UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4709

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY DONNELL TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior 

District Judge. (5:12-cr-00326-F-1)

Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015

Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Donnell Taylor pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and 5 kilograms or 

more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and conspiracy to commit 

money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012). He was sentenced to 

a below-Guidelines total term of 240 months’ imprisonment. His 

attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she asserts that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questions whether the district 

court erred in rejecting the Government’s request for a sentence 

that was 50% below his Sentencing Guidelines range and instead 

imposing a sentence that was 25% below his Guidelines range. 

Although informed of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, 

Taylor has not done so. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). This review requires consideration of both the procedural 

and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. First, this 

court must assess whether the district court properly calculated 

the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). We also 
3

must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether the 

sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the 

sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” 

United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 

2010). Where, as here, the Government has moved for a downward 

departure under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2012), 

the court “has broad discretion in deciding whether to depart 

downward and to what extent.” United States v. Pearce, 191 F.3d 

488, 492 (4th Cir. 1999). If the sentence is within or below the 

Guidelines range, we presume on appeal that the sentence is 

reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) 

(permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentence).

Here, the district court correctly calculated and considered 

the advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel and 

allocution from Taylor. The court considered the relevant § 

3553(a) factors and explained that the chosen sentence was 

warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of the offense.

Further, Taylor offers no grounds to rebut the presumption on 

appeal that his below-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Thus, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Taylor.
4

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

If Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Taylor. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED