United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KATANA RACING, INC., DBA WHEEL & TIRE 

DISTRIBUTORS,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2022-1832

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:19-cv-00125-TJA, Senior Judge Thomas J. 

Aquilino, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: August 3, 2023

______________________ 

EMMA EATON BOND, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

 PRATIK A. SHAH, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 

LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by PATRICK KLEIN, JOHN M. PETERSON, Neville 

Peterson LLP, New York, NY; RICHARD F. O’NEILL, Seattle, 

WA.

Case: 22-1832 Document: 45 Page: 1 Filed: 08/03/2023
2 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

 ______________________ 

Before PROST, SCHALL, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge.

On July 15, 2019, the United States brought an action 

in the United States Court of International Trade against 

Katana Racing, Inc. (“Katana”). In that action, the government sought to recover unpaid customs duties and fees pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d). J.A. 

89–94. Instead of answering the complaint, on August 30, 

2019, Katana filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to United 

States Court of International Trade Rule (“CIT Rule”)

12(b). Among other things, Katana asserted that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to CIT Rule 12(b)(1)

for lack of jurisdiction because the government had filed 

suit after the statute of limitations set forth at 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1621 had run. Katana stated that, although it had signed 

a waiver of the statute of limitations on October 25, 2016, 

it had revoked the waiver prior to the expiration of the limitations period. J.A. 242–45. In a decision dated March 28, 

2022, the Court of International Trade found that Katana 

had properly revoked its October 25, 2016 waiver of the 

statute of limitations. As a result, the court held that the 

government’s suit was untimely, and it dismissed the suit 

pursuant to CIT Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. 

United States v. Katana Racing, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 

1314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2022).

The government now appeals. For the reasons set forth 

below, we hold that the Court of International Trade erred 

in dismissing the government’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. 

We therefore reverse the court’s decision and remand the 

case to the court for further proceedings.

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 3

BACKGROUND

I 

The facts pertinent to this appeal are set forth in the 

government’s complaint. See Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. 

de C.V. v. United States, 31 F.4th 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2022) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, we ‘must accept 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true and must draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant.’” (quoting 

Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 827 

F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016))).

Katana, a California-based distributor of high-end 

wheels and tires, was the importer of record for 386 entries 

of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China between November 24, 2009, and August 7, 2012. J.A. 89–

91. For those 386 entries, Katana supplied U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) with invoices 

that listed prices lower than what Katana actually paid its 

Chinese vendors. Id. at 91. Due to this error, Katana undercalculated the amount of safeguard duties, regular customs duties, harbor maintenance fees, and merchandise 

processing fees it owed Customs by $5,742,483.80. Id. On 

June 20, 2019, Customs issued a demand to Katana for the 

unpaid duties and fees. Id. at 93.

As noted, on July 15, 2019, the government filed suit 

against Katana for unpaid customs duties and fees “[b]ased 

on its violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) and under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1592(d).” Id. at 93–94. According to the government, 

“Katana did not exercise reasonable care to ensure that 

[the 386 entries at issue] . . . reflected accurate values of 

the merchandise, and thus Katana violated 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1592(a).” Id. at 92.1

1 Section 1592(a) provides:

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4 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

Although filed outside the statute of limitations time 

period set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1621, the government’s complaint stated that it was timely because Katana had executed three consecutive waivers of the statute of 

limitations. In the last of these waivers, dated October 25, 

2016, Katana indicated that the statute of limitations 

would be waived for a period “up to and including July 15, 

2019,” the date the government filed suit. Id. at 90 (quoting J.A. 173).

II

As noted, on August 30, 2019, Katana moved to dismiss 

the government’s action under CIT Rule 12(b). J.A. 204–

05. Specifically, Katana’s motion sought dismissal under 

CIT Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted” and CIT Rule 12(b)(1) for “lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 204; CIT Rule 12(b). 

Katana’s motion included a statement of facts supported by 

exhibits other than the pleadings. J.A. 213–21, 215 n.4, 

252. In that statement of facts, Katana asserted that it 

“had been the victim of a pervasive scheme of identity theft, 

[N]o person, by fraud, gross negligence, or 

negligence . . . may enter, introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce any merchandise 

into the commerce of the United States by 

means of (i) any document or electronically 

transmitted data or information, written or 

oral statement, or act which is material and 

false, or (ii) any omission which is material[.] 

Section 1592(d) states that “if the United States has 

been deprived of lawful duties, taxes, or fees as a result of 

a violation of [§ 1592(a)], the Customs Service shall require 

that such lawful duties, taxes, and fees be restored, 

whether or not a monetary penalty is assessed.” Section 

1592(c) of 19 U.S.C. sets forth “[m]aximum penalties” for 

violations of § 1592(a).

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 5

as Chinese vendors had engaged U.S. customs brokers to 

file entries in Katana’s name, without Katana’s knowledge 

or permission.” Id. at 215.

Although it acknowledged that a CIT Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the facts as alleged in the complaint, id. at

222, Katana stated that, “[t]o the extent the parties rely on 

materials outside the pleadings,” the Court of International Trade should treat Katana’s motion as a motion for 

summary judgment under CIT Rule 12(d), id. at 215 n.4.2 

In its motion, Katana also stated that the court could consider evidence outside the pleadings to establish the predicate facts when considering a CIT Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 221–

22 (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 

1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 

Katana made three main arguments in its motion to 

dismiss. First, it argued that the government’s complaint 

should be dismissed under CIT Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim because Customs had never found a violation 

of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). According to Katana, such a finding 

was a prerequisite to the assessment of penalties under 19 

U.S.C. § 1592(c) and the assertion of a claim for unpaid and 

owed duties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d). Id. at 222, 228,

232–37. Second, Katana argued that the complaint should 

be dismissed under CIT Rule 12(b)(6) because Customs was 

required to exhaust the administrative procedures set forth 

in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b) before it could lawfully determine 

2 CIT Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are 

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 

must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule

56.” 

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6 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

that a violation of § 1592(a) had occurred, which it failed to 

do. Id. at 237–42.3

Katana’s third argument was that the government’s 

suit was untimely and should be dismissed under CIT Rule 

12(b)(1) because Katana had revoked its final waiver of the 

statute of limitations. Id. at 242–49. Katana asserted that 

it had agreed to three different waivers of the statute of 

limitations “[a]t CBP’s request, and in order to obtain the 

benefit of orderly administrative proceedings regarding 

any violations which might be asserted.” Id. at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). Katana argued that it 

properly revoked the third waiver of the statute of limitations on June 26, 2019, because, contrary to representations that Customs had made to it, Customs never 

undertook the administrative proceedings contemplated by 

§ 1592(b) to determine the validity of Katana’s claim that

it had been the victim of identity theft. Id. at 243–49.

Responding first to Katana’s arguments for dismissal 

under CIT Rule 12(b)(6), the government argued that Customs need not have established a violation of § 1592(a) to 

bring suit. Instead, the government contended, it needed 

only to allege a violation of § 1592(a) in its complaint. J.A.

697. Next, the government urged that Customs need not 

have followed the administrative process outlined in 

§ 1592(b) to establish such a violation of § 1592(a) prior to 

filing suit under § 1592(d). Id. at 693–97. In making this 

argument, the government cited this court’s decisions in 

United States v. Blum, 858 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1988),

United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 560 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 

2009), and United States v. Jac Natori Co., 108 F.3d 295 

3 Section 1592(b) sets forth procedures that must be 

followed when the government seeks to collect a penalty for 

a violation of § 1592(a). These procedures include a prepenalty notice and a penalty claim. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b)(1), 

(2).

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 7

(Fed. Cir. 1997), as well as the decisions of the Court of International Trade in United States v. Aegis Security Insurance Co., 301 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018), 

United States v. Nitek Electronics, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 

1298 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 806 F.3d 

1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015), United States v. Aegis Security Insurance Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005), 

and United States v. Ross, 574 F. Supp. 1067 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 1983). J.A. 694–98. According to the government, 

these cases stand for the proposition that § 1592(d) creates 

an independent cause of action for unpaid duties that does 

not require the exhaustion of § 1592(b)’s administrative 

remedies. Id. 

The government also disputed Katana’s contention 

that the suit was untimely. Katana’s purported justification for revoking its third waiver of the statute of limitations was unavailing, the government asserted, because 

the government did not promise Katana administrative 

proceedings in exchange for the waiver. Id. at 701–02. In 

addition, the government argued that Katana should be estopped from revoking its waiver because Customs justifiably relied upon the waiver. Id. at 702–04.

III 

On March 28, 2022, the Court of International Trade 

granted Katana’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the 

suit was “barred by the passage of time.” Katana, 569 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1314. The court deemed Katana’s June 26, 

2019 revocation of its third waiver of the statute of limitations to be effective, accepting Katana’s explanation that 

Customs did not undertake the administrative procedures 

it had “promised” Katana it would provide. Id. at 1305–06, 

1308–10, 1312–14. That is, Customs “did not properly exhaust the administrative procedures that it had obliged itself to undertake,” the court concluded. Id. at 1309. The 

court also stated that the government could not bring suit 

against Katana solely because it was the “importer of 

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8 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

record” for the 386 entries at issue. Id. at 1314. Instead, 

Customs had to provide “precise reasons for holding a defendant ‘responsible’ for paying its § 1592(d) duty demand 

in its complaint.” Id.

The government has appealed the Court of International Trade’s decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

I 

A 

On appeal, the government contends that the Court of 

International Trade erroneously dismissed its suit for lack 

of jurisdiction pursuant to CIT Rule 12(b)(1). First, the 

government argues that the statute of limitations set forth 

at 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is not jurisdictional. Rather, it is an 

affirmative defense that, at the pleading stage, must be adjudicated based on the well-pleaded facts in the complaint. 

Appellant’s Br. 15; Reply Br. 1–8. In this vein, the government urges that the court erred when it held that Katana’s 

statute of limitations waiver was properly revoked. While 

acknowledging that misconduct could render a statute of 

limitations waiver void, the government asserts that no 

such misconduct was alleged here and that Katana’s 

waiver was a voluntary, unilateral action that the government relied upon. Therefore, it was irrevocable. Appellant’s Br. 15–21 (citing United States v. Ford Motor Co., 497 

F.3d 1331, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Reply Br. 9–16. The 

government also argues that, even assuming a statute of 

limitations waiver can be revoked, equitable estoppel prevents Katana from revoking its waiver here. Appellant’s 

Br. 21–26. 

The government next argues that the Court of International Trade erroneously determined that Customs had 

failed to exhaust administrative procedures before issuing 

a duty demand. The government points to § 1592(b), 

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 9

which, by its own terms, only applies to penalty claims for 

violations of § 1592(a), as opposed to restoration of “lawful 

duties” under § 1592(d). Id. at 26–28. The government 

also relies on Blum, where we recognized that § 1592(d) 

provides an independent cause of action to recover lost import duties even against parties who did not themselves violate § 1592(a). Id. at 29 (citing Blum, 858 F.2d at 1568–

69). “Accordingly,” the government argues, “the Government may bring a non-penalty action for duties under 

[§ ]1592(d) without first undertaking the administrative 

procedures necessary to find that Katana, itself, violated 

[§ ]1592(a).” Id. at 30 (citing Ross, 574 F. Supp. at 1069).

Finally, the government argues that the court “erred 

by holding that Katana’s status as importer of record was 

not sufficient to state a claim under [§ ]1592(d).” Id. at 32; 

see also id. at 31–33. The government contends that the 

court erred by engaging in fact-finding in connection with

Katana’s “identity theft” defense, which the government 

states is not appropriate at the CIT Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Id.

at 33–35.

B 

Katana’s position has evolved in the course of this appeal. In its responding brief, Katana argued that the Court 

of International Trade correctly determined that it lacked 

jurisdiction because the government’s suit was untimely. 

Appellee’s Br. 14–15, 43. Katana asserted that the statute 

of limitations waiver was procured by deception, specifically, Customs’ false promise of the administrative proceedings required by § 1592(b), and that therefore it was in 

fact “void,” as opposed to “revoked.” Id. at 22; see also id.

at 12–13, 15–30. Katana’s brief asserted that the court did 

not issue an appealable decision on Katana’s CIT Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, id. at 15–16, 23 n.24, 30–32, and that 

therefore “[t]he sole focus of this appeal should be on the 

CIT’s dismissal based on untimeliness,” id. at 31. In the 

alternative, Katana argued that the government’s 

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10 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

complaint did not assert a violation of § 1592(a) and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. Id. at 39–43.

At oral argument, however, Katana agreed with the 

government that, to the extent the Court of International 

Trade dismissed the government’s suit for lack of jurisdiction, it erred. Oral Arg. at 13:00–14:21, 20:50–21:15

https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22

-1832_06072023.mp3 (“[W]e don’t dispute that [the statute 

of limitations waiver issue] is, in fact, not jurisdictional, so 

I think we’re on the same page with the government 

there.”). Katana also agreed with the government that

Customs was not required by statute to follow the administrative procedures in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b) in order to assert a claim for unpaid and owed duties under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1592(d). Id. at 14:20–50, 26:40–50 (agreeing that 

§ 1592(b) procedures were not required).4 Instead, Katana 

argued that the Court of International Trade issued an appealable decision on Katana’s CIT Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 

that we should affirm the court’s dismissal on that basis. 

Id. at 16:45–17:55. That is, Katana urged at oral argument

that the government’s complaint should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to CIT Rule 12(b)(6) because it lacks factual allegations supporting Katana’s culpability under § 1592(a). Id. at 13:00–14:20, 14:45–20:38. 

Katana acknowledges that the Court of International 

Trade improperly considered extrinsic evidence in rendering what Katana now says was a CIT Rule 12(b)(6) decision. It argues, however, that this error was harmless 

4 Katana’s appeal brief also had conceded that 

§ 1592(b) procedures are not administrative remedies 

whose exhaustion is required before a suit may be brought 

to recover withheld duties. Appellee’s Br. 27 n.27 (citing 

Blum, 858 F.2d 1566).

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 11

because the government had affirmatively indicated to the 

court that it did not object to consideration of the exhibits 

Katana had attached to its motion to dismiss. Id. at 21:15–

23:00 (quoting J.A. 689 n.1), 24:50–26:05. 

II

At times the Court of International Trade’s decision appears to interweave analyses under CIT Rules 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim and 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Katana, 569 F. Supp. 3d at 1300

(discussing CIT Rule 12(b)(6) in the context of challenges 

to subject matter jurisdiction), 1308 (“[T]he question here 

is whether plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for 

which relief can be granted, which implicates the circumstances that would permit a company to revoke its waiver 

of the relevant statute of limitations . . . pertaining to a customs duty matter.”), 1314 (“The complaint’s reliance on 

that duty demand thus fails to ‘state[] a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face[,]’ given the facts as presented now 

herein.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009))). At the end of the day, however, it is clear that the 

basis for the court’s dismissal was CIT Rule 12(b)(1). After 

first noting that Katana had moved to dismiss pursuant to 

both rules, the court indicated that “[c]onsideration of the 

parties’ positions persuades the court that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter.” Id. at 1299 (emphasis added). In 

addition, the court observed that it considered subject matter jurisdiction to be of primary concern since, “if subject 

matter jurisdiction is lacking, then there can be no adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 1300 (citation omitted). Finally, the court concluded its decision with the following 

statement: “[Katana] has provided reasonable justification 

for its revocation of its last [statute of limitations waiver], 

with the result that this action is now barred by the passage of time.” Id. at 1314. This was the basis for Katana’s 

motion to dismiss under CIT Rule 12(b)(1). See J.A. 242–

49. We therefore agree with Katana’s original position that 

the court did not issue an appealable decision on Katana’s 

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12 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

CIT Rule 12(b)(6) motion and, instead, dismissed the suit 

for lack of jurisdiction under CIT Rule 12(b)(1). We review 

such a decision de novo. Hutchison, 827 F.3d at 1359. 

As we have previously held, the statute of limitations 

set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is not a jurisdictional time 

limit. See United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., 172 F.3d 

1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing a decision by the 

Court of International Trade and holding that the statute 

of limitations under § 1621 could be waived because it was 

not jurisdictional). Instead, it provides “an affirmative defense” that “can be waived . . . either by not raising it or by 

agreeing before trial not to assert it.” Id. (citations omitted); cf. Ford, 497 F.3d at 1337 (“We hold that Ford’s tenth 

waiver was an express, voluntary, and unilateral act that 

alone was sufficient to extend the § 1621 statute of limitations period until April 7, 2005.”). In addition, a statute of 

limitations waiver, which is tantamount to a “consensual 

extension of the limitations period,” United States v. Inn 

Foods, Inc., 383 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004), serves to 

preclude the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Our prior conclusion that 

§ 1621 is not jurisdictional is consistent with recent decisions of the Supreme Court addressing similar statutes. 

See Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. ___, ___, 143 S. Ct. 

870, 875–81 (2023) (concluding that the Quiet Title Act’s 

12-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g), is not 

jurisdictional); United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408–

12 (2015) (holding that the statute of limitations for the 

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401, is not jurisdictional and therefore is subject to equitable tolling, explaining that “Congress must do something special, beyond 

setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling 

it.”); cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 

U.S. 130, 133–39 (concluding that the statute of limitations 

under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, is jurisdictional 

due to the Supreme Court’s “definitive earlier 

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 13

interpretation” of the statute as being of a “more absolute 

nature”). We therefore concur with the parties that the 

Court of International Trade erred in dismissing the government’s suit for lack of jurisdiction under CIT Rule 

12(b)(1). 

Because the Court of International Trade erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, we reverse the court’s decision and remand the case to the court for further 

proceedings. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 

550, 558 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing the dismissal of a claim 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanding after 

determining that the Court of International Trade’s decision was based on a requirement that was not jurisdictional).5 On remand, Katana will be able to assert as an 

affirmative defense its claim that its third statute of limitations waiver was void.6 And of course, on remand Katana 

5 Because it was not the basis for the Court of International Trade’s decision, and because it contradicts Katana’s own original position in this appeal, we decline to 

accept Katana’s belated invitation to address the sufficiency of the complaint in the first instance on appeal. Instead, on remand Katana may renew its motion to dismiss 

under CIT Rule 12(b)(6) or seek summary judgment.

6 The waiver of an applicable statute of limitations 

is not a contract, but instead a voluntary, unilateral action

that, once executed, may be relied upon by the government

and therefore cannot be revoked. Ford, 497 F.3d at 1336; 

Stange v. United States, 282 U.S. 270, 276 (1931). Without 

expressing any view on the matter, we do not foreclose, 

however, Katana’s argument that its third waiver was induced by affirmative misconduct by Customs. See Heckler 

v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 

60–61 & n.12 (1984); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 463

F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[E]stoppel is available 

against government actors only in cases involving 

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14 US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 

also will be entitled to assert any and all defenses to the 

government’s claim for unpaid duties. We note however 

that, on remand, Katana will not be able to argue that Customs was required by statute to follow the penalty assessment procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b). As the 

government argues and as Katana recognizes, such procedures were not statutorily required. Section 1592(b) provides the applicable procedures for issuing a pre-penalty 

and penalty notice in the event the government seeks to 

collect penalties for a violation of § 1592(a). In contrast, 

§ 1592(d) explains that “the Customs Service shall require 

that . . . lawful duties, taxes, and fees be restored, whether 

or not a monetary penalty is assessed.” 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) 

(emphasis added). Thus, when a penalty is not assessed, 

as here, the statute does not mandate the performance of 

the procedures under § 1592(b). See Ross, 574 F. Supp. at

1069 (“Section 1592(d), taken at face-value, demonstrates 

that the United States need not follow the elaborate penalty procedures when pursuing a duty claim.”); 19 C.F.R. 

Part 171, Appx. B, section J (noting that, where “issuance 

of a penalty under [§ 1592] is not warranted,” but that “circumstances do warrant issuance of a demand for payment 

of an actual loss of duty pursuant to [§ 1592(d)],” Customs 

should follow the procedures set forth at 19 C.F.R. 

§ 162.79b); 19 C.F.R. § 162.79b (requiring “written notice 

to the person of the liability for the actual loss of duties, 

taxes and fees or actual loss of revenue,” “in any case in 

which a monetary penalty is not assessed or a written notification of claim of monetary penalty is not issued”).7

affirmative misconduct.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

7 Indeed, the Court of International Trade acknowledged that “generalized case law indicates that collection 

of unpaid duties does not require the elaborate 

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US v. KATANA RACING, INC. 15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of 

International Trade is reversed. The case is remanded to 

the court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.8

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

administrative procedures of § 1592(b)(1).” Katana, 569 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted).

8 At oral argument, the parties informed us that 

pages 165–69 and 177–99 were inadvertently included in

the Appendix. Accordingly, at the request of the parties, 

we have disregarded those pages. See Oral Arg. at 10:50–

11:52, 12:20–58. 

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