alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1722 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1722

To suspend temporarily the duty on electron guns for cathode ray tubes 
 (CRT's) with a high definition television screen aspect ratio of 16:9.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 14, 2003

 Mr. Santorum introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To suspend temporarily the duty on electron guns for cathode ray tubes 
 (CRT's) with a high definition television screen aspect ratio of 16:9.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELECTRON GUNS FOR CATHODE RAY TUBES.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

      

``      9902.85.25       Electron guns        Free       No change        No change        On or before 12/
                          actually used for                                                 31/2006           ''
                          cathode ray tubes                                                                    .
                          (CRT's) with a
                          high definition
                          television screen
                          aspect ratio of
                          16:9 (provided for
                          in subheading
                          8540.91.50).......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### The Board of Trustees for the Vincennes University *v.*Embree.

*Saturday, July*19.

The judges of the Circuit Court are not bound to seal a bill of exceptions, which requires the clerk to insert therein copies of certain papers after the bill shall have been sealed.

Blackford, J.

— This is a motion on the part of the plaintiffs for an order, requiring the judges of the *Gibson*Circuit Court to seal a certain bill of exceptions, or show cause, &c. The bill of exceptions presented to the judges to be sealed was as follows:

“ *Gibson*Circuit Court, *March*term, 1845. *The Board of Trustees for the Vincennes University*v. *Elisha Embree.*Be it remembered, that on this fifth day of *March,*1845, and on the third day of the *March*term of this Court, the plaintiffs moved the Court to grant -a change of venue in this case to some county out of this Circuit, and in support of such motion produced and read to the Court the following petition and affidavit, viz.: [The clerk will here insert the petition and affidavit of Mr. *Judah,*and the certificate of *George W. Rathbone,*notary public.] But the Court refused to grant said petition. To which refusal the plaintiffs, by their counsel, excepted, and prayed that this their bill of exceptions be signed and. sealed, &c., which is done, &c., the day and year aforesaid.”

The judges refused to seal this bill of exceptions.

The provision in the statute on the subject is, that the exception shall be in writing; but the Court shall allow such time as may-be deemed reasonable to settle and reduce the same to form. R. S. 1843, p. 733. The bill before us shows on its face that it is incomplete. It requires- the clerk to insert copies of certain papers after it shall have been sealed. We think the judges are not bound to seal such a bill.

*Per Curiam,.*

— The motion is overruled.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavana gh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway,

Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk March 31, 2010

s0324 

# Order

March 31, 2010

140264

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 140264

COA: 287420

Kent CC: 07

- 006211

- FC

JOSEPH RYAN CARLSON,

Defendant

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the November 5, 2009

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE only that part of the judgment of the

Court of Appeals that vacates the defendant’s convictions of and sentences for first

degree criminal sexual conduct based on oral penetration of the victim and REMAND

this case to the Court of Appeals. The challenged evidence that was found to be arguably

admissible by the Court of Appeal s supported a finding of cunnilingus, which, by

definition, is penetration. See MCL 750.520a(r). On remand, the court is to consider

whether that evidence was admissible under the circumstances of this case. See People v

Meeboer , 439 Mich 310 (1992). T he court shall also determine whether a remand for a

new trial is appropriate pursuant to Lockhart v Nelson , 488 US 33; 109 S Ct 285; 102 L

Ed 2d 265 (1988). In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 20, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-10132 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ALFREDO COVARRUBIAS, also known as Alfredo Covarrubias-Amaral, also known as Robert Covarrubias, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:03-CR-229-ALL-A

-------------------- Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Alfredo Covarrubias appeals his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) by illegally reentering the United States, without permission, following his deportation. Covarrubias contends for the first time on appeal that he should not have been assessed a criminal history point for a prior conviction for shoplifting because that crime is similar to the crime of writing an insufficient-funds check, which is exempt from inclusion in the criminal history calculation. See U.S.S.G.No. 04-10132 -2- § 4A1.2(c)(1). Covarrubias fails to provide any binding authority holding that the two offenses are similar, and he thus fails to show that the district court made any “clear” or “obvious” error. See United States v. Hull , 160 F.3d 265, 271- 272 (5th Cir. 1998). Covarrubias also has filed a letter pursuant to F ED . R. A PP . P. 28(j) calling our attention to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). However, we have held that Blakely does not apply to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Pineiro , 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263).
AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         168,654
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,387,611
<ALLOWANCES>                                   477,000
<INVENTORY>                                  6,334,110
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,835,786
<PP&E>                                       7,447,463
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,203,523
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,472,465
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,272,527
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<OTHER-SE>                                  10,510,023
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,472,465
<SALES>                                      4,679,101
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,679,101
<CGS>                                        2,773,640
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,773,640
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,444,559
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              85,369
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                361,211
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            361,211
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   361,211
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.05
        

</TABLE>
Johns appealed his conviction to this Court in 1999. See Johns v. State, No. 03-99-00731- 1

CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4601 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for

publication). He has also previously filed a petition for mandamus seeking to overturn his

conviction. See In re Johns, No. 03-09-00365-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5367

(Tex. App.—Austin July 8, 2009) (orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-09-00700-CV

In re Henry Lee Johns

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Henry Lee Johns, appearing pro se, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus. In this

petition, Johns raises a number of issues challenging his 1999 criminal conviction for aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 (West Supp. 2008).1

An intermediate court of appeals has no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs

of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Ex parte Martinez, 175 S.W.3d 510, 512-13

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding); Self v. State, 122 S.W.3d 294, 294-95

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07

(West Supp. 2008) (post-conviction applications for writs of habeas corpus, for felony cases in which

death penalty was not assessed, must be filed in court of original conviction and made returnable to

the court of criminal appeals). The court of criminal appeals has recognized that “the exclusive
2

post-conviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts isthrough a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to [article] 11.07.” Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 525 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

(quoting Charles v. State, 809 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.)). We are

also not authorized under section 22.221 of the government code to consider an original, postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004)

(describing writ power of intermediate courts of appeals). 

Because we have no jurisdiction over what is in effect a post-conviction habeas

corpus proceeding, we dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

___________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Waldrop and Henson

Filed: December 18, 2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000893046
<NAME>                        Rent-Way, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    0

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                 OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                   JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                1
<CASH>                         6,914
<SECURITIES>                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                   0
<INVENTORY>                    189,728
<CURRENT-ASSETS>               0
<PP&E>                         64,822
<DEPRECIATION>                 18,332
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                 495,451
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          0
<BONDS>                        198,245
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>          0
<PREFERRED>                    0
<COMMON>                       248,910
<OTHER-SE>                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   495,451
<SALES>                        330,368
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               371,661
<CGS>                          93,369
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  344,729
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               337
<LOSS-PROVISION>               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>             11,762
<INCOME-PRETAX>                14,833
<INCOME-TAX>                   9,126
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            5,707
<DISCONTINUED>                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                519
<CHANGES>                      0
<NET-INCOME>                   5,188
<EPS-BASIC>                  0.24
<EPS-DILUTED>                  0.24




</TABLE>
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 

STS-132 Atlantis 

The crew: 

STS-132 mission crew members, 


seated, from left, are 


Mission Specialist Garrett Reisman, 


Commander Ken Ham and 


Mission Specialist Steve Bowen. 


Standing, from left, are 


Mission Specialist Michael Good, 


Pilot Tony Antonelli and 


Mission Specialist Piers Sellers. 


The mission: 

Space shuttle Atlantis’ STS-132 

mission will carry the Russian-built 

Mini-Research Module-1, or MRM-1, 

and an integrated cargo carrier to 

the International Space Station. 

During the 12-day flight, crew 

members will use the shuttle and 

station robotic arms, and perform 

three spacewalks to attach the 

MRM-1 to the Earth-facing port 

of the Zarya control module. 

The MRM-1 will be used for cargo 

storage and will provide an additional 

docking port to the station. The cargo 

carrier will be used to support the 

transfer of exterior cargo from the 

shuttle to the space station. 

STS-132 is Atlantis’ 32nd flight, the 132nd 

shuttle mission and the 34th shuttle flight 

to the space station. 

It also is the 150th launch from Launch 

Complex 39. This includes 132 shuttle 

launches, 17 Saturn launches and one 

www.nasa.gov
 Ares I-X flight test.
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 6091

WILLIE COUVIN G TON , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. HAROLD CLARKE , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Anthony John Trenga , District Judge. ( 1:17

- cv - 00931

- AJT

- TCB )

Submitted : March 13, 2018 Decided: March 16, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Willie Couvington, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Willie Couvington seeks to appeal the dis trict court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition as untimely and procedurally defaulted . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certific ate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reaso nable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief o n procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently review ed the record and conclude that Couvington has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 205 (Monday, October 25, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 65517]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-26901]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-72,949]


Western Digital Technologies, Inc., Corporate Headquarters/Hard 
Drive Development Division, Lake Forest, CA; Notice of Affirmative 
Determination Regarding Application for Reconsideration

    By application dated September 14, 2010, workers requested 
administrative reconsideration of the negative determination regarding 
workers' eligibility to apply for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
applicable to workers and former workers of the subject firm. The 
Department's Notice of negative determination was issued on August 5, 
2010 and published in the Federal Register on August 23, 2010 (75 FR 
51849). The workers are engaged in activity related to the supply of 
engineering services.
    The negative determination was based on the findings that the 
subject firm did not increase imports services supplied by the worker's 
firm and that there has not been a shift to a foreign country in the 
supply of services by the subject firm. The investigation also revealed 
that the subject firm does not supply a service that was directly used 
in the production of an article by a firm that employed a worker group 
eligible to apply for TAA.
    The request for reconsideration alleges that increased imports of 
articles (disk drives) that were produced directly using the services 
supplied by the subject workers (engineering) contributed importantly 
to separations at the subject firm.
    The Department has carefully reviewed the request for 
reconsideration and the existing record, and has determined that the 
Department will conduct further investigation to determine if the 
workers meet the eligibility requirements of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the application, I conclude that the claim 
is of sufficient weight to justify reconsideration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor's prior decision. The application is, therefore, 
granted.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 7th day of October 2010.
Del Min Amy Chen,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2010-26901 Filed 10-22-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 23


         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


TO: Telkonet, Inc.

As registered independent certified public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of Telkonet, Inc. for the year ended December
31, 2004 of our report dated January 18, 2005 and contained in the Registration
Statement NO. 333-114425 of Telkonet, Inc. Form S-3 under the Securities Act of
1933 insofar as such report relates to the financial statements of Telkonet,
Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2004.



                            /s/ RUSSELL BEDFORD STEFANOU MIRCHANDANI LLP
                            --------------------------------------------
                                Russell Bedford Stefanou Mirchandani LLP



McLean, Virginia
January 18, 2005
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Aris Morfopoulos, Chief Executive Officer of GeneMax Corp. (the "Company"), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(a)	the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Annual Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(b)	the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date:  April 27, 2006 | By: "Aris Morfopoulos"Aris Morfopoulos, President, Chief Executive Officer, Principal Executive Officer and a director
|--------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This written statement is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A. A signed original of this statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.

__________