NASA SP4407 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 

Selected Documents in the History of the 

US. Civilian Space Program 

Volume 11: External Relationships 

John M. Logsdon, Editor 

with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius 

The NASA History Series 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASA History Office 

Washington, D.C. 1996 
Library of Congress Cataloguingin-Publication Data 

Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space 

ProgradJohn M. Logsdon, editor ... [et al.] 

p. cm.-(The NASA history series) (NASA SP: 4407) 

Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 

Contents: v. 1. Organizing for exploration 

1. Astronautics-United States-History. I. Logsdon, John M., 1937- 

11. Lear, Linda 1940- 111. Series. N. Series: NASASP: 4407. 

TL789.8.U5E8? 1996 9G9066 

387.8'0973-dc20 CIP 

I., 

For sale by the US. Government Rnting Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-048899-0 
To the Memory of T. Keith Glennan (1905-1995), 

James E. Webb (1 906-1 992), 

and Hugh L. Dryden (1 898-1 965) 

Whose Early Vision of External Relationships 

Helped Shape the Direction of Space Exploration 

vii 

Contents 

Acknowledgments ..................................................... xxi 

Introduction .......................................................... xxv 

Biographies of Volume I1 Essay Authors. .................................. xxix 

Glossary ............................................................ xxxi 

Chapter One 

Essay: “The Development of International Space Cooperation,” by John M. Logsdon . . 1 

Documents 

1-1 Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, 

July29,1958 ............................................... 16 

1-2 and 1-3 Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to T. Keith Glennan, 

et al., March 12, 1959; and Richard W. Porter, to Professor 

Dr. H.C. van de Hulst, President, Committee on Space Research 

(COSPAR), March 14, 1959 .................................. 17 

1-4 T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, to Professor H.S.W. Massey, 

United Kingdom Scientific Ministry, July 6, 1959, with attached: 

H.S.W. Massey, “UK-U.S. Technical Discussions on Space Research, 

June 25-July 3, 1959,” July 3, 1959 .............................. 19 

1-5 Hugh L. Dryden, NASA Deputy Administrator, to Sir Harrie Massey, 

European Preparatory Commission for Space Research, 

June27,1962 .............................................. 21 

1-6 James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 

May24,1966 .............................................. 22 

1-7 James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy 

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, May 19, 1966 .......... 23 

1-8 Robert J. Allnutt, for A.M. Lovelace, Acting Administrator, NASA, 

via Margaret Finarelli, NASA Headquarters, to Erik Quistgaard, 

Director General, European Space Agency, Telegraphic Message, 

February20,1981 .......................................... 26 

1-9 WJ. Mellors, Head, Washington Office, European Space Agency, 

“Aide Memoire, International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM) ,” 

February24,1981 .......................................... 27 
vlll 

1-1 0 “Meeting of NASA Administrator and ESA Director General, 

17 June 1982, ESA Head Office,” with attached: “General Principles 

for NASA/ESA Cooperative Agreements” ........................ 29 

1-1 1 Burton I. Edelson, Associate Administrator, Space Science 

Applications, NASA, and Roger M. Bonnet, Director, Scientific 

Programme, ESA, “NASA/ESA Space Science Planning Meeting, 

ESA Head Office-27th-29th June 1983,” June 29,1983. ............ 31 

1-1 2 George M. Low, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, to Director, 

Apollo Spacecraft Program, “Flag for Lunar Landing Mission,” 

January23,1969 ............................................ 34 

1-1 3 Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Acting Administrator, to 

President Richard Nixon, February 12, 1969. ..................... 35 

1-14 thru 1-16 Thomas.0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, 

August 12, 1969; Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the 

President, November 7, 1969; and Thomas.0. Paine, 

NASA Administrator, to the President, March 26, 1970 ............ .40 

1-1 7 Secretary of State, Telegram 93721 for U.S. Ambassador, Tokyo, 

“Space Cooperation with Japan,” January 5,1968. ................ .46 

1-18 Arnold W. Frutkin, NASA Assistant Administrator for International 

Affairs, to Administrator, “Canadian Interest in Remote Manipulator 

Technology to be Used with the Space Shuttle,” April 3, 1972. ...... .48 

1-19 Peter M. Flanigan, “Memorandum for John Erlichman,” 

February 16, 1971, with attached: Clay T. Whitehead, 

“Memorandum for Mr. Peter Flanigan,” February 6,1971 .......... .49 

1-20 and 1-21 Memorandum from Edward E. David, Jr., Science Advisor, for 

Henry Kissinger and Peter Flanigan, “Post-Apollo Space 

Cooperation with the Europeans,” July 23, 1971, with attached: 

“Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program” and Henry A. 

Kissinger, National Security Advisor, to William P. Rogers, Secretary 

of State, no dates; and George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, 

to NASA Administrator, “Items of Interest,” August 12, 1971 ......... 52 

1-22 Department of State Telegram, “Johnson Letter to Lefevre,” 

September7,1971 .......................................... 59 

1-23 “Memorandum for Peter Flanigan from the President,” 

November 24,1969 ........................................ .62 

... 
ix 

1-24 George M. Low, Excerpts from Personal Notes: No. 63, 

February 1, 1972; No. 67, March 26, 1972; No. 68, April 17, 1962; 

No. 69, undated; No. 71, June 3, 1972; No. 72, June 17, 1972 ....... .63 

1-25 thru 1-27 William A. Anders, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and 

Space Council, to The Honorable Peter M. Flanigan, March 17, 

1972, with attached: “Position Paper on European Participation in 

our Post-Apollo Space Program”; William P. Rogers, Secretary of 

State, Memorandum for the President, “Post-Apollo Relationships 

With the Europeans,”April 29, 1972; and James C. Fletcher, NASA 

Administrator, to Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs, May 5, 1972, with attached: 

“NASA’s Comments on Secretary Rogers’ Memorandum of 

April29,1972” ............................................. 68 

1-28 European Space Conference, Committee of Alternates, “Report 

of the ESC Delegation on discussions held with the US. Delegation 

on European participation in the Post-Apollo Program, Washington, 

1416 June 1972,” CSE/CS (72) 15, June 22,1972, excerpts. ........ .81 

1-29 Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, 

NASA, Memorandum to Administrator, “Government Level 

Negotiations on Sortie Lab,” May 9,1973 ....................... .85 

1-30 Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, 

NASA, Memorandum to Deputy Administrator, “International 

Space Station Approach,” June 7,1974 ......................... .87 

1-3 1 Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director of International Affairs, NASA, 

to Director, Space Station Task Force, “Strategy for International 

Cooperation in Space Station Planning,” undated [August 19821 .... .90 

1-32 NASA Fact Sheet, “Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy,” 

August6,1982 ............................................ 100 

1-33 James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Honorable George P. 

Shultz, Secretary of State, March 16, 1984. ...................... 105 

1-34 James M. Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to Kenneth Baker, MP, 

Minister of State for Industry with Special Responsibility for Space 

and Information Technology, April 6,1984. ..................... 107 

1-35 Dale D. Myers, NASA, and Reimar Leust, European Space Agency 

(ESA), “Memorandum of Understanding between the United States 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European 

Space Agency on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, 

Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space 

Station,” September 29, 1988. ................................ 110 
X 

1-36 “Draft Proposals for US-USSR Space Cooperation,” April 4,1961 .... 143 

1-37 John E Kennedy, to Soviet Union Chairman Khrushchev, 

March 7,1962 ............................................. 147 

1-38 Nikita Khrushchev, to President John E Kennedy, March 20, 1962. ... 149 

1-39 “Record of the US-USSR Talks on Space Cooperation,” March 27, 

28, and 30, 1962, with attached: Arnold W. Frutkin, Director, 

Office of International Programs, NASA, ‘Topical Summary of 

Bilateral Discussions With Soviet Union,” May 1, 1962 ............. 152 

1-40 McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, July 13, 1962, 

with attached: George Ball, Under Secretary of State, Memorandum 

for the President, “Bilateral Talks Concerning US-USSR 

Cooperation in Outer Space Activities,” July 5,1962. .............. 162 

I41 McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, ‘Your 11 a.m. 

appointment with Jim Webb,” September 18,1963. ............... 165 

1-42 National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, “Cooperation 

with the USSR on Outer Space Matters,” November 12, 1963, 

with attached: Charles E. Johnson, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 

December 16,1963.. ....................................... 166 

1-43 James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, 

January 31,1964, with attached: “US-USSR Cooperation in 

Space Research Programs”. .................................. 168 

I44 Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Academician M.V. Keldysh, 

President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, July 31,1970 ......... 182 

1-45 Glynn S. Lunney, ‘Trip Report-Delegation to Moscow to 

Discuss Possible Compatibility in Docking,” November 5, 1970 ...... 183 

1-46 George M. Low, ‘Visit to Moscow, April 1972, to Discuss Compatible 

Docking Systems for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft,” 

April 46, 1972, with attached: “Addendum, Moscow Trip, 

April 46, 1972,” May 30,1972 ................................ 189 

1-47 Henry A. Kissinger, to the President, “US-Soviet Space 

Cooperation,” May 17, 1972, with attached “Draft Agreement”. ..... 198 

1-48 George M. Low, Memorandum for the Record, ‘Visit to Moscow, 

October 1419, 1973,” November 1,1973 ....................... 199 
xi 

1-49 George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to Academician 

M.V. Keldysh, President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 

March24,1975 ......................................... 214 

1-50 A.P. Aleksandrov, USSR Academy of Sciences, and A.M. Lovelace, 

NASA, “Agreement Between the USSR Academy of Sciences and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA on 

Cooperation in the Area of Manned Space Flight,” May 11, 1977 . 215 

1-5 1 George P. Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, “Agreement Between 

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes,” April 15, 1987, with attached: 

“Agreed List of Cooperative Projects” ....................... 217 

1-52 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Joint Statement 

on Cooperation in Space,”June 17,1992 ...................... .220 

1-53 thru 1-55 “Implementing Agreement Between the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration of the United States of America and 

the Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation on Human Space 

Flight Cooperation,” October 5, 1992; Office of the Vice President, 

The White House, “United States-Russian Joint Commission on 

Energy and Space-Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space,” 

September 2, 1993; and “Protocol to the Implementing Agreement 

Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the 

United States of America and the Russian Space Agency of the 

Russian Federation on Human Space Flight Cooperation of 

October 5, 1992,” December’l6, 1993. ......................... 222 

Chapter Two 

Essay: “Invitation to Struggle: The History of Civilian-Wtary Relations in Space,” 

byDwayneA.Day ..................................................... 233 

Documents 

11-1 Major General L.C. Craigie, Director of Research and Development 

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, to Brig. Gen. Alden R. 

Crawford, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, 

“Satellite Vehicles,” January 16, 1948, with attached: Memorandum 

for the Vice Chief of Staff, “Earth Satellite Vehicles,” January 12, 

1948, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, United 

States Air Force, “Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle” ........ 271 
xii 

11-2 and 11-3 Robert R. Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 

“Memorandum for Mr. Phleger,” March 28, 1955; and Robert R. 

Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to Secretary of 

State, “Recommendations in the Report to the President by the 

Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory 

Committee, ODM (Killian Committee) : Item 2-NSC Agenda 

10/4/56,” October 2,1956 .................................. 272 

I14 Percival Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the 

President, “Project Vanguard,” April 30,1957. ................... 277 

11-5 thru 11-7 Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Development, U.S. Air Force, to Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director, 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, January 31, 1958; 

Gen. Donald L. Putt, to Commander, Air Research and Develop 

ment Command, “Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft,” 

January 31,1958; and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, 

USAF, and Hugh L. Dryden, Director, NACA, “Memorandum of 

Understanding: Principles for Participation of NACA in 

Development and Testing of the ‘Air Force System 4641 

Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicle (Dyna-Soar I),”’ May 20, 1958 ...... 280 

11-8 T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and Roy W. Johnson, 

Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Memorandum 

of Understanding: Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle,” 

November 20,1958 ........................................ 285 

11-9 and 11-10 T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Wilber M. Brucker, 

Secretary of the Army, “Cooperative Agreement on Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of the Army,” December 3, 

1958; and T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, and Wilber M. Brucker, 

Secretary of the Army, “Cooperative Agreement on Army 

Ordnance Missile Command Between the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration and the Department of the Army,” 

December 3,1958 ........................................ .286 

11-1 1 T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Thomas S. Gates, 

Acting Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, 

“Responsibility and Organization for Certain Activities,” 

October21,1959 .......................................... 290 
... Xlll 

11-1 2 T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, “DOD-NASA AgreementReimbursement of Costs,” NASA Management Instruction 1052.14, 

November 17, 1959, with attached: Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, and T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, 

“Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Principles 

Governing Reimbursement of Costs,” November 12, 1959 ......... .292 

11-1 3 T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and James H. Douglas, 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Agreement Between the 

Department of Defense amd the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration Concerning the Aeronautics and 

Astronautics Coordinating Board,” reprinted in: U.S. Congress, 

House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee 

on NASA Oversight, “The NASA-DOD Relationship,” 88th Cong., 

2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1964),pp.10-11 ........................................... 296 

11-1 4 “General Proposal for Organization for Command and Control 

of Military Operations in Space,” with attached: “Schematic 

Diagrams of Proposed Organization for Command and Control 

of Military Operations in Space,” no date ....................... 298 

11-1 5 “Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory 

Study,” Study Summary and Program Plan, Air Research and 

Development Command, Project No. 7987, Task No. 19769, 

Directorate of Space Planning and Analysis, Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Division, April 1960, pp. 1-9. ........................... 304 

11-16 thru 11-19 General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 

to General Landon, Air Force Personnel Deputy Commander, and 

General Wilson, Air Force Development Deputy Commander, 

April 14, 1960, reprinted in: Defense Space Interests, Hearings Before 

the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st. sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1961); Robert S. McNamara, Secretary 

of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., 

“Development of Space Systems,” March 6, 1961, with attached: 

Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, “Development of Space 

Systems,” March 6, 1961, reprinted in: Defense Space Interests, Hearings 

Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, US. House 

of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st. sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1961) ; Overton Brooks, Chairman, 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of 

Representatives, to the President, March 9, 1961; and President 

John F. Kennedy, to Overton Brooks, Chairman, Committee on 

Science and Astronautics, US. House of Representatives, 

March23.1961 .......................................... 311 
XiV 

11-20 “Summary Report: NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle 

Planning Group,” September 24, 1962, pp. ii-iv, 1-1-111-13. ........ 318 

11-21 thru 11-23 James E. Webb, Administrator, to The Honorable Robert S. 

McNamara, Secretary of Defense, January 16, 1963; James E. Webb, 

Administrator, Memorandum for Dr. Robert Seamans, Associate 

Administrator, January 18, 1963; and James E. Webb, Administrator, 

NASA, and Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 

“Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of Defense Concerning 

the Gemini Program,” January 21, 1963. ...................... 337 

11-24 Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for 

the Vice President, “National Space Program,” May 3, 1963 ....... 342 

11-25 W.F. Boone, to Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden, 

“DOD-NASA Relations,” July 12,1963 ........................ 347 

11-26 and 11-27 James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, and Robert S. McNamara, 

Secretary of Defense, “Agreement Between the Department of 

Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital Research and 

Development Project,” August 17, 1963, with attached: 

“Procedure for Coordination of Advanced Exploratory 

Studies by the DOD and the NASA in the Area of Manned 

Earth Orbital Flight Under the Aegis of the Aeronautics and 

Astronautics Coordinating Board”; and Robert S. McNamara, 

to Honorable James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, 

Septemberl6,1963 ...................................... 356 

11-28 John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Associate 

Administrator, March 19, 1966, with attached: Robert Seamans, Jr., 

NASA Deputy Administrator, and John Foster, Jr., Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering, DOD, Memorandum of 

Agreement, “Establishment of a Manned Space Flight 

Experiments Board (MSFEB),” no date ....................... 361 

11-29 Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Honorable Robert C. 

Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, April 4,1969, with 

attached: ‘Terms of Reference for Joint DOD/NASA Study 

of Space Transportation Systems”. ........................... 364 

11-30 George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Memorandum 

for the Record, “Space Shuttle Discussions with Secretary 

Seamans,” January 28,1970 ................................ 366 
xv 

11-3 1 Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, and Robert C. 

Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, “Agreement 

Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

and the Department of the Air Force Concerning the Space 

Transportation System,” NMI 1052.130, Attachment A, 

February17,1970 ........................................ 367 

11-32 William F. Moore, NASA STS Secretary, and Lt. Col. Donald L. 

Steelman, USAF STS Secretary, “Space Transportation System 

Committee: Summary of Activities for 1970, June 1971. ..... ... . . 369 

11-33 John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, to Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, 

April13,1972 ...................................... . .378 

11-34 George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, to NASA 

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, “Space 

Tug Decision,” October 3, 1973 ........................ ... . .378 

11-35 and 11-36 James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable 

James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, June 21, 1974; 

and W.P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to 

Honorable James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, 

August7,1974 ...................................... ... . . 380 

11-37 John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator for Space 

Flight; John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Research and Development); James C. Fletcher, NASA 

Administrator; William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, “NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding on 

Management and Operation of the Space Transportation 

System,” January 14, 1977. ............................ . . 382 

11-38 John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research 

and Development); John F. Yardley, NASA Associate 

Administrator for Space Flight; Robert N. Parker, Acting 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department 

of Defense; A.M. Lovelace, NASA Deputy Administrator, 

“Memorandum of Agreement Between NASA and DOD: 

Basic Principles for NASA/DOD Space Transportation 

System Launch Reimbursement,” March 7, 1977. .......... ... . . 386 

11-39 George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Co-Chairman, 

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) , 

and Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, Department of Defense, Co-Chairman, AACB, 

“Joint NASA/DOD Position Statement on Space Shuttle 

Orbiter Procurement,” January 23, 1976 ...................... 389 
I140 General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems 

Command, to General Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, 

USAF, August 5,1982, with attachment ....................... 390 

11-41 Lt. General Richard C. Henry, Commander, Air Force Space 

Division, to General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force 

Systems Command, March 4,1983. .......................... 398 

11-42 Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for 

Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staft Under Secretaries of Defense; Assistant 

Secretaries of Defense; General Counsel, “Defense Space 

Launch Strategy,” February 7, 1984, with attached: “Defense 

Space Launch Strategy,” January 23,1984 .................... .400 

11-43 Charles W. Cook, Executive Secretary, Defense Space Operations 

Committee, Memorandum for Defense Operations Committee 

(DSOC) Principals, “DoD Position on Shuttle Issues,” 

November19,1984 ....................................... 403 

I144 National Security Decision Directive 164, “National Security 

Launch Strategy,” February 25,1985 ......................... 410 

Chapter Three 

may: “The NASA-Industry-University Nexus: A Critical Alliance in the 

Development of Space Exploration,” by W. Henry Lambright. .................. 41 1 

Documents 

111-1 T. Keith Glennan, Memorandum from the Administrator, 

“Functions and Authority-Office of Research Grants and 

Contracts,” April 6, 1959. ................................. .436 

111-2 Walter D. Sohier, NASA Assistant General Counsel, “Legal 

Framework of NASA’s Procurement Program,” NASA-Industry 

Bogram Plan Conference, Jul~ 28, 1960 (Washington, DC: 

NASA, 1960), pp. 105-108.. ............................... .438 

111-3 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific 

Inventions, “Property Rights in Inventions Made Under 

Federal Space Research Contracts,” Hearings on Public 

Law 85-568, Augusts 19-20, November 30, December 1-5, 

1959, Report No. 47, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office), 1959, pp. 1-36. ............. .442 
xvii 

111-4 and 111-5 T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, Memorandum for 

Distribution, “Appraisal of NASAs Contracting Policy 

and Industrial Relations,” February 29, 1960, with attached: 

“Preliminary Outline of Plan for Appraising NASAs Contracting 

Policies and Industry Relationships,” February 26, 1960; and 

McKinsey and Company, Inc., “An Evaluation of NASAs 

Contracting Policies, Organization, and Performance,” 

October 1960 (a report prepared under contract for NASA) ...... 472 

111-6 James E. Webb, Address at Graduation Exercises, 

Advanced Management Program, Graduate School of Business 

Administration, Harvard University, December 6, 1966. .......... 485 

111-7 James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for the 

Vice President, May 23,1961 .............................. .492 

111-8 James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to 

NASA Program Offices, Headquarters; Directors, NASA 

Centers and Installations, July 5, 1961 ....................... .494 

111-9 James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for Dr. Dryden, 

Deputy Administrator, “University Relationships,” August 4, 1961. .. 495 

111-1 0 James E. Webb, Adminiatrator, to Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President, 

California Institute of Technology, June 29,1961 .............. .496 

111-1 1 Hugh L. Dryden, ‘The Role of the University in Meeting 

National Goals in Space Exploration,” NASA and the Universities: 

Principal Addresses at the General Sessions of the NASA-University 

Confmence on the Science and Technology of Space Exploration in 

Chicago, Illinois, November I, 1962 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1962), 

pp.87-91 ................................................ 497 

111-12 and 111-13 Edgar M. Cortright, Memorandum for Mr. Webb, “NASA-CIT/JPL 

Relations as they pertain to the present contractual arrangements 

of operating conditions and the future role of JPL in the NASA 

Program,” June 1964; and Arnold 0. Beckman, Chairman, Board 

of Trustees, California Institute of Technology, to James E. Webb, 

Administrator, NASA, June 26,1964. ........................ .503 

111-14 Raymond Einhorn and Robert B. Lewis, Memorandum to 

Mr. Hilburn, “Review of Purposes and Application of CIT Fee 

and Overhead for the JPL Contract,” with summary of report, 

October20,1964 ......................................... 512 
xviii 

111-15 Contract Briefing Memorandum: Contract NAS7-100 With 

California Institute of Technology, January 12, 1965 ............ .515 

111-16 Office of Technology Utilization, Task Force to Assess NASA 

University Programs, A Study of NASA University Programs 

(Washington, DC: NASA Special Publication-185, 1968), pp. 1-8 ... 520 

111-17 and 111-18 Major General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF, Apollo Program Director, 

to J. Leland,Atwood, President, North American Aviation, Inc., 

December 19, 1965, with attached: “NASA Review Team Report”; 

and George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned 

Space Flight, to J. Leland Atwood, President, North American 

Aviation, Inc., December 19, 1965 ........................... 527 

111-1 9 James E. Webb, Administrator, to Dr. Frederick Seitz, President, 

National Academy of Sciences, December 20, 1967. ............ .538 

111-20 John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator, NASA, Memorandum 

to Administrator, “Space Astronomy Institute,” February 4, 1976 ... 540 

I1191 Memphis Norman, Budget Examiner, SET, to Mr. Loweth, 

“National Academy of Sciences Report Regarding Institutional 

Arrangements for the Space Telescope,” April 6, 1977 .......... .541 

111-22 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, “Space 

Telescope Program Review,” 95th Cong., 2d sess., Report No. 85 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 

pp.37,11-14 ............................................ 544 

111-23 and 111-24 R. W. Gutman, Director, General Accounting Office, to 

Robert A. Frosch, NASA Administrator, November 11, 1977; 

and Robert A. Frosch, NASA Administrator, to Associate 

Administrator for Space and Terrestrial Applications, et al., 

“NASA/University Relations,” May 18, 1978, with attached: 

“Policy for Academic Involvement in the NASA R&D Program” .... 550 

111-25 NASA/University Relations Study Group, ‘The Universities and 

NASA Space Sciences,” Initial Report of the NASA/University 

Relations Study Group, July 1983 ........................... .553 

111-26 Section 201 of Title I1 of Public Law 100-147, “National Space 

Grant College and Fellowship Program,” October 30, 1987 ....... 565 

111-27 NASA Commercial Space Policy, October 1984 ................. 572 
xix 

111-28 Office of the Press Secretary. ‘The President’s Space Policy 

and Commercial Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century. ” 

Februaryll. 1988 ........................................ 577 

111-29 Office of the Press Secretary. “NASA Space Launch Policy. ” 

NSPD.2. September 5. 1990 ................................ 581 

111-30 Executive Office of the President. “US . Commercial Space 

Policy Guidelines. .. NSPD.3. February 11. 1991 ................. 583 

BiographicalAppendix ................................................. 587 

Index ............................................................... 615 

The NASA History Series ............................................... 633 

xxi 

Acknowledgments 

This volume is the second in a series that had its origins almost a decade ago. The initial 

idea for creating a set of reference works that would include documents seminal to the 

evolution of the U.S. civilian space program came from then-NASA Chief Historian Sylvia 

K Kraemer. She recognized that while there were substantial primary resources for future 

historians and others interested in the early years and evolution of the U.S. civilian space 

program available in many archives, and particularly in the NASA Historical Reference 

Collection of the History Office at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., this material was widely scattered and contained a mixture of the significant and the routine. It was 

her sense that it was important to bring together the “best” of this documentary material 

in a widely accessible form. The several volumes of this collection, and any long-term value 

it may have, are the result of that vision. Once Dr. Kraemer left her position as NASA Chief 

Historian in 1990 to assume broader responsibilities within the agency, the project was 

guided with a gentle but firm hand by her successor, Roger D. Launius. His contributions 

have been so substantial that he fully deserves being listed as one of the primary collaborators on this volume. 

Jannelle Warren-Findley, an independent intellectual/cultural historian, and Linda J. 

Lear, an adjunct professor of environmental history at George Washington University, 

approached the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of 

International Affairs with the suggestion that it might serve as the institutional base for a 

proposal to NASA to undertake the documentary history project. This suggestion found 

a positive response. The Space Policy Institute was created in 1987 as a center of scholarly research and graduate education regarding space issues-and as a resource for those 

interested in a knowledgeable but independent perspective on past and current space 

activities. Having the kind of historical base that would have to be created to carry out the 

documentary history project would certainly enhance the Space Policy Institute’s capabilities, and so the Director of the Institute, John M. Logsdon, joined with Warren-Findley, 

Lear, and Ray A. Williamson of the congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 

preparing a proposal to NASA. Much to our delight, we were awarded the contract for the 

project in late 1988, and the enterprise was officially under way in May 1989. 

The undertaking proved more challenging than anyone had anticipated. The combination of getting ourselves started in the right direction, canvassing and selecting from the 

immense documentary resources available, commissioning essays to introduce the various 

sections of the work from external authors and writing several essays ourselves, and dealing with conflicting demands on the time of the four principals in the project has led to 

a delay in publishing the initial volume far beyond what we anticipated when first undertaking the project. The final pieces of the manuscript for Volume I were not delivered to 

NASA until the end of 1993, and the published volume itself did not appear until late 

1995. By that time, both Jannelle Warren-Findley and Linda Lear had long ago moved on 

to the next steps in their careers, and Ray Williamson, who had taken a nine-month leave 

from the Office of Technology Assessment in 1990 to work on the project, had returned 

to his primary job. (However, after the Office of Technology Assessment in 1995 was 

closed by congressional decision, he returned to the staff of the Space Policy Institute, and 

he will be deeply involved in preparing subsequent volumes in this series.) This meant 

that Warren-Findley and Lear did not have the opportunity to make the kinds of contribution to the overall series that they had anticipated; nevertheless, without their initiative, 

the effort would not have been located at George Washington University, and they both 
made crucial contributions to conceptualizing and organizing the work in its early stages 

and to gathering the material from which the documents to be included in the collection 

have been selected. For all of that, they deserve high credit. 

In its start-up phase, the project profited from the advice of a distinguished advisory panel 

that met twice formally; members of the panel were always available for individual consultation. Included on this panel were: Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Case Western University 

(chair); Charlene Bickford, First Congress Project; Herbert Friedman, Naval Research 

Laboratory; Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian; John Hodge, NASA (retired); Sally 

Gregory Kohlstedt, University of Minnesota; W. Henry Lambright, Syracuse University; 

Sharon Thibodeau, National Archives and Records Administration; and John Townsend, 

NASA (retired). Certainly, none of these individuals bear responsibility for the final content or style of this series, but their advice along the way was invaluable. 

We owe thanks to the individuals and organizations that have searched their files for 

potentially useful materials, as well as to the staffs at various archives and collections who 

have helped us locate documents. Without question, first among them is Lee D. Saegesser 

of the History Office at NASA Headquarters, who has helped compile the NASA Historical 

Reference Collection that contains many of the documents selected for inclusion in this 

work. All those who in the future will write on the history of the US. space program will 

owe a debt of thanks to Lee; those who have already worked in this area realize his tireless 

contributions. 

Among those who have been particularly helpful in identifjmg documents for inclusion 

in this volume are: Lorenza Sebesta, European Space Agency History Project, European 

University Institute; R. Cargill Hall, Air Force History Office; Mark Erikson, Air Force 

Academy; Roy Houchin, Air Staff History Office; and Bill Burr, National Security Archive. 

L. Parker Temple I11 and Charles Cook deserve particular thanks for their work on an earlier overview of civil-military relations that served as a basis for the essay by Dwayne A. Day 

that appears in this volume. 

Essential to the project was a system for archiving the documents collected. Charlene 

Bickford, on the basis of her experience with the First Congress Project, advised on our 

approach to archiving and to developing document headnotes. The archiving system was 

developed by graduate student John Morris, who also assisted with initial document collection. The documentary archive has been nurtured with fervor by Space Policy Institute 

research associate Dwayne Day; Dwayne has made many major contributions to all aspects 

of the project, including the essay on NASA-Department of Defense relations in this volume. Other students who worked on the project in its early years include Max Nelson, 

Jordan Katz, Stewart Money, Michelle Heskett, Robin Auger, and Heather Young. All were 

a great help. 

Beginning with Linda Lear, a series of individuals struggled to bring editorial consistency 

to the essays and headnotes introducing the documents included in Volume I, thereby setting the standard for that and subsequent volumes. They included Erica Aungst, Kathie 

Pett Keel, and Kimberly Carter. Their contributions were essential to the lasting quality of 

the end product. Alita Black also helped set up the initial indexing system. 

John M. Logsdon, George Washington University 

********* 
There are numerous people at NASA associated with historical study, technical information, and the mechanics of publishing who helped in myriad ways in the preparation of 

this documentary history. J.D. Hunley, of the NASA History Office, edited and critiqued 

the text before he departed to take over the History Program at the Dryden Flight 

Research Center; his replacement, Stephen J. Garber, prepared the biographical 

appendix and helped in the final proofing of the work. Nadine Andreassen of the 

NASA History Office performed editorial and proofreading work on the project; the staffs 

of the NASA Headquarters Library, the Scientific and Technical Information Program, 

and the NASA Document Services Center provided assistance in locating and preparing 

for publication the documentary materials in this work. The NASA Headquarters 

Communications Management Division, under the leadership of Y. Diane Powell, developed the layout and handled printing. Specifically, we wish to acknowledge the work of 

Jane E. Penn, Patricia Lutkenhouse Talbert, Jonathan L. Friedman, and Kelly L. Rindfusz 

for their design and editorial work. In addition, Michael Crnkovic and Craig A. Larsen saw 

the book through the publication process. Thanks are due to all of them. 

Roger D. Launius, NASA 

xxiii 

Introduction 

One of the most important developments of the twentieth century has been the movement of humanity into space with machines and people. The underpinnings of that movement-why it took the shape it did; which individuals and organizations were involved; 

what factors drove a particular choice of scientific objectives and technologies to be used; 

and the political, economic, managerial, and international contexts in which the events 

of the space age unfolded-are all important ingredients of this epoch transition from an 

Earth-bound to a spacefaring people. The desire to understand the development of spaceflight in the United States sparked this documentary history series. 

The extension of human activity into outer space has been accompanied by a high degree 

of self-awareness of its historical significance. Few large-scale activities have been as extensively chronicled so closely to the time they actually occurred. Many of those who were 

directly involved were quite conscious that they were making history, and they kept full 

records of their activities. Because most of the activity in outer space was carried out under 

government sponsorship, it was accompanied by the documentary record required of 

public institutions, and there has been a spate of official and privately written histories of 

most major aspects of space achievement to date. When top leaders considered what 

course of action to pursue in space, their deliberations and decisions often were carefully 

put on the record. There is, accordingly, no lack of material for those who aspire to understand the origins and evolution of US. space policies and programs. 

This reality forms the rationale for this series. Precisely because there is so much historical material available on space matters, the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) decided in 1988 that it would be extremely useful to have a selective collection of many of the seminal documents related to the evolution of the U.S. civilian space program that was easily available to scholars and the interested public. While 

recognizing that much of the space activity has taken place under the sponsorship of the 

Department of Defense and other national security organizations, for the U.S. private sector, and in other countries around the world, NASA felt that there would be lasting value 

in a collection of documentary material primarily focused on the evolution of the U.S. 

government’s civilian space program. Most of this activity has been carried out under the 

NASA’s auspices since its creation in 1958. As a result, the NASA History Office contracted with the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of 

International Affairs to prepare such a collection. This is the second volume in the documentary history series; at least two additional ones detailing programmatic developments 

will follow. 

The documents collected during this research project were assembled from a diverse 

number of both public and private sources. A major repository of primary source materials relative to the history of the civilian space program is the NASA Historical Reference 

Collection of the NASA History Office, located at the agency’s headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. Project assistants combed this collection for the “cream” of the wealth 

of material housed there. Indeed, one purpose of this series from the start was to capture 

some of the highlights of the holdings at headquarters. Historical materials housed at the 

other NASA installations-as well as at institutions of higher learning, such as Rice 

University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 

University (Virginia Tech)-were also “mined” for their most significant materials. Other 

collections from which documents have been drawn include the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 

Johnson, and Carter Presidential Libraries; the papers of T. Keith Glennan, Thomas 0. 
Paine, James C. Fletcher, George M. Low, and John A. Simpson; and the archives of the 

National Academy of Sciences, the Rand Corporation, AT&T, the Communications 

Satellite Corporation, INTELSAT, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California 

Institute of Technology, and the National Archives and Records Administration. 

Copies of more than 2,000 documents in their original form collected during this project 

(notjust the documents selected for inclusion), as well as a database that provides a guide 

to their contents, will be deposited in the NASA Historical Reference Collection. Another 

complete set of project materials is located at the Space Policy Institute at George 

Washington University. These materials in their original form are available for use by 

researchers seeking additional information about the evolution of the US. civilian space 

program or wishing to consult the documents reprinted herein in their original form. 

The documents selected for inclusion in this volume are presented in three chapters, each 

covering a particular aspect of the evolution of U.S. space exploration. These chapters 

address (1) the relations between the civilian space program of the United States and the 

space activities of other countries, (2) the relations between the US. civilian space program and the space efforts of national security organizations and the military, and 

(3) NASA's relations with industry and academic institutions. Volume I of this series covered the antecedents to the U.S. space program, the origins and evolution of U.S. space 

policy, and NASA as an organizational institution. Future volumes will address space science activities, space application programs, human spaceflight, and space transportation 

activities. 

Each chapter in this volume is introduced by an overview essay, prepared either by a member of the project team or by an individual particularly wellqualified to write on the topic. 

In the main, these essays are intended to introduce and complement the documents in 

the section and to place them in a chronological and substantive context. In certain 

instances, the essays go beyond this basic goal to reinterpret specific aspects of the history of the civilian space program and to offer historiographical commentary or inquiry 

about the space program. Each essay contains references to the documents in the section 

it introduces, and many also contain references to documents in other sections of the collection. These introductory essays were the responsibility of their individual authors, and 

the views and conclusions contained therein do not necessarily represent the opinions of 

either George Washington University or NASA. 

The documents appended to each chapter were chosen by the essay writer in concert with 

the project team from the more than 2,000 assembled by the research staff for the overall 

project. The contents of this volume emphasize primary documents or long-out-of-print 

essays or articles and material from the private recollections of important actors in shaping space affairs. The contents of this volume thus do not comprise in themselves a comprehensive historical account; they must be supplemented by other sources, those both 

already available and to become available in the future. Indeed, a few of the documents 

included in this collection, particularly in the chapter on civilian-military relations, are 

not complete; some portions of them were still subject to security classification. As this 

collection was being prepared, the U.S. government was involved in declassifylng and 

releasing to the public a number of formerly highly classified documents. As this declassification process continues, increasingly more information on the early history of NASA 

and the civilian space program will come to light. 

The documents included in each chapter are for the most part arranged chronologically, 

although some thematic organization is used when appropriate. Each document is 
assigned its own number in terms of the chapter in which it is placed. As a result, the first 

document in the third chapter of this volume is designated “Document 111-1.” Each document is accompanied by a headnote setting out its context and providing a background 

narrative. These headnotes also provide specific information about the people and events 

discussed. We have avoided the inclusion of explanatory notes in the documents themselves and have confined such material to the headnotes. 

The editorial method we adopted for dealing with these documents seeks to preserve 

spelling, grammar, paragraphing, and use of language as in the original. We have sometimes changed punctuation where it enhances readability. We have used ellipses to note 

sections of a document not included in this publication, and we have avoided including 

words and phrases that had been deleted in the original document unless they contribute 

to an understanding of what was going on in the mind of the writer in making the record. 

Marginal notations on the original documents are inserted into the text of the documents 

in brackets, each clearly marked as a marginal comment. When deletions to the original 

document have been made in the process of declassification, we have noted this with a 

parenthetical statement in brackets. Except insofar as illustrations and figures are necessary to understanding the text, those items have been omitted from this printed version. 

Page numbers in the original document are noted in brackets internal to the document 

text. Copies of all documents in their original form, however, are available for research by 

anyone interested at the NASA History Office or the Space Policy Institute of George 

Washington University. 

We recognize that there are significant documents left out of this compilation. No two individuals would totally agree on all documents to be included from the more than 2,000 that 

we collected, and surely we have not been totally successful in locating all relevant records. 

As a result, this documentary history can raise an immediate question from its users: Why 

were some documents included while others of seemingly equal importance were omitted? 

There can never be a fully satisfactory answer to this question. Our own criteria for choosing particular documents and omitting others rested on three interrelated factors: 

Is the document the best available, most expressive, most representative reflection of 

a particular event or development important to the evolution of the space program? 

Is the document not easily accessible except in one or a few locations, or is it included 

(for example, in published compilations of presidential statements) in reference 

sources that are widely available and thus not a candidate for inclusion in this collection? 

Is the document protected by copyright, security classification, or some other form of 

proprietary right and thus unavailable for publication? 

As editor of this volume, I was ultimately responsible for the decisions about which documents to include and for the accuracy of the headnotes accompanying them. It has been 

an occasionally frustrating but consistently exciting experience to be involved with this 

undertaking. My associates and I hope that those who consult it in the future will find our 

efforts worthwhile. 

John M. Logsdon 

Director 

Space Policy Institute 

Elliott School of International Affairs 

George Washington University 

xxix 

Biographies of Volume I1 Essay Authors 

Dwayne A. Day is a Guggenheim Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum of the 

Smithsonian Institution and a staff member of George Washington University’s Space 

Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of numerous articles on the development of space policy in the United States in such periodicals as Space Policy, Spaceflight, 

and Quest: The Magazine of SpaceJight History. He also was a coeditor of Volume I of 

Exploring the Unknown. 

W. Henry Lambright is professor of political science and public administration at the 

Maxwell School at Syracuse University in Syracuse, New York. A premier scholar of the 

management of high technology in the federal government, he is the author of 

Governing Science and Technology (Oxford University Press, 1976), Shooting Down the 

Nuclear Plane (Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), Technology Tran+ to Cities (Westview Press, 1979), 

Presidential Management of Science and Technology: The Johnson Presidency (University of Texas 

Press, 1985), and Powering Apollo: Jams E. Webb of NASA (Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1995). 

John M. Logsdon is Director of both the Center for International Science and Technology 

Policy and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of 

International Affairs, where he is also a professor of political science and international 

affairs. He holds a B.S. in physics from Xavier University and a Ph.D. in political science 

from New York University. He has been at George Washington University since 1970; he 

previously taught at The Catholic University of America. Dr. Logsdon’s research interests 

include space policy, the history of the U.S. space program, the structure and process of 

government decision-making for research and development programs, and international 

science and technology policy. He is author of The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo 

and the National Interest (MIT Press, 1970) and has written numerous articles and reports 

on space policy and science and technology policy. In January 1992, Dr. Logsdon was 

appointed to Vice President Dan Quayle’s Space Policy Advisory Board and served 

through January 1993. He is a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, of 

the Board of Advisors of The Planetary Society, of the Board of Directors of the National 

Space Society, and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National 

Research Council. In past years, he was a member of the National Academy of Sciences’s 

National Academy of Engineering Committee on Space Policy and the National Research 

Council Committee on a Commercially Developed Space Facility, NASAs Space and Earth 

Science Advisory Committee and History Advisory Committee, and the Research Advisory 

Committee of the National Air and Space Museum. He also is a former chair of the 

Committee on Science and Public Policy of the American Association for the 

Advancement of Science (AAAS) and of the Education Committee of the Interna-tional 

Astronautical Federation. He is a fellow of the AAAS and the Explorers Club and an associate fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. In addition, he is 

North American editor for the journal Space Policy. 

xxxi 

Glossary 

......... .Associate Administrator 

......... .Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board 

AAS ............... .American Astronomical Society 

ABA .......... .American Bar Association 

ABMA ........ .Army Ballistic Missile Agency 

ACD .......... .Architectural Control Document 

AD/DA ............ .Deputy Administrator 

ADCA ............. .Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

.......... .Air Corps Jet Propulsion 

AEC ......... Atomic Energy Commission 

Arnold Engineering Development Center 

AF ................ .Air Force 

AFBMD ............ .Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 

...... .American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

A0 ................ .Announcement of Opportunity 

AOMC ...... Army Ordnance Missile Command 

APM .............. .Attached Pressurized Module 

ARDC ............. .Air Research and Development Command 

....... .Advanced Research Projects Agency 

....... .American Society of Electrical Engineers 

ASPA .............. .Armed Services Procurement Act (of 1947) 

ASPR . ........ .Armed Services Procurement Regulation 

ASTP .............. .Advanced Space Technology Program or Apollo-Soyuz Test 

Project 

ATS ............... .Applications Technology Satellite 

...... .astronomical unit 

...... .Baseline Configuration Document 

Caltech ............ .California Institute of Technology 

CCIR .............. .Comite Consultatif International des Radiocommunications 

(International Radio Consultive Committee) 

CCSDS ............. .Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 

CCZ ............... Command and Control Zone 

CG ......... .. .commanding general 

.. .Central Intelligence Agency 

...... .California Institute of Technology 

CNES .............. .Centre Nationale des Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) 

COBE ............. .Cosmic Background Explorer 

COP .. ....... .Composite Operations Plan 

COPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (United 

Nations) 

COSPAR ........... .Committee on Space Research 

COUP ............. .Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan 

CRAF .............. .Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
xxxii 

CSM .............. .Command and Service Module 

CSOC ............. .Consolidated Space Operations Center 

CSTI .............. .Civil Space Technology Initiative 

CUP ............... .Composite Utilization Plan 

CY ................ .calendar year 

DD ................ .Defense Directive 

DDE .............. .Dwight D. Eisenhower 

DDTE ............. .design, development, test, and evaluation 

DEW .............. .Defense Early Warning (Line) 

DMSP ............. .Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

DOD/DoD ......... .Department of Defense 

DOT .............. .Department of Transportation 

DSOC ......... .Defense Space Operations Committee 

ECS ........... .Environment Control System 

EDRS .............. .ESA's Data Relay Satellite (system) 

EDT ....... .... .Eastern Daylight Time 

ELDO ............. .European Launcher Development Organization 

ELV ............... .Expendable Launch Vehicle 

EML .............. .European Microgravity Laboratory 

E.O./EO ........... .Executive Order 

EOM .............. .end of mission 

EOS ............... .earth orbital shuttle 

ESA ............... .European Space Agency 

ESC ............... .European Space Conference 

ESF ............... .European Space Foundation 

ESRO ............. .European Space Research Organization 

......... .European Space & Technology Centre 

ET ................ .External Tank 

ETR ............... .Eastern Test Range 

EVA ............... .extravehicular activity 

FCDA ............. .Federal Civil Defense Authority 

FPR ............... .Federal Procurement Regulations 

F.R. ............... .Federal Register 

FSE ............... .flight support equipment 

FTS ............... .Flight Telerobotic System 

FY ................ .fiscal year 

GALCIT ........... .Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California 

Institute of Technology 

GAO .............. .General Accounting Office 

GEO .............. .geosynchronous equatorial orbit 

GLOW ............. .gross liftoff weight 

GMS .............. .Geostationary Meteorological Satellite 

GNP .............. .gross national product 

GOES ............. .Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite . GOJ ............... .Government of Japan 

GPS ............... .Global Positioning System 

GRO .............. .Gamma Ray Observatory 

GSA ............... .General Services Administration 

GSE ............... .ground support equipment 

GSFC .............. .Goddard Space Flight Center 
HEAO ............. .High Energy Astronomy Observatory 

........ .House Resolution 

ICD ........... Interface Control Document 

Evolution Working Group 

International Geophysical Year 

Monitoring Platform 

International Telecommunications Satellite (consortium) 

Increment Plan 

IRBM .............. .intermediate range missile 

grate-Transfer-Launch (complex) 

ITU ........... International Telecommunications Union 

oint Chiefs of Staff 

Requirements Document 

LST ............... .Large Space Telescope 

MCB .............. .Multilateral Coordination Board 

Mission Control Center 

Mars Geoscience-Climatology Orbiter 

MIT ...... Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

......... .MSC Maintenance Depot 

xxxiii 
xxxiv 

....... .memorandum of agreement 

.Manned Orbital Development System 

MOL .............. .Manned Orbital Laboratory 

MORL ............. .Manned Orbital Research Laboratory 

. .Ministry of State for Science and Technology (Canada) 

.memorandum of understanding 

.. .Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth 

.Material Review Board 

.Mobile Remote Servicer 

MSC .............. .Manned Spacecraft Center or Mobile Servicing Center 

MSFC ............. .Marshall Space Flight Center 

. .Manned Space Flight Experiments Board 

. .Military Sea Transportation Service (Navy) 

....... .Mississippi Test Facility 

....... .Man-Tended Free Flyer 

....... .North American Aviation 

NACA ............. .National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

NAS ............... .National Academy of Sciences 

NASA .............. .National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

. .National Aeronautics and Space Council 

........ .North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

nm ................ .nautical mile 

NIH ............... .National Institutes of Health 

NMI ............... .NASA Management Instruction 

NOAA ............. .National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NORAD ......... North American Air Defense 

NOSS .......... National Oceanic Satellite System 

NRC .............. .National Research Council 

NSC ............... .National Security Council 

......... .National Security Directive 

......... .National Security Decision Directive 

... .National Security Decision Memorandum 

... .National Science Foundation 

... .National Space Policy Directive 

NSSD .............. .National Security Study Directive 

NSSM ............. .National Security Study Memorandum 

.......... .Orbiting Astronomical Observatories 

OART ............. .Office of Aeronautical Research and Technology (NASA) 

OMB .............. .Office of Management and Budget 

OMS .............. .Orbital Maneuvering System 

OMSF ............. .Office of Manned Space Flight (NASA) 

ONR .............. .Office of Naval Research 

00s .............. .orbit-toarbit shuttle 

OSD .............. .Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSFP .............. .Office of Space Flight Programs (NASA) 

OSS ............... .Office of Space Science (NASA) 

OSSA .............. .Office of Space Science and Applications (NASA) 

OSTP .............. .Office of Science and Technology Policy (White House) 

PCC ............... .Program Coordination Committee 

PDRD ............. .Program Definition and Requirements Document 

PMR .............. .Pacific Missile Range 
POIC .............. .Payload Operations Integration Center 

PRD ............... .Program Requirements Document 

.President’s Science Advisory Committee 

.Pioneer Venus Orbiter 

.Research and Applications (program) 

.research and development 

. (Defense) Research and Engineering 

RAM .............. .Research Application Module 

RCA ... ....... .Radio Corporation of America 

RCS ............... .Reaction Control System 

RFP ............... .request for proposals 

.Remote Manipulator System 

.Russian Space Agency 

RTLS .............. .return to launch site 

S&ID ....... Space and Information Systems Division (North American 

SAC ........ Strategic Air Command 

SCA ............... .Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 

SCF ............... Shuttle Carrier Flight 

SET ... ....... .Science, Engineering, and Technology (OMB division) 

SIC ............... .Senior Interagency Group (Space) 

SIRTF ............. .Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility 

SITE .............. .Satellite Instructional Television Experiment 

SL ................ .Spacelab 

SOH0 ............. Solar and Heliospheric Observatory Satellite 

SOP ............... System Operations Panel 

Space Station Control Board 

ST .......... STA ......... 

.Training and Data Acquisition (NASA) 

...... .Tactical Air Command 

...... .Tactical Air Navigation 

...... .tour of duty 
TIROS ............. .Television and Infrared Operational Satellite 

TMIS .............. .Technical Management Information System 

TOP ............... .Tactical Operations Plan 

TPS ............... .Thermal Protection System 

TV ................ .television 

TVA ............... .Tennessee Valley Authority 

TWA .............. .Trans World Airlines 

UCLA ............. .University of California at Los Angeles 

UK/U.K. ........... .United Kingdom 

UN ............... ..United Nations 

UOP .............. .User Operations Panel 

URA .............. .Universities Research Association, Inc. 

US/U.S. ............ .United States 

USA/U.S.A. ......... .United States of America ur United Space Alliance 

USAF .............. .U.S. Air Force 

U.S.C. ............. .US. Code 

USRA ............. .University Space Research Association 

USSR/U.S.S.R. ...... .Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VAFB .............. .Vandenberg Air Force Base 

VHF ............... .very high frequency 

VOIR .............. .Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar 

VSIA .............. .Vehicle System Integration Activity 

VTOL ............. .vertical takeoff and landing 

WMO .............. .World Meteorological Organization 

WS ................ .Weapons System 

WSMR ............. .White Sands Missile Range 
.
Chapter One 

The Development of 

International Space Cooperation 

by John M. Logsdon 

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, among its many provisions, indicated that NASA “under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful 

applications of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the 

advice and consent of the Senate.”‘ The new space agency interpreted this provision as 

giving it authority to take the initiative in international space dealings. Therefore, within 

six months, NASA began to develop a program of international cooperation in space that 

over the following three decades has resulted in agreements with more than 100 countries 

and in major cooperative projects with both traditional U.S. allies and the country’s erstwhile competitor in space, the Soviet Union. The engagement of other countries with the 

space activities of the United States has been a hallmark of the U.S. space program. 

The language of the Space Act seemed to present unintentionally a formal obstacle 

to NASA in taking the lead in initiating such cooperative activities. The Space Act stated 

that the United States would enter into cooperative activities “pursuant to agreements 

entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.” This seemed to 

require that the executive branch treat every cooperative space agreement as if it had the 

status of an international treaty, which certainly was not the intent of the congressional 

drafters of the final bill nor the desire of the White House. Thus, as he signed the document on July 29, 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that he regarded this section of the Space Act “as recognizing that international treaties may [emphasis added] be 

made in this field, and as not precluding, in appropriate cases, less formal arrangements 

for cooperation.”’ [I-1Is With that clarification, NASA felt free to begin exploring the possibilities of cooperative activity with other countries interested in space-and particularly 

in the new scientific opportunities made available by the ability to place instruments 

aboard orbiting satellites and into space beyond the near vicinity of Earth. Cooperation in 

space science (in addition to the creation of the international agreements needed to 

locate tracking and data reception sites in other countries) dominated the first decade of 

1. “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,” Public Law 85-568, 72 Stat., 426, Section 205. Signed 

by the president on July 29, 1958. This is document 11-17 in John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., with Linda J. Lear, 

Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Exploring the Unknown: Se[uclrrl Dommh in fhe 

Histrvry qf lhc U.S. Civil Space Propm, Vohw I: Organiring fm Explmnlion (Washington, DC: NASA Special 

Publication (SP)4407, 1995), 1: 33445. 

2. Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President.” July 29, 1958, Presidential Files, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

3. Unlike most other chapters in Exploring fhr Unknown, the documents supporting this essay are listed 

in the order in which they appear, rather than in chronological order, because of the unique nature of the 

international effort in space and the importance of ensuring a regional continuity. This has been done at the 

expense of maintaining a chronological unity to the essay, but the overall understanding of this complex subject 

is enhanced as a result. 

1 
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

NASA’s international activities, and this has continued as a centerpiece of U.S. cooperative activities to the present. 

From its start, space cooperation was linked to broader U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. The first comprehensive post-Sputnik statement of U.S. space policy, NSC 5814, suggested: “International cooperation in certain outer space activities 

appears highly desirable from a scientific, political and psychological [emphasis added] 

standpoint. . . . International cooperation agreements in which the United States participates could have the effect of. . . enhancing the position of the United States as a leader 

in advocating the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes. . . .’I4 The considerations of 

American leadership have been associated with the nation’s approach to international 

cooperation from the beginning. 

Early Space Science Cooperation 

The initial NASA approach to space cooperation was crafted by individuals who had 

been involved in the U.S. activities related to the International Geophysical Year (IGY), 

which ended on December 31, 1958. These included Hugh Dryden, Deputy 

Administrator of NASA; Homer Newell, who came to NASA in October 1958 as its first 

head of space science; and Arnold Frutkin, who had worked on ICY matters with the 

National Academy of Sciences and then became NASA’s second director of international 

affairs in September 1959 (a position he held for almost two decades).5 

Under the coordinating umbrella of the International Council of Scientific Unions 

(ICSU) , the nongovernmental scientific academies of participating states had carried out 

most IGY activities. NASA and National Academy of Sciences leaders hoped that ICSU 

could provide a venue for discussing, and perhaps coordinating, emerging cooperative 

activities in space, although some in the United States suggested that the North American 

Treaty Organization (NATO) would be a more appropriate body to perform this function. 

At the urging of the United States, ICSU created the Committee on Space Research 

(COSPAR) in October 1958. At the time of COSPAR’s second meeting in March 1959, 

Richard Porter, the delegate from the National Academy of Sciences, after consultation 

with NASA, communicated to the president of COSPAR, H.C. van de Hulst of the 

Netherlands, a groundbreaking offer. The United States hoped that COSPAR “could serve 

as an avenue through which the capabilities of satellite launching nations and the 

scientific potential of other nations may be brought together.” To facilitate such a development, the United States was willing to launch on U.S. boosters “suitable and worthy 

experiments proposed by scientists of other countries. This can be done by sending into 

space either single experiments as part of a larger payload or groups of experiments comprising complete payloads.”6 [I-2, 1-31 

4. National Security Council, NSC 5814, “U.S. Policy on Outer Space,” June 20, 1958. This was published as Document 11-18 in Logsdon, gen. ed., EXploting the Unknown, 1: 349. 

5. Arnold W. Frutkin’s 1965 book, International Co@mation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1965) provides an insider’s view of the early years of cooperative space activity. Another source that 

describes this period is Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphme: Early Years ofSpace Sn’anm (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-4211, 1980), Chap. 18. 

6. Richard W. Porter to Professor Dr. H.C. van de Hulst, President, Committee on Space Research 

(COSPAR), March 14, 1959, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection, George Washington 

University, Washington, DC. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 3 

It soon became clear that COSPAR was not well suited for the actual coordination of 

cooperative scientific missions; instead, for the most part, NASA would be cooperating 

with an appropriate government body in a partner country. The first country to respond 

to the U.S. invitation was the United Kingdom; even before the U.S. invitation to 

COSPAR, U.K. and U.S. scientists had been discussing possible cooperative projects. 

British Prime Minister Harold McMillan personally announced on May 12, 1959, that a 

delegation led by Professor Harrie S.W. Massey would visit the United States to discuss specific cooperative projects. Massey was chairman of the British National Space Committee, 

which had been formed by the Royal Society (the U.K. academy of science) in close consultation with the British government.’ The British delegation met with NASA counterparts from June 25 through July 3, 1959, and reached agreement in principle on initial 

cooperative activities. This agreement was reflected in an exchange of correspondence 

between Massey and NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan; although this was not a formal agreement, the exchange provided the basis for beginning NASA’s first cooperative 

project. [I-41 Only in September 1961 did the US. and U.K. governments exchange diplomatic notes that put the cooperation on a formal bakR The first of the cooperative US.- 

U.K. satellites, Ariel 1, was launched on April 26, 1962.” 

Then, as Europe decided in the early 1960s to undertake most of its space science 

activities through a new multinational entity, the European Space Research Organization 

(ESRO), NASA quickly extended its cooperative offer to that new body.“’ [I-51 

These initial cooperative efforts and most others since were carried out within the 

framework of a set of guiding principles that were developed during the first year of U.S. 

space activity.” These principles were relatively conservative in character; they did not 

commit the United States to help pay for other countries’ shares of cooperative projects. 

Rather, they provided some specific and rather limiting criteria that cooperative proposals would have to meet. as follows: 

1. Designation by each participating government of a central agenq for the negotiation and 

supervision of joint efforts 

2. Agreements on specific projects rather than generalized programs 

3. Each country’s acceptance ofjinancial responsilnlity for its own contributions to joint projects 

4. Projects of mutual scientijic interest 

5. General publication of scientific result?’ 

Added to this framework for cooperation in later years were the requirements that 

each cooperating partner assume technical as well as financial responsibility for its 

contributions and that there be simple technical interfaces between the contributions 

from different countries. This latter requirement was originally established to minimize 

7. NASA, “Statement by NASA,” Release 59-193, July 29, 1959, Press Release Files, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

8. Arnold S. Levine, Ariel I: An Experiment in Inlernntionnl Coqf~eruLron, Goddard Historical Note Number 

4, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, September 1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

9. Frutkin, Intrrnntimnl Coopration, pp. 4243. 

10. See John Krige and Arturo Russo, Europe in Space, 19601973 (Noordwijk, The Netherlands: 

European Space Agency, 1994), for a brief account of the origins of ESRO. 

11. See Newell, Bqrond the Almrphme, p. 306, and Frutkin, IntPrnnlionnl Cooperation, pp. 32-36, for a discussion of the development of the NASA guidelines for cooperation. 

12. NASA, Inlrrnnlionnl Pn,g7rm, 1962, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

the managerial complexity of cooperative projects, but in later years it also became an 

important safeguard to prevent unwanted technology transfer as a result of such projects.I5 

Operating under these guidelines over the years, NASA and its partners have been 

able to conduct numerous space science projects that have been scientifically productive, 

of increasing technical complexity, and in general free of rancor. On balance, the record 

of cooperation in space science is strongly positive, with both political and scientific benefits to all involved. This is not to say, however, that the path has been totally smooth. 

While Canada and most European countries worked closely with the United States in 

developing capabilities for performing space science, Japan chose to develop that capability on its 0~n.I~ [I-61 Only after its Institute for Space and Astronautical Science in the 

1970s developed an autonomous space science program, including its own launch vehicle, 

was Japan ready to enter into cooperative scientific projects with the United States. 

Despite efforts from the late 1950s on to engage the Soviet Union in scientific cooperation (described in more detail below), such cooperation was slow to emerge, being 

constantly “held hostage” to the state of the overall political relationship between the two 

global superpowers. In the mid-l960s, the United States also initiated cooperative interactions with emerging spacefaring countries such as India and Brazil. [I-71 For many 

years, however, America’s primary cooperative partner was Europe. 

Even with Europe, there were diffi~u1ties.l~ On the U.S. side, scientists eager to have 

their instruments and experiments fly in space could not participate as principal investigators in the missions undertaken by ESRO and its successor, the European Space Agency 

(ESA), which was created in 1975. Europe gave priority to nurturing its own space scientists and did not want to have them compete with their U.S. counterparts for the limited 

payload space available on European missions. In contrast, European scientists from the 

beginning were afforded such an opportunity to participate in NASA missions. 

Meanwhile, US. scientists complained that scarce space on U.S. scientific missions was 

being allocated to non-U.S. scientists and instruments, both for political reasons and 

because the non-U.S. contributions did not cost NASA any money. Securing European 

participation in the kind of large science missions that became the NASA norm in the 

1970s required delicate and lengthy negotiations.16 

On the European side, there were reservations about the U.S. role as the dominant 

partner in almost every cooperative project. This often meant that NASA and U.S. scientists would define the objectives and content of a scientific mission and only then invite 

non-U.S. scientists to participate. In addition, the value of any international contribution 

to a U.S. mission depended on NASA’s ability to sustain political and budgetary support 

for that mission. 

These reservations peaked in the 1979-1981 period. First, Europe, frustrated by US. 

vacillation over whether to undertake a mission to Halley’s comet during its 1986 visit to 

13. Personal communication from Richard Barnes, former Director of NASA’s Office of International 

Affairs, to John M. Logsdon, December 11, 1995. 

14. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, pp. 309-11. See Joan Johnson-Freese, Over the Pacific: Japanese Space 

Policy into the TwentyFirst Century (Dubuque, IA: KendaWHunt Publishing, 1993), for an overview of the Japanese 

space program. 

15. See Roger Bonnet and Vittorio Manno, Inlernafimal Cooperation in Space: The Exampk of the European 

Space Agency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 

16. For an expansion of this point, see Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in 

Jerry Grey and Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activifies (New York: American Institute of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1981), pp. 38-39; John M. Logsdon, “US.-European Cooperation in Space: A 25- 

Year Perspective,” Science 223 (January 6, 1984): 11-16. 
EXPLOIUNG THE UNKNOWN 5 

the inner Solar System, decided to undertake a Halley mission of its own. Europe did not 

want to wait for the United States to make up its mind whether it would initiate a Halley 

mission and then invite Europe to participate." Then, in early 1981, the United States 

informed Europe that it was withdrawing its spacecraft from the cooperative twospacecraft International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM). [1-8,1-9] This withdrawal was forced 

by the decision of the new administration of Ronald Reagan to reduce the federal budget. 

The White House required NASA to cancel one of its three major approved science missions (the Hubble Space Telescope, the Galileo mission to Jupiter, and ISPM), and the 

space agency chose the ISPM spacecraft for cancellation.'' The European Space Agency 

and individual European countries protested loudly, but the decision was not reversed. 

Europe left this experience with a reminder of its dependence on U.S. political and budgetary decisions for achieving its own objectives in its many cooperative efforts with the 

United States. [I-101 

While the ISPM controversy cast a temporary chill on cooperation in space science, 

its effect did not linger (although the incident was frequently raised during subsequent 

negotiations concerning cooperative arrangements for other US-European projects). 

The mutual benefits of cooperation in space science were evident to all. By 1983, for 

example, NASA and the European Space Agency had established regular consultations 

regarding areas for possible future cooperation. [I-1 11 Similar consultations between the 

United States and Japan and between the United States and Canada have provided the 

venue for discussions on when cooperative scientific projects were the best ways of achieving the objectives of the participating scientific communities, as well as on when those 

objectives were best served (in the case of infrared astronomy, for example) by mounting 

separate missions. In addition, the Inter-Agency Consultative Group, with the space agencies of the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and Japan as members, has proven a 

valuable forum for coordinating multilateral scientific undertakings.'!' From its beginning 

during the IGY to the present, space science remains the paradigm for successful international space cooperation.*" 

Cooperation in Human Spaceflight: Post-Apollo, 

the Spacelab, and. the Space Station 

The Apollo program was, by its very nature, competitive and unilateral in character. 

Its objective was to demonstrate to the world U.S. technological and managerial competence by being the first to and on the Moon. Although President Kennedy had considered 

turning Apollo into a cooperative US.-Soviet undertaking in 1963 (see below), as the first 

lunar landing grew near, it was clearly viewed as a symbol of U.S. power and capability." 

[I-121 

17. See John M. Logsdon, "Missing Halley's Comet: The Politics of Big Science," L7i.c 80 (1989): 268-70. 

18. See Joan Johnson-Freese, "Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft: Implications for International 

Cooperation in Space," Space Poliry 3 (February 1987): 2437, for more details on this incident. 

19. For a description and analysis of the Inter-Agency Consultative Group, see JoanJohnson-Freese, "A 

Model for Multinational Space Cooperation: The Inter-Agency Consultative Group,'' Sfmc. Poky 5 (November 

1989): 288-300; Joan Johnson-Freese, "From Halley's Comet to Solar Terrestrial Science: The Evolution of the 

Inter-Agency Consultative Group," Sf~m I'oliry 8 (August 1992): 245-55. 

20. See Bonnet and Manno, Inhnrrtionnl Coopmalion in Spnrx, for a European perspective on this. 

21. Again, as mentioned previously in footnote 3, the documents associated with this chapter are 

arranged in the order in which they are discussed, rather than in strict chronological order. This organization 

was chosen to best represent the diverse character of NASA's international relationships. 
6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The idea of expanded international space cooperation had been under discussion 

within the top levels of the U.S. government since the mid-l960s, and these discussions 

continued after Richard Nixon became president in January 1969. [I-131 With the Apollo 

11 mission a success, NASA and the Nixon administration made a conscious decision to 

broaden the basis of international participation in U.S. post-Apollo efforts in space.‘g This 

broadening took two directions: (1) attempting to engage the Soviet Union in more substantial cooperative undertakings (discussed later in this essay) and (2) inviting U.S. allies 

to participate in the human spaceflight and technology development parts of the U.S. program (from which they previously had been largely excluded). 

Such a broadening was one of the recommendations of the Space Task Group, which 

had been established by President Nixon in February 1969 to advise him on post-Apollo 

space plans. In its September 1969 report, the Space Task Group recommended “the use 

of our space capability not only to extend the benefits of space to the rest of the world, 

but also to increase direct participation of the world community in both manned and 

unmanned exploration and use of space.” The group recognized that for other industrial 

countries “the form of cooperation most sought after . . . would he technical assistance to 

enable them to develop their own capabilities.”The group also suggested that the United 

States should “move toward a liberalization of our policies affecting cooperation in space 

activities, should stand ready to provide launch services and share technology wherever 

possible, and should make arrangements to involve foreign experts in the detailed definition of future United States space programs. . . .’”’ 

Armed with these recommendations and what he believed was a direct mandate from 

President Nixon to seek such expanded cooperation, during late 1969 and the early 

months of 1970, NASA Administrator Thomas 0. Paine visited Europe, Canada, Japan, 

and Australia for initial discussions of cooperative opportunities in the post-Apollo period. [I-14,I-15,I-161 Paine believed that he could use the post-Apollo proposals spelled out 

in the September 1969 report of the Space Task Group as the basis for what the US. program during the 1970s would be-and thus for what cooperative possibilities might be 

open for US. allies. The reactions to Paine’s overtures were varied. In addition, NASA 

found that some in the Nixon White House were far less enthusiastic about cooperation 

in large hardware programs than were Paine and the Space Task Group and that President 

Nixon had no intention of approving in toto the group’s recommended program that had 

been the basis of Paine’s briefings to foreign officials. 

Early on, Australia indicated that space was not among its highest priorities and that 

it was not able to spend the considerable amount of money required to cooperate with the 

United States on a meaningful basis. The Japanese response was somewhat similar.24 In the 

late 1960s, Japan had decided to accelerate its acquisition of an autonomous capability for 

space launch and satellite construction for missions other than space science. Japan asked 

the U.S. government to allow U.S. aerospace firms to license space technology to Japan to 

“jump start” that capability development process. Although NASA and the Department of 

22. See Arnold W. Frutkin, “International Cooperation in Space,” Science 169 uuly 24, 1970): 333-38, for 

an early discussion of this policy change. More recently, see Lorenza Sebesta, “The Politics of Technological 

Cooperation in Space: UsEuropean Negotiations on the Post-Apollo Programme,” Histmy and Technology: An 

IntmationalJrmrnc~l 11 (1994): 31741. 

23. Space Task Group, The Post-Apolln Space Program: Direcfims .for fhs Future (Washington, DC: US. 

Government Printing Office, September 1969), pp. 7, 16. 

24. For a discussion of the evolution of U.S.-Japanese space relations, see John M. Logsdon, “U.S.- 

Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads,” Science 255 (January 17, 1992): 294300; Johnson-Freese, Ouer the 

Pacijc. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 7 

Defense opposed such licensing, advocates of the diplomatic and strategic importance of 

the U.S.-Japanese alliance, particularly within the State Department, prevailed. [I-171 

On July 31, 1969, the United States and Japan signed an agreement that cleared the 

way for firm-to-firm cooperation between the two countries.25 This agreement and its subsequent modifications in 1976 and 1980 facilitated Japanese acquisition of launch-related 

technology that was used and modified as the basis ofJapanese booster capability for more 

than twenty years; by contrast, there was limited transfer of satellite-related technology. 

During most of the 1970s, cooperation between the United States and Japan was at the 

firm-to-firm, not the government agency-to-government agency, level. Although Japan 

eventually indicated limited interest in participating in post-Apollo efforts, clear priority 

was given to Japanese autonomy in space, and the Japanese interest did not lead to a postApollo cooperative agreement. 

Canada, in contrast, indicated that it was interested, in the context of its modest space 

effort, in making a contribution to the U.S. post-Apollo program. [I-18] After several years 

of harmonious negotiations, it was agreed in 1975 that Canada would be responsible for 

developing the Remote Manipulator System for use aboard the Space Shuttle. 

The most difficult post-Apollo interactions were between the United States and 

Europe. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding which of those systems proposed in 

the Space Task Group report the Nixon administration would approve, and then what 

contributions Europe could best make to such systems, there were two background issues 

that influenced the discussions. One was the question of whether the United States would 

guarantee to launch communication satellites for European regional use or whether 

Europe would have to develop its own launch vehicle to guarantee its access to, in particular, geosynchronous orbit. The second issue was the concern by some at the White House 

that space cooperation could be a means for European firms to gain access, at minimum 

cost, to advanced or sensitive US. technology. In the background of both of these issues 

was a concern on the part of some in the White House that NASA and the Department of 

State were advocating an approach to international cooperation that was not in the 

administration’s interest. [I-191 

During this period, a goal of U.S. policy was to discourage Europe from developing its 

own launcher capable of lifting sizable payloads to orbit, thereby connecting much of 

Europe’s future in space to cooperative projects with the United States launched on U.S. 

boosters, particularly the Space Shuttle. For example, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, 

in his November 7, 1969, letter to President Nixon, indicated that his “fundamental objective was to stimulate Europeans to rethink their present limited space objectives, to avoid 

their wasting resources on obsolescent developments [a thinly veiled reference to 

European development of an expendable launch vehicle at the time that the United 

States was planning to develop a totally reusable Space Shuttle], and eventually to establish more considerable prospects for future international collaboration on major space 

projects.”“’ One reason for this posture was to maintain the U.S. monopoly on access to 

space for such payloads and to create customers for the Space Shuttle once it became 

available. A second reason was the U.S. attempt to protect U.S. communications satellite 

manufacturers-companies that in 1970 had a “free-world” monopoly on the technology. 

25. Department of State, “Agreement between the United States of America and Japan,July 31, 1969,” 

Trmh mil Othrr Inlmntioniil Ait.5, Series 6375. 

26. Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, November 7, 1969, Administrators Files, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Also, the United States and its partners in the International Telecommunications Satellite 

Consortium (INTELSAT) were participating in difficult negotiations over the future of 

the organization, and the United States wanted to block the emergence of regional competitors to INTELSAT in Europe and elsewhere.*’ 

After lengthy discussions and negotiations within the U.S. government [I-20, 1-21] 

and between the United States and the European Space Conference (a policy-level entity 

created to coordinate European responses to U.S. positions on space issues), the United 

States on September 1, 1971, set forth a policy on the availability of U.S. launchers for 

European satellites. The United States also made it clear that the issue of post-Apollo 

cooperation was, in U.S. thinking, not linked to the launcher issue.‘* [I-223 

The other obstacle-concern that the United States would be forced to transfer valuable technology to Europe to ensure that Europe could successfully complete its share of 

the post-Apollo program-proved more difficult to surmount. Assistant to the President 

Peter Flanigan, who had responsibility within the White House for space issues, raised concerns about technology flows related to US.-European cooperation. Flanigan suggested 

that President Nixon’s 1969 mandate to NASA seeking expanded international cooperation was really focused on greater European participation as astronauts or in-orbit scientific investigators, not on Europe as a developer of hardware to be used by the United 

States. [I-231 

The debate over European involvement in the post-Apollo program had continued 

throughout 1971. As the Space Shuttle finally gained approval in January 1972 as the 

major post-Apollo development project, the question of European participation was still 

undecided.2g Over the next several months, debates over how to proceed continued within the administration. [I-241 

Among those attempting to find a position satisfactory to both the advocates of coop 

eration within NASA and the State Department and the skeptics inside the White House 

was the executive secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, former astronaut William A. Anders. In a March 17, 1972, memorandum to Flanigan, Anders suggested that Europe be invited only to develop a “sortie can”-a pressurized laboratory to fly 

inside the shuttle’s payload bay-rather than be allowed to develop a technologically 

more challenging orbit-toorbit “space tug” or parts of the shuttle orbiter itself.’” [I-251 

Responding to the Anders proposal on April 29, Secretary of State William Rogers argued 

against reversing the U.S. position that the space tug might be developed by Europe on a 

cooperative basis and against limiting European cooperation to developing the sortie can 

(also called the Research and Application Module) .” [I-261 Commenting on Secretary 

Rogers’s memorandum, NASA indicated that its “preferred objective is to obtain 

27. For some background on how the issue of launch guarantees interacted with European-US. negotiations on post-Apollo cooperation, see Douglas R. Lord, Spamlab: An Internntionrrl Sucmc Stmy (Washington, 

DC NASA SP-487, 1987), Chap. 1; Sebesta, “Politics of Technological Cooperation in Space.” 

28. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State, to The0 Lefevre, Chairman of European Space 

Conference, September 1, 1971, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

29. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, memorandum to George M. Low, NASA Deputy 

Adminisuator, “Summary of Peter Flanigan Meeting,” March 3, 1972, Administrators Files, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

30. William A. Anders, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council, to The Honorable 

Peter M. Flanigan, March 17, 1972, with attached: “Position Paper on European Participation in our Post Apollo 

Space Program,” Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

31. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, “Post-Apollo Relationships 

With the Europeans,” April 29, 1972, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 9 

European agreement to develop a specific type of sortie module” and that European 

development of the space tug was “a distinctly second choice, and much less desirable.”52 

[ 1-27] 

The State Department argument did not prevail, and U.S. representatives informed 

their European colleagues in June 1972 that only the sortie can was an acceptable contribution to post-Apollo efforts. [I-281 European governments and industry were displeased 

by this outcome; substantial study funds had been invested in the tug, and the sortie can 

was technologically a much less interesting development.” Within a little more than a year, 

however, a US.-European agreement on the terms for the cooperative development of the 

sortie can (renamed the Spacelab) had been achieved [I-291, committing Europe to a 

cooperative project with the United States that was much more expensive and highly visible than previously had been the case.” Europe’s agreement to develop the Spacelab 

came in the context of a comprehensive “package deal” that also committed European 

nations to develop their own launch vehicle (in spite of the 1971 U.S. assurance of access 

to U.S. launchers) and to begin work on a maritime communications satellite. In addition, 

Europe decided to develop a single space organization, to be called the European Space 

Agency (ESA) , to manage these large projects and other European efforts in space. The 

European nations’ experience in post-Apollo dealings with the United States was a major 

factor in convincing leading European countries to pool the better part of their future 

projects in a multilateral alliance for space.” 

Despite the difficulties in reaching agreement on a mutually satisfactory undertaking, 

as well as substantial European dissatisfaction with the results of the cooperative effort, 

European-U.S. cooperation on the Spacelab created a precedent for contemplatingeven expecting-similar close cooperation on any subsequent large-scale program that 

NASA might undertake. In fact, within a year after signing the Spacelab agreement, some 

at NASA were already thinking about international participation in a space station program. [I-301 When NASA Headquarters once again began active planning for a space station in 1982, the head of the Space Station Task Force, John Hodge, asked NASA Director 

of International Affairs Kenneth Pedersen-Arnold Frutkin had left NASA in 1979-for 

his ideas on what might be learned from the post-Apollo experience with respect to 

preparing for international participation in a space station. In reply, Pedersen prepared a 

lengthy memorandum containing his thoughts not only on the relevance of past experience but also on a strategy for obtaining international commitments to the emerging station program. [I-311 

Pedersen’s ideas largely governed the NASA approach to international participation 

in the space station during 1982 and 1983. In addition, in August 1982 the Reagan administration adopted an overall policy statement with respect to international space relationships that provided a context for making the station an international project. [I-321 

When Ronald Reagan announced the approval of the space station program in his 

January 25, 1984, State of the Union address, he also stated that “NASA will invite other 

countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity and expand freedom 

32. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs, May 5, 1972, with attached: ”NASA’s Comments on Secretary Rogers’ 

Memorandum of April 29, 1972,” Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

33. See, for example, “Europeans Delay Post-Apollo Meeting,” Aviation Wwk €7’ Spnrx ~khnok,gy,.fuly 17, 

1972, p. 19. 

34. See Lord, ‘+amla6, for a participant’s account on the international dimensions of the undertaking. 

35. See Krige and Russo, Europe in Spar< Michiel Schwarz, “European Policies on Space Science and 

Technology, 1960-1978,” Rpsmrrh Policy 8 (1979): 205-44; Michiel Schwarz, Europr:r Fuhm an Spm (London: 

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), Chap. 4, for discussions of the early years of European space cooperation. 
10 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

for all who share our goals.’”6 NASA Administrator James Beggs, acting as Reagan’s personal emissary, extended the president’s invitation to join the space station program to 

leaders in Europe, Canada, and Japan during a series of rapid visits during March 1984. 

After returning from his visits to Europe and Japan, he reported the following to Secretary 

of State George Shultz: 

The reaction so far to the President’s call for international cooperation has been strongly positive 

and openly appreciative. It has been positive in the sense that ourpincipal Allies are moving quickly, or have already moved, to take political decisions to participate. And their reactions clearly show 

appreciation for the major foreign policy benefits that will flow ?om open and collaborative cooperation on such a bold, visible, and imaginativepr~ject.’~ [I-331 

Beggs also wrote a letter to a senior official in each of the countries he had visited, 

summarizing his understandings, clarifying issues that had been raised, and laying out the 

next steps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position: 

President Reagan has committed the US. to building an $8B fully functional Space Station to 

be operational by the early 1990s, but has also set the stage for working together to develop a more 

expansive international Space Station m’th even greater benefits and capabilities for all to use. Thus, 

we are inviting your Government to take a close look at our plans and concepts and then, based on 

your long-term interests and goals, share with us your ideas for cooperation that will expand the capabilities of the Space Station.” lI-341 

It would take more than four years of difficult negotiations to develop a framework 

for cooperation in the space station program that was acceptable to the United States and 

its partners-ten European countries acting through the European Space Agency, Japan, 

and Canada. In agreeing to that framework, the station partners launched what was the 

most expensive, longest duration in international scientific and technological cooperation ever undertaken. The station agreements included a multilateral intergovernmental 

agreement among the governments of the United States, Japan, Canada, and the nine 

European countries,’g as well as three separate and lengthy memoranda of understanding 

(one between NASA and ESA, another between NASA and its counterpart agency in 

Canada, and the third between NASA and Japan’s space agency.“’ [I-351 In its scope and 

complexity, international space cooperation had come a long way from the initial, quickly negotiated, informal, and straightforward 1959 agreement that, almost three decades 

earlier, had led to the US.-U.K. Ariel project. 

36. See John M. Logsdon, Together in Orbit: The Origins of Intaational Participation in Space Station Freedom 

(Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, December 1991), for an account of the 

process of internationalizing the U.S. space station program. 

37. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, March 16, 1984, 

Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

38. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Kenneth Baker, MP, Minister of State for Industry with 

Special Responsibility for Space and Information Technology, United Kingdom, April 6, 1984, Administrators 

Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

39. At the time this essay was written, the Department of State had not yet published the space station 

intergovernmental agreement. When it is published, it will appear in the Department of State series United States 

Treatk and Other International Acts. However, a copy of the agreement does appear in Hein’s Microfiche Service, 

United States Treaties ad Othm Inlaational Acts, NO. KAV 2383. 

40. Each memorandum of understanding was slightly different but covered essentially the same points. 

The one with Japan was signed by a representative of the Science and Technology Agency in the name of the 

government of Japan; the Japanese National Space Development Agency was not formally a government body. 

The Canadian signatory was the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, because the new Canadian Space 

Agency had not yet been formally established in September 1988. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 11 

Cooperation With the Soviet Union 

From their inception, the space programs of the United States and the Soviet Union 

were closely linked to the global political and military rivalry between the two superpowers. Issues of US.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation have historically received separate treatment 

in U.S. policy making from those related to cooperation with U.S. allies. Although the IGY 

provided the context for the first scientific satellite launches, space cooperation was the 

most disappointing aspect of the ICY, primarily because the Soviet Union shared only very 

limited information about the substantive character of its satellite programs with other 

ICY participants. Also, the Soviet Union did not make the data obtained by those satellites 

available for analysis to scientists outside of its borders.4' 

Although the Soviet Union had refused to discuss the possibility of space cooperation 

with the United States during the Eisenhower administration, newly inaugurated 

President John F. Kennedy attempted to open the door to such discussions in his January 

20, 1961, inaugural address, stating "let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science 

instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars. . . .'I4' Kennedy added more detail 

to this call in his first State of the Union address ten days later: 

I now invite all nations-including the Soviet Union-to join with us in developing a weather 

prediction program, in a new communications satellite program, and in preparation for probing the 

distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes which someday may unlock the deepest secrets of the unive~se.'~ 

To back up his cooperative initiative, Kennedy in early February asked his science 

advisor, Jerome Wiesner, to establish a NASA-Department of State panel on international 

space cooperation. During its meetings over the following few weeks, the panel considered not only the cooperative possibilities mentioned by President Kennedy in the State 

of the Union address but also such bold initiatives as the creation of an international scientific outpost on the Moon. In its report, the panel listed more than twenty possibilities 

for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. [I-361 

However, by the time the panel's final report was completed, its recommendations 

had been overtaken by events. The first orbital flight by Yuri Gagarin, on April 12, 1961, 

had stimulated John F. Kennedy to a competitive response.44 With the announcement of 

the decision to go to the Moon a few weeks later, the chances for significant cooperation 

in space with the Soviet Union disappeared, at least for the time being." 

Tense US.-U.S.S.R. relations during 1961, symbolized by the Kennedy-Khrushchev 

confrontations at a June summit meeting in Vienna and the August erecting of the Berlin 

Wall, seemed to make any chance of cooperation in space remote. However, even after 

challenging the Soviet Union to a space race, President Kennedy never abandoned his 

41. See Frutkin, Infmofzonnl Coopmifion, pp. 1920, for this assessment. 

42. Quoted in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda Ciccoritti, U.S.-S'omef Coqbmafzon zn Spm (Miami, FL: 

University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 65. The following account of cooperative initiatives in the first months of the Kennedy administration is taken from pages 66 through 74 of this study. 

43. Ibid. 

44. This story has been told in a series of documents contained in Volume I of this series. See 

Documents 111-6 through 111-12 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exphing Ihr Unknown, 1: 423-54. 

45. SeeJohn M. Logsdon, The Drcirion lo Go fo fhr Moon: hjrrf Apollo nnrl fhrN,~IzonnlInf~~.\l (Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 1970). 
12 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

hope of turning space into an arena for cooperation rather than competition. Apparently, 

Nikita Khrushchev was willing to change slightly the prior Soviet position linking the possibility of space cooperation with progress in the US.-U.S.S.R. disarmament talks. In late 

1961, the Soviet Union joined with the United States in supporting United Nations resolution 1721 (XVI), which among other things called for strengthening international space 

cooperation. In his February 21, 1962, message to President Kennedy, which congratulated the United States on the orbital flight of John Glenn, Khrushchev suggested: 

If our countries pooled their efforts-scientific, technical, and material-to master the universe, 

this would be very beneficial fw the advance of science and would be joyfully acclaimed by all peoples 

who would like to see scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for “cold warn purposes and 

the arm race.“’ 

Quickly seizing what seemed to be an opening, the next day President Kennedy 

cabled Khrushchev. Kennedy stated that he was “instructing the appropriate officers of 

this Government to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate projects of common action.”” Those proposals were contained in a March 7 letter from Kennedy to 

Khrushchev. [I-371 Kennedy proposed specific cooperative undertakings in five areas: 

weather satellites, tracking services, mapping of the Earth’s magnetic field, satellite communications, and space medicine?* 

Khrushchev’s reply came within two weeks. [I-381 It in effect accepted the notion of 

cooperation in most of the areas suggested by Kennedy, and it added other areas as candidates for cooperation. Most importantly, Khrushchev agreed to a meeting between U.S. 

and Soviet representatives to discuss how to implement the proposals that he and 

President Kennedy had made. However, Khrushchev also made it clear that the scope of 

U.S.4J.S.S.R. space cooperation was limited by broader considerations; he noted that “the 

scale of our cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space, as well as the choice of lines 

along which such cooperation would seem possible, is to a certain extent related to the 

solution of the disarmament pr~blem.”~’ 

President Kennedy appointed NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden as his representative to the US.-U.S.S.R. talks, and Khrushchev appointed academician Anatoli 

Blagonravov. Both were experienced in international scientific diplomacy. Their first 

meeting took place on March 27 through 30,1962 [I-391; byJune the two sides had agreed 

on three areas of initial c~operation.~” [I-401 During October 1962 (in the midst of the 

Cuban missile crisis), an exchange of letters between NASA Administrator James Webb 

and the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, M.V. Keldysh, put the agreements 

into effe~t.~’ 

46. Quoted in Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperntion in Space, p. 86. 

47. Ibid. 

48. John F. Kennedy, “Text of Letter Dated March 7, 1962, From President Kennedy to Chairman 

Khrushchev Re Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” March 7, 1962, Space Policy Institute 

Documentary History Collection. 

49. Nikita Khrushchev, “Text of Letter From Chairman Khrushchev in Reply to President Kennedy’s 

Letter of March 7, 1962,” March 7, 1962, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

50. For an account of the Dryden-Blagonravov negotiations, see Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.Souiat 

Cooperalion, pp. 92-102; Frutkin, International Cooperation, pp. 94105. 

51. For the text of the letters, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 

Sciences, Documnts un International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954.1962, Staff Report, May 

9, 1963, pp. 357-58. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 13 

Early results from this initial cooperative agreement were disappointing. By 

September 1963, however, the Kennedy administration was considering a bold initiativeturning Project Apollo from an exercise in U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition into a cooperative 

undertaking.” [I-411 The two countries had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in August 

1963, and President Kennedy wanted to build on that agreement to move toward a broad 

detente between the superpowers. Joining together in sending people to the Moon would 

be a dramatic symbol of such detente, and on September 20, 1963, in a speech to the 

General Assembly of the United Nations, Kennedy asked: 

Why, therejore, should man’s first flight to the Moon be a matter of national competition ? Why 

should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in 

immense duplication of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the 

scientists and astronauts of our two countries-indeed of all the world-cannot work together in the 

conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the Moon not the representatives of a single 

nation, but the representatives of all our countrie~.~’ 

Kennedy’s proposal got a mixed reaction within the United States-and no response 

from the Soviet Union-but the president was not dissuaded. On November 12, 1963, 

Kennedy directed NASA Administrator James Webb “to assume personally the initiative 

and central responsibility within the government for the development of a program of 

substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space.” This program, 

said Kennedy, should include “cooperation in lunar landing proposals.”‘4 [I-421 

Ten days later, Kennedy was assassinated. While President Lyndon B. Johnson was also 

in favor of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation, the continued lack of a Soviet response to 

Kennedy’s September 20 invitation and the absence of Kennedy’s personal involvement 

led to the initiative gradually fading away. By the time NASA responded to the November 

directive on January 31, 1964, the focus had shifted to cooperation on the robotic predecessors to a human landing on the Moon. [I431 Even that did not happen, and throughout the rest of the 1960s, US.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in space continued at a very modest 

level.” 

As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of the first lunar landing on July 20, 1969, the 

Nixon administration decided to broaden the basis of its cooperative space activities. One 

set of initiatives was directed at U.S. allies; other overtures were made to the Soviet Union. 

Rather than proposing cooperation across a broad range of space activities, NASA 

Administrator Thomas 0. Paine, in a July 31, 1970, letter to Keldysh, proposed that cooperation focus on the issue of astronaut safety-and particularly on a program to achieve 

compatible rendezvous and docking systems between U.S. and Soviet spacecraft.‘“’ [I-441 

52. This account of the consideration of making the Moon landing a cooperative undertaking is drawn 

from Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S:Souicl Co@mdion, pp. 11240; Frutkin, Intmnrclionnl Coqivrrrlion, pp. 105-19. 

53. Quoted in Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-.Siivivl C<J+WI~IWL, p. 123. 

54. National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, “Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space 

Matters,” November 12, 1963, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

55. For an assessment of the record of US.-U.S.S.R. cooperation during the 1960s, in addition to the 

sources cited above, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, US -SJULV~ Co<+mhon in Sfimv, 

Technical Memorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985). 

56. Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Academician M.V. Keldysh, President, Academy of 

Sciences of the USSR, July 31, 1970, Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. For a full history of what eventually became the Apollc&oyuz Test Project, see Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman 

Ezell, The Prcrfnmhifi: A Hz.\trrry rflhu ApollrrSnyuz 7e.s~ Prrvpcf (Washington, DC: NASA SP4209, 1978). 
14 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

This proposal produced a positive response from the Soviet Union, and on October 

26, 1970, a NASA delegation traveled to Moscow to discuss the feasibility of such a program with its Soviet counterparts. [I451 This was the first official NASA delegation to visit 

the Soviet Union. These meetings went quite well, and they seemed to break a logjam in 

US.-U.S.S.R. cooperative relations. In January 1971, Acting NASA Administrator George 

Low and an accompanying delegation traveled to Moscow to meet with Keldysh and his 

colleagues, and they reached a preliminary agreement on renewed and expanded cooperation in a variety of areas. Following an exchange of letters between Low and Keldysh, 

a broad agreement on areas of U.S.W.S.S.R. cooperation was announced on March 31, 

1971. To implement the agreement, US-U.S.S.R. joint working groups on meteorological 

satellites, meteorological rocket soundings, the natural environment, the exploration of 

near-Earth, the Moon and the planets, and space biology and medicine were established. 

These working groups and their successors have been the principal mechanisms for planning US-U.S.S.R. space cooperation since 1971. 

Meanwhile, discussions on the feasibility of a 1975 joint test flight involving the inorbit rendezvous of U.S. and Soviet spacecraft had proceeded to the point where George 

Low, now back in his position as NASA’s deputy administrator, journeyed to Moscow in 

April 1972 to determine whether the United States should commit to such a mission. This 

trip was made secretly at the request of the White House, because a formal agreement on 

such a mission was to be announced at a planned May 1972 summit meeting between 

President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhne~.~~ [I-461 

Low’s recommendation was to go ahead with the mission, which was accepted by the 

White House. [I471 On May 24, 1972, President Richard Nixon and Chairman of the 

Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin signed the government-to-government 

“Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for 

Peaceful Purposes.”5R Although this agreement incorporated all the areas of cooperation 

that had been agreed to in 1971, its centerpiece was the announcement of the ApolloSoyuz Test Project (ASTP) . The agreement had a five-year lifetime, with the possibility of 

an extension by mutual agreement. 

Soviet and U.S. engineers, managers, and astronauts met frequently over the next 

three years. [I481 This led to the successful ASTP mission, which took place from July 14 

to 24, 1975. The mission itself was accomplished without major problems.”’ 

Even as the launch dates for the ASTP mission approached, George Low and Keldysh 

began to discuss follow-on cooperation, particularly in human spaceflight and robotic missions to the far side of the Moon and to Mars. [I-491 These discussions continued over the 

next two years, and by May 1977, when the US-U.S.S.R. space cooperation agreement was 

renewed for five more years, the two countries had also agreed to consider a joint mission 

between the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Sulyut space station, as well as cooperation 

in the development of an “international space platform.’”” [I-501 

As it turned out, however, the ASTP mission marked the high point of US.-U.S.S.R. 

space cooperation for some time to come. That cooperation fell prey to a deterioration in 

the overall state of US.-U.S.S.R. relations during the presidency of Jimmy Carter and the 

first White House term of Ronald Reagan. The Carter White House by 1978 was ques57. George M. Low, NASA Deputy Adminismator, ‘Visit to Moscow, April 1972, to Discuss Compatible 

Docking Systems for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft,” April 46, 1972, with attached: “Addendum, Moscow 

Trip, April 46, 1972,” May 30, 1972, Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

58. For more on the agreement, see Ezell and Ezell, The Purtmrship, pp. 192-93. 

59. See ibirl. for details. 

60. Office of Technology Assessment, LI.S.Souief Cooprution, p. 32. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 15 

tioning whether it was in the U.S. interest to be seen as a highly visible cooperative 

partner with a Soviet Union that it was accusing of human rights violations, and the shuttle-Sulyut project was set aside. As part of the U.S. reaction to Soviet involvement in the 

declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981, the US-U.S.S.R. space cooperation agreement was allowed to lapse when it came up for renewal in 1982. With that development, 

any cooperation in space between the United States and the Soviet Union had to be on a 

scientist-to-scientist basis, with no formal government involvement or funding. 

This situation lasted for several years. Then in 1986, the United States, in response to 

the reforms of new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and to increasing pressure from scientists and others in the United States who viewed space as an arena for demonstrating a 

new, post-Cold War superpower relationship, indicated its willingness to resume formal 

cooperative relations in space with the Soviet Union. Negotiations led to the April 1987 

signing of a new government-to-government cooperative agreement that identified sixteen areas for initial cooperation.G1 [I-511 

The US.-U.S.S.R. space relationship, always a barometer of the overall state of relations between the two countries, was once again on the upswing. Cooperation increased 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as the inheritor of 

most of the former Soviet Union’s space capabilities. By the mid-l990s, US.-Russian cooperation had become the centerpiece of NASA’s international space activities, as the two 

countries in effect merged their programs of human spaceflight in the period leading to 

the creation of the International Space Station. Initial steps in this direction came in 1992, 

when Russia created a civilian space agency and when Russian President Boris Yeltsin and 

President George Bush agreed to broaden US.-Russian space interactions. [I-521 This 

accelerated under President Bill Clinton; the United States and Russia in effect merged 

most of their programs of human spaceflight. [I-53, 1-54, 1-55] Russia was invited to 

become a key participant in the International Space Station. [I-561 

After almost forty years, cooperation had replaced competition as the central focus of 

US.-Russian space relations. The January 1961 hopes of President John Kennedy finally 

neared realization. 

61. George P. Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, “Agreement Between the United States ofAmerica and 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for 

Peaceful Purposes,” April 15, 1987, with attached: “Agreed List of Cooperative Projects,” Space Policy Institute 

Documentary History Collection. 
16 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-1 

Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, July 29, 1958. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The congressional drafters of changes to the Eisenhower administration's version of a bill that set out 

the goals and organizational features of the US. civilian space program were strong advocates of 

international cooperation in carrying out the new program. Thq inserted in the bill a provision, contained in Section 205, that appeared to require Senate approval for any cooperative agreement into 

which the executive branch or the new space agency might enter This was intended to signal congressional interest in international space issues, but legal experts pointed out afer the bill had passed 

Congress that such approval could be interpreted as trespassing on the power of the president and his 

appointees to enter into nontreaty agreements for cooperation. At the time he signed the National 

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, President Eisenhowerplaced this statmnt on the record to dispel the possibility of such an interpretation. 

[ 11 IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 29, 1958 

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Statement by the President 

I have today signed H. R. 12575, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 

The enactment of this legislation is an historic step, further equipping the United 

States for leadership in the space age. I wish to commend the Congress for the promptness with which it has created the organization and provided the authority needed for an 

effective national effort in the fields of aeronautics and space exploration. 

The new Act contains one provision that requires comment. Section 205 authorizes 

cooperation with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to the Act 

and in the peaceful application of the results of such work, pursuant to international 

agreements entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I 

regard this section merely as recognizing that international treaties may be made in this 

field, and as not precluding, in appropriate cases, less formal arrangements for cooperation. To construe the section otherwise would raise substantial constitutional questions. 

The present National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), with its large and 

competent staff and wellequipped laboratories, will provide the nucleus for the NASA. 

The NACA has an established record of research performance and of cooperation with 

the Armed Services. The combination of space exploration responsibilities with the 

NACA's traditional aeronautical research functions is a natural evolution. 

The enactment of the law establishing the NACA in 1915 proved a decisive step in the 

advancement of our civil and military aviation. The Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 

should have an even greater impact on our future. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 17 

Document 1-2 

Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to T. Keith Glennan, et al., 

March 12, 1959. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Document 1-3 

Document title: Richard W. Porter, to Professor Dr. H.C. van de Hulst, President, 

Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), March 14, 1959. 

Source: Archives, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. 

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) had managed US. participation in the International 

Geophysical Yea? including related U.S. space activities, and had suggested to the International 

Council of Scientific Unions that it establish a continuing Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). 

When the new space agency, NASA, was formed, its initial staff handling both space science and 

international affairs had close ties to the NAS. Once a decision had been made not to use the United 

Nations for carrying out international space propams, NASA worked closely with the NAS. They 

authorized the U.S. delegate to COSPAR, Richard Portc to invite other members of COSPAR to plan 

experiments that would be launched on US. boosters and to cooperate with NASA in getting started 

in space. NASA’s head scientist, Homer Newell, attended the COSPAR meeting and stayed in touch 

with Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden as the US. offer tookjnal shape. Dryden in turn informed 

others at NASA headquarters about the final changes to the U.S. ofler; Administrator 7: Keith 

Glennan wrote “OK-Good” on his copy of Dryden’s memorandum, which is reproduced here. The 

final offer came in the form of Richard Porter’s letter to COSPAR President H.C. van de Hulst. With 

this kttq the United States initiated a program of productive cooperation in space science that has 

continued to the present. 

Document 1-2 

March 12, 1959 

Memorandum for Dr. T. Keith Glennan 

Mr. Henry E. Billingsley 

Mr. Franklyn W. Phillips 

Mr. Harold R. Lawrence 

1. On March 11 th Homer Newell telephoned me from Holland to ask further advice on the statements that could be made with respect to cooperation with COSPAR in satellite launchings. The Executive Committee of COSPAR had met during the day in the 

absence of the Russian member, Dr. Federov, who arrived after the meeting had 

adjourned. 

2. We had previously authorized to the US. delegation to offer cooperation in the 

provision of payload space or possibly a booster for a complete COSPAR payload. The U.S. 

delegation felt, from the nature of the discussion at the Executive Committee meeting, 

that it would be desirable to make this offer somewhat more specific. After discussion with 
18 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Newell, I authorized him to make the definite offer for a booster for a COSPAR payload, 

the booster not to be named although we have in mind either Scout or Thor Delta. The 

payload would be described as 150 to 500 pounds, depending on the specific booster; and 

the general nature of the available orbits would be described. The booster would be available in 1-1/2 to 2 years. It was agreed that the payload should be recommended by 

COSPAR, that it should be acceptable to NASA, and that it should pass environmental 

tests prescribed by NASA. 

3. The question was raised as to whether the foreign scientists would be permitted 

to be present at the launching. I suggested that this question be avoided for the present 

for we are not in a position to commit the Atlantic or Pacific Missile Range. 

4. The meeting of COSPAR itself takes place today. 

Hugh L. Dryden 

Deputy Administrator 

Document 1-3 

March 14, 1959 

Professor Dr. H. C. van de Hulst, 

President, 

Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 

Paleis Nooreinde 68, 

THE HAGUE, The Netherlands. 

Dear Mr. President, 

COSPAR has a truly historic opportunity to become an effective force for international cooperation in space research. This cooperation will be most fruitful and meaningful if the maximum opportunity to participate in, and contribute to, all aspects of space 

research can be provided to the entire scientific community. In this regard, COSPAR can 

serve as an avenue through which the capabilities of satellite launching nations and the 

scientific potential of other nations may be brought together. 

The United States will support COSPAR in this objective by undertaking the launching of suitable and worthy experiments proposed by scientists of other countries. This can 

be done by sending into space either single experiments as part of a larger payload or 

groups of experiments comprising complete payloads. 

In the case of individual experiments to become part of a larger payload, the originator will be invited to work in a United States laboratory on the construction, calibration, 

and installation of the necessary equipment in a U.S. research vehicle. If this is impossible, a US. scientist may be designated to represent the originator, working on the project 

in consultation with him. Or, in the last report, the originator might prepare his experiment abroad, supplying the launching group with a final piece of equipment, or “black 

box,” for installation. However, this last approach may not be practical in most cases. 

In the case of complete payloads, the United States also will support COSPAR. As a 

first step, the delegate of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences is authorized to state that 

the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration will undertake to launch an 

entire payload to be recommended by COSPAR. This payload may weigh from 100 to 

300 pounds and can be placed in an orbit ranging from 200 to 2,000 miles altitude. It is 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 19 

expected that the choice of the experiments and the preparation of the payload may 

require a period of 1 1/2 to 2 years. NASA is prepared to advise on the feasibility of proposed experiments, the design and construction of the payload package, and the necessary pre-flight environmental testing. The U.S. delegate will be pleased to receive 

COSPAR’s recommendations for the proposed payload when they can be readied. 

In further support of COSPAR, the U.S. delegate would like to call attention to the 

availability of resident research associateships at the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration in both theoretical and experimental space research. These provide for 

stipends of $8000 per annum and up. 

Very truly yours, 

Richard W. Porter 

Document 1-4 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, to Professor H.S.W. Massey, 

United Kingdom Scientific Ministry, July 6, 1959, with attached H.S.W. Massey, “U.KU.S. Technical Discussions on Space Research, June 25-July 3, 1959,” July 3, 1959. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This exchange of documents constituted what was, in effect, the first (albeit informal) cooperative 

agreement concluded by NASA and a counterpart space organization (in this case, the British 

National Space Committee of the nongovernmental Royal Society). Upon its return to the United 

Kingdom, the proposals for cooperation developed by Professor Massty and his delegation were quickly approved iy the U. K. government, although a formal U. s.-U.X agreement implementing the cooperative program was not signed until 1961. Thefirst mission resulting from this agreement, Ariel 1, 

was launched in less than three years, on April 26, 1962. 

July 6, 1959 

Professor H. S. W. Massey 

United Kingdom Scientific Mission 

1907 K Street, Northwest 

Washington 6, D.C. 

Dear Professor Massey: 

I have examined your statement of July 3, 1959, of the discussions held here between 

your group and our people and find it accurate and acceptable, from my standpoint. 

It is my understanding that this statement represents only an informal technical 

understanding between us and does not commit either of our governments to proceeding 

with this undertaking until further arrangements have been consummated. On both 

sides, it must be recognized that the exact content and pace of the proposed program is 

subject to the success we may have with supporting technological developments and the 

financial resources made available by our respective governments. 

Because of the importance of this matter and its relationship to the improvement of 

international understanding between our two countries in this field, I hope we shall hear 

from you further after you have reported the results of our talks to your people in 

London. 
20 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPEKATlON 

I trust this understanding is satisfactory to you and that your trip here has been pleasant and satisfactory in all regards. 

Sincerely, 

T. Keith Glennan 

Administrator 

********* 

[Attachment page 13 

U.K.-U.S. Technical Discussions on Space Research 

June 25-July 3,1959 

Discussions have been held between N.A.S.A. and the team of British scientists led by 

myself, to consider the offer made by N.A.S.A. to assist other countries in scientific work 

with satellites, in the interest of developing a programme of international cooperation in 

space research. Specifically, this paper records the outcome of meetings held in 

Washington in late June and early July. As far as the U.K. side is concerned the outcome 

of these discussions, as recorded below, will be reported as soon as possible to the U.K. 

Steering Group on Space Research: 

1. N.A.S.A. confirm that they would be ready to offer facilities to the U.K. for launching U.K. instrumented satellites in the U.S.A. by means of the SCOUT vehicle. 

2. The U.K. side consider that three SCOUT satellites should provide sufficient 

space for first flights of the instruments which would be required for a programme of 

experiments of the type and range provisionally listed in Document NCSP 41 (59). 

3. On present plans, N.A.S.A. hope that the launching of three British-instrumented SCOUT satellites could be completed within 3 to 4 years from now-with the aim that 

the first launching would be in about 2 years from now. 

4. If it is decided to accept the N.A.S.A. offer, the U.K. side would hope to provide 

specific proposals for the instrument content of the first satellite in the near future. 

Consideration of the possible content of further satellites would proceed as soon as possible, but would obviously be affected by success or otherwise in launching. 

[2] 5. In the first instance, N.A.S.A. would provide the satellite shell and auxiliary facilities, including solar cells and batteries, temperature control and data transmission. 

6. During the whole process of planning and constructing the satellites, the U.K. 

would do everything possible to maintain the necessary direct scientific and technical 

cooperation between the experts. 

7. Both sides agreed that a detailed exchange of views was desirable about possible 

extension of worldwide tracking and telemetry reception stations. 

8. N.A.S.A. said that the financial basis of their offer was “no billing” on either side. 

9. In making this offer it is N.A.S.A.’s position that this should be a mutually cooperative programme, with benefits flowing to both parties, for the advancement of science. 

It is contemplated that the experiments, conducted with the instruments flown by the 

British scientists, would form an integral part of the total spectrum of scientific experiments in space, and mutually agreed upon as a reasonable and important group of experiments. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 21 

The U.K. side explained that they were not at this stage authorized to come to any 

agreement, as this was a matter for the authorities in London. 

July 3, 1959 H.S.W. MASSEY 

Document 1-5 

Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, NASA Deputy Administrator, to Sir Harrie Massey, 

European Preparatory Commission for Space Research, June 27,1962. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

At the urging of many leading scientists in Europe, the European governments decided in 1962 to 

create a multilateral European Space Research Organization as the primary mechanism for carrying 

out a European space science effort. It was general U.S. policy to favor the daelopment of multilateral institutions in Europe, and NASA wasted no time in extending to the new organization the 

same cooperative offer it had earlier extended to individual European countries. 

June 27, 1962 

Sir Harrie Massey, President 

European Preparatory Commission for Space Research 

36, rue La Perouse 

Paris 16, France 

Dear Sir Harrie: 

On behalf of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, I should like to 

extend felicitations upon the recent signing of the Convention for establishment of the 

European Preparatory Commission for Space Research. 

NASA will welcome ESRO as a major new force contributing to the advancement of 

space science and technology in the context of peaceful cooperation among nations. It is 

our hope that we may participate with ESRO in cooperative efforts which may enhance 

our respective programs and our contributions toward this goal. There are many possibilities for specific projects in which we may join our efforts. It may serve a useful purpose 

to suggest a few of them: 

1. We should be very happy to enter with ESRO into a joint program of the type proposed in COSPAR on our behalf in March 1959. In such a program, NASA would 

provide a suitable launching vehicle to place in orbit a satellite of scientific interest which might be prepared by ESRO. 

2. As you know, NASA plans the launching of complex “Observatory” satellites, each 

bearing a variety of experiments. Some of these satellites are to be placed in polar 

orbits, others into highly eccentric orbits of lower inclination to the equator. We 

would propose to notify ESRO of opportunities for it to recommend the incorporation of specific European experiments in these satellites. Such recommendations would be given the same consideration as proposals from American 

scientists for the same satellites. 
22 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[2] 3. With the concurrence of the Department of State, certain satellite boosters manufactured in the United States would be available under reasonable conditions for 

purchase by ESRO for scientific purposes. 

4. NASA is prepared to accommodate in its own laboratories, in conjunction with 

agreed programs of the above character, technicians and scientists sponsored and 

supported by ESRO for such training and orientation as desired. In addition, fellowships in American university laboratories devoted to space theory and experimentation will continue to be available to ESRO nominees. 

I hope that ESRO will soon be prepared to discuss these and other possibilities for useful cooperation. At such time, or at any stage in your preparation for such discussions, we 

will be happy to welcome here scientific representatives of ESRO to discuss possible satellite or sounding rocket experiments. 

Sincerely yours, 

Hugh L. Dryden 

Deputy Administrator 

Document 1-6 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 

May 24, 1966. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Beginning in late 1965, the United States tried to expand the scope and intensity of its space science 

cooperation with other countries. Initial initiatives were made with Europe, but the hope was to 

involve Japan as well. In this let& NASA AdministratorJames E. Webb suggests to Secretary of State 

Dean Rusk why he was not optimistic about the potential fbr enhanced U.S.-Japanese space cooperation. At this point, Japan’s space effort was concentrated at an institute of the University of Tokyo. 

[ 13 Honorable Dean Rusk 

Secretary of State 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Dean: 

I share the views expressed in your letter of May 12 regarding the desirability of cooperation with Japan in the space field and would be happy to send to Japan a team similar 

to that which visited Europe in connection with President Johnson’s offer on the occasion 

of Chancellor Erhard’s December visit. In order to work out an appropriate approach to 

the Japanese, I am asking Mr. Arnold Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International 

Affairs, to work with Mr. Pollack. 

There are certain limitations with respect to an approach to the Japanese which I 

think you will want to consider. As you know, the President’s proposals for cooperation on 

the European side were of a scale and character necessarily multilateral. Proposals of the 

same dimensions could not well be made to the Japanese since Japan could not be expect- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 23 

ed to carry a burden of spacecraft development which would be appropriate to the 

combined resources of the leading European nations. Thus, it seems inevitable that the 

subject matter of any space cooperation with Japan would have to be scaled down to the 

bilateral level, unless Europe itself should invite Japan to participate in its broader multilateral project. 

When the question of Japanese participation with Europe came up in the Advance 

Team discussions in Europe last February, the Team made it quite clear that the U.S. 

would welcome such an overture by the European countries. Unfortunately, the prospect 

of positive European action on the President’s proposal is in itself uncertain. While the 

matter is probably best not further complicated at this particular time, it may be that the 

possibility of Japanese contributions might be reopened in Europe in terms of European 

interest. 

[2] With regard to bilateral cooperation with the Japanese, the pertinent history is rather 

dubious. Over the years, Dr. Dryden and Mr. Frutkin both made strenuous efforts to interest Japan in a bilateral satellite program comparable with those which have been entered 

into with virtually all other advanced nations. Japan clearly made a conscious decision to 

proceed on its own without involvement with the United States. (At the COSPAR meeting 

in Vienna early in May, Japanese scientists for the first time officially reported plans to 

launch small satellites this year and next year in the course of a self-contained Japanese 

program.) In order to obtain this decision, the dominant figures in Japanese space activity particularly Professor Itokawa at the University of Japan, have quite consciously 

distorted the conditions of cooperation with the United States. Professor Itokawa is understood to have a close family association with the Prime Minister. Professor Kaneshige, with 

whom we have maintained very close touch, who is the Japanese Chairman of the US 

Japan Scientific Commission, and who has been the senior Japanese scientific adviser to 

the Prime Minister, only last month told me that his continuing efforts to promote space 

cooperation with the United States have failed. He frankly confirmed the policy of deliberate distortion of our program (a matter which we have sought to bring to Embassy attention). 

It is our understanding that the reception given in Tokyo to the Vice President’s 

remarks on cooperation was rather cool. In the circumstances, a team, even of the caliber 

sent to Europe in February, would almost certainly find its efforts contained within a 

Japanese policy of noncooperation at quite senior levels. You may wish then to consider 

how persistent the U.S. ought to be and through what channels in pressing an objective 

that has met quite calculated and entrenched opposition over a period of years. 

Sincerely yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 1-7 

Document title: James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under 

Secretary of State for Political Affairs, May 19, 1966. 

Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 

Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
24 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

During late 1965 and 1966, the United States considered ways to increase its cooperative activities 

in space. Most of the focus was on increased cooperation with Europe and Japan. Howevq there was 

interest in involving some of the larger developing countries with space ambitions of their own, such 

as India and Brazil, in cooperative efffmts with NASA. This letter outlined ffm thefirst time a possible initiative with India to use a NASA communications satellite to broadcast educational programming to Indian villages. Almost a decade after the idea was first broached, between August 1, 1975, 

andJu13( 31, 1976, the United States and India cooperated on the Satellite Instructional Teleyision 

Expa'ment (SITE). During this expm'ment, the NASA Applications Technology Satellite ATS-6 was 

moved to an orbital position over India, and educational programming was broadcast to more than 

5,000 Indian villages. 

May 19,1966 

U. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs 

Department of State 

Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Alex: 

In my letter of April 26, I forwarded to you some thoughts for extending international 

cooperation in space. I would now like to supplement those with an additional suggestion 

that could prove valuable in opening new avenues for USIndian collaboration in the practical applications of space. 

The proposal should be understood on several levels: (1) A technical experiment in 

direct broadcasting, (2) A pilot project in the social impact of direct broadcasting, (3) A 

stimulus to Indian industrial electronics, [and] (4) An attack upon the food and population problems of India. The only step proposed is a joint USIndia study of feasibilitywhich would have political value in and of itself. 

If they agree, India and the United States would jointly establish a study group to 

examine the feasibility, the advantages and disadvantages, and the trade-off considerations of alternate approaches as these factors relate to a continuing experiment in direct 

broadcasting. In this experiment, the US would build and position a synchronous satellite 

near India in such a way that broadcasts from it could be received over the major part of 

the Indian subcontinent. Most of the basic technology for this experiment exists already 

and it should prove possible to beam the broadcasts tightly enough and on such frequencies that no interference would be caused to adjacent nations. 

India, for its part, would use its nascent electronics capability now focussed [sic] at the 

atomic energy center at Bombay to develop (with some design assistance from the US) 

improved television receivers to be established in perhaps a thousand rural population 

centers. India has [2] already demonstrated a significant capacity to contribute to such a 

task: Bombay is currently turning out analog computers, oscilloscopes, solid state components, and the like. In addition, there exists within India a considerable capacity for the 

production of radio receivers and other, simpler electronics devices. 

The satellites would be turned over to India for its own use in broadcasting to its people news and other material of an informational and educational value. The US would 

probably want to limit its commitment to provide satellites to perhaps two with a total projected life expectancy of five years. Following this experimental period, India would be 

expected to arrange with the US or INTELSAT for continuing service if desired. The cost 

to the US would be that of placing two large synchronous satellites in orbit. The cost to 

India would be that of the receivers themselves. One thousand such receivers might cost 

about $1.6 million, much of it in rupees. Since there are over 100,000 villages that might 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 25 

benefit from this program it would be up to India to decide the extent of its commitment 

beyond the initial one thousand receivers. In any case, much could be done by moving 

receivers from village to village to maximize the size of audience. 

I would not understate the problems we would be likely to encounter. The cost of the 

program might be more than either we or the Indian Government would care to bear. 

Television appears to possess a significant informational and educational potential, but 

there may be many pitfalls to its application on a scale such as this. We should certainly 

have to reach definite prior agreement with the Indians concerning the uses to which 

space broadcasting was put. We obviously could not tolerate its use to defame us or our 

actions or to embarrass us in our relations with nations such as Pakistan. We might also 

have to face the question of continuing subsidies after the experimental satellite had gone 

dead; India might not be able to finance new satellites solely from its own pocket. We 

should also have to be careful that the experiment remained clearly separate from commercial communications projects and did not prejudice relations with INTELSAT or the 

concept of a single global communications satellite system. 

Nevertheless, there remain powerful arguments in favor of discussing such an experiment with the Indian Government. The discussions and the institution of a joint study 

group would be a convincing display to that Government of our intent to use the most 

advanced technologies in helping it to cope with its urgent human problems. The joint 

study itself would bring Indians and Americans into intimate technical collaboration. 

India could learn from the study new technological and management approaches to education and to the uses of informational media to weld together a nation-state. The US 

would, in turn, learn more about the Indians and their most pressing problems. 

[3] Should the project come to fruition, then important additional benefits would flow. 

India would, on its own initiative and with its own resources, begin the accelerated development of a modern electronics industry. This “bootstrapping” operation would materially raise India’s technological base and contribute thereby to the development of other, 

similar industries. Some Indian energies might also be diverted from concern with 

nuclear weapons development, the more so perhaps as the success of the experiment contributed to India’s prestige in Asia. The posture of the US would also be improved 

through a generous demonstration of its willingness to share the benefits of advanced 

space technology with underdeveloped nations. 

As I view the proposal, we would at no time be exposing ourselves by unconsidered 

commitments or precipitous action. Each step, from the initial, private discussions with 

the Indian Government, through the careful and detailed examination by the joint study 

group would provide renewed opportunities to reexamine initial premises and search for 

possible flaws in all facets of the proposal. Even should it prove infeasible in the end, both 

we and the Indians could not fail to have profited by the intimacy of our cooperation in 

a joint technological venture. 

I look forward with interest to hearing your reaction to this proposal. I do want to add 

that we are already negotiating or entertaining a number of other prospective projects for 

the near or distant future ad so have excluded these possib es from the category of suggestions for new cooperation. . . . 

Sincerely yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 
26 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-8 

Document title: Robert J. Allnutt, for A.M. Lovelace, Acting Administrator, NASA, via 

Margaret Finarelli, NASA Headquarters, to Erik Quistgaard, Director General, European 

Space Agency, Telegraphic Message, February 20, 1981. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In February 1981, the Office of Management and Budget, under the new administration of President 

Ronald Reagan, ordered NASA to cancel one of its major science programs. This represented a way of 

reducing the NASA budget in future years. NASA chose to cancel the spacecraft it was committed to 

provide as part of the International Solar Polar Mission, a joint venture of NASA and the European 

Space Agency. Because of the secrecy surrounding budget decisions, NASA was unable to alert ESA of 

the possibility of such a cancellation until a telephone call on February 18, the same day that 

President Reagan announced the cuts he was making in the budget submitted by outgoing President 

Jimmy Carter Formal notice of the cancellation was provided by this telegram, signed by Robert 

Allnutt, one of the top staff of NASA’s Acting Administrator Alan Lovelace, and forwarded by 

Margaret Finarelli of the Ofjce of Intmational Affairs. 

[I1 

TO: MR. ERIK QUISTGAARD 

DIRECTOR GENERAL 

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY 

8-10 RUE MARIO NIKIS 

75738 PARIS CEDEX 15 

FRANCE 

INFO: 

MR. JAMES MORRISON 

NASA EUROPEAN REP. 

RUFNPS AMEMBASSY 

PARIS, FRANCE 

MR. WILFRED MELLORS 

ESA WASHINGTON OFFICE 

(CODE LID-1 8 TO MAIL) 

As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation yesterday, the administration’s 

budget for FY82 requires severe cuts in the full range of NASA’s programs. Because work 

on vital shuttle activities must continue, we have been forced to cancel or otherwise forego 

a number of major programs in the science and applications areas. We are foregoing starts 

for both VOIR and GRO; monies for the development of Spacelab payloads have been cut 

back even further: NOSS has been cancelled; and numerous other programs in the applications area such as our agricultural forecasting program have suffered deep cuts. 

[2] We have endeavored, and will continue to endeavor, to honor our international commitments to the fullest extent possible. Nonetheless, the deep budget cuts have necessitated cancellation of part of the joint NASA/ESA ISPM Mission, namely the US Spacecraft 

which was to have participated in the Solar Polar mission. In view of the major scientific 

importance of Solar Polar research, we hope that ESA will continue with the mission 

which can now be launched in 1986 on a Shuttle/Centaur and that we will be able to 

maintain its cooperative nature. 

As I indicated to you yesterday, the NASA budget will permit support of the remaining spacecraft, including the U.S. experiments previously planned for the ESA spacecraft. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 27 

[3] As I mentioned to you on the telephone, I propose that Dr. Stofan, NASA’s Acting 

Associate Administrator for Space Science, and Dr. Trendlenberg, ESAs Director for 

Scientific and Meteorological Programs, meet promptly to review the current spacecraft 

situation, assess the impact of the budget reduction on the scientific value of the mission 

and determine the most effective way to proceed with the ESA spacecraft. When Stofan 

and Trendlenberg have concluded their discussions regarding the spacecraft, you and I 

should then discuss the mission further. 

I want to assure you that cancellation of the US Spacecraft in the ISPM mission is 

taken with great reluctance and was unavoidable given the broad and deep cuts occurring 

throughout NASA and throughout the US Government budget. I would like to reiterate 

my deep appreciation for ESA’s cooperation with NASA in the past and my continuing 

sense of commitment to working with ESA on programs of mutual interest. 

[4] I share your view about the value of looking closely at our existing consultation procedures to see if, within the constraints on both sides, improvements can be made. I have 

asked Ken Pedersen to be sure this topic gets a high place on the agenda for our informal 

talk on March 9. I am looking forward to seeing you again. 

Robert J. Allnutt signed for 

A. M. Lovelace 

Acting Administrator 

Document 1-9 

Document title: W.J. Mellors, Head, Washington Office, European Space Agency, “Aide 

Memoire, International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM),” February 24,1981. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Not surprisingly, the European Space Agency (ESA) and its member states reacted with outrage to the 

U. S. cancellation of its spacecraj contribution to the International Solar Polar Mission. Diplomatic 

protests were lodged on a government-tegovernment basis, and Congress was made aware of Europe’s 

unhappiness. These notes, prepared by Wilfred Mellors, the head ofESAS Washington office, were the 

basis of his initial fmmal presentation of the ESA response to the cancellation. 

[11 24th February, 1981 

Aide Memoire 

International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM) 

1. Last week the Acting Administrator of NASA informed the Director General of 

the European Space Agency that the cuts announced by President Reagan in his speech 

on February 18th, 1981 included the cancellation of the US spacecraft and the associated 

U.S. experiments for the above mentioned mission. At a meeting held on February 23rd 

NASA confirmed this situation. 

2. I am to say that: 

a) The cancellation of the NASA satellite, which was effected without consultation, is a unilateral breach of the ISPM MOU; this cancellation is totally 
28 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

unacceptable and ESA requests full restoration of the programme to its original level. 

b) If the cancellation were permitted to stand, there would be serious long term 

damage to European/United States cooperation in space. 

c) Naturally, there has been a very unfavorable reaction in Europe. No less than 

seventeen European scientific institutes are involved in the United States 

spacecraft and would consequently be unable to fly. These experimenters 

have already committed more than 50% of the total cost of their experiments. 

Indeed, Europe has already made a major investment of the order of one 

hundred millions of US dollars, equivalent to the whole of ESAs annual budget for Space Science, in the ISPM programme. 

3. It is to be noted that at the time ESA decided to participate in ISPM, other candidate missions were considered, including some purely European projects with no 

American participation. However, ESA decided to collaborate with NASA because first, 

the ISPM mission-as it was with two spacecraft-was of outstanding value to the scientific community in Europe and in the United States as it permitted simultaneous measurements over the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the sun and, secondly, (of equal 

and even greater importance), it was believed there was great value in such transatlantic 

coopera tion. 

[2] 4. I am further to say that this present cancellation of the US spacecraft is not the 

first instance of a unilateral action by the US in this project which has had serious consequences for ESA. I am to point out that in March of 1980 the revision of the NASA FY81 

budget resulted in a delay of two years in the launch date which cost ESA and the 

European scientific institutes supporting the mission at least an additional twenty millions 

of dollars; while in January of this year a decision was taken to change the upper stage 

from the IUS [Inertial Upper Stage] to the CENTAUR vehicle, the full consequences of 

which have not yet been established. 

5. In view of the above the Director General has today requested each Member State 

immediately to make through its Washington Embassy at Ambassador level, the strongest 

possible protest against the announced cancellation and to request a full restoration of 

the two spacecraft mission. 

6. Finally I am to point out that it is ESA's view that such unilateral actions as now 

taken by the United States could destroy the basis for collaborations of this nature in the 

future and that the impact could well go beyond the field of scientific space research. 

W. J. Mellors 

Head, Washington Office 

European Space Agency 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 29 

Document 1-10 

Document title: “Meeting of NASA Administrator and ESA Director General, 17 June 

1982, ESA Head Office,” with attached: “General Principles for NASA/ESA Cooperative 

Agreements.” 

Source: ESA Collection, European Community Archives, Florence, Italy. 

In the months following the cancellation of the International Solar Polar Mission, the European 

Space Agency (ESA) and its member states conducted a comprehensive assessment of the desirability 

of continuingEurope’s close cooperation with the United States. The conclusion of this assessment was 

that such cooperation remained desirable but the terms and conditions under which it would be carried out had to provide more protection to European interests. These terms and conditions were agreed 

to at a June 1982 meeting between the heads ofNASA and ESA. 

[I1 

Meeting of NASA Administrator and 

ESA Director General 

17 June 1982, ESA Head Office 

FUTURE NASA/ESA COOPERATION 

A. Principles and terms of future agreements. 

Having confirmed their intention to continue their long-standing cooperation, ESA 

and NASA agreed on the “General Principles for NASA/ESA Cooperative Agreements” 

attached to these minutes (Annex 1). 

B. Procedures for regular exchange of views on future programmes in space science and applications. 

NASA proposed three measures to set up such procedures: - schedule regular discussions between the respective division directors responsible 

for astrophysics, environmental observations, and earth and planetary exploration programmes; 

encourage exchange of information and ideas among US and European scientists 

who participate in the respective NASA and ESA programmes; 

encourage regular meetings between the NASA Associate Administrator for Space 

Science and Applications and the ESA Directors of Scientific Programmes and 

Application Programmes. 

ESA gave a brief outline of ground rules recently approved by its Science Programme 

Committee for future scientific cooperation. 

These ground rules are attached (Annex 2). 

- 

- 

[2] As to applications, ESA stated to be in favor of regular meetings at working level in 

the field of earth observation. In the telecommunications sector further ad hoc discussions on specific topics could be envisaged. 

ESA agreed to the three measures proposed by NASA and outlined above. . . . 

********* 
30 

r31 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

DG/A Meeting 

17 June 1982 

Annex 1 

General Principles for NASA/ESA 

Cooperative Agreements 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space Agency 

confirm their desire to continue conducting cooperative space projects. They recognize 

that in the past, cooperation has in general, been of great mutual interest to both parties. 

NASA and ESA intend to continue formalizing such cooperation through either 

Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the two agencies, the standard form of 

agreement for joint projects, or, for some specific major programmes, Intergovernmental 

Agreements between ESA Member States and the Government of the United States of 

America. Before a proposed MOU is concluded, it will be submitted by NASA to the U.S. 

Department of State, which will determine whether it constitutes an international agreement as defined by the provisions of Public law 92-403. This action is necessary because of 

Sec. 503 of Public law 92-426, which requires that the Secretary of State be informed and 

consulted before any agency of the United States Government takes any major action, primarily involving science or technology, with respect to any foreign government or international organization, and also because of Sec. 504 of that law which stipulates that the 

Secretary of State has primary responsibility for coordination and oversight with respect 

to all major science or science and technology agreements and activities between the 

United States and foreign countries or international organizations. NASA will notify ESA 

of the U.S. Department of State opinion before submission of the proposed MOU to the 

ESA Council. 

As such international agreements have general limitations within the U.S. legal system 

and may have to contain, for legal or institutional reasons, specific limitations regarding 

their liabilities, the parties note that some degree of risk is involved in joint projects. Thus, 

NASA and ESA agree that, in order to alleviate the uncertainties and the risks, they will 

from now on apply the following guidelines: 

1. In developing the type and degree of assurances to be included in a particular 

agreement, NASA and ESA will take into consideration the degree of risk and the 

importance of the project for each of the parties. The calculation of risk will 

include such factors as the possibility of one party losing all or a major part of its 

investment if the other party cannot further fulfill its commitment, the cost burden assumed by each party, the overall cost of the mission, and the time criticality of the mission. Both parties, in the process of negotiating an agreement, will 

undertake to provide within that agreement for a degree of assurances appropriate to the degree of risk resulting from the factors mentioned above. 

[4] 2. NASA and ESA will endeavor to inform each other of any legislative or regulatory provisions existing, or coming into force subsequent to the signing of a[n] 

MOU, that might limit or prevent implementation of the agreement’s provisions. 

3. NASA and ESA recognize the importance of timely and full consultation to the 

effective implementation and completion of joint projects. Consultation is particularly important when one party experiences difficulties in meeting its obligations as stated in the project agreement of its annexes, if any. NASA and ESA will, 

to the fullest extent practicable in such cases, consult before a decision is taken. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 31 

4. NASA and ESAwill consider whether a proposed project is suited to being implemented in discrete phases which could be the subject of separate agreements. 

The purpose of this approach would be to permit, after conclusion of each phase, 

each party to review its interest in continuing with the project. It is recognized 

that many projects will not be amenable to this approach. 

5. In the course of negotiation [of future cooperative project agreements, NASA 

and ESA will examine possibilities for proving assurances relative to alternative 

flight opportunities or developed flight hardware in the event the agreement is 

not able to be executed in full. 

Document 1-11 

Document title: Burton I. Edelson, Associate Administrator, Space Science Applications, 

NASA, and Roger M. Bonnet, Director, Scientific Programme, ESA, “NASA/ESA Space 

Science Planning Meeting, ESA Head Office-27th-29th June 1983,” June 29, 1983. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

By 1983, the unhappiness of the European Space Agency (ESA) had not completely disappeared with 

respect to the 1981 cancellation of the US. spacecraft intended as part of the joint NASA-ESA 

International Solar Polar Mission. Howmq the two organizations still recognized the benefits of regular consultations on their future space science plans to identih p-oductive synergzes and opportunities for collaboration. For example, the following minutes of a June 1983 meeting show that together 

the two agencies identifzd areas, such as solar terrestrial research, in which enhanced cooperation 

would be fruit/iul. They also recognized other areas, such as infrared astronomy, in which each would 

pursue separate missions. 

NASA/ESA Space Science Planning Meeting 

ESA Head Office-27th-29th June 1983 

At their meeting on 27th, 28th, 29th June 1983 in Paris, ESA and NASA reaffirmed 

the great advantage of international cooperation in space science which they consider of 

particular importance from the point of view of scientific, technological, political and 

financial considerations. 

The meeting was held with the aim of reaching an in-depth understanding of the 

other party’s goals on fundamental as well as more immediate practical issues. Three areas 

of cooperation were discussed in more detail: 

- Infrared Astronomy 

Solar Terrestrial Research 

Planetary Exploration 

- 

- 

Each of these areas is treated in the following sections. 

1. General Framework of Cooperation between ESA and NASA 

It was agreed during the meeting that measures should be taken to improve in the 

future the framework of cooperation between the two parties. Two such measures have 

already been identified: 
32 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

a) ESA and NASA agree to set up an international committee to advise the two parties on specific issues related to cooperation. The committee will be co-chaired by 

R. Bonnet from ESA and F. MacDonald from NASA and will include four 

American and four European senior scientists with experience in international 

cooperative programmes. The committee will in particular analyze the best ways 

of implementing the principle of reciprocity by which American participation in 

European programmes is applied in recognition of the US principle of opening 

their AOs [Announcements of Opportunity] to the non-US scientific community. 

The committee will report to ESA and NASA before the end of January 1984. 

b) In order to widen their cooperation at the level of the younger scientists, the two 

parties agreed to formalize an exchange of fellowship programmes whereby a 

number of postdoctoral European fellows will each year be based in NASA centres and the same number of American fellows based in the Space Science 

Department of ESA/ESTEC [European Space Technology Education Centre]. 

The exact procedure for selection of the scientists and for reviewing their 

research programmes will be analyzed in detail before the next bilateral meeting. 

Action: NASA, F. MacDonald; ESA, D.E. Page 

2. Infrared Astronomy 

a) analyse the objectives and anticipated performances of IS0 and SIRTF to identify their complementarity; 

b) identify characteristics of focal plane instruments in both facilities which could 

optimise the overall performance capability of these two missions; 

c) identify elements in both programmes which could be considered as reciprocal 

contributions. 

The joint study team will be headed by Dr. Nancy Boggess of NASA and Dr. Henk 

Olthof of ESA and will meet during the autumn with a preliminary report in time for the 

next ESA/NASA Space Science Planning Meeting. 

3. Future Solar Terrestrial Research 

The ESA/NASA representatives surveyed the large number of missions under study 

in the USA, Europe and Japan in the area of Solar Terrestrial physics (DISCO, SDO, 

SOHO, Cluster, OPEN, OPEN J, Plasma Turbulence Explorer) and agreed that a need 

exists for an integrated look at all these missions. 

ESA and NASA note the technological and scientific success of IRAS [Infrared 

Astronomical Satellite] and reaffirm their commitment to infrared astronomy in space. 

[2] They agree to continue to explore furtherjoint effort in infrared space astronomy. 

ESA notes NASA's revised plans to make SIRTF [Space Infrared Telescope Facility] a 

long duration, reserviceable mission operating in a Shuttle/Space Station compatible 

orbit, and NASA's strong interest in collaborating to develop a single major international 

infrared Space telescope facility. 

NASA notes the firm commitment of ESA to the approved Infrared Space 

Observatory, ISO, which is an Ariane launched mission with an elliptical orbit. 

The parties discussed the possibility for US participation in the IS0 mission and 

European participation in the SIRTF mission by furnishing focal plane instruments and 

exchange of observing time. It is noted that the differences in orbit and launch vehicle 

restrict any major hardware collaboration between these two missions as currently 

defined. 

It is recognised that in the post-IRAS time frame, coordination in programme planning is desirable to optimize the overall scientific return. It is therefore agreed to set up a 

joint study team to: 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 33 

There seems to be considerable merit in considering a joint NASA/ESA/ISAS 

[Institute of Space and Astronautical Science ofJapan] mission which would cover major 

parts of solar heliospheric physics of DISCO, SDO and SOH0 and at the same time cover 

magnetospheric and interplanetary physics and thereby replace IPL of OPEN in conjunction with the utilization of an enhanced OPEN J as the EML portion of OPEN. 

[3] It was agreed that NASA and ESAwill set up a preparatory meeting, to which ISAS will 

be invited, with two or three representatives from each Agency and one or two representatives from each of the projects mentioned above. The meeting will be organized by 

NASA in Washington DC in late September 1983. The goal of this meeting should be to 

look for joint missions which can satisfy the main scientific requirements in a costeffective way. 

Following reporting to the advisory committees of the Agencies in 

October/November, and a further round of meetings of the preparatory committee and 

advisory committees in January 1984, the aim is to define missions which can go into ESA 

phase A and NASA studies in approximately March 1984. 

4. Planetary Exploration 

The ESA/NASA representatives reviewed the status of the plans and studies of the two 

Agencies in the area of planetary exploration in order to identify mutually beneficial 

opportunities for cooperative missions. 

a) Saturn-Titan Probe Mission 

Pending the recommendation of ESA's advisory committees, NASA and ESA agree to 

undertake a joint assessment study in 1984 of a Saturn-Titan probe mission for launch 

around 1992. This mission would call for an FY 1989 NASA new start. The mission would 

be based on the ESA Cassini proposal and on the Titan probe mission identified by 

NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee, and would take into account the recommendations of the NAS/ESF Joint Working Group. 

b) Small Bodies Rendezvous Mission 

NASA and ESA plan to undertake a joint assessment study of a small bodies rendezvous mission using a European Solar Electric Propulsion System for launch in the 

1990s. The mission would be based on the ESAAgora proposal and on the Multi-Mainbelt 

Asteroid mission identified by NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee, and would 

take into account the recommendation of the NAS/ESF Joint Working Group. The organization and timing of this study will be addressed at the next NASA/ESF Space Science 

Planning Meeting. 

c) Mars Missions 

The Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for the NASA Mars GeoscienceClimatology Orbiter (MGCO) mission is planned for release in 1985 and, as such, is well 

timed for coordination with an ESA A0 for a 1992 Kepler mission, if this mission is 

approved for launch in that year. 

[4] 5. Next Meeting 

The next ESA/NASA Space Science Planning meeting is scheduled to take place in 

the US in December 1983/January 1984. 

Burton I. Edelson 

Associate Administrator 

Space Science Applications 

NASA 

Roger M. Bonnet 

Director 

Scientific Programme 

ESA 
34 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Paris, 29th June 1983 

[5] List of Participants 

NASA 

Burton Edelson 

Charles Pellerin 

Shelby Tilford 

Frank MacDonald 

Geff Briggs 

Richard Barnes 

Lyn Wigbels 

ESA 

Roger Bonnet 

Vittorio Manno 

Edgar Page 

Henk Olthof 

George Haskell 

Gordan Whitcomb 

Roger Emery 

Arne Pedersen 

Brian Taylor 

Valerie Hood 

Document 1-12 

Document title: George M. Low, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, to Director, Apollo 

Spacecraft Program, “Flag for Lunar Landing Mission,” January 23,1969. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In his January 20, 1969, Inaugural Address, Richard Nixon had suggested that “as we explore the 

reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together-not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new 

adventure to be shared. ” Unsure of the intent behind the new president 5 words, NASA headquarters 

began to think of how best to make thefirst lunar landing appear to be more of an international 

accomplishment. To those working on the Apollo program who saw the enterprise primarily in nationalistic terms, this was a troubling helopment. This memorandum from George Low, who had 

assumed personal direction of the Apollo spacecraft program after the Apollo 204 capsule fire, gives a 

sense of this reaction. George Hage, mentioned in the memorandum, was an official of the Apollo 

Program Ofjce at NASA headquarters. The Apollo 11 mission eventually carried very lightweight 

flags of every country, which were returned to Earth and presented, along with a small lunar sample, 

to heads of state. A plaque saying “We Came in Peace fm All Mankind” was attached to the lunar 

lander and left on the Moon. 

[ll 

AA /Director January 23, 1969 

In reply refer to: 

PA-9-1-40 

PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 

Flag for lunar landing mission 

I received a call from George Hage indicating that, in light of Nixon’s inaugural 

address, many questions are being raised in Headquarters as to how we might emphasize 

the international flavor of the Apollo lunar landing. Specifically, it was suggested that we 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 35 

might paint a United Nations flag on the LM [Lunar Module] descent stage instead of the 

United States flag. My response cannot be repeated here. I feel very strongly that planting the United States flag on the moon represents a most important aspect of all of our 

efforts; I indicated that, from a personal point of view, I would have no objection to carrying some small United Nations flags to the moon and bringing them back for subsequent presentation to the UN (provided, of course, that they don't weigh too much). 

I thought that you should be aware of these discussions since the subject will probably come up again on several occasions. 

George M. Low 

Document 1-13 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Acting Administrator, to President Richard 

Nixon, February 12, 1969. 

Source: Thomas 0. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 

D.C. 

As Richard M. Nixon assumed the presidency on January 20, 1969, interest in space was at a peak. 

The December 1968 Apollo 8 circumlunar mission, commanded by astronaut Frank Borman, had 

captured the imagination of the world and cleared the way for an initial lunar landing attempt. 

Thomas 0. Paine, who had been NASA Deputy Administrator since March 1968 and had become 

Acting Administrator after James E. Webb retired in November 1968, stayed on during the presidential transition. In this lettq Paine provides to the president an assessment of the space situation in 

Europe and of i7.S.-European space relations. The Or DuBridge mentioned in the letter is Lee A. 

DuBridge, the president j science advisor 

February 12, 1969 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

Dr. DuBridge has informed me of your desire for a summary of European space activities in connection with your forthcoming visit abroad and for advice on space-related 

matters that might be appropriate for you to discuss with the Europeans. 

Frank Borman's visits are being enthusiastically received and may serve to generate 

more interest in space at the time of your trip than would otherwise be the case. The 

Borman family is now visiting the countries on your itinerary and we have offered your 

staff any assistance our people in Europe may be able to give in advance work and arrangements for your trip. 

The following brief review covers national and regional space activities in Europe, 

European cooperative activities with NASA, and suggested positions which you might take 

on both European and cooperative space activities. This review has been coordinated with 

the State Department people concerned and accords with their views. 
36 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

I have also considered two suggestions for additional ways in which you might express 

your personal interest in space cooperation while you are in Europe. One would be 

through your participation in a ceremony in Rome to confirm two pending agreements. 

The other would be to extend personal invitations to the Chiefs of State you meet to 

attend the historic Apollo 11 launch now scheduled to undertake a lunar landing this 

summer. The Department of State feels, however, that both suggestions could create problems that might outweigh the advantages, and we concur in their view that these proposals should not be pursued without further careful consideration by State. 

I - General 

Although much study and discussion has taken place, the European countries have 

not yet defined and agreed upon their individual and joint basic policies in space. They 

are making limited [2] investments in national programs at a level of about $300 million 

annually. They have pooled resources in two intergovernmental regional bodies: the 

European Space Research Organization (ESRO) , and the European Launcher 

Development Organization (ELDO). These are maintained on a marginal basis only, however, with severe internal divisions as to purpose, structure, funding level, contract-sharing, and future direction and pace. 

The countries you will visit all belong to the 65-nation communications satellite consortium, Intelsat, for which the US Comsat Corporation is manager and NASA is the 

launching agency on a reimbursable basis. Intelsat has made excellent progress toward a 

global satellite communications system, but certain quarters (particularly France) argue 

that the United States unduly dominates Intelsat through its technological advantages, 

large voting rights, designation of the US Comsat Corporation as manager, NASA's position as the only source of suitable launch vehicles, and by obtaining (competitively) the 

largest share of contracts for US industry. These basic issues will be the subjects of negotiating sessions beginning this month in Washington to arrive at definitive arrangements 

for Intelsat's future. Also at issue will be the place, if any, for domestic or regional communications satellite systems inside or outside of the Intelsat. 

There has been and continues to be significant and productive cooperation between 

NASA on the one hand and the European national space agencies and ESRO on the 

other. This includes: a dozen European satellites launched or to be launched by NASA 

with full international data-sharing, some twenty European experiments contributed for 

flight on NASA satellites, dozens ofjoint scientific sounding rocket launchings, important 

support for meteorological and communications experiments, accommodation and operation of U.S. tracking and data acquisition facilities overseas, advanced information 

exchange programs, and joint fellowship and training programs. 

Nevertheless, the European nations have still not determined whether they should 

rely ultimately on cooperation with the United States or should develop a completely 

independent capability for space operations. Near the heart of this issue is the specific 

question in Europe whether they should develop an independent launch capability for 

communications satellites, or should remain dependent upon U.S. boosters only, thereby 

submitting to the alleged American domination of Intelsat. 

In the meantime European Space Agency-NASA cooperation proceeds very satisfactorily on the technical level and is proving most productive. It appears limited, however, 

to essentially small scientific satellites and one larger undertaking now nearing agreement 

with Germany until the above fundamental issue is resolved. Efforts on NASA's part to 

increase the scale of cooperation in the past several years have been [3] viewed in Europe 

against the background of the Intelsat issue. Thus, we have been suspected of attempting 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 37 

to divert European activities toward scientific pursuits and away from “high pay-off” projects in space communications, and our offers of boosters for their satellites have been 

interpreted in some quarters as calculated to undermine support for ELDO’s development of a European booster. In general, however, you will find a positive view of American 

space cooperation, and a very enthusiastic view of NASA in the wake of Astronaut 

Borman’s highly successful Presidential good-will tour. 

II - National Situations 

France is the third “space power” and the only country besides the U.S. and the USSR 

to have launched its own satellites with its own launchers. It possesses an excellent space 

laboratory at Bretigny and is developing a unique equatorial-polar launch site in Guiana. 

Cooperation between NASA and its French counterpart (CNES) has been professional, 

extensive, and scientifically rewarding. The first French scientific satellite, FR-1, was 

launched by NASA in December 1965. Another major French satellite, EOLE, is to be 

launched by NASA in 1970 to determine the feasibility of a satellite-balloon system for 

mapping global winds systems. Of five French scientific experiments accepted for flight on 

NASA satellites, four have already flown. 

With respect to other space relationships, France has reflected Gaullist policies, has 

sought to dominate both ESRO and ELDO, has led the attempt to direct both organizations toward local communications satellite objectives, and had led the most severe criticism of alleged U.S. domination of Intelsat. France is now engaged with Germany in an 

experimental communications satellite, Symphonie. France is the only western nation to 

have reached a cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union for the actual development 

of a scientific satellite. This was delayed by French budget cuts and by French scientists’ 

efforts to obtain access to Soviet launch sites necessary for validating their work, and is 

now reported abandoned. 

The United Kingdom has contributed three scientific satellites for launching by NASA, 

agreement has been reached on a fourth, and a fifth is under consideration. British scientists have also contributed eleven outstanding experiments selected for flight on NASA 

satellites (more than any other country) and have made major contributions to ESRO 

satellites. This is significant, since the contribution of an individual experiment for a 

NASA satellite may cost the contributing country perhaps $300 thousand. Although 

Britain initiated ELDO in [4] 1962, it has led the current movement to scuttle the organization on grounds of excessive cost, poor reliability, and the ready availability of proven 

U.S. launch vehicles. 

Germany was slow to initiate space activity but is now developing the largest space budget in Europe, over $100 million annually. Two small satellites are being prepared for 

launching in 1970 and 1972 on NASA launch vehicles. A space probe will be launched in 

1970 by another NASA launch vehicle, and an ambitious solar probe, HELIOS, is in the 

final stages ofjoint definition. This will carry German and U.S. experiments closer to the 

sun than has yet been done, again using a U.S. launch vehicle. Germany usually aligns 

itself with France on European regional space issues and has joined with France in the 

Symphonie communications satellite project. These projects are straining Germany’s project management capability to the utmost. 

Ztaly has focussed [sic] mainly on cooperative satellite agreements with NASA (signed 

in Rome by then Vice-president Johnson in 1962). Under these agreements, Italy has 

developed an imaginative launch complex on towable platforms moored in the Indian 

Ocean off Kenya. 
38 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Here, the San Marco satellite was launched by Italians using a contributed NASA 

booster to make unique measurements of the density of the spatial medium. A jointlyinstrumented satellite will be launched here in the next cooperative effort in 1970. NASA 

has a new agreement pending with Italy for the launching of two U.S. spacecraft from this 

complex on a reimbursable basis; the platform’s location on the equator permits us to use 

smaller boosters than would otherwise be required to achieve equatorial orbits, thereby 

saving NASA $2-3 million per launch. Italy is the weakest supporter for ELDO and ESRO 

at the present time. 

The Netherlands and Belgium maintain small but highquality space science programs, 

primarily in selected university laboratories. The principal ESRO laboratory is located in 

Holland at Noordwijk. Dutch scientific groups have made contributions to ESRO and 

NASA satellites out of all proportion to their modest domestic support. Dutch scientific 

and industrial interests are pressing their government to propose the cooperative launching by NASA of a small but sophisticated astronomical satellite. Both Belgium and 

Holland possess excellent laboratory facilities in aeronautics as well as in space science. 

Both countries support the regional space institutions in Europe, although Belgium has 

tended to follow France’s hostile lead with regard to Intelsat. 

[51 111 - Regional Organizations 

ESRO is a ten-member intergovernmental agency for the development and operation 

of spacecraft and sounding rockets for scientific purposes and practical applications. It 

spends about $50 million a year and has developed highly professional facilities at 

Noordwijk in Holland, other facilities elsewhere, and a small tracking and data acquisition 

network. NASA has, on a cooperative basis, launched ESRO’s first two scientific satellites 

and, on a reimbursable basis, has launched a third. NASA and ESRO have developed a 

sophisticated integrated data exchanged system and conduct a jointly-funding training 

program. The ELDO crisis and financial and contract-sharing difficulties have strained 

ESRO and currently limit opportunities for enlarging the scale of U.S. cooperation. 

ELDO is a seven-member intergovernmental organization, spending now about $90 

million annually to develop a large European launch vehicle. England has developed the 

first rocket stage with U.S. technology, France the second stage, and Germany the third, 

while Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are contributing ancillary systems. The 

Australian launch site at Woomera has been used for test launchings but the vehicle will 

ultimately be shifted to the French Guiana range. The three-stage ELDO launch vehicle 

falls between the US. Thor and Atlas rockets, but has yet to function successfully as a 

whole, though it probably will in time. Severe cost overruns and a decision by the UK to 

discontinue membership after 1971 have thrown ELDO into a serious crisis which jeopardizes its future as well as that of ESRO. ELDO has called on NASA only for minor assistance through visits or discussions relating to technical background and management 

systems. U.S. policy has supported both ESRO and ELDO as having European 

institutional values. Other U.S. policies, however, conflict to the extent that they restrict 

technical assistance which might conceivably be used to support European communications satellite capabilities inconsistent with Intelsat. 

NATO. With regard to larger U.S. policy, efforts were made before the establishment 

of ELDO and ESRO to develop a European regional space activity based on NATO. 

European interests nevertheless insisted on: (1) projecting an uncompromising civilian 

posture in space, (2) making it possible for non-NATO nations like Switzerland and 

Sweden to join with others, and (3) preserving the option for an independent European 

space effort. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 39 

It is not yet clear whether Europe will be able to save and strengthen ELDO and 

ESRO, although efforts are in progress and the situation is very sensitive, particularly with 

regard to putative U.S. motivations [6] and European goals. European leaders have discussed an ultimate possibility that ESRO and ELDO might be merged into a single 

European “NASA” but plans for this purpose are not due for consideration until the end 

of this year. 

IV - Suggested Positions During Your Trip 

We anticipate that the Intelsat question would be the major space-related matter that 

might arise during your visit. This is a matter of central concern to the Department of 

State and other agencies. NASA is in complete agreement with the State Department’s 

position that the United States should respond to questions and criticisms on Intelsat to 

the effect that these matters are negotiable in the Intelsat definitive negotiations beginning later this month. In particular, the French and German space commissions have 

jointly asked NASA whether we would launch their joint experimental communications 

satellite, Symphonie, on a reimbursable basis. With the guidance of the Department of 

State, we have responded positively. This was considered the best answer under the circumstances, though it was recognized that some Europeans would interpret this positive 

answer as designed to undercut ELDO’s European launcher programs, just as they would 

have interpreted a negative answer as designed to monopolize satellite communication 

experiments by denying launching assistance in this area to European nations. We believe 

it important to continue to maintain as positive a posture on this point as possible. 

Against this background, it would appear to us desirable if you could reassure 

Europeans, wherever space matters arise, that the U.S. is not seeking to impose its will on 

the direction of future West European space activities and that we recognize that 

European nations should determine their own courses based on their own assessments of 

where their interests lie. If U.S. cooperation can figure positively to our mutual advantage, 

it will indeed be available. There is a strong positive interest in NASA to further develop 

international cooperation in space in both the science and applications areas, on the basis of 

mutual interest. 

Respectfully yours, 

T. 0. Paine 

Acting Administrator 
40 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-14 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASAAdministrator, to the President, August 12,1969. 

Document 1-15 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, November 7, 

1969. 

Document 1-16 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASAAdministrator, to the President, March 26, 1970. 

Source: All in Thomas 0. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 

Washington, D.C. 

These three letters record the initiatives that NASA, and particularly Administrator Thomas 0. 

Paine, took in the aftermath of the Apollo 11 landing to increase international participation in the 

US. post-Apollo space program. Paine believed that he had a mandate directly from President Richard 

M. Nixon, delivered as thqr flew to the Apollo 11 landing (splashdown) in the Pacific Ocean, to 

actively seek enhanced international cooperation. Paine based his briefings to leading officials in other 

countries on the futureplans laid out in the report of the Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President 

Spiro i? Agnew. As the Nixon administration made it clear in early 1970 that it did not intend to 

approve the program recommended by the Space Task Group and as the president’s advisors raised 

concerns about the potential of technology transfer to other countries through cooperative space programs, the early enthusiasm about the possibility of major cooperative initiatives faded. 

Document 1-14 

August 12, 1969 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

This is a brief status report on our current efforts and immediate plans to find new 

ways to increase international participation in space programs in the favorable situation 

generated by Apollo 11. 

1. On August 12, I met with Professor Herman Bondi, Director General of the 

European Space Research Organization (ESRO) , briefed him fully on U.S. post-Apollo 

thinking and urged him to begin serious consideration of new approaches to achieve 

more substantial European participation in the manned and unmanned exploration and 

utilization of major space systems in the 1970’s and 1980’s. European thinking with 

respect to space activity has been relatively restricted heretofore [because] ESRO’s current annual budget is slightly over $50 million and the European Launch Development 

Organization budget is slightly over $90 million. In addition, individual national efforts 

total over $160 million, for a total European space effort of something in excess of 

$300 million. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 41 

Professor Bondi agreed that a series of presentations should be made by top NASA 

personnel to senior space officials in Europe within the next few months to raise their 

sights to more advanced projects of greater mutual value. 

2. To initiate these presentations and to conduct more direct and private discussions 

with officials in the best position to respond positively, I plan to brief senior (government) 

officials of the European Space Conference on future U.S. programs and the concrete 

opportunities they will [have] for rewarding participation. I will also talk with Ministers of 

Science in the three principal countries but especially with Minister Stoltenberg in West 

Germany, which is probably in the best position to consider substantial new participation. 

While we cannot achieve immediate commitments of a major character from these first 

discussions, we do hope to gain early agreement to an arrangement which could involve 

the Europeans ever more closely with us and place the benefits of participation constantly in their view. To this end, I plan to propose to the leading European space agencies that 

they associate their top space experts with us in phased program studies which we will be 

undertaking for important post-Apollo missions. The knowledge and interest which we 

jointly develop should then open the door to more substantial [2] participation in specific projects which flow out of these studies, and which would be suitable for European 

attention to the opportunities which would then develop to associate their own astronauts 

with us in future programs in the context of substantive joint contributions to space exploration and application. This could generate greater public interest and support abroad for 

participation with the United States in this venture. 

3. Professor Bondi's mission to the US. was to obtain information needed to decide 

whether the European Launch Development Organization should continue the costly 

development of an already-outmoded medium launch vehicle, duplicating those we have 

had for years, or should halt this work and rely on reimbursable launch services from 

NASA. Europeans have heretofore feared that the U.S. would not provide launchings for 

regional communications satellites, which has motivated them toward small independent 

efforts rather than major joint ventures along the lines we will be proposing. A forthcoming response to Dr. Bondi has now been obtained from the Department of State and will, 

we hope, remove a long-standing negative element in the environment and facilitate our 

discussions looking to more significant cooperation. If Europe should now decide to abandon its trouble-plagued and obsolescent launch vehicle program in favor of purchasing 

U.S. launchings, European funds would be freed for more constructive cooperative purposes and a modest additional dollar market would be created for our vehicles and launch 

services. 

4. Among other promising near-term prospects for significant cooperation with 

Europe are a prototype North Atlantic Air Traffic Control and Navigation Satellite 

Program, and a Synchronous Meteorological Satellite Program. NASA would develop the 

former in partnership with ESRO to meet requirements defined by the Department of 

Transportation (FAA) and its European counterparts. The latter would be developed with 

the French Space Commission as a contribution to the Global Atmospheric Research 

Program. We are pursuing both these prospects energetically. 

5. We have recently significantly extended our data exchange arrangements with 

ESRO to the point where they now constitute, we believe, the most extensive and sophisticated international data system in existence. ESRO uses NASA computer software systems and formats to collect the European technical literature and feed it into their own 

and into NASA's computer banks making possible a totally integrated space publication 

and search system. ESRO has also introduced the NASA Recon (Remote Control) System 

to Europe. An international on-line computerized aerospace information network is thus 

enabling researchers at a number of scattered locations in Europe and in the U.S. to 
42 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

retrieve from the NASA ESRO data bank in “real time,” scientific and technical information for immediate use. This is the first international system of its kind and is being studied both in Europe and this country as a model for similiar [sic] systems. 

6. NASA welcomes and will participate enthusiastically in the review called for by Dr. 

Kissinger to consider U.S. policies on space and other technology exports. This is a timely opportunity to clear away unnecessary restrictions which could seriously obstruct the 

increased international activity which you have called for. 

[3] 7. With regard to potential cooperation with the Soviet Union, I have recently written top Soviet space authorities offering to discuss carrying Soviet scientists’ experiments 

of future NASA planetary probes. I am now inviting Soviet scientists to attend a preparatory briefing next month for scientists from many other countries on our Viking Mars mission with a view to discussing possible participation in that mission and the achievement 

of some measure of cooperation between U.S. and Soviet planetary programs. Whether 

the Apollo 11 success will moderate past Soviet negativists in this area is not yet clear. 

8. Japan, Australia, and Canada are the principal remaining areas whose potential 

for greater participation will be carefully explored. I believe NASA has contributed to a 

reasonable formulation of the new agreement with Japan to initiate that country’s purchase of certain space technology here and we will play a role in providing for the implementation of the agreement. Under your recent directive, we will provide Canada launch 

services for her planned communications satellite system; this action has clearly improved 

relationships in this area, and we are already discussing with Canadian officials their active 

interest in possible participation in our advanced earth resources technology satellite 

series. I discussed yesterday with our new Ambassador to Australia the great services that 

have been rendered through Australian operation of our large tracking and data acquisition complex there and our strong interest in further participation. I expect to visit these 

three countries at the earliest opportunity for greater international cooperation in those 

quarters. 

I will, of course, report to you the results of my forthcoming visit to Europe immediately upon my return. 

Respectfully yours, 

T. 0. Paine 

Administrator 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

Document 1-15 

Nov. 7, 1989 

This is to report to you the results of my recent three-day visit to Europe and related 

actions seeking to promote greater international participation in future US. space programs. 

1. On October 13, 14, and 15, I met with Ministers of Science and senior space program officials of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom plus 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 43 

the Committee of Senior Officials of the European Space Conference in Paris. I described 

for them the principal elements of our space program in the next decades-the reusable 

Space Shuttle, the multi-purpose space station, and the advanced nuclear stage-as recommended in the Space Task Group Report. I invited their careful study of these plans so 

that Europeans might assess the implications for their own planning and determine what 

interest they may have in constructive participation with us. 

Our audiences were clearly impressed by the prospects for development of an economic, shuttle-based space transportation system and by the prospects for a space station 

as a platform for work in both practical applications and science. The Europeans appear 

to recognize that the shuttle and space station together clearly imply the gradual convergence of manned and unmanned flight programs and that this may well outmode their 

previous assumption that automated missions might suffice for Europe in the next 

decade. 

Our fundamental objective was to stimulate Europeans to rethink their present limited space objectives, to [2] help them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent developments, and eventually to establish more considerable prospects for future international 

collaboration on major space projects. In these respects, I believe our visits were more 

successful than might have been expected in the present circumstances of very limited 

budgets and organizational difficulties in European space affairs. We were given to understand privately that the general reaction to our discussions was that current European 

space planning must indeed be thoroughly reassessed in the light of the opportunities 

inherent in the proposed U.S. programs. Chancellor Brandt's speech of last week called 

for increased cooperation in direct response to our suggestions. 

2. On October 16 and 17, NASA convened in Washington a conference of industrial firms to critique concepts for the Space Shuttle and to lay our design considerations for 

next steps in the program to develop the shuttle. At our invitation, some 43 foreign participants and observers attended from Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, Canada, 

Sweden, and Italy, as well as the European Launcher Development Organization. This 

event interacted most favorably with my visit to Europe, lending credibility to my statements that the U.S. would welcome broader participation in our overall programs. In 

turn, the broad opportunities described during the European visit provided a meaningful 

framework for international participation in the Space Shuttle conference. We plan to 

continue this pattern of activity to the extent that substantive European interest permits. 

3. In the area of earth resources surveys by satellite, we have moved forward in several respects to follow through on your recent remarks to the United Nations General 

Assembly: 

(a) An invitation was circulated to the entire UN membership to send observers to 

the 1969 International Symposium on Remote Sensing of the Environment, conducted at 

the University of Michigan last week. Some 41 foreign experts from 12 countries attended. 

(b) If suitable arrangements can be made, we plan to invite the United Nations 

Outer Space Committee and representatives of the UN specialized agencies to inspect 

earth resources program work [3] and facilities at NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center in 

Houston at an early date. 

(c) We are proceeding with several domestic universities to provide a number of 

graduate fellowships covering work in the earth resources disciplines; this fact will be 

reported to the Outer Space Affairs Group of the United Nations so that training possibilities will be generally known; and 

(d) We are also moving forward with plans for an international workshop in 1970 

to review the status of research and experimentation in the earth resources field for all 

interested nations. 
44 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPEKATION 

4. I believe you know already of the agreement signed by NASA and an Indian counterpart agency in mid-September to make available access to a NASA satellite for an experiment in instructional TV broadcasting to 5,000 remote Indian villages, beginning in 

1973. Our ability to make available a share of the time of an advanced satellite in the 

course of an on-going program and to suggest a programmatic framework for the experiment stimulated India to a very considerable effort which will include the construction 

of augmented TV village receivers, the planning of instructional programs, and the logistics system required to coordinate and support all elements of the system. Such programs 

have the greatest implications for benefit to the developing world and for political value 

to the United States as a generous source of advanced technology able to serve the interests of the LDC's. 

5. I have in the past weeks written several times to President Keldysh of the Academy 

of Sciences of the Soviet Union. We invited him to send Soviet scientists to a briefing on 

our Viking Mars mission with a view to discussing possible participation in that mission as 

well as possibilities for coordination between American and Soviet planetary programs. 

Another letter assured Keldysh that NASA will welcome proposals from Soviet scientists 

for the analysis of lunar samples. Finally, I am forwarding to him copies of the Space Task 

Group [4] Report, suggesting that this may be an appropriate time for a meeting to discuss the possibilities of complementary or cooperative space programs. The exchange of 

astronaut/cosmonaut visits may indicate a greater receptivity on their part to such discussions. 

Beyond this, I plan visits to Canada, Australia and Japan to provide the same sort of 

briefing and open the same opportunities to these nations as in my European visit. I shall 

continue to report to you as progress is made in any of the relevant areas and in particular to the extent that any substantial European interest develops. 

Respectfully yours, 

T. 0. Paine 

Administrator 

[I1 

The President 

The White House 

Document 1-16 

March 26, 1970 

Dear Mr. President: 

My recent talks in Australia and Japan completed the first round of foreign visits to 

discuss our space plans for the next decade and to stimulate consideration of new and" 

more extensive international participation in the development and realization of those 

plans. 

In Australia, I met with the Minister of Supply, his principal colleagues, and senior 

officials of the Department of Education and Science. A number of representatives of 

other agencies with interest in the practical applications of space technology participated 

in broader discussions. My impression is that our proposals for increased international 

participation in space activities will receive thoughtful consideration. Australian interest 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 45 

will probably focus on future application satellite programs and the possibilities for a role 

in operational aspects of space station/Space Shuttle activities. 

In Japan, my discussions were with the leadership of the Science and Technics Agency, 

the Ministries of Education, International Trade, Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, Foreign Affairs, and with Japan’s space agencies. I was encouraged by evidence of 

top-level industrial interest in our programs. Our meetings included a full afternoon session with major corporation executives who are members of the Keidanren, the federation of Japanese industry. Japan clearly construes its interests in participation in the 

proposed international program in hard and practical terms. As one deputy minister stated, Japan realizes that in the future it must go beyond quality initiative work and move on 

to undertake new, highly creative enterprises. Participation in the proposed major space 

development projects for the ‘70s may offer Japanese industry a unique opportunity for 

such technical creativity. 

[2] Upon my return to Washington, NASA held an important meeting on March 13 

attended by 40 space officials and representatives from 17 countries and from the three 

regional European space organizations: the European [Space] Research Organization, 

the European Launcher Development Organization, and the European Space 

Conference. These visitors participated in a quarterly review by NASA management of 

contractor design and definition studies for our space station and Space Shuttle programs. The principal discussion centered on the potential of these new systems for replacing many of the space systems which had previously been proposed in their development 

programs for the 1970’s. It seems clear that our proposed space station/Space Shuttle systems would obsolete many of their proposed developments before they became fully operational. For this reason our proposals for international participation are receiving 

thoughtful attention. 

The stakes are high and the issues complex here, so we should expect an extended 

period of up to a year during which foreign governments and their space agency officials 

will be increasing their grasp of the technical details and potentials of our new space systems for the ‘70s. European circles are now giving more serious and open consideration 

to the possibilities for their participation (an example is the attached item from today’s 

Christian Science Monitor). The choices are, however, difficult ones. Many in Europe 

believe that they must choose either an independent European space effort of a limited 

and retrograde character or commit to a much bolder joint program that will be dominated by the United States. We are discussing with the Department of State the kinds of 

assurances of access to and use of the proposed jointly developed new systems that we 

should be prepared to give foreign collaborators in order to win their participation. 

We will continue to involve foreign space interests in government and industry more 

closely with us, to stimulate their interest, and to begin to formulate for their consideration more specific proposals and institutional formats for joint development work. 

Respectfully yours, 

T. 0. Paine 

Administrator 
46 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-17 

Document title: Secretary of State, Telegram 93721 for U.S. Ambassador, Tokyo, “Space 

Cooperation with Japan,” January 5, 1968. 

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. 

This telegram transmitted policy guidance to US. Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson regarding 

new initiatives in U.S.-Japanese space cooperation. Johnson had pressured his colleagues in 

Washington to approve firm-to-firm licensing agreements that would help Japan develop launch a 

capability equivalent to an early model of the US. Delta booster; as well as application satellite capability. NASA and the Department of Defense opposed such an arrangement, but Johnson and the 

Department of State prevailed. The terms and conditions suggested in this telegram were incorporated in a July 31, 1969, exchange of diplomatic notes. 

[ 11 R 0505402 Jan 68 

FM SecState WashDC 

To AmEmbassy Tokyo 0000 

Info CINCPAC . . . 

[ 21 For Ambassador 

Subject: Space Cooperation with Japan 

Reference: Tokyo 3837 

1. Agreement in November 15 communique between President Johnson and Prime 

Minister Sat0 (para 9) opens way for expanded space cooperation with Japan and we 

would like to initiate discussion with [the Government of Japan (GOJ)] to this end. We 

consider close cooperation with Japan in field of space very much in US interest. Such 

cooperation, first, entirely consistent with our basic relationship with Japan and national 

policy of closest possible partnership with Japan in both bilateral relations and joint 

actions to strengthen non-Communist position in east Asia. [Remainder of paragraph 

excised during declassification review] 

2. Therefore, on basis of discussions with you here, we have developed following policy regarding space cooperation with Japan: 

A. Under NSAM 338, we are prepared to cooperate in all aspects of communications satellite development and launch on the assumption that both governments will 

continue to act in sphere in conformity with their INTELSAT commitments. 

[2] Therefore, we would approve technology transfers only after determining to our satisfaction that it would be used only in (i) purely experimental (as opposed to operational) 

systems or (ii) operationally domestic systems compatible with INTELSAT arrangements 

as they evolve. FYI-Neither Japanese nor we are in position to predict just what arrangements for satellite ownership and control other than by INTELSAT will be reflected in 

renegotiated INTELSAT agreements. However, President Johnson, in his message of 

August 14 (CA 1299, dated August 15), committed us to support continuation of 

INTELSAT and to avoid course of action which is incompatible with our support for a 

global system. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to indicate to Japanese 

that we could not assist them if their policy is to contrary. End FYI. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 47 

B. [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

C. Only unclassified US technology is involved. 

D. There must be Japanese [government] commitment on third country controls transferes [sic] of technology derived from US cooperation to Communist China and 

Soviet Union must be explicitly excluded. Sales or technical exchanges involving other 

third countries will require prior US [Government] /GOJ agreement, based on common 

policy for US and GOJ suppliers. 

E. [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

[4] 3. Guidelines for review of applications for licenses, export of equipment or technology will be: 

A. [Paragraphs A and B excised during declassification review] 

C. Licenses for export of equipment or technology will be granted if equipment 

or technology is unclassified and related to an identified Japanese peaceful space program 

or objective: 

and 

D. We are satisfied that end-use of technology applied to communications satellites will be consistent with INTELSAT arrangements as they develop. 

4. On basis above, we propose moving ahead with GOJ along following lines: 

A. We anticipate space cooperation could be extended at two levels: (1) government-to-government and/or agency-level agreements in specific joint projects, including 

provision of reimbursable launch services and (2) industry-to-industry licensing arrangements requiring government approval under munitions control procedures and consistent with provisions of NSAM 338. 

B. We are prepare [sic] to adopt positive position in all areas of peaceful space 

cooperation including technology, reimbursable launch services, and assistance in development of launch vehicles nessary [sic] for application satelites [sic]. 

C. The Japanese should understand that we take our commitment to INTELSAT 

seriously and would not act inconsistently with it. Therefore, we would approve technology transfers [5] only after determining to our satisfaction that it would be used only in 

(i) purely experimental (as opposed to operational) systems or (ii) operationally domestic systems compatible in INTELSAT arrangements as they evolve. 

D. We would want an agreement with Japanese government (preferably through 

exchange of notes) covering two points: 

(1) Technology or equipment transferred under either government-togovernment agreements or industry-to-industry arrangements will be for peaceful purposes except as may be otherwise mutually agreed; and, 

(2) Technology or equipment derived from US cooperation cannot be transferred under any circumstances to Communist China or the Soviet Union and can be 

transferred to other third countries only after mutual agreement based on common 

export policies. 

5. We suggest you undertake appropriate discussions with GOJ. If, in yourjudgment, 

GOJ [is] sincere on end-use technology consistent with INTELSAT arrangements, we will 

be in position to move ahead vis-a-vis NSAM 338 on government, agency, and later on 

industry levels as appropriate. Action on proposals involving NSAM 294 would be undertaken following appropriate agreement as set forth [in] para 3 D above. When it becomes 

clear that such an arrangement is acceptable to the Japanese, we would want to undertake 

appropriate congressional consultation prior to formalizing agreement with the Japanese. 

GP-3 Rusk 
48 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-18 

Document Title: Arnold W. Frutkin, NASA histant Administrator for International 

Affairs, to Administrator, “Canadian Interest in Remote Manipulator Technology to be 

Used with the Space Shuttle,” April 3,1972. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Afer President Nixon gave his go-ahead to the Space Shuttle program on January 5, 1972, it was 

time to decide what contributions, if any, other countries might make to the program. While U.S.- 

European negotiations on this question were rather am’monious, the discussions on a Canadian contribution proceeded relatively smoothly. This memorandum summarizes the prospects for U. s. - 

Canadian post-Apollo cooperation as of early 1972; a final agreement that Canada would contribute 

a remote manipulator system (later named “Canadarm”) to the Space Transportation System was 

reached in 1975. NASA Administrator James Fletchq in a handm‘tten note to NASA staffer Donald 

Morris on the first page of this memorandum, stated: “O.K. to start discussions, but let’s not get as 

far into it as we have on the shuttle (Post-Apollo) with the Europeans. I don’t want any embarrassment if we den’& not to go ahead.” 

Dl APR 3, 1972 

Memorandum 

TO: A/Administrator 

FROM: I/Assistant Administrator for International Affairs 

SUBJECT: Canadian interest in remote manipulator technology to be used with the 

Space Shuttle 

The only result of the NASA offer to the Canadians on post- Apollo participation has 

been interest in possible development of remote manipulator equipment which might be 

used in the Space Shuttle to service the Large Space Telescope [LST], and possibly other 

orbiting spacecraft. This offer stems from a specialized Canadian capability and technology resulting from the development of extensible booms for use in space, and the particular requirements of their nuclear power reactors-which are fueled without shutting 

down. 

Two methods are now under consideration for servicing of the Large Space 

Telescope. The first involves a special RAM-telescope combination which would be serviced by technicians entering the RAM from the docked Space Shuttle for film and subsystem recovery and replacement. The second involves the use of an endeffector 

deployed by a technician-operator from the Shuttle, and designed to detach and replace 

equipment packages on the Large Space Telescope. Current study activity sponsored by 

[the Office of Manned Space Flight] is directed to a choice between these two options 

sometime next summer. 

The Canadian Department of Trade, Industry and Commerce would like to have a 

Canadian industry team assist in a Goddard-conducted interface study of the Space 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 49 

Shuttle and LST, which will explore the second option described above. Their goal is to 

indicate sincere Canadian interest in hardware development participation, to promote 

better understanding in Canada of the factors which would be involved in possible 

Canadian participation in any subsequent development effort, and to demonstrate to 

NASA what they have to offer. 

[Z] In considering possible Canadian association in this early study phase, we have examined the following factors relevant to subsequent hardware development: 

Both [Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight] Dale Myers and I believe this 

proposed activity lies more in the area of “separable items” than in “bit and pieces” of the 

Shuttle and that NASA would stand to benefit from Canadian participation in development of remote manipulators if this option is chosen by [the Office of Manned Space 

Flight]. Therefore, unless you feel [3] differently we would propose to respond positively 

to the Canadian request to work with us on the current interface study on a nocommitment basis along the lines of the attached draft letter. I would, of course, discuss 

this with State and John Walsh before proceeding. 

Arnold W. Frutkin [initialed] 

1. Remote manipulator technology related to the LST would not affect the Space 

Shuttle development schedule. It would involve relatively simple interfaces with the 

Shuttle itself. The Shuttle Program would develop the basic manipulator and the 

Canadians would develop the endeffector to attach to the manipulator. 

2. The development of remote manipulator endeffectors is not comparable to the 

kinds of “bits and pieces” of the Space Shuttle central to current discussions of post-Apollo 

participation. Manipulator endeffectors are related more to the payloads under consideration than to the development of the Shuttle itself. 

3. The Canadians have a very special capability in this field which our people feel 

would be of benefit to the program. 

4. Canadian association in the study effort and in a subsequent development effort 

would not require transfer of US technology to Canada. Interface and parametric data will 

be provided. 

5. Although the Canadians would expect us to agree to procure a certain number of 

production units (in the same manner we have suggested to the Europeans we would be 

prepared to do in the case of Sortie modules or Tugs) the ratio of development cost to 

production costs is reasonable. Goddard estimates that development of a manipulator to 

work with the LST would cost the Canadians about $7-9 million while the cost per unit for 

production should be about $2.5 million. 

Document 1-19 

Document title: Peter M. Flanigan, “Memorandum for John Erlichman,” February 16, 

1971, with attached: Clay T. Whitehead, “Memorandum for Mr. Peter Flanigan,” February 

6, 1971. 

Source: Nixon Project, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 

Thomas Paine, supported by the Department of State, had takn a bullish approach to expanded 

international space cooperation. Paine, however; was frustrated by the Nixon administration ’s 

unwillingness to approve a large post-Apollo space program, and he resigned in September 1970. 

Deputy Administrator George Low, who had come to Washington from Houston afer the Apollo 11 

mission, became Acting Administrator Within the White House staff; Assistant to the President Peter 
50 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Flanigan had responsibility for policy oversight of NASA. His assistant, Clay 7: “Tom” Whitehead, 

worked with Flanigan on NASA and telecommunications policy issues, men after he became the director of the newly established Office of Telecommunications Policy. This memorandum is an early indication of the split within the executive branch over the approach to be taken with respect to European 

involvement in the post-Apollo program. President Nixon had made it clear that he wanted increased 

international cooperation, but just what that meant was a subject of some debate within top policy 

circles. 

Dl February 16,1971 

Memorandum for John Erlichman 

FROM: PETER. M. FLANIGAN 

Attached is a thoughtful memorandum which I asked Tom Whitehead to prepare on 

NASA. One obvious use of this memorandum is to give it to the new Administrator when 

he comes on board (I am expecting that Jim Fletcher will take the job in about four 

weeks). 

You will particularly note the discussion starting in the middle of page two regarding international cooperation in space. I suggest that either you or I, or both of us, talk to 

the President about this before we get ourselves too deeply committed. If the President is 

not, as I suspect, committed to the current sharing program, then I think I should immediately get George Low in and discuss with him the kind of international cooperation that 

is desired. 

********* 

[attachment page 11 February 6, 1971 

Memorandum for Mr. Peter Flanigan 

This Administration has never really faced up to where we are going in Space. NASA, 

with some help from the Vice President, made a try in 1969 to get the President committed to an “everanward-and-upward’’ post-Apollo program with continued budget growth 

into the $6-10 billion range. We were successful in holding that off at least temporarily, but 

we have not developed any theme or consistency in policy. As a result, NASA is both drifting and lobbying for bigger things [parenthetical comment: “‘the bigger the best’ correct”]-without being forced to focus realistically on what it ought to be doing. They are 

playing the President’s vaguely defined desire for international cooperation for all it’s 

worth, and no one is effectively forcing them to put their cooperative schemes in any perspective of whether they are good or not so good, what are their side effects, and are they 

worth the candle. For the last two years, we have cut the NASA budget, but they manage 

each year to get a “compromise” of a few hundred million on their shuttle and space station plans. Is the President really going to ignore a billion or so of sunk costs and industry expectations when he gets hit for the really big money in a year or two? 

I will try to be constructive by sketching out a few thoughts on the subject that might 

suggest what we should do about all this. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 51 

NASA is-or should be-making a transition from rapid razzle-dazzle growth and 

glamour to organizational maturity and more stable operation for the long term. Such a 

transition requires wise and agile management at the top if it is to be achieved successfully. NASA has not had that. (Tom Paine may have had the ability, but he lacked the inclination-preferring to aim for continued growth.) They have a tremendous overhead 

structure, far too large for any reasonable size space program, that will have to be 

reduced. There will be internal morale problems of obvious kinds. The bright young 

experts attracted by the Apollo adventure are leaving or becoming middle-aged bureaucrats with vested interests and narrow perspectives. (Remember when atomic power was a 

young glamour technology? Look at [the Atomic Energy Commission] now and you see 

what NASA could easily become.) 

[2] There needs to be a sense of direction, both publicly and within NASA. The 

President’s statement on the seventies in space laid the groundwork, but no one is following up. What do we expect of a space program? We need to define a balance of science, technology development, applications, defense, international prestige and the like; 

but someone will have to do that in a way that really controls the program rather than viceversa. In particular, we need a new balance of manned and unmanned space activity, for 

that one dimension has big implications for everything else. We need a more sensible balance of overhead expenditures and money for actual hardware and operations; the aerospace industry could be getting a lot more business than they are, I suspect, with the same 

overall NASA budget if we could get into all that overhead. 

NASA is aggressively pursuing European funding for their post-Apollo program. It 

superficially sounds like the “cooperation” the President wants, but is this what the 

President would really want if we really thought it through? We have not yet decided what 

we want our post-Apollo program to be or how fast it will go, but if NASA successfully gets 

a European commitment of $1 billion, the President and the Congress will have been 

locked into NASA’s grand plans because the political cost of reneging would be too high. 

I assume the President wants space cooperation as a way of building good will and reducing international tensions. But it does not follow that all joint ventures will have that 

effect. INTELSAT, for example, is a fully cooperative space venture and less political than 

the post-Apollo effort now envisaged would be, but most would agree it has been more of 

a headache than ajoy and has created new tensions and contentions rather than good will 

and constructive working relationships. [parenthetical comment: “yes!”] Finally, the U.S. 

trade advantage in the future will increasingly depend on our technological know-how. 

The kind of cooperation now being talked up will have the effect of giving away our space 

launch, space operations, and related know-how at 10 cents on the dollar. [parenthetical 

emphasis: “!!”I It does seem to me that taking space operations out of the political realm 

and putting it more nearly in the commercial area would diminish international bickering and give U.S. high technology industries the advantages and opportunities they 

deserve; this may or may not prove fully feasible but the point is, no one in this 

Administration is seriously trying to find out. 

[3] The key thing missing, I think, is management attention to these issues. We need a 

new Administrator who will turn down NASA’s empire-building fervor and turn his attention to (1) sensible straightening away of internal management and (2) working with [the 

Office of Management and Budget] and White House to show us what broad but concrete 

alternative the President has that meet[s] all his various objectives. [parenthetical comment: “implying Paine was not”] In short, we need someone who will work with us rather 

than against us, and will seek progress toward the President’s stated goals, and will shape 

the program to reflect credit on the President rather than embarrassment. We need a generalist who can understand dedicated technical experts rather than the opposite. But we 
52 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

also need someone in the Executive Office who has the time, inclination, and authority to 

coordinate policy aspects. Separate handling of political, budget, technical, and international aspects of NASA planning here means that we have no effective control over the 

course of events because all these aspects are interrelated. 

We really ought to decide if we mean to muddle through on space policy for the rest 

of the President’s term in office or want to get serious about it. 

Clay T. Whitehead [signed ‘Tom”] 

Document 1-20 

Document title: Memorandum from Edward E. David, Jr., Science Advisor, for Henry 

Kissinger and Peter Flanigan, “Post-Apollo Space Cooperation with the Europeans,” July 

23, 1971, with attached “Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program” and Henry A. 

Kissinger, National Security Advisor, to William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, no dates. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Document 1-21 

Document title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, to NASA Administrator, 

“Items of Interest,” August 12, 1971. 

Source: James C. Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of 

Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 

These two documents give a sense of the state of discussion on post-Apollo cooperation during the summer of 1971. The president’s science advisol; Edward David, was one of those in the White House trying to jind a position acceptable to those holding more nationalistic views, such as Peter Flanigan, 

and those in the State Department and NASA’s international office taking a more internationalist 

perspective. James Fletcher had become NASA Administrator in May 1971, and George Low, who had 

been Acting Administratorfrom the time that Thomas Paine lefi in September 1970 until Fletcher was 

sworn in May 1971, had returned to his position as Deputy Administratox Fletcher and Low wded 

closely together in dealings with the White House and the Executive Office of the President and let each 

other know what thq were doing through frequent private memoranda. 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 53 

Document 1-20 

July 23, 1971 

Memorandum for 

Henry Kissinger 

Peter Flanigan 

Subject: Post-Apollo Space Cooperation with the Europeans 

Backpound 

It was agreed at our meeting with Jim Fletcher on April 23, 1971, that NASA should 

prepare an evaluation of (1) the degree of technology transfer to the Europeans, which 

would take place if the proposed U.S.-European cooperation on development of a space 

transportation system (STS) were to materialize; and (2) alternative subjects for US.- 

European cooperation. I have now reviewed NASA’s informal paper (summary attached) 

and discussed the subject with Jim Fletcher, who concurs with the course of action recommended in this memorandum. 

Pending further consideration of the details of the NASA analysis, and additional discussions at the technical level between the U.S. and European space groups, I am not prepared to have the U.S. commit itself to this cooperative program of STS development. 

Although the NASA study (concurred in by Jim Fletcher) suggests that the technology 

transfer question as well as management complications are not of significant proportions, 

my personal concerns on these points have not yet been answered to my full satisfaction, 

nor can they be answered until there is a better understanding of the potential European 

contribution. Furthermore, U.S. shuttle planning is not sufficiently definitive at present 

to permit any agreement on the shuttle with the Europeans in the near future. 

Nonetheless, I do believe that a resumption of technical-level discussions with the 

Europeans would be in order at this time for the purpose of more clearly defining, without any precommitment, the potential interests and contributions of both sides. 

[Z] It is also apparent from recent telegrams from Europe that a reply to Minister The0 

Lefevre’s letter to Alex Johnson of March 3, requesting a statement of the U.S. position 

on post-Apollo space cooperation, cannot he delayed much longer. Europe’s space officials must move ahead with their own planning for the future. I believe this matter can be 

resolved by separating the issue into two components and addressing each separately. 

The urgent question before the Europeans is whether U.S. launchers will be available 

at a fair price and on a non- discriminatory basis for launching European satellites. If the 

answer is no, the Europeans will likely proceed to develop their own EUROPA-I11 launch 

vehicle, with little or no funds left for cooperation with the U.S. in any areas; if yes, they 

will most probably abandon their launcher development plans, freeing funds for 

increased cooperation with the U.S. and/or for other space developments of their own. 

The first alternative would require European expenditures of almost a billion dollars 

to build a launch capability which has already existed in the United States for several years. 

In the process, it will doubtless engender some bitterness on the part of those countries 

who oppose this choice on practical grounds, but would feel constrained to support it on 

political grounds. However, this approach will by 197&78 provide the Europeans with a 

capability to launch their own geosynchronous satellites independently of U.S. views or 

influence. 
54 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The second alternative would perpetuate European dependence on the U.S. for 

launch services, would generate sales for U.S. booster manufacturing firms, and would 

preserve the chance for a major European input to a cooperative program with the U.S. 

This alternative would seem more attractive than the first for longer-range U.S. interests. 

Although the availability of U.S. launchers might also enable the Europeans to compete with U.S. firms for satellite construction contracts from other countries, both the 

U.S. aerospace industry and I believe that this would not be a significant commercial 

threat, in view of our vastly superiority [sic] satellite technology. 

[ 31 Recommendation 

Accordingly, I propose that we separate the two elements of launch assurances and 

space cooperation and that State be advised to proceed along the lines of the attached 

draft letter to Bill Rogers. If you are in agreement, I believe this course of action provides 

a satisfactory exit from the present impasse. 

Edward E. David, Jr. 

Science Advisor 

Attachments 

********* 

[Attachment page 11 

Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program 

As background for a decision on the course of action to be pursued in defining a 

mutually acceptable set of tasks for European participation in the post-Apollo space program, NASA was asked to examine the implications of cooperation in Space Shuttle development, particularly from the standpoint of technology transfer. The detailed report on 

this effort is attached. 

One conclusion of the NASA study was that development of specific components of 

the shuttle, such as the vertical tail or elements of the attitude control system by the 

Europeans could provide technology benefits to both the United States and Europe, and 

that the transfer of critical technology to Europe would be a relatively small percentage of 

the program value. European development of the space tug might entail a broader range 

of technology transfer, but would he amenable to some controls. Other potential cooperative projects in the Post-Apollo Program such as payload modules would generally fall 

between these two cases. European cooperation in payload development could vary from 

zero transfer to modest transfer, depending on the policies we choose to follow in selecting and approving proposals. 

In general, it has been understood that the major thrust of our international postApollo effort is to obtain foreign contributions primarily through the exercise of fieign 

capabilities and not through utilization of U.S. technology transferred abroad for that 

purpose. It is already widely understood abroad that NASA means to accept foreign participation only in those tasks for which Europe has an existing or potential capability and 

that this capability must be validated by joint teams from NASA, NASAs contractors, and 

the foreign governments concerned. If we could determine in some cases that it is in our 

own interest to provide certain elements of a task in order to make possible larger foreign 

contribution, we will still retain an option to provide those elements either as technology or, 

if they are particularly sensitive in character, on a “black-box’’ or end-product basis. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 55 

[2] It was judged that the transfer of management knowhow and systems engineering 

capability that would occur as a byproduct of European participation with the U.S. in a 

large-scale development such as the shuttle would be one of the principal objectives of 

such European participation. The significance of the transfer that might take place is 

open to question, and future implications are difficult to assess. 

In the longer term, the impact of transfer of technology or management expertise will 

depend more upon the degree to which these elements can be transferred to other activities in the commercial sector, than upon their direct application to advanced space systems. It has been our experience that transfer of aerospace technical capabilities to other 

commercial areas has not been an easy or very successful process. 

At the present time, direct commercial benefits from use of space systems have been 

restricted to communications satellites operated by the Intelsat Consortium. European 

contractors are playing an increasing role in supplying subsystems, satellites and ground 

elements of the Intelsat system. In the future, there may be additional space-based systems 

that provide income to the supplier from sale of satellites and services in areas such as navigation, traffic control, mobile communications, pollution monitoring, earth resources 

and crop surveys, and an increase in technical sophistication in European industry would 

enable a greater degree of competition with potential U.S. suppliers. In a meeting with 

U.S. aerospace industry managers, it was quite apparent that they are not concerned 

about being unable to compete for such contracts with European firms, as a result of 

cooperation on post-Apollo or the technology transfer which might ensue. 

Furthermore, it is characteristic that the service provided by a space system is international in nature, requiring agreements and cooperation between nations if the potential 

benefits are to be realized. In the future, therefore, the U.S. is likely to depend upon the 

ties that can be developed with other nations in order to insure a role for U.S. industry 

and U.S. interests in service provided by space systems. It would be preferable to develop 

cooperative programs that foster these tips, rather than to force nations to develop capabilities that permit decisions independent of the U.S. Similarly, in a commercial sense, it 

is likely to be of greater value to involve many nations in cooperative systems with shared 

contracting than to see separate systems developed that may isolate the U.S. 

[3] The previous record of major cooperative development programs, such as Skybolt, 

the Main Battle Tank, US/FRG fighter aircraft, and Concorde, have left some doubt 

whether such programs foster closer ties between the participants or act as an irritant 

which limits full development of cooperative relationships. The record of cooperative 

space projects conducted by NASA, on the other hand, has been excellent and provides 

an indication of those characteristics which produce favorable results from cooperative 

enterprises. They are in part: 

(1) Mutual interest and mutual benefits. 

(2) Financial contributions by both partners-usually no transfer of funds. 

(3) Clearly defined interfaces and objectives. 

(4) Capability for performance of agreed tasks can be assured. 

While the scale of potential European participation in the shuttle program is much larger than previous programs, it appears possible to define tasks that meet these criteria. 

One of the principal European contributions to the Space Shuttle program could be 

development of the Space Tug. This propulsion module would represent a major technological and economic challenge to Europe, and would fit the above criteria-particularly the ability to define interfaces and objectives clearly, since there would be minimum 

impact on design characteristics of the respective systems, as a result of changes within 

each element. The U.S. will be required to have some technical involvement in the development of the Tug, and in general, some technology support would be required for both 
56 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

the propulsion and avionics modules, as well as in total systems engineering. As the program develops, some additional technology may be required to alleviate unanticipated 

problems which arise. 

In the future, it is expected that there will be sustained production of the Space Tug 

and that it will be used for both DOD and NASA missions. This would imply dependence 

upon a European supplier, or alternatively development of an independent U.S. production capability, perhaps on a license basis. 

[4] A similar, highly separable component of the shuttle system that would be an attractive candidate for European development is a Research and Applications Module that 

would be used as the payload of a shuttle orbiter, providing a structure for observing 

instruments and other experiments, either manned or man-attended. In addition, 

European technology appears adequate to support design and construction of major 

structural elements of the shuttle such as wing and tail surfaces and the thrusters for the 

auxiliary propulsion and control system. 

Alternatives to major participation in shuttle system development are limited, particularly in view of the unique scope, challenge, and economic implication of the shuttle 

program; the narrow focus of European space interests; the degree to which the U.S. is 

considered abroad to be committed to welcoming post-Apollo participation; and the wide 

range of existing international space programs and overtures by the U.S. None of the 

alternative cooperative ventures that have been developed appear to be acceptable, either 

individually or collectively, as replacements for shuttle participation. They may be pursued, however, on their own merits. If the U.S. should withdraw from the Shuttle program 

or decide to pursue it unilaterally, discussions of possible other projects would certainly 

continue. 

A final question concerns launch assurance. It is generally understood that Europe 

desires assured access to US. launchers on a fee basis if she is to give up the development 

of her own launch vehicles so as to free funds for contribution to post-Apollo tasks. The 

response which the U.S. gave last September on this question was widely regarded as satisfactory in Europe but has since been reversed in part and become confused. 

A restatement of the U.S. policy regarding provision of launch services, valid for all 

nations, is being developed through the interagency committee on space cooperation 

established under NSSM 72, and, if approved, should reduce European concerns about 

launch assurances and separate this issue from the question of post-Apollo cooperation. 

The proposed policy statement would have the effect of assuring availability of launch services for payloads that are for peaceful purposes and are consistent with international 

agreements. 

********* 

[Attachment page 11 

Dear Bill: 

Uncertainties in U.S. domestic shuttle planning and a need for additional review of 

the problems of technology transfer and management complications in undertaking a 

joint program of space transportation system (STS) development with the Europeans have 

delayed this reply to your letter to the President of March 23. 

Although that review is not yet complete, the President feels it is now possible to develop a reply to Minister Lefevre and the European Space Conference (ESC) and to resume 

a dialogue with the Europeans; however, in a way that does not condition US. launch 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 57 

assurances for European payloads upon substantial European participation in a joint STS 

program, but treats each of these two matters separately. 

A first priority would be to prepare a position for discussion with the Europeans, indicating U.S. willingness to provide launch assurances for foreign satellites of a peaceful 

nature. Language acceptable to the Europeans, but recognizing overall U.S. obligations 

to Intelsat, should be sought for such assurances. 

[2] .However, one possible formulation which would be acceptable to the President, if 

such a degree of assurance is necessary to avoid European charges that the U.S. seeks to 

retain a veto over their space plans, would provide for launch services by the US. of foreign systems approved under Article 14 of the definitive arrangements of Intelsat; and 

would permit sale of the necessary launch vehicle for “unapproved” systems, leaving to the 

launching nation the interpretation of its obligations under Article 14. 

Renewed discussions with the ESC about post-Apollo cooperation should be undertaken at the technical working level. Their purpose would be to seek to define a possible 

cooperative relationship between Europe and the U.S. in a program of STS development, 

with full understanding that no commitment on either side is expected or assured until 

the results of these discussions have been referred to the involved governments for review 

and final decision. Although no cooperative programs have been discussed in the present 

context with the Europeans to compare in magnitude with STS development, it will be 

useful in the course of these talks to keep in mind the full range [3] of potential cooperative opportunities, in the eventuality that a satisfactory agreement is not reached on the 

STS program and assuming that the Europeans do respond to the offer of U.S. launch 

assurances by abandoning EUROPA-111. 

The President hopes that this course of action will address the pressing European concern regarding launcher availability, will permit a continued dialogue with the Europeans 

directed toward mutually beneficial space cooperation with full protection of U.S. interests, and will avoid locking the U.S. prematurely into a commitment or schedule for the 

STS. 

Sincerely, 

Henry A. Kissinger 

Honorable William P. Rogers 

Secretary of State 

Washington, D.C. 20520 
58 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-21 

August 12, 1971 

Memorandum 

TO: A/Administrator 

FROM: AD/Deputy Administrator 

SUBJECT Items of Interest 

Kissinger Meeting 

Attendees were Ed David, Alex Johnson, Tom Whitehead, Herman Pollack, Arnold 

Frutkin, Kissinger’s new staff man whose name is Michael Guhin, and Low. 

On the subject of launch services, Johnson proposed that the United States would 

guarantee launch services if (a) there is a positive two-thirds finding by the INTELSAT 

body that the launch should proceed; or (b) in the absence of such a finding, if the 

United States itself is not opposed to the launch. Johnson believed that in the context of 

a post-Apollo participation (which presumably the Europeans want), they would be willing to accept this formula of launch assurances. David and Whitehead, on the other hand, 

believed that these assurances do not go far enough, that they constitute a “blatant U.S. 

veto,” and that we should in addition offer to sell launch vehicles to the Europeans to 

launch from their own soil for whatever peaceful purposes they desire. Johnson indicated 

that this would be unacceptable to COMSAT and Senator Pastore. Low did not enter into 

the discussion in any major way, but did support Ed David’s point of view. 

On the subject of technology transfer Kissinger understands that this transfer would 

not be large and would be essentially controllable. He also understands [2] that what 

would be transferred and what is desired by the Europeans is systems engineering and systems management know-how. 

On the subject of continuing the technical discussions with the Europeans, David and 

Whitehead felt that the shuttle should be de-emphasized in these discussions and that, 

instead, the “content” of the space program should be emphasized. After some debate on 

this subject, it was agreed that technical discussions on the Space Shuttle/space tug could 

be continued, but that they would be broadened to include payloads as well. 

In the context of the technical discussions with the Europeans, I had an opportunity 

to mention the significance of our recent budgetary guidelines. Although I did this in a 

relatively low key way, Kissinger immediately reached a conclusion that we had been given 

a guideline that would essentially stop manned space flight for the United States, which 

was confirmed by Whitehead. David, on the other hand, stated that this was only a preliminary guideline to “force NASA to consider alternatives to the very expensive shuttle 

concept.” Kissinger stated that stopping manned space flight in the United States is entirely unsatisfactory, and that he would do everything in his power to prevent this from 

happening. 

The conclusion of the meeting was that Kissinger would notify Alex Johnson by the 

end of the week (by August 13th) of his decisions in all these matters. In the meantime, 

the State Department (with Arnold Frutkin’s help) is drafting a response to Lefevre’s 

February letter. In this response, the current United States position on launch assurances 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 59 

will be stated, and a continuation of the technical discussions on post-Apollo, plus payloads, will be urged. Frutkin understands that from NASA’s point ofview, we would like to 

delay the start of discussions until at least September 30th, so that we can have made up 

our own mind concerning the shuttle in the context of the Fiscal Year 1973 budget 

posture. . . . 

Document 1-22 

Document title: Department of State Telegram, “Johnson Letter to Lefevre,” September 

7, 1971. 

Source: James C. Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of 

Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 

This telegram communicated to concerned US. officials, including the U S. embassy in Brussels, 

Belgium, the text of a letter from Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson to Belgian Minister Theo 

Lefmre. As the chairman of the European Space Conference, Lefmre led the European delegation in 

negotiations with the United States concerning launch assurances and post-Apollo cooperation. This 

letter spelled out the conditions under which the United States would provide launch services for 

European satellites. It also discussed issues with respect to European participation in the U.S. postApollo program. The letter was the product of more than six months of debate within the executive 

branch in Washington. While the launch assurances were not totally acceptable to Europe, the letter 

did clear the path for additional discussions of post-Apollo cooperation. 

[l] R 0123072 Sep 71 

FM SecState WashDC 

To AmEmbassy Bern 

[2] Subject: Johnson Letter to Lefevre 

Refs: A) State CA-5237 October 9, 1970 

B) 

C) 

State 30947 Feb 24, 1971 

Brussels 774 Mar 6, 1971 

1. Under Secretary Johnson has written a letter to the Honorable The0 Lefevre, 

Chairman, European Space Conference, Brussels in response to Lefevre’s letter of March 

3, 1971, Ref (C). Instructions for action posts given in paras 7 and 8 below: 

2. Letter is dated September 1, 1971 and is marked “confidential” in view of US 

desire to avoid public discussion at this time. Text follows: 

Quote Dear Minister Lefevre: Para This letter is in response to yours of March 3, 1971, 

concerning possible European participation in post-Apollo space programs. It sets out our 

current views on the matters of consequence which were involved in our discussions this 

past February and in September, 1970. It overtakes my letter to you of October 2, 1970. 

Para I regret that it has not been possible to respond to you earlier. We felt that our 

mutual interests would be served best ifwe took sufficient time to review our position carefully in the light of your letter and of events since our discussions in February. As I stated 

during those discussions, our ultimate views on most of these matters remain contingent 

on choices yet to be made in Europe as to the measure and character of European participation and on further development of our own plans for post-Apollo programs. 
60 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Para Since we have understood that the [3] matter of greatest concern to the 

European Space Conference is the availability of launchers for European satellite projects, 

we have reviewed our position so as to meet the concerns expressed in your letter and during our earlier discussions. Our new position in this regard, described in the numbered 

paragraphs below, is not conditioned on European participation in post-Apollo programs. 

I believe it should provide a basis for confidence in Europe in the availability of US launch 

assistance. 

Specifically: 

Para (1.) We recognize the concern of the European Space Conference with regard 

to the availability of launch assistance for European payloads. In this respect US launch 

assistance will be available for those satellite projects which are for peaceful purposes and 

are consistent with obligations under relevant international agreements and arrangements, subject only to the following: 

Subpara (A) With respect to satellites intended to provide international public 

telecommunications services, when the definitive arrangements for INTELSAT come into 

force the US will provide appropriate launch assistance for those satellite systems on 

which INTELSAT makes a favorable recommendation in accordance with Article XIV of 

its definitive arrangements. If launch assistance is requested in the absence of a favorable 

recommendation by INTELSAT, we expect that we would provide launch assistance for 

those systems which we had supported within INTELSAT so long as the country or 

international entity requesting the assistance considers in good faith that it has met its relevant obligations under Article XIV of the definitive arrangements. In those cases where 

requests for launch assistance are maintained in the absence of a favorable INTELSAT recommendation and the US had not supported the proposed system, the United States 

would reach a decision on such a request after [4] taking into account the degree to which 

the proposed system would be modified in the light of the factors which were the basis for 

the lack of support within INTELSAT. 

Subpara (B) With respect to future operational satellite applications which do not 

have broad international acceptance, we would hope to be able to work with you in seeking such acceptance, and would favorably consider requests for launch assistance when 

broad international acceptance has been obtained. 

Para (2.) Such launch assistance would be available, consistent with US laws, either 

from US launch sites (through the acquisition of US launch services on a cooperative or 

reimbursable basis) or from foreign launch sites (by purchase of an appropriate US 

launch vehicle). It would not be conditioned on participation in post-Apollo programs. In 

the case of launchings from foreign sites the US would require assurance that the launch 

vehicles would not be made available to third without prior agreement [with] the US. 

Para (3.) With respect to European proposals for satellites intended to provide 

international public telecommunications services, we are prepared to consult with the 

European Space Conference in advance so as to advise the Conference whether we would 

support such proposals within INTELSAT. In this connection we have undertaken a preliminary analysis of the acceptability of European space segment facilities for international public telecommunications services separate from those of INTELSAT, in terms of 

the conditions established by Article XIV, and find that the “example of a possible operational system of European communication satellites,” which was presented during our discussions in February, would appear to cause measurable, but not significant, economic 

harm to INTELSAT. Thus, if this specific proposal were submitted for our consideration, 

we would expect to support it in INTELSAT. 

[5] Para (4.) With respect to the financial conditions for reimbursable launch services 

from US launch sites, European users would be charged on the same basis as comparable 

non-US Government domestic users. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 61 

Para (5.) With respect to the priority and scheduling for launching European payloads at US launch sites, we would deal with these launchings on the same basis as our 

own. Each launching would be treated in terms of its own requirements and as an individual case. When we know when a payload will become available and what its launch window requirements will be, we would schedule it for that time. We expect that conflicts 

would rarely arise, if at all. If there should be a conflict, we would consult with all interested parties in order to arrive at an equitable solution. On the basis of our experience in 

scheduling launchings, we would not expect any loss of time because of such a conflict to 

be significant. 

(Note to posts: Remaining paragraphs of this letter are unnumbered.) 

Para The United States is considering the timing and manner of public release of this 

position. Accordingly, it is requested that there be no public disclosure of this position 

without prior agreement with US. 

Para With regard to post-Apollo cooperation, as you know, the United States had not 

yet taken final decisions with respect to its post-Apollo space programs, nor can we predict 

with assurance when such decisions will be taken. 

Para With respect to the more detailed questions on post-Apollo collaboration posed 

in your letter of March 3, 1971 and in our earlier discussions in September 1970 and 

February 1971, our views [6] remain broadly as we put them to you in my letter of October 

2, 1970 and in our meetings of last September and February. We would much prefer to 

continue the consideration of such questions in the context of specific possibilities for collaboration rather than in the abstract. 

Para The relationship we are seeking with Europe with respect to post-Apollo space 

programs would, we believe, be well served if we can jointly consider the possibilities for 

collaboration in the context of a broader examination of the content and purposes of the 

space programs of the late 1970s and 1980s. 

Para Accordingly, we suggest broadening your earlier suggestion for a joint expert 

group to conduct technical discussions. The purpose of these discussions will include the 

definition of possible cooperative relationships between Europe and the U.S. in a program of development of the space transportation system, but would be broadened to 

include an exchange of views regarding the content of space activities in which Europe 

might wish to participate in the post-Apollo era. The technical questions relevant to such 

participation, including the remaining questions raised in your letter of March 3, would 

be examined as well. the joint group would carry on its activities with no commitment on 

either side. the US representation would be Charles W. Mathews, Deputy Associate 

Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA. 

Para This group could most usefully commence its work after the end of September 

when the results of NASA's current technical studies of space transportation systems 

become available. 

Para I trust, Mr. Minister, that this summary of our present views is a helpful response 

to the matters raised in your letter of March 3. I am pleased to confirm our continuing 

interest in [7] cooperating with interested European nations in the further exploration 

and use of space. Sincerely, U. Alexis Johnson, Unquote. 

3. Comment for posts: It has become evident that the matter of greatest concern to 

the ESC is assured availability of launchers for European satellite projects, and it is our 

view that the new position set forth above achieves this goal. it important to note that 

launch assistance we are prepared to furnish (as given in the numbered paragraphs of the 

above letter to Lefevre) is not [repeat] not conditioned on European participation in 

post-Apollo programs. 
62 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

4. Johnson letter also reiterates our offer made at February meeting with ESC 

representatives to consult with ESC in advance so as to advise them whether we would sup 

port within INTELSAT European proposals for satellites intended to provide international public communications at February meeting, Europeans presented a document 

entitled “example of a possible operational system of European communications 

satellites.” Analysis of this example led to conclusion that we would expect to support such 

a proposal if it were submitted to INTELSAT. 

5. The new position reserves to the US decisions with respect to “future operational 

satellite applications which do not yet have broad international acceptance.” In maintaining this reservation we have in mind applications such as direct broadcasting satellites 

which do not yet have the broad international acceptance necessary to assure that this 

application will not be source of international tensions. 

6. Letter to Lefevre also endorses Lefevre’s suggestion that joint expert group be 

established to consider technical and scientific tasks which Europe might wish to perform 

as part ofjoint program. 

Action requested 

7. For Brussels: Pass above text of Under Secretary Johnson’s letter to Lefevre as 

soon as feasible. Word “confidential” should appear just above salutation. Call Lefevre’s 

attention to paragraph of this letter requesting that there be no public disclosure of 

launch assistance position without prior agreement with US. Ask that his response be sent 

through diplomatic channel. Advise Department and other action addressees when delivery has been made. (Signed copy of letter pouched to Embassy today.) 

8. For other action addressees: On the day after receiving Brussels’s confirmation 

that Lefevre has received the letter, pass copies of text to foreign ministries and other 

space-related ministries at highest appropriate level and explain the importance of our 

new launch assurance position. Repeat caveat to Brussels (para 7) re: our [8] desire to 

avoid publicity at this time. We hope this new position will be widely accepted by the 

European nations as a satisfactory basis for confidence in the availability of US launch 

assistance. Rogers 

Document 1-23 

Document title: “Memorandum for Peter Flanigan from the President,” November 24, 

1969. 

Source: Nixon Project, National Archives and Records Admiitration, Washington, D.C. 

Richard Nixon was intrigued b.r the possibility ofjlying non-US. astronauts aboard U.S. spacecrajt. 

Astronaut Frank Borman first sugested this idea after his post-Apollo 8 overseas tou?: NASA 

Administrator Thomas Paine had interpreted the president’s mandate to him, while they travekd to 

the Apollo 11 splashdown, in terms of seeking increased international cooperation in space through 

cooperation in hardware development. Others believed, howevq that the president was most interested in jlying foreign astronauts and experiments. This memorandum was directed at getting more 

attmtion paid to the latterpossibility. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 63 

November 24,1969 

Memorandum for 

Peter Flanigan 

from the President 

Is there still no feasible way to get multi-national participation in some of our future 

space flights? I have raised this with Paine and Borman and I know there are some technical problems but it is a pet idea of mine and I would like to press it. Raise it with Borman 

and see whether we can jog the bureaucracy in that direction. 

Document 1-24 

Document title: George M. Low, Excerpts from Personal Notes: No. 63, February 1,1972; 

No. 67, March 26, 1972; No. 68, April 17, 1962; No. 69, undated; No. 71, June 3, 1972; 

No. 72, June 17, 1972. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

Each week, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low dictated his views on the preceding week’s 

euents. These notes compise a fascinating first-hand account of personalities and decisions. The 

excerpts portray the confused character of the &bate over post-Apollo cooperation during the first 

months of 1972. Among those mentioned are: Russell Drew, the staffer who handled space in the 

White House Office of Science and Technology; Herman Pollack, the top science and technology 

official in the Department of State; Phil Culbertson, a top NASA technical manager; and National 

Aeronautics and Space Council Executive Secretary Bill Anders. 

[I1 

[ 21 International Aspects of Post-Apollo Program 

Personal Notes No. 63 . . . 

Ever since our visit to San Clemente on January 5, 1972, Arnold Frutkin and the 

International people have been pushing for major activities with the Europeans in the 

Space Shuttle development. This work has been supported by the State Department, but 

has generally been opposed by Tom Whitehead, Bill Anders, and John Walsh, who’s working for Kissinger. Walsh put together a group consisting of Russ Drew, Bill Anders, Arnold 

Frutkin, Phil Culbertson, Herman Pollack, Tom Whitehead, and perhaps others to review 

the situation. According to Frutkin, this group has now been converted to be in favor of 

post Apollo Shuttle development activities with the Europeans. According to Whitehead 

and Anders the group is still opposed and NASA would do well to get out of this activity. 

In an internal meeting within NASA, Fletcher and I felt that we should only undertake this 

work if it were really in the interest of the White House and the State Department to do 

so, and that we should not be pushing for it unless we were pushed into it. As a result of 

these views, we decided that Fletcher would visit with Henry Kissinger or Al Haig to tell 

him about NASA’s concerns about full participation by the Europeans for the Shuttle 

development, and ask them whether they really want us to do this. We are still under the 

impression that we may be getting wrong signals from Frutkin (I have gotten wrong 
64 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

signals from Paine before that) and that we’re really moving into an area that we don’t 

want to get into and that the White House also does not want us to get into. At any rate, 

we need clarification, which Fletcher will seek before we proceed. . . . 

********* 

VI Personal Notes No. 67 . . . 

[2] Post-Apollo International Situation 

This matter is still terribly confused. The Flanigan/David Rice side of the White 

House feels that NASA pressured the White House into undertaking these international 

initiatives “in order to make it less likely to have the shuttle cancelled.” NASA’s position is 

that, at least since Tom Paine left, we have consistently stated we will do what the State 

Department and the White House want us to do, but that if we were on our own we would 

like to build the shuttle and its equipments all within this country. The State Department 

feels that we strung them along and we are now letting them down. Out of all this, Bill 

Anders was given the job by Flanigan to pull together a position that would be acceptable 

to the White House. The State Department, however, feels it should be its job to pull that 

position together, while at least John Rose in the White House is concerned that if the 

State Department were allowed to do this a position would be established that is not in the 

best interest of the United States. The underlying argument in the White House against 

having active participation in the post-Apollo programs is based upon a concern of too 

much technology transfer to Europe which is probably not a valid concern as well as a concern about being beholden to the Europeans for their piece of action in case they want to 

hold us up for it. The State Department concern on the other hand is that we have now 

gone so far that any backing down might cause serious international repercussions. I seem 

to be in the middle with Herman Pollack coming to visit me privately for a “nonmeeting” 

giving me his concerns and presumably the State Department concerns (Alex Johnson is 

still recuperating from a heart attack), while Bill Anders calls me and asks for help to consolidate the White House position. 

In my meeting with Herman Pollack, I once again made it very clear that it was 

NASA’s view that from the programmatic standpoint we would like to do the whole program [ 31 domestically; however, there are many options of doing things in Europe if it is 

in the United States’ international interest to do so. I also took the same position in my 

recent discussions with Bill Anders. A memo for the record of my latest conversation with 

him is attached, as is a copy of a paper that he prepared for Peter Flanigan. . . . 

********* 

Personal Notes No. 68 

These are the personal notes for the week ending April 1, 1972, as well as the week 

ending April 15, 1972. (I have already prepared special notes for the week ending 

April 8.) . . . 

[2] International Cooperation 

The situation in the post-Apollo international cooperation, primarily with the 

Europeans, is still very much up in the air. Bill Anders, in reaction to what he thought was 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 65 

Peter Flanigan’s request, had prepared a very one-sided document, indicating that at most 

we should let the Europeans develop the sortie module. In this document he did not air 

the two sides of the story so that it would have been impossible for the President to really 

pursue any alternatives. When Flanigan saw the document, he wisely stated that this was 

not at all what he wanted and, in effect, sent Bill back to the showers. The over-all situation is still that we have implied commitments to the Europeans that they could participate in the development of bits and pieces of the Shuttle itself, provided they also worked 

on either a sortie module or a tug. Our position now is that we don’t want them to get 

involved in bits and pieces of the Shuttle because it makes for a very difficult technical and 

management problem, and at the same time we don’t want them involved in the tug 

because we think this is too difficult a technical bite for them to take. We think the 

Europeans really are no longer deeply interested in working with us either and that, if we 

let matters stand as they are, they are going to die of their own weight. However, Bill 

Anders feels that this is not the proper way to proceed and that we should indeed take positive action to turn the Europeans off. Basically my own conclusion is that this is no longer 

a matter of substance because we have pretty well decided what to do and don’t want the 

Europeans to do, and the entire situation merely becomes a matter of tactics. 

My latest suggestion to Frutkin was that we should allow the Europeans to participate 

in an annual program review with us with the understanding that they would file a report 

within [3] 60 days, suggesting solutions to any problems that we might be facing. This they 

would do in addition to the development of a sortie module or, if they can demonstrate 

competence, the development of a tug. . . . 

********* 

[I1 Personal Notes No. 69 . . . 

Post-Apollo European Cooperation 

This subject is still nearly as confused as it has been for a long time. 

State Department has now formally taken a position in a letter from Rogers to the 

President. . . that we should encourage the Europeans to participate through the development of a sortie can; that we should defer participation on the tug until they have conducted further studies; and that we should allow them to build bits and pieces of the 

shuttle, provided this is tied in with participation in the major elements such as the sortie 

module. 

Peter Flanigan’s position protecting the domestic economy is that he has no objection 

to Europe’s participation in the development of the sortie can, but that we should 

absolutely not allow any participation in the tug or bits and pieces of the shuttle. Peter also 

believes that Kissinger will defer to him in this area and that his position is the one that 

will prevail with the President. Incidentally, Bill Anders has been asked by Flanigan to prepare a Presidential action paper reflecting Flanigan’s views. 

NASA’s position is a fairly straightforward one. First, we state that given our own preference, in the absence of any international considerations, we would, of course, prefer to 

do everything in connection with the shuttle in the United States. Secondly, we state that 

given a strong Presidential directive that for international considerations Europe must participate in the shuttle, we would first [3] of all prefer their participation in the sortie can; 

secondly as a very poor second choice we would allow their participation in the tug, provided they can demonstrate through studies that they can indeed work on the tug and their 

technology is sufficiently advanced to do so; third, we would dislike their participation in bits 
66 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

and pieces of the shuttle because this would make our job much more 

difficult, but this too could be accomplished if we were directed to do so. Our views were 

expressed in a memorandum to Kissinger commenting on Secretary Rogers’ memorandum. 

At the time of this dictation, John Walsh on Kissinger’s staff is preparing two action 

papers for the President, presumably they will be signed by both Flanigan and Kissinger. 

The first of these, which is the one that Flanigan prefers and the one that will go unless 

Kissinger feels strongly enough to get personally into the act, says in effect that the 

Europeans should be allowed to participate in the sortie can only, and we should turn off 

the tug and the bits and pieces of the shuttle immediately. The second paper also states 

that participation in the sortie can should be encouraged; that participation in the tug 

should be denied; but that participation in the bits and pieces of the shuttle should be 

“discouraged but not excluded.” Presumably all of this will be steeled within the next several weeks. 

In the meantime, the Europeans are champing at the bit because they are trying to 

meet a deadline that we have imposed on them to make up their mind by approximately 

the first of July. To do this, they need answers to some detailed questions that they posed 

to us two weeks ago; however, we, of course, are not in any position to answer these questions until we have settled our policy issues. 

For the record, it might be worthwhile to review a bit of history here also. When I first 

came to NASA Headquarters, I learned from Tom Paine that the President was extremely interested in European participation in Space Shuttle development. I had no reason to 

disbelieve this and, as a matter of fact, I had seen letters from Paine to Kissinger reporting on his various visits to Europe, Japan, etc. and reports coming back from Kissinger 

saying in effect “keep [4] up the good work.” When I became Acting Administrator, I continued what Paine had started and continued to send reports both to Kissinger and to 

Peter Flanigan. In all cases, I received replies from Kissinger and Flanigan (generally quite 

late) encouraging me to go ahead. However, it wasn’t too long before I got views 

expressed by both Don Rice and Ed David that what I was doing might not really be what 

the President wanted us to do. I then tried for a long time to see Kissinger to get his personal views on this before continuing any further discussions; however, Kissinger was never 

able to see me on this subject. It wasn’t until about the time that Fletcher came on board 

that we had the first meeting in Kissinger’s office involving Kissinger, Whitehead for 

Flanigan, and several others where again the views expressed were inconclusive except 

that it became quite apparent that the domestic side of the White House was very much 

opposed to the kinds of things that Tom Paine had been doing. Ever since then, this had 

been tried to be brought to a resolution in the White House, and it may be that we are 

now close to this resolution. . . . 

********* 

Personal Notes No. 71 . . . 

Post-Apollo European Cooperation 

I forget when I last discussed this situation, but, briefly, the facts are these. We have 

been trying to get the White House to resolve the difference of opinion that exists among 

NASA, State Department, and some of the White House staff. Basically, the State 

Department would like to cooperate to the greatest extent possible. The White House 

would like to have an isolationist policy and no cooperation whatsoever. NASA has taken 

a “hands off‘ approach indicating that we would like to undertake a minimum amount of 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 67 

cooperation in order to simplify our own problems, but that we could do almost anything 

that was necessary if the President so directed it because he felt they were overriding in a 

national consideration to do it. Out of all of this came a set of instructions signed by 

Kissinger which indicated that we should encourage the Europeans to develop one of several forms of Sortie modules; that we should discourage but permit European participation in the development of selected bits and pieces of the Shuttle; that we should under 

no conditions let Europe develop the tug; and that for future cooperative ventures we 

should concentrate on payloads and not launch systems hardware. 

[3] This set of instructions is perfectly acceptable to us and it is now planned to meet with 

the Europeans within the next two weeks to respond to their long-standing questions concerning what we would be willing to do in cooperation with them on the post-Apollo projects. 

Incidentally, Europe is quite confused concerning where the United States now stands 

with respect to all technological interchanges. I recently met Mr. Boelkow, President of 

Messerschmitt, who feels that our recent policies are so isolationist that we are going to 

hurt Europe and ourselves. He believes that we could reach agreements, particularly in 

aeronautics, that would help both countries both technically and economically. He wanted to discuss these with Magruder. However, I told him that Magruder was not the right 

person nor do we have a right person to do it. Nobody has really examined both the shortrange and long-range economic effects of technology transfer. I subsequently discussed 

this with Fletcher and we decided to try to see Pete Peterson (Secretary of Commerce) to 

see whether we can’t get him interested in the problem. . . . 

********* 

VI Personal Notes No. 72 . . . 

European Post-Apollo Cooperation 

After more than a year of indecision, we finally received a memo from Kissinger concerning the extent of European post-Apollo cooperation. Specifically, the memorandum 

indicated that we should seek participation in the Sortie Module, should deny the tug to 

the Europeans, and should discourage [3] but allow essential participation in bits and 

pieces of the Shuttle. This is the package that Jim Fletcher and I had hoped for, and with 

the exception of the bits and pieces of the Shuttle, it is exactly how we would like to handle it. Meetings with the Europeans were held during the past week (at the sub-Ministerial 

level) and they very quickly got the message. It appears now that they might join us in a 

Sortie Module, and we have strongly encouraged them to do so. The real question is 

whether they can move quickly enough in pulling themselves together. At their informal 

request, we have set a deadline of this summer for them to make up their mind because 

the people who were here felt that if we did not do this, Europe would continue to argue 

about this for several years to come. . . . 
68 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPEKATION 

Document 1-25 

Document title: William A. Anders, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space 

Council, to The Honorable Peter M. Flanigan, March 17, 1972, with attached: “Position 

Paper on European Participation in our Post-Apollo Space Program.” 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

Document 1-26 

Document title: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, 

“Post-Apollo Relationships With the Europeans,” April 29, 1972. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

Document 1-27 

Document title: James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, to Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, May 5, 1972, with attached: 

“NASA’s Comments on Secretary Rogers’ Memorandum of April 29,1972.” 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

These documents capture the character of the closing stages of the debate inside the US. government 

regarding international participation in the post-Apollo program. Thq, demonstrate the concern with 

dqficulties in completing largescale technological projects. They also reflect the euer9resent worry over 

technology transfer and the possibility of the United States losing its edge in a highly competitive 

international arena. 

Document 1-25 

[l] March 17, 1972 

Memorandum for 

The Honorable Peter M. Flanigan 

Pursuant to our conversation at lunch on March 3, I have summarized what I believe 

are the issues, objectives, and options for international participation in the post-Apollo 

space program. The outstanding problem is that in the past, NASA, interpreting a 

Presidential sanction, emphasized joint shuttle development with the Europeans, whereas our involvement would appear to have been greatly more in tune with the President’s 

desire if it had been focused on joint manned operations and mutual utilization of space. 

Joint European participation in our hardware programs has always seemed to me to 

have little national advantage and several drawbacks. However, as a country we have gone 

some distance down the pike with the Europeans, and an abrupt, visible change in policy 

will probably create a foreign relations problem of measurable but uncertain magnitude. 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 69 

Possibly the problem can be reduced by a careful selection of options and tactics. Taking 

the factors I see bearing on the problem into account and weighing them as best I can, I 

have proposed a strawman cooperative program in this paper which, qit could be accepted by the Europeans, would be to the net advantage to the U.S. This program, consisting 

of payload cooperation andjoint manned flight, plus European development of the Sortie 

can, is acceptable to NASA from their viewpoint as program managers. State will likely 

view this course of action as not responsive to Europe’s expectations and as representing 

a significant change in previous policy. They can be expected to resist such a change or 

urge some intermediate concession by the U.S. A possible concession is discussed in the 

attached paper, whereby the U.S. prime contractor for the shuttle does a nominal amount 

of subcontracting in Europe; however, NASA would agree to this arrangement only if 

directed to as a concession to our foreign relations. 

Please excuse the length of the paper, but there is a several year history of the development of this issue and a significant difference in motivations that are relevant to an 

understanding of our commitment and posture. Your [2] reaction to this paper and the 

strawman proposal, which has been coordinated with Jim Fletcher and John Walsh, of 

Kissinger’s staff, and discussed with others, would be most timely if available by Tuesday 

a.m. The State Department has opened the post-Apollo policy for reexamination and will 

be meeting that afternoon. Since I will be attending, I could see that your views and whatever guidance you may have are put forward. Attention to and resolution of this messy 

issue should be soon since decision dates (e.g., NASA selection of prime contractors) are 

approaching inexorably and NASA needs a clear directive on how to proceed. 

William A. Anders 

Enclosure 

********* 

[Enclosure page 11 

Position Paper on European Participation 

in our Post-Apollo Space Program 

This paper examines our current position re European participation in our postApollo space program, how we got to this position, what are our commitments, and the 

options for decisions. A pragmatic program is proposed, and tactics for its implementation are discussed. Because of the technical content of the post-Apollo program and some 

semantic confusion, a definition of terms is desirable. 

Definition of Terms 

Post-Apollo literally encompasses all of the US. space program that comes after 

Apollo, starting in 1973. In the context of European cooperation, however, it has meant, 

at various times, the partnership development and utilization of the space station or Space 

Shuttle, then the shuttle alone, and now the shuttle, tug, or RAM. These elements of the 

post-Apollo system have the following characteristics: 
70 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The Space Station was a multi-manned, permanent orbital laboratory, which was 

dropped from NASA’s plans on cost grounds, at least until the shuttle is completed and operational. 

The Shuttle is a partially reusable launcher used to put a payload plus upper stage 

(“tug”) into a 100 to 200 mile orbit, and to return them to earth. The shuttle can 

also be used to carry, support, and return a small manned space laboratory. The 

shuttle and later the tug will be used both in DOD and the civil space program. 

Development cost of the shuttle is projected to be $5.5B, unit cost will be $250M 

with an anticipated production of 5 units, and the operating cost is estimated 

between $10 to $12M per flight. 

The Tugis a reusable upper stage, carried and returned in the shuttle payload bay, 

which moves payloads from the altitude of the shuttle orbit to higher altitudes, 

and returns payloads in the same fashion. Virtually all payloads above 200 n.m. 

will use the tug (or an expendable transfer stage), but owing to reuse, the production run for the tug will not be great-perhaps 25 altogether. Costs are estimated to be $1B for development, $20M per production unit, and $0.5M per 

flight for operations. 

[2] RAM (Research and Applications Module) refers to a family of small manned (or 

unmanned) laboratories to be carried to orbit and supported there, internally or 

externally, by the shuttle, and then returned in the shuttle bay. (The first version 

has been referred to as a sortie module or sortie can.) In later versions, the lab 

oratories may be left in orbit independently and recovered on a later shuttle 

flight. Because of distinctly different uses of the system, there will be several different versions of RAM, and each version can be developed and equipped independently. For each version the production run might be 10 units, development 

cost of $150 to $200M, and unit cost $15 to $20M, though a basic “stripped” version might be less. 

Subcontracts. This term needs to be defined because of the confusion resulting from 

its dual usage in the post-Apollo negotiations. 

European Contributed “Subcontracts was until very recently the concept under discussion, wherein the European governments would pay for their industry to 

develop certain parts of the shuttle, which we would then use. This arrangement 

was necessitated by the NASA operating rule of no exchange of funds in foreign 

cooperative projects. A government-togovernment agreement would cover the 

arrangement; this type of arrangement is felt to have a number of unattractive 

features which are discussed later in this paper under “Options.” In February, the 

possibility of having more normal (company-to-company) commercial subcontracts was raised by the Europeans, and so now the intended definition of the 

term subcontract is further confused in dealing with the Europeans and among 

ourselves. 

Normal Commercial Subcontracts. Subcontracts of this nature are undertaken 

between industries with no unusual government involvement. The prime contractor chooses certain parts of a system for outside development and production, selects the winner among bidders for the work (with NASA’s concurrence 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 71 

in the case of the shuttle contract), and then has sole control of managing and 

paying the subcontractor. In this context, European industry would not be precluded from bidding on the shuttle subcontracts, and under normal economic 

pressures to use low bid from a qualified supplier, theyxould conceivably win $10 

to $100M of the subcontracts. However, because of the nature of [3] R&D contracts, such as for the shuttle, there is little inherent pressure on our industry to 

choose low bid subcontractors; rather the most important considerations are 

minimizing programmatic, schedule, and management risks, and thereby maximizing the possibility of receiving their incentive. Historically, Europe has won 

no subcontracts of significance on space systems. Relaxation of implied restrictions and guidance to our industry to be more receptive to qualified bidders in 

Europe could be employed by us as a bargaining tool in the post-Apollo negotiation; and if the dollar flow is considered a problem, it might be balanced through 

some reciprocal arrangements. These alternatives are discussed later under 

“Options.” 

U.S. Motivations and Objectives in Post-Apollo Cooperation 

It has been U.S. policy and President Nixon’s desire to promote international cooperation in space and to share the benefits (and burdens) of space with all mankind. It has 

also been U.S. policy to strengthen our allies and alliances, and to foster a sense of community among the Europeans and to encourage their joint undertakings. The desire to 

implement these policies and also to make a new program more attractive to Congress 

(and also less cancelable), led NASA to seek European partnership in the post-Apollo 

space program over two years ago. The prospect of a European financial contribution to 

our program was thought to be a further plus. There was, however, ambivalence in our 

understanding of how much of the Administration’s desire for international participation 

in space focused on joint usage and how much on joint development of space hardware. 

In recent weeks there has been some clarification of Presidential preference; his interest 

is primarily in European involvement in the use of space, coming from the development 

of payloads and operations rather than from big joint engineering projects, and specifically to share in the use of our post-Apollo space systems for international manned operations. 

Whatever cooperative program is devised, we seek maximum benefit for ourselves in 

terms of (1) creating togetherness and good will, or at least minimizing any ill will, (2) 

drawing their interest away from undertaking separate space systems (e.g., the Europa 111 

booster, aerosat, or those competitive with Intelsat), and (3) gaining some technology 

from areas of European special qualification, and possibly obtaining some minor components at a lower cost. At the same time, we want to minimize (1) increased risk and management complexity of our development program, (2) technology/dollar/job outflow, 

and (3) foreign relations impairment resulting from disputes as the program progresses. 

[4] European Motivations and Objectives in Post-Apollo Cooperation 

A major European objective is to gain large systems management capability and some 

technology. Their government/industry technocrats were very impressed by our success 

with Apollo, and they believe that by participating with us in a major systems development, 

such as the shuttle, they can learn how to better manage and build their own big technical projects (Europa I11 being a possible example). Their willingness to pay for the development of part of our shuttle is, in their view, a ticket to participate in or at least get a 

front row seat to our management process. A second European objective is to have the use 
72 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

of the world’s most advanced space system, the shuttle, to carry out more complex science 

and applications programs in space, and, in spite of no explicit European plans at this 

time, there may be awakening interest in sharing in the prestige and greater capabilities 

of manned flight. Finally, the science-technology ministers and the international space 

organizations are looking for big projects that their respective governments will support 

(bureaucratic empire building). Also, of course, the European aerospace industry, which 

is in a decline analogous to ours, wants to get some business, particularly if that business 

might have fallout that would improve their competitive posture in other high technology areas. The direct business prospect appears to them as twofold: the R&D money from 

European governments and then the sale of production items to both European and U.S. 

users. 

The History of the U.S. Commitment to Post-Apollo Cooperation 

It has been a U.S. attitude that space like Antarctica is inherently international, only 

to be explored for humanitarian reasons. Whatever benefits that derive from being in 

space can be benefits to all mankind, except, of course, where military utility is involved. 

The one challenge, thus far, to this viewpoint has been in the use of satellites for communications, where commercial exploitation exists for point-to-point communications and is 

in dispute for mobile usage (aerosat). Such challenges will become more common as the 

shuttle opens up the commercial utilization of space. All Presidents since the inception of 

the space program have called for international cooperation in space, many in Congress 

favor it, and the Space Act, which formed NASA, urges it. President Nixon publicly promoted it in his statement of March 7, 1970. 

[5] NASA has had an international outlook and has engaged other nations in many useful joint science projects. Partially because of this international orientation and partially 

because of the desire to make the program more attractive (and less cancelable), Tom 

Paine in private discussions with President Nixon at the time of Apollo 11 raised the issue 

of seeking greater international participation in our space program after Apollo. Paine 

reported that the President concurred in the desirability of this course of action, though 

it was not made clear as to the relative preference between participation in hardware 

development or participation in manned flight and science payloads. Paine then went to 

Europe to test and stimulate the Europeans’ interest, and at the same time he narrowed 

the candidates for cooperation to the joint development and use of the space station or 

shuttle, and then only to the latter when the space station was dropped from our plans 

due to funding reductions. NASA did report to the White House on its progress in obtaining European involvement, and these reports elicited acknowledgments which were possibly of a somewhat perfunctory nature. NASA, however, accepted these acknowledgments 

as direction to continue. Operating from the same background and with stimulation from 

NASA and in response to European overtures, the State Department conducted two minister-level exploratory talks with the Europeans on the basis of U.S. “desire for maximum 

partnership in the post-Apollo program consistent with mutual desires and capabilities.” 

This came to mean to NASA, Europe, and the State Department, a partnership in the 

development and construction of the shuttle, with possible involvement in the tug or the 

sortie can version of RAM. It was also understood that the U.S. would guarantee to use the 

particular European product, if that product was completely satisfactory to us. Talks have 

continued between U.S. and European technical groups to define areas of possible cooperation, meanwhile the Europeans have spent roughly $5M studying the shuttle and tug 

in order to decide where their work might be concentrated. They are now expanding 

their tug studies and are also studying RAM (sortie can). 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 73 

The initial U.S. stipulations to cooperation were that there be no exchange of funds 

and that the management/technology level of the European undertaking be in keeping 

with their current capability and not rely on technology infusion from the U.S. A later stipulation was that the Europeans would have to contribute a significant portion of the effort 

(10% of the program’s cost). This stipulation was dropped, however, after the U.S. decided on separating the issues of post-Apollo and launch assurances. (The launch assurance 

issue involved Europe’s concern about obtaining U.S. launches of their payloads, The U.S. 

has now agreed to launch any European payload having a peaceful [6] purpose, except 

where we believed the payload violated international agreements (e.g. , military systems 

or those competing with Intelsat). These launches would use our present boosters and the 

costs would be reimbursed.) Our most recent stipulation is that they would have to commit themselves to a “package deal” for the development of the tug or RAM before we 

would settle on their government-supported “subcontractual” involvement in the shuttle. 

An implied stipulation was that neither Europe nor we would try to recover our respective 

development costs through amortization in the unit or use prices. 

There has been growing concern in the Executive Office and with top NASA management that we are getting ourselves involved in a situation that is not advantageous. A 

recent informal sounding of Presidential desire indicated that his interest would be 

almost fully served through joint use of space, and partnership construction of complex 

space hardware is not a strong motivation. In some response to these feelings, NASA has 

been directed to attempt to shift European interest away from the shuttle and onto the 

tug or RAM. 

Present status is as follows: the Europeans are now trying to decide whether or not to 

develop a tug or RAM. If their decision is affirmative, they have been led to believe that 

they can, if they wish, develop a few prescribed, “simple” parts of the shuttle, with certain 

restrictions on funding control. The Europeans must make up their minds by early summer if they wish to avail themselves of this “package deal.” The decision is very hard for 

them because they have not thoroughly studied what is involved in the development of the 

tug or RAM, and they are going to have to decide with major technical and cost uncertainties facing them. Meanwhile, our change in signals on aerosat has caused them additional concern as to our motives in space, and has produced some European “threats” 

against post-Apollo; apparently they believe us to be eager for their involvement. 

Options for US.-European Involvement 

The four main options, some having suboptions, that are open to the U.S. are listed 

below in increasing order of complexity as far as program management is concerned 

(except possibly for 4b). 

1. Complete Disengagement. The most obvious option is to disengage and have no 

international participation in our space program, other than at the scientific level as we 

already have. This option guarantees no technology or dollar outflow, does not restrict 

our future political or programmatic decisions, and adds no technical and management 

complications to an [7] already complex program. This, in fact, may be the outcome anyway, since European interests may well not be sufficiently strong to underwrite an expensive program having a nebulous quid po quo. But if we force this option, the Europeans 

will correctly view this as a major shift away from the commitment they accepted from U.S. 

officials as our government’s policy. Foreign relations harm may result and, in fact, may 

have wider effects than space matters usually do because this would closely follow other 

unsatisfactory space negotiations in the European view and also may seem to show a 

quixotic approach to policy formulation in the U.S. 
74 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

2. International Cooperative Payloads. This option is to indicate that our interest in 

international participation is focused on the usage of the shuttle for mutual benefit, 

including manned flight, and not on development of the hardware. This option probably 

should be emphasized whatever else we jointly undertake because it appears to be at the 

heart of the President’s actual desire. However, the Europeans will probably not view this 

as a significant concession since we are talking about events eight years from now, and furthermore the Europeans may believe this already to be U.S. policy. 

3. European Development of an Element of the Post-Apollo Program Other than the Shuttle 

(Tug or Sortie Can Version of RAM). A third option is to allow the present situation to continue to the extent that Europe is free to choose between the development of a tug or sortie can, with a U.S. guarantee to use the item if it meets our required specifications. Either 

would meet Europe’s perception of the US. commitment. The possible advantages to us 

of their undertaking the tug is the savings of a substantial R&D cost and the availability of 

the system several years earlier than otherwise. A possible other advantage is that the 

diversion of European funds to the tug would preclude their development of Europa 111, 

and thus limit the expansion of their independent launch capability. (Any lesser commitment of European funds to post-Apollo, such as doing a RAM-sortie can and/or parts of 

the shuttle, would leave open the possibility of doing Europa 111. However, It is possible 

that the cost and difficulty of Europa I11 will discourage the Europeans from undertaking 

it regardless of their post-Apollo involvement; and if undertaken it is even more possible 

that it would not be completed, as greater realization of its relative inadequacy became 

more apparent.) Any advantages to the U.S. of a European tug project seem to be more 

than offset by several disadvantages: the probability of Europe producing an unacceptably 

low performance system, the likelihood of technology outflow, the enhancement of their 

own booster capability, the dollar outflow to buy production units (perhaps up to $500M), 

and the difficulty in accommodating DOD’s unwillingness to rely on a foreign supplier. 

[8] Concerning the other side of this option, the advantages of Europe developing the 

sortie can version of RAM is that the task clearly can be within their capabilities, has minimum risk of technology transfer, could contribute a useful element to the post-Apollo 

program, and has no military implication. The cost to the U.S. to buy units from Europe 

would depend on the degree of equipping but may be fairly nominal, in the range of $20 

to $60M over a period of several years. This expenditure would be offset by European purchase of the other versions of RAM produced in the U.S. 

Given that the tug is an unacceptable European project for several reasons, and that 

the sortie can would be acceptable, a difficult problem faces us in causing redirection of 

European interests. We could easily end up with the foreign relations disadvantages listed 

under 1 even though we are trying to take a conciliatory approach in offering a moderate 

program of participation. This problem is discussed further under “Tactical 

Considerations,” but anticipating that discussion, no fully satisfactory tactic is evident. 

4. European Involvement in the Development of the Shuttle. This option is in two parts: the 

first being a continuation of the current position and the second a possible fallback 

maneuver as a possible foreign relations concession. 

a. European Government-Supported “Subcontracts.” This option is also a continuation of the current situation, namely, to accept Europe as a limited partner in the 

development of the shuttle, with them building at their expense certain “simple” parts of 

the hardware. The advantage to us in this arrangement is that it further meets European 

understanding of our commitment. It had been a NASA position that sufficiently simple 

tasks had been identified to make this arrangement feasible, however, many now feel that 

the increased risks and technology/management outflow may well more than offset the 

dollar or good will value of a European government-supported contribution to the 

shuttle. There is also serious concern that the normal supplier problems in big and com- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 75 

plicated development programs would, on occasion, be elevated into international disputes, thereby producing the reverse of the President’s desire for good will. Furthermore, 

this arrangement amounts to a U.S. government guarantee to supply certain components 

to our prime contractor, thus removing some of our government’s leverage and some of 

the contractors overall responsibility for the integration and management function. 

During the course of the program, the prime contractor could well use this as an excuse 

for schedule, cost, or design changes. Withdrawing this option, however, will have a negative effect on European attitude toward the US., and a possible concession to lessen this 

impact is suggested by the following option. 

[9] b. Normal Commercial Subcontracts (A possible foreign relations concession to 

offset the negative impact of withdrawing shuttle participation as an option). If some 

European involvement in shuttle development was felt to be necessary as a foreign relations concession due to our past stimulation and commitments, a possible fallback from 

the above government arrangement would be for the prime contractor to do some nominal amount of normal commercial subcontracting with qualified bidders in Europe, once 

Europe has committed to a RAM or tug. This would partially satisfy their industry’s desire 

to do some work on the shuttle, and would not have the serious disadvantage of involving 

their governments directly in the arrangements, nor of having European participation in 

the management of the overall system. Also, the U.S. might benefit by some minor technology flow in our direction. To mitigate outward dollar flow, some balancing amount of 

work might be subcontracted by Europe in the U.S. on their RAM or tug, though this may 

happen anyway depending upon the degree of assistance they need on their task, or balancing might be achieved through other offset arrangements to achieve no net exchange 

of funds. This alternative is not favored by NASA, but if directed to choose between 4a and 

4b for foreign relations reasons, this latter alternative is less odious and is doable. 

A Proposed Program 

A program agreeable to NASA, and which attempts to maximize the net advantage to 

the U.S. and at the same time appears to be reasonably attentive to our commitment to 

Europe, has been selected from parts of the above options. 

System Use: European operational involvement with us in some joint 

manned orbital missions, plus reimbursable use of our space 

transportation system to orbit their science and applications 

satellites, as a natural continuation of our present launch 

assurances. 

System Development: If European interest continues to include working on hardware development, we should agree only to their building the 

sortie can version of the family of RAM’S. We would agree to 

buy from them the basic components of this item, while other 

versions of RAM would be built by the U.S. and would be for 

sale to the Europeans. 

[ 101 The second part of the above program, system development, has the most immediate impact and also major difficulties associated with it in a foreign relations sense. In visibly removing the tug and shuttle from the list of acceptable projects for participation, we 

will antagonize the Europeans, even if they were not going to opt for these projects. 

Coming on top of the bad deals they believe they have been dealt in aerosat and Intelsat, 

a narrowing of our post-Apollo policy in this fashion may well have serious repercussions 

in a broader context: we may be increasingly seen as unreliable partners and allies. For 
76 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

this reason, some concession may be in order, and the views of [the National Security 

Council] and State would help to guide the policy in this regard. A concession could be 

made either re the tug or shuttle. However, because of the difficulty of developing a satisfactory tug and the potential for sizable technology and dollar outflow, and also because 

of DOD’s concern in this area, we should preclude European development of this project. 

We would simply be trading off a short-term foreign relations problem for a longer-term 

one. In regard to shuttle involvement, the management and foreign relations problems 

associated with government-to-government subcontracting are unacceptable, but we 

might accept European subcontracting on a normal company-to-company basis. Though 

not to their liking, NASA could informally direct our U.S. shuttle contractors to select and 

use qualified, low-bid European subcontractors on tasks the prime contractors choose, 

perhaps up to the level of $50 to $100M out of a $3 to $4B shuttle contract. Dollar outflow 

could be balanced by our requirement that the Europeans subcontract at least a compensatory amount in the U.S. for their RAM development, if the two to three year delay 

in balancing is acceptable to us. Otherwise, balancing can be achieved through other offset arrangements. NASA would prefer not to make a foreign relations concession of this 

nature because of their long-standing adherence to an internal rule against exchange of 

funds and its potential political impact. If, however, State and [the National Security 

Council] urge this concession, NASA sees this arrangement as less odious than government-togovernment subcontracting, and could implement it. 

Strategy and Tactics for Implementing the Proposed Program 

Two levels of action should be pursued: a longer-term (months) strategic move to 

gain European political appreciation of and accommodation to the differences in 

European and US. motivations re space, and a short-term (weeks) tactical move to decide 

on and offer to the Europeans a moderate program of participation in the post-Apollo 

development Phase, having net advantage to the U.S. 

1. Strategic Considerations. 

Complicating our discussions on space cooperation with the Europeans are the differences in our respective backgrounds and orientations with respect to space. To those 

who ran the U.S. space program, particularly the Apollo program, and conducted our side 

of the talks with the Europeans, space has been a non-commercial venture encompassing 

exploration, science, and technology, and space’s commercial value has played only an 

emerging role in their thinking. Commercial utilization has been handled by our [ 111 private sector; while in Europe both the exploration and utilization of space are government 

functions. European interest in post-Apollo is more in the vein of commerce than adventure. Obtaining a mutually satisfactory cooperative program has been difficult because the 

two sides have seen it as offering different payoffs. Therefore, our strategy must not simply be to bring a shift in emphasis on what piece of hardware Europe might supply, but 

should develop a basic accommodation through mutual understanding and acceptance of 

objectives. 

We must attempt, for example, to stimulate recognition in European scienceminister/political leaders, and their staffs, of the political-prestige value of manned space 

flight. No significant effort has been made by the U.S. to determine the latent political 

interest in manned flight, nor has any coordinated attempt been made to guide them persuasively into the program. NASA seems to have taken the European view at face value, 

and all of our negotiations on cooperation have generally reflected our axiomatic acceptance of European disinterest in manned space flight. We also should try to obtain an 

understanding with Europe that the development of launchers duplicates skills and equip- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 77 

ment that already are well developed in the U.S., does not really enhance the direct 

derivation of benefits from space given the availability of launches, and does heighten U.S. concern because of technology flow and security considerations. There is some doubt that 

Europe can learn our management skills simply by sitting in on the shuttle management, 

but it is a risk to us for reasons of future competitive posture. We should attempt to make 

it clear that we expect them to join us in a cooperative space program primarily for noncommercial reasons, and they should disabuse themselves of the idea of making money 

from us or learning our technology and know-how. They may feel that it is their financial 

contribution to the program that motivates U.S. interest in cooperation, and hence they 

are entitled to get something significant and tangible out of the program. They are wrong 

on both counts, and we must clarify this matter to them. Discussion should begin informally and individually, not groupwise, recognizing, however, that the prospects of evangelizing are not great, a priori. 

2. Tactical Considerations. 

The most immediate problem is to persuade the European space technocrats that a 

RAM-sortie can is a challenging and important task, and that it opens the part of the postApollo program having the greatest direct benefit, [ 121 namely, payload development and 

use. The tug should be ruled out because of its difficulty and its high potential for technology and dollar outflow:If the Europeans insist on also participating in shuttle 

development, we can, on grounds of avoiding government involvement in contractorsubcontractor disputes, offer the possibility of their industry functioning as normal 

commercial subcontractors to our U.S. prime contractor at a moderate level ($50 to 

$100M). The Europeans have purportedly inquired about this possibility last month, and 

so a change in our position of this nature can be offered as acquiescence to their proposal. There would be an understanding with Europe that the dollar flow inherent in this 

arrangement would have some balance through European subcontracting in the US. for 

parts of its RAM, or through other offset arrangements. 

The fact must be faced that the European technicians have been strongly motivated 

toward [a] tug; it is the biggest and most challenging post-Apollo project available to 

them, and has the greatest technology stimulation and spin-off to other. high technology 

capabilities. Moreover, nothing the U.S. has said to the Europeans in almost two years 

would indicate anything other than our desire for them to undertake the tug. And at our 

encouragement they have spent $1 to $2M studying their capability for its development. 

Changing signals is therefore going to be difficult without irritating them (justifiably). 

Because it postpones the problem, there have been suggestions that we wait for Europe to 

come to its own understanding or demonstration of its inability to build an acceptable tug. 

The Europeans’ anger and frustration would increase, though, in proportion to the 

amount of time and money they waste on a project we reject. It may be that the best course 

is to take the flak now and admit our concern over their abilities and over the technology/dollar outflow we envision, and withdraw the tug from consideration. In order to ease 

the foreign relations impact and some of the pressure their industry is applying to their 

governments to undertake development tasks that are unacceptable to us (tug or 

European-contributed shuttle work), we might allow them some normal subcontractor 

participation in the shuttle as qualified bidders. 

The timing of these tactics is a major difficulty. We would have to get these messages 

across and obtain European agreement by July if European subcontractors are to be used 

on the shuttle; our prime contractor cannot wait past that period. If Europe only undertakes a RAM-sortie can, timing is no longer critical to us, but the Europeans themselves 

say they must decide by mid-summer because of the coupling with their decision on 

whether or not to go ahead with Europa 111. 
78 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[13] The State Department is now reviewing the post-Apollo policy, and the receipt of 

directions to propose a modified program to the Europeans would be most timely. Some 

resistance within our government to an alteration in direction can be anticipated, if for 

no other reason than the psychological momentum of the people that have been involved 

in obtaining European participation. Considering the many factors involved, no more 

time should lapse before a decision is made and guidance given. 

Document 1-26 

Memorandum for the President 

Subject: Post-Apollo Relationships with the Europeans 

I wish to bring to your attention my increasing concern about developing U.S. attitudes toward European participation in the development of the post-Apollo Space 

Transportation System and the need for prompt U.S. decisions in this matter, if we are to 

control the play of events. 

Your name has been closely identified with U.S. efforts over the past several years to 

encourage European participation in the development of that System-the Shuttle, the 

Tug and associated research applications modules (RAMs). Tom Paine, alluding repeatedly to what he described as your views, visited each major European capital to invite such 

participation. In October of 1970 and again in February 1971, Alex Johnson and a 

subcabinet team met with the European space and science Ministers. These and other 

activities of responsible US. officials, including our Ambassadors, have provided the 

Europeans every reason to believe that the U.S. was seriously interested in having them 

participate in the development of certain parts of the Shuttle, in one or more of the 

RAMs, especially in the Tug. As an indication of their interest the European governments 

have already spent or committed a total of $11.5 million on preliminary technical studies. 

The European space and science Ministers are scheduled to meet in three weeks (May 

19th) to formulate their views with respect to participation, and again in early July to take 

a final position. We can expect a visit of a high-level European delegation shortly after the 

May meeting. 

Within the last several months U.S. views that we should minimize European participation have begun to harden. These views hold that we should not permit European participation in development of the Shuttle because of domestic economic consideration and 

the difficulties of sharing such a task with foreign governments and subcontractors. With 

respect to the Tug they hold that the development task will be too [2] difficult technically to rely on European performance. European participation would thus be limited to 

development of one or more of the RAMs. 

Were the European share of Shuttle development to be truly substantial, these economic and management considerations might well be overriding. However, the extent of 

their possible participation is now limited to a few specific projects totaling about $100 

million out of the total Shuttle program costing $5.15 billion. The advantages of denying 

their participation at this level do not justify the loss of U.S. integrity abroad. 

There is no need to reverse our position now on European development of the Tug, 

since it is a vary advanced project which will require several more years of design study. 

The Europeans are, as yet, not convinced that they should undertake it. 

My basic worry is that we will buy more trouble with the Europeans than can be 

justified by the ephemeral domestic advantages that we may gain by denying their partic- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 79 

ipation. To limit them now to development of only a RAM would be judged by them as a 

clear reversal of our previous policy. Your reputation as a consistent advocate of international cooperation in space and specifically with Europe on the post-Apollo program 

would inevitably suffer. Furthermore, we ought not to ignore altogether the very real 

political values that would result from European participation with us in the development 

as well as the use of the Space Transportation System. 

Balancing all these considerations I suggest: 

1. That we accept, but not encourage, European participation in the tasks in the 

development of the shuttle already identified by NASA conditioned on a prior 

commitment by the European Space Conference (ESC) that it will undertake the 

subsequent development of one or more RAMS. 

2. That we bring the Europeans to agree that consideration of their undertaking the 

development of the Tug will be deferred pending further mutual study. 

I urge that you approve this course of action in principle and instruct me to reach 

agreement with the Europeans along these lines. 

131 3. That we conduct negotiations on these matters so as to avoid indicating a major 

change in our policy toward European participation (i.e.: in the proposals which 

we have already made to the ESC) . 

William P. Rogers 

Document 1-27 

May 5, 1972 

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Henry: 

Dr. Walsh of your staff has requested formal comments from NASA on Secretary 

Rogers’ memorandum to the President of April 29 on Post-Apollo relations with the 

Europeans. 

Our comments are attached. 

Sincerely, 

James C. Fletcher 

Administrator 

Enclosure 

********* 
80 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[Enclosure Page 11 

NASA’s Comments on Secretary Rogers’ 

Memorandum of April 29, 1972 

NASA’s comments on Secretary Rogers’ memorandum of April 29 for the President, 

on the subject of post-Apollo relationships with the Europeans, follow: 

Our preferred objective is to obtain European agreement to develop a specified type 

of sortie module for use with the shuttle, reserving other types for our own development. 

We regard this as a desirable contribution to the space transportation system and one 

which should present no undue problems technically or managerially. 

We agree with the Secretary’s letter that the tug requires further study. It is, therefore, 

a distinctly, second choice, and much less desirable. We believe that European study of the 

tug should be on element of an agreement only if it is clear that the US commitment to a 

European undertaking to develop the tug could be considered only after extensive 

European study and only on the basis that we might well decide not to pursue the tug after 

such study. The Europeans would have to understand, even before undertaking such a 

study, that the definition of the tug and European capability [2] to develop it are uncertain; even in the event we were both persuaded by studies and proposed management 

schemes that the project appeared feasible in Europe, we would still want to reserve the 

right to escape from an agreement if interim review indicated that the tug would be substantially delayed or fall short of agreed specifications. Of course, the Europeans might 

not wish to participate in the study on such a tenuous basis. Unless directed by the 

President, we would not anticipate NASA technical support of the European study. For all 

of these reasons, we do not recommend European involvement in the tug. 

With regard to specific shuttle tasks that Europe might perform, we continue to feel 

such European participation is highly undesirable and that it would complicate our shuttle management problems. However, if it is considered by the President, on the basis of 

international factors, that Europe’s participation in the shuttle itself is of overriding 

importance, we believe that we could accept such participation if suitable management 

terms cam be established. In essence, acceptable management terms would call for US 

prime contractor selection and direction of European subcontractors, with the [3] 

European side responsible for both estimated costs and overruns and the US side responsible only for those out-of-scope changes imposed by us. As stated in the Secretary’s letter, 

the European performance of shuttle items would be conditioned upon European development of a sortie module. 

[41 INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION 

INTHESHUTTLE 

A. NASAwants: 

1. US. Shuttle (now) 

2. U.S. Sortie 

3. U.S. Tug (2-3 years later) 

B. NASA can do (if required): 

1. A European Sortie Can (no significant management problem) 

2. European “bits and pieces” of shuttle (now) 

3. Maybe European Tug (later) (Technology and Management Problem) 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 81 

C. Europe Wants (?) 

1. European Tug 

2. “Bits and pieces” of shuttle 

a. or involvement some way in shuttle 

3. Sortie (?) 

D. U.S. should (1) offer and (2) accept 

1. (1) Sortie Can 

2. (2) Shuttle Items or C 2 a. Plus D 1 

3. (2) Europe study of Tug in full knowledge of questions re definition, European 

capability, performance, minimal number of procurements, interim review and 

escape procedure for NASA 

[5] E. NASAPosition 

1. Sortie OK 

2. Tug only after detailed study, poor second choice, et cetera 

3. We are directable to do shuttle items plus 1 (if we can control management 

method) 

Document 1-28 

Document title: European Space Conference, Committee of Alternates, “Report of the 

ESC Delegation on discussions held with the US. Delegation on European participation 

in the Post-Apollo Program, Washington, 1416 June 1972,” CSE/CS (72) 15, June 22, 

1972, excerpts. 

Source: ESA Collection, European Community Archives, Florence, Italy. 

On June I, 1972, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger communicated to the Department of State and NASA, among others, a presidential decision that removed a 

reusable space “tug” as a candidate for the European contribution to the Space Transportation 

System. President Nixon was also discouraging the idea of European jim building portions of the 

space shuttle itself: These prejierences were the basis of the US. position announced in a meting with 

a European Space Conference delegation on June 14 through June 16. Aft.. the meting, Europe 

decided over the next year that its post-Apollo contribution would be a research and applications module (subsequently renamed Spacelab). 

[I1 Neuilly, 22nd June 1972 

Report of the ESC Delegation on discussions 

held with the U.S. Delegation on European 

participation in the Post-Apollo Program 

Washington, 1416June 1972 

1. According to instructions given by ESC Ministers in an informal meeting of 19 May 

1972, held in Paris, a European Space Conference Delegation met a U.S. Delegation in 

Washington, D.C., 1415 June 1972. 

A list of the European and U.S. delegates is attached to this report (Annexes I and 11). 
82 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

General considerations 

2. At the beginning of the discussions, Mr. Herman Pollack, head of the US. Delegation, 

made an opening statement (see Annex 111) in which he recalled the developments which 

had occurred since the last meeting between President Lefevre and Under Secretary of 

State Johnson in early 1971 and provided a brief overview of the current U.S. attitude 

towards cooperation with Europe in the post-Apollo Program: 

(1) The concept of European participation in the Shuttle development has changed 

considerably and would be subject to such stringent conditions that it may 

become almost unattractive for Europeans; 

(2) The U.S. has concluded that it is not prudent to continue discussions on the possibility of tug development by Europe; 

(3) The U.S. encourages Europe to undertake the development of one or more of 

the Research and Application Modules which in its opinion would constitute a 

desirable form of cooperation; 

[2] (4) The U.S. also urges Europe to anticipate and make extensive use of the Space 

Shuttle system when it becomes operational and to participate in payload development, both manned and unmanned. It was mentioned in that respect that participation of European astronauts in shuttle flights would be welcomed. 

3. In the course of the discussion which followed the statement, it was made clear to the 

European Delegation that the U.S. attitude was defined at top governmental level and that 

no change in it could be expected; it was also stressed within the limits so described 

Europe could submit any proposal of participation. 

4. In his concluding remarks (see Annex IV) Mr. Herman Pollack drew the attention of 

the European Delegation to the fact that the U.S. feels that the “potential of outer space” 

which would become possible through the post Apollo program is so far-reaching that it 

can no longer be the subject solely of national decision. This is the reason why the U.S. is 

seeking ways to make it possible for other qualified and interested nations to participate 

with it in the development and utilization of this new capability. 

The enduring nature of the ties that bind the U.S. and Europe motivated the U.S. in 

it search for European participation in the post-Apollo program. The motivations were 

purely political and commercial or technical factors had practically no influence. . . . 

111 ANNEX I11 

Opening Remarks by Mr. Herman Pollack 

Meeting with ESC Delegation on Post-Apollo Cooperation 

June 14,1972 

Welcome. 

Many of us sat in this room for the second of the two meetings between Minister 

Lefevre and Under Secretary Johnson and their delegations 16 months ago in early 1971. 

A good deal has occurred during those 16 months to enable us all to have a clearer 

definition of the post-Apollo program and a somewhat better understanding of each others’ readiness and interest in cooperating in that program. In retrospect perhaps the most 

significant of these developments have been: 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 83 

1. The development by the U.S. of a launch assurance policy, which stands independent of European participation in the development of the reusable Space 

Transportation System or its use. I refer to the launch assurances conveyed in 

Under Secretary Johnson’s letter to Minister Lefevre of September 1, 1971. 

2. The discussions held between NASA and technical representatives of the 

European Space Conference. 

3. The decision of our President to proceed with the development of the Space 

Shuttle System, and the development timetable which follows from that decision. 

4. The preparations under way in Europe for Ministerial decisions, prospectively this 

summer, on a broad range of matters affecting European space activities. 

5. Considerable changes in the economic perceptions and budgetary circumstances 

in the U.S. I imagine the same is true in Europe. 

We meet now, at your request, specifically to discuss the questions which you have 

raised in the agenda before us. 

It is our understanding that these discussions are not negotiations. Obviously we will 

not reach decisions here. Rather, we anticipate informal and frank exchange of views in 

which we seek to understand more precisely each others’ preferences and interests on the 

matters which you have raised. 

In the absence of a clear indication of the measure of European interest in possible 

participation, we shall do our best to make the US. views regarding the questions you have 

raised as helpful as we can. Were it possible during the early part of our discussions to 

obtain a clearer understanding of the measure of European interest, and possible participation, our views could possibly be more responsive and useful to you. 

[2] Now, if I may, I should like to present a brief overview of U.S. attitudes toward cooperation with Europe in the post-Apollo program. 

As I indicated earlier I have presented this overview in the interests of making our discussion here today more constructive and to help illuminate the responses we shall make 

to the questions you have raised. 

1. We urge Europe to anticipate and make extensive use of the Space Shuttle System 

when it becomes operational, and to participate in payload development, both 

manned and unmanned. 

2. We have concluded that from our point of view, as well as yours as we understand 

it, that the development by Europe.of one or more of the Research Applications 

Modules would constitute a desirable form of cooperation, and we encourage you 

to undertake such a task. 

3. With the passage of time the concept of European participation in the development of the Shuttle itself has changed considerably. We are now strongly 

impressed by the potential difficulties that might ensue from an intergovernmental effort to produce a relatively small number of components of a massive 

piece of highly complex hardware whose timetable is pressing and in whose success the political and economic stakes are so high. Cooperation in some of the 

Shuttle items is not precluded. However, it will be necessary for Europe to undertake to meet rather stringent conditions designed to satisfy fully U.S. concerns. In 

candor I must report that the conditions the United States finds necessary may 

diminish the attractiveness to Europe of participating in the Shuttle items. 

4. Since the definition of the Tug is still uncertain and the decision by the United 

States to proceed with its development has not yet been made, and there are no 

hard predictions as to when it will be made, the United States has concluded that 

it is not prudent to continue discussions of the possibility of cooperation on this 

task. 
84 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

I have, as you know, participated in these discussions from their outset. If words alone 

were all that were required to get cooperation under way we would be in full orbit by now. 

I want to assure you that European cooperation in this program, while evolving in form 

with passing time and changing circumstances, continues to be an objective of the United 

States. Let me say, however, that this is not essentially a commercial transaction we are discussing. Above all, it is a political act. In the absence of mutual political will to achieve a 

state of cooperation the real and apparent hazards and pitfalls will assume inordinate proportions and I fear that thkventure will founder. It is my hope that our discussion today, 

and any that may subsequently follow, will be strongly motivated by a mutual desire to find 

a basis for agreement. 

That concludes my opening remarks. 

r11 ANNEX IV 

Concluding Remarks by Mr. Herman Pollack 

Meeting with ESC Delegation on Post-Apollo Cooperation 

June 16, 1972 

In this meeting we have tried to be entirely forthcoming, realizing fully the difficulty 

and the importance of the decisions that are to be made in Europe and the value to you 

of the clearest possible understanding of what the United States has in mind. It is our 

hope that we have provided the facts you are seeking and that they will enable your 

Governments to arrive at affirmative decisions when your Ministers meet in July. Some of 

the facts, however, which I think are relevant to the decisions of your Governments cannot be expressed with mathematical precision but are nevertheless important, and perhaps fundamentally of greater importance than some of the hard information we have 

provided you with during this meeting. 

For example, it is important that both sides keep in mind the basic, enduring nature 

of the ties that bind the United States and Europe. These are well understood on both 

sides of the Atlantic and need not be elaborated here. But, it is this compelling and fundamental fact of life that above all else has motivated the United States in its search for 

European participation in the Post-Apollo program. 

Another major but somewhat ineffable motivation arises out of the awe which United 

States leaders viewed the potential of outer space which would become possible once 

capability such as that contemplated in the post-Apollo program became a part of 

mankind’s competence. We felt then and continue to feel now that this potential is too 

great, its implications to mankind too far reaching to be properly the subject solely of 

national decision. We therefore began to seek ways to make it possible for other qualified 

and interested nations to participate with us in the development and utilization of this 

new capability. 

I repeat my statement made on the first day that commercial or technical factors have 

practically no influence in motivating our desire for European participation in a postApollo program. Rather, the considerations I mentioned above have generated this objective and keep it alive and strong today. 

When we began our discussions with Europe we ourselves did not fully understand the 

nature of the system whose construction we shall embark on this summer. 

Furthermore, it is clear in retrospect, that we approached these opportunities in 

prospect of a considerable interest abroad in participating in the development and use of 

a new Space Transportation System. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 85 

[2] You have participated with us in the preliminary definition of that System and, 

indeed, have made significant contributions to our changing perspectives and deepening 

understanding of it. Positions which originated several years ago relied heavily on predictions-indeed speculation-both as to the System itself and your interest in it. These position have been altered and modified as our mutual comprehension grew. 

Thus we have arrived at a point in time at which your participation in the development of the Shuttle on a significant scale, as originally conceived, has been overtaken by 

time and, for the reasons we have enumerated during our discussions, can no longer be 

encouraged by us even on the limited scale we are still discussing. Consideration of mutual development of the Tug has of necessity been set aside. The opportunity to develop 

Sortie modules and to plan together for the use of the over-all Space Shuttle System and 

actually to make use of it, nonetheless constitute a major challenge and would be a significant response to our earlier expectations. We hope we have made it clear that we 

would warmly welcome your participation in these two areas. 

Finally, let me repeat that for over two years we have sought European participation 

in this program and let me emphasize that we continue to do so. It is my hope that for 

your own reasons as well as for those which move us, we shall be able to come this summer to an agreement to move forward together on this historic project. 

Document 1-29 

Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistaut Administrator for International Affairs, 

NASA, Memorandum to Administrator, “Government Level Negotiations on Sortie Lab,” 

May 9, 1973. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This memorandum describes the final issues that had to be resolved before the United States and 

Europe could sign a memorandum of unhtanding regardingEuropean development of the Spacelab 

(SL). The French L3S vehicle mentioned in the memorandum was later renamed Ariane. AEROSAT 

was a proposed cooperative satellite system for air traffic control, which was controversial at the time 

this memorandum was witten; the United States later withdrew from discussions regarding the development of this system. 

[I1 May 9, 1973 

Memorandum 

TO: A/ Administrator 

FROM: I/Asst. Administrator for International Affairs 

SUBJECT Government Level Negotiations on Sortie Lab 

Formal but secondary level efforts to arrive at a consolidated US/European text 

between the European side and the US side were carried out on May 2-3 in Washington. 

Pollack chaired the US side (myself, Elliott, Rattinger) and Trella chaired the European 

side (with representation from seven countries). 
86 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

A large number of essentially cosmetic changes were made in the existing US draft to 

accommodate European interests. In the end the European side cited three “reservations.” It was agreed the European side would attempt to respond in about two weeks to 

indicate whether the reservations stood so as to require further discussion or were 

removed. 

Among the many cosmetic changes were the following: 

1. The words “United States” were dropped where they preceded space shuttle system in order to parallel our removal of the word “European” before Spacelab. We do not 

want to emphasize ownership of the Spacelab by Europe and feel there is no need, in view 

of all the facts of life, to emphasize US ownership of the Shuttle. 

2. Under obligations of the US, “assistance” was removed to come under a requirement for mutual agreement and relevant US law and regulation. 

3. We agreed that the US right to provide assistance as hardware rather than knowhow could be exercised “in exceptional cases.” In fact, we do not now know of any requirements for such reservations. 

4. We agreed to state the legal situation in response to the European request for 

technology beyond that necessary to execute the SL program, namely, that the US will 

consider [2] such requests on a case-by-case basis. 

5. We made the same arrangement for the use of required technology for additional purposes outside the SL. 

6. We agreed that cooperative (non-reimbursable) European proposals would be 

given preference over third countries if at least equal in merit, but that cost reimbursable 

proposals by Europe will get such preference in the event of payload limitations or scheduling conflicts. This was agreed by our side to be only what would be the case under the 

President’s launch assurance policy in practice. 

7. It is specified, again pursuant to the President’s launch policy, that commercial 

use of Shuttles and SLs will be non-discriminatory. 

8. On the first SL we get “full control . . . including the right to make final determination as to its use . . .” and, except for joint planning of the first flight on a cooperative 

basis and encouragement of cooperative use of the first SL unit throughout its life, we get 

“unrestricted use of the first SL free of cost.” It is made clear that we may charge Europe 

for use of the first SL. 

9. The term of agreement-five years after the first operational flight of the 

Shuttle-is restated as lasting until January 1, 1985 but at least for five years following the 

first flight. 

The European chairman ended with three reservations: 

1. The group was not convinced that the European risk or contribution was adequately balanced by European benefits. He was specifically referring to their hope that we 

would agree to try to balance the European procurements in the US with US procurements in Europe. We said this is out of the question. 

2. The Europeans feel that the agreement ought to extend to 1988 in order to draw 

out our obligation to buy SLs. We feel that a term beyond 1985 is totally unrealistic in the 

light of our present knowledge and future uncertainties. 

3. The European side would still hope to improve the US launch assurance policy. 

We’ve made clear that it is totally impractical to think of working OUL changes in the US 

Government on this policy at this time. 

[3] My own assessment is that the three reservations are tactical, to keep things open, 

while the final arrangements in Europe fall into place on such matters as funding of the 

French L3S launch vehicle. I believe that the European leaders are essentially committed 

to participation with us and that only unexpected rebuffs by us, congressional reversal, or 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 87 

a serious falling out in Europe can change this. The AEROSAT problem is one such threat 

on the horizon. 

Arnold W. Frutkin 

Document 1-30 

Document title: Arnold W. Frutkin, Assistant Admiitrator for International Affairs, 

NASA, Memorandum to Deputy Administrator, “International Space Station Approach,” 

June 7,1974. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

This memorandum, prepared by longtime NASA Assistant Administrator for International Affairs 

Arnold Frutkin, contains some of the earliest thinking within top NASA circles with respect to what 

was expected to be the major ‘post-shuttle program-a space station. 

June 7, 1974 

TO: AD/Deputy Administrator 

FROM: I/Asst. Administrator for International Affairs 

SUBJECT International Space Station Approach 

REF Your Oral Request of May 15 

Note: I have assumed that it would be easier to get domestic clearance to explore a 

space station internationally than to get domestic approval for a space station per se 

before inviting international participation. Therefore, we propose an approach here in 

which all elements of the project would be attacked on an international basis: justification, 

definition, design, construction, operation and use. 

1. Prospective Partners 

The three plausible partners for an international space station effort would be the US, 

the Soviet Union, and the European Space Agency. All have space experience, will have 

had manned flight experience, and have the necessary resources. (Canada is extremely 

limited in resources and Japan has shown no disposition to contribute to a non-national 

space purpose. The possible participation on a secondary level of these and other countries will be discussed later.) 

There are a number of options as to how to approach participation by the senior 

three. We could approach either the USSR or Europe bilaterally, but I believe that each 

would be reluctant to enter into a strictly bilateral arrangement in the foreseeable 

future-Europe because of conservative space funding views and current space commitments, the Soviet Union because of political and security considerations. I do not think 

we should put the USSR forward as the senior partner since Europe would be quite 

offended (in view of the Spacelab agreement). Moreover, Europe might really be a better 

partner operationally, technically, financially and politically. 
88 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[2] Our best bet would be to approach both Europe and the USSR simultaneously, holding over each the possibility that we might be going ahead with the other. On this basis, 

we may be able to motivate both to work with us on a tripartite basis. This would give us the 

strongest basis for a large undertaking-economically and politically. Our approach 

(below) is calculated to make the USSR and Europe feel they have very little to lose and 

perhaps something to gain by entering into the particular procedure we are proposing. 

2. Domestic Clearance 

The multi-step approach outlined below would, of course, have to be cleared domestically with the usual offices. The prospects for such clearance would be greatly improved 

for the following reasons: 

(a) No significant funds would be required until about the fourth year of the relationship. 

(b) The procedure would advance us vary cautiously, step by step, into the project, 

with a longdeferred final commitment, and ample and specific opportunity to decide not 

to proceed beyond any given step. 

3. Initial International Approach 

After obtaining clearance, NASA would approach the Soviet Academy (or Aerospace 

Ministry) and the ESA (with backup visit at least to the principal ESA membersGermany, UK, France and Italy) on the following basis: 

“The next major step in space, following the Shuttle/Spacelab, could well be a space 

station-‘permanent,’ resuppliable, recycling, etc. Such a space station would represent a 

facility of verywide interest and potential value to nations. As avery considerable and beneficial undertaking, it would require and deserve the pooling of resources. Accordingly, 

we feel that the question of such a space station should be explored as a possible international undertaking. 

‘We recognize that it is entirely too early for any nation to consider any commitment 

whatever to such a project. At the same time, in view of the protracted study and development which would be required before a space station could become a reality, it is out 

too early to undertake the very first preliminary inquiries regarding the purposes and 

character of such a facility. 

[3] ‘We propose a very cautiously and conservatively structure[d] approach which would 

allow the three principal space power centers to examine into the question. They would 

begin independently, coordinate their next steps and, assuming that progress is satisfactory, proceed on an increasingly integrated basis. 

“Thus, we are asking you, the USSR and Europe to agree to explore with us, according to a very highly protective procedure, your possible interest in proceeding into the 

design, development and operation of a truly international space station.” 

4. Detailed International Procedure 

This procedure would proceed on two separate tracks. The first track would move 

from study and definition to planning the design, construction and establishment of the 

space station. The second track would aim at setting up the relationships and arrangements among the participants for undertaking, managing, and operating the space 

station. 

The two-track approach is designed to separate the technical from the political problems in the early phases of the project. The second track, on management and operation, 

begins only at a specific point, when it should be clear whether the first track is making 

satisfactory progress. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 89 

This arrangement will give us the best chance to see if we can agree on what it is that 

we might want to do together. We could then turn to how we want to do it. Our entire 

experience, especially the Spacelab negotiations, demonstrates that if you get into how 

before what, you argue about abstractions and principles and problems which will never 

arise instead of arguing about a specific job to be done. 

Farther down the road, the two tracks must be brought together so that we end up 

with a coherent plan and program. 

(a) First Track 

i. The three participants would initiate independent conceptual (pre-phase A) 

studies of a space station in order to develop their own very preliminary notions of its possible objectives, benefits, character and use, configuration and approach to placing and 

maintaining the station on orbit. (3/75) 

ii. The participants would interchange their independent studies and consider 

them. (9/75) 

[4] iii. The participants would form a (technical) joint study group to produce a 

single “strawman” concept. This would have no necessary relationship to the prior independent studies nor would the participants be bound by the views of their technical 

representatives. (12/75) 

iv. The participants would independently review the “strawman” study. (9/76) 

v. Technical representatives of the three participants would convene to formulate plans for a formal Phase A conceptual study to be conducted on an integrated (joint) 

basis. These plans would provide for integrated management of the study with ajoint project team supported by “contractors,” public or private, in the three countries. (12/76) 

vi. Implementation of the Phase A study per above. (3/76-3/78) 

vii. Those participants prepared to proceed, on the basis of Phase A results, to 

formulate a Phase B plan would do so. (They would do whatever might be appropriate to 

preserve the participation of any member with reservations at any step.) (6/78) 

viii. Implementation of Phase I1 Program. (6/7&6/80) 

ix. Review of Phase B program in manner similar to the review of Phase A above. 

(6/80-9/80) 

x. Formulation of Phase C/D program. (9/80-3/81) 

xi. Review of formulation and commitment to Phase C/D. (3/81-6/81) 

(b) Second Track 

i. At approximately the time when the formal Phase A study is agreed in Track 

One, the parties would convene a separate Joint Implementation Working Group to initiate an implementation plan for managing a possible Phase B and beyond. 

ii. The Joint Implementation Working Group would address the financial 

arrangements, the form and location of management, method of decision making, provision for a systems integration mechanism, the division of labor among the participants, 

the degree to which management [5] authority should reflect the relative responsibility of 

the parties, questions of mutual access, and ultimately the operation and use of the 

system. The target for final agreement on an implementation plan would be the conclusion of the formal study of Phase A. 

5. Technology Transfer 

Each participant will expect the ultimate space station to be fully available for his use, 

alone or in concert with the other participants. Therefore, each will want essentially a total 

knowledge of the system. In all likelihood, narrow commercial processes could be held 

back as proprietary. I believe we should face this prospect squarely-in approaching 

domestic clearances and later in reaching understandings with the other participants. 
90 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Thus, for the present, we would not hold out any tenuous, complex or artificial prospects 

for restricting technology in the course of the program. I believe we could support such a 

policy on the basis that the space station itself would be a valuable consideration and that 

the technology entering into its structure would be unlikely to have significant commercial application. I propose, however, to keep this question under review to see if an alternative is feasible. 

6. Additional Accessions 

The question of participation by additional countries might be handled in the following way: 

(a) In the design and development phase, any one of the three major participants 

could absorb personnel from additional countries within its own participation without in 

any way reducing its own responsibilities. It could not subcontract its responsibilities to 

foreign companies or the equivalent without the specific knowledge and consent of the 

other major participants. 

(b) In the use phase, other nations might apply for use of the system to a combined 

use-control board composed of the major participants according to provisions which 

would have to be worked out by the Joint Implementation Working Group. 

7. Assurances 

The participants would have to exchange government-level assurances relating to 

peaceful purposes, the openness of scientific results, [and] descriptive information of 

technical [6] activities (allowing for reservation of proprietary rights to industrial processes tested or employed in space, etc.). 

Arnold W. Frutkin 

Document 1-31 

Document title: Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director of International Affairs, NASA, to 

Director, Space Station Task Force, “Strategy for International Cooperation in Space 

Station Planning,” undated [August 19821. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This memorandum by NASA Director of International Affairs Kenneth Ped-men, who had joined the 

space agency in 1979, was prqared in response to a query from John Hodge, Director of NASA’s 

Space Station Task Force, about the elemats of a strakgy for international cooperation in a possible 

station program. The Space Station Task Force had been established earlier in 1982 as a focal point 

for heloping a NASA proposal for such an undertaking, which new Administrator James Be= and 

D@~J Administrator Hans Mark had ma& a top pn’m‘ty in their approach to the space agency’s 

future. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 91 

Dl 

TO: MFA-lS/Director, Space Station Task Force 

FROM: LI-l5/Director of International Affairs 

SUBJECT: Strategy for International Cooperation in Space Station Planning 

In your July 30 memo, you raised some interesting questions concerning international cooperation strategies. I would like to set down some thoughts on the matter, beginning 

with a quick look back to how we proceeded during Post-Apollo planning. 

LESSONS LE-. 

The most important lesson is to avoid making premature commitments or promises. 

Along with this, we must be careful to avoid broad statements that can be misconstrued. 

Based on long-standing U.S. policy to cooperate internationally in space (that was 

reconfirmed in a 1969 White House Space Task Force report) and to encourage a 

European community, President Nixon told NASA that the U.S. should have European 

participation in Post-Apollo activities. NASA, as a result, immediately began to seek 

European cooperation in its Shuttle and Space Station activities. In late 1971, NASA and 

the European Space Conference (ESC) agreed that Europe would study a Tug and RAM 

(a Spacelab-like module that could either be operated within the Shuttle bay or on a space 

station), and that European companies would formally team with U.S. companies during 

Phase A and look at specific parts of the Shuttle (i.e., tail, payload bay doors). Also, NASA 

and European labs engaged in studying technologies needed for Post-Apollo activities. All 

in all, Europe spent about $20M on these Phase A (and in some cases, Phase B) studies. 

In the end, Europe’s main interest was to develop the Tug. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. position with respect to the level and kind of European participation it wanted crystallized. First, the Administration’s interest in cooperating was later 

interpreted as an interest in European involvement in the use of space; Le., the develop 

ment of payloads and international manned operations rather than joint engineering projects. Second, [2] NASA, through an extensive review of European industry, found that 

European industry lagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S. industry. 

Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of joint development of technology, speculating that 

the U.S. might stand to lose more than it would gain. Third, NASA also decided that it did 

not want to depend on foreign countries for critical items on the Shuttle, so that the 

Shuttle could fly independent of foreign activities. Fourth, NASA decided that, for safety 

reasons, it did not want to fly a Tug using liquid propellants, the only type Europe was 

studying. Moreover, there was real concern that Europe did not have all the technology to 

develop a Tug. 

A smaller lesson learned was the undesirability of formal teaming in the study phase. 

While this teaming was for joint development of [the] Shuttle, which was eventually 

dropped for the reason stated above, it did reveal the possibility of losing flexibility in 

subsequent development. NASA might prefer certain European companies while not 

wanting to choose the U.S. companies with which they were teamed, 0; vice versa. Most 

important, individual European companies could be denied participation in the program 

if they had prematurely teamed with a U.S. company which did not end up winning the 

bid. 
92 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The U.S. Government thus found itself in the position of having to walk back from 

the European perception of the cooperative possibilities in Post-Apollo that were encouraged by the way the U.S. and Europe had proceeded to define that cooperation. In some 

quarters in Europe, these misperceptions still exist, particularly as they concern the reasons why we rejected European development of the Tug. 

Therefore, it must be decided whether certain systems and subsystems are going to be 

off-limits before we enter Phase B, so that we can avoid not only dashed expectations but 

also the possibility of missused [sic] foreign funding. Looking at it from the positive side, 

we should seek to identify, as soon as possible after we understand the basic design of the 

space station and before Phase B, what systems are realistic possibilities for foreign cooperation. 

Further along in our program as we begin our negotiations with potential partners on 

an MOU, we need also to avoid some of the features which have proved troublesome in 

the Spacelab agreement. Neither NASA nor potential foreign partners will want an 

arrangement where one piece of hardware is contributed, and NASA is obligated to buy 

the additional units. Instead, our foreign partners will probably want preferential or free 

access to the Space Station as the quid pro quo. As an internal exercise, they will probably want to assure themselves there will be industrial spin-offs for their industry. And while 

NASA may indeed want to buy additional units from the foreign source, it is not desirable 

for NASA to be either [3] obligated to do so or restricted from developing similar types 

of hardware. 

MISSION REQUIREhIENTS STU9LES. . . HOW WW PROCEEDED TO DATE. 

The first key step was to involve foreigners early on in the process. This is responsive 

to their longtime requests for earlier participation in major NASA projects. It creates some 

ambiguity such as schedules, false starts, etc., but not enough so that it outweighs the benefits of beginning this way. Therefore, I think we are on the right track. 

Each space agency that is undertaking a parallel mission requirements study has made 

the mission requirements aspect the first effort of its study, so that the results of its study 

can be factored into NASA's similar efforts. This results from the numerous times NASA 

has emphasized in its discussions with foreign officials the importance of identifylng the 

potential uses of a space station, and from the realization by foreign officials that key U.S. 

players need to be apprised of the requirements that justify developing a space station. 

Nonetheless, these same space agencies are also studying possible hardware contributions to a NASA space station. These efforts result from their own political realities at 

home; i.e., they have to justify spending their resources in a space station not only on 

potential space station utilization, but on potential industrial return as well. It also derives 

from the fact that if NASA is successful in its attempts to get Phase B approval for FY84, 

then they are going to have to move quickly to get big bucks from their governments to 

fund their Phase B activities. Thus, they are preparing the information necessary for their 

governments to determine if they are interested. 

While this is acceptable, we must not let the emphasis on requirements get lost in the 

next several months. We can accomplish this by immediately addressing the question of 

how we plan to exchange results of the studies, thus reenforcing [sic] in the foreign space 

officials' minds that we are most interested in this aspect. I believe we will accomplish this 

at the September 13 meeting. I have outlined a proposal for this in the next section. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 93 

HOW ME SHOULD PROW FROM HERE. 

Phase A 

We have already laid the groundwork for this Phase. We saw an intense interest in our 

Space Station plans, and we have effectively translated that interest into several foreign 

mission requirements studies which are useful to both NASA and our potential partners. 

The complementary studies are designed to determine how much foreign interest exists 

in contributing to and using a U.S. Space Station. The results of these [4] studies will help 

both NASA and the potential partners decide if there is mutual interest in continuing 

cooperative activities in Phase B. 

The next eight months-the duration of the mission requirements studies-are a very 

important time. It is incumbent upon NASA to maintain the emphasis on these requirements studies. I believe we have to continue to demonstrate that these studies are important for all the reasons we discussed at the beginning. 

Thus, the scenario I would like to see happen for the rest of Phase A is as follows. 

Since the mid-term review of the U.S. contractors will be done individually with each contractor, it is not appropriate to invite our potential partners to observe this review. 

However, immediately following these reviews, I propose we invite the agencies which are 

undertaking parallel studies to a NASA summary of the mid-term reviews, and in turn, 

request each potential partner to brief us on their mid-term results. The final review of 

the U.S. contractors, I understand, will be an open review with all contractors reporting at 

the same forum. Thus, it is appropriate to invite our foreign agency study managers to 

attend this review, and present the final results of their studies. Finally, just as the U.S. contractors will prepare a final report on their studies, we should request copies of the reports 

of the foreign studies. We should also offer to provide to them the unclassified portion of 

the U.S. contractors’ reports. 

In addition to the above, we should use any of our NASA trips abroad in the next year 

as an opportunity to pulse the progress of these foreign studies. Likewise, we should welcome any requests to meet with us at NASA Headquarters to discuss the status of our 

Space Station planning activities. Given that the current space station activities are being 

run out of NASA Headquarters, I believe we should request foreign visitors to meet with 

Headquarters rather than Center personnel. Our foreign visitors should not be needlessly exposed to the Center politics now going on, which could only arouse further confusion as to NASA’s objectives at the present time. In addition, if opportunities for NASA 

personnel to address conferences arise that are attractive and useful, we should accept 

them, and use the conferences as additional opportunities to meet offline with foreign 

officials. In particular, we should attempt to find conferences that include potential foreign users of a Space Station: scientists, business groups, and applications-oriented 

groups. This office will be on the lookout for all such possibilities. Finally, this office will 

ensure that all foreign visitors to NASA are apprised of our Space Station planning activities and, where relevant, set up meetings with Space Station Task Force personnel. We may 

be able to identify new potential users through this process. 

[5] As we planned for our Phase A activities, we discussed with our potential foreign partners the best way for NASA to work with them and with foreign industry. Based on these 

and our own internal discussions, we decided that NASA would work directly with the foreign agencies, which in turn would keep their respective industries informed. In this way, 

NASA maintains its ties with its foreign space agency partners. And, since we do not want 

any formal industry teaming during Phase A, this strategy best suits our objectives. I 

believe we should maintain this strategy throughout Phase A. However, if a foreign partner invites NASA to address a meeting it has convened for its foreign industry, it might be 
94 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

beneficial for us to attend. But if we decide to accept one, we must be ready to respond 

positively to all such foreign requests. Finally, we should encourage foreign space agencies 

to invite foreign industry to the planned January NASA industrial symposium that the 

[American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics] is arranging for us. 

Phase B 

The following discussion on Phase B presupposes that we get the go-ahead for Phase 

B in Ey84. If not, then NASAwould in effect be winding down Phase A activities or stretching them out another year. Our potential foreign partners will only proceed beyond these 

requirement studies when NASA gets Phase B approval. 

Planning for and discussions with our potential partners on Phase B should rightly 

take place as Phase A winds down and as we have a better fix on the conduct of Phase B. 

I believe it is too early now to begin publicly speculating in great detail about how Phase 

B might look. This would only result in the danger of appearing to be overcommitting, 

and may, in fact, raise expectations in our potential foreign partners that we should not 

now raise. Although we must begin developing our views on how collaboration in Phase B 

would look, it would be premature to talk at length with our potential foreign partners at 

this stage. 

The way our potential partners interact with NASA in Phase B is largely dependent on 

the management scheme we choose. I understand that one of the Task Force's working 

groups is now looking at various Phase B management schemes and that choice will probably be made around January. However, I would like to set down a few thoughts that I have 

concerning the way the international aspect of this Phase should proceed, regardless of 

the management approach chosen. 

By the time we reach Phase B, special foreign interests in system and subsystem areas 

will probably have developed. These can be explicitly recognized within an agreement and 

used to focus respective studies, but no commitments to hardware development should be 

made. In a sense, this second phase would be the time when NASA and the potential partners would be [6] trying each other out, to see if cooperation really makes sense, both in 

the hardware and in the policy sense. But neither side will be quite ready to make a formal commitment. 

While the main focus of Phase B is on designing hardware concepts, I believe each 

party should continue to refine requirements. Mission requirements analysis efforts 

should be an ongoing activity throughout the life of the Space Station program. In Phase 

B, we will be farther along in our design of the Space Station, which should help us discover additional uses. In addition, results from past Shuttle flights and other space endeavors should reveal new uses. 

Whatever Phase B management scheme we decide upon, it may be desirable to avoid 

formal teaming of U.S. and foreign industry. The Shuttle experience suggests that it can 

reduce NASA's flexibility to choose certain foreign proposals because they are so tied to 

U.S. companies that eventually lose out in the development Phase. We all realize, however, 

how hard discouraging formal teaming will be, given our recent experience with Phase A. 

If foreign space agencies fund Phase B activities, then they are half way there in seeing the merits of cooperating on the development phase. However, they will need to be 

convinced that a) the piece they eventually build is of significant value to the total system 

and, b) the returns to them are worth the costs of building it. Thus, regular discussions 

with our potential partners throughout Phase B is important to ensure that we mutually 

determine the best possible combination of cooperative possibilities that satisfy all our 

needs. Thus, in addition to meeting with our potential partners on the specifics of the 

Space Station activities, we must also use these opportunities to begin this ty-pe of 

dialogue. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOMrN 95 

Phase C/D 

While MOU negotiations are at least 1 1/2 to two years away, over the next year, 

International Affairs will be re-examining past cooperative agreements (in particular 

Spacelab) to determine what features NASA ought to retain or avoid. In addition, we will 

be holding informal discussions with our potential partners to determine the things they 

will be looking for in their MOU's. As we proceed, we will continue to consult with you. 

GUIDELINES FOR COOPERATIVE PROPOSALS. 

First, we must determine if each specific proposal is beneficial to the US.; Le., contributes to the overall objectives of the Space Station Program, to NASA's scientific and 

technological goals, and in a broader sense to overall US. foreign policy objectives. From 

our experience, a proposal can be beneficial by: 

[7] - encouraging foreign STS and space station use on both a cooperative and reimbursable basis, thus tying other countries' programs to ours; 

sharing the cost of U.S. programs by stimulating contributions from abroad; 

extending ties among scientific and national communities; 

enlarging the potential for the development of the state-of-the-art; 

supporting U.S. foreign relations and foreign policy. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Second, we should be confident that the industrial and technological infrastructure 

exists within a foreign country in order to handle the tasks proposed. This point is crucial, because it is one of the most important ways we assure ourselves that little or no technology will be transferred. During the Post-Apollo discussions, we were not that familiar 

with the European aerospace industry and subsequently toured that industry to make an 

assessment. We are much more fortunate today in that we have now worked with both 

European and Canadian industry on STS, and with Japanese industry on several scientific and applications projects. Thus, our analysis will probably be done much more quickly 

this time around. 

We should also assure ourselves that the proposals are realistic in terms of the projected costs involved. ESA, for example, sets ceilings on the amount of money a program 

will cost. Yet, many times, unforeseen design changes or launch slips will push that cost 

up. We would want to make sure that the proposals' cost projections include an adequate 

contingency to hopefully avoid the potential problem of foreign attempts to have NASA 

pay for these charges and slips. 

Finally, while it might be attractive if the potential partner proposed hardware that 

matched its utilization requirements, I believe that we should be satisfied that the partner 

has utilization requirements for the Space Station system as a whole, and that its specific 

proposal contributes to that system. 

OTHER U. S. GOWRNMENT INVOLWMENT 

The decision to involve international partners in NASA's Post-Apollo Program was 

made before that program was either defined or approved. The White House Space Task 

Force Group headed by Vice President Agnew confirmed that there would continue to be 

international involvement in NASA's Post-Apollo programs, and President Nixon reinforced this to Administrator Tom Paine. Afterwards, there was a long, intensive interagency review to determine just what President Nixon meant when he [8] said he wanted 

international involvement in the Post-Apollo Program. As the program was defined, 

NASA, too, determined what it thought the optimal international involvement should be. 

As the development evolved, some conclusions were confirmed, and others were identified as things to avoid in future undertakings. 
96 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The 1958 Space Act gave NASA the statutory responsibility to seek international cooperation in its space activities. This policy was interpreted by the Nixon Administration as 

applying to NASA's Post-Apollo activities. President Reagan's July 4 space policy statement 

reconfirmed that policy with respect to present and future NASA activities. Therefore, 

NASA should proceed with pursuing the best possible international involvement in a 

space station that is beneficial to U.S. interests. 

Given this, NASA is responsible for making sure that all U.S. Government agencies or 

portions thereof that have foreign policy responsibilities are kept informed of our activities. Furthermore, informing them early on in the planning process gives us a much better opportunity to have them onboard as potential supporters for this program. 

We started by briefing the interested offices within the State Department. The Space 

Station Task Force has kept the relevant DOD offices informed of NASA's international 

activities. NASA is briefing the export control community since US. companies are now 

seeking approval for information exchange agreements during the Phase A mission 

requirements study. Other agencies such as OSTP, OMB, DOD, NSC and ACDA are probably interested in the international aspects as well as the programmatic ones. We should 

consider augmenting the briefings the Task Force is giving to these organizations. Further, 

we typically prepare briefing materials for White House and other U.S. Government 

agency personnel as they attend foreign and international S&T conferences, summits, 

etc.; we will include in these materials information on the Space Station activities being 

undertaken by foreign space agencies. 

As we proceed towards designing the Space Station, we will be much more aware of 

the level and type of DOD involvement expected. It is possible that DOD may express concerns that might drive an interagency review of the international component of a Space 

Station similar to the type experienced in Post-Apollo planning. Otherwise, I expect the 

international aspect will be considered within the context of the overall decision on the 

Space Station program. NASA's best strategy in such a policy review would have to be 

determined once we saw how the arguments were shaping up. 

In terms of the normal State Department review of NASA's international agreements, 

it will only review the final MOUs. 

[9] SPACE STATION APPROVAL--CANFOREIGN IhVOLEMEA'T HELP? 

From the onset, we must be fully aware that a Space Station will be built by the U.S. 

Government because the U.S. needs and wants it. However, after having said that, I believe 

there are several ways our potential partners can help NASA gain approval to proceed with 

building it. 

The first is already underway. If the foreign requirements studies reveal that the 

potential foreign utilization rate is large or moderate, then this can help bolster NASA's 

contention that it is timely to develop a Space Station. Foreign industrial support can help 

expand the overall industrial interest in a Space Station and willingness to fund space 

R&D that can contribute to Space Station utilization. Thus, a larger corps of domestic 

industry (besides aerospace) may visibly support the Space Station. 

Second, foreign contributions will reduce the cost to the U.S. of the Space Station 

program, something that can help us in our budget deliberations with both OMB and the 

Congress. 

On a different level, the fact that foreign governments are willing to put funds into a 

U.S. program again shows additional support for the Space Station concept. 

Our development of foreign cooperative relationships must be consistent with U.S. 

foreign policy objectives. While making the argument that this is politically feasible and 

desirable will never be a sole justification for the program, it is important to recognize that 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 97 

it could help NASA bring in members of the foreign policy community as supporters, and 

help produce a willing Presidential ear. 

Congress has consistently been an ardent supporter of international space programs. 

Foreign involvement in a U.S. Space Station will be kindly received there. Moreover, it may 

help allay Congressional fears that the civil space program is being unduly influenced by 

the military. Thus, we could see active Congressional support both before and after 

Presidential approval of the program. 

FOREIGN REACTION TO MILITARY WOLWMLWT. 

This is an important issue, since the interest and debate over the militarization of 

space is at an all-time high-much more intense than during the Post-Apollo planning 

activities. Foreign reaction to military involvement in a U.S. Space Station will largely rest 

on three factors: 1) the nature of the military involvement and the architecture of the 

Space Station; 2) the manner in which these countries already interact with the U.S. military; and 3) the tradeoff these countries perceive between: (a) the benefits from participating and (b) the domestic and foreign reaction to such participation. 

The first depends on the final Space Station design and how the U.S. structures military involvement. If military operational weapons systems are to be part of one U.S. space 

station, other countries would probably be reluctant to join since doing so would constitute tacit acceptance ofweapons activities in space. They might also be concerned that the 

station could be considered an attractive military target. If DOD use of a single space station were restricted to peaceful military purposes (Le., reconnaissance and communications), the reluctance would be greatly reduced since both of the above concerns would 

be lessened. If there are two space stations (one military and one civil), foreign participation on the civil unit should pose no problem to anyone. 

In that case, we must then look at our potential partners' current activities with and 

attitudes toward the U.S. military. [lo] 

Most member nations of ESA are also members of NATO (exceptions being Austria, 

Sweden and Switzerland; France, while still a NATO member, has withdrawn from all 

NATO military activities). Therefore, most of the ESA member states have a longstanding involvement and NATO commitment to work with the U.S. militarily. Thus, 

while ESA is a civilian space agency, there is solid foundation among a majority of its 

member states to cooperate in a program that may have some military aspects. In fact, 

ESA did make that decision a decade ago when it decided to cooperate with NASA on 

STS and contribute Spacelab, despite the fact that the U.S. military would useSTS and 

possibly Spacelab. In fact, ESA wanted the Spacelab MOU and Intergovernmental 

Agreement to state that Spacelab would be used by the US. Government (not just 

NASA) for peaceful purposes. However, it is important to point out that, on the one 

hand, Sweden chose not to participate in Spacelab because it did not want to contribute to any system which would be used by the U.S. military; on the other hand, 

neutral Switzerland has participated. Thus, we can foresee a situation where ESA 

might sign on, while some of its individual member countries might choose not to 

participate for political reasons. France has raised an additional concern; that is, the 

possibility that military involvement would mean that international users could be 

bumped. In fact, this is a current Ariane claim with respect to STS reliability to provide launch services to domestic and international commercial users. The question of 

how military involvement would infringe on access rights to the station is a vital 

issue-probably in the end the single most important factor influencing foreign 

participation. 
98 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The Science Minister of the ruling LDP Party in Japan has recently stated that Japan’s 

participation in cooperative projects such as space station would be “unavoidably narrowed” if the US. plans to use them for largely military purposes. This statement is 

not unexpected. Since World War 11, Japan has been consistent in not wanting for 

political and economic reason to divert national resources for military reasons, even 

[ 111 if defensive in nature. The LDP is extremely sensitive to opposition party charges 

that its policies are tied too much to what the U.S. wants. For mainly economic reasons, Japan needs to be highly sensitive to Third World attitudes, including the current focus on “the militarization of space.” Japan is critically dependent on the Third 

World suppliers for virtually all of its energy needs and raw materials. Given Japanese 

interest in the Third World as both a supplier and a consumer, Japan could thus be 

expected to be very cautious about participating with the U.S. in a space station perceived as largely military. However, the above has to be balanced with Japan’s strong 

ties to the U.S. for defense. Therefore, Japan’s participation will largely depend on 

the tradeoff between the benefits it sees from a Space Station and potential domestic 

and foreign negative reaction if the station has obvious military roles. Japan’s assessment of involvement in a Space Station will also be driven by a frank eagerness to join 

the US. and other developed countries in the next major step, since Japan feels it 

missed a key opportunity to participate in the Shuttle. 

Canada is probably the country that would least object to any military involvement in 

a space station. Canada is also a member of NATO, but even more than that, is part 

of NORAD and has several defense sharing agreements with the U.S. The line 

between civil and military for Canada is probably slightly fuzzier than ours. 

Furthermore, Canada strongly supports DOD use of [the Remote Manipulator System 

(RMS)], and would work hard to ensure that DOD did not use an alternative. 

When making an analysis like this, we must keep in mind that this is the situation as 

we perceive it today. Who knows what the political situation might be like a few years from 

now when we are ready to make a commitment to cooperate? In the interim, these countries will stay in the game because they do not want to be the only developed country to 

miss out and because they want to make sure they are ready to participate when the time 

comes to sign on the dotted line. It is at that point that each country will weigh the pros 

and cons of their participation. 

From NASA’s perspective, I believe it is important to be fairly straightforward at all 

times on the probability and level of DOD involvement expected. Since NASA wants to 

maintain and even strengthen the civil role of space activities in the next few years, it is to 

our advantage to actively seek and encourage international civil involvement in our next 

major step. We should be working to accommodate both civil and military uses within the 

basic design of the space station, so that one does not make the other impossible. 

[ 121 TECHNOLOGY TYMVSFER. 

The greatest source of technology transfer, in my mind, is through industry to industry relationships. NASA’s cooperative programs have been structured carefully to avoid 

technology transfer. Historically, our partners have agreed to provide a discrete piece of 

the overall project, and have then been fully responsible for the R&D on that piece. Only 

the minimum amount of technical information necessary to achieve a successful interface 

among the various elements of a project has been exchanged. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 99 

Secondly, while it might have been true ten years ago that US. industry was several 

years ahead of foreign industry overall, I do not think the same claim can be made today. 

During the past decade, we have seen measurable growth in foreign space budgets and 

capabilities. European, Japanese and Canadian industries are challenging U.S. industry in 

several fields: communications, remote sensing and launch vehicle development. We see 

increasing evidence that foreign governments are adopting sophisticated strategies to 

enhance their aerospace industries' competitive positions. Many foreign governments 

support their space industry not only through direct R&D funding (which often is targeted to areas with demonstrable commercial payoff), but also by price subsidization and 

financing assistance, development of attractive package deals, and creation of quasigovernmental marketing organizations. As a result, the U.S. probably stands to gain as 

much as our potential partners. 

I want to reemphasize what I said earlier, that one of the more important criteria we 

should use in evaluating specific proposals for cooperation is that the cooperating country has the necessary industrial and technological infrastructure to successfully complete 

the job. If we carefully choose the cooperative arrangements-for example, we might 

make sure that they are discrete hardware pieces with minimal interfaces-we can minimize the potential for technology transfer in the normal conduct of the project. 

However, even if we at NASA are satisfied we have structured a program which minimizes the opportunity for technology transfer, we must be sensitive to the growing interest in this topic throughout the government. Evidence of closer application of existing 

export guidelines and review of appropriate future steps in staunching the flow of 

advanced technology is readily apparent. In a long-term, multi-faceted program of this 

type, we must maintain close and continuing contacts with the export control community. Thus, we must keep the export control community continually informed on our activities and our efforts to protect against technology transfer. As I mentioned above, this 

process has been initiated. 

[ 131 POTENTIAL FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPACE STATION. 

An assessment of potential foreign contributions to a U.S. Space Station can only be 

a speculative one. Foreign decisions and commitments on participation will be reached 

during the end of Phase B, at least two years away. Impacting each country's decision will 

be the domestic and international economic situation at that time. 

However, it is possible to make some assumptions based on the size of foreign space 

budgets and the level of contributions already made to NASA STSrelated programs. 

Ultimately, the size of the contributions will be related to the potential benefits perceived 

by the contributors and the terms of cooperation proposed by NASA. 

ESA's current annual budget is approximately $750 million a year. In addition, the 

combined space budgets of the ESA Member States is approximately $1.5 billion, apportioned between ESA contributions and individual space programs. 

Canada recently increased its space budget by one third to almost $500 million for the 

next four years. Japan's annual space budgets for recent years have been on the order of 

$500 million and could be expected to remain at least at that level. 

In sum, our potential partners now have moderate-sized space budgets that have 

greatly increased over the past decade, reflecting a realization by these nations of the 

importance and benefits from space activities. 

Our STS partners contributed roughly 11-12% of the cost of the development program. ESA contributed a $1 billion Spacelab and Canada contributed a $100 million RMS. 

Italy currently plans to contribute $30 million to Tether. I believe it is reasonable to expect 

similar percentage contributions from these countries to Space Station, if they choose to 
100 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

cooperate. Japan’s GNP is roughly half that of the ESA Member States. Thus, it is not unrealistic to expect them to contribute half the European contribution. Furthermore, 

Japanese space industry has advocated doubling its space budget in the near future. 

Therefore, a 20% increase (approximately $100 million/year) for Space Station activities 

would not be unrealistic, given a strong Japanese industrial interest in a Space Station. 

We should keep in mind that other space activities and comparable competing concepts for these funds exist. The Canadian Minister for Science and Technology recently 

told Mr. Beggs that while Canada is interested in cooperating on a Space Station, Canada 

is already planning several communications and remote sensing missions. Its economy 

would have to improve before it could take on new space projects. ESA will be considering additional Ariane upgrades at the same time it will [14] consider participating in a 

NASA Space Station. France has been studying its own robotics-space station, Solaris. 

Ultimately, the willingness of these countries to contribute will depend on both prevailing economic conditions and the perceived benefits. Foreign partners will be willing 

to consider large investments only if they will lead to direct quid pro quos which are highly attractive, such as preferred or free access to the station, and also to spin off benefits 

which magnify the returns to their industry. 

I would be happy to discuss with you any of these topics in greater detail. 

Kenneth S. Pedersen 

Document 1-32 

Document title: NASA Fact Sheet, “Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy,” August 6, 

1982. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This statement of U.S. policy concerning launch assistance and international cooperation was an 

update and reuision of a similar policy approved b-y the Nixon administration on August 30, 1972, 

and contained in National Security Decision Memorandum 187. The earlier policy statement formalized the modijed U.S. approach to international space issues adopted in the post-Apollo period, 

and the 1982 revision made fm changes in the basic principles set out a decade earlim 

August 6, 1982 

Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The fundamental aspects of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 187 

of August 30, 1972, as they apply to today’s international space activity have been 

reviewed. This review highlighted the substantial lead the U.S. enjoys in a wide variety of 

technological and space related areas-a lead which should be maintained when considering and implementing any international activity or transfer governed by the following 

directive. Based upon this review, this directive which replaces NSDM 187 is approved and 

provides general guidance for U.S. space launch assistance; space hardware, software and 

related technologies assistance; and international space cooperation. Specific implementing guidelines are being issued by the Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 101 

11. POLICY GOWBNING SPACE LAUNCH ASSISTANCE 

In dealing with requests from foreign governments, international organizations or 

foreign business entities for assistance in launching foreign spacecraft, the following general policy guidance is provided. 

[Paragraph excised in declassification review] 

[2] 111. POLICY GOVERNING SPACE HARDWARE RELATED TECHNOLOGLES 

ASSISTANCE 

AND 

In dealing with requests for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of space 

hardware, software and related technologies, the following general policy guidance is provided. 

Sales of unclassified U.S. space hardware, software, and related technologies for use 

in foreign space projects will be for peaceful purposes; will be consistent with relevant 

international agreements and arrangements and relevant bilateral agreements and 

arrangements; [phrase excised in declassification review] will contain restrictions on third 

country transfers; will favor transfers of hardware over transfers of technology; will not 

adversely affect U.S. national security, foreign policy, or trade interests through diffusion 

of technology in which the US. has international leadership; and will continue to be subject to the export control process. A special interagency coordinating group chaired by 

the Department of State will be established to consider special bilateral agreements covering the transfer of space hardware, software, and related technologies. 

IV. OBJECTmS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE ACTMTES 

The broad objectives of the United States in international cooperation in space activities are to protect national security; promote foreign policy considerations; advance 

national science and technology; and maximize national economic benefits, including 

domestic considerations. The suitability of each cooperative space activity must be judged 

within the framework of all of these objectives. 

[Attachment page 13 

Implementing Guidelines to the Space Assistance 

and Cooperation Policy 

A. Policy Governing Space Launch Assistance 

1. Space launch assistance will be available, consistent with U.S. laws, either from 

U.S. launch sites through the acquisition of U.S. launch services on a cooperative or reimbursable basis or from foreign launch sites by purchase of an appropriate U.S. launch 

vehicle (see policy guidance under Section B). In the case of launchings from foreign 

sites, the U.S. will require assurance that the launch vehicles will be used solely for peaceful purposes and wili not be made available to third parties without prior akeement of 

the US. 

2. Although due consideration is to be given to Intelsat definitive arrangements, the 

absence of a favorable Intelsat recommendation regarding such arrangements should not 

necessarily preclude US. launching of public domestic or international telecommunications satellites when such launching is determined to be in the best interests of the U.S. 

3. With respect to the financial conditions for reimbursable launch services from 

U.S. launch sites, foreign users (including international organizations) will be charged on 

the same basis as comparable non-U.S. Government domestic users. 
102 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

4. With respect to the priority and scheduling for launching foreign payloads at U.S. 

launch sites, such launchings will be dealt with on the same basis as U.S. launchings. Each 

launching will be treated in terms of its own requirements and as an individual case. Once 

a payload is scheduled for launch, the launching agency will use its best efforts to meet 

the scheduling commitments. Should events arise which require rescheduling, such as 

national security missions, the U.S. will consult with all affected users in an attempt to 

meet the needs of the users in an equitable manner. 

5. Interface drawings and hardware (Le., spacecraft attach fittings, etc.) provided in 

connection with the launch assistance provisions of this policy shall be exempt from the 

provisions of Section B. 

B. Space Hardware, and Related Technologies Assistance 

1. For the purpose of this policy, the following distinctions are recognized: 

[ 23 a. Hardware, software, and related technical information include: 

(1) Equipment in the form of launch vehicle components and spacecraft 

including subsystems and components thereof, associated production and support equipment. 

(2) General physical and performance specifications, and operating and 

maintenance information on the above equipment. 

b. Technical assistance technology, data and know-how necessary for design, 

development and production of space hardware and software, including pertinent laboratory and test equipment or performance of functions and/or the conveyance of oral, 

visual or documentary information involving the disclosure of information relating to: 

(1) Development and testing activities, detailed design drawings and specifications, managerial and engineering know-how and problem solving techniques. 

(2) Production activities in the form of licenses, detailed production drawings, process specifications, and identification of requirements for production equipment. 

2. [Sentence excised in declassification review] This does not mean that transfer of 

certain “technical assistance” under appropriate safeguards should not be considered on 

a case-by-case basis. In those cases in which “technical assistance” is provided, it should be 

done under safeguards which ensure protection of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Thus, whether the sale involves “hardware, software and related technical 

information,” or “technical assistance,” or some combination, adequate assurances to control replication and retransfer and ensure peaceful use must be provided in advance of 

the transfer through bilateral agreements, export licensing procedures or other mechanisms. [Sentence excised in declassification review] 

[3] 3. All requests for the export or exchange of either space “hardware, software and 

related technical information” or “technical assistance” as defined above must specify the 

end use for which it is sought. 

4. All such requests shall be examined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 

applicable U.S. laws and regulations to determine the net advantage to the U.S. The determination shall take into account relevant international agreements and arrangements, 

relevant bilateral agreements and arrangements, and our objectives for international 

cooperation in space activities (see Section C). 

5. U.S. space “hardware, software and related technical information” or “technical 

assistance” as defined above shall be made available solely for peaceful purposes. No U.S. 

space “hardware, software and related technical information” or “technical assistance” as 

defined above shall be made available by a recipient to a third party without the express 

prior agreement of the U.S. This includes any cases where U.S. space hardware is 

launched from a foreign site. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 103 

6. U.S. space “hardware, software and related technical information” or “technical 

assistance” as defined above, or any hardware, software, or technical information and 

processes derived from such transfers, will not be used to contribute to or assist in the 

development of any foreign weapon delivery system. Further, any officially promulgated 

national security policy directive is overriding with respect to the transfer of military-related missile hardware, information or technology within its purview. 

7. In view of the sensitivity of space technology, the following distinctions shall be 

applied in reaching decisions as to its export. These distinctions shall apply both to transfer abroad by federal agencies and to commercial export. 

a. Proposals or requests for the export of space “hardware, software and related 

technical information” should be met, when in the interests of the U.S., through the provision of “hardware, software and related technical information” rather than “technical 

assistance” as defined above, whenever possible and reasonable to do so. 

b. “Technical assistance” as defined above shall be exported only under adequate safeguards providing for its use and protection. 

[4] 8. In instances where space “hardware, software and related technical information” 

and “technical assistance” are intended specifically for use in operational communication 

satellite projects to provide public domestic or international telecommunications services, 

its export shall be governed as specified in Section 111 of the Space Assistance and 

Cooperation Policy and Section A, paragraph 2 above. 

9. Recognizing distinct U.S. national interests, special bilateral agreements covering 

the transfer of space launch vehicle “hardware, software and related technical information” or “technical assistance” may be considered under the following guidance: 

a. The Department of State will convene and chair a special interagency coordinating group consisting of representatives from DOD, ACDA, NASA, NSC, OSTP, DCI, 

and other interested agencies as appropriate to recommend policy and to decide upon, 

formulate, negotiate, and provide general guidance on implementation oversight activities regarding bilateral agreements covering transfer to selected foreign governments and 

international organizations. 

b. Such agreements with selected foreign governments and international organizations will contain provisions for peaceful use assurances, restrictions on third country 

transfers and other appropriate safeguards as may be deemed necessary and mutually 

agreed. c. Any agreements that would result in funding demands on the U.S. 

Government must be approved through the budgetary process prior to any commitment 

with a foreign entity. 

d. Transfer of specific space “hardware, software and related technical information” and “technical assistance” under such agreements will continue to be subject to the 

export control review process. 

10. The U.S. should encourage other supplier nations of space “hardware and related technical information” and “technical assistance” to establish controls on their exports 

which are comparable to those set forth in this policy. 

C. Objectives of International Cooperation in Space Activities National Security Objectives 

[Paragraph excised in declassification review] 

[ 51 Fmeign Policy Objectives 

a. To gain other countries’ support for the U.S. in general by promoting the 

U.S. national interest through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 

b. To assist in the achievement of foreign policy objectives through: 
104 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

(1) Strengthening our allies and improving our working relationships with 

them. 

(2) Promoting multilateral cooperation with, and among, other nations similar to on-going US. cooperation with the European Space Agency 

through suitable cooperation with their programs, on a commercial or 

joint program basis, in the event they desire such cooperation. 

c. To encourage other countries to associate their interests with our space 

program. 

d. To enhance US. prestige and ensure the U.S. position as the world’s leader 

in science and technology. 

e. [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

f. To demonstrate that the U.S. is a reliable partner in international ventures. 

Scientajic and Technological Objectives 

a. To foster cooperation in basic scientific research. 

b. To develop precedents and experience in substantial cooperative undertakings which will lend themselves to other international scientific and technological 

activities. 

[6] c. To obtain support and assistance in the development of our national 

program through (1) acquisition of scientific and technical contributions from areas of 

excellence abroad and (2) use of facilities abroad that are necessary for mission supporttracking stations, overflights, contingency recovery, etc. 

Economic Objectives 

a. To maximize economic benefit by appropriately weighing: 

(1) Implications of releasing technology which involves commercial “knowhow”; 

(2) [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

(3) ensuring a reasonable return on the American investment in space technology; and 

(4) promoting positive effects on domestic employment and our balance of 

payments. 

b. [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

c. To seek opportunities to enhance our overall competitive position in space 

technology. 

d. To seek more productive aggregate use of American and foreign resources 

and skills. 

e. [Paragraph excised during declassification review] 

f. To enhance the cost-effectiveness of space systems through increased and 

more effective use. 

D. Effective immediately, National Security Decision Memorandum 187 is rescinded. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 105 

[Attachment page 11 

Fact Sheet 

Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy 

Introduction 

'On August 6, 1982, the President signed a directive which establishes U.S. national 

space assistance and cooperation. This policy directive highlights the substantial lead the 

U.S. enjoys in a wide variety of technological and space related areas-a lead which should 

be maintained when considering and implementing any international activity or transfer. 

This directive provides general guidance for US. space launch assistance; space hardware, 

software and related technologies assistance; and international space cooperation. 

Policy Governing Space Launch Assistance 

In dealing with requests from foreign governments, international organizations or 

foreign business entities for those space projects which are for peaceful purposes and are 

consistent with U.S. laws and obligations under relevant international agreements and 

arrangements (such as Intelsat) as determined by the U.S. Government. 

Policy Governing Space Hardware, and Related Technologies Assistance 

In dealing with requests for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of space hardware, software and related technologies, the following general policy guidance is provided. 

Sales of unclassified U.S. space hardware, software, and related technologies for use 

in foreign space projects will be for peaceful purposes; will be consistent with relevant 

bilateral and international agreements and arrangements; will serve U.S. objectives for 

international cooperation in space activities (see the following section); will contain 

restrictions of third country transfer; will favor transfers of hardware over transfers of technology; will not adversely affect U.S. national security, foreign policy, or trade interests 

through diffusion of technology in which the U.S. has international leadership; and will 

continue to be subject to the export control process. The Department of State will chair 

an interagency coordinating group when it becomes necessary to consider bilateral agreements which cover the transfer of space hardware, software, and related technologies. 

[ 23 Obectives of International Cooperation in Space Activities 

The broad objectives of the United States in international cooperation in space activities are to protect national security; promote foreign policy consideration; advance 

national science and technology; and maximize national economic benefits, including 

domestic considerations. The suitability of each cooperative space activity must be judged 

within the framework of all these objectives. 

Document 1-33 

Document title: James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Honorable George P. Shultz, 

Secretary of State, March 16, 1984. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

From March 3 to 13, 1984, a NASA delegation led by Administratm James Begs visited London, 

Rome, Bonn, Paris, and Tokyo to extend personally President Ronald Reagan's invitation to U.S. 

"jiends and allies" to participate in the U. S. space station program that Reagan had announced in 

his January 25, 1984, State of the Union address. (The group visited Ottawa later in March.) In 

this letter to the Secretary of State, Begs reported the results of his trip. 
106 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

MAR 16, 1984 

Honorable George P. Shultz 

Secretary of State 

Washington, DC 20520 

Dear George: 

As you recall, the President recently asked me to visit certain of our Allies to invite 

international participation in our Space Station program. This followed up, of course, on 

the President’s announcement of this initiative during January’s State of the Union 

address. I’ve just come back from Europe and Japan. Before heading off to Ottawa next 

week, I wanted to fill you in on the first stage of our consultations. 

The reaction so far to the President’s call for international cooperation has been both 

strongly positive and openly appreciative. It has been positive in the sense that our principal Allies are moving quickly, or have already moved, to take political decisions to 

participate. And their reactions clearly show appreciation for the major foreign policy 

benefits that will flow from open and collaborative cooperation on such a bold, imaginative and visible project. I heard nothing but praise and admiration for the President’s foresight and leadership in making this decision. Prime Minister Nakasome and other 

Japanese officials, while still cautious in public, made it obvious that Japan will participate 

in a significant way. The Japanese believe they made a mistake in not joining us on the 

Shuttle and are determined not to be left behind again. In Europe, Italian Prime Minister 

Craxi was openly ebullient about the prospect of cooperation and strong Italian participation is assured. Mitterrand and Cheysson were both well informed and prepared to 

move ahead. Mitterrand, in particular, has obviously thought deeply about the need to 

press ahead with the exploration and exploitation of space. The French will be tough bargainers, and obviously intend to pursue their own independent space programs, but I am 

confident that we can agree on mutually beneficial terms for cooperation. By the way, you 

will be interested that Mitterrand observed to me that his recent proposal for a European 

military space station fell on deaf ears in Europe. 

[2] Chancellor Kohl was in Washington during my stop in Bonn, but the relevant 

Ministers were quite clear that a major German contribution will be forthcoming. The 

British were more cautious, and, while I believe they will participate, it will probably be on 

the same terms that have marked their recent space-related activities-relatively small 

scale projects done on a multilateral basis. 

While in Paris, I also met with the executive leadership of the European Space Agency 

(ESA) and with delegates from the Agency’s eleven member countries-encompassing 

essentially all of our friends and allies in Western Europe. Here, too, the reception was 

warm and positive. ESA will almost certainly play a key role in managing Europe’s Space 

Station participation, just as it did in the highly successful Spacelab project. 

As businessmen, we both understand the importance of protecting intellectual property if we’re to motivate private sector investment in this program. Not surprisingly, the 

Europeans and the Japanese are as concerned about this-from their point of view-as we 

are. The whole technology transfer question will obviously be an area where I will look to 

you, and other relevant agencies, for advice as discussions on the details of cooperation 

get more specific in the months ahead. I also explained our policy on the possibility of 

military use of the Space Station. I was pleased to find, even in Japan where the need for 

caution is clear, general acceptance of our announced position: that while no military use 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 107 

is contemplated, the Space Station will be a national facility open to any paying customers-including DOD-for peaceful uses. 

As a final item, I raised the President’s desire to have the London Economic Summit 

endorse the principle that members will cooperate in developing an international Space 

Station. Germany, Italy, France and Japan were all supportive. Again, the British were 

more cautious and will need more convincing. The next step here-as laid out by Bud 

McFarlane-is for NASA, with State’s help, to prepare a report on approaches to international collaboration before the Summit. I plan to present that report to the President and 

also to report to him on my trip. I hope you will join me in that meeting. 

I’d like to thank you for the excellent support provided by the Department and by our 

Embassies at every step of the way. I especially want to express my appreciation and gratitude for the fine work done by Mark Platt and Mike Michalak who accompanied me on 

the trip. They are true professionals whose [3] involvement was instrumental in helping 

to produce the positive reception the President’s initiative received. I look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff in the months ahead in the same productive and 

cooperative spirit. 

Sincerely, 

James M. Beggs 

Administrator 

Document 1-34 

Document title: James M. Beggs, Administrator, NASA, to Kenneth Baker, MP, Minister of 

State for Industry with Special Responsibility for Space and Information Technology, 

April 6, 1984. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Afer his initial round of uisits in Europe, Japan, and Canada to extend President Reagan’s inuitation to participate in the US. space station program, NASA Administrator Begs wrote essentially 

idzntical letters to the most senior official with whom he had met in each country visited. The following is the letter to the minister in charge of space matters for the United Kingdom (U. K.), Kenneth 

Baker In his btters, Begs spelled out what he believed were the results of his uisits, and he restated 

the basic US. policy with respect to the station program and international participation in it. He also 

outlined the next stgbs in the process of heloping international station partnerships. 
108 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[ 11 Office of the Administrator 

Mr. Kenneth Baker, MP 

Minister of State for Industry with Special Responsibility 

for Space and Information Technology 

Department of Industry 

Ashdown House 

123 Victoria Street 

London SWlE 6RB 

UNITED KINGDOM 

APR 6,1984 

Dear Mr. Minister: 

Having recently returned from my visit to Europe, Japan and Canada, I wish to take 

this opportunity to summarize my impressions of the trip and to express my appreciation 

for your generous hospitality. Overall, I was extremely pleased by the reactions I received 

to President Reagan’s Space Station initiative. Government and industry leaders at each 

of my stops exhibited great interest in the possibilities for an international Space Station. 

I believe this reflects the successful legacy of cooperation already established among us in 

the space age, as well as the groundwork we have laid together over the past two years for 

embracing this challenge. I hope you feel as I do that our discussions were quite useful for 

getting the dialogue started for our next step in the planning process. I am quite optimistic about the prospects for international cooperation on the Space Station project, and 

will soon be sharing these views with the President. 

As we discussed, the President believes that international participation in the manned 

Space Station program can provide a highly positive centerpiece for demonstrating Free 

World unity, goodwill and technological progress. He has proposed that the international Space Station be discussed at the London Economic Summit with an eye towards agreement in principle that Summit partners will participate in the development of the station. 

A Summit declaration will serve us all well by establishing the political underpinnings for 

this joint technological venture. With this firm basis for our collaboration, we will be able 

to arrange mechanisms that will allow us to interact more closely during the planning 

phase of the Space Station project. 

I believe that our working closely together over the next year is extremely important. 

This will ensure that our respective planning activities and definition studies are [2] complementary. During the next two years, NASA will conduct an extended definition phase 

study of the Space Station in order to design the Station best capable of meeting requirements, facilitating management and providing flexibility for growth. As time goes on, 

there will be less and less flexibility in the Space Station design to accommodate the interests and needs of potential partners. Early participation in the planning process, either 

directly or through ESA, is therefore essential. I believe insight into this planning process 

will allow participants to hone their ideas for participation; it will also allow them to speak 

directly to their proposals so that the final Space Station design can accommodate them. 

As I mentioned, NASA will hold frequent international workshops over the next two 

years to permit this cross-fertilization to occur. We will hold the first such workshop in 

June at which time we can all review our activities. For our part, we will brief you on our 

preparation of the domestic U.S. “Request for Proposals” for Phase B. These RFP’s will 

cover the $8B fully functional Space Station that the U.S. will provide. As I described to 

you, President Reagan has committed the U.S. to building an $8B fully functional Space 

Station to be operational by the early 199O’s, but has also set the stage for working togeth- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 109 

er to develop a more expansive international Space Station with even greater benefits and 

capabilities for us all to use. Thus, we are inviting your Government to take a close look at 

our plans and concepts and then, based on your long-term interests and goals, share with 

us your ideas for cooperation that will expand the capabilities of the Space Station. 

Also during the June meeting, we will discuss additional mechanisms for working 

together over the next two years. In the course of my trip, I heard many proposals for such 

mechanisms which we are currently evaluating. Mr. Kenneth Pedersen, NASA Director of 

International Affairs, will be contacting you in the near future with the necessary details 

on the June meeting. 

During the past 18 months, we have worked hard to make sure that our Space Station 

concepts are compatible with and responsive to user communities. We will continue this 

emphasis in the next two years of planning as well as throughout the lifetime of the Space 

Station program. As I mentioned, the US. is committed to maintaining a strong space science and applications program. I have received a commitment from the President that the 

NASA budget will grow 1% per year in real terms in order to maintain a balanced space 

program. Indeed, this year, the President requested Congress to authorize two new starts 

in space science along with the Space Station. 

Because I understand that the relationship between scientific objectives and the Space 

Station program is [3] important to you, I would be pleased for you to designate an 

observer to our Space Station Science Advisory Committee, chaired by Professor Peter 

Banks, which was recently established to assist NASA in scientific planning for the Space 

Station. As you know, ESA has already designated two observers, so you may wish to work 

through them. The first meeting of the Banks Committee will take place at NASA 

Headquarters on April 25 and 26. A second meeting is planned in June. There will also be 

a week-long workshop held later this summer. One of the key early objectives of the 

Committee is to influence the Space Station Phase B RFP so that the Space Station is 

designed to optimize space science and application uses. In addition, an Industrial 

Committee similar to the Peter Banks Committee will be established to ensure that the 

Space Station maximizes the commercial opportunities of space, another important 

objective that we all share. We will welcome observers on that Committee, as well. Once 

we agree more formally on our respective activities during the planning phase, then we 

would look forward to having our partners as permanent members on both Committees. 

Another topic which we discussed is the importance of protecting against the unwarranted transfer of technology. Technology transfer has been an increasing concern on all 

our parts in the past few years, and we will need to work together to make sure we are protecting our respective technology bases in this partnership. Major international partners 

in the Space Station will receive assured access to the Station. Therefore, protection of 

intellectual property is a prime requirement if we are to stimulate private sector investment and involvement in this program over the long term. 

During my trip I was also asked frequently about the extent of U.S. military involvement in the U.S. Space Station. The U.S. Space Station program is a civil program which 

will be funded entirely out of NASA's budget, with no national security funds to be used. 

While the Defense Department worked with NASA in the early planning for [the] Space 

Station by reviewing their near- and long-term requirements for space, they concluded 

they had no requirements for a manned Space Station. NASA, therefore, constructed its 

proposal to the President on the basis of civil and commercial requirements. The Space 

Station that the President directed NASA to build is a civil Space Station. Of course, like 

the Shuttle, the Space Station will be available for users. If there are any national security 

users, like national and international users, they will be able to pay to use the facility. As 

provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, all activity on the Space Station will be limited to peaceful, non-aggressive functions. 
110 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Finally, on behalf of the U.S. Delegation, I would like to thank you for your gracious 

hospitality during our visit. I especially appreciated your giving me the opportunity to 

meet [4] numerous U.K. Government and industrial representatives at the fine luncheon 

you hosted. It was a pleasure seeing you, and I am looking forward to seeing you again 

soon in the near future. 

With warm personal regards. 

Sincerely, ’ 

James M. Beggs 

Administrator 

Document 1-35 

Document title: Dale D. Myers, NASA, and Reimar Leust, European Space Agency (ESA), 

“Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and the European Space Agency on Cooperation in the Detailed 

Design, Development, Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space 

Station,” September 29,1988. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This NASA-ESA memorandum of understanding (MOW and two similar documents-one between 

NASA and the Science and Technology Agency of Japan and the other between NASA and the 

Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology-contained the detailed agremnts that 

would guide the international partners during the lifetime of the space station program. The MOUs 

were the end product of lengthy and contentious negotiations between NASA and its potential station 

partners. These MOUs operated within a policy and legal Jjamewark established a multilateral 

intergovernmental agreement signed at the same time by representatives of the governments (rather 

than of the respective space agencies). The intergovernmental agreement and the three MOUs estab 

lished the most ambitious expm‘ment in international technological cooperation ever undertaken. 

Memorandum of Understanding Between the 

United States National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the European Space Agency 

on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, 

Development, Operation and Utilization of the 

Permanently Manned Civil Space Station 

[ 13 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter “NASA”) and the 

European Space Agency (hereinafter “ESA) , 

Recalling that in his State of the Union Address of January 25, 1984, the President of 

the United States directed NASA to develop and place into orbit within a decade a permanently manned Space Station and invited friends and allies of the United States to 

participate in its development and use and to share in the benefits thereof, in order to 

promote peace, prosperity and freedom, 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 111 

Recalling the terms of Resolution Number 2 adopted on 31 January 1985 by the ESA 

Council meeting at ministerial level on participation in the Space Station program, 

Recalling the terms of Resolution Number 2 adopted on 10 November 1987 by the 

ESA Council meeting at ministerial level on participation in the Space Station program, 

Recalling the NASA Administrator’s letter of April 6, 1984, to the ESA Director 

General, 

Having successfully implemented the Memorandum of Understanding between 

NASA and ESA for the Conduct of Parallel Detailed Definition and Preliminary Design 

Studies (Phase B) Leading toward Further cooperation in the Development, Operation 

and Utilization of a Permanently Manned Space Station, which entered into force on June 

3, 1985, 

Considering the Agreement among the Government of the United States of America, 

Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government ofJapan 

and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, 

Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station (hereinafter 

“the Intergovernmental Agreement”) and particularly Article 4 thereof, 

[2] Considering the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and the Science and 

Technology Agency of Japan (STA) for the Cooperative Program Concerning Detailed 

Definition and Preliminary Design Activities of a Permanently Manned Space Station, 

which entered into force on May 9, 1985, and the Memorandum of Understanding 

between NASA and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology of Canada 

(MOSST), for a Cooperative Program Concerning Detailed Definition and Preliminary 

Design (Phase B) of a Permanently Manned Space Station, which entered into force on 

April 16, 1985, 

Considering the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and the 

Government of Japan (the GOJ) on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, 

Operation and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station and recognizing that the GOJ has designated STA in that Memorandum of Understanding as its 

Cooperating Agency, as provided for in Article 4 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, 

Considering also the Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and MOSST on 

Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation and Utilization of the 

Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, 

Convinced that this cooperation among NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST implementing 

the provisions established in the Intergovernmental Agreement will further expand cooperation through the establishment of a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship 

and will further promote cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 -Purpose and Objectives 

1.1. The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is, pursuant to 

Article 4 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and on the basis of genuine partnership, 

to establish arrangements between NASA and ESA (hereinafter “the Parties”) implementing the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the detailed 

design, development, operation and utilization of the permanently manned civil Space 

Station for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law. In drafting this MOU, 

the Parties intended it to be consistent with the provisions of the Intergovernmental 

Agreement. This MOU will be subject to the provisions of the Intergovernmental 

Agreement. It defines [3] the nature of the genuine partnership, including the respective 

rights and obligations of the Parties to this MOU. 
112 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

1.2. The specific objectives of this MOU are: - to detail the roles and responsibilities of NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST (hereinafter the “partners”) in the detailed design, development, operation and utilization of 

the Space Station and also to record the commitments of NASA and ESA to each other 

and to STA and MOSST; - to establish the management structure and interfaces necessary to ensure 

effective planning and coordination in the conduct of the detailed design, development, 

operation and utilization of the Space Station; - to provide a framework that maximizes the total capability of the Space 

Station to accommodate user needs and that ensures that the Space Station is operated in 

a manner that is safe, efficient and effective for both Space Station users and Space 

Station operators; and - to provide a general description of the Space Station and the elements comprising it. 

1.3. Relevant definitions and explanations are to be found in Article 22. 

Article 2 - General Desrription of the Space Station 

2.1. NASA has a Space Station program which will produce a core U.S. Space Station. 

ESA has a Columbus program, and STA and MOSST also have space programs to produce 

significant elements which, together with the core U.S. Space Station, will create an 

international Space Station complex with greater capabilities that will enhance the use of 

space for the benefit of all participating nations and humanity. MOSST’s contribution will 

be an essential part of the infrastructure of the permanently manned civil international 

Space Station complex (hereinafter “the Space Station”). 

2.2. The Space Station will be a unique, multi-use facility in low-Earth orbit, comprising both manned and unmanned elements: a permanently manned base comprising 

elements provided by all the partners; unmanned platforms in near-polar orbit; a mantended free-flying laboratory to be serviced at the manned base; and Space Station-unique 

ground elements to support the operation and utilization of the elements on orbit. 

[4] 2.3. The Space Station will enable its users to take advantage of human ingenuity in 

connection with its low-gravity environment, the near-perfect vacuum of space and the 

vantage point for observing the Earth and the rest of the Universe. Specifically, the Space 

Station and its evolutionary additions could provide for a variety of capabilities, for example: 

a laboratory in space, for the conduct of science and applications and the 

development of new technologies; - a permanent observatory, with elements in low inclination and near-polar 

orbits, from which to observe Earth, the Solar System and the rest of the Universe; - a transportation node where payloads and vehicles are stationed, assembled, 

processed and deployed to their destination; - a servicing capability from which payloads and vehicles are maintained, 

repaired, replenished and refurbished; - an assembly capability from which large space structures and systems are 

assembled and verified; - a research and manufacturing capability in space, where the unique space 

environment enhances commercial opportunities; - 

- an infrastructure to encourage commercial investment in space; 

a storage depot for consumables, payloads and spares; and 

- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 113 

- a staging base for possible future missions, such as a permanent lunar base, a 

manned mission to Mars, unmanned planetary probes, a manned survey of the asteroids, 

and a manned scientific and communications facility in geosynchronous orbit. 

ArticL 3 - Space Station Elemats 

3.1. The Space Station will consist of elements comprising both flight elements and 

Space Station-unique ground elements. The elements are summarized in the Annex to 

the Intergovernmental Agreement and are further elaborated in this Article. Their 

requirements are defined and controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7. 

[5] 3.2. NASA Space Station Flight Elements: NASA will design, develop and provide the 

following flight elements including subsystems, the Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) system, 

the Space Station Information System, flight software and spares as required: - one permanently attached Habitation Module with complete basic functional outfitting to support habitation for a crew of up to eight, including primary storage of 

crew provisions - one permanently attached multipurpose Laboratory Module, located so as to 

contain the center of gravity of the manned base, with complete basic functional outfitting and including provisions for storage of NASA spares, secondary storage of crew provisions, and storage for safe haven capability - two sets of Attached Payload Accommodation Equipment for accommodation of payloads externally attached to the Space Station Truss Assembly - four Resource Nodes which provide pressurized volume for crew and equipment, connections between manned base pressurized elements and support of pressurized attached payloads - Truss Assembly which is the manned base structural framework - Solar Photovoltaic Power Modules which serve as the manned base electrical 

power source, providing 75kw of total power 

- Propulsion Assembly - at least three sets of Logistics Elements (pressurized and unpressurized 

Integrated Logistics System carriers) which provide systems operation support and user 

ground-twrbit and return logistics and on-orbit supply for extended periods - Airlock/Hyperbaric Airlock for purposes of crew and equipment transfer - one Flight Telerobotic System (FTS) - one Mobile Transporter which will serve to provide translation capability for 

the Mobile Servicing Center - one Polar Platform to work together with the ESA-provided Polar Platform 

[6] 3.3. ESA Space Station Flight Elements: ESA will design, develop and provide the following flight elements including subsystems, flight software and spares as required: - one Attached Pressurized Module (APM) , with volume equivalent to that of 

four Spacelab segments, permanently attached to the manned base, with complete basic 

functional outfitting and including provisions for storage of ESA spares, secondary storage of crew provisions, and storage for safe haven capability - one Polar Platform to work together with the NASA-provided Polar Platform - one Man-Tended Free Flyer (MTFF), including a pressurized module, with 

volume equivalent to that of two Spacelab segments, capable of autonomous operational 

periods of six months or longer 
114 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

3.4. STA and MOSST Space Station Flight Elements: As reflected in the MOU 

between NASA and the GOJ and in the MOU between NASA and MOSST 

3.4.a. STA Space Station Flight Elements: STA will design, develop and provide the following flight elements including subsystems, flight software and spares as required: 

- one Japanese Experiment Module UEM), a permanently attached multipurpose research and development laboratory, consisting of a pressurized module and an 

Exposed Facility, at least two Experiment Logistic Modules, and including a scientific 

equipment airlock, the JEM remote manipulator and R7A control/monitoring of the JEM 

Remote Manipulator System UEM-RMS) , with complete basic functional outfitting, 

including provisions for storage of STA spares, secondary storage of crew provisions, and 

storage for safe haven capability 

3.4.b. MOSST Space Station Flight Elements: Canadian elements will be developed to 

play the predominant role in satisfying the following functions for the Space Station: 

- attached payload servicing (external) 

Space Station assembly 

Space Station maintenance (external) 

transportation on Space Station 

deployment and retrieval functions 

EVAsupport 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

3.4.b.l. MOSST will design, develop and provide the following flight elements, including 

subsystems, flight software and spares as required: 

[7] - one Mobile Servicing Center (MSC) which comprises a Mobile Remote 

Servicer (MRS) and the NASA-provided Mobile Transporter - one MSC Maintenance Depot (MMD), primarily for maintenance of the 

MSC, including external storage of MOSST element spares. (Necessary internal storage 

of MOSST element spares will be provided in the NASA-provided elements.) - one Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) 

3.5. Space Station-unique ground elements will be provided by NASA, ESA and the 

other partners. These elements will be adequate to support the design and development 

(including assembly and verification), the continuing operation and the full international utilization of each partner’s flight elements listed above. The requirements for these 

elements will be defined and controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7. 

3.5.a. NASA will provide the following Space Station-unique ground elements to support the flight elements listed in Article 3.2: equipment required for specialized or unique 

integration or launch; ground support equipment (GSE) and flight support equipment 

(FSE) including necessary logistics; engineering support centers and user support centers; a polar platform control center; and test equipment, mock-ups, simulators, crew 

training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house these items. To support 

the Space Station as a whole, NASA will provide Space Station-unique ground elements 

including the Space Station Control Center (SSCC), the Payload Operations Integration 

Center (POIC), subsystem testbeds and elements related to logistics support and to software development including the Software Support Environment. 

3.5.b. As will be agreed and documented in the program documentation as provided for 

in Article 7, ESA will provide, at defined locations, a defined capacity of the following 

Space Station-unique ground elements to support the ESA flight elements listed in Article 

3.3: equipment required for specialized or unique integration or, as the case may be, for 

launch or return to Earth; GSE and FSE including necessary logistics; operations control 

centers, engineering support centers and user support centers; and test equipment, mockups, simulators, crew training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house 

these items. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 115 

3.5.c. As reflected in the MOU between NASA end the COJ and in the MOU between 

NASA and MOSST, STA and MOSST will provide, at defined locations, a defined capacity 

of the following Space [8] Station-unique ground elements to support their flight elements listed in Article 3.4: equipment required for specialized or unique integration or, 

as the case may be, for Launch or return to Earth; GSE and FSE including necessary logistics; engineering support centers and user support centers; and test equipment, mockups, simulators, crew training equipment, software and any facilities necessary to house 

these items. 

Articb 4 - Access to and Use of the Space Station 

4.1. NASA and ESAwill each assure access to and use of their Space Station flight elements listed in Article 3, in accordance with allocation commitments detailed in Articles 

8.3.a, 8.3.b, and 8.3.c. Beyond these allocation commitments, the capabilities of the Space 

Station will be made available to the partners subject to specific arrangement between the 

relevant partners. 

4.2. The partners’ utilization of flight elements listed in Article 3 will be equitable, as 

provided in the allocation commitments set forth in Article 8 of this MOU and of the corresponding MOU’s between NASA and the COJ and between NASA and MOSST. 

4.3. In accordance with the procedures in Article 8, NASA and ESA will each assure 

access to and use of their Space Station-unique ground elements referred to in Article 3.5 

by each other and the other partners in order to support fully the utilization of the flight 

elements in accordance with the Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan provided 

for in Article 8.l.c. As provided in Article 8, NASA and ESAwill each also assure access to 

and use of their Space Station-unique ground elements by each other and the other partners for system operations support. 

4.4. As requested by ESA for its design and development activities, access to and use 

of the Space Station-unique ground elements provided by NASA to support the Space 

Station as a whole will be provided for in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7. Access by ESA and NASA to each other’s remaining Space Stationunique ground elements for design and development activities will be subject to specific 

arrangements on a space-available basis. 

[91 

5.1. The Space Station program of NASA and the Columbus program of ESA eac

include detailed design and development. The NASA and ESA programs also includ

Space Station operation and utilization. Because of the extended period required t

assemble the Space Station, the design and development activities will overlap the oper

tion and utilization activities. After the completion of detailed design and developmen

which includes assembly of the Space Station and one year of initial operational verific

tion (Phase C/D), mature operations and utilization (Phase E) will begin. 

5.2. Major target milestones for the Space Station are as follows: 

h 

e 

o 

at 

aArticb 5 - Major Program Milestones 

- Initiation of NASA’s Phase C/D Dec 1987 

Initiation of ESA’s Phase C/D Feb 1988 

NASA-provided Polar Platform 

Preliminary Design Review Jan 1989 

First Space Station Element Launch Jan 1994 

NASA-provided Laboratory Module Launch Jan 1995 

- 

- 

- 

- 
116 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

- Permanently Manned Capability Oct 1995 

NASA-provided Polar Platform Launch Oct 1995 

ESA-provided AF’M Launch Oct 1996 

Completion of Manned Base Assembly Nov 1996 

ESA-provided Polar Platform Launch 

Completion of NASAs Phase C/D; 

Mar 1997 

Initiation of Phase E Nov 1997 

First Station Servicing of MTFF Jun 1998 

-

-

-

-

-

-

5.3. NASA and ESA will develop, maintain and exchange coordinated implementation schedules. These schedules, including the dates for the above milestones, the delivery dates for the ESA-provided elements and the assembly sequence for all elements of the 

Space Station, will be updated as necessary and formally controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7. 

Article 6 - Respective Responsibilities 

6.1.a. While undertaking the detailed design and development of the Space Station elements described in Articles 3.2 and 3.5.a, and within the scope of the Parties’ responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU, NASA will: 

[lo] 1. provide overall program coordination and direction; 

2. perform overall system engineering and integration and perform system engineering 

and integration for NASA-provided elements consistent with these responsibilities; 

3. establish, in consultation with the other partners, overall verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans and develop verification, 

safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans for the 

NASA-provided elements that meet or exceed these overall requirements and plans, 

which address the elements in Articles 3.2 and 3.5.5; 

4. confirm that the ESA verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans for the APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the 

manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base, and for the ESA-provided 

Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the NASA Space Transportation System (STS) 

associated with its servicing by the STS, developed by ESA in accordance with Article 

6.2.a.5, meet or exceed the overall Space Station verification, safety, reliability, quality 

assurance and maintainability requirements and plans; 

5. provide regular progress and status information on NASA Space Station program 

activities and plans; 

6. provide, as applicable, program information, systems requirements information and 

technical interface information necessary for the integration of ESA-provided elements 

described in Article 3.3 into the Space Station and/or the coordinated operation and utilization of ESA-provided elements; 

7. develop, with ESA, the agreedjoint documentation described in Article 7.1; 

8. perform ground integration tests as necessary to assure on-orbit compatibility and 

perform verification and acceptance tests for the flight elements in Article 3.2 and accommodate ESA representation at such tests as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their 

respective responsibilities under this MOU; 

9. conduct overall Space Station preliminary design reviews, critical design reviews, 

design certification [ 111 reviews, safety, reliability and quality assurance reviews, operations readiness reviews and flight readiness reviews in order for NASA to certify, following 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 117 

the certifications at element level provided by NASA and the other partners, that all Space 

Station elements to be launched on the STS, including the ESA-provided APM, are 

acceptable for launch, onmbit assembly and orbital operations; that the ESA-provided 

Polar Platform, to be launched on Ariane-5, is acceptable for servicing by STS; and that 

the ESA-provided MTFF, to be launched by Ariane-5, is acceptable for servicing at the 

manned base; and accommodate ESA representation as necessary for NASA and ESA to 

fulfill their respective responsibilities under this MOU; 

10. conduct for the elements it provides preliminary design reviews, critical design 

reviews, design certification reviews, and safety, reliability and quality assurance reviews; 

and accommodate ESA representatives as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their 

respective responsibilities under this MOU; 

11. support, as appropriate, and provide information necessary for ESA to conduct the 

reviews identified in Article 6.2.a.11; 

12. deliver on-orbit the ESA-provided APM and its initial outfitting in accordance with 

Article 12 and the assembly sequence controlled in appropriate program documentation 

as provided for in Article 7; [and] assemble on-orbit and verify interfaces of Space Station 

flight elements, including the flight elements that ESA will provide, with assistance from 

ESA, in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans; 

13. assist in the on-orbit activation and performance verification of the APM provided by 

ESA in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans; 

14. for each NASA-provided flight element, provide necessary ground and flight support 

equipment and initial spares; and perform qualification and acceptance tests of this 

equipment according to Space Station program requirements and interfaces as set forth 

in the documents described in Article 7.1; 

15. establish in Europe and accommodate in the US. agreed liaison personnel as provided in Article 7.2; 

[ 121 16. participate with ESA and the other partners in Space Station management mechanisms as provided in Articles 7 and 8, including the development of the Operations 

Management Plan and the Utilization Management Plan; 

17. work with ESA and the other partners to ensure that the Space Station Composite 

Utilization Plan described in Article 8.3.f can be accommodated by the elements provided by NASA, ESA and the other partners-in particular, work with ESA and the other partners to establish standard interfaces between the elements and user-provided hardware 

and software; provide standard and special user integration and user operations support 

as described in Articles 8.3.e, 8.3.h, and 8.3.1 to users of the other partners or the other 

partners as users who are to use the NASA-provided flight elements; perform rack-level 

physical integration on the ground of NASA users of the APM; plan and conduct user 

operations; and make available Space Station-unique ground elements to support the 

Space Station Composite Utilization Plan. In addition, NASA will work with ESA in order 

that NASA and MOSST, respectively, may establish the capabilities to distribute data to 

NASA and MOSST users of the APM directly from the NASA Tracking and Data Relay 

Satellite System (TDRSS) space network and to process NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network; 

18. establish in consultation with ESA and the other partners, information format and 

communication standards for a technical and management information system, and 

establish and maintain a computerized technical and management information system. 

This system is to work in conjunction with a compatible ESA computerized information 

system in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1; 

19. develop a Space Station Information System (SSIS) architecture for the end-toend 

data transmission between the Space Station data source and the data user; [and] 
118 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

establish and maintain a Software Support Environment (SSE), including necessary hardware and Space Station software standards to be established by NASA in consultation with 

ESA and the other partners, to work in conjunction with an ESA software development 

facility, in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1; 

20. develop and maintain flight and ground software related to elements it provides in 

accordance with Space Station software standards described in Article 6.1.a.19; 

[13] 21. develop an Integrated Logistics System for the manned base in accordance with 

the documents described in Article 7.1; 

22. provide spares for the NASA-provided elements as required to support assembly and 

initial operational verification; 

23. provide operations support and logistics support for the NASA-provided flight elements; and 

24. develop and provide to the System Operations Panel described in Article 8 baseline 

operations plans and maintenance plans for the NASA-provided elements describing routine systems capabilities and defining maintenance requirements, including logistics 

requirements, necessary for sustaining their functional performance. 

6.1.b. Beginning upon the initiation of Space Station operations and utilization, and 

within the scope of the Parties’ responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU, NASA 

will: 

1. participate in Space Station management mechanisms and development of documentation as provided in Articles 7 and 8, and in the sharing of Space Station operations 

costs as provided in Article 9; 

2. provide sustaining engineering, spares, operations support and logistics support for 

the Space Station elements it provides; 

3. maintain overall systems engineering, integration and operations support capability 

for Space Station operations and utilization; 

4. provide resupply and logistics management/integration support for Space Station 

operations; 

5. work with ESA and the other partners to prepare and implement plans for the integration and operation of user activities in the Space Station Consolidated Operations and 

Utilization Plan described in Article 8.l.c. In order to accomplish this, provide standard 

and special user integration and user operations support as described in Articles 8.3.e, 

8.3.h, and 8.3.1; perform rack-level physical integration on the ground of NASA users of 

the APM; make available its Space Station-unique ground elements to support this 

Consolidated Plan; support planning for future utilization activities; and, using the capabilities provided for in Article 6.1.a.17, NASA and MOSST, respectively, may distribute 

data to NASA and MOSST [ 141 users of the APM directly from the TDRSS space network 

and process NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network; 

6. provide logistics flights for the NASA-provided elements in accordance with Articles 9 

and 12, and provide logistics flights for the ESA-provided elements in accordance with 

Articles 9 and 12; 

7. provide the Space Station Control Center and the Payload Operations Integration 

Center for manned base operations control; a polar platform control center for the 

NASA-provided Polar Platform; and engineering support centers for the NASA-provided 

elements as provided in Article 8; 

8. maintain the Software Support Environment including hardware and software standards for the support of Space Station operations; 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 119 

9. maintain its flight and ground software in accordance with the Space Station software 

standards described in Article 6.1.a.19; 

10. upon completion of manned base assembly plus a one-year operational verification 

period, provide docking, access and servicing for the MTFF at the manned base as 

required by ESA, however, no more frequently than once every six months; and 

11. if appropriate STS capability exists, provide for STS servicing of the NASA-provided 

Polar Platform and, if ESA selects to use this STS capability and with details to be agreed 

by NASA and ESA, provide STS servicing of the ESA-provided Polar Platform in accordance with Articles 9 and 12. 

6.2.a. While undertaking the detailed design and development of the Space Station elements described in Articles 3.3 and 3.5.b, and within the scope of the Parties' responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU. ESA will: 

1. perform system engineering and integration for the APM consistent with NASA's 

overall system engineering and integration responsibilities; 

2. design the APM to be compatible with the STS and with the Space Station 

Information System which includes use of TDRSS; 

3. design and develop the ESA-provided MTFF, insofar as the MTFF has effects on the 

manned base associated with its [15] servicing at the manned base, the design and development of the MTFF will comply with otherwise established manned base requirements, 

capabilities and interfaces, including safety; the MTFF will be capable of autonomous 

operational periods of six months or longer; 

4. design and develop the ESA-provided Polar Platform; insofar as the ESA-provided 

Polar Platform has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS, its design 

and development will comply with the operational and safety requirements of the STS; 

5. develop, in consultation with NASA, verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance 

and maintainability requirements and plans for the APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has 

effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base, and for the 

ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS that meet or exceed the overall Space Station verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance and maintainability requirements and plans established in Article 

6.1.a.3, which address the elements in Articles 3.3 and 3.5.b; 

6. provide regular progress and status information on Columbus Program activities and 

plans; 

7. provide, as applicable, program information, systems requirements information and 

technical interface information necessary to understand the impact of the ESA-provided 

flight elements on the Space Station configuration and/or on the coordinated operation 

and utilization of the Space Station, and necessary to integrate those flight elements into 

the Space Station; 

8. develop, with NASA, the agreed joint documentation described in Article 7.1; 

9. perform interface verification tests as necessary to assure on-orbit compatibility and 

perform verification and acceptance tests for the flight elements in Article 3.3, and accommodate NASA representation at such tests as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their 

respective responsibilities under this MOU; 

10. maintain, and provide to NASA on request, ground and on-orbit verification test procedures and results as necessary to assess that the ESA-provided APM complies with overall Space Station program requirements and interface requirements, and, insofar as they 

have effects on the STS and the manned base, that the [ 161 ESA-provided Polar Platform 

and MTFF comply with the operational and safety requirements associated with servicing 
120 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

of these ESA-provided elements by the STS and at the manned base, respectively, as set 

forth in the documents described in Article 7.1; 

11. conduct for the elements it provides preliminary design reviews, critical design 

reviews and other reviews as set forth in the documents described in Article 7.1 which will 

include review of safety, reliability and quality assurance, and accommodate NASA representation as necessary for NASA and ESA to fulfill their respective responsibilities under 

this MOU; 

12. support as appropriate, and provide information necessary for NASA to conduct, the 

reviews identified in Article 6.1 .a.9; 

13. support, as appropriate, and provide information necessary for NASA to conduct the 

reviews identified in Article 6.1.a.10; 

14. following design and development of the APM, arrange for the on-orbit delivery of 

the APM and its initial outfitting in accordance with Article 12 and in accordance with the 

assembly sequence controlled by appropriate program documentation as described in 

Article 7; 

15. launch and operate the MTFF so that its first servicing at the manned base will be no 

earlier than the completion of the one-year manned base operational verification period, 

and launch and operate the ESA-provided Polar Platform; 

16. assist in the on-orbit assembly and interface verification of the ESA-provided APM in 

accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans; 

17. activate on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided APM, with assistance 

from NASA, in accordance with agreed assembly, activation and verification plans; activate 

on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided MTFF, in accordance with the 

appropriate program documentation as described in Article 7 which addresses the MTFF 

insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned 

base; and activate on-orbit and verify performance of the ESA-provided Polar Platform; 

18. for each ESA-provided flight element, provide necessary ground and flight support 

equipment and initial spares; [17] and perform qualification and acceptance tests of this 

equipment according to Space Station program requirements and interfaces as set forth 

in the documents described in Article 7.1; 

19. establish in the United States and accommodate in Europe agreed liaison personnel 

as provided in Article 7.2; 

20. participate with NASA and the other partners in Space Station management mechanisms as provided in Articles 7 and 8, including the development of the Operations 

Management Plan and the Utilization Management Plan; 

21. work with NASA and the other partners to ensure that the Space Station Composite 

Utilization Plan described in Article 8.3.f can be accommodated by the elements provided by NASA, ESA and the other partners-in particular, work with NASA and the other 

partners to establish standard interfaces between the elements and user-provided hardware and software; provide standard and special user integration and user operations 

support as described in Articles 8.3.e, 8.3.h, and 8.3.1 to users of the other partners or the 

other partners as users who are to use the ESA-provided flight elements; support and 

provide information necessary for NASA and MOSST to perform rack-level physical integration on the ground of NASA and MOSST users of the APM; plan and conduct user 

operations; make available Space Station-unique ground elements to support the Space 

Station Composite Utilization Plan; and support and provide information necessary for 

NASA and MOSST, respectively, to establish the capabilities to distribute data to NASA 

and MOSST users of the APM directly from the TDRSS space network and to process 

NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network; 
EXPLOIUNG THE UNKNOWN 121 

22. establish and maintain, in accordance with the documents described in Article 7.1, a 

compatible computerized technical and management information system to work in 

conjunction with the NASA computerized information system referred to in Article 

6.1.a.18; ESA will be responsible for the provision of necessary hardware and software 

based on information format and communication standards established by NASA, in consultation with ESA and the other partners; 

23. establish and maintain the necessary hardware and software for software production 

to work in conjunction with the Software Support Environment; 

[18] 24. develop and maintain flight and ground software related to elements it provides; 

for the ESA-provided APM, the development and maintenance of this software will be in 

accordance with Space Station software standards described in Article 6.1 .a.19; 

25. provide spares for the ESA-provided elements as required to support initial operational verifications, including assembly for the APM; 

26. provide operations support and logistics support for the ESA-provided flight elements; and 

27. develop and provide to the System Operations Panel described in Article 8 baseline 

operations plans and maintenance plans describing routine systems capabilities and defining maintenance requirements, including logistics requirements, necessary for sustaining 

the functional performance of the ESA-provided APM, for the MTFF insofar as it has 

effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base and for the 

ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. 

6.2.b. Beginning upon the initiation of Space Station operations and utilization, and 

within the scope of the Parties’ responsibilities established elsewhere in this MOU, ESA 

will: 

1. participate in Space Station management mechanisms and development of documentation as provided in Articles 7 and 8, and in the sharing of Space Station operations 

costs as provided in Article 9; 

2. provide sustaining engineering, spares, operations support and logistics support for 

the Space Station elements it provides; 

3. work with NASA and the other partners to prepare and implement plans for the integration and operation of user activities in the Space Station Consolidated Operations and 

Utilization Plan described in Article 8.1 .c. In order to accomplish this, provide standard 

and special user integration and user operations support as described in Articles 8.3.e, 

8.3.h, and 8.3.1; support and provide information necessary for NASA and MOSST to perform rack-level physical integration on the ground of NASA and MOSST users of the 

APM; make available its Space Station-unique ground elements to support this 

Consolidated Plan; support planning for future utilization activities; and support and provide information necessary for NASA and MOSST, respectively, to distribute data to NASA 

and MOSST users of the APM [ 191 directly from the TDRSS space network and to process 

NASA and MOSST user commands to the APM through the TDRSS space network; 

4. arrange for logistics flights related to the ESA-provided elements in accordance with 

Articles 9 and 12; 

5. provide operations control centers and engineering support centers for the ESAprovided APM, Polar Platform and MTFF, as provided in Article 8; and 

6. maintain its flight and ground software for the elements it provides; for the ESAprovided APM, the maintenance of this software will be in accordance with Space Station 

software standards described in Article 6.1 .a.19. 
122 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Article 7 - Managmnt Aspects ofthe Space Station Program 

Primarily Related to Detailed Design and Development 

7.1. Management/Reviews 

7.1.a. NASA and ESA are each responsible for the management of their respective 

Space Station Phase C/D activities consistent with the provisions of this MOU. This Article 

establishes the management mechanisms to coordinate the respective Space Station 

design and development (including assembly and verification) activities of NASA and 

ESA, to establish applicable requirements, to assure safe operations, to establish the interfaces between the Space Station elements, to review decisions, to establish schedules, to 

review the status of activities, to report progress and to resolve issues and technical problems as they arise. 

7.1.b. The NASA/ESA Program Coordination Committee (PCC), co-chaired by the 

NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station 

and Platforms, will meet periodically throughout the lifetime of the program or promptly at the request of either Party to review the Parties’ respective design and development 

activities. The Co-Chairmen will together take those decisions necessary to assure implementation of the cooperative design and development activities related to Space Station 

flight elements and to Space Station-unique ground elements provided by the Parties, 

including, as appropriate, to design changes of the Parties’ flight elements during Phase 

E. In taking decisions regarding design and development, the PCC will consider operation 

and utilization impacts, and will [203 also consider design and development recommendations from the Multilateral Coordination Board described in Article 8.1 .b. However, 

decisions regarding operation and utilization activities will be taken in accordance with 

Article 8. The Co-Chairmen will each designate their respective members and will decide 

on the location of meetings. If the Co-Chairmen agree that a specific design and development issue or decision requires consideration by another partner at the PCC level, the 

NASA/ESA PCC may meet jointly with the NASA/STA PCC and/or the NASA/MOSST 

PCC. 

7.l.c. Multilateral Program Reviews will be organized by NASA and will meet as necessary at the request of any partner so that the Parties to this MOU and the other partners 

can report progress and discuss the status of their Phase C/D program activities. 

7.1 .d. The manned base and NASA-provided Polar Platform requirements, configuration, housekeeping resource allocations for design purposes, and element interfaces will 

be controlled by the Space Station Control Board (SSCB) chaired by NASA. The SSCB will 

also control Space Station activities through the completion of assembly and initial operational verification, and other Space Station configuration control activities related to the 

manned base, related to the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated 

with its servicing at the manned base, and related to the ESA-provided Polar Platform 

insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. ESA will be a 

member of the SSCB, and of such subordinate boards thereof as may be agreed, attending and participating when these boards consider items which affect the APM, interfaces 

between the NASA-provided and the ESA-provided elements, interfaces between the ESAprovided elements and the STS, interfaces between the ESA-provided elements and other 

partner-provided elements, or the accommodation on the manned base of the Composite 

Utilization Plan and the Composite Operations Plan described in Article 8. Decisions by 

the SSCB Chairman may be appealed to the PCC, although it is the duty of the SSCB 

Chairman to make every effort to reach consensus with ESA rather than have issues 

referred to the PCC. Such appeals will be made and processed expeditiously. Pending resolution of appeals, ESA need not proceed with the implementation of an SSCB decision 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 123 

as far as its provided elements are concerned; NASA may, however, proceed with an SSCB 

decision as far as its provided elements are concerned. NASA will be a member of the 

Columbus Control Board chaired by ESA, and of such subordinate boards thereof as may 

be agreed, attending and participating as appropriate. As far as the elements separated 

from the manned base are concerned, NASA will assume management responsibility for 

the design and development of the NASA-provided Polar Platform, including meeting 

requirements related to polar [21] platform user interfaces and polar platform STS servicing; ESA will assume management responsibility for the design and development of the 

ESA-provided Polar Platform, including meeting requirements related to polar platform 

user interfaces and polar platform STS servicing; [and] ESAwill also assume management 

responsibility for the design and development of the MTFF and for meeting requirements 

related to its effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base. 

7.1.e. NASA will develop an overall Program Plan for Space Station design and development based on information provided by all the partners detailing overall program content, implementation approach and schedules. ESA will develop a Columbus Program 

Plan for design and development detailing ESA program content, implementation 

approach and schedules. A Joint Program Plan UPP] for design and development, signed 

by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station and the ESA Director of Space 

Station and Platforms, will cover the interrelationship between the ESA program and the 

overall program. Any modification or any addition to the JPP will be approved by the PCC. 

7.1.f. NASA will develop a Program Requirements Document (PRD) based on information provided by all the partners providing the programmatic basis for the overall conduct of Phase C/D. A Joint PRD UPRD), signed by the NASA Associate Administrator for 

Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station and Platforms, will represent the toplevel requirements related to the APM, the MTFT insofar as it has effects on the manned 

base associated with its servicing at the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform 

insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. The JPRD will 

identify the applicability to the ESA program of all paragraphs in the PRD, including any 

which are added or modified. Any modification or any addition to the JPRD will be 

approved by the PCC. 

7.1 .g. NASA has developed an overall Program Definition and Requirements Document 

(PDRD) based on information provided by all the partners which contains requirements 

for Space Station flight element hardware and software and provides the technical basis 

for the overall conduct of Phase C/D. A Joint PDRD UPDRD), signed by the NASA 

Program Director and the ESA Program Manager, contains the detailed requirements 

related to the APM, the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with 

its servicing at the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has 

effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. The JPDRD identifies the 

applicability to the ESA program of all paragraphs in the PDRD including any which are 

added or modified. Any modification to the PDRD will be approved by the SSCB. Any 

modification or any addition to the co-signed JPDRD will be mutually agreed and 

[22] jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the ESA Program Manager. 

7.1.h. NASA will develop Architectural Control Documents (ACD’s) which define and 

control the end-toend architecture of the manned base distributed systems and control 

the interfaces of these systems with each other and with the flight elements. In addition, 

NASA will develop, in consultation with the appropriate partners, Interface Control 

Documents (ICD’s) which control interfaces between: the flight elements comprising 

infrastructural elements and the flight elements comprising accommodations elements as 

defined in Article 8.1 .d; between the flight elements comprising infrastructural elements; 

and, as appropriate, between any other flight elements, between flight and ground 
124 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

or among ground elements. NASA will also develop a Baseline Configuration Document 

(BCD) based on information provided by all the partners which controls the configuration of the manned base and of the NASA-provided Polar Platform. The ACD’s and the 

BCD will be developed by the start of NASA’s Phase C/D; the ICD’s will be developed early 

in Phase C/D. Any modification or any addition to the ACD’s, the BCD and the ICD’s will 

be approved by the SSCB. Joint interface documentation, which identifies the applicability to the ESA-provided APM of all interfaces in the ACD’s, BCD and ICD’s, including any 

which are modified, will be developed by NASA and ESA. This joint interface documentation will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the 

ESA Program Manager. Any modification or any addition to this joint interface documentation will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and 

the ESA Program Manager. NASA and ESA will jointly develop an ICD which will govern 

the interfaces between the ESA-provided MTFF and the manned base in connection with 

the docking, access and servicing of the MTFF at the manned base, in accordance with 

Article 6.2.a.3. NASA and ESA will also jointly develop an ICD in which they will agree on 

standard user interfaces for the polar platforms they provide; this ICD will also govern the 

interfaces between the ESA-provided Polar Platform and the STS. The MTFF ICD will be 

developed early in Phase C/D; the Polar Platform ICD will be established no later than 

the Preliminary Design Review for the NASA-provided Polar Platform. The MTF’F and 

Polar Platform ICD’s will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program 

Director and the ESA Program Manager. Any modification or addition to these documents will be mutually agreed and jointly signed by the NASA Program Director and the 

ESA Program Manager. 

7.1.i. Program Management Reviews will be held as necessary at which the NASA 

Program Director and the Program Managers representing ESA and the other partners 

will report on the status of their respective design and development activities, including 

schedule, element performance parameters and element [23] interface requirements. 

These formal Program Management Reviews will be held at least quarterly and will be 

chaired by NASA. Less formal status reviews will be held monthly; representatives of the 

partners’ Program Managers will attend these reviews. 

7.1.j. ESA will participate in selected NASA reviews on Space Station requirements, 

architecture and interfaces as defined in the JPP. Similarly, NASAwill participate in selected ESA reviews as defined in the JPP; the other partners will participate as appropriate, 

7.1.k. Through participation in the above management mechanisms, NASA and ESA 

agree to achieve commonality on the manned base as required by the overall Space 

Station safety requirements as defined pursuant to Article 10. NASA and ESA also agree 

to provide standard interfaces for Space Station users both in the permanently attached 

pressurized laboratories and on the polar platforms. Exceptions to these requirements for 

commonality may be agreed on a case-by-case basis between NASA and ESA. In addition, 

NASA and ESAwill work through the above management mechanisms to seek agreement 

on a case-by-case basis regarding the use of interchangeable hardware and software in 

order to promote efficient and effective Space Station operations, including reducing the 

burden on the Space Station logistics system. 

7.2. Liaison. The NASA Office of Space Station and ESA Space Station and Platforms 

Directorate are responsible for NASA/ESA liaison activities. ESA may provide representative(~) to NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and NASA may provide representative(s) to ESA Headquarters in Paris. In order to facilitate the working relationships 

between the NASA Program Director and the ESA Program Manager, ESA will provide 

and NASA will accommodate ESA liaison to the NASA Space Station Program Office. 

Similarly, NASA will provide and ESA will accommodate NASA liaison to the ESA Space 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 125 

Station Program Office. In addition, by mutual agreement, ESA may provide and NASA 

will accommodate ESA liaison to NASA Centers involved in the Space Station program, 

and NASA may provide and ESA will accommodate liaison to ESA Centers involved in the 

ESA Space Station program. Arrangements specifylng all conditions relating to the liaison 

relationships will be agreed and co-signed by the Co-Chairmen of the PCC. 

Article 8 - Management Aspects of the Space Station Program 

Primarily Related to Operations and Utilization 

8.1. General 

8.1.a. NASA and ESA each have responsibilities regarding the management of their 

respective operations and utilization [24] activities and the overall Space Station operations and utilization activities, in accordance with the provisions of this MOU. NASA will 

have the responsibility for the overall planning for and direction of the operation of the 

manned base (including all elements within the operational Command and Control Zone 

(CCZ) of the manned base as defined in the program documentation provided for in 

Article 7) and the NASA-provided Polar Platform. ESA will have the responsibility for the 

planning for and direction of the operation of the elements it provides which are separated from the manned base (specifically, the MTFF when outside the operational CCZ of 

the manned base and the ESA-provided Polar Platform when outside the operational CCZ 

of the STS, as defined in the program documentation provided for in Article 7). 

Operations and utilization activities will comprise long-range planning and toplevel direction and coordination, which will be performed by the strategic-level organizations; 

detailed planning and support to the strategic-level organizations which will be performed by the tactical-level organizations; and implementation of these plans which will 

be performed by the execution-level organizations. 

8.1.b. A Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB) will be established as soon as possible 

after the start of NASA's Phase C/D and will meet periodically over the lifetime of the 

program or promptly at the request of any partner with the task to ensure coordination 

of the activities of the partners related to the operation and utilization of the Space 

Station. The Parties to this MOU and the other partners will plan and coordinate activities affecting the safe, efficient and effective operation and utilization of the Space Station 

through the MCB, except as otherwise specifically provided in this MOU. The MCB will 

comprise the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Station; the ESA Director of Space 

Station and Platforms; the MOSST Deputy Secretary, Space Policy Sector; and the STA 

Director-General of the Research and Development Bureau. The NASA Associate 

Administrator for Space Station will chair he MCB. The Parties agree that all MCB decisions should be made by consensus. However, where consensus cannot be achieved on any 

specific issue within the purview of the MCB within the time required, the Chairman is 

authorized to take decisions. The Parties agree that, in order to protect the interests of all 

partners in the program, the operation and utilization of the Space Station will be most 

successful when consensus is reached and when the affected partners' interests are taken 

into account. MCB decisions will not modify rights of the partners specifically provided in 

this MOU. Decisions regarding the operation and utilization of the ESA-provided elements which are separated from the manned base and which do not have effects on the 

manned base associated with servicing at the manned base or have effects on the STS associated with servicing by the STS will be taken by ESA, except as otherwise specifically provided in Article 8.3. 

[25] 8.l.c. The MCB will establish Panels which will be responsible for the long-range 

strategic coordination of the operation and utilization of the Space Station, to be called 
126 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

the System Operations Panel and the User Operations Panel respectively, described in 

detail below. The MCB will develop a charter that will define the organizational relationships and responsibilities of these Panels, and the organizational relationships of these 

Panels with the tactical- and execution-level organizations described below. Any modifications to the charter will be approved by the MCB. The MCB will approve, on an annual 

basis, a Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan (COUP) for the Space Station 

based on the annual Composite Operations Plan and the annual Composite Utilization 

Plan developed by the Panels and described below. In doing so, the MCB will be responsible for resolving any conflicts between the Composite Operations Plan and the 

Composite Utilization Plan which cannot be resolved by the Panels. The COUP will be 

prepared by the User Operations Panel and agreed to by the System Operations Panel. 

The charter for these Panels will also delineate the Panels’ delegated responsibilities with 

respect to adjustment of the COUP. The COUP will be implemented by the appropriate 

tactical- and execution-level organizations. 

8.1.d. Manned Base Hardware. The following is provided to explain the relationships 

between the different types of elements on the manned base which are allocated for use 

by the partners. The Space Station manned base includes: 

- accommodations elements; and 

- infrastructural elements. 

The accommodations elements are the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the ESA-provided APM, the STA-provided JEM including the Exposed Facility and the Experiment 

Logistics Modules, and the NASA-provided Attached Payload Accommodation 

Equipment. The infrastructural elements comprise all other manned base elements, 

including servicing elements and other elements that produce resources which permit all 

manned base elements to be operated and used. 

8.1 .d.l. Housekeeping. Both accommodations elements and infrastructural elements will 

be used for assembly, for verification and for maintenance of the manned base in an operational status, and also for the storage of element spares, crew provisions and safe haven 

capability, with secondary storage of crew provisions to be distributed equally among the 

three laboratories. In such use, they are referred to, respectively, as providing: 

[ 261 - housekeeping accommodations; and 

housekeeping resources. 

During Phase C/D, these housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources 

will be controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Article 7. 

During Phase E, these housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources will 

be controlled according to the mechanisms in Article 8.2.d. 

8.1 .d.2. Utilization. The accommodations and resources not required to maintain the 

manned base in an operational status will be used in connection with Space Station utilization, and are referred to, respectively, as: 

- 

- user accommodations; and 

- utilization resources. 

Details regarding the allocation of the Space Station user accommodations and utilization 

resources are provided in Article 8.3. NASA and ESA agree to seek to minimize the 

demands for housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources in order to 

maximize those available for utilization. 

8.1.e. Platforms and MTFF. Because of the different character of the platforms and the 

MTFF, differentiation between accommodations and resources is not required. 

Mechanisms governing the operation of these elements are to be found in Article 8.2 and 

mechanisms governing the utilization of these elements are to be found in Article 8.3. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 127 

8.2. Operations 

8.2.a. It is the goal of the Parties to this MOU to operate the Space Station in a manner 

that is safe, efficient and effective for both Space Station users and Space Station operators. To accomplish this, the MCB will establish, within three months of its establishment, 

a System Operations Panel (SOP) to coordinate strategic-level operations activities and 

operations planning activities as provided for in Article 8.l.c. 

8.2.b. The SOP will comprise one member each from NASA, ESA and the other partners. Members may send designated alternates to SOP meetings. In addition, each partner may call upon relevant expertise as necessary to support SOP activities. The SOP will 

take decisions by consensus; in the event of failure to reach consensus on any issue, the 

issue will be forwarded to the MCB for resolution. In the interest of efficient management, NASA and ESA recognize that the SOP should take the responsibility routinely to 

resolve all operations issues as expeditiously as possible rather than refer such issues to the 

MCB. 

[27] 8.2.c. The SOP will develop, approve and maintain an Operations Management 

Plan for the operation, maintenance and refurbishment of and logistics for the manned 

base, the NASA-provided Polar Platform and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as 

these platforms have effects on the STS associated with their servicing by the STS, and the 

MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the 

manned base during Phase E. This Plan will describe relationships among the strategic, 

tactical and execution levels of operations management, where the strategic level is coordinated by the SOP; the tactical level, by the tactical operations organization referred to 

in Article 8.2.e; and the execution level, by implementing organizations and field centers. 

Consistent with the other provisions of this Article, the Operations Management Plan will 

also address operational requirements for the manned base, the NASA-provided Polar 

Platform and the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as these platforms have effects on 

the STS associated with their servicing by the STS, [and] the MTFF insofar as it has effects 

on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base and Space Stationunique ground elements. The Operations Management Plan will provide the procedures 

for preparation of the baseline operations plans and maintenance plans provided for in 

Articles 6.1.a.24 and 6.2.a.27, annual refinements to these baseline plans, and the 

Composite Operations Plan described in Article 8.2.d, including procedures for adjustment of these plans as further information becomes available. 

8.2.d. On an annual basis, NASA and ESA will each provide to the SOP any significant 

refinements to their baseline operations plans and maintenance plans five years in 

advance. Using the operations and maintenance plans and these refinements provided by 

all of the partners, including requirements for use of Space Station-unique ground 

elements, the SOP will develop and approve an annual Space Station Composite 

Operations Plan (COP) consistent with the annual Space Station Composite Utilization 

Plan described in Article 8.3.f. The COP will also identify the housekeeping accommodations and housekeeping resources required for maintenance of the manned base in an 

operational status. Compatibility of the COP and the Composite Utilization Plan must be 

assured through coordination between the SOP and the User Operations Panel, 

described in Article 8.3.d, during the preparation and approval process. 

8.2.e. NASA, with the participation of all the partners, will be responsible for integrated tactical-level activities for Space Station manned base operations. To this end, NASA 

will establish an integrated tactical operations organization and the other partners will 

participate in discharging the responsibilities of this organization. ESA and the other partners will provide personnel to the integrated tactical operations organization who will 

bring expertise on the elements [28] each provides and will participate in overall integrated tactical operations activities. NASA and ESA will consult and agree regarding the 
128 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL. SPACE COOPERATION 

responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult 

and agree regarding the number of ESA personnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. In conjunction with the integrated activities, NASA, ESA and the 

other partners will each perform distributed tactical-level activities related to the elements 

each provides, such as decentralized system operations support planning, user support 

planning, logistics planning, and the accommodations assessments described in Article 

8.3.h. Tactical-level activities will include planning for system operations and for user sup 

port activities across all manned base elements. Tactical-level activities for elements separated from the manned base when outside the operational CCZ of the STS or the manned 

base, as defined in the program documentation provided for in Article 7, will be performed by the element provider. However, where the same services, such as transportation, logistics and communications, are required by both the manned base and elements 

which are operating separated from the manned base, planning for these services will be 

performed by the integrated tactical operations organization. 

8.2.f. Tactical Operations Plans (TOP’S) for the manned base and for the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned base 

will be developed by the tactical operations organization described in Article 8.2.e to 

implement the COUP. Each TOP will include Increment Plans (IP’s) for a period of two 

years prior to launch of the STS to the manned base for a specific increment. (An increment is normally the interval between visits of the STS for the purpose of resupply in support of manned base operations and utilization as approved in the COUP.) Each IP will 

describe the detailed manifest of user payloads, systems support equipment and supplies 

needed to support the increment. Each IP will also describe changes to the complement 

of hardware and software to be flown during that increment and the payload and system 

support activities needed to carry out the activities approved in the COUP for that increment. The IP will identify the crew complement and define logistics requirements including STS interface requirements, changes to housekeeping resource requirements, 

changes to housekeeping accommodation requirements and communication requirements, including TDRSS use and requirements for distribution of data, to support the 

subject increment. 

8.2.g. NASA, with the participation of all the partners, will be responsible for integrated execution-level planning for and execution of the day-to-day operation of the manned 

base. ESA and the other partners will participate in discharging the responsibilities of the 

Space Station Control Center (SSCC), [29] established and managed by NASA, which will 

conduct execution-level activities and support tactical planning. ESA and the other partners will provide personnel to the SSCC. These personnel will bring expertise on the 

elements that partner provides, will participate in overall SSCC-based activities, and will 

support real-time on-orbit activities with emphasis on the elements each provides. NASA 

and ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA 

personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA personnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. In conjunction with 

the integrated activities, NASA, ESA and the other partners will each perform distributed 

execution-level activities related to the elements each provides, such as monitoring and 

support of real-time systems operations. NASA, ESA and the other partners will provide 

engineering support centers to perform detailed engineering assessments and real-time 

operations support to the SSCC required for the operational control of the manned base 

elements they provide. Execution-level activities for elements separated from the manned 

base when outside the operational CCZ of the STS or the manned base, as defined in the 

program documentation provided for in Article 7, will be the responsibility of the element 

provider. The partners may also participate in and provide personnel to other execution- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 129 

level activities at other sites as agreed. 

8.2.h. The International Operational Concepts Working Group (IOCWC), established 

by the Space Station Phase B MOU’s, will continue to advise the Parties to this MOU in 

planning for the establishment of the SOP. Once the SOP is established, the activities of 

the IOCWG will end. 

8.3. Utilization 

8.3.a. Manned Base 

8.3.a.l. NASA and MOSST will provide Space Station manned base infrastructural elements to assemble, maintain, operate and service the manned base; NASA and MOSST 

will also provide resources derived from these infrastructural elements to the other partners as provided in Article 8.3.a.2. ESA will retain the use of 41% of the user accommodations on its APM; NASA will retain the use of 97% of the user accommodations on its 

accommodations elements; NASA and ESA will each provide MOSST 3% of the user 

accommodations on their accommodations elements; and ESA will provide NASA the 

remaining user accommodations on its APM. NASA, ESA and MOSST will each control 

the selection of users for their allocations of user accommodations; such NASA, ESA and 

MOSST control of the selection of users for their allocation of user accommodations will 

he exercised in accordance with the procedures in this MOU and in the NASA-MOSST 

MOU for developing the Composite Utilization Plan. 

[30] 8.3.a.2. Allocation of manned base resources among the partners will be in accordance with the following approach. Housekeeping resources required by all elements, and 

provided as noted in Article 8.1.d.1, will be set aside. The utilization resources will be allocated as follows: 20% of utilization resources will be allocated to NASA because of its 

Attached Payload Accommodation Equipment; 3% of utilization resources will be allocated to MOSST; [and] the remaining utilization resources will be apportioned equally 

among the three laboratory modules. ESA will be allocated 50% of the utilization 

resources apportioned to the ESA-provided APM and STA will be allocated 50% of the utilization resources apportioned to the ESA-provided JEM. NASA will be allocated 100% of 

the utilization resources apportioned to the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the 

remaining 50% of the utilization resources apportioned to the ESA-provided APM and the 

remaining 50% of the utilization resources apportioned to the ESA-provided JEM. The 

above allocation of utilization resources is to the partner, not to the elements, and may be 

used by the partner on any Space Station element consistent with the COP and the 

Composite Utilization Plan. More than this allocation of any utilization resource may be 

gained by each partner through barter or purchase from other partners. 

8.3.a.3. ESAs allocation of user accommodations and utilization resources will begin 

once the APM is verified following assembly to the manned base. 

8.3.a.4. Manned base utilization resources are power, user servicing capacity, heat rejection capacity, data handling capacity, total crew time and EVA capacity. The initial list of 

manned base utilization resources to be allocated is power, user servicing capacity and 

total crew time. All other manned base utilization resources may be used without allocation. To support the operation and full international utilization of the Space Station 

manned base as defined in Article 3, NASA plans to provide the number of STS flights per 

year baselined by the SSCB during Phase C/D. From the total Space Station user payload 

capacity available on STS flights actually flown to and from the manned base each year, 

each partner will have the right to purchase STS launch and return services for its Space 

Station utilization activities, up to its allocated percentage of utilization resources. (The 

foregoing does not apply to STS launch and return capacity provided to and from the 
130 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

manned base in connection with Space Station evolutionary additions.) Similarly, the 

partners will have the right to purchase, up to their allocated percentage of utilization 

resources, TDRSS data transmission capacity available to the manned base. The User 

Operations Panel, defined in Article 8.3.d, will update the lists of utilization resources and 

allocated utilization resources as necessary as NASA and the other partners gain experience. 

[31] 8.3.b. Platforms 

8.3.b.l. In recognition of the fact that platforms are separate elements that do not require 

extensive support from the infrastructural elements of the manned base, platforms are 

treated separately from the manned base. 

8.3.b.2. NASA and ESA will share the use of each other’s polar platforms on a balanced 

reciprocal basis, recognizing that the two platforms may have different capabilities and 

that the user community may propose specific splits based on actual payloads; such proposals must be agreed to by NASA and ESA, and by MOSST with respect to its 3% utilization of the polar platforms provided for in Article 8.3.b.3, and processed by the User 

Operations Panel as part of the development of the Composite Utilization Plan provided 

in Article 8.3.f.2. NASA and ESA will also provide associated user integration and user 

operations support to each other and each other’s users. 

8.3.b.3. MOSST will be provided 3% utilization of both the NASA and ESA polar platforms together with the associated user integration and user operations support. STA may 

purchase, barter or enter into other arrangements for platform utilization. 

8.3.c. Man-Tended Free Flyer 

8.3.c.l. ESAwill retain the total use of the MTFF it provides. 

8.3.c.2. Notwithstanding Article 8.3.c.1, each year, NASA will have an option to use up to 

25% of MTFF utilization capacity by purchase at prices ESA routinely charges comparable 

customers or by barter such as for an amount of utilization resources and/or user accommodations. The conditions of such purchase or barter will be agreed between NASA and 

ESA. 

8.3.c.3. In case of total use of the MTFF by ESA, all accommodations and resources 

required to service the MTFF at the manned base will come out of the user accommodations and utilization resources available to ESA as provided in Article 8.3.a. 

8.3.d. It is the goal of the Parties to use the Space Station in a safe, efficient and effective manner. To accomplish this, the MCB will establish, within three months of its establishment, a User Operations Panel (UOP), to assure the compatibility of utilization 

activities of the manned base, the polar platforms, and use by the MTFF of manned base 

utilization resources and user accommodations. The UOP will comprise one member 

each from NASA, ESA and the other partners. Members may send designated alternates 

to UOP meetings. In addition, each partner may call upon relevant expertise as necessary 

to support [32] UOP activities. The UOP will take decisions by consensus; except as noted 

in Article 8.3.f.2, in the event of failure to reach consensus on any issue, the issue will be 

forwarded to the MCB for resolution. In the interest of efficient management, NASA and 

ESA recognize that the UOP should take the responsibility to routinely resolve all utilization issues as expeditiously as possible rather than refer such issues to the MCB. 

8.3.e. The UOP will develop, approve and maintain a Utilization Management Plan 

which will describe relationships among the strategic, tactical and execution levels of utilization management, where the strategic level is coordinated by the UOP; the tactical 

level, by the integrated tactical operations organization described in Article 8.2.e; and the 

execution level, by implementing organizations and field centers. The Plan will also establish processes for utilization of the Space Station elements, including the user support 

centers and other Space Station-unique ground elements provided by all the partners, 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 131 

consistent with Article 8.3.d; define standard user integration and user operations support; and describe the approach to distributed user integration and operations. The Plan 

will provide procedures for preparation of the partners’ Utilization Plans and Composite 

Utilization Plan described in Article 8.3.f, including procedures for adjustment of these 

Plans as further information becomes available. 

8.3.f. Utilization Plan for the Manned Base and the Polar Platforms 

8.3.f.l. On an annual basis, five years in advance, NASA and ESA each will develop a 

Utilization Plan for all proposed uses of its allocation of manned base user accommodations and utilization resources, for all proposed uses of unallocated manned base utilization resources and Space Station-unique ground elements, and for all uses of the polar 

platforms. Each partner will satisfy the requirements of its users for storage within the user 

accommodations available to that partner, with the exception of temporary on-orbit storage in the Integrated Logistics System carriers in which user equipment, including MTFF 

equipment, is launched or returned to Earth as specified in the applicable Increment 

Plan. As regards the MTFF, the ESA Utilization Plan will include all uses of manned base 

user accommodations and utilization resources required to service the MTFF at the 

manned base, information necessary to determine whether any planned utilization of the 

MTFF would have effects on the manned base associated with its servicing at the manned 

base, and information related to Article 9.8(e) of the Intergovernmental Agreement. 

NASA and ESA each will prioritize and propose appropriate schedules for the user activities in its Utilization Plan, including the use of user support centers and other Space 

Station-unique ground elements to support the [33] utilization of the flight elements. 

These individual Utilization Plans will take into consideration all factors necessary to 

assure successful implementation of the user activities, including any relevant information 

regarding crew skills and special requirements associated with the proposed payloads. 

8.3.f.2. NASA and ESA each will forward its Utilization Plan to the UOP. Using the 

Utilization Plans of NASA, ESA and the other partners, the UOP will develop the 

Composite Utilization Plan (CUP), covering the use of both flight and Space Stationunique ground elements, based on all relevant factors, including each element-provider’s 

recommendations regarding resolution of technical and operational incompatibilities 

among the users proposed for its elements. In its use of the Space Station, each partner 

will seek, through the mechanisms established in this MOU, to avoid causing serious 

adverse effects on the use of the Space Station by the other partners. In the event of failure of the UOP to reach consensus on the utilization of the manned base and/or related 

Space Station-unique ground elements, the issue will be forwarded to the MCB for resolution. In the event of failure of the UOP to reach consensus on the utilization of the ESAprovided Polar Platform, ESAwill take the decision, and in the event of failure of the UOP 

to reach consensus on the utilization of the NASA-provided Polar Platform, NMA will 

take the decision; however, in either event, NASA and ESA will respect the utilization 

rights of Canada and of each other in any such decisions. 

8.3.f.3. Utilization Plans proposed by NASA, ESA and the other partners which fall completely within their respective allocations and do not conflict operationally or technically 

with one another’s Utilization Plans will be automatically approved. However, Articles 

9.8(a), 9.8(b) and 9.11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement will apply. 

8.3.g. Utilization Plan for the MTFF 

8.3.g.l. The MTFF Utilization Plan will be developed and approved by ESA. As appropriate, MTFF utilization will be consistent with Articles 8.3.c.2 and 8.3.f.l. 

8.3.h. Each partner will participate in integrated tactical-level planning of user activities. 

To this end, each partner will provide personnel to the operations organization described 

in Article 8.2.e. These personnel will participate in integrated tactical-level planning of 
132 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

user activities; they will also support the strategic-level planning of user activities. NASA 

and ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA 

personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA personnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. In addition, partners 

providing user accommodations [34] will be responsible for providing standard user integration and user operations support to users of other partners or other partners as users, 

including conducting assessments of the flow of payload integration activities for all payloads manifested in the user accommodations they provide. Accommodation assessments 

for individual payloads manifested in a laboratory module covering engineering, operations and software compatibility will also be performed by the partner providing that laboratory module in support of the preparation and execution of Tactical Operations Plans 

and Increment Plans. Similarly, MOSST will be responsible for providing standard user 

integration and user operations support for users of the other partners or other partners 

as users of the flight elements provided by MOSST; and NASA will be responsible for providing standard user integration and user operations support for users of the other partners or other partners as users of the manned base systems/subsystems provided by NASA. 

8.3.i. Each partner will participate in discharging the responsibilities of the Payload 

Operations Integration Center (POIC) established and managed by NASA which will be 

responsible for assistance to manned base users in planning and executing user activities 

on the manned base, for overall direction of the execution of user activities on the 

manned base, and for interaction with the SSCC in order to coordinate user activities with 

systems operations activities. Each partner will provide personnel to the POIC. NASA and 

ESA will consult and agree regarding the responsibilities to be discharged by the ESA personnel. NASA and ESA will also consult and agree regarding the number of ESA personnel and all administrative conditions related to these personnel. The interaction between 

the POIC and SSCC will be described in the Operations Management Plan. Both NASA 

and ESA will provide user support centers which will function within the framework of 

NASA's responsibilities for the POIC. The interactions between the user support centers 

and the POIC will be described in the Utilization Management Plan. NASA and ESA will 

each be responsible, relative to the elements they provide which are separated from the 

manned base, for assistance to users in planning and executing user activities, for direction of the execution of user activities and for interaction with the MTFF and polar platform control centers to coordinate user and element operations activities. 

8.3.j. In working out problems which may arise after the development of the COUP, in 

the case of a technical or operational incompatibility between users, the partner(s) providing the element(s) in which the users have accommodations, as well as other impacted 

partners, will provide appropriate analyses and recommendations to the appropriate 

strategic-, tactical- or execution-level organization for resolution of conflicts. However, if 

such conflict only has impacts within a single manned base element and only impacts 

users of the [35] provider of that element, the partner providing that manned base element will be responsible for resolving such conflicts in accordance with the content of the 

COUP; conflicts related to proposed polar platform utilization will be resolved as provided in Article 8.3.f.2. 

8.3.k. NASA, ESA and the other partners may at any time barter for, sell to one another or enter into other arrangements for any portion of their Space Station allocations, and 

are free to market the use of their allocations individually or collectively, according to the 

procedures established in the Utilization Management Plan. The terms and conditions of 

any barter or sale will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the parties to the transaction. The partner providing allocations will ensure that the obligations it has undertaken 

under this MOU are met. NASA, ESA and the other partners each may retain the revenues 

they derive from such marketing. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 133 

8.3.1. NASA and ESA will make their Space Station-unique ground elements, including 

user support centers, available for use by each other and the other partners in order to 

support fully both the standard and special user integration and operations support 

approved in the CUP and the requirements in the COP. Any special user integration or 

user operations support provided by a partner to users of the other partners or other partners as users will be provided on a reimbursable basis at prices routinely charged comparable users for similar services. 

8.3.m. The International Utilization Coordination Working Group (IUCWG) , established by the Space Station Phase B MOU's, will continue to advise the Parties to this 

MOU in planning for the establishment of the UOP. Once the UOP is established, the 

activities of the IUCWG will end. 

8.4. In order to protect the intellectual property of Space Station users, procedures 

covering all personnel, including Space Station crew, who have access to data will be developed by the MCB. 

8.5. The partners will seek to outfit the NASA-provided Laboratory Module, the ESAprovided APM and the STA-provided JEM to equivalent levels by the end of Space Station 

assembly in Phase C/D. 

Article 9 - Operations Costs Responsihlities 

9.1. The Parties will seek to minimize operations costs for the Space Station. The 

Parties will also seek to minimize the exchange of funds, for example, through the performance of specific operations activities. 

[36] 9.1.a. The costs associated with ESAs providing personnel to undertake integrated 

tactical- and execution-level activities as provided for in Articles 8.2.e, 8.2.g, 8.3.h, and 

8.3.i will be agreed between NASA and ESA and will be a contribution towards the satisfaction of ESA's common system operations costs responsibilities established below. 

9.2. Element operations costs 

9.2.a. NASA and ESAwill each have operational responsibilities for the elements it provides as detailed in Article 8. Such operational responsibilities mean that NASA and ESA 

will each be financially responsible for element operations costs, that is, costs attributed 

to operating and to sustaining the functional performance of the flight elements that it 

provides, such as ground-based maintenance, sustaining engineering, provision of spares, 

launch and return costs for spares, launch and return costs of the fraction of the 

Integrated Logistics System carriers provided for in Article 3.2 that is attributable to 

spares, and also costs attributed to the maintenance and operation of element-unique 

ground centers. 

9.3. Common system operations costs 

9.3.a. Manned Base. Other than the element operations costs covered in Article 9.2.a, 

NASA, ESA and the other partners will equitably share the common system operations 

costs; that is, the costs attributed to the operation of the manned base as a whole. The categories comprising common system operations costs are: integrated tactical planning 

activities performed by the integrated tactical operations organization provided for in 

Article 8.2.e, including user integration planning and maintenance of common documentation; space systems operations (SSCGbased operations, SSCC maintenance and 

common elements of the Software Support Environment) ; POIGbased operations and 

POIC maintenance; Integrated Logistics System operations, including consumables and 

common inventory management activities; prelaunch/post landing processing of logistics 

carriers; launch to orbit and return of consumables, crew and crew logistics, and launch 

and return of the fraction of the Integrated Logistics System carriers provided for in 
134 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Article 3.2 that is attributable to consumables and crew logistics; and transmission of 

housekeeping data between the manned base and the ground (SSCC, POIC and launch 

and landing sites). Each partner will be responsible for a percentage of common system 

operations costs equal to the percentage of Space Station utilization resources allocated 

to it in Article 8.3.a.2. ESA’s responsibility for sharing common system operations costs will 

begin following the assembly and verification of the APM. 

[37] 9.3.b. Platforms. NASA and ESA will each be responsible for the common system 

operations costs for the platforms which they provide. 

9.3.c. Man-Tended Free Flyer. ESA will be responsible for the common system operations costs for the MTFF it provides. 

9.3.d. Any changes to the list of common system operations costs in this Article will be 

made by agreement among the partners. 

9.4. The Parties to this MOU and the other partners will work through the SOP to 

identify the detailed contents to be included in each common system operations cost category. The partners will also, each year, report to the SOP on their forecasts for future 

years for all costs included in the common system operations costs of the manned base 

and on their identified actual annual common system operations costs. The SOP will 

develop detailed procedures for implementing this Article. If possible, after the partners 

have gained experience in the operation of the Space Station, the SOP will endeavor to 

establish a fixed value for the annual common system operations costs. 

9.5. Costs of user activities such as payload/experiment design, development, test and 

evaluation (DDT&E) ; payload ground processing; provision of payload/experiment 

spares and associated equipment; launch and return of payloads/experiments, spares and 

associated equipment; launch and return of the fraction of the Integrated Logistics 

System carriers provided for in Article 3.2 that is attributable to user payloads/experiments, spares and associated equipment; and any special user integration or user operations support, including specialized crew training, will be the responsibility of Space 

Station users of the partners or of individual partners as users. Such costs will not be 

shared among NASA, ESA and the other partners, nor will such costs contribute toward 

the satisfaction of common system operations costs responsibilities. In addition, the 

DDT&E and operations costs of the users’ support centers will not be shared among 

NASA, ESA and the other partners. 

9.6. NASA, ESA and the other partners will not recoup their DDT&E costs for their 

elements from one another in the operation and utilization of the Space Station. 

9.7. In case of failure of any partner to perform its operations responsibilities or to 

provide for its share of common system operations costs, the partners will meet to discuss 

what action should be taken. Such action could result in, for example, an appropriate 

reduction of the failing partner’s rights to its allocations. 

[381 Article 10 - Safety 

10.1. In order to assure safety, NASA has the responsibility, working with the other partners, to establish overall Space Station safety requirements and plans covering Phase C/D 

and Phase E. Such requirements and plans for Phase C/D have been established, and 

development of further safety requirements and plans for Phase C/D and Phase E and 

changes to safety requirements and plans will be processed, according to the procedures 

in Articles 7 and 8. As far as the elements separated from the manned base and their payloads are concerned, NASA has the responsibility to establish and implement overall safety requirements and plans governing the NASA-provided Polar Platform, and ESA has the 

responsibility to establish and implement overall safety requirements and plans governing 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 135 

the ESA-provided Polar Platform and the MTFE The overall Space Station safety requirements and plans will be applicable to the MTFF insofar as it has effects on the manned 

base associated with its servicing at the manned base. STS safety requirements will be 

applicable to the ESA-provided Polar Platform insofar as it has effects on the STS associated with its servicing by the STS. 

10.2. Each partner will develop detailed safety requirements and plans, using its own 

standards where practicable, for its manned base hardware and software that meet or 

exceed the overall Space Station safety requirements and plans. Each partner will have the 

responsibility to implement applicable overall and detailed Space Station safety requirements and plans throughout the lifetime of the program, and to certify that such safety 

requirements and plans have been met with respect to the Space Station manned base elements and payloads it provides. ESA will have the responsibility to certify that the MTFF 

and ESA-provided Polar Platform and their payloads are safe. However, NASA will have 

the overall responsibility to certify that all Space Station manned base elements and payloads are safe, including the MTFF and its payloads insofar as they have effects on the 

manned base associated with their servicing at the manned base. NASA will also have the 

responsibility to certify that the ESA-provided Polar Platform and its payloads are safe 

insofar as they have effects on the STS associated with their servicing by the STS. 

10.3. NASA will conduct system safety reviews which ESA will support. NASA, ESA and 

the other partners will also conduct safety reviews of the elements and payloads they provide; NASA will participate in and support such reviews by the other partners. MOSST will 

also participate in and support safety reviews by the other partners as appropriate related 

to the MOSST-provided elements and MOSST payloads. NASA and MOSST [39] support 

to such safety reviews will include provision of necessary safety-related information to 

enable the other partners to conduct their reviews. Furthermore, status reports on safety 

requirements and plans will be a standard agenda item at the Program Management 

Reviews provided for in Article 7.1.i. The partners will participate as appropriate in any 

Space Station safety review boards established by NASA. 

10.4. NASA will have the responsibility for taking any decision necessary to protect the 

safety of the manned base, including all elements operating in conjunction with the 

manned base, or its crew in an emergency. 

Artick 11 - Space Station Crew 

11.1. ESA has the right to provide personnel to serve as Space Station crew from the 

time that ESA begins to share common system operations costs as provided in Article 

9.3.5. NASA will provide flight opportunities for ESA Space Station crew satisfylng the percentage of the total crew requirement equal to the percentage of manned base utilization 

resources allocated to ESA in Article 8.3.a.2. Flight of ESA Space Station crew will be satisfied over time, not necessarily on each specific crew rotation cycle. The SOP will review 

the implementation of this paragraph on a biennial basis. 

11.2. During assembly and verification, a fully trained ESA crew member will participate in the on-orbit assembly and system verification of the ESA-provided APM and other 

assigned flight element assembly and system verification tasks planned during that onorbit period as provided in the verification plan described in Articles 6.1.a.4. and 6.2.a.3. 

Further, during the first two servicings of the MTFF at the manned base, a fully trained 

ESA crew member will participate in the relevant activities. 

11.3. Space Station crew will meet medical standards and security and suitability 

requirements developed by NASA in consultation with ESA and the other partners regarding Space Station crew qualifications for long-term manned space flight. NASA and ESA 
136 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

will jointly certify that these standards and requirements have been met by the ESA Space 

Station crew. Furthermore, the MCB may establish additional criteria for Space Station 

crew. Following certification, all Space Station crew will enter into an appropriate training 

cycle in order to acquire the skills necessary to conduct Space Station operations and 

utilization. Such training will be conducted in groups, subject to the requirements of different functional specializations. The training will include integrated manned systems 

operations training conducted primarily at NASA centers [40] and element-specific operations training conducted primarily by the partner providing the element at appropriate 

centers of all of the partners. In full consultation with ESA regarding the flight assignments of ESA crew members, NASAwill designate, from among the certified Space Station 

crew, specific crew complements, which include the Space Station Commander, for 

specific crew rotation cycles, consistent with Article 11.1. NASA will designate specific crew 

complements to support payload requirements identified in the COUP. A specific crew 

complementwill be trained as a team in preparation for a specific crew rotation cycle, subject to requirements of different functional specializations. 

11.4. NASA and ESA will be financially responsible for all compensation, medical 

expenses, subsistence costs on Earth, and training for Space Station crew which they provide. Full training for all assigned duties will be required. 

11.5. The Code of Conduct for the Space Station will be developed by NASA, with the 

full involvement of ESA, MOSST and the GOJ, and approved for the Space Station program in accordance with the principles for reaching decisions established in Article 8.1.b. 

It will, inter alia: establish a clear chain of command; set forth standards for work and 

activities in space, and, as appropriate, on the ground; establish responsibilities with 

respect to elements and equipment; set forth disciplinary regulations; establish physical 

and information security guidelines; and provide the Space Station Commander appropriate authority and responsibility, on behalf of all the partners, to enforce safety procedures and physical and information security procedures in or on the Space Station. 

11.6. ESA crew selected for operating the MTFF outside the operational CCZ of the 

manned base are not considered Space Station crew, pursuant to this Article, for the purposes of that activity. 

Article 12 - Transpmtation, Communications 

and Other Non-Space Station Facilities 

12.1. Transportation 

12.1.a. For purposes of design of Space Station elements and payloads, NASAs STS is the 

baseline launch and return transportation system for the Space Station manned base and 

for the NASA-provided Polar Platform. ESA's Space Transportation System is the baseline 

launch transportation system for the MTFF and the ESA-provided Polar Platform. 

12.1.b. NASA will provide reimbursable STS launch services to ESA in connection with 

the assembly of the ESA-provided APM to the manned base and its initial outfitting in 

accordance with the program documentation described in Article 7.1. NASAwill [41] also 

provide reimbursable launch and return services in connection with the logistics requirements of manned base elements. NASA will also provide reimbursable launch and return 

services in connection with the MTFF when it is serviced at the manned base and in connection with manned base users; availability of STS services for such purposes is as provided in Articles 8.3.a.4 and 8.3.c. NASA will also provide reimbursable launch services in 

connection with servicing of the ESA-provided Polar Platform, with details to be agreed 

by NASA and ESA, if appropriate STS capability exists and if ESA selects to use this capability. Reimbursement for such launch services may be in cash or agreed kind. All reim- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 137 

bursable STS services will be provided under launch services agreements. NASA will also 

provide launch and return services in connection with manned base common system 

operations logistics; costs for such services will be shared among the partners as provided 

in Article 9.3. ESA will provide the initial launch of the MTFF and the ESA-provided Polar 

Platform. ESAwill also provide launch and return services in connection with the logistics 

requirements of the MTFF when it is not serviced at the manned base. 

12.l.c. Other government or private sector space transportation systems of partners may 

be used in connection with the Space Station if they are compatible with the Space 

Station. Specifically, ESA will have the right of access to the Space Station manned base 

using the ESA Space Transportation System, including Ariane and Hermes. Recognizing 

that the responsibility for developing these systems and for making them technically and 

operationally compatible with the manned base rests with ESA, NASA will provide to ESA 

that information necessary for ESA to make them compatible. Technical, operational and 

safety requirements for access to the manned base will be controlled in appropriate program documentation as provided for in Articles 7 and 8. 

12.1.d. With respect to financial conditions, NASA and ESA will provide reimbursable 

launch and return services to each other, to the other partners and to each other’s and 

the other partners’ users at prices they routinely charge comparable users. Launch and 

return services related to manned base common system operations logistics will also be 

made available by NASA on the same basis. 

12.1.e. Both NASA and ESAwill use their best efforts to accommodate additional launch 

and return requirements in relation to the Space Station, as well as proposed requirements and flight schedules related to the Space Station activities described above. 

12.1.f. Each partner will respect the proprietary rights in and confidentiality of appropriately marked data and goods to be transported on its space transportation system. 

[42] 12.2. Communications 

12.2.a. Space Station communications will involve space-teground, ground-to-space, 

ground-toground and space-to-space data transmission. The TDRSS space network is the 

baseline communication system for the manned base elements and payloads, as well as for 

the NASA-provided Polar Platform and its payloads. ESAs Data Relay Satellite system 

(EDRS) is the baseline communication system for the ESA-provided Polar Platform and 

the MTFF and their payloads. ESA will be responsible for ensuring communications compatibility of the MTFF with the manned base for proximity operations, docking and servicing and of the ESA-provided Polar Platform with the STS for servicing as applicable. On 

a reimbursable basis, NASA and ESA will use their best efforts to accommodate, with their 

respective communication systems, specific Space Station-related requirements of each 

other and the other partners. With respect to financial conditions, NASA and ESA will 

provide such communication services at prices no higher than those they routinely charge 

comparable customers. Other communication systems may be used on the manned base 

by ESA, the other partners or Space Station users if such communication systems are compatible with the manned base and manned base use of TDRSS. Technical and operational 

requirements related to Space Station communications will be controlled in appropriate 

program documentation as provided for in Articles 7 and 8. 

12.2.b. NASA and ESA will consult regarding the possible future addition of manned 

base capability to accommodate ESA-provided facilities permitting manned base use of 

EDRS, if compatible with the manned base and with manned base use of TDRSS. 

12.2.c. Unless otherwise agreed by NASA and ESA, ground-to-ground transmission of 

polar platform data from one partner to the other partners or the other partners’ users 

will conform to the communications transportation formats, protocols and standards 

agreed to by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS). 
138 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

12.2.d. Partners and users of the partners may implement measures to ensure confidentiality of their utilization data passing through the Space Station Information System and 

other communication systems being used in connection with the Space Station. 

(Notwithstanding the foregoing, data which are necessary to assure safe operations will be 

made available according to procedures in the Utilization Management Plan and their use 

will be restricted to safety purposes only.) Each partner will respect the proprietary rights 

in, and the confidentiality of, the utilization data passing through its communication systems, including its ground network and the communication systems of its contractors, 

when providing communication services to another partner. 

[43] 12.3. Other Non-Space Station Facilities 

12.3.a. Should ESA desire to use the Space Shuttle, Spacelab, or other NASA facilities on 

a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support the development of its Space Station 

Utilization Plan or to support its Space Station detailed design or development activities, 

NASA will use its best efforts to accommodate ESA's proposed requirements and 

schedules. Likewise, should NASA desire to use Ariane, Hermes or other ESA facilities on 

a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support the development of its Space Station 

Utilization Plan or to support its Space Station detailed design or development activities, 

ESA will use its best efforts to accommodate NASA's proposed requirements and 

schedules. 

12.3.b. If NASA and ESA agree that it is appropriate and necessary for the conduct of the 

cooperative program, NASA and ESA will use their good offices in connection with 

attempting to arrange for the use of U.S. and European Governments' or contractors' 

facilities by the Parties and/or their contractors. Such use will be subject to separate 

arrangements between the user and the owner of the facilities. 

Article 13 -Advanced Development Program 

13.1. NASA and ESA each are conducting Space Station advanced development programs in support of their respective detailed design and development activities. 

Cooperation in such advanced development activities will be considered on a case-by-case 

basis and entered into where it is advantageous to both sides and where there are reciprocal opportunities. 

13.2. ESA proposals to use NASA advanced development test beds or other NASA facilities in support of ESA's Space Station advanced development program will be considered 

on a case-by-case basis either on a cooperative or reimbursable basis. Likewise, NASA proposals to use ESA's facilities in support of NASA's Space Station advanced development 

program will be considered on a case-by-case basis either on a cooperative or reimbursable 

basis. 

13.3. Should ESA desire to use the Space Shuttle or Spacelab on a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support ESA Space Station advanced development activities, NASA will 

use its best efforts to accommodate ESA's proposed requirements and flight schedules. 

Likewise, should NASA desire to use ESA launch vehicles on a cooperative or reimbursable basis to support NASA Space Station advanced development activities, ESA will 

use its best efforts to accommodate NASA's proposed requirements and flight schedules. 

[441 

14.1. The partners intend that the Space Station will evolve through the addition of 

capability and will strive to maximize the likelihood that such evolution will be effected 

through contributions from all the partners. To this end, it will be the object of the Parties 

Article 14 - Spaa Station Evolution 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 139 

to provide, where appropriate, the opportunity to the other partners to cooperate in their 

respective proposals for additions of evolutionary capability. The Space Station together 

with its additions of evolutionary capability will remain a civil station, and its operation 

and utilization will be for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law. 

14.2. This MOU sets forth rights and obligations concerning only the elements listed 

in Article 3, except that this Article and Article 16 of the Intergovernmental Agreement 

will apply to any additions of evolutionary capability. As such, this MOU does not commit 

either Party to participate in, or grant either Party rights in, the addition of evolutionary 

capability. 

14.3. NASA and ESA agree to study evolution concepts for the Space Station during 

Phase C/D and Phase E. NASA will be responsible for development of overall manned 

base evolution concepts, in consultation with ESA and the other partners, and for integrating ESAs and the other partners’ evolution concepts into an overall manned base 

evolution plan. ESA will be responsible for development and decision on subsequent 

implementation of evolution concepts for the ESA-provided Polar Platform and for the 

MTFF insofar as they have no technical or operational impacts on the STS or the manned 

base, in accordance with Articles 14.6 and 14.7. 

14.4. NASA, ESA, and the other partners will participate in an International Evolution 

Working Group (IEWG) to coordinate their respective evolution studies and to consider 

overall Space Station evolution concepts and planning activities. 

14.5. The MCB will review specific evolutionary capabilities proposed by any partner, 

assess the impacts of those plans on the other partners’ elements and on the manned 

base, and review recommendation for minimizing potential impacts on Space Station 

activity during the addition of evolutionary capabilities. 

14.6. Following the review and assessment provided for in Article 14.5, and consistent 

with the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, cooperation between or among 

partners regarding the sharing of addition (s) of evolutionary capability will require either 

amendment of the relevant NASA-ESA, NASA-GOJ and NASA-MOSST MOU’s or a separate agreement to which, to the extent that such addition is on the manned base or has a 

technical or operational impact on the STS or the manned base, NASA is a party to ensure 

that such addition is [45] consistent with NASA’s overall programmatic responsibilities as 

detailed in this MOU. 

14.7. Following the review and assessment provided for in Article 14.5, and consistent 

with the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the addition of evolutionary 

capability by one partner will require prior notification of the other partners, and, to the 

extent that such addition is on the manned base or has a technical or operational impact 

on the STS or the manned base, an agreement with NASA to ensure that such addition is 

consistent with NASA’s overall programmatic responsibilities as detailed in this MOU. 

14.8. The addition of evolutionary capability will in no event alter the rights and obligations of either Party to this MOU concerning the elements listed in Article 3, unless otherwise agreed by the affected Party. 

Article 15 - Cross-Waiver of Liability: Exchange of Data and Goods; 

Treatment ofData and Goods in Transit; Customs and Immigration; 

Intellectual Property; Criminal Jurisdiction 

The Parties note that, with respect to the cross-waiver of liability, exchange of data and 

goods, treatment of data and goods in transit, customs and immigration, intellectual 

property and criminal jurisdiction, the relevant provisions of the Intergovernmental 

Agreement apply. 
140 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Article 16 - Financial Arrangements 

16.1. Each Party will bear the costs of fulfilling its responsibilities, including but not 

limited to costs of compensation, travel and subsistence of its own personnel and transportation of all equipment and other items for which it is responsible under this MOU. 

However, as provided in Article 9.3, the partners will equitably share common system 

operations costs. 

16.2. The ability of each Party to carry out its obligations is subject to its funding procedures and the availability of appropriated funds. 

16.3. In the event that funding problems are arising that may affect a partner’s ability 

to fulfill its responsibilities under this MOU, that partner will promptly notify and consult 

with the other partners. Further, the Parties undertake to grant high priority to their 

Space Station programs in developing their budgetary plans. 

[461 

16.4. The Parties will seek to minimize the exchange of funds while carrying out their 

respective responsibilities in this cooperative program, including, if they agree, through 

the use of barter, that is, the provision of goods or services. 

Article 17 - Public Infmtaon 

17.1. NASA and ESA will be responsible for the development of an agreed Public 

Affairs Plan that will specify guidelines for NASA/ESA cooperative public affairs activities 

during the detailed design, development, operation and utilization of the Space Station. 

17.2. Within the Public Affairs Plan guidelines, both NASA and ESA will retain the 

right to release public information on their respective portions of the program. NASA and 

ESA will undertake to coordinate with each other, and, as appropriate, with the other partners, in advance concerning public information activities which relate to each other’s 

responsibilities or performance in the Space Station program. 

Article 18 - Consultation and Settlement of Disputes 

18.1. The Parties agree to consult with each other and with the other partners 

promptly when events occur or matters arise which may occasion a question of interpretation or implementation of the terms of this MOU. 

18.2. In the case of a question of interpretation or implementation of the terms of 

this MOU, such question will be first referred to the NASA Associate Administrator for 

Space Station and the ESA Director of Space Station and Platforms for settlement. The 

Parties recognize that in the case of a question concerning the commitments made in this 

MOU to STA and/or MOSST, the consultations will be broadened so as to include the STA 

Director General of the Research and Development Bureau and/or the MOSST Deputy 

Secretary, Space Policy Sector. 

18.3. Any question of interpretation or implementation of the terms of this MOU 

which has not been settled in accordance with Article 18.2 will be referred to the NASA 

Administrator and the ESA Director General for settlement. The Parties recognize that in 

case of a question concerning the commitments made in this MOU to STA and/or 

MOSST, the matter will also be referred to the Minister of State for Science and 

Technology of Japan and/or the Secretary of MOSST. 

18.4. Any issues arising out of this MOU not satisfactorily settled through consultation, 

pursuant to this Article may be [47] pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions 

of the Intergovernmental Agreement. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 141 

18.5. Unless otherwise agreed between NASA and ESA, implementation of decisions 

made pursuant to mechanisms provided for in this MOU will not be held in abeyance 

pending settlement of issues under this Article. 

Article I9 - Entry into Force 

19.1. ’ Pursuant to the Arrangement Concerning Application of the Space Station 

Intergovernmental Agreement Pending its Entry into Force, which became effective on 

September 29, 1988, this MOU will enter into force after signature of both the NASA 

Administrator or his designee and the ESA Director General or his designee, upon written notification by each Party to the other that all procedures necessary for its entry into 

force have been completed. 

19.2. Pending the entry into force of the Intergovernmental Agreement between the 

United States and the European Partner in accordance with Article 25 of that Agreement, 

the Parties agree to abide by the relevant terms of that Agreement. 

19.3. If the United States or the European Partner withdraws from the Arrangement 

Concerning Application of the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement Pending its 

Entry into Force, the corresponding Cooperating Agency will be deemed to have withdrawn from this MOU effective from the same date. 

19.4. If, by December 31, 1992, the Intergovernmental Agreement has not yet entered 

into force between the United States and the European Partner in accordance with Article 

25 of that Agreement, the Parties will consider what steps are necessary and appropriate 

to take account of that circumstance. 

19.5. If the United States or the European Partner gives notice of withdrawal from the 

Intergovernmental Agreement in accordance with Article 21 of that Agreement, the corresponding Cooperating Agency will be deemed to have withdrawn from this MOU effective from the same date. 

Article 20 - MOU Amendments 

This MOU may be amended at any time by written agreement of the Parties. Any 

amendment must be consistent with the Intergovernmental Agreement. To the extent 

that a provision of this MOU creates specific rights or obligations accepted by another 

partner, that provision may be amended only with the written consent of that partner. 

[481 Article 21 - Review 

Upon the request of either Party, the Parties will meet for the purpose of reviewing 

and promoting cooperation in the Space Station. In the process of this review, the Parties 

may consider amendments to this MOU. 

Article 22 -Definitions and Explanations 

22.1. In addition to the definitions specified in the Intergovernmental Agreement, the 

following definitions will apply to this MOU: 

“international Space Station complex,” also “Space Station,” means the collection 

of elements listed in Article 3; 

“manned base” means Space Station flight elements excluding the polar platforms and the MTFF; 

“Parties” means NASA and ESA; 

“partners” means NASA, ESA, STA and MOSST. 
142 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

22.2. Explanation of the following terms may be found in this MOU in the Articles 

noted: 

“Accommodations” - Article 8.1.d 

“Command and Control Zone (CCZ)” -Article 8.1.a 

“Common system operations costs” -Article 9.3 

“Composite Operations Plan (COP)” - Article 8.2.d 

“Composite Utilization Plan (CUP)” - Article 8.3.f 

“Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan (COUP)” -Article 8.l.c 

“Flight elements” -Article 3 

“Increment Plan (IP)” -Article 8.2.f 

“Infrastructure” -Article 8.1.b 

“Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB)” - Article 8.1 .b 

“Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) 

- ” - Article 8.3.i 

“Program Coordination Committee (PCC)” Article 7.1 .b 

“Resources” - Article 8.1.d and Article 8.3.a.4 

“Space Station Control Board (SSCB)” - Article 7.1.d 

“Space Station Control Center (SSCC)” -Article 8.2.g 

“Space Station-unique ground elements” -Article 3 

“System Operations Panel (SOP)” -Article 8.2.a and Article 8.2.b 

“Tactical Operations Plan (TOP)” - Article 8.2.f 

“User Operations Panel (UOP)” - Article 8.3.d 

[49] DONE at Washington, this 29th day of September, 1988, in two originals in the 

English, French, German and Italian languages, each version being equally authentic. 

[50] FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EUROPEAN SPACE 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND AGENCY: 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

POUR L‘ADMINISTRATION NATIONALE POUR L‘AGENCE SPATIALE 

DE L‘AERONAUTIQUE ET DE EUROPEENNE: 

L‘ESPACE DES ETATS UNIS: 

mR DEI NATIONALE LUFT UND FOR DEI EUROPAISE 

RAUMFAHRTORGANISATION DER WELTRAUMORGANISATION: 

VEREINIGTEN STAATEN: 

PER L‘AMMINISTRAZIONE PER L‘AGENZIA SPAZIALE 

NAZIONALE PER L‘AERONAUTICA EUROPEA: 

STAT1 UNITI: 

signed by Dale D. Myers signed by Reimar Leust 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 143 

Document 1-36 

Document title: “Draft Proposals for US-USSR Space Cooperation,” April 4,1961. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

President John l? Kennedy called for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in his January 20, 1961, inaugural address and his first State of the Union address a fm days latex To examine the possibilities for 

such cooperation, presidential science advisor Jerom Wiesner set up both an external advisory group 

and an internal government study group. A number of draf? of a white paper on the topic were prepared. As the whitepaper was nearing completion, the Soviet Union launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit 

on Ap’lI2, 1961. A fm days latq President Kennedy decided that he had to compete-not cooperate-in space, and the white paper was temporarily set aside. 

April 4, 1961 

Draft Proposals for US-USSR Space Cooperation 

OBJECTAES 

The objectives are to confirm concretely the U.S. preference for a cooperative rather 

than competitive approach to space exploration, to contribute to reduction of cold war 

tensions by demonstrating the possibility of cooperative enterprise between the U.S. and 

the USSR in a field of major public concern, and to achieve the substantive advantages of 

cooperation that in major projects would impose more of a strain on economic and manpower resources if carried out unilaterally. 

GUWELJNES 

The proposals seek to (a) maximize acceptability by the USSR, and (b) minimize the 

potential for misunderstanding and obstructionism which must be recognized to exist in 

any joint program with the Soviet Union. The proposals therefore have, in general, the 

following character: 

(1) Valid scientific objectives. 

(2) Comparable contributions by U.S. and USSR. 

(3) Technical and economic feasibility for US. portion. 

(4) Minimal interference with ongoing U.S. programs. 

(5) Minimal grounds for Soviet suspicions of U.S. motives (success, surveillance, etc.) 

(6) Opportunities for third-nation participation at appropriate time. 

The proposals fall into three categories: 

(a) The employment of existing or easily attainable ground facilities for exchange of 

information and services in support of orbiting experiments. 

(b) The coordination of independently-launched satellite experiments so as to 

achieve simultaneous but complementary coverage of agreed phenomena. 

[2] (c) Coordination of or cooperation in ambitious projects for the manned exploration 

of the moon and the unmanned exploration of the planets. 

The three categories of proposals are advanced in order to offer the Soviet Union a 

wide range of choice and avoid the appearance of “pushing” a pre-selected objective. 

While the costs are estimated by NASA to range from relatively insignificant levels in 

Category (a) to $15-20 million in Category (b) and, very roughly, $10 billion in Category 
144 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

(c), it may be assumed that the Soviet Union as well as ourselves is likely to pursue the 

more costly programs in any event. 

Such cooperation as is discussed here should be proposed and carried out on the 

basis of an expanding U.S. program of space science and exploration, and without prejudice to continuing joint enterprise with and assistance to the free world. 

PROCEDURE 

Overtures should be made at Governmental levels, inviting the USSR to engage in 

cooperative enterprise such as the proposals below. Soviet counter-suggestions of areas of 

cooperation would also be invited. The initial discussions would seek a go-ahead for 

exploratory technical talks preliminary to agreements in principle. Privacy in all such discussions would appear to enhance the chances of success. Technical advice should be 

available at all times. 

[3] PROPOSALS 

Category (a) 

These proposals for the most part call for the use of ground facilities for mutual 

service: 

(i) The U.S. and the USSR might agree to provide ground-based support on a reciprocal basis for space experiments, e.g., 

- When either nation launches a satellite or probe carrying a magnetometer experiment, the other would collect rapid-run magnetograms at its ground observatories. (A Soviet scientist has recently promised to do this in connection with the 

U.S. P-14 probe, following a private request.) 

When either nation launches a meteorological satellite, the other would carry out 

routine and special (airborne, balloon-borne, all-sky camera) weather observations synchronized with the passes of the satellite, analyze the data from both 

sources, and participate in scientific exchanges of the results. 

Similar arrangements would be useful in connection with ionospheric, auroral, 

and other geophysical researches. 

- 

(ii) The U.S. and the USSR could agree to record telemetry from each other’s satellites, exchanging the resulting tapes as requested. Each would furnish the necessary 

orbital information and telemetry calibrations to the other. This would be of particular 

value in sun-related experiments and could extend to the exchange of command signals 

to permit the best-situated nation to energize a given experiment under certain conditions of solar activity. 

(iii) In the communications field, the USSR may wish to employ a ground facility for 

long-distance experimental transmission of voice or TV signals by means of communications satellites to be launched by NASA after mid-1962 (Projects Relay/Rebound). Such 

facilities are being prepared also by the U.K. and France. Transmissions may be effected 

between the latter and the USSR (by means of a U.S. satellite) as usefully as between the 

U.S. and the USSR. (If supphtary equipment peculiar to such experimental testing in 

this case is required by the USSR, NASA could provide it at costs ranging up to $2 million.) 

[4] The exchanges proposals in (a) have been sought, almost with complete unsuccess, at 

government agency and scientific society levels since the beginning of the IGY They are 

included because of their inherent desirability and because a somewhat greater chance of 

acceptance may follow if initiated at higher levels. (The programs in Categories (b) and 

(c) have not yet been proposed to the Soviet Union.) 

- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 145 

The proposals made in Category (a) are for coordinated rather than interd@endent 

efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associated with the latter type of 

cooperation with the USSR. 

[51 Category (b) 

(i) Weather satellites promise broad near-future benefits to the peoples of the world. 

Equal participation by the US. and the USSR in coordinated launching of experimental 

satellites capable of providing typhoon warnings, etc., would have great impact.* 

One specific proposal is that the U.S. and the USSR each place in polar orbit a meteorological satellite to record cloud-cover and radiation-balance data, such that - 

- The two satellites have reasonably overlapping lifetimes (at least three months). 

The satellites orbit in planes at right angles to each other, providing at least sixhour coverage of the earth. 

The data characteristics permit reception and analysis interchangeably, if possible. 

Each country may receive telemetry from the other’s satellite through continuous 

readout if power sources permit or by command if otherwise. 

Camera resolutions are appropriate only for the objective-photographs of cloud 

cover. 

The results are to be made available to the scientific community (World Data 

Centers and WMO). 

- 

(ii) Coordinated programs including experimental or research satellite launchings in 

other fields than meteorology (e.g., communications) could also be of value. In the field 

of geophysics, for example, there are possibilities for the useful coordination of the orbits 

of contemporaneous satellites so as to obtain measurements under contrasting or complementary conditions. 

(iii) Simultaneous and coordinated rocket launchings from a number of stations covering a wide range of latitudes and longitudes would for the first time provide a global picture of the properties of the atmosphere at a given instant of time, if conducted on a scale 

greater than now done during International Rocket Weeks. 

[6] The first proposal in Category (b) above falls in the meteorological field, in which the 

U.S. appears to lead. While the USSR has not yet done anything in this field, it has on one 

occasion indicated at the highest scientific level that space meteorology is favorably viewed 

as an area for cooperation. A generous time-scale (or offer to provide instrumentation) 

might moderate the negative factor. 

The proposals made in Category (b) are, like those in Category (a), for coordinated 

rather than interdependent efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associated with the latter type of cooperation with the USSR. 

[7] Category (c) 

- 

- 

- 

These proposals related to the exploration of celestial bodies. 

(i) Mars or Venus Programs. 

Planetary investigations are immensely difficult undertakings requiring protracted 

programs of great complexity and variety, progressing through fly-bys, orbiters, hard and 

soft landings, and surface prospecting. The U.S. and the USSR could coordinate their 

independent programs so as to provide for a useful sequencing and, perhaps, sharing of 

experimental missions, with scientific benefits and economics. Full data exchange, guaranteed by provision of telemetry calibrations, should be provided. If cooperation is interrupted, no less is sustained and the programs may proceed independently. 

The U.S. and USSR could, alternatively, enter into a joint program that would mean 

more intimate involvement; such a program would include cooperative development of 

* Broader cooperation in meteorology is possible and desirable. A specific proposal for a major worldwide cooperative meteorological program, in which satellites would be a part, is being developed separately. 
146 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

equipment and sharing of experimental missions, and would point toward eventual joint 

launching of probes. 

(ii) Manned Exploration of Moon. 

The presence of man will immeasurably enhance the scientific investigation of the 

Moon-so critical for understanding the origin of the solar system-by providing the 

resourcefulness, flexibility and opportunity for improvisation available only with man. 

As a first step in non-limited cooperative effort, the U.S. and the USSR would each 

undertake to place a small party (about 3) of men on the moon for scientific purposes and 

return them to earth. 

As in planetary programs, a more extensive cooperative program could also be envisaged in which the U.S. and USSR enter into a joint manned lunar program, including 

cooperative development, planning, and international exploration. 

The proposals made in Category (c), in the lunar and planetary fields, suggest programs for which the USSR has demonstrably greater existing capability. Inclusion of both 

categories in proposals to the USSR may therefore be effective. 

[8] No significant Mars probe capability now exits in the U.S. By 1964, Centaur should 

permit significant fly-bys only, while Saturn C-1 would put about 300 pound payloads in 

orbit after 1964. 

The Mars/Venus program is a long-range one whose cost varies widely with numbers 

of launchings, nature of payloads, and extent of back-up. A balanced program 

(unmanned), including some 15 Venus shots and 8 Mars shots in the next decade, may 

cost in the order of $1 billion. 

Neither country now possesses a capability for a manned lunar project. It will require 

boosters of the order of Saturn C-2 using orbital rendezvous and refueling techniques 

(still to be attempted and perfected) for the upper stages. At least six Saturn C2’s would 

be required for a single mission, plus appropriate back-up. The time-scale is probably a 

decade, during which some 70-80 Saturns would be required for developmental purposes, and the cost is roughly of the order of $10 billion. During the decade, alternative 

vehicle systems may conceivably become available, obviating the difficult rendezvous 

requirement. 

In the suggestions for cooperation given above, it can be seen that the degree of 

involvement between the U.S. and the USSR can in principle be varied from coordination 

of national programs to full cooperation on joint endeavors. 

It is possible to restrict proposals which may be made to the Soviet Union to the level 

of coordination of essentially independent programs. Benefits would derive from joint 

planning and organization of such coordinated efforts. This might have the advantages of 

greater acceptability in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union (where suspicions of U.S. motivations would be present in any case). It may also be more realistic in terms of the technical exchange and access which may be feasible. 

On the other hand, it would be possible to indicate a range of possible relationships 

to the Soviet Union, extending to interdependent programs and leaving it to them to 

select the starting level. 

As we contemplate programs that involve greater degrees of cooperation, we must 

also anticipate certain increased difficulties. These would include the risk that the whole 

program would be lost if one or the other participant withdrew because of political or 

other reasons: the fact that we would have to be prepared to admit Russians to installations such as Cape Canaveral and to show them details of our booster and payload systems 

(of course, the Russians [9] would have to do the same if they agreed to intimate cooperation), and the possibility that Congressional, scientific and public support might also be 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 147 

more difficult because of the very high costs involved, coupled with the potential damage 

to our program if the Soviets became obstructive or withdraw. Positive factors must also be 

considered, of course, such as the impact on U.S./USSR relations growing out of intimate 

cooperation on large and meaningful projects, and the advantages occurring to both 

countries in carrying out space programs utilizing the best of what each has to offer without unnecessary time pressures. 

At any level of relationships, proposals for cooperation in Category (a) have the greatest potential for matching the President’s theme that “Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing those endeavors from the bitter and wasteful 

competition of the Cold War.” The United States considers exploration of the celestial 

bodies, particularly manned space exploration, to be perhaps the most challenging adventure of this century. This venture should be conducted on behalf of the human race and 

the earth as a whole, not on behalf of any single nation. The vigorous and accelerating 

United States space exploration program is proceeding in this spirit. If the Soviet Union 

shares this conception, then planning should be undertaken promptly for cooperative 

manned exploration of the moon and unmanned exploration of Mars and Venus. These 

projects should of course be open to the participation of all interested countries [and 

might come under the auspices of the United Nations]. They could, however, be 

undertaken most constructively only if the United States and the Soviet Union agree on 

objectives and on coordination of their efforts for the most rapid progress and the most 

efficient use of human and natural resources. 

Document 1-37 

Document title: John E Kennedy, to Soviet Union Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, March 7, 

1962. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

From the day he was inaugurated, President John F Kennedy had hoped that the Soviet Union would 

be willing to cooperate with the United States in space exploration and exploitation. Kennedy decided 

in 1961 that he had to compete with the Soviet Union in dramatic space achievemmts, but he still 

hoped that other ureas of space could serve as arenas for cooperation. Nikita Mtrushchev seemed to 

open the door to such cooperation in his February 21, 1962, message to Kennedy, which congratuluted the United States on its first human orbital flight, the Freedom 7 Mercury mission of John 

Glenn. Kennedy replied immediately, telling the Soviet premier that the United States would soon forward spenjic proposals for cooperation. After a rapid review of cooperative possibilities within the US. 

government, Kennedy forwarded this letter on March 7, proposing specific cooperative initiatives to 

the Soviet Union. This letter marked the beginning ofsubstantive cooperation between the two space 

superpowers. 

[ 11 Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On February twenty-second last I wrote you that I was instructing appropriate officers 

of this Government to prepare concrete proposals for immediate projects of common 

action in the exploration of space. I now present such proposals to you. 

The exploration of space is a broad and varied activity and the possibilities for coop 

eration are many. In suggesting the possible first steps which are set out below, I do not 
148 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

intend to limit our mutual consideration of desirable cooperative activities. On the contrary, I will welcome your concrete suggestions along these or other lines. 

1. Perhaps we could render no greater service to mankind through our space programs than by the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system. 

Such a system would be designed to provide global weather data for prompt use by any 

nation. To initiate this service, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union each 

launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations. The two satellites would be placed in near-polar orbits in planes 

approximately perpendicular to each other, thus providing regular coverage of all areas. 

This immensely valuable data would then be disseminated through normal international 

meteorological channels and would make a significant contribution to the research and 

service programs now under study by the World Meteorological Organization in response 

to Resolution 1721 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 

20, 1961. 

2. It would be of great interest to those responsible for the conduct of our respective space programs if they could obtain operational tracking services from each other’s 

territories. Accordingly, I propose that each of our countries establish and operate a radio 

tracking station to provide tracking services to the other, utilizing equipment which we 

would each provide to the other. Thus, the United States would provide the technical 

equipment for a tracking station to be established in the Soviet Union and to be operated by Soviet technicians. The United States would in turn establish and operate a radio 

tracking station utilizing Soviet equipment. Each country would train the other’s technicians in the operation of its equipment, would utilize the station located on its territory 

to provide tracking services to the other, and would afford such access as may be necessary to accommodate modification and maintenance of equipment from time to time. 

[2] 3. In the field of the earth sciences, the precise character of the earth’s magnetic 

field is central to many scientific problems. I propose therefore that we cooperate in mapping the earth’s magnetic field in space by utilizing two satellites, one in a near-earth orbit 

and the second in a more distant orbit. The United States would launch one of these satellites while the Soviet Union would launch the other. The data would be exchanged 

throughout the world scientific community, and opportunity for correlation of supporting data obtained on the ground would be arranged. 

4. In the field of experimental communications by satellite, the United States has 

already undertaken arrangements to test and demonstrate the feasibility of intercontinental transmissions. A number of countries are constructing equipment suitable for participation in such testing. I would welcome the Soviet Union’s joining in this cooperative 

effort which will be a step toward meeting the objective, contained in United Nations 

General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that communications by means of satellites 

should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and 

nondiscriminatory basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has broached the subject of cooperation in this field with Minister Gromyko and that Mr. Gromyko has expressed some 

interest. Our technical representatives might now discuss specific possibilities in this field. 

5. Given our common interest in manned space flights and in insuring [sic] man’s 

ability to survive in space and return safely, I propose that we pool our efforts and 

exchange our knowledge in the field of space medicine, where future research can be pursued in cooperation with scientists from various countries. 

Beyond these specific projects we are prepared now to discuss broader cooperation in 

the still more challenging projects which must be undertaken in the exploration of outer 

space. The tasks are so challenging, the costs so great, and the risk to the brave men who 

engage in space exploration so grave, that we must in all good conscience try every possibility of sharing these tasks and costs and of minimizing these risks. Leaders of the United 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 149 

States space program have developed detailed plans for an orderly sequence of manned 

and unmanned flights for exploration of space and the planets. Out of discussion of these 

plans, and of our own, for undertaking the tasks of this decade would undoubtedly 

emerge possibilities for substantive scientific and technical cooperation in manned and 

unmanned space investigation. Some possibilities are not yet precisely identifiable, but 

should become clear as the space programs of our two countries proceed. 

[3] In the case of others it may be possible to start planning together now. For example, 

we might cooperate in unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, or we might commence now the mutual definition of steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive scientific investigation of the planet Mars or Venus, including consideration of the possible 

utility of manned flight in such programs. When a proper sequence for experiments has 

been determined, we might share responsibility for the necessary projects. All data would 

be made freely available. 

I believe it is both appropriate and desirable that we take full cognizance of the scientific and other contributions which other states the world over might be able to make 

in such programs. As agreements are reached between us on any parts of these or similar 

programs, I propose that we report them to the United Nations Committee on the 

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Committee offers a variety of additional opportunities 

for joint cooperative efforts within the framework of its mandate as sets forth in General 

Assembly Resolutions 1472'(XIV) and 1721 (XVI). 

I am designating technical representatives who will be prepared to meet and discuss 

with your representatives our ideas and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation. In order 

to accomplish this at an early date I suggest that the representatives of our countries, who 

will be coming to New York to take part in the United Nations Outer Space Committee, 

meet privately to discuss the proposals set forth in this letter. 

Sincerely, 

John E Kennedy 

Document 1-38 

Document title: Nikita Khrushchev, to President John E Kennedy, March 20,1962. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Nikita Khrushcheu replied to President Kennedy 5 March 7 letter within two weeks. With his acceptance in principle of the concept of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation, discussions could begin between 

NASA and its Soviet counterparts regarding specijic cooperative undertakings. While the need for 

progress on disarmament was mentioned in the Khrushchev let& it was not made a precondition for 

cooperation. 

[ 13 Dear Mr. President: 

Having carefully familiarized myself with your message of March 7 of this year, I note 

with satisfaction that my communication to you of February 21 containing the proposal 

that our two countries unite their efforts for the conquest of space has met with the necessary understanding on the part of the Government of the United States. 
150 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

In advancing this proposal, we proceeded from the fact that all peoples and all 

mankind are interested in achieving the objective of exploration and peaceful use of outer 

space, and that the enormous scale of this task, as well as the enormous difficulties which 

must be overcome, urgently demand broad unification of the scientific, technical, and 

material capabilities and resources of nations. Now, at a time when the space age is just 

dawning, it is already evident how much men will be called upon to accomplish. If today 

the genius of man has created space ships capable of reaching the surface of the moon 

with great accuracy and of launching the first cosmonauts into orbit around the earth, 

then tomorrow manned spacecraft will be able to race to Mars and Venus, and the farther 

they travel the wider and more immense the prospects will become, for man’s penetration 

into the depths of the universe. 

The greater the number of countries making their contribution to this truly complicated endeavor, which involves great expense, the more swiftly will the conquest of space 

in the interests of all humanity proceed. And this means that equal opportunities should 

be made available for all countries to participate in international cooperation in this field. 

It is precisely this kind of international cooperation that the Soviet Union unswervingly 

advocates, true to its policy of developing and strengthening friendship between peoples. 

As far back as the beginning of 1958 the Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of 

a broad international agreement on cooperation in the field of the study and peaceful use 

of outer space and took the initiative in raising this question for examination by the 

United Nations. In 1961, immediately after the first space flight by man had been achieved 

in the Soviet Union, we reaffirmed our readiness to cooperate and unite our efforts with 

those of other countries, and most of all with your country, which was then making preparations for similar flights. My message to you of February 21, 1962 was dictated by these 

same aspirations and directed toward this same purpose. 

[2] The Soviet Government considers and has always considered the successes of our 

country in the field of space exploration as achievements not only of the Soviet people but 

of all mankind. The Soviet Union is taking practical steps to the end that the fruits of the 

labor of Soviet scientists shall become the property of all countries. We widely publish 

notification of all launchings of satellites, space ships and space rockets, reporting all data 

pertaining to the orbit of flight, weight of space devices launched, radio frequencies, etc. 

Soviet scientists have established fruitful professional contact with their foreign colleagues, including scientists of your country, in such international organizations as the 

Committee of Outer Space Research and the International Astronautical Federation. 

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the necessity is now generally recognized for further practical steps in the noble cause of developing international cooperation in space 

research for peaceful purposes. Your message shows that the direction of your thoughts 

does not differ in essence from what we conceive to be practical measures in the field of 

such cooperation. What, then, should be our starting point? 

In this connection I should like to name several problems of research and peaceful use 

of space, for whose solution it would in our opinion be important to unite the efforts of 

nations. Some of them, which are encompassed by the recent U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted at the initiative of our two countries, are also mentioned in your message. 

1. Scientists consider that the use of artificial earth satellites for the creation of 

international systems of long-distance communication is entirely realistic at the present 

stage of space research. Realization of such projects can lead to a significant improvement 

in the means of communication and television all over the globe. People would be provided with a reliable means of communication and hitherto unknown opportunities for 

broadening contacts between nations would be opened. So let us begin by specifjmg the 

definite opportunities for cooperation in solving this problem. As I understood from your 

message, the U.S.A. is also prepared to do this. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 151 

2. It is difficult to overestimate the advantage that people would derive from the 

organization of a world-wide weather observation service using artificial earth satellites. 

Precise and timely weather prediction would be still another important step on the path 

to man’s subjugation of the forces of nature; it would permit him to combat more successfully the [3] calamities of the elements and would give new prospects for advancing 

the well-being of mankind. Let us also cooperate in this field. 

3. It seems to us that it would be expedient to agree upon organizing the observation of objects launched in the direction of the moon, Mars, Venus, and other planets of 

the solar system, by radio-technical and optical means, through a joint program. 

As our scientists see it, undoubted advantage would be gained by uniting the efforts 

of nations for the purpose of hastening scientific progress in the study of the physics of 

interplanetary space and heaven [ly] bodies. 

4. At the present stage of man’s penetration into space, it would be most desirable 

to draw up and conclude an international agreement providing for aid in searching for 

and rescuing space ships, satellites and capsules that have accidentally fallen. Such an 

agreement appears all the more necessary, since it might involve saving the lives of cosmonauts, those courageous explorers of the far reaches of the universe. 

5. Your message contains proposals for cooperation between our countries in compiling charts of the earth’s magnetic field in outer space by means of satellites, and also 

for exchanging knowledge in the field of space medicine. I can say that Soviet scientists 

are prepared to cooperate in this and to exchange data regarding such questions with scientists of other countries. 

6. I think, Mr. President, that the time has also come for our two countries, which 

have advanced further than others in space research, to try to find a common approach 

to the solution of the important legal problem with which life itself has confronted the 

nations in the space age. In this connection I find it a positive fact that at the UN General 

Assembly’s 16th session the Soviet Union and the United States were able to agree upon 

a proposal on the first principles of space law which was then unanimously approved by 

the members of the UN: a proposal on the applicability of international law, including the 

UN charter, in outer space and on heavenly bodies; on the accessibility of outer space and 

heavenly bodies for research and use by all nations in accordance with international law; 

and on the fact that space is not subject to appropriation by nations. 

Now, in our opinion, it is necessary to go further. 

[4] Expansion of space research being carried out by nations definitely makes it necessary 

to agree also that in conducting experiments in outer space no one should create obstacles for space study and research for peaceful purposes by other nations. Perhaps it should 

be stipulated that those experiments in space that might complicate space research by 

other countries should be the subject of preliminary discussion and agreement on an 

appropriate international basis. 

I have named, Mr. President, only some of the questions whose solution has, in our 

view, now become urgent and requires cooperation between our countries. In the future, 

international cooperation in the conquest of space will undoubtedly extend to ever newer 

fields of space exploration if we can now lay a firm foundation for it. We hope that scientists of the USSR and the U.S.A. will be able to engage in working out and realizing the 

many projects for the conquest of outer space hand in hand, and together with scientists 

of other countries. 

Representatives of the USSR on the UN Space Committee will be given instructions 

to meet with representatives of the United States in order to discuss concrete questions of 

cooperation in research and peaceful use of outer space that are of interest to our countries. 
152 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Thus, Mr. President, do we conceive of-shall we say-heavenly matters. We sincerely 

desire that the establishment of cooperation in the field of peaceful use of outer space 

facilitate the improvement of relations between our countries, the easing of international 

tension and the creation of a favorable situation for the peaceful settlement of urgent 

problems here on our own earth. 

At the same time it appears obvious to me that the scale of our cooperation in the 

peaceful conquest of space, as well as the choice of the lines along which such cooperation would seem possible is to a certain extent related to the solution of the disarmament 

problem. Until an agreement in general and complete disarmament is achieved, both our 

countries will, nevertheless, be limited in their abilities to cooperate in the field of peaceful use of outer space. It is no secret that rockets for military purposes and spacecraft 

launched for peaceful purposes are based on common scientific and technical achievements. It is true that there are some distinctions here; space rockets require more powerful engines, since by this means they carry greater payloads and attain a higher altitude, 

while military rockets in general do not require such powerful engines-engines already 

in existence can carry warheads of great destructive force and assure their arrival at any 

point, on the globe. 

[5] However, both you and we know, Mr. President, that the principles for designing and 

producing military rockets and space rockets are the same. 

I am expressing these considerations for the simple reason that it would be better if 

we saw all sides of the question realistically. We should try to overcome any obstacles which 

may arise in the path of international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space. It is 

possible that we shall succeed in doing this, and that will be useful. Considerably broader 

prospects for cooperation and uniting our scientific-technological achievements, up to 

and including joint construction of spacecraft for reaching other planets-the moon, 

Venus, Mars-will arise when agreement on disarmament has been achieved. 

We hope that agreement on general and complete disarmament will be achieved; we 

are exerting and will continue to exert every effort toward this end. I should like to believe 

that you also, Mr. President, will spare no effort in acting along these lines. 

Yours respectfully, 

N. Khrushchev 

Moscow, March 20, 1962 

Document 1-39 

Document title: “Record of the US-USSR Talks on Space Cooperation,” March 27,28, and 

30, 1962, with attached Arnold W. Frutkiin, Director, Office of International Programs, 

NASA, “Topical Summary of Bilateral Discussions With Soviet Union,” May 1, 1962. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Following up on the exchange of letters between John Kennedy and Nikita Khwshchew, both the 

United States and the Soviet Union appointed delegations to begin discussions on space cooperation 

possibilities. NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden headed the US. delegation, while 

Professor Anatoli A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Science led the Soviet delegation. This 

document records theirfirst three days of meetings, which laid the foundation for more formal negotiations a few months lata 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 153 

Record of the US-USSR Talks on Space Cooperation 

Held in New York City 

on March 27,28 and 30,1962 

First Meeting - March 2 7 

Participants: United States USSR 

Dr. Hugh Dryden Prof. A. A. Blagonravov 

Dr. John W. Townsend Mr. Y. A. Barinov 

Dr. Donald F. Hornig Mr. Roland H. Timerbaev 

Mr. Lewis Bowden Mr. Valentin A. Zaitzev 

Mr. Peter Thacher Mr. G. S. Strashevsky 

(Interpreter) 

The first in a series of bilateral conversations between the US and the USSR was held 

March 27 at USUN [United Nations]. It was agreed at the outset by Dryden and 

Blagonravov that these were preliminary, informal talks designed to prepare the basis for 

further, formal negotiations between US and Soviet experts to discuss specific areas of 

practical cooperation in outer space as suggested in the exchange of correspondence 

between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. Blagonravov stressed the need for initial cooperation in practical fields, such as weather satellites and communication systems, 

which would be meaningful to the man in the street. They agreed to take up the subject 

of meteorological satellites at the outset. 

Meteorological Satellites. Dryden suggested that the US and the USSR put up meteorological satellites in complimentary [sic] orbits. The US TIROS satellite was a relatively 

crude, experimental craft, and we had in mind making NIMBUS the basis of our contribution to an operational system. The first launching of NIMBUS would be within a year. 

It would be stabilized as to scan the earth continuously from a polar orbit, and we had in 

mind equipment which would permit transmittal of data direct to any nation’s ground 

station, including pictures of overhead cloud cover. We would in addition, of course, transmit information to WMO [the World Meteorological Organization]. 

[2] Blagonravov made what appeared to be a general statement to the effect that cooperation must develop stage by stage; he noted that launch systems were closely related to 

other aspects (military); therefore the achievement of broadest cooperation will be 

related to progress in disarmament. Conversely, progress in cooperation will aid the development of mutual trust between nations. 

Turning to the meteorological project, the USSR will transmit to the US all data they 

receive from NIMBUS. They expect to launch their own meteorological satellite and are 

prepared to come to an agreement on coordination of orbits. They will transmit all meteorological data from their own system to other countries. He noted that speedy transmittal of data is essential. 

Dryden commented that he had in mind the problem of access to launch sites and 

therefore was proposing only coordination; in any case, we will not seek information the 

Soviets do not wish to give. He noted that the recent Soviet launch, which was first in a 

new series, was said to include devices for measurement of cloud coverage. 
154 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Blagonravov said that they intend to launch meteorological satellites on a national 

basis and to exchange data. He had in mind that WMO would insure [sic] the proper 

transmittal of information to other countries. 

Dryden questioned what the next step might be. Should there be a meeting of both 

sides’ experts at the time of the coming COSPAR [Committee on Space Research] 

Conference in Washington, or should the problem be left to WMO? Blagonravov said the 

best way would be to continue through WMO. He drew attention to an April 23 symposium scheduled for Washington. Dryden asked if there should be private meetings 

between US and Soviet experts at that time. Blagonravov said this particular symposium 

will not attract experts in the field of satellite weather forecasting, but nonetheless the 

experts present could explore the problem in a preliminary way. 

Dryden noted that the SYG of WMO has obtained the presence of two US and Soviet 

meteorological experts in Geneva to help with the preparation of WMO’s report on this 

subject. Blagonravov said he had no information about the details of their discussion and 

was unable to judge the results. 

[3] Dr. Hornig commented that success in this field will depend in large part on the compatibility of information sought and obtained. He asked if we could discuss this aspect 

with a view to standardizing equipment in satellites. Blagonravov preferred to leave the job 

of determining technical requirements to WMO experts. 

Communications Satellites. Blagonravov said they are ready to take part in studies of 

principles and of design plans for a system which should be organized through ITU [the 

International Telecommunications Union]. They are ready to take part in experimental 

projects, and they are ready to supply information to the US on radio signals bounced off 

ECHO. He thought the time had come to make a “symbolic start” in this field. 

Dryden noted that ECHO has become smaller, and the surface is considerably wrinkled; it is therefore less satisfactory for radio relay purposes. We plan to launch within a 

year a large, 140-foot sphere which will be more rigid and therefore more suitable. 

Blagonravov indicated that they were agreeable to using the larger sphere. 

Dryden suggested the USSR might wish to join experiments with active relays. 

Blagonravov said they lack experience. Dryden said we also lack experience but noted that 

several European states are building ground stations for this purpose and suggested that 

the USSR might also. Blagonravov noted that active relays require extensive equipment 

somewhat like the enormous receivers that the USSR is now building for deep space 

probes, such as to Venus. Dryden suggested it might be possible to modify some of these 

large dishes so that they could receive signals from active-relay satellites. Blagonravov said 

they would prefer to leave it up to ITU experts to organize cooperation in this field. 

Townsend noted this would be difficult for ITU because the problem is one essentially of 

equipment, a subject ITU does not normally handle. 

Dryden felt the subject needed further bilateral discussions between experts. He noted 

that CCIR has recently been discussing the problem of the sharing of frequencies between 

satellite and ground-based microwave systems. He thought that both countries might coop 

erate in studying this possible source of interference, a subject also suitable for [4] bilateral discussion. Blagonravov noted the problem is already under review by ITU. Dryden 

said we do not presently have any active communications satellites; they are at present only 

in a research and development phase which will include one low-altitude launch later this 

year. Blagonravov commented this first experiment may help to clarify the situation. 

Geomagnetic Research. Dryden noted the desirability of coordinating data gathering in 

this field. Blagonravov said he could not yet say when the USSR will be prepared to launch 
EXPLONNG THE UNKNOWN 155 

research vehicles to measure the earth's magnetic field. Their first interest will be the 

measurement of field components; later they will seek to measure the dimension of the 

total field. Nonetheless, the time is now right to organize an exchange of data on geomagnetic measurements. Dryden thought this was already on the agenda of COSPAR and 

wondered if Soviet experts wouid be present at the COSPAR meeting. It was agreed that 

Dryden and Blagonravov would meet with their experts during COSPAR. Townsend asked 

if the USSR had decided which orbit, high or low, they would undertake. Blagonravov 

replied that it does not make much difference; they could do it at any altitude. He noted 

that at a previous COSPAR meeting US experts had suggested that the Soviet Union take 

the high orbits but no decision had been reached. Dryden commented that this suggestion had been in recognition of greater Soviet thrust capabilities. Although not exciting 

for the man in the street, Dryden felt this is a field of great interest to scientists. 

Space Medicine. Dryden announced that the US will publish on April 6 a detailed 

report containing all medical information resulting from the Glenn flight. He said 

Blagonravov and other Soviet scientists would be welcome at the time. On the US side 

many ideas for cooperation in this field are being discussed, such as the establishment of 

an international laboratory, and possible coordination in manned-flight experiments, but 

he suspected that the Soviets might prefer an exchange of information. Blagonravov 

expressed preference for a broad exchange of information. Dr. Hornig noted that much 

background other than from manned-flight space is available; he hoped that the 

exchange would include ground laboratory and animal data. Blagonravov agreed. Dryden 

asked if Blagonravov had considered visits to laboratory facilities. Blagonravov said he had 

not discussed this subject with appropriate Soviet experts before leaving Moscow and, 

therefore. could not answer. 

[5] Salvage and Rescue. Blagonravov raised the problem of insuring [sic] the return of 

astronauts and vehicles from other states. Dryden noted this was largely a legal and political problem, but worth exploring here. Blagonravov said their ideas had not advanced 

beyond general terms. Dryden said it was no question but that the US would use its facilities to aid a Soviet astronaut in difficulty and he hoped the same would be true for 

Americans. Blagonravov stated this would, of course, be so. Dryden asked if the Soviets 

favor some form of international agreement or treaty, of the sort, for example, which govern civil aircraft. Blagonravov felt some means should be found to assure that all UN members agree to the return of capsules. Dryden called on Thacher who suggested that it 

might be appropriate for the UN Outer Space Committee to recommend an appropriate 

resolution for adoption at the next session of the General Assembly. Timerbaev felt he and 

Thacher should discuss this bilaterally in the context of the committee. 

It was agreed that there should be no announcement made to the press concerning 

these talks and that the next meeting would take place on March 28 at the Soviet Mission. 

Second Meeting - March 28 

Participants: United States 

Dr. Dryden 

Dr. Townsend 

USSR 

Prof. Blagonravov 

Mr. Barinov 

Dr. Hornig 

Mr. Frutkin 

Mr. Timerbaev 

Mr. Zaitzev 

Mr. Bowden Mr. Aldoshin 

Dr. Porter 

Mr. Thacher 

Mr. Strashevsky 

(Interpreter) 
156 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The second in a series of USSoviet bilateral discussions about possible cooperation in 

outer space matters was held at the Soviet Mission to the UN during the morning of 

March 28. 

[ 61 Contamination of Space. Blagonravov believed the problem of pollution deserves studying. He had in mind radioactive contamination, bacteriological contamination, interference with radio transmission from the earth to satellites and from satellites to the earth, 

and possible physical interference of the sort many feared would result from Project 

WESTFORD. He commented that there were grounds for fear of interference by the needles on two counts: radio astronomy, and physical damage to other satellites, particularly 

optical equipment. He did not feel it necessary to exclude this type of experiment, rather 

he felt there should be some procedure for preliminary discussion which would analyze 

all possible harmful effects and thereby dispel the fears of interested scientists. Dryden 

noted that in his letter, Khrushchev had placed the subjects of radioactive and bacteriological contaminations primarily in a legal context. He noted that there is broad consultation by the US with interested scientists and, on the international level, through 

COSPAR which is a useful means of bringing about understanding of the scientific aspects 

of experiments. Blagonravov and Dryden agreed that nuclear engines would be needed 

for long distance probes and presented a number of technical problems. Dryden commented these were primarily problems relating to Contamination of the surface of the 

moon and planets, not of intervening space. Porter noted that in Florence he and 

Blagonravov had agreed on three principles: (1) radioactive components should be so 

packaged as to prevent dispersal in case of impact; (2) radioactive materials should be 

chosen with short half-life times; and (3) radioactive materials should be chosen which did 

not occur in nature. Dryden felt there was not much left to discuss about radioactive and 

bacteriological contamination and asked if we should consider the problem of frequency 

allocation. Thacher noted that the UN Committee would probably consider the problem 

of contamination in its technical subcommittee. Porter suggested it might be wise to delegate to COSPAR the task of studying this problem. Dryden felt that the ultimate decision 

must rest with launching states. As to the problem of terminating satellite transmissions, 

he found it hard to make a general rule where so much depends on the precise nature of 

the experiment. For example, it did not seem desirable arbitrarily to exclude experiments 

from which continual transmission could be expected. Blagonravov agreed and said the 

Soviet idea is mainly to stress the importance of preliminary [7] exchanges which can dispel apprehensions whenever they seem likely. Although thankful for information given 

him by Porter about the problem of physical interference by WESTFORD, apprehension 

nonetheless arose and Blagonravov felt it might be necessary to have meetings between 

scientists. Porter invited Blagonravov to express these apprehensions as soon as they arise 

to the National Academy of Sciences. 

Tracking for Deep Space Probes. After Blagonravov appeared to have completed his 

remarks, Dryden noted that in the course of conversation all but one of the general top 

ics suggested in the letters of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had been 

touched upon. The one remaining was Khrushchev’s suggestion which appeared to relate 

to tracking facilities for deep space probes. He turned to Blagonravov. 

Blagonravov said he would prefer to hear Dryden first. Dryden said that President 

Kennedy had suggested an exchange of “tracking stations” but that our interest was more 

in the field of telemetry data rather than in observation of satellite orbits. This is particularly true with regard to those scientific satellites, such as Van Allen’s which broadcast 

continuously and do not store data. He noted that emphasis was placed in Khrushchev’s 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 157 

letter on the need for observation and contact with deep space shots. It seemed logical 

that useful exchange could be found. Dryden commented that to a large extent the technical problem in following a deep space probe relates to the transmitter. Our stations in 

Southern California, Australia and South Africa, for example, are equipped to handle 

only certain frequencies which cannot easily be altered. Therefore, if our receivers were 

to be of help, the satellite transmitter should be at appropriate frequencies. He wondered 

if this presented any technical problems for the Soviets. 

Blagonravov replied there is no problem in tracking US satelIites over the USSR, and 

if the US supplied frequencies the USSR will devote the necessary facilities to track them 

and receive them, and will supply resulting data. Conversely, when the Soviets are interested in receiving data from us they will supply the frequencies and the codes to us. 

[SI Dryden commented this could be done in two ways, either by recording telemetry signals on tape and sending the tape to the launchers, or by supplying the code, in which 

case the recipient could reduce the data for the launchers. Blagonravov asked which 

Dryden preferred. 

Dryden commented we found our own scientists prefer to work out their own results. 

He cited as an example the case of Van Allen and the Japanese scientist who had been 

given the code but whose results were out of line because he had not realized that one of 

the channels was malfunctioning. Blagonravov felt that both ways were possible and that 

the decision would depend on the specifics in each case. Townsend suggested this would 

be a good area for progress. 

Next Steps. Dryden asked where we were to go from here. Blagonravov replied our 

approach may vary from problem to problem. Some, as had been suggested, may be 

appropriate for COSPAR, the general subject of frequency allocation is appropriate for 

ITU; others are appropriate for WMO experts. 

Dryden agreed that discussions ultimately should take place with other states in an 

appropriate international forum. But we felt it more useful to start bilateral talks at the 

time of the COSPAR meeting. For example, it might then be useful to start discussions on 

meteorological satellites and geomagnetic research. So far as the meteorological satellite 

is concerned, he felt it would be wise to distinguish between the research and development phase, and the operational system. He thought talk should start without delay about 

the experimental stage; as a result the two sides could come to an agreement on the type 

of information to be sought. Continuing with the general outline, Dryden suggested there 

might be later discussion in Moscow about such matters as coordination of planetary 

exploration. In the meantime, he thought it would be helpful if we could follow up the 

general discussion of the past days with specific discussions on certain subjects. He asked 

if it would be possible to agree to try to arrange discussions at the time of the COSPAR 

meeting on meteorological satellites and geomagnetic research. 

[9] Blagonravov drew attention to his inability to consult with appropriate experts but 

said he would be prepared to get in touch with Dryden. It would be helpful if Dryden 

could list his ideas as to the priority of subjects which he could take with him to Moscow, 

and later he, Blagonravov, could respond with proposals. Dryden suggested that he could 

prepare plans and meet with Blagonravov again next week. Blagonravov said he would be 

leaving for Moscow this weekend, and it would be desirable to receive a list before that 

time. Dryden suggested we could select a few steps, although we are to respond to all, and 

suggested meeting again on March 30. 

Blagonravov made an evasive reply. Dryden said we therefore would prepare and give 

to Blagonravov on Friday specific proposals for later discussion by the experts during the 

COSPAR meeting in Washington. These proposals would involve meteorological satellites, 
158 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

geomagnetic research and the general area of telemetry. At the same time, we would be 

prepared for later discussions, perhaps in Moscow, regarding communication satellites, 

space medicine, and inter-planetary exploration. 

It was agreed that the next meeting would take on “neutral ground” (at the Soviet’s 

insistence), i.e. at the UN. It was agreed that Thacher and Timerbaev should prepare a 

joint press release for issuance after the following meeting which would respond to the 

desires of both countries for forward movement in the area of US-Soviet cooperation. 

Military Reconnaissance. During the course of general conversation which followed, 

Blagonravov commented that the climate for cooperation would be greatly improved if 

both sides would issue a declaration to the effect that neither would use satellites for the 

purpose of military reconnaissance. Blagonravov expressed himself as certain that Dryden 

was not in a position to comment on this aspect of outer space. Nonetheless, Blagonravov 

hoped that the US Government was as attentive to the opinion of its scientists as was his, 

the Soviet, Government. Before coming to New York, his colleagues had asked him to 

urge his American colleagues to persuade the US Government to issue such a declaration. 

(The translator failed to make clear, as had Blagonravov in Russian, that he had been 

instructed by his Government to raise this matter.) 

[lo1 Third Meeting - March 30 

Participants: United States USSR 

Dr. Dryden Prof. Blagonravov 

Dr. Townsend Mr. Barinov 

Dr. Hornig Mr. Timerbaev 

Mr. Frutkin Mr. Zaitzev 

Mr. Bowden Mr. Strashevsky 

Dr. Porter (Interpreter) 

Mr. Thacher 

The third in a series of US-Soviet bilateral discussions about possible cooperation in 

outer space matters was held at the United Nations Headquarters during the afternoon of 

March 30. 

Dryden presented to Blagonravov the three tentative proposals worked out by the 

American side on collaboration in the fields ofweather satellites, geomagnetic survey, and 

telemetry. Dryden pointed out that these proposals were being handed to the Soviets in 

order that they might study them and be prepared to discuss them in a concrete fashion 

at the April COSPAR meeting and in other forums. Blagonravov, with the aid of his interpreter, scanned the tentative proposals quickly and said that he would take them back to 

Moscow and discuss them with the relevant Soviet specialists. 

While Blagonravov was reading our proposals, Thacher of USUN and Timerbaev of 

the Soviet UN Mission attempted to come to agreement on the wording of the joint statement to be made upon the conclusion of the talks that day. The US draft had proposed 

listing the three topics mentioned above since these were the fields in which further concrete talks were planned. Timerbaev insisted that if topics touched on in the three days of 

talks were listed they would necessarily have to include mention of military intelligence 

reconnaissance satellites. Thacher and Timerbaev did not reach an accord on the matter, 

and it was placed before Dryden and Blagonravov. The latter reiterated Timerbaev’s stand 

and Dryden demurred, pointing out that the subject of military reconnaissance satellites 

did not fall within the frame of reference agreed to for the talks. Agreement was finally 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 159 

reached that the statement issued would simply say that the items mentioned in the 

Kennedy and Khrushchev letters respectively had been discussed, as well as additional topics. The problem of listing the specific items touched on was, therefore, obviated. 

Dryden and Blagonravov then met with the press and released their statement.* 

*******e* 

[Attachment page 11 

Topical Summary of Bilateral Discussions 

With Soviet Union 

(Note: For negotiations of March 27,28,30, 1962) 

1. Meteorological Satellites 

Blagonravov indicated that a series of scientific satellites which had just begun with 

the launching of COSMOS I would seek meteorological data, although this was not necessarily true of the first launching in the series. The Soviet Union intends to launch meteorological satellites to photograph cloud cover and would be agreeable to coordinating 

their orbits and other details with the US and to exchange the data. Like the US, the USSR 

would wish to relate any such program to WMO activities and sponsorship. Blagonravov 

said that meteorological satellites should be launched on a national basis with data coordination through WMO. (Subsequent private discussions suggest that the USSR nevertheless recognizes the fundamental necessity of bilateral coordination in flight programs.) 

Dr. Dryden suggested the possibility of using Nimbus as a basis for the joint program in 

about a year. 

2. Communications Satellites 

Khrushchev had given priority to cooperation in the field of communications 

satellites, and Blagonravov indicated that the Soviet Union would desire to take part in 

experimental projects. Nevertheless, he was not yet ready to identify suitable modes of 

cooperation in this field. He said that (Soviet) experience was lacking on active repeaters 

and seemed to feel that a position must be worked out on communications systems in the 

ITU before such could be done. The Soviet interest in communications satellites cooperation actually appeared directed primarily toward operational matters rather than experimental. As a “symbolic” gesture, however, Blagonravov made a point of expressing 

readiness to utilize the US ECHO satellite for a communication demonstration between 

the US and the Soviet Union. (It should be noted that Blagonravov later stated that he did 

not mean, by the use of the word symbolic, that the cooperative use of ECHO would not 

have real value.) The US delegation considered that ECHO had deteriorated too much to 

permit a satisfactory demonstration, and the two sides agreed to look toward the ECHO 

follow-on program for such a demonstration. There was some indication that the Russians 

would wish to utilize a new deep space probe dish, or dishes, which they are now constructing for communications experiments. 

[2] 3. Magnetic Field Survey 

The Soviets would be willing to coordinate with the US in an effort in which each 

country placed a satellite in orbit to measure the Earth’s field. Blagonravov said that the 

Soviets could place a satellite at either of the higher or lower altitudes required for this 

project and could measure the field components as well as strength. It is still undecided 

whether the USSR would devote a special satellite for the program or join the experiment 

* See “Preliminary Summary Report” of these conversations prepared by Dr. Dryden. 
160 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

with others in a multi-purpose satellite. There vas some indication that the Soviets would 

measure the field components as early as, or earlier than, the scalar values. When it was 

suggested that the standards established for the World Magnetic Survey for measurement 

of vectors were quite stringent, Blagonravov said he was not personally familiar with them 

but would make sure that they were brought to the attention of the proper scientists of 

the USSR. 

4. Data Acquisition 

Blagonravov made clear that the Soviet Union was not ready to exchange tracking and 

data acquisition station equipment. Instead, he said that the Soviet Union would make 

available on its own territory equipment to American specifications to provide desired services. Blagonravov did not exclude the possibility of equipment exchange at a later stage. 

Soviet interests were clearly directed more toward deep space tracking and data acquisition than toward the acquisition of telemetry for scientific satellites as desired by the US. 

There was some appearance of the possibility of an agreement for appropriate trade-offs 

here. The question of exchanging telemetry codes along with the exchange of telemetry 

tapes was discussed, and it was agreed that such exchanges would have to be worked cut 

on a case-by-case basis. Dr. Dryden pointed out that there was some difficulty in providing 

calibrations for telemetry, both because of the sensitivities of prime experimenters and 

the empirical requirements for calibration adjustment in the period after satellite launch. 

Dr. Dryden pointed out, in addition, that public errors had been made, as by the 

Japanese, in using calibrations not fully understood by them. With regard to deep space 

probe tracking and telemetry, it appeared that some activity is going on in the Soviet 

Union to strengthen its capabilities. It was also understood that both sides would be 

launching deep space probes at approximately the same periods due to the “window” situation and that therefore each country might be limited in providing services to the 

other. 

[3] 5. Deep Space Activities 

With regard to cooperation in lunar and planetary activities per se, Blagonravov stated that current programs were too far along to permit coordination at this date. The coordination of future progress with respect to physical quantities measured by the probes 

launched by the US and USSR seemed possible. 

6. Space Medicine 

There was relatively little discussion of space medicine. Dr. Dryden suggested this 

might be an appropriate area for broad exchanges. He indicated that some people in this 

country feel it may be useful to exchange laboratory visits. Blagonravov appeared to 

believe that laboratory visits would not be easy to arrange at this stage but rested on a lack 

of information as to the situation in his own country. The matter was left for further definition. 

7. “Pollution” of Space 

Blagonravov expressed concern about several types of possible interference in the 

space activities of one country by reason of the activities of another. In this category, he 

included biological contamination, radio nuisances and interference, and the dispersion 

of particles as in Project WESTFORD. It is not clear whether he had in mind legal prohibitions. Specifically, with regard to Project WESTFORD, Blagonravov indicated fear of 

damage or interference with optical experiments in satellites. It was clear that he did not 

argue to prohibit WESTFORD but rather to provide for preliminary discussion to avoid 

harmful effects. Dr. Dryden reviewed the procedures followed in the US to assure that the 

scientific community has no substantial concerns regarding any proposed experiment, 

referred to the descriptions by a Uet Propulsion Laboratory] representative of our contamination procedures at a recent meeting in the Soviet Union, to continuing consideration by COSPAR of this subject, and to the coordination of radio frequency uses by the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 161 

ITU. The US delegation indicated its belief that the technical aspects were largely for the 

Technical Subcommittee. Dr. Dryden concluded with the observation that each launching country would undoubtedly expect to retain the final judgment over action to be 

taken in any given case of possible or alleged pollution. Blagonravov seemed to be in complete agreement. Dr. Dryden explored Soviet attitude toward the use of nuclear power or 

propulsion sources. Blagonravov agreed that there was no objection to these per se, 

assuming general safeguards. His response to this was so prompt as to reflect current 

Soviet consideration of nuclear propulsion or power sources. 

[4] 8. Spy Satellites 

During the session held at the Soviet UN Mission, Blagonravov brought up, almost 

apologetically, a proposal which he stated he had been “instructed” to raise. He said that 

it would be desirable if the scientists of the US would join with those of the Soviet Union 

in a pledge to reserve space for peaceful purpose and to prohibit the use of satellites for 

surveillance purposes. Blagonravov suggested that Dr. Dryden might not be prepared to 

comment on this. Dr. Dryden replied that the subject was outside the scope of the present 

technical discussions. There was some further discussion in a rather bantering vein about 

this subject with Blagonravov expressing the belief that scientists in his country could not 

devote themselves to non-peaceful purposes in space research. Dr. Dryden observed that 

this was an interesting remark to come from an old artillery observer. The subject was 

raised again by Blagonravov at the end of a subsequent session as an item to be included 

in the joint press release at the end of the first round of discussions. It was offered as a 

counterproposal to the US desire to specify the three subjects of greatest [discussion, with 

plans for future talks,] identified in the negotiations. The Soviets wished then to include 

all other subjects, plus the spy-in-the-sky pledge, or, in the alternative, remove the specific references to subjects discussed. The US side held to the position that the press release 

should not go beyond those matters discussed in the letters. The implication left in the 

press release was that the current, as well as fhture, discussions would be based upon the 

matters identified in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. 

9. Balloons 

When the question relating to balloon-borne experiments arose, Blagonravov made 

clear the Soviet dislike for the use of balloons. 

10. Procedures 

It was agreed that the first round of discussions constituted informal exploratory talks 

prior to formal negotiations. Dr. Dryden’s official summary of the opening sessions and 

the text of the press release which terminated them are attached. These indicate that formal negotiations will begin either at the time of the COSPAR meeting in Washington at 

the end of April or at the time of the meeting of the Technical and Legal Subcommittees 

of the UN Outer Space Committee in Geneva at the end of May. Continuity between the 

two separate sessions was assured by (1) leading the Soviet delegation to agree privately to 

the identification of three subjects as most promising for early and [5] more detailed 

investigation, and (2) providing to the USSR somewhat expanded papers on each of these 

three subjects for their study and future comments. It was agreed that Soviet scientists 

would consider these papers and Blagonravov indicated that his side would provide similar papers. It was agreed that the working papers would not be published. It should be 

noted, however, that none of the subjects indicated in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence is excluded from further investigation, although Dr. Dryden indicated that certain aspects might be more appropriate for the Legal Subcommittee of the UN or other 

forms. 

Dr. Dryden specifically asked Blagonravov whether the Soviet view would permit 

agreement on individual cooperative projects as agreement could be reached upon them 
162 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

or whether the Soviets felt it was necessary to achieve a total package before any agreement could be reached. Blagonravov strongly indicated his belief that the first procedure 

should be followed. This may be interpreted as a hopeful sign, particularly in view of the 

fact that this discussion followed immediately upon the heels of Blagonravov’s efforts to 

write a spy-in-the-sky pledge into a final joint press release. The sequence would suggest 

that the Soviets do not at this time mean to impose political preconditions upon cooperative projects of the character discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. 

With regard to locations of meetings, Dr. Dryden indicated readiness to hold a future 

meeting in Moscow, after the Washington or Geneva meeting. The Soviets welcomed this 

since they appear to attachsome value to rotating meetings at among western, neutral and 

Soviet sites. 

11. General 

While political considerations were trotted out by Blagonravov at various times during 

the course of the discussions, they did not appear ever to be raised with the purpose of 

obstructing conversation. Blagonravov repeated Khrushchev’s statement that more ambitious cooperative efforts would have to wait upon disarmament. The spy-in-the-sky pledge 

discussed above was raised with good humor and appeared to have been fitted in outside 

the central framework of the negotiations. In the formulation of the press release, the 

Soviet political offices did ask to reverse the priority of the references to Kennedy and 

Khrushchev, presumably on the basis of Khrushchev’s initiation of their correspondence. 

[6] On several occasions, the junior member of the Soviet delegation Barinov indicated 

he was considerably impressed by the scope and size of the NASA program as reflected in 

the briefings given during the week for the Outer Space Committee at the US Mission. 

At one point, Dr. Dryden described in detail the US working relations with the UK on 

their joint satellite program. Blagonravov stated that he hoped for similar relationships 

between the US and the USSR. 

Arnold W. Frutkin, Director 

Office of International Programs 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration May 1,1962 

Document 1-40 

Document title: McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, July 13, 1962, with 

attached George Ball, Under Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, 

“Bilateral Talks Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities,” July 5, 

1962. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The White House monitored closely the initial U.S.-US.S.R talks on space cooperation to make sure 

that any agremnts reached did not go bond the bounds of politicalfeasibility in the United States. 

McGeorge Bundy was President John E Kennedy ’s Assistant fm National Security Ajfain. With this 

memorandum, he fwwarded to Kennedy the Department of State’s report on the initial talks and 

agreements between NASA’s Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden and Soviet representative Anatoli 

Blagonravov. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 163 

July 13, 1962 

Memorandum for the President 

Here for your approval is a memorandum from George Ball on the results of the 

Dryden and Blagonravov outer space negotiations. At pages three and four it gives recommended procedure from here on out. 

I know you have been concerned lest Dryden make agreements that might come 

under political attack. I believe these three specific projects are quite safe. They have been 

reviewed with a beady eye by CIA and Defense, and they have been reported in detail to 

determined and watchful Congressmen like Tiger Teague, with no criticism. In essence 

they provide for the kind of cooperation in which we get as much as we give, and in which 

neither our advanced techniques nor our cognate reconnaissance capabilities will he compromised. 

McG. B. 

********* 

[Attachment page 13 July 5, 1962 

Memorandum for the President 

Subject: Bilateral Talks Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities 

On May 15 the Secretary wrote to you describing the developments in this matter 

prior to the recent talks in Geneva between Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov. These 

talks commenced on May 29 and continued concurrently with meetings of the subcommittees of the UN Outer Space Committee. As a result, technical arrangements for three 

specific cooperative projects were agreed ad referendum to the US and Soviet 

Governments in a joint memorandum signed by Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov 

on June 8. (See Enclosure 1.) On the same day, Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov 

issued a joint Press Communique summarizing briefly the results of these discussions. 

(See Enclosure 2.) 

The three projects involve (1) exchange of weather data from satellites and the eventual coordinated launching of meteorological satellites, (2) a joint effort to map the magnetic field of the earth by means of coordinated launchings of geomagnetic satellites and 

related ground observations, and (3) cooperation in the experimental relay of communications via the ECHO satellite. It was also agreed that there should be further discussion 

of the possibility of broader cooperation in experiments using active communications 

satellites to be launched in the future. These arrangements are quite limited in [2] scope 

and have been drawn carefully to assure reciprocal benefit. They have been developed in 

the context of multilateral programs (e.g., the program of the World Meteorological 

Organization for the acquisition and world-wide distribution of weather data, and the program being planned by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics for a world 

geomagnetic survey). The Soviets appeared quite anxious to achieve these agreements. 

The arrangements proposed in the joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum represent a sound way of proceeding so long as they are adhered to by the Soviet Government 

and are developed in such a way as not to foster an impression abroad that they represent 
164 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

a more significant step toward USSoviet cooperation than they actually do or that USUSSR cooperation will in any way preempt the cooperation already being developed with 

other countries. 

There remain three other specific projects which were suggested in your exchange of 

correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev last March, but on which no specific conclusions or proposals have been reached during the technical discussions so far, i.e.: (1) the 

acquisition of data obtained through tracking facilities located in each other’s countries 

but operated by the host governments, (2) joint observation of solar and interplanetary 

probes, and (3) space medicine. Although it seems clear that the Soviets are not interested in cooperating in tracking and it appears doubtful that they are really interested in 

joint observation of space probes, it would be well to afford them the opportunity to discuss all these projects further. 

Upon Dr. Dryden’s return from Geneva, Under Secretary McGhee, who is coordinating this matter for the Department, [3] convened a meeting of the interested agencies of 

government in which Dr. Dryden, Dr. Welsh, Dr. Reichelderfer, and representatives of Dr. 

Wiesner, Mr. Bundy, the Defense Department, the Air Force and CIA participated. A 

review of the recent discussions in Geneva and of the specific proposals contained in the 

joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum resulted in agreement to proceed as follows: 

1. After a reasonable interval and if no serious objections have been raised by any of 

the interested agencies, Dr. Dryden will inform Professor Blagonravov that we have no 

changes to suggest in their joint memorandum. (The memorandum provided for a twomonth waiting period during which either party could propose changes.) 

2. Upon notification from Professor Blagonravov that the Soviets do not desire 

changes which would be unacceptable to us (or at the conclusion of the two-month waiting period), we will, assuming the Soviets still wish to proceed, exchange notes with the 

Soviet Government to confirm government-level agreement to these proposals. 

3. It was suggested that when that agreement has been obtained, you may wish to 

write to Chairman Khrushchev noting both the agreement to proceed with the specific 

arrangements at hand and the prospects of further technical discussions on additional 

topics. A draft of such a letter will be submitted for your approval. 

4. Meanwhile, Under Secretary McGhee and Dr. Dryden will report these developments to members of Congress who have a specific interest and responsibility in this field, 

and the Department will prepare a report to be sent to the Secretary General of the 

United Nations when formal agreement has been reached with the Soviets. 

5. Dr. Dryden will, in cooperation with the interested agencies, proceed now to 

arrange nominations for US membership in the joint USSoviet working groups which are 

to [4] develop the detailed implementation of the meteorological and geomagnetic proposals. These working groups will not, however, be activated until formal agreement has 

been reached with the Soviet Government. 

6. The joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL, 

pending government-level agreement by the Soviets or earlier Soviet public release. 

7. After formal agreement has been obtained, Dr. Dryden will arrange directly with 

Professor Blagonravov for further technical discussions, possibly in Moscow this fall, concerning broader cooperation in communication via satellites and the possibility of coop 

eration in such of the remaining topics dealt with in your exchange of letters with 

Chairman Khrushchev as may seem worthwhile to pursue further. 

It is our feeling that the present low key, stepby-step approach through informal talks 

by scientific representatives continues to be the preferable means of moving toward further cooperation and that we should plan to proceed on this basis after government-level 

agreement has been reached on the specific arrangements already proposed. 

George Ball 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 165 

Document 1-41 

Document title: McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, “Your 11 a.m. 

appointment withJim Webb,” September 18,1963. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The possibility of turning hoject Apollo into a cooperative undertaking with the Soviet Union wm 

under active consideration in NASA and the White House as President John F Kennedy met with 

NASA Administrator James E. Webb on September 15, 1963. The political climate was much dqfment than it had been in 1961, when the President had deciakd to race the Soviet Union to the Moon; 

the high levels of spending for Apollo were coming under criticism in the United States. Kennedy’s 

National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy suggested to the Presiaknt that a cooperative mission was 

desirable, if technically, institutionally, and politically feasible. Two days law in an address to the 

United Nations General Assembly, Kennedy suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union 

take the lead in making thefirst human voyages to the Moon an undertaking of all countries. 

September 18, 1963 

Memorandum for the President 

SUBJECT Your 11 a.m. appointment with Jim Webb 

Webb called me yesterday to comment on three interconnected aspects of the space 

problem that he thinks may be of importance in his talk with you: 

1. Monqr. The space authorization is passed at $5.350 billion, and he expects the 

appropriation to come out at about $5.150 billion. While the estimates are not complete, 

his current guess is that in early ‘64 he will require a supplemental of $400 million ($200 

million requiring authorization and $200 million appropriation only) in order to keep 

our commitment to a lunar landing in the 1960’s. 

2. The Soviets. He reports more forthcoming noises about cooperation from 

Blagonravov in the UN, and I am trying to run down a report in today’s Times (attached) 

that we have rebuffed the Soviets on this. Webb himself is quite open to an exploration of 

possible cooperation with the Soviets and thinks that they might wish to use our big rocket, and offer in exchange the advanced technology which they are likely to get in the 

immediate future. (For example, Webb expects a Soviet landing of instruments on the 

moon to establish moonearth communications almost any time.) 

The obvious choice is whether to press for cooperation or to continue to use the 

Soviet space effort as a spur to our own. The Tims story suggests that there is already lowlevel disagreement on exactly this point. 

3. The Military Rob. Webb reports that the discontent of the military with their limited role in space damaged the bill on the Hill this year, with no corresponding advantage 

to the military. He thinks this point can and should be made to the Air Force, and he 

believes that the thing to do is to offer the military an increased role somehow. He has 

already had private exploratory talks with Ros Gilpatric for this purpose. 

[2] Webb thinks the best place for a military effort in space would be in the design and 

manning of a space craft in which gravity could be simulated, in preparation for later 

explorations. He thinks such a space craft may be the next logical step after Gemini. On 
166 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

the other hand, he is quite cool about the use of Titan I11 and Dinosoar [sic] and would 

be glad to see them both cancelled. You will recall that McNamara has just come out on 

the other side on Titan 111. 

My own hastyjudgment is that the central question here is whether to compete or to 

cooperate with the Soviets in a manned lunar landing: 

1. If we compete, we should do everything we can to unify all agencies of the United 

States Government in a combined space program which comes as near to our existing 

pledges as possible. 

2. Ifwe cooperate, the pressure comes off, and we can easily argue that it was our crash 

effort on ‘61 and ‘62 which made the Soviets ready to cooperate. 

I am for cooperation if it is possible, and I think we need to make a really major effort 

inside and outside the government to find out whether in fact it can be done. Conceivably 

this is a betterjob for Harriman than East-West trade, which might almost as well be given 

to George Ball. 

McG. B. 

Document 1-42 

Document title: National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, “Cooperation with the 

USSR on Outer Space Matters,” November 12, 1963, with attached Charles E. Johnson, 

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, December 16,1963. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Ten days before he was assassinated, President John I;: Kennedy signed this memorandum giving the 

NASA Administrator the lead within the Executive Branch in deweloping substantive poposals for 

enhanced US.-US.S.R space cooperation. This action was a followup to Kennedy’s September 20 

speech before the United Nations. Note that the attached maarandumfi-om Charles Johnson to 

McGeorge Bundy has Anatoli Blagonravov’s lust name misspelled twice. 

November 12,1963 

National Security Action Memorandum No. 2’71 

Memorandum for the Administrator, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

SUBJECT Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters 

I would like you to assume personally the initiative and central responsibility within 

the Government for the development of a program of substantive cooperation with the 

Soviet Union in the field of outer space, including the development of specific technical 

proposals. I assume that you will work closely with the Department of State and other 

agencies as appropriate. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 167 

These proposals should be developed with a view to their possible discussion with the 

Soviet Union as a direct outcome of my September 20 proposal for broader cooperation 

between the United States and the USSR in outer space, including cooperation in lunar 

landing programs. All proposals or suggestions originating within the Government relating to this general subject will be referred to you for your consideration and evaluation. 

In addition to developing substantive proposals, I expect that you will assist the 

Secretary of State in exploring problems of procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels 

which would be most desirable from our point of view. In this connection the channel of 

contact developed [2] by Dr. Dryden between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences 

has been quite effective, and I believe that we should continue to utilize it as appropriate 

as a means of continuing the dialogue between the scientists of both countries. 

I would like an interim report on the progress of our planning by December 15. 

Information copies to: 

Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council 

Secretary of State 

Secretary of Defense 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 

Director, National Science Foundation 

Special Assistant to the President 

for Science and Technology 

Director, Bureau of the Budget 

Director, US. Information Agency 

********* 

[Attachment page 11 December 16, 1963 

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy 

MacThe attached interim report to the President from NASA in response to NSAM 271 

follows the line I suggested to NASA. It is intended to show that work is actively progressing on the development of a concrete approach to the Soviets following on the KennedyJohnson initiatives. I am following the progress of this project and will try to ensure that 

it stays on the timetable described by Dryden. 

There has been an additional development since the preparation of the interim 

report. Our Embassy Moscow reports the receipt of a letter from Blaganravov to Dryden, 

the cable is attached. This is the first communication from Blaganravov in eight months. 

NASA still has its institutional fingers crossed as to whether this represents a substantive 

response on the part of the Soviets. They are awaiting the final text (being pouched) 

before reacting to the letter. 

Charles E. Johnson [initialed] 
168 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-43 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, January 31, 1964, 

with attached “US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs.” 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This btter from NASA Administrator Webb transmitted to President Lyndon Johnson th report on 

possible U. S.-Soviet cooperative initiatives related to the lunar landing program that had been requested by President Kennedy in November 1963. It also summarized the contents of the lengthy report. 

None of the suggested cooperative initiatives was mer implemented because the Soviet Union decided 

in 1964 to carry out its own lunar landingprogram on a mash basis. 

JAN 31, 1964 

The President 

The White House 

Dear Mr. President: 

The attached report on possible projects for substantive co-operation with the Soviet 

Union in the field of outer space is provided to you in accordance with National Security 

Action Memorandum 271, dated November 12, 1963, and my interim report to you of 

December 13, 1963. It has been coordinated with the Department of State, the 

Department of Defense, the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Science Adviser, and White House staff. 

Since space technology is closely related to and in some measure interchangeable 

with technology of military interest, careful examination of the attached report is desirable in connection with further initiative in this field. 

1. An appendix to the report reviews the status of agreements already reached 

between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences for cooperation in three areas: (1) 

coordinated meteorological satellite program; (2) passive communications satellite experiments with the ECHO I1 satellite launched this month; and (3) geomagnetic satellite data 

exchange. The appendix also reviews Soviet rejection of numerous specific offers of space 

cooperation made in the past by the US. At this writing, the Soviet Academy, while in communication with NASA in regard to the agreements between us, has failed to meet time 

limits on most agreed action items but has conducted optical observations of the ECHO 

I1 satellite as agreed and apparently intends to proceed with communications experiments 

between the USSR and the Jodrell Bank Observatory. Other tests of Soviet intentions 

under these agreements will materialize shortly. 

2. The report focuses upon possible cooperation in manned and related unmanned 

lunar programs. (Possibilities for cooperation in other space programs have been and will 

continue to be advanced in the channel between NASA and the Soviet Academy.) 

[2] 3. The report recommends these guidelines to govern foreseeable negotiations with 

the Soviet Union in the space field: substantive rather than propaganda objectives alone; 

welldefined and comparable obligations for both sides; freedom to take independent 

action; protection of national and military security interests; opportunity for participation 

by friendly nations; and open dissemination of scientific results. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 169 

4. The report recognizes that cooperation with the Soviet Union must ultimately 

rest on specific projects. However, the advantages and disadvantages of specific proposals 

are not absolute. They may vary significantly, depending upon Soviet objectives, techniques, procedures, and schedules relative to ours. Lacking sufficient information of these 

factors, we remain uncertain of the security and tactical aspects of specific proposals which 

might be advanced to the Soviets. 

5. Accordingly, the report outlines a preferred structured approach calculated to 

determine a level of confidence in any Soviet response, to gain information on basic elements of the Soviet program, and to merit confidence and support by the public and the 

Congress. 

Briefly, this approach provides for maximum exchange of past results (generally subject to verification from other US sources), proceeds then to sufficient disclosure of the 

future planning of both sides to identify areas favorable for cooperation, and concludes 

with the joint definition of specific projects. Examples of specific projects would be put 

forward in the initial presentation of this approach to lend credibility and substance to it. 

6. The report recognizes that the Soviet Union is unlikely to be amenable to such 

an approach. In that case, it would be possible to proceed directly to specific proposals. 

Some 15 examples of possible projects are described in the report and evaluated in such 

terms as our current knowledge of the Soviet program permits. 

However, limitations (described in the report) attach to virtually all these proposals. 

These limitations reflect the general climate of USSoviet relations and are therefore 

subject to change-which might bring any of the proposals within the range of realistic 

negotiation. At present, a change in sentiment appears necessary even for small steps in 

cooperation; for example, in the exchange of purely scientific data relating to solar radiation and micrometeorites, the Soviet Union has within the past year declined to provide 

details of instrumentation and calibration required for their understanding. Given a 

change in sentiment, however, such [3] exchanges would be useful and some cooperation 

might be proposed and developed in several areas including those listed below and, in 

addition, mutual tracking support and the recovery and return of manned capsules after 

their return to earth. 

7. On balance, the most realistic and constructive group of proposals which might 

be advanced to the Soviet Union, with due regard for the uncertainties and limitations discussed above and detailed in the report, relates to a joint program of unmanned flight 

projects to support a manned lunar landing. These projects should be linked so far as possible to a stepby-step approach, ranging from exchange of data already obtained to joint 

planning of future flight missions. They include projects for the determination of: 

(a) Micrometeoroid density in space between earth and moon. 

(b) The radiation and energetic particle environment between earth and moon. 

(c) The character of the lunar surface. 

(d) The selection of lunar landing sites. 

(a) Continuing interest should be expressed through the existing NASA-Soviet 

Academy channel, in a positive Soviet response to the proposals for cooperation already 

made by President Kennedy and by you. 

(b) No new high-level US initiative is recommended until the Soviet Union has 

had a further opportunity (possibly three months) to discharge its current obligations 

8. I believe this affords flexibility for positive action, utilizing either a variant of the 

structured approach (paragraph 5) or, with necessarily greater caution, selected specific 

proposals without reference to the structured approach (paragraph 7). 

9. With regard to the timing and form of further US initiatives toward the Soviet 

Union, the report recommends the following: 
170 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

under the existing NASA-USSR Academy agreement, or, in the alternative, until the 

Soviets respond affirmatively to the proposal you have already made in the UN. 

(c) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement is unsatisfactory, a highlevel initiative on a non- [4] public basis would seem desirable to prod the Soviet Union 

to better performance; additional public steps might be considered if this proves unavailing. 

(d) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement proves satisfactory, personal initiative by you would still be required to extend this success to cooperation in 

manned lunar programs. Because the scope of initiative by Soviet Academy representatives seems limited, Mr. Khrushchev’s personal interest and support would also seem to be 

required for any significant extension ofjoint activity. It is believed that your initiative will 

be more effective if taken privately in the first instance. 

(e) A US initiative should establish our interest in the preferred structured 

approach described above. If it then becomes feasible to proceed with technical negotiations, the NASA-Soviet Academy channel should continue to be the vehicle used; as in the 

past, technical proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available 

for prior interdepartmental comment. (It may become appropriate to consider an effort 

to induce the Soviet Union to make personnel available who are closer to their technical 

program.) 

(fJ Agreements reached in technical negotiations should be embodied in memoranda of understanding, explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments. 

(g) To demonstrate the serious intentions of the US with regard to international 

cooperation in space and to maintain some pressure upon the Soviet Union to follow suit, 

we should continue to expand our current and successful joint projects with other nations 

to the degree possible. 

This report will he kept under continuing review in NASA in concert with other interested offices and agencies, and we shall keep you advised of our progress with the Soviet 

Academy under the current agreement between us. I believe we are well prepared to support whatever initiative you determine to be appropriate in light of this report and stand 

ready to provide such additional information and judgment as you may require. 

Respectfully yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Enclosure 

********* 

[Enclosure page 13 

US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs 

President Kennedy and President Johnson have affirmed and reaffirmed the 

desirability of exploring further joint efforts with the Soviet Union and other countries in 

cooperative space activities, including manned lunar programs. (See Appendix I.) In support of these initiatives and in anticipation of possible discussions with the Soviet Union, 

this report examines technical proposals which might be put forward by the United States, 

as well as other considerations appropriate to such discussions. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 171 

For two reasons, this report concentrates upon possible cooperation in lunar programs: (1) cooperation in lunar programs was the focus of President Kennedy’s 

September 1963 initiative and of President Johnson’s confirmation of that initiative and, 

in particular, of his State-of-the-Union reference to the subject; (2) cooperation in other 

areas of space research and exploration was covered in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence of February-March 1962 in both specific and general terms, has progressed to 

the point of firm agreement on three projects, and is the subject of an apparently continuing relationship pursuant to that correspondence and agreement. At issue now is an 

extension of this relationship to the only major field effectively excluded from it, Le., 

manned lunar programs and related unmanned efforts. (A brief review of the current 

relationship [2] appears in Appendix 11.) 

This report necessarily assumes that the Soviet Union is engaged to some degree in a 

program looking toward eventual manned lunar landings. Soviet statements on this point 

have been ambiguous as to timing and status but clearly positive on balance. If there is not 

a Soviet program, the Soviet Union will probably confuse the issue for an indefinite period. (In that case, it has been suggested that US pressure for cooperation might even 

induce the Soviet to undertake manned lunar efforts not now planned. Viewed positively, 

this could divert Soviet resources from less desirable preoccupations; seen negatively, it 

could lead the Soviet Union into new technology. We believe that the safest assumption is 

that the Soviet Union does not exclude a manned lunar program and that no significant 

danger to us is involved if this assumption is incorrect.) 

I. 

Guidelines which have been applied in the preparation of this report follow: 

(1) The central objective is to bring about continuing cooperation with the Soviet 

Union, rather than to achieve propaganda gains as such. (In his September 20 speech at 

the UN, President Kennedy stated, “. . . we must not put forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes;”). 

(2) In order to achieve real gains, we should press for [3] substantive rather than 

token cooperation. 

(3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of 

both sides made clear and comparable. (This will facilitate implementation as well as clarify responsibility in the event of failure and withdrawal.) 

(4) In the present state of USSoviet relations, we should undertake no project or 

other arrangement which night make us dependent upon Soviet performance, thereby 

impairing or limiting our independent capability in space. 

(5) National security interests and military potential must be fully protected. No 

exchanges impinging upon security should be considered in the absence of certain, comparable, and verifiable information from the Soviet side. 

(6) Opportunity for participation by other countries should be preserved and all 

results made available to them. 

Ultimately, any program of substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union must rest 

upon positive proposals of specific character. Such specific proposals can be defined 

almost without limit, and numerous examples of different modes of cooperation with the 

Soviet Union are provided in this report. Howevq the advantages and disadvantages ofspectfic 

proposals are not fixed by the term of those proposals in an absolute sense. The positive and 
172 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

negative [4] values to us may vary markedly, depending upon Soviet objectives, techniques, procedures, and schedules relative to ours. It is therefore most desirable that we 

seek information on these aspects of the Soviet program so that we can evaluate and shape 

our own proposals effectively and prudently. Lacking such information, we would 

inevitably remain uncertain in matters of security, tactics, and bona fides. 

Accordingly, we should define, and attempt to hold to, an approach to the Soviet 

Union which is calculated to (1) determine the leuel of confidence which we can place in the 

Soviet Union in this subject area, (2) provide information of the basic elements of the Soviet 

program, and (3) merit the confidence and support of the public and the Congress. 

An approach structured to achieve these ends is spelled out in the next section of this 

report. rfsuch a structured approach is not acceptable in whole or in part to the Soviet Union, the 

President and the Department of State may, nevertheless, depending upon the circumstances and 

apparent attitude of the Soviet Union, determine that technical negotiators should proceed to the direct 

presentation of specific proposals. Suchfixibility is desirable-but with clear recognition that dqfment considerations will apply to the samepoposals, depending upon whether they are oflied with [5] 

or without some confidence and knowledge of Soviet plans. 

111. 

The preferred approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union entails the discharge 

of outstanding obligations, followed by an escalating series of exchanges which are, in the 

initial stages, subject to verification. It is thus calculated to build a level of confidence 

upon which progressively significant cooperative activities may be based. 

Since negotiation on manned lunar programs necessarily presages significant new 

relationships with the Soviet Union, requiring evidences of good faith, the first steps 

should be directed to clearing the slate as much as possible. 

A most desirable first step would be material progress on both sides to implement the 

existing bilateral (Dryden-Blagonravov) space agreement in which the Soviets remain, at 

this writing, delinquent (although they have resumed communication). 

A second step more directly following upon the US overtures in the UN would be the 

detailed exchange of data and information of the two countries’ manned space programs 

to date. (This should include past flight, biomedical, and training data and could extend 

to early spacecraft technology.) The virtues of this step would be that it would represent a 

clean start, requiring from us little new information yet obliging the Soviet Union to present [ 61 considerable information not previously made available publicly. Since elements 

of the USSR contribution at this stage would be subject to verification through independent sources, a practical and useful test of Soviet intentions would be available at the earliest contact, and a first confidence level could be established. 

If this step should prove a significant obstacle to further progress, it might, in the 

interests of flexibility, be downgraded, as it were, and subsumed quite naturally under the 

third step (below). It should, in any event, be tested since other means of determining the 

degree of Soviet good faith are not readily apparent. Opportunities for establishing a confidence level for dealing further with the Soviets would be diminished in proportion to deemphasis of this second step. 

The third step would be the exchange of gross descriptions of our respective manned 

lunar programs. Again, this step would not place an undue burden upon us because of 

the publicity already given to our own intentions, but it would for the first time require 

the Soviet Union to describe its conceptual approach to the lunar landing problem. This 

step appears virtually indispensable for it is hardly possible to proceed intelligently or safely to coordinated, cooperative, or joint effort without some over-view of the proposed 

Soviet program. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 173 

The fourth step would seek, through more precise descriptions of our respective 

lunar programs, to isolate [7] elements of conflict or duplication and to discover opportunities for trade-off, complementary procedure, or joint action. Significant security 

considerations do not arise until this step is reached. 

*** 

Examples of cooperative relationships that might develop at various stages of the 

above procedure follow: 

- Conflict between the two programs could arise, as a crude illustration, through 

plans to use the same "window" for independent lunar missions on the same radio frequencies. 

- 

It would be of mutual interest to eliminate any such conflicts. 

Unnecessary duplication, illustrated by independent but adequate programs for 

exploration of the lunar surface, would offer opportunities for thinning out or otherwise 

adjusting our respective programs so as to provide, together, only required informationthe exact degree of thinning out depending upon the confidence level established at the 

time. 

- In other cases, a desirable redundancy of effort might be recognized and specific provisions 

- 

for data exchange made to increase reliability and confidence. 

Discovery that both sides planned to apply limited resources to the same facet of 

a broader problem (e.g., examination of the lunar surface in a relatively narrow region) 

would permit a reordering of efforts to cover additional facets of the problem on a sharedeffort basis, with subsequent exchange of the results. 

[8] - Some tradeoffs can be visualized, arising from differentials in schedules and capability in the two programs; e.g., the possibility that the Soviet Union might acquire a sample of the lunar surface before the United States, taken together with our twenty-four 

hour deep space tracking capability, suggests a trade-off between the two; medical data 

obtained in the Vostok flights might be.traded for radiation or micrometeorite data 

obtained in our scientific program. 

If an improved confidence level is achieved through the modest but meaningful 

arrangements suggested above, progress toward more advanced, integrated relationships 

could be made. 

At various steps in the above procedure, specific projects should be put forward as 

appropriate to lend concrete substance to the negotiations. A relatively detailed description of such projects follows: 

(Negative or uncertain values reflected in this description follow from our current 

lack of knowledge of Soviet plans; a more positive evaluation should be possible in each 

case if serious intentions on the part of the Soviet Union motivate a sufficient exchange 

of the necessary background information. A negative assessment of Soviet interest or 

desire in a given case does not necessarily mean that the proposal should not be put forward; it is intended [9] solely to reflect realistically the pfesent prospects for a substantive 

advance of our purpose. These apparent prospects may well change in light of any information forthcoming from the Soviet side relative to their program and interests. Close 

examination of the comments provided in each case will show that the framing of proposals with positive appeal to both sides requires knowledge of the objectives, modes of 

attack, and relevant scheduks of both sides. The same knowledge is necessary to determine 

what critical tactical or security advantages may be conferred or lost in a given project. These 

defects grow in direct proportion to the significance of the proposal contemplated.) 
174 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

A. Data Exchange 

1. On Micrometmroid Flu-Both the US and the USSR could profit from a full 

exchange of information on the temporal and spatial distribution, mass penetration characteristics, and shielding of micrometeorites in earth-to-moon space. The security aspects 

are minimal, and present indications are that information obtained will not present radical problems of an unexpected nature. However, as recently as June 1963, Soviet scientists, 

in precisely such an exchange relating to their Mars and our Venus flights, declined to give 

us instrumentation and programming information necessary for meaningful interpretation of their data. Also, the USSR must be expected to be quite [lo] reluctant to provide 

data on shielding materials and results. 

2. On Radiation and SolarEvent-Both sides seek greater knowledge of radiation 

end particle fluxes in cislunar space, particularly that associated with solar proton events. 

Such information is nec,essary to improve the predictability of proton showers so as to fix 

manned flight schedules safely and permit the design of optimum shielding. This is likely to be a long-range program requiring constant monitoring and predisposes both sides 

to welcome an exchange of information. We could advance a proposal to define a project 

of investigation and exchange on this subject to be carried forward by a joint working 

group consisting of designated representatives of both sides. There is some question, however, whether the Soviets are yet on a par with us in this work. Also, we anticipate that the 

USSR will continue [to be] reluctant to discuss the detailed interrelationships of data, 

instrumentation, and programming in adequate depth. Nor could we be sanguine about 

exchange relating to shielding or other countermeasures. 

3. Lunar Surface Characteristics-Both sides require information on the characteristics of the lunar surface for final design of spacecraft to land on the moon. Whether 

there is the basis for an exchange relationship depends in part on the relative schedules 

of the two programs; if the Soviets are ahead of us, as is possible at this early stage, they 

will have acquired intelligence [ 111 of the lunar surface before we do and have little interest in any contribution we can make on this point. On the other hand, if we are on 

similar schedules and the lunar surface is discovered to have radical characteristics not 

anticipated, such information could become critical to equipment design and even mission success. It could thus become an important element in the space race itself, with critical tactical and even security value. Either side might well wish to withhold knowledge of 

this kind. 

4. Selection of Lunar Landing Sites-The same considerations discussed immediately above apply to exchange of information in the survey and selection of lunar landing 

sites. Assuming a Soviet lunar landing program, both sides are faced with the same gross 

requirement, and thus there should be in principle a basis for cooperation. However, the 

actual degree of interest and potential for cooperation would depend in good part upon 

technical requirements and relative time schedules; if the latter are not close, the leading 

side could be expected to be relatively disinterested, whereas if they are close, information 

on a suitable site could become critical in a closely competitive situation. 

5. Astronaut Training and ExperimeEach side must be assumed in principle to 

have interest in the other’s astronaut training techniques, flight experience, space medicine results, and spacecraft technology. The US has already been quite open in publishing its material along [12] these lines, and has not yet had comparable periods in orbit. 

The Soviet Union must therefore be presumed to have less interest than we. Indeed, a 

Soviet representative to a very recent International Academy of Astronautics meeting 

declined to participate in a second conference on manned flight, asserting that there was 

little new to be expected from the American program in the next year or so. (No additional manned flights can be expected in the US program for upwards of a year.) In sum, 

it would appear that we cannot offer mutuality for a considerable time in flight results and 
EXPLONNG THE UNKNOWN 175 

space medicine. Indeed, we would appear to be leading from weakness if we pushed for 

exchanges in these fields. Exchanges in the related areas of astronaut training and spacecraft technology would, if they were to be meaningful, impinge upon flight systems, security considerations, and simulator techniques, and must be regarded as most difficult to 

approach in the initial instance with the Soviet Union. 

B. Operational Cooperation 

1. Mutual Trucking Support-Several modes of cooperation in tracking and data 

acquisition have been explored from time to time with the Soviet Union: the USSR was 

offered the support of the Mercury network for any manned flight of their own, with no 

strings attached (Glennan); itwas asked to consider an exchange of tracking stations, each 

side to place a station in the other country, each to operate its own station (Kennedy); and 

the USSR itself [13] suggested cooperation in the tracking of deep space probes 

(Khrushchev) , but later retracted this offer, privately implying security considerations. 

Despite seeming Soviet disinterest in this area and the fact that lunar missions are conducted at particular times (windows) when both sides may launch missions of their own, 

it seems probable that both could gain from mutual tracking arrangements. Since windows are a function of launch site and tracking station locations, mission profile and 

objectives, and payload capabilities, the two sides would probably utilize somewhat different windows. We might then provide twenty-four hour ground coverage (lacked by the 

USSR) in exchange for greater flexibility afforded by use of their land and shipbased 

nets. 

2. Cupsub Recovery (eurth)-Both sides face the possibility of spacecraft returns to 

earth in areas not planned. Accordingly, they might both have an interest in exchanging 

the signals and recovery procedures to be utilized in emergency recoveries. Either side 

could then proceed to the rescue of astronauts in areas under their control. The exchange 

of such signals could in principle also permit either side, somewhat more readily than 

now, to interfere with recovery operations by the other. However, this appears a very small 

risk and one which might very well be taken. Such a project would appear to have few negative aspects, little prospect for wide implementation, but possibly considerable public 

value. 

[14] 3. Cupsub Recovery (spuce)--It is possible to frame a proposal that both sides 

agree upon common docking hardware so as to permit either to “rescue” the spacecraft 

of the other in distress. In fact, it is not known whether hardware common to the two competing systems would be feasible, but assuming it is, rescue operations of this kind, given 

current limits to spacecraft maneuverability, would require compatible trajectories and 

orbits, compatible oxygen supply arrangements, an agreed communications, rendezvous, 

and docking procedure, common training, and possibly compatible aerodynamic configurations for re-entry purposes. At a minimum, guidance systems, docking hardware, and 

rendezvous and docking techniques, capabilities and limitations would all appear, at early 

stages, to be of security concern. A proposal of this sort would;therefore, not be attractive 

to either side. 

4. Lunar Logistics-Following the first manned lunar landings, it would appear 

possible to define a proposal for sharing logistic support for more ambitious lunar exploration. Such a proposal could be shaped in terms of a division of the logistic responsibilities or a division of responsibility as between logistics and personnel. A proposal of this 

type would have some appeal if the two sides were on roughly similar schedules and 

shared ambitious plans for lunar stations or exploration, something not known to be 

planned in either case. If one were well ahead [15] of the other or had no current plans 

for ambitious follow-on lunar projects, it would have relatively little appeal. A proposal of 

this type would have the disadvantage of subjecting us to reliance on the honorable and 
176 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

competent discharge by the USSR of its responsibilities over a period of years. In any case, 

the proposal would not appear to promise early realization and should be deferred for 

subsequent consideration in the course of a progressive and satisfactory development of 

more immediate projects. 

5. Tradt-Offewhere mutual benefits cannot be established in symmetrical projects, it may be possible to relate dissimilar activities to a single balanced cooperative 

effort. For example, we could offer the Soviets the support of our twenty-four hour deep 

space tracking capability (in periods when it is not directed to our own use) in exchange 

for data (or samples) of the lunar surface, which the Soviets might acquire before the US. 

C. Integrated Projects 

Substantial integration of major elements of flight configurations is circumscribed by two factors: (1) virtually all major contracts for accomplishment of project 

APOLLO have already bean placed, establishing a heavy and costly commitment in design 

and development; (2) the placement of responsibility in the Soviet Union for integral 

elements of our own program would enable the Soviets to obstruct our progress while proceeding [ 161 clandestinely on their own. Nevertheless, certain cooperative projects requiring close integration are widely entertained and some comment is appropriate. More 

important, there may be some integrated effort which is, nevertheless, possible at a relatively early stage. At least one proposal of this type is noted below. 

1. USSR Booster/US SpacecrafbIt has been widely proposed that we suggest to the 

Soviet Union a manned lunar effort based upon the use of their greater boosting capability and the most advanced spacecraft of the US. The Soviet Union is not now known to 

possess a booster capable of manned lunar landing and return although they are developing engines which, if clustered, could provide this capability. The US is building such a 

booster. It is not consistent with the US objective of achieving a leading space capability 

to delegate the development of an adequate booster to the Soviet Union. A reversal of the 

proposal would not appear to be in the national interest since it would employ an 

advanced US capability to place a Soviet spacecraft first on the moon. It would also entail 

Soviet access to US launching sites and techniques without the possibility of access to 

USSR sites under comparable circumstances. 

The heart of the problem posed by a proposal of this type lies in the very extensive exchange of technology required to integrate the spacecraft of one side with the 

booster of the other. Such an exchange applies to all [17] significant characteristics of the 

booster system in design and performance, including guidance, and requires the launching authority to have full information of the spacecraft system. A continuing and extensive mutual interplay on technical terms is known (through experience in domestic as well 

as international satellite programs with friendly nations) to be required for spacecraftbooster integration if success and avoidance of recrimination are to be achieved. 

Extensive access would be required by both sides to the launch site, and, by reason of the 

unsymmetrical basis for the project, such access would be one-sided. The experience with 

the Soviet Union in areas with (or, indeed, without) military implications suggests that 

even a small fraction of the interchange required would be forthcoming from them. 

2. Turner ProposaOA Republic Aviation engineer, Thomas Turner, has proposed in Lye (October 11, 1963) a cooperative effort to circumvent (some of) the diffculties noted immediately above. According to his proposal, the US would forego the 

development of a large booster and concentrate simply on placing its lunar excursion 

module (LEM) in earth orbit. The Soviet Union would at the same time place a very large 

and powerful spacecraft in earth orbit. The two would rendezvous, then utilize the Soviet’s 

spacecraft propulsion to transfer to a lunar orbit, at which time the LEM would separate 

and descend to the lunar surface with both a Soviet and an American aboard. It would 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 177 

then [18] return to lunar orbit, the occupants would transfer to the Soviet spacecraft, 

abandoning the LEM, and return to earth. According to Turner, the sole requirements 

are common docking hardware and a communications agreement. The proposal is an 

ingenious one but implies that neither side would develop the total resources to conduct 

a manned lunar program by itself. We regard this, at this time and in the present context, 

as an unacceptable interdependence, prejudicing seriously our ability to proceed with our 

own program in the event that the Soviets do not live up to their agreement over the 

extended period of years required to implement it. The US requires a major booster for 

its own posture and broad national interest. Thus, no real saving would be effected by the 

Turner proposal. The notion that the necessary lunar orbit docking could be conducted 

without common training and practice procedures on earth is not tenable. In addition, 

this raises most of the questions which are specified in item B.(3) above. Our conclusion 

is that the Turner proposal is neither practicable nor desirable at this stage in US/USSR 

relationships. It could be held in abeyance until a progressive improvement in the discharge of cooperative obligations by the USSR warrants its consideration at a later date. 

3. Interchange of Astronauts-The US could propose a reciprocal arrangement 

under which astronauts of each side are accepted by the other for extended periods [ 191 

of training leading to participation in flight missions. It is apparent that such an exchange 

would entail long-term and extensive access to training facilities and programs, flight 

hardware and systems, launching sites, and so forth, as well as language preparation; however, reciprocity might be assured through synchronized phasing of the program in both 

countries. The US would have far more to gain than to lose from such reciprocity in view 

of the relative secrecy of the Soviet program to date. The prospect is particularly attractive 

because of its implications for opening up Soviet operations. We are informed, however, 

that it may be politically premature. 

As always in dealing with the Soviet Union, it may be feared that comparable 

access, information, and training will not be afforded the American astronaut(s) 

exchanged with the Soviet Union. The concept of synchronized phasing of the training of 

the two would go a long way to correct this, since the two astronauts would move from one 

phase to another of the two countries’ programs on a par and we could withdraw our man 

if we were dissatisfied. The prospects of such dissatisfaction must be regarded as rather 

high, given experience with exchange programs with the Soviets in the past. It may be, 

therefore, that greater success could be had with this same project if, again, it were developed in the course of a progressively improving relationship with Soviet space authorities. 

It remains, in any case, one of the more attractive possibilities. [20] In fact, early instruction of selected astronauts in the Russian language has been suggested to remove at least 

one obstacle to its realization. 

V. 

Questions of initiative, timing, and procedure for negotiations with the Soviet Union 

have been considered. (The pertinent background and status of past negotiations with the 

USSR is briefly summarized in Appendix 11.) 

(a) the Soviet Union is given a further opportunity to evidence the discharge of 

its obligations under the existing NASA-USSR Academy space agreement, or 

1. As contacts continue at the agency (Dryden-Blagonravov) level, we should clearly express our continuing interest in a response from the Soviet Union on the question of 

extending cooperation to lunar programming and other subjects. 

2. No new top-level action (by the President, Secretary of State, or Ambassador) is 

recommended until- 
178 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

(b) the Soviets respond to US initiatives already taken in the UN. 

3. After the Soviet Union has had a further opportunity to deliver or default on the 

existing agreement, a further top level initiative would seem appropriate. 

The nature of such a US initiative might be along the following lines: 

(a) In the event of continued failure of the Soviet Union to discharge existing 

obligations in the Dryden- [21] Blagonravov agreement, a top level US/USSR initiative 

would seem desirable, privately in the first instance. If Soviet intransigence persists, it may 

then become appropriate to tax the Soviet Union publicly with their failure in matters of 

cooperation. 

(b) If the prospects for an extension of existing agreements to the manned lunar 

landing area become promising-either because of performance in the existing agreement or because of a response from the Soviet Union to our UN initiative-a further top 

level US action should be taken, privately in the first instance. For example, the President 

may wish to inform Khrushchev that we propose an orderly, structured approach toward 

a developing cooperation, beginning with the maximum exchange of past results, proceeding to sufficient description of future planning to permit identification of possible 

areas of cooperation, and concluding with the definition of specific projects. (Examples 

of possible projects would be included in the presentation of this structured approach to 

lend it credibility.) Again, if the Soviets are intransigent, consideration might be given to 

stating our position publicly in order to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. In such a 

public statement, the US approach could be openly described to domestic and foreign 

advantage. 

[22] 4. Whether a further US initiative is taken or a specific Soviet response to the 

President’s UN offer received, in either case making negotiations possible, it is then our 

considered view that our action should be for the express purpose of preparing the way 

for technical discussions. The NASA-Soviet Academy channel, which has been successfully opened by Dr. Dryden, should continue to be the vehicle for technical exploration and 

negotiation of the possibilities for cooperation with the Soviet Union. (If it should prove 

technically desirable or necessary, consideration should be given to requesting the Soviets 

to assign to the negotiations personnel closer to the technology of their program.) As in 

the past, proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available for 

prior interdepartmental consideration. 

5. Any agreements reached at this technical level should be embodied in memoranda of understanding, explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments. 

6. As a tactical device, calculated to put pressure upon the Soviet Union, demonstrate our serious intentions, and gain good will from certain nations, consideration 

should be given to means by which “other countries” than the Soviet Union might be further identified with our lunar programs. (See Appendix 111.) 

* * * * * * * * * 

VI 

Appendix I 

(A) President Kennedy made the following statement regarding United States-Soviet 

cooperation in outer space in his address before the United Nations General Assembly on 

September 20, 1963: 

‘Finally, in afield where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity-the fwld of space-there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the 

moon. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 179 

“Space offm no problem of sovereignty; resolution of this Assembly, the members of 

the United Nations have foresworn [sic] any claim to tan’tm‘al rights in outer space or on 

celestial bodies, and declared that international law and the c! N. charter w‘ll apply. why 

should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become 

involved in immense duplications of research, construction and expenditure? Surely we 

should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries-indeed, of all the 

world-cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this deca& to the 

moon, not the representatives of a singk nation, but the representatives of all humanity, 

[2] (B) President Johnson reaffirmed the above statement through Ambassador Adlai E. 

Stevenson who made the following remarks in Committee I of the United Nations General 

Assembly during debate on international cooperation on outer space, on December 2, 

1963: 

“As you also know, President Kennedy poposed before the General Assembly last 

September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for wmking together in the conquest 

ofspace, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all our countries. 

President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today. Ifgiant strides cannot be 

taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work-short of 

integrating the two national programs-from which all could benefit. We should explore the 

opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to 

larger ones. 

‘Tn any event, our policy of engaging in mutually benebcia1 and mutually supporting 

cooperation in outer space-with the Soviet Union as with all nations-does not begin m 

end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come befme that-and there 

will be even more afterward. 

[3] (C) In his State-of-the-Union address to the Congress on January 8, 1964, President 

Johnson said, 

‘Fourth, we must assure our preeminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space, 

focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade-in cooperation with other powers if 

possible, alone if necessary. 

********* 

[11 

Appendiv 11 

The background of experience in negotiations with the USSR is briefly summarized: Progress at 

all levels has almost invariably required US initiative. It appears that new initiatives are successful only if the way is paved at the very highest levels. Negotiations are seriously hampered by the fact that Soviet representatives are drawn from the Academy complex which 

seems to be once removed from the actual conduct of the Soviet space program. (Soviet 

scientists do not often appear well informed of flight conditions or hardware.) Soviet reaction time to US initiatives and correspondence has been extremely slow. The USSR is currently delinquent on most action items scheduled in the Dryden-Blagonravov agreements; 

however, correspondence has been resumed by Blagonravov after more than three 

months of silence and agreed optical observations of the ECHO I1 satellite have now been 

performed by the Soviet Union. 

The basic Soviet line for the past four years has been that significant cooperation cannot precede major improvements in the political atmosphere, including disarmament. 
180 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

(The US proposals which led to the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement were apparently 

regarded as sufficiently modest to permit some departure from this line-though at least 

one of the agreed projects could lead to a joint global meteorological satellite system.) 

[2] At various times the Soviet Union has rejected US offers of tracking support for 

manned flights, an interchange of overseas tracking stations for earth satellites or deep 

space probes, formal participation with NASA and other countries in experimental communication satellite tests, exchanges on standards and techniques to preclude contamination of the lunar and Martian environments, and repeated open-end offers to explore 

any items of interest to the Soviet Union. 

With regard to Soviet plans for a manned lunar program, Khrushchev has said little 

more than that the USSR will not proceed until they are ready and that they are working 

on the problem, but it is not known whether they are developing a large enough booster 

although engines suitable for clustering for that purpose are reportedly under development. Khrushchev has spoken only ambiguously about cooperation and has actually 

seemed to accept competition as desirable. 

On the other hand, some softening of the Soviet line may be indicated, not only by 

the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement, but also by the recent willingness of the Soviet Union 

to reach agreement on legal principles to apply to space activity and on radio frequencies 

to be used in space communications and research. The requirements for these agreements, however, are far from comparable to those applicable to cooperation in manned 

lunar programs. 

A brief summary and waluation of the status and contat of the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement 

follows: 

[3] A first USUSSR Bilateral Space Agreement was reached on June 6, 1962 and was then 

supplemented by an implementing Memorandum of Understanding which became effective August 1, 1963. Together, these agreements set forth the technical details and 

arrangements for cooperation in three areas: 

1. Coordinated Meteorological Satellite Program - Exchange of cloud cover photographs and weather situation analyses gained 

from each country’s experimental meteorological satellites; - Establishment of a full-time, conventional, facsimile quality communications 

link between Washington and Moscow for two-way transmission of these data; - Coordinated launchings of future experimental weather satellites, and ultimately, of operational weather satellites. 

2. Communications Satellite-Experiments - Experimental transmissions at 162 mc/s between the USSR and the Jodrell 

Bank Observatory in England using the US passive reflector satellite ECHO 

11; - USSR to consider experiments at higher frequencies; 

[4] - USSR to consider radar and optical observation of ECHO 11; - Future negotiations on possible joint experiments with active communications satellites. 

3. Geomagnetic Satellite Data - Launching by each country of a satellite equipped to measure the earth’s 

magnetic field as part of research planned for the International Year of the 

Quiet Sun in 1965; - Exchange of results of satellite measurements; - Exchange of data from magnetic surveys of other types. 

Dr. Dryden wrote Blagonravov in mid-August listing action items requiring early completion if the agreed deadlines for joint action were to be met, and conveying the United 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 181 

States position on each. This communication went unanswered until December when 

Blagonravov acknowledged the letter, apologized for delay, indicated substantive replies 

were being prepared, and asked for the launch date for ECHO 11. Dr. Dryden replied 

immediately by cable, giving the launch window and nominal orbital elements for the 

ECHO I1 satellite, and reiterating NASAs request for Soviet radar cross-section and optical observation of the satellite during the inflation stage (which occurs in part over the 

USSR on the first orbit). [5] This cable was immediately acknowledged by Blagonravov; as 

of this writing, he has provided a statement of intention to discharge at least the minimum 

requirements upon the Soviet Union for observation of ECHO I1 and communications 

tests with that satellite. He remains delinquent in other outstanding matters. 

Although all joint action has slipped several months because of Soviet dilatoriness, 

this need not affect any of the proposed cooperative efforts substantively but may only 

delay their implementation. At this time, it seems likely that Soviet performance will continue [to be] ragged, with little regard for deadlines. The remoteness of the relationship 

maintained by the USSR detracts in some degree from the positive value of the cooperative association established; nevertheless, satisfactory completion of any of the steps prescribed in the agreements should provide the best basis for improved relationships and 

further progress. 

********* 

Appendix III 

Besides inviting the Soviet Union to cooperate in the lunar program in his recent UN 

speech, the President expressed a desire to bring other countries in as well. The possibilities include the following: 

1. Tracking and data acquisition-We already enjoy the cooperation of a number of 

countries in the accommodation and operation of manned flight tracking and data acquisition stations and should publicize this fact along with our interest in extending the present level of participation. 

2. Scientific experiments-We now give foreign scientists a chance to compete for 

space for their experiments in our observatory satellites. We should consider extending 

this practice to Gemini and Apollo, noting that these opportunities may be very limited 

even for our own scientists. (In addition to space and weight limitations, there could be 

difficulties growing out of Air Force participation in Gemini). 

3. Contracts-If they materialize in sufficient number, publicity can be given to certain subcontracts entered into with foreign contractors (e.g., Canadian companies are 

developing and providing extensible antennae for the Gemini and Apollo missions, 

including the antenna to be used for rendezvous missions.) In addition, consideration 

[2] could be given to offering foreign governments the opportunity to take on the development and production of subsystems and parts, on a cooperative basis (Le., at their own 

expense), to meet our design, standard, and schedule requirements. The technical and 

contracting limitations would, however, be severe and the takers few. 

4. Astronaut orientation-A program might be organized under which foreign high 

performance pilots might be brought together for observation of, and limited participation in, NASA astronaut training (only) programs as a familiarization and orientation 

effort on a continuing basis (e.g., successive three-month classes). 

5. Astronaut training and flight-The numerous and valid objections heretofore 

raised against including foreign pilots in our astronaut program are recognized. 
182 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The negative aspects are these: rivalry among interested foreign nations; further pressure upon our limited flight opportunities; resentment by current US astronauts; difficulties in application of commercial benefits to astronauts; security questions; pressures for 

flight priorities; feminist and congressional criticism; absence of practical application 

abroad for the training given here. 

The positive aspects are these: few other single actions could more dramatically 

express the President's deep desire for cooperation; few other single actions could equal 

[3] the boost given by this one to US relations with Latin America or Asia, if pilots from 

those regions (many already trained here) were chosen; few other actions could do more 

in the next few years to eclipse Soviet propaganda in this area-or protect us more effectively against a similar Soviet move. 

On balance, technical and political considerations suggest a negative conclusion on 

an offer of this kind and preference for the proposal reflected in item 4 above. 

*** 

Perhaps the most acceptable position to meet the issue of the third country participation is represented by the recent statement of Senator Clinton P. Anderson before the 

AlAA, January 1964: 

". . . we can give validity to this nation's poli? to internationalize space asserting 

that the United States will accept oflm of supportfrom any nation which can contribute to 

the space program. 

9 

Such contributions should continue to be organized " and imdemented within the 

policies already applicable to existing (and uniformly successful) international programs 

of NASA. 

Document 1-44 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Admiitrator, to Academician M.V. Keldysh, 

President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, July 31,1970. 

Source: Thomas 0. Paine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 

D.C. 

In this letter; NASA Administrator Thomas 0. Paine, the successor to James E. Webb in 1968, followed up on earlier; more general overtures to the Soviet Union for enhanced post-Apollo cooperation. 

This was a specific proposal for cooperation in compatible docking arrangements between US. and 

Soviet spacecraft. Paine had also just announced his intention to resign as NASA Administrator in 

September; and he wanted to assure Keldysh that the desire for enhanced cooperation was a US. government position, not just his own preference. The Soviet reply to this letter was positive, and the two 

countries began discussions in October 1970 that led to the 1975.4poElo-Soyur Test Project. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 183 

JUL 31,1970 

Academician M.V. Keldysh 

President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR 

Leninsky Prospect 14 

MOSCOW, U-71, USSR 

Dear Academician Keldysh: 

We were encouraged to learn of the inquiries by your Embassy to the National 

Academy of Sciences regarding possible discussions of compatible docking arrangements 

in space. I had mentioned the subject to Dr. Handler as a possible item for consideration 

by NASA and your Academy prior to his recent trip to the Soviet Union. 

As the government agency responsible for civil space activities, NASA has direct 

responsibility for any discussions with Soviet officials regarding actions we might take 

together to assure compatible docking systems in our respective manned space flight programs. If you agree that this subject should be discussed between us in the meeting which 

we have had in view for some time, we will be glad, in order to facilitate adequate mutual 

preparation, to receive two Soviet engineers at our Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston 

in the very nearest future to examine NASA's current spacecraft designs for docking purposes and to discuss future docking techniques. In the next step we would propose to proceed with the responsible Soviet officials to discuss our respective views with regard to the 

achievement of compatible docking configurations and techniques. If we can indeed 

agree on common systems, and I foresee no particular technical difficulty, we will have 

made an important step toward increased safety and additional cooperative activities in 

future space operations. This is particularly timely in my view as we proceed toward the 

initial experiments leading to the orbiting space station. 

[2] You may already know that I have submitted my resignation as Administrator of NASA 

to the President for personal reasons. This, of course, will not change the policies and 

interests of NASA with respect to international cooperation in space. Thus, you should 

understand our past and current correspondence on [an] official rather than personal 

[basis], although this matter has my wholehearted personal support. I regret very much 

that I will not have the opportunity to carry through personally our discussions with you 

to fruition, but am optimistic that much can be accomplished and hope that we can continue to make progress in the next month. 

Sincerely, 

T.O. Paine 

Administrator 

Document 1-45 

Document title: Glynn S. Lunney, "Trip Report-Delegation to Moscow to Discuss 

Possible Compatibility in Docking," November 5, 1970. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Glynn Lunney, who headed the Flight Directm's Office at NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center in 

Houston-renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in 1973-was part of the jirst-ever 

delegation of NASA engineers and other officials who traveled to Moscow, October 26 to 28, 1970. 
184 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The purpose of the trip was fw the initial discussions of the feasibility of a US.-Soviet cooperative fie 

ject regarding compatible docking between the two countries’ spacecraft. This trip report captures both 

the human and the technical aspects of the NASA team’s three days in Moscow. The figures referred 

to in the text have been omitted. 

MEMORANDUM TO: See attached list 

FROM: FC/Glynn S. Lunney 

SUBJECT Trip Report-Delegation to Moscow to Discuss 

Possible Compatibility in Docking 

Before I discuss our technical meetings, so many people have asked me about 

personal observations that I have included some of these at the beginning. In general, 

everything was done to make our visit pleasant and productive. General comments are as 

follows. 

1. Our time was scheduled very well, and we kept a busy schedule. 

2. Transportation and a guide/interpreter were always at the ready. 

3. Weather was mostly overcast and occasional drizzle, but just “raincoat” cold. 

4. We stayed in a very large, modern hotel (the Russiya4000 rooms) and the quarters were very adequate. 

5. Breakfast was a buffet arrangement in the hotel. 

6. Lunch in the middle of the afternoon and dinner in the late evening were scheduled each day at various places. The food was delicious, the Russian vodka is an excellent 

drink; the caviar is worth eating also. 

7. There is a fair amount of apartment building going on in Moscow. From what we 

saw, there were essentially no single-family dwellings in the city; the 7 million population 

apparently lives in the apartment buildings. We were in only one apartment building 

which is provided specifically for the foreign embassy people. The rooms were comfortable and about the size of Houston apartments. 

8. We did not see any downtown or remote shopping center areas. Mostly, there 

were shops of different merchandise in some of the first floors of buildings we passed. 

[2] 9. There is a very extensive subway system we did not see, and there never was any 

real traffic problems although it slowed a little around quitting time. Their car, the Volga, 

is about the size of a Moor Mustang if you can imagine that. 

10. The people generally seemed to me to be more serious or somber than you might 

find in our country (outside New York), but that is really hard to justify on very limited 

contact in a large city. 

11. The Bolshoi Theater is a beautiful place. For the talks, we met with the same 

Soviet delegation on all three days. These same men also accompanied us on most of our 

unofficial stops. 

General comments are as follows. 

1. The official people we visited were friendly and openly discussed various aspects 

of their program. They presented and answered questions on their technical areas. 

2. They were also very interested in bringing our first talks to a productive conclusion and to provide the framework for future discussions. In attempting to summarize the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 185 

technical discussions, I will include the impressions from our visit to Star City where their 

cosmonauts live and train. We visited there on Sunday and were greeted by the 

Commandant, General K. , General Beregovoy, who was in the U.S. last year, 

and Colonel Shatalov, the rendezvous pilot on Soyoz [sic] 4 and 5 flights, [who] were our 

principal escorts. Star City is 40 minutes out of central Moscow in pleasant woods country. 

There were 3 or 4 apartment buildings (about 8 stories) and another one being finished 

(probably a sign of continued progress in manned space). We visited their exhibit area, a 

memorial area for Yuri Gagarin, saw a Gagarin film and, the highlight for me, visited two 

[3] different simulators. The first was a general purpose simulator for all bases including 

docking. With reference to Figure 1, this simulator has the command module below and 

the orbital module attached above (with a hatch to pass through). 

In the order I visited them, the orbital module was a sphere about 7-8 feet in diameter. A sketch of it is shown in Figure 2, and the inflight films and stills would indicate the 

flight vehicle being very similar to these simulators. The walls were covered with a lightcolored, felt-like material much like the ceiling covering in some of our earlier cars. The 

flight atmosphere is an air mixture, slightly greater then one atmosphere, I believe. In the 

sketch, you can see the central trench area with the hatch in the floor. From this view, the 

left compartment has a hinged lid for stowage. (I imagine their space suits are stowed in 

there.) The right compartment is a work area, with a top like a desk and a slightly-inclinedfrom-the-vertical control panel. I believe there is some access to the volume underneath 

from the side of the central trench. There was also a manual handle in this area for water 

condensation removal. (Sounded like a manually operated squeezer, but I could not tell 

if that was their primary mode-I doubt it.) There were 4 portholes (approximately 

10” diameter) 90” apart and an ECS inlet and CO, scrubber against the wall on the opposite side of the central trench from the EVA hatch. The side (?) view in Figure 2 attempts 

to show that. Based on the answers given, they do not use replaceable cartridges but add 

other inlets and scrubber units, dependent on the flight. I am still a little surprized [sic] 

by that, but maybe we lost something in the translation. 

The overall impression of this module is one of simplicity, and I will try to convey that 

by a discussion of what I will call the control area [4] on the right-hand compartment. 

This is shown in Figure 2 from memory, and we did not hear what all the buttons were for. 

From the front, the central panel has a stowage compartment on the left side with a food 

warmer mounted on the wall behind it. The control panel has buttons, a C&W panel 

(about 6x6 lights), a speaker for A/G voice and one of the very few gauges in the ship. 

The gauge has three readouts-command module pressure, orbital module pressure, and 

ECS pressure (source or regulated4 am not sure). An identical gauge exists in the command module. 

The hatch can be operated remotely from the control panel by several buttons-for 

depress, open and close hatch (although I did not hear this, these functions are probably 

repeated in the command module). The depress and hatch actuation can also be done 

with manual valves, handles on the hatch itself. The hatch opened into the cabin. Several 

other buttons on the control panel were labeled for use with the TV camera mounted on 

the far right of the control panel and with a long length of power cord stowed in the compartment underneath. On the tabletop in front of the control panels were several switches and a small electrical package, apparently for experiments. 

From their flight films, the orbital module is the living, sleeping, and experiment area 

where the crew spends most of their time. It, of course, is also an airlock. I think it is worth 

repeating how it impressed us-a roomy area with very simple controls and instruments, 

probably all of which were devoted to airlock, experiment, living and sleeping functions 

(as opposed to attitude control, etc.). 
186 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[5] Next, George Hardy and I went down to the command module with Colonel Shatalov. 

For three men this is a small volume, but is only used during takeoff, landing, rendezvous, 

and periodically in orbit (see Figure 3); and, since they wear flight coveralls for these portions, it is adequate. Also, the couches are essentially against the floor for most flight phases. Dr. Gilruth found out that the couches are raised toward the control panel for attenuation travel at some point in the deorbit-landing phase. 

Again, the very strong impression is one of simplicity-no circuit breaker panels, no 

large number of switches, not many displays. The couches are not exactly parallel to the 

display panel. As a matter of fact, we almost sat on the horizontal couches to view the 

panel with the upper hatch to the orbital module overhead. In Figure 3, I have sketched 

the control/display panel as I remember it. From the left top, the G&N area had a 

6-8” diameter globe of the earth which obviously rotated with the orbital position. There 

were several digital readouts in this area like latitude, longitude, altitude, period, and 

maybe one or two others. I could not determine exactly how these readouts were driven. 

From the rest of what I learned, I would guess they were set up manually (probably from 

ground instructions) and then are driven in some approximate way to provide the pilots 

with general navigation data. There was a round-face clock with, I believe, a couple of controls below that. There was a C&W panel (maybe about 6x8) with red, yellow, and blue 

lights from the top down which is also used in some fashion in periodic systems checkout. 

The TV screen showing the target vehicles was approximately 5-6” square and driven from 

either of two TV cameras up in the nose of the ship, around the probe or drogue mechanisms. Below this screen was a range/range rate meter. On [6] the upper right were 6 digital readouts with controls for setting them. I had the impression these were digital inputs 

to the control system for attitude and/or translation maneuvers, but I may not have that 

quite right. I believe there was something in the lower right which I cannot recall-perhaps radio controls. Below the panel and above the center couch right knee was the 

periscope view of the target. (We were concentrating on the rendezvous and docking 

aspects, but I gathered that they use it for earth observation also.) The identical pressure 

gauge was on top of the panel, and there was a “sun lamp” above that. George Hardy was 

questioning about that and I did not hear the conversation. My guess is that it was a device 

for the pilot to see how close the vehicle alignment was for solar inertial holds for their 

solar panels. As in ours, the left-hand T-handle was for translation, although some switches had to be used for fore-aft braking. The right hand T-handle device was for rotation. 

On the right and left of the main display panel was the control device which I figured 

to be the heart of the ship control. There were about 12 buttons down the left side of the 

device which seemed to be used for operating a given phase. As a phase was selected; e.g., 

manual docking, the pilot would punch one of these buttons. Then, next to the buttons, 

a set of display windows with labels on them would be mechanically rotated into view. 

Some of these windows would be lit, some blue, and some not lit. Although it was difficult 

to get a clear understanding, this device seemed to be used for whatever configuring 

would be necessary (perhaps deadbands, for example) and for displaying and executing 

any sequential functions. These could be automatic or backed up manually. There were 

two columns of [7] buttons to the right of these windows which seem to be this manual 

function. I asked if a different phase; e.g., landing, would be selected on this panel and 

got an affirmative. I kind of concluded that this device, then, was used to select the flight 

phasesome automatic configuring is probably done according to the phase; and there 

can be auto or manual sequential functions performed. So, it seemed to be a combination 

of a sequence controller and a vehicle configurer according to the flight phase. 

(Admittedly, this is some extrapolation on my part.) The flight films we saw showed the 

pilots using this device in their periodic systems checkout. So I would also guess that the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 187 

light patters there and on the C&W panel represented a checkout, monitoring tool. Also, 

one row of buttons across horizontally were red, indicating special precaution. 

All in all, this was a fairly simple cockpit and we watched a docking exercise from 

about several hundred feet out into docking. Much as you would expect, the pilot monitored the TV, the periscope, and the range/range rate meter and brought the ship in to 

docking. Roll is easy with the displays, and at docking the periscope cross hairs were lined 

up on a flashing light on one of the other ships' booms. Again, no circuit breaker panels, 

few displays, and control switches, no attitude reference display (except periscope and 

perhaps sun lamp). 

The second set of simulators were two command module elements-one active and 

one passive. There were 2 parallel tracks per module on which a model of the Soyoz [sic] 

spacecraft was brought towards the simulator, from about 150' away. One track was 

watched by the TV, the other through the periscope. The images were magnified to proper scale on the cockpit instruments. Inside the cockpit, all was very similar to the general 

[8] simulator and I concluded that this was a more accurate docking trainer, with a greater 

separation distance simulated than the general-purpose simulator. Roll control only needs 

to be within 15" but the cosmonauts always try for and generally make approximately 

1 degree. 

This simulator work was a great help in the following days of discussion. It was easy to 

watch and understand what was happening, but, in real specifics, it was more difficult to 

understand that sequencer, for example, with the time we had and the need to translate 

everything. 

For our technical discussions with the Soviet delegation, two days were planned for a 

mutual exchange of experience and to outline a framework for future activities. On the 

third day, Wednesday, October 28, it was planned to formalize our discussions by approving a document containing the framework and schedule for future work. The members of 

two delegations were: 

Dr. Robert Gilruth B. N. Petrov 

(Academician-National Academy of Sciences) 

Arnold W. Frutkin K. P. Feoktistov 

(Deputy Director-Manned Space Program) 

George K Hardy V. S. Syromyatnikov 

(Docking Assembly) 

Caldwell C. Johnson V. V. Suslennikov 

(Radio Guidance Equipment) 

Glynn S. Lunney V. A. Lavrow 

(Foreign Affairs) 

On the first day, the U.S. side presented two discussions: 

1. Rendezvous experience and techniques. (General vehicle capabilities, rendezvous techniques.) 

[9] 2. Docking assemblies. (Gemini, Apollo designs, future possibilities.) The Soviet 

side presented two discussions, essentially parallel to our presentations, but with no reference to any future programs. Dr. Feoktistov presented the rendezvous discussion; Dr. 

Syromyatnikov presented the docking hardware discussion. Papers were given to us on 
188 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

each of these subjects and on the radio guidance system presentation on the next day. We 

are in the translation process now, and these papers will be available. 

With reference to rendezvous, the Soviet approach is to build a system for both 

unmanned and manned use. They view the rendezvous process in three distinct phases. 

1. Delivery of the active vehicle to the vicinity of the target. (Done in either direct 

ascent fashion, or a re-rendezvous vectored from the ground.) 

2. The zone of automatic rendezvous to station keeping. (The limits of this zone 

were not specifically identified, but the range was on the order of tens of kilometers and 

tens of meters per second.) 

3. Station keeping from about 300 meters to docking. (Relative velocity is very low 

during this phase.) The system discussion primarily centered around phases 2 and 3, and 

I understood the second phase discussion best. Phase 3 is easy manually, but I did not fully 

understand the implementation for the automatic option. The automatic rendezvous is 

started when the two vehicles acquire each other and orient nose-to-nose. This is done 

with 2 acquisition-type antennas, giving spherical coverage. The radio guidance radar 

heads are then locked to each other. The active ship has a gimballing head and [ 101 the 

passive ship has a fixed head with vehicle orientation to keep the nose pointed at the 

active ship. Range, range rate and the relative angular motion is measured by the active 

ship. The relative angular motion is then used to continually establish the plane in which 

the guidance system solves the problem. The mechanization of the guidance scheme is to 

establish and maintain a range/range rate corridor and to keep the relative angular 

motion within some deadband. This is done by firing the main engine (ofwhich there are 

two [?I of about 800# thrust) in the direction required to satisfy the range corridor or the 

line of site motion deadband. This is an iterative, driving technique to bring the vehicles 

within a few hundred meters. 

Once in this zone of docking, small thrusters of 20# are used and relative roll control 

is established for docking assembly. This can be done either automatically or manually, 

and, I believe, signal strengths to mutually aligned antennas are used in the auto mode 

although I am not real positive of that. The manual mode we watched in the simulators 

was a very reasonable one and the bright flashing lights can be used on the lit side of the 

earth. 

Dr. Syromyatnikov presented a discussion of the docking assembly-a probe and 

drogue device very similar to ours, with a few exceptions. 

1. It was not designed to be removed for a tunnel transfer. (They use an EVA transfer) 

2. They use an electric motor for retracting which permits unlimited reuse. 

3. The docking interface automatically includes the mating of four electrical umbilicals with on the order of 20-30 pins apiece. 

Once the head of the probe is engaged, there are mechanical guide pins (6” long, 

1” diameter, approximately) for further alignment and then grooves to get down to a 

1-minute accuracy. This must be required for [ 1 I] only the electrical umbilicals and I get 

a little fuzzy here. 1 believe that the umbilicals alone are controlled to 1 minute and the 

rest of the mechanism is a ldegree fit, but I pass to Dr. Johnson who understood this portion very well. Their alignment and velocity tolerances seemed to be about the same as 

Apollo. 

On the second day of discussions George Hardy presented a discussion of the Skylab 

program, and I think the long term aspects of this flight intrigued the Soviets, especially 

after the Soyoz [sic] 9 18-day flight. After this discussion, Dr. Suslennikov presented a 

more detailed paper on the radio guidance equipment used in the automatic rendezvous. 

This paper did not add much to my understanding of the rendezvous but did discuss some 

of the functional elements within the radio guidance equipment-modulators, doppler 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 189 

shift extraction, etc. After this discussion, the Soviets requested similar kind of information on our system which we agreed to do. The kind of information is in the Russian text 

and is available in many of our block diagrams. 

After these exchange discussions, we entertained the subject of what areas to study for 

compatibility and how to proceed. We had previously discussed the subjects which would 

require attention and the Soviet delegation had essentially the same ones. We grouped 

these subjects into logical groups such that three working groups could handle the range 

of subject matter. There would be some overlap between groups, and the three groups 

suggested are: 

1. Group to assure compatibility of overall methods and means for rendezvous, docking, and life support. 

[ 121 2. Group to assure compatibility of radio, optical guidance systems and communications. 

3. Group to assure compatibility of docking assembly and tunnel. 

The groups, a more detailed definition of the work required, and the proposed schedule is contained in a summary of results signed by both delegations. This summary is being 

presented to Dr. Low of NASA and Academician Keldysh of the National Academy of 

Sciences. Once agreed to by these two parties, I envision the work proceeding along the 

lines expressed therein. It is my belief that this effort will involve a rigorous, full-time effort 

by a relatively small number of personnel, but with the support of many other elements. 

This effort will be similar to early mission and techniques planning combined with ICD 

tradeoffs and definition and, finally, preliminary system design to assure compatibility. 

Glynn S. Lunney 

Document 1-46 

Document title: George M. Low, “Visit to Moscow, April 1972, to Discuss Compatible 

Docking Systems for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft,” April 4-6, 1972, with attached 

“Addendum, Moscow Trip, April 46,1972,” May 30, 1972. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Space Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low led a threelberson NASA dekgation on an April 1972 

trip to Moscow to make a final technical determination of whether the United States and the Soviet 

Union should agree to a joint test jlight. This would involve an in-orbit docking oj a U.S. Apollo 

spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz spacema$. Low concluded that such a test flight was indeed desirable 

and feasible, and NASA recommended to the White House that the United Slates agree to it. The U.S.- 

Soviet agreement to carry out the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was announced just as an overall agreement on space cooperation was signed at a U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting in May 1972. 
190 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

VI April 46, 1972 

Visit to Moscow, April 19’72, 

to Discuss Compatible Docking Systems 

for US and USSR Manned Spacecraft 

Summary 

In early April 1972, Arnold Frutkin, Glynn Lunney and I went to Moscow to meet with 

representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences on the subject of compatible docking 

systems for US and USSR manned spacecraft. The specific purpose of the trip was to determine whether the US side was ready to make a commitment to a joint test flight in 1975 

involving a rendezvous and docking of US and USSR spacecraft in earth orbit. Such a 

commitment could be made in the forthcoming summit talks at the end of May 1972. 

As a result of three days of meetings, we reached agreement on technical matters, as 

well as on the principles of managing and scheduling and conducting a 1975 joint test 

flight. Both sides affirmed the desirability of such a test flight and are ready to proceed 

with preparations for the flight on the basis of a prospective government-to-government 

agreement. 

Backgruund 

Initial discussions concerning compatible docking systems, for future manned spacecraft took place in October 1970. Following those discussions, Bob Gilruth, who headed 

the US team to Moscow in October 1970, recommended that an early test flight using 

Apollo and Soyuz hardware would be highly desirable. After discussions with Henry 

Kissinger in San Clemente early in January 1971, I proposed such a joint test flight to 

Keldysh in Moscow when I was there to negotiate the Low/Keldysh agreement. During the 

next set of talks on the compatible docking systems in Houston in June 1971, the Soviet 

side agreed that an early test flight would be highly desirable, but suggested that the Salyut 

space station (which was then on its first and only flight) be used instead of the Soyuz 

spacecraft. Detailed work on an Apollo/Salyut mission for the 1975 time period continued into the Fall of 1971, and during meetings in Moscow in November/December 1971, 

the US and USSR agreed that such a mission would be technically feasible and desirable. 

[2] In the Fall of 1971, NASA also recommended to the White House that a final agreement on a test mission might be included in the agenda for the May 1972 summit meeting. As a result of several discussions on the subject, we were asked to make a firm 

recommendation by April 15, 1972, concerning the feasibility of conducting such a 

mission. 

Lunney recommended that in order to assure this feasibility, we should get agreement 

in principle at least on three basic documents: a project technical proposal document, an 

organization plan, and a project schedules document. Draft versions of these documents 

had been prepared by MSC [the Manned Spacecraft Center] and had been transmitted 

to Moscow in late March 1972. At the same time, we asked for a meeting with Keldysh to 

explain the purpose of the documents and to establish a firm basis for discussing them. It 

turned out, however, that Keldysh had just entered the hospital and would not be available until early April. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 191 

We therefore decided that Frutkin, Lunney and I would go to Moscow during the 

week of April 2nd to discuss the documents, to reach agreement on the most important 

points, and especially to determine whether the Soviets really understood what we were 

talking about. 

We decided that we would not publicize this trip, [Handwritten footnote: ‘This was at 

the request of the White House, because we were to discuss a possible agenda item for the 

following summit meeting.” (footnote added 1-10-76)] this was at the request of the White 

House, because we were to discern a possible agenda item for the forthcoming summit 

meeting, and it took pains to make sure that only the smallest possible number of people 

would know that we had gone to Moscow. For example, insofar as MSC was concerned, 

Lunney was visiting Washington. In my own case I was on leave “to take care of family business.” Then, on the day we left the United States, the New York Times carried a front-page 

story of an interview between John Noble Wilford and Petrov. In this interview, Petrov stated that there would be meetings in Moscow during the coming week on the compatible 

docking systems. Fortunately, however, at least at the time of this writing, nobody has yet 

asked whether anyone had indeed gone to Moscow or who had gone. 

Chronology of Events 

We left Washington via TWA on Easter Sunday, April 2, 1972, and arrived in Paris early 

the following morning. From Paris to Moscow, we were on Aeroflot (an Iluyshian 62) and 

arrived [3] in Moscow approximately 5:30 Monday evening, Moscow time. There we were 

met by Petrov, Vereshchetin, and Bushuyev. On the way to Moscow, Petrov told me that 

Keldysh was still in the hospital but that I would meet with the Acting President of the 

Academy, Academician Kotelnikov; however, Kotelnikov would not be available until 

Tuesday noon, and our meetings would start at that time. 

Tuesday morning we had a brief meeting with Ambassador Beam, during the course 

of which he invited us to a luncheon on Thursday. I later found out that one of the invited guests was Bob Kaiser, the Washington Post correspondent in Moscow. I went back to 

see the Ambassador and told him in view of the White House and State Department desire 

not to publicize our trip, I felt this was a bad idea. The Ambassador assured me that this 

would be a purely social occasion, that he would take personal responsibility, and that Bob 

Kaiser would not know the purpose of our trip nor would he say anything about it. 

Although I was extremely skeptical about this, I had no way of avoiding the invitation. 

Tuesday from noon to approximately 2 o’clock, we met with Kotelnikov, Petrov, 

Bushuyev, Rumyantsev, Vereshchetin, with Zonov as their interpreter. (We had also 

brought along our own interpreter, Cyril Murumcev.) From that session, we went to a typical Moscow luncheon at the Club of Scientists, which, I guess, is Moscow’s Cosmos Club. 

After lunch we continued the discussions, with Petrov taking charge on the Soviet side and 

without Kotelnikov. We adjourned at close to 7 p.m. that evening. 

We reconvened at 9:30 Wednesday morning, held discussions until approximately 

2 o’clock, at which time we adjourned for lunch. The American party went to the U.S. 

Embassy for a quick lunch in their snack bar, as well as a complete reworking of our final 

document. The afternoon session started at 4 p.m. and lasted only until about 6. However, 

as a result of the document we had prepared during lunch, and as a result of the basic 

understandings reached in previous discussions, we were able to conclude the substance 

of our talks at that time. 

[4] On Thursday morning, Frutkin and Vereshchetin worked on the editing of the final 

document, with the help of Jack Tech, who is the Science Attache at the American 

Embassy. Lunney and I continued our discussions until about 1 o’clock. This was followed 
192 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

by luncheon at the American Embassy Residence (Spaso House) while the English version 

of the summary of the results of the talks was being typed at the Embassy. 

Following lunch, we returned to the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences 

(where all of the discussions had been held) in order to sign the documents. This was the 

usual signing ceremony in which each of us signed two English and two Russian texts. 

Incidentally, this signing ceremony took place in Kotelnikov’s office, which he claims 

Napoleon used as his bedroom during his last night in Moscow on the way back to France. 

I also learned that the large table that I used in signing the Keldysh/Low agreement had 

been a desk used by Napoleon. 

Thursday evening we had a farewell dinner with Kotelnikov, Petrov and the rest of the 

Russian delegation. There were the usual toasts, as there had been at the luncheon on 

Tuesday afternoon. (At the Tuesday luncheon, I had made a toast, stating that we here 

had an opportunity to make history and that the results of what we were trying to accomplish would probably be much more far reaching than any of us could at that time even 

imagine. During the Thursday evening dinner, Kotelnikov said in a toast that the true 

importance of what we were doing was that this could be an important step in bringing 

peace to men everywhere.) 

Early Friday morning we left Moscow via Aeroflot to London, Pan Am to New York, 

and then back to Washington. 

Highlights of the Talks 

Tuesday Noon. This was the meeting with Kotelnikov, Petrov, Bushuyev, and 

Rumyantsev. After a brief welcome by Kotelnikov, I gave a brief opening statement in 

which I reviewed the history of 18 months of technical discussions and that the possibility now existed to reach a government-togovernment agreement, perhaps during the 

forthcoming summit talks. I went on to say that before such an agreement can be reached, 

it is essential that we both understand that [5] this mission can indeed be carried out and 

that my specific assignment in these talks was to determine whether we are now ready to 

proceed. I pointed out that we had high confidence in understanding each other on technical matters, but that I was still less sure of a complete understanding on matters of 

schedule and organization. I concluded by stating that it was my hope that in these talks 

we could gain a common understanding of the basic principles for organizing, developing, scheduling and conducting a test mission so that I can advise the White House that 

we are indeed ready to commit to such a mission. 

Kotelnikov, in his opening statement, said that they had reached a very important conclusion that they would like to lay on the table at this time. The conclusion was that they 

would use the Soyuz spacecraft instead of the Salyut space station for their rendezvousing 

vehicle. 

This, of course, came as a major surprise, and we had a long discussion on the subject. The reasons for the switch, they said, were “technical and economic.” They explained 

that the Salyut space station only had one docking port and that it would have to be 

redesigned completely to accept a second docked vehicle. This was a major redesign that 

would be extremely costly. They then took a close look at the Soyuz and found that it 

could be modified with all of the modifications that had already been discussed for the 

Salyut, and that they were prepared to do so. They were quite strong in stating that there 

would be no difference in any of the things that had already been agreed to. (My own 

assessment is that there are three possible reasons for the switch. These are: (1) the actual reason given by them; (2) major difficulties with Salyut identified during its first flight; 

and (3) the “political reason” that since we will not have a Skylab available for a future 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 193 

flight, they are unwilling to commit a Salyut to such a mission. My inclination is to believe 

that the reason they gave is the actual one.) I stated that barring any technical difficulties, 

Lunney would have to certify that the switch from Salyut to Soyuz would be acceptable to 

the United States and, in fact, reminded the Soviets that this was the vehicle that we had 

recommended in the first instance in January 1971. From the technical point of view, 

Lunney was unable to identify any difficulties with this mission and, in fact, [6] pointed 

out that operationally this could present a simpler problem, since it would involve only 

two coordinated launches (Apollo and Soyuz) and not three (Apollo, Salyut and Soyuz). 

I also tried to think through any “political” implications and found none. It would still be 

possible to exchange crews, which will have the major public impact of this mission. And 

having a Soyuz, instead of a Salyut, will have the added benefit of not calling attention to 

the fact that they have a space station flying at the time when we do not. 

After we had settled this issue, I stated that I wanted to bring up another matter; 

namely, that of the lack of the Soviet responsiveness to our proposals concerning direct 

voice communications between the two project managers on a regular basis. (For background, this item had been proposed by us during the November/December 1971 talks 

and was supposed to be confirmed by the Soviets when the agreement of those talks was 

confirmed. This was not done, and I sent a telegram to Keldysh asking for confirmation. 

As of now, we have not received a response to that telegram.) I mentioned that I was not 

only interested in the substance of the issue but also concerned about the lack of responsiveness on their part which, if indicative of future relationships, would make it difficult to 

conduct the joint mission. Kotelnikov quickly understood why I attached importance to 

the issue and said we should settle it right then, which we did after considerable debate 

and discussion. 

Finally, during the first session, we determined the agenda for the remaining stay in 

Moscow. Specifically, we agreed that we would attempt to reach an agreement on the basic 

principles of the “organizational plan”; the level of detail to be included in the schedules; 

and any technical matters that might have come about as a result of the switch from Salyut 

to Soyuz. Both sides also agreed that with the exception of any new technical problems 

that might have resulted from the switch, we knew of no other outstanding difficulties. 

Tuesday Afiernoon. The discussion proceeded after lunch, with the same participants 

with the exception of Kotelnikov. Lunney had prepared a document entitled, 

Apollo/Salyut Test Mission Consideration, dated March 23, 1972, a [7] copy of which is 

attached to these notes. This document essentially is a summary of the organizational 

plan, and we had hoped to agree to this plan in detail to make it part of our agreement 

of these Moscow talks. At this point, however, things got to be quite confusing, and we 

started spending an inordinate amount of time quibbling over the exact wording of each 

sentence. We quickly saw that we would be in Moscow for weeks rather than days were we 

to proceed in this way. 

We had also brought along a “Summary of Results” which was to be the basic document of agreement concerning these talks. At this point in our proceedings, we, therefore, called for a quick recess to discuss our strategy for the meeting and to show the 

Soviets that what we really intended to sign was something like the Summary of Results. 

Further, we indicated that the document which I previously discussed we had hoped to 

make part of this summary and to include it as an appendix. Finally I pointed out that it 

would be most important to reach agreement and a full understanding of the “twelve principles governing mission conduct” which were an enclosure to the Apollo/Salyut Test 

Mission Consideration document, and that I felt it would be best if we started discussing 

those. The Soviet side agreed with this recommendation. 
194 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

We had no problems in reaching a very quick understanding and agreement on the 

first six of the principles, which concern command, control, and communications. By that 

time, however, it was getting late, and we decided to review the remaining six principles 

only very quickly for subsequent discussion in tomorrow’s meeting, In this quick review, 

however, we determined that we might have major problems on item seven concerning 

astronaut training and item 12 concerning public information release. 

Wednesday Morning. On Wednesday morning, we continued the discussions of Tuesday 

afternoon, starting out with a detailed discussion of astronaut familiarization and training. 

After an in depth discussion, we did agree that it would be essential to identify candidate 

crews one to two years before the flight and that these crews would have to be trained in 

the other country on the other country’s normal training equipment. The discussions 

continued then [8] with a relatively quick understanding on the need to transmit television downlinks from one control center to the other; the need to gain participation by 

flight operational personnel in the talks; and the need to have the flight crews understand 

the other country’s language. We did have some difficulty in the discussion concerning 

the desire to locate a small team of flight-oriented personnel from each country in the 

other country’s control center during the flight, but, on our side, decided this was not 

essential and, therefore, did not pursue the point but rather left it for further discussion 

by the project managers. Finally, on the point of public releases we again held a rather 

lengthy discussion. The Soviets agreed that everything during a normal flight should be 

released immediately and also pointed out that during a major disaster they would be willing to have speedy releases just as they did in the case of the deaths of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts. Their main concern seems to be with minor abnormalities during a flight, 

which, in their words, might be misunderstood by the general public. They indicated, 

however, that in all areas of public information, they were loosening up and cited the 

recent announcement of the intended objective of the Venera 8 as an example. I, in turn, 

pointed out absolute need for us to continue to disclose publicly all information that is 

available at the American control center and received at American tracking stations. At 

the conclusion of the discussions, we agreed that we would develop a public information 

plan which would take into account the obligations and practices of both sides. 

After we finished discussing the 12 basic principles, it became time to start thinking 

about the wording in the summary of the results of the talks. In the meantime, the Soviets 

had translated our draft summary and had made a number of changes in it, and then 

retranslated it back into English. This was to be the basis for ourjoint document. However, 

we quickly found that the document had been weakened to the point where it really said 

nothing of substance. To be a little more charitable, it said that we understood each other, 

but it didn’t say that we had agreed to anything. After a long discussion on this point, I 

said that the document as written by the Russians was totally unacceptable to us and that 

unless we could come out of this meeting with a firm agreement on at least basic principles of organi- [9] zation, as well as on the need to firm documentation and schedules, I 

would be in no position to recommend that we are ready to proceed with a test mission, 

and, in fact, would make a negative report when I returned to the United States. I further 

stated that I was prepared to stay in Moscow until we had hammered out the necessary 

words; that I believed that we did understand each other and it was now time to put all of 

this down on paper. Thereupon we adjourned for lunch. 

Wednesday Lunch. We had a quick bite to eat in the Embassy snack bar, and then 

Frutkin, Lunney and I each took a piece of the summary of results that we had prepared 

before we left Washington and modified it to include all of the 12 basic principles, together with any changes that we had made in these principles during our previous discussions 

in Moscow. All of this, of course, had to be done in a great hurry, and the document was 

retyped before we returned to the Presidium at 4 o’clock for the afternoon session. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 195 

Wednesday Ajernoon. When we returned with our new document, this came as a complete surprise to the Soviet side. It was just unthinkable for them that anybody could have 

recast the entire document so quickly. After a quick verbal translation by Zonov, the 

Soviets called for a recess of half an hour. During the course of that recess, they studied 

the document in detail, and when they returned, told us that the document was completely acceptable to them with the exception of some minor editorial changes. We then 

adjourned for the evening and agreed that Frutkin and Vereshchetin would form an editorial committee of two that would meet in the morning to go over the final document. 

Thursday Morning. While Frutkin and Vereshchetin were editing the document, 

Lunney and I continued the discussions with Petrov, Bushuyev, and Rumyantsev. First, 

Bushuyev responded to the schedules document and gave an excellent discussion of his 

views of the need to control schedules. During the course of the scheduling discussion, we 

also discussed design reviews, which were understood and agreed to by both sides; joint 

testing, which was also understood and agreed to; and finally, the Soviet side stated that 

they agreed in principle to the entire organizational plan. 

[lo] Next I raised a question concerning the Soviet organization to do this mission. I 

pointed out that they knew clearly where each of us fit into our organization and what our 

responsibilities were. I asked if it would be possible to get the same kind of understanding 

of their organization. Petrov responded in some detail, but really said nothing. He said 

that Keldysh, as President of the Academy of Sciences, reported to the Council of 

Ministers, and had been charged with being responsible for the US/USSR cooperation in 

space. Petrov, in turn, reported directly to Keldysh, and Bushuyev to Petrov. I asked 

whether the same organization would be in force during the hardware and flight operational phase, and the answer was in the affirmative. Petrov indicated that they would bring 

additional people into the organization at that time, but that these people would still 

report to Bushuyev. 

By this time, Vereshchetin and Frutkin had finished editing the “Summary of Results” 

and had prepared identical documents in English and in Russian. We reviewed these documents, had a few questions but no major hangups. Both sides agreed with the documents 

as they had been prepared. 

Finally, Thursday morning Bushuyev discussed technically the Soyuz system and gave 

Lunney a document describing those systems. For the test mission in 1975, the Soyuz 

would fly only two men for a fiveilay period, plus one day in reserve. They proposed also 

that the Apollo spacecraft should be launched first and that the Apollo would be active in 

the rendezvous and docking maneuver. (In subsequent discussions with Lunney, I told 

him that from a policy point of view, I would actually prefer to have the Apollo launched 

first as the Soviets now recommended and that unless there is a good technical reason not 

to do so, we should accept this recommendation.) 

Thursday A+oon. After lunch at the American Embassy Residence, we returned to 

the Presidium to sign the Summary of Results. After the signing ceremony and after 

making the usual speeches, I discussed with Kotelnikov and the group the public posture 

relative to the meetings we had just completed. I mentioned, first, that we intended no 

public release of the meetings at all; second, that we do not intend to mention the fact 

that we were now discussing Soyuz instead of [ll] Salyut; third, I indicated that if pressed 

and ifwe had to admit that meetings took place in Moscow during this week, we would say 

that we were preparing the agenda for the July meeting but that we could not discuss the 

content of the agenda; fourth, that if we were to take any different action from the above, 

we would so notify Petrov; and, fifth, that we would intend to remain in this posture until 

after the summit meeting. Kotelnikov completely agreed with this proposal, and with this 

we ended our formal discussions in Moscow. 
196 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Conclusions 

A copy of the Summary of Results that was signed in Moscow is attached. From this, 

and particularly from the discussions that went along with the agreements that were 

reached and documented, I have reached the conclusion that we are ready to undertake 

this test mission. Insofar as hardware matters are concerned, we have reached an understanding and agreement on all issues which have been identified so far, and, furthermore, 

don’t see any issues that we will be unable to agree on. On the management side, we have 

reached agreement on such matters as regular and direct contact through frequent 

telephone and telex communications, as well as visits; the requirement for and control of 

formal documentation; joint reviews of designs and hardware at various stages of development; the requirement for joint tests of interconnecting systems; early participation by 

flight operations specialists; the development of crew training plans; and the training in 

each country of the other country’s flight crew and operations personnel. We also 

reached agreement on the requirement for and the level of detail of project schedules. 

Finally, in the area of flight operations, we reached agreement on the principles of communications command and control of the flight; the requirement for flight plans and mission rules for both normal and contingency situations; the immediate transmission of 

flight television received in one country to the other country’s control center; the language problem; and the need to develop a public information plan, taking into account 

the obligations and practices of both sides. 

Based on all of these agreements, it was my recommendation that the United States is 

ready to execute a government-togovernment agreement and should now do so. 

********* 

[Attachment page 11 

Addendum 

Moscow Trip, April 46, 1972 

May 30, 1972 

This is an Epilogue to the special notes I prepared after my trip to the Soviet Union 

on April 46, 1972. 

During the course of that visit to Moscow we reached an agreement (signed by 

Kotelnikov, the then Acting President of the USSR Academy of Sciences and myself) on 

matters concerning the technical details, the organization, management, operational 

details, and scheduling of a possible joint docking mission involving the United States 

Apollo spacecraft and the Soviet Union’s Soyuz spacecraft. Upon my return from Moscow 

we recommended to the White House (Henry Kissinger) that, from NASA’s point of view, 

we were prepared to proceed with such a mission in the 1975 time period, that no further 

NASA/USSR Academy meetings would be required, and that the form of the agreement 

between the United States and the Soviet Union could be a relatively simple and straightforward one. A copy of our proposed wording for that agreement is attached. 

Between the middle of April and the middle of May (the summit meeting started on 

May 22), there was a great deal of interest by the press in the possibility of having a joint 

docking mission on the summit agenda, and a large number of interviews with NASA people was held. In all of these interviews, there was a great deal of speculation about the possibility of an agreement on the docking mission at the summit, but there was never any 

hint of the April 46 meeting, nor was there ever any hint that during that meeting the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 197 

Soyuz spacecraft was substituted by the Russians by the Salyut. In other words, from 

NASA's side we were able to avoid any discussions of NASA's preparation for the summit 

meeting or of the form that any agreement might take. This was possible only because 

such a very small number of NASA people had been involved in the activities leading up 

to the summit. 

[2] It was only during the week before the summit meeting that the State Department 

worked on the specific wording of the agreement and made only minor changes in our 

previously submitted wording. Apparently State and the White House started coordinating the words with the Soviet Union only on the 18th or 19th of May (we have no idea in 

NASA why this was undertaken only at this late date). On May 20, the USSR responded to 

our proposed wording with a much lengthier document, which among other things, 

included the Keldysh-Low agreement of January 21, 1971, in addition to the docking 

agreement. Furthermore, with respect to the docking agreement, the Soviet words did not 

include by reference our previous meetings and, instead, some rather cumbersome wording was substituted. 

Apparently when the Soviet response was received by our State Department, it was 

immediately discussed with Kissinger and Rogers, who were at the time over the Atlantic 

on their way to Salzburg, a stop on the way to Moscow. Kissinger asked that we prepare an 

appropriate response but that insofar as possible, we should not change the wording in 

the Soviet text. All of this was done in a meeting at State Department starting at 2:30 

Saturday afternoon, the 20th, and ending in the middle of the night. During that time we 

straightened out the wording in the Preamble but kept by and large the Soviet meaning. 

With respect to the Keldysh-Low Agreement, we did not make any significant changes, 

with one exception. The Soviet document had incorporated words concerning communications satellites which had not been part of the January 21, 1971, agreement, and we 

therefore deleted these words. Finally, with respect to the docking agreement, we selected words similar to those that we had proposed in April in our memorandum to Kissinger 

and especially incorporated in that article the April 46 agreement by reference. This document, together with the clarifying document, was forwarded to the White 

House/Salzburg late that night. In the clarifylng document we stated that NASA had no 

objection to the inclusion of the Keldysh-Low Agreement in the government-togovernment agreement, but [3] pointed out that this was not necessary, nor had it been 

the intent. State Department on the other hand felt that it should not be included because 

it would make our relationships with the Europeans even more difficult in light of our 

recent lack of enthusiasm for space cooperation with the Europeans. With respect to the 

April 6 agreement, we stated in the clarifymg telegram that NASA insisted that it be 

included by reference. 

Following the Saturday meeting we had no additional information except persistent 

signals that the space agreement was scheduled to be signed in Moscow on Wednesday, 

the 24th. On the 23rd, I left for the West Coast for a talk in San Diego on the evening of 

the 23rd, and then a visit to JPL [the Jet Propulsion Laboratory] on the 24th. During the 

course of the evening in San Diego (after dinner and during the preliminaries leading up 

to my talk), I received a telephone call, through the State Department Operations Center, 

involving Arnold Frutkin, somebody in State Department, and myself. State had just 

received a final text as it had been agreed to tentatively in Moscow. In this text the KeldyshLow Agreement was still included and there were words acceptable to us with respect to 

the docking mission. The April 6th agreement was specifically included. I accepted the 

words as they had been read to me just in time to get back into the ballroom (I had taken 

the telephone call at a hallway outside) to hear myself introduced as the evening's main 

speaker. It is interesting to note that by this time it was 6 a.m. in Moscow on the day that 

the agreement was actually signed. 
198 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

On the next day, May 24, I went to JPL and soon learned that the agreement actually 

had been signed in Moscow at apparently 11 o’clock a.m. EDT. At 2:25 p.m. EDT, the Vice 

President introduced Jim Fletcher, Jim McDivitt, and Glynn Lunney, who held a press conference at the Executive Office Building. Sometime thereafter, Fletcher held another 

press conference at NASA Headquarters, and simultaneously, I held one at JPL. 

[4] There has been no adverse criticism in this country concerning the space agreement 

in general, or the Apollo/Soyuz test project in particular, and, in fact, there has been a 

great deal of overwhelmingly favorable editorial comment. . . . 

Document 1-47 

Document title: Henry A. Kissinger, to the President, “USSoviet Space Cooperation,” 

May 17, 1972, with attached “Draft Agreement.” 

Source: Nixon Project, National Archies and Records Admiitration, Washington, D.C. 

The final decision to pfoceed with what became known as the Apollo-Scyur Test Project was not made 

until shortly before the May 1972 US.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting in Moscow. This decision memorandum, when approved by President Nixon, was the basis for project approval. 

May 17,1972 

Memorandum for the President 

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger 

SUBJECT USSoviet Space Cooperation 

In NSDM 153, you directed NASA and State to explore with the Soviets the possibility of a US-Soviet agreement on the desirability of a joint, manned space docking mission, 

so as to provide you with the option of announcing this agreement during the Moscow 

visit. 

NASA’s Deputy Administrator, Dr. George Low, held detailed talks on the possible 

joint mission with representatives gf the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow from April 

46. Both sides had earlier agreed that such a mission was technically feasible and 

desirable. NASA Administrator Fletcher now reports that Dr. Low’s April mission was successful; he was able to reach agreement on the principles of managing, scheduling and 

conducting a joint space docking mission. 

The Soviets have infmd NASA that thq, would Like to reach formal agreement on space cooperation, including the joint manned mission, during the Moscow Summit. Programmatically, the US 

is ready to execute such an agreement, and NASA recommends that this be done. 

The costs involved with the joint manned mission, which would be scheduled for 

1975, are now estimated by NASA to be approximately $250 million. This estimate has 

been developed in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget. 

Clark MacGregor has taken soundings to determine the likely Congressional reaction 

to the proposed joint mission. These soundings indicate that the proposal would gain 

acceptance by a 31 or 41 margin. 
EXPLOFUNG THE UNKNOWN 199 

The text of the proposed space agreement could be quite brief, along the lines of the 

draft at Tab A. I recommend that you approve the proposed [2] US-Soviet space agreement, permitting the necessary steps to be taken prior to your Moscow visit to provide you 

with the option of announcing the agreement at the Summit. 

Approve Disapprove 

With your approval, I will forward a copy of this memorandum to the Director, Office 

of Management and Budget, with the request that he arrange to take such budgetary steps 

as may be necessary to provide for implementation of the agreement. 

Approve Disapprove 

********* 

[Attachment page I] 

Draft Agreement 

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to a 

program of joint activities designed to enhance the safety of manned flight in space and 

provide a basis for possible cooperative space projects of mutual benefit. 

Toward these goals, it is agreed that rendezvous and docking systems of future generarions of manned spacecraft of both countries will be compatible, to permit rendezvous, 

docking, rescue, and possible joint experiments in space. It is further agreed that the first 

flight to test these future systems will be carried out in 1975, using specially modified 

Apollo-type and Soyuz-type spacecraft. In this flight the two spacecraft will rendezvous and 

dock in space, and cosmonauts and astronauts will visit in each other’s spacecraft. This 

joint project will be conducted in accordance with the Summary of Results of the Meeting 

Between Representatives of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 

the USSR Academy of Sciences held in Moscow on April 4 to 6, 1972. 

Document 1-48 

Document title: George M. Low, Memorandum for the Record, “Visit to Moscow, October 

14-19, 1973,” November 1, 1973. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

Once the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to carry out the Apollo-Squr Test Project, 

there were frequent interchanges of personnel between NASA and its counterparts in the U.S.S.R. 

NASA Deputy Administrator George Low made an October I973 visit to Moscow for a top-level midterm project review. This detailed memorandum fbr the record contains Low’s observations on his time 

in Moscow. 
200 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[11 November 1,1973 

Memorandum for the Record 

SUBJECT Visit to Moscow, October 1419, 1973 

BACKGROm 

On August 14, I had written to Academician H. V. Keldysh, President of the USSR 

Academy of Sciences, suggesting a mid-term review of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. A 

copy of my letter to Keldysh is attached. In the letter I also stated that in addition to reviewing the current status of the project, I would like to discuss in detail four specific subjects: 

system failures; participation in and observation of the test activity and flight preparation; 

project milestones; and the preparation of documentation. I further asked if it would be 

possible to visit some Soviet space facilities during the course of my visit. Keldysh responded favorably on August 30. (A copy of his letter is also attached.) Then, about a week 

before my visit, I received a telephone call from Chet Lee, who was already in Moscow, 

indicating that Keldysh was ill and would be unable to see me. He added, however, that 

the Soviet side clearly wanted me to come ahead and urged him to convey to me that this 

is not a “diplomatic illness” and that my visit would be most worthwhile. In order to further make it desirable for me to come, they promised that they would take me to the 

Soviet Mission Control Center near Moscow. The telephone call was followed by an official telegram from Keldysh and after discussions with Arnold Frutkin we decided that I 

should go ahead with the visit as planned. (Both Arnold and I asked about Keldysh’s 

health on many occasions after we arrived in Moscow. The response we both received was 

that Keldysh is not really ill in the true sense of the word but is extremely tired and rundown. He had not taken a vacation after his major operation earlier this year and had 

worked extremely hard ever since then. He was therefore “ordered” by his physicians to 

take a rest and not to participate in any of the meetings with me. During the course of my 

visit, his office was always dark, his secretary was nowhere in sight, and it was quite clear 

that he was completely away from the office during this week.) 

[21 SUMMARY OF VISIT 

Sunday, October 14 

Arrived in Moscow with Frutkin early in the evening. Met at airport by Boris Petrov, 

Vereshchetin, Jack Tech from the U.S. Embassy, and one or two others. Rode to Hotel 

Rossia in Petrov’s car and, as we had requested, did not participate in any official functions that evening. 

Monday, October 15, 7:OO a.m. 

Executive Session at Hotel Rossia with Lunney and his Working Group chairmen. 

According to Lunney, the two weeks of preparatory meetings had gone extremely well and 

much had been accomplished. The “Summery of Results” of their meetings had been prepared and a copy of this is attached. In addition, Donnelly had negotiated a first-phase 

(pre-flight) Public Affairs Plan which was to be ratified by Petrov and me. We discussed 

some of the technical results of the meeting but I will cover these later as I discuss each 

specific item. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 201 

Monday, October 15, 9:OO a.m. 

We met at the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for the Apollo-Soyuz “Midterm Review.” Participating on our side were Low, Frutkin, Lee, Lunney, Cernan, Stafford, 

Smylie, Dietz, and Frank. Soviet attendees included Petrov, Bushuyev, Vereshchetin, 

Rumyantsev, Abduyevski (the Deputy Director of the Control Center), Cosmonaut 

Yeliseyev (the Flight Director), Cosmonaut Leonov (the Soyuz Commander) ; Tulin, 

Tsorev, and Kozorev of Intercosmos; Working Group Chairmen Timchenko, Legostaev, 

Syromyatnikov, Nikitin, Galin, and Lavrov; and their interpreter Zonov. During the course 

of the meetings, Bushuyev, Lunney and alternate Working Group Chairmen gave a technical review using a notebook of ‘Vugraphs.” Notebooks had been prepared in both languages so that all of us could follow the review. 

Monday, October 15, lunch time 

Frutkin, Lee, Lunney, and I joined Petrov, Bushuyev, and Vereshchetin for a small luncheon at the “Club of Scientists.” [3] Even though this was very informal and there were 

not too many toasts, it was nevertheless a Soviet-size dinner, with five or six courses, which 

consumed the better part of two hours. 

Monday, October 15, 3:OOp.m. 

We returned to the Presidium for another session involving all participants. This was 

a relatively brief session with only a few questions asked by our side and responses given 

by their side. At the conclusion of the session, both Petrov and I agreed that good progress 

had been made in ASTP, that there were no open questions other than those raised by the 

technical Project Directors in their Summary, and that we had high confidence in meeting our launch date of July 15, 1975. 

Monday, October 15, 4:OO p.m. 

I had asked for an Executive Session to discuss some of the points raised in my letter 

to Keldysh which were not brought out during the technical meeting. Participating on our 

side were Low, Frutkin, Lee, and Lunney, and on their side Petrov, Bushuyev, 

Vereshchetin, Rumyantsev, Tulin, Tsorev, and Kozorev. During the course of this meeting, 

I brought up the subjects of systems failures, participation in factory installation of US. 

equipment, documentation, Stafford’s desire to see actual spacecraft hardware and not 

only mock-ups, and the desirability of a press conference before our departure from 

Moscow. This was a very frank and forceful discussion with our side politely but firmly 

insisting on responsiveness by the Soviet side. 

Monday, October 15, 7:OOp.m. 

The Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had invited the two delegations 

for a small reception at the Embassy. This was quite informal and friendly with no detailed 

discussions about the business at hand. There was great interest in Skylab and the wellbeing of the Skylab’s three astronauts on the part of a number of the Soviet delegation 

and they appeared to be amazed how well Bean and his crew had done after 59 1/2 days 

in space. I also picked up the following incidental piece of information from Petrov: It is 

the Soviet’s view that TU-144 [4] accident was caused by a small French aircraft which flew 

into the TU-144’s flight path. The TU-144 had to veer off and thus flew into the ground. 

Monday, October 15, 8:OO p.m. 

I met in my hotel room with Donnelly, Shafer, Frutkin, and Lee to discuss the Public 

Affairs Plan. Donnelly and Shafer appeared to be quite disturbed by some of the things 

that had happened while they were in Moscow but we agreed not to discuss this any further until we returned to Washington. We then discussed the substance of the Public 

Affairs Plan and agreed that it was not yet ready for ratification without further clarification. 
202 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Tuesday, October 16, 9:OO a.m. 

I paid a brief call on Academician Kotelnikof, the Acting President of the Academy of 

Sciences. This was only a courtesy visit, with some small talk but no substance. 

Tuesday, October 16, 1O:OO a.m. 

Visited the Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of the Academy of 

Sciences. Vinogradov was to have been our host, but we were told that he suffered a bad 

cold and we therefore met with his Deputy, whose name I believe is Sorkhov. 

Tuesday, October 16, 11:OO a.m. 

Next we visited the Institute of Space Research of the Academy of Sciences and met 

its new head, Prof. R. S. Sagdeyev. Sagdeyev speaks good English, is friendly and open, and 

looks like the sort of person with whom we ought to be able to develop good relationships. 

Tuesday, October 16, 3:OOp.m. 

Visited Academician V. A. Kirillin, the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers 

and Chairman of the State Committee for [5] Science and Technology. I had asked for 

this courtesy visit prior to my arrival in Moscow and as soon as I arrived there were many 

questions as to why I wanted to see Kirillin. I assured everybody that this was really only a 

courtesy visit. 

Tuesday, October 16, 7:OO p.m. 

Went to the ballet in the Kremlin and saw “Don Quixote” for the second time during 

one of my Moscow visits. For one who doesn’t like ballet, this should be considered to be 

above and beyond the call of duty. 

Wednesday, October I 7, 8:45 a.m. 

Left the hotel to visit the cosmonauts’ training center at Star City. At Star City we were 

met by General Beregovoy since General Shatalov, who is now in charge, was visiting in 

Japan. We also met the Soyuz 12 cosmonauts, Lazarev and Makarov, as well as ASTP cosmonauts Leonov, Kubasev, and Filipchenko. Petrov and Bushuyev were with us, and we 

were also joined by Feoktistov, whom I had not seen since my January 1971 visit. The reason for this became apparent later. Feoktistov was there to show us through the Salyut 

mock-up. He knew Salyut as well as I had at one time known Apollo, and obviously is either 

the Chief Engineer or Program Manager on Salyut. 

At Star City we had a sit-down briefing, a visit to the Soyuz simulators and docking 

trainers, a discussion of the ASTP version of Soyuz, and then a very detailed description 

of Salyut, with a tour of its high fidelity mock-up. We were also shown the Soyuz 12 space 

suit. We then had a quick tour of the museum and the usual seven- or eight-course dinner 

with the usual number (15 or 20) of toasts. I was a lot smarter this time, though, then I 

had been on the last visit to Star City. I did not participate in any of the “bottoms up” toasts 

and merely sipped my vodka politely each time. 

Wednesday, October 17, 4:OO p.m. 

I had asked for discussion on the ASTP Public Affairs Plan and Petrov and I decided 

to have this meeting while we were at [6] Star City. Participating in this meeting were the 

same ones who participated in the Executive Session on Monday afternoon. At the completion of this meeting we left for Moscow. 

Wednesday, October 17, evening 

The evening was free but Arnold Frutkin and I met in our hotel room for further dis 

cussions on the Public Affairs Plan. Here we wrote some words which we hoped would 

clarify the Plan, for additional discussions the next morning. 

Thursday, October 18, 9:OO a.m. 

Frutkin and I met with Petrov, Vereshchetin, and Rumyantsev on the ASTP Public 

Affairs Plan. During the course of this discussion, we reached a complete understanding 

of all points but did not reach agreement on them. Unfortunately, Donnelly had already 

left Moscow so he was unable to participate with us. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 203 

Thursday, October 18, 10:15 a.m. 

We left the hotel for the visit to the Soviet Mission Control Center. This was a first for 

any Western visitors and, of course, of great interest to us. We arrived there approximately 45 minutes later and had a very detailed tour of the Center. Following the tour, at 2:OO 

p.m., we had lunch at the Control Center, complete with eight different wine, vodka, and 

brandy glasses in front of us, and served by waiters in dinner jackets. It was again a dinner 

with many, many courses and many, many toasts. Chris Kraft’s cafeteria in the Houston 

Mission Control Center was really put to shame. 

Thursday, October 18, 3:30 p. m. 

We visited the Cosmos Pavilion of the USSR Exhibition of Achievements in National 

Economy. This is the USSR Space Museum, which I had seen once before. I, therefore, 

looked at only the new exhibits, which included Mars 3, Lunokhod, and several other lesser exhibits. We also were shown a countdown and launch [7] demonstration using a complete working model of the Baikonur launch complex. 

Thursday, October 15, 5:15 p.m. 

We were back at the Presidium for the “signing ceremony.” Here we signed the 

Summary of Results of our meeting which, in this case, was very brief since the detailed 

Summary had been signed by Lunney and Bushuyev. The Summary, as well as the press 

release, had been worked out by Frutkin and Vereshchetin and had been previously 

approved by Petrov and me during our meeting at Star City. (Copies attached.) 

Thursday, October 18, 5:30 p. m. 

Petrov and I, in the company of Lunney and Bushuyev, held a press conference at the 

Presidium. Petrov preferred to call this a “meeting” with the press because he did not 

invite the foreign press corps (other than US.) nor many of the Soviet press corps. We 

had, however, insisted that the entire American press corps would be invited. After a brief 

introduction by Petrov, I gave an opening statement summarizing our entire visit. We then 

opened it up to questions. Unfortunately, the American press wasn’t smart enough to ask 

some of the more difficult questions like “Where is the Mission Control Center?” or ‘What 

did you learn about the Soyuz I1 failure?” We were prepared on both of these questions. 

However, Lunney did talk to some of the American press after the press conference and 

did at that time get into the record that we had indeed been given a detailed report on 

the Soyuz I1 failure. 

Thursday, October 18, 7:OO p. m. 

The Soviet delegation had a dinner and reception in our honor at the “Hall of 

Mirrors” of the Hotel Prague. This was another formal sit-down dinner with many more 

toasts and, I might add, the second big dinner of the day. Somehow we all survived. 

Friday, October 19, 8:00 a.m. 

We left Moscow Airport on an Aeroflot flight for London and from there back to the 

us. 

[81 GERiERAL OBSERVATIONS 

Moscow 

Moscow seemed to be a friendlier place this time than I remembered it from my previous visits. There were more cars, more lights, people appeared to be livelier, and even 

the hotel staff appeared to be less dour. Either there has been a change or perhaps we 

have become accustomed to their way of life. The fact that I could understand their language this time, at least at times, and the fact that I could speak it well enough to order 

breakfast, get my room key, and leave a wake-up call, may also have had something to do 

with the apparent change in attitude. 
204 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Relations with Academy of Sciences and ASTP Personnel 

In general, both sides seemed to get to the point quicker and easier and appeared to 

reach a fuller understanding of each issue. Discussions were more direct and more open 

and frank. Each side made a special effort to make sure that there would be no misunderstandings in the agreements which were reached. (The single exception appeared to 

be in the negotiation of the Public Affairs Plan where our people have less experience in 

working with the Soviets.) 

NASA Contingent 

The NASA contingent under Glynn Lunney is doing an outstanding job. They are 

diplomatic but firm in all their dealings with their Soviet counterparts. They excel not 

only during the course of technical discussions but also at social functions. 

USSR Reaction 

The general reaction to us and to our work still appears to be one of inferiority, but 

at the same time one that seeks parity. After each visit we were asked, “How did you like 

it?” ‘What did you think?” “How does it compare with yours?” 

International Situation 

We were in Moscow at the height of the Middle East conflict and at a time when 

Handler and Keldysh were exchanging rather firm [9] letters on the Sakharov affair. Yet 

neither one of these subjects came up at any time during our visit and the situation 

appeared to be perfectly normal. (From our side, of course, we missed getting any news 

about the Middle East situation.) As a matter of fact, the New York Times concluded ‘The 

warm treatment of Mr. Low and a team of American specialists, working with their Soviet 

counterparts to prepare for the Apollo-Soyuz mission, was read as a deliberate gesture by 

Moscow to emphasize its interest in Soviet-American cooperation and the detente despite 

the frictions of the Middle East conflict.” 

Personal Reaction 

I had learned a great deal about how to “survive” for a week in Moscow since my first 

visit and, therefore, this visit was very much easier than previous ones had been. Generally, 

I had only one meal per day, that is lunch, which, as I have mentioned previously, was 

always a full dinner. (On Thursday, however, we had two of these dinners.) I always had 

only a very minimal breakfast of tea, bread, and butter at the hotel “cafeteria” and more 

often than not no evening meal at all. I also learned that I could coax a single vodka 

through many toasts. 

TECHNICAL STATUS OF ASTP 

During the course of the status review, Bushuyev gave a basic introduction which was 

followed by status reports on internal preparations in the U.S. and USSR given by Lunney 

and Bushuyev, respectively. Next, each of the Working Group chairmen (either a Russian 

or an American) gave a progress report for their respective groups: mission model, operations plans, experiments, and spacecraft integration; guidance and control, and docking 

aids; mechanical design; communications and tracking; and life support and crew transfer. Each group gave a detailed schedule and report of progress against that schedule. By 

and large, all milestones were met and when they were not being met workarounds were 

available. 

Agreements have been reached on five joint experiments; on reciprocal participation 

of specialists as observers during life support system tests of Apollo and Soyuz; participation in joint seal tests; on a number of safety assessment reports and others [lo] that yet 

had to be written; on studies for the need of electro-magnetic compatibility tests of the 

cable communications system; and on the participation by U.S. specialists at the Soviet 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 205 

launch site during the pre-flight checkout of the VHF AM equipment. In addition, drawings had been exchanged on the Soyuz orbital module and the Apollo docking module. 

The problem of mixed crew descent had been discussed and it was decided that this would 

be considered an “unexamined contingency situation.” Another area open for further discussion is additional dockings subsequent to the first undocking. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, four potential problem areas were described. These 

were: documentation; the desirability of U.S. access to the factory in the event of problems 

during the installation of the VHF equipment; the launch window; and the need for continuing timely exchange of ground and flight test data on ASTP-type Soyuz and Apollo 

vehicles and systems. 

The subject of documentation was discussed during the main meeting as well as during the executive session. I also brought it up privately with Petrov. It seems that a great 

deal of progress has been made by the Soviets in recent weeks in catching up in all areas 

where they were behind on documentation. Nevertheless, Lunney is concerned that as 

time grows shorter they will once again fall behind and we may stub our toe on the entire 

project. The Soviet solution to the problem is a better forecast of documentation requirements. We agree with this point of view but we say that this is not the complete solution 

because we can’t possibly foresee all problem areas. I believe that Petrov finally understood what we were getting at and promised to personally keep an eye on the situation. 

On the subject of access of U.S. specialists during the installation of the US. provided VHF equipment, it is quite clear that they do notwant our people in their factory but 

have no objection to their presence at the launch site. We told them that we accepted their 

view on this but that they should consider now what they would do in the event they were 

to run into trouble and then really required our presence at the factory. I later told Petrov 

during the executive session that we understood that this might present difficulties and 

that he would be wise to work these out now for the contingency situation which might 

require our presence. 

[ 111 Insofar as the launch window is concerned, it now closes on September 22 as a result 

of lighting constraints in the recovery area. Both sides agreed to work on this to see 

whether it cannot be extended into December. 

The last point concerning the timely exchange of ground and flight test data is closely related to the documentation question which I have already discussed. 

VISITS TO USSR FACILITIES 

The present Soviet decision is that Star City, the Control Center, and the launch site 

will be open to our technical people. The Soyuz factory will not. Although we reached 

agreement only on pre-flight activities insofar as the launch site is concerned, Petrov let it 

be known during the press conference that there would be no problem with our specialists staying there during the time of the launch. Insofar as access for the news media is concerned, the present decision seems to be that Star City, or at least parts thereof, will be 

open to the news media but the Control Center and the launch site will not. 

Tom Stafford had also voiced a concern to me about the fact that he would only see 

Soyuz simulators and never actual Soyuz flight hardware. I discussed this concern during 

the executive session. We were told that simulators really were exactly like the flight hardware but nevertheless I said that Stafford was looking for subtle differences and that it was 

quite important to him to see the actual flight hardware. I suggested perhaps that this too 

would be possible at the launch site since their spacecraft arrived there some four to six 

months before the launch. During the course of the executive session, Petrov agreed to 

look into this and later told Stafford that he, thought this would be possible. 
206 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

SOVlET FAILURES 

During the course of the technical visits preceding my review, the Soviets had made a 

detailed presentation of the Soyuz I1 failure and had given us a copy of their failure report. 

They had not discussed any other failures. In the failure report, they also stated that 

Cosmos 496 and Cosmos 573 were both [ 121 unmanned test flights of the changes made 

after the Soyuz I1 failure and prior to the Soyuz 12 flight. During the course of the technical review they also stated that there will be two or three more manned Soyuz flights in 

1974 and prior to the ASTP flight. Soyuz 12, by the way, did not incorporate a docking system while the 1974 flights will incorporate the ASTP-type docking system. 

During the course of the executive session, I told Petrov that we greatly appreciated 

their report on the Soyuz I1 failure but that we were also concerned about additional failures reported in the American press during the summer of 1973. I specifically mentioned 

Salyut 2, which the press had reported as a failure, and Cosmos 557, which some American 

press reports had also called a Salyut-type vehicle. 

Petrov was obviously prepared for the Salyut 2 question, but not for the Cosmos 557 

question. On Salyut 2, he said that this bore no relation to the Soyuz which we will use in 

our joint mission. He stated that Salyut 2 was an improved modernized version of the 

Salyut. Because of the significant changes, the Salyut 2 flight had been planned from the 

beginning as an automated flight and was never intended to be manned. We were told 

that many of the changes were in the automatic control system and these changes clearly 

required an unmanned flight. To add emphasis, this point was repeated many times. 

Petrov went on to say that Salyut 2 should be considered a flight for the development of 

future space stations, that the Salyut is completely independent of the Soyuz, and, finally, 

that it was not important where it returned to the earth, merely that it returned some 

place in the open sea. 

In summary, it was never clearly said whether Salyut 2 was a failure or a success, but 

only that whatever it was did not concern us because it did not relate to Soyuz. 

I again brought up the subject of Cosmos 557 since there was no response on this 

question. Petrov did not respond, but another in the group1 believe it was Tsorev-did. 

He said that Cosmos 557 bore no relation to a manned flight and was neither related to 

Salyut nor to Soyuz. He said the reports in our press obviously were mistaken. 

~31 STAR CITY 

I saw more of Star City this time than I had during my previous visit. Of major significance is the amount of new construction underway at the present time. A new training 

building is being put up especially for ASTP training. It is a 4story building which will 

include classrooms, lecture halls, display rooms for our spacecraft subsystems, etc. In addition, they are building a new hotel and dispensary for the United States team. I think both 

of these projects are underway so that astronaut treatment at Star City won’t appear to be 

shabby in comparison to cosmonaut treatment in Houston. In addition, two or three 

other large buildings for training or to house simulators are under construction, as well 

as a large centrifuge with a capability of up to 20 g’s at an onset rate of 2 g’s per second 

for personnel or 4 g’s per second for equipment. Both the ASTP classroom and the ASTP 

hotel buildings were started after the ASTP agreement had been reached, and neither will 

be quite ready at the time of the November visit but should be ready for the second visit 

of our astronauts. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 207 

Soyuz Simulator and Docking Simulator 

I had seen both of these on my previous visit to Star City in January 1971. Leonov conducted the briefings on both. The basic change in the Soyuz reentry module is that it is 

equipped for only two cosmonauts now while it had room for three during my previous 

visit. There are also provisions to connect pressure suits and the new pressure relief and 

shut-off valves which were installed subsequent to the Soyuz I1 failure are very evident. We 

were told that the simulator was currently in the Soyuz 12 configuration. This configuration did not include a docking hatch. In the orbital module, we were shown the potassium superoxide air regeneration system and during the course of the discussion there was 

much talk about condensation removal. This must at one time have been a problem. On 

the way to the orbital module simulators, one passes through the room in which the optical systems for the displays are mounted. These included both Soyuz and Salyut models. 

The docking trainer also showed no difference from 1971 except that the visual targets for docking now included both the Soyuz and the Salyut, whereas only the Soyuz was 

included in 1971. 

[ 141 Mock-up Area 

We next went to the mock-up area where Bushuyev went over the Paris Air Show display of the Soyuz with the new docking system, as well as an “external mock-up” of each 

of the two Soyuz modules. I put the words “external mock-up” in quotes because for all I 

know this might have been flight hardware. Of interest on this external mock-up was the 

external insulation, which is a fabric blanket, and the fact that the orbital module had an 

old style docking system, and it too was said to be in the Soyuz 12 configuration. Again we 

were told that the ASTP docking system will not be flown until 1974. Bushuyev also indicated that in the Soyuz 12 configuration, Soyuz is a May vehicle if flown alone and a 

6Oday vehicle if flown with Salyut. 

Space Suit 

This was modeled by a technician and described by Cosmonaut Kubasev. It is a fairly 

lightweight garment which, according to Leonov, takes five minutes to don. It will be the 

type of garment used in ASTP. It is expected to be worn only for about two hours at any 

one time and, therefore, has no provisions for sanitation. The outer garment provides the 

strength. The inner garment is a thin rubber bladder, which is sealed by gathering up a 

bunch of rubber, twisting it, and then prig it with a large rubber band. This sealed garment is then tucked underneath the folds of the external garment which is laced shut. 

The suit is worn for launch, docking, undocking, and reentry. 

Salyut 

In the same mock-up building with the Soyuz Paris Air Show exhibit is also the Salyut 

mock-up. Incidentally, this is a fairly new building in which the ASTP training will also be 

conducted. It has a glass partition and we were told that the news media will be able to 

watch from behind that partition when our crews are there. (Even though the building is 

fairly new, somehow they managed to make the bathrooms look as though they were twenty years old.) Feoktistov was our guide around and through Salyut. (He had already met 

with Lunney earlier during the visit because Lunney had asked why we never see him anymore. At that time, [15] Lunney asked him when he would again visit the U.S. Feoktistov 

responded that he had many very serious problems and thought that he would not. be able 

to visit for a long time to come.) Externally, the Salyut we saw differed from the pictures 

I had previously seen in that it had three solar panels mounted on the main part of the 

body. Two were mounted horizontally like wings on an airplane and the third vertically 

but in the same section as the horizontal ones. The horizontal ones could be pivoted to 

get a better exposure to the sun even while the Salyut was flying at an angle. (I don’t recall 

whether the vertical one could also be pivoted.) Feoktistov told us that Salyut could fly in 

any attitude for an indefinite period of time without thermal problems. 
208 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

We entered Salyut through a hatch on the side of what in Skylab would be the multiple docking adapter. I forgot to ask, however, whether it was possible to dock with more 

than one spacecraft at a time. I don't believe it is. We then went into the main section and 

first looked at the instrument panel which is very similar to that of the Soyuz. In fact, many 

of the instruments are identical, as are many of the subsystems. The propulsion system, for 

example, we were told is exactly like the Soyuz system, and the ECS is a version of the 

Soyuz system. In response to my question, Feoktistov said that Salyut nominally had a 

6May lifetime but that this could easily be extended to four months by trading on-board 

consumables for propellants. He also mentioned that food, water, and the air generation 

system could be resupplied but the propellant could not be resupplied. However, if the 

Salyut is in a sufficiently high orbit the amount of propellant used for attitude stabilization is minimal. There are no control moment gyros. We saw two rather primitive fire 

extinguishers, a bungie cord exerciser, including a treadmill, and a wall chart indicating 

the exercises to be taken. Sleep stations are tucked away around a 10-meter focal length 

solar telescope. There were a number of other scientific instruments-spectrometers, 

cameras, star sensors, sun sensors, etc.-all of which were explained in detail by 

Feoktistov. There is also a refrigerator and a food warmer. Finally, the bathroom is at the 

very tail end of the station and does not appear to be as complete as the Skylab bathroom. 

Also at the tail end of the station are two trash air-locks, both used for dumping garbage 

in bags to the outside. They are at approximately f 45" from the vertical and appear to be 

of inordinately heavy construction. 

[ 161 Incidentally, Lunney told me that he inferred from some discussions that there might 

be some heavy flight activity in the March-April time period next year since many of the 

specialists with whom he normally deals will then not be available. 

SOVIET MISSION CONTROL CUTER 

The drive to the Mission Control Center from the hotel took approximately 45 minutes. We headed out of town in a northerly direction, passed the Exhibition of 

Achievements in the National Economy (Space Museum), then the Moscow city limits, 

and then drove for another five minutes or so. The Center is located in the village of 

Kaliningrad. (After leaving the Center and on the way to the press conference, I asked 

Petrov how I should respond to a question concerning the Control Center's location. At 

first he stated that I should merely say that it is at the outskirts of Moscow, but apparently 

he checked this out after we reached the Academy of Sciences again and then told me that 

I could state, if asked, that it is in Kaliningrad. I was not asked.) 

The Center is located within a large complex of buildings surrounded by a security 

wall. The way we entered and left the area it was difficult to see much of the other buildings. They all are several stories high and could house all sorts of equipment. There were 

no antennas in evidence. Some new construction is also going on. Within the Control 

Center building, all of the curtains on the street side were open but all of the curtains fating the rest of the complex were conspicuously drawn. The Control Center building is 

approximately three or four years old. It had been used in the past for the control of 

unmanned flights but the first manned flight under control of this Center was Soyuz 12. 

We were told that it would be used for all future manned flights, Soyuz as well as Salyut, 

but that not all Salyut flights would be controlled from there. Apparently, there will be 

some unmanned Salyut flights to be controlled from somewhere else. The building itself 

is well-constructed and well-appointed. (I will later describe the Institute of Space 

Research, which is very poorly constructed. By contrast, a lot more money was spent on 

the physical building of the Control Center than on the Institute of Space Research.) We 
ESPLOKING THE UNRNO\VN 209 

were first L?ken into the conference room on the second floor where we were greeted by 

Abduyevski (the Deputy Director of the Control Center). Abduyevski was with us all of the 

time but answered few, if any, [ 171 questions. I have the feeling that he is relatively new in 

the Control Center and does not know a great deal about it yet. In fact, he may be there 

solely for the purpose of dealing with NASA. Next we were briefed by Yeliseyev, the Flight 

Director. He used three charts which had been prepared in English as well as in Russian. 

These charts depicted how the Control Center fits within the overall operations (launch, 

network, communications, control, etc.); the flow of information within the Control 

Center; and the organization of flight controllers within the mission operations control 

room. In the first order, there is no difference in any of these areas from the way we operate in Houston. It is possible, however, that some of the functions that are performed at 

CBddard for manned flight control in the US. are actually performed within this Control 

Center in the USSR. 

Data flow from the tracking stations apparently without any preprocessing at the stations. They are then manipulated and formatted within various parts of the Control 

Center and finally displayed in digital form on TV displays in the Mission Operations 

Control Room. Voice transmissions to the spacecraft flow in the opposite direction. There 

are no electronic commands generated within the Control Center. Command decisions 

are made at the Control Center, of course, but the electronic command generation takes 

place at the tracking stations. 

We left the conference room through a second door and found ourselves in the viewing room of the Mission Operations Control Room. This is on a balcony overlooking the 

main floor of the Control Room. I don’t know exactly what I expected to see when I 

entered the Control Room, but somehow I was surprised and had the feeling that I had 

wound up in the midst of a Hollywood set. The Control Room is extremely wellappointed and well-outfitted. It is not very different in appearance from our Control 

Room in Houston. On the front wall there are a number of large screens for either optical or television displays. Television displays are handled with an eidophor just as they are 

in our case. 

As we entered the Control Room, a playback of the Soyuz 12 final countdown was in 

progress. Across the top of the front wall are a number of clocks showing Moscow time, 

elapsed time, station acquisition time, and station loss-of-signal time. On the left hand 

screen were displayed a number of trajectory parameters-apogee, perigee, period, etc. 

The top of the center screen was [ 181 a world map with a lighted dot indicating the spacecraft location. The bottom part of the screen was a piece of flight plan concentrating on 

the “dynamic mode” which refers to the type of control of the spacecraft, as well as a display concerning the type of data being displayed (real time, playback, etc.). On the right 

hand screen the top half was a television display of the booster at the launch site (later on 

it switched to onboard television), while the bottom half of the right hand screen contained additional flight planning parameters. (We saw later that there was access to at least 

this screen from a typewriter at the back of the Control Room, and they were able to type 

the message ‘%’elcome American colleagues” on that screen. 

On the floor were four rows of consoles. The very back row, which is out of sight from 

the balcony, is for the people who set up the communications and data flow within the 

Control Center. Also the Project Director (Bushuyev) will sit in this back row. The Flight 

Director is in the next row from the back and is the focal point for all activity in the 

Control Center. To his left and right, and in the two rows of consoles in front of him, are 

the various support functions, which are pretty much the same as the functions within our 

own Control Center, except that there is no launch vehicle console. Each console has a 

number of television screens, and the Flight Controller at that console calls up all sorts of 
210 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

displays, either out of the computers or from any one of a number of hard copy projectors. Real time data apparently are only a few seconds behind the actual event. They are 

also able to generate within the computer a display which merely indicates whether all 

parameters on a given subsystem are normal or abnormal. If they are normal, that’s the 

end of it. If they are abnormal, the Flight Controller can then go to another display to find 

out which function is specifically abnormal. There are no warning tones with any of the 

displays. The communications system allows the Flight Director to talk to any or all of the 

other consoles as well as to the back rooms. We learned that the Control Center takes over 

after the spacecraft has been separated from the launch vehicle in orbit. Until that time, 

the flight is under full control of the Launch Center. The reason for this was explained to 

us as follows: 

First, there are no booster functions that can be performed by the astronauts themselves. Second, spacecraft functions must also be read out at the Launch Center for checkout purposes, and spacecraft experts are at the Launch Center for checkout purposes. 

[19] For both of these reasons it was more convenient then to handle all abort control at 

the launch site and not at the Mission Control Center. These facts were further borne out 

when we saw the onboard TV of the Soyuz 12 launch. The cosmonauts were lying in their 

couches with their hands folded in their laps. They are obviously just passengers during 

the launch phase. 

In the Mission Operations Control Room Yeliseyev answered all questions concerning 

flight control. He has obviously been there before and has obviously worked in the 

Control Center on at least some simulations if not on Soyuz 12. The questions concerning the Control Center itself were answered by the “Deputy Flight Director for 

Measurements.” I believe his name was Miltsin, but I am not sure of this. At any rate, he 

obviously knew the Control Center well and was able to answer every question which we 

asked. There was no holding back. 

We left the Control Room floor and went behind the large screen where we saw the 

display projectors. From there we looked into a large number of rooms housing, first, 

communications equipment, and then computing equipment. We also went to one of the 

staff support rooms, which was located quite a distance from the Control Room floor, but 

was equipped with consoles similar or identical to those in the Control Room. 

Communications gear included a large number of teletype machines as well as all sorts of 

terminals, recorders, strip charts, and the kind of gear you see in any communications 

center. 

We also saw rooms where all of the onboard tapes were being processed, but none for 

photographic processing. AI1 of the computing equipment appeared to be made in the 

Soviet Union. There are three large digital computers, and my guess would be that they 

are of the generation we used for Mercury and Gemini and not of the Apollo generation. 

The external memory is a drum memory with 16 drums, each storing 32,000 48-bit words 

for each of the computers. I don’t recall the numbers for the internal memories. In addition to the main computers, there are quite a few peripheral computers used for special 

tasks. The computers are used for trajectory as well as telemetry work. 

As I said earlier, every one of our questions was answered in detail, and if there is anything we don’t know it is only because we didn’t have enough time or didn’t know to ask 

the [20] right questions. Lunney and Frank, both of whom are very familiar with our own 

Control Center, should, of course, have a much better view of the real significance of what 

we saw. It was also of interest that the Control Center was obviously not controlling a flight 

while we were there. There was very little activity, although one or two people were in evidence in each or the rooms where we opened a door. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 211 

During one of the toasts at lunch, Abduyevski said that frankly they had been quite 

concerned about our visit because they knew of our wonderful technology and hoped that 

they compared favorably. Many of the private questions we were asked afterwards also concerned our views of their Center. They are obviously very proud of it. 

VISIT TO INSTITUTE OF GEOCHEMISTRY 

This is Vinogradov’s institute where lunar samples are being analyzed. The area of 

sample handling and preliminary analysis is extremely primitive. Samples from Luna 16 

and 20 and from Apollos 11 through 17 were all in storage. The various tools for sample 

analysis throughout the institute also appeared to be extremely primitive and mostly foreign made. We were shown equipment for spectrographic analysis, a scanning electron 

microscope, and equipment to measure magnetic spin resonance. I was impressed by neither the people nor the equipment. 

INSTITUTE OF SPACE RESEARCH 

This institute is in a brand new building which is not yet fully in operation. Apparently 

the building was constructed by a military labor battalion. It is the shoddiest construction 

I have ever seen. 

We were taken to various laboratories in the Institute and saw flight instrumentation 

used in gamma ray astronomy, X-ray astronomy, particles and fields measurements, and 

ionospheric measurements. We also saw some of the instruments which are now on their 

way to Mars. Incidentally, I asked Sagdeyev whether the newspaper reports to the effect 

that no life sensing instruments were on the present Mars spacecraft were indeed true, 

and he said yes, they were not yet ready to send any instruments [21] that were capable of 

searching for life. He implied, however, that they were working on such instruments for 

the next Mars opportunity. He also asked how long it had taken us to develop the instruments we intend to fly on Viking. There was some additional discussion about the present 

flights to Mars and apparently one of the four spacecraft is having telemetry difficulties 

which have not yet been resolved. 

The X-ray type instrumentation we saw apparently has already been flown and some 

results have been published. By their own admission, however, these results are not as 

good as those obtained with Uhuru. They indicated that since their satellite was not in an 

equatorial orbit and was only in orbit for a short period of time, they could not match 

Uhuru’s results. The gamma ray instrumentation we saw had not yet flown on a satellite. 

Insofar as ionospheric measurements are concerned, they apparently have a very active 

program, both with sounding rockets and with satellites. 

In summary, we saw instruments of the type flown in our physics and astronomy and 

planetary programs. Although earth resources work is also going on in the same institute, 

this was not discussed nor were we shown any of the work. Our guess is that theyjust don’t 

have anything worth seeing. 

The remaining time at the Institute of Space Research was spent on a discussion of 

the results of the Venus 8 spacecraft. (Sagdeyev pointed out that this was done especially 

at the request of Keldysh since we had discussed our Mars results with Keldysh.) The briefing was given by Abduyevski, who, as I mentioned earlier, is now the Deputy Director of 

the Control Center. Whereas he was a novice at the Control Center business, he knew all 

about the engineering of the Venus 8 spacecraft as well as the details of the scientific 

results. My guess is that he was deeply involved in the Venus 8 flight. 
212 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

The Venus 8 spacecraft was designed to withstand the Venus surface temperatures for 

a short period of time (approximately 1 hour). This was achieved with good insulation 

and through precooling the spacecraft for several days before it arrived at Venus. 

Abduyevski made a major point of the fact that the insulating properties of the insulation 

change drastically with increasing pressures of the kind encountered at the surface of 

Venus (90 atmospheres), and that new materials with lower “filtration constants” had to 

be designed. 

[22] The most interesting result was the measurement of surface lighting in an area near 

the Venus terminater. The conclusion is that there is adequate lighting on the surface of 

Venus for television. even near the terminater. 

VISIT WTH KTRILLIN 

As I mentioned before, this was a courtesy visit made at my request. After a few words 

of welcome by Kirillin, I opened the discussion by reviewing the status of ASTP and other 

joint projects. 

Kirillin then asked my views concerning the practical results of the exploration of 

space. I spoke of the usual things-communications, weather, and earth resources-as 

well as the potential long-range results of some of the scientific efforts in space. Kirillin 

came back to the point that the future of space must be practical and added one subject 

which I had left out of my discussions of earth resources, and that is geology. He felt that 

major contributions to geology can be made from space. 

I then asked Kirillin where he thought our future cooperation in space might go. My 

purpose in asking this question was to find out whether he had given the matter any 

thought. Apparently he had not and gave only a very vague answer. 

Finally, I brought up the subject of aeronautics, reminding Kirillin that NASA, of 

course, has a major effort in aeronautics research and asking whether he had ever considered any cooperation in this area. His eyes immediately lit up and he started talking 

about some of the commercial discussions now underway with Boeing, General Dynamics, 

and McDonnell Douglas, but he wondered what I had in mind and how NASA might fit 

in. I told him that I had really nothing specific in mind when I brought up the subject but 

that any cooperative efforts with NASA would have to be in the areas of aeronautical 

research as opposed to in the commercial areas. Both of us agreed to think about future 

possibilities in possible cooperation in aeronautics and said that we might pursue this at a 

later time. 

PUBLIC AEJCAIRS PLAN 

Donnelly had negotiated the first phase of a Public Affairs Plan covering preflight 

activities. This plan had been signed by Lunney and Bushuyev; it was to be confirmed by 

Petrov and me. When I met with Donnelly to review the plan he was concerned that the 

definition of news media in the plan was not clear and that it was quite likely that the 

Soviet side would not permit television cameramen to accompany television correspondents. Instead, he felt that they would want to impose on us the usual practice of having 

the Soviets take all television film and of selling that film through Novesty news agency. 

Donnelly, therefore, suggested that we should not confirm the plan until this issue had 

been settled. (Since this was an open issue, it is still not clear to me why he asked Lunney 

to approve the plan in the first place.) 

In subsequent discussions with Petrov, it became clear to me that the plan as signed 

lacked in two other respects: first, it would be quite possible that the Soviet side would 

admit its own news media to ajoint function without at the same time admitting US. news 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 213 

media; and secondly, Donnelly indicated that he had verbal agreements that our astronauts could be accompanied by their own documentary photographer. This was not written down in the plan. 

In my first meeting with Petrov (the meeting at Star City), he appeared to understand 

all the points that needed to be covered, and also appeared to be in agreement with them. 

We adjourned our meeting at Star City, and Frutkin and I wrote additions to the 

Public Affairs Plan in the area of the three points mentioned; that is, the definition of 

news media, the participation of news media from both sides in joint activities, and the 

possibility of bringing along a documentary photographer. When we met again the next 

morning, Petrov was not as willing to include these new additions as he had implied the 

night before. Obviously, he must have checked into this with somebody better versed in 

the ways of the press in the Soviet Union. He threw up a smoke screen about things like 

the copyright agreement and the lighting required whenever TV cameramen were present. I told him that I wanted him to understand that there is only one serious issue in the 

definition of news media and that concerns television [24] cameramen. Will U.S. cameramen be allowed in the Soviet Union or not? The meeting broke up without reaching 

any conclusion. Subsequently, Frutkin had additional discussions with Vereshchetin, and 

I had additional discussions with Petrov. Vereshchetin assured Frutkin before we left 

Moscow that they agreed in principle with all of our points, but they were not sure 

whether they could agree exactly with our language. They promised that they would send, 

at an early date, a new version of the Public Affairs Plan, incorporating the substance of 

our additions. We could then either confirm the plan or, ifwe still did not like it, we would 

have to have further negotiations. 

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 

Comet Kohoutek 

I gave Petrov several reprints of the Kohoutek article which appeared in the October 

issue of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and asked whether the USSR would have any interest 

in participating in the planned observations. On the following day Petrov informed me 

that they would ordinarily be quite interested in participating, thanked me for the invitation, but told me that during the time of the Comet the weather would be so bad in the 

Soviet Union that it was unlikely that any of their ground observatories would be able to 

see it. I took this as a polite way of saying “no.” 

Reaffirmation of the Low-Kddysh Agreement 

Frutkin informed me that he believed that the Low-Keldysh Agreement needed to be 

reaffirmed three years after it was approved, or in the spring of 1974. Although I was not 

quite sure that this was the case, I did bring up the subject with Petrov. He implied that 

the spring of 1974 would be a bad time because this will be the 250th Anniversary of the 

Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Keldysh is expected to be very busy. However, he suggested that we might get together in the summer or fall of 1974. Although he assumed 

that we would get together in the Soviet Union, I issued an invitation to do this in the 

United States. However, I am not sure how necessary it is to do anything other than to 

exchange letters on the subject. 

George M. Low 
214 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Document 1-49 

Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, to Academician M.V. 

Keldysh, President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, March 24, 1975. 

Source: George M. Low Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Rensselaer 

Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. 

The United States viewed the Apollc-Soyuz Test Project as only thefirst step in an ambitious program 

of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. As indicated in this letter; the United States was eager to begin 

discussing next cooperative st@s with the Soviet Union men befwe the Apollc-Soyuz mission was 

completed. 

March 24, 1975 

Academician M. V. Keldysh 

President 

Academy of Sciences of the USSR 

Leninsky Prospect 14 

MOSCOW, V-71, USSR 

Dear Academician Keldysh: 

I understand that the ASTP Technical Directors have now agreed on the schedule of 

activities for the May meetings in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, I plan to arrive in 

Moscow on May 17 and to join in the visit to the launch area scheduled for May 19. I would 

return with the Technical Directors to Moscow and remain for the Flight Readiness 

Review on May 23. 

This schedule would make May 21 and 22 available for other business. I understand 

from Academician Petrov your wish to defer the meeting of full delegations for detailed 

discussions of future cooperation because of the demands of ASTP on the time of your 

specialists and because of the demands of the Academy elections on your own time. We, 

of course, will accede to your wishes in this respect. At the same time, I believe it would be 

most desirable for us to take advantage of this opportunity to meet briefly. 

To assure that your concerns are met, our meeting could be entirely informal in character, with no written record. I would plan to be accompanied only by Mr. Frutkin and our 

interpreter. I would expect to outline the status of our thinking here with regard to future 

possibilities for cooperation. You would, of course, be free to comment or to indicate 

Soviet thinking in the degree you wish. It would be understood that no commitments of 

any kind were implied by either side. 

Our own present thinking, which I would expand on in our meeting, is along three 

lines: 

1. Projects in the area of manned space flight-We would be prepared to consider 

cooperative exploratory [2] studies of future space stations, with a view to pursuing such 

studies to further steps, ifwarranted. We are prepared also to consider such possible interim steps as a Space Shuttle/Salyut mission, as well as Soviet use of the Shuttle in cooperative projects of mutual value. 

2. Projects in the area of unmanned scientific missions-We have in mind the possibility of a lunar farside sample return mission, and we continue to find the long-term 

goal of a future Mars surface sample return mission attractive. 
EXPLONNG THE UNKNOWN 215 

3. Projects in the area of space applications-Here we have in mind such possibilities as coordinated environmental monitoring missions and the exchange of data relating 

to radiation balance, stratospheric ozone monitoring, and search and rescue. 

In the informal conversation which I suggest, we might also refer to a subject which 

Dr. Lunney has already taken up with Prof. Bushuyev in a preliminary way. If the first 

NASA Space Shuttle mission is to have rendezvous and docking capability compatible with 

Soviet spacecraft of the 1979-80 time period, we would need, for development purposes, 

to have agreement by January 1976 on such parameters as diameter of the passageway, 

load factors, communications interface, and atmospheric pressures. To this purpose, we 

would want to put discussion of such parameters by our specialists on a schedule consistent with design and development requirements. 

I hope it would be possible to use the occasion of my presence in Moscow for such an 

informal constructive conversation so that we can preserve the momentum which has 

been generated by our cooperation in ASTP. 

Sincerely, 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

Document 1-50 

Document title: A.P. Aleksandrov, USSR Academy of Sciences, and A.M. Lovelace, NASA, 

“Agreement Between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration of the USA on Cooperation in the Area of Manned Space Flight,” 

May 11, 1977. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D . C. 

This agreement was the result of almost two years of discussions between the United States and the 

Soviet Union. It was signed at the time that the renewal of the US.-Soviet Space Cooperation 

Agreement for a second jiveyear term was announced. The agrement was never implemented. Carter 

administration displeasure with the Soviet record on human rights and then with Soviet involvement 

in Afghanistan led to low F‘ority being given to U.S.4J.S.S.R. space cooperation overall. 

Agreement Between the USSR Academy of 

Sciences and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration of the USA on Cooperation ii the 

Area of Manned Space Flight 

In accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes between the USSR and the USA, dated May 24, 1972, 

and taking into account the results of discussions held in Washington, October 19-22, 

1976, between the delegation of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by the Chairman 
216 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

of the Intercosmos Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician B. N. Petrov, 

and the delegation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA, 

headed by the NASA Deputy Administrator, Dr. A. M. Lovelace, the Academy of Sciences 

and NASA agree to undertake the following steps for further development of cooperation 

between the USSR and USA in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. 

I. Study of the Objectives, Feasibility and Means of Accomplishing Joint Expen’mental Flights of a 

Long-Duration Station of the Salyut-Type and a Reusable “Shuttle Spacecraft (Salyut-Shuttle 

Program) 

In view of the fact that the long orbital stay-time of the Salyut-type station and the 

capabilities of the Shuttle spacecraft commend their use for joint scientific and applied 

experiments and for further development of means for rendezvous and docking of spacecraft and stations of both [2] nations, the two sides agree to establish two joint working 

groups (JWGs) of specialists, charging them with studying the objectives, feasibility and 

means of carrying out ajoint experimental program using the Soyuz/Salyut and Shuttle 

spacecraft: - aJWG for basic and applied scientific experiments. 

- aJWG for operations. 

Within 30 days after the Agreement becomes effective, the sides will inform each 

other of the initial leaders and composition of these JWGs. The work of both Joint 

Working Groups should begin simultaneously. The composition of the JWGs can be 

changed or enlarged at any time as necessary. Appropriate subgroups can be formed. 

In their studies, theJWGs should proceed on the assumption that the first flight would 

occur in 1981. The final date would be set in the course of the joint work. 

First Phase of the Joint Wonking Croups’ Activity 

The following preliminary project documents should be prepared within 612 months 

after the agreement comes into effect: - preliminary proposals for scientific experiments; - preliminary technical proposals for carrying out the program; - preliminary schedules for implementing the program. 

[3] Second Phase of the Joint Wonking Croups’ Activity 

TheJWGs should prepare the following definitive documents within one year ofjoint 

work in the second phase: - 

- a technical description of the joint program and its realization; 

a scientific program for the joint flight; - a schedule for conducting the joint work; - an organizational basis for implementing the program; - a list of additional joint technical documentation which may be required. 

The sides will make the final decision on implementing the program at the end of the 

second phase of theJWGs’ activity. 

The working period of theJWGs in the first and second phases of their activities can 

be shortened. 

Each side will consider the accommodation on its spacecraft of payloads proposed by 

the other side for flight in the ShuttleSalyut program. Such accommodation will be 

undertaken where both sides agree that the payloads concerned are of mutual value and 

interest. 

11. Consideration of the Feasibility of Developing an International Space Platform in the Future 

(International Space Platform Program) 

Both sides recognize that no commitments are made at [4] this stage concerning the 

realization of any project for creating an international space platform. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 217 

The sides agree to establish a Joint Working Group of specialists for preliminary consideration of the feasibility of developing an International Space Platform on a bilateral 

or multilateral basis in the future. 

The JWG will carry out its work on the basis of studies conducted by each side independently and also by the two sides jointly, proceeding from each of the following stages 

to the next as may be mutually agreed: - define at the first stage the scientific and technical objectives which would warrant 

the use of such a space platform. - consider possible configurations appropriate to the objectives identified. 

- formulate proposals on the feasibility and character of further joint work which 

may be desirable in this field. 

At the first stage of its activity, the group will work in close coordination and contact 

with the JWGs set up to consider ways to realize the Salyut-Shuttle program. 

The sides will appoint the initial leaders and members of the JWG for this program 

within two months after the Agreement goes into effect. ThisJWG should formulate preliminary proposals on possible scientific-technical objectives which could be achieved by 

an international station one year after beginning its work. 

[5] This Agreement comes into force at the moment it is signed by both sides. 

For the USSR Academy For the National Aeronautics and 

of Sciences Space Administration of the USA 

A. P. Aleksandrov A. M. Lovelace 

Document 1-51 

Document title: George P. Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, “Agreement Between the 

United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning 

Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes,” April 15, 

1987, with attached “Agreed List of Cooperative Projects.” 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

As part of its overall hostile stance toward the Soviet Union, the administration of President Ronald 

Reagan allowed the basic US.-Soviet Space Cooperation Agreement, signed in I972 and renewed in 

1977, to lapse when it came up for renewal in 1982. U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R became much 

more friendly a@ Mikhail Gorbacheu came into power in 1985, and by I987 the two countries had 

agreed to restart formal cooperative activities in space. This agreement, signed by the US. secretary of 

state and the Soviet fn-eign minister; provided the framework for such cooperation, and an attached 

list identifzs an initial sixteen areas of possibk cooperation. 
218 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

Agreement Between the United States of America 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration 

and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes 

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 

referred to as the Parties; 

Considering the role of the two States in the exploration and use of outer space for 

peaceful purposes; 

Desiring to make the results of the exploration and use of outer space available for 

the benefit of the peoples of the two States and of all peoples of the world; 

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 

Other Celestial Bodies, and other multilateral agreements regarding the exploration and 

use of outer space to which both States are Parties; 

Noting the General Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, 

Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and other 

fields, signed on November 21, 1985; 

Have agreed as follows: 

[21 ARTICLE 1 

The Parties shall carry out cooperation in such fields of space science as solar system 

exploration, space astronomy and astrophysics, earth sciences, solar-terrestrial physics, 

and space biology and medicine. 

The initial agreed list of cooperative projects is attached as an Annex. 

ARTICLE 2 

The Parties shall carry out cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific 

information and delegations, meetings of scientists and specialists and in such other ways 

as may be mutually agreed, including exchange of scientific equipment where appropriate. The Parties, acting through their designated cooperating agencies, shall form joint 

working groups for the implementation of cooperation in each of the fields listed in 

Article 1. The recommendations of the joint working groups shall be subject to the 

approval of each Party in accordance with its appropriate national procedures prior to 

implementation. The designated cooperating agencies shall notify each other of the 

action taken by the parties on the recommendations within three months of their adoption by the joint working groups. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 219 

[31 ARTICLE 3 

The joint working groups shall begin their work with the projects listed in the Annex 

to this Agreement. Revisions to the list of projects in the Annex, which may include the 

identification of other projects in which cooperation would be of mutual benefit, may be 

effected by written agreement between the Parties through a procedure to be determined 

by them. 

ARTICLE 4 

Cooperative activities under this Agreement, including exchanges of technical information, equipment and data, shall be conducted in accordance with international law as 

well as the international obligations, national laws, and regulations of each Party, and within the limits of available funds. 

ARTICLE 5 

This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the cooperation of either Party with 

other States and international organizations. 

ARTICLE 6 

The Parties shall encourage international cooperation in the study of legal questions 

of mutual interest which may arise in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 

purposes. 

[41 ARTICLE 7 

This Agreement will enter into force on the date of signature by the Parties and will 

remain in force for five years. It may be extended for further five-year periods by an 

exchange of notes between the Parties. Either Party may notify the other in writing of its 

intent to terminate this Agreement at any time effective six months after receipt of such 

notices by the other Party. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective 

Governments, have signed this Agreement. 

DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, this 15th day of April, 1987, in the English and 

Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 

[signed George P. Shultz] 

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA: 

[signed Eduard Shevardnadze) 

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

********* 
220 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

[Attachment page 11 

Agreed List of Cooperative Projects 

1. Coordination of the Phobos, Vesta, and Mars Observer missions and the 

exchange of scientific data resulting from them. 

2. Utilization of the U.S. Deep Space Network for position tracking of the Phobos 

and Vesta landers and subsequent exchange of scientific data. 

3. Invitation, by mutual agreement, of co-investigators and/or interdisciplinary scientists’ participation in the Mars Observer and the Phobos and Vesta missions. 

4. Joint studies to identify the most promising landing sites on Mars. 

5. Exchange of scientific data on the exploration of the Venusian surface. 

6. Exchange of scientific data on cosmic dust, meteorites and lunar materials. 

7. Exchange of scientific data in the field of radio astronomy. 

8. Exchange of scientific data in the fields of cosmic gamma-ray x-ray, and submillimeter astronomy. 

9. Exchange of scientific data and coordination of programs and investigations relative to studies of gamma-ray burst data. 

10. Coordination of observations from solar terrestrial physics missions and the subsequent exchange of appropriate scientific data. 

11. Coordination of activities in the study of global changes of the natural environment. 

12. Cooperation in the Cosmos biosatellite program. 

13. Exchange of appropriate biomedical data from U.S. and U.S.S.R. manned space 

flights. 

14. Exchange of data arising from studies of space flight-induced changes of metabolism, including the metabolism of calcium, from both space flight and ground experiments. 

15. Exploration of the feasibility ofjoint fundamental and applied biomedical experiments on the ground and in various types of spacecraft, including exobiology. 

16. Preparation and publication of a second amplified edition of the joint study 

“Fundamentals of Space Biology and Medicine.” 

Document 1-52 

Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement on 

Cooperation in Space,” June 17, 1992. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The I991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the ewgence of the Russian Federation as its pzmary 

successor opened new prospects for space cooperation. The Russian Federation created a civilian space 

agency, the Russian Space Agency, in April 1992; its head was Yuri Koptev, form& an official of 

the Soviet Ministry of General Machine Building. On Ap’l I, 1992, a new NASA Administrator; 

Daniel S. Goldin, took office. The two agency heads met for thejrst time in June 1992 and quickly 

agreed that there were many opportunities for enhanced cooperation, particularly in the area of 

human spacefight. During a summit meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and US. 

President George Bush a few days later; the two countries announced their intention to broaden cooperative relations in space. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 22 1 

June 17, 1992 

Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space 

- The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed on steps to broaden cooperation in the use and exploration of outer space: 

- Space Agreement: A new space agreement has been signed today that puts space 

cooperation between the two countries on a new footing, reflecting their new 

relationship. 

The new agreement provides a broad framework for NASA and the Russian Space 

Agency to map out new projects in a full range of fields; space science, space 

exploration, space applications and the use of space technology. 

Cooperation may include human and robotic spaceflight projects, ground-based 

operations and experiments and other important activities, such as monitoring 

the global environment from space, Mir Space station and Space Shuttle missions 

involving the participation of U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts, safety of 

spaceflight activities, and space biology and medicine. 

Pursuant to the agreement, the two governments will give consideration to the 

following: 

flights of Russian cosmonauts aboard a Space Shuttle mission (STS 60), and 

U.S. astronauts aboard the Mir Space Station in 1993; and a rendezvous docking mission between the Mir and the Space Shuttle in 1994 

or 1995. 

An important part of the agreement involves annual subcabinet consultations led 

at the Under Secretary of State/Deputy Foreign Minister level, a new mechanism 

for high level government review of the bilateral civil space re.lationship between 

the two countries. 

- Joint Study of Space Techno1ogy:The two governments are also announcing detailed technical studies of the possible use of space technology. 

[2] 

NASA is awarding a contract to the Russian firm NPO Energiya; the principal area 

being examined in the Russian Soyuz-TM spacecraft as an interim crew return 

vehicle for Space Station Freedom. 

Other important areas to be studied are the suitability of the Russian developed 

Automated Rendavous and Docking Systa in support of NASA spaceflight activities, 

the use of the Mir Space Station for long-lead time medical experiments, and other 

applications by NASA of Russian hardware. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Space Commerce: Both governments also agreed on steps to encourage private companies to expand their search for new commercial space business. 

The United States has accepted an invitation from the Russian Federation for 

American businessmen to visit Russia. The Department of Commerce will lead a 

delegation of U.S. aerospace firms to Russia in the near future on a space technology assessment mission. 

The Russian Federation has accepted an invitation from the United States to send 

a delegation of business leaders to the United states to meet with their counterparts in the American aerospace private sector. 

Space Launch: Reflecting its support for economic reform in Russia, the United States 

has decided to consider favorably a decision expected by the INMARSAT 

Organization in July 1992 to launch one of the INMARSAT 3 satellites from Russia. 
222 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

- The INMARSAT 3 satellite is manufactured primarily in the United States. If 

approved by INMARSAT, this would mark the first time that a U.S. manufactured 

commercial satellite would be launched from Russia. 

The United States and Russia have agreed to negotiate a bilateral agreement on 

technology safeguards for the INMARSAT 3 satellite to enable issuance of a U.S. 

export license. 

The United States and the Russian Federation support the application of market 

principles to international competition in the provision of launch services, 

including avoidance of unfair trade practices. 

Recognizing Russia’s current transition to a market economy, and in order to 

allow consideration of future proposals involving Russian launch of U.S. satellites, 

the Russian Federation and the United States have agreed to enter into international negotiations on an expeditious basis to develop international guidelines 

concerning competition in the launch of commercial satellites. 

In the case of INMARSAT, the Russian Federation has also assured the United 

States that the terms and conditions of the Russian proposal, including pricing, are 

consistent with those that would normally be offered in the international market, 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Document 1-53 

Document title: “Implementing Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency of the 

Russian Federation on Human Space Flight Cooperation,” October 5, 1992. 

Document 1-54 

Document title: Office of the Vice President, The White House, “United States-Russian 

Joint Commission on Energy and Space-Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space,” 

September 2, 1993. 

Document 1-55 

Document title: “Protocol to the Implementing Agreement Between the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the Russian 

Space Agency of the Russian Federation on Human Space Flight Cooperation of October 

5,1992,” December 16,1993. 

Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

As a result of the US.-Russian dialogue on expanded space cooperation initiated in June 1992, 

NASA and the Russian Space Agency signed an agreement in October 1992 to exchange cosmonauts 

and astronauts on each others’ human spaceJight missions and to dock the Space Shuttle with the 

Russian space station Mir. During itsfirst year in office, the administration of President Bill Clinton 

and Vice President A1 Gore moved to expand substantially existing US.-Russian cooperation in 

human spaceflight, in effect merging large portions of the effmts of the only two countries with the 

capability of sending people into space; such a move was announced in September 1993. The political decision to undertake this expansion was linked to broader US.-Russian fweign policy concerns, 

such as stemming the proliJeation of missik technology capability and providingjob opportunities for 

the Russian aerospace sectox The United States agreed to provide funding for various Russian 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 223 

activities and hardware associated with the expanded cooperation; this transfer broke with the longstanding NASA tradition that its cooperative programs did not involve an exchange of funds. Afm 

a few more months of discussion, NASA and the Russian Space Agenq decided to increase the intensity of their interactions, particularly with respect toflights of the US. Space Shuttle to dock with the 

Russian space station Mir. On December 16, 1993, the heads of the two agencies signed a protocol to 

the October 1992 agreement that rejlected this new he1 of activity. 

Document 1-53 

Implementing Agreement Between the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

of the United States of America and the 

Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation on 

Human Space Flight Cooperation 

PREAMBLE 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereafter referred to as 

“NASA”) and the Russian Space Agency (hereafter referred to as “EA), jointly referred 

to as “The Parties,” have agreed to cooperate in the area of human space flight. This cooperative program consists of three inter-related projects: the flight of Russian cosmonauts 

on the U.S. Space Shuttle; the flight of U.S. astronauts on the Mir Space Station; and a 

joint mission involving the rendezvous and docking of the U.S. Space Shuttle with the Mir 

Space Station. These will be jointly referred to in the future as the “Shuttle-Mir Program.” 

The Parties have agreed as follows: 

ARTICLE I: DESCRIPTION OF COOPERATION 

1. The cooperation set forth in this Implementing Agreement will be undertaken in 

accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian 

Federation concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for 

Peaceful Purposes, of June 17, 1992 (hereinafter the June 17, 1992 Agreement). 

2. An experienced cosmonaut will fly aboard the Space Shuttle on the STS-60 mission, which is currently scheduled for November 1993. The cosmonaut will be an integral 

member of the orbiter crew, and will be trained as a Mission Specialist on Shuttle systems, 

flight operations, and manifested payload procedures following existing Shuttle practices. 

3. The RSA will nominate two cosmonauts, for approval by NASA as candidates for 

the STSGO Space Shuttle mission. In accordance with Article IV, one of the two cosmonauts will be designated the Primary Russian-sponsored crewmember, with the other 

being designated as a backup crewmember. Both crewmembers will receive [2] Mission 

Specialist Astronaut training, until the time that the STS-60 crew begins dedicated mission 

training. From that point, the backup crewmember will receive as much training as practical. The two cosmonauts will be scheduled for arrival at the Johnson Space Center in 

Houston, Texas, in October, 1992. Their names, experience and personal history will be 

provided to NASA by the RSA prior to the initiation of training. 
224 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

4. An experienced NASA astronaut will fly on the Mir Space Station as an integral 

long-duration crewmember (e.g., longer than 90 days) participating as an integral member of the crew in a variety of operations and experiments. The timing of this flight will 

be consistent with a Shuttle docking flight in 1994 or 1995. The astronaut will be flown to 

the Mir on a Soyuz transportation system. Special emphasis will be placed on science, particularly life science, as well as engineering and operational objectives. Astronaut and cosmonaut participation before, during and after the longduration flight will be emphasized 

to accomplish all flight objectives. 

5. NASA will nominate two astronauts for approval by RSA as candidates for a longduration Mir mission (e.g., longer than 90 days) to occur in conjunction with the rendezvous and docking of the Space Shuttle with Mir. In accordance with Article IV, one of 

the two astronauts will be designated as the primary US.-sponsored crewmember, with the 

other being designated as the backup crewmember. Both crewmembers will receive full 

cosmonaut training with their cosmonaut crew. 

The two astronauts will be scheduled to begin training no later than 12 months prior 

to the agreed upon flight date. They will be US. citizens, and their names, experience and 

personal history will be provided to RSA by NASA no later than one month prior to the 

initiation of training. 

6. The Space Shuttle will rendezvous and dock with Mir in conjunction with the 

flight of the NASA astronaut aboard Mir. NASA will transport two Russian cosmonauts in 

the Shuttle to replace the two cosmonauts on board Mir. Training for these cosmonauts 

will be in accordance with Article V of this Implementing Agreement. Life sciences experiments involving the NASA astronaut and the two cosmonauts who have been on board 

the Mir for 90 days or more will be conducted while the Shuttle is docked to the Mir. The 

NASA astronaut and the two cosmonauts who have been on the Mir for 90 days or more 

will be returned in the Shuttle for continued postflight life sciences experiments. 

7. As part of the technical discussions leading up to the Mir rendezvous, joint implementation teams will explore the use of the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Assembly 

developed by NPO Energiya, consistent with the June 17, 1992 Agreement and this 

Implementing Agreement. (If such used appears technically [ 31 feasible, NPO Energiya 

will enter into a separate contract with an American company to provide, modify or integrate this device or its derivatives with the Shuttle.) 

8. Joint implementation teams will also consider exchange of Mir crewmembers, 

transportation of experimental and logistic equipment, and Extra Vehicular Activity 

(EVA), and will define the respective responsibilities of the Parties, consistent with the 

June 17,1992 Agreement and this Implementing Agreement. The implementation teams 

will jointly develop a contingency plan which will cover procedures for investigation, consultation, and exchange of data in the event of a mishap which causes damage to equipment or injury to personnel during the conduct of the Shuttle-Mir Program. 

9. Consistent with the June 17, 1992 Agreement, each Party will be responsible for 

funding its respective responsibilities, consistent with its domestic laws and regulations, 

and subject to the availability of appropriated funds. All training, in-country travel and living arrangements, flight and other associated posts for each Party’s crew members and 

dependents will be borne by the host country, in a manner it deems appropriate, at a standard afforded its own flight crews. 

ARTICLE 11: DESIGNATION OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ORGANIZATIONS 

Designated Points of Contact for the implementation of the activities described herein are contained in Annex 1 to this Implementing Agreement. Annex 1 may be modified 

by either Party upon notification to the other Party. NPO Energiya and the Yuri Gagarin 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 225 

Cosmonaut Training Facility will be the lead technical implementors of the Shuttle-Mir 

Program in Russia. 

ARTICLE 111: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TEAMS 

The Parties agree to establish joint implementation teams to coordinate and implement the activities described herein. Designated team members will be identified by each 

side within 30 days of the entry into force of this Implementing Agreement. Each Party 

may modify the membership of its joint implementation teams at its discretion. The joint 

implementation teams will develop a plan for implementation of the activities described 

herein on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit, consistent with the June 

17,1992 agreement. 

ARTICLE W. SELECTION OF CANDIDATES 

1. Selection of flight candidates will be based on mutual agreement prior to any 

announcement. Candidates selected will be [4] current, active members of each side’s 

astronaut or cosmonaut corps. 

2. Flight candidates selected will have previous space flight experience. The cosmonauts selected for training shall have sufficient knowledge in verbal and written English. 

The NASA astronauts selected for training shall have sufficient knowledge in verbal and 

written Russian. Information that each side’s candidates meet the criteria in this Article 

shall be exchanged prior to any announcement on crew selections. 

ARTICLE V TRAINING 

1. Throughout their training programs, the Russian cosmonauts will be based at the 

Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, and will be assigned to the Astronaut Office in 

the Flight Crew Operations Directorate. The NASA astronauts will be based at Yuri 

Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Facility (“Star City”) in the Moscow Region. 

2. At the beginning of the training programs, each Party will require its candidates 

to enter into a Standards of Conduct Agreement with the other Party, which will include, 

inter alia, installation safety and security matters, provisions related to prohibitions on use 

of position for private gain, authority of the Mission Commander, and limitations on use 

of information received during training and flight. Each Party will ensure that its candidates comply with the provisions of such an agreement. 

3. The candidates will have completed all aspects of the required training to the full 

and final satisfaction of the host Party prior to certification for flight. 

4. By mutual agreement, the Parties will identify any support personnel required for 

the flight candidates selected. 

ARTICLE VI: SCIENCE 

1. The Parties will establish a Scientific Working Group to coordinate appropriate 

scientific experiments and activities to be conducted by each side on the respective missions. Designated working group members will be identified by each side within 30 days 

of the entry into force of this Implementing Agreement. Each Party may modify the membership of its Scientific Working Group at its discretion. 

2. Results of the scientific experiments conducted by each Party under this 

Implementing Agreement will be made available to the scientific community in general 
226 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

through publication in appropriate journals of other established channels. In the event 

[5] such reports or publications are copyrighted, NASA and RSA shall have a royalty-free 

right under the copyright to reproduce, distribute and use such copyrighted work for 

their own purposes. 

ARTICLE VII: LIABILITY 

1. A comprehensive cross-waiver of liability between the two Parties and their related entities (e.g., contractors, subcontractors, and other participating entities associated 

with the Parties including any state from which RSA procures a launch to carry out its 

obligations under this agreement) shall apply to the activities under this agreement. The 

cross-waiver of liability shall be broadly construed. The terms of the waiver are set out in 

Annex 2. 

2. Except as provided in Annex 2, the Government of the United States and the 

Government of the Russian Federation will remain liable in accordance with the 

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability 

Convention”) of March 29, 1972. In the event of a claim arising out of the Liability 

Convention, the governments will consult promptly on any potential liability, on any 

apportionment of such liability, and on the defense of such claim. 

ARTICLE VIII: INVENTION AND PATENT RIGHTS 

1. With the exception of the intellectual property rights referred to in Article X, 

Exchange of Technical Data and Goods, and subject to national laws and regulations, provisions for the protection and allocation of intellectual property rights created during the 

course of cooperation under this Implementing Agreement are set forth in Annex 1 of 

the June 17, 1992 Agreement. 

2. Except as set forth in paragraph 1, nothing in this Implementing Agreement shall 

be construed as granting or implying any rights to, or interest in, patents or inventions of 

the Parties or their contractors and subcontractors. 

ARTICLE IX: PUBLIC INFORMATION 

Release of public information regarding these joint activities may be made by the 

appropriate agency for its own portion of the program as desired and, insofar as participation of the other is involved, after suitable consultation. 

[6] ARTICLE X: EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL DATA AND GOODS 

Each Party is obligated to transfer to the other Party only those technical data and 

goods which both Parties agree are necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the transferring Party under this Implementing Agreement, subject to the following: 

1. Interface, integration, training and safety data (excluding detailed design, manufacturing, and processing data, and associated software) will be exchanged by the Parties 

without restrictions as to use or disclosure, except as otherwise restricted by national laws 

or regulations relating to export controls. 

2. In the event a Party finds it necessary to transfer technical data other than that 

specified in paragraph 1 above, in carrying out its responsibilities under this 

Implementing Agreement that are proprietary, and for which protection is to be maintained, such technical data will be marked with a notice indicating that it shall be used and 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 227 

disclosed by the receiving Party and its contractors and subcontractors only for the purposes of fulfilling the receiving Party’s responsibilities under this Implementing 

Agreement, and that the technical data shall not be disclosed or retransferred to any 

other entity without prior written permission of the furnishing Party. The receiving Party 

agrees to abide by the terms of the notice, and to protect any such marked technical data 

from unauthorized use and disclosure. 

3. In the event a Party finds it necessary to transfer technical data and goods in 

carrying out its responsibilities under this Implementing Agreement that are exportcontrolled, and for which protection is desired, the furnishing Party will mark such technical data with a notice and identify such goods. The notice or identification will indicate 

that such technical data and goods will be used and such technical data will be disclosed 

by the receiving Party and its contractors and subcontractors only for the purposes of fulfilling the receiving Party’s responsibilities under this Implementing Agreement. The 

notice or identification will also provide that such technical data will not be disclosed, and 

such technical data and goods will not be retransferred, to any other entity without prior 

written permission of the furnishing Party. The Parties will abide by the terms of the 

notice or identification and will protect any such marked technical data and identified 

goods. 

4. The Parties are under no obligation to protect any unmarked technical data or 

unidentified goods. 

[7] ARTICLE XI: CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION 

1. Each Party will facilitate the movement of persons and goods necessary to implement this Implementing Agreement into and out of its territory, subject to its laws and regulations. The RSA will take steps to expedite such movement of persons and goods to 

launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations under this Implementing Agreement. 

2. Subject to its laws and regulations, each Party will facilitate provision of the appropriate entry and residence documentation for the other Party’s nationals and families of 

nationals who enter, exit, or reside within its territory in order to carry out the activities 

under this implementing Agreement. The RSA will take steps to arrange for such provision for such activities at launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations under this 

Implementing Agreement. 

3. The Parties agree to arrange for free customs clearance for entrances to, and exits 

from, their respective countries for equipment required for implementation of the activities described herein. The RSA will take steps to arrange for such clearances to and from 

launch facilities it will utilize to fulfill its obligations under this Implementing Agreement. 

ARTICLE XII: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 

1. The Parties will consult promptly with each other on all issues involving interpretation or implementation of this Implementing Agreement. In the case of a continuing 

dispute, such matters will first be referred to the Points of Contact identified in Annex 1. 

2. Any matter which has not been settled in accordance with the above paragraph 

will be referred to the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the First Deputy 

of the General Director of the RSA, or their designees, for resolution. Issues not resolved 

at this level will be referred to the NASA Administrator and the RSA General Director. 
228 THE DEVELOPMENT OFINTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

ARTICLE XIII: DURATION OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT 

1. This Implementing Agreement will terminate five (5) years following its entry 

into force or upon completion of all activities covered by this Implementing Agreement, 

whichever comes first. This Implementing Agreement may be extended or amended by 

written agreement of the Parties. 

[8] 2. Either Party may terminate this Implementing Agreement upon six months written notice to the other Party. Termination of this Implementing Agreement shall not 

affect the Parties’ continuing obligations under Articles VII, VI11 and X, unless otherwise 

agreed to by the Parties. 

ARTICLE XM ENTRY INTO FORCE 

This Implementing Agreement will enter into force upon an exchange of diplomatic 

notes between the Governments of the United States of America and the Russian 

Federation confirming acceptance of its terms and that all necessary legal requirements 

for entry into force have been fulfilled. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective 

Governments, have signed this Implementing Agreement. 

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, this 5th day of October, 1992, in Russian and English 

languages, both texts being equally authentic. 

Daniel S. Goldin 

FOR THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Yuri Koptev 

FOR THE RUSSIAN SPACE AGENCY 

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

Document 1-54 

Dl THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Vice President 

September 2,1993 

United States-Russian Joint Commission 

on Energy and Space 

Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space 

Having reviewed the status of the agreement between the United States of America 

and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes dated June 17, 1992, the Parties note with satisfaction 

past agreement on the following: the flight of a Russian cosmonaut on the Space Shuttle 

System in 1993 and 1994, and American astronauts on the MIR station, the docking and 

a joint flight of these two space complexes in 1995. These activities are consistent with the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 229 

national space programs of both countries and the overall development of a spirit of trust, 

partnership, and long-term political and scientific and technological cooperation 

between Russia and the United States. 

Based on the agreement reached at a meeting of the U.S. and Russian Presidents in 

Vancouver on April 3-4, 1993 and June 17, 1992, the Parties see great promise and mutual benefit through cooperation in space science and exploration activities. 

Given the particular importance for Russia and the U.S. of their respective efforts in 

developing a new generation of orbital stations for scientific and technological progress 

and human activities in space, the Parties regard further cooperation in this area as most 

important, and consistent with the interests of both Russia and the U.S., as well as the 

broader international community. 

With this in mind it is the intent of the U.S. and Russia to undertake a cooperative 

human space flight program. Interim investigation has already indicated potential advantages of joint cooperative activities in a truly international space station program. The 

Parties intend to pursue such cooperation in accordance with the following principles: 

joining on a mutually beneficial basis the resources and the scientific, technological, and industrial potentials of Russia and the U.S. in space activities to carry out 

a large-scale program of scientific, technical, and technological research; 

working with each of our current partners, and in accordance with earlier 

international obligations assumed by each of the Parties under the Freedom and 

MIR projects; 

operating in an orbit which is accessible by both U.S. and Russian resources; 

utilizing compatible service systems, enhancing reliability of the station and 

increasing the flexibility of transportation and technical maintenance; 

performing activities under cooperative programs on mutually beneficial terms, 

and including on a contract basis the procurement of individual systems and units 

or the provision of services. 

The first phase of our joint programs begins immediately and is designed to form a 

basis for resolution of engineering and technical problems. This initial phase encompasses an expansion of our bilateral program involving the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Russian 

MIR Space Station. The MIR will be made available for U.S. experiments for up to two 

years of total U.S. astronaut stay time. The number of Space Shuttle flights and the length 

of crew stay time will depend upon the details of the experiments to be defined by 

November 1, 1993. During phase one, the use of the Russian modules “Priroda” and 

“Spektr,” equipped with U.S. experiments, could undertake a wide-scale research program. These missions will provide valuable in-orbit experience in rendezvous, docking, 

and joint space-based research in life sciences, microgravity, and Earth resources. It will 

bring to reality performance of large-scale space operations in the future. The Parties consider it is reasonable to initiate in 1993 the joint development of a solar dynamic power 

system with a test flight on the Space Shuttle and MIR in 1996, the joint development of 

environmental control and life support systems, and the joint development of a common 

space suit. 

Subsequent joint efforts on the second phase will be directed to the use of a Russian 

MIR module of the next generation, in conjunction with a U.S. laboratory module and 

the U.S. Space Shuttle. This facilitywould provide an interim human-tended space science 

capability where significant scientific experimentation can take place in a microgravity 

environment and also provide practical experience gained out of the use of different 

transportation systems (including the US. Space Shuttle and the Russian Proton), performance of complex construction and assembly efforts and command and control 

process of orbital structure of considerable complexity. Successful implementation of this 

phase could constitute a key element of a truly international space station. 

- 

- 

[2] - 

- 

- 
230 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

It is envisioned that the U.S. will provide compensation to Russia for services to be 

provided during phase one in the amount of $100 million dollars in F‘Y 1994. Additional 

funding of $300 million dollars, for compensation of phase one and for mutually 

[3] agreed upon phase two activities, will be provided through 1991. This funding and 

appropriate agreements will be confirmed and signed by no later than November 1,1993. 

Other forms of mutual cooperation and compensation will be considered as appropriate. 

All the above programs are mutually connected and are considered as a single package, the main goal of which is to create an effective scientific research complex earlier and 

with less cost than if done separately. The Parties are convinced that a unified Space 

Station can offer significant advantages to all concerned, including current U.S. partners, 

Canada, Europe, and Japan. 

The precise planning process and organization of drafted phases ofjoint activity will 

give the opportunity to benefit both countries through expanded cooperative efforts on 

the space station project. 

The Parties hereby instruct NASA and RSA, in pursuance of this Joint Statement, to 

develop by November 1, 1993, a detailed plan of activities for an international space station. This will serve as the basis for early review and decision within each government and 

as the basis for consultations with the international partners. Upon conclusion of the 

process of government approval and consultation, appropriate implementing agreements 

will be signed. NASA and RSA will include within the plan overall configuration, volumes, 

and forms of contributions and mutual compensation for Russian and U.S. activities. 

Document 1-55 

Protocol to the Implementing Agreement Between the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the 

United States of America and the 

Russian Space Agency of the Russian Federation 

on Space Flight Cooperation 

of October 5,1992 

PREAMBLE 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereafter referred to as 

“NASA) and the Russian Space Agency (hereafter referred to as “RSA) ,jointly referred 

to as “the Parties”; 

Consistent with the Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space issued by Vice President 

Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on September 2, 1993; desiring to broaden the 

scope of the Implementing Agreement of October 5, 1992, on Human Space Flight 

Cooperation (hereinafter the October 5, 1992 Agreement) to encompass an expanded 

program of activities for cooperation involving the Russian Mir-1 Space Station and the 

U.S. Space Shuttle Program; 

Having decided that the enhanced cooperative program will consist of a number of 

inter-related projects in two phases; 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 231 

Having determined that Phase One will include those activities described in the 

October 5, 1992, Agreement and known as the Shuttle-Mir Program, including the 

exchange of the Russian Mir-1 crew and crew member participation in joint mission science, as well as additional astronaut flights, Space Shuttle dockings with Mir-1, and other 

activities; 

Having further determined that Phase Two of the enhanced cooperative program will 

involve use of a Russian Mir module of the next generation mated with a U.S. laboratory 

module operated on a human-tended basis in conjunction with the Space Shuttle, operating in a 51.6 degree orbit which is accessible by both U.S. and Russian resources, to perform precursor activities for future space station-related activities of each Party, with 

launch to occur in 1997; and 

Intending that activities in Phase Two would be effected through subsequent specific 

agreements between the Parties. 

Have agreed as follows: 

[2] ARTICLE I: DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES 

1. This Protocol forms an integral part of the October 5, 1992 Agreement. 

2. An additional Russian cosmonaut flight on the Space Shuttle will take place in 

1995. The back-up cosmonaut currently in training at NASA's Johnson Space Center will 

be the primary cosmonaut for that flight, with the STSGO primary cosmonaut acting as 

back-up. During this mission, the Shuttle will perform a rendezvous with the Mir-1 Space 

Station and will approach to a safe distance, as determined by the Flight Operations and 

Systems Integration Joint Working Group established pursuant to the October 5, 1992 

Agreement. 

3. The Space Shuttle will rendezvous and dock with Mir-1 in October-November 

1995, and, if necessary, the crew will include Russian cosmonauts. Mir-1 equipment, 

including power supply and life support system elements, will also be carried. The crew 

will return on the same Space Shuttle mission. This mission will include activities on Mir1 and possible extravehicular activities to upgrade solar arrays. The extravehicular activities may involve astronauts of other international partners of the Parties. 

4. NASA-designated astronauts will fly on the Mir-1 space station for an additional 

21 months for a Phase One total of two years. This will include at least four astronaut 

flights. Additional flights will be by mutual agreement. 

5. The Space Shuttle will dock with Mir-1 up to ten times. The Shuttle flights will be 

used for crew exchange, technological experiments, logistics or sample return. Some of 

those flights will be dedicated to resources and equipment necessary for life extension of 

Mir-I. For schedule adjustments of less than two weeks, both sides agree to attempt to 

accommodate such adjustments without impacting the overall schedule of flights. 

Schedule adjustments of greater than two weeks will be resolved on a case-by-case basis 

through consultations between NASA and RSA. 

6. A specific program of technological and scientific research, including utilization 

of the Mir-1 Spektr and Priroda modules, equipped with U.S. experiments, to undertake 

a wide-scale research program, will be developed by the Mission Science Joint Working 

Group established pursuant to the October 5, 1992 Agreement. The activities carried out 

in this program will expand ongoing research in biotechnology, materials sciences, biomedical sciences, Earth observations and technology. 

7. Technology and engineering demonstrations applicable to future space station 

activities will be defined. Potential areas include but are not limited to: automated rendezvous and docking, electrical power systems, life support, command and [3] control, 
232 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 

microgravity isolation system, and data management and collection. Joint crew operations 

will be examined as well. 

8. The Parties consider it reasonable to initiate in 1993 the joint development of a 

solar dynamic power system with a test flight on the Space Shuttle and Mir in 1996, the 

joint development of spacecraft environmental control and life support systems, and the 

joint development of a common space suit. 

9. The Parties will initiate a joint crew medical support program for the benefit of 

both sides' crew members, including the development of common standards, requirements, procedures, databases, and countermeasures. Supporting ground systems may also 

be jointly operated, including telemedicine links and other activities. 

10. The Space Shuttle will support the above activities, including launch and return 

transportation of hardware, material, and crew members. The Shuttle may also support 

extravehicular and other space activities. 

11. Consistent with U.S. law, and subject to the availability of appropriated funds, 

NASA will provide both compensation to the RSA for services to be provided during Phase 

One in the amount of US $100 million in FY 1994, and additional funding of US $300 million for compensation of Phase One and for mutually-agreed upon Phase Two activities 

will be provided through 1997. This funding will take place through subsequent NASARSA and/or through industry-to-industry arrangements. Reimbursable activities covered 

by the above arrangements and described in paragraphs 3-8 will proceed after these 

arrangements are in place and after this Protocol enters into force in accordance with 

Article 111. Specific Phase One activities, schedules and financial plans will be included in 

separate documents. 

12. Implementation decisions on each part of this program will be based on the cost 

of each part of the program, relative benefits to each Party, and relationship to future 

space station activities of the Parties. 

13. The additional activities will not interfere with or otherwise affect any existing, 

independent obligations either Party may have to other international partners. 

ARTICLE 11: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TEAMS 

The coordination and implementation of the activities described herein will be conducted through the Joint Working Groups established pursuant to the October 5, 1992 

Agreement or such other joint bodies as may be established by mutual agreement. 

[4] ARTICLE 111: ENTRY INTO FORCE 

This Protocol will enter into force upon an exchange of diplomatic notes between the 

Governments of the United States of America and the Russian Federation confirming 

acceptance of its terms and that all necessary legal requirements for entry into force have 

been fulfilled. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective 

Governments, have signed this Protocol. Done at Moscow, in duplicate, this sixteenth day 

of December, 1993, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally 

authentic. 

FOR THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Daniel S. Goldin 

FOR THE RUSSIAN SPACE 

AGENCY 

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 

Yuri Koptev 
Chapter Two 

Invitation to Struggle: 

The History of Civilian-Military 

Relations in Space 

by Dwayne A. Day 

The history of American civilian and military cooperation in space is one of competing interests, priorities, and justifications at the upper policy levels, combined with a 

remarkable degree of cooperation and coordination at virtually all operational levels. It is 

a history of the evolution of responsibility for space exploration. Both the Eisenhower and 

Kennedy administrations gradually decided which organization should be responsible for 

which activities, eventually establishing these responsibilities as fact. This process did not 

result in a smooth transition; first the Army and then the Air Force saw its hopes for assuming the predominant role in space exploration subsumed to larger national priorities. It 

proved to be most painful for the Air Force, which had the biggest dreams €or space and 

saw them dashed as NASA achieved all of the glory during the Cold War space race. 

This history can be separated into two broad eras-cooperation prior to NASA's creation and cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD), with a 

transition period in between. This transition is an aspect that is frequently overlooked in 

discussions of the subject, for civil-military cooperation in space did not begin with the 

establishment of NASA-it changedwith the creation of NASA, and it did so dramatically. 

Prior to NASA's establishment, the military had had the upper hand in.determining all 

space priorities, and civilian interests, when considered at all, were clearly secondary. 

There were also multiple military space actors-primarily the Air Force and the Armyand it was not clear which would emerge dominant. After NASA was created, the Army 

space program largely disappeared-being subsumed by NASA. The Air Force became the 

dominant military space actor and often found itself playing a secondary, supporting role 

to the civilian program. 

This history is also the history of the evolution of an idea-that space exploration, 

particularly human exploration, should be a civilian pursuit. Throughout history there is 

ample precedent for both civilians and the military undertaking exploratory missions with 

government support, but early American plans for human space exploration centered on 

military missions. Wernher von Braun's wheeled space station and planned trips to the 

Moon all involved the use of military crews in what were envisioned as essentially military 

missions. The popular culture of the day echoed this vision, as in B-grade science fiction 

films such as Project Moonbase and The Conquest ojSpace. Also, science fiction and pseudonews articles depicted a military space force dedicated to conquering the heavens. Human 

space exploration seemed, at least in much of the popular consciousness, to be a logical 

evolution of existing military missions and an extension of the idea of military pacification of the frontier. Certainly, this was the view of the uniformed leadership of the Air 

Force immediately after Sputnik. 

Reality was to prove to be more complex and more nuanced than the popular vision, 

however, in large part because of the desire to make the American space program stand 

as a positive, peaceful beacon for Western-style democracy. The U.S. Air Force strove to 

233 
234 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

find a military mission for humans in space. It could not. Once the two main reasons to 

place humans in space-science and prestige-became civilian pursuits, the Air Force, 

after more than a decade trying, could find no cost-effective reason to place humans in 

orbit. 

The idea that there was no role for military officers in space found resistance within 

the Air Force, which tried unsuccessfully to portray space as merely an expansion of its 

current operating realm. Prior to Sputnik, there was only limited enthusiasm within the 

Air Force for space programs and expenditures. There was a core group of space enthusiasts within the Air Force, but they lacked both authority and resources. After Sputnik, 

the top brass-particularly the Air Staff-embraced space, with a strong emphasis on 

human spaceflight. But it did so at precisely the same time that the political wind was shifting, and human spaceflight was determined to be better as a civilian, rather than a military, mission. 

This essay also highlights the difference between the civilian and uniformed leadership of the military-particularly in the Air Force. Throughout the 1945-1988 period, 

both the civilian and uniformed leaders of the Air Force made major decisions concerning space, but most of the major policy decisions were made by the civilian leadership, not 

those in uniform, who had different priorities, biases, and interests. 

Yet one of the important differences to note is that the uniformed officers represent 

the institutional memory of a military service. Secretaries of DOD, service secretaries, and 

undersecretaries come and go, making decisions during their reign of which they usually 

do not have to bear the consequences later. But military officers-particularly midranking officers hoping to make general officer rank-often see the decisions get made, 

are responsible for implementing them, and then have to live with the consequences as 

they rise up through the ranks. The result is that uniformed officers may eventually resent 

decisions made by civilian officials long before their time; this can color their outlook as 

they rise to leadership positions. There is no better example of this than the Space Shuttle 

experience, which continues to shape NASA-DOD relations to this day. 

Finally, this is a history of the attention to, and ignorance of, the issue of duplication 

by the civilian and military space programs. Virtually every presidential administration has 

referred to the “national space program” as if the separate civilian, military, and intelligence space programs were part of a unified whole. This was certainly the intent of the 

Eisenhower administration. But the, creation of NASA itself duplicated missions that were 

already being addressed by DOD. Other policy decisions, such as giving NASA its own 

rocket development capability, created further redundancy. 

This issue really came to the fore during the Kennedy administration. Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara sought to eliminate duplication among the parts of the 

“national space program,” but with only limited success-killing the Dyna-Soar space 

plane while attempting to reduce duplication between DOD and civilian organizations, 

such as NASA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, while he attempted 

to reduce duplication in certain aspects, McNamara allowed further divergence on 

rocket development. Finally, perhaps the biggest attempt to eliminate the duplication of 

functions-the Space Shuttle-failed spectacularly at that task and made the future convergence of military and civilian functions all the more difficult. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 235 

The First Era-Pre-NASA 

The true genesis of the U.S. military space program predates Sputnik and even predates the well-known V-2 rocket research at White Sands at the end of World War 11. 

American military rocket research began at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at 

the California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), under Frank Malina, Hsue-shen Tsien, 

and others in the late 1930s and early 1940s.' Malina and Tsien speculated about the possibilities of ballistic missiles at GALCIT, an Army laboratory renamed the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory UPL) in 1943. But the US. military chose not to follow the German path of 

investing heavily in an immature technology with only limited immediate payoff. Instead, 

the military focused research on the development of a much more promising weapon, the 

atomic bomb.* As a result, U.S. rocket research during the war centered on more immediate and practical, if rather mundane, applications, such as short-range rocket projectiles 

and the misnamed jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) rockets for heavily laden aircraft. 

In the immediate post-war years, the U.S. military conducted extensive research with 

captured German rocket technology. It was during this time that a precedent was established that would have a significant impact a decade later. Colonel Holger Toftoy, chief of 

the Army Ordnance Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section, had acquired the parts and 

documentation to assemble more than 100 captured V-2 rockets. Toftoy invited scientists 

from various organizations to participate in V-2 launches by providing test payloads and 

instrumentation for everything from upper atmosphere research to radio and radar propagation experiments.' The field of rocketry was so new that basic research was a high priority and the involvement of scientific groups was only natural. Out of this emerged the 

precedent for civilian government scientists to provide scientific payloads for military 

rockets, and indeed this was the genesis of a US. space science community. 

Close military-civilian cooperation in basic research in many fields was a result of 

World War 11, and a number of government-university research centers evolved. In the aviation field, the military already had a long track record of working with the civilian 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) . The military-primarily the U.S. 

Air Force-conducted a large number of aeronautics test and development projects with 

NACA throughout the 1950s. 

It was from this early cooperation on space and aeronautics-related research that the 

NASA-military relationship was to expand and evolve. But early American proposals for 

the development of satellites and rockets were entirely military in nature. 

1. An early GALCIT report can be found as Document 1-12 in Volume I of this series. See John M. 

Logsdon, gen. ed., with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Explming 

the Unknown: Sekcld Docummtc in the Histmy of the US. Ciuil Sl,ace Program, Volumt I: &g(mizing./irr Exf~halion 

(Washington, DC NASA Special Publication (SP)4407, 1995), 1: 153-76. 

2. For a discussion of the limited military utility and tremendous drain on German resources of the V2, see Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket ad the Reich: Pemaird ad the Coming ofthe Ballislic MissiL: Era (New York: 

Free Press, 1995). 

3. David H. DeVorkin, Science With a Vmgeanrx How fhe US. Military Creak11 Sflace Sciences After Wrrrld 

War II (New York Springer-Verlag. 1992), pp. 59-61. See also Homer E. Newell, Bqronrl the Afmnsphme: The Earh 

Ears nf Space Scienct (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 1980). 
236 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY R!2LATIONS 

The Air Force and Army Space Studies 

In May 1945, German rocket expert Wernher von Braun, who was brought to the 

United States after the war, prepared a report for the U.S. Army discussing the potential 

of Earth-orbiting satellites. In October, the U.S. Navy proposed its own satellite. In 

November, Army Air Force General H. H. “Hap” Arnold declared that a spaceship was 

entirely “practicable today.”‘ 

On April 9, 1946, the Army-Navy Aeronautical Board discussed the subject and decided to reconsider it a month later on May 14. Immediately after the first meeting, Major 

General Curtis E. LeMay, Director of Research and Development of the Army Air Forces, 

decided to commission an independent study of the issue. It was to be a three-week crash 

effort to return a report before the second Aeronautical Board meeting, apparently with 

the intention of securing this new field for the Army Air Forces. 

Project RAND, a division of Douglas Aircraft Company’s Santa Monica research laboratories, which had been established to serve as a “think tank” for the Army Air Forces, 

was given the responsibility for the satellite study. The result was the report titled 

“Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship,” issued on May 2, 

1946. This was RAND’s first study. In 324 pages, it concluded that it was entirely possible, 

using existing technology, to develop a satellite system, although the payload would be 

limited to less than 2,000 pounds. The satellite could be used to gather scientific information, as well as to conduct weather reconnaissance, weapons delivery, attack assessment, communications, and “observation.” The report further noted that “the satellite 

offers an observation aircraft which cannot be brought down by an enemy who has not 

mastered similar technique^."^ 

If LeMay’s concern had been to maneuver the Navy out of the satellite business, his 

tactic apparently worked, for Navy efforts soon disappeared. However, while the first study 

had concluded that a satellite vehicle was practical, it failed to create any great enthusiasm 

for it in the Army Air Forces, which did not want to ignore the possibilities of satellitesparticularly for satellite reconnaissance-but was unwilling to pursue it in any meaningful 

way. The Army Air Forces ordered a second study, and RAND produced a series of documents on the subject during the winter of 1946-1947. One document noted that a satellite 

in polar orbit would be ideal for scanning the oceans for ships. Another noted that a satellite equipped with television equipment and one or more cameras could be used for 

reconnaissance. In September 1947, the Air Staff of the newly formed Air Force ordered 

the Air Materiel Command to evaluate RAND’s studies. The Air Materiel Command 

returned a cautious report noting that the practicality of such systems was questionable 

and recommended a further study to establish Air Force requirementso 

In January 1948, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff of the newly created US. Air Force, signed a “Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle.” This statement 

declared that the Air Force “as the Service dealing primarily with air weapons-especially 

strategic-has logical responsibility for the Satellite.” The document also stated that the 

technology was immature and that a development decision lay some time in the future. 

4. R. Cargill Hall, “Early U.S. Satellite Proposals,” Technolog and Cullure 4 (Fall 1963): 410-34. See also 

R. Cargill Hall, “Earth Satellites: A First Look by the United States Navy,“ in R. Cargill Hall, ed., History of Rocketry 

and Astnmaufics: Rooceedings of the Third thruugh fhc Sixth Hisfmy Symposia of the International Academy of Astronautics 

(San Diego, CA: Univelt, Inc., 1986), AAS History Series, Vol. 7, Part 11, pp. 25378. 

5. Document 11-2 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring fhe Unknown, 1: 23645. 

6. Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris, RAM)’s Role in the Euolufia of Balloon and Satellite Observation 

System and alated U.S. Space Technology (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1988), p. 15. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 237 

Until that time, the issue would be studied “with a view to keeping an optimum design 

abreast of the art, to determine the military worth of the vehicle-considering its utility 

and probable cost-to insure [sic] development in critical components, if indicated, and 

to recommend initiation of the development phases of the project at the proper time.” 

[11-I] 

With a very clearly stated position on the matter, the Air Force asked RAND in 

February 1948 to conduct further studies on the satellite. RAND contracted with several 

other organizations, including North American Aviation, the Radio Corporation of 

America (RCA), the Ohio University Research Foundation, and Boston University. This 

was a classic early Cold War research effort, uniting government, industry, and academia. 

By 1950, RAND’S research was bearing fruit; in November, the Air Force Directorate of 

Intelligence recommended that further research and development was justified.’ 

The primary use envisioned for a satellite was reconnaissance. In February 1951, 

Colonel Bernard A. Schriever organized a conference during which he established several criteria for a satellite reconnaissance system. Early the next month, tests were conducted using television cameras to establish further baselines for these criteria. In April 1951, 

RAND released two further reports. The first, Feasibility of Weather Reconnaissance from a 

Satellite Vehicle, examined the requirements and value of weather forecasting from space. 

In particular, such a system enabled weather reconnaissance behind enemy lines, something crucial to strategic bombing campaigns. The second study was Utility of a Satellite 

Vehicle for Reconnaissance.8 

This study led to yet another study, which eventually became known as Project Feed 

Back; it was presented to the Air Force in 1954. The report demonstrated that a space 

reconnaissance satellite was feasible, and it outlined the steps to develop it. In December 

1948, the “first report” of the Secretary of Defense stated: 

The Earth Satellite Vehicle Program, which was being carried out independently by each military 

service, was assigned to the Committee on Guided Missiles for coordination. To provide an integrated program with resultant elimination of duplication, the committee recommended that current efforts 

in thisfield be limited to studies and component designs; well-defined areas of such research have been 

allocated to each of the three military departments.’ 

This statement seems to have been an anomaly, because the three services continued 

their individual studies on their own. Why it was written remains unknown. The Air 

Force’s clearly stated claim on the satellite mission may have prompted it. But after the 

publication of the report, nothing changed-there was no centralization of the satellite 

mission, and the services continued their separate low-level studies. The report apparently was completely overlooked. 

In the meantime, others in the civilian world had been working on different satellite 

ideas. During a spring 1950 meeting at scientist James A. Van Allen’s home, the prospect 

of an International Geophysical Year (ICY) was discussed. S. Fred Singer, a physicist at the 

University of Maryland, proposed building a satellite for the ICY. Singer later proposed a 

Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of 

the International Astronautical Federation in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1953.’” Singer’s 

7. Iln‘d., pp. 17-19. 

8. Ilnd., pp. 2330. 

9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, First Report of theDPpartmt ofDeJmse (Washington, DC Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, December 1948), p. 129. 

10. Document 11-11 in Logsdon, gen. ed., E@[mingthe Unknown, 1: 31424. 
238 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

paper was based on a study prepared two years earlier by members of the British 

Interplanetary Society. 

On June 23, 1954, Frederick C. Durant 111, former president of the American Rocket 

Society and then president of the International Astronautical Federation, called Wernher 

von Braun at the Redstone Arsenal and invited him to a meeting two days later in 

Washington, D.C., at the Office of Naval Research, which had been involved in the earlier V-2 upper atmosphere experiments. At this meeting, plans were discussed for developing a satellite program using already existing rocket components. Further meetings 

followed at which the Army gave tentative approval, provided that the cost was not too 

great and the plan did not interfere with missile development. Von Braun’s secret report, 

A Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Based on Components availabbfiom missile developments of the Army 

Ordnance Corps, was submitted to the Army.” It summarized what he had said at earlier 

meetings. The Air Force’s declaration six years before that it was responsible for satellite 

development was either unknown or ignored by the Army.12 

Sometime in 1952, President Truman discussed the satellite issue with his personal 

physician, Brigadier General Wallace Graham. Graham persuaded Truman to commission 

a study from Aristid Grosse, a chemical engineer who had worked on some military projects. Grosse conducted extensive discussions with Wernher von Braun. He delivered his 

rather slim report not to Truman, but to the Eisenhower administration.” Despite years 

of research on the subject, the space issue never reached the upper levels of the Truman 

White House.“ There was no Truman space policy, and space issues remained largely the 

realm of a small group of engineers and analysts. 

However, to say that the Grosse report had no effect is to overlook one key fact: 

although not delivered to the administration for which it was intended, it was delivered to 

the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Donald A. 

Quarles. In the Eisenhower administration, Quarles was to play a major role in establishing the American space program. 

The Killian Report 

In September 1954, the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense 

Mobilization, under orders from President Eisenhower, began a study of the problem of 

surprise attack.I5 One of the major reasons behind this study was the surprises the Soviet 

Union had achieved in regard to atomic weapon development. The main task of the committee was “obtaining before it is launched more adequate foreknowledge of a surprise 

attack, should one be planned, obtaining better knowledge of enemy capabilities.” 

This special group was headed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 

President James R. Killian, who later became Eisenhower’s science advisor. The group 

became known as the Technological Capabilities Panel, and it issued its report, titled 

“Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” on February 14, 1955. Eisenhower and others 

often referred to this document as the “Killian Report.” 

11. Document 11-7 in ibid., 1: 274-81. 

12. The earlier Air Force declaration was also apparently more of an internal document intended to 

authorize further Air Force studies of the issue rather than an external statement of policy; ibid. 

13. Document 11-5 in ibid., 1: 266-69. 

14. Rip Bulkeley, The Sputnik Ckis and Early United Skzks Space Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University 

Press, 1991), p. 83. 

15. J.R. Killian, Jr., to General Curtis E. LeMay, September 2, 1954, Papers of Curtis LeMay, Box 205, 

Folder B-39356, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 239 

During the course of deliberations, the intelligence panel, headed by Polaroid’s Din 

Land, became aware of two advanced proposals for intelligence collection. One was the 

nuclear-powered reconnaissance satellite using a television camera outlined in the Project 

Feed Back study. The other idea was for a high-flying strategic reconnaissance aircraft 

then under consideration by the Air Force. While investigating the latter, Land’s panel 

became aware of a proposal by the Lockheed Skunk Works for its own high-flying strategic reconnaissance aircraft known as the CL-282. They brought this to the attention of 

President Eisenhower. Unlike the Air Force program, the CL-282 would be configured for 

strategic reconnaissance prior to hostilities-what was referred to as “pre-D-Day reconnaissance.” This was a mission that the Strategic Air Command had previously rejected. 

Eisenhower approved the CL-282 in the fall of 1954, and he placed it under the 

charge of the CIA. It eventually became known as the U-2, and Richard Bissell, a newcomer to the CIA was to manage the program. When the report was issued in the spring 

of 1955, it apparently never mentioned the aircraft, which was, however, detailed in a classified annex to the report. This was most likely for the “eyes only” of President Eisenhower, 

and he probably destroyed it along with another classified annex on submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles.16 

It was obvious to those involved in the issue that overflight of another nation’s territory by such an aircraft would constitute a clear violation of international law and could 

also be viewed as a hostile act. In fact, such issues were not abstract, because American aircraft flying on the periphery of the Soviet Union were being fired on and even occasionally shot down. 

However, the other advanced reconnaissance proposal-a satellite-would fly much 

higher and would not necessarily violate international law because no clear definition 

existed of where “airspace” ended and “space” began. Realizing this, Land and the others 

on his panel decided to attempt to strongly influence the evolution of international law. 

They proposed that the United States first launch a scientific satellite to establish 

“Freedom of Space.” By doing so, later military and intelligence satellites.would be able to 

overfly Soviet territory following the precedent established by the earlier civilian satellite. 

The report’s recommendation 9.b read: 

Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an orbit 

about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a peczdent for distinguishing between 

“national air” and “international space, a distinction which could be to our advantage at some 

future date when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence purposes. [11-21 

Land and others considered the reconnaissance satellite to be technologically 

unrealistic in the near future, but that should not prevent the United States from helping 

to establish the right to overfly other nations in space. This was best done with a satellite 

that was nonmilitary in nature. 

16. Although the intelligence section of the Technological Capabilities Panel report remains classified, 

awaiting review as of mid-1996, the index has been declassified. It includes the word “satellites,” but apparently 

in the context of satellite countries of the Soviet Union. Those who have seen the report confirm that it mentioned balloon and satellite programs, but it apparently did not mention the u-2 aircraft, except in a separate 

appendix that Eisenhower most likely destroyed. The information about the separate “eyes only” reports given 

to Eisenhower is contained in an interview with Killian. Other documents concerning the recommendations of 

the intelligence committee have also been released. “The Report to the President by the Technological 

Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee,” February 14, 1955, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 

of Paul T. Carroll, AndrewJ. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 195241, Subject Series, 

Alphabetical Subseries, Box 16, “Killian Report-Technological Capabilities Panel (2),” Dwight D. Eisenhower 

Library, Abilene, Kansas. 
240 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

The Scientific Satellite Program 

In August and September of 1954, Wernher von Braun and his colleagues at the Army 

Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) in Huntsville, Alabama, teamed up with the Office of 

Naval Research to propose a satellite called Orbiter. This was essentially a slight re-work of 

von Braun’s Minimum Unmanned Satellite Vehicle. Orbiter was to be a scientific satellite 

only, essentially mirroring the earlier upper atmosphere research conducted with the V-2 

rockets at White Sands. Later in the year, the American Rocket Society prepared a detailed 

survey of possible scientific’ and other uses of a satellite and proposed it to the U.S. 

National Committee for the IGY, a group under the National Academy of Sciences 

(NAS).” 

As it was, 1954 proved to be a very important year for the generation of significant 

ideas concerning scientific and intelligence collection systems. In addition to both the 

Project Feed Back and the Lockheed CL-282 ideas, the NAS was now considering a scientific satellite as well. These projects were inextricably linked politically. 

While the Project Feed Back study and the Killian Report were both highly secret, 

Orbiterwas not. The CL-282, in particular, was known to only a handful of people. One person who did know of all three projects, as well as the Technological Capabilities Panel 

report, was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Donald 

Quarles. He was in charge of virtually all defense research projects. 

On the same day as the release of the Technological Capabilities Panel report, the 

U.S. National Committee for the IGY presented a recommendation to National Science 

Foundation Director Alan T. Waterman at the NAS. The committee recommended that a 

scientific satellite be launched as part of the IGY.” Quarles lobbied Waterman to suggest 

this idea to the National Security Council (NSC), and four days later, Waterman sent a letter to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, proposing that the United States 

conduct such a scientific mission.I0 

Four days later, Murphy met with Waterman, NAS President Detlev Bronk, and Lloyd 

Berkner (who at the time was a member of the U.S. National Committee for the IGY) to 

discuss the issue. In a letter one month later, Murphy stated that such a proposal would 

“as a matter of fact, undoubtedly add to the scientific prestige of the United States, and it 

would have a considerable propaganda value in the cold war.’’2u Having gained the concurrence of the Department of State, Waterman then discussed the issue once again with 

Quarles, who suggested that he consult CIA Director Allen Dulles on how to proceed. 

Waterman did so and gained Dulles’s support for the program. He also spoke with Bureau 

of the Budget Director Percival Brundage to gain his cooperation when needed. Thus, the 

proposal now had the support of the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the 

Bureau of the Budget. Waterman also agreed to formally propose the full program to an 

executive session of the National Science Board on May 20, and he notified Quarles of 

these events on May 13, 1955.” 

17. Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A Histury (Washington, DC: 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 22-23. 

18. Joseph Kaplan, Chairman, United States National Committee, International Geophysical Year 1957- 

58, National Academy of Sciences, to Dr. A.T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation, March 14, 

1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection, Washington, DC. 

19. Alan T. Waterman, Director, Memorandum for Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of 

State, 18 March, 1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

20. Robert Murphy, “Memorandum for Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation,” 

April 27, 1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

21. Alan T. Waterman, Director, to Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and 

Development), May 13, 1955, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 241 

On May 20,1955, the NSC approved a top-level policy document known as NSC 5520, 

“Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program,” which stated that the 

United States should develop a small scientific satellite weighing 5 to 10 pounds.22 

Paragraph number 2 of the document stated (the newly released part is in roman type): 

The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the F’resident 5 Science Advisory Committee 

recommended that intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading to a very 

small satellite in orbit around the earth, and that re-examination should be made of the p‘nciples or 

practices of international law with regard to ‘Freedom of Space” from the standpoint of recent 

advances in weapon technology. 

The other major declassified portion of the document (paragraph number 5) stated: 

From a military standpoint, the Joint Chitfs of Staff have stated their belitf that intelligence 

applications strongly warrant the construction of a large surveillance satellite. While a small scientific satellite cannot carry surveillance equipment and therefme will have no direct intelligence potential, it does represent a technological st@ toward the achievement of the large surveillance satellite, 

and will be helpful to this end so long as the small scientific satellite program does not impede development of the large surveillance satellite. 

NSC 5520 also stated (starting at the end of paragraph number 6): 

Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the pn‘nciple of ‘Freedom of Space. ” 

The implications of this principle are being studied within the Executive Branch. Howevq preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle under international law to the launching of such a 

satellite. 

7. It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military offensive threat to 

any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite might conceivably serve to launch a 

guided missile at a ground target, it will always be a poor choice for the purpose. A bomb could not 

be dropped from a satellite on a target below, because anything dropped from a satellite would simply 

continue alongside in the orbitz3 

Although the document correctly noted the limited utility of satellites as active military offensive threats, this was not the purpose of the program. Also included in NSC 5520 

was the clear stipulation that the program was not to interfere in any way with the ballis 

tic missile programs. 

Establishing a right of overflight was important, but developing the intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) and the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) was considered even more important. Both considerations later established a framework for 

conducting the program-the U.S. scientific satellite, although developed by the U.S. 

military, would be handled in such a way as to both seem as disassociated from ballistic 

missiles as possible and interfere in their development as little as possible. 

22. Document 11-10 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Explrrnng thu Unknown, 1: 30814. 

23. NSC 5520, May 20, 1955, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State: Records 

Relating to State Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security 

Council, 1947-1963, Box 112, “NSC 5520,” National Archives and Records Administration,Washington, DC. 
242 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Quarles oversaw the selection process that followed. It involved the creation of the 

Committee on Special Capabilities, headed by Homer Stewart. This committee evaluated 

the various proposals and rejected the Army’s Jupiter rocket for reasons that included its 

obvious military tiesz4 

It was determined that the scientific satellite program should look as nonmilitary as 

possible-a rocket vehicle that was not the direct development of a ballistic missile was 

considered the best way to do this. The result was the selection of the Navy’s Vanguard 

rocket, which had its genesis in a pure research program and would be developed virtually from the ground up as a space vehicle.25 

At the time, there was no clear distinction made between military and civilian space 

exploration. The military was to bear responsibility for launching all U.S. payloads. The 

payloads could be either civilian, such as the NAS satellite, or military, such as the Project 

Feed Back satellite, but all would fly on military rockets. Meanwhile, a distinction was 

made among different degrees of what can only be labeled “militaristic” involvement. The 

Vanguard rocket, although developed by the Navy, had no direct connections to a 

weapons system. It was therefore a better choice politically to peacefully establish the right 

to overfly foreign territory. Fundamental to Eisenhower’s philosophy at this time was not 

to inflame the superpower rivalry unnecessarily. Keeping the rocket program as far away 

from weapons development was an outgrowth of this attitude. 

Lukewarm Military Enthusiasm for Space 

The Air Force had made only a half-hearted effort at submitting a proposal for the scientific satellite program. At the time, the program was apparently too uninteresting to garner toplevel Air Force support. General Bernard A. Schriever, commander of the Western 

Development Division and head of U.S. ICBM development, thought that the Air Force 

should concentrate on the military satellite instead. On March 16, 1955, the Air Force 

issued General Operational Requirement No. 80. Up until this time, the approval for 

24. Charles A. Lindbergh wrote in the foreword to the most detailed book on the Vanguard program 

(Green and Lomask, Vanguard: A Histmy), which was written before the recent revelations on the origins of the 

program, stated on page vi: 

Why was the Rehtone-von Braun satellite prqect not supported? Answers vary with the person talked to: The Na y ’s 

brilliant deuelopments in satellite instrumentation had tipped the choice to Vanguard, and budgetary restrictions hadpeuented 

a parallelingpqect. The name Redstone was tw closely associated w’th military missiles. Vanguard ofjiied lower casts, mmz 

growth potential, longer duration of orbiting. We would euenlually gain we scientijc information through Vanguard than 

through Redstone. To these observations, I can addJiom my own exPet;ence that inter-service rivalry exerted strong influence; 

also, that any conclusion drawn would be incomplete without taking into account the antapism still existing toward von 

Braun and his CO-WM~S because of their service on the German si& of W~ld War II. 

25. Eisenhower’s staff secretary, thenGIonel Andrew Goodpaster, provided some insight into the 

Huntsville Germans’ views and their lobbying on behalf of their work in a memorandum written in the summer 

of 1956: 

On May 28th Secretary [Deputy Secretary of Statel Hoover called me mer to mention a report he had reckued from a 

fwm associate in the engineering and developmatfield regarding the earth satellite @eject. The best estimate is that the fie sent puject would not be ready until the end of ‘57 at the earliest, and probably well into ‘58. Redstone had a peject well 

advanced when the new one was set up. At minimal expense ($2-$5 million) thq could have a satellite ready forjnng by the 

end of 1956 orJanuary 1957. The Redstone prqect is one essentially of German scientists and it is Adcan envy of them 

that has led to a duplicative project. 

I spoke to the President ah1 this to see what would be the best way to act on the matk He asked me to talh to Secretary 

Wilson. In the latter’s absence, I talked to Secretary Robertson day and he said he would go into the matter fully and care 

fully to try to ascertain the facts. In order to establish the substance of this report, I told him it came through Mr Hoover (Mr 

Hmer had said I might do so if1 felt it necessary). 

Quoted in Colonel AJ. Goodpaster, “Memorandum for Record,” June 7,1956, White House Office, Office 

of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, Box 6, “Missiles and Satellites,“ Eisenhower Library. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWK 243 

further satellite studies had been from a low level of the Air Force bureaucracy; now the 

go-ahead came from the top. On April 2,1956, Schriever and General Thomas Power, the 

commander of the Air Research and Development Command, approved a full-scale development plan for what was called ‘Weapons System 117L” (WS117L), a reconnaissance 

satellite program. It would utilize an Atlas launch vehicle and was to be fully operational 

by 1963. Air Force headquarters approved the plan on July 24, 1956, and allocated $3 million. This proved to be a major disappointment to all involved, because it was less than 10 

percent as much as was needed to go to full-scale development.26 

The Air Force, as a young organization that owed its very existence to modern technology, was also the most logical of the services to embrace new technology such as satellites and long-range rockets. But at the same time, the Air Force was also dominated by 

the culture of the manned strategic bomber, and any new missions often had to serve this 

culture. Thus, the concept of strategic rocketry was not one that was adopted readily or 

without resistance by the Air For~e.~’ 

The Air Force’s strategic bombing emphasis had been one of the main reasons that 

the Western Development Division had been set up on the west coast instead of the preexisting development operation at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. The satellite program 

was also more likely to receive the support it needed there than at Wright Field. But 

Donald Quarles, who had been promoted to Secretary of the Air Force in July 1955, apparently felt that reconnaissance satellites, although a very promising idea, were still a long 

way from being practical, and he did not provide the money for full-scale development. 

In 1956, the Air Force also directed Bell Aircraft Company to conduct a study of a 

manned boostglide reconnaissance system known as “Brass Bell.” An earlier study, known 

as BOMI, evolved into a concept known as ROBO, for “rocket bomber.” The Air Research 

and Development Command also issued a system requirement for a hypersonic research 

and development vehicle known as “Hywards.” But the Air Force did not allocate any 

money to manned space operations in fiscal year 1957.’* 

Similarly, the early RAND studies about the possibilities of space did not receive an 

enthusiastic response from top leaders of the Air Force. Space was still an expensive and 

dubious proposition for the Air Force, which was more interested in spending its money 

on strategic bombers and, to a much lesser extent, the Atlas ICBM. As long as neither the 

Navy nor the Army was developing a military satellite system, the Air Force did not show 

much enthusiasm for the various military satellite systems-human and robotic-that it 

was evaluating. The WS-117L proceeded, and the Air Force even selected Lockheed as the 

prime contractor for the vehicle. One of the losers in the competition, RCA, then looked 

elsewhere for an agency to pay it to build a televisionequipped satellite. It found the 

receptive ear of Wernher von Braun. In April 1957, the Army produced the Janus report, 

which was essentially the RCA bid for the WS117L.” 

26. Davies and Harris, RAND% Role, pp. 7374. 

27. See, for instance, Carl Builder, The Icam Syndrome (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1994). 

To be fair, the manned strategic bomber was a proven technology, whereas ICBMs were not. Furthermore, 

manned bombers were more flexible, reliable, and accurate than ICBMs would be for a long time. They also 

were recallable, compared to the “push button” ICBM. As one Air Force historian has noted: ‘The Air Force’s 

institutional penchant for equating the necessity for a manned bomber to fulfill its primary mission of strategic 

bombardment, and ensure its continued independence, hindered the incorporation of missile technology. The 

majority of Air Force leaders believed ballistic missiles should undergo a step by step development, followed by 

integration into the weapons inventory.” Roy F. Houchin, “The Dyna-Soar Program: Why the Air Force Proposed 

the DynaSoar X-20 Program,” Quuesf: The Hzstury qfSpaceflghf Magazine 3 (Winter 1994): 10. 

28. Iln‘d. 

29. “Briefing on Army Satellite Program,” November 19, 1957, White House Office, Office of the 

Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Records (James R. Killian and George 8. Kistiakowsky, 1957-61), 

Box 15, “Space (2),” Eisenhower Library. 
244 THE HISTORY OF CMLIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Thus, various space programs within the military services received support, but primarily only for continued study, not for substantial development. These programs also 

produced core groups of enthusiasts. Schriever and his people at the Western 

Development Division in California were the Air Force space enthusiasts. Von Braun and 

his ABMA team in Huntsville were the Army space enthusiasts. But in the case of the Air 

Force, the program lacked support from both the top-level career military officers in the 

Air Staff and the civilian leadership. Schriever had mentioned satellites in a speech in 

February 1957. The Office of the Secretary of Defense told him not to mention “space” 

again-this was not a military priority for the administration, and Eisenhower did not 

want anyone to think it was, particularly when the White House was concerned about 

peacefully establishing “Freedom of Space.”so In the case of the Army, the ABMA was 

specifically forbidden by the White House to develop satellites. The only satellite program 

that had all the money it needed was the Navy’s Vanguard program, and it quickly ran way 

over its early estimated budget. 

Even though von Braun and the Army were officially precluded from developing a 

satellite, he and his rocket team lacked faith in the Vanguard Project. In the spring of 

1956, they lobbied for a reconsideration to allow the Army to attempt to launch a satellite 

atop a Jupiter-C missile. This proposal was rejected in the summer of 1956.” 

In late 1956, after the Vanguard Project was well under way and running into cost 

overruns, one of von Braun’s closest associates, Ernst Stuhlinger, made contact with James 

Van Allen, who in 1950 had shown an interest in a scientific satellite. Stuhlinger informed 

Van Allen that, although von Braun had been ordered not to place a satellite in orbit with 

the Jupiter-C, the team had grave doubts about the officially sanctioned Vanguard Project. 

Stuhlinger discussed possible scientific payloads capable of being carried atop a Jupiter-C. 

On November 23, 1956, he sent a letter to Van Allen thanking him for the meeting and 

proposing that Van Allen visit the ABMA to view their operations. Van Allen apparently 

did.” 

Van Allen responded on February 13, 1957, with a list of possible scientific payloads. 

This letter was sent to William Pickering, Director of the Army’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

UPL) of the California Institute of Technology (the renamed GALCIT operation) .” It was 

JPL that had begun to build the Explorer I satellitework that was both clandestine and 

forbidden at the time. Also, at some point during this period, von Braun’s team entertained RCA, reviewing its failed bid for the WS117L program. 

Meanwhile, establishing “Freedom of Space” continued to be an active concern in 

policy planning circles in Washington; the legal ramifications were being worked out in 

the State Department and elsewhere. [II-31 Furthermore, Vanguard ran severely over budget. The initial estimate had been $15 to 20 million for the program. By late 1957, the cost 

was estimated at ten times that amount. Money had to be found in various budgets to pay 

for it. Budget Director Percival Brundage said: “Apparently, both the Department of 

Defense and the National Science Foundation are very reluctant to continue to finance 

30. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, p. 181. 

31. Dwayne A. Day, “New Revelations About the American Satellite Programme Before Sputnik,” 

Spaceflight, November 1994, pp. 372-73. 

32. Ernst Stuhlinger, Director, Research Projects Office, Development Operations Division, Army 

Ballistic Missile Agency, U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, to Dr. Van Allen, Department of Physics, Iowa State 

University, November 23, 1956, James A. Van Allen Papers, Special Collections, University of Iowa Library, Iowa 

City. 

33. J.A. Van Allen, Head, Department of Physics, State University of Iowa, to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Army 

Ballistic Missile Agency, February 13, 1957, James A. Van Allen Papers. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 245 

this project to completion. But each is quite prepared to have the other do so.” The two 

had supplied some supplementary funds to the program, and, surprisingly, even the CIA 

contributed $2.5 million in funds. [I143 

Why this was done is unknown. CIA Director Richard Bissell was kept abreast of the 

developments and may have realized the importance of “Freedom of Space” to future 

reconnaissance efforts. It is also true that he had a substantial discretionary fund to spend 

on unforeseen problems. This fund contained around $100 million and was often used to 

address pressing national security needs. Completing the Vanguard mission of shaping 

international law was considered a national security issue, and this may have been why CIA 

money funded part of the U.S. satellite for the IGY What it certainly does illustrate, however, is the confluence of both civilian and national security interests in the early space 

program. 

By the end of September 1957, the framework of the American space program was 

pretty much in place. The military was responsible for launching and supporting all satellites. Scientific satellites would be developed and manufactured by civilian scientists, most 

likely under the auspices of the NAS or at universities. The Army was not officially 

involved in any space programs. It was, however, actively studying large rocket proposals 

and also conducting numerous studies of possible satellite payloads. 

The Air Force had the WS117L under way but was underfunding it. In the summer 

of 1957, a proposal for a faster, interim reconnaissance satellite using film-return techniques was not received enthusiastically by the Air Force. The Air Force was also undertaking the ROBO, Hywards, and Brass Bell studies, but not at a significant level. Overall, 

the service’s commitment to military space programs was weak-both in the Air Staff and 

in the civilian Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. At the same time, although military 

space programs had not received much high-level support in either the Air Force or the 

Army, within each service core groups of officers and scientists had formed-space enthusiasts who constantly advocated for bigger programs. 

Under the restrictions of both NSC 5520 and President Eisenhower’s conservative 

spending priorities, space seemed unlikely to become a major enterprise. Even after the 

scientific satellite had flown and established “Freedom of Space,” it was unlikely that 

things would change substantially for either the Air Force or the Army. Both would have 

to face the continued fiscal conservatism of the president and the civilian and military 

leadership at the Pentagon. Sputnik changed all of that. 

Turbulent Transition 

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. The launch itself was not a 

great surprise to U.S. intelligence, which had ample warning that the Soviets were capable 

of launching a ~atellite.~~ The public reaction to the launch was greater than the administration expected, despite plenty of warning in mrious toplevel policy documents.qi 

Eisenhower had failed to realize the degree to which a Soviet first in space could 

undercut his domestic priorities. He attempted to downplay the significance of Sputnik so 

34. Document 11-13 in Logsdon, gen. ed., EXplming fhe Unknown, 1: 329. 

35. Document 11-5 in ilnd., 1: 266-69. General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, stated 

that Eisenhower had been warned plenty of times of the propaganda effects of such a satellite launch but had 

always dismissed them. He also stated that the attitude in the White House was generally dismissive of the Sputnik 

launch for about 24 hours, before the public and scientific reaction of the country became known. After that, 

everybody’s attitude changed. Interview with General Andrew Goodpaster, March 19, 1996, Washington, DC. 
246 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

that he could “head off a stampede on the Treasury.”% But if the public reaction was bad 

enough after Sputnik, it would soon get much worse. On November 3, the Soviets orbited Sputnik 11, which weighed 1,121 pounds and carried the dog Laika. The sophistication 

and size of this satellite (partly because the upper stage remained attached to the payload) 

left no doubt in the minds of many that the Soviet Union possessed tremendous superiority in space launchers. The public uproar, and Khrushchev’s gloating, took on even bigger dimensions when the Vanguard Tv-3 launch-billed as a fully operational vehicle and 

broadcast on national television at the White House’s urgings (and the muted protests of 

the engineers)-blew up on the launch pad on December 6. 

The reaction to Sputnik within the military services was swift and startling-and 

alarmed even Eisenhower. On October 10, the Air Force rolled its three human spaceflight proposals into one and labeled it “Dyna-Soar,” for “dynamic soaring.” In midOctober, someone leaked information to Aviation Week magazine about the WS-117Lincluding the involvement of L~ckheed.~’ On October 26, the Army made a presentation 

to the Committee on Special Capabilities (which had rejected the Army’s earlier scientific satellite proposal), recommending the development of its Janus reconnaissance satellite that would use a television system to photograph the Soviet Union. On December 10, 

the Air Force created in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Development a new 

department called the Directorate of Astronautics. 

This enthusiastic response, particularly within the Air Force, came from the career 

military officers and not the civilian leadership, who shared Eisenhower’s skepticism. 

After objections from Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and others, the order estab 

lishing the Directorate of Astronautics in the Air Force was revoked only three days after 

it was issued.38 

Eisenhower clearly liked none of this. Soon after Sputnik, he admonished his officials 

not to comment on the issue ofwhether the United States could have “beaten” the Soviets 

into space. The reason was that talk about whether or not the Army could have launched 

a satellite sooner tended to make the matter look like a race, which was exactly what he 

wanted to avoid.39 

By sheer coincidence, soon-to-be Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was having dinner with ABMA Director General John Medaris and Wernher von Braun when the 

announcement of the Sputnik launch was made. Von Braun immediately pressured 

McElroy to let the ABMA team launch a satellite into orbit; they received permission on 

November 8. The ABMs military leaders apparently had their own satellite in mind for 

the mission. But von Braun and JPL‘s leadership had their own, and this was initially 

named “Deal-1 .” As in a game of poker, if you are dealt a bad hand-as the country had 

been dealt with both Sputniks I and 11-you fold and tell the person to deal you another. 

JPL Director William Pickering was able to convince ABMA Director Medaris that their 

satellite was the better choice.‘O Deal-1 was soon renamed Explorer I, and it was launched 

into orbit on January 31, 1958. 

36. Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heauens and the Earth: A Political Histmy of the Space Age (New York: Basic 

Books, 1985), p. 146. 

37. “USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle,” Aviation Week, October 14, 1957, p. 26. 

38. Lee Bowen, The Threshold of Space: The Air Force in the National Space Program, 1945-1959, USAF 

Historical Division Liaison Office, September 1960, p. 20. 

39. Brigadier General AJ. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, Office of the 

Staff Secretary: Records of Carroll, Goodpaster, Minnich, and Russell, 1952-61, Subject Series, Department of 

Defense Subseries, Box 6, “Missiles and Satellites, Vol. I (3) [September-December 19571 ,” Eisenhower Library. 

40. William E. Burrows, Exploring Space (New York: Random House, 1990), p. 76. The information on 

the story of the name Deal-1 comes from Dr. Jonathan McDowell at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for 

Astrophysics. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 247 

The New Military Space Agency 

In November, newly appointed Secretary of Defense McElroy proposed centralizing 

control of the various American space projects then under way, such as Vanguard and the 

WS-I 17L, along with advanced ballistic missile development. They would be placed into a 

Defense Special Projects Agency, which would be responsible for whatever projects the 

secretary would assign to it. The idea for this agency apparently arose from the President’s 

Science Advisory Council in mid-October, just days after both Sputnik and McElroy’s nomination.“ Eisenhower himself expressed the opinion that a fourth service should be established to handle the “missiles a~tivity.’”~ McElroy said that he was thinking about a 

“Manhattan Project” for anti-ballistic missiles. The president thought that a separate organization might be a good idea for this problem.’3 In testimony before Congress, Quarles, 

who might easily have been regarded as an Air Force partisan, stated that long-range, surface-to-surface missiles had been assigned to the Air Force because it possessed the targeting and reconnaissance capabilities to use them, not because it was uniquely an Air 

Force mission.4‘ Space could conceivably be treated in the same way. 

Killian and the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization 

found McElroy more receptive than his predecessor.’5 On November 7, in a national television address, Eisenhower announced that he was elevating Killian to the position of 

Special Assistant for Science and Technology and head of the President’s Science Advisory 

Committee. The press quickly labeled Killian the “Missile Czar.” By this time, Killian was 

probably pushing the idea of a separate agency for space as well.“’ 

41. Goodpaster interview, March 19, 1996. 

42. Eisenhower’s comments on this subject appear in numerous documents. For instance, in October 

1957, Goodpaster reported: “The President went on to say he sometimes wondered whether there should not be 

a fourth service established to handle the whole missiles activity.” Brigadier General AJ. Goodpaster, 

“Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 11, 1957,8:30 AM,” October 11, 1957, Ann Whitman 

File, DDE Diary Series, Box 67, “Oct. 57 Staff Notes (2);’ Eisenhower Library. In January 1958, Goodpaster 

reported: “In the course of the discussion the President indicated strongly that he thinks future missiles should 

be brought into a central organization.” Brigadier General AJ. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with 

the President, January 21, 1958,” January 22, 1958, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Carroll, Goodpaster, 

Minnich, and Russell, 1952-61, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box 6, “Missiles and Satellites, 

Vol. I1 (1) Uanuary-February 19581 ,” Eisenhower Library. In February 1958, Goodpaster reported: ‘The 

President said that he has come to regret deeply that the missile program was not set up in [the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense] rather than in any of the services.” Brigadier General A.J. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of 

Conference with the President, February 4, 1958 (following Legislative Leaders meeting),” February 6, 1958, 

Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Carroll, Goodpaster, Minnich, and Russell, 1952-61, Subject Series, 

Department of Defense Subseries, Box 6, “Missiles and Satellites, Vol. I1 (1) Uanuary-February 19581,” 

Eisenhower Library. 

43. Brigadier General A.J. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 11, 

1957,” Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 67, “Oct. 57 Staff Notes (2) ,” Eisenhower Library. In February, 

another memorandum states: ‘The President said that he has come to regret deeply that the missile program 

was not set up in [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] rather than in any of the services. Personal feelings 

are now so intense that changes are extremely difficult.” Brigadier General AJ. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of 

Conference with the President, February 4, 1958 (Following Legislative Leaders meeting) ,” February 6, 1958, 

Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Carroll, Goodpaster, Minnich, and Russell, 1952-61, Subject Series, 

Department of Defense Subseries, Box 8, “Missiles and Satellites, A National Integrated Missile and Space 

Vehicle Development Program, December 10, 1957,” Eisenhower Library. 

44. Robert Frank Futrell, IrLri, Cr~n~fh, DorlrinP, Kil. I: A Hi\fory /~f,ln(i.\i/, Thinking in Lhv Uni~vrl 9n&,\ Air 

Fkrx (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1989) p. 589. The comments on Quarles’s partmanship come from 

the Goodpaster interview, March 19, 1996. 

45. Richard Vernon Damms, “Scientists and Statesmen: President Eisenhower’s Science Advisors and 

National Security Policy, 1953-1961,” Ph.D. Diss., Ohio State University, 1993, p. 297. 

46. Goodpaster interview, March 19, 1996. 
248 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

The Defense Special Projects Agency would act as a central authority for all U.S. space 

programs and would essentially contract out missions to the separate services, civilian government agencies, and even universities and private industry. “Above the level of the three 

military services,” McElroy said, “having its own budget, it would be able to concentrate 

on the new and the unknown without involvement in immediate requirements and inter 

service rivalries.” McElroy also stated in front of Congress that “the vast weapons systems 

of the future in our judgment need to be the responsibility of a separate part of the 

Defense Department.’”’ This proposal was placed in a DOD reorganization bill. At this 

point, it was still assumed that the entire American space program would remain under 

military control, although at the level of the secretary of defense, in an office specially created to manage it. 

On December 6, McElroy received a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating their 

opposition to the creation of the Defense Special Projects Agency. They felt that line 

authority for space programs should remain within the services themselves. Schriever also 

objected. He wanted an authority that would be able to set policy, but not one that would 

actually manage programs for astronautics. This, he felt, would duplicate capabilities 

already within his own organization.‘8 McElroy-and, more importantly, Eisenhower-did 

not agree. This was to be a constant source of contention for the next year and a half. 

All of these events apparently were having a cumulative effect on Eisenhower, who was 

concerned that the military services were less focused on their missions and more interested in grabbing this newly opening frontier as their own turf. For Eisenhower, this was 

a constant worry. He had always been concerned about the parochialism and turfbuilding impulses of the military and became convinced that he was seeing it again. A sep 

arate military space agency seemed to be the way to avoid it. 

A Separate Civilian Agency 

At the end of December 1957, Killian drafted a “Memorandum on Organizational 

Alternatives for Space Research and Development.” In it, he argued that the Defense 

Special Projects Agency was a good idea and should house the DOD space program. In 

addition, much space-related research and development properly belonged in such an 

agency. At the same time, however, the scientific community was arguing that purely scientific and nonmilitary aspects of space research should not be under the control of the 

military. There were two options for addressing this. The first option was to establish a 

central space laboratory within DOD with a broad charter that included basic space 

research. The second option was to establish a new civilian space agency formed around 

NACA. 

Although Killian did not specifically recommend one option over the other, he concluded: 

The overall plan, then, must keep steadily in view the need fm those means and programs which 

will command the interest and participation of our best scientists. We must have far more than a program which appeals to the “space cadets. ’’ It must invoke, in the deepest sense, the attention of our 

best scientijic mindr if we as a nation are to become a leader in this field,. rf we do not achieve this, 

then other nations will continue to hold the leader~hip.~’ 

47. Organizafimt and Management ofMissileprOgram, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 

on Government Operations, US. House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 133. 

48. Futrell, Idem, Concepts, Doctrine, 1: 590. 

49. Document Iv-1 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exfilming fhe Unknown, 1: 62831. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 249 

In January 1958, the Senate began a series of public hearings on the country’s space 

program. They were ostensibly intended to investigate the status of the U.S. missile and 

space programs and to determine why the United States was apparently so far behind the 

Soviet Union in space. But Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson also wanted to use 

them to publicly embarrass Eisenhower. 

Before the hearings began, on January 7, 1958, McElroy requested that all three services list their proposed space projects. The ABMA, under von Braun, had an extensive 

list, such as reconnaissance, meteorology, basic science, and extensive rocket development 

for space missions, including the delivery of supplies to paratroopers in enemy territ~ry.~” 

The Navy was already responsible for the one satellite program that was actually building 

hardware and was not itself adverse to expanding its slice of the pie. 

The Air Force expected to be lead agency in the new space program. The Air Staff by 

now had ambitious space plans that included reconnaissance, early warning, and hypersonic space planes. It also had expanded its wish list to include nuclear rockets to service 

lunar bases and soon added a proposal for placing an American in space sooner than the 

Dyna-Soar schedule would allow. The uniformed Air Force interpreted this request as an 

indication that not only was it being named lead agency for space, but that its grandiose 

program was about to be appro~ed.~’ This propensity of the Air Force for thinking big was 

well known in the White House, and members of the President’s Science Advisory 

Committee felt they had an obligation to “ridicule the occasional wild-blue-yonder proposals by a few Air Force officers for the exploitation of space for military purposes.”52 

At the same time, the Air Force signed several agreements with NACA concerning the 

Dyna-Soar program (also known as Weapons System 464L). [IE5,11-6, 11-71 The Air Force 

was interested in the strategic bombardment aspects of the program, while NACA was 

interested in the possible civil applications of such a vehicle. What differentiated these 

agreements from earlier space cooperation was that both the military and civilian agencies were to cooperate on the development of a space payload, not simply focus individually on the payload or the launch vehicle. The precedent for this cooperation came from 

the previous Air Force-NACA work on the X-plane series, particularly the challenging 

X-15 program. 

Discussion of the Defense Special Projects Agency continued within the administration. Its name was changed to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and 

Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on January 7, 1958, requesting supplemental 

appropriations for the agency.53 In early January, the newly created President’s Science 

Advisory Committee addressed the issue of ARPA. Other than opposing the placement of 

advanced ICBM research into a separate agency instead of keeping it with the current 

ICBM programs, the committee had no objection to ARPA. 

On February 4, 1958, during a White House meeting between Eisenhower and 

key Senate Republicans to discuss legislation currently before Congress, the issue of space 

came up again. Eisenhower felt that all of the nation’s space programs could be adequately housed within DOD, presumably with ARPA in charge. Eisenhower wanted to 

50. “Proposal: A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program,” December 10, 

1957, Report No. D-R-37, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Carroll, Goodpaster, Minnich, and Russell, 

1952-61, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box 8, “Missiles and Satellites, A National Integrated 

Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program, December 10, 1957,” Eisenhower Library. 

51. Bowen, The Thrshold of Space, p. 22. 

52. James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the 

Prmi&nt,fur Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 29697. 

53. Organization and Management of Missik I’rog~amc, Hearings, US. House of Representatives, 86th 

Cong., 2d sess., p. 133. 
250 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

avoid duplication of effort, and because military space programs were of paramount 

importance, he saw no need for creating a civilian space agency outside DOD.54 

Killian expressed some reservations at having the military run the U.S. space program. The interests of civilian scientists were unlikely to be represented in such an organization, and Killian was, after all, a scientist himself. But it was Vice President Richard 

Nixon who stated that it was important for the United States to have a civilian space program entirely separate from the military. This, Nixon argued, would advance the 

American position in the world the most.55 

On February 7, 1958, James Killian and Din Land, who was also a member of the 

President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, met with Eisenhower 

and his staff secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster. They briefed him on the potential of 

both a recoverable space capsule and a supersonic reconnaissance aircraft program, suggesting that to speed up the development of a reconnaissance satellite, the United States 

should pursue the recoverable capsule idea as an “interim” solution. Eisenhower apparently accepted this recommendation at that time. 

An equally important result of this first meeting was the decision to finalize Secretary 

of Defense McElroy’s proposal and create ARPA to house highly technical defense 

research programs. General Electric executive Roy W. Johnson was to serve as its director. 

Eisenhower decided to give ARPA control of all military space programs. The military 

“man-in-space” program, meteorological programs, and the WS117L would all be turned 

over to ARPA. 

During a second conference on February 8 concerning the recoverable satellite program, Eisenhower said “emphatically that he believed the project should be centered in 

the new Defense space agency, doing what CIA wanted them to do.”56 This was a major 

shift in the development of the reconnaissance satellite program; not only did it give it 

top-level approval, it also removed responsibility for the film-return satellite from the Air 

Force and granted it to the CIA, mirroring the earlier U-2 decision. 

The importance of these meetings in early February cannot be overemphasized. In 

the course of only a few days, Eisenhower had not only taken the entire military space program, particularly the Air Force’s ambitious plans, and given it to a newly created DOD 

agency, but he had also taken a key project in that program and given it to the CIA. Both 

decisions later had profound effects on the shape of the American military and civilian 

space programs. In addition, the president had begun to address the issue of creating a 

separate civilian space agency. This was being heavily discussed in Congress and the press, 

but until the February 4 meeting, Eisenhower apparently thought that the issue of duplication of effort justified keeping all space research located in DOD, centralized at a level 

above any of the rival armed services. 

A month later, on the same day that the Air Force proposed the approval of a “manin-space’’ program, Eisenhower announced his decision to create a separate civilian space 

agency, with NACA as its core. This was to forever change the nature of civil-military cooperation in the American space program. 

54. Eisenhower may have also been swayed by public opinion at the time, which was generally in favor 

of a separate civilian space program. See Robert Hotz, “NACA, The Logical Space Agency,” Auiafion Week, 

February 3, 1958, p. 21. 

55. Document IV-2 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring the Unknown, 1: 631-32. 

56. “Memorandum of Conferences on 7 and 8 February, 1958,” cited in “CORONA Program Profile,” 

Lockheed Press Release, May 1995. This document is apparently the only written record of these meetings and 

the decision to proceed with CORONA. It is therefore one of the most important documents on the reconnaissance satellite program. Unfortunately, it remains classified in the Eisenhower Library. 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 251 

Sputnik brought space to the attention of the top military and civilian Air Force leadership. It was suddenly a highly visible and exciting endeavor and one in which top Air 

Force officers naturally felt that the service should lead. As a result, the dreams of the service’s space enthusiasts suddenly received high-level attention. Chief among these was the 

plan to place a human-an Air Force pilot, no less-in orbit around the Earth. 

Sputnik also re-focused attention on Wernher von Braun’s rocket team at the 

ABMA-a highly capable team of engineers who dramatically enhanced their reputation 

by launching Explorer I. The Army hoped that the ABMA would be the flag-carrier for a 

significant Army role in space. 

However, the ambitious plans of both the Air Force and Army ran headlong into reality-and the civilian leadership of DOD. In February 1958, ARPA was formally created, 

and the interim reconnaissance satellite program (later called CORONA) was placed 

under CIA control. ARPA assumed control of the manned ballistic capsule project as well. 

One by one, the Air Force’s other plans were gradually stripped away. The Army’s programs did not receive serious support; despite its impressive capabilities, the “ground service” was not considered particularly well-suited to lead the country into space. 

Thus, in the immediate post-Sputnik period, the Air Force saw its plans for becoming 

an “aerospace force” emerge and then quickly vanish-one by one lost to other agencies. 

In many of the programs that it had conceived and pioneered, it was thus reduced to a 

support role-almost the same as a contractor. Over the next few months, it became obvious that the projects it did not lose to ARPA would be lost anyway to the new civilian 

agency. 

The one program of which the Air Force did maintain exclusive control was the DynaSoar project. This was not simply a consolation prize; it was, in fact, the most important 

mission to many within the Air Force space community. It had everything that an Air 

Force space program was expected to have.-wings and a human in the cockpit. What it 

lacked was a clearly defined mission. 

The Transition 

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 established a purposely blurry line 

between NASA and the military space programs. Under the “Declaration of Policy and 

Purpose,” the Space Act states: 

The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that adequateprovision be made for aeronautical and space activities. The Congress further declares that such 

activities shall be the responsibility of; and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control 

over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United Stutq except that activities peculiar 

to orprimarily associated with the development of weapons system, military operations, or the defense 

of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for 

the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of; and shall be directed by, the Department 

of Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsibility for and direction of any 

such activity shall be made by the President in conformity with section 201 (e).57 

This was not terribly clear policy guidance, particularly as the entire nature of 

space exploration and exploitation was still vague and under development. It was also not 

very clear considering that the entire issue of which organization-ARPA or NASA57. Document 11-17 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Explming rhr Unknown, 1: 334-45. 
252 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY &LATlONS 

would be responsible for human spaceflight was unresolved. For the time being, the military space program was under the control of ARPA in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. This was not popular with the military services, but it did serve to mitigate turf 

disputes over the proper location of space programs. Such decisions were made at the 

national level, and the services on their own were incapable of making significant movement on space programs with ARPA in control of initiating and budgeting programs. The 

Space Act made it clear that it was up to the president to decide which programs belonged 

where. 

More importantly, the establishment of NASA to conduct scientific experiments in 

space undercut much of the Air Force’s emergingjustification for human spaceflight. The 

Air Force had proposed human spaceflight less for mission reasons than as an extension 

of aeronautical medicine-to study the reaction of the human body to spaceflight. This 

was now a mission that NASA was more appropriately suited to accomplish. Furthermore, 

if people were to be placed in space for prestige reasons, the civilian program was more 

suitable for this from a propaganda standpoint. The Air Force was thus largely left with 

the search for a practical reason to put people in space. As robotic systems improved, this 

practical justification became more and more elusive. Finally, in August 1958, Eisenhower 

formally assigned the role of human spaceflight to NASA.% 

Over time, the issue of where to conduct human spaceflight began to be resolved by 

top officials. For instance, by November 1958, only two months after NASA officially came 

into being, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan and ARPA Director Roy Johnson signed 

a memorandum of understanding concerning a “Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle.” 

[11-81 This was to supplement the Dyna-Soar vehicle development (whose exact status had 

not been clearly defined, although it stayed within the Air Force and did not come under 

the control of ARF’A) . Eventually, the ballistic capsule concept totally migrated over to 

NASA. As long as the Air Force continued to have its own human spaceflight program, top 

Air Force officials did not complain too much about losing the less interesting ballistic 

capsule vehicle. 

Other areas proved more contentious, however. NASA had acquired the three NACA 

research centers and their heavy emphasis on aeronautics research. But the new space 

agency lacked expertise in other areas, particularly the key ones of satellite and rocket 

development. It became obvious that NASA would have to acquire these as well. In the 

meantime, the Army was launching lunar and scientific probes on behalf of NASA, including Pioneer 111, which traveled 63,580 miles toward the Moon, and Explorer IV, which 

took radiation measurements in space. 

The obvious choice was for NASA to acquire the Army’s JPL, which had technical 

expertise in the areas of guidance, communications, telemetry, rocket propellants, and 

satellites. JPL was primarily a research center, and the Army could continue to benefit 

from its research no matter who operated it. On December 3, 1958, the Army transferred 

JPL to NASA, along with its Explorer satellite program.59 tII-91 

The other obvious entity to turn over to NASA was the ABMA in Huntsville, Alabama, 

which had produced the Jupiter and Redstone rockets. Jupiter was an IRBM and fulfilled 

the same role as the Air Force’s Thor. Its days as a weapons system were limited. The 

ABMA had other rocket programs in the works. In October 1958, with the concurrence 

58. Loyd. S. Swenson, Jr.. James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of 

Prqect Mercury (Washington, DC NASA SP-4201, 1966), pp. 101-102. 

59. Eddie Mitchell, Apogee, Perigee, and Recovery: Chronology of Amy Exploitation of Space, N-3103-A (Santa 

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1991), p. 24. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 253 

of ARPA, the ABMA had initiated an effort known as Juno V, which was soon to be 

renamed Saturn. Juno Vwas a space rocket, not a missile, and the ABMs other work was 

not in the IRBM or ICBM field (the latter being the exclusive domain of the Air Force). 

However, the ABMA represented the Army’s last vestige of long-range missile work, a 

concept that it had pioneered in the post-war years. Unlike JPL, it was also a major development command and, as such, represented a significant amount of money. The Army 

was therefore reluctant to give it up, especially if the money would no longer appear in 

the Army budget as well. There was even the appalling (for the Army) possibility that the 

Saturn rocket could be turned over to the Air Force. 

Rather than turning the center over to NASA immediately, the Army negotiated to do 

this gradually. Eisenhower disagreed with this strategy, but he was willing to let NASA 

Administrator T. Keith Glennan work it out. [11-101 The Redstone program was transferred to NASA on December 3, 1958, and then the Saturn program was transferred in 

November 1959. Finally, from March through July 1960, the Army transferred the ABMA 

Development Operations Division, which included the 150 German scientists and engineers, 3,900 ABMA personnel, and 2,500 missile and satellite technicians. [11-Ill The 

Army was officially out of the space business. 

While NASA was busy acquiring facilities and personnel from the Army, it was also 

using the services of the Air Force and forging various agreements with that military service, particularly for the use of its powerful missile, the Atlas, as well as its ground stations. 

Paying for these systems became an issue; NASA and DOD signed an agreement in 

November 1959 for the reimbursement of costs. [II-12] 

The move of the ABMA to NASA was the second important step in the creation of 

duplicative tasks for the civilian and military space programs. But it seems to have aroused 

little concern within the Eisenhower administration. 

Although the core of NASA consisted of NACA, as the organization grew, it took on 

aspects of both the Army and the Air Force approaches to ballistic missile development. 

The Army approach centered on the arsenal system, which involved heavy in-house development of weapons using both uniformed personnel as well as civilian Army employees, 

but relatively few outside contractors. The Air Force adopted a more open, contractor-oriented approach; direction remained within the military, but civilian contractors did a 

large amount of the research and development work. NASA adopted both of these practices over time. As it rapidly acquired former Army laboratories, it developed a strong inhouse technical capability for the development of hardware. But key NASA managers also 

came to the agency from the Air Force and brought with them both their experience and 

expertise of working with aerospace contractors, as well as long-standing close relationships with such contractors.““ 

A Rocky Road to Cooperation 

The Space Act included provisions for a “Civilian-Military Liaison Committee,” in 

which NASA and DOD were expected to “advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities and 

shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” But 

almost from the beginning, this committee did not work very well. 

60. For a discussion of the evolution of NASA as an institution, see Chapter IV in Logsdon, gen. ed., 

I<xfil..‘ng thv Unknown, 1: 61 1-29. 
254 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

In a December 15, 1958, interagency meeting on U.S. launch vehicles, representatives of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD), speaking for ARPA, had discussed their upper stage vehicles with NASA. However, they failed to mention the Agena 

B vehicle, which at the time was being considered for the CORONA and SAMOS reconnaissance satellites, as well as other payloads. NASA representatives discussed their AtlasVega vehicle. Vega was to be a two-stage addition to the Atlas. The second stage would be 

powered by a 33,000-pound thrust, liquid oxygen-kerosene engine. The third stage was to 

be a restartable 6,000-pound thrust, storable-propellant engine developed by JPL. 

On January 16, 1959, the AFBMD ordered Lockheed to initiate a study and a test program for a restartable booster. This occurred only a day after Convair submitted a proposal for a mediumenergy upper stage for the Atlas-Vega. A week and a half later, on 

January 27, NASA listed the Atlas-Vega as the first in a series of upper stage vehicles for 

use in the national space program.61 NASA signed contracts for the Atlas-Vega in March 

and May of that year. In April and June, the AFBMD had worked out details for the Agena 

B with Lockheed and authorized formal development work-without notifymg NASA.62 

Gradually, word of the Agena B reached NASA officials, and by December 1959, NASA 

canceled the Vega as redundant. This duplication of effort had cost the country $16 million. A Government Accounting Office review of the program placed most of the blame 

on the Air Force for not informing NASA of its ongoing program.”.9 The Civilian-Military 

Liaison Committee had been intended to preclude just such a duplication of effort, and 

it had failed because the Air Force decided to keep part of its program secret from another government agency. A year later, in September 1960, the Civilian-Military Liaison 

Committee was eliminated, and NASA and DOD signed an agreement creating an 

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board. [11-131 Over the years, the importance 

of the board has varied, depending on the issue and the personnel participating in it. 

Taking the Military Space Program Away From ARPA 

ARPA was never very popular with the military services. It removed a number of 

key space programs from service control and placed it within DOD itself. Although the 

services bowed to this reality, it became increasingly irksome to them as time went on. In 

March 1958, soon after its creation, Director RoyJohnson informed the service secretaries 

that he would bypass the service chiefs and deal with the heads of the commands directIY.~ Soon thereafter, the services began losing each of their programs. 

When the structure of ARF’A came up for review a year later, Air Force Brigadier 

General James F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated 

in a February 1959 memorandum to General Nathan Twining (the Chairman) : “From the 

military viewpoint, we would hope that ARF’A would be phased out eventually and that 

[the Office of the Secretary of Defense] could get back solely to policy dire~tion.’’~~ 

There was also concern that the Air Force would predominate once ARPA was 

eliminated. A Department of the Army space policy in February clearly stated that the 

Army would have a subordinate role in the national space program. But it also stated that 

in its view, “Space is a new largely unknown medium which transcends the exclusive inter61. “A National Space Vehicle Program,” NASA, January 27, 1959, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

62. Paul Means, “How the Two Programs Progressed,” Missiles atul Rockets, June 20, 1960, p. 20. 

63. Paul Means, “Vega-Agena-B Mix-up Cost Millions,” Missiles and Rockets, June 20, 1960, p. 19. 

64. Bowen, The Threshold of Space, p. 24. 

65. Brigadier General James E Whisenand, Special Assistant to Chairman, Memorandum for General 

Twining, “DOD Charter for ARF”,” February 16, 1959, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Chairman’s File, General Twining, 1957-1960, Box 34, “471.94 (1959).” National Archives. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 255 

est of any service. . . . No military department should be assigned sole responsibility for 

space activities.”ffi 

This situation also was unacceptable for the Navy. In April 1959, the chief of naval 

operations urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a single military space agency. The 

Army, rapidly losing its space program to NASA, agreed. The Air Force chief of staff 

objected that this would remove the weapons systems from the unified commands. By July 

1959, White House and DOD officials began evaluating this separate military space 

agency. It would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and command would rotate 

among the services. It was tentatively called the Defense Astronautical Agency.67 [II-14] 

In September 1959, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy rejected the proposal for a separate military space agency. Furthermore, he removed military space from ARPA and gave 

it back to the separate services. Booster development was transferred to the Air Force, and 

payload development went to the Army, Navy, and Air Force based on competence and 

primary interest. Under this plan, the Saturn rocket was expected to be turned over to the 

Air Force. This ultimately did not happen, however, as administration leaders recognized 

that there was no military need for such a large booster; a month later, Saturn was turned 

over to NASA.6” 

During the first two years after Sputnik, there was a considerable philosophical 

change in the Eisenhower administration’s approach toward space. Eisenhower had initially opposed the creation of a separate civilian space agency, which he thought would 

duplicate capabilities already at DOD. Yet he had been convinced to create NASA. His top 

officials, such as Killian, had also initially opposed the idea of giving NASA programs that 

duplicated those in the military services. However, first the ballistic space capsule and 

then Saturn and ABMA’s rocket development facilities were given to NASA. 

These later moves, in particular, were a much more dramatic shift. Giving NASA its 

own rocket development capability directly duplicated capabilities that could have been 

left solely with the Air Force, but they were not. This split-and the establishment of separate civilian and military rocket production facilities-was to have a profound effect on 

the relationship between NASA and the Air Force for years to come. In military terms, it 

created separate “stovepipes” that duplicated missions and capabilities. The creation of 

the National Reconnaissance Office only a few years later added a third stovepipe to the 

national space program, adding even more duplication. Gradually, by accretion and usually without much second thought, the separate programs grew beyond what Eisenhower 

had originally wanted when he created ARF’A in early 1958. 

The New Era 

By the end of 1959, the Air Force had regained from ARF’A control over most of its 

space program. Furthermore, it had been made lead authority for developing large military boosters. With the Army out of the picture, the Air Force was now clearly the premier 

military space agency. 

The Air Force also had not abandoned some of the expansive dreaming that had 

begun in the immediate post-Sputnik period. In April 1960, the AFBMD produced a 

secret report for a “Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study.” 

66. Office of the Adjutant General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, D@al-fmnf oJ the Army’s 

Interest, Capability, awl Rob in Space, February 25, 1959, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Chairman’s File, General Twining, 1957-1960, Box 34, “471.94 (1959);’ National Archives. 

67. Bowen, The Threshold of Space, pp. 30-32. 

68. Ibid., p. 33. 
256 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

[II-15] The base was billed as a “manned intelligence observatory” that could be developed into a “Lunar Based Earth Bombardment System.” According to the report, the decision to place strategic weapons on the Moon could be deferred for a few years. “However, 

the program to establish a lunar base must not be delayed and the initial base design must 

meet military requirements. For example, the base should be designed as a permanent 

installation, it should be underground, it should strive to be completely self-supporting, 

and it should provide suitable accommodations to support extended tours of duty.” The 

report recommended that “[t] he program for establishing a military lunar base be recognized as an Air Force requirement.’w 

The Air Force clearly still had its own designs on a large human spaceflight program. 

Within this atmosphere, on April 14, 1960, Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White sent 

a letter to his staff, stating: 

I am convinced that one of the major long range elements of the AirForce future lies in space. It 

is also obvious that NASA will phy a large part in the national effort in this direction and, moreovq inevitably will be closely associated, if not eventually combined with the military. It is perfectly 

clear to me that particularly in these fmative years the Air Force must, fm its own good as well as 

for national interest, cooperate to the maximum extent with NASA, to include the furnishing of kqr 

personnel even at the expense of som AirForce dilution of technical talent. [11-161 

Unfortunately for White and the Air Force, the memorandum was leaked to 

Congressman Overton Brooks, the chair of the House Committee on Science and 

Astronautics. As Brooks characterized it, the statement indicated that White thought “that 

the military would ultimately take over NASA.”” There was also much speculation within 

the press about the possible consolidation of the military and civilian space programs. 

69. The ideas of military bases on the Moon and orbital weapons were not new. One of the first mentions of orbital bombardment weapons appeared in Forbes magazine in 1946 (see Document 11-1 in Logsdon, 

gen. ed., Exploring the Unknown, 1: 230-36). Apparently the first mention of a lunar-based bombardment system 

appeared in Collier’s magazine in 1948 (see Robert S. Richardson, “Rocket Blitz From the Moon,” Collier’s, 

October 23, 1948, pp. 2425; 4446). Noted science fiction author Robert A. Heinlein used the idea of space bombardment in a short story called ”The Long Watch” in Amaican Legion Magazine in December 1949-and again 

in his popular novel Space Cadet. The same week that the creation of ARPA was being finalized, Brigadier General 

Homer A. Boushey, Air Force Deputy Director for Research and Development, wrote an article that advocated a 

lunar base as the ultimate deterrent (see Brig. Gen. Homer A. Boushey, “Who Controls the Moon Controls the 

Earth,” U.S. News &# World Report, February 7, 1958, p. 54). See also Lt. Col. S.E. Singer, “The Military Potential 

of the Moon,” Air Uniuersily him 11 (1959), pp. 31-53. But by far the most noteworthy study was conducted by 

von Braun and his team at the ABMA, known as Project Horizon. It was presented in June 1959, and one of the 

justifications was the basing of weapons on the Moon to provide “International Law Enforcement” (Prqect 

Horizon, Phase I Repmt, Volume I, June 8, 1959, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection). Rather 

surprisingly, the Army was still discussing lunar bases long after the Apollo program was under way (see, for 

instance, Space Infmtion B~+ng, March 30, 1966, Future Weapons Office, R&D Directorate, U.S. Army 

Weapons Command, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection). 

70. Defeme Space Inkresfs, Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 91. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 257 

Robert S. McNamara and the 

“National Space Program” 

Soon after the Kennedy administration took office on January 20, 1961, newly 

appointed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quickly put his own imprint on the military space program. On March 6, he issued a directive to the secretaries of the military 

services stating: “I have decided to assign space development programs and projects to the 

Department of the Air Force, except under unusual ~ircumstances.’”~ Such assignment, 

McNamara stated, was not to predetermine the assignment of operational responsibilities 

for the space systems. In addition, preliminary research could still be conducted by the 

individual services, but it would eventually have to be transferred to the newly created 

director of defense research and engineering for evaluation before proceeding to development. In light of that, “[r]esearch, development, test, and engineering of Department 

of Defense space development programs or projects, which are approved hereafter, will be 

the responsibility of the Department of the Air Force.” [II-17] 

Taken together, both memoranda made outside observers believe that the Air Force 

was about to attempt to take control of the majority of the civilian space program. In 

March 1961, Overton Brooks called hearings to discuss the issue. He was also concerned 

about the report of President Kennedy’s transition group for space, which indicated that 

NASA was to be responsible for scientific research, while the military would play the predominant role in developing space systems. Shortly before the hearings began, he sent a 

letter to Kennedy asking for clarification on the matter. [II-181 

During the course of the hearings, General Thomas D. White declared that the leaked 

memorandum, which had caused such consternation in the press and the committee, was 

only a general marching order to his staff to improve its cooperation with NASA; it did not 

indicate any planning to take over NASA. General Bernard Schriever, then commander of 

the Air Research and Development Command, admitted that he was mostly to blame for 

White’s memorandum, because he had resisted the transfer of Air Force personnel to 

NASA. White was trying to indicate to Schriever that he was not happy with this lack of 

cooperation. However, given the Air Force’s secrecy over the Agena B, and its continuing 

expansive space plans, it was conceivable that the service’s top officials had at least some 

designs on NASA’s turf.” 

The result of the hearings, and of Brooks’s letter to Kennedy, came in Kennedy’s reply 

on March 23, the final day of the hearings. Kennedy stated: 

71. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments, rf d., March 6, 1961, reprinted in ihd., p. 2. 

72. Certainly, the Air Force was interested in expanding its missions and power. In the course of the 

hearings, White also denied that he wanted to gain control of all strategic nuclear forces, stating that “[t] he Air 

Force has no designs whatsoever, on the Polaris weapon system.” hid, p. 98. This question came up because sixteen months before White had sent a letter to the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting that he recommend to the secretary of defense that he “assign control of the Polaris weapon system to the Strategic Air 

Command in view of its strategic capabilities.” General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, USAF, to 

General Nathan G. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, October, 1959, Record Group 218, Records of the 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s File, General Twining, 1957-1960, Box 34, “471.94 (1959) ,” National 

Archives. After a protest from the Nay, the Air Force backed away from this request. White’s actions, as well as 

those of others in the Air Force, indicate that the service was obviously interested in empire-building, but the 

uniformed leadership was being less successful at it than they had hoped. For a further discussion, see David 

Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-60,” Infrrnalional 

Srcurify 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71. 
258 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

It is not now, nor has it euer been, my intention to subordinate the activities in space of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration to those of the Department of Defense. Z belieue, as 

you do, that there are legitimate missions in space for which the military services should assume 

responsibility, but that there are major missions, such as the scientific unmanned and manned exploration of space and the application of space technology to the conduct of peaceful activities, which 

should be carried forward by our civilian space agency. [11-191 

Kennedy’s letter thus made it clear to the Air Force that NASA would have primary 

responsibility for both human spaceflight and the development of space technology in 

general. At the same time, he acknowledged a clear military role in space. This attitude 

would become clearer less than two months later with a joint memorandum to the president from NASA Administrator James E. Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara. The “Webb-McNamara Memo,” as it became known, stated that space projects 

could be undertaken for one of four possible reasons. The first was scientific knowledge, 

the second was commercial/civilian value, and the third was military missions. The final 

reason was for purposes of national prestige. Such missions were “part of the battle along 

the fluid front of the cold war.”” 

This was in stark contrast to the position of President Eisenhower, who had explicitly 

rejected national prestige as a reason for space exploration and attempted to restrict both 

NASA and the military to strict utilitarian missions. By embracing their own view, and by 

calling explicitly for an “integrated” space program, Webb and McNamara also indicated 

that large, “prestige” missions were best carried out within NASA. They essentially applied 

a “strict scrutiny” approach to military space programs. If the programs did not serve clear 

military needs, then they should be either turned over to NASA or abandoned altogether. 

Blue Gemini 

On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy committed the United States to a major new 

undertaking in space, expressly for the purposes of national prestige.” Project Apollo 

resulted in a dramatic infusion of funds to NASA, along with the decision to ensure that 

the United States was ahead in every area of space technology. NASA was selected as the 

primary-and most visible-instrument for accomplishing this. As NASA’s leadership 

planned out its program for reaching the Moon, it became obvious that certain technologies and capabilities would have to be developed. Foremost among these was rendezvous in orbit. NASA quickly decided to develop a more advanced space vehicle than 

the Mercury to develop these new techniques and technologies. This first “operational” 

spacecraft was soon named Gemini. 

As NASA increased in size and assumed a predominant role, its interests also tended 

to diverge at key points from those of DOD. On July 7, 1961, NASA Associate 

Administrator Robert Seamans proposed a joint study to determine mission models and 

requirements affecting the selection of large launch vehicles. NASA’s Nicholas Golovin 

directed the study. As this study progressed, the different requirements and institutional 

interests of NASA and DOD became clear. Both agencies distanced themselves from the 

contents of the report. By the time the report was released on September 24,1962, almost 

73. Document 111-11 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Erplon’ng the Unknown, 1: 43452. 

74. Document 111-12 in ibid.. 1: 453-54. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 259 

a year later, it had been obvious for some time that there would be very little cooperation 

between NASA and DOD on large launch vehicles. [11-201 The result was a further solidification of entirely separate and redundant rocket development programs in the civil and 

military spheres. 

In February 1962, during congressional hearings on the Air Force space plan, Air 

Force officials first broached the idea of an Air Force version of the Gemini spacecraft. 

The idea became firmer in June when the Air Force’s Space Systems Division began looking at the use of Gemini hardware for a preliminary Air Force space station known as 

MODS (Manned Orbital Development System). The Space Systems Division had been 

given the task of acting as a contractor to NASA for providing launch and target vehicles 

for Gemini. In August, those at the Space Systems Division started referring to the Air 

Force plan as “Blue Gemini.”75 

Although not officially sanctioned at the top levels of the Air Force, Blue Gemini 

became more appealing as other Air Force programs were cut back or slipped in schedule. A planned satellite interceptor was cut in the fall of 1962, and Dyna-Soar was still a 

long way from its first flight. The possibility of acquiring a simpler vehicle than Dyna-Soar 

to accomplish the rendezvous and reconnaissance agendas for the other two programs 

became very appealing at many levels of the Air F~rce.?~ 

Many at NASA did not oppose the possibility of the Air Force taking a bigger role in 

the development of Gemini; they thought that DOD money flowing into the program 

could only help its development. In November 1962, the NASA Gemini program team 

met with representatives of the Air Force’s Space Systems Division to discuss the coordination between the agencies. Soon after, NASA Administrator James Webb and Associate 

Administrator Robert Seamans visited the Pentagon to discuss increased DOD participation in Gemini with Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. However, Secretary 

of Defense McNamara was also there, and he surprised all of them by proposing the merging of the NASA Gemini program office with the Air Force office and moving it all to 

DOD.~~ 

Retired Admiral W. Fred Boone became NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for 

Defense Affairs on December 1,1962. Boone soon began working in earnest to build support against such a move. In early January 1963, NASA officials met with Pentagon officials and convinced them that taking over Gemini was a bad idea. McNamara and 

Gilpatric backed away from the takeover idea, but McNamara pushed for a joint management board for Gemini.?” 

In January 1963, Webb wrote Secretary of Defense McNamara and stated unequivocally his opposition to the joint management board for Gemini. [11-21,11-22,11-23] Webb 

had a major argument on his side; Gemini was vital to achieving the lunar goal, and DOD 

could not interfere with that mission. For DOD, Gemini was intended to be used to 

explore the utility of human spaceflight for the military-it was a much more open-ended 

and ambiguous mission. At the same time, there were those in the Air Force who were 

opposed to taking over Gemini because it would increase the chance of Dyna-Soar being 

killed. McNamara had to back away from the Gemini takeover attempt and ultimately 

accepted the creation of a Gemini Program Planning Board, which did not significantly 

alter the relationship between the actors.”’ 

75. Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Sh0uLlUr.s of Tzlrcn.~: A Hi.shy o/ I’rnjwf Gemini 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP4203, 1977), p. 118. 

76. Ilnd. 

77. IlifL., p. 119. 

78. Iljid., p. 120. 

79. Ilirl., pp. 121-22. 
260 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

In this context, and as Dyna-Soar moved toward the construction of hardware, that 

program became increasingly difficult for the Air Force to justify convincingly. Its proponents were forced to grasp at whatever justification they could find. Dyna-Soar was to be a 

reconnaissance craft. It was to be an offensive weapon, capable of striking the Soviet 

Union from virtually any direction, dropping up to two nuclear warheads. It was also to be 

an anti-satellite weapon, capable of destroying Soviet reconnaissance satellites. Some of 

these missions, however, could be accomplished more cheaply and more immediately with 

robotic spacecraft. Others, such as the bombing mission, were not really needed. 

Furthermore, as long as the fundamental utility of human spacecraft for military missions 

was in doubt, it made no sense to rely on a technologically challenging program to prove 

their worth. Gemini was perfect at the time for demonstrating the military value of human 

spaceflight because it was cheaper and easier than Dyna-Soar. The Air Force still remained 

wedded to the image of flying Air Force pilots in space, but this was an image that was 

more emotional than logical. 

In April 1963, President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to conduct, in his role 

as chair of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, an overall review of the “national space program.” [II-24] McNamara was asked to report to Johnson on this issue and did 

so, commenting that he and NASA Administrator Webb had worked hard to eliminate 

duplication between the civilian and military space programs. [11-251 The idea of a 

“national space program” was not McNamara’s alone; indeed, the term had been used 

during the prior administration. But McNamara, with his dedication to efficiency, was the 

person most concerned about eliminating duplicative and wasteful programs.*” 

McNamara was expansive in his view of his mission as well, and he was willing to reach 

beyond the DOD budget and programs to attempt to acquire or even to eliminate programs in other organizations that he did not see as worthwhile. Striving for McNamara’s 

definition of “efficiency” was not always easy, but this was a central factor in DOD-NASA 

relations during much of the first decade of the space program.*’ 

80. The strive for efficiency was felt in other areas as well, including a major fight in late 1962 and early 

1963 over whether or not the CIA’S presence in the ultra-secret National Reconnaissance Office was still necessary. McNamara thought it was duplicative and wasteful and felt that the Air Force should run all satellite reconnaissance. He lost this fight. See Albert D. Wheelon, “Lifting the Veil on CORONA,” Space Poky 11 (November 

1995): 252-53. 

81. There was, however, an example of duplication in space programs that proved in the end to be positive. This centered on the meteorological satellite programs. NASA inherited its Television and Infrared 

Operational Satellite (TIROS) system from the Army. The first TIROS flew in April 1960. NASA and DOD began 

negotiating on the development of an operational system in October, but by December, Air Force Commander 

in Chief Thomas S. Power expressed an interest in the Air Force controlling the operational system to provide 

weather data to its forces and also to be used for reconnaissance satellite flights. Negotiations continued for several months before the Air Force withdrew and began its own program, within the secrecy of the National 

Reconnaissance Office (it was later apparently turned over to the Strategic Air Command). NASA and the 

National Weather Bureau signed a joint agreement to cooperate on the development of an operational satellite 

in January 1962, but the program did not proceed very well because of conflicts between the partners, and the 

Weather Bureau withdrew in September 1963. Then the Weather Bureau approached the Air Force for access to 

its system. TIROS IX was launched in 1966 and was based on the Air Force’s satellite design. The majority of this 

story still remains classified, but it provides an interesting counter to McNamara’s arguments for efficiency in 

the national space program. See Janice Hill, WeatherFrom Above (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1991), pp. 22-26. See also General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, to General 

Thomas D. White, December 1, 1960, Box 34, “2-15 SAC,” Papers of Thomas D. White, Library of Congress, 

Washington, DC. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 261 

In March 1963, McNamara still had not made up his mind about the desirability of 

Dyna-Soar. He felt that the Air Force had not concentrated enough on exactly what it was 

to do in orbit, focusing solely on its flying characteristics. He suggested several missions 

that should be evaluated, including inspection and kill, reconnaissance, the vulnerability 

of space vehicles, and orbital weapons. But he was also interested in the test bed possibilities of any spacecraft and voiced this in a meeting with Boeing and NASA officials. One 

NASA official stated that according to the Space Act, such joint use might create a conflict, because regulations dictated that NASA was not to be involved in weapons develop 

ment. McNamara responded to this with scorn, stating that he was willing to change the 

law if necessary.82 His view of his authority and mission was quite expansive indeed. 

During the summer of 1963, the Air Force began to seriously consider an orbital space 

station. It received authorization from the director of defense research and engineering 

to study the issue. The space station was not to be an end in itself; rather, it was to be used 

to “demonstrate and assess qualitatively the utility of man for military purposes in space.’’n3 

The Air Force’s initial study was completed by November, and it assessed a number of 

options, including the use of Gemini and Apollo spacecraft to service the military space 

station. 

Dyna-Soar was an arguably duplicative program and also one that was becoming 

increasingly expensive as it moved away from purely theoretical research and into the 

development phase. In addition, Kennedy had been elected to some degree on the propaganda scare of a nonexistent “missile gap,” from which he and McNamara later had to 

retreat. Kennedy’s actions after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty of 1963 also symbolized a movement away from boisterous displays of nuclear capabilities. In light of these events, as well as ongoing public and congressional concerns 

about “the militarization of space,” the image of a piloted space bomber swooping in from 

orbit to obliterate Moscow became distinctly unattractive to the administration. 

Another problem with Dyna-Soar was that the basic utility of humans for military 

space missions was in doubt. It was to be proven or disproven with the military space station, which was itself an experimental vehicle. Identifjmg the utility issue did not require 

an experimental vehicle, and using an experimental spacecraft to service an experimental space station seemed to be too risky and too expensive. 

By 1963, the Kennedy administration was very aware of the value of satellite reconnaissance. It had even evaluated the possibility of sharing U.S. reconnaissance data with 

other nations. Satellite reconnaissance was viewed as a valuable national asset, not merely 

a military war-fighting tool. But the Air Force apparently continued to view reconnaissance solely in terms of military capabilities and thus sought a way of neutralizing Soviet 

reconnaissance satellitesaoing so in a highly visible manner. 

In short, Dyna-Soar would militarize space in all the ways that the administration did 

not want to see it militarized. It was largely unjustified and duplicative of missions that 

NASA was already conducting. It also now stood in the way of identifying clear military 

space missions for humans. Thus, by late 1963, Dyna-Soar was in clear trouble with 

Defense Secretary McNamara. The response from the Air Staff was a letter to the secretary of the Air Force outlining several space station missions, all involving Dyna-Soar. If 

money was a problem for the national space program, suggested the assistant to the vice 

82. Brockway McMillan, Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, “Memorandum for 

Secretary Zuckert,” March 15, 1963, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 

83. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Secretary of the Air Force, 

“Military Orbiting Space Station,” August 30, 1963, Space Policy Institute Documentary History Collection. 
262 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

chief of staff, then it was always possible to cancel Gemini (its role in the Apollo program 

was ignored).& This last ditch, vindictive effort to save Dyna-Soar failed. 

On December 10,1963, McNamara canceled the Dyna-Soar program. As consolation 

to the Air Force, DOD authorized money for a Manned Orbital Laboratory program utilizing the Gemini spacecraft. This laboratory program would continue for another five 

years, serving as the Air Force’s hope for flying its own pilots in space. The laboratory was 

to serve as an occupied, real-time reconnaissance spacecraft with multiple cameras, 

demonstrating various reconnaissance and surveillance technologies. However, at the 

beginning of its life, the Manned Orbital Laboratory, similar to Dyna-Soar, was amorphous, with no clear, overriding purpose other than technology development and the 

ever-persistent Air Force desire to fly its own astronauts in space. 

At the same time, NASA was investigating the possibility of developing a space station, 

and cooperation with DOD on this matter was only natural. [II-26,11-27] The two organizations even signed an agreement for the creation of a Manned Space Flight Experiments 

Board. [11-281 The agreement established the principle of reciprocity and the sharing of 

flight opportunities between NASA and DOD for both Apollo and the Manned Orbital 

Laboratory. 

By 1968, the Manned Orbital Laboratory had solidified significantly and was to 

include a massive camera system with a ground resolution of four inches. The officers 

aboard it were to provide near real-time reconnaissance of the Earth. This had been an 

early goal of the Air Force’s WS117L and SAMOS programs, but it had proven a difficult 

one to achieve because of the technological challenges. The CIA had successfully developed its CORONA reconnaissance system, which, by the late 1960s, had already flown 

more than 100 missions and proved an astounding success. The Air Force had chosen 

another route, developing “close-look systems for the technical assessment of Soviet 

weapons, but the service had never abandoned its desire for real-time reconnaissance. 

CORONA photographs could take more than a day to reach Washington and photointerpreters. The Air Force wanted to reduce this to hours or less; such a quick 

turn-around would enable the photographs to be used in battlefield operations. This 

coincided well with the Air Force’s dream of flying Air Force officers in space-hence a 

major impetus behind Dyna-Soar and, later, the Manned Orbital Laboratory. 

With the Vietnam War waging, the DOD budget was under extreme pressure. The 

Manned Orbital Laboratory was the largest single item in the DOD budget and therefore 

an obvious target for being cut. In 1968, the laboratory was doomed, but it survived for 

one more year and the election of another president (Richard Nixon). Then it was killed. 

Once again, the Air Force’s attempt to fly military officers in space had been thwarted.85 

84. Major General J.K. Hester, Assistant, Vice Chief of Staff, HQ, Air Force, Memorandum to the 

Secretary of the Air Force, “Approaches to Manned Military Space Programs,” December 4, 1963, Space Policy 

Institute Documentary History Collection. 

85. The Manned Orbital Laboratory had also run afoul of other developments and a shortage of funds, 

this time not because of NASA, but from a different source entirely-the CIA. By the late 1960s, the CIA was 

beginning to develop its follow-on to the highly successful CORONA series of wide-area surveillance satellites. 

The CORONA follow-on and the Manned Orbital Laboratory, which were intended to perform entirely different missions, were competing with each other for funding within the highly secret world of the National 

Reconnaissance Office. Furthermore, the laboratory ran into some of the same problems as its linear predecessor, DynaSoar; it was far too visible for its own good, especially for a reconnaissance system. In a contentious 

meeting at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, chair 

of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, repeatedly complained that the Manned Orbital Laboratory 

would not be able to fly without ‘Walter Cronkite looking over your shoulder.” While the nation’s other reconnaissance satellite programs had remained remarkably secret, the laboratory had attracted much attention within the press and Congress. It had become a political football in Congress, where angry Florida senators and 

representatives wanted to know why the space station had to fly out of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 263 

Human spaceflight was one of the key issues of military-civilian cooperation. During 

the 1960s, NASA had clear justifications for flying humans in space-medical research 

and prestige. The Air Force did not have these clear justifications, and its human spaceflight program was thus focused first on demonstrating the utility of astronauts for military space missions. In the end, the Air Force failed even to jwtijvjlying astronauts simply to 

perform this evaluation, let alone to serve practical purposes in space. Robotic spacecraft as 

well as NASA experiments undercut the tenuous justifications the Air Force had advanced 

even for experimental missions. The costs were simply too high and the benefits viewed as 

too elusive. The experience with both Dyna-Soar and the Manned Orbital Laboratory 

apparently taught the senior uniformed leadership at the Air Force a lesson, and they 

were forever after very skeptical of human spaceflight. 

The Military and the Space Shuttle 

In early 1969, Presidentelect Richard Nixon appointed a Space Task Group to 

address the issue of the post-Apollo space program. Vice Presidentelect Spiro Agnew was 

appointed chair of the group, and its other members were NASA Administrator 

Thomas 0. Paine and Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans (who had been 

deputy administrator at NASA). On March 22, 1969, the Space Task Group met to discuss 

the joint development of a Space Transportation System (STS) . Less than two weeks later, 

on April 4, Paine asked Seamans to approve a joint NASA-Air Force study of an STS.86 

The conclusion of the Space Task Group was that the country should undertake an 

ambitious space exploration program involving landing humans on Mars and developing 

a lunar base and space station. These missions would be serviced by a reusable Space 

Shuttle, intended to reduce the costs of transportation. President Nixon, however, did not 

accept this report and only gave his initial approval to the space station and shuttle 

options, postponing the former and tentatively agreeing to the latter.R7 

NASA and the Air Force had diverged on the issue of large launch vehicle development seven years before. While NASA developed the Saturn IB and the much larger 

Saturn V, the Air Force developed its Titan series of boosters. Versions of the Titan were 

used for ICBMs and various reconnaissance missions, and even larger versions were developed first for Dyna-Soar and later the Manned Orbital Laboratory and CORONA followon. By early 1970, NASA officials such as Paine had recognized that DOD support would 

likely be essential for obtaining White House approval for the Space Shuttle program. 

NASA and Air Force officials met a number of times to discuss the design of the Space 

Shuttle and to establish terms of reference for such a system. [11-291 

In February 1970, NASA and the Air Force signed a joint agreement to cooperate by 

establishing a NASA-Air Force Space Transportation System Committee (STS 

Committee). They agreed that the program would be unclassified and would also involve 

international cooperation. Furthermore, both NASA and DOD would make substantial 

contributions to shuttle development and operations-which later became important for 

the establishment of shuttle pricing agreements. [11-30, 11-31, 11-32] The STS Committee 

was the mechanism through which the Air Force informed NASA of its requirements for 

86. DOD prepared a massive report for the Space Task Group, which served as a basis for transportation mission models for the space shuttle. This document was essentially a listing of all possible DOD missions 

over the next several years. "DOD Space Programs, Options, Recommendations," August 7, 1969, Space Policy 

Institute Documentary History Collection. 

87. Documents 111-25 and 111-26 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Exphing Ihs Unknown, 1: 52246. 
264 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

the Space Shuttle. During its first year of operation, the STS Committee laid considerable 

groundwork for the shuttle’s design. 

NASA initially wanted a smaller shuttle with only limited cross-range (that is, the 

ability of the shuttle to travel to either side of its ground track during landing). Low crossrange meant relatively small, straight wings, while high cross-range meant larger, deltashaped wings for more maneuvering. Smaller payload size and smaller wings would 

presumably result in a smaller, easier (to build), and, hopefully, cheaper shuttle. 

The Air Force, however, had two primary requirements. One was the ability to launch 

the largest payload in its inventory, by then the CORONA follow-on satellite (which the 

CIA had eventually turned over to the Air Force for development), with a little extra room 

and weight for growth. The second was the ability to launch polar-orbiting reconnaissance 

satellites. Polar orbit could not be reached from Cape Canaveral without overflying inhabited areas, and such launches therefore flew out of Vandenberg Air Force Base in 

California, heading south. For the shuttle, this proved problematic, for if there was an 

abort during liftoff, the shuttle had to be capable of returning to California to avoid landing with a highly classified payload in the Soviet Union. The rotation of the Earth would 

cause California to move during that time period, and the shuttle needed to catch up with 

it. It therefore needed a high cross-range capability-1,100 miles-in addition to the large 

payload capability. 

NASA’s initial proposal was for a shuttle with a 14foot by 45-foot payload bay, which 

would eventually be expanded to 15 feet by 60 feet at a future date. The Air Force strongly objected to this, because it could not use a payload bay smaller than 15 feet by 60 feet 

for key missions. The Air Force stated that of the 149 military payloads forecast to be flown 

between 1981 and 1990, 71 would not fit in the smaller payload bay. Without the larger 

bay, these missions would have to fly on Titan I11 boosters instead, undercutting the justification for the Space Shuttle.88 

To gain the Air Force’s support for the development of the shuttle, NASA agreed to 

both the payload and cross-range design requirements.*‘ [11-331 In addition, to place large 

payloads in high-Earth orbit, a “space tug” was needed. NASA and DOD began negotiating on the development of this vehicle as well. [11-341 

According to NASA’s early cost models for the shuttle’s development, virtually all 

American payloads had to be shifted to the shuttle for the vehicle to be cost-effective. This 

meant, in effect, that other launch vehicle production had to be eliminated, but the Air 

Force had not explicitly agreed to this. In 1973, Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering, wrote to the secretary of the Air Force stating, that uncertainties about the operational availability of the shuttle dictated the maintenance of a back-up 

launch capability using expendable launch vehicles.w With congressional pressure mounting on NASA because of rising shuttle costs, NASA Administrator James Fletcher wrote to 

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, asking for his continued support of the shuttle, 

as well as continued dialogue with NASA on the issue. [11-351 Schlesinger, along with 

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, met with Fletcher in August 1976 to discuss the shuttle issue. 

88. For a fuller discussion of the technical tradeoffs involved in the shuttle design, see M. Scott Pace, 

“Engineering Design and Political Choice: the Space Shuttle 1969-1972,” MA. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, 1982. 

89. Documents 111-28 and 111-32 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Explon‘ng the Unknown, 1: 546-59. 

90. Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, 

Secretary of the Air Force, “DOD Space Shuttle Planning,” August 7, 1973, Space Policy Institute Documentary 

History Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 265 

In a letter to Fletcher, Clements stated for the first time: “Once the Shuttle’s capabilities and low operating cost are demonstrated we expect to launch essentially all of our 

military space payloads on this new vehicle and phase out of inventory our current 

expendable launch vehicles.” [11-361 This letter, although not a specific policy directive, is 

apparently the first clear statement of DOD intent to rely exclusively on the shuttle for 

access to space. This policy was not quickly or easily accepted within the Air Force, and 

even two and a half years later, a joint memorandum of understanding on the management and operation of the shuttle notably did not state that the shuttle would be the 

exclusive means for access to space. [11-371 

Two months later, John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and 

Development), and John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, 

signed an agreement that determined what DOD would pay for shuttle launch services. 

For the first six years of operation, DOD would pay NASA what amounted to the incremental costs of materials and services. [11-381 This later led to charges in Congress and 

the press that NASA was giving the Air Force a preferential deal on shuttle flights to maintain its continued support. However, the Air Force had already agreed to significant costs 

of its own for using the shuttle. 

The effects of the Air Force decision to cooperate with NASA on the shuttle were not 

felt for some time. There were gradual indications that this had been a mistake. The cost 

of developing a separate launch and landing facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base was 

increasing. It was planned that the shuttle use Space Launch Complex-6 (known as “Slick 

Six”) at Vandenberg, which had originally been intended for Dyna-Soar, was then modified for the Manned Orbital Laboratory, and had never launched a single rocket despite 

the expenditure of billions of dollars. The modification of “Slick Six” was expected to cost 

even more money than planned. 

In addition, the Air Force was looking at the possible procurement of its own orbiters, 

but as the development cost rose, this became less attractive. Finally, the decision to cooperate on the shuttle did not necessarily constitute an Air Force decision to make exclusive 

use of the shuttle for launching all payloads. However, the cost of supporting both the 

shuttle and the Air Force fleet of expendable boosters was also becoming apparent. By 

1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Secretary of the Air Force Malcolm 

Currie were becoming increasingly concerned about all of these costs. 

NASA-Air Force relations during this time were not always cordial. As the shuttle 

design matured, NASA managers frequently made changes without including the Air 

Force in the decisions, only informing the service after the fact. Furthermore, the initial 

launch rate for the shuttle was set at 60 flights per year, with 40 from Kennedy Space 

Center and 20 from Vandenberg. NASA soon determined that this flight rate was 

unachievable without a five-orbiter fleet; in 1976, the space agency began calling for a fifth 

orbiter, expecting the Air Force to pay for it. The DOD leadership refused to acknowledge 

that its mission model dictated the need for the fifth orbiter, which it feared it would have 

to procure on its own. [11-391 

In 1977, Hans Mark became the new under secretary of the Air Force and the director of the National Reconnaissance Office. Mark previously had directed NASA’s Ames 

Research Center and felt that the shuttle was in the best interests of the country. He 

entered office at a time when the shuttle was coming under increasing pressure from the 

new administration of President Jimmy Carter over cost increases and schedule delays.’” 

91. Document 111-33 in Logsdon, gen. ed., Expkrn~ngfhr Unknown, 1: 559-74. 
266 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Mark was an ardent shuttle supporter and argued that the vehicle itself was an important contributor to national defense.w To further justify the shuttle, Mark chose to eliminate the option of “dual-compatibility” and shift key national security payloads to a 

“shuttle-compatible” only policy. According to a report at the time, this meant “a payload 

design compatible with shuttle launch: it may or may not be compatible with [expendable 

launch vehicle] launch. The term ‘Shuttle optimized’ implies a payload designed to 

exploit the unique capabilities of the shuttle-i.e., retrieval, on-orbit service, large weight 

and volume, etc. The ‘Shuttle optimized’ payload is not likely to be compatible with existing [expendable launch vehicle] launch capability.’”s In anticipation of using the shuttle’s 

unique capabilities, the procurement rate of national security satellites was reduced during the 1970s until the shuttle became operational. The result of this decision was a “bow 

wave” of unfunded requirements that drove up DOD space spending in the 1980s.” 

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan, despite the objections of the uniformed Air Force, 

directed the transition of all U.S. government payloads to the Space Shuttle as expeditiously as possible, once “the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and 

 obligation^.'^^ As a result, a number of national security payloads were modified so that 

they could only fly on the Space Shuttle. This was to have a profound effect on the military and intelligence space programs later in the 1980s. 

The Death of Military Human Spaceflight 

By the time the Space Shuttle became operational in the early 1980s, it had changed 

considerably from what the Air Force had originally anticipated. The Air Force faced 

launch costs totaling nearly $300 million per flight. In August 1982, Air Force Systems 

Command Commander General Robert T. Marsh, who had responsibility for Air Force 

participation in the STS, informed Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Gabriel of rising shuttle costs. [I1401 The shuttle did not fare well when compared to the Air Force’s 

other heavy booster, the Titan 111. Not only had shuttle costs risen, but when added to the 

Air Force’s internal costs for personnel, hardware, mission control, and so on, the overall 

cost to the Air Force was much higher than expected. It was becoming obvious to many 

within the Air Force that the shuttle posed a major budgetary burden. In addition, the 

shuttle program was also considerably behind schedule and was unlikely to meet anticipated flight rates. 

92. See Hans Mark, The Space Station: A PersonalJounzqr (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987). 

93. Space Shuttle Appropations fm Fiscal Ear 1979, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings before 

Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. 

(Washington, DC US. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 363. 

94. From 1973 to 1976, DOD strove to design satellites for “duakompatibility” with both the shuttle and 

expendable launch vehicles. This meant that the satellites had to be designed and tested in the different acoustic 

and dynamic environments of the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. Such a design, however, proved to be 

more difficult in practice than in theory, because of widely different operating environments and other conditions. As a result, satellite program managers tended to defer changes until the next “block change” in the satellite, when the costs could be folded into other necessary design changes as well. Vice President’s Space Policy 

Advisory Board, A Post Cold WarAssessmat of US. Space Poliq (Washington, DC US. Government Printing Office, 

December 1992), p. 6. 

95. National Security Decision Directive 8, “Space Transportation System,” November 13, 1981, and 

National Security Decision Directive 42, “National Space Policy,” July 4, 1982, Space Policy Institute 

Documentary History Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 267 

In March 1983, Lieutenant General Richard C. Henry, Commander of the Air Force 

Space Division, wrote a letter to General Marsh at the Systems Command. Henry 

expressed growing concern that carrying humans aboard a vehicle designed merely to 

deliver payloads to orbit created an unnecessary expense. After the initial groundprocessing delays of the shuttle Chalhgq Henry wrote: 

A four mbitm-only fleet, experiencing problems similar to those of Chalhgq would helop a 

backlog of launches that would take months to years to work off: This represents a considerable threat 

to the continued vitality of th national spaceprogram and in particula?; could impact national security through inadequate launch support of p’m’ty DOD spacecraft. 

Henry’s letter outlined for the first time the idea of a “mixed fleet” of launch vehicles 

and also mentioned the possibility of commercializing launch vehicles, such as the Delta 

and the Atlas. [I1411 This was at a time when the Air Force was rapidly preparing to close 

down its expendable launch vehicle production lines. 

DOD continued to support the shuttle despite strong reservations, particularly among 

top Air Force officers. In early 1984, however, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 

issued a directive that established a need for a complementary expendable launch vehicle 

to supplement the Space Shuttle. [I1421 This move was not popular with top NASA officials, who viewed it, correctly, as a lack of faith in the Space Shuttle, but they could not 

address the problem because it was an Air Force policy issue. In the Air Force’s view, the 

Space Shuttle was nowhere near reaching its definition of “operational status,” even more 

than three years since the first launch. [I1431 DOD initially ordered ten complementary 

expendable launch vehicles, based on a modified Titan 34D design. This eventually 

became known as the Titan IV. 

A year after the complementary expendable launch vehicle decision, Undersecretary 

of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, who was also the director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, discussed with NASA Administrator James Beggs the possibility of 

preserving other expendable launch vehicle lines in addition to the Titan. Having completed a competition to select the complementary expendable launch vehicle, Aldridge 

needed NASA to concur with the decision. He reached an agreement with Beggs, and this 

was taken to the National Security Council for the president’s signature. It became 

National Security Decision Directive 164 (NSDD 164), “National Security Launch 

Strategy,” signed on February 25, 1985, which stated that the shuttle would continue to be 

the primary space launch system for both the military and civilian space programs. This 

directive authorized DOD to develop the complementary expendable launch vehicle; it 

also stated that the two organizations should begin developing a second-generation STS. 

[ 11-44] 

After the Challenger accident, however, the military was placed in a tremendous bind. 

Although DOD had already begun shifting some of its payloads away from the shuttle, it 

had also designed a number of them so that they could be carried only by the shuttle. With 

the primary launch vehicle for many of these payloads out of service for an indeterminate 

amount of time, the depth of the shuttle cooperation mistake became apparent to virtually everyone in the Air Force and DOD. Classified satellites that could only fly on the shuttle began to pile up at various “clean rooms” around the country, creating a backlog of 

payloads that needed to be in orbit. Furthermore, several other expendable launch vehicle failures at the same time left the United States grounded and resulted in the destruction of several valuable reconnaissance payloads. Finally, the on-orbit constellation of 

reconnaissance, early warning, communications, and other satellites continued to age. 
268 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

For a period of several years, the United States was left with only one reconnaissance satellite in orbit, a situation that was totally unacceptable from a national security point of 

view.96 

The Shuttle Legacy for NASA-DOD Relations 

Air Force involvement in the shuttle came largely at the urging of the civilian leadership of the service, not the general officers or the Air Staff. This is not terribly surprising 

because the shuttle was a NASA-initiated program, and NASA officials had negotiated with 

their civilian counterparts in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force Grant Hansen was one of the principal contacts with NASA during early negotiations, as was Secretary Seamans. Later in the 1970s, Undersecretary of the 

Air Force Hans Mark further entwined the Air Force’s fate with the performance of the 

Space Shuttle. 

At the same time, support for involvement with the shuttle received only lukewarm 

response from uniformed personnel. This represented a decided shift from the previous 

major military space initiatives in the Air Force, where the uniformed officers had been 

pushing the programs and the civilian leadership-both at the secretary level and in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense-had opposed them. This characteristic had begun 

with the WS117L reconnaissance program, which had been underfunded by Secretary of 

the Air Force Quarles. It was also seen in such instances as General Schriever being 

warned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense not to use the word “space” in speeches. 

It was certainly common in the immediate post-Sputnik era, when the Air Staff had lobbied extensively for a number of new space missions, only to see its authority stripped by 

Secretary of Defense McElroy with the creation of ARF’A. And it was in evidence under 

McNamara, when the Air Staff had bold plans for Dyna-Soar, which met opposition among 

the civilian leadership. It even applied to areas that were well within the Air Force’s space 

mission, such as the development of the MIDAS early warning satellite, which McNamara 

refused to approve for operational development over the objections of Schriever and others?’ By the time that the shuttle decision was made, however, the Air Staff had apparently lost much of its enthusiasm for space, particularly for human spaceflight missions. Why 

this is so is not clear. At the very least, solely military “man-in-space’’ missions were apparently out of the question, and cooperative missions with NASA were not particularly attractive to the uniformed military. 

96. A report by the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board in June 1983 further symbolized the uniformed 

Air Force’s move away from the dream of a military “man-in-space’’ program. A special Ad Hoc Committee on 

the Potential Military Utility of a Manned National Space Station concluded that the most valuable use to the 

military of a space station was the ability to conduct research and test new technology with human crews in attendance. However, the committee did not feel that this mission justified major involvement or funding; DOD could 

be a potential customer of the planned NASA space station once it was operational without being an active participant in designing, managing, or funding the station. This time, the Air Force, rather than striving to develop 

its own program for human spaceflight or even cooperating with NASA as it did with the shuttle, would be content to serve merely as a customer. This later caused same controversy when Secretary of Defense Weinberger 

insisted that no agreement be signed with an international partner that prevented the United States from conducting military experiments on the station. 

97. General B.A. Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary 

of the Air Force, “DOD Program Change (4.4.040) on MIDAS (239A),” August 13, 1962, Box B167, Curtis E. 

LeMay Papers, Library of Congress. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 269 

This is not to say that the civilian leadership of DOD in general, or the Air Force in 

particular, rushed enthusiastically into a major development project with NASA. Certain 

important members of DOD required much convincing before signing the agreements 

that increased cooperation with NASA on the Space Shuttle. Later on, in the 1980s, particularly under the leadership of first Undersecretary and then Secretary of the Air Force 

Edward Aldridge, the civilian leadership at the Air Force became particularly suspicious 

and distrustful of the total reliance on the Space Shuttle. It is also true that by the 1980s, 

the military space program had clear priority within the White House. Even the policymaking apparatus for space decisions, centered as it was in the National Security Council, 

was biased in favor of DOD over NASA. 

The Challenger accident did not create the problems for DOD in general and the Air 

Force in particular in terms of cooperation with NASA. However, it did throw them into 

harsh relief; it confirmed the grumblings and second-thoughts of much of the uniformed 

military. All of this is important to recognize with respect to what happened later to Air 

Force-NASA relations-Challenger was not the cause, merely the most blatant symptom of 

a long-standing tension. 

Civilian DOD officials typically serve no more than a single presidential term in office. 

Occasionally, they move to higher positions, but it is far more common that they leave the 

government altogether. They therefore rarely have to live with the long-term consequences of the policy decisions they make. The uniformed officers in a service, however, 

do remain. The mid-level officers frequently are given the task of implementing decisions 

made at higher levels and then may rise to general officer rank themselves years later, 

when they are faced with the consequences of the decisions made earlier. In the case of 

the shuttle decision, many Air Force officers who were colonels and lieutenant colonels at 

the time later rose to general officer rank when the true effects of the shuttle decisionparticularly the higher costs and the schedule delays-were being felt. At that point, they 

were inclined to heavily resist any further cooperative efforts with NASA. 

This was the legacy that NASA and DOD faced as the 1990s began. The situation was 

akin to what Mark Twain once said about a cat that sits on a hot stove top: it will never sit 

on a hot stove top again, but neither will it sit on a cold one. Thus, despite the change of 

the civilian political leadership at both DOD and NASA from both the change of administrations and simple personnel turnover, the institutional memory of the Air Force-its 

uniformed officers-remained highly distrustful of any cooperative agreement foisted on 

them by civilians. 

Conclusion 

The civilian-military relationship in space has been one that has evolved over time and 

continues to evolve to this day. Determining whether it has been a success or not is largely impossible, because the question depends on at what level one wants to look. 

At the operational level, there has been much successful cooperation on all aspects of 

the space program. DOD provided facilities, material, and personnel in support of the 

civilian space agency. Navy ships conducted retrieval operations for NASA missions. Air 

Force personnel served in important positions in the Apollo program. DOD and NASA 

shared tracking and communications facilities for each other’s programs. Even the highly secretive “black” intelligence programs have been used in the civilian space program. 

Optics developed for reconnaissance satellites found their way into Apollo and other 

space science missions. In fact, a reconnaissance satellite was even used to photograph the 
270 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Skylab space station soon after launch to assess the damage it incurred during liftoff. The 

photographs were used to train the NASA astronauts who flew the repair mission.”R 

At the policy level, it has been a different story. From the Air Force’s perspective, the 

service has largely come up short-being relegated to less glamorous, but more vital roles 

in space, while also being forced to serve in a support capacity for NASA, which managed 

to take much of the credit. For the first decade of its existence, NASA reaped the fruits of 

much military spending and research on space and was frequently predominant in policy 

disputes. Beginning with the shuttle, NASA’s dependence on the military for more than 

just operational support became blatantly clear. In the end, however, the Air Force seems 

to have suffered more from this situation as well. 

By the early 199Os, the situation had become much more complex. Both NASA and 

DOD needed each other to find a solution to the problem of excessive launch costs. 

Perhaps more importantly, NASA began the painful transformation to a post-Cold War 

world much earlier than the military space program. Whether the military can learn from 

NASA’s example awaits to be seen. 

98. Dwayne A. Day, The Air Force in Space: Past, Present and Future,” Space Times: The Magazine of the 

American Astronautical Sociefy 35 (March-April 1996): 17. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 271 

Document 11-1 

Document title: Major General L.C. Craigie, Director of Research and Development 

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, to Brig. Gen. Alden R. Crawford, Air Materiel 

Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, “Satellite Vehicles,” January 16, 1948, with 

attached: Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff, “Earth Satellite Vehicles,” January 12, 

1948, and General Hop S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 

“Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle.” 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Following RAhD S study titled ‘Freliminary Design of an Expm’mental World Circling Spaceship, 

published as Document 11-2 in Volume I of Exploring the Unknown, RAh!Ll conducted several 

more studies. The staff of Headquarters United States Air Force ordered the Air Matetiel Command 

to evaluate RAh!Ll’s studies. The Materiel Command returned a cautious report stating that thepacticality of satellites was questionable and advisedfurther study. As a result, the Air Staffauthon‘zed 

further study of the subject by RAh!Ll, and also stated that the Air Force was the logical service fw 

developing satellite systems. This was thefirst definitive stataent by the AirForce that it should have 

primacy in space systems. 

[no pagination] 16 January 1948 

SUBJECT Satellite Vehicles 

TO: Commanding General 

Air Materiel Command 

Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio 

Attn: Brig Gen Alden R. Crawford 

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 8 December 1947, file TSKON-9/ 

MSR/loa, subject as above. 

2. In line with the contents of referenced letter, the attempted statement of policy covering this matter has been formulated and approved. 

3. It is requested that this policy be implemented by action under the RAND contract. 

This matter has been co-ordinated [sic] with the local RAND office. 

4. The classification of this subject may be considered confidential with the exception 

of the attached policy statement. 

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF: 

L.C. CRAIGIE 

Major General, U.S. Air Force 

Director of Research and Development 

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel 

********* 
272 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

[no pagination] 12 JAN 1948 

Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff 

SUBJECT: Earth Satellite Vehicles. 

DISCUSSION. 

1. Progress in guided missile research and development by the Air Force, the Navy 

and other agencies is now at a point where the actual design, construction, and launching 

of an Earth Satellite Vehicle is technically, although not necessarily, possible. The passage 

of time, with accompanying technical progress, will gradually bring the cost of such a missile within feasible bounds. 

2. It seems therefore, imperative, in order that the USAF maintain its present position 

in aeronautics and prepare for a future role in astronautics, that a USAF policy regarding 

Earth Satellite Vehicles be promulgated. A suggested policy is attached hereto. 

RECOMMENDATION. 

That the inclosed [sic] policy be approved. 

********* 

[no pagination] 

Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle 

The USAF, as the Service dealing primarily with air weapons-especially strategichas logical responsibility for the Satellite. 

Research and development will be pursued as rapidly as progress is guided missiles are 

justifies and requirements dictate. To this end the problem will be continually studied with 

a view to keeping an optimum design abreast of the art, to determine the military worth 

of the vehicle-considering its utility and probably cost-to insure development in critical components, if indicated, and to recommend initiation of the development phases of 

the project at the proper time. 

HOW S. VANDENBERG 

General, United States Air Force 

Vice Chief of Staff 

Document 11-2 

Document title: Robert R. Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 

“Memorandum for Mr. Phleger,” March 28, 1955. 

Source: State Department Central Decimal Files (711.5/3-2855), Record Group 59, 

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 273 

Document 11-3 

Document title: Robert R. Bowie, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to Secretary 

of State, “Recommendations in the Report to the President by the Technological 

Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Killian Committee): Item 

2-NSC Agenda 10/4/56,” October 2, 1956. 

Source: Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State: Records Relating 

to State Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the National 

Security Council, 1947-1963, Box 87, “NSC 5522 Memoranda,” National Archives and 

Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 

In February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel, headed by MIT professor James R Killian, 

produced a report on the threat of surprise attack on the United States. The report made a number of 

recommendations on how to reduce this threat, including the development of radar early warning 

systems and better intelligence collection methods. One recommendation was the establishment of the 

concept of ‘Freedom of Space” by first orbiting a scientific satellite before orbiting an intelligence 

satellite. This recommendation resulted in the signing of NSC 5520, “Draft Stataent of Policy on 

U.S. Scientific Satellite Program, published as Document II-IO in Volume I of Exploring the 

Unknown. Prior to the signing of this document, the Department of State was requested to study the 

issue and report to the National Security Council (NSC), as stated in the recently declassijed top secret 

letter by Robert Bo& to Assistant Secretary of State Herman Phlegm The Policy Planning Staff at 

the Department of State continued to study the issue, along with several other recommendations in the 

Technological Capabilities Panel’s report, and issued further reports on their status, also recently 

declassified from “Top Secret status, ” including the ‘Freedom of Space” recommendation. ‘Freedom of 

Space” continued to be an issue for several years after Sputnik. 

Document 11-2 

[no pagination] March 28, 1955 

Memorandum for Mr. Phleger 

At a recent meeting, the NSC considered a report to the President by a panel of the 

Science Advisory Committee on threat of surprise attack. 

Recommendations No. 9 and B. 12b of the report read as follows: 

“9. A re-examination be made of the following principles or practices of international law from the standpoint of recent advances in weapons technology: 

“a. Freedom of the Seas. Radical extension of the ‘three-mile limit’ to permit control of surface and subsurface traffic from the coastline to beyond the likely striking 

range of sea-launched nuclear missiles. 

“b. Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distinguishing between ‘national air’ and ‘international space,’ a distinction 

which could be to our advantage at some future date when we might employ larger 

satellites for intelligence purposes.” 

“B. 12b. Studies should be made of appropriate changes in the concept of the ‘threemile limit’ to permit actions in keeping with the threat; for realistic implementations of 
274 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

any policy changes, the missions of the Coast Guard and Navy must be amended and 

forces increased to equal the tasks of inspection and control.” 

The Department of State has been requested to study these recommendations, in 

coordination with the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Justice, and to submit a 

report and recommendations to the NSC on or about May 15,1955. 

It seems clear that L should undertake the two studies involved, working with other 

interested divisions and offices of the Department. 

Robert R. Bowie 

Document 11-3 

[no pagination] October 2, 1956 

TO: The Secretary 

THROUGH: S/S 

FROM: S/P - Robert R. Bowie 

SUBJECT Recommendations in the Report to the President by the Technological 

Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Killian 

Committee): Item 2-NSC Agenda 10/4/56 

1. The Council is asked to note the status of implementations of the Technological 

Capabilities Panel (TCP) recommendations on “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” 

as presented in the several agency reports contained in NSC 5611 (“Status of National 

Security Programs on June 30, 1956”). Oral reports may be given to the Council by 

Defense, AEC, ODM, FCDA [Federal Civil Defense Authority] and CIA. 

2. The draft Record of Action, which the Council will be asked to approve: 

a) noted a number of changes in programs to carry out that is assigned to 

Defense; 

b) requests Defense to supplement its Council briefing, in December, on the 

ICBM, with a report on the anti-missile missile program; and 

c) defers decision on a follow-up study to the Killian Report, which the TCP recommended “within two years.” 

Defense and ODM differ as to the need for this: The Planning Board agreed to defer 

a recommendation to the Council until the ODM consults its Science Advisory 

Committee, the TCP parent, on whether technological advance in the past two years justifies initiation of another study at this time.) 

3. Five TCP Recommendations were assigned as our primary responsibility by NSC 

Action 1355. We do not make an annual Status Report and therefore have not submitted 

an accounting. In the event that questions arise concerning their status, I am attaching a 

brief memorandum of comments you may care to use. 

********* 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 275 

[I1 

Status of Implementation of TCP Recommendations 

Assigned to the Department of State 

General Recommendation 7 a - b - c: 

‘The NSC initiate preparatory studies of the problems of international negotiations 

in the following areas growing out of recommendations of this Report.” 

a. “Atomic weapons in air defense negotiations with Canada to provide our air defense 

forces with authority to use atomic warheads over Canada.” 

Status: Under current negotiation with the Canadian Government. 

Comment: Preliminary negotiations were opened last month between the Department 

and the Canadian Ambassador to discuss the integration of atomic weapons in joint 

USCanadian air arrangements. The Ambassador was informed of new weapons developments and their implications for air defense. We pointed out in particular that US 

forces must have advance authority to overfly Canada with atomic weapons and to use 

such weapons over Canadian territory in air defense. The conversations covered other 

aspects of the problem including the compatibility of Canadian aircraft for US 

weapons, the training of Canadian personnel, the storage of weapons on Canadian 

soil, and the availability of the weapons to Canadian forces. The Canadian 

Ambassador stressed the political sensitivity of the problem and stated that he would 

report to his government and reply to the US how it thought the matter might best 

be studied. 

b. “Extension of the Planned Early Warning Line - International negotiations for the seaward extension of the distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via Iceland and the 

Faroes to join future NATO warning systems.” 

Status: a) Denmark: Under current negotiation with the Danish Government; 

b) Iceland: in abeyance pending political developments with respect to the base problem; c) UK: awaiting a Defense report of current conversations between the US and 

UK Chiefs of Staff. 

[2] Comment: With respect to the requirements in Greenland (6 radar sites and their associated communication facilities), the Danish Foreign Office has recently granted 

approval for the conduct of technical and engineering surveys by US military authorities but has made clear that the approval is without prejudice to final decision of the 

Danish Government regarding the establish-ment location and operation of the proposed radar stations. With respect to the programmed Northwest radar site in 

Iceland, the present situation is obscure in view of the uncertain future status of US 

and NATO defense installations in Iceland. With regard to requirements in the 

Faroes, the Depart-ment has recently requested information from the Department of 

Defense of the details of these requirements in order that they may be considered 

from the political viewpoint. With respect to the termination of the DEW Line in the 

United Kingdom, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the British Chiefs of Staff 

of the general nature of this proposal, and are currently awaiting a reply. The 

Department of Defense has been requested to inform the Department of State as 

soon as the reply is received. The Department of State has also asked for information 

from Defense on the relation-ship of the proposed DEW Line extension both to 

SHAPE’S plans and to SACL4NT’s plans, both of which contain NATO requirements 

for early warning facilities. 
276 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY &iLATIONS 

c. “Remote Sea Monitor Line - International negotiations for the installation of a submerged, sea traffic monitor line extending from Greenland to Iceland and to the United 

Kingdom. ” 

Status: The Department is awaiting definitions of defense requirements, which, it 

understands, are now being worked out in service to service discussions. 

General Recommendation 9 - 6: 

“Freedom of Space- The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an 

orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distinguishing between ‘national air’ and ‘international space,’ a distinction which could be to 

our advantage at some future time when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence 

purposes. ” 

[3] Status: The Department’s Legal Adviser has this problem under current review. State 

has participated with Defense, the National Science Foundation, and the National 

Academy of Science in planning the program for launching an earth satellite as part 

of the US participation in the International Geophysical Year 1957-58. Our studies are 

continuing in cooperation with the interested agencies. 

Comment: So for as law is concerned, space beyond the earth is an uncharted region 

concerning which no firm rules have been established. The law on the subject will 

necessarily differ with the passage of time and with practical efforts at space navigation. Various theories have been advanced concerning the upper limits of a state’s 

jurisdiction, but no firm conclusions are now possible. 

A few tentative observations may be made: (1) A state could scarcely claim territorial 

sovereignty at altitudes where orbital velocity of an object is practicable (perhaps 

somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 miles); (2) a state would, however, be on 

strong ground in claiming territorial sovereignty up through the “air space” (perhaps 

ultimately to be fixed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 miles); (3) regions of 

space which are eventually established to be free for navigation without regard to territorial jurisdiction will be open not only to one country or a few, but to all; (4) if, contrary to planning and expectation, a satellite launched from the earth should not be 

consumed upon reentering the atmosphere, and should fall to the earth and do damage, the question of liability on the part of the launching authority would arise. 

General Recommendation 2B - 12-a: 

“We recommend that comprehensive programs be instituted to provide effective control of surface and, so far as possible, subsurface traffic in both oceans from the coastlines 

to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched attacks. For proper implementation: 

“a. international arrangements should be made for the establishment of information 

reporting procedures and of control measures.” 

[4] Status: The Department is awaiting the results of other studies, assigned to Defense, 

which will bear on the scope and type of the “international arrangements” desired. It 

is our understanding that Defense has recently consulted with Treasury to ascertain 

whether international arrangements for search and rescue operations could be 

expanded to satisfy defense requirements. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 277 

Document 11-4 

Document title: Percival Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the President, 

“Project Vanguard,” April 30, 1957. 

Source: Bureau of the Budget Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 

Project Vanguard was the result of NSC 5520 and was intended to establish ‘Freedom of Space”-the 

right to overfly foreign ta’tory far future intelligence satellites. The initial estimate of its cost was $15 

to $20 million, but by mid-1 956 the program was already over budget, and estimates of its total costs 

continued to grow. In Apil 1957, the Directar of the Bureau of the Budget, Percival Brundage, wrote 

President Eisenhower explaining the costs of the program and where additional funding had been 

found. His memorandum provides a good insight into the close relationship between the National 

Academy of Sciences and the Department of Defense. It also indicates that $2.5 million far the 

Scientific Satellite Program came from the Central Intelligence Agency. Finally, Brundage notes that 

work on the Air Force reconnaissance satellite was funded far the next fiscal year and that if the 

Vanguard satellite was not completed, satellite research would still continue. 

I11 April 30, 1957 

Memorandum for the President 

Subject: Project VANGUARD 

The Department of Defense advises that developmental difficulties requiring additional time and effort have resulted in further revision of the estimated total cost of 

Project VANGUARD and that it will not be possible to complete the presently authorized 

six vehicle project within the January estimate of $83.6 million for the total cost. Arrangements have been made to fund approximately $70 million to date. Of this amount, some 

$50 million is being provided by the Department of Defense for the launching vehicles 

and related activities, of which $25 million was advanced from the fiscal year 1957 

Department of Defense emergency fund and has not been replaced. A fiscal year 1956 

supplemental appropriation for the National Science Foundation has provided funds for 

the satellites themselves and the scientific instrumentation and ground observations. 

We have been advised that it is currently estimated that if no further major developmental problems are encountered, the project may be completed within a total of $110 

million. With respect to the probability of success of the project within this level of funding, the Department of Defense has reviewed and reconfirmed its statement to the 

National Security Council at the meeting ofJanuary 24, 1957, that in the technical judgment of Defense scientists and their consultants at least one successful satellite should 

result from six launchings of the presently planned Project VANGUARD launching vehicle. Since arrangements have been made to fund approximately $70 million, an additional amount of $40 million would be required to complete the project on present 

assumptions. 

While no further major technical difficulties are now anticipated, it must be recognized that flight tests have not yet been completed. We have been advised that in the event 

unforeseeable developments should make it necessary to incorporate fundamental 

changes in the present approach or to employ an alternative approach, substantial additional funds beyond the $1 10 million estimate might be required. 
278 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

When continuation of the policy established under NSC 5520 [was] considered at the 

NSC meeting of May 8,1956, it was decided that this policy should be continued ‘’with the 

understanding that the program developed thereunder will not be allowed to interfere 

with the ICBM and IRBM programs but will be given sufficient priority by the Department 

of Defense in relation to other weapon systems to achieve the objectives of NSC 5520.” 

The use of Department of Defense emergency funds in late fiscal year 1956 as well as 

during fiscal year 1957 was necessary because costs of [2] development and procurement 

of the launching vehicles increased much higher than the original estimate. The Central 

Intelligence Agency had made $2.5 million available to the Department of Defense, and 

the National Science Foundation was able to transfer $5.8 million when the decision was 

made to plan for no more than six launchings. It is the position of the Department that 

use of its funds was not based on any understanding by the Department that it had a continuing responsibility for funding this project but rather that the Department has used its 

funds thus far because no other clear-cut assignment of responsibility for funding the 

launching vehicles has been made and because it was assured that funds advanced to this 

project would be replaced, at least insofar as advances were made from fiscal year 1957 

funds. 

The Secretary of Defense has now concluded that it is not advisable for the 

Department to provide further support of the project in fiscal year 1957 or future years 

from the emergency fund. In addition to the fact that the Department does not consider 

that it has a continuing responsibility for the project, the Secretary’s position is understood to result from the fact that the Department has not been reimbursed for fiscal year 

1957 emergency funds already provided as well as from congressional criticism of the use 

of emergency funds for this purpose. In this connection it is noted that in view of established fiscal policies limiting supplemental appropriations to the most urgent cases, the 

Bureau of the Budget recently disapproved a request of the Department of Defense to 

reimburse the emergency fund. 

The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this problem with staff of the Department of 

Defense and the National Science Foundation. From the evidence at hand, the Bureau of 

the Budget believes that the project cannot go forward without additional funding. 

Taking into consideration the fact that this project has all the elements of a guided missile development program together with additional problems of a novel and difficult character, it is not surprising that substantial cost increases have occurred. However, inasmuch 

as the Department is now well into the project and states that it has already resolved a 

number of the technical problems, the present estimate of $1 10 million may be more reliable than previous estimates. 

On the other hand, in the light of past experience with this project and in the absence 

of flight test results confirming the soundness of the present approach, I believe that it 

should be recognized that the cost of the project may be as high as $150 to $200 million. 

In weighing the benefits deemed to be derived from the project and its priority in comparison with all the other current projects, it was initially approved in the expectation that 

the cost would be between $15 and $20 million. I question very much whether it would 

have been authorized, at least on a crash basis, if the actual cost had been known at that 

time. 

[3] It is hoped that in the future more careful estimates will be made as to the total cost 

or range in possible costs before such projects are initially approved. Furthermore, this 

seems to offer an opportunity to give up a desirable project for something else which is 

considered to be of higher priority in relation to cost and benefits to be derived. We are 

presently developing nine intercontinental and intermediate missiles with a range of over 

1,000 miles, some of which involve comparable techniques and which will require difficult 
EXPLONNC THE UNKNOWN 279 

priority decisions as to programming and funding. Some eliminations will have to be 

made. 

The Department of Defense has indicated interest in this program to about the same 

degree it has shown on some other basic research projects, but has stated that its interest 

is not sufficient to justify the project’s continuance with Department of Defense financing. 

Therefore, the Department believes that the program must be justified on the basis of the 

several national objectives stated in NSC 5520 rather than on the Department’s interest. 

The Department of Defense believes that to prosecute the balance of the program 

successfully, adequate financing should be arranged by supplemental requests submitted 

for appropriation to the National Science Foundation, which the Department considers 

to be the sponsor of the program. The Department would assist in justifylng the supplemental requests of the National Science Foundation by assuming the burden of justification as to the technical difficulties encountered and the cost elements involved. 

It should be noted that one of the important considerations has been and is the completion of the project during the period of the International Geophysical Year. If you 

desire the project to be continued in accordance with the existing policy under NSC 5520, 

it is suggested that the following actions could resolve the current financing problem: 

1. The Department of Defense should be directed to provide immediately $5.8 million from the emergency fund to continue the project from May l through 

approximately August 1. The Department feels it must clear this use of the emergency fund with the Appropriations Committees who have questioned the propriety of its use for this purpose. It should be recognized that the Department 

would prefer that these funds be replaced. 

2. A fiscal year 1958 budget amendment should be submitted requesting an additional $34.2 million for appropriation to the National Science Foundation to 

cover costs to completion of the project, assuming that current cost estimates are 

valid, that no further major difficulties are encountered in the course of completing the development, and that the [4] Department of Defense would continue to provide general support for which no special funding has been considered 

necessary. Upon availability to the National Science Foundation these funds 

would be transferred to the Department of the Navy to complete the program. 

The National Science Foundation believes that in view of the national interests 

involved the program cannot be permitted to fail at this stage. If it were the only possible 

alternative to cancellation of the project, the National Science Foundation would consider it necessary in the total national interest to request a supplemental appropriation to 

cover the costs required to complete the responsibilities undertaken by the Department 

of Defense under NSC 5520. Moreover, the National Science Foundation recommends 

that the Department of Defense provide the necessary funds to complete the project for 

the following reasons: (1) the Department of Defense is responsible under the present 

terms of NSC 5520 for the portion of the program requiring additional funds; (2) the 

Department of Defense is best qualified to justify to the Congress the reasons for present 

cost increases. 

Apparently, both the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation 

are very reluctant to continue to finance this project to completion. But each is quite prepared to have the other do so. 

General Cutler believes the following considerations are particularly relevant to a 

decision in this matter: 

“1. The substantive scientific information concerning upper atmospheres which 

might be acquired by the launching of a successful satellite. Included in this information would be data as to the content of the upper atmosphere (such as invisible 
280 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

heavenly bodies) through which the very costly intercontinental ballistic missiles, if 

perfected, must pass. 

“2. The world reaction to an abandonment by the U.S. in mid-stage of the satellite 

program. A conclusion that the richest nation in the world could not afford to complete this scientific undertaking would be unfortunate. Even more unfortunate would 

be an inevitable inference that American scientists were not up to bringing the project to a successful conclusion. 

“3. The reaction of the scientific community to the abandonment by the US. in midstage of the satellite program. A time when the Free World is coming more and more 

to depend on advanced technology and scientific accomplishment is not a time to 

alienate the scientific community at home and lead it to believe that the Government 

has lost faith in scientific accomplishment. [5] From what I hear and read, the scientific community and those in highly technical industry who work with them are 

already sensitive in this regard. 

“4. A final decision on the satellite program should be made by the President on an 

integrated presentation of the views of all concerned in this matter. The integrated 

process of presentation, such as is illustrated in the National Security Council, is a 

primary achievement of this Administration. Where so much, beyond financial 

considerations alone, is at stake, the President should have the benefit of an integrated presentation and discussion. This point of view is important, irrespective of what 

the President’s decision might ultimately be.” 

It should be noted that the Air Force has already started its own project for a much 

larger reconnaissance satellite vehicle and is spending approximately $10 million in fiscal 

year 1957 and is currently planning additional funding of at least $10 million for fiscal 

year 1958. Therefore, whether or not the International Geophysical Year satellite project 

is completed, research in this area will not be dropped. 

Percival Brundage 

Director 

Document 11-5 

Document title: Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, 

U.S. Air Force, to Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director, National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics, January 31, 1958. 

Document 11-6 

Document title: Gen. Donald L. Putt, to Commander, Air Research and Development 

Command, “Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft,” January 31,1958. 

Document 11-7 

Document title: General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, and Hugh L. Dryden, 

Director, NACA, “Memorandum of Understanding: Principles for Participation of NACA 

in Development and Testing of the ‘Air Force System 464L Hypersonic Boost Glide 

Vehicle (Dyna-Soar I),’ ” May 20, 1958. 

Source: All in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 281 

Even before NASA was created, the Dqbartnaat of Defense (000) and National Advisory Committee 

for Aeronautics (NACA) were cooperating on space-related developments. The letter from Lt. General 

Putt, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff; Development, opened the possibility for NACA participation in 

a potential X-series aircraj with the qualities of both a spacecraft and an airplane. Technically a 

hypersonic boost-glide vehick, its flight charactmstiw were termed “dynamic soaring” for its ability to 

skim the thin air of the upper atmosphere. It was given the nickname of “Dyna-Soar ” While the motivation from the DOD side was the development of technologies for an orbital bombing aircrafi and 

related missions, NACA participation was intended to beneft civil applications. Dyna-Soar was not 

covered in the original agreements creating NASA that outlined transfm.ng or sharing pfogams 

with DOD. Dyna-Soar’s importance was its demonstration of the possibility ofjoint development of a 

major new system, despite widely dqfmhg reasons for cooperation. Although the program was canceled in I963 for technical and cost reasons, it set a precedent for future cooperation. 

Document 11-5 

31 January 1958 

Dr. Hugh L. Dryden 

Director 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

1512 H Street, N.W. 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Dear Dr. Dryden: 

In the last few months the dimensions of the contest for superiority in aircraft and 

missile technology have suddenly and drastically expanded. 

This letter is addressed to a particularly, important event in this contest-the matter 

of a research vehicle program to explore and solve the problems of manned space flight. 

Specifically, the Air Force is convinced that we must undertake at once .a research vehicle 

program having as its objective the earliest possible manned orbital flight which will contribute substantially and essentially to followan scientific and military space systems. 

The Air Force has set up a design competition for a hypersonic boost glide vehicle 

nicknamed Dyna Soar I. The objectives of this program closely conform to the recommendations of the NACA report of last summer. It appears probable that this vehicle will 

be able to orbit as a satellite since the aerodynamic heating problems of re-entry appear 

less severe than those of the Dyna Soar I flight profile. However, it may be feasible to 

demonstrate an orbital flight appreciably earlier with a vehicle designed only for the satellite mission than would be possible with a vehicle capable of the boost-glide mission as 

well. It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether a research aircraft designed only as 

a satellite will give us an orbital flight of technical significance enough sooner than a vehicle designed for the glide mission to warrant a separate development. 

Both the NACA and the Air Force are well along in investigations seeking the best 

approach to the design of a manned earth orbiting research vehicle. We earnestly believe 

that these efforts should be joined at once and brought promptly to a conclusion. 

Accordingly the NACA is invited to collaborate with the Air Research and Development 

Command [ARDC] in this important task. Because of the advanced stages to which the 

individual NACA and ARDC investigations have already [2] progressed and because of the 

urgency of getting on with the job, we believe that the evaluation should be confined to 
282 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

existing and planned projects, appropriate available proposals, and competitive approaches already under study. We visualize that any program growing out of this joint evaluation 

will best be presented, managed and funded along the lines of the X-15 effort, with the 

Navy being brought into the picture as soon as possible without delaying the evaluation. 

To provide further insight into Air Force thinking on this matter, the concluding paragraphs of the letter directing ARDC to make this evaluation are quoted: 

“4. . . . it is desired that the evaluation consider separately the following approaches: 

“a. What is the best design concept, the minimum time to first orbital flight and the 

dollar cost of demonstrating a manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a satellite orbit? Time is a primary consideration, but to qualify, an approach must offer 

prospects of tangible contributions to the over-all astronautics program. 

“b. What is the minimum time to first orbital flight and dollar cost of demonstrating 

a manned one-orbit flight with a vehicle designed to utilize the boostglide concept? In 

this approach it is not necessary that the first orbit flight be made within the atmosphere 

if an “outside” orbit offered the possibility of an earlier successful flight. 

“5. The following additional guidance is provided: 

“a. The program to meet the stated objective should be the minimum consistent with 

a high degree of confidence that the objective will be met. Maximum practical use must 

be made of existing components and technology and of the momentum of existing programs. 

“b. The hazard at launch and during flight will not be greater than that dictated by 

good engineering and flight safety practice. If feasible, in order to save time and money, 

pilot safety may be provided by emergency escape systems rather than insisting on standards of component reliability normally required for routine repetitive flights of weapon 

systems. This statement is particularly pointed at the problem of qualifjmg boosters for 

initial orbital flights. 

“6. It is requested that this Headquarters be furnished the results of your evaluation 

of each of the approaches specified in paragraph 4. Finally, your over-all conclusions and 

recommendations for accomplishing the objective stated in paragraph 1 are desired. 

[3] “7. The requested information should be forwarded at the earliest practicable date, 

but in no event later than 15 March 1958.” 

It is hoped that the Air Force-NAG4 team relationship which has proven so effective 

in earlier programs of the X-airplane series can be continued in the conception and conduct of this and other research vehicle programs directed to the extension of our knowledge and capability in upper atmosphere and space operations. 

We look forward to receiving your comments and suggestions to this proposed course 

of action. 

Sincerely, 

D. L. Putt 

Lieutenant General, USAF 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Development 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 283 

Document 11-6 

31 January 1958 

SUBJECT: Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft 

TO: Commander 

Air Research and Development Command 

Andrews Air Force Base 

Washington 25, D.C. 

1. It is desired that ARDC in collaboration with the NACA expedite the evaluation 

of existing or planned projects, appropriate available proposals and other competitive 

approaches with a view to providing an experimental system capable of an early flight of 

a manned vehicle making an orbit of the earth. The Air Force-NACA team relationship 

which has proven so productive in earlier programs of the X-airplane series will be continued in the conception and conduct of this new program. A letter, copy attached, has 

been sent to invite NACA collaboration. It is contemplated that as soon as possible without delaying the evaluation, the Research Aircraft Committee will be convened to invite 

Navy participation. 

2. A manned orbital flight, whether by a glide vehicle or by a minimum altitude 

satellite essentially outside the earth’s atmosphere is a significant technical milestone in 

the USAF space program. It is also vital to the prestige of the nation that such a feat be 

accomplished at the earliest technically practicable date-if at all possible before the 

Russians. However, it should be clearly understood that only those approaches to an early 

demonstration of manned orbital flight will be considered which can be expected to contribute information of a substantial value to follow-on systems. 

3. It is understood that the boostglide test vehicle which will be developed under 

the DynaSoar I program will be able to orbit as a satellite. It is also understood, however, 

that the problems associated with a manned orbital flight as a satellite, [are] outside the 

stringent design requirements than the lower altitude, hypersonic Dyna-Soar I flight profile. Consequently, it may be feasible to demonstrate an orbital flight appreciably earlier 

with a vehicle designed only for the satellite mission than would be possible with a vehicle 

capable of executing the boost-glide mission as well. An important objective of the evaluation, then, will be to determine whether a test vehicle designed only as a satellite will give 

us an orbital flight of technical significance enough sooner than a vehicle designed for the 

glide mission to warrant a separate development. Consequently, it is desired that the evaluation consider separately the following approaches: 

a. What is the best design concept, the minimum time to first orbital flight and 

the dollar cost of demonstrating a manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a 

satellite orbit? Time [2] is a primary consideration, but to qualify, an approach must offer 

prospects of tangible contributions to the over-all astronautics program. 

b. What is the minimum time to first orbital flight and dollar cost of demonstrating a manned one-orbit flight with a vehicle designed to utilize the boost-glide concept? In this approach it is not necessary that the first orbit flight be made within the 

atmosphere under typical boost glide conditions-it could be made outside the atmosphere if an “outside” orbit offered the possibility of an earlier successful flight. . . . 5. The following additional guidance is provided: 

a. The program to meet the stated objective should be the minimum consistent 

with a high degree of confidence that the objective will be met. Maximum practical use 
284 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

must be made of existing components and technology and of the momentum of existing 

programs. 

b. The hazard at launch and during flight will not be greater than that desired 

by good engineering and flight safety practice. If feasible, in order to save time and 

money, pilot safety may be provided by emergency escape systems rather than insisting on 

standards of component reliability normally required for routine repetitive flights of 

weapon systems. This statement is particularly pointed at the problem of qualifymg boosters for inisial [sic] orbital flights. 

6. It is requested that this Headquarters be furnished the results of your evaluation 

of each of the approaches specified in paragraph 4. Finally, your over-all conclusions and 

recommendations for accomplishing the objective stated in paragraph 1 are desired. 

7. The requested information should be forwarded at the earliest practicable date, 

but in no event later than 15 March 1958. 

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF: 

Gen. Donald L. Putt 

Document 11-7 

PI 

Memorandum of Understanding 

Subject: Principles for Participation of NACA in Development and Testing of the “Air 

Force System 464L Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicle (Dyna Soar I) .” 

1. System 464L is being developed to: 

a. Determine the military potential of hypersonic boost glide type weapon systems 

and provide a basis for such developments. 

b. Research characteristics and problems of flight in the boost glide flight regime up 

to and including orbital flight outside of the earth’s atmosphere. 

2. The following principles will be applied in conduct of the project: 

a. The project will be conducted as a joint Air Force-NACA project. 

b. Overall technical control of the project will rest with the Air Force, acting with the 

advice and assistance of the NACA. The two partners will jointly participate in the 

technical development to maximize the vehicle’s capabilities from both the military weapon system development and aeronautical-astronautical research viewpoints. 

c. Financing of the design, construction, and Air Force test operation of the vehicles will be borne by the Air Force. 

d. Management of the project will be conducted by an Air Force project office within the Directorate of Systems Management, Hq ARDC. The NACA will provide 

liaison representation in the project office and provide the chairman of the technical team responsible for data transmission and research instrumentation. 

e. Design and construction of the system will be conducted through a negotiated 

contract with a prime contractor selected by the USAF on the basis of the recommendations of the ARDGAMGSAC Source Selection Board, acting with the consultation of the NACA. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 285 

[2] f. Flight test of the vehicle and related equipments will be accomplished by the 

NACA, the USAF, and the prime contractor in a combined test program under 

the overall control of a joint NACA-USAF Committee, chaired by the Air Force. 

General Thomas D. White 

Chief of Staff, USAF 

13 May 1958 

Hugh L. Dryden 

Director, NACA 

20 May 1958 

Document 11-8 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and Roy W. Johnson, Director, 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Memorandum of Understanding: Program for a 

Manned Orbital Vehicle,” November 20, 1958. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

NASA Administrator Glennan and Advanced Research Projects Agency (AREA) Director Roy 

Johnson agreed in midSeptember 1958 that their two agencies would cooperate on a “man-in-space” 

program based on the development of space capsules; this program would complement the Air Force 

Dyna-Soar program. Thq established a joint NASA-ARPA Manned Satellite Panel, which included 

six representatives from NASA and two from AREA, reficting the Eisenhower Administration’s desire 

to have NASA primarily responsible for manned spaceflight. This memorandum of understanding 

established guidelines for this early cooperation. 

[no pagination] November 20, 1958 

Memorandum of Understanding 

SUBJECT: Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle 

1. The Administrator of NASA is responsible for management and technical direction of a program for a manned orbital vehicle to be conducted in cooperation with the 

Department of Defense. The objectives of the program are to achieve, at the earliest practicable date, orbital flight and successful recovery of a manned satellite and to investigate 

the capabilities of man in this environment. The accomplishment of the program is a matter of national urgency. 

2. In carrying out the program, the Administrator of NASA intends to make full use 

of the background and capabilities existing in the Department of Defense. 

3. The Department of Defense will support the program until it is terminated by the 

achievement of a sufficient number of manned orbital flights to accomplish the above 

objectives. 
286 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

4. $8,000,000 of FY 1959 funds will be contributed by ARPA in support of the program and will be made available by appropriation transfer to NASA. NASA will budget for 

and fund all subsequent years’ costs. 

5. A working committee consisting of members of the staff of NASA and ARPA will 

be established to advise the Administrator of NASA on technical and management aspects 

of the program. The chairman of the committee will be a member of the NASA staff. 

T. Keith Glennan Roy W. Johnson 

Director 

Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Document 11-9 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary 

of the Army, “Cooperative Agreement on Jet Propulsion Laboratory Between the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the Army,” December 3, 

1958. 

Document 11-10 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, and Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the 

Army, “Cooperative Agreement on Army Ordnance Missile Command Between the 

National Aeronautics and Space Admitration and the Department of the Army,” 

December 3, 1958. 

Source: Both from NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In 1958, the Army was called on to transfer two major developmt agencies to the newly meated 

NASA. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was part of the Calfornia Institute of Technology, with 

expertise in guidance, communications, telemetry, and rocket propellants. All agreed thatJPL was a 

center of technical expertise important to the future of NASA and the space program, and the transfer was complete and immediate. In contrast, the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency 

(ABM) generated substantial controversy, because it was the major development arm of the Army 

Ordnance Missile Command, and the Army leadership considered it too important to relinquish. 

ABM’s development work included weather satellite programs such as TIROS, rocket engine work 

such as the F-1 engine (which later powered the Saturn v), and the booster deuelopmnt group headed by Wernher von Braun. The Army was reluctant to lose von Braun and his team of talented engineers. The Department of Defense had been Willing to transfer to NASA such research work as that 

performed by JPL, recognizing that it could still beneft from the research performed. Howevs the 

Army resisted losing a major development group such as ABM, despite its unsure budgetary footing, 

The Army’s initial intransigence eventually required presidential intervention to resolve the situation. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 287 

Document 11-9 

[I1 

Cooperative Agreement on Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of the Army 

A. AUTHOIUTES 

This agreement is authorized by Public Law 85568 as implemented by Executive 

Order 10793, dated 3 Dec 1958. 

B. PURPOSE 

The purpose of this agreement is to establish the relationships between the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of the Army (Army) 

that will govern the following: 

1. Implementation of Executive Order No. 10793 dated 3 Dec 58, which is incorporated herein by reference. 

2. Planning for the orderly transition from current Army military operations and 

weapons systems development program to programs predominately in the field of exploration and exploitation of space science and technology for peaceful purposes under 

NASA direction. 

3. Provision for certain Army administrative and logistical support desired by NASA in 

the operation of JPL. 

c. POLICY 

The Army states and NASA recognizes that an abrupt transfer or cessation of Army 

activities relating to military operations and weapons systems development programs performed at the JPL would be deleterious to both national defense and the accomplishment 

of NASA objectives. Both NASA and the Army recognize that NASA is not fully staffed to 

perform certain administrative functions and to provide the administrative and logistical 

support essential to the uninterrupted operation of JPL and that NASA may request that 

certain services and support be provided by the Army. 

D. OPERATING CONCEPTS 

1. NASA will provide for the general management and technical direction of the JPL, 

except as to projects relating to military operations and weapons systems development 

programs. 

[2] 2. For Calendar Year 1959 the Army will continue its contractual relations with the 

California Institute of Technology for continued effort by the JPL on the following programs which are specifically related to military operations and weapons systems develop 

men t programs: 

a. The SERGEANT guided missile program. 

b. Special intelligence investigations. 

c. Secure communications research. 

d. Aerodynamic testing and research. 

It is expected that these specific Army activities will be largely phased out during CY 

59; however, if it is necessary to continue certain activities for a longer period of time, this 

may be done by direct Army contract or through NASA as may be mutually agreed by 

NASA and the Army. 
288 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

3. The Army budgets on a program basis and Army installations receive funds on the 

basis of assigned program activities. Traditionally, the Army has funded the activities performed at JPL on a Calendar rather than Fiscal Year basis. For these reasons, a firm 1959 

program had been agreed to by the Army and JPL prior to the publishing of the Executive 

Order effecting transfer of JPL. NASA, through assumption of technical direction of the 

general supporting research portion of the program on 1 January 1958, can reorient the 

effort toward NASA objectives by the end of the first half of the Calendar Year 1959. 

Therefore, the Army and NASA reached prior agreement and the Executive Order provided for transfer of Army funds in the amount of $4,078,250 to NASA for this general 

supporting research program for the first half of Calendar Year 1959. The additional 

funds for general supporting research during CY 1958 will be provided by NASA. 

4. NASA may request from time to time, and the Army agrees, that certain administrative and logistical support can and will be furnished to NASA on a non-reimburseable 

[sic] basis for servicing contract activities at JPL for Calendar Year 1959. Provision of this 

support may require in certain instances delegations of authority from NASA to the Army 

where appropriate to the service or support action requested. After Calendar Year 1959 

such services and support may be provided in such scope and under such conditions as 

may be mutually agreed upon. 

The following types of services and support are contemplated: 

[3] a. Contract administration; 

b. Property transfer; and 

c. Such other matters as fall within the purview of this instrument. 

The Administrator, NASA, and the Secretary of the Army hereby designate respectively the Director of Business Administration, NASA, and the Chief of Ordnance, Army, 

to jointly formulate the necessary teams to effectuate this Agreement. 

5. It is understood and agreed that the Administrator will delegate to the Secretary of 

the Army, or his designee, such authority as may be required to authorize the Army to fulfill the intent and purposes of this Agreement. 

Date: 3 December 1958 

Washing ton, D.C. 

T. KEITH GLENNAN 

Administrator, NASA 

WILBER M. BRUCKER 

Secretary of the Army 

Dacument 11-10 

Cooperative Agreement on Army Ordnance Missile 

Command Between the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and the Department of the Army 

A. AUTHORITY 

This agreement is authorized by public Law 85-583. 

B. PURPOSE 

This agreement is for the purpose of establishing relationships between the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of the Army for the efficient 
EXPLORING THEUNKNOWN 289 

utilization of United States Army resources in the accomplishment of the purposes of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This agreement is intended to provide for 

relationships in the national interest that will prevent undue delay of progress in the 

national space program, and prevent undesirable disruption of military programs. This 

agreement is also intended to contribute to effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the country by fostering close cooperation among the interested 

agencies in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities. 

c. POLICY 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of 

the Army recognize the often inseparable nature of the efforts of this Nation in meeting 

military and scientific objectives in the missile and space field. Continuation of the organizational strength of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (Al3MA) of the U.S. Army 

Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) and its established contractor structure and support from other elements of the Army has been stated by the Defense Department to he 

essential to the Defense mission. The proper provisions for asking the capabilities of this 

organization available for meeting objectives of NASA permit the application of these 

resources to the needs of both civilian space activities and essential military requirements. 

Accordingly, this agreement establishes relationships between NASA and the Department 

of the Army which make the AOMC and its subordinate organizations immediately, directly, and continuously responsive to NASA requirements. 

D. PROCEDURES 

1. The CG, AOMC, will have full authority, as the principal agent of the Army, to utilize the resources of his Command, those organizations [2] directly under his control 

through contractual structure, and other elements of the Department of the Army with 

which he deals directly, for the accomplishment of assigned NASA projects. 

2. Key personnel of AOMC and appropriate subordinate elements, as may be 

requested by NASA, will serve on technical committees under the chairmanship of NASA, 

or on advisory groups, or will serve as individual consultants to: 

a. Assist in the development of broad requirements and objectives in space programs. 

b. Assist in the determination of specific projects and specific methods (including 

hardware development) by which NASA may accomplish its overall objective. 

3. Specific orders for projects to be accomplished for NASA will be placed direct by 

NASA upon AOMC with provision of funds for their accomplishment. AOMC will accept 

full responsibility for the fulfillment of the assigned projects as accepted from NASA. 

4. NASAwill have direct and continuing access, through visits or resident personnel, 

for technical contact and direction of effort on assigned NASA projects. In this connection, NASA is invited to place a small staff in residence at AOMC. This staff will provide 

for a continuing exchange of information on all projects assigned by NASA, as well as 

exchange of information on supporting research in the entire missile and space field. 

5. On request by NASA, in connection with projects funded by NASA, the prime and 

subcontractor facilities of the Army in weapons systems and other programs, including 

scientific and educational institutions and private industry, will be made available through 

identical procurement channels and with use of the special authorities delegated to the 

CG, AOMC, by the Secretary of the Army. In addition, resources of other elements of the 

Army, available to AOMC on a direct basis for space and missile system development, will 

be used as deemed necessary in the fulfillment of assigned NASA projects. 
290 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

6. The CG, AOMC, is responsible for scheduling the space and missile activities 

under his control to meet the priority requirements of NASA in a manner consistent with 

overall National priorities. He is further responsible for anticipating in advance any possible conflict in the commitment of effort to NASA and Defense programs, and for providing a timely report to NASA, as well as to the Department of the Army, for the purpose 

of resolving such conflicts. 

[3] 7. Public information and historical and technical documentation of assigned NASA 

projects will be under the direction and control of NASA. 

8. The CG, AOMC, is authorized to enter into specific agreements with the duly designated representative of the Administrator, NASA, in implementation of this agreement. 

Date: 3 December 1958 

Washington, D.C. 

T. KEITH GLENNAN 

Administrator 

WILBER M. BRUCKER 

Secretary of the Army 

Document 11-11 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, and Thomas S. Gates, Acting 

Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, “Responsibility and Organization 

for Certain Activities,” October 21, 1959. 

Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 

The Army had been reluctant to transfer the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic 

Missile Agency (ABM) to NASA; it required presidential intervention to settle the matter This joint 

agreementjnally settled the issue of the transfer of the Development Operations Division headed by 

Wernher von Braun and the assignment to NASA as the lead in heloping a US. heay-lz$ booster 

President Eisenhower app-oved the proposals outlined in this memorandum on November 2, 1952. 

[11 October 21, 1959 

Memorandum for the President 

SUBJECT Responsibility and Organization for Certain Space Activities 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have agreed upon, and recommend to the President, certain actions designed to clarify responsibilities, improve coordination, and enhance the national space effort. The actions recommended below are 

consistent with the steps taken by the Secretary of Defense to clarify responsibilities and 

assignments in the field of military space applications within the Department of Defense. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator have agreed upon and recommend to 

the President the following actions: 
EXPLOFUNG THE UNKNOWN 29 1 

A. The assignment to NASA of sole responsibility for the development of new space 

booster vehicle systems of very high thrust. Both the DOD and NASA will continue 

with a coordinated program for the development of space vehicles based on the current ICBM and IRBM missiles and growth versions of those missiles. 

B. The transfer from the Department of the Army to NASA of the Development 

Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, including its personnel and 

such facilities and equipment which are presently assigned and required for the 

future use of NASA at the transferred activity, and such other personnel, facilities and 

equipment for administrative and [2] technical support of the transferred activity as 

may be agreed upon. 

C. The provision by the Army to NASA of such administrative services as may be 

agreed upon to effect a smooth transition of management and funding responsibility 

of the transferred activity. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA are in agreement on the following: 

1. The nation requires and must build at least one super booster and responsibility for 

this activity should be vested in one agency. There is, at present, no clear military requirement for super boosters, although there is a real possibility that the future will bring military weapons systems requirements. However, there is a definite need for super boosters 

for civilian space exploration purposes both manned and unmanned. Accordingly, it is 

agreed that the responsibility for the super booster program should be vested in NASA. It 

is agreed that the recommendations to center this function in NASA and to transfer the 

Development Operations Division of ABMA to NASA are independent of any decisions on 

whether either or both of the super booster systems currently under development are continued in their presently conceived form. 

2. The transfer of the Development Operations Division of ABMA shall include transfer 

of responsibility for Saturn, together with 1960 funds allocated for the project, and transfer to the NASA 1961 budget of such amounts as may be approved for this project in the 

1961 Department of Defense budget. 

3. In carrying out its responsibilities, NASA will keep the Department of Defense thoroughly and completely informed on its booster program and will [3] be fully responsive 

to specific requirements of the Department of Defense for the development of super 

boosters for future military missions as requested by the Secretary of Defense. 

4. It is NASA's intent to center at the transferred activity the bulk of its space booster 

vehicle systems work, including an appropriate research and development effort, and ultimately, substantial responsibility for NASA launch operations. 

5. It is agreed that NASA wall provide support to the Department of Defense and military services at the transferred activity in the same manner as it now does at all other field 

centers. 

6. The management and employment of the transferred activity will be the responsibility of NASA, and no commitment is possible with respect to levels of staffing or funding for 

the operation. NASA, however, will make every possible effort within its responsibilities 

and resources to utilize the capabilities of the Development Operations Division of ABMA. 
292 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

7. The transfer of personnel, facilities, end equipment will he on a nonreimbursable 

basis. 

8. The Department of the Army will provide and maintain on a reimbursable basis station-wide services as required by NASA within the Redstone Arsenal complex. 

9. NASAwill provide for continuation, transfer, or phasing out of military projects under 

way at the transferred activity as may be requested and to the extent funded by the 

Department of Defense, and will undertake at the transferred activity such additional military projects as may be agreed upon by NASA and the [4] Department of Defense. 

10. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and NASA, recognizing 

the value to the nation’s space program of maintaining at a high level the present competence of ABM, will cooperate to preserve the continuity of the technical and administrative leadership of the group. 

11. The detailed implementation of the actions proposed will be accomplished through 

the subsequent negotiation of cooperative agreements between the Department of 

Defense and NASA. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have reached agreement and 

recommend approval of the above actions in the firm belief that the national space effort 

requires a strong civilian agency and progress and a strong military space effort by the 

Department of Defense, and clear lines of responsibility and authority if the U.S. is to 

employ its best efforts in the exploration of outer space and to assure the defense of the 

nation. 

If the President approves the recommended actions set forth in A, B, and C above, the 

Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA will proceed immediately to form 

the necessary staff teams to develop the required implementing documents. 

Administrator, NASA Acting Secretary of Defense 

OCT 30 1959 

[Handwritten presidential note: “Approved Dwight Eisenhower 2 Nov 59”] 

Document 11-12 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, “DOD-NASA AgreementReimbursement of Costs,” NASA Management Instruction 1052.14, November 17, 1959, 

with attached: Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, and T. Keith Glennan, 

NASA Administrator, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Principles Governing Reimbursement 

of Costs,” November 12,1959. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 293 

As resources from other government agencies were being allocated to NASA, it became imperative to 

draw up policies outlining reimbursement procedures. These agreements represented the first comprehensive policy on reimbursement between the Department of Defense and NASA that did not apply to 

a specific program. Thqr also demonstrated the dominant role of the Defense Department a.s a provider 

of various services to NASA in the early years. 

[I1 

Management Instruction 

SUBJECT: DOD-NASA AGREEMENT-REIMBURSEMEhT OF COSTS 

November 17,1959 

1. PURPOSE 

This Instruction incorporates into the NASA Issuance System an agreement entered into 

between the Department of Defense (DOD) end NASA for the reimbursement of certain 

costs incurred by either agency in providing services, equipment, supplies, personnel, and 

facilities for use by the other agency. Provisions of the agreement are effective as of 

November 12, 1959. 

2. AUTHORITY 

Section 203(b)(6) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 

2473(b) (6)). 

3. SCOPE 

a. Principles set forth in the DOD-NASA agreement, which is included as 

Attachment A, shall govern the reimbursement of costs incurred by NASA or 

DOD in providing services, equipment, supplies, personnel, and facilities of the 

types and for the purposes described therein for use by the other agency. 

b. The agreement shall not apply to existing agreements or arrangements already 

[agreed] upon between NASA and the military departments or the Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which may not yet be formalized. However, all 

future arrangements, agreements, and amendments of existing agreements 

between NASA and the military departments or ARF'A shall conform to the provisions of Attachment A. 

[2] 4. IMPLEIWENTATION. . . 

5. CANCELLATION 

NASA Management Manual Instruction 2-3-5 (TS 43), November 17, 1959. 

Administrator 

********* 
294 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

[11 

Attachment A to NMI 1052.14 

Agreement Between the Department of Defense 

and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration Concerning Principles Governing 

Reimbursement of Costs 

1. Purpose. 

Section 203(b) (6) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, authorizes the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) “to use, with their consent, the 

services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of other Federal agencies with or without 

reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies 

and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment,and facilities.” Federal agencies 

are also required to cooperate fully with NASA in making their services, equipment, personnel, and facilities available, and are authorized by this statute “to transfer to or to 

receive from NASA, without reimbursement, aeronautical and space vehicles, and supplies and equipment other than administrative supplies or equipment.” It is the purpose 

of this Agreement to set forth the general principles governing the reimbursement of 

costs incurred by DOD or NASA in providing for use by the other of its services, equipment, personnel and facilities and in transferring equipment and supplies. 

2. Principles Governing Reimbursement. 

Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 hereof, DOD and NASA agree upon the following general principles governing the reimbursement of costs: 

[2] A. Orders Contracted Out. Where DOD or NASA places an order with the other which 

is contracted out (in whole or in part) to industry, reimbursement will be limited 

to the direct costs to the contracting agency of the contract, or the standard price 

established for the item being procured where procurement is accomplished 

through consolidated contracts covering the same or similar items (or components thereof) for the contracting agency. Except as otherwise provided in 

subparagraph E below, the agency placing the contract shall bear without reimbursement therefor the administrative costs incidental to its procurement of 

material or services for the ordering agency. As used in the foregoing sentence 

the term, “administrative costs” includes the normal administrative services performed in connection with placing, administering or terminating contracts, and 

such related administrative services as security, contract auditing, inspection, etc. 

(not all inclusive). Administrative costs are to be distinguished from the procurement costs of end items or services, the latter being appropriate for reimbursement under the provisions of this subparagraph. 

B. Orders Perfid “In-House. ”Where DOD performs an “in-house order” for NASA 

and the order is performed (in whole or in part) in facilities using an industrialtype cost accounting system, the basis of billing will be the same as that used for 

all customers of the Federal Government. Where the order is performed in facilities not using an industrial-type cost accounting system, reimbursement [3] will 

be limited to the direct costs (including an allowance for annual and sick leave, 

holidays, contributions for group life insurance and civil service retirement, etc.) 

attributable to the performance of the order. In no case, however, will charges be 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 295 

made for depreciation or rent for use of facilities and equipment in connection 

with the performance of orders. 

C. Administration of Other Agency i Contract. Where DOD or NASA assigns one of its 

contracts to the other for purposes of administration, the administering agency 

may be reimbursed for the cost of contract administration services performed in 

connection with the contract to the extent of the special direct costs incurred in 

providing these services to the other and mutually agreed upon as clearly identified added costs. 

D. Material. Where DOD or NASA provides the other with materials, supplies or 

equipment from stock, reimbursement will be made in accordance with established agency pricing practice. DOD materials, supplies or equipment which are 

in excess of DOD requirements (called “transferable-nonreimbursable’’ property 

in the DOD), will be furnished without charge, except that the furnishing agency 

may require reimbursement for transportation and handling costs. DOD may 

loan equipment to NASAwithout charge, subject to return in the same condition 

as when loaned, normal wear and tear excepted. The return of such equipment 

may be waived by DOD under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 3 of this 

Agreement. Where the loaned equipment is not returned, DOD will [be] reimbursed for the value thereof, unless the return of the equipment has been specifically waived by DOD under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 3 of this 

Agreement. [4] Where the loaned equipment is returned in a damaged condition, DOD will be reimbursed for the cost of restoring it to the same condition as 

when loaned, unless such reimbursement has been waived under the provisions 

of paragraph 3 of this Agreement, or waived on the basis that the equipment, at 

the time of return, is excess to the requirements of DOD. 

E. Travel. In connection with the services covered by subparagraphs A, B, and C 

above, special travel costs attributable to the performance of these services will be 

reimbursed. 

F. Construction or Public Works. Construction or public works projects undertaken by 

the DOD for NASA will be charged directly to NASA funds (or where appropriate 

will be reimbursed) on the basis of “project costs,” the customary basis used by the 

DOD for charging DOD sponsored projects. 

G. Tenancy on Installation. Except where other arrangements are in existence or are 

agreed upon, where either DOD or NASA is a tenant on an installation of the 

other, all direct costs or increases in direct costs attributable to such tenancy will 

be reimbursed. 

H. Use of Government-Owned Facilities. No charge will be made for rent or depreciation 

in connection with the use by either DOD or NASA of Government owned facilities under their cognizance whether operated by the government or by a contractor. 

3. Exceptions. 

The foregoing principles do not apply to work or services, materials, supplies or 

equipment furnished to NASA or DOD for use in connection with specific projects of 

either agency, which are mutual interest and benefit to each. In such cases, work or services, materials, supplies or equipment furnished by one agency to the other will be on a 

non-reimbursable basis to the extent of the furnishing agency’s interest in the particular 

project. 
296 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

4. Effective Date. 

This Agreement is effective immediately, but it does not apply to existing agreements 

or arrangements already agreed upon which may not yet be formalized between NASA 

and the military department or MA. However, all future arrangements, agreements and 

amendments of existing agreements between NASA and the military departments or 

ARPA shall conform to the provisions of the Agreement. 

5. Duration of Agreement. 

The provisions of the Agreement may be revised at any time, based upon further 

experience of the two agencies. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Administrator 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

NOV 12 1959 

Date 

Document 11-13 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, and James H. Douglas, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning the Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Coordinating Board,” reprinted in: US. Congress, House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, “The NASA-DOD Relationship,” 88th 

Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 10-1 1. 

The drafiers of the 1958 Space Act considered it necessary to have close coordination of activities 

between NASA and the Department of Defense; therefwe, a liaison board was povided for in the Act. 

By 1960, this liaison board was no longer effective and was replaced by the Aeronautics and 

Astronautics Coordinating Board. Over the years since then, the board has varied in its importance 

in coordinating cooperation between NASA and the Defense Department. 

[lo1 

Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Concerning the Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Coordinating Board 

I. POLICIES AND PURPOSE 

(a) It is essential that the aeronautical and space activities of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration and the Department of Defense be coordinated at all management and technical levels. Where policy issues and management decisions are not 

involved, it is important that liaison be achieved in the most direct manner possible, and 

that it continue to be accomplished as in the past between project level personnel on a 

day-today basis. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 297 

(b) It is essential that [a] close working relationship between decision-making officials within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of 

Defense be developed at all management levels. Where policy issues and management 

decisions are involved, it is important that the planning and coordination of activities, the 

identification of problems, and the exchange of information be facilitated between offcials having the authority and responsibility for decisions within their respective offices. 

(c) To implement the forgoing [sic] policies it is the purpose of this agreement to 

establish the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board. 

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOARD 

There is hereby established the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, 

which shall be responsible for facilitating 

(1) the planning of activities by the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of Defense to avoid undesirable duplication and 

to achieve efficient utilization of available resources; 

(2) the coordination of activities in areas of common interest to the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense; 

(3) the identification of problems requiring solution by either the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Department of Defense; and 

(4) the exchange of information between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of Defense. 

III. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 

(a) The Board shall be headed by the Deputy Administrator of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering as Cochairmen. 

(b) The other Board members shall consist of chairmen of panels as hereinafter 

established, and a minimum number of additional members as may be equipped to insure 

that each military department is represented and that the National Aeronautics and Space 

[ 111 Administration and Department of Defense have an equal number of members. 

(c) The members of the Board, other than the Cochairmen, shall be appointed by 

the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense, jointly. 

IV. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 

(a) Panels of the Board shall be established by the Administrator and the Secretary 

of Defense and, initially, shall include the following: 

(1) Manned Space Flight. 

(2) Spacecraft.' 

(3) Launch Vehicles. 

(5) Supporting Space Research and Technology. 

(6) Aeronautics. 

(b) Terms of reference shall be prescribed for each panel by the cochairmen of the 

Board. The members of each panel shall be designated by the cochairmen of the Board. 

1. For purposes of clarity, the name of the Panel was changed to Unmanned Spacecraft by the 

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board at the second meeting on July 26, 1960. 
298 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

(c) The board shall meet at the call of the Cochairmen, at least bimonthly, and the 

cochairmen shall alternately preside over the meetings. Only Board members, and such 

others as the cochairmen specifically approve, may attend meetings. 

(d) The cochairmen shall establish a small secretariat to maintain records of the 

meetings of the Board and of its panels and to perform such other duties as the cochairmen may direct. 

(e) The board, its panels, and the secretariat shall make full use of available facilities 

within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of 

Defense, and all elements of the Administration and the Department of Defense shall 

cooperate fully with the board, its panels, and the secretariat. 

(f) Actions based on consideration of matters by the board may be taken by individual members utilizing the authority vested in them by their respective agencies. 

For the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

T. KEITH GLENNAN, 

Administrator. 

For the Department of Defense: 

JAMES H. DOUGLAS, 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Promulgated this 13th day of September 1960. 

Document 11-14 

Document title: “General Proposal for Organization for Command and Control of 

Military Operations in Space,” with attached “Schematic Diagrams of Proposed 

Organization for Command and Control of Military Operations in Space,” no date. 

Source: White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 

Records (James R. Killian and George B. Kktiakowsky, 1957-61), Box 15, “Space DulyDecember 19593 (7),” Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 

ARPA was created in February 1958 to manage all the military space programs. Once NASA was created, several programs were taken from ARRA and given to the civilian space agency. ARPA did 

maintain managerial control of the military space program, but this was not popular with the military services. The Army and the Nay were concerned, howevq that ifARPA was eliminated, the Air 

Force would be given control of all space programs. In Apnl 1959, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral Arleigh Burke urged the Joint Chieji of Staff to create a single military space agency. The 

Army leadership agreed, but the Air Force chief of staff objected that this would remove the weapons 

systems fi-om the unfid commands. By July 1959, White House and Department of Defense ofjcials 

began evaluating this separate military space agency. It would report directly to the Joint Chieji, and 

command would rotate among the military services. It was to be known as the Defense Astronautical 

Agency. The authorship of this documat is unknown, but it was probably presented to the President’s 

Science Advisory Committee in the summer of 1959. The idea was ultimately rejected, and the space 

programs were returned to the services. The Air Force was given control of most of the military space 

program, with the Army and Nay responsible for developing payloads for their own use. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 299 

General Proposal for Organization for Command and 

Control of Military Operations in Space 

Encl: (1) Schematic Diagrams of Proposed Organization for Command and Control of 

Military Operations in Space 

The rapid advances achieved by our research and development agencies need to be 

exploited by the uniformed services. A whole family of militarily useful satellite vehicles is 

now coming into being. Facilities for launching, tracking, data acquisition and recovery of 

satellite and space vehicles are now in operation. In the very near future these new capabilities will become accepted operational techniques of the Army, Navy and Air Force 

units deployed over the oceans and land masses of the Free World. The military implications of these developments to the National Security dictate the command attention of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The basic facilities required for conducting satellite and space vehicle operations are: 

launching equipment with associated safety and control instrumentation, tracking, data 

acquisition and communication networks and coordinated vehicle recovery equipment 

located on land, sea and in the air. The compression of time in relation to the new space 

era, wherein satellites encircle the globe in 90 minutes, dictates the need for integrating 

all satellite and space vehicle facilities under one military commander. Each of the 

3 national missile range commanders, presently has the facilities for conducting, in at least 

a limited capability, satellite and space vehicle operations. The global nature of military 

satellite and space vehicle operations, particularly satellite vehicle recovery operations, 

requires that the 3 national missile range commanders be incorporated into one over-all 

military command. 

It is recommended that a joint command for the coordination of military operations 

in space be established incorporating the following features: 

[2] 1. That the commander report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

2. That the command position be rotated among the services. 

3. That a Scientific Director be designated as a staff assistant to the Space 

Commander whose prime function would be scientific direction and the assurance of 

rapid military exploitation of technological breakthroughs in astronautics. The incumbent of this position would be designated by NASA or ARPA and would be satisfactory to 

those two agencies. The incumbent could fill joint positions on the Space Command and 

NASA similar to joint military and AEC billets. 

4. That the joint headquarters be located at the primary space surveillance control 

center to minimize time involved in receipt and processing of intelligence and the transmission of command decisions. 

5. That consideration be given to locating this control center within reasonable distance from Washington D.C. to simplify liaison with all the Services and with NASA. 

6. That the space surveillance control center be manned by a group consisting of 

personnel from the 3 services. 

7. That all the facilities of each particular service related to satellite and space tracking, data acquisition and communications continue to function within that service, but 

under the respective range commander for operational control by the joint command. 

8. That all research and development and training activity continue as heretofore 

on a not-to-interfere basis with the national security responsibilities of the joint space 

command. 
300 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

9. That each national range commander report directly to the commander of the 

joint space command for operational control, and to his normal commander for other 

control. 

[3] The commander of the space command force would perform the following 5 functions: 

1. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, command the 3 national ranges 

in-so-far as they contribute operationally to our national security. 

2. Review and approve the planned operation of the 3 national ranges to assure consonance with the operational requirements of over-all national security. 

3. Review the annual budgetary requirements of the 3 national ranges for national 

priority, scope and adequacy in support of national security objectives and make recommendations accordingly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the annual budgetary requirements to the 

Secretary of Defense who in turn would submit the requirements to the National Security 

Council for review concerning national priority, scope and adequacy for support of 

national security objectives and for financial coordination with the Atomic Energy 

Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Bureau of the 

Budget. 

4. Integrate satellite and space vehicle tracking, data acquisition and communications control into one centralized global system. 

5. Provide for the participation by all services, as appropriate, for indoctrination and 

training in the field of satellite and space vehicle operations. 

The following advantages would accrue for national security by the establishment of 

a joint task force: 

1. A central command, responsive directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would insure 

the earliest possible military effectiveness of satellite and space vehicles. 

2. Parallel developments and duplicative installations for R&D with [an] expensive 

network of communications, launching facilities and logistics systems would be eliminated. 

[4] 3. Indoctrination and training of the uniformed services in all aspects of space operations would be insured. 

4. The evolution of sound military requirements would be improved. 

5. The relative importance of military space operations in national security would be 

responsibly defined. 

It is to be noted that since ARPA does not actually operate any facilities it is not 

involved in this type of operational chain of command. 

Regarding the tie-in with NASA's facilities, it is proposed that consideration be given 

that NASA facilities be controlled in a manner similar to the relationship between the 

Coast Guard and the Navy. That is, in time of emergency operationally useful equipment 

and facilities would be at the disposal of the joint space commander. 
I 

301 

President 

I 1 

Chief 

Bureau of Aeronautics Chief of Ordnance 

Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Air Force 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Air Research 8 

Development Command 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 

Orbital Space Operations 

- 

CombatSystems I MET GEO Comm. NAV RECCO EW ECM 

STRAC e e e e 

Deployed Armies e e e e 

Amphib e e e e e 

Carrier Strike e e e e e 

FBM e e e e 

ASW e e e e e 

Air Def e e e 

Mis Def e 0 e 

TAC e e e e 

Strat Air e e e e e 

ICBM e e e 

IRBM e e e 

Commanding General Commander Commanding General I Wh le Sands M ss s Rangel I Pachc Missile Range I I At antic M ssde Range I 1 1 L I 1 I 

- - - 
302 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY kL4TIONS 

Space 

Command 

(Rotating) 

I President 

Specified Unified 

Commands Commands 

I I I 

AEC M LC DOD CMLC NASA 

AMR PMR WSMR 

Track & Surv. Additional 

Coord. Cent. Force & Fac. 

(Jointly Manned) Assigned 

I Jcs I 

Command 

(Rotating) 

Scientific 

Director 

Tracking, 

Launching Read-Out Support 
support 

303 

Plans 

Policy 

Program Admin. Operations Comm. Logistics 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 

Command Director 

Comm. Operations Det. B Track amp. 

Division Division Division Division 

Vice 

Cmdr. 

(Rotating) 

Plans Admin. 

Division Division 

Track 8 Surveillance 

Coord. Center 

(Jointly Manned) 

Advantages JCS Desig. Command - 

Insures Earliest Space Exploitation for U.S.A. 

Eliminates Duplicative Installations 

Insures Indoctrination and Training of Uniformed Personnel 

Would Improve Evolution of Sound Operational Requirements 

Would Define Relative Importance of Military Space Operations 
304 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Document 11-15 

Document title: “Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study,” 

Study Summary and Program Plan, Air Research and Development Command, Project 

No. 7987, Task No. 19769, Directorate of Space Planning and Analysis, Air Force Balliitic 

Missile Division, April 1960, pp. 1-9. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Space Act did not settle the issue of which organization-NASA or the AirForce-would conduct 

human spaceflight. The Space Act clearly indicated, however; that NASA would be responsible for most 

basic science in space. This created a much higher standard of justijication of humans in space for 

the Air Force, which searched for practical missions requin’ng piloted spacecraj, In Apil 1960, the 

Air Research and Development Command completed a report on the feasibili9 of establishing a lunar 

base and argued that it should be recognized as an AirForce requirement. The base could serue as the 

site of a lunar-based Earth bombardment system capable of launching nuclear missiles with an accurag of two to five nautical miles. Echoing the arguments made for many civilian manned space programs, the repm-t noted that the cost of such a base ($8.14 billion ouer ten years) was less than the 

annual cost of the Farm Subsidy Program. It was more ambiguous about the need for such a base. 

Study Summary 

The purpose of this study was to “determine an economical and sound approach for 

establishing a manned intelligence observatory on the moon.” Normally the end product 

of this type of study is an Evaluation Report. However, due to the importance of the study 

conclusions and the significance of time, it was decided to prepare a preliminary Program 

Plan, as part of the final Report. 

The final report has been prepared in two volumes. Volume I includes this Study 

Summary and the Program Plan. Volume I1 consists of the Technical Requirements to 

support the Program Plan. The Technical Requirements are presented in “technical packages’’ that cover each of the major technical areas. Each package includes the characteristics and required development schedules for all known items within the specific 

technical area, as well as the development philosophy to be followed. 

The “technical packages” have been prepared to assist the appropriate development 

agencies to initiate the required applied research and technical development programs. 

The complete Military Lunar Base Program Report is suitable for use by personnel in a 

Program Office to establish a Lunar Base Program, or to coordinate Air Force lunar 

requirements with the NASA. 

Based on present knowledge, the study has concluded that it is technically feasible to 

establish a manned base on the moon. ‘Technically feasible” is not meant to imply that 

the equipments are available, or the techniques are completely known. Actually it means 

that the problems have been analyzed, and logical and reasonable extensions to the “stateof-the-art” should provide the desired techniques and equipments and this is comparable 

to the establishment of the original “design objectives” for the Ballistic Missile Programs 

in the year, 1954. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 305 

As the study progressed it became obvious that this is not a program “far off in the 

future.” Actually the long lead development items should be started immediately if maximum military advantage is to be derived from a lunar program. If this is done the United 

States could send a man to the moon and return him to the earth during the last quarter 

of 1967. 

The final decision concerning the types of strategic systems to be placed on the moon 

(such as a Lunar Based Earth Bombardment System) can be safely deferred for three to 

four years. However, the program to establish a lunar base must not be delayed and the 

initial base design must meet military requirements. For example, the base should be 

designed as a permanent installation, it should be underground, it should strive to be 

completely self-supporting, and it should provide suitable accommodations to support 

extended tours of duty. A companion study of Strategic Lunar Systems (SR-192) has shown 

that the lunar base is the most time-critical part of the system, so it is obvious that any delay 

in initiating the base development program will proportionally delay the final operational 

capability. 

The subject of establishing a military lunar base is extremely complex and includes 

almost every known technical discipline. For the technical portion of this report the technical problems have been categorized as Propulsion, Secondary Power, Guidance, Life 

Support, Communications and,Data Handling, Sensors, Materials and Resources, Lunar 

Base Design, and Environment. However, the general subject can be simply described as 

searching for the answers to the following four questions. 

1. HOW can a manned base be established on the moon? 

2. WHEN can a manned base be established on the moon? 

3. HOW MUCH will it cost to establish a manned lunar base? 

4. WHY should a manned base be established on the moon? 

A majority of the study effort was expended on the question of “How can a manned 

base be established on the moon?” The first step’was to perform a Transportation Analysis 

and determine [2] the most advantageous method of transporting men and materials to 

the moon and returning the men to earth. All conceivable chemical, naclear and ion 

propulsion systems, using earth and lunar satellites, as well as “direct shot” trajectories, 

were considered. In addition, every reasonable technical perturbation was considered. As 

a result ofthe analysis it was conclusively shown that the “direct shot” to the moon, using ajiue stage 

chemically propelled vehicle, is the most desirable. This was not the expected conclusion since 

the establishment and use of a manned earth satellite-refueling station has been proposed 

for many years as the best way for man to travel to the moon. However, these original proposals did not have the benefit of a detailed analysis like the one performed in this study. 

The analysis indicated the nuclear propulsion system could not be operational before 

1970, so it was not advisable to rely on this system to establish the lunar base. However, if 

a nuclear system is available as expected in 1970, it could be used as indicated on the 

Master Program Schedule to logistically support the base. 

With the “direct shot” determined to be the most desirable approach, it was possible 

to develop a vehicle concept. Based on technical and payload considerations, as well as the 

psychologists[’] philosophy on “ideal crew size,” it was concluded that a three-man aerodynamic re-entry vehicle would be the best method for transporting men to the moon and 

for returning them to the earth. This vehicle would weigh approximately 30,000 pounds 

as it enters the earth’s atmosphere, and it would be capable of completely automaticunmanned-10 day flights. The initial unmanned earth re-entry flights will require a landing area of 10 x 20 miles. When mail has been included in the system a more conventional 
306 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

landing strip will be usable, but to meet both of these requirements a facility like Edwards 

Air Force Base will be necessary. 

The vehicle would be launched as the payload of a fire stage system that has six million pounds of thrust in the first stage. All stages of the system would use liquid hydrogen 

and oxygen for propulsion, since this combination has about a 3 to 1 payload advantage 

over the more conventional liquid oxygen and Rp-1 combination. It was determined that 

the proposed NOVA vehicles using liquid oxygen and RP-1 in the first stage would not be 

adequate for supporting manned lunar base operations. Therefore, it is desirable to go 

completely to the use of liquid hydrogen and oxygen as soon as possible. 

The first four stages of this same system will provide the capability of soft landing a 

payload of 50,000 to 80,000 pounds at a preselected lunar site. This provides a configuration suitable for transporting large cargo payloads to the moon for use in constructing the 

permanent lunar base. Approximately one million pounds of cargo will need to be delivered to the lunar surface in order to construct and support the permanent base. Part of 

this cargo will consist of telescopic and sensing equipment for performing “surveillance 

and control” of cislunar space. 

An analysis of the functions that are necessary to operate a lunar base has shown that 

a base complement of 21 personnel will be required. The tour of duty for space personnel is extremely critical, since “personnel transport” is one of the most important cost factors in a space program. Present studies show the maximum tour of duty on an orbiting 

space satellite is in the neighborhood of 30 days. However, it seems reasonable to expect 

tours of 7 to 9 months on a lunar base due to the possibility of better living conditions, 

availability of a natural gravity environment, and greater protection from natural hazards 

while in the underground base. 

Once the decision was made to use a “direct shot” chemical system and a vehicle configuration was determined, it became possible to outline a program for development 

equipments and a plan for establishing the lunar base. The program broke down into six 

logical phases with each phase designed to meet a specific secondary objective. These 

objectives all lead directly to the prime objective of establishing a manned military lunar 

base. 

Basic to each phase of the program is our present knowledge of the environment in 

space and on the moon. Therefore, as part of this study all existing space and lunar environment knowledge [3] was surveyed, analyzed, summarized and applied to the program 

plan. The environmental data obtained from each phase of the program will add to this 

knowledge and assist in the design of equipments for the following phases. 

Reliability and safety are of basic importance to each program phase. Reliability is 

equally essential to the unmanned as well as the manned flights. However, when man is 

placed in the vehicles safety becomes of prime importance. It was determined that the 

multiengine vehicles should be capable of performing the mission even following the loss 

of one engine. Normally the loss in payload and efficiency to achieve an “engine out” 

capability is undesirable, but in this program where large quantities of hydrogen and oxygen are part of the regular payload to support the base, the corresponding loss in payload 

to provide extra fuel and oxidizer is not a disadvantage. Actually a “real” payload loss will 

only take place when a catastrophic engine failure occurs. In the cases of noncatastrophic 

failure, the mission will still be accomplished at reduced efficiency. 

The following table presents the objectives and systems to be used in each of the six 

program phases. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 307 

PAYL.OAD NO. OF 

PHASE OBJECllVE BOOSTER (Pounds) SHOTS METHOD 

I. Lunar Probes Obtain Lunar and ATLASABLE 370 6 High Resolution Video 

Cislunar Environmental Data System and Sensors. 

2. Lunar Orbits Map Complete Lunar ATLAS 1,200 6 Solar energy and strip 

Surface (10-15‘ Resolution) CENTAUR mapping. 

3. LunarSoft Soft Land on Moon and SATURN 2,000 9 Deceleration stage, terLanding obtain environmental data (4 stages) minal guidance alighting 

gear, core sampling 

devices. 

SATURN 4,500 

(5 stages) 

NOVA4 25,000 

(5 stages) 

4. Lunar Landing 

and Return 

Return First Payload 

from Moon (A core sample 

SATURN 

(5 stages) 

1,400 6 Gire drilling and analysis 

package, lunar launchingof the lunar surface) atmospheric drag and 

NOVA4 10,000 retro-rocket remtry, 

(5 stages) earth terminal guidance. 

5. Manned Vehicle Develop a Three Man NOVA4 30,000 13 Extend Dyna Soar TechDevelopment Space Vehicle for (5 stages) (Hi alt & niques to Reentry velociAerodynamic Earth ‘ARAGO Lunar Pass) ties of 37,000 ft/sec, 

Remtry (5 stages) 

(Lunar 

30,000 fiilly automatic flight of 

manned space vehicle to 

landing & moon and remm tn earth. 

Return 

with Man) 

6. LunarBase Cmnstruct an Operational *ARAGO 30,000 l/mo Construct temporary base, 

Development Permanent Base on the 

moon and support a 

21 man crew. 

(5 stages) Man Space 

Vehicle) 

57,000 I/mo 

build underground permanent base, install operational surveillance 

80,000 equipment. Support of 

(One Way 

Cargo 

the completed base will 

require a total of 1 flight/ 

Vehicle) month. 

*ARAGO is the term used to describe the 6 million pound thrust, liquid hydrogen and oxygen, propulsion stage. 

[4] Many items of equipment will be required for the lunar base program and wherever 

existing or programmed equipments would meet the requirements of the lunar base program they were scheduled for use. Where the item did not presently exist and none is programmed, a development schedule was provided. In addition, all necessary items are 

scheduled for use in the program as early as possible. This will improve reliability by use 

and growth, and allow the equipments to be “man-rated’’ by the desired time. 

The major-pacing hardware items that require development to start immediately are 

as follows: 

1. A liquid hydrogen and oxygen rocket stage which develops six million pounds of 

thrust. 

2. A 30,000 pound, three man, earth return vehicle. 

3. A 100 KW nuclear power unit capable of operating on the lunar surface for two 

years. 

4. A suit/capsule capable of protecting personnel in the lunar environment. 

5. A closed ecological system for use in the permanent lunar base. 
308 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

6. A high definition video strip mapping system to map the lunar surface. 

7. Suitable biopacks for use in the first three phases of the program. 

8. A fully throttable, 6,000 pound thrust, liquid hydrogen and oxygen propulsion 

system. 

9. A hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. 

10. A horizon scanner and altitude control system for lunar terminal guidance. 

11. A command link midcourse guidance system. 

12. A communications and terminal guidance package to be dropped on the lunar 

surface from orbiting vehicles. 

The second major question concerning the establishment of a manned base on the 

moon is, ‘When can this be accomplished?” The Master Program Schedule for establishing a manned lunar base was obtained by scheduling the development of every known 

technical item and then integrating these individual schedules to determine when the 

base could become a reality. . . . Five major milestones worthy of special mention are: 

1. First lunar sample return to earth November 1964 

2. First manned lunar landing and return August 1967 

3. Temporary lunar base initiated November 1967 

(This temporary base will be on the lunar surface and it will provide facilities 

while the permanent underground base is under construction.) 

4. Permanent lunar base completed December 1968 

(The permanent base will support a complement of 21 men.) 

5. Operational Lunar Base June 1969 

(Equipment will be installed to perform surveillance of earth-lunar space.) 

The third major question is, “How much will it cost to establish a manned lunar base?” 

. . . These cost figures were prepared by the Air Force. After the technical program plan 

was completed, the Cost Analysis Panel “coated” the program using the best Air Force 

information available from present ballistic missile and aircraft programs. 

[5] The important cost figures are summarized below: 

Total Cost-Permanent Lunar Base $7,726 million 

Total Cost-10 Year Program 8,146 million 

(Includes installation of the permanent base and 6 months of operations.) 

Annual Operating Cost 631 million 

These costs are based on the following assumptions: 

1. The major development engineering costs on the Saturn B and the NOVA 4 

boosters has [sic] been assumed to be provided under independently funded programs. However, the actual cost of the boosters has been included and it was 

assumed that the first vehicle would be made available to the lunar program. If 

this is not the case, due to the “learning curve” it is expected that the vehicle costs 

would be decreased. 

2. The costs include all shots in the program except the nuclear shots shown in the 

last half of 1970. The development costs for the nuclear system were not included because the lunar base program is not dependent upon the nuclear system. 

However, if the nuclear system is available and more economical it would be used 

to support the operational base. 

3. Costs of all items normally considered as part of a weapon system (such as, launch 

pads and ground facilities) have been included. 

4. It was assumed that adequate earth based tracking facilities will be available as the 

result of other programs. If they are not available the costs could increase by 

300-600 million dollars in the later phases of the program. 

When the average annual cost ($814 million) of the proposed program is compared 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 309 

to the Air Force efforts, it becomes apparent that this program is approximately equal to 

the output of just one of the major airframe companies normally supported by the Air 

Force. As a matter of information, the annual cost of the U.S. Farm Subsidy Program is 

approximately the same as the 9 1/2 year program required to install the permanent 

lunar base. 

One point worthy of particular mention when considering costs, is the development 

of lunar resources. Analysis has shown that the development of lunar resources could 

decrease the cost of Strategic Lunar Operations by as much as 25 per cent [sic]. This is 

based on the fact that the moon’s surface probably consists of many types of silicates. Since 

hydrogen and oxygen are used as propellants in the transport vehicles, as essential elements in the secondary power systems, as an element for personnel breathing, and when 

combined as water for life support, the value of obtaining these two elements on the 

moon is obvious. Should oxygen and hydrogen be obtained on the lunar surface they 

would be literally worth more than their weight in gold. This study has shown that it may 

be very possible to process lunar silicates to obtain water and then, by dissociation, the 

elements oxygen and hydrogen. It seemed very worthwhile to pursue this objective so a 

program schedule has been presented in the Environment section of Volume 11. A glance 

at the lunar resource program schedule shows that the sample “core” of the lunar surface 

to be obtained in Phase IV, is critical to this effort. Although the process will require large 

quantities of power, solar energy is available in unlimited supply and nuclear power has 

been programmed for use on the lunar base. 

The fourth major question, ‘Why should a manned base be established on the 

moon?,” was not answered as a part of this SR-183 study. SR-192, the Strategic Lunar 

System Study was initiated on 29 August 1958 for the specific purpose of looking at this 

question. However, to provide a complete picture on the lunar base it seems necessary to 

consider the question in this report. Since the [6] final results of SR[-I192 are not yet 

available, the mid-term conclusions have been utilized. The Space Mission Analysis portion of this final SR[-] 183 report briefly discusses these conclusions. The essential factors 

can be stated as follows: 

1. The lunar base possesses strategic value for the U.S. by providing a site where 

future military deterrent forces could be located. 

2. The decision on the types of military forces to be installed at the lunar base can 

be safely deferred for 3 to 4 years provided a military lunar base program is initiated immediately. 

3. A lunar based earth bombardment system could have a CEP of two to five nautical miles. 

4. The development of lunar resources could enhance the potential for strategic 

space operations in the cislunar volume. 

[ 71 CONCLUSIONS 

The most important conclusions of this study can be summarized by the following 

statements: 

1. It is technically feasible to establish a lunar base by logical extension of present 

techniques. 

2. Earliest lunar operations may be attained through the use of a direct shot chemically powered booster. 

3. A 6 million pound thrust LOX/LH propulsion capability must be developed for 

the three-manned vehicle for lunar landing and return missions. 
310 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

4. Investigation indicates that the payload penalty for using earth re-entry retro 

rockets is so great that the only logical re-entry approach is by means of aerodynamic braking. Therefore, the present Dyna Soar program is essential to provide 

re-entry vehicle design data. 

5. A multi-phased program is essential to establish an operational lunar base. The 

Program Plan presented in this report included the following six phases: 

Phase I Lunar Probes 

Phase I1 Lunar Orbits 

Phase I11 Soft Lunar Landing 

Phase IV Lunar Landing and Return 

Phase V Manned Vehicle Development 

Phase VI Lunar Base Development 

6. Based on the above program the following milestones have been established as 

reasonable objectives. 

a. First Lunar Sample Returned to Earth November 1964 

b. Manned Lunar Landing and Return August 1967 

c. Temporary Lunar Base Initiated November 1967 

d. Permanent Lunar Base Completed December 1968 

e. Operational Lunar Base June 1969 

7. The initial pleases of the program can be undertaken for an investment which 

averages approximately 800 million dollars per year during the initial building 

phase. After the establishment of the base the annual costs will decrease to about 

600 million dollars per year. This may be still further reduced when nuclear 

propulsion becomes available and as lunar resources are developed to provide 

oxygen and hydrogen to support space operations. 

8. A lunar base is the initial and essential step in the attainment of a military capability in the lunar volume. 

9. A military lunar system has potential to increase our deterrent capability by insuring positive retaliation. 

10. The decisions regarding the type of military operations to be conducted in lunar 

and cislunar space can be safely deferred for several years provided a military 

lunar base is established which can be readily expanded to support lunar operations. 

11. From a national viewpoint it is desirable that a lunar base be established as soon 

as possible. This conclusion is based on the strategic potential as well as the psychological, political and scientific implications. 

[8] This page intentionally left blank. 

[9] The following actions are recommended as a result of this study. 

1. The program for establishing a military lunar base be recognized as an Air Force 

requirement. 

2. Immediate action be taken to implement the early phases of the program. 

3. Immediate action be taken to start the development of the critical long lead items 

listed below: 

a. Six million pound thrust LOX/LH propulsion system. 

b. Three-man space vehicle which can re-enter earth’s atmosphere. 

c. There are smaller items that should be started before the end of 1960. These 

are listed in the separate technical areas. 

4. A program office be established within ARDC to coordinate with NASA, all activities directed toward the establishment of the lunar base. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 311 

5. The military requirements and NASA’s requirements be integrated into one 

national lunar program. 

6. Responsibilities be assigned for the various phases of the integrated lunar program. 

7. The establishment of the base be considered a military expedition. 

8. The Air Force develop space operational know-how by being intimately involved 

in all phases of the lunar program. This is in keeping with the philosophy of concurrency and is necessary to shorten the development cycle. 

9. Further study be initiated as explained in each section of the technical report. 

The follow-on SR-183 study will tie all of these together into a comprehensive systems study. 

Document 11-16 

Document title: General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to 

General Landon, Air Force Personnel Deputy Commander, and General Wilson, Air Force 

Development Deputy Commander, April 14, 1960, reprinted in: D@me Space Interests, 

Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1961). 

Document 11-17 

Document title: Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments, et al., “Development of Space Systems,” March 6, 1961, with 

attached Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, “Development of Space Systems,” 

March 6, 1961, reprinted in. Defknse Space Interests, Hearings Before the Committee on 

Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess. 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). 

Document 11-18 

Document title: Overton Brooks, Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. 

House of Representatives, to the President, March 9, 1961. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Document 11-19 

Document title: President John F. Kennedy, to Overton Brooks, Chairman, Committee on 

Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, March 23, 1961. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

After the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) returned control of the military space program 

to the individual services---pn’marily the Air Force-there was gradually increasing concern in 

Congress and the press that the Air Force was interested in expanding its power over other aspects of 

the civilian space program as well. In Ap’l 1960, Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White wrote a 
312 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

memorandum to his staff stating that he wanted them to cooperate more fully with NASA and that it 

might be possible that NASA would eventually be combined m‘th the military. Almost a year latq 

newly appointed Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara gave the AirForce control of the development 

of all military space systems. The other services would still conduct basic research, but aft.. some predetermined point, the program would be turned over to the Air Force. White’s memo “leaked” and, 

combined with the McNamara policy statement, led to hearings before the House Committee on Science 

and Astronautics, chaired by Overton Brooks. Bejiore the hearings started, Brooks sent a letter to 

President Kennedy asking for clarification of the AirForceS role in conducting aspects of the national space program. By the last day of the hearings, Kennedy responded, declaring that manned and 

unmanned exploration of space and the application of space technology to peaceful activities were 

NASA missions, but that there also were exclusively military missions in space as well. 

Document 11-16 

[no pagination] 

AFPDC (Gen Landon) 

AFDDC (Gen Wilson) 

14 April 1960 

1. I am convinced that one of the major long range elements of the Air Force future 

lies in space. It is also obvious that NASA will play a large part in the national effort in this 

direction and, moreover, inevitably will be closely associated, if not eventually combined 

with the military. It is perfectly clear to me that particularly in these formative years the 

Air Force must, for its own good as well as for national interest, cooperate to the maximum extent with NASA, to include the furnishing of key personnel even at the expense 

of some Air Force dilution of technical talent. 

2. It has come to my attention that key personnel in NASA feel that there has been 

a shift in Air Force policy in respect to the type of cooperation stated above. I want to 

make it crystal clear that the policy has not changed and that to the very limit of our ability, and even beyond it to the extent of some risk to our own programs, the Air Force will 

cooperate and will supply all reasonable key personnel requests made to it by NASA. 

3. To meet the above requirements I have no doubt that some shifting of Air Force 

personnel within the Air Force will be necessary in order to feed new talent into [the Air 

Research and Development Command]. This should be done. In addition, while late, we 

must increase the number of slots in civil technical institutions for Air Force officers. I 

want this type of technical education to be given the highest priority in our civil educational program and the percentage of slots in this respect to be radically increased, effective as early as possible. 

THOMAS D. WHITE 

Chief of Staff 

cc: Under Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Perkins 

General LeMay 

General Schriever 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 313 

Document 11-17 

[no pagination] THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Washington, D.C., March 6, 1961 

Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense 

The General Counsel 

The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense 

SUBJECT Deuelopment of Space Systems 

Having carefully reviewed the military portion of the national space program, the 

Deputy Secretary and I have become convinced that it could be much improved by better 

organization and clearer assignment of responsibility. To this end, I directed the General 

Counsel of the Department of Defense to obtain your comments on a new draft DOD 

Directive, “Development of Space Systems.” 

After careful consideration of the comments and alternate plans that were submitted, 

the Deputy Secretary and I have decided to assign space development programs and projects to the Department of the Air Force, except under unusual circumstances. 

This assignment of space development programs and projects does not predetermine 

the assignment of operational responsibilities for space systems which will be made on a 

project by project basis as a particular project approaches the operational stage, and 

which will take into account the competence and experience of each of the Services and 

the unified and specified commands. 

We recognize that all the military departments, as well as other Defense agencies, may 

have requirements for the use of space equipment. The directive expressly provides that 

they will continue to conduct preliminary research to develop specific statements of these 

requirements, and provides a mechanism through which these requirements may be fulfilled. 

Attached is a directive incorporating this decision. We expect all elements of the 

Department of Defense to support it fully and to help develop the military portion of the 

national space program in the most effective manner. 

Robert S. McNamara 

Encl. DOD Dir. 51G0.32 

********* 
314 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

PI March 6, 1961 

Number 5160.32 

Department of Defense Directive 

SUBJECT Development of Space Systems 

References: 

(a) Memorandum (Con0 from Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, subject: Satellite and Space Vehicles Operations, September 18, 1959 

(b) Memorandum from Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency to Secretary of 

the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, subject: Study Contracts 

for Projects Assigned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, September 14, 1959 

(c) Memorandum from Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency to Secretary of 

the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of [2] the Air Force, and Director, 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, subject: ARPA Programs, June 11, 1959 

I. Purpose 

This establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for research, development, test, 

and engineering of satellites, anti-satellites, space probes and supporting systems therefor, 

for all components of the Department of Defense. 

II. Policy and assignment of responsibilities 

A. Each military department and Department of Defense agency is authorized to 

conduct preliminary research to develop new ways of using space technology to perform 

its assigned function. The scope of such research shall be defined by the Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering in terms of expenditure limitations and other appropriate conditions. 

B. Proposals for research and development of space programs and projects beyond 

the defined preliminary research stage shall be submitted to the Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering for review and determination as to whether such proposals, 

when transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, will be recommended for approval. Any 

such proposal will become a Department of Defense space development program or project only upon specific approval by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. 

C. Research, development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space 

development programs or projects, which are approved hereafter, will be the responsibility of the Department of the Air Force. 

D. Exceptions to paragraph C, will be made by the Secretary of Defense or the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense only in unusual circumstances. 

E. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering will maintain a current summary of approved Department of Defense space development programs and projects. 

III. Cancellation 

Reference (a), except as to the assignments of specific projects made therein, and references (b) and (c) are hereby cancelled. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 315 

IK Effective date 

This directive is effective upon publication. Instructions implementing this directive 

will be issued within thirty (30) days. 

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, Secretary of Defense 

Document 11-18 

March 9, 1961 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 

My dear Mr. President: 

I am seriously disturbed by the persistency and strength of implications reaching me 

to the effect that a radical change in our national space policy is contemplated with some 

areas of the executive branch. In essence, it is implied that United States policy should be 

revised to accentuate the military uses of space at the expense of civilian and peaceful 

uses. 

Of course, I am aware that no official statement to this effect has been forthcoming; 

but the voluminous rash of such reports appearing in the press, and particularly in the 

military and trade journals, is, it seems to me, indicative that more than mere rumor is 

involved. 

Moreover, I cannot fail to take cognizance of the fact that emphasis on the military 

uses of space is being promoted in a quasi-public fashion within the defense establishment. Nor can I ignore the suggestion, implicit in the unabridged version of the Wiesner 

report, that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration role in the development 

of space systems will be predominant. Such an assertion not only seems to disregard the 

spirit of the law but minimizes the values of peaceful space exploration and exploitation. 

I have hesitated to call this to your personal attention. However, since the National 

Aeronautics and Space Council, whose duty it is to advise on the formulation of United 

States space policy, remains unformed, I feel constrained to broach the matter directly. 

May I point out that the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 passed the 

Senate in which both you and the current Vice President so ably served without a recorded dissenting vote. It was unanimously approved by the House. In that Act Congress took 

great pains to declare that space activities “shall be the responsibility of, and shall be 

directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautics and [2] space activities 

sponsored by the United States. . .” Space activities “peculiar to or primarily associated 

with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the 

United States” were quite properly made the responsibility of the Defense Department, 

but this was a literal “exception” to the proclaimed procedure. 

As you know, I served twenty-two years on the House Armed Services Committee. I 

would be the last person to attempt to weaken our defense posture. But neither do I 

intend to sit by and, contrary to the express intent of Congress, watch the military tail 

undertake to wag the space dog. 

The law makes it crystal clear that the prime American mission in space is toward 

peaceful purposes. It specifically enjoins NASA to promote space science and technology 
316 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

with a view to the “application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.” The law not only does not limit NASA’s functions to scientific 

research; it affirmatively directs NASA to make peaceful use of space and to develop operational space systems, manned and unmanned. This is a legislative requirement imposed. 

To place the prime operational responsibility for space exploration and use with the military, particularly when no military requirement for men in space yet exists, would be to 

disorient completely the space program as contemplated by Congress and as set forth in 

the law. 

As Chief Executive of the United States charged with the conduct of foreign affairs 

and as a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you are, I know, 

aware of the great importance of preserving the peaceful image of the United States within the international community. At the same time, few areas of national endeavor today 

serve better to reflect the American attitude in world politics than what we intend and 

how we behave in this new dimension of human activity. I do not see how we can square 

an exclusive, or even a predominant, military exploitation of space with our announced 

aspirations for peace and disarmament. To sublimate military operations in space would 

thus seem to be inconsistent with our foreign policy and, in myjudgment, would serve to 

impede our future negotiations for world-wide disarmament. 

There is another extremely important aspect of this picture, namely participation by 

private enterprise in the space venture. If we are to reap genuine economic pay-off 

through space exploration, we must find ways of eliciting and using the resources of private capital. While I recognize that the armed services have a legitimate interest in such 

space enterprises as communications, weather prediction, navigation and the like, I submit that these concepts have a predominant use for peaceful activities. In my judgment, 

we will lag seriously in any efforts to bring private enterprise into space if we turn control 

of research, development and operation of such endeavors over to the military whose [3] 

needs are highly specialized and whose research methods tend to be restricted in scope 

and concept. 

To amplify: if we envision the military in control of world-wide space communications, 

it is difficult to understand in advance what basis would be provided for world-wide media 

of communications such as television, radio and telephone systems. If we concede military 

control of weather satellites, how shall such control be reconciled to the needs of farmers, 

merchants, and business generally? If we permit military domination of space navigation 

devices, are we fulfilling our obligations to the merchant marine and the commercial air 

fleets operating on and above the high seas? I think not. In fact, many of the benefits 

which humanity could expect to reap from the exploration of space may easily be lost 

unless they are made available on a non-military basis. If the fruits of our efforts to conquer space are to enrich people’s lives and raise standards of living throughout the world, 

they must be handled through a civilian peacetime agency, not by the military which necessarily is governed by its particular objectives. 

In conclusion, I feel obliged to point out that in view of the recent Defense 

Department decision to concentrate all military space research in a single service, this 

question of civilian preeminence in space exploration becomes paramount. Space exploration involves much research, basic and applied, and it is axiomatic that the rate of 

research pay-off is accelerated many times when a variety of approaches, ideas and concepts are explored simultaneously. Testimony before our Committee permits no doubt 

whatever that the United States space effort, civilian and military, has achieved what it has 

during the past three years only because of an imaginative and diversified approach. 

If NASA’s role is in any way diminished in favor of a space research program conducted by a single military service, it seems unlikely to me that we shall ever overtake our 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 317 

Soviet competition-a competition which, by the way, has been peculiarly effective 

because of its public emphasis on scientific and peaceful uses of space. 

It is my hope that you will find it feasible to clear up this matter, and, coincidentally, 

to reassure me in the very near future. 

Very sincerely yours, 

OVERTON BROOKS 

Chairman 

Document 11-19 

March 23, 1961 

Dear Overton: 

Recently you wrote to me concerning my attitude toward the conduct of our national space effort. I appreciate your comments and have given considerable thought to the 

problems of this program which you have raised. I hope that this letter will serve to reassure you that there is no basic disagreement between us. 

It is now, nor has it ever been, my intention to subordinate the activities in space of 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to those of the Department of 

Defense. I believe, as you do, that there are legitimate missions in space for which the military services should assume responsibility, but that there are major missions, such as the 

scientific unmanned and manned exploration of space and the application of space technology to the conduct of peaceful activities, which should be carried forward by our civilian space agency. Furthermore, I have been assured by Dr. Wiesner that it was not the 

intention of his space task force to recommend the restriction of the NASA to the area of 

scientific research in space. One of their strongest recommendations was; in fact, that vigorous leadership be provided by NASA in the area of non-military exploitation of space 

technology. 

As you have pointed out, there are programs which have strong implications in both 

the military and civilian fields. In making policy decisions on such programs, I intend to 

rely heavily on the advice of the Vice President, based on his invaluable experience with 

the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. We are also moving ahead 

with plans to reactivate the Space Council, and to make it an active and effective organization. As [2] you know, I have nominated Dr. Edward c. Welsh to be executive secretary 

of the Space Council. I believe that he, working under the Vice President, can assemble a 

topflight staff that will make the Space Council more than just a box on an organization 

chart as it has been heretofore. 

I agree wholeheartedly with you that there are highly important benefits to be realized from the civil applications of space technology and that private enterprise must play 

an important role. I am confident that with the help of the Vice President, the Space 

Council, the Senate Committee under Senator Kerr, and the House Committee under 

your able leadership, we can assure that the proper policy decisions will be reached. 

Again, may I thank you for your comments and also express my appreciation for the 

outstanding job you are performing as Chairman of the Committee on Science and 

Astronautics. 

Sincerely yours 

John F. Kennedy 
318 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Document 11-20 

Document title: “Summary Report: NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group,” 

September 24, 1962, pp. ii-iv, I-1-111-13. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Aft.. President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961, speech to Congress, which committed the United States to a 

lunar mission, there was an attempt to establish military and civilian requirements for large launch 

vehicles, with the hope of establishinga single national launch vehiclefleet. On Jub 7, 1961, NASA 

Associate Administrator Robert Seamans proposed a joint study to determine mission models and 

requirements affecting the selection of large launch vehicles; the study was headed by NASA’s Nicholas 

Golovin. As the study progressed, the dyferent requirements and institutional interests of NASA and 

the Department of Defense (000) became clear and both agencies quickly distanced themselves from 

the contents of the report. By the time this report was released on September 24, 1962, almost a year 

after the group had completed its work, it had been obvious for some time that there would be very little cooperation between NASA and the DOD on large launch vehicles. 

[ ii] 

Foreword 

Early in 1961 numerous studies relative to our space programs were undertaken 

under a variety of auspices. In one of the initial efforts the Space Exploration Program 

Council of NASA revived in detail the various aspects and approaches to manned lunar 

landing including both rendezvous and direct ascent. This review culminated in the decision that NASA would proceed toward the manned lunar landing on a broad base. 

Accordingly, studies were initiated to aid in formulating an approach to the task. At about 

the same time, the Secretary of Defense requested a comprehensive study by his staff of 

our total national space program and a comparison of these with what was known of Soviet 

undertakings in this field. 

Early in May 1961, NASA presented its plans for accomplishing a manned lunar 

landing and estimates of the cost to the Department of Defense for the purpose of coordinating the resources and efforts of these two agencies to accomplish this mission. These 

discussions culminated in a NASA-DOD report submitted to the Vice President, in his 

capacity as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, entitled 

“Recommendations for Our National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals.” This 

report, dated 8 May 1961, was submitted jointly by the Administrator of NASA and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

The most important of these recommendations was that the achievement of manned 

lunar landing before the end of the decade be established as a national goal. In addition, 

it was recommended that scientific exploration of space be intensified; that operational 

communications and meteorological satellite systems be developed at the earliest reasonable time; that large scale boosters be developed for potential military use as well as to 

support the civilian space program; and that an increased effort be placed on advanced 

technology, particularly with regard to the development of chemical and nuclear rocket 

propulsion. It was recognized, of course, that further analysis would be required to develop more detailed program plans in each of the recommended areas. It is important to 

note, however, that the basis for such planning was clearly [iii] specified in the 8 May 1961 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 319 

report; it was recognized that long-range planning, especially for launch vehicles (which 

account for more than half the cost of space programs), must first be successfully accomplished, and that such planning was essential to insure that national resources would be 

properly harnessed to national tasks on a national scale. 

The 8 May 1961 report gave renewed support to the “building block” concept. It was 

stated in this connection: “It is absolutely vital that national planning be sufficiently 

detailed to define the building blocks in an orderly and integrated way. It is absolutely vital 

that national management be equal to the task of focusing resources, particularly scientific and engineering resources, on the essential building blocks.” 

The budgetary and policy recommendations of the 8 May report were adopted by the 

President and presented to the Congress in his message of 25 May. Subsequently, virtually all the recommended authorizations and appropriations were passed by the Congress. 

Simultaneously with these acts, NASA and DOD continued an intensified effort to 

define mere explicitly and explore more thoroughly the actions that would have to be 

taken to implement these recommendations. New studies were begun in both agencies 

and the talents of specialists were harnessed in organizations in many parts of the country. 

Within NASA the first of a series of major study efforts was begun on 2 May 1961, initiated to define in greater detail the feasibility, schedule, and costs of accomplishing 

manned lunar landing, giving attention to the various possible approaches for accomplishing the mission. An ad hoc task group was then established and assigned the responsibility for defining in detail a feasible approach for accomplishment of an early manned 

lunar landing. A second ad hoc group was assigned the task of conducting a broad survey 

of the feasible ways for accomplishing manned lunar landing. 

One of the results of these studies was establishment of the need for further information on the rendezvous approach to manned lunar landing and the associated launch 

site planning and resources required. Accordingly, two [iv] additional ad hoc task groups 

were established. One group established on 20 June 1961 was assigned responsibility for 

studying in detail the plans and supporting resources needed to accomplish manned 

lunar landing by the rendezvous technique. The other group established 23 June 1961 

conducted a joint NASA-DOD study of national launch site planning and of the resources 

required to accomplish the manned lunar landing mission-as it was defined by the earlier studies. 

Early in July it became apparent that a very major effort was necessary to aid in defining the large launch vehicles which would be needed for the Manned Lunar Landing 

Program. Numerous mechanisms were considered for this purpose. The idea of establishing a committee of scientists and technologists somewhat analogous to the Von 

Neuman Committee, which in 1954 recommended the initiation of our ICBM program, 

was considered. The possibility of establishing a contractor or a group of contractors 

charged with responsibility for this analytical and planning effort was also considered. 

From such considerations emerged the concept of the Large Launch Vehicle Planning 

Group (LLWG). This group was to be comprised of representatives from both NASA and 

DOD reflecting equally the experience, viewpoints and special knowledge of both agencies. The group was to be responsible jointly to a senior official in each agency and 

empowered to draw upon scientific and technological resources wherever they might be 

found and needed. . . . 
320 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

LI-11 

Chapter I 

Summary and Recommendations 

I. Introduction 

A. Formation of the Large Launch lrehicle Planning Group 

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA, in an exchange of correspondence on 7 July 1961, established the DOD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Planning 

Group (LLVPG), to provide the necessary joint planning leading to future specification 

and development of large launch vehicles required as a result of the expansion of the 

national space effort outlined by the President on 25 May 1961. 

The LLVPG was headed by Dr. Nicholas E. Golovin of NASA, and by Dr. Lawrence L. 

Kavanau of OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense], who served as Deputy Director 

of the group. They reported jointly to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Associate Administrator 

of NASA, and Mr. John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering) of DOD. A total of nine DOD representatives and ten 

NASA representatives made up the membership of the LLVPG. Their names appear in 

Appendix A, which also describes the assistance the group secured from other agencies, 

such as the Marshall Flight Test Center, Aerospace Corporation, Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, and industrial contractors. As noted in Appendix A, the LLWG commenced 

its operations in July and continued through the month of November 1961, and utilized 

the equivalent full-time services of approximately 150 people during this period. 

Representatives from many NASA and DOD components served as members of the 

LLVPG. Although it was desired and necessary to insure that organizations charged with 

on-going responsibilities for the execution of space programs would have the opportunity to participate in this planning effort, the principal criterion used in selecting members 

of the LLVPG was their personal technical ability and experience. The objective was not 

to attain a compromise between the preconceived notions of DOD representatives on the 

one hand and NASA representatives on the other, but to harness, through cooperative 

study, the best capabilities available for the task of laying out a long-range plan for a 

National Launch Vehicle Program. 

[I-21 The initial instructions to the LLVPG were comprised [sic] in a memorandum dated 

7 July 1961 to the Administrator of NASA from Dr. Seamans. This document was approved 

by the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of Defense. While these documents 

served as the important starting point and the principal framework for LLVPG deliberations, the LLVPG was responsive to considerable detailed guidance furnished by Dr. 

Seamans and Mr. Rubel, immediately following its establishment, and from time to time 

during the course of its deliberations. Since the objective of the LLVPG was to formulate 

plans, it was natural to expect that ideas and concepts would be changed as their studies 

and analyses evolved. This was indeed the case, and some of the notions with which this 

undertaking began were significantly modified before the completion of the group’s 

effort. 

Based on the direction received by the LLVPG, the following frame of reference for 

the study was adopted: 

a. The launch vehicle configurations and the operational procedures to be developed and recommended by the LLVPG were to take into account the current and 

anticipated needs of DOD and of NASA and be guided by the following national 

objectives for large launch vehicles: 

(1) Early successful landing of manned spacecraft on the moon to return to 

earth. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 321 

(2) Manned scientific missions in earth orbit and circumlunar flight as well as on 

the lunar surface. 

(3) Launch vehicle developments for advanced military missions. 

(4) Increased reliability and economy of effort achieved by multiple use of vehicle components, vehicle stages, and complete launch vehicles. 

b. The principal specific allegation of the LLWG was the explicit development, in 

useful detail, of a technically wellestablished planning basis in which coordinated action 

could be taken leading to the development [I-31 and use of the recommended launch 

vehicles and the necessary facilities for their test and launching. The group was charged 

with the identification and preparation of preliminary specifications for long lead time 

items for which development should be initiated immediately, and was directed to review 

and recommend a suitable balance between early achievement of major goals, over-all 

costs, and growth potential of large launch vehicles. 

c. Guidelines provided the LLWG included the following: 

(1) Both direct ascent and rendezvous operations with respect to the lunar landing were to be considered. 

(2) Plans were to be based on components within the present state-of-the-art but 

not restricted to on-the-shelf items. When the scheduled development of a 

new component appeared questionable, a duplicate approach was to be 

included. 

(3) Although only liquid and solid motors were to be employed, proposal designs 

should facilitate exploitation of nuclear and electric propulsion for follow-on 

systems if feasible. 

(4) The group was to concern itself only with large launch vehicle systems. The 

word “large” was to mean those vehicles whose capability to accelerate payloads on spacecraft to escape velocity would be greater than the capability of 

the Atlas-Agena B system. (This guidance was subsequently modified as a 

result of the booster requirements arising in connection with the NASA 

Gemini program, and the group was reconvened by a memorandum dated 

18 November 1961, from the Associate Administrator of NASA and the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering) to extend its study of vehicle systems with the range of payloads 

down to 5000 pounds.) The term “vehicle system” was to include not only 

propulsion elements, but guidance, control and those instrumentation, 

telemetry, and command/communication subsystems which are normally 

physically part of the vehicle system and are employed for maneuvering the 

payload or spacecraft into a desired sequence of position and velocity coordinates. 

[I-41 B. A~~TO UC~ 

The general approach followed by the group was that of defining stage and vehicle 

combinations which could reasonably be expected to become available within the next 

5 to 8 years: executing a systematic quantitative analysis of their relative performance, 

schedule, cost and reliability characteristics; and comparing resultant launch vehicle capabilities, with the projected national missions requirements. In developing national launch 

vehicle requirements for the period 1962 - 1970, the LLWG utilized forecasts of launch 

needs prepared by DOD and NASA reflecting programmed and anticipated mission 

needs. 

It was not considered an assignment of the LLWG to establish preferred mission 

modes where alternative operational concepts were involved as, for example, in the case 
322 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

of various approaches to accomplishment of manned lunar landing. However, it was the 

aim of the group to define the launch vehicle configurations (and their availability, cost, 

reliability and performance characteristics) associated with such alternative mission 

modes and thereby provide inputs which could be used for decisions by DOD and NASA. 

In defining building block combinations of boosters and upper stages, consideration 

was extended to major subsystems including guidance systems, control systems, power supplies, telemetry and the like. Quantitative preliminary design analyses were made by 

Aerospace Corporation and/or the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and were 

carried through to a sufficient depth of technical detail to substantiate the operational 

feasibility of each prospective launch vehicle. These studies included: propulsion system 

performance characteristics; controllability; structural behavior in typical trajectories; 

detailed development schedules for the engines, stages, and vehicles, structured in the 

form of PERT diagrams incorporating all significant milestones throughout the development cycle up to first vehicle availability for flight test, and detailed cost estimates for each 

phase of the development process for each stage of every vehicle, including manufacturing facilities, static and dynamic testing facilities, as well as the necessary launch complexes. 

[I-5] In this effort one of the early decisions of the LLVPG was that no recommendation, 

consistent with the guidelines given to the group was likely to be of practical utility as a 

basis for management decisions in NASA or DOD unless the prospective reliability of the 

vehicle systems involved was estimated. Accordingly, arrangements were made for detailed 

reliability analysis of each stage, each major subsystem, and each over-all vehicle system. 

In view of the fact that durations of testing programs, both static and flight, are dependent on the engineering and testing philosophies employed in the development process, 

substantial attention was also given by the group to these matters. The experience of qualified staffs at MSFC and Aerospace Corporation, as well as of members of the LLWG, were 

melded in sharpening the concepts involved and in applying them, to establish vehicle 

development and flight schedules for various mission-vehicle combinations later considered by the group. 

Further details of the participation of the LLWG, the manner in which the group proceeded in its activities, and the contents of the final report are included in Appendix A. 

As stated previously, it was the objective of the LLWG to develop recommendations 

for a National Launch Vehicle Program that would satisfy NASA and DOD flight mission 

requirements for the remainder of the decade. Therefore, one of the initial steps taken 

by the group was to obtain the mission requirements of the two agencies and analyze them 

with a view to developing a systematic mission requirement base to serve as a foundation 

for the vehicle studies to follow. Spacecraft development and mission attempt schedules 

were assumed to be paced by the availability of vehicles, the derivation of vehicle types and 

their development schedules. 

For convenience in analyzing the characteristics of the various vehicles considered, 

the mission requirements were divided into four classes. These mission classes are: 

Class I - Unmanned NASA and DOD missions plus early manned flight 

Class A - Low earth orbit missions for large manned spacecraft systems (Apollo, 

Dyna-Soar, Orbiting Laboratory) 

Class B - Manned lunar missions involving lunar circumnavigation, lunar orbit 

and lunar landing by earth orbit or lunar orbit rendezvous 

Class C - Manned flight to the moon by direct ascent 

[I-61 

The launch vehicles studied were correspondingly divided into four classes. The performance characteristics, reliability and development schedules for these vehicles are 

summarized in Appendix B. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 323 

A total of over 800 missions was projected for NASA and DOD to the end of the 

decade. These missions were distributed among the four mission classes as follows: 

NASA DOD Total 

Class I 

Class A 277 523 800 

Class B 69 Undefined 69 

Class C _. 

10 - - 10 

Total 356 523 879 

[11-I] 11. Principal Recommendations 

A. Recommendations 

The following are the principal recommendations of the LLWG with a brief discussion of each. 

1. Class A Launch Vehicle Development 

Recommendation: Development of the Saturn GI should continue. 

The Saturn G1 is the only vehicle (A-1) available in time to meet the present development schedule of the Apollo program. Therefore, the Saturn C-1 vehicle (A-1) should 

be developed, flown, and man-rated as soon as possible as a matter of high priority. Such 

development will not only allow initiation of Apollo spacecraft tests at the earliest possible 

date, but will also generate experience in the operation of large hydrogenaxygen stages 

and will provide definition of the problems and the potential of multiple engine clusters 

for such stages. 

2. Titan Launch Vehicle System 

At the conclusion of the LLWG studies in October 1961, the following recommendation was made by the group with regard to the Titan 111: 

Recommendation: The 120-inch diameter solid motor and the Titan ZZZ launch vehicle should 

be developed the Department of Dejense to meet DOD and NASA needs, as appropriate in the payload range of 5000 to 30,000 pounds, low earth orbit equivalent. 

Of the various considerations taken into account in evaluating the advisability of proceeding with development of the Titan 111 system, the principal arguments leading to the 

conclusion of the group were: (1) the anticipated large number of DOD missions during 

this decade justify the development of the Titan I11 family because of its substantially lower 

cost per launch than for Saturn based vehicles; (2) the importance to DOD of having a 

launching system not dependent on the use of cryogenic propellants; (3) the Titan 111, by 

virtue of the way its building blocks can be combined, permits greater flexibility; [11-21 (4) 

the Titan 111 uses DOD experience with Titan 11, making logistics and training easy for 

DOD; and (5) development of large solid motor technology would be part of the development effort and cost of this vehicle system. Such development would be in accord with 

prior governmental policy decisions that advancement of large solid rocket technology 

would be vigorously pursued. 

Following the adjournment of the LLWG in October 1961, unresolved questions still 

remained relative to the role of the Titan 111. The LLVPG had given little or no attention 

to the Titan 11-1/2, the Department of Defense had initiated a Phase I development on 

the Titan 111, and NASA was soon to make a decision on Gemini and was considering the 

Titan II-I/2. To assist the pending decision by DOD and NASA relative to these vehicles, 

the LLVPG was reconvened for analysis of the National Launch Vehicle Program in the 

5000 to 30,000 pound low earth equivalent range. 
324 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

At the termination of this reconvened session of the group. the recommendation on 

the Titan 111 was as follows: 

Recommendation: The Titan ZZZ space launching system should be developed by the 

Department of Defense providing that the Phase I study now under way confirms the technical feasibility and desirability of the system. 

The further review of the Titan I11 by the group did not result in the introduction of 

any additional factual evidence either for or against the prior recommendation. Thus, the 

arguments outlined above in favor of Titan 111 suggest again the recommendation to proceed with development of the vehicle should the Phase I study confirm the technical feasi bility. 

3. Saturn Upper Stage 

Recommendation: Develop the S-ZVB stage as promptly as possible using it as an alternate 

stage for the 5-ZV in the Saturn GI. This stage is necessary fw the Class B vehicle recommended and 

its combination with the S-Z stage (A-2 vehicle) will constitute another potential Class A vehicle. 

[11-31 An examination of the various Class B vehicles considered shows that all of the interesting versions have as their third stage the SIVB which is powered by one 5-2 engine. In 

view of its almost certain use in Class B vehicles it is considered extremely desirable that 

plans be made for early flight tests of the SIVB on the SI stage in order to build up its 

reliability as rapidly as possible. 

4. Class 13 Launch Vehicle 

Recommendation: Develop as promptly as possible a Class B vehicle (B-8, B-10, or B-15) consisting of a four orjive F-1 enginefirst stage, a four orfive J-2 engine second stage and a one J-2 engine 

third stage (S-IVB). This vehicle should be designed for use as a twestage vehicle for low earth orbit 

missions and a threestage vehicle for escape missions m'th a minimum perfmance capability of 

1 SO, 000 pounds in a low earth orbit and 70,000 pounds to escape. 

It is felt that a Class B vehicle can be developed with relatively little delay and that this 

development should be pursued with the highest priority. This conclusion results from 

recognition that both earth orbit rendezvous and lunar orbit rendezvous are attractive 

mission concepts and that they can be achieved with Class B vehicles. Furthermore, lunar 

orbit rendezvous offers the chance of the earliest accomplishment of manned lunar landing. It is quite likely that the pacing item for any rendezvous approach is development of 

the Class B vehicles, hence the high degree of urgency recommended. 

5. Use of Solid Motors in Class B Launch Vehicles 

Recommendation: The design of the second and third stages of the Class B vehicle recommended (B-8, B-10, or B-15) should, if practicable, provide potential for economical and early sub 

stitution of a solid motorjirst stage for the four or five F-1 engine first stage. Substitution of such a 

solid motor stage may permit the construction of a vehicle (B-5 or B-14) of comparable but somewhat 

lower capability than the recommended all-liquid Class B vehicle. 

[I141 The group examined the question as to whether a solid first stage should be developed for the Class B vehicle in parallel with the recommended liquid first stage. It was considered that while LOX/RF' is a familiar propellant combination and the F-1 engine 

appears to be progressing satisfactorily thus far, there is considerable merit in a backup 

development that exploits large solid rocket motors. This is particularly the case if the 

manned lunar landing program is to be considered a high priority program aimed at 

accomplishing the mission at the earliest possible date. Therefore, it was recommended 

that the upper stages of the all-liquid Class B vehicle should be designed for possible substitution of a solid first stage. Such a solid first stage vehicle appears to be attractive in 

terms of a low cost, high reliability and operational simplicity if there are sufficient continuing needs for Class B vehicles in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 325 

6. Rendezvous Operations Techniques 

Recommendation: A major enginem’ngeffort should be made to develop rendezvous operations 

techniques in both earth and lunar orbits as possible approachesfor accomplishing the manned lunar 

landing mission at the earliest possible date. 

The Class B vehicle required for manned lunar landing by rendezvous operations will 

be available earlier than the Class C vehicle necessary to carry out the mission by direct 

ascent. Thus, if the development of rendezvous operations are not the pacing item, use of 

the Class B vehicle offers the earliest possibility of a manned lunar landing. 

It is therefore important to determine the feasibility of rendezvous at the earliest 

possible date. Accordingly, efforts should be initiated as soon as possible to develop techniques for both earth and lunar orbital rendezvous. A detailed discussion of these 

rendezvous techniques is included in Chapter VI, Volume 111. 

[II-5] 7. Class C Launch Vehicles 

Recommendation: Since it is by no means certain that the development of rendezvous operations will advance rapidly enough to provide earliest accomplishment of manned lunar landing, it is 

recommended that the direct ascent capability be developed on a concurrent basis. 

For that purpose the following specific steps are recommended: 

a. On a concurrent and urgent basis a thorough engineering analysis should be 

made of attractive Class C vehicles (C11, C-16, C-20, C-24, C-25), their constituent building blocks and other related possible configurations to enable 

selection of the most desirable NOVA vehicle for manned lunar landing. 

b. The large solid rocket motor and the large hydrogen/oxygen engine development also recommended should be pursued in a manner that will permit 

their potential use in a NOVA configuration for planetary missions. 

The group felt that a Class C vehicle program must be carried forward on an urgent 

basis and concurrent with development of orbital rendezvous. Nevertheless, the group 

also felt that initiation of Class C stage and vehicle development at this time was inappropriate because of the lack of sufficient information to select a specific Class C vehicle. 

The initial step that the group felt should be taken is to analyze in detail the potential Class G vehicles. This analysis should take into consideration the large solid motors, 

the M-1 engine, and the stages of the recommended Class B vehicle (J3-8, J3-10, J3-15) that 

would potentially be available as building blocks. It was also considered important to study 

in greater depth the technical problems and schedule implications involved in producing 

very large solid motors. 

8. Large Liquid Hydrogen Enginefor Class C Launch Vehicles 

Recommendation: Initiate promptly the deuelopment of a hydrogen-oxygen engine having a 

nominal thrust of 1.5 million pounds. 

[11-61 Studies made by the group to date do not support a specific thrust level recommendation at this time but do suggest that a level above 1.2 million pounds is necessary 

to provide for follow-up programs after a manned lunar landing. 

Although it had been concluded that insufficient information was available to initiate 

development of a specific Class G vehicle it was recommended by the group that development be initiated or continued on certain components of attractive Class G vehicles 

that might prove useful in the development of a Class G vehicle. One such component on 

which the group felt development should be initiated was a large hydrogen-oxygen 

engine, the M-1. 

9. Large Solid Motors for Class C Vehicles 

Recommendation: Initiate promptly a program aimed at the development and production of 

solid propellant motors up to 300 inches in diameter and 3,000,000pounds in weight. The program 

should be associated initially with a thorough study of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
326 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

segmented type assembly, with particular attention given to clustered motor configurations. 

Emphasis in the initial phase of the program should be to produce an early test firing 

of a unitized motor of at least 240-inch diameter and to utilize to a maximum the existing 

solid motor facilities for the development of 156-inch diameter segmented motors for test 

firing as promptly as possible. This solid motor program should be conducted concurrently with development of the Class C liquid propellant vehicle. 

The effort should be incrementally funded so as to reduce the total funds that must 

be committed before definitive engineering information is available on the suitability of 

large solid motors of various dimensions and before the requirements are established for 

the number of motors needed in each size class. These recommendations are made in full 

awareness of the fact that a new facility on water for case fabrication, propellant mixing, 

casting and curing and for static firing purposes must be committed at the beginning of 

this development effort. 

[11-71 10. Launch Facilities 

Recommendation: The following launch complex plans should be implemented: 

a. The complex for the Saturn GI should be built so that it is compatible for use with the 

SI and S-NB stage versions of Saturn (A-2). 

b. Develop an Integra&-Transfe-Launch (ITL) complex for solid-boosted Class A vehicles. 

c. Construct an ITL complex to handle the all-liquid Class B uehicle (B-8, B-10, or B-15) 

and initiate the A and E work necessary to pennit use of the complex for launch of a 

solid-boosted Class B vehicle (B-5 or R14). 

d. Initiate A and E studies on a Class C vehick launch complex designed to accommodate 

either liquid ar solid first stage boosters and .using all or part of the ITL concept. 

Consideration has been given to the launch facilities required for all three vehicle 

classes. In general, where new facilities are to be constructed, the group favors an ITL type 

complex. This type of complex provides for an integration building near, but not on, the 

launch pad in which the launch vehicle and spacecraft integration and checkout are performed. After completing the checkout, the vehicle is moved to the pad, where it is fueled 

and launched. By utilizing this technique, the on-pad time can be cut drastically and overall cost reduced while high launch rates are simultaneously achieved. 

For Class A vehicles it is clear that the Saturn configuration should be launched from 

the existing pad and others of similar design. An ITL is not worthwhile for these vehicles 

because of the urgent program schedule. On the other hand, for a workhorse Class Avehicle, which would have a solid first stage, the ITL concept should be used. 

[11-81 B. Discussion of Recommendations 

The basis for the principal recommendation, briefly discussed above are [sic] amplified in the following paragraphs. 

1. Class A Vehicles 

Considerations of the group relating to the Class A vehicles led to a study in some 

detail of the reasons for supporting development of a Titan 111-C vehicle in addition to the 

Saturn C-1. It was projected that during this decade there would be over 200 missions, 

largely for DOD, in which 12,000 to 30,000-pound payloads will be required in low earth 

orbit. In addition to the Titan 111-C there are two versions of the Saturn that have this payload capability. These vehicles are the Saturn C-1 and a possible variation of Saturn (A-2) 

using the S1 and the SM3 stages. The Saturn C-1 is already in the National Launch 

Vehicle Program and the A-2 version of Saturn was recommended to provide early flight 

development of the SM3 stage. 

Although the two versions of Saturn have performance capabilities that are comparable or superior to the Titan 111-C, the Saturns are likely to have a somewhat higher cost; 

they do not have the militarily desirable feature of employing solid and storable propel- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 327 

lants, which permit fast reaction times, or, stated differently, permit long waiting periods 

on-pad; and they do not contribute to the development of large solid motor technology. 

On the other hand, the two Saturn vehicles appear to offer more growth capability than 

members of the Titan I11 family for a general program of space exploration. In this regard 

the Saturn permits larger diameter payloads than the Titan 111-C. The Saturn can accommodate payloads of up to 20 feet in diameter, which also makes them suitable for launching a nuclear stage. This will be an important advantage if it is eventually desirable to use 

them for the development of such stages or to provide increased payload capabilities for 

future missions by the use of a nuclear upper stage. It was after weighing these factors that 

the LLVPG recommended that the Saturn C-1, which is scheduled for use in Apollo 

manned orbital flights prior to completion of Titan 111 development, should be improved 

(Recommendation 1) for the purpose of its continued use in support [11-91 of Apollo. 

Furthermore, the Titan I11 should be developed primarily for support of other scientific 

and military missions (Recommendation 2). 

In considering the Titan I11 vehicle family it was noted that the Titan 111-A and the 

Titan 111-B, which are closely associated with the Titan 111-C development, have payload 

capabilities that can he provided by the second generation Centaur on an Atlas. There 

was, therefore, some question as to whether the Titan Ill-A and 111-B should be developed. 

However, development of the Titan B1 family will enable the economical introduction of 

the Titan 111-A and 111-1s; also those versions of Titan 111 will serve as backup to cryogenic 

based boosters or as a substitution for them in cases where fast reaction time is needed. 

2. Class B Vehicles 

In connection with the development of the Class B vehicle, it was recommended that 

development of the upper stage, the SIVB stage, be initiated immediately with a view 

toward flight testing it on an S1 stage (Recommendation 3). This procedure would insure 

most rapid development of the Class B vehicle. 

The Class B vehicle recommended (Recommendation 4) will provide a minimum payload capability of 180,000 pounds in low earth orbit and 70,000 pounds to lunar escape 

velocity. This capability is sufficient to enable manned circumlunar flight using the Apollo 

spacecraft and with a single rendezvous operation in earth orbit, to perform the manned 

lunar landing mission. It was strongly recommended that the rendezvous approach be 

pursued vigorously. 

An item that received particular attention with relation to the Class B vehicles was 

whether a large solid rocket motor should be developed in parallel or as backup to the liquid first stage booster. Two configurations were examined, both of which utilized 156-inch 

diameter solids on the first stage and 5-2 engines on the second and third stages. 

[11-101 It was concluded that a vehicle such as these might be attractive in terms of low 

cost high reliability and operational simplicity if there are sufficient continuing needs for 

Class B vehicles in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (Recommendation 5). By reducing the 

size of the solid motor first stage and thus significantly reducing vehicle cost, a useful vehicle can be provided that will cover the payload range between 30,000 and 180,000 pounds 

in a low earth orbit. While the total cost of the solid motor rocket development program 

cannot be justified on the basis of this application alone, there are other applications for 

solid motors in the development of Class C vehicles. 

3. Class C Vehicles 

The principal reason for recommending development of direct ascent capability concurrently with rendezvous, and thus the development of a Class C vehicle was so that success of the manned lunar landing mission is not solely dependent on the timely success of 

rendezvous techniques (Recommendation 7). It is also important to recognize that the 
328 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

national space program should be projected beyond the initial manned lunar explorations to the problems of a more thorough exploration of the moon, possible establishment of a moon base and the initiation of a manned planetary exploration program. 

Aside from the obvious direct importance of early attainment of US. capability for planetary exploration there is also the consideration that failure to develop a Class C vehicle 

at an early date could, if our rendezvous capability is delayed, leave this country in a particularly difficult posture if the USSR should be first to achieve a successful manned lunar 

landing. 

After reviewing the various configurations for the Class C or NOVA vehicle it was concluded that insufficient information exists to permit selection of a specific NOVA configuration to be developed or to support a recommendation that development of a specific 

stage be initiated. It was felt that more must be known about the performance and design 

feasibility of the various vehicles considered and about the development risk of such 

important elements as the very large solid rocket motors. Another consideration was 

recognition of the cost and management difficulties of undertaking development of a 

Class IS and C vehicle simultaneously and with equal urgency. 

[11-111 The best approach appeared to he initiation and continuation of component 

development which may be applicable to the NOVA vehicle. It would also be desirable to 

intensify detailed engineering studies of the most promising Class C configurations. One 

component that should be developed is the large hydrogen/oxygen engine, the M-1, 

which is visualized as having a thrust between 1 and 2 million pounds (Recommendation 

8). Such an engine could replace the five 5-2 engines of the SI1 stage with a single engine. 

It would also permit the design of two or four engine stages considerably larger than the 

present SI1 stage, thus providing greater payload capability. 

The other major component possibly useful for NOVA class vehicles is a very large 

solid motor, and thus the recommendation that development be initiated on solid motors 

up to 300 inches in diameter and weighing up to 3,000,000 pounds (Recommendation 9). 

From the study of the various vehicle configurations it appears possible to make a Class C 

vehicle by clustering 4 to 10 solid motors in the first stage on top ofwhich would be placed 

a complete Class B all-liquid vehicle (EM, B10, or B15). The Class B vehicle would 

require suitable modifications to the first stage to provide for altitude starting of the F1 

engine and increased strength to withstand the structural loads that it would experience 

as a second stage. If such a vehicle is not feasible, two other approaches are offered. One 

is to be a cluster of solids for the first stage and new upper stages based on the M-1 and 

5-2 engines (G16 and G21). The other approach is to make an all-liquid vehicle with all 

of the stages different from those of the Class B vehicle. The C-11 is an example of such a 

vehicle . 

The development of large solid rocket motors was examined quite thoroughly by the 

group. Of course, the generally claimed advantages of solids are high reliability, low cost, 

and short development time. The group, however, found it very difficult to establish any 

clear superiority in reliability or development time for the solid over the liquid rocket 

booster. From the standpoint of cost, the solid motors appear relatively most attractive in 

the Class A vehicles, less attractive in the Class B, and least attractive in the Class C. Since 

the Class Avehicles require smaller diameter solids [11-121 (100 to 120 inches), which present the least development risk and earliest availability, the group favors the development 

of a solid first stage Class A vehicle as a workhorse. A solid first stage Class B vehicle 

appears attractive from the viewpoint of operating convenience, cost and perhaps reliability (based on the use of 156-inch diameter clustered solids). However, this vehicle is not 

sufficiently attractive in itself to justify development of solid motors larger than 120 inches in diameter. For Class C vehicles, the 240 to 280-inch diameter solids are considered the 
EXPLOFUNC THE UNKNOWN 329 

most attractive size. 

If solid motors are selected for use in large vehicles, it therefore appears that the two 

most attractive sizes are 156 and 240-inch diameter. The 156-inch diameter motors are 

favored because, if segmented, they can be fabricated, tested and shipped with presently 

existing facilities and transportation methods. The basic factor limiting the size of a segmented motor is the limit for railroad transportation. Present manufacturing facilities 

permit research and development motors to be made in the 156-inch diameter size but 

they are inadequate to supply production quantities. Development of the capacity to supply production demands for this size motor would require a new propellant mixing, casting and curing plant. One unattractive feature of the 156-inch diameter motor is the fact 

that as many as 7 to 10 motors must be clustered together to provide the first stage of a 

Class C vehicle. This means that the reliability of each motor must be very high and of 

each segment even higher if the over-all stage reliability is to be satisfactory. 

The advantage of going to larger diameter solid motors, those in the range of 240 to 

280-inch diameter, is that only a few motors need be clustered in the vehicle first stage. 

For example, four motors of this size appear to be adequate for the first stage of a Class C 

vehicle. Fewer motors favor higher stage reliability and also simplify the intrastage structural design and vehicle bending load analysis. 

There are three principal disadvantages of the larger motors. The first is that a greater 

chance exists for the occurrence of developmental problems, although at this time no 

such problems can be identified by scaling [11-131 analysis. The second disadvantage is 

that production of even the early test motors must await construction of new plant facilities. In order to facilitate transportation to the launch site such facilities should be located on navigable waterways. Thus, it would require from 6 to 18 months longer to develop 

these motors than those of 156-inch diameter. Finally, such large motors, particularly if 

unitized, are extremely heavy, weighing about 2,500,000 pounds. Thus, new problems in 

handling, transportation and assembly must be faced. 

Whether large solid motors will actually provide the advantages of early availability, 

flexibility of configuration, simplicity of operation and high reliability in Class C vehicles 

cannot yet be predicted with any assurance. However, the importance of developing a 

Class C vehicle at the earliest possible date is so great that initiation ofa large solid motor 

program, including development of integrated motors up to 300-inch diameter, is called 

for. Furthermore, the design studies of various Class C vehicles with solid propellant first 

stages should be intensified. It is felt that such an effort will insure availability of a Class C 

vehicle at the earliest possible date with a relatively modest additional development effort. 

In connection with the possibility of using large solid motors, a NOVA vehicle comprised of all solid stages was considered. The most carefully investigated vehicle in this 

class was conceived by the Jet Propulsion laboratory and proposed for the manned lunar 

landing program in JPL-TM33-52, “A Solid Propellant Nova Injection Vehicle System,” 3 

August 1961. The report proposed a four-stage vehicle consisting entirely of solid propellant motors with a liftoff gross weight of 25,000,000 pounds, and an estimated capability 

of’ placing 130,000 pounds in a lunar escape trajectory. This design was considered sufficiently interesting to warrant careful review by qualified and disinterested organizations. 

Accordingly, it was requested that Space Technology Laboratories and the Boeing 

Company review the JPL report. After completion of these studies, the group arrived at 

the conclusion that the all-solid NOVA development constituted a very high risk program 

and thus should not receive further consideration. 

[11-141 4. Future Decisions 

There are three major future program decisions that are implied by the conclusions 

and recommendations of the group. These are: 
330 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

a. Whether or not the SI stage - SIVB stage version of Saturn, which is recommended to provide early flight testing of the SIVB stage, should be fully 

developed as another Class A vehicle. 

b. Selection of the Class C or NOVA vehicle design. 

c. Establishment of the diameter and other pertinent specifications of the large 

solid rocket motors to be developed, and definition of the stages in which the 

large solids are to be used. 

Replacing the S-IV stage of the Saturn G1 with the SIVB stage will provide a substantial increase in performance capability. In addition, the single engine of the SIVB stage 

offers the potential for greater ultimate reliability than does the six engine SIV stage. 

Even though the SIVB stage is successfully flown on an SI stage for test purposes, considerable additional design and development effort would be required to fully develop 

such a vehicle for operational use. Therefore, the decision as to whether the development 

of such a vehicle should proceed must be based on the degree of success achieved in 

developing the Saturn C-1 and the Titan I11 and on their ability to fulfill the mission 

requirements for Class A vehicles. 

The decisions on the Class C vehicle design and the selection of the large solids to be 

developed can interact strongly. The first opportunity for a decision on Class C vehicle 

configurations will occur when the recommended design studies are completed in about 

mid-1962. Probably a better decision can be made if it is postponed until late 1962, by 

which time significantly more should be known about the performance of the F-1, the 

5-2, the cluster of eight H-1 engines in the $1 stage, and about 15Ginch diameter solid 

motors. More may also be known about the feasibility of orbital operations. If the solid 

motor development program and stage engineering studies [II-14] proceed as recommended, probably no appreciable time will be lost in the Class C vehicle operational date 

by delaying the configuration decision for a year. This viewpoint is based on the premise 

that the final configuration selected would use a large solid motor first stage and the modified upper stages of the Class B vehicle based on the M-1 engine. If the configuration chosen is the all-liquid Class C vehicle (G1 1) , some time will probably have been lost. 

If the solid motor diameter decision is not made as part of the vehicle configuration 

choice, but is kept open among 156, 240 and 280-inch or greater, it will probably be an 

additional six months to a year before enough is known from actual tests of the large solid 

motors to enable selection of a diameter with confidence. 

[111-I] 111. Supplemental Recommendations 

In addition to the primary recommendations there were several supplementary recommendations made by the group. One subject of particular importance, which NASA 

requested the group to consider at the end of its study efforts, was a possible launch vehicle for the Gemini spacecraft. Other supplementary considerations and recommendations concern largely technical problems which stand out as requiring further detailed 

study to maximize vehicle system usefulness and to minimize time and costs. These supplemental recommendations of the group are summarized in the following paragraphs. 

A. Supplemental Launch Vehicle fw NASA’s Gemini Program 

Recommendation: A minimum modification version of the Titan 11 ballistic missile should be 

used for the Gemini program. 

In the studies of launch vehicle requirements for Gemini it was found that there were 

four alternative vehicles that might be used. These four vehicles are the Titan 11, Titan 

11-1/2, Titan IIIAJ, and the Saturn C-1. The development schedule indicates that the Titan 

IIIAJ will not be available until a year later than the two versions of the Titan 11. In addition the need for all of the Saturn C-1 vehicles scheduled for production to support the 

Apollo program, as well as launch facility scheduling problems associated with an 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 331 

increased Saturn G1 launch rate, indicate that consideration of this vehicle is purely academic, since it would not be available for use in the Gemini program. Thus the only useful alternatives are the Titan I1 and Titan 11-1/2. The principal difference between these 

two vehicles is that the Titan II-1/2 provides subsystem redundancy leading ultimately to 

higher reliability but with a penalty in payload weight. 

Since the performance differences between these two vehicle configurations are not 

striking. vehicle reliability and development schedules were the areas of consideration in 

making a choice between them. Safety of the crew will be insured by malfunction detection and abort systems in either vehicle. Thus the greater reliability offered by additional 

redundancy of the Titan 11-1/2 is a factor that can be supported principally as a need on 

the basis [I1191 of launch vehicle economy. However, the initial planning of the Gemini 

program calls for only about 18 flights and the Titan I1 will have attained a reasonable reliability by the time this program begins. Therefore, little weight can he given to possible 

economic gains that might be realized with the Titan 11-1/2. In addition, the inherent 

uncertainties in reliability estimates as well as uncertainties in projected reliability growth 

during the brief life span of the Gemini program suggest that even the economic arguments based on greater reliability of Titan 11-1/2 may not be well founded. 

Other major factors that were weighed in determining the relative suitability of these 

two vehicles are: (1) availability in 15 to 18 months after program go-ahead; (2) the degree 

to which either may interfere with DOD programs; and (3) relative cost. 

Considering the many factors pertinent to a choice between these two vehicles, it was 

the judgment of the group that use of the Titan I1 ICBM with minimum modifications in 

the Gemini program would provide greatest assurance of timely availability of a vehicle 

that has adequate reliability and performance, best utilization of DOD engineering and 

management resources associated with the Titan I1 weapon system, and minimum vehicle 

cost for the program. 

B. Reliability and Reliability Growth 

Recommendation: A vigorous theoretical study and experimental program must be implemented to determine the degree to which redundanq engine-out and manned monitming and control should be used in each vehicle and subsystem. The LLWG believes that, in the size booster vehicles considered for the Apollo missions, it is practical and desirable to use such techniques to a far 

greater extent than was possible in previous booster systems. 

The reliability to be expected in early flights of vehicles used for the manned lunar 

landing program has an extremely important bearing on the time required to accomplish 

the mission and on the cost of the over-all program. In addition, reliability will have an 

effect on crew safety and on the [I1131 possibility of program stretch-out or cancellation. 

Indeed, it might be said that the chances of being first to the moon are very small indeed, 

unless a significant step forward can be made in obtaining high reliability earlier in the 

life of the vehicles than has been experienced to date. 

From an examination of the results of the calculation of mis3ion success data analyzed 

by the LLWG, it was found that it would take two to three years of flight test and about 

25 to 60 launchings to man-rate a Class B or C vehicle using the reliability growth estimates 

of this study. As previously indicated, it is important to note that “man-rate,’’ as used in this 

entire study, refers to a vehicle having an absolute reliability of 50 percent or more. This 

level of reliability should not be confused with “man-safety’’ which is sought to be maintained at a relatively much higher level by providing abort subsystems for crew escape in 

case of catastrophic malfunction. 

If a significant improvement in early reliability were achieved, the date for mission 

accomplishment could be advanced about a year. In addition, 20 to 30 flight vehicles 

could be eliminated from the program at a cost savings of the order of one billion dollars. 
332 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

The reliability growth curves used in the analysis were based on past experience primarily with ballistic missiles and space adaptations thereof. The data from previous flight 

test programs were smoothed and interpreted in terms of the number of such systems, 

stages, restarts, etc., involved, and in terms of the number of redundant and nonredundant elements such as engines, thrust vector control systems and the like. The fundamental assumption underlying the argument is: It will be possible to obtain about the 

same early reliability on an absolute basis with the new, large launch vehicles as we have 

done in the past on smaller, primarily ballistic, missiles (Atlas, Titan, Thor, Jupiter, 

Polaris). 

It could be argued that the reliability growth should be much better because so much 

has been learned from past failures and mistakes, and because weight and performance 

are not quite as critical as they were for such vehicles as the Atlas. Conversely, it could be 

argued that the reliability growth will be [I1141 worse because of the greatly increased size 

of these new vehicles, the use of a new propellant (hydrogen), the clustering of 4,5, and 

even 8 liquid engines per stage, and the simultaneous development of so many large 

stages and multi-stage vehicles by the same organization. In the group’s deliberations it 

was agreed that these two sides of the argumentjust about offset one another and that reliability growth about equal to that of past vehicle development programs might reasonably 

be expected. Nevertheless, it was recognized that there is a very wide range of uncertainty in reliability growth projections. 

It is important to examine very carefully the question as to whether, and how it might 

be possible, to improve significantly the reliability growth rate of the new vehicles to be 

developed. In order to be somewhat more specific about the major problems, the LLVPG 

had specific studies made in the technical areas of redundancy, the role of man in complex systems, and engine-out capability. 

C. filiabilig Budgeting 

Recommendation: The iterative use of the “reliability budget” during the design phase is prob 

ably the most practical means of achieving an optimum approach in reliability engineering of complex systems. 

Because of the large number of stages involved in the total lunar mission, the requirement for a much higher level of redundancy should be anticipated than has been normal 

in the past. This redundancy will vary from conservative design margins and state-of-theart engineering to the use of completely redundant subsystems in some cases. The 

iterative use of reliability budgeting provides a basis for establishing the amount of redundancy to be employed in a given system or subsystem. 

Reliability budgeting is a general approach toward reliability which has been used on 

some programs and which can be extended and improved for application to the manned 

lunar landing program. It is an iterative approach which must be run repeatedly until the 

design converges or is frozen for other reasons. Underlying the whole process is a recognition and an acceptance of the fact that there are gains to be made by the judicious 

employment of [111-51 redundancy but that such employment in no way diminishes the 

need for a sound analytical approach to design. 

The process of reliability budgeting begins with the system engineer. The first step is 

for the system engineer to block out the total system design and translate it into a reliability budget. Each subsystem is assigned a level of reliability which in combination with 

those of the other subsystems will produce the desired system reliability. Where the 

assumed reliability is not feasible with the simplest system configuration, redundancy is 

added judiciously until it is attained. Costs and schedules must be evaluated in parallel to 

assist in weighing the merits of the particular design choice. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 333 

The reliability budgeting task is then given to the subsystem designer who carries 

through the same processes for his subsystem against the assigned reliability target given 

to him by the system engineer. Should the subsystem designer find the reliability target 

impossible to meet, even with optimum redundancy, he must obtain a new target from the 

system engineer, thus requiring that the system engineer rebudget the reliability requirements among the various subsystems. Conversely, if the subsystem designer finds ways of 

obtaining reliability higher than the target value, the system engineer can likewise take 

this information into account together with the cost and schedule implications to rebudget his reliability among the various subsystems. 

By carrying this process on through to the lowest level of component design and by 

maintaining the over-all design relatively fluid in its early stages and freezing it as late as 

possible, the maximum number of iterations can be made and thus the optimum use of 

redundancy can best be approached. 

D. The Role of Man in System Operation 

Recommendation: It is recommended that prompt sttps be taken to initiate further detailed 

studies concerning the role of man in system operation employing welldefnitized systems and subsystems of the launch vehicles intended to be used for future manned missions. Furthermore, launch vehicle system designs compatible with crew participation in vehicle control, but not solely dependent on 

it, should be investigated in detail. It would be desirable [IIId] for these studies to be conducted by 

organizations having experience and capability in th manned aircrajl and missile design feu. 

The problem which is of concern here is the establishment of the role of the flight 

crew during the launch phase of manned flight operations. That is, whether the crew 

should be given an active role in the control and management of the launch vehicle systems or whether they should maintain a completely passive role with all functions being 

programmed automatically. Because of man’s inherent ability to perceive, reason, and 

judge in even unrehearsed situations, it is believed that the idea of a completely passive 

role for the crew is unreasonable. 

There are several modes of manned participation which could be considered, namely: 

a. Direct control 

b. Monitor, switching, and override 

c. Monitor, adjustment, and maintenance 

The direct control mode would provide the crew with the primary path for control 

inputs to the given system in much the same manner as our present day aircraft are 

designed. In this mode, the automatic controls would be provided for crew convenience 

for use during reasonably uneventful periods. The second mode-monitor, switching, and 

override-would provide the crew with a generally subordinate control approach with the 

option for primary control. In this mode, the crew would normally monitor a system and, 

in the event of some malfunction, they could exercise direct control by manually switching to a redundant system or by manually overriding the automatic system. The third 

mode provides for the lowest degree of crew participation. In this mode, the crew would 

monitor certain function displays and would make only minor adjustments, such as gain 

settings, gyro realignment, etc. In addition, the crew could perform certain maintenance 

functions, such as changing fuses and small components. 

[111-71 Of the three modes of participation cited, it is believed that the direct control 

mode is probably too drastic in view of our present, very limited experience in this area. 

On the other hand, some real gains in the over-all reliability, or mission success achievement, are likely to be made by the judicious adoption of the second and third modes of 

crew participation for certain launch vehicle systems. 
334 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

After reviewing this problem and the various possible approaches, the following general conclusions were reached: 

a. From an environmental standpoint, no evidence exists indicating that the 

vehicle control task cannot be handled by man as an integral control element. 

b. Considerable evidence exists to show that man, having been given adequate 

instrumentation and training, has the capability of successfully completing 

booster trajectory control during launch. 

c. It is believed that appreciable gains in mission success can be achieved 

through crew participation, particularly during the early development stages, 

where the demonstrated reliability of launch vehicles is generally quite low. 

In the light of the foregoing, it is believed that the role of the spacecraft crew should he 

one of active participation during the launch phase of flight. The exact degree of crew participation cannot, of course, be definitely specified at this time. However, available evidence 

suggests that the crew should be provided with more than merely monitor capability. 

E. Engine-Out Capability 

Conclusion: While engine-out capability appears attractive on the basis of the engine and control system redundancy considerations, a detailed enginem’ng study of the implications on the remainingportions of the vehicle system is required. 

1. Perfwmance Degradation Versus Reliability Increase 

The LLWG has made some estimates of the losses in payload that would result from 

stage designs with engine-out capability. The major points revealed by this study are as follows: 

a. For a given number of engines, the performance loss with one engine out is 

about one half as great in a second stage as in a first stage. 

b. Engine-out performance loss is serious in the first stage, particularly if the 

number of engines is small (four or five compared to eight) and engine shutdown occurs early in the stage burning time. 

c. Engine-out penalties in first and second stages are a non-linear function of 

time; one engine shutdown at the halfway point results in about one-fourth 

to one-fifth as much performance loss as when the engine shutdown occurs 

just after ignition. 

d. Operation with an engine out does not result in a significant performance 

loss in a third (escape) stage. 

These performance degradation results are based upon reasonably well-designed 

vehicles and therefore should not be assumed as applying to off-optimum or unique vehicle designs. 

Another approach to engine-out redundancy would be to add extra or spare engines. 

The performance loss for the Saturn G4 class vehicles using such an approach has been 

examined and found to be acceptably low. It would be possible to design a stage carrying 

a true spare engine which would not be started unless required; however, this “delay-untilneeded” design philosophy would appear undesirable in the lower stages. 

Preliminary analyses of the over-all problem by the LLWG has led to the 

following stage-by-stage design philosophy: 

a. First Stage-the design should probably be based upon hold-down and 

engine-out. One engine out in this stage could extend to two if a large number of unreliable engines are used. Similarly, if a stage [111-91 contains a small 

number of very reliable engines, the engine-out design approach should not 

be used. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOMTN 335 

All engines should be started before liftoff and should be able to operate 

through the thrust/weight instability and high q regions. The use of holddown aids the reliability since over one-half (68 per cent) of the engine failures occur in the first few seconds of engine operation. 

b. Second Stage-all engines in this stage should be started. The q problem is 

not important in this stage since staging occurs at a very high altitude. 

Engine-out capability should be provided for in all multiple engine stages. 

The performance reliability “map” is attractive in this stage since engine-out 

performance losses are about one-half to one-third as severe as in the first 

stage and the improvement in reliability with one engine out capability is 

attractive. 

c. Third Stage-a two-engine stage seems attractive here from a reliability point 

of view. The reliability of a twc-engine stage is typically raised from 0.90 to 

0.95 by the use of one engine redundancy. 

The third stage problem is somewhat unique. First examinations seem to indicate that 

a twoengine system should be used by starting just one engine, with the second engine 

started only if the first should fail. The guidance control problems in the third or higher 

stage, if both engines are initially started, seem to be quite severe. Therefore, the delayuntil-needed approach is suggested. 

2. Effect on Other Systems 

The previous suggestions are based upon considerations of the reliability of engine 

and control systems and their associated failures and performance. For a stage to have 

engine-out capability a number of modifications of other subsystems may be required. 

These modifications will affect system reliability and performance. The autopilot, for 

instance, may be required to have provisions for automatic reprogramming when an 

engine is shut down. Similarly, the control system may be required to have faster [111-IO] 

response and to operate with larger gimbal angles and increased actuation forces. Vehicle 

structure will be subjected to new load distribution which may necessitate a different 

design. The implications of engineaut operation will vary between stage designs. It is 

anticipated that, in some cases, significant modification (by present standards) of autopilot and/or structure and control systems will be required to accommodate the engine-out 

feature. Other stages may conceivably require little or no change in these systems. 

F. Automatic Vehicle Checkout and Countdown Considerations 

Conclusion: The significance of the considerations concerning automatic checkout and countdown of vehicles is twofold: 

a. A most intimate relationship is needed among design m’ta’a of the vehicle and its sub 

systems, of ground support equipment and the launch complex of the spacecraJ, its 

propulsion and other subsystas, and of the payload. The extent of this relationship, 

and the amount of pqlanning needed cannot be fulb envisioned at this time. 

b. The necessity to standardize specifications of interrelated components will require a level 

of systems engineering, both in comprehensiveness and in detail, far surpassing in complexity previous technological undertakings of any kind. 

Among the factors strongly influencing the probability of mission success is the efficacy of checkout procedures used just prior to launch. The checkout procedures may 

require the testing of all essential components, subsystems and systems and thus involve 

measurement of up to 1500 functions in research and development vehicles. The concept 

of automatic checkout has been advanced primarily for two reasons: (1) to reduce the 

amount of time required in using launch facilities; and (2) to enhance the reliability of 

the entire checkout operation. 
336 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

No figures can be quoted on time savings or operational vehicle reliability improvements achievable with automatic checkout procedures, since numbers and types of measurements, amount of data processing, manner of [111-111 presentation and use of 

processed data are not currently defined. It has been estimated, however, that manual 

operations for a large vehicle might require two to three weeks as contrasted with three 

days for an automatic system. 

The employment of automatic checkout equipment will require a high level of 

advance planning effectiveness and good over-all system engineering, in the following 

areas: 

Even with effective preplanning, 30 to 40 flights may be needed to perfect the launch 

vehicle automatic checkout system. It is possible that the spacecraft checkout system can 

be perfected in fewer flights, since it is in some ways less complex than the vehicle system, 

but this implies extensive systems engineering coordination at the earliest stages between 

spacecraft and vehicle contractors. In this view, conceptual separation between spacecraft 

and launch vehicles is largely artificial and has significance or convenience principally for 

administrative rather than substantive engineering purposes. 

The difference between automatic checkout of solid and liquid motors is not entirely clear due to unknowns affecting solid motor design and assembly. Checkout procedure 

on solid motors may be shorter and less complex but the [111-123 loading process may be 

longer, since by some estimates the motors must be perhaps assembled at the launch area 

instead of the assembly area. The estimated installation and checkout time required for 

solids may be as long as several weeks. There is little doubt, however, that the advantages 

of automatic checkout will be required for solids as well as liquids. 

The high level of design unification which will be required for the launch vehicle, 

ground support equipment and launch complex must also be extended to include the 

spacecraft and all of its essential subsystems. Since the demands on the crew in flight 

should be minimized, the spacecraft system must incorporate design provisions permitting not only automatic checkout on demand but also containing continuous reliability 

and damage assessment checks. These checkout provisions must naturally be compatible 

with the ground-based launching checkout system. In addition, limited but effective and 

compatible provisions must be included for in-flight maintenance, based on modular 

design, at least for those components with the lowest reliability and for those most subject 

to in-flight damage. 

a. Design criteria of the vehicle, the ground support equipment and the launch 

complex must contain automatic checkout requirements so that the automatic checkout concept is extended back to, and properly accounted for, at 

the stage and subsystem manufacturing level. 

b. Management arrangements between contractors involved in development of 

the vehicle, the ground support equipment and the launch complex. 

c. The planning and stocking of spares, up to and including individual stages. 

d. Equipment modification and change control. The potential conflict between 

research and development or operational changes and automatic checkout 

compatibility requires that the changes be carefully scheduled. 

G. Technical Manpower Requirements 

Recommendation: Because the preliminary study of technical manpower requirements for 

DOD and NASA programs during the reminder of the decade suggests that a potential shortage of 

technical manpower may be in store, becoming critical in CY 64, it is recommended that a more thorough and complete inquiry in this area be initiated by DOD and NASA as expeditiowly as possible. 

It may also be desirable to begin deuelopingplans promptly for appropiate action by DOD and NASA 

in case the d@culties predickd by the LLVPG are confinned 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 337 

In view of the large scale and long duration of the research and development efforts 

needed to accomplish the manned lunar landing mission, and the need to superimpose 

them on the already large and growing requirements of the Department of Defense for 

scientific and technical manpower, a study was undertaken by the group to provide information on whether such [III-13] manpower resources might be a limiting factor to early 

accomplishment of national apace exploration objectives. 

This study compared an estimate of the supply of scientists and engineers for each 

year through 1967 with three estimates of the need for such manpower. The supply for 

any year was computed by beginning with an inventory for 1960 (as reported by the 

National Science Foundation), increasing it by the number of college graduates and nondegree personnel entering the field each year, and decreasing it by losses due to retirement because of age or death and transfers to other fields. 

Three estimates for manpower need were developed in an effort to insure realism in 

the final comparisons of supply with demand. One estimate was based on the projections 

by industry of the ratio of scientists and engineers to total employment, the latter itself 

being estimated from gross national projections. The other two estimates were based on 

building up the total national need for scientists and engineers from estimates of total 

research and development and other dollar expenditures using “experience” ratios for 

numbers of scientists and engineers per million dollars for various types of such expenditures. 

The conclusion of the study is quite clear. No matter what projection of the national 

needs for scientists and engineers is chosen as the probably correct one, the supply does 

not appear adequate; the lowest reasonable estimate of requirements approximates the 

projected supply. This lowest reasonable estimate includes, however, a substantial number 

(many tens of thousands) of scientists and engineers engaged in writing proposals and 

brochures, and in advancing state-of-the-art through engineering overhead, and may, 

therefore, be subject to adjustment if appropriate national policies and implementation 

procedures are developed. 

It is also of interest that the most stringent problem in adjusting demand and supply 

for scientific and technical manpower will probably occur during 1964 if LLWG estimates 

for program growth turn out to be valid. 

Document 11-21 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, 

Secretary of Defense, January 16, 1963. 

Document 11-22 

Document title: James E. Webb, Admiitrator, Memorandum for Dr. Robert Seamans, 

Associate Administrator, January 18, 1963. 

Document 11-23 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, and Robert S. McNamara, 

Secretary of Defense, “Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of Defense Concerning the Gemini Program,” 

January 21, 1963. 
338 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Source: AU in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

As an Earth-orbiting program that would darelop capabilities for in-orbit rendezvous and human 

observation of the Earth from space, the Gemini program was of high interest to the Departmnt of 

Defense as well as the program’s sponsq NASA. In lute 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara, with the support of Presidential Science Advisor Jerm Wiesnq attempted to seize control of the program f;om NASA, or at least share in its management. This initiative set off an intense 

conjlict between NASA and Department of Defense (000) top management. Several documents give 

a sense of the issues at stake. The January 16, 1963, letter from Jams Webb indicates the depth of 

NASA concern, while the January 18 Webb memorandum to Associate Administrator Robert Seamans 

suggests Webb’s desire to find a way to settle the dispute. The January 21 NASA-DOD agreement 

resolved the conflict. NASA would retain management control over the Gemini program, but a joint 

NASA-DOD Program Planning Board would ensure that the program’s activities were responsive to 

DOD’s interests and requirements. Mentioned are Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown, Deputy Director of Defense Research 

and Enginem‘ngJohn H. Rubel, and NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden. 

Document 11-21 

January 16,1963 

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara 

Secretary of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Dear Bob: 

I cannot agree that your proposed version of an agreement would set up management 

arrangements suitable to a national Gemini program. Nor do I consider its basic pattern 

one which can be made acceptable through a series of negotiated changes. 

In the recent discussion in which you, Mr. Gilpatric, Dr. Brown, and Mr. Rubel participated, with Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans and me, I presented in detail the reasons why we 

here in NASA consider it a serious mistake to proceed with any plan to transfer the 

Gemini program to the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense as raised by Dr. 

Wiesner. Following the subsequent receipt of your suggested agreement, Dryden, 

Seamans, and I have consulted with our senior associates involved in the manned space 

flight program. We are unanimous in the view that for us to proceed with the arrangements you suggest would jeopardize our ability to meet our manned lunar landing target 

dates, would disrupt or certainly impair the effectiveness of an organization that is functioning in a magnificent way on a very tight schedule, and would raise a public and 

Congressional storm of protest that the language and intent of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Act of 1958 was being violated. 

The scientific knowledge and technologies we, as a nation, need are being rapidly 

accumulated. An effective capability to continue this activity has been created. It is operating in close co-operation with the military services, and we have recently, through the 

establishment of a Deputy Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs, strengthened our 

effort to make available all that is of use to them. We should not risk this hard-won 

progress. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 339 

The policies we have been following in this agency have been directed toward the 

establishment of a broad national participation by and stimulation of the utilization of 

increased resources in the universities to meet present and future national requirements. 

Similarly, increasingly important programs of international cooperation involving both 

governmental and scientific agencies have been successfully established and are a valuable 

asset to the Nation’s space program, both operationally and scientifically. To mix military 

and civilian activities to the extent proposed would appear to us to have the most serious 

implications for the future success of these important national and international activities. 

Further, the clear and repeated pronouncements which have been made by the 

President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and [2] other leaders concerned with 

space, would be compared here and abroad with the action taken, with the inevitable conclusion drawn that there had been a major change in policy with regard to the objectives 

and purposes of the United States in space activity. Such a conclusion could have a farreaching influence upon this country’s relationships with both the neutral and hostile 

blocs and upon their policies. 

As an alternative to your suggestion, I enclose a brief agreement with an attached suggested plan for increased Air Force participation in Project Gemini. It is about as far as we 

in NASA feel we can go at this time. 

Permit me to close with the suggestion that the agreement I enclose will retain for the 

President a flexible military program including manned space flight, with the ultimate 

growth of that program dependent on the knowledge both NASA and the Department of 

Defense gain as we go along. It facilitates the closest co-operation in obtaining and utilizing this knowledge. The President can as a matter of policy increase this military program 

or decide not to go forward with it. Likewise, the proposed agreement, taken with the program which he is recommending to Congress in his 1964 budget for NASA, gives him a 

civilian program to develop the scientific and technological base for preeminence in 

space with a vigorous program to make the manned lunar landing and the incident gaining of experiences in extended manned space flight on a fast schedule. Here again the 

President retains the flexibility, dependent on the needs of the Nation, for speeding up or 

slowing down the NASA program. To join the DOD and NASA programs in a monolithic 

effort would inevitably cause the total program to be characterized as military with substantial loss of flexibility in our international posture. 

Sincerely yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 11-22 

January 18,1963 

Memorandum for Dr. Seamans-AA 

After thinking overnight about the suggestions made by Secretary McNamara, it 

seems to me that in reality he is coming back with the same pattern ofjoint management. 

I do not see how this is possible under the law. However, I think it is essential that we 

explore every possibility of working with him and retaining his support. Further, we 
340 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

certainly must go into the question very carefully of why he feels he needs a voice in our 

management to be sure we accomplish the things that are required in the interest of the 

Department of Defense. 

Further, it seems to me that when he says he does not know what is going on in these 

programs, we could suggest some way that he could find out and keep abreast without having to actually participate in the decisions. Somehow, we must convince him that we can 

operate this program better as it is now being operated, producing more value for the 

total national interest, including the military, than under any other system, but are perfectly prepared to have any system that helps identify the things that are in the national 

interest and facilitates their accomplishment. 

I got the impression last night that somehow the clause about extending the arrangements we now have about launch vehicles-that neither of us will start another one without a sign-off by the other-to the manned space flight field is of great importance. It may 

be that he feels his situation would be seriously impaired if we should start a manned 

orbiting station, and that he would then be expected to support it as having value for the 

military services. 

On the other hand, I do not see how we can discharge our responsibilities and give 

him a veto over this. We could do it with respect to the launch vehicles because each of us 

was [2] developing some, each of us had authority to develop others, and we needed some 

device to insist on a national program. It may be that there are some elements of this situation in the manned orbital problem, and if so we should explore them with great care. 

It may be that he will tell the Bureau of the Budget what he has not yet told us-his 

real reasons for wanting a jointly-managed effort. 

While I believe the instructions to the Bureau of the Budget should be as I mentioned 

them to Harold Brown-that the last paper drawn by McNamara represents something on 

which he and I would like to try to find agreement, provide there is a basis without 

destroying fundamental values for either of us or impairing the President’s position, 

requirements and responsibilities. I think there are many elements in the draft that do not 

correspond with this. However, it seems to me that some agency experienced in handling 

Presidential problems must put these forward perhaps more forcefully than I have been 

able to do so. 

It seems to me that you, Hugh, and I should bear in mind that we have signed, as you 

said last night, and sent over a paper that truly represents our views. While we want to go 

just as far as we can to meet Mr. McNamara, we must not recede from this position except 

as we reach a settlement that all of us can live with. 

I wonder if Harold Brown would be willing to list what it is they want from Gemini? 

I have no doubt whatever that McNamara is underrating the problems that will be created with Congress if he insists on the participation in our management or that we participate in the management of the development of military equipment such as weapons 

systems. We can contribute a great deal, but when it come [sic] to the actual development, 

this is not our function under the law. 

There is another element which we must consider. Under the proposed arrangement, 

we would lose control of the research which we will do. The basic policy from NACA days 

is that we would determine the research which was necessary, would fund it, and would do 

it. This made us independent of those who wanted us to undertake contract research, but 

of course, we were always [3] sensitive to their needs. I believe this principle is one that 

has made for advance, has given the nation strength, and that even though Mr. McNamara 

does not seem to be able to understand it today, we must not lightly put it aside. After all, 

we do not know how long he or I or any of the principal actors will be on the stage, and 

we must keep a system that others can operate under. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 34 1 

These are just early morning thoughts as I leave for the airport. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 11-23 

[I1 

Agreement 

Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

and the Department of Defense 

Concerning the Gemini Program 

This document defines the policy agreement for arrangements to insure the most 

effective utilization of the GEMINI Program in the national interest. 

1. Objectives of the GEMINI Program - 

The GEMINI Program constitutes a major portion of the current nearearth manned 

space program in the United States. It is the intent of this agreement to assure that the scientific and operational experiments undertaken as a part of the GEMINI Program are 

directed at the objectives and requirements both of the DoD and the NASA manned space 

flight program. 

2. Establishment of the GEMINI Proeram Planning - Board. 

A GEMINI Program Planning Board is hereby established reporting jointly to the 

Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense. The Associate Administrator of 

the NASA and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development will 

serve as Co-Chairmen of the Planning Board. The Board will include two additional representatives of each of the two agencies. Members will be named by the Co-Chairmen and 

approved by the Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense. 

3. Functions of the GEMINI Program - Planning Board 

The Board hereby created is intended to assure that the GEMINI Program is planned, 

executed, and utilized in the over-all national [2] interest, in accordance with policy direction from the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the NASA, so as to avoid 

duplication of effort in the field of manned space flight and to insure maximum attainment of objectives of value to both the NASA and the DoD. The functions of the Board in 

carrying out this responsibility shall include the delineation of NASA and DoD requirements and program monitoring to insure that they are met in: 

1. The planning of experiments. 

2. The actual conduct of flight and in-flight tests. 

3. The analysis and dissemination of results. 

Should actual project plans fail to meet the requirements specified by the Board, or 

should competing requirements produce resource or schedule conflicts, the CoChairmen shall so inform the Administrator of the NASA and the Secretary of Defense. 
342 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

4. GEMINI Project Management - 

NASA will continue to manage the GEMINI project. It is, however, agreed that the 

DoD will participate in the development, pilot training, pre-flight check-out, launch operations and flight operations of the GEMINI Program to assist NASA and to meet the DoD 

objectives. 

5. Funding 

In recognition of its interest in the program, the DoD will contribute funds to assist 

in the attainment of GEMINI Program [3] objectives. The amount of such support will be 

determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Board. 

6. Additional Proaams - 

It is further agreed that the DoD and the NASA will initiate major new programs or 

projects in the field of manned space flight aimed chiefly at the attainment of experimental or other capabilities in nearearth orbit only by mutual agreement. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator, NASA 

Date: Tanuarv 21, 1963 

Robert S. McNamara 

Secretary of Defense 

Date: lanuarv 21, 1963 

Document 11-24 

Document title: Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Vice 

President, ‘‘National Space Program,” May 3, 1963. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In April 1963, President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to conduct, as chairman of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Council, an overall review of the national space program, published 

as Document 111-17 in Volume I of Exploring the Unknown. Secretary of Defense McNamara S 

reply suggests the many ways in which the programs of NASA and Department ofDefese had become 

intertwined. 

111 3 May 1963 

Memorandum for the Vice President 

SUBJECT: National Space Program 

This memorandum will respond to Dr. [Edward C.] Welsh’s memorandum to me of 

April 10, requesting information on which to base replies to the questions in the 

President’s memorandum to you of April 9. I should point out first that. most of the points 

raised by the President deal with matters for which NASA has primary or exclusive responsibility. My comments will, therefore, be confined to the military aspects to questions 2 

and 3, and to question 5. 

Question 2: What specifically are the principal benefits to the national economy we 

can expect to accrue from the present, greatly augmented program in the following 

areas. . . military technology? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 343 

I have attempted to measure these benefits by estimating the extent to which [the] 

DoD budget would be increased, in each of the DoD budget categories corresponding to 

the major NASA budget categories, if the present greatly augmented program had not 

been undertaken by NASA. It should be borne in mind that a part of the augmented program, including, for example, the TITAN 111 development, has been undertaken directly 

by the Department of Defense. The military justification for this portion of the program 

is such that it would have been undertaken without regard to the other objectives of the 

National Space Program. The great bulk of the augmented program, $4,388 million out 

of $4,696 million, is in the NASA budget; the Department of Defense space program for 

FY 1964 is about 7% higher than the 1 January 1961 projection for FY 1964, after adjustment for comparability. A comparative tabulation of DoD and NASA budgets for the 

National Space Program appears at Table I. 

Research. Although it is difficult to assess the direct military value of space research, it 

appears likely about $20 million of NASA’s $100 million research budget proposed for FY 

1964 would be undertaken by DoD in the absence of a NASA program. 

[2] Exploratory and Advanced Development (corresponds to NASA’s Supporting Research 

and Technology). While the military value of this category of expenditures is almost 

equally difficult to determine in advance, I estimate that some $100 million of NASA’s 

augmented program might be supported by DoD if NASA were not supporting it. In addition, the Department of Defense would probably support the entire NASA “base” program 

in this area under like circumstances. 

Engineering Development 

Launch Vehicles. The major NASA development activity in this field is focused on the 

use of liquid hydrogen to lift the extremely large payloads required for the lunar mission. 

This technology is probably not of much military value because of severe operational 

restraints on its handling and storage. Some of this development work will undoubtedly 

have incidental military benefits, but they cannot be estimated in advance, and would not 

merit DoD expenditures in the absence of the NASA program. Primary DoD reliance is 

on the TITAN 111 as the standardized workhorse building block for military applications 

in space. It is important to point out, however, that the concept of a single National 

Launch Vehicle Program dates back to the first agreement between NASA and the DoD 

signed in the new Administration, by Mr. Webb and Mr. Gilpatric, in February 1961, and 

that the Department of Defense includes in its consideration of launch vehicles for new 

military missions any vehicles under development by NASA for nonmilitary space missions. 

Manned Space Craft. The APOLLO space craft, designed for the lunar mission, has no 

predictable military applications. The GEMINI space craft, however, is in a different category, and if it were not under development, the Department of Defense would probably 

undertake a GEMINI-type program. The NASA GEMINI program has a critical early flight 

date as a part of the over-all lunar project. This condensed scheduling cannot be 

supported as a military requirement, and, therefore, an additional Defense program of 

$150-$200 million in FY 1964 might be justified in lieu of the $300 million level of effort 

proposed by NASA for FY 1964. 

Unmanned Space Craj. In part because DoD was active in this area before the organization of NASA, there are no vehicles under development by NASA which would have 

been undertaken or would be taken over by DoD in the absence of the program. 

[3] Mission Applications. A number of the special mission applications of NASA space 

vehicles, such as meteorological satellites and communication satellites are of military 

interest. If they were not undertaken by NASA, the Defense budget might be increased by 

$25-$50 million in these particular mission application areas. Most of these applications 
344 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

stem from the pre-1961 NASA program, and their present level of effort cannot easily be 

apportioned between the “base” program and the augmented program. These essentially 

experimental mission applications, however, do not include the necessity for extensive 

military development activity, since the technology for military operations is increasingly 

distinct from the technology for experimentation. 

0th Most of the increase in the augmented NASA effort classified in Table I as management and support reflects the lunar program directly and has no demonstrable military value. We have found, for example, that military use of GEMINI could very likely be 

fitted into our existing DoD tracking facilities for current classified programs, without 

major increases in funds. Of course, if space becomes very much more important from a 

military standpoint-if many more laboratories, tracking sites, launch facilities and the like 

were needed over and above what we already have in the Defense Department[-] then 

NASA’s extensive facilities could be combined into indirect military assets. On the other 

hand, based upon what we presently foresee, the Defense Department would not pay for 

the large augmented management and support effort, or any appreciable fraction of it, if 

NASA did not. 

Summary 

The NASA budget estimate for FY 1964 totals approximately $5.7 billion. It is about 

$4.5 billion larger than the NASA budget for FY 1962 as of January 1961. The NASA budget for FY 1964, as projected at that time was somewhat less than the present amount. 

In the foregoing paragraphs, I have identified approximately $600-$675 million of 

NASA effort which appears to have direct or indirect value for military technology. Of that 

amount, about $275-$350 million stems from the augmentation of NASA programs since 

January 1961. 

Question 3: What are some of the major military problems likely to result from continuation of the National Space Program as now projected in the fields of. . . government.. . ? 

[4] While the detailed answer to this question will come more appropriately from NASA, 

some comments from the special vantage point of the DoD may be appropriate. 

The concerns suggested in this question were foremost in our minds two years ago 

when Mr. Webb and I submitted our report to you of 6 May 1961. On page 10 of that document, urging the importance of planning at the national level, we noted that the decade 

of 1950-1960 

“has witnessed a great expansion in US. government sponsored research and 

development especially for large scale defense programs. Enormous strides have been 

made, particularly in our space efforts and In the development of related ballistic mi* 

sile technology on a ‘crash’ basis. We have, however, incurred certain liabilities in the 

process. We have overencouraged [sic] the development of entrepreneurs and the 

proliferation of new enterprises. As a result, key personnel have been thinly spread. 

The turnover rate in U.S. defense and space industry has had the effect of removing 

many key scientific engineering personnel from their jobs before the completion of 

the projects for which they were employed. Strong concentrations of technical talent 

needed for the best work on difficult tasks have been seriously weakened. Engineering 

costs have doubled in the past ten years. 

“These and other trends have a strong adverse effect on our capacity to do a good 

job in space. The inflation of costs has an obvious impact, and they are still rising at 

the rate of about seven per cent [sic] per year. This fact alone affects forward planning. It has often led to project stretch-outs, and may again in future years. The 

spreading out of technological personnel among a great many organizations has 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 345 

greatly slowed down the evolution of design and development skills at the working 

level throughout the country.” 

Earlier in the same report we also stated again in connection with planning, that 

“it is absolutely vital that national management be equal to the task of focusing 

resources, particularly scientific and engineering resources, on the essential building 

blocks. It is particularly vital that we do not continue to make the error of spreading 

ourselves too thin and expect to solve our problems through the mere appropriation 

and expenditure of additional funds.” 

[5] The concerns expressed in the report of 8 May 1961 were related to the impediments 

to and opportunities for success in undertaking an expanded space program. The concerns implicit in Question 3 of the President’s memorandum relate to impact of this program on the nongovernment sector. These two concerns are opposite sides of the same 

coin. Moreover, the same trends that were of concern two years ago are, in many cases, of 

equal or greater concern today. 

For example, it turns out that federal expenditures for research and development, 

although they exhibit fluctuations from year to year, seem to have been following a longrange trend for the last fifteen years, at least. This trend rises much more steeply than the 

total federal budget or total [gross national product]. In fact, if extrapolated, federal 

expenditures for research and development can be predicted to equal the entire gross 

national product by about the year 2000. It is obvious, therefore, that the slope of the 

curve must flatten out over the next few years. 

The Department of Defense, along with every other agency of government and the 

private sector of the economy, is in increasingly sharp competition for the research and 

development dollar. The elimination of waste and inefficiency in the National Space 

Program, whether it occurs in NASA, in DoD, or in overlaps between the two agencies, is 

essential to our national security. 

Question 5: Are we taking sufficient measures to insure the maximum degree of coordination and cooperation between NASA and DoD in the areas of space vehicles 

development and facility utilization? 

The adequacy of coordination and cooperation between NASA and DoD must be 

measured by the extent to which such efforts support the policy of creating and maintaining a single National Space Program. That policy has governed our actions since the 

beginning of this Administration. In our report of 8 May 1961, Mr. Webb and I stated, in 

summary: 

“Clearly, then, the future of our efforts in space is going to depend on much more 

than this year’s appropriations or tomorrow’s new idea. It is going to depend in large 

measure upon the extent to which this country is able to establish and to direct ‘an 

Integrated National Space Program’.” 

[6] We pointed out then (page 12) that: 

“It will be necessary, therefore, to find a way to formulate and apply plans and 

policies aimed at insuring the success of an Integrated National Space Program. Top 

level scientific and policy direction must be forthcoming from the top management 

echelons. The mere statement of broad objectives will not be enough. Periodic budget reviews and their intensification in the spring of each year will not suffice. It will 

be necessary to impose policy and management actions which will alter many of the 

trends of the past ten years, particularly in the management of research and engineering resources on a national scale.” 
346 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

In my view, it is essential that all major space programs be integrated with military 

requirements in the early stages of their development. This integration has been fostered 

through the organization and operation of the Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Coordinating Board and its six panels. A series of written agreements between NASA and 

DoD spells out this general policy in such fields as development of launch vehicles and 

space craft, administration of range facilities, and planning for communications satellites. 

I am not satisfied, and I am sure that Mr. Webb is not satisfied, that we have gone far 

enough to eliminate all problems of duplication and waste in administration. We are 

engaged in a continuingjoint effort in this area. But I am more concerned with the potential dangers in the divergence of our efforts in the study and planning of potential new 

large projects. 

Take, for example, the proposed space station being considered by NASA and DoD, 

and still in the planning phase. While it is not yet clear that the project is justified, either 

on a military or nonmilitary basis, it is clear that it should be undertaken only as a national program, which meets the requirements of both NASA and DoD, and that it must be 

jointly planned from its inception. 

Coordination and joint planning of our efforts must extend to all so-called “advanced 

studies.” Experience has demonstrated that if many or sizeable [sic] studies are supported throughout industry, the expectation of a new project grows rapidly until such expectations are translated into public debate and controversy. Mr. Webb and I agreed on this 

matter in recent discussions. 

In the National Launch Vehicle Program, to take another example, we must be constantly alert to consider new vehicles for inclusion as standard “building block” vehicles 

meeting the requirements of both agencies. We must refrain from undertaking unnecessary new developments, and we must limit the scope of adaptations of standard devices to 

unique projects. Both NASA and DoD continue to be exposed to proposals for additional launch vehicles or modifications of those that are already a [7] part of the National 

Launch Vehicle Program. It is even conceivable that within a year or two pressures will 

arise to develop vehicles using new materials and techniques on the sole ground that “no 

new launch vehicle projects have been undertaken” in a long time. This is not to say that 

we should abandon the continuing examination of new technological achievements in 

these areas. But development projects must be jointly planned and development decisions 

jointly taken. 

Coordination and joint planning of our efforts must extend to all so-called “advanced 

studies.” Experience has demonstrated that if many or sizeable [sic] studies are supported throughout industry, the expectation of [a] new project grows rapidly until such expectations are translated into public debate and controversy. Mr. Webb and I agreed on this 

matter in recent discussions. 

I am also concerned with the potential dangers in the divergence or unnecessary 

duplication of our efforts in fields where technology and other factors are rapidly changing. Communications and meteorological satellites are two examples. I have already canceled some major programs in the communications area, and I do not propose to launch 

any additional projects until the roles of NASA, DoD and the Communications Satellite 

Corporation have been clearly defined. 

The heads of the two agencies must constantly be sensitive to the dangers of duplication and waste. The problem is of sufficient importance to require continuous monitoring at a level above that of the agencies themselves. I suggest that responsibility for this 

monitoring be assigned to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Director of the Office of 

Science and Technology. Only by assigning specific responsibility in this fashion can the 

integrity of the National Space Program be protected. 

Robert S. McNamara 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 347 

TABLE I 

SPACE AND SPACE RELATED PROGRAMS 

BREAKDOWN BY DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM CATEGORY OF 

AMOUNTS APPEARING ON PAGE 404 OF BUREAU OF THE BUDGET SPECIAL 

ANALYSIS G, “Research and Development and Selected Scientific and Technical Activities 

of the Federal Government,” January 1963.’ 

NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 

DOD NASA 

DOD 

R&D Program 

Category -. FY1962 (act.) 1963 (est.) 1964 (est.) 1962 (act.) 1963 (est.) 1964 (est.1 

Research 4 4 6 23 65 99 

Exploratory Dev. 140 159 166 

Advanced Dev. 535 509 405 

Supporting Rsch. 

& Technology 675 668 571 236 439 647 

Engineering Dev. 112 382 437 845 1,858 3,297 

Operational Sys. Dev. 26 39 40 

Mgt. & Support - 467 5.25 - 614 - 692 1,2611,621 

TOTAL 1,285 1,618 1,668 1,796 3,623 5,664 

’ Special Analysis G states: ‘“The amounts show for the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration cover all the activities of that agency except those specifically identified 

with aircraft technology. The estimates for the Department of Defense include all the 

principal amounts identifiable with the Department’s space programs, but exclude certain 

amounts which cannot be feasibly separated from other military expenses, such as the 

development of missiles which are also used in the space programs, military personnel 

costs, and various other operating costs.” 

Document 11-25 

Document title: W.F. Boone, to Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden, “DOD-NASA 

Relations,” July 12, 1963. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
348 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

NASA’s Office ofDOD Liaison, headed by retired Admiral W Fred Boone, perfmd the difficult task 

of attempting to keep communications open between NASA and the military when Secretary ofDefense 

McNamara and NASA Administratm Webb were at odds. Boone’s Jul~ 12, 1963, memorandum to 

top NASA officials attempted to place in perspective NASA’s views of the military intentions and the 

military’s view of NASA intentions. It highlights the problems of developing collaborative programs 

with such widely dijfm‘ng needs. 

[no pagination] July 12, 1963 

A/Mr. Webb 

AA/Dr. Seamans 

AD/Dr. Dryden 

AAD-3 

DOD-NASA Relations 

In response to your desire expressed at a recent staff meeting, the attached paper is 

submitted. 

The paper has been prepared with the thought that it would be used as a “talking 

paper” rather than one to be given to Mr. McNamara. 

The whole paper has been coordinated with [D. Brainerd] Holmes and has his concurrence. 

The section on GROUND SUPPORT OPERATIONS has been coordinated with 

[Edmond C.] Buckley [special assistant to the administrator] and has his concurrence. 

If the DOD agrees that NASA and the DOD should work together primarily on the 

basis of coordination rather than joint action, I suggest that we might want to ask the 

AACB to agree on the meaning of “coordinate” in this context. 

It is suggested that this be held on an “eyes only” basis among Dr. Dryden, Dr. 

Seamans, and yourself, until all or part of the paper is released by you. 

W.F. Boone 

2 Enclosures 

DOD-NASA Relations 

Definition 

********* 

[I] PRNATE-Eyes Only fm M7: Webb, Dr Dryden, and Dx Seamans. 

DOD-NASA Relations 

1. The purpose of this paper is to bring into focus the divergent philosophies, attitudes, 

and interpretations of the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration with respect to the implementation of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Act of 1958. Delineation of certain differing points of View may suggest guidelines 

for their resolution, and closer agreement as to principles involved will permit the two 

agencies to work more harmoniously, economically, and effectively together in the national interest. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 349 

2. This discussion will be presented under the headings of NATIONAL POLICK PLANNING, and GROW SUPPORT OPERATIONS as these pertain to space activities, and 

AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH. These are the areas in which the principal problems appear 

to lie. 

NATIONAL POLICY 

3. A difference of opinion exists as to the proper function and status of the Space 

Administration under the Space Act of 1958. 

NASA Position 

4. The National Aeronautics and Space Act was responsive to national requirements in 

two categories: (1) general welfare, and (2) security. The objectives set forth in the Act 

were formulated after thorough deliberation by the Executive and Legislative Branches, 

and extensive correlation with the scientific community. The Act provided that the scientific exploration and exploitation of space shall be the responsibility of and directed by an 

independent civilian agency, while stating the major exception that “activities peculiar to 

or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations or 

the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to 

make effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility 

of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense. . . ” Thus, the Congress clearly 

recognized the need for two mutually supporting but separately directed space programs. 

The Act established a liaison mechanism (the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, later 

superseded by the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board) through which the 

DOD and NASA were required to “advise and consult with each other on all matters within [2] their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities” and to 

“keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” The Act 

provided that the President shall determine which agency shall have responsibility for the 

direction of a space activity. 

5. In drafting the Act, the Congress stressed the peaceful purposes of our space activities. It was apparently recognized that the exploration of space was more than an area of 

future significance to the defense of the United States, and that the scientific, political, 

and economic benefits to be derived from a space program might be subordinated if 

space exploration were conducted solely under military auspices. 

6. NASA sees the national space effort as a spectrum encompassing three areas: (1) 

acquisition of basic scientific knowledge and the development of basic technologies and 

operating techniques; (2) the application of space knowledge, technologies, and techniques to the development of prototype space systems; (3) the production and operation 

of commercial and military space systems to meet national requirements. A necessary 

adjunct to this total effort is the establishment of a government in[-]house capability supported by a broad industrial base competent in the space field. 

7. NASA‘s assigned functions lie primarily in category (1) above. The DOD has research 

and development responsibilities in this category to the extent that such research and 

development pertains to the defense of the United States. NASA’s responsibilities do not 

extend to the area of category (3). Category (2) is a gray area in which the responsibilities of DOD and NASA overlap to a considerable extent. NASA of necessity becomes an 

operating agency in those cases where basic subsystems and operating techniques can best 

be developed by means of an experimental operational flight system, and where NASA is 

called upon to furnish operational services to another agency. NASA recognizes that some 
350 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

programs to meet the requirements of DOD and NASA in category (2) are of such magnitude as to require that a single program serve the needs of both agencies; Le., a manned 

orbiting laboratory. Where predominant interest is at issue in such cases, a Presidential 

decision as to management responsibility would be needed. Presumably, the decision, in 

addition to the matter of relative interest in terms of experiments to be accommodated, 

would take into account additional factors such as management competence, operational 

experience, and political impact. 

8. Consideration of national policy and national interests dictates that the civilian space 

program under NASA should be an “open” program with maximum dissemination of 

derived information “for the benefit of all mankind,” whereas these same considerations 

require that a military space program be conducted essentially under security restrictions. 

[3] DOD Position--as it appears to NASA 

9. The attitude of the DOD with respect to the roles of the two agencies in the national 

space effort differs from that of NASA in that the DOD sees the civilian and military space 

programs as one program which should be jointly conducted to attain both civilian and 

military objectives. They believe that the military requirements in space were not as well 

foreseen when the Space Act was passed in 1958 as they are now. In the intervening years, 

it has become apparent that the Soviet space program is directed primarily toward the 

gaining of a military advantage through space operations, forcing the United States to 

build a military defense in space. Because of this increasing role, the military should have 

a stronger voice in shaping and direction of the total national space program than was recognized and provided for in the Space Act. 

10. This attitude has led to efforts on the part of the DOD to have segments of the NASA 

program transferred to the DOD (i.e., Gemini, bio-astronautics, training of astronauts, 

MILA). The desire to control is especially strong within the Air Force, as the Service of primary interest in the field of space, is disproportionately small and has not received the 

proper public recognition. The Air Force considers that space operations are simply an 

extension of flight operations in the atmosphere, and therefore that they should be under 

Air Force control. Lacking greater support for this position at the DOD level, the Air 

Force has made an “end runs” [sic] to members of Congress and the White House staff, 

and has launched an intensive and well organized public relations campaign to convert 

the public to the Air Force point of view. The Air Force is inclined to look upon NASA as 

a competitor rather than a partner in the field of space. 

Proposed Basis of Agreement 

11. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator should agree in principle along the 

following lines, and should join in a vigorous effort to indoctrinate subordinate staffs and 

agencies in acceptance of these principles: 

(a) It was the intent of Congress, and remains in the national interest so far as possible without jeopardizing national security, that the United Sates maintain in the 

eyes of the world the peaceful image of our space program. 

(b) As a corollary to (a), NASA should remain a fully independent, civilian agency. 

[4] (c) There are certain advantages to the national space effort, and in the long run 

specifically to the Department of Defense, which accrue the virtue of civilian 

agency management of a major portion of the total space effort; i.e., international cooperation; and relations with the research and development organizations of 

industry, with the civilian scientific organizations, and with the university community. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 35 1 

(d) At the same time, the unfolding military requirement in space demands an 

expanding role for the Department of Defense in the total space effort. 

(e) For the present, this increasing role will be accommodated by earlier and 

stronger concerted DOD-NASA action on the basis of coordination rather than 

joint control, and in a manner which will not compromise the civilian character of 

NASA’s activities. 

(NOTE: “Coordination” as used in this paper, will have the following meaning: An 

agency having responsibility to “coordinate” with another agency on a specified 

project (1) will recognize the interest of the other agency in the project, (2) will 

initiate a full exchange of information and consultations early in the conceptual 

phase, (3) will encourage the active participation of the other agency in the planning from the very outset, and (4) will make an earnest effort to meet the requirements and objectives of the other agency. Concurrence of the other agency will 

be sought in the planning and execution of the project. Concurrence is not 

required as a pre-condition to further action. However, matters on which agreement is not reached may be referred for resolution to the next higher authority 

in which both participants have a voice.) 

(f) It is expected that the decision as to management responsibility for a major new program will be made by the President primarily on the basis of predominance of 

interest, but also taking into account other factors such as capability to conduct 

the program, relation to other major programs, international aspects, security 

considerations, etc. 

[ 5 ] (g) There will be maximum cross-servicing in the use of support resources and technical know-how. 

(h) Except in unusual cases, joint management responsibility is not favored on the 

basis that the requirement for concurrence at every step [is] inefficient, uneconomical, and tends to impede rapid progress. 

12. A difference of opinion exists as to the desirability of joint versus coordinated planning. 

NASA Position 

13. NASA’s assigned mission is to maintain a national position in the vanguard of space 

exploration. In its quest for scientific knowledge and its efforts to develop the basic techniques necessary for space operations, NASA must constantly seek to advance man’s space 

frontier further into the unknown. In pursuing this mission, NASA should not be restricted by a limitation that its advanced exploratory studies must be related to established 

operational requirements of either a military or commercial nature. At the same time, 

NASA should ever be alert to discern those areas of research which appear to offer the 

most promising potential for the solution of military problems and for otherwise contributing to the national welfare, and be prepared to orient its efforts responsively to these 

objectives. 

14. There should be a thorough, inter-agency exchange of ideas and information as to 

requirements and problems early in the process of formulating advance studies in an area 

of mutual interest, but to impose the restriction that the formal concurrence of another 

agency is required before NASA may proceed with such a study would seriously obstruct 

NASA’s ability to discharge its statutorily assigned functions. 
352 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

15. Major future progress in space are [sic] likely to be so costly that the nation will be 

able to afford only one program in each category. Consequently, each such program 

should be designed to meet, in so far as possible, the requirements of all government 

agencies for space research and development. 

16. Once the decision is made to embark upon a multi-interest project, the agency 

responsible for its direction should be designated. Thereafter, the planning and execution 

should be coordinated between interested agencies to assure that in so far as practicable 

the requirements of all agencies are fulfilled in the national interest. The primary responsibility for that coordination should reside with the agency directing the project. 

[6] DOD Position-as it appears to NASA 

17. The DOD view with respect to planning differs from that of NASA in that the DOD 

feels all planning relating to NASA programs or projects which are of interest to DOD 

should be jointly conducted from inception. This view has led DOD to seek inflexible 

agreements concerning the manner in which NASA‘s advance exploratory studies may be 

initiated, including sign-off authority for DOD. 

Proposed Basis of Agreement 

18. (a) Requirements and objectives in any particular area of space research and development will, as a general rule, be developed unilaterally by DOD and NASA. 

Subject to security restrictions, general knowledge of each other’s requirements 

and objectives must be assumed. 

(b) Prior to the approval by either agency of a study project in an area of mutual interest, inter-agency coordination will be accomplished. This will take the form of a 

free exchange of information concerning requirements, objectives and plans for 

the study, and an earnest attempt to cast the study in such manner as to be responsive to the requirements and objectives of both agencies in so far as practicable. 

Provisions will be made so that in the event an agency feels that its needs are not 

being adequately met in formulating the study, recourse may be had to higher 

authority for resolution of differences, initially to the Co-chairmen of the 

[Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board]. 

(c) Results of studies in an area of mutual interest will be made available to both 

agencies. 

(d) Upon approval of a new major project of mutual interest, the agency responsible 

for its direction will also be charged with insuring that adequate arrangements for 

coordinated planning and coordinated monitoring of execution are made. 

Again, provision will be made for recourse to higher authority to resolve differences. 

GROW SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

19. There are some conflicting views in the matter of control of ground support operations. 

[ 71 NASA Position 

20. NASA fully subscribes to the concept of national launch ranges operated by the DOD 

for the benefit of all government user agencies. NASA has levied known requirements on 

the ranges for over 140 future launches, over 40 ofwhich involve tracking ships. However, 

the requirements which NASA must place on the ranges have become so large, complex, 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 353 

and exacting that NASA feels it must actively participate in planning the manner in which 

the ranges are to be equipped and operated to provide the project-peculiar services 

required by NASA. 

21. The magnitude and nature of the Manned Lunar Landing Program are such as to 

require that the assembly, check-out, and launch area (Merritt Island) be under NASA 

control. 

22. The world network of land-based orbital tracking and data acquisition stations should, 

to the maximum practical extent, be under NASA control for NASA missions. This applies 

to planning of facilities, specification and installation of instrumentation, training and 

maintenance of proficiency activities, communication links, and operational control during a flight. As high a degree as possible of standardization among stations is necessary in 

order to permit the most effective operational flexibility and casualty control during an 

operation. Exceptions to this doctrine can be accepted in the case of a few DOD stations 

that are already in existence, strategically located, and responsive to NASA requirements. 

This doctrine is made necessary by the indivisible relationship between program management and the operations control organization. 

23. If and when stations of the NASA world network are utilized to track DOD missions, 

NASA would be willing to place these stations temporarily under DOD operational control if DOD considers this necessary to the mission and to the extent permitted by international agreements. (Nearly half of the spacecraft being tracked by the NASA satellite network are DOD spacecraft.) 

24. Arrangements for the procurement, preparation, and operation of the project peculiar tracking ships required to occupy the critical stations for insertion into orbit and injection into the moon transfer in the Apollo operation must be such as to give NASA a high 

degree of control through relatively direct administrative channels. 

25. To this end, NASA’s present intention is to employ MSTS [Military Sea Transportation 

Service (NAW ,] a DOD agency experienced in the operation of special purpose ships, to 

prepare the hulls and machinery and to operate the ships themselves as differentiated 

from the instrumentation installed therein. In the interest of standardization, NASA plans 

to use the same contractor for installation and operation of the instrumentation as is used 

in the case of other NASA stations in the net. [8] While these ships will be required nearly full time for the Apollo mission, NASA has no objection to adding general purpose 

instrumentation to the extent this will not compromise the project peculiar instrumentation, and to make the ships available for general purpose use when not required in connection with Apollo. Generally speaking, these ships should basically be special purpose 

ships, with a general purpose secondary mission, rather than vice versa. 

26. The priority assigned to the Apollo program and considerations of safety are such that 

where other agencies are depended upon to furnish facilities or perform essential services 

in the loop, NASA must have the prerogative of monitoring the provisions for rendering 

such services to the extent necessary to assure itself that all recognizable potential limitations which might delay the schedule or increase the risk of the mission are eliminated. 

DOD Position-as it appears to NASA 

27. The DOD takes the position that the launch ranges are a national asset which would 

be used to capacity by other agencies of the government, and on which requirements 

should be levied without voice as to the manner in which these requirements are to be 

met. The range facilities, including tracking ships, should be primarily “general purpose” 

in nature, with “project peculiar” provisions added. The DOD fears that NASA, by establishing the Merritt Island Launch Area and seeking to acquire its own project-peculiar 
354 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

tracking ships, wishes to depend less and less upon the DOD ranges for services, becoming a range operator instead of a range user. 

Proposed Basis of Agreement 

28. The differences in this area stem more from a lack of mutual trust than from differing concepts. Each agency sees the other as seeking control of segments of its operations. 

This has at times inhibited a free exchange of information. In order to dispel any such 

fears, it is proposed that DOD and NASA agree in principle to the following, and that all 

subordinate organizations be informed accordingly: 

(a) The concept of national launch ranges operated by the DOD is to be fully accepted and implemented. NASA will depend upon the facilities and services of these 

ranges to the extent that they can meet NASA requirements. 

[9] (b) The principle of “primary assignment” will be applied in accordance with priorities established by mutual agreement or by higher authority. 

(c) Where NASA specialized requirements exceed the capacity of the national range, 

the range will be given an opportunity to augment its capacity if desired, before 

NASA proceeds to make its own provisions to meet the excess requirements. 

(d) NASA will continue to be responsible for operating the world networks required 

for tracking NASA spacecraft in orbit and in lunar and planetary transfers. In the 

interest of avoiding unwarranted duplication, the DOD will utilize these NASA 

networks for DOD orbital missions where feasible. 

(e) Generally speaking, the point of demarcation between the ranges and the world 

tracking nets will be the point of insertion into orbit. 

(f) Each agency will participate actively on a coordination basis in the other’s plans 

for equipment development and facilities with the objectives of achieving the 

maximum practicable degree of standardization and permitting such facilities 

and equipments to meet the needs of both agencies to the maximum practicable 

extent. 

(g) All tracking [of] the data acquisition ships, once ready for service, will be assigned 

to the national ranges who will utilize MSTS to operate and maintain the ships 

generally under the same arrangements that currently govern the MSTS to operation and maintenance of special purpose ships for various agencies of the 

government. Under this arrangement, there will be a mutually agreed upon 

scheduling authority who will assign the ships to the operational control of the 

user agency on a prime assignment basis as necessary to meet the requirements 

of the user agency as to training, calibration check-out, minor modifications to 

instrumentation, and tracking and data acquisition operations. 

(h) Operation of instrumentation aboard each ship will be contracted for directly by 

the user having primary interest. 

[IO1 AERONAUTICAL RE.!EARCH 

29. There is a difference of opinion as to the relative importance time-wise of aeronautical research programs utilizing new prototypes and the flight test programs of these prototypes. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 355 

RS 70 Program 

30. In a letter dated May 3, 1962, the Administrator proposed to the Secretary of Defense 

that one of the three XB70 prototypes be made available to NASA for use in conducting 

an advanced aeronautical research program in the area of supersonic cruise flight. NASA 

considers that this program is essential to our country’s progress in the field of aeronautics, and that the information desired cannot be obtained by any other means. No official 

response to this request has been received. Recently, after an elapse of over a year, the proposal has been revived by NASA in the [Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating 

Board]. 

31. NASA considers it to be of the utmost importance that the opportunity presented by 

the XB-70 for flight research in the supersonic range be fully exploited as early as practicable. The data to be gained thereby will have special application in the development of 

the supersonic transport now advocated by the Administration. 

32. A proper flight research program cannot be conducted simultaneously with and as a 

part of the flight tests of this aircraft. Since the instrumentation for the research program 

should be installed during the fabrication of the designated aircraft, an early decision by 

the Secretary of Defense to make one of the XB70 prototypes available on loan to NASA 

is required if the valuable data to be derived from such a research program is to be available in time to be used in designing the supersonic transport. 

TFX Program 

33. By letter dated January 15, 1963, the Administrator requested that one of the early 

TFX prototypes be made available on loan to NASA to be used in conducting a flight 

research program to obtain basic data concerning the variable swept wing concept incorporated in the aircraft. This concept originated at the Langley Research Center, and much 

of the supporting ground research data were gathered there. On 1 March 1963, the 

Secretary of Defense responded by disapproving the request, making the alternate suggestions that: 

(a) NASA participate jointly with the Air Force by combining the research program 

with the flight test program, 

[ 111 (b) NASA acquire one of the prototypes upon completion of the flight test program, 

or 

(c) NASA purchase an additional prototype at a cost of about $10 million. 

Alternative (c) appeared to involve unwarranted duplication, and neither alternative (a) 

nor (b) would permit the accomplishment of an adequate flight research program in a 

timely manner. 

34. Following personal negotiations with the Secretary of the Air Force by the Deputy 

Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs, discussions were commenced between NASA 

and the TFX Project Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to find ways and means of 

meshing an adequate flight research program under NASA control with the flight test program on the TFX prototypes. It is too early to say whether satisfactory arrangements for 

meeting the requirements of both agencies will evolve from these negotiations. The 

Secretary of Defense and the Administrator should agree to review this matter again about 

six months hence. 
356 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY &LATIONS 

Proposed Basis of Agreement 

35. In layout [of] a program for the acquisition of a new military aircraft type incorporating a new concept or a substantial projection of a current design concept, provision will 

be made to make an early prototype available to NASA for the purpose of accomplishing 

an “in-flight” research program designed to obtain advanced technical data in the field of 

aeronautics. 

********* 

[no pagination] 

Definition of 

“Coordination With” and “In Coordination With” 

This expression means that agencies coordinated with shall participate actively; and 

concurrence shall be sought; and that if concurrence is not obtained the disputed matter 

shall be referred to the next highest authority in which all participants have a voice. 

(The above information from JCS Publication “Dictionary of US. Military Term for Joint 

Usage ’’ and Army Regulation 320-5) 

Document 11-26 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, and Robert S. McNamara, 

Secretary of Defense, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital 

Research and Development Project,” August 17, 1963, with attached “Procedure for 

Coordination of Advanced Exploratory Studies by the DOD and the NASA in the Area of 

Manned Earth Orbital Flight Under the Aegis of the Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Coordinating Board.” 

Document 11-27 

Document title: Robert S. McNamara, to Honorable James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, 

September 16,1963. 

Source: Both in Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Among the more important areas on which NASA and the Department of Defense (000) agreed to 

cooperate was the development, of future orbital space stations. This agreement, signed on August 17, 

1963, was to cover the development of a joint national space station. Although Secretary of Defense 

Robert McNamara signed the agreement, in a S$tember 16, 1963, letter to Administrator Webb, he 

expressed his reservations, focusing particularly on the need for both agencies to concur on, not just 

coordinate, their future activities related to future station design and development. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 357 

Document 11-26 

[I1 

Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital 

Research and Development Project 

Objective 

It is the purpose of this agreement to ensure that in the national interest complete 

coordination is achieved between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 

the Department of Defense in approaching a possible new project in the area of manned 

earth orbital research and development vehicles. 

Basic Considerations 

The National Space Program has now advanced to the point that further significant 

progress in the areas of scientific research, space exploration, basic space technology, and 

defense applications may well require the operation of a manned orbital research and 

development system involving spacecraft larger and more sophisticated than Gemini and 

Apollo. Such a system would be a major technical and financial undertaking. For this reason, and while recognizing that the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 assigns to 

their respective Agencies separate and distinct responsibilities in the planning, directing, 

and conduct of aeronautical and space activities, the Secretary of Defense and the 

Administrator of the NASA agree that advanced exploratory studies and any follow-on 

actions in this area should be most carefully coordinated through the Aeronautics and 

Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), successor to the Civilian-Military Liaison 

Committee established by the Space Act. They further agree that in so far as practicable 

all foreseeable future requirements of both agencies in this area should be encompassed 

in a single project. 

A system involving a manned earth orbital research and development vehicle capable 

of prolonged space flight would provide basic scientific and technological knowledge and 

basic design and operational criteria which would have across-the-board application to 

both military and civilian operational programs. Such a developmental system would be a 

mandatory forerunner of any long duration manned space operational system. Based 

upon present knowledge, it appears that the requirements of the DOD and the NASA, as 

well as of all other interested governmental agencies, can be met in a single national program. It is necessary that the NASA and the DOD take steps to ensure that their total 

effort is directed to this end. 

Agreement 

Pursuant to the foregoing, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA 

agree to a common approach to this project through the steps set forth below. In the event 

that agreement is not reached on [2] any issue considered by either party adversely to 

involve the responsibilities of his Agency, the issue of disagreement will be jointly referred 

to the President for resolution. 

a. The DOD and the NASA will continue advanced and exploratory studies in this 

area as considered necessary by the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, 
358 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

respectively, to develop data as to Agency requirements, possible design concepts, feasibility, and costs; these studies will be coordinated under the AACB in accordance with the 

procedures set forth in the attachment hereto. 

b. The AACB will include the evaluation of various concepts from the standpoint of 

productiveness, feasibility, and estimated costs. 

c. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, will then attempt to 

arrive at ajoint recommendation as to whether to proceed with a new project in this area, 

evaluating the national need by comparing potential returns to returns which could be 

realized by an extension of current ongoing projects. 

d. If the recommendation under c., above, is affirmative, the DOD and the NASA 

will jointly formulate an agreed project description for submission to the President together with 

e. A recommendation as to responsibility for the direction of the project based on 

predominant interest and consideration of other pertinent factors, such as management 

competence, relation to other programs in progress, and international political implications. 

f. If and when a decision is made by the Administration to proceed with such a project, the appropriate timing determined, and responsibility for direction assigned, a joint 

DOD/NASA board will be established to formulate the specific objectives to be obtained 

by means of the project and to approve the experiments to be conducted. 

g. Acting in accordance with the results of f., above, the Agency assigned responsibility for direction will prepare a definitive project plan for approval by the Administration 

and submission to Congress for funding. 

h. On provision of the necessary funding, the project will be implemented under 

single management but with joint DOD/NASA participation and monitorship. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator, NASA 

Aug. 17, 1963 

Robert S, McNamara 

Secretary of Defense 

********* 

Attachment 

Procedure for Coordination of 

Advanced Exploratory Studies 

[I1 

Procedure for Coordination of Advanced Exploratory 

Studies by the DOD and the NASA in the Area of 

Manned Earth Orbital Flight Under the Aegis of the 

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board 

(Attached to McNamara/Webb Agreement dated August 17, 1963) 

1. As a general procedure, there will be the maximum practicable interchange of ideas 

and information at all levels within the two Agencies beginning early in the conceptual or 

planning stage of the advanced exploratory studies in this area. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 359 

2. Within fifteen (15) days after the signing of the Basic Agreement, each Agency will 

present to the Manned Space Flight Panel a list of studies which have been completed during the past three (3) years. Detailed information relating to these studies will be furnished to the non-sponsoring Agency on request. 

3. Within fifteen (15) days after the signing of the Basic Agreement, each Agency will 

present to the Manned Space Flight Panel a status report concerning: 

(a) All studies which are in progress under contract and in-house; 

(b) All studies which already have been formalized in a Statement of Work but not yet 

approved; and 

(c) All additional new studies under active consideration or development. 

4. Within thirty (30) days after the signing of the Basic Agreement, the Panel will: 

(a) Institute a review of the studies under category (a) above, and will effect such 

coordinating action as is deemed appropriate and practicable in the light of their ongoing status; 

(b) Designate to the AACB those studies in categories (b) and (c) above which either 

Agency considers should be formally coordinated to incorporate requirements of both 

Agencies and to avoid unwarranted duplication. 

5. Thereafter, the Panel will be kept informed of all new studies taken under active consideration or development by either Agency, and will promptly designate to the AACB any 

new study which either Agency considers should be formally coordinated as above. 

[2] 6. In the case of each study designated to the AACB for coordination, the nonsponsoring Agency will, within fifteen (15) days of such designation, indicate in writing its 

concurrence in the study without change, its reasons for not concurring, or submit in writing a list of the requirements of the non-sponsoring Agency which are desired to be considered for incorporation in the study. If no comments are received within the fifteen (15) 

day limit, satisfactory coordination may. be assumed. 

7. Within thirty (30) days of the receipt of notification from the Panel of the designation 

of a study for coordination, the Co-Chairmen of the AACB will either: 

(a) Certify in writing that satisfactory coordination has been accomplished, or 

(b) Jointly submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, an explanation of any areas of disagreement arising out of the coordinating action. At that point, 

the sponsoring Agency may, if desired, proceed with the study. 

8. In all of the foregoing steps, the responsibility for taking the initiative in the coordinating process will rest with the Agency sponsoring the study in question. 

Document 11-27 

[I1 

Honorable James E. Webb 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Washington 25, D.C. 

16 Sept. 1963 

Dear Jim: 

Thank you for your correspondence of August 17, 1963, and your proposed agreement covering a possible new manned earth orbital research and development project. I 

appreciate your constructive and earnest efforts to develop a method which will insure a 

sound, coordinated approach to this potentially important national effort. I am fully 
360 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

aware that, since we began our discussions on this matter, there have been many actions 

implemented which have already gone a long way toward improving the exchange of 

information between our agencies and the coordination of our study efforts. I concur in 

your proposed agreement in many respects and I feel that it is an excellent contribution 

to improved understanding and mutually useful effort of our agencies. I do, however, have 

certain reservations. 

As I have expressed several times, my greatest current concern is to insure that 

advanced engineering studies are properly integrated and phased so that the requirements and design constraints of each agency can be really incorporated from the beginning. For this reason;and because of the potential scope and national importance of this 

program, I have continued to insist on the principle of concurrence of one agency in the 

proposed actions of the other vice simple coordination and possible subsequent unilateral action in the face of disagreement. As an example of the type of problem we are confronting, I refer to your proposed $3.5 million for contractor effort for the design of a 

Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL). I believe that an effort of this magnitude 

is premature by eight months to a year since it will not be possible prior to that time for 

us to provide properly for the incorporation of Defense Departmentjudgements [sic] and 

thoughts on military requirements into the design. You must realize that if ongoing DOD 

studies provide justifiable military objectives for a space station development, there may 

be the necessity for a significantly different design approach which will be responsive to 

both agency’s needs. 

[2] I further note that the proposed agreement does not define specifically the level of 

study effort required to qualify for interagency coordination [in] an “advanced exploratory study,” although provision is made for the coordination of all such studies. I believe that 

an annual level of effort of $100,000 defines a reasonable threshold for initiating such 

action. 

I concur in your view that the AACB is the proper medium for interagency coordination. I would observe, however, that while coordination has always been a prima facie 

AACB function, this has been accomplished in the past largely by other means, through 

other channels. I believe the AACB can serve as an effective coordinating body as long as 

proper attention continues to be accorded to the membership of the Board and its panels and the formulation and execution of meeting agendas, and as long as we both emphasize the resolution of issues at the Board level. 

There remains, of course, the subject of recourse in the event that you and I cannot 

reach agreement on any issue referred to us. In the unlikely event that this should occur, 

I feel that, as a matter of practice, we should inform the Director of the Bureau of the 

Budget concerning the nature and extent of disagreement before initiating unilaterally 

any program actions which might later be subject to criticism in Congress or elsewhere. 

Finally, I believe that at the present time it is not essential that we define the procedure for implementing the possible development program. It is inevitable that this 

procedure will be influenced by the nature and extent of each agency interest in such a 

program. Our final determinations of these procedures, therefore, may be somewhat 

different from what we now envisage. 

I believe we have discussed this matter as much as is useful and that it is most important to insure continued harmonious accord between our agencies. Therefore, hoping 

you can accept my reservations as expressed in this letter, I have signed the agreement as 

you have prepared it. I believe that we can proceed constructively on the basis of this 

agreement and our mutual desire to formulate a recommended course of action in the 

best national interest. 

Sincerely 

Robert S. McNamara 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 361 

Document 11-28 

Document title: John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr. 

Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Associate Administrator, March 19, 1966, with attached 

Robert Seamans, Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator, and John Foster, Jr., Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering, DOD, Memorandum of Agreement, “Iktablishment 

of a Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MFEB),” no date. 

Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This agreement established the principle of reciprocity and sharing of flight opportunities between 

NASA and the Department of Defense, and it applied to the Apollo and the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory programs. When the Space Shuttle agreement was fmmulated, the agremnt in this memorandum was not renewed. When the subject of human spaceJight expa’ments arose again in the 

mid-I 980s, the approach taken in the earlier agreement was modified tofit with the shuttle management process and was handled the Air Force. 

[no pagination] 

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH 

AND ENGINEERING 

Washington 25, DC 20301 

March 16, 1966 

Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 

Associate Administrator 

National Aeronautics & Space Administration 

Washington, DC 20546 

Dear Bob: 

In response to your letter of 1 March 1966, I have concurred in the NASA-DoD 

Memorandum of Agreement establishing the “Manned Space Flight Experiments Board 

(MSFEB).” 

Based on discussions of our staff, and with the understanding that it would be acceptable to you, I have added to paragraph 6 of the Memorandum the following sentence: 

“Similar technical advice will be made available from appropriate DoD agencies.” 

A copy of the revised Memorandum is attached. 

Sincerely, 

“Johnny” 

John S. Foster, Jr. 

Enclosure 

********* 
362 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

[11 

Memorandum of Agreement 

Subject: Establishment of Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB) 

General Guidelines 

This Memorandum of Agreement is implemented in order to provide a means of 

coordination of the DoD and NASA manned space flight experiments program. These 

experiments, of a scientific, technological, or non-military operational nature, will be carried as a secondary objective on a space-available basis on selected DoD flight missions 

and as primary or secondary objectives on NASA flight missions. 

It is anticipated that experiments will be submitted from a variety of sources to both 

DoD and NASA where they will be reviewed and, if approved, submitted to a joint experiments review board whose functions are defined in this agreement. In general, those 

experiments which are related primarily to basic space science, technology, and applications will be assigned to NASA programs. Similarly, those experiments which are peculiar 

to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, 

or the defense of the United States would normally be assigned to DoD programs, whenever possible. This is not to preclude, however, the assignment of any experiment to a program of either Agency when this appears desirable on the basis of economy, timeliness, or 

other considerations of national interest. 

[2] 1. PURPOSE 

This agreement established a Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB) to 

coordinate experiment programs which will be conducted on DoD and NASA manned 

space flights. 

2. AUTHORITY 

The MSFEB is advisory to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 

NASA, and the Deputy Director for Strategic & Space Systems, DoD. 

3. FWCTIONS 

The MSFEB will have the following functions: 

a. Recommend the approval or disapproval of experiments to be conducted under 

DoD and NASA Manned Space Flight Programs. 

b. Recommend assignment of experiments to specific flight programs. 

c. Recommend relative priorities of experiments to be implemented, and periodically review the numbers of experiments scheduled for specific missions. 

d. Review the status of approved experiments. 

As used herein, “experiment” means an investigation which is not essential to the primary mission, launching, navigation, or recovery of the space vehicle or the spacecraft. 

Experiments normally will be under three general classifications: scientific, applications, 

and technological or non-military operational. MSFEB recommendations will be based on 

analyses which show that it will be operationally and technically feasible to conduct the 

experiment, and that the basic experimental objectives of the investigation can be satisfied within the framework of the primary mission objectives of the program to which the 

experiment is assigned. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 363 

[3] 4. h4EMBERSHIP 

The following personnel will serve as members and alternate members of the MSFEB: 

Members Alternates 

Dr. Homer E. Newell 

Associate Administrator for Space Science 

& Applications, NASA 

Dr. Mac C. Adams 

Associate Administrator for Advanced 

Research & Technology, NASA 

Dr. George E. Mueller 

Associate Administrator for Manned 

Space Flight, NASA 

Mr. Daniel J. Fink 

Deputy Director for Strategic & 

Space Systems, DOD 

Gen. Bernard A. Schriever 

Commander of the Air Force 

Systems Command, USAF 

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright 

Deputy Associate Administrator for Space 

Science & Applications, NASA 

Dr. Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. 

Deputy Associate Administrator for 

Advanced Research & Technology, NASA 

Mr. James C. Elms 

Deputy Associate Administrator for 

Manned Space Flight, NASA 

Mr. John E. Kirk 

Assistant Director for Space 

Technology, DOD 

Brig. Gen. Harry L. Evans 

Vice Director, MOL Program 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 

5. CHAIRMANSHIP Ah!D VOTING PROCEDURES 

The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, will act as Chairman. In 

his absence the DOD member will act as Chairman. 

MSFEB recommendations will not be based on majority and minority voting. Where 

recommendations are not unanimous, the views of all members will be recorded. 

6. STm SUPPORT 

A technical advisor to the Board will be appointed from the staff of the Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight to provide an independent source of advice to the 

Board on the feasibility and technical merit of proposed experiments submitted for Board 

approval, and on such other matters as the Board may deem desirable. Similar technical 

advice will be made available from appropriate DoD agencies. 

[4] A member of the staff of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight will 

serve as Executive Secretary to the Board and will be responsible for the management of 

the Board operations and maintenance of records. Additional support will be provided to 

the Board, as required, by the Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program. 

7. SUBMISSION OF EXPERIMEhTS 

Experiments will be reviewed within the sponsoring NASA or DOD Program Offices 

for scientific and technical merit prior to their submission to the MSFEB Secretariat for 

consideration by the Board. This review should include a recommendation of the priority of an experiment relative to others submitted by the sponsoring office. 

8. COORLUNATION 

It is the responsibility of the sponsoring office to accomplish appropriate coordination of experiment proposals within its program. The Executive Secretary, MSFEB, in 
364 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

conjunction with his coordination duties for the NASA Advanced Manned Missions 

Program, will effect overall coordination of experiments among the NASA Program 

Offices and a designated point of contact in DOD prior to placing them on the agenda 

for MSFEB consideration. 

9. GENERAL 

The Executive Secretary, MSFEB, will document the recommendations of the MSFEB 

for presentation to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, and to 

the Deputy Director for Strategic & Space Systems, DOD. 

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 

Deputy Administrator, NASA 

John Foster, Jr. 

Director of Defense Research & 

Engineering, DOD 

Document 11-29 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, to Honorable Robert C. 

Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, April 4, 1969, with attached “Terms of Reference 

for Joint DOD/NASA Study of Space Transportation Systems.” 

Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 

Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

President-elect Richard Nixon appointed a Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President-ebct Spiro 

Agnew, to oversee Am‘can space policy. At a March 22, 1969, Space Task Group meeting, the membership discussed joint development of a Space Transportation System (STS). Less than two weeks 

later; on Apnl4, NASA Administrator Paine fmally invited Secretary of the Air Force Seamans to 

study jointly the possibility of building a national STS. 

[no pagination] 

Honorable Robert C. Seamans 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Department of Defense 

Washington, DC 20301 

Dear Dr. Seamans: 

April 4, 1969 

Enclosed is a draft of Terms of Reference for a joint DoD/NASA study of space transportation systems. I understand this draft has been coordinated between our staffs, and I 

have signed it. Upon notification of your approval and signature, we are prepared to proceed immediately to implement the terms of the study. 

Sincerely yours, 

T.O. Paine 

Administrator 

Enclosure 

********* 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 365 

Terms of Reference for Joint DoD/NASA Study 

of Space Transportation Systems 

OBJECTIVE: 

The objective of the joint DoD/NASA study of Space Transportation Systems is to 

assess the practicality of a common system to meet the needs of both the DoD and the 

NASA. Emphasis will be placed on the economic sensibility and technical feasibility of 

such a system. 

BACKGROW: 

The need for ajoint DoD/NASA group to study space transportation was discussed at 

the Space Task Group meeting of March 22,1969. The Space Task Group was established 

by the President to recommend by September 1, 1969, a National Space Program for the 

post-Apollo period. It is expected that submissions by each participating agency will occur 

in June or July 1969. The joint DoD/NASA Study Group should provide timely results for 

these submissions. 

FUVCTIONS: 

The study shall be accomplished in two parts, the first part to be done separately by 

the two agencies, DoD and NASA, and the second part to be done jointly. 

1. The first part of the study shall proceed as follows: 

(a) Each agency, DoD and NASA, shall study its own [2] needs, present and 

future, for a new space transportation system. 

(b) On the basis of its own needs, each agency shall make a preliminary determination of the characteristics of the transportation system that would best 

meet its needs. 

2. The second part of the study shall be done jointly and shall proceed as follows: 

(a) The Joint Study Group shall assemble and correlate the needs of both agencies for a space transportation system. 

(b) The Joint Study Group shall assess the technical feasibility of various systems 

to meet the needs of both agencies. 

(c) The Joint Study Group shall compare the relative costs and assess the economic sensibility of systems meeting the needs of both agencies. 

(d) The Joint Study Group shall recommend a preferred concept and, if appropriate, alternative concepts of a space transportation system and provide the 

supporting rationale for each concept. 

RESULTS: 

A report shall be provided to the President’s Space Task Group on June 15, 1969. 

APPROA CH: 

The Staff Directors of DoD and NASA serving the Space Task [3] Group shall each 

designate a co-chairman for the Joint Study Group. Theses [sic] co-chairmen shall 

appoint members from each agency to form the group. The Staff Directors shall be 

responsible for providing a report to the Space Task Group on June 15, 1969. 

APPROVAL: 

Dr. Robert C. Seamans 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Dr. Thomas 0. Paine 

Administrator, NASA 
366 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Document 11-30 

Document title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Memorandum for the 

Record, “Space Shuttle Discussions with Secretary Seamans,” January 28,1970. 

Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

By early 1970, NASA had recognized that Department of Dejiise (DOD) support would likely be 

essential if White House approval for the Space Shuttle program were mer to be obtained. In this memorandum, NASA Deputy Administrator George Low records an early policy-level discussion with 

Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans and Assistant Secretary for Research and Development 

Grant Hansen on NASA-DOD cooperation in shuttle planning. 

[I1 Jan. 28, 1970 

Memorandum for the Record 

SUBJECT Space Shuttle Discussions with Secretary Seamans 

On January 27, 1970, I met with Bob Seamans to discuss the Phase B shuttle effort, 

shuttle classification, and the proposed DoD/NASA agreement on the Space Shuttle. 

I informed Bob of our plans to move out with a Phase B effort in the near future and 

told him of our general Phase B plans. I mentioned that, to my knowledge, the Air Force 

was in basic agreement with these plans except possibly on the questions of gross weight 

versus payload weight and cross-range requirements. I explained the reasons for going 

with a 3 1/2 million-pound gross weight and pointed out that the studies could be 

redirected at mid-point if this was the wrong weight. I also pointed out that the cross-range 

question would be handled by having two point designs, one with low cross-range and the 

second with high cross-range. Seamans agreed that the basic objective of the shuttle program should be to develop a low-cost transportation system and that requirements, such 

as cross-range, go-around capability, etc., must be tested in the light of this objective. 

Although he made no specific commitment, I believe that he has no significant objections 

to the points that I made. Grant Hansen was also present and raised a question concerning the use of gross weight instead of payload weight. However, he voiced no strong objections to our approach. A letter from Paine to Seamans on this subject was given to 

Seamans. 

On the subject of classification, there was agreement that the Space Shuttle program 

should be conducted on a generally unclassified basis. The justification for specific DoD 

performance requirements can, of course, be presented internal to the government on a 

classified basis, but the resulting Space Shuttle system should be unclassified in the same 

sense that the Apollo Program was unclassified. Seamans agreed to these points and fully 

recognized the international flavor of the program. 

[2] I left copies of the proposed NASA/DoD agreement on the Space Shuttle. . . . Bob 

Seamans pointed out that the Air Force had no money to spend on shuttle development 

this year, but nevertheless was very much interested in developing the shuttle as a national capability. He strongly urged the establishment of a co-chaired board for DoD requirements. Although he did not have time to read the agreement while I was there, I read 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 367 

pertinent excerpts to him and received a favorable response. I would expect that the Air 

Force will sign the agreement in short order. 

In response to a direct question, Bob Seamans pointed out that the Air Force was 

indeed an agent for the DoD on the Space Shuttle program and that he had discussed this 

with both Secretary Laird and John Foster. 

Following the discussions on the Space Shuttle, we talked about aeronautics, with 

Seamans emphasizing the need to move forward on an aeronautics program. Al Eggers 

[Dr. Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., special assistant to the Administrator] had, earlier in the day, discussed with him our dealings with [the Department of Transportation (DOT)] on the 

VTOL/STOL [vertical takeoff and landing/short takeoff and landing] aircraft program. 

Seamans indicated that the Air Force would like to participate in this effort as a third 

party, with the principal effort coming from NASA and DOT. 

We also discussed the DoD/NASA funding picture, and Seamans pointed out that 

Secretary Laird is most interested in getting NASA to “pay its own way.” He felt that Tom 

Paine should have lunch with Secretary Laird in the near future to discuss this in more 

detail. We agreed that the immediate problem is that of ETR [Eastern Test Range] and 

KSC and that some joint study in this area may be called for. At the present time the Air 

Force is conducting its own study on whether or not it should maintain a capability at 

ETR. 

Bob Seamans’ last point concerned the direction of NASA programs. He mentioned 

that, in the 1960’s, NASA was fully supported because of the competition with Soviet 

Russia. This type of support should not be expected in the 1970’s. NASA should therefore 

help solve the problems of the natural environment and thereby help pay for itself. 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

Document 11-31 

Document title: Thomas 0. Paine, NASA Administrator, and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 

Secretary of the Air Force, “Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Department of the Air Force Concerning the Space 

Transportation System,” NMI 1052.130, Attachment A, February 17,1970. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

During 1969, it became clear that there was great interest within the Department of Defense (000) 

as well as NASA with respect to a reusable space launch system. ReJecting this, a joint NASA-Air 

Force (USAF) Space Transportation System Committee was formally created on February 17, 1970, 

and was given primacy among all joint activities pertaining to the Space Transportation System. 

Important concepts established in the agreement included the unclassified nature of the program, the 

possibility of international cooperation, and equal participation of NASA and DOD in shuttle deuelopment, in terms of both investment and operations. This equality of investment was later used as the 

basis for subsequent shuttle pricing agreements. 
368 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

r11 

Agreement Between 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

and the Department of the Am Force 

Concerning the Space Transportation System 

This document establishes an agreement between NASA and the Department of the 

Air Force, acting as the agent of DoD, to insure that the proposed National Space 

Transportation System will be of maximum utility to both NASA and the DoD. 

I. Objective of the Space Transportation System 

The objective of the Space Transportation System (STS) is to provide the United 

States with an economical capability for delivering payloads of men, equipment, supplies, 

and other spacecraft to and from space by reducing operating costs an order of magnitude below those of present systems. 

The program may involve international participation and use. The development of 

the STS will be managed by NASA. The project will be generally unclassified. For purposes of this agreement, the STS will consist of the earth-toorbit Space Shuttle. 

II. NASA/USAF STS Committee 

A. Organization 

In order that the STS be designed and developed to fulfill the objectives of both the 

NASA and the DoD in a manner [2] that best serves the national interest, a NASA/USAF 

STS Committee is hereby established that will report jointly to the Administrator of the 

NASA and the Secretary of the Air Force. The Committee will consist of eight members, 

four to be appointed by the Administrator of the NASA and four to be appointed by the 

Secretary of the Air Force. The Co-Chairmen of the Committee will be the Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight (NASA) and the Assistant Secretary for Research 

and Development (Air Force). Any proposal for changing the composition or functions 

of the Committee will be referred to the NASA Administrator and the Air Force Secretary 

for their joint consideration. 

B. Function 

The Committee will conduct a continuing review of the STS Program and will recommend steps to achieve the objectives of a system that meets DoD and NASA requirements. Specifically, the Committee will review and make recommendations to the 

Administrator of NASA and to the Secretary of the Air Force on the establishment and 

assessment of program objectives, operational applications, and development plans. This 

will [3] include, but not be limited to: Development and operational aspects, technology 

status and needs, resource considerations, and interagency relationships. 

THOMAS 0. PAINE 

Administrator, NASA 

Date: Feb. 17, 1970 

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR. 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Date: Feb. 17, 1970 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWh’ 369 

Document 11-32 

Document title: William E Moore, NASA STS Secretary, and Lt. Col. Donald L. Steelman, 

USAF STS Secretary, “Space Transportation System Committee: Summary of Activities 

for 1970,” June 1971. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Space Transportation System (STS) Committee was established as the policy-level coordination 

forum between NASA and the Department of Defense (000) for developing the Space Shuttle. It drew 

its authority from the February 17, 1970, NASA-DOD agreement on the STS. It was through the 

forum of the STS Committee that DOD’s requirements for the Space Shuttb werefirst transmitted to 

NASA; DOD indicated the conditions under which it would place exclusive reliance on the shuttle. 

This report summarizing the committee’sfirst year activities, endorsed by the NASA and AirForce secretaries to the STS Committee, demonstrates the considerabb groundwd that was laid during that 

time for the joint program. The acronyms MSC, MSFC, and KSC are NASA centers and stand for the 

Manned Space Center; the Marshall Space Flight Center; and the Kennedy Space Center; respectively. 

The acronym OSSA refers to NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications, and AFSC stands for 

the Air Force Space Centex 

Introduction 

The NASA/USAF Space Transportation System Committee was formed for the purpose of providing a policy level interface between NASA and the USAF on the problems 

of developing the Space Shuttle. An agreement was formally signed on February 17, 1970 

by Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, 

Administrator, NASA. The agreement specified the objective of the Space Transportation 

System (STS), defined its limits, and established a committee to perform a continuing 

review of the program and recommend steps to achieve the objectives of the system that 

would meet the needs of both NASA and the DOD. The committee consists of eight 

members, four from each agency, and is co-chaired by the Associate Administrator for 

Manned Space Flight (NASA) and the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development 

(USAF) . A copy of the agreement is attached to this summary. 

The original members were: 

USAF 

Mr. Grant L. Hansen Co-Chairman 

General Walter Hedrick Member (HQ USAF) 

General Raymond Gilbert Member (AFSC) 

General F. M. Rodgers Member (AFSC) 

NASA 

Mr. Dale D. Myers 

Mr. Vincent Johnson 

Co-Chairman 

Member (OSSA) 

Mr. Lee James Member (MSFC) 

Dr. Chris Kraft, Jr. Member (MSC) 
370 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

By separate correspondence the Secretary of the Air Force and the Acting 

Administrator of NASA invited the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Council [NASC] to participate on the committee as an official observer. During the 

year the membership has changed in the Air Force representation and provision was 

made for specific alternates to attend when the principal was unable to make a called 

meeting. 

[2] The current membership and alternates are: 

USAF 

Mr. Grant IL. Hansen-Co-Chairman 

Alternate-Mr. Frank Ross 

MGen Paul Cooper-Member (AFSC) 

Alternate-Col Paul Atkinson 

BGen Kenneth Chapman-Member (AFSC) 

Alternate-Col Ralph Ford 

Col John Albert-Member (AF/RDS) 

Alternate-Col Frank Knolle 

Official Observer 

Mr. William Anders-NASC 

Alternate-M. Raymond Gilbert 

NASA 

Mr. Dale D. Myers-Co-Chairman 

Alternate-Mr. Charles Mathews 

Mr. Vincent Johnson-Member (OSSA) 

Alternate-Dr. Robert Wilson 

Mr. Lee James-Member (MSFC) 

Alternate-Dr. William Lucas 

Dr. Chris Kraft, Jr.-Member (MSC) 

Alternate-Lt Gen (Ret) Frank Bogast 

The following summary of the Space Transportation System Committee’s activities 

covers the period from the initial meeting on May 28, 1970, through the sixth meeting on 

December 15, 1970. 

131 

USAF Personnel Participation 

in the Space Shuttle Program 

One of the first questions at the initial meeting of the STS Committee was the extent 

to which the Air Force would participate in the Space Shuttle activities. The discussion 

focused on USAF personnel participation in the NASA program offices particularly at 

MSC and MSFC. SAMSO [Space and Missile Systems Organization] on an ad-hoc basis was 

already covering early integration meetings by travel assignments (TDY) . NASA stressed 

that the activities were beginning to accelerate and that a more permanent arrangement 

would be welcome if the Air Force wanted to participate actively. It was emphasized that 

very close coordination between NASA and the Air Force at the center level was critical to 

the Phase B definition effort and that this was the most effective way to facilitate the 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 371 

exchange of technical data and program activity status. NASA preferred direct involvement (or detailing) of Air Force personnel in the program activity, but that as a minimum, 

immediate liaison was recommended. 

At the second meeting of the STS Committee in June 1970, NASA presented its plan 

based on non-reimbursable assignment of USAF officers to NASA Centers and 

Headquarters. The plan requested five officers each for Headquarters and MSFC, ten officers for MSC and two officers for KSC during the Phase B activity. When Phases C and D were begun the Air Force could augment these assignments with additional officers as the 

need arose. The USAF accepted the plan for further study and stated that ten qualified 

officers would be assigned to SAMSO with five placed at MSFC and five on duty at MSC to 

participate in the Phase D activity. They expected to have the officers on site by fall. In the 

meantime SAMSO would continue covering the two centers by TDYuntil the assignments 

were executed. No assignments were made to KSC but [the] Air Force agreed to reappraise its manpower situation and report to the Committee in 90 days. They would also 

investigate the possibility of establishing a point of contact in the 6555th Aerospace Test 

Wing at Patrick AFB to coordinate activities with KSC. 

At the sixth meeting in December the Air Force reported that the two officers requested for KSC would be assigned to SAMSO with duty at KSC and that they should be on 

board by July 1971. 

[4] As a result of these actions, the following officers are currently participating in the 

Space Shuttle activities at the two Centers. 

MSFC 

LCol Thomas Moore 

Maj James A. Feibleman 

Capt Byron Thurer 

MSC 

Maj Patrick Crotty 

Maj Gary H. Minar 

Maj Charles T. Essmeier 

Implementation of Phase B 

Space Shuttle Management Plan 

NASA reported to the STS Committee at the first meeting its management plan for 

implementing the Phase a definition studies. The organization chart attached shows the 

relationship of the three Manned Space Flight Centers (MSFC, MSC and KSC) to each 

other and to the Headquarters Space Shuttle Office. Also shown were the Phase B contractor management assignments to the centers and the Vehicle System Integration 

Activity (VSIA) function between MSC and MSFC with Headquarters participation. 

Main points relative to the management of Phase efforts were the assignment of the 

North American Rockwell vehicle contract to MSC and the McDonnell Douglas vehicle 

contract to MSFC. Houston would have the overall orbiter technical responsibility for 

both contractors and Huntsville would have the overall booster technical responsibility for 

both contractors. The three Phase B engine contracts with Pratt and Whitney, Aerojet and 

Rocketdyne are being managed by MSFC. KSC has representatives in both center program 

offices and participates in the integration activity. Program integration activity takes place 

on a regular basis and includes representation from the Air Force (SAMSO). 

Space Shuttle Facilities Planning 

A briefing on the Master Facilities Planning Study was presented to the STS 

Committee at its first meeting. Basically the NASA Facilities Office is managing a $380K 

study by the Ralph M. Parsons Co. The study is to survey the candidate facilities as to their 
372 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

adequacy to support the Space Shuttle [5] Program and the costs of modifications or new 

construction required to meet criteria established as necessary for the launch, recovery 

and refurbishment of the Space Shuttle. The twelve month study is to culminate in a 

report to NASA setting forth the plan having the most favorable overall features as measured against the “ideal facilities matrix.” 

The Committee was concerned as to how this study was tied into the facilities activity 

of AACB [Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board], but was assured that close 

personnel liaison and information exchange would prevent any duplication of effort. It 

was stated that the AACB effort is an across-the-board national facility activity whereas the 

Parsons study is specifically oriented toward Space Shuttle requirements. It was also pointed out that the Air Force had personnel participating in the Space Shuttle Facilities 

Planning Group and therefore would be kept fully aware of the progress of the study. 

As a part of the discussion the question of industrial funding was raised by NASA, in 

particular, as it relates to the use of AEDC [Arnold Engineering Development Center] test 

facilities at Tullahoma and the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory Test Stand 1-56 at Haystack 

Butte. The present policy of DOD requires user funding for such facilities and the Air 

Force did not have FY 71 funds available to support shuttle testing at AEDC. An alternative would be to reprogram funds within the DOD to support Space Shuttle testing. 

However, military priorities for project funding precluded this. Therefore, any Phase B 

Space Shuttle testing at AEDC facilities would have to be on a cost reimbursable basis in 

accordance with the DOD policy. 

Space Tug or Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle 

A discussion of the expected similarities and differences between the DOD and NASA 

requirements for the space tug or orbit-toorbit shuttle (00s) was presented to the STS 

Committee by NASA at the first meeting. The main point emphasized was that a single 

design may be possible, but that further conceptual study and definition of mission 

requirements were needed. 

NASA informed the Committee that it was proceeding with a pre-Phase A study of the 

space tug which it hoped would define its requirements. The Air Force reports that it also 

was planning to conduct a concept and requirements analysis for the 00s. The 

Committee felt that the two studies would be [6] complementary. 

The Air Force Co-Chairman indicated that it might be appropriate for the development of the 00s to be undertaken by the Air Force. The NASA Co-Chairman stated that 

they would like the Air Force to consider that approach. Also the NASA Co-Chairman 

reported that the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) had contracted with two groups of foreign contractors for a pre-Phase A study to determine the feasibility and derive a simple definition for a space tug design. The costs of the contracts are 

approximately $500K. The STS Committee agreed that ELDO should be encouraged to 

continue in their space efforts. 

At the sixth meeting in December 1970, NASA briefed the Committee on the ELDO 

tug studies and the NASA pre-Phase A Space Tug studies. The various configurations 

being studied by ELDO were discussed and the observation was made that nothing different from U.S. findings on the space tug had emerged. NASA concluded their presentation on the pre-Phase A studies briefing with the following list of findings: 

a. Reusable tug synchronous mission performance is extremely sensitive to mass 

fraction. 

b. Ground based tugs will not be recovered for most synchronous missions. 

c. Synchronous payload recovery will require tug staging or orbital propellant 

loading. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 373 

d. Moderate increase in shuttle payload capability (above the 25K reference payload) will not affect general conclusions or tug utilization for synchronous missions. 

e. Current upper stages may serve as effective interim expendable tugs for synchronous missions. 

f. Shuttle economic model should assume no synchronous tug or payload recovery-at least for [the] early operational years. 

The NASA Co-Chairman stressed that in the tug studies we want to make sure that the 

payload and Space Shuttle interface is minimized in order to keep the system complexity 

and cost down. NASA also covered the expendable stages for use with the Space Shuttle 

in lieu of an 00s or space tug. This included the current state of “kick” stages such as 

Agena, [7] Centaur, Burner 11, and the Titan Transtage as well as the potential modified 

Agena and modified Centaur stages all of which could serve as interim tugs. 

The Air Force gave a status report on the DOD orbit-toorbit shuttle and expendable 

stage study efforts. In FY 71 the DOD effort has involved both contractor and in-house 

activity to define an 00s that would meet unique DOD requirements. Contracts for conceptual designs of a reusable 00s were let with two contractors in February 1971. This 

effort is directed toward meeting DOD needs with an assessment being made to see if 

[the] vehicle couldn’t meet the needs of both agencies with a minimum of modification. 

The Air Force also was specifying that deployment/retrieval considerations for the earth 

orbital shuttle/orbit-to-orbit shuttle (EOS/OOS) and payload interfaces be examined. 

Engine design studies to define a light weight, high performance propulsion system for 

potential use in a high energy upper stage/OOS were being conducted at the same time. 

General Security Guide 

The development of a general security guide for the Space Shuttle program was 

assigned to both NASA and the USAF at the first meeting in May 1970 of the Space 

Transportation System Committee. A draft of the security guidelines was presented to the 

Committee for review and comment at the second meeting. It was requested that the 

guidelines for their comments and a report be made to the Committee at a later date. The 

Committee also suggested that the draft be as short as possible. A condensed version was 

submitted at the third meeting for consideration and coordination. 

Comments were incorporated and the general security guidelines were accepted by 

the Committee at the fourth meeting in October 1970. The Co-Chairmen instructed the 

Secretariat to prepare the document for their signature. The guidelines were signed on 

November 19, 1970 and distributed through channels to all elements participating in the 

Space Shuttle Program. 

[SI Space Shuttle Payload Size 

The Air Force briefed the STS Committee on DOD payload size and weight requirements at the second meeting in June 1970. 

Payload physical size has a definite influence on development and operational costs; 

however, in order to make the decision, mission utility to both NASA and the DOD must 

be considered in the analysis as well. From the baseline the size and weight of future payloads was projected for missions to be flown eight to ten years hence when the shuttle 

would be operational. Also the growth history of launch vehicle payload capabilities and 

the length of payload fairings were shown as indicators of the need to plan for the accommodation large payload mission requirements that would utilize [a] 60 foot by 15 foot 
374 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITAKY RELATIONS 

cargo bay and carry an equivalent payload weight of 40,000 pounds to low earth polar 

orbit. 

The diameters of current launch vehicles restrict their payload diameters which in 

turn causes design complications and the attendant high costs for packaging and reliability. Furthermore, analysis of available data shows that the pressing need for improved 

capability and mission use demands larger diameters and greater payload weight capabilities. Increased lifetime, power and minimum design cost are additional parameters for 

consideration. 

Based on required improvements to the present systems, mission needs and payload 

growths predicted for the 1980's an equivalent payload weight capability of 40,000 to 

53,000 pounds is required to low earth polar orbit; 40,000 to 50,000 pounds is required to 

low earth polar orbit. A 60 foot cargo bay length is necessary for current and projected 

missions and a 15 foot diameter is needed for high energy missions if the 60 foot length 

is not to be exceeded. 

It was pointed out that studies [have] shown a Space Shuttle with a 40,000 to 50,000 

pound capability coupled with sufficient payload volume (the baseline requirement) is 

the most economical size for DOD and national mission projections. NASA studies were 

in agreement and also indicated that the larger vehicle was more economical from a total 

dollar standpoint but there was the problem of securing the annual funding levels 

required for this type [of] development. 

[9] The Air Force emphasized that if a shuttle of reduced payload capability was developed then NASA could expect the Air Force to retain an inventory of expendable launch 

vehicles to satisfy their mission needs and this would cause the shuttle to lose some of its 

economic attractiveness and probably degrade the utility of the shuttle. It was also noted 

that DOD has not been considering any upgrading of its current stable of expendables 

because it is intended that the shuttle, if properly sized and with the proper capability, 

would replace them. 

NASA suggested that cost tradeoff studies for retaining a limited expendable launch 

vehicle capability and developing a smaller Space Shuttle versus the development of a 

large Space Shuttle should be considered. This suggestion was accepted and a report was 

requested for the next meeting. 

At the fourth meeting the Committee was informed by NASA that the 60 foot by 15 

foot cargo bay should be retained and that the 25,000 pound payload to reference orbit 

(55" x 270 nm) with air-breathing engines in [it] could be increased to 40,000 pounds to 

low earth polar orbit by removing the air-breathing engines. The USAF emphasized that 

operational and safety considerations must be analyzed before such a proposal would be 

accepted. NASA indicates that the airbreathers would be retained for all development/ 

test flights and also for the early operational flights. 

International Participation 

At the second meeting of the STS Committee, the Office of International Affairs discussed the possibility of foreign industry and governments participating in the Space 

Shuttle Program. This would require a technology exchange between the parties involved. 

The STS Committee received a request from the Chairman, Interagency Ad Hoc Group 

on NSDM 72 for assistance in establishing procedures for the exchange of technical data 

with those nations desiring to participate in the development program. The Air Force 

indicated they had been studying this and therefore was assigned the task of drafting a 

technology sensitivity guidelines document for review by the Committee. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 375 

While the sensitivity guidelines document was being coordinated in both the DOD 

and NASA, the Phase A and B contractors were advised by NASA to control foreign representatives [ 101 within the contractor’s system on the same basis as any foreign visitor. At 

the fifth meeting the STS Committee learned that the Grumman agreement with Dornier 

of West Germany and the North American Rockwell (NAR) agreement with 

Messerschmidt, Boelkow and Blohm (MBB) and British Aircraft Company (BAC) had 

been approved in two phases. The first phase provides for transfer of general data and the 

second phase provides for the transfer of more specific data after the US. contractors and 

their foreign participants have defined the areas of interest and government-togovernment agreements have been approved. 

The STS Committee requested copies of the coordinated sensitivity document be supplied to each member at the sixth meeting with comments to be forwarded to the 

Secretariat by December 28, 1970. The STS Committee also decided that the sensitivity document, when approved, would be subject to semi-annual reviews. (The document was subsequently approved and forwarded to the NASA Office of International Affairs-Code I). 

Other Government Agency/Other Military Service 

Space Shuttle Mission Requirements 

NASA was requested by the STS Committee to check with other civilian agencies and 

the Air Force was requested to check with other military services for all possible mission 

requirements that might be factored into the Space Shuttle mission model being formulated for the Phase B study contractors. NASA reported at the third meeting that mission 

requirements from other government agencies are coordinated by the Meteorological 

Satellite Program Review Board and provided to NASA planners when these requirements 

are firm. The Air Force reported that Army and Navy mission requirements have been validated and are reflected in the extended DOD mission and traffic models provided to 

NASA on 4 June 1970. These models cover projected missions and traffic through 1990. 

The Air Force will keep the model data current by updating or revising when necessary. 

[I11 

Early Flight Payload Identification 

NASA informed the Air Force at the third STS Committee meeting that they were 

attempting to identify meaningful specific payloads that could be candidates for the early 

orbital shuttle flights. Primary emphasis was being placed on identifymg payloads for low 

altitude missions, particularly those which would not require high energy stages. Payloads 

for high energy missions [that] would require additional propulsive stages would also be 

identified but in a separate category. It was suggested that the Air Force also identify a 

number of specific payloads that could be candidates for early flights. 

At the fourth meeting the STS Committee was briefed on the results of a joint 

NASA/USAF-SAMSO study leading to the selection of specific payloads that could be carried on early shuttle flights. The STS Committee requested that USAF and NASA field 

installations be provided copies of the study for review and comment. Guidance for the 

review was given by USAF (Hdqtrs) and [the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight]. 

A briefing on the in-depth review of the first ten Space Shuttle missions was presented in December at the sixth meeting of the STS Committee. The NASA portion of the 

briefing provided data on the constraints that must be placed upon the early payloads and 

the capabilities that the crew and orbiter will have on the first few flights. With these limitations in mind, several prospective payloads were discussed but no hard schedule was 
376 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

proposed nor desired. The USAF portion was classified and provided alternate payloads 

to those first proposed in the original package. They stressed that the Air Force data was 

for planning purposes and as such could change as mission requirements changed during 

the next eight years of shuttle development. 

The STS Committee decided that NASA and the USAF should continue the study 

since it had proven a good mechanism for learning about some of the expected operational and interface problems. 

[I21 

Phase B Cost/Design Performance 

Management Plan 

NASA presented its Cost/Design Performance Management Plan which was implemented during Phase B at the third meeting of the STS Committee in August 1970. The 

plan resulted from the need to assure NASA that they could afford to build the Space 

Shuttle and that the contractors were aware of the limitations of the NASA projected budget. By establishing objectives early in the program, NASA hoped to give the contractors 

“bogeys” which they could use in their definition studies and that the studies would produce a realistic program that NASA and the nation could afford. 

These cost objectives or “bogeys” are in fact specific cost estimates established as a target or baseline reference to accomplish the specific goal. The bogeys which the Phase C 

vehicle contractors are using now related primarily to that portion of the Space Shuttle 

program for which they are responsible. It is important to realize that other cost elements 

such as main engines, facilities, special test handling equipment, etc., will have to be taken 

into account in addition to the vehicle contractor cost in order to arrive at a total Space 

Shuttle program cost. Cost objectives for these other elements of the program have been 

set and will be used at the appropriate time in the phased program plan. 

The fundamental principal of the cost objective plan is to provide working cost targets as a cost reference in the design selection process during the Phase B definite effort. 

Cost thus becomes a major design criteria in the same sense as performance. The high 

cost elements and influence will be identified and consideration can be given to alternate 

design approaches or a modification of the requirements if necessary, e.g., the decision to 

make GLOW [gross liftoff weight] a tradeoff variable and baseline the payload weight as 

a means of lowering costs and simplifylng design. 

The necessity to stay within the cost objective can then be an incentive to find and 

adopt new ways of doing business including subsystems tradeoff. This method thus 

becomes the shared responsibility of both the government and the contracts to keep costs 

as low as possible while at the same time maintaining the high quality and reliability that 

have been a hallmark of the space program to date. 

~ 3 1 

Crossrange Requirements 

Operational requirements of the DOD and refinement of NASA studies have resulted 

in the crossrange of the Space Shuttle being baselined at 1100 nm. 

In a classified briefing at the fourth meeting of the STS Committee the Air Force 

pointed out that the military need for a high crossrange is based on DOD dedicated missions requiring a fast response in the event of a national crisis, a quick return from orbit, 

[or] abort to orbit[,] and return to a high crossrange, the order of 1100 nm, is necessary 

to provide the operational flexibility required by these types of mission. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 377 

One way of achieving this requirement is to trade payload weight for the added 

Thermal Protection System (TPS) weight which will protect the vehicle in the hypersonic 

maneuvers that produce the desired crossrange. A study to determine the merit of such a 

trade was initiated by the Air Force. At the sixth STS meeting the Air Force gave a classified briefing covering the preliminary findings of the study. 

Of the DOD applications, the near polar missions were shown as the ones requiring 

the 1100 nm crossrange if the orbiter is to return to the launch site after once around. 

This high crossrange requirement could be reduced if alternate landing sites were used. 

However, the orbiter would have to be ferried from the alternate recovery site to the 

launch site for refurbishment prior to its next launch. Use of alternate sites then would 

require additional handling and servicing equipment. Since the orbiter ferry range is limited to about 700 nm, either in-flight refueling or several flight legs night be required 

depending on the location of the alternate site. 

About 30% of the DOD missions require the orbiter to carry an equivalent payload 

weight of about 40,000 pounds to low entry orbit and still have a high crossrange capability. This equivalent payload weight does not include the propellant weight of 11,000 

pounds required for abort to orbit using the then currently baselined engine size. (Engine 

size has subsequently been increased to 550,000 pounds of thrust at sea level.) 

The briefing concluded that, for some DOD missions, high crossrange requirements 

are coincident with heavy payloads. Therefore, unless alternate recovery sites and ferrying [14] capabilities are shown to be operationally attractive, the shuttle orbiter must have 

both the 1100 nm crossrange capability and the ability to deliver 40,000 pounds to low 

earth polar orbit. This capability will enable the Space Shuttle to capture the type of mission discussed above. 

Air Force Phase B Study Tasks 

The Air Force briefed the Committee on their FY71 STS study tasks at the third meeting. Their primary emphasis was a study effort to identify the functions and operating 

modes peculiar to the support of DOD missions. Contract tasks were proposed as add-on 

effort to the two NASA Phase B vehicle contracts. This would provide an assessment of 

NASA Phase B candidate Space Shuttle system capabilities to support missions unique to 

DOD. 

The contractors would perform tradeoff studies and cost analysis to determine the 

impact of specific DOD needs on baseline system design and operations and to determine 

the modifications necessary to the baseline configuration in order to capture the DOD 

missions. The Air Force assured NASA that this study effort would identify those DOD missions that the current NASA baseline configuration would satisQ. It was emphasized that 

contractor teams supporting the DOD study effort would be identifiable and separate 

from the teams performing work under the NASA Phase B contract. The contracting 

alternatives were discussed and the STS Committee recommended that the NASA Phase 

B Space Shuttle contracts be amended to accomplish the specified Air Force tasks. Also 

recommended was a management approach which assured the close integration of the 

SAMSO and NASA study efforts. NASA agreed with this approach and felt that the addition of the two $300K tasks would contribute significantly to the Phase B effort. 
378 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Document 11-33 

Document title: John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to Dr. 

James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, April 13, 1972. 

Source: Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 

Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Because a large number of mililary and national security payloads are placed into polar orbits and 

the launch sites at Cape Canaveral are unsuitable for this purpose, the military has launched satellites into high-inclination orbits from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California since February 1959. 

The use of Vandenberg as a shuttle launch and landing site was one of the primary drivers of shuttle design, determining cross-range requirements and abort modes. In April 1972, the Department OJ 

Defense officially concurred with the selection of both Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg as 

launch and landing sites fi the Space Shuttle. 

[no pagination] 13 April 1972 

Dr. James C. Fletcher 

Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 20546 

Dear Dr. Fletcher: 

This is to advise you that the Department of Defense concurs in the selection of the 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, as 

launch and landing sites for the Space Shuttle, as follows: 

1. The initial launch and landing site will be at KSC and be used for research and 

development launches and for all easterly operational launches feasible from KSC. 

General purpose shuttle facilities for all users will be provided by NASA at KSC on a time 

schedule compatible with the shuttle development program. 

2. A second operational site for missions requiring high inclination launches not 

feasible from KSC is planned at Vandenberg Air Force Base toward the end of the 1970’s. 

General purpose shuttle facilities for all users will be provided by the Department of 

Defense at Vandenberg AFB on a time schedule compatible with progress in the shuttle 

development program and timely utilization of the shuttle for operational missions 

requiring high inclination launches. 

Sincerely, 

John S. Foster, Jr. 

Document 11-34 

Document title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, to NASA Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight, “Space Tug Decision,” October 3, 1973. 

Source: Deputy Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 379 

This memorandum from NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low reflected NASA thinking 

regarding management of the space tug. Low’s reasoning included Department of Defense (000) 

funding of part of the development costs of the ouerall Space Transportation System, so NASA could 

reduce its costs and peak funding requirements. Furthore, Low considered it important that the 

Air Force get more involved in the shuttk’s development. DOD had committed to use the shuttle conditionally, requesting further study of its performance and technology and demonstration of both its 

cost savings and operational status. Degber involvement the AirForce, it was assumed, would kad 

to its stronger commitment to the shuttle. Don Fuqua, mentioned in the memorandum, was a Flon‘da 

congressman active on the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Jim Wilson was a committee staff member 

October 3, 1973 

Memorandum 

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 

FR AD/Deputy Administrator 

SUBJECT: Space Tug Decision 

Don Fuqua asked to see me privately after the ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] briefing. During the private meeting he asked, “Does NASA intend to develop the Tug or do 

you intend to let the Air Force take it away from you?” 

I told Don that this decision had not yet been made but that NASA management was 

quite interested in having the Air Force develop the Tug for two reasons: 

1. to minimize NASA’s peak funding requirements, and 

2. to get the Air Force (DOD) more deeply involved in the Space Shuttle development. 

Don voiced a number of concerns, most of which are expressed in the attached document, which, I believe, was prepared by Jim Wilson. I promised two things: 

1. Phil Culbertson would get together with Jim Wilson soon to discuss some of the 

points raised in the document. Specifically, the question of the applicability of the Space 

Act would be discussed. 

2. [NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Dale] Myers and Low 

would get together with Fuqua toward the end of October to discuss the entire issue. 

[2] I am not sure whether the end of October date needs to be firm, but certainly we 

ought to talk to Fuqua about it before a final decision is made. 

By copy of this memo, I am asking Gerry Griffin to keep track of setting up this 

meeting. 

George M. Low 
380 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Document 11-35 

Document title: James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable James R. 

Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, June 21,1974. 

Document 11-36 

Document title: W.P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Honorable James C. 

Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, August 7, 1974. 

Source: Both in Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

NASA and the Office of Management and Budget had agreed on January 3, 1972, that the Space 

Shuttle would have a large payload bay, capable of handling the largest US. military satellites being 

planned. This did not mark a policy decision of exclusive use of the shuttle, however; as is evident in 

this letter from NASA Administrator James Fletcher to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and the 

reply from Deputy Secretary of Defense WP Clements. By 1974, the Department of Defense (000) 

was examining the wisdom of a complete phaseout of expendable launch vehicles, which raised sa'- 

ous concern within NASA and Congress. Later budgetary decisions would make abandoning expendabb launch uehicbs a de facto policy because of the cost of maintaining both options. This de facto 

policy, howevq was never explicitly stated; DOD continued to favor a prudent expendable launch 

vehicle backup policy. The handwritten note on the Clements letter is from NASA Deputy 

Administrator George Low to Fletche?: In the Fletcher lettq Mal Currie was the Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering; his name was misspelled by Clements. 

[11 

Honorable James R. Schlesinger 

Secretary of Defense 

Washington, DC 20301 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

Document 11-35 

June 21, 1974 

I had hoped to see you before having to leave town for two weeks, but since this has 

not been possible I am taking this way to alert you to the matter I wanted to talk to you 

about. 

It concerns the Space Shuttle. Through our regular contacts with DOD, we understand that in the present review of the DOD five-year plan questions are being raised on 

the DOD participation in the shuttle program which had been agreed to for planning purposes at the time the program was approved by the President. Questions are being raised 

on the DOD's provision of launch and landing facilities on the West Coast, on future DOD 

procurement of orbiters for DOD use, and on the planned phase-out of DOD's use of 

expendable launch vehicles. 

We have discussed these problems with the Air Force and Mal Currie and they are 

working on ways to reduce the cost of the facilities planned at Vandenberg Air Force Base 

and to minimize the budgetary impact on DOD procurement of orbiters. Neither the 

VAFB facilities nor the procurement of orbiters are matters requiring actual decisions now 

or in the FY 1976 budget. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 381 

My concern is that a decision in the DOD planning process to back away from previously planned DOD participation in the shuttle program, or a decision which implies that 

the DOD will not rely on the shuttle for its space activities in the 1980’s, could be used by 

Congressional opponents of the program to attack and perhaps even cut back the shuttle 

development program. 

As you know, the Space Shuttle is an Administration program that is national in scope, 

and decisions to proceed with the shuttle were based, in part, on previous DOD studies 

which indicated [2] very substantial benefits to DOD through use of the shuttle. I’m sure 

you would plan to consult with me in advance if you believed that any decisions making 

significant changes in DOD’s previously planned role and use of the Space Shuttle are 

necessary at this time. However, I was afraid that due to the press of other DOD business 

such consultation might have been overlooked and therefore was most anxious to see you 

before I left. 

In my absence George Low will be available to meet with you whenever convenient. 

With best wishes, 

Sincerely, 

James C. Fletcher 

Administrator 

Document 11-36 

[no pagination] Aug 7 1974 

Honorable James C. Fletcher 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics & Space Administration 

Washington, D. C. 20546 

Dear Dr. Fletcher: 

The Secretary and I were pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you and Dr. 

Low the Space Shuttle program and the concerns which you raised earlier in your June 

21, 1974, letter. 

The Department of Defense is planning to use the Space Shuttle, which NASA is 

developing, to achieve more effective and flexible military space operations in the future. 

Once the Shuttle’s capabilities and low operating cost are demonstrated we expect to 

launch essentially all of our military space payloads on this new vehicle and phase out of 

inventory our current expendable launch vehicles. 

Recent budget actions assure that adequate outyear funding will be available to develop a low cost modified upper stage for use with the Shuttle. This stage will be ready for 

operational use at Kennedy Space Center concurrently with the Shuttle in 1980. Funding 

is also included now in out budget for establishing a minimum cost Shuttle launch capability at Vandenberg Air Force Base consistent with realistic DOD and NASA needs. This 

addition should be available around December 1982; however, funding constraints could 

cause some delays. As we made clear in our conversation, overall budget constraints force 

us to defer any consideration of orbiter buys at this time. 
382 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Dr. Curry [sic] has been very much involved in our budgetary deliberations on the 

use of the Shuttle and will be available to discuss these points further with you at any time. 

Sincerely, 

W. P. Clements 

Document 11-37 

Document title: John E Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight; John J. 

Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development); James C. 

Fletcher, NASA Administrator; William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

“NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding on Management and Operation of the 

Space Transportation System,” January 14,1977. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In the mid-1 970s, NASA and the Department of Defense (000) began to discuss the management 

and operations of the Space Shuttle system. These discussions resulted in a memorandum of understanding, which expanded earlierpincipks of cooperation between NASA and DOD. The document 

avoided asserting that the Space Transportation System would be the exclusive launch vehicle for 

DOD, referring to it instead as the primary launch vehicle. 

[I1 

NASA/DOD 

Memorandum of Understanding on 

Management and Operation of 

the Space Transportation System 

1.0 PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Understanding establishes the broad policies and 

principles that will govern the relationships between the DOD and NASA relevant to the 

development, acquisition and operation of the national Space Transportation System. 

The Memorandum of Understanding shall be used as the basis for more detailed documentation between the NASA and the DOD further delineating Space Transportation 

System management and operations concepts and the specific roles and responsibilities of 

each agency. 

For purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the national Space 

Transportation System consists of an earth-toorbit Space Shuttle, the upper stage(s) 

required for orbital velocities exceeding the Shuttle capability, and the ground support 

equipment and facilities necessary for operation of the system. A DODdeveloped expendable Interim Upper Stage (IUS) will be available concurrently [2] with the operational 

Space Shuttle for use by both agencies. There is planning for development of Spinning 

Solid Upper Stage (SSUS) to supplement the IUS which would be available concurrently 

with the operational Space Shuttle for use by both agencies. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 383 

2.0 BACKGROW: On February 13, 1969, the President appointed a multi-agency Space 

Task Group to develop recommendations on the direction which the US. Space Program 

should take in the Post Apollo period. The Space Task Group recommended that a 

reusable Space Transportation System be developed to allow more economical and effective use of space. 

On February 17, 1970, NASA and the Air Force, acting as the designated agent for 

DOD, established by joint agreement the NASA/USAF Space Transportation System 

Committee to provide an instrumentality for joint review and recommendations concerning development and evolution of a Space Transportation System which fulfill the 

objectives of both NASA and DOD in a manner that best serves the national interest. 

[3] On January 5, 1972, the President decided that the United States should proceed at 

once with the development of a space transportation system capable of providing routine 

access to space and taking the place of all present launch vehicles except the very smallest and the very largest. 

On April 13, 1972, the selection of J.F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, and 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, as launch/landing sites for the Space Shuttle was 

agreed upon. 

3.0 GEhERAL POLICIES ANLI PRINCIPLES: The Space Transportation System (STS) is a 

national program designed to serve all users-both civil and defense. The evolution of a 

viable, cost effective system requires the efficient use of extensive national resources, primarily those of NASA, DOD and the aerospace industry. The overall planning and coordination to insure the most effective utilization of these resources in the development, 

acquisition and operation of the STS are the responsibility of NASA. The DOD will use the 

STS and participate as a partner in development, acquisition, and operation activities as 

specifically defined herein. 

[4] Effective and efficient use of the national STS requires an environment of understanding and cooperation between the agencies. To this end, there shall be maintained a 

free and effective interchange of essential technical, financial, and managerial information between the two agencies. This interchange shall be accomplished primarily throughout the NMA/USAF Space Transportation System Committee. Coordination will be 

maintained with the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board and other joint 

groups established by mutual agreement. 

It is anticipated that interest in the National Space Transportation System will continue to grow as more and more agencies recognize the merits and benefits associated 

with a non-expendable means for placing and retrieving payloads in space. The STS 

should provide benefits for many varied space requirements. Fulfillment of requirements 

from actual and potential users of this system must be given careful consideration. Insofar 

as their fulfillment does not compromise other priority requirements to an unreasonable 

degree, they will be accommodated. 

[5] The cooperation and coordination required will be implemented so as to assure consistency with applicable policy with respect to the relationship between civil and military 

space activities. 

4.0 MANAGEMEhTAh!D OPERATIONS CONCEPTS: The overall objective is to ensure that 

the national Space Transportation System will be of maximum utility to both agencies. 

The accomplishment of this objective will be under the purview of the joint NASA/USAF 

STS Committee. 

The following concepts, policies and principles, and the associated roles and responsibilities are agreed to: 
384 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

4.1 NASA RESPONSIBILITIES: The NASA is responsible for developing the overall STS 

operations concepts and plans for serving as overall financial manager for the STS. In 

addition: 

4.1.1 The NASA is responsible for the development of the Space Shuttle, to include 

the orbiter and its propulsion systems, the solid rocket boosters, the external tank and 

general purpose ground support equipment and facilities. 

[6] 4.1.2 The NASA will make every effort to incorporate the DOD requirements into 

the Space Shuttle, with due consideration for schedule and cost impacts, in order that 

the STS be designed and developed to fulfill the objectives of future uses of the STS. 

4.1.3 The NASA is responsible for providing the general purpose Shuttle equipment and facilities to perform the ground, launch and landing activities for all Space 

Shuttle operations at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) . NASA will plan for an initial 

operational capability at KSC in 1980. 

4.1.4 The NASA will plan to use the Interim Upper Stage (IUS) for appropriate 

missions and is responsible for providing to DOD those requirements affecting the 

IUS design which are considered important to meet NASA objectives. NASA will provide the USAF with funds for their peculiar IUS requirements. 

[7] 4.1.5 The NASA will plan to use the IUS for all of its planetary missions for those 

earth orbital missions that are not more economically achieved by the SSUS. The 

SSUS will be used primarily for gec-synchronous missions of the type currently flown 

by the expendable Delta and Atlas-Centaur vehicles. 

4.1.6 The NASA is the responsible agency for Space Shuttle flight planning and 

interacting all flights and users. NASA will provide for management, integration, 

flight operations, and control for all Shuttle flights regardless of launch or landing 

site used. For DOD dedicated missions DOD will provide the mission director. STS 

users will provide to NASA their requirements in the format and to the detail required 

by NASA to allow the hardware and software integration of the payload or combined 

upper stage payload combination. Payload mission planning and operations are the 

responsibility of the payload agency. Funding for these activities will be in accordance 

with the reimbursement sub[-]agreement referred to in 4.1.8. 

[8] 4.1.7 NASA with USAF assistance will develop integrated STS logistics and training 

plans encompassing, JSC Uohnson Space Center], KSC, and VAFB. 

4.1.8 NASA, as financial manager of the STS, is responsible for establishing an STS 

pricing and reimbursement policy for all non-DOD users for the STS operational era. 

Because of DOD’s heavy investment, large usage, and the operation of VAFB, the 

DOD pricing and reimbursement arrangements will be jointly negotiated between 

NASA and DOD and will be set forth in a more detailed NASA/DOD sub[-]agreement. 

4.2 DOD RESPONSIBILITIES: The DOD will plan to use the STS as the primary vehicle for 

placing payloads in orbit. In addition: 

4.2.1 The DOD is responsible for providing to NASA those requirements affecting 

the Space Transportation System which are the responsibility of NASA and considered essential to meet the DOD objectives. 

[9] 4.2.2 The DOD will develop the IUS including the general purpose ground support equipment. The DOD will insure that both DOD and NASA requirements are 

considered in the current IUS validation phase. 

4.2.3 The USAF is the responsible agency for planning the mission integration of 

users involving DOD programs and international military activities covered by government-togovernment agreements. The USAF is the focal point for providing the 

necessary data to NASA for the STS integration of the integrated DOD payload upper 

stage combination. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 385 

4.2.4 The USAF is responsible for providing the general purpose Shuttle equipment and facilities to perform the ground, launching and landing activities for all 

Space Shuttle operations at VAFB. The USAF will operate VAFB and plan for an initial operational capability at VAFB of 1982. 

[ 101 4.3 OTHER RESPONSIBILITLES 

4.3.1 The resources of both agencies which can contribute to the development, 

testing, production, training and operations for the STS will be used to the maximum 

extent possible. The plans and agreements on agency roles and responsibilities for use 

of these resources will be developed as required. 

4.3.2 To the maximum extent possible, ground support equipment and ground 

operating procedures developed for use at KSC by NASA will be used by DOD at 

VAFB. NASA will consider the DOD operational needs at VAFB in t.he development of 

KSC equipment and procedures. 

4.3.3 Each agency is responsible for providing its own payload facilities external to 

the launch pad area. Launch pad payload facilities will be provided by the developing 

agency to satisfy the normal mode of payload operations at that launch site. Other 

payload peculiar facilities and [ground support equipment] will be provided [ 111 by 

the agency responsible for the peculiar payload. Mutual usage of facilities will be considered where feasible and appropriate. 

4.3.4 Orbiter flight control for all missions will be the responsibility of the NASA 

JSC Mission Control Center (MCC) unless mission traffic changes or security needs 

require that a DOD MCC be developed. DOD and NASA will agree on DOD peculiar 

security provisions required at NASA facilities. Such provisions will be subjected to 

negotiated reimbursement. 

4.3.5 STS flight elements procured will be interchangeable for use on either 

agency’s missions, and capable of being operated at all designated sites. 

4.3.6 A procurement strategy for acquisition of STS production items will be jointly developed by NASA and the USAF for both initial investment and continuing procurement. 

4.3.7 The STS will be compatible with the communications, command, and control 

systems of both agencies. 

[ 121 4.3.8 An operating/using agency(ies) mission model, to include expendable booster transition and phase-out plans, will be maintained to provide the basis for program 

and operational analyses and planning. 

4.3.9 This Memorandum of Understanding represents the current status of agreements between NASA and the DOD on development, acquisition and operation of the 

Space Transportation System. Revisions and/or amendments will be made as required 

to maintain the currency of this document. 

5.0 EFFECTIVE DATE: This Memorandum of Understanding is effective on the last day 

of the signatures below: 

John F. Yardley 

Associate Administrator 

for Space Flight 

Date: 13 October, 1976 

John J. Martin 

Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force (Research and 

Development) 

Date: 13 October 1976 
386 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

APPROVED: 

James C. Fletcher 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Date: December 6, 1976 

William P. Clements, Jr. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Date: 1-1477 

Document 11-38 

Document title: John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and 

Development), Department of Defense; John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator 

for Space Flight; Robert N. Parker, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 

Department of Defense; A.M. Lovelace, NASA Deputy Administrator, “Memorandum of 

Agreement Between NASA and DOD: Basic Principles for NASA/DOD Space 

Transportation System Launch Reimbursement,” March 7,1977. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

John J. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the AirForce (Research and Development), and John F Yardlqr, 

NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, signed an agreement in March I977 that determined 

what the Department of Dejense (000) would pay for shuttle launch services. For thefirst six years 

of operation, DOD would pay NASA what amounted to the incremental costs of rnata’als and services. This agremnt later caused much public discussion about the favorable price allowed DOD payloads, but it is important to note that this decision had been based on the recognition of equal involvement established in the original Space Transportation System agreement OfFebruary I970 (Document 

11-21 in this volume), VAFB is the acronym for Vandenberg Air Force Base, and KSC stands for 

Kennedy Space Centex 

PI 

Memorandum of Agreement Between NASA and DOD 

SUBJECT Basic Principles for NASA/DOD Space Transportation System Launch 

Reimbursement 

1. The intent of this reimbursement agreement is to encourage efficient operation, early 

transition from expendable launch vehicles to the Space Shuttle, provide pricing stability and to establish a mutually acceptable price for STS launch and flight services. 

This agreement applies to DOD sponsored US payloads and DOD cooperative agreement payloads. 

2. It is agreed that: 

(a) The DOD should pay a fair share price to have payloads placed in orbit by the 

Space Transportation System. 

(b) The price to the DOD should recognize that both the DOD and NASA will incur 

STS investment, operating and support costs. 

(c) NASA, as financial manager of the STS, is responsible for establishing an STS 

pricing and reimbursement policy for all non-DOD users which should recover 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 387 

appropriate support and depreciation of investment costs. NASA will reimburse 

the DOD for appropriate use charges paid to NASA under NASA's reimbursement policy (reference Federal Register, dated January 21, 1977) in addition to 

any other changes as may be specifically required by law at the time of contract. 

(d) The DOD reimbursement to NASAwill be based on the costs of materials and services, to be mutually agreed upon. The DOD will provide the VAFB Space Shuttle 

launch support for all non-DOD users in return for provision by NASA of all 

Shuttle launch operations support from KSC and Shuttle flight operations support for all DOD flights. These services are projected to be of approximately 

equal value to each agency. 

[2] 3. In line with the above, we agree that: 

(a) The DOD should be charged a fixed price for the first six years of operations. 

(b) The initial six year price per launch should be a realistic projected materials and 

services cost per launch averaged over the first six years. The materials and services costs definitions are set forth in Appendix A. 

(c) There should he no recoupment of prior years costs ever or under the mutually 

agreed upon projected costs of part 3b. 

(d) For launches after the first six years of STS operations, the price to DOD will be 

adjusted annually based on actual costs projected each year for materials and services. The adjustment is intended to insure meeting the goals established in parts 

2a and 3c of this Agreement. 

(e) The DOD and NASA agree to establish the price of STS launches for the DOD. 

The specific price for materials and services will take into consideration the programmatic, operational and technical services uncertainties in providing STS 

launch services during the six year fixed price period. The mutually agreed to 

price is $12.2M in FY 1975 dollars escalated according to a mutually agreed to economic index. 

This agreement is contingent on the DOD meeting the VAFB STS launch site activation schedule agreed to in the MOU dated January 14,1977, that NASA meet the [initial operational capability] dates for the KSC launch site and the Shuttle, and that 

NASA provide an adequate orbiter fleet. 

DOD agrees to reimburse NASA for STS launches in the fiscal year prior to the fiscal 

year of launch and at least twelve months prior to the planned launch date. The reimbursement will be made in dollars escalated to the fiscal year of payment (reference 

paragraph 3e above). If after payment [3] for a DOD launch, the launch is slipped or 

cancelled, the DOD will receive credit on a future launch. The DOD and NASA will 

develop a launch schedule three years prior to launch based on the most probable 

launch requirements. The schedule will be updated annually. 

This agreement becomes an integral part of the NASA/DOD Memorandum of 

Understanding on Management and Operations of the Space Transportation System 

dated January 14, 1977. 

John J. Martin 

Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Research and Development) 

Department of Defense 

Date: 7 MAR 1977 

John F. Yardley 

Associate Administrator 

for Space Flight 

National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

MAR7 1977 
388 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY hLATIONS 

Robert N. Parker 

Acting Director, Defense Research 

and Engineering 

Department of Defense 

Date: 7 MAR 1977 

A.M. Lovelace 

Deputy Administrator 

National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

MAR 7 1977 

********* 

[no pagination] 

Appendix A 

The total of all costs incurred by the government for the procurement of all expended hardware; refurbishment hardware and all flight spares and provisions excluding external tank propellants, the maintenance and support costs included in the $12.2M are: 

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) 

Refurbishment 

Spares 

Engine Overhaul and Test 

Transportation 

Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB ’s) 

Solid Propellants 

Refurbishment of SRB’s 

Spares 

Procurement of Replacement Units 

Transportation 

External Tank (ET) 

Production 

Spares 

Transportation (excludes West Coast Port to Launch Site Transportation) 

system support 

ET, SRB and SSME Sustaining Engineering Support Services 

Orbiter Spares 

Replenishment and Transportation of LRU’s and Shop Replaceable Units to 

Support Orbiter [Hardware] Maintenance and Replacement 

Crew GPE 

Replacement and Replenishment Hardware and Field and Maintenance Support 

for all Crew Related GPE 

Contract Administration 

Costs Associated with Contract Administration of all Shuttle Direct Support 

Contractors 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 389 

Document 11-39 

Document Title: George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, Co-Chairman, Aeronautics 

and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), and Malcolm R. Currie, Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, Co-Chairman, AACB, “Joint 

NASA/DOD Position Statement on Space Shuttle Orbiter Procurement,” January 23, 

1976. 

Source: Documentary History Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington 

University, Washington, D.C. 

The initial launch rate for the shuttle was set at 60flights per yea? with 40 from Kennedy Space 

Center and 20 from Vandenberg Air Force Base. NASA soon determined, howevq that thisflight rate 

was unachievable without a five-orbiterfleet, and in 1976 the space agency began to ask for a fifth 

orbite?: NASA expected the Air Force to pay for this vehicle. Department of Defense (000) leadership 

refused to acknowledge that its mission dictated the need for thefifth orbiter and feared it would have 

to procure the vehicle on its own. NASA and DOD agreed that afifth orbiter was needed, but both 

agencies deferred the decision to budget funds for the fourth andfifth orbiters, as well as the decision 

on who would pay for them. Ultimately, only four orbiters were built initially. A fifth orbiter was not 

built until aft.. the loss of the Challenger. 

[no pagination] 

Joint NASA/DOD Position Statement 

on Space Shuttle Orbiter Procurement 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense 

agree that five Space Shuttle Orbiters are needed to meet our national traffic model 

requirements. Orbiters are funded by NASA within the [design, development, testing, and 

evaluation] and [the] production programs. Neither agency has budgeted funds for the 

remaining two Orbiters. While this is a current interagency Space Shuttle issue, NASA has 

evolved a production plan which does not require an FY 1977 funding increment. 

Therefore, NASA and DOD agree to work together to resolve this issue as part of the FY 

1978 budget cycle activities. 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Co-Chairman, AACB 

23 Jan 1976 

Date 

Malcolm R. Currie 

Director of Defense Research 

and Engineering 

Department of Defense 

Co-Chairman, AACB 

January 23,1976 

Date 

********* 
390 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

Plan for NASA-DOD Orbiter 

Procurement Decision 

1. Fletcher-Clements Exchange of Letters Dec 75/Jan 76 

2. Currie/Low sign position paper Jan 76 

3. Currie/Low prepare detailed request Jan 76 

for NASA/DOD issues paper to be 

prepared by STS Committee 

4. STS Committee address the following By Aug 76 

issues: 

a. Verify need for 5 orbiters 

b. Develop detailed budget plans, using 

various delivery assumptions, and assuming 

either NASA or DOD funding 

c. Prepare draft issues paper for 

Fletcher-Rumsfeld meeting 

5. STS Committee prepare monthly progress Feb, Mar, Apr, 

reports addressed to Currie and Low. May, Juri, Jul 

Currie and Low meet as necessary 

6. Fletcher-Rumsfeld meeting Aug 76 

7. If Fletcher-Rumsfeld cannot agree on Aug 76 

which agency funds orbiter, prepare 

joint Presidential issues paper 

8. Fletcher-Rumsfeld-Lynn discuss joint Aug 76 

issues paper 

9. Fletcher-Rumsfeld-Lynn meet with Sep 76 

President 

Document 11-40 

Document title: General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to 

General Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, USAF, August 5, 1982, with attachment. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

By the time the Space Shuttle became operational, it had changed considerably from what the AirForce 

had originally anticipated. The Air Force faced launch costs totaling nearly $300 million perflight. 

Air Force Systems Command Commander General Robert T Marsh, who was in charge of Air Force 

participation in the Space Transportation System, felt it was necessary to inform Air Force Chief of 

Staff General Charles A. Gabriel of rising shuttle costs. His information package povides a detailed 

comparison of launch costs for a variety of Titan and Space Shuttle vehicle mixes. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 39 1 

[no pagination] 

General Charles A. Gabriel 

Chief of Staff 

United States Air Force 

Washington, DC 20330 

5 AUG 1982 

Dear Chief 

Although many of us are familiar with projected costs of conventional weapons systems, the understanding of space systems and support costs, as well as future predictions, 

is not as clear. To enhance this understanding, I’ve provided a macro-perspective ofwhere 

launch costs in the Shuttle era are headed. 

I am emphasizing launch costs in this package because I want to alert you to the significant Air Force requirements we will see when the STS at Vandenberg AFB and [the 

Consolidated Space Operations Center] become operational. The effective cost to ride 

[the] Shuttle will be about $300M per launch in the late 1980s. These costs are based on 

an optimistic launch plan, and due to the high fixed costs involved, reducing the number 

of flights will increase the cost per flight. 

The amounts in this package do not reflect our approved program. They are merely 

intended to convey the message that costs for access to space are increasing. Although 

most of our near-year requirements are founded, I think you’ll agree that we face a significant budgeting challenge in the out-years when these systems become operational. 

I think the attachments help generate a clearer understanding of the space arena. We 

will provide additional information should you desire. 

Sincerely 

ROBERT T. MARSH, General USAF 

Commander 

2 Atch 

1. Titan and Shuttle Costs Per Flight 

2. Launch Costs w/ Investments 

Amor tized 
TOTAL AMORTIZED LAUNCH PROFILE WITH AMORTIZED INVESTMENTS COSTS 

(THEN $M) 

SEGMENT _76 _ 77 28 79 So 82 83 - 84&8537@8!990 _ 91 

HARDWARE 55.6 58.2 66.2 65.2 84.2 100.4 145.7 220.9 409.3 380.3 266.0 290.2 408.2 725.5 646.1 743.3 

LAUNCH SERVICES 19.9 24.1 28.3 29.2 34.8 38.9 42.0 46.3 107.8 123.9 132.1 133.0 137.6 149.8 163.4 178.1 

RANGE SUPPORT 63.1 68.9 74.0 80.7 88.9 98.1 107.2 118.4 244.8 271.8 256.0 305.4 309.3 336.9 367.4 400.4 

SCF SUPPORT 65.7 57.7 64.9 69.5 96.1 90.3 99.2 114.1 144.5 225.2 167.1 255.2 243.7 265.4 289.5 315.4 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE’ - - 106.5 193.0 383.6 597.0 520.8 1063.5 1082.2 1263.0 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE* - - 165.2 258.0 224.8 460.5 467.6 547.5 

STS OPERATIONS - 120.0 314.2 375.9 424.1 445.8 444.2 484.3 527.9 

CSOC OPERATIONS 15.9 57.1 245.9 288.1 316.9 376.3 410.4 447.2 

STS SECURITY - 36.9 40.5 45.2 49.2 51.3 55.9 61.0 66.5 

AMORTIZED COSTS’ --- -- - - - - 89.9 -- 89.8 109.4 263.3 245.7 245.7 245.7 245.7 245.7 

TOTAL 204.3 208.9 233.4 244.6 304.0 327.7 394.1 589.6 1275.5 1715.4 2300.3 2845.9 2904.1 4123.7 4035.6 4735.0 

DOD LAUNCHES‘ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6 7 7 10 8 15 14 15 

COST P/LAUNCH 

WITH AMORTIZED COSTS 

102.2 104.5 116.7 122.3 152.0 163.9 197.1 196.5 * * 328.6 284.6 363.0 274.9 288.3 315.7 

1 BASED ON $lG.OM/FLT FY8485 AND $20.8M/FLT FY86-91 (CONSTANT FY75 $). 

2 DELTA COST IF DOD REQUIRED TO PAY $29.8/FLT FY 86-91 (CONSTANT FY 75 $). 

3 INCLUDED IUS DEVELOPMENT, AND CSOC, DELTA SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION, AND STS-VAFB INVESTMENT. 

4 LAUNCH FORECASTS ARE HISTORICALLY OPTIMISTIC. REDUCTION IN LAUNCHES WILL INCREASE COST PER FLIGHT. 

*NOT APPLICABLE: OVERLAP YEARS FOR TITAN AND SHUTTLE. 

01 

a 

N 

51 

m 

3: 

Y 

T 

0 
TOTAL AMORTIZED LAUNCH PROFILE WITH AMORTIZED INVESTMENTS COSTS 

(THEN YEAR $M) 

SEGMENT N - 84 - 85 - 86 - 87 - 88 - 89 - 90 - 91 

HARDWARE 130.0 155.1 266.0 290.3 408.2 725.5 464.1 743.3 

LAUNCH SERVICES 55.4 67.0 132.1 133.0 137.6 149.8 163.4 178.1 

RANGE SUPPORT 244.8 271.8 256.0 305.4 309.3 336.9 367.4 400.4 

SCF SUPPORT 144.5 225.2 167.1 255.2 243.7 265.4 289.5 315.4 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE' 106.5 193.0 383.6 597.0 520.8 1063.5 1082.2 1263.0 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE' 0 0 165.2 258.0 224.8 460.5 467.6 547.5 

STS OPERATIONS 120.0 314.2 375.9 424.1 445.8 444.2 484.3 527.9 

CSOC OPERATIONS 15.9 57.1 245.9 288.1 316.9 376.3 410.4 447.2 

SECURITY 36.9 40.5 45.2 49.2 51.3 55.9 61.0 66.5 

AMORTIZED COSTS' 89.8 109.4 263.3 245.7 w 245.7 245.7 245.7 

TOTAL (THEN W $) 943.8 1433.3 2300.3 2845.9 2904.1 4123.7 4035.6 4735.0 

(FY 84 $) 943.8 1315.8 1936.9 2197.0 2056.1 2680.4 2405.2 2590.0 

DOD LAUNCHES' 3 5 7 10 8 15 14 15 

COST/FLIGHT (THEN W $) 314.6 286.7 328.6 284.6 363.0 274.9 288.3 315.7 

(N 84) 314.6 263.2 276.7 219.7 257.0 178.7 171.8 172.7 

AVERAGE COST PER FLIGHT $307.1M (THEN YR $), 232.0M (FY84) 

1 

2 

BASED ON $lG.OM/FLT FY 8485 AND $20.8M/FLT FY 8691 (CONSTANT FY 75 $). 

DELTA COST IF DOD REQUIRED TO PAY $29.8/FLT FY 8691 (CONSTANT FY 75 $). 

3 

4 

INCLUDED IUS DEVELOPMENT, AND CSOC, DELTA SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION, AND STSVAFB INVESTMENT. 

LAUNCH FORECASTS ARE HISTORICALLY OPTIMISTIC. REDUCTION IN LAUNCHES WILL INCREASE COST PER FLIGHT. 
AMORTIZED COSTS BACK-UP' 

(THEN YEAR $M) 

SEGMENT FY - 83 - 84 - 85 - 86 - 87 - 88 - 89 - 90 - 91 

IUS AMORTIZED? 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 

STS SECURITY AMORTIZED' 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 

DATA SYSTEMS MOD 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 

AMORTIZED' 

STS VAFE3 AMORTIZED5 93.2 93.2 93.2 93.2 93.2 93.2 

AMORTIZED COSTS" - - - - 60.7 60.7 60.7 - 60.7 - 60.7 60.7 

89.8 943.8 109.4 263.3 263.3 245.7 245.7 245.7 245.7 

1 AMORTIZING BEGINS UPON IOC (STRAIGHT LINE) 

2 TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ($722.2M)/PROJECTED LIFE (10 YEARS)=$72.2M/YR 

3 TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ($87.9M)/PROJECTED LIFE (5 YEARS)=$12.6M/YR 

4 TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ($391.5M)/PROJECTED LIFE (20 YEARS)=$19.6M/YR 

5 TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ($2797.9M)/PROJECTED LIFE (30 YEARS)=$93.2M/YR 

6 TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ($1213.5M)/PROJECTED LIFE (20 YEARS)=$60.7M/YR 
TITAN IIIC/TITAN 34D COSTS PER LAUNCH 

(CONSTANT FY 84 $M) 

SEGMENT FY - 76 - 77 - 78 - 79 - 80 - 81 - 82 - 83 - 84 - 85 

HARDWARE 114.4 109.7 116.2 104.9 123.3 133.0 176.7 242.6 279.3 206.8 

LAUNCH SERVICES 41.0 45.5 49.7 47.1 50.9 51.6 50.9 50.8 52.4 52.2 

RANGE SUPPORT 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 

SCF SUPPORT' ----~---- 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 

TOTAL 335.4 335.2 345.9 332.0 354.2 364.6 407.6 473.5 511.7 439.0 

ESMC LAUNCHES 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 

COST PER LAUNCH 167.7 167.7 173.0 166.0 177.1 182.3 203.8 157.8 170.6 219.5 

AVERAGE COST PER FLIGHT $178.5M 

- 

1 THESE AMOUNTS DIFFER FROM THOSE SHOWN ON THE TOTAL SPACE LAUNCH PROFILE (ATCH 12). THE 

AMOUNTS ON THIS CHART REFLECT ONLY A PRO RATA ALLOCATION OF SCF SUPPORT FOR ESMC LAUNCHES 
STS LAUNCH COST PER FLIGHT* 

(CONSTANT FY 84 $M) 

SEGMENT FY - 84 - 85 - 86 - 87 - 88 - 89 - 90 - 91 

HARDWARE 130.0 142.4 224.0 224.0 289.0 471.6 276.6 406.6 

LAUNCH SERVICES 55.4 61.5 111.2 102.7 97.4 97.4 97.4 97.4 

RANGE SUPPORT 244.8 249.5 215.6 235.8 219.0 219.0 219.0 219.0 

SCF SUPPORT 144.5 206.7 140.7 197.0 172.5 172.5 172.5 172.5 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE' 106.5 177.5 322.7 461.0 368.8 691.5 645.4 691.5 

ORBITER FLIGHT CHARGE* 0 0 139.3 199.0 159.2 298.5 278.6 298.5 

STS OPERATIONS 120.0 288.4 316.5 327.4 315.6 288.7 288.7 288.7 

CSOC OPERATIONS 15.9 52.4 207.0 222.4 244.6 244.6 244.6 244.6 

SECURITY -~ 36.9 37.2 ------ 38.1 38.0 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 

TOTAL 854.0 1215.6 1715.1 2007.3 1902.4 2520.1 2259.1 2455.1 

DOD LAUNCHES' 3 5 7 10 8 15 14 15 

COST PER FLIGHT 284.7 243.1 245.0 200.7 237.8 168.0 161.4 163.7 

AVERAGE COST PER FLIGHT $218.8M 

* RECURRING COSTS ONLY. TREATS DEVELOPMENTS/ACQUISITIONS AS SUNK COSTS. 

1 BASED ON $lG.OM/FLT FY 8485 AND $20.8M/FLT FY 86-91 (CONSTANT FY 75 $). 

2 DELTA COST IF DOD REQUIRED TO PAY $29.8/FLT Ey 8691 (CONSTANT FY 75 $). 

3 LAUNCH FORECASTS ARE HISTORICALLY OPTIMISTIC. REDUCTION IN LAUNCHES WILL INCREASE COST PER FLIGHT. 
TOTAL SPACE PROGRAMS 

(FY 84 $B) 

SECTOR - 84* - 85 - 86 - 87 - 88 89** - 90 - 91 - 92 - 93 - 94 - 95 

Current 

Space* * * 5.4 6.3 6.3 5.9 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.3 

Launch 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 

Support - 0.9 - 1 .o - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 1.0 - 1.0 

Subtotal 7.2 8.2 8.4 7.8 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.4 9.6 

Future 

Space 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 .o 1.1 1.2 

Launch 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 1 .o 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 

Support - - - - - - - 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.3 - 0.3 - 0.3 

Subtotal 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 

TOTAL 7.3 8.5 8.6 8.0 8.8 9.4 10.4 10.6 10.5 11.0 11.0 11.2 

* Current Systems-FY 84 AF POM through FY 88. ** Current Systems-FY 89 and out assumes 2% per year real growth. 

*** Includes PE 341 11F. 
398 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY &LATIONS 

Document 11-41 

Document title: Lt. General Richard C. Henry, Commander, Air Force Space Division, to 

General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, March 4,1983. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

By the early 1980s, the Space Shuttle program was considerably behind schedule and was not meeting its promised jlight rates or cost targets. Various leaders in the US. Air Force were increasingly 

uneasy with relying on the shuttle. In March 1983, Lt. General Richard C. Henry, in this letter to 

General Robert 7: Marsh, expressed growing concern that carrying humans aboard a vehicle designed 

to merely deliverpayloads to orbit created an unnecessary expense. This indicated the changed status 

of human spacefight initiatives in the military, which was later reflected in the Department of 

Defense’s (000) position on the proposed NASA space station. Henry’s letter also gave a broad 

overview of a proposed military launch strategy, which eventually evolved into what was called a 

“mixed fleet” after the Challenger accident. 

[I1 4 March 1983 

General Robert T. Marsh 

AFsc/cc 

Andrews AFB, DC 20334 

Dear General Marsh 

Last year the AF committed to using [the] Space Transportation System exclusively 

and according to current planning, we will close down the Titan production line this 

spring and expand all Titans and Atlas’ in the 1987, 1988 time frame. I believe this plan 

is seriously deficient from the DOD standpoint both operationally and economically. 

Current estimates of STS mission model requirements have been reduced to where 

they can be satisfied with a launch capability of about 20 per year, 16 at KSC and 4 at VAFB. 

Thus, there is a debate underway as to whether a fifth orbiter should be procured. This 

situation coupled with a phase of Expandable Launch Vehicles, might lead to (an economically irreversible) loss of all U.S. capabilities to produce space launch vehicles in the 

1985 time period. 

A four orbiter only fleet, experiencing problems similar to those of Challenger, would 

develop a backlog of launches that would take months to years to work off. This presents 

a considerable threat to the continued vitality of the national space program and in particular, could impact national security through inadequate launch support of priority 

DOD spacecraft. 

In the past, it has been argued that the shuttle would achieve economy by launch rate. 

A high launch rate is not materializing, and is unlikely to come forth; therefore, we should 

seek alternative ways to achieve best return on investment. An example is the acceptance 

of orbiter refurbishment and checkout at KSC prior to Vandenberg launch as a permanent procedure to restrict work force build up on the west coast. Another example is to 

re-look at the economics of using the shuttle on missions where its unique capabilities are 

not needed. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 399 

The current cost estimate ($FY 83) for shuttle launch to place a payload in geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) is 165 million dollars. Similar estimates ($FY 83) for a 

commercial version of the Titan/Centaur and a modified Atlas/Centaur are 125/115 million dollars and 120/90 million dollars respectively, where the first number includes the 

amortization of development costs over nine launches and the second is the cost per 

launch thereafter. Launch of a stretch version of the Titan/Centaur is estimated at 

145/120 million dollars. The major driver in the higher STS costs is the cost of carrying 

man on a mission which does not need man. The costs shown here for expendable 

vehicles, launched, [2] are slightly less conservative than we would have used in the past 

(qossibly by 10 or 15 million per launch). However, the important point is that the GEO 

mission can be accomplished at less cost with an expandable booster. I have not included 

the not insignificant costs to our spacecraft to enable their carriage on a manned vehicle 

(the orbiter). 

Assuming that commercialization of expandable launch vehicles does occur, I believe 

their most important use by DOD would be the transport of spacecraft to GEO, namely 

[the Defense Support Program], MILSTAR, [Defense Satellite Communication System] 

I11 and other special missions. 

From the DOD standpoint, either the Titan/Centaur or the modified Atlas/Centaur 

launch vehicles would meet most of the performance requirements through the 1980’s. 

Thus, a DOD commitment to commercial launches of either vehicle could provide an 

expendable launch vehicle capability for critical DOD programs through the late 1980’s 

(in the longer term, the growth Titan/Centaur presents the option for launching larger 

payloads than does Atlas). DOD launch rate requirements for this time period, are expected to be about four or five per year. 

Another opportunity for DOD participation in commercialization of expandable 

launch vehicles exists for the Delta class launch vehicles. The GPS [Global Positioning 

System] and the DMSP [Defense Meteorological Satellite Program] programs are currently being launched on Atlas. Both payloads are relatively small and lightweight and, 

therefore, both require manifesting with other payloads for effective Shuttle launching. 

To date, no other appropriate DOD payload has been found for manifesting with either 

GPS or DMSP. Although manifesting with non-DOD payloads may prove feasible, single 

payload launches, when needed, are necessary for effective systems operation. Thus, it 

would be highly desirable to have a dual capability for launching these payloads; the 

Satellite replacement rate for the GPS and DMSP programs is expected to be about three 

or four per year. 

We estimate that the 20 flight per year STS requirement would include 6 flights per 

commercial GEO satellites and 7 for government. If commercial launch vehicles captured 

these flights, the yearly STS flight rate would be reduced to about 7. Most, if not all, of 

these would require the unique capabilities of the Shuttle. 

100 flights have been postulated for the useful life of a Shuttle. Thus, a four orbiter 

fleet flying 20 flights per year could be expected to wear out in about 2 decades. Reducing 

Shuttle flights to those for which it has unique capabilities could significantly expand the 

life of the fleet. 

The orbiter is necessarily an essential element of a space station program which NASA 

proposes to initiate. Therefore, if the nation embarks on a space station program in the 

near future, it will be argued that more orbiters should be procured for the construction 

and sustaining of the station. This would be an investment of about $2 billion per orbiter 

above and beyond the non [-]recurring and recurring space station costs. 

The question of requirements for a space station is now under debate. I suggest that 

this debate is premature. The more fundamental question is the utility of [3] man in space 
400 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RE.LATIONS 

and whether we first, need him in a hostile environment; then, if we do, how can we sustain him in a more affordable way than we do today. I believe strongly that these questions 

can be addressed and answered with the existing four orbiter fleet on spacelab type missions. 

In summary, I believe that the orbiter is a marvelous machine, but it is better used for 

those missions where the utility of man is clear or needs further exploration. It is clear that 

man is not needed on the transport mission to CEO and is, in fact, the more expensive 

alternative. I recommend an investment strategy in a mixed fleet, preferably with commercialization. The primary DoD mission is on orbit, not in getting there. I recommend 

the government endorse commercialization, and commit to commercial launches to 

GEO. This will assure the success of commercialization. 

I recognize that these are issues that transcend the Air Force and DoD, and need 

NASA, OMB and National Security Council involvement, but I suggest that Air Force leadership is not inappropriate. 

I urge your serious consideration of my recommendations before we burn our bridges 

behind us and stand ready to give any additional support that you may need. 

Warm regards 

Richard C. Henry 

Lt. General, USAF 

Commander 

Document 11-42 

Document title: Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries 

of the Military Departments; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretaries of 

Defense; Assistant Secretaries of Defense; General Counsel, “Defense Space Launch 

Strategy,” February 7,1984, with attached: “Defense Space Launch Strategy,” January 23, 

1984. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Department of Defense continued to support the Space Shuttle despite reservations about its performance and reliability. The Air Force, however; wanted a back-up expendable launch vehicle until 

the shuttle’s problems had been solved. In early 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Wa’nbe-rger issued 

a directive that established a need fm a “complaentary expendable hunch vehicle” to supplement the 

Space Shuttle. The vehicle developed to meet this requirement became known as the Titan IV 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 40 1 

Memorandum for Secretaries of the 

Military Departments 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Under Secretaries of Defense 

Assistant Secretaries of Defense 

General Counsel 

SUBJECT Defense Space Launch Strategy 

On 23 January 1984, I approved the attached Defense Space Launch Strategy. The 

approach described in this document will be used to guide future defense space launch 

planning. Please ensure. maximum distribution to all those affected within your departments and agencies. 

Caspar Weinberger 

Attachment 

********* 

Defense Space Launch Strategy 

POLICY 

Defense space launch strategy has been developed in response to validated DoD 

assured space launch requirements and implements the launch policies contained in the 

National Space Policy and the Defense Space Policy. The National Space Policy identifies 

the Space Transportation System (STS) as the primary U.S. government space launch 

vehicle, but recognizes that unique national security requirements may dictate the development of special purpose launch capabilities. The Defense Space Policy states that: 

“While affirming its commitment to the STS, DoD will ensure the availability of 

an adequate launch capability to provide flexible and operationally responsive 

access to space, as needed for all levels of conflict, to meet the requirements of 

national security missions.” 

REQlJIREMErnS 

The DoD has a validated requirement for an assured launch capability under peace, 

crisis and conflict conditions. Assured launch capability is a function of satisfylng two specific requirements: the need for complementary launch systems to hedge against unforeseen technical and operational problems, and the need for a launch system suited for 

operations in crisis and conflict situations. While DoD policy requires assured access to 

space across the spectrum of conflict, the ability to satisfy this requirement is currently 

unachievable if the U.S. mainland is subjected to direct attack. Therefore, this launch 

strategy addresses an assured launch capability only through levels of conflict in which it 

is postulated that the U.S. homeland is not under direct attack. Additional survivability 

options beyond an assured launch capability are being pursued to ensure sustained operations of critical space assets after homeland attack. 
402 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

STRATEGY 

Near Term: Existing Defense space launch planning specifies that DoD will rely on four 

unique, manned orbiters for sole access to space for all national security space systems. 

DoD studies and other independent evaluations have concluded that this does not represent an assured, flexible and responsive access to space. While the DoD is fully committed 

to the STS, total reliance upon the STS for sole access to space in view of the technical and 

operational uncertainties, represents an unacceptable national security risk. A complementary system is necessary to provide high confidence of access to space particularly 

since the Shuttle will be the only launch vehicle for all U.S. space users. In addition, the 

limited number of unique, manned Shuttle vehicles renders them ill-suited and inappropriate for use in a high risk environment. 

The solution to this problem must be affordable and effective and yet offer a high 

degree of requirements satisfaction, low technical risk, and reasonable schedule availability. Unmanned, expendable launch vehicles meet these criteria [2] and satisfy DoD operational needs for a launch system which complements the STS and extends our ability to 

conduct launch operations further into the spectrum of conflict. These systems can provide unique and assured launch capabilities in peace, crisis and conflict levels short of general nuclear war. These vehicles are designed to be expendable and the loss of a single 

vehicle affects only that one mission and would not degrade future common, national 

launch capabilities by the loss of a reusable launch system. 

The President’s policy on the Commercialization of Expendable Launch Vehicles 

[ELVs] states that the goals of the U.S. space launch policy are to ensure a flexible and 

robust US. launch posture, to maintain space transportation leadership, and to encourage the U.S. private sector development of commercial launch operations. Consistent with 

this policy, the DoD will pursue the use of commercially procured ELVs to meet its 

requirements for improving its assured launch capabilities. For requirements that cannot 

be satisfied by commercially available ELVs, unique DoD developments may be undertaken for special purpose launch capabilities. 

The STS will remain the primary launch system for routine DoD launch services. 

Unmanned, expendable launch vehicles represent a complementary capability to the STS 

and will be maintained and routinely launched to ensure their operational viability. To 

accomplish this, selected national security payloads will be identified for dedicated launch 

on ELVs, but will remain compatible with the STS. 

Long Term: While commercial expendable launch vehicles represent an available solution to the unique DoD space launch requirements into the early-l990s, the need for 

other DoD launch capabilities to meet requirements beyond that must be evaluated and 

validated. This effort must be initiated immediately in order to ensure that future national security space missions are not constrained by inadequate launch capability. The evaluation should examine potential DoD launch requirements, such as the need for a heavy 

lift vehicle, and should attempt to take maximum advantage of prior investments in the 

US. launch vehicle technology base. 

IMPLEMENTATION 

As Executive Agent for launch vehicles, the Air Force will take immediate action to 

acquire a commercial, unmanned, expandable launch vehicle capability to complement 

the STS with a first launch availability no later than FY 1990. These vehicles must provide 

a launch capability essentially equal to the original STS weight and volume specifications. 

In addition, the Air Force, in conjunction and coordination with other Services, 

affected agencies and departments, will: 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 403 

a) identify specific national security systems that will be used on the commercially 

procured expendable launch vehicles and the proposed peacetime launch rate 

required to maintain an operationally responsive posture. 

[3] b) develop a comprehensive space launch plan to meet projected national security 

requirements through the year 2000. This strategy will be submitted to the Secretary 

of Defense for approval and validation. 

The Defense Space Launch Strategywill be reflected in the FY-86 Defense Guidance Plan. 

Document 11-43 

Document title: Charles W. Cook, Executive Secretary, Defense Space Operations 

Committee, Memorandum for Defense Operations Committee (DSOC) Principals, “DoD 

Position on Shuttle Issues,” November 19, 1984. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Defense Space Operations Committee was a Department of Defense (D0D)-wide internal policymaking and coordination group composed of the leading space individuals in each military service, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staft President 

Reagan had directed NASA and DoD to detenine what steps were necessary to make the shuttle fully 

operational. The Defense Space Operations Committee was the mechanism to coordinate the DOD 

definition of the steps necessary to attain operational status. On October 19, 1984, the committee 

principals were bnefed on the issues identified by the Air Force. Their comments were included in the 

operational plan. The committee met again on October 29, 1984, and the recommendations were 

finalized on November 19, in a memorandum representing the first coherent statement by DOD of 

what it meant by an “operational Space Transportation System. DOD felt that a number of requirements for the Space Transportation System had not been adequately addressed 4 NASA, and the outstanding issues were stated as changes needed in the Space Transportation Master Plan. 

[no pagination] 19 November 1984 

Memorandum for Defense Operations Committee 

(DSOC) Principals 

SUBJECT: DoD Position on Shuttle Issues 

Attached is a revised copy of the DoD Position resulting from the DSOC meeting of 

29 October 1984. Changes have been incorporated to reflect the comments received. I 

would like to touch base with each of you personally early next week to go over the final 

position. 

CHARLES W. COOK 

Executive Secretary 

DSOC 

2 Attachments 

1. Revised DoD Position 

2. Summary-Issues Not Discussed 

********* 
404 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

[no pagination] 

Memorandum for the Defense Space Operations 

Committee (DSOC) 

SUBJECT DoD Position on Shuttle Issues 

During the 19 October 1984 meeting of the DSOC, DoD positions were established 

on several key Shuttle issues. 

Attachment 1 summarizes the DoD positions on issues discussed during the DSOC 

meeting. Attachment 2 summarizes less controversial issues which were coordinated with 

you. 

I am requesting that the Executive Secretary coordinate with NASA in revising the 

Space Transportation System Master Plan to reflect DoD positions prior to the Master 

Plan being approved. 

2 Attachments 

1. Summary-Issues Discussed 

2. Summary-Issues Not Discussed 

********* 

Attachment 1 

Defense Space Operations Committee, 

29 October 1984 

DoD Position on Key STS Master Plan Issues 

Continued Orbiter Production 

The Space Transportation System (STS) Master Plan must include a viable, long-term 

plan for the Space Shuttle System. Since the STS is the primary means of transportation 

to space for all U.S. programs, including national security programs, it is essential that the 

STS Master Plan contain a NASA program for providing continued orbiter capability. 

The current NASA budget and financial program does not include plans for a fifth 

orbiter, follow-on orbiter, continuing spares production, requalifylng and restarting production lines, or qualifylng the orbiter fleet beyond 100 flights. In view of the national policy for the use of the Shuttle system, the plan would not be complete without a specific 

program for viability of the orbiter fleet through continued orbiter production. 

Therefore, the DoD takes the position: 

"In accordance with National Policy, the STS is the primary means of access to 

space for all U.S. programs, including National Security programs. The STS 

Master Plan should include provisions for continued orbiter fleet capability. 

Specifically, NASA should develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary funding for continuing spares production and qualification of the orbiter fleet beyond 

the current 100 flights. Since the loss of an orbiter would have a significant impact 

on the STS overall mission capability, NASA should develop a plan to address that 

contingency." 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 405 

Intemperability of orbiters 

Space launch operational flexibility is restricted by the fact that each of the orbiters 

in the current fleet has different characteristics and capabilities. 

[2] Therefore, the DoD takes the position: 

“The STS Master Plan should include Provisions to increase interoperability of 

the orbiter fleet. Specifically, additional orbiters should be fully capable of meeting all existing and documented DOD mission requirements. NASA should modify existing orbiters as follows: 

(1) Orbiter 103 modified to be Centaur-capable. 

(2) Orbiter 099 upgraded to allow operating from Vandenberg. 

All launch facilities should be interoperable with all orbiters. Therefore, the Air 

Force and NASA should modify the shuttle launch facilities to accommodate the 

configurations of all orbiters.” 

Payload Performance (Shuttle Lift Capability) 

The STS Master Plan should include the Level I requirement of 32,000 pounds of payload lift capability for a Vandenberg Reference Mission 4 or equivalent. Of concern to the 

DoD is the fact that even with filament-woundcase solid rocket boosters and main engines 

operating at 109% thrust, maximum performance is approximately 28,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit. Additionally, there is not a specific program (aside from hopeful 

flight experience, demanifesting, etc.) to attain the 4,000 pounds needed to reach the 

NASA “goal” of 32,000 pounds. Therefore, the DoD takes the position that: 

“The STS Master Plan should include a definitive technical plan with appropriate 

budgetary funding which, with a high degree of confidence, will meet the commitment of a lift capability of 32,000 pounds for Reference Mission 4 or equivalent.” 

Orbiter Crossrange Capability 

The Shuttle orbiter crossrange requirement of 1100 nautical miles cannot be met with 

the current design. This shortfall will prevent a Vandenberg Shuttle launch from aborting 

once-around back to Vandenberg. Current orbiter capability is approximately 800 nautical miles. This impacts DoD payloads by involving increased exposure to landing at abort 

and contingency landing sites outside the Continental United States. 

Complying with the 1100-mile crossrange requirement would appear to entail a costly orbiter redesign. 

[ 31 Therefore, the DoD takes the position: 

“The Level I crossrange requirement of 1100 miles remains unchanged. The STS 

Master Plan should include extension of the current Shuttle crossrange beyond 

800 miles. This extension should be accomplished through flight test and analysis. Until the crossrange requirement. of 1100 miles can be met, NASA should 

develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary funding for a capability to provide air transportation of payload and orbiter from contingency landing sites to 
406 THE HISTORY OFCIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

the launch site. NASA should also assure that the design of any future orbiters or 

Thermal Protection System (TPS) meet the needed 1100 mile crossrange capability.” 

Orbiter/Cargo Transportation Capabilities 

The STS Master Plan should include specific steps to be taken to provide payload and 

orbiter transportation capabilities. 

The DoD takes the position: 

“NASA should provide a second Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA) and should install 

refueling capabilities on both SCA. The Air Force should plan to procure outside 

airborne cargo transportation capability. Both NASA and the Air Force should 

develop definitive plans with adequate budgetary funding to accomplish these 

tasks.” 

It is noted that the Air Force is examining a way that they may provide a Civil Reserve 

Air Fleet (CRAF) 147 that could be modified by NASA for use as a backup SCA. 

Orbiter Bay Contamination 

Since orbiter bay contamination could have a significant effect on the design of future 

payloads, the orbiter bay contamination environment must be accurately characterized. 

The DoD takes the position: 

“The STS Master Plan should reflect the NASA and the Air Force Contamination 

Working Group plan to provide pre-flight cleanliness specifications and procedures, and inflight measurements to define the orbiter bay environment. NASA 

should provide quantitative contamination data to the payload community for 

design consideration.” 

[4] Future Shuttle Management 

On the issue of future management of the Space Transportation System (STS) the 

DoD position is: 

“The status quo with the current NASA-led, joint NASA/DoD management 

arrangement is the preferred management option for the foreseeable future. 

NASA should identify and separately account for the Shuttle budget (e.g. budgetary fencing) to distinguish that funding from other NASA Programs. Transfer 

of the STS to another government agency in the foreseeable future is not recommended.” 

Additional DoD comment[s]: 

‘The DoD should not be the sole operator of the STS.” 

“An STS operational organization within NASA might be acceptable to DoD if the 

following conditions are met: 
407 

- 

- 

- 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 

DoD participation in organizational implementation 

DoD participation in operational management 

Specific NASA commitments are made to complete the necessary Shuttle 

system enhancements as specified in the STS Master Plan’s Baseline 

Operation Plan.” 

********* 

Attachment 2 

Issues 

STS Baseline Operations Plan 

INFORMATION ITEMS 

ISSUE COMMENT 

DOD SECURITY COSTS - NON-SECURITY CHANGES TO 

SECURITY SYSTEMS 

- IN WORK BY NASA AND SYSTEMS 

COMMAND 

OIL LEASE OFF VANDENBERG COAST - COULD LIMIT LAUNCH AZIMUTH 

- SENSITIVE “POLITICAL” ISSUE 

FUTURE FLIGHT CHANGES - IAW REIMBURSEMENT MOA 

NEW PRICE DETAILED IN 1985 

- EXPECT $63100M PRICE (FY 84 $) 

RECOMMENDATION 

CONTINUE WORKING THESE ITEMS SEPARATELY 

NON-CONTROVERSIAL CAPABILITIES SHORTFALLS 

SPECIFICATION 

ISSUE SHUTTLE SYSTEM CAPABILITY COMMENT 

MISSION DURATION 30 DAYS 10-12 DAYS DOD REQT IS 7 DAYS 

+ 2 DAYS CONTINGENCY 

RESCUE CAPABILITY sum & PERSONAL 

RESCUE SYSTEM 

NONE NO DOD REQUIREMENT 

DOCKING MODULE INTERNATIONAL NONE 

REQUIREMENT FOR 

RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING 

CAPABILITY 

NO DOD REQUIREMENT 
408 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 

OPERATING LIFE 10 YEARS, CERTIFIED TO SATISFIES PROJECTED 

500 USES 100 USES 20-YEAR MISSION MODEL 

ADDITIONAL ORBITAL NONE NO DOD REQUIREMENT 

PROPELLANT MANEUVERING 

SYSTEM (OMS) KITS 

RECOMMENDATION 

CONCUR WITH NASA POSITION TO CHANGE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION 

TO BE CONSISTENT WITH CAPABILITY 

NATIONAL SECURITY/CRISIS CONSTRAINTS 

SHUTTLE 

SYSTEM 

ISSUE SPECIFICATION CAPABILITY COMMENT 

LANDING WTHER 

CONSIRAIhTS AND 

AUTOLAND 

NONE NO PRECIPITATION 

15,000 FT CEILING 

7 MILE VISIBIW 

8 KNOT CROSSWIND 

- RTLS & EOM* ALTERNATE 

LANDING SITES PLANNED 

- AUTOLAND DEMO ON 

STS 51-E (FEB 85) 

ORBITER AUTONOMY NONE TACAN FOR NAV 

AND DEORBIT 

TARGETING UNTIL 

1992 

- GPS PLANNED 

ORBITERCOMPUTER 

UPGRADE APPROVED 

- 

LAUNCH FROM WITHIN 2 HRS 6.5 HRS (KSC) - ACCEFIABLE 

4.5 HRS (VAFB) CONSIlZAINTS 

ORBITER TURNAROUND TIME 14 DAYS 28DAYSISCOAL - ACCEPTABLE 

BETWEEN CONFLIGHTS (DOD HAS PRIORITY) 

RECOMMENDATION 

ACCEPT FACT THAT STS WILL NOT MEET TRADITIONAL MILITARY SYSTEMS 

REQUIREMENTS (ALL WEATHER, RAPID DEPLOYMENT, SURVIVABILITY, ETC.) 

* RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE AND END OF MISSION 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 409 

PAYLOAD MISSION FLEXIBILITY CAPABILITIES 

SHUlTLE SYSTEM 

ISSUE CAPABILITY DOD REOUIREMENT COMMENT 

NAVIGATION 1000'-ALL AXIS 45'-ALL AXIS WITH - GPS WILL MEET 

ACCURACY GPS REQUIREMENT 

- NASA/AF PLAN FOR JOINT 

IMPLEMENTATION OF GPS 

CAPABILITY (FY 87 BUDGET 

$3040M) 

REDUNDANT NO REDUNDANCY REDUNDANCY IN 

MISSION CRITICAL 

SYSTEMS 

- AF PAYLOADS RELUCTANT 

PAXOAD SERVICES TO USE SERVICES 

- REDUNDANT ANTENNA 

- KuBANDANTENNA 

CONTROL 

CONTROLLER OR 

MECHANICAL STOPS 

- PAYLOADDATA 

SESTEM (PDI) 

NECESSARY 

- REDUNDANT PAYLOAD 

- MANIPULATORARM 

(as) 

DATA SYSTEM, MORE 

RELIABILITYIN ARM 

NEEDED 

- COSTS HIGH: PDI (40 

POUNDS, f2M); RMS (900 

POUNDS, f20M) 

EXTRA VEHICULAR 

ACTIVITY (EVA) PROVISIONS 

- IMMEDIATE EVA MINIMUM SEVERAL NO CURRENT 

REQUIREMENT 

- ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT 

HOURS 

- CARGOBAY 56FTTO60FT 60 FT - REQUIRES CONTINUED 

ENVELOPE MISSION-BY-MISSION 

COORDINATION 

RECOMMENDATION 

- NASA/DOD AGREE ON EFFECTIVITY OF GPS 

NASA/DOD EVALUATE ON MISSION-BY-MISSION BASIS, COST AND 

WEIGHT TRADES OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS 

ACCEPT EVA CONSTRAINT 

- 

- 
410 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN-MILITAKY RELTIONS 

Document 11-44 

Document title: National Security Decision Directive 164, “National Security Launch 

Strategy,” February 25, 1985. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Under Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge wanted to keep expendable launch vehicle production lines open, because he was concerned that valuable manufacturing expertise would be lost. 

Having completed a commercial competition to select the complementary expendable launch vehicle, 

Aldridge needed NASA to concur with the Air Force’s selection of a Titan da’vatiue. Negotiations at 

the staff level had little success. Aldridge called NASA Administrator Jams Beggs to discuss the mattm Thqr reached an agreement, which was transm‘bed and takn to the National Security Council to 

be processed for the President’s signature. The result was the National Security Launch Stratea, 

which, after the Challenger disaster; resulted in the Department of Defense transferring most of its 

payloads off the shuttle. 

VI February 25, 1985 

National Security Launch Strategy 

NSDD 144, National Space Strategy, states that the Space Transportation System 

(STS) will continue as the primary space launch system for both national security and civil 

government missions. It also directs DoD to pursue an improved assured launch capability that will be complementary to the STS. This NSDD provides a launch strategy to implement these two provisions, as well as initiate a study to look toward the future development 

of a second-generation space transportation system. 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of 

Defense (DoD) will work together to insure that the STS is fully operational and costeffective at a flight rate sufficient to meetjustified needs. (The target rate is 24 flights per 

year.) 

The Air Force will buy ten expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and will launch them 

at a rate of approximately two per year during the period 1988-92. A competitive decision 

will be made between the Titan derivative vehicle and the SBR-X before March 1, 1985. 

DoD will rely on the STS as its primary launch vehicle and will commit to at least onethird of the STS flights available during the next ten years. NASA and DoD will jointly 

develop a pricing policy for DoD flights that provides a positive incentive for flying on the 

Shuttle. The pricing policy will be based upon the principle that an agreed reimbursement rate per flight will be comprised of a fixed and variable component. This will result 

in an annual fixed fee and a charge per flight at marginal or incremental cost. NASA will 

propose a pricing policy based upon this principle by April 15, 1985. 

DoD and NASA will jointly study the development of a second-generation space 

transportation system-making use of manned and unmanned systems to meet the 

requirements of all users. A full range of operations will be studied, including Shuttlederived technologies and others. It would be anticipated that NASA would be responsible 

for systems management of civil manned systems and DoD would be responsible for [2] 

systems management of unmanned systems. DoD and NASA will jointly define the terms 

of reference of this effort for issuance as a National Security Study Directive (NSSD) . Any disagreements regarding implementation of this Strategy should be referred first 

to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and subsequently, if necessary, to the President for resolution. 
Chapter Three 

The NASA-In dus tr y-U nive r si ty 

Nexus: A Critical Alliance in the 

Development of Space Exploration 

by W. Henry Lambright 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is and always has been 

more than a simple, conventional government organization. When NASA Administrator 

James E. Webb spoke in 1966 about the organization he headed, he referred proudly to 

an enterprise involving some 420,000 men and women involved in the single-minded purpose of leading the United States into space. At the time, however, less than 10 percent 

(34,000) of those employees were civil servants. NASA extended its reach through contracts and grants to numerous external organizations, chiefly industry and universities. 

The government-industry-university team constituted a powerful institutional partnership 

throughout NASA’s history.’ 

The 1960s-the Apollo years-were the time when this partnership reached its peak 

in terms of scale.2 It was also the period during which NASA established or refined most 

of its innovative management practices. Since then, NASA has consolidated and built further on the foundation it created for itself; few fundamental changes were made in the 

character of the relations between NASA and its nongovernment partners during the 

1970s and 198Os, even as the partners attempted to adjust to diminished budgets and a 

lower national priority for space. As an agency, NASA still represents one of the more 

effective government-industry-university systems in existence. This essay focuses on how 

this system came into being after Sputnik I, was expanded, was pushed to its limit during 

the 1960s, and was altered in the post-Apollo era of spaceflight since the decade of the 

1960s. Most of NASAs interactions with industry and academia since Apollo have been an 

extension of the approaches put in place during that earlier time. 

Origins: The Glennan Era, 1958-1961 

Because NASA was formed from existing components based elsewhere within the U.S. 

government, especially from among the various components of the defense organization, 

it inherited a strong “in-house” tradition of technical expertise (referring to the idea that 

1. For biographical information on James E. Webb, especially as it relates to his management philosophy for large-scale technological systems, see W. Henry Lambright, Powm’ng Apollo: Jam.! E. We66 of NASA 

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). For a condensed analysis of Webb‘s leadership in this 

effort, see W. Henry Lambright, “James E. Webb A Dominant Force in 20th Century Public Administration,” 

I’ublic Adminisfrafion Review 53 (March/April 1993): 95-99; W. Henry Lambright, “Past and Present in Powering 

Big Technology,” Stmce Tims: Mapzinc rffhe Amairan Asfronaufical Society 34 (November-December 1995): 11-13. 

2. For a critique of this administrative approach from one who sees in it too great an aggregation of 

power, see the Pulitzer Prize-winning book by Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earfh: A Political 

Hz.!fmy rffhe Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985). 

41 1 
412 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

most engineering and even some production work would be performed by a government 

entity rather than an industry or university contractor). An emphasis on “in-house” technological skill had been bequeathed from various weapons laboratories, becoming known 

collectively as the “arsenal system.” Clearly, Wernher von Braun’s Army Ballistic Missile 

Agency team at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, was an organization firmly 

rooted in this culture of in-house capability. In addition, such government organizations 

as the nonmilitary National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), first established in 1915 as a means of improving the quality of airplanes in the United States to help 

offset foreign competition in the commercial market, developed strong “in-house” technical expertise in aeronautical research and development.’ 

The first NASA Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, on leave from his position as president of the Case Institute of Technology, appreciated the legacy of “in-house” engineering capability that the organizational components incorporated into NASA had developed, but it did not mesh well with the mission of the new agency as he understood it. 

Accordingly, he determined that most of NASA’s work would be performed externally by 

industry. This was required in part by the need to “scale up” rapidly for Project Mercury, 

NASA’s first human spaceflight program, but it was also a matter of ideology. As he wrote 

in his diary: 

. . . having the conuiction that our government operations were growing too large, I determined 

to avoid excessive additions to the federal payroll. Since our organizational structure was to be erected on the NACA staff; and their operation had been conducted almost wholly “in-house, I knew I 

would face demands on the part of our technical staffto add to in-house capacity. . . . But I was convinced that the major portion of our funds must be spent with industry, education, and other institution~.~ 

Glennan, as an Eisenhower Republican, believed that government’s role should be kept 

small and that the federal government should rely on private enterprise for getting the 

public’s work done whenever p~ssible.~ 

To a very real extent, Glennan was both an Eisenhower Republican with a fiscally conservative inclination and an aggressive businessman with a keen sense of public duty. He 

also possessed a strong opposition to government intrusion into the lives of Americans. 

But he was also an administrator and an educator with a rich appreciation for the role of 

science and technology in an international setting.6 As historian Roger D. Launius has 

written of Glennan: 

3. This legacy of “in-house” engineering capability has been explored in detail in Howard E. McCurdy, 

Imide NASA: High Ethnological and Organizafional Change in the US. Space Program (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1993), pp. 3450. 

4. T. Keith Glennan, The Birth of NASA: TheDiary of T. Keith Glennan, J.D. Hunley, ed. (Washington, DC 

NASA SP4105, 1993), p. 5. 

5. Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative Hisfmy of NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington, DC NASA SP-4101, 

1966), pp. iii-vii. 

6. These themes are well developed in Glennan’s diary, The Birfh of NASA. See also “Glennan 

Announces First Details of the New Space Agency Organization,” October 5, 1958, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC; James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, 

and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President fm Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 1977), pp. 141-144; James R. Killian, Jr., Oral History, July 23, 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Eisenhower’s concerns about this aspect of modern America are revealed in “Farewell Radio and Television 

Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961, Papers of fhe President, Dwighf D. Eisenhower 196@61 

(Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 103540. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 41 3 

while he was an ardent cold warrior and understood very well the importance of the space pr~ 

gram as an instrument of international prestige, Glennan emphasized long-range goals that would 

yield genuine scientific and technological results. Second, he belimed that the new space agency should 

remain relatively small, and that much of its work would of necessity be done under contract to private industry and educational institutions. This was in line with his concerns about the growing size 

and power of the fideral government. Third, when it grew, as he knew it would, Glennan tried to 

direct it in an orderly manner Along those lines, he tenaciously worked for the incorporation of the 

non-military space efforts being carried out in several other federal agencies-specially in the 

Department of Defense-into NASA so that the space program could be brought together into a meaningful whole.’ 

Glennan fostered the replication of his values and perspectives in NASA as he began to 

direct its affairs in the fall of 1958, and by the time of his departure from Washington in 

January 1961, they had been placed on the road to adoption. 

Little attention was given to universities, per se, during the Glennan era. There was 

interest in nurturing space science and research projects sponsored at universities, but 

Glennan did not develop a master plan for the incorporation of a partnership with universities. What he did establish in 1958 was a University Research Program Office at NASA 

Headquarters under the direction of the Office of Aeronautical and Space Research. This 

organization, at the behest of the technical program offices, oversaw a small “research by 

contract” program. [111-I] 

In May 1960, Glennan reorganized this structure and created the Office of Research 

Grants and Contracts as an administrative unit of NASA to coordinate research conducted by nonprofit institutions. This effectively made the new organization the liaison 

between NASA and most universities, acting on behalf of program offices for work performed outside the agency. All such research activities, therefore, were approved by NASA 

Headquarters, even though the agency’s field centers might still manage the actual work 

once it was put into place by the Office of Research Grants and Contracts.” 

The Department of Defense Framework 

Also during the Glennan period, the basic structure of NASA-industry relations was 

established. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which laid out the legal 

groundwork for NASA’s creation, anticipated that the agency would contract with industry for much of its activities.9 In a significant policy action, it extended to NASA the procurement authority contained in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (ASPA). 

The importance of this legislation was that it recognized that NASA would be establishing 

a partnership with many of the same companies with which the Department of Defense 

(DOD) already had long-standing relations. 

The ASPA provisions, which had been amended frequently over the preceding 

decade, provided the government with the flexibility to address work based on research 

and development (R&D). ASPA allowed the federal government to divert from the traditional practices of advertising for competitive bids and awarding contracts to the lowest 

responsible bidder. Instead, the government could use negotiation, a technique developed 

largely in World War 11 to meet the war crisis and institutionalized subsequently by DOD. 

7. Roger D. Launius, “Introduction,” in Glennan, The Birth o/NASA, p. xxii. 

8. Rosholt, AdrnmLh&z H8stmy n/NASA, pp. 12829. 

9. This act is available as Document 11-17 in John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle 

Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day, Explming the Unknown: &tkcted DonrmLs in the Hi5lmy or 

thr U.S. Civil Spare Progum, Vnlumr I: Orgmzizing/mE~lmatiun (Washington, DC NASA SP4407, 1995), 1: 33445. 
414 THE NASA-INDUSTKY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

On October 30, 1958, Glennan underlined NASA's intent to extend ASPA and DOD 

practices into its jurisdiction. He announced that NASA's procurement and contracting 

regulations ''would conform in every practicable way" to ASPA. Defense contractors would 

not have to learn how to work under new rules.'" This was important for many reasons, 

including the fact that much of what NASA was doing in its initial years was work DOD 

had pioneered and then transferred to NASA. With the work came the defense contractors. As a principle of his policy, Glennan maintained continuity between the defense 

realm and NASA's civilian realm as much as possible, and this continuity increased NASA's 

contracting options. 

Glennan also helped'smooth relations with DOD and industry by hiring many former 

DOD officials to work specifically on NASA-industry relations. In January 1959, he 

appointed Ernest Brackett, a DOD procurement specialist, to head NASA's Procurement 

Division. John Johnson, Glennan's General Counsel appointee, also came from DOD. 

These men brought others to NASA, many of whom had learned government-industry 

relations in the DOD setting." 

Once its staffing was well under way, NASA began holding conferences with industry 

to discuss NASA hardware needs and the legal/administrative relations governing procurement. [I1191 NASA stressed that (1) it expected most of its work to be performed by 

industry and (2) it intended to make it easy for industry to work with the agency by maintaining a principle of continuity between DOD and NASA contracting procedures. 

The Patent Problem 

One problem in NASA-industry relations in the Glennan era loomed very large: the 

question of how to ascertain and assign the rights to patented inventions. In the Space 

Act, there is a lengthy provision (section 305) requiring that inventions (and their 

patents) made in performance of contracts for NASA become the property of the U.S. 

government, unless waived (in which case the government retained a royalty-free license 

for the use of the invention). The responsibility of waiving U.S. rights to an invention was 

retained by the NASA Administrator, assisted by the Invention and Contributions Board 

(a body established by the Administrator). Waivers were to be made only in the public 

interest. 

This statutory policy was similar to the statutory policy guiding the Atomic Energy 

Commission (AEC), but it was very different from the policy that DOD had promulgated 

administratively. DOD, the nation's largest buyer of R&D and the agency with an industrial clientele similar to NASA's, followed a more liberal policy from the contractor's point 

ofview. The invention remained the property of the contractor, with the provision that the 

government would have a royalty-free license for the invention's use. In other words, 

NASA would have to invoke the waiver procedure to grant the same privileges to a contractor that DOD could grant outright in the contract itself.I2 

Glennan was stymied in regard to his "continuity" policy, at least in this area. The 

patent issue mattered in two ways. First, there might well be tangible stakes involved. 

Significant inventions might derive from working for NASA, and industry could therefore 

make additional money from marketing them in other contexts. For the federal government, these financial stakes did not exist, because the government itself did not commercialize inventions. However, at a second, symbolic level, there were two political issues: 

10. Rosholt, Adminisfratiue Histmy of NASA, p. 62. 

11. Zbid., pp. 62-63; Glennan, Birfh ofNASA, pp. 108, 120. 

12. Rosholt, Administrative Histmy of NASA, p. 92. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 415 

whether the federal government might end up “paying twice” for its work and whether the 

government was “giving away” the public’s property rights to an invention. 

These symbolic concerns were intensely expressed by certain legislators with a populist bent. As government expanded its R&D work beyond DOD, they made it a point to 

push their “title policy’’ (the AEC model) into other fields. In atomic energy, which began 

as a government-created monopoly, industry did not have the opportunity to fight for the 

license policy (the DOD approach). In the case of NASA, industry did fight-but only 

after the National Aeronautics and Space Act had been passed. 

What the patent issue also illuminated was the degree to which terms such as “procurement” and even the broader concept of “acquisitions policy” masked a dynamic institutional relationship between “buyers” and “sellers.” The federal government is a buyer, 

but the buyer does not always hold all the bargaining advantages. In the pre-Apollo days, 

NASA was distinctly at a disadvantage-or so it perceived itself-vis-a-vis DOD in acquisition of the best contractors. Many firms quietly spread the word that “NASA would take 

your patents.” They also pointed out that NASA was an R&D agency and would not 

provide the lucrative production runs industry could get through DOD. Moreover, the 

leaders of NASA, such as Glennan and the DOD transplants, did not want an AEC type of 

policy. They wanted continuity with DOD and an equal chance to get the best and most 

enthusiastic contractors-the contractor companies that would allow their most creative 

(and inventive) people to work on NASA contracts. 

Although it is all but forgotten today, this matter of patent policy was a significant 

political issue in the Glennan era. NASA was trying to initiate a close relationship with 

industry; it was a rival of DOD for many space missions, and by no means an advantaged 

rival. The patent issue grated on these relations. Glennan felt that the section 305 legislation tied his hands, and the result was his decision to get the legislation amended. 

Legislators favoring the title policy took a stand, and a legislative struggle ensued. [111-31 

This created a controversial backdrop to the more staid NASA-industry relations in other 

areas during 1959 and 1960. NASA fought for an amendment throughout the Glennan 

period and was finally able to get legislation through the House of Representatives that 

would shift the law from title-oriented policy to license-oriented policy. This legislation 

failed in the Senate, however, where such powerful and populist Democratic senators as 

Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, and Russell Long of 

Louisiana favored the title approach. 

0 th er Ear 1 y NASA-Indus tr y D eve lop me n ts 

Having decided that most of its work would be done with industry, and using DOD 

practices as much as possible, the next question for NASA was how to award major contracts. Glennan concluded that he should be the decision maker for large contracts. In 

October 1959, NASA promulgated a formal procedure for selecting the recipients of very 

large NASA contracts. The procedure provided that the NASA Administrator would select 

all contractors when the intended contract exceeded $1 million. Glennan indicated that 

the Administrator would be advised on these decisions by ad hoc source selection boards, 

primarily composed of technical specialists.” 

For instance, Glennan’s personal diary discussed the dilemmas involved in the bidding and selection process. In one particularly poignant section, he described the process 

leading to his selection of Rocketdyne to build the 5-2 engine, which powered both the 

Saturn 1B first stage and the Saturn V second stage: 
416 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

At 9:OO o’clock the Source Evaluation Board on the 200 K engine reported. This is a stink in 

the vernacular-jive companies bid and three of them are very close together at the top. In fact, thq, 

are so close in the technical evaluation that it is almost impossible to choose between them. The same 

is essentially true in the business evaluation except that one of them bid $138 million, a second bid 

$69 million, the third bid $44 million. These bids are really estimates of the total cost of the project 

since this research and development work is always handled on a cost plus afixedfee basis. The costs 

do give an indication of the extent of experience of a company in undertaking a difficult task of this 

sort. For instance, one of the companies which was not in the running bid only $24 million dollars. 

While the highest one is undoubtedly high, the lowest indicates a complete lack of understanding of 

the difficulty of the job. 

Z took the reports and will now have to sit down with myself in an attempt to find a proper answer 

to this question. 

Later he met with his chief advisers, and they agreed that Rocketdyne would receive 

the contract. This process was ticklish at best. As Glennan concluded: “It is a fact that if 10 

people bid, 9 of them are going to be unhappy because only 1 can win. With the 9 having 

representatives in Congress, it is almost inevitable that some charges of favoritism, lack of 

objectivity, etc., will be tossed our way.”I4 

Throughout 1959 and 1960, Glennan had various management consultants take a 

look at the agency’s administrative issues, including NASA-industry relations. The general thrust of these reports confirmed Glennan’s view that as much of NASA’s work as possible should be contracted out. [1114, 111-51 However, the reports also pointed out the 

need for balancing the external work with internal competence. NASA’s centers pressed 

on Glennan their need to grow and build competence. By the end of the Glennan years, 

85 percent of NASA’s $1 billion budget was going to industry. But the agency was also 

expanding its in-house work and capabilities. 

Under Glennan in the 1958-1960 period, NASA established a strong relationship with 

industry based on the principle of continuity with DOD contracting practices. As a 

Republican, Glennan’s conservative values helped create a sense of partnership critical to 

jumpstarting NASA-industry relations. The “closeness” with industry bothered some critics, including NASA civil servants who wanted more work to be performed in-house. This 

was particularly true of those who had come to NASA from NACA and the Army Ballistic 

Missile Agency. The patent issue was also left unsettled. All in all, however, Glennan left a 

solid foundation on which the next Administrator of NASA could build. 

The Webb Era, 1961-1968 

Under James E. Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961 to 1968, the NASA-industryuniversity relationship expanded tremendously. Webb continued the basic philosophy of 

Glennan-to contract out most of the agency’s work to industry-but he surpassed 

Glennan by consciously seeking innovation in these relations. Both continuity and change 

were objects of NASA policy. Whereas only modest efforts had been made on the academic front under Glennan, Webb established a “university program” that went beyond, in 

its goals, anything seen in government before-or since. Glennan was rather cautious in 

his approach to external institutions. Webb used government with an eye toward reform. 

Glennan was a technical engineer. Webb-a lawyer-administrator with exceptional political 

skills-had the instincts of a social engineer. When he took the oath of office, Webb stated that “my purpose would be to work toward creating an environment within which 

14. Glennan, Birth of NASA, p. 137. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOW 417 

NASA could be as innovative in the management of its programs as it was in aeronautics 

and space s~ience.’’’~ [111-61 

When first asked by the White House whether he would accept a nomination as NASA 

Administrator, Webb made it clear that he wanted to inherit the two principal NASA officials from the Eisenhower administration: Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, who 

was a physicist and former NACA chief, and Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, 

Jr., who was also known as the “General Manager.” Webb wanted to make the major decisions in conjunction with these two men, and together they would form a “triad” for the 

administrative leadership of the agency. 

The May 1961 decision to go to the Moon-just three months after Webb took 

office-had tremendous impacts on NASA in many ways. The question facing Webb, 

Dryden, and Seamans after the Apollo decision was how well Glennan’s contracting 

system would serve to organize the lunar landing program. In general, they accepted that 

system, even strengthening the procedures instituted by Glennan. The principle of contracting out for R&D was reaffirmed, and the role of in-house staff in technical direction 

was stressed. Headquarters officials took it upon themselves to make procurement policy 

more uniform, yet flexible enough for NASA to obtain space hardware whose main features could not be specified in advance.lfi 

Given Webb’s orientation, there would have been changes in the way NASA dealt with 

universities and industry even without Kennedy’s decision to go to the Moon. However, 

what that decision did was enlarge the scope of NASA’s effort and give it a new urgency 

and many more resources.” Also, problems that were important for Glennan were less significant under the impetus of Apollo. For example, the patent issue was one problem 

Glennan felt had to be resolved with new legislation. Webb decided that he could handle 

the problem administratively, using the waiver clause. In effect, Webb used an administrative strategy to bring NASA patent policy in line with DOD policy. This infuriated title 

policy advocates, but Webb pushed ahead and absorbed intense (sometimes very personal) criticism thereafter from particular legislators. This made for easier NASA-industry 

relations, though. It also made it possible for NASA to move on other issues in Webb’s 

agenda. 

Among the issues Webb wanted to address was the role of universities and industry in 

economic and social development. Just two days prior to the announcement of the Apollo 

goal, on May 23, 1961, Webb sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson a memorandum in 

which he revealed that NASA-industry-university relations would have a new flavor.” 

[111-71 For Webb, Apollo was both an end and a means. As an end, it served as an arena 

for a technological race with the Soviet Union for pride and prestige. As a means, it would 

provide an impetus that would allow NASA to spend a large amount of R&D money in 

15. James E. Webb, “Foreword” in Rosholt, Administrative Hisfmy ofNASA, p. iv. 

16. Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in fhe Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP4102, 1982), pp. 65- 

105; Sylvia D. Fries, NASA Enginem and the Age of Apollo (Washington, DC NASA SP4104, 1991), pp. 17483; 

McCurdy, Inside NASA, pp. 13441. 

17. On the Kennedy lunar decision, as well as the ramifications of it, see John M. Logsdon, TheDecision 

to Go lo the Moon: Project Apob and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970); Charles Murray and 

Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New York Simon and Schuster, 1989); Roger D. Launius, Apollu: 

A KPtmospectiue Anal+, Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 3 (Washington, DC NASA, 1994); Andrew 

Chaiken, A Man on the Mom: The Voyages ofthe Apollo Astmnaufs (New York: Viking, 1994). 

18. James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for the Vice President, May 23, 1961, Administrator’s 

Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
418 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

ways that would help the country, including having government work with universities and 

industry in terms of regional economic development.’!’ 

Webb also told Johnson in this wide-ranging memorandum how he thought about 

Apollo. He mentioned the prospect, for example, of a new NASA facility to manage the 

Apollo program; this eventually was the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston (later 

named Johnson Space Center). He suggested its possible linkage with Rice University. 

Webb noted that Lloyd Berkner, Chair of the Space Science Board of the National 

Academy of Sciences, was establishing a Graduate Research Center in Dallas, Texas, with 

industrial backing and that this new organization might also be brought into the alliance. 

Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma (Chair of the Senate Space Committee) also had interests in this area, and he and others saw a development potential for Arkansas and 

Mississippi. Even without NASA’s involvement, Webb anticipated a scientific-industrial 

complex in California, running from San Francisco south through the new University of 

California at San Diego. Webb saw another center emerging around Chicago, as a pivot, 

and a strong northeastern arrangement with Harvard, MIT, and similar institutions. He 

envisioned work in the Southeast, perhaps revolving around the Research Triangle in 

North Carolina, in which Charlie Jonas as the ranking minority member on Albert 

Thomas’s House Appropriations Subcommittee (which controlled the NASA budget) 

would have an interest. To fill out the picture, he thought NASA could help make the possibility of a southwestern complex into a reality. 

It was clear that Webb thought about NASA-industry-university relations both as a procedure to secure the Apollo goal and also as a way toward advancing regional socioeconomic development. The latter end would also be a means for Apollo in terms of winning 

congressional support. For Webb, it was one mosaic, with each part contributing to the 

whole design. Thus, on May 25, 1961, when Kennedy announced the Moon decision, 

Webb had an institutional strategy in mind, and he was ready to go at full speed. 

Early Decisions Involving Contractors 

Like Glennan, Webb believed the big decisions on procurement should be made at 

the top. However, with NASA’s budget soaring, the $1 million level established by Glennan 

as the threshold for the Administrator’s personal involvement was raised to $5 million. As 

Webb wrote: 

07: Dryden, 07: Seamans, and I determined that we would personally examine, in detail, the 

results of the work of all source evaluation boards on competitively negotiated contracts that amounted to 5 million dollars or more. We expected these boards to appear befDre us personally in a formal 

setting and make a full and complete presentation of (1) the method chosen to break down for evaluation the contractor proposals, (2) the results achieved in the application of this method, and (3) the 

judgment of the board on each of the categ~es of the breakdown. 

The fact that the three senior officers of the agency would take the time to conduct what amounted to a thorough baring and question-and-answer period on each contractor selection action enabled 

19. This approach toward handling Apollo has been explicitly laid out in Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., ‘The 

Fertile Crescent: The South’s Role in the National Space Program,” Sotlthweslon Histmica1 Quarfmly 71 (January 

1968): 377-92; Robert A. Divine, “Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space,” in Robert A. Divine, ed., The 

Johnson Years, uol. 11: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), pp. 217- 

53; Robert Dallek, ‘Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning,” unpublished paper 

delivered at a symposium titled “Presidential Leadership, Congress, and the US. Space Program,” sponsored by 

NASA and American University, March 25, 1993. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 419 

all levels of management, in Headquarters and in our &ten, to get their questions out on the table 

before all three of us fw debate and clarification. Another important result was that when the presentation to the three of us was over; eueryone involved had a clear understanding of the ehnmts basic 

to a proper decision and everyone in NASA concerned with the matter was aware of this. The burden 

then passed to Dryden, Seamans, and me to make the final daision, and the personnel of the boards 

were in position to form their own judgmats as to whether the three of us did in fact arrive at the best 

decision as indicated the facts and analysis. Furthq an important element of a NASA-m‘de and 

pervasive se!f$olicing system was thereh established. This has had an important effect on maintaining high standards throughout the ageqrn 

In the months following the Apollo announcement, NASA made one decision after 

another involving contracts to companies for the Moon program. The most controversial 

decision, made late in 1961, was the award to North American Aviation for the construction of the Apollo spacecraft. This was controversial because the Source Evaluation Board 

recommended in favor of a company other than North American. A number of astronauts 

and Manned Spacecraft Center Director Robert Gilruth believed that North American 

Aviation, which the Source Evaluation Board also ranked highly, was more qualified and 

said so to Webb, Dryden, and Seamans. 

Webb had an informal policy to spread contracts around so NASA would not overly 

depend on any one organization. North American had already been awarded the contract 

for the second stage of the Saturn rocket (MI). Hence, given the Source Evaluation Board 

recommendation, there was a second reason not to give this critical contract to North 

American. However, pressured by Gilruth and others, Webb and his senior colleagues 

decided in favor of North American. It was the largest single contract of the entire Apollo 

program.*I 

In early 1962, with most of the big hardware contracts for Apollo signed, NASA made 

two other industrial decisions of policy significance. These involved contracts for supporting NASA in Apollo management. One was the Bellcomm contract with AT&T. 

Bellcomm was a profit-making subsidiary established by AT&T in March 1962 at NASA‘s 

request to conduct analytical studies in support of Apollo. The second, a General Electric 

contract signed in February 1962, was to assist with the integration, reliability, and checkout of hardware at the three large spaceflight centers (Houston, Marshall, and Cape 

Canaveral) . These two contracts, negotiated on a sole-source basis, helped NASA with the 

total Apollo system, whereas other contractors worked only on Apollo components.22 

One other development involving industry during the start of the Webb era is worth 

noting. In a November 1961 reorganization, a small Industrial Applications Office was 

established as part of the Office of Space Applications. The larger office was concerned 

with communications satellites, weather satellites, and large hardware programs, while the 

Industrial Applications unit concentrated on NASA technology “spinoffs” to industries 

outside the space arena. [111-81 This highlighted Webb’s interest in the socioeconomic 

mission for NASA, as mentioned in his memorandum to Vice President Johnson. In the 

university field, Webb was similarly seeking to achieve multiple goals in parallel. 

20. James E. Webb, “Foreword,” in Rosholt, Arlmznzrlrnliuv Hzsfmy o/ NASA, p. v. 

21. Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., ChnnoI.r/mApollr,: A Hishy of 

Mrinnvd Lunar .Spnrrma/L (Washington, DC: NASA SP4205, 1979), pp. 4144. 

22. Levine, Mrcnr~ging NASA in Ihr Apolh Em, pp. 88-93. 
420 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

Launching a New University Relationship 

With the overall expansion of the space program, NASAs interactions with universities grew enormously. Most of these were in the field of space science. The November 1961 

reorganization established an Office of Space Science to organize and sponsor most of 

this work.‘> 

Academic participation in Project Apollo was relatively modest compared to that of 

industry. However, one of the most critical contracts for Apollo did go to a university-the 

Apollo guidance and navigation contract awarded to MIT’s Instrumentation Laboratory 

on August 9, 1961. This was a sole-source award, much to the annoyance of industry. 

NASAjustified the selection because the laboratory’s director, C. Stark Draper, was viewed 

as the country’s leading expert on guidance systems. 

However, the most striking aspect of NASA’s university relationship came with the 

advent of the Sustaining University Program.24 In November 1961, the Office of Research 

Grants and Contracts was moved under the Office of Space Science, and a new program 

was launched under this organization’s aegis. This program aimed to use universities for 

socioeconomic goals. 

Until 1961, NASA, like most other federal agencies supporting research in universities, concentrated on specific projects. The agency’s interest in allocating resources for 

the best research was paramount. The consequence was that a relative handful of universities in the nation received most federal research grants and contracts. Webb inherited 

the “project system” and did not interfere with this basic pattern of NASA relations to academic science. Most of NASAs science money was spent on projects directed by leading 

academic investigators. 

But Webb did not believe this was enough. [IIIS] In late 1961, following considerable 

discussions within and outside NASA, the Administrator directed the agency to establish 

the Sustaining University Program.” This was intended to complement the project system 

model with an approach that would relate NASA to universities as institutions, rather than 

to specific individuals and projects. The program had three basic components: fellowships, research grants, and facilities. 

The program also embodied a number of policy thrusts. One thrust was human 

resources, with the goal of enlarging the number of Ph.D.s in selected technical fields 

through fellowships. A second thrust was geographical spread, to nurture new centers of 

strength (as well as new talent) in university science throughout the country. NASA provided funds to universities, not to individual students. The fellowships were then awarded 

by those universities; hence, students had incentives to enroll there, rather than going to 

a few elite schools. The third thrust was the interdisciplinary principle. NASA provided 

research funds to support broad areas of research and involve a cross section of disciplines, including social scientists, who would study the impacts of science and technology. 

A fourth thrust focused on regional socioeconomic development. NASA would provide 

laboratory facilities-buildings-if the presidents and faculty of a university receiving a 

NASA facility pledged to work actively with private enterprise and community leaders in 

their local area, using the scientific, technological, and managerial advances being generated by the space program to benefit their regions and communities. Finally, there was 

23. John E. Naugle, First Anumg Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Expm‘menls (Washington, DC 

NASA SP-4215, 1991), pp. 107-11. 

24. For more on this subject, see W. Henry Lambright, Launching NASA’s Sustaining Llnivenily Program 

(Syracuse, Ny: Interuniversity Case Program, 1969). 

25. W. Henry Lambright and Laurin L. Henry, “Using Universities: The NASA Experience,” PublicPolicy 

20 (Winter 1972): 61-82. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 42 1 

a fifth principle that was implicit in all the rest-the enhancement of the university as an 

institution. NASAwanted a coherent response from the university; this meant that the university administration, especially the president, had to be a proactive force-a leader-in 

implementing the objectives of the Sustaining University Program. 

This program went well beyond anything any other department or agency was doing 

(or even considering) at the time. NASA had no specific legislative authority to do what it 

did, but, in the environment of Apollo, it was possible for an individual with Webb’s goals 

and skills to innovate in ways that would be impossible later. [111-IO] The president and 

key legislators gave Webb enough leeway to start the Sustaining University Program in 

1961. Once under way, the program’s geographical spread attracted a considerable constituency. There is no doubt that the ability of NASA to reach most states through the 

Sustaining University Program helped build support for the agency. However, the broader notions of using universities for a NASA-based socio-industrial policy mattered to Webb. 

The historian Walter McDougall contends that Webb aimed at building a “Space Age 

America.”26 If so, a major part of the leverage was to be supplied by the Sustaining 

University Program and the “space age university.” Thus, by early 1962, the NASAindustry-university partnership had been forged anew. Although an extension of the 

Glennan period, it bore the distinct stamp of James Webb, especially with respect to 

NASA’s university relations. [111-1 11 

“Incentivizing” Con tracts 

One of the problems of R&D contracting was that technical uncertainties made it difficult to judge how much it would cost to create a particular item of hardware. Hence, 

most of the industrial contracts NASA awarded in the late 1950s and early 1960s were cost 

plus fixed fee. In 1962, Administrator Webb participated in an interagency task force 

headed by David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The report of this group (the 

“Bell Report”) examined various aspects of the public-private relationship between government and ind~stry.~’Webb was a major participant on the task force, and the report 

emphasized areas in which NASA was already moving. 

One of these was the notion of “incentivizing contracts” so that industry would have 

some motivation to perform well and save money. Following some internal studies and the 

advice of Robert Charles, who served as Webb’s special assistant for procurement in 1963, 

NASA established more and more contracts with incentive provisions. The basic notion of 

NASA contracting would claim that “significant improvement in product quality . . . timeliness and cost can be achieved if the procurement process is saturated with competition 

before contract execution, and with performance and cost reduction incentives thereafter.” In late November 1963, NASA directed that the number of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts be reduced substantially and that incentives be considered for all contracts. Many 

existing contracts were subsequently converted to incentive arrangements, including the 

North American contract for the Apollo spacecraft. Doing so was difficult. In some cases 

(such as the North American contract), the process was achieved over a period of years.’” 

26. McDougall, Heavens awl fhe Enrfh, p. 361. 

27. This has been published as Document Tv-9, Rppurr Lo fhP f4e.dmf on Govrrnmvnf Cn,nfmrfing fir 

ihmrh and Dme@mr?nf, Bureau of the Budget, U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 87th 

Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. vii-xiii, 1-24, in Logsdon, gen. ed., 

Explming fhr: Unknown, 1: 651-72. 

28. Levine, Managing NASA in fhe Afiollo Em, p. 77. 
422 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Bringing Projects Under Greater Control: 

Phased Project Planning 

During 19641965, NASA leaders made an effort to bring industrially managed projects under greater control. Webb’s view was that “when you let the contract, all you’ve 

done is started a process that with the greatest of care, and ability, and drive will produce 

a bird. All you’ve done is put in motion forces that have the capability but which could fail 

at any point along the line.””’ 

In the mid-l960s, NASA received increasing criticism from members of Congress and 

others who believed too much was being spent on space versus the Great Society or 

Vietnam. Webb believed that NASA had to be especially careful to avoid even the appearance of mismanagement of its industrial contracts (cost overruns, schedule slippages, and 

so on), because this would give critics a wedge to attack the entire program.w 

In 1964, the deputy of Robert Seamans, Earl Hilburn, studied NASA’s methods of 

scheduling and project cost estimation. In 1965, the results of Hilburn’s analysis were 

implemented in the form of a new agency policy, “phased project planning,” to define 

programs more explicitly. This policy was aimed at conducting R&D contracts in a number of sequential phases with maximum competition characterizing the “phase-by-phase 

increments of project execution,” with each phase allowing for “the fundamental concept 

of agency top management participation at all major decision points.’’3’ Presumably, government could terminate the contract at each phase and go elsewhere if dissatisfied. It 

also permitted better opportunities for an agency to keep track of costs and schedules. 

Phased project planning was “predicated on the assumption that NASA employees 

would be responsible primarily for defining programs and providing technical direction to 

agency contractors.’”* The concept that government would direct industry in large-scale 

development programs was also a critical principle of the Bell Report. For the most part, 

NASA felt exceedingly capable of exercising technical management. But there was one 

area where the agency did not, and this caused NASA to create a new in-house center. 

The Electronics Research Center 

As the space program grew, it became evident that electronics was a crucial disciplinary area, cutting across virtually every NASA field. As one scholar, Thomas Murphy, concluded: 

NASA specialists estimated that forty percent of the cost of the space boosters would be accounted 

fw by electronics components. The figure was even higher with respect to spacemap, where it was estimated thatfifty percent of the cost involved electronics. In the tracking and data acquisition elements 

of the program, as much as ninety percent of the resources were electronics-oriented.” 

29. Ibid., p. 80. 

30. See Document 111-17, Summary Repmt: Future Programs Task Group, January 1965, in Logsdon, gen. 

ed., Explming the Unknown, 1: 7390. 

31. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apolla Era, p. 84. 

32. Ibid., pp. 8485. 

33. Thomas Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, andFederalSPending (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1971), p. 226. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 423 

NASA leaders were increasingly feeling the need to have more in-house competence 

to direct the vast electronics work being performed by industry and universities. “NASA 

management was very sensitive to avoiding some of the problems the Air Force had experienced,” Murphy added, “in relying too heavily on contractors whose work it lacked the 

ability to e~a1uate.I’~~ 

Webb, Dryden, and Seamans decided in 1962 that NASA needed an Electronics 

Research Center and that the best place in the country to put it was the Boston area. They 

wanted it located where frontier research was going on in universities and where there was 

a concentration of the electronics industry. In their view, the Harvard-MIT-Route 128 

complex made the Boston area a natural. There was also relatively less NASA work in this 

region, compared to California, another possible site. Finally, Webb no doubt viewed the 

Boston area as an ideal site to test his vision of government, industry, and university cooperation. 

The problem was that the Boston area was Kennedy territory. Not only was the president from Massachusetts, but his younger brother Edward (Ted) was running for senator 

in the fall of 1962 with the slogan: “I can do more for Massachusetts.” Webb kept quiet 

about the Electronics Research Center decision, informing the president, but not making 

it known even in preliminary discussions with the Bureau of the Budget. He feared a leak 

that would mix NASA interests with the Massachusetts election. After Ted Kennedy’s election, the decision was made known to the Bureau of the Budget and became official when 

NASA submitted its budget to Congress in early 1963.35 

The protests were large and immediate, with most of the criticism coming from 

Midwest legislators. The “taint” of political favoritism was charged, and Webb denied it. 

However, those against the siting choice prevailed in Congress to the extent that the 

Electronics Research Center’s approval was made contingent on NASA conducting a 

nationwide search for sites. NASA conducted the required search, and this did not change 

the final outcome, but it did delay the start in building the center (in Cambridge, 

Massachusetts) by a year. By that time, Lyndon Johnson had become the president.“’ 

NASA’s Controversy With the California Institute of 

Technology’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

In January 1964, Ranger ”ne of the space vehicles designed to study landing sites 

on the Moon prior to NASA’s sending astronauts-failed. This was the sixth Ranger flight 

in a row to fail, and so much effort had been invested in this particular flight to make it 

succeed that its failure brought many festering issues to light. The Ranger failure raised 

questions about the relationship between NASA and the California Institute of 

Technology’s (Caltech) Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) .” 

The primary issues were the responsiveness to NASA of JPL, which was in charge of 

Ranger, and JPL‘s capacity to manage large technology projects. JPL was different from all 

other NASA centers in that it was not a civil service organization. The laboratory grounds, 

buildings, and equipment belonged to the government, but the laboratory itself-as an 

34. Ilrill. 

35. Lambright, /’owning Apollo, p. 121. 

36. Jan Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Hz.hncnl Dnln lhk, Md. I: 

NASA I&sm~ri;ec, 195X-1968 (Washington, DC: NASA SP4012, 1988 ed.), pp. 285-94. 

37. See Homer Newell, Lkyond the Almosphm: Early Years ofSpaw Science (Washington, DC: NASASP4211, 

iwo), pp. 25873. 
424 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

organization-was part of Caltech, and its staff were Caltech employees. JPL identified 

with the academic values of Caltech, and Caltech charged NASA for managing JPL. 

JPL had been accustomed to near-total autonomy under its previous sponsor-the 

Army-and had expected the same under NASA. There were special provisions in JPL 

contracts-a mutuality clause-indicating that JPL could refuse to perform certain kinds 

of work that did not suit its interests. However, two factors created seeds for change. The 

first was the Apollo decision, which gave a special urgency to Ranger and changed it from 

a research-oriented lunar science project to an enabling mission for Apollo. In response, 

NASA wanted to install a general manager under the JPL director who would instill project management values and skills. JPL needed to give more attention to deadlines, costs, 

and tight engineering procedures. The second factor was Webb’s desire for more 

response from Caltech to Washington’s management directives. 

As part of its management responsibility, according to Webb, Caltech should be more 

involved with JPL, getting the laboratory to interact with other universities and industry 

in California. JPL should set an example for the universities under the Sustaining 

University Program to follow. Caltech president Lee DuBridge, however, was not interested in doing what Webb wanted, and he told Webb that.% 

This institutional struggle continued into the early 1960s. JPL had on its side both 

prestige and a history of independence. NASA, however, supplied the money, and the 

Caltech-JPL contract was up for renewal. What tipped the scales in favor of NASA was 

Ranger 6. The Ranger disaster first produced a NASA investigation and then a congressional inquiry. Because of these inquiries, Caltech’s Board of Trustees became involved. 

Webb protected Caltech and JPL from congressional actions that might have gone too 

far in punishing these institutions. At the same time, he bargained with Caltech’s Board 

of Trustees to get more control over JPL. The chairman of Caltech’s Board of Trustees, 

Arnold Beckman, became a Webb ally, and the pressure on Caltech and JPL to change 

became too strong to resist. [111-12, 111-131 The mutuality clause was removed, there was 

agreement by Caltech and JPL that a general manager would be appointed, and the 

Caltech fee was made subject to performance evaluation. [III-14,III-15] Webb was unable 

to get DuBridge to go along with his vision of a “space age university,” but Webb never 

stopped trying. Most importantly, from the standpoint of buffering the NASA-Caltech-JPL 

partnership from a congressionally mandated restructuring, Ranger 7 was launched on 

July 28, 1964, and was 

Problems With the Sustaining University Program 

Starting in 1966, Webb initiated several studies on how the Sustaining University 

Program was doing.” What he found was that by most “standard” measures of a successful 

government-university program, the Sustaining University Program was doing very well 

indeed. The fellowship program was highly regarded in the academic community. The 

facility grants provided badly needed buildings. The research money was put to work in 

ways that could be described as interdisciplinary, in comparison to traditional research 

groupings, although in most cases this involved relations among physical and life scientists 

rather than between such “hard” scientists and social scientists. 

38. Clayton R. Koppes,JPL and the Am’can SpacePrugram (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 

Ch. 8. 

39. R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impacf: A History ufProject Ranger (Washington, DC NASA SP4210, 1977), pp. 

25670. 

40. See Lambright and Henry, “Using Universities”; Lambright, Launching NASA‘s Sutfaining Unium’ty 

hgram. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 425 

Webb was disappointed, however, with the university response to his desire for innovative approaches to complex problems. He had signed a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) with each university president receiving a facility grant. These MOUs included 

commitments by the presidents to work on the Sustaining University Program’s broader 

goals. For example, they were to seek new and more effective ways to make research 

results available to external clientele. There were reports on some campuses of industrial 

advisory committees, conferences on applications of new findings, outside consulting relationships of individual faculty members, and so on. But most of these initiatives seemed 

trivial to Webb. He was seeking a more profound response, basic attitude changes, a major 

restructuring of campuses, and new external relationships for academic professionals.” 

Webb badgered his staff and eventually reorganized and changed the leadership of 

his Office of Research Grants and Contracts. However, the more fundamental problems 

were on the campuses of the United States. A task force that he appointed to study NASAuniversity relationships told him in 1968: [111-161 

The failure of the universities to respond to the explicit agreements of the memwandums-technoloa transfer and multidisciplinary research-suggests that the [Sustaining University Program] 

goals, which thq contained implicitly, were not achieved. Thus, the [Sustaining University Program] 

facilities program cannot claim to have heloped concern fw societal problem, capability fw institutional response, awareness of a service role, w strengthened ties with industry and the local and 

regional community. 

The major m‘ticisrn that must be made of the universities’ response to the Memorandum of 

Understanding is that thqr did not try. Thqr clearly committed themselves to make an “energetic and 

organized ’’ effort to implement the memorandums, and then did not make it.‘2 

The year 1967 was the turning point for the Sustaining University Program, as well as 

a turning point for NASA in general. The reasons behind this shift reflected Webb’s policy dissatisfaction, but they were more closely related to budget constraints. President 

Lyndon Johnson, in putting together the federal budget that went to Congress that year, 

looked everywhere for budget savings to finance the conflict in Southeast Asia, which was 

now becoming his dominant preoccupation. The Sustaining Universi6 Program was nice 

to have, but not really essential, in the president’s view, and he ordered Webb to terminate 

the program. 

Given his own frustration with the program’s results, Webb was not in a good position 

to defend the universities. Indeed, as Vietnam protests on campuses heated up, Johnson 

was not anxious to listen to any defense of academia. The best thing Webb could accomplish was to get permission to curtail, rather than terminate, the program and to do so 

over time. Webb had just a few more initiatives he wished to try before closing the program-initiatives that included research in administration and management, engineering 

systems design, and aid to historically black colleges and universities. 

The $31 million budget for the Sustaining University Program was slashed to $10.9 in 

fiscal year 1968 (calendar year 1967). As Webb left NASA in November 1968, the program 

was scaled down even further, and it was eventually terminated completely by President 

Richard M. Nixon. The program’s funding ended officially in 1970. 

41. Laurin L. Henry, The NA.W-Univemity Memornnrln of Undmtnnrling (Syracuse, Ny: Interuniversity 

Case Program, 1969). 

42. Homer Morgan, rf rrl., A Sfurly ofNASA Unimity I+ngrnmy (Washington, DC NASA SP-185, 1968), p. 58. 
426 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

The Sustaining University Program’s lifetime ran from 1961 to 1970 (fiscal years 1962 

to 1971). It obligated more than $200 million to research, training, and facilities that complemented and facilitated NASA’s larger research project effort. Some of the program’s 

accomplishments are as follows: 

More than 4,000 graduate students at more than 100 universities were financed in 

space-related disciplines. 

About 1,400 faculty members participated in research and design projects at NASA 

centers during the summers. 

Thirty-seven research laboratories were built on university campuses. 

More than 3,000 space-related endeavors were carried out under the research portion 

of the program. 

Successful by almost every customary standard, the Sustaining University Program 

enlarged the personnel base from which to draw aerospace scientists and engineers, 

brought new universities into aeronautics and space research, facilitated regular participation by scientists in NASA project research, consolidated disparate research endeavors 

into space “centers” on campus, and served as a model for other agencies with regard to 

institutional grants, geographical spread, and other features. It even stimulated many 

social scientists to focus on science policy and technology as a dominant concern. What 

the program did not do was meet the broader criteria set by Webb: 

He hoped to see more innovation and change in universities-broader capabilities fm multidisciplinary research, university concern with the technology transfer process, increased involvement with 

industry and community and regional problems, developing capability for institutional response to 

societal need. These hopes were largely disappointed. By the late 1960s, there was evidence on some 

campuses of movement in the directions Webb sought, but just as these were appearing [the Sustaining 

University Program] ended.49 

Problems With Industry: NASA’s Relationship 

With North American Aviation 

Without question, the NASA-industry-university partnership had produced the successes of the Mercury program. This partnership was so effective in the Gemini program 

that it won an award for achievement in 1966 as an example of excellence. In January 

1967, however, the Apollo fire occurred, taking the lives of three astronauts while they 

conducted tests in a space capsule on the launch pad.@ This served to focus attention on 

problems in the relationship of NASA with North American Aviation, the builder of the 

Apollo spacecraft. No doubt, some of the issues involved were present where other 

governmen t-industry interactions were concerned. However, the NASA-North American 

problems were especially significant, given the central role North American played in 

43. Lambright and Henry, “Using Universities,” p. 73. 

44. On the Apollo 204 capsule tire, see “The Ten Desperate Minutes,” Lqe, April 21, 1967, pp. 113-14; 

Erik Bergaust, Murder on Pad ?4 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968); Mike Gray, Angle $Attack: Harrison Stm 

and the Race to the Moon (New York W.W. Norton and Co., 1992); Erlend A. Kennan, and Edmund H. Harvey, Jr., 

Mission to the Moon: A Critical Examinafion of NASA and the Space Program (New York William Morrow and Co., 

1969). 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 427 

Apollo, and the resulting managerial solution was an example of what Webb called “innovating our way” out of a problem.45 

The North American controversy went back to the original award of the Apollo spacecraft contract. As noted, this was one of those rare occasions when Webb, Dryden, and 

Seamans overruled the Source Evaluation Board. Charges of “politics” were hurled at the 

time, and not forgotten in subsequent years by NASA critics. What made the North 

American Aviation award stand out was its size and the fact that it made the corporation 

the single most important contractor for NASA in terms of sheer work. 

The nature of the Apollo program was such that it entailed a relatively small number 

of huge awards. North American received two of these. The six largest NASA contract 

awards made to industry all involved Project Apollo. The expenditures on these contracts 

through fiscal year 1969 are shown in the following table. 

Major NASA Contracts 

(cumulative awards through 1969) 

Cost 

Contract Con tractm (in billions) 

Apollo Spacecraft North American Aviation 3.345 

Lunar Excursion Module Grumman Aerospace 1.914 

S-IC Stages of Saturn V Rocket Boeing Company 1.377 

S-I1 Stage of Saturn V North American Aviation 1.269 

S-IVB Stage of Saturn V McDonnell Douglas 1.097 

Apollo Integration and Systems Support General Electric 0.754 

Source: NASA, AnnualProcurement Report, FY 1969, p. 30. Cited in “R&D-The GovernmentIndustry Relationship,” Thomas P. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending 

(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1971), p. 173. 

Hence, from 1961 on, NASA knew it had an unusually dependent relationship with 

North American Aviation. Marshall Space Flight Center managed the SI1 contract on 

behalf of NASA, and the Manned Spacecraft Center managed the Apollo spacecraft contract. NASA worried that North American was not always giving the agency’s work the 

attention required. 

45. Numerous inquiries took place concerning the Apollo 204 capsule fire. See U.S. House, Committee 

on Science and Aeronautics, A@h nnrl Aplh Applir&i%s: StrifrSlurly fir lhe Suhrnmmillvr on NASA Omnigh/ orlhr 

Crimmi/tur on .S<imre rind A.slninriulir.\, U.S. Hmsc o/ /Lprr.wn/ntivrs. Ninr/zrlh Cringws, Suiond 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); U.S. House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Apollo 

Proprim Parr and Prnper.c Slriff Study fiw thr >Sul~rommi&e on NASA Ohmsigh/, Ninrlirth Ginpes\, Firs1 Sr.ssinn 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); LJS. House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Apolh and Apolki Applz<dzon.\: Slnff Slurly, Ninulwlh (hgrr,\,s, 

Second S~.Y.WJ~ (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); U.S. House, Committee on Science 

and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, /nvr\tiga/wn into Atdo 204 A<iidml, Hunnnp, Ninutir/h 

Conpn, Fir.\/ Su.nion, three volumes (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1967); US. Senate, 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, ApolkJ Am&nt Hrrinnp, Nznrlirlh fhgru.s\, Ftr\/ Srswm, seven volumes (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); U.S. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and 

Space Sciences, Apolki 204 Ardent: /Lfmrl of thu (hmrnztlvu on Avronnuli~ril rind Sfiaru .S,~OUY\. llni/d Slnlus Srnotu, 

ruilh Addili~n~l Vzrua (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968). 
428 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

During the early years of the relationship, North American Aviation developed a negative reputation within NASA. The company, for its part, thought NASA’s criticism unfair. 

By 1965, the delays on both the $11 and the spacecraft were long enough for NASA 

Headquarters to become truly concerned. Late in 1965, the director of the Apollo program within the Office of Manned Space Flight, U.S. Air Force General Samuel C. 

Phillips, organized a “tiger team” of NASA specialists who went to North American to 

investigate what was going on. Phillips prepared a highly critical report that would later 

become notorious as the “Phillips Report.” In the report, a series of extreme criticisms 

were pointed directly at North American. [III-17, 111-181 

During 1966, North American worked to respond to the NASA criticisms; however, 

problems continued. The most visible ones were recounted by Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, a trade journal, on November 21,1966. It reported on a “crisis” threatening the 

U.S. Moon landing venture.‘6 The specific problems reported in the article included the 

structural failures of both a North American command module fuel tank and the S-XI 

stage. They were indeed serious problems, so much so that Webb felt obliged to alert 

President Johnson to them. 

NASA and North American did in fact quickly address these known issues. By the end 

of 1966, the situation was looking so good that optimism prevailed among NASA’s technical people. However, one technical issue that was not addressed was the possibility of a 

fire in the pure oxygen atmosphere of the space capsule. The fire problem did not 

become an issue until it actually occurred in January 1967. Indicative of the tangled state 

of NASA-North American Aviation relations at the time was the circumstance that NASA 

and its contractor were haggling over a renegotiation in their basic agreement at the turn 

of the year. This most significant of all the NASA-industry partnerships was actually held 

together only by a letter contract as 1967 began. 

The fire took place January 27, 1967, and threw NASA-North American relations into 

turmoil. NASA established an internal accident review board, which was followed by a 

series of congressional investigations. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the 

first six months after the fire was a period of crisis management, with the succeeding 

months a time of recovery. During the crisis management period, media attention was 

searching and accusatory. The NASA-North American partnership was a target, as was the 

performance of the NASA Administrator in particular. 

There were charges that the original award to North American Aviation was a result 

of political pressure led by North American lobbyist Fred Black and a former Lyndon 

Johnson associate and Washington insider named Bobby Baker. Meanwhile, the NASA 

investigation showed that NASA and North American were both at fault, with many errors 

of both omission and commission. Webb concluded that the basic relationship was sound; 

however, “surgical” changes would have to be made. This meant key personnel changes; 

the head of NASA’s Apollo spacecraft project office in Houston was replaced. At Webb’s 

adamant insistence, his counterpart at North American was also replaced. The NASANorth American contract was renegotiated so that the contractor was penalized financially for the accident. And most importantly, a new contract was negotiated with Boeing to 

certify that “the whole unit, vehicle and payload, does function together, is compatible, 

and is ready for flight.” The Boeing contract was announced by Webb in congressional testimony on May 9, 1967.” All these actions were taken rapidly, largely at the command of 

Webb, and sometimes after bitter discussions between Webb and North American 

46. “Problems Force Drastic Apollo Rescheduling,” Auiation Wmk and Space Technology, November 21, 

1966, p. 36 

47. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, p. 90. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 429 

President, J. Leland Atwood, with Webb threatening to take the Apollo contract away from 

North American unless the company went along-which it ultimately did. 

All this happened while Webb defended publicly and before Congress the basic 

strength of the NASA-North American system. Congress and Webb engaged in a major 

struggle over the right of Congress to see the aforementioned “Phillips Report” that had 

been so critical of North American. Webb regarded NASA’s ability to deal frankly and privately with contractors as critical to its ability to root out problems at an early stage and 

then address them. In the end, Webb let Congress see the Phillips Report only in executive sessions of the Senate and House space committees. 

After six months, the crisis decision making gave way to recovery. The wounds 

between NASA and North American Aviation began to heal. For everyone, the Apollo 

lunar landing in 1969 marked the final evidence of successful recovery. The Apollo fire, 

while not forgotten, became much less significant in the wake of this triumph. The issues 

in the NASA-North American relationship became matters for historians rather than policy makers. The successful lunar landing quite properly refocused attention on the positive aspects of NASA’s industrial and university partnerships. 

Other Organizational Innovations: Research Institutes 

The basic relationship NASA had with industry and universities was a direct one. 

NASA addressed a university or corporation one-on-one. However, the agency experimented in its early years with other approaches to getting its work done. One approach 

worth documenting was the creation of a research institute. Its earliest manifestation originated in the Glennan years and grew under Webb. A different version came into being at 

the end of the 1960s, and a third variation was born in the 1970s. 

One of these was the Institute for Space Studies. Robert Jastrow, a NASA physicist and 

scientific administrator, was concerned that NASA needed to have a close relationship 

with the best scientific minds in the country for its theoretical space science work. He proposed to Glennan that a special institution be established. In December 1960, Glennan 

approved setting up the Institute for Space Studies in New York City. It was established as 

an arm of the Goddard Space Flight Center, but with considerable autonomy over the 

choice of its research activities. The institute would have a small in-house staff and be a 

place where notable scientists could come and work for relatively brief stays. It would also 

work closely with Columbia University and other institutions in the New York City area. 

The institute flourished in the 1960s and evolved various programs of interaction with universities, succeeding in its prime objective of linking NASA more closely to the very best 

space science theorists. Such individuals came to NASA via fellowship and other arrangements with the institute.’* 

Another organization NASA created was the Lunar Science Institute, which was 

founded on a different kind of model-the university consortium. The origins of the 

Lunar Science Institute lay in the realization in the late 1960s that as Apollo flights 

brought lunar samples and other data back to the Manned Spacecraft Center, there was a 

need to maximize the use of these samples and other data by non-NASA space scientists. 

The Institute for Space Studies was obviously a model, but NASA’s Manned Spacecraft 

Center in Houston, in contrast to Goddard (which ran the Institute for Space Studies), 

was not oriented toward science. Instead of an institute managed by a NASA center, Webb 

turned to the possibility that an institute might be managed by a university or a group of 

48. Van Nimmen and Bruno, with Rosholt, NASA Histmcnlllntn Book, Vol. I, pp. 31425. 
430 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

universities. With the help of the National Academy of Sciences, NASA established the 

Lunar Science Institute, based near the Manned Spacecraft Center. [V-191 Then, on 

March 12, 1969, NASA formed a university-based consortium, called the University Space 

Research Association, to manage the institute, which remained in Houston. 

However, the Lunar Science Institute was launched at a time of budget shrinkage, 

whereas the Institute for Space Studies had been born during a time of growth. The new 

entity was not greeted with enthusiasm by civil servant-led NASA entities that were hardpressed to defend existing resources. Personality issues exacerbated the situation. The 

Lunar Science Institute survived, but it left a legacy that was controversiaLqJ 

A somewhat later and entirely different approach to these institutions was the Space 

Telescope Science Institute. By 1970, NASA had a number of ambitious space science projects on its agenda, but because of budget cutbacks and government-academic rivalries, 

relations between NASA and the scientific community had deteriorated. The agency consciously searched for better ways to deal with the community. The space telescope, a highpriority program for scientists as well as for NASA, became a vehicle for finding a solution 

to what Homer Newell has described as a “love-hate relationship.” Astronomers, those scientists most concerned with the telescope, had Kitt Peak National Observatory and other 

national facilities in mind. They called for an institute that would be managed by a university consortium and located at a university to maximize their control over the telescope’s observation agenda. NASA, which had its own in-house scientists, did not wish to 

relinquish such control. NASA insisted that it was a mission agency, not the National 

Science Fo~ndation.~’ 

University astronomers and NASA scientists (chiefly at Goddard Space Flight Center) 

fought for the next few years. By 1975, an important inside ally of academia emerged. 

[I11901 This was Noel Hinners, Associate Administrator for Space Science. For Hinners, 

“an institute could solve two problems: one, pacify, if you will, the ground based astronomy community, so that they’d be all the more supportive of the Space Telescope, and two, 

really provide an external advocate for a good operations program.” In short, Hinners 

concluded that unless NASA had a united constituency outside NASA to help promote the 

telescope, the agency could not get the necessary resources to have a telescope at all. This 

meant giving the astronomers what they wanted: the Space Telescope Science In~titute.~’ 

Hinners arranged for the National Academy of Sciences to study the plan and eventually added its blessing to the institute in 1976. [III-211 In 1978, NASA Administrator 

Robert Frosch followed suit. NASA Headquarters backed the academic astronomers over 

the NASA scientists, and Hinners announced the NASA decision to Congress, pointing 

out that the agency would retain operational control of the telescope in orbit. [III-221 On 

January 16, 1981, following a vigorous competition, Frosch announced that a university 

consortium based at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, would receive the 

contract to operate the Space Telescope Science Institute; it has been in operation since 

that date.52 

49. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, pp. 240-42. 

50. The story of this institute’s creation has been told in Robert W. Smith, with contributions by Paul A. 

1 Ianle, Robert H. Kargon, and Joseph N. Tatarewicz, The Spa- Tehcope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technoha, and 

I’nliticr (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 207-8, 226, 337-39, 342-52. 

51. [bid., p. 187. 

52. hid., pp. 187-220. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 431 

Changing NASA-Unive r si ty Re la tio ns 

During the latter 1970s, there were several efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of NASA’s administration of research grants and contracts to colleges and universities. In 1977 and 1978, a review of the entire program led to several reforms to 

improve accountability, ensure quality, and establish mission criticality for university 

research supported by NASA.53 [111-23, 111-241 

Even if these reforms were successful, other difficulties had emerged by the early 

1980s as the launch rate of scientific satellites by NASA had dropped from its peak of four 

to five missions a year to only one or two annual flights. Moreover, the Sustaining 

University Program had disappeared a decade earlier, and NASA’s graduate fellowship 

program had been terminated. Indeed, the purchasing power of the space science budget had been cut almost in half over a twodecade period. Contrary to expectations, frequent opportunities to carry out scientific investigations on the Space Shuttle were not 

emerging.54 

In this context, NASA in 1983 undertook a comprehensive re-examination of its relationship with American universities. This review validated the perception that there were 

serious problems in the relationship and proposed a series of steps that NASA might take 

to address those problems. {III-251 However, most of those steps fell victim to continuing 

pressures on the Office of Space Science and Applications budget; only the recommendation to reinstitute a Graduate Fellowship Program was fully implemented. By the mid1980s, the NASA space and Earth sciences program, including its university-based 

component, perceived itself in a crisis situation; the intimate and mutually productive 

relationship that had developed over the past quarter century required revitali~ation.~~ 

A new wrinkle to NASA-university relations took place in 1988, when Congress passed 

the National Space Grant Act, which established a national program of space grant 

colleges and universities eligible for a major fellowship program. [I11261 With the first 

competitive awards for fellowships in 1989, 21 independent space grant consortia began 

operation. Three years later, the number of consortia stabilized at 52. The intent of this 

program was to: 

Continue to strengthen the national network of colleges and universities with interests and capabilities in aeronautics, astronautics, Earth systems, space science and 

technology, and related fields 

Encourage cooperative programs and collaborations among colleges, universities, 

business and industry, and federal, state, and local governments 

Promote programs related to aeronautics, astronautics, Earth systems, and space science and related technology in the areas of research, education, and public service 

53. Robert A. Frosch, NASA Administrator, to Frank Press, Director, Office of Science and Technology 

Policy, Executive Office of the White House, December 12, 1977; Walter C. Shupe, NASA Director of GAO 

Liaison Activities, to Distribution, “GAO Survey of NASA’s Administration of Research Grants and Contracts to 

Colleges and Universities,” March 2, 1978; W.A. Greene, NASA Chief of Policy Coordination, to Director of 

Contract Pricing and Finance Office, “Policy on Advance Payment of Contract Financing,” June 2, 1978; Walter 

C. Shupe, NASA Director of GAO Liaison Activities, to Distribution, ”Comments on GAO ‘discussion paper’ on 

NASA’s administration of research grants ad contracts wilh universities,”June 28, 1978, all in University Affairs 

Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

54. NASA/University Relations Study Group, Office of Space Science and Applications, “The 

Universities and NASA Space Sciences,” Initial Report, July 1983, p. 1, copy in NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

55. Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee, NASA Advisory Council, Thu Cna, in Sfmw nnd Earlh 

S/ivn(u: A 7inu /iir n Nuni Commilnwnl, November 1986, copy available in NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
432 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Recruit and train U.S. citizens for careers in aeronautics, astronautics, and space science and related technology, placing special emphasis on diversity by recruiting 

women, underrepresented minorities, and persons with disabilities 

Support the national agenda to develop a strong science, mathematics, and technology education base from elementary through university levels56 

This partnership infused various educational institutions in the United States with 

funding from NASA to further aerospace science and technology in the same way that the 

National Land Grant College Act of 1862 made federal resources available for higher education in the nineteenth century. 

A New Role for NASA-Supporting U.S. Industry 

One of the themes that President Ronald Reagan’s administration brought to 

Washington in 1981 was increased reliance on the US. private sector, rather than the government, to take the lead in developing new areas of economic and societal activity. With 

respect to the space program, there was a flurry of interest in “privatizing” various elements of the government’s activities, including the Landsat program, the operation of 

expendable launch vehicles, and even the construction and operation of additional Space 

Shuttle orbiters. Another area of emphasis was the potential for substantial economic 

returns from space; one influential projection was that by the year 2000, the annual revenue from commercial activities in space could reach $65 billi~n.~’ The White House 

issued a National Commercial Space Policy in 1984; in response, NASA developed a 

“NASA Commercial Use of Space Policy” during the same year. [111-271 This policy was 

intended to implement a new goal for the space agency-partnerships with U.S. industry 

to “expand opportunities for U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil space 

and space-related activitie~.’’~~ 

In response to this emphasis on space industry, NASA established in September 1984 

an Office of Commercial Programs, to be overseen by an associate administrator at the 

NASA Headquarters level. This new entity was intended to provide “a focus for and facilitate efforts within NASA to expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil 

space related activities.” Specifically, NASA Administrator James M. Beggs intended the 

office to foster: 

New commercial high-technology ventures 

New commercial applications of existing space technology 

Unsubsidized initiatives aimed at transferring existing space programs to the private 

sector59 

56. Nafional Space Grant Colkge and Fellowship Program: The Finf Five Yean, 1989-1994 (Washington, DC 

NASA Education Division, n.d.), p. 17. 

57. For one version of this forecast, see David Lippy, as quoted in The New Ymk Times, June 24, 1984, Sec. 

3, p. 1. For a sample of the discussion about the commercial potentials of space, see Aerospace Industries 

Association of America, A Current Perspective 071 Space Cummercializafin, (Washington, DC: Aerospace Research 

Center, 1985); Business-Higher Education Forum, Space: Ammica’s New Competitive Frontier, April 1986 John M. 

Logsdon, “Space Commercialization: How Soon the Payoffs?,” Futures 16 (February 1984); John M. Logsdon, 

“Status of Space Commercialization in the USA.,” SpacePoliq 2 (February 1986). 

58. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, Memorandum to Officials-incharge of Headquarters Offices 

and Field Installations, “NASA Commercial Use of Space Policy,” October 29, 1984, Administrators Files, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

59. James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, Special Announcement, “Establishment of the Office of 

Commercial Programs,” September 11, 1984, Administrators Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 433 

Since it was first established in 1984, the Office of Commercial Programs has enjoyed 

mixed success in meeting the objectives laid out in the original charter.“ 

NASA, as an R&D organization created to carry out national science and exploration 

objectives in space, found its new relationship with an emerging but uncertain commercial space sector difficult to incorporate into its long-established patterns of institutional 

behavior. While a number of the initiatives contained in the 1984 Commercial Use of 

Space Policy were formally put into practice (perhaps most notably a network of university-based Centers for the Commercial Development of Space that brought industry and 

university researchers together with funding from both NASA and industry), a combination of mixed returns from early commercially oriented experiments, the Chalbnger 

accident and the resultant dramatic decrease in Space Shuttle flight opportunities, and 

institutional resistance at NASA meant that space commercialization never got very high 

on the agency’s list of priorities for its future. 

The emphasis on government-industry cooperation in commercializing space had 

another implication for NASA; other government agencies began to take a more active 

role in space-related issues that NASA had previously thought were its exclusive purview. 

During the 1980s, the Department of Commerce created an Office of Space Commerce, 

while the Department of Transportation formed its own Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation. Operating through the Executive Branch interagency process, these organizations were often critical of how NASA was carrying out its new partnership with industry. At other times, they pushed for new roles for NASA in the commercialization process. 

By the last year of the Reagan administration, commercialization advocates within the government were able to delay the release of a new statement of national space policy until it 

was accompanied by a set of commercially oriented initiatives. [111-281 The proliferation 

of space organizations within the government was not a comfortable development for 

NASA. 

The efforts toward greater commercialization of space activities did not abate with the 

change of administrations in 1989. In January of that year, George Bush succeeded 

Ronald Reagan as president, with whom he had served as vice president. Bush continued 

to emphasize the development of space industry. During the Bush administration, the 

shaping and articulation of space policy were the work of the National Space Council, a 

descendant of the National Space Council first established in 1958 under the National 

Aeronautics and Space Act (Public Law 85-568). Chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, 

the council consisted of the heads of all federal departments or other high-level offices 

having either a programmatic role or legitimate concern in federal government space 

activities, including NASA, the Department of Commerce (which contains the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), the office of the director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among 

others. 

Several of the National Space Council’s policy declarations, designated “National 

Space Policy Directives” (NSPD), related directly to commercial space policy. NSPD-2 

(“Commercial Space Launch Policy”) [111-291 reflected the administration’s commitment 

in 1990 to developing a thriving commercial space sector by establishing “the long-term 

goal of a free and fair [space launch] market in which the U.S. industry can compete” 

internationally. NSPD-3 [1II-30] elaborated the administration’s commercial space policy 

60. NASA Management Instruction 1103.38, “Role and Responsibilities-Assistant Administrator for 

Commercial Programs,” November 6, 1984; James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to Edward P. Boland, Chair, 

Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies, House of Representatives, December 27, 1984; NASA Press 

Release, “New NASA Initiatives Encourage Commercial Space Activity,” November 3,1987, all in NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 
434 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

with specific guidelines “aimed at expanding private sector investment in space by the 

market-driven Commercial Space Sector.” Each of these documents emphasized a strong 

presidential commitment to commercial space activity. Each also helped redefine the relationship of NASA to the space industry.”’ 

Privatizing the Space Shuttle 

One of the most potentially significant developments in NASA’s history of private sector relations has been the privatization effort for the Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle has 

been seen as a momentous technological innovation that has gone from R&D to operations. As it has made that transition, many observers have suggested that NASA, whose 

mission is R&D, should “spin off” the shuttle to the private sector. In the early 198Os, 

NASA administrators spoke of this eventuality taking place by 1990. 

The transition did not take place in light of the 1986 Challenger accident, which 

showed the shuttle to be far less routine than NASA officials believed. The Space Shuttle 

is a piloted vehicle, and it is utterly indispensable for many of the most important NASA 

activities, including the space station. The notion of “operational” has, therefore, had to 

be redefined. In a real sense, the shuttle is not routine, and safety must be foremost in 

everyone’s mind. After 15 years of flights, learning has taken place, however, and a new 

structural relationship has been proposed in the mid-1990s as desirable and possible. Also, 

budget pressures have forced NASA to take a hard look at shuttle management. The key 

document in privatization decision-making thus far is the Report of the Space Shuttle 

Management Independent Review Team (February 1995). Chaired by Christopher Kraft, former director of the Johnson Space Center, the review team called for replacing much of 

NASA’s shuttle bureaucracy and many contractors with a single contractor possessing 

broad decision-making authority, 

The report led to a decision by NASA in 1996 to negotiate a contract with a new company called United Space Alliance (USA), formed by a partnership of Rockwell 

International and Lockheed-Martin. It is believed that such a move would save $1 billion 

annually in present shuttle costs and require far fewer employees to service shuttle operations. The actual details of what would remain governmental and what would be private 

are to be worked out over time. Scheduled to begin by September 1996, the transition of 

the shuttle from public to private would take years. Privatization of the Space Shuttle 

would break new ground in NASA-business relations-indeed governmental-private sector relations in general. There has been talk and some action at NASA in terms of privatization in the past, but never has an activity so central to NASA been privatized, or one 

so overladen with risk to human life. 

Privatization of the shuttle makes NASA a showcase for the Clinton administration’s 

call for “Reinventing Government.” However, the move is a controversial change in public-private relations. It entails marrying private profit, cost reduction, and public purpose 

in shuttle utilization. At the same time, privatization is expected to maintain a virtually 

perfect record in preventing loss of human life. The combination of requirements is 

unprecedented. 

Conclusion 

This essay has discussed NASA-industry-university relationships-a research partnership. The basic infrastructure for this partnership was established in the period from 1958 

to 1969. Changes subsequent to this era have been variations on the models of this time 

61. This information was obtained from Sylvia K Kraemer, Office of Policy and Plans (Code Z), 

“Explanation of Executive Branch Policy Directives,” September 1995, copy available in NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 435 

frame, modified by the need to address funding constraints. Attempts to expand NASA's 

role to support private sector commercial space initiatives have had difficulties. 

Nonetheless, NASA overall has been an important pioneering agency in terms of industry 

and university relations. NASA's innovations in contracting and emphasis on spinoff technologies. have been adopted by other government functionaries. NASA-university relations in the Sustaining University Program, while disappointing to Webb, were precursors 

of the current emphasis on government-university-industry relations today. NASA's geographical spread and institutional development policies certainly have been emulated 

elsewhere. 

The problems in these relationships are more than balanced by their positive features. 

NASA's basic problem in these relationships since 1969 has been how to maintain some 

of their more successful features that were seen earlier in NASA's history-such as the balance between in-house capability and contractor expertise. It is easier to innovate when 

funds are growing rather than declining. Also, as the space program matured, it has 

become increasingly necessary to determine what activities must remain governmental 

and what can be privatized. The division of labor based on concepts of what is R&D and 

what is operational in space can be controversial, as the shuttle case indicates. Still, the 

basic infrastructure has proved itsel€robust and resilient. During the 1960s, NASA built a 

base that could last and a set of partnerships that could be renewed. The NASA-industryuniversity relationship today remains one of the more adaptive and important policy concepts when applied to national purposes. 
436 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-1 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Memorandum from the Administrator, “Functions and 

Authority-Office of Research Grants and Contracts,” April 6,1959. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

When ?: Ka’th Glennan became the NASA Administrator in the fall of 1958, just as the space agency 

began operations, he had the opportunity to frame relations with other federal and pn’vate organizations as he wished. Recognizing that universities held much scientijic and technical expertise, he naturally sought a formal alliance that would allow a mutually beneficial relationship. Much of what 

he put in place was carried out ,!y the Office of Research Grants and Contracts, the formal entity at 

NASA Headquarters charged with caring for this relationship. The following memorandum provides 

a statement of functions and authm’ty for this office, as well as a rationale for action. 

[I1 April 6, 1959 

Memorandum from the Administrator 

Subject: Functions and Authority-Office of Research Grants and Contracts 

1. Purpose of this Memorandum. 

a. To redesignate the University Research Program Office as the Office of Research 

Grants and Contracts. 

b. To provide a statement of functions and authority for the office. 

2. Functions. The Office of Research Grants and Contracts is assigned the following functions. 

a. Developing the NASA basic research program to be conducted in educational, 

scientific and industrial organizations, except for research directly related to or 

accomplished under the Space Flight Development Program. 

b. Assisting other offices and divisions in identifylng basic research projects which 

justify NASA support. 

C. Serving as NASA contact point for research scientists and administrators of other 

organizations concerning research grants and contracts. 

d. Advising educational, scientific and industrial organizations of NASA basic 

research needs. 

e. Providing procedures for handling all unsolicited research proposals received by 

NASA. 

f. Obtaining and coordinating the review and evaluation of all research grant and 

contract proposals, with other interested and responsible offices and divisions. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 437 

[21 g. Providing the Procurement and Supply Division with recommendations and necessary justifications for all research grant and contract actions. 

h. Ensuring, or providing when necessary, proper technical monitoring of sponsored research. 

1. Coordinating the sponsored basic research program with related programs of the 

National Science Foundation and other Government agencies. 

1. Ensuring, and assisting in, the publication of research information arising from 

the sponsored research program. 

k. Providing administrative services for all approved research grants and contracts, 

including recommending type of contracts or grant instrument forms, maintenance of official agency files and records, handling of all correspondence, receipt 

and processing of vouchers for payment, etc., but not including such services for 

industrial research sponsored with Space Flight Development funds. 

Reporting Responsibility. The- Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts reports 

directly to the Director, Aeronautical and Space Research. 

Scope ofAuthority. The Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts is authorized 

and directed to take such action as is necessary to carry out the responsibilities 

assigned to him within the limitations of this and other official NASA issuances and 

communications. 

Limitutions on Authority. The authority of the Chief, Office of Research Grants and 

Contracts, does not include technical cognizance of research activities funded in the 

Space Flight Development Program or research conducted in NASA facilities, but 

does include administration of university and non-profit institution grants and contracts to ensure conformance to administrative policies and procedures. 

Relutionships With Other NASA Officials. In performing the functions assigned to him, 

the Chief, Office of Research Grants and Contracts is responsible for recognizing the 

delegations of authority and responsibility of other NASA officials and for seeing that 

instructions he may issue are properly coordinated with the offices and divisions having joint interests. 

T. Keith Glennan 

Administrator 
438 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-2 

Document title: Walter D. Sohier, NASA Assistant General Counsel, “Legal Framework of 

NASA’s Procurement Program,” NASA-Zdustry A-ogram Plans Conjiwence, July 28, 1960 

(Washington, DC: NASA, 1960), pp. 105-108. 

At a first-of-its-kind NASA-industry conference in mid-I 960, NASA presented its thinking regarding 

future spaceflight plans to the industn’es that would play a key role in implementing those plans. In 

anticipation of increased contracting with industry, NASA’s Assistant General Counsel, Walter D. 

Sohiq provided an overview of the space agency’s procurement policy. In it he emphasized the legal 

aspects of the procurement policy being implemented !y NASA. This policy served the space agency during the earliest pa‘od of its contracting for spacecrafl, ancillary components, and support infrastructure in the lunar landingprogram of the 1960s. 

DO51 

Legal Framework of NASA’s Procurement Program 

It is my purpose to discuss with you the legal framework of NASA’s procurement program. Since many of you are familiar with the basic statutory and regulatory authority 

under which the procurement operations of the Military Departments function, particular emphasis will be given in this discussion to similarities and differences between the 

rules which we in NASA must follow and those which govern the military. The subject of 

NASA’s statutory patent policy is presented in the paper by Mr. Gerald D. O’Brien, our 

Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, and therefore will be omitted entirely from 

this discussion. 

The question of what statutory procurement authority to give such a new agency in 

order for it to be able to carry out its rather unique program within the tight schedules 

necessarily involved was given considerable thought during preparation and enactment of 

what is now the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The original bill which was 

submitted to Congress by the Executive Branch contained a broad grant of substantive 

authority for NASA to enter into such contracts or other transactions as might be necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as the new agency might deem appropriate. This bill also proposed making applicable to the new agency the provisions of 

chapter 137 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, formerly known as the Armed Services 

Procurement Act of 1947. 

There were both history and practical reasoning behind choosing this legislative 

approach to NASA’s procurement authority. Historically, NASA’s predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), had been included along 

with the military departments and the Coast Guard as an agency to which the provisions 

of the Armed Services Procurement Act applied. Hence, this set of rules was already familiar to NASA people. From a practical standpoint, it was felt that the research and development procurement activities of the new agency were likely to involve the same general 

industry as that which was engaged in military research and development programs. To 

require this agency to follow about the same set of procurement rules as the military followed might avoid needless confusion on the part of industry and might cut to a minimum delays created by unfamiliarity with the practices of the new agency. 

Essentially, this formulation of procurement authority was in the end enacted into law 

[in] the Space Act by the Congress, requiring NASA to follow the same statutory rules gov- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOM’N 439 

erning procurement procedures as the military. In spite of this fact, there are a number 

of differences between the statutory authority available to NASA and to the military 

departments that have an impact on the procurement process and which will be apparent 

to industry in its dealings with NASA. 

The first, and most serious, difference relates to NASA’s lack of authority to indemnify research and development contractors against unusually hazardous risks. The military 

departments have had such indemnification authority since 1952, but unfortunately this 

authority was not extended to NASA. We have been able largely to surmount this problem 

where nuclear material is involved, since the Atomic Energy Commission can extend 

indemnification coverage under the Atomic Energy Act to NASA contractors covered by 

operating licenses of the AEC. There remain, however, instances of other unusually hazardous risks that are involved in the performance for work for NASA. These risks by very 

definition are not normally insurable unless exorbitant premiums are paid. NASA has 

sought to rectify this lack of authority by proposing in [lo61 our legislative program to 

Congress that NASA be given the same authority to indemnify research and development 

contractors as is available to the military. We have hopes that when Congress comes back 

next month this, along with other items of the legislative program, will get favorable 

action. 

A second difference between the legal authority available to the military departments 

and to NASA that has procurement implications relates to the authority of the military to 

exempt foreign purchases from the payment of duty under 10 U.S.C. 2383. This statutory 

provision provides that the Secretary of a military department may make “emergency purchases of war material aboard.” It is clearly inapplicable to NASA. The immediate practical effect of this difference in authority is obvious. 

A less obvious effect arises in connection with the Buy American Act and the handling 

of purchases in Canada. Defense currently provides that the purchases in Canada of supplies appearing on certain departmental lists will, in effect, be exempt from the Buy 

American Act. Supplies purchased in Canada that do not appear on such lists are likewise 

exempt, except that duty will be added to the price offered by the Canadian supplier, 

whether or not a duty free entry certificate is provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2383. 

For NASA to treat certain listed supplies in the same way as the Department of 

Defense would mean that, in spite of the actual payment of duty, the Canadian firm would 

be treated as if no duty were to be paid. Thus, under such a procedure, a Canadian firm 

would be awarded a contract even though the ultimate cost to NASA, when duty is considered, might be considerably more than the next lower bid or proposal. The taxpayer 

would come out the same in the end, but NASA appropriations would suffer. 

We have recently determined that because of this difference in the application of duty 

to purchases in Canada by NASA we cannot adopt precisely the same policy and procedures as the military in dealing with Canadian companies. Moreover, American industry 

will be involved in this problem since the duty situation, so far as it affects subcontractors 

in Canada as well as other countries, must be taken into consideration. As you can see, this 

is a pretty complicated subject. Suffice it to say that NASA has tried to minimize the procedural differences in this area between dealing with the military and dealing with NASA. 

But certain differences must remain, since our authority to exempt from duty purchases 

from foreign sources is not the same as that of the military. 

A third difference in legal authority available to DOD and NASA has been resolved by 

Executive Order. At the outset, NASA was not an agency authorized by the President to 

include the so-called “no set-off” provision in its contracts pursuant to the Assignment of 

Claims Act. By Executive Order No. 10824, dated May 29, 1959, the President remedied 

the situation, thus placing NASA in the same position in this respect as the Department 
440 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the General Services Administration. 

Prior to the issuance of the executive order, this lack of authority of NASA had posed difficulties for contractors that were in need of financing. 

An effort to eliminate a fourth difference between DOD and NASA is being made in 

the NASA legislative program for this year. This difference relates to the bonding requirements of the Miller Act. Under this act, the Secretaries of the military departments and of 

the Treasury are authorized to waive the requirements of the Miller Act in the case of costtype contracts. NASA is not an agency to which this authority to waive has been extended. 

When Title I1 of the First War Powers Act was in existence, this lack of authority posed 

no difficulty for NACA, NASA’s predecessor, because Title I1 afforded a similar authority 

to waive this bonding requirement. However, with the repeal of Title 11 by Public Law 

85-804, this failure to be specifically authorized by the Miller Act to waive bonds under 

cost-type contracts became significant. This was so because Public Law 85-804 clearly states 

that it is not to be construed as authorizing the waiver of “any bid, payment, performance, 

or other bond required by law.” 

We have had a recent contract situation arise where this has posed an awkward and, 

seemingly, unnecessary situation for us. It would [lo71 appear that the end result was 

never intended by the Congress, and we hope the situation will be remedied by the 

Congress in August by adding NASA to the agencies authorized by the Miller Act to waive 

bonds in cost-type contracts. 

A final difference in authority, a remedy for which is also in our legislative submittal 

presently before the Congress, relates to our authority to outlease property. It has procurement implications to the extent we lease out industrial facilities to companies in connection with the performance of NASA contracts. The heart of this problem lies in the fact 

that the military departments have express statutory authority in 10 U.S.C. 2667(b) (5) to 

outlease property even though the consideration for such leasing is no more than maintenance of the property by the lessee. The absence of such express authority requires the 

charging of additional consideration. NASA has, in the Space Act, the authority to lease 

out property but does not have express authority to accept maintenance of the property as 

sole consideration. We are seeking such authority in our legislative program. Without it, 

NASA must treat industry differently in this respect than does the military. 

I have discussed in some detail certain differences in authority which must be borne 

in mind in doing business with NASA as distinguished from the military departments. 

These are exceptions to the general rule that the rules involved in doing business with 

NASA are not appreciably different from doing business with the military. But I do not 

wish to overemphasize the differences in procurement authority between NASA and the 

military. Essentially, the same set of rules applies. This may be illustrated by turning briefly 

to a discussion of the regulations governing NASA procurement. 

There are two main bodies of government Procurement Regulations at the present 

time-the Armed Services Procurement Regulation [ASPR] , and the Federal 

Procurement Regulations. Generally speaking, the Federal Procurement Regulations are 

followed by the civilian agencies of the government, the Armed Services Procurement 

Regulation by the military agencies. This would seem to be a logical division, since most 

of the civilian agencies are governed by Title 111 of the Federal Property and 

Administrative Services Act of 1949, under which the Federal Procurement Regulations 

are issued, whereas the military is governed by a different statute establishing procurement procedures. The difficulty arises with respect to NASA, however, since-civilian as it 

is-it is governed by the same procurement law as the military departments and not the 

civilian agencies of the government. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 441 

Where does this lead to in terms ofwhich procurement regulations to apply to NASA? 

A compromise was worked out on this question which, we feel, achieves the laudable 

objectives of the Federal Procurement Regulations System to eliminate the multiplicity of 

government procurement regulations while also achieving the objective of not requiring 

contractors of NASA to learn a different set of rules from those which they must follow in 

contracting with the military departments. 

In essence, this compromise permits NASA to adopt the policies and procedures set 

forth in ASPR rather than in the Federal Procurement Regulations [FPR]. In practice, it 

seems unlikely that there will be many differences of substance between the FPR and the 

ASPR. If a policy or practice is not covered by the FPR, NASA will follow any existing ASPR 

policy or practice unless the Administrator of NASA determines that the objective of uniformity between NASA and DOD is outweighed by other considerations. Of course, in the 

area of patents, NASA must adopt special policies and procedures because of the unique 

patent provisions contained in the Space Act. It is also contemplated that, in the area of 

grants and contracts falling generally within the purview of Public Law 85-934, NASA will 

not be required to conform to any future FPR coverage on these matters. 

NASA has already published a considerable portion of its procurement regulations. In 

the near future, the balance will be published. These will appear, as they are published, in 

the Federal Register as part of the FPR System. However, they will read and look very 

much like ASPR. 

One practical effect of these arrangements concerning ASPR and the FPR and our 

manner of proceeding in the adoption of procurement regulations is that, when a military department is faced with administering a NASA [lo81 contract, it will not be unfamiliar to it. We can, in effect, tell the military: “Just follow your normal procedures for 

contract administration; our contracts are pretty much the same as yours.” And, of course, 

for industry-ordinarily the same industry with which the military departments deal-a 

new set of rules need not be learned. 

This simplifies the problems of negotiating contracts, too. If a company wants to 

change a NASA clause or form, the first question asked is whether a similar deviation has 

been granted by the military departments. If not, why is NASA any different? If so, NASA 

will certainly give the request careful consideration and will ordinarily grant the request. 

NASA cannot afford to hash over old arguments with respect to some of the policies 

now set forth in ASPR and to open up these matters for extensive negotiation. If we have 

ideas as to changes that should be made in standard clauses or in major policies, we would 

prefer to work these changes out with the other government agencies as a normal course 

of proceeding. Of course, our special mission may give rise to the adoption of some different procurement policies and procedures in fields other than patents. In addition, it 

must be recognized that at the present time NASA’s contracting is largely of a research 

and development nature: hence, it must orient its procurement methods to this fact. We 

do not wish to abandon flexibility where this is needed to get our special job done. But we 

feel that the present arrangements under applicable statutes and regulations are, in general, well suited to meet our needs. We are hopeful that the few deficiencies in authority 

which were noted earlier will be remedied by the Congress when it returns to finish up its 

work in August. 
442 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-3 

Document title: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, “Property Rights in Inventions Made 

Under Federal Space Research Contracts,” Hearings on Public Law 85-568, August 19-20, 

November 30, December 1-5,1959, Report No. 47,86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 1-36. 

Responding to a drive spearheaded by NASA Administrator i? Keith Glennan, the House of 

Representatives voted to amend NASA’s title-oriented patent policy to reflect the Department of 

Defense’s license policy. This legislation died, howmq when the Senate failed to pass a similar version. These hearing excerpts capture the issues underpinning the patent policy question. 

Property Rights in Inventions Made Under 

Federal Space Research Contracts 

Wednesday, August 19, 1959 

House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 214B, New House 

Office Building, Hon. Erwin Mitchell (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

MR. MITCHELL. The subcommittee will be in order. 

As the witnesses know, this is the first general session of the special Subcommittee on 

Patents and Scientific Inventions. I feel-and I know that the members of the subcommittee feel-that we are certainly considering a most important problem-not only one 

that is important currently, but which will have a great significance in the future. I think 

each of us feels that we can, by very slow and thorough study, possibly set a course of action 

in the patent field insofar as the Government is concerned. 

We are certainly most privileged to have two distinguished specialists in this field to 

testify this morning-Mr. John A. Johnson, the General Counsel of NASA, and Mr. Gerald 

D. O’Brien, the Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, NASA. 

Mr. Johnson, do you have a prepared statement? 

Statement of John A. Johnson, General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration; Accompanied by Gerald D. O’Brien, Assistant General Counsel for Patent 

Matters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairmen, I do not have a prepared statement. 

MR. MITCHELL. We would like you to just give us a general outline of NASA’s activities insofar as patents are concerned. 

MR. JOHNSON. I will be glad to, Mr. Chairman. 

I should at the outset say, despite the chairman’s very generous introduction, that I 

am not a specialist in patent matters, but Mr. O’Brien, our Assistant General Counsel for 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 443 

Patent Matters, is and I would hope on more technical aspects of the patent problems that 

he will be our witness this morning. However, I am acquainted with and responsible to the 

Administrator of NASA for the patent policies of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. 

[2] As the committee knows, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 contains a 

section, section 305, which deals in quite elaborate detail with the subject of inventions 

which are made in the performance of contracts for the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. 

The overall effect of section 305 is to require that such inventions become the property of the U.S. Government if they are made under the conditions specified in section 

305(a) unless the Administrator of NASA determines that the public interest is better 

served by a waiver of rights to those inventions. In that case, however, the Government 

would still remain a royalty-free license to the use of the invention. 

This policy which is expressed in section 305, the statutory policy, is at fundamental 

variance with the policy followed by the Department of Defense. It is rather similar to that 

followed by the Atomic Energy Commission-not identical with that, but it is quite apparent that the statute does, in its overall substance, follow the Atomic Energy Act rather than 

the practice of the Department of Defense. 

As you know, the Department of Defense policy is one of ordinarily acquiring only a 

royalty-free license to inventions that are made in the course of research and development 

work sponsored by the Department of Defense agencies. 

This policy of the Department of Defense is not the result of legislation. It is the result 

of policy determinations made in the executive branch of the Government, which have 

been well known to the legislative branch for many years and evidently acquiesced in by 

the Congress. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Johnson, just to pippoint that, what is the underlying philosophy insofar as the NASA point of view is concerned? 

Why the difference? 

What is your thinking in NASA? 

Why should there be the difference in the patent policy in DOD and NASA? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, the reason there is a difference is because the 

Congress so decided a year ago. 

This was not the result of any determination within the agency. As a matter of fact, 

the agency didn’t exist when Congress passed this law. Therefore, it has not been an open 

question for NASA as it has been for the Department of Defense. 

The Department of Defense, being unhampered by legislation on this subject, has 

determined its policy on its own, but with congressional knowledge and acquiescence. 

MR. MITCHELL. Is there any existing policy in NASA now insofar as this matter is 

concerned? 

MR. JOHNSON. The existing policy in NASA is to do our best to implement the provisions of law passed by the Congress a year ago. 

This has really been the only thing we could do, and it has been our task. 

Now, if you are asking, Mr. Chairman, whether the agency has yet evolved a position 

on whether this legislation should he continued, this hasn’t been formally developed yet. 

I am not really in a position to express either the agency’s or the administration’s point of 

view yet on that. It will he developed in time for the Congress to consider [3] at the next 

session because we are now in the process of preparing our legislative program for the 

next session of Congress. As you know, this must be submitted to the Bureau of the 

Budget. It may be transmitted to Congress only after we have the approval of the executive branch on it. I can, however, express some personal points of view on the matter, if 

you wish. 
444 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

MR. MITCHELL. I would like for you to do so. 

MR. JOHNSON. It is my own personal point of view-and I have expressed this publicly several times over the past few months-that it is undesirable for an agency such as 

NASA to be compelled by legislation to follow a patent policy that is fundamentally divergent from that of the Department of Defense. 

Now, I say this without entering upon the question of whether it is good Government 

policy to take title to inventions that arise from Government-sponsored research or not. 

This is a question which, as you know, has been much discussed in the Congress and the 

legislative branch for many, many years. The Congress has never chosen to enact uniform 

legislation on this subject for the entire executive branch of the Government. We have 

some piecemeal legislation; we have legislation for the National Science Foundation; we 

have legislation for the TVA, we have legislation for NASA; we have legislation for the 

Atomic Energy Commission and probably others too. All of these are different. We have 

no legislation for the Department of Defense, which is the biggest agency of all spending 

money on research and development contracts. 

What I would say is this: That, leaving aside for the moment the ultimate question of 

what is good Government policy as a whole, until a uniform legislative plan is devised by 

Congress for the entire executive branch of the Government-it is desirable that in the 

field of patents, as in all other legal aspects of our procurement program, we should be 

free to follow the Department of Defense policies. 

I say that for this reason: All of our principal contracts are with the very same companies and will be with the very same companies that are principal contractors for the 

Department of Defense. 

We are not really like the Atomic Energy Commission, which had to embark on an 

entirely new field of technology and where the major work was done within the 

Government-at least at the beginning. Here we are right in midstream as far as the whole 

aeronautics and space industry is concerned. 

The space industry, as you know, is the aeronautics industry in transition. 

MR. FULTON. I can’t agree to that. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Fulton. 

MR. FULTON. I can’t have that go by unchallenged. 

MR. MITCHELL. Go ahead 

The record will show Mr. Fulton’s objection. 

MR. FULTON. Yes. I just can’t have that as a general comment. I don’t think you 

mean it. 

MR. JOHNSON. Well, may I elaborate a bit on it? 

MR. FULTON. Go ahead, sir. 

MR. JOHNSON. At the present time the companies that have expressed the greatest 

interest-this applies to all parts of the country-in our leading contracts, of course, that 

are producing the boosters [4] for the space program are the same companies that have 

been in the aeronautics and missile business down through the years. 

The years are of sort of recent origin because this is a fast moving industry. 

There are probably some companies that may be confined solely to space business, 

but this is, I would say, not very much in evidence yet. 

In any event, our contracting, by and large, is with the same companies that have substantial business with the Air Force and the Navy in particular, and the Army to some 

extent. 

I mightjust cite. 

Well, I won’t mention names. That is beyond your investigation, I think, this morning. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 445 

In those cases where research and development work is involved we have had to 

request that our patent clauses be inserted in the contracts placed by the military departments. 

This might not technically be called for by the terms of the statute because the statute 

speaks of contracts of the administration and I suppose it is an arguable question whether 

a contract placed by the Air Force with X Company at the request of NASA is a contract 

with the administration, but we felt, as a matter of policy, it would open the door wide to 

a type of evasion which the Congress certainly could not have contemplated if it were possible for NASA to place contracts through the military departments and evade section 305. 

So, we have required, as a matter of policy, that our patent clauses be inserted in all 

of those contracts. 

This means that a contract is placed by the Air Force at NASA’s request for work that 

is substantially similar to the very work they would be placing themselves with that same 

company, the patent results of the first contract are essentially different from the patent 

results of the second contract, and yet this is the US. Government dealing with this company with the right hand and with the left hand. It is our feeling that this is not a good 

position for the Government to be in. 

Now, I would like to say something more in that connection. Congress has been quite 

careful in every other respect in recognizing that we must do business essentially as the 

Department of Defense does it. NASA is the only nonmilitary agency that is under the 

terms of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, now codified as chapter 137, title 

10, of the United States Code. 

NACA was under that act when it was first enacted 11 years ago. It was actually passed 

in 1948, I believe. Last year when the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was 

passed, Congress in section 301(b), specifically amended chapter 137 of title 10, which 

appears in that portion of the code that applies to the Defense Department, to make it 

applicable to NASA. This doesn’t apply to the Atomic Energy Commission; it doesn’t 

apply to the General Services Administration or any other Federal agencies of the 

Government. Thus, unlike all the other civilian agencies, NASA alone is under the terms 

of the Armed Services Procurement Act. 

[5] One of the first official acts of the Administrator after NASA came into existence last 

fall was to announce that NASA would, insofar as practicable, follow the policies and procedures of the Armed Service Procurement Regulations, which is an elaborately developed set of regulations implementing the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1917. 

We thought it would be undesirable, since Congress has determined that we should 

be under the same corpus of legislation, to be developing an essentially different group 

of regulations. 

As you know, the General Services Administration has a responsibility for achieving 

maximum uniformity in procurement regulations in the executive branch of the 

Government and they recently published the Federal Procurement Regulations, or the 

first portions of it at least. 

NASA has secured from the General Services Administration authority to deviate 

from the Federal Procurement Regulations. Insofar as the Armed Services Procurement 

Regulations are not consistent with them, we have the authority to follow the Armed 

Services Procurement Regulations rather than the FPR’s when the Administrator determines that to be in the public interest. 

There have been a number of other instances during the past year in which we have 

striven for legal uniformity with the Department of Defense to carry out what clearly 

seemed to be the intention of Congress in amending the Armed Services Procurement 

Act to include NASA. 
446 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

We obtained by executive order the so-called V-loan authority to guarantee loans to 

contractors under the Defense Production Act. We obtained the authority to use what is 

called the no set-off clause under the Assignment of Claims Act. Both of these could be 

accomplished by Executive order. They were available to the Department of Defense and 

the President extended them to us. 

We also joined with the Department of Defense in seeking identical pieces of legislation which would grant both NASA and the Department of Defense authority to indemnify contractors to a very large amount against certain extra hazardous risks involved in 

the kind of business they are doing for us. 

One of those bills came to this committee; the other one to the Armed Services 

Committee. There has been no action on them at this session of Congress. 

All of these actions, which we deemed to be in accordance with the intent of 

Congress, expressed in the portion of the act I referred to, have been designed to put us 

in a posture of legal equality or parity with the Department of Defense. 

The one outstanding exception to that is in the field of patents and this, of course, is 

a field of great importance to industry. 

Now, we are sort of the tail on the dog in this. Our program is not as big as the 

Department of Defense program; yet in the development of much of this hardware, it is 

quite indistinguishable so far as the technology is concerned from the kinds of things that 

the Department of Defense is doing. 

MR. MITCHELL. If I may interrupt you at this point, I think I should state to the 

members of the committee the gentlemen were not requested to give any official position 

as far as NASA is concerned, but [6] merely to brief us on the existing law. However, I 

think it is most important-and I appreciate deeply, Mr. Johnson, your willingness-to 

give us your own personal views because that is exactly what the subcommittee wants. We 

want to hear opinions concerning the existing law and the operation of the law that you 

and Mr. O’Brien are so familiar with. 

I can see, as a matter of convenience, why NASA would want to operate similarly to 

DOD, but, in your personal opinion, if you care to give it, is there any uniqueness about 

the R. & D. field so far as NASA is concerned that would cause the Government to have 

more interest in the result of these inventions? 

Is there some difference between DOD and NASA in the R. & D. field? 

MR. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is a difference in the results so far as some 

of the ultimate product is concerned. 

I would think so far as the technology is concerned and so far as the public interest is 

concerned that they are substantially identical. There is no significant difference. 

As you know, the Department of Defense is way out in forward-looking research in 

space technology. It has to be because, while NASA is given a very extensive statutory 

responsibility by the first sections in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, section 102(b) excerpts from that and gives to the Department of Defense those activities 

peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military 

operations or the defense of the United States, including the research and development 

necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States. 

So far as inventions are concerned, the same kind of inventions can very well be made 

in the course of developing these advanced weapons systems that are utilized in space, as 

might be the case on the civilian side. 

Now there are some uniquely civilian applications this might not be true of. 

MR. MITCHELL. Any questions by any members of the committee? 

MR. KING. Yes. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. King. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 447 

MR. KING. Mr. Johnson, you expressed your opinion, unofficially, and we understand 

the spirit in which it was given, but I am interested in pursuing it just a bit. 

Your reasoning has followed pretty much in the line that you think uniformity is a 

good thing inasmuch as NASAs practice, as indicated by the Congress, is not uniform and 

not consistent with the practice developed by the DOD: therefore, that creates an anomaly. You feel it might be well to bring the two together. 

That, as I understand it, is the burden of your reasoning. 

That, of course, avoids the question, the big question, which is: What is a desirable 

policy here? 

If the NASA policy, as expressed by Congress, is inherently correct and sound and if 

the DOD policy, which has not received congressional approval, but has just grown up, is 

inherently unsound, then it seems to me the movement should be in the other direction. 

Even though NASA may be the tail and the DOD is the dog, if the tail happens to be right 

and the dog happens to be wrong, then the movement would be in the other direction. 

[7] So, I get to the more ultimate question as to what is a sound policy. 

Now, that, I realize, is a tremendous question. You may not want to comment on it, 

but if you would like to I would be interested in hearing your comments. 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. King, I agree with your analysis entirely. That is the ultimate 

question. 

I would rather not express an opinion on that because I am sure that we in NASA have 

a lot more to learn about this. 

We have been in the process during the past several months of administering this just 

as objectively and fairly as we can, and I would like to assure the committee that I feel confident that the views I have just expressed have not impaired our objectivity in the administration of this provision of the law. 

This is the ultimate question that Congress has been discussing off and on, and so has 

the executive branch for I don’t know how many years. It would be, I think, a great public service if it could be decided wisely and finally. 

I think I would rather at this stage of things simply say that until that question is settled and the Congress itself is able, through the processes you have of bringing together 

so many different points of view and the practices of the different agencies, to settle this 

thing, it is undesirable for an agency like NASA, given the kind of business we have to do, 

to be compelled to be essentially different from the Department of Defense. 

MR. KING. Mr. Johnson, don’t you feel, though, that this ultimate question is 

inevitably before us? 

We can’t evade it, and I, personally, would be most reluctant to predicate any decision 

of mine simply on the grounds of uniformity without coming to grips with this more ultimate question, and I haven’t made up my mind on it and I don’t want anything that I am 

saying to you to intimate that I have. I just recognize that as the ultimate problem, and I 

would be loath to take an action simply for the sake of uniformity if that action actually 

represented a step away from what I would otherwise consider to be the more desirable 

objective. 

So, my comment is this: Don’t you feel that this subcommittee still must face this ultimate question and predicate its action on the basis of the ultimate question rather than 

on the basis of uniformity alone? 

MR. JOHNSON. I’m sure that the committee can’t avoid facing the ultimate question. 

I do think, though-and I suppose maybe I must differ with you fundamentally on 

this-that if a problem like this can’t be settled with some reasonable degree of uniformity, here is an area where equal treatment by Government agencies is a principal that is 

perhaps even paramount to the question that you are concerned with. I don’t mean by 
448 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

this you have to, say bring TVA into this picture, but you have here two agencies, NASA 

and the Department of Defense, that are doing a very similar kind of business with a similar segment of U.S. industry. 

I don’t think that you will find that this is a question that lends itself to a very clear 

black and white solution. 

The very fact that Congress, itself, has dealt with it in such a variety of ways before, 

and the fact that it is argued by people who [8] have spent their lives in the patent field 

without clear-cut answers, I think would indicate that there is probably a lot to be said on 

both sides of the question, so that I don’t think you would be committing a really gross 

error by at least achieving uniformity before you have solved the ultimate problem. 

I think there is something essentially wrong with the U.S. Government, which, after 

all, is one legal person, dealing with a company through two different agencies on essentially the same kind of contracts and taking an invention with one hand and leaving it 

there with the other, or say, two different companies-one that happens to be only contracting with NASA at that time and the other one with the Department of Defense, but 

on essentially similar kinds of business and involving inventions that are in the same field 

of technology. 

I think equality is still the basic principle of equity; and it is more desirable here to 

have equality of treatment than it is to perpetuate inequality for fear you might depart 

temporarily from what would appear ultimately to be the best principle. 

MR. DADDARIO. Will the gentleman yield? 

MR. KING. Yes. 

MR. DADDARIO. If that is so and you feel there should be this equality, why is it that 

you put a limitation on some of these departments, which are not under this restriction, 

when they make contracts in behalf of NASA, that [thlis patent infringement type of 

restriction should apply? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Daddario, as I said before, we are administrating this law as 

objectively as we can without regard to the personal opinions that I have been asked to 

express here this morning. As we see the law, it could not be intended that NASA, simply 

by placing an order with the Defense Department rather than entering into a contract 

with X Company directly, would cause an arbitrary difference in patent results. 

We know that when Congress writes a law, even as complicated as this, they can’t say 

everything, and we have to try to determine what the intent of Congress was. 

We read in section 305 (b) : 

“Each contract entered into by the Administrator with any party for the performance 

of any work shall contain effective provision+” 

and so forth. 

This is the basis for our patent clauses. 

It was our conclusion that Congress must have intended that when any work is placed 

as a result of a NASA requirement by the Government it is within the intention of 

Congress that the patent provisions of section 305 apply. 

You wouldn’t get uniformity, anyway, because you would still have the NASA contracts 

as distinguished from the DOD contracts. So, you are already faced with the lack of uniformity. You have the contracts placed directly by NASA. You have the contracts placed 

directly by the Defense Department for its own business. Those are already nonuniform 

by virtue of the legislation. 

Now, you have this intermediate category of contracts placed by the Defense 

Department at the request of NASA with our funds and for our proposes, and this is the 

question: Should we throw these into the pot with the Defense Department contracts or 

should [we] throw them into the pot with our contracts? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOUU 449 

[9] We felt that if we didn’t throw them into the pot with our contracts this would be just 

an open-sesame to an evasion of the patent requirements of section 305. 

MR. DADDARIO. In some cases you have departments which enter into contracts for 

the benefit of NASA without necessarily udizing funds obligated to NASA. They are essentially using their own funds. 

Isn’t that so? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is-yes-a small amount of that. 

I don’t know of any new contracts of that kind being placed. 

MR. O’BRIEN. No. 

MR. JOHNSON. I think all of our new business-you see, we have a certain number 

of contracts that were commenced originally by the Defense Department. We had an executive order last October transferring a number of projects from the Air Force and from 

ARPA, and also the Vanguard project from the Navy Department, as an example. 

Now, in the case of those projects, contracts were already in existence and we have 

taken them over. That is a case where we clearly didn’t feel it would be legally proper for 

us to amend the contract to change the patent situation, because if a contract means anything at all it means what is says when the contractor signs it. 

At the present time I don’t know of any cases where other Government agencies are 

continuing to place contracts with their own funds for our benefit. 

MR. DADDARIO. That is all. 

Thank you. 

MR. KING. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to belabor this, but I would like to say for the 

record I think we would be derelict in our duty as a subcommittee if we did not consider 

the problem of uniformity in the context of the larger problem; that is, whether or not 

the Government’s retaining patents is inherently a good policy or a bad policy. 

I feel that that problem is before us, and I just wanted to state that for the record. 

MR. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. King. 

I think you have stated the purpose of the creation of this subcommittee, and that is 

the problem that we are going to look to. 

Mr. Bass, I am going to recognize you, but I have just one question first. 

What difficulty, if any, have you encountered as a result of the wording in the NASA 

Act and the difference in the policy of DOD? 

Has it concerned you or made it more difficult to obtain contracts? 

MR. JOHNSON. This is a difficult question, Mr. Congressman, to answer categorically. 

We have had a number of contractors express reluctance at first to enter into contracts with us and have even requested additional compensation because of the loss of 

what would otherwise be their patent rights. 

I think that in every case, even though it has taken time, we have negotiated this prob 

lem successfully and have not, I believe, to date been faced with a known situation of 

unwillingness to do business with NASA. 

We have also taken a firm stand against any additional compensation for the loss of 

what they regard as their patent rights, but which we [lo] regard under the terms of the 

law as the patent rights of the United States. 

On the other hand, we have had a number of reports-these, I should say, are unauthenticated and it is not the kind of thing we can trace down easily-f companies that 

have put out the word to their own personnel that they will not accept any work for NASA, 

they will not do any work either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor which involves 

the loss of patent rights which they would otherwise retain if they were doing business for 

the Department of Defense. 
450 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Now, it is very difficult to know the extent of that because when we put out requests 

for proposals we don’t know whether a company that doesn’t respond is not responding 

for that reason or for some other reason. 

Also, when you get down to the subcontractor level, in the lower tiers, this is something which some of our prime contractors might know more about than we do; but we 

have had information to that effect. 

Perhaps Mr. O’Brien could be more specific on this. 

MR. O’BRIEN. No; I don’t think I could add very much to that, Mr. Johnson. I think 

that is the extent of my information. 

MR. JOHNSON. We have to recognize, too, that we have been only in the beginning 

phase of this thing. It takes quite a long while for the impact of these things really to be 

felt. 

We have been in the beginning stage of our contracting program, and the whole 

NASA program is still pretty young. 

So far I don’t believe we have had yet the first report, have we, of an invention made 

in the performance of one of our contracts? 

MR. O’BRIEN. No. 

MR. JOHNSON. The ultimateMR. MITCHELL. In negotiating these contracts if I may interrupt, have you had indication, without going into specifics, that if the contractor had the patent right this contract could be let less cheaply to the Government? 

Have they indicated that, knowing the existing law and knowing it could be done? 

Has there been some such indication when you negotiate on these contracts? 

MR. JOHNSON. There have been some indications of contractors that wanted extra 

compensation for this thing, but it has been refused and they have taken the contract. 

The answer is that, from my personal knowledge-and, of course, there are many of 

these that I have not had personal knowledge of-I don’t know of that kind of case. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. O’Brien. 

MR. O’BRIEN. I know of none where they have placed a premium or said they would 

do it for a lesser amount if the patent provisions of their contract were similar to the 

Department of Defense patent provisions. 

I only have the instances where they had tried to make additional charges for taking 

the patent rights provisions of the NASA patent clauses, and this was not permitted and 

they didn’t take the contract with the original pricing. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Bass. 

[ 111 MR. BASS. Then, Mr. Johnson, I assume you base your feeling in regard to this question primarily on the grounds of equity and what is fair rather than on any matter of 

impeding or hindering the defense effort because of this unequal treatment? 

MR. JOHNSON. I do base it on that, Mr. Bass, primarily. 

I think, too, with reference to Mr. King’s comments, I am looking at this mainly as a 

lawyer rather than as a person concerned, as the committee has to be, with the ultimate 

question of Government policy. I think that, as a lawyer, in the negotiation of contracts 

with industry, it is basically unfair for two Government agencies, both representing, after 

all, the same U.S. Government, to be dealing in essentially different ways on a matter of 

this importance with the same contractors or with two contractors similarly situated. 

MR. KING. Would the gentleman yield at that point of one question? 

MR. BASS. Yes. 

MR. KING. Right in connection with that, Mr. Johnson, do you not feel that the 

waiver provisions in the law allowing the Administrator to waive them under certain circumstances-that if he exercised that rather liberally, that that might not bring about the 

uniformity that you desire? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 45 1 

MR. JOHNSON. From the strictly legal point, Mr. King, the waiver provisions could be 

exercised to achieve absolute uniformity, but that would only be, I think, by disregarding 

the main intent of Congress in enacting section 305. 

I mean by that it would be necessary for the Administrator to adopt almost a policy of 

automatic waiver in every case, because typically the Department of Defense does not 

acquire title to inventions. 

Of course, this is what industry would like to have us do. It has been proposed to us. 

This is only natural. They would say, ‘Why don’t you just utilize this very extensive authority granted here and, if you think uniformity is desirable, announce a policy of automatic 

waiver in almost every case?” 

It certainly doesn’t seem to us that Congress could have taken the trouble to enact a 

provision as elaborate and detailed as this is and expect that to be the result. 

We haven’t gone into our waiver regulations at this hearing today. We do have interim waiver regulations out and, while we think they are reasonably liberal, they don’t begin 

to go that far. 

MR. BASS. Mr. Johnson, you pointed out a little earlier in your testimony that in the 

Atomic Energy Commission they are governed by the same policy as NASA. 

Is that not correct? 

MR. JOHNSON. Not precisely, but more like ours than like the Department of 

Defense. 

MR. BASS. And you justified that on the ground that in the atomic energy field this 

was a brand new field and, therefore, perhaps there was no inequity involved; is that right? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Bass, I was simply explaining the difference between AEC and 

NASA. I don’t want to be in the position ofjustifylng that legislation either. I don’t know 

enough about the atomic energy business. I do know, I think, enough about it to know 

that it is quite different from our business. 

[ 121 MR. BASS. I always thought of your business as pretty much pioneering, too. 

That is the point I am coming to. 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Bass, here, I think, is the reason we have section 305 in the act if 

I can speculate a little bit, because, as you know, this is a rather unique piece of legislation 

and has no significant legislative history behind it that we can read in the reports and the 

debates of Congress. In the establishment of a new civilian agency to carry on a very forward-looking program of research and development and a new and expanding technology, it must have seemed that the Atomic Energy Commission was the best precedent, the 

most analogous field of Government activity. But I think when you look at the kind of 

technology we are involved in, the kinds of contracts we are making, the very fact that 

most of the business we initially have had was transferred to us from the Defense 

Department, we must conclude that while we are out in a very forward field of technology, it is a field that has been in process of development a long, long time. You can’tjust 

drive a sharp line between space technology and missile technology and between missile 

technology and aeronautical technology. 

It is a field in which the Department of Defense has already had a long and wellunderstood patent practice, which the Congress has at least acquiesced in, because it has 

been well known and is one of the big features of our economy. 

I think the atomic energy field is quite different. It was developed originally as what 

you might call a Government-housed effort through the Manhattan project. This was 

done in large Government laboratories and installations segregated from private industry. 

We have a rule of Government monopoly in that field that pervades the whole thing which 

we don’t have in the space and aeronautical field. We must not forget either that this 

agency is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the act is the National 
452 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Aeronautics and Space Act. It isn’tjust space technology we are talking about. This is the 

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, and this section 305 isn’t confined to space 

technology either. It applies to the whole field of activity of NASA. 

MR. BASS. Now, for instance if I may interrupt, we are in the process of developing 

the nuclear-powered engine. Is that done by the Atomic Energy Commission or us? 

MR. JOHNSON. We are participating in this. 

I don’t know how muchMR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

MR. BASS. I was wonderingMR. JOHNSON. I am not technically equipped to describe the division of effort 

between NASA and AEC on that sort of thing. 

MR. FULTON. We have the Rover program. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Under the Rover program funds are transferred to AEC. 

MR. FULTON. If I may comment on that, under Rickover, of course, the AEC has the 

atomic nuclear engine and we have it under NASA under the Rover and other allied projects. There is a lapover. 

MR. JOHNSON. In that area I know that Mr. O’Brien has worked out some patent 

procedures with the Atomic Energy Commission’s patent counsel. Perhaps you would like 

to have him explain those. 

MR. BASS. Yes; I would like to have him explain that. 

[13] MR. O’BRIEN. In connection with Project Rover, the funds were transferred from 

NASA to the Atomic Energy Commission, which placed the contract with North 

American, and in this contract we had both the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the 

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 to consider. The contract terms provide that 

the inventions which emanate from the research work undertaken pursuant to that contract will be subject to both acts and, without going into any details of the patent article 

which was included in that contract, it does attempt-and we hope it achieves that purpose-to make the inventions which were made in carrying out the research under that 

contract subject to both acts. 

That is about the gist of the situation, I would think. 

MR. BASS. One final question: If this committee and the Congress should decide it 

would be better to change the patent policy with regard to NASA, would we not be forced 

into applying the same rules with respect to the patents of the Atomic Energy 

Commission? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Bass, I don’t think so at all because they don’t have the same situation of relative uniformity in all these other respects with the Department of Defense 

that we have. 

Congress, as I have mentioned before, has already decided that in the field of general procurement regulations NASA is to follow the Department of Defense. 

This decision was made last year. 

No similar decision has ever been made with the Atomic Energy Commission. 

It has been a unique operation from the beginning. 

So, whereas NASA is a separate agency, it doesn’t have the same kind of uniqueness 

in its manner of doing business. Congress has recognized that in the legal field it is desirable for us to be as uniform with the Department of Defense as possible. 

MR. BASS. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Fulton. 

MR. FULTON. We are glad to have you here, and I would like to go over this field 

rather widely so that we can check into and see what the problems are, and I would say to 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 453 

you, rather than have some of the answers directly today, I would rather have you give it 

some more thought, because I have been a member of the previous select committee and 

was on the committee at the time of the conference report, and I was also one of the conferees when the patent provision was put in 

The question first comes up in this field, as it does in any field: What are the limits 

that,we are talking about? 

For example, are we going to talk simply about patents in space? 

Are we going to talk about them in the field of aeronautics? 

Are we going to talk about them in both fields? 

For my part, I could see there would be a distinction between the patents fields in 

aeronautics and in space. One, the aeronautics field, has been developed under the 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics over a period of time under established 

principles. The other is an entirely new field. 

Now, would you agree with that? 

Would you agree that you could have a distinction between aeronautics’ patents and 

space patents? 

[14] Then I have some other distinctions I would like to make. 

The question is: In your mind, must the aeronautics field always apply to space in the 

patent field? 

I don’t think they should. 

MR. JOHNSON. I agree, Mr. Fulton, there can be a distinction between patents in the 

field of aeronautics and space. 

I would like to define “space” rather restrictively in that connection if I could, and 

recite the fact that we have already made this distinction in our waiver regulations. 

As you know, the law doesn’t make any distinction between aeronautics and space. 

MR. FULTON. I am going to point out the defects in the law, as I see it. 

MR. JOHNSON. Yes. 

MR. FULTON. Likewise, I am going to point out the defect, possibly, in not distinguishing between research and development contracts as regards patents and ordinary 

supply contracts either in space or aeronautics. 

MR. JOHNSON. We made the distinction also. 

MR. FULTON. You see, our section we made in the previous select committee just 

applies across the field in aeronautics and space as well as on every type of contract. 

Isn’t that right? 

MR. JOHNSON. That is correct. 

I feel I must say a few words in self defense at this point becauseMR. FULTON. No. I am just inquiring. I am not criticizing you. 

MR. JOHNSON. May I say something in explanation? 

We did make that distinction. We have made it administratively-and we were without 

any published legislative history on this to help us-because we simply could not believe, 

in the context of this section, that every time we entered into a contract for the supply of 

some office supplies or something of that kind it was intended that this kind of patent 

clause should go into it. We have confined the use of the patent clause to-we have a 

rather elaborate formula in our regulations; but, to oversimplify it, it is basically a research 

and development type contract. We felt, after all, that this is the only reasonable intention 

we could read into this section of the law; but the language is so broad that some of the 

initial commentators on this section made it appear more horrible than it actually is in 

practice. 

MR. FULTON. The point I am making is: The law is too broad, and in that connection I disagree with it and believe it should be more carefully written, so that, as a matter 
454 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

of fact, I would compliment the NASA, the Administrator, and the people who have been 

advising him on making the distinction as to the type of contract that the patent provisions apply to. 

Of course, when you come to a situation where there is a Defense Department type of 

contract, the Defense Department for years has had the provision that the particular person, the inventor, or the company with the contract has the exclusive right to the patent, 

subject to a free license or, rather, a free use by the Government, unless the inventor or 

the particular person who made the discovery is an employee of the Government. 

[ 151 Now, that brings me to the next question: Should we not have a distinction under the 

patent provisions of the NASA law as between the contractors and the employees? 

I would say to you I see no particular reason why there should be a difference as to 

employees in this connection, Government employees in this connection, especially when 

we have the Executive Order 10096 of 1950 covering all Government employees. 

When there has been such an Executive order and we have the Government Patent 

Board, why do we make a distinction in this particular act? 

I think the act might be deficient in that regard. 

What do you think? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Fulton, we have taken the position that section 305(a) does not 

apply to our employees, but that they are still under Executive Order 10096- 

MR. FWLTON. I think that is fine. 

MR. JOHNSON (continuing). Because it says: 

“Whenever any invention is made in the performance of any work under any contract 

of the administration. . .” 

The term “contract” is a broad one, and I admit it would be arguable to construe it so 

broadly as to include our employment contract with our own employees. But in view of 

the fact the Congress has, for example, in its TVA legislation dealt specifically with employees, we couldn’t believe it was intended to work a distinction between the NASA employees and, say, the employees of the Department of Defense in view of Executive Order 

10096. 

MR. FULTON. But you specifically limit yourself to the determination of what the 

Chairman of the Government Patent Board has decided and the decisions of that Board, 

and under no circumstances do you go outside that and try to apply direct court decisions? 

You are restrained administratively, are you not? 

MR. JOHNSON. Right. 

MR. FULTON. I will ask the other gentleman that question. 

MR. O’Brien. Yes; this is true, Mr. Fulton. We are bound by the decisions of the 

Government Patent Board. 

MR. FULTON. So, the particular agency of the Government-and you are representing NASA here-makes its own determination and then forwards that determination to 

the Chairman of the Government Patent Board for his decision to see if it is right, doesn’t it? 

MR. O’BRIEN. This is correct, sir. 

MR. FULTON. But even there the Chairman doesn’t decide whether the inventor is 

entitled to the invention unless the inventor, himself, appeals; isn’t that correct? 

MR. O’BRIEN. The Chairman of the GovernmentMR. FULTON. The particular person aggrieved must appeal? 

MR. O’BRIEN. The Chairman of the Government Patent Board has the inherent 

right to either agree or disagree with the initial determination of the agency, butMR. FULTON. Yes; but he doesn’t review the particular ownership of the patent 

unless the inventor, himself, appeals; isn’t that right? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 455 

MR. O’BRIEN. He may review the initial determination; yes. 

[16] I can’t agree with you, Mr. Fulton. 

I think he may review the initial determination. 

MR. FULTON. That is the practice. 

I am trying to get the practice. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Oh, yes; I think this is generally true. 

MR. FULTON. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the Chairman of the Government 

Patent Board, he then is the one who construes this Executive Order 10096 of 1950 in accordance with the court decisions and not particularly in reference to its strict legal language. 

MR. O’BRIEN. That is correct. 

MR. FULTON. Isn’t that correct? 

MR. O’BRIEN. That is correct. 

MR. FULTON. So that you have to go through this system to get a determination? 

Is that not the case? 

MR. O’BRIEN. That is true. 

MR. FULTON. Let’s go a little bit further. Let’s look particularly to section 203(b) (3), 

where it says “to acquire (by purchase, lease, condemnation, or otherwise), construct, 

improve,” and so on, and then, in the same sentence, includes “such other real and personal property (including patents) ,” and then it gives the right “to sell and otherwise dispose of real and personal property (including patents and rights thereunder). . . .” 

Actually, to me, that portion of the section referring to condemnation is completely 

unnecessary in this provision because we have other provisions that will take care of it. 

Is that not right? 

MR. O’BRIEN. With respect to patents, I believe this is true. 

MR. FULTON. With respect to patents. 

MR. O’BRIEN. I don’t know about other properties. 

MR. JOHNSON. We wouldn’t want to delete that wording because it applies to other 

things. 

MR. O’BRIEN. A lot of other property. 

MR. FULTON. Yes; but I am referring only to patentsMR. O’BRIEN. I agree. 

MR. FULTON. And I think we should exclude the wording in that section applying to 

patents because under title 48 of the United States Code there is also the provision that 

takes care of that administrative authority for patents. 

MR. JOHNSON. This will simply not be used. 

MR. FULTON. My point is: it is overlapping and redundant in respect to patents. So, 

the act is poorly written in that regard in that particular section. 

Is that not right? 

MR. O’BRIEN. I agree. 

MR. FULTON. I would say when no condemnation is necessary, because the 

Administrator can acquire the use of any patents there existing upon payment of reasonable compensation to the patentee, it would then further cloud the title of anybody and 

make it harder for the individual patentee. 

Is that not right? 

MR. O’BRIEN. It would be if the authority were so exercised. 

[ 171 MR. JOHNSON. I think it would be just inconceivable this authority would be exercised. 

MR. FULTON. Why shouldn’t we have a provision that gives to the inventor or the 

company that hires him the exclusive right to the ownership of the patent in commercial 

situations that have no direct relation either to military or security uses? 
456 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

MR. JOHNSON. I think several of your questions have come pretty close to the waiver regulations we have developed under the present law. 

MR. FULTON. Yes; that is correct, but I am trying to set what the law should be 

changed to because actually your regulations are based upon what the legislative intent of 

Congress must have been without any hearings on the patent provision and no legislative 

history. 

Is that not correct? 

MR. JOHNSON. Well, of course, the law itself gives us considerable discretion. So we 

haven’t really had to justify everything in terms of what Congress might have foreseen. 

We felt that congress certainly expected the Administrator to use his best judgment, 

but at the same time you are quite right in saying that we have had to sort of look in the 

dark here in trying to stay consistent with what Congress must have intended. 

We have tried to do that. 

MR. FULTON. Then where supply contracts are concerned and there is either background information, trade secrets, or previous patent rights-in that case, it would seem 

to me this particular NASA Act of 1958 is burdensome and restrictive. 

You see, it doesn’t give credit to the company which has a patent and experience built 

up in a particular field; does it? 

MR. O’BRIEN. I don’t know that I exactly follow you, Mr. Fulton. 

MR. FULTON. Here is the pointMR. O’BRIEN. I don’t think we acquire rights under background patents. 

MR. FULTON. Suppose some person, some inventor, or some company has the background information, the trade secrets and previous patent rights in a particular field; the 

question is: Should these all be made available to the Government without reasonable 

compensation? 

MR. O’BRIEN. They should not and they are not under the act. 

MR. FULTON. Secondly, when there is a new patent or patent in that field or a substantial discovery that would require the company to disclose these or make them available to the Government, does the mere fact of an additional discovery in the field require 

them to come up with all this other background, patent and trade information? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Certainly not with respect to background patents. There is some question about the acquisition of technical data in order to practice the invention which is 

made under a contract with NASA. 

MR. FULTON. That is the question I am raising, and I wish you would submit some 

sort of statement on it to get the line of demarcation as to where that might be. 

(The information requested is as follows:) 

The first question concerns the issue of whether or not the operation of section 305 of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 is burdensome or restrictive upon contractors with respect to the 

Government’s acquisition of background patents or trade secrets. 

[ 181 With regard to background patents, the NASA Patent Regulations, subpart A (24 RR 3575), 

specifically states that it is the poliq of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to pay 

reasonable compensation for the acquisition of “rights in background patents and that the same will 

be acquired only by “specific negotiation, ” not by the automatic operation of the contract clauses used 

to implement section 305 of the act. 

To the same effect, the special NASA ‘@operq rights in inventions” clause, which appears as 

appendix ZX-A in these regulations, also p-ovides in paragraph (g)(i) that any license granted to the 

Government does not imply the granting of any license under any dominating “background” patent. 

Accordingly (excluding those inventions made by Government emplqees), NASA does not 

acquire, except by direct purchase, any rights in an invention that has been reduced to practice Prior 

to and independently of a NASA contract. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 457 

With regard to trade secrets as thq my be involved in nml patent acquisition, the special 

NASA “p.operty rights in inventions” clause, refered to above, requires that the contractor shall furnish to the contracting officera written report containing full and complete technical infmation concerning any invention made in the perfmance of any work under the contract. Compliance with this 

clause may require the contractor to reveal background technical information of apropnetary nature. 

Ordinarily, howevq the type of information required for the preparation of a patent application is not 

that type of “background infmation” which would be susceptible to protection as a trade secret. 

Moreovq the NASA Patent Regulations, subpart A, paragraph 1201, 101 3(b), states that the contractor may initially furnish to the contracting officer only such technical infmation as may be 

required for the purpose of identihing an invention made by the contractor and in determining its 

utility in the conduct of aeronautical and space activities. Wen requested ly the contracting offq 

the contractor shall, howevq prepare and furnish such additional technical desmpions of the invention as will be adequate for ready transposition to patent specification fm and for effective prosecution of the patent application. 

With regard to the matter of acquiring trade secrets directly, NASA’s practice is like that of the 

Department of Defense concerning the acquisition of technical data and of rights in technical data. 

In those NASA contracts which have as one of their purposes the performance of technical or scientif 

ic work directed toward the dmelopment of models of equipment or practical processes, NASA requires 

that there be delivered such technical infmation as may be necessary for the manufacture of the 

equipment or the performance of the process. To this end NASA has adopted the data clauses as set 

forth in sections 9-203.1 and 9-203.4 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation. 

MR. FULTON. I think that is a defect of the act at present. With respect to research 

and development, I think, we could make a distinction there on that type of contract 

because generally industry is willing to give the background information, especially when 

it is for a military or security purpose. 

Is that not right? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Generally, I think so. 

MR. FULTON. All right. Then let me disagree with the former gentleman here a little bit. 

When you were speaking, I was making some notes. 

You had spoken of this being the creation of a civilian agency and remarked that this 

was a new field of patent law that is being developed for a civilian agency when, as a matter of fact, under the Department of Defense the provisions for patents were otherwise. 

I would like to point out to you in the TVA Act of 1933, under 16 United States Code, 

as well as in the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, there were two civilian agencies 

created, each of which had patent provisions different from the Department of Defense. 

At the time this act of 1958 that we are speaking of for NASA was passed, we were within the emergency conditions, which may now be forgotten, of the first orbit of the sputnik. Secondly, no one then [19] knew as much about space as we do now and we thought 

that it was a new field, that it was much over and beyond anything that was then covered 

by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 

I say in that connection, as a member of the former Space Committee, that is why the 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was notjust continued and the space put as 

a subdivision under that particular body, but the whole new concept was set up that it was 

to be the NASA rather than the NACA. 

One of the great differences between Dr. Dryden and myself-I will speak for myself, 

although I know that Mr. McCormack felt a little bit along the same lines that I did-was 

that, as it was discussed so many times in the bearing before the select committee, space 

was just a buildup of aeronautics. Now, our feeling was that it was a new field and should 
458 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

be treated as such; secondly, that it had a good bit of the security requirements of the 

Atomic Energy Act because at that time we thought that either the sputnik or a space platform could cause us to lose everything we had. Under those circumstances, we wanted no 

one company to find and get the key to space and then everybody else in the country or 

the Government have to go through that one particular source in the approach to space. 

So, I think you should take that philosophic background into account when we are 

now, at a later time, looking at the past history. For example, I had written down here my 

recollection that the inventions or discoveries of any employee of the US. Government or 

by any employee of the TVA corporation, together with any patents on those discoveries, 

are the sole and exclusive property of the corporation and the corporation is authorized 

to give licenses to various people. 

MR. JOHNSON. May I comment on that? 

MR. FULTON. That is the provision of the TVA Act, as I recall it, in 1933, so that we 

do have a precedent for NASA. 

MR. JOHNSON. I would like to comment on that, Mr. Fulton. 

That provision you refer to applies to TVA research by its own employees. 

As I recall the report rendered by the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier this year on 

the TVA patent practices, they had acquired no patents as a result of Government-sponsored research with private industry. 

As we said before, section 305 does not apply to NASA employees. It applies solely, on 

the other hand, to Government-sponsored research in private industries, and TVA is not 

a precedent for this situation at all. The TVA situation is taken care of under Executive 

Order 10096, which imposes a certain regime on it. TVA is different from other 

Government departments, but it is not a precedent for this kind of treatment of contractors. 

The National Science Foundation, on the other hand, is not a precedent either 

because there the legislative provision merely is that the Foundation shall take such interest in patents as the public interest requires and, as you know, the National Science 

Foundation has followed the same practice as the Department of Defense in requiring 

only a royalty-free license. 

MR. FULTON. As I recall it, the National Science Foundation provision requires that 

the contracts shall contain provisions regarding [20] the disposition of inventions produced under those contracts in a manner calculated to protect the public interest. 

MR. JOHNSON. That is correct. 

MR. FULTON. And the discoveries and patents must be directly related to the subject 

matter of the contract, and in the case of either the contractor or the inventor being an 

employee it must be directly in connection with the assigned duties or the purpose of the 

contract. 

Is that not right? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

MR. JOHNSON. But the legislative provision does not say anything about the taking 

of title to those inventions being the rule in the case of the National Science Foundation. 

In carrying out that particular provision of law the National Science Foundation ordinarily does the same thing as the Department of Defense does and only acquires a royalty-free 

license. 

MR. FULTON. Yes, but don’t you think when there is a specific legislative provision 

under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 that the contracts that are let shall 

contain provisions governing the disposition of inventions produced under the contracts 

in a manner calculated to protect the public interest that that certainly is a provision relating to the title and use and licensing of the patents? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 459 

MR. JOHNSON. It relates to that subject matter, but it doesn’t require the 

Government to take title to the patents, by any means. 

MR. FULTON. No, but it certainly governsMR. JOHNSON. If it does, the National Science Foundation has been in gross disregard of the law for a number of years. 

MR. FULTON. No, but it certainly limits the use of the patents, doesn’t it? 

Doesn’t it limit the use, because every contract that is made with the National Science 

Foundation has to have these provisions in it that they are to be handled in a manner calculated to protect the public interest? 

MR. O’BRIEN. It seems to me it would certainly lead to some interest of the 

Government or some governmental interest being acquired, butMR. FULTON. So, it is an extension in the act of NASA, but it is not contrary to those 

other two agencies and some of their actions. 

I think it is certainly a like comparison to compare these two previous civilian agencies-one, the TVA in 1933 and the other the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 

as well as the Atomic Energy Act. 

Now, let us look at that for a minute. The Atomic Energy Act has been changed by the 

act of 1954. Would you please comment on what you think of the present state of the art 

in the Atomic Energy Act with the amendment of 1954 put in? 

MR. JOHNSON. I am not competent to do that at all. 

MR. FULTON. Would you please state thatMR. JOHNSON. I know the Atomic Energy Commission has had testimony recently 

before the Joint Committee, but I don’t feel competent to talk on that. 

MR. FULTON. I believe they appeared before subcommittee of the Judiciary 

Committee as well. 

If you will give us a short statement on that, I would like to have that. 

[21] (The information requested is as follows:) 

The question raised by Congressman Fulton concerns the statutory concept of aeronautical and 

space activities as it is used in section 305(c) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act. 

Section 305(c) imposes a responsibility upon the Commissioner of Patents to determine which 

applications for patents disclose inventions having significant utility in the conduct of aeronautical 

and space activities. It was suggested by M?: Fulton that the concept is too broad and that it does not 

permit a distinction between the fwld ofgovernmental interests and thefield ofprivate interests regarding the area in which patents may not be issued without first having the applicant submit witten 

statements of the circumstances undm which the invention was made. It was suggested that the responsibility of the Commissioner should be delimited and proposalj for doing so were requested. 

It appears that the foregoing objective could be effected by statutory language basing the selection 

criterion to be used by the Commissioner of Patents on the concept expressed in the NASA Patent 

Waiver Regulations, subpart 1 (24 FR. 8788), of inventions- 

(1) pimarily adapted for and especial4 useful in the development and operation of vehicles, 

manned or unmanned, capable of sustained flight without support from or akpendence upon the 

atmosphere, or 

(2) of basic importance in continued research toward the solution ofproblems of sustainedflight 

without support from or dependence upon the atmosphere. 

MR. FULTON. Could we make a distinction, then, between patents that are not being 

used for what we would call the welfare of the Government? 

Suppose you had a patent discovery where its prime importance or effect was relating 

to the welfare of our Government or some important governmental functions; would you 
460 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

make some distinction there in trying to eliminate and put into the private field such 

patents? 

Would it not have that effect? 

MR. JOHNSON. I didn’t hear the last. 

MR. FULTON. For example-I will simplify it-to protect private industry in the private field, where there are nongovernment usages chiefly. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. I think that we have tried to make such distinctions in patentable 

inventions in our waiver regulations. 

We have tried to reserve an entire area of patentable inventions, with respect to which 

no waiver would generally be granted, as those inventions which become perhaps associated with the public interest, so that it wouldn’t be to the public benefit to grant rights in 

these inventions, inventions used almost exclusively in outer space, solar sails, or something of that character, because to grant rights in these inventions or patents on these 

inventions might carry the inference that private industry or private parties were authorized to go into outer space under no governmental regulation. 

We have also in our waiver regulations identified a class of inventions as those inventions which have predominant commercial utility and only incidental utility in space and 

aeronautics. 

MR. FULTON. Yes. Now, there is a comment thereMR. O’BRIEN. As to this type of invention, we are granting or proposing to the 

Administrator to grant waiver of rights so that the contractor who made these inventions 

can exploit the invention to the public benefit, to bring these inventions into the hands 

of the public and to use the patent for that purpose. 

MR. FULTON. So, my comment is: Section 103, when it makes the definitions that are 

very broad covering both equipment that is usable [22] and possible exclusively in outer 

space, as well as commercial-type equipment, is, therefore, too broad in its coverage and 

should be changed. 

So, I would make a change in the definitions in section 103 to make the field of private enterprise larger and to protect what we in Government are deeply interested in, that 

is, the things that are related to Government uses, exclusive outer space uses or weapon 

purposes. 

What do you think of that? 

To summarize, that is to change the definitions and restrict them in section 103. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Well, I think the definition of aeronautical and space activities, as set 

forth in section 103, is broad and probably could be more carefully defined. 

I haven’t given much thought to that, Mr. Fulton. 

MR. FULTON. Would you look into that and submit us some sort of recommendation 

along the lines I have been trying to point up here? 

I would rather not do it here because the time is running out. 

MR. JOHNSON. That definition, Mr. Fulton, is only of significance in connection with 

section 305(c) insofar as patent matters are concerned. 

MR. FULTON. That is correct. 

MR. JOHNSON. That is where the term appears. 

MR. FULTON. It has to be taken in connection with section 305(c). 

Just one more point and I am through. 

I was just trying to think back. 

The question comes up of the development of the space field in relation to time. I can 

see that when we were passing and preparing for the passage of the act of 1958 we were 

under emergency conditions. The question now occurs: Are we in the same emergency 

conditions in space and are we in the same relative place where we have such a lack of 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 46 1 

knowledge that we have to keep the field open and, therefore, have a larger Government 

interest in these patents or has the time come where we now see more about the field and 

we should, therefore, say, as I would recommend, that the field of private enterprise and 

individual initiative and private rights should be more stressed? 

Would you comment on that? 

Where are we in point of time in relation to a transition period that is different from 

the Atomic Energy Commission in its development? 

MR. JOHNSON. Well, I think we are in a substantially different position than we were 

a year ago. 

I know our Administrator has made several statements to that effect-that we are able 

to shake down, in a sense, into a more orderly program and know where we are going and 

the worthwhileness of the things we are doing in a much better way than we were a year 

ago when it was necessary to try to do everything at once. 

I don’t think that I can compare this very profitably, Mr. Fulton, with the Atomic 

Energy Commission. 

MR. FULTON. As you remember, the patent section of the American Bar Association 

at its 1956 meeting had recommended the repeal of the provisions of the Atomic Energy 

Commission patent sections. 

They wanted them repealed. 

They haven’t taken any action since. 

Then at their 1958 meeting they recommended the outright repeal of the patent sections of the NASA Act. 

[23] To me, that probably goes too far and my disposition would be to try to go over it, as 

we are today, and pick out the places where the language is too broad and the provisions 

cover more than we intended because at the time we passed it, at that stage of the act, we 

couldn’t make definite provisions that would account for all these variations. 

Now, which approach would you use? 

Would you use the ABA approach or would you use the approach that some of us on 

this committee recommend of revision, and move toward the private ownership and the 

private field? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Fulton, this, of course, is a question that we are all sweating over 

a good deal in NASA right now in preparing our legislative recommendations for the next 

session of Congress. 

I would not expect Congress to repeal outright section 305, and I wouldn’t think, 

speaking personally now, that NASA would make any such recommendation. 

It seems to me thatMR. FULTON. You, therefore, disagree with the patent section of the American Bar 

Association at its 1958 meeting? 

MR. JOHNSON. I read that. I don’t recall the detail now, but if it is true that they recommended simply an outright repeal I would disagree with that. 

On the other hand, there are two ways of approaching it, and I thinkMR. FULTON. Actually, while you are on that point, while we are commenting on 

what they did do, they had a resolution opposing Government ownership of the patents 

and inventions arising from Government-financed research and development as well as 

repeal of the patent sections. 

I must say that to you. 

MR. JOHNSON. Yes. 

MR. FULTON. 1958. 

MR. JOHNSON. You have mentioned as a precedent the National Science 

Foundation provision. I would think that would be probably the minimum that the 
462 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Congress ought to do, if you were to undertake a radical treatment of section 305. 

Substitute something of that kind, which would express the concern of Congress in the 

protection of the public interest in patents in this field, but would leave to the 

Administrator great discretions as to how to do it, without imposing the kind of rules from 

which we now have to depart by means of waiver. 

This is quite a different thing from section 305. 

MR. MITCHELL. Would ,the gentleman yield? 

MR. FULTON. I would like to have him continue. I am very interested in this point. 

MR. JOHNSON. I say this without regard to whether the National Science Foundation 

has or has not carried out its legal responsibilities. 

I don’t have any opinion on that either because I don’t know enough about their business. 

In the alternative-and it is my guess, if I must do some forecasting now-this is probably the way we will present our legislative proposals. 

MR. FULTON. I will be glad to hear it. 

[24] MR. JOHNSON. In the alternative, we would propose a cleanup of this legislation 

along the lines you have mentioned this morning. 

There are some things that obviously were done in haste, it seems to us, in this section 

and, on the basis of the past year’s experience, even in line with what one might call the 

overriding philosophy of this section, you can make a lot of changes in it and make it 

more understandable and easier to administer. 

Certainly I think the ultimate choice, as far as patent philosophy is concerned, is 

going to be one that the Congress will have to make and ought to make, I think, with this 

question of uniformity in mind, as well as Mr. King’s ultimate question. 

These two things have to be balanced, and whether you give one the greater consideration or the other I think is a very serious legislative problem. 

My own personal preference would be to substitute for section 305 something very 

much like the general principles in the National Science Foundation Act and then hold 

us responsible for the way we protect the public interest. 

MR. FULTON. How would that then correlate with your previous statement on the 

Department of Defense? 

Why do you now say you would correlate this with the civilian agency, the National 

Science Foundation Act of 1950, when previously I thought you were going to say correlate it with the military and Department of Defense practices? 

MR. JOHNSON. I am not suggesting the National Science Foundation just for the 

sake of making NASA uniform with a civilian agency. The National Science Foundation 

practice is actually the same as the Department of Defense practice at the present time. 

Now, that practice could be changed. If it seemed to be desirable in the public interest to 

change the practice under the broad terms of the National Science Foundation Act, they 

could do it. Under that kind of authority from Congress we could, as a matter of administrative policy, make our policies as uniform with those of the Department of Defense as 

we felt the situation demanded, and we could examine the results of that on the case-bycase basis to see whether the public interest was adequately protected. 

In order to achieve uniform practice with the Department of Defense, you don’t have 

to have uniformity in statutory language. The Department of Defense has no statutory language. The broad grant of authority to the Administrator to take such action as is in the 

public interest, which is really what the National Science Foundation Act says, could result 

in uniformity of practice, although not in uniformity of statute. 

MR. FULTON. But you would still have that assertion of title under the section 305(d) 

and (e) remain subject to the Board of Review of the Patent Interferences, wouldn’t you, 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 463 

and you would also have the final decision on the authority of the Administrator of NASA, 

wouldn’t you, that is, the final decision on waiver? 

MR. JOHNSON. If we did the thing I was just suggesting, you would eliminate all of 

this portion of section 305 that relates to title. 

The National Science Foundation Act has nothing about title in it, Mr. Fulton. 

[25] MR. FULTON. I know, but 1 am still saying: Wouldn’t you still retain a waiver provision of some type or a title provision and keep it under the Review Board of Patent 

Interferences and leave some final authority on that particular type of thing in the 

Administrator of NASA? 

MR. JOHNSON. I don’t see how they are compatible. 

It seems to me what you are suggesting now is that you really retain a rule that says 

title will ordinarily vest in the Government with the power of waiver vested in the 

Administrator. 

This is radically different from what the National Science Foundation Act says. The 

National Science Foundation Act doesn’t impose a rule of title acquisition. 

MR. FULTON. That is right. 

MR. JOHNSON. It leaves all the discretion to the head of the agency. 

MR. FULTON. So, you would then have the complete title provision cut out in the 

NASA Act? 

MR. JOHNSON. This is what I would say my personal preference would be at the present time in view of the fact I feel very strongly about the inequity that now exists between 

the DOD practice and ours. 

MR. FULTON. That is all. 

Thank you. 

I appreciate very much both of your comments, which have been excellent and very 

interesting. 

MR. MITCHELL. What you are saying, Mr. Johnson, in substance, is that you are suggesting legislation which would give to the Administrator the right to determine the specific phraseology that would go into the contract insofar as whether the Government 

would retain title or not; is that it? 

MR. JOHNSON. This is correct, which is the way I read the National Science 

Foundation Act. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Daddario. 

MR. DADDARIO. Mr. Johnson, taking the present posture of the space program into 

consideration and also last year’s experience, do you find any need that NASA have 

greater protection in inventions than the Department of Defense? 

MR. JOHNSON. I don’t think so. 

By this, I am not meaning to say I agree entirely with the Department of Defense policy as a matter of policy either; but on this question I would say-and I might hark back 

to Mr. Fulton’s remarks about the great interest in such things as space platforms and 

security interests, and so forth; naturally, all of this applies to intercontinental ballistics 

missiles, too-you have got the most urgently needed things with the greatest security 

considerations right over in the Department of Defense. 

Our work by and large, is unclassified. Not all of it, but the greater portion of it is in 

the nonmilitary side of the program. I think I would have to say, honestly, that I cannot 

see any reason why there is a need for acquisition of title to inventions under our contracts 

if such a need does not exist under Department of Defense contracts. 

MR. DADDARIO. Following that further, if such a need does not exist and, therefore, 

we can assume from that there is an imposition of a greater need than is necessary on 

these companies which might wish to enter into contracts with the Government, is this 

added prohibition, if we can put it that way, affecting the space movement? 
464 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

[26] Are companies not contracting with you as a result? 

MR. JOHNSON. I testified earlier that it is very difficult to get definite information 

on that. 

MR. DADDARIO. What is your thought? 

MR. JOHNSON. We have not encountered so far in any of our negotiations with contractors a turndown because of this. 

We have encountered a lot of resistance, but they have all been negotiated successfully. 

We cannot be sure, of course, that some of the things we hear about the complete 

unwillingness of some companies to do business with NASA may not be true. 

We have had rumors and reports particularly at the subcontractor level that some 

companies have put out the word they don’t want the business; they will not do any business that involves the vesting of title to any of their inventions in the Government and, 

hence, their people are not to bid on NASA contract proposals. 

This kind of thing is hard to get definite information on because you just don’t know 

about the people who don’t respond to your invitations or requests for bids and proposals. 

Some may be doing it because they don’t want the business; they are completely 

booked up or they aren’t interested; or they may be staying away for this reason. 

You cannot be sure of this. 

MR. DADDARIO. Mr. Johnson, if you have a company which is in the aeronautical 

field and, because of the great interest there is in space, it has a strong research and development section, couldn’t you assume they would look very carefully into putting the 

endeavors that they have already put into this field to the use of the Government, when 

that whole program could then be taken by the Government and then passed off into 

commercial enterprises or to other countries or to other companies, and this could be 

research and development which they have built up to this point with their own means 

and without any Government assistance whatsoever? 

MR. JOHNSON. I could speculate along those lines. That sounds quite reasonable 

and, of course, we are told by industry this is exactly their reaction to it. 

MR. DADDARIO. Wouldn’t you say this must be the reaction because this is traditional way which many companies, those with great tradition, have operated? 

MR. JOHNSON. Yes. 

MR. DADDARIO. They have looked ahead; they have research and development programs to keep themselves apace with progress? 

MR. JOHNSON. That is true. 

MR. DADDARIO. And it must necessarily, as a result, be something that they would 

look into very carefully, and if they are doing so, this need that you have tagged on here 

and which you, yourself, say is not necessary, is probably slowing down the whole space 

program because companies are staying away from it? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Daddario, I simply cannot say I know the program is being 

slowed down by this. I couldn’t honestly say that. 

Everything you say sounds reasonable, and we are told that there are companies that 

are reluctant-in fact, even unwilling-to do business, particularly with our prime contractors on the sublevel. 

[27] I couldn’t document it by saying I know X company or Y company or Z company has 

refused to do business with us or has slowed down their participation because of this. 

MR. DADDARIO. Let me ask you this: Let’s assume there is a situation where you have 

a company that does enter into a contract with NASA and, in the performance of this contract, it uses other inventions which it has produced to increase its technical superiority or 

potential. What would be the situation involving the utilization of these other inventions? 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 465 

MR. JOHNSON. Do you want to comment on that? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

I will comment on this, Mr. Daddario. 

We do not, by acquiring a right to use or acquiring title to an invention made under 

contract with NASA, acquire also rights under patents on inventions developed independently of a Government contract. These are called background patent rights on inventions. The owner or right to practice the invention under contract, where we acquired 

rights, does not automatically give the Government rights under these background 

patents. 

MR. DADDARIO. Who is to decide whether it follows within one patent or the other? 

You have no way of waiving, do you, under the present provisions, these rights to 

inventions before a contract is signed? 

So, if you sign the contract, then it is up to your Administrator to determine whether 

or not they are background inventions or whether or not they fall within the area under 

which they can then be separated from Government control? 

MR. O’BRIEN. I think I misunderstood you perhaps as to what you regard as a background invention. 

We regard as a background invention an invention which has been made by a contractor prior to the entering into a contract with NASA, and by “made” we mean actually 

reduced to practice. 

As to those inventions, NASA would acquire no rights merely because an improvement on that invention was made in the pursuance of research work under a NASA contract. 

MR. DADDARIO. Let me ask you this: Is there any provision at the present time under 

which a waiver can be granted before a contract is entered into? 

MR. O’BRIEN. The law so provides. 

Our regulations do not provide for granting of any waivers prior to entering into a 

contract. 

MR. DADDARIO. Then, under the act, the situation is this: Under all circumstances, 

even though the Administrator would have the authority, as the chairman has pointed out 

previously, you would first have to give him the complete control and he would then have 

to decide whether or not it fell within the categories set forth? 

MR. O’BRIEN. That is right, sir. 

MR. JOHNSON. I think we might mention the prima facie case for waiver, though, in 

this connection. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think this is related to the questions you asked. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

[28] In this regard, we have established certain categories of invention. If an invention 

which is made by a contractor falls within these categories, and he can show to the 

Administrator or to the Inventions and Contributions Board that this is so, then the contractor has established a prima facie case for waiver of title or the waiver of the right of the 

United States to acquire title. 

Now, these classes of inventions are, one, those inventions which a contractor may 

have conceived prior to entering into a contract with NASA and upon which he has filed 

a patent application, but which was first actually reduced to practice in the performance 

of the contract. 

That is the first class. 

MR. DADDARIO. Before you go further, because there isn’t much time and there may 

he others who have questions, there is one thing which bothers me here and I am sure you 

can give me the answer. 
466 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

When a waiver is granted under any circumstances, are there minimum requirements? 

MR. O’BRIEN. There are. 

MR. DADDARIO. Therefore, there is no such thing as a complete waiver? 

No matter what the situation might be, once an invention comes under the jurisdiction of NASA, whatever waiver is granted, there are minimum requirements and, therefore, a sort of a cloud on the title of whatever the invention might be? 

MR. O’BRIEN. The first class of invention which I gave you-there are very minor 

requirements. 

MR. DADDARIO. But some? 

MR. O’BRIEN. With respect to this first class of invention, the requirements would 

not place any cloud on title. 

We have certain requirements in our waiver instrument, but as to those requirements 

they would not place a cloud on title. 

As to other categories of invention, the requirements are provisional; that is, title is 

provisional, the retention of title is provisional, upon the satisfylng of certain requirements, those requirements being that the invention should be developed to the point of 

practical application, which means that it must be developed so that it is put into the 

hands of the public. We believe that the granting of rights to inventions to a contractor by 

waiver must carry some assurance that the contractor will not shelve the patent on this 

invention or not let the public have the benefit of it. If this were to be permitted the waiver would not be in the public interest. For that reason, we have placed compulsory working provisions upon the grant of these waivers. So, if the invention has, in our view or in 

the view of the contractor, to which we agree, predominant commercial interest and only 

incidental interest and utility in space and aeronautics and we give him the right to 

acquire title in the invention and the right to acquire a patent on it, then we say, ‘You shall 

practice this invention; you shall put it into the hands of the public within a period of years 

or you shall make it available for license to anyone who desires to do so.” 

MR. DADDARIO. Does that include foreign governments and foreign countries, anyone who would do so? 

MR. O’BRIEN. No; I think not. 

[29] Mr. DADDARIO. You think that would be restricted to the continental limits of the 

United States? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

MR. DADDARIO. That is all. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Quigley. 

MR. QUIGLEY. I have no questions. 

I do regret my inability to be here on time. I occupied the witness stand in another 

committee and on a matter which was controversial. I couldn’t quit under fire. So I had 

to stay, and I deeply regret it, because I wanted to get here and get the benefit of this background presentation. So I will have to study the record. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Yeager. 

MR. YFAGER. Mr. Johnson, did I understand you to say in the recommendations for 

legislation next year there will be some recommendations for a change in section 305? 

MR. JOHNSON. No, Mr. Yeager. I didn’t predict that positivelyMR. YFAGER. There might be? 

MR. JOHNSON (continuing). As to what NASA’s position would be, I said we are hard 

at work in developing this as a part of our entire legislative program, and I said that, so far 

as a personal prediction was concerned. I would predict that we might submit even alternative provisions as means of treating this problem. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 467 

I suppose, if we did that, we would have a clear-cut recommendation as to which one 

we preferred. 

I certainly think it is fair to say we will have some legislative recommendation to 

amend section 305. 

I don’t see how we could help but have that. This is one of our major legal problems. 

MR. MITCHELL. You are going to have to live with this law, and certainly you should 

give us the benefit of your experience and your recommendation. 

MR. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

MR. YEAGER. Might that include section 306, too, on theMR. JOHNSON. That is an entirely separate question. At the present time, I don’t personally have anyMR. YEAGER. This doesn’t give you concern at the moment, then? 

MR. JOHNSON. No. 

MR. YEAGER. As 305 does? 

MR. JOHNSON. No, this is an entirely separate question. 

MR. YEAGER. I would like to develop just one brief line here. 

You have interpreted in section 305(a) the phrase “any work” to exclude procurement 

contracts; is that correct? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes, sir. 

MR. YEAGER. And according to the memorandum, I think, of May 6, which you sub 

mitted to this committee, you indicated that you are requiring your patent clause in contracts where the work is of a technical or scientific or engineering type. Does this extend 

to subcontracting? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes 

MR. YEAGER. It does? 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes. 

MR. JOHNSON. The description is a little more elaborate than that. 

MR. YEXGER. Yes. 

[30] MR. JOHNSON. I think you are giving it sort of a shorthand characterization. 

MR. YF.AGER. Yes; but what I wanted to get at is not in direct reference to that provision. What I am getting at is how you arrived really at the intent of Congress on this, and 

again in section 305(c), where apparentlyyou have interpreted this to mean that this section applies only in the case of work, done under a contract with NASA. You say NASA has 

concluded that this was not intended; this section was not intended to give the 

Government rights under inventions outside the contractual situation with NASA. 

MR. O’BRIEN. We regard this provision of the act as a policing provision. 

MR. YEAGER. How did you reach that conclusion? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Yeager, you have asked several questions, I am not sure just which 

one I am answering first. 

MR. YEAGER. How did you reach the conclusion that Congress did not intend for section 305(c) to apply to situations other than those where a work contract was under 

NASA? That is what I was getting at. 

MR. JOHNSON. Section 305(c). 

MR. YEAGER. The record, as I recall the previous testimony, is pretty skimpy on this. 

MR. JOHNSON. Yes. 

MR. YEAGER (continuing). And I was just wondering whether you perhaps didn’t 

have to just play it by ear. 

MR. O’BRIEN. I think a resolution reading of 305(c) and a reading of 305(d) answer 

that the information on the material, which, under these provisions of the act, the 

Commissioner of Patents is required to secure from the applicant for a patent, is that 
468 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVER.WY NEXUS 

information and material which bears directly upon the circumstances surrounding the 

making of the invention and whether or not it was made under any contract with NASA. 

So, if all of the information and material which is submitted in these statements which 

the Commissioner secures, bears on the question of whether or not the invention was 

made under any contract of NASA, what other purpose could this provision of the law 

have other than to makeinquiry as to whether or not it was made under a contract? 

Therefore, we believed this provision generally to have two purposes, the first providing a policing provision for our contracts and the second providing an opportunity to 

have the Administrator’s determination, subject to a review by another independent 

agency; namely, the Board of Patent Interferences of the Patent Office or, ultimately, the 

Court of Customers and Patent Appeals. 

We tried to derive from this subsection of the act some incidental advantage to NASA, 

from a technological point of view, that in bringing this information to the attention of 

the NASA technical staff, where the inventions are of significant utility to space and aeronautics NASA might derive some technology benefit from its disclosure. 

It hasn’t proven to be of much value in this respect, butMR. YEAGER. What I was trying to get at was: You say you believe this to have been 

the case, and this seemed reasonable to you. [31] But as far as the record shows, there isn’t 

much to go on, since there were no bearings and very little debate on it in Congress, and 

the conference report was very meager. 

MR. O’BRIEN. The conference report hasMR. YEAGER. It says something about it, but my question is: Wouldn’t you agree this 

is susceptible of a different interpretation? 

MR. JOHNSON. Mr. Yeager, I would like to answer that. 

You mentioned before, I think, three or four important interpretations we have given 

to section 305. In the absence of any legislative history, all of these have been rather arbitrary. I have to admit that. 

This is the problem you are faced with in giving an initial interpretation to any important piece of legislation. 

I don’t think in any of these cases that we have done violence to the statutory language, and we have always tried, as well as we could, to discover from reading the sections 

as a whole what we felt the legislative intent was. 

Mr. O’Brien has just explained how we think the interpretation we have given to section 305(c) does derive from a study of the section as a whole. 

MR. YEAGER. Sure. 

MR. JOHNSON. This is true of all the rest of it, but we would admit these are arguable 

propositions. 

We have tried in each case also, while not doing violence to the language, to try to 

reach an interpretation which we thought was a most workable one and one that we could 

administer. 

MR. YEAGER. Yes. 

I wasn’t suggesting there was any violence done to it. The only point I was driving at 

was: Unless these sections are clarified, perhaps at some point in the future a future 

administrative body might very well construct them differently than you have. 

MR. JOHNSON. That is quite possible. 

I would like to say, too, that we have tried, each step along the way, to keep the committee fully informed of the administrative interpretations we have given this act. 

I think you have been constantly supplied with our regulations and contract clauses 

and have been informed of all our significant steps just as soon as we have taken them. 

MR. YEAGER. Thank you. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 469 

That is very helpful. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Bass. 

MR. BASS. Mr. Johnson, I just want to say I have been very much impressed with your 

presentation, and particularly the grasp that you and Mr. O’Brien have shown of this very 

complicated technical field. 

Would you give us, very briefly, a biographical sketch of yourself? 

It might be interesting. 

MR. JOHNSON. I am a graduate of DePauw University, and University of Chicago Law 

School, and have a graduate degree from Harvard Law School, LL.M. I am a member of 

the Illinois bar, practiced law in the general counsel’s office of the Chicago, Burlington, 

& Quincy Railroad and with the law firm of Wilson & Mellvaine in Chicago before World 

War 11. 

MR. BASS. I know the firm very well. 

MR. JOHNSON. I have 3 years of active duty in the Navy. 

[32] My Government service-I have been with the Department of State in the Office of 

United Nations Affairs and with the Department of the Air Force where I was General 

Counsel for the last 6 years before assuming the position of General Counsel of NASA last 

October. 

MR. BASS. How old are you? 

MR. JOHNSON. Forty-three. 

MR. MITCHELL. Any further questions? 

MR. DADDARIO. No further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. MITCHELL. Let me express appreciation on behalf of the committee for the 

appearance of both you, Mr. Johnson, and you, Mr. O’Brien. Certainly the information 

you have given us will be of help. As I stated previously, we are in no hurry on this matter 

and we will be looking forward to seeing you back with an official recommendation. 

Thank you very much. 

MR. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. MITCHELL. The committee will be in recess until 10 in the morning. 

(Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., 

Thursday, August 20, 1959.) 

[331 

Property Rights in Inventions Made Under 

Federal Space Research Contracts 

Thursday, August 20, 1959 

House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, 

Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 1O:lO a.m., Hon. Erwin Mitchell 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

MR. MITCHELL. The subcommittee will be in order. 

This morning we are privileged to have Mr. Ray M. Harris, Assistant Patent Counsel, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, who formerly was chairman of the 

Armed Services Procurement Regulations Committee, and procurement and patent specialist, Department of Defense. 
470 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERITY NEXUS 

Mr. Harris is presently with the Space Administration, as I pointed out. The purpose 

of his appearance today is to brief the members of the committee on patent policies followed by the Department of Defense and other Government agencies. 

We are happy to have Mr. O’Brien back again this morning. 

Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Harris? 

Statement of Ray M. Harris, histant Patent Counsel, NASA; Accompanied by Gerald D. 

O’Brien, Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, NASA 

MR. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, as announced, my subject was supposed to be the patent 

policy of the Department of Defense and other Government agencies, but I felt they were 

discussed pretty extensively yesterday and probably if the members have any more interest in those policies than was brought out yesterday, it could be handled by questions. 

On the other hand, in view of some of the questions raised yesterday, I thought the 

members might be interested in a discussion of some of the more fundamental aspects of 

the patent problem and system as an aid to arriving at a determination of what the 

Government’s patent policy should be. Mr. King particularly raised that question. 

I thought if the committee would care to, I would discuss that aspect. 

MR. MITCHELL. I think it would be most benefiting. 

MR. HARRIS. My prepared statement here is a couple of pages of introduction. The 

first paragraph is what I have already said and then the second paragraph: 

[34] I would like to say at the beginning that these are my personal views and have not 

been coordinated with my superiors, Mr. O’Brien and Mr. Johnson. I agree with Mr. 

Johnson, who spoke yesterday, that this problem is so complex that it is difficult to give a 

categorical answer. 

As Mr. Johnson said, this problem has been with us for many, many years. One might 

be justified in arriving at different answers to the question with respect to Government 

employees’ inventions versus Government contractors’ inventions, with respect to different Government agencies, and with respect to different fields of technology. 

The problem is currently being studied by the staff of the Patents, Trademarks, and 

Copyrights Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and by an interdepartmental working group under the chairmanship of the Commissioner of Patents, Study 

No. 14 of the Interagency Task Force for Review of Government Procurement Policies and 

Procedures. 

Mr. O’Brien is a member of this study group 14 and I was while I was with the 

Department of Defense. 

The problem has been the subject of numerous studies in the past, most notable 

being the Attorney General’s report of 1947 to which there was a sequel report of 

November 9, 1956. In the sequel, the Attorney General pointed out that the Department 

of Defense patent license policy was permitting the concentration of patents in the hands 

of big business. 

I would like also to mention, in the interests of what has been done on this subject, 

that Dr. Howard L. Forman, who is a personal friend of mine, got his Ph.D. degree on the 

subject as a result of his investigations into what should be the patent policy of the 

Government with respect to its employees’ inventions and has written a book on the subject: “Patent-Their Ownership and Administration by the United States Government” 

published by Central Book Co., Inc. 

I think the above introduction indicates the extent of the problem. Nevertheless, I 

have a conviction that the people concerned with this problem have spent too much time 

attacking it from the standpoint of who should have the rights to patents as a matter of 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 471 

law or equity, and not nearly enough time as to what is the purpose of ownership of a 

patent, and from the Government’s viewpoint, what should it do with the patents it owns. 

If the Government doesn’t have a good program of administration of its patent property, 

why should it be so concerned with getting title to the patents, and getting more patent 

property? 

I might say also, Dr. Forman takes that position, that we have the cart before the 

horse. We have been concerned with deciding who should get the rights to the patents 

and we haven’t decided first what we are going to do with the patents we’ve got. 

MR. KING. As a matter of fact, what does happen to Government patents? Do they go 

into the public domain or are they locked up for 17 years? 

MR. HARRIS. The practice largely with Government-owned patents is, in effect that 

they come under the public domain because the Government does not have a policy of 

enforcing its patents. In order for a patent to be used as the patent law intends it to be, it 

must be exercised-the exclusivity provided by the patent must be exercised which 

[35] means that you must use it for yourself or your licensees and not permit others to use 

it. The Government’s policy is exactly the opposite. When it gets a patent, most of the 

Government agencies will grant a revocable, not an irrevocable, royalty-free license to anyone who asks for it. If you don’t ask for it, it is all the same because they won’t sue you for 

infringement. 

Mr. O’Brien, would you like to add to that? 

MR. O’BRIEN. I would only mention that one of the reasons for the Government’s 

patent policy, as Mr. Harris has stated, is that the major executive branches of our 

Government have no authority to grant rights in patents which that agency of the 

Government may own. The Congress has never provided the executive branch of the 

Government with that authority except in a few instances such as the Tennessee Valley 

Authority and the AEC. 

MR. HARRIS. And our own organization. 

MR. O’BRIEN. And the NASA. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. King, will you yield? 

MR. KING. Yes, I am through, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. MITCHELL. I understand you to say that in most agencies you do not have the 

authority to grant licenses? 

MR. O’BRIEN. The authority to grant any irrevocable or exclusive license. 

MR. MITCHELL. The policy has been to grant these licenses but they are revocable? 

MR. O’BRIEN. That is right. 

MR. BASS. Does that also mean the Government cannot collect royalties and enter 

into that kind of agreement? 

MR. HARRIS. I think it would mean that except in the case of these agencies which 

have the authority such as NASA, TVA, and AEC, I believe. 

MR. BASS. They have the authority? 

MR. HARRIS. Yes. 

MR. BASS. Do they exercise it? 

MR. HARRIS. No, sir. 

We haven’t developed our policy on the subject. We are in the process of trying to formulate a policy but one of the difficulties that one is going to have in trying to grant royalty-bearing licenses is that it is obligatory on the licensor in such cases to defend that 

patent against infringers because it is unfair to the person who takes a license and agrees 

to pay royalties if somebody else would start to manufacture the thing and not pay royalties and have it royalty-fi-ee. 
472 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

So, therefore, in private practice, it is incumbent upon the patent owner who grants 

a license to undertake to sue infringers. In the Government’s case, if it were to adopt a 

policy of granting royalty-bearing licenses it would mean the Department of Justice would 

have to sue infringers of patents. 

MR. KING. May we pursue this, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. MITCHELL. Yes. 

MR. QUIGLEY. May I ask a question here just for clarification? 

Do I gather, sir, that the Tennessee Valley Authority and the AEC, those two, have in 

the past granted exclusive licenses, not with the royalties attached? 

MR. HARRIS. The Tennessee Valley Authority has granted at least one royalty-bearing 

license. 

[36] MR. QUIGLEY. At least one royalty-bearing? 

MR. HARRIS. Yes. The AEC has never granted more than a revocable license, which 

the Department of Defense also grants. They have never exercised the authority of their 

act. 

MR. QUIGLEY In other words, while the AEC has the authority to grant exclusive 

irrevocable licenses, they have not in fact exercised it? 

MR. HARRIS. That is right. 

MR. QUIGLEY What you are saying in effect, then, is that the only Government 

agency that has done that would be the TVA? 

MR. HARRIS. That is right, and also that license was to a British concern and it may 

be that they didn’t know the situation over here, as well as ourselves, because had I been 

representing an American client or them, I would have advised then not the enter into a 

royalty-bearing license. 

MR. QUIGLEY. Even though this authority has existed on the books for a number of 

years, in fact it has not been exercised? 

MR. HARRIS. That is right. 

MR. QUIGLEY With this one exception? 

MR. HARRIS. That is right, sir. 

MR. O’BRIEN. I would like to add one comment. 

The Tennessee Valley Authority does grant licenses which are irrevocable, but not royalty-bearing. It has granted exclusive licenses. 

MR. QUIGLEY That would be the only agency of the Federal Government that has 

done that. AEC has the authority to, but hasn’t. 

MR. O’BRIEN. Yes, sir, except for a few instances of vested property of the Alien 

Property Custodian where licenses have been granted under those vested patents. 

MR. MITCHELL. Mr. Harris, this example you gave of the British concern obtaining 

a license was later canceled. . . . 

Document 111-4 

Document title: T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, Memorandum for Distribution, 

“Appraisal of NASA’s Contracting Policy and Industrial Relations,” February 29, 1960, 

with attached “Preliminary Outline of Plan for Appraising NASA’s Contracting Policies 

and Industry Relationships,” February 26,1960. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 473 

Document 111-5 

Document title: McKinsey and Company, Inc., “An Evaluation of NASA’s Contracting 

Policies, Organization, and Performance,” October 1960 (a report prepared under contract for NASA). 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

NASA Administrator T Keith Glennan began 1960 with an eye to the future, conmed with estub 

lishing policies to pia2 NASA’s external relationships with other government agencies and pn’uate 

industry. Knowing NASA would be contracting out the major$ of its work through various fild mters with differing characteristics, and recognixing that his actions would set a precedent for the agency 

in years to come, Glananfelt it important to acquire outside advice on these issues. Consequently, he 

hired the management consultingfirm of McKinsey and Company to u&t& an extensive study of 

how NASA might best establish these external relationships. Reporting back eight months lato; 

McKinsey laid out a number of recommendations. The first chapter of the firm’s report summarized 

them. 

Document 111-4 

r 11 February 29, 1960 

Memorandum for Distribution 

Subject: Appraisal of NASA’s Contracting Policy and Industrial Relations 

A contract has been entered into with McKinsey and Company, Management 

Consultants, for a comprehensive study of (1) how NASA should utilize industry and private institutions, (2) method of utilizing in-house research capabilities, and (3) the extent 

and manner of sharing responsibility and authority between government and industry. 

Now that our field organizations are shaping up, it seems particularly important to study 

very carefully how NASA can best conduct its business with industry in carrying out the 

program planned for the next 10 years and in a context decentralizing the major elements 

of industry relationships to the development centers. 

The study will follow three basic approaches: (1) an examination of our experience 

to date in handling several major contracting actions; (2) an appraisal of experience of 

other government agencies; and (3) an analysis of approaches and techniques used or 

advocated by our own centers. I urge all elements of NASA to be fully and completely 

cooperative in working with the McKinsey staff. 

In the past NASA has found that it obtains the greatest results from such studies if the 

outside consultant group has a close liaison with responsible program areas most involved. 

In this instance, our plan is to assign one NASA staff member to work virtually full time 

with the McKinsey staff. This person in turn will be assisted by and will head up a task 

group of people from various parts of NASA Headquarters. The task group will be composed of the following people: 
474 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Leader-William P. Kelly, Jr.-Office of Business Administration 

Member-Newel1 Sanders-Office of Space Flight Programs 

Member-Col. D. H. Heaton-Office of Launch Vehicle Programs 

Member-Emerson V. Conlon-Office of Advanced Research Programs 

MemberWalter D. Sohier-Office of General Counsel 

Member-John R. Scull-Office of Program Planning and Evaluation 

In addition, it is requested that each NASA research and development center, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, designate a top level technical person with management responsibility as a point of contact for the study group with that center. The name 

of the individual so designated should be supplied in writing to the leader of the NASA 

task group, Mr. William P. Kelly, Jr., Chief, Procurement Assistance Branch, Procurement 

and Supply Division, Office of Business Administration, NASA Headquarters, as soon as 

possible. 

[2] Attached for your information is a brief summary of the study purposes and objectives. I believe this is a timely study of one of our major problem areas and can result in a 

major contribution toward improved program management if it is properly and enthusiastically pursued. 

Attachment as stated 

T. Keith Glennan 

Administrator 

********* 

[Attachment p. 13 

February 29,1960 

Preliminary Outline of Plan for Appraising NASA's 

Contracting Policies and Industry Relationships 

NASA is now a principal source of government contracts and may be expected in the 

future to contract for the requirements of an even larger space program. It is dependent 

upon its ability to contract effectively for the industrial and scientific resources of the 

nation to carry out the national space program. NASA has now (and probably only within the next year) the opportunity to appraise objectively and to revise imaginatively its 

contracting policies and relationships with private industry and institutions. 

Scope and Objectives of the Study 

This study is to be primarily concerned with an analysis of the basic concepts of (1) 

how NASA should utilize industry and private institutions, (2) the method of utilizing inhouse research and development capabilities, and (3) the extent and manner of sharing 

responsibility and authority between government and industry. 

The answers that this study seeks must be reconcilable with (1) the ten-year planned 

program, (2) the present order of magnitude of in-house development resources (at least 

through Fiscal Year 1961), and (3) NASA's basic policy of decentralizing major elements 

of the contracting job (and related industry relationships) to the development centers. 

These factors establish a basic frame of reference against which the feasibility of recommendations must be tested. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 475 

A study of NASA contracting at this time should be designed to provide factual and 

reasoned answers to the following (and related) questions: 

1. What role should the space development centers-Goddard, Huntsville, and 

JPL-play in contracting? How does this role relate to the need for in-house 

development and engineering capabilities? Which of several approaches should 

be followed by the development centers in contracting, e.g., contracting with a 

single company for a major system as [2] contrasted with contracting subsystems 

and components with several companies? To what extent should the approach be 

varied in terms of the type of project involved? What are the implications of various approaches to contracting in terms of laboratory requirements for personnel 

and facilities, and in government-industry relationships? 

2. Under what circumstances, and for what reasons, should NASA employ each of 

the following in systems management? 

a. NASA space development center. 

b. Industrial contractor as solely a systems manager. 

c. Industrial contractor as systems manager and prime contractor. 

d. University or other type of nonprofit contractors as systems manager with an 

industrial prime contractor as in the Vega case. 

3. What approaches and techniques should NASA use in supervising contractor 

operations and in evaluating contractor performance-from both a technical and 

administrative point of view? How should these techniques be varied in terms of 

(a) contractor capabilities, (b) amount of advanced research and development 

involved, (c) priorities, and (d) similar factors? What decisions should be made 

by the development centers and various elements of the headquarters staff in contractor supervision? What information is required to make these decisions effectively and how should it be provided? 

4. How and to what extent should NASA encourage elements of United States industry not now interested in or involved in space technology to enter the field? 

5. What new approaches can be developed to provide effective incentives to industry to control costs and increase performance? On what types of contracts, and 

under what circumstances, can these innovations to contracting be employed?* 

[3] 6. What problems does NASA’s present approach to contracting cause in terms of 

the agency’s internal processes, particularly program planning, integration, and 

control? What changes are indicated in terms of either contracting policies or 

internal processes to increase the agency’s over-all effectiveness? 

7. To what extent is NASA limited by the government frame-work in making desirable changes in its approaches to contracting and in its relationships with contractors? What steps should be taken to modify or remove these limitations? 

An Approach to the Study 

To answer these questions a three-pronged approach to fact finding and analyses will 

be undertaken: 

1. Appraise NASAs contracting experience by examining a sample of representative 

contracts NASA has executed.** The analysis of the actions taken on each contract should provide effective insights as to actual experience. To this end the 

Study Team will, with the aid of NASAs staff, select contracts that provide 

* Recognition must be given to the difficulties involved in providing effective incentives in rapidly 

evolving areas of research and development. ** This technique has been tested in an extensive study of “Weapons Acquisition” now under way at the 

Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in collaboration with the Rand Corporation. 
476 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

contrasting approaches to contracting, e.g., the McDonnell Corporation contract 

for the Mercury Capsule and the role of the Langley Research Center; Vega and 

the role of JPL; and the North American contracts for the “big engine” and the 

role of headquarters. The Study Team would not expect to derive answers to the 

questions listed above from the analysis of any sample of contracts alone. 

2. Appraise the experience of other government departments and agencies in contracting for research and development projects. Evidence would be sought as to 

the advantages and disadvantages of the differing approaches employed, e.g., 

AEC in reactor development; the Army in a program such asJupitm, the Air Force 

on Atlas; and the Navy on Polaris. In addition, the contracting practices of one [4] 

large laboratory outside the NASA and AEC orbit will be reviewed, e.g., Lincoln 

Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

3. Analyze the contracting approaches and techniques now being employed by the 

Development Operations Division, the Space Project Group, and JPL. This 

approach will include assembling specific illustrations of the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches to contracting represented by these three 

groups. In addition, review and appraise the procedures followed by one or more 

of NASA’s Research Centers to make certain that the contracting requirements 

and procedures at these Centers will not be incompatible with the policies to be 

recommended. 

Specific Steps Involved in the Study 

More specifically, the Study Team proposes to proceed as follows: 

Approximate Timing steps 

Feb. 29-Mar. 18 1. Finalize Detailed Study plan: To make more precise the types of 

information and analyses required, the ideas of key personnel in 

NASA headquarters, Langley, Goddard, and at JPL as to materials and experience relevant to the questions listed above will be 

assembled. This step will also involve establishing criteria for the 

selection of contracts to be studied. At the completion of this 

step, the Study Team will: 

a. Formulate, in terms of outlines and questionnaires, the specific detailed inquires to be made at NASA headquarters, 

NASA development and research centers, successful industrial contractors, unsuccessful contractors, and other government departments and agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and AEC) . 

[5] Appoximate Timing steps 

Feb. 29-Mar. 18 

(continued) b. Make a detailed presentation to the top staff of NASA-both 

headquarters and field-picturing the study objectives and 

plans. This will be done to ensure understanding of the 

kinds of issues and problems the study seeks to resolve, and 

the kinds of evidence, experience, and opinion that will be 

required to resolve these problems. It will be important that 

this step result in a consensus among key personnel as to the 

desirability of the study objectives and the feasibility of the 

approach. The Study Team will evaluate with the 

Administrator, at this point, the adequacy of the study plans, 

and the reactions of NASA’s staff to these plans. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 477 

Approximate Timing steps 

Mar. 21-May 13 2. Assemble C~nb-acEing Espoiolce: This step will involve three simultaneous efforts: 

a. In assembling and analyzing NASA’s contracting experience, 

the Study Team will be seeking information on such questions as: 

(1) Where did the idea for the project come from? What 

program decisions gave rise to it? Was its feasibility adequately considered? 

(2) Were in-house capabilities available for all or part of the 

project? What factors such as cost, were considered in 

making the decision to place the contract with an 

industrial firm or private institution? 

(3) What criteria or guidelines were used to select organizations to submit proposals? 

(4) What factors were considered in evaluating proposals 

and what was the relative significance of each factor in 

negotiating and awarding the contract? 

[ 61 Approximate Timing 

Mar. 21-May 13 

steps 

(5) What major technical, timing, and cost modifications were required in the contract and for what reason? 

Who made these decisions and on what basis? What has 

been the impact of these changes in NASA (e.g., reprogramming of available funds) and on the contractor? 

(6) How are the contractor’s operations supervised and his 

performance evaluated? 

b. In assembling and analyzing the experience of other government departments and agencies, the Study Team will 

want to determine why certain approaches have been selected for the contracting of specific research and development 

programs rather than others, e.g., the Special Projects Office 

in the case of Polaris; the separation of technical and 

management supervision in the case of certain Air Force 

contracts; the management services contract for systems 

management on the Atlas; and the Army approach of inhouse systems management. 

c. In assembling and analyzing the contracting approaches 

employed within the NASA centers at Huntsville, Langley, 

and JPL, the Study Team will want to determine what 

circumstances created or accounted for the different 

approaches to contracting and the specific advantages and 

disadvantages of the varying approaches, in terms of concrete illustrations. 
478 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

ty~fUJCLffLILuLC 1 LflL6fLg 

May 16-June 24 3. Develop Behinary Findings, Cond&ons, and Recommendations: 

This step will involve (a) preparing a series of discussion papers 

on each of the study's major objectives, and (b) subjecting these 

discussion papers to the review and criticism of key headquarters 

and field personnel. [7] This step has a dual purpose-(a) to 

refine the conclusions and recommendations, and (b) provide a 

basis for achieving a consensus among key NASA personnel as to 

the approaches NASA should take to contracting and government-industry relationships in the future. 

June 27-June 29 4. A.epare Final Report: The Study Team's objective will be to present a final report that sets forth recommendations and implementing action steps that have, for all practical purposes, been 

agreed to by key headquarters and field personnel. The previous 

study steps are designed with this objective in mind. 

Document 111-5 

An Evaluation of NASA's Contracting Policies, 

Organization, and Performance 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

1-How Better to Perform NASA's Contracting JobA Summary of Recommendations 

Importance of Contracting to NASA's Total Job 

No single element of NASA's management is as essential to the accomplishment of 

NASA's job as the ability to contract effectively for the research, development, production, 

and services required. The volume of work to be done and the fast range of scientific and 

engineering skills involved require that NASA utilize effectively through contracts those 

enterprises-universities or business firms-that possess the skills required. 

Approximately 85 percent of NASA's annual appropriations, hence, are spent on contracts. This fact is illustrated by the following table: 

Estimated Obligations FY 1960 Budget Estimate FY 1961 

(millions) (millions) 

Dollars Permt Dollars Percent 

Contracts 

Personnel 

468 

81 

85.2 

- 14.8 

770 

M* 

84.2 

15.8 

Total 549 100.0 915 100.0 

* Increase due largely to added personnel costs resulting from transfer of Development Operations Division 

(Marshall Space Flight Center) from Army to NASA effective beginning with Fiscal Year 1961. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 479 

[2] Factors That Condition NASA’s Job 

The manner in which the contracting job is carried out is conditioned by four factors-(1) the unique characteristics of NASA’s job, (2) the legislative framework within 

which NASA operates, (3) the political sensitivity of contracting, and (4) the manner in 

which NASA came into being. 

(a) Characteristics of NASA’s job 

NASA’s ultimate objective is the acquisition, evaluation and dissemination of scientific information. Space vehicles and associated hardware provide the tools to achieve this 

objective. This means that most of NASA’s contract dollars go for never-before-produced 

experimental equipment and systems, requiring diverse engineering and scientific skills. 

The bulk of NASA’s contracting, hence, is carried out on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. 

This method of contracting demands a closer day-today working relationship between 

NASA’s technical and procurement specialists than other methods of procurement in 

such areas as the preparation of work statements, analyses of costs, in selecting suppliers, 

and in progress reporting and evaluation. 

Contracting for such efforts is complicated further by the fact that many projects utilize industrial resources on what is essentially a “one time basis.” The enterprise that contracts to carry out a NASA project may have to assemble scientists, engineers, technicians, 

and facilities especially adapted to an unprecedented undertaking. Upon completion of 

the project the “team” and facilities may no longer be required. There is little need for 

the repetitive production of a succession of items (e.g., as in aircraft or even military missile systems) but for the production of a single or very limited number of launch vehicles 

and space craft. Procurement of a small number of unique items places major stress on 

the reliability of each item. 

The high reliability requirements, plus the small number of similar units that are 

used, are central characteristics that distinguish and complicate NASAs procurementjob. 

These characteristics mean that the normal cost and performance incentives are often not 

available to NASA and contractors. Therefore, NASA must substitute for the self-discipline 

of such incentives continual and effective technical supervision of contractor’s efforts. 

[3] Over and above its own immediate needs for the services of industrial enterprises, 

NASA has a longer-run obligation in a free enterprise society to provide industry opportunities to take advantage of the commercial aspects of research and development.* 

The goods and services that NASA contracts for and the distribution of contracts 

among suppliers inevitably condition the capacity of American industry and of individual 

enterprise to participate in those areas where (a) commercial applications are foreseeable, eg., communications, and (b) where space research and development has an indirect impact on industrial technology and commercial products, e.g., electronics. 

These factors also determine the extent of economic concentration or dispersion that 

will characterize the supplying industry in the decades ahead. At present, relatively few 

industrial concerns possess the engineering and scientific skills requisite to the successful 

completion of a total space vehicle subsystem such as the launch or space vehicle. 

However, unless industrial contractors are encouraged to round out their capabilities, 

NASA will find it necessary to expand its in-house capabilities-facilities and personnel 

wise. 

* Some of the problems involved were set forth in an address by Ralph J. Cordiner, Chairman of the Board, 

General Electric Company, entitled “Competitive Private Enterprise in Space” at the University of 

California, Los Angeles, May 14, 1960. 
480 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

(b) The Legal Framework of Contracting 

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 provided NASA broad authority “to 

enter into . . . and perform such contracts . . . or other transactions as may be necessary 

to the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate.” The Act also 

made applicable to NASA the provisions of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. 

These legislative grants,of procurement authority were designed (1) to grant NASA 

the same flexibility to procurement as is available to the military and (2) to avoid the 

imposition of an additional set of procurement regulations with which industry would 

have to cope. This latter point is of particular [4] significance since a substantial proportion of NASA’s requirements are similar to those of the military departments and are produced by the same companies. 

The contracting authority granted by the Congress has made it possible for NASA to 

depend on the military departments during its first two years of existence for substantial 

assistance in contracting. Without this assistance it would have been impossible for NASA 

to have achieved as much in the time that has elapsed. However, this dependence has 

influenced the speed and effectiveness with which NASA has developed its own organization and contracting processes. It has also limited the extent to which NASA has been 

able to initiate new approaches and techniques for contracting for research and development. 

(c) Political Sensitivity of Contracting 

No aspect of NASA’s job is more politically sensitive than the contracting process. In 

substantial part this political sensitivity arises out of the large value of the contracts being 

let and their significance to individual contractors and to the communities in which their 

plants are located. A second cause of this sensitivity is the fact that the contracting activities of large government agencies have become instruments for achieving indirect objectives. These include (1) assisting small business, (2) channeling public funds into 

depressed and labor surplus areas, (3) maintaining a broad national industrial based for 

mobilization, and (4) supporting academic and institutional programs. 

NASA’s public and Congressional relations will depend, in considerable part, upon 

the manner in which the contracting process is carried out. 

(d) NASA’s Organizational Inheritance 

NASA’s organization was built on the foundations of the NACA laboratories. The traditional job of these laboratories had been in-house supporting research for the military 

departments and the aircraft industry. Their staffs had little experience in contracting for 

complex development projects. 

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, prior to its transfer to NASA, had been primarily concerned with the in-house development of Army missile systems. Although this laboratory 

had spent approximately half of its annual budget via contractors and vendors, the items 

contracted for consisted primarily of raw materials, parts, components, and similar items. 

Laboratory [5] personnel possessed little or no experience in contracting with industry 

for major subsystems of the nature involved in NASA’s program. 

The individuals making up these groups had been primarily concerned with in-house 

development and had had little experience in utilizing nongovernmental contractors for 

development of subsystems as distinguished from components. The staff of the 

Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency had had a markedly different experience but this staff was similarly oriented toward in-house development. 

A further factor conditioning NASA’s contracting processes was the inheritance by the 

Agency of a number of projects that had already been initiated by other agencies. These 

include the Vapor Magnetometer Project, initiated by the Naval Research Laboratory; the 

Saturn Launch vehicle by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 48 1 

Defense and the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency; 

the Centaur launch vehicle initiated by the Air Force; Tiros I, a project conceived and initiated by the Army Signal Corps; and Echo, a project developed by the Langley Research 

Center of NACA. 

Each of these projects involved differing approaches to (a) the division of effort 

between government and private resources, (b) project management, (c) technical supervision of contractor efforts, (d) contract administration, and (e) progress reporting, 

including financial and procurement control processes. 

Method of Analysis 

In studying NASA's approach to its contracting job, we took the pragmatic approach 

of analyzing stepby-step twelve significant space flight and launch vehicle projects. The 

projects studied are identified in Table 1-"Framework for Analyzing NASA's Contracting 

Policies."* For each project, we studied the 

[6] 1. Division of effort between NASA and private contractors in terms of the major elements (e.g., detailed design) that comprise each project. 

2. Varying approaches employed in contracting, i.e., relying for the project on a single contractor, procuring subsystems from various contractors, and procuring compo: 

nents to be assembled with NASA. 

3. Varying approaches employed in project management. 

4. Techniques employed in technical supervision and administration of contracts. 

In addition to these analyses of NASA's experience, we: 

1. Studied the working relationships between technical and Procurement staffs in the 

headquarters and in the field centers. 

2. Acquainted ourselves with the comparable contracting experience of our agencies, 

i.e., the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, Army, and the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Summary of Recommendations 

The results of these analyses are set forth in the following chapters of this report. Here 

we summarize those recommendations on which action has already been initiated or on 

which we urge that action be taken. 

1. NASA has made significant progress in reorienting staffs that had been oriented 

toward in-house research and development and in increasing the utilization of industrial 

enterprises and other nongovernmental contractors. To stimulate further contracting 

out, we recommend that NASA approve and generally promulgate the following criteria 

to govern what work shall be done in-house, and what shall be contracted out: 

(a) NASA should retain in-house the conceptual and preliminary design elements of a major project, or its equivalent, in each major program.** 

* In addition to the project listed, we examined various aspects of contracts of the F-1 engine; 

Minitrack; research Grants and Contracts at Johns Hopkins and Stanford Universities and at the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology; AtlasAble Space Probe; Snap 8; GE Plug Nozzle engine; nuclear rocket plump; and 

Deep Space Net. ** Major programs include-(1) Applications, (2) Manned Space Flight, (3) Lunar and Planetary, (4) 

Scientific Satellite, (5) Sounding Rocket, and (6) Launch Vehicle. . . . 
482 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

[71 Table 1 

Framework for Analyzing NASA's Contracting Policies 

Space 

Flight 

Pmjects 

Estimated Obligations FYI 960* 

(Millions of Dollars) 

In-House Out-ofHouse Program 

Mgmt 

Distribution of Responsibilities 

Pmject Contract 

Mgmt Admin. Principal Contractors 

Mercury 3.8 87.2 OSFP STG NavylAir Force McDonnell. Convair, 

Western Electric** 

Ranger 5.5 10.9 OSFP JPL Air Force Convair, Lockheed 

OAO 0.5 0.3 OSFP GSFC Air Force Convair, Lockheed 

S-16 0.05 2.1 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas, Ball Brothers 

P-14 0.7 0.2 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas. MIT, Varlan 

Echo 0.05 3.2 OSFP GSFC Air Force Douglas, Bell Telephone, 

General Mills, MMM 

Launch Vehicle Projects 

Saturn 43.0 135.3 OLVP MSFC Air Force Douglas, Convair, 

Rocketdyne 

Centaur 0.2 36.5 OLVP MSFC Air Force Convair, Rocketdyne 

Agena-B 0.1 7.3 OLVP JPL Air Force Convair. Lockheed 

Delta 0.7 11.8 OLVP OLVP Air Force Douglas 

scout 0.0s 2.5 OLVP Langley RC Navy Chance Vought 

Vega 0.1 3.5 OLVP OLVPNPL Air Force Convair 

Total $ 56. I 300.8 

Total % 18.8 81.2 

* The in-house estimates include obligations from the Salaries and Expenses Appropriation; out-of-house obligations from the 

Research and Development Appropriation. The estimates were obtained from the various project managers and reflect the 

general magnitudes only. 

** The Western Electric contract for the Mercury tracking system is supervised by the Langley Research Center. 

[8] (b) NASA's in-house efforts in the conceptual and preliminary design elements 

of space flight and launch vehicle projects should be supplemented extensively through the use of study contracts. 

(c) NASA should retain in-house the detailed design, fabrication, assembly, test 

and check out elements of a single advanced launch vehicle* and spacecraft 

unique to each major program. 

(d) Each center should contract out the detailed design, fabrication, assembly, 

test, and check out elements of all launch vehicles and spacecraft except the 

relatively few required to meet the criteria set forth in item (c) above. 

(e) NASA's centers should contract all production manufacturing efforts including the standard or relatively standard parts and components used for inhouse launch vehicles and spacecraft of an advanced developmental nature. 

(f) NASA should contract out total space vehicles including the physical integration of subsystems, i.e., the launch vehicle and spacecraft. 

* Or stage in the case of a project such as the Saturn Launch Vehicle, i.e., the SI Stage. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 483 

(g) NASA should contract with the external scientific community for a preponderant proportion (70 to 85 percent) of all space flight experiments. 

Adoption of these criteria will ensure the retention in-house of the capability required 

to enable NASA effectively to contract for the bulk of the research and development services needed. Adoption of the criteria will curb the tendency to do all that can be done 

in-house and contract out what remains. 

2. To utilize its in-house facilities to the fullest, we recommend that NASA 

[9] (a) Place responsibility for a limited number of development projects in the 

research centers where they have the capabilities required, and these capabilities are needed by NASA for the particular project. 

(b) Establish project management teams in the Research Centers where this 

means a center’s capabilities can best be utilized to provide needed development assistance. 

3. The complex character of space vehicle subsystems makes inevitable the distribution of responsibility among several NASA centers and among industrial contractors. To 

resolve more effectively the technical (in matching up one space vehicle subsystem with 

another) and jurisdictional problems (headquarters staffs vs. center staffs) that arise, we 

recommend that NASA 

(a) Assign as full responsibility as practicable for the execution of each project to 

a specific center. 

(b) Clarify the relative responsibilities of the headquarters staff and the space 

flight centers by concentrating the efforts of the headquarters staffs on 

reviewing and approving: 

(1) Development plans for each space flight project, including conceptual 

and preliminary designs and allocation of responsibilities in- and out-ofhouse. 

(2) Schedules in terms of major procurement actions and technical milestones. 

(3) Budget justifications and financial operating plans. 

In addition, the headquarters technical staffs would evaluate projects and approve 

changes in the project plans which significantly alter objectives, schedules, and/or costs. 

4. Strengthen the capabilities of the space flight centers to manage projects, particularly those in which major systems or total space flight vehicles are developed by contractors. To this end, we recommend that NASA 

[lo] (a) Improve the competence of its project managers. Steps must be taken to 

ensure that project managers develop the full complement of technical and 

managerial skills essential for this task. The “custom-tailored” training program for project management personnel that has been initiated is a promising step toward this end. 

(b) Improve the project organizational arrangements that now exist. Each project management team responsible for a major space flight project should be 

headed by a full-time project manager reporting directly to the director or 

deputy director of the responsible center.* Each project management team 

should include sufficient technical and administrative (e.g., financial procurement) personnel to make the project manager effective in mobilizing the 

resources of the whole center, of other centers, and of the contractors. 

* Because of the inability to attract senior project managers at the salary level NASA is able to offer, achievement of this objective will require, in a number of cases, a considerable period of time. 
484 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

5. NASA is faced with a major and complex task of developing, under cost-plusfixed-fee contracts, working relationships with contractors which neither stifle the contractor’s capabilities, nor relieve them of their obligations to use public funds wisely and 

economically. To this end, we recommend that NASA 

(a) Develop a guide for preparing and evaluating statements of work to be done 

and service to be rendered under research and development contracts. 

(b) Institute a continuing program to assemble and study cost data as a basis for 

improving funding estimates. 

(c) Provide a single point of ultimate technical authority for each contractor on 

a given project-the project manager. 

(d) Establish guidelines as to the approaches and techniques to be used in technical supervision of contractors. 

[ll] (e) Establish guidelines as to staff action on the analysis and control of costs in 

terms of pre-award analyses of price, costs, and profits, and post-award costs 

control techniques. 

(Q Continue to make its own source selections, handle its own contract negotiations, and provide its own technical supervision. 

(g) Supplement use of the military services for “field service functions” by periodic evaluation of services rendered, direct handling when required in special situations, and approval of subcontracts within clearly prescribed criteria. 

6. To overcome apparent deficiencies in the functioning of the headquarters 

Procurement and Supply Division, we recommend: 

(a) Approval of the organizational plan prepared by the Director of the 

Procurement and Supply Division with one major exception; that is, focus all 

activities related to facilities planning and utilization in a separate division in 

the Office of Business Administration rather than in a branch of 

Procurement and Supply Division. 

(b) Development of a system of field center procurement reviews with will involve 

key personnel from each of the branches of the headquarters Procurement 

and Supply Division. This step plus the one recommended in item (a) above 

will make it possible to abolish what is presently termed the Field Installations 

Branch in the Procurement and Supply Division. 

(c) Establishment of a position of Assistant Director in the Procurement and 

Supply Division.* The person appointed to fill this position should be given 

primary responsibility for the day-to-day internal management of the 

Division. 

(d) Additional staff be made available, particularly in the Policies and Procedures 

Branch, for the Procurement Committee, and in the Procurement Assistance 

Branch. 

[ 123 7. NASA’s technical staff have reflected lack of understanding of the processes that 

must be carried out if their needs for research and development services are to be translated into contracts with qualified suppliers and NASA’s resources are to be conserved. To 

overcome this lack, we recommend that steps be taken to aid the technical staffs-in headquarters and in the centers-in expanding their understanding of the: 

(a) Succession of actions that the procurement staff must take to negotiate and 

administer a contract. 

* Action has been taken to establish such a position. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 485 

(b) Importance of keeping procurement staffs advised of needs that will affect 

procurement actions. 

(c) Importance of recognizing what constitutes contractual commitments and 

refraining from making them.without advice from NASA procurement staffs. 

(d) Importance of cost analysis and negotiation and tolerance of the time that is 

required. 

There is no simple nor established method of creating understanding and acceptance 

of these points by technical personnel. The primary obligation falls on NASA's management. It is to establish in day-today practice-at headquarters and in the field centersthe concept of team action on procurement matters. 

To implement this concept requires the availability of procurement personnel who 

are strongly program oriented, while at the same time possessing outstanding experience 

in, and a clear understanding of, the contracting processes associated with complex 

research and development projects-including their financial and program implications. 

8. Most of the development contracts that are still being awarded and supervised by 

NASA headquarters can be associated either with a specific project or with the technical 

skills available in one of the field centers. Wherever this is the case these contracts should 

be technically supervised and administrated from a given field center rather than from 

headquarters. In a very limited number of cases it may be appropriate for NASA headquarters to award and supervise contracts related to the development and feasibility of 

future programs. This should knowingly be the exception to the general rule. 

[13] 9. All contracts now supervised from headquarters that can be associated either with 

a specific project or with the specific skills of one of the field centers should be technically 

supervised and administered from the field centers; for example, those advanced technology studies for the development of solid rocket motors which are technically supervised from headquarters and administrated by the Goddard procurement office. 

Document 111-6 

Document title: James E. Webb, Address at Graduation Exercises, Advanced Management 

Program, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Uniwisity, December 6, 

1966. 

Document source: Administrators' Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Experienced in public management, NASA Administrator James E. Webb considered the o!euelopment 

of new approaches to management an important goal of the Apollo project. His emphasis called for 

the assimilation of concepts and processes from government, industry, and academia into a usable 

form. In this 1966 graduation address at the Harvard Business School, Webb took the opportunily 

to explain his view of the interaction of various communities on spaceflight management, as well of 

NASA S broader contribution to public administration. 

[ 11 During the time spent here, you have been studying the present state of the management art as it has developed in recent years. You have brought yourselves up to date, and 

I am certain that you hope that what you have learned will last you for at least a few years 

to come. 

On the other hand, you came here because you are not complacent. You recognize 

that the world is changing and the requirements you have to meet on the job and off the 
486 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

job are changing. I am sure you want to continue to keep abreast of the times. 

[2] That being the case, let me take this opportunity to talk about some of the changes I 

see going on that challenge any new complacency you might be tempted to develop. 

Let us start with some new kinds of management problems that all of us are going to 

be dealing with in the days and years immediately ahead. Secondly, let us move on to talk 

about some new approaches, new techniques and new solutions that are being tested and 

that have proved productive in dealing with these new kinds of problems. Some of these 

are too new to be written into the literature or even into the case studies generally available. 

As I see it, there are new ways of thinking about management problems, new ways of 

doing things or getting them done in an organization, new styles of management. 

I. The Changing Dimensions of the Challenge 

During the years since World War 11, we have all been mindful of the magnitude of 

the changes going on around us. The numbers needed to describe the growth in our [3] 

gross national product or our national income, or the magnitude of our private investment or public debt are all enormous numbers. We have heard a great deal, too, about 

the pace of change and about its acceleration. Much of our attention, therefore, has been 

given to size and speed, and to how these affect the requirements for good effective managemen t. 

I want to talk about some other dimensions of the challenge we face. As I see it, the 

problems that we are going to be dealing with in the days ahead of us are not just bigger 

than the problems our parents or grandparents were faced with. They are different in a 

number of important ways. 

First, they are going to be more complex, in many bewildering ways. 

How complex our environment is was brought forcibly to my mind in a recent article 

in Business Week on the wood product industry. Some years ago, companies in the industry who owned timberland became aware of the fact that they really had to farm their land 

if they wanted [4] to stay in business. They had to grow new crops of trees to replace those 

they cut down. Then the timber companies began to diversify, as they realized that the 

closer they got to the end product, the more control they had over their markets and their 

customers. And so timber companies began to go into all kinds of businesses. Some went 

one way and some another. Some went into building products and others into paper products and one into retail stationery stores. This article in Business Week talked about the furniture business and it told how one furniture manufacturer was building diningroom 

chairs of wood, except that the legs were made of plastic, because that had proved to be 

much stronger than wood for that purpose. In some of these companies, production of 

both wood and plastic parts is now controlled by punch tape and by optical scanners that 

trace cutting patterns electronically. As good wood gets scarcer, some companies are using 

thin veneers backed with aluminum foil coated with vinyl. This article then went on to 

describe some of the production techniques the furniture industries have borrowed from 

the aerospace companies, resulting in highly automated production lines [5] that produce new kinds of raw materials, and then shape them and mold them under electronic 

control. One company has adapted the technology of textile and paper mills to bleach 

natural wood to a neutral color and then stain it to produce a more uniform finish than 

can be found in natural timber. One company is working with epoxy impregnation of 

wood that has been treated with nuclear radiation to change its molecular structure. The 

purpose of this is to make hard wood out of pine, according to this manufacturer. 

I cite this example only to illustrate one aspect of the complexity of what might appear 

to be a relatively simple business. It serves to illustrate kinds of decisions that the managements of even relatively small companies are faced with today, and will be faced with 

increasingly in the days ahead. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 487 

An interesting reflection for me as I read this article was the viewpoint of the TVA I 

had gained back in 1947 when, as Director of the Budget, I had made an inspection of 

each major river system which was being developed with Federal funds. In addition to its 

demonstration farms which were experimenting with various new [6] phosphates and 

other fertilizers developed through TVA research, experiments were being carried out to 

determine how the small farmer could “tree-farm” his wood lot with highest yield. 

Another reflection is that recently I read a report on the research which led to the radiation hardening of treated wood which had been partly financed by the Atomic Energy 

Commission and sponsored by the Southern Interstate Nuclear and Space Board. A wise 

utilization of an accumulation of technology based on research does pay off-in the 

health of a regional economy or in the profitability of a business. It pays off in the field of 

management too. 

Certainly you are mindful of the fact that very few of the companies that make up 

Fortune’s list of our 500 largest industrial corporations can be said to be in any one industry, or even in two or three industries. The logic of events and of circumstances have led 

them to diversify all across the industrial spectrum. And most of them are just as far flung 

geographically as they are industrially. The search for raw materials and markets and labor 

supply have caused them to set up shop in one [7] country after another all around the 

world. Each of them has at its command many different kinds of raw materials, natural 

and synthetic, and many different production technologies. Products are proliferating 

and markets are fragmented and all of this requires different entrepreneurial skills which 

require new kinds of management approaches. 

What is going on in the private industrial sector of our economy is also going on 

throughout our society. Our universities are no longer the simple “halls of ivy” they used 

to be. Every major university is a large complex of different and diverse highly specialized 

schools, and centers, and institutes, and research laboratories. 

Our cultural institutions have become similarly complex. Instead of a Metropolitan 

Opera House or a Carnegie Hall, New York now has a Lincoln Center and a similar cultural complex is emerging in each of our metropolitan areas, or will soon emerge there. 

Or think of our approach to the problem of poverty. Not so many years ago, we thought 

of poverty in terms of incompetence or charity, in terms of drives to support charitable 

institutions. Now we recognize that poverty is a much [8] more complex fact, requiring a 

much more fundamental approach involving many different disciplines. Management of 

efforts to apply new approaches can only be elaborately intricate. 

Not only are the challenges facing us much more complex than they used to be, but 

they are also involved increasingly with new sciences and new technology. Whether you 

think of the wood product business or the Lincoln Center complex, those who occupy the 

positions where important decisions are made are more and more dealing with a rapid 

pace of scientific and technological progress. The furniture executive has to make decisions involving optical scanners and radiation. The management of Lincoln Center finds 

itself dealing with scientists who are experts in acoustics one day and on the next day with 

engineers who are masters of the technology involved in the giant rotating mechanism 

that operates the center stage of the new Opera House, and with the problems posed 

when that breaks down the night before the new Opera House was to be the scene of its 

first public performance. We in NASA face the same problem when a diesel engine refuses to start and a gantry [9] cannot be lowered to accommodate a major rocket launching. 

Similarly, those who work in the field of poverty are involved in the latest findings of 

behavioral scientists and economists. The same is true of those who are dealing in the 

problems of mass transportation or air pollution or management of vast health and welfare programs to serve our major communities. We in NASA are similarly involved when 
488 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

we have to translate a supersonic transport design into pilot performance or into a predicted return on invested capital for an airline. 

And our affluent society is becoming day by day a more impatient society. Those who 

hold positions of responsibility are expected to be able to cope with the most complex of 

new scientific findings and their potential at the very frontier of technology. It was only a 

few years ago that Henry Ford made his contribution by putting to productive use the 

proven engineering practices involved in assembly line mass production. Production of 

things is no longer the major challenge of our society. We are dealing with problems and 

with solutions that involve high [lo] elements of creativity and, associated with them, high 

degrees of uncertainty and risk. Management must be able to assess these in its decisionmaking. And to solve these problems we find ourselves involved with creating and learning to use different kinds of skills and talents and training. 

I am reminded of the fact that not so many years ago one of our major corporations 

was faced with the challenge of shifting from the assembly of electrical components to the 

manufacture of products involving the latest developments in solid-state physics. The 

electrical assembly operation required long lines of women with nimble fingers. The new 

production line was peopled entirely by physicists with advanced degrees. This involved a 

different kind of recruiting, a different kind of motivation, and a much different kind of 

supervision. And, of course, it meant a different kind of management at the higher levels 

of the company. These are some of the new dimensions that we are facing in our private 

sector and in the public sector of our society. They define a new challenge and they 

require a new kind of management. 

[ 111 II. New Perspectives on Available Resources 

I believe we can accept the fact that today’s furniture manufacture has to think of the 

new world of plastics as well as new kinds of treated wood. We have at our command, in 

other words, a much wider range of natural and synthetic materials to take into account 

in our critical decisions as managers. 

But more important, I suspect, are the human resources we have to work with. 

Our generation of managers grew up in a world in which there were some rather nice 

distinctions between the world of commerce, the world of the university, and the world of 

government. We came to think of these as quite separate, peopled with quite different 

kinds of human beings, with different value systems and different sets of capabilities. To 

some extent, at least, we thought of these as worlds in conflict with each other. One was 

the world of the practical man of action, the other the world of the intellectual. One was 

a profit motivated world and the other a world motivated by a desire to teach and to learn. 

But as we look at the kind of problems facing us and accept the challenge of dealing 

forthrightly with these, [12] it becomes increasingly apparent that we need to learn how 

to work with or draw on each of these resources and learn how to meld them together and 

balance them in proper proportion. 

Certainly we have seen this at NASA where our successes can be traced to our learning how to relate our needs and resources to the needs and resources of these great 

segments of our society. We have labored hard to set up a partnership in which each contributes its capabilities to and receives its rewards from the effort to master and use the air 

and space environments. 

The first industrial revolution put to practical use the principle of standard or interchangeable parts. I suspect that the world we are making will be characterized by mobility, but also by interchangeability of people, by people who can transfer their work and 

talents from the university into industry or from industry into government, a mobility in 

any direction. The first name that comes to my mind is Robert Seamans, who was an 

associate professor in the Department of Aeronautical Engineering at MIT, and [13] 
EXPLOFUNG THE UNKNOWN 489 

moved from there into industry where he had a distinguished career from which he was 

drafted into government and is now the Deputy Administrator of NASA. There are many 

other examples, and the number of people who can move easily and comfortably from 

one of these spheres to another is increasing day by day. In dealing with the problems that 

you will be working on in the years ahead, you will be drawing more and more on people 

with this kind of talent. 

III. New Kinds of Organizations 

One thing that is becoming increasingly clear to students and practitioners of management is that the classic approaches to organization are inappropriate for dealing with 

the kind of problems we are talking about. 

The earliest attempts to increase the effectiveness of organizations followed the prevailing concepts of the division of labor. The work to be done was broken down into identifiable tasks or functions, and a specialist was put at the head of each major element. This 

had some obvious advantages, but it also had the disadvantage of dividing responsibility 

into pieces that really did not [14] correspond to the reality of everything required to get 

the total job done. Everyone had only partial responsibility so no one had the total responsi bility. 

This led to the idea of decentralization, which divided the organization into units, 

each of which had an identifiable task, for which the head of the unit could be held 

responsible. This proved to have some advantages, but it had the disadvantage of weakening the leadership contribution of those responsible for giving the entire organization 

its direction and its momentum. 

I believe we have learned that neither of these broad-brush concepts, nor any other 

rules of thumb, work for all organizations. They fail particularly to meet the needs and 

challenges we face. What we see going on today is the tailoring of new types of organizational structures and new kinds of assignments of authority and responsibility. We are 

hearing more and more about free-form management, which connotes the development 

of specific organizational approaches designed to serve a particular unit of a large complex organization. Return to earth is so important to each astronaut and to NASA that we 

tailor [ 151 to each his re-entry support or couch to give him maximum support at the time 

he needs it most. 

In modern management, we are seeing increasing use of organizational concepts like 

product management and project management in which the responsibility for the development and marketing of a product, or the completion of an important project are [sic] 

put in the hands of one individual who has all required elements of command over all of 

the resources he needs to get the job done. What characterizes these new kinds of 

organizational structures is that they cut across the traditional proverbs used to express 

concepts of authority and responsibility. They utilize, rather than accept as limits, the differences of function or discipline or the division of work into bits and pieces. At NASA, 

the concept of project management has been applied successfully to large and complex 

efforts in which one individual is responsible for integrating all of the capabilities and 

resources necessary to get the job done. Whenever possible, even while exercising very 

broad authority associated with his responsibility for performance, cost, and schedule, we 

leave him attached to [16] the laboratory or technical group within which his technical 

competence was demonstrated and where the forward thrust of current research keeps 

him uptodate. This also gives him easy access to colleagues who know how to wring out 

the facts needed for the difficult trade-off decisions. 

The kind of challenges that we in management are facing today do, therefore, call for 

new and experimental approaches to organization. One that I think worth commenting 
490 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

on in detail is the question of the chief executive function. In traditional organizational 

thinking, the structure of an organization peaked in the chief executive, who was positioned at the top of the organizational hierarchy. This concept goes back to some of the 

origins of modern organizational theory and practices, to the Catholic church, and to the 

Prussian military, which are the prototypes of much of modern organizational thinking. 

However, as organizations have become more complex and their challenges more interdisciplinary, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there is nothing sacred about the 

notion of a single chief executive. Accordingly, there has been an increasing tendency to 

experiment with the idea of the multiple executive, [17] usually in the form of the “office 

of the president” concept. I understand that a number of important companies, including Union Carbide, General Mills, Metropolitan Life Insurance, Boise Cascade, and others, have experimented with this pragmatic approach to the requirements of managing 

the kind of far-flung and diverse activities over which some form of executive authority is 

necessary. We saw this kind of need at the very beginning of NASA’s history. We evolved, 

therefore, a partnership arrangement which included Dr. Hugh Dryden, Dr. Robert 

Seamans, and myself. We all had many common ideas, and yet each brought to our work 

on the critical decisions affecting the nation’s space effort certain specialized experience. 

To do it any other way would have deprived the organization of critical inputs needed for 

important decisions. To do it any other way would have deprived us of the kind of mutual support and broadly-based leadership that I think we achieved. 

The point I want to make is that there is need for innovation and risk-taking as well 

as seasoned judgment in the structuring of organizations to face the challenges [18] of 

today. This is true in the business world. It is equally true in managing many of the other 

undertakings in our increasingly complex society. 

IV. New Approaches and New Techniques 

There are, then, no pat or ready-made organizational devices for structuring these 

efforts which will substitute for analysis and judgment. Neither are there approaches or 

techniques that can be taken off the shelf. We are in the midst of a period of innovation 

and experimentation in both, and there is the same need for creativity that there is in science and technology. 

I find this going on in many efforts at the kind of complex problem-solving and decision-making I am talking about. Some specific examples from NASA may be helpful. 

To begin with, every aspect of the aeronautical and space effort draws on many different disciplines and many different contractors and suppliers of services. Some of our 

sources are within NASA itself. Others are in other agencies, and still others in universities. Altogether we have over 20,000 prime, first, and second tier contractors [19] in industry, each of whom is making its contribution to the total effort. 

From the beginning of the Space Act, we realized that this effort could achieve its 

objectives only if each of the contributions to it fit into a carefully designed, fully integrated, totally engineered system. Each of the 200 or more major projects could achieve 

its objectives only if its elements similarly fit together into a desired whole. In this sense, 

the space effort represents what is probably the greatest experiment to date in the design, 

development, test, and use of large complex systems and subsystems. In this effort, we 

were concerned, of course, with the performance and cost of each element. We were also 

concerned that all could be delivered and used on a very short time-phased schedule. 

Ranger had to precede Surveyor, and Orbiter had to follow. Apollo needed the knowledge 

to be gained from each. We knew that the perfection of the parts would not guarantee the 

success of the effort. The interfaces among the elements were at least as important as the 

elements themselves, and to manage this kind of achievement we found little in the text- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 49 1 

books or in the case [20] histories. We did find men in our military services and in industry who had experience in the management of large projects such as Minuteman and 

Polaris. From the beginning we worked at developing new approaches and new techniques appropriate for the design and management of this kind of systems effort, in the 

open, without the protection of military security classification. One of the techniques we 

had to develop involved the gathering, processing, and dissemination of large amounts of 

information. We had to collect information on the state of each scientific and technical 

field in which we or our suppliers were working, and we had to make sure this information was used where appropriate. We had to establish techniques for collecting and 

distributing information on the state of each of our programs, so that everyone with 

responsibility or need-to-know could be kept informed. 

Sometimes the collection and processing of data had to meet some rather strenuous 

deadlines. For example, a few seconds after the launch of a manned vehicle, a decision 

had to be made to abort or to continue the flight. [21] Thus we became involved in developing techniques for real time information processing. 

Similarly, some of our projects involved many thousands of discrete activities, all of 

which had to be coordinated and controlled at a central point. We had to develop display 

techniques so that the progress of each of these elements could be displayed to teams of 

people working on different aspects of the same project, in a manner that made it possible for everyone to know where everyone stood at a particular moment in time. PERT in 

its original form was only a starting point to the development of the control technique we 

use at Houston and at Cape Kennedy. Again, we had to experiment and to innovate. It is 

gratifylng that the techniques we developed have already found application outside of the 

space effort. 

One of the principles underlying a number of our management techniques is the 

principle ofvisibility. We decided itwas important that as far as possible problems be identified in a manner visible to everyone involved and that the people responsible for solving 

these problems be [22] visibly identified to their colleagues. A number of management 

techniques we have developed serve the purpose of achieving this kind of visibility of 

information and responsibility. 

Similarly, we wanted to achieve an approach to management in which everyone with 

responsibility was aware that on any decision he could consult both colleagues and superiors without delay and without an involved system to assure a common basis for almost 

instantaneous identification of the important elements requiring attention. We had to 

build individual competence and confidence that work could go on with full knowledge 

of the individual that his superiors were literally “looking over his shoulder” at all times. 

We had to do this without discouraging initiative and innovation. In this kind of an effort, 

there was no room for protectiveness or self-consciousness. Accordingly, we developed a 

number of techniques to achieve this kind of real time “over the shoulder” supervision. 

[23] These are only a few of the management techniques we have developed. As a 

result of this period of experimentation and testing, there are now available a number of 

techniques of proven usefulness that may well have applicability to problems in other 

areas of our economy and our society, in our country and around the world. 

V. New Breeds of People 

What kind of people do we need to manage and to carry out this kind of effort? What 

qualities identify the individual with this kind of temperament and capability, and how do 

we go about developing such people to their full potential? Very little is known about this. 

It is all too new. The only thing we can be sure of is that they are different kinds of people than those that have succeeded in management in the past. One characteristic we have 
492 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

always depended on is that of a strong urge to compete and the urge to excel. In the kind 

of complex challenges we are talking about, it is rarely possible to attribute a solution or 

an achievement to one individual. In this kind of effort the boundaries between disciplines is all [24] but erased and the skills of individuals fuse with each other. It is all but 

impossible to identify who has contributed some key element to the final outcome. I suspect that it is in this area of identifying the new manager and developing him to his full 

potential that we have the most to learn and in which the greatest progress is yet to be 

made. This may well be the greatest challenge to those of you who are dedicated to the 

art of management. 

Document 111-7 

Document title: James E. Webb, Admiitrator, Memorandum for the Vice President, May 

23, 1961. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

A& delivering to President Kennedy a recommendation supporting an Americanpiloted lunar landingprop-am on May 8, 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson departed on a tour to reuiew the 

military and political situation in Southeast Asia. Given Johnson’s interest in the space program, 

NASA Administrator Webbpqared this memorandum for him upon his return. This memorandum 

is an excellent example of the broad context in which Webb was contemplating the mobilization that 

would be required to accomplish the Apollo program. The memorandum refers to Edward Welsh, the 

executive secretary of the National Air and Space Council, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and Glen Seaborg, the head of the Atomic Energy 

Commission. Webb also mentions Albert Thomas, a Democratic congressman fi-om the Houston area 

and chair of NASA’s Appropn’ations Subcommittee; George Brown, one of the principals in the 

Houston construction firm of Brown an4 Root; Jon Erik Jonsson, chairman of the board of Texas 

Instruments; Cecil Green, a Dallas business leader; Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, chair of the 

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; and a Charlie Jonas, Republican House memhfi-om North Carolina. 

May 23,1961 

Memorandum for the Vice President 

By way of a brief report, as you return to Washington, let me set down the following: 

1. The President has approved the program you submitted, with very few changes, 

and the message will go up on Wednesday. 

2. In working out this program and all of the details involved, there has been an 

absolutely splendid spirit of teamwork not only with Ed Welsh but with the Defense 

Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. 

3. Considerable interest has been expressed in this program by members of the 

Congress, following your consultations with them, and as I have followed up, I have 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 493 

impressed on them the need you have felt for action and the importance we have placed 

on the operating responsibilities to be carried by McNamara, Seaborg, and myself. 

Without exception, all have responded well to this, and many have pledged fullest cooperation and assistance. 

4. In preparing for the hearings on the original Kennedy submission before the 

House Appropriations Committee, and in other discussions with Congressman Thomas, 

Thomas made it very clear that he and George Brown were extremely interested in having Rice University make a real contribution to the effort, particularly in view of the fact 

that some research funds were now being spent at Rice, that the resources of Rice had 

increased substantially, and that some 3 00 [sic] acres of land had been set aside for Rice 

for an important research installation. On investigation, I find that we are going to have 

to establish some place where we can do the technology related to the Apollo program, 

and this should be on the water where the vehicle can ultimately be barged to the launching site. Therefore we have looked carefully at the situation at Rice, and at the possible 

locations near the Houston Ship Canal or other accessible waterways in that general area. 

George Brown has been extremely helpful in doing this. No commitments whatever have 

been made, but I believe it is going to be [of] great importance to develop the intellectual and other resources of the Southwest in connection with the new programs which the 

Government is undertaking. Texas offers an unusual opportunity at this time due to the 

fact that Dr. Lloyd Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board of the National 

Academy of Sciences, is establishing a Graduate Research Center in Dallas with the backing of Erik Jonsson, Cecil Green, and others in that area (estimated at about one hundred 

million dollars), and in view of the fact that Senator Kerr and those interested with him 

in the Arkansas, White, and Red River System have now pushed it to the point that it is 

opening up the whole area related to Arkansas, Oklahoma, and in many ways helping to 

provide a development potential for Mississippi. If it were possible to get a combination 

where the out-in-front theoretical research were done by Berkner and his group around 

Dallas in such [2] a way as to strengthen all the universities in the area, and if at the same 

time a strong engineering and technological center could be established near the water 

near Houston and perhaps in conjunction with Rice University, these two strong centers 

would provide a great impetus to the intellectual and industrial base of this whole region 

and would permit us to think of the country as having a complex in California running 

from San Francisco down through the new University of California installation at San 

Diego, another center around Chicago with the University of Chicago as a pivot, a strong 

Northeastern arrangement with Harvard, M.I.T., and like institutions participating, some 

work in the Southeast perhaps revolving around the research triangle in North Carolina 

(in which Charlie Jonas and the ranking minority member on Thomas’s Appropriations 

Subcommittee would have an interest), and with the Southwestern complex rounding out 

the situation. I am sure you know that the decisions relating to this must await the completion of the work on our program by the Congress, but I am convinced, and believe you 

should consider very carefully, that will attract the kind of strong support that will permit 

the President and you to move the program on through the Congress with minimum 

political in-fighting. I think this is important in the present situation and particularly to 

avoid the kind of end-runs that some of our friends related to the Pentagon, directly or 

industrially, have pursued in the past. 

5. To get clearly before the country the idea that this is a national effort, the appearance which will introduce the new program to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 

Space Sciences will be made by Gilpatric, Seaborg, and myself, all three sitting together at 
494 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

the witness table, and each of us presenting a brief statement to start the discussion. I 

believe this is the kind of image of unity and drive in the Executive Branch that you would 

like to see. 

6. In all of the work that has gone on while you have been doing such a great service in Southeast Asia, we have emphasized the important place you and the Space 

Council have occupied in pressing forward for the necessary decisions. In view of this you 

may wish to consider some form of statement or public expression in connection with the 

presentation of the program to the country and to the Congress. 

7. In order to discharge our obligation to give both the general public and the scientific community a report on the Shepard flight, we are having a session sponsored by 

NASA, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Academy of Sciences, in the 

State Department Auditorium on June 6th. All the people concerned with the program, 

and particularly those in the scientific and technological side, will be present, as will 

Commander Shepard. Secratary [sic] Connaly of the Navy is giving a lunch that day for 

Commander Shepard and Robert Gilruth, Director of the Space Task Group. Would you 

like to give a lunch or join with me in giving a lunch to the scientists and others on the 

program? Generally we have tried to avoid getting up any large lunch but could have a 

small one right in the [3] State Department for those actually on the program and perhaps one or two of the other leaders here that day. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 111-8 

Document title: James E. Webb, Admiitrator, NASA, Memorandum to NASA Program 

Offices, Headquarters; Directors, NASA Centers and Installations, July 5,1961. 

Source: Presidential Papers, Agency Records, John E Kennedy Library, Boston, 

Massachusetts. 

One justification for spending monqr on space is the benejt daived from “spinoffs”-knowledge or 

technology heloped for a specific space purpose that yields benefits in d$fment fields altogethex In 

this let4 Webb made an early effort to encourage NASA personnel to facilitate this process, not only 

to just@ space spending but on the grounds that it would hey the United States in its Cold War 

endeavor to outstrip the Soviet economy. 

r11 July 5, 1961 

Memorandum 

To: Program Offices, Headquarters 

Directors, NASA Centers and Installations 

One of the most important aspects of the space program is the possibility of the feedback of valuable, new technological ideas and know-how for use in the American economy. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 495 

Our economy is expected to grow to something over 700 billion dollars per year by 

1970. In the next ten years Dodge Reports estimates that something over 700 billion dollars will be spent for building all kinds of things-highways, bridges, houses, airplanes, 

trains, and so forth. It also estimates that some 360 billion dollars will be spent for maintenance and repairs in this period. This means that something over a trillion dollars will 

be spent in America to build or repair or maintain capital items. 

Under the above circumstances, any technological gains from our program, if rapidly inserted into the stream of the above activity, can yield great benefits. We must obtain 

this yield at the most rapid rate to stay ahead of the USSR economy, which is constantly 

seeking to gain from the technological ideas and know-how which are emerging from its 

military and space effort. Our problem is to get the feed-back into our normal stream of 

activity in a better manner than they are able to do. 

I will appreciate your sending me any ideas you or your staff have as to specific areas 

connected with our program where the feed-back can be accelerated or the method of 

obtaining the feed-back improved. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 111-9 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum for Dr. Dryden, Deputy 

Adminiitrator, “University Relationships,” August 4,1961. 

Source: Presidential Papers, Agency Records, John E Kennedy Library, Boston, 

Massachusetts. 

In assuming the leadership of NASA, a ke~ goal for James E. Webb was to foster space-miented academic institutions in each of the nation’s mujm geographic areas, with the ultimate goal of stimulating the general academic environment of each region. This plan, which would eventually be encompassed within the Sustaining University Program, broke new ground f’ the relationship between the 

federal government and universities. In this memorandum, Webb targets Rice University in Houston, 

Texas, as such a facility in the Southwest. A little over a month later; he recommended to President 

Kennedy that Houston be chosen as the site for the Manned Spacecraft Gmtq which became the 

Johnson Space Center in 1973, and thereby a focal point for the entire Apollo program. As identified 

in Document 111-7 above, Lloyd Berkner was the chair of the National Academy of Sciences’s Space 

Science Board. 

August 4,1961 

Memorandum for Dr. Dryden-AD 

Subject: University Relationships 

As I believe we agreed before you started on your vacation, the whole area of developing university relationships is of very vital importance to our future, particularly the 

development of some centers capable of greater efforts in the space science field. Of 

course we must supplement this with some work with universities who can generally raise 
496 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

the level of education in the basic sciences, and the great reservoir remaining in the country seems to be the Middle West and the Southwest. 

There are signs of stirrings in the Upper Middle West, around Minnesota, and some 

in the Central Middle West, around Kansas City and the general South Illinois-MissouriKansas area, and then quite a bit of stirring in the Southwest. 

Also, the Research Institute, based on the North Carolina University complex, is 

making some presentations as to the things they can do in the space program. And Lloyd 

Berkner has suggested some activities for the Graduate Research Center. 

In line with the above, I got a call yesterday from Hugh Odishaw, who says that the 

Provost of Rice University will be here on Tuesday of next week, and I am to meet the two 

of them for lunch at the National Academy of Sciences to talk over what Rice can contribute to the program. I believe we already have an active program there and have been 

told that the new president, Dr. Pitzer, is quite an outstanding man around which a real 

effort could be built. 

By copy of this memorandum, in the absence of Dr. Dryden, I would like to have such 

information about Rice as will be helpful in conducting the above conference and endeavoring to develop the most constructive lines of interest for the agency with Rice. 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 111-10 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President, 

California Institute of Technology, June 29,1961. 

Source: President's Science Advisory Committee Files, John E Kennedy Library, Boston, 

Massachusetts. 

As a master politician, NASA Administrator James E. Webb realized the need for a broad national 

consensus in support of the Apollo program. Recognizing that the university science community was 

likely to be nitical, Webb reached out to explain the program as he envisioned it. This letter is one 

example of his approach. William Pickering, whom Webb mentions, was the director of the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory at the Calijimia Institute of Technology. 

June 29, 1961 

Dr. Lee A. DuBridge 

President 

California Institute of Technology 

Pasadena, California 

Dear Lee: 

Last night the Senate passed the full requested authorization of $1,784,000,000 for 

our 1962 budget, which is the first formal endorsement of the program suggested by 

President Kennedy. I believe this means that we will get an approval of our program somewhat earlier than I had expected and with a broader base of acceptance throughout the 

country than seemed indicated even two or three weeks ago. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 497 

Even so, I know the ultimate commitment to the program will depend on the way we 

go at the job and the results we achieve. Therefore I have been wondering if it might not 

be helpful if some of the leaders of American science, such as yourself, might not like to 

have a rather complete briefing on exactly where we stand with respect to our planning. 

We did have a task force drawn from our ablest people all over the country who have put 

together a program that appears to be capable of accomplishment, and we are now considering alternatives to see whether we can better this plan. There are several areas where 

competition exists, such as between the liquid and solid approach. 

Would you feel it helpful to take the time, when you are next in Washington, for a 

quite complete briefing as to how we expect to carry out our entire ten-year program, 

including the lunar landing? I am taking the position that this program must be so complete and so useful that even if we never make the lunar landing, or do it after the Russians 

have done so, we still will have obtained outstanding value for the time and money invested. Your own judgement [sic] as to whether the program we have fits this requirement 

would be helpful. 

[2] Another possibility, which I have discussed with several, including Bill Pickering, 

is that of asking a group of outstanding scientists who have expressed concerns about the 

program to come in for a group briefing. In this way no one would be singled out, and we 

would not have present anyone except those who were explaining the program. We would 

not have those who are in favor of the program and who might want to argue on its behalf. 

The purpose of this would be to facilitate the understanding which we hope everyone concerned with the program will endeavor to achieve before they take their firm and final 

positions on it. 

As I told you by telephone when we first discussed this program, I certainly have no 

desire whatever to suggest that anyone who wishes to oppose the program soften his criticism. However, I do feel it quite important, under the conditions that exist in the world 

today, that the program be quite thoroughly understood before strong adverse positions 

are taken by our national leaders in any field. 

Sincerely yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 111-11 

Document title: Hugh L. Dryden, “The Role of the University in Meeting National Goals 

in Space Exploration,” NASA and the Universities: Aineipal Addresses at the Geneml Sessions 

of the NASA-UniversiQ Gn#mce on the Science and Technology of Space Exploration in Chimp, 

ZUinok, November 2, 2962 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1962), pp. 87-91. 

NASA Deputy Administrator Dryden gave this presentation at a NASA-university confkrence in 

1962. This meeting, which was patterned after the NASA-industry confmence of 1960, was the first 

meeting in which NASA attempted to convqr to the academic world the role envisioned for universities in the Apollo program. This represented the p‘ncipal address at the general sessions of the conference and pronounced formal NASA policy on the issue. As such, it was especially important as a 

statement of government position on the interactions of various scientific and technical organizations 

in conducting space exploration. 
498 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

The Role of the University in Meeting 

National Goals in Space Exploration 

[87] The last half century has brought forth a succession of new technologies, sparked by 

advances in scientific knowledge but brought to maturity by the interaction of scientists 

and engineers in an environment of national needs for national defense or social and 

economic development. I need only mention the technologies of aeronautics, communications, radar, nuclear energy, and, now, space. These scientific and technological developments have affected our individual lives as citizens and as professional men and women, 

and our social institutions, including universities, industry, and other segments of the 

Nation, as well as government itself. Our international relations, our social and economic development, our military strength-all have been profoundly modified by the powerful forces of science and technology. 

It is my purpose to discuss the role of the university in our present-day environment, 

specifically its responsibilities in space exploration, the responsibilities of NASA, and our 

joint responsibility for promoting the national welfare. 

What is the role of the university today? 

There is, I think, general agreement that the university's primary objectives are the 

education and guidance of students and the promotion of scholarly and scientific inquiry. 

The ideal university is a community of scholars engaged in research and teaching. In particular, graduate education at its best rests on research, the students learning as apprentices to teachers engaged in advancing knowledge in their professional field. 

Yet to state these principles is not to provide a sufficient basis for determining the role 

of a university. Better than I, college officials and faculty members know that this statement of principles merely indicates where the university's ultimate identity and integrity 

lie; it does not indicate how this state of affairs is to be achieved in the modern world. 

So many at least superficially contradictory demands must be met: the requirements 

of teaching our swollen enrollments~as opposed to those of research; the desire of the 

individual scholar to wend his solitary way as opposed to the rising tide of programmatic 

and team work; the necessity, from an institutional point of view, for drawing a balance 

between scholarly withdrawal-from which perspective may be gained-and an involvement with ongoing life that provides both intellectual stimulation and humane feelings. 

The truth is, of course, that in the modern world the university must-for its own survival, and I think for the survival of all that we hold dear-face both inward and outward; 

it must somehow contain the contradictory forces that threaten to tear our world apart. 

Because of this, university administration and faculty members bear one of the most difficult burdens of our time. We in NASA-sharing many of the same problems-are aware 

of this fact; and our aim is to remain aware of it in all of our activities. 

In a Commemoration Day Address at the Johns Hopkins University on February 22, 

1936, Isaiah Bowman presents this picture of a university which is, I think, equally applicable today: 

A university is like a state in the variety of the forces that determine its lije: clash of divergent 

opinion, power to inspire ma with exalted purpose, association of distinctive personalities, ordered 

procedure in a self-governing system, financial pm'ls, and men treasury crises. A citizen in a university-state is not a recluse [88] trending daily a well-worn path of routine. True, he may deal OM 

day with quitepetty details of courses and clusses; but the next day finds him standing, as it were, on 

the rim of the universe, analyzing the spectrum of a beam of starlight that I.Jt its remoh source two 

hundred million years befm-e the treedwelling precursors of man passed theirjrst anxious nights on 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 499 

the ground. The range of the university's interest extendsj?om microscope to telescope, from a student's 

minutepersonalpoblem to the nature and impact of social form that are rocking the world. 

I suggest that the exploration of space is a social force which is rocking the world. I 

feel no hesitation whatever in saying that the university cannot ignore this force, that it 

has an inherent responsibility entirely apart from any thought of governmental support 

to contribute to this major task. Like the small nations of the world which many never 

launch a satellite, but which must find ways of participation in space exploration, the 

smallest university must contribute some of its intellectual resources and active interest. 

Again quoting from Bowman: 

To keep research in pure science in the University actively related to social needs and national 

strength is a duty which cannot be evaded. Pasteur's dream of a p'vate research institute was interrupted again and again by waking realities. There was a national need for knowledge abwt the silkwarm disease and for an understanding of the fermentation problem. His flaming sense of social 

responsibility was the source of energy and inspiration in his attack upon nationalpoblems. As men 

of pivileged education we are not being trained and equipped for isolated and protected living, playboys in the land of dream. 

Our educational institutions bear a major responsibility for the success of our national effort to explore space. Our universities and colleges are called upon to produce a body 

of scientists and engineers of unexcelled competence. Some of these graduates will enter 

governmental service with NASA and other agencies participating in the space program: 

some will join private research organizations and industrial corporations; but some must 

remain at the universities where they continue to advance knowledge and produce new 

talent. This last function, as previously mentioned, should receive high priority. The government laboratory, industry, the research foundation, all are users of creative and talented men without reproducing this vital national resource. The university alone is the 

producer of new engineers and scientists. 

The university is not only a center for the development of men with eager, trained, 

self-starting minds but also a center of creative activity in research. The Summer-Study 

Committee on NASA/University Relationships of the Space Science Board of the National 

Academy of Sciences points out that: 

. . . the opportunities for developing new fundamental knowledge and technical applications may 

very well equal or exceed those which have existed in the atomic and nuclearphysicsfields during the 

past thirty years. . . . A vigorous academic program in all appropriate aspects of the space endeavor 

must be developed. Such a program must enjoy a visible relationship to that of the federal establishment itseg but it is of utmost importance that it preserve the essential virtues of universities+ devotion to scholarly and scientific inquiry, a pnmdry concern for the guidance and eduction of students, 

full freedom of discussion and publication, and essential autonomy in the formulation of research 

objectives and of program of wark directed toward such objectives. 

Other aspects of the independent role of the university in the environment of a 

national program of space exploration will be discussed subsequently. Consider now 

NASA's specific needs for assistance from the university community. The NASA program 

comprises four main areas-space sciences, manned space flight, applications of earth 

satellites to communications and meteorology, and advanced research and technology. 

What help do we expect to get from the university in each of these areas? 
500 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

The term “space sciences” is a shorthand expression to describe investigations in any 

field of science carried out by apparatus carried into space by sounding rockets, earth 

satellites, and lunar, planetary, or interplanetary probes. Sometimes the term is extended 

in meaning to include laboratory or earth-based observations related to the flight experiments. The fields of science included are, in the main, astronomy and solar physics; 

geophysics, including aeronomy, ionosphere physics and energetic particles and fields; 

interplanetary investigations; lunar and planetary investigations; and biosciences. 

The NASA program in space sciences is being built on the participation by the competent scientific community. It is freely recognized that the U.S. would have no space science program worth talking about if at least some of the [89] most competent scientists 

of the Nation were not deeply involved in it. The importance of the creative activity of the 

individual working scientist in the program is paramount. It is necessary to make use of 

scientific competence wherever that competence may be found. Although there is significant participation by scientists within NASA, scientists in other government agencies, in 

the industrial community, and the international scientific community, the major element 

in the participating scientific community is the university community of the U.S. 

The university scientist who participates in satellite and space-probe experiments 

finds an environment different from that to which he has become accustomed. 

Traditionally, a scientist conceives an experiment, builds the apparatus himself or has it 

built under his supervision in the university shop or by contract, carries out his experiment, analyzes the data, and publishes his results. This relatively simple procedure is not 

possible in satellite and space-probe experiments, although a fair approximation to it is 

feasible for experiments with small sounding rockets. Satellite launching requires large 

rockets, special launch sites, a worldwide tracking and data-acquisition network, sharing 

by many experimenters in a single flight, and a large team of cooperating specialists. The 

scientist becomes involved in scheduling his work to meet a flight date, once that date is 

set. His apparatus must be engineered to meet severe environmental requirements of 

vibration, temperature, exposure to radiation and charged particles, and so forth. Some 

universities are able to provide this service; others must depend on industrial help. Thus, 

the role of the university scientist often reduces to concept of the experiment, development of laboratory prototypes of the equipment, analysis of the data and publication, plus 

participation in a large team to design the actual satellite, launch it, and receive the data. 

NASA policy is to support the tradition of responsibility and freedom of the experimenter 

to the maximum extent consistent with the nature of the operation. Selection of experiments to be flown is made by a Space Sciences Steering Committee composed of scientists 

and engineers in NASA Headquarters who are not contenders for payload space and who 

have the advice and guidance of outside consultants. 

In the space sciences area, NASA supports by grants the development of scientific and 

technical information in areas broadly related to space science as well as specific project 

tasks. Examples of current specific tasks are: develop, construct, and test four magnetometer instruments suitable for use on a satellite to determine the magnitude and direction of the earth’s magnetic field and analyze telemetered data from the instrument; 

design, construct, and test a Cerenkov counter and associated circuitry to measure the 

energy spectrum of high energy gamma rays; test and calibrate the equipment by synchrotron or balloon techniques; and assemble instrument packages suitable for use in 

satellites. Examples of broader tasks in areas related to space science are: research in solar 

and cosmic-ray physics; theoretical research on low-energy electronic, ionic, and atomic 

impact phenomena; and the magnetohydrostatics of the magnetosphere of the earth and 

problems in theory of orbits of space vehicles. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 501 

In the field of advanced research and technology not directly connected with the 

flight program of sounding rockets, satellites, and space probes, NASA is interested in and 

supports a wide range of research activities from basic research to technological applications, from theoretical investigations to laboratory experiments. Some are related to problems of immediate operational concern; others endeavor to extend the present limits of 

knowledge and broaden the research capabilities available for such extension. Our quarterly program report for July 1, 1962, shows about 450 active grants and research contracts. A few of these are related to the manned space flight and the applications program 

of NASA but the majority are in the fields of advanced research and technology and space 

sciences. 

Although NASA does place demands for direct assistance on the universities, we consider that we have an obligation to conduct the space program in such a way as to help 

strengthen the university. We wish to work within the existing university structure rather 

than to set [go] up independent contract-operated activities that tend to draw the university research scientist or engineer away from the teaching of students in the course of 

the research he performs and directs. We seek to share in a joint responsibility to add to 

our national strength. It is clear that NASA cannot meet all the desires or even needs of 

the universities or mount a program of general support to education. We have neither the 

responsibility nor the resources to do this. But like the logger who has a responsibility of 

replacing for the future the trees which he harvests, NASA, as a user of university trained 

talent, has an obligation to carry a fair share of the load of replacing the resources consumed. The universities must bear their share of responsibility for the success of the space 

program, as previously discussed, and must allocate an appropriate fraction of their own 

material and human resources to the effort. But NASA stands ready to invest substantial 

resources in partnership with the university. 

Thus, in addition to direct project support, NASA initiated in fiscal year 1962, a program of enlarged scope for utilizing more fully the abilities of our universities. The program is frankly NASA-oriented but planned in such a manner to recognize the acute 

needs of the university as well. In brief, to meet the space program needs, we are proceeding to strengthen university participation in four ways: (1) to utilize university 

resources for specific research projects under grant or contract as appropriate; (2) to 

encourage the establishment of interdisciplinary groups for research in broad areas to be 

supported by grants; (3) to support the training of people in the field of space science and 

technology through grants; and (4) in certain cases to provide research facilities. 

The first method is the traditional support of projects; the other three are new so far 

as NASA is concerned. The broad grants are intended to encourage the establishment of 

creative multidisciplinary investigations, the development of new capabilities, and the 

consolidation of closely related activities. As will be discussed subsequently, multidisciplinary is here intended to include not only cooperative effort among branches of the physical sciences but also between physical and biological sciences and with some participation 

from the social sciences, all as appropriate to the selected broad areas in which a given 

university possesses high competence. 

The third method comprises research training grants to increase the supply of scientists and engineers in space-related science and technology. It has been estimated that by 

1970 as many as one-fourth of the Nation’s trained scientific and engineering manpower 

will be engaged in space activities, although I cannot confirm the accuracy of this estimate. For planning purposes only, we have suggested as a goal the support of about 4,000 

graduate students per year in 150 qualified universities, to yield an annual output of about 

1,000 new Ph.D.’s in space-related fields. In selecting universities, we consider such factors 

as accreditation ratings, resources, previous and current efforts in developing research 
502 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

activity in the space sciences, location and extent to which the region already is provided 

with advanced training opportunities, and so forth. 

The fourth method is the provision of grants for facilities in certain cases. 

Consideration is given to the urgency of the need, the nature and extent of the university’s involvement in space-related research, the relative importance of the research to the 

national space program, the demonstrated competence, past achievements, and potential 

future accomplishments of the research groups, and similar factors. In general, we 

attempt to consider a total university situation and use an appropriate mix of the several 

methods for the specific circumstances, subject of course to the total resources available 

for the program. 

In FY 1962 the commitments for the support of project research at universities were 

of the order of $28 million and the estimate for FY 1963 indicates an increase to about $55 

million. A few interdisciplinary grants date back to FY 1961. In FY 1962 eleven such grants 

were made, amounting to a total of about $3 1/2 million. Training grants were made to 

ten institutions amounting to a total of about $2 million, and facilities grants to five institutions amounting to $6 1/2 million, all of which have existing interdisciplinary activities. 

This total [91] of $12 million for the last three categories will be increased to about $30 

million in FY 1963. The many proposals on hand are under evaluation at the present time. 

We recognize that a larger effort needs to be made and hope to move toward the desirable goals in succeeding years. 

In recognizing the separate responsibilities and specialized interests of the universities and NASA and their interrelationships, we cannot forget other parties at interest in 

the spaceexploration program. The major fraction of the effort, as measured by dollar 

value or manpower, is conducted under contract by private industry. There are many 

aspects of university-industry and NASA-industry relations which lie outside the province 

of the present discussion. Here we note only that NASA, the universities, and the aerospace industries have a collective responsibility for the conduct of the space program. 

The collective responsibility goes far beyond that for the success of the technical 

aspects of the program, if the greatest benefit to the nation is to be realized. We have previously discussed at some length the conduct of the program in such a manner as to 

strengthen the universities as an element of national strength. Similar conditions apply to 

the aerospace industry, but our obligations extended further to every aspect of our social, 

economic, and political life. 

Space research and development, like the predecessor fields of rapid scientific and 

technical advance at the frontiers of knowledge-aeronautics, electronics, and nuclear 

research and development-produce corollary benefits in the form of new knowledge, 

new products, new methods, and new materials which can be employed in the develop 

ment and manufacture of countless articles for human use. In the past the transfer 

process proceeded in a laissez-faire manner at a relatively slow pace. We believe that it is 

incumbent on all of us to try to accelerate this process. We have suggested that universities participate in promoting wider use of the information obtained by associating members of the faculties in economics, business administration, and political science in the 

activities of the interdisciplinary groups. 

It is our feeling that the universities should go still further to assert leadership in 

attacking the totality of problems affecting the welfare of man within their sphere of influence, whether this be a community, a region, or the entire nation. Abraham Horwitz, in 

discussing ‘The Changing Scene in Latin American Medical Education” in the Journal of 

Medical Education for April 1962, made some observations which, in the following paraphrased form, are applicable to the current situation in the United States: There is a new 

spirit abroad in the U.S. today, a spirit imbued with the determination to create more 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 503 

wealth, to distribute it more equitably, and to promote the well-being of man. The focal 

point of this signal endeavor should, we believe, be the universities for the primary need 

is for experts to put to work the capital that will be invested in systematic programs. 

Equally pressing is the need for a deep and searching examination of the problems that 

beset us and the establishment of the procedures for their solution. A debate of this kind 

can best be carried on in the university, which is wedded to the free examination of all 

problems affecting the life of man in society, and where culture, in the sense of perfection 

of man, has its wellspring. . . . In summary, all of us who participate in the conduct of the spaceexploration prob 

lem should endeavor to discharge our task in the light of these broader considerations of 

human welfare. The university has a unique opportunity, not only to perform basic 

research and train new talent in new areas of science and technology and to carry a large 

share in the scientific aspects of the space flight programs, but also to provide leadership 

in the wide discussion and practical solution of the broader aspects of extracting from our 

space effort the greatest possible contributions to human welfare within its sphere of influence. For its part NASA is attempting to give due consideration to its responsibility in 

these major questions of the social impact of the space program. 

Document 111-12 

Document title: Edgar M. Cortright, Memorandum for Mr. Webb, “NASA-ClT/JPL 

Relations as they pertain to the present contractual arrangements of operating conditions 

and the future role of JPL in the NASA Program,” June 1964. 

Document 111-13 

Document title: Arnold 0. Beckman, Chairman, Board of Trustees, California Institute of 

Technology, to James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, June 26,1964. 

Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

One of the persistent challenges faced by NASA managers in the agency’s earliest years was the relationship with the Califbnia Institute of Technology ’s (Caltech, or Cm, as stated in Document ZII-12) 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. JPL had been established during World 

War II as a contractor facility developing rockets and other tzchnologies for the US. Amy. Since the 

wa?; it had expanded its capabilities, and by the tim of NASA’s establishment in 1958, JPL was a 

major location not only for the development of rocket technology but also space science. Because of this, 

NASA leaders secured the transfer ofJPL born the Army and reemphasized in the late 1950s aJPL 

$fort already un& way-Project Rangq an $fort to send satellites to the Moon. Following the failure of the Ranger 6 spacecraji in January 1964, NASA Administrator James E. Webb pressed Arnold 

0. Beckman, chair of the Caltech Board of Trustees, to alter the methodologies of management atJPL. 

These two documents describe this situation and propose changes. Thqr successfully set in motion a 

number of activities that affected the relationship for more than a decade thereajim Edgar Cortright 

was NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Appl‘ acations. 
504 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-12 

t11 Memorandum for Mr. Webb 

Subject: NASA-CIT/JPL Relations as they pertain to the present contractual arrangements of operating conditions and the future role of JPL in the NASA Program. 

Although this memorandum is designed as a position paper it is necessary to review 

certain aspects of the history in working with Cal Tech and JPL. 

I. History 

A. Contract Provisions 

The initial NASA contract placed in late 1959 with CIT for the operation and management of JPL was quite broad and free from constraint and provided for minimum 

control over the activities of the Lab. The current contract, executed in December 1961, 

reflects the experience gained in the two preceding years, of dealingwithJPL, but still permits JPL considerable latitude for independent operation. This operating latitude results 

primarily from the necessity of mutual agreement between NASA and CIT/JPL on substantive changes in program or administration. During negotiation of the current contract, NASA officials suggested a change in the requirement for mutuality in certain 

aspects of JPL operation. However, this change was not successfully negotiated. 

[2] B. JPLAssignments 

Since the beginning of our working relationship with JPL, the Laboratory has been 

assigned functions in the areas of flight projects, deep space instrumentation, and supporting research and technology. Among the flight projects, the assignments have included Ranger (Blocks 1,2,3,4, and 5), Mariners (A, R, C and B), Surveyor, Surveyor Orbiter 

(study phase), Voyager (study phase), and Prospector (study phase-cancelled) . In addition, the launch vehicle, Vega, was assigned to JPL and subsequently cancelled. JPL has 

carried out the buildup of the deep space instrumentation facility on a worldwide basis. It 

has carried out research in fluid mechanics, structures, propulsion, electronics, telemetry 

guidance and control, and other areas, many of which were not covered at other NASA 

Centers. JPL has, through a master planning board initiated by NASA, undertaken to 

expand and upgrade the existing laboratory facilities for the Government. 

C. JPL Organization 

The JPL organization was originally structured as a research laboratory in propulsion 

fuels, materials, etc., and subsequently assigned one large project, e.g., Corporal, then 

Sergeant. This meant that research people were intermixed with project people; the laboratory was strictly a matrix organization and a loose one at that. With the assignment of 

multiple projects, JPL began a series of reorganizations. [3] Basically, they created a 

Systems Division to do systems engineering for all of the projects, and two program 

offices-the Lunar Program Office, and the Planetary Program Office. These program 

offices, the Systems Division, and all of the other laboratory divisions reported to the 

Director’s office. The Program Offices contained the project managers with small staffs. 

To assist in the management of this matrix, Dr. Pickering UPL Director] hired a Deputy 

Director (Brian Sparks). This early configuration has recently been modified to combine 

the two program offices into a single program office; to strengthen the coordination 

among projects, deep space instrumentation facility, research and development, and business administration; and to strengthen the reliability and quality assurance effort. 

Although the laboratory was not projectized, all employees working for the projects have 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 505 

been identified and fixed to a project. In brief then, the laboratory has moved in the 

direction of strengthening its project management and correcting its faults after they have 

become apparent to the laboratory. They still retain a matrix organization with many 

important individuals reporting to Pickering and Sparks directly and with project offices 

which are marginal in strength and quite dependent on strong front office leadership to 

insure a smoothly functioning total laboratory team. 

[4] II. NASA Direction 

Initially, NASA direction to JPL was almost exclusively from the Office of Space Flight 

Programs. With the advent of the NASA matrix organization JPL receives direction from 

many offices in Headquarters, e.g., OSS, OART, T&DA, Office of Programs, Procurement 

and Contracting, and the Office of Administration. The quality and depth of direction 

have varied from situation to situation and many have been inadequate to the situation 

existing within JPL on several occasions. The rapid growth of the laboratory of 2400 to 

4000 has certainly contributed to developing problem areas. The rescheduling of projects 

necessitated by the Vega cancellation and the Centaur slippage have been serious perturbations. The overloading of the laboratory by NASA Headquarters and its own management had caused problems which might have been avoided if we had used better 

judgement [sic]. Lastly, the changing interface between JPL and NASA has caused 

communications problems and misunderstanding with regard to direction functions and 

authority. 

111. Strength of CIT/JPL Performance 

From the positive point of view, JPL represents a collection of highly imaginative and 

skilled engineers and technicians. This scientific and engineering team has been attracted to JPL, at least partially, because of the outstanding technical reputation of CIT. [5] 

They have shown considerable flexibility and have been able to roll with the number of 

reprogramming punches which have been forced upon them by circumstances. They have 

shown a keen interest in the space program and, despite frequent internal wranglings, 

they have never carried their arguments with NASA to the public. The working relationships have grown steadily better and excellent communications links exist among individuals in certain areas. The Project performance has generally been spotty, having varied 

from outstanding on Mariner to poor on Ranger. Similarly, the quality of business performance has varied ranging from excellent on source evaluation procedures used on 

Surveyor to inadequate administration of the resulting contract. 

W. Weaknesses of CIT/JF’L Performance 

In general, the performance of Cal Tech and JPL can be summarized as follows: Cal 

Tech has provided almost no visible leadership to JPL and has generally proven to be a 

poor communication link between NASA policy makers and JPL policy makers, e.g., at the 

DuBridge-Pickering level. Also lacking is action by the CIT Board of Trustees to clearly 

define the Institute’s responsibility in the management of JPL, and to assign specific 

responsibility to designated positions or individuals. The CIT/JPL top leadership has 

been weak in terms of attention to substantive program issues in the [6] laboratory and 

in terms of responsiveness to official NASA guidance and direction. At times, the leadership has almost obstructionist. This has primarily been the case when NASA suggestions 

have been made with a view to improving laboratory management. The top management 

has consistently taken the attitude that the management of their laboratory is their business, and that unless the the contract terms specifically cover items discussed they have no 

interest in our compulsion to perform functions or take actions demanded by NASA man- 
506 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

agements [sic]. The most serious concern on the part of those of us doing business with 

the laboratory, however, has been the lack of involvement of the top management in direction of the day-today operations. The organization is structured so that it requires such 

involvement yet little or no evidence of such management direction is apparent. The 

members of the team operate much of the time with no apparent leadership. Many of the 

problems which JPL is now struggling to solve might have been avoided or at least recognized earlier had JPL management been more involved in the day-today execution of the 

major laboratory assignments or had they worked with NASA to correct those weaknesses 

detected and pointed up. One might say that it took the Ranger situation to make JPL face 

up to its many problems. I might add that NASA is having to face up to a few of its own by 

the same token. 

[7] V. Actions That Can Be Taken Prior to Contract Renewal 

Some of the things that can be done under the present arrangement for operation of 

JPL are: 

1. The CIT Board of Trustees should, by formal action, define the responsibility of CIT for direction of JPL. 

2. CIT should designate a top University official to whom NASA can direct its 

requests for corrective actions. This official should have clearly assigned authority to effect 

changes in all areas (management, technical, and business administration). In this regard, 

it may be desirable for NASA to offer to present its views to the CIT Board of Trustees. 

3. An understanding should be reached whereby CIT/JPL will be responsive to 

NASA suggested changes in management and organization. For example, there is still a 

need for a strong General Manager at the Laboratory. 

4. The ‘Task Order” problem should be resolved. The contract provides for separate task orders covering major NASA projects and these have not yet been negotiated. 

5. The business management practices at JPL should be made compatible with 

NASA policies and practices. Examples of areas where business management practices can 

be improved are: 

[81 

a. Procurement policies and procedures 

b. Budget programming, financial management, and reporting systems 

c. Management of facilities property and supply 

d. Travel and other fringe benefit policies 

VI. Alternatives for Consideration Before Present Contract Expires 

Since the present contract expires December 31, 1964, it is not too early to think 

about the relationship of NASA-CIT/JPL after that date. 

Several alternative arrangements are possible. 

A. The contract could be allowed to expire and the Government owned Laboratory 

could be operated by civil servants. 

Advantages 

1. True center of NASA would operate under same NASA policies and regulations as other NASA Centers. 

2. Problem of salary differential for similar work would disappear. 

3. One echelon of management would be eliminated, Le., CIT. 

Disadvantages 

1. Loss of effort and drive for some period while change takes place (612 

months) Projects disrupted. 

2. Loss of hardcore of key personnel-would probably move to industry. 

3. NASA recruitment problem to be faced. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 507 

[9] 4. NASA public image problem. 

a. Cal-Tech 

b. Scientific community-industry 

c. Congressional 

5. Loss of flexibility laboratory enjoys as contractor operated, e.g., not bound by 

all Government rules and regulations. 

B. A non-profit corporation could be substituted for CIT/JPL management. 

Advantages 

1. Single purpose of Board of Directors. Minimizes possibilities of conflict of 

interest situations. Only serve one customer, NASA. 

2. Provide NASA ability to have direct influence on management selected or 

replaced. 

3. Provide flexibility of wage and fringe benefit allowances-not tied to campus 

scale or limitations. 

Disadvantages 

1. Project disruption while changes take place. 

2. NASA public image problem. 

3. Higher cost operation. 

4. Magnification of differences between the Lab and other NASA Centers. 

C. An industrial contractor could be selected to operate the Laboratory for the 

Government. 

[lo] Advantages 

1. Initial selectivity from range of industrial capabilities. 

2. Flexibility of industry management policies and practices. 

3. Responsiveness to changes in direction or level of effort. 

Disadvantages 

1. Project disruption while changes take place. 

2. NASA public image problem. 

3. High cost operation. 

4. Loss of relationship of Lab to other NASA Centers. 

5. Possible conflict of interest situations. 

6. Loss of active and direct control. 

D. A form of the present contract with CIT/JPL could be continued if the following 

improvements can be worked out. 

1. Clearly defined management responsibilities and accountability for CIT and 

JPL. 

2. Clearly defined communication links between CIT:JPL-NASA Managements. 

3. Acceptance of NASA contractor relationship by CIT/JPL. 

4. JPL responsiveness to NASA direction and control. 

Advantages 

a. No major disruption to programs and projects. 

b. No major loss of hardcore key personnel. 

c. No public image problem. 

d. No loss of flexibility of operating outside Government rules and regulations. 

Disadvantages 

a. Continued status of “almost NASA Center” concept. 

b. Continued problem of campus-off campus status. 

c. Management layer between lab and NASA-CIT. 

d. Conflight [sic] of interest situations. 
508 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

W. Summary 

These observations on JPL and Cal Tech do not begin to tell the whole story, either 

good or bad. However, I think they can provide background for a position which is rather 

firm toward CIT in terms of demanding stronger management of the laboratory. In being 

fair, however, I think we can be responsible in terms of time required to implement some 

of the more radical changes we have suggested, such as hiring a general manager to supplement Pickering and Sparks or breaking up the Systems Division to strengthen the project offices. In reviewing our own judgements [sic], it might help to point out that these 

opinions of the laboratory are held rather widely throughout industry and among many 

of the JPL staff. The staff itself, I believe, hopes for continued NASA pressure which will 

result in stronger management by evolution rather then revolution. I consider it desirable 

that JPL continue in its past role of performing much the same function as a NASA 

center. The laboratory will be of most use to NASA if we can truly develop [ 121 the working relationships to make this possible. 

Edgar M. Cortright 

Document 111-13 

June 26,1964 

Mr. James E. Webb 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Webb 

About three months ago, at a meeting in your office, we discussed the NASA-JPLCaltech relations. This meeting was the first opportunity since I assumed the chairmanship of the Caltech Board of Trustees to hear directly from you and members of your staff 

about a number of problems related to JPL. I promised then to do everything possible to 

assist in eliminating the causes of past complaints, improve management operations atJPL 

in the light of suggestions made by your staff and others and attempt to find new ways in 

which NASA and Caltech could be mutually helpful in expanding fundamental research 

in space. Substantial progress has been made, I believe, and I thought you would be interested in hearing about it. In the following pages and attached appendices I have outlined 

briefly some of the highlights in the areas of management, technical coordination, and 

Caltech-JPL research activities. 

Management 

Prior to January 1,1964 Price-Waterhouse management advisory services department 

had been retained to study the organizational structure of JPL. At my request, the 

McMurry Company was called in to evaluate the top dozen or more administrators at JPL, 

and to make an independent study of the organization. This work, performed personally 

by Dr. McMurry, has been completed. 

One of Dr. McMurry’s principal recommendations was the procurement of a new 

Deputy Director at JPL. A detailed job description was prepared and two leading executive recruiting firms were retained to find suitable candidates. Many candidates were 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 509 

screened, including persons recommended by Mr. Hilburn and others in NASA. We were 

very fortunate, we believe, in being able to secure General A. R. Luedecke, currently 

General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. I believe that General Luedecke is 

an extraordinarily fortunate choice. His experience in handling large operations in the 

Air Force and the AEC has given him an excellent background in governmental procedures and requirements. In addition to his demonstrated high level of competence, the 

fact that the AEC carries much, if not all, of its research and development through university-type contracts has given the General very valuable experience which especially 

qualifies him for the NASA-JPL-Caltech operation. 

[2] Dr. McMurry’s report recommends that certain organizational changes be made 

at JPL. He recommends, however, that these changes be made after a new Deputy Director 

has assumed his duties. In the meantime, several changes have already been made which 

should improve management. 

In December of 1963, the Lunar and Planetary Projects at JPL were consolidated 

under Mr. R. J. Parks, who [was] appointed Assistant Laboratory Director for Lunar and 

Planetary Projects. 

In February 1963 the Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory formed an Executive 

Council consisting of the Deputy Director, Assistant Laboratory Directors, and the Special 

Assistant for Advanced Technical Studies. This group will advise the Director on all major 

policy matters, develop long-range plans, and to recommend preferable courses of action 

relative to major Laboratory questions and problems. 

JPL management has consolidated all quality assurance and reliability activities into 

one office, reporting directly to the Director/Deputy Director of the Laboratory. The 

chief of this office, Mr. Brooks Morris, has been delegated the responsibility for all quality assurance and reliability activities related to JPL projects and to evaluate the probable 

reliability of the designs and plans for Laboratory missions. 

A Management Information Office has [been] established in March 1963 to provide 

accurate and timely information to JPL top management, and to the appropriate elements 

within NASA Headquarters. 

As suggested by certain people in NASA Headquarters, the Laboratory had taken a 

very close, hard look at the advisability of modifying the matrix organization in favor of a 

strict project structure. The results of this review has been a high degree of projectizing 

within the technical divisions. The majority of the professional staff, working on the flight 

projects, have been assigned full time and their efforts restricted to specific projects. The 

management of JPL is continuing to move in this direction in the establishment of new 

projects, as well as in the strengthening of existing projects. 

The Financial Management Division has been transferred. The manager of that 

division now reports to the Deputy Director, giving that office increased stature and 

authority in keeping with the Laboratory’s growth, and the increased emphasis on fiscal 

and contractual activities. 

The Procurement Division has been transferred. It now reports directly to the Deputy 

Director in order to provide more complete integration of the technical and managerial 

problems associated with the increasingly large procurement actions entered into by the 

Laboratory in carrying out NASA’s projects. 

The Technical Studies Office, headed by Dr. Homer J. Stewart, has been established 

to direct, coordinate and to originate all JPL advanced mission studies for the unmanned 

lunar and planetary exploration. 

[3] To accommodate the increasing number of outside projects utilizing the DSIF 

and the JPL SFOF, an Assistant Laboratory Director has been appointed to head the Deep 

Space Network activities at JPL. Dr. Rechtin, who is in charge of this office, is responsible 
510 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNNERSITY NEXUS 

for coordinating all Laboratory actions relative to the DSIF, SFOF and the JPL technical 

divisions in order to assure that project requirements are understood and met. 

In January of this year, the Facilities Office was reorganized and given responsibility 

for developing the implementing [of] a technical and supporting facilities program that 

will provide those facilities required for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks and for 

coordinating and integrating the inputs from the JPL technical divisions and other 

sources into a single approved long-range master facilities plan. 

The Laboratory has engaged the services of the Harbridge House organization to 

make additional detailed studies of the procurement process, and to recommend procedures and policies to be adopted by JPL in this area. 

Internal audit groups reporting to CIT and to the top management of the Laboratory 

are being established to review and ascertain the degree to which Laboratory policies and 

procedures are being complied with in order to adequately inform management of need 

for corrective actions. 

In addition to the organizational changes delineated above, which are aimed at 

strengthening the decision-making processes by which JPL conducts its affairs, the management of the Laboratory has requested a review of the Procurement Division operations 

by a panel of NASA procurement specialists and has responded to all suggestions offered 

by this group; the majority of the substantive recommendations have been carried out. 

To insure that JPL will receive that best possible guidance and assistance from 

Caltech, two new and influential working committees, reporting to the Chairman of the 

Board of Trustees of the Institute, have been formed. This will bring the knowledge and 

experience of many business executives and scientists to bear on the problems concerning the tasks to be performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

A Trustees Committee composed of the Chairman of the Board, the President of the 

Institute and four other trustees has been established. They bring to the Committee a vast 

background of experience in the management of industrial organizations operating in 

the aerospace field. 

[4] The members of the Trustees Committee are: 

Dr. Arnold 0. Beckman (Chairman) 

President-Beckman Instruments, Inc. 

Dr. Lee A. DuBridge 

President-California Institute of Technology 

Mr. John G. Braun 

President-C. F. Braun 8c Co. 

Mr. Thomas V. Jones 

President-Northrop Corporation 

Dr. Augustus B. Kinzel 

Vice President, Research-Union Carbide Corp. 

Mr. Herbert L. Hahn 

Partner-Hahn & Hahn 

Mr. William E. Zisch 

President-Aerojet General Corporation 

Mr. Robert B. Gilmore and Dr. William H. Pickering are ex officio and nonvoting 

members. This group has already met several times. Its principle role is that of advisor to 

the Laboratory top management on major policy matters, and to keep the Executive 

Committee and Board of Trustees of the Institute informed on important matters at the 

Laboratory. 

A committee of appropriate facility members has also been formed to deal with the 

very important interrelationships between the academic and scientific staff of the Institute 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 51 1 

and the technical staff of the Laboratory. The membership of the Facility Committee is as 

follows: 

Dr. Clark B. Millikan (Chairman) 

Director-Graduate Aeronautic Laboratories 

Dr. Robert F. Bacher 

Provost 

Dr. Norman Horowitz 

Professor, Biology 

Dr. Robert B. Leighton 

Professor, Physics 

Dr. Frederick C. Lindvall 

Professor, Electrical & Mechanical Engineering 

Dr. Robert P. Sharp 

Professor, Geology 

Chairman, Division Geological Sciences 

Dr. William H. Pickering 

Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

This committee is principally concerned with the technical problems in which the 

experience of the scientific and technical staff of the Institute can be of support to the 

Laboratory. It will meet frequently to review [5] activities at the Laboratory and the 

Campus, to provide the Director of JPL with advice and support on important technical 

decisions, and to arrange for the exchange of technical information and to advise on the 

selection of highly qualified scientific personnel at the Laboratory. 

Mr. Robert B. Gilmore, Vice President for Business Affairs at Caltech, has submitted 

several reports to Mr. Hilburn, stating in some detail the corrective measures that have 

been taken upon the recommendations of the Army Audit Report number LA 64581, 

date of issue February 26, 1964 entitled “Report on Financial Management and Related 

Operations for the Period Ended June 30, 1963.” A brief summary of some of the principal items is attached as Appendix A to this letter. 

Technical Problems 

As you know, there has been some criticism ofJPL concerning technical matters such 

as design features, quality control, and testing. Some have stated their opinion that JPL 

scientists have not been adequately responsive to suggestions made by others. Not all suggestions are necessarily good, of course. To assist JPL in evaluating suggestions and to 

make sure that JPL‘s technical problems will receive the attention of the best research people at Caltech, the Caltech-JPL Facility Committee referred to above meets from time to 

time. This group has given Dr. Pickering and his associates probably the best advice available today, in the respective fields of the committee members, on the suggestions and the 

recommendations in the Kelly and Hilburn reports. To the best of my knowledge, every 

technical suggestion that has been received by JPL has either been adopted or, if not 

adopted, sound reasons for the rejection have been given. 

With respect to Ranger 7, I have been informed and believe there has been the 

utmost cooperation between JPL and NASA officials. So far as I know, JPL has performed 

every task and made every test that has been requested by Dr. Seamans, Dr. Newell and 

Mr. Cortright. I have been unable to find any indication of unresponsiveness or lack of 

cooperation on the part ofJPL. If something less than complete agreement on technical 

matters existed in the past, that situation does not exist today 
512 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Caltech-JPL Research Activities 

I have been aware, and I heartily applaud, your great personal interest in expansion 

of basic research. The Institute certainly shares your interest and desires to do all it can to 

assist in the development of a vigorous research program, not only at Caltech but in other 

universities capable of carrying on fundamental research. To give me an idea of what 

Caltech is doing in research related to space, Dr. Bacher and the various [6] division chairmen at Caltech have provided the information that is attached as Appendices B through 

I. The following items are included: 

A proposal dated April 18, 1962 for NASA support of research in certain fields of 

physics and astronomy. This report gives a broad outline of important fields of research 

in which Caltech and the Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories are engaged, together with a specific recommendation for a %year research program. This has been brought 

up to date by the attached list of staff members, postdoctoral research fellows and graduate students now working in the various fields of research. 

A proposal dated July 20, 1962 for predoctoral training grants for Caltech. This proposal covers work that would be carried on in the divisions of biology, chemistry and 

chemical engineering, engineering and applied sciences, geology, physics, mathematics 

and astronomy. 

A proposal dated July 22, 1963 for predoctoral training grants for a %year period. 

This proposal is essentially a duplicate of the previous one, with certain added programs. 

Extracts of memoranda given by the various division chairmen at Caltech, which contain information of direct interest. Your attention is called particularly to the special summer program which started June 22, 1964 with 36 students selected from institutions all 

over the country for an intensified course in problems of space technology. 

I hope I haven’t burdened you unduly with this rather lengthy letter. I feel that 

Caltech and JPL both have done excellentjobs in getting on top of their problems and in 

taking steps to insure that NASA will receive the type of managerial and technical competence and performance that it desires. I believe that most of the sources of annoyance 

in the past have been eliminated and that developments of the past three of four months, 

while not entirely to the liking of any of us, have actually resulted in a substantial improvement in understanding and in over-all operations. 

If you would care to make any comments or suggestions, I should be pleased to 

receive them. 

Cordially yours, 

Arnold 0. Beckman, Chairman 

Board of Trustees 

Document 111-14 

Document title: Raymond Einhorn and Robert B. Lewis, Memorandum to Mr. Hdburn, 

“Review of Purposes and Application of CIT Fee and Overhead for the JPL Contract,” 

with summary of report, October 20, 1964. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

One of the issues of contention in the NASA-Caltech relationship during the early 1960s was thfee 

Caltech (refiied to below as “CIT”) charged NASA for managing the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 513 

(JPL). When the failure of the Ranger 6 spacemap in January 1964 brought the terms of contract 

renewal into question, the management fee amount became a signijicant issue. Consequently, NASA 

Assistant Deputy Administrator Earl D. Hilburn instructed Audit Division Director Raymond 

Einhm and Financial Management Division Director Robert B. Lewis to review the fee. The following memorandum discusses this investigation and transmits a hgthy, fiue-part report. Also 

included here is the summary from the larget; Il-page report that war used to provide information for 

the space agency’s effort to rem‘ent relations between the NASA Headquarters andJPL. 

Memorandum 

October 20, 1964 

TO: Mr. Earl D. Hilburn 

FROM: Raymond Einhorn [initialed] 

Robert B. Lewis [initialed] 

SUBJECT Review of Purposes and Application of CIT Fee and Overhead for the JPL 

Contract 

In accordance with your request to us and your discussion with Mr. Robert Gilmore, we 

visited the California Institute of Technology to review a current statement of CIT’s reasons 

for a management fee for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory contract, and how CIT applied the 

fee and other income received by the Institute. We also were to determine the kinds of indirect expense which CIT charged to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory contract, the amounts 

charged, and how reimbursements for these charges were applied by CIT. . . . 

[21 I. SUMMARY 

1. CIT Refused to Discuss Fee 

CIT was unwilling to discuss the reasons for requesting or paying a fee for the JPL 

operation. It thought it was inappropriate for NASA to ask about the application of the 

fee, inappropriate for CIT to give the information, and dangerous for NASA to have the 

information even if it should get it. Despite the recent discussions that have been held 

with NASA officials concerning the fee, we were informed that Dr. DuBridge could not 

present a list of reasons immediately since the statement had to be carefully drawn up and 

reviewed by CIT officials and the Board of Trustees. The statement probably will not be 

submitted until after modification 10 is signed, and apparently will not contain dollar or 

other measurement factors. 

2. CIT Reasons for a Fee 

We summarized in Section I1 of this report the reasons previously given by CIT for the 

fee, and have made comments based on our analyses. Of the reasons given, we believe 

only four are suitable for consideration: (1) the benefits which NASA derives from a competent technical team at JPL, attracted and retained by CIT’s reputation and academic 

environment, and from the availability of eminent faculty scientists to advise and consult 

with the JPL technical team; (2) to compensate CIT for the risk of possible injury to its 

reputation and damage to the future of the Institute, due [3] to technical failures in JPL 

projects, which are beyond the control of CIT; (3) to provide a “buffer” or a reserve of 

funds to help absorb the economic shock of the loss of fee and campus overhead pay- 
514 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

ments in the event the JPL contract expires; and (4) to assist in the current financing of 

higher campus costs, such as higher salaries and operation of expanded facilities caused 

by the operation of JPL. 

These reasons should be reevaluated by NASA and CIT. Presumably Dr. DuBridge’s 

additional statement of CIT’s fee reasons will be of assistance in accomplishing this evaluation. The assignment of dollar or other measurements to fee factors is difficult, except 

for the “buffer” and “higher campus cost” items. These two factors can be measured if CIT 

would cooperate in the effort. 

Other factors given by CIT in support of a fee do not have merit, such as unallowable 

costs and intangible and other costs no longer recoverable under current cost principles 

prescribed by the Federal Government (see Section IV). In addition, it should be noted 

that several factors given to justify a fee relate to operations for which NASA is already paying a very large proportion of the costs. 

3. Source and Application of CIT Funds 

We are fairly certain that the fee is used to finance current CIT expenditures and to 

provide the “buffer” that CIT stated it would need in case of the expiration of the JPL contract. We also believe [4] it may be used to supplement the plant fund and other special 

purpose funds. We are also fairly certain that the “buffer” is included in CIT’s income stabilization reserve, a general reserve established for the purpose of smoothing out the 

“peaks and valleys” in the Institute’s income. Our analysis of CIT’s financial statements 

confirms the fact that the reserve is broader than just for the “buffer.” 

The only information CIT was willing to provide on the overall source and application 

of its operating income is summarized in Section 11. However, the statement gives little 

guidance on the application of the fee. 

4. CIT Indirect Expenses 

NASA pays CIT for about one-half of its general and administrative expenses and 

about 65% to 78% of all major categories of general and administrative expenses that are 

applicable to on and off campus activities. These expenses are summarized in Exhibit A 

and Paragraph 2 of Section 111. Our analyses of these payments showed not only that the 

allocation basis of salaries and wages is not suitable in all instances, but that the benefits 

to the JPL contract do not in many instances flow in this direction. A review of data available in selected areas, such as the Office of the Comptroller, showed that the vast majority of the effort is for on campus activities rather than for theJPL contract. Studies by the 

Army Audit [5] Agency indicate that there are many general and administrative areas that 

will be questioned by the contracting officer and the auditors when the preliminary audit 

report is discussed with CIT officials in late December. 

NASA also pays around 78% of the operation and maintenance expenses of the CIT 

administration buildings and a corresponding proportion of the use charge and depreciation on these buildings. To the extent that the allocation of general and administrative 

expenses to JPL is high, operation and maintenance expenses are correspondingly high. 

For other categories of overhead, NASA pays small amounts related to JPL‘s usage of 

students and other educational facilities. 

5. Practices of Other Agencies 

We made a limited examination of the practices followed in similar contracts with 

respect to the payment of a fee, as described in Section V. The only university situations 

which appear to us to be truly comparable were the AEC contracts with the Universities 

of California and Chicago. In these cases, the AEC pays a management allowance which 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 515 

AEC policy states may exceed a conservative estimate of indirect cost, provided the 

allowance is not greater than the lower of the university’s overhead requests or the fee that 

would be payable to a commercial contractor operating a government-owned plant. 

[SI It should be noted that as adjustments are contemplated or made in the amount of 

overhead paid to CIT there will be even greater pressure for a fee. CIT has stated that the 

sum of the overhead and fee is the payment it requests for the operation of the JPL contract, and that this payment can be measured only partially by assignments of cost 

incurred. The balance, however determined, is the price tag CIT places on the contributions it makes, including the privilege given to the Government of using the University to 

conduct research. . . . 

Document 111-15 

Document title: Contract Briefing Memorandum: Contract NM7-100 With California 

Institute of Technology, January 12,1965. 

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory Archives, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 

California. 

In response to both NASA and congressional investigations following the failure of thefirst six Ranger 

spacecrafl, NASA’s relations with the Jet Proputsion Laboratory and Caltech underwent a dyficult 

period in 1964 and 1965. As demonstrated in earlier documents, NASA leaders demanded a number of changes in the nature of the agency’s relationship with both Caltech and JPL. Because th.e 1962 

NASA-Caltech contract was due to expire in December 1964, contract renewal was contingent upon 

these changes. The result was a twoyear extension to the 1962 contract (NAS7-100), but with a number of significant changes, which are documented in this briefing memorandum. 

January 12, 1965 

CONTRACT BFUEFING MEMORANDUM 

Contract NAS7-100 With 

California Institute of Technology 

A. General 

1. Contract NAS7-100 was originally entered into effective January 1, 1962, between 

NASA and the California Institute of Technology for the performance of Research & 

Development activities at Jet Propulsion Laboratory. NAS7-100 continued the effort performed under NASW-6 which expired on December 31, 1962 and which was originally 

entered into on May 1, 1959 when NASA took over the facilities at JPL from the 

Department of the Army (Los Angeles Procurement District, Pasadena). The facility was 

then administered under Army Contract No. DA-04-4950RD-18. 

Total costs under NASW-6 approximated $ 166,516,043.31 

Total Obligations Under NAS7-100 to Date, Approximates $ 776.183,640.01 

2. NAS7-100 was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1964 and negotiations commenced in late 1963 and concluded in early 1964 for both a contract extension as well as 

desirable management changes to he effected both contractually and organizationally. 

During the latter part of 1964, CIT instituted many organizational changes, principal ones 
516 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

included (1) the hiring of General A. R. Luedecke, (Ret) formerlywith the Atomic Energy 

Commission and assigned him as Deputy Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

(actually as General Manager) and (2) projectizing its major programs from what was originally a matrix type organization. During this same period, NASA developed Task Orders, 

setting out for the first time in the almost five years since NASA started work at JPL the 

specific areas the programs to be covered in separately identifiable and funded Task 

Orders. 

3. NASA Headquarters, satisfied that CIT had instituted mutually desirable changes, 

approved on December 16,1964, a two-year extension to Contract NAS7-100 to expire on 

December 31, 1966. The extended contract, issued as modification No. 10 to NAS7-100, 

actually is a completely revised contract superseding in its entirety the terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended. 

4. All contract management and monitoring activities are administered by the NASA 

Resident Office at JPL under the direction of the NASA Institutional Director, the 

Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications. 

[2] B. NAS7-100 (mod. 10) Principal Provisions 

a. Both NASA and the CIT have agreed that the Contractor shall perform only 

those specific tasks as may be designated in unilaterally issued Task Orders which fall within the following broad areas of activity: 

1. Scope of Work 

(1) Exploring the moon and its environment and the planets and interplanetary space, including earth-based investigations and operations related thereto. 

(2) Conducting (i) a program of supporting research and (ii) a program of 

advanced technical development, designed to make contributions to space science, technology, and exploration. 

(3) Developing and operating the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and 

Space Flight Operations Facility in support of NASA programs. 

(4) Carrying out investigations and providing services in the field of aeronautics. 

(5) Assisting NASA in the formulation and execution of its programs by providing NASA with technical advice, studies and reports of investigations. 

(6) Providing technical direction or project management in connection with 

contracts for work falling within the broad areas defined above which are awarded by 

NASA to other contractors. 

The principal change between the old contract and that part revised as indicated 

above is that NASA now may issue unilateral direction for CIT to perform within the areas 

noted whereas CIT had the right previously to reject NASA’s directions or insist on 

changes before it would accept any specific task. The old provisions (commonly referred 

to as “mutuality”) served to restrict the Government on the work or services it could 

demand of CIT and was the cause of much friction between technical counterparts of 

both NASA and JPL. It is believed that the present arrangement will prove more satisfactory and follows more closely the normal task order type contract which allows for unilateral issuance of task orders. The contract does include, however, a safeguard against the 

Government issuing technically unfeasible or otherwise unworkable tasks. The contractor 

has an obligation to advise the Contracting Officer, within 10 days, of any Task Order it 

(the Contractor) does not consider feasible. Such an occurrence, will, of course, be investigated by NASA. 

b. If NASA desires any work performed by JPL which is not included in the 

broad areas agreed to, it will be issued in a Task Order which requires acceptance by CIT. 

This type of work is expected to be insignificant. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 517 

[3] c. Preliminary to the award of Modification No. 10 (the revised contract) both 

NASA and CIT have agreed upon the specific task orders to be issued to cover the work 

then in progress. Other than for a relatively few and minor tasks, all definitive task orders 

required to cover the work in progress prior to effective date of Modification 10, have now 

been issued and will be maintained on a current basis. 

d. In addition to specific scopes of work included in separate Task Orders, there 

are also included provisions concerned with Technical Direction and Guidance, 

Operation of a Technical Plan, Reliability and Quality Assurance, Specific Reporting 

Requirements, Manpower Utilization Plans and Project Management Responsibilities-all 

of which are spelled out and included in contractual directions for the first time. 

e. Concurrently with the issuance of Definitive Task Orders, NASA has negotiated with CIT and the contract has now been amended to provide for an “authorized manpower” clause. This clause permits the Contracting Officer, for the first time, to establish 

a manpower ceiling on the total number of persons which the Contractor may employ at 

JPL and provides a penalty in the form of disallowing costs of persons employed in excess 

of the ceiling. Under the old contract, although informed ceilings were established, they 

were usually exceeded without any penalty placed on the Contractor. The initial ceiling 

under the revised contract was established on October 31, 1964 as 4,275 persons. JPL 

reduced to 4,245 persons as of November 30, 1964 and to 4,225 persons as of December 

31, 1964. The ceiling has been reduced to 4,100 by June 30, 1965, and to 4,000 by 

December 31, 1965. JPL is expected to be sustained at about 4,000 persons. Adequate controls have been established at our Resident Office at JPL to preclude JPL from exceeding 

its established ceiling. New work is being monitored through the Resident Office relative 

to adequacy of JPL manpower resources without disturbing the manpower ceiling. 

2. Contract Resources 

a. CIT must provide all of the management, personnel, labor and services necessary for performance of all work under the contract except that work which it is authorized to subcontract for. NASA furnishes or CIT acquires for the Government’s account, 

all property, including facilities, necessary for performance of work under the contract. 

This includes all real and leased property at JPL and buildings authorized for construction by JPL and/or Army Corps of Engineers. Now, for the first time, all property of a facilities nature, including real estate, comes under the cognizance and control of a separate 

Facilities Contract and removes it from the Research and Development area under which 

it was formerly controlled. 

b. The Facilities contract (No. NAS7-270(F)) provides for periodic reporting, 

control, protection and maintenance of the Government property as well as a vehicle for 

authorized new construction. 

[4] 3. Reporting 

a. Under the revised contract, CIT is obligated to furnish management, financial, technical, progress and other reports as the Contracting Officer may direct. Under 

the old contract each report had to be mutually agreed to be furnished before it could be 

placed into effect. Here again, “mutuality” has been removed to provide for prompt 

response from the Contractor. Under the revised Contract, however, CIT may initiate 

additional unclassified reports to disseminate scientific and technical knowledge to the 

scientific community. Distribution and costs of publication of such additional reports are 

furnished annually to the Contracting Officer for his review. 

4. Fiscal and Other Management Requirements 

a. CIT is required to segregate and separately maintain the costs of each Task 

Order and each program so that costs for each program are readily identifiable. 

b. JPL‘s financial management system must be compatible with NASA’s system 

including integration of the NASA Agency-wide coding structure. NASA-PERT and the 

NASA Financial Management Reporting System for cost type contracts have been imposed 
518 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

on JPL and its major subcontractors in implementation of an integrated time-cost management control and reporting system. 

c. The Contractor is required to make maximum use of Department of Defense 

Audit and Administrative Services to preclude duplication of effort. Audit services are 

being utilized to the fullest extent. Property and Inspection Services performed by DOD 

Agencies are constantly being expanded to meet requirements. It is expected that proposed Defense Contract Administrative Services District when established in Los Angeles 

will be used to the maximum extent practicable. 

d. The Contractor is required to submit annual budget estimates for the work it 

anticipates will be performed for each succeeding fiscal year of a particular program. 

Revised estimates will be also be furnished as program requirements change, are reduced 

or are increased. Periodic guidelines are furnished to CIT for use in projecting its estimates. 

e. The usual “Limitations of the Government’s Obligation” and “Estimated 

Cost” clauses limiting the Contractor’s expenditures to funds allotted and estimated costs 

set forth in Task Orders are included in the contract to control unauthorized expenditures by the Contractor. 

5. Allowable Costs 

a. The allowability of all costs for purposes of determining amounts payable to 

the Contractor is determined by the cost principles set forth in [5] Part 3 of Section XV 

of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation applicable to Educational Institutions 

(negotiations with CIT will be accomplished to convert the ASPR reference to the appropriate part of NASA Procurement Regulation). The contract also lists specific items of 

direct costs for purposes of agreement on an “advance understanding” as to the allowability of certain costs by the Government. The types of costs listed are compatible with the 

ASPR Cost Principles. 

b. The revised contract calls for negotiation of overhead rates to cover institutional indirect cost. These provisions follow the standard procedure for agreement on 

final overhead rates as contained in most Government cost-type contracts. The old contract provided for a fixed allowance for “indirect costs” which generally could not be 

changed. This was fixed after the beginning of the fiscal year regardless of the actual overhead expenditures which might be incurred during the year. The present procedure fixes 

rates only after the completion of the fiscal year and is based upon actual audited overhead expenditures. The present arrangement is more equitable to both parties. 

6. Fixed Fee 

a. A fixed fee is negotiated for each full fiscal year (or part of year included in 

term of contract) and the amount agreed upon is included in an amendment to the contract. The old contract did not provide any contractual incentive for raising or lowering 

the fee whereas the revised contract contains a schedule of fee ranges from a stated minimum to a maximum range according to the NASA approved Financial Operating Plan. 

The fee ranges are listed below: 

Schedule of Fee Ranges 

$ 

NASA Approved Fee Ranges 

Financial ODerating Plan Minimum Fixed Fee Maximum Fixed Fee 

$ 96 $ 

150,000,000 175,000,000 948,700.00 1,423,050.00 

175,000,000 200,000,000 1,045,000.00 1,567,500.00 

200,000,000 225,000,000 1,127,500.00 1,691,250.00 

225,000,000 250,000,000 1,210,000.00 1,815,000.00 

250,000,000 275,000,000 1,288,250.00 1,931,875.00 

275,000,000 300,000,000 1,361,250.00 2,041,875.00 

300,000,000 325,000,000 1,430,000.00 2,145,000.00 

325,000,000 350,000,000 1,498,750.00 2,248,125.00 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 519 

The basis for determining fee is the total JPL financial operating plan first approved 

by NASA following passage and approval of the NASA Appropriation Act for a particular 

fiscal year. Although the Plan may be [6] subsequently amended or revised, the fee 

remains unchanged and avoids any aspect of a cost-plus-percentage-of-cost situation. 

Within the range of a particular Financial Operating Plan, negotiations may then take 

place within the stated minimum and maximum ranges. Consideration is given by the 

Contracting Officer, among other factors, in negotiations, to: 

(1) Extent of subcontracting 

(2) Complexity of the work 

(3) Past performance evaluations conducted under a new clause of the contract entitled “Evaluation of Contractor’s Performance.” 

b. Using the current fiscal year (1965) for an example, the first approved Plan 

issued by the Contracting Officer, NASA Resident Office, totaled $216,195,000. This then 

falls within an operating plan range of $200,000,000 to $225,000,000 and a fee range of 

$1,127,500 to $1,691,250, which is subject to negotiations. The fixed fee negotiated for FY 

1964 under the old contract amounted to $1,250,000. 

7. Patent, New Technology and Related Clauses 

The contract contains the appropriate Patents, New Technology, Data Rights and 

Licenses clauses prescribed by NASA Procurement Regulations. The NASA Resident Staff 

includes a qualified Patents Attorney who monitors all of the patent type activities ofJPL. 

8. Subcontracts 

a. The contract contains provisions for review of selected subcontracts by the 

Contracting Officer to ensure compliance with good business practices, NASA 

Procurement Regulations and special requirements placed upon the Contractor. 

b. All of the Contractor’s procurement policies and procedures are subject to 

approval by the Contracting Officer. Included are Source Evaluation Board procedures 

which the Contractor has agreed to use for procurements in excess of $1,000,000. 

c. The Contractor, by contract terms, has established and maintains a “Small 

Business Subcontracting Program” in accordance with current statutes and regulations. It 

is also obligated to include “Small Business Program” requirements in all of its subcontracts which offer substantial small business subcontracting opportunities. 

171 9. Advance Payments 

CIT is permitted to receive, on an interest-free basis, advance payments usually permitted in the case of Educational Institutions. The advance payments are sufficient to pay 

current payroll and operating costs. Under negotiation, however, is a letter-of-credit procedure designed to replace the advance payments provisions. This procedure has been 

promulgated by the U.S. Treasury Department and simplifies the advance payment 

process. Its primary advantage is to reduce the time that cash is in the hands of the 

Contractor and save Treasury the interest cost of idle money in the hands of a Contractor. 

This new procedure should be in effect shortly. 

10. Safety and Plant Protection 

The Contractor is obligated to maintain maximum safety conditions at all times and 

comply with applicable Federal, State and local laws and ordinances including 

Government regulations applicable to handling and storage of potentially dangerous fuels 

and propellants. CIT must also maintain plant protection devices, a security force and 

enforce applicable rules and regulations regarding Security and Classified matters. It must 

coordinate all Security matters with the cognizant Department of Defense Agency. 

11. Equal Opportunities for Employment 

The Contractor has agreed to comply with all nondiscrimination policies of the 

Government and administratively enforce compliance by its subcontractors. 
520 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

12. Key Personnel, Wages and Salaries 

a. Key personnel assigned to a particular program may not be reassigned without the consent of the NASA Headquarters Program Director. 

b. CIT is obligated to keep the Contracting Officer fully informed as to JPL‘s 

wage and salary policies including notice of any action to an employee involving a rate of 

compensation in excess of $15,000 per annum. 

13. General Services Administration Supply Services 

Under the terms of the Contract, the Contracting Officer has required JPL to utilize 

GSA sources for any property which can be furnished from either warehouse stock or 

from GSA contractors. The use of this authorization has resulted in savings in procurement costs. 

[8] 14. Non-Renewal of Contract 

Appropriate provisions are made for the settlement of closing costs which might reasonably be expected to occur in the event NASA should decide not to further extend the 

contract. 

15. Evaluation of Contractor’s Performance 

The revised contract includes provisions, for the first time, for the Government to 

evaluate the Contractor’s (JPL‘s) performance both semi-annually and at the close of each 

fiscal year. An Evaluation Board will be composed of representatives appointed by the 

NASA Administrator. Conclusions will be reached after consideration of all the facts and 

after giving CIT the opportunity to submit such information and material as it desires. 

The conclusions reached by the Board will influence, in part, subsequent fee negotiations. 

16. Government Property 

The Contractor receives, issues, maintains and protects all Government property 

under its control, in accordance with NASA Procurement Regulations and the NASA 

Industrial Property Control Manual. The Contractor’s activities in this area are continuously monitored by a NASA Property Administrator assigned to the NASA Resident Office 

Staff. Property in the control of subcontractors is monitored by DOD Agencies assigned 

secondary property administration. 

17. Other Requirements 

Other contract clauses required by statute or regulation are included in the contract. 

Document 111-16 

Document title: Office of Technology Utilization, Task Force to Assess NASA University 

Programs, A Study of NASA University B-ograms (Washington, DC: NASA Special 

Publication-185, 1968), pp. 1-8. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Between I962 and 1968, the NASA-univmity relationship expanded considerably. This document is 

the report of a task force assigned to review the totality of that relutionship, which had resulted from 

NASA’s attmpt to use Apollo funding to effect a change in academic America. This rgbort lent sup 

port to the decision to curtail drastically and eventually even to cancel the Sustaining University 

Program. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 521 

[l] Precis 

This study examines the results of the total NASA university program. It is an assessment of the program based on goals publicly expressed by NASA managers as recorded in 

the literature and correspondence with universities. Foremost among the goals has been 

the intent of NASA to accomplish its aeronautics and space mission while at the same time 

strengthening the universities involved; NASA-sponsored research was to be conducted in 

the traditional atmosphere of instruction and learning in order to maximize the indirect 

returns from the mission-oriented programs. The study was approached through selected 

sampling of NASA-university interactions by interviews, university visits, and in-depth case 

studies. The significant limitations of the study are those imposed by the lack of sufficient 

time to collect and analyze data on such a huge and diverse program. However, the Task 

Force believes this report to be indicative of the total NASA university program. 

Impact on NASA, Universities, and the Nation 

The returns from all NASA university programs fall into the categories of new knowledge, trained people, or new capability for research, education, and service. The major 

impact of these returns is upon the participants. However, since NASA and universities are 

both parts of the Nation, anything that affects them also affects the Nation. The results of 

programs that affect the Nation outside the immediate areas of the participants generally 

are too obscure to be identifiable. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is on the new 

knowledge, trained people, and new capability that have impacted NASA and universities 

and, through them, the Nation. 

Generul.-NASA's university programs have made major contributions to the aeronautics and space program. Research sponsored by university programs has generated 

new concepts, has developed new technology, and has created unique facilities for further 

education and research. Over 50 percent of all experiments flown on NASA satellites have 

been generated by university programs. Universities have awarded at least 500 graduate 

degrees and provided continuing education opportunities to thousands through NASA 

employee graduate training programs. Even management of the aerospace program has 

been influenced, since university consultants have given policy, scien'tific, and engineering advice to NASA at all levels. These contributions demonstrate that NASA university 

programs have been successful in their first and most important objective-obtaining the 

expertise of the university community to help meet the aeronautics and space goals of 

NASA and the Nation. 

NASA university programs have had a significant impact on the university community. About 250 universities have been responsive to opportunities to become involved in the 

aeronautics and space program made available by NASA. [2] They have welcomed NASA 

support and have used it to strengthen and build research and education capability. 

Centers of excellence exist that were created with NASA support. Entire departments and 

graduate degree programs have grown out of NASA involvement, many new courses have 

been developed, and countless science and engineering courses have had their content 

altered by NASA programs. The national capability for education and research has been 

both broadened and strengthened. 

In general, universities have not taken advantage of the opportunities offered by 

NASA to innovate in research management, multidisciplinary research, and governmentindustry-university relations. There is little evidence that the long-range goals of NASA 

university programs, such as the development of a university capability to respond as an 

institution, capability for multidisciplinary research, concern with societal problems, and 

acceleration of technology transfer, are being achieved. The examples that were identified-an Urban Laboratory at UCLA, the Industrial Development Division at the 

University of Michigan, Cornell's new Department of Environmental Systems 
522 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Engineering, etc.-are only loosely tied to NASA programs. Sometimes they were 

unknown to, or unrecognized by, the scientists administering the NASA grants. It should 

be pointed out, however, that the dollars NASA has used to encourage change have come 

mostly from the Sustaining University research and facilities programs and have amounted to less than 1 percent of the total Federal support to universities. From this perspective, the changes that NASA university programs have stimulated in universities appear 

more significant. 

NASA's university programs have built up a reservoir of good will within the university community toward the agency. University administrators generally perceive that NASA 

is sensitive to their needs and has undertaken a program to assist them with facilities, graduate student support, and institutional support grants. Generally, faculty members appreciate the opportunities for research and education that have been made available to them. 

Industry has benefited from NASA university programs through the increased availability of trained people, new knowledge, and new capability. For the most part, however, 

industry-university relations do not appear to have been altered by NASA programs. Little 

evidence was found that universities were working harder at transferring technology to 

industry or have been successful in increasing industry support for university research. 

Although NASA's stated policy is to conduct its programs in such a manner as not to 

draw faculty away from teaching, some of the research institutes, centers and laboratories 

in universities have very few graduate students involved in the ongoing research. Some 

have full-time staffs of research professionals who neither teach nor supervise graduate 

students. Most universities that have such special research groups are aware of the problem and are attempting to find mechanisms to bring research closer to the educational 

process. Some are successful; some are not. Significant numbers of groups with little educational involvement still exist. NASAviolates its own policies when it supports groups that 

continue to divorce themselves from the educational function of the university. 

[3] Project researcLAbout 70 percent of NASA funds obligated to universities has been by 

the project research method. This system of supporting the research of principal investigators within universities is serving both NASA and the universities well. Abuse of the system sometimes occurs (e.g., overcommitment by an aggressive university researcher, 

demands for industrial-type response by a NASA contract monitor, or too little educational involvement). However, on balance, these are excellent programs that have contributed directly to the aerospace objectives of NASA. Project research also involves large 

numbers of faculty and graduate students and generates about three out of four of the 

space-science publications from all NASA programs. A large amount of education at all 

levels-undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral-is supported by these NASA programs. More than 10 percent of all funds supporting project research have been invested 

in equipment, which is available in university laboratories for further education and 

research. 

Small project grants, which involve only one or two faculty members and their graduate students, have often led to productive interactions with NASA center personnel. 

Research on optimal control of nuclear rockets at the University of Arizona and ablationmaterial research at Louisiana State University are examples of projects through which 

NASA has received new concepts and techniques, the university has improved curricula 

and research and increased the number of publications, and technology is being transferred from universities to other segments of society. Larger project research grants, while 

producing valuable research, do not seem to foster development of as close a tie to the 

ongoing NASA program. 

Space-science flight experimentation represents an area of significant accomplishment in NASA university programs. University scientists have been eager to take advantage 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 523 

of the opportunities made available by NASA to conduct experiments in space. More than 

98 percent of balloon-borne experiments, more than 40 percent of sounding rocket 

experiments, and more than 50 percent of satellite experiments flown on NASA vehicles 

had principal investigators or coinvestigators in universities. For the satellite experiments, 

this is five times the level of participation of industry and about the same as the participation of all government laboratories. For the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory 

program alone, 50 percent of the flight experiments and almost two-thirds of the early 

scientific publications came from universities. A large share of the significant discoveries 

in space science were made in university-originated experiments. 

Although the university community appears to have an effective voice in flight programs and selection of experiments through advisory committees, some university people 

complain about favoritism in the selection of flight experiments. Another continuing 

problem with university participation in flight experiments is involvement of graduate students. Long lead times and project uncertainties limit the suitability of flight programs for 

thesis projects. Universities have adopted various approaches to circumvent the difficulties, but NASA must continue to be aware of them and continue to seek administrative 

mechanisms that encourage participation of graduate students. 

A university research program in R. & D. management and socioeconomics in aerospace-related areas has been NASA's only significant support of the social [4] science 

disciplines. This program has been quite productive as measured by publications and 

involvement of faculty and students. Capability for research on management of large technological programs has been created in several universities and is now available to the 

Nation. However, few if any management or policy decisions or processes within NASA 

appear to have been influenced by the research. While some of the research may have had 

potential usefulness, NASA has no mechanism for utilizing its results. The program has 

had no centralized direction or policy and almost no involvement of the centers where 

many management problems occur. It may be significant that NASA has sponsored a university research program in these disciplines without a corresponding in-house research 

capability-a position it has carefully avoided in engineering and physical-science 

disciplines. 

Sustaining University Program.-The Sustaining University Program, which provided 

about 30 percent of NASA funds obligated to universities and provides support to institutions rather than to principal investigators within universities, has generally been successful. Its short-range objectives-increasing the supply of trained manpower, increasing university involvement in aeronautics and space, broadening the base of competence, and 

consolidating closely related activities-have been achieved. However, the long-range 

goals that require innovation and change by universities-capability for multidisciplinary 

research, university concern with the technology-transfer process, increased university 

involvement with community and societal problems, developing capability for institutional response-have not been successfully attained. There are a few indications of change 

in the direction of long-range goals that may lead to future developments. 

The aims and operation of the Sustaining University Program are poorly understood 

within NASA outside the Office of University Affairs. Only in the Office of Space Science 

and Applications, which formerly directed the program, are they reasonably well understood and felt to have value to NASA as a supplement to project research. In other 

Headquarters offices and in the Centers, no benefit to NASA is seen in the program. The 

Sustaining University Program grants are viewed as giveaways to help universities. The 

quality of research sponsored by the program is regarded as not good enough to obtain 

support in open competition. The impact on both NASA and universities would have 

been greater if the in-house managers had been involved and committed to the programs. 
524 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

The Sustaining University Program has made grants for multidisciplinary space-related research to 50 universities. These grants were about 10 percent of the total research 

funds provided to universities by NASA. The grants achieved the objective of broadening 

the base of involvement and capability in aerospace research. They have contributed to 

the establishment of new departments (e.g., aerospace engineering or space sciences) and 

strengthened old ones (e.g., astronomy). Capabilities were nourished that since successfully competed for research support from NASA project research and other Government 

agencies. 

The multidisciplinary aspect of Sustaining University Program research grants has 

generally not been taken seriously by universities. The universities perceive the grants as 

institutional support in a conventional sense that does not require innovation in the 

administration of research. A contributing [5] factor to this attitude is the lack of “systems” administrators in universities with broad views of real-world problems and the capability for breaking problems into small subsystems for attack by individual researchers. A 

small amount of multidisciplinary research that involves physical and life scientists and 

engineers is supported, but little of it was initiated under the grants. Research involving 

individuals from multiple disciplines, including social sciences, jointly attacking a multidisciplinary problem is nonexistent. 

NASA has encouraged universities to involve social scientists in their research with little response. The small amount of social-science involvement that does exist is usually on 

a subproject that does not interact with other research. 

Many of the individual researchers supported by Sustaining University Program 

research grants have no direct contact with NASA. If they know their counterparts in 

NASA, it is only by chance. While some of the scientists and engineers relish independence, many would welcome closer relations with NASA peers. Examples of interactions 

in project research illustrate the benefits that close relations could have for both universities and NASA. 

A Sustaining University Program research grant in a university gives a focus to its aeronautics and space program that is not present in universities without such a grant. The 

steering committee which administers the grant seems to give identity and visibility to the 

total NASA program. The existence of this committee appears to give credence to NASA’s 

concern for doing its business in a way that strengthens the university and is a step toward 

interdepartmental cooperation for multidisciplinary research. Key members of these committees tend to dominate the direction of the program for the total university. 

The Sustaining University Program predoctoral traineeship grants to 152 universities 

accounted for about 15 percent of total NASA obligations to universities and have sup 

ported more than a thousand students who have earned Ph.D. degrees in space-related 

areas. By 1970, over 4,000 doctorates will have been earned by trainees. More than half of 

these highly trained scientists and engineers are remaining in universities and will contribute to the Nation through education and research for years to come. About a third of 

the former trainees are seeking industrial careers. Many of their skills are transferable to 

areas other than aerospace and will continue to benefit society and science whether or not 

they engage in aerospace research. Some evidence exists that traineeship grants have 

accelerated (as well as increased) the production of doctorates, but it is not conclusive 

except in the obvious cases of students who otherwise would have held part-time jobs. 

The trainees tend to be isolated from NASA and have little opportunity to identify 

with the Agency. Since the program is administered by the individual universities, not 

even the stipend checks come from NASA. The Agency has overlooked an opportunity to 

communicate with the students, which is reflected by the statistic that only 1 percent of 

the Ph.D. recipients have been hired by NASA. This indicates very little direct impact on 
EXPLOFUNC THE UNKNOWN 525 

NASA by the traineeship program. 

[6] The traineeship-grant program has had little impact on large established graduate 

schools. Ten or 12 additional traineeships tend to get lost in universities such as Cornel1 

or Michigan. However, traineeships were awarded to 152 universities, most of whom [sic] 

do not have the size or reputation of the two universities just mentioned. The grants have 

enabled the smaller and less well established universities to recruit more and better graduate students and to strengthen their graduate education programs. 

The Sustaining University Program has made 35 facilities grants to 32 universities that 

have already resulted in 27 completed laboratories. The grants account for over 6 percent 

of NASA obligations to universities. The facilities are enabling universities to participate 

in aerospace programs more effectively by providing working space and by consolidating 

aerospace-related activities. They are being used to house interdisciplinary activities, usually in the form of an aerospace-related institute, center, or laboratory. Little evidence was 

found that technology-transfer processes or university interaction with the local or regional community had been stimulated by the facilities visited. 

Little evidence was found that the Memorandums of Understanding associated with 

Sustaining University Program facilities grants have led to anything but talk. Usually only 

a few administrators with a university even knew about the Memorandum. They had not 

attempted to use it as a tool to induce changes in procedures or attitudes; they did not 

regard it as requiring them to do anything new or different. The major criticism which 

must be made is that universities have not made “energetic and organized” efforts to 

implement the Memorandums, which they clearly agreed to do. 

Personnel development p-ograms.-The temporary in-residence faculty programs (NASAASEE [American Society of Electrical Engineers] summer faculty fellowships, NASA-NRC 

[National Research Council] resident research associates) are among the most rewarding 

of NASA university programs. NASA managers feel that the participants bring new talent 

and ideas into NASA projects and develop continuing relationships with NASA after they 

return to their schools. The participants like the programs for the exposure to real problems, for new ideas for research, and because they often provide a sponsor for their own 

research. Almost a thousand NMA-ASEE summer faculty fellows have spent 10 weeks during the summer working on real-world problems at a NASA center. More than 300 NASANRC postdoctoral research associates have had the opportunity to conduct research in a 

NASA center for at least 1 year. These programs have led to new research projects, 

curriculum modifications, and the creation of new centers of excellence. The acoustics 

program at North Carolina State University is just one outstanding example of impact on 

NASA, the university, and the Nation resulting from participation in these programs. 

The employee training program has contributed in a major way to upgrading the 

capabilities of NASA personnel. Employees have earned about 400 master’s degrees and 

100 Ph.D. degrees by this method in recent years. Simultaneously, in meeting training 

needs, NASA centers have strengthened old departments and accelerated the creation of 

new departments in nearby universities. The graduate program in physics at the College 

of William and Mary is one example of stimulation of regional graduateeducation capability to meet Langley Research Center’s graduate training needs. 

[71 Alternatives for Future Consideration 

The results of the study suggested many changes in procedures, policies, or approaches that would lead to more effective university programs. Many of these involve operational details and have been called to the attention of appropriate NASA managers. Only 

those of broad scope and general interest will be discussed here. 

A substantial portion of Government-supported R. & D. management research within the country has been sponsored by NASA. However, NASA is not reaping full benefit 
526 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

from it because there is no mechanism for translating research into applications. In physical-science and engineering disciplines, university researchers interface with researchoriented NASA personnel who know how to disseminate and use their results. In the R. & 

D. management area, university researchers interface with NASA management practitioners with whom the researchers have difficulty communicating. Research-oriented 

management-science groups within NASA would be one approach to improving utilization of the sponsored research. 

The Memorandums of Understanding associated with facilities grants have been ineffective in accomplishing change. The facilities may be a permanent symbol and reminder 

of NASA support, but NASA loses all leverage once the grant is awarded. Memorandums 

of Understanding might be more effective in inducing change if used in conjunction with 

institutional or multidisciplinary grants that have a renewal feature. University administrators could then use the threat of failure of renewal to influence faculty. NASA has 

recently begun to experiment with Memorandums associated with research and training 

grants and their effectiveness should be carefully evaluated. 

Many NASA-university interactions have demonstrated that synergism occurs when 

personnel are in close communication. The element of close working relations has been 

missing from research sponsored by the Sustaining University Program. Therefore, the 

benefits to both NASA and universities from this research would be increased by closer 

ties with ongoing NASA programs. Individual researchers in universities need to communicate with their NASA peers and university administrators need more data on real NASA 

problems for decision-making in allocating grant resources. Therefore, centers and program offices should be participants-not advisors-and share responsibility in administration of Sustaining University Program research grants. 

The mechanisms that have been established for bringing university faculty into NASA 

on a temporary basis are valued highly by NASA managers and by the participating university people. It is noteworthy that equivalent mechanisms permit NASA employees to 

enter the university community on a short-term basis but are not widely known or used. 

Many highly qualified NASA scientists, engineers, and managers could make significant 

contributions to universities in research, education, and administration, as well as increase 

their own understanding of university problems, if mechanisms could be developed for 

them to spend 6 months or a year as active participants-not students-in university programs. Exchange programs between universities and NASA should be encouraged. 

[ 81 Employee graduate-training programs should be considered as another method for 

meeting the Nation's need for highly educated scientists, engineers, and managers. 

Innovations in these programs could help offset the reduction in Ph.D. production that 

will come after 1970 as a result of decreases in Sustaining University Program traineeships. 

If the employee graduate-training programs could be expanded, NASA would benefit 

from the services of highly motivated and capable employees while at the same time giving them educational opportunities. In addition, if NASA's requirements for employee 

graduate training at nearby universities are large, financial support to the universities for 

facilities and faculty augmentation should be considered. 

A requirement that annual reports on all grants and contracts summarize numbers of 

graduate students given full or partial support, theses supported, technical reports 

published, curriculum changes, facilities acquired, and degrees earned by students being 

supported would emphasize to universities NASA's desire to support research in an educational environment and would provide data to assess the program. 

Continuous feedback on the effectiveness of university programs is needed by NASA 

management at all levels. A better management information system and reporting of educational impact of NASA programs would satisfy many requirements. However, periodic 
EXPLOMNG THE UNKNOWN 527 

use of ad hoc groups, university consultants, and regularly scheduled conferences of the 

Office of University Affairs, Centers, and Program Offices will probably all be required. 

Document 111-17 

Document title: Major General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF, Apollo Program Director, to J. 

Leland Atwood, President, North American Aviation, Inc., December 19, 1965, with 

attached “NASA Review Team Report.” 

Document 111-18 

Document title: George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, to 

J. Leland Atwood, President, North American Aviation, Inc., December 19, 1965. 

Source: Both in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In late 1965, at the request of NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. 

Mueller, Major General Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director at NASA Headquarters, initiated a review of NASA’s contract with North Amoican Aviation, Inc. (referred to as “NAA” below), 

to determine why work on both the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn V second stage was behind schedule 

and over budget. This highly m’tical study, known as the Phillips Report, took on added signifcance 

when in the aftermath of th Apollo 204 capsulefire (just over om year later), it was discovered that 

NASA Administrator Jams E. Webb was apparently unaware of the existence of the report. General 

Phillips provided a set of the notes which compnsed the study to North Amen‘can President J. Leland 

Atwood, and George Mueller added his views in a separate ktter: 

Document 111-17 

[ 11 IN REPLY REFER TO: MA December 19,1965 

Mr. J. L. Atwood 

President 

North American Aviation, Inc. 

1700 E. Imperial Highway 

El Segundo, California 

Dear Lee: 

I believe that I and the team that worked with me were able to examine the Apollo 

Spacecraft and SI1 stage programs at your Space and Information Systems Division in sufficient detail during our recent visits to formulate a reasonably accurate assessment of the 

current situation concerning these two programs. 

I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of either program and am 

convinced that the right actions now can result in substantial improvement of position in 

both programs in the relatively near future. 
528 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Enclosed are ten copies of the notes which was compiled on the basis of our visits. 

They include details not discussed in our briefing and are provided for your consideration 

and use. 

The conclusion expressed in our briefing and notes, are critical. Even with due consideration of hopeful signs, I could not find a substantive basis for confidence in future 

performance. I believe that a task group drawn from NAA at large could rather quickly 

verify the substance of our conclusions, and might be useful to you in setting the course 

for improvements. 

[2] The gravity of the situation compels me to ask that you let me know, by the end of 

January if possible, the actions you propose to take. If I can assist in any way, please let me 

know. 

Sincerely, 

SAMUEL C. PHILLIPS 

Major General, USAF 

Apollo Program Director 

[Attachment p.11 

NASA Review Team Report 

I. Introduction 

This is the report of the NASA’s Management Review of North American Aviation 

Corporation management of Saturn I1 Stage (SII) and Command and Service 

Module (CSM) programs. The Review was conducted as a result of the continual failure of NAA to achieve the progress required to support the objective of the Apollo 

Program. 

The scope of the review included an examination of the Corporate organization and 

its relationship to and influence on the activities of S&ID [Space and Information 

Systems Division of North American], the operating Division charged with the execution of the SI1 and CSM programs. The review also included examination of NAA offsite program activities at KSC and MTF [Mississippi Test Facility]. 

The members of the review team were specifically chosen for their experience with 

S&ID and their intimate knowledge of the SI1 and CSM programs. The Review findings, therefore, are a culmination of the judgements [sic] of responsible government 

personnel directly involved with these programs. The team report represents an 

assessment of the contractor’s performance and existing conditions affecting current 

and future progress, and recommends actions believed necessary to achieve an early 

return to the position supporting Apollo program objectives. 

The Review was conducted from November 22 through December 6 and was organized into a Basic Team, responsible for over-all [2] assessment of the contractor’s 

activities and the relationships among his organizational elements and functions; and 

sub-teams who [sic] assessed the contractor’s activities in the following areas: 
EXPLOFUNC THE UNKNOW 529 

Program Planning and Control (including Logistics) 

Contracting, Pricing, Subcontracting, Purchasing 

Engineering 

Manufacturing 

Reliability and Quality Assurance. 

Review Team membership is shown in Appendix 7. 

Team findings and recommendations were presented to NAA Corporate and S&ID 

management on December 19. 

II. NAA's Performance to Date-Ability to Meet Commitments 

At the start of the CSM and SI1 Programs, key milestones were agreed upon, performance requirements established and cost plans developed. These were essentially 

commitments made by NAA to NASA. As the program progressed NASA has been 

forced to accept slippages in key milestone accomplishments, degradation in hardware performance, and increasing costs. 

A. S-I1 

1. Schedules 

As reflected in Appendix VI key performance milestones in testing, as well as 

end item hardware deliveries, have slipped continuously in spite of deletions 

of both hardware and test content. The fact that the delivery [3] of the common bulkhead test article was rescheduled 5 times, for a total slippage of 

more than a year, the All System firing rescheduled 5 times for a total slippage 

of more than a year, and SII-1 and SI19 flight stage deliveries rescheduled 

several times for a total slippage of more than a year, are indicative of NAA's 

inability to stay within planned schedules. Although the total Apollo program 

was reoriented during this time, the SI1 flight stages have remained behind 

schedules even after this reorientation. 

The SI1 cost picture, as indicated in Appendix VI has been essentially a series 

of costs escalations with a bow wave of peak costs advancing steadily throughout the program life. Each annual projection has shown either the current or 

succeeding year to be the peak. NAA's estimate of the total 10 stage program 

has more than tripled. These increases have occurred despite the fact that 

there have been reductions in hardware. 

The SI1 stage is still plagued with technical difficulties as illustrated in 

Appendix VI. Welding difficulties, insulation bonding, continued redesign as 

a result of component failures during qualification are indicative of insufficiently aggressive pursuit of technical resolutions during the earlier phases of 

the program. 

2. costs 

3. Technical Performance 

[4] B. CSM 

1. Schedules 

A history of slippages in meeting key CSM milestones is contained in 

Appendix VI. The propulsion spacecraft, the systems integration spacecraft, 

and the spacecraft for the first development flight have each slipped more 

than six months. In addition, the first manned and the key environmental 

ground spacecraft have each slipped more than a year. These slippages have 
530 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

occurred in spite of the fact that schedule requirements have been revised a 

number of times, and seven articles, originally required for delivery by the 

end of 1965, have been eliminated. Activation of two major checkout stations 

was completed more than a year late in one case and more than six months 

late in the other. The start of major testing in the ground test program has 

slipped from three to nine months in less than two years. 

2. costs 

Analysis of spacecraft forecasted costs as reflected in Appendix VI reveals 

NAA has not been able to forecast costs with any reasonable degree of accuracy. The peak of the program cost has slipped 18 months in two years. In 

addition, NAA is forecasting that the total cost of the reduced spacecraft program will be greater than the cost of the previous planned program. 

[5] 3. Technical Performance 

Inadequate procedures and controls in bonding and welding, as well as inadequate master tooling, have delayed fabrication of airframes. In addition, 

there are still major development problems to be resolved. SPS engine life, 

RCS performance, stress corrosion, and failure of oxidizer tanks has resulted 

in degradation of the Block I spacecraft as well as forced postponement of the 

resolution of the Block I1 spacecraft configuration. 

III. NASA Assessment-Probability of NAA Meeting Future Commitments 

A. SI1 

Today, after 4 1/2 years and a little more than a year before first flight, there are 

still significant technical problems and unknowns affecting the stage. 

Manufacture is at least 5 months behind schedule. NAA’s continued inability to 

meet internal objectives, as evidenced by 5 changes in the manufacturing plan in 

the last 3 months, clearly indicates that extraordinary effort will be required if the 

contractor is to hold the current position, let alone better it. The MTF activation 

program is being seriously affected by the insulation repairs and other work 

required on All Systems stage. The contractor’s most recent schedule reveals further slippage in completion of insulation repair. Further, integration of manual 

GSE has recently slipped 3 weeks as a result of configuration discrepancies discovered during engineering checkout of the system. Failures in timely [6] and 

complete engineering support, poor workmanship, and other conditions have 

also contributed to the current SI1 situation. Factors which have caused these 

problems still exist. The two recent funding requirements exercises, with their 

widely different results, coupled with NAA’s demonstrated history of unreliable 

forecasting, as shown in Appendix VI, leave little basis for confidence in the contractor’s ability to accomplish the required work within the funds estimated. The 

team did not find significant indications of actions underway to build confidence 

that future progress will be better than past performance. 

With the first unmanned flight spacecraft finally delivered to KSC, there are still 

significant problems remaining for Block I and Block I1 CSM’s. Technical problems with electrical power capacity, service propulsion, structural integrity, weight 

growth, etc. have yet to be resolved. Test stand activation and undersupport of 

GSE still retard schedule progress. Delayed and compromised ground and qualification test programs give us serious concern that fully qualified flight vehicles 

will not be available to support the lunar landing program. NAA’s inability to 

meet spacecraft contract use deliveries has caused rescheduling of the total 

B. CSM 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 531 

Apollo program. Appendix VI indicates the contractor’s schedule trends which 

cause NASA to have little confidence that the S&ID will meet its future spacecraft 

commitments. While our management review indicated that some progress is [7] 

being made to improve the CSM outlook, there is little confidence that NAA will 

meet its schedule and performance commitments within the funds available for 

this portion of the Apollo program. 

[8] 

Presented below is a summary of the team’s views on those program conditions and 

fundamental management deficiencies that are impeding program progress and that 

require resolution by NAA to ensure that the CSM and SI1 Programs regain the required 

program position. The detail findings and recommendations of the individual sub-team 

reviews are Appendix to this report. 

IV. Summary Findings 

A. NAA performance on both programs is characterized by continued failure to 

meet committed schedule dates with required technical performance and within 

costs. There is no evidence of current improvement in NAA’s management of 

these programs of the magnitude required to give confidence that NAA performance will improve at the rate required to meet established Apollo program 

objectives. 

B. Corporate interest in, and attention to, S&ID performance against the customer’s 

stated requirements on these programs is consider[ed] passive. With the exception of the recent General Office survey of selected functional areas of S&ID, the 

main area of Corporate level interest appears to be in S&ID’s financial outlook 

and in their cost estimating and proposal efforts. While we consider it appropriate that the responsibility and authority for execution of NASA programs be 

vested in the operating Division, this does not relieve the Corporation of its 

responsibility, and accountability to NASA for results. [9] We do not suggest that 

another level of program management be established in the Corporate staff, but 

we do recommend that the Corporate Office sincerely concern itself with how 

well S&ID is performing to customer requirements and ensure that responsible 

and effective actions are taken to meet commitments. 

C. Organization and Manning 

We consider the program organization structure and assignment of competent 

people within the organization a prerogative of the manager and his team that 

have been given the program job to do. However, in view of what we consider to 

be an extremely critical situation at S&ID, one expected result of the NASA review 

might be the direction of certain reorganizations and reassignments considered 

appropriate, by NASA, to improve the situation. While we do have some suggestions for NAA consideration on this subject, they are to be accepted as such and 

not considered directive in nature. We emphasize that we clearly expect 

NAA/S&ID to take responsible and thoroughly considered actions on the organization and assignment of people required to accomplish the SI1 and CSM 

Programs. We expect full consideration, in this judgement [sic] by NAA, of both 

near and long term benefits of changes that are made. 

Frankly stated-we firmly believe that S&ID is overmaned and that the SI1 and 

CSM Programs can be done, and done better, with fewer people. This is not to 

suggest that an arbitrary [ 101 percentage reduction should be applied to each element of S&ID, but we do suggest the need for adjustments, based on a reassessment and clear definition of organizational responsibilities and task assignments. 
532 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

It is our view that the total Engineering, Manufacturing, QJality, and Program 

Control functions are too diversely spread and in too many layers throughout the 

S&ID organization to contribute, in an integrated and effective manner, to the 

hard core requirements of the programs. The present proliferation of the functions invites non-contributing, “make-work” use of manpower and dollars as well 

as impediments to program progress. 

We question the true strength and authority of each Program Manager and his 

real ability to be fully accountable for results when he directly controls less that 

50% of the manpower effort that goes into his program. This suggests the need 

for an objective reappraisal of the people and functions assigned to Central versus Program organizations. This should be done with full recognition that the 

Central organization’s primary reason for existence is to support the requirements of the Program Managers. Concurrently, the Program Manager should 

undertake a thorough and objective “audit” of all current and planned tasks, as 

well as evaluate the people assigned to these tasks, in order to bring the total 

effort down to that which truly contributes to the program. 

[ 111 It is our opinion that the assignment of the Florida Facility to the Test and Quality 

Assurance organization creates an anomaly since the Florida activities clearly 

relate to direct program responsibilities. We recognize that the existence of both 

CSM and SI1 activities at KSC may require the establishment of a single unit for 

administrative purposes. However, it is our view that the management of this unit 

is an executive function, rather than one connected with a functional responsibility. We suggest NAA consider a “mirror image” organizational relationship 

between S&ID and the Florida operation, with the top man at Florida reporting 

to the S&ID President and the two program organizations reporting to the S&ID 

Program Managers. 

D. Program Planning and Control 

Effective planning and control from a program standpoint does not exist. Each 

organization defines its own job, its own schedules, and its own budget, all of 

which may not be compatible or developed in a manner required to achieve program objectives. The Program Managers do not define, monitor, or control the 

interfaces between the various organizations supporting their program. 

Organization-S&ID’s planning and control functions are fragmented; responsibility and authority are not clearly defined. 

[ 121 Work Task Management-General Orders, task authorizations, product plans, 

etc., are broad and almost meaningless from a standpoint of defining end products. Detailed definitions of work tasks are available at the “doing level”; however, 

these ‘kork plans” are not reviewed, approved, or controlled by the Program 

Managers. 

Schedules-Each organization supporting the programs develops its own 

detailed schedules; they are not effectively integrated within an organization, nor 

are they necessarily compatible with program master schedule requirements. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 533 

Budgeting System-Without control over work scope and schedules, the budget 

control system cannot be effective. In general, it is an allocation system assigning 

program resources by organizations. 

Management Reports-There is no effective reporting system to management 

that evaluates performance against plans. Plans are changed to reflect performance. Trends and performance indices reporting is almost nonexistent. 

E. Logistics 

The CSM and SI1 Site Activations and Logistic organizations are adequately 

staffed to carry out the Logistics support. The problems in the Logistics area are 

in arriving at a mutual agreement, between NAA and NASA, clearly defining the 

tasks required to support the programs. The areas requiring actions are as follows: 

[ 131 1. Logistics Plan 

2. Maintenance Manuals 

3. Maintenance Analysis 

4. NAA/KSC Relationship 

5. Common and Bulk Item Requisitioning at KSC 

6. Review of Spare Parts, Tooling, and Test Equipment Status 

E Engineering 

The most pronounced deficiencies observed in S&ID Engineering are: 

1. Fragmentation of the Engineering function throughout the S&ID organization, with the result that it is difficult to identify and place accountability for 

program-required Engineering outputs. 

2. Inadequate systems engineering job is being done from interpretation of 

NASA stated technical requirements through design release. 

3. Adequate visibility on intermediate progress on planned engineering 

releases is lacking. Late, incomplete, and incorrect engineering releases have 

caused significant hardware delivery schedule slippages as well as unnecessary program costs. 

[14] 4. The principles and procedures for configuration management, as agreed to 

between NAA and NASA, are not being adhered to by the engineering organizations. 

G. Cost Estimating 

The “grass roots” estimating technique used at S&ID is a logical step in the 

process of arriving at program cost estimates and developing operating budgets. 

However, there are several aspects of the total process that are of concern to 

NASA 

1. The first relates to the inadequate directing, planning, scheduling, and controlling of program work tasks throughout %ID. While the grass roots estimates may, in fact, represent valid estimates (subject to scrubbing of “cushion”) of individual tasks by working level people, we believe that the present 

deficiencies in Planning and Control permit, and may encourage, the inclusion in these estimates of work tasks and level of efforts that are truly not 

required for the program. 

2. The second concern is that the final consolidation of grass roots estimates, 

developed up through the S&ID organization in parallel through both 

Central functional and Program organizations, does not receive the required 

[ 151 management judgements [sic], at successive levels for (a) the real program need for the tasks included in the estimate, or (b) adequate scrubbing 

and validation of the man-hours and dollars estimates. 
534 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

3. The third concern, which results from 1 and 2 above, is that the final estimate 

does not represent, either in tasks to be done or in resources required, the 

legitimate program requirements as judged by the Program Manager, but 

represents total work and dollars required to support a level of effort within 

S&ID. 

Several recommendations are made in the appended reports for correcting deficiencies in the estimating process. The basic issue, however, is that an S&ID 

Management position must be clearly stated and disciplines established to ensure 

that the end product of the estimating process be only those resources required to 

do necessary program tasks. In addition, the Program Management must be in an 

authoritative position that allows him to accept, reject, and negotiate these resource 

requirements. 

H. Manufacturing Work Force Efficiency 

There are several indications of less than effective utilization of the manufacturing labor force. Poor workmanship is evidenced by the continual high rates of 

rejection and MRB actions which result in rework that would not be necessary if 

the workmanship [16] had been good. This raises a question as to the effectiveness of the PRIDE program which was designed to motivate personnel toward 

excellence of performance as a result of personal responsibility for the end product. As brought out elsewhere in this report, the ability of Manufacturing to plan 

and execute its tasks has been severely limited due to continual changing engineering information and lack of visibility as to the expected availability of the 

engineering information. Recognizing that overtime shifts are necessary at this 

time, it is our view that strong and knowledgeable supervision of these overtime 

shifts is necessary, and that a practical system of measuring work accomplished 

versus work planned must be implemented and used to gauge and to improve the 

effectiveness of the labor force. The condition of hardware shipped from the factory, with thousands of hours of work to complete, is unsatisfactory to NASA. 

WID must complete all hardware at the factory and further implement, without 

delay, an accurate system to certify configuration of delivered hardware, properly 

related to the DD 250. 

I. Quality 

NAA quality is not up to NASA required standards. This is evidencerd] by the 

large number of “correction” E.O.’s and manufacturing discrepancies. This deficiency is further compounded [17] by the large number of discrepancies that 

escape NAA inspectors but are detected by NASA inspectors. NAA must take 

immediate and effective action to improve the quality of workmanship and to 

tighten their own inspection. Performance goals for demonstrating high quality 

must be established, and trend data must be maintained and given serious attention by Management to correct this unsatisfactory condition. 

J. Following are additional observations and findings that have resulted from discussions during the Review. Most of them are covered in most detail in the 

appended sub-team reports. They are considered significant to the objective of 

improving NAA management of our programs and are therefore highlighted in 

this section of the report: 

1. S&ID must assume more responsibility and initiative for carrying out these 

programs, and not expect step-by-step direction from NASA. 

2. S&ID must establish work package management techniques that effectively 

define, integrate, and control program tasks, schedules, and resource 

requirements. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 535 

3. S&ID must give concurrent attention to both present and downstream tasks 

to halt the alarming trend of crisis operation and neglect of future tasks 

because of concentration on today’s problems. 

4. A quick response capability must be developed to work critical “program pacing” problems by a shortcut route, with follow-up to ensure meeting normal 

system requirements. 

[18] 5. S&ID must maintain a current list of open issues and unresolved problems, 

with clear responsibility assigned for resolving these and insuring proper 

attention by Program and Division Management. 

6. Effort needs to be applied to simplify management systems and end products. 

There must be greater emphasis on making today’s procedures work to solve 

today’s problems, and less on future, more sophisticated systems. The implementation and adherence to prescribed systems should be audited. 

7. NAA must define standards of performance for maintaining contracts 

current then establish internal disciplines to meet these standards. Present 

undefinitized subcontracts and outstanding change orders on the SI1 prime 

contract must be definitized without delay. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The NASA Team views on existing deficiencies in the contractor’s management of the 

S-I1 and CSM Programs are highlighted in this section of the report and are treated in 

more detail in the appended sub-team reports. The findings are expressed frankly and 

result from the team’s work in attempting to relate the end results we see in program conditions to fundamental causes for these conditions. 

[19] In most instances, recommendations for improvement accompany the findings. In 

some cases, problems are expressed for which the team has no specific recommendations, 

other than the need for attention and resolution by NAA. 

It is not NASAs intent to dictate solutions to the deficiencies noted in this report. The 

solution to NAA’s internal problems is both a prerogative and a responsibility of NAA 

Management, within the parameters of NASA’s requirements as stated in the contracts. 

NASA does, however, fully expect objective, responsible, and timely action by NAA to correct the conditions described in this report. 

It is recommended that the CSM incentive contract conversion proceed as now 

planned. 

Incentivization of the SI1 Program should be delayed until NASA is assured that the 

S-I1 Program is under control and a responsible proposal is received from the contractor. 

Decision on a follow-on incentive contract for the CSM, beyond the present contract 

period, will be based on contractor performance. 

It is recommended that NAA respond to NASA, by the end of January 1966, on the 

actions taken and planned to be taken to correct the conditions described in this report. 

At that time, NAA is also to certify the tasks, schedules, and resource requirements for the 

S-I1 and CSM Programs. 

[20] It is further recommended that the same NASA Review Team re-visit NAA during 

March 1966 to review NAA performance in the critical areas described in this report. 
536 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-18 

[I1 December 19, 1965 

Mr. J. L. Atwood, President 

North American Aviation, Inc. 

1700 E. Imperial Highway 

El Segundo, California 

Dear Lee: 

In my letter of October 27, 1965, I conveyed to you the seriousness with which I 

viewed the state of affairs in both the Apollo and SI1 Programs at your Space and 

Information Systems Division. Phillips’ report has not only corroborated my concern, but 

has convinced me beyond doubt that the situation at S&ID requires positive and substantive actions immediately in order to meet the national objectives of the Apollo Program. 

Since I am not sure that you see the performance of S&ID in the same light that I do, 

let me give you a perspective from my point of view. 

When I joined NASA in the Fall of 1963, I restructured the Apollo Program to bring 

its several elements into balance and to establish a schedule that could be achieved based 

on the state of development at that time. Since that time, in the spacecraft project, we 

have found it necessary to: 

a. Omit several subsystems from 009. 

b. Delay flight of 201 from November 65 until probably February or March 66 due 

to late delivery of 009 and its GSE together with the many difficulties of getting things 

[2] to work together at the Cape. 

c. Reschedule the first manned flight from 203 to 204 to relieve the spacecraft 

schedule. NAA ability to support the 204 flight scheduled in October 66 now looks doubtful. 

d. Reschedule 202 from April to June 1966 because 011 is several months behind 

schedule. NAA ability to support the June schedule now looks doubtful. 

e. Reschedule the first Block I1 spacecraft flight from 206 in April 67 to 207 in July 

67. Late last year, when the Block I1 Program was defined, your people agreed that they 

could and would do a better job on Block I1 engineering and that they would meet their 

design review and drawing release schedules. I’m very disturbed to learn now that Block 

I1 engineering has been neglected and that it is some months behind schedule. To me, 

considering performance to date, it looks like the danger flags portend delay of the critical 207 flight. 

f. Delay the delivery of 008 by several months. This is a critical vehicle to perform 

thermal vacuum tests in the Houston Chamber as a prerequisite to manned flight. People 

will argue that the Chamber isn’t ready, but we urgently need that spacecraft to get it working as a system vehicle and with its ground equipment and crews. 

g. Delete seven boilerplate and flight spacecraft from the Block I Program to reduce 

cost growth and relieve the schedule to minimize slippage. 

I could go on; there are other things that we’ve had to accommodate such as cost 

growth, but I believe this list gives you some insight into my evaluation of performance in 

the spacecraft project. Now, regarding the SI1 Project: 

a. I am facing the probability that the flight of 501 will be delayed between three and 

nine months. I [3] assure you that this is due entirely to the status of the SI1 stage. It is 

clear to me that it didn’t have to come out this way, and I regret now that I wasn’t more 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 537 

insistent a year and a quarter ago when you and I discussed the danger flags then flying, 

and the possibility of such far reaching actions as transferring the project to your Los 

Angeles Division. 

b. The cost proposal which S&ID presented to MSFC in October of this year was 

shocking in light of cost projections reported only one month earlier. Perhaps I should 

even go so far as to suggest that it was irresponsible; in any case, it surely was a gross 

demonstration of management shortcomings. 

c. The Battleship Program is another significant case. You got behind it personally 

and an ignition test in November 64 resulted; but that achievement was one year behind 

the original schedule and the test fixture was so devoid of systems as to be little more than 

a facade. Further, the firing record indicates that only about one-third of the firings really achieved their objectives. The firing program was stopped last April to incorporate 

flight systems; it has not yet resumed firing. 

d. SILT is a real problem. It was delivered late with what was stated to be approximately 21,000 manhours of work to incorporate EO’S and perform work that was not 

completed in the factory due to parts shortages. Today, the work stands at over 50,000 

manhours and the firing scheduled for January 66 will most likely occur in March or April. 

Based on what I have seen so far, I am very concerned that the engineering on which 

S-11-1 is based will require many changes when SILT is fired, and further delays of 501 will 

result. 

It is hard for me to understand how a company with the background and demonstrated competence of NAA could have spent 4 1/2 years and more than half a billion dollars on the SI1 Project and not yet have fired a stage with flight systems in operation. 

[4] Again, I could go on and enumerate additional problems, but the points I have discussed should show you how I see the performance of NAA on these two programs. 

I have been in this business long enough to understand quite well the difficulties and 

setbacks that occur and manifest themselves in many forms in government-industry programs which have as their objective the development, building, and operation of sophisticated systems involving advanced technology and real forward projection of thought. My 

experience indicates that results are a function of management and technical competence. I submit that the record of these two programs makes it clear that a good job has 

not been done. Based on what I see going on currently, I have absolutely no confidence 

that future commitments will be met. 

I can see no way of improving future performance, and meeting commitments which 

NAA must meet if we are to achieve the national objectives of Apollo, except to improve 

the management and technical competence of your Space and Information Systems 

Division. 

Sam Phillips is convinced that S&ID can do a better job with less people. He and his 

team discussed the reasons why they believe this in their briefing. 

I suggest that you can go even further to concentrate management and technical talent on the two programs that constitute 98 percent of the business of S&ID. For example: 

a. Eliminate or transfer to another Division those activities at S&ID that are not contributing directly to the progress of the Spacecraft and SI1 projects. Examples are the 

Federal Programs Group, parts of the Information Systems Division, and parts of the 

Advanced Systems Division. This should make possible a substantial consolidation of central engineering and insure that [5] available talent concentrates on the two important 

programs. 

b. Take a hard look at the competence and effectiveness of individuals, especially in 

the upper echelons of the organization; and move out those who are not really contributing, due either to the organization or to their own competence. 
538 THE NMA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

I urge you to consider the potential payoff of extending the project management 

principle beyond the “designated subsystems project manager” as now practiced in Dale 

Meyers’ organization. I am convinced that there is no substitute for clear assignment of 

responsibility and accountability to individuals for delivering results. Work packages can 

be defined quite clearly in both projects and I am sure it is possible to assign responsibility to individuals who are given control of the applicable budget and who are held 

accountable for delivering on schedule and within budget. 

I had hoped that a letter such as this would not be necessary. However, I consider the 

present situation to be intolerable and can only conclude that drastic action is in the best 

national interest. I assure you that I have only one purpose, and that is to carry out the 

Apollo Program on schedule and within planned costs. 

I have instructed Sam Phillips to keep his team together so that they can visit S&ID 

again in March to see if progress is consistent with that required to achieve program objectives. 

Sincerely, 

George E. Mueller 

Associate Administrator 

For Manned Space Flight 

Document 111-19 

Document title: James E. Webb, Administrator, to Dr. Frederick Seitz, President, National 

Academy of Sciences, December 20,1967. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In this letter, NASA Administrator James Webb thanks the National Academy of Sciences for its advice 

regarding the establishment of a Lunar Science Institute to be a central location for the analysis of 

samples returned from the Moon. He also attempts to clarijj NASA’s reasoning behind its decision to 

establish such an institute. Essentially, Webb sought the creation of this institute under NASA funding but m’th academic management. This arrangement, he beliewed, was m’tical if the institute were 

to achieve the stature Webb wanted fm it. 

Dl December 20,1967 

Dr. Frederick Seitz 

President 

National Academy of Sciences 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Fred: 

We have your letter of November 1, 1967 and the report of the Academy of 

NASA/University Relations Committee. Will you please give them my thanks for the work 

they have done so far to help resolve the problems of the “Lunar Science Institute” we are 

thinking of establishing near the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston. We also 

deeply appreciate the help you and the National Academy are giving us in this matter. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 539 

We asked the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board (LF’MB) to review the needs and 

plans for this “Institute,” which they did at their last meeting. The Board did not take any 

formal action pending further clarification and discussion of the nature of the Institute at 

their next meeting in January. Several of the members still have grave reservations about 

the usefulness of the proposed Institute; its method of operation; and its effect on academic scientists interested in lunar exploration. Specifically, they are concerned that the 

establishment of the Institute might weaken the position of the university scientist either 

by encouraging him to participate only if he is a member of the Institute or by forcing him 

to come to the Institute to do his research. They were also concerned about the name, 

“Lunar Science Institute,” which they felt implied a more substantial institution with a 

larger staff than [2] that described to them. In the discussion at the Board and in later 

consultations with the concerned members of the Board, it seems that we can alleviate 

much of this concern if it is made clear that: 

1. NASA plans to continue the policy of encouraging all competent scientists to 

compete for participation in the lunar exploration program and that membership or non-membership of his parent institution in the Institute will not be permitted to affect the standing of his proposal in NASA’s evaluation of it and others 

in that competition. 

2. The selection of the principal investigators in the Lunar Exploration Program or 

for lunar sample analysis will continue to be made as they have in the past by the 

highest level and most competent personnel in NASA. 

3. The “Lunar Science Institute” is being established to help those scientists who 

consider it desirable to come to MSC from time to time either to plan or conduct 

their research and to provide an easy access to scientists who have an interest in 

considering participation or in the pattern of relationships which will grow from 

this pilot model experiment in the continuing NASA effort to find the most satisfactory basis for scientists to participate in its programs. 

4. Selection as a principal investigator automatically makes the facilities of the 

Institute available to him when he needs to come to Houston. 

5. NASA will continue to follow the policy of encouraging an academic scientist to 

conduct his research at his home institution to the fullest extent possible and with 

as little interference with his academic responsibilities as possibie. 

[3] It is also apparent that what we are thinking of is not so much an “Institute” as it is a 

“Facility for Continuation Study” in a location that provides some benefits over and 

beyond those heretofore available. Therefore, we should seek a name which more accurately describes such a facility and its functions. 

An interim arrangement whereby the National Academy of Sciences has a prime 

contract from NASA for the operation of the facility, and where it, in turn, negotiates a 

subcontract with Rice University to operate the facility seems a reasonable arrangement 

provided the following matters, in addition to those above, are worked out to our mutual 

satisfaction and to the satisfaction of the LF’MB and specified in the appropriate contracts 

or memoranda of understanding: 

1. The administrative arrangements and agreements necessary to bring the facility 

into being and operate it. Careful attention must be given to the role of the 

LPMB, which is the principal group we look to for advice on the content of the 

lunar program and to represent the interests of the scientists involved in that program. Careful attention must also be given to the role of the Science and 

Applications Directorate at the Manned Spacecraft Center. 

2. The size and type of staff required (should be small). 

3. The location, size, and nature of the buildings and equipment to be utilized. 

Presumably, this would be the West Mansion located on the Rice property adjacent to MSC. 
540 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

4. If it is the West Mansion, the nature and cost of the modificationswhichwill be required. 

5. If the arrangement with the Academy and Rice is to be regarded as temporary, 

then plans [4] leading to a permanent arrangement should be outlined. 

Even though the arrangement for Rice to operate the facility may be temporary, these 

arrangements should specify the role that Rice will play in the administration, the fee considered proper, and any plans or actions which Rice expects to take to help evolve new and 

better relationships between graduate education in the disciplines involved and the space 

program. 

Dr. John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, will 

be my representative in working out these arrangements with you as President of the 

Academy and Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer in his dual role of Chairman of the Academy 

Committee on NASA/University Relations, and as President of Rice. Dr. Newel1 and I will 

be following these matters very closely. 

Sincerely yours, 

James E. Webb 

Administrator 

Document 111-20 

Document title: John E. Naugle, Associate Admiitrator, NASA, Memorandum to 

Administrator, “Space Astronomy Institute,” February 4, 1976. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This memorandum to Administrator James C. Fletcher from NASA Associate Administrator John E. 

Naugk reficts the lagthy debate over form and control of the proposed Space Astronomy Institute, 

soon to be renamed the Space Telescope Science Institute. The astronomy community was concerned 

about playing a role in the telescope project, and envisioned an institute separate from NASA and 

managed by a university or a university consortium. fi Hinners is Noel W Hinners, NASA’s 

Associate Administrator for Space Science and the ke~ individual in deciding the institute’s Jinal 

form. 

Ul 

Memorandum 

February 4,1975 

TO: A/Administrator 

FROM: AA/Associate Administrator 

SUBJECT Space Astronomy Institute 

On February 2, Dr. Richard Goody called on behalf of the International Astronomy 

Group with which we met on January 29 in Williamsburg, Virginia. Goody said a matter 

had come up after we left which he had been asked to discuss with NASA on behalf of the 

group. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 541 

The group discussed the so-called “Space Astronomy Institute” (SAI) and concluded 

that SAI would very likely become the key or certainly one of the two or three key astronomy institutions of the western world in the 1980’s. The astronomers assembled in 

Williamsburg wanted NASA to know of their interest in the SAI and also they were concerned that there would be the necessary interaction of astronomers with NASA in developing the plan so this would indeed become such an institution. Goody said he had been 

empowered by that group to approach NASA to offer to help in this matter and he felt a 

group could be organized to represent the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the 

American Astronomical Society [AAS] and the European Science Foundation (ESF). 

I told Goody that: we certainly felt that the SAI was exceedingly important; we hoped 

it became precisely the kind of institution he envisioned; and Dr. Hinners had laid out a 

very careful approach in planning for the SAI which allowed for considerable interaction 

and review of our plans with and by astronomers. I told him that Dr. Hinners and I would 

need to discuss this matter with you before any commitment could be made, but that it 

would be helpful to have a small group [2] of senior astronomers designated as the 

spokesman for NAS, AAS and ESF. I told him there were precedents for NAS helping to 

organize such a facility-noting that Mr. Webb had worked closely with the then President 

of NAS, Dr. Seitz, in establishing University Space Research Association (USRA) and the 

Lunar Science Institute, and that AEC had also worked closely with Dr. Seitz in creating 

the Universities Research Association, Inc. (URA) in getting the big accelerator under 

way. 

At our meeting with you on February 9, Dr. Hinners will outline the present strategy 

and plan of action for bringing the AS1 [sic] into being. I told Dr. Hinners of Dr. Goody’s 

call and asked that he consider how a group such as the one proposed by Goody could be 

brought into that plan of action. 

John E. Naugle 

Document 111-21 

Document title: Memphis Norman, Budget Examiner, SET, to Mr. Loweth, “National 

Academy of Sciences Report Regarding Institutional Arrangements for the Space 

Telescope,” April 6, 1977. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In attempting to determine the best form of management organization for the Space Telescope Science 

Institute, NASA requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study the issue and provide 

a recommendation. The resulting report would pluy an important role in the decision to have a universityled consortium manage the institute. This document, an internal Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) memorandum, contains a summary of the report, as well as additional comments that 

refict OMB’sfavorable disposition toward a non-NASA amangaent. Hugh Loweth was the head of 

that portion of OMB that oversaw the NASA budget, and Memphis Norman was one of his staff members. The name of the OMB division was Science, Enginea’ng, and Technology (SET). PSAC stands 

for the President S Science Advisory Committee. 
542 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

[I1 

National Academy of Sciences Report 

Regarding Institutional Arrangements 

for the Space Telescope 

The National Academy of Sciences conducted a Woods Hole Conference between July 

19-30, 1976 to examine the institutional arrangements for the operational phase of the 

Space Telescope-the report was released in January 1977. The report was prepared in 

response to a request by NASA's Office of Space Science for the Space Science Board of 

NAS to examine organizational and management features of a possible Institute and to 

make recommendations for NASA's consideration. This memo summarizes the report, 

and provides NASA['s] and our comments on the subject matter. There is no action for 

use to take at this time, although we should keep it on our "watch list." 

Background 

The Space Telescope will have the most complex organizational arrangement ever 

experienced on a NASA mission. The project will involve over a ten-to-twenty year 

period, two NASA centers, three headquarters program offices, NSF [National 

Science Foundation], the European Space Agency, other national and international 

organizations, and the complex of ground based observatories outside of NASA (the 

Space Telescope and ground telescopes will complement each other). 

NASA talked to us last fall about an Institute for the Space Telescope, but the details 

were sketchy. To assess the need for an Institute and plan it, NASA conducted an internal study last year, and asked the National Academy to conduct an additional 

study involving spaced-based and ground-based astronomers. NASA is establishing a 

working group (chaired by a NASA individual) to examine inputs from various groups 

regarding the Institute, and to make recommendations to NASA management. 

The fundamental point addressed by the report is how to maximize scientific return 

from a large investment for R&D and operations. The report proposes a strong role 

for the Institute and concludes that ST operations should move from engineers to the 

scientists and that central responsibility (a focal point) should be placed in a highly 

visible independent institute (free from organizational restrictions) and staffed by 

full-time astronomers. 

- 

Report Summary 

[2] Key recommendations include: 

The institute should organize and manage itself, and pick its own location-off a 

NASA installation. 

The new organization should include space-based and ground based astronomers 

(including foreigners) and provide for extensive coordination. 

The Institute should have direct involvement in the development and operation 

of the Telescope. The Institute should have its own laboratories, facilities, and 

computers, and plan and manage the science program (observations and instruments) ; participate in technical development by developing hardware and software systems for data handling and control capability on-board the ST, and being 

involved in contract negotiations, trade-off decisions and design modifications; 

perform data analysis at its own laboratories; and checkout the ST before and 

after launch. 

Operational decision-making should be the responsibility of the Institute since 

the participation of all astronomers should make possible decisions in the context 

of a comprehensive astronomy program (overall strategy). 

- 
543 

- 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 

The Institute should be similar to a university consortium with a Director, Board 

of Trustees, scientific staff, and advisory committees. Staffing would build-up to 90 

positions by 1983 (ST launch year), and to 150-200 positions during operations. 

The Institute should be established as soon as possible and a Director appointed. 

Funding should be provided under contract with NASA with contributions from 

NSF, other public agencies, foreign governments, and private organizations. Costs 

were not provided. 

The Institute should maintain close liaison with NASA headquarters, NASA centers, engineering groups, contractors, and scientists. 

- 

- 

- 

NASA’s Position 

NASA has not made a decision about the Institute-even whether to have one. A 

working group will be set up (chaired by Warren Keller-NASA Headquarters) shortly to review the NAS report as well as other inputs. 

The study group will include NASA engineers, scientists, and operations specialists, and advisers from NSF and NAS. 

The review will probably start with the NAS concept, since scientists should be in a 

nucleus position and many aspects of the concept are good. However, NASA views the 

concept as too large and expensive-particularly if NASA should fund. NASA will cost 

out the NAS proposal and alternatives. 

NASA views the NAS report as an expression (particularly by ground-based 

astronomers such as Kitt Peak) to curtail NASA’s influence because of fear of NASA. 

Astronomers want an NSF-type operation (independence). 

NASA plans to complete the study by July/August and recommend to NASA management whether to have an Institute and its size, structure, management, operations, 

budget, and timing. A budget request for the Institute would likely be in the 1980 budget-not 1979. 

[3]

Staff Comments 

It appears that NASA is correct in sensing that astronomers (particularly groundbased) are afraid of NASA. We have heard numerous accounts before from PSAC 

members and NSF-perhaps there are good reasons for fear, particularly about the 

Marshall Center which will manage ST development. 

However, we do believe that an Institute is a good idea, particularly the involvement 

of ground-based astronomers. We have often talked about the need for coordination 

and a comprehensive strategy for astronomy. The Institute may be the beginning. 

We also believe that once the Shuttle becomes operational its new capabilities should 

allow for greater participation by scientists. Institutional arrangements to bring in 

more people is a consideration for NASA in the future-these new programs will not 

be “normal” NASA programs. 

We will need, obviously, to watch the funding arrangements and level of costs. 

Leo Goldberg feels very strongly that the science community should have a strong 

hand in the organization and management of the Space Telescope-you may want to 

formally ask NASA by letter to report to us on the NAS report and the Institute when 

they are ready. We can prepare a letter for the Director or Mr. Cutter, if you wish. 
544 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-22 

Document title: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, “Space Telescope Program Review,” 

95th Cong., 2d sess., Report No. 85 (Washington, DC. U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1978), pp. 3-7, 11-14. 

D?: Noel W Hinners, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space Science, was the key player in resolving the dispute over whether a Space Telescope Science Institute should be operated by NASA or by a 

university consortium. Opting for the late Hinners presented to Congress NASA’s reasoning behind 

its plans for the institute. This explanation was delivered in a filled hearing room before the 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology in the 

House of Representatives. Called 4 Hinners the “Space Telescope Propam Review,” his report on July 

13, 1978, presented well the planning for the NASA-university partnership that governed the Hubble 

Space Telescope. 

[31 

Statement 

of 

Dr. Noel W. Hinners 

Associate Administrator for Space Science 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I welcome the opportunity to review with you the status of the Space Telescope 

Program. Following my brief overview including some discussion of our planned 

approach to science operations, Mr. William C. Keathley, the NASA Space Telescope 

Project Manager at Marshall Space Flight Center, will give a more detailed description of 

the development program and its cost performance, and schedule status. 

The Space Telescope is being designed as a general-purpose, astronomical observatory in space with an anticipated lifetime of more than a decade. To be launched in late 

1983 by the Space Shuttle, it will be the first long term national astronomical observatory 

in space. . . . The availability of the Space Shuttle will allow in-orbit repair of the observatory, exchange of experiments by Shuttle crew members, and, if necessary, return of the 

entire system to Earth for refurbishment and subsequent relaunch. 

The Space Telescope, by being outside the Earth’s atmosphere, will enable us to 

image objects that are ten times smaller than possible with ground-based optical telescopes. This will permit us to study nearby objects in much greater detail or to detect 

stellar counterparts at about ten times greater distance than is now possible from Earth. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 545 

If the universe has a beginning, we should be able to see some objects as they were near 

the beginning of time. The Space Telescope will allow us to observe light over the entire 

range from the far ultraviolet to the far infrared (from wavelengths of approximately 1100 

angstroms to about 1 millimeter = 10,000,000 angstroms). Most of this range is inaccessible from ground observatories. 

[4] The spacecraft facility is a cylinder of about 14 meters (46 feet) in length and 4.3 

meters (14 feet) in diameter, weighing about 9,000 kilograms (10 tons). The mirror size 

will be 2.4 meters (94 inches), comparable to the larger Earth-based telescopes. The mirror is sufficiently large that experiments requiring large, light-gathering power can be carried out with this Telescope that have been impossible with smaller predecessors. The 

high resolution of the Space Telescope will permit the detection and measurement of 

stars as faint as the 27th or 28th magnitude, some fifty times fainter than those which can 

now be detected from Earth. Spectra will be obtainable from objects as faint as 25th magnitude, which is 9 1/2 magnitudes (factor of approximately 7,000) fainter than is possible 

with the International Ultraviolet Explorer and 13 magnitudes (factor of approximately 

100,000) fainter than with the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory. 

Five versatile scientific instruments (four American and one European) have been 

selected for flight at the focal plane of the Telescope to carry out a wide range of observations. The Space Shuttle in-orbit maintenance capability, mentioned earlier, will permit 

the replacement of failed or outdated equipment at a small fraction of the cost of a new 

scientific mission. Thus, the Space Telescope can be operated with the best scientific 

instruments as they become available. 

Preliminary design efforts of the scientific focal plane instruments for the Space 

Telescope are being carried out by Investigation Definition Teams, composed of participating scientists who were tentatively selected by NASA on November 8, 1977. Final evaluation and confirmation of the payload selection will occur in early FY 1979, based on the 

results of the preliminary design reviews. We are confident of our ability to develop the 

instruments on a time scale consistent with the Space Telescope Project schedule, which 

assumes a late 1983 launch. 

As has been indicated in previous testimony, negotiations with the European Space 

Agency (ESA) covering their participation in the Space Telescope Program have resulted 

in a Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 7, 1977, by the NASA 

Administrator and the ESA Director General. ESA will supply, without cost to NASA, one 

of the scientific instruments, the Faint Object Camera; the solar array, which will provide 

power for the spacecraft facility; and, a number of personnel for science operations support. In return, observing time on the Telescope will be provided for European Scientists. 

NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center is responsible for overall management of the 

Space Telescope Project. . . . 

[5] As you are aware, the Space Telescope Program was approved as a new start in NASA's 

FY 1987 budget. The Program, because of its very complex and interactive nature, has 

been carefully planned and well defined. Currently, the major hardware contracts have 

been awarded, and all elements of the development work are on schedule and within the 

cost estimate. 

As indicated in the past testimony, the development program for the Space Telescope 

does not include funding for the operation and maintenance of the Telescope beyond 

thirty days after launch nor for the establishment of the hardware and software capabilities required for science operations. As I indicated in February, during the Hearings on 

the FY 1979 Budget, we must begin to budget for science operations in FY 1980, if we are 

to have the required operational capability at the time of launch. In the remainder of my 

time, I would like to discuss this area of science operations which has been left open in 

previous testimony. I promised that we would get back and discuss our plans with you. 
546 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

As indicated earlier, the Space Telescope is planned for operation for more than a 

decade with attendant in-orbit maintenance; recovery, refurbishment, and relaunch; and 

update of the focal plane scientific instruments. . . . During the operational period, the 

Space Telescope will be used the majority of the time by “general observers” who will be 

selected on the basis of proposals submitted in response to periodic solicitations. In developing observing schedules for the Telescope, the requirements of these observers will be 

integrated with those of investigators who are involved with development of specific focal 

plane instruments. The Space Telescope operations, including the investigation selection, 

scheduling, maintenance, refurbishment, etc., can be viewed as quite analogous to the 

operation of a large, ground-based telescope. 

An important consideration with respect to the science operations for the Telescope 

has been the question of whether or not a Space Telescope Science Institute will be established, rendering the operation similar to that for a number of large, ground-based facilities. Over the years, a growing number of astronomical groups have studied the question 

of Space Telescope science operations. While these considerations have been carried out 

to widely varying depths, all such groups have made recommendations in favor of the 

Science Institute approach. . . . The 1976 National Academy of Sciences study group, 

chaired by Professor Donald. F. Hornig, studied the problem at our request. This group, 

which consisted of an ad hoc group of independent scientists, strongly recommended the 

establishment of a Space Telescope Science [6] Institute and outlined, in some detail, the 

functions, structure, and implementation mode for the recommended Institute. This 

study served as the point of departure for our in-house study group in considering the 

possible establishment of a Science Institute. 

After studying this question at considerable length, using inputs from both the inhouse and external study groups, we have come to a conclusion that the most efficient 

and scientifically satisfactory approach to science operations would involve the establishment of [a] Space Telescope Science Institute which would be operated under a longterm contract with NASA. Our approach, however, would not be identical to the National 

Science Foundation’s approach to operation of large, ground-based facilities, since NASA 

must retain operational responsibility for the spacecraft/observatory. . . . We feel that the science operations concept for the Telescope must reflect a long-term 

commitment as would be accomplished by a dedicated “independent” institute, giving 

astronomers and science operations personnel access to computer and other facilities, 

based on Space Telescope priorities. There is no doubt that the science impact of the 

Space Telescope will be comparable to that of major laboratories, which are being operated efficiently as national facilities in the “institute” mode. Such laboratories have proven 

to be responsive to the user community and, at the same time, able to work well with the 

funding Agency. The Space Telescope is the first planned, long-life, NASA science flight 

project, and we feel that operational procedures used on past flight projects do not 

necessarily constitute the most efficient way to handle this program. We are, in a sense, 

taking our cue from the people who have been successfully operating the analogous, 

ground-based observatories over a large number of years. Another obvious advantage of 

the “institute” mode is that it is an operational mode with which the world-wide astronomical community is familiar and confident. . . . The Space Telescope Science Institute would have independent management and 

staff and its own computer hardware, which, in order to minimize cost, would begin operation using software developed by NASA. 

[7] The Science Institute would conduct science operations activities in three major 

areas: planning and management, Space Telescope scheduling, and data activities. Within 

the planning and management function, the Institute would implement those policies 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 547 

established by NASA which pertain to Space Telescope use. In this endeavor, the Institute 

would solicit, evaluate, and select observational proposals received from the scientific 

community and would formulate, for NASA review and approval, yearly activity goals 

which are in consonance with the overall policy established by NASA. 

The Science Institute, in addition to a long-term planning function, would generate 

the generalized observing schedules. To accomplish this function, computers would be 

located at the Institute to develop the target selection sequence while, at the same time, 

observing such factors as target availability, sky constraints, and spacecraft design constraints. The Institute would generate observing instructions as required. In turn, the 

Space Telescope Operations and Control Center (STOCC) at Goddard Space Flight 

Center would convert the observing instructions into space commands that would properly point and control the Space Telescope. 

In the data activities areas, the Institute would provide equipment enabling visiting 

scientists and staff to perform analyses of Space Telescope data, as well as to conduct basic 

research in the field of astronomy. Further, it would evaluate science productivity of the 

Space Telescope research program. It would help coordinate both correlative research 

with ground observing facilities and international participation in the overall activity. 

Finally, it would be responsible for informing the public of research results, as well as for 

archiving all Space Telescope data for dissemination as requested. 

In view of the use, initially, of NASA-generated software, the computer complex would 

be designed to be compatible with the computers in the STOCC at Goddard Space Flight 

Center. Consequently, the complex at the Institute would be designed by NASA prior to 

the establishment of the Institute. 

No compelling reasons have been identified for locating the Science Institute close to 

any existing NASA facility, so long as appropriate Institute personnel are collocated at 

Goddard Space Flight Center to interface with the STOCC. It is anticipated that the operational site of the Institute would be included as part of the proposals for its operation. 

Only general site criteria would be specified by NASA. These criteria might include such 

factors as proximity to an active astronomical center of excellence, a major airport, etc. 

We currently would anticipate release of a Request for Proposals early in FY 1980 for 

the operation of the Institute. The Institute would be built up slowly to full strength prior 

to launch of the Telescope in the first quarter of FY 1984. . . . 
548 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

[ 111 [Briefing Charts] 

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE METHOD OF 

SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE OPERATIONS 

(ALL IN FAVOR OF THE SCIENCE INSTITUTE APPROACH) 

Organization 

1966 REPORT OF STUDY HEADED BY NORMAN RAMSEY 

APRIL 1975 ST SCIENCE WORKING GROUP-BODY OF SENIOR SCIENTISTS 

SELECTED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE OF ST 

AUGUST 1975 COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETYELECTED COUNCIL OF THE ONLY PROFESSIONAL ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER1975 LST STUDY GROUP-AD HOC BODY OF SCIENTISTS CONVENED BY THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR TO PROVIDE AN 

OVERVIEW OF THE ST PROGRAM 

FEBRUARY 1976 SHUTTLE ASTRONOMY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 

WORKING GROUP-SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP CHAIRED 

BY THE CHIEF OF THE ASTRONOMYAND RELATIVITY OFFICE 

OF THE OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE 

DECEMBER 1976 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY HEADED BY PROFESSOR HORNIG 

[I21 

SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE 

CHARACTERISTICS 

LONGTERM COMMITMENT TO SCIENCE OPERATION 

COMPUTERS AND OTHER FACILITIES ACCESSIBLE TO ASTRONOMERS AND 

SCIENCE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL 

EFFICIENT MODE OF OPERATION WHICH HAS PROVEN TO BE RESPONSIVE 

TO THE USER COMMUNITYAND AT THE SAME TIME TO WORK WELL WITH 

FUNDING AGENCY 

ANALOGOUS TO THE OPERATING MODE EMPLOYED AT LARGE GROUNDBASED OBSERVATORIES OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF YEARS 

OPERATIONAL MODE WITH WHICH THE WORLDWIDE ASTRONOMICAL 

COMMUNITY IS FAMILIAR AND CONFIDENT 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 549 

[I31 

SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE 

SOME KEY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS 

.SCIENCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT - 

- 

- 

- 

IMPLEMENT NASA ST SCIENCE POLICY 

SOLICIT, EVALUATE, AND SELECT OBSERVATIONAL PROPOSALS 

COORDINATE CORRELATIVE RESEARCH 

COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION 

SCHEDULING 

- GENERALIZED OBSERVING SCHEDULES 

TARGET SEQUENCE 

TARGET AVAILABILITY 

SKY CONSTRAINTS 

SPACECRAFT CONSTRAINTS 

- GENERATE OBSERVING INSTRUCTIONS 

DATA ACTIVITIES 

- REDUCE AND ANALEE DATA 

CONDUCT BASIC RESEARCH 

EVALUATE SCIENCE 

INFORM THE PUBLIC 

ARCHIVE AND DISSEMINATE ST DATA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

[I41 

SPACE TELESCOPE SCIENCE INSTITUTE 

SUMMARY 

CHARACTERISTICS- 

* INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT AND STAFT 

DEDICATED FACILITIES (INCLUDING COMPUTERS) 

INITIAL SOFIWARE DEVELOPED BY NASA 

LONGTERM CONTRACT WITH NASA 

LOCATION- 

* NO COMPELLING DATA-HANDLING, MANAGERIAL, OR COST REASONS FOR 

LOCATION AT ANY EXISTING FACILITY 

SITE TO BE INCLUDED AS PART OF PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTE OPERATION/GENERAL SITE CRITERIA 

IMPLEMENTATION- 

* FIRST BUDGET YEAR-FY 1980 

RF'P RELEASED-EARLY FY 1980 

FULLY OPERATIONAI-AT LAUNCH-FIRST QUARTER OF EY 1984 
550 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-23 

Document title: R. W. Gutman, Director, General Accounting Office, to Robert A. Frosch, 

NASA Administrator, November 11,1977. 

Document 111-24 

Document title: Robert A. Frosch, NASA Administrator, to Associate Administrator for 

Space and Terrestrial Applications, et al., “NASA/University Relations,” May 18, 1978, 

with attached “Policy for Academic Involvement in the NASA R8cD Program.” 

Source: Both in University Affairs Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

These two memoranda discuss the review and ref? ofNASAS university relations eforts during the 

latter 1970s. In these documents, NASA Administrator Robert Frosch, in concert with others, sought 

to delineate the relationship between NASA and academia, as well as the activities that were appropiate for each to undertake. Essentially, Frosch directed that NASA rely on university expertise to provide basic research relative to the mission ofthe agmq, and he interpreted NASAS role in this arena 

as being one of facilitatol: He was also responding to concerns expressed ty the General Accounting 

Office (GAO) that NASA was conducting its university affairs program as basically open-ended sup 

port for scientists and engineers without clear propam definition. By tying the research sponsored by 

NASA much more closely to aerospace research and development activities under way at the agency, 

Frosch helped resolve many of these concerns. 

Document 111-23 

[l] The Honorable Robert A. Frosch 

Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Dear Dr. Frosch: 

November 11,1977 

The General Accounting Office just completed a survey under assignment code 

952174 of NASA’s administration of research grants and contracts to colleges and universities. During this survey, several aspects of NASA’s university research program were identified which we believe could be improved. Before planning additional work in this area 

we believe it would be mutually beneficial to both NASA and GAO to meet with you and 

your representatives. The purpose of the meeting would be to present to you our survey 

results and observations and to obtain your views thereon. 

The specific areas we would like to discuss are: - increasing university competition for research projects; 

improving the negotiation process and detailed support for the number of hours 

included in a proposal; 

the possibility of requiring NASA technical monitors to visit research sites to see 

what progress is being made; 

-

-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 551 

- corrective action that NASA could take when the cognizant Federal audit agency 

reports accounting system deficiencies at universities having NASA research 

grants and contracts; and 

- acquiring and disseminating technical information. 

Another area to be discussed relates to administrative differences between grants and 

contracts. It is not always clear as to whether a grant or a contract is the proper instrument 

to fund a project. In the case of grants, grantees are not required to report how funds were 

spent, grants are not audited prior to closing, and grantee-acquired equipment is not 

entered in NASA’s Equipment Visibility System although NASA has the option to obtain 

title to this equipment upon completion of a grant. 

In summary, NASA’s grant and contract administration practices give the appearance 

that a university assistance program is being conducted rather than a mission-oriented 

research program to further the agency’s [2] mission. Several NASA officials told us that 

a grant is a gift and that if a university fails to comply with grant provisions, action taken 

by NASA is limited to “friendly persuasion.” It may be a valid position that universities 

should be treated differently than commercial entities dealing with the Government; however, this should be balanced against the responsibility Federal agencies have for stewardship of public funds entrusted to them. 

We would like to schedule a meeting at your convenience soon after the first of 

December. Arrangements for the meeting can be made with Mr. Chester S. Daniels, 

Assistant Director of this Division. He can be reached by telephone on 275-3191. 

Sincerely yours, 

R. W. Gutman 

Director 

Document 111-24 

May 18, 1978 

Memorandum 

TO: E-1 /Associate Administrator for Space and Terrestrial Applications 

R-l/Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Technology 

$1 /Associate Administrator for Space Science 

L-l/Associate Administrator for External Relations 

FROM: A-l/Administrator 

SUBJECT: NASA/University Relations 

We have completed our review of the role of academic institutions in the NASA R&D 

Program, and it is our intention to continue to have strong academic involvement in the 

NASA R&D Program. 

NASA intends to enhance and strengthen the academic participation in its research 

program, particularly in those disciplines supporting our aeronautical and applications 

programs. 
552 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

It is NASA policy to involve academic scientists primarily in basic research. NASA 

encourages a growing independent academic research program; in particular, academic 

scientists will be given the opportunity to help advance the frontiers of science and technology in all disciplines of interest to the Nation in aeronautics and space. Cooperative 

programs between academia and in-house NASA research groups are beneficial and will 

continue. NASA will encourage the use of facilities at NASA centers by university scientists. 

NASA's policy shall be to encourage centers of excellence in universities and to cooperate with academic groups to strengthen them as required in research and education in 

aerospace science, engineering, and management. 

[2] NASA's relations with the university community will be conducted in a manner that 

reflects concern and understanding for the role of universities in education and research; 

avoids undue imposition of burdensome requirements; and does not tax an institution's 

financial resources. 

Enclosed is a draft of policy guidelines for university relationships which will be converted into an appropriate policy statement by the Office of External Relations. 

Each Associate Administrator, working with the appropriate Center Directors, shall 

prepare and submit by July 1, 1978, an action plan for my approval for accomplishing the 

goals of this policy. The action plan should define the current program with academic 

institutions, the plans to increase emphasis on independent research, and the management approach designed to place these policies into action. After acceptance of these 

action plans, the Associate Administrators and the Center Directors will be held accountable for the conduct of all academic activities under their control and, in particular, for 

strengthening academic programs in basic creative, and independent research in the area 

of applications, aerospace science and engineering. 

The Associate Administrator for External Relations will be responsible for necessary 

coordination activities among program offices and should be kept appropriately 

informed. 

It is my firm belief thatjudicious application of these policies will result in a combined 

stronger in-house and academic research establishment, and a stronger and more creative 

NASA research program in the decades ahead. 

Robert A. Frosch 

[Attachment 11 

POLICY FOR ACADEMIC INVOLVEMENT 

IN THE NASA R&D PROGRAM 

Academic scientists will conduct a substantial portion of the basic research in all disciplines in the NASA program. 

Academic scientists will participate directly, or through advisory groups, in all phases 

of the basic research activity: conception, planning, programming, execution, analysis and interpretation of the data, and publication of the results. 

Academic basic research groups will be encouraged to show independence and creativity in their work which will be subject to periodic peer evaluation. 

Basic research opportunities using specified NASA spacecraft and/or specified instruments aboard a NASA spacecraft will be available to academic scientists on the basis 

of open competition, evaluation of their proposal by their peers and selection by the 

appropriate Associate Administrator. 

NASA's research facilities will be available for basic research by academic scientists. The 

appropriate Associate Administrator and Center Director will assure access of suitable 

facilities, broad notification, and proper selection of academic research projects. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 553 

Cooperation in basic research between academic research groups and NASA in-house 

groups will be encouraged. 

Continuing research programs will be subject to peer evaluation at least once every 

three years involving reviews by a group of academic and in-house scientists with recognized research competence in the discipline. 

NASA’s relations with the university community will be conducted in a manner that 

reflects concern and understanding for the role of universities in education and 

research; avoids undue imposition of burdensome requirements; and does not tax a 

university’s financial resources. 

Document 111-25 

Document title: NASA/University Relations Study Group, “The Universities and NASA 

Space Sciences,” Initial Report of the NASA/University Relations Study Group, July 1983. 

Source: University Affairs Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 

Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

By the early 1980s, the entire NASA-university space science relationship was still experiencing d@- 

culties. In March and Apnl of 1983, a special group of NASA and university representatives met to 

discuss the problems in the relationship and to discuss possible short- and long-term policy solutions. 

The study group was co-chaired by Thomas Donahue of the University of Michigan and Frank 

McDonald of NASA Headparfen. Their initial report, repinfed here, contained a series of recommendations on ways to put the relationship back on a productive footing. 

The Universities and NASA Space Sciences 

[l] I. Introduction 

From the beginning of the space program, university scientists have played a vital role 

in all phases of NASA’s basic space research activity. It continues to be NASA’s policy that 

a substantial portion of the basic research in space science should be conducted by university groups. The contributions from these groups have been an essential factor in the 

vitality of our nation’s space program. Universities not only help generate new missions, 

design and build experiments, and interpret data, but most importantly, they are the 

essential conduit in transferring new knowledge and technology to other elements of society through the education and training of students. 

A. NASA/University Relations: The NASA space science program has evolved over 

25 years from one with a high frequency of exploratory missions, to one based primarily 

on long-lived observatories and planetary orbiters. During the ~O’S, NASA’s space science 

program involved an average of 4 or 5 flight missions per year. The scientific investigations 

for most of these missions were selected by a competitive process with the university 

groups historically supplying some 60% of the experiments. NASA further encouraged 

university participation through continuing multidisciplinary research grants to more 

than 40 universities and through the construction of 37 space science buildings or additions. To increase the number of research workers, there was a nationwide program of 

NASA fellowships for graduate students. By the late ~O’S, more than 5,300 students had 

received 3 year graduate fellowship awards. The establishment of the Space Science 

Board, under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences/National Research 

Council, provided university research scientists with a major role in advising NASA on science goals and policy for the U.S. space program. 
554 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

By the early 80’s the NASA launch rate of scientific satellites had declined to 1 or 2 

per year. The graduate fellowship program had been dropped and the sustaining university grants were terminated. The Office of Space Science and Applications’ [OSSA] 

budget, when measured in 1982 dollars, has decreased from a peak of 1.63 billion dollars 

in 1964 to .95 billion in 1984. Despite this decrease, the NASA science and applications 

budget remains one of the major funding sources for basic research in the United States. 

There have also been programmatic changes with a natural evolution toward larger and 

more complex missions as the exploratory phase of space studies has been completed. 

These new missions are taking the form of long-lived observatories such as Space 

Telescope and the Gamma Ray Observatory and planetary orbiters such as Galileo and 

the Venus Radar Mapper. A similar evolution has taken place with Explorers and the very 

exciting but technologically challenging missions such as IRAS [Infrared Astronomical 

Satellite] and COBE [Cosmic Background Explorer]. This sharp decrease in flight opportunities, accompanied by significant decreases in supporting research and data analysis 

funding have had the most deleterious effect, forcing drastic reductions in many university space research groups. Furthermore, contrary to original expectations, frequent 

opportunities to carry out scientific investigations on the Space Shuttle have not yet developed. 

[Z] B. The Role of the University: The elements of space sciences are a part of broader 

scientific disciplines, such as astronomy and astrophysics, earth and planetary sciences, 

and solar and space plasma physics. In their complete form, these provide both the rationale for the NASA programs and a framework for interpreting, incorporating, and communicating the results of those programs. It is through the continuing development and 

evolution of this disciplinary framework and the education of new scientists and engineers, that the universities play their unique and essential role in NASA’s space program. 

There are many facets to the universities’ role in the space sciences which result naturally from its place in this broader spectrum of science and engineering research. In the 

universities, the space sciences maintain contact with related disciplines, benefiting from 

and contributing to the cross-fertilization of creative activity that stimulates innovation. 

Contact between disciplines in the universities also leads to the development of new areas 

of research. For example, high energy astrophysics emerged from such contact between 

physics and astronomy. Similarly, space plasma physics grew out of physics, geophysics, 

and solar physics. Within the universities there is the flexibility to respond to the opportunities offered by new developments in related fields of study, and there are young, innovative students anxious to develop and exploit new approaches to scientific endeavors. 

Perhaps the most obvious role of the universities is in the education and training of 

graduate students. Students are an integral part of university research programs which are 

directed toward the increase of fundamental knowledge in the various scientific and engineering disciplines. The infusion of new talent, ideas, and innovation through the education of young people in the relevant disciplines is essential in maintaining the long-term 

vitality of space sciences. Equally important is the transfer of knowledge and technology 

that occurs when students trained in these disciplines move to industry and the national 

laboratories, taking with them research skills and familiarity with advanced technology 

characteristic of the space sciences. 

The universities educate more than just space scientists. As the results from the space 

sciences are distilled and incorporated into coherent bodies of knowledge, they become 

part of the general education of all students and are eventually woven into the fabric of 

society. 

C. The Requirements of University Space Science: The ways in which universities 

participate in space science can be broadly characterized as the formulation of new con- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 555 

cepts and ideas, the development of new observational and experimental techniques, data 

analysis and interpretation, laboratory studies and theory. The relative importance of 

these various modes tends to differ among disciplines and to change with time. 

Organizationally, university participation has taken many different forms, from the creation of large research centers on some campuses to the involvement of small investigator 

groups at other institutions. The vitality of NASA’s space science program is dependent on 

establishing an adequate research base at universities as well as at the NASA centers. It 

requires adequate research and analysis funding, a proper level of support for mission 

operation, data analysis and theoretical research, and continuing opportunity for participation in flight experiments. 

[3] Continuity of support is a very kq factor in sustaining the vitality of university research groups. 

To be effective, a typical university research activity must include professional faculty, key 

senior research faculty, postdoctoral fellows, and graduate students. Many activities also 

require a small core staff of engineers, programmers, and technicians in order to carry 

out the technical and managerial tasks characteristic of space science programs. 

Continuity is also important in the many cases where the innovations of subsequent programs often arise from the experience gained in previous programs. 

Continuity of support for graduate students and postdoctoral fellows is also essential. 

The key element of graduate education is learning to be a researcher, a process that takes 

on average 6 years in space sciences, culminating in a doctoral dissertation. Undertaking 

such a lengthy educational process is feasible only if there is dependable continuity of support not only for the student, but for the university group’s research program. 

As a postdoctoral fellow, for a period of 2 to 3 years, the scientist continues to develop as a researcher, seeking to establish a solid research program and gaining recognition 

as an effective and independent scientist through the publication of research results. 

Since these objectives can be accomplished only with a sustained effort over several years, 

continuity of support is required during this important phase of an emerging scientist’s 

research career. 

Effective university programs also depend on the availability of modern instrumentation and computing facilities. Modern laboratory test equipment is critical not only in the 

development of new observational techniques, but also in training graduate students in 

the technology which is current in industrial and federal laboratories. Effective progress 

in space research depends on the existence of appropriately staffed and maintained major 

laboratory facilities, which must be periodically upgraded in order to address the scientific questions of greatest interest with the most modern techniques. 

All of these attributes, including the provision of adequate flight opportunities, continuity of support, and the need for modern instrumentation and computing facilities, are 

necessary if the space sciences are to be sufficiently challenging to retain the interest of 

senior researchers, to offer realistic career opportunities to the most innovative younger 

researchers, and to attract capable, motivated graduate students. 

D. NAsA/University Study: Both NASA and the university scientific community have 

recognized for some time that a significant and undesirable erosion has occurred in the 

funding level of many university space research groups. (See Appendix 2 for a brief discussion of long-term funding trends in both NASA and in NASA funding to educational 

institutions.) After consultation with the Space Science Board, NASA felt that the best 

approach to defining the problem was to conduct a study with broad representation from 

NASA and the university community. The terms of reference and list of participants are 

included as Appendix 1. This group had meetings in March and April 1983. The strategy 

developed was to first explore short-term problems and issues and then spend the next 

year examining longer-term policy considerations and changes that might be made to 

reaffirm and/or redefine the NASA-university space science program. 
556 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

[4] A letter describing the study and requesting comments from the community was sent 

to some 120 scientists. Thirty percent sent written responses. A representative sample of 

these letters is included in Appendix 3. Members of the group also had lengthy discussions 

with many university and NASA scientists. The Headquarters science discipline chiefs were 

also consulted in a series of meetings on the principal needs of their research areas. 

In summary, the most important areas identified by the community and the discipline 

chiefs were: 

1. Increase the availability of low to moderate cost flight opportunities on the Space 

Shuttle, Explorers and the sub-orbital programs. 

2. Improve and modernize the university space science laboratories. 

3. Provide additional data analysis funding. 

4. Examine the adequacy of the research and technology base for the space science 

and applications program. 

Three of these areas were identified where immediate steps could be taken which 

would have a positive impact on the health of university research groups. These were: 

1. University Equipment Grants to provide standard laboratory equipment, as well 

as larger facility instruments, to university groups actively engaged in NASA research. 

2. Graduate Student Fellowships to provide financial support to graduate students 

working on NASA related programs. 

3. Increased Funding for Data Analysis which many programs including Voyager, 

IUE [International Ultraviolet Explorer], Landsat and others, could greatly benefit from. 

The specific recommendations and their rationale are given in the next three sections. Looking beyond these immediate steps the following longer range studies are 

planned for the coming year: - The Space Shuttle offers great promise for creating new experiment opportunities on 

a timely basis which can be exploited at a reasonable cost. A group will be established 

under the auspices of the NASA-university relations study group to examine how 

these objectives can be met. 

It is recommended that the NASA Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee 

examine the research and analysis program to ensure that the various discipline areas 

are being properly supported both in the development of new detectors, advanced 

analysis systems, and theoretical research. 

The NASA-Center-university relations should be examined to consider means by 

which this partnership could be made more effective. 

- 

- 

[5] II. Laboratory Tools for the Space Sciences 

University scientists, with their students and staff, have made major contributions 

during the past quarter century in establishing the position of leadership in the space sciences and exploration that the United States enjoys. This achievement was made possible 

by the unique collaboration, or partnership, between the university community and 

NASA, that provided the resources, planning, and long-range objectives for our national 

space program. Central to this success was the recognition by NASA at the beginning of 

the Space Age (e.g., 1958-64) that university scientists needed the “tools” and equipment 

to design and develop innovative instrumentation for space flight, and to process and analyze the data returned from space missions. Thus, through the purchase of equipment 

and facilities with funds provided by NASA, and pooling of laboratory equipment existing 

in the university laboratories at that time, there came into existence well equipped facilities that generated a program of imaginative scientific research in space and permitted 

the training of a new generation of investigators, engineers and managers. However, during the past decade the equipment and special facilities acquired in the early 1960’s and 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 557 

70’s became obsolete and increasingly difficult to maintain. Dramatic technological 

advances in space flight instrumentation made it very difficult, or impossible, to develop 

“state of the art” space flight instruments with the laboratory equipment of the 1960’s and 

early 70’s. As aging instruments have fallen into disrepair, it has become all but impossible to obtain replacement parts from industry. Consequently, technicians in the laboratories are preoccupied increasingly with repair of instruments, side-tracking them from 

more important tasks. 

The development of experiments for future space missions requires full access to 

modern technology. All too often we are now training our next generation of scientists 

and engineers and designing new experiments with equipment from a past generationinstead of equipment that will keep them and our technology on the forefront of the engineering and experimental sciences. Indeed, many European and Japanese laboratories, 

with which we compete, are equipped with much more modern tools than those possessed 

by our own laboratories. 

How did NASA and the universities fall so far behind in equipping university laboratories for space research and teaching of the next generation-after such an auspicious 

beginning? Two factors, both based on financial support, appear to be at the root of the 

problem: 

1. NASA support for space experiments by university investigators is in the form of 

a contract which provides for the design, fabrication and testing of the instrument, followed by funds for data analysis. However, the contracts exclude funding 

for the acquisition of new capital equipment or facilities to carry out the commitment; 

[6] 2. Since the principal support is through mission contracts, university scientists look 

to supporting Research and Technology (now Research and Analysis) grants for 

research and equipment funds. However, over the past decade the real level of 

support in these areas has steadily declined. Consequently, as the support 

declines, an ever-increasing fraction of the funds must be used to keep students 

and staff-with the result that funds for equipment become nonexistent, especially for state-of-the-art equipment. 

The time has come to take extraordinary steps to rectify this situation and again bring 

university laboratories into the same competitive position as laboratories in other countries, or even laboratories in our own NASA centers. Clearly, this will require an infusion 

of funds over a period of a few years devoted to this objective, but an early beginning is 

urgently needed. 

In working out a program, we may define three general classes of equipment and 

facilities needed as follows: 

1. Commercial laboratory equipment (e.g., oscilloscopes, test equipment, spectral 

analyzers, micro-processor development systems, etc.) ; 

2. Small and medium sized computational equipment of the micro and minicomputer class (e.g., computers and peripheral hardware, tape and disc drives, terminals, couplers to national networks, commercial software, etc.) , and interactive 

hardware which becomes especially important with the evolution of “observer 

class” space missions (e.g., Space Telescope, IUE, etc.); 

3. Major facilities for use by several investigators collaborating at an institution (e.g., 

vibration and shock testing equipment), or for establishing interdisciplinary 

research (e.g., micro-ion probes, gas analyzers, etc.) which would be used by different groups of investigators within an institution. Another example would be 

large, fast computer facilities of the Cray class, which would be used by several 

investigators and jointly by investigators at several institutions. Major facilities of 
558 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

this type require periodic technical support; and it is recognized that the neces 

sary funding support for these facilities should be provided by NASA as part of 

this program. 

Clearly, the NASA Discipline Chiefs within OSSA are closest to the needs of the investigators and their institutions, and are in the optimum’position to make judgments on 

which institutions, investigators, and researchers would benefit the most from equipment 

funds. Therefore, we recommend that a line item be identified in each Discipline Chiefs 

budget which would be available only for this purpose and would be funded through augmentation of current budgets by the appropriate amount. 

[7] A preliminary survey by NASA staff indicates that the following annual budget levels 

for this purpose would be: 

Astrophysics $3.000M 

Planetary Sciences 2.000M 

Environmental Observations 

including Space Plasma Physics 

and Solar Terrestrial Theory 4.000M 

Life Sciences 1.000M 

Communications, etc. 1.000M 

TOTAL Annual Commitment: $1 1.000M 

In view of the urgency, it is recommended that this program be instituted in the FY 

1985 budget and continued at this, or higher level, for at least five years-with a somewhat 

lower level in future fiscal years. 

How should the NASA Discipline Chiefs decide on which institutions to focus their 

attention? Suitable criteria might include: 

a. The proven record of the investigators at institutions with regard to innovative 

instrumentation, discovery, and exploration in their disciplines; 

b. The proven record of their training graduate students; 

c. Evidence that the institution has demonstrated a commitment to the space sciences as an integral part of teaching, research, etc., in the departments of the 

institution; 

d. New institutional support where a novel and important direction of research of 

interest to NASA has been identified. 

A program of this type is essential for revitalizing-indeed retaining-those institutions and individuals and groups within institutions concerned with the space sciences, if 

they are to continue their vital role in space research and training for the 1980’s and 

1990’s. 

[9] III. Graduate Research Fellowships 

The education and training of graduate students is one of the vital roles of the 

University. Training these students in space science is important to NASA and to the technology base of the country. They bring dedication and new insight to the ongoing 

research program and will design and build tomorrow’s new generations of spacecraft, 

instrumentation, telescopes and rockets. 

To attract the best students into the challenging areas of NASA activities and to reaffirm its commitment to graduate education, it is proposed that NASA re-establish a 

program of graduate research fellowships on a smaller and more focussed [sic] scale. 

Such a program would initially have 50 fellowships and would build to an annual steady 

state program level of 200 students. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 559 

The existence of such a fellowship program would constitute an announcement by 

NASA that the Agency is interested once again in seeing students of the highest quality 

involved in its programs and, we believe, would be a mechanism for attracting the best 

students. The competitive nature of the program we propose (as well as an attractive 

stipend) would help ensure that these fellowships would be regarded as prestigious 

awards. Such a fellowship program would permit awardees the freedom and stability to 

concentrate on their studies and research and allow them to progress through their graduate studies without being dependent on a particular NASA grant or flight program. 

The fellowship program would be designed to attract students at two stages in their 

careers. The first of these is at the transition from undergraduate to graduate school when 

the student is selecting a field of study and a university department in which he wishes to 

pursue those studies. The objective of the fellowship program is to influence the best graduating seniors to select some field of space science. The second group of students is that 

which is at the stage of selecting and being accepted by a faculty research advisor with a 

view to choosing a thesis research topic. The purpose of the fellowship award, is to induce 

the best students already in a department or a university that has a space science program 

to do his thesis research in that program. 

The preliminary prospectus for such a program is outlined in the following paragraphs: 

Graduate Research Fellowships 

Eligibility-The first class of students eligible consists of those entering graduate 

school who are accepted for study in a university department with a recognized program 

in some phase of space science. A list of such departments will be prepared by NASA. 

Students with outstanding undergraduate records and a[n] aptitude for success in some 

field of space science will be sought. Their continuing eligibility would be dependent on 

their selecting a space related thesis topic. The second class are students with proven ability in graduate study. 

[IO] Duration-In no case will a student be eligible to maintain a NASA graduate fellowship beyond the sixth year of graduate study. For students in category (a), the initial award 

shall be for three years. Renewal for a second three year period will be contingent on the 

student’s admission to candidacy for the PhD degree and acceptance by a faculty research 

advisor for a thesis research project in space science. For students in category (b), the 

award should be for three years, subject to annual certification that the student is making 

normal progress toward a degree and is continuing to work in space science. 

Stipend-The stipend should cover the full calendar year (not only the 9-month academic year) and be comparable to the best graduate research assistantships. The stipend 

should provide full tuition at whatever university the student attends (so as not to prevent 

students from attending private universities having higher tuition) and a living allowance 

of $13,000 per year that would be increased by $1,000 per year after each additional year 

after the first, up to a maximum of $16,000. 

Application-Selection of candidates entering graduate school should be based on a 

one-page statement by the student describing their career goals, a transcript, G.R.E. 

results, and three letters of recommendation. For advanced students, the statement 

should describe the proposed research topic and one of the letters of recommendation 

must be from the proposed research advisor. 

Selection-Applications should be submitted to NASA Headquarters and fellows 

should be selected by a board consisting of 3 members of the academic community and 3 

NASA scientists, all appointed by the NASA Administrator. NASA discipline chiefs will be 

asked to review and grade the proposals in the appropriate disciplines. 
560 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

Number-Approximately 50 new awards per year, of which at least 25 should be to 

entering graduate students, leading to a steady state number of about 250. 

Publicity-We would urge wide publicity for the selected students including, if possible, articles in Science News, Science, etc. 

[ 111 IV. Data Analysis and Mission Operations 

It is the interpretation and analysis of the data from space missions that frequently 

offers the greatest intellectual challenge to researchers, postdocs and graduate students. 

The scientist takes the information from these remote laboratories, analyzes the data, and 

uses the results to extend our knowledge of the universe. This seeking of “new knowledge” 

is the primary reason for undertaking these new missions. However, as the experiments 

and spacecraft have become more complex and the costs of mission operations and data 

analysis have increased, the available funding has not always reflected this change. 

There has also been a very positive development over the past ten years as the average lifetime of the NASA science missions has significantly increased. This enhanced 

longevity is due in large measure to the increase in space engineering experience and the 

development of a sophisticated technology base. Despite the decrease in launch rate, 

there are now some 14 active satellites returning valuable new data to a large number of 

space experimenters and guest investigators. 

This increase in spacecraft lifetime frequently offers a very cost effective means of 

achieving new, high priority scientific objectives-bjectives which were not part of the 

spacecraft’s original intended mission. For example, ISEE-3 has been moved from the 

Lagrangian point 8,000,000 km in front of the Earth to a close lunar fly-by with repeated 

passes through the distant geomagnetic tail region. It will be the first detailed survey of 

this very dynamic portion of our magnetosphere. Later this year, ISEE-3 will be redirected toward the first encounter with a comet-Giacobini-Zinner in 1985. After completing 

its fly-by of Jupiter and Saturn, Voyager 2 has now been targeted for a Uranus encounter 

in 1986 and Neptune in 1989-thus making it possible to accomplish most of the objectives of the original “Grand Tour.” Pioneer 10, now in its 12th year, is exploring the distant heliosphere beyond 30 AU and discovering a number of unexpected phenomena. 

ISEE I and 11, Pioneer-Venus and IMP-8 [Interplanetary Monitoring Platform] are studying the changes that occur in the Earth’s magnetosphere, the atmosphere of Venus and 

the interplanetary medium as the level of solar activity begins to significantly decrease. 

IUE has an almost unlimited number of classes of astronomical objects that are being 

observed for the first time in the ultra-violet portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. 

Nimbus-7 is in its fifth year of operation and its data set of earth observations is now long 

enough to permit study of long-term trends, interannual variations, and questions of climate. This fleet of active satellites is currently one of space science’s greatest assets. 

The Landsat programs produced vast quantities of high resolution imagery of the 

[E] arth’s surface. As with the operational meteorological satellites, there is a significant 

need to analyze this data as part of scientific research into the functioning of the Earth. 

Extended analysis of this type of data must be established in the university community as 

an integral part of space science research or else this available wealth of information will 

not be adequately used for furthering the understanding of our own planet. 

[ 121 The costs associated with the extended phases of these missions are generally modest, since most production and analysis programs have already been developed and only 

require updating. However, the funding levels for data analysis and mission operations 

have not been adequate to realize the full scientific return from this sustained and available flow of scientific data. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 561 

In fiscal year 1983, the data analysis and mission operation budget is about $155M or 

approximately 15% of the OSSA total budget. $14M of this was added by Congressional 

appropriations committees to ensure the continuation of such key programs as PioneerVenus and Pioneer 10. It is proposed that this be increased by $20M per year with most of 

this increased allocation going to University groups. This increase in data analysis funding 

will have 'an enormous impact on the vitality of the space science program. 

A survey of the data analysis requirements was made by the NASA headquarter's [sic] 

discipline chiefs and the following augmentations were proposed: 

Data Analysis Requirements 

Solar System Exploration 

Inner Planets Data Analysis 

(Mariner 10, Lunar Orbiter, PVO) 

$4M/yr 

Outer Planets Data Analysis 

(Viking, Voyager, Pioneer 10/11) 

$6M/yr 

Astrophysics 

Solar & Heliospheric Physics 

(SMM Guest Investigators, OSO-7, OSO-8) 

Astronomy & Relativity 

(OAO 2 & 3, Increase IUE) 

High Energy Astrophysics 

(HEAO-1, 2, 3, SASS) 

Environmental Observations 

Space Plasma Physics 

(IMP-8, AE, ISEE-1, 2, 3) 

Climate Research 

(Nimbus 6 & 7, Sage 1) 

Upper Atmosphere Research 

(Nimbus 4,6 & 7, Sage, SME) 

Global Weather, Tropical Air Quality 

(GOES, GMS, TIROSN, NOAA-D, E, F) 

[ 131 V. Future Studies 

The most important area identified by the community was increasing the availability 

of low-cost flight opportunities via the Space Shuttle, Explorers, and the sub-orbital programs. This is a challenging task that requires more detailed study. The implementation 

of a more effective Explorer program should be pursued by the Space Science Board, 

NASA Headquarters and the NASA field centers. The current sub-orbital program is a 

good way for graduate students to conduct small but scientifically significant experiments 

which complement larger missions. The Space Shuttle offers great promise for creating 

new experimental opportunities. With the current flight plans, there should be frequent 

flight opportunities which can be exploited at a reasonable cost. The time scale from project approval to launch should be on the order of 18 months. It is not surprising that the 

great promise of the Shuttle for science has not been fully realized. The Shuttle itself has 

just reached operational status. Scientists and the manned program both need to learn 

how to use this new transportation system to greater advantage for science. The Study 

Group strongly urges that NASA establish a panel to study the Spacelab experience and 
562 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

make recommendations on new approaches. It would be highly desirable to have this task 

completed over the next 8-10 months. 

The research and analysis funding provides the research base for the NASA science 

program both at the universities and at the NASA centers. Over the years there have been 

substantial changes in the NASA program. The Study Group recommends that a reexamination of the R&A [Research and Applications] program be made to ensure that 

the various discipline areas are being properly supported both in the development of new 

detectors, advanced analysis systems and theoretical research. It is recommended that this 

study be undertaken by the Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee. 

The NASA centers in managing the space missions and sub-orbital programs play a 

crucial role in the space science program. The centers also maintain strong in-house 

research programs. It is important to reevaluate the University-NASA Center relationship, 

both in the management of space missions and experiments as well as their relative roles 

in the conduct of space sciences. In the longer term activity of the Study Group, a committee will be formed including representation from all the NASA centers strongly 

involved in space science and university representatives to consider ways in which the 

NASA-University partnership may be made more effective. Specific questions to be 

considered include the interchange of NASA and university personnel at several levels, 

methods of making center facilities, including large computer systems, more accessible to 

university users, and methods of providing center management and technical expertise to 

university principal investigators. 

VI 

Appendix 1 

Study of NASA-University Relations in Space Sciences 

Terms of Reference 

I. Motivation for Study 

The agency recognizes that the benefits to the nation from a vital university space science program are large and diverse, and extend beyond the areas of scientific inquiry; 

that university-based space science research is a national resource which cannot be duplicated or obtained elsewhere; and that a healthy space science program at U.S. universities 

is essential to the agency space science program. 

The nation's space science program has evolved so there is now greater emphasis on 

long-lived space observatories. These programmatic changes combined with a decline in 

the funding of the space science program has led to a marked decrease in new opportunities for flight experiments and to a decline in the viability of many long established 

research groups. 

While there may have been early expectations that the university-based program 

could adjust itself at an appropriate level to support the agency space science program, 

there is now a growing body of evidence which strongly indicates that university relations 

and the resource represented in university space science will soon be insufficient to support current levels of the space science program in the agency. 

11. General Approach to the Study 

The agency, after consultation with the Space Science Board and other outside 

groups, feels that the best approach to the problem is a study with broad representation 

from NASA and the university community. The information resources (statistics, management personnel, and contract network to the universities) are on hand within the agency. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 563 

However, the programmatic changes related to both the evolution of the flight program 

and the decrease in the number of flight activities depends on a combined 

NASA/University discussion. Of greater importance is the understanding of conditions in 

the university laboratories that can only be supplied by representatives from all levels of 

university-based space science (researchers, program managers, university administrators), and they should possess knowledge of the problems adequate at their respective 

levels to serve as representatives of their communities. The agency will assume responsibility for the management of the study and the study report. 

[2] In. Tasks for Study Group 

A study group consisting of approximately 12 people drawn from NASA and the university community will: 

Assess the health of university space science research groups and identify the problems. 

Examine, and redefine if necessary, the role of university groups in NASA future space 

science program. 

Identify the essential steps which must be taken in the agency and universities to 

restore university space science to a viable level. 

Present conclusions and recommendations to appropriate outside groups for comment and assessment and to the Space Science Board and to NASA management for 

review and action. 

IV. Methodology 

Organizational meeting to pose the problem and scope of the study (2 1/2 daysearly March 1983). 

Period of information gathering (statistics, funding trends, student trends, program 

trends) (April-June 1983). 

- Individual visits 

Regional meetings/workshops 

Study groups, representatives meeting Gth appropriate groups (NASA centers, 

university research groups, research administrators) 

Collection of statistics 

- 

- 

- 

Synthesis of data and information (mid-July 1983, one week). 

Determine follow-on as necessary. 

r 11 

Appendiv 2 

Funding Trends in NASA’s Space 

Science and Applications Program 

In this appendix, the long term funding trends in both the total NASA appropriation 

and the Office of Space Science and Application’s [sic] (OSSA) portion of that budget are 

briefly examined. All of these budget numbers have been converted to 1982 dollars in 

order to compare the variation of equivalent real purchasing power. In Figure 1, the total 

NASA funding is shown for the 1960-1984 period. The corresponding OSSA numbers are 

also shown, but have been multiplied by a factor of 10 to emphasize the relative variation 

of the OSSA budget to the total NASA appropriation. The OSSA data has been compiled 

by the Administration and Resources Management Division of NASA’s Office of Space 

Science and Applications. They have taken into account the reorganization and changing 

program office responsibilities that have occurred during this time. 
564 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Over a period of 3-5 years, there can be large variations in the annual OSSA funding 

level. . . . The most disturbing trend is the decrease from 1.55 billion dollars in 1973 to 0.9 

billion in 1982. Most of this decrease occurred in the planetary program. . . . These 

changes reflect the launch of the Viking and Voyager spacecraft and the stretch-out of the 

Galileo program. However, there are reductions in other .areas that also have a large 

impact on the science program. There has been a steady decrease in the annual appropriations for research and analysis in the space science area . . . , while the level in space 

applications has remained relatively constant. As emphasized in the main body of the text, 

this support is of great importance in maintaining the vitality of research groups. . . . 

[2]. . . [3] NASA total funding to universities has been almost exactly 3% of the total 

appropriations from 1973 to 1984 (Table 1). However, in 1982 dollars, there is a decrease 

from 261.3M in 1973 to 177.6 in 1983. It is thisvery large decrease in the real funding level 

that is the key problem in maintaining NASA research programs at the universities. 

The marked decrease in the number of flight opportunities, (see Table 2), has been 

an additional factor that has greatly affected space science research groups. This change 

is more complex, since it represents both a decrease in the available funding, as well as a 

move to larger, more expensive missions. 

Table 1 

Total NASA Funding to Educational Institutions 

Total NASA % of Univ. 

R&D Obligations Real Year in Constant Funding to Total 

Year 1982 $(millions) $(millions) FY 1982 Dollars NASA Funding 

1973 7,710 114.9 261.3 3.0% 

1974 6,420 100.9 214.0 3.0% 

1975 6,160 112.4 215.1 3.0% 

1976 6,2 10 122.5 215.1 3.0% 

1977 6,030 124.9 198.0 3.0% 

1978 5,950 135.3 199.0 3.0% 

1979 6,100 147.8 198.5 2.8% 

1980 6,330 177.3 215.1 3.0% 

1981 6,010 191.1 209.1 3.0% 

1982 6,020 185.6 185.6 3.0% 

1983 6,210 197.2 177.6 2.8% 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 565 

[41 Table 2 

NASA Space Science and Applications Launches 

Year # of Launches 5 Year Average/Year 

1958 1 

1959 4 

1960 2 

1961 3 

1962 4 3.8 

1963 3 

1964 7 - 

1965 7 

1966 5 

1967 8 6.2 

1968 5 

1969 6 - 1970 2 

1971 4 

1972 4 4.2 

1973 6 

1974 5 - 

1975 7 

1976 1 

1977 5 4.0 

1978 6 

1979 1 - 

1980 1 

1981 2 

1982 0 1 .o 

1983 1 

1984 1 - 

Document 111-26 

Document title: Section 201 of Title I1 of Public Law 100-147, “National Space Grant 

College and Fellowship Program,” October 30, 1987. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

During the administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981 to 1989, Congress passed the “National Space 

Chant and Fellnwship Act” as a means of making funding available to institutions of higher learning for the reuitaliration of the scientific and engineering disciplines. The act was deliberately modeled on the Momdl Land Grant College Act of the 1860s, which provided land for public sale with 

the proceeds going to public universities. The 1987 act created “space grant” universities and consortia eligible for public funds to foster aerospace research and development and education. 
566 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UN IVERSI~ NEXUS 

[no pagination] 

Title 11-National Space Grant College and 

Fellowship Program 

Sec. 201. This title may be cited at the “National Space Grant College and Fellowship 

Act.” 

Sec. 202. The Congress finds that- 

(1) the vitality of the Nation and the quality of life of the citizens of the Nation 

depend increasingly on the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization 

of space resources; 

(2) research and development of space science, space technology, and space 

commercialization will contribute to the quality of life, national security, and the 

enhancement of commerce; 

(3) the understanding and development of the space frontiers require a broad 

commitment and an intense involvement on the part of the Federal Government in 

partnership with State and local governments, private industry, universities, organizations, and individuals concerned with the exploration and utilization of space; 

(4) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, through the national 

space grant college and fellowship program, offers the most suitable means for such 

commitment and involvement through the promotion of activities that will result in 

greater understanding, assessment, development, and utilization; and 

(5) Federal support of the establishment, development, and operation of programs and projects by space grant colleges, space grant regional consortia, institutions 

of higher education, institutes, laboratories, and other appropriate public and private 

entities is the most cost-effective way to promote such activities. 

Sec. 203. The purposes of this title are to- 

(1) increase the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization of 

space resources by promoting a strong educational base, responsive research and 

training activities, and broad and prompt dissemination of knowledge and techniques; 

(2) utilize the abilities and talents of the universities of the Nation to support and 

contribute to the exploration and development of the resources and opportunities 

afforded by the space environment; 

(3) encourage and support the existence of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary programs of space research within the university community of the Nation, to 

engage in integrated activities of training, research and public service, to have cooperative programs with industry, and to be coordinated with the overall program of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 

(4) encourage and support the existence of consortia, made up of university and 

industry members, to advance the exploration and development of space resources in 

cases in which national objectives can be better fulfilled than through the programs 

of single universities; 

(5) encourage and support Federal funding for graduate fellowships in fields 

related to space; and 

(6) support activities in colleges and universities generally for the purpose of 

creating and operating a network of institutional programs that will enhance achievements resulting from efforts under this title. 

Sec. 204. As used in this chapter, the term- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 567 

(1) “Administration” means the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 

(2) “Administrator” means the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration; 

(3) “aeronautical and space activities” has the meaning given to such term in section 2452( 1) of this title; 

(4) “field related to space” means any academic discipline or field of study 

(including the physical, natural, and biological sciences, and engineering, space technology, education, economics, sociology, communications, planning, law, international affairs, and public administration) which is concerned with or likely to improve 

the understanding, assessment, development, and utilization of space; 

(5) “panel” means the space grant review panel established pursuant to section 

2486h of this title; 

(6) “person” means any individual, any public or private corporation, partnership, or other association or entity (including any space grant college, space grant 

regional consortium, institution of higher education, institute, or laboratory), or any 

State, political subdivision of a State, or agency or officer of a State or political subdivision of a State; 

(7) “space environment” means the environment beyond the sensibIe atmosphere of the Earth; 

(8) “space grant college” means any public or private institution of higher 

education which is designated as such by the Administrator pursuant to section 2486f 

of this title; 

(9) “space grant program” means any program which- 

(A) is administered by any space grant college, space grant regional consortium, institution of higher education, institute, laboratory, or State or local 

agency; and 

(B) includes two or more projects involving education and one or more of 

the following activities in the fields related to space- 

(i) research, 

(ii) training, or 

(iii) advisory services; 

(10) “space grant regional consortium” means any association or other alliance 

which is designated as such by the Administrator pursuant to section 2486f of this title; 

(1 1) “space resource” means any tangible or intangible benefit which can only be 

realized from- 

(A) aeronautical and space activities; or 

(B) advancements in any field related to space; and 

(12) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any other territory or possession 

of the United States. 

Sec. 205. (a) The Administrator shall establish and maintain, within the 

Administration, a program to be known as the national space grant college and fellowship 

program. The national space grant college and fellowship program shall consist of the 

financial assistance and other activities provided for in this chapter. The Administrator 

shall establish long-range planning guidelines and priorities, and adequately evaluate the 

program. 

(b) Within the Administration, the program shall- 

(1) apply the long-range planning guidelines and the priorities established by the 

Administrator under subsection (a) of this section; 
568 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

(2) advise the Administrator with respect to the expertise and capabilities which 

are available through the national space grant college and fellowship program, and 

make such expertise available to the Administration as directed by the Administrator; 

(3) evaluate activities conducted under grants and contracts awarded pursuant to 

sections 2486d and 2486e of this title to assure that the purposes set forth in section 

2486a of this title are implemented; 

(4) encourage other Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities to use 

and take advantage of the expertise and capabilities which are available through the 

national space grant college and fellowship program, on a cooperative or other basis; 

(5) encourage cooperation and coordination with other Federal programs concerned with the development of space resources and fields related to space; 

(6) advise the Administrator on the designation of recipients supported by the 

national space grant college and fellowship program and, in appropriate cases, on the 

termination or suspension of any such designation; and 

(7) encourage the formation and growth of space grant and fellowship programs. 

(c) To carry out the provisions of this chapter, the Administrator may- 

(1) accept conditional or unconditional gifts or donations of services, money, or 

property, real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible; 

(2) accept and use funds from other Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities to pay for fellowships, grants, contracts, and other transactions; and 

(3) issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary and appropriate. 

Sec. 206. (a) The Administrator may make grants and enter into contracts or other 

transactions under this subsection to assist any space grant and fellowship program or project if the Administrator finds that such program or project will carry out the purposes set 

forth in section 2486a of this title. The total amount paid pursuant to any such grant or 

contract may equal 66 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the space grant 

and fellowship program or project involved, except that this limitation shall not apply in 

the case of grants or contracts paid for with funds accepted by the Administrator pursuant 

to section 2486c(c) (2) of this title. 

(b) The Administrator may make special grants under this subsection to carry out the 

purposes set forth in section 2486a of this title. The amount of any such grant may equal 

100 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the project involved. No grant may 

be made under this subsection, unless the Administrator finds that- 

(1) no reasonable means is available through which the applicant can meet the 

matching requirement for a grant under subsection (a) of this section; 

(2) the probable benefit of such project outweighs the public interest in such 

matching requirement; and 

(3) the same or equivalent benefit cannot be obtained through the award of a 

contract or grant under subsection (a) of this section or section 2486e of this title. 

(c) Any person may apply to the Administrator for a grant or contract under this section. Application shall be made in such form and manner, and with such content and 

other submissions, as the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe. 

(d) (1) Any grant made, or contract entered into, under this section shall be subject 

to the limitations and provisions set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection 

and to such other terms, conditions and requirements as the Administrator considers 

necessary or appropriate. 

(2) No payment under any grant or contract under this section may be applied 

to- 

(A) the purchase of any land; 

(B) the purchase, construction, preservation, or repair of any building; or 

(C) the purchase or construction of any launch facility or launch vehicle. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 569 

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, the items in subparagraphs 

(A), (B), and (C) of such paragraph may be leased upon written approval of the 

Administrator. 

(4) Any person who receives or utilizes any proceeds of any grant or contract 

under this section shall keep such records as the Administrator shall by regulation 

prescribe as being necessary and appropriate to facilitate effective audit and evaluation, including records which fully disclose the amount and disposition by such recipient of such proceeds, the total cost of the program or project in connection with 

which such proceeds were used, and the amount, if any, of such cost which was provided through other sources. Such records shall be maintained for three years after 

the completion of such a program or project. The Administrator and the Comptroller 

General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall 

have access, for the purpose of audit and evaluation, to any books, documents, papers 

and records of receipts which, in the opinion of the Administrator or the Comptroller 

General, may be related or pertinent to such grants and contracts. 

Sec. 207. (a) The Administrator shall identify specific national needs and problems 

relating to space. The Administrator may make grants or enter into contracts under this 

section with respect to such needs or problems. The amount of any such grant or contract 

may equal 100 percent, or any lesser percent, of the total cost of the project involved. 

(b) Any person may apply to the Administrator for a grant or contract under this section. In addition, the Administrator may invite applications with respect to specific 

national needs or problems identified under subsection (a) of this section. Application 

shall be made in such form and manner, and with such content and other submissions, as 

the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe. Any grant made, or contract entered into, 

under this section shall be subject to the limitations and provisions set forth in section 

2486d(d) (2) and (4) of this title and to such other terms, conditions, and requirements 

as the Administrator considers necessary or appropriate. 

Sec. 208. (a) (1) The Administrator may designate- 

(A) any institution of higher education as a space grant college; and 

(B) any association or other alliance of two or more persons, other than individuals, as a space grant regional consortium. 

(2) No institution of higher education may be designated as a space grant college, unless the Administrator finds that such institution- 

(A) is maintaining a balanced program of research, education, training, and 

advisory services in fields related to space; 

(B) will act in accordance with such guidelines as are prescribed under subsection (b) (2) of this section; and 

(C) meets such other qualifications as the Administrator considers necessary 

or appropriate. 

(3) No association or other alliance of two or more persons may be designated as 

a space grant regional consortium, unless the Administrator finds that such association or alliance- 

(A) is established for the purpose of sharing expertise, research, educational 

facilities or training facilities, and other capabilities in order to facilitate research, 

education, training, and advisory services, in any field related to space; 

(B) will encourage and follow a regional approach to solving problems or 

meeting needs relating to space, in cooperation with appropriate space grant colleges, space grant programs, and other persons in the region; 

(C) will act in accordance with such guidelines as are prescribed under subsection (b) (2) of this section; and 
570 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

(D) meets such other qualifications as the Administrator considers necessary 

or appropriate. 

(b) The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe- 

(1) the qualifications required to be met under subsection (a) (2) (C) and (3) (D) 

of this section; and 

(2) guidelines relating to the activities and responsibilities of space grant colleges 

and space grant regional consortia. 

(c) The Administrator may, for cause and after an opportunity for hearing, suspend 

or terminate any designation under subsection (a) of this section. 

Sec. 209. (a) The Administrator shall support a space grant fellowship program to 

provide educational and training assistance to qualified individuals at the graduate level 

of education in fields related to space. Such fellowships shall be awarded pursuant to 

guidelines established by the Administrator. Space grant fellowships shall be awarded to 

individuals at space grant colleges, space grant regional consortia, other colleges and institutions of higher education, professional associations, and institutes in such a manner as 

to assure wide geographic and institutional diversity in the pursuit of research under the 

fellowship program. 

(b) The total amount which may be provided for grants under the space grant fellowship program during any fiscal year shall not exceed an amount equal to 50 percent of 

the total funds appropriated for such year pursuant to this chapter. 

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the Administrator from 

sponsoring any research fellowship program, including any special emphasis program, 

which is established under an authority other than this chapter. 

Sec. 210. (a) The Administrator shall establish an independent committee known as 

the space grant review panel, which shall not be subject to the provis[i]ons of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.; Public Law 92-463). 

(b) The panel shall take such steps as may be necessary to review, and shall advise the 

Administrator with respect to- 

(1) applications or proposals for, and performance under, grants and contracts 

awarded pursuant to sections 2486d and 2486e of this title; 

(2) the space grant fellowship program; 

(3) the designation and operation of space grant colleges and space grant regional consortia, and the operation of space grant and fellowship programs; 

(4) the formulation and application of the planning guidelines and priorities 

pursuant to section 2486c(a) and (b) (1) of this title; and 

(5) such other matters as the Administrator refers to the panel for review and 

advice. 

(c) The Administrator shall make available to the panel any information, personnel 

and administrative services and assistance which is reasonable to carry out the duties of 

the panel. 

(d) (1) The Administrator shall appoint the voting members of the panel. A majority of the voting members shall be individuals who, by reason of knowledge, experience, or training, are especially qualified in one or more of the disciplines and fields 

related to space. The other voting members shall be individuals who, by reason of 

knowledge, experience or training, are especially qualified in, or representative of, 

education, extension services, State government, industry, economics, planning, or 

any other activity related to efforts to enhance the understanding, assessment, development, or utilization of space resources. The Administrator shall consider the potential conflict of interest of any individual in making appointments to the panel. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 571 

(2) The Administrator shall select one voting member to serve as the Chairman 

and another voting member to serve as the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman shall 

act as Chairman in the absence or incapacity of the Chairman. 

(3) Voting members of the panel who are not Federal employees shall be reimbursed for actual and reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of such 

duties. 

(4) The panel shall meet on a biannual basis and, at any other time, at the call of 

the Chairman or upon the request of a majority of the voting members or of the 

Administrator. 

(5) The panel may exercise such powers as are reasonably necessary in order to 

carry out the duties enumerated in subsection (b) of this section. 

Sec. 211. Each department, agency or other instrumentality of the Federal 

Government which is engaged in or concerned with, or which has authority over, matters 

relating to space- 

(1) may, upon a written request from the Administrator, make available, on a 

reimbursable basis or otherwise, any personnel (with their consent and without prejudice to their position and rating), service, or facility which the Administrator considers necessary to carry out any provision of this chapter; 

(2) may, upon a written request from the Administrator, furnish any available 

data or other information which the Administrator considers necessary to carry out 

any provision of this chapter; and 

(3) may cooperate with the Administration. 

Sec. 212. (a) The Administrator shall submit to the Congress and the President, not 

later than January 1, 1989, and not later than February 15 of every odd-numbered year 

thereafter, a report on the activities of the national space grant and fellowship program. 

(b) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Director of the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President shall 

have the opportunity to review each report prepared pursuant to subsection (a) of this 

section. Such Directors may submit, for inclusion in such report, comments and recommendations and an independent evaluation of the national space grant college and fellowship program. Such comments and recommendations shall be submitted to the 

Administrator not later than 90 days before such a report is submitted pursuant to sub 

section (a) of this section and the Administrator shall include such comments and recommendations as a separate section in such report. 

Sec. 213. The Administrator shall not under this chapter designate any space grant 

college or space grant regional consortium or award any fellowship, grant, or contract 

unless such designation or award is made in accordance with the competitive, merit-based 

review process employed by the Administration on the date of enactment of this Act. 

Sec. 214. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes of carrying 

out the provisions of this chapter sums not to exceed- 

(1) $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1988 and 1989; and 

(2) $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1990 and 1991. 

(b) Such sums as may be appropriated under this section shall remain available until 

expended. 
572 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Document 111-27 

Document title: NASA Commercial Space Policy, October 1984. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Reagan administration placed a high value on Fvatizing many government services and activities. This perspective extended to space and was coupled with the optimistic viqoint that space 

commerce held the potential of growing into a multibillion dollar annual enterprise. In 1984, the 

administration released a National Commercial Space Policy, which outlined its views in this area. 

NASA responded soon afh with its own commercial space policy, which attempted to redefine the 

agency’s role, including being a partner m’th US. industry in explm‘ng various areas of space 

commercialization. 

[ ii] 

NASA Commercial Space Policy 

Encouraging Private Enterprise in Space 

The purpose of this Policy is to prepare NASA for expanding its mission in 

a new direction-the fostering of commercial enterprises in space. 

This Policy, and accompanying Implementation Plan were drawn up by 

rtgresentatives from NASA headquarters and field centers. These representatives looked at the commercial possibilities in space and how NASA can 

encourage more pn’vate industrial ventures in orbit. 

To supplement their perspective, the NASA representatives sought and 

received advice from experts in industry and universities as well as other 

outside specialists. 

[iii] The United States Government willp-ovide a climate conducive to expanded private sector investment and involvement in civil space activities. . . . 

President Ronald Reagan 

in his National Space Policy, July 4,1982 

[iv] We should establish a policy which would encourage commercialization of 

space technology to the maximum extent feasible. 

Committee on Science and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Report, April 15, 1983 

***** 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 573 

[VI 

The Committee is fulb supportive of eforts by the private sector to invest 

and seek commern'al opportunities in space. 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate, 

Report, May 15, 1983 

***** 

The extent to which past investment in space technology contributes to our 

future economic well-being and national growth will depend in large measure on policies and actions taken in a spirit of collaboration by the Federal 

Government and industry. 

Unless the public and pivate sector join to develop the opportunities jwesented by new space technologies and unless entrepreneurial forces are 

engaged more fully, the United States will fall behind in the contest for leadership in space and the economic rewards associated with that position. 

May 1983 Report, 

National Academy of Public Administration 

Preamble 

The new chapter in the U. S. space program that opened early in this decade with the 

first flights of the Shuttle is now reaching a new phase: space technology is ripe for its transition from exploration to major exploitation, from experimentation to expanded profitable commercial uses. 

To examine the opportunities for and impediments to expanded commercial activities in space, NASA formed a Task Force in mid-1983. 

The Task Force's conclusions are straightforward: 

Commercial activities in space by private enterprise should be expanded now if our 

nation is to retain and improve its leadership in science and technology, its high living standards, and its advantage in international trade. 

Natural and bureaucratic barriers inhibiting the commercialization of space need to 

be and can be lessened or removed through joint actions by the Government and private enterprises. 

With firm resolve and the commitment of reasonable resources over a number of 

years, Government and private enterprise working together can turn space into a 

realm of immense benefit for our nation. 

A positive NASA Commercial Space Policy should be implemented to expedite the 

expansion of self-sustaining, profit-earning, tax-paying, jobs-providing commercial 

space activities. 

- 

[vi] The NASA Commercial Space Policy supports commercial space activities through: 

Reducing the risks of doing business in space to levels competitive with conventional 

investments. 

- 

To reduce technical risks, NASA will conduct and stimulate additional research 

relevant to commercial developments in space. 

To reduce financial risks, NASA will provide easy and inexpensive access to orbit 

as well as to experimental ground facilities. 
574 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

- To reduce institutional risks, NASA will help remove procedural impediments, 

offer organizational support, and maintain consistent policies regarding its relationship with commercial space ventures. 

Reaching out and establishing new links with the private sector to stimulate the development of private businesses in space. - NASA will expand its traditional links with the aerospace industry and academia to 

also embrace other industries such as new high-technology entrepreneurial ventures and the financial and non-aerospace industrial and academic communities. 

NASA will expand and target dissemination of scientific information to stimulate 

domestic space commerce projects. 

NASA will use public announcements, interviews, speeches, press releases, and 

articles in technical and business journals to provide information about commercialization opportunities and its commercialization activities to industry, academia, and the American public. . . . 

- 

- 

Dl 

NASA Commercial Space Policy 

Introduction 

NASA’s thrust into the future is taking a new turn: NASA is encouraging free enterprise to participate in space by inviting industries and other private entities to finance and 

conduct business in space. 

Private investment in space is called “space commercialization.” Commercial projects 

would aim at developing profitable products and services in space for sale to consumers 

on Earth and for other space activities. 

The NASA Policy to stimulate the commercialization of space will give new impetus 

and importance to traditional space efforts. At the same time, the Policy will give private 

enterprises the extra push they need to get started with permanent self-sustaining, tax revenue-producing establishments that will generate unique goods, well-paying jobs, and new 

outlets for innovation and ingenuity in space and on the Earth. The rewards can be 

immense for our nation. 

The Policy calls for new ways of thinking about space. It requires revision and innovation in the traditional approaches and outlook. It calls for new roles by and alterations 

in relationships between NASA and private enterprises. 

NASA has accumulated a long and proud history of working closely and productively 

with private enterprises. NASA-space programs have been based on participation and contributions by a trio of segments in our society-Government, industry, and academic institutions. 

Since its earliest days, NASA has employed industries and universities as contractors. 

Since 1962, NASA has provided launch services for privately-owned commercial communications satellites. Beginning in 1972, NASA has entered into “partnership” arrangements with private firms for the commercial use of space. Now, the nature and character 

of NASA’s relationship with private enterprise is changing still more. To persuade private 

investors to become involved in new space endeavors, NASA must be responsive to the 

needs and wants of these investors. 

NASA must assure these investors of reliable and dependable roundtrip transportation for their projects between Earth and orbit. NASA must also help assure the availability of suitable work places for industries in orbit. 

NASA will need to expand its basic researchwith the advice of these customers and 

partners-to make sure it is relevant and helpful to private space ventures. 
EXPLOFUNG THE UNKNOWN 575 

NASA must share its experience and know-how, including research information and 

NASA patents. NASAwill need to establish space commercialization offices [2] at its headquarters and field centers to coordinate the new relationships with private investors. 

There may be opportunity for specialized companies to serve as, intermediariesbridges-between NASA and private investors in space endeavors. 

These and other approaches are outlined in the new NASA Commercial Space Policy 

on the following pages. 

Space commercialization can have profound impact on the future of our Nation. We 

already know from our experiences with highly profitable, privately-owned communications satellites that free enterprise in space can work well. New leaps in technology which 

are likely to emerge from private initiatives in space could have major implications for the 

national economy, individual living standards and life styles, industrial activities and jobs 

and international trade. 

The NASA Commercial Space Policy is designed to provide a foundation and framework for facilitating the realization of these opportunities. 

[31 

NASA Commercial Space Policy 

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

President Reagan, in his National Space Policy ofJuly 4,1982, made the expansion of 

private investment and involvement in space, a major objective of the United States 

Government. Committee reports from both Houses of Congress strongly endorsed this 

thrust in 1983. Supporting statements also have come from studies by non-government 

groups. 

Opportunities for benefiting the nation are significant. Commercial space endeavors 

offer the potential for new industries, newjobs, lower product costs and-an improved balance of trade. Technological advances from commercial use of space could help conquer 

diseases, produce computers faster and smarter than presently exist, develop metals 

lighter and stronger than any presently known, increase communications and information availability around the world and enhance our understanding of our environment 

and its resources. 

NASA’s Commercial Space Policy is designed to encourage private involvement in 

commercial endeavors in space to help take advantage of these opportunities. The Policy 

introduces approaches and incentives to reduce the risks inherent in commercial space 

ventures to levels competitive with conventional investments. 

This “Executive Summary” presents an overview of the goals and principles of the 

NASA Commercial Space Policy, as well as a summary of major new initiatives NASA will 

implement to stimulate private investment in commercial space ventures. 

Goals and Principles 

The primary goal of NASA’s Commercial Space Policy is to encourage and stimulate 

free enterprise in space. 

Private investments in space, in turn, are expected to (a) yield important economic 

advantages; (b) advance science and technology; (c) help maintain in U.S. space leadership; and (d) enhance the nation’s competitive position in international trade, thereby 

improving the in [-1U.S. balance of payments. 
576 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

Implementation of the NASA Commercial Space Policy is to be guided by these five 

principles: 

1. The Government should reach out to and establish mw links with the pn’vate sector 

NASA will broaden its traditional links with the aerpspace industry and the science 

community to include relationships with major non-aerospace [4] firms, new entrepreneurial ventures, as well as the financial and academic communities. 

2. Regardless of the Government S view of a Fject’s feasibility, it should not impede pzvate 

eflorts to undertake commercial space ventures. 

If the private sector is willing to make the necessary investment, the project’s feasibility should allowed to be determined by the marketplace and the creativity of the 

entrepreneur rather than the Government’s opinion of its viability. 

3. If the p‘vate sector can operate a space venture more efficiently than the Government, then 

such commercialization should be encouraged. 

When developing new public space programs, the Government should actively consider the view of, and the potential effect on, private ventures. 

4. The Government should invest in high-herage research, and space facilities which encourage pivate investment. Howevo; the Government should not expend tax dollars for endeavors 

the private sector is willing to unhm’te. 

This will provide at least two benefits. First it will enable NASA to concentrate a 

greater percentage of its resources on advancing the technological state-of-the-art in 

areas where the investment is too great for the private sector. Second, it will engage 

the private sector’s applications and marketing skills for getting space benefits to the 

people. 

5. When a signijcant Government contribution to a commercial endeavor is requested, two 

requirements must be met. First, the private sector must have significant capital at risk, and second, there must be signijcant potential benejits for the nation. 

In appraising the potential benefits from and determining appropriate Government 

contributions to commercial space proposals, NASA will use an equitable, consistent 

review process. 

A possible exception to these principles would be a commercial venture intended to 

replace a service or displace a NASA R&D program and/or technology development program of paramount public importance now provided by the Government. In that case, the 

Government might require additional prerequisites before commercialization. 

Implementation 

In implementing this Policy, NASA will take an active role in supporting commercial 

space ventures in the following categories, listed in order of importance: 

New commercial high-technology ventures. 

New commercial applications of existing space technology. 

[5] Commercial ventures resulting from the transfer of existing space programs to 

the private sector. 

NASA will implement initiatives to reduce the technical, financial and institutional 

risks associated with doing business in space. 

To reduce technical risks, NASA will: 

Support research aimed at commercial applications; ease access to NASA experimental facilities; establish scheduled flight opportunities for commercial payloads; expand 

the availability of space technology information of commercial interest; and support 

the development of facilities necessary for commercial uses of space. 

To reduce jinancial risks, NASA will: 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 577 

Continue to offer reduced-rate space transportation for high-technology space 

endeavors; assist in integrating commercial equipment with the Shuttle; provide seedfunding to stimulate commercial space ventures; and, under certain circumstances, 

purchase commercial space products and services and offer some exclusivity. 

To reduce institutional risks, NASA will: 

Speed integration of commercial payloads into the Orbiter; shorten proposal evaluation time for NASA/private sector Joint Endeavor proposals; establish procedures to 

encourage development of space hardware and services with private capital instead of 

Government funds; and introduce new institutional approaches for strengthening 

NASA’s support of private investment in space. 

A high-level Commercial Space Office will be formed within NASA as a focal point for 

commercial space matters. This Office will be responsible for implementing the NASA 

Policy to stimulate space commerce. It will have sufficient authority and resources to fully 

carry out this assignment. 

Document 111-28 

Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, “The President’s Space Policy and 

Commercial Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century,” February 11,1988. 

Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

During the second Reagan administration, an alternative space policy making body concentrating on 

commercial spacejlight emerged to complement the National Security Council’s Senior Interagency 

Group (Space), known as SIG (Space). Chaired by the Commerce Department, the Space Working 

Group of the White House Economic Policy Council worked on a new set of commercial space initiatives during 1987, at the same time that SIC (Space) was examining overall national space policy. 

SIG (Space) finished its review first, and its directive on national space policy was approved by 

President Reagan on January 5, 1988 (published in 1995 as Document 111-42 in Volume I of 

Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space 

Program). Howeve?; its release was delayed until the space commerce review was completed. Both 

rmiews were made public on February 1 I, 1988. 

111 

The President’s Space Policy and Commercial 

Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century 

Fact Sheet 

The President today announced a comprehensive “Space Policy and Commercial 

Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century” intended to ensure United States space leadership. 

The President’s program has three major components: 

Establishing a long-range goal to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth 

orbit into the Solar System; 

Creating opportunities for US. commerce in space; and 

Continuing our national commitment to a permanently manned Space Station. 
578 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

The new policy and programs are contained in a National Security Decision Directive 

(NSDD) signed by the President January 5, 1988, the FY 1989 Budget the President will 

submit shortly to Congress, and a fifteen point Commercial Space Initiative. 

I. Expanding Human Presence Beyond Earth Orbit 

In the recent NSDD, the President committed to a goal of expanding human presence and activity in the Solar System. To lay the foundation for this goal, the President will 

be requesting $100 million in his FY 1989 Budget for a major new technology development program “Project Pathfinder” that will enable a broad range of manned or 

unmanned missions beyond the Earth’s orbit. 

Project Pathfinder will be organized around four major focuses: 

- Exploration technology; 

Operations technology; 

Humans-in-space technology; and 

Transfer vehicle technology. 

- 

- 

- 

This research effort will give the United States know-how in critical areas, such as 

human in space environment, closed loop life support, aero braking, orbital transfer and 

maneuvering, cryogenic storage and handling, and large scale space operations, and provide a base for wise decisions on long term goals and missions. 

Additional highlight[s] of the NSDD are outlined in Section IV of this fact sheet. 

[2] 11. Creating Opportunities for U.S. Commerce in Space 

The President is announcing a fifteen point commercial space initiative to seize the 

opportunities for a vigorous U.S. commercial presence in Earth orbit and beyond-in 

research and manufacturing. This initiative has three goals: 

Promoting a strong U.S. commercial presence in space; 

Assuring a highway to space; and 

Building a solid technology and talent base. 

Promoting a Strong US. Commercial hence in Space 

Private Sector &ace Facility: The President is announcing an intent for the Federal 

Government to lease space as an “anchor Tenant” in an orbiting space facility satiable 

for research and commercial manufacturing that is financed, constructed, and operated by the private sector. The Administration will solicit proposals from the U.S. private sector for such a facility. Space in this facility will be used and/or subleased by 

various Federal agencies with interest in microgravity research. 

The Administration’s intent is to award a contract during mid-summer of this year for 

such space and related services to be available to the Government no later than the 

end of FY 1993. 

Spacehab: The Administration is committing to make best efforts to launch within the 

Shuttle payload bay, in the early 199Os, the commercially developed, owned and managed Shuttle middeck module: Spacehab. Manifesting requirements will depend on 

customer demand. 

Spacehab is a pressurized metal cylinder that fits in the Shuttle payload by and connect to the crew compartment through the orbiter airlock. Spacehab takes up approximately onequarter of the payload bay and increases the pressurized living and working space of the orbiter by approximately 1,000 cubic feet or 400 percent in usable 

research volume. The facility is intended to be ready for commercial use in mid-1991. 

Microgravity Research Board: The President will establish, through Executive Order, a 

National Microgravity Research Board to assure and coordinate a broader range of 

opportunities for research in microgravity conditions. 

- 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 579 

NASA will chair this board, which will include senior-level representatives from 

Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Defense, NIH [National 

Institutes of Health], and NSF [National Science Foundation] ; and will consult with 

the university and commercial sectors. The board will have the following responsibilities: 

To stimulate research in microgravity environments and its applications to commercial 

uses by advising Federal agencies, including NASA, on microgravity priorities, and consulting with private industry and academia on microgravity research opportunities; 

To develop policy recommendations to the Federal Government on matters relating to 

microgravity research, including tapes of research, government/industry/and academic cooperation, and access to space, including a potential launch voucher program; 

[3] To coordinate the microgravity programs of Federal agencies by: 

reviewing agency plans for microgravity research and recommending priorities for the use of Federally-owned or leased space on microgravity facilities; 

and 

ensuring that agencies established merit review processes for evaluating 

microgravity research proposals; and 

- 

- 

To promote transfer of Federally funded microgravity research to the commercial 

sector in furtherance of Executive Order 12591. 

NASA will continue to be responsible for making adjustments on the safety of experiments and for making manifesting decisions for manned space flight systems. 

External Tanks: The Administration is making available for five years the expended 

external tanks of the Shuttle fleet at no cost to all feasible U.S. commercial nonprofit endeavors, for use such as research, storage, or manufacturing in space. 

NASA will provide any necessary technical other assistance to these endeavors on a 

direct cost basis. If private sector demand exceeds supply, NASA may auction the 

external tanks. 

Pn'uatizing Space Station: NASA, in coordination with the Office of Management and 

Budget, will revise its guide lines [sic] on commercialization of the U.S. Space Station 

to clarify and strengthen the Federal commitment to private sector investment in this 

program. 

FuturePn'uatization: NASAwill seek to rely to the greatest extent feasible on private sector design, financing, construction, and operation of future Space Station requirements, including those currently under study. 

Remote Sensing: The Administration is encouraging the development of commercial 

remote sensing systems. As part of this effort, the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other agencies, is examining potential opportunities for future Federal 

procurement of remote sensing data from the U.S. commercial sector. 

Assuring a Hzghway to Space 

8. Reliance on Private Launch Services: Federal agencies will be required to purchase expendable launch services directly from the private sector to the fullest extent feasible. 

9. Insurance Relief for Launch Prouidms: The Administration will take administrative steps 

to address the insurance concerns of the U.S. commercial launch industry, which currently uses Federal launch ranges. These steps include: 

Limits on Third Party Liability: Consistent with the Administration's tort policy, the 

Administration will propose to Congress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic damage 

awards to individual third parties resulting from commercial launch accidents; 
580 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

[4] Limits on Property Damage Liability: The liability of commercial launch operators for 

damage to Government property resulting from a commercial launch accident 

will be administratively limited to the level of insurance required by the 

Department of Transportation. 

If losses to the Government exceed this level, the Government will waive its right to 

recover for damages. If losses are less than this level, the Government will waive its 

right to recover for those damages caused by Government willful misconduct or reckless disregard. 

10. Private Launch Ranges: The Administration will consult with the private sector on the 

potential construction of commercial launch range facilities separate from Federal 

facilities and the use of such facilities by the Federal Government. 

11. Vouchers fm Research Payloads: NASA and the Department of Transportation will 

explore providing to research payload owners manifested on the Shuttle a one time 

launch voucher that can be used to purchase an alternative U.S. commercial launch 

service. 

Building a Solid Technology and Talent Base 

12. Space Technology Spin-offs: The President is directing that the new Pathfinder program, 

the Civil Space Technology Initiative [CSTI], and other technology programs be conducted in accordance with the following policies: 

Federally funded contractors, universities, and Federal laboratories will retain the 

rights to any patents and technical data, including copyright, th[at] result from 

these programs. The Federal Government will have the authority to use this intellectual property royalty free; 

Proposed technologies and patents available for licensing will be housed in a 

Pathfinder/CSTI library within NASA, and 

When contracting for commercial development of Pathfinder, CSTI and other 

technology work products, NASA will specify its requirements in a manner that 

provides contractors with maximum flexibility to pursue innovative and creative 

approaches. 

13. Federal Expertise on Loan to Am’can Schools: The President is encouraging Federal 

Scientists, engineers, and technicians in aerospace and space related careers to take a 

sabbatical year to teach in any level of education in the United States. 

14. Education Opportunities: The President is requesting in his FY 1989 Budget expanding 

five-fold opportunities for US. Teachers to visit NASA field centers and related aerospace and university facilities. 

In addition, NASA, NSF, and DoD [Department of Defense] will contribute materials 

and classroom experiments through the Department of Education to U.S. schools 

developing “tech shop” programs. NASA will encourage corporate participation in 

this program. 

15. Protecting US. Critical Technologies: The Administration is requesting that Congress 

extend to NASA the authority it has given the Department of Defense to protect the 

whole-sale release under the Freedom of Information Act those critical national technologies and systems that are prohibited from export. 

[ 51 111. Continuing the National Commitment to the Space Station 

In 1984, the President directed NASA to develop a permanently manned Space 

Station. The President remains committed to achieving this end and this requesting $1 billion in his FY 1989 Budget for continued development and a three year appropriation 

commitment from Congress for $6.1 billion. The Space Station, planned for development 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 58 1 

in cooperation with U.S. friends and allies, is intended to be a multi-purpose facility for 

the nation’s science and applications programs. It will permit such things in space as: 

research, observation of the solar system, assembly of vehicles for facilities, storage, servicing of satellites, and basing for future space missions and commercial and entrepreneurial endeavors in space. 

The help ensure a Space Station that is cost effective, the President is proposing as 

part of this Commercial Space Initiative actions to encourage private sector investment in 

the Space Station, including directing NASA to rely to the greatest extent feasible on private sector design, financing, construction, and operation of future Space Station requirements. 

IV. Additional Highlights of the January 5,1988 NSDD 

U.S. Space Leadership: Leadership is reiterated as a fundamental national objective in 

areas of space activity critical to achieving US. national security, scientific, economic 

and foreign policy goals. 

Defining Federal Roles and Responsibilities: Government activities are specified in three 

separate and distinct sectors: civil, national security, and nongovernmental. Agency 

roles and responsibilities are codified and specific goals are established for the civil 

space sector; those for other sectors are updated. 

Encouraging a Commercial Sector: A separate, nongovernmental or commercial space 

sector is recognized and encouraged by the policy that Federal Government actions 

shall not preclude or deter the continuing development of this sector. New Guidelines 

are established to limit unnecessary Government competition with the private sector 

and ensure that Federal agencies are reliable customers for commercial space goods 

and services. 

The President’s launch policy prohibiting NASA from maintaining an expendable 

launch vehicle adjunct to the Shuttle, as well as limiting commercial and foreign payloads on the Shuttle to those that are Shuttle-unique or serve national security for foreign policy purpose, is reaffirmed. In addition, policies endorsing the purchase of 

commercial launch services by Federal agencies are further strengthened. 

National Security Space Sector: An assured compatibility for national security missions is 

clearly enunciated, and the survivability and endurance of critical national security 

space functions is [sic] stressed. 

Assuring Access to Space: Assured access to space is recognized as a key element of 

national space policy. U.S. space transportation systems that provide sufficient 

resiliency to allow continued operation, despite failures in any single system, are 

emphasized. The mix of space transportation vehicles will be defined to support mission needs in the most cost effective manner. 

Remob Sensing: Policies for Federal “remote sensing” or observation of the Earth are 

established to encourage the development of U.S. commercial systems competitive 

with or superior to foreign-operated civil or commercial systems. 

Document 111-29 

Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, “Commercial Space Launch Policy,” 

NSPD-2, September 5,1990. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D . C. 
582 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

During the administration of George Bush, 1989 to 1993, several commercial space policy documents 

emerged that affected the manner in which NASA conducted its relations. National Space Policy 

Directive-2 established a “Commercial Space Launch Policy * that reflected the administration S commitment to develop a thriving commercial space sector by establishing “the long-term goal of a free and 

fair [space launch] market in which the US. industry can compete” internationally. 

[no pagination] 

Statement by the Press Secretary 

The President has approved a new National Space Policy Directive providing important guidance which will further encourage the growth of U.S. private sector space activities. This policy, developed by the Vice President and the National Space Council, is 

completely consistent with, and provided the policy framework for, the President’s August 

22, 1990, decision regarding participation by a U.S. firm in Australia’s Cape York space 

launch project. The policy supplements the National Space Policy which the President 

approved on November 2, 1989. 

The commercial space launch policy recognizes the many benefits which a commercial space launch industry provides to the United States. It balances launch industry needs 

with those of other industries and with important national security interests, and estab 

lishes the long-term goal of a free and fair market in which U.S. industry can compete. 

The policy specifies a coordinated set of actions for the next ten years aimed at achieving 

this goal. 

Fact Sheet on Commercial Space Launch Policy 

Policy Findings 

A commercial space launch industry can provide many benefits to the U.S. including 

indirect benefits to U.S. national security. The long-term goal of the United States is a free 

and fair market in which U.S. industry can compete. To achieve this, a set of coordinated 

actions is needed for dealing with international competition in launch goods and services 

in a manner that is consistent with our nonproliferation and technology transfer objectives. These actions must address both the short-term (actions which will affect competitiveness over approximately the next ten years) and those which will have their principal 

effect in the longer term (i.e. after approximately the year 2000). 

In the near term, this includes trade agreements and enforcement of those agreements to limit unfair competition. It also includes the continued use of US.-manufactured launch vehicles for launching U.S. Government satellites. 

For the longer term, the United States should take actions to encourage technical 

improvements to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of U.S. space launch vehicles. 

Implementing Actions 

U.S. government satellites will be launched on US.-manufactured launch vehicles 

unless specifically exempted by the President. 

Consistent with guidelines to be developed by the National Space Council, U.S. 

Government Agencies will actively consider commercial space launch needs and factor 

them into their decisions on improvements in launch infrastructure and launch vehicles 

aimed at reducing cost, and increasing responsiveness and reliability of space launch vehicles. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 583 

The US. Government will enter into negotiations to achieve agreement with the 

European Space Agency (ESA), ESA member states, and others as appropriate, which 

defines principles of free and fair trade. 

Nonmarket launch providers of space launch goods and services create a special case 

because of the absence of market[-]oriented pricing and cost structures. To deal with 

their entry into the market there needs to be a transition period during which special conditions may be required. 

There also must be an effective means of enforcing international agreements related 

to space launch goods and services. 

Statement by the Press Secretary 

The United States seeks a free and fair international commercial space launch market 

to further the use of outer space for the betterment of mankind. At the same time, because 

space launch technologies have significant military applications, important U.S. national 

security considerations must be addressed by our commercial space launch policy. 

Over the past several weeks, the President has had detailed discussions with the Vice 

President and other senior advisors on U.S. commercial space launch policy developed by 

the National Space Council. The President has authorized the Secretary of State to 

approve a license application for participation by a U.S. firm in Australia’s Cape York 

space launch project, provided certain agreements necessary to ensure U.S. national security interests are reached. 

Specifically, the US. will seek agreements to ensure that: 

(1) The USSR will provide launch services (boosters, equipment, technology, or 

training) only from Cape York or any other single location; 

(2) The USSR and Australia will observe the Missile Technology Control Regime; and 

(3) US. regulations on technology transfer to the Soviet Union will be observed. 

The United States hopes and expects that these agreements can be concluded quickly so that the license can be granted. 

To permit continued U.S. participation, the United States in the coming months will 

also be seeking agreements to ensure free and fair trade in the international commercial 

space launch market. 

Details of the U.S. commercial space launch policy will be announced in the near 

future. 

Document Ill-30 

Document title: Executive Office of the President, “U.S. Commercial Space Policy 

Guidelines,” NSPD-3, February 11, 1991. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In 1991, the Bush administration refined its commercial space policy ly issuing 

NSPD-3, which articulated in specijic term a commercial space policy “aimed at expanding pnvate 

sector investment in space by the market-driven Commern’al Space Sector ” The intent was to move 

more of the onus for investment in space technology to the private sectq where it was assumed that 

market forces would drive down costs. 
584 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS 

Dl 

U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines 

A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been space leadership, which requires preeminence in key areas of space activity. In an increasingly competitive international environment, the U.S. Government encourages the commercial use 

and exploitation of space technologies and systems for national economic benefit. These 

efforts to encourage commercial activities must be consistent with national security and 

foreign policy interests, international and domestic legal obligations, including U.S. commitments to stem missile proliferation, and agency mission requirements. 

United States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two 

U.S. Government sectors[-] the civil and national security[-] and a non-governmental 

commercial space sector. The commercial space sector includes a broad cross section of 

potential providers and users, including both established and new market participants. 

There also has been a recent emergence of State government initiatives related to encouraging commercial space activities. The commercial space sector is comprised of at least 

five market areas, each encompassing both earth and spacebased activities, with varying 

degrees of market maturity or potential: 

[2] Satellite Communications: the private development, manufacture, and operation of 

communications satellites and marketing of satellite telecommunications services, including position location and navigation; 

Launch and Vehicle Services: the private development, manufacture, and operation of 

launch and reentry vehicles, and the marketing of space transportation services; 

Remote Sensing: the private development, manufacture, and operation of remote sensing satellites and the processing and marketing of remote sensing data; 

Materials Processing the experimentation with, and production of, organic and inorganic materials and products utilizing the space environment; and 

Commercial Znfrustructure: the private development and provision of space [-I related 

support facilities, capabilities and services. 

In addition, other marketdriven commercial space sector opportunities are emerging. 

The US. Government encourages private investment in, and broader responsibility 

for, space-related activities that can result in products and services that meet the needs of 

government and other customers in a competitive market. As a matter of policy, the U.S. 

Government pursues its commercial space objectives without the use of direct federal subsidies. A robust commercial space sector has the potential to generate new technologies, 

products, markets, jobs, and other economic benefits for the nation, as well as indirect 

benefits for national security. 

Commercial space sector activities are characterized by the provision of products and 

services such that: - 

- 

- 

- 

private capital is at risk; 

there are existing, or potential, nongovernmental customers for the activity; 

the commercial market ultimately determines the viability of the activity; and 

primary responsibility and management initiative for the activity resides with the 

private sector. 

Implementing Guidelines 

r 31 

The following implementing guidelines shall serve to provide the U.S. private sector 

with a level of stability and predictability in its dealings with agencies of the U.S. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 585 

Government. The agencies will work separately but cooperatively, as appropriate, to develop specific measures to implement this strategy. U.S. Government agencies shall, consistent with national security and foreign policy interests, international and domestic legal 

obligation and agency mission requirements, encourage the growth of the U.S. commercial space sector in accordance with the following guidelines: 

US. Government agencies shall utilize commercially available space products and 

services to the fullest extent feasible. This policy of encouraging U.S. Government 

agencies to purchase, and the private sector to sell, commercial space products and 

services has potentially large economic benefits. 

- A space product or service is “commercially available” if it is currently offered 

commercially, or if it could be supplied commercially in response to a government procurement request. 

“Feasible” means that products and services meet mission requirements in a costeffective manner. 

“Cost-effective” generally means that the commercial product or service costs no 

more than governmental development or directed procurement where such government costs include applicable government labor and overhead costs, as well as 

contractor charges and operations costs. 

However, the acquisition of commercia1 space products and services shall 

generally be considered costeffective if they are procured competitively using 

performance-based contracting techniques. Such contracting techniques give 

contractors the freedom and financial incentive to achieve economies of scale by 

combining their government and commercial work as well as increased productivity through innovation. 

US. Government agencies shall actively consider, at the earliest appropriate time, 

the feasibility of their using commercially available products and services in 

agency programs and activities. 

U.S. Government agencies shall continue to take appropriate measures to protect 

from disclosure any proprietary data which is shared with the US. Government 

in the acquisition of commercial space products and services. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

[4] - 

U.S. Government agencies shall promote the transfer of US. Governmentdeveloped 

technology to the private sector. 

- U.S. Governmentdeveloped unclassified space technology will be transferred to 

the U.S. commercial space sector in as timely a manner as possible and in ways 

that protect its commercial value. 

U.S. Government agencies may undertake cooperative research and development 

activities with the private sector, as well as State and local governments, consistent 

with policies and funding, in order to fulfill mission requirements in a manner 

which encourages the creation of commercial opportunities. 

With respect to technologies generated in the performance of government contracts, U.S. Government agencies shall obtain only those rights necessary to meet 

government needs and mission requirements, as directed by Executive Order 

12591. 

U.S. Government agencies may make unused capacity of space assets, services and 

infrastructure available for commercial space sector use. 

- Private sector use of US. Government agency space assets, services, and infrastructure shall be made available on a reimbursable basis consistent with OMB 

[Office of Management and Budget] circular A25 or appropriate legislation. 

U.S. Government agencies may make available to the private sector those assets which 

have been determined to be excess to the requirements of the U.S. Government in 

accordance with U.S. law and applicable international treaty obligations. Due regard 

- 

- 
586 THE NASA-INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY NEXUS

shall be given to the economic impact such transfer may have on the commercial 

space sector, promoting competition, and the long-term public interest. 

[5] The US. Government shall avoid regulating domestic space activities in a manner 

that precludes or deters commercial space sector activities, except to the extent necessary to meet international and domestic legal obligations, including those of the 

Missile Technology Control Regime. Accordingly, agencies shall identi9, and propose 

for revision or elimination, applicable portions of U.S. laws and regulations that 

unnecessarily impede commercial space sector activities. 

U.S. Government agencies shall work with the commercial space sector to promote 

the establishment of technical standards for commercial space products and services. 

U.S. Government agencies shall enter into appropriate cooperative agreements to 

encourage and advance private sector basic research, development, and operations. 

Agencies may reduce initial private sector risk by agreeing to future use of privately 

supplied space products and services where appropriate. 

- “Anchor tenancy” is an example of such an arrangement whereby 

Government agencies can provide initial support to a venture by contracting for 

enough of the future product or service to make the venture viable in the short 

term. Long[-]term viability and growth must come primarily from the sale of the 

product or service to customers outside the U.S. Government. 

There must be demonstrable U.S. Government mission or program requirements 

for the proposed commercial space good or service. In assessing the U.S. 

Government’s mission or program requirements for these purposes, the procuring agency may consider consolidating all anticipated U.S. Government needs for 

the particular product or service, to the maximum extent feasible. 

US. Government agencies entering into such arrangements may take action, 

consistent with current policies and funding availability, to provide compensation 

to commercial space providers for future termination of missions for which the 

products or services were required. 

U.S. 

- 

- 

[6] The United States will work toward establishment of an international trading 

environment that encourages market[-] oriented competition by working with its trading partners to: 

- Establish clear principles for international space markets that provide an atmosphere favorable to stimulating greater private investment and market development; 

Eliminate direct government subsidies and other unfair practices that undermine 

normal market competition among commercial firms; 

Eliminate unfair competition by governments for business in space markets consistent with domestic policies that preclude or deter U.S. Government competition with commercial space sector activities. 

The Commercial Space Policy Guidelines are consistent with the National Space 

Policy and the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Policy which remain fully applicable to 

activities of the governmental space sectors and the commercial space sector. 

U.S. 

- 

- 

Reporting Requirements 

U.S. Government agencies affected by these guidelines are directed to report by 

October 1, 1991, to the National Space Council on their activities related to the implementation of these policy guidelines. 

George Bush 
587 

Biographical Appendix 

A 

Spiro T. Agnew (19181996) was elected vice president of the United States in November 1968, serving under 

Richard M. Nixon. He served as chair of the 1969 Space Task Group that developed a long-range plan for a postApollo space effort. The Posf-Apollo Space Program: Lhrecltonrfor fhc Future (Washington, DC: President's Science 

Advisory Council, September 1969) developed an expansive program, including the building of a space station, 

a space shuttle, and a lunar base, as well as a mission to Mars (the last goal had been endorsed by the vice president at the time of the Apollo 11 launch in July 1969). President Nixon did not accept this plan, and only the 

Space Shuttle was approved for development. See Roger D. Launius, "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space 

Shuttle, 196972," The Hasfmian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34. 

Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. (1938- ), spent his entire career in the aerospace community as a corporate and governmental official. He served as under secretary and then secretary of the Air Force during the Reagan administration. Before then, he was educated at Texas A&M University and the Georgia Institute of Technology, entering the Department of Defense (DOD) as assistant secretary for systems analysis from 1967 through 1972. He 

then went to LTVAerospace Corporation for a year. In 1973 he was named as a senior management associate in 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Washington. Returning to DOD in 1974, he served as assistant 

secretary for strategic programs until 1976. He then moved back to private industry until reentering government 

service with the Air Force in 1981. See "Aldridge, Edward C.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Anatoliy P. Aleksandrov (1903 ) was a senior member of the of the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s and served as its president from 1980 to 1986. A physicist, Aleksandrov was 

born in the Ukraine and educated at Kiev State University. He was heavily involved in research on the physics of 

dielectrics and studies of the properties of compounds having high molecular weight. See "Aleksandrov, 

Anatoliy, P.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert F. mutt (1935- ) was a longtime NASA employee throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Born in Richmond, 

Virginia, and educated at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (now known as Virginia Tech) and the George 

Washington University Law School, Allnuttjoined NASA in 1960 as a patent attorney. He then worked as a attorney with the Communications Satellite Corporation and as NASAs assistant general counsel (patents). In 1967 

he was named as assistant administrator for legislative affairs; later, he was a member of the Apollo 13 Accident 

Review Board. He left NASA in 1983 to become legal counsel to the U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness. He 

became executive vice president for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. See "Allnutt, Robert E," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

William A. Andea (1933 ) was a career U.S. Air Force officer, although a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Chosen with the third group of astronauts in 1963, he was the backup pilot for Gemini XI and lunar module 

pilot for Apollo 8. Having resigned from NASA and the Air Force (active duty) in September 1969, he became 

executive secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. He joined the Atomic Energy Commission 

in 1973 and became the chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974. He was named U.S. ambassador 

to Norway in 1976. Later, he worked as a vice president of General Electric and then as senior executive vice 

president of operations for Textron, Inc. Anders retired as chief executive officer of General Dynamics in 1993, 

but he remained chairman of the board. See "Anders, WA.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Clinton P. Anderson (18951975) (D-NM) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1940 and served 

through 1945, when he was appointed secretary of agriculture. He resigned from that position in 1948 and was 

elected to the Senate, where he served until 1973. See BiographiculDirectury ufthe United Stafes Cungms, 1774-1989 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989). 
588 

Neil A. Armstrong (1930- ) was the first human to set foot on the Moon on July 20, 1969, as commander of 

Apollo 11. He had become an astronaut in 1962, after having served as a test pilot with the National Advisory 

Committee for Aeronautics (1955-1958) and NASA (1958-1962). He flew as command pilot on Gemini VI11 in 

March 1966. In 1970 and 1971, he was deputy associate administrator for the Office of Advanced Research and 

Technology at NASA Headquarters. In 1971 he left NASA to become a professor of aerospace engineering at the 

University of Cincinnati and to undertake private consulting. See Neil A. Armstrong, et al., First on the Moon: A 

Voyage with Neil Armstrun& Michael Collins andEdwin E. Aldrin, Jr (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Neil A. Armstrong, 

et aL, The First Lunar Landing 20th Anniversary/as Told by the Astronauts, Neil Armstrong, Edw’n Aldrin, Michael Collim 

(Washington, DC: NASA EP-73, 1989) 

Henry H. (Hap) Arnold (18861950) was commander of the Army Air Forces in World War I1 and the only air 

commander ever to attain the five-star rank of general of the armies. He was especially interested in the development of sophisticated aerospace technology to give the United States an edge in achieving air superiority. He 

fostered the development of such innovations as jet aircraft, rocketry, rocket-assisted takeoff, and supersonic 

flight. After a lengthy career as an Army aviator and commander that spanned the two world wars, he retired 

from active service in 1945. See Henry H. Arnold, GlobalMission (New York Harper & Brothers, 1949); Flint 0. 

DuPre, Hap Arnold: Architect ofAtmican Air Power (New York Macmillan, 1972); Thomas M. Coffey, Hap: The Stmy 

ofthe U.S. AirFmce and the Man Who Built It (New York: Viking, 1982). 

J. Leland Attwood (1904 ) was a long-standing official of North American Rockwell, Inc. He began work as an 

aeronautical engineer for the Douglas Aircraft Corporation in 1930, and he moved to North American in 1934. 

He became assistant general manager in 1938 and was named North American’s first vice president in 1941. He 

became president in 1948 and served continually until 1970, when he retired. (The company eventually became 

known as North American Aviation.) See “J.L. Attwood,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Norman R. Augustine (1935- ) was born in Denver, Colorado, and has been longtime a key person in the 

aerospace industry. He became chairman and chief executive officer of the Martin Marietta Corporation in the 

1980s. Previously, he had served as under secretary of the Army, assistant secretary of the Army for research and 

development, and assistant director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. In 1990 he was appointed to head the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program 

for the Bush administration. This panel produced the R@urt of the Adukury Commitfee on the Future of fhe U.S. Space 

Program (Washington, DC Government Printing Office, December 1990). The study was enormously important 

in charting the course of the space program in the first half of the 1990s. See Norman R. Augustine, Augustine’s 

Laws (Washington, DC: American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1984); “Norman R. Augustine,” 

biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

George Ball (1909-1994) served as under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966. See Who’s Who in America, 

1978-1979 (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1978); NASA Headquarters Library, Washington, DC. 

Richard J.H. Barnes was director of the International Affairs Division of the Office of External Relations at NASA 

throughout much of the 1980s. He had been a longtime NASA official, first coming to the agency in 1961 to 

work on international programs. See “Barnes, Richard J.H.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Arnold 0. Beckman (1900- ) received his Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) in 1928 

and became an inventor and manufacturer of various analytical instruments. He became chairman emeritus of 

Caltech’s Board of Trustees in 1981. See Who’s Who in America, 1996 (New Providence, NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 

1995). 

James E. Beggs (1926 ) served as NASA administrator between July 10, 1981, and December 4, 1985, when he 

took an indefinite leave of absence pending disposition of an indictment from the Justice Department for activities taking place prior to his tenure at NASA. This indictment was later dismissed, and the U.S. attorney 
589 

general apologized to Beggs for any embarrassment. His resignation from NASA was effective on February 25, 

1986. Prior to NASA, Beggs had been executive vice president and a director of General Dynamics Corporation 

in St. Louis. Previously, he had served with NASA in 19681969 as associate administrator for the Office of 

Advanced Research and Technology. From 1969 to 1973, he was under secretary of transportation. He went to 

Summa Corporation in Los Angeles as managing director of operations and joined General Dynamics in January 

1974. Before joining NASA, he had been with Westinghouse Electric Corporation, in Sharon, Pennsylvania, and 

Baltimore, Maryland, for thirteen years. A 1947 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served with the Navy 

until 1954. In 1955, he received a master’s degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business 

Administration. See “Beggs, James E.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

David E. Bell (1919- ) was budget director for President Kennedy, 1961-1962. A Harvard University-trained 

economist, Bell had previously been a member of the staff of the Bureau of the Budget and special assistant to 

the president during the Truman administration before returning to the Harvard faculty during the late 1950s. 

Between 1962 and 1966, he served as head of the U.S. Agency for International Development and thereafter as 

vice president of the Ford Foundation. While budget director, Bell was responsible for working with NASA in 

establishing a realistic financial outlook for Project Apollo. See “Bell, David,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

LloydV. Berkner (19051967) was involved in most of the early spaceflight activities of the United States in some 

capacity. Trained as an electrical engineer, he was at first interested in atmospheric propagation of radio waves, 

but after World War I1 he became a scientific entrepreneur of the first magnitude. He was heavily involved in the 

planning for and execution of the International Geophysical Year in 1957-1958, and he served in a variety of 

positions in Washington where he could influence the course of science policy. See “Berkner, Lloyd V.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Henry E. Billingsley (1906- ) was appointed NASAs director of the Office of International Cooperation in 

January 1959. Previously, he had served in the Navy in World War 11; he later joined the Department of State. 

See “Henry E. Billingsley,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Richard M. Bissell (1909-1994) was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official who was the deputy director for 

plans during the Bay of Pigs incident. He also was involved in various reconnaissance programs such as the U-2 

airplane. See Evan Thomas, The Vwy Besf Ma (New York Simon and Schuster, 1995); Richard M. Bissell, 

Reficfions qfn Cold Wuniur (New Haven, CT Yale University Press, 1996); CIA History Office, Washington, DC. 

Anatoli A. Blagonravov (18951975) was head of an engineering research institute in the Soviet Union. As Soviet 

representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in the early 

1960s, he served as a senior negotiator, along with NASAs Hugh L. Dryden, for cooperative space projects at the 

height of the Cold War in the early 1960s. He worked in developing infantry and artillery weapons in World War 

I1 and on rockets afterward. See “Blagonravov, A.A.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Nancy W. Boggess was a scientist at the Goddard Space Flight Center working on the Cosmic Background 

Explorer (COBE) spacecraft in the latter 1980s and early 1990s. See “Miscellaneous NASA,” biographical file, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Herman Bondi was director general of the European Space Research Organization from 1967 through the early 

1970s and the organization’s transformation into the European Space Agency. A British citizen, Bondi later 

served as science advisor to the minister for energy. See “Biography, Foreign Miscellaneous, A-D,” file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Roger M. Bonnet (1938 ) of France became director of scientific programs for the European Space Agency 

(ESA) in 1983. Previously, he had been director of the Stellar and Planetary Laboratory of the French National 

Scientific Research Center and chair of ESA’s Space Science Advisory Committee from 1978 to 1980. See “ESA 

Names New Scientific Chief,” Dej&seDni[y, January 27, 1983, p. 144. 
590 

Walter E Boone was an admiral, who, after retiring from the Navy, became the NASA’s deputy associate administrator for defense affairs. He held this post until retiring from NASA in 1968. See “Boone, Walter E,” 

biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Frank Borman (192% ) was the commander of the December 1968 Apollo 8 circumlunar flight. He had been 

chosen as a NASA astronaut in the early 1960s and had been on the Gemini VI1 mission in 1965. After leaving 

the astronaut corps, he became president of Eastern Airlines. See Andrew Chaiken, A Man m the Mom: The 

VbyagpJ ?/the Apollo AstronauCc (New York: Viking, 1994); Frank Borman, with Robert J. Serling, Countdown: An 

Autobiography (New York: William Morrow, 1988). 

Robert R. Bowie (1909- ) was the deputy director and then director of the Policy Planning Staff at the 

Department of State from 1953 to 1958. Afterward, he became a consultant to the Department of State. From 

1966 to 1968, he returned to the State Department to serve as a counselor. Biographical information from the 

Biographic Register of the Dqartmenf of State, 1957, Department of State History Office, Washington, DC. 

Ernest W. Brackettjoined NASA in 1959 as director of procurement, after a lengthy career as an attorney (1925- 

1942) in Utica, New York, an Army Air Forces officer (1942-1946), and a civilian in the Department of the Air 

Force (19461959). He served as director of NASA procurement until 1968, during the Apollo era, and was 

appointed chair of the Board of Contract Appeals in 1968. Later, he served as chair of the Inventions and 

Contributions Board, before retiring from NASA in 1972. See “Brackett, Ernest W.,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Willy Brandt (19131992) was chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1974. See “Brandt, 

Willy,” obituary section, Current Biography Yearbook 1992, p. 628, from obituary, New York Tim.v, October 9, 1992, 

p. A23. 

Wernher von Braun (1912-1977) was the leader of the so-called “rocket team” that had developed the German 

V-2 ballistic missile in World War 11. At the conclusion of the war, von Braun and some of his chief assistanas part of a military operation called Project Paperclip-came to America and were installed at Fort Bliss in El 

Paso, Texas, to work on rocket development and use the V-2 for high-altitude research. They used launch facilities at the nearby White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. In 1950 von Braun’s team moved to the Redstone 

Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama, to concentrate on the development of a new missile for the Army. They built 

the Army’s Jupiter ballistic missile, and before that the Redstone, used by NASA to launch the first Mercury 

capsules. The story of von Braun and the “rocket team” has been told many times. See, as examples, David H. 

DeVorkin, Science With a Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space Sciences After World War II (New York 

Springer-Verlag, 1992); Frederick I. Ordway I11 and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (New York Thomas Y 

Crawell, 1979); Erik Bergaust, Wernher vm Braun (Washington, DC: National Space Institute, 1976). 

Leonid I. Brezhnev (19061982) was first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between 1964 

and 1982 and the Soviet leader during the entire official lunar program. He was responsible for the develop 

ment of a succession of Soviet space stations built in the 1970s. See “Brezhnev, L.I.,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Geoffrey A. Briggs was director of the Solar System Exploration Division at NASA Headquarters throughout the 

1980s. Educated in high-energy physics at the University of Virginia, Briggs became involved in the space program in 1967, working at Bellcomm, Inc., and at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, where he was principal investigator on the Mariner Mars 1971 imaging team. He also worked on the Viking Orbiter imaging team and was 

leader of the Voyager imaging team. See “Briggs, Geoffrey A.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Detlev W. Bronk (1897-1975), a scientist, was president of the National Academy of Sciences, 1950-1962, and a 

member of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. He also was president of Johns Hopkins University, 

1949-1953, and Rockefeller University, 19531968. See “Bronk, Detlev,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 
591 

Overton Brooks (1897-1961) (DLA) was elected to represent Louisiana in the House of Representatives for 

twelve successive terms since 1937. He became chair of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in 

January 1959 and was reappointed to this position in 1961. See "Brook, Overton," biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Wilber M. Brucker (18941968) was secretary of the Army between 1955 and 1961. An attorney, he had also held 

a number of important government positions, including governor of Michigan (1930-1932), prior to becoming 

secretary. Brucker had served with the Army in World War I. After leaving federal service, Brucker returned to 

his law practice in Detroit. See William Gardner Bell, Secretaries of War and Secrefaries ofthe Amy: Portraits 0.' 

Biographical Skefches (Washington, DC Center of Military History, 1982), p. 140; New Yonh Times, October 29,1968, 

p. 41. 

Percival Brundage (1892-1981) was deputy director and then director of the Bureau of the Budget, 19541958. 

Thereafter, he worked in a series of business and financial positions. 

McCeorge Bundy (1919-1996) was a professor of government before serving as the national security advisor to 

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-1966. See Who's Who in Ammca, 1996 (New Providence, NJ: Marquis 

Who's Who, 1995). 

George H.W. Bush (1924 ) was president of the United States between 1989 and 1993. Before that, he had been 

a diplomat, director of the CIA, and vice president under Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). 

C 

James (Jiiy) Carter (1924 ) was president of the United States between 1977 and 1981. Previously, he had 

been a naval officer and businessman before entering politics. He entered politics in the Georgia State 

Legislature (1962-1966) and served as the governor of Georgia (1971-1975). 

Eugene A. Cernan (1934 ), a career naval aviator, was chosen by NASA to enter the astronaut corps in the third 

group, in 1963. He served as the pilot of Gemini IX upon the death of a prime crew member. He was also backup pilot for Gemini MI, backup lunar module pilot for Apollo 7, lunar module pilot for Apollo 10, backup commander for Apollo 14, and commander for Apollo 17 (becoming the eleventh American to walk on the Moon). 

Thereafter, he served as deputy director of the ApolleSoyuz Test Project before resigning from NASA and the 

Navy on July 1, 1976, to become executive vice president-international at Coral Petroleum, Inc., in Houston. 

Later, he headed the Cernan Corporation in Houston. See "Eugene A. Cernan," biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert H. Charles (1914 ) became a special assistant to the NASA administrator in 1963, with responsibility for 

working with industry to accomplish Project Apollo. He was especially involved in the creation of incentive contracting mechanisms at the agency to reward exceptional performance by contractors. Previously, he had been 

an executive with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. After remaining with NASA for a short time, Charles 

became assistant secretary of the Air Force, where he was involved in the development of the G5A total procurement package contract of the mid-1960s. He left that position in 1968 to return to industry. See "Biography, 

NASA Miscellaneous, ChCi," file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

William P. Clements, Jr., served as deputy secretary of defense from 1973-1977. He also was governor of Texas 

from 1979 to 1983 and from 1987 to 1991. See Department o/De/en.se Key Officials (Washington, DC: Historical 

Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1995). 

William J. (Bill) Clinton (1946 ) became president of the United States in 1993. Previously, he served as governor and attorney general of Arkansas. 

Charles W. Cook served during the 1970s and 1980s as deputy under secretary and deputy assistant secretary of 

the U.S. Air Force in the Office of Plans, Policy and Operations of Space Systems. He also worked in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense as director for defensive systems and served in positions in the Advanced Research 
592 

Projects Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and various aerospace companies. Since retiring from formal 

government service in 1988, Cook has worked as a consultant to the Institute for Defense Analyses, ANSER, the 

Defense Science Board, and several other aerospace organizations in areas related to U.S. and foreign space 

activities. 

John J. Corson (1905-1990) had been a management consultant with McKinsey and Company, Inc. since 1951, 

remaining there until 1966. T. Keith Glennan contracted with McKinsey for a series of studies, including: 

“Organizing Headquarters Functions,” two volumes, December 1958; “Financial Management-NASA-JPL 

Relationships,” February 1959; “Security and Safety-NASA-JPL Relationships,” February 1959 “Facilities 

Construction-NASA-JPL Relationships,” February 1959; “Procurement and Subcontracting-NASA-JPL 

Relationships,” February 1959; ”NASA-JPL Relationships and the Role of the Western Coordination Office,” 

March 1959; “Providing Supporting Services for the Development Operations Division,” January 1960, on the 

transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to NASA “Report of the Advisory Committee on Organization,” 

October 1960; and “An Evaluation of NASA’s Contracting Politics, Organization, and Performance,” October 

1960. All are in T. Keith Glennan. Correspondence Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Edgar M. Cortright (1923- ) earned an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 

in 1949, the year after he joined the staff of Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. He conducted research at Lewis 

on the aerodynamics of high-speed air induction systems and jet exit nozzles. In 1958 he joined a small task 

group to lay the foundation for a national space agency. As soon as NASA was created, he became chief of 

advanced technology at NASA Headquarters, directing the initial formulation of the agency’s meteorological 

satellite program, including the TIROS and Nimbus projects. After becoming assistant director for lunar and 

planetary programs in 1960, Cortright directed the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, 

Ranger, and Surveyor. He became deputy director and then deputy associate administrator for space science and 

applications in the next few years. In 1967 he was deputy associate administrator for manned space flight. In 

1968 he became director of the Langley Research Center, a position he held until 1975, when he went to work 

for private industry, becoming president of the LockheedCalifornia Company in 1979. See “Cortright, Edgar 

M.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Laurence C. Craigie (1902-1994) was a career Air Force officer and the first US. military jet pilot in 1942 when 

he flew the Bell XI-59. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, in 1923 he went into the Army 

Air Corps and became a pilot. In World War 11, he served in a variety of weapons development programs, as well 

as in a combat role in North Africa and Corsica. After the war, he directed the Air Force’s research and development programs, serving as deputy chief of staff for development, 1951-1954, and commander of Allied Air 

Force in southern Europe before his retirement following a heart attack in 1955. See “Lieut. Gen. Laurence 

Craigie, 92; First Military Jet Pilot for the U.S.,” New Yd Times, March 1, 1994. 

Malcolm R Currie (1927- ) was trained in physics and electrical engineering at the University of California at 

Berkeley and served in the US. Navy from 1944 to 1947. After military service, he returned to school to complete his Ph.D. In 1954 he joined Hughes Research Laboratories, eventually serving as director, before becoming vice president of Hughes Aircraft from 1964 to 1969. He then worked for Beckman Instruments, Inc., but in 

1973 President Nixon appointed him director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of 

Defense, where he served until returning to Hughes in 1977. See “Currie, Dr. Malcolm R.,” biographical file, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Edward E. David, Jr. (1925- ), served as science advisor to President Richard Nixon in 1970 and then as director of the Office of Science and Technology. Previously, he had served between 1950 and 1970 as executive director of research at Bell Telephone Laboratories. For a discussion of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, 

see Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the Resident f.M. Hiroshima to SLM (New York Oxford 

University Press, 1992). 

James H. Douglas, Jr. (1899-1988), was secretary of the Air Force, 1957-1959, and deputy secretary of defense, 

1959-1961. Trained as an attorney, Douglas practiced most of his career in Chicago but served as fiscal assistant 
593 

secretary of the treasury, 1932-1933, and under secretary of the Air Force, 19591957, before serving as Air Force 

secretary. At the conclusion of the Eisenhower administration, Douglas rejoined his old law firm, Gardner, 

Carton, Douglas, Chilgren & Waud. See "Miscellaneous Department of Defense (DOD) ," biographical file, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Charles Stark (Doc) Draper (1901-1987) earned his Ph.D. in physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT) in 1938 and became a full professor there the following year, when he founded the Instrumentation 

Laboratory. Its first major achievement was the Mark 14 gyroscopic gunsight for Navy antiaircraft guns. Draper 

and the laboratory applied gyroscopic principles to the development of inertial guidance systems for airplanes, 

missiles, submarines, ships, satellites, and space vehiclesnotably those used in the Apollo Moon landings. See 

John Noble Wilford, "Charles S. Draper, Engineer, Guided Astronauts to the Moon," Neu, Yurk Times, July 27, 

1987, p. 2; Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuraq: A Hish'cal Sociol~gy of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 1990), especially pp. 6494; C. Stark Draper, "The Evolution of Aerospace Guidance Technology 

at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1935-1951: A Memoir," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., E.nay.s on the Histmy of 

Rocketry and Astronautics, Vol. I1 (Washington, DC: NASA Conf. Pub. 2014, 1977), pp. 214252. 

Hugh L. Dryden (18981965) was a career civil servant and an aerodynamicist by discipline who had also begun 

life as a child prodigy. He graduated at age 14 from high school and went on to earn an A.B. in three years from 

Johns Hopkins University (1916). Three years later, he earned his Ph.D. in physics and mathematics from the 

same institution, even though he had been employed full time by the National Bureau of Standards since June 

1918. His career at the Bureau of Standards, which lasted until 1947, was devoted to studying airflow, turbulence, 

and particularly the problems of the boundary layer-the thin layer of air next to an airfoil that causes drag. In 

1920 he became chief of the bureau's aerodynamics section. His work in the 1920s on measuring turbulence in 

wind tunnels facilitated research in the NACA that produced the laminar flow wings used in the P-51 Mustang 

and other World War I1 aircraft. From the mid-1920s to 1947, his publications became essential reading for aerodynamicists around the world. During World War 11, his work on a glide bomb named the Bat won him a 

Presidential Certificate ofMerit. He capped his career at the Bureau of Standards by becoming its assistant director and then associate director during his final two years there. He then served as director of the NACA from 

1947 to 1958, after which he became deputy administrator of NASA under T. Keith Glennan and James E. Webb. 

See Richard K Smith, The Hugh L. Dryden Papers, 1898-1965 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Library, 

1974); Michael H. Gorn, Hugh L. Dryda's Career in Aviation and Space, Monographs in Aerospace History #5 

(Washington, DC: NASA, 1996). 

Lee A. DuBridge (1901-1994), a physicist with a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin (1926), became director of the radiation laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after an academic career capped by 

a deanship at the University of Rochester, 1938-1941. He was president of the California Institute of Technology 

between 1946 and 1969, when he resigned to serve as presidential science advisor to Richard Nixon. He had 

been involved in several governmental science advisory organizations before taking up his formal White House 

duties in 1969 and serving in that capacity until 1970. See "Lee A. DuBridge," biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Men W. Ddes (18931969), brother of President Eisenhower's more famous secretary of state, served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) served as secretary of state under President Eisenhower, 19531959. See 

"Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Frederick C. Durant 111 (1916 ) was heavily involved in rocketry in the United States during the period between 

the end of World War I1 and the mid-1960s. He worked for several different aerospace organizations, including 

Bell Aircraft Corporation, Everett Research Laboratory, the Naval Air Rocket Test Station, and the Maynard 

Ordnance Test Station. He later became the director of astronautics for the National Air and Space Museum, 

Smithsonian Institution. In addition, he was an officer in several spaceflight organizations, including the 

American Rocket Society (president in 1953), the International Astronautical Federation (president from 1953 

to 1956), and the National Space Club (governor in 1961). 
594 

c 

Burton I. Edelson (1926 ) was NASA’s associate administrator for space science and applications between 1982 

and 1988. He earned his B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1947 and served for 20 years in the service. He 

then returned to school and received a Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego in 1969. Thereafter, 

he worked with the Communications Satellite Corporation for 14 years before arriving at NASA. See “Edelson, 

Burt I.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Raymond Einhorn was a former General Accounting Office auditor who joined NASA in 1960 as its director of 

audits. He served in this position throughout the 1960s. See “Assorted NASA Officials,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) was president of the United States between 1953 and 1961. Previously, he had 

been a career U.S. Army officer and was supreme allied commander in Europe during World War 11. As president he was deeply interested in the use of space technologyfor national security purposes and directed that ballistic missiles and reconnaissance satellites be developed on a crash basis. On Eisenhower’s space efforts, see 

Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United Sfah Space Poliq (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); 

R. Cargill Hall, “The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve 

National Security,” Prologue: Quarfmly of fhe Nafional Archives 27 (Spring 1995): 59-72; Robert A. Divine, The 

Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response fo fhe Snvief Salel[ile (New York Oxford University Press, 1993). 

John D. Erlichman was a senior assistant to the president during the Nixon administration. See John Erlichman, 

Witness Lo Power The Nim Years (New York Simon and Schuster, 1982). 

Konstantin Petrovich Feoktistov (1926 ) worked as a spacecraft engineer and cosmonaut. As a cosmonaut, he 

flew on the Voskhod 1 mission in 1964 and was also flight director on the Soyuz 18/Salyut mission in 1975. See 

Who’s Who in Russia and the New Sfah (London: J.B. Tauris and Co., 1993). 

Peter M. Flanigan (1923- ) was an assistant to President Nixon on the White House staff, 1969-1974. Previously, 

he had been involved in investment banking with Dillon, Read, and Company. He returned to business when he 

left government service. His position in the White House involved him in efforts to gain approval to build the 

Space Shuttle during the 19641972 period. See “Miscellaneous Other Agencies,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

James C. Fletcher (1919-1991) was born on June 5, 1919, in Millburn, New Jersey. He received an undergraduate degree in physics from Columbia University and a doctorate in physics from the California Institute of 

Technology. After holding research and teaching positions at Harvard and Princeton Universities, he joined 

Hughes Aircraft in 1948 and later worked for the Guided Missile Division of the Ram-Wooldridge Corporation. 

In 1958 Fletcher co-founded the Space Electronics Corporation in Glendale, California, which after a merger 

became the Space General Corporation. He was later named systems vice president of the Aerojet General 

Corporation in Sacramento, California. In 1964 he became president of the University of Utah, a position he 

held until he was named NASA administrator in 1971, serving until 1977. He also served as NASA administrator 

a second time, for nearly three years following the loss of the Space Shuttle Chabgerin 1986 until 1989. During 

his first administration at NASA, Dr. Fletcher was responsible for beginning the shuttle effort. During his second 

tenure, he presided over the effort to recover from the Chabgeraccident. See Roger D. Launius, “A Western 

Mormon in Washington, DC James C. Fletcher, NASA, and the Final Frontier,” Pacific Hisfmica1 Reuiew 64 (May 

1995): 21741. 

Gerald R. Ford (1913 ) (R-MI) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1948 and served there until he 

became vice president in 1973 following the resignation of Spiro T. Agnew. He then became president, 

19741977, following Richard M. Nixon’s resignation in the wake of the Watergate scandal. 
595 

John S. Foster, Jr. (1922- ), is a physicist who served as director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1965 

to 1973, when he moved to the private sector. He has served on a number of scientific and technical government 

advisory boards. In 1995, he was the chair of a NASA federal laboratory review team. In 1992, he served on the 

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board that reviewed U.S. space policy after the cold war. See “Foster, John 

S., Jr.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert A. Frosch (1928 ) was NASA administrator throughout the administration of President Jimmy Carter, 

1977-1981. He earned undergraduate and graduate degrees in theoretical physics at Columbia University, and 

between September 1951 and August 1963, he worked as a research scientist and director of research programs 

for Hudson Laboratories of Columbia University. Until 1953 he worked on problems in underwater sound, 

sonar, oceanography, marine geology, and marine geophysics. Thereafter, Frosch was first associate and then director of the laboratories. In September 1963, he came to Washington to work with the Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, serving as director for nuclear test detection (Project VELA), and then as deputy director of the 

agency. In July 1966 he became assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development, responsible for all 

Navy programs of research, development, engineering, test, and evaluation. From January 1973 to July 1975, he 

served as assistant executive director of the United Nations Environmental Program. While at NASA, Frosch was 

responsible for overseeing the continuation of the development effort on the Space Shuttle. During his tenure, 

the project underwent testing of the first orbiter, Enropnsp, at NASAs Dryden Flight Research Facility in southern California. The orbiter made its first free flight in the atmosphere on August 12, 1977. He left NASA with 

the change of administrations in January 1981 to become vice president for research at the General Motors 

Research Laboratories. See “Frosch, Robert A,, Administrators Files,” NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Arnold W. Frutkii (1918 ) was deputy director of the U.S. National Committee for the International 

Geophysical Year in the National Academy of Sciences when NASA hired him in 1959 as director of international 

programs, a title that changed in 1963 to assistant administrator for international affairs. In 1978 he became 

associate administrator for external relations, a post he relinquished in 1979 when he retired from federal service. During his career, he had been NASA‘s senior negotiator for almost all of the important international space 

agreements. See “Arnold W. Frutkin,“ biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

G 

Charles A. Gabriel served as US. Air Force chief of staff between 1983 and 1986 and was the highest ranking 

uniformed official in the service. See “Miscellaneous DOD,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Yuri Gagarin (19341968) was the Soviet cosmonaut who became the first human in space with a one+rbit rnis 

sion aboard the spacecraft Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961. The great success of that feat made the gregarious Gagarin 

a global hero, and he was an effective spokesman for the Soviet Union until his death in an unfortunate aircraft 

accident. See “Gagarin, Yuri,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Thomas S. Gates (19061983) was a businessman who served as secretary of the Navy and then, from 1959 to 

1960, as secretary of defense. See Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Branch, Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC; Who’s Who in Anmica, 1972-1973 (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1972). 

Roswell L. Gilpatric (1906 ) is a retired attorney who served as deputy secretary of defense from 1961 to 1964. 

See Who’s Who in Anu?n~~, 1996 (New Providence, NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 1995). 

Robert R. Gilruth (1915 ) was a longtime NACA engineer working at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 

1937-1946, then chief of the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at Wallops Island, 19461952, who had been 

exploring the possibility of human spaceflight before the creation of NASA. He served as assistant director at 

Langley, 1952-1959, and as assistant director (crewed satellites) and head of Project Mercury, 1959-1961-technically assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center but physically located at Langley. In early 1961, T. Keith 

Glennan established an independent Space Task Group (already the group’s name as an independent subdivision of Goddard) under Gilruth at Langley to supervise the Mercury program. This group moved to the Manned 

Spacecraft Center in Houston in 1962. Gilruth was then director of the Houston operation from 1962 to 1972. 
596 

See Henry C. Dethloff, “Suddml, Tommow Cam. . . ”:A History nf JeJohnsnn Space Gnkr (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP4307, 1993); James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History ./the Langley Awnnautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP4305, 1987), pp. 386-88. 

John H. Glenn, Jr. (1921- ), was chosen with the first group of astronauts in 1959. He was the pilot for the 

February 20, 1962, Mercury-Atlas 6 (Friendship 7) mission, the first American orbital flight, making three orbits. 

He left the NASA astronaut corps in 1964 and later entered politics as a senator from Ohio. See Lloyd S. 

Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A Hislory ofk’rqecl Mercury 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP4201, 1966). 

T. Keith Glennan (1905-1995) was the first administrator of the NASA. Born in Enderlin, North Dakota, in 1905, 

Glennan was educated at Yale University and worked in the sound motion picture industry with the Electrical 

Research Products Company. He was also studio manager of Paramount Pictures, Inc., and Samuel Goldwyn 

Studios in the 1930s. Glennan joined the Columbia University Division of War Research in 1942, serving through 

the war, first as administrator and then as director of the US. Navy’s Underwater Sound Laboratories at New 

London, Connecticut. In 1947 he became president of the Case Institute of Technology. During his administration, Case rose from a primarily local institution to rank with the top engineering schools in the nation. From 

October 1950 to November 1952, Glennan served as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. He then 

served as administrator of NASA while on leave from Case, between August 7, 1958, and January 20, 1961. Upon 

leaving NASA, Glennan returned to the Case, where he was continued to serve as president until 1966. See J.D. 

Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: The Diary uf7: Keith Gknnan (Washington, DC: NASA SP4105, 1993). 

Daniel S. Goldin (1940- ) became the ninth NASA administrator in April 1992 and immediately began to earn 

a reputation as an “agent of change” by bringing reform to America’s space agency. In addition to implementing many management changes, Goldin negotiated with his Russian counterpart, Yuri Koptev, the head of the 

Russian Space Agency, m construct an international space station with a partnership involving fourteen nations. 

Before coming to NASA, Goldin was vice president and general manager of the TRW Space &Technology Group 

in Redondo Beach, California. During a twenty-five-year career at TRW, he managed the development and production of advanced spacecraft, technologies, and space science instruments. Goldin began his career as a 

research scientist at NASA’s Lewis Research Center in Cleveland in 1962, where he worked on electric propulsion systems for human interplanetary travel. See “Daniel S. Goldin,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Nicholas E. Golovin (1912-1969), born in Odessa, Russia, but educated in this country (Ph.D. in physics at 

George Washington University in 1955), worked in various capacities for the government during and after World 

War 11, including the Naval Research Laboratory, 19461948, He held several administrative positions with the 

National Bureau of Standards from 1949 to 1958. In 1958 he was chief scientist for the White Sands Missile 

Range and then worked for the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1959 as director of technical operations. 

He became deputy associate administrator at NASA in 1960. He joined private industry before becoming, in 

1961, the director of the NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group. He joined the Office of Science 

and Technology at the White House in 1962 as a technical advisor for aviation and space and remained there 

until 1968, when he took a leave of absence as a research associate at Harvard and as a fellow at the Brookings 

Institution. See his obituaries, Washington Star, April 30, 1969, p. M, and Washington Post, April 30, 1969, p. B14. 

Mid S. Gorbachev (1931- ) became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 and restructured the nation, presiding over the demise of the communist state and the end of the cold war in 1989. In the process, he opened negotiations with the United States for significant international cooperation in space exploration. See Thomas G. 

Butson, Gorbucheu: A Biogruphy (New York Stein and Day, 1985); “Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich,” biographical 

file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Aristid V. Grosse (1905- ) was born in Riga, Russia, and trained in engineering at the Technische Hochschule 

in Berlin. He came to the United States in 1930 and was on the chemistry faculty at the University of Chicago, 

1931-1940. He then went to Columbia University briefly before working on the Manhattan Project during the 

war years. In 1948 he became a faculty member at Temple University, presiding over the Research Institute (now 

Franklin Institute) through 1969. See “Grosse, Aristid,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
597 

Richard W. Gutman (1921- ) is a retired auditor and accountant who worked at the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) on defense and international programs. From 1968 to 1972, he was deputy director of the Defense 

Division, and when he retired from GAO in 1981, he was the director for the Defense Programs Planning and 

Analysis Staff. See The GAO Rmiew (Fall 1968, Summer 1978, and Spring 1982) GAO’s O/j$ce ofPmonnd 

Management: Professional Stan Regas*1: entry for Gutman dated September 30, 1970. This information was 

obtained from the GAO Law Library, Washington, DC. 

H 

George H. Hage (1925- ) was associated with Project Apollo in the 1960s. After completing his B.S. in electrical 

engineering from the University of Washington, he went to work for the Boeing Company in 1947. He was 

involved in the development of the Bomarc and Minuteman missile systems, and in 1962 he went to the 

Minuteman assembly and test complex in Florida in 1962. From there he took charge of Boeing’s reconnais 

sance efforts, and in 1968 he came to NASA Headquarters as deputy director of the Apollo program. Soon afterward Hage returned to Boeing, and in 1973 he was appointed president of the Aerojet Solid Propulsion 

Company. See “Hage, George H.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

James C. Hagerty (1909-1981) had been on the staff of the New York Times from 1934 to 1942, the last four years 

as legislative correspondent in the newspaper’s Albany bureau. He served as executive assistant to New York 

Governor Thomas Dewey from 1943 to 1950 and then as Dewey’s secretary for the next two years before becoming press secretary for President Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961. See “Miscellaneous Other Agencies,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Grant L. Hansen (1921- ) was an engineer in the aerospace industry before serving as assistant secretary of the 

Air Force for research and development from 1969 to 1973. See Whok Who in Amrn.cn, 1996 (New Providence, 

NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 1995). 

George Haskell (1940- ) is a British physicist who has worked for the European Space Agency (ESA) since 1972. 

From 1972 to 1987, he worked in ESAs space science planning office, and from 1987 to 1992, he served as the 

liaison officer for scientific use of the space station. He has also served as associate dean and vice president for 

academic affairs of the International Space University. See “Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Walter Hedridc (1921- ) was an Air Force brigadier general who was involved in space systems throughout the 

1960s. In 1967, he became the Air Force’s director of space, deputy chief of staff, research and development. See 

U.S. Air Force biography, June 15, 1969, for Brigadier General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., History Office, Air Force 

Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. 

Richard C. Henry was a career U.S. Air Force officer involved in the development of space systems during the 

last part of his service. He was commander of Air Force Space Division in Los Angeles between 1978 and 1982 

and vice commander of Air Force Space Command for almost a year, 1982-1983, retiring as a lieutenant general. See AerospaceDaib, February 9, 1983, p. 232. 

Earl D. Hilburn (1920- ) was trained in physics and mathematics at the University of Wisconsin and worked for 

more than twenty years in the electronics and aerospace industry before accepting a position at NASA in 1963 

as deputy associate administrator. In that post, he was responsible for industry affairs, helping maintain liaison 

with the far-flung corporations involved in the production of NASA space hardware. In 1966 he left NASA and 

became president of Western Union. See “Hilburn, Earl D.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Noel W. Hinnen (1935- ) was trained in geochemistry and geology at Rutgers University, the California Institute 

of Technology, and Princeton University. He began his career in 1963 with Bellcomm, Inc., working on the 

Apollo program, and he arrived at NASA Headquarters in 1972 as the deputy director of lunar programs in the 

Office of Space Science. From 1974 to 1979, he was NASA‘s associate administrator for space science. He also 

served as director of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, 1979-1982, and as director 
598 

of the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, 1982-1987. He then became associate deputy 

administrator of NASA before leaving the agency in 1989 to join the Martin Marietta Corporation as vice president of strategic planning. See “Hinners, Noel W.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

John Hodge (1929- ) began a distinguished career at NASA in 1959. He worked in the area of flight control at 

the Langley Research Center and the Johnson Space Center until 1970. In 1982 he became director of the Space 

Station Task Force at NASA Headquarters. He then took on a series of increasingly responsible positions dealing with the Space Station, culminating with him being named associate administrator for operations, space station, in 1986. See “Hodge, John,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Valerie Hood (1945- ) is a lawyer specializing in space law who has worked for the International Affairs Branch 

of the European Space Agency since 1976. See “Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Donald E Hornig (1920- ), a chemist, was a research associate at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Laboratory, 

1943-1944, and a scientist and group leader at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1944-1946. He taught chemistry at Brown University starting in 1946, rising to the directorship of the Metcalf Research Laboratory, 

1949-1957, and also serving as associate dean and acting dean of the graduate school from 1952 to 1954. He was 

Donner professor of science at Princeton from 1957 to 1964 as well as chairman of the chemistry department 

from 1958 to 1964. He was President Lyndon Johnson’s special assistant on science and technology from 1964 

to 1969 and president of Brown University from 1970 to 1976. See Gregg Herken, Gal-dinal Choices: Science Aduice 

to the Presidat&mz Hiroshima to DI (New York Oxford University Press, 1992). 

H.C. van de Hulst of the Netherlands served as president of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). 

J 

Lee B. James (1920 ) was a career Army officer, trained at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the 

California Institute of Technology, who was assigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, 

in 1956. In 1960 he became deputy director of the Army’s newly formed Research and Development Division. 

In 1962 he was assigned to the Marshall Space Flight Center and the next year became deputy director of the 

Apollo program at NASA Headquarters. In 1968 he returned to Marshall to head the Saturn Program Office and 

retired from the Army as a colonel. Only a year later, he was elevated as the director of the overall program office 

at Marshall. James retired from NASA in 1971 and accepted a faculty position at the University of Tennessee 

Space Institute in Tullahoma. See “James, Lee. B.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert Jastrow (1925- ) earned a Ph.D. in theoretical physics h-om Columbia in 1948 and pursued postdoctoral studies at Leiden, Princeton (Institute for Advanced Studies), and the University of California at Berkeley 

before becoming an assistant professor at Yale, 1953-1954. He then served on the staff at the Naval Research 

Laboratory from 1954 to 1958. In 1958, he was appointed chief of the theoretical division at the Goddard Space 

Flight Center. He became director of the Goddard Institute of Space Studies in 1961 and stayed at its helm for 

twenty years before becoming professor of earth sciences at Dartmouth. He specialized in nuclear physics, plasma physics, geophysics, and the physics of the Moon and terrestrial planets. See “Jastrow, Robert,” biographical 

tile, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Caldwell C. Johnson was a longtime NASA official who held a number of positions in the Apollo program at the 

Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston in the 1960s. He started work at the Langley Memorial Aeronautical 

Laboratory in Hampton, Virginia, in 1938 and worked in a variety of aeronautical engineering activities. He 

moved to Houston with the Space Task Group in 1962. He retired from NASA and became chief of design for 

Space Industries, Inc., in Texas. See ‘‘Johnson, Caldwell C.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

John A. Johnson (1915 ), after completing law school at the University of Chicago in 1940, practiced in Chicago 

until 1943, when he entered military service with the Navy. From 1946 to 1948, he was an assistant for international security affairs in the Department of State. He joined the office of the general counsel of the Department 

of the Air Force in 1949 and served until October 7, 1958 (for the last six years as the general counsel), when 
599 

he accepted the general counsel position at NASA. In 1963 he left NASA to become director of international 

arrangements at the Communications Satellite Corporation. The next year, he became a vice president of 

COMSAT, and, in 1973, senior vice president and then chief executive officer, retiring in 1980. See 'Johnson, 

John A.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Lyndon B. Johnson (19081973) (D-TX) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1937 and served until 

1949. He was a senator from 1949 to 1961, vice president underJohn F. Kennedy from 1960 to 1963, and president from the time of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 until 1969. Best known for the social legislation he passed during his presidency and for his escalation of the war in Vietnam, he was also highly instrumental 

in revising and passing the legislation that created NASA and in supporting the U.S. space program as chair of 

the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and of the preparedness subcommittee of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee. While he was vice president, he chaired the National Aeronautics and Space Council. On 

his role in support of the space program, see Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space," 

in Robert A. Divine, ed., TheJohma bars: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University of Kansas 

Press, 1987), pp. 217-53; Robert Dallek, yohnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," 

unpublished paper delivered at a symposium on "Presidential Leadership, Congress, and the U.S. Space 

Program," sponsored by NASA and American University, March 25, 1993. 

Roy W. Johnson (19061965) was named director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency for the Department 

of Defense in 1958, serving until 1961. Previously, he had been with the General Electric Company. He was a 

strong proponent of exploiting space for national security objectives. See "Roy W. Johnson Dead; First U.S. Space 

Chief," Washington Post, July 23, 1965. 

U. Alexis Johnson (1908 ) was a longtime member of the U.S. Foreign Service and served in a number of 

embassies around the world. A specialist in Asian affairs, he was attached to the embassy in Tokyo, 1935-1938, 

served as consul general to Japan, 1947-1949, and served as ambassador to Japan, 19661969. He also served on 

several international commissions and in numerous senior positions with the Department of State in 

Washington, D.C., most significantly as under secretary of state for political affairs, beginning in 1969 until his 

retirement. See "Miscellaneous Other Agencies," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Vincent L. Johnson (1918- ) was a longtime NASA ufficial, joining the agency in 1960 after working as an 

aerospace engineer with the Navy since 1947. He managed the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion Programs 

Division at NASA Headquarters and had primary responsibility for the program management of Scout, Delta, 

and Centaur launch vehicle development. He retired from NASA in 1974, after having served as deputy associate administrator for space science. See 'Johnson, V.L.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Charlie Jonas (1904 ) (R-NC) served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1953 to 1973. See Biographical 

Directmy ofthe United Stah Cmgren, 1 774-1989 (Washington, DC US. Government Printing Office, 1989). 

John Erik Jonsson (1901-1995) was an engineer and businessman who chaired the board of Texas Instruments, 

Inc., from 1958 to 1966. He later became the mayor of Dallas. Biographical information from the Corporate 

Archives Office of Texas Instruments, Inc., Dallas, TX. 

William C. Keathley arrived at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 1966. He served as the project manager 

for the Apollo Telescope Mount experiments that were flown on Skylab and as chief of the Skylab Optical 

Telescope Assembly project. In 1977 he was named manager of the Space Telescope Project (later named the 

Hubble Space Telescope). See Marshall 9al; March 16, 1977, p.4, from the Marshall Space Flight Center History 

Office, Huntsville, AL. 

Estes Kefauver (1903-1963) (D-TN) served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1939 to 1949 and in the 

U.S. Senate from 1949 to 1963. He ran unsuccessfully as Adlai Stevenson's vice presidential choice in 1956. See 

Niographircrl Directmy oJthe Unifal States Gmpe.s.s, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1989). 
600 

M.V. Keldysh (1911-1978) was trained in physics and mathematics at Moscow University (where he received a 

Ph.D. in 1938) and became the chief theoretician of Soviet cosmonautics in the 1960s. He had previously served 

many years in a variety of positions at the Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics, Moscow University, and the 

Steklov Mathematical Institute. He was vice president (1960-1961) and then president (until 1975) of the Soviet 

Academy of Sciences. See “M.V. Keldysh, Soviet Scientist, Dies,” Washington Post, June 27, 1978. 

Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy (1932- ) (DMA) has been a longtime Democratic member of the Senate from 

Massachusetts who was first elected in 1962. 

John F. Kennedy (19161963) was president of the United States from 1961 to 1963. In 1960, as a senator from 

Massachusetts between 1953 and 1960, he ran for president as the Democratic candidate, with party wheelhorse 

Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. Using the slogan, “Let’s get this country moving again,” Kennedy 

charged the Republican Eisenhower administration with doing nothing about the myriad social, economic, and 

international problems that festered in the 1950s. He was especially hard on Eisenhower’s record in international relations, taking a cold warrior position on a supposed “missile gap” (which turned out not to be the case) 

wherein the United States lagged far behind the Soviet Union in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy announced to the nation the goal of sending an American to the 

Moon before the end of the decade. The human spaceflight imperative was a direct outgrowth of it; Projects 

Mercury (at least in its latter stages), Gemini, and Apollo were each designed to execute it. On this subject, see 

Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 

1985); John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to Ihe Moon: Rqect Apolb and the National Inhat (Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 1970). 

Robert F. Kennedy (1925-1968) was attorney general during the administration of his brother, John F. Kennedy, 

and a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1968 at the time of his assassination. He 

was involved in the 1961 decision to go to the Moon as a senior advisor in the Kennedy administration. On his 

career, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kenmdy and His Times (Boston: Houghton MiHin, 1978). 

Robert S. Kerr (18961963) (D-OK) had been governor of Oklahoma from 1943 to 1947 and was elected to the 

Senate the following year. From 1961 until 1963, he chaired the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. 

See Anne Hodges Morgan, Robert S. b: The hale Ears (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977). 

Nikita S. Khrushchev (18941971) was premier of the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1964 and first secretary of the 

Communist Party from 1953 to 1964. He was noted for an astonishing speech in 1956 denouncing the crimes 

and blunders of Joseph Stalin and for gestures of reconciliation with the West in 19591960. ending with the 

breakdown of a Paris summit with President Eisenhower and the leaders of France and Great Britain in the wake 

of Khrushchev’s announcement that the Soviets had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over 

the Ural Mountains on May 1, 1960. Then in 1962, Khrushchev attempted to place Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba. This led to an intense crisis in October, following which Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles 

if the United States promised to make no more attempts to overthrow Cuba’s Communist government. Although 

he could be charming at times, Khrushchev was known for boisterous threats (extending even to shoepounding at the United Nations) and was a tough negotiator, although he believed, unlike his predecessors, in 

the possibility of Communist victory over the West without war. For further information about him, see his 

Khluthchm Remembers: The kt Tatammt (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchm: A Carem 

(New York Viking, 1966); Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhowa Khrushchm and the U-2 Affair (New York 

Harper and Row, 1986); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York Oxford University Press, 1981). 

James R. Wan, Jr. (19041988), was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) between 

1949 and 1959, but he was on leave between November 1957 and July 1959 to serve as the first presidential science advisor. President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 

which Killian chaired, following the Sputnik crisis. After leaving the White House staff in 1959, Killian continued his work at MIT. In 1965 he began working with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to develop public 

television. Killian described his experiences as a presidential advisor in Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A 

Mmir ofthe First Special Assistant to the President fm Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). For 

a discussion of PSAC, see Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the Redent frm Hiroshima to SDI (New 

York Oxford University Press, 1992). 
60 1 

VA. Kirillin (1913- ) was educated as a physicist and worked in thermodynamics. He was deputy chair of the 

Council of Ministers (in the early 1960s) and chair of the State Committee for Science and Technology 

(1965-1980) for the Soviet Union. He was stripped of his position in 1980 after the ascension of Leonid Brezhnev 

as head of the Soviet Union. See "Biography, Soviet, Miscellaneous (K-O)," NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Henry A. Kissiiger (1923 ) was presidential advisor for national security affairs from 1969 to 1973 and secretary of state (under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) thereafter until 1977. In these positions, he was 

especially involved in international aspects of spaceflight, particularly the joint Soviet-American flight, the 

ApolleSoyuz Tcst Project, in 1975. See "Kissinger, Henry," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

George B. Kistiakowsky (1900-1982) was a pioneering chemist at Harvard University, associated with the development of the atomic bomb. He later became an advocate of banning nuclear weapons. He served as science 

advisor to President Eisenhower from July 1959 to the end of the administration. He later served on the advisory board to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1962 to 1969. See Nm Ymk Timps, December 

9, 1982, p. B21; "George B. Kistiakowsky," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Yuri N. Koptev (1940- ) became general director of the Russian Space Agency. Trained as an engineer, he began 

work in 1965 at NPO SA. Lavochkina, as head of the organization for spacecraft design. Beginning in 1969, he 

served in administration and eventually was appointed as senior engineer to the deputy minister at the design 

bureau. See "Koptev, Yuri N.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. (1924 ), was a long-standing official with NASA throughout the Apollo program. He 

received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from Virginia Polytechnic University in 1944 and joined the Langley 

Aeronautical Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) the next year. In 1958, 

still at Langley, he became a member of the Space Task Group developing Project Mercury and moved with the 

group to Houston in 1962. He was flight director for all of the Mercury and many of the Gemini missions and 

directed the design of Mission Control at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), redesignated the Johnson 

Space Center in 1973. He was named the MSC deputy director in 1970 and its director two years later, a position 

he held until his retirement in 1982. Since then, he has remained active as an aerospace consultant. See "Kraft, 

Christopher C., Jr.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

L 

Edwin (Din) Land was president of the Polaroid Corporation and a member of the Purcell Panel that assessed 

spaceflight capabilities for the U.S. government in 1957-1958. 

Harold R. Lawrence was assistant director of NASA's Office of International Programs. He resigned in 1960 to 

take a job at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. See T. Keith Glennan, Correspondence Files, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

The0 Lefewe was the Belgian minister who served as chair of the European Space Conference, which was a policy-level organization created to coordinate European responses to US. positions on space issues. Lefevre led 

the European delegation in negotiations with the United States concerning launch assurance and post-Apollo 

cooperation during the early 1970s. 

Curtis E. LeMay (1906-1990) was a career Air Force officer who entered the Army Air Corps in the 1920s and 

rose through a series of increasingly responsible Army Air Forces commands during World War 11. After the war, 

LeMay built the Strategic Air Command into the premier nuclear deterrent force in the early 1950s. He also 

served as deputy chief of staff, 1957-1961, and chief of staff, 1961-1965, of the U.S. Air Force. He retired as a fourstar general in 1965 and ran for vice president with independent candidate George C. Wallace in 1968. See 

Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: Tht Turlnrlent L@ of General Curtis &May (New York Crown Pub., 1986). 
602 

Reimar Leust (1923- ) is a German theoretical physicist who held a variety of prestigious academic and advisory council posts before serving as director general of European Space Agency from 1984 to 1990. See 

“Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert B. Lewis was a longtime government official who joined NASA in 1961 as director of financial management. He served until 1965, when he left the agency to return to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. See 

“Miscellaneous NASA,” biographical tile, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Russell Long (1918 ) served as a U.S. senator from Louisiana from 1948 to 1987. See Biogruphicul Directmy nf the 

Unika! Statm Congms, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 

Alan M. Lovelace (1929- ) was born in St. Petersburg, Florida, and was educated at the University of Florida, 

receiving a B.S. in chemistry in 1951, an M.S. in organic chemistry in 1952, and a Ph.D. in organic chemistry in 

1954. Shortly after the end of the Korean conflict, he served in the US. Air Force from 1954 to 1956, Thereafter, 

Dr. Lovelace began work as a government scientist at the Air Force Materials Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. In January 1964, he was named as chief scientist of the Air Force Materials Laboratory, 

and in 1967 he was named director of the laboratory. In October 1972, he was named director of science and 

technology for the Air Force Systems Command at Headquarters, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In 

September 1973, he became the principal deputy to the assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and 

development. One year late, Dr. Lovelace left the Department of Defense to become the associate administrator 

of the NASA Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. With the departure of George Low as NASA deputy 

administrator in June 1976, Dr. Lovelace became deputy administrator, serving until July 1981. He retired from 

NASA to accept a position as corporate vice president of science and engineering at the General Dynamics 

Corporation in St. Louis. See “Lovelace, Alan M.,” Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

George M. Low (19261984), a native of Vienna, Austria, moved to the United States in 1940 and received an 

aeronautical engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RF’I) in 1948 and an M.S. in the same 

field from that school in 1950. He joined the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in 1949; at 

the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory he specialized in experimental and theoretical research in several fields. 

He became chief of manned spaceflight at NASA Headquarters in 1958. In 1960, he chaired a special committee that formulated the original plans for the Apollo lunar landings. In 1964 he became deputy director of the 

Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, the forerunner of the Johnson Space Center. He became deputy administrator of NASA in 1969 and served as acting administrator in 1970-1971. He retired from NASA in 1976 to 

become president of RPI, a position he still held until his death. In 1990 NASA renamed its quality and excellence award after him. See “Low, George M.,” Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Glynn S. Lunney (1936 ) was a longtime NASA official. Trained as an aeronautical engineer, he came to the 

Lewis Research Center near the time of the creation of NASA in 1958 and became a member of the Space Task 

Group developing Project Mercury the next year. He worked on the Apollo program in a series of positions, 

including manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program in 1973 and manager of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project at 

the Johnson Space Center in Houston. Thereafter, he managed the development of the Space Shuttle and 

served in several other NASA positions. Lunney retired from NASA in 1985 and became vice president and general manager, Houston Operations, for Rockwell International’s Space Systems Division. See “Lunney, Glenn s.,” 

biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

M 

Harold Macdan (18941986) became a British member of Parliament in 1924, foreign secretary in 1955, and then 

prime minister from 1957 to 1963. See “Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold,” Currnzt Biography Yearbook 1987, p. 637. 

Frank J. Malina (1912-1981) was a young California Institute of Technology Ph.D. student in the mid-1930s when 

he began an aggressive rocket research program to design a high-altitude sounding rocket. Beginning in late 

1936, Malina and his colleagues started the static testing of rocket engines in the canyons above the Rose Bowl, 

with mixed results, but a series of tests eventually led to the development of the WAGCorporal rocket during 
603 

World War 11. After the war, Malina worked with the United Nations and eventually retired to Pans to pursue a 

career as an artist. See “Malina, Frank J.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Vittorio Manno (1938- ) is an Italian physicist who was a senior scientist at European Space Agency’s Science 

Directorate from 1972 to 1989. From 1989 to 1995, Manno served as the scientific attache at the Italian Embassy 

in Vienna. See “Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Hans Mark (1929- ) became NASA’s deputy administrator in July 1981. He had previously served as secretary of 

the Air Force from July 1979 until February 1981 and as under secretary of the Air Force since 1977. In February 

1969, Mark became director of NASA’s Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California, where he managed 

the center’s research and applications efforts in aeronautics, space science, life science, and space technology. 

Born in Mannheim, Germany, he came to the United States in 1940 and became a citizen in 1945. He received 

a Ph.D. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1954. Upon leaving NASA, he became chancellor of the University of Texas at Austin. See “Mark, Hans,” Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Robert T. Marsh, a general in the Air Force, was commander of the Air Force Systems Command from 1982 to 

1984. See “Miscellaneous DOD,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

John J. Martin was educated as a mechanical engineer, receiving a Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1951. He 

joined North American Aviation in 1951 and moved to the Bendix Corporation in 1953. In 1960 he joined the 

Institute for Defense Analyses and in 1969 moved to the staff of the President’s science advisor at the White 

House. During 19731974, he served as the associate deputy to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

He then was deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development, 19741976, before returning to Bendix. He became a NASA official in 1984, as associate administrator for aeronautics and space technology at NASA Headquarters, before returning to industry in 1985. See ”Martin, Dr. John J.,” biographical file, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Sir Harrie S.W. Massey (1908 ) was Quain professor of physics at University College in London and chaired the 

British National Space Research Committee in the early 1960s. He was the leader of a team of British scientists 

responsible for the selection of the experiments and instruments for the S.51 satellite project, a British-American 

cooperative effort begun in 1959 to launch individual instruments into space for scientific purposes. See 

“Biography, Foreign Miscellaneous, I-M,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

James A. McDivitt (1929- ) was a career Air Force officer, retiring as a brigadier general, who was chosen as a 

NASA astronaut in the second group selected, in 1962. He served as command pilot of the Gemini IV and commander of the Apollo 9 missions. He also managed the Apollo Spacecraft Program at Johnson Space Center 

from September 1969 to August 1972; he then resigned from NASA and the Air Force. Starting in 1975, he 

joined Pullman, Inc., in Chicago and then served as vice president, president of Pullman Standard, and executive vice president, in that order. He resigned from Pullman on January 31, 1981, to become vice president of 

strategic management for Rockwell International in Pittsburgh. He then became senior vice president of government and international operations for Rockwell International in Washington, D.C. See “McDivitt, James A,,” 

biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Frank B. McDonald (1925- ) began a career with NASA in 1959 as head of the Energetic Particles Branch in the 

Space Science Division at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Thereafter, he served as project scientist on nine NASA satellite programs. In 1982 he became NASA’s chief scientist, serving until 1987 when 

he returned to Goddard as associate director/chief scientist. See “McDonald, Dr. Frank B. (Chief Scientist),” bigraphical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Neil H. McElroy (19041972) became secretary of defense in 1957 and served through 1959. He had previously 

been president of Procter & Gamble and returned there in December 1959 to become chair of the board. He 

served in that position until October 1972, a month before his death. See “McElroy, Neil,” biographical file, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
604 

Robert S. McNamara (1916 ) was secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 

1961-1968. Thereafter, he served as president of the World Bank, where he remained until retirement in 1981. 

As secretary of defense in 1961, McNamara was intimately involved in the process of approving Project Apollo 

by the Kennedy administration. See “McNamara, Robert S(trange),” Current Biography Yearbook 1987, pp. 408-13; 

John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apolb and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 

1970). 

John B. Medaris (1902-1990) was a major general commanding the Army Ballistic Missile Agency when T. Keith 

Glennan tried to incorporate it into NASA in the late 1950s. He attempted to retain the organization as part of 

the Army, but with a series of Department of Defense agreements, the Air Force obtained primacy in space activities. Therefore, Medaris could not succeed in his effort. Medaris also worked with Wernher von Braun to launch 

Explorer I in early 1958. He retired from the Army in 1969 and became an Episcopal priest, laterjoining an even 

more conservative Anglican-Catholic church. See ‘John Bruce Medaris,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection; John B. Medaris, with Arthur Gordon, Countdavnfar Decision (New York Putnam, 1960)). 

W.J. Mellors headed the Washington, D.C., office of the European Space Agency. 

Clark B. Millikan (1903-1966) was a pioneer researcher in aerodynamics and guided missiles. With a Ph.D. in 

physics from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), he was the son of Nobel Prize-winning Robert A. 

Millikan. He was appointed to the faculty of Caltech in 1928 and later became director of the Guggenheim 

Aeronautical Laboratory at the institute. He was enormously important in fostering rocket technology, both at 

Caltech and elsewhere, and he served as chair of the Guided Missile Committee for the Department of Defense 

during the late 1940s and early 1950s. See “Clark B. Millikan of Cal Tech Dead,” New Yolk Times, January 3,1966. 

Erwin Mitchell (1924 ) (D-GA) served as a congressman from 1958 to 1961. He chaired the House 

Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions, which was under the Committee on Science and 

Astronautics. See BiographicalDirectmy ofthe United States Cmgress, 1774-1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1989). 

Brooks Morris (1913 ) was an aerospace engineer who worked as a manager of quality assurance and reliability at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory from 1961 to 1981. See Who’s Who in Aviation and Aerospace, U.S. edition 

(Boston and New York: National Aeronautical Institute and Jane’s Publishing Company, Ltd., 1983). 

Donald Morris was a former Foreign Service official who joined NASA in 1967. Morris served as deputy assistant 

administrator for international affairs and then became deputy associate administrator for applications 

management in 1976. In 1977 he was detailed to the President’s Committee on Science and Technology. See 

“Assorted NASA Officials,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

George E. Mueller (1918- ) was associate administrator for the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA 

Headquarters, 1963-1969, where he responsible for overseeing the completion of Project Apollo and for beginning the development of the Space Shuttle. He moved to the General Dynamics Corporation, as senior vice president in 1969, and remained there until 1971. He then became president of the Systems Development 

Corporation, 1971-1980, eventually becoming its chairman and corporate executive officer, 1981-1983. See 

“Mueller, George E.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Robert Murphy (18941978) was a career Foreign Service and State Department official. He served as deputy 

under secretary of state for political affairs and then as under secretary in the 1950s. Biographical information 

from the Biographic Register of the Department of State, 1959, Department of State History Office, Washington, DC. 

Dale D. Myers (1922- ) served as NASAs deputy administrator from October 1986 until 1989. He had previously 

been under secretary of the Department of Energy from 1977 to 1979. From 1974 to 1977, he was vice president 

at Rockwell International and president at North American Aircraft Group in El Segundo, California. He also 

was the associate administrator for manned spaceflight at NASA from 1970 to 1974. From 1969 to 1970, Myers 

served as vice president/program manager of the Space Shuttle Program at Rockwell International. He was vice 

president and program manager of the Apollo Command/Service Module Program at North AmericanRockwell from 1964 to 1969. After leaving NASA in 1989, Myers returned to private industry. See “Myers, Dale 

D.,“ Deputy Administrators files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
605 

N 

John E. Naugle (1925 ) was trained as a physicist at the University of Minnesota and began his career studying 

cosmic rays by launching balloons to high altitudes. in 1959 he joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in 

Greenbelt, Maryland, where he developed projects to study the magnetosphere. In 1960 he took charge of 

NASA's fields and particles research program. He also served as NASA's associate administrator for the Ofice of 

Space Science and as the agency's chief scientist before his retirement in 1981. See John E. Naugle, First Among 

Equals: The Selection ofNASA Space Science Ex@imenls (Washington, DC NASA SP4215, 1991). 

Homer E. Newell (1915-1983) earned his Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of Wisconsin in 1940 and 

served as a theoretical physicist and mathematician at the Naval Research Laboratory from 1944 to 1958. During 

part of that period, he was science program coordinator for Project Vanguard and was acting superintendent of 

the Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division. In 1958 he transferred to NASA to assume responsibility for planning 

and developing the new agency's space science program. He soon became deputy director of spaceflight programs. In 1961 he assumed directorship of the Office of Space Sciences, and in 1963, he became associate 

administrator for space science and applications. Over the course of his career, he became an internationally 

known authority in the field of atmospheric and space sciences, as well as the author of numerous scientific articles and seven books, including Bf?yyond the Atmosphere: Early Years a/Sparx Sn'mce (Washington, DC: NASA SP4211, 

1980). He retired from NASA at the end of 1973. See "Newell, Homer," biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Richard M. Nixon (19131994) was president of the United States between January 1969 and August 1974. Early 

in his presidency, Nixon appointed a Space Task Group under the direction ofvice President Spiro T. Agnew to 

assess the future of spaceflight for the nation. Its report recommended a vigorous post-Apollo exploration program, culminating in a human expedition to Mars. Nixon did not approve this plan, but he did decide in favor 

of building one element of it, the Space Shuttle, which was approved on January 5, 1972. See Roger D. Launius, 

"NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 196472," The Histmian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34. 

0 

Gerald D. O'Brien was assistant general counsel for patent matters at NASA between 1958 and 1965, when he 

was appointed an assistant commissioner of patents by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Previously, he had received 

a B.S. in electrical engineering at the U.S. Naval Academy and a law degree in 1940 froni American University's 

Washington College of Law. He then served in the Navy as patent advisor to the National Defense Research 

Council during World War 11. After the war, he became patent counsel of the Bureau of Ordnance, Department 

of the Navy, from 1946 to 1958. See "O'Brien, Gerald D.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Henk Olthof (1944 ) is a Dutch physicist who has worked at the European Space Agency since 1977. From 1977 

to 1986, he was responsible for the secretariat of the Astronomy Working Group. Since 1986, Olthof has served 

as the head of space station and platforms for scientific users at the European Space Research and Technology 

Centre in the Netherlands. See "Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

P 

Edgar Page (1935- ) is an Irish physicist who specialized in cosmic ray research while at the European Space 

Research Organization from 1965 to 1975. He then became head of the European Space Agency's Space Science 

Department. Beginning in 1986, he has served as the science coordinator for the Ulysses spacecraft mission. See 

"Miscellaneous Foreign," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Thomas 0. Paine (1921-1992) was appointed deputy administrator of NASA on January 31, 1968. Upon the 

retirement of James E. Webb on October 8, 1968, he was named acting administrator. He was nominated as 

NASA's third administrator on March 5, 1969, and confirmed by the Senate on March 20, 1969. During his leadership, the first seven Apollo crewed missions were flown, in which twenty astronauts orbited the Earth, fourteen 
606 

traveled to the Moon, and four walked on its surface. Paine resigned from NASA on September 15, 1970, to 

return to the General Electric Company in New York City as vice president and group executive, Power 

Generation Group, where he remained until 1976. In 1985 the White House chose Paine as chair of the National 

Commission on Space to prepare a report on the future of space exploration. Since leaving NASA fifteen years 

earlier, Paine had been a tireless spokesperson for an expansive view ofwhat should be done in space. The Paine 

Commission took most of a year to prepare its report, largely because it solicited public input in hearings 

throughout the United States. The report, Pioneering the Spa@ Frontio; was published in a lavishly illustrated, 

glossy format in May 1986. It espoused a "pioneering mission for 2lst-century America'-"to lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit, 

from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars." The report also contained a "Declaration for Space," 

which included a rationale for exploring and settling the solar system and outlined a long-range space program 

for the United States. See Roger D. Launius, "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72," The 

Histmian 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34. 

Frank Parker (1916 ) was assistant director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Department of Defense 

from 1959 to 1961. This information is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Branch, 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 

Robert J. Parks (1922- ) was a longtime employee at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), arriving there in 1947 

after completing his education at the nearby California Institute of Technology. Closely associated with robotic 

planetary exploration, he worked on the Manner, Ranger, and Surveyor programs. He served as JPL's planetary 

program director in the 1960s and then became JPL's associate and finally deputy director. See "Parks, Robert 

J.," biographical tile, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Kenneth S. Pedersen (1939- ) served in numerous government agencies--the Office of Equal Opportunity, the 

Department of Commerce, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-prior to 

coming to NASA in 1982 as director of international affairs. In 1988 Pedersen was appointed as NASA's associate administrator for external relations, serving until 1990, when he left NASA to accept an academic appointment at Georgetown University. See "Pedersen, Kenneth s.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Charles J. Pellerin, Jr., was a longtime NASA official who began his career at the Goddard Space Flight Center 

as he was completing his Ph.D. in physics from the Catholic University of America in 1974. The next year he 

moved to NASA Headquarters, where he managed the development and integration of scientific instrumentation for flight on the Space Shuttle. In 1983 he was named director of astrophysics in NASA's Office of Space 

Science and Applications, and in 1992, he was appointed as deputy associate administrator for safety and mission quality, serving until 1994. See "Pellerin, Charles J., Jr.," biographical tile, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Boris N. Petrov (1913-1980) was a leading Soviet scientist whose later years were devoted to space exploration. 

As a senior academician for the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Petrov chaired the Inter-Cosmos Council, which 

promoted cooperation in space among eastern European nations during the height of the cold war, 19661980. 

See "Boris Petrov, 67, Soviet Expert on Automation, Space Research," Washington Post, August 27, 1980; Kenneth 

W. Gatland, "Boris Petrov," Spaceflight 23 (January 1981): 29. 

Franklyn W. Phillips (1917- ) graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1941 with a degree 

in mechanical engineering. He then worked at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, later moving to Lewis 

Flight Propulsion Laboratory, where he conducted research on aircraft engine materials and stresses. In 1945 he 

became a member of the NACA director's staff and served as administrator for a variety of NACA research programs in aircraft engines and aircraft and missile structures and loads. In October 1958, he became special assis 

tant to T. Keith Glennan, NASA's first administrator. He relinquished that position in January 1959 to become 

acting secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, but in February 1960, he returned to his position as Glennan's assistant. He continued in thatjob underJames E. Webb until 1962, when he became director 

of NASA's new northeastern office. In 1964 he became assistant director for administrative operations at the new 
607 

NASA Electronics Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This information is from background summaries of top NASA staff, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Samuel C. Phillips (1921-1990) was trained as an electrical engineer at the University of Wyoming, but he also 

participated in the Civilian Pilot Training Program during World War 11. Upon his graduation in 1942, Phillips 

entered the Army infantry but soon transferred to the air component. As a young pilot, he served with distinction in the Eighth Air Force in England-arning two distinguished flying crosses, eight air medals, and the 

French croix de guerre-hut he quickly became interested in aeronautical research and development. He was 

involved in the development of the successful E52 bomber in the early 1950s and headed the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile program in the latter part of the decade. In 1964 Phillips, by this time an Air Force 

general, was lent to NASA to head the Apollo lunar landing program, which, of course, was unique in its technological accomplishment. He returned to the Air Force in the 1970s and commanded the Air Force Systems 

Command prior to his retirement in 1975. See “Gen. Samuel C. Phillips of Wyoming,” Congrmsionnl Record, 

August 3, 1973, S15689 Rep. John Wold, ”Sam Phillips: One Who Led Us to the Moon,” NASA Adivities, 

May/June 1990, pp. 1819; obituary in New York Tim, February 1, 1990, p. D1. 

William H. Pidtering (1910- ) obtained his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in electrical engineering and then 

a Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology before becoming a professor of electrical engineering there in 1946. In 1944 he organized the electronics efforts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) to 

support guided missile research and development, becoming project manager for Corporal, the first operational 

missile JPL developed. From 1954 to 1976, he was director of JPL, which developed the first US. satellite 

(Explorer I), the first successful US. circumlunar space probe (Pioneer IV), the Mariner flights to Venus and 

Mars in the early to mid-l960s, the Ranger photographic missions to the Moon in 1964 and 1965, and the 

Surveyor lunar landings of 1966 and 1967. See “Pickering, William H.,” biographical tile, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Kenneth S. Pitzer (1914) was a chemist who served as director of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1949 to 

1951. From 1961 to 1968, he served as president of Rice University. From 1964 to 1965, Dr. Pitzer also served on 

NASA’s Science and Technology Advisory Committee, and in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson appointed him a 

member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee. Biographical information from University Relations 

Office of Rice University, Houston, TX. 

Herman Pollack (1920-1993) was a State Department official for 28 years before retiring in 1974. He served as 

the department’s director of international scientific and technological affairs for ten years before retiring. See 

obituary, Wrtshington Post, April 14, 1993, p. C6, in “Biography, Other Agency Miscellaneous, N-2,” file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Richard W. Porter was an electrical engineer who worked on missile programs with the General Electric 

Company before working on Earth sciences programs at the National Academy of Sciences. In 1964 he was the 

academy’s delegate to the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). See “Assorted Government Officials,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Thomas Power (1905-1970) was an accomplished pilot who served as a general during World War 11. As chief of 

staff to General Curtis LeMay, he was one of several top planners of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki. After World War 11, Power served as the commander of the Air Research and Development Command, 

which developed early missiles. He served as commander of the Strategic Air Command from 1957 to 1964, 

when he retired. See “Power, Thomas,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Donald L. Putt (1905-1988) was a career U.S. Air Force officer who specialized in the management of aerospace 

research and development activities. Trained as an engineer, he entered the Army Air Corps in 1928 and served 

in a series of increasingly responsible posts at the Air Materiel Command and Air Force headquarters. From 1948 

to 1952, he was director of research and development for the Air Force, and between 1952 and 1954, he was first 

vice commander and then commander of the Air Research and Development Command. Thereafter, until his 

retirement in 1958, he served as deputy chief of the development staff at Air Force headquarters. See “Putt, 

Donald,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
608 

Donald A. Quarles (18941959) was deputy secretary of defense between 1957 and 1959. Just after World War 11, 

he had been a vice president first at the Western Electric Company and later at Sandia National Laboratories, 

but in 1953, he accepted the position of assistant secretary of defense for research and development. He also was 

secretary of the Air Force between 1955 and 1957. See “Quarles, Donald,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

J. Danfortb (Dan) Quayle (R-IN) served as a senator before becoming George Bush’s vice president from 1989 

to 1993. As vice president, he chaired the National Space Council and had significant involvement with the development of the space station, Space Shuttle replacement options, the Space Exploration Initiative, and NASA 

management. 

Erik Quistgaard was the director general of the European Space Agency from 1980 to 1984, overseeing the 

Ariane rocket’s development and Spacelab’s many contributions to space science. See “Quistgaard, Erik,” bie 

graphical tile, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Ronald Reagan (1911- ) served as president of the United States from January 1981 until 1989. During his presidency, the maiden flight of the Space Shuttle took place. In 1984 he mandated the construction of an orbital 

space station. Reagan declared: “America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for 

greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic, 

and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it 

within a decade.” See Sylvia D. Fries, “2001 to 1994 Political Environment and the Design of NASA’s Space 

Station System,” Technology and Culture 29 (July 1988): 568-93. 

Felix Michael Rogers (1921- ) was an ace fighter pilot who became an Air Force general. He was deputy chief 

of staff for development plans at the Air Force Systems Command and also served with the United Nations 

Military Armistice Commission in Korea. After working as the commander of Air University at Maxwell Air Force 

Base, he became commander of the Air Force Logistics Command. See US. Air Force biography, November 

1977, for General Felix Michael Rogers, History Office, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, Dayton, OH. 

William P. Rogers (1913 ) was chair of the presidentially mandated blue ribbon commission investigating the 

Challenger accident of January 1986. It found that the failure had resulted from a poor engineering decisionan O-ring used to seal joints in the solid rocket booster that was susceptible to failure at low temperatures, 

introduced innocently enough years earlier. Rogers kept the commission’s analysis on that technical level and 

documented the problems in exceptional detail. The commission, after some prodding by Nobel Prize-winning 

scientist Richard P. Feynman, did a credible job of grappling with the technologically difficult issues associated 

with the accident. See Report nf thefisidmtial Gnnmissim on the Space Shuttle ChallengerAccident, Vnl. I (Washington, 

DC U.S. Government Printing Office, June 6, 1986). 

Dean Rusk (1909-1994) was a Rhodes scholar who studied philosophy, politics, economics, and law. After teaching government and international relations and serving in the military in World War 11, Rusk joined the State 

Department in 1946. He held increasingly responsible positions, culminating in his appointment as secretary of 

state in 1961. He served as secretary for eight years, through the entire Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 

He was a strong supporter of US. involvement in Vietnam and also presided over US. foreign policy during the 

Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban missile crisis. See “Rusk, Dean,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

S 

Roald 2. Sagdeyev (1932- ) was one of the leaders of Soviet space science from the 1960s through the 1980s. He 

was involved in virtually every lunar and planetary probe of the Soviet Union during this era, including the highly successful Venera and Vega missions. He also advised Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on space and arms control at the 1986 Geneva, 1987 Washington, and 1988 Moscow summits. In he late 1980s, he left the Soviet Union 
609 

and settled in the United States, where he headed the East-West Science and Technology Center at the University 

of Maryland at College Park. See Roald Z. Sagdeyev, The Making of a Soviet Scienfist: My Adventures in NuckarFusion 

and Space From Stalin to Star Wars (New York: John Wiley, 1995). 

James R. Schlesinger (1929- ) served in numerous governmental positions during the 1960s and 1970s. After a 

career at the University of Virginia, 1955-1963, and the RAND Corporation, 19631969, he worked for the 

Bureau of the Budget/Office of Management and Budget, 1969-1971. He also served as chair of the Atomic 

Energy Commission, 1971-1973, and secretary of defense, 1973-1975. In 1977 he was appointed head of the 

newly created Department of Energy. See “Schlesinger, James,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Bernard A. Scluiever (1910- ) earned a B.S. in architectural engineering from Texas A&M University in 1931 

and was commissioned in the Army Air Corps Reserve in 1933 after completing pilot training. Following broken 

service, he received a regular commission in 1938. He earned an MA. in aeronautical engineering from 

Stanford in 1942 and then flew 63 combat missions on 517s with the 19th Bombardment Group in the Pacific 

Theater during World War 11. In 1954, he became commander of the Western Development Division (soon 

renamed the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division), and from 1959 to 1966, he was commander of its parent organization, the Air Research and Development Command, renamed Air Force Systems Command in 1961. As such, 

he presided over the development of the Atlas, Thor, and Titan missiles, which served not only as military 

weapon systems but also as boosters for NASA’s space missions. In developing these missiles, Schriever instituted a systems approach, whereby the various components of the Atlas and succeeding missiles underwent 

simultaneous design and test as part of an overall “weapons system.” Schriever also introduced the notion of concurrency, which has been given various interpretations but essentially allowed the components of the missiles to 

enter production while still in the test phase, thereby speeding up development. He retired as a general in 1966. 

See Jacob Neufeld, “Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the Unknown,” Makers of fhe Unirpd Sfaks Air Force 

(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), pp. 281-306; Robert L. Perry, “Atlas, Thor . . .,” in 

Eugene M. Emme, ed., A Histmy oJRocket Technology (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 144160 

Robert A. Divine, The Spufnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response lo the Souief Salellile (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1993), p. 25. 

Glenn T. Seaborg (1912- ) earned a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1937 and 

worked on the Manhattan Project in Chicago during World War 11. Afterward, he became associate director of 

Berkeley’s Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, where he and associates isolated several transuranic elements. For 

this work, Seaborg received the Nobel Prize in 1951. He also served as chair of the Atomic Energy Commission 

between 1961 and 1971; thereafter, he returned to the University of California at Berkeley as a member of the 

faculty. See David Petechuk, “Glenn T. Seaborg,” in Emily J. McMurray, ed., Notabk Twentieth-Century Scientists 

(New York Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 1803-1806. 

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (1918- ), had been involved in aerospace issues since he completed his Sc.D. degree at 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1951. He was on the faculty at MIT’s Department of 

Aeronautical Engineering between 1949 and 1955, when he joined the Radio Corporation of America as manager of the Airborne Systems Laboratory. In 1958 he became the chief engineer of the Missile Electronics and 

Control Division. He then joined NASA in 1960 as associate administrator. In December 1965, he became 

NASAs deputy administrator. He left NASA in 1968, and in 1969, he became secretary of the Air Force, serving 

until 1973. Seamans was president of the National Academy of Engineering from May 1973 to December 1974, 

when he became the first administrator of the new Energy Research and Development Administration. He 

returned to MIT in 1977, becoming dean of its School of Engineering in 1978. In 1981 he was elected chair of 

the board of trustees of the Aerospace Corporation. See “Seamans, Robert C., Jr.,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection; Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets (Washington, DC: NASA SP4106, 

1996). 

Frederick Seitz (1911- ) was trained in mathematics and physics at Stanford and Princeton Universities and 

worked at a variety of corporations, laboratories, and government organizations throughout his career. He 

served on the National Defense Research Committee from 1941 to1945, was a consultant to the secretary of war 

in 1945, served as director of the atomic energy training program at Oak Ridge from 1946 to 1947, was a science 
610 

advisor to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1959 to 1960, and was a faculty member of 

several universities during his career. In 1962 he was elected president of the National Academy of Sciences, and 

he was reelected to a six-year term in 1965. In 1968 he left the academy to become president of Rockefeller 

University in New York City and served until his retirement. See “Seitz, Frederick,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Eduard A. Shevardnadze (1927- ) was a reform leader of the Soviet Union along with Mikhail Gorbachev in the 

late 1980s. He was heavily involved in the transformation of the nation from a Communist state to one built on 

capitalism. Serving in a variety of senior positions, he negotiated with the United States for international cooperation in space, including the building of a space station in the 1990s. See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future 

Belongs toFreedom (New York Free Press, 1991). 

George P. Shdtz (1920- ) served as director of the Office of Management and Budget after 1970, during the 

Nixon administration. Before that time, he had been Nixon’s secretary of labor. During the Reagan administration, 1981-1989, Shultz served as secretary of state. See ”Shultz, George P.,” Current Biography Yparbook 1988, 

pp. 525-30. 

S. Fred Singer (1924 ), a physicist at the University of Maryland, proposed a Minimum Orbital Unmanned 

Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of the International Astronautics Federation in Zurich, 

Switzerland, in the summer of 1953. It had been based on two years of previous study conducted under the auspices of the British Interplanetary Society, which had built on the post-war research of the V-2 rocket. The Upper 

Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel at White Sands discussed Singer’s plan in April 1954, and a month later, 

Singer presented his MOUSE proposal at the Hayden Planetarium’s fourth Space Travel Symposium. MOUSE 

was the first satellite proposal widely discussed in nongovernmental engineering and scientific circles, although 

it never was adopted. See “Singer, S. Fred,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Walter D. Sohier (1924 ), a graduate of Columbia Law School, had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) and the Air Force before joining NASA in 1958 as assistant general counsel. He became deputy general 

counsel in 1961 and general counsel in 1963. He left NASA in 1966 to become a partner in a New York law firm. 

See “Sohier, Walter,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Thomas P. Stafford (1930- ), a career military officer who retired as a lieutenant general in the US. Air Force, 

was chosen by NASA in the second group of astronauts, in 1962. He served as the backup pilot for Gemini 111 

and the pilot for Gemini VI. He became command pilot for Gemini IX upon the death of a prime crew member and was the backup commander for Apollo 7, the commander of Apollo 10, and the commander of the 

ApolloSoyuz Test Project. He resigned from NASA on November 1, 1975, to become commander of the Air 

Force Flight Test Center, at Edwards Air Force Base in California. He was promoted to Air Force deputy chief of 

staff for research and development in March 1978. He then retired from the Air Force in November 1979 and 

became executive vice president of commercial sales and finance for American Farm Line in Oklahoma City. He 

also worked as a consultant with Defense Technology in Oklahoma City and thereafter as vice chairman of 

Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc., in Alexandria, Virginia. He joined the Spectrum Information Technologies 

Technical Advisory Board in 1993. See “Stafford, Thomas P.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Homer J. Stewart (1915- ) earned his doctorate in aeronautics from the California Institute of Technology 

(Caltech) in 1940, joining the faculty there two years before that. In 1939 he participated in pioneering rocket 

research with other Caltech engineers and scientists, including Frank Malina, in the foothills of Pasadena. Out 

of their efforts, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) arose, and Stewart maintained his interest in rocketry at that 

institution. He was involved in developing the first American satellite, Explorer I, in 1958. In that year, on leave 

from Caltech, he became director of NASA’s Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, returning to Caltech 

in 1960 in a variety of positions, including chief of the Advanced Studies Office at JPL from 1963 to 1967 and 

professor of aeronautics at Caltech itself. See “Stewart, Homer,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection; Clayton R. Koppes,JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet RopUlrion Laboratory (New 

Haven, Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 23, 32, 44, 47, 79-80, 82. 
61 1 

Vladimir S. Symmiahlikov (1934 ) was educated at Bauman Technical University in Moscow and went to work 

for RKK Energia of Kalingrad after graduating in 1956. He was the designer of one of the most successful pieces 

of space hardware used by the Soviet Union, the docking collar used to link two spacecraft together. It was adapted for use in the Apollc+Soyuz Test Project in 1975 and has been successful in more than 200 dockings of 

Soviet/Russian missions. It will be used aboard the International Space Station being constructed at the end of 

the twentieth century. See “Vladimir S. Syromiatnikov, Russian Docking System Engineer,” Space News, February 

12-18, 1996, p. 22. 

T 

Brian Taylor (1940- )joined the European Space Agency (then the European Space Research Organization) in 

1967 as a staff scientist. In 1971, he became the head of the High Energyhtrophysics Division and then, in 1984, 

the head of the Astrophysics Division. See “Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Albert Thomas (1898-1966) (D-TX), a lawyer and World War I veteran, had first been elected to the House of 

Representatives in 1936 and served successively until 1962. In 1960 he was chair of the independent offices sub 

committee of the House Appropriations Committee and thus exercised considerable congressional power over 

NASA’s funding. See “Thomas, Albert,“ biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Shelby G. Tilford was a NASA scientist in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Office of Space Science, for which 

he was director of Earth sciences. In 1992 he was appointed acting associate administrator for Mission to Planet 

Earth and served until 1994. See Tilford, Shelby,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Holger N. Toftoy (1903-1967) was a career U.S. Army officer and an expert in ordnance who was responsible for 

bringing the German “rocket team” under the leadership of Wernher von Braun to the United States in 1945. 

He became commander of the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, in 1954 and worked closely with von 

Braun’s team in the development of the Redstone and Jupiter missiles. In the aftermath of the first successful 

Sputnik launch in 1957, he persuaded the Department of Defense to allow the launch of the first U.S. Earthorbiting satellite aboard the Jupiter missile; the result.was the orbiting of Explorer I on January 31, 1958. He also 

held a number of other positions in the Army; he was the head of the Rocket Research Branch of the Chief of 

Ordnance in Washington, D.C., and the commander of the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. He retired 

from the Army in 1960 with the rank of major general. See “Maj. Gen. Holger Toftoy Dies; Leader in U.S. Rocket 

Program,” New Ymk Tim.~, April 20, 1967, p. 41. 

H.S. Tsien (1909- ) was a Chinese national who received a Ph.D. in aeronautics in 1939 from the California 

Institute of Technology (Caltech) and worked on the development of rocket technology at his aha mater 

through World War 11. He was on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1946 to 1949, 

when he returned to Caltech. In the 1950s, his loyalty to democratic institutions was questioned, and he was 

deported from the United States to the People’s Republic of China. There, he was largely responsible for the 

development of intercontinental ballistic missile rocket technology, especially the “Long March” launch vehicle. 

See Iris Chang, Threw1 ofthe Siulwmm (New York: Free Press, 1996). 

Nathan E Twining (1897-1982) was a career pilot in the Army and the Air Force, commanding the 13th Air Force 

in the Pacific, the 15th Air Force in Europe, and then the 20th Air Force in the Pacific during World War 11. He 

became chief of staff of the Air Force in 1953 and chaired the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957 to 1960. See Donald 

J. Mrozek, “Nathan F. Twining: New Dimensions, a New Look,” in John L. Frisbee, ed., Makm ofthe Unilpd States 

Airl;mrr (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 257-80. 

James A. Van Allen (1914 ) was a pathbreaking astrophysicist best known for his work in magnetospheric 

physics. Van Allen’s January 1958 Explorer I experiment established the existence of radiation belts-later 

named for the scientist-that encircled the Earth, representing the opening of a broad research field. Extending 

outward in the direction of the Sun approximately 40,000 miles, as well as stretching out with a trail away from 
612 

the Sun to approximately 370,000 miles, the magnetosphere is the area dominated by Earth’s strong magnetic 

field. See James A. Van Allen, Origins of Magnetospheric Physirs (Washington, DC Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1983); David E. Newton, “James A. Van Allen,” in Emily J. McMurray, ed., Notable Twentieth-Century Scientists (New 

York: Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 2070-72. 

Hoyt S. Vandenberg (1899-1954) was a career military aviator who served as chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force 

between 1948 and 1953. He was educated the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and entered the Army Air 

Corps after graduation, becoming a pilot and air commander. After numerous command positions during World 

War 11, most significantly as commander of Ninth Air Force, which provided fighter support in Europe during 

the invasion and march to Berlin, he returned to Washington and helped with the formation of the Department 

of Defense (DOD) in 1947. As Air Force chief of staff, he was a senior ofticia1 at DOD during the formative period of rocketry development and the work on intercontinental ballistic missiles. See Phillip S. Meilinger, Hqt S. 

Vandenberg: The Life qf a Gewd (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 

W 

Alan T. Waterman (1892-1967) was the first director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), from its founding in 1951 until 1963. He received his Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University in 1916. He then served with 

the Army’s Science and Research Division during World War I, on the faculty of Yale University in the interwar 

years, with the War Department’s Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War 11, and then 

with the Office of Naval Research between 1946 and 1951. He and NASA leaders contended over control of the 

scientific projects to be undertaken by the space agency, with Waterman’s NSF being used as an advisory body 

in the selection of space experiments. See Waterman, First NSF Head, Dies at 75,” Science 158 (December 8, 

1967): 1293; Norriss S. Hetherington, “Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space Science Program,” 

h-ologue: The Jmrnal of the National Archives 7 (Summer 1975): 99-108; John E. Naugle. First Among Equals: The 

bkction of NASA Sjiau Sn‘mr- Expm’mmts (Washington, DC: NASA SP4215, 1991). 

James E. Webb (19061992) was NASA administrator between 1961 and 1968. Previously, he had been an aide to 

a congressman during the New Deal era in Washington, an aide to Washington lawyer Max 0. Gardner, and a 

business executive with the Sperry Corporation and the Kerr-McCee Oil Company. He also had been director 

of the Bureau ofrhe Budget between 1946 and 1950 and under secretary of state from 1950 to 1952. See W. 

Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: Jams E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 

Caspar W. Weinberger (1917- ), a longtime Republican government official, was a senior member of the Nixon, 

Ford, and Reagan administrations. For Nixon, he was deputy director (1970-1972) and director (1972-1976) of 

the Office of Management and Budget. In this capacity, he had a leading role in shaping the direction of NASA‘s 

major effort of the 1970s, the development of the reusable Space Shuttle. For Reagan, he served as secretary of 

defense, where he also oversaw the use of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s for the launching of classified 

Department of Defense payloads into orbit. See ‘Weinberger, Caspar W(il1ard) ,” Current Biography Earbook 1973, 

pp. 428-30. 

Edward C. Welsh (1909-1990) had a long career in various private and public enterprises. He had served as legislative assistant to Senator Stuart Symington (DMO), 1953-1961, and was the executive secretary of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Council through the 1960s. See Welsh, Edward,” biographical file, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 

Fred L. Whipple (1906 ) received a Ph.D. in astronomy from the University of California at Berkeley. He then 

served on the faculty of Harvard University. He was involved in efforts during the early 1950s to expand public 

interest in the possibility of spaceflight through a series of symposia at the Hayden Planetarium in New York City 

and articles in Collier’s magazine. He was also heavily involved in planning for the International Geophysical Year, 

1957-1958. As a pathbreaking astronomer, he pioneered research on comets. See Raymond E. Bullock, “Fred 

Lawrence Whipple,” in Emily J. McMurray, ed., Notable Twatieth-Century Scientists (New York: Gale Research Inc., 

1995), pp. 2167-70. 
613 

James E Whisenand (1911- ) was trained as an aeronautical engineer at the University of Illinois and entered 

the Army Air Corps in 1934. Serving in a variety of command and staff positions, including in combat in World 

War I1 and Korea, he served as special assistant to the chair of the Joint Chiefs, General Nathan F. Twining, 

beginning in 1957 as a major general. See “Biography, DOD Miscellaneous, N-Z,” biographical file, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection. 

Gordon P. Whitcomb (1940- ) is a British engineer who began his career working on automatic landing systems 

for civilian aircraft. In 1974 he joined the European Space Research Organization to work on spacecraft system 

design. Currently, he is the head of the European Space Agency’s Future Science Projects Office. See 

“Miscellaneous Foreign,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Thomas D. White (1901-1965) was a career Air Force officer who served in a succession of increasingly responsible positions until his retirement in 1961. He was director of legislation for the secretary of the Air Force 

between 1948 and 1951, deputy chief of staff for operations from 1951 to 1953; vice chief of staff from 1953 to 

1957, and chief of staff from 1957 to 1961. See ‘White, T.D.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Clay T. Whitehead was a White House staff assistant during the Nixon administration between 1969 and 1972. 

He was heavily involved in space policy associated with the decision to build the Space Shuttle and post-Apollo 

planning for NASA. See Roger D. Launius, “NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72,” Thr 

Histm’an 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34; Roger D. Launius, “A Western Mormon in Washington, D.C.: James C. 

Fletcher, NASA, and the Final Frontier,” Pacifir HistmiralRmb64 (May 1995): 21741. 

Jerome B. Wiesner (19151994) was science advisor to President John F. Kennedy. He had been a faculty member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had served on President Eisenhower’s Science Advisory 

Committee. During the presidential campaign of 1960, Wiesner had advised Kennedy on science and technology issues and prepared a transition team report on the subject that questioned the value of human spaceflight. 

As Kennedy’s science advisor, he tussled with NASA over the lunar landing commitment and the method of conducting it. See Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice k~ the President from Hiroshima lo SDI (New York 

Oxford University Press, 1992). 

Lynette (Lyn) Wigbek is the assistant director for international programs on the Global Learning and 

Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) program. She joined NASA’s International Affairs Division 

in 1979 and developed the space station agreements covering cooperation with Europe, Japan, and Canada. She 

has also held several other policy and internationally related positions at NASA. Biographical sketch from Lyn 

Wigbels and ‘Wigbels, Lyn,” ‘‘Miscellaneous NASA Officials,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

Y 

John E Yardley (1925- ) was an aerospace engineer who worked with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation on 

several NASA human spaceflight projects between the 1950s and the 1970s. He also served as NASA associate 

administrator for spaceflight between 1974 and 1981. Thereafter, he returned to McDonnell Douglas as president, 1981-1988. See “Yardley, John F.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

Boris N. Yeltsin (193Ck ) became leader of Russia in the immediate post-Cold War era in the early 1990s and 

carried even further democratic reforms than had his predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev. One of his principle 

objectives was closer ties to the West, and under his leadership, the international partnership to build a space 

station came much closer to reality. See “Yeltsin, Boris N.,” biographical file, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

615 

Index 

Adams, Mac C., 363 

Administrative Services Act of 1949,440 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 249-51,285-86,293,296,298301,311,314,449,480; and creation 

of NASA, 24553; and loses program, 25455 

Aerojet General Corporation, 371, 510 

Aeronaufics and Asfrmufics journal, 213 

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), 254, 29697, 346,349, 352,357, 359, 360, 372, 383, 

389 

AEROSAT cooperative satellite system, 85, 87 

Aerospace Corporation, 320,322 

Afghanistan, 215 

Agena rocket, 254, 257, 373, 482 

Agnew, Spiro, 40, 95 

Air Force, US., 164-65, 181,233, 238, 299,301,303-04, 309, 311, 313-14,350,355, 389410,423, 44445,469,476, 

481-82, 509; and Air Force Space Center (AFSC), 369; and ARPA, 249-51, 25455, 285-86, 298, 311, 339, 

36679,383,384,449; and Blue Gemini, 258-63; and Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 253-54; and creation of 

NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 24748; and Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 24650; and 

Dyna-Soar program, 166,234,246,252,259,260-62,268,280-85,310; and Explorer I, 244-45; and Feusibility of 

Weather Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle, 237; and "Freedom of Space," 239, 24445, 273; and ICBM development, 24244; and IGY, 237-38,27577; and Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL), 262-63; and "Meeting the 

Threat of Surprise Attack," 238-39 and Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE), 

237-38; and NASA roles and missions, 290-92; and "Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling 

Spaceship," 236 and Project Feed Back, 237; and Project RAND, 236, 271-72; and relations with NASA, 

233410; and Robert McNamara, 257-63, 312; and scientific satellite program, 240-42; and Space Shuttle, 

26-69; and space studies, 23638; and Sputnik, 244-46, 251; and "Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle," 

236 and Utili9 of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance, 237; and Vanguard Program, 24245, 277-80 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD), 254,255-56 

Air Materiel Command, 236, 271-72 

Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), 243, 257,310 

Albert, John, 370 

Aldridge, Edward C., 267, 410 

Aleksandrov, A. P., 215, 217 

Allnutt, Robert J., 2627 

American Astronomical Society (AAS), 541, 548 

American Bar Association, 461 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 94, 182 

American Rocket Society, 238, 240 

American Society of Electrical Engineers (ASEE), 525 

Ames Research Center, California, 264 

Anders, William A,, 8, 63-65, 68-69, 370 

Anderson, Clinton P., 182, 415 

Antarctica, 71 

Apollo, Project, 5, 7-9, 13, 34, 48-51, 5361, 64, 66-74, 77-84, 91-92, 95-97, 100, 165, 176, 81-82, 189-211, 21415, 

322-23, 330, 343, 357, 365, 383, 411, 417-21, 427-29, 485, 490, 495, 497, 520; and Apollo 8 mission, 62; and 

Apollo 11 mission, 6,3435, 40,62, 72; and Apollo 204 capsule fire, 34, 42627, 527-37; and ApollrAoyuz Test 

Project (ASTP), 14,182, 189-211,21415,379; and Robert McNamara, 257-63 

Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) program, 24 

Ariane launch vehicle, 85, 137-38 

Ariel 1, 3, 10, 19 

Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,413-14,438,445,457,480 
616 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 96,103 

Army, U.S., 235, 236,299,301,303,314,476,481; and Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 288-90; andARPA, 

249-51,25455,285-86,298, 444; and Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 25354; and creation of NASA, 248-53; 

and defense reorganization, 24748; and Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 24650; and Explorer I, 

24445; and Janus Report, 243 246; and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 287-88, 503; and “Meeting the 

Threat of Surprise Attack,” 238-39; and Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Errred on Components availablefrom missile &elopment of the Army Ordnance Ws, A, 238; and NASA roles and missions, 290-92 and Robert McNamara, 

257-63; and scientific satellite program, 24042; and Vanguard Program, 24245, 277-80 

Army Air Forces, see Army, United States 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 240-45, 246, 416, 480-81; and ARPA, 249-51, 25455; and Civil-Military 

Liaison Committee, 25354; and creation of NASA, 248-53,412; and Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 

24650; and NASA roles and missions, 290-92; and transfer to NASA, 28590 

Army-Navy Aeronautical Board, 236 

Army Ordnance Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section, 235 

Army Signal Corps, 481 

Arnold Engineering Development Center, 372 

Arnold, Gen. Henry H. (Hap), 236 

Asia, 182 

AT&T Corporation, 419; and Bellcomm, 419 

Atkinson, Paul, 370 

Atlantic Missile Range, 18 

Atlas launch vehicle, 38, 243, 254, 267, 327, 332, 476; and AtlasAgena B launch system, 321; and Atlas-Centaur 

launch system, 384, 399 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 51, 167, 274, 299302, 41415, 43940, 443, 451-52, 458-60, 471-72, 476, 481, 

487,492,509,51415 

Attached Pressurized Module (AF’M), 113,117-23, 126, 129, 133 

Atwood, J. Leland, 429, 527,536 

Australia, 582-83; and Cape York launch program, 582-83 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 246,428 

Austin, 46 

Australia, 6, 42, 44, 157 

Austria, 97 

B 

Bacher, Robert F., 511-12 

Baikonaur launch complex, 203 

Baker, Bobby, 428 

Baker, Kenneth, 107-108 

Ball Brothers Corporation, 482 

Ball, George, 162-64, 166 

Baltimore, 430 

Banks, Peter, 109 

Barinov, Y. A,, 153, 155, 158 

Barnes, Richard 

Bean, Alan, 201 

Beckman, Arnold O., 503,510,512 

Beckman Instruments, Inc., 510 

Beggs, James M., 10,90, 100,105, 107,110,410,432 

Belgium, 38, 59 

Bell, David, 421; and “Bell Report,” 421-22 

Bellcomm, see AT&T Corporation 

Bell Telephone Company, 482 

Berkner, Lloyd V., 240, 418, 493, 495-96 

Berlin Wall, 11 
617 

Billingsley, Henry E., 17 

Bissell, Richard, 245 

Black, Fred, 428 

Blagonravov, Anatoli, 12, 152-67, 172, 177-81 

Blue Gemini. Project, 258-63 

Boeing Company, 212,329,427-28 

Bogart, Frank, 370 

Boggess, Nancy, 32 

Boise Cascade Corporation, 490 

Bolshoi Theater, 184 

Bombay, 24 

Bondi, Herman, 4041 

Bonn, Germany, 105106 

Bonnet, Roger M., 31-34 

Boone, Adm. W. Fred, 259,34748 

Borman. Frank, 35, 37,63 

Boston, 423 

Boston University, 237 

Bowden, Lewis, 153, 155, 158 

Bowie, Robert B., 27374 

Bowman, Isaiah, 498 

Brackett, Ernest, 414 

Brandt, Willy, 43 

Braun & Co., C. E, 510 

Braun, John G., 510 

Braun, Wernher von, 233,236,238,243,286,28890 and ARFA, 249-51, 25455; and “arsenal” system, 412; and 

Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 253-54; and creation of NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 24748; 

and Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 24650; and Robert McNamara, 25743; and scientific satellite 

program, 24045; and Sputnik, 24446, 251 

Brazil, 4, 24 

Brezhnev, Leonid A,, 14 

Briggs, Geff, 220 

British National Space Committee, 3 

Bronk, Detlov, 240 

Brooks, Overton, 256, 257-28, 311-12, 317 

Brown, George, 492-93 

Brown, Harold, 338, 340 

Brucker, Wilber M., 287-90 

Brundage, Percival, 24445, 277-80 

Brussels, Belgium, 59, 62 

Bundy, McGeorge, 162, 164-67 

Bureau of the Budget, 167, 340,346,421,423,443,492 also see Office of Management and Budget 

Burke, Arleigh, 298 

Bush, George H. W., 15, 220, 433, 582-83, 586 

Busimss Week, 486 

C 

California Institute of Technology (Caltech or CIT), 235, 244, 287-88, 423-24, 496, 503-20 

Canada, 4-6, 10, 4244, 49, 87, 95, 98100, 107-108, 110-111, 181, 439 and Remote Manipulator System 

(Canadarm), 7, 4849, 98; also see Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) of Canada 

Cape Canaveral, Florida, 146, 264, 378, 419, 491 

Carter, James (Jimmy), 14, 26, 265 

Case Institute of Technology, 412 

Cassini spacecraft program, 33 
618 

Catholic church, 490 

Centaur launch vehicle program, 26,28,373,384,399,481-82, 505 

Centers for the Commercial Development of Space, 433 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 16364, 167, 234, 240, 245, 264, 274, 433; and ARPA, 249-51, 25455; and 

creation of NASA, 248-53; and defense reorganization, 24748; and Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 

246.50; and Dpa-Soar program, 166,234,246,252,259,26042,268,28885; and Explorer I, 244-45; and Janus 

Report, 243 246 and “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” 238-39 and Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Baced on 

Components auailnble frm missile deve&mat of the Army Ordnance Corps, A, 238; and scientific satellite program, 

24M2; and Vanguard Program, 24245,27750: and WSI 17L, 243,245,246,250,262,268; WS464L, 249 

Centre Nationale des Etudes Spatiales (CNES) (French Space Agency), 37, 41 

Cernan, Eugene, 201 

Chalhgq 267,268, 398,410,43334 

Chance Vought Corporation, 482 

Chapman, Kenneth, 370 

Charles, Robert, 421 

Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 230 

China, 47 

Christian Science Monitol; 45 

Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 25354 

Civil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI), 580 

Clements, William, 264, 380, 382, 385, 390 

Clinton, WilliamJ. (Bill), 15, 222, 434 

CL-282,240 

Cluster spacecraft program, 32 

Coast Guard, US., 300, 438 

Columbia University, 429 

Columbus program, 119, 123 

Command and Service Module (CSM), 528-37 

Commerce, Department of, 67,221,433,577, 579; and Office of Space Commerce, 433 

Commercial Space Initiative (1988), 577-81 

Commercial Space Launch Policy, 581-86 

Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 2-3,17-19,21,23, 154-61 

Communications Satellite (Comsat) Corporation, 36, 346 

Concorde aircraft program, 55 

Congress, U.S., 16, 51, 97, 198, 296, 301, 311-12, 317, 319, 349, 358, 380, 415-18, 422-23, 425, 42931, 438, 

440-72,480,492-94,544, 561, 565, 572,575, 580 

Conlon, Emerson V., 474 

Conquest of +am, The, 233 

Convair Company, 482 

Cook, Charles W., 403 

Cooper, Paul, 370 

Cornel1 University, 521, 525 

CORONA reconnaissance program, 254,262, 263, 264 

Cortright, Edgar M., 363,503, 508,511 

Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE), 554 

Cosmos satellite program, 159, 206, 220 

Craigie, Maj. Gen. L.C., 271-72 

Crawford, Brig. Gen., Alden T., 271-72 

Crotty, Patrick, 371 

Cuban missile crisis, 12 

Culbertson, Phil, 63, 379 

Currie, Malcolm R., 264-65, 380-81, 38490 
619 

Dallas, 493 

Daniels, Chester S., 551 

David, Edward E., Jr., 52, 54,58 

Dayton, Ohio, 243 

Deep Space Network, 509 

Defense Astronautical Agency, 298 

Defense Early Warning (DEW) Line, 275-76 

Defense, Department of (DOD), 67, 46, 56, 70, 74, 76, 96-98, 103, 107, 109, 163-64, 167-68, 413-15, 43940, 

443-58,462-63,470,480-81,492-93,51819,579-80; and ARPA, 249-51,25455, 285-86, 293,; and Blue Gemini, 

258-63; and Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 25354; and creation of NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 24748; and Defense Space Operations Committee, 40349; and Defense Special Projects Agency 

(DSPA), 246-50; and “Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program“ (NSC 5520), 241, 245, 

273, 277; and Dyna-Soar program, 166, 234, 246, 252, 259, 26062, 268, 280-85; and Explorer I, 24445; and 

“Freedom of Space,” 239, 24445, 273; and Janus Report, 243, 246 and “Meeting the Threat of Surprise 

Attack,” 23839; and NASA roles and missions, 290-92; and Office of Defense Mobilization, 238-39, 274; and 

relations with NASA, 233410, 417; and Robert McNamara, 257-63; and scientific satellite program, 24042; 

and Space Shuttle, 26-69; and Technological Capabilities Panel, 23839, 240, 27376; and Vanguard Program, 

24245, 277-80 

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), 399 

Defense Production Act, 446 

Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), 24650 

Defense Mobilization, Office of, 23839, 274 

Delta launch vehicle, 46, 384, 482 

DePauw University, 469 

Donahue, Thomas, 553 

Dornier Corporation, 375 

Douglas Aircraft Company, 482 

Douglas, James H., 296,298 

“Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program” (NSC 5520), 241, 245,273, 277 

Draper, Charles Stark, 420 

Drew, Russell, 63 

Dryden, Hugh L., 2, 12, 17-18, 21-23, 152-64, 167, 172, 177-80, 280-85, 338, 340, 34748, 417-19, 423, 427, 495-97 

DuBridge, Lee A,, 35,424,496,505,510,514 

Dulles, Allen, 240 

Durant, Frederick C., 111, 238 

Dyna-Soar program, 166,234,246,252,259,26@62,268,280-85,310,322 

E 

Eastern Test Range, 367 

Echo satellite program, 154, 159, 163, 168, 481-82 

Economic Policy Council, see White House 

Edelson, Burton I., 31, 33-34 

Education, Department of, 580 

Eggers, Alfred J., Jr., 363, 367 

Einhorn, Raymond, 512-13 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1, 11, 16, 298, 412, 417; and ABMA, 288-90; and ARPA, 24951, 25455; and creation of 

NASA, 248-53; and defense reorganization, 24748; and DSPA, 24650; and “Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. 

Scientific Satellite Program” (NSC 5520), 241, 245,273,277; and Dyna-Soar program, 285-86; and Explorer I, 

24445; and “Freedom of Space,” 239, 24445, 273; and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 286-88; and NASA 

roles and missions, 290-92; and scientific satellite program, 240-42; and Sputnik, 2, 234, 24547, 251; and 

Vanguard Program, 24245, 277-80 

Electronics Research Center, 422-23 
620 

Elms, James C., 363 

Erlichman, John, 50 

Emery, Roger, 34 

Energiya, see NPO Energiya 

Energy, Department of, 579 

Essmeier, Charles T., 371 

Europa 111 launch vehicle program, 53, 57, 71, 74 

Europe, 3-7, 10, 21-24, 28, 3639, 41, 4345, 48, 50-100, 106, 108, 197, 545 

European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), 36-41,43,45, 372 

European Prepatory Commission for Space Research, 21 

European Science Foundation (ESF), 541 

European Space Agency (ESA), 45,9-10,2633,36,81,87-88,95,97,94100, 106, 108, 110-12, 11542,583: and 

European Space Technology Education Centre, 32; and Hubble Space Telescope, 545 

European Space Conference (ESC), 8, 43, 45, 5657, 60-62, 79,8144 

European Space Research Organization (ESRO), 34, 21-22,35, 3742, 45 

Evans, Harry L., 363 

Explorer spacecraft program, 24445, 252,561 

F 

Femibility of Weather Reconnaissanm fmm a Satellite Vehick, 237 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 41 

Federal Civil Defense Authority (FCDA), 274 

Feed Back, Project, 237, 239, 240, 242 

Feibleman, James A., 371 

Feoktistov, K. P., 187 

Finarelli, Margaret, 26 

Fink, Daniel J. 

Flanigan, Peter, 8, 49-50, 52-53, 62-66, 68 

Fletcher, James C., 48,50, 52-53, 59,64,6669,79, 198,264-65, 378, 380-82, 385, 390 

Flight Telerobotic System (FTS), 113 

Florence, 29, 81 

Ford, Henry, 488 

Ford, Ralph, 370 

Forman, Howard L., 470-71 

Fmtum magazine, 487 

Foster, John S., Jr., 361, 364, 378 

France, 21, 26, 37-39, 4243, 85-86, 88, 97, 100, 107 

Freedom of Information Act, 580 

French Guiana, 38 

Frosch, Robert A., 430,550. 552 

Frutkin, Arnold W., 2, 9, 22-23, 4849, 5859, 63, 65, 8587, 152, 155, 158, 162, 187, 190-91, 19495, 197, 201-203, 

213 

Fuqua, Don, 379 

G 

Gabriel, Gen. Charles A,, 266, 390-91 

Gagarin, Yuri, 11, 143, 185; and Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Facility, 22425; also see Star City 

Galileo mission, 5, 554, 564 

Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) program, 26,554 

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 292 

Gemini program, 165, 181, 210, 330-31, 337-38,34044,350,357,426 

General Accounting Office (GAO), 550-51 

General Dynamics Corporation, 212 
62 1 

General Electric Company, 419 

General Mills Corporation, 482, 490 

General Services Administration (GSA), 440, 445 

Geneva, Switzerland, 161-64 

George Washington University, 389 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) program, 561 

Germany, 3637, 39, 4143, 55, 88, 106107, 375 

Gilbert, M. Raymond, 36970 

Gilmore, Robert B., 510-11 

Gilpatric, Roswell L., 165, 338, 343, 492-93 

Gilruth, Robert, 18687, 419, 494 

Glenn, John H., Jr., 12, 147, 155 

Glennan, T. Keith, 3, 17, 1920, 175, 252, 292, 296, 298, 411-18, 429, 43637, 442, 472-74; and ABM, 28890; 

and Dyna-Soar program, 285-86; and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 28688; and NASA roles and missions, 

290-92 

Global Atmospheric Research program, 41 

Global Positioning System (GPS) program, 399, 40849 

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Maryland, 4849, 209, 429-30, 47576, 482, 547 

Goldberg, Leo, 543 

Goldin, Daniel S., 220, 228, 232 

Golovin, Nicholas, 258, 318, 320 

Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew, 250 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 15, 217 

Gore, Albert, Jr.. 222, 230 

Government Patent Board, 454 

Graham, Brig. Gen. Wallace, 238 

Green, Cecil, 492-93 

Griffin, Gerry, 379 

Grosse, Aristide V., 238 

Grumman Corporation, 375,427 

Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), 235 

Guhin, Michael, 58 

Gutman, Richard W., 550-51 

H 

Hage, George, 34 

Hagerty, James C., 16 

Hahn, Herbert L., 510 

Haig, Alexander, 63 

Halley’s Comet, 45 

Hansen, Grant, 268, 366, 369-70 

Harbridge House, 510 

Hardy, George IC, 18688 

Harriman, W. Averell, 166 

Harris, Ray M., 469-72 

Harvard University, 418, 423, 469, 485, 493 

Haskell, George, 34 

Heaton, D. H., 474 

Hedrick, Walter, 369 

Henry, Lt. Gen. Richard C., 267,398, 400 

Hermes program, 137-38 

High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO), 561 

Hilburn, Earl, 422, 511, 513 

Hinners, Noel W., 430, 541, 544 
622 

Hodge, John, 9,90 

Holmes, D. Brainerd, 348 

Hood, Valerie, 34 

Hornig, Donald E, 153-55, 158, 546, 548 

Horowitz, Norman, 511 

Horwitz, Abraham, 502 

Houston, 43, 209, 223, 225, 371, 418-19, 42830, 491-92, 53839 

Houston Ship Canal, 493 

Hubble Space Telescope, 5, 544; also see Space Telescope 

Hulst, H. C. van de, 2, 17, 18 

Huntsville, Alabama, 240, 244,371,475,477 

I 

India, 4, 44, 225 

Indian Ocean, 37 

Inertial (or Interim) Upper Stage (IUS), 28,382, 393 

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS) program, 32, 554 

Infrared Space Observatory (ISO) program, 32 

Institute of Geochemistry (of Soviet Union), 211 

Institute of Space Research (of Soviet Union), 211 

Institute for Space and Astronautical Science (of Japan) (ISAS), 4, 33 

Institute for Space Studies, 429-30 

Inter-Agency Consultative Group, 5 

International Academy of Astronautics, 174 

International Astronautical Federation, 237-38 

International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), 2 

International Geophysical Year (IO, 2, 5, 11, 17, 237, 240, 275-76 

International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), 5, 2628, 31 

International Space Station program, 15, 87-90, 223-32 

International Mobile (formerly Maritime) Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), 221-22 

International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), 8, 2425, 36, 3839, 4647, 51, 55, 60, 62, 

71, 105 

International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 154, 157 

International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE), 545, 55657, 561 

International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, 163 

Italy, 29, 37-38, 43, 81, 88, 106107 

J 

5-2 engine, 415 

James, Lee, 369-70 

Janus Report, 243,246 

Japan, 47,10,22-24,42,44-47,66,87,95,98100,10648,110-11, 157, 160,202 

Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), 114,126,129, 133 

Jastrow, Robert, 429 

Jet-assisted takeoff (JATO), 235 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 160, 197-98, 235, 244, 245, 252-53, 28688, 320, 329, 423-24, 47477, 482, 

503-20 

Jodrell Bank Observatory, 168 

Johns Hopkins University, 430,498 

Johnson, Caldwell C., 187-88 

Johnson, Charles E., 16667 

Johnson, John, 414, 442472 

Johnson, Lyndon B., 13,22,37,46,168, 170-71,179,260,342,417-19,423,425,428, 492 
623 

Johnson, Roy W., 250, 252, 285-86 

Johnson Space Center USC), Texas, 183,203,223,225,384,418-19,434,495; also see Manned Spacecraft Center 

and Houston 

Johnson, U. Alexis, 2324,46, 53,58-62,64, 78, 82-83 

Johnson, Vincent, 369-70 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25455 

Jonas, Charlie, 418, 492-93 

Jones, Thomas V., 510 

Jonsson, Jon Erik, 492-93 

Journal of Medical Education, 502 

Juno rocket, 252 

Jupiter, 5, 560 

Jupiter launch vehicle program, 252, 332, 476 

Justice, Department of, 472 

K 

Kaiser, Robert, 191 

Kaliningrad, 208 

Kavanau, Lawrence L., 320 

Keathley, William C., 544 

Kefauver, Estes, 415 

Keldysh, M. V., 12-14, 44, 182-83, 18495, 197, 200, 211, 213-14 

Kelly, William P., 474 

Kennedy, Edward, 423 

Kennedy, John F., 5, 11-13, 15, 143, 147, 149, 153,156, 159, 161-62, 16566, 168-71, 175, 178, 234, 25762,311-12, 

317-18, 342, 417, 423, 492, 494, 496 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, 369, 371, 378, 381, 383-85, 398, 491, 532-33 

Kenya, 37 

Kerr, Robert S., 317, 418, 492-93 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 11-12, 147, 149, 152-53, 156, 159, 161, 164, 170, 175, 178, 180 

Killian, James R., 23&39, 273, 274, 298; and ARF'A, 249-51, 25455, 285-86 and creation of NASA, 248-53; and 

defense reorganization, 24748; and DSPA, 246-50; and "Freedom of Space," 239, 244-45, 273; and scientific 

satellite program, 24042 

Kinzel, Augustus B., 510 

Kirillin, V. A,, 202, 212 

Kirk, John E., 363 

Kissinger, Henry, 42,52-53, 57-58, 63, 65-69, 79, 81, 190, 19698 

Kistiakowsky, George B., 298 

Kitt Peak National Observatory, 430, 542 

Knolle, Frank, 370 

Kohl, Helmut, 106 

Koptev, Yuri, 220, 228, 232 

Kosygin, Alexei, 14 

Kraft, Christopher C., Jr., 203, 369-70; and Rtpt of the Spaa Shutlle ManagemPnt Inwmnrhnt Rpvim Team, 434 

L3S launch vehicle, 85-86; also see Ariane launch vehicle 

Laird, Melvin, 367 

Lambright, W. Henry, 411435 

Land, Edwin (Din), 239,250 

Landsat program, 432, 556, 560 

Langley Research Center, Virginia, 355, 47677, 481-82 

Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG), 318-37 
624 

Large Space Telescope (UT), 4849, 548; also see Space Telescope and Hubble Space Telescope 

Latin America, 182 

Launius, Roger D., 412-13 

Lavrow, V. A., 187 

Lawrence, Harold R., 17 

Lee, Chet, 200-01 

Lefevre, Theo, 53, 56, 59, 61-62, 82 

Leighton, Robert B., 511 

LeMay, Gen. Curtis E., 236, 312 

Leust, Reimar, 110, 142 

Lewis, Robert B., 512-13 

Lincoln Center, New York City, 487 

Lindvall, Frederick C., 511 

Lije magazine, 176 

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 13 

Lincoln Laboratory, 476 

Lockheed Aircraft, Inc., 239,243,246, 254,482 

Lockheed Martin Corporation, 434 

London, 19,105, 108, 203 

London Economic Summit, 107-108 

Long, Russell, 415 

Louisiana State University, 522 

Lovelace, Alan M., 2627, 21517,386-88 

Low, George M., 14,3435,39,49-50,52,58,63,68, 189-90, 197-99,201,204,213-15,366-67,378-81,389-90 

Loweth, Hugh, 541 

Lucas, William 

Luedecke, A. R., 509,516 

Luna program, 21 1 

Lunar Excursion Module (LEM), 17677,427 

Lunar Module (LM) ,35 

Lunar and Planetary Missions Board, 539 

Lunar Science Institute, 429-30, 538-39 

Lunney, Glynn S., 18384,187,189, 190-95,198,200-05,208,210,212,215 

M 

MacDonald, Frank, 32, 34 

MacGregor, Clark, 198 

Magruder, Jeb, 67 

Main Battle Tank program, 55 

Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL), 262-65, 322 

Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL), 360 

Man-Tended Free Flyer (MTFF), 113, 11642 

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), 43, 183, 190-91, 369-71, 418-20, 427, 428-30, 491, 495, 538-39 also see 

Johnson Space Center and Houston 

Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), 361-64 

Manno, Vittorio, 34 

Mark, Hans, 90,264-66,268 

Mariner, Project, 504-05,561 

Mars, 11, 14,42,44, 113, 145-52, 180,211, 214, 220 

Mars Geoscience Climatology Orbiter (MGCO) program, 33 

Mars Observer program, 220 

Marsh, Gen. Robert T., 266,390, 398 

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Alabama, 320,322,36971,419,427,475,477,482,537, 542,54445 

Martin, John J., 264,382,385437 
625 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 238, 418, 423, 476, 482, 488, 493; and MIT Instrumentation 

Laboratory, 420 

Massey, Harrie S. W., 3, 19, 21 

Mathews, Charles W., 61,370 

McDivitt, James, 198 

McDonald, Frank, 553 

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 212,371,427,476,482 

McDougall, Walter, 421 

McElroy, Neil A., 246, 247, 268; and defense reorganization, 24748 

McFarland, Robert (Bud), 107 

McKinsey and Company, Inc., 473 

McMillan, Harold, 3 

McMurry Company, 508 

McNamara, Robert S., 234, 257-63, 268, 311-15, 337-42, 346, 348, 356-60, 492-93 

Medaris, Gen. John, 246 

“Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” 238-39 

Mellors, W. J., 26-28 

Mercury program, 147, 175, 210, 412,426, 476,482; and Freedom 7 flight, 147 

Merritt Island, 353 

Messerschmidt, Boelkow, and Blohm Corporation, 375 

Meteorological Satellite Review Board, 375 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 490 

Michalak, Mike, 107 

MIDAS Program, 268 

Middle East, 204 

“Military Lunar Base Program or S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study,” 25556 

Miller Act, 440 

Millikan, Clark B., 511 

MIISTAR program, 399 

Minar, Gary H., 371 

Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE), 237-38 

Minimum Satellite &hick: Based on Compunents auailabk from missile &e[Opment of the Army Ordnance Cmps, A, 

238, 240 

Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) of Canada, 11142 

Minuteman missile program, 491 

Mir space station, 221-23; and Shuttle-Mir program, 223-32 

Missile Technology Control Regime, 583, 586 

Mississippi River area, 493 

Mississippi Test Facility (MTF), 528, 530 

Mitchell, Erwin, 442472 

Mobile Servicing Center, 114 

Moon, 11, 13-14, 146, 165, 417-18, 428, 503, 538; and Military Lunar Base Program, 30+11 

Moore, Thomas, 371 

Moore, William F., 369 

Morrill Land Grant College Act, 565 

Morris, Brooks, 509 

Morris, Donald, 48 

Morrison, James, 26 

MOSCOW, 14, 157-58, 162, 164, 167, 183-211, 215, 219, 225, 228, 232 

Mount Wilson Observatory, 512 

Mueller, George E., 363, 527, 538 

Murphy, Robert, 240 

Murphy, Thomas, 422-23, 427 

Murumcev, Cyril, 191 

Myers, Dale, 49, 110, 142, 369-70, 379, 538 
626 

NASA-Air Force Space Transportation System Committee, see Space Transportation System 

National Academy of Public Administration, 573 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 2, 17-18, 156, 24042, 276-80, 418, 430, 493-96, 499, 53839, 54142, 548; 

and National Research Council, 525; and Space Science Board, 553, 555,562 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 16, 235, 412, 41617, 438; and ARPA, 24951, 25455, 

28546,453, 480-81; and creation of NASA, 248-53; and DynaSoar program, 166, 234, 246, 252, 259, 260-62, 

268, 280-85 

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 1, 16, 72, 96, 251-52, 294, 296, 304, 315, 338, 348-50, 357, 379, 

413-15, 433, 438, 440, 442, 445, 451-52, 456, 459, 461, 480, 490; and ARPA, 249-55, 285-86; and Civil-Military 

Liaison Committee, 253-54; and creation of NASA, 24853 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and ABMA, 28890; and ARPA, 24955, 28586; and 

"arsenal" system, 412; and Blue Gemini, 258-63; and Civil-Military Liaison Committee, 253-54; and 

Commercial Space Initiative (1988), 577-81; and creation of, 24853; and DynaSoar program, 166, 234, 246, 

252, 259, 260-62, 268, 280-85; and industry-university relations, 41 1-586; and Industrial Applications Office, 

419; and international relations, 1-231; and Inventions and Contributions Board, 414; and JPL, 287-88, 

50320; and National Commercial Space Policy (1984). 432-33,572-77; and National Space Grant College and 

Fellowship Program, 565-71; and Office of Commercial Programs, 432-33; and Office of Research Grants and 

Contracts, 413,425,43637; and relations with DOD, 233-410,413,417; and Robert McNamara, 257-63; and 

Space Shuttle, 26-69; and Sustaining University Program, 420-21,42426,431,435,520-26 

National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), 8,63,68, 167-68,260,301-02,315,317-18,370,492-94 

National Commercial Space Policy (1984), 432-33, 572-77 

National Institutes of Health (NIH), 494,579 

National Land Grant College Act of 1862,432 

National Launch Vehicle Program, 320-37,343,346 

National Microgravity Research Board, 578 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 433 

National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS) program, 26 

National Reconnaissance Office, 264, 267 

National Research Council (NRC), see National Academy of Sciences 

National Science Foundation (NSF), 167,240,27680,337,430,437,444,457-63,54243,546,579-80 

National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 271, 168 

National Security Council (NSC), 76,96,103,274,301-02,400,410; and ARPA, 249-51, 25455,28586,300; and 

creation of NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 24748; and "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. 

Scientific Satellite Program" (NSC 5520), 241, 245, 273, 277; and Explorer I, 244-45; and "Policy on Outer 

Space, US." (NSC 5814). 2; and Robert McNamara, 257-63; and Senior Interagency Group (SIG) (Space), 

577; and scientific satellite program, 24042; and Space Shuttle, 263-69; and Technological Capabilities Panel, 

238339,27376; and Vanguard Program, 24245,277-80 

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 187, 100, 104 

"National Security Launch Strategy," 278-68 

National Space Council, 433,582-83, 586; and National Space Policy Directives, 433-34, 582 

National Space Grant Act, 431 

National Space Grant College and Fellowship Act, 565-71 

National Space Policy (1982), 575 

Naugle, John E., 54041 

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 480 

Navy, US., 238,299-301,303,314,353-54,444,449,469,47682,494; and ARPA, 249-51,25455,298,480; and 

creation of NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 2474; and Robert McNamara, 257-63; and scientific 

satellite program, 240-42; and Vanguard Program, 24245,277-80 

Navy Research, Office of, 238; and ARPA, 24951,25455; and creation of NASA, 248-53; and defense reorganization, 24748; and Robert McNamara, 257-63; and scientific satellite program, 24042; and Vanguard 

Program, 24245,277-80 

Neptune, 560 

Netherlands, 2, 17-18, 38, 43 
627 

Newell, Homer E., J., 2, 17-18, 363, 430, 511 

New York City, 149,158, 184 

New Yurk Times, 165, 191 

Nimbus satellite program, 153, 560-61 

Nixon, Richard M., 68, 14, 3435,40,4850,62-63, 71-72,91,9596, 100, 198, 250, 262,263, 364, 425 

Nerdwijk, 38 

Norman, Memphis, 541 

North American Air Defense (NORAD) system, 98 

North American Aviation, Inc., 237,419,42629,527-37 

North American Rockwell, 371,375 

North Atlantic Air TrafEc Control and Navigation Satellite program, 41 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2, 38, 97, 27576 

Northrop Corporation, 510 

Nova launch vehicle, 30648, 325, 32530 

Novosty news agency, 212 

NPO Energiya, 22 1,224 

0 

O’Brien, Gerald D., 438, 442-72 

Odishaw, Hugh, 496 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 26, 51,96, 19899, 380,400, 541, 571,579, 585 

Office of Science and Technology Policy (Om), 63,96, 103, 167-68, 346,571 

Ohio University Research Foundation, 237 

Olthof, Henk, 32,34 

Or&& Project, 240 

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO), 545,561 

Orbiting Geophysical Observatory, 523 

Ottawa, 105 

Outer Space Treaty, 109 

P 

Pacific Missile Range, 18 

Page, Edgar, 34 

Paine, Thomas O., 67,13,35,3940,42,44-45,49,51,62-64,66,72,78,95,182-83,263,364,36768 

Pakistan, 25 

Palomar Observatory, 512 

Paris, 21, 26, 31, 43, 81, 105, 123, 191 

Paris Air Show, 207 

Parker, Robert N., 386-88 

Parks, R. J., 509 

Parsons Company, see Ralph M. Parsons Company 

Pasteur, Louis, 499 

Pathfinder, Project, 578, 580 

Patrick Air Force Base, 371 

Pedersen, Kenneth S., 9, 27, 34,90, 100, 109 

Pellerin, Charles, 34 

Peterson, Pete, 67 

Petrov, Boris N., 187, 191, 195, 20046, 212-13, 216 

Phleger, Herman, 272-74 

Phillips, Franklyn W., 17 

Phillips, Samuel C., 428, 527-28, 538; and ”Phillips Report,” 42529, 527 

Phobos program, 220 

Pickering, William H., 244, 246, 496, 504-05, 508, 510-11 
628 

Pioneer spacecraft, 560-61 

Pitzer, Lyman, 496, 540 

Platt, Mark, 107 

Pollack, Herman, 22, 58, 63-64, 82-85 

Polar Platform, 11 142 

Polaris Missile, 332, 476-77, 491 

Polaroid, Inc., 239 

Porter, Richard, 17, 19 

Power, Gen. Thomas, 243 

Pratt and Whitney, 371 

“Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship,” 236 

President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, 250 

President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 247,301,541; and defense reorganization, 24748,298 

Presidium (of Soviet Academy of Sciences), 19495, 201, 203; also see Soviet Academy of Sciences 

Price Waterhouse, 508 

“Priorda” module, 229, 231 

Project Moonbare, 233 

Prospector program, 504 

Prussia, 490 

Putt, Lt. Gen. Donald L., 280-85 

Q 

Quarles, Donald A., 238, 24042, 243, 246, 268; and creation of NASA, 24853; and defense reorganization, 

247-48; and DSPA, 24&50 

Quayle, J. Danforth (Dan), 433, 582-83 

Quistgaard, Erik, 26 

R 

Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 237, 243 

Ralph M. Parsons Company, 371 

Ramsey, Norman, 548 

RAND, Project, 236,237, 271-72 

Ranger, Project, 423-24, 482, 490, 50306, 511, 515 

Reagan, Ronald, 5, 9-10, 14, 26-27, 96, 105, 108, 217, 266, 432-33, 565, 572, 575, 577 

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, 238, 412 

Redstone Missile, 252-53 

Remote Control (Recon) system, 41 

Remote Manipulator System (RMS), 7, 98; also see Canada 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 63, 68, 199, 214 

Report of the Space Shuttle Management In-t Revim Team, see Space Shuttle program 

Republic Aviation Company, 176 

Research Application Module (RAM), 48, 56, 6970, 72-79, 81-83,91; also see Spacelab 

Research Triangle, North Carolina, 418,493 

Rice, David, 64 

Rice, Donald, 66 

Rice University, 418,493,495,53940 

Rocketdyne Company, 371,415-16,482 

Rockwell International Corporation, 434 

Rodgers, F. M., 369 

Rogers, William P., 8, 52, 54, 57, 65-66, 68, 79-80, 197 

Rome, 36-37, 105 

Rose, John, 64 

Ross, Frank, 370 
629 

Rover project, 452 

Royal Society (United Kmgdom academy of science), 3; and British National Space Committee, 19 

Rubel, John H., 320,338 

Rumsfield, Donald, 390 

Rusk, Dean, 22,47 

Russia, 15, 220-32 

Russian Space Agency (SA), 220-232 

Sagdeyev, Roald S., 202, 211 

Salt Lake City, 52, 59 

Snlyutprogram, 1415, 190, 193, 197, 206, 214,216; and SalyukShuttle program, 216 

SAMOS reconnaissance program, 254, 262 

San Clemente (California), 190 

Sanders, Newell, 474 

San Diego, 197 

San Marco satellite, 38 

Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), 24 

Saturn, 33,560 

Saturn Launch Vehicle program; 146, 263, 286, 307-08, 323-24, 32627, 330-31, 334, 415, 419, 427-28, 482, 

527-37 

Schlesinger, James, 264.65, 378 

Schriever, Gen. Bernard A., 237, 242, 243, 257, 268,312, 363 

Science Adviser, Office of, see Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTp) 

Science, 560 

Sn’ace Naus, 560 

Science and Technology Agency (STA) of Japan, 11 142 

Scout launch vehicle, 18, 20, 482 

Scull, John R., 474 

Seaborg, Glen, 492-93 

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 258, 263, 318, 320, 337-39, 34748, 364, 366.69, 417-19, 422-23, 427, 48890, 511 

Seitz, Frederick, 538, 541 

Senate, US, 1, 16, 31617, 415, 429, 442, 458, 460, 493, 573, 575 

Senior Interagency Group (SIG) (Space), see National Security Council 

Sharp, Robert P., 511 

Shepard, Alan, 494 

Shevardnadze, Eduard, 217, 219 

Shultz, George P., 10, 105106, 217, 219 

Singer, S. Fred, 237-37 

“Skunkworks,” Lockheed, 239 

Skybolt program, 55 

Skylab program, 201 

Sohier, Walter D., 438, 474 

Solar and Heliospheric Observatory Satellite (SOHO) program, 32-33 

Solaris space station, 100 

South Africa, 157 

Southern Interstate Nuclear and Space Board, 487 

Soviet Academy of Sciences, 12, 44, 88, 152, 168, 170, 177-78, 182, 189-90, 192-96, 199, 202, 21315 

Soviet Ministry of General Machine Building, 220 

Soviet Union, 1, 5-6, 11-15, 42, 47, 87-88, 143220, 328, 350, 367, 417, 583 

Soyuz program, 185, 188-90, 193211,21415,221,224 

Space Astronomy Institute (SAI), 541 

Spacehab, 578 

Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) program, 32 
630 

Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), 370-71 

Spacelab, 5, 9, 81, 8689, 91-92, 95, 97, 99 

Space Museum of the Soviet Union, 203, 208 

Space Science Board, see National Academy of Sciences 

Space Shuttle program, 7-8, 14, 26, 32, 43, 45, 4849, 5455, 58, 63, 65-67, 69-70, 7488, 91, 94, 98, 109, 21416, 

221-32, 366, 431, 43334, 554, ,556, 561, 573, 577-81; and Hubble Space Telescope, 54445, 548; and military, 

26369, 367410; and Report of the Space Shuttle Managemat Independmf Review Team, 434; and Shuttle Carrier 

Aircraft, 406; and Shuttle-Mir program, 22332; also see Space Transportation System 

Space Station program, 9-10,32,45,69-70,87-100,10542,356,398,579-81; also see International Space Station 

program 

Space Station Task Force, 9,90-96 

Space Task Group, 67,40,43-44, 263,364-65,383,494 

Space Telescope, 54249,554,557; also see Hubble Space Telescope 

Space Telescope Science Institute, 430, 54149 

Space Transportation System (STS), 53, 56, 78-79, 83-84, 95, 97, 99, 11617, 119-20, 125, 127-28, 136, 139; and 

military, 364-65, 367410; and Space Transportation System Committee, 263-64, 369-77, 383, 390; also see 

Space Shuttle program 

Space Tug, 55-56, 58, 65, 67, 6470, 72-78, 80-82, 85, 91-92, 372-73, 378-79 

Sparks, Brian, 50445,508 

Spaso House, 192 

“Spektr” module, 229, 231 

Spinning Solid Upper Stage (SSUS), 382 

Sputnik, 2, 234,24547,251,411 

Stafford, Thomas, 201,205 

Stuhlinger, Ernst, 244 

Star City, 20243,20513,225; also see Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center 

State, Department of, 7-9, 11, 22, 24, 30, 35, 39, 41, 4546, 49, 5859, 63-66, 68-69, 72. 76, 78, 81, 96, 103, 105, 

162, 166-68,172, 177, 191, 197,240, 244,494; and Office of United Nations Affairs, 469 

“Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle,” 236 

Steelman, Donald L., 369 

Stevenson, Adlai E., 179 

Stewart, Homer J., 509 

Strashevsky, G. S., 153 

Surveyor, Project, 50405 

Suslennikov, V. V., 187-88 

Sweden, 38,43,97 

Switzerland, 38,97 

Symphonie communications satellite program, 39 

Synchronous Meteorological Satellite program, 41 

Syromyatnikov, V. S., 187, 201 

T 

Taylor, Brian, 34 

Teague, Olin E. (Tiger), 163 

Tech, Jack, 191, 200 

Technological Capabilities Panel, 238-39,27376 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 471-72,487 

Test Ban Treaty, see Limited Test Ban Treaty 

Tether program, 99 

Texas Instruments, Inc., 492 

Thacher, Peter, 153, 155-56, 158 

Thomas, Albert, 418,492-93 

Thor Delta launch vehicle, 18, 252; also see Delta launch vehicle 

Thor launch vehicle, 38, 332 
631 

Thurer, Byron, 371 

Tilford, Shelby, 34 

Timerbaev, Roland H., 153 

Television and Infrared Operational Satellite (TIROS) weather satellite program, 153, 481, 561 

Titan (moon of Saturn), 33 

Titan launch vehicle program, 166,263,267,323-24,32627,330-32,343,373,390-92,395, 399,400,410 

Toftoy, Holger, 235 

Tokyo, 23, 46, 105 

Townsend, John W., 153, 155, 157-58 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) space network, 117-21, 130 

Transportation, Department of, 41,367,433,57980; and Offce of Commercial Space Transportation, 433 

Treasury, Department of, 519 

Truman, Harry S, 238 

Turner, Thomas, 17677 

Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 254 

U 

Uhuru, 211 

Union Carbide Corporation, 490, 510 

United Kingdom (U.K.), 3, 19-20, 37-38, 4243, 88, 107-108; and U.K. Steering Group on Space Research, 20 

United Nations (UN), 12-13, 35, 43, 147-53, 156, 158, 161, 16566, 170.71, 17879; and Outer Space Affairs 

Group, 43; and Outer Space Committee, 43, 149, 161 

United Space Alliance (USA), 434 

University of Arizona, 522 

University of California at San Diego, 418, 493 

University of California at Los Angeles, 521 

University of Chicago, 493 

University of Japan, 23 

University of Michigan, 43, 521, 525, 553 

University of Tokyo, 22 

University of Utah, 52, 59 

University Space Research Association (USRA), 430, 541 

Uranus, 560 

U.S. Information Agency, 167 

Utah, 52, 59 

Utitity of a Satellite &hick fbr Reconnai.nance, 237 

V 

V-2 rocket, 235, 238, 240 

Van Allen,James A., 157, 237-38, 244; and creation of NASA, 24553 

Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S., 236, 271-72 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 264,265, 378,380-81, 38485,391,394, 398,405 

Vanguard Program, 24245, 277-80 

Vapor Magnetometer Project, 480 

Vega rocket, 254, 482,504-05 

Venus, 11, 14552, 220, 560-61 

Venus 8 spacecraft, 212 

Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR) program, 26 

Venus Radar Mapper, 554 

Vesta program, 220 

Vienna, 11, 23 

Vietnam, 422,425 

Viking spacecraft program, 42,44, 211, 561, 564 
632 

Vostok program, 173 

Voyager program, 504,556,56041,564 

W 

Walsh, John, 49, 63, 66,69, 79 

Washington Post, 191 

Waterman, Alan T., 240 

Weapons System (WS) 117L, 243,245,246,250,262,268 

Weapons System (WS) 464L. 249 

Webb, James E., 12-13, 22-23.25, 35, 165, 168, 170, 182, 34748, 411,41629,485, 492, 49497, 503, 508,527, 538, 

541; and Robert McNamara, 25763,33747,356-60 

Weinberger, Caspar, 267,400-01 

Welsh, Edward C., 164,317,342, 492 

Western Electric Company, 482 

Western Development Division, 24244 

WESTFORD project, 156, 160 

Whisenand, Brig. Gen. James F., 254 

Whitcomb, Gordan, 34 

White, Gen. Thomas D., 256, 257, 280-85, 311-12 

Whitehead, Clay T., 49-50, 52, 58, 63, 66 

White House, 5.7-8, 14,35,40,42,44,49,51-52,6364,66,72,79,91,96,162, 165, 168, 189-91, 19697,220,298, 

315,417,432; and White House Economic Policy Council, 577; and White House Space Task Force Group, 95 

White Sands Proving Grounds, New Mexico, 240 

Wiesner, Jerome B., 11, 143,164,317, 338 

Wigbels, Lynnette A,, 34 

Wilford, John Noble, 191 

Wilson, Jim, 379 

Wilson, Robert, 370 

Woods Hole, Massachusetts, 542 

World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 148, 153-54, 157, 159, 163 

Wright Field (later Wright-Patterson Air Force Base), Ohio, 243, 355 

X-15, 249 

xB70,355 

Y 

Yardley, John E, 264, 382, 385-87 

Yeltsin, Boris N., 15, 220 

Zaitzev, Valentin A,, 153, 155, 158 

Zisch, William E., 510 

Zurich, Switzerland, 237 
633 

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Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1978: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP4023, 1986) 

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Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn bunch Ehicles (NASA SP4206, 1980) 

Compton, W. David, and Benson, Charles D. Living and Working in Space: A History of Skylab (NASA SP4208,1983) 

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Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A History ofAmes Research Center, 19401976 (NASA SP4304, 1985) 

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