# FILED October 27, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Cle rk IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE AMY (KELLEY) SMITH, ) ) Pla intiff /A pp elle e, ) Williamson Chancery No. 24120

) VS. ) Appeal No. 01A01-9711- CH-00657 ) ALTON WADE KELLEY , )

) D efe nd an t/Ap pe llan t. ) APPEAL FROM

THE CHA NCERY C OURT O F WILLI AMSO

N COU NTY AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE THE HONORABL E HENRY DENMAR K BEL L, CHANCEL LOR

J. RUSSELL HELDMAN Frankli n, Tennessee Attor ney for Appel lant
JAMES L. CURTIS Nashvill e, Tennessee Attor ney for Appel lee

AFFIRMED

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR: DAVID R. FARMER, J. HOLLY KIRBY LILLA RD, J.2

D efe nd an t, Alt on Wade Kel le y (“ Ap

pellan t” o r “H us ba nd ”), a pp ea ls th e tr ial c ou rt’s ord er a llow ing Pla initff, Am y K elley S m ith (“Ap pellee ” or “W ife”), to relo

cate to Te xas with the p arties’ m inor c hil d, Rob ert Wade Kelley , decl ini ng

to change custody of t he minor child t o Husband, declini ng to award Husban d attor neys fees, an d d ec linin g to dis m iss W ife’s m otio n u nd er 1 2(b )(6 ). W ife a pp ea ls th e p ort ion of the t ri al cou rt’s judgment which set the new visi tati on schedule for Husband.
I. Factual and Procedur al History
The partie s in this action we re divor ced on October

11, 1 996 . A M arital D issolu tion A gree m ent (“M DA ”) was incor porated into

the fina l dec ree o f divorc e. Th ere w as o nly o ne c hild bo rn of th e m arriag e. Th e de cree provi ded that the pa rties w ou ld s ha re jo int c us tod y o f the ch ild, w ith W ife having act ual physi cal cust ody of t he minor chil d. The Final Decree granted Husband liber al vi sit ati on privi leges, pr ovidi ng him about 180 days of visi tat ion per y

ear. Th e F ina l D ec ree als o s tate d th at “th e p artie s a gre e n ot to m ov e m ore tha n s ixty miles f rom N as hv ille, T en ne ss ee .”
On July 4, 19 97

, W ife w as m arr ied to J im Sm ith ( “S m ith” ). S m ith w as em plo ye d b y G en era l M ills in Dallas, Te xa s. S ho rtly a fter th eir m arr iag e, W ife file d a Pe tition to M od ify re qu es ting tha t she b e a llow ed to move the pa rtie s’ c hild , t he n a ge 2 1⁄2 , to T ex as to r es ide w ith h er a nd he r ne w hu sb an d. H us ba nd filed a motionto d ism iss W ife’s pe tition for Fa ilure to S tate a C laim Upo n W hich Re lief Ca n B e G rante d. Th e trial co urt fou nd tha t the pe tition w as the pro pe r w ay for W ife to ex erc ise he r de sire to re m ov e th e c hild from the sta te and dis m iss ed Hus ba nd ’s m otio n. In res po ns e to W ife’s m otio n, Husband fil ed a complaint to Change C ustody, Vis itatio n a nd C hild Su pp ort a nd for In jun ctio n a nd O the r R elie f.
At the tim e o f the he arin g, W ife h ad ob tain ed a new job with I nternat ional Paper in Dall as with a $6, 000 increasein pay

plu s a dd ition al b on us es . W ife a nd he r ne w hu sb an d h ad m ad e p lan s to pu rch as e a ho us e in a city jus t no rth o f D alla s. A lso , W ife test if ied t hat

she had checked int o schools i n the McKinney area and had en rolle d th e c hild in a priv ate day school. Wife contends t hat, at the ti me their MDA was w rit ten, she had no plans to r emarry or to move to another stat e. Husband contended otherwise.
Both W ife a nd Hus ba nd tes tified tha t the y w ork ed to ac co m m od ate ea ch oth er w hile atte nd ing to the ir3

chil d. W ife c on ten ds tha t sh e is the prim ary ca re g ive r. W ife fu rthe r tes tified tha t sh e is rea dy to tra ns po rt the pa rties ’ ch ild h ow ev er o ften is n ec es sa ry to ke ep Hus ba nd inv olv ed in th e c hild ’s life
. The pa rties ’ ch ild h as feb rile s eiz ure s o n o cc as ion. Hus ba nd is c on ce rne d th at S m ith has no idea

of how to h an dle su ch se izu res . A lso , Hus ba nd tes tified tha t the ch ild’s pe dia trici an s a re in B ren tw oo d, N as hv ille, and C olu m bia , an d th at th es e d oc tors are fam iliar w ith th e c hild ’s c on ditio n. A s s uc h, H us ba nd co nte nd s th at this w ou ld n ot b e in the ch ild’s be st in tere st a nd w ou ld b e a m ate rial c ha ng e in circ um sta nc es to u pro ot th e ch ild from Te nn es se e to Te xa s. W ife te stifie d th at s he ha d a refe rra l for a do cto r in a D alla s s ub urb , an d th at Sm it h could be taught how to deal wit h the chil d’s seizur es.
Husband test if ied t hat

he wanted the

ch ild to ha ve co ntin ue d c on tac t w ith h is fa m ily in Te nn es se e. H e stat ed that t he child has a good rel ati onship with bot h W if e’s and Husband’s famil y and

tha t the y a ll re sid e in Te nne sse e. H e als o de sires for the

child to atten d the sch ools that h e atte nde d in th e N ash ville are a.
Both parti es testified

on the ir ow n b eh alf a lon g w ith v ario us oth er w itne ss es . A gre at d ea l of th e testi mony d

ealt wit h what is in t he best int erest of th e p art ies ’ ch ild. A t the clo se of a ll the evi dence the t ri al cou rt ren de red its d ec isio n. T he tria l court f ound that al though the MDA labeled t he parti es’ custody of the ch ild as “jo int c us tod y,” the Hus ba nd ’s perio ds o f place m ent w ere ref err ed to in the ag ree m en t as “C hild Vis itatio n” and Hus ba nd w as pa yin g s up po rt fo r th e c hild . Th e tr ial c ou rt th ere for e d ete rm ine d W ife to be the “cu sto dia l pa ren t” and Hu sba nd w as d eterm ined to be the “n on-c usto dial pa rent.” T h e tria l co urt th en rule d th at W ife sh ou ld be allo w ed to rem ov e th e c hild to another st ate al though Husband should be awarded the same amount of vis itatio n a s p rov ide d fo r in th e M D A. The trial court t hen ordered both parti es to presentvis itatio n p rop os als to the cour t. The tri al cou rt at a

su bs eq ue nt h ea ring ap pro ve d a vis itatio n s ch ed ule w hic h a w ard ed the Hus ba nd 17 0 d ay s v isita tion w ith th e c hild, an d o rde red W ife to pro vid e a ll tran sp orta tion co sts . Husband ap pe als fro m this jud gm en t. W ife a pp ea ls th e p ort ion of the j udgment which set vi sit ati on at 1 70 da ys . II. Husband’s Motio n to Dismiss4

Husband contends that the Chancell or err ed in failing to d

ism iss W ife’s Pe tition to M odify fo r failure to stat e a clai m upon w

hich r eli ef can be

granted. He argues thatno

w he re in W ife’s pe tition do es sh e a sk the cou rt to m od ify the Final Decree of Divor ce to change the inju nc tive lan gu ag e th ere in. R ath er, W ife’s pe tition asks for pe rm iss ion to m ov e th e m ino r ch ild to the Sta te o f Te xa s, a nd for H us ba nd ’s v isita tion to b e a m en de d. Husband arg ue s th at s inc e w ife h as alle ge d n o s ub sta ntia l or material ch

an ge of c ircu m sta nc es ac co rdin g to law wh ich jus tifies any cha nge in the loca tional re strictions foun d in th e F inal D ecre e of Divo rce, a change cannot be made, and therefore her pet it ion should have been dismissed.
W ife co nte nd s th at Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 ( Tenn . 1993), specifica lly e nd ors es this proc edu re of r eq ue stin g fr om the tria l co urt , in ad va nc e, p erm iss ion to re loc ate . W ife a lso po ints to T en n. C od e Ann. §3 6-6 -10 1(a ) w hic h s tate s: “ Su ch de cre e s ha ll re m ain w ithin the co ntr ol o f the co urt an d b e s ub jec t to su ch ch an ge s o r m od ifica tion s a s th e e xig en cie s o f the ca se m ay req uire .”
A prio r or de r re stric ting m ov em en t of c hild m ay be m od ified by ag ree m en t on m otio n to court havi ng jur isdi cti on over matter, and subject t o approval of t hat co u rt, if n on cu sto dia l pa ren t co ns en ts to rem ov al o f ch ild from stat e and parti es

can ag ree on rev ise d v isita tion arr an ge m en t. Taylor at 332. “If agreement between custodi al parent and noncustodial parent regardi ng removal of chil d from state cannot be r eached,burden of proof fal ls on pa ren t w ho files pe tition se ek ing relief; n on cu sto dia l parent who seeks to prevent removal must sho w b y pre pon dera nce of ev iden ce . . .” Id
.
In this ca se, W ife follow ed th e pro per p roce dure to s ee k th e c ou rt’s ap pro va l to r em ov e th e m ino r ch ild from the stat e. The requirement that W if e need show

a change of circumstances is r elevan t t o change of cu stody determinati ons. Wife did not seek to change custody, but r ather sought t he court’ s permission t o remove the m inor c hild to T exa s. Th e trial co urt co m m itted no error in r efu sin g to gra nt H us ba nd ’s M otio n to D ism iss for F ailure to Sta te a C laim Upo n W hic h R elie f ca n b e g ran ted
. III. Removal of Minor Child and Altering Visitation
Recent cases ha ve ad dre ss ed the law of re m ov al a nd atte m pte d to se t for th p ara m ete rs t o b e fo llow ed by the court s and the

parti es in such removal cases. In t he case of Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.5

199 3),the Supreme C

ourt of Tennessee w

as aske d to reverse a d

ec isio n o f the trial c ou rt pr oh ibitin g th e custodi al parent f rom m

oving out ofstat e with her

thre e-y ea r-o ld d au gh ter, w hic h m ov e h ad be en ob jec ted to by the fat her of t he child. The Suprem e Court lai d out the procedu re to be fol lowed in t hese cases and the burdens which mu

st be carri ed by the parti es. If there i s no outstandi ng order restr ict ing movem ent of th e c hild or chil dren, and the pa rtie s c an ag ree to a rev ise d v isita tion sc he du le, th e c us tod ial parentis fr

ee to r em ov e w it ho ut s ee kin g fu rth er c ou rt a uth oriz atio n. Likewise, if the

no n-c us tod ial p are nt c on se nts to th e re m ov al a nd the pa rtie s can agr ee on a re vis ed vis itatio n a rra ng em en t, a p rior ord er o f res tricti o n may be modifi ed by agreement

on m otio n to the co urt ha vin g ju risd ictio n o f tha t ord er a nd su bje ct to the ap pro va l of th at c ou rt. If agreement between the part ies cannot be reached, underthe procedur al rule an no un ce d in Seessel and Nichols , t he burden of pr oof falls on the pa rty who fi les a pet it ion seek in g re

lief. In ord er to dis ch arg e th at b urd en, the non-cust odial pa

ren t w ho seeks to prevent removal must show by a preponderance

of t he evidence that removal is adverse to t he best inter est of the chi ld or

chil dren invol ved. I f, on the other hand, the cust odial parent files for r eli ef, seek

ing t o lift a p rior pro hib ition on rem ov al o r as kin g th e co ur t's pe rm iss ion to m ov e fro m the juris dic tion, or b oth, the custodi al parent has t he burden of

pro vin g th at re m ov al is in th e c hild 's b es t inte res t. Th at burden ca n b e s hifte d b y a prim a fa cie sh ow ing of a sin ce re, g ood-fai th reasonfor t he move and a prima facie showing that the move is consi stent w ith th e c hild 's b es t inte res t. Id. at 332.
The Supreme C

ourt i n Taylor

ap plie d th es e s ub sta ntiv e p rinc iple s a nd pro ce du ral rule s and ca m e to the co nc lus ion tha t the jud gm en ts o f the tria l court and the Court of Appeals must be reversed. The custodial parentpro pe rly petition ed th e trial co urt to suspend it s previousl y imposed restri cti on on remova l and sought permissi on to move with t he chil d to Davenport, Iowa. The Supreme Court st ated t hat removal was warrant ed based on a well- establ ished reason forthe m ov e-h er r em arr iag e to so m eo ne w ho w as livin g, fo r an eq ua lly good reason, some distance

fro m M em ph is. T he C ou rt a lso sta ted tha t the re w as no su gg es tion in the re cord that the mother

was anything oth

er t ha n a w ho lly fit p ers on to h av e c us tod y o f ch ild a nd the re w as no sh ow ing that the move w

ould have adverse consequences

to th e c hild ’s h ea lth o r w ell-b ein g. T he Su pre m e C ou rt the n sta ted as follo w s: It is o bv iou s th at th e p rev iou sly es tab lish ed sc he du le of visi tati on will have to be a l ter ed . T he re i s n o p roo f tha t this ca nn ot b e s uc ce ss fully accomplished to accommodate the inter ests of bot h parents, as well as t he ch ild 's inter est. There i s noth

ing in the recor d to i ndicat e that Deborah M itte n's conduct has been vi ndict ive or that in prop os

in g to m ov e to D av en po rt, she inte nd ed to d ep rive St ev e T ay lor of h is v isita tion righ ts o r to inte rfe re w ith h is c los e re latio ns hip w ith h is c hild
. Id. at 333.6

In the ca se of Aaby v. Str ange , 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996), the cust odial par ent peti ti oned to move out of s tate w ith th e c hild . Th e S up rem e C ou rt, in rev ers ing the de cis ion s o f the tria l an d a pp ella te c ou rts, rul ed that a custodial parent may remove a child t o another jur isdi cti on unless noncustod ial parent can show, by pre po nd era nc e o f ev ide nc e, th at c us tod ial p are nt's m otiv es for m ov ing are vin dic tive
. Id . at 6 23
. The Su pre m e C ou rt in Aaby stat ed that the ultim ate m ess age to be glea ned from Taylor

is a dm itted ly obscure. They felt that was evidenced by thefact that both part ies i n Aaby put f orth ar guments which found su ppo rt in t he text of t he Taylor

op inio n, a nd by the trial c ou rt's o bv iou s c on fus ion as to its m ea nin g. Th e Supreme C ou rt fur ther stat ed that be

ca us e th ey ha d fa iled to "m ak e d ete rm ina te a n a rea of la w tha t ha s become increasi ngly unsett led," they must dispel the am big uity of Taylor and clari fy i ts i mpact on the law of rem ov al. Aaby at 6 29
. Although it dr

ew up on au tho rity fro m m an y o the r ju risd ictio ns and de alt w ith a nu m be r of s pe cific su b-is su es , Taylor w as fun da m en tally co nc ern ed w ith furt hering tw

o overarchi ng

goa ls in the law of rem ova l: (1) "limiting judicial intervention

in post-divorce famil

y decision-making

, and (2) making disputes easier of resol ution if they must be litigated." Id. at 331 (emphasis added) . We continueto beli eve that t hese goals must determine the

law
. Moreover, we beli eve that the trad ition al b es t inte res ts of th e c hild tes t, for the rea so ns en un cia ted in Taylor , m

ak es the se go als diffic ult or impossibl e to achi eve. And we are c onvinced, again f or the reasons stat ed in Tay lor , tha t the inte res ts o f the cu sto dia l pa ren t an d th e inte res ts of th e c hild are ba sic ally inte rre late d, e ve n if th ey a re not always pre cis ely the s am e. Th ere fore , w e c on clu de , as the m oth er in sis ts, th at a custodi al pa

ren t w ill be allo w ed to r em ov e th e c hild fro m the jur isd ictio n unless the non-cust odial parent can show, by a pr eponderance of t he evidence, th

at th e c us to dia l pa re nt 's m otives for m ovin g are vindi cti ve--t hat is, int ended to defeat or

de ter th e v isita tion righ ts o f the no n-c us tod ial p are nt. Aaby at 629. Th e S up rem e C ou rt th en pro ce ed ed to s et o ut th e a pp rop riat e p roc ed ure for rem ov al. W ith rega rd to p roc ed ure , w e c on clu de tha t if th e p art ies cannot agree on an ac ce pta ble vis itatio n s ch ed ule , the cu sto dia l parent seeking t o remove

must file a pe tition w ith the c ourt to reappr ove or revi se, as t he case may require, the ex istin g v isita tion sc he du le. In the he arin g o n th e p etitio n, t he non-cust odial parent may, i f he or she wis hes, pr esent ev idence t hat t he custodi al pare

nt's m otives for m ovin g are vin dic tive ; als o, a ny pe tition for a change of cust ody based on the above-di scussed grounds shal l be heard at this tim e. Id . at 6 30
.
In the c ase befo re this Court , ther e was a specific provi sion placed in t he MD A which prohibi ted t he parti es from moving m

ore than sixt y (60) miles f rom N ashvil le, Tennessee. Husban d fir st contends that the re7

ex ists no new circ um sta nc es w hic h ju stify a c ha ng e in the “six ty m ile” res ide ntia l res trict ion . H e c ites ca se law wh ich holds

tha t the “re m arr iag e o f eith er p are nt d oe s n ot o f itse lf co ns titute a c ha ng e o f circ um sta nc e th at would wa rrant a cha nge of cu stod y.” Tortor ich v. Erickson , 67

5 S .W .2d 19 0, 1 92 (T en n. C t. A pp . 19 84 ). W hile this statement of t he law is correct , we point out that Wife was not seeking t o change c ustody, but rat her pe rm iss ion to r em ov e th e c hild fro m the sta te a nd a r ed ete rm ina tion of v isita tion
. Husband contends t hat t he remo

va l la nguage in t he MD

A is contr actual in nat ure and should be enforced as

w ritte n. H e a rgu es tha t the on ly w ay the ag ree m en t ca n b e m od ified is pu rsu an t to the modifi cati on clause in t he MD A which states t hat the agreement can only be modifi ed by the parti es in writ ing. Husband contends tha t the C ha nc ello r w as the ref ore w itho ut a uth orit y, a bs en t the pa rtie s’ a gre em en t, to p erm it this rem ov al.
In Penland v. Penl and , 521 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tenn. 1975), t he Supreme C ourt of Tennessee held that when a hus band and wife co

ntra ct w ith re sp ec t to th e le ga l du ty o f ch ild s up po rt, up on ap pro va l of th at co ntra ct, the agreement of the part ies becomes merged into t he decree an d lo se s its contract ual nat ure. The Supreme C ou rt sta ted tha t the rea so n fo r str ipp ing the ag ree m en t of the part ies of it s contr actual nature was the conti nuing st atut ory power

of the Co urt to m od ify its term s w he n c ha ng ed circ um sta nc es jus tify. Id. at 224. Trial courts have cont inued au tho rity in p os t-d ivo rce m atte rs c on ce rnin g th e c are , cu sto dy an d c on tro l of chil dren. Tennessee

C od e A nn ota ted § 3 6-6 -10 1(a ) st ate s: “ Su ch de cre e s ha ll re m ain w ithin the cont rol of t he cou rt and be subject to such changes or modifi cati ons as the exi genciesof t he case may require. ” Provi sions wh ich re strict w here the c hild sh all resid e are pro vis ion s w hic h c on ce rn t he ca re, cu sto dy an d c on tro l of the chil d. Therefor e, t he removal provi sion i n the MDA w

as merged into t he

decree and lost it s contr actual nature. It m ay the ref ore be m od ified if the co rre ct p roc ed ure is fol lowed. Such procedur es have been spell ed out in Taylor and Aaby
. Husband contends t hat t he Taylor

and Aaby li ne of cases are not appli cable to t he case at ha nd . In this case there was a

sp ec ific p rov isio n p lac ed in th e M D A w hic h p roh ibite d th e p art ies fro m m ov ing more than six ty (60) m iles from Na shv ille, Ten nes see . Ne ither Taylor

nor Aaby co nta ine d a sim ilar pro vis ion
. Ho we ver, in Ta ylo r, th ere w as a s tan din g c ou rt o rde r w hic h p roh ibite d th e M oth er f rom rem ov ing the chi ld t o another sta te.8

When layi ng out t he procedural framework for removal in Taylor , the

Su pre m e C ou rt sta ted , “If,on the other ha nd , the cu sto dia l pa ren t files for relie f, seeking to lift a prior prohibition on removal or asking the court’s permission t

o move from the jurisdi

ction, or both , t he custodi al parent has the burden of provi ng thatremoval is i n the ch ild’s bes t interes t.” Taylor at 3 32 . (Em ph as is a dd ed ). W hile it w as late r clar if iedin Aaby

that the burd en re sts u pon the n on-c usto dial pa rent to show a vindi cti ve purpose for the move, the l anguage in Taylor

stat es that a parent

m ay se ek relief in the co urt s to lift a prio r pr oh ibitio n o n re m ov al. The Supreme C

ourt di d not l imit such “pri or

proh ibition on rem ova l” to on e pla ced upo n the partie s by the c ourt in a prior pr oceeding. The language used by the Supreme C ourt i s broad enough to encom pass a p rior pro hib ition on rem ov al fo un d in an M D A.
Additi onally, in Hill v. Robbins , 859 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. Ct . App. 1993) , this Court rever sed a tri al co urt ’s de cis ion to c ha ng e p hy sic al c us tod y to the fath er u ntil the mother r elocat ed to t he stat e of Tennessee. In Hill, the f inal decree inc orporat ed the m arita l dis so lutio n a gre em en t in w hic h th e wife agreed not t o move from the sta te o f Te nn es se e w ith th e c hild ren du ring the ir m ino rity. O n a pp ea l this C ou rt sta ted that “an y agreement or arran ge m en t co nc ern ing the cu sto dy of m ino r ch ildre n is su bje ct to m od ifica tion . . .” c iting R og ero v. P itt , 759 S.W .2d 1 09 (T enn . 198 8).
For the fo rego ing re aso ns, the trial cou rt w as at lib erty to lift th e p roh ibitio n o n re m ov al fo un d in th e fina l de cre e. W ife fo llow ed the pro pe r pr oc ed ure ou tline d in Ta ylor and Aaby

by petition ing the cou rt to al low her to remove the chil d from Tennessee an d asking for a new visi tati on sche du le fo r Husband. The burden then w as up on the Hus ba nd to s ho w , by a p rep on de ran ce of th e e vid en ce , tha t W ife’s motives f or

m ovin g w ere vin dic tive , tha t is, in ten de d to de fea t or d ete r H us ba nd ’s v isita tion righ ts. Aaby at 6 29
. W ife tes tified to h er r ea so ns for de sirin g to m ov e to Te xa s w ith th e m ino r ch ild. W ife s tate d that she had remarri ed and her husband li ved and worked

in T ex as . W ife w as ab le to find em plo ym en t the re w ith a pa y increaseof $6, 000.00

an d a dd ition al b on us es . S m ith, W ife’s cu rre nt h us ba nd , tes tified that he would not be able to move to Tennessee

as his employment w

as in Texas and he also has two m inor chi ldren i n Texas and has reg ula r vis itatio n w ith th em . S m ith te stifie d th at if t he co urt did no t allo w W ife to m ov e w it h t he ch ild to Te xa s, W ife a nd Sm ith w ou ld b e fo rce d to ca rry on a lo ng dis tan ce m arr iag e.
W ife test if iedthat she was willi ng to w ork w ith H us ba nd , if the co urt a llow s h er to rem ov e to the Sta te9

of T ex as , to tr an sp ort th e c hild ba ck an d fo rth to Hus ba nd in T en ne ss ee . Q: Now, tell Judge Bell what y ou are wil li ng to do. A: W ell, I want Alt on to have every opportuni ty to spend as much time with hi m as he can. And we are - I am pr ep are d to bri ng him back at m

y expense every six weeks f or nine day s an d transport the chil d at my expense. Q: Now, are

there any other t imes that you would propose for the re to be vi sit ati on between the f ather and t he chil d? A: Yes, si r. We would li ke to have hi m spend a w eek with h i m a t Christmas and two separate two-week periods during t he s um m er a n d then any weekend out of t he m on th that he would like to

come to D all as. Q: So yo u d on ’t ob jec t to h im vis iting at le as t on ce a m on th i n D alla s if he wants to come or can come? A: I en

co ura ge it. W he n W ife w as qu es tion ed ab ou t w he the r he r m ov e w as do ne to d efe at o r de ter v isita tion, W ife s tate d th at it w as no t an d th at s he en co ura ge s v isita tion be tw ee n H us ba nd an d th e c hild
. Husband tes tified as to n um ero us an d s ub sta ntia l re as on s w hy he w ou ld lik e th e c hild to remain i n Tennessee. While thi s Court admires and encour ages the bond Husband seeks to maintai n by keeping t he ch ild in c los e p rox im ity to Hus ba nd an d th e c hild ’s e xte nd ed fam ily, th is C ou rt is bo un d b y th e h old ing in Aaby
. The cu sto dia l pa ren t w ill be allo w ed to m ov e w ith th e c hild un les s th e n on -cu sto dia l parent proves a vindict ive purpose. Th

ere w as sim ply no pro of in this ca se tha t W ife w as se ek ing to d efe at o r de ter Husband’s visi tat ion right s. Q uite the co ntra ry, th e p roo f sh ow ed tha t W ife w as w illing to unde rtake t he rathercostl y expense of transpor ti ng

the chi ld t o and from Tennessee at six -w ee k in terv als for v isita tion pe riod s w ith H us ba nd . W ife also ex pre ss ed tha t Hus ba nd w as w elc om e to tra ve l to D alla s fo r pe riod s o f vis itatio n a s w ell. T his Co urt holds tha t the trial c ou rt w as no t in e rro r in a llow ing W ife to rem ov e th e m ino r ch ild fro m the sta te.
IV. Visitation Schedule
Both parti es object

to the visitation sch edu le ord ered by the t ri al court. In Taylor

the S upre m e C ourt discussed t he visi tat ion i ssue.

[R]emoval of the chi ld f rom

the jur isd ictio n m ay req uire res ch ed ulin g of t he non-cust odial pa

ren t's vis itatio n; . . . tha t the co urts m us t be se ns itive to th e non-cust odial parent' s effor ts t o m ain tain his or h er r ela tion sh ip w ith th e chil dren, and that vi sit ati on should be arranged in a manner m ost li kely t o enhance that relat ionshi p . . . These factor s, and any rel ated f actual cir cumstances

foun d by the c ourt to be signif icant i n a given sit uation, must be weighed indivi dually and col lect ivel y. Taylor at 332.10

Th e S up rem e C ou rt a lso ad dre ss ed the vis itatio n is su e in Aaby
. W ith rega rd to p roc ed ure , w e c on clu de tha t if th e p art ies cannot agree on an ac ce pta ble vis itatio n s ch ed ule , the cu sto dia l parent seeking t o remove

must file a peti ti on with t he court t o reapprove or revi se, as the case may requir e, the ex istin g v isita tion sc he du le
. . . As is the case in t he init ial proceedings, neit her party shal l bea r the b

urd en o f proo f on th e visita tion iss ue; ra ther, the tri al court sha ll , i n its sound di screti on, fashi on an acceptable revi sed visi tat ion arr

an ge m en t. A ny pri or l aw inc on sis ten t w ith th es e c on clu sio ns is ex pre ss ly o ve rruled
. Aaby

at 630.
It is a pp are nt th at th e tria l co urt had di sc

ret ion to fa sh ion an ac ce pta ble vis itatio n s ch ed ule
. Due to the dis tan ce of th e m ov e in this ca se , it w ou ld b e hig hly im pra ctic al to ret ain the ori gin al v isita tion schedule. Husband’s visi tat ion proposal requested t hat he ha ve the ch ild a t lea st tw o we eke nds per m onth and the e ntire tim e he is out of school during t he summ er. Wif e proposed

a visi tati on schedule consisti ng of 111 days while Hus ba nd ’s s ch ed ule req ue ste d 1 84 da ys . Th e tria l jud ge de cid ed to k ee p th e v isita tion at th e same level as it had previously been exerci sed. The trial ju dg e u ltim ate ly a pp rov ed a v isita tion sc he du le p atte rne d a fter W ife’s sc he du le, b ut c on sis ting of 1 70 .5 d ay s p er y ea r.
W ife co nte nd s th at th e tria l co urt fa iled to im po rt in to its vis itatio n s ch ed ule the cu rre nt la w in Tennessee. She claims the t ri al court i ncorrect ly concl uded that Husband was necessa

ril y entit led to “ the same kind of vi sit ati on” he

had in t he Ma

rita l D iss olu tion Ag ree m en t. W ife c on ten ds tha t he r or igin al v isita tion pro po sa l, which provi des

ap pro xim ate ly 11 1 d ay s o f vis itatio n, re qu ires sig nific an tly le ss trav el. S he cla im s th at w hile this ha s a po sitiv e im pa ct o n h er, it is a lso be ne ficia l to th e c hild
.
It is c lea r fro m the lan gu ag e o f Taylor and Aaby quoted above that the t ri al court i s free t o modify t he visi tat ion schedule and i s not rest ri ctedto t he same kind of visitatio n orig inally p rovid ed fo r. Ho we ver, th ere is nothi ng in t he record which conv inces thi s Co urt tha t the tria l jud ge w as no t aw are of th is fa ct w he n it fashi oned the new visit ati on schedule. The tri al court was equally at l ibert y to incr ease or decrease t he

amount of vis itatio n. In se tting the ne w vis itatio n s ch ed ule the Chancellorm

ad e th e fo llow ing co m m en t. “I th ink he is enti tl ed to, and I think i n the int erest of the chil d, half and half f orever is not going to work. Half and hal f f or the foreseea blef uture I hope will work. ” This l anguage evidences the tri al court ’s recogni ti on that i t was not requir ed to a w ard the sa m e a m ou nt o f tim e H us ba nd pre vio us ly h ad , bu t tha t for no w , the sp lit of t im e would conti nue to work. For t he reasons stated, we hold that t he tri al court did not commit error i n granti ng Husband11

170 days of visi tati on, with Wife pr ovidi ng all t ransportat ion costs.

V. Husband’s Request for Attorney Fees
Pa rag rap h T hre e o f the M arita l D iss olu tion Ag ree m en t rea ds in p ertin en t pa rt: NON-COMPLI ANCE
. Should eit her part y incur any expense for l egal fees as a resul t ofthe breach of any

po rtion of th is M arita l D iss olu tion Ag ree m en t by the other part y, the Court shal l award reasonable at tor ne y’s fee s a nd su it exp ens es to the n on-d efau lting pa rty w hich are r eas ona bly inc urred
. Husband arg ue s th at W ife b rea ch ed the “six ty m ile p rov isio n” a nd the es tra ng em en t pr ov isio n o f the MDA, and that he should t herefor e be awarded his fees and expenses pur suant t o Paragraph Three o f the MDA and Tenn. Code Ann.

§3 6-5 -10 3(c ). T he tria l co urt fou nd tha t W ife fo llow ed the co rre ct p roc ed ure in c om ing to co urt to g et p erm iss ion to m ov e a nd as su ch sh e d id n ot b rea ch the ag ree m en t.
If W if e had remove

d the chil d from the jur isdi cti on and subsequen tly file d th is peti ti on, or by her removalac

tion s c au se d H us ba nd to file a p etition for r elie f, we would have a clear case of breach of t he agreement. However, Wif e was aw are of th is p rov isio n in the ag ree m en t, an d s ou gh t the co urt ’s ap pro va l in ord er to avo id b rea ch ing the ag ree m en t. W ife fo llow ed the co rre ct p roc ed ure to a vo id v iola ting the “60 m ile pro vis ion.” Fo r re as on s th at w ill be ex pla ine d h ere inb elo w , W ife als o d id n ot v iola te th e “e stra ng em en t” pro visi on of th e M D A. Fo r th e fo reg oin g re as on s, th is C ou rt fin ds tha t the tria l co urt did no t co m m it er ror in decli ning t o award attor ney fees t o Husband. VI. Change of Custody Issue
Husband co nte nd s th at th e tria l co urt e rre d in failin g to aw ard Hus ba nd so le a nd ex clu siv e c us tod y of the ch ild. H e c laim s th at W ife v iola ted the es tran ge m en t pr ov isio n o f the M D A w hic h s tate s th at “N eith er pa rty shall do anythi ng which may estrange the chi ld f rom eitherparent or hamper the natur al devel opment of thei r [si c] l ove for

eit her pa ren t.” H e c laim s W ife v iola ted the es tra ng em en t pr ov isio n b y b ec om ing en ga ge d to a m an an d n ot te lling him un til afte r sh e w as m arr ied tha t sh e h ad de cid ed to m o ve . H e c laim s th at th is sho ws that Wife does not want i n goo d fa ith to ex erc ise join t cu sto dy of th e m ino r ch ild a nd tha t sh e w ou ld rather “estr ange” or ali enate the chi ld fr om H usband.He cites cases i n which thi s Court has ref us ed to p erm it12

the ali enati ng parent

to have cust ody of t he chil dren and insur ed that the pa ren t w ho ha s s uffe red alie na tion because of the other par ent’s act ions is awarded custody so t hat no furt her ali enation occurs.
In thi s case, t here wa

s absol ute ly n o e vid en ce offe red to s up po rt the co nte ntio n th at W ife h as att empted to a lien ate the ch ild fr om Hus ba nd . Th ere ha s n ev er b ee n a ny pro ble m w ith H us ba nd ex erc isin g his visi tat ion. There have been no alle ga tion s th at e ithe r pa rty ha s c ritic ize d o r ot he rw ise talk ed po orly about the other parent in the pr esence of th e c hild. R ath er th ere w as ev ide nc e b y b oth pa rties tha t the y sh are d in the up brin gin g o f the ch ild. B oth pa rtie s tes tified tha t the oth er w as a fit p are nt. H us ba nd ap pe ars to ba se his estrangement clai m on the fact that W if e desires t o move

with the chi ld to Texas.
Relocati on, st anding al one, does not const it ute a basi s for a change of cu sto dy
. Taylor at 332. The Supreme C ou rt su bs eq ue ntly dis cu ss ed w ha t is n ec es sa ry fo r a change of c

us tod y in rem ov al s itua tion s in Aaby v. Str ange .

This conclusion does not mean, howeve r , th at a n on -c us to dia l pa re nt 's hands are tied w he re r em ov al c ou ld p os e a sp ec ific, s erio us threa t of ha rm to the child. In thes e situa tions th e no n-cu stod ial pare nt may fil e a peti ti on for change of cust ody based on a m ate ria l change of cir cumstances. The pe tition w ou ld s tate , in effect , that the proposed move evidences such bad judgment and is so pot enti all y harmful t o the chil d tha t cust ody should be changed to th e p etitio ne r. B ec au se Te nn es se e la w al lows custody t o be changed if the be ha vio r of th e c us tod ial p are nt c lea rly p os its a danger to t he ph ys ica l, m en tal o r em otio nal w ell-b ein g o f the ch ild, M us se lm an v. A cu ff , 826 S.W .2 d 92 0 (T en n.A pp .19 91 ), su ch a p etitio n w ou ld n ot v iola te Taylor --which only prohi bit s a change of cust ody based solel y on the

fact of the move. How

ever, exper t psychol ogical an d/o r ps yc hia tric tes tim on y that removalcould be general ly det ri mentalto the chi ld wil l usuall y not su ffice to establi sh an injury th at is sp ec ific a nd se riou s e no ug h to jus tify a change of custody. A m

ove in a ny ch ild's life, w he the r he or sh e is rai se d in the context of a one or two parent home, carri es with i t t he potent ial of di srupti on; such comm on phenomena--both the f act of moving and the accompanying dist ress-- cannot

consti tut e a basis f or the drasti c m easure of a change of cu sto dy
. Aaby at 629-30.
Husband did not offerany evidence that t he proposed m ove evidenced

such bad judgment and was so potent ial ly har mful t o the

ch ild th at c us tod y s ho uld be changed to Husband. No evidence was int roduced tha t the be ha vio r of W ife c lea rly p os its a da ng er t o th e p hy sic al, m en tal o r em otio na l w ell-b ein g o f the chi ld. In fac t, the ev ide nc e in this ca se sh ow ed tha t W ife h ad founda hig

her p ayin g job in Te xas , she and Sm ith we re in the process of purchasi ng a home, she had made arrangements for a sui tabl e day school pr ogram for t he chil d, and she had gotten references f or doctors i n the Dallas area who could tr eat chil d for hi s medical13

condit ion. W

if e furt her agreed to pay the cost to tra ns po rt the chi ld, accompanying him both to and f rom Tennessee, for h

is s ch ed ule d v isita tion w ith H us ba nd
. It ap pe ars tha t W ife is do ing ev ery thin g p os sib le to ensure a smoo

th tr ansiti on for t he child and f acil it ate ample visi tati on with Husband. Custody w ill no t be changed to the Husband based solel y on the fact of Wife’s move. Husband did not off er su fficie nt e vid en ce to s up po rt his e stra ng em en t cla im , no r di d h e o ffer ev ide nc e th at th e m ov e w ou ld po sit a da ng er t o th e c hild ’s p hy sic al, m en tal o r em otio na l w ell-b ein g. F urt he rm ore , the lan gu ag e in Aaby su gg es ts a ve ry s tron g s ho w ing of d an ge r w ou ld n ee d b e s ho w n, a s e xp ert te stim on y th a t t he m ov e its elf w ou ld b e ge ne rally de trim en tal to the ch ild w ill no t us ua lly s uffic e. S uc h a sh ow ing w as no t m ad e by Husband.The tri al co urt did no t co m m it er ror in fa iling to a w ard Hus ba nd so le a nd ex clu siv e c us tod y o f the m ino r ch ild.

VII. Conclusion
The judgment of t he tri al co

urt is he reb y a ffirm ed . C os ts o f this ap pe al a re ta xe d to the Hus ba nd , for which execution may issue if necessary.

HIGH ERS , J.14

CONCUR:

FAR ME R, J.

LILLARD , J.