J. A20004/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MICHELLE L. RYBNER :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JACOB RYBNER, : No. 1790 MDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Civil Division at No. CI-10-03913

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 18, 2020

Jacob Rybner (“Husband”) appeals from the September 26, 2018 

divorce decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. 

We affirm.

The record reflects that Husband and Michelle Rybner (“Wife”) married 

on December 2, 2000. Wife filed for divorce on April 15, 2010. The trial court 

appointed a divorce master with respect to Wife’s claims for equitable 

distribution, alimony,1 attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. The divorce 

master held hearings on April 27, 2016 and October 19, 2016. On the date 

of the first hearing, both parties were 40 years old. Wife was a college student

and worked as a house cleaner. Husband was self-employed and worked as 

 

1 The record reflects that Wife subsequently abandoned her claim for alimony. 

(See notes of testimony, 4/27/16 at 73-74.)
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a real estate developer, constable, and used car dealer. The parties had three 

children born of the marriage, who were then 15, 12, and 10 years old.

The divorce master filed her report on January 16, 2018. The

trial court summarized the report, which divided the marital property into 

eight categories, as follows:

1. Husband’s Real Estate Businesses

The Divorce Master valued Husband’s real 

estate businesses at $202,369.07. This was 

based upon the evidence that could be retrieved 

and presented to the Divorce Master. The 

Divorce Master noted that it was incredibly 

difficult for her to obtain clear, verifiable 

information about these businesses from 

Husband because he ignored both her and 

Wife’s counsel’s request for documentation to 

support the dealings of these businesses. 

Information received was often later 

contradicted by Husband, thus adding 

confusion. Wife did present testimony to 

support Husband’s many large cash 

transactions which indicated to the Divorce 

Master that Husband had access to greater 

financial assets than he alleged prior. There 

was no formal business valuation introduced by 

either party, only convoluted and contradictory 

testimony, much of which relied on the 

credibility of Husband. The Divorce Master 

arrived at the $202,369.07 number as 

Husband’s portion of the real estate businesses 

because that was the amount he paid to his 

brother, Leon, when they ceased joint business 

operations.

2. Proceeds from the Sale of the Marital Residence 

at 1939 [Kendale] Place

The marital residence was sold on February 14, 

2014, and each party received approximately 
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$12,708.14 from the proceeds of the sale for a 

total of $25,416.29. The Divorce Master 

recognized that Husband again desired to have 

these amounts offset by the “losses” he suffered 

on this property, though Husband did not 

present adequate evidence or testimony to 

establish any valid losses sustained. Further, 

this property was owned by Husband and Wife 

and not by any of the businesses so any housing 

expenses or mortgage payments would not be 

deducted from the proceeds of the sale to 

determine net equity.

3. Proceeds from the Sale of the Marital Property 

located at Old Delp Road

When this property was sold the proceeds 

deposited into the escrow accounts were in the 

amount of $206,833.49 and approximately 

$23,180.00. These amounts are what the 

Divorce Master used for valuation of the marital 

property for equitable distribution. The Divorce 

Master recognized that Husband desired to have 

these amounts offset by the “losses” he suffered 

on this property, though Husband did not 

present adequate evidence or testimony to 

establish these alleged losses.

4. Rent Received from Marital Property located in 

East Brunswick, New Jersey

The parties owned the Old Bridge Turnpike 

property in East Brunswick for several years. 

This property was originally their marital 

residence and then was later intended to be 

developed for a profit. The nature of the 

ownership of this property was unclear, whether 

it was a personal or business property. The 

property was owned jointly by Husband and 

Wife and Husband received rental income of 

approximately $2,000 a month which he did not 

share with Wife. In November 2015, Husband 

stopped paying the mortgage and taxes on the 

property. Nevertheless, Husband continued to 
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receive rental income from November 2015 until 

February 2017, which amounts to $32,000. 

Husband claims that during the recent years, 

the property maintenance costs exceeded the 

rental income; thus, he should be credited with 

the losses during those years. Husband did not 

produce evidence to adequately substantiate 

these losses. Conversely, substantial evidence 

was presented that Husband received rental 

income from this marital property. The Divorce 

Master divided the $32,000 equally between 

Husband and Wife in her recommended 

distribution.

5. Real Estate Located in East Brunswick, New 

Jersey

The Divorce Master used the amount of 

$100,000 as the marital value of the Old Bridge 

Turnpike property in East Brunswick in light of 

the parties’ testimony that the property would 

be sold to Serge Shapiro for $100,000 to 

extinguish an outstanding loan Serge had with 

Husband. The nature of the ownership of this 

property was unclear, whether it was a personal 

or business property. It was deeded in Husband 

and Wife’s name, but the mortgage was in 

Husband’s name alone. The property was

bought in 2004 for $650,000.00 with a plan to 

develop the property to make a million dollars. 

Husband never obtained the necessary 

approvals to develop the land. As of February 

2016, the mortgage balance was $354,800.00. 

After the cost of sale and assuming that they 

could sell the property for appraisal value, the 

net equity would be $249,700.00. Husband 

testified to massive losses he sustained on the 

property, but did not produce adequate 

evidence for the Divorce Master to adequately 

determine those loss amounts. When asked 

what he would like the Court to do in equitable 

distribution, Husband replied, “the property in 

Jersey, I’d like to write off to Serge for the 

money that’s owed to him and wish him good 
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luck with it.” Accordingly, the Divorce Master set 

the marital value of the East Brunswick property 

at $100,000.00, which is the amount that 

Husband testified he owed to Serge.

Trial court opinion, 9/26/18 at 1-5 (record citations omitted). The divorce 

master identified the remaining three categories of marital property subject 

to equitable distribution as the marital portion of Husband’s whole life 

insurance policy, a 2005 Dodge Caravan, and the parties’ personal property, 

which were all determined to have no value for purposes of equitable 

distribution. (Id. at 5.)

The divorce master valued the marital estate at $589,798.85.2 The 

divorce master recommended that Husband be awarded the marital value of 

the real estate businesses in the amount of $202,369.07 and the parties’

New Jersey real estate valued at $100,000 and that Wife be awarded the 

proceeds of the sale of the marital property located at Old Delp Road, totaling 

$230,013.49. The divorce master recommended an equal division of the 

proceeds from the sale of the marital residence at Kendale Place and the rent 

received from the marital property located in New Jersey, which amounted to 

$28,708.15 to each party. In order to effectuate an equitable distribution of 

53 percent of the marital estate to Wife and 47 percent to Husband, the 

divorce master recommended that Husband make a $50,000 cash payment to 

 

2 We note that the divorce master also included other debts and credits that 

did not affect the value of the marital estate for equitable distribution purposes 

and that are not germane to this appeal.
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Wife so that Husband would receive $281,077.21 and Wife would receive 

$308,721.64. The divorce master also recommended that Husband pay 

$15,000 toward Wife’s attorney’s fees and pay the fees and costs associated 

with the divorce action.

Husband filed exceptions to the divorce master’s report. Following a 

hearing, the trial court denied the exceptions, affirmed and adopted the 

divorce master’s report, and entered the divorce decree. Husband filed a 

timely appeal. The trial court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Husband 

timely complied. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion that relied upon 

the opinion it filed with the divorce decree on September 26, 2019.

Husband raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Whether the multiple factual errors made by the 

Lower Court establishes [sic] its racial bias and

prejudice against Husband?

[2.] Whether the Lower Court erred in finding that 

the record supports the determination of the 

value of the marital estate?

[3.] Whether the Lower Court erred in not including 

the $25,000 payment in the Equitable 

Distribution analysis?

[4.] Whether the Lower Court erred in awarding 

attorney’s fees when the Husband was forced to 

provide discovery materials for five (5) years 

including multiple requests for the same 

documents and information?

Husband’s brief at 2.
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A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an 

award of equitable distribution. Our standard of 

review when assessing the propriety of an order 

effectuating the equitable distribution of marital 

property is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to 

follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find 

an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find 

an abuse of discretion unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence in the certified record. In determining the 

propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts 

must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the 

objective of effectuating economic justice between the 

parties and achieving a just determination of their 

property rights.

Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654, 662-663 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

At the outset, we note that Husband’s brief is largely unintelligible, and 

we could dismiss this appeal on that basis. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (authorizing 

dismissal of an appeal when an appellant submits a substantially defective 

brief). To add to the brief’s lack of clarity, Husband most often refers to the 

divorce master as the “lower court” and appears to challenge her factual 

findings when this appeal lies from the trial court’s equitable distribution order. 

Despite the defects in Husband’s brief, because we are able to discern 

Husband’s issues, we will address them on the merits.

In his statement of questions presented, Husband first claims that the 

“multiple factual errors made by the Lower Court establishes [sic] its 
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racial bias and prejudice against Husband.” (Husband’s brief at 2 (emphasis 

added).) In the argument section of his brief on this issue, Husband complains 

that “[t]he numerous errors in the Opinion and Order establishes [sic] the 

Lower Court’s intent to discriminate against the Husband based on his 

religion.” (Husband’s brief at 4 (emphasis added).) Husband abandons his 

racial bias claim and levels his bald allegation of religious bias against the trial 

court and the divorce master. A review of Husband’s Rule 1925(b) statement 

reveals that Husband failed to raise any claims of bias – racial, religious, or 

otherwise. Therefore, Husband waives all bias claims on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (setting forth the rule that issues not included in an 

appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement are waived). Notwithstanding waiver, we 

note that Husband entirely fails to substantiate either of these serious claims

with any record support. Our thorough review of the record reveals that there 

is not one scintilla of evidence to support a claim of racial, religious, or any 

other bias by either the trial court or the divorce master.

Husband next complains that the record fails to support the valuation of 

the marital estate. Once again, Husband baldly asserts that the “valuation 

demonstrates the bias of the Lower Court against Husband.” (Husband’s brief 

at 9.) Husband then accuses the “Lower Court” of “‘double dipping’ the value 

of the business and real estate assets.” (Id.) Husband claims that 

“[a]ssuming the martial [sic] business is worth $202,369.07, the value for 

that business must be used to purchase subsequent properties owned by the 
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parties” and the “Lower Court does not establish any source of the funds to 

purchase” the Kendale Place and Old Delp Road properties. (Id.) In this 

argument, Husband baldly claims that the down payments for the 

Kendale Place and Old Delp Road marital properties should be deducted from 

the marital value of these properties and credited to his real estate businesses. 

Husband raises this issue for the first time on appeal and, therefore, waives 

the issue on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302 (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).3

Husband next complains that the “Lower Court failed to take into 

account Husband’s direct payment of $25,000 to Wife” . . . “in the Equitable 

Distribution analysis.” (Husband’s brief at 10.) The record belies Husband’s 

claim. The record reflects that, pursuant to a post-nuptial agreement entered 

into between Husband and Wife, Wife received an advanced distribution of 

$25,000 from an escrow account that held the proceeds of the sale of the 

Old Delp Road marital property, which proceeds were awarded to Wife. 

(Decree, 9/26/18 at 2 & n.1.) As aptly noted by the trial court, “Husband is 

mischaracterizing this as a direct payment” that he made to Wife. (Trial court 

opinion, 9/26/18 at 15.) Additionally, our review of the record reveals that 

 

3 We note that when this matter was before the divorce master, Husband 

baldly claimed that what he characterized as “losses” on marital property,

which included mortgage payments, real estate taxes, household expenses,

and fixtures, such as toilets, should be deducted from the value of the marital 

property and credited to his real estate businesses. (See master’s report, 

1/16/18 at n.7, 8 n.8; see also notes of testimony, 4/27/16 at 169-188.)
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the divorce master noted the advanced distribution made to Wife in her report.

(Master’s report, 1/16/18 at 10 & n.1.)

Husband finally complains that Wife is not entitled to an award of 

counsel fees because she engaged in “vexatious and abusive discovery.” 

(Husband’s brief at 11.) 

Inasmuch as appellant challenges the award of 

counsel fees, our standard of review is, once again, an 

abuse of discretion. Furthermore:

The purpose of an award of counsel fees 

is to promote fair administration of justice 

by enabling the dependent spouse to 

maintain or defend the divorce action 

without being placed at a financial 

disadvantage; the parties must be on par 

with one another.

Counsel fees are awarded based on the 

facts of each case after a review of all the 

relevant factors. These factors include 

the payor’s ability to pay, the requesting 

party’s financial resources, the value of 

the services rendered, and the property 

received in equitable distribution.

Counsel fees are only to be awarded upon a showing 

of need. In essence, each party’s financial 

considerations dictate whether such an award is 

appropriate.

Gates v. Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted).

Husband takes a kitchen-sink approach to his argument on this issue. 

Husband first claims, without any supporting record references, that Wife is 

not entitled to counsel fees because she engaged in “vexatious and abusive 
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discovery.” (Husband’s brief at 11.) Husband waives this issue on appeal for 

failure to comply with procedural rules requiring the brief to contain citations 

to the record. Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see also Irwin Union Nat’l Bank & Trust 

Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 20 

A.3d 1212 (Pa. 2011) (reiterating that where deficiencies in the brief hinder 

meaningful appellate review, issues are waived, and noting that it is not this 

court’s responsibility to comb through the record to find record support for a 

claim). Notwithstanding waiver, we note that the divorce master summarized 

what the record reflects:

Husband’s behavior during the pendency of the 

divorce proceedings was obdurate and vexatious. 

Husband’s behavior caused delay, frustrated the 

divorce proceedings, and created unnecessary 

additional expense. The docket demonstrates the 

necessity of repeated attempts to return to Court to 

request the Court direct discovery and compliance 

with previous motions and direction. Throughout the 

hearing, the Master continued to be frustrated by 

Husband’s lack of ability or willingness to provide the 

Court with information which would allow the Court to 

make sense of Husband’s personal and business 

dealings and accountings, as stated multiple times in 

this Master[’s] Report.

Master’s report, 1/16/18 at 32 (record citations omitted).

Husband next erroneously, and without citation to legal authority, 

claims that his payment of spousal support “over a seven year period of 

approximately $400.00 per month” was “designed to level the playing field 

between the parties and allow the Wife to have access to counsel and lifestyle 

enjoyed during marriage.” (Husband’s brief at 12.) Husband waives this claim 
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on appeal for failure to cite to legal authority. See Estate of Haiko v. 

McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.Super. 2002) (reiterating that an appellant 

must support each question raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent 

authority; absent reasoned discussion of law in an appellate brief, this court’s 

ability to provide review is hampered, necessitating waiver on appeal). 

Despite waiver, we note that, contrary to Husband’s assertion, the purpose of 

spousal support is to assure a reasonable living allowance to the party 

requiring the support. Hainaut v. Hainaut, 599 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Pa.Super. 

1991). Conversely, “the purpose of an award of counsel fees is to promote 

fair administration of justice by enabling the dependent spouse to maintain or 

defend the divorce action without being placed at a financial disadvantage.” 

See Gates, 933 A.2d at 109.

Husband finally complains that

[t]he determination of Husband’s income by the Lower 

Court is simply conjecture and speculation. The 

lifestyle assigned to Husband is based simply on the 

biased belief of the Lower Court. Any comparison of 

Husband and Wife’s lifestyle and/or earning capacity 

should only be completed after a new hearing to 

properly determine his income and lifestyle.

Husband’s brief at 13. Husband waives these final claims for failure to develop 

a legal argument capable of any meaningful appellate review. See Butler v. 

Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944-945 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived 

claim where she failed to set forth adequate argument concerning her claim 

on appeal; argument lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere 
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conclusory statements; appellant failed to explain cogently or even tenuously 

assert how trial court abused its discretion or made error of law).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/18/2020