20 17 UT App 66



### T HE 

### U TAH 

### C OURT O F 

### A PPEALS

CORA USA LLC

, Appell ee ,

v. Q UICK C HANGE A RTIST LLC

, Appell ant

.

Opinion
N o. 20150504

- CA
Filed April 13, 2017

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie
No. 130901898

Chance McClain

, Attorney for Appellant

Richard F. Ensor and Michael C. Barnhill

, Attorney s for Appellee

J UDGE K ATE A. T OOMEY authored th is Opinion

, in which J UDGES G REGORY K. O RME and S TEPHEN L. R OTH concurred

.

TOOMEY

, Judge :

¶1 Quick Change Artist LLC (Quick Change) appeals the district court’s award of damages and attorney fees to CORA
USA LLC (CORA ) in connection with its breach of contract claim against Quick Change

. Quick Change argues the court erred when it granted th ree of CORA’s motions in limine and asks us “to vacate or set aside the Final Judgment and reverse and

rem and for a new trial.” Because Quick Change has “ failed to
address the trial court ’ s detail ed ruling, failed to develop [its]

c itation to authority, and failed to provide any reasoned analysis
based on tha t authority, we conclude that [it has ] failed to carry [its] burden of persuasion on appeal.” State v. MacNeill , 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 84 ; see also State v. Roberts , 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18 , 345 P.3d 1226 (explaining that “our adequate briefing requirement

. . . is aC ORA USA v. Quick Change Artist

20150504

- CA 2 2017 UT App 66 natural extension of an appellant’ s burden of persuasion” (citation and interna l quotation marks omitted)). We therefore
affirm.

¶2 “It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately
brief.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald , 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (plurality opinion) . To be adequately briefed, an “argument shall
contain the contentions and reason s of the appellant with respect to the issues presented

. . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). An adequately briefed ar gument requires more than

“ bald citation to authority but devel opment of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.” State v. Thomas , 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

¶3 In its appeal, Quick Change asserts several arguments

over a scant six pages. It takes issue with the district court ’s decision to gran t two of CORA ’s motions in limine, which
barred Quick Change “from using evidence or testimony prior to October 28, 2012

, ” and excluded a number of unproduced exhibits Quick Change used in it s deposition of CORA

. In support of the se two arguments, Quick Ch ange cites Tschaggeny v. Milbank Insurance Co. , 2007 UT 37, 163 P.3d 615

, for the bare proposition that “a trial court is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,” and

asserts that it should have done so in this case. Id. ¶ 16 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Quick Change also cite s Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. , 2003 UT 51, 82 P.3d 1076, for the proposition that “[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is
harmful.” Id. ¶ 100 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Quick Change claims it was harmed by the court’s
decision to grant the motion s in limine and “was not able to put on a proper defe nse ” as a result. B ut this is the beginning an d end of its legal analysis. “Analysis of what [these authorities]C ORA USA v. Quick Change Artist

20150504

- CA 3 2017 UT App 66 require[] and of how the facts of [the ] cas e satisfy these

r equirements [is] wholly lacking. ” S ee Thomas , 961 P.2d at 305

.

¶4 Quick Change’s third claim consists of one paragraph in which it argues the district court erred in awarding CORA attorney fees. Quick Change cites Stewart v. Utah Public Service
Commission , 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that, in general , “attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party
unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award.” Id. at 782. According to Quick Change, “the original contract [between the two parties] was no longer controlling” and therefore the court erroneously awarded CORA attorney fees. But Quick Change does not demonstrate how the original contract was superseded

or , more importantly, cite any authority to support its argument that in such a situation the decision by the court to award the prevailing party its attorney fees is an abuse of discretion.

¶5 Quick Change’s final two claims

— that its expert and accompanying expert report should not have been excluded and that it should have been awarded damage s on its counterclaim

— each span one paragraph and lack any citation to authority. We note that “[w]hile failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of the issue is so lackin g as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.” See Thomas , 961
P.2d at 305. Such is the case here.

¶6 In sum , “[w] hile there is no bright line between adequate
and ina dequate briefing, ” we conclude that Quick Change has

not “ develo ped an ar gument sufficient to carry [its] burden of persuasion. ” See Heslop v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. , 2017 UT 5, ¶ 47, 390 P.3d 314 ; s ee also Bank of Am. v. Adamson

, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12 (“ [A] n appellant who fail s to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal

. ” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) )

. We therefore
affirm.C ORA USA v. Quick Change Artist

20150504

- CA 4 2017 UT App 66 ¶7 As a final matter, we address CORA ’s request for its attorney fees and costs on appeal. In general, “w hen a part y who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.” Utah Dep’t of Social Services v. Adams , 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
see also Management Services Corp. v. Development As sociates , 617 P.2d 406, 408

– 09 (Utah 1980) (explaining that a prevailing party may receive attorney fees on appeal where it is permitted by statute or contract). Pursuan t to the parties’ agreement

, the
district court awarded CORA its att orney fees and costs

. Accordi ngly, CORA “is entitled to an award of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal ” and we remand for calculation
of those fees. See Adams , 806 P.2d at 1198.

¶8 Having concluded that Quick Change has failed to meet its burden of persuasion on ea ch of the issues it raises , we affirm
th e district court’s rulings and remand for the limited purpose of determining the amount of attorney fees and costs CORA reasonably incurred on appeal.