FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED ST ATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 17 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

RONALD L. CAL VERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

V. 

No. 04-1430 

(D.C. No. 00-BB-294 (MJW)) 

(D. Colo.) 

ROADWAY EXPRESS INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL, McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); I 0th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 04-1430 Document: 010110642391 Date Filed: 05/17/2005 Page: 1
Plaintiff-appellant Ronald L. Calvert, appearing prose, appeals from the 

magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment to defendant-appellee Roadway 

Express Inc. on his claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-l 7, and disability discrimination under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

The case was decided by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland by consent of 

the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l); R. doc. 62. Appellant does not challenge 

the magistrate judge's decision to grant summary judgment to appellee. We will 

neither manufacture arguments for a party nor sift through the record to find 

support for a party's arguments. Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1513 

(10th Cir. 1990). We therefore affirm, without discussion, the magistrate judge's 

decision to grant summary judgment to appellee. 

Appellant raises three issues on appeal. First, appellant argues that defense 

counsel James J. Gonzales should be removed from the case because he allegedly 

obtained certain documents in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act of 1996 (HIP AA), Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2087-2088, and 

used them at appellant's deposition in another case on April 5, 2001. Next, 

appellant argues that Magistrate Judge Boland should be recused because he 

allegedly remarked to Mr. Gonzales at a hearing on June 24, 2003: "you might 

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Appellate Case: 04-1430 Document: 010110642391 Date Filed: 05/17/2005 Page: 2
want to check on a criminal record while you 're at it," allegedly implying that 

appellant had a criminal record. Aplt. Br. at 2. Finally, appellant argues that a 

discovery protective order should be dismissed without prejudice because it 

prevented him from obtaining documents relevant to his discrimination claim. 

Appellant's challenge to the discovery of certain medical records used at 

his deposition in another case in 2001 is without merit. Appellant concedes that 

the deposition was in another case, appellant fails to demonstrate that the 

documents were not lawfully in appellee's possession at that time, and appellant 

has not shown that HIP AA applied at that time, see 45 C.F .R. § 164.534. 

We also reject appellant's challenge to Magistrate Judge Boland's 

participation in this case. Appellee provided transcripts from the June 24, 2003 

and November 4, 2003 hearings at which appellant's medical records were 

discussed. The transcripts show that Magistrate Judge Boland did not make the 

remark at either hearing that appellant attributes to him. See Aplee. App. at 1-15, 

16-48. Thus, there is no evidence of bias to support recusal. 

Finally, we reject appellant's challenge to the discovery protective order 

because he failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(£). "Where a movant has met 

the initial burden required for a grant of summary judgment, the opposing party 

must either establish the existence of a triable issue of fact under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56( e) or explain why he cannot present facts to justify his opposition under Rule 

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Appellate Case: 04-1430 Document: 010110642391 Date Filed: 05/17/2005 Page: 3
56([)." Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832 (10th 

Cir. 1986). Thus, when appellee moved for summary judgment, appellant was 

required to object to the alleged obstacle to discovery under Rule 56([) in the 

district court, rather than to wait to raise it on appeal as a challenge to the grant 

of summary judgment. See id. at 832-33. Because appellant did not do so, we 

will not disturb the magistrate judge's ruling. See id. at 833. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Timothy M. Tymkovich 

Circuit Judge 

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