PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES CHANDLER RYDER, by and 

through his Next Friend, Sue Ryder, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

MAURICE WARRIOR,1

 Interim Warden, 

Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 13-7073 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 6:05-CV-00024-JHP-KEW)

_________________________________ 

Patti Palmer Ghezzi, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Randy A. Bauman, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender with her on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

Jennifer J. Dickson, Assistant Attorney General (Jennifer L. Crabb, Assistant Attorney 

General, and E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General of Oklahoma, with her on the briefs), 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 1

 Anita Trammell retired as Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary on 

October 28, 2015 and has been succeeded by Interim Warden Maurice Warrior. 

Warden Warrior has thus replaced Warden Trammell as Respondent-Appellee in this 

matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c) (“When a public officer who is a party to an appeal 

or other proceeding in an official capacity . . . ceases to hold office[,] . . . [t]he public 

officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 11, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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McHUGH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner-Appellant James Chandler Ryder, an Oklahoma state prisoner who 

was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, appeals from the district court’s 

denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In a prior unpublished order, we 

granted a certificate of appealability on three issues: (1) whether the district court 

erred in denying Mr. Ryder a definite stay of his habeas proceedings based on his 

incompetency; (2) whether Mr. Ryder was incompetent to stand trial and whether the 

procedures employed by Oklahoma to assess his competency violated his 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether 

Mr. Ryder’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully investigate his mental 

health and background as they related to competence to stand trial and his mitigation 

case at sentencing, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Applying the deferential standard 

required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 

we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Ryder’s petition for habeas relief. 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

The facts underlying Mr. Ryder’s conviction are largely undisputed.2

 On 

April 8, 1999, after an ongoing dispute over personal property Mr. Ryder had been 

storing at the residence of Daisy Hallum and her adult son Sam Hallum, Mr. Ryder 

killed the Hallums. The property in dispute consisted of supplies Mr. Ryder had 

collected in preparation for a world-ending apocalypse he believed would occur on 

January 1, 2000. Mr. Ryder planned to depart for the Yukon region of Canada in the 

spring of 1999 because he believed the Yukon was the only place he could survive 

the pending apocalyptic event. When his plans were frustrated by the Hallums’ 

refusal to return his property, Mr. Ryder went to the Hallums’ home and beat Daisy 

Hallum to death and shot and killed Sam Hallum. 

B. State Criminal Trial, Appeal, and Postconviction Proceedings 

1. Criminal Trial 

The State charged Mr. Ryder with two counts of first-degree murder. The State 

offered Mr. Ryder a plea agreement of two concurrent life sentences, with the 

possibility of parole in as early as fifteen years. Mr. Ryder rejected the plea 

agreement, stating to the trial court, “if I am found guilty and y’all kill me I will be 

free anyway. Let’s see what happens.” 

 2

 This factual summary borrows extensively from the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals (OCCA) presentation of the facts in its direct review of 

Mr. Ryder’s trial. Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). We presume 

a state court’s factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that 

presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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Less than two weeks before trial, psychologist Dean P. Montgomery issued a 

report to Mr. Ryder’s trial counsel in which he opined that Mr. Ryder suffered from a 

longstanding schizoid personality disorder and was incompetent to assist in his own 

defense. But based on Mr. Ryder’s interactions with counsel and participation in 

preparing his defense, trial counsel did not have a “good faith doubt” as to 

Mr. Ryder’s competency to stand trial. Counsel therefore did not raise the issue of 

competency at that time. 

Mr. Ryder’s case went to trial and a jury convicted him on both first-degreemurder counts. Following Mr. Ryder’s convictions, but before the sentencing phase 

commenced, defense counsel filed an application for a determination of competency. 

See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1175.2. The application was supported by Dr. Montgomery’s 

report, which explained that although Mr. Ryder at times presented himself as 

competent, he demonstrated a pattern of resisting counsel and refusing to reveal 

mitigating evidence, including refusing to allow his family to testify on his behalf. 

The trial court held a hearing on the application, out of the presence of the 

jury. At the hearing, trial counsel expressed concerns that Mr. Ryder had refused to 

assist in preparation for the sentencing phase and had instructed counsel not to offer 

any mitigating evidence. The trial court denied the request for a separate competency 

hearing and instead called Mr. Ryder to the stand to assess his competency to waive 

his mitigation case.3

 During his colloquy with the court, Mr. Ryder assured the judge 

 3

 In assessing Mr. Ryder’s competency, the trial court followed the guidelines 

set forth in Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504, 512–13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). 

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that he understood he had been convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and 

the State was pursuing the death penalty. He further attested that he understood the 

purpose of mitigation evidence. Mr. Ryder testified that he did not want to present 

any mitigation evidence because he preferred the death penalty to life in prison 

without parole. Mr. Ryder also expressed his own belief that he was competent to 

make that decision. In response to questions from the court, Mr. Ryder denied having 

ever been treated for a mental illness, stating, “No, nothing [is] wrong with me.” 

After concluding its colloquy with Mr. Ryder, the court asked defense counsel 

to identify the proposed mitigation witnesses and the nature of their expected 

testimony. Counsel proceeded to describe the various witnesses they hoped to call, 

including family members, acquaintances, and prison staff. During this presentation, 

Mr. Ryder became upset, interrupting counsel and stating “I’ve heard all I need to. . . 

. Get me out of here. I do not want any second stage. Nobody to testify. And if I 

don’t have that right, then get me out of here.” 

Defense counsel next called Mr. Ryder’s mother, Sue Ryder, to testify on the 

competency issue. Not wishing to hear his mother’s testimony, Mr. Ryder left the 

courtroom. Ms. Ryder then described her interactions with Mr. Ryder shortly before 

the murders took place and stated she believed he was severely depressed. She also 

testified that Mr. Ryder spent much of his time helping others, that he hated being in 

enclosed spaces, and that he asked her not to testify as a mitigation witness. 

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Mr. Ryder was then brought back into the courtroom. The court confirmed 

with Mr. Ryder that he wished to waive his mitigation case and that he understood 

the strong likelihood he would receive the death penalty as a result. 

The trial court then ruled Mr. Ryder was competent to stand trial and to waive 

his right to present mitigating evidence. The court also found Mr. Ryder had 

knowingly and voluntarily done so. Next, defense counsel argued that although 

Mr. Ryder had the right to waive his mitigation case under the Eighth Amendment, 

counsel still had a Sixth Amendment obligation to provide effective assistance. 

Counsel therefore requested that the court permit the defense to call two mitigation 

witnesses who were not among the family members Mr. Ryder had explicitly asked to 

not testify. The court granted this request and stated it would not foreclose counsel 

from calling mitigation witnesses. 

During the sentencing phase, the State put forward evidence of three 

aggravating factors it claimed supported a sentence of death: Daisy Hallum’s death 

was especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious; Mr. Ryder knowingly created a grave 

risk of death to more than one person; and there existed a probability that Mr. Ryder 

would commit acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 

After the State rested, Mr. Ryder left the courtroom for the defense’s presentation of 

its mitigation evidence. Defense counsel called family friend Sue Epley and jail staff 

member Sue Watkins. Ms. Epley testified that she had known Mr. Ryder for several 

years and he was honest, decent, hardworking, and not violent, but he was a loner 

who often talked about going to the Yukon in anticipation of the end of the world. 

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Ms. Watkins, a dispatcher at the county jail where Mr. Ryder was then incarcerated, 

testified that Mr. Ryder was quiet and gave no problems to jail staff or other inmates. 

The jury then deliberated and recommended a sentence of life in prison 

without parole for Sam Hallum’s murder and death for Daisy Hallum’s murder. The 

trial court sentenced Mr. Ryder accordingly. 

2. Direct Appeal, Retrospective Competency Hearing, and State Postconviction 

Proceedings 

Mr. Ryder appealed his conviction and sentence to the OCCA. On appeal, 

Mr. Ryder was represented by new counsel, Gloyd L. McCoy.4

 He argued, among 

other things, that the trial court erred in failing to make a proper competency 

determination prior to the sentencing phase and that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to notify the court of the competency issues before trial and by 

failing to present an adequate mitigation case. The OCCA remanded the case to the 

trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether a retrospective competency trial 

was feasible, and, if so, to conduct such a trial to determine whether Mr. Ryder had 

been competent to stand trial. On remand, the trial court determined that a 

retrospective competency hearing was feasible. 

The trial court thus began the process of selecting a jury to determine whether 

Mr. Ryder had been competent to stand trial. During voir dire, defense counsel told 

 4

 Mr. McCoy was subsequently suspended from practicing law for two years 

beginning in September 2010. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assoc. v. McCoy, 240 P.3d 675 

(Okla. 2010). Mr. McCoy was disciplined by the Tenth Circuit in 2007, Order at 5–6, 

In re McCoy, No. 07-819 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007), and was disbarred from 

practicing before the Tenth Circuit in 2010, Order at 2, In re McCoy, No. 10-802 

(10th Cir. Mar. 5, 2010). 

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the jury venire that Mr. Ryder was on death row and asked whether the prospective 

jurors could give him a fair hearing, despite that fact. Later, during the prosecution’s 

voir dire, a prospective juror raised the fact that Mr. Ryder was on death row, and the 

prosecution explained that Mr. Ryder had been convicted of capital murder. The juror 

then inquired whether Mr. Ryder would be taken off death row or whether his case 

would be overturned if the jury determined he was incompetent. The court instructed 

the jury that its only concern was competency and the OCCA would decide what 

happens after the resolution of that issue. 

Once the jury was empaneled, defense counsel called one witness, 

Dr. Montgomery. Dr. Montgomery discussed his 2000 and 2002 evaluations of 

Mr. Ryder, including the results of the MacArthur Competence Assessment ToolCriminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), a test designed to assess the competency of 

criminal defendants. Dr. Montgomery testified that the MacCAT-CA results showed 

Mr. Ryder’s competency to stand trial was questionable in that he was uncooperative 

with counsel and did not seem to be acting in his own best interest by withholding 

evidence, refusing to cooperate in any plea agreements, and refusing to allow his 

family to assist defense counsel. Dr. Montgomery further explained that although he 

had diagnosed Mr. Ryder with a schizoid personality disorder in 2000, his 2002 

evaluation led him to believe that Mr. Ryder suffered from a more severe, delusional 

disorder under the schizophrenic group of disorders. This diagnosis was based on 

Mr. Ryder’s hyperreligiosity, his delusions about the end of the world, his desire to 

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live off the land in the Yukon, and other information Dr. Montgomery obtained 

through the historical records defense counsel provided in 2002. 

After the defense rested, the State called three witnesses: Charlie Rogers, a 

deputy sheriff at the county jail where Mr. Ryder was incarcerated during his trial; 

Judge Thomas M. Bartheld, who had presided over Mr. Ryder’s criminal trial;5

 and 

Charlie Mackey, the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agent who worked on 

Mr. Ryder’s case. Each of the State’s witnesses testified as to their interactions with 

Mr. Ryder before and during his criminal trial and their perceptions as to his 

participation in and understanding of the trial proceedings. After the State rested, the 

jury found Mr. Ryder had been competent during his original criminal trial. 

Mr. Ryder then refiled his direct appeal to the OCCA, challenging both his 

underlying criminal trial and the retrospective competency trial. See generally Ryder 

v. State, 83 P.3d 856 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). The OCCA denied relief on all 

grounds and affirmed Mr. Ryder’s conviction and sentence. Id. at 879. 

Mr. Ryder then applied for postconviction relief with the OCCA, but the court 

denied the application on all grounds. Ryder v. State, No. PCD-2002-257 (Okla. 

Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004). Mr. Ryder filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the 

U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court denied. Ryder v. Oklahoma, 543 U.S. 886 

(2004) (mem.). 

 5

 Judge Bartheld had presided over the feasibility hearing, but when he learned 

the State planned to call him as a witness, he recused himself from the retrospective 

competency trial. 

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C. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 

1. Habeas Petition 

In September 2005, Mr. Ryder filed a timely petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. In his 

petition, Mr. Ryder raised eleven grounds for relief and requested equitable tolling 

and abeyance of his habeas proceedings based on his incompetency. In arguing for a 

competency-based tolling and abeyance, Mr. Ryder relied on an evaluation conducted 

and a report written by Dr. Raphael Morris, a board certified psychiatrist retained by 

habeas counsel to assess Mr. Ryder’s mental health. Dr. Morris diagnosed Mr. Ryder 

with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and opined that “Mr. Ryder did not (at the time of 

trial) and does not now demonstrate the requisite rational understanding of his legal 

predicament” and that his “delusions adversely impact on his ability to assist current 

counsel and to access defense resources.” Accordingly, counsel requested a stay of 

Mr. Ryder’s habeas case “until such time that he is restored to competency.” Two 

years later, habeas counsel renewed the motion for equitable tolling and abeyance, 

asserting Mr. Ryder’s mental health had deteriorated significantly since he filed his 

initial habeas petition, making “even the most basic communication next to 

impossible.” 

2. Mental Health Evaluations 

The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing and referred the matter to the 

magistrate judge to determine Mr. Ryder’s competency. The magistrate judge ordered 

Mr. Ryder to undergo a psychiatric examination by Federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) 

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psychologist, Dr. Lee Ann Preston-Baecht. As part of her evaluation, Dr. PrestonBaecht requested Mr. Ryder’s historical and medical documentation, but the 

magistrate judge denied the request in an effort to ensure an unbiased evaluation. 

Dr. Preston-Baecht therefore evaluated Mr. Ryder, without the benefit of his 

historical records, over the course of several weeks while he stayed at a federal 

mental-health facility. 

In her 2008 final report, Dr. Preston-Baecht concluded that although 

Mr. Ryder “appeared religiously preoccupied and often expressed unusual ideas,” he 

did not appear to express “any obviously delusional ideation.” In regard to a mental 

health diagnosis, Dr. Preston-Baecht explained that she had been unable to make a 

conclusive diagnosis, faulting her lack of access to Mr. Ryder’s historical records. 

Despite this admitted inability to definitively diagnose Mr. Ryder, Dr. PrestonBaecht opined that Mr. Ryder “appears to have a rational understanding of the nature 

and potential consequences of the proceedings in which he is now engaged” and 

“despite his irritable mood, hyper-religiosity and tangential speech, Mr. Ryder 

demonstrated . . . the ability to effectively and rationally assist and communicate with 

his counsel.” Dr. Preston-Baecht thus opined that although Mr. Ryder likely suffers 

from an undiagnosed mental health condition, he was competent to assist with the 

habeas proceedings. 

A few months later, the State filed a motion for leave to provide Dr. PrestonBaecht with the historical documentation previously withheld. The district court 

granted the motion, and upon reviewing Mr. Ryder’s historical information, 

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Dr. Preston-Baecht requested an opportunity for further evaluation. The district court 

granted the request, and, in the presence of counsel, Dr. Preston-Baecht conducted a 

one-day interview of Mr. Ryder at the prison where he was incarcerated. During this 

second evaluation, Dr. Preston-Baecht administered the MacCAT-CA competency 

test. She had not administered the MacCAT-CA during her prior evaluation because 

Mr. Ryder had refused to cooperate. 

In her 2009 follow-up report, Dr. Preston-Baecht concluded that Mr. Ryder’s 

“mental state had deteriorated significantly” since her 2008 examination. The report 

discussed Mr. Ryder’s rapid, often incoherent and tangential speech reflecting his 

various delusions, and indicated that Dr. Preston-Baecht found it difficult, if not 

impossible, to redirect Mr. Ryder from discussing his delusions. Based on her 

observations of Mr. Ryder’s changed condition and her review of his historical 

records, Dr. Preston Baecht concluded that Mr. Ryder suffers from a psychotic 

disorder, most likely schizophrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Preston-Baecht also reported 

that the results of the MacCAT-CA competency test confirmed that Mr. Ryder was 

incompetent and that without treatment, his condition would likely get worse. 

3. Competency Hearing 

The parties thereafter entered into a proposed stipulation, which provided that 

if Dr. Morris and Dr. Preston-Baecht were called to testify, they would both offer 

testimony that Mr. Ryder was not competent to proceed in habeas and that the State 

would not call any witnesses to rebut this testimony. Accordingly, the magistrate 

judge entered a Report and Recommendation concluding that Mr. Ryder was 

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“incompetent in theses habeas corpus proceedings.” Based on this Report and 

Recommendation, the district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine, 

among other things, whether Mr. Ryder was incompetent when the statute of 

limitations on his habeas petition ran, and if not, when he became incompetent. At 

the evidentiary hearing, the court heard from Dr. Morris, who opined that Mr. Ryder 

had been incompetent since well before his habeas proceedings commenced, and 

from Dr. Preston-Baecht, who opined that Mr. Ryder had been incompetent since at 

least 2009, when she conducted her second evaluation. When asked why her 2008 

and 2009 evaluations produced such starkly different results, Dr. Preston-Baecht 

suggested that Mr. Ryder may have been guarded during the first evaluation because 

he knew he would be psychologically evaluated while at the BOP mental-health 

facility. In contrast, she conducted the second evaluation in the prison where Mr. 

Ryder had been incarcerated for years, “he was on his own turf,” his attorneys were 

present, and he did not know the precise purpose of the visit. Dr. Preston-Baecht 

opined that these circumstances may have “allowed [Mr. Ryder] to let his guard 

down.” She added that although the background information helped her reach a more 

accurate mental illness diagnosis in 2009, it was the difference in his behavior 

between the first and second evaluation that really changed her opinion as to 

competency. 

4. District Court’s Rulings 

A few months later, the district court entered its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. The court found that Mr. Ryder suffers from paranoid 

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schizophrenia, which had worsened over time and will continue to get worse without 

treatment. The court concluded that even though Mr. Ryder may have been suffering 

from this mental illness at the time he filed his habeas petition, he had failed to show 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent on October 4, 2005, 

when the statute of limitations on his habeas petition ran. Relying on Dr. PrestonBaecht’s 2008 evaluation, the court concluded that Mr. Ryder demonstrated a 

sufficient degree of rational understanding to be deemed competent as of the date of 

that evaluation, but that he became legally incompetent sometime thereafter. The 

court held that because Mr. Ryder was competent when the statute of limitations 

expired, and because, under AEDPA, habeas review is limited to the record that was 

before the state court, equitable tolling was not required. But due to Mr. Ryder’s 

incompetency, the court appointed his mother to act as his next friend to decide on 

the appropriate medical treatment for Mr. Ryder and to determine, with the assistance 

of counsel, his best legal options. 

The district court subsequently issued an order and final judgment denying 

Mr. Ryder’s request for habeas relief and denying a COA on all grounds. Ryder ex 

rel. Ryder v. Trammell, No. CIV-05-0024-JHP-KEW, 2013 WL 5603851 (E.D. Okla. 

Oct. 11, 2013). Mr. Ryder timely appealed and moved this court for a COA on five 

issues relating to prior competency determinations, ineffective assistance of counsel, 

and cumulative error. In an unpublished order, we granted Mr. Ryder a COA as to 

three issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Ryder a definite stay 

of his habeas proceedings to determine whether he has claims that could substantially 

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benefit from his assistance and to determine the likelihood that he would regain 

competency in the foreseeable future; (2) whether Mr. Ryder was incompetent to 

stand trial and whether the procedures employed by Oklahoma to assess his 

competency violated his due process and Sixth Amendment rights; and (3) whether 

Mr. Ryder’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to fully investigate 

his mental illness and background as it related to both his competency to stand trial 

and as mitigating evidence that would have prevented the imposition of the death 

penalty. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(c)(1)(A) and is 

limited to the three issues for which we granted a COA. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003); Jones v. Warrior, 805 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 

2015). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Competency-Based Stay of Habeas Proceedings 

We begin our analysis by addressing Mr. Ryder’s challenge to the denial of his 

request for a competency-based stay of his habeas proceedings. Mr. Ryder argues the 

district court erred in concluding he was competent on the date the statute of limitations 

ran on his habeas petition, in focusing on that date as the only relevant time for assessing 

competency, and in determining that none of his habeas claims would substantially 

benefit from his assistance. 

“[T]he decision to grant a stay, like the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing, is 

generally left to the sound discretion of district courts.” Ryan v. Gonzales, --- U.S. ---, 

133 S. Ct. 696, 708 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). District courts maintain 

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this authority in the context of habeas proceedings subject to AEDPA, id., but AEDPA 

does “circumscribe their discretion.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). A stay 

of habeas proceedings “must therefore be compatible with AEDPA’s purposes,” 

including its goal of “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal 

sentences, particularly in capital cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. The Authority to Grant a Competency-Based Stay 

The Supreme Court recently addressed the propriety of a competency-based stay 

of habeas proceedings. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696. In Gonzales, the Court reviewed the 

conclusion reached by two appellate courts, the Ninth and the Sixth Circuits, that habeas 

petitioners have a statutory right to be competent during habeas proceedings and that a 

petitioner’s incompetence necessitates a stay of habeas proceedings. Id. at 700–02. On 

certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled, first, that no such statutory right exists. It thus 

rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), which grants a habeas 

petitioner seeking review of a death sentence a right to counsel, and the Sixth Circuit’s 

reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which establishes procedures for determining a federal 

criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial. Id. at 702–07. 

 The Court next considered whether a district court may exercise its equitable 

powers to issue a stay of habeas proceedings in light of a petitioner’s incompetence. Id. at 

707–08. The Court observed that, despite the absence of a statutory right to competency 

in habeas proceedings, district courts retain the “authority to issue stays, where such a 

stay would be a proper exercise of discretion.” Id. at 708 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although the Court declined to determine “the precise contours” of this 

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equitable authority, it instead described the “outer limits” of a district court’s discretion to 

grant a competency-based stay of habeas proceedings. Id. These outer limits instruct that 

where a habeas petitioner raises claims that are either “record based”—i.e., were 

adjudicated on the merits in state court—or are “resolvable as a matter of law,” a district 

court abuses its discretion in granting a request for a competency-based stay. Id. The 

Court reasoned that a habeas petitioner’s competent participation is not necessary when 

the petitioner raises only claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court because 

AEDPA limits the review of such claims to “the record that was before the state court.” 

Id. (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Nor is the petitioner’s participation necessary when he raises legal challenges 

because such challenges do not depend on the petitioner’s knowledge or comprehension. 

Id.. Therefore, “any evidence that a petitioner might have would be inadmissible.” Id.

The Court also suggested that an unexhausted but procedurally barred claim would not 

benefit from petitioner’s assistance and therefore would not provide a sufficient basis for 

granting a competency-based stay. Id. at 709. 

Finally, the Court concluded that even if a habeas petitioner raises claims that are 

neither exhausted nor procedurally defaulted, “an indefinite stay would be inappropriate” 

because such a stay would undermine AEDPA’s interest in finality. Id. Therefore, “[i]f a 

district court concludes that the petitioner’s claim could substantially benefit from the 

petitioner’s assistance, the district court should take into account the likelihood that the 

petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable future.” Id. If the result of such an 

assessment is “no reasonable hope” that the petitioner will regain competency, “a stay is 

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inappropriate and merely frustrates the State’s attempts to defend its presumptively valid 

judgment.” Id.

Guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales, we must determine whether 

the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Ryder’s request for a competencybased stay. As the following discussion shows, even if the district court erred in deeming 

Mr. Ryder competent at the time he filed his habeas petition, the court was within its 

discretion in denying his request for a stay because all of his claims fall outside the outer 

limits of the district court’s discretion.

2. Mr. Ryder’s Habeas Claims 

In his habeas petition, Mr. Ryder raised eleven claims for habeas relief. On appeal, 

he argues at least two of these claims would benefit from his assistance. Specifically, he 

relies on habeas claims one and two, the same two claims for which we granted a COA. 

These claims assert: (1) Mr. Ryder was incompetent to stand trial, trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to raise the issue of competency prior to trial, the retrospective 

competency hearing violated his due process rights, and appellate counsel was ineffective 

at the retrospective competency hearing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

timely raise the issue of competency and by inadequately presenting Mr. Ryder’s 

mitigation case.6

 Mr. Ryder contends these claims depend in large part on facts outside 

 6

 Mr. Ryder has not expressly relied on his other nine habeas claims in 

requesting a competency-based stay. Our review of these claims demonstrates that 

none provide a sufficient basis for granting a stay. Of the nine additional claims, the 

OCCA adjudicated seven on the merits, either on direct appeal or through 

postconviction proceedings. See Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Trammell, No. CIV-05-0024-

JHP-KEW, 2013 WL 5603851, at *23, *30, *32–36, 38 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2013).

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the record, namely, facts regarding his communications and interactions with trial and 

appellate counsel, his understanding of the various mental health experts’ reports, and 

whether he knew of additional mitigation information. But the OCCA adjudicated the 

merits7

 of these claims either on direct appeal or postconviction review. Ryder v. State, 

No. PCD-2002-257, slip. op. at 3–15 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004); Ryder v. State, 

83 P.3d 856, 875–78 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). They are therefore subject to the 

limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes on the habeas record such that “any evidence 

[Mr. Ryder] might have would be inadmissible.” Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 708. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ryder’s request 

for a competency-based stay. 

 

Habeas review of these claims is therefore limited to the record that was before the 

state court, and any additional evidence a competent Mr. Ryder might possess would 

be inadmissible. With respect to the remaining two habeas claims, the first asserts 

that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional. Id. at *37. But 

Mr. Ryder has not suggested that facts exist outside the record that would 

differentiate his challenge from those which the Supreme Court rejected in Glossip v. 

Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015). The second remaining 

claim argues Mr. Ryder is incompetent to be executed, Ryder, 2013 WL 5603851, at 

*36, which Mr. Ryder acknowledges is not ripe for review, see Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945–48 (2007) (explaining that a claim of incompetency 

to be executed is not ripe until an execution date has been set). We are therefore 

satisfied that none of these claims would benefit from Mr. Ryder’s competent 

assistance. 

7

 As we explain more fully below, the OCCA was less than thorough in its 

analysis of Mr. Ryder’s first habeas claim. See infra Part III.B.1. But it nonetheless 

disposed of the claim on the merits, and therefore our review is limited to the record 

that was before the OCCA. See Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) 

(“Since we have an adjudication on the merits, we must consider what it means to 

defer to a decision which does not articulate a reasoned application of federal law to 

determined facts. We conclude . . . that we owe deference to the state court’s result, 

even if its reasoning is not expressly stated.”). 

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B. Habeas Claims 

We now address the merits of Mr. Ryder’s habeas claims. Our review of these 

claims is circumscribed by AEDPA, which allows for habeas relief from a state court 

adjudication only if the petitioner can show the state court decision (1) is “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) is “based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). This standard “erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court” 

and requires the petitioner to show “that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 

16 (2013) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frost v. Pryor, 

749 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Under the [fairminded jurists] test, if all 

fairminded jurists would agree the state court decision was incorrect, then it was 

unreasonable and the habeas corpus writ should be granted. If, however, some 

fairminded jurists could possibly agree with the state court decision, then it was not 

unreasonable and the writ should be denied.”). AEDPA therefore “demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

181 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A state court’s legal conclusion is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent under § 2254(d)(1) if it “‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 

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forth in Supreme Court cases’ or ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a 

result different from that precedent.’” Fairchild v. Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 710 (10th 

Cir. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000)). 

Likewise, “a state court decision is an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court 

precedent if it “‘correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to 

the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.’” Id. at 711 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

407–08). In assessing whether the state court decision comports with Supreme Court 

precedent, we focus “on what a state court knew and did,” and we measure the state 

court’s decision “against [the Supreme] Court’s precedents as of the time the state court 

renders its decision.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our review of a state court’s factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2) is even 

narrower. “We may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as 

unreasonable merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the 

first instance.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Instead, we must accord the state court’s factual findings 

“substantial deference.” Id. Under this standard, if “reasonable minds reviewing the 

record might disagree about the finding in question,” we must defer to the state court 

decision. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But “where the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the 

misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, 

that misapprehension can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the 

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resulting factual finding unreasonable.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1171–72 

(10th Cir. 2011). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the state court’s 

factual findings “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

In determining whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Ryder’s request 

for habeas relief, “we review the district court’s legal analysis of the state court 

decision de novo and its factual findings, if any, for clear error.” Frost, 749 F.3d at 

1223 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Retrospective Competency Trial 

We begin by applying this standard to Mr. Ryder’s challenge to the retrospective 

competency trial. In his habeas petition, Mr. Ryder challenged the Oklahoma courts’ 

competency determinations on both substantive and procedural grounds, arguing the 

evidence at the retrospective competency trial showed he was convicted and sentenced 

while incompetent and the procedures employed to assess his competency and his 

counsel’s representation were deficient. On appeal, however, Mr. Ryder limits his 

competency argument to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the retrospective 

competency trial. He argues defense counsel provided deficient performance and but for 

this deficient performance, the jury would have found him incompetent. 

As a threshold matter, we must address Mr. Ryder’s contention that we should 

review this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim de novo, instead of under AEDPA’s 

deferential standard. Mr. Ryder argues the OCCA failed to expressly rule on this claim, 

even though he raised it in his application for postconviction relief. As a result, he 

contends that no state court decision exists to which we must defer. 

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But AEDPA’s deferential standard applies not only to claims the state court 

squarely addressed, but also to claims it reached only cursorily. As the Supreme Court 

explained in Harrington v. Richter, “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by 

an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). This burden 

remains “whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim 

it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has 

been adjudicated.” Id. 

We have applied Richter’s directive to our habeas review of a prior OCCA 

decision. See Williams v. Trammell, 782 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2015). In Williams, the 

OCCA failed to thoroughly analyze the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim. Id. at 1199. We explained that although the OCCA’s decision was not “a model of 

clarity,” our task under AEDPA was “still to evaluate the reasonableness of the OCCA’s 

application of Strickland, considering the reasonableness of the theories that ‘could have 

supported’ the OCCA’s decision.” Id. at 1200 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102). 

Applying this test, we concluded that the OCCA “reasonably could have” ruled that 

petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed. Id. 

Here, Mr. Ryder raised a broad ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 

claim in his application for postconviction relief to the OCCA. As a subpart of that 

claim, Mr. Ryder argued appellate counsel was ineffective during the retrospective 

competency trial, and he requested an evidentiary hearing to more fully develop the 

issue. In its order denying Mr. Ryder’s application for postconviction relief, the 

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OCCA broadly rejected Mr. Ryder’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 

claim but did not separately discuss Mr. Ryder’s challenge to counsel’s 

representation during the retrospective competency trial. Ryder v. State, No. PCD2002-257, slip op. at 16 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004). The OCCA did, however, 

expressly deny Mr. Ryder’s request for an evidentiary hearing to “develop the issue 

surrounding the retrospective competency trial.” Id. at 18. Although the OCCA’s 

rejection of this claim was “unaccompanied by an explanation,” the claim was clearly 

presented to the OCCA and ruled on. AEDPA deference therefore still applies to our 

review of its decision and restrains us from granting relief unless Mr. Ryder can 

show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 98; See also Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1213 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[A]ny 

denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of 

counsel filed pursuant to OCCA Rule 3.11 [which permits supplementing the record 

on direct appeal or on postconviction] . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits 

of the Strickland claim and is therefore entitled to deference under § 2254(d)(1).”). 

The only exception to this deference is “if there is reason to think some other 

explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely” than an adjudication on the 

merits. Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. Mr. Ryder contends another explanation exists 

here, namely that the OCCA applied the ineffective-assistance standard it set forth in 

Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), which we have invalidated as 

contrary to Strickland. Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 2003). 

But our review of the OCCA’s decision convinces us it did not apply Walker in 

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assessing Mr. Ryder’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective during the 

retrospective competency trial. Instead, it applied Walker to claims that are not 

before us regarding appellate counsel’s investigation prior to briefing. With respect 

to the claim at issue, the OCCA cited and properly applied Strickland. Ryder, No. 

PCD-2002-257, slip op. at 11–15. The OCCA’s mistaken reliance on Walker in one 

part of its opinion does not invalidate the whole. Thus, because Mr. Ryder has not 

shown that “some other explanation” for the OCCA’s decision exists, we proceed by 

assessing Mr. Ryder’s challenges to counsel’s performance at the retrospective 

competency trial to determine if indeed there was no reasonable basis for the 

OCCA’s decision to reject this claim. 

Mr. Ryder argues counsel provided ineffective assistance at the retrospective 

competency trial by (a) failing to adequately investigate his history of mental illness, 

(b) declining to present evidence showing his disengaged demeanor throughout his 

criminal trial, and (c) informing the jury at the retrospective competency trial that he 

had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. To succeed on this ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, Mr. Ryder must prove deficient performance and 

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When determining 

whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we begin with a strong presumption 

that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. To overcome this 

presumption, Mr. Ryder must show that counsel failed to act “reasonab[ly] 

considering all the circumstances” and “made errors so serious that counsel was not 

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functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.

687–88. To prove prejudice, Mr. Ryder must show “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Adding the extra layer of AEDPA deference, Mr. Ryder must show that “the 

state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 101. Because the OCCA failed to articulate its basis for rejecting this 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, our task is to “determine what arguments or 

theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision.” Id. at 102. 

We must affirm the state court decision if “it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme Court].” Id. Thus, our review of Mr. Ryder’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims is “doubly deferential” in that “we take a highly 

deferential look at counsel’s performance [under Strickland] through the deferential 

lens of § 2254(d).” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (explaining that under this double 

deference, “[t]he question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard”). As the following analysis explains, none 

of Mr. Ryder’s challenges to counsel’s performance at the retrospective competency 

trial overcomes this sizeable hurdle. 

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a. Investigation into Mr. Ryder’s mental health history 

Mr. Ryder argues, first, that appellate counsel was ineffective for inadequately 

investigating his personal and family history of mental illness and his mental health 

symptoms in preparation for the retrospective competency trial. In so arguing, Mr. Ryder 

relies primarily on appellate counsel’s affidavit submitted to the OCCA with his 

application for postconviction relief. In that affidavit, counsel stated he “did not conduct 

any investigation into any extra-record issues.” 

Although a complete failure to investigate Mr. Ryder’s background could 

demonstrate deficient performance, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394–96 

(2000), the record here does not support Mr. Ryder’s contention that counsel’s 

investigation was completely lacking. The affidavit upon which Mr. Ryder relies 

does not indicate that counsel failed to conduct any investigation into Mr. Ryder’s 

personal and family history of mental illness, but rather that counsel chose not to 

investigate any “extra-record issues.” The affidavit goes on to explain that in 

preparation for Mr. Ryder’s appeal and retrospective competency proceedings, 

counsel reviewed the trial records and transcripts, spoke with Mr. Ryder’s parents on 

more than one occasion, and was present at a competency evaluation the State had 

requested. The affidavit of Mr. Ryder’s mother, Sue Ryder, also states that, prior to 

the competency proceedings, Mr. Ryder’s counsel visited her in Georgia and 

interviewed her and other family members. 

The transcript from the retrospective competency trial likewise demonstrates 

that counsel conducted an investigation into Mr. Ryder’s mental health history. 

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Dr. Montgomery testified that before he reevaluated Mr. Ryder in anticipation of the 

competency proceedings, Mr. Ryder’s counsel provided him with additional records 

to which he did not have access when he initially evaluated Mr. Ryder in 2000. 

Dr. Montgomery further testified that based on that additional information provided 

by defense counsel, he was able to make a more reliable diagnosis and to conclude 

that Mr. Ryder suffered from a delusional disorder under the schizophrenic group of 

disorders. And contrary to Mr. Ryder’s position that Dr. Montgomery was 

unprepared to testify about his delusional symptoms due to counsel’s inadequate 

investigation, the trial transcripts reveal that Dr. Montgomery did, in fact, testify that 

Mr. Ryder suffered from grandiose delusional beliefs including an obsession with 

going to the Yukon to survive an approaching apocalypse. 

Because the record demonstrates that counsel conducted an investigation into 

Mr. Ryder’s mental health history and symptoms, we cannot say that there was no 

reasonable basis for the OCCA to deny relief on this issue. 

b. Investigation and presentation of evidence regarding Mr. Ryder’s trial 

demeanor 

Mr. Ryder next claims counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present 

evidence at the retrospective competency trial that could have rebutted Judge Bartheld’s 

testimony. He argues counsel could have called various witnesses who observed 

Mr. Ryder’s demeanor during his criminal trial and who would have testified, contrary to 

Judge Bartheld’s testimony, that Mr. Ryder appeared distant and disengaged. 

Specifically, Mr. Ryder relies on the affidavits of several sitting and alternate jurors, each 

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of whom stated that Mr. Ryder did not make eye contact with his attorneys and appeared 

uninterested and expressionless throughout his trial. Mr. Ryder also points to his mother’s 

and brother’s affidavits, which indicated that Mr. Ryder was in “a preaching mode” 

during one break in his criminal trial and at another time his eyes were “hollow and 

glazed over” and his speech was incoherent. Mr. Ryder’s mother also averred that 

Mr. Ryder seemed not to understand what was taking place in the courtroom. She further 

stated that had appellate counsel asked her to testify at the retrospective competency 

hearing, she would have. 

Respondent, Warden Warrior, contends it was a reasonable strategy for counsel to 

rely solely on Dr. Montgomery’s testimony. Respondent argues that Judge Bartheld’s 

testimony would have easily rebutted any lay witness testimony Mr. Ryder might have 

offered. Specifically, Respondent relies on Judge Bartheld’s testimony indicating 

Mr. Ryder appeared engaged throughout the criminal proceedings and coherently 

responded to questioning during the extensive colloquy with the court about his decision 

to waive his right to present mitigation evidence. 

But Mr. Ryder argues counsel could not have made a strategic choice to exclude 

lay testimony because counsel never investigated the possibility of presenting such 

evidence in the first instance. He contends that, although “strategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable,” Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690), the question here is not whether counsel made a strategic 

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choice but whether “the investigation supporting counsel’s decision . . . was itself 

reasonable,” id. (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)). 

We agree with Mr. Ryder that if counsel completely failed to investigate the 

possibility of presenting lay witnesses at the retrospective competency trial, such a failure 

could amount to deficient performance. But we are not convinced that all fairminded 

jurists would conclude that counsel’s investigation was inadequate. First, as to counsel’s 

investigation into the possibility of having Mr. Ryder’s family testify, as previously 

explained, the record demonstrates counsel interviewed Mr. Ryder’s family on at least 

two separate occasions before the retrospective competency trial. Based on these 

interviews, counsel could have made the strategic choice that the testimony from 

Mr. Ryder’s family would not have been sufficient to rebut Judge Bartheld’s testimony 

regarding Mr. Ryder’s competency at trial. 

Second, although the record suggests appellate counsel did not interview the jurors 

from Mr. Ryder’s criminal trial or otherwise pursue lay testimony about Mr. Ryder’s trial 

demeanor, reasonable jurists could conclude that counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

do so. In preparing for the retrospective competency trial, counsel’s charge was to 

investigate possible theories that could show Mr. Ryder was legally incompetent. The test 

for legal competency instructs that “[a] defendant may not be put to trial unless he has 

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 

him.” Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (alterations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Observations from criminal-trial jurors regarding Mr. Ryder’s demeanor 

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during his criminal trial would provide little, if any, evidence as to whether Mr. Ryder 

had a sufficient ability to consult with his attorneys or a rational understanding of the 

nature of the proceedings against him. Although such testimony may have supported an 

inference that Mr. Ryder was suffering from a mental health condition, “[t]hat a 

defendant suffers from some degree of mental illness or disorder does not necessarily 

mean that he is incompetent to assist in his own defense.” United States v. DeShazer, 554 

F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the jurors’ testimony would have done little to 

undermine Judge Bartheld’s testimony about his colloquy with Mr. Ryder, during which 

Mr. Ryder attested that he knew he had been convicted of first-degree murder, that he 

faced the possibility of being sentenced to death, and that he would rather die than spend 

his life in prison. 

Under these circumstances, fairminded jurists could conclude that counsel made a 

reasonable strategic choice to forego investigating witnesses who could merely describe 

Mr. Ryder’s countenance and instead to focus on presenting expert testimony that could 

counteract Judge Bartheld’s testimony with a medical diagnosis of Mr. Ryder’s mental 

disorder. We therefore cannot conclude this claim overcomes the double deference we 

afford to counsel and the state court under AEDPA. 

Moreover, even if Mr. Ryder could satisfy his burden of showing deficient 

performance under our doubly deferential standard, he has not shown prejudice. First, 

fairminded jurists could conclude that Judge Bartheld’s testimony was sufficient to rebut 

the testimony from the jurors and Mr. Ryder’s family, even if such testimony had been 

presented. Second, even if Mr. Ryder suffered from some mental disorder that manifested 

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itself in the manner described by the jurors and Mr. Ryder’s mother, fairminded jurists 

could conclude that Mr. Ryder nevertheless met the legal standard of competency. See

Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354. Judge Bartheld provided compelling testimony that Mr. Ryder 

was able to engage in an extensive colloquy and that he understood the nature of the 

proceedings, could communicate his instructions to counsel, and was aware of the likely 

consequences. Because fairminded jurists could conclude that the outcome of 

Mr. Ryder’s retrospective competency trial would not have been different, had counsel 

investigated and presented the testimony of lay witnesses, we must affirm the district 

court’s rejection of this claim. 

c. Decision to inform the jury of Mr. Ryder’s conviction and sentence 

Finally, Mr. Ryder contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance by informing 

the retrospective competency jury that he had been convicted of murder and sentenced to 

death. He argues this information was irrelevant to the issue of competency, prejudicial, 

and contrary to Oklahoma law. See Lambert v. State, 71 P.3d 30, 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 

2003) (instructing that a jury determining defendant’s mental capacity in a remanded case 

“should not hear evidence on the crimes for which [defendant] was convicted, unless 

particular facts of the case are relevant to the issue of mental retardation”) (superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in Murphy v. State, 281 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 2012)). 

Although this information raises concerns of prejudice, we are not convinced 

counsel’s decision to reveal it during voir dire was deficient “beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. A key component of the evidence of 

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Mr. Ryder’s alleged incompetence was his refusal to allow counsel to present any 

mitigation evidence at sentencing. For the defense to explain the significance of that 

decision and why it reflected on Mr. Ryder’s competence, the jury would need to know 

Mr. Ryder was facing a death sentence. Because Mr. Ryder’s conviction and sentence 

were so intertwined with evidence relevant to his competency, we cannot conclude 

counsel acted unreasonably in raising this information during voir dire, when counsel 

could assess its impact on the prospective jurors’ ability to render an impartial decision 

on Mr. Ryder’s competency. 

In sum, Mr. Ryder has failed to demonstrate there was no reasonable basis for the 

OCCA to deny relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective at the retrospective 

competency trial. Nor has he proven that the OCCA’s decision was contrary to or 

constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland or its progeny. And because 

Mr. Ryder has raised no other challenges to the retrospective competency trial, we must 

defer to the OCCA’s decision affirming that Mr. Ryder was competent to stand trial. See 

Bryan v. Gibson, 276 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We must presume the jury’s 

competency finding is correct, absent clear and convincing evidence that [petitioner] was 

in fact incompetent at the time of his trial.”) (citations and footnote omitted), rev’d in 

part on other grounds sub nom. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc); Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (“Any rational trier of 

fact could have found from the evidence presented that [Mr. Ryder] had not proven his 

incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

In his second claim for habeas relief, Mr. Ryder argues trial counsel failed to 

adequately investigate and raise his mental illness and background as they related to his 

competency to stand trial and as mitigation evidence. He therefore contends he was 

deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Before assessing the merits of this 

claim, we address its complicated procedural posture. 

a. Procedural posture 

Mr. Ryder first raised an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in his direct 

appeal to the OCCA. He argued on direct appeal that trial counsel had been ineffective 

for failing to timely raise the issue of competency and was rendered ineffective in the 

penalty phase when the trial court allowed Mr. Ryder to prohibit counsel from presenting 

a full mitigation case. The OCCA rejected both claims on their merits. Ryder, 83 P.3d at 

875–78. 

In his application for postconviction relief to the OCCA, Mr. Ryder again argued 

trial counsel was ineffective. This time, he asserted his incompetency rendered counsel’s 

investigation into and presentation of his mitigation case ineffective. Mr. Ryder further 

asserted appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct 

appeal. In rejecting this claim on postconviction review, the OCCA ruled, first, that the 

claim “ha[d] been raised previously” on direct appeal and therefore further consideration 

was barred under principles of res judicata. Ryder, No. PCD-2002-257, slip op. at 6. But, 

the OCCA continued, to the extent Mr. Ryder’s argument on postconviction differed 

from his appellate argument, the claim was waived. Id. at 6–7; see also Okla. Stat. tit. 22, 

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§ 1089(D)(4) (barring claims that could have been raised on direct appeal from being 

raised in an application for postconviction relief). As for Mr. Ryder’s argument that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim, the OCCA ruled that because 

Mr. Ryder’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claim failed on its merits, appellate 

counsel could not have been ineffective even if it had failed to raise the claim. Ryder, No. 

PCD-2002-257, slip op. at 9–15. Therefore, even though the OCCA determined that this 

claim was barred either due to principles of res judicata or procedural default, the court 

ultimately assessed the merits of the claim in order to determine whether appellate 

counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise it. 

Because the OCCA reached the merits of Mr. Ryder’s ineffective-assistance-oftrial counsel claim on both direct appeal and postconviction review, we must apply 

AEDPA deference to those merits adjudications. 

b. Cause and Prejudice 

Assuming, as did the OCCA, that Mr. Ryder did not raise this precise rendition of 

his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal, he must demonstrate 

cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 

922 (2012). During postconviction proceedings before the OCCA, Mr. Ryder argued, as 

he does now, that appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise the argument 

demonstrates cause and prejudice. Ryder, No. PCD-2002-257, slip op. at 6 (“[Mr. Ryder] 

argues [his trial counsel ineffectiveness claim] is not procedurally barred due to appellate 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise the issue.”). The OCCA analyzed this claim 

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and concluded appellate counsel had not been ineffective under Strickland because the 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim lacked merit. Id. at 15. 

When a state court analyzes appellate counsel ineffectiveness as an excuse for 

procedural default, we must afford AEDPA deference to that analysis. Turrentine v. 

Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1202 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the state court had already 

addressed petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as a basis to 

avoid a procedural bar and thus ruling that AEDPA “confines our review to the question 

of whether the OCCA’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application 

of Strickland”). Despite clear circuit precedent dictating that we defer to the OCCA’s 

analysis of this claim, Mr. Ryder contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), supersedes this authority. But Martinez does not address 

this issue. There, the Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i), which forbids 

habeas petitioners from using ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel as “a ground for 

relief.” 132 S. Ct. at 1320. The Court found this language did not prohibit a petitioner 

from using postconviction ineffectiveness as cause and prejudice to excuse a default 

because “‘[c]ause’ . . . is not synonymous with ‘a ground for relief.’” Id. 

Because Martinez addressed only what constitutes “a ground for relief,” it has no 

bearing on our ruling in Turrentine regarding application of AEDPA deference to a state 

court’s cause-and-prejudice analysis. Rather, we are guided by other Supreme Court 

precedent that explains the principles AEDPA deference is intended to further. These 

principles include comity and federalism, respect for state judicial processes, giving 

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effect to state convictions to the extent possible under the law, and finality. Woodford v. 

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). 

With these principles in mind, we now analyze Mr. Ryder’s argument that 

appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise this claim of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness demonstrates cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar. A 

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel can serve as cause and prejudice to 

overcome a procedural bar, if it has merit. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489–90 

(1986). To assess the merits of Mr. Ryder’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 

claim, we first examine the merits of the issue appellate counsel failed to raise. Hawkins 

v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). “If the omitted issue is meritless, 

then counsel’s failure to raise it does not amount to constitutionally ineffective 

assistance.” Id. 8

c. Merits

 Turning to the merits of the underlying claim—that is, ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel—Mr. Ryder asserts, first, that trial counsel’s failure to adequately 

 8

 In addition to arguing the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-appellatecounsel claim, Mr. Ryder insists we should grant relief because, in assessing this 

claim, the OCCA relied in part on Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1997). As we explained earlier, the OCCA relied on Walker only in assessing Mr. 

Ryder’s claim that appellate counsel conducted an inadequate investigation prior to 

briefing. In assessing whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

trial counsel’s ineffective investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, the 

OCCA did not rely on Walker but instead assessed the merits of Mr. Ryder’s 

underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim under Strickland. Ryder v. 

State, No. PCD-2002-257, slip op. at 11–15 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004). We 

are therefore unpersuaded that the OCCA’s reliance on Walker in a different section 

of its postconviction decision provides grounds for granting habeas relief on this 

claim. 

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investigate his mental health and background resulted in counsel failing to timely raise 

the issue of competency. Because we have already affirmed the outcome of the 

retrospective competency trial and therefore must defer to the OCCA’s ruling that 

Mr. Ryder was competent to stand trial, this claim is now moot. In other words, trial 

counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to argue incompetency during the guilt 

phase of his criminal trial because, based on our deference to the OCCA’s competency 

determination, we must assume Mr. Ryder was, in fact, competent. Therefore, trial 

counsel’s investigation into and presentation of Mr. Ryder’s mental illness is only 

relevant to whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of 

his criminal trial, and our analysis proceeds accordingly. 

Mr. Ryder argues counsel failed to put forward evidence regarding his mental 

health and troubled past, which were critical elements of his mitigation case. 

“Mitigating evidence plays an overwhelmingly important role in the just imposition of 

the death penalty.” Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because of the importance of mitigating evidence, “counsel 

has a duty to pursue leads indicating a defendant’s troubled background,” including 

defendant’s mental health history. United States v. Barrett, 797 F.3d 1207, 1223 

(10th Cir. 2015). But, in certain circumstances, a defendant’s actions may alter or 

eliminate counsel’s penalty-phase obligations. We confronted just such a situation in 

Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) holding modified on other grounds 

by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 953–54 (10th Cir. 2001). In Wallace, we 

reviewed an Oklahoma death row inmate’s habeas petition, which alleged trial 

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counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Id. at 

1239. During the penalty phase of his criminal trial, petitioner “took the stand 

himself and requested that the trial court impose the death penalty.” Id. at 1240. 

On appeal, we explained that although counsel’s performance during the 

penalty phase is critical in a capital case, “[f]ailure to present mitigating evidence is 

not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 1247. Instead, courts must look to 

counsel’s reasons for not presenting available mitigating evidence and must take into 

account that “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 

substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements and actions.” Id. (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). We therefore concluded that petitioner had failed to 

show counsel’s performance was deficient because “counsel’s decision not to 

investigate or present mitigating evidence was completely determined by petitioner 

and was within the realm of reasonable tactical decisions.” Id. at 1248; see also Tyler 

v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Constitution does not prohibit 

a competent capital defendant from waiving the presentation of mitigation 

evidence.”); Singleton v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315, 1321 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that 

in the face of a defendant’s waiver of mitigating evidence, defense counsel “was 

under no duty” to present a mitigation case). 

The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 

U.S. 465 (2007). During the penalty phase of the defendant’s criminal trial in 

Landrigan, defendant prohibited his family members from testifying on his behalf, 

told the trial judge there was no relevant mitigating evidence, and interfered with 

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counsel’s efforts to present mitigating evidence in open court. Id.at 475–77. On 

appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit 

ruled the district court abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel was ineffective during the 

penalty phase. Id. at 472. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 

court of appeals. The Court ruled it was “not objectively unreasonable” for the state 

court “to conclude that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of any 

mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based on his counsel’s 

failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence.” Id. at 478. The Court thus 

concluded that petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed and an 

evidentiary hearing was not warranted. 

In this case, Mr. Ryder’s trial counsel informed the court at the beginning of the 

penalty phase that Mr. Ryder refused to assist in preparing his mitigation case and had 

instructed counsel not to present any mitigating evidence. The trial court then engaged in 

a colloquy with Mr. Ryder to determine whether he wished to waive his mitigation case 

and whether he was competent to do so. During this colloquy, Mr. Ryder expressed that 

he would rather die than receive life in prison without the possibility of parole and that he 

therefore did not want to put on any mitigation evidence. The court also ascertained that 

Mr. Ryder understood he had a right to present mitigating evidence and that failing to 

present such evidence would likely result in the jury sentencing him to death. The court 

thus concluded that Mr. Ryder had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to present 

mitigation evidence. 

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In his briefing to this court, Mr. Ryder insists he did not waive his entire 

mitigation case, but merely waived his right to be present during the penalty phase, as 

evidenced by the fact that the district court ultimately permitted defense counsel to put on 

a limited mitigation case outside of Mr. Ryder’s presence. The record, however, belies 

this argument. As the trial transcript reveals, the trial court expressly informed Mr. Ryder 

that instead of waiving his mitigation rights entirely, he could simply waive his right to 

be present during the penalty phase. But Mr. Ryder responded, “No, I want to be here. I 

don’t want—I don’t want no second stage. I don’t want no evidence.” Although the 

record also indicates the trial court allowed defense counsel to put on two mitigation 

witnesses, it did so not because Mr. Ryder acquiesced, but because defense counsel 

sought leave to do so despite Mr. Ryder’s waiver. Although defense counsel believed 

they were still under a constitutional and ethical obligation to present some mitigation 

evidence, once a capital defendant waives the right to present mitigating evidence, 

counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for complying with that waiver. Wallace, 191 F.3d 

at 1247–48. Where Mr. Ryder waived his right to present mitigating evidence, trial 

counsel was not ineffective for doing more than was then required. And because 

Mr. Ryder’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is meritless, his claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue likewise fails. Thus, 

Mr. Ryder has not shown cause to overcome any procedural bar to this claim. 

We acknowledge the tragic reality in this case: that Mr. Ryder’s untreated mental 

illness may have influenced his decision to withhold mitigating evidence from the jury. 

Thus, the condition responsible for Mr. Ryder’s unwillingness to present mitigating 

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evidence could have been the very evidence that would have persuaded the jury not to 

impose the death penalty. See United States v. Barrett, 797 F.3d 1207, 1231 (10th Cir. 

2015) (“[E]vidence of mental impairments is exactly the sort of evidence that garners the 

most sympathy from jurors.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But at the time 

Mr. Ryder made his decision to waive his mitigation case, his mental health had not yet 

deteriorated to the point where he was no longer legally competent to make that decision. 

Or at least we must presume that he was legally competent based on our deference to the 

state court’s retrospective competency determination. Therefore, while we recognize the 

existence of compelling mitigating evidence that the jury never heard, controlling 

precedent and the narrowness of review permitted under ADEPA dictate that we must 

affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief on this claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court denying Mr. Ryder’s petition for habeas relief. 

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