writing Reactor in the Garden, a history o

NASA’s nuclear research reactor at Plum Brook Station.

About the Authors 25

The NASA History Series

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266 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
INDEX

A

ADDJUST steering program, 73, 128, 130, 144

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), iii, 13, 18, 20, 22

Advent Communications Satellite Program, 22, 27, 29, 32, 51, 67

Aerobee rocket, 27

Aerojet Engineering Corporation, 14, 15, 142

Aerospace Management, 66

Agena upper stage rocket, x, 22, 25, 26, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 51, 93. See also Atlas-Agena, Thor

Agena

Air Force, ix, 13, 14, 18, 22, 26, 33, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 62, 64, 71, 86, 130, 141, 144

151, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 180, 184, 193, 194, 196, 205, 209, 214, 215; and commer

cialization, 226, 232, 235, 236, 246 

Aldridge, Edward (Pete), 235, 236

Aldrin, Edwin (Buzz), 93

American Rocket Society, 2

Ames Research Center, 62, 107 

Analex, Inc., 209, 213

Andrews, Jan, 68

Angara engine, v

Anthony, Frank, 67, 68, 128, 256

Apollo 4, 96

Apollo 11, 100, 101

Apollo program, xi, 33, 50, 56, 64, 82, 83, 88, 89, 94, 100, 101, 163, 168, 174, 205

Applications Technology Satellite (ATS), 108, 110, 111, 113, 116, 123

Appold, Norman, 18

Ariane (launch vehicle), iv, v, vii, ix, 221, 228, 231, 232, 233, 236, 242, 243, 246

Arianespace, 221, 233, 235, 242

Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 3

Arnold Engineering Development Center, 27

Asteroid 29 Amphitrite, 190, 191

Asteroid Gaspra, 211

Astrotech International, 192

AT&T, 223, 225

Atlantis, 202

Atlas (launch vehicle), iv, v, ix, 1, 18, 20, 22, 38–39, 49–51, 60–61, 74, 76–78, 85, 124, 126

178, 189

Atlas (missile), 1, 10, 39, 7–12, 39 

Atlas G, 232, 242

Atlas I, 242, 246

Atlas II, 242, 243, 249, 250

Index 26
Atlas IIA, 242, 245, 250

Atlas IIAS, 242, 245, 250, 251

Atlas III, 250, 251

Atlas IIIA, 250

Atlas IIIB, 250, 251

Atlas V, 251

Atlas-Agena, 20, 32, 44, 50, 61, 102, 104, 108, 113. See also Agena rocket

Atlas-Centaur 1 (F-1), 46–47, 61, 72

Atlas-Centaur 2 (AC-2), 80, 81, 83, 90

Atlas-Centaur 3 (AC-3), 84, 90

Atlas-Centaur 4 (AC-4), 84, 90

Atlas-Centaur 5 (AC-5), 85, 87, 90

Atlas-Centaur 6 (AC-6), 89, 90

Atlas-Centaur 7 (AC-7), 90, 93

Atlas-Centaur 8 (AC-8), 89, 90

Atlas-Centaur 9 (AC-9), 90, 93

Atlas-Centaur 10 (AC-10), 89, 90

Atlas-Centaur 11 (AC-11), 90

Atlas-Centaur 12 (AC-12), 90, 94

Atlas-Centaur 13 (AC-13), 90, 94

Atlas-Centaur 14 (AC-14), 90, 94

Atlas-Centaur 15 (AC-15), 90, 95

Atlas-Centaur 16 (AC-16), 116 

Atlas-Centaur 17 (AC-17), 113, 116

Atlas-Centaur 18 (AC-18), 113, 116 

Atlas-Centaur 19 (AC-19), 112, 116, 118 

Atlas-Centaur 20 (AC-20), 112, 116, 118 

Atlas-Centaur 21 (AC-21), 116 

Atlas-Centaur 22 (AC-22) 116, 117

Atlas-Centaur 23 (AC-23) 120, 122 

Atlas-Centaur 24 (AC-24) 116, 120

Atlas-Centaur 25 (AC-25), 223

Atlas-Centaur 26 (AC-26), 223

Atlas-Centaur 27 (AC-27), 116, 124 

Atlas-Centaur 28 (AC-28), 223

Atlas-Centaur 29 (AC-29), 223

Atlas-Centaur 30 (AC-30), 116, 125, 130

Atlas-Centaur 31 (AC-31), 223

Atlas-Centaur 32 (AC-32), 223

Atlas-Centaur 33 (AC-33), 223 

Atlas-Centaur 34 (AC-34), 116, 131, 132

268 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Atlas-Centaur 35 (AC-35), 223

Atlas-Centaur 36 (AC-36), 223

Atlas-Centaur 37 (AC-37), 223

Atlas-Centaur 38 (AC-38), 223

Atlas-Centaur 39 (AC-39), 223

Atlas-Centaur 40 (AC-40), 223

Atlas-Centaur 41 (AC-41), 223

Atlas-Centaur 42 (AC-42), 223

Atlas-Centaur 43 (AC-43), 223

Atlas-Centaur 44 (AC-44), 223

Atlas-Centaur 45 (AC-45), 116, 137

Atlas-Centaur 46 (AC-46), 223 

Atlas-Centaur 47 (AC-47), 223

Atlas-Centaur 48 (AC-48), 223

Atlas-Centaur 49 (AC-49), 223

Atlas-Centaur 50 (AC-50), 116, 134

Atlas-Centaur 51 (AC-51), 116 

Atlas-Centaur 52 (AC-52), 116, 137

Atlas-Centaur 53 (AC-53), 116, 135, 138

Atlas-Centaur 54 (AC-54), 223

Atlas-Centaur 55 (AC-55), 223, 226

Atlas-Centaur 56 (AC-56), 223

Atlas-Centaur 57 (AC-57), 223, 226

Atlas-Centaur 58 (AC-58), 223, 226

Atlas-Centaur 59 (AC-59), 223 

Atlas-Centaur 60 (AC-60), 223

Atlas-Centaur 61 (AC-61), 223

Atlas-Centaur 62 (AC-62), 223, 232

Atlas-Centaur 63 (AC-63), 224

Atlas-Centaur 64 (AC-64), 224

Atlas-Centaur 65 (AC-65), 224

Atlas-Centaur 66 (AC-66), 224

Atlas-Centaur 67 (AC-67), 224, 234

Atlas-Centaur 68 (AC-68), 224, 238

Atlas-Centaur 69 (AC-69), 238, 244

Atlas-Centaur 70 (AC-70), 246

Atlas-Centaur 71 (AC-71), 246

Atlas-Centaur 74 (AC-74), 246

Atlas-Centaur D-1AR, 224

Atlas-Centaur D-IA, 242

Atlas-Centaur diagram, 3

Index 26
Atlas-Centaur, commercialization of, 237–245

Augustine, Norman, 247

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 144, 150, 234

B

B-2 facility. See Plum Brook Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility

Baddour, Maurie, 255

Baehr, Ed, 61

Barnett, Phillip, 257

Baud, Ken, 255

Baughman, Eugene, 54

Beaton, Baxter, 255

Beggs, James, 232

Bell Aerospace Co., 26

Bell Aircraft Corp., 7

Benik, Mike, 250, 256

Benzwi, Robert, 256 

Berkowitz, Bruce, 246

Beverlin, Charles, 118

Bilstein, Roger E., x, 96

Bitler, Dean, 255

Bock, Edward, xii, 197, 199, 243, 248, 250, 257

Boeing, 172, 173, 175, 192, 209, 211

Boland, Edward P., 210

Bonesteel, Howard, 256 

Borsody, Janos, 255

Bossart, Karel (Charlie), 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 34, 38

Bostwick, Leonard, 43

Bradley, Robert, xii, 256 

Brahms, William, 65

Bridges, Roy D., 202

Brun, Rinaldo (Jack), 68, 255

Bulloch, John, 255

Burrows, William, 189, 219

C

Campbell, Richard, 65

Canright, Richard, 6

Cape Canaveral, vi, 10, 11, 27, 44, 51, 71, 75, 82, 106, 118, 120, 124, 150, 159, 164

207, 221, 228, 235, 236, 245

Cape Kennedy, 132, 144

Carpenter, M. Scott, 11

Carpenter, Mary Sue, 256

270 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Carter, President Jimmy, administration of, 229 

Case Institute of Technology, 99

Cassini Program, 105, 163, 215

Catone, John, 255

Centaur attitude control, 108

Centaur autopilot, 112

Centaur coast period, 108, 109, 112–114, 131, 143, 149–152, 155, 156, 159, 160

Centaur D-1, 119 

Centaur D-1A (improved), 125, 128, 131, 136

Centaur D-1T, 141–143 

Centaur Engineering Data Center, 213, 214

Centaur failures, iii, 46–53, 72, 85, 87, 90, 113, 116, 117, 120, 123, 138, 145, 146

Centaur G, 184, 193, 194, 209, 215

Centaur G-prime, 184, 196, 215

Centaur insulation, 28–29

Centaur Integrated Support Structure (CISS), 171, 185, 186, 194, 199, 205, 206, 214

Centaur intermediate bulkhead, 19, 34, 51, 74, 144, 174, 184, 216

Centaur liquid-hydrogen venting, 28, 137, 143, 150, 151, 186, 200

Centaur pressure-stabilized (balloon) structure, iii, 19, 38–39, 48–49, 227

Centaur Project Office, 109 

Centaur Safety Waiver, 200

Centaur Standard Shroud (CSS), 143, 146, 149, 159

Centaur technical modifications after Surveyor, 109–112

Centaur tenth anniversary, 99

Center for Space Research, 181

Cernan, Eugene, 93

Challenge to Apollo, 98

Challenger, vii, 167, 168, 189, 202, 207–209, 211–213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222, 233, 234

235, 242, 253

Chamberlain, Stanley, 256 

Chance Vought Aircraft, 17

Chandik, Thomas, 256 

Chicago Tribune, 94

Cieslewicz, Gene, 255

Clark, Victor, 66

Clarke, Arthur, C., 222

Clayton, Marvin, 65

Coar, Richard, 17

Cold War, iv, viii, 97, 101

Coleman, Kevin, xii

Collins, Michael, 101

Collins, Stuart, 118

Index 27
Commerce, Department of, 237

Commercial Launch Directive 94 (NSDD 94), 229, 231

Commercial Space Launch Act, 229, 239

Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), 229, 240, 241

Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, vii, 31, 33, 5

123

CommSpace, Inc., 230

Communications Satellite Act, 223

Communications satellites, 222–225

Comsat (Communications Satellite Corp.), 125, 223, 225

Comstar I, 223

Comstar satellite, 222, 225, 226

Conrad, Charles, Jr., 95

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA), 251

Contraves Space, A.G., 251

Convair Corp. (Consolidated Vultee Corp.), 7

Cooper, L. Gordon, 11

Copernicus, 117, 

Cortright, Edgar, 33, 93

Courington, T. C., 65

Covault, Craig, 144, 150

Crawford, Fred, 99

Crooks, James, 4

CRRES (Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite), 238, 244, 245

Cryogenics Engineering Laboratory (U.S. National Bureau of Standards), 14, 29

Curington, Floyd, 256 

Cutting, Elliot, 69

D

Dankhoff, Walter, 54

Dante, 192,

Davis, Deane, ix, 20, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 67, 71, 74, 91

Day, Dwayne, xii

Death Star, 189, 207

Debus, Kurt, 44, 77

Deep Space Network (DSN), 147, 148

Defense, Department of (DOD), 50, 61, 86, 108, 172, 176, 182, 184, 186, 193, 194

225, 232

Delaney, Gus, 255

Delta (launch vehicle), iv, v, 44, 53, 75, 124, 125, 134, 141, 149, 150, 224, 231, 233

242

Dempsey, James, 2, 4, 10–12, 35, 36, 37, 65

Dempster, Harry, 108

272 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Deschamps, Roland, 232

Dewar, James, 4–5

DiNal, Robert, 248

Dobos, Andy, 255

Dole, Elizabeth, 229

Dore, Frank, 4

Dornberger, Walter, 7

Douglas Aircraft Corp., 25, 35, 75, 98, 252

Douglas Thor missile, 25, 35

Dryden, Hugh, 53

DUKSUP, 108 

Dunbar, Dennis, 240, 241 

Dunbar, William (Russ), 64, 125

Dunholter, Howard, 4

DX priority, 50, 54, 64, 86

E

Eastern Test Range, 130, 206

Eastman, Harry O., III, 183

Eastwood, Charles, 255

Eaton, D., 211, 212

Echo satellite, 61

Edwards Air Force Base, 10, 23

Edwards, Robert, 255

EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle), 251

Ehricke, Krafft, ix, xii, 1, 2, 4, 6–7, 11–13, 18–20, 23, 25, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 48, 49, 50, 80

100, 253

Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 3, 11

Element (Shuttle), 198–200

Estes, Jack, 255

European Space Agency (ESA), v, x, 182, 191, 194, 211, 215, 228

Eutelsat II (satellite), 243

Eutelsat, 241 

Everett, Ronald, xii, 255

Exceptional Bravery Medal, 118

Ezell, Edward and Linda, ix

F

F-1 Rocketdyne engine, 54

F-1(launch vehicle). See Atlas-Centaur 1

Faget, Max, 33

Failure Review Board, 146

Far Travelers, 33

Index 27
Faraday, Michael, 4

Farley, Jack, 255

Feagan, John, 255

Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 147

Files, Colonel William, 194

Firestone, Robert, 255

Flage, Richard, 68, 255

Fleet Satellite Communications. See FLTSATCOM

Fleming, William, 61, 82

Fletcher, James C., 101, 210

Flippo, Ronnie G., 174, 176

FLTSATCOM (Fleet Satellite Communications), 106, 108

FLTSATCOM satellite, 222

FLTSATCOM F1, 223

FLTSATCOM F2, 223

FLTSATCOM F3, 223

FLTSATCOM F4, 223, 226

FLTSATCOM F5, 223

FLTSATCOM F6, 224, 234

FLTSATCOM F7, 224

FLTSATCOM F8, 224, 238

Foerster, Pam, 255

Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp., 224

Forsythe, D. L., 25

Fourney, Eugene, 248, 255

Foushee, Robert, 68

François, Steve, 256 

Frau im Mond, 1 

Friedrich, Hans, 4

Frosch, Robert A., 136, 175

G

Gabriel, David, 62–64, 66, 93 

Galileo mission, vii, 163, 172, 177, 180, 190–192, 194, 196, 198, 202, 204–205, 207–

Galilei, Galileo, 154

Gardner, Trevor, 8

Garman, Don, 126, 255

Garside, Joseph, 68

Gemini mission, 141

General Accounting Office (GAO), 51, 61–62

274 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
General Dynamics, Astronautics Division (after 1961), viii, ix, x, 60–69, 71–75, 78, 85, 92

100, 101, 105, 107, 108, 118, 126, 130, 141, 142, 144, 170, 172–174, 180, 183, 193, 194

196, 197, 199, 203–205, 209, 210, 212, 213, 216, 217

General Dynamics, Convair/Astronautics Division (1957–61), 2, 4, 10, 18, 11, 27, 36, 22–23

31–34, 43, 46–47, 49, 51, 52, 55, 86

General Dynamics, German Society for Space Research, 5

General Dynamics, Space Systems Division, 226, 229, 232–233, 236–238, 240, 241–242, 246

250, 252

Gerus, Ted, 73, 255

Geye, Richard, 159, 255

Geyer, David, 126 

Giauque, William, 13

Gibb, John, 238, 239, 255

Glenn L. Martin Co. See Martin Marietta Corp.

Glenn, John, 11, 49, 53

Glennan, T. Keith, iii, vii, 11, 22, 31, 99

Goddard Space Flight Center, 44, 75, 77, 107, 113, 147, 226

Goddard, Robert, 5

GOES (Geosynchronous Operational Environmental Satellite), 237, 240, 241, 249

Goette, William, 89

Gold, Thomas, 56

Gordon, W. L., 100 

Gossett, John, 75, 144, 256 

Grabe, Ronald J., 202

Graham, William R., 208

Grand Tour, 160, 162

Gray, Robert, 75, 77–79, 105, 256

Gray, Vern, 28–29

Green, Joseph, x

Green, William, 210

Groesbeck, William, 255

Groth, Harry, 255

GTE Satellite Corp. (GSAT), 225

Gue, Frank, 255

guidance systems, 91, 120. See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., Teledyne Industries, Inc. 

H

Hahn, Al, 255

Hall, Eldon, 16, 24

Hanes, Earl, 255

Hanes, Sandy, 255

Hannum, Ned, 41

Hansen, Grant, 35, 36, 48, 49, 62, 66, 71, 80, 99, 256

Index 27
Hart, Rita, 255

HATV (High Altitude Test Vehicle), 14

Hauck, Frederick (Rick) H., 189, 202, 204, 207, 210, 217, 218, 247, 256

Haynes, Norm, 105, 257

Heald, Daniel, 27

Heath, Richard, 255

Heatherly, Joe, 63

Heaton, Donald, 27, 33

Heineman, Ed, 80

Heisenberg, Wernher, 5

Helios 1, 140, 153

Helios 2, 140

Helios mission, 108, 139, 143, 147–152, 154, 176, 251

Henneberry, Hugh, 67

Hennings, Glen, 126

Henry, Tom, 91

Heritage Foundation, 177

Herman, Jack, 255

Hicks, Edward, 65

High-Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO), 108, 136

High-Energy Astronomy Observatory-1, 116, 137 

High-Energy Astronomy Observatory-2, 116

High-Energy Astronomy Observatory-3, 116, 135, 138

Hill, Robert, 65

Hill, Tom, 255

Hilmers, David C., 202

Himmel, Seymour, 61, 143, 146, 155, 256

Hindenberg dirigible, 5

Hines, William, 54

Hoagland, Richard C., 157

Hoften, James (Ox), 202

Holmes, Brainerd, 53

Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 215, 216

Honeywell. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Co.

Hubble telescope, 117 

Huber, Denny, 27, 46, 66

Huber, Sharon, 255

Hueter, Hans, 32, 36, 37, 38, 47

Hughes Aircraft Co., 33, 69, 83, 92

Hughes, Thomas, vi

Hulzman, William, 255

276 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Hunley, John, xii

Huygens, Christian, 154 

hydrogen liquifier (cryostat), 14, 17

I

Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), 171–176, 178, 190, 192, 211

Integrate, Transfer and Launch (ITL) facility, 141

integrating Centaur with Atlas, 39–40, 76, 77, 230

integrating Centaur with Shuttle, 178, 180, 185, 195, 198

integrating Centaur with Titan, 143, 144, 163

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

Intelsat III–IV, 224

Intelsat IV, 223

Intelsat IVA, 223

Intelsat V, 223, 228, 242 

Intelsat VA, 224

Intelsat VII, 241

Interim Orbital Transfer Vehicle (IOTV), 171

International Solar Polar Mission. See Ulysses spacecraft

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 106, 108, 125, 131, 138

149, 155, 222, 223, 226, 228

Irene Blanchard, 255

Italian Space Agency (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana), 215, 242

J

J-2 Rocketdyne engine, 54, 85, 96, 98

Jabo, Robert, 255

Jakobowski, Walter, 151

James, J. N., 104

Jenkins, Dennis R., xi

Jensen, Michael, 257 

Jeris, Ed, 255

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 14, 15, 26, 29, 33, 52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 60, 67–69, 83, 91, 92

95, 104, 105, 107, 120, 157, 159, 165, 190, 191, 194, 197, 211, 212, 226

Johns, William, 257

Johnson Space Center (JSC), vii, viii, 168, 174, 177–180, 182, 184, 185, 191, 194, 196–202

207–209, 218

Johnson, Clarence (Kelly), 17, 18

Johnson, President Lyndon, 100

Johnson, Roy, 11

Johnson, Vincent, 53, 54, 73, 125, 226

Johnston, Herrick L., 13, 14

Jonash, Edmund, 62, 63, 64, 93

Index 27
Jones, Fuller C., x

Jones, Merle, 255

Journal of the American Rocket Society, 6

K

Kachigan, Karl, 77, 78, 144, 145, 256

Kalo, Richard, 255 

Karth, Congressman Joseph, 33, 47, 83, 85, 86, 88, 123

Katalinsky, Drew, 63

Kaukonen, Everett, 256 

Kearny Mesa complex, 10, 71, 142, 248, 252

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), iv, ix, xii, 44, 75, 92, 105, 120, 129, 141, 146, 148, 151

161, 177–180, 182, 194, 204–206, 208, 209, 211, 214, 234, 252

Kennedy, President John F., iii, iv, viii, 50, 56, 80, 100, 101, 253

Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center, 250

Kiacz, Steve, 255

Klineberg, John M., 239

Kloman, Erasmus, 55

Knapp, Tom, 248

Koester, F. W., 68

Kohlhase, Charles, 105, 257

Kohrs, Richard, 218, 256 

Koppes, Clayton R., ix

Korolev, Sergei, 98

Kozar, Robert, 256 

Kraemer, Robert S., 103, 120, 154, 157

Kraft, Chris C., Jr., 178

Kramer, John, 255

Kranzberg, Melvin, xi

Kress, William, 255

Krige, John, x, 233

Kubancik, Joe, 255

Kuebeler, Paul, 255

Kuivinen, Ralph, 255

L

Lacovic, Ray, 84, 255

Laird, Hugh, 256

Lang, Fritz, 1

Lange, Oswald, 24

Langley Laboratory, 13, 59

Langley Research Center, 169, 226

Launius, Roger, xi, 163, 165

278 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Lee, Jack, 68

Lenoir, William B., 239

Lesney, Don, 39–40, 128, 256 

Lewis (Glenn) Research Center, vi, ix, 23, 27, 43, 53, 55, 60, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 80, 84

89, 92, 98 

Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, v, 13, 15, 16, 17

Lewis Research Center Altitude Wind Tunnel, 117

Lewis Research Center Development Engineering Building (DEB), 106 

Lewis Research Center Launch Vehicles Division, 106, 226, 227 

Lewis Research Center Propellant Systems Section, 141, 181

Lewis Research Center Reduction in Force (RIF), 106, 177

Lewis Research Center Space Transportation Engineering Division, 182, 183 

Lewis Research Center Trajectory Group, 107

Lewis Research Center, role in commercialization, 226, 227, 233, 240, 243, 248, 252

Lewis, Roger, 80

Lightbown, Red, 36, 77

Lindbergh Field, 10

Linde Air Products Company, 29

Lindsay, Brigadier General Nathan J., 215

liquid hydrogen, iii, v, 4, 5, 13–14, 17–19, 49–50, 252

liquid oxygen, 4–5 

Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 16, 17

Lockheed Khrunichev Energia International, 250

Lockheed Martin Corp., iv, vii, viii, 250

Lockheed Martin International Launch Services (ILS), 250

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 26, 101, 143, 209

Logsdon, John M., 231

Lounge, J. Mike, 202

Lovelace, Alan M., xii, 178, 180, 205, 229, 235, 236, 241

Low, George, 101, 120, 123, 169

Lowell, Percival, 154

Lowery, William, 174

Lubick, Robert, 255

Lucas, William R., 178, 180

Luna IX, 92

Lunar Excursion Module, 33, 88, 92, 93, 95

Lunar Orbiter Program, 55, 82

Lundin, Bruce, 53, 54, 65, 66, 73, 77, 99, 106, 128, 226, 256

Lunney, Glynn, 184, 199–201

Lynch, Roger, xii, 44, 45, 46, 66, 79, 80, 91, 256

Index 27
M

Mackey, Arthur (Skip), 79, 256 

Magellan spacecraft, 163, 192

Magellan, Ferdinand, 219

Magrini, James, 255

Manganiello, Eugene, 53

Manning, Lillian, 255

Mansour, Ali, 41

Mariner 1, 105 

Mariner 2, 105

Mariner 3, 105

Mariner 4, 105, 118

Mariner 6, 116, 120

Mariner 7, 116, 118, 120

Mariner 8, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123

Mariner 9, 116, 120, 122, 139, 154, 156

Mariner 10, 116, 131, 133 

Mariner Program, 26, 29, 31, 34, 51, 54, 104, 108, 117, 129, 138

Mars Global Surveyor, 157

Marsch, Eckart, 152, 154

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), vi, viii, 18, 25, 26, 29, 31–32, 34, 36–37, 43, 4

51, 52, 54–55, 59–60, 62, 66, 69, 74–79, 85, 89, 107, 136, 174, 177–180, 197, 

208–209, 252–253

Martin Marietta Corp., vii, 14, 86, 141, 144, 209, 229, 232, 235, 236, 240, 247, 248, 2

Martin, Richard, x, xii, 73

McAleese, James, 255

McCarthy, John F., Jr., 179, 181

McClure, Billy, 118 

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 101, 229, 235, 236, 240, 242

Medium Launch Vehicle II (MLV II) contract, 236, 241

Mercury Program, 50

Merino, Fred, 27–28, 84, 257

Meyers, Dale D., 239

Middendorf, William, 255

Miller, Pat, 255

Miller, Riley, 15

Miller, Robert, 73, 255

Milstar satellite, 193, 194

Milwitzky, Benjamin, 67, 88, 89

Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 22, 46, 60, 63, 67, 79, 180, 194, 213, 226, 227, 237, 238

Minuteman missile, 12

Miramar Naval Air Station, 142

280 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Misichko, William, 255

Mission Integration Office (Shuttle/Centaur), 183

Mitchell, William, 20

Monnin, Carl, 255

Monzel, William, 65

Moore, Jesse, 167, 204, 206–208

Mrazek, Willie, 38, 39

Muckley, Edwin, 107, 183, 255

Mulready, Dick, x, 42, 43

Multiprobe, 134, 136

Murray, Bruce, 159, 160, 174

MX-774, 8. See also Atlas (missile)

Mylar radiation shield, 150

N

NASA barter agreement, 237–238

NASA Historical Reference Collection, xii

NASA Mixed Fleet Study, 233

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 13, 15 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 240

National Security Directive 254, 233

Naugle, John, 123

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 3

Nechvatal, John, 255 

Neilon, John, xii, 75, 141–142, 256

Nelson, William, 231, 239

Nettles, J. Cary, xi, xii, 59, 62, 63, 65, 91, 93, 256

New York Times, 140, 187

Newell, Homer, iii, 32, 34, 53, 55, 82, 86, 88, 93, 99, 103, 104

Newton, Kenneth, 18, 44

Nicks, Oran, 32–33, 44, 67, 95

Nieberding, Joe, xi, xii, 106, 128, 139, 144, 145, 163, 182, 183, 198, 208, 212, 218, 245, 255

256

Nimbus satellite, 61

Nixon, President Richard, 101, 215

Norris, Chet, 120

North American Aviation, Inc., 14

North American Rockwell Corp., 101

nose fairing, 110, 131 

Nova rocket, 51, 54

nuclear rocket, 5. See also Rover

Index 28
O

O’Dear, Cecil, 255

O’Neil, William, 69, 120, 257

Oberth, Hermann, 1, 5, 8

Office of Commercial Space Transportation, 222

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 173, 174, 176

Office of Space Flight Programs, 18, 23

Ohio State University, 13, 14

Opp, Al, 152

Orbital Sciences Corporation, 192

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO), 108, 113, 121, 123, 136, 138

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2, 113, 116, 137

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-3, 113, 116

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-4, 116, 117

Ordin, Paul, 15

Orzechowski, Richard, 255

Ostrander, Don, 26, 31, 33, 42

Owara, Vern, 257

P

Palley, I. Nelvin, 86

parking orbit. See Centaur coast period

Patterson, James, 126, 226, 255

Patterson, William, 4, 12

payload (Shuttle), 198–200

Payload Integration Plan, 193

Peery, David, 73

Penner, Rudolph, 231

Performance Trajectory Group (PTG), 67–68

Perkins, Clay, 84

Perry, L. (Len) Charles, xii, 65, 257 

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 97

Pickering, William, 82

Pioneer 4, 45

Pioneer 10, 116, 123–125, 128, 130 

Pioneer 11, 116, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131 

Pioneer Venus, 108, 116, 133, 134, 136

Plain Dealer, 88, 231

planetary assists, 162, 175, 192, 208, 211, 212 

Plum Brook Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility (B-2), 73, 125–127, 143, 146

Plum Brook Station, Sandusky, Ohio, 65, 73, 251, 104, 106, 121, 138, 146

Point Loma test facility, 20, 22, 65, 106 

282 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Polaris missile, 37

Popular Science, 139

Porada, Ted, 255

Powell, Joel W., x

Prati, William, 117

Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Engine Co., 17, 18, 19, 26, 31, 32, 40, 42, 43, 47, 79, 89, 94, 155

180, 194, 213, 214, 226, 227, 237, 238, 252. See also RL10 engine

Pratt, Perry, 40

Procasky, Ed, 255

Proctor, Richard, 65

Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), 37, 66

Project Bee, 16, 74

Proof Flight (Viking mission), 140, 145, 147, 149

Propellant settling, 77, 108, 137, 159

Propulsion Systems Laboratory, 27

Proton (launch vehicle), 250

Q

Quarles, Donald, 18

R

Radcliffe, William, 4, 37

Ramo-Wooldridge Corp., 10, 60

Ranger Program, 33, 44, 47, 61, 82

Rasper, Colonel David, 215

RD-180 engine, 250, 251 

Reaction Control System (RCS), 84

Reagan, President Ronald, 181, 233; administration of, iv, 222, 229, 231

Reed, Craig, 231

Reinberger, Robert, 255

Reshotko, Meyer, xi, 193, 256

Retargeting software, 136

Reusable Centaur Study, 170

Reynolds, Robert, 257 

Richards, G. R., x

Riehl, John, 255

Rigi-Mesh, 42, 98

risk, relation to spaceflight, vii–viii, 168, 170, 173, 176, 186, 189, 190, 198, 201, 204, 206

207, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219

RL10 engine, x, 33, 54, 63, 72, 82, 85, 89, 96, 126, 180, 214, 227, 245, 246, 251; and 30

turbojet engine, 40; and Saturn, 24–26, 32, 43, 60–61, 98; diagram, 39; expander or boo

strap cycle, 18–20; failures, 246; ignition problem, 42–43; regenerative cooling, 14; restar

capability, 93, 113, 126, 131, 133, 149, 150, 152. See also Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Engin

Company

Index 28
RL10A-3-3, 89, 100

Robbins, William H. (Red), 182, 194, 196–201, 207, 212, 256

Roberts, John, 255

Roberts, Roy, 68, 242, 245, 250

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., 13, 75, 96, 98, 170, 238, 246, 252, 2

Rocketdyne engine (Atlas), 85, 246

Rocky, 196

Rohal, Robert, 255

Rosen, Milton, 3, 27

Rosenbaum, Mort, 35

Rosin, A., 68

Ross, Lawrence (Larry), xii, 64, 136, 155, 176, 179, 180, 194, 197, 201, 205, 206, 209

215, 217, 228, 255, 256

Rovenger, Ronald, 62, 63

Rover nuclear rocket, 50, 63

S

Salmi, Ray, 255

Sarokon, Dan, 79

Saturn (launch vehicle), iv, 23, 24, 25, 40, 43, 44, 48, 51, 54, 75, 80 

Saturn C-1, 24, 25, 29, 31, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 61, 85 

Saturn S-IV stage, 25, 26, 43, 56, 61, 82, 85, 98

Saturn V rocket, 24, 53, 85, 96, 139, 154, 169, 174, 175, 212, 252

SAX (Satellite per Astronomia X), 242

Schaefer, George, 255

Scherer, Lee R., 233

Schiaparelli, Giovanni, 154

Schirra, Walter, 11

Schneiderman, Dan, 120

Schriever, Bernard, 8

Schuler, Margaret, 255

Schwenn, Rainer, 152

Science, 167

SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay Equipment) Project, 11

Scott, Ronald, 88, 89

Seaberg, John, 17, 18

Seamans, Robert, 52, 82, 88, 92

Seeholzer, Tom, 255

Semenchuk, Konnie, 255

Shaw, Lutha (Tom), 107, 165, 197, 212, 257

Shramo, Dan, 106

Shuttle Payload Integration Facility, 205

284 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Shuttle/Centaur: advantages, 176; cancellation, 168, 235, 237; fuel dump, 175, 185, 200, 206

207, 216; mission patch, 169; rollout, 203–205; safety, 170, 173–177, 186, 189, 196, 198

200–202, 206, 207, 209, 215, 217, 253; weight issues, 208, 209

Shuttle/Centaur Project Office, 182, 191, 194

Shuttle/Centaur-1, 204–206

Shuttle/Centaur-2, 205, 206

Shuttle-Centaur man-rating, 169, 178, 201

Siddiqi, Asif, 98

Silverstein, Abe, vi, ix, 12, 13, 18, 32, 33, 34, 99, 100, 237, 252; and direct ascent, 66–67; an

Lewis management of Centaur, 53–54, 57, 59, 62, 65, 71–75, 77, 92–93; and Saturn

23–25

Simon, Harlan, 59, 64, 65, 255, 256

Slayton, Deke, 93

Slone, Henry, 106

Sloop, John, ix, 5, 6, 15, 34, 35

Smith, Clyde Curry, 122

Smith, Dick G., 178

Smith, Floyd, 214, 255

Smith, Matthew, 257

SOHO (Solar and Heliospheric Observatory), 242

Solid Motor Assembly Building (SMAB), 141, 142

Solid Rocket Motors, 124, 142

Solomon, George, 66

Soviet Union, v, 3, 4, 11, 47, 98, 222; and space race, 104, 105, 134, 168

Space Commerce, 245

Space Plasma High Voltage Interaction Experiment (SPHINX), 145

Space Power Chamber, 71

space science, 103, 147, 152, 156, 162, 163, 165, 191, 192

Space Shuttle limitations, 169

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), 255

Space Shuttle, iv, v, vi, 101, 102, 221, 222, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 239, 243, 253

Space Taskforce Group, 169

Space Technology Laboratories (STL), 60, 66

Space Transportation System (STS). See Space Shuttle

space tug, 170, 171

Space, 5

Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Facility, 161

Sparks, Brian, 52, 54, 55

Spurlock, Lewis Omer (Frank), xii, 107, 108, 183, 245, 256

Sputnik, 3, 11, 103, 222

Squires, Edward, 248

Stafford, Thomas, 93

Index 28
Stages to Saturn, 96

Star Trek, 157

Star Wars, 205

Stofan, Andrew, 64, 84, 106, 107, 141, 163, 181, 182, 198, 213, 256

Stoll, James, 255

Strughold, Hubertus, 3

STS-6, 172

STS-7, 204

STS-51A, 204

Stuhlinger, Ernst, 252

Suntan 304 turbojet engine, 17, 18, 40

Suntan Project, 17, 40

Surveyor I, 91, 92

Surveyor II, 93

Surveyor III, 94, 95, 97

Surveyor IV, 94, 95

Surveyor V, 94

Surveyor Program, iv, 26, 29, 31–34, 47, 51, 52, 55, 60, 61, 66–68, 82, 83, 86, 88–9

108, 128, 131, 179, 221

Surveyor, Sustaining Engineering and Maintenance (SE&M) contract, 65

Swavely, Jim, 256 

Sycamore Canyon test facility, 10, 22, 34, 38, 44, 65, 106, 196, 209

Synor, Henry, 255

System Requirements Review, 183

Szabo, Steven V., xii, 84, 182, 183, 255

Szpatura, Steve, 255

T

Teledyne: avionics, 125; computer, 126, 130, 137, 142, 149, 184; guidance and co

systems, 104, 128

Teledyne Industries, Inc., 180, 194, 213, 226, 238

telemetry systems, 78, 79, 111, 113 

Telstar-401, 246

Teren, Fred, 107 

Terhune, Terry, 151

Thagard, Norman E., 202

thermal radiation shield, 143

Thiel, Walter, 5–6, 24

Thiokol Chemical Co., 83, 124

Thomas, Russ, 141

Thompson, Craig, 205

Thor-Able (launch vehicle), 239

286 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Thor-Agena (launch vehicle), 44, 61

Thor-Delta (launch vehicle), 231

Tiede, Chuck, 255

Tingley, Sandy, 255

Tischler, Adelbert O., xii, 26

Titan (launch vehicle), v, 141, 142, 189, 194, 224, 233, 247, 248, 250 

Titan 34D booster, 172, 233

Titan I, 141

Titan II, 141, 153

Titan II-Transtage, 247

Titan III, 140

Titan IIIA, 141

Titan IIIC (launch vehicle), 86, 113, 136, 141

Titan IIIE, 139

Titan IV (launch vehicle), 143, 215, 232, 235, 247

Titan-Centaur 1, 140, 145

Titan-Centaur 2, 140, 153, 159

Titan-Centaur 3, 140, 156

Titan-Centaur 4, 140, 155

Titan-Centaur 5, 140, 159, 251

Titan-Centaur 6, 140

Titan-Centaur 7, 140, 159, 161, 163, 164

Tokmenko, Thomas D., 241

Torel, Bruce, 43

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), 172, 186, 189

trajectory analysis, 107, 108, 159, 183, 199

Transpace Carriers, Inc., 231, 233, 242

Transportation, Department of, 229, 231

Transtage, 86, 141, 171

Troyan, Barbara, 255

Truly, Richard H., 210, 219, 233

Truman, President Harry, 14

TRW, Inc., 124, 136, 209, 225

Tsiolkovskiy, Konstantin, 5

Tucker, Joel, x

tumble-recovery software, 137

Two-planet mission, 131, 132

U

U-2, 16

Ulysses spacecraft, 177, 180, 181, 191, 192, 194, 196, 202, 204, 207, 208, 211, 212

United Technologies, Inc., 141, 142, 214

Index 28
upper stage rockets, iv

Urey, Harold, 13

V

V-2 rocket, 4, 5, 7, 8

Valentine, Jack, 68

Vandenberg Air Force Base, 61

Vanguard Program vi, 27, 44, 75, 79

Vega rocket, 27

Venera spacecraft, 134 

Venus Radar Mapper (VRM). See Magellan spacecraft

Vertical Integration Building (VIB), 141, 142, 158

Vietnam War, 140

Viking 1, 140, 145, 155, 156, 159

Viking 2, 140, 156

Viking Dynamic Simulator (VDS), 145

Viking Mars lander, 96

Viking spacecraft, 108, 139, 151, 154, 157, 179, 204

Vivian, Weston E., 86

von Braun, Wernher, iii, viii, 3, 5, 7, 8, 29, 43, 52, 139, 174; and C1-Agena, 54–56

Centaur management, 31–39, 47–49; and management at the Cape, 45–46; and 

management, 43, 60; and Saturn upper stages, 24–25

von Neumann, John, 10

Voyager 1, 140, 159, 160, 162

Voyager 2, 140, 159, 160, 162–164

Voyager spacecraft, 108, 139, 157, 158, 161, 179, 204

W

Waldrop, M. Mitchell, 167

Walker, David M., 202, 204, 209

Wall Street Journal, 231

Wallops Flight Research Station, 27, 59, 234

Webb, James, iv, vii, viii, 33, 53, 56, 57, 98, 99, 100

Weisberg, Norm, 255

Wentink, Richard, 68

Wentworth, Carl, 68, 255

Weston, Maynard, 255

Weyers, Vernon, 194, 205, 206, 210, 216, 239, 256 

Widra, Gil, 255

Wiesner, Jerome, 56

Wilcox, Fred, 54

Wilcox, Ward, 54

Wilford, John Noble, 140

288 Taming Liquid Hydrogen
Wilmot, Allan, 257

Wilson, Chuck, 257

winds, upper altitude, 124, 128, 130. See also ADDJUST steering program

Winkler, Martin, xii, 189, 193, 196, 216, 217, 219, 243, 257

Winslow, Paul, 106

Woelfle, Richard, 255

Womack, James, 44, 238, 256

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 17, 18

Wynne, Michael, 247, 248

Y

Yardley, John, 178, 179

York, Herbert, iii, 13, 22

Young, John, 207

Z

Zeenkov, Seymour, 257

Ziemba, Edmund R., 120, 130, 255, 256 

Zimmerman, Art, xii, 66, 68, 69, 255, 256

Zucrow, Maurice, 6

Index 28