Final Report to the 

President on the 

U.S. SPACE PROGRAM 

January 1993 
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THE VICE PRESIDENT 

WASHINGTON 

January 7, 1993 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

I am pleased to transmit to you this final report on the 

U.S. space program. It has been my great privilege to serve as 

Chairman of the National Space Council over these past four 

years. At the beginning of the Administration, you made it clear 

to me that you were determined to keep America first in space. 

We have accomplished that, and much more. 

As you know, there were many challenges. At the outset of 

the Administration, the nation's space program was still 

recovering from the Challenger accident. Cur commercial space 

enterprises were coming under increasing pressure from a variety 

of players in the domestic and international marketplace. The 

need for more reliable data on environmental change was placing 

new demands on the space program. 

More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

unprecedented global political and economic upheaval, lessons 

learned from Operation Desert Storm, and increasing and often 

conflicting claims on spending priorities have forced further 

reassessments of many of our space policies. Last summer, I 

commissioned the Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board to 

provide broad policy recommendations as the nation continues to 

adjust to these changes. The Board's recently released findings 

and recommendations are highlighted in this report. 

In spite of all these challenges -- indeed, because of them 

-- this Administration will leave behind an important legacy of 

accomplishment. I believe the policy foundations that we have 

laid in response to these challenges will serve America well and 

will stand the test of time. 
This report highlights the accomplishments of the 

Administration, identifies the policies and programs it has put 

in place, and points the way to the future. Like those who. came 

before us, we must rely on our successors to build upon what has 

been achieved. The success of our space program over three and a 

half decades would not have been possible without a bipartisan 

coalition of engineers, scientists, government and industry 

leaders, and most importantly, generations of Americans with a 

shared vision and a strong belief in U.S. leadership. With that 

in mind, I conclude this report with a series of recommendations 

for the future which I hope will be received as they are intended 

-- to aid the next administration, Republicans and Democrats in 

Congress, and the American people as they shape our space program 

over the coming years. 

Sincerely, 
The National Space Council 

The National Space Council is responsible for advising the President on 

national space policy and strategy, and coordinating the implementation of the 

President’s policies. It was authorized by an act of Congress in 1988 and was 

established as an agency of the federal government by President Bush on 

April 20, 1989. 

The Space Council is chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, who serves 

as the President’s principal advisor on national space policy and strategy. 

National Space Council Membership 

The Vice Prw&wt 

Dan Quayle 

Chairman 

The Secretary of State 

Lawrence Eagleburger 

The Director of the Ofice of 

Mawgement and Budget 

Richard G. Datman 

The Sec?l?tury of Energy 

James D. Watkins 

The Secwtq of the Treawy 

Nicholas F. Brady 

The Secretaty of Defense 

Dick Cheney 

i%e Secretq of Commerce 

Barbara Franklin 

The Secretary of Transportation 

Andrew Card 

The Assbtant to the Presideti 

for N&owl Security Aflbin 

Brent Scowcroft 

i%e Assistam to the President 

for Science and Technology 

D. Allan Bromley 

National Space Co utzcil 

Executiz!e Secretary 

Brian D. Dailey 

The Chief of St@ to the 

President 

James A. Baker III 

The Director of Central 

Intelligence 

Robert Gates 

The Administrate r of the 

Natio ?& Aervnuutics and 

Spwe Adminisb-atiozl 

Daniel Goldin 

Contents 

Space Leadership 1 

Status of the U.S. Space Program 5 

Space Transportation 5 

National Security 8 

Civil Space 12 

Mission to Planet Earth 13 

Mission from Planet Earth 16 

International Space Activity 20 

Space Commerce and Trade 23 

Planning for the Future 27 

Appendices 

Appendix I - Chronology of Bush Administration 

Space Policy Activities I-l 

Appendix II - Executive Order Establishing the 

National Space Council II-1 

Appendix III - National Space Policy Directives III-1 
Space Leadership 

Space is vita.@ important to our nation’s futzm and . . . to the 

quality of lif hen2 on &rtb . . . It oflets a tecbmlogic~frontier, mating 

$2~ for tomonvw. And space progmns inspiE an interest in mutb, 

science, and engineering in young people - knowledge so irrtpow 

for a competitiveji&mz?. Space offeets us the chance to unlock semts 

billions of years aid and billions of light-years away. Space fi the 

manifest destination of a new generation and a new centmy. 

- President George Bush 

At the outset of this Administration, as the U.S. space program entered its 

fourth decade, a series of challenges faced space policymakers. Many of 

those challenges were the result of past policy decisions. We were just 

beginning to emerge from the shadow of the Challenger accident that had 

paralyzed our space program for over two years. The return to reliance on 

our aging expendable launch systems and our continuing dependence on the 

Space Shuttle had revealed the shortcomings of our overall space transportation capability in terms of both cost and performance. These 

shortcomings, among others, were placing U.S. companies at a competitive 

disadvantage in world markets for space goods and services, where a variety 

of foreign players were increasingly reaping the rewards of more deliberate 

and effective government support. 

Other challenges were the result of relatively new developments, including 

the demand for information to understand potential threats to the global 

environment. Speculation about the extent to which natural phenomena as 
Final Report to the Pmidend on the U.S. Spme F’rvgrm 

well as human-induced activities were contributing to adverse global 

environmental changes placed new requirements on the U.S. space program 

for reliable space-based data collection and systems to analyze that data. 

But perhaps most significant were the more recent sweeping global political 

and economic changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 

concomitant decline in U.S. defense spending, a global economic recession, 

and new and often conflicting demands on U.S. spending priorities all affected 

the U.S. space program and required - and continue to require - 

fundamental changes in U.S. space policy. 

During these past four years, and particularly during this period of 

upheaval, this Administration has remained steadfast in its commitment to 

maintain U.S. leadership in space. Space contributes to our quality of life, to 

our national competitiveness, to the acquisition of knowledge, to our national 

prestige, and to our economy. 

Space is also assuming an increasingly important role in our national 

security. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that even with the Soviet 

threat diminished, threats to global security will continue to exist, and space 

will be crucial to our ability to provide for our national defense and maintain 

global stability. 

The National Space Council, established by President Bush at the outset of 

the Administration, has provided direction and continuity during this period 

of great change. It was charged with developing recommendations for the 

President on space policy, developing a strategy for national space activities, 

and monitoring and coordinating the implementation of U.S. national space 

policy. It brought together the leaders of the departments, agencies, and 

White House offices with space program oversight and laid a comprehensive 

policy foundation for the U.S. space program. 

Early on, the Council’s efforts were focused on five strategic objectives: 

l To develop U.S. space launch capability and related infrastructure as a 

nation31 resource, 

2 
Space Leadership 

l To open the frontiers of space through both human and robotic 

exploration, 

l To intensify our use of space in solving problems here on Earth, 

l To use space to foster our economic well-being, and 

l To ensure the freedom of space for exploration, development, and 

security. 

Much was accomplished. America was challenged to build on its 

pioneering achievements in space exploration by moving forward with Space 

Station Freedom, returning to the Moon, and mounting a human expedition 

to Mars. Aggressive research and technology efforts were supported and 

enhanced through programs like the National Aerospace Plane (NASP). A 

commercial launch policy was developed to address the trading environment 

in which U.S. fiis compete with a variety of foreign entities, and guidelines 

were issued to support and encourage commercial space activities at home. 

A national space launch strategy was established, calling for a transition away 

from our current expensive, inefficient systems through the development of 

a new, less costly, and more responsive family of launch vehicles. New 

international cooperative projects were undertaken with our traditional 

partners as well as with Russia. The civil remote sensing program was 

renewed and strengthened. These, and other accomplishments, are 

documented in this report. 

On the assumption, however, that the post-Cold War era will require 

additional near-term and long-term adjustments to our space program, the 

Vice President’s Space ‘Policy Advisory Board was tasked last summer to 

undertake a series of forward-looking assessments. This nonpartisan group 

of experts was asked to consider what changes might be necessary for more 

effective implementation of our space launch strategy, to preserve our critical 

U.S. space industrial base, and to achieve an overall space policy structure 

that more accurately reflects current national and international conditions. 

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Final Report to the Pwideti on the U.S. Space Program 

In three reports released recently, the Board recommended the continuation 

of several important Administration initiatives: to develop a new, cost-effective 

space launch system, to streamline acquisition and regulatory mechanisms, to 

foster and support U.S. private sector commercial ventures, to improve the 

space support infrastructure, and to aggressively pursue science and 

technology. The Board also recommended significant changes in the way the 

U.S. space program is managed and organized, as well as other important 

changes highlighted in this report. 

When viewed as a whole, the seven National Space Policy Directives 

(NSPDs) signed by President Bush over the last four years, several other 

decision memoranda and policy statements, six major nonpartisan assessments 

including the three recent studies, a series of international agreements, as well 

as an aggressive commitment of resources, defme the history of this 

Administration’s stewardship of the space program, the policy foundation it 

has laid, and the challenges that lie ahead for the next administration. Many 

of these milestones are noted in an appendix to this report. 

The following section highlights the policy initiatives and activities 

undertaken by the Administration in the areas of space transportation, national 

security, civil space, and space commerce and trade. The concluding section 

contains a series of policy recommendations that build on the 

accomplishments of this and preceding administrations and recently 

completed Advisory Board policy assessments. They are intended to assist the 

next administration in the important deliberations it will undertake on the 

future of this critical national asset. 

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Space Transportation 

America’s space launch capability is the fundamental building block for all 

of its space activities. Yet the United States fmds itself at a critical juncture. 

Our systems were developed decades ago, they are expensive to build and 

operate, and they lack operability and responsiveness. ‘The policy decisions 

of the late 197Os, which committed the nation to exclusive reliance on the 

Space Shuttle, led to the termination of all investments in expendable launch 

vehicle (ELV) infrastructure. Following the Challenger accident, the nation 

was forced to spend more than $12 billion to restore ELV operations and 

transfer satellites designed for the Space Shuttle back to these aging launchers. 

Thus, our early decision to rely totally on the Space Shuttle delayed needed 

improvements in space launch by some two decades. 

The Space Shuttle has now been returned to full flight status, and during 

the past year it flew eight times, more than in any year since before the 

Challenger accident. Of the total time Space Shuttles have spent in orbit, 20 

percent occurred during the past year. In addition, a record seven out of 

eight flights were launched on schedule. This has been accomplished while 

simultaneously reducing operational costs and maintaining creel safety. 

The loss of American dominance in the international launch market to 

foreign competitors demonstrates the importance of continued investments in 

space transportation technology and infrastructure. This is among the lessons 

to be learned from the stable funding and commitment to improved 
Final Report to the Prmident on the U.S. Space Prvgruna 

performance we see overseas. ‘The most conspicuous example is Europe’s 

Ariane V program, which promises to result in a low-cost, reliable, and 

improved launch system for worldwide users. 

Several exercises conducted under National Space Council auspices over 

the past three years have attempted to focus informed attention on the need 

to strengthen America’s space launch capability. First, The Report of the 

Advbory Committee on the Futzm of the U.S. Space Rvgmm, chaired by Mr. 

Norman Augustine, Chief Executive Officer of Martin Marietta, recommended 

the development of a new national launch system. The so-called Augustine 

Committee found that the most significant deficiency in the nation’s future 

civil space program is the lack of a reliable, flexible, and efficient space 

launch capability. The Committee recommended strongly that the nation 

move ahead quickly to develop a more robust launch capability. 

The need for a new launch capability has been reinforced by every 

government study and outside advisory panel that has addressed this issue 

since the Augustine Committee report and, indeed, since the Challenger 

accident. Key members of the National Space Council, including the NASA 

Administrator and the Secretary of Defense, agree strongly with this 

recommendation. 

In July 1991, the President issued the National Space Launch Strategy, NSPD 

4, that established a long-range plan to meet America’s space launch needs 

well into the next century. Agencies were directed to: 

l Ensure that existing space launch capabilities, including support facilities, 

are sufficient to meet U.S. government manned and unmanned launch 

needs; 

l Develop a new, man-rateable, space launch system to reduce costs and 

improve performance; 

l Sustain a vigorous space launch technology program to apply to both 

existing and new space launch systems; and 

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Status of the US. Sbace Rmmam 

l Actively consider commercial space launch needs and factor those needs 

into the decisions on improvements in space launch facilities and vehicles. 

The environment in which these directives were to be implemented, 

however, has changed significantly with increasing international competition 

and difficult fiscal realities at home. Recognizing the urgency to refine our 

space transportation objectives and devise an effective implementation plan, 

a Task Group of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, led by 

former Secretary of the Air Force E.C. (Pete) Aldridge, Jr., recently conducted 

a study on The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Cq?ability. The report, 

released in November 1992, endorsed the 1991 National Space Launch 

Strategy, but found that implementation by the key government agencies, 

Congress, and industry had not been adequate. Specifically, it found that 

while the United States is meeting the minimum basic needs of launching 

payloads into space to support government and commercial missions, it is not 

taking advantage of new efficient, reliable, and low-cost technological and 

manufacturing concepts. As a consequence, we are lagging farther behind 

virtually every other national or multinational launch program. 

The principal recommendation of the Task Group was that the government 

should develop a new launch vehicle, dubbed “Spacelifter.” Recognizing that 

at least 85 percent of U.S. launch requirements are in the range of 20,000 

pounds - or less - to low Earth orbit, the Spacelifter program would focus 

initially on a medium-lift capability to satisfy most national payload 

requirements, but would have growth potential to fulfill heavier lift 

requirements up to 50,000 pounds. 

The Task Group suggested that the development of a personnel launch 

system and a cargo transfer and return vehicle compatible with the Spacelifter 

could allow a phaseout of the Space Shuttle system by about 2005, with 

prudent time for overlap. The group also endorsed the Administration’s 

commitment to NASP, and to other advanced technology programs such as 

space nuclear power and propulsion. NASP development, in particular, lays 

the foundation for revolutionary improvements in space launch and 

hypersonic flight, and can contribute to continued U.S. leadership in 

aerospace into the 2lst century. 

7 
Find Report to the President on the U.S. Space proRrm?a 

Finally, the Task Group recommended centralizing space launch 

management, continuing infrastructure improvements, and supporting 

advanced technology development. 

As Dr. Sally Ride stated in her 1987 report, Leaakrsbip and America’s Future 

in Space, “From now until the mid-l!?%, Earth-to-orbit transportation is 

NASA’s most pressing problem.” During the intervening five years, efforts to 

secure support for a new launch system have been largely unsuccessful. The 

failure of our institutions - U.S. Government agencies, Congress, and the 

aerospace companies - to converge and agree to support and fund a new 

launch system not only is shortsighted, but will prevent us from achieving 

many - if not most - of our long-term space objectives. Though blame can 

be assigned to all parties, little will be gained from fmger pointing. We must 

move ahead. I.f the United States is to control its own destiny in space, a 

nonpartisan effort must be directed immediately to implement a new launch 

program. 

National Security 

The importance of a strong military space program to U.S. national security 

was clearly demonstrated during the Persian Gulf crisis. The superiority of 

U.S. space communications, navigation, weather reporting, reconnaissance, 

surveillance, remote sensing, and early warning systems was critical to the 

success of the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm. Secretary of 

Defense Dick Cheney later noted that our space systems were a prime 

example “of the way technology went to work making our troops more 

effective and . . . safer.” Control of space was essential to our ability to 

prosecute the war quickly, successfully, and with minimum loss of American 

personnel. 

Space assets enhance the ability of U.S. forces to reach their objectives and 

act as “force multipliers” for our air, sea, and land forces. The advanced 

command, control, and communications network provided by these assets 

reduces the size of the force necessary to accomplish a mission. Suppofi for 

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Status of the U.S. Space Bvgmm 

ground and air operations during the Gulf War came from a combination of 

military and civil space systems. 

Accurate, realtime weather information provided by the Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program, combined with satellites of the National 

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), was critical to the 

success of our air operations and saved American and coalition forces lives. 

The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) - a constellation of 

satellites that can transmit extremely accurate position information to handheld receivers - was used for the first time in combat and was invaluable in 

guiding coalition forces movements across trackless desert sands. In contrast, 

some Iraqi units were unable to navigate in their own terrain, lacking access 

to space-based positioning systems. 

The Defense Support Program, our early warning satellite system, allowed 

rapid identification of Iraqi Scud missile launches and quick alerts to our 

troops, enabling Patriot missile batteries to target and destroy the incoming 

missiles. The Landsat satellite broad-area, multispectral images of the Persian 

Gulf region were extremely valuable in the preparation of tactical maps for 

combat operations. Surveillance systems helped identify enemy targets and 

validated the success of allied strikes. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cohn Powell, noted that 

the ability of the United States to use military force effectively relied heavily 

on support from the “high ground” of space. The important role of space 

systems to the success of Desert Storm did not go unnoticed by our allies, or 

by our potential future adversaries. Accordingly, many nations are moving to 

acquire space systems to improve their military capabilities. 

For the past twenty years, the United States has been ambivalent and 

indecisive about the desirability of maintaining a comprehensive space control 

capability. Until the early 197Os, the United States operated an antisatellite 

(ASAT) missile system capable of destroying space-based assets of our 

adversaries. Its principal purpose was to deny the use of space to the former 

Soviet Union in time of war. That program was terminated and a successor 

9 
Final Rebort to the President on the U.S. Space Frv~ram 

program, the Air Force Miniature Homing Vehicle, was never deployed 

operationally. 

Supporters of an ASAT system have argued that the capability to deny the 

use of space to an adversary can add great protection to U.S. land, sea, and 

air forces during hostile military action. Its opponents, however, have argued 

that U.S. interests are best protected by seeking to avoid an “ASAT race” with 

the former Soviet Union, thereby preserving a “space sanctuary.” But the 

proliferation of space systems has changed profoundly the space control 

equation, and the “space sanctuary” concept has been overtaken by events. 

Sixteen nations today have some degree of indigenous capability to employ 

militarily useful satellites. That number is expected to double by the 

beginning of the next century. Had the Iraqis possessed militarily useful 

space systems during Operation Desert Storm, coalition maneuvers could have 

been detected and many American lives might have been lost. 

To counter such threats, the nation more than ever needs a comprehensive 

space control capability, including space surveillance systems that can detect 

and track hostile objects in space, satellites that are impervious to interference 

from hostile forces, and a comprehensive antisatellite capability to deny the 

military use of space to future enemies. The United States would never 

tolerate the flight of enemy airborne reconnaissance vehicles over U.S. military 

forces. Similarly, the United States should not allow hostile space-based 

reconnaissance systems to overfly and threaten U.S. forces with impunity. 

In addition, we must continue to demand that all our space partners 

comply with current nonproliferation treaties and norms, and continue to 

ensure adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and other nonproliferation guidelines. While it is unlikely that we can halt completely the 

proliferation of space technology to destabilizing regimes, at a minimum we 

must make every effort to hinder and slow down the acquisition of such 

systems. 

Many national security space systems have applications in the civil space 

sector, and vice versa. Our current fleet of ELVs was originally designed and 

built to meet defense requirements. The Space Shuttle was also designed, in 

10 
Status of the U.S. Spae Pmgram 

part, to fulfill military requirements. These government launch systems 

opened the door for the emergence of commercial launch providers and 

supported our civil systems. Defense satellites are being used for many 

civilian applications including air traffic control, general navigation, terrain and 

feature mapping, global environmental observation, and space debris tracking. 

The GPS navigation system, developed and operated by the Air Force, was 

made available for civilian applications when it frost became operational. 

Today, GPS applications abound, and we may one day become as dependent 

on this technology as we are on the telephone today. GPS assists surveyors, 

geologists, fishermen, hunters, and campers and is used for auto and truck 

fleet management and air navigation. The United States has also permitted 

access to GPS for use in international air traffic control. 

President Bush’s decision to begin the process of decompartmentalization 

and declassification of information about the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO) and its capabilities will enable the United States to make better use of 

those assets. By disseminating information cgathered by satellites built and 

operated by the NRO, we will expand the use of our intelligence-gathering 

systems into innovative and nontraditional secondary missions such as 

environmental monitoring. In addition, systems and technology under 

development for the Strategic Defense Initiative, particularly Brilliant Eyes, can 

be used to enhance our environmental monitoring program. 

Similarly, commercial sector space systems have many national security 

applications. Commercial communications satellites were used by coalition 

military forces in Operation Desert Storm. Scientific and commercial Earthobservation systems provided useful low-resolution data for military mapping 

and broad-area surveillance. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

and NOAA regularly exchange space-derived weather data. 

Fostering linkages such as these and increasing the synergism between civil 

and national security space operations are important elements of a successful 

national space program in the 21 st century. The emphasis on space programs 

within the defense budget must remain strong, because our nation’s space 

assets are a critical force multiplier and the backbone of an effective military 

capability. In addition, investing in space systems keeps our defense and 

11 
Find Report to the I%sident on the U.S. Space Program 

commercial industrial base healthy, maintains American leadership in 

advanced technology, and strengthens the competitiveness of our industry in 

the international marketplace. 

Civil Space 

When the history of the 20th century is written, the achievements of 

America’s civil space program will stand among the great events of the era. 

Mercury, Gemini, Voyager, Viking, and especially Apollo will be recorded as 

great triumphs of technology, engineering, perseverance, and national will. 

Through these accomplishments, America has earned the respect and 

admiration of the world, fired the collective imagination, and inspired our 

youth. We have produced science and technology that have improved the 

lives of people around the globe. And we have achieved and maintained our 

civil space policy goal of space leadership. 

At the start of this Administration, however, the civil space program was 

widely viewed with concern. Recovery from the 1986 Space Shuttle accident 

had been time-consuming and difficult. A series of widely reported technical 

problems was sapping public enthusiasm and draining the morale of NASA 

employees. There was a lack of consensus about where the space program 

should be going. 

Recommendations had been provided to the previous administration by the 

National Commission on Space, chaired by Dr. Tom Paine. Dr. Sally Ride had 

also published a report identifying the need for challenging new goals. But 

the choices called for in these reports had not been made. The National 

Academy of Sciences and the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

provided reports to the new administration in 1989. Each called for decisive 

actions to rejuvenate America’s civil space efforts. 

As a result, the civil space program was an early and frequent focus of the 

National Space Council. The Council used a combination of internal policy 

reviews and external advisory committees to assist in this effort. 

12 
Status of the U.S. Space Bqyam 

Perhaps most notable among these was the Advisory Committee on the 

Future of the U.S. Space Program, the Augustine Committee. That group, 

which included many of the nation’s most respected space authorities, 

conducted a far-reaching assessment of the future of the civil space program, 

including both management issues and program content. The Committee 

heard from all branches of government, visited many space facilities across the 

country, and took testimony or otherwise received the advice of hundreds of 

citizens. 

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The Committee’s recommendations called for fundamental changes in the 

civil space program. At the core of its conclusions was the recommendation 

that the space program’s goals be organized around two central missions: 

First, a Mission to Planet Earth, to use space to observe the Earth and its 

environment to facilitate the study of environmental change and the potential 

for global warming. Second, a Mission from Planet Earth, to explore space 

through both human and robotic missions with the goal of returning to the 

Moon and mounting a human expedition to Mars. The Committee 

recommended that both missions be supported by a solid base of 

transportation infrastructure, science, and technology. 

The Augustine Committee also recommended a series of management and 

organizational changes designed to streamline the execution of programs and 

to focus in the future on smaller, less expensive programs that could be% 

accomplished relatively quickly. 

These core recommendations, as well as many other specific program and 

policy recommendations, were widely endorsed in the space community and 

in the Congress, formed the basis for many of the Administration’s subsequent 

policy decisions and actions, and have continued to guide both Administration 

policymakers and department and agency managers. 

Mission to Planet Earth 

Mission to Planet Earth is an effort to use space-based assets to better 

understand the Earth as an integrated system by exploring climatic, ecological, 

13 
Find Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program 

and environmental changes. In recent years we have become acutely aware 

that human actions, as well as natural phenomena, can affect the environment 

on a global scale. Space provides a uniquely broad vantage point from which 

our expertise in remote sensing can be used to determine whether global 

warming is in fact occurring, to study deforestation and land erosion, and 

even to detect and examine earthquakes. 

The Administration’s efforts to support this core element of our civil space 

program were focused on its two key programmatic elements - the Earth 

Observing System (EOS) and the Landsat earth remote sensing program. 

The Landsat program presented the National Space Council with its frost 

challenge. Landsat remote sensing imagery is important not only for global 

change research and environmental monitoring, but for national security, law 

enforcement, natural resource estimates, and a host of commercial enterprises. 

In early 1989, the program faced termination as a result of a decision in 

previous years to commercialize the program. This decision had been based 

on faulty assumptions about private sector demand for Landsat data, and the 

absence of near-term commercial viability had resulted in a funding crisis. 

. 

The National Space Council, meeting for the first time in May 1989, 

recognized that Landsat data was critical to a host of civil and national security 

activities as well as to the private sector, and that commercialization of the 

program would not be feasible in the foreseeable future. It recommended 

that the government provide near-term operational funding and that a solution 

be found to ensure the long-term stability of the program, recommendations 

supported by a Presidential decision. 

Subsequent decisions by the Administration, including National Space 

Policy Directive 5, guaranteed stable funding and management for the 

program. The Administration and the Congress worked together to enact 

legislation which will ensure that continuity of Landsat-type data is maintained 

for the foreseeable future. The legislation will also encourage future 

commercial opportunities in remote sensing by: 

l Supporting investment in new remote sensing technologies, 

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Status of the U.S. Space Progrmn 

l Removing unnecessary restrictions on the dissemination of privately 

gathered data, 

l Streamlining the licensing process for private remote sensing systems, and 

l Encouraging growth of the market for remote sensing data by pricing 

federally provided data at the cost of fulfiiing user requests, but no higher. 

The EOS program presented the Administration with a different set of 

challenges. EOS is a constellation of satellites, and a complementary data 

handling system, designed to measure worldwide environmental parameters 

such as air and ocean temperature, humidity levels, and atmospheric 

chemistry. It is a key component of the U.S. program for environmental 

research, an effort in which the United States is investing more resources than 

the rest of the world combined. The program enjoys broad support within 

the Administration, the Congress, and the space and environmental 

communities. It will produce quantities of data an order of magnitude beyond 

what is currently available, and will provide the basis on which future 

environmental policies can be based. 

However, there was mounting concern that the space-based component of 

the program was centered around two large, unnecessarily complex and 

expensive satellites. These two satellites, each carrying a large array of 

instruments, put large segments of the program at risk of single-point failure, 

and the entire program at considerable budget and schedule risk. 

The Augustine Committee recommended that consideration be given to 

restructuring the program and deploying, instead, “a combination of different 

size spacecraft.” A panel of technical experts, led by Dr. Edward Frieman, 

Director of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, was commissioned to assess 

this recommendation. The Frieman panel concluded that the two large 

satellite platforms should be broken down into a series of smaller platforms, 

each with fewer instruments. This resulted in a Presidential decision, 

embodied in National Space Policy Directive 7, to redesign the system using 

an architecture of smaller satellites. 
Final Report to the Pmident on the U.S. Space Frvgmm 

NSPD 7, issued in June 1992, established a comprehensive, multiagency 

Space-based Global Change Observation System to address global warming 

and other potentially adverse environmental changes. In addition to directing 

NASA to develop EOS using small and intermediate-sized satellites, it assigned 

global change observation functions to various government agencies, and 

encouraged international cooperation in global change observation. 

Significantly, classified national security information and archives are now 

being made available to support our environmental monitoring efforts. 

Mission from Planet Earth 

NASA’s Mission from Planet Earth is nearly as old as NASA itself. Among 

the frost missions the nation embarked upon in the earliest days of the space 

pro&m were human missions into space, including landings on the Moon, 

and robotic missions to explore the planets. 

At the outset of this Administration, the human exploration component of 

NASA’s Mission from Planet Earth was focused almost exclusively on two 

programs - the operational Space Shuttle program and the developmental 

Space Station program. The space Shuttle is a multipurpose program, but its 

principal function is to provide transportation to and from space. Secondarily 

it serves as a temporary laboratory in space, but it lacks the capability to 

provide the research and scientific data that a permanent Earth-orbiting space 

station could provide. 

The potential benefits of deploying an Earth-orbiting station in space were 

recognized and understood long before access to space became a reality in 

the late 1950s. Early space science pioneers, Wemher von Braun and others 

before him, had conceived of plans for a human outpost in Earth orbit that 

would be the steppingstone for human exploration of the Moon and the 

planets. A space station had remained a distant goal throughout the first two 

decades of the space program. 

In 1984, President Reagan approved a plan for NASA to begin development 

of what is now known as Space Station Freedom. The designs for the Space 
Status of the U.S. Space Pmgrm 

Station that had emerged were for a facility that - like the Space Shuttle - 

would serve many purposes. It would be a laboratory for scientific research 

on the effects of long-term exposure to a zero-gravity environment on 

humans, enabling preparation for long-duration human spaceflights. It would 

serve as a transportation depot for equipment and supplies for other space 

missions. It would contain laboratories for research on materials processing 

in space, potentially leading to breakthroughs and applications in chemistry, 

medicine, and physics. It would be used as a platform for Earth remote 

sensing and as an astronomical observatory, and provide for a host of other 

applications. 

Amid the multiplicity of demands on both the Space Shuttle and the Space 

Station, however, there did not exist a clear focus on longer term human 

exploration goals, nor was there a plan or policy in place that outlined the 

next incremental step. Where were humans to go next and what were they 

to do? 

On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo Moon landing, 

President Bush outlined just such a long-term vision for human space 

exploration by proposing to the nation that it complete Space Station 

Freedom, then return to the Moon - “this time to stay” - and mount a 

human expedition to Mars. He directed the National Space Council to begin 

developing policies and plans to accomplish these objectives. 

In March 1990, the President issued the first of several policy decisions on 

what became known as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). In that first 

decision, he directed that the SE1 give early focus to technology development 

and a search for new and innovative technical approaches. The Moon and 

Mars missions were to be driven not by schedule, but by investments in highleverage, innovative technologies that would have the potential to improve 

mission cost, schedule, and performance and could enhance the nation’s 

technology base. He also directed that several years be invested in defining 

two or more significantly different mission architectures from which later 

policymakers could choose, while developing and demonstrating technologies 

broad enough to support all. 

17 
Find ReDort to the President on the U.S. Sbace Fm~?ram 

At the request of the Administration, Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, USAF 

(Ret), a former astronaut and space pioneer, led a group of technical experts 

that developed a set of mission architectures and identified key enabling 

technologies to be developed. Their findings and recommendations are 

contained in The Report of tbe Synthesis Gmup on America’s Space 

Exploration Initiative, released in June 1991. 

Additionally, the President directed that consideration be given to inviting 

other nations to participate in SEI, including our partners in Space Station 

Freedom, other traditional allies, and the former Soviet Union. 

Based upon the so-called Synthesis Group report and Presidential decisions, 

NASA developed a long-term plan for accomplishing Moon and Mars missions. 

Two near-term precursor orbital missions to the Moon are planned, followed 

by an unmanned lunar lander. A goal of NASA’s longer term plans for 

manned Moon and Mars missions is to provide significant technology and 

science benefits to the nation and to challenge young engineers and scientists. 

In the meantime, however, the Space Station program had experienced 

several crises. The initial cost projections had seriously understated the 

funding requirements for the program. Out-year funding profiles began to 

grow by significant margins, and the annual appropriations debates in 

Congress had become increasingly contentious. Several serious attempts to 

cancel the program were supported by significant numbers of members in 

both houses, beginning in the late 1980s. During this period, several 

redesigns of the facility were initiated - some at the direction of Congress - 

which reduced the Station’s costs and capabilities, but the debate continued. 

A contributing factor was the overall magnitude of the funding requirements 

combined with a lack of confidence that cost growth would not continue. 

Another was concern that the Space Shuttle would not be able to perform the 

relatively large number of flights required to deploy and operate the program. 

But central to the debate was the lack of a well-understood program focus. 

Among the many arguments made was that most of the requirements for the 

program could be better met by a series of discrete, focused efforts - both 

on Earth and in space - and at considerably less overall cost. 

18 
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fm (1

Status of the U.S. Space Frvgram 

In early 1991, the National Space Council undertook an overall assessment 

of the program in the course of a review of NASA’s most recent redesign of 

the facility. It found that the redesign had significantly reduced development 

costs, had decreased the demands on the Space Shuttle, and had successfully 

addressed a number of other logistics problems. The Council concluded that 

though the Space Station will appropriately enable a great deal of valuable 

scientific research and innovation, the science returns may not, in and of 

themselves, justify the investment. But most significantly, it concluded that, 

in any case, pure scientific research was not the compelling rationale for the 

Space Station. It found that the underlying purpose for building and 

operating the Space Station is exploration, although the synergism of activities 

obviously provides greater weight to its overall benefit. Indeed, the Council 

concluded that the Space Station is the necessary next step in space 

exploration and Mission from Planet Earth. In so doing, it laid the policy 

foundation on which future deliberations about the Station’s merits and 

purpose can reasonably take place. And more importantly, it reaffirmed the 

Administration’s commitment to build the Space Station and to an aggressive 

Mission from Planet Earth. 

Alongside human exploration, the Mission from Planet Earth component of 

the civil space program has included a series of exciting robotic explorers. 

Scientific discoveries gained through missions such as Viking and Voyager 

provided answers to some of mankind’s oldest questions and rank among the 

greatest accomplishments of the modern age. But during the 198Os, our civil 

space resources were focused on the development of the Space Shuttle, and 

funding for robotic exploration was curtailed. 

However, a new age of robotic exploration began with the launch of the 

Magellan mission to Venus in 1989. M:lellan was a spectacular success. 

Galileo is now on its way to Jupiter, and the Mars Observer spacecraft will 

reach that planet in August 1993. Cassini is being readied for its exploration 

of Saturn and its moon, Titan. Meanwhile, the Hubble Space Telescope is 

unlocking secrets of distant galaxies. Additional Great Observatories are 

planned including the Advanced X-ray Astronomy Facility, which will gather 

exciting new scientific information about the origin and nature of the universe. 

19 
Firm’ Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program 

But the size and complexity of this new generation of robotic spacecraft 

resulted in development programs that stretched out over a decade or more 

and cost many hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars. Because of 

the high cost of each program, there were few of them, leaving the careers of 

many astronomers and planetary scientists heavily dependent on the success 

of a single spacecraft. And because of the long development times, many 

scientists will have dedicated large portions of their professional lifetimes to 

a single project before they receive the first scientific return. 

Also, because robotic exploration programs are so few, so large, and so 

expensive, the consequences of technical problems are magnified. Any single 

failure can have an enormous scientific impact and can seriously undermine 

public confidence and support for the space program. Hubble’s flawed mirror 

and Galileo’s jammed communications antenna are current examples. For 

these and other reasons, many promising young students, are turning away ,. 

from space sciences and applying themselves to other disciplines. 

The crisis in space science is broadly recognized, and it reflects a problem 

that needs to be addressed. Beginning right away, new programs should be 

designed in ways that allow construction and launch to occur in no more than 

about five years. This will keep costs down and allow a greater number and 

variety of programs to be conducted. Some of these programs should look 

outward beyond the region that mankind can aspire to visit - toward Pluto, 

for example. An increasing share of scientific effort should be focused on 

learning more about our human exploration goals - the Moon and Mars. As 

much as any other aspect of the space program, civil science and robotic 

exploration demand faster, better, and less costly systems. 

International Space Activity 

The United States has sought to involve foreign partners in its civil space 

program from its inception. The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 

which established NASA, charged it with conducting its activities in ways that 

contribute “materially to . . . cooperation by the United States with other 

nations.” For more than three decades our cooperative initiatives have 

20 
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.j 

m 

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Status qf the U.S. Spuce Program 

resulted in important and highly successful research missions and space 

infrastructure programs. 

During the four years of the Bush Administration, both the volume and 

range of our projects with international partners have increased. mdeed, with 

the exception of advanced technology development and applications projects 

with commercial potential, virtually every area of NASA activity now involves 

international partners. The preeminent example of this is Space Station 

Freedom, the largest international science and technology project ever 

undertaken, which is currently being developed by the United States along 

with Europe, Canada, and Japan. Each of our partners has made a large, 

long-term financial commitment, and Space Station-related work now 

dominates their overall space programs. Each partner will contribute 

substantial hardware and expertise to the Station, and all will share 

responsibility for its operation. 

A review of the major projects completed during this past year 

demonstrates further the degree to which international partnerships have 

become integral to achievement of our overall national space goals. These 

included the Topex/Poseidon satellite, a joint U.S./French project to study 

ocean circulation and its role in regulating global climate, which was 

successfully launched in August on a European Ariane vehicle; several Space 

Shuttle missions such as the International Microgravity Laboratory, involving 

experiments from Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States, flown in 

January with an international crew; the first Atmospheric Laboratory for 

Applications and Science (ATLAS) mission in March, which involved a full 

complement of international instruments and an international crew; and, a 

joint U.S./Japanese Spacelab mission in September that involved 34 Japanese 

experiments and the first Japanese payload specialist flown aboard the Shuttle. 

This past year also saw a historic reshaping of our relationship with the 

republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia. During Russian 

President Boris Yeltsin’s June visit to Washington, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin 

signed a new space cooperation agreement, which provides the basis for new 

and important interaction between the worlds two major space powers in a 

wide range of areas - space science, exploration, and applications. 
Final Report to the Fmidenl on the U.S. Space Program 

Soon after this agreement was signed, we and the Russians moved swiftly 

to implement a number of ambitious initiatives that had been proposed during 

the June meetings. In July, NASA signed a contract with the Russian space 

entity IWO Energia to study potential application of specialized Russian 

hardware in our spaceflight and exploration programs, in particular the 

possible use of the Russian Soyuz-TM vehicle as an interim Assured Crew 

Return Vehicle for Space Station Freedom. In October, NASA and the Russian 

Space Agency signed an agreement on a series of joint human spaceflight 

missions: Russian cosmonauts will fly on the Space Shuttle in November of 

this year and American astronauts will be aboard the Russian Mir Space 

Station for as long as 90 days in 1995. Also in 1995, the Space Shuttle will 

rendezvous and dock with Mir using a Russian docking system that will 

ultimately be used for Space Station Freedom. In October we signed an 

agreement on the flight of two U.S. scientific instruments on the Russian Mars 

‘94 mission. All told, 1992 was the most dynamic year of cooperative activity 

in the history of America’s space program. 

Not coincidentally, we engaged in this activity with countries that are also 

among our strongest industrial competitors. Budgetary constraints and the 

inherent desirability of pursuing certain important goals jointly will continue 

to increase the pressure for more cooperation with an ever more diverse 

group of players. Successful partnerships can generate positive results: 

international good wilI, a favorable impression of U.S. policies and programs, 

and a constructive means for demonstrating U.S. scientific and technological 

leadership. But we cannot lose sight of the elements that form the basis for 

success - careful integration of first-rate technical and scientific resources and 

a sense that the interests of all partners have been advanced by virtue of their 

interaction. 

It is important to note that the primary motivation for joint pursuit of space 

goals is and always has been self-interest. This is true of us and it is true of 

our partners, old and new alike. It is also true, though often 

unacknowledged, that the expertise and systems possessed by the world’s 

major space powers are the results of strategic decisions to enhance national 

scientific, technological, and industrial performance. These strategic 

objectives, not foreign policy objectives, are now driving space programs 

22 
Status of the U.S. Space Frvgrmn 

worldwide. The potential partners for important cooperative space activity are 

now so numerous precisely because their efforts to achieve these objectives 

have yielded such impressive results. Cooperative projects are assessed by 

individual countries, in large part, from the standpoint of their potential to 

advance these objectives further. 

Our challenge is to devise policies and procedures that encourage 

maximum mutually beneficial engagement with international partners across 

the full range of government and industrial space activity. These policies and 

procedures may need to be more flexible than those employed in the past, 

but they cannot be less protective of our national economic and security 

interests. 

Space Commerce and Trade 

A separate, nongovernmental commercial space sector was first explicitly 

addressed in the National Space Policy issued by President Bush in November 

1989. That document highlights the value of U.S. commercial space activity 

by noting that “expanding private sector investment in space by the marketdriven commercial sector generates economic benefits for the Nation and 

supports governmental space sectors with an increasing range of space goods 

and services.” 

Total revenue from U.S. commercial space activity was at least $5 billion in 

1992 and is growing at a rate of about 20 percent per year. The largest 

portion of these revenues was generated by the communications satellite 

industry. The space communications equipment and services industries are 

the most mature and fastest growing elements of U.S. commercial space 

activity. Superior technology and manufacturing techniques have made 

American industry the world leader in this area and secured for it roughly 70 

percent of satellite sales to domestic and international customers in 1992. U.S. 

companies are continuing to develop the most innovative and commercially 

promising satellite applications. 

-23 
Final Report to the Fhzsideti on the U.S. Space Program 

More recently, space transportation has become another important 

commercial activity in the United States. Unlike communications satellite 

systems, which have been privately operated since the 196Os, private entities 

were only permitted and encouraged to operate space launch systems starting 

in the early 1980s. The first major private commercial U.S. launch did not 

take place until August 1989. In contrast to all foreign competitors, U.S. 

companies have invested more than $700 miltion of their private capital in 

vehicle upgrades and infrastructure improvements. These companies have 

secured roughly 50 percent of the launch contracts competed openly in 

domestic and international markets. 

U.S. leadership in any area of space activity, but particularly commercial 

space activity, requires technological preeminence. As emphasized elsewhere 

in this report, the United States is not currently meeting this requirement in 

the space transportation area. Every major space policy report since 1985 

reflects the view expressed in the Aldridge Report: “The failure to fund [a 

next-generation launch vehicle] is equivalent to an implicit policy decision to 

forego U.S. competitiveness in space launch and increase the long-term cost 

to the government.” Although we have emphasized commercial activity in our 

space policy statements, we have tended to lose sight of a fundamental reality 

in the launch arena: Virtually all launch systems in operation in the world 

today were developed by governments. And, unlike the United States, all 

other nations involved in commercial launch either have a highly efficient 

launch capability or are attempting to develop one. 

At the same time, we should not overlook one of this Administration’s 

major commercial space policy accomplishments: recognition that technology 

development is only one side of the commercial coin. The advantages that 

can be derived from developing the best technologies - whether in launch 

systems or spacecraft - will be blunted, if not negated, without rules of fair 

play in markets for space goods and services. U.S. satellite and launch vehicle 

manufacturers should have access to foreign customers that is comparable to 

the access foreign suppliers have to the large domestic U.S. market. We 

define commercial space activity in the National Space Policy and elsewhere 

as noqouemrnetiul, an element largely unique to the United States. Our 

satellite and launch vehicle manufacturers are private companies, not state

24 
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Status of the U.S. Space Pmgram 

owned or -managed enterprises, as is the case not only in China and Russia, 

but in Europe as well. In all markets in which U.S. companies must compete, 

domestic and foreign, either their competitors are the beneficiaries of 

government support that we would consider excessive or improper, or their 

competitors are governments themselves. In what is, in effect, competition 

with foreign governments, U.S. firms will have limited success without 

appropriate international standards regarding subsidies and other forms of 

government involvement in commercial space activity. 

Accordingly, NSPD 2, Commercial Space Launch Policy, calls for both 

development of new launch technology and establishment of a free and fair 

commercial launch trading environment which will, in the end, provide a level 

playing field. Relying on the detailed roadmap provided in that document, 

U.S agencies, led by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, are 

discussing guidelines and principles for international space trade with Europe, 

Russia, and China. 

m - 

m 

With respect to the domestic policy environment, the U.S. Commercial 

Space Guidelines, issued as NSPD 3 in 191, are intended to promote the 

transfer of government-developed technology to the private sector and 

encourage agencies to participate in cooperative research and development 

programs with the private sector. This directive also mandates that 

government agencies use commercially available space products and services 

to the fullest extent possible; that they make available for commercial use any 

unused capacity of space assets, services, or infrastructure; and that they 

implement new acquisition procedures such as “anchor tenancy” to promote 

commercial space enterprise. 

NASA is developing technology for direct commercial application in several 

areas. It has established 17 Centers for Commercial Development of Space - 

consortia of government, industry, and academia focusing on research with 

commercial potential. This program provides vital support to U.S. industry in 

a number of high-technology markets, including materials research, remote 

sensing, space power and propulsion, automation and robotics, and life 

sciences. Among these efforts are development of the Commercial 

Experiment Transporter system for launching and retrieving space 

25 
Final RepoH to the f%ddeti on the U.S. Space Program 

experiments, and the SPACEHAB module, an example of the government 

serving as an “anchor tenant” in a privately funded project. 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has continued its unique 

efforts to encourage commercially promising projects by providing seed 

funding and developmental assistance. These projects have included the 

development of small spacecraft experiments, known as lightsats, and the 

Pegasus launch vehicle. 

As important as these efforts to encourage commercial space enterprise 

have been, more is needed. Our long-standing efforts to streamline 

government regulations should not only be continued but accelerated. III 

addition, a Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board Task Group headed 

by Daniel J. Fink recently issued a report on The Futzm of the U.S. Space 

Indz&n2zZ Base that made several policy recommendations intended to 

facilitate the growth of the commercial space sector. Among these are 

changes in our policies on technology exports, export fmancing, and 

government procurement; market-opening measures; implementation of a fairtrade agreement; and the encouragement of multiple, small programs for 

developing space technology. And, echoing the findings of many earlier 

studies, it emphasized the urgency of developing a new low-cost, reliable 

launch system that, in addition to meeting U.S. government needs, would be 

competitive in commercial markets. 

26 
Planning for the Future 

America’s space program is a continuum of activity that stretches back more 

than three and a half decades. With its origins in the Eisenhower 

Administration, during a period in which Democrats controlled the Congress, 

the space program evolved largely independent of partisan influences. The 

triumphs of human space exploration, new scientific discoveries from a variety 

of human and robotic programs, and the continuing success of our 

intelligence and other national security programs are among the nation’s 

greatest achievements. 

Our space program was a direct outgrowth of our ideological conflict with 

the Soviet Union, and it was focused initially on demonstrating America’s 

technological capabilities. As our technology matured, an increasing number 

of applications were identified and developed, and space is now an integral 

part of our national security, intelligence, civil, and commercial infrastructure. 

The activities of the National Space Council over the past four years were 

predicated on the assumption that space infrastructure is vital to a host of 

government functions. The Council also believed that space will increasingly 

contribute to the competitiveness of the U.S. private sector in the international 

marketplace. 

Consequently, the National Space Council, and the government as a whole, 

have acted to expand activity in space. Regulations have been reduced to 

encourage commercial opportunities and foster entrepreneurship. New goals 

have been set for the civil space program, and serious efforts have been 
Find Repor, to the Prestieti on the U.S. Space Progmn 

undertaken to reform and revitalize the civil space agency. Mihtary space 

programs have continued to receive priority for funding and support even as 

overall defense spending has declined. 

The fundamental principles guiding the conduct of U.S. space activities 

were established nearly 35 years ago. The government’s basic policy, and its 

regulatory and organizational framework, still reflects the international 

tensions as well as the economic and technological constraints of the past. 

However, the world has changed in many important respects. The Cold War 

has ended. We have had a revolution in electronic and other space-related 

technologies. The international demand for space capabilities has increased 

along with the proliferation of space technology to other nations. And 

Operation Desert Storm taught us many new lessons about the military use of 

space in combat. 

These and other factors present new opportunities and new challenges. 

Overall budget constraints and reduced defense spending have made it 

necessary, more than ever before, for the United States to ensure that it gets 

maximum return from its investments in space. 

To aid in understanding whether - and what - fundamental changes are 

necessary to adjust America’s space activities to the post-Cold War era, three 

nonpartisan Task Groups of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board 

were assembled in mid-1992. The first two Groups, which dealt specifically 

with the space-related industrial base and with space launch, were discussed 

earlier in this report. Those assessments provide a foundation for addressing 

what I believe is the central question facing our space program in the postCold War era: How should our space policy be adjusted to respond to a 

changing world? 

To address this question, the third Task Group was formed under the 

leadership of the Advisory Board Chair, Dr. Laurel Wilkening, the Provost and 

Vice President for Academic Affairs at the University of Washington, and 

included policy experts from across the political spectrum. The members 

brought to this effort hundreds of man-years of experience in civil, military, 

and commercial space activities. Among its members were prominent 
scientists, business leaders, the former chairman of a key congressional 

committee, retired military leaders, industry leaders, and former government 

executives, both Democrats and Republicans. 

The Task Group’s report, A Post Cold WarAssessment of U.S. Space Policy, 

concludes that fundamental changes are needed in the way government space 

activities are organized and managed. The Task Group also found that the 

United States must take a number of steps needed to foster the 

competitiveness of its space industries and take the lead in defining a new 

cooperative strategy for expanded international cooperation in both civil and 

military space. 

mm 

The Wilkening Task Group report provides a solid basis for reshaping 

government policies. While all of these recommendations will require careful 

implementation and, in a few cases, further study, the Task Group has 

identified the core issues facing U.S. space policymakers. 

On the basis of this report, taking into account many other assessments I 

have received over the years from both organizations and individuals, and 

drawing on the individual and collective wisdom of the National Space 

Council members, I would urge the next administration to consider the 

following policy and program recommendations: 

1. 

m 

Government Organtzation 

The organizational structure that evolved during the Cold War should be 

adjusted to encourage greater cooperation and synergism and less 

duplication among government space activities. A strong White House 

focus is needed to implement those changes. Sharing technology and 

systems, consolidating management organizations, and streamlining 

program review and approval processes can substantially increase the 

return on investments and maintain America’s competitive high-technology 

edge. Implementing these changes will involve difficult political 

challenges, but it is essential if the nation is to invest in, and realize the 

benefits of, new space initiatives in the future. 
Find Report to the Bcsident on the U.S. Space hgmm 

2. Security and Classifkation 

Current security regulations should be changed. There can be no doubt 

that strict security protection was necessary to safeguard military and 

intelligence space activities in the early days of the space program. 

However, we paid a high price for this security: lack of synergism among 

government activities, higher than need-be costs, lost opportunities for 

foreign sales revenues, and restrictions on the use of data for public and 

private purposes. 

With the end of the Cold War, the national security imperative has shifted 

from the strategic threat posed by the former Soviet Union to the support 

of U.S. forces engaged in regional conflicts. Relaxed security restrictions 

can facilitate such operational support. And sharing our capabilities, 

within prudent limits, with allies and friendly states could deter the 

proliferation of space technologies, foster U.S. leadership, and enhance our 

overall national security. 

3. Space Control 

The proliferation of space capabilities internationally puts U.S. interests 

and global security at risk. Many nations have learned the lessons of 

Operation Desert Storm, including the importance of space support to the 

successful conduct of modem warfare. The United States benefited greatly 

from the freedom to exploit space in support of coalition forces. 

The intelligence community estimates that today, at least 16 nations have 

some indigenous capability to use space to support their military 

operations. By the turn of the century, this number could double. We 

should continue our aggressive efforts to curb the proliferation of these 

technologies through security and export controls. And carefully crafted 

cooperative military space agreements will reduce the incentive for some 

nations to develop indigenous space capabilities. But it is unlikely that we 

will succeed in denying this capability to all potential adversaries, and we 

should not gamble that space capabilities will not be used against us in 

30 
Phmiqg for the Ftiuf~? 

future regional conflicts. Thus, one unexpected outcome of the end of the 

Cold War is the increased need to develop and maintain our ability to 

deny the use of space to our adversaries during a crisis or in wartime. 

Space control is an area that needs attention and additional investments. 

4. Space Industry Regulation 

Our space industries evolved to meet the needs of government space 

program requirements and, as a result, have traditionally been highly 

regulated. It was an overall policy goal of this Administration to eliminate 

unnecessary government interference in private enterprise. Our spacerelated industries are capable of growth and can provide greater economic 

benefits for the nation if the process of regulatory reform is quickened and 

expanded. The new administration and the Congress should work 

together to implement the actions outlined in both the Wilkening and Fink 

Task Group reports aimed at facilitating this growth. In addition, U.S. 

agencies should give priority to concluding the pending regulatory 

proceedings on new satellite technologies and granting the authorizations 

needed to introduce these technologies into the market. 

5. International Cooperation and Trade 

In western Europe, Russia, and elsewhere the same fundamental questions 

are being asked: What should we be trying to achieve in space given the 

competing demands made for scarce resources? How do we obtain the 

greatest, most beneficial results from the resources we invest in space? I 

believe that we can do more, do it faster, and do it at lower cost through 

carefully structured cooperation with other nations. 

Our current national space policy calls for the United States to “conduct 

international space-related activities expected to achieve significant 

scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits to the nation.” 

The Wilkening Task Group recently considered our international space 

policies and concluded that expanded international cooperation presents 

31 
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Find Report to the Fmsideti on the U.S. Space proRram 

us with strategic opportunities. It recommended that the United States 

take the initiative in shaping a common international agenda in selected 

areas of civilian and national security space activity. 

Expanded international space activity can yield important benefits both for 

U.S. government space agencies and for U.S. industry. These benefits 

need not be secured at the expense of our national economic and security 

interests - interests that must be safeguarded in our dealings with 

international space cooperative and trading partners. Moreover, 

transactions involving our space assets should not be used primarily as a 

means for rewarding or stimulating desirable behavior in other areas. 

New or refined policies and procedures should be developed to guide U.S. 

government agencies and private U.S. firms that engage in international 

space activity, particularly with respect to proposed activity involving the 

space organizations of the former Soviet Union. At a minimum, these 

agencies and firms must understand the limits of their ability to enter into 

agreements involving purchase or sale of space technology. 

With respect to trade in space goods and services, the United States must 

come to terms with the fact that other spacefaring nations - including 

Japan, China, Russia, and the Europeans - are determined to establish the 

strongest possible market presence in all sectors of aerospace trade. We 

should focus more attention on the issues that will increasingly confront 

our suppliers of communications satellite equipment as competitive 

pressures in that area intensify. In the launch area, the effort to establish 

a multilateral framework for free and fair trade should be accelerated. U.S. 

agencies must redouble their efforts to achieve this goal and should avoid 

actions that impede or undermine these efforts. 

6. Space Launch 

The nation must develop a new, modem space launch capability. As we 

have stated repeatedly over the past four years, our current ELV systems 

- Titan, Atlas, and Delta - are aging. They are not responsive to the 

32 
Pkmning for the Ftiurv 

needs of spacecraft users. They are expensive to operate, which adds to 

the cost of military and civil space programs. These systems will become 

less competitive over time in the international marketplace as new foreign 

government-developed systems enter that marketplace. 

The “Spacelifter” concept recommended by the Vice President’s Space 

Policy Advisory Board represents the kind of capability the nation will 

need for the 21st century. The time has come to replace our current 

launch vehicles, and the time to effect this transition is in the early years 

of the next century when the next generation of several satellite systems 

being planned today will be ready for launch. If we delay, the nation will 

be locked into its current expensive systems for another decade or longer, 

consuming funds and foreclosing new initiatives for another generation. 

For these reasons, we should plan to phase over to a new launch 

capability by about the turn of the century. 

The Space Shuttle is also aging. It is too expensive to operate and lacks 

responsiveness. As a result, space transportation consumes too large a 

share of civil space resources, foreclosing opportunities for new science 

and new technology initiatives. 

I endorse recent efforts to reduce the cost of Space Shuttle operations, but 

believe they cannot go far enough without sacrificing safety. A serious 

assessment of human spaceflight options is needed. Our goal should be 

to begin transitioning to a more cost-effective and efficient human 

spaceflight system by about 2005 and retire the Space Shuttle program 

soon thereafter. 

7. Space Exploration 

The nation should continue to pursue a long-range goal of human space 

exploration. While Congressional concerns about affordability have 

delayed funding for the Space Exploration Initiative, the goals of a 

permanent settlement on the Moon and the human exploration of Mars are 

both achievable and affordable if managed skillfully. Future science and 

33 
Final Report to the f%wiieti on the U.S. Space Progrm 

technology initiatives should be focused on gaining the knowledge critical 

to enabling these endeavors. 

Space Station Freedom is the essential first step toward human exploration 

of the solar system. It will be mankind’s laboratory in space, providing, 

among other things, the knowledge of human physiology necessary to 

support future long-duration space flight. 

However, the Space Station will continue to be threatened by political and 

budget challenges. There have been three concerted efforts in the last 

years to cancel the program in Congress. If the nation is to have this 

important capability, there must be confidence that the facility will be 

completed within its current budget projection and on the schedule 

currently planned. The management and integration of Space Station is 

one of the most difhcult programmatic challenges facing NASA, and the 

involvement of foreign partners adds another layer of complexity. Any 

significant additional cost overruns or schedule delays will put the 

program at serious risk of termination. 

To contain costs, overhead should be reduced by consolidating 

management responsibility within a single NASA center and by assigning 

a single contractor with overall responsibility for program integration. 

Unnecessary supporting activities should also be cancelled. 

8. Faster, Cheaper, Better Programs 

The size and complexity of future programs, particularly civil science 

programs, should be constrained. The crisis in space science is primarily 

the result of too much reliance on too few large projects. The EOS 

program is among the large and important projects confronting technical 

and budget challenges. 

As originally conceived, the EOS satellites were too complex, cost too 

much, and took too long to build. Recognizing these problems the 

Frieman panel identified a number of design and program deficiencies 

34 
Pt2mni~ for the Future 

including the size of the satellites. NASA has begun restructuring .EOS 

along the lines the panel recommended. At a minimum, this restructuring 

should be completed and all the panel’s recommendations implemented. 

Even so, continued vigilance will be required to guard against the 

temptation to add further capability and complexity to the satellites and 

their supporting ground processing systems. If not, EOS cost overruns will 

force the deferral or termination of other important science programs, 

eliminating the balance that currently exists among scientific missions. 

For the future, EOS should have direct oversight at the highest level of 

management within NASA, and regular external reviews, along the lines 

of the Frieman panel, should be conducted. New science missions should 

be designed in ways that allow their construction and launch to occur in 

no more than about five years. Exercising this discipline will yield more 

timely data and reduce the probability of schedule delays and cost growth 

in future programs. 

Taken together, this Administration’s activities over the last four years have 

resulted in a forward-looking U.S. space program - one that is vigorous, 

nonpartisan, and provides for our nation’s security and its international 

competitiveness. Our space program has been strengthened, and a 

framework and vision for the future have been created. It will be up to the 

new administration to pick up the challenge, adjust to the new environment, 

and build on what has come before. 

35 
Appendix I 

Chronology of Bush Administration 

Space Policy Activities 

President signs Executive Order 12675 establishing the 

National Space Council 

President announces continuation of the Landsat program. 

President announces the Space Exploration Initiative. 

President announces continuation of the National 

Aerospace Plane Program as a high-priority effort to 

develop a single-stage-to-orbit vehicle. 

President announces NSPD 1, National Space Policy. 

President announces program elements of the Space 

Exploration Initiative. 

President announces the United States will explore 

participation of other nations, including the Soviet Union, 

in the Space Exploration Initiative. 

President announces NSPD 2, Commercial Space Launch 

Policy. 

The Report of the Adhory Committee on the Future of 

the U.S. Space Progrmn, prepared under the leadership of 

Norman Augustine, is released. 

President announces NSPD 3, U.S. Commercial Space 

Policy Guidelines. 

Vice President appoints Dr. Laurel Wilkening to serve as 

Chair of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board. 

The Report of the Qnthesis Group on Americ& Space 

Exploration Initintir~e, prepared under the leadership of 

Thomas Stafford, is released. 

April 20, 1989 

June 1, 1989 

July 20, 1989 

July 25, 1989 

November 2, 1989 

March 8, 1990 

March 30, 1990 

September 5, 1990 

December 17, 1990 

February 12, 1991 

May 17, 1991 

June 11, 1991 
Final Report to the h&dent on the U.S. Space Program 

July 24, 1991 

September 30, 1991 

February 13, 1992 

March 13, 1992 

June 5, 1992 

June 17, 1992 

November 19, 1992 

November 19, 1992 

January 4, 1993 

President announces NSPD 4, National Space Launch 

Strategy. 

Report of the Earth Observing System (EOS) Engineering 

Review Committee, prepared under the leadership of 

Edward Frieman, is released. 

President announces NSPD 5, Landsat Remote Sensing 

Strategy. 

President announces NSPD 6, Space Exploration Initiative 

Strategy. 

President announces NSPD 7, Space-based Global Change 

Observation System. 

President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin sign 

cooperation agreement which provides a framework for 

joint U.S./Russia cooperative projects. 

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board releases a 

report, prepared by a Task Group led by Daniel J. Fink, 

Z%e Future of the U.S. Space Indzlstrial Bae. 

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board releases a 

report, prepared by a Task Group led by E. C. (Pete) 

Aldridge, Jr., ne Future of the U.S. Space hunch 

Cc@&ility. 

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board releases a 

report, prepared by a Task Group led by Laurel 

Wilkening, A Post Cold Wu- Assessment of U.S. Spme 

Policy 

1-2 
- 

im 

- 

-I - 

Appendix II 

Executive Order Establishing the National Space Council 
- 

N 

Executive Order 12675 

April 20, 1989 

Establishing the National Space Council 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of 

America, and in order to provide a coordinated process for developing a national space policy and 

strategy and for monitoring its implementation, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Establishment and Composition of the National Space Council. 

(a) There is established the National Space Council (“the Council”). 

(b) The Council shall be composed of the following members: 

(1) The Vice President, who shall be Chairman of the Council; 

(2) The Secretary of State; 

(3) The Secretary of the Treasury; 

(4) The Secretary of Defense; 

(5) The Secretary of Commerce; 

(6) The Secretary of Transportation; 

(7) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget; 

(8) The Chief of Staff to the President; 

(9) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; 

(10) The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; 

(11) The Director of Central Intelligence; and 

(12) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

(c) The Chairman shall, from time to time, invite the following to participate in meetings of the 

Council: 

(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and 

(2) The heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior officials in the 

Executive Office of the President. 

Section 2. Functions of the Council. 

(a) The Council shall advise and assist the President on national space policy and strategy, and 

perform such other duties as the President may from time to time prescribe. 

(b) In addition, the Council is directed to: 

(1) review United States Government space policy, including long-range goals, and develop 

a strategy for national space activities; 

(2) develop recommendations for the President on space policy and space-related issues; 
Final Report to the Rcstdeti on the U.S. Spme Progrm 

(3) monitor and coordinate implementation of the objectives of the President’s national space 

policy by executive departments and agencies; and 

(4) foster close coordination, cooperation, and technology and information exchange among 

the civil, national security, and commercial space sectors, and facilitate resolution of 

differences concerning major space and space-related policy issues. 

(c) The creation and operation of the Council shall not interfere with existing lines of authority 

and responsibilities in the departments and agencies. 

Section 3. Responsibilities of the Chairman. 

(a) The Chairman shall serve as the President’s principal advisor on national space policy and 

strategy. 

(b) The Chairman shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, establish procedures 

for the Council and establish the agenda for Council activities. 

(c) The Chairman shall report to the President on the activities and recommendations of the 

Council. The Chairman shall advise the Council as appropriate regarding the President’s 

directions with respect to the Council’s activities and national space policy generally. 

(d) The Chairman shall authorize the establishment of such committees of the Council, including 

an executive committee, and of such working groups, composed of senior designees of the 

Council members and of other officials invited to participate in Council meetings, as he 

deems necessary or appropriate for the efficient conduct of Council functions. 

Section 4. National Space Policy Planning Process. 

(a) The Council will establish a process for developing and monitoring the implementation of 

national space policy and strategy. 

(b) To implement this process, each agency represented on the Council shall provide such 

information regarding its current and planned space activities as the Chairman shall request. 

(c) The head of each executive department and agency shall ensure that its space-related 

activities conform to national space policy and strategy. 

II-4 
Executive Order 12675 

- 

Section 5. Establishment of Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board. 

(a) The Vice President shall establish, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 2), governing presidential advisory committees, 

an advisory committee of private citizens to advise the Vice President on the space policy 

of the United States (“the Board”). 

(b) The Board shall be composed and function as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

(31 

(4) 

(5) 

Section 6. 

The Board shall be composed of members appointed by the Vice President. 

The Vice President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Board. 

The Executive Secretary of the National Space Council shall serve as the Secretary to the 

Board. 

Members of the Board shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Board. 

However, they shall be entitled to travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 

subsistence, as authorized by law, for persons serving intermittently in the Government 

service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707), to the extent funds are available for that purpose. 

Necessary expenses of the Board shall be paid from funds available for the expenses of 

the National Space Council. 

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Executive Order, the responsibilities of the 

President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, except that of 

reporting annually to the Congress, which are applicable to the Board established by this 

order, shall be performed on a reimbursable basis by the Director of the Office of 

Administration in the Executive Office of the President, in accordance with the guidelines 

and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services. 

Microgravity Research Board. 

Section l(c) of Executive Order No. 12660 is amended by deleting “Economic Policy Council” 

and inserting in lieu thereof “National Space Council.” 

Section 7. Administrative Provisions. 

(a> The Office of Administration in the Executive Office of the President shall provide the 

Council with such administrative support on a reimbursable basis as may be necessary for 

the performance of the functions of the Council. 

II-5 
Final Report to the l%?sident on the U.S. Space Program 

(b> The President shall appoint an Executive Secretary, who shall appoint such staff as may be 

necessary to assist in the performance of the Council’s functions. 

(c) All Federal departments, agencies, and interagency councils and committees having an 

impact on space policy shall extend, as appropriate, such cooperation and assistance to the 

Council as is necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this order. 

(d) The head of each agency serving on the Council or represented on any working group or 

committee of the Council shall provide such administrative support as may be necessary, in 

accordance with law and subject to the availability of appropriations, to enable the agency 

head or its representative to carry out his responsibilities. 

Section 8. Reports. 

The Council shall submit an annual report setting forth its assesment of and recommendations 

for the space policy and strategy of the United States Government. 

II-G 
Appendix III 

National Space Policy Directives 

- 

L 
-- 

mm - c- 

.I 

National Space Policy Directive 1 

November 2, 1989 

National Space Policy 

htroduction 

This document contains national policy, guidelines, and implementing actions with respect to 

the conduct of United States space programs and related activities. 

United States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two strongly 

interacting governmental sectors (Civil and National Security) and a separate, nongovernmental 

Commercial Sector. Close coordination, cooperation, and technology and information exchange will 

be maintained among these sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication and promote attainment of 

United States space goals. 

Goals and Principles 

A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been, and continues to be, 

space. leadership. Leadership in an increasingly competitive international environment does not 

require United States preeminence in all areas and disciplines of space enterprise. It does require 

United States preeminence in the key areas of space activity critical to achieving our national 

security, scientific, technical, economic, and foreign policy goals. 

The overall goals of United States space activities are: (1) to strengthen the security of the United 

States; (2) to obtain scientific, technological, and economic benefits for the general population and 

to improve the quality of life on Earth through space-related activities; (3) to encourage continuing 

United States private-sector investment in space and related activities; (4) to promote international 

cooperative activities, taking into account United States national security, foreign policy, scientific, 

and economic interests; (5) to cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for 

all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind; and, as a long-range goal, (6) to 

expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system. 

United States space activities shall be conducted in accordance with the follomring principles: 

- The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for 

peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. “Peaceful purposes” allow for activities 

in pursuit of national security goals. 

- The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its inherent right of self-defense 

and its defense commitments to its allies. 

- The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial 

bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign 

nations to acquire data from space. 
Find Report to the l?wident on the U.S. Space Bvgrmn 

- The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the 

right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference 

with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights. 

- The United States shall encourage and not preclude the commercial use and exploitation of 

space technologies and systems for national economic benefit. These commercial activities must 

be consistent with national security interests, and international and domestic legal obligations. 

- The United States will, as a matter of policy, pursue its commercial space objectives without the 

use of direct Federal subsidies. 

- The United States shall encourage other countries to engage in free and fair trade in commercial 

space goods and services. 

- The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities that are expected 

to achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits for the Nation. 

The United States will seek mutually beneficial international participation in space and spacerelated programs. 

Civil Space Policy 

The United States civil space sector activities shall contribute significantly to enhancing the 

Nation’s science, technology, economy, pride, Sense of well-being and direction, as well as United 

States world prestige and leadership. Civil sector activities shall comprise a balanced straregy of 

research, development, operations, and technology for science, exploration, and appropriate 

applications. 

The objectives of the United States civil space activities shall be (1) to expand knowledge of the 

Earth, its environment, the solar system, and the universe; (2) to create new opportunities for use 

of the space environment through the conduct of appropriate research and experimentation in 

advanced technology and systems; (3) to develop space technology for civil applications and, 

wherever appropriate, make such technology available to the commercial sector; (4) to preserve the 

United States preeminence in critical aspects of space science, applications, technology, and manned 

space flight; (5) to establish a permanently manned presence in space; (6) to engage in international 

cooperative efforts that further United States overall space goals. 
NSPD 2 - Nutiomd Spuce Policy 

Commercial Space Policy 

The United States Government shall not preclude or deter the continuing development of a 

separate nongovernmental Commercial Space Sector. Expanding private sector investment in space 

by the market-driven Commercial Sector generates economic benefits for the Nation and supports 

governmental Space Sectors with an increasing range of space goods and services. Governmental 

Space Sectors shall purchase commercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent 

feasible and shall not conduct activities with potential commercial applications that preclude or deter 

Commercial Sector space activities, except for national security or public safety reasons. Commercial 

Sector space activities shall be supervised or regulated only to the extent required by law, national 

security, international obligations, and public safety. 

National Security Space Policy 

The United States will conduct those activities in space that are necessary to national defense. 

Space activities will contribute to national security -objectives by (1) deterring, or if necessary, 

defending against enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own 

use of space; (3) negating, if necessary, ~hostile space systems; and (4) enhancing operations of 

United States and allied forces. Consistent with treaty obligations, the national security space 

program shall support such functions as command and control, communications, navigation, 

environmental monitoring, warning, surveillance, and force application (including research and 

development of programs which support these functions). 

Inter-Sector Policies 

This section contains policies applicable to, and binding on, the National Security and Civil Space 

Sectors. 

The United States Government will maintain and coordinate separate national security and civil 

operational space systems where differing needs of the sectors dictate. 

Survivability and endurance of national security space systems, including all necessary system 

elements, will be pursued commensurate with the planned use in crisis and conflict, with the threat, 

and with the availability of other assets to perform the mission. 

Government sectors shall encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, the development and use 

of United States private sector space capabilities. 

III-5 

-y.- .-I.-__) _.l_r-.. .___..- 1.... ~.. -- -.-. - 
Find Report to the h&dent on the U.S. Space Program 

A continuing capability to remotely sense the Earth from space is important to the achievement 

of United States space goals. To ensure that the necessary capability exists, the United States 

Government will: (a> ensure the continuity of Lam&at-type remote sensing data; (b) discuss remote 

sensing issues and activities with foreign governments operating or regulating the private operation 

of remote sensing systems; (c) continue government research and development for future advanced 

remote sensing technologies or systems; and (d) encourage the development of commercial systems, 

which image the Earth from space, competitive with, or superior to, foreign-operated civil or 

commercial systems. 

Assured access to space, sufficient to achieve all United States space goals, is a key element of 

national space policy. United States space transportation systems must provide a balanced, robust, 

and flexible capability with sufficient resiliency to allow continued operations despite failures in any 

single system. The United States Government will continue research and development on 

component technologies in support of future transportation systems. The goals of United.States 

space transportation policy are: (1) to achieve and maintain safe and reliable access to, 

transportation in, and return from, space; (2) to exploit the unique attributes of manned and 

unmanned launch and recovery systems; (3) to encourage,to the maximum extent feasible, the 

development and use of United States private sector space transportation capabilities; and (4) to 

reduce the costs of space transportation and related services. 

Communications advancements are critical to all United States space sectors. To ensure 

necessary capabilities exist, the United States Government will continue research and development 

efforts for future advanced space communications technologies. 

The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy positions on arms control 

measures governing activities in space, and will conclude agreements on such measures only if they 

are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the United States and our allies. 

All space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and operations of 

space tests, experiments, and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris 

consistent with mission requirements and cost-effectiveness. The United States Government will 

encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization. 

Implementing Procedures 

Normal interagency procedures will be employed wherever possible to coordinate the policies 

enunciated in this directive. 

Executive Order No. 12675 established the National Space Council to provide a coordinated 

process for developing a national space policy and strategy and for monitoring its implementation. 

III- 6 
NSPD 1 - National Space Policy 

The Vice President serves as the Chairman of the Council, and as the President’s principal advisor 

on national space policy and strategy. Other members of the Council are the Secretaries of State, 

Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Transportation; the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director 

of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 

the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director of Central Intelligence, and 

the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Chairman, from time 

to time, invites the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the heads of executive agencies, and other 

senior officials to participate in meetings of the Council. 

Policy Guidelines and Implementing Actions 

The following Policy Guidelines and Implementing Actions provide a framework through which 

the policies in this directive shall be carried out. Agencies will use these sections as guidance on 

priorities, including preparation, review, and execution of budgets for space activities, within the 

overall resource and policy guidance provided by the President. Affected Government agencies shall 

ensure that their current policies are consistent with this ‘directive and, where necessary, shall 

establish policies to implement these practices. 

Civil Space Sector Guidelines 

Introduction. In conjunction with other agencies: NASA will continue the lead role within the 

Federal Government for advancing space science, exploration, and appropriate applications 

through the conduct of activities for research, technology, development, and related operations; 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will gather data, conduct research, and make 

predictions about the Earth’s environment; DOT will license and promote commercial launch 

operations which support Civil Sector operations. 

Space Science. NASA, with the collaboration of other appropriate agencies, will conduct a balanced 

program to support scientific research, exploration, and experimentation to expand 

understanding of: (1) astrophysical phenomena and the origin and evolution of the universe; 

(2) the Earth, its environment, and its dynamic relationship with the Sun; (3) the origin and 

evolution of the solar system; (4) fundamental physical, chemical, and biological processes; (5) 

the effects of the space environment on human beings; and (6) the factors governing the origin 

and spread of life in the universe. 

Space Exploration. In order to investigate phenomena and objects both within and beyond the solar 

system, NASA will conduct a balanced program of manned and unmanned exploration. 

III- 7 
Find Report to the FWsident on the U.S. Space Bv.gram 

- Human Exploration. To implement the long-range goal of expanding human presence and 

activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system, NASA will continue the systematic 

development of technologies necessary to enable and support a range of future manned 

missions. This technology program (Pathfinder) will be oriented toward a Presidential 

Decision on a focused program of manned exploration of the solar system. 

- Unmanned Exploration. NASA will continue to pursue a program of unmanned exploration 

where such exploration can most efficiently and effectively satisfy national space objectives 

by, among other things: achieving scientific objectives where human presence is undesirable 

or unnecessary; exploring realms where the risks or costs of life support are unacceptable; 

and providing data vital to support future manned missions. 

Permanent Manned Presence. NASA will develop the Space Station to achieve permanently manned 

operational capability by the mid-1990s. Space Station Freedom will: (1) contribute to United 

States preeminence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight; (2) provide support and stability 

to scientific and technological investigations; (3) provide early benefits, particularly in the 

materials and life sciences; (4) promote private sector experimentation preparatory to 

independent commercial activity; (5) allow evolution in keeping with the needs of Station users 

and the long-term goals of the United States; (6) provide opportunities for Commercial Sector 

participation; and (7) contribute to the longer term goal of expanding human presence and 

activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system. 

Manned Spaceflight Preeminence. Approved programs, such as efforts to improve and safely operate 

the Space Transportation System (STS) and to develop, deploy, and use the Space Station, are 

intended to ensure United States preeminence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight. 

Space Applications. NASA and other agencies will pursue the identification and development of 

appropriate applications flowing from their activities. Agencies will seek to promote private 

sector development and implementation of applications. 

- Such applications will create new capabilities, or improve the quality or efficiency of 

continuing activities, including long-term scientific observations. 

- NASA will seek to ensure its capability to conduct selected critical missions through an 

appropriate mix of assured access to space, on-orbit sparing, advanced automation 

techniques, redundancy, and other suitable measures. 

- Agencies may enter cooperative research and development agreements on space applications 

with firms seeking to advance the relevant state of the art consistent with United States 

Government space objectives. 

III-8 
NSPD I - National Space Policy 

- Management of Federal civil operational remote sensing is the responsibility of the 

Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce will: (a) consolidate Federal 

needs for civil operational remote sensing products to be met either by the private sector or 

by the Federal Government; (b) identify needed civil operational system research and 

development objectives; and cc> in coordination with other departments or agencies, provide 

for the regulation of private sector operational remote sensing systems. 

Civil Government Space Transportation. The unique Space Transportation System (STS) capability 

to provide manned access to space will be exploited in those areas that offer the greatest 

national return, including contributing to U.S. preeminence in critical aspects of manned 

spaceflight. The STS fleet will maintain the Nation’s capability and will be used to support 

critical programs requiring manned presence and other unique STS capabilities. In support of 

national space transportation goals, NASA will establish sustainable STS flight rates to provide 

for planning and budgeting of Government space programs. NASA will pursue appropriate 

enhancements to STS operational capabilities, upper stages, and systems for deploying, 

servicing, and retrieving spacecraft as national and user requirements are defined. 

International Cooperation. The United States will foster increased international cooperation in civil 

space activities by seeking mutually beneficial international participation in civil space and spacerelated programs. The National Space Council shall be responsible for oversight of civil space 

cooperation with the Soviet Union. No such cooperative activity shall be initiated until an 

appropriate interagency review has been completed. U.S. cooperation in international civil space 

activities will: 

- United States participation in international space ventures, whether public or private, must 

be consistent with U.S. technology transfer laws, regulations, Executive Orders, and 

Presidential Directives. 

- Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from Federal civil systems to 

foreign ground stations and the provision of data to foreign users under specified conditions. 

- Be conducted in such a way as to protect the commercial value of intellectual property 

developed with Federal support. Such cooperation will not preclude or deter commercial 

space activities by the U.S. private sector, except as required by national security or public 

safety. 

Commercial Space Sector Guidelines 

NASA, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Transportation, will work cooperatively 

to develop and implement specific measures to foster the growth of private sector commercial use 

III-9 
Final Report to the Pmident on the U.S. Space Pmgmm 

of space. A high-level focus for commercial space issues has been created through establishment 

of the National Space Council. 

To stimulate private sector investment, ownership, and operation of space assets, the U.S. 

Government will facilitate private sector access to appropriate U.S. space-related hardware and 

facilities, and encourage the private sector to undertake commercial space ventures. Governmental 

Space Sectors shall: 

- Utilize commercially available goods and services to the fullest extent feasible, and avoid actions 

that may preclude or deter commercial space sector activities, except as required by national 

security or public safety. A space good or service is “commercially available” if it is currently 

offered to a Government service procurement request. “Feasible” means that such goods or 

services meet mission requirements in a cost-effective manner. 

- Enter into appropriate cooperative agreements to encourage and advance private sector basic 

research, development, and operations while protecting the commercial value of the intellectual 

property developed. 

- Provide for the use of appropriate Government facilities on a reimbursable basis. 

- Identify, and eliminate or propose for elimination, applicable portions of United States laws and 

regulations that unnecessary impede Commercial Space Sector activities. 

- Encourage free and fair trade in commercial space activities. Consistent with the goals, 

principles, and policies set forth in this directive, the United States Trade Representative will 

consult, or, as appropriate, negotiate with other countries to encourage free and fair trade in 

commercial space activities. In entering into space-related technology development and transfer 

agreements with other countries, executive departments and agencies will take into consideration 

whether such countries practice and encourage free and fair trade in commercial space activities. 

- Provide for the timely transfer of Government-developed space technology to the private sector 

in such a manner as to protect its commercial value, consistent with national security. 

- Price Government-provided goods and services consistent with OMB Circular A-25. 
NSPD 1 - National Space Policy 

National Security Space Sector Guidelines 

General: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) will develop, operate, and maintain an assured mission 

capability through an appropriate mix of robust satellite control, assured access to space, on-orbit 

sparing, proliferation, reconstitution, or other means, 

The national security space program, including dissemination of data, shall be conducted in 

accordance with Executive Orders and applicable directives for the protection of national security 

information and commensurate with both the missions performed and the security measures 

necessary to protect related space activities. 

DOD will ensure that the national security space program incorporates the support requirements 

of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 

Space Support: 

- The National Security Space Sector may use both manned and unmanned launch systems as 

determined by specific mission requirements. Payloads will be distributed among launch systems 

and launch sites to minimize the impact of loss of any single launch system or launch site on 

mission performance. The DOD will procure unmanned launch vehicles or services and maintain 

launch capability on both the East and West coasts. DOD will also continue to enhance the 

robustness of its satellite control capability through an appropriate mix of satellite autonomy and 

survivable command and control, processing, and data dissemination systems. 

- DOD will study concepts and technologies which would support future contingency launch 

capabilities. 

Force Enhancement: 

- The National Security Space Sector will develop, operate, and maintain space systems and 

develop plans and architectures to meet the requirements of operational land, sea, and air forces 

through all levels of conflict commensurate with their intended use. 

III-11 
Final Report to the hdaknt on the U.S. Space Pmgnun 

Space Control: 

- The DOD will develop, operate, and maintain enduring space systems to ensure its freedom of 

action in space. This requires an integrated combination of antisatellite, survivability, and 

surveillance capabilities. 

- Antisatellite (ASAT) Capability. The United States will develop and deploy a comprehensive 

capability with programs as required and with initial operational capability at the earliest possible 

date. 

- DOD space programs will pursue a survivability enhancement program with long-term planning 

for future requirements. The DOD must provide for the survivability of selected, critical national 

security space assets (including associated terrestrial components) to a degree commensurate 

with the value and utility of the support they provide to national-level decision functions, and 

military operational forces across the spectrum of conflict. 

- The United States will develop and maintain an integrated attack warning, notification, 

verification, and contingency reaction capability which can effectively detect and react to threats 

to United States space systems. 

Force Application: 

- The DOD will, consistent with treaty obligations, conduct research, development, and planning 

to be prepared to acquire and deploy space systems should national security conditions dictate. 

Inter-Sector Guidelines: 

The following paragraphs identify selected, high-priority cross-sector efforts and responsibilities 

to implement plans supporting major United States space policy objectives: 

Space Transportation Guidelines: 

- The United States national space transportation capability will be based on a mix of vehicles, 

consisting of the Space Transportation System (STS), unmanned launch vehicles (ULVs), and inspace transportation systems. The elements of this mix will be defined to support the mission 

needs of National Security and Civil Government Sectors of United States space activities in the 

most cost-effective manner. 

III 12 
- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

NSPD 1 - National Space Policy 

As determined by specific mission requirements, National Security Space Sector will use the STS 

and ULVs. In coordination with NASA, the DOD will assure the Shuttle’s utility to national 

defense and will integrate missions into the Shuttle system. Launch priority will be provided for 

national security missions as implemented by NASA-DOD agreements. Launches necessary to 

preserve and protect human life in space shall have the highest priority except in times of 

national security emergency. 

The STS will continue to be managed and operated in an institutional arrangement consistent 

with the current NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding. Responsibility will remain in NASA 

for operational control of the STS for civil missions, and in the DOD for operational control of 

the STS for national security missions. Mission management is the responsibility of the mission 

agency. 

United States commercial launch operations are an integral element of a robust national space 

launch capability. NASA will not maintain an expendable launch vehicle (ELVI adjunct to the 

STS. NASA will provide launch services for commercial and foreign payloads only where those 

payloads must be man-tended, require the unique capabilities of the STS, or it& determined that 

launching the payloads on the STS is important for national security or foreign policy purposes. 

Commercial and foreign payloads will not be launched on Government-owned or -operated ELV 

systems except for national security or foreign policy reasons. 

Civil Government agencies will encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, a domestic 

commercial launch industry by contracting for necessary ELV launch services directly from the 

private sector or with DOD. 

NASA and the DOD will continue to cooperate in the development and use of military and civil 

space transportation systems and avoid unnecessary duplication of activities. They will pursue 

new launch and launch support concepts aimed at improving cost-effectiveness, responsiveness, 

capability, reliability, availability, maintainability, and flexibility. Such cooperation between the 

National Security and Civil Sectors will ensure efficient and effective use of national resources. 

Guidelines for the Federal Encouragement of Commercial Unmanned Launch Vehicles 

(ULVs): 

- 

- 

The United States Government fully endorses and will facilitate the commercialization of United 

States unmanned launch vehicles (ULVs). 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) is the lead agency within the Federal Government for 

developing, coordinating, and articulating Federal policy and regulatory guidance pertaining to 

United States commercial launch activities in consultation with DOD, State, NASA, and other 
Find Report to the President on the U.S. Space Pmgram 

concerned agencies. All executive departments and agencies shall assist the DOT in carrying out 

its responsibilities, as set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act and Executive Order 12465. 

- The United States Government encourages the use of its launch and launch-related facilities for 

United States commercial launch operations. 

- The United States Government will have priority use of Government facilities and support 

services to meet national security and critical mission requirements. The United States 

Government will make all reasonable efforts to minimize impacts on commercial operations. 

- The United States Government will not subsidize the commercialization of ULVs, but will price 

the use of its facilities, equipment, and services with the goal of encouraging viable commercial 

ULV activities in accordance with the Commercial Space Launch Act. 

- The United States Government will encourage free market competition within the United States 

private sector. The United States Government will provide equitable treatment for all commercial 

. launch operators for the sale or lease of Government equipment and facilities consistent with 

its economic, foreign policy, and national security interests. 

- NASA and DOD, for those unclassified and releasable capabilities for which they have 

responsibility, shall, to the maximum extent feasible: 

- Use best efforts to provide commercial launch firms with access, on a reimbursable basis, to 

national launch and launch-related facilities, equipment, tooling, and services to support 

commercial launch operations; 

- Develop, in consultation with the DOT, contractual arrangements covering access by 

commercial launch firms to national launch and launch-related property and services they 

request in support of their operations; 

- Provide technical advice and assistance to commercial launch firms on a reimbursable basis, 

consistent with the pricing guidelines herein; and 

- Conduct, in coordination with DOT, appropriate environmental analyses necessary to ensure 

that commercial launch operations conducted at Federal launch facilities are in compliance 

with the National Environmental Policy Act. 
NSPD 1 - National Space Policy 

Government ULV Pricing Guidelines: 

The price charged for the use of United States Government facilities, equipment, and service will 

be based on the following principles: 

- 

- 

- 

Price all services (including those associated with production and launch of commercial ULVs) 

based on the direct costs incurred by the United States Government. Reimbursement shall be 

credited to the appropriation from which the cost of providing such property or service was paid. 

The United States Government will not seek to recover ULV design and development costs or 

investments associated with any existing facilities or new facilities required to meet United States 

Government needs to which the U.S. Government retains title. 

Tooling, equipment, and residual ULV hardware on hand at the completion of the United States 

Government’s program will be priced on a basis that is in the best overall interest of the United 

States Government, taking into consideration that these sales will not constitute a subsidy to the 

private sector operator. 

Commercial Launch Firm Requirements: 

- 

- 

Commercial launch firms shall: 

Maintain all facilities and equipment leased from the United States Government to a level of 

readiness and repair specified by the United States Government. 

ULV operators shall comply with all requirements of the Commercial Space Launch Act, all 

regulations issued under the Act, and all terms, conditions, or restrictions of any license issued 

or transferred by the Secretary of Transportation under the Act. 

Technology Transfer Guidelines: 

- The United States will work to stem the flow of advanced Western space technology to 

unauthorized destinations. Executive departments and agencies will be fully responsible for 

protecting against adverse technology transfer in the conduct of their programs. 

- Sales of United States space hardware, software, and related technologies for use in foreign space 

projects will be consistent with relevant international and bilateral agreements and arrangements. 

III- 15 
Find Report to the Bwideti on the U.S. ?#?ace Prqram 

Space infrastructure 

All Sectors shall recognize the importance of appropriate invezxments in the facilities and human 

resources necessary to support United States space objectives rrnd maintain investments that are 

consistent with such objectives. The National Space Council a-ill conduct a feasibility study of 

alternate methods for encouraging private sector investment, tiuding capital funding, of United 

States space infrastructure such as ground facilities, launcher ddopments, and orbital assembly and 

test facilities. 

- The primary forum for negotiations on nuclear and pe arms is the Nuclear and Space 

Talks (NST) with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The instructions to the United States 

Delegation will be consistent with this National Space Policy Directive, established legal 

obligations, and additional guidance by the President- The United States will continue to 

consult with its allies on these negotiations and ensure tizat any resulting agreements enhance 

the security of the United States and its allies. Any d-ions on arms control relating to 

activities in space in forums other than NST must be coeent with, and subordinate to, the 

foregoing activities and objectives. 

III-1 6 
National Space Policy Directive 2 

September 5, 1990 

Policy Findings 

Commercial Space Launch Policy 

A commercial space launch industry can provide many benefits to the U.S., including indirect 

benefits to U.S. national security. 

The long-term goal of the United States is a free and fair market in which U.S. industry can 

compete. To achieve this, a set of coordinated actions is needed for dealing with international 

competition in launch goods and services in a manner that is consistent with our nonproliferation 

and technology transfer objectives. These actions must address both the short term (actions which 

will affect competitiveness over approximately the next ten years) and those which will have their 

principal effect in the longer term (i.e., after approximately the year 2000). 

- In the near term, this includes trade agreements and enforcement of those agreements to 

limit unfair competition. It also includes the continued use of U.S.-manufactured launch 

vehicles for launching U.S. Government satellites. 

- For the longer term, the United States should take actions to encourage technical 

improvements to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of U.S. space launch vehicles. 

Implementing Actions 

U.S. Government satellites will be launched on U.S.-manufactured launch vehicles unless 

specifically exempted by the President. 

Consistent with guidelines to be developed by the National Space Council, U..S. Government 

agencies will actively consider commercial space launch needs and factor them into their decisions 

on improvements in launch infrastructure and launch vehicles aimed at reducing cost, and increasing 

responsiveness and reliability, of space launch vehicles. 

The U.S. Government will enter into negotiations to achieve agreement with the European Space 

Agency (ESA), ESA member states, and others as appropriate, which defines principles of free and 

fair trade. 

Nonmarket launch providers of space launch goods and services create a special case because 

of the absence of market-oriented pricing and cost structures. To deal with their entry into the 

market, there needs to be a transition period during which special conditions may be required. 

There also must be an effective means of enforcing international agreements related to space 

launch goods and services. 

III- I 7 
National Space Policy Directive 3 

February 12, 1991 

U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines 

A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been space leadership, which 

requires preeminence in key areas of space activity. In an increasingly competitive international 

environment, the U.S. Government encourages the commercial use and exploitation of space 

technologies and systems for national economic benefit. These efforts to encourage commercial 

activities must be consistent with national security and foreign policy interests; international and 

domestic legal obligations, including U.S. commitments to stem missile proliferation; and agency 

mission requirements. 

United States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two U.S. 

Government sectors -the civil and national security - and a nongovernmental commercial space 

sector. The commercial space sector includes a broad cross section of potential providers and users, 

including both established and new market participants. There also has been a recent emergence 

of State government initiatives related to encouraging commercial space activities. The commercial 

space sector is comprised of at least five market areas, each encompassing both Earth- and 

space-based activities, with varying degrees of market maturity or potential: 

Satellite Communications - the private development, manufacture, and operation of communications 

satellites and marketing of satellite telecommunications services, including position location and 

navigation; 

Launch and Vehicle Services - the private development, manufacture, and operation of launch and 

reentry vehicles, and the marketing of space transportation services; 

Remote Sensing - the private development, manufacture, and operation of remote sensing satellites 

and the processing and marketing of remote sensing data; 

Materials Processing - the experimentation with, and production of, organic and inorganic materials 

and products utilizing the space environment; and 

Commercial Infrastructure - the private development and provision of space-related support facilities, 

capabilities, and services. 

In addition, other market-driven commercial space sector opportunities are emerging. 

The U.S. Government encourages private investment in, and broader responsibility for, 

space-related activities that can result in products and services that meet the needs of Government 

and other customers in a competitive market. As a matter of policy, the U.S. Government pursues 

its commercial space objectives without the ux of direct Federal subsidies. A robust commercial 

space sector has the potential to generate new technologies, products, markets, jobs, and other 

economic benefits for the Nation, as well as indirect benefits for national security. 

Commercial space sector activities are characterized by the provision of products and services 

such that: 
Final Report to the prr?sident on the U.S. Space Frvgrm 

- private capital is at risk; 

- there are existing, or potential, nongovernmental customers for the activity; 

- the commercial market ultimately determines the viability of the activity; and 

- primary responsibility and management initiative for the activity resides with the private 

sector. 

Implementing Guidelines 

The following implementing guidelines shall serve to provide the U.S. private sector with a level 

of stability and predictability in its dealings with agencies of the U.S. Government. The agencies will 

work separately but cooperatively, as appropriate, to develop specific measures to implement this 

strategy. U.S. Government agencies shall, consistent with national security and foreign policy 

interests, international and domestic legal obligations, and.agency mission requirements, encourage 

the growth of the U.S. commercial space sector in accordance with the following guidelines: 

l U.S. Government agencies shall utilize commercially available space products and services to the 

fullest extent feasible. This policy of encouraging U.S. Government agencies to purchase, and 

the private sector to sell, commercial space products and services has potentially large economic 

benefits. 

- A space product or service is “commercially available” if it is currently offered commercially, 

or if it could be supplied commercially in response to a Government procurement request. 

- “Feasible” means that products and services meet mission requirements in a cost-effective 

manner. 

- “Cost-effective” generally means that the commercial product or service costs no more than 

governmental development or directed procurement where such Government costs include 

applicable Government labor and overhead costs, as well as contractor charges and 

operations costs. 

- However, the acquisition of commercial space products and services shall generally be 

considered cost effective if they are procured competitively using performance-based 

contracting techniques. Such contracting techniques give contractors the freedom and 

financial incentive to achieve economies of scale by combining their Government and 

commercial work, as well as increased productivity through innovation. 

III-20 
- 

- 

NSPD 3 - US. Comme~ti Space Policy Guidelines 

U.S. Government 

feasibility of their 

and activities. 

agencies shall actively consider, at the earliest appropriate time, the 

using commercially available products and services in agency programs 

U.S. Government agencies shall continue to take appropriate measures to protect from 

disclosure any proprietary data which is shared with the U.S. Government in the acquisition 

of commercial space products and services. 

l U.S. Government agencies shall promote the transfer of U.S. Government-developed technology 

to the private sector. 

- 

- 

- 

U.S. Government-developed unclassified space technology will be transferred to the U.S. 

commercial space sector in as timely a manner as possible and in ways that protect its 

commercial value. 

U.S. Government agencies may undertake cooperative research and development activities 

with the private sector, as well as State and local governments, consistent with policies and 

funding, in order to fulfill mission requirements in a manner which encourages the creation 

of commercial opportunities. 

With respect to technologies generated in the performance of Government contracts, U.S. 

Government agencies shall obtain only those rights necessary to meet Government needs 

and mission requirements, as directed by Executive Order 12591. 

- U.S. Government agencies may make unused capacity of space assets, services, and infrastructure 

available for commercial space sector use. 

- Private sector use of U.S. Government agency space assets, services, and infrastructure shall 

be made available on a reimbursable basis consistent with OMB Circular A-25 or appropriate 

legislation. 

l U.S. Government agencies may make available to the private sector those assets which have 

been determined to be excess to the requirements of the U.S. Government in accordance with 

U.S. law and applicable international treaty obligations. Due regard shall be given to the 

economic impact such transfer may have on the commercial space sector, promoting 

competition, and the long-term public interest. 

l The U.S. Government shall avoid regulating domestic space activities in a manner that precludes 

or deters commercial space sector activities, except to the extent necessary to meet international 

and domestic legal obligations, including those of the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Final Report to the Pmident on the U.S. Space Bvgram 

Accordingly, agencies shall identify, and propose for revision or elimination, applicable portions 

of U.S. laws and regulations that unnecessarily impede commercial space sector activities. 

l U.S. Government agencies shall work with the commercial space sector to promote the 

establishment of technical standards for commercial space products and services. 

l U.S. Government agencies shall enter into appropriate cooperative agreements to encourage and 

advance private sector basic research, development, and operations. Agencies may reduce initial 

private sector risk by agreeing to tuture use ot privately suppiled space prOdUCtS ana services 

where appropriate. 

- “Anchor tenancy” is an example of such an arrangement, whereby U.S. Government agencies 

can provide initial support to a venture by contracting for enough of the future product or 

service to make the venture viable in the short term. Long-term viability and growth must 

come primarily from the sale of the product or service to customers outside the U.S. 

Government. 

- There must be demonstrable U.S. Government mission or program requirements for the 

proposed commercial space good or service. In assessing the U.S. Government’s mission or 

program requirements for these purposes, the procuring agency may consider consolidating 

all anticipated U.S. Government needs for the particular product or service, to the maximum 

extent feasible. 

- U.S. Government agencies entering into such arrangements may take action, consistent with 

current policies and funding availability, to provide compensation to commercial space 

providers for future termination of missions for which the products or services were required. 

- The United States will work toward establishment of an international trading environment that 

encourages market-oriented competition by working with its trading partners to: 

- Establish clear principles for international space markets that provide an atmosphere 

favorable to stimulating greater private investment and market development; 

- Eliminate direct Government subsidies and other unfair practices that undermine normal 

market competition among commercial firms; 

- Eliminate unfair competition by governments for business in space markets consistent with 

domestic policies that preclude or deter U.S. Government competition with commercial space 

sector activities. 

III-22 
NSPD 3 - U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines 

The U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines are consistent with the National Space Policy and 

the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Policy, which remain fully applicable to activities of the 

governmental space sectors and the commercial space sector. 

Reporting Requirements 

U.S. Government agencies affected by these guidelines are directed to report by October 1,1991, 

to the National Space Council on their activities related to the implementation of these policy 

guidelines. 

III-23 

.*-* -1 _.. . . ,, ~. _, . 

^. I._ _-- . . . -- .“__. _ - .-. 
Introduction 

National space policy provides a framework within which agencies plan and conduct U.S. 

National Space Policy Directive 4 

July 24, 1991 

National Space Launch Strategy 

Government space activities. The National Space Launch Strategy provides guidance for implementation of that policy with respect to access to and from space. 

Assured access to space is a key element of U.S. national space policy and a foundation upon 

which U.S. civil, national security, and commercial space activities depend. 

United States space launch infrastructure, including launch vehicles and supporting facilities, 

should: (1) provide safe and reliable access to, transportation in, and return from space; (2) reduce 

the costs of space transportation and related services, thus encouraging expanded space activities; 

(3) exploit the unique attributes of manned and unmanned launch and recovery systems; and (4) 

encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, the development and growth of U.S. private sector space 

transportation capabilities which can compete internationally. 

Space Launch Strategy 

The National Space Launch Strategy is composed of four elements: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Ensuring that existing space launch capabilities, including support facilities, are sufficient to 

meet U.S. Government manned and unmanned space launch needs. 

Developing a new unmanned, but man-rateable, space launch system to greatly improve 

national launch capability with reductions in operating costs and improvements in launch 

system reliability, responsiveness, and mission performance. 

Sustaining a vigorous space launch technology program to provide cost-effective 

improvements to current launch systems, and to support development of advanced launch 

capabilities, complementary to the new launch system. 

Actively considering commercial space launch needs and factoring them into decisions on 

improvements in launch facilities and launch vehicles. 

These strategy elements will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance 

provided by the President. 
Final Repor to the Presideti on the U.S. Space Progrm 

Strategy Guidelines 

Existing Space Launch Capability 

(1) A mixed fleet comprised of the Space Shuttle and existing expendable launch vehicles will 

be the primary U.S. Government means to transport people and cargo to and from space 

through the current decade and will be important components of the Nation’s launch 

capability well into the first decade of the 21st century. 

(2) To meet U.S. Government needs, agencies will conduct programs to systematically maintain 

and improve the Space Shuttle, current U.S. expendable launch vehicle fleets, and supporting 

launch site facilities and range capabilities. Such programs shall be cost-effective relative to 

current and programmed mission needs and to investments in new launch capabilities. 

(3) As the Nation is moving toward development of a new space launch system, the production 

of additional Space Shuttle orbiters is not planned. The production of spare parts should 

continue in the near term to support the existing Shuttle fleet, and to preserve an option to 

acquire a replacement orbiter in the event of an orbiter loss or other demonstrable need. 

By continuing to operate the Shuttle conservatively, by taking steps to increase the reliability 

and lifetime of existing orbiters, and by developing a new launch system, the operational life 

of the existing orbiter fleet will be extended. The Space Shuttle will be used only for those 

important missions that require manned presence or other unique Shuttle capabilities, or for 

which use of the Shuttle is determined to be important for national security, foreign policy, 

or other compelling purposes. 

(4) Consistent with U.S. national security and national space policy, the U.S. Government may 

seek to recover residual value from ballistic missiles which are, or subsequently become, 

surplus to the needs of the Department of Defense. Prior to any release of such missiles, 

including components, beyond those already approved for use as space launch vehicles, the 

Department of Defense will conduct, and the National Space Council and the National 

Security Council will review, an assessment of alternative disposition options for such 

missiles. 

Disposition options will be evaluated in terms of their consistency with U.S. national security and 

foreign policy interests, available agency resources, defense industrial base considerations, and with 

due regard to economic impact on the commercial space sector, promoting competition, and the 

long-term public interest. 

III-25 
NSPD 4- National Space LLWK~ Strategy 

Space Launch Technology 

(1) In addition to conducting the focused development program for a new launch system, 

appropriate U.S. Government agencies will continue to conduct broadly based research and 

focused technology programs to support long-term improvements in national space launch 

capabilities. This technology effort shall address launch system components (e.g., engines, 

materials, structures, avionics); upper stages; improved launch processing concepts; advanced 

New Space Launch System 

(1) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will 

undertake the joint development of a new space launch system to meet civil and national 

security needs. The goal of this launch program is to greatly improve national launch 

capability with reductions in operating costs and improvements in launch system reliability, 

responsiveness, and mission performance. 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

The new launch system, including manufacturing processes and production and launch 

facilities, will be designed to support a range of medium- to heavy-lift performance 

requirements and to facilitate evolutionary change as requirements evolve. The design may 

take advantage of existing components from both the Space Shuttle and existing expendable 

rockets in order to expedite initial capability and reduce development costs. While initially 

unmanned, the new launch system will be designed to be man-rateable in the future. 

The new launch system will be managed, funded, and developed jointly by the Department 

of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The development 

program will be structured in the near term toward the goal of a first flight in 1999. 

However, the program should allow for several schedule options for the first flight and 

should identify key intermediate milestones. Since the new launch system will provide the 

opportunity for significant long-term benefits to the commercial space launch industry, the 

agencies should actively explore the potential for U.S. private sector participation. Final 

decisions on the program schedule, including the date of the first flight, will be made during 

fiscal year 1993, based on updated requirements and technical and budgetary considerations 

at that time. A joint program plan will be prepared by the Department of Defense and the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and reviewed by the National Space Council. 

The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will plan 

for the transition of selected space programs from current launch systems to the new launch 

system at appropriate program milestones to insure mission continuity and to minimize 

satellite and other transition costs. 

III-2 7 
Final Repott to the Besideti on the U.S. Space l?rv~ram 

launch system concepts (e.g., single-stage-to-orbit concepts, including the National Aerospace 

Plane); and experimental flight vehicle programs. 

(2) The Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration will coordinate space launch technology efforts and, by December I, 

1991, jointly prepare a lo-year space launch technology plan. 

Commercial Space Launch Considerations 

(1) In addition to addressing Government needs, improvement of space launch capabilities can 

facilitate the ability of the U.S. commercial space launch industry to compete. Consistent 

with U.S. space policy, U.S. Government agencies will actively consider commercial space 

launch needs and factor them into decisions on existing space launch capabilities, 

development of a new space launch system, and implementation of space launch technology 

programs in the following ways: 

(a) U.S. Government-funded investments will be consistent with approved budges and U.S. 

Government requirements. 

(b) U.S. Government agencies, in acquiring space launch-related capabilities, should: 

111 Allow contractors, to the fullest extent feasible, the flexibility to accommodate 

commercial needs when developing launch vehicles and infrastructure to meet 

Government needs. 

[2] Emphasize procurement strategies which are based on: “best value” rather than 

lowest cost, performance-based functional requirements, commercial production and 

quality-assurance standards and techniques, and the use of commercially offered 

space products and services. 

[3] Encourage commercial and State and local government investment and participation 

in the development and improvement of U.S. launch systems and facilities. 

[4] Provide for private sector retention of technical data rights, except those rights 

necessary to meet Government needs or to comply with statutory responsibilities. 

(c) U.S. Government agencies should seek to remove, where appropriate, legal or 

administrative impediments to private sector arrangements such as industry teams, 

consortia, cost-sharing, and joint production agreements which may benefit U.S. 

III-28 
NSPD 4 - National Space Launch Strategy 

Government needs and economic competitiveness. Agencies should also seek legislative 

authority for stable long-term commitments to purchase space transportation services. 

(d) Within applicable law, U.S. Government agencies are encouraged to use industry 

advisory groups to facilitate the identification of commercial space launch needs and the 

elimination of barriers that unnecessarily impede commercial space launch activities. U.S. 

agencies are also encouraged to consult with State and local governments. 

(2) U.S. Government agencies should develop explicit provisions to implement these guidelines 

for actively considering commercial space launch needs. As appropriate, agencies should 

solicit public views on these provisions. 

Reporting Requirements 

U.S. Government agencies affected by these strategy guidelines are directed to report 

December 1, 1991, to the National Space Council on their activities related to the implementat 

of these policies. 

bY 

lion 

III-29 
Government needs, and 

commercialization. 

(4) Seeking to minimize 

provide data for use in global 

potentially, enabling substantially greater opportunities for 

the cost of Landsat-type data for U.S. Government agencies and to 

change research in a manner consistent with the Administration’s Data 

Management for Global Change Research Policy Statements. 

(5) Limiting U.S. Government regulations affecting private sector remote sensing activities to only 

those required in the interest of national security, foreign policy, and public safety. 

(6) Maintaining an archive, within the United States, of existing and future Landsat-type data. 

(7) Considering alternatives for maintaining continuity of data beyond Landsat 7. 

National Space Policy Directive 5 

February 13, 1992 

Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy 

Policy Goals 

A remote sensing capability such as is currently being provided by landsat satellites 4 and 5 

benefits the civil and national security interests of the United States and makes contributions to the 

private sector which are in the public interest. For these reasons, the United States%ovemment will 

seek to maintain continuity of Lam&at-type data. The U.S. Government will: 

a. Provide data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition geometry, coverage 

characteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous Landsat data to allow comparisons for 

change detection and characterization; 

b. Make Landsat data available to meet the needs of national security, global change research, 

and other Federal users; and, 

c. Promote and not preclude private sector commercial opportunities in Landsat-type remote 

sensing. 

Landsat Strategy 

The Landsat strategy is composed of the following elements: 

(1) Ensuring that Landsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as long as they are 

technically capable of doing so, or until Iandsac 6 becomes operational. 

(2) Acquiring a Landsat 7 satellite with the goal of maintaining continuity of La&sat-type data 

beyond the projected Landsat 6 end of life. 

(3) Fostering the development of advanced remote sensing technologies, with the goal of 

reducing the cost and increasing the performance of future Landsat-type satellites to meet U.S. 
Final Repoti to the B&dent on the U.S. Space kqyam 

These strategy elements will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance 

provided by the President. 

Implementing Guidelines 

III-32 

The Department of Commerce will: 

(1) Complete and launch Landsat 6. 

(2) In coordination with OMB, arrange For the continued operation of Landsat satellites 4 and 

5 until Landsat 6 becomes operational. 

The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will: 

(1) Develop and launch a Landsat 7 satellite of at least equivalent performance to replace 

Landsat 6 and define alternatives for maintaining data continuity beyond Landsat 7. 

(2) Prepare a plan by March 1,1992, which addresses management and funding responsibilities, 

operations, data archiving and dissemination, and commercial considerations associated with the 

Landsat program. This plan will be coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies, as 

appropriate, and reviewed by the National Space Council 

(3) With the support of the Department of Energy and other appropriate agencies, prepare a 

coordinated technology plan that has as its goals improving the performance and reducing the cost 

for future Landsat-type remote sensing systems. 

The Department of the Interior will continue to maintain a national archive of Lax-&at-type 

remote sensing data. 

Affected agencies will identify funds, within their approved Fiscal year 1993 budget, necessary 

to implement this strategy. 

Reporting Requirements 

U.S. Government agencies affected by these strategy guidelines are directed to report by March 

15, 1992, to the National Space Council on the implementation of this strategy. 
National Space Policy Directive 6 

March 13, 1332 

Space Exploration Initiative Strategy 

Lntroduction 

The Space Exploration Initiative Strategy approves the next in a series of steps to be taken by 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the 

Department of Energy (DOE), and other Federal agencies regarding the planning for, and conduct 

of, the Nation’s Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), which includes both Lunar and Mars elements, 

manned and robotic missions, and supporting technology. This series of steps augments previous 

Presidential Directives and recognizes the recommendations of both the Advisory Committee on the 

Future of the U.S. Space Program and the SE1 Synthesis Group. The exploration of space is one of 

the fundamental goals of the U.S. civil space program. The SE1 objectives, which build upon 

previous accomplishments, as well as upon existing programs, include a return to the Moon - this 

time to stay - and human expeditions to Mars. In addition, the objectives will provide a strategic 

framework for the conduct of the U.S. civil space program and will help focus investments in many 

areas of goal-oriented research and development by government, industry, and academia. Consistent 

with the Commercial Space Policy this framework is also intended to encourage private sector 

activities which augment or support the SE1 objectives. 

NASA is the principal implementing agency for the SEI. DOD and DOE, ,as participating agencies, 

will have major roles in support of the SE1 in the conduct of technology development and concept 

definition. Other U.S. Government agencies are encouraged to participate by developing activities 

supportive of the SEI. 

Exploration Responsibilities and Actions 

To establish a firm foundation and clear direction for the SEI, the Following actions shall be 

undertaken immediately: 

a. NASA shall establish an exploration office headed by the Associate Administrator for 

Exploration and staffed by NASA and representatives from other participating agencies. The 

Associate Administrator shall be responsible For architecture and mission studies, planning, and 

program execution, as well as the definition of resulting requirements for research, technology, 

infrastructure, mission elements, and program implementation. As director of the exploration office, 

the Associate Administrator shall prepare an annual status report. The NASA Administrator shall 

present this report to the National Space Council. 

b. Working with participating agencies, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Exploration shall 

develop a strategic plan For the SE1 to establish the basis for integrating existing and Future SEIrelated activities. This plan shall address research, technology development, and operations and 

identify the relationships between the SE1 mission elements and the U.S. space infrastructure. 

c. A Steering Committee for Space Exploration shall be established, chaired by NASA’s Associate 

Administrator for Exploration, and shall include representation from participating agencies. The 
Final Report to the FWsident on the U.S. Space Prv~rmn 

Committee shall be the senior interagency forum for coordinating organizational interfaces, repor&, 

plans and activities, and SEI-related programs and budgets, and for identifying those issues requiring 

consideration by the National Space Council. The Department of State shall participate in any 

meetings of the Committee related to international cooperation or other international activity. 

Exploration Guidelines 

. 

To insure that necessary preparatory activities are accomplished, the following steps shall be 

taken: 

a. The participating agencies shall address critical, long-lead research and technology 

development activities which are supportive of the exploration strategic plan. 

b. The Department of Commerce and other appropriate agencies shall encourage the 

development of SEI-related proposals which foster private sector investments, ownership, and 

operation of space-related projects and ventures, as well as promote U.S. economic competitiveness. 

These agencies shall seek increased cooperation with the private sector through mechanisms such 

as technology transfer agreements, cooperative research and development agreements, and consortia, 

as appropriate. 

c. Exploration requirements shall be incorporated into the evolutionary plans for the new 

national launch system. 

d. NASA, DOD, and DOE shall continue technology development for space nuclear power and 

propulsion while ensuring that these activities are performed in a safe and environmentally 

acceptable manner and consistent with existing laws and regulations, treaty obligations, and agency 

mission requirements. 

e. NASA and appropriate participating agencies shall implement a definitive life science program 

in support of the human exploration of the Moon and Mars. 

f. All participating agencies should include space exploration in their respective educational 

programs. In addition, participating agencies shall take advantage of university research capabilities 

and cooperative education programs in SEI-related activities. 

g. International cooperation in this endeavor is feasible and could offer significant benefits to 

the United States, subject to the satisfaction of national security, Foreign policy, scientific, and 

economic interests. 

III-39 
NSPD G- Space Exploration Initiative Sfmlegy 

h. Expanding on individual agency efforts to improve and streamline acquisition procedures, 

the Associate Administrator for Exploration, and participating agencies, shall work with the Office 

of Management and Budget and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to develop improved U.S. 

Government procurement practices available for SE1 acquisition. 

i. The exploration office shall seek innovative ideas by encouraging input from all sectors of 

American society. 

Reporting Requirements 

a. By November 1992, the first annual status report shall be presented to the National Space 

Council. It shall address options for exploration architectures and initial capabilities. 

b. The initial version of the Strategic Plan for the Space Exploration Initiative shall be presented 

to the National Space Council by April 1992, and updated regularly thereafter. The initial version 

shall focus on technology development and alternate mission architectures. 
National Space Policy Directive 7 

June 5, 1972 

Introduction 

Space-based Global Change Observation 

The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) is a key component of the Nation’s overall 

approach to global stewardship and is one of the Nation’s highest priority science programs. This 

program’s goal is to provide a sound scientific basis for developing national and international policy 

relating to natural and human-induced changes in the Earth system. The ultimate success of the 

USGCRP depends upon an integrated set of ground- and space-based observation and research 

programs. The United States is planning and implementing a series of satellite missions that include 

NASA’S Mission to Planet Earth, related environmental satellites, and activities of other agencies to 

provide these global observations for the next several decades. For the purposes of this document, 

these systems are collectively referred to as the Space-based Global Change Observation System (SGCOS) 

Objectives 

a. General 

The Space-based Global Change Observation System will provide space-based global 

observations which, together with other observations and studies, coordinated through the U.S. 

Global Change Research Program, will provide the scientific information to help understand the Earth 

system. 

b. Specific 

In support of the USGCRP, the S-GCOS shall: 

1. Improve our ability to detect and document changes in the global climate system to 

determine, as soon as possible, whether there is global warming or other potentially adverse global 

environmental changes; and, if changes are detected, determine the magnitude of these changes and 

identify their causes. 

2. Provide data to help identify and understand the complex interactions that characterize 

the Earth system in order to anticipate changes and differentiate between human-induced and natural 

processes. 

3. Provide for a data system to manage the information collected by S-GCOS as an integral 

part of the Global Change Data and Information System, consistent with the USGCW data policy. 

4. Provide for the development and demonstration of new space-based remote sensing 

technologies for global change observation and identify candidate technologies for future operational 

USe. 
Final Report to the l?wideti on the U.S. Space Bogrcma 

Lmplementing Actions 

This directive provides guidance to agencies developing, deploying, operating, or supporting SGCOS elements to acquire and manage relevant observations and data sets for the USGCRP. 

a. International Cooperation 

It is recognized that the goals and objectives of the U.S. Global Change Research Program can 

best be achieved through the mutually reinforcing research of all nations and many organizations 

and programs, which require a large measure of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Accordingly, 

participating agencies may explore, in accordance with this directive and established procedures, 

international cooperation in space-based global change observation. 

b. Interagency Coordination 

Space-based Global Change Observation System activities are conducted in the context of the 

USGCRP. The Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET), 

through its Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), is responsible for developing 

and coordinating the USGCRP, and for the activities and requirements of the USGCRP and, therefore, 

for the Space-based Global Change Observation System. All S-GCOS agencies shall participate with 

other USGCRP agencies and the CEES in the development and coordination of the Space-based 

Global Change Observation System Program Plan. The provision, management, and exchange of 

data will be a key element of the USGCRP. 

The CEES will coordinate the interagency development of the Global Change Data and 

Information System (GCDIS), which integrates appropriate observations, regardless of platform basing 

mode or orientation of data (land, oceanographic, atmospheric, or space). All agencies involved 

with S-GCOS will participate with other USGCRP agencies in planning for the GCDIS, with a goal 

of maximizing the system’s interoperability. Data sets intended for the GCDIS shall be responsive 

to the requirements of, and be accessible to, global change scientists and U.S. Governmentauthorized research and operational users. 

c. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is the lead agency for planning Space-based 

Global Change Observation System activities, and is responsible for developing and operating the 

NASA component of the S-GCOS. This component shall be developed to provide maximum program 

flexibility within budget constraints. As part of the USGCRP, NASA shall: 

1. Lead the development and preparation of a coordinated interagency Space-based Global 

Change Observation System Program Plan, to be delivered to the National Space Council (NSpC), 

III-33 
-r 

NSPD 7- Space-based Global Change Observation 

National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Office 

of Management and Budget COMB) by the CEES through FCCSET. This plan will guide agencies’ SGCOS activities. 

2. Continue with the Mission to Planet Earth by conducting the ongoing development, 

operation, and scientific use of instruments and satellites designed to observe and monitor processes 

that govern key aspects of global environmental change. 

3. As part of the Mission to Planet Earth, develop the Earth Observing System (EOS), 

comprised of intermediate and small sized satellites as recommended by the EOS Engineering Review 

Panel. 

4. Plan and develop, in an incremental and evolutionary manner, the EOS Data and 

Information System (EOSDIS), which is the NASA part of the data and information system for SGCOS. This data and information system shall be compatible with other parts of the USGCRP Global 

Change Data and Information System, and able to incorporate, as appropriate, currently available 

Earth observations, such as those from Landsat, and provide an active archive for S-GCOS system 

data sets. Prototype versions of this system, using existing Earth observations, shall be constructed 

to demonstrate system utility and functions. 

5. Develop new instruments and space systems for global change monitoring, utilizing 

technologies from NASA and other S-GCOS agencies. A plan for related NASA research and 

development activity shall be integral to the interagency-coordinated Space-based Global Change 

Observation System Program Plan. 

d. Department of Energy (DOE) 

The Department of Energy shall participate with NASA and the other appropriate S-GCOS 

agencies in developing satellite systems to maintain data continuity for the understanding of the 

Earth’s radiation budget, starting in 1995, consistent with the Space-based Global Change 

Observation System Program Plan. 

The DOE shall participate with other S-GCOS agencies in conducting research and development 

for advanced technologies that can offer promise of increased performance and/or lower cost for 

advanced long-term global change monitoring systems. A plan for related DOE research and 

development activity shall be integral to the interagency-coordinated Space-based Global Change 

Observation System Program Plan. 

III-39 
Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space FVv~ram 

e. Department of Defense (DOD) 

The participation of the Department of Defense in the Space-based Global Change Observation 

System shall consist of related activities derived from current and planned DOD programs. DOD, in 

cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, as appropriate, will identify those technologies 

and programs that support the S-GCOS and shall seek to make appropriate technology and data from 

those programs available. DOD may also seek to identify and take advantage of S-GCOS programs 

and capabilities, as appropriate. 

f. Department of Commerce (DO0 

The Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), shall participate in the collection, processing, archiving, retrieval, and use of oceanic- and 

atmospheric-oriented data and shall, consistent with the Space-based Global Change Observation 

System Program Plan, provide for the permanent archiving, management, access, and distribution 

of oceanic and atmospheric Earth science data sets for global change research, including data sets 

obtained by the S-GCOS. DOC/NOAA shall work with other appropriate agencies to transition, as 

appropriate, systems, technology, and/or sensors developed for use in the S-GCOS to operational 

use. The Space-based Global Change Observation System Program Plan shall include a discussion 

of the criteria related to the desirability and economic feasibility of transitioning specific S-GCOS 

assets to operational use. 

g. Department of the Interior 

The Department of the Interior shall assist in the collection, processing, archiving, retrieval, and 

use of land-oriented data and shall, consistent with the Space-based Global Change Observation 

System Program Plan, provide for the permanent archiving, management, access, and distribution 

of land-oriented Earth science data sets for global change research, including data sets obtained by 

S-GCOS. 

h. Department of State 

The Department of State has a role in Space-based Global Change Observation with respect to 

international agreements, significant activities, or arrangements with foreign countries, international 

organizations, or commissions where the United States and one or more foreign countries are 

members. Prior to discussions between participating agencies and foreign entities that could 

reasonably be expected to lead to such agreements, activities, or arrangements, the Department of 

State shall be consulted and, as appropriate, shall coordinate interagency review of the proposed U.S. 

position to ensure consistency with U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests, and 

satisfaction of applicable legal requirements. This shall not affect the ability of participating agencies 
NSPD 7- Space-based Global Change Obsenmion 

to explore, in accordance with established procedures, scientific, technical, and programmatic aspects 

of proposed international cooperation that do not involve commitments or foreign policy concerns. 

Reporting Requirements 

a. NASA shall lead the preparation of a coordinated and integrated interagency Space-based 

Global Change Observation System Program Plan that shall be forwarded by the CEES through 

FCCSET to the NSpC, NSC, OSTP, and OMB not later than July 1, 1992. This plan shall address the 

S-GCOS architecture, existing and planned S-GCOS satellite systems, technology development 

activities, sensor suites, launch systems, supporting agency contributions, and the data and 

information systems. 

b. Each March, FCCSETKEES shall prepare and forward a Space-based Global Change 

Observation System Program Report on the progress and accomplishments of the S-GCOS to the 

NSpC, NSC, OSTP, and OMB. The Space-based Global Change Observation System Program Plan 

will meet this requirement for 1932. 

III-41