[Cite as State v. Savors, 2022-Ohio-894.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RANDY A. SAVORS, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 21 CO 0007 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio 

Case No. 2020 CR 160 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 

Atty. Vito Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor and Atty. Tammie M. Jones, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney105 South Market Street, Lisbon, Ohio 44432, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. Donald K. Pond, 5140 North High Street, Suite 101, Columbus, Ohio 43214, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

Dated: March 21, 2022 

D’APOLITO, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Randy A. Savors, Jr., appeals the judgment entry of the 

Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas overruling his Motion for Discharge/Speedy 

Trial based on an alleged constitutional violation by the state of his right to a speedy trial. 

Appellant later entered pleas of no contest to one count of Failure to Verify Address, in 

violation of R.C. 2950.06(F), a felony of the third degree, and one count of Failure to 

Provide Notice of Change of Address, in violation of R.C. 2950.05(F)(1), a felony of the 

third degree. Following the entry of his pleas of no contest, Appellant was sentenced to 

a mandatory prison sentence of three years on each count to be served concurrently. For 

the following reasons, the judgment entry of the trial court on the alleged constitutional 

speedy trial violation is affirmed. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} On March 17, 2020, the state charged Appellant with one count of Failure 

to Verify Address and one count of Failure to Provide Notice of Change of Address in the 

municipal court. Ten days later, on March 27, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 

pandemic, the Governor of Ohio signed into law Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197, which immediately 

tolled all statutes of limitation, time limitations, and deadlines in the Ohio Revised Code 

and the Ohio Administrative Code until the expiration of Executive Order 2020-01D or 

July 30, 2020, whichever was came first. In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed by 

Rules Promulgated by Supreme Court & Use of Technology, 158 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2020-

Ohio-1166. 

{¶3} Appellant was arrested on April 2, 2020. The following day, Appellant 

appeared in the municipal court and entered a technical no plea to the charges. 

{¶4} Appellant appeared again in the municipal court on April 9, 2020 and waived 

a preliminary hearing. Bond was set at $25,000.00 cash or surety. On April 23, 2020, 

the common pleas court issued a continuation order on the original bond. 

{¶5} On June 10, 2020, the grand jury indicted Appellant for the two charges to 

which Appellant ultimately entered his pleas of no contest. Appellant was served with the 
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indictment at the county jail on June 16, 2020. He was arraigned on the same day. The 

bond was ordered to remain in effect. 

{¶6} On July 23, 2020, Appellant filed motions for a bill of particulars and for 

access to discovery and applicable Brady material. 

{¶7} On August 10, 2020, the matter was set for a status conference on August 

13, 2020, and a trial by jury was scheduled for August 17, 2020. 

{¶8} On August 11, 2020, Appellant filed the Motion for Discharge/Speedy Trial 

currently on appeal. Appellant alleged both statutory and constitutional speedy trial 

violations, predicated upon the fact that he had been incarcerated for 133 days as of 

August 11, 2020. On August 13, 2020, the trial court modified Appellant’s bond order to 

a $50,000.00 recognizance bond. Appellant was released from jail that same day. 

{¶9} On August 27, 2020, the state filed its response brief. The state asserted 

that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197 tolled all of the time up to July 30, 2020. The state further 

asserted that the time period between August 1, 2020 to August 5, 2020 was tolled due 

to Appellant’s pending motions for a bill of particulars and for Brady material. In so 

arguing, the state appears to argue that it had fourteen days to respond to Appellant’s 

motions. Therefore, according to the state’s calculation, only six days had elapsed 

(August 6 to August 11). 

{¶10} The state’s brief reads, “TIME COUNTED AT TRIPLE COUNT (6 days).” 

However, applying the triple count provision, as Appellant was incarcerated, eighteen of 

the 270 days would have elapsed on August 11, 2020. Nonetheless, based on the state’s 

calculation, no statutory speedy trial violation had occurred. 

{¶11} On September 23, 2020, the trial court overruled Appellant’s motion. With 

respect to the alleged constitutional violation, the trial court opined that “[u]nder these 

extraordinary circumstances, dismissing the indictment would be an unsatisfactorily 

severe remedy, penalizing the State of Ohio for a delay not of its own doing and over 

which it had no control.” (9/23/20 J.E., p. 2.) The trial court further opined that “even 

factoring in the delay in this case caused by the COVID pandemic, there is no evidence 

of an overly long prosecution.” (Id.) 

{¶12} Two days later, on September 25, 2020, Appellant failed to appear for a 

scheduled court hearing. According to his trial counsel, who was present at the hearing, 
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Appellant had been taken into federal custody. As a consequence, the trial court revoked 

Appellant’s bond and issued a bench warrant for his arrest on September 28, 2020. 

{¶13} On October 19, 2020, the trial court scheduled a pretrial hearing for October 

29, 2020. That same day, the trial court issued a “Notice of Court Order” directing the 

Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office to retrieve Appellant from the Mahoning County Jail 

no later than October 26, 2020 for the October 29, 2020 hearing. 

{¶14} On October 30, 2020, the trial court issued a judgment entry memorializing 

the fact that Appellant was not transported to attend the pretrial hearing. The return, filed 

on October 27, 2020, indicates that the trial court was required to issue a writ in order to 

authorize the Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office to remove Appellant from federal 

custody. 

{¶15} On January 15, 2021, the trial court rescheduled the pretrial hearing for 

February 5, 2021, but the matter was continued for fourteen days by motion of the state, 

which requested the additional time to file the required paperwork to obtain temporary 

custody of Appellant from the federal authorities. At the February 19, 2021 hearing, 

counsel for Appellant waived Appellant’s appearance and the matter was continued to 

March 29, 2021. 

{¶16} At the March 29, 2021 pretrial hearing, Appellant was present and entered 

his pleas of no contest to both counts in the indictment. That same day, the trial court 

imposed mandatory three-year sentences for each count to be served concurrently. 

{¶17} On April 19, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting Appellant 

133 days of jail time credit. On June 1, 2021, a letter dated May 25, 2021 from the Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was filed. The letter establishes that the 

ODRC was unable to apply the jail time credit, and offers the explanation that its failure 

“may be due to time served/expired, federal custody, county jail, probation/community 

control, offender is not incarcerated, or the entry has been held for over 30 days and 

[Appellant] has not been transported to the [ODRC.]” 

{¶18} This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISCHARGE APPELLANT 

FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE THE STATE VIOLATED 

APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 

{¶19} The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an 

accused this same right. State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 357 N.E.2d 40 (1976). 

Although the United States Supreme Court declined to establish the exact number of days 

within which a trial must be held, it recognized that states may prescribe a reasonable 

period of time consistent with constitutional requirements. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 

523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In response to this authority, Ohio enacted 

R.C. 2945.71, which designates specific time requirements for the state to bring an 

accused to trial. 

{¶20} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), the state must bring a defendant to trial on 

felony charges within 270 days of arrest. The statutory speedy-trial period begins to run 

on the date the defendant is arrested, although the date of arrest is not counted when 

calculating speedy-trial time. State v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98388, 2013-Ohio3722, ¶ 44, citing State v. Tatum, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-10-18, 2011-Ohio-3005. Once 

the statutory limit has expired, the defendant has established a prima facie case for 

dismissal. State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 30-31, 500 N.E.2d 1368 (1986). At that 

point, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that sufficient time was tolled pursuant 

to R.C. 2945.72. Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55-56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). If 

the state has violated a defendant's right to a speedy trial, then the court must dismiss 

the charges against the defendant. R.C. 2945.73(B). 

{¶21} Speedy-trial time is tolled by certain events listed in R.C. 2945.72. Such 

tolling events include “[a]ny period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of 

the accused,” any period of delay “necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, 

motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused, and any continuances 

granted upon the accused’s own motion,” and a “period of any reasonable continuance 

granted” upon any other party's motion. R.C. 2945.72(D), (E), and (H). 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

{¶22} A defendant’s demand for discovery tolls the speedy-trial time until the state 

responds to the discovery, or for a reasonable time. State v. Shabazz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 95021, 2011-Ohio-2260, ¶ 26, 31; R.C. 2945.72(E). Thus, the tolling period for a 

motion filed by the accused provides a “reasonable time” for the state to respond to 

motions and the court to rule on them. Courts have held that “30 days” is a “reasonable 

time.” State v. Crawford, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1297, 2019-Ohio-2660, ¶ 30; State v. 

Shelby, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA20, 2016-Ohio-5721, ¶ 53; State v. Walker, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99239, 2013-Ohio-3522, ¶ 15, citing State v. Byrd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

91433, 2009-Ohio-3283. 

{¶23} Under the “triple-count provision” contained in R.C. 2945.71(E), each day a 

defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail counts as three days in the speedy-trial time 

calculation. However, in MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 357 N.E.2d 40, the Ohio Supreme 

Court held the triple-count provision applies “only to those defendants held in jail in lieu 

of bail solely on the pending charge.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, 

when an accused is also being held in jail on another charge, the triple-count provision 

does not apply. 

{¶24} Additionally, “[t]he Ohio Attorney General has opined that courts may 

suspend jury trials to prevent the spread of the coronavirus and they may do so consistent 

with state and federal speedy-trial obligations.” In re Disqualification of Paris, 161 Ohio 

St.3d 1285, 2020-Ohio-6875, 164 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 5, quoting In re Disqualification of 

Fleegle, 161 Ohio St.3d 1263, 2020-Ohio-5636, 163 N.E.3d 609, ¶ 7, citing 2020 Ohio 

Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2020-002. In Fleegle, the Ohio Supreme Court held that trial judges 

have the authority to continue trials for defendants on a case-by-case basis without 

violating speedy-trial requirements and continuing a trial because of a pandemic state of 

emergency is reasonable under R.C. 2945.72(H). Id. 

{¶25} When reviewing a statutory speedy-trial question, an appellate court must 

count the number of delays chargeable to each side and then determine whether the 

number of days not tolled exceeded the time limits under R.C. 2945.71. State v. Ferrell, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93003, 2010-Ohio-2882, ¶ 20. Furthermore, the reviewing court 

must construe the statutes strictly against the state when reviewing the legal issues in a 

speedy-trial claim. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d at 57, 661 N.E.2d 70. 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

{¶26} In determining whether a constitutional speedy-trial violation exists, the 

reviewing court must balance four factors: “the length of the delay, the reason for the 

delay, the accused’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the 

accused as a result of the delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. 

“[T]he length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the 

peculiar circumstances of the case.” Id. at 530-531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (e.g., the tolerable 

delay for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex charge). 

{¶27} The accused must make a threshold showing of a “presumptively 

prejudicial” delay to trigger an analysis of the other Barker factors. Doggett v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Post-accusation 

delay approaching one year is generally found to be presumptively prejudicial. Doggett at 

fn. 1. 

{¶28} The prejudice factor must be analyzed in light of the following interests that 

the speedy trial right was designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 

incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the 

possibility that the defense will be impaired.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-

Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 22, quoting Barker, supra, at 532. The third interest, that 

is, the impact of the delay on the ability of the defendant to prepare his or her defense, is 

the greatest concern because it “skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. 

{¶29} Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. 

Therefore, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence, but review the application of the law to those 

facts de novo. State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15, 168 N.E.3d 

1163. 

{¶30} Appellant was arrested on April 2, 2020. Accordingly, his speedy trial clock 

began to run on April 3, 2020. Trial was scheduled for August 17, 2020. Appellant argues 

that trials by jury were being conducted in Ohio despite the tolling order, and as a 

consequence, his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. 

{¶31} However, only four months and fourteen days separate Appellant’s arrest 

and his scheduled trial. Therefore, we find that Appellant has failed to demonstrate the 

threshold “presumptive prejudice” necessary to trigger analysis under the remaining 
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Barker factors. Appellant argues that the “presumptive prejudice” relating to two nonviolent third-degree felonies should be markedly less than one year. Even assuming 

arguendo that one-half of that time was the appropriate benchmark by which to presume 

that a defendant suffers prejudice due to the delay, the delay in this case lies at the 

median point between the three-month speedy trial deadline and the proposed six-month 

deadline. 

{¶32} Next, Appellant argues that the post-motion delay of six months between 

September 25, 2020 (the day that the state learned he was in federal custody) and his 

pretrial hearing on March 26, 2020 (when he entered his plea) likewise violated his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. Appellant attributes the six-month delay to “inaction 

by the prosecution.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 8.) 

{¶33} Prior to the entry of Appellant’s no-contest plea, Appellant did not assert a 

second speedy-trial violation based on the post-motion delay by written motion, or raise 

the issue at the plea/sentencing hearing. In other words, Appellant challenges the postmotion delay for the first time on appeal. The failure to file an appropriately timed motion 

on speedy trial grounds constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. State v. Paige, 7th 

Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0033, 2019-Ohio-1088, ¶ 68. Failure to assert a second motion 

to dismiss on speedy trial grounds predicated upon events occurring after the original 

motion to dismiss was filed waives the issue on appeal. State v. McGee, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 07 MA 137, 2013-Ohio-1853, ¶ 12. However, even assuming arguendo 

that the issue is properly before us, we find no constitutional violation. 

{¶34} The speedy trial period is tolled by R.C. 2945.72(A) for any time that the 

accused is unavailable for hearing or trial by reason of other criminal proceedings against 

him “provided that the prosecution exercises reasonable diligence to secure his 

availability.” R.C. 2945.72(A). If the defendant is incarcerated in the county jail of another 

Ohio county, and the prosecution is aware of the defendant’s whereabouts, the record 

must show that the prosecutor exercised reasonable diligence to have the defendant 

appear before the court. State v. Gage, 1st Dist. No. C-160824A, 2018-Ohio-480, ¶ 21, 

citing State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. No. 76148 (Nov. 9, 2000). 

{¶35} Even assuming that the six-month delay constitutes a failure to exercise 

reasonable diligence in securing Appellant for the pretrial hearing, Appellant has not 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

demonstrated any actual prejudice resulting from the delay. The public policies 

underlying the prejudice analysis are the prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, 

the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, and limiting the possibility that 

the defense will be impaired. Long, supra. There is no evidence in the record that 

Appellant’s defense was impaired by the delay, and he was incarcerated for a pending 

federal charge at the time, which allays any concern regarding oppressive pretrial 

incarceration or anxiety and concern of the accused. 

{¶36} In summary, we find that the delay between Appellant’s arrest and his 

scheduled trial, roughly four month and fourteen days, was insufficient to demonstrate the 

presumptive prejudice to trigger the remainder of the Barker factors. Further, even 

assuming arguendo that the state failed to exercise reasonable diligence to secure 

Appellant’s availability for the pretrial hearing, we find that Appellant suffered no actual 

prejudice due to the delay. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entry of the trial court 

overruling Appellant’s Motion for Discharge/Speedy Trial based on an alleged 

constitutional violation by the state of his right to a speedy trial is affirmed. 

Donofrio, P.J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
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Case No. 21 CO 0007

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.