II 

Calendar No. 392

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1866

To enhance the security of the United States and United States allies. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 14 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 12), 2003

Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. BIDEN) introduced the following bill; which 

was read the first time 

NOVEMBER 17, 2003

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

A BILL

To enhance the security of the United States and United 

States allies.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Security Enhancement Act of 2003’’. 

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 
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TITLE I—RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT REDUCTION 

Sec. 101. Short title. 

Sec. 102. Findings. 

Sec. 103. Definitions. 

Sec. 104. International storage facilities for radioactive sources. 

Sec. 105. Discovery, inventory, and recovery of radioactive sources. 

Sec. 106. Radioisotope thermal generator power units in the independent states 

of the former Soviet Union. 

Sec. 107. Foreign first responders. 

Sec. 108. Threat assessment reports. 

Sec. 109. Availability of funds. 

TITLE II—GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE 

Sec. 201. Short title. 

Sec. 202. Findings; purposes. 

Sec. 203. Definitions. 

Sec. 204. Priority for certain countries. 

Sec. 205. Restriction. 

Sec. 206. Fellowship program. 

Sec. 207. In-country training in laboratory techniques and syndrome surveillance. 

Sec. 208. Assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health laboratory equipment. 

Sec. 209. Assistance for improved communication of public health information. 

Sec. 210. Assignment of public health personnel to United States missions and 

international organizations. 

Sec. 211. Expansion of certain United States Government laboratories abroad. 

Sec. 212. Assistance for regional health networks and expansion of foreign epidemiology training programs. 

Sec. 213. Availability of funds. 

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 

Sec. 301. Authority to transfer naval vessels to certain foreign countries.

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com5 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations 

6 of the Senate and the Committee on International 

7 Relations of the House of Representatives. 

8 (2) DEFENSE ARTICLES.—The term ‘‘defense 

9 articles’’ has the meaning given the term in section 
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1 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

2 2794). 

3 (3) DEFENSE SERVICES.—The term ‘‘defense 

4 services’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

5 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

6 2794). 

7 (4) SECRETARY.—Unless otherwise provided, 

8 the term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of State. 

9 TITLE I—RADIOLOGICAL TER10 RORISM THREAT REDUCTION 

11 SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 

12 This title may be cited as the ‘‘Radiological Ter13 rorism Threat Reduction Act of 2003’’. 

14 SEC. 102. FINDINGS. 

15 Congress makes the following findings: 

16 (1) It is feasible for terrorists to obtain and dis17 seminate radioactive material by using a radiological 

18 dispersion device (RDD) or by emplacing discrete 

19 radioactive sources in major public places. 

20 (2) An attack made in the United States or 

21 against United States interests by terrorists using 

22 radiological material could cause catastrophic eco23 nomic and social damage, although it might kill few, 

24 if any, Americans. 
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1 (3) The first line of defense against radiological 

2 terrorism is preventing the acquisition of radioactive 

3 material by terrorists. 

4 SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS. 

5 In this title: 

6 (1) BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.—The term ‘‘by7 product material’’ has the meaning given the term in 

8 section 11 e. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

9 U.S.C. 2014(e)). 

10 (2) IAEA.—The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the 

11 International Atomic Energy Agency. 

12 (3) INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SO13 VIET UNION.—The term ‘‘independent states of the 

14 former Soviet Union’’ has the meaning given the 

15 term in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act 

16 (22 U.S.C. 5801). 

17 (4) RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.—The term ‘‘ra18 dioactive material’’ means—

19 (A) source material and special nuclear 

20 material, but does not include natural or de21 pleted uranium; 

22 (B) nuclear byproduct material; 

23 (C) material made radioactive by bombard24 ment in an accelerator; and 

25 (D) all refined isotopes of radium. 
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1 (5) RADIOACTIVE SOURCE.—The term ‘‘radio2 active source’’ means radioactive material that is 

3 permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded 

4 and includes any radioactive material released if the 

5 source is leaking or stolen, but does not include any 

6 material within the nuclear fuel cycle of a research 

7 or power reactor. 

8 (6) RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR.—

9 The term ‘‘radioisotope thermal generator’’ means 

10 an electrical generator which derives its power from 

11 the heat produced by the decay of a radioactive 

12 source by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma ra13 diation. The term does not include nuclear reactors 

14 deriving their energy from the fission or fusion of 

15 atomic nuclei. 

16 (7) SOURCE MATERIAL.—The term ‘‘source ma17 terial’’ has the meaning given the term in section 11 

18 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

19 2014(z)). 

20 (8) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.—The term 

21 ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the meaning given 

22 the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act 

23 of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)). 
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1 SEC. 104. INTERNATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES FOR RA2 DIOACTIVE SOURCES. 

3 (a) AGREEMENTS ON TEMPORARY SECURE STOR4 AGE.—The Secretary is authorized to propose that the 

5 IAEA conclude agreements with up to 8 countries under 

6 which agreement each country would provide temporary

7 secure storage for orphaned, unused, surplus, or other ra8 dioactive sources (other than special nuclear material, nu9 clear fuel, or spent nuclear fuel). Such agreements shall 

10 be consistent with the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safe11 ty and Security of Radioactive Sources, and shall address 

12 the need for storage of such radioactive sources in coun13 tries or regions of the world where convenient access to 

14 secure storage of such radioactive sources does not exist. 

15 (b) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA AUTHOR16 IZED.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary is authorized 

18 to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA for use 

19 by the Department of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA 

20 to fund the United States share of the costs of ac21 tivities associated with or under agreements under 

22 subsection (a). 

23 (2) UNITED STATES SHARE IN FISCAL YEAR

24 2004.—The United States share of the costs of ac25 tivities under agreements under subsection (a) in fis-
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1 cal year 2004 may be 100 percent of the costs of 

2 such activities in that fiscal year. 

3 (c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary is au4 thorized to provide the IAEA and other countries with 

5 technical assistance to carry out activities under agree6 ments under subsection (a) in a manner that meets the 

7 standards of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety 

8 and Security of Radioactive Sources. 

9 (d) APPLICABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.—

10 (1) INAPPLICABILITY OF NEPA TO FACILITIES

11 OUTSIDE UNITED STATES.—The National Environ12 mental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) 

13 shall not apply with respect to any temporary secure 

14 storage facility constructed outside the United 

15 States under an agreement under subsection (a). 

16 (2) APPLICABILITY OF FOREIGN ENVIRON17 MENTAL LAWS.—The construction and operation of 

18 a facility described in paragraph (1) shall be gov19 erned by any applicable environmental laws of the 

20 country in which the facility is constructed. 

21 SEC. 105. DISCOVERY, INVENTORY, AND RECOVERY OF RA22 DIOACTIVE SOURCES. 

23 (a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary is authorized to pro24 vide assistance, including through voluntary contributions 

25 to the IAEA under subsection (b), to support a program 
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1 of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety of the De2 partment of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA to promote the 

3 discovery, inventory, and recovery of radioactive sources 

4 in member nations of the IAEA. 

5 (b) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA AUTHOR6 IZED.—The Secretary is authorized to make voluntary 

7 contributions to the IAEA to fund the United States share 

8 of the program described in subsection (a). 

9 (c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary is au10 thorized to provide the IAEA and other countries with 

11 technical assistance to carry out the program described 

12 in subsection (a). 

13 SEC. 106. RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR POWER 

14 UNITS IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE 

15 FORMER SOVIET UNION. 

16 (a) SUBSTITUTION WITH OTHER POWER UNITS.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary is authorized 

18 to assist the Government of the Russian Federation 

19 to substitute solar (or other non-nuclear) power 

20 sources for radioisotope thermal power units oper21 ated by the Russian Federation and other inde22 pendent states of the former Soviet Union in appli23 cations such as lighthouses in the Arctic, remote 

24 weather stations, and for providing electricity in re25 mote locations. 
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1 (2) TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENT.—Any power 

2 unit utilized as a substitute power unit under para3 graph (1) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 

4 be based upon tested technologies that have operated 

5 for at least one full year in the environment where 

6 the substitute power unit will be used. 

7 (b) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall consult 

8 with the Secretary of Energy to ensure that substitute 

9 power sources provided under this section are for facilities 

10 from which the radioisotope thermal generator power units 

11 have been or are being removed. 

12 (c) ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE FORMER SOVIET UNION.—

13 The Secretary may use not more than 20 percent of the 

14 funds available for carrying out this section in any fiscal 

15 year to replace dangerous radioisotope thermal power fa16 cilities that are similar to the facilities described in sub17 section (a) in countries other than the independent states 

18 of the former Soviet Union. 

19 SEC. 107. FOREIGN FIRST RESPONDERS. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary is authorized to as21 sist foreign countries, or to propose that the IAEA assist 

22 foreign countries, in the development of appropriate na23 tional response plans and the training of first responders 

24 to—
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1 (1) detect, identify, and characterize radioactive 

2 material; 

3 (2) understand the hazards posed by radioactive 

4 contamination; 

5 (3) understand the risks encountered at various 

6 dose rates; 

7 (4) enter contaminated areas safely and speed8 ily; and 

9 (5) evacuate persons within a contaminated 

10 area. 

11 (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out activities 

12 under subsection (a), the Secretary shall take into account 

13 the findings of the threat assessment report required by 

14 section 108 and the location of any storage facilities for 

15 radioactive sources described in section 104.

16 SEC. 108. THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS. 

17 (a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Secretary shall, at 

18 the times specified in subsection (c), submit to the appro19 priate congressional committees a report—

20 (1) detailing the preparations made at United 

21 States diplomatic missions abroad to detect and 

22 mitigate a radiological attack on United States mis23 sions and other United States facilities under the 

24 control of the Secretary; 
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1 (2) setting forth a rank-ordered list of the Sec2 retary’s priorities for improving radiological security 

3 and consequence management at United States mis4 sions; and 

5 (3) providing a rank-ordered list of the missions 

6 where such improvement is most important.

7 (b) BUDGET REQUEST.—Each report under sub8 section (a) shall also include a proposed budget to carry 

9 out the improvements listed in such report pursuant to 

10 subsection (a)(2). 

11 (c) TIMING.—

12 (1) FIRST REPORT.—The first report under 

13 subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 180 

14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

15 (2) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—Subsequent re16 ports under subsection (a) shall be submitted with 

17 the budget justification materials submitted by the 

18 Secretary to Congress in support of the budget of 

19 the President for the fiscal year (as submitted under 

20 section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) for 

21 each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005. 

22 (d) FORM.—Each report shall be submitted in un23 classified form, but may include a classified annex. 
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1 SEC. 109. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the funds appropriated to the 

3 Department of State for fiscal year 2004, up to 

4 $15,000,000 may be used to carry out this title. 

5 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made 

6 available under subsection (a)—

7 (1) $4,000,000 may be used to carry out sec8 tion 104; 

9 (2) $4,000,000 may be used to carry out sec10 tion 105; 

11 (3) $5,000,000 may be used to carry out sec12 tion 106; and 

13 (4) $2,000,000 may be used to carry out sec14 tion 107. 

15 TITLE II—GLOBAL PATHOGEN 

16 SURVEILLANCE 

17 SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE. 

18 This title may be cited as the ‘‘Global Pathogen Sur19 veillance Act of 2003’’. 

20 SEC. 202. FINDINGS; PURPOSES. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find22 ings: 

23 (1) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security 

24 threat to the United States. The insidious nature of 

25 the threat, the likely delayed recognition in the event 

26 of an attack, and the underpreparedness of the do-
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1 mestic public health infrastructure may produce cat2 astrophic consequences following a biological weap3 ons attack upon the United States. 

4 (2) A contagious pathogen engineered as a bio5 logical weapon and developed, tested, produced, or 

6 released in another country can quickly spread to 

7 the United States. Given the realities of inter8 national travel, trade, and migration patterns, a 

9 dangerous pathogen released anywhere in the world 

10 can spread to United States territory in a matter of 

11 days, before any effective quarantine or isolation 

12 measures can be implemented. 

13 (3) To effectively combat bioterrorism and en14 sure that the United States is fully prepared to pre15 vent, diagnose, and contain a biological weapons at16 tack, measures to strengthen the domestic public 

17 health infrastructure and improve domestic surveil18 lance and monitoring, while absolutely essential, are 

19 not sufficient. 

20 (4) The United States should enhance coopera21 tion with the World Health Organization, regional 

22 health organizations, and individual countries, in23 cluding data sharing with appropriate United States 

24 departments and agencies, to help detect and quickly 
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1 contain infectious disease outbreaks or bioterrorism 

2 agents before they can spread. 

3 (5) The World Health Organization has done 

4 an impressive job in monitoring infectious disease 

5 outbreaks around the world, including the recent 

6 emergence of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syn7 drome (SARS) epidemic, particularly with the estab8 lishment in April 2000 of the Global Outbreak Alert 

9 and Response network. 

10 (6) The capabilities of the World Health Orga11 nization are inherently limited by the quality of the 

12 data and information it receives from member coun13 tries, the narrow range of diseases (plague, cholera, 

14 and yellow fever) upon which its disease surveillance 

15 and monitoring is based, and the consensus process 

16 it uses to add new diseases to the list. Developing 

17 countries in particular often cannot devote the nec18 essary resources to build and maintain public health 

19 infrastructures. 

20 (7) In particular, developing countries could 

21 benefit from—

22 (A) better trained public health profes23 sionals and epidemiologists to recognize disease 

24 patterns; 
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1 (B) appropriate laboratory equipment for 

2 diagnosis of pathogens; 

3 (C) disease reporting that is based on 

4 symptoms and signs (known as ‘‘syndrome sur5 veillance’’) and affords the earliest possible op6 portunity to conduct an effective response; 

7 (D) a narrowing of the existing technology 

8 gap in syndrome surveillance capabilities and 

9 real-time information dissemination to public 

10 health officials; and 

11 (E) appropriate communications equip12 ment and information technology to efficiently 

13 transmit information and data within national 

14 and regional health networks, including inex15 pensive, Internet-based Geographic Information 

16 Systems (GIS) and relevant telephone-based 

17 systems for early recognition and diagnosis of 

18 diseases. 

19 (8) An effective international capability to mon20 itor and quickly diagnose infectious disease out21 breaks will offer dividends not only in the event of 

22 biological weapons development, testing, production, 

23 and attack, but also in the more likely cases of natu24 rally occurring infectious disease outbreaks that 

25 could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a 
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1 robust surveillance system will serve to deter ter2 rorist use of biological weapons, as early detection 

3 will help mitigate the intended effects of such malev4 olent uses. 

5 (b) PURPOSE.—The purposes of this title are as fol6 lows: 

7 (1) To enhance the capability and cooperation 

8 of the international community, including the World

9 Health Organization and individual countries, 

10 through enhanced pathogen surveillance and appro11 priate data sharing, to detect, identify, and contain 

12 infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of 

13 those outbreaks is intentional human action or nat14 ural in origin. 

15 (2) To enhance the training of public health 

16 professionals and epidemiologists from eligible devel17 oping countries in advanced Internet-based and 

18 other electronic syndrome surveillance systems, in 

19 addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so that 

20 they may better detect, diagnose, and contain infec21 tious disease outbreaks, especially those due to 

22 pathogens most likely to be used in a biological 

23 weapons attack. 

24 (3) To provide assistance to developing coun25 tries to purchase appropriate public health labora-
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1 tory equipment necessary for infectious disease sur2 veillance and diagnosis. 

3 (4) To provide assistance to developing coun4 tries to purchase appropriate communications equip5 ment and information technology, including, as ap6 propriate, relevant computer equipment, Internet 

7 connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-based appli8 cations to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit 

9 public health information for infectious disease sur10 veillance and diagnosis. 

11 (5) To make available greater numbers of 

12 United States Government public health profes13 sionals to international health organizations, re14 gional health networks, and United States diplo15 matic missions where appropriate. 

16 (6) To establish ‘‘lab-to-lab’’ cooperative rela17 tionships between United States public health lab18 oratories and established foreign counterparts. 

19 (7) To expand the training and outreach activi20 ties of overseas United States laboratories, including 

21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and De22 partment of Defense entities, to enhance the disease 

23 surveillance capabilities of developing countries. 
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1 (8) To provide appropriate technical assistance 

2 to existing regional health networks and, where ap3 propriate, seed money for new regional networks. 

4 SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS. 

5 In this title: 

6 (1) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The 

7 term ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’ means the 

8 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

9 Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio10 logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc11 tion, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow 

12 April 10, 1972. 

13 (2) ELIGIBLE DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The 

14 term ‘‘eligible developing country’’ means any devel15 oping country that—

16 (A) has agreed to the objective of fully 

17 complying with requirements of the World 

18 Health Organization on reporting public health 

19 information on outbreaks of infectious diseases; 

20 (B) has not been determined by the Sec21 retary, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms 

22 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 

23 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

24 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export 

25 Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
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1 2405), to have repeatedly provided support for 

2 acts of international terrorism, unless the Sec3 retary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in 

4 the national interest of the United States to 

5 provide assistance under the provisions of this 

6 Act; 

7 (C) is a state party to the Biological 

8 Weapons Convention; and 

9 (D) is determined by the United States 

10 Government not to have an offensive biological 

11 weapons program. 

12 (3) ELIGIBLE NATIONAL.—The term ‘‘eligible 

13 national’’ means any citizen or national of an eligible 

14 developing country who— 

15 (A) is eligible to receive a visa under the 

16 provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 

17 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); and 

18 (B) is not currently or previously affiliated 

19 with or employed by a laboratory or entity de20 termined by the United States Government to 

21 be involved in offensive biological weapons ac22 tivities. 

23 (4) INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—

24 The term ‘‘international health organization’’ in-
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1 cludes the World Health Organization and the Pan 

2 American Health Organization. 

3 (5) LABORATORY.—The term ‘‘laboratory’’ 

4 means a facility for the biological, microbiological, 

5 serological, chemical, immuno-hematological, 

6 hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, 

7 or other examination of materials derived from the 

8 human body for the purpose of providing informa9 tion for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of 

10 any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of 

11 the health of, human beings. 

12 (6) SELECT AGENT.—The term ‘‘select agent’’ 

13 has the meaning applied in the administration of 

14 section 72.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regula15 tions. 

16 (7) SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.—The term 

17 ‘‘syndrome surveillance’’ means the recording of 

18 symptoms (patient complaints) and signs (derived 

19 from physical examination) combined with simple ge20 ographic locators to track the emergence of a disease 

21 in a population. 

22 SEC. 204. PRIORITY FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES. 

23 Priority in the provision of United States assistance 

24 for eligible developing countries under all the provisions 

25 of this title shall be given to those countries that permit 
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1 personnel from the World Health Organization and the 

2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to investigate 

3 outbreaks of infectious diseases on their territories, pro4 vide early notification of disease outbreaks, and provide 

5 pathogen surveillance data to appropriate United States 

6 departments and agencies in addition to international 

7 health organizations.

8 SEC. 205. RESTRICTION. 

9 Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no 

10 foreign national participating in programs authorized 

11 under this title shall have access, during the course of such 

12 participation, to select agents that may be used as, or in, 

13 a biological weapon, except in a supervised and controlled 

14 setting. 

15 SEC. 206. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 

16 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a fellow17 ship program (hereafter in this section referred to as the 

18 ‘‘program’’) under which the Secretary, in consultation 

19 with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 

20 subject to the availability of appropriations, shall award 

21 fellowships to eligible nationals to pursue public health 

22 education or training, as follows: 

23 (1) MASTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEGREE.—

24 Graduate courses of study leading to a master of 

25 public health degree with a concentration in epidemi-
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1 ology from an institution of higher education in the 

2 United States with a Center for Public Health Pre3 paredness, as determined by the Centers for Disease 

4 Control and Prevention. 

5 (2) ADVANCED PUBLIC HEALTH EPIDEMIOLOGY

6 TRAINING.—Advanced public health training in epi7 demiology to be carried out at the Centers for Dis8 ease Control and Prevention (or equivalent State fa9 cility), or other Federal facility (excluding the De10 partment of Defense or United States National Lab11 oratories), for a period of not less than 6 months or 

12 more than 12 months. 

13 (b) SPECIALIZATION IN BIOTERRORISM.—In addition 

14 to the education or training specified in subsection (a), 

15 each recipient of a fellowship under this section (hereafter 

16 in this section referred to as a ‘‘fellow’’) may take courses 

17 of study at the Centers for Disease Control and Preven18 tion or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and contain19 ment of likely bioterrorism agents. 

20 (c) FELLOWSHIP AGREEMENT.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—In awarding a fellowship 

22 under the program, the Secretary, in consultation 

23 with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 

24 shall require the recipient to enter into an agree-
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1 ment under which, in exchange for such assistance, 

2 the recipient—

3 (A) will maintain satisfactory academic 

4 progress (as determined in accordance with reg5 ulations issued by the Secretary and confirmed 

6 in regularly scheduled updates to the Secretary 

7 from the institution providing the education or 

8 training on the progress of the recipient’s edu9 cation or training); 

10 (B) will, upon completion of such edu11 cation or training, return to the recipient’s 

12 country of nationality or last habitual residence 

13 (if it is an eligible developing country) and com14 plete at least four years of employment in a 

15 public health position in the government or a 

16 nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity in that 

17 country or, with the approval of the Secretary, 

18 complete part or all of this requirement through 

19 service with an international health organiza20 tion without geographic restriction; and 

21 (C) agrees that, if the recipient is unable 

22 to meet the requirements described in subpara23 graph (A) or (B), the recipient will reimburse 

24 the United States for the value of the assist25 ance provided to the recipient under the fellow-
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1 ship, together with interest at a rate deter2 mined in accordance with regulations issued by 

3 the Secretary but not higher than the rate gen4 erally applied in connection with other Federal 

5 loans. 

6 (2) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary may 

7 waive the application of subparagraphs (B) and (C) 

8 of paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that it 

9 is in the national interest of the United States to do 

10 so. 

11 (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Secretary, in consulta12 tion with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 

13 is authorized to enter into an agreement with any eligible 

14 developing country under which the country agrees—

15 (1) to establish a procedure for the nomination 

16 of eligible nationals for fellowships under this sec17 tion; 

18 (2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a 

19 professional public health position within the country 

20 upon completion of his studies; and 

21 (3) to certify to the Secretary when a fellow has 

22 concluded the minimum period of employment in a 

23 public health position required by the fellowship 

24 agreement, with an explanation of how the require25 ment was met. 
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1 (e) PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS.—

2 On a case-by-case basis, the Secretary may provide for the 

3 participation of United States citizens under the provi4 sions of this section if the Secretary determines that it 

5 is in the national interest of the United States to do so. 

6 Upon completion of education or training as a fellow under 

7 this section, a United States citizen shall complete at least 

8 5 years of employment in a public health position in an

9 eligible developing country or an international health orga10 nization. 

11 SEC. 207. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECH12 NIQUES AND SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—In conjunction with the Centers 

14 for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department 

15 of Defense, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability 

16 of appropriations, support short training courses in-coun17 try (not in the United States) for laboratory technicians 

18 and other public health personnel from eligible developing 

19 countries in laboratory techniques relating to the identi20 fication, diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens responsible 

21 for possible infectious disease outbreaks. Training under 

22 this section may be conducted in overseas facilities of the 

23 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or in Overseas 

24 Medical Research Units of the Department of Defense, as 

25 appropriate. The Secretary shall coordinate such training 
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1 courses, where appropriate, with the existing programs 

2 and activities of the World Health Organization. 

3 (b) TRAINING IN SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.—In 

4 conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Pre5 vention and the Department of Defense, the Secretary 

6 shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, estab7 lish and support short training courses in-country (not in 

8 the United States) for public health personnel from eligi9 ble developing countries in techniques of syndrome surveil10 lance reporting and rapid analysis of syndrome informa11 tion using Geographic Information System (GIS) and 

12 other Internet-based tools. Training under this subsection 

13 may be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate facili14 ties as determined by the Secretary. The Secretary shall 

15 coordinate such training courses, where appropriate, with 

16 the existing programs and activities of the World Health 

17 Organization. 

18 SEC. 208. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTE19 NANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY 

20 EQUIPMENT. 

21 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized, 

22 on such terms and conditions as the President may deter23 mine, to furnish assistance to eligible developing countries 

24 to purchase and maintain public health laboratory equip25 ment described in subsection (b). 
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1 (b) EQUIPMENT COVERED.—Equipment described in 

2 this subsection is equipment that is—

3 (1) appropriate, where possible, for use in the 

4 intended geographic area; 

5 (2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify 

6 expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including 

7 mutant strains, which may cause disease outbreaks 

8 or may be used as a biological weapon; 

9 (3) compatible with general standards set forth, 

10 as appropriate, by the World Health Organization 

11 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

12 to ensure interoperability with regional and inter13 national public health networks; 

14 (4) necessary to secure and monitor pathogen 

15 collections containing select agents; and 

16 (5) not defense articles or defense services. 

17 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec18 tion shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods 

19 and technology from compliance with applicable provisions 

20 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 

21 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). 

22 (d) LIMITATION.—Amounts appropriated to carry 

23 out this section shall not be made available for the pur24 chase from a foreign country of equipment that, if made 

25 in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export 
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1 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred 

2 or subject to special conditions under the Export Adminis3 tration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or 

4 successor statutes). 

5 (e) HOST COUNTRY’S COMMITMENTS.—The assist6 ance provided under this section shall be contingent upon 

7 the host country’s commitment to provide the resources, 

8 infrastructure, and other assets required to house, main9 tain, support, secure, monitor, and maximize use of this 

10 equipment and appropriate technical personnel. 

11 SEC. 209. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION 

12 OF PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION. 

13 (a) ASSISTANCE FOR PURCHASE OF COMMUNICATION

14 EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.—The 

15 President is authorized to provide, on such terms and con16 ditions as the President may determine, assistance to eligi17 ble developing countries for the purchase and maintenance 

18 of communications equipment and information technology 

19 described in subsection (b), and supporting equipment, 

20 necessary to effectively collect, analyze, and transmit pub21 lic health information.

22 (b) COVERED EQUIPMENT.—Equipment (and infor23 mation technology) described in this subsection is equip24 ment that—
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1 (1) is suitable for use under the particular con2 ditions of the area of intended use; 

3 (2) meets appropriate World Health Organiza4 tion standards to ensure interoperability with like 

5 equipment of other countries and international 

6 health organizations; and 

7 (3) is not defense articles or defense services. 

8 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec9 tion shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods 

10 and technology from compliance with applicable provisions 

11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 

12 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). 

13 (d) LIMITATION.—Amounts appropriated to carry 

14 out this section shall not be made available for the pur15 chase from a foreign country of equipment that, if made 

16 in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export 

17 Control Act or likely be barred or subject to special condi18 tions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 

19 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). 

20 (e) ASSISTANCE FOR STANDARDIZATION OF REPORT21 ING.—The President is authorized to provide, on such 

22 terms and conditions as the President may determine, 

23 technical assistance and grant assistance to international 

24 health organizations to facilitate standardization in the re25 porting of public health information between and among 
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1 developing countries and international health organiza2 tions. 

3 (f) HOST COUNTRY’S COMMITMENTS.—The assist4 ance provided under this section shall be contingent upon 

5 the host country’s commitment to provide the resources, 

6 infrastructure, and other assets required to house, sup7 port, maintain, secure, and maximize use of this equip8 ment and appropriate technical personnel.

9 SEC. 210. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO 

10 UNITED STATES MISSIONS AND INTER11 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon the request of a United 

13 States chief of diplomatic mission or an international 

14 health organization, and with the concurrence of the Sec15 retary, the head of a Federal agency may assign to the 

16 respective United States mission or organization any offi17 cer or employee of the agency occupying a public health 

18 position within the agency for the purpose of enhancing 

19 disease and pathogen surveillance efforts in developing 

20 countries. 

21 (b) REIMBURSEMENT.—The costs incurred by a Fed22 eral agency by reason of the detail of personnel under sub23 section (a) may be reimbursed to that agency out of the 

24 applicable appropriations account of the Department of 

25 State if the Secretary determines that the relevant agency 
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1 may otherwise be unable to assign such personnel on a 

2 non-reimbursable basis. 

3 SEC. 211. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOV4 ERNMENT LABORATORIES ABROAD. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of ap6 propriations, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven7 tion and the Department of Defense shall each—

8 (1) increase the number of personnel assigned 

9 to laboratories of the Centers or the Department, as 

10 appropriate, located in eligible developing countries 

11 that conduct research and other activities with re12 spect to infectious diseases; and 

13 (2) expand the operations of those laboratories, 

14 especially with respect to the implementation of on15 site training of foreign nationals and regional out16 reach efforts involving neighboring countries. 

17 (b) COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN

18 LABORATORIES.—Subsection (a) shall be carried out in 

19 such a manner as to foster cooperation and avoid duplica20 tion between and among laboratories. 

21 (c) RELATION TO CORE MISSIONS AND SECURITY.—

22 The expansion of the operations of overseas laboratories 

23 of the Centers or the Department under this section shall 

24 not—
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1 (1) detract from the established core missions 

2 of the laboratories; or 

3 (2) compromise the security of those labora4 tories, as well as their research, equipment, exper5 tise, and materials. 

6 SEC. 212. ASSISTANCE FOR REGIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS 

7 AND EXPANSION OF FOREIGN EPIDEMI8 OLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS. 

9 (a) AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized, on 

10 such terms and conditions as the President may deter11 mine, to provide assistance for the purposes of—

12 (1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting ca13 pabilities of the World Health Organization and ex14 isting regional health networks; and 

15 (2) developing new regional health networks. 

16 (b) EXPANSION OF FOREIGN EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAIN17 ING PROGRAMS.—The Secretary of Health and Human 

18 Services is authorized to establish new country or regional 

19 Foreign Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible devel20 oping countries. 

21 SEC. 213. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Of the funds appropriated to the 

23 Department of State for fiscal year 2004, up to 

24 $35,000,000 may be used to carry out this title. 
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1 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made 

2 available under subsection (a)—

3 (1) $25,000,000 may be used to carry out sec4 tions 206, 207, 208, and 209; 

5 (2) $500,000 may be used to carry out section 

6 210; 

7 (3) $2,500,000 may be used to carry out sec8 tion 211; and 

9 (4) $7,000,000 may be used to carry out sec10 tion 212. 

11 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 120 

12 days after the date of the enactment of this title, the Sec13 retary shall, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health 

14 and Human Services and the Secretary of Defense, submit 

15 to the appropriate congressional committees a report con16 taining—

17 (1) a description of the implementation of pro18 grams under this title that has been undertaken or 

19 is planned; and 

20 (2) an estimate of the level of funding required 

21 to carry out those programs at a sufficient level. 
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1 TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS 

2 PROVISIONS 

3 SEC. 301. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER NAVAL VESSELS TO 

4 CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 

5 (a) AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER BY GRANT.—The 

6 President is authorized to transfer vessels to foreign coun7 tries on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign 

8 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321(j)) as follows: 

9 (1) The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class 

10 guided missile frigate USS GEORGE PHILIP 

11 (FFG 12) to the Government of Bahrain. 

12 (2) The OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class 

13 guided missile frigate USS SIDES (FFG 14) to the 

14 Government of Portugal. 

15 (b) AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER BY SALE.—The Presi16 dent is authorized to transfer the SPRUANCE class de17 stroyer FLETCHER (DD 992) to the Government of 

18 Chile on a sales basis under section 21 of the Arms Export 

19 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761). 

20 (c) GRANTS NOT COUNTED AGAINST AGGREGATE

21 VALUE OF TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTI22 CLES.—The value of a vessel transferred to another coun23 try on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign As24 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j) pursuant to au25 thority provided by subsection (a) shall not be counted for 
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1 the purposes of subsection (g) of that section in the aggre2 gate value of excess defense articles transferred to coun3 tries under that section in any fiscal year. 

4 (d) COSTS OF TRANSFERS.—Any expense incurred by 

5 the United States in connection with a transfer authorized 

6 to be made on a grant basis under subsection (a) shall 

7 be charged to the recipient (notwithstanding section 

8 516(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (2 U.S.C. 

9 2321j(e)(1))). 

10 (e) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED

11 STATES SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent prac12 ticable, the President shall require, as a condition of the 

13 transfer of a vessel under this section, that the country 

14 to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or re15 furbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel 

16 joins the naval forces of that country, performed at a ship17 yard located in the United States, including a United 

18 States Navy shipyard. 

19 (f) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.— The authority to 

20 transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end 

21 of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the enact22 ment of this Act.
Calendar No. 392

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1866

A BILL

To enhance the security of the United States and 

United States allies. 

NOVEMBER 17, 2003

Read the second time and placed on the calendar