Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 15, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00450-CR

STEVEN WAYNE ISBEL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1322305

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Steven Wayne Isbel appeals his conviction for fraudulent 

possession of identifying information. He asserts that the evidence is legally 

insufficient to support the conviction and challenges the trial court’s assessment of 

court costs. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Officer Christopher Bruce testified that he was dispatched to a service 
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station to investigate a report of a woman harassing customers. It was reported that 

the woman was approaching customers and offering to pay for their gas with a

credit card in exchange for cash.

When Bruce arrived at the service station he located the woman and 

appellant, who were seated in a vehicle together; the woman sat in the driver’s seat 

and appellant sat in the passenger seat. Bruce walked up to the driver’s door and 

began to introduce himself. As he did so, the woman turned from him and grabbed 

something black. Concerned for his safety, Bruce told the woman to place her 

hands on the steering wheel. When the woman refused to show her hands, Bruce 

opened the door and physically removed her from the vehicle. Bruce placed the 

woman in handcuffs and noticed she was concealing crack cocaine in one hand.

After seeing the cocaine, Bruce called for backup. While waiting for backup to 

arrive, Bruce observed appellant “fidgeting” in the passenger seat; he also 

observed appellant discard a plastic baggie; Bruce suspected that it contained 

cocaine. Appellant stepped out of the car after Bruce asked him to do so and Bruce 

then placed appellant in handcuffs.

After securing both individuals, Bruce searched the car and found a “black 

Oakley [sunglass] case” containing two syringes, a used crack pipe, and a baggie 

containing a crystalline substance. On the passenger side, Bruce found a clear 

plastic baggie with white crystal-like residue. Bruce found appellant’s wallet and a 

passport where appellant had been sitting. In appellant’s wallet, Bruce found an 

armed forces identification card, a KBR employee access card, and a

Transportation Worker Identification Card, each of which bore the name Gerald 

Field. Appellant’s identification was also in the wallet. Underneath the wallet was 

a passport in the name of Joseph Johnson. Bruce also found “two bags full of 

Gerald Field’s paperwork,” which consisted of a passport, social security card, 
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driver’s license, birth certificate, marriage license, military discharge certificate, 

health insurance card, and earnings statements, each of which bore the name 

Gerald Field; some of the items also contained Field’s social security number. 

Bruce ran Field’s and Johnson’s names through the Houston Police Department 

computer and learned they had reported a recent burglary.

Johnson and Field testified that they were staying in a hotel in Houston 

while training for jobs with KBR. Both men worked in transportation and support 

for the military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the nature of their work the Human 

Resources department at KBR required them to provide detailed identification 

documents such as their passports, birth certificates, social security cards, and 

marriage licenses in addition to immunization records. Shortly before both men 

were to travel overseas, their hotel room was burglarized and these items were 

taken. Johnson and Field identified the documents found in appellant’s possession 

as the documents that were taken from them.

Field testified that shortly after the burglary his wife received a phone call 

from a check cashing location because an unidentified individual had attempted to 

cash one of Field’s checks. 

Appellant was convicted of fraudulent possession of identifying information. 

He stipulated to two prior convictions, and was sentenced to forty years in prison. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In his first issue appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show 

he acted with intent to defraud or harm another. When reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

and determine whether, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from 

it, any rational fact finder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 

(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). The jury is the 

exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 

Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the 

jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the evidence, and we draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction

Appellant was charged under section 32.51 of the Texas Penal Code, which 

states a person commits an offense if, with the intent to harm or defraud another, 

he obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses an item of identifying information of 

another person without the other person’s consent. Tex. Penal Code § 32.51(b). 

Identifying information includes information that alone or in conjunction with 

other information identifies a person, including a person’s name and date of birth. 

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2013). The purpose of this 

section is to protect individuals from identity theft. See Ford v. State, 282 S.W.3d 

256, 264–65 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.).

To find appellant guilty of fraudulent possession of identifying information, 

the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed Field’s and 

Johnson’s identifying information without their consent, and that appellant did so 

with the intent to harm or defraud another. See Tex. Penal Code § 32.51. “Harm” is 

defined under the Texas Penal Code as:

[A]nything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, 

including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected 

is interested.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(25) (West Supp. 2013).
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Juries are free to “use common sense and apply common knowledge, 

observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when giving 

effect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Aguilar

v. State, 263 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d), 

quoting Taylor v. State, 71 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. 

ref’d). This includes inferring intent from an individual’s acts, words, or conduct. 

Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Appellant relies on Crittenden v. State, 671 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984), and Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), in arguing 

that that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he intended to harm or 

defraud another. The facts presented in each of these cases are distinguishable from 

the facts of this case.

In Crittenden, the court held that the State failed to prove the defendant’s 

knowledge of a forgery when he passed a check. 671 S.W.2d at 528. The defendant 

had attempted to open checking and savings accounts with a forged check. Id. at 

527. When the bank teller became suspicious she asked Crittenden to wait while 

she called the person who allegedly signed the check. Id. The individual confirmed 

her suspicion that the check was forged. Id. Crittenden told the police he had 

received the check in the mail from his attorney who had been representing him in 

a personal injury case, which had recently settled. Id. The check, although drawn 

on the account of a service station, appeared to have been signed by Crittenden’s 

personal injury attorney. Id. at 528. At trial, the attorney testified that he had told 

Crittenden the case had settled, but he had not received the settlement funds, nor 

had he signed the check. Id. The court found that although the State proved the 

forgery, it failed to show that Crittenden possessed the check with intent to defraud 

or harm. Id. The court noted that Crittenden made no statement from which it 
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could be inferred he knew the instrument was forged, he was listed as the payee 

and did not falsely represent himself, and there was no connection made between 

appellant and the check stolen from the service station prior to the time appellant 

said he received it in the mail. Id. The court further noted that Crittenden made no 

attempt to flee the bank while the teller phoned the attorney to determine if the 

check was genuine. Id. For those reasons, the Court of Criminal Appeals 

determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Crittenden 

intended to defraud or harm another by presenting the check to the bank. Id.

Similarly, in Stuebgen, the defendant presented a forged check for payment 

at a grocery store; the store later learned the check had been forged. 547 S.W.2d at 

31. Stuebgen was listed as the payee on the check. Id. The State did not produce 

any evidence that Stuebgen’s handwriting was anywhere on the check, nor did 

Stuebgen make any statement from which knowledge of the forgery could be 

inferred. Id. at 32. In light of the fact that Stuebgen did not falsely represent 

himself when presenting the check for payment, the Court of Criminal Appeals 

held that the State failed to prove that he knew the instrument he passed was 

forged. Id. at 32–33. 

By contrast, in this case, police discovered stolen identifying information in 

appellant’s wallet and in bags in the back seat of his car. When approached by 

police officers, appellant did not initially cooperate; instead, he attempted to hide 

his wallet and Johnson’s passport by sitting on them. Johnson testified that in 

order to leave the country for his employer he had to get a “one-day turnaround on 

[his] passport, which is very costly.” He was within 30 minutes of missing his 

flight due to the loss of his passport. Field was required to contact his bank and 

credit card companies to cancel his checking account and credit cards.

Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, Williams v. State, 688 
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S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and a person’s intent may be inferred 

from acts, words, or conduct. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d at 50. The State 

introduced evidence that appellant possessed stolen identifying information from 

Field and Johnson including social security numbers, passports, and driver’s 

licenses without their permission. Unlike Crittenden and Stuebgen, appellant’s 

actions reflected that he knew he possessed another’s stolen identifying 

information and attempted to conceal it from police. A rational fact finder could 

have inferred that appellant possessed the information with intent to harm Field 

and Johnson. See Garcia v. State, 630 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1981, no pet.) (holding “use of deception by an accused” in the form of 

“engaging in behavior designed to avoid detection” is “evidence of intent to 

defraud and harm”). We find the evidence sufficient to support a finding that 

appellant had intent to harm or defraud another, and overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. Court Costs

In his second issue appellant argues the trial court’s assessment of court 

costs was unlawful. Appellant requests modification of the judgment to delete the 

assessment of court costs because the bill of costs was not prepared and certified 

until after the judgment was signed. 

The judgment includes an assessment of $259 in court costs. The record 

contains a certified, signed bill of costs listing $259 in court costs. We review the 

assessment of court costs on appeal to determine if there is a basis for the costs, not 

to determine whether there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each 

cost. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Traditional 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standards of review do not apply. Id.

Generally, a bill of costs must (1) contain the items of cost, (2) be signed by 

the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment 
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for the cost, and (3) be certified. Id. at 392–93; see Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. 

arts. 103.001, 103.006 (West 2006). The record supports the assessment of costs in 

this case because the record contains a bill of costs that contains each item of cost, 

is signed by a representative of the district clerk’s office who is entitled to receive 

payment of the costs, and is certified by the district clerk. See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d 

at 393. There being no challenge to any specific cost or the basis for the 

assessment of such cost, the bill of costs supports the costs assessed in the 

judgment. Id. at 396. The fact that the bill of costs was not prepared until after the 

court signed the judgment does not defeat the lawfulness of the bill of costs. Id. at 

394. (“[M]atters pertaining to the imposition of court costs need not be brought to 

the attention of the trial court, including a bill of costs prepared after a criminal 

trial.”). We overrule appellant’s second issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).