LARRY EDWARD MAJOR, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 62819 

FILED 

AUG 28 201ii 

County; 

130 Nev., Advance Opinion 70 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

TRACE K I iNCEMAN 

CLE S REMES.QyR 

11% 

BYH -F DE L-aK Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant' to a guilty 

plea, of child abuse. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe 

Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Chief Deputy 

Public Defender, Washoe County, 

for Appellant. 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A. 

Gammick, District Attorney, and Jennifer P. Noble, Deputy District 

Attorney, Washoe County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE PICKERING, PARRAGUIRRE and SAITTA, JJ. 

OPINION 

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.: 

In this appeal, we consider whether a district court has 

jurisdiction to impose restitution to the State for the cost of child care in a 

child abuse case where a family court has already imposed an obligation 

on the defendant for the costs of supporting the child. We conclude that 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

KO 1947A e 1 4_ 2B4-15D 
the district court has jurisdiction to impose such restitution but that the 

district court must offset the restitution amount by the amount of the 

support obligation imposed by the family court. 

FACTS 

The State placed appellant Larry Major's daughter in the 

custody of Washoe County Social Services (Social Services) following his 

2012 arrest for child abuse. A family court hearing master ordered Major 

to pay child support in the amount of $100 per month directly to Social 

Services. A family court district judge affirmed that order. The child was 

in the care of Social Services for approximately seven months 

Major entered a guilty plea to one felony count of child abuse. 

Social Services sought restitution in the amount of $20,362.07. Ida Peeks, 

a fiscal compliance officer for Social Services, testified that Social Services 

based this amount on the amount it charges other agencies for the cost of 

care provided to children placed in Kids Kottage, where Social Services 

housed Major's daughter. Social Services bases this rate on the costs of 

running Kids Kottage, including overhead and salaries. Peeks also 

testified that Social Services may receive reimbursement for the cost of 

care from the federal government for children who meet certain eligibility 

requirements. Peeks did not know whether Major's daughter met these 

requirements or if Social Services received any reimbursement for her 

care. 

Major objected to the amount sought by Social Services on the 

basis that the family court had already entered a cost-of-care order. 

Following oral argument on the issue, the district court concluded that the 

family court's order, which was based on Major's ability to pay, did not 

affect the jurisdiction of the district court as to its criminal restitution 

order. Accordingly, the district court ordered Major to pay restitution to 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1.947A 
Social Services in the amount of $19,662.07. This amount reflected an 

offset of $700 for the amount Major incurred from the support obligation 

imposed by the family court. Major now brings this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Major argues that: (1) the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to order him to pay restitution for the total cost of his 

daughter's care because the family court previously ordered him to pay 

$100 per month for the cost of care; and (2) if the district court had 

jurisdiction, there was insufficient evidence to support the amount of the 

restitution award. 

The district court had jurisdiction to order Major to pay restitution 

Major argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

order him to pay $19,662.07 in restitution to Social Services for the cost of 

his daughter's care because the family court had already ordered him to 

pay child support to Social Services in the amount of $100 per month. 

This is an issue of first impression in Nevada. 

According to Major, the district court was improperly 

modifying or reviewing the family court's support order when it imposed 

restitution. We disagree with that characterization. Family courts have 

original, exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting the familial unit, 

including child support. NRS 3.223(1); Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. , 

, 251 P.3d 163, 169 (2011). We have held that family court judges "are 

district court judges with authority to preside over matters outside the 

family court division's jurisdiction." Landreth, 127 Nev. at 251 P.3d 

at 164. 

Although district courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify 

actions of other district courts, Rohlfing v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 

106 Nev. 902, 906, 803 P.2d 659, 662 (1990), we conclude that the district 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) 1947A mit. 
SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

court's order imposing restitution did not constitute a review or 

modification of the family court's support obligation. 

In this case, the family court lacked the power to grant 

restitution to compensate for the costs of child care imposed on the State 

by Major's criminal acts, as the power to grant restitution to crime victims 

is statutory, not inherent to a district court. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 

10, 974 P.2d 133, 134 (1999) (quoting State v. Davison, 809 P.2d 1374, 

1375 (Wash. 1991)). NRS 176.033(1)(c) provides that a sentencing court 

may award restitution to the victims of a crime upon a criminal conviction. 

Thus, although a family court judge has the same authority as a district 

court judge, NRS 176.033(1)(c) limits the power of a district court judge to 

award restitution to victims of crimes to the sentencing phase of a 

criminal proceeding. 

Statutes also circumscribe a family court's authority to award 

child support. NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080 provide that the amount 

of a parent's support obligation is calculated based on the gross monthly 

income of the parent or a minimum payment of $100. This amount is 

presumed to be sufficient to meet the basic needs of the child. NRS 

125B.080(5). The purpose of child support is to prevent the child from 

experiencing the effects of poverty and becoming a charge of the State, 

Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 798, 812, 102 P.3d 41, 

50 (2004), and there is no statutory authority for increasing the amount 

where the parent's support obligation arose from a criminal act. 

The purpose of restitution in the context of a criminal case, 

however, is to compensate a victim for costs arising from a defendant's 

criminal act. Martinez v. State, 120 Nev. 200, 202-03, 88 P.3d 825, 827 

(2004). Although we have recognized that there are limited circumstances 

4 
wherein the State may be considered the victim of a crime for purposes of 

restitution, see Igbinovia v. State, 111 Nev. 699, 706-07, 895 P.2d 1304, 

1308-09 (1995) (concluding that a police department was not entitled to 

restitution as a victim for the cost of setting up a drug transaction), we 

have held that the State was a victim for purposes of awarding restitution 

in a case where the defendant was convicted of abusing his children and 

the State incurred expenses for the medical and foster care of the children. 

Roe v. State, 112 Nev. 733, 735, 917 P.2d 959, 960 (1996). 

Accordingly, only the district court during the sentencing 

phase of the criminal trial had the power to grant restitution to the State 

for the total cost imposed on it by Major's criminal act. Nevertheless, this 

created an overlap between the family court's authority to impose a 

support obligation and a district court's authority to impose restitution as 

part of a criminal sentence. See Rohlfing, 106 Nev. at 906, 803 P.2d at 

662. Such an overlap need not undermine the jurisdiction of either the 

family court or the sentencing court. In the current case, where the 

support obligation and the restitution arose from the same occurrence and 

compensate for overlapping expenditures, we note with approval that the 

district court offset the restitution amount by the amount of the support 

obligation. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had 

jurisdiction to award restitution to the State for the cost of care for the 

victim of Major's crime to the extent that the district court's order did not 

overlap with the existing support obligation imposed by the family court. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

5 

(0) 1947A 
Sufficient evidence supports the restitution award 

Major next argues in the alternative that we should remand 

for a hearing to establish the actual cost of care for his daughter. We 

conclude that this contention lacks merit. 

NRS 176.033(1)(c) provides that a district court may impose 

restitution at sentencing for the victims of crimes. Social Services can be a 

"victim" for purposes of restitution. Roe, 112 Nev. at 735-36, 917 P.2d at 

960. Although we have cautioned sentencing courts to "rely on reliable 

and accurate evidence in setting restitution," a defendant is not entitled to 

a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 13, 

974 P.2d 133, 135 (1999). Thus, "[silo long as the record does not 

demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or 

accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly 

suspect evidence, this court will refrain from interfering with the sentence 

imposed." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). 

At sentencing, Peeks testified that Social Services based the 

cost-of-care rate on the total cost of running Kids Kottage. Peeks also 

testified that the federal government provides reimbursement of up to 56 

percent of the cost of care for certain eligible children. She did not know, 

however, whether Social Services received such a reimbursement for 

Major's daughter's care. The district court required Social Services to 

notify the district court if it did receive such a reimbursement in order to 

allow the district court to amend the restitution order to reflect the 

reimbursement. Major did not present any evidence that Social Services 

actually received such a reimbursement. 

We conclude that the evidence presented by Social Services for 

the cost of care is sufficient to support the district court's order. Although 

the question remains whether Social Services received a reimbursement, 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

6 

(0) 1947A 
tPeoleet. 

Major makes no showing there actually was such a reimbursement, and 

the district court appears to have imposed on Social Services a continuing 

obligation to notify the district court if there was a reimbursement to 

allow the court to revise the restitution order. Given these circumstances, 

we affirm the judgment of conviction. 

Parraguirre 

We concur: 

Saitta 

J. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 7 

(0) 1947A .A1g494