Filed 5/30/24 P. v. McNeill CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACK B. McNEILL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B328153

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. A039828)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.

William L. Heyman, under the appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Nima Razfar, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

In 1992, the jury found Jack B. McNeill guilty of first 

degree murder (Pen. Code1, § 187), burglary (§ 459), and robbery 

(§ 211). The jury found true the special circumstances that 

McNeill committed the murder while he was engaged in the 

commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i) 

and (vii)), and the allegation that the victim was over the age of 

60 years old. (§ 1203.09, subd. (f).) McNeill was 18 years old at 

the time he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to life 

without parole (LWOP). 

In 2022, McNeill moved for a hearing to preserve evidence 

for use at a future youth offender parole hearing pursuant to 

section 1203.1. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261; In re 

Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.) The trial court denied the motion on 

the ground that youth offender parole hearings are not available 

for people, like McNeill, serving LWOP sentences for an offense 

committed after the offender attained 18 years of age. (§ 3051, 

subd. (h).) 

On appeal, McNeill contends that excluding from youth 

offender parole consideration defendants like himself, who were 

between the ages of 18 and 26 years old at the time of the 

offenses for which they were sentenced to LWOP, violates the

constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and the 

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

We affirm the trial court’s order.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

FACTS2

“The decedent, Thelma Sterling, lived at 5239 Arbor Road 

in Long Beach. In August 1986, when defendant, who was a 

friend of her grandson, had problems at home, the decedent 

allowed him to move into her home. Defendant moved out of the 

decedent’s home in February 1987. On Friday, March 18, 1988, 

the decedent went shopping with her friend Dorothy Condit 

(Condit). The decedent bought toilet paper. Condit took the 

decedent home and then went to her own residence.

“The following Monday, March 21, 1988, Condit went to the 

decedent’s residence. Condit saw the toilet paper on the floor in 

the shopping bag where she had seen it the preceding Friday. 

Inside the residence, Condit saw the decedent on the bedroom 

floor. The decedent’s head was covered with her pajamas which 

had been pulled over her head. The pajamas were saturated with 

a large amount of blood. The decedent had died from multiple 

blunt force injuries to her head, back of her neck, chest, knees, 

and hands. Her spine and ribs had been broken and there were 

several bruises and cuts on her body.

“Condit also observed that the residence had been

ransacked. Drawers had been opened and items were dumped 

onto the floor from the inside of the drawers. Condit knew that 

the decedent kept money in a file cabinet in the house. On March 

18, 1988, the last time they were together, the decedent had $680 

in a file box in the file cabinet in her bedroom. The file cabinet 

had been broken open. Other portions of the residence looked as 

though they had been searched.

2 The facts are taken from the prior appellate opinion in 

People v. McNeill (Jun. 15, 1992, B040728 [nonpub. opn.] ).
4

“Defendant’s left thumb print was found on the inside 

frame of a broken dining room window in the front of the house. 

A portion of defendant’s palm print was found on the outside of 

the northwest bedroom door frame, near where the body was 

found. A pane near the locking thumb latch of the window on the 

north side of the front porch had been broken. The thumb 

portion had been bent but did not open because it had been 

sealed shut with paint. A bathroom window at the rear of the 

house had been opened and the screen left on the grass. The 

wood frame of the window had indentations or pry marks in it. 

The marks on both of the windows had been made in an effort to 

gain entry into the house.

“Defendant was arrested in Arizona on April 1, 1988, where 

he was interviewed by Detective Bill Robbins of the Yavapai 

County Sheriff’s Office. During the trial, People’s exhibit 19, a 

tape recording of two interviews . . . was played for the jury. In 

the first interview, defendant stated that he knew that a murder 

had been committed on the weekend he was in California; denied 

involvement with any of the charged crimes; but admitted that he 

had previously stolen $1,500 from the decedent approximately a 

year before the homicide. Defendant claimed he had arranged 

with his father to pay the money back to the decedent. When he 

returned to Arizona after the homicide, he told some people that 

he had gotten into trouble because he thought that he would be a 

suspect because of the previous theft. He knew that the decedent 

kept her money in a file cabinet in her bedroom.

“During the second interview, defendant admitted that he 

committed the burglary, but denied he murdered the decedent. 

Defendant stated that on the night in question, his friend, Chris 

Manriquez (Manriquez) dropped him off at defendant’s mother’s 
5

house. Defendant decided that he would break into the 

decedent’s house to take money. He knew that this was ‘an easy 

way to get money’ because defendant had taken money from her 

on another occasion. Defendant considered it safe to break into 

the house and take the money out of the file cabinet in the 

bedroom because the decedent was deaf. At about 3:00 a.m., he 

tried to break into a window by the front door and when the latch 

would not turn, he entered the house through the bathroom 

window and went into the decedent’s bedroom to obtain the 

money from the file cabinet. The decedent was asleep. 

Defendant pulled the handle off of a drawer to the file cabinet 

and took about $400 in cash. Defendant claimed that when he 

left she was still sleeping. Defendant also stated that he had not 

been drinking nor had he taken drugs on the night that he went 

into the house.” 

DISCUSSION

“California’s youth offender parole statute offers 

opportunities for early release to certain persons who are 

incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. (§§ 3051, 

4801.) When it was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied 

only to individuals who committed their crimes before the age of 

18; the purpose of the statute was to align California law with 

then-recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment 

limitations on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. 

In more recent years, however, the Legislature has expanded the 

statute to include certain young adult offenders as well. Under 

the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a 

crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole 
6

hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration. 

(§ 3051, subd. (b).) But not all youthful offenders are eligible for 

parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others, offenders 

who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility 

of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. (Id., subd. 

(h).)” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838–839 

(Hardin).)

Due Process

McNeill first contends, as he did in the trial court, that 

section 3051 violates federal and state constitutional guaranties 

of equal protection by excluding from eligibility for youth offender 

parole hearings persons serving LWOP sentences for crimes 

committed when they were between 18 and 25 years of age. The 

issue is one that had divided the Courts of Appeal, but after 

briefing in this case was complete, the California Supreme Court 

resolved the conflict by holding that section 3051 does not violate 

equal protection. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839 [“Hardin 

has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in 

declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult 

offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has 

granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of 

other offenses”].) Although the court left open the possibility of 

“other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special 

circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more 

focused as-applied inquiry” (id. at p. 862), here McNeill has not 

made an as-applied challenge based on the special circumstances

found true by the jury against him. Hardin is controlling, and 

McNeill’s contention necessarily fails.
7

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

McNeill next contends that the amendments to section 

3051 that provide youth offender parole hearings for persons 

serving non-LWOP sentences who committed their controlling 

offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 years old rendered his 

LWOP sentence cruel and unusual punishment under article I, 

section 17 of the California Constitution. We reject this 

contention as well.

“A punishment may violate article I, section 17 of the 

California Constitution if ‘it is so disproportionate to the crime 

for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends 

fundamental notions of human dignity.’ (In re Lynch (1972) 8 

Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted [(Lynch)].) It requires that we 

‘examine the circumstances of the offense’ and the defendant in 

determining whether the ‘the penalty imposed is “grossly 

disproportionate to the defendant’s culpability.” ’ [Citation.] We 

assess three factors in making this determination: (1) the nature 

of the offense and the offender, and the degree of danger posed to 

society; (2) a comparison with sentences for more serious offenses 

under California law; and (3) a comparison with sentences 

imposed by other states for the same offense. (Lynch, at pp. 425–

427.)” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 191.)

Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of 

the California Constitution under the legal principles set forth in 

Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 through 427, “presents a 

question of law subject to independent review; it is ‘not a 

discretionary decision to which the appellate court must defer.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994, 1000.) 
8

The reduction of a sentence based on the determination it is cruel 

or unusual under the California Constitution “ ‘is a solemn power 

to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the 

Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.’ 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Furthermore, such a reduction “ ‘ “must be 

viewed as representing an exception rather than a general 

rule” ’ ” and “ ‘[i]n such cases the punishment is reduced because 

the Constitution compels reduction, not because a trial court in 

its discretion believes the punishment too severe.’ [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.)

McNeill acknowledges that his sentence “may not meet the 

three-part test set forth in In re Lynch, supra,” and does not 

attempt to argue any of the factors set forth above. Instead, he 

asserts that, because he was 18 years old at the time he 

committed the offenses, he—like any other person under the age 

of 26—was immature and less culpable than a person 26 years 

old or older, regardless of the crimes he committed. McNeill 

argues that his reduced culpability essentially renders the 

circumstances of the crimes and the fact that he committed the 

murder while committing a burglary and a robbery irrelevant. 

This is simply incorrect. That McNeill committed the murder in 

the course of committing two other felonies cannot be ignored—

article I, section 17 requires that we “ ‘examine the circumstances 

of the offense’ and the defendant.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra,

34 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.)

In this case, McNeill broke into the home of an elderly 

woman who had previously taken him in, and over-powered and 

murdered her before stealing from her. McNeill inflicted multiple 

blunt force injuries on the victim’s head, the back of her neck, her 

chest, knees, and hands. He broke the victim’s spine and ribs. 
9

Even taking into account his diminished culpability as a 18 year 

old, McNeill’s crimes are such that the sentence does not exceed 

the constitutional limit. 

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying McNeill’s motion 

for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1203.1.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting, P. J.

LEE, J.





Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.