alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2141 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2141

To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to enhance 
  the ability to produce fruits and vegetables on soybean base acres.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 26, 2004

   Mr. Lugar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to enhance 
  the ability to produce fruits and vegetables on soybean base acres.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Farming Flexibility Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2. PRODUCTION OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES FOR PROCESSING ON SOYBEAN 
              BASE ACRES.

    Section 1101 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
(7 U.S.C. 7911) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(i) Production of Fruits or Vegetables for Processing.--
            ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the 
        producers on a farm may reduce the base acres for soybeans for 
        the farm if the reduced acres are used for the planting and 
        production of fruits or vegetables for processing.
            ``(2) Reversion to soybean base acres.--Any reduced acres 
        of a farm devoted to the planting and production of fruits or 
        vegetables during a crop year under paragraph (1) shall be 
        included in base acres for soybeans for the subsequent crop 
        year, unless the producers on the farm make the election 
        described in paragraph (1) for the subsequent crop year.
            ``(3) Recalculation of base acres.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), if 
                the Secretary recalculates base acres for a farm, the 
                planting and production of fruits or vegetables for 
                processing under paragraph (1) shall be considered to 
                be the same as the planting, prevented planting, or 
                production of soybeans.
                    ``(B) Authority.--Nothing in this subsection 
                provides authority for the Secretary to recalculate 
                base acres for a farm.''.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

RAFAEL TORRES, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY 

COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY 

OF EL PASO, STATE OF COLORADO, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 14-1508

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00329-REB-KMT)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

The captioned appeal is dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 

42.1.

A copy of this order shall stand as and for the mandate of this court.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 23, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-1508 Document: 01019403217 Date Filed: 03/23/2015 Page: 1
#### BEN JOHNSON HOMES, INC., a Georgia Corporation, and C. BENJAMIN JOHNSON, JR., individually v. CAROL FREES WATKINS

No. 148A01

(Filed 18 December 2001)

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 142 N.C. App. 162, 541 S.E.2d 769 (2001), affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part an order for summary judgment entered 1 February 2000 by Beal, J., in Superior Court, Transylvania County. On 16 August 2001, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 November 2001.

*William H. Coward for plaintiff-appellants.*

*Cloninger, Lindsay, Hensley & Searson, PLLC, by John C. Cloninger, for defendant-appellee.*

PER CURIAM.

Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. The remaining members of this Court were equally divided, with three members voting to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and three members voting to reverse. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and stands without precedential value. *See Williamson v. Bullington,*353 N.C. 363, 544 S.E.2d 221 (2001); *Reese v. Barbee,*350 N.C. 60, 510 S.E.2d 374 (1999).

AFFIRMED.
#### John J. Schurmacher et al., Respondents, v Goran Djordjevski et al., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[788 NYS2d 175]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Goran Djordjevski appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.), entered April 27, 2004, as denied that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the appellant is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

The defendant property owner, Goran Djordjevski, who resides in the State of Michigan, sustained his initial burden of demonstrating his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that he had no contractual duty to maintain and repair the leased premises, had no actual notice of the allegedly dangerous condition, and did not retain sufficient *504control over the premises to be held to have had constructive notice of the condition *(see White v Jeffco W. Props.,*304 AD2d 824 [2003]; *Beaumont-Strumer v Buffalino,*295 AD2d 381 [2002]; *Wheeler v Princess Assoc.,*259 AD2d 611 [1999]). In opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Florio, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Mastro, JJ., concur.
#### Nicole Bynum, Appellant, v Willie Salter et al., Respondents.

[787 NYS2d 882]

*583In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Barone, J.), entered January 22, 2004, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied, as academic, her cross motion for leave to serve an amended bill of particulars.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting proof that they neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the wet condition of the carpeting which allegedly contributed to the plaintiffs fall *(see Gwyn v 575 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 12*AD3d 403 [2004]; *Izrailova v Rego Realty,*309 AD2d 902 [2003]; *Rodriguez v Kimco Centereach 605,*298 AD2d 571 [2002]), and by demonstrating that the plaintiff, at her examination before trial, could not identify what caused her fall, other than by speculation.

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]; *Penn v Fleet Bank, 12*AD3d 584 [2004]). She presented no evidence regarding the length of time the wet condition existed, or whether it was visible and apparent, and thus did not satisfy the elements of constructive notice *(see Gwyn v 575 Fifth Ave. Assoc., supra; Izrailova v Rego Realty, supra*at 903). The plaintiffs conjecture in this regard was insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment *(see Gooding v Waldbaum, Inc.,*300 AD2d 282, 283 [2002]; *Becker v Waldbaum, Inc.,*221 AD2d 396 [1995]). In any event, the mere fact that the carpet was wet was insufficient to establish the existence of a dangerous condition *(see Cavorti v Winston,*307 AD2d 1018, 1019 [2003]; *Sadowsky v 2175 Wantagh Ave. Corp.,*281 AD2d 407 [2001]).

In light of our determination, the plaintiffs contentions with respect to her cross motion have been rendered academic.

The plaintiffs remaining contention is not properly before this Court. Santucci, J.P., Crane, Skelos and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Charles Holloway, Claimant, v West Street Trucking et al., Appellants, and State Insurance Fund et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent.

[789 NYS2d 745]

Lahtinen, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 2, 2003, which ruled, inter alia, that National Union Fire Insurance Company is the proper workers’ compensation carrier and directed it to reimburse the State Insurance Fund for all awards made.

In September 1989, claimant suffered a cardiovascular accident while working for the employer and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits 10 months later. National Union Fire Insurance Company was the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier at the time of the work-related accident but the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter SIF) was the employer’s carrier when the claim was filed and was mistakenly placed on notice. In June 1992 National was placed on notice and eventually controverted the claim raising, among other things, the issue of laches. Over the next several years numerous hearings were held until a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) finally determined that National was the proper carrier and the WCLJ directed National to reimburse the SIF for all payments made in the case. National filed an application for review alleging that the SIF’s delay in investigating the claim, uncovering a prior medical condition and filing a C-250 claim prejudiced and precluded it from pursuing reimbursement from the Special Disability Fund *(see*Workers' Compensation Law § 15 [8]). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ’s decision, and National appeals.

*817We affirm. Failure to assert a right for an “unreasonable and unexplained length of time, accompanied by other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a basis for the doctrine of laches” *(Matter of Taylor v Vassar Coll.,*138 AD2d 70, 73 [1988]; *see Matter of Ricciardi v Johnstown Leather,*1 AD3d 661, 663 [2003]; *Matter of Kobre v Camp Mogen Avraham,*293 AD2d 893, 895 [2002]; *Matter of Carney v Newburgh Park Motors,*84 AD2d 599, 600 [1981]). In this record, however, there is substantial evidence that the SIF acted diligently in defending this claim and that National knew or should have known of claimant’s September 1989 accident as early as December 1989. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the Board’s decision.

Peters, J.P., Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MAURICE SIMS CARPENTER.

May 22, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit 32.3  

 

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Books-A-Million, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies, to the best of such officer’s knowledge, that:

 

 (i)           the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended August 4, 2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

 (ii)          the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

| Dated: September 13, 2007 |
|---------------------------|

 

| /s/ Douglas G. Markham  |
|-------------------------|
| Douglas G. Markham      |
| Chief Financial Officer |
#### MARY MANCA v. BOROUGH OF HOPATCONG.

May 16, 1978.

Petition for certification denied. (See 157 *N. J. Super.*67)
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

                     MICRO WAREHOUSE, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                      (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)
                                   (UNAUDITED)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                             THREE MONTHS ENDED
                                                            March 31,    March 31,
                                                             1999         1998
                                                            -------      -------
<S>                                                         <C>          <C>    
Net income                                                  $12,286      $ 9,762
                                                            =======      =======

Shares
Weighted average common shares outstanding - Basic           35,547       34,600
Common equivalent shares                                      1,056           62
                                                            -------      -------

Weighted average common shares and common
    equivalent shares outstanding - Diluted                  36,603       34,662
                                                            =======      =======

Net income per share - Basic                                $  0.35      $  0.28
                                                            =======      =======

Net income per share - Diluted                              $  0.34      $  0.28
                                                            =======      =======
</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 8, 2022

No. 04-22-00651-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.S., a Child

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021-PA-02002

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant Dad’s brief was due on November 7, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a). On 

the due date, Dad moved for a seven-day extension of time to file his brief.

Appellant Dad’s motion is granted. His brief is due on November 14, 2022. 

It is so ORDERED on November 8, 2022.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:__________________________

 MICHAEL A. CRUZ, 

 CLERK OF COURT

FILE COPY
#### Vincent Starnella, Appellant, v Burke Heat et al., Respondents.

[789 NYS2d 227]

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 to recover damages resulting from the discharge of petroleum the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bellantoni, J.), entered August 12, 2003, which denied his motion for an award of an attorney’s fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, to determine the amount of the attorney’s fee to which the plaintiff is entitled.

The court erred in denying the plaintiffs motion for an award of an attorney’s fee incurred in this action to recover damages pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 resulting from the discharge of petroleum. There is no requirement that to bring an action pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 (5), or to recover an attorney’s fee thereunder, a plaintiff must have either paid *695cleanup and removal costs or been held liable to the State for cleanup and removal costs *(see AMCO Intl. v Long Is. R.R. Co.,*302 AD2d 338 [2003]; *cf. State of New York v Tartan Oil Corp.,*219 AD2d 111 [1996]). The statute provides a private right of action against a discharger to recover direct and indirect damages, in addition to damages relating to the cleanup and removal of oil *(see*Navigation Law § 181 [1], [2], [5]; *Putnam v State of New York,*223 AD2d 872 [1996]). Indirect damages include an attorney’s fee incurred by a property owner against the discharger in such an action *(see AMCO Intl. v Long Is. R.R. Co., supra; Strand v Neglia,*232 AD2d 907, 909 [1996]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### Givens *v.*Burget.

*Wednesday, December*17.

The promise of a purchaser of *V. States’*land to pay a person for an improvement, which the latter had made on the land before the purchase, is valid under the statute of 1834.

ERROR to the *Jasper*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

— This was an action of assumpsit in which *Burget*was the plaintiff. Plea, the general issue. The cause was submitted to the Court, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff.

The facts in this case necessary to be noticed are as follows: The plaintiff, in 1839 or 1840, made an improvement on a quarter section of land owned by the *United States. The*improvement consisted in ploughing a few acres of the land in a prairie, and enclosing with a fence the land so ploughed. In 1841, the defendant bought said quarter section of land of the *United States,*and took possession of it. In 1843, the plaintiff, defendant, and on *ePomeroy,*being together, the latter offered to let the defendant have certain rails (about 400), if he would pay the plaintiff for said improvement. The defendant then agreed to pay for the improvement, and afterwards made use of the rails.

The promise, as appears by the briefs of the counsel of the *578parties, was made to *Burget,*but the consideration, except improvement, moved from *Pomeroy.*

*D. D. Pratt,*for the plaintiff.

*A. L. Robinson*and *H. P. Biddle,*for the defendant.

Assuming the consideration which moved from *Pomeroy,*to be insufficient to support the promise, the plaintiff would fail as the law was when the case of *Boston*v. *Dodge,*1 Blackf. 19, was decided. But after that case a statute passed, and which was in force when the defendant’s promise was made, which enacts, “ that no contract made in consideration, either in whole or in part,-of the sale of any interest, real or supposed, in or to any land belonging to the *United States,*or for the occupancy thereof, or any improvement made thereon, shall, for that cause, be avoided or impeached,” &c. Stat. 1834, p. 60. There can be no doubt but that under this statute, the plaintiff has a right to recover, though it be considered that there was no consideration for the promise but the improvement on the land made by the plaintiff (1).

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is affirmed with costs.

(1)

 One of the considerations of the promise in the principal case — that moving from *Pomeroy*— was insufficient; *Farlow v. Kemp, ante,*p. 544; but the contract was not thereby invalidated. Where in assumpsit two considerations are alleged, the one good and sufficient, the other idle and vain, proof of that which is good will suffice. *Crisp*v. *Gamel,*Cro. Jac. 127.—Bull. N. P. 147.—1 Chitt. Pl. 323. Or if the declaration, in such case, set out the valid consideration without noticing the frivolous one, there will be no variance. 1 Chitt. Pl. 328.—*Thomas*v. *Thomas,*2 Adol. & Ell. N. S. 851. Where, howevor, one of the considerations is illegal, the whole contract is void. *Featherston v. Hutchinson,*Cro. Eliz. 199.—*Waite*v. *Jones,*1 Bingh. N. C. *656.—Shackell**v. Rosier,*2 *id. 634.*—Jones v. *Waite, 5*Bingh. *N.*C. 341.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 301**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Randolph C. Kohn,certify that:

 

1.     I have reviewedthis annual report on Form 10-KSB of Coastal Banking Company, Inc. (the “Registrant”);

 

2.     Based on myknowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3.     Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this annual report;

 

4.     The Registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e))for the Registrant and have:

 

a)     designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the Registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

 

b)    evaluated theeffectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)     disclosed inthis report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (theRegistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of this report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theRegistrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

 

5.     The Registrant’sother certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

 

a)     all significantdeficiencies in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

b)    any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 
| Date: April 13,  2006 | /s/ Randolph C.  Kohn          |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
|                  | Randolph C. Kohn               |
|                  | Chief Executive  Officer       |
|                  | (Principal  Executive Officer) |

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ralph S. Taufman, Appellant.

[789 NYS2d 239]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Mackenzie, J.), rendered October 15, 2003, convicting him of driving while ability impaired by the use . of drugs, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution was preserved by his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10 *(cf. People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665 [1988]; *People v Deyes,*3 AD3d 575 [2004]). However, the challenge is without merit because the plea allocution was sufficient to establish that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by the use of drugs *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [4]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Lopez, supra*at 666; *People v Martin,*7 AD3d 640, 641 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 677 [2004]; *People v Deyes, supra*at 576), and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Cozier, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Fisher, JJ., concur.