IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA15-644

Filed: 19 January 2016

Madison County, No. 13 JT 13-15

IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.B, D.G.B., and C.M.B.

Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 24 February 2015 by Judge 

Hal G. Harrison in Madison County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 

December 2015.

Leake & Stokes, by Larry Leake, for petitioner-appellee Madison County 

Department of Social Services.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Jason R. Benton, for Guardian ad 

Litem.

Michael E. Casterline, for respondent-appellant mother.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Respondent-mother (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s orders 

terminating her parental rights to the minor children C.B., D.B., and C.B. (“the 

children”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Background

In January 2013, petitioner Madison County Department of Social Services 

(“DSS”) conducted a “family assessment” of Mother and the children after six-yearold D.G.B. was discovered unattended in a car. During the assessment, “other 

concerns regarding the family became apparent.” Specifically, Mother suffers from 
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numerous debilitating mental illnesses as well as substance dependence and an

“[e]xtremely [l]ow” intellectual capacity. The majority of Mother’s infirmities stem 

from years of sexual and physical abuse that she suffered at the hands of her father. 

Due to this myriad of mental and physical health issues, Mother was unable to 

provide proper care for the children.

Although the children’s maternal grandmother had been assisting in their 

care, DSS expressed concern over her ability to appropriately supervise the children. 

Consequently, after DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency, it obtained 

non-secure custody of the children in March 2013 and placed them in foster care. 

Shortly thereafter, Mother consented to the entry of an order that adjudicated the 

children to be neglected. Mother then signed a case plan formulated to address, inter 

alia, her mental health, substance abuse, and intellectual disability issues. As part 

of the plan toward Mother’s reunification with the children, DSS worked “directly 

with [the] October Road-Assertive Community Treatment Team to insure that all [of 

Mother’s] medical and mental needs [were] met.” By attending all scheduled DSS 

meetings, completing a domestic violence education program, and undergoing a 

parenting capacity evaluation, Mother accomplished certain goals contained in her 

case plan. She also attended weekly supervised visits with the children. However, 

Mother failed to complete a substance abuse assessment. Mother’s visitation was 

suspended in September 2013 upon recommendation of the children’s therapist. At 
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that time, Mother had not completed the October Road program, and in January 

2014, the permanent plan was changed from reunification to adoption.

In March 2014, DSS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and the unknown 

father(s)’ parental rights to the children. The petitions alleged that five statutory 

grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights. When the trial court 

conducted its termination hearing on 12 January 2015, Mother was in Georgia and 

claimed she was unable to secure transportation back to North Carolina. Her counsel 

moved the court for a continuance, but the motion was denied.

At the termination hearing, social worker Shanna Young (“Young”) testified on 

behalf of DSS. Her testimony was based, in part, on the DSS report (“the report”) 

filed with the trial court on 6 January 2015 in anticipation of the 12 January hearing. 

The report contained other DSS updates which had been addressed to and filed with 

the trial court at previous hearings on this matter. Mother repeatedly objected to 

Young’s testimony from the case file as hearsay, but the trial court overruled each of 

those objections. The trial court also denied Mother’s motion to strike the portions of 

Young’s testimony regarding events and circumstances that occurred before August 

2014, the time at which Young was assigned to work on the children’s cases.

On 24 February 2015, the trial court entered adjudication and disposition 

orders terminating Mother’s parental rights. The court concluded that two grounds 

existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights: (1) her failure to make reasonable 
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progress to correct the conditions that led to the children’s removal from her care,

and (2) her inability to provide the proper care or supervision for the children coupled 

with a reasonable probability that such inability would continue for the foreseeable 

future. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), (6) (2013). As a result, the court 

determined that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests. Mother appeals from these orders. 

II. Analysis

Trial courts conduct termination of parental rights proceedings in two distinct 

stages: adjudication and disposition. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 

S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At “the adjudication stage, the trial court must determine 

whether there exists one or more grounds for termination of parental rights under 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1111(a).” In re D.H., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 753 S.E.2d 732, 734 

(2014); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1109(e) (2013). Our appellate review of the 

adjudication is limited to determining whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 

exists to support the court’s findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support 

the court’s conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 

840 (2000). Even if there is evidence to the contrary, the trial court’s findings are 

binding on appeal when “supported by ample, competent evidence[.]” In re S.C.R., 

198 N.C. App. 525, 531, 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009). However, we review conclusions 

of law de novo. In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006).
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“If the trial court determines that at least one ground for termination exists, it 

then proceeds to the disposition stage where it must determine whether terminating 

the rights of the parent is in the best interest[s] of the child, in accordance with N.C. 

Gen.[]Stat. § 7B–1110(a).” D.H., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 753 S.E.2d at 734. We review 

the trial court’s determination of the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion, 

In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002), which occurs only 

when “the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that 

it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 

279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(2), a court may terminate parental 

rights when “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement 

outside the home for more than [twelve] months without showing to the satisfaction 

of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in 

correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7–1111(a)(2). 

A finding of willfulness here does not require proof of 

parental fault. On the contrary, [w]illfulness is established 

when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable 

progress, but was unwilling to make the effort. A finding 

of willfulness is not precluded even if the respondent has 

made some efforts to regain custody of [her child]. 

In re A.W, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 765 S.E.2d 111, 115 (2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “This standard operates as a safeguard for children. If 
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parents were not required to show both positive efforts and positive results, ‘a parent 

could forestall termination proceedings indefinitely by making sporadic efforts for 

that purpose.’ ” In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 545, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2004)

(quoting In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995)).

Mother first argues that the following two findings in the trial court’s 

adjudication order are based on improperly admitted hearsay testimony: 

19. [Mother] did have diagnostic testing, showing the IQ of 

53, with very little ability to function. The record reflects 

that [Mother] had a parental capacity evaluation by Dr. 

Mary DeBeus, which reported that due to her low 

functioning level, additional testing could not be 

completed. During the twenty-two (22) months that the 

juveniles have been in the custody of [DSS], [Mother] has 

failed to complete her Court Ordered case plan, in large 

part due to [Mother’s] mental health diagnoses of cyclical 

mood disorder involving psychotic features, post-traumatic 

stress disorder, poly-substance dependence, bipolar 

disorder, borderline personality disorder, and traumatic 

brain injury. Her mental health status has resulted in 

cycles of hospitalization, with stabilization of her 

symptoms after hospitalization, then digression upon her 

return home. [Mother] is unable to care for herself or her 

hygiene; is unable to provide adequate care for her 

children; and her symptoms are triggered by the stress of 

being around the juvenile and his siblings.

. . . 

21. There was no documentation of a substance abuse 

assessment, and at the time of [DSS] being relieved of its 

efforts in the fall of 2013, . . . Mother had not completed 

the October Road Program.

Specifically, Mother contends the trial court erred by admitting the portions of 
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Young’s testimony in which she relied on information contained in DSS’s report.

In Mother’s view, because Young read from the report and testified “to 

circumstances and events about which she had no first-hand knowledge,” a 

significant amount of her testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and provided 

the evidentiary support for findings of fact 19 and 21. According to Mother, since 

these findings were “critical” to the trial court’s conclusion that her parental rights

should be terminated based, in part, on her failure “to show progress in alleviating 

the causes of the children’s removal” pursuant to subdivision 7B–1111(a)(2), there 

would have been “insufficient competent evidence to support th[is] ground[] for 

termination” if the court had properly sustained Mother’s hearsay objections to 

Young’s testimony. We disagree. 

Generally, a “witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 602 (2013). Furthermore, “ ‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other 

than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 

801(c) (2013). Unless allowed by statute or the Rules of Evidence, hearsay evidence 

is not admissible in court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 802 (2013). This Court has 

previously determined that even though a witness’s knowledge was “limited to the 

contents of [the] plaintiff’s file with which he had familiarized himself, he could 
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properly testify about the records and their significance so long as the records 

themselves were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay 

rule[.]” U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Everett, Creech, Hancock and Herzig, 88 N.C. App. 418, 

423, 363 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1988). 

Pursuant to the business records exception, the following items of evidence are 

not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a 

witness:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 

form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, 

made at or near the time by, or from information 

transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 

course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it 

was the regular practice of that business activity to make 

the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all 

as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 

qualified witness, unless the source of information or the 

method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 

trustworthiness.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 803(6) (2013). Qualifying business records are 

admissible under Rule 803(6) “when a proper foundation . . . is laid by testimony of a 

witness who is familiar with the . . . records and the methods under which they were 

made so as to satisfy the court that the methods, the sources of information, and the 

time of preparation render such evidence trustworthy.” In re S.D.J., 192 N.C. App. 

478, 482, 665 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the instant case, Mother is wrong to suggest that Young was not qualified 
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to introduce and testify to the report, which was comprised of the DSS business 

records in question. “While the foundation must be laid by a person familiar with the 

records and the system under which they are made, there is ‘no requirement that the 

records be authenticated by the person who made them.’ ” Id. at 482–83, 665 S.E.2d 

at 821 (citation omitted); see also Barber v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 98 N.C. 

App. 203, 208, 390 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1990) (under Rule 803(6), safety specialist for 

defendant-employer was qualified to authenticate and introduce the results of a test

performed by a private laboratory because “he was familiar with the system used by 

his company in obtaining tests and filing the results with his office”), reversed on 

other grounds on reh’g, 101 N.C. App. 564, 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991). Not only was Young 

familiar with the report, she personally signed it and appears to be one of its authors. 

Furthermore, although the report was never offered into evidence at the 

termination hearing, the majority of its contents—previous DSS updates addressed 

to the trial court—had been admitted at prior hearings, and the report as a whole 

would have been admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 

Specifically, Young testified that she had reviewed and was familiar with DSS’s case 

file on this matter, that she had kept and maintained the file since her employment 

with DSS, and that the file’s contents were maintained during the “regular, ordinary 

course of [DSS’s] business.” Given this foundation, Young’s testimony regarding 

matters contained in DSS’s business records—namely, the circumstances and events 
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underlying the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights—was clearly 

admissible under the rule announced in U.S. Leasing Corp. It is equally clear that 

Young’s testimony amply supported the challenged findings. 

III. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that findings 19 and 21 were fully supported by Young’s 

testimony, which was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay 

rule. These findings, which are based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, 

support the trial court’s conclusion that a sufficient ground pursuant to subdivision 

7B-1111(a)(2) existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children based on 

her willfulness in leaving the children in foster care for at least twelve months and 

her failure to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the 

their removal from her care. Finding 21 specifically demonstrates that Mother failed 

to complete vital portions of her case plan while the children were in foster care. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. 

Since “[a] valid finding on one statutorily enumerated ground is sufficient to support 

an order terminating parental rights[,]” we need not address Mother’s remaining 

arguments challenging the other ground for termination found by the trial court. In 

re Greene, 152 N.C. App. 410, 416, 568 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2002) (citations omitted; 

second alteration added).
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AFFIRMED.

Judges ELMORE and ZACHARY concur.