alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                 Certification of President and CEO pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                           Laurel Capital Group, Inc.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Laurel Capital Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Edwin
R. Maus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of and for the period covered by the Report.


/s/ Edwin R. Maus
-----------------
Edwin R. Maus
President and Chief Executive Officer
February 14, 2003
CHARLES A. BASSETT, II (CAPTAIN, USAF)

NASA ASTRONAUT (DECEASED)

PERSONAL DATA: Born in Dayton, Ohio, on December 30, 1931. Died 

February 28, 1966, in St. Louis, Missouri, in the crash of a T-38 jet. He is survived 

by his wife, Jean, and two children. 

EDUCATION: He attended Ohio State University from 1950 to 1952, and Texas 

Technological College from 1958 to 1960. He received a Bachelor of Science 

Degree in Electrical Engineering with honors from Texas Tech; He had done 

graduate work at University of Southern California. 

ORGANIZATIONS: Member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics, Phi Kappa Tau, Eta Kappa Nu, Tau Beta Pi and the Daedalians

EXPERIENCE: Bassett was an Air Force Captain. He graduated from the 

Aerospace Research Pilot School and the Air Force Experimental Pilot School.

He served as an experimental test pilot and engineering test pilot in the Fighter Projects Office at Edwards Air Force Base, 

California.

He logged over 3,600 hours-flying time, including over 2,900 hours in a jet aircraft.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Bassett was one of the third group of astronauts named by NASA in October 1963. In addition to 

participating in the overall astronaut-training program, he had specific responsibilities pertaining to training and simulators. 

On November 8, 1965, he was selected as pilot of the upcoming Gemini 9 mission. He died on February 28, 1966, in the 

crash of a T-38 jet.

MARCH 1966

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Biographical Data

 Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

 Houston, Texas 77058
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A1853. ERIC WEDLOWE v. COTTON STATE MORTGAGE, INC. et al.

Eric Wedlowe filed a petition to quiet title against several defendants,

including Bank of America, N. A. After a special master determined that Bank of

America wasthe only proper defendant,Bank of America moved for judgment on the

pleadings. The trial court granted the motion and entered final judgment on May 1,

2015. Wedlowe filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on August

21, 2015. Wedlowe then filed this direct appeal.

1 Bank of America has filed a motion

to dismiss.

The proper and timely filing of the notice of appeal is an absolute requirement

to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872

(452 SE2d 756) (1995). Here, Wedlowe filed a motion for new trial which, when

timely filed, extends the time for filing a notice of appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).

However, “[w]here a motion for new trial is not a proper vehicle for review of a trial

court’s action, the motion has no validity and will not extend the time for filing the

notice of appeal.” Pillow v. Seymour, 255 Ga. 683, 684 (341 SE2d 447) (1986). 

Generally, a party cannot move for new trial if no trial has been had. See Downs v.

State, 270 Ga. 310 (509 SE2d 40) (1998) (one who has entered a guilty plea cannot

move for new trial as there was no trial); see also Debter v. Stephens, 297 Ga. 652

(777 SE2d 244) (2015) (motion for new trial is not a proper vehicle for challenging

the grant of summary judgment); Gooding v. Boatright, 211 Ga. App. 221, 222 (438

1 Wedlowe directed his appeal to the Supreme Court, which transferred the

matter to this Court.

July 07, 2016
SE2d 685) (1993) (“Objections which go to the judgment only, and do not extend to

the verdict, cannot properly be made grounds of a motion for new trial”) (punctuation

omitted). 

Because the motion for new trial was not the appropriate vehicle for

challenging the trial court’s ruling, it did not operate to extend the time for filing a

notice of appeal. See Pillow, supra. As no timely appeal was filed from the trial

court’s May 2015 order granting judgment on the pleadings, we lack jurisdiction to

consider this matter. Accordingly, Bank of America’s motion to dismiss is hereby

GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

07/07/2016
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        In connection with the Annual Report of BPK Resources, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
John B. Connally, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.


                                               BPK RESOURCES, INC.



                                               By: /s/ John  B. Connally, III
                                                   --------------------------
                                                   John B. Connally, III
                                                   Chief Executive Officer

                                               Date:  April  14, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<CASH>                                             541
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,344
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
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<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     13,278
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          14,698
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            14,682
<LOANS>                                        148,714
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,907
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 201,911
<DEPOSITS>                                     167,019
<SHORT-TERM>                                     6,900
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<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  2,981
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<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   301
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 3,773
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<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,905
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     93
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .04
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<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.33
<LOANS-NON>                                        733
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,899
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       21
<RECOVERIES>                                        21
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,907
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,907
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Tevis *v.*The State.

Aii indictment founded on two statutes should conclude against the form of the statutes.

APPEAL from the *Shelby*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

Indictment for usurpation. Plea, not guilty. Verdict of guilty, and fine of one cent. Judgment accordingly.

This indictment is founded on two statutes. The offence charged is, that the defendant solemnized a marriage without being authorized to solemnize marriages. This offence is defined in the 9th section of the act -to regulate marriages. R. S. 1838, p. 411. The punishment is prescribed by the 47th section of the act concerning crime and punishment. R. S. 1838, p. 215. The indictment concludes against the statute. It should have concluded against the form of the statutes. *The State*v. *Moses,*7 Blackf. 244(1).

*304*W. Quarles*and *H. O’Neal,*for the appellant.

*A. A. Iiammond,*for the state.

*Per Curiam.-*

-The judgment is reversed. Cause re. manded, &c.

(1)

*The State*v. *Hunter, ante,*p. 212.
#### Evans *v.*State.

Opinion delivered September 29, 1924.

Criminal law — admonition to jury to agree upon verdict. — Where the jury appeared in court room to report their inability to reach a verdict, and the court asked how they stood numerically, to which the foreman replied that the jury stood ten to two for conviction, whereupon the court admonished the jury as to their duty to make every reasonable effort to agree upon a verdict, *held*no error.

Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court, Ohickasawba District; *G. E. Keck,*Judge;

affirmed.

*J. S. Utley,*Attorney General, and *John L. Garter,*Assistant, for appellee.

McCulloch, C. J.

Appellant was convicted on tbe trial below under an indictment charging him with the offense of selling alcoholic liquor. He perfected his appeal, but there has been no appearance by counsel, and we must look to the motion for a new trial to determine the assignments of error. The first relates to the sufficiency of the evidence.

It is not difficult to determine that the evidence is legally sufficient, for one of the witnesses testified positively and unequivocally that she was present when appellant made a sale of whiskey to another person. There was a conflict in the testimony, but, as there was testimony of a substantial nature to support the verdict, we will not disturb the finding of the jury.

The other assignment of error relates to an incident in the proceedings when the jurors appeared in court to report their inability to reach a verdict. The court asked how the jurors stood numerically, but did not ask for a statement as to the side on which the majority stood. The foreman, however, responded that the jury stood ten to two for conviction. The court thereupon, on its own •motion, delivered to the jury an admonition as to their duty to make every reasonable effort to agree upon a verdict. We have held that it does not constitute reversible error for the court to elicit a statement as to how the jury *425stood numerically. *Murchison*v. *State,*153 Ark. 300; *Phares*v. *State,*158 Ark. 156. In neither of those cases was there a statement made as to the side on which the majority was arrayed, hut we think the fact that the information is made public on that subject does not constitute prejudicial error. There was nothing in the remarks of the court calculated to operate as an invasion of the province of the jury or to unduly influence the jury. The court admonished the jurors that it was their duty not to yield their convictions, but to endeavor, in conference with each other, to reconcile their conflicting views and reach a verdict consistent with their conviction as to the law and testimony in the case.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-7089

CHARLES WALKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus
RALPH S. BEARDSLEY; OFFICER BRANHAM; J. MCFADDEN, Correctional Officer; M. TAYLOR, Correctional Officer; R. MCDOWELL, Defendants - Appellees, and JANE DOE, Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (CA-97-2896-24-AK) Submitted: December 14, 2000 Decided: December 21, 2000 Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Thomas King, WILLCOX, BUYCK & WILLIAMS, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Charles Walker seeks to appeal from the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granting summary judgment for Defendants in Walker’s 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) action. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Walker’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March 31, 1999. Walker’s notice of appeal was filed on July 31, 2000. Because Walker failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 32.1



                          SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
                1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection  with the Form 10-KSB/A of Auteo Media,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB/A  for the  period  ended  December  31,  2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Donald
Bell,  Chief  Executive  Officer  and Chief  Financial  Officer of the  Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on my knowledge:

     1. The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date:  April 29, 2005


/s/ DONALD BELL
______________________________________
Donald Bell
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer




A SIGNED  ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN  STATEMENT  REQUIRED BY SECTION 906, OR OTHER
DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATING, ACKNOWLEDGING, OR OTHERWISE ADOPTING THE SIGNATURE THAT
APPEARS IN TYPED FORM WITHIN THE  ELECTRONIC  VERSION OF THIS WRITTEN  STATEMENT
REQUIRED BY SECTION  906,  HAS BEEN  PROVIDED TO AUTEO  MEDIA,  INC. AND WILL BE
RETAINED BY AUTEO MEDIA,  INC.  AND  FURNISHED  TO THE  SECURITIES  AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 30851 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

DANIEL DAVID GARZA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:16

- CR

- 297

- 1

Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
Daniel David Garza appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine actual and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer initiating the traffic stop did not have an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. He

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED July 11, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-30851 Document: 00514550906 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/11/2018No. 17

- 30851

2 contends that th e video from the patrol unit did not show a traffic violation prior to the officer in itiating the stop. Garza argues that the officer’s testimon y that he did not activate the patrol unit’s lights and video recorder immediately upon observing the traffic violation due to safet y concerns was not credible. Having reviewed the record, we c onclude that the officer ’s testimony is not “so unbelievable on its face that it defies physical laws.” See United States v. Casteneda , 951 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, Garza’s arguments do not su ffice to permit a “definite and firm conviction” that the magistrate judge and the district court erred in finding the officer’s testimony credible. United States v. Hearn , 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. Viewing the evidence in the requisite light most favorable to the Go vernment, we conclude that the officer ’s decision to conduct a traffic stop was justified at its inception because the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver committed a traffic violation

. See United States v. Pack , 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lopez

- Moreno , 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 17-30851 Document: 00514550906 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/11/2018
#### Floom *v.*Beard.

In a suit on the covenant of seisin or of right to convey in a conveyance of real estate, the breach may be assigned by negativing the words of the covenant.

ERROR to the *Be Kalb*Circuit Court.

Perkins, J.

Covenant. The plaintiff, *Francis Floom,*declares upon a deed in fee-simple, executed to him by the defendant, *George Beard,*for the consideration of fifty dollars, for a lot in the town of *Canton, Ohio.*The’ declaration avers that the deed contains the following among other cove*77nants, viz., that the said *Beard*was, on the day of the date of the deed, lawfully seised in fee of the premises, and good right to sell and convey the same. The breaches are assigned in the following words: “ And the said *Floorn*avers that the said *Beard*was not, on the day and year aforesaid, nor at any time since, seised in fee of said premises in manner aforesaid nor otherwise however; nor had he, the said *Beard,*then good right to sell and convey the same in manner aforesaid, nor in any manner otherwise.” The defendant demurred generally; the demurrer was sustained; and final judgment rendered for the defendant.

*J. B. Howe,*for the plaintiff.

We think the Court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The brief of counsel informs us that the demurrer was sustained on the ground that the breaches were too generally assigned. The law is that “in the covenant of seisin, and in the covenant that the covenantor has good right to convey, it is sufficient to allege the breach by negativing the words of the covenant.” 4 Kent’s Comm. 479. — 1 Blackf. 102, n. — 5 *id.*236. The declaration in this case conforms to the law.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. GREGORY THOMAS.

April 28, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Covert *v.*Nelson.

Suit by the assignee of a sealed note against the maker. *Held,*that a judf recovered against the maker on the note as garnishee, in an attachment" against the payee, might be pleaded in bar of the suit, if the judgment was rendered before the maker had notice of the assignment.

APPEAL’ from the *Johnson*Circuit Court.

Dewey, *J.*

Nelson, the assignee of *Young,-*the payee of a sealed note, sued *Covert,*the maker, in debt on the note. The defendant pleaded, that one *Vanarsdale*sued out a writ of domestic attachment against *Young,*and caused the defendant to be summoned as a garnishee; that he admitted his indebtedness to *Young*on the note which is the foundation of this action; that *Vanarsdale*recovered a judgment against *Young,*and also a judgment against the defendant, as garnishee, on the note, which judgment remained in full force,

&c. The plea sets out the proceedings in attachment, which appear to be regular, and avers that the defendant had no notice of the assignment of the note to the plaintiff, until after the recovery of the judgment against him (the defendant) as garnishee. The plaintiff demurred generally to the plea; the demurrer was sustained; and a final judgment rendered in favour of the plaintiff.

We think the plea constituted a goodi bar, and that the demurrer should have been overruled. The statute authorizes a general and personal judgment against a garnishee in attachment; and such is the judgment rendered against the defendant. If that judgment is not a bar to this action, the defendant will be compelled to pay the same debt twice.

We do not think that, under our statute, though it may be *266otherwise by the custom of *London,*satisfaction of the judgment against him, as garnishee, is necessary to enable the defendant to set it up as a defence to this action. See *Evans*v. *Darlington,*5 Biackf. 320.

*W. W. Wick*and *L. Barbour,*for the appellant.

*II.*and *H. Brown,*for the appellee.

The assignment of the note on which he was garnisheed, and on which this action is founded, can make no difference, because he is entitled, by the statute, to all defences against the note in the hands of the assignee, which he could make against it in a suit by the payee, unless he had notice of the assignment before the matter alleged in defence originated. The plea alleges that he had no notice of the assignment until after the rendition of the judgment against him as garnishee.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.