Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 1

NASA MSFC Oral History Interview

Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Brooks Moore

Interviewed by Steve Johnson

Huntsville, Alabama – Unknown, Circa 2012

Steve Johnson: I am talking now with Brooks Moore, who was at Marshall Space Flight 

Center from 1960 to 1981. Brooks, would you talk a little bit about your educational 

background?

Brooks Moore: I was educated out in the country in Perry County, sixty-five miles 

south of Birmingham [Alabama], a little country community called Hillsboro. I often

say all the education I ever needed I got at Hillsboro Junior High School. You have 

heard the story about all you needed you got in Kindergarten. I cannot quite say that. I 

finished junior high, then Perry County High School. I went in to the Army. I was on 

the tail end of World War II, so I did have a little setback timewise. I entered Auburn 

[University] in 1946. I was in Officer Training School while I was in the Navy, so I was 

able to finish Auburn in only a couple of years. I got a B.S. [Bachelor of Science] degree 

in electrical engineering. I then went over to Georgia Tech [Georgia Institute of 

Technology] and got a master’s degree. I finished there in March 1949. Then I started 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 2

my career at Panama City, Florida Naval Research Laboratory there before I came to 

Huntsville [Alabama] in 1952.

Johnson: You worked for the Army when you came to Huntsville?

Moore: I worked for the Army. I came here in 1952. I joined the [Wernher] von Braun 

team, 120 of the Germans here. They were hiring young Americans to come in to the 

understudy and be a part of that team. I was most fortunate to have that opportunity to 

join them. It has been a very rewarding career.

Johnson: What brought you to the space program?

Moore: In Panama City, the work I was doing for the Navy, we were working on 

torpedo countermeasures. We were involved in torpedoes, which is sort of like 

underwater missiles. I had always been intrigued by flying, aircraft. One of my hobbies 

as a youngster was building model airplanes. I would build them by the dozens, some 

of them would fly. I never had a real ambition to be a pilot, but I was always interested 

in the aspect of flight. I was intrigued by the possibility of maybe building missiles that 

had long range potential. Already, even in those early years, there was some talk about 

eventually going into space and the rocket concept was going to be that propulsion 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 3

system. That coupled with the fact that this was in Alabama, I am an Alabama boy, and 

it was close to the career that I had in Panama City. As far as a major change of working 

on control systems down there, this just looked like an attractive opportunity to me. 

Johnson: Describe what you did at Marshall when you joined during the Saturn years. 

In 1960, you went with the von Braun team to Marshall Space Flight Center, what did 

you do?

Moore: My responsibility in the early years was the guidance and control of the Saturn 

vehicle. We developed within my division, what it was called at that time, division of 

the Astrionics Laboratory. We were responsible for the sense systems, stabilized 

platform, the great gyros, the computer systems, the actuation systems for controlling 

the direction of the vehicle, everything associated with guiding and controlling the 

vehicle. Included in that, of course, were the computers. We flew for the first time, we 

had experience earlier with missile systems on the Redstone and Jupiter, but we had 

never used a digital computer. We did develop with IBM’s [International Business 

Machines] support a digital computer to fly on the Saturn. Because of the complexity of 

the mission, we could not get by with the old analogue type. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 4

In addition to using the digital computers as a part of our flight systems, we also 

developed the automated ground equipment using automated systems for the first time 

for checking out missiles, for checking out the Saturn launch vehicle. This was such a 

complex vehicle that it was very difficult to actually do the job with just people on the 

control panel. We found we could modify existing computers and actually use them to 

an automated checkout of the Saturn V. It was the ground automated checkout plus all 

of the flight hardware that was related to guidance, navigation, and control. 

Johnson: Would you talk about the main technical challenges and the work you were 

doing during the Saturn Program. I guess the challenge was trying to accomplish a 

much more difficulty mission with using technology that we had confidence in. The 

philosophy we had developed in the earlier years, the Redstone and the Jupiter, was to 

use proven technology in every way that we could and not jump into high-tech. That 

may be a surprise to you that we did not go for whatever the latest trends were. We 

tried to use the old tried and true techniques. When we came to the complexity of the 

Saturn, we found that the old tried and true methods of using analogue systems and 

electromechanical systems as we had used on some of the earlier missile systems, we 

could not do the job without going to a digital computer. We were very concerned 

about the complexity of digital computers and the potential reliability problems. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 5

I would say one of the biggest technical challenges we had in the guidance control 

system of the Saturn was developing with a digital computer that we felt confident was 

reliable enough that we could depend on them for the Saturn mission. With the help of 

our contractor, IBM, we did design and develop what we called a triple modular 

redundant computer. You may have heard of three sting computers, you have two and 

one to compare to. We were concerned that even that would not give us sufficient 

reliability, so we went to a concept that we called triple modular redundant that we 

had. Within the computer, we had seven different sections where we would vote on the 

pluses and minuses, the zeros and ones, at all of those stages. Therefore, we 

significantly improved the reliability of the digital computer. We, of course, never had a 

flight failure in the Saturn vehicle. 

One other challenge I might say of the major components of the Saturn guidance control 

system was to miniaturize the stabilized platform. The stabilized platform is the 

technique we use as a reference system. We used gyros that would space fix a platform 

on which accelerometers would be mounted and also you had gimbals so you could 

sense the motion of the vehicle around the stable platform. On the heavier vehicles we 

worked on earlier where we did not have to be so concerned about weight, we used an 

approach that was very large and quite heavy compared to what we really needed on 

the Saturn. We did go to a miniaturized version of that same concept we had used on 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 6

the Redstone and the Jupiter vehicle. I would say those were two of the major 

challenges we had from a technical standpoint. We used the same stabilized platform 

concepts, which air bearing were a concept developed right here in Huntsville, 

Alabama. It was a carried over experience from the German team, but we were able to 

miniaturize that platform to test it on the earlier vehicles, like the Saturn I and IB, which 

were test vehicles for the Saturn V, and prove the reliability. In fact, those are two of the 

major components, the most critical components of the guidance and control system.

Johnson: As far as testing goes, were most of the valuable tests flight tests or did you do 

a lot of ground testing also?

Moore: We did extensive ground testing in all subsystems. This means in my particular 

area, we tested even down to the electronic component level. We used specified parts 

that had been tested and essentially designed for the rugged nature of what we would 

see in the launch vehicle. All of our systems we had tested at the individual component 

level and we tested at what we call the black box level. We did vibration tests, thermal 

tests, vacuum tests, every way we could think of to simulate the environment of flight. 

We even had what we called a bread board, which was a system where we pulled all of 

the systems together. In the case of the guidance control navigation system. We had 

them mounted in what we called an Instrument Unit, which was the flight 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 7

configuration of the hardware for the Saturn V. We did functional testing of that 

complete Instrument Unit. This was just for our subsystem, of course, but all the other 

subsystems, the propulsion systems and the structures, all of those subsystems did their 

individual testing. 

Even though we relied on analyses to do the design to start with, one of Dr. von Braun’s 

quotes was, “One good test is worth 1000 analyses.” He believed in testing and we did 

testing at all levels. We had a lot of failures on the ground and we did a lot of 

upgrading and comparing to overcome those failures. On the earlier test vehicles, we 

did not have the phenomenal success we had on the Saturn V. The Saturn V did not just 

happen, it evolved from the Redstone and Jupiter vehicles. We had a number of test 

failures back in those earlier days, back in the 1950s. We had a number of malfunctions 

in flight in those early vehicles. We had good telemetry systems that we could go back 

and figure out what the problem was from the information we got telemetered back to 

us on the ground, It was an evolution sort of thig. By the time we got to the Saturn V, 

we had evolved to the point that we actually never had a catastrophic flight failure. We 

had some anomalies in the Saturn Program, but the Saturn V Program, I believe, is the 

only program even to date that was completely successful. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 8

We had a Saturn I and Saturn IB Program prior to the Saturn V, which was an upgrade 

where we also did a lot of this testing. That was a situation where we actually combined 

a lot of the hardware from the Redstone and Jupiter Programs and built a larger vehicle. 

You might have seen the Saturn Is out a the [U.S.] Space and Rocket Center. There are a 

bunch of tanks you see. It is not just a single tank. Those are actually Redstone tanks 

clustered around a Jupiter tank. That vehicle was used to flight test some of the 

hardware. In particular, in the case of the guidance system, we put a passenger platform 

on a Saturn I and a passenger computer on a Saturn I and flew it using the old analogue 

techniques, but we actually got a flight test of the hardware. I think all of those testing 

situations, testing from every aspect we could imagine, is what led us to the 

phenomenal success of the Saturn V.

Johnson: Did you have to develop any new tools or come up with any new materials? 

Could you talk about that process?

Moore: As far as materials and tools, we had to, in the case of the design of the 

electronic components in particular in the flight computer I mentioned, up to that time, 

we had not flown a digital computer and we were concerned about its reliability. In 

order to build in all of these redundancies, a replication in order to assure reliability, we 

badly needed a new technique of electronic device rather than the little discreet 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 9

capacitors and resistors that you used to see in radios at that timeframe. This was a key 

contribution of IBM, they came up with a technique of screening a conducting material 

onto little silicone substrates, miniature. They were about a quarter of an inch square 

and a sixteenth of an inch thick. Using this screening technique, you could actually put 

the equivalent of maybe a dozen standard components onto a miniature. This was all 

the beginning of integrated circuits. Everything now has integrated screen circuits, 

almost every bit of electronics. A lot of that was done very early in the space program, 

and some of the present electronics is an outgrowth of that. 

In the other areas of propulsion, they were constantly working to come up with new 

and better materials. Of course, that is out of my area of specialty, but we did work 

closely with the Materials Laboratory. They assisted us with their expertise with 

materials as far as the things we needed to do in order to microminiaturize our 

electronic components to make it so that even this triple modular computer that I 

mentioned still only weighed seventy-five, eighty pounds and dimensions of twenty 

inches by fifteen inches, a foot thick. To use the old technology, it would have been too 

heavy and too large to fly. That was where we had to depend. We shied away from new 

technology wherever we could, but that was a case where we were forced to it and it 

worked out. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 10

Johnson: Could you talk about the pace of work. How fast did things have to be 

accomplished during these Saturn years?

Moore: Things moved very fast. We had the assignment to put man on the Moon and 

return him to Earth within the decade from President [John Fitzgerald] Kennedy. At the 

time he made that famous pronouncement, we were really right at the very beginning 

of the space program. We had only flown Alan Shepard for a suborbital flight of 150 

miles, riding on a Mercury-Redstone. We had put up Explorer I, we had put up some 

small satellites. As far as having anything approaching the capability of putting a man 

in space, even in Earth orbit, much less the consideration of going into lunar orbit, we 

did not really have that capability. It was an all-out effort based on this challenge to put 

man on the Moon and return him safely home. 

Here, again, we relied on the experience we had to pull together, rather than designing 

from scratch, a test vehicle. We use the combination of Jupiter and Redstone hardware 

and built what we call a Saturn I and later called a Saturn IB, which was an upgrade of 

the Saturn I. We used that as a test vehicle so as we advanced and developed the articles 

that would actually fly on the Saturn V, we had the opportunity to test fly them on the 

test vehicle. The pace of work was very rapid. People were extremely conscientious. I 

will not say we worked seven days a week. We did not work 168 hours a week. I think 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 11

it was the dedication in addition to the hours spent and the expertise that had been 

pulled together with the team that made it possible. To develop a vehicle like that 

within that timeframe was unheard of at that time. 

By clustering the Redstone and Jupiter vehicle technology into a cluster and putting 

eight engines on it, we were able to put astronauts into Earth orbit. We accomplished 

that by about 1966. We were past that first step. The big step beyond that, of course, was 

to have the full-up Saturn V vehicle with its three stages. Prior to the Saturn Program, 

we had only designed and built single stage vehicles. When we got into the Saturn I and 

IB, we did gain experience with two stages. The first launch stage was the combined 

Saturn and Jupiter. With the help of McDonnell Douglas, we built an upper stage that 

flew on the Saturn IB stages. The Saturn V was not only a major step forward as far as 

size is concerned, but it was also in complexity because of the three propelled stages, 

five engines on the first stage, five engines on the second stage, and one engine on the 

third stage. That was a rather ambitious program, but with a lot of good fortune, we 

were able to pull it off and meet the deadline President Kennedy had set. 

Johnson: How about the work hours and shifts you had to work? Did you have to work 

a lot of extra hours?
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 12

Moore: I worked extra hours as required. There were a lot of people, like the 

technicians, that were doing a lot of the hands-on work that had occasions where they 

had to work much longer hours than we did. We were often on a six day week. Very 

seldom did we go to a seven day week, except in specialized areas. This was the 

constant monitoring. Not only did we have key technical people to do all this work, but 

we had these excellent program managers who tracked the progress of all the 

subsystems. They had this famous expression, they used the long pole in the tent. What 

is it that is likely to delay us? Wherever there was a potential problem of a likelihood of 

delay, additional effort would be put onto those programs. One thing about the Saturn 

V Program that was unique is that we were not constrained funding wise. Whatever we 

needed to do, we were supported in doing. That is unique in the space program both 

before Saturn V and since Saturn V. In the meantime, we had reverted to a stage where 

we are not three percent of the gross national product that is allocated to space.

Johnson: From what you said, money was not a problem, but did you work to control 

costs at all?

Moore: Yes, we did. I should not infer that we were careless. The program managers 

held the purse strings pretty tight. You did not go to them for frivolous additional 

allocation of funds, but if they detected a program area where they could apply 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 13

additional resources, that is really what I meant. We did not consider ourselves 

unlimited. We were prudent, we had trained to be prudent. Back in the earlier years of 

Redstone and Jupiter, we were extremely austere and we had learned as a heritage to 

do things as well as we could, as economically as we could. Where there was a need for 

additional effort, like additional personnel, additional funding, even bringing in an 

additional contractor, in some cases we did that. When we became nervous a contractor 

was building a certain subsystem, we had what we call a single point failure in the 

system, and we would go out and hire another contractor to duplicate that. 

One thing that comes to mind in my area of responsibility was the hydraulic actuators 

for the engines. We suddenly realized as we were well into the program that we had 

one company, Moog Valve Company, that was building all of our actuators. They were 

not a large contractor, but we realized if something were to happen in their plant, that 

they could cause a delay in the vehicle. We went out and found another competent 

contractor and actually built duplicate equipment. There were cases where we 

expended beyond what we would have in the earlier years where we had to take some 

chances. On the Saturn V Program, we tried to minimize those chances. 

Johnson: Talk about the work environment. Was it a good place to work?
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 14

Moore: It was an excellent place to work. It is amazing the team spirit we had within 

what we call the von Braun team. It really was a team and he was the team leader. At 

the senior levels, like the laboratory directors, we had the key German, we called them 

scientists, but they were really engineers. Dr. [Ernst] Stuhlinger was probably the only 

true scientist among the 120. Von Braun and his key leaders were unparalleled in their 

expertise, knowledge, and experience in their particular disciplines. They had the very 

highest respect. The engineers like myself that came in later and learned from them, 

they made us feel a part of the team. I had nothing but very excellent relationships with 

all of them. I knew all 120 reasonably well. Of course, I worked with some of them 

much, much closer than others. 

Dr. von Braun operated as a team leader in a somewhat unorthodox management 

approach, but he tried to get inputs from all levels. He would go out of his way to try to 

get the opinions of experts at the lowest level. All this was orchestrated through the 

laboratory directors. There were eight labs that reported to him. I was fortunate later to 

become one of those when my mentor, Dr. [Walter] Haeussermann, was given another 

assignment. During most of the Saturn development program, the eight specialized 

laboratories, each one had a special discipline and they had clear lines of responsibility 

and they delegated clear lines of responsibility. We had key engineers that fulfilled all 

of those obligations. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 15

The team spirit was we were all working toward the same goal and felt like this was a 

unique opportunity. We always had a situation that somebody else would pick up the 

slack if you had somebody that maybe was a marginal performer. Here again, we were 

not constrained if we had to hire in some additional expert because one of the other was 

not performing quite as well as we would like. We had the wherewithal to do that. That 

gave us an environment of success that created cause for us to have the team spirit we 

did and have the success we had.

Johnson: Were there any dead ends in your work? If there were, how did you recover 

from them?

Moore: I cannot think of anything in successful programs. We did get in, and this is 

getting into the utilization of the Saturn in the Skylab Program, and that may be getting 

beyond. Skylab was our nation’s first space station and it was put up by a Saturn V. In 

that regard, it is a part of the Saturn Program. What we did there was take the upper 

stage of the vehicle and convert it to a laboratory. I guess there were some conceptual 

changes that were made along the way with that. In the first concept, we were going to 

actually use that upper stage as part of the propulsion, but we found out there would be 

too many complications of having a stage that could be a laboratory but also carry fuel 

and oxygen. We went in the other direction and came up with a concept called the dry 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 16

workshop where we actually used the upper stage and equipped it on the ground as a 

laboratory. Skylab was a very successful program. It was put in orbit by the Saturn V, 

the first two stages. 

A program cancellation that I would say is one of the most disappointing moments of 

my career was Skylab, which had served well as a space station. We had three different 

crews that visited that and stayed for periods of two to three months. We were gaining 

very valuable experience with man operating in Earth orbit over long durations. After 

the three missions, we had decided we would build a little tele operator that would go 

up and reboost Skylab to keep it in orbit so it could be later used and further equipped 

and serviced. We would have had a continuing space station from 1974 rather than 

what we did. That tele operator retrieval system, which was cancelled because of the 

desire to get on with the shuttle and to put all funds available to NASA [National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration] into the shuttle. 

I think one of the most serious mistakes made by the NASA management was not to 

keep Skylab in orbit. We could have continued Space Station twenty-five years earlier. 

That was one of those areas where we had to deviate from a plan that we did not have a 

successful end to that story. Skylab reentered in 1979, it burned up on reentry. The 

management rationale was we would have the shuttle in time to go up and reboost the 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 17

Skylab. Those of us that were close to the program felt that was totally unrealistic, and it 

was. We were not even close to being ready to go up with the shuttle, but that was the 

rationale that was used. I would say that is one that sticks in my mind as one of the 

major disappointments in redirections that effected our situation, even up to today.

Johnson: Were there any surprises while you were doing your development work for 

the Saturn Program?

Moore: Every day. (Laughs) Many, many surprises starting all the way back to the 

Redstone. We tried to use mathematical equations to describe the vehicle and to use 

simulators to simulate the flight. The first flight test, we had a failure, and it was 

because we had not actually described quite properly the aerodynamics of the vehicle 

because of interpretation, wind tunnel tests, some problem of that nature. We had a lot 

of surprises along the way. One we had to learn the hard way is that if you have a large 

propulsion tank, you have to have baffles in it, or some means of keeping the fuel and 

liquid oxygen from sloshing. We actually had a flight failure. I say again, we got 

through the failures on the precursor to the Saturn V. The first time we flew a tank that 

was more than about three or four feet in diameter, that would have been on the Jupiter 

Program, we actually had that first flight fail because of sloshing, which causes side 

forces and caused the vehicle to eventually fail. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 18

There were a lot of surprises along the way. One that sticks in my mind is to gimbal a 

large engine, we did that with large actuators, which is a hydraulic device like you 

would see on a caterpillar for lifting the blade. We had an upgraded version of those. 

The first time we tried to gimbal one of those engines on a test stand with a live firing, 

we found out the engine stood still and the structure on the other end took up all the 

slack. There was a structural design deficiency that had to be overcome. There were a 

lot of surprises along the way. Fortunately, we were always able, except for some 

unfortunate cancellation of programs, to recover any of the deviations that occurred. 

Johnson: Can you talk about the difference between Marshall and the other NASA 

centers? Were there rivalries that you noticed?

Moore: I have extreme difficulty being objective here since my whole career in the space 

program was at Marshall and I am still even involved through a contractor in keeping 

up with what is going on out there. I think we probably had the most unique 

assemblage of engineering talent that existed within the agency as civil service people. 

Other centers certainly had scientists who were more renown. Within the expertise of 

launch vehicles and even on orbit spacecraft, I think we had a unique situation. One 

thing is the organization, we had very clear cut disciplines with senior technical people 

that knew, even all the way up to the laboratory director, the technical discipline in 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 19

depth. I think we had a unique management arrangement in the way Dr. von Braun

managed and the way he had these large meetings where he would have all the 

specialists together and he would go around the table and ask everybody what their 

opinion was. At least everybody thought they were involved and therefore they kept 

highly motivated. 

As far as interagency competition, there was always a very strong inter center 

competition between Johnson [Space Center] and Marshall. Johnson was an outgrowth 

of Langley [Research Center] when it was NACA [National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics]. They were the first center that organized and it was organized at Langley 

and then it was moved out to Houston [Texas] and named for [Lyndon Baines] Johnson. 

We were sort of joining the team after they were the key center that started NASA. 

There was a constant competition between the two laboratories, even in the concept of 

how we would do the Saturn Program. Johnson, they wanted to do the complete 

guidance and control and everything else all within the spacecraft. Of course, the 

concept which we had used in the past and what we felt was justified for the Saturn 

was to develop a totally independent launch vehicle which had its own guidance and 

control. The spacecraft would be a separate vehicle. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 20

Even from those very early days, there was competition and attempts, as we saw it, to 

infringe on the expertise and what we had to bring to bear in the launch vehicle area to 

NASA. The other thing was the competition, or influence, of the fact that the astronauts 

being test pilots, they wanted to fly the vehicle. Marshall had always had automated 

systems that we had hands-off, that everything was onboard and we felt that was the 

way to handle this as far as the Saturn/ Apollo Program. Those were issues that were 

worked out at the highest level between von Braun and Dr. [Robert Rowe] Gilruth. At 

least with Johnson Space Center, we always felt uneasy that they were maybe trying to 

pull some things from behind the back. 

In general, the cooperation with other centers was very good. For instance, JPL [Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory], we had an excellent relationship going all the way back to 

when we launched Explorer I. We did that jointly with JPL. They furnished the upper 

stages. From a scientific payload standpoint, we had very close and congenial relations 

with JPL and really with most of the other centers because we relied on the so-called 

research centers. There were several centers like Ames [Research Center] and Langley 

and Goddard [Space Flight Center] that were focused on research. We actually utilized 

them and got considerable assistance from them in certain areas. Like Langley, as far as 

the actuations systems we had on Skylab, we used what they call control moment 

gyros, huge gyros, that actually applied the force to Skylab to keep it in orbit, to keep it 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 21

oriented directly. Langley had done a considerable research effort in trying to develop a 

large gyro, which was unique at that point in time. We worked very closely with them 

and they cooperated with us and helped to supervise the development of the actuation 

systems we used on Skylab. I would say in general, with the exception of JSC, we had 

good working relationships. At JSC, though, I always felt it really went all the way to 

the very top as far as the jealousy, resentment, or whatever of Marshall Space Flight 

Center. I think there was, unfortunately, a little bit of the German heritage that was a 

part of that resentment. 

Johnson: Talk about Dr. von Braun’s involvement, both direct and indirect in what you 

did. Was he around a lot?

Moore: He was around an awful lot. He showed up at unexpected times. He was a 

hands-on guy and really believed he had to interface with employees. This goes back 

pre Saturn, I had not been here more than two, three, four weeks when I joined the 

Army. Back then we were out in the metal buildings. We were really an austere 

environment. I was back in the boondocks in Building 4481. I had been assigned to do

some testing with a technician on a helium leak detector that we borrowed. That is what 

they did, they borrowed things from Oak Ridge or wherever. Dr. von Braun walked in 

with the then lab director of that operation. He and the laboratory director had a 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 22

dialogue going about the helium leak detector and whether it would be practical for use 

for testing for leaks on tanks. I could sense from the conversation that von Braun 

thought it would not be practical, but the laboratory director thought it could be. He

introduced me and the technician and he turned to me and said, “Brooks, what do you 

think?” I stammered a little bit and then admitted I was too new on the program and 

did not want to get in the middle between him and the lab director. 

I mention that for two reasons, he had a unique capability to remember names and from 

that day on, he knew me as Brooks. I certainly did not call him Wernher, I tell you what. 

I called him Dr. von Braun until the day he left. He was out and about. I remember one 

instance walking through the laboratory and in the hallway he saw what turned out to 

be a janitor with a smock on like the lab folks wore. He went up to him and asked him 

what his role was, what did he do to support the program. He told him he was the 

janitor and he said he was certainly doing a great job of keeping this place clean for 

these workers. 

Another thing, if he was expecting some visitors and wanted to understand some 

details of what was going on in a lab, he would come through and we would brief him. 

Then he would come through and essentially do the briefing himself. He had the 

phenomenal knack of communication and of insight into so many technical areas that 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 23

were really not his original area of specialty. His original area of specialty and interest 

was propulsion and rocketry. He understood enough in the guidance control and 

navigation area even though he left the detailed supervision up to Dr. Walter 

Haeussermann who was my mentor and who was the laboratory director over 

astrionics before I became lab director. Dr. von Braun was out and about and always 

tried to make everybody feel like their opinion counted and I think that paid off as far 

as team spirit.

Johnson: Talk about the integration of the different parts, projects, and designs, how 

well your work was added to everything everyone else had done. Were you excited 

about how it worked? Did it all work well together?

Moore: Fortunately, we had all of these check points along the way that when you 

finally brought everything together, it was not as if there had not been some exposure 

beforehand. I am speaking particularly of the Saturn V integration into a structure, 

which was the Instrument Unit. This was a case where my responsibility was all of the 

black boxes, the individual sensors, computers, gyros, various instrumentation. When 

we integrated this into the Instrument Unit, that was a physical integration of making 

things fit together and having the wiring so everything was properly connected. We 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 24

went through a great deal of preliminary integration at all levels where we worked very 

closely with the mechanical people on how our boxes would be mounted. 

By the way, the Instrument Unit did have a unique capability of a built in refrigeration 

system. It had a cooling system because of the fact that in space, we did not have the 

convection of air to cool the system like you would have in a low-flying aircraft. We had 

to have cold plates that were mounted around the inside of the Instrument Unit, which 

is a ring. The Instrument Unit is a three-foot high, thirty-three foot diameter ring. Inside 

that, we had cold plates that we mounted our instruments on. Of course, the 

coordination of the design of the instrument and how it was going to fit on the cold 

plate, all of that was worked out at the working level by people working together. 

When it came together, we had some surprises, there is always an occasion of things not 

exactly fitting. There were some functional surprises, a few integrated things. The final 

integration, of course, was stacking all of the stages. That was something that you had a 

few surprises, but along the way, most of the mating surfaces had been checked out, so 

it was pretty well a routine matter of putting it together eventually. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 25

Johnson: Describe the contractor experience in your work. You have already mentioned 

IBM as being a good partner. Generally speaking, was the experience of working with 

contractors at Marshall a good one for you?

Moore: It was good. It was good because we were fortunate to select very fortunate 

contractors. I think one of the key aspects of that is Dr. von Braun insisted that a 

contractor have a strong local presence. Of course, we could not move some of the 

aircraft companies from the west coast where they had their large manufacturing 

facilities, but wherever we could, we had a strong local presence. IBM, we selected them 

with rules of competition and selection. With the present rules of competition and 

selection, I do not know whether we would have gotten to the Moon or not. We literally

made the decision that we wanted IBM. I was among the group of three or four people 

that went up to check them out at their plant in Owego, New York. As far as experience 

with flight systems they were building, some computers the Air Force had flown. We 

felt like they probably had more experience than anyone else with flight digital systems. 

We essentially made the selection and von Braun made the decision and directed to 

give them the contract. 

Mr. [Thomas John] Watson [Junior] was the president of IBM at that time and Dr. von 

Braun interfaced with him directly and told him he wanted him to build a plant in 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 26

Huntsville, Alabama so we could have very, very close coordination. Not only did IBM 

design with us, with a very close cooperative, we had technical specialists and they had 

technical specialists, and we worked very closely together, but they also had the 

contract of integrating the other components into the Instrument Unit. That was done 

right here, not more than three or four miles outside the [Redstone] Arsenal where we 

could visit them on a daily basis and they could visit us. 

Another key contractor we had was Bendix [Corporation], who built the stabilized 

platforms not for the Saturn. Here again, we had a continuity of experience in that we 

had worked with them on the earlier vehicles, the Redstone and the Jupiter. It was a 

team relationship that was already established. They took the designs that were done by 

the team here in Huntsville of these complex stabilized platforms and did the 

fabrication. They helped us with improving the design to make it more easily 

manufactured. 

We had a little company that did our so-called control computer. It was an electronic 

communications in Orlando, Florida. They were selected because they had a good 

experience. That was an analogue system. Fortunately, we had clear lines of 

responsibility. Every black box, there was a key engineer, we had a name that that 

individual was responsible for coordinating the work internally and dealing with the
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 27

contractor. The contractors knew how to work with us. I would say our experience was 

very good as far as dealing with the contractors. 

Of course, the propulsion structures people, there were some problems along the way 

in those regards because a lot of that work had to be done remotely at the contactor’s 

plant. Our program manager kept on top of things. I would like to mention the program 

managers were well coordinated. We had one for each of the stages an then a program 

manager for the whole Saturn V. Where it was perceived the contractor was getting into 

some difficulty of schedule, and that actually happened, and I hate to call names in this 

regard, but North American was building the S-II stage and it became obvious they 

were lagging and were not going to be able to make the deadline. They were not 

progressing as well as Boeing was on the S-IC and McDonnell Douglas was on the S-IVB. A team of key people from Marshall lead by Dr. [Eberhard] Rees, who was von 

Braun’s deputy, actually went and camped out, you might say, in California for about a 

year to have onsite insight into that situation. They were able to recover with the help of 

Marshall and the management expertise and insight that was brought to bear. 

Johnson: How about NASA Headquarters? Did it help or did it interfere in the work 

you were doing?
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 28

Moore: (Laughs) We often said if somebody showed up and said, “I am from 

Washington [District of Columbia] and I am here to help you,” you should beware. I 

think it was a mixed bag. We had some very astute managers that were the head of our 

Manned Spaceflight, which was what we interfaced with. Dr. [George] Mueller. Let me 

mention him by name, he was the director of Manned Spaceflight, not at the very 

beginning of the Saturn Program, but during a lot of those critical phases. You probably 

have met him. He has been here in Huntsville several times in recent years for special 

events. He is still healthy enough that he was here last year, but not this year. I would 

say he was one of those that actually contributed. There were earlier managers, you 

might say, who probably did not have the technical insight that he had. There were 

probably some problems created by their enforcement of certain things. 

One thing that comes to my mind is you hear now that the key thing is you have to 

have system engineers that make sure everything is going to fit together. The Saturn 

Program was not designed that way. We did all the systems engineering by the fact that 

we knew each other and we knew who the experts were, who the managers were that 

were responsible. About 1967, Headquarters decided that Marshall was not organized 

properly and they needed to have a Systems Laboratory. We had what we called eight 

different fiefdoms at that time, Astrionics, Electronics, Structures, Propulsion, Tests, 

Manufacturing, but each one of those was headed up by the key specialists in the area 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 29

and they had done quite well. They decided we had to have a Systems Laboratory, so 

they decreed that. 

In a way it gave me an opportunity in that Dr. Haeussermann was selected to head up 

that laboratory and none of the lab directors wanted to take on that responsibility. They 

were all key in their technical specialties. We had a chief engineer, but we did not have 

a heavily populated systems engineering. Dr. von Braun insisted one of the laboratory 

directors take over that lab. They met and discussed it for hours, apparently, and Dr. 

Haeussermann finally acquiesced and agreed to take over the lab with the stipulation 

with Dr. von Braun, for some reason I do not know, he insisted I be named the 

laboratory director. I would say Headquarters’ interference maybe gave me an 

advancement opportunity, which I would have been glad not to have had because I 

really felt it did not work out to Dr. Haeussermann’s benefit. I have always regretted 

that because the so-called Systems Laboratory, it was too late in the program and we 

did not need it, in all honesty. The program managers, from an internal standpoint, it 

was a situation that sticks out in my mind that it was an enforced Headquarters 

reorganization that did not necessarily help.

Johnson: How did you feel when the Saturn V first flew?
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 30

Moore: It was greatly gratifying. I do not know how to express it any other way. It was 

a thrill. It was not the first one I had had. We had some other major accomplishments 

along the way. We had the first Explorer, the first satellite, the launch on the Redstone, 

and the intervening vehicles we worked on. The Saturn V, that was a unique 

experience. I was fortunate enough to be at the Cape [Canaveral, Florida] for that first 

launch. I was not in the control room though. We had two control rooms. You have a 

control room where all the active guys were on the panels controlling all the subsystems 

and then we had a similar control room where the more senior people sort of 

overviewed things. You never know until it is over if it was successful. As soon as it is 

launched, you get that exhilarating feeling and you see it, but you know there are still 

some critical things ahead. Until that last stage burned out, I did not feel like 

celebrating. It was a unique experience.

Johnson: Did you sense during the Saturn V Program that you were making history? 

Was that something you ever thought about or talked about?

Moore: Not really. It was one little step at a time. You got involved in it. When we got 

into the Saturn V Program and the gratification for having a job and assignment that 

you had the wherewithal to do with whatever resources you needed, it was just the job 

itself. It was a daily experience. There were new things all the time and it was a learning 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 31

experience. I would say I had serious doubts that we would ever get a man to the Moon 

and back without casualties. Therefore, I was not able to celebrate until after we got the 

first crew back from the Moon. (Laughs) I was fortunate enough to be there for the first 

launch that landed on the Moon. I did not feel like celebrating even when they landed. 

Of course, our responsibility was essentially over once we injected them into Earth 

orbit. 

As far as the burden on me personally, it was relieved if we got them on a trajectory to 

the Moon. I did not feel like celebrating until they got off of the Moon, which was not

our responsibility at all. I think one of the real pluses of the Saturn/Apollo Program was 

that decision to make a clear delineation between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. 

The spacecraft people had enough problems of their own with the lunar lander and 

having to get back up into lunar orbit. I believe that management decision that was 

made back early in the program at the highest levels, we had such clear cut 

responsibilities with no need for much communication technically and even 

functionally across that interface between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. 

I never really realized, except in later years, that what we did was historic because I 

guess I was foolish enough to think we were going to continue and we had not yet 

reached the ultimate. We were already talking about going to Mars. I did not know that 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 32

it would happen in my life, which it obviously will not, but we were already of thinking 

of the next step without thinking about this being a unique situation. We were going to 

rise to this point and we were not going out of Earth orbit again for decades. It has 

taken quite a few years for the significance to sink in. Invariably, we did do something 

that was probably about as special as building the pyramids. 

Johnson: We know how much recognition Dr. von Braun and the German rocket team 

got. Did the rest of the workforce receive the recognition they deserved? Do you feel 

like you received the recognition you deserved for your work in making history?

Moore: I did. You may talk to some people who feel the German team got more credit 

than they deserved. Dr. von Braun was always in the forefront and there is no doubt he 

was the key leader. Perhaps we could have had success without all 120 of the original 

team, but in a way they were all key. Some of these were people down at the hands-on 

technician level, some of that 120. They were not all Ph. Ds [Doctor of Philosophy]. I felt 

like the Americans like myself owed a great deal to that team because of the experience 

they had, that they instilled in us, and that they brought us along. I never would have 

been a part of this effort if it had not been for the German team. There are some people 

out there that feel like the contribution of the German team was overemphasized, but I 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 33

am certainly not one of them. I am a strong supporter and believe every bit of the 

recognition that von Braun got, he deserved, and that the team got. 

It is interesting that the team as individuals did not really get a lot of recognition. In 

fact, until a couple of my friends and I started an effort to recognize the rest of the team, 

there was nowhere in Huntsville that the names of all of those 120 were engraved in 

stone or in bronze. Three of us on the Marshall Retiree Association decided that every 

one of those names needed to be highlighted, even down to the last technician. We 

actually sponsored an effort, the Marshall Retiree Association Board, and we now have 

a plaque under the Saturn out in the courtyard, a large plaque, twenty by thirty or 

something like that, that has the name of every one of the German contributors. 

Likewise, we have a bronze plaque inside the Davidson Center that has those names. 

You cannot believe the appreciation we got from the widows and from the families of 

those. 

There were a lot of them whose names were totally unknown. They were just known as 

the 120 German scientists. Those who were recognized as the leaders, like the lab 

directors and the lead managers, they got a lot of visibility, but down it the ranks, a lot 

of them did not. I got more awards and citations than I would ever have expected I 

would have gotten. I think the Americans, as they got into key positions, and I happen 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 34

to be one of the very first. I was the first non-German lab director. We brought other 

people along into those intermediate supervisor positions. I believe we owed the team 

more, and we owed the nation more, for being a part of this team than the nation owes 

us. 

Johnson: Compare, if you would, the challenges faced in the Saturn Program with those 

faced with the shuttle development stage, which you were a part of both. 

Moore: Here I have to speak very candidly. I feel like the shuttle concept was a mistake. 

This may be something you may want to delete. I was never comfortable with concept 

of a side-mount crew compartment with strap-on boosters and without any way for 

crew to escape. As is said, I have trouble being objective because there were some 

things done in those early days that concentrated all the funds for the orbiter and we 

were limping along in a somewhat more austere situation as far as developing the 

propulsion systems that had to lift the orbiter. That decision to let Skylab come down 

and to put all the money into the development of the orbiter, to use an upgraded 

existing solid rocket booster, and things like that. I was very concerned from the very 

beginning. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 35

The first time I saw the concept they had for the thermal, which is not my area of 

specialty, but the thermal coating for the wings of the orbiter was just like egg shells. It 

is very fragile. As many launches as I have ever seen, I have never seen one where 

debris did not fall off the launch vehicle. I had personal concerns from the very 

beginning about that concept. We actually had a lesser role, so it was less exciting. As 

we went into the shuttle, our area of responsibility was decreased. That is the reason I 

am having to say more than once that I am probably not objective. I do feel there were a 

lot of mistakes that were made. 

We did the best with the assignments we did have. The most challenging one was that 

the Space Shuttle Main Engine was so complex that it had to have a digital computer 

onboard, literally mounted on the engine. Of the challenges in my area of responsibility, 

that was the one I was most concerned about. Even though we had always been 

concerned about vibrations, to have a digital computer that would mount on the engine 

and be gimbaled with the engine, that was an area of great concern. Fortunately, we 

never had a failure of those computers. We never had a failure on the shuttle of our 

systems that we were responsible for. I guess we can take pride in the fact that we did 

our job. 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 36

It was not as challenging and as exciting, certainly, as the Saturn V. After the first failure 

and realizations that we were not going to be able to make it with no casualties and 

then the second failure, I, frankly, blame both on the configuration. I think it could have 

been done differently. We made the decision to try to go partially recoverable. That was 

the whole concept, to save money. It has not worked out. There has been more money 

spent on the shuttle because of the complexity. The orbiter, the astronauts will tell you 

is was a great machine. It, unfortunately, did not have the protective devices that we 

existed on having on anything where we were responsible for the launch vehicle. I have 

mixed thoughts about the shuttle. I am not as proud of my contribution to the shuttle. 

There are strong supports of the shuttle, and probably these comments would raise 

some eyebrows, even some of my friends. It is a remarkable accomplishment with two 

key blotches on it, and that is the loss of the two crews. That is not an insignificant 

sacrifice. We did lose one crew on the Saturn, but it was a ground situation. That is 

where they were using pure oxygen in the spacecraft. Because of that, we lost the three 

astronauts. I go to the Shuttle Buddies breakfast. I am supportive. I know it was a great 

accomplishment and Marshall’s contribution was significant. I am most pleased that on 

the Space Launch System that is now on the drawing boards, they are returning to 

Saturn V concept, pure and simple. We are going back to the inline configuration with 

the means of a crew escape on top and I feel good about that. My only concern is the 
Steve Johnson Interviews – Apollo/Saturn Program

Unknown, Circa 2012 37

lack of funding and the lack of support from the administration. The concept is not 

quite Saturn V, but it is easing back in that direction. They still plan to have strap-on 

Solid Rocket Boosters in the early systems, but the later phases have the possibility of 

having some other kind of higher specific impulse liquid vehicle. 

Dr. von Braun’s interest in propulsion systems was always directly related to the 

specific impulse, the amount of thrust you get per pound. He never really cared much 

for Solid Rocket Boosters because they are lower specific impulse. Even the Pershing we 

developed for the Army, the weapons system, was a solid. That was in the very last 

days of our stay with the Army. If his influence was still being felt, I am not absolutely 

sure we would have exactly the configuration we have of the Space Launch System. I 

am extremely encouraged that that configuration has the promise that we could at least 

let the crew have a chance of getting off. I think that is key to manned spaceflight.