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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE RICHARD BLICK, on behalfof himself and others similarly situated, Appellants,

v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, ELDON VAIL, BERNIE WARNER, and DOES 1-20, Respondents. No. 70403-6-I

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED: June 23, 2014 Verellen, J. — The countyjaildetermines a prisoner's earned early release 

### (good time) credit for time served injail. The Department of Corrections (DOC) must include that credit when computing the date when an individual becomes eligible for transferto community custody in lieu ofearned early release. Butregardless of that 

### eligibility date, DOC may deny a transfer to community custody inlieu ofearned early release ifthe prisoner fails to satisfy other statutory prerequisites such as failure to obtain an approved release plan. Richard Blicksued DOC for the torts ofnegligence and unlawful imprisonment on 

### the theory that DOC wrongfully refused to honor his 52-day earned early release credit for time he served injail. Butbecause Blickfailed to provide an approved address, 

### DOC was entitled to deny Blick's transfer to community custody in lieu ofearned earlyNo. 70403-6-1/2 release. Such a denial was neither unlawful imprisonment nor negligence. We affirm the trial court's summaryjudgment order dismissing Blick's lawsuit.
FACTS Blickwas arrested June 1, 2000. He was held in the King County Department of Adult Detention (jail) for 310 days. Blickaccumulated 52 days ofearned early release credit pursuant to thejail's procedure. Blickpleaded guilty to two counts ofsecond degree rape of a child. On March 16, 2001, he was sentenced to the maximum standard range term of 136 months. Blickwas credited for time served as determined by thejail. Thejudgment and sentence also provided for community custody of 36 months or the term ofearned early release, whicheverwas longer. Appendix H ofthejudgment and sentence 

### explained that "[cjommunity [cjustody shall begin upon completion ofthe term(s) of confinement imposed herein or when the defendant is transferred to [cjommunity 

### [cjustody in lieu ofearned early release."1 Blick was transferred to DOC custody on April 6, 2001. The jail provided DOC a certification and authorization showing that Blick had earned 54 days, later corrected to 

### 52 days, of early release credit. Including credit for time served, Blick's prison 

### maximum expiration date was September 30, 2011 ? Hisearned release date was August 9, 2011 (computed by subtracting the 52 days ofjail earned early release credit

1 Clerk's Papers at 78. 

### 2Blick's prison minimum expiration date was April 19, 2010 (computed by 

### subtracting the 52 days ofearned early release credit and the time he couldpotentially earn whilein prisonfrom the prison maximum expiration date). Although Blick earned 

### 90 days of earlyrelease creditwhile in the custody ofDOC, he later lost this credit due to an infraction.No. 70403-6-1/3 and the 0 days ofearly release credit he earned while in prison from the prison maximum expiration date). Blickwas required to obtain an approved address to be eligible for community custody in lieu ofearned early release in accordance withthe law ineffect on the date of his offense.3 Blickwas unable to obtain an approved address and was not transferred to community custody until his prison maximum expiration date, September 30, 2011. Blicksued DOC and several of its officers on tort claims ofnegligence and false 

### imprisonment. Although styled as a class action complaint, Blick has not soughtto certify a class. The complaint outlines the "facts" as follows: Blickwas required to obtain an approved address before he was eligible for release. Inthe event his release address was approved, he would have been required to wait 35 days for notification before release. . . . Blickwas not able to obtain an approved address and was released to the community on . . . September 30, 2011.

... As a result of [DOC's] actions, all 52 days ofearned release 

### credits earned in the county jail by Blick were forfeited by the actions of 

### [DOC]. If [DOC] had notforfeited the 52 days ofearned release credits 

### granted by the countyjail, Blick's release date would have been August 9, 2011.



### . . . [DOC] didn't have the statutory authority to cause the forfeiture ofthe earned release credits earned by Blickbecause they were earned 

### while he was under the jurisdiction ofthe King County Jail and in 

### accordance with procedures developed and promulgated by the King County Jail.14'

3Former RCW 9.94A.120(10) (1998) (citing former RCW 9.94.120(9)(b)(v) (1998)). 4Clerk's Papers at 9-10.No. 70403-6-1/4 Blick's negligence claim is premised on allegations that DOC had a duty to

ensure that the statutes governing the amount oftime he would spend under DOC jurisdiction were properly interpreted and that DOC "breached this duty by ignoring the 

### language" ofthose statutes.5 Hisfalse imprisonment claim is based on allegations that DOC lacked lawful authority to restrain him until his prison maximum expiration date. The defendants moved forjudgment on the pleadings under CR 12(c). Blick moved for partial summaryjudgment. The trial court considered evidence attached to both plaintiff's and defendants' motions, and converted the defendants' motion to a 

### motion for summary judgment under CR 56 "because of the evidence submitted."6 The trial court granted the defendants' motion, denied Blick's motion, and dismissed Blick's complaint with prejudice. Blick appeals. DISCUSSION 

### This court reviews a trial court's summaryjudgment order de novo.7 Summary judgment is appropriate ifthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 

### moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.8 We review questions ofstatutory interpretation de novo and our goal is to 

### determine the intent of the legislature.9 To determine the plain meaning of a sentencing

5id at 12. 6 \± at 287. 7 Lvbbert v. Grant County. 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000); McKee v. Washington State Dep't ofCorrections, 160 Wn. App. 437, 446, 248 P.3d 115(2011). 8CR 56(c). 9 In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluqe. 162 Wn.2d 814, 817-18, 177 P.3d 675 (2008).No. 70403-6-1/5 

### statute, we lookto the sentencing scheme as a whole and considerrelated statutes.10 Blick relies upon statutory provisions to claimthat DOC wrongfullydeprived him of 52 days of early release time he earned in jail. He argues that DOC should have transferred him to community custody 52 days before his prison sentence was due to 

### end, even though he admits he did not have an approved release plan. His complaint 

### alleges that ifan inmate is unable to satisfy the requirement ofobtaining an approved address before the prison maximum release date is reached, DOC has forfeited the 

### inmate's early release credits earned under the jurisdiction of the countyjail. He contends that this "violates the separation of the two good time statutory schemes for the different correctional facilities havingjurisdiction."11 

### Washington lawpresumes that a prisonerwill serve his or her complete sentence. RCW 9.94A.728 provides that "[n]o person serving a sentence imposed 

### pursuanttothis chapterandcommitted to thecustody of[DOC] shall leave theconfines of the correctionalfacility or be released priorto the expiration of the sentence" except forearned release time as provided by RCW9.94A.729. Earned early release is an 

### exception to the generalrule that the prisoner serves the complete sentence in confinement.12 Generally, "exceptions to statutory provisions are narrowly construed in 

### orderto give effectto legislative intent underlying thegeneral provisions."13

10jd, at 818. 11 Clerk's Papers at 4. 

### 12 "Thestatute prohibits early release absent existence of one of the statutory 

### exceptions." Statev. Rogers, 112Wn.2d 180, 183, 770P.2d 180(1989). 13 R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 137Wn.2d 118, 140,969 P.2d 458 (1999).No. 70403-6-1/6 The relevant statutes divide authority between thejail and DOC over the 

### provision of jailearned early release credit and prison earned early release credit so that each institution may make decisions about awarding good time for time served in 

### that institution.14 This scheme isconsistent with the legislative purpose ofproviding incentives for good behaviorwhile in a particular institution.15 However, the statutes make clear that the DOC program allowing community custody in lieu ofearned early release is administered by DOC when the decision is made to release an inmate from prison to community custody. RCW 9.94A.729 authorizes DOC to transfer offenders sentenced to community custody from total confinement to community custody in lieu ofearned early release on DOC's approval of each offender's release plan: (5)(a) A person who is eligible for earned early release as provided in this section and who willbe supervised by [DOC]. . . shall be transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release time; (b) [DOC] shall, as a part or its program for release to the community in lieu ofearned release, require the offenderto propose a release plan that includes an approved residence and living arrangement. Alloffenders withcommunity custody terms eligible forrelease to community custody in lieu ofearned release shallprovide an approved residence and livingarrangementprior to release to the community; (c) [DOC] may deny transfer to community custody in lieu ofearned release time if [DOC] determines an offender's release plan, including proposed residence location and living arrangements, may violate the conditions ofthe sentence or conditions of supervision, place the offender at risk to violate the conditions ofthe sentence, place the offender at risk to reoffend, or present a risk to victim safety or community safety. [DOC]'s authority under this section is independent ofany court-ordered condition

14 In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 121 Wn.2d 655, 661, 853 P.2d 444 (1993) (citingformer RCW 9.94A.150 (1989), recodified as RCW 9.94A.728 (Laws of 2001, ch. 10, §6)). 15 Id. at 661-62.No. 70403-6-1/7 

### ofsentence orstatutoryprovision regarding conditions forcommunity custody.[:6] Our Supreme Court has held that RCW 9.94A.728 does not create a liberty interest in release from prison prior to the end ofthe sentence: The permissive terms ofthe early release statute, "may become 

### eligible" and "may deny transfer," do not require DOC to grant an offender early release to community custody. The statute does not create an 

### expectation ofrelease and cannot establish a liberty interest.1171 Rather, an inmate's only right under the statute is the right to have DOCconsider his proposed release plan.18 

### Blick argues that priorcase lawestablishes that DOC may not take away earned release credit from an inmate ifthe credit was earned while under thejurisdiction of a 

### countyjail. But one fundamental flaw in Blick's argument is that he fails to demonstrate 

### howjail earned early release credittrumpsDOC's authority underRCW 9.94A.729(5)(b) and (c). RCW 9.94A.729(5)(c) allows DOC to deny Blick's transfer to community custody in lieu ofearned release for hisfailure to provide an approved release plan. 

### This court has previously held that it is the inmate's obligation to propose acceptable 

### release plans early enough beforethe prison maximum expiration date to allow such a transferto community custody to occur.19

16 (Emphasis added.) 17 In re Pers. Restraint of Mattson,166 Wn.2d 730, 740, 214 P.3d 141 (2009). 18 Id at 741. 

### 19 Inre Pers. Restraint of Crowder, 97 Wn. App. 598, 601, 985 P.2d 944 (1999).No. 70403-6-1/8 

### "'Washington courts have implied only one limit on the substance ofthe DOC's 

### exercise of discretion: it's reasons for denial must be legitimate.'"20 The Ninth Circuit has noted the discretionary nature of RCW 9.94A.728: [T]he DOC has no "discretion to decide whetheror when to consider an 

### offender fortransferto community custody," [b]utWashington lawplaces no substantive limitation on how the DOC is to make that 

### determination [RCW 9.94A.728(2)(d)] instructs that the DOC "may denytransfer to community custody if one or more ofthose criteria are met. Farfrom setting forth "substantive predicates" under which the DOC must grant transfer, the statute is silent regarding even precatory criteria 

### for granting transferto community custody, specifying only when the DOC may—but need not—"deny."[21] Blickidentifies no statute exempting an offenderfrom the requirement of obtaining an approved living arrangement under RCW 9.94A.729(5)(b). Nor does Blick identify any statute directing DOC to transfer an offender to community custody on what he refers to as his "countyjail maximum release date," regardless ofwhether he has obtained an approved release address. Blickmakes no showing of any duty on the part of DOC to release him to community custody without regard to these statutory conditions and does not contend he was denied due process. Blick fails to establish that DOC breached "a duty to ensure that all statutes affecting the amount oftime that a Class member would spend under its jurisdiction was 

### properly interpreted," as alleged in his negligence claim.22 Accordingly, the negligence claim was properly dismissed on summaryjudgment.

20 Mattson, 166 Wn.2d at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carver v. Lehman. 558 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

### 21 Carver, 558 F.3d at 875 (quoting Inre Pers. Restraint ofLiptrap, 127 Wn. App. 463, 111 P.3d 1227). 22 Clerk's Papers at 12-13.

8No. 70403-6-1/9 As to his false imprisonment claim, Blick fails to demonstrate that DOC acted without lawful authority. An imprisonment enacted pursuant to a valid legal process and 

### court sentence is not false imprisonment.23 Based on analogous facts, the United States District Court for the Western District ofWashington dismissed similar claims of false imprisonment and negligence in Dailey v. Washington: Mr. Dailey's negligence claim requires him to show that [DOC] had a duty to release him early. Mr. Dailey has failed to establish any such duty. Likewise, Mr. Dailey's false imprisonment claim also requires that he establish that he had a right to early release. Mr. Dailey has failed to 

### establish any such right.[24] Blick similarly fails to establish either DOC's duty to release him early or his right 

### to early release. We affirm the summary judgment dismissal of his lawsuit.25

WE CONCUR: 

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23 See Mundt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1980). 242012 WL 380272, at *4 (W.D. Wash., 2012). 25 Because we affirm the dismissal of Blick's claims on these grounds, we need not decide whether DOC's actions are entitled to discretionary immunity or quasi-judicial 

### immunity, or whether Blickwas required under the favorable termination doctrine to obtain a decision invalidating his restraint before bringing his tort.