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 NASA OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

 WASHINGTON, D.C. 

 Media Teleconference 

 "NASA Report Reviews Crew Safety Measures 

 During Columbia Accident, Recommends Improvements" 

 Briefing Participants: 

 WAYNE HALE, Deputy Associate Administrator 

 for Strategic Partnerships 

 ASTRONAUT PAM MELROY, Deputy Project Manager 

 for Investigation Team 

 NIGEL PACKHAM, Project Manager for Investigation Team 

 JEFF HANLEY, Constellation Program Manager 

 Moderated by JAMES HARTSFIELD

 Johnson Space Center, Houston 

 4:00 through 4:50 p.m., EST 

 Tuesday, December 30, 2008 
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 P R O C E E D I N G S 

 MODERATOR: Welcome to the Spacecraft Crew 

Survival Integrated Investigation Team Report Telecon. 

With us on the line is Wayne Hale, NASA's Deputy Associate 

Administrator for Strategic Partnerships and former Space 

Shuttle Program Manager; Astronaut Pam Melroy, who served 

as the Deputy Project Manager for the Investigation Team; 

Nigel Packham, who served as the Project Manager for the 

Investigation Team; and Jeff Hanley, the Constellation 

Program Manager at NASA. 

 We will hear some opening remarks from Wayne, and 

then we will open it up for questions. 

 Wayne? 

 MR. HALE: Thanks, James. 

 This is Wayne Hale, and today, we are completing 

and publishing some work which has been in the making for 

some length of time. This work, we all hope will go toward 

making space flight safer for all those who venture into 

space in the future. 

 In the spring of 2003, the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board requested that NASA form a Crew 

Survivability Working Group to better understand what 
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happened during the final stages of the Columbia accident. 

 In the CAIB report, you can read a very brief summary of 

their findings in Volume 1 on page 77 and also in Appendix 

G12. 

 At the time of the CAIB report, I was the Deputy 

Shuttle Program Manager. My boss, Program Manager Bill 

Parsons, and I were subsequently informed that there was 

much more information available from the Columbia accident 

that could be useful in the prevention of future accidents. 

 We then instituted a larger team called the Spacecraft 

Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team -- I won't 

repeat that name again -- to capture the lessons learned 

from the loss of Columbia and her crew and develop 

recommendations to improve crew survival on all future 

human spacecraft. 

 We specifically asked the team to prepare a more 

thorough NTSB-type report that future spacecraft designers 

could use to protect space travelers of the future. This 

team performed a comprehensive multidisciplinary analysis 

of the accident. They investigated all the elements of 

crew survival, including the design features, equipment, 

training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. 
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This has taken some time to complete, but the goal was to 

have a complete engineering report, not to meet some 

arbitrary schedule. 

 In the interim, several recommendations have been 

made, many of which have been adopted and implemented to 

increase the safety of the Space Shuttle crews on their 

remaining flights. Recommendations of the team have also 

been provided to the Orion spacecraft designers who are 

preparing the next generation of NASA spacecraft. 

 Today, we are providing a final version of the 

report in a public forum, so the designers of future 

spacecraft, whoever they might be, can learn from the 

Columbia tragedy and prevent or hopefully at least mitigate 

future accidents. 

 The team's final report include 30 

recommendations to improve crew safety on future space 

flights. The recommendations cover a broad array of 

subjects, ranging from crew training, procedures, 

restraints, and individual safety gear; the spacecraft 

design, methods, and recommendations regarding future crew 

survival investigations. 

 I call on the spacecraft designers from all the 
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other nations of the world, as well as the commercial and 

personal spacecraft designers here at home, to read this 

report and apply these hard lessons which have been paid 

for so dearly. 

 This report confirms that although the valiant 

Columbia crew tried every possible way to maintain control 

of their vehicle, the accident was not ultimately 

survivable. The report and this media telecon is limited 

only by the goal to protect the privacy interest of the 

surviving family members. 

 The Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated 

Investigation Team's initial Project Manager was Dr. 

Gregory Hite with NASA's Johnson Space Center, who retired 

in December of 2007. Dr. Nigel Packham took over as 

Project Manager of the team. NASA Astronaut Pam Melroy 

served as the Deputy Project Manager. Dr. Packham and 

Colonel Melroy, along with Constellation Program Manager, 

Jeff Hanley, are here with me today to talk about the 

report. 

 With that, I think we are ready for questions. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you, Wayne. 

 I have a list of all the media that are on the 
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line, and I will call on you each for questions. When you 

ask your question, please state your name and affiliation, 

and if possible, address your question to the person you 

would like to have respond. 

 I will preface everything with the fact that we 

have a limited amount of time available with the folks on 

the line. So please limit yourself at this first go-around 

to a single question, and if time permits, we will go 

around to everyone again for a follow-up. 

 So, with that, Gina Sunceri with ABC, do you have 

a question? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Gina Sunceri, are you on? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: What is the delay? Why has 

this report taken so long to come out? 

 MR. HALE: Gina, let me address that, and perhaps 

Colonel Melroy or Dr. Packham can elaborate. 

 First of all, we did not set an arbitrary time 

deadline. All the people working on this report have other 

jobs, and they are taking time from those other jobs to 

participate in this investigation. We wanted to make sure 

we had a thorough and complete engineering report, and 
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frankly, it did take longer than at least I initially 

envisioned, but here it is. It is complete, and we think 

it is a very good report. 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy speaking. 

 I would just like to add that as we identified 

key findings, we transmitted that information to both the 

Shuttle and the Constellation programs to make sure that 

there was no delay in understanding those findings and 

applying them where they could. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question. Mark Carreau? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thank you. Mark Carreau, 

Houston Chronicle. 

 I am not sure who this might go to best, but 

could you describe some of the things that you really have 

kind of high-balled into the Orion program and the 

development that are really going to make a difference, do 

you think? Is it a series of small things or anything 

large? How are you attacking that? 

 DR. HANLEY: This is Jim Hanley. I will comment 

briefly and then ask Pam and Nigel to perhaps comment 

because they have been much closer to the Orion design 

activity and can comment further and have helped on the 
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Orion team with incorporating many of these findings. 

 The one example, Mark, is the loop, the air 

revitalization loop that is provided to the crew's suits. 

They required manual activation during STS-107. On Orion, 

that is something we are going to have them already plugged 

in and ready to go and pressurized. So, as an example, 

that is one that I would point to. 

 Pam? 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I would like to add that, in addition, the seat 

design, we spent a considerable amount of time talking to 

the suit and the seat design folks for Orion, and they have 

really embraced the findings of the report and are working 

very hard to come up with an integrated design that 

integrates the seats and the suits into the spacecraft in 

more ways, including the restraint system, as well as the 

suit loop that Jeff mentioned, to make it more part of an 

integrated package, and we are really pleased with the work 

that they are doing. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question will be from 

Irene Klotz. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thanks very much. It is good 
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to hear your voice, Wayne. 

 I have two quick questions. One, is this NASA's 

last word on the accident, and second is, when did the team 

start its work? Thanks. 

 MR. HALE: Well, let's see. The team started its 

work, Irene, in the fall of 2003 -- I'm sorry -- 2004, and 

as far as I'm concerned, this is the last word. I don't 

know of anything else that is in work at this time. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question is from Frank 

Morring with Aviation Week. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Frank Morring with Av Week. Are you 

on, Frank? 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: Sir, it looks like he 

has disconnected. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. We will go on with Seth 

Borenstein, AP. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: The issue of the crew members, 

one wasn't completely seated, the others with issues of the 

restraints, helmets, glove, if you look at the big picture 

-- I guess this is for Pam or Wayne or Nigel, whichever -- 

is this more of a problem with timing and suit design? Is 
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this more of a problem with crew, crew timing issues, or is 

this just an issue -- you know, does it really matter if 

they had been fully suited, seated, and restrained? They 

would have still not survived. Why does that matter? 

 MR. HALE: Well, in this particular accident, 

Seth -- this is Wayne Hale again. In this particular 

accident, none of those actions would have ultimately made 

any difference. 

 It is an unfortunate feature of the Shuttle crew 

escape suits, that you cannot have the visors down during 

the entire entry phase because the atmosphere is not a 

closed atmosphere, and pure oxygen bleeds out of those 

suits into the cabin, and you exceed the O2 flammability 

limits in the crew cabin. 

 There are always constraints, and one of the 

things I think you heard Jeff Hanley say was the new suits 

that are going to be in the Orion spacecraft that are under 

design right now will not have that problem. So the crew 

can be completely encapsulated at all the critical times. 

 So it was not a problem with the crew. It is a 

basic problem of suit design, and that is one that we 

intend to fix in the future, future spacecraft. 
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 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question from John 

Schwartz. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Hi there, folks. I guess this 

is for Pam Melroy, though I would invite Wayne Hale to 

speak up as well. 

 These folks were -- these seven astronauts were, 

Pam -- these folks were your -- your colleagues and your 

friends, and I am just trying to get a sense of what it was 

like to work on such emotionally close material at such a 

deep technical level. Just talk, please, about what it was 

like to work through all that and whether it helped to be 

doing it in some way. 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I think I would certainly be far from the only 

person who felt that learning the lessons of Columbia was a 

way for all of us to work through our grief at the 

accident. I think that was a very important thing. In 

fact, it is something that NASA is really good at, is 

literally wringing every piece of data that we can out of 

the things that we do, both right and wrong, and that was 

very much an important part of it. 

 I would say this is one of the hardest things I 
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have ever done, technically and emotionally, but it was so 

important, and I felt so sure that the crew -- that we 

needed to make the best and all the knowledge that we could 

get out of the accident, that I think for all of us, we 

knew we were doing the right thing, and that was extremely 

important. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question, Tracy Watson, 

USA Today. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Hi. Thanks for taking my 

question. I guess this is for Pam Melroy and Wayne Hale. 

 You say in one of the sections of the report that 

the crew probably never realized that the loss of control 

situation was unrecoverable. I am wondering if you could 

elaborate on that a little bit because, certainly, the 

folks on the flight deck would have seen -- you know, they 

would have noticed that they were -- they were tumbling, 

and they noticed that they had, you know, hydraulic APU 

problems. Thanks. 

 MR. HALE: Well, let me start. This is Wayne. I 

will start and see if I can give you some thoughts here, 

Tracy. 

 It was a very short time. We know it was a very 
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disorienting motion that was going on. There were a number 

of alarms that went off simultaneously, and the crews, of 

course, are trained to maintain or regain control in a 

number of different ways, and we have evidence from some of 

the switch positions that the crew was trying very hard to 

regain control. So, you know, we are talking about a very 

brief time in a crisis situation, and I would hate to go 

any farther than that. 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I would just like to add that we found that those 

actions that Wayne referred to really showed that the crew 

was relying on their training in problem-solving and 

problem resolution, and that they were focused on 

attempting to recover the vehicle when they did detect that 

there was something off nominal, and so we think that they 

showed remarkable systems knowledge and problem resolution 

techniques. 

 Unfortunately, of course, there was no way for 

them to know, with the information that they had, that they 

were -- that that was going to be impossible, but we were 

impressed with the training, certainly, and the crew. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question from Bill 
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Harwood. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Bill Harwood, do you have a question? 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: Sir, he is not online. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. We will move on. Todd 

Halvorson, Florida Today. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thanks, James. I guess this 

is for Wayne and/or Pam or maybe Nigel. I don't know. 

 I am trying to respect the privacy of the 

families. I am wondering if you could give us an 

inclination on when the families might have been informed 

about the release of this report and what you all were able 

to, I guess, pass onto them and any reaction they might 

have had. 

 MR. HALE: Todd, this is Wayne Hale, and I will 

start. 

 First of all, we informed the family sometime ago 

that this report was in work. So they have known it's 

coming, and we are -- I would like to emphasize this is an 

engineering report. This is not a, per se, medical report 

or any other kind of report. We are trying to find 

engineering solutions to the types of problems and 
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situations that were encountered with the hope that in some 

perhaps less severe circumstances in the future, lives can 

be saved by improved designs. 

 I know that we did, in fact, coordinate with the 

families who got Janet Kavandi from the Astronaut Office 

who can say a couple of words about that. 

 MS. KAVANDI: Hi. This is Janet Kavandi, Deputy 

Director, Flight Crew Operations. 

 The families were notified several years ago 

about the investigation, and when we were nearing 

completion of the report, the families were given copies, 

preliminary copies of the report, so that they could 

understand what would be released and so that they would 

not be surprised. So they have been involved for quite 

sometime. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question from Jay Barbree 

with NBC. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Jay Barbree, are you on? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. We will skip to Tariq Malik. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Tariq Malik from Space.Com and 
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SpaceNews. I think my question is for Wayne and Pam. 

 It has been, I guess, five years since the 

Columbia accident. There is at least nine more Shuttle 

flights on the manifest now. 

 Wayne, you mentioned modifications for Orion, but 

I am just curious how reentry procedures have been altered 

maybe in the last few flights and in the next nine coming 

up. Based on the report and the information that was 

gathered here, if you could touch on that, that would be 

great. Thanks. 

 MR. HALE: Tariq, I will start. This is Wayne 

again. 

 We did, I think, post on the website a list of 

some of the improvements that have been implemented. There 

are a number of things that have been done on board the 

Shuttle, both in terms of hardware and procedures that were 

implemented and some more that are even now being 

implemented. 

 I would like to stress, Tariq, that there were 

more things that I would have liked to have done when I was 

Shuttle Program Manager, but they were not practical to be 

completed by the retirement date of the Shuttle. So some 
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things that we would have done if the Shuttle were to fly 

longer have not been implemented. 

 Pam, did you want to add anything to that? 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I will just add some comments about the changes 

in training. We have instituted additional elements to the 

loss of control and crew escape briefings, to incorporate 

the information learned from this report. I had made a 

point actually, personally, of tagging up with every 

Shuttle commander since Return to Flight to go over some of 

the findings, because they weren't generally available 

until now, to make sure that they understood the 

implications, and the Astronaut Office has also placed 

increased emphasis on the training and the preparation for 

deorbit prep with regard to the suits and the timing and 

the way to arrange the duties, to make that work a little 

better. 

 So I think we have really got a lot of 

comprehensive areas in training where we have been trying 

to tackle this. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thank you. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Mark Mathews, Orlando 
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Sentinel? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thanks. I guess a follow-up 

to that question. 

 I know, Wayne, you said that you had a number of 

the changes to the Shuttle posted on the website, but I 

wanted to see maybe if you could pick out one or two that 

you think that have been implemented that are most vitally 

important or the biggest changes that you have seen to the 

Shuttle operations. Thanks. 

 MR. HALE: Well, in terms of hardware -- and we 

have got a long list of these -- I think the most important 

thing that was done was the inertia reel change. If you 

drive a car and wear a seat belt, you are familiar with an 

inertia reel that locks down when you have an impact, or a 

"rapid deceleration," I think is the term people like to 

use. The inertial reels, quite frankly, did not perform as 

we would have liked during the Columbia accident, and we 

have now new and improved inertia reels on all crew seats 

for all the Shuttle flights, and that is a huge, I think, 

safe improvement, again, one that would not have made any 

ultimate difference in the Columbia accident, but one that 

in a less severe circumstance could save lives. And there 
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is just a long list, but I would start with the inertia 

reels. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next up, Alan Scaia with KTRH 

Radio. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Alan Scaia? 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: He has disconnected, 

sir. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. And Liz Turrell with ABC 

Radio? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Dave Mosher -- 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: Excuse me. Ms. 

Turrell, your line is open. 

 MODERATOR: Liz Turrell, do you have a question? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. We will go ahead and go with 

Dave Mosher, Discovery Channel. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Yeah. Hi. This is Dave 

Mosher. Can you guys hear me? 

 MODERATOR: Yeah, we can hear you, Dave. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Hello? Okay, great. 
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 I guess this question is perhaps for Wayne, maybe 

anybody who can take it. 

 I noticed a lot of redactions in the crew section 

in the Chapter 3. I'm just curious. What was the nature 

of those redactions? Why was that material edited out? 

 COLONEL MELROY: Dave, this is Pam Melroy. 

 This is an engineering document, and as such, it 

was important to us to include a full description of the 

analysis and the basis for our conclusions. However, the 

surviving family members have a protectable privacy 

interest, and NASA will protect their rights. So that was 

the basis for the redaction. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. And next, Keith Cowing with 

NASA Watch. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: This is Keith Cowing. Can you 

hear me? 

 MODERATOR: Yeah, we hear you, Keith. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Wayne Hale, question. Both 

the Challenger and Columbia accidents happened with 

millions of people watching. Challenger was marked by NASA 

not responding quickly. However, with Columbia, it was 

virtually real time. 
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 How did this crowd sourcing, almost, with people 

with their video cameras -- how did it help you? How was 

it a hindrance, and as you design new systems, how are you 

going to incorporate this nearly virtual sensory web that 

seems to be developing into the spacecraft, such that, God 

forbid, something like this happened again, you would be 

able to further understand the anomaly? 

 MR. HALE: You know, Keith, I think that the 

folks that had video camera recordings of the Columbia 

reentry were a vital part of the investigation, and the 

fact that people came forward and allowed us to use their 

material off their personal cameras provided a huge input, 

particularly in the early stages where we really didn't 

understand what had happened. 

 In the future, of course, we hope that we don't 

have such an incident again. In the future, however, we 

know that there is a network of amateur astronomers around 

the world, people that are interested in using personal 

cameras and video devices to track satellites and 

spacecraft, and we have made a number of contacts with that 

network of people, and so should we -- and again, I hope 

not -- have to call on those resources in the future, it 
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will go much faster and I think much smoother. We have 

learned how to do that. 

 DR. PACKHAM: Keith, this is Nigel Packham. 

 Let me add that I think the video analysis became 

vitally important, especially after we lost telemetry from 

the vehicle. That was one of our major sources of input 

into the findings and recommendations. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next question from Roxanne 

Martinez with Univision. 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: She is not online, sir. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Then Shelby Spires with the 

Huntsville Times? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Shelby Spires with the 

Huntsville Times. 

 Wayne, or Pam, maybe you can answer this. I see 

some similarities here of some of the same lessons that 

have been learned and relearned over and over again. Is 

there a fear that in 10 or 15 years, Columbia will be 

forgotten, and how are you preserving this for future 

generations? 

 MR. HALE: Well, you know, I think that what we 

are trying to do is have a report that is out there that 
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people can have as they design their spacecraft. The 

intent is exactly as you say, to make sure the lessons 

aren't forgotten. 

 If you look back in the history of spaceflight, 

one of the early accidents that happened in the Soviet 

space program was a cosmonaut in a ground test was severely 

injured in a pure oxygen fire, which was never published to 

the world because, in those days, they didn't share those 

kinds of things, and when the Apollo 1 fire happened in a 

pure oxygen environment, there were many people that said 

had we had that experience from some years earlier, we 

might have done better and prevented that. 

 So here we are. We have had this accident. It 

is unique. Hopefully, nothing like this will ever happen 

again, but we ought to learn the lessons from the Apollo 1 

fire, from the Soyuz 1 parachute tangle, reentry from Soyuz 

11 where the crew came back without pressure suits and 

killed during depressurization, and Challenger and 

Columbia. We need to learn all these lessons and not 

repeat the mistakes of the past. It is an extraordinarily 

 hazardous thing to go into space, and we need to not 

forget these hard-paid-for lessons. 
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 MODERATOR: Okay. I would remind everybody to 

please mute your phone. We can hear some talking on the 

line. I don't want to drown out anything. 

 Next question, Keith Landry with Fox Orlando. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Moving on. Damien McLean with 

Bloomberg News. 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: He's not online, sir. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Sandra Frederick with Daytona 

Beach News Journal? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Yes. My question is about the 

two objects that peeled away simultaneously, exposing the 

entire crew module pressure vessel to the thermal effects 

of entry. What was learned about that in the report? 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I guess what you are referring to was the 

combined assessment of the four-body breakup, and based on 

video and the analysis of the debris field, two objects 

separated, and it was believed, based on the analysis, that 

those were the surrounding parts of the forward fuselage 

that surround the crew module, and so that was determined, 

again, through ballistics. Video was probably the most 
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significant, but then also the debris field on the ground. 

 So I think, really, the purpose of this 

engineering report was to understand occupant protection 

and crew survival. In order to do that, we needed to 

systematically approach what happened to the structures, 

and so that was simply a part of that structural 

assessment. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next, Jim Lesher with NPR, if 

you have a question. 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Jim Lesher with NPR? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. I see that I have completed 

the list of media. So I want to make sure I haven't missed 

anybody. Is there any media person online that I have not 

called on once so far? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Then I will go through again 

from the top for follow-ups, if you have any, and we will 

check for those. 

 Gina, do you have a follow-up question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: It's been answered. Thank 
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you. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Mark Carreau, any follow-up? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: I do. Mark Carreau, Houston 

Chronicle. 

 I believe early in the report writing, you 

mention that this is sort of a first of its kind in space 

history, the sort of attempt to look into what happened in 

this kind of detail, and I wonder if any of you, Nigel or 

Pam or Wayne, would wish to give a bit of a testimonial on 

whether when this happens again, either in this country or 

some other country, the value of making an effort to do 

this. 

 I think I am kind of asking this in light of, you 

know, we are still competing, but we are also cooperating a 

lot more than we used to, and this may be a part of that 

spirit, if you will. 

 DR. PACKHAM: Mark, this is Nigel Packham. 

 First, let me point you back to the answer that 

Wayne Hale brought up in terms of learning the lessons and 

capturing all that data which I think, in essence, this 

engineering report was meant to do, and I hope does. 

 But I think in parallel, an analogy here may be 
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the main, the vast knowledge of information we have in the 

field of aviation, what we are trying to do here is get 

that knowledge out to any spacecraft designer, wherever 

they might be, around the world. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Irene Klotz, do you have 

another question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: I do, just another quick one. 

 I was just curious when you all decided that 

today was a good day to release this report. It just seems 

a little odd to do it between Christmas and New Year's 

holidays. Thanks. 

 COLONEL MELROY: Irene, this is Pam Melroy. 

 The report was actually just completed this 

month. We finally got all the process done, and it was 

ready to be released, but out of respect to the Columbia 

crew families and at their request, we released it after 

Christmas, but while the children were still out of school 

and home with their family members, so that they could 

discuss the findings and the elements of the report with 

some privacy. So that is what drive the timing of today. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Seth Borenstein, do you have a 

question, follow-up? 
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 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Seth Borenstein at AP, for 

Pam. 

 Would it be unfair -- can you explain, would it 

be unfair, and if so why, to say that some of the crew 

weren't quite ready, given that their suits -- you know, 

their suits weren't fully on and the belts weren't on and 

the helmet wasn't on, one wasn't seated -- does it show 

that they weren't quite ready to do this, you know, because 

the timeline hadn't given them time, or can you just tell 

me how would you characterize that, the fact that so many 

of them didn't have their stuff, you know, their suits 

fully donned? 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 On the contrary, I think the crew was following 

both procedures and standard accepted operational 

practices. The emphasis in deorbit prep has always been on 

preparing the vehicle because there are certain key 

moments. 

 For example, you have to have the payload bay 

door closed at a certain time in order to have -- you know, 

you want to wait until you have the adequate amount of 

cooling for entry, and so there are these vehicle-driven 
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milestones, and so that has always been the focus of 

deorbit prep. 

 And I know this is old news, and it doesn't come 

as a surprise. We have already brought it up before that 

the suits and the helmets themselves and that particular 

aspect of the crew equipment was not part of the original 

vehicle design, and so integrating that into the 

operational timeline has some limitations, and in addition, 

we have always structured it, so that there were some 

duties post-deorbit burn. 

 So I think the way we have tackled that now is 

that there is an increased recognition of the importance, 

the equal importance of configuring the crew equipment for 

entry, and we have moved some of those milestones back from 

the standard operational practices that we have had in the 

past, and so we do think that that is an improvement in 

training, but the crew was doing everything that they had 

been trained to do, and they were doing everything right. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Thank you. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Next, John Schwartz, do you 

have a follow-up question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: I do. I don't think this has 
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been asked. 

 I have been hearing from some folks in the 

families and stuff that there was some resistance within 

NASA to making this report public, find a use of the data 

to get improvements in future spacecraft design and Shuttle 

safety, but don't let it out there. 

 Can you give me a sense of what has been 

described to me as a kind of tug-of-war and the arguments 

on either side? Thanks. 

 MR. HALE: You know, John, I wouldn't 

characterize -- this is Wayne Hale. I wouldn't 

characterize it that way at all. 

 There is, I think, quite a bit of concern about 

the families and their feelings and their status, as you 

might expect in a situation like this, but I have not once 

heard from anybody that we should not write this report 

from a technical or administrative or logistical or any 

other standpoint. 

 The only concerns that I have ever heard had been 

regarding the crew family sensitivities, and certainly, 

there hasn't been anybody that has slowed us down or 

stopped us or anything of that nature. We have proceeded 
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along just as promptly as circumstances would allow. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Tracy Watson, do you have 

another question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: I do. Thanks, James. 

 I guess this is for Pam Melroy and Wayne Hale 

again. 

 Kind of a ticklish subject, but I am wondering if 

there was any relief for you in some ways to firmly nail 

down that the crew was not really aware of how much danger 

they were in, and that they -- that there was -- it sounds 

like there was very little suffering on their part 

involved. Was that -- did that come as a relief to you at 

all? 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 I think on behalf of certainly my colleagues -- 

and I know the families feel this way too -- that, of 

course, we were relieved that we discovered this, and that 

it is a very small blessing, but we will take them where we 

can find them. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Todd Halvorson, do you have a 

follow-up question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Yeah, real quick, if I could, 
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James. 

 I understood that Jon Clark was a part of this 

investigation, and I was wondering what role he played and 

how having a family member on board might have colored to 

not the investigation. 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 Yes, we are very proud, actually, to call Jon a 

part of our team. 

 Jon has a very diverse background, and he has 

experience with accident investigation through the 

military, and so he had a very strong profound personal 

belief in the importance of this investigation, and so his 

role was to actually encourage us, but I would let you talk 

to him directly. He should speak for himself, but we were 

very proud to have him as a part of the team, and we 

appreciated his background in accident investigation and 

his deep determination to understand what happened. And I 

think that was very motivational for all of us. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Tariq Malik, do you have 

another question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Maybe a quick one for Wayne 

and Pam. 
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 You had mentioned, Wayne, about this being the 

last expected report on the accident and whatnot, and Pam, 

you mentioned, I guess, some of the relief that you had 

felt. I was just curious from a personal standpoint if 

there was a sense of closure while working on the report, 

to kind of build on that, that you felt, and if so, I guess 

what the feeling is now moving forward towards Shuttle 

retirement and the start of a new vehicle. Thanks. 

 COLONEL MELROY: This is Pam Melroy. 

 Yes, I have been working on this report for a 

while, and I think most definitely, this is a great day for 

the whole investigative team. On their behalf, I think I 

can say that we all feel the same way, that we are very 

proud of this work, and we really hope that it will be used 

to improve safety throughout the world and the entire 

community of human spaceflight, and so this is a very 

special day, and there is closure in it for us. 

 MR. HALE: Tariq, I will give you my impressions. 

 This is Wayne Hale. I would say that in my personal 

circumstance, "closure" is not the operative word because 

spaceflight takes eternal vigilance, and there isn't a day 

that I go through that I don't think about the Columbia 
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crew, Rick, Willie, K.C., or even the Challenge crew, Judy, 

Dick Scobee, El Onizuka. You know, I knew all these 

people, some of crew's members better than others. 

 And we know when we come into this business that 

it is a risky business, that accidents can happen, and 

certainly, if you want to talk about regrets, that's a 

whole other discussion, but our goal here is to do our best 

to prevent accidents in the future, and that is not a 

subject that is ever going to be closed. So I would take 

it a little bit different tact, maybe, than Pam did. 

 MODERATOR: Mark Mathews, Orlando Sentinel, do 

you have another question, Mark? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: I do. Thank you very much. 

 I guess with the question of space suits being 

revised after the 1986 Challenger accident, were those 

changes enough, and have some of these concerns about the 

space suits not being adequate enough been in NASA for a 

while? 

 MR. HALE: Well, you know, this is an interesting 

question, Mark. In most things, there is a tradeoff. One 

of the things that we probably should have learned from the 

Soyuz 11 accident is that you must wear pressure suits 
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during launch and landing, and that was a real problem 

during Challenger. 

 After Challenger, we added the pressure suits, 

the launch escape suits. They were good suits at the time, 

but one of the things that we were very concerned about was 

bailing out in the North Atlantic in cold weather and cold 

water. 

 There was an advanced crew space suit that was 

developed from some military applications -- the ACES suit, 

we call it -- which is a much better survival suit in cold 

water situations. It is what we thought we would be facing 

during a launch abort scenario. 

 Unfortunately, the ACES suit is not as good a 

pressure suit. So there is a tradeoff that was made to 

increase our potential to survive a bailout into the North 

Atlantic, which frankly was not useful in this accident, 

but I would go back again, these pressure suits have 

limited capability, and in any event, this accident was not 

ultimately survivable, no matter what kind of pressure suit 

the crew would have worn. 

 MODERATOR: Dave Mosher, Discovery Channel, do 

you have a follow-up? 
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 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Yeah. I just have one last 

question. Someone actually stole my last question, but I 

do have another. 

 Previously, someone asked about a fear of 

forgetting lessons of Columbia. I'm not sure who that was, 

but I wonder about the next generation of people, you know, 

younger kids today who probably won't remember Columbia. 

 Pam, Wayne, anyone who wants to take it, is there 

any sort of concern that there will be no permanence about 

Columbia in the minds of kids today, and if so, why? 

 MR. HALE: Well, no. I think that what we are 

trying to do here is make sure that the lessons learned are 

preserved and are available to be taught to the spacecraft 

designers of the future who are children today, and even as 

I was in engineering school, we studied engineering 

failures of the past, to learn from them, so that we would 

not repeat them in the future, bridges, pressure vessels, 

all those kinds of things that had big problems in the 19th 

century. Now in the 20th century, we studied aircraft 

accidents and looked at the causes for early aircraft to 

fail and have made improvements, to the point where today, 

aviation safety is unparalleled in the history of the world 
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in terms of commercial passenger safety. 

 Still, we are in the infancy of space travel, and 

these hard lessons need to be preserved. We have done that 

with this report, and we will certainly do our level best 

to teach it to the new generation of engineers as they come 

forward to design the future spacecraft. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Keith Cowing, do you have 

another question, Keith? 

 [No response.] 

 MODERATOR: Keith Cowing, do you have -- 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: Hello? Can you hear me? 

 MODERATOR: Yes. 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: This is Keith Cowing for Wayne 

Hale. 

 Just a philosophical question here. It's been 

sort of dickering around in my mind as to how to ask it. 

America's new spacecraft will be a capsule, sort of "Back 

to the Future." It has some benefits and some fallbacks. 

 If you look at a lot of the private spacecraft 

that are being built, they have big glorious wings. Is 

there anything to be distilled out of this, that you might 

say would guide future designers in terms of tried and true 
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versus pushing the envelope, and that maybe you might want 

to defer on caution to something that has worked before, or 

do you still think it is worth trying to push the envelope 

with spacecraft to try things new? 

 MR. HALE: Well, let me see, Keith. Let me start 

where I left of the last question. We are still in the 

infancy of space travel. 

 Now, I had a discussion with Mike Griffin some 

years ago when we talked about being at the Viking longboat 

stage of exploration. We have got a long way to go to 

design spacecraft that are as safe as current aircraft are, 

for example. Whether capsules or wings are safer, there's 

pros, and there's cons. What you have to have in either 

event is good engineering. You have to learn the lessons 

of the past, apply the right factors of safety to the 

future design, and improve in incremental ways with every 

new design that comes off the drawing boards, or I should 

say off the CAD/CAM design panels of the future. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. Shelby Spires, Huntsville 

Times, do you have another question? 

 [No response.] 

 TELECONFERENCE OPERATOR: She is no longer 
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online, sir. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. And Sandra Frederick, Daytona 

Beach, do you have a question? 

 MEDIA QUESTIONER: No, I don't. 

 MODERATOR: Okay. I think with that, we have 

reached our limit on time for folks here at the telecon. 

So we will conclude. Thank you very much. 

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