alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 12, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN ROBERT DEMOS, JR.,

Plaintiff ! Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant ! Appellee.

 

 No. 10-4100

 (D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00285-DAK)

 

ORDER

Plaintiff John Robert Demos, proceeding pro se, seeks to appeal the district court’s

May 10, 2010 Order dismissing his complaint based on failure to pay the entire filing fee. 

Plaintiff Demos is under filing restrictions in this circuit. See Demos v. Keating, 33

F. App’x 918 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 2002). As a result of these restrictions, he can not proceed

pro se in this court unless he first obtains leave to do so. Moreover, the filing restrictions

imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) are applicable to Plaintiff Demos because, prior to filing this

appeal, he has accumulated at least three or more civil actions, while incarcerated or

detained, that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.

In a June 4, 2010 Order, this court directed Plaintiff Demos to follow the required

procedures set forth in Demos v. Keating for obtaining leave to proceed pro se and to show

Appellate Case: 10-4100 Document: 01018455362 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Page: 1
2

cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for failure to prepay the entire filing fee. The

June 4, 2010 Order warned Plaintiff that failure to fully comply in any way with the filingrestriction requirements would result in dismissal of this appeal without further notice. 

In response to the June 4, 2010 Order, Plaintiff Demos submitted a document entitled

“notice of appeal, or in the alternative, a request for a certificate of appealability . . . request

to proceed pro se,” which the court has construed as a petition for leave to proceed pro se.

This petition, however, is not in compliance with the court’s 2002 order imposing filing

restrictions. 

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. See 10th Cir. R.

42.1. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-4100 Document: 01018455362 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Page: 2
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  133,065
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,845,429
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               840,125
<CGS>                                          680,319
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  680,319
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,836
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 71,068
<INCOME-TAX>                                    28,500
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             42,568
<DISCONTINUED>                                   6,107
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    34,129
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.19


</TABLE>
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1267 KA 09-01350
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, GREEN, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES ROGERS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

ROBERT M. PUSATERI, CONFLICT DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (EDWARD P. PERLMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a resentence of the Niagara County Court (Sara S. Sperrazza, J.), rendered March 18, 2009. Defendant was resentenced upon his conviction of robbery in the first degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a resentence imposed upon remittal of this matter to County Court. On defendant’s first appeal in this matter, we reversed the judgment convicting him after a jury trial of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]) and robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15 [1]), and we granted him a new trial on the counts of the indictment charging him with those crimes ( People v Rogers , 16 AD3d 1101). On appeal from the judgment convicting defendant of robbery in the first degree following the retrial, we vacated the sentence on the ground that it was presumptively vindictive, and we remitted the matter to County Court for resentencing ( People v Rogers , 56 AD3d 1173, lv denied 12 NY3d 787). Upon remittal, the court resentenced defendant to a determinate term of imprisonment of 20 years and to five years of postrelease supervision.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the resentence is not vindictive. As we stated in our decision with respect to defendant’s second appeal in this matter, “ ‘[t]he threshold issue in evaluating whether a resentence is vindictive is whether the resentence is more severe than that originally imposed’ ” ( id. at 1174; see generally People v Young , 94 NY2d 171, 176-177, rearg denied 94 NY2d 876; People v Van Pelt , 76 NY2d 156, 159-161). Here, defendant’s resentence is identical to the sentence originally imposed, and thus the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise.-2- 1267 KA 09-01350

We reject the further contention of defendant that the court erred in resentencing him without ordering an updated presentence report. “[T]he decision whether to obtain an updated [presentence] report at resentencing is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the sentencing [court]” ( People v Kuey , 83 NY2d 278, 282). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an updated report inasmuch as defendant had been incarcerated since the original sentence was imposed ( see People v Brinson , 298 AD2d 870, lv denied 99 NY2d 533), and defendant presented favorable information concerning his behavior while incarcerated. Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: December 23, 2011 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 13.1



CERTIFICATION BY THE
PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



The certification set forth below is being
submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Advanced Accelerator Applications S.A. (the “Company”)
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 (the “Report”), I, Stefano Buono, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: March 29, 2017



|By: | /s/ Stefano Buono              | 
|--- | ------------------------------ | 
|    | Name:	Stefano Buono            | 
|    | Title:	Chief Executive Officer | 
|    | (Principal Executive Officer)  |
#### The Philadelphia Bank *v.*W. E. Rice et al.

Execution •— Levy —■ Venditioni Exponas.

Had the execution been so levied on Joe, as to authorize a sale, the *venditioni exponas*addressed to a sheriff of a different county did not authorize the caption or sale of Joe after he had gone to Montgomery county from Fleming, where the levy purported to have been made; the only legal process to take and sell him by_ execution was a new fi. fa. to Montgomery county.

Same — Refusal to1 Surrender Joe.

If either of the appellants refused to surrender Joe to be sold by the sheriff of Montgomery county under the *venditioni exponas*he violated no law.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

September 21, 1866.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Bobertson:

It seems to this court that the judgment in this case is as liberal for the appellant as he had any right to expect.

It is not certain that the execution debtor had such a right to Joe, or to the possession of him, as would have justified the sheriff in taking him from the bailee for hire. Nor, if Joe was legally *255subject to levy and sale, does it appear that tbe appellants or either of them ever prevented or attempted to elude the levying the fi. fa. on Joe, or that it was ever legally levied on him. But, had it been so levied as to authorize a sale, the *venditio exponas*addressed to a different sheriff of a different county did not authorize either the caption or sale of Joe. After he had gone to Montgomery from Fleming, where the levy, such as it may have been, purported to have been made, the only legal process for taking and selling him by execution was a new fi. fa. to Montgomery. Therefore, if either of the appellants refused to surrender Joe to be sold by the sheriff of Montgomery, under the *venditio*he violated no law, nor did any wrong to the appellant.

Wherefore, the judgment dismissing the appellant’s petition for damages seems clearly right, and is hereby affirmed.
# Sitemap

## November 19, 1999

- Home
- Sitemap
- 1999
- 11
- November 19, 1999

            - Significant Event Report for Week Ending 11/19/1999
#### L. Schloss, Gritz et al. *v.*James P. O’Hara et al.

Pleadings.

Where issue has been joined and a trial had irregularity of the pleadings will not avail on appeal.

Cross-appeal — Noninterested Parties.

Where a sale and transfer of goods is made by a conveyance binding on the transferrer, *held,*that no complaint can be made on cross-appeal ¡of that not injurious to such party.

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT.

October 6, 1866.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson :

However informal or even technically insufficient the pleadings may have been the appellant Ackerland and the appellees conventionally made and tried the issue on the question whether the transfer of the goods by Schloss & Gritz was constructively fraud*396ulent and the proceeds legally distributed under the Statute of 1856. This was a waiver by Ackerland of all advantage which he might have taken of the irregularity of the pleadings or the form of the issue. And, although Schloss and Gritz may not have been formal parties to that agreement, yet as they had transferred the goods to Ackerland, by a conveyance binding on themselves, and, therefore, had no interest in the main question litigated, they, on their cross-appeal, cannot complain of that which is not injurious to them. Nor are they entitled to a reversal on the ground that no bond was executed to them as nonresidents, because the Code does not require any such bond in a proceeding under the Statute of 1856, and because, also, having irrevocably alienated all their interest, they had no right to restitution of the goods or indemnity for the decretal sale of them even on a reversal of that decree.

The record sustains the judgment subjecting the goods to the claims of all the creditors of Schloss and Gritz, and the amount adjudged against them seems to be unobjectionable. Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.1Cronos Global Income Fund XIV, L.P.Rule 13a-14 CERTIFICATION     I, Dennis J. Tietz, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Cronos Global Income Fund XIV, L.P.(the “Partnership”);     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the Partnership as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report;     4. The other certifying officer of Cronos Capital Corp. (“CCC”), the General Partner of thePartnership, and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Partnership and wehave:          (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe Partnership, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;and          (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Partnership’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, based on our evaluation; and          (c) disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the Partnership’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the Partnership’s most recent fiscal quarter (thePartnership’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Partnership’s internal control over financialreporting.     5. CCC’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluationof internal control over financial reporting, to the Partnership’s auditors and the Audit Committeeof Partnership’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):          (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect thePartnership’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and          (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who havea significant role in the Partnership’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: November 13, 2006   /s/ DENNIS J. TIETZ Dennis J. Tietz  President of CCC  (Chief Executive Officer)
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk June 25, 2012

t0618 

# Order

June 25, 2012

144664

JAMI L. THADEN, TERI L. BEAL, and

JONI S. MERINO,

Plaintiffs/Counter

- Defendants

- Appellants,

v SC: 144664

COA: 299036

Alcona CC: 09

- 001308

- CH

JOYE L. GORINAC and LAVERNE

GORINAC,

Defendants/Counter

Plaintiffs

- Appellees.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 1, 2011

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court prior to the

completion of the proceedings ordered by the Court of Appeals.
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<CASH>                                           8,601
<SECURITIES>                                         1
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    86
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  24
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    185
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                182
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.0

            CERTIFICATION OF CHAIRMAN AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Daniel J. Dorman, as Chairman and Principal Financial Officer of Sandston
Corporation, certify that based upon a review of the Quarterly Report on Form
10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ Daniel J. Dorman
--------------------

Name:       Daniel J. Dorman
Title:      Chairman and Principal Financial Officer
Date:       August 13, 2004
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 17, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY DANIEL MOORE,

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL;

STEVE HARGETT, Warden, Wyoming

Department of Corrections Honor

Conservation Camp, 

 Respondents - Appellees,

No. 10-8058

 (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00217-ABJ)

 (D. Wyoming)

ORDER

Before KELLY, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

On May 13, 2010 the district court entered an order and separate judgment dismissing

Timothy Moore’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as time-barred. Petitioner Moore,

proceeding pro se, appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner’s notice of appeal

is untimely.

The time limit for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case is “mandatory and

jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The thirty-day deadline under

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) for filing a timely notice of appeal in this civil case expired on

Monday, June 14, 2010. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Petitioner’s notice of appeal was

Appellate Case: 10-8058 Document: 01018478630 Date Filed: 08/17/2010 Page: 1
2

filed on July 26, 2010, which was forty-two days past the thirty-day filing deadline.

Petitioner did not timely move in the district court for an extension of time under Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(5), which deadline expired on July 14, 2010. This court may not extend the

time for filing an appeal. See Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 949

(10th Cir. 1995).

However, contained within the notice of appeal are statements by Petitioner Moore

that he did not receive the May 13, 2010 Order “until on or about July 24, 2010 ” and that

this information can be verified by “viewing the legal mail logs at the Cheyenne Transitional

Center from May 13, 2010 through and including July 24, 2010.” Id. at 2. See generally

Portley-El v. Milyard, 365 F. App’x 912, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2010) (discussing Rule

4(a)(6)).

The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The case is

REMANDED to the district court for a determination of whether Petitioner Moore’s notice

of appeal should be construed as a motion under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

Entered for the Court,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Kathleen T. Clifford

Attorney - Deputy Clerk

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11

Case: 10-8058 Document: 01018466561 Date Filed: 07/28/2010 Page: 9 Case 1:09-cv-00217-ABJ Document 11-2 Filed 07/28/10 Page 9 of 19

Appellate Case: 10-8058 Document: 01018478630 Date Filed: 08/17/2010 Page: 3
Case 1:09-cv-00217-ABJ Document 10 Filed 07/26/10 Page 2 of 11

12

Case: 10-8058 Document: 01018466561 Date Filed: 07/28/2010 Page: 10 Case 1:09-cv-00217-ABJ Document 11-2 Filed 07/28/10 Page 10 of 19

Appellate Case: 10-8058 Document: 01018478630 Date Filed: 08/17/2010 Page: 4
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

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