UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

YUREN ARANDA-DIAZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Nos. 14-2089 & 14-2093 

(D.C. Nos. 1:08-CR-02344-JB-1 and 

1:12-CR-02686-JB-1) 

(D.N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Yuren “Oso” Aranda-Diaz pled guilty to several immigration and firearmrelated counts. A jury subsequently found him guilty of two counts related to heroin 

distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and one count of possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Prior to his guilty plea and trial, Aranda-Diaz moved to suppress evidence gathered 

during a search of his vehicle. The district court denied his motion. Aranda-Diaz 

now appeals that denial. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his § 924(c) conviction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 5, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I 

 On October 2, 2012, a confidential informant (the “CI”) called Albuquerque 

Police Department (“APD”) Detective Herman Martinez. The CI said he could 

arrange to purchase $750 worth of heroin through an unwitting intermediary (Jessie 

Lopez). Martinez had previously worked with the CI at least twice and considered 

him to be reliable. After agreeing to facilitate the “buy-bust” operation, Martinez 

met with the CI, and searched him and his vehicle to ensure that he did not have 

drugs or currency in his possession. Martinez then provided the CI with $750 in 

previously-photocopied bills. During this meeting, Martinez heard Lopez call the CI 

and tell him to hurry because the source of the heroin, an individual named Oso, “was 

ready and was kind of pushing the deal forward.” 

 The CI then drove to Lopez’s residence, where the drug transaction was 

supposed to occur, and which APD placed under surveillance. Lopez exited the 

residence and entered the CI’s car, which promptly drove away. APD officers 

followed the vehicle, and a short time later Martinez received a text message from 

the CI reading “Fourth and Menaul.” Martinez interpreted this to mean that the drug 

transaction was to take place at that location. He testified that although the CI 

driving away initially surprised him, the changed location itself “didn’t really 

surprise [him]” because “in the big terms, this kind of always happens. Meet 

locations always change, and we’re real flexible about being able to move from one 

location to another location.”

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 Eventually, APD officers following the CI’s vehicle witnessed it park on a 

residential street. APD Sergeant Patrick Ficke reported over the radio that he had 

“obtained a visual of the CI” and “that he was on Fifth Street, that he had seen a 

brown Chevy [S]uburban parked, and that another vehicle had pulled behind that 

vehicle and one of the occupants of the unknown vehicle had gone to the Chevy 

Suburban.” The person from the unknown vehicle then returned to his vehicle and 

drove away. Martinez later testified that Ficke believed that he was witnessing 

another drug transaction.1

 Martinez also heard Ficke report over the radio that after 

the unknown vehicle drove away, Lopez exited the CI’s vehicle, entered the 

Suburban, then returned to the CI’s vehicle. During Lopez’s absence, the CI 

telephoned Martinez and informed him that the CI had given Lopez the money and 

that Lopez was going to get the drugs. After Lopez returned to the CI’s car, Martinez 

heard Ficke report that he observed the CI give the predetermined signal to indicate 

that the CI saw narcotics. Lopez and the CI then drove away. 

 Officers later witnessed Aranda-Diaz exit the Suburban and knock on the door 

of a nearby house. Nobody answered, and he returned to the vehicle. Officers then 

executed an arrest. Aranda-Diaz was the only individual in the Suburban. 

APD Sergeant Glen Stout testified that shortly after Aranda-Diaz was arrested, 

he noticed a gun on the driver’s seat of the Suburban. He initiated a search of the 

vehicle. During this search, Stout noticed that a cup holder in the center console area 

 1

 Ficke himself did not testify at the motion to suppress hearing or at trial 

because he had by that time resigned from the APD. 

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was loose. He testified that in his experience “folks like to hide things in [the center 

console] area.” He further explained that “[i]t’s a natural area where there’s a void, 

and in most vehicles the cup holders come out to sort of facilitate cleaning them 

versus, you know, having to clean out anything that spilled having it mounted in the 

car.” In the void, Stout located a digital scale and a pill bottle that contained five 

individually-wrapped bags of what later proved to be heroin. In a subsequent 

interrogation conducted by Homeland Security Special Agent Jeremy Arellano, 

Aranda-Diaz admitted that he kept the gun for his “protection.” 

 Aranda-Diaz moved to suppress all evidence recovered as a result of his arrest 

and search of his vehicle. He argued that APD officers lacked probable cause to 

arrest him, and that even if his arrest was lawful the officers nevertheless lacked 

probable cause to search his vehicle. He further argued that the search of his vehicle 

exceeded the scope allowable for a search incident to arrest, and that the search was 

not a permissible inventory search. The district court denied this motion, finding that 

probable cause supported both the arrest and the search of the vehicle. The district 

court also explained that the search of the vehicle was permissible as a search 

incident to arrest. Aranda-Diaz pled guilty to some of the charges against him, and a 

jury found him guilty of several others. He timely appealed.

II 

 Following the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s 

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Soza, 643 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011). “At a hearing on a pre-trial motion to 

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suppress, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to the evidence, as 

well as the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters for the trial 

judge.” United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations 

omitted). 

A 

“Probable cause to arrest exists only when the facts and circumstances within 

the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, 

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief 

that an offense has been or is being committed.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 

1108, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The probable cause 

inquiry is a “commonsense, practical question to be informed by the totality of the 

circumstances present in any particular case.” United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 

1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). 

 Aranda-Diaz contends that the participation of unwitting informant Lopez in 

the buy-bust operation vitiates probable cause because Lopez was not searched and 

his veracity and reliability were unknown to APD officers. Aranda-Diaz claims 

support from United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2004), which explains 

that “[t]he use of an unwitting informant introduces an additional layer of uncertainty 

to the transaction because it leaves open the possibility that the narcotics were 

acquired not at the suspect residence but at the location where the confidential and 

unwitting informants met before and after the transaction.” Id. at 1112. But as Artez 

further explains, “[w]hen there is sufficient independent corroboration of an 

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informant’s information, there is no need to establish the veracity of the informant.” 

Id. at 1111 (citing United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2000)). 

Thus, the Artez court held that probable cause existed based on independent 

corroboration, even though an unwitting informant was used as an intermediary 

between a CI and the suspect. Id. at 1113; see also United States v. Richardson, 86 

F.3d 1537, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Artez, 

389 F.3d at 1112 (concluding that probable cause existed despite the use of an 

unwitting intermediary due to the existence of corroborating information). 

 As in Artez and Richardson, we hold that there was sufficient corroborating 

information in this case to establish probable cause to arrest Aranda-Diaz. Martinez 

had previously worked with the CI and found him to be reliable. Martinez overheard 

the CI and Lopez arranging the heroin sale. APD officers observed Lopez enter the 

CI’s car and drive to a different location. Ficke witnessed both Lopez and an 

unknown individual participate in what he believed were drug transactions in the 

Suburban. While Lopez was in the Suburban, the CI telephoned Martinez and 

informed him that the CI had given Lopez the buy money and that he was going to 

get the drugs. After Lopez returned to the CI’s vehicle, the CI gave officers the 

prearranged signal indicating that he saw drugs. Aranda-Diaz was the sole occupant 

of the Suburban. Under the totality of the circumstances, these facts plainly 

constitute reasonably trustworthy information “that would lead a reasonable person to 

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person arrested.” 

United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001). 

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B 

 Having established the existence of probable cause to arrest Aranda-Diaz, we 

turn to the search of his automobile. Under the automobile exception to the warrant 

requirement, “police officers may stop and search a car if they have probable cause to 

believe it contains contraband, regardless of whether a traffic violation has occurred 

or a search warrant has been obtained.” United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 

1210 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) 

(“Circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest 

when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found 

in the vehicle.”). 

 Aranda-Diaz argues that even if his arrest was legal, it was unreasonable for 

officers to believe that they would find evidence relevant to his heroin distribution in 

the vehicle and, alternatively, that it was unreasonable to “dismantle” the cup holder 

during a search for that evidence. We disagree. Aranda-Diaz was the sole occupant 

of a vehicle from which APD officers witnessed two suspected drug transactions. 

Officers also found the buy money on Aranda-Diaz’s person and observed a gun in 

plain sight on the driver’s seat of his vehicle. Under these facts, it was reasonable for 

the officers to believe that evidence relating to heroin distribution would be found 

inside the Suburban. 

 It is well settled that “once the officers’ suspicions rise to the level of probable 

cause, they are empowered to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and all 

containers therein that might contain contraband.” United States v. Vazquez, 555 

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F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Because the officers had 

probable cause to search the Suburban for evidence related to heroin distribution, the 

removal of the loose console did not violate Aranda-Diaz’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. Cf. United States v. Carbajal-Iriarte, 586 F.3d 795, 803 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that cutting open the upholstery of a vehicle seat to search for drugs did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment because general probable cause existed to search the 

vehicle). 

III 

 We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2011). In our 

review, we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury 

verdict. See United States v. Calloway, 562 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977). 

 To sustain a conviction under § 924(c), the government had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the gun facilitated Aranda-Diaz’s drug trafficking offense in 

some way. See United States v. Luke-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 703, 706 (10th Cir. 2007). 

We have “held that a firearm that is kept available for use if needed during a drug 

transaction, is possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking so long as such possession 

in furtherance of is the intent of the drug trafficker.” United States v. Avery, 295 

F.3d 1158, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations and alterations omitted). A reasonable 

jury could therefore have found that Aranda-Diaz possessed the requisite intent for 

possession of a firearm in violation of § 924(c) based on trial testimony indicating 

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that a drug transaction had taken place, the gun being found in plain view on the 

driver’s seat of that Suburban, and Arellano’s testimony that Aranda-Diaz stated that 

he kept the gun under his leg for protection because he was worried about his safety. 

Moreover, the driver’s seat is in close proximity to the center console in which 

additional heroin was discovered. Cf. King, 632 F.3d at 657 (“Because the loaded 

rifle in this case was located immediately adjacent to the drugs, a reasonable jury 

could infer that it furthered [the defendant’s] drug trade by protecting [him] and his 

merchandise.”). 

IV 

 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Carlos F. Lucero 

 Circuit Judge 

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