[Cite as Anthony v. Princeton Trading Group, Inc., 2012-Ohio-1834.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97460 

DONALD D. ANTHONY, M.D. 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

PRINCETON TRADING GROUP, INC., ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. CV-758454 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, A.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Kilbane, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 26, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Mark E. Porter 

Gallup & Burns 

The Leader Bldg., Suite 810 

526 Superior Avenue, East 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1401 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

James F. Koehler 

Philip Wesley Lambert 

Koehler Neal L.L.C. 

3330 Erieview Tower 

1301 East Ninth Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.: 

{¶1} Appellants Princeton Trading Group, Inc. and John Boyer (collectively 

referred to as “Princeton”) appeal the trial court’s refusal to stay the matter for arbitration 

and assign the following error for our review: 

The trial court erred as a matter of law in denying defendants’ motion 

to stay and compel arbitration.

{¶2} After reviewing the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. The apposite facts follow. 

Facts

{¶3} On June 27, 2011, appellee Donald D. Anthony, M.D. (“Anthony”) filed a 

complaint against Princeton and its owner John Boyer, along with two of Princeton’s 

former employees, Frank Paterno and Jason Alexis, for breach of fiduciary duties, breach 

of contract, negligence, fraud, and a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. 

The claims arose from Princeton purchasing and trading precious metals on Anthony’s 

behalf. Anthony contended that Princeton without authority to do so, sold his interest in 

a quantity of silver bullion and purchased palladium with the sales proceeds, after which 

the prices for the palladium dropped dramatically, while the price for silver increased 

two-fold. 

{¶4} In response to the complaint, Princeton filed a motion to stay and compel 

arbitration pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711, arguing that the parties’ relationship was 

governed by the terms of the Customer Account agreement. The document referred to by 
Princeton is not titled as an agreement, but as a “Customer Account Documentation” in 

which the customer, in this case, Anthony provided information to Princeton. Within the 

document is an arbitration provision stating that the parties agreed to resolve disputes via 

binding arbitration to be conducted in Palm Beach County, Florida, and that Florida law 

would govern the relationship. Anthony was the only party to sign the agreement. 

There is no signature by a Princeton representative. 

{¶5} In his brief in opposition, Anthony argued that, 1) he did not agree to the 

arbitration disputes arising from his metal trading account, 2) the arbitration provision 

failed to set forth the terms of arbitration, 3) he was induced by fraud to sign the 

agreement as he was assured by Princeton’s representative that it was safe to invest with 

Princeton, when in reality during the time he was solicited and provided Princeton with 

checks to purchase silver, Princeton was being sued in federal court for running a “Ponzi” 

scheme, and 4) Princeton waived its right to arbitration. The trial court denied 

Princeton’s motion to stay and compel arbitration without opinion. 

Enforcement of Arbitration Provision

{¶6} In its sole assigned error, Princeton argues the trial court erred as a matter 

of law in denying its motion to stay and compel arbitration. 

{¶7} “In determining whether the trial court properly denied or granted a motion 

to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, the standard of review is whether the order 

constituted an abuse of discretion.” Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C., 

194 Ohio App.3d 826, 2011-Ohio-3390, 958 N.E.2d 585, ¶10 (8th Dist.) “Abuse of 
discretion” implies more than a mere error of judgment or law, but indicates that the trial 

court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 

5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 140 (1983). 

{¶8} The arbitration provision in the instant case stated as follows: 

The parties agree that any disputes relating to this account will be 

submitted to binding arbitration. The venue for any such arbitration 

shall be exclusive in the State of Florida and all parties agree that any 

arbitration award entered shall be binding and convertible to a State of 

Florida judgment subject to the laws of the State of Florida and further 

subject to any modifications thereof permissible thereunder. The 

parties hereby accordingly waive their right to any other remedy or to 

proceed with any court actions and further hereby waive jurisdiction 

and venue. This account and the activities contemplated hereunder 

shall be governed by the substantive and procedural laws of Palm 

Beach County, the State of Florida without respect to Florida conflict 

of law rules and venue of any dispute resolution shall likewise be in 

Palm Beach County, State of Florida without respect to Florida conflict 

of law rules.

{¶9} Princeton argues the provision is contained within a valid written contract 

and that Anthony, by his signature, agreed to be bound by the arbitration provision. We 

disagree that the arbitration provision is contained within a contract. 
{¶10} Pursuant to Anthony’s affidavit attached to his motion in opposition, he 

stated that he received numerous telephone calls from a Princeton representative to 

persuade him to invest in precious metals. He eventually agreed to open an account with 

Princeton to purchase precious metals. 

{¶11} He was sent a document entitled, “Customer Account Documentation.” 

There are three parts to the document. The first section entitled “Customer Information,” 

contains blank spaces for Anthony to set forth his name, address, and telephone numbers. 

 This section bears no signature or initials. 

{¶12} The second section of the document is entitled “Customer Profile.” It 

requests information such as the applicant’s occupation, employer, and certain financial 

disclosures. Anthony’s signature appears on this page but only to attest that the 

information he provided was “true and correct.” 

{¶13} The third section is entitled “Risk Factors and Disclosure Statement.” The 

section contains statements regarding market fluctuations, risk, fee delivery charges, and 

financing. It also contains the alleged arbitration provision. The third section was 

separately initialed and signed by Anthony, but not signed by a Princeton representative. 

His signature was underneath an acknowledgment that he “read and understand[s] the 

foregoing risk factors and disclosures related to investing in precious metal investments.” 

 Thus, his signature did not obligate him to open an account, but merely attested to the 

risks and fees involved. Anthony stated in his affidavit that he did not understand the 

document to be a binding contract. In fact, there is nothing in the document to alert 
Anthony that the document was a contract; there is no language that the parties were 

agreeing to certain terms. 

{¶14} “While policy prefers enforcement of an arbitration clause, that clause may 

be invalidated upon grounds existing in law or equity where the contract itself is invalid. 

R.C. 2711.01(A).” Hanson v. Valley View Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 9th Dist. No. 23001, 

2006-Ohio-3815. A party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he or she has 

not contracted to arbitrate. Henderson v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 108 Ohio St.3d 265, 

2006-Ohio-906, 843 N.E.2d 152, ¶ 28; Joseph v. M.B.N.A. Am. Bank, 148 Ohio App.3d 

660, 2002-Ohio-4090, 775 N.E.2d 550 (8th Dist.), citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. 

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 

(1960). 

{¶15} We conclude the Customer Account Document is not a contract but a 

means for collecting information about potential customers. The document even states 

that “The purchase of precious metals is not suitable for all individuals because of the risk 

involved and the long term nature of the purchase. Please complete the following 

questions so we can determine if precious metals are a suitable investment for you.” 

Document, p. 2. (Emphasis added.) Thus, this clause indicates that the document is for 

gathering information on potential customers and does not obligate Anthony to invest in 

precious metals or Princeton to open an account on his behalf because it was not yet 

determined if Anthony was a suitable investor. Although Anthony did eventually send 

Princeton a check, and it appears Princeton purchased metals in his name, this document 
did not obligate either party to perform. Whether any other documents were exchanged 

is not apparent on the record. 

{¶16} “[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a 

manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.” Harmon v. Phillip 

Morris, Inc., 120 Ohio App.3d 187, 697 N.E.2d 270 (8th Dist.1997), quoting Restatement 

of the Law 2d, Contracts, Section 17 (1981). “Consideration may consist of either a 

detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor. A benefit may consist of some 

right, interest or profit accruing to the promisor, while a detriment may consist of some 

forbearance, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the promisee.” Brads 

v. First Baptist Church, 89 Ohio App.3d 328, 336, 624 N.E.2d 737 (2d Dist. 1993). 

Here, because there is no consideration as neither party is obligated to perform, the 

document does not constitute a valid contract to which the arbitration provision would 

apply. The arbitration provision serves no purpose because there are absolutely no terms 

agreed to in the document that would be subject to the arbitration provision. As we 

stated, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he or she has not contracted 

to arbitrate. Accordingly, Princeton’s sole assigned error is overruled. 

{¶17} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR