IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

January 2014 Term FILED 

June 6, 2014 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

No. 14-0059 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex rel. THORNHILL
 

GROUP, INC. and WALLY L. THORNHILL,
 

Petitioners
 

v. 

CHARLES E. KING, JR., Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
 

and GEORGE A. ROBERTS,
 

Respondent
 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
 

WRIT GRANTED
 

Submitted: April 22, 2014 

Filed: June 6, 2014 

Johnnie E. Brown, Esq. Harry F. Bell, Jr., Esq. 

S. Andrew Stonestreet, Esq. Jonathan W. Price, Esq. 

Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, The Bell Law Firm, PLLC 

Brown & Poe, PLLC Charleston, West Virginia 

Charleston, West Virginia Attorneys for Respondent Roberts 

Attorneys for Petitioners 

JUSTICE LOUGHRY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
 

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS
 

1. The holding in syllabus point three of Wetzel County Savings & Loan Co. 

v. Stern Bros., Inc., 156 W.Va. 693, 195 S.E.2d 732 (1973), and its progeny, which identifies 

the place where a cause of action arises in a breach of contract claim for purposes of venue 

selection based on the tripartite aspects of a contractual claim (formation, breach, and 

damages), was not impacted by the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56-1-2 in 1986. 

2. “Courts of record can speak only by their records, and what does not so 

appear does not exist in law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Hudgins v. Crowder and Freeman, Inc., 156 W.Va. 

111, 191 S.E.2d 443 (1972). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LOUGHRY, Justice: 

Petitioners Thornhill Group, Inc. (“Thornhill Group”) and Wally L. Thornhill 

seek a writ of prohibition in connection with the December 16, 2013, ruling of the Circuit 

Court of Kanawha County denying their motion to dismiss for improper venue. Given that 

the petitioners–defendants below–are either residents of or have their principal place of 

business in Logan County and all the relevant factual events alleged by respondent George 

A. Roberts in support of the underlying cause of action transpired in Logan County, the 

petitioners argue that the provisions of our general venue statute1 dictate that venue is proper 

in Logan County. After a careful review of the applicable venue statute in conjunction with 

controlling case law, we conclude that the trial court committed error in ruling that venue 

lies properly in Kanawha County.2 Accordingly, we grant the requested writ of prohibition. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On or about December 11, 2006, Mr. Roberts began working as a general 

manager for the Thornhill Group at its automotive dealership in Logan County.3 In the 

Spring of 2011, Mr. Roberts learned of the Thornhill Group’s alleged decision to replace him 

1

See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1 (2012). 

2

George A. Roberts, the plaintiff below and individual respondent herein, is a resident 

of Kanawha County. 

3

The Thornhill Group owns multiple automobile dealerships. 

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with a younger employee.4 Through a complaint filed on February 11, 2013, in the Circuit 

Court of Kanawha County, Mr. Roberts asserted claims against the petitioners predicated on 

breach of contract, age discrimination, unlawful retaliation,5 and unpaid wages. The 

petitioners promptly filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Kanawha County is not the 

proper venue for the underlying cause of action based on the provisions of the general venue 

statute.6 Addressing Mr. Roberts’ allegation that a Kanawha County venue is supported by 

case law which recognizes a three-pronged consideration for selection of venue in breach of 

contract cases,7 the petitioners argued that not only was the alleged offer of employment 

accepted at the dealership located in Logan County, but all of the events related to an alleged 

breach of contract similarly took place in Logan County. The petitioners also question the 

validity of the decisional law relied upon by Mr. Roberts in light of the repeal of West 

4

When the complaint was filed, Mr. Roberts was sixty-four years old. 

5

According to the allegations set forth in the complaint, various retaliatory acts 

allegedly ensued after Mr. Roberts notified the petitioners on December 17, 2012, that they 

were unlawfullydiscriminating against himbygrooming a younger employee to replace him. 

6

See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1 (2012). 

7

In his complaint, Mr. Roberts relied upon this Court’s holding in syllabus point three 

of Wetzel County Savings & Loan Co. v. Stern Bros., Inc., 156 W.Va. 693, 195 S.E.2d 732 

(1973), that 

[t]he venue of a cause of action in a case involving 

breach of contract in West Virginia arises within the county: 

(1) in which the contract was made, that is, where the duty came 

into existence; or (2) in which the breach or violation of the 

duty occurs; or (3) in which the manifestation of the 

breach–substantial damage occurs. 

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Virginia Code § 56-1-2 in 1986.8 The petitioners assert that no fair or reasonable reading of 

the venue statute at issue would support venue existing in Kanawha County. 

In denying the petitioners’ motion to dismiss on improper venue grounds, the 

trial court ruled that venue was appropriate in Kanawha County based on the alleged 

acceptance by Mr. Roberts of an offer of employment from the Thornhill Group in Kanawha 

County.9 As an additional basis for its ruling, the trial court relied upon Mr. Roberts’ 

Kanawha County residency at the time of the alleged breach of contract and the fact that “his 

damages would be most acutely felt there.”10 With regard to the non-contractual claims,11 

the trial court concluded that judicial economy dictated they be similarly heard in Kanawha 

County. It is from this ruling that the petitioners seek relief. 

8

See infra note 16 for text of former West Virginia Code § 56-1-2. 

9

While Mr. Roberts contends that he accepted a verbal offer of employment over the 

telephone while in his residence in Kanawha County, the record of this case is devoid of any 

evidence to support that contention. 

10Three additional factors that the trial court cited in support of its ruling included: 

(1) the fact, of which it took judicial notice, that “the Thornhill Group advertises extensively 

in Kanawha County via both print and broadcast media;” (2) the Thornhill Group’s 

operation of a dealership in Kanawha County, and (3) the likely recusal of the two sitting 

circuit court judges in Logan County based on their prior actions in suits involving the 

petitioners. 

11The petitioners are adamant that no employment contract exists. Instead, Mr. 

Roberts was an at-will employee. 

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II. Standard of Review 

That the issue of venue mayproperlybe addressed through a writ of prohibition 

is well-settled. In State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson, 195 W.Va. 121, 464 S.E.2d 763 (1995), we 

explained our preference for “resolving this issue [venue] in an original action” given the 

“inadequacy of the relief permitted by appeal.” Id. at 124, 464 S.E.2d at 766; accord State 

ex rel. Huffman v. Stephens, 206 W.Va. 501, 503, 526 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1999) (recognizing 

that concerns regarding litigants being placed at unwarranted disadvantage and inadequate 

appellate relief compel exercise of original jurisdiction in venue matters). In deciding 

whether to grant a writ of prohibition in cases where the lower court is acting within its 

jurisdiction but alleged to have exceeded its authority, we rely upon those now axiomatic 

factors set forth in syllabus point four of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 

S.E.2d 12 (1996).12 We proceed to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue. 

12Those factors are: 

(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate 

means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) 

whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way 

that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower 

tribunal’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) 

whether the lower tribunal’s order is an oft repeated error or 

manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or 

substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal’s order 

raises new and important problems or issues of law of first 

impression. 

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III. Discussion 

The parties agree that the singular issue of venue before us is controlled by the 

provisions of West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 (2012). Under that statute, which is referred to 

as the general venue statute, venue is determined by examining the following factors 

pertinent to this case: 

(a) Any civil action or other proceeding, except where it is 

otherwise specially provided, may hereafter be brought in the 

circuit court of any county: 

(1) Wherein any of the defendants may reside or the cause of 

action arose, . . .; or 

(2) If a corporation be a defendant, wherein its principal office 

is or wherein its mayor, president or other chief officer resides 

. . . . 

Id. (emphasis supplied). 

According to the petitioners, the residencyfactors set forth in subsections (a)(1) 

and (2) of our general venue statute require the conclusion that Logan County is the proper 

county in which to resolve the underlying action. See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a)(1), (2). As 

both the individual and corporate defendant have their residences, for purposes of the general 

venue statute, in Logan County, the petitioners maintain that venue does not lie in Kanawha 

County. Looking to the alternate statutory basis for venue, the place where the cause of 

action arose, the petitioners contend that all the facts upon which Mr. Roberts relies in 

support of his cause of action occurred in Logan County at the dealership where he was 

employed. As a result, the petitioners insist that the clear and unambiguous language of West 

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Virginia Code § 56-1-1(a) compels the conclusion that venue properly lies in Logan County, 

and not in Kanawha County. 

Eschewing any discussion of the defendants’ residency, Mr. Roberts relies 

instead on his residency in Kanawha County combined with his alleged acceptance of an 

offer of employment from the Thornhill Group in Kanawha County.13 Adopting the circuit 

court’s reasoning in its order denying the motion to dismiss, Mr. Roberts suggests that the 

damages incurred from the breach of contract “would be most acutely felt in the county in 

which he makes his home.” In response to the petitioners’ contention that the case law he 

relied upon to assert venue, Wetzel County Savings & Loan, is no longer valid, Mr. Roberts 

cites to multiple decisions of this Court which continue to view the holding of that decision 

as authoritative. See, e.g., State ex rel. Galloway Group v. McGraw, 227 W.Va. 435, 711 

S.E.2d 257 (2011) (recognizing three-pronged analysis announced in Wetzel County Savings 

& Loan for venue in breach of contract cases);14 McGuire v. Fitzsimmons, 197 W.Va. 132, 

136-37, 475 S.E.2d 132, 136-37 (1996) (applying venue analysis of Wetzel County Savings 

& Loan to legal malpractice action); Banner Printing Co. v. Bykota Corp., 182 W.Va. 488, 

491-92, 388 S.E.2d 844, 847-48 (1989) (discussing 1986 amendments to venue statutes and 

applying Wetzel County Savings & Loan holding to determine venue). 

13See supra note 9.
 

14See supra note 7.
 

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Turning to the residency requirements set forth in the general venue statute, 

it is clear that venue lies in Logan County. See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a)(1), (2). The 

individual defendant in this case, Wally Thornhill, resides in Logan County. Mr. Thornhill 

serves as the president and chief officer of the Thornhill Group and the principal office of 

the Thornhill Group is in Logan County. Although the residency of the defendants clearly 

points to Logan County for venue purposes, the general venue statute provides an alternate 

basis for determining venue that must be considered: where the cause of action arose. W.Va. 

Code § 56-1-1(a)(1). 

As part of our consideration of where Mr. Roberts’ cause of action arose, we 

find it necessary to address the petitioners’ contention that the trial court relied on case law 

that is no longer valid. In making its ruling in this case, the circuit court considered whether 

the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56-1-2 in 1986 compels the conclusion that the legal 

principles announced in Wetzel County Savings & Loan, a case applying that statute, had 

been rendered nugatory.15 In rejecting the postulate that this Court’s recognition of multiple 

venues for a breach of contract case was effectively abrogated by the statutory repeal, the 

trial court reasoned: 

the West Virginia Supreme Court has applied the same 

reasoning subsequent to repeal of that statute, recognizing that 

the divisible and transitory nature of contracts means that venue 

15See supra note 7. 

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may be appropriate in more than one county. McGuire v. 

Fitzsimmons, 197 W.Va. 132, 136-37, 475 S.E.2d 132, 136-137 

(1996); 

6. Further, the McGuire court observed that “[t]he plain 

language of W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(a)(1) [1986] does not limit the 

venue to one county, but provides at least two possible 

justifications for proper venue, either the residence of the 

defendants or where the ‘cause of action arose.’” Id. at 136, [475 

S.E.2d at] 136. 

The petitioners’ suggestion that the repeal of West Virginia Code § 56-1-2 

invalidates this Court’s case law addressing the issue of where a cause of action arises in a 

contract case fails upon scrutiny. Of critical import is the fact that while West Virginia Code 

§ 56-1-2 no longer exists in its original format,16 the core provisions of that section have been 

incorporated into West Virginia Code § 56-1-1. In discussing the subject statutory changes 

in Banner Printing, we stated: 

16That statute provided as follows: 

An action, suit or proceeding may be brought in any county 

wherein the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose, although 

none of the defendants reside therein, in the following 

instances: 

(a) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant, 

one or more of the defendants, is a corporation; 

(b) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant, 

one or more of the defendants, are served in such county with 

process or notice commencing such action, suit or proceeding. 

W.Va. Code § 56-1-2 (repealed 1986). 

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This statutory enactment [W.Va. Code, 56-1-1], which became 

effective in 1986, consolidated and slightly modified two 

previous venue statutes, W.Va. Code, 56-1-1 [1927], and W.Va. 

Code, 56-1-2[1927]. 

West Virginia Code, 56-1-1, as in effect prior to the 1986 

amendments, provided for venue based on the location of the 

defendant . . . . 

. . . . 

The former W.Va. Code, 56-1-2, unlike the former W.Va. 

Code, 56-1-1, provided for venue under certain circumstances 

in the county where the cause of action arose . . . . 

As previously indicated, after the 1986 amendments, it 

was provided in W.Va. Code, 56-1-1, that, except where 

otherwise specifically provided, a cause of action could be 

brought in any county, “(1) Wherein any of the defendants 

reside or the cause of action arose.” 

182 W.Va. at 490, 388 S.E.2d at 846 (emphasis supplied). 

Rather than discarding established common law principles of venue concerning 

where the cause of action arose, we explained in Banner Printing that “this Court believes 

that the new W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(a)(2), was intended to amplify upon the language of the 

former W.Va. Code, 56-1-1, which dealt with venue based on the location of the defendant 

and was not intended to affect venue based on where the cause of action arose.” 182 W.Va. 

at 491, 388 S.E.2d at 847 (emphasis supplied). After first resolving that the 1986 

amendments to West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 allow an action to be brought in the county in 

which the action arose when a corporate defendant has been sued in addition to the 

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“residency” locations specified in subsection (a)(2),17 we proceeded to consider whether the 

amended language had any effect on this Court’s precedent with regard to where a cause of 

action arises. With specific reference to the rulings reached in Wetzel County Savings & 

Loan,18 this Court opined that the new statute [56-1-1] did not alter the law as it relates to 

where a cause of action arises. Banner Printing, 182 W.Va. at 492, 388 S.E.2d at 848. 

Affirming the continued validity of our decisional law addressing where a cause of action 

arises in a breach of contract case, we relied on syllabus point four of Wetzel County Savings 

& Loan19 to reverse the trial court’s decision that “venue is placed in the circuit court of the 

17Subsection (a)(2) provides in its entirety: 

If a corporation be a defendant, wherein its principal 

office is or wherein its mayor, president or other chief officer 

resides; or if its principal office be not in this State, and its 

mayor, president or other chief officer do not reside therein, 

wherein it does business; or if it be a corporation organized 

under the laws of this State which has its principal office 

located outside of this State and which has no office or place of 

business within the State, the circuit court of the county in 

which the plaintiff resides or the circuit court of the county in 

which the seat of state government is located shall have 

jurisdiction of all actions at law or suits in equity against the 

corporation, where the cause of action arose in this State or 

grew out of the rights of stockholders with respect to corporate 

management[.] 

W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a)(2). 

18See supra note 7. 

19Syllabus point four of Wetzel County Savings & Loan provides as follows: 

Where one supports the venue for his civil action based 

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county wherein the cause of action arose only if the corporation does not have a principal 

office or its chief officer does not reside in this State.” 182 W.Va. at 489, 388 S.E.2d at 845 

(emphasis supplied). 

With our ruling in Banner Printing, this Court resolved more than two decades 

ago that, subsequent to the 1986 amendments to the general venue statute, our case law 

addressing the issue of where a cause of action arises continues to be controlling law. To 

avoid any further confusion on this issue, however, we conclude that the holding in Wetzel 

County Savings & Loan and its progeny, which identifies the place where the cause of action 

arises in a breach of contract claim for purposes of venue selection based on the tripartite 

aspects of a contractual claim (formation, breach, and damages), was not impacted by the 

repeal of West Virginia Code § 56-1-2 in 1986. We recognize, however, that the facts 

upon the place of the breach comprising a part of the cause of 

action, in the usual case, he must bring the action in the place or 

county in the State where the breach, repudiation or violation of 

the duty occurs. But a well recognized exception to the above 

rule is the “to pay” doctrine providing: where the duty imposed 

is to pay a debt, the courts construe the contract and the law 

implies a further duty upon the debtor after default, to seek the 

creditor and make payment to him and declares that the 

residence of the creditor at the time the debt is due is the place 

of the breach of the contract. 

156 W.Va. at 694, 195 S.E.2d at 734. 

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relevant to a particular breach of contract claim will govern which of those three potential 

venue selections are appropriate in a given case.20 

Prior recognition of the legislative purpose for the 1986 amendments to our 

venue laws further supports the conclusion we reach in this case. Addressing the addition 

of language to West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 that allows a defendant to seek a transfer when 

the cause of action is filed in a county in which he does not reside, Justice Cleckley opined: 

By enacting W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(b),21 the legislature 

granted to the circuit courts of this State broader discretion than 

was permissible under the old rule of forum non conveniens. 

Thus, in effect, it gave the circuit court some discretion to 

20In illustration, the fact that Mr. Roberts sought to assert venue in Kanawha County 

based primarily on his alleged acceptance of an oral contract of employment via the 

telephone from his residence has no bearing on the allegations relevant to the breach of 

contract–all of which clearly point to Logan County as the proper venue in this case. 

21That section provides: 

Whenever a civil action or proceeding is brought in the county 

where the cause of action arose under the provisions of 

subsection (a) of this section, if no defendant resides in the 

county, a defendant to the action or proceeding may move the 

court before which the action is pending for a change of venue 

to a county where one or more of the defendants resides and 

upon a showing by the moving defendant that the county to 

which the proposed change of venue would be made would 

better afford convenience to the parties litigant and the 

witnesses likely to be called, and if the ends of justice would be 

better served by the change of venue, the court may grant the 

motion. 

W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(b). 

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decide the choice of forum, a prerogative which previously was 

placed in the hands of the plaintiff. Under W.Va. Code, 56-1­

1(b), the “plaintiff’s choice [of forum] is no longer the dominant 

factor that it was prior to [the] adoption of [this section].” 

State ex rel. Smith v. Maynard, 193 W.Va. 1, 7, 454 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1994) (footnoted added 

and citation omitted). Justice Cleckley elicited further that the legislative changes came in 

response to our ruling in Hinkle v. Black,22 with the aim of revising “this Court’s formulation 

of the forum non conveniens doctrine.”23 Id. at 9, 454 S.E.2d at 54. Under subsection (b), 

defendants who do not reside in the county in which a plaintiff has filed a cause of action 

were provided with a procedural mechanism by which to seek transfer of that action to a 

county where one or more defendants resides in the interests of convenience and serving the 

ends of justice.24 See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(b). 

22164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979). 

23In Riffle, Justice Cleckley expounded on this issue, stating 

Before the 1986 revisions, our application of the doctrine 

of forum non conveniens struck directly at venue choices 

authorized by the Legislature. In other words, it gave the circuit 

courts authority to disregard the venue statutes that limited 

venue to certain counties and permitted transfers to another 

county based upon the circuit court’s determination that it 

would be more convenient and just to transfer the case. 

195 W.Va. at 127 n.9, 464 S.E.2d at 769 n.9. 

24As we discussed in Maynard, the transfer provisions only apply where the plaintiff 

has filed the action in the county in which the cause of action arose. 193 W.Va. at 7, 454 

S.E.2d at 52. From the record of this case, it does not appear that the petitioners ever sought 

to transfer this matter, but only to dismiss it on grounds of improper venue. 

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Returning to the case before us, we proceed to analyze the trial court’s decision 

that venue was proper in Kanawha County based on the residency of Mr. Roberts; his situs 

when accepting the employment contract; and the location where damages from the alleged 

breach would be most acutely realized. Under the provisions of our general venue statute, 

the place of the plaintiff’s residency has no independent bearing on where an action may be 

maintained. See Syl. Pt. 2, Crawford v. Carson, 138 W.Va. 852, 78 S.E.2d 268 (1953) 

(recognizing that plaintiff’s residence, without more, does not establish venue in absence of 

statute or other principle of law); accord Crispen v. W.Va. Secondary Schools Activities 

Comm’n, 206 W.Va. 486, 525 S.E.2d 677 (1999). Only two statutory factors control the 

issue of venue before us: the place of the defendants’ residence and the place where the cause 

of action arose. See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a). Because there is no dispute that both the 

individual and the corporate defendants reside in Logan County for purposes of our general 

venue statute, the only way this case can remain in Kanawha County is if the cause of action 

arose there. 

In support of its ruling that venue lies in Kanawha County, the trial court 

concludes that Mr. Roberts accepted an offer of employment from the Thornhill Group in 

Kanawha County. The record of this case, however, is devoid of any evidence in support of 

this finding. Not only does the complaint fail to refer to where the oral contract was formed, 

but no supporting evidence has been submitted on this issue. As we recognized in syllabus 

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point three of Hudgins v. Crowder & Freeman, Inc., 156 W.Va. 111, 191 S.E.2d 443 (1972), 

“[c]ourts of record can speak only by their records, and what does not so appear does not 

exist in law.” There is simply no evidence in the record of this case to establish that Mr. 

Roberts accepted his offer of employment, as was represented during oral argument of this 

case, while utilizing the telephone in his home. 

Although we have no basis from which to assess whether an offer of 

employment was accepted in Kanawha County,25 the location of the contract’s acceptance 

has no bearing on where the subject cause of action arose in this case. See Syl. Pt. 1, Jones 

v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 84 W.Va. 245, 99 S.E. 462 (1919) (recognizing that cause 

of action consists of duty owing to one person from another combined with violation or 

breach of that duty). Rather than the existence of the contract itself being the pivotal focus 

of Mr. Roberts’ contractual claim, his claim is predicated on the alleged breach of that 

contract. Accordingly, for purposes of determining venue in the case before us, what is 

relevant is where the breach of contract ensued and not where the contract was accepted. 

By focusing on the location of the alleged contract’s acceptance, the trial court 

overlooked the critical need to determine where the cause of action arose when deciding 

25The petitioners maintain that the offer of employment was made and accepted at the 

dealership in Logan County. 

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where venue lies. See W.Va. Code § 56-1-1(a)(1). In view of both the transitory nature of 

contracts as well as the potential involvement of multiple geographic locations, we 

recognized in Wetzel County Savings & Loan that the place of the contract’s formation may 

sometimes govern where venue lies. 156 W.Va. at 698, 195 S.E.2d at 736. Typically, 

however, the situs of the breach of a contract will be the obvious location in which to 

institute an action to recover for that breach. See Russell v. Pineview Realty, Inc., 165 W.Va. 

822, 824-25, 272 S.E.2d 241, 242-43 (1980) (examining contractual terms to conclude that 

Kanawha Countywas place of breach and, correspondingly, proper situs of venue). The third 

possible location for a breach of contract action is the location where the breach manifests 

itself and damages are made evident from that breach. It is not, as the trial court ruled, a 

reference to the physical locale in which a plaintiff’s monetary harm is most acutely felt.26 

In many instances, this location will be the same location as the breach. As we recognized 

in Wetzel County Savings & Loan, however, the county where the damages occur may be a 

distinct location from the county in which the breach occurred. 156 W.Va. at 698, 195 

S.E.2d at 736. 

26There is simply no basis in the law for identifying a plaintiff’s residence as the 

location where substantial damage occurs based on a perceived reduction in the flow of 

income to that county as a result of the contractual breach. Critically, the place where the 

damages are made manifest is not the location of the plaintiff’s wallet or pocketbook but 

instead the physical locale where the damages flowing from the breach are first made 

evident. 

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Looking at the nature of the alleged breach of contract in this case, Mr. Roberts 

is asserting that the breach occurred by “materially and unilaterally altering the terms under 

which [he] was employed.” In support of this claim, Mr. Roberts alleges that the petitioners 

“manipulat[ed] dealership sales figures in a calculated effort to deprive Plaintiff of 

compensation he should have received based on his employment agreement.” Assuming, 

arguendo, the truth of this averment regarding sales figure manipulation aimed at reducing 

Mr. Roberts’ income, the situs of the contractual breach would have been Logan County 

where the dealership was located. Not only was Logan County the location of the alleged 

breach of the employment contract but it was also the location where the damages resulting 

from the alleged breach of contract would have manifested. Upon application of the general 

venue statute provisions to this case, there is a complete convergence of result: Logan 

County is the place where the cause of action for an alleged breach of contract arose.27 See 

W.Va. Code § 56-1-1. 

IV. Conclusion 

Given the fact that West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 prescribes that a civil action 

shall be brought where the individual defendants reside, where a corporate defendant has 

a principal place of business, or where the cause of action arose, and given the facts of the 

27Each of the three additional causes of action Mr. Roberts has alleged against the 

petitioners (age discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and unpaid wages) would have similarly 

arisen in Logan County. 

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present case, this Court can only conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that venue lies 

in Kanawha County. Based upon the foregoing, we grant the writ of prohibition. 

Writ granted. 

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