stood-up an IRT and NASA has a voting member on the AJB, if there is disagreement over
root cause, contributing factors, etc., the true leverage of NASA will be when and whether

to load our cargo for launch to the ISS [Question 3-4].

Conclusion

In addition to the two memos from NASA you mentioned in your letter (attached here for
completeness), I am attaching two additional memos, also from Bill Gerstenmaier, AA for
HEOMD, where in one memo he identified the NASA interfaces to the Orbital ATK
investigation activities, and in the other he documented the rationale behind use of the LSP
organization to serve the function of an IRT for the SpX-7 launch failure investigation.

In closing, I want to thank you for your letter and for communicating your
concerns. Please be assured NASA is conducting independent reviews of both Orbital
ATK and SpaceX failures and we are committed to sharing our findings with each
contractor so they can improve their own knowledge, their own processes, and their own
reliability. As always, NASA shares your commitment to our Nation’s leadership in space.
NASA believes that our leadership will be best maintained through a competitive,
innovative, commercial U.S. space transportation industry. As you know, spaceflight is
difficult, and while these two recent losses were not welcome, we believe our U.S.
commercial space transportation industry will emerge stronger and more competitive from
these failures. We have confidence that our commercial suppliers are up to the challenge
and will independently review their approaches to return to flight.

Thank you for your interest in this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me if
there are additional questions pertaining to this matter.

Sincerely,

Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Administrator

4 Enclosures

cc: The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson


which LSP has approval authority [Question 8]. Although different mechanisms are being
utilized, NASA is still conducting an independent review of the two failures.

Specific to the SpX-7 investigation activities, we will have the additional involvement of
the Commercial Crew Program representative to provide insight into potential implications
to that program. Also for SpX-7, because the Falcon 9 launch vehicle is to be used to
launch high-value payloads, for example the upcoming Jason-3 mission, NASA LSP will
also review SpaceX’s readiness to launch that mission as part of our Flight Readiness
Review process, as documented in NPD 8610.24 Launch Services Program Pre-Launch
Readiness Reviews. Further, LSP will look carefully at the cause(s) for the failure and see
if any information learned from the investigation might prompt an examination of other
systems on the launch vehicle that could be susceptible to similar or related problems. By
maximizing learning from this failure, we can help to ensure that a more reliable launcher
is available. Rather than providing less insight into the SpX-7 investigation over the Orb-3
investigation, we are providing direct insight through Commercial Crew personnel
involvement and through the LSP Jason-3 pre-launch reviews that will guide our decisions
for flight readiness [Question 6]. Both independent reviews will seek to validate the
efforts of the contractor-led AIBs. For the SpX-7 investigation, NASA must agree with
the findings, recommendations, and implementation for return-to-flight, prior to NASA
utilizing that same model launch vehicle for a high-value NASA mission, such as Jason-3

[Question 7].

The material above focuses on the policy and contractual mechanisms for providing
NASA the insight and level of access needed to perform our independent reviews.
However, an effective way to achieve insight and influence in a contractor-led accident
investigation from a mishap on a FAA-licensed launch is for NASA’s participation to be
viewed as “value added” by the commercial provider. In this way, NASA benefits from
the investigation by having NASA personnel directly use analysis and test data and the
contractor gets to understand the benefits of different analysis techniques. Ultimately
NASA and industry end up with more reliable systems. Similar processes have been
followed when heritage commercial launch service suppliers have experienced major
anomalies that could have resulted in mission loss. Those heritage supplier launches were
not FAA-licensed missions, but there were anomaly investigations led by the contractor
with participation from NASA and the USAF which, shared the common goal of returning
to successful flight [Question 13].

Government Leverage

For Orb-3, in addition to the formal IRT established, NASA has a representative on Orbital
ATK’s AJB as a voting member. For SpX-7, the NASA representative is not a voting
member of SpaceX’s AIB. Per 14 CFR 417.111, the contractor does not have to name a
Government member, other than the FAA, to be a voting member as part of their AIB.
However, for SpaceX, NASA will have leverage under the terms of the NLS-II Contract
where NASA will have the right to accept/reject any finding, root cause, and corrective
action resulting from SpaceX’s board. For the Orb-3 investigation, where NASA has


National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001

August 24, 2015

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith

Chairman

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Smith:

Thank you very much for your letter of August 4, 2015 regarding the recent space
launch failures of June 28, 2015 and October 28, 2014. I appreciate your sincere
commitment to our Nation’s leadership in space and NASA has always shared that
commitment. I am pleased for the opportunity to address your concerns. I would also
mention that on August 3, 2015, Vice Admiral Joe Dyer, Chairman of the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) provided a written response related to concerns that we
were treating SpaceX differently than Orbital ATK with respect to our oversight of the
respective accident investigations to Mr. Chris Shank, Policy Director of the House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee. I think you will find Vice Admiral Dyer’s
response is in basic agreement with the contents of my letter following.

First and foremost, I want to assure you.that NASA is performing an independent
analysis of the Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) SpX-7 (“CRS-7”) launch failure.
For the Orbital ATK failure, we chose to establish a formal Independent Review Team
(IRT) to, as you pointed out, “amplify the learning for the NASA teams.” While it may
not have been as visible, we chose to do a similar thing for the SpaceX failure, conducting
an independent review, but using existing mechanisms that were already in place. Note
that due to this misunderstanding, many of the questions posed were written under an
incorrect premise that NASA is not conducting an independent review of the SpX-7
accident; therefore, we have attempted to answer the spirit of those questions.

Decision to Stand-Up an IRT for the Orbital ATK Antares Orb-3 Launch Failure

Since the Orbital ATK Antares launch was conducted under a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) license, the Antares launch failure was not considered a NASA
mishap. The process for conducting a launch failure investigation under a FAA-licensed
launch is codified in 14 CFR 417.111. Under the International Space Station (ISS)
Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract, NASA must be allowed to participate in a
CRS provider’s Accident Investigation Board (AIB). At the prerogative of the contractor,
in this case Orbital ATK, NASA was also provided a voting membership in their AIB.
However, to accomplish the spirit of conducting an independent investigation by which to


inform and amplify the learning for the NASA team, the Associate Administrator (AA) for
the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) established a
NASA-led IRT. NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8621.1, NASA Procedural
Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping
guided the thinking of the HEOMD AA and his decision to form such an independent
review. The HEOMD AA also consulted with the NASA Chief of Safety and Mission
Assurance in making this decision [Questions 9-13]. As stated previously, the ultimate
goal of the IRT was to amplify the learning for the NASA team. It would provide a
validation of the contractor-led AIB efforts to ascertain technical root cause, define
corrective actions, and inform the Agency’s risk posture to support a return-to-flight in an
ISS cargo resupply capacity. The decision to create an IRT also avoided any limitations on
NASA’s ability to understand the launch failure data and analysis [Question 2]. Although
the U.S. Air Force (USAF) is not performing their own independent review of the Orb-3
accident, they requested participation in the NASA IRT, which was granted. NASA and
the USAF have a history of collaboration and sharing launch vehicle related information
and data [Question 14].

Decision that NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) will serve the Function of the
IRT for the SpX-7 Launch Failure

Like the Orbital ATK Antares launch, the SpX-7 launch was conducted under an FAA
license, and was therefore not considered a NASA mishap; however, in the case of the
Falcon 9, the LSP has two contract launch service task orders in place with SpaceX under
our NASA Launch Services II (NLS ID) contract for the launch of two high-value payloads
on the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. NASA’s NLS II contract allows NASA to stand up its
own independent review or assessment team for an anomaly or launch failure of a launch
vehicle directly applicable to an on-contract launch service, and the commercial launch
service provider is contractually bound to support and cooperate with NASA’s independent
team. In addition, NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8610.7 Launch Services Risk Mitigation
Policy for NASA-Owned and/or NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions, and NPD 8610.23
Launch Vehicle Technical Oversight Policy are incorporated into the NLS II contract.
NPD 8610.7 requires a post-flight assessment be performed by LSP of every launch of
every vehicle certified or in the process of being certified for use under the NLS-II
contract. Per this NPD, “[rJesolution of all flight anomalies and mission failures is
required by the launch service contractor with Launch Service Program (LSP) technical
evaluation and disposition” [emphasis added]. NPD 8610.23 calls out specific data,
products, processes, events, etc. into which LSP shall be provided insight by the
commercial launch provider and lists specific events and items over which LSP has

approval authority [Question 8].

Since extensive independent analysis was already underway due to the standard
practices, policies, and contract requirements described above, and since LSP is in a unique
position to accomplish an efficient and effective independent review, the AA for HEOMD
believed that LSP’s investigation would lead to an in-depth understanding of the events.
Not only was this the most efficient use of NASA resources, but it also afforded a single


interface for providing data and other products from SpaceX and its subcontractors in
support of all three NASA Programs interested in SpaceX launch services: the LSP, the
Commercial Resupply Services Program and the Commercial Crew Program. The AA for
HEOMD also factored in the level of inclusion being afforded to LSP by SpaceX and felt
confident that this approach would provide an efficient, effective, and independent
assessment of the data. This is documented in a Memorandum for the Record dated
August 3, 2015 [Question 9]. As in the case of the Orb-3 accident, the AA for HEOMD
consulted with the NASA Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance regarding the need for an
IRT. It was the AA for HEOMD’s discretion to decide that the LSP effort would serve the

function of an independent review team [Question 10-11].

Through this independent review effort, NASA will benefit from the “continuous
learning” afforded by analysis of the data, findings, and rationale which will enhance our
knowledge of the Falcon 9 systems, as well as our understanding of SpaceX’s launch-
related processes [Question 1]. Since there has been no decision to forego an independent
review of the SpX-7 accident, there has been no consideration by NASA of any factors
such as the financial impact on contractors associated with the delay of the Jason-3 or
commercial resupply missions [Question 15]. As with Orb-3, the USAF is also
participating as an observer in the SpaceX Accident Investigation Team (AIT), and may be
conducting some independent analysis. NASA LSP is “leading” the independent review
effort because of the existing contracts NASA has for high-value missions to be flown on
the SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle, and because the next Government launch utilizing the
Falcon 9 will be a NASA mission. NASA and the USAF have a history of collaboration
and sharing launch-vehicle-related information and data. NASA is sharing, and will
continue to share, our findings with the USAF; however, each agency will need to make its
own independent engineering judgments from the data to match a given mission risk

posture [Question 14].

Independent Reviews

In both the Orb-3 and SpX-7 accident investigations, NASA has significant insight into the
findings and rationale developed by the contractors. In addition, the Government is being
afforded access to all data and physical evidence, as well as access to the contractor teams
in support of both independent review team efforts. Specifically, the mechanisms under
which these interactions have been agreed to are found in the NLS-II and CRS contracts.
Both accidents fall under the CRS contract. Like NLS-II, this contract is also a
commercial launch service, but is more akin to a “delivery-on-orbit” launch service that
relies on the commercial launch provider. NASA’s mission assurance efforts under CRS
were focused on ISS proximity operations rather than on the launch vehicle. This was a
conscious choice by NASA for the CRS program in an effort to reduce costs and allow the
commercial launch provider broad latitude to innovate [Question 5]. As mentioned above,
NPD 8610.23 is a contractual requirement in the NLS-II contract, and calls out specific
data, products, processes, events, etc. into which LSP shall be provided insight by the
commercial launch provider. In addition, the NPD lists specific events and items over