alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of WorldStar Energy,  Corp. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB  for the  period  ended  December  31,  2006 as  filed  with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael
Kinley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

a)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

b)   The information  contained in this Report fairly presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                              /s/ M. W. KINLEY
                                                  _______________________
                                                  Michael Kinley
                                                  Chief Financial Officer

                                                  March 30, 2007

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to  WorldStar  Energy,  Corp.  and will be retained by the company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 196 (Thursday, October 9, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 61098]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-24043]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Pistoia Alliance, Inc.

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 5, 2014, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Pistoia Alliance, Inc. has 
filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership. 
The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Philip Quinlan 
(individual member), Nottingham, UNITED KINGDOM; and QFAB 
Bioinformatics, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA, have been added as parties to this 
venture.
    Also, 3E Company Environmental, Ecological and Engineering, 
Carlsbad, CA, has withdrawn as a party to this venture.
    In addition, the following members have changed their names: 
Accelrys to Dassault Syst[egrave]mes, Surenes, Cedex, FRANCE; and GGA 
to EPAM Systems, Newtown, PA.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Pistoia Alliance, Inc. intends to 
file additional written notifications disclosing all changes in 
membership.
    On May 28, 2009, Pistoia Alliance, Inc. filed its original 
notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of 
Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 
6(b) of the Act on July 15, 2009 (74 FR 34364).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on June 16, 
2014. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on July 23, 2014 (79 FR 42816).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2014-24043 Filed 10-8-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 99


                  1999 ACC SHARE, OPTION AND WARRANT ISSUANCES


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                         No. of Shares(S),
                            Options(O)                              Nature of        Total Amount of
ISSUEE                   and Warrants(W)      Issuance Date       Consideration       Consideration
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                      <C>               <C>                 <C>                  <C>     
Christopher A. Millar    559,000 (S&W)          2/15/99        Cash and Services       $139,750

                         500,000 (S&W)          3/12/99        Cash and Services       $125,000

                         202,664 (S&W)          3/12/99        Cash and Services       $50,666

Dennis R. Gutzman        500,000 (S&W)          3/12/99              Cash              $125,000

                         140,000 (S)            2/15/99              Cash              $35,000

Samuel B. Watson         400,000 (S&W)          3/15/99        Cash and Services       $100,000

                         400,000 (S&W)          4/6/99         Cash and Services       $100,000

Roy L. Painter           75,000 (S&W)           3/12/99             Services           $18,750

Ameri-Tech 
  Financial, LLC         200,000 (S)            4/15/99              Cash              $50,000

Royangrove, Limited      30,000 (S)             3/12/99              Other             Note 2

Net Voucher, Inc.
  Shareholders           2,000,000 (S)          4/12/99              Other             Note 3
                                                                                       
                         3,000,000 (0)          4/12/99              Other             Note 3

Monica Kennison          500,000 (S)            4/15/99              Cash              $125,000

Life Planning Group      200,000 (S)            4/15/99              Cash              $50,000
</TABLE>

Note 1: Each reference to S&W denotes an issuance of equal numbers of shares
and 3-year purchase warrants. 

Note 2: These shares were issued in settlement of litigation between the
Company and the issuee.

Note 3: Reference should be made to the Financial Statements and notes thereto
in Part I, Item 1, with respect to the valuation of the consideration for these
issuances.
EXHIBIT 32.1











CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.  SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of UNR Holdings, Inc. (formerly known as Promotora Valle Hermoso, Inc.) (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Alexey A. Kim, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Alexey A. KimAlexey A. KimChief Executive OfficerApril 13, 2010
#### The Board of Commissioners of Johnson County *v.*Mullikin and Another.

*Friday, December 6.*

A promissory note given to the county commissioners, in consideration of their appointment of a certain person to the office of collector of the revenue, is void.

ERROR to the *Johnson*Circuit Court.

Sullivan, J.

— Assumpsit by the plaintiffs against the defendants on a promissory note in the following words: “ *FranJclin, May*8th, 1840. On or before the first day of *May*next, we or either of us will pay to *James*Gillaspie, *Daniel*Covert, and *James*Ritchie, commissioners of *Johnson*county, or their successors in office, the sum of $>131 31, for value received in the appointment .of collector of the state and county revenue of *Johnson*county for the year 1840, which sum when paid to, the board is to go to the county treasurer’s office, to be a part of the county revenue of said county of *Johnson.*— Arthur *MulliJcin. Davicl Allen.”*General demurrer to the declaration. Demurrer sustained, and judgment for the defendants.

*302*F. M.*Finch, for the plaintiffs.

*W. Quarles*and *J. H. Bradley,*for the defendants.

The objection to the plaintiffs’ right to recover is, that the _ note was given in consideration of the sale of a public office, and therefore void.

It is admitted by the parties, as well as apparent from the note itself, that it was given in consideration of the appointment of one of the promisers, or of some other person, to the office of collector of the state and county revenue of *Johnson*county for the year 1840, and the question is, whether a promise to pay money on such a consideration is valid or not. The office of collector of the revenue is one of great responsibility, and the public is deeply interested in the fidelity with which its duties are discharged. The public interest requires, that it should be filled by men selected with especial reference to their competency to fill the office, and not with reference to their ability to purchase it. By the common law, the sale of offices of a public nature is forbidden as having a tendency to tempt officers to abuse their power by bribery, extortion, and other acts of injustice, by which they may be reimbursed for the expense they incurred in getting their places. 5 Bac. Abr. tit. Offices and Officers, F.' It does not matter whether the office be sold in violation of an express statute or not. If the bestowment of it be for a money consideration, it is in contravention of public policy, and equally void. *Blackford*v. Preston, 8 T. R. 89—*Garforth*v. *Fearon,*1 H. Blackstone, *327.*—Card v. Hope, 2 Barn. & Cress. 661.

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is affirmed with costs.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 10.20A

                              [VENTANA LETTERHEAD]

February 26, 1998

Mr. John Patience
C/O Crabtree Partners
1419 Lake Cook Road
Suite 410
Deerfield, IL 60015


Dear John:

     This letter is to confirm the extension for an additional two years of the
arrangement (the "Arrangement") under which you have agreed to devote a
significant portion of your professional working time to the business and
affairs of Ventana Medical Systems, Inc. ("Ventana" or the "Company").

     Under the extension of the Arrangement, you would receive a grant of a
nonstatutory option to purchase 150,000 shares of Common Stock of the Company
at an exercise price of $12.625 per share, the fair market value of the
Company's Common Stock on the date that the extension of the Arrangement, as
well as the grant of these additional options, was approved by the Company's
Board of Directors. These options would vest on a cumulative monthly basis
over 24 months commencing February 26, 1998; provided that during such 24 month
vesting period you devote, on a cumulative average basis, at least 50% of your
professional working time to matters related to the Company.

     Please acknowledge your agreement with the foregoing by signing the
enclosed counterpart of this letter.

Very truly yours,


/s/ HANK PIETRASZEK
-------------------
Hank Pietraszek
President & CFO


Acknowledged and agreed as of this 26th day of February, 1998.


                                /s/ JOHN PATIENCE
                              -------------------------
                                   John Patience
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00267

- CV

IN RE KELLY MEDIA GR OUP, INC.

AND JASON CARDIFF RELATOR S

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

------------

The court has considered relators ’ petition for writ of mandamus and is of

the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relators’ petition for writ of

mandamus is denied.

This court’s stay order issued July 3, 2012, is hereby lifted.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GABRIEL, WALKER, and MEI ER, JJ.

DELIVERED: July 20, 2012

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4, 52.8 (d).
March 21, 2000

Joseph Dillon & Company, Inc.     Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company
107 Northern Boulevard            2 Broadway
Great Neck, New York 11021        New York, New York 10004

     RE:  Amendment No. 3 to Warrant Agreement

Gentlemen:

     This letter agreement represents Amendment No. 3 to the Warrant
Agreement between Joseph Dillon & Company, Inc. ("Dillon"), Continental
Stock Transfer & Trust Company (the "Warrant Agent"), and Dialysis
Corporation of America (the "Company"), dated April 16, 1996, between and
among the parties, and amended on March 9, 1999 and September 10, 1999
(the "Warrant Agreement"), to further extend the exercise period of the
Warrants.  This Amendment No. 3 amends Section 2 of the Warrant Agreement
as amended by extending the exercise period of the Warrants to June 30,
2000.  Any and all other provisions of the Warrant Agreement indicating
the expiration of the term being October 16, 1999 or March 31, 2000 are
hereby amended to read June 30, 2000.

     The Warrants and the Warrant Agreement as previously modified will
otherwise remain the same and in full force and effect in accordance with
their terms.

                                       Very truly yours,

                                       DIALYSIS CORPORATION OF AMERICA

                                          /s/ Thomas K. Langbein

                                       By:--------------------------------
                                          THOMAS K. LANGBEIN, Chief
                                          Executive Officer

                                       Dated: March 21, 2000

Acknowledged and agreed to:

Joseph Dillon & Company, Inc.     Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company

   /s/ Steven Jaloza                 /s/ Michael Nelson

By:---------------------------    By:-------------------------------
   STEVEN JALOZA, CEO                MICHAEL NELSON, President

Dated: March 21, 2000             Dated: March 21, 2000
#### Haas *v.*Flint.

*The Madison Insurance Company*may take interest in advance on the loan of money.

But where that company took interest in advance for six months on a note dated the 7th of February, 1841, and payable one hundred and eighty days after date, it was held to be usury.

Although usurious interest be received on the loan of money, the principal sum after deducting the interest may, under the statute of 1843, be recovered from the borrower, but the defendant will recover costs.

ERROR to the *Jeferson*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

This was an action of debt brought by *Haas,*as assignee of a promissory note, before a justice of the peace against *Flint,*one of the makers of the note. Plea, *nil debet,*with leave to give the special matter in evidence. The justice gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. The cause was submitted to the Circuit Court, and the defendant, on the 26th of *March,*1844, obtained judgment.

The note sued on was as follows: “ *Madison, February*7, 1841. One hundred and eighty days after date, we or either of us promise to pay *The Madison Insurance Company,*at their office, one hundred dollars, with interest at the rate of ten *per cent, per annum*in advance; and if not paid at maturity, to bear interest at the rate of ten *per cent, per annum*until paid. Value received. *A. W. Flint.*As security, *D. Blackmore.”*The note was assigned to the plaintiff.

It was proved that the defendant being indebted to the payees in the sum of one hundred and sixteen dollars and five cents, paid the sixteen dollars and five cents, and paid also five dollars as interest in advance for six months on one hundred dollars, and gave the note in question for the *balance;*and that one hundred and eighty days were usually rated there as six months.

The only question raised in this cause is, whether the note is usurious or not?

It is contended by the defendant that it was usury to take interest in advance, but he is mistaken in this. The payees are authorized to discount or loan money, Stat. 1832, p. 143, and they may consequently take interest in advance in a case *68like the Present- *Fleckner*v. *The Bank of the U. S.*8 Wheat. 338, 354.

*J. G. Marshall,*for the plaintiff.

*M. G. Bright,*for the defendant.

It is also contended that the payees took more than at the rate of ten *per cent, per annum*interest; and this objection is fatal. On a note for one hundred dollars payable in one hundred and eighty days, five dollars were taken as interest for six months, which was for a greater length of time than the note had to run. It has been decided, after a very full discussion, that the taking of interest for a fourth of a year on a note payable in ninety days is usury. *The New York Firemen Insurance Co.*v. *Ely, 2*Cowen, 678.

But though the note is usurious, the judgment for the defendant is erroneous. The plaintiff is entitled, under the statute of 1843, to a judgment for ninety-five dollars; and the defendant to a judgment for costs. R. S. 1843, p. *581.*— An*drews*v. *Russell et al.*7 Blackf. 474.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
#### Rachel Awuli AJEBON, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 02-2337.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 5, 2003.

Decided Sept. 10, 2003.

Danielle L.C. Beach-Oswald, Noto *&*Oswald, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Jacqueline R. Dryden, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Rachel Awuli Ajebon, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions this court for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. Ajebon challenges the BIA’s conclusion that her asylum application failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution driven by the imputed political opinions of her husband.

We find no basis to overturn the BIA’s decision, however. The evidence in the record indicates that the examples of past discrimination on which Ajebon relied were not driven by imputed political opinion. *See M.A. v. INS,*899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc). Likewise, the record indicates that changed circumstances undermine Ajebon’s assertion that her fear of persecution should she return to Nigeria is well-founded. *See Chen v. INS,*195 F.3d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.1999); *Gebremichael v. INS,*10 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir.1993).

Accordingly, we deny Ajebon’s petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

I, Raju Vegesna, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of Sify Technologies Limited for the year ended March 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 20-F/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sify Technologies Limited.



|                    |  |  |  |     |  |                                   |  | 
|------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------------------- |  | 
|Date: June 19, 2012 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Raju Vegesna                  |  | 
|                    |  |  |  |     |  | Name: Raju Vegesna                |  | 
|                    |  |  |  |     |  | Title:    Chief Executive Officer |  | 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference to any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless
of any general incorporation language in such filing.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 2, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: WAYNE BRUNSILIUS

Petitioner. No. 10-1210

(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00739-BNB)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

Wayne Brunsilius has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Upon

consideration, we deny the petition. 

In district court, Mr. Brunsilius filed a pleading titled “Complaint and

Petition for Removal of Case Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),(b),(c), (e1) to

Federal Jurisdiction.” After reviewing the complaint, the district court

determined that Mr. Brunsilius’s claims were properly asserted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he was challenging his state court conviction. The

district court therefore ordered Mr. Brunsilius to correct several deficiencies with

his complaint in order to properly file it as a § 2254 petition. Mr. Brunsilius then

moved to recuse the magistrate judge that had been assigned to his case and for an

extension of time to cure the deficiencies in his filing. 

Appellate Case: 10-1210 Document: 01018433181 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 Page: 1 
-2-

Less than two weeks after he filed the motion to recuse, Mr. Brunsilius

filed the instant mandamus petition in this court seeking an order compelling the

district court to rule on his motion to recuse the magistrate judge assigned to his

case and to set a hearing on his complaint. On May 17, 2010, the district denied

his recusal motion. Accordingly, his request for relief with respect to that motion

is moot. As for his second request seeking an order to compel the district court to

hold a hearing on his complaint, Mr. Brunsilius has failed to demonstrate that he

is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus. See In re Cooper

Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing standard

for writ of mandamus and noting petitioner must show “that his right to the writ is

clear and indisputable.” (quotation omitted)). 

The petition for a writ of mandamus and the motion to proceed in forma

pauperis are DENIED. 

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-1210 Document: 01018433181 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 Page: 2