United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 22-2452

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Deborah J. Lightner

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Catalent CTS (Kansas City), LLC

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri

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Submitted: September 21, 2023

Filed: December 26, 2023

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Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge. 

Deborah Lightner sued her former employer, Catalent CTS (Kansas City), 

LLC (“Catalent”), under Missouri law for age discrimination and retaliation. On 

appeal, Lightner challenges the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment 

for her age discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as its denial of her motion 

for leave to file a sur-reply brief in the summary judgment proceedings. We affirm 
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in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

I. Background

Consistent with our standard of review, we present the facts in the light most 

favorable to Lightner, the nonmoving party, and grant all reasonable inferences in 

her favor. Oglesby v. Lesan, 929 F.3d 526, 531–32 (8th Cir. 2019).

Lightner worked for Catalent from 2012 to 2020, when she was between the 

ages of 56 and 64. Throughout her employment with Catalent, Lightner received 

multiple promotions, the last of which occurred in October 2018, when Lightner was 

promoted to “Director, Project Manager.” Approximately a year after Lightner 

assumed her role as a director, three employees left her team, citing concerns with 

management and workload. Two of those employees specifically cited Lightner as 

a reason for their departures. And in Lightner’s 2019 year-end review, Catalent rated

Lightner’s performance as “Partially Met Expectations,” which is the second lowest 

rating on a five-point scale. 

In January 2020, Kevin Economos, Catalent’s Kansas City General Manager 

and Lightner’s only on-site supervisor, left the company. Before that, Economos 

had worked with Lightner daily and praised Lightner in her director role. After 

Economos left Catalent, members within Catalent’s management and human 

resources (“HR”) teams discussed Lightner’s declining performance. 

By February 2020, Catalent decided to act. Two more employees from 

Lightner’s team resigned, again citing Lightner as one of the reasons for their 

departures. Catalent management and HR considered three options for Lightner: (1) 

place her on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”); (2) demote her to a lowerlevel position; or (3) end her employment and offer her a severance plan. Members 

of Catalent’s management and HR team were concerned about the managerial risks 

of Lightner running her department on a PIP. 
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On February 13, Catalent gave Lightner her mid-year performance review, 

told Lightner she was rated “not on track,” and asked Lightner whether she was 

interested in staying in her current position, but on a PIP, or receiving a demotion to 

the Senior Manager role. Five days later, on February 18, Lightner emailed Catalent, 

writing she believed her age was a factor in her employment options. In that same 

email, Lightner chose to be placed on a PIP and stay in her current position. Just 

two days later, on February 20, Catalent met with Lightner and told her the PIP was 

no longer an option—she could either accept a demotion or a severance plan. 

Lightner told Catalent she did not want a demotion. Catalent then provided Lightner 

with a proposed separation agreement with a severance plan. Catalent allowed 

Lightner twenty-one days to review the document. 

 

Lightner worked from home on Friday, February 21 and took paid time off 

the following work week. On Friday, February 28, Reid Tonik, Lightner’s direct 

supervisor, texted Lightner to ask whether she intended to accept the demotion to 

the Senior Manager role. Lightner responded to Tonik by email, explaining that she 

felt Catalent was retaliating against her for raising a complaint of age discrimination. 

Tonik emailed Lightner the following Monday, March 2, explaining Catalent would 

consider Lightner to have resigned if she did not report to work the next day. 

Lightner did not report to work on March 3. 

Lightner subsequently sued Catalent in Missouri state court, alleging age 

discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Missouri 

Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010–.137 (“MHRA”). Catalent removed 

the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion for 

summary judgment on all of Lightner’s claims. Lightner conceded to dismissal of 

her sex discrimination claim under the MHRA but otherwise opposed Catalent’s 

motion. After Lightner filed her response brief, Catalent produced court-ordered 

evidence of certain text messages between members of Catalent leadership from the 

day following Lightner’s complaint of age discrimination. Lightner moved for leave 

from the district court to file a sur-reply brief, but the district court denied leave.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Catalent on 

Lightner’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Specifically, the district court held 

(1) Lightner did not establish Catalent’s proffered justifications were a pretext for 

discrimination;1 and (2) the timing between Lightner’s discrimination complaint and

Catalent’s subsequent revocation of the PIP option did not alone establish that 

retaliation was a motivating factor for Catalent’s adverse action. Lightner appeals 

the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claims and the denial of her motion 

for leave to file a sur-reply brief. 

II. Analysis

We review the district court’s “grant of summary judgment de novo.” Kiel v. 

Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Summary 

judgment is only appropriate if the evidence, viewed most favorably for the 

nonmoving party, demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Meier v. St. Louis, 934 F.3d 824, 

827–28 (8th Cir. 2019). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A. Age Discrimination

The district court held Lightner’s age discrimination claim failed because 

Lightner “has not established that Catalent’s proffered justifications are a pretext for 

discrimination.” We agree. 

We analyze MHRA age discrimination claims under the same framework as 

claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Ramlet v. E.F. 

Johnson Co., 507 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 2007). Under the MHRA, an employee 

1

The district court also dismissed Lightner’s claim for a hostile work 

environment because Lightner’s “allegations of a hostile work environment amount 

to isolated instances of unpleasant conduct rather than a pattern of severe or 

pervasive harassment.” Lightner does not appeal the dismissal of her hostile work 

environment claim.
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who “presents no evidence of direct discrimination must satisfy the McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Bonomo v. Boeing Co., 63 F.4th 736, 742 

(8th Cir. 2023) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802—03 

(1973)). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must first show a 

prima facie case of age discrimination. Ramlet, 507 F.3d at 1153. “The burden of 

production then shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’” Hilde v. City of Eveleth, 

777 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 

If such a reason is articulated, the burden then returns to the employee “to [present] 

evidence that the employer’s proffered explanation is pretext for unlawful 

discrimination.” Id. An employee may show pretext through various means, such 

as by presenting evidence that the employer treated similarly-situated employees in 

a favorable manner, did not follow its own policies, “shifted its explanation of the 

employment decision,” or by showing evidence of a decision maker’s biased 

comments. Grant v. City of Blytheville, 841 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2016).

Here, Lightner tries to show pretext by arguing Catalent treated a younger, 

similarly-situated employee, Erin Killeen (age 41), more favorably. But Lightner 

and Killeen cannot be similarly situated due to several distinguishing circumstances. 

See Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he individuals used for 

comparison must have . . . engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or 

distinguishing circumstances.”). Members of Lightner’s team specifically pointed 

to Lightner’s lack of leadership when they resigned. One team member said in an 

exit interview, “I think [Lightner] is the most un-engaged. I know she is busy but 

she needs to have more contact with the group.” Another team member noted the 

“lack of support from [Lightner]” as a reason for his departure. He elaborated that 

Lightner is “not the right fit for that role. You will continue to lose people with her 

in that role.” Although members of Killeen’s team also resigned, Lightner does not 

allege those employees resigned because of Killeen’s leadership. Therefore, 

Lightner and Killeen’s different marks in performance reviews do not show pretext, 

as Lightner and Killeen’s performances were not comparable. See Gilmore v. AT & 

T, 319 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting certain other employees are not 
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similarly situated when the plaintiff “did not establish that the circumstances of their 

misconduct were comparable in severity or frequency to [the plaintiff’s] 

infractions.”). 

Next, Lightner claims Catalent managers made certain negative, age-related 

comments. None of these comments, however, support a reasonable inference of 

age discrimination. For instance, during a leadership meeting discussing whether 

Lightner should be promoted from interim to permanent director, Kristen Devito, 

Catalent’s Global Director of Project Management, shared that she did not think 

Lightner was the “long-term solution” for the director role. But there is no other 

probative evidence indicating that comment was based on Lightner’s age, as opposed 

to her performance or skill set. See Ranieri v. Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery Sch. 

Dist., 198 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting the phrase “long term plans” 

does not necessarily have an age-based meaning). Lightner also points out that 

decision makers in Catalent mentioned “retirement” and an “exit plan,” and 

discussed her age. These fleeting references to retirement are not enough to infer 

age discrimination. Although “retirement inquiries can sometimes be so 

unnecessary and excessive as to constitute evidence of discriminatory harassment,” 

“an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the retirement plans of its 

employees and . . . a plaintiff should not be able to rely on those inquiries to prove 

intentional discrimination.” Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 560 

(8th Cir. 1999). Here, the minimal retirement discussions were not “so unnecessary 

and excessive” to raise an inference of age discrimination. See id.

2

 

We also reject Lightner’s argument that Catalent’s “unsupported performance 

criticisms and failure to provide any feedback or coaching” are indicative of pretext. 

Criticisms and lack of coaching are generally not factors to prove pretext in a 

2

Lightner also points to a comment by Reid Tonik, Lightner’s direct 

supervisor. After the head of HR asked Tonik whether Lightner would be “on track” 

for her mid-year performance rating, he responded, “why do you ask? :)” Lightner 

claims Tonik’s response was sarcastic and suggests he planned to rate her poorly. 

Even if we infer sarcasm, Tonik’s question was not age-related. 
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discrimination suit. See Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 959 (8th 

Cir. 2001) (noting it is lawful to make “employment decisions based upon poor job 

performance, erroneous evaluations, personal conflicts between employees, or even 

unsound business practices” as long as these decisions are not the result of 

discrimination). 

Lastly, Lightner claims Catalent failed to follow its own discrimination 

policies because Catalent’s HR Investigation Training Manual contained a policy 

requiring an investigation of any complaints of discrimination, and no one 

investigated Lightner’s complaint. But Catalent claims it investigated her 

allegations when it asked her for examples of the alleged age discrimination. “The 

appropriate scope of an internal investigation . . . is a business judgment, and we do 

not review the rationale behind such a decision.” Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural 

Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). Moreover, “shortcoming in an 

internal investigation alone, without additional evidence of pretext, would not 

suffice to support an inference of discrimination on the part of the employer.” 

Edwards v. Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co., 860 F.3d 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 2017). Here, 

Lightner has not presented any facts to create an inference that age discrimination 

motivated Catalent’s lack of sufficient investigation.

In sum, Lightner failed to show Catalent’s proffered justifications, namely 

Lightner’s history of deficient performance in the director role, were pretext for age 

discrimination. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of her age discrimination 

claim. 

B. Retaliation

The district court found there is not sufficient evidence to support a retaliation 

claim. We disagree. 

Before determining the merits of Lightner’s retaliation claim, we must first 

resolve whether evidence Lightner received from Catalent after summary judgment
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briefing was improperly excluded when the district court denied Lightner’s motion 

for leave to file a sur-reply brief. We review the district court’s denial of a motion 

for leave to file a sur-reply for an abuse of discretion. Cornice & Rose Int’l, LLC v. 

Four Keys, LLC, 76 F.4th 1116, 1123 (8th Cir. 2023). On December 22, the district 

court ordered Catalent to provide information to Lightner which would facilitate 

production of Tonik’s text messages in and around the time Lightner complained of 

age discrimination. On December 24, Lightner filed her opposition to Catalent’s 

motion for summary judgment. On January 12, Catalent produced the disputed text 

messages. The text messages showed that, one day after Lightner’s allegation of age 

discrimination, Tonik shared, “[t]aking PIP off the table” was a “new idea” by Jeff 

Wheeler, the HR Manager, and asked for Devito’s approval of the idea. Devito 

responded affirmatively with a thumbs-up emoji. 

Lightner filed her motion for leave to file a sur-reply brief, alleging: (1) 

Catalent raised new arguments in its reply brief and (2) the court-ordered text 

messages contained evidence of retaliation. The district court denied Lightner’s 

motion for leave to file a sur-reply without explanation. This was an abuse of 

discretion, at least to the extent the denial meant the district court did not consider 

this highly probative evidence in resolving Catalent’s summary judgment motion. 

The district court adversely granted summary judgment on Lightner’s retaliation 

claim because “there is not sufficient evidence to support more than a temporal 

connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action.” This 

suggests the district court disregarded the text messages revealing that the “new 

idea” of taking the PIP option away occurred after Lightner made her complaint of 

age retaliation, which supported “more than a temporal connection” for Lightner’s 

retaliation claim. Thus we conclude the district court abused its discretion by

improperly excluding court-ordered evidence when it denied Lightner’s motion for 

leave to file a sur-reply. We will thus consider this evidence to be in the record as 

part of our analysis of whether Lightner’s retaliation claim survives Catalant’s 

motion for summary judgment, the substance of which we turn to now. 
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Missouri courts may follow federal law when it is consistent with the MHRA. 

Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.3d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 2019). To prevail on a 

retaliation claim under the MHRA, Lightner must prove: (1) she complained about 

discrimination; (2) Catalent took adverse action against her; “and (3) a causal 

relationship existed between the complaint and the adverse action.” Eivins v. Mo.

Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021). To demonstrate a causal 

relationship, Lightner must demonstrate her “complaint was a motivating factor in 

the . . . adverse employment action by providing direct evidence of retaliation, or 

creating an inference of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework.” Id. “[C]ircumstantial evidence that tends to support an inference of 

retaliatory motive is sufficient.” Holmes v. Kansas City Pub. Sch. Dist., 571 S.W.3d 

602, 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). An example of “circumstantial evidence of causation 

include[s] . . . close temporal proximity between the complaint and the adverse 

action.” McGaughy v. Laclede Gas Co., 604 S.W.3d 730, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).

Related federal law consistent with Missouri law further supports Lightner’s 

retaliation claim at the summary judgment stage. Though “[a]n employee can 

establish a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment 

action through ‘the timing of the two events[,]’” Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 

858, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am., 398 F.3d 

1071, 1079 (8th Cir. 2005)), “[t]emporal evidence should generally be corroborated 

by other evidence of employment discrimination.” Marez v. Saint-Gobain 

Containers, Inc., 688 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2012). But there is an exception to that 

general rule: when the temporal proximity is “very close,” temporal proximity alone 

may be “sufficient to create an inference of the causal link.” Id. In Marez, the court 

held that when the adverse action “occurred less than forty-eight hours after notice 

of the protected activity was given, the timing of the two events could support the 

jury’s finding of discrimination.” Id. 

For summary judgment purposes, the parties agreed Lightner complained of 

discrimination and that Catalent removed the PIP option for Lightner. Therefore, 

the first two elements of Lightner’s retaliation claim are satisfied. We now examine 
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whether Lightner provided sufficient evidence to create a causal inference of 

retaliation. 

Three key events form the basis of Lightner’s retaliation claim. First, on 

February 13, 2020, Catalent told Lightner that she was rated “not on track” and asked 

Lightner whether she would prefer either a PIP or a demotion. Second, on February 

18, Lightner emailed Catalent stating she believed her age was a factor in her 

employment options. In that same email, Lightner chose to be placed on a PIP and 

stay in her current director position. Third, within forty-eight hours, on February 

20, Catalent told Lightner the PIP was no longer an option—her only options were

a demotion or a severance plan. The close temporal proximity between Lightner’s 

age discrimination complaint and Catalent’s adverse action of removing the PIP 

option arguably creates a sufficient inference of retaliation to submit the claim to the 

jury. See, e.g., Marez, 688 F.3d at 963. This inference was bolstered by the lateproduced evidence of back-to-back February 18 and 19 text messages, where Tonik 

forwarded Lightner’s email alleging age discrimination and then asked Devito for 

approval to remove the PIP option for Lightner.3

 Combined, the evidence is 

sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a causal relationship.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the age 

discrimination claim. We reverse summary judgment on the retaliation claim and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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3

Tonik wrote to Devito, “Jeff has new idea to give the option of 3-month 

package or forced demotion to the Sr. Pm role. Taking PIP off the table. He’s got 

ryan and [redacted] approval. Need yours, and then Jeff and I can meet with her 

tomorrow.”