* The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-4054

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Kennan R. Mallory, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 12, 2006 Filed: August 24, 2006

___________ Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, AR NOLD, Circuit Judge, and DOTY, * District Judge.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kennan R. Mallory pleaded guilty to cons piracy to distribute cocaine base in May 2002. He was sentenced to 188 months in prison, but the sentence was later reduced to 36 months as a result of the government’s motion under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mallory began five years of supervised release in July 2004. In November 2005, he admitted committing two violations of his mandatory conditions of supervised rel ease -- possession of drug paraphernalia and the submission of nine urine samples that tested positive for controlled substances.1 The HONORABLE RICHARD G. KOPF, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
-2- The district court 1 revoked supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence of sixty months in prison, the maximum pe nalty authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Mallory appeals, arguing the senten ce is unreasonable. We affirm.
Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines includes policy statements regarding revocation sentences. Because policy statemen ts are advisory, a sentencing court has always been “entirely fr ee” to impose a sentence outside the Chapter 7 suggested range when a different sentence is warranted. United States v. Jasper , 338 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2003). Thus, the Supreme Cour t’s decision in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), has had a “far less dramatic” impact on our review of revocation sentences compared to sentences gove rned by formerly mandatory guidelines provisions. United States v. Tyson , 413 F.3d 824, 825 (8th Cir. 2005).
Mallory argues that the sixty-month se ntence is excessive in view of the sentencing range recommended in Chapter 7 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He asserts that his suggest ed Chapter 7 sentencing range is four to ten months because he committed two Grad e C supervised release violations, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3), and has a criminal history category of II. The four-to-ten month range may have been recommended by the probation officer and counsel, but the district court made no such finding. Given Mallory’s admission that he submitted eight urine samples testing positive for co caine over a four-month period, it appears to us that he likely committed one or more Grade A violations. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). In that case, his Chapter 7 s uggested range is 27- 33 months in prison. SeeU.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Thus, Mallory’s contention that the district court imposed a sentence 600% above the suggested guidelines range is greatly exaggerated.-3- The revocation sentence in this case b ears a strong resemblance to the sixtymonth sentence we affirmed inUnited States v. Larison , 432 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2006). First, like Mallory, Larison asserted that the district court ignored a dramatically lower Chapter 7 suggested range, but Larison had also committed numerous drug-related supervised release violations after completing his prison term for a prior drug offense. Second, as in Larison , the district court noted that Mallory was the beneficiary of a substantial downward departure reducing his prior sentence but then committed numerous supervised release violations, conduct suggesting a high risk of future crimes. The Guidelines expressly permit a sentencing court to consider this factor. SeeU.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, comment. (n.4). Finally, as in Larison , the district court expressly considered the sentencing fact ors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and emphasized Mallory’s demonstrated need fo r intensive in-prison treatment of his serious drug addiction. In these circumstan ces, we conclude that Mallory’s revocation sentence was clearly reasonable.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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