Filed 11/12/20 (unmodified o pn

. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re CHRISTOPHER L.

, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B 305225

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS L.

,
Defendant and Appellant

. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02800 )

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:
The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on November

2 , 2020 is modified as follows :

1. On page 11

, in the first paragraph of the Discussion,
the word “certain” is inserted between the words “to participate in” and “dependency proceedings

. ” That sentence now reads:
Father also argues that when the juvenile court
conducted the jurisdiction/disposition hearing without
Father or Father’s counsel present, it violated Penal Code2 section 2625, which guarantees incarcerated parents
the opportunity to participate in certain dependency proceedings.

2. On page 12, the following is deleted : “ (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 625 ( Jesusa V. ) [applying Watson harmless error analysis to violation of Penal Code section 2625 that denied the father the ability to personally participate in dependency hearing]; In re Andrew M. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 859, 864, 867 (

Andrew M. ) [failure to appoint coun sel for the presumed
father reviewed for harmless error under Watson ].) ”

3. In the first full paragraph on page 13, the word “only”
is deleted from the third sentence. That sentence now reads:

Presumed fathers are entitled to appointed counsel and
reunif ication services.

4. In the first full paragraph on page 13, “ ( In re Zacharia
D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451; see also Francisco G. v. Superior
Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596 [distinguishing the greater rights that presumed fathers have as opposed to b iological fathers]

. ) ” is deleted and replaced with the following :
( In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451 [“only a

pres u med, not a mere biological, father is a ‘parent’ entitled
to receive reunification services”] ; In re Kobe A. (2007)
146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120 [“ ‘[ p ] resumed father status entitles the father to appointed counsel, custody (absent

a finding of detriment), and a reunification plan ’ ”]; see also
Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596 [distinguishing the greater rights that presumed fathers have as opposed to biological fathers]

. )3 5

. In the first sentence on page 14, the word “certain”
is inserted between the words “participate in” and “dependency proceedings

. ” That sentence now reads:

Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d) requires that

a prisoner be permitted to participate in certain dependency proceedings.

6. On page 14

, in the second paragraph, the first short
form case citation

, “ Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 621

– 622 ; ” is replaced wi th the long form of that citation : In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 621

– 622 ( Jesusa V. ) ;

7

. On page 14, within the parenthetical in the second paragraph, the words “ resulting in the father participating in hearing only through counsel ” are inserted between the phrases “subdivision (d)” and “was not jurisdictional.” That parenthetical (and its associated citation) now read:

id . at p. 625 [ holding violation of Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d) resulting in the father participatin g in hearing only through counsel was not jurisdictional, because “ we have regularly applied a harmless

- error analysis when a defendant has been involuntarily absent from a criminal trial . . . [and]
do not believe the Legislature intended a different resu lt

. . . when a prisoner is involuntarily absent from a dependency proceeding ” ].)

8

. T he “

Andrew M. ” citation at the bottom of page 15 is
revised as follows: ( In re Andrew M. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 849, 867 ( Andrew M. ).)4 9. On page 18, in the first sentence
, the words “causing an incarcerated parent to appear only through counsel” are inserted between the words “notice errors” and “are reviewed

. ”
T hat sentence now reads:

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that Penal Code
section 2625 notice errors causing an incarcerated parent

to appear only through counsel are reviewed under a
harmless error analysis in dependency proceedings (see
Jesusa V. , supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 625 ), and at least one Court of Appeal has concluded that an incorrect ruling as

to a father’s parental status resulting in the father being denied appointed counsel was reviewable for harmless error.

Th ese modification s do not constitute a change in the judgment. Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on November 4, 2020
is denied.

__________________________________________ __ __________________ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY , J. BENDIX , J.Filed 11/2/20 (unmodified opinion) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re C HRISTOPHER L.

, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B 305225

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C ARLOS L.

,
Defendant and Appellant

. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02800 )

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing , Judge. Affirmed. Christopher Blake

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant and Defendant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 C hristopher L., born in December 2017, and I

. L., born
in February 2017

, are the children of a ppellant C arlos L. (F ather)
and V. L. (Mother), who is not a party to this appeal

. Father

was represented by counsel in connection with

, and personally participated in

, the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 1 permanency planning hearing at which his parental rights regarding C hristopher were terminated . He appeals from that
termination based on the juvenile court having conducted the earlier jurisdiction/disposition hearing regarding both children
in his absence and without couns el present on his behalf. Father had not provided a written waiver of his right as an incarcerated parent under Penal Code section 2625 to participate , personally

or through counsel, in the jurisdiction/disposition hearing ; to the contrary, in documents provided to the juvenile court before that hearing , Father requested that he be allowed to participate. Before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court was also presented
with documents establishing that Father was e ntitled to “presumed father” status, which carries with it the right to appointed counsel

. On these bases, Father argues that he was denied due process at
the jurisdiction/ disposition hearing

, that these due process errors
affected the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, and that, in

any case, they constitute structural error and trigger automatic
reversal

. We agree with Father that the trial court erred

, and that
these errors affected the due process afforded Father at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in that they denied him counsel at that hearing

. But even errors of a constitutional dimension can be subject to a harmless error analysis in dependency proceedings,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references and citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3

given the unique nature of such proceedings , unl ess it is impossible to assess prejudice without engaging in speculation. ( See In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915

– 91 9 ( James F. ) ; In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 800; In re S.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
963
, 972, petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020

, S264203 , time

to grant or deny review extended to Nov. 30, 2020 .) No such speculation is necessary here. The record clearly establishes that, had Father appeared and/or been represented by counsel

at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, F ather would not have
obtained a more favorable result. We decline Father’s invitation

to expand current law and deem reversible per se an error in dependency proceedings that is amenable to harmless error analysis . Accordingly, although we are troubled by the errors Father identifies in connection with the jurisdiction/disposition hearing , we conclude that they w ould not have affected the ultimate

outcome of the dependency proceedings and affirm the trial court’s

or der regarding C hristopher

. Father’s parental rights to C hristopher ’s older sister I.L.

were terminated in a separate order, which Father did not appeal. Instead, 18 months a fter the time for filing such an app eal expired,
Father moved this c ourt to apply the doctrine of constructive filing and “ e xtend” Father’s appeal regarding C hristopher to apply to I.L. as well. But Father concedes that he would make
the exact same arguments in an app eal regarding I.L. that he
made rega rding C hristopher , and that these arguments apply in
the exact same way to both children. Given our conclusion that Father’s arguments regarding C hristopher do not warrant reversal, permitting Father to pursue them with respect to I.L. would serve no purpose. Therefore, w e deny Father’s motion.4 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Father’s Older Children F rom a Previous Relationship

Father has three older children (not with Mother) who were the subject of separate dependency proceedings, and with whom h e failed to reunify. The dependency proceedings regarding Father’s
older children were initiated in 2013 based on issues related

to substance abuse by those children’s mother

. F ather was
incarcerated at the outset of the sepa rate proceedings, release d approximately three months thereafter

, then rearrested for a drug

related offense and returned to prison approximately three months after that release. During the interim period when Father was not in prison, he failed to comply with juvenile court orders, which
included an order for regular drug testing. Father’s r eunification
services were terminated. As of the most recent information in
the record, two of Father’s older children are receiving permanent placement services wit h a plan of legal guardianship.

B. Family Background

Father is in his late 30’s and has an e xtensive criminal record, as a result of which he wa s required to register as a controlled substance offender. 2 Father’s criminal history spans over a decade and includes a conviction for robbery, multiple convictions for possession of a controlled substance or being under the influence of a controlled substance, firearms offen s es and multiple parole
violations.

2 Former section 11590 of the Health and Safety Code required persons convicted of certain offenses to register as a controlled substance offender with law enforcement in the city

or county where he or she resides. The Legislature repealed the requirement in 2019. (Stats. 2019, ch. 580, § 1, p. 5212.)5 F ather and Mother have been married s ince December 2014

. In February 2017, Mother gave birth to I.L.; Father’s name is listed

on I.L.’s birth certificate.
Mother and Father stopped liv ing together in approximately April 2017 , when Father was arrested for ro bbery, and Mother began living with a man named J. M. Mother and I.L. moved in
with J. M. at some point in 2017

. Father was convicted of robbery in October 2017 and began serving a seven

- year prison sentence

. M onths later, in December 2017, Mother gave birth to C hristopher

. Father ’s counsel represented during the hearing before this court that Father is eligible for parole in late 2020

.
C. Section 300 Petition Regarding I.L. and C hristopher On December 28, 2017, th e Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS ) filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of newborn C hristopher and 10

- month

- old I.L. , alleging they were at risk due to , inter alia, C hristopher being born with

a positive toxic ology screen for amphetamines and M other havin g

a history of substance abuse. The petition further alleged risk

to both children based on J. M. (who was initially identified as
C hristopher ’s father ) having a h istory of substance abuse, and
F ather ’s extensi ve criminal history and status as a registered
controlled substance offender

. The petition lists Father’s address

as that of Sierra Conservation Center, the facility at which he was
incarcerated at the time

.

D

. Detention Hearing and Detention Report

The detention report listed Father as the alleged father
of I.L. and J. M. as the alleged father of C hristopher

. The report noted that Mother and Father were married, and their marriage6

certificate was attached to the detention report. The report
summarized an interview with J

. M., during which J. M. indicated Mother had a young daughter who was not J. M.’s child, and that he

was “pretty sure [ C hristopher ] [was] not [his] baby.” DCFS furth er reported that, on the day C hristopher was born, Mother indicated
J. M. was the father, but that she later told social workers she was
uncertain who C hristopher ’s father was. DCFS provided written notice of the detention hearing to
Father at the Sierra Co nservation Center address. The detention hearing took place on December 29, 2017, at which time the court determined that notice had been provided as required by law. Neither parent, nor counsel for either parent, appeared. The court
noted Father was in state custody and a statewide search was
ordered for him. T he court postponed findings regarding paternity
of either child. The children were detained from Mother, Father,
and J. M., and ultimately placed in the custody of the maternal great aunt S. M. (the maternal a unt). The jurisdiction/disposition hearing was set for March 9, 2018

, and DCFS ordered to give notice

. DCFS sent F ather such notice at the Sierra Conservation Center
address by certified mail and included his correct inmate
identification number. The notice listed both children on it a nd attached a copy of the petition. Apparently in response to this notice, o n February 21,
2018
, Father wrote to DCFS social worker Magdalen a Elorriaga, thanking her for “reaching out” and indicating that he had “received [her] letter.” 3 Father’s letter discussed his participation in

3 The record suggests that what Father refers to as the “letter” from Elorriaga may be the notice of hearing on the petition, which indicates Elorriaga executed and served it via mail on Father 10 days before the date of his letter to her. Further supportin g7

dependency proceedings as follows: “I wanted to ask if a court appearance is necessary. In your letter you stated that a court date
of 3/9/18 will be set. The reason why I’m asking is that this court date will delay my process on being transferred to a California Fire Camp. If possible I was wondering can this matter be handled over the telephone. If so, it would be very much appreciated if we took that route. I love my kids and I will do anything in my po w er to be with them. The faster I get to camp, the faster I’ll be home. . . .
Ple ase inform me of my options if a court appearance is needed to handle this matter.” Father also requested paternity testing , but
indicated he considered both children to be his regardless: “ [M] y wife . . . and I had our differences through the years and just so I

can have some piece [ sic ] of mind I would like DNA testing on [ I.L. ] and [ C hristopher ]. Regardless of the outcome I will love them as my own. They are still my kids and I love them de arly.” Father requested pictures of the children and that he be kept “ updated with the status of my children.” Finally, Father asked that his mother be “allowed visitation rights” and inquire d as to how she could “go about seeing the children.”

E. Jurisd ic tional Hearing and Jurisdiction / Disposition Report Father’s letter is referenced in and attached to the report prepared in a nticipation of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
The report further summarizes J. M.’s additional statements that “he believe[d] 80% [ C hristopher ] is his child,” as well as Mother ’ s additional statements denying this and identifying Father as the
father of both children. The report summarizes Father’s DCFS

this conclusion is the fact that Father’s letter refers to Christopher as “Baby Boy [L.],” the name used to refer to Christopher in the petition and notice of petition.8

history, including that he had failed to reu nify with three of his older children in separate dependency proceedings several years
earlier

. T he jurisdiction/disposition hearing for both I.L. and
C hristopher was held on March 9, 2018. The jurisdiction / disposition report and detention report were admitted into evidence at the hearing, including the attached marriage certificate and February 2018 letter from Father.
Neither Father nor counsel for him appeared at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing

. Apparently unaware of Father’s letter, t he court indicated that “ [Father] is currently incarcerated,
and he has not made himself available . . . . [H] e’s been noticed,
but he’s made no contact with [DCFS].” The court therefore proceeded with the hearing, at which counsel for DCFS and the
minor’s c ounsel very briefly argued that the petition should be
sustained as ple a d ed

. As to Father, DCFS argued that Father “ha[d] multiple convictions for possession and lost children for permanent placement for not complying with drug treatment.”
The court su st ained the petition as amended to indicate Father
is a “ registered controlled substance offender ,” “ [ t ] here is no information that he’s ever complied with programming , and he’s currently incarcerated based on his extensive criminal history.” The court denied Father (and Mother and J. M.) reunification
services for both children “pursuant to [ section ] 361.5[, subdivision] (b)(1 0 )”

— that is, on the basis that they had previously failed to reunify with children deemed dependents and that placement
with them would not be in the best interests of the children. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(10).) The court confirmed both chil dren were suitably placed with the m aternal a unt, who had already adopted two of Mother’s other children. The paternal grandparents were present, and the court ordered that they be assessed for visits.9 The court later set a permanency planning hearing for both
children , for which the court would “order [Father] out. ” Adoption
with the maternal aunt was the recommended permanent plan.
No paternity findings regarding either child were made. The court asked a Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc. f irm to act as a “friend of the c ourt” and contact Father before the permanency planning hearing

.

F

. Permanency Planning Hearin gs
DCFS gave Father written notice of the permanency planning hearing , which he received

. DCFS also submitted an order to prison authorities for Father’s a ppearance at the permanency planning hearing

. On November 15, 2018, the court appointed Father counsel,
who made a general appear ance on Father’s behalf

. Father’s
counsel informed the court that F ather was asking to participate
in the permanency planning hear ing telephonically and that he objected to the termination of parental rights. The court found Father to be the presumed father of I.L. only, based on his having signed her birth certificate.
The permanency planning hearing for both children began on December 19, 2018. Father participated telephonical ly, as he had requested. Father’s counsel indicated that Father would prefer legal guardianship with the m aternal a unt , as opposed to adoption, as the permanent plan. The report for the hearing indicates
that the children had been in the m aternal a unt’s care without interruptio n since their initial detention and were doing well, and
that the maternal aunt was not interested in legal guardianship of the children, but was willing to adopt them

.10 Father’s counsel r equested DNA testing with respect to C hristopher

. T he court granted the request and continued the permanency plan ning hearing with respect to C hristopher

. T he court proceeded to conduct the permanency planning hearing for I.L. only. Father’s counsel objected to terminatio n of parental rights as to I.L. , but offered no evidence or argument. The court terminated Father’s parental rights as to I.L. and gave
oral notice of its decision. The cou rt also advised both parents regarding appellate rig hts as follows: “I’m advising [F ather], who
is on the phone, an d

. . . [M other], who is not present in court, that having terminated their parental rights, each parent is entitled

to a free copy of the transcript for appellate purposes. [ ¶ ] But they mus t file their notice of app ellate [ sic ] within 60 days.” The December 29, 2018 minute order reflecting the termination of parental rights as to I.L. and related “Appeal Rights form(s)”

were incorrectly sent to Father at the addr ess on file for J. M.
At a later hearing, upon learning the results of the DNA test
indicat ing that Father was the biological parent of C hristopher , the
court found Father to be C hristopher ’s alleged father

. Counsel for Father was present and did not objec t to this finding . The court continued the hearing , and Father’s counsel indic a ted it would arrange for Father to participate in that hearing telephonically

. In the interim, C hristopher continued to reside with his sister
and the m aternal a unt , referred to the maternal aunt as “ m ommy,” and was thriving in her care. DCFS gave notice to Father of the permanency planning hearing for C hristopher , which was ultimat ely held on March 5,
2020. Father was presen t via telephone and was represented by ap pointed counsel ( a different attorney from the same firm )

. Father’s counsel objected to termination of parental rights, but presented no evidence and offered no argument opposing it

. The11

court found that Christopher was adopta ble

, and that none of the

excep tions for adoption exist ed. Accordingly, the court terminated Father’s parental rights

.
G. Father’s Appeal and Benoit Motion On April 1, 2020, F ather filed a notice of appeal from the order terminating his parental rights as to Christopher

. On June 25, 2020

— 18 months after his parental rights

as to I.L. had been terminated

— F ather filed a motion “ to extend
his notice of appeal to apply to b o th [I.L. and Christopher ] and/or
motion for c onstru ctive notice of appeal ” p ursuant to In re Benoit (197 3 ) 10 Cal.3d 72 ( Benoit )

. (Capitalization omitted.) DCFS opposed the motion, and this c ourt deferre d ruling on the motion pending consideration of th is appeal

.
DISCUSSION Father first argues tha t the court erred by failing to find
that Father had “pr esumed father” status as to both children

, which would have entitled him to appointed counsel at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing

. Father also argues that when
the juvenile court conducted the ju risdiction/disposition hearing without Father or Father’s counsel present, it violated Penal
Code section 26 25 , which guarantees incarcerated parents the opportunity to parti ci pa te in depend ency proceedings. According to
Father

, these errors denied Father his due process right to counsel

, affected the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, and are in any

event of such constitutional dimension that they should be reversed regardless of whether they prejudiced Father. 4

4 DCFS argues that Father has forfeited these arguments, because he failed to raise t hem through a section 388 motion below, pursuant to Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477.12 We agree that the trial court erred in t he manner Father identifies, but disagree that the se errors warrant automatic
reversal

. T he errors identified we re not prejudicial under
the applicable harmless error analysis articulated in People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ( Watson ) . (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 625 ( Jesusa V. ) [applying Watson harmless error analysis to violation of Penal Code section 2625 that denied the
father the ability to personally participate in dependency hearing];
In re Andrew M. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 859 , 86 4, 867 ( Andrew M. ) [failure to appoint counsel for the presumed father reviewed for
harmless error under Watson ].) Nor are they prejudicial under the more stringent “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard

( See id. at p p . 487, 490 [section 388 petition can be used to challenge lack of notice of earlier proceedings].) Father anticipates this argument in h is opening brief, and counters that, although a section 388 motion would have been the proper vehicle for raising these issues, his attorney’s failure to make such a motion was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus any forfeiture should be excused. According to Father, any competent counsel would have filed such a motion, or otherwise raised the errors identified on appeal with the juvenile court. We need not determine whether Father forfeited these arguments, however, because even if he did, we would exercise our discretion to address Father’s appeal, which raises fundamental due process issues

. (See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [waiver rule not enforced where it conflicts with due process]; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[T]he appellate court ’ s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court ’ s discretion to consider forfeited claims e xtends to dependency cases [ c itations], the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.”].)13

articulated in Chapman v. California (19 67) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 ( Chapman ). Accordingly, we affirm.

A

. The Juvenile Court Erred

1. Error regarding Father’s parental status

“ ‘ In dependency proceedings, “ fathers ” are divided into four categories

— natural [or biological], presumed, alleged, and de facto.’ [Citation.]” ( In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436

– 437.)
“A father’s status is significant in dependency cases because it determines the extent to which the father may participate in the proceedin gs and the rights to which he is entitled. ” ( In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) Only presumed fathers are
entitled to appointed counsel and reunification services. ( In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451; see also Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596 [distinguishing the greater rights that presumed fathers have as opposed to biological fathers]

. ) The Family Code sets forth various circumstances under
which a man may acquire presumed fathe r status. ( See Fam. Code

, § 7611.) These include that the man “ and the child’s natural
mother are

, or have been

, married to each other and the child is
born during the marriage .” ( § 7611

, subd. (a).) Thus, based on the marriage certificate provided to the court at both the detention and the jurisdictiona l he aring s , Father qualified as C hristopher and
I.L. ’s “presumed father ”

— an d, as such, sh ould have been appointed
counsel at t he detention hearing. The trial court erred in failing

to so find and appoint counsel for Father prior to the jurisdiction/ disposition hearing.14 2. Penal Code s ection 26 25 e rror Penal Code s ection 26 25 , subdivision (d) requires that a prisoner be permitted to pa rticipate in dependency proceedings regarding the p risoner ’s child , if he or she desires . Specifically,
it provides that a “ petition to ad judge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court pursuant
, ” i nter al ia, section 300, subdivision (b)

, “ may not b e adjudicated without the phys ical

presen ce of the prisoner or the prisoner’ s att orney, unless the court
has be fore it a knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the prisoner or an affi da vit signed by the warden,

su perintendent, or other person in charge of the institu tion, or a designated represen tative stating that the prisoner has, by express statement or action, indicated an intent not to appear at the proceeding.” ( Pen. Code

, § 2625, subd. (d).)
The record is clear that Father made no such written waiver.
T o the contrary, t he juvenile court had before it a letter from Father informing DCFS that he want ed to participate in the proceedings

, albeit via telephone. The trial co ur t thus failed to comply with
Penal Code s ection 2625, subdivision (d), when it conducted
the jurisdiction/disposition hearing without Father or counsel appearing on his behalf

. Altho ugh the failure to comply with
Penal Code s ection 2625 did not, as Father implies, deprive the court of jurisdiction, it is error. (See Jesusa V. , supra, 32 Cal.4th

at p p

. 621

– 622 ; id . at p. 625 [ holding violation of Penal Code
section 2625, subdivision (d), was not jurisdictional , because “ we have regularly applied a harmless

- error analysis when a defendant
has been involuntaril y absent from a criminal trial . . . [and] do not believe the Legislature intended a different result . . . when a prisoner is involuntarily absent from a dependency proceeding ” ].)15 B. The Error s Do Not Require Automatic Revers al Father argues that because the errors he identifies deprived him of counsel at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the y denied
him due process and are reve rsible per se, regardless of prejudice. But the California Sup reme Court has rejected the argument that

, in dependency proceedings, every due process error is reversible

per se. (See James F.

, supra , 42 Cal.4th at pp. 915

– 91 9 .) In
James F. , the Supreme Court concluded that error in the procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding was “ amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of the juvenile court’ s orders without regard to prejudice

. ” ( Id. at p

. 915.) In so holding, the Court first “ observe [d] that juvenile dependency proceedings differ from criminal proceedings in ways that affect the determination
of whether an error requires automatic reversal of the resulting judgment. The rights and protections afforded parents in a dependency proceeding are not the same as those afforded to
the a ccused in a criminal proceeding.” ( I bi d. ) On this basis, the
Court rejected that “ the structural error doctrine that has been established for certain errors in criminal proceedings should be imported wholesale, or unthinkingly, into the quite different context of dependency cases.” ( Id. at pp. 915

– 916. )

“ James F . cited United States Supreme Court authority to explain that generally, an error is structural when it ‘ “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless

- error ’ standards” ’ and cannot ‘ “be quantitively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [it was] harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ [Citation.] The structural error doctrine is used when

‘ “assess ing the effect of the error” ’ is ‘ “difficult[ ].” ’ [Citation.] ” ( Andrew M.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) James F. also acknowledged that there are “ very few constitutional errors that16

the United States Supreme Court has categorized as structural

, not because they defy harmless error analysis, but because prejudice is irrelevant and reversal deemed essential to vindicate the particular constitutional right at issue” ( James F., supra

, 42 Cal.4th at p. 917, citing United States v. Gonzalez

– Lopez (2006)
548 U.S. 140

, 149 ( Gonzalez

– Lopez ) )

, but noted that such authority

“ has not applied this reasoning outside the c ontext of criminal proceedings

. . . nor has it ever held that harmlessness is irrelevant when the right of procedural due process

. . . has been violated. ” ( James F.

, supra , at p. 917 .) James F. concluded that prejudice was
not irrelevant in the dependency context, because “ the welfare of the child is at issue and delay in resolution of the proceeding is
inhe rently prejudicial to the child,” and applied a harmless error analysis. ( Ibid .) Courts of Appeal have cited James F. for the proposition that

“ harmless error analysis applies in juvenile dependency proceedings
even where the error is of constitutional dimension .” ( In re J.P.

, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 798 ; In re S.P

. , supra, 52 Cal.App.5th

at p. 972 , petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020, S264203, time to grant or deny review extended to Nov. 30, 2020 .) “I n juvenile dependency proceedings, no error

— even one of constitutional
dimension

— can be examined based solely on legal principles (no matter how venerable) or only from the parent ’ s perspective. ” ( In re
J.P.

, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 ; In re S.P.

, supra , at p. 972 [ the concept of automa tically reversible structural error “ was firmly rejected by our Supreme Court in

. . . James F

. ”] .) Rather than categorically deeming errors of a certain type “structural” and thus reversible per se, a reviewing court should first consider whether

an error in dependency proceedings is amen able to harmless error analysis

— that is, whether potential prejudice from the error can be
assessed without “necessarily requir [ing] ‘a speculative inquiry into17

what might have oc curred in an alternate universe’ ” ( Ja mes F.,

supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 915, quoting Gonzalez

– Lopez , supra, 548 U.S. at p. 150 )

— and , if so, apply a harmless error analysis

. 5 ( In re J.P.

, supra , at p. 800 [ “ [ a ] ccordingly, because we conclude the juvenile court ’ s error here is ‘amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of the juvenile court's orders without regard to prejudice’

. . . , we proceed with
the harmless error analysis ” ] , quoting James F., supra , at p. 915 .)
For reasons we discuss in detail in the following section,
the circumstances of Father’s situation and the nature of
the errors identified are such that we can assess whether the
court’s Penal Code section 2625 error and /or Father being denied
counsel at the jurisdiction/detention hearing prejudiced him

at the subsequent permanency planning hearings, based “ not

on guesswork or speculation, but on the undisputed facts before us. ” ( In re S.P.

, supra , 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 975 , petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020, S264203, time to gra nt or deny review extended to Nov. 30, 2020

. )

5 Division Five of this court interpreted and applied James F. in th e same way as we do recently in In re S.P., supra , 52 Cal.App.5th 963. In arguing that we should take a different approach, Father notes that the appealing parent in In re S.P. has filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court based on several issues, including whether James F. “ need [s] to be clarified to make sure that structural error is a concept that can apply to dependency proceedings depen ding on the nature of the right.” As of the date of th is opinion, the Supreme Co urt has not ruled

on the petition . This is not a basis on which to treat James F. any differently, as we agree with In re S.P.’s interpretation of our state Supreme Court’s unambiguous discussion of this issue in James F., and this interpretation is not novel. (See, e.g., In re J.P.

, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.)18 More over, the Supreme Court has held that Penal Code
section 2625 notice errors are reviewed under a harmless

error analysis in dependency proceedings (see Jesusa V.

, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 625 )

, and at least one C ourt of A ppeal
has concluded that an incorrect ruling as to a father’s parental status resulting in the father being denied appointed counsel

was reviewable for harmless error

. ( See Andrew M. , supra, 46 Cal.App.5 th at pp. 864
, 867

. )
Father relies on cases involving a complete failure to provide notice to a parent. (See, e.g., In re Jasmine G. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 ( Jasmine G. ) [“the failure to attempt

to give a parent statutorily required notice of a selection and impleme ntation hearing is a structural defect that requires automatic reversal”]; Andrew M.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5 th at p. 867, fn. 4 [noting in dicta that the father never having received a section 300 petition would be structural error under James F. ].)
These cases do not assist Father in arguing for automatic reversal in this case, because t he errors Father identified ar e a denial of counsel at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing and a violation of his
Penal Code section 2625 right to be present at that hearing

— not lack of notice

. Indeed, Father expressly states in his opening brief
that he “is not contesting that he received notice” of either the jurisdiction/disposition hearing or the permanency planning hearings. The record also reflects he received notice of all hearings, and participated, with counsel, in the hearings resulting in the termination of parental rights from which he now appeals. Cases involving a complete lack of notice present unique concerns, none of
which is present here. (See In r e Z.S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 754, 772 [“[o]nly the failure to attempt to give notice to a parent is a structural defect requiring automatic reversal”], citing Jasmine G.,

supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116 ; see also In re R.L. (201 6) 419

Cal.App.5th 125, 146 [“Unless there is no attempt to serve notice on a parent, in which case the error is reversible per se, notice errors do not automatically require reversal but are reviewed to determine whether the error is harmless beyond a reaso nable doubt.”].)
Fa ther’s reliance on such cases is thus unavailing.
H armless error analysis is appropriate here

.
C

. The Juvenile Co urt’s Errors Were Not Prejudicial

1. Watson and Chapman harmless error

a nalyses

To assess whether an error in dependency proceedings
is harmless, “s ome C ourts of A ppeal have applied a Chapman

‘ har mless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard [citations]

, [and] [a] t least two Supreme Court cases have embraced the
Watson more probable than not standard. ” ( In re S.P. , supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 972 , fns. omitted, petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020, S264203, time to grant or deny review extended

to Nov. 30, 2020 ; see, e.g ., In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45

, 59

- 60 ( Celine R .) [ applying Watson standard for failure to appoint separate counsel for minor siblings ] .) Watson requires

a “reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome,” absent
the challenged errors, in order for an error to warrant reversal. ( In re A.J. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 652, 665 [applying Watson harmless error standard]; Celine R.

, supra , at p. 60 [court must
find it “reasonably probab le the result would have been more
favorable to the appealing party but for the error” ].) Under Chapman

, by contrast, “the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( Chapman,

supra , 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
T wo divisions of this court ha ve applied the Watson standard

to err o rs relating to a parent’s right to appointed counsel. (See, e.g.,20

Andrew M

., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 864
, 867 ; In re J.P

., supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 798

– 800 [erroneous failure to grant mother’ s request for r e appointment of counsel before the hearing on her petition for modification ] .) We conclude that this standard should apply here as well. But even if we were to analyze the errors Father identifies under the more stringent Chapman standard, our analysis would yield the same result.

2. Application of harmless error a nalysis
to the e rrors F ather identifies Had Father’s presumed f ather status been recognized
when the court was first provided with the marriage certificate
establishin g this status, Father would have been represented by appointed counsel at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing

. Separately, h ad the court complied with Penal Code section 2625, Father or his counsel would have been present at the hearing. Father argues these changes could have led to the marshaling of additional evidence or the pursuit of additional arguments, based
on which the court m ight have provided him with reunification

s ervices

, 6 thereby c hanging the trajectory of the pr oceedings and, potentially, preserving his parental rights

. I n light of the applicable statutory presumptions and showings required under section 361.5, however, the errors at
issue do not warrant reversa l under either a Watson or Chapman harmless error analysis , as discussed below

.

a. Section 361.5, subdivision (b) bypass provisions

Section 3 61.5, subdivision (b) contains several reunification “bypass provisions” permitting (or, in some cases, requiring ) a

6 Father concedes that jurisdiction would have been proper regardless.21

court to deny a parent reunification services. (See In re A.E. (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141 ; Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) Once the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that a case presents one of the
situations set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b), “the general
rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption
that offering [reunifica tion] services would be an unwise use of governmental resources

. ” ( In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478

. ) Here, as the court correctly noted , the bypass provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applied: A juvenile court had previously “ ordered termination of reunification services for

. . . half siblings of [ C hristopher ] because [Father] failed to reunify
with the

. . . half sibling [s] ” and “ [Father] has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal
of the

. . . half sibling of [ Christopher ] from [Father]

. ” ( See § 361.5, subd. (b)(1) .) Father does not challenge the applicability of this bypass provision, nor c ould he. Father failed to reunify with two
of his older children in dependency proceedings based on substance
abuse issues

, and Father has since cont inued his drug

- related criminality

. Even if Father could offer evidence of efforts to address
these issues, no such efforts could have supported a “reasonable
effort to addre ss” finding ( see § 361.5, subd. (b)(10))

, g iven Father’s
continuous drug

- related criminality.
T he services bypass provision in subdivision (b)(12) of
section 361.5 applied as well, based on Father’s violent felony conviction (robbery), for which he is currently incarcerated. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12) [ “ [r] eunification services need not be provided

. . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence

. . . [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . the parent or guardian of the child
has bee n convicted of a violent felony”] ; see P en. Code, § 667.5,
subd. (c)( 9 ) [ “ any robbery ” constitutes a violent felony] .)22 If, as occurred here, a byp ass provision is found to apply, a juvenile court “shall not” order reunification unless the court makes
certain countervailing factual findings. (§ 361.5 , subd. (c) (2) .) The countervailing factual finding necessary to support reunification
services here would be a finding “ by clear and convincing evidenc e[ ]
that reunification is in the best interes t of the child.” ( Ibid .) F ather
has never even met Christopher

, acknowledges having “little to no relationship with either child

, ” and will be in carcerated until at
least late 2020

. Both children have been living with the maternal

aunt since Christopher ’s birth ( and thus for almost three years ),

are thriving in her care, and are on a path to being adopted by
her. Given these facts, t here is no basis on which even the most competent counsel could have shown it was in Christopher’s best interest to override the statutory presumption that reunification
services should be denied. (See In re Marcos G . (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 390

– 391 [ no abuse of discretion in court’s
conclusion that reunification services not in child’s best interest
where the child was bonded to and had been living with his foster parents for 20 months, and the father ’s weekly visits with child “were nothing more than friendly visits between the two in which [they would ] play”] .) Indeed, Father makes no attempt to argue how a court could have concluded that services would have been in Christopher’s
best interest, nor does he argue the bypass provision under
section 361.5, subdivision (b) is inapplicable

.

b. Section 361.5, subdivision (e) regarding services for incarcerated p arents
S ection 361.5, subdivision (e) instructs a court to order
reasonable reunification services for an incarcerated parent “ unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those
services wou ld be detrimental to the child.” ( Ibid .) Father does not23

explain how the juvenile court could have found that reunification
services would not be detrimental to Christopher under the factors
identified in the statute. T he statutorily

- enumerated factors potentially applicable here are: “ [T] he age of the child, the degree
of parent

- child bond ing, the length o f the sentence,

. . . the nature
of the crime

. . . , the degree of detriment to the child if services

are not offered

. . . , the likelihood of the parent’ s discharge from
incarceration

. . . within the reunification time limitati ons [,] ” and “any other appropriate factors.” ( Ibid .) Applying these factors, t here is not a reasonable probability
that reunifi cation services would not be detrimental to Christopher

— even if Father had had counsel to advocate against such a finding

. Indeed, undisputed facts in the record establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such services would be deemed detrimental to Christopher under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). Father is not eligible for parole until approximately three years
after Chri stopher was first detained, so Father’s incarceration
would have fallen well outside the maximum reunification period

,

even if the court permitted an exten sion beyond the applicable
six

- month limit for children under three years ol d. ( See § 361.5, subd. ( a)(1)(B) , (3)(A) & (4)(A)

. ) As such

, any services the court might order could not have successfully reunified Father with Christopher wi thin the statutory time frame, which section 361.5, subdivision (e) (1) instructs they must in order to avoid pro ceeding

to a permanency planning hearing. 7 (See In re Ronell A. (199 5 )

7 Under certain “unusual” or “extraordinary circumstances”

a juvenile court may extend the reunification period as an exercise of its discretionary power to “ ‘continue any hearing . . . beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held.’ ” ( Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501,24

44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365

– 1366 [“ Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) specifically states reunification services for an incarcerated parent are subject to the 18

– month time frame

. When a child cannot be returned to the parent within the statutory time frame, the court is required to establish a permanent plan for the child and refer the
case for a section 366.26 hearing. ”].) Instead

, ordering reunification
services for Father would serve only to delay establishing a permanent home for Christopher with the only caregiver he h as ever known

. D elaying Christopher a stable, permanent placement in the interest of pursuing a reunification doomed to fail would be detrimental to Christopher

. T hat the length of Father’s sentence prevents him from reunify ing with Christopher within the necessary time frame is

not the only section 361.5, subdivision (e) (1) factor suggesting detriment to Christopher. As noted, F ather admits he ha s

no relationship with Christopher. Moreover, F ather’s lengthy
criminal history of substance abuse related offenses , which caused
him to lose custo dy of his three older children

, has escalated to
include , most recently, a violent felony conviction , as a result
of whi ch he has never even met Christopher

. (See § 361.5,
subd. ( b)(10) & (12).) In light of all of these facts

— none of which
Father contests

— any additional evidence or argument counsel might hav e offered at the jurisdiction/ disposition hearing w o uld

1510, quoting § 352, subd. (a); see, e.g., In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1777

– 1778.) “[G]iven the imperative t o resolve dependency cases in a timely fashion,” such a continuance that almost doubles the reunification period would, on the facts of this case, “be outside the scope of what the Legislature intended with enactment of the continuance statute.” ( Denny H., supra

, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511; id. at p. 1510 [rejecting a six

- month illness

- based extension of the reunification period on this basis].)25

not have caused the court to award Father reunification services
for Christopher. (See In re James C

. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 486 [substantial evidence supported denial of reunification
services where the father was convicted of several violent felonies and his release date from prison exceeded the maximum period of reunification services]; In re S.P.

, supra , 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 975
, petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020, S264203, time to grant or deny review extended to Nov. 30, 2020 [fi nding it was not reasonably likely the father would have been granted reunification services
when he had failed to reunify with other children, had no bond with
the child at issue in the proceedings, had a lengthy criminal history and history of unaddresse d drug abuse, and r emained incarcerated
at the time of the permanency planning hearing with no plan for
the child’s care].)
W e reject Father’s suggestion that considering the duration
of Father’s incarceration in assessing detriment runs afoul of the
admonition in In r e Brittany S. ( 1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, that
there is no “go to prison, lose your child” law in California

. ( Id.

at p. 1402

. ) Certainly a court may not deny reunification services based solely on a parent being incarcerated, but section 361.5, subdivision (e) (1) expressly provides that a court may consider whether imprisonment may make reunification impossible within the statutory timelines. Here, it would, and reunification services would thus almost certainly be to Christopher’s detriment. (See Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Court s Practice and Procedure (20 20 ) § 2.129[ 3 ][b], p. 2

– 540 [ “ [T]o attempt services in such circumstances may be setting everyone up for failure, including the parent, agency, and child” and “it may be possible to show that providing services to the incarcerated parent would be detrimental to the child since it would delay permanenc y with no likelihood of success ” and “thus only serve[ ] to delay stability for the child

. ” ].)26 Given our conclusion that the termination of reunification services for Christopher was inevitable, Father has presented no basis on which to conclude that the challenge d errors could have somehow affected the juvenile court’s subsequent decision at the permanency planning hearing to terminate his parental rights. Once “ the court has decided to end parent

- child reunification services, the legisla tive preference is for ad option .” ( In re
Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780.) If, as the court
found to be the case here, “adoption is likely, the court is required

to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination wou ld be detrimental to the child.” ( In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 .) Father was both present for and represented by counsel at the permanency planning hearings, during which the court concluded that no such countervailing
factual finding could be made to override the presumption in favor of adoption and the “compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody” following termination of reunification services. ( I n re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 .) Although Father
raises ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in an effort

to rebut DCFS’s forf

eiture arguments (see ante , f n. 4 )

, th ese
arg uments are not based on any ineffective assistance in connection
with the representation provided during the permanency planning hearings , save that his counsel made “ ‘general appearances’ when
she should hav e only made special appearances” at those hearings. Thus, Father cannot establish a reasonable pro bability that the challenged errors affected the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights as to Christopher

. 8 The errors are therefore

8 In his reply brief, Father appears to raise, for the first time, the argument that such ineffective assistance of counsel

— that is,27

harmless under Watson , the applicable framework for assessing prejudice here. (See Celine R.

, supra , 31 Cal.4th at pp. 59

– 60 ; In re S.P., supra , 52 Cal.App.5th

. at pp. 973

– 974 , petn. for review filed Sept. 1, 2020, S264203, time to grant or deny review extended to Nov. 30, 20 20

. ) Moreover, even if the more stringent Chapman framework were to apply, we further conclude, based “not on guesswork or speculation, but on the undisputed facts before us” ( In re S.P.

, supra , at p. 975)

, and the portions of section 361.5 discussed above, that the errors were also harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt

.

D. Father’s Motion to Extend His No tice of Appeal
to Apply to I.L. In criminal cases, the doctrine of constructive filing permits

an appellate court to construe a belated notice of appeal as having been timely filed under certain circumstances, including when an incarcerated criminal defendant made arrangements with his trial attorney to file the notice of appeal, and the attorney faile d to do so

. ( In re Benoit , supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 86 .) The California Supreme
Court has explained the goal of applying the doctrine under such
circumstances is to avoid penalizing a defendant for justifiably

r elying on his attorney to file the notice of appeal in a timely
fashion

. ( I

d. at pp. 88

– 89.)

the failure of counsel to bring a section 388 petition to challenge the court’s ruling at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing

— is itself

a basis for reversal (as opposed to a basis for avoiding forfeiture of Fathe r’s arguments on appeal). We need not determine whether this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel , as there was no prejudice from the due process violations in connection with the jurisdiction/disposition hearing that such a petition would have

r aised , for the reasons discussed in the Discussion ante , section C.2

.28 Father concedes that, under longstanding precedent

, the constructive filing doctrine does not apply to cases involving
the termination of parental rights. ( See , e.g., In re Z.S.

, supra , 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 .) “ ‘ Numerous cases

. . . have determined that the special need for finality in parental termination cases and the danger of imperiling adoption proceedings prevails over the policy considerations in favor of constructive filing. ’ ” ( Ibid. , quoting In re Alyssa H. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1254; In re A. M. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 319, 322 [“While we reco gnize the importance of

a natural mother or father’s parental rights [citations] , we deem
the special need for finality in [such] cases

. . . of paramount importance. Adoption proceedings could be jeopardized if
the finality of a judgment

. . . were uncertain.”]. ) As one court explained, although the result of this approach “ will be harsh
in s ome cases

. . . [w] e have considered the desirability of a more flexible standard, but can formulate no rules for the applicability
of such a standard under which we could confidently predict
that more good would be done than harm.” ( In re Isaac J. (1992)

4 Cal.App.4th 525, 534 .)
Father’s motion nevertheless requests that the constructive filing doctrine should apply here and permit him to “extend”
his timely notice of appeal as to Christopher to also cover I.L.

, regarding whom he filed no notice of appeal. Father rel ies in large part on the fact that the California Supreme Court has granted
review in In re A.R

. (Jan. 21, 2020, A158143) [nonpub. order], petition for review granted May 13, 2020, S2609 28, to addre ss the question whether “ a parent in a juvenile dependency case ha[s]
the right to challenge h er coun sel’s failure to file a timely notice
of ap peal fr om an order terminating her parental rights. ” ( Supreme
Ct. Minutes

, May 13, 20 20 , p. 6 1 2

. ) Based on this pending matter, Father argues that the Supreme Court “ seems at least open to29

challenges to ” the “ widely accepted ” policy of “ all intermediate appellate courts in this state for more than a quarte r of a century” regarding the inapplicability of Benoit to proceedings involving
the termination of parental rights. He notes his motion is in part intended to preserve his right to seek relief, depending on the
outcome of In re A.R. Father further argue s that the constructive notice of appeal doctrine should permit an appeal regarding I.L. According to Father, because I.L. has no t yet been adopted by the maternal aunt (although th is remains the permanency plan)

, the primary basis for not applying Benoit in the dependency context

— that doing so would compromise the finality of adoption s

— is not implicated here. Father further argues that we should permit this appeal to apply to
I.L. , because “ if [I.L. ] ’s case had no t become separated from that of
Christ opher

. . . the exact same arguments would apply to both.

. . . [Christopher’s] arguments woul d apply with equal force to [I.L.]
and with the same results had a timely notice of appeal been filed
as to her. In other w ords, we may well have the anomaly of two full siblings, identically situated, with identical arguments that could [ be ] raised on be half of both but paren tal rights will be reversed as

to one but affirmed as to the other solely based upon judicial neglect as aided by ineffective assis tance of counsel. That ca nnot and
should not be the law.” Father argues he has satisfied the requirements of Benoit
based on facts, which he supports through attached declarations and citations to the appellate record, suggesting he was not sufficiently informed of how and when to appeal the order

term inating his parental rights over I.L . He argues that the advisory of appellate rights the juvenile court provided at the permanency planning hearing regarding I.L. was in complete

, and
he declares that his counsel never explained the deadline for an30

appeal (or anything else regarding his right to appeal)

, and that he never received a copy of the minute order terminating his parental rights to I.L. (which, as noted, the record on appeal reflect s were mailed to an incorrect address). A declaration from an attorney at the firm of his former counsel provides that Father’s file does not contain any indication Father ’s counsel informed him of his right to appeal or provided him with the necessary paperwork for filing an appeal. DCFS counters that Father did not file any notice of appeal regarding I.L. that we mi ght be able to deem constructively filed, that Father’s bases for applying Benoit to these or other proceedings involving termination of parental rights lack merit, and that, in any event, Father has not satisfied the requirements of Benoit because
he fail ed to exercise sufficient diligence in pursuing review of the order regarding I.L

. ( See In re Benoit

, supra , 10 Cal.3d at pp. 88

– 89 [court should “not indiscriminately permit a defendant whose counsel has undertaken to file the notice of appeal, to invoke the doctrine of constructive filing when the defendant has displayed

no diligence in seeing that his attorney has discharged this responsibility” ] .)
Father’s motion raises important policy issues, and we

are troubled by the fact that Father appears not to have received
basic guidance from his attorney regarding his appellate rights. Nevertheless, Father’s motion does not present an opportunity

to engage on these policy issues, and no prejudice resulted from Father’s inability to appeal the order reg arding I.L. This is because
Father makes clear that, were we to permit an appeal regarding the
I.L. order, Father would raise the ex act same arguments that he raised in his appeal regarding Christopher . Given our conclusion, for the reasons discussed above, that Father’s arguments regarding Christopher do not merit reversal , p ermitting Father to extend his31

appeal to I.L. would serve no purpose , even assuming this court
has the ability and inclination to grant it

. T he motion is denied

.
DISPOSITION The order of the juvenile court terminating Father’s parental rights as to Christopher L. on March 5, 2020 is affirmed in all
respects. Father’s motion to extend his notice of appeal to apply to I.L.
and/or motion for c onstru ctive notice of appeal as to I.L. is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

CHANEY , J.

BENDIX , J.