.
.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

NASA at 50: interviews with NASA senior leadership / Rebecca Wright, Sandra 

Johnson, Steven J. Dick, editors.

 p. cm.

1. Aerospace engineers—United States—Interviews. 2. United States. National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration—History—Sources. I. Wright, Rebecca 

II. Johnson, Sandra L. III. Dick, Steven J. IV. Title: NASA at fifty. 

 

NASA SP-2012-4114

TL539.N36 2011

629.40973—dc22

 2009054448

F as ro el t yb eh S 

I tn re en :t tskoob ro e pg. 

aF :x ( 5 )202 

ISB N 978-0-16-091447-8

9 780160 914478

90000

F ro as le b y t eh S pu eri tn e dn e tn fo D co mu e tn s, .U S. G vo er mn e tn P ri tn i gn Office

I tn er en t: koob st ro e. opg . vog P noh e: lot l ree f ( 668 ) 215 - 0081 ; DC a re a ( 202 ) 215 - 0081

Fa :x ( 202 ) 215 - 4012 Mail: St po IDCC, W a hs i gn t no , D C 20402 - 1000

ISBN 978-0-16-091447-8

0
Rebecca Wright

Sandra Johnson

Steven J. Dick

Editors

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of Communications

Public Outreach Division

NASA History Program Office

Washington, DC 

NASA SP-2012-4114
.
Table of Contents

Introduction // Steven J. Dick, NASA Chief Historian ............................... vii

PART I: NASA Headquarters

Chapter 1 // Michael D. Griffin 

Administrator ............................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 // Shana L. Dale 

Deputy Administrator ................................................................................. 24

Chapter 3 // Rex D. Geveden 

Associate Administrator ...............................................................................38

Chapter 4 // Charles H. Scales 

Associate Deputy Administrator ...................................................................50

Chapter 5 // Bryan D. O’Connor 

Chief, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance .............................................58

Chapter 6 // Christopher J. Scolese 

Associate Administrator/Former Chief Engineer ..........................................74

Chapter 7 // Scott N. Pace 

Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation ..................88

Chapter 8 // William H. Gerstenmaier 

Associate Administrator for Space Operations ...........................................106

Chapter 9 // Scott J. Horowitz 

Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems .......................................118

Chapter 10 // S. Alan Stern 

Associate Administrator for Science ...........................................................130

Chapter 11 // Jaiwon Shin 

Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research ....................................144

Chapter 12 // Michael F. O’Brien 

Assistant Administrator for External Relations .........................................154

Chapter 13 // Robert W. Cobb 

Inspector General for NASA .......................................................................164

Chapter 14 // J. T. Jezierski 

Deputy Chief of Staff, White House Liaison................................................174 

v
NASA at 50

PART II: NASA Centers

Chapter 15 // S. Pete Worden 

Center Director, Ames Research Center ......................................................188

Chapter 16 // Kevin L. Petersen 

Center Director, Dryden Flight Research Center ....................................... 200

Chapter 17 // Woodrow Whitlow, Jr. 

Center Director, Glenn Research Center ....................................................206

Chapter 18 // Edward J. Weiler 

Center Director, Goddard Space Flight Center ...........................................216

Chapter 19 // Charles Elachi 

Center Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory ............................................... 232

Chapter 20 // Michael L. Coats 

Center Director, Johnson Space Center ......................................................246

Chapter 21 // William W. Parsons 

Center Director, Kennedy Space Center .................................................... 260

Chapter 22 // Lesa B. Roe 

Center Director, Langley Research Center ................................................. 274

Chapter 23 // David A. King 

Center Director, Marshall Space Flight Center ...........................................282

Chapter 24 // Richard J. Gilbrech 

Center Director, Stennis Space Center ....................................................... 292

Index ....................................................................................................... 311

The NASA History Series ...................................................................... 335

vi
Introduction

The 50th anniversary of NASA on 1 October 2008 found an agency in the 

midst of deep transition. In the closing year of the presidency of George W. 

Bush, only a month before the presidential election and in the midst of a 

worldwide economic crisis, the Agency was implementing a new Vision for 

Space Exploration intended to return humans to the Moon, to proceed onward 

to Mars, and to study the cosmos beyond. 

All of this was to be done not with new funding, but by ramping down 

the Space Shuttle Program that had been the centerpiece of human spaceflight for three decades and ramping up a new program known collectively 

as Constellation. The immediate elements of Constellation were a new launch 

vehicle, Ares I; an “Apollo on steroids” human capsule dubbed Orion; and the 

lunar lander Altair. Huge decisions were being made that would likely affect the 

Agency for decades to come. In short, a new era of spaceflight was dawning—or 

at least that was NASA’s fondest hope.

It was in this milieu that the History Division at NASA Headquarters commissioned oral history interviews to be undertaken with NASA senior management. This volume is the result and provides a snapshot of the thinking of NASA 

senior leadership on the occasion of its 50th anniversary and in the midst of 

these sea changes. It is all the more valuable from an historical point of view 

because of the large changes that have again taken place since the 50th anniversary. Since the interviews could not be done instantaneously, this volume is 

the result of conversations recorded during 2007 and 2008. The interviews were 

facilitated by Rebecca Wright and Sandra Johnson of the Johnson Space Center 

(JSC) in Houston, and the whole program was under my guidance as the NASA 

Chief Historian at Headquarters in Washington, DC. Recordings and transcripts 

are available at JSC and Headquarters and are now part of the Agency’s considerable oral history efforts of the past several decades.

The reader of this volume may also wish to consult a companion volume 

in the NASA History series, NASA’s First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives, the 

proceedings of NASA’s 50th anniversary conference. There the reader will find 

in-depth critical analysis from a variety of scholars of the diverse array of 

NASA’s activities from 1958 to the present. 

Steven J. Dick

NASA Chief Historian

December 2009

vii
.
Chapter 1

Michael D. Griffin

Administrator

Mike Griffin became the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Administrator on 

14 April 2005, a position he had been “aiming” for his entire life. Griffin’s interest in space first 

began when his mother gave him A Child’s Book of Stars when he was five years old. He was so 

fascinated by the book’s scientific material that he became enamored with space and did not want 

to do anything else. The interest continued, and a few years later, when Sputnik launched, Griffin 

remembers being the only student in his third-grade class who knew what it was and why it was 

important; he explained it all to his teacher. By the time he became a teenager, Griffin had realized 

that he saw the bigger picture, saw how things connected and related, and began to feel like a 

leadership position was something that he could aspire to, so he used that goal to shape his career. 

 Although he has described himself modestly as a “simple aerospace engineer from a small 

town,” Griffin was not. He served in a number of high-profile jobs with various prominent companies, 

organizations, and universities. When asked to become the NASA Administrator, he was 55 and 

serving as head of the Space Department at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. 

 This interview, conducted on 10 September 2007 at NASA Headquarters, began with Griffin talking about his reasons for assuming this leadership role that he held from April 2005 until January 

2009. Nearby was a framed display containing the book that inspired his life’s dream.

I would not have just accepted the position of NASA Administrator merely 

because it was offered. I was at a prestigious university laboratory in a very 

comfortable situation and enjoyed it quite a lot. If NASA had been following 

the plan that the Agency was following prior to the loss of Columbia [STS107] and President George W. Bush’s announcement of the Vision for Space 

Exploration, I honestly don’t think I would have been interested. Taking this 

job is a substantial financial sacrifice and an enormous personal sacrifice. I see 

my family way less often than I want, and I pursue my hobbies with less vigor 

than I used to. You give up a lot to accept a senior position in public service.

1
NASA at 50

But I think and have thought for decades that the proper purpose of the 

United States civil space program is pretty much along the lines that President 

Bush announced in January of 2004. The President got it right, and given a 

chance to help bring that about, I would take the position of Administrator, 

and I did take it. That’s the more general reason, but the very specific reason 

was that this was a place I wanted to be at this time and for that purpose.

What has been the most challenging aspect that you’ve encountered since 

moving into this role?

Overcoming the loss of credibility that NASA encountered, frankly, following the Challenger [STS-51L] accident and throughout the Space Station era 

and then into the loss of Columbia. As you well know, the commission that 

investigated the loss of Columbia found disturbing similarities with regard to 

the management decision-making process that cost us Challenger. And the 

development of the International Space Station and, as an agency, our inability 

to control cost and schedule and all that has not been our finest hour. NASA’s 

credibility was, I would say, at an all-time low when I took over the Agency.

I have way more external advice than I need or want, most of which has to 

be paid significant attention. I have way more scrutiny by the OMB [Office of 

Management and Budget] than any prior Administrator. I have relatively junior 

staff exercising significant control over both budget and direction at NASA, 

because NASA is not trusted any longer in the upper reaches of the federal 

government. I have way more scrutiny from congressional staff than has ever 

been the practice in the past. With our most recent authorization bill, we owe 

the Congress something like 55 or so reports in any given year on various 

aspects of what we’re doing.

We have organizations like the Government Accountability Office investigating our decisions on launch architecture. When I was young, NASA’s word 

on what the launch architecture needed to be was the word. Others were not 

judged to have the appropriate credentials to be asking those questions, and 

yet now they are. 

Now, they’re no smarter than they were then, but NASA is viewed as being 

less smart. Getting us out of that hole to where we have the technical and 

managerial credibility to make those decisions and to be seen to be making 

those decisions is probably the biggest challenge we have.

You are the 11th Administrator at NASA. How does your leadership style 

differ from the ones that have come before you?

I don’t know that I can answer that one; you might need to ask other 

people that. I can’t self-assess. I don’t know how to give you a fair assessment 

of what I do or how I do it. I have my own innate characteristics, but you’d 

have to get others to compare and contrast me with prior Administrators.

2
Michael D. Griffin

I remember hearing that one of your most recommended books is one 

that was about former NASA Administrator [James E.] Jim Webb and his 

leadership style. Why?

I was 19 when Webb left the Agency in 1968, but even as a teenager I paid 

a lot of attention to Webb’s management style and tactics, and more so later 

on. I certainly am an admirer of Jim Webb’s. He did an awful lot of things right.

Webb was a guy who very clearly listened to an awful lot of different 

people, many of whom did not agree among themselves, but that was okay, 

nor did they necessarily agree with Webb. Very clearly, he didn’t mind that. He 

was comfortable with argument and a certain amount of dissent, knowing that 

he had to make the final decision, because that was his job. But he seems, in 

light of history, to have been somebody who was comfortable hearing from 

a very wide range of people, whether they agreed with him or not, before 

making a decision, and that’s a characteristic I try to employ.

Webb was someone who understood, and very explicitly understood in 

his makeup of the Administrator’s Office, that he himself did not bring all the 

necessary skills to the Administrator’s Office to do the job. The job is a very big 

job. It is technical. It is scientific. It is political. It is managerial. Webb brought 

several of those talents and brought them in abundance, but he didn’t bring 

them all.

So he augmented himself with Hugh Dryden as his Deputy [Administrator], 

a very esteemed aeronautical scientist from the early days of aircraft flight, and 

[Robert C.] Bob Seamans [Jr.] as his Associate Administrator. I’ve characterized 

that position at NASA as being like the Chief Operating Officer.1

Would you say you’ve modeled your top management after this structure?

I’ve modeled the construct after that, because I believe that it works. Now, 

I bring a different set of specialties than Webb himself brought. Webb came 

from OMB, but more than that, he was the Washington [DC] political insider. 

NASA’s Deputy Administrator, Shana Dale, is as skilled politically, having 

served time on both the Capitol Hill and in the White House, as anyone I know. 

Shana knows how Washington works better than I will ever know it, and I’m 

nearly always guided by her advice on how to handle the Washington politics. 

Our Associate Administrator, first Rex Geveden and now Chris Scolese, are 

people with broad experience at the Centers and at Headquarters, but whose 

day-to-day skill is in institutional and project management. Those are strengths 

I have as well, but I don’t have the time to exercise them on a daily basis. My 

 1. Seamans passed away shortly after this interview.

3
NASA at 50

strong skill areas are technical. I like to think that I bring as much technical 

credibility to the Office of the Administrator as has been done.

So I liked Webb’s style in explicitly recognizing that he himself didn’t bring 

all the skills necessary, but that he could construct a team which did, and I’ve 

tried to do that. The job is not all about me. It’s not all about the Administrator. 

It’s about getting good decisions out the front door, and that strikes me as a 

Webb characteristic. So there are some areas where I was very appreciative of 

his accomplishments. I thought he was a landmark Administrator.

As you were talking, you shared some of the decisions that Webb made 

that still impact the Agency today. What decisions do you feel you’ve made 

so far that are going to help provide a successful management structure 

for NASA as it starts its next 50 years?

One of the crucial decisions I’ve made actually returns us to an 

organizational pattern that was espoused by George Mueller, one of Webb’s 

AAs [Associate Administrators], during the Apollo era, and that is the matrix 

organization. This is where the responsibilities of the project and program 

managers and the institutional managers—the Center Directors and mission 

support folks—are clearly separated. That separation between project and 

program, and institution, which comes together only in my office, is a crucial 

feature of a system with built-in checks and balances.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB] cited NASA for a lack of 

independent technical authority, and indeed they were correct, because basically 

all authority was vested in the line structure of programs. The Center Directors 

reported to the AAs. In that construct there is no path for independence.

In the Apollo era, George Mueller organized the human spaceflight program such that the Center Directors were his board of directors for the technical and managerial aspects of the program. But the project managers—Sam 

Phillips for Apollo and the Apollo Spacecraft Program Managers, first Joe Shea 

and then George Low—the key program and project managers did not report 

through the Center Directors. They did not report through the Center chain of 

command, so there was an independence there between institutional imperatives and programmatic imperatives that is absolutely crucial, and I hope it’s 

not lost when I leave.

Now, the Center Directors don’t like it. They didn’t like it in Mueller’s 

time, and they don’t like it today. The Center Directors would prefer to be 

handed a suite of programs and then to be the chief executive in charge of 

the implementation of those programs. But that leaves NASA Headquarters 

in the position of managing 10 little NASAs, each with their own full and 

separate authority, and while that may be beneficial for a given Center Director, 

it’s not beneficial in terms of the conduct of the programs and projects that 

we do. It mitigates against a corporate NASA where we can take advantage 

4
Michael D. Griffin

of capabilities across the whole Agency, and it completely mitigates against 

having any sort of independent technical authority.

That’s a change I have made that I hope will stick. Now, far be it from me 

to suggest that I invented matrix management. I did not. Even George Mueller, 

to whom I referred earlier, didn’t invent it. It was invented in the late 1940s 

and early 1950s in conjunction with the task of trying to grapple with large 

aerospace programs, such as the B-29 development and early ballistic missile 

development. It was first published as a formal theory of organization in 1956 

in a journal called Machine Design, of all things. The approach has been 

around for decades.

As I say, Mueller didn’t invent it. He merely applied it, and it was applied 

at NASA during our best years. After Mueller left the Agency in 1969, that 

organizational structure survived for about a half an hour afterwards, at which 

point the Center Directors took over and restored things to the way they 

preferred them to be. That didn’t mean it was right, and I hope I’ve made 

enough of a big deal out of that that it survives me.

Other key decisions I have made, I like to believe that I have restored 

technical credibility to the upper ranks at NASA. When John Yardley was the 

AA for spaceflight and when George Low was the Deputy Administrator, when 

Hans Mark was the Deputy Administrator, when—I could go on and on. When 

George Mueller was the head of human spaceflight, there was no doubt. 

When Len Fisk was the head of science at NASA, there was no doubt that, 

whether you agreed with them or disagreed with them—and I’ve disagreed 

with some of those individuals—there was no doubt that they had top-level 

technical credibility. No one doubted it. It was not even a question.

So it was quite clear that when a George Low or a George Mueller spoke, 

that those in the field further down the hierarchy would follow. They might 

or might not agree, but they would follow. When those gentlemen spoke on 

the Hill or to the OMB, there was no doubt that the listeners were hearing the 

voice of authority.

In the last 20 years we had gotten away from that, in my opinion. We 

had gotten to a point where many people were selected for top management 

positions at NASA because they had had a great military record, because they 

were friends of other top managers, because they had done esteemed public 

service elsewhere, but not because they had great technical credibility or knew 

anything about the space business.

When I came on board, we had several people at NASA whose first job 

in the space business was at the top. I don’t know of any rationally managed 

organization where your first job in the business can be at the top. You don’t 

start life in the space business as a Center Director at NASA. You don’t start life 

in the space business as an Associate Administrator at NASA. That’s where you 

get to after a long and distinguished career in the space business.

5
NASA at 50

Now, notice that I don’t say “a long and distinguished career at NASA.” 

That’s good; that’s a good thing, but the space business is broader than NASA. 

There is a robust and thriving military space business, of which I have been a 

part personally. There’s a robust and thriving now commercial space business, 

of which I’ve been a part.

So we, NASA, do ourselves a favor if we have some interchange with other 

parts of the space business in our personnel selection, but to bring someone 

to NASA because they were a great carrier pilot, or ran a great fighter wing for 

the Marines, or had an esteemed career of public service in another agency 

is foolhardy. Those people are then in a position of making, by the level of 

authority they’re given as very senior managers, decisions that they don’t have 

the background to be making.

I like to think that I’ve fixed that, and I hope that serves as a model for the 

future. I hope that it does. It needs to be.

I’ve made certain choices about our post-Shuttle spaceflight architecture. 

I’ve returned us to a simpler design for getting people into low-Earth orbit. 

For 35 years, NASA has made getting into low-Earth orbit just about the most 

complex possible thing we could do, and it should be among the simplest 

possible things. Our future lies out beyond low-Earth orbit. I have seen to the 

crafting of the simplest possible system I could envision to get people back 

into orbit to replace the Shuttle.

Now, I’ve been praised for that by some and criticized by others who think 

that it’s too retro. We’ve done that before. It could be more sophisticated. All 

those things are true. But to me those things are a virtue for their truth. We 

shouldn’t be spending all our money, all of our effort, all of our time, figuring 

out how to get people into low-Earth orbit. We should do it in the simplest way 

possible, because our future lies beyond, and we need to save our resources, 

people, money, and time, for those other things. That was a conscious decision. 

Some may disagree with it, but it was a conscious decision.

Would you share with us your opinion of the Shuttle era? In the past, you’ve 

made remarks about the Shuttle era that haven’t gone over very well.

You don’t know me well enough, but you may gather a little bit that I 

really don’t care whether they’ve gone over well or not. [Laughter] But people 

have been a bit mistaken. It’s not about the Shuttle. My discontent is with the 

decisions that led to the Shuttle being an answer to a question which never 

should have been posed. The Shuttle answers the question of how do you get 

people and medium-weight cargo into low-Earth orbit when you’re not going 

anywhere else beyond.

But that was a policy mistake. The decision to bring Apollo to a halt, and 

beyond that to dismantle the spaceflight transportation infrastructure that had 

been built in that era, was a deeply flawed decision from the point of view of 

6
Michael D. Griffin

American strategic positioning in the world. We essentially ground-ruled out 

any space program that was going to involve flight beyond low-Earth orbit for 

humans. That was a mistake. 

Now, I’ve tried to be very clear about that. That was a mistake promulgated 

by the [Richard M.] Nixon administration from nearly their first days in office. 

I mean, Neil Armstrong had not been back from the Moon for three weeks 

before the last couple of Apollo missions were canceled, and then the next 

year after that Apollo 18 was canceled.

Of course, you have to put it in the context of the times, too, the Vietnam War.

No, in a paper called “The Next 50 Years in Space,”2 I’ve done a constantdollar calculation of what the dollars of the time would have purchased in 

terms of a human spaceflight program had we simply utilized the equipment 

that we had already bought.

It is true that we could not at the time carry out that spaceflight program 

and develop the Shuttle, and that’s what I mean when I say the wrong choice 

was made. We had the choice at the time to fly half a dozen human crews to 

low-Earth orbit per year to visit a Skylab-like station, as well as conducting a 

couple of Apollo missions per year every year, as well as conducting a cargoonly Apollo mission to the Moon every year. So we could have been in a position, using only the budgets we had at the time, of beginning construction 

work on a lunar base while pursuing a Space Station Program had we only 

utilized the equipment that we had.

That paper is carefully researched. The necessary stipulation is to believe 

that the OMB deflators that we are required to use are the correct deflators. 

But given that, the position that in constant dollars we could have had an 

alternate and very robust future is irrefutable.

[Wernher] von Braun and others wanted to go to Mars. Many were saying 

that humans would be on Mars in 1984. Was that too ambitious at the time?

The paper demonstrates that as well. We could have been on Mars by 

now easily, and yes, and could have been to Mars by 1984. What needs to be 

understood is that we spent $25 billion building and flying Apollo, and of that, 

21 [billion] was in building it, and 4 billion was in flying it. So we spent 80 

percent of the money of the Apollo era building a capability, which we used 

to go to the Moon half a dozen times and then threw it away.

 2. This paper was published in 

7
NASA at 50

Was this a bad decision? I can’t get inside the mind of President Nixon 

and other policy-makers at the time. I simply know that it is irrefutably true 

that even for the lower budgets of the time, because of the severe inflation 

that we encountered in the 1970s, the Vietnam War, despite all of those things, 

in constant dollars we had enough money to conduct a very robust space 

program had we chosen not to build the Shuttle. But the Shuttle was the 

logical outcome of a decision that was first made, which was we would cancel 

Apollo, and then the question was, well, then what, right?

So we as a nation allowed a very poor set of policy choices to be made. 

You’d have to cast a wide net through history to find such an unproductive 

ratio of expenditures in developing any new capability. In developing any 

new capability, a given society must undergo the design, the development, 

the construction, and then transition into operations, and to spend 80 percent 

of the money that was spent on the effort in design, development, and 

construction, spend 20 percent of the money using it, and then throwing it 

away. You’d have to look hard to find a society making such a choice, and I 

think it was a poor choice.

Now, I was saying so at the time, but I was, you know, in my young 20s.

There were many others also saying that this is a poor choice, and they 

weren’t listened to, either. As I’ve gotten older, received wisdom has tended to 

come more toward my position, but my position hasn’t changed. The public 

perception has changed, that looking back on it, people say, “That wasn’t the 

best choice.”

Do you think that knowledge of history and NASA history in particular 

can be useful for current policy?

There are two things which are really important when you’re deciding 

policy, making policy choices for an entity like NASA, any technical agency. 

One is you absolutely must have people you trust who know the technical 

domain, because even God can’t dictate that which is technically infeasible, 

and certainly no President can. Congress can vote what it wishes, but Mother 

Nature reigns supreme. So one must have a perception or have access to 

perceptions of technical truth.

Secondarily, one must understand history. There cannot have been a NASA 

Administrator who has read more history than I have. I’ve read all the books 

on space, I think, that have been published, but more importantly, I’ve read 

more widely in history. I often use these historical references in my speeches. 

People think that what we do today is unique. We talk about putting crews 

on the Station for six months at a time as arduous duty, and we talk about 

developing a lunar base with a six-month crew rotation or sending people 

on voyages to Mars that will last three years. Unless I point it out in a speech, 

who today understands that on Captain [James] Cook’s first voyage, wherein 

8
Michael D. Griffin

he discovered Australia, he and his people were gone for three years, with no 

communication home. By the time his crew complement was complete, he 

had 102 people on board and only lost 38 of them on that voyage, only lost 

38 of his crew. Upon his return home he was praised for his great economy 

in husbanding the lives of his crew. And we talk about a three-year voyage to 

Mars and making 99 percent certain that no one will die, I mean, who are we 

kidding? We’ve lost sight of history.

We’ve talked about history; let’s talk a little about the future. You mentioned that you get a great deal of external advice on how to make decisions and that the Vision for Space Exploration gives you a template 

of what needs to be done. How do you determine what the priorities 

are, and what factors do you think over the next few years will change 

those priorities?

Well, that’s actually a question which contains the seeds of its own error. 

The NASA Administrator doesn’t determine the priorities. I may get a voice, if 

lucky. I may get a voice in what those priorities ought to be. But the President 

wrote down what he wanted NASA to do. His OMB doesn’t always listen, but 

that’s the problem of top managers and staff everywhere. There’s an old saying, 

the President proposes and the Congress disposes. Congress thought about all 

that for a couple of years and then voted on it and voted generally in accord 

with what the President wants.

Those are the priorities. The law of the land is that NASA shall manage its 

affairs in such a way as to return human beings to the Moon and establish a 

research base. That’s the law. NASA Administrators have at best a minor-vote 

voice in setting priorities.

The relative balance between human exploration and science, or either of 

those two and aeronautics, and within science what will be done in science, is 

always a compromise, and largely a compromise between the various space 

community constituents who have opinions about what ought to be done and 

a budget which, of course, if the budget doesn’t start over every year, every 

budget is a continuation of the one the year before. So overall, policies and 

priorities change only very slowly.

The Administrator’s role is more a matter of seeing to it that the Agency 

does indeed execute in a way that accomplishes those priorities, as handed 

to us by the President and the Congress. There’s an old saying in career civil 

service, “Well, we believe in the hereafter. We believe we’ll be here after 

he’s gone.” [Laughter] The purpose of any agency head is to try to bend the 

organization to follow the priorities that Congress has voted and appropriated 

and that the President has stated.

In that respect, government service is very different from the private 

sector, where in a private-sector organization there is never any doubt that the 

9
NASA at 50

employees are following where the boss wants to go, because there’s not even 

time for that discussion. If somebody doesn’t want to go where the boss wants 

to go, they’re just not there anymore, and then we have the discussion about 

how well or how poorly they’re implementing the objectives. But there isn’t a 

question as to whether they are co-aligned with where the boss wants to go.

Government service is almost nothing except a question about whether or 

not the employees are co-aligned with where the boss wants to go, and usually, 

or I would say often, they’re not. So that’s the Administrator’s challenge.

Would you give us an overview of the changes you’ve made to implement 

the Vision aside from the management ones you’ve already talked about?

Those were the changes. The management changes that I’ve made are 

the things I’ve done to try to implement the Vision. When you have technical 

credibility in a management team and when you have a sensible architecture, 

that is my contribution.

I’ve changed how we do budgeting, as well. For a long time at NASA, 

budgeting was done by the Comptroller, but the Comptroller is also the person 

who counts the money and moves it around. In the private sector the combining 

of the roles of keeping track of and moving the money with deciding where 

the money should go, or helping to decide where the money should go, would 

be considered a conflict of interest and it’s simply not allowed. It doesn’t pass 

fundamental accounting standards for separation of duties, separation of roles.

I have separated them here at NASA. The people who now do the strategic 

budgeting for me and with me are not the people who are in charge of 

physically moving the money where it is supposed to be moved or keeping 

track of it. I think that has helped. There are any number of urban legends, and 

they may be not just urban legends, about people in the NASA Comptroller 

shop who made the decisions about what programs would be done and what 

programs wouldn’t be done, just by controlling the money. It’s always possible 

to do that, but it’s much more difficult now.

Would you say a little more about how you came to some of the technical 

decisions you made? For example, Ares, CEV [Crew Exploration Vehicle].

A lot of these decisions nearly make themselves, if you start with the right 

premises. We’re going back to the Moon, and we’re unlikely in the extreme 

to be given enough money to have two different kinds of human spaceflight 

vehicles. We’re lucky to get one. So if primacy rests on we’re going back to the 

Moon, then the vehicle which carries people has to be capable of coming back 

from the Moon. That’s a difficult technical challenge. A vehicle like the Shuttle, 

a smaller vehicle but shaped like the Shuttle, can’t do it. The aerodynamic 

heating rates and heating loads are simply too high with anything other than 

an ablative material such as was used on Apollo. Shuttle tiles won’t cut it.

10
Michael D. Griffin

Also, the penalty of carrying wings all the way up to the Moon and all 

the way back doesn’t seem to justify itself. So without question, if we’re 

going to the Moon, then we’re going to be coming back home in what I’ll call 

technically a semiballistic, a blunt-body type of arrangement. That means it’s 

going to look something like Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo-Soyuz, one of that 

family of vehicles.

So if it’s going to look something like that, then it was a reasonably logical 

choice—not the only choice—to model it after the vehicle where we have the 

most aerodynamic experience, and that was Apollo, the Apollo Command 

Module. People say, “Well, gee, it looks a lot like Apollo.” Well, the economics 

of not spending money to refine a new aerodynamic shape, even though 

others would serve, combined with the fact that it must come home at lunar 

entry speeds, give you something that looks like Apollo.

You have an Apollo-like shape, and it could be on a Shuttle-C type 

arrangement, or it could be in a variety of other arrangements. But one of the 

first things that I didn’t like about the Shuttle when, as a young engineer in my 

20s when I saw it, my reaction was immediately, “My God, they put the crew 

right down there amongst all the hardware. So they’re not in a safe place, and 

they didn’t give them a way to get off.” I was going to have an escape system, 

and I was not going to have the crew in a position where if something happens 

to the other hardware, it would impact the crew module. It will be below them. 

Now, that’s not a guarantee, but it’s a lot better deal than being down in a 

place where, if a tank ruptures or if the stack blows up or if something falls on 

it—I actually never thought—as most people did not—never thought about the 

impact of foam coming off of a bipod strut on the Shuttle and impacting a wing. 

I’d be the first to admit that I missed that along with everybody else at NASA.

But generically, the idea of not having the crew module where it’s in a 

place where if the hardware has a problem, that problem would impact the 

crew module, generically, that idea was one of the first things I noticed at the 

age of 23 when they rolled the design out. I thought it was the dumbest thing 

I’d ever seen. I just would not work on the Shuttle during the ’70s and ’80s; I 

just would not. I really did not like the design.

Now, the other technical decisions about Ares and Orion, the Ares design 

uses a device, the first stage of the Shuttle, solid rocket; the first stage is a solid 

rocket booster. Well, the United States has paid billions of dollars and seven 

human lives to figure out how to make that thing work nearly perfectly every 

time, and we’ve now had, I think, 186 successful uses of that in a row, as I sit 

here, maybe 188; I’m losing track. It is at this point the most reliable piece of 

space transportation hardware yet invented. It seemed ludicrous to me not to 

use it in crafting the next system. So it’s the first stage of Ares I. 

We needed a new upper stage, but even had we used the EELVs 

[Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles], Atlas V or Delta IV, we would have 

11
NASA at 50

needed a new upper stage, because what comes with those vehicles wasn’t 

adequate. So a new upper stage on top of the most reliable piece of space 

transportation hardware yet invented seemed like[ly] to me to be a pretty 

good deal, as well as being economical. With our budgets, being economical 

in our designs was absolutely crucial. So if you follow those technical 

decisions to their logical conclusions, it’s really hard to say that you would 

come up with a different answer.

Now, if you walk into it with a vested interest, such as, “I need to sell more 

EELVs,” then you won’t reach the conclusion I reached. But I actually started 

out thinking the EELV would be the right path for getting crew into orbit and 

then decided that this other approach was better. So another feature is you 

need to be willing to change your mind.

The Ares V architecture, well, if you go back to a study that I led in 1993 

when I was the Chief Engineer at the Agency, I led a study in 1993, led a team, 

that concluded that the proper way to deploy the Space Station was not on 

dozens of Shuttle launches but on half a dozen launches of something that 

looks exactly like what we call Ares V today. Because you would have enough 

payload capability to put up several modules at a time, and you could put up 

approximately four to five Shuttle flights’ worth of hardware on that vehicle for 

each launch. Had we done that in the early ’90s, we’d be finished with Space 

Station today and probably be back on the Moon.

Ares V is a design I had carried around in my head for 15 years. In order 

to go to the Moon, you need a vehicle, at a minimum, in the Saturn V class, 

120 or more metric tons, equivalent to low-Earth orbit. Smaller than that and 

you get into the problem that you just can’t carry enough to make the trip 

worthwhile, or else you have to miniaturize the people. Well, that isn’t going to 

happen, so there’s a floor on how small a vehicle can be if you want to go to 

the Moon, unless you want to do an extensive set of rendezvous in Earth orbit; 

half a dozen launches and rendezvous in Earth orbit, which is really rather silly.

So the Ares V is big enough to put about 130 or so metric tons in low-Earth 

orbit. It’s over the threshold. It gives us a great growth path for Mars. We can 

put together a Mars-sized payload over about a year with four or five launches.

Rendezvousing with the Ares I, it will allow us to go to the Moon with 

two launches, one for cargo and one for crew, and gives us a substantial 

capability over Apollo. It makes maximal use of Shuttle elements, the solid 

rocket boosters; the ability to craft large tanks that we use for the Shuttle, the 

Shuttle external tank technology. It makes maximal use of old Apollo heritage, 

the J-2, and also work is being done by the Air Force, the RS-68 engine.

So for the Ares V basically what we did was to use every single component 

we could find that already existed so that we weren’t wasting money that we 

don’t have. Again, those decisions are very logical, and one would have a hard 

time overturning them if efficiency was one’s goal.

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Michael D. Griffin

In today’s newspaper, an article states Congress may be providing an 

increase to the budget, more than NASA expected. If you could direct 

an increase, what types of programs would you like to add to NASA’s 

strategic vision for the future?

Well, I think we have enough programs. We’re doing the programs we need 

to do. We do need more money than has been allocated to do those programs 

on a reasonable schedule. We’re fundamentally doing the right things. We’re not 

doing as many of the right things as I’d like to see us do. For example, in human 

spaceflight we’re doing in series a number of things that were done in parallel 

during Apollo. In our science programs we’re doing things sequentially that we 

would like to be doing together, and we would do if we had more money.

But I really believe the Agency is doing fundamentally the right things. 

Wrong things just don’t survive the scrutiny of the National Academy of 

Sciences. There’s the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the White 

House, the OMB, congressional staff, the NASA Advisory Council. There are 

so many external groups who look at what we do that if we were doing 

something fundamentally wrong, it just wouldn’t survive.

And, you’ve got to ask what the definition of wrong is, and I would 

say something wrong is being done if it has no real constituency out there 

among the taxpaying public. The definition of right is what our elected 

representatives are willing to support and vote for, because in a democracy 

that is how we make the determination of what it is that government funding 

will be spent on. There’s nothing we’re doing that doesn’t have a very ample 

constituency behind it.

Now, some of those different constituents don’t like each other. There are 

scientists who would happily end human spaceflight, and human spaceflight 

advocates who would happily reduce science to a trickle. But fortunately, 

neither of those extremes prevail.

How do you reconcile that with what you just said about the Shuttle? How 

did so many of these oversight groups let the Shuttle go forward when it 

was obviously the wrong thing to do, you say?

But again, the Shuttle going forward was the second stage of a decision 

which said, first, let’s end Apollo. I can’t advocate that democracy is a perfect 

system. I’m not trying to do that. Clearly the democratically elected leadership 

of the nation thought it was okay to cease doing what the United States had 

spent an enormous amount of treasure developing a capability to do. That was 

okay with them.

They didn’t see what I see as larger strategic implications of having the 

United States be the unquestioned preeminent leader in space. Now, that 

same democratically elected government understood that we needed to have 

strategically superior airpower and a strategically superior Navy, and that we 

13
NASA at 50

needed to have an industry which was the equal of any and superior to any 

other in the world. But they missed it with regard to space. They just missed 

it. So our systems are not perfect.

But, I’m very forthright in saying this was a flawed decision, in my opinion. 

It was my opinion at the time and has remained so. I think there are now more 

who agree with me.

Does that go for the International Space Station, too, the ISS?

Well, no. Having a space station is an excellent idea. Putting the space 

station up in dozens of chunks of 40,000 pounds or less each is rather silly. 

If we were going to put up a space station, the proper way to do it is first to 

develop the heavy-lift booster, and then put it up in more reasonable-sized 

chunks. Having a space station is not a flawed decision. That’s a very useful 

decision. We’ve made a lot harder work out of having a space station than it 

ever needed to be, in my opinion.

Switching the subject for a minute to robotics, just recently [exploration 

rovers] Spirit and Opportunity woke up from their nap during a dust 

storm and are back traveling around Mars. They have definitely surpassed 

their length of service and have added to NASA’s legacy of successful 

use of robotics. Tell us what you think the relative importance of robotic 

spaceflight is and how will this change the next years as part of the 

overall Vision for Space Exploration.

Well, I don’t think it’s going to change anything. For a very long time 

to come, the human frontier in space is going to be well behind that of the 

robotic frontier, and in many ways it always will be. Our tools, whether on 

Earth or in space, can see farther, can see in different spectra, can see more 

deeply both large and small than we can unaided. What is it that humans do 

that doesn’t involve tool usage?

So to me our robotic scientific spacecraft are just an extension of the 

human being as a tool-making animal. We can send our tools. Today we can 

deploy our tools well beyond our own personal reach, and that capability is 

in itself a tool. The ability to remotely control our tools is itself a tool, and we 

make extensive use of it here on the ground, in the air, and in space, and I 

hope we will continue to do so. Our science frontier is enormously beyond our 

human frontier, and always will be.

In addition, well, the bumper sticker version is when something is too 

dirty, dumb, or dangerous for human beings, we use robotic systems. We 

dislike using human beings in applications which are kind of disgusting. We 

do it, but we don’t like it. We dislike using human beings when a task is so 

repetitive that humans become bored with it; humans don’t usually do it well. 

14
Michael D. Griffin

And we dislike using human beings when a task is so dangerous that many of 

them may not survive.

Now, we do all of those things, and the history of human civilization is a 

history of trying to fix that. So for our dirty, dumb, and dangerous applications 

we use robots, and in the exploration of the solar system we’re going to continue 

to do that.

I see it as those two things. One is the area where we really dislike to 

involve humans, even though we could, and the other thing being simply that 

the science frontier is so much farther than the human frontier that we don’t 

want to miss out on those opportunities.

For example, the Hubble Space Telescope is helping us to understand how 

the universe works. The discovery of dark energy and dark matter is right at the 

feet of Hubble. What is the value—I can’t even begin to guess—but what is the 

value to human civilization a thousand years from now of having discovered 

that dark energy and dark matter exist, and how will they use that discovery? I 

only wish I could be around to find out. This is what we do here.

You’ve made the case for robotic space exploration; some people would 

say, “Well, why do you need the human then?”

Well, because if I want to do human exploration, it needs humans. It’s 

self-justifying. It doesn’t need anything more than that. Humans like to go 

where they can take themselves. The entire history of human civilization is of 

expansion out of East Africa. In fact, the entire history of life is to expand into 

every niche and habitat that some mutated form of life can inhabit.

I’ll never capture it better than Norm Augustine put it when he was doing 

the 1990 study on the future of the U.S. human spaceflight program. In the 

introduction to that [paper], he made the remark, and I’m not quoting directly, 

but the essence of the quote is, whether everyone can understand it or not, 

there is a difference between placing an instrumented package at the top of 

Mount Everest and climbing Mount Everest. I don’t think I need to say any more. 

Anyone who doesn’t get that difference, he and I can’t have a conversation.

But there are a lot of people who don’t get that. 

Fortunately, wiser heads have prevailed. The fundamental purpose of NASA 

as a space agency is to explore the universe that we can reach with humans and 

robots. That’s the fundamental purpose, and it’s an and, not an or.

We look down, we look up, and we travel outward. And all those things 

are important, and it is to me very narrow thinking, narrow thinking in the 

extreme, for any constituency to say, “Well, my part is worth doing, but these 

other parts are not worth doing.” I could not more profoundly disapprove of 

that view.

15
NASA at 50

NASA’s foundation was built on NACA [National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics], an organization with a focus on aeronautical research. What 

is NASA’s role now and in the future in the field of aeronautics?

I don’t see nearly as big a role as I wish I saw. There is still much to be 

learned about flight within the atmosphere, flight within atmospheres. We’re 

not going to do space exploration at any planet with an atmosphere, even a 

residual one like Mars, without a heavy investment in aeronautical research 

that has not yet been done. Right now we’re limited to the Viking entry envelope in terms of our thinking about aero entry at Mars. That’s silly. We should 

be well beyond that by now.

There is an enormous amount to be learned about flight within our own 

atmosphere, to doing it more economically, safer, more efficiently, more quietly, 

and in a way that provides better service to more people. We’re not spending 

as a nation as much on aeronautics as I believe should be spent.

Do you see that role changing at all for NASA in the future?

Only slowly. I’ll just give you some budgetary facts, and I won’t put any 

coloration of opinion on them. It is often said that human spaceflight—“eats 

the lunch” is the phrase commonly used—of other enterprises within the 

Agency. Well, during Apollo, to the nearest percent, during the epoch in which 

NASA basically pioneered human spaceflight, during our first decade, human 

spaceflight was using right around 63 percent of our budget. Today human 

spaceflight consumes 62 percent of our budget.

During the Apollo era, science consumed about 17 percent of our budget, 

and today it takes about 32 percent of our budget. During the Apollo era basic 

technology—space technology, learning how things work and making them—

it consumed about 6 percent of our budget, and aeronautics consumed about 

another 6 percent of our budget. Today all of aeronautics and technology is 3.2, 

3.3 percent of our budget. Then there was always an “other” category of crossAgency programs and things like that, that was about 4 percent of the budget.

The only conclusion one can draw from that is that over the years, political 

priorities have shifted out of basic technology and aeronautics and toward 

science, with 3 or 4 percent of “other” being about the same today as it was 

then, and human spaceflight being almost identical today to what it was then. 

So we have as a political process decided that our space science investigations 

are of more value than are aeronautics and space technology development.

These things go in cycles, but they go in very long cycles, and I would not 

say that I see any immediate change coming in the near future. I don’t see the 

political imperative out there to make such a change. We’ve evolved to this 

position over decades. It’s been pretty continuous. I gave you the snapshot at 

the beginning and the snapshot at the end, and I didn’t take you through the 

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Michael D. Griffin

evolution. It’s been pretty continuous to get there, and I don’t see something 

yet which is going to alter it.

Speaking of budgets in a broader sense, during Apollo NASA had about 

4 percent of the discretionary budget, and now it’s about 1 percent. What 

is your thought on that?

It’s about six-tenths of a percent. And, I actually want to make a couple 

of observations before I give you a thought on that. In 1969, for the 

first time, the budget of the United States topped $100 billion, if I recall 

correctly, and I’m pretty sure I do. The NASA budget in 1969 was a number 

probably right around $4 billion. So in that year we were 4 percent of the 

nation’s budget.

But—and this is a crucial “but”—in 1969 almost none of the budget as 

a percentage and in comparison to today—almost none of the budget was 

anything other than what today we would call the domestic discretionary 

budget. That was defense, plus all of the other non-defense discretionary 

programs. Very little of the budget went to entitlements—interest on the public 

debt, Social Security, other things like that—very little of it. There was some, 

but on a percentage basis it was small.

Now, today our domestic discretionary budget, counting defense, is about 

$800 or so billion, $800 billion and change, but our budget in round numbers 

is $2.7 or so trillion, and in round numbers our domestic discretionary is just 

under $900 billion, $877 or some number like that billion.

So the proper comparison is of $870-some or $900 billion to $100 billion, 

because the $1.9 trillion in entitlements, interest on the public debt, and other 

non-discretionary things didn’t exist 40 years ago. Those categories didn’t exist 

in terms of occupying any size in the budget. 

Today NASA gets $16 billion and change out of a $900 billion budget. 

That’s a couple percent; it’s not 4 percent, but it’s a couple percent. We’re 

not doing terribly badly in terms of the budget fraction of the budget that 

would be apples to apples, okay? We’re doing very poorly in comparison to 

entitlements and interest on the public debt, which 40 years ago were nits.

What has happened to the country over 40 years is that political imperatives 

have shifted by an enormous factor. For every three dollars that are spent 

by the government, two of them are spent for entitlements and interest on 

the public debt, and only one of those three dollars is being used to buy 

things for people, as functions of government. So in that crowding out of 

budget which has occurred, NASA, along with other domestic nondefense 

discretionary functions, has been crowded out. But relative to, on an applesto-apples comparison, the kinds of things we used to be up against 40 years 

ago in the budget, we’re really not doing too badly.

17
NASA at 50

The NASA budget peaked in 1965 or 1966 and had already started down.

It had started down by 1969. As I said earlier, we made an enormous 

investment for about four or five years to purchase for Apollo things in parallel 

that today we are purchasing in series fashion, and so I chose for the moment 

to draw a comparison between now and the late ’60s.

Oh, by the way, I would also say that if you compare the inflation of the 

time, $100 billion in the late ’60s is about $700 billion today, so the domestic 

discretionary portion of the budget in constant dollars is a little bit larger than 

it was back then, but not a lot. We’ve done a very economical job over the 

decades of controlling the growth of domestic discretionary funding. We’ve not 

done a good job over the decades of controlling the growth of entitlements and 

interest on the public debt. Those have mushroomed beyond any imagining 

from the time of our young adulthood.

As you know, global warming has become a topic of intense discussion 

over the last few years, and NASA scientists have been a source of 

information regarding this topic. How will NASA be involved with the 

discussion of global warming in the next years?

I hope in the same way that we have been. Our job is to gather data, 

build climate models, try to understand the data, publish the results. We’re 

not a policy-making agency and shouldn’t be. That would be, in my view, a 

severe conflict of interest. If you are involved in the making of policy and in 

the development of the data and the models that contribute to that, there will 

inevitably be the question of, are you coloring the results to match what you 

want the policy to be?

So our job is that of scientific research; gather the information, understand 

it, interpret it, build theoretical models to explain it, and then publish those 

results. I think actually we do it rather well. All the controversy on global 

warming and climate change generally, the enormous fraction of that data 

which exists in the world comes from NASA.

I personally think people have gone overboard in the discussion of climate 

change, to the point where it has become almost not legitimate to view it 

as a technical subject. It has almost acquired religious status, which I find 

deplorable. Science moves forward as the outcome of arguments. You develop 

your theories, publish your data, advance your concept, and others shoot it 

down, or try to. Scientific consensus evolves in that way.

When it becomes not legitimate to question the data, question the models, 

when anybody who doesn’t believe as you believe is shouted down, then goodquality science suffers. We just had an incident where one of our researchers, 

Jim Hansen, who is notable for his prominence in the media, but is also a good 

scientist, had to correct some of his data, his published data, on which years 

were the warmest years in the last century. It was a small correction in terms 

18
Michael D. Griffin

of the magnitude of the numbers, but a fairly large effect in determining which 

years were the warmest years. Jim has been criticized in some circles for doing 

that much more quietly than he published the original data.

I don’t think anybody should be criticized for correcting their data. In the 

normal course of scientific work, mistakes and misinterpretations are made. 

This is what is normal. When one determines that an error has been made, it 

should be fixed as rapidly as possible, but nobody should be criticized for 

doing so. It should be regarded as routine and should be treated routinely. That 

is what life is like on the scientific frontier or, for that matter, the engineering 

frontier. When we develop new designs, we should not be surprised that they 

break. We have to correct them and fix them and move on. That is what 

progress is.

When Congress created NASA, [Congress said] the policy of the country 

regarding activities in space would be devoted to peaceful purposes for 

the benefit of all mankind. Many times when elected officials talk about 

NASA and its worth or its value, they mention about how valuable it is 

for the efforts of national security. Do you find that NASA’s role may be 

changing as the role of global terrorism emerges through the world?

Well, I don’t really. When people talk about the value of NASA for national 

security, I see that in two ways, and both, are extremely important.

The first and most obvious way is that the technology we develop is part 

of the overall space business in these United States. NASA space technology is 

not colored differently than Air Force or NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] 

space technology or, for that matter, commercial space technology. It’s all part 

of our industrial base in space technology, and NASA is a major and has been 

a major contributor to that. Since our military space systems are part of our 

first line of defense and certainly part of our ability to know what’s going on 

worldwide, then in that sense NASA is a contributor and has always been, and 

I hope will always remain so.

There is a more subtle aspect to national security, however, where NASA 

plays an enormous role and that is not widely appreciated. I’ve used this point 

in speeches and I’m going to use it again here, because I really think it matters. 

National security to me involves several different levels.

The first level is having enough military firepower, if you will, that you 

can defeat a likely enemy, and the nation has fallen into periods where that 

hasn’t been seen to, but we don’t live in such a period and haven’t since World 

War II. We were taken by surprise with World War II. We shouldn’t have been. 

We have maybe made mistakes, but we have tried to see to it that we have an 

adequate defense establishment since that time. That’s the first line of security. 

I’ve often said with tongue in cheek that the only thing more expensive than 

a good army is having the second-best army. So that’s the first line of defense.

19
NASA at 50

Now, the second thing is, and I’m drawn to a quote by our first President, 

George Washington, who said, “If you would have peace, prepare for war.” The 

thrust of that obviously being if you are clearly strong and seen to be strong 

by other nations who are potential adversaries, then they will be measured 

in their actions, because they will know that if it comes to an actual conflict, 

you will be well positioned to deal with them. So that’s the deterrence theory, 

which, as we’ve carried well in now to two centuries past Washington’s original 

advice, and I think it was well founded.

Now, it seems to me that there’s a third step in national security, and that step 

is more subtle. That involves being the kind of nation, the kind of society doing 

the kinds of things that make other people want to be your ally. We did that with 

the Marshall Plan in Europe at the end of World War II. We could have behaved as 

a conquering power squashing everything in our path, very, very Roman Empire–

like. We could have done that. We could have behaved as the Soviet Union did at 

the end of World War II, amalgamating all of Eastern Europe into its grasp.

We didn’t do any of that. We didn’t do it in Europe, and we didn’t do it 

in Japan. We behaved, by and large, in ways—certainly not perfectly—but by 

and large in ways that made former adversaries want to be our ally, and today 

Germany and Japan are two of our strongest allies. That was a level of wisdom 

on the part of our grandparents’ generation that is not widely appreciated.

Now, space activity, civilian space activity that NASA carries out, is 

emphatically in this vein. The kinds of things we do, both for robotic science 

and for human spaceflight, encourage and entice other countries to want to 

partner with us in the doing of them. They are frontier activities and always 

will be, and they excite the human spirit and challenge the human imagination 

and the human mind, and others want to do that, too. When we can be a leader 

in those activities, it makes them want to join us.

There are many areas in which the United States has to do things that 

others don’t like, as part of our global policy agenda. We should proactively 

look for things that go the other way, that make others want to join with us. 

Spaceflight is one of those things, and in that sense, to me NASA exerts an 

enormous role in improving our national security.

NASA celebrates its 50th anniversary next year. Share with us what you 

believe to be NASA’s impact on society in the past and now and even in 

the future.

NASA’s impact on society, American society especially, is to do things and 

bring home things that are larger than life. NASA makes us look toward our 

future. People want to have a future. They want to have a frontier. They want 

to see and learn and imagine new things.

People want to feed their kids and have a roof over their heads and dress 

warmly against the cold and not be hungry and not worry about where their 

20
Michael D. Griffin

next car payment is coming from, and they want to have some leisure time. 

Yes, people want all those things. But they also want to look beyond that 

when they can, and NASA is the entity above all others in this country that 

brings that to them.

It’s not for nothing that 40 years after we did it, television commercials are 

still showing Apollo Moon rockets. They’ve had 40 years of other stuff they 

could substitute since that time, and they don’t; or even going beyond Apollo 

Moon rockets, beyond Apollo Moon walkers. Television commercials today 

are showing Apollo Moon walkers as part of their spiel. That’s not an accident.

You came to NASA at the beginning of the SEI, the Space Exploration 

Initiative. Do you have lessons learned from that experience?

Yes, I was the AA for Exploration until it got canceled by the [President 

Bill] Clinton administration. I was the Exploration Administrator who was 

hired in 1991 as a result of the Augustine Committee’s recommendations. I 

guess the lessons that I would say are learned from that time are that you’ve 

got to have the President and the Congress both in support. At that time we 

had the President’s support, the Congress emphatically was not.

Today that’s not so. The Congress has been hugely supportive of our 

program. You never get unanimity, but the Authorization Act, which passed in 

2005, December of ’05, was enormously supportive of our agenda. I have now 

Democratic committee chairs in both the House and the Senate. They are as 

supportive as were the Republicans.

Are you hopeful that the Vision for Space Exploration will go forward, 

past this administration?

I am, because of the points that Admiral [Harold W.] Gehman [Jr.] made in 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and the report that came out of that. 

If you look at the chapter that is on rationale—I’ll give you the bumper sticker 

version. The Gehman Commission makes the point that for the foreseeable 

future, spaceflight is expensive, difficult, and dangerous. But for the United 

States, it’s strategic, and it should continue. But if it is to continue, that the 

goals ought to be worthy of the cost and the risk and the difficulty of the 

enterprise, and that flying the Space Shuttle to and from the Space Station 

doesn’t constitute such a goal. They were pretty explicit about that. You don’t 

have to read between the lines to read those conclusions.

Well, in what I can only regard as a miracle of Washington policy, the 

White House listened. They responded. They proposed a program which goes 

logically beyond the Station, back to the Moon, on to Mars. Those are the 

pieces of geography in the solar system that we can envision reaching over the 

next few generations. Now, our descendants will reach farther, but that’s what 

we can see. So they proposed that that’s what we should do. The Congress 

21
NASA at 50

studied all that for damn near two years, from January of ’04 to December of 

’05, and decided, “You know, that’s right,” and they voted an Authorization Act, 

which basically tells us to go do those things.

I’m hopeful. I’m not confident, but I’m hopeful that the lessons of the past, 

this time, will be learned. We’re not asking for more money. It would be nice, 

but for like 20 years the space program has been roughly fixed in constant 

dollars, and I don’t expect that to change. What we’re asking now is that we 

use these constant-dollar budgets to buy the right things. It will be more slowly 

than many of us would like, but at least let us spend the money in the right 

direction, and I believe that will be done.

Speaking of confident and hopeful, we haven’t said much about 

commercial space. Are you confident or hopeful that commercial space in 

the future will have a greater role?

I hope so. We have to bring that about. The government can act to 

encourage commercial development or to discourage it. Now, at crucial periods 

in our history in aviation, the government took proactive steps to encourage 

the development of commercial aviation to satisfy government needs. All 

you’ve got to do is go back and look at the Air Mail Acts. Look at how we 

apportion cargo shipment of supplies into Iraq today. Much of it is done by 

contract carriers; operating at risk, but it’s done by commercial carriers. Some 

is done by military carriers.

We grew aviation policy in the United States with the thought in mind that 

we are a capitalistic nation rooted in doing things that cause free enterprise to 

succeed. So rather than trying to suppress it, we tried to sponsor it. In space 

we didn’t do that. We emphatically didn’t do that. We made it the province of 

government employees, which was not in itself bad, but we missed the other part.

We have a logistics market to the Space Station. What I’ve done with our 

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services agreements, or COTS agreements, 

is to say that the Space Station logistics market is open to free enterprise, 

and oh, by the way, here is some seed money from NASA if you can get your 

venture started. But we’re not telling them how to do it. Of the two ventures 

we sponsored, one appears to be succeeding; one appears to be failing. We’re 

going to cancel the failing one and use the money to start a new one.

This kind of activity on the part of government is essential if we want to have 

commercial space capability, and as a nation we don’t want to have no government 

space activity, but we don’t want to have only government space activity. We need 

to act in ways that bring about the commercial space development.

What are the relative roles of government and commercial entities?

It changes with time. I don’t think a relevant role for a commercial entity 

can be to send a human being to the Moon today. But I think a relevant role for 

22
Michael D. Griffin

commercial space activity today can be to send a human into orbit and can be 

for sending supplies into orbit. That is well within the reach of the industrial 

space community today.

So it’s not “what are the roles?” It’s “what is the attitude?” The attitude 

should be to make available the power of government to offer its markets 

to commercial enterprise in a hands-off way to stimulate the development 

of that commercial enterprise. As the technology moves forward, the role of 

commercial providers can always increase, but not unless the attitude is right.

23
.
Chapter 2

Shana L. Dale

Deputy Administrator 

Prior to joining the space agency, Shana Dale served as the Deputy Director for Homeland and 

National Security for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Executive Office 

of the President of the United States. Her duties focused heavily on science and technology as 

part of the nation’s efforts to combat terroristic threats. Although deeply passionate about this 

effort, she accepted the offer from NASA Administrator Mike Griffin to become the Agency’s 

Deputy Administrator. On 14 November 2005, Dale became the first woman to serve in this 

position and became the highest-ranking woman in NASA’s history. She served in this position 

until January 2009.

 Her work in public service had been recognized for years. She cochaired the National Science 

and Technology Council and also led and managed staffs associated with legislative affairs, budgets, 

and legal and ethical issues. For more than 10 years, Dale worked on Capitol Hill in positions that 

included staff director to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

and counsel to additional science and space-related committees. She also had worked in the private 

sector as an attorney and is certified to practice before the United States Supreme Court. 

 Dale admitted that the decision to join NASA was not “automatic” but said the most compelling 

reason to take the position was the opportunity to work with the multigenerational space exploration 

effort while developing a foundation to move the Agency forward. In an interview conducted on 11 

September 2007 in her office at NASA Headquarters, she discussed other reasons and her role in 

achieving the goals of NASA.

The reasons that led me to decide to go into the confirmation process 

were, first of all, that there was a Vision for Space Exploration. This Vision set 

goals, multigenerational goals, for what NASA will do in the human spaceflight arena beyond what we’re doing in low-Earth orbit. The Space Shuttle 

and International Space Station are incredibly important projects, but I had 

been concerned for a while about NASA’s goals and its mission, particularly 

25
NASA at 50

in human spaceflight, beyond those specific missions. While I was in the 

White House, I was very happy to see that the President [George W. Bush] 

was devoted to goals in terms of space exploration. With that as a backdrop, 

I was very interested in coming into the Agency. Obviously, the other areas 

of NASA excite me as well. Space science and Earth science have been huge 

success stories for this agency, with tremendous discoveries. The aeronautics 

work is incredibly important to the United States.

The second reason for me to come to NASA was that Mike Griffin was here. 

He and I have followed each other’s careers for a very long time in the space 

community. I have an enormous respect for him that has only grown during 

the time that I have been at NASA. He is a person who I think is uniquely 

qualified to lead NASA because of his extreme intellect, project experience, 

the fact that he’d previously been in NASA, and his private-sector experience. 

All of those capabilities together mean that he is uniquely qualified to lead 

this agency.

The combination of those two factors, having the Vision for Space Exploration 

and having Mike Griffin, that was the thinking—both went into the decision to 

move forward into the confirmation process.

Explain the division of labor between yourself and the Administrator.

Everything in the Agency reports up to Mike and me. For example, earlier 

today we were both in one of the meetings to review the Crew Exploration 

Vehicle, Orion. We’re both a part of the decisions that are made. He obviously 

is going to focus in much more detail on the hard-core engineering, the very 

technical aspects of the Agency. But there are many issues within the Agency 

that are technical that rise to the level of policy as well, because many of these 

decisions have policy-related implications. That’s usually where I come into 

the picture.

When he was looking for somebody to become Deputy [Administrator] and 

also the Associate Administrator, he obviously went back to the timeframe of 

[James E.] Webb and thought that was a really great model in terms of having 

complementary skill sets. He was looking for somebody who had extensive 

policy-related experience; management; familiarity with NASA (which I gained 

during my time on Capitol Hill where we had oversight of NASA); and political 

experience, knowing how Congress and the White House work.

All of my background was important to balance out all of the skill sets that 

Mike brings to the table, as well as Chris Scolese, the Associate Administrator, 

who has long-term experience in the Agency and great technical expertise as 

well. So I think it’s the combination of all those skill sets that come together.

On a day-to-day basis, I oversee some of the functional areas within 

the Agency, and that includes financial management, information technology, procurement, human resources, legal, international relations, property 

26
Shana L. Dale

management, environmental compliance, legislative, public affairs, strategic 

messaging, and education.

The four of us at the top have a really, really good dynamic, which I think 

is very healthy for this Agency. That includes Mike; me; Chris Scolese, the 

Associate Administrator; and Paul Morrell, who’s the Chief of Staff. We meet 

every morning during the week to discuss the issues that arise in managing 

the Agency, and we have a really good working relationship. We like each 

other as well, which is very helpful. I just think it’s really great to see that in 

any department, really any organization, that you’ve got leaders at the top that 

work so well together. I would say the vast majority of time we’re kind of in 

a mind meld together in terms of what direction to take the Agency and what 

steps we’re going to implement.

Tell us why you identified financial management as an immediate focal 

point when you came to the Agency. What does this mean for the future 

of the Agency?

Well, that was mainly because Mike and I had already talked about the 

functional areas, and that he would be looking to me for leadership in the 

functional areas. Given the long history that NASA has experienced with financial management woes and the fact that we haven’t had a clean audit opinion 

for a while, I knew that, just from that standpoint alone, that was going to be 

a significant focus area.

But also during the confirmation process you meet with a lot of Senators 

who are on your confirmation committee, the Senate Commerce Committee. 

There was a lot of concern expressed about the financial management system, 

and they were quite interested in terms of what the state of play was within 

the Agency and how much focus I was going to bring to financial management. 

It’s incredibly important to any organization, but it’s very important to NASA 

in terms of having accurate data that supports the projects and the programs, 

in terms of exactly where they are at any point in time.

We’ve been making progress not only in our audits, in terms of the material 

weaknesses that our auditors review, but also OMB [Office of Management and 

Budget] ranks agencies in terms of their status and progress, and in progress 

we’ve actually turned green, which is the stoplight indicator that we are making significant progress.

We’ve also ticked off a number of items in terms of progress on our corrective action plan. There’s still a ways to go on financial management, but we 

have processes in place and coordination among all the functional areas that 

impact financial management: the Integrated Enterprise Management Program, 

information technology, and property. Property management, in particular, is 

important because it’s another area where we need to make significant progress over the next couple of years.

27
NASA at 50

Share with us how NASA will be involved with commercial aspects and 

interests in the future. Explain to us how the partnerships between the 

space agency and entrepreneurs will change in the next years.

Mike Griffin and I are definitely of the same mindset that if the commercial sector can provide relevant services or hardware, and it’s relatively costeffective, we want to procure it commercially. To the extent that commercial 

space activities are viable in low-Earth orbit and potentially what we’re doing 

in terms of an outpost on the Moon, that’s an indication that we as a society 

have actually made it in terms of establishing a strong foundation with what 

we do in space. You know, it’s just like Lewis and Clark on their exploration, 

and eventually people followed and commerce followed on the rivers, etc. 

That’s one angle of it.

Another angle is to the extent that they can provide these services or hardware, whatever the situation may be, that allows us to procure commercially, 

and it frees up NASA to continue to pursue the cutting edge, pushing the 

edge of the envelope, which is exactly what the federal government should be 

doing. If the private sector is able and willing to provide commercial services 

or goods, the federal government needs to get out of the way. That’s been a 

longstanding philosophy for both Mike and myself.

You see it most significantly in terms of COTS, the Commercial Orbital 

Transportation Services project. This is the project for which NASA is providing 

some seed money—the commercial entity also provides its own money—in the 

hopes of developing a capability to bring cargo up to the International Space 

Station, and eventually crew as well, which would be incredible, especially 

given the gap that we’re facing between Space Shuttle retirement in 2010. 

Orion and Ares are not expected to come online for four and a half years. 

That’s a significant gap. 

Right now we know we have to focus on provision of capability, obviously 

from the Russians, potentially also from the Europeans and the Japanese, for 

cargo. It would be great, and needed in terms of what we need to do with 

cargo and getting crews up there, if we could also rely on the American commercial sector. To me, that’s one of the most significant activities that we’re 

engaged in.

Mike and I have worked very hard since we’ve been in here. Obviously, 

even before I came into the Agency, he was absolutely committed to COTS. 

That has not wavered, even though from a budget standpoint it would be easy, 

I think, to take that money and put it into some of the areas for which we’re 

having funding problems. But given the fact that it remains a healthy level of 

contribution coming from NASA, that should give an indication of the level of 

commitment this Agency has for that commercial activity. 

Also, some other things that are happening out at Ames Research Center—

one of their goals is reaching out to entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and 

28
Shana L. Dale

others in Silicon Valley to see what kind of synergies exist and what type of 

partnerships would benefit NASA.

We’ll see exactly where that leads us. But I like seeing within NASA an 

opening up to the perspective that there’s a lot of great talent in the United 

States. Back in the days of Apollo, NASA had to be a driving force for most of 

the technologies that were needed. Now, there are many areas where NASA 

continues to drive technological innovation and many areas where cuttingedge technology comes directly from the private sector. 

How do our international partners fit in with the commercial aspect 

within the NASA environment?

The federal government is always going to have a role in space, and that’s 

pushing the absolute boundaries. There are going to be certain activities that I 

don’t necessarily see the commercial sector ever taking an interest in, because 

there are areas that aren’t going to have a return on investment, and that 

includes some of the fundamental work in space science, for instance. So 

there’s always going to be a role for the federal government.

The same is true for other nations. When we collaborate with other countries, we collaborate with those space agencies of the other countries, and 

that will definitely continue. The question is the extent to which those other 

countries and their space agencies collaborate internally with their commercial 

entities, and I know they have significant collaboration.

What I think you’re seeing in the United States is an effort to tap into the 

entrepreneurial or nontraditional aerospace community, and that’s a change. 

It will be interesting to watch and see the extent to which that also occurs in 

other countries.

Although NASA continues to share its vision and its message, research 

has shown that the American public has little specific understanding 

about what NASA does or why it is relevant to their lives. What do you 

believe to be NASA’s most important role for the nation?

The most important role for the nation is that we’re the agency of exploration and discovery; we are always extending the frontiers. For a lot of us, not 

just at NASA but throughout the United States and probably throughout the 

world, our imagination is captured by the idea of us developing an outpost 

on another world, eventually moving out to Mars, but taking these toeholds, 

as Mike refers to them, of exploration, and actually moving out into the solar 

system. It is a multigenerational effort and one that extends as far as we can 

imagine into the future.

What’s the potential for even going beyond the solar system? Who knows 

what will happen there. But that’s exciting. It’s inspirational and it inspires many 

kids along the way to continue on in science, engineering, and mathematics. 

29
NASA at 50

Space exploration is hard and complex and requires us to develop innovative technologies. NASA pushes new markets and new technologies that are 

important for economic competitiveness in the United States. That’s another 

area that I don’t think we have been as effective as we could be in communicating that to both the American public and some of our stakeholders, because 

when a lot of people now in 2007 talk about innovation in the federal government, NASA usually doesn’t come to mind for them. They’re usually talking 

about the National Science Foundation or different parts of the Department of 

Energy or different parts of the Department of Commerce.

Many of us would like to see NASA in that equation as well, in terms of 

understanding NASA’s significant contribution to innovation and how technologies that are developed for space exploration are then enhanced or transformed—usually by somebody in the private sector—into applications that are 

incredibly important here on Earth. That’s only going to continue, particularly 

with going back to the Moon and then on to Mars. The types of capabilities that 

we’re going to have to develop, particularly alternative energy sources, could 

have huge implications for what we do here on Earth.

Would that be your answer to the question, “We should solve our problems 

on Earth before we go into outer space?”

First of all, NASA’s funding is only six-tenths of 1 percent of the federal 

budget, and it results in a huge return on investment in terms of achieving 

scientific discoveries, exploring the space frontier, and developing innovative technologies. Tackling the hard challenges of space exploration, whether 

you’re conducting human missions or robotic missions, results in benefits here 

on Earth. That also is incredibly important to our economic competitiveness. At 

its very core, space exploration is very important for the purposes of discovery 

and venturing on to the next frontier, and it’s important not just to the United 

States, but all of humanity.

I was really struck when I watched the premier of In the Shadow of the 

Moon, and they were doing clips after Apollo 11. The astronauts were talking 

about when they visited other countries after their mission, and how what was 

accomplished wasn’t just for the United States. The sentiment expressed by 

those in other countries was that the astronauts had accomplished this incredible feat for the entire world and for all of humanity.

It was very striking to me, because that’s what I think about in terms of 

what we’re trying to do now with developing an outpost on the Moon and 

going on to Mars. This is going to be an intense international collaboration. 

We’re obviously leading the way in terms of space transportation capabilities, 

but this is going to be a huge community coming together and developing the 

outpost and all the capabilities.

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Shana L. Dale

With your experience in Congress, do you find that Congress is impressed 

by that argument for exploration, or do they have other drivers?

I think it depends on the individual, because different people are going to 

resonate with different messages. A lot of people, a lot of us who are diehards 

in the space community, we know what we’re consumed by, and that’s the 

idea of pushing—pushing the frontier and pushing the idea of exploration and 

discovery. That engages a lot of members in Congress, but not all.

Some members are very interested in the missions that NASA engages 

in and what impact that has on the youth of the United States, and to the 

extent that they’re actually inspired to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics [STEM]—that’s pretty significant. We’ve seen spikes with 

the Apollo program, and then the Space Shuttle Program, in terms of students 

actually going into aerospace engineering. You hear that time and again, kids 

who want to be astronauts or space scientists, and because of that they are 

inspired to study science, engineering, and math. So there is a correlation, and 

that is important to many congressional members.

Other members are very interested in innovation and economic competitiveness for the United States. That’s the area, again, that I feel like we don’t 

get the recognition that we deserve as an Agency for what we’ve done in the 

past and the contributions we’re going to make in the future. 

It varies by person, based on what their experiences are, what part of the 

country they come from, a whole host of variables. But there are going to be 

different things about NASA that engage different people. To me that just goes 

back to our 1958 [National Aeronautics and] Space Act, which calls for the widest possible dissemination of information about the Agency. Today we need to 

educate, create awareness, and conduct outreach in order to reconnect with 

the American public. They get excited about NASA, but they’re not sure why. 

I feel like we’ve lost that connection with them about all the amazing things 

that we’re doing.

Traditionally, the previous NASA Deputy Administrators were male and 

either had engineering or science backgrounds. Your credentials are 

different from those. How do you feel your qualifications will assist NASA 

in meeting the Agency goals and of Vision for Space Exploration?

One of our greatest challenges, I believe, is communicating effectively 

what the Vision for Space Exploration is, what it means to embark upon this 

next great era of exploration, and having that communication with a broader 

base in Congress, the American public, and the international community.

I lived through the fights on Capitol Hill in the 1990s on the International 

Space Station. As that fight started to wane, the outreach to Congress became 

much smaller and became more focused on members and Senators that 

31
NASA at 50

represent regions and states that have NASA Centers or NASA contractors, or 

individuals who are very much in tune with the mission of NASA, as opposed 

to connecting with a much broader base in Congress.

I think it is incredibly important, and we have been working on this since 

I have been here, to reengage with a broader community on the Hill to talk 

about what we’re doing and the importance of what we’re doing for the United 

States, for exploration and discovery.

Also another issue that I didn’t raise that will touch some members is 

strategic leadership, being a world power. One of the defining elements of 

being a world power is having a human spaceflight program. That’s something 

obviously Russia is well aware of, China is newly emerging on this world stage, 

and India is expressing interest in developing their own human spaceflight 

program. Given India’s capabilities and their very strong motivation, I have no 

doubt that they are also going to fulfill their desire to have human spaceflight 

capability. The issue of strategic leadership in space is important to many 

members of Congress. 

But again, getting back to engagement with the American public, that 

needs to continue, and there’s a whole host of things that we’re looking at 

internally, including redesign of our Web site, which is fairly antiquated at this 

point. The people who have been running the Web site are limited in number, 

and they’ve been running it on a shoestring budget. Since I’ve been here, I’ve 

dedicated more resources to significantly advance our Web site and also really 

focus on content for the NASA Web site, trying to become much more interactive and be a go-to place for the exciting things that are happening within the 

Agency. That’s one communication tool.

We’re also embarking upon a lecture series. Mike is giving a speech on 

September 17 at the National Press Club, and that will be the kickoff of a lecture series here in DC, in which different notable high-profile people will come 

in and discuss different aspects of America’s space program. He’s going to be 

talking about the space economy.

We’re also looking at going beyond what we like to refer to as “the choir.” 

We’ve been very effective in the past talking within the aerospace community about what we’re doing, and that’s great. We’re going to continue to do 

that, but there’s definitely a realization that all of us need to get beyond this 

group. It’s a little bit premature to talk about the different places that we’ve 

pinpointed in the country, but they’re definitely outside the traditional aerospace communities, and they’re groups that may be focused on commerce or 

environment or a whole host of other issues where we haven’t necessarily 

engaged with them in the past, and we feel like we have messages for them. 

So that’s part of it.

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Shana L. Dale

One topic that seems to come up in the midst of the excitement of the 

Constellation Program is the “significant gap.” Give us some details on 

how NASA is going to move through this period.

First of all, we are very concerned about the duration of the gap. When 

Mike first came in, he was obviously, and still is, committed to narrowing the 

gap to as short a timeframe as possible. That’s also a requirement that we 

have in statute, based on what the Hill passed in the NASA Authorization Act 

of 2005, a specific requirement that the replacement come online as soon as 

possible after Space Shuttle retirement.

What we’re concerned about is similar to what happened between the 

retirement of Apollo and bringing the Space Shuttle online. That was a five- to 

six-year gap, and what happened was people left aerospace entirely. They either 

left NASA or they left the industrial base, and they never came back. That’s a 

huge learning curve. It’s a huge recruitment issue. That’s just going to be devastating in terms of if that happens again, so we’re very concerned about that.

I’ve had discussions with senior people in the Agency, and they’ve said 

they could probably make the transition from Shuttle to Orion/Ares work if 

the gap is three, three and a half years, or maybe four years. But as it starts to 

go beyond four, that becomes a real issue for us. It’s an issue not only in terms 

of workers and then impact on industrial base, but also our reliance upon 

the space systems of other nations. That’s fine up to a certain point, but then 

you really have to question what we’re doing as a nation given that we’ll be 

ceding our leadership position in the world space arena for a very significant 

amount of time.

Now, what we are doing is making significant progress on those programs, Orion and Ares, and those are proceeding forward. We’re going to 

have all of our contracts let on Ares by the end of the year. So we’re fulfilling 

commitments on our end to do the progress that is needed to carry these 

programs forward.

I think the other thing that is needed is just continuing to explain why 

we are so concerned about the duration of this gap. I think many members in 

Congress understand that, and they also share our concern about the duration 

of the gap. Obviously, when a new administration comes in, there will need to 

be a discussion with them as well in terms of the concerns related to the gap.

Next year NASA celebrates its 50th year. Share with us what you believe 

to be NASA’s impact on society in the past and what you expect it to be 

in the future.

NASA’s historical impact is taking something that’s inconceivable and making it happen in a relatively short period of time. We demonstrated the can-do 

33
NASA at 50

spirit that Americans possess with the incredible mission of landing men on 

the Moon and bringing them home safely. It’s so compelling, and as we mentioned earlier, the whole world watched with us, and the whole world watched 

with us during Apollo 13 when we were all worried about the crew actually 

making it home alive.

The Agency will always be known for pushing the boundaries of exploration. Obviously, there have been so many successes that this Agency has experienced in the realm of space science, resulting in incredible discoveries. This 

typifies what NASA has been to the American public in the past, and will be 

in the future. Currently, we’re going through this transition period, a relatively 

hard transition period, trying to finish assembly of the International Space 

Station, retiring the Space Shuttle, and bringing these new systems online.

This is a very difficult period in the history of the Agency, but we will eventually get to the point where we have developed this new human spaceflight 

capability, established an outpost on the surface of the Moon, and at some 

point in the future we will journey on to Mars. So I think that’s an incredible 

future to look forward to. And again, it kind of blows the imagination in terms 

of actually sending humans on to Mars. That’s going to be an incredible feat 

when it happens.

And who knows what’s going to flow from it? Just as breakthrough technologies came out of the Apollo program and the Hubble [Space Telescope] 

program, just to name a few, innovative technologies will flow from other 

space endeavors as we’re pushing innovation, and the technologies that are 

important for the space program. Somebody in the private sector is going to 

see a link between what we’re doing and whatever practical need exists here 

on Earth. They’re going to take new technology that NASA developed, and 

they’re going to modify it, enhance it, and who knows what spectacular benefits will result from it? 

It is a turning point for the Agency, and it’s just a very difficult time right 

now for not only the reasons that we’ve talked about, but also a lot of fundamental changes in the Agency, governance structure, trying to turn the Agency 

around in financial management, trying to make very difficult decisions to turn 

around information technology in the Agency, which hopefully we can do that 

by the time that we walk out the door at this agency. Those are things that will 

have lasting impact on this agency as well, because they are part of the core 

foundation of any organization.

Explain what you mean in changing IT [information technology] and the 

changing governance structure. What in particular?

Governance structure—when Mike came in, he wanted to make sure there 

was a separation between the programs and the [NASA] Centers in particular. Previously, Centers had reported in to Mission Directorates. Now Mission 

34
Shana L. Dale

Directorates and Centers are on an equal footing, and both of them will report 

directly into the A-suite [Administrator’s office]. That’s fundamentally different. 

The programs flow from the Mission Directorate directly into the Centers, and 

those people in the Centers report, obviously, into their Center management, 

but they also report back into the Mission Directorate structure. So that’s different, and I think people understand it now, but there are still some struggles 

along the way in terms of governance.

In regards to information technology, that’s an area that, like many organizations, has grown up piecemeal or ad hoc. For NASA it’s been an intense 

focus on information technology needed for programs and projects and individual organizations, instead of looking at information technology strategically 

across the board and the types of integration that’s needed.

So what we have are a lot of information technology systems throughout 

the entire Agency, and the direction that we’re moving in now is trying to 

integrate so that we have seamless information technology that also allows 

for Centers to collaborate, because right now some Centers have firewalls; 

it’s actually hard for people, for instance, who are working on Constellation. 

Constellation work resides in every single Center throughout NASA. It makes 

it hard for them to actually share data right now.

Also, given the fact that it’s grown up over time in this piecemeal way 

means that there’s been duplication along the way and in some areas, too 

much complexity. That all adds up to too much money, and potentially wasted 

money along the way. That’s another area of efficiency that we’re tackling. It 

will be a struggle, but it’s incredibly important for NASA.

Another fallout of all of this decentralization and culture at NASA is information technology security. You have an Agency of scientists and engineers 

who don’t typically think of the ways in which our information might be used 

by adversaries, so information technology security is a very critical component 

of what we need to improve.

You’ve worked at several places throughout the government, several 

agencies. How does NASA compare? 

Well, I have not yet worked at another federal agency. OSTP is really a part 

of the Executive Office of the President, although it is its own agency in terms 

of having all the functions that a normal agency would have, housed in that 

small office.

And Congress is one of a kind. What can you compare that to? That was 

a great experience, both being on the Hill and also being in the White House. 

It’s really hard until you get into either one of those to understand how they 

work and how they operate, and it’s kind of hard to penetrate on the outside.

I would say the first thing, again, is the fact that I’ve been really fortunate 

to work both homeland security and space issues. The people that do this 

35
NASA at 50

day in and day out, they love their jobs. They’re dedicated. They’re committed. These people commit their lives to these goals, to these missions, and 

are incredibly dedicated and passionate. They’re very passionate. You don’t 

always get that in the federal government. From that standpoint, it’s really 

nice to work in this agency and see the level of devotion and commitment 

to America’s space program when you go out anywhere in the Agency or the 

broader aerospace community.

The other things are just what you would expect in large organizations 

and also in bureaucracies. It’s not going to be the same level of bureaucracy 

at NASA as it is at some of the bigger departments, which is good, but it’s a 

level of bureaucracy that you don’t necessarily encounter in the private sector. Throughout my entire career, if I felt a sense of urgency about particular 

issues, I would want them to be taken care of very quickly, and so I have had 

to learn patience in this job, because things don’t move as quickly as I would 

like them to move.

Any other big surprises since you’ve been here that you didn’t expect?

I just take it day by day. There definitely have been some things that have 

happened over the course of this past year that I did not think when I came 

to NASA I would be dealing with, but I think those are outliers. Those were 

unusual situations that would have taken anybody by surprise. 

What do you feel is going to be the most challenging aspect of your role 

in the next years?

In the next—14 months? [Laughter] It’s a relatively short time that we have 

left, because Mike and I will say, “Oh, we’ve got two years left,” and then I’ll 

modify it, and I’ll say, “No, actually, we have a year and a half left.” The other 

day I heard him say “a year and a half,” and I said, “Oh, it’s not really a year 

and a half anymore.”

I think one of the most challenging aspects is coming in at this particular point in time when there’s not that much time left, and there’s so much 

that Mike and I want to accomplish. I would certainly hope—this is just my 

own hope—that the next [presidential] administration keeps Mike Griffin on, 

because I just think he is a phenomenal leader, and he is the right person for 

this agency, particularly at this time when it is a turning point for the Agency. 

This is a hard time for the Agency, and they need somebody like Mike Griffin 

here. I hope that he’s able to continue on.

In terms of the biggest challenges, we will obviously continue to make 

progress on the programs and projects that are in front of us. This gap and 

transition between the Space Shuttle and Orion/Ares I is one of the biggest 

challenges that we face. Another challenge that we face is our outreach and 

our dissemination of information about NASA so that the American public and 

36
Shana L. Dale

also our stakeholders in the White House and Congress have a much greater 

understanding of what NASA engages in and how important it is for this nation.

During our interview with the Administrator [Griffin], he showed us his 

book that inspired him when he was five years old. Were you inspired that 

early on, or was it later that you were inspired about space?

It was later. Definitely. I was inspired as a kid, but I didn’t have the same 

desire that Mike did, as many people do, to become an astronaut. There was 

definitely a coolness factor about astronauts when I was little. My intense 

interest in either working at NASA or somehow being affiliated with aerospace 

actually came in law school, and that was because of a law article that I wrote 

on remote sensing satellites. I had applied to NASA for an attorney position 

just as I was coming out of law school, and nothing came of that, and that was 

fine. But the reason that I came up to Capitol Hill was to either pursue space 

or telecommunications policy work, and eventually, after a year on Capitol 

Hill working on Public Works and Transportation Committee, there was an 

opening on the House Science Committee in 1991, and that was the start of 

my progression into space work. 

And now, after all these years, I’m finally at NASA.

37
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Chapter 3

Rex D. Geveden

Associate Administrator

Rex Geveden joined the space agency in 1990. He spent his last years with NASA in a position that he described as “newly reconstituted” by the Administrator. Along with having responsibility for the technical operations of the Agency, Geveden had oversight of all the NASA 

programs and Field Centers as he worked closely with Mike Griffin to develop strategy and policy. 

 Before coming to NASA, Geveden had spent years in industry working on hardware design for a 

number of science satellite missions and had a long association with the Gravity Probe B, a challenging 

science and technology program. He was serving as the Deputy Director at the Marshall Space Flight 

Center when he was asked to come to Headquarters and become the NASA Chief Engineer. He had 

been in that position for less than a year when he moved into the role of Associate Administrator (AA).

 Geveden left NASA in 2007, but before departing, he provided his insights on the duties and 

expectations of the AA. The interview was held on 20 March 2007 at NASA Headquarters in 

Washington, DC. He began by sharing the reasons for the re-creation of this position. 

Mike Griffin had a couple of things in mind. One was he wanted to have someone in the Agency functioning more or less as a Chief Operating Officer who was 

concentrating on the down-and-in business of the Agency—the Mission Directors; 

the Field Center Directors; and the technical components of Headquarters, Chief 

Engineer, Safety and Mission Assurance, Program Analysis and Evaluation—have 

them reporting through me to the Administrator. So I’ve kind of got my eyes on 

the whole technical portfolio of the Agency. That’s really one motivation for having 

re-created the AA position. Of course, when you do that, when you have a downand-in Chief Operating Officer concept, then the Administrator and the Deputy can 

go and do a lot of the up-and-out functions like international partners, Capitol Hill, 

the White House, and major industry components.

The second motivation behind re-creating the position was that those two 

positions—the Administrator and the Deputy—are presidentially appointed, 

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NASA at 50

Senate-confirmed positions, and therefore political. It’s typical for those positions to change out with new presidential administrations. The idea here was 

to have organizational continuity from one administration to the next by having 

this AA position. So I’m sitting in a position that’s the top nonpolitical in NASA. 

You started with NASA in 1990. Share with us how NASA has changed 

since that time.

The NASA that I came into was headed by Richard Truly, and Truly was 

kind of a transitional figure at that time. It was right before Dan Goldin came 

in. I believe that Truly was the first insider to ever run the Agency, maybe with 

the exception of Keith Glennan, who was sort of an insider with NACA, the 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Truly had been an astronaut and 

had a military career. Truly wasn’t there [as Administrator] for very long, so I 

don’t have much of an impression of him.

My first really strong impressions are of Goldin as the Administrator; he 

did that job for nearly 10 years. My view of Goldin was that when he came in 

he was viewed as a welcome reformer. He brought a lot of energy and a lot 

of creativity to the Agency, and I think his view was the Agency had become 

a sort of complacent bureaucracy, and I think he was right. He brought the 

faster, better, cheaper reforms. He downsized Headquarters. He created the 

“Lead Center” concept and did a lot of things that early on were, in my view as 

a newcomer to the Agency, welcome initiatives.

On the other hand, over the course of 10 years he came to be seen as 

something of a terror. He was capricious in his outlook. He changed his interests from day to day. We never knew where we were, whether we were going 

to focus on aeronautics or on astrobiology or on propulsion or whatever. So 

the Agency felt very adrift at that time and very insecure because of Goldin, 

his personality, and how the Agency was run.

Morale was very poor for most of that administration, and for two reasons. 

One was the leadership was seen as unstable and dangerous, and also because 

the Agency did not have a clear mission. People knew it and people talked about 

it all during that period, but it was very unlike the Apollo period, in which we had 

a focused mission. I’m telling you nothing new, but we didn’t have a clear mission.

Contrast that to today. In today’s environment we have an Administrator 

who I would say is easily the most technically competent Administrator this 

Agency’s ever had, somebody who’s got a clear idea strategically where to go 

and articulated that direction very early on. In fact, in his Senate confirmation 

hearings, he articulated the six strategic goals for the Agency. Those made 

their way into our strategic plan, and of course, they follow from President 

[George W.] Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration.

So where are we today? We have clear strategic direction. Most people 

believe that, even though there is transitional pain, we know where we wish 

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Rex D. Geveden

to go. They also believe that, in the case of the Administrator, we have competent leadership to get there. I think the morale, the organizational health, the 

culture is in a better state than it’s been in for a long time, and people see us 

as making progress toward a very clear vision.

Tell us about your strategy.

There were goals spelled out in our 2006 Strategic Plan: completing the 

International Space Station, getting off the Shuttle by 2010, developing a new 

Crew Exploration Vehicle, having a balanced portfolio in aeronautics and science, creating a lunar return program with applicability to the Mars Program, 

and exploiting commercial capability. Very strongly oriented around our exploration and our human spaceflight goals, with emphasis on balance in the rest 

of the portfolio.

My role in this job is basically the implementation of that entire strategy. 

I’ve talked a lot around the Agency about what I call the NASA game plan, 

which is our implementation strategy for the strategic goals that I just articulated. Think of the game plan as the set of implementing strategies, and then 

the game that we’re playing are those six strategic goals, return to the Moon, 

complete the Station, have a balanced portfolio of science and aeronautics, 

and so on.

I focus on implementing those. I don’t focus on developing strategy. That’s 

the Administrator’s job, with the White House. My goal is to make sure those 

are implemented, and I do that in a lot of different ways.

Share with us some of the challenges you will be facing.

One very clear challenge that we’re facing right now is that entrenched 

parts of the portfolio, if I could use that term, have very strong bases of political 

support. The human spaceflight program and its legacy, the Shuttle and Station, 

enjoy enormous political support, and enjoy political support for a lot of reasons. Some of it has to do with jobs and the history of those programs. Some 

of it has to do with the White House and the Department of State’s view of the 

importance of those programs and how we relate to our international partners.

The top priority, as was articulated by the White House in discussions a 

year and a half or two years ago, is the completion of the International Space 

Station. That implies we’re going to fly the Shuttle another 14 times or so. 

We’re going to satisfy those partner agreements. 

What most people would say is that you can’t justify the existence of the 

Space Station based on the scientific research value; there’s not enough there. 

But there are other reasons you’d want to do the Space Station. Some of them 

have to do with logistics. Some of them have to do with the development 

of capability; there’s no doubt this is the most complex construction project 

ever undertaken by human beings. Another reason you do it is to involve 

41
NASA at 50

international partners, to bind the ambitions of other nations with our space 

ambitions, and I think that’s seen from a national strategic point of view as an 

important thing to do, to satisfy those agreements. That is sort of the bedrock 

of the NASA program, because it enjoys the most political and the most strategic support; it’s sort of immutable. We’re just not going to change that strategy 

unless something very significant happens, like loss of a Shuttle or something. 

That’s pretty much fixed in the portfolio.

The science base, which now is 32 percent of our budget, including Earth 

science, heliophysics, the planetary science component, and astrophysics, 

enjoys very energetic support. Principal Investigators and others that are adherents to science in the science portfolio have a strong base of political support, 

and they’re very active. That part of the portfolio is pretty static, too, in terms 

of how much support it gets. Science is going to be roughly a third of our 

portfolio for the foreseeable future. Aeronautics is seen as something that has 

languished in recent years, and the support for that is either static or improving.

What that means is that this exploration campaign we’re undertaking, this 

new component to our portfolio, this new Vision for Space Exploration, is 

actually quite literally the bill payer for any challenges that we take to our 

budget. We can’t really change the International Space Station–Shuttle part of 

it. We can’t really change science. We can’t really change aero very much. So 

exploration becomes the bill payer, and you see that in the consequences of 

all the budgetary decisions that have occurred. Whenever we have a rescission, 

whether it’s uncovered capacity, whether it’s a yearlong continuing resolution 

that results in flat funding from year to year and takes five, six hundred million 

out of our budget, exploration pays the bill.

Trying to implement a program that’s a new program and doesn’t yet have 

its political base of support, doesn’t yet have all of its large contractors on 

board and advocating for it, is a very hard thing to do. People will say, “Well, I 

want to do science. I want to do aero. So we’ll just go to the Moon later, or we’ll 

go to Mars in 2040 instead of in 2030; what difference does it make?” It makes 

a huge difference whether we commit to going now or going later, and so it 

worries me very much. It’s a hard challenge, and it’s manifesting in schedule 

breakage every day. That’s one of the biggest challenges.

It’s interesting to look at NASA’s portfolio. It’s almost all high risk, high 

payoff. So we tend to fly stuff that’s two, three, five hundred million dollars at 

the small end, and two or three billion dollars up on the big end of it. Sometimes it involves human life; sometimes it doesn’t. But almost all of it is visible, 

and so failures are extremely visible in the Agency, and being able to execute 

this risky portfolio successfully is a challenging thing to do. It really is. You’re 

constantly at risk of mission failure, of working in very harsh environments, 

working in very visible environments. The Congress pays attention. The public 

tends to pay attention. Having success with that challenging portfolio is hard.

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Rex D. Geveden

What are lessons that you’ve learned and will be applying to meet the 

goals and objectives of the Agency’s vision?

There are several very obvious lessons out of our last epoch in human 

spaceflight.

The Shuttle is a vulnerable design. It’s as much as anything a compromise 

of technical and political and financial forces, and it resulted in this vehicle 

that we have, which is an elegant and beautiful and capable vehicle. It’s also 

a vulnerable vehicle. It doesn’t degrade gracefully, and in some ways it’s not 

robust to safety problems. If you start having a significant problem on the 

Space Shuttle, it is likely to end up in catastrophic failure. There’s no serious 

escape system on the Space Shuttle. There’s no abort system. You look at a 

system in which there’s external cryogenic tankage with exposed thermal protection systems all the way through the launch phase, and you have a system 

that can be damaged by a hailstorm, for God’s sake.

Now we’re pushing back and fixing 2,600 divots or whatever the number 

is, manually, because we’ve got exposed thermal protection and exposed 

foam for this external cryogenic tankage, and the crew sits down there in 

the middle of the propulsion stack, in the middle of where the explosion 

occurs. We’ll never design a vehicle like that again. In returning to this Apollo 

system, in which the crew sits atop the launch stack, in which there is an 

escape rocket, in which the thermal protection system is not exposed during 

launch, at least the return part of the thermal protection system, the base of 

the reentry vehicle—all of those are lessons that we’re learning and applying 

right now.

We also know that we built a system, in the case of the Space Shuttle, that 

was enormously operationally expensive. It takes 18,000 people to run the 

Shuttle Program. We cannot have a system with that kind of operational complexity going forward, because we need to be able to wedge up the budget for 

Orion, for Ares, and then in the out years wedge up budgets for landers and 

for habitat on the lunar surface and for other kinds of systems.

The only way we can do that is to have an operationally lean system, which 

means that you can’t have literally 10,000 people down at Cape Canaveral processing the Shuttle from mission to mission. You can’t do it. It needs to be a 

factor of 5 or a factor of 10 smaller than that. It needs to be a crew of a few 

hundred people or a maybe a thousand people that are processing the next 

vehicle, or we won’t able to do this.

One of the real lessons learned that we’re applying every day is to try 

to design to operations. That means that you think about the operational 

scenarios as you go through the development, and you design around that. 

Sometimes that means it’s more expensive in the development phase, but the 

recurring costs are more limited when you design to operations. That’s a very 

important thing that we’re doing.

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NASA at 50

I’ll speculate here a little bit and say that I think we’re going to have to 

learn how to design toward reliability. In Shuttle and in other kinds of modern 

systems that involve humans, we have spent a lot of energy on creating redundancy, in creating schemes and logic that sort of protect you against failure. It 

can get to the point where the system reaches sufficient complexity that it’s 

almost operationally impossible, and this happens when you build up layers 

of redundancy and fail-safe and all that kind of thing.

We have to take a reliability-based approach, a probabilistic approach to 

reliability of systems, and those lessons will be integrated into the systems that 

we build going into the future.

Share with us your perception of the culture within the Agency.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB] was right, in the sense 

that we didn’t have a safety-oriented culture, and we didn’t have the right kind 

of organization and the right kind of culture that would support bringing forth 

dissenting opinions and disagreements. We didn’t have a healthy tension in the 

system that manifested itself in a positive way. 

Now, I believe that our initial take on how to solve that problem was misguided. We went out and hired a contractor to do surveys and give us executive 

coaches, and if you pursue that logic, what you have to believe is that we lost 

the Shuttle; we did a survey; and now we’re going to work on the pieces of the 

survey that we found to be weak. And, oh, by the way, NASA scored higher on 

the pre-survey than any organization they’d ever surveyed before.

We started working on these two slight weaknesses, which were perceived 

to be organizational support and communicating across organizational lines. 

Johnson Space Center, in particular, took a pretty good beating on their culture. We worked on those things a little bit, and the idea was now we can take 

the test again, and we improved our score, and therefore we’re not going to 

lose any more Shuttles. I think that’s a really oversimplified way to look at the 

problem, to put it kindly.

I don’t think that’s the way you attack culture at all. The way you attack 

culture is you set the tone, and you lead by example; but even more than that, 

you design the organization and you design the principles and the operating 

principles and the values around the kind of culture you want to have. That’s 

what we’re trying to do right now.

One of the first things the Administrator did was to promote the Center 

Directors to the same status as Mission Directors so that they’re all direct 

reports now. One of the reasons behind that was—and it sounds subtle, but 

it’s very important—he wanted to create a very clear distinction between the 

programmatic chain of command and the institutional chain of command. He 

promoted Center Directors up; took them out of the programmatic chain of 

command so that now the programmatic chain of command flows from the 

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Rex D. Geveden

Administrator through me to Mission Directors, who have programs and projects, science, aeronautics, space operations, and exploration. The chain of 

command flows through those Mission Directors to program managers in the 

field to project managers in the field. That’s where that goes.

Now, the institutional chain of command is separate and distinct from that, 

clearly distinct now. It flows from the Administrator through me to Center 

Directors, who are not in the programmatic chain of command now but are 

in charge of technical excellence, safety and mission assurance, procurement, 

down through the institutional components of all the Field Centers, Directors 

of Procurement, Directors of Engineering, and their workforce.

When you set up a system where you’ve got a clear delineation between 

program and institution, then the institution can take care of its requirements, its 

regulations, its policies, and make sure that those are enforced in programmatic 

implementation. The program managers are out there trying to get missions 

flown. The institutional managers are out there trying to make sure the processes, 

the people that we apply to it, are following the right principles for development.

If there’s a disagreement between those two chains of command, agreement is sought at the lowest possible level. If it is not achieved, then there 

are ways to protest those decisions all the way up the chain of command so 

that the final point of adjudication is in the Administrator’s office, and it starts 

through me. And we’ve done that. We’ve had six or seven really tough issues 

between engineering and the program reach this level.

When you put in a system like that and you tell people it’s your responsibility to protest a decision that doesn’t sit well with you, if something doesn’t 

feel right in your gut, if something doesn’t work well in your analysis, it’s your 

responsibility to raise the decision. And you organize your agency that way to 

create that healthy tension that you want between the institutional and programmatic elements. Then, I think you’ve got a chance of getting people to talk 

about the danger of foam or the danger of an ice frost ramp or the danger of 

a RP-1 [Rocket Propellant-1] tank on the Atlas mission that we flew for Pluto, 

New Horizons. And it has happened. People are talking about it.

You create the culture by example of leadership. You also design to the culture 

that you want by putting together the organizational mechanisms and the processes to make it work. There are many more dimensions to the culture, and one 

of the things that the Administrator has said is that we will not cede our authority 

to external advisers. We had gotten into a consent loop with the CAIB and the 

Stafford-Covey Task Group in the sense that we said, “Your recommendations are 

requirements, and we will follow your requirements, and we’ll submit our data to 

you to make sure you approve of our response to your recommendations.”

We’re not doing that. Our external advisers are wise, seasoned, intelligent 

people that we should listen to. We, NASA, are the people who are responsible 

for executing the nation’s civil space program, and we will take responsibility 

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NASA at 50

for which recommendations we accept and which we do not. We need to 

apply that discernment and make recommendations about that. So liberating 

ourselves to do what we think is right is a positive cultural step.

The Administrator and I have put great emphasis on making sure that we 

have the core capabilities, the technical talent—and technical, I mean broadly; 

not just engineering, but procurement, legal talent, institutional talent—to 

execute the mission. You’re seeing a lot more in-house work. You’re seeing a 

lot more autonomy in decision-making, and you’re seeing a healthy tension.

It is my belief that the consequence of constructive disagreement is a healthy 

culture. To me the signs of poor health in an organization are the inability to 

deal with conflict. So when you hear this kind of language in a meeting, when 

an argument breaks out in a meeting, and people start saying, “Oh, let’s take that 

offline,” or, “We’ll take an action on that.” Or, you know, “We don’t need to talk 

about that in here. Why don’t you two get together?” That’s poor health.

To me, we’ve got to have an organization, a culture in which you can fight 

a little bit, in which you can say, “You know what? I think it’s dangerous to fly 

with those ice frost ramps the way they are,” or, “No, I don’t like the way you’re 

doing the thermal protection system,” or, “I don’t like the way you’re executing that contract, because I think it puts us at risk.” Let’s fight about that stuff, 

in a civil, constructive, respectful way, but let’s fight about it. That’s how you 

get to organizational health, cultural health, and that’s what we’re trying to do.

I think it’s contrary to conventional wisdom, by the way, which says, “Let’s 

not disagree in public.” I don’t want that kind of an organization. I want to 

fight a little bit.

What is NASA’s role for the nation? How do you want the nation to view 

NASA as it moves toward its next 50 years?

I want NASA to be perceived as the agency in our government that does 

the most innovative and the most excellent things that we do as a society. 

We enjoyed that reputation during the Apollo era. We still, I think, residually enjoy that reputation, but I want to make sure that we protect and promote and improve that legacy. It’s my very strong belief, and you’ll hear the 

Administrator talk in similar terms, that the ability to do human spaceflight in 

particular, but also the other parts of what we do, aeronautics and science and 

space operations, those things are a precious strategic capability for this nation.

I have said that for those nations that can afford to do it and have the 

desire to do it, the ability to explore space remunerates positively towards 

greater security and survivability on one’s own terms. This is the reason why 

the Russians do it. It’s the reason why the Chinese are trying to do it. It’s the 

reason why the Indians want to do it, and the Iranians and everybody else. 

They know the strategic value of being able to put people in space, to be able 

to put instruments in space, and to be able to do those things.

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Rex D. Geveden

That value manifests in many different ways, but among those are that you 

build your technology base with it. You build your human capital base. This is 

a business in which the barriers to entry are very high, and so if you can demonstrate that capability, then you build your technical base, and in my view in 

this modern world there’s no difference between technological superiority and 

economic superiority. So you therefore build your economic base. All this has 

important implications to national security and to global leadership.

Now, even if you don’t buy that part of it—and some people don’t—I think 

if you choose as a nation to do these very hard things like putting people on 

Mars, then you have to trust that choosing to do those things is going to give 

you benefits that are unforeseen at this point and that it’s worth making the 

investment. If you look at the nation’s investment in our civil space program, 

and the ballistic missile program, to some extent, it led to miniaturization of 

electronics. It led to embedded software, advanced materials. It led to, for 

God’s sakes, the cable television industry; the guy that’s running around digging in your yard with a cable-company label on his jumpsuit owes his job 

to this nation’s investment in space. The technology that we created made its 

way into heart monitors, into improved screening for breast cancer. It was the 

enabling technology. We created the enabling technology for modern, small, 

lightweight, cheap smoke detectors that are in your home right now. The 

Global Positioning System that exists wouldn’t be here if it weren’t for our 

investment in the space business.

So you choose to do these very hard things, which seem abstract and 

which seem to some people to be useless, going to places like Mars, but in 

the end the economic benefit, the strategic benefits, are enormous. I want to 

see the nation committed to that course and I want to see them seeing us, us 

NASA, as enabling that.

Why would you encourage someone to begin a NASA career at this point?

Well, hell, a NASA career, it’s just the best thing you can do with your life. 

There are other laudable and worthy things to do with a life, no doubt, but 

just for all the reasons that I articulated, the importance of NASA cannot be 

overstated, in my opinion.

But apart from that, ideologically speaking, I believe in the advancement 

of knowledge. I believe in the advancement of scientific understanding. I 

believe that’s something that cultures do that advance and grow and that bring 

along their people with them. I believe, from an idealistic point of view, that 

it’s mankind’s destiny to migrate into the cosmos ultimately, and I think our 

survival depends upon it. I think there will come a day when we corrupt the 

environment or an asteroid hits us or some other kind of thing happens, and 

we’re going to wish we had planted the seeds for survival of the species into 

other parts of the solar system, or beyond, if that ever becomes feasible.

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NASA at 50

So, having this little toehold on the Moon, having the ability to maybe get 

on Mars and exploit the resources and live there, I think is an important step 

in the migration of humanity and to the salvation of humanity, if you will, not 

to be too philosophical about it. But idealistically, it’s what I want to do with 

my life. But practically speaking, it’s what I want to do, too, because I think it’s 

too important to the nation not to do it.

On top of all that, we just have a very damn sexy mission here. We’ve got 

robots running around on Mars. We’ve got people in space continuously, 24 

hours a day. We created the technology that led to the weather satellites that 

helped us evacuate the Gulf Coast during Hurricane Katrina. There would be 

100,000 dead people if it wasn’t for weather satellite technology. There are just 

so many good things that we do in the space program, and I could commend 

all those to any person who’s interested in pursuing a career in it.

Would you say that NASA is the premier exploration agency for the country?

No doubt. NASA is the premier exploration agency for the country and for 

the world. I give these Center guest briefings down at Kennedy Space Center 

periodically, and I will say down there that “this spaceport that we’re sitting at 

today is the only place on the planet from which humans have departed for 

another heavenly body.” This is a rare capability that exists here, and this is the 

only nation that’s put anybody beyond low-Earth orbit. We’ve put people on the 

Moon, and we’ll put people on Mars eventually, so I think we represent mankind 

here with the NASA meatball. You know, this is not just a national thing.

I receive correspondence from people all over the globe. There’s a guy in 

South America that writes to me every month or two. “I’m really excited about 

what’s going on with the Space Station. Oh, by the way, did you think about this 

sequence? Let’s put on Node 2 before you do the Japanese experiment module” or 

whatever. He’s out there thinking about how we construct the Space Station, and 

he writes me and gives me pointers on it. But he’s in love with our space program, 

and I meet people from all over the world who love this program, who see it as a 

ray of hope, who see it as representing mankind’s aspirations in some way.

How do you respond to the question, “Shouldn’t we solve our problems 

on Earth first?”

This question seemed especially relevant in light of Hurricane Katrina, in 

light of the war in Iraq. People will say, “Well, you know, we’ve got a war. We 

have devastation from Katrina. Why are we spending money in space?”

First, spending money in space is a convenient and specious argument. We 

spend money on the ground, and most of it goes into the pockets of people 

who have chosen to study hard subjects and commit to the space program. 

Next, Hurricane Camille occurred the summer Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin 

were on the Moon for the first time, when this nation first went to the Moon. 

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Rex D. Geveden

We had a Vietnam War going on at that time. Does anybody regret the commitment that we made at that point in time? Yes, you can say if you try and stack 

up Mars exploration against AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome] 

research or against childcare or education, it doesn’t stack up that well if you 

just sort of abstractly put it together in that list.

But, the benefits to this economy, to this nation, to everything that’s come 

out of the space program, are enormous. You have to think of NASA’s part in 

America’s portfolio, our federal portfolio, not as a cost like a lot of things are, 

but as an investment. I’ve seen an economic analysis that suggests that something like eight dollars come back to the economy for every dollar we invested 

in space in this country. This is a dividend-paying program. This is a stock. This 

pays dividends instead of taking cost away.

So I don’t think we want to compare it to those things to the detriment of 

NASA. I think you want to say we’re committed to education, we’re committed 

to healthcare, we’re committed to childcare, we’re committed to breast cancer 

research. But on the margins of our very robust economy we’re committed 

to space too. I think it’s a false alternative to suggest that you have to choose 

among the two, because this nation can afford to do all of it and do it well.

We are on the cusp of something very significant here in space, and you can 

feel it all over the globe if you are plugged into the space community. You can see 

the Russians activating their space program. The Chinese obviously have a very 

ambitious program. The Indians, the Brazilians, the Iranians, everybody wants 

to be in space right now. So you feel a very significant global commitment to it.

Obviously, there are commercial dividends to be had in space, and we’ve 

had a robust commercial satellite industry for a long time. But now you’re 

starting to see the emergence of new kinds of things. You’re seeing the emergence of the commercial human spaceflight market. Who saw that coming? 

Who saw Richard Branson being able to sell 200 seats at $200,000 apiece to fly 

people in the low-Earth orbit for five minutes? Doesn’t it say something about 

how interested people are in space?

Who thought space tourists like Dennis Tito and Anousheh Ansari and 

Greg Olsen would pay $20 million to go into space for 10 days? Who would 

think that Internet entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos and others 

would be spending their billions on developing space capability? There’s a 

commercial emergence of human spaceflight. There’s a global emergence, and 

a huge amount of interest in space exploration partially stimulated by this 

nation’s commitment to it.

We are on the verge of something great here, and it feels wonderful to be 

a part of it. There is momentum out there that hasn’t existed for a long time. 

It’s comparable to the Sputnik and Mercury-Gemini-Apollo days. That’s how 

exciting it is. It’s a great time for there to be a revitalization of interest in space.

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Chapter 4

Charles H. Scales

Associate Deputy Administrator

In April 2007, Charles Scales moved into the role of the Associate Deputy Administrator. He began 

working with the space agency in 1973 as a cooperative education college student at the Marshall 

Space Flight Center. During the following three decades, he served in a number of positions there, 

including Deputy Director in the Office of Center Operations. For three years, Scales served in an 

upper-level management position at the Glenn Research Center. 

 In 2005, he accepted the job as Associate Administrator for the Office of Institutions and 

Management at NASA Headquarters, where he ensured that the Agency’s workforce, infrastructure, 

and facility capabilities were working together in support of NASA’s long-range needs. Two years 

later, he was asked to assume the duties of the Associate Deputy Administrator. In an interview 

held at NASA Headquarters on 16 November 2007, he shared his thoughts on NASA’s future and 

began by explaining his duties.

I wish I could tell you specifically what they are. They pretty much 

change every day. But generally speaking, I serve as the deputy to Deputy 

Administrator Shana Dale. Until you’ve actually worked here, you really don’t 

have an appreciation for what the Deputy Administrator and Administrator 

do on a daily basis. 

My job is to help fill in the blanks. I cover some of those things that 

she just can’t get to because of such demands on her schedule. That can 

range from filling in for her at a speaking engagement at a Field Center or 

conducting budget reviews. Making sure the Operations Management Council 

is scheduled and the agenda is appropriate for what she’s trying to get done. 

But if I could sum it up, I help execute her vision and strategy for the things 

she wants to get done during her tenure here at the Agency.

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NASA at 50

Generally speaking, what really is amazing is the pace at which things 

occur here in the Administrator’s suite. It is most relentless. It’s constant and it’s 

full. But actually helping work the corporate G&A [general and administrative 

expenses] budget process has been, I believe, a tremendous help to Shana, 

as well as working with the various mission support offices here in the 

building and helping balance the budget needs across each of those Mission 

Directorates. Also being an interface for her into the HSPD-12, the Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive project that’s going on now throughout all of 

government, and helping to keep that in focus and in line, and working with 

the different offices that are charged with implementing HSPD-12.

Tell us your thoughts on how NASA has changed from when you started.

The change has been actually tremendous. It doesn’t even seem like the 

same Agency, except for the fact that the people who worked in the Agency 

then and now are in my opinion perhaps the best of the best. Now I say that 

with hardly any experience of working anyplace else. So I try to be objective, 

but keep that in mind. I’ve always been at NASA. Of course, if I had to do it all 

over again, I would still only be at NASA. But never a day that goes by, even 

now, where I’m not really impressed with the caliber of people that work in 

this Agency and their belief that borders on being cocky because we feel like 

we can do anything. Most of the time we can. 

When I started, it was right after Apollo. In fact, the major program then 

was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and then the Skylab Program. In those 

days, a lot of my management focus was still at the Centers. I didn’t have 

really much insight into the Center-Headquarters relationship. There was a 

lot of on-site work done. In those days, if we couldn’t build it in-house, we 

wouldn’t buy it. 

One of the big changes that’s taken place is we seem to depend on 

contractors for a lot more now, sometimes even to the point of having them 

tell us what we want. When I started, it was just the opposite. If we couldn’t 

build a prototype, then we wouldn’t contract for it. As time went on, obviously we lost those kinds of skills or the capability to do a lot of in-house 

work. As the pendulum would have it, I’ve seen that coming back now. That’s 

a good thing.

What do you see as your role in assisting with the success of the Vision 

for Space Exploration?

My years at NASA have been spent on the mission support side of the 

Agency, or in those early days we called it the institutional side. When 

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Charles H. Scales

you’re doing that kind of work, you really learn that this is a role where 

you never see a mission support person at the podium after some launch 

explaining how well you provided a facility. Once you understand that’s 

never going to be the case, then you can really have fun working in mission support organizations because you’re not limited to supporting one 

program. You’re supporting all of the programs, be it human spaceflight or 

science or aeronautics or what have you. So to me it’s the best side of the 

Agency to work on.

Now if you’re not comfortable with that, it could be almost depressing, 

because you don’t see mission support people. But that’s the way it should 

be. Our role is mission support, to provide the facilities to make sure the 

human capital programs are in place, to make sure the environmental concerns are taken care of. All of those things that are absolutely critical to execute programs and projects. That has always been my primary focus, and it 

still is today, making sure that we’re providing the support to the programs 

at the best price we can provide it. 

At the same time we are making sure we build an institution that will 

be here to support future programs that have not even been thought of yet. 

Sometimes that gets to be really tricky, because the program managers are 

paid to execute the programs they have on their plate. They don’t have a 

whole lot of time to think about what the institution should be like in 2030. 

But if you work on the institutional side, you have to worry about those things. 

Should we keep these facilities available for post-Constellation programs? 

You have to think that way. Sometimes that creates a natural tension between 

today’s programs and those that haven’t come along yet.

What are some of the lessons learned that help you meet those objectives?

In the early days working at Centers, Centers knew what would be 

needed in the future. They had to figure out ways to keep some of those 

facilities funded and some of those institutional things funded, even when 

Headquarters might not agree. But what I‘ve seen happen, particularly 

with the current Administrator, is an appreciation for that, even to the 

point of identifying facilities that are not fully subscribed now and coming 

up with a way to fund those from an Agency perspective. A program called 

Strategic Capability Asset Program, a strategic view to look at undersubscribed programs, gets the funding in there to keep them alive so they will 

be available in the future. It’s gone from a Center figuring out a way to do 

that to a more strategic approach at the Agency level. That’s been really, 

really good.

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NASA at 50

How do budgets impact what you do; how can they impact what you are 

planning for the future?

Again, in the early days I can remember dealing with budgets twice a 

year, the initial budget and one update. Now budgets are 365 days a year. 

You’re either planning, executing, modifying, changing, adjusting, or moving 

dollars around. 

Of course, we hardly ever go into a year where we actually have a budget. 

We’re constantly operating under a continuing resolution, and it makes it 

awfully difficult to manage when you’re not sure what your final budget is 

going to be in an operating year. But you learn to work your way through 

that. It is time-intense. 

You learn to figure out what the highest priorities are of the Agency and 

try to move dollars into those areas. But when you don’t know what your 

final budget is going to be, it’s difficult to plan. As you know, we’re at a point 

now where we’re going to retire the Space Shuttle in a couple years. The Ares 

launch vehicles won’t be ready for a few years, and there’s this gap where 

we have to depend on another country for access to the International Space 

Station. Not a good position for a spacefaring nation to be in, but it all has to 

do with budget priorities for the country.

How much of your role is involved in gathering information from 

the different aspects to give to Ms. Dale and then on to the Office of 

Management and Budget?

I chair a monthly budget performance review for Ms. Dale for the mission 

support organizations, where we actually look at how the organizations are 

performing against the budgets they have and try to watch for trends to see 

at what point we need to shift dollars from one organization to another, to 

see if we’re headed in a direction where we may go over the cliff on some 

aspect of the budget, to make sure we don’t get to a point where we have to 

do something hurriedly. It’s constantly watching the aggregate. Organizations 

focus on their piece of it, but someone has to pay attention to the total. That’s 

a function I try to help Shana keep an eye on.

What do you believe NASA’s role is for society? 

In the history of the world, those nations that have grown have always 

been explorers. Now NASA for the United States is the one agency charged 

with exploration. We don’t know what’s out there. We believe that it’s our 

charge to try to find out. As we attempt to find out, as we go on those paths, 

there are all kinds of things that we discover. But if not NASA, who’s going 

to do that? 

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Charles H. Scales

The benefits that we’ve gained for society as a whole over the last 50 

years are just frankly immeasurable. They will have impact on society for as 

long as there is a society. Just the challenge itself has been so inspirational for 

not only the United States but for people everywhere. I think going forward 

we will continue to play that role. As President George Bush said, it’s not an 

option we choose. It’s a desire written in the human heart. Someone is going 

to do it; why not us?

How will aeronautics and science continue to be a part of the future 

along with human exploration?

Our role in aeronautics is sometimes underappreciated. I think when the 

flying public goes to Grandma’s for Thanksgiving, they don’t really have a 

full appreciation for what NASA has done to improve air travel and the safety 

involved, and the air traffic management, and materials used to build aircraft, 

and de-icing technology. All of those things NASA’s played a tremendous role 

in. Maybe the public shouldn’t say, “I feel better about going to Grandma’s 

because of what NASA’s done.” Maybe that’s not the role of government to do 

that kind of marketing. 

NASA’s role in aeronautics has been good, and there is going to always 

be a role for NASA in aeronautics research. When I worked at Glenn Research 

Center, I used to love going down to the de-icing tunnel where they do 

research on the impact of ice forming on the wings of aircraft and the proper 

way to de-ice aircraft. People don’t really relate that to NASA research.

You have worked at two different Centers as well as Headquarters. What 

do you believe are the characteristics of NASA that are at all three, what 

are the differences? 

Marshall, a research and development Center involved with the development of the propulsion elements for Apollo and the Shuttle Program, has 

operational responsibilities. It’s a rather fast-paced Center, lots of things going 

on, lots of different programs. Not only just in human space but a lot of science work as well. Glenn is a research Center, and the nature of research itself 

is somewhat slow and methodical. That’s something you notice right away. 

It’s not good or bad. It’s just a difference you notice, and the pace of things 

seemed to me to be a lot slower. But you have to understand that is the nature 

of research.

Now historically, a tension had existed between the two Centers because 

of competing roles in propulsion. But once you get past that and start working 

with the employees, there really wasn’t that much tension there. They worked 

quite well together. What you discover is that there was a lot of talent at both 

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NASA at 50

Centers, but not enough at either Center. But when they started working 

together, the products were a whole lot better and the relationships improved. 

How is it different working at the Centers than it is at Headquarters?

It doesn’t even seem like the same Agency. I always try to describe it when 

I’m talking to groups, when you work at a Center and you get frustrated, you 

can always go visit a laboratory and an engineer or scientist will show you 

hardware and tell you what they’re doing, and if they are on schedule, and let 

you see some of the research results. 

When you work here, there is no space hardware in the building. So you 

don’t have that kind of release. What you do have is a much better appreciation 

of the role that the folks here in the building play. I used to think at a Center 

that all the work that flowed from Headquarters to the Centers was just a passthrough. Not the case at all. The folks here turn around a lot of work. A lot of 

the demands we get from Capitol Hill, Office of Management and Budget, and 

the General Accounting Office are worked here at Headquarters. 

I wish there was a way for more Center people to spend some time here, 

and for people who’ve only worked at Headquarters to actually go and spend 

some time working at a Field Center. I think they both would appreciate 

each other a lot more. The route I took by working at Centers first and then 

coming here has been a tremendous help, because now when we’re working 

on a policy I actually understand the impact it’s going to have when it gets 

executed on the Centers. So I think that’s been good, and a perspective I bring 

to the Headquarters. 

Tell us why you would encourage someone to come to NASA to work.

Where else can you work where there is a mission like the one we have? 

Challenging and exploring the unknown and trying to figure out if we can 

we live in other places other than Earth, and how we get there, the research 

we do, having a permanent presence in space on the Space Station, to me 

that should be encouragement enough. But the benefits that impact society, I 

would argue that we play a greater or as great a role as any other agency in 

all of government. It’s simply an exciting place to work. Again, I go back to 

the people that work in this agency—extremely bright and always willing to 

help, and take on any challenge. 

I’ve enjoyed every day of my NASA career. I still get giddy coming to 

work every day because of what we do and the people we get to work with. 

You’re sitting around the conference table with the mission directors, and 

you’re talking about things like, “Well that’s a dust storm on Mars. The robots, 

they’re in a fail-safe mode now waiting for the storm to go, then we’re going 

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Charles H. Scales

to send them down in the crater.” You talk about it as if it’s something right 

outside the building. We’re talking about things on Mars and how they can 

reprogram the software and tell them what to do. Where else can you work 

and have those kinds of discussions?

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NASA at 50

Chapter 5

Bryan D. O’Connor

Chief, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Bryan O’Connor arrived at NASA as a member of the 1980 astronaut class with years of experience 

garnered from being a part of the flight-test community. In the U.S. Marine Corps, he had served 

as a test pilot and chief engineer with the Naval Air Systems Command on the Harrier Program. 

O’Connor worked in flight operations and in areas of development and flight-test matters while 

training to be a Shuttle crewmember.

 His first Shuttle flight occurred two months before the Challenger accident. For the next three 

years, O’Connor handled safety- and management-related issues for NASA such as organizing 

the initial wreckage reassembly activities, then establishing and managing the Action Center that 

served as the link between NASA and the presidential accident investigation panel known as the 

Rogers Commission. Afterwards O’Connor served in numerous leadership positions including the 

first Chairman of NASA’s Space Flight Safety Panel and commander of STS-40 in June 1991. 

 Immediately after becoming the Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight, O’Connor 

developed a comprehensive flight safety improvement plan for the Space Shuttle, working closely 

with Congress and the administration for the funding of the major upgrade program. In late summer 

1992, he led the negotiating team that traveled to Moscow to establish the framework for what 

subsequently became the Shuttle-Mir Program. The next year, he served as the Director of the 

Space Station Redesign team, which led to the International Space Station Program. Before leaving 

the Agency in 1996, he was the Director of the Space Shuttle Program.

 In June 2002, O’Connor returned to NASA as Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, where he 

served until August 2011. In an interview on 19 March 2007 at NASA Headquarters, he discussed 

his responsibilities in this position. 

I was in the Astronaut Office for 11 years, and as with the others who 

came when I did, it was punctuated by the Challenger accident. My first flight 

in the Shuttle was shortly before, and my second flight was after the accident, 

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NASA at 50

so it gave me an opportunity to see some of the root cause things and to be 

able to participate in the recovery and the Return to Flight activity and to 

watch the Agency as it learned from that catastrophe.

I think learning for me was important in that it steered me towards flight 

safety even more strongly than I had been before I came to NASA. I had long 

since been a safety officer. When I was in the Marine Corps, I was a trained 

certified aviation safety officer. But when I got to NASA, I realized that was an 

area that would be of great interest to me if I stayed with the Agency after my 

flying days, and sure enough, that’s where I wound up. In this role, my third 

assignment at NASA, I’m working in safety, reliability, and quality engineering, 

and I really enjoy that. It’s a good calling, and I appreciate the opportunity to 

serve in that way.

How has NASA changed since you began your career with the space 

agency?

Probably the most important change is in the distinction between flight 

operations and flight-test operations. When we had the Challenger accident, 

people looked at what happened and advised us. We looked at it ourselves. 

It was a big realization to us that this was more dangerous and a higher risk 

than we thought. There were things that we weren’t looking at hard enough. 

There were processes that we backed off on because we didn’t think that the 

risk required that kind of oversight and review.

In retrospect we were wrong, and that piece of the story hit us again with 

Space Shuttle Columbia. After the Columbia accident, the board that looked 

at us thought that we were wrong to think of ourselves as purely operational 

and that we were more of a flight-test kind of an analogy. We should have 

more engineering oversight and more safety oversight, more government 

oversight of the contractor activities. When you look at that, I’d have to say 

that’s a common set of learning that, unfortunately, we had to learn twice.

As I look forward, I occasionally hear people talk about how we’re going 

to do a development activity with the new system and then we’ll be operational. It always raises a little yellow flag with me. In fact, if I take it to the 

extreme, I could say that we’ll never be operational in the way I think of 

operations. When I was at the Naval Air Systems Command, we flew the F-18 

and the AV-8B Harrier, and those two airplanes went through a couple of 

thousand flights in a flight-test environment before we gave them over to the 

fleet pilots to operate and declared them operational. That’s quite a few years 

to get those couple of thousand flights.

I’m not saying we need a thousand flights on a human-rated space system to make it operational, but I am saying that it does take a while, and it 

takes a lot of experience and a lot of tests. We’re still learning about Shuttle 

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Bryan D. O’Connor

to this day—how it really operates in the environment it’s in, flying the mission it flies—and we’re somewhere where I would think of as mid-to-late 

flight test on the Space Shuttle today. We’re certainly not operational the way 

I remember it.

So that’s why I say the yellow flag comes up when I hear people talk 

about operations. I think the bad implication of operations is that it’s okay to 

back off and not watch what you’re doing too much, everything is all clear, 

procedures and techniques are all well established and tried and true, and 

you’re not getting hit by surprises very often. I just don’t know that we’ll get 

there anytime soon with the new systems, and we ought to keep our eyes 

open and act more like a flight- test community for the foreseeable future.

When I mention this to people, they say “Oh, sure, of course, you’re right.” 

And yet I see lapses occasionally where folks will say, “Yeah, but this one here 

is already pretty much proven. The equipment that we’re using, we’re not 

using high-tech new technology. We’re using proven stuff,” and so on. I see 

that as a path towards convincing ourselves, once again as we have several 

times in the past, that we’re different; that maybe we’re above and beyond 

the lessons learned in the past because of differences. And I see similarities.

Maybe I’m a “glass half empty” kind of guy here when it comes to this, 

but I don’t blame the folks at NASA. They are can-do folks. They’ve got a 

great attitude about the future, about discovery, about their systems they’re 

developing. That’s all wonderful. I just sometimes get a little bit concerned 

that we forget some of those lessons from the past, and that’s something that 

we need to keep in mind as we go forward.

Describe for us the scope of your current position.

The Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance [OSMA] is responsible for the functional oversight, the policy and direction and leadership 

in the functions of safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality. Now, each 

of those functions has different aspects to it. Safety, for example, includes 

industrial and occupational safety for the workforce in their day-to-day jobs. 

It also includes systems safety engineering as a discipline in the engineering 

community.

For years and years—in fact, ever since the Apollo fire—NASA has 

decided that they would separate out safety and reliability engineering from 

the Engineering organizations and put them under a separate organization. 

They’re still engineering disciplines, but they’re under separate organizations. Usually it’s called Safety and Mission Assurance. I think one or two of 

the NASA Centers have a slightly different term for it, because they include 

Environmental or Occupational Health. But, basically, the system safety 

and reliability and quality engineers in the Agency fall under my functional 

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NASA at 50

leadership as well as those who do pure assurance and verification of procedures. We’re not just the checkers; we’re also people who are actively involved 

in the design and the development work with our people. 

We have functional leadership for safety and reliability and quality assurance for all the programs. It’s also for all the institutions, and that’s basically 

where the industrial and occupational safety piece comes in. We have a close 

alliance with the Chief Medical Officer of the Agency, who is the designated 

Agency safety and health official. He’s the safety and health officer, by statute, 

for the Agency. Every agency has to have one. 

When it comes to mishap prevention and pure accident safety matters, 

that’s where our folks come in. When it’s health and the health environment type of things, that’s where the health community tends to come in. 

The health community reports to the Chief Medical Office, and the system 

safety and occupational safety folks report functionally to me, operationally 

to their Centers.

How has the mission of your office changed? 

When I first came to the Agency, this office did not exist here at 

Headquarters, but it did at the Centers. At the Johnson Space Center [JSC] 

in Houston, it was called the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance. At 

some point the “m” word came in there: Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and 

Quality Assurance. Most of the Centers had similar titles to these offices. They 

were a vestige of the post-Apollo timeframe when the safety engineering and 

the reliability engineering functions were put into those independent offices 

for a check and balance. The check and balance was meant not to be simply 

with the programs and the projects at the Centers, but also with engineering. 

The safety folks would look to the engineering organization, as part of their 

scope, as well as the projects that were at the Center.

In some aerospace companies and other government organizations, the 

safety engineer and especially the reliability engineer may not actually be in 

a separate safety organization. They may be assigned to the engineering organization as divisions of engineering. There are other places, in fact the one I 

came from, the Naval Air Systems Command, where the safety engineer wore 

two hats, reported to two different organizations. They reported to the chief 

engineer or the engineering director at the Systems Command. But they also 

had a separate reporting line to an independent safety organization.

The reason they did that was similar to the reason that NASA came up 

with after the Apollo fire. The safety engineer needs to have a check-andbalance function over all the other engineering that’s going on; not just to 

worry about their hazard reports, for example, that they’re being done on 

time or whatever, but also to be able to step back and assure themselves that 

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Bryan D. O’Connor

the safety aspects of the other engineering disciplines were being carried out 

properly, and that’s why they needed an independent path. They didn’t want 

the safety engineer to be drowned out and maybe a safety engineer input left 

out with no alternative route. NASA went a step further, and we actually took 

them out of engineering and put them in the Safety and Mission Assurance 

organization.

Now, the name Safety and Mission Assurance came about after the 

Challenger accident, where we had a variety of names in the Agency. We 

were adding “-ilities” to the function, like Maintainability, in some cases, 

Survivability or things like that. The titles got so long that we decided to just 

keep it shorter by using the words “mission assurance” to capture all the other 

things, including quality: quality engineering, reliability, and maintainability. 

That’s different from the Defense Department [DOD], where “mission assurance” captures different kinds of things, and we sometimes will confuse our 

friends in the DOD because of that. But here at NASA, mission assurance was 

a term to capture all the other “-ilities” other than safety and just make the 

title shorter.

Also, after the Challenger accident, the Challenger mishap board, the 

Rogers Commission, dedicated one of their 10 recommendations to the fact 

that we did not have an independent safety and mission assurance organization here at Headquarters like we did at all the Centers. In fact, the safety engineer at Headquarters, the reliability and the quality engineers at Headquarters, 

were basically assigned to the Chief Engineer’s Office at NASA Headquarters. 

They thought that was a disconnect, that there ought to be a separate Safety 

and Mission Assurance organization here just like we had at the Centers, and 

that we should have functional ownership of the safety, reliability, and quality 

disciplines under an Associate Administrator–level manager reporting directly 

to the Administrator. So NASA invented what was then called Code Q and now 

is called the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.

From the beginnings of this Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, 

shortly after Challenger until now, I haven’t seen much change in general 

scope and function. We have leadership and policy and directional oversight 

of these “-ilities” that we call safety and reliability and quality. That means 

we are responsible for directives, the NPDs [NASA Policy Directives], NPRs 

[NASA Procedural Requirements], what we call our directive system, standards that are used, and so on. About a third of the people that I have here in 

Washington [DC] deal with that every day, updating the standards. We try to 

update our policy directives every five years, and that keeps us busy, because 

we own about 50 or so of these directives.

As part of our functional oversight, we also do audits and assessments 

out of Headquarters and try to keep track of what’s going on in the Mission 

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NASA at 50

Directorates and at the Centers, so I’m aware of that and can participate 

in the reviews for those things that come to the Agency for top-level decisions such as launches, major programs, and so on. Those functions have 

not really changed very much. Some of the things we’re doing about those 

functions have changed a little bit, but the functions themselves have been 

the same.

Several groups that have come in as late as the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board have recommended that we actually have more operational leadership of the things that are going on at the Centers and in the 

programs and projects, and relieve the Centers of those responsibilities that 

they’ve had all these years. Functional leadership is not the same as operational management, and there are people who every now and then will come 

in and suggest that we combine those two, and that all the safety people, for 

example, that work on programs and projects should actually be reporting 

operationally to me, and that I would handle their budget. We understand 

why this comes up, and it’s not unique to our organization that this kind of 

undelegating suggestion occasionally comes up, or centralization. But every 

time we’ve looked at it, we’ve decided that no, we think it’s better to allow 

a Center Director, for example, to own and manage the safety and mission 

assurance people at their Center as part of the Center’s job in hosting and 

providing the technical authority for the programs and projects that are at that 

Center; the same with engineering. We do occasionally challenge that notion, 

but so far we’ve decided to pretty much keep it the same, and I’d have to say 

it hasn’t really changed too much over the years.

Why does it work better having the Centers somewhat independent?

Because the real work that goes on in hosting a program and a project 

at one of the Centers happens at the Center. If we want to go to a model that 

says the Center Directors are similar to what we think of as base commanders 

in the DOD analogy, where their only responsibility is roads and commodes 

and providing the paper and maybe the personnel but no technical authority 

whatsoever, then if we were to decide to do that, it would be appropriate to 

elevate the technical authority to me and the Chief Engineer of the Agency 

and the Chief Medical Officer. But so far the Agency has seen that it’s good 

that the Center Directors have technical authority and that they be technical 

people, they have technical staffs, that they be responsible for the technical 

oversight that goes on in their Engineering and Safety organizations. 

We’ll look at this again as time goes on, but so far—with one exception, and that is major programs like Shuttle and Space Station—the Center 

Director per se does not have technical authority over programs that are 

hosted at their Center, just projects. So when you go down to a program 

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Bryan D. O’Connor

review in Houston for the Space Shuttle, for example, you’ll see an OSMA 

placard at that review, and although the person wears a JSC badge, they are 

exercising technical authority that’s a Headquarters authority at that meeting. 

But when you go to an orbiter project meeting or any of the projects that you 

see at Goddard Space Flight Center or the Jet Propulsion Laboratory [JPL], the 

Center Directors have the technical authority for project oversight.

How would you like to shape the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance?

Sometimes I may be a “glass half empty” kind of guy, but I’m not the kind 

of guy who raises the red flag every time it looks like somebody’s bumping 

up against a rule or a regulation. Our community needs to be smart enough 

to be an active member of any design or development team, and not just a 

policeman. They need to be aware of what the safety requirements are and be 

very familiar with them, but they also need to be smart enough to understand 

those things in the context of the design as a whole.

Now, it’s hard to find a safety engineer that knows all about the entire 

integrated story, but they have a community back in their organization that 

does. You may have a safety engineer who turns out to be a propulsion expert 

and is a little weaker on electrical; that’s fine, as long as they know where 

to go to get electrical help in the safety organization. And they need to have 

a “yes/if” kind of attitude, not a “no/because” attitude. It’s a little easier to 

be “no/because.” “No, you can’t do that because it violates this standard,” for 

example. It’s a little harder to be a “yes/if.” “Yes, you can do it that way if you 

come up with an equivalency for this standard that you’re going to have to 

violate.” That’s the kind of attitude they need to have.

That’s what’s most helpful to the designers. Standards and rules and 

regulations were all based on lessons learned from the past, so we need 

to give them credit and understand why they’re there, but we also need to 

realize that it would be virtually impossible to design, develop, and operate a system that meets every rule we got. We’re going to have to find ways 

around some of those regulations and rules, by definition. The Space Shuttle, 

for example, had some requirements for reliability, and it had to find its way 

around them several thousand times with its design. We call those “waivers” or a “critical items list.” With the kind of work we do, we have to make 

sure that if and when that happens, we have a safety and a reliability and a 

quality community that can help the designers figure out the best ways to 

deal with these things.

We’re not there yet. In this Agency, we have a safety and mission assurance community that is very good. In fact, it’s a lot better than what I had in 

the government ranks when I was at the Naval Air Systems Command as far 

as their training and their education and their understanding of what’s going 

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on. But we can also improve ourselves, and we can become better at our disciplines and we can be better systems engineers as a whole and help us move 

forward in Constellation.

Talk about the budget for this office.

We recently had an independent team come and look at us, and they 

didn’t think we were spending enough time, effort, and resources on some of 

what I’m going to call the engineering excellence parts of our role, and that 

we need to be “yes/if” people. In order to get us to that next step of competence, we need to do some things, and some of those will cost some money 

and some resources and training and so on. The Chief Engineer is in the same 

boat. He’s trying to improve the engineering excellence in the Agency as a 

whole for all the disciplines, and we’re sort of following in his footsteps.

We’re also creating a NASA Safety Center at Glenn Research Center in 

Cleveland. Right outside the gate there is a facility that’s the home of our new 

NASA Safety Center. That Safety Center will have a big role in helping improve 

the training and the qualifications of our people to where we can get to that 

next step, and that will probably cost a few million bucks which we haven’t 

had in our budget in the past, and we’ll need to step up to that.

We’re spending pretty much a bare minimum on other things that we have 

to do as well, so that means a little more money will probably be required, 

and the Agency has told us that they expect that and will deal with it. Certainly 

improving today’s posture a little bit so we can get a better handle on Agencywide technical excellence is in the works.

We also need to improve how we do mishap investigation support and 

a little bit on how we develop new tools and standards. None of those are 

free. They all cost. Independent verification validation of the software, that’s 

a fairly sizable piece of our budget, and we need to keep doing that. I don’t 

think we need to double it, but we can’t let that dwindle. That’s important for 

the software.

How would you improve the mishap investigation support?

Just to give you an idea of what we’re talking about here, in the last two 

years we convened 31 class-A and -B mishap investigations. Class-Bs are what 

you do when you have damage to hardware in excess of $250,000 or an injury 

to personnel that requires that they go to the hospital. Class-A is when you 

have a million-dollar damage or a serious injury or incapacitation or death. We 

had 31 of those in a two-year period, and each of those boards was a three- to 

five-member board. Each of them had a chair that depended more or less on 

members of the board to help them navigate themselves through our mishap 

investigation process.

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It takes a lot to do a good mishap investigation board, a lot of good engineering, a lot of good analysis, and very good communication skills in the way 

of findings, recommendations, and writing a good report, and it takes time. 

Some of our boards struggled with the thing, not necessarily just because it 

was a difficult technical challenge to find out what happened and get to root 

cause, but because the tools and techniques for developing your root cause 

analysis can take a lot of time and effort. Frankly, some of them struggled 

more than they needed to just because they hadn’t done it before, and they 

hadn’t really sat down and gone through the thinking that goes into findings 

and recommendations. So they spent an awful lot of time writing their report. 

The technical part was easy for the engineering team that they had, but the 

writing of the report was hard because it’s not the normal kind of report that 

they’re used to writing.

All those difficulties they had, they could use some help in the way of 

experience, facilitation, and advice. We will call for our Safety Center to have 

a small staff of people who are very good at mishap investigation, especially 

the development of the findings, recommendations, and the writing of the 

report, so that each team doesn’t have to learn this on their own, the hard 

way. They can have someone there to advise them and help them get through 

that. That will cut down the amount of time it takes to do these reports and 

improve the standardization across the board. So we’re talking about four or 

five, maybe six, people that would be dedicated to mishap investigation support for the Agency.

What has NASA’s impact on society been in the past, what it is now, and 

what do you see in the future as far as what the impact will be?

NASA’s had impacts in a variety of ways. You can look at the NASA 

Spinoff magazines and see all kinds of things that NASA technology brought 

to the fore, but there are also some process things. I couldn’t tell you that 

we invented some of these processes that I’ve been impressed with, but we 

certainly have taken them on and made good use of them. Process failure 

mode and effect analysis was something that our Morton Thiokol folks 

developed on the solid rocket motors. That’s an excellent mission assurance process that doesn’t just look at the design of the hardware; it looks 

at the process that people are using to build a motor or build a nozzle, for 

example. It uses a process similar to what you do in a design to look for 

single-failure points in your process where you might then solve the problem by adding an inspection or an independent oversight function of some 

sort. That process, I think, has improved the reliability of the product that 

comes out the back end of that process. People outside of the Agency are 

now using it for their own purposes.

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We tend to beat ourselves up and get advice from our own mishap investigations on where our failings are, but we also have people calling all the time 

asking us how we do this, that, and the other, looking to benchmark NASA 

on how it does safety practices.

We have a pretty good record in the government for industrial and occupational safety across our Centers. Part of that is because we have stepped up 

to the Voluntary Protection Program, VPP, which is an OSHA [Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration] process, which basically gets the leadership much more involved and improves the discipline on your operational 

hazard analysis and your incident reporting. Those things have given us a 

big improvement in our mishap statistics for slips, trips, falls, industrial and 

occupational safety matters. So there’s been some impact there, because we’ve 

had other agencies and other companies come and look at us to see what it 

is we’re doing and have taken some of those lessons back. We like to benchmark other people, too, but we find ourselves as a subject, or an object, of a 

benchmark every now and then.

What do you think the impact in the future might be?

Hopefully we’ll help this country do what we do best, and that is explore 

the unknown and try to answer some of those answers that nobody else can 

come up with. We’ll do it in new and inventive ways that are more efficient, 

more effective, and those spinoffs or impacts on society will take root in 

other areas. 

But fundamentally we don’t do our work here at NASA for spinoff reasons. 

We do it because we have a mission to go and explore the unknown, and we 

do find that when we do that work, there are things that the country and its 

institutions learn from us in the way of technology or procedure or process 

that help in other ways.

Do you believe that exploration is the most important role for NASA, for 

the nation?

Yes, I do. Any nation that is going to claim some sort of a historical leadership role, in retrospect you would find that they spent some part of their 

resources on exploring the unknown. When you look back on ancient civilizations, people focused on things like the arts and the technology that they 

developed that made them great. Our job is the technology and answering 

the science side of the questions. There are other people who work the arts 

and the architecture and those sorts of things that make great nations, and 

other things in philosophy and social sciences and so on. When it comes to 

scientific unknowns, that’s one of the areas that NASA has been asked to deal 

with, and that’s what we ought to be doing, and we ought to focus on that.

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Share with us the role of humans and the use of robotics in spaceflight.

There’s a role for both humans and robotics in exploration. We wouldn’t 

be putting human beings on inhospitable places like Venus, but we have 

drawn a line somewhere between the Venus inhospitability and the Mars 

inhospitability, and said that maybe Mars is okay. I think we could probably 

deal with that.

Having said that, though, the role of the robots is to pave the way. We 

have the rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, doing their thing on Mars. I remember one of my visits to JPL when I talked to one of the scientists out there, 

and he was going on and on about how much more effective and efficient 

timewise that whole operation could be if there were a human being actually 

there working with those robots rather than having the big time delays, the 

limitations of telemetry and so on to deal with on the ground. Even our robotics people sometimes will tell you that there are places where human beings 

can really work with the robots, not instead of them but with them, to come 

out with a better exploration model. So I’m looking forward to the day when 

we’ve got human beings and robots on Mars working together.

Should aeronautics stay with NASA, and if so, why?

Maybe I’m too simplistic about it, I guess that’s what comes with being 

a Marine. But we’re one of the few agencies that has an and in our title. You 

know, Food and Drug; they can’t just do one or the other; their whole charter 

says you do both, and so does ours. Aeronautics and Space, that’s what we 

were set up for. If they take the and out of there and get rid of aeronautics, 

then we won’t do it anymore. But as long as we have that and in there, we 

owe it to the public, and it just goes back to the beginnings. There’s a lot of 

discussion about whether it’s going away. Well, it can’t really, unless we go 

change our charter.

Do we need to do more? Yes, sure, but it takes resources. There will 

always be a balance in there of what’s the appropriate amount. I think Lisa 

Porter [Associate Administrator for Aeronautics], working with other government agencies and the White House, recently was instrumental in establishing 

a framework for how the government deals with aeronautics research and 

development, and our role in that is going to be very pivotal and important 

in doing advanced research stuff. Not so much the prototype work we used 

to do; more basic research, and that’s great. Somebody needs to do that, and 

that’s an important part of aeronautics.

What do you believe are the lessons learned through the last 50 years?

In the job I’m in, I tend to focus on lessons learned that had to do with 

failures and how we recovered from them. That’s part of the nature of this 

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job. I sometimes refer people in my community, and in the engineering community, to a book by a fellow named [Henry] Petroski called To Engineer 

Is Human. In that book, his basic premise is that all the great engineering 

advances throughout history tended to come from recovering well from failures. Not to say that every time there was a failure, people recovered well 

from it. Sometimes people ignored failures, and so they didn’t get any learning from them. But when you have a failure, you owe it to yourself, the people 

who may have suffered in the failure, and the future, to learn as much as you 

can about why it happened and how to avoid it in the future.

So I tend to look at things like the Apollo fire, the failures we’ve had 

in our spaceflight such as the Atlas failure with lightning back in 1987—20 

years ago this month, in fact—the human spaceflight failures that we’ve had, 

failures in operations where we lost people in aircraft, and some of the mission failures we’ve had in our robotics programs, and I worry that we will 

lose some of those lessons. I worry a little bit about how we capture lessons 

learned. We have a lot to do there to make sure we don’t lose those.

This office several years ago, before I got here, developed a system called 

Lessons Learned Information System, LLIS. As you know, every two or three 

years any kind of database or computer program software you come up with 

to do anything is pretty much outmoded, and it’s the same with the LLIS. It 

was a great thing to do. It was meant to solve part of that problem on not losing our lessons learned. When you look at it today, you say, “We’ve got to do 

better than that.” It’s not searchable like we’d like it to be. It’s not using the 

latest technology and so on.

I’m a believer in lessons learned not just being in a database or in a book 

somewhere, but also in the day-to-day operations, the procedures, the design 

requirements, the standards that we have. Those things need to capture our 

lessons learned. That’s how we would not lose them.

I mentioned the Atlas failure, struck by lightning. Well, that lesson had 

been learned in Apollo. Apollo 12 was struck by lightning. There was a lot 

of work in developing the science and understanding of triggered lightning, 

which is a phenomenon that shows up much more in launch vehicles with 

long ionized plumes coming out of them than it would in aircraft, where it’s 

not a big deal. But from the Apollo experience there was a lot of learning 

and lessons that came out of that, and yet a few years later, in 1987, we were 

struck by triggered lightning and lost the payload and the Atlas rocket.

In retrospect, you’d say we failed to learn that lesson. It turns out that 

when you go back and look at that accident investigation, you find that there 

was a rule in the rule book, the launch commit criteria, that dealt with that. 

It said, don’t launch in clouds that are a certain depth with the freezing layer 

going through them. But there was a lack of understanding by the launch 

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team about why that was there, what it was for. It’s not clear from reading 

the transcripts that they even knew that that rule had anything to do with 

triggered lightning, because they were asking questions about icing and so 

on. So you could say that we had imperfect capture of lessons learned there, 

and that that was part of the root cause of that accident. That’s the kind of 

stuff I worry about.

How do we keep from repeating mistakes? Shame on us when we have 

something happen twice. It’s just almost unforgivable, and yet you really 

struggle with how to deal with it. There are so many lessons we’re learning 

every day in our design and operational activities that it’s really difficult to 

capture how do we make sure that the next generation doesn’t forget those. 

That’s not an easy task.

When we develop our lessons learned from accidents and failures, we 

need to find homes for those things that include not only the lesson itself 

but some reference to show you where it came from and why it’s there so 

that people understand that that’s not something you can violate, you can 

waive, without discussing and understanding why it’s there. Just putting the 

rule in there doesn’t necessarily prevent people in the future from having 

a problem.

Human nature is such that in the “yes/if” mode that I talked about is better—yes, you can do this if you can come up with an approach that matches 

that rule that you’re trying to waive or deviate from. I know that’s going to 

happen in the future. We’re not a rule-driven organization, and when people 

do challenge the rules and the regulations, they need to do it from a knowledge base that captures the real lesson learned, not just what the rule says, 

but why it’s there and why it got there in the first place. That’s a lot of effort 

to put a system like that into place.

There are people who have done it well. The mission operations people 

in Houston, for example, have, because of the Atlas accident, which was not a 

human spaceflight thing. But because of that accident, the mission operations 

people in Houston decided that from now on the flight rules that we live by 

for human spaceflight will have not just the rule, but a little italicized rationale 

behind that rule, right in there with the book, so that everybody reading that 

rule will see why it’s there.

It’s hard to capture the entire why. Sometimes the “why it’s there” could 

be a volume. But in two or three sentences they capture the essence of it and 

maybe a reference to something else. That’s the way they tried to deal with 

that lesson learned. There are other ways to do it. Training, of course, is a big 

piece of that, making sure that people who are qualified as operators understand the rules they live with, not just what they are, but why they’re there.

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Do you believe that tapping into corporate knowledge or knowledge from 

the past generation helps the next generation understand why those rules 

and regulations are there?

Yes. In fact, a thing like this oral history project is a big piece of that. 

People should not put it on the shelf. They ought to make use of it. They’re 

going to learn something every time they touch it, and they may find that they 

might even save a mishap.

What is your perception of NASA culture?

The NASA Values statement helps with that; the Core Values, which over 

the last 10 years have pretty much been about three or four items: integrity, 

safety, excellence, and teamwork. Different words, maybe, have defined them 

in the various strategic plans and so on, but those four things are things that 

NASA people tend to strive for. They have a keen sense of awareness of safety. 

The Snoopy Program and the Space Flight Awareness Program, for example, 

are great examples of how NASA people really do worry about the people 

they strap into the spacecraft, and the same with the airplane community. 

That’s a cultural thing that I noticed when I first came to this Agency.

When you talk to NASA people, they take pride in their work, and they 

take pride in the integrity of their work. If they can’t trust somebody in 

the chain of command, for example, they take offense at that, because they 

believe that integrity is important in this Agency, and somebody walking on 

the edge of an integrity issue or an ethical issue really bothers NASA people. 

That shows up as a cultural aspect that I appreciate.

I know NASA’s Chief Historian Steven Dick just conducted a culture survey, and one of the things that really bothered us when we heard about that 

was that there’s a higher-than-comfortable segment of our NASA population 

who believe that there’s an integrity issue with their leadership, for example. 

“Can you trust your leadership?” I think is the way the question came out, and 

it didn’t come out 100 percent yes. When it doesn’t come out 100 percent 

yes, we in the Agency worry about that. Now, just because something is a 

Core Value doesn’t mean we’re there. It does mean something that we value, 

though, and I sense that.

If a young person came to you today and asked about joining NASA as a 

career, what would you tell them?

I’d say don’t worry about the long-term part of it, but if you have the drive 

and the interest in doing important work for the nation in the area of discovering unknowns, and you don’t mind long hours and hard work, you will 

enjoy this Agency. You’ll enjoy the people you work with, because they’re all 

of like mind, and you’ll enjoy the values that we share. Now, if you’re coming 

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here for the money, for the retirement plan, for the location of the Center, for 

example, forget about it. That’s not why people come to this Agency. They 

will be disappointed in all those other things. If they’re not turned on by the 

mission that we have, then we probably don’t need to take them on.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 6

Christopher J. Scolese

Associate Administrator

Former Chief Engineer

Chris Scolese began his career with NASA in 1987, focusing almost exclusively on robotic spacecraft and principally Earth-orbiting spacecraft. During the next two decades, he expanded his 

expertise in space science, planetary science, astrophysics, heliophysics, and other related disciplines, as well as gaining experience in institutional management from several major assignments. 

As Chief Engineer for two years, he broadened his range of knowledge in the fields of human 

spaceflight and aeronautics. 

 In July of 2007, Scolese assumed the role of Associate Administrator, making him responsible 

for all the technical operations of the space agency. On 13 November 2007, at NASA Headquarters, 

he spoke about his new position, which coordinates programmatic and institutional aspects of 

NASA to bring them together to work effectively. 

As you know, NASA is organized to accomplish missions to put people 

and machines into the air/space arena and to do research in science and engineering. We have two fundamental organizations to make this happen. The 

Mission Directorates do the programmatic aspects; they do the missions, the 

Space Shuttles, the robotic missions to Mars and around Earth. The Centers 

are where the work actually gets done; they have the people and facilities to 

get that done.

It is important to bring those two organizations together so that the right 

work is done at the right time at the right place. My job is to facilitate that, 

and to facilitate that means making sure that we have the facilities that we 

need, that we’re pursuing the right types of missions, and after we approve 

a mission that we maintain its priority relative to other Agency and national 

objectives. So it’s necessary to communicate a lot with the Centers and the 

Mission Directorates to make sure they are all on the same page.

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What are the challenges of having direct oversight of those programs 

and the Centers?

I have been a project manager. Every project manager knows that their 

project is the most important in the world, not just in NASA but in the whole 

world. Then that works its way on up. Every program manager knows their 

program is the most important. Every mission director knows their Mission 

Directorate is the most important. Every Center Director knows that their 

Center is the most important. The challenge? Trying to convince people that 

maybe they’re not the most important and that they have to bend a little bit 

in order to achieve the overall goals of the Agency so that everybody can succeed and move on in the right direction. That’s probably the biggest challenge. 

Couple that with the fact that there are limited resources. Clearly NASA 

can’t do all the things that NASA wants to do, let alone what the outside 

world wants NASA to do. That increases the challenge we have to go off and 

deal with. 

Plus we have the obvious external factors. The Office of Management and 

Budget has an opinion on what we should do and how we should do it. The 

Office of Science and Technology Policy has ideas on what we should do and 

how we should do it. The Congress of the United States has ideas on what 

we should and shouldn’t do as well and how we should do it. So we have to 

balance those external factors along with all those internal factors. 

Of course we have to account to the American public by giving them 

something that they see is of value, whether it’s providing them excitement 

like flying the Shuttle and building the International Space Station, which 

is one of the toughest engineering projects ever, or whether we’re giving 

them great inspiration, great science as we rove Mars or explore the outer 

reaches of our universe with things like Hubble [Space Telescope]. Or whether 

it’s doing very practical things like helping NOAA [National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration] get weather satellites up there so that we can 

better monitor weather and help out with disasters. All of those things are 

important. Another aspect of NASA is to help the aircraft industry to become 

more efficient and therefore more competitive. These all play into the balance 

that we need to maintain.

Balancing all those is probably the most difficult thing that we have to do, 

within those resources and within the desires of people outside of the Agency 

that want us to do this, that, or the other thing that they consider important. 

That’s probably the struggle that we have. Having been in this job for a few 

months now, it’s a pretty dynamic environment to work in and to balance 

those various activities. 

Of course the practical part for me is to make sure we have the right projects and the right programs assigned to the right place and to assure that we 

have the necessary resources to be successful. This is not done alone as there 

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are many people in and out of NASA that I work with to accomplish our missions. However, in this position it is necessary to assure that our activities start 

out properly; by that I mean that we understand our requirements, understand the risks, have the correct resources, and have the support required to 

accomplish our objectives. 

Recall that NASA typically does things that have not been done before, so 

establishing a good baseline in the beginning is critical. Not only does this 

help us to succeed, but, as often happens when things change, it allows us to 

adjust. When the funding profile changes for whatever reason, if we have a 

baseline, we can now adjust our plan based on priorities so that the internaland external-to-NASA communities understand the rationale. Of course, this 

has longer-term implications as well, since to have the correct resources also 

means that we must make sure that we have the right skills within the Agency 

to do what we need to do. To help universities and schools bring up the skills 

that we’re ultimately going to need, the scientists, the engineers, the technicians, the mathematicians, the accountants that we’re going to need in the 

future to make these things work. That the facilities we have are capable of 

doing not only what we need to do today, which is more of an availability 

issue, but are also capable to do those things that we need to do down the 

road, like [the] Constellation [Program], where we’re going to have to develop 

some new capabilities. We’ll use some existing facilities, have to modify them, 

but we’ll have to build some new ones as well. 

Then stay within the constraints that we get. We get a certain budget every 

year. It doesn’t grow as fast as we’d like, so we have to balance all that within 

that budget. All plays into the absolute practical aspect of what we need to do. 

How did the job of Chief Engineer help prepare you for what you’re 

doing now?

That job was an interesting one. As Chief Engineer of the Agency, you are 

truly looking over the technical aspects of the Agency. That means the capabilities that we have, the skills that we have, and making sure that those skills 

in engineering meet the needs of the Agency, that we have the right people 

and the right skills to do the jobs at the various locations. 

One of the things that [Administrator] Mike Griffin asked me to do when I 

came in was to reestablish the technical integrity, technical capability, technical respect that the Agency had in the past. We developed something called 

technical excellence, to establish a common policy and a common language 

across the Agency so that whether you are principally at a robotics center or 

principally at an aero [aeronautics] center or principally at a human spaceflight center, you can communicate with each other and work effectively without calling a bottle one thing in one place and calling it a jug somewhere else 

and you’re really talking about the same thing. We wanted to get a consistency 

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of language, a consistency of process, so that we could be effective, yet at 

the same time allowing for flexibilities, recognizing that an airplane isn’t a 

spacecraft, and a robotic spacecraft isn’t a human spacecraft, and a spacecraft 

that goes in Earth orbit isn’t the same as one that’s going to the Moon or Mars 

or further. That was really the challenge. That was the challenge that Mike 

asked me to take on.

We did that with various processes and procedures that we started putting 

in place. Probably the most notable of them was 7120.5D, which was a revision to the Program and Projects Practices Document. It did many of those 

things I talked about. In addition, we began working with our partners outside the Agency, with the Department of Defense, with industry, Department 

of Energy, to try and establish some standards that we could all agree on so 

that we weren’t asking each other to do things in different ways that resulted 

in the same product. 

Personally, for me, it was a broadening experience, which allowed me 

to probably be able to step into this job. My career in NASA began in 1987 

and was almost exclusively on robotic spacecraft, principally Earth-orbiting 

spacecraft for Earth science or NOAA. Then, it broadened out into space science, planetary science, astrophysics, heliophysics, that type of thing. I had 

limited professional interaction with the human spaceflight community and 

the aeronautics community. Being Chief Engineer broadened me and got me 

engaged with all of those people. I knew many of those people from professional societies, but this gave me an opportunity to really work with them and 

understand their fields better. As a result, when I was able to step into this job, 

I had the knowledge of those other communities to help me. I think it would 

be very difficult to step into this job without knowing that.

Also, prior to that, I was a Deputy Center Director at Goddard [Space 

Flight Center] and the Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science. That 

gave me a strong institutional background, so I understood what it is to get 

personnel and human resources and facilities and all of those things that 

engineers try and stay away from. That helped as well. 

While I was in the Chief Engineer’s office, we really tried to bring together 

the relationship amongst all of our Centers’ engineering organizations so that 

they could support each other and share resources more efficiently. When 

you are in this job, you realize how good the people of NASA are and how 

willing they are to help each other by sharing knowledge and resources to 

get the job done. 

This part wasn’t hard; it just needed a little nudge. I also wanted to 

foster closer cooperation with our safety and mission assurance brethren 

because there’s a tight overlap amongst those fields. Engineering is pretty 

much focused on design and development and test and what have you. Safety 

and mission assurance is engaged in all those activities to make sure we’re 

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Christopher J. Scolese

doing the right thing as checkers, but also bringing in reliability engineering, sustainability or maintainability, and those types of things. So we really 

needed to have a closer relationship. I worked closely with Bryan O’Connor 

to try and bring that. I asked all of our Center engineering directors to work 

with that, to work with their counterparts in safety and mission assurance at 

their Centers, to establish a closer relationship.

The other aspect was working with the NASA Engineering [and] Safety 

Center [NESC], already established under Ralph Roe, and they were doing a 

great job. When I became Chief Engineer, it was absorbed under the Chief 

Engineer’s Office, and I’d like to believe that as a result, it became even more 

of a utility for the Agency and outside. So we ended up doing a lot of things 

to address issues and concerns clearly, which is what it was originally set up 

to do, principally for the Shuttle, but it expanded to not just the Shuttle but 

the Station and all of our activities. 

We also moved into those other areas I talked about, because they had the 

interaction with the whole Agency. They had an interaction with the outside 

world. To a lesser extent we were able to go off and create within the NESC 

what we called technical fellows, which served as the stewards of their particular discipline. So if you’re talking about avionics or electrical systems or 

thermal systems or environmental control life-support systems, we either have 

or are putting in place people that are respected both within the Agency and 

outside of the Agency as the person to go to if you have questions. And their 

responsibilities are to advance their discipline, to make sure that the people at 

the Centers that have similar titles are competent and capable, to help maintain the curriculum for training programs, and to develop career development 

paths that will allow others in their discipline to be effective and ultimately to 

succeed them as technical fellows. 

We also want technical fellows to be available to go off and work the hard 

technical problems, whether they be actual problems or they be questions 

about new capabilities that we would like to have. Last, they should serve 

as representatives outside of NASA to advance NASA’s interests in terms of 

specifications and standards so that we can get that commonality throughout 

the industry and within NASA, and also to be there to show that NASA is at 

the technical forefront of whatever that field they represent, so they need to 

participate in professional societies and that type of thing. 

That’s pretty much what I did when I was the Chief Engineer, along with 

lots of missions that went on during that time. It was lots of Shuttle missions 

and robotic missions and exciting things that happened all during that.

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Share with us what you believe to be the relative importance of human 

and robotic spaceflight.

Both are really important. I don’t think that we can have one without the 

other. I would relate it to actually when I was growing up, both aspects of 

space got me excited in the space program, for as far back as I can remember. Probably John Glenn was the first mission I really remember, and being 

pretty excited about a human going into space. I know that [Yuri] Gagarin 

and [Gherman] Titov went before and [Alan] Shepard and [Gus] Grissom did 

suborbital flights. But I don’t really remember those. John Glenn was really 

the first memory I’ve got of that. I followed every human spaceflight mission 

since then. 

But I also remember sitting there in front of the television before we ever 

landed on the Moon watching the Ranger spacecraft crash into the Moon and 

waiting, as if you saw anything in real time back then, but waiting for the 

paper to come out with the first images of Mars when the Mariners went to 

Mars or they went to Venus. I think a lot of people today think the same way. 

Not that they leapfrog over each other in the public’s mind, but we do some 

really exciting things out there. The human spaceflight community is doing 

some really neat stuff and we’re doing spacewalks and we’re building the 

Space Station. People are excited. 

When we’re doing the seemingly routine stuff, people don’t notice. People 

don’t notice our weather satellites, even though images show up on TV every 

day, unless we’re tracking a tropical storm, then everybody knows what’s 

going on and sees our results. However, when we’re roving on the surface 

of Mars or we make a discovery with Hubble or we add an element to the 

Space Station or we repair Hubble—that gets out there. So I think from the 

imagination of the public, they all play in, and at any given time one is more 

exciting than the other. 

But you really need both the human and robotic missions to have a space 

program that advances our frontiers as humans and improves our place on 

Earth and hopefully allows us to expand our presence beyond Earth. 

Technologically speaking, space is a hostile frontier, and we need our 

robotic missions to go out there and find the safe landing sites, as an obvious 

choice. We need to map where we’re going to. We don’t have oxygen and 

water up there. We can’t just send a group out there like [Ferdinand] Magellan 

and say, “Well, there’s going to be water, there’s going to be air, there’s going 

to be food along the way.” But we don’t have that luxury here. We have to go 

off and scout and see where the safe places to land are and where there are 

resources to be used. Then we can send our ships with people on them with 

just the amount of fuel, oxygen, water, and food that is needed to accomplish 

the mission.

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We have to learn about the environment at the desired destination and 

understand it. It’s a lot safer and cheaper to first go out with our robotic 

spacecraft to find out what is it like at the Moon, what’s the radiation environment like there, what’s it like at Mars, what’s it like at an asteroid, what can 

we expect. To test out components and capabilities, communications systems, 

the ability to orbit and change orbit around planets, the ability to land. Atmospheric characteristics when you go to someplace like Mars or Titan. We need 

those robotic spacecraft to go out there and do their thing, or else it would 

be extremely risky for a human to go there, and probably much more costly 

than it is today.

The other thing I think that we have to realize is you can’t have one 

without the other. Today the Station orbits Earth every day. There’s three 

or four crewmembers on there, soon to be six. All their communications 

come through something called TDRSS [Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 

System], which is a robotic spacecraft sitting in geosynchronous orbit. We 

launch missions based on weather. Well, where do we get that information 

from? We get it from our robotic spacecraft sitting in geosynchronous orbit 

and polar orbit. 

Those spacecraft were developed by NASA. They may be operated by 

NOAA, but they’re developed by NASA. When we go to the Moon, we’ll have 

communications satellites around the Moon so that we don’t have to lose 

communications when we go behind the Moon like we did during the Apollo 

days, so we’ll know what happens when they go behind the Moon. We’ll have 

communications. We’ll have better coverage on the surface of the Moon. We’ll 

probably use robotic missions to supplement human missions so they don’t 

have to do as many EVAs [Extravehicular Activities]. That’s coming up in I 

think in March [2008] when Dextre [Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator] 

goes into orbit on a couple of Shuttle flights from now that has more capabilities as a robot to do some things that astronauts would have to do otherwise. 

We’re seeing that robotic missions served as test beds for understanding 

the environment, they served as sentinels or scouts for finding out what’s 

there and where’s the best place to go, and today they’re serving as a vital part 

of the overall infrastructure to a) allow us to do our job with humans, and b) I 

think in the future and the very near future to supplement humans and allow 

us to do more than we would be able to do otherwise. Human spaceflight 

then takes us another leap in a different direction.

To get people into low-Earth orbit is quite a challenge. To get them beyond 

low-Earth orbit is an even bigger challenge. We have people living in space. 

I think on the human spaceflight side there has always been a motivational 

aspect to it, but there’s probably even more of a practical aspect to it. If we can 

keep humans alive in space with regenerative systems, with medical systems, 

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NASA at 50

we obviously have technologies that we can bring down to Earth. As we take 

them further and further away, we learn more and better ways to keep people 

healthy when there’s no doctor around, when there’s no hospital around, stuff 

that you could never think about doing otherwise and you wouldn’t really 

need to do otherwise. But we need to do it, and it’ll help us just like it helped 

us in the past. 

There are new technologies that come out of it as well as the motivational stuff, and like I said, I think the two ultimately marry together. I don’t 

think you can put one over the other. In every aspect that you put into the 

motivational aspect, what would be neater than flying in space, to encourage 

people to do it? What’s neater than building a robot that can go places where 

no human can go, go near the Sun, go on the surface of Mars right now, go 

near Saturn? Go onto Titan and see what’s there? 

From a practical standpoint, humans in space have enabled so many technologies and so many capabilities here on Earth that benefit us every day. 

Robotic spacecraft orbiting, never blinking, giving us our weather and helping us mitigate disasters. Probably half the people in the world don’t know 

that it’s two NASA spacecraft that help them track fires on the ground, that 

help mitigate the fire disasters in California. We even used a UAV [Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle] to go off and support that, so aeronautics even plays into 

this discussion. 

You can’t pick one over the other. I think you have to look at both of 

them and say that they all add lots and lots to make our life here on Earth 

even better.

Talk about the importance of NASA’s development of research in aeronautics in the future.

We have to keep that first A in there; we have to be the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration. Well, actually it is important for a lot of different 

reasons as well. We talked about robotic and human just a moment ago. The 

development of Constellation right now is very dependent on technologies 

that have been developed on the aeronautics side. Acoustics is a big one. As it 

travels through the atmosphere, and in the lower part of the atmosphere, it’s 

traveling very fast. That creates a lot of noise as that air rushes over it. We spent 

lots of time with airplanes trying to make them quieter so they can go into 

urban areas; it’s better for the passengers and people on the ground. 

Now many of those people are now working on Constellation to allow 

us to reduce noise levels for the crew at launch or have an abort. Had we not 

been investing in that over the last 50 years, we wouldn’t be ready to do that 

today. People probably don’t realize it, but all of our studies of supersonic 

aircraft and hypersonic aircraft and atmospheric physics allowed us to land 

on Mars, allows us to bring the Shuttle back safely, will allow us to bring 

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Constellation Orion back from the Moon and from Earth orbit safely. Without 

the people in the aerothermodynamics world, we wouldn’t be able to do this; 

there’s a synergy there amongst all of those things. So I think we need the A 

in aeronautics. 

Also, there are long-lived sensors in extreme environments that allow us 

to monitor engine performance. Inside of a jet engine is a pretty hostile environment, high temperatures, lots of vibration, lots of mechanical stress, and 

we develop sensors that will allow us to see if things are not quite right, so 

you can more effectively schedule maintenance, more effectively determine 

what’s needed so you can reduce the amount of time on maintenance and 

improve safety and performance. That’ll clearly help us with our spacecraft as 

well. There’s a synergy amongst all of these things that I think would be bad 

to separate. So yeah, we need that A for Aeronautics.

How has the space agency changed over these last 20 years generally and 

then in your area of expertise?

When I first came in here, there was a real battle between human and 

robotic space communities. I’m not sure it was within the Agency, but it was 

certainly on the outside. That might be one of the biggest changes. I don’t 

know that there ever really was a disconnect between the communities, but I 

think there was a mistrust outside about who was going to take more money 

from whom. I don’t see that as much now. That’s a big change. 

I think that the science community and the human spaceflight community 

and the space community in general recognizes that we all hang together or 

we hang separately and it’s better to hang together. So I think that’s probably 

the biggest change I’ve seen.

From a strictly NASA perspective, when I came here we were basically 

just going in circles around Earth. I think all of us inside of NASA had this 

desire—we all came to NASA so that we could go to the Moon, we could go 

to Mars, we could go off and do great discoveries. Yet we weren’t doing it. 

You could fill in the blank. Robotic or human, we were pretty much stuck 

in low-Earth orbit. I don’t believe Galileo had launched at that time; what 

we had was Galileo and Cassini on the drawing board. So we really weren’t 

doing much. 

In those 20 years it has totally changed. We are now doing sophisticated 

Earth science missions. We’re taking into account comparative planetology 

if you will. What’s the climate on Mars like and what does that tell us about 

Earth? We went out beyond Earth orbit. We have a total presence on and 

around Mars. We’re heading towards Mercury. We’re heading towards Pluto. 

We’ve been to Jupiter. We’re around Saturn. We’re making great discoveries. I 

think all of that together with people seeing what can be done, we now have 

a vision that allows us to get humans finally out of low-Earth orbit.

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When I was a kid, I figured we’d have been to Mars by now and populating the solar system. The scientific discoveries, the revolution in the last 20 

years has been huge, not only in Earth science, where I think it’d be fair to 

say that we have better capabilities of dealing with natural disasters. We have 

better predictive capabilities for severe storms, we’re starting to get to the 

point where we can develop climate models, we have a better understanding 

of our solar system, we have a better understanding of human physiology, and 

our understanding of the universe has been greatly expanded. We probably 

influenced aeronautics in ways that I can’t even describe at this particular 

point because I just don’t know all of them, but in engine design, quiet engine 

technology, and what have you. 

All that happened in the last 20 years, so I think we’ve had a pretty exciting 20 years. As a result of all that, we now have a charter that’ll take us out 

of low-Earth orbit, which I think is the neatest thing around.

What are some of those lessons learned that will serve you well in this 

position and the ones that you’ll have in the future?

It’s probably not worth going through all the technical ones, all the lessons learned there. Things like test before you fly and don’t trust heritage, treat 

everything regardless of what it is as if it’s new. They are important things. 

One that’s probably really important that’ll help me in this job is the 

recognition that space missions are complex regardless of how big or how 

small they are. As a result, no one individual can make it happen. It takes 

a team. That team can be composed of people all within your organization, 

within your Center, within your Mission Directorate, but it’s still a team. More 

than likely it requires participation of multiple Mission Directorates, multiple 

Centers, probably multiple agencies and probably many countries. Once you 

realize that, you realize how important it is to be able to communicate effectively, to build those partnerships, to respect the technical capabilities and the 

performance of other organizations. Or else we’re just plain not going to be 

able to accomplish the things that we want to do.

Look at the Space Station: 18 nations are engaged. If we made every one 

of those nations do it exactly like us, I don’t think there would be any nations. 

Yet it’s a marvel. It works. It’s an extremely complicated system both technically 

and, if you will, organizationally, when you have to bring in people that don’t 

speak the same language as you do, that don’t use the same tools you do. Yet 

you can put it all together. All by itself is a perfect example of it. Every once in a 

while from here in Washington, DC, you look up in the sky and you can see it. 

It works. It is working. That’s important, not just for us, but for the whole world, 

if you will, to see that you can work together as an organization. 

Probably less visible to people, most of our robotic missions have international participation. The last satellite I worked on, I was a project manager 

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Christopher J. Scolese

of, we had U.S. instruments, Canadian instruments, Japanese instruments, 

Canadian parts, and German parts. We had things from all over the world. We 

had investigators from all over the world. That’s typical. The two rovers on 

Mars, part of the science package came from Germany. So once people realize that and realize that you can, in fact, work together, that’s really important. 

When you realize that, then you realize that communications, and clear communications, is really important, that building a team is important. I mention 

communications first because you can’t really build a team unless you can 

communicate with them and express whatever it is that you want done clearly.

I think the other one that’s in there that I learned is integrity. We do have 

a lot of challenges. A lot of people ask us to do a lot of things that are, let’s 

say, challenging. We have to have the integrity to be able to go back and say 

we’ll do it but this is what it’s really going to take. 

What do you believe NASA’s role is in the future? What do you believe its 

impact has been on society as a whole?

NASA’s role has been to expand our frontiers, period. And our intellectual 

frontiers by giving us better knowledge of the universe, better knowledge of 

the solar system, better knowledge of Earth. I think it expanded our frontiers 

in technology. You could talk to anybody about the spinoffs, all the things that 

we’ve done with autonomy, with medical technology, with making long-lived 

reliable systems, and how they play into any number of different things that 

we have on Earth today. I think we expand our imagination by being able to 

look outside where we are. I also think we expand frontiers of relationships, 

just like I was talking about. 

In 1987, who would have ever believed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union 

would be building a space station together? Today no one thinks about it anymore. Of course it’s not the Soviet Union, it’s Russia, but still, it’s the United 

States, it’s Russia, it’s European nations, it’s Japan. We’ve got everybody. Who 

would believe that we’d be flying satellites with the Argentinians and the 

Brazilians? Yet we’re doing it. That we’d be sharing data with everybody in the 

world that can listen, basically? That’s something that I think NASA can do that 

other agencies can’t, because we have that reputation for expanding frontiers.

I think the other part of NASA is that it motivates children, like it motivated me and motivates others, to want to go off and do difficult things. I’d 

like to believe they want to go off and do things in science and engineering. 

But I think when you throw a grand challenge out there, something that’s 

very difficult, that’s just at the reaches of known capability, that you encourage other people in other fields to try things that they view as difficult or 

different. So I think that’s where NASA was in the past, and I think that’s 

what NASA’s future is. 

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NASA at 50

From the practical standpoint, because people always ask that question, 

what NASA does for us, it’s clearly the spinoffs. There’s no question about 

that. It’s clearly the knowledge that goes into the technical textbooks and the 

school textbooks. But also I think people have to realize the everyday stuff 

that goes on. You can always argue about spinoffs. I typically don’t, but other 

people do. But you can’t argue that NASA-designed satellites are orbiting 

Earth and telling us what the weather is. You can’t argue that those same satellites are helping us to mitigate natural disasters when they occur. You can’t 

argue that NASA-developed technology hasn’t made aircraft more efficient 

and therefore made our air system safer and our airline tickets cheaper. You 

can’t argue that NASA helped pioneer communications satellites and spawned 

a whole new industry. 

So I think there are some very practical things that we have to get out 

there as well. That’s what the skeptical taxpayer wants to hear. It’s something 

we don’t talk about as much. But I think the main thing that NASA does is 

really expand our frontiers. NASA demonstrates that really difficult things can 

be done and that other people should attempt really difficult things.

Why would you encourage someone to have a career with NASA?

Actually, when I talk to kids I always tell them the same thing. This is 

the one place where you can come into work every day and you have a new 

challenge. If you want to create something that’s never been created before, 

this is the place to do it. I have a joke for the engineers around here that at 

NASA, no two identical spacecraft are the same. That’s true. Every one of our 

orbiters is a little bit different. Every one of our communications satellites is 

a little bit different. They all have a personality. Every time we’re asked to do 

a mission, you may use the same parts, but you use them in a different way. 

So if you really want to have your creative juices flowing and use your 

knowledge to make something that’s never been made before and to deliver 

something that’s a new capability, regardless of what it is, to put humans on 

the Moon, to give us better predictions of weather, to go to Jupiter or Saturn 

or the surface of Mars, this is the place to do it. I was in the Navy early in 

my career, and I left for a company that made blood gas analyzers as well as 

doing space stuff. I was on the space side. I spent some time with the blood 

gas analyzers, and you could always make a better one, and then you make 

thousands of the same thing, and you watch them make a thousand of the 

same thing. I don’t have to make a thousand of anything, and everything I 

do is different. 

Risk for us is: will it work, will it land on Mars, will they safely get to orbit, 

will they safely be able to do what they want to do, how do I fix a solar array 

that’s torn in space, versus could I make this a little bit smaller? It’s a heck of a 

lot more fun to go off and do those things. So that’s what I tell people. If you 

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really, really want to tax your knowledge and you really want to do something 

that’s meaningful and you want to do something that’s different and you want 

to do something that requires real creative energy, come and work for NASA.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 7

Scott N. Pace

Associate Administrator for 

Program Analysis and Evaluation

After Michael Griffin became Administrator in 2005, he contacted Scott Pace to say that he was 

forming a Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) function and asked Pace to lead this effort. The 

new organization became part of the change within the Agency’s governing structure, responsible 

for providing objective studies and analysis in support of policy, program, and budget decisions by 

the NASA Administrator. 

 Pace has been involved with the space business since his first job out of high school, when he 

went to work at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in the summer of 1976, when the Viking 1 Lander 

touched down on Mars. After receiving a degree in physics, he followed his interests in the history of 

science and large government efforts; earned degrees in aeronautics and astronautics, and technology and public policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); and earned a doctorate 

in policy analysis from the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School. He has worked in business 

development and advanced engineering groups. Through the years, Pace realized that his interest in 

space development and exploration was not about overcoming highly technical issues but handling 

public policy, politics, and economic concerns. He left the space agency in 2008. During an interview 

on 21 March 2007 at NASA Headquarters, he provided a history of his expertise and details about 

the PA&E function.

At RAND I worked on a number of different projects, including reviews of the 

National Aero-Space Plane Program and some Strategic Defense Initiative–related 

work, as well as doing my dissertation on the launch vehicle choices the nation 

was then facing. I came back to Washington, DC, and was a career employee in 

the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Commerce. This was in the first 

[George H. W.] Bush administration. I worked as the Deputy Director there and 

was a career staff employee in the Office of the Deputy Secretary.

There we worked on a number of interesting items, including the first regulations for the first private remote sensing satellite systems that became Title 2 

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of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, 1992. We worked on streamlining export 

controls, which, given the difficulties in export control today, people would be 

thrilled if we could get back to where we were in 1992, because a whole bunch 

of things subsequently happened in the succeeding administrations.

We did the first agreements with the entry of nonmarket launch vehicle 

systems, so agreements with the Chinese, the Russians, and the Ukrainians, 

into the international launch market. We did the first real statistics on the 

growth of the commercial space industry happening at that time. We had the 

first meetings with the emergence of the direct broadcast audio systems, which 

today are Sirius and XM Radio. It was an exciting time for the commercial 

space area.

This was also the time when there was a National Space Council, and 

one of the things the National Space Council did were reports. There were a 

number of difficulties at the time; the Hubble Space Telescope, of course, was 

not good on orbit. Norm Augustine was named to head a commission, the 

Augustine Commission on the Future of the U.S. Space Program. I was part 

of the Department of Commerce team in that discussion and involved in the 

Space Exploration Initiative [SEI], the first effort to do the Moon-Mars effort 

again in Bush 1 [President George H. W. Bush’s administration].

One of the things that came out of the Augustine Commission Report was 

that the idea that NASA was going to be doing work that was actually somewhat different than it had done in the past. NASA’s work has always traditionally been very project oriented. You build a satellite, you put it on a rocket, you 

send it into orbit, you get the data, it comes back. You build another satellite, 

you put it on a rocket, and send it up, get data, come back. It’s not quite building an architecture that’s interrelated, that spans decadal-long work.

When you’re looking at the SEI, there is sort of a recognition that what 

we were trying to have NASA do was something more like the Defense 

Department [DOD], which had a national military strategy, had a force structure that reflected that strategy. You costed out what that force structure would 

take, what resources it would take. It never fit within the available budget, and 

you would go back and redo it; there’s an iterative analysis cycle that you go 

on. You can try to find some sort of longer-term strategy. You have a structure 

to meet that strategy, made up of a whole bunch of little pieces. You try to integrate all of those with the policy support and resources you had and so forth.

That kind of cyclic analysis and integrative function was something that 

people felt NASA needed, and they refer to it as sort of a PA&E-like function, because the Defense Department had a PA&E Office, which arose in 

the [President] John F. Kennedy administration under [Secretary of Defense] 

Robert McNamara in order to adjudicate all the different competing demands 

on resources in the Cold War. And you never had enough resources to do 

whatever a service wanted to do. You had to pick and choose among them. 

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In fact, that was really the basis of sort of modern military systems analysis, 

which the RAND Corporation had been involved in and I had been exposed to.

Given NASA’s proposed new role in things like SEI, there was a thought 

that you needed a PA&E-like function, and in the final Augustine Report it 

was referred to as sort of a systems analysis house to do that. With the demise 

of SEI, NASA didn’t really want to do that kind of systems analysis. There’s a 

whole bunch of reasons for it that would probably take even longer than we 

have, but my perception of it was the Enterprises or Mission Directorates and 

so forth didn’t want to have independent analysis and tradeoffs. They knew 

what they wanted to do, thank you very much, and without an overarching 

objective for the Agency like SEI, there wasn’t really a lot of push to do that 

integrative function at the Agency level and incur all the various pushback that 

you would get.

Now, the person heading the Office of Exploration at NASA during that 

period of time was Michael Griffin, the current NASA Administrator. I was very 

impressed with what he was able to do with limited resources at NASA in the 

first Bush administration and the architecture that he wanted to implement. 

With the end of the Bush administration, we all sort of went our separate ways. 

I went about six months into the [President Bill] Clinton administration, as 

a career person, but decided that I had had enough of a government tour. I 

accomplished a lot, but I had run out of new ideas that I wanted to pursue at 

that time and decided I needed to go replenish my intellectual capital.

I was back at the RAND Washington office and wound up supporting the 

Clinton administration through the Office of Science and Technology Policy 

[OSTP]; I was working in space policy for the Critical Technologies Institute, 

which was a FFRDC [Federally Funded Research and Development Center] 

for OSTP.

Probably the most notable among what I did while there was the work 

that led to the GPS [Global Positioning System] policy statement in 1996, which 

was the first presidential policy statement on GPS as a dual-use technology. I 

also did some work for rethinking some of the Mission to Planet Earth and 

commercial remote sensing, and on the National Space Policy. 

After the election of President George W. Bush, I became part of the twomember transition team with Courtney Stadd. Given the compressed schedule 

as a result of the election dispute in Florida and the Supreme Court case and 

so forth, there was not really time to stand up some of the larger transition 

teams that had been done in the past. Past transition teams for NASA would 

be about 25, 30 people and panels and so forth. There was no time. There 

were two of us.

We were done by Inauguration Day, and we split up. Courtney came over 

here to Headquarters as the Chief of Staff and White House Liaison, and in 

the space of about a month or two, I wound up at OSTP as the space and 

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aeronautics person over there. After about a year at OSTP, I came back to NASA 

and went to work for Courtney as the Deputy Chief of Staff. Then, Administrator 

Sean O’Keefe reorganized the front office after the loss of Columbia, and I went 

back to work on GPS and spectrum issues. I became involved in negotiations 

at the World Radio Conference in 1997, serving as part of the U.S. delegation 

there. I was very involved with both the technology and politics of international 

discussions on spectrum and communications since there was a large international debate about the various efforts to reallocate spectrum needed by GPS.

So that’s what I wound up doing at NASA when I went to work in the Space 

Communications Office and again working interagency issues between ourselves; National Telecommunications and Information Administration, which 

handles government spectrum; and the Federal Communications Commission, 

which handles commercial issues.

When the 2003 World Radio Conference was approaching, there were a 

couple of pressing issues there, including some of these spectrum discussions 

and communications issues important to the Agency for science purposes as 

well as national security. O’Keefe’s general order to me was, “Pace, don’t let 

anything stupid happen.” So with that order, I went as part of the U.S. delegation again, and we had a good outcome that protected GPS. 

I became more focused on technical work and not involved in a lot of the 

policy work. It was sort of bittersweet for me to watch some of my colleagues 

in the policy development for the Vision for Space Exploration. On the one 

hand, I was extremely proud of my colleagues, former colleagues, in what 

they did for the President’s speech. On the other hand, I was watching from 

a distance after having been directly involved in policy for over a decade on 

these sorts of issues. But I was very pleased with the outcome.

Then, when Michael Griffin was named to become Administrator, he called 

me up and said that he was forming a PA&E function at NASA in light of the 

architectural demands that would be involved, the tradeoffs and so forth that 

would be necessary, and he thought that NASA needed a PA&E analytical function. So in 2005, I left doing technical work and came back to doing policytechnical work. I’ve been in this position ever since April 2005. 

Explain your organization.

We stood up the new organization as part of the change of the Agency’s 

governing structure—having the Centers report to Headquarters, to the 

Administrator, versus having to go through the Mission Directorates; having 

a balance between the programmatic side of the house and the institutional 

side of the house. You want those tensions not resolved at lower levels, but 

you want them resolved at a Headquarters level, and you want PA&E to be not 

the adjudicator, but really the independent voice that says, “Well, there’s A and 

there’s B, and here’s the pro and con of each side.”

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Our organization is made up of several parts. We do studies and analysis, any PA&E office does, for the Administrator and for those top-priority 

questions that the Administrator thinks are worth looking at. We have a Cost 

Analysis Division that provides independent cost estimates, again, crucial in 

terms of resource allocation.

We have a Strategic Investments Division, which does the budget, essentially. 

As part of the reorganization we pulled the strategic investments work out of the 

Office of the CFO [Chief Financial Officer] and made it a separate organization. 

When you look at the PA&E systems and the budget systems, for example, at 

DOD, it’s what’s known as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution, 

PPBE. The planning and programming side is one major set of steps, and the 

budgeting and execution side is the other. There are those who authorize the 

checks and those who cut the checks. You keep those functions separate.

NASA traditionally had put those functions together in the CFO and put 

them under the comptroller. We’ve had very, very powerful and competent 

comptrollers in NASA for many years, and they were the ones who were 

responsible for putting the budget together. But it’s also sort of odd, because in 

any normal corporate world the comptroller is the person who determines that 

the numbers are good for the CFO, who in turn advises the Chief Executive 

Officer, who does strategy using the CFO. Well, the comptroller function we 

had in NASA was extremely powerful and focused, out of any proportion to 

what you would see in sort of a normal governance environment.

That was because work needed to get done. I don’t think there was any 

malice aforethought of anybody. Work had to get done, the budget had to get 

done, and it was the easiest way to do it.

But as we thought what the governance of the Agency ought to be, one of 

the things you wanted to do was to separate the authorizing of checks from 

the cutting of the checks so there isn’t this sort of self-dealing problem where 

people would see a lack of transparency.

On the strategic investment side, PA&E prepares the strategic planning 

guidance, which is approved by the leadership; pulls all the input from the 

Mission Directorates and Centers and so forth; identifies where there are 

issues; crisps up those issues for decision that are then decided on by the 

leadership chain.

We are a corporate staff function. We are not a chain-of-command function. We don’t tell anybody what to do, push this button or close that building. 

But we are corporate staff. Again a very, very important role that PA&E plays, 

I believe, is the PPBE part of the process. After the budget is done and it’s 

approved and its monies appropriated, the CFO is in charge of executing that 

money fund distribution and all the accounting side of things. So there are 

really two different cultures. There is a CFO culture, and there is the PA&E, a 

budget and policy and programming culture.

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We have an Independent Program Assessment Office, which reviews programs and projects at major milestones. It’s governed by Project and Program 

Guidance 7120.5, now “D” version. It’s gone through several versions, and 

there’s 7120.4, Program and Project Management. Again, we’ve made a number of changes there where projects come forward at particular milestones. 

They’re independently reviewed. There are differences that you then try to reconcile. Where the differences cannot be reconciled, you bring those forward to 

Program Management Council for people to hear both sides. But you work very 

collaboratively. It is not an audit function the way reviews might be thought of. 

Studies and Analysis, Cost Analysis Division, Independent Program 

Assessment, and budget, and then I have a Mission Support Office, which covers travel, procurement, and administration, trying to provide a common basis 

for all these rather disparate functions.

Where we are today is we have a PA&E function, which I have long 

thought was necessary, not just as a good idea in and of itself, but one which 

comes out of the kind of work NASA has been asked to do by presidential 

policy and legislation.

What lessons have you learned through these years?

A lot of the lessons learned have been incorporated into the governance 

model. The idea of checks and balances, the idea of documenting decisions, the 

idea that how you operate and manage a bureaucracy is absolutely critical to 

achieving more transcendent or visionary goals and objectives. I learned in my 

first government tour that I came with some of the usual prejudices about government service and government bureaucrats in Washington. Fairly quickly, I came 

to the conclusion that the people were much better than I might have expected. 

I also concluded that the system was much worse than I might have suspected.

To some extent this was just the nature of human organizations. To another 

extent it was actually intentional by the founding fathers in terms of setting up 

divided government. The federal government, in particular, was not set up for 

efficiency, and that’s intentional. 

One of the things I learned was the importance of collaboration. Sometimes 

I refer to it as an open conspiracy between career staff and political staff. 

Politicals can get things done that careers cannot do. They can make very fundamental sorts of changes. On the other hand, if you want those changes to 

be long-lasting and enduring, you really have to involve the career staff, and 

you have to convince them that this is actually for the long-term good of the 

agency where those career staff will be spending their lives, many of them. You 

still have long tenures in the federal government in ways that you do not have 

in the private sector much anymore.

As a result, there is sort of a miniature democratic conversation that must 

go on as a negotiation between the careers and politicals on getting things 

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done. One of the things that I say is that career staff, where there’s opportunities for reform and improvement, need to learn how to use politicals, and the 

politicals in turn need to understand how they need to use and involve career 

staff to elicit more permanent change. That kind of continuing democratic 

negotiation is something that has certainly informed my background.

Another thing I would point to is the differences in cultural views that people bring together, particularly in the space area. Space has been interesting to 

me in part because of the conflict between the uses of dual-use technologies. 

Satellite navigation systems, communications, launch vehicles; all these things 

have both civil and military applications. They also have public and private 

uses. Actually, I wrote a paper on this topic called “Merchants and Guardians,” 

which refers to different cultural views.

There are the guardians, sort of Plato’s guardians of The Republic, who 

have very long-term views, make change fairly slowly, slow to trust, fairly 

conservative, interested in long-term principles and values. Then there are the 

merchants, who are entrepreneurial, risk-taking, energetic, will make a deal 

with anyone; relationships are fairly short; everything kind of stands on its 

own individual merits. Those are two very different ways of interacting and 

working, and there can be merchants in the government—rarely, but some—

and there can be guardians in industry, but again rarely.

As the public and private sectors try to talk about policy issues and programs and priorities, you find them often having mental models of themselves 

that are culturally very different from each other, and space, which has lots of 

other aspects to it, political and emotional and visionary aspects to it, comes 

in for more than its fair share, as well as being technically challenging. That’s 

a sort of a second lesson or whatever, but certainly it’s a reality that I’ve seen.

Finally I would say NASA, which tends to be very dominated by scientists, 

engineers, astronauts, the technical community, tends not to pay attention to 

more prosaic things, what I’ve sometimes called the soft underbelly of the 

Agency, things like procurement, legal, financial, all the things that are necessary to make an organization run. I would submit that you can have a mission 

failure just as assuredly because funds distribution doesn’t work, or because 

the human resources office doesn’t get you the right people, than as if you 

blow up on the pad.

In some ways this to me is reminiscent back to the NASA Administrator 

James Webb sort of experience, where Webb was very much interested in 

management. He came out of the Bureau of the Budget, understood that major 

endeavors are often unstable conglomerations of forces and interests that 

you’re trying to keep in metastable balance and moving in the same direction. 

But that interest of his during the Apollo period, you can definitely see the 

merit of it, because if all the focus is on the science and engineering, you will 

find yourself in deep trouble in other areas, costs, monies, resources.

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In management there are really four things to keep track of. There’s people, 

there’s money, there’s the physical assets you have, and then what programs 

you’re being asked to do. Pretty much things evolve down to problems in those 

areas. Either you’ve got the wrong program, you’ve got the wrong people, 

you’ve got the wrong assets or too many of them, or you’ve got the wrong 

amount of money at the wrong time. Attention to management of a large 

bureaucracy is also crucially important.

Now, this may be biased by my having spent more time in Washington 

than in a Field Center. I did a master’s thesis on the Shuttle, and I dug through 

a lot of the archives at the Johnson Space Center [JSC], and I dug through a lot 

of the archives back here at Headquarters, and—well, during the time period 

’69 to ’72, there were all these decisions being made. Although everybody 

ostensibly was working on the same problem, the records at Headquarters 

were just a dramatically different cultural environment than the records at JSC.

At JSC, you worry about wing planforms and whether or not the straight 

wing would win out over the Delta wing, and why the Air Force wanted the 

Delta wing, and arguments over mission models and design reference missions and so forth. At Headquarters, there are letters back and forth between 

Jim Fletcher and George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger and Don Rice and 

Office of Management and Budget examiners that occasionally intersected 

with technology in debates over the size of the payload bays and so forth, but 

in a very, very different world.

My bias has been more toward the policy and the Washington world, so 

someone with a different NASA experience, maybe more in a Field Center 

program, will come up with a different view. Again, from my experience on 

the managerial side, the relationship between political leadership and career 

staff, and the importance of dealing with different cultures of the merchants 

and guardians are the enduring touchstones that I’ve seen over and over again.

How has NASA changed over the years since you first became involved?

Some things are the same and some things are different. Right now we’re 

in a period where we’re trying to develop a new generation of manned access 

to space to replace the Shuttle after 2010. As a result of that, we’ve had to 

take some steps such as moderating the growth in the science budget, which 

had been projected to grow. We, of course, have slowed that growth in order 

to pay for Shuttle and Station operations as the highest-priority things now 

and as we’re trying to develop, within a fairly capped top line, a bunch of 

new systems.

If you look at the Apollo program, there is this large spike in the budget 

between fiscal years ’62 and ’64, which enabled the parallel development 

of multiple activities. The assets at Kennedy Space Center, developments of 

multiple Saturn vehicles. Now, that peak died off afterward, but that pulse of 

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money at the beginning was very important to doing simultaneous development programs.

Well, we don’t have that kind of pulse of money. We have a capped top 

line. So, as a result, if we’re going to start something new, other things have 

to end. The Shuttle Program has to end not only because the CAIB [Columbia

Accident Investigation Board] Report on Columbia pretty much made it clear 

that we needed to transition off of that, and because of people’s experiences 

with Shuttle as an aging vehicle, but I think there is pretty much a consensus 

that it’s time to wrap this program up, that it has to end as a way to make 

room for a follow-on. We can’t do major simultaneous development within a 

capped program.

As a result, we have to make painful choices about what has to end and 

how we start transition over to something new. So that’s, on one hand, different between today versus, say, back in the ’60s.

On the other hand, I remember during the late ’70s, after the last mission, 

the Apollo-Soyuz [Test Project] in ’75 and before Shuttle in flew in ’81, when I 

was at JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory]. I was a lab technician making $2.85 an 

hour analyzing data, and I had my overtime hours cut to zero because NASA 

was paying for Shuttle. This was during the summers of ’77 and ’78, when 

Shuttle main engines were blowing up at Stennis and we were having lots of 

difficulties with the program.

So I tell that story because, I say, “You know, when you’re making $2.85 an 

hour, overtime is really important, and I had my hours cut to zero to pay for 

Shuttle. Not that I’m bitter about it or anything.” You tell people, “Hey, guess 

what? We’re in a generational change today which is also forcing constraints,” 

because the option of walking away from manned space flight is really not 

something a great nation should do.

There are some differences between now and the first effort at the SEI. 

One of the things that is striking is that the degree of denial that was present 

in NASA in the early ’90s but is not here today. I thought that NASA’s reaction 

in the SEI Program—NASA has come under a number of unfair criticisms for 

that program—but it seemed to me that NASA was offered a very compelling 

and attractive vision, something it had long argued for a long time, in the 

SEI Program.

But faced with a choice between making reforms necessary to achieve 

that vision within a capped-budget environment, and turning some things off 

in order to do new things, making those kind of reforms and choices to go 

after its vision or preserving its culture, NASA chose to preserve its culture. It 

chose to stay within its comfort zone of what it knew and its routine rather 

than move out. Now maybe that was because it felt that they should be given 

more money to do these things. But that wasn’t going to be forthcoming. So in 

a choice between its vision and its culture, NASA chose its culture.

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Are those painful culture choices here today? Yes, they are, but I think the 

experience of the ’90s and all the turbulence that NASA went through, such as 

the pain of the Columbia accident and so forth, I don’t see that sort of denial 

anymore. I see more a sense of yes, we need to make tough choices. What we 

want to know is, are the choices logical? Can we understand what the priorities 

are and what the logic of it is? Yes, we always like more money. But given that 

there’s not more money and we have to make painful choices, do we think that 

there is some sort of logical process that’s being followed that therefore can 

make our lives a little bit more predictable in what we’re asked to do?

Again, this is probably where I’m biased, but I think we do have that logic. 

I think that the Administrator has been very good at articulating that logic in 

a way that NASA folks sort of understand, and that the way that the Vision 

for Space Exploration was done this time is somewhat different than the SEI 

effort. One of the ways it was different is that the resource constraints and the 

need for tough priorities were really spelled out right from the beginning. The 

President made his speech saying, “This is a journey, not a race.”

The FY05 budget had some increases in there. We would love to get back to 

where we were in FY05, by the way, versus dealing with some of the CR [continuing resolution] issues and so forth we are today. I would love to be back at 

the NASA budget in real-dollars terms where we were in 1992. It would solve 

a lot of current problems. Again, it doesn’t need to be an Apollo-like effort of 

money. It just needs to be a little bit better than it currently is. But again, those 

constraints have led to more willingness to make some hard choices, and the 

Administrator’s ability to articulate the logic behind those choices, both on 

Capitol Hill and with career staff, I think has been very helpful.

Nonetheless there are enduring differences. You will always have folks in 

the science community who will say, “Well, the money should go to my projects, because I think they’re wonderful.” They have a point, and they should 

articulate that point, but it’s up to other people to make those trades. Similarly 

you have technologists who say, “Hey, more money ought to go into new technology because that’s the way of the future.” On the other hand, you don’t have 

a future if you don’t have manned access to space.

In my personal view, we wasted about a decade, if not two decades, on 

Shuttle replacement with all sorts of excursions, beginning with, say, the 

National Aero-Space Plane experience that I reviewed when I was at RAND; 

also the Space Launch Initiatives and other efforts. In part, we did those things 

because we thought we had the luxury of time and that the Shuttle could go 

on. When I first came here, there were people talking about Shuttle operations 

in 2020 and what would be necessary for that, which I think were completely 

not viable.

Nonetheless, people thought that culture and that vehicle could and should 

go on for a long period of time, and that therefore one could afford to take 

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higher chances with exotic technologies. If you look at decisions like the X-33 

Program, there was an intentional choice made to go not with a vehicle that 

probably could be built—say, a two-stage orbit vehicle—but intentionally went 

for the most exotic technologies possible. So over-optimism on technology, a 

sense that the downside risks were covered by an existing vehicle, meant that 

when you did have an accident and you said, “You know, we really do need 

to do something different,” you had to go with what you knew, and that’s why 

a high degree of Shuttle heritage parts and use of the existing industrial base 

and so forth is so important to our plans today.

Technologists don’t like that and rightly are critical, saying that there are 

more promising things that we could have done, or could be done better, it 

could be this, it could be that. Well, yes, but that was maybe 15 years ago. 

We’re out of time; pencils down.

The tensions we’re balancing today are between, again, the lofty goals 

we have, the resources we have, the realities of where we are, and the consequences of decisions that were made earlier and commitments that were made 

earlier. I think part of the challenge for us or the opportunity for us is how we 

deal with those constraints, the processes, the governance, the explanations, 

the rationales, the logic, about how we deal with those constraints is important to the sustainability and the viability of the Vision as it goes forward. It’s 

precisely how we deal with these problems that ensures that we can rebuild 

our credibility, both with our stakeholders externally and also with the NASA 

folks internally.

What do you believe NASA’s impact on society is as well as its role for the 

future?

At one level NASA is a discretionary tool of Presidents. It’s sort of an 

ultimate discretionary activity. Not only is science a discretionary activity, but 

exploration is a discretionary sort of activity, and therefore if public resources 

are going to be used, it has to be in some ways responsive to what the 

Presidents want and what the Congress will support.

John Kennedy used it as a means for Cold War competition with the Soviet 

Union, in terms of hearts and minds of the third world and making a demonstration of American capability. And therefore we did things, with going to 

the Moon, that arguably were ahead of their time. They were not things that 

normally emerged or evolved in terms of the course of normal science or 

exploration, but were driven at a heated pace by the political requirements of 

the Cold War.

You can also say that President Ronald Reagan used the space program 

as part of his broader themes for “Morning in America,” American renewal, 

as a counterpoint to the policies of [President] Jimmy Carter’s administration, 

who explicitly disavowed large major-scale engineering projects. There was 

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a debate in the ’70s about things like solar-power satellites and responding 

to the energy crisis and so forth, and the Carter administration explicitly said 

that in their policy there was no need for high-challenge engineering projects, 

which while not naming solar-power satellites and those kinds of things explicitly, were definitely caught by it.

Ironically, the support for and interest in some of those things came from 

Congress, in the form of people like Don Fuqua of the House Science and 

Technology Committee at the time. The Reagan counterpoint used the Shuttle 

and its symbolism, plus the Space Station, to be a unifying force among the alliance, again in counterpoint to the Cold War as an overarching political theme.

With the Clinton administration you saw the Space Station nearly die in 

Congress a couple of times, and at one point only surviving by a single vote. 

The involvement of the Russians in the Space Station Program provided a new 

alignment of political support for Station. You lost some conservative votes 

who didn’t like to see the Russians involved; they saw it as more of a U.S.-

centric project. But you also picked up a larger number of votes from people 

who liked the idea in Congress of involving the Russians in the Space Station, 

now symbolizing the end of the Cold War.

So the large programs, particularly the human space exploration programs, 

are responsive to the needs of the Presidents at the time. Now, there are transcendent reasons and experiences with space exploration and science that go 

beyond any particular President. You simply look at some of the public reaction to Hubble Space Telescope, the reaction to the Rovers and so forth on 

Mars, the support and interest in human spaceflight that’s still enduring there, 

although certainly not what it was in the ’60s, and, to an extent, the exploration in science and space symbolizes Americans’ definitions of who they are. 

This is part of what great nations do. This is part of what Americans define 

themselves as doing.

You could, of course, stop all this tomorrow, and we would still have all 

the practical benefits of space, satellite communications and navigation and 

remote sensing and all that sort of thing. But if you weren’t doing exploration, 

and Administrator Mike Griffin put it well in one of his speeches, there would 

be sort of a sense that something lost, that something was missing by America 

not being involved in this. I certainly recall a feeling of relief or satisfaction 

at the inaugural launch of Columbia in 1981 with the return of humans to 

space, who had not been there for the previous six years, and even longer if 

you count back even to the Skylab missions. The idea that Americans are not 

in space, not exploring, is something we would find disturbing.

Also ironically, and again the CAIB Commission put their fingers on this, 

was the idea that we are only going around in low-Earth orbit was also somewhat disturbing. People were getting the sense of, “Well, where are we going 

with this?” prior to the President’s speech. So having a sense of direction, even 

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if we are constrained by realities of money and resources and technology to 

schedules that take longer than we would like or progress is slower than we 

would like, the idea of making progress, of engaging in exploration as opposed 

to not doing those things, is very important to Americans’ sense of themselves.

There are the immediate necessities of day-to-day budgetary decisions 

that the Congress deals with. There are the slightly longer-term issues that 

Presidents deal with in terms of what are the demands of the country at the 

time and what is the overall tone and tenor of the environment that we’re in. 

There are even longer-term enduring issues of Americans’ senses of themselves 

as to what they’re engaged in.

The importance of space is, of course, not just the practical benefits but 

also the inspirational benefits, and inspiration means different things to different stakeholders, the American people, Presidents, and Congress. As we wind 

up going forward with hopefully the next set of explorations, I think that the 

general direction that the President laid out of journeying on to the Moon and 

on to Mars will be sort of a cornerstone of what NASA will try to do.

What’s different today, with this effort versus things done in the past, is 

the role of the international community and of the commercial community, 

and that there are these possibilities of space tourism. There are possibilities 

of independent space capabilities from China and India and other new players. Now, they’re facing a number of difficult challenges. I don’t think that 

they are going to supplant NASA or the United States anytime soon unless we 

ourselves relinquish our efforts and give up, but it is a much more crowded 

and dynamic field.

Space is literally larger than NASA and larger than the United States, and so 

the question is now not whether anybody is there in space or not, but who is 

there, how are they there, how are they operating, and how are they working 

with each other. Are we engaging with the commercial community in productive 

ways? Are we engaging with the international community in productive ways? 

How we do those things will reflect what values we are taking out onto the 

frontier, to use that metaphor, and it is those values that are probably the most 

important for defining what NASA and what space exploration more broadly are. 

It’s not just our DNA and our robots that go out there. It’s the values we carry.

I got involved in a number of debates back in the ’80s with people who 

wanted to go to Mars with the Soviets as part of détente, increasing cooperation, and so forth. I opposed those kinds of efforts, spoke against them as a 

private citizen or involved in various space activist groups like the National 

Space Society and the L5 Society, and would debate people. Their comment 

was often, “Well, I thought you were a space supporter, so why wouldn’t you 

support going to Mars with the Soviets?”

I said, “Well, because it is not just our robots and our DNA that’s out there.” 

To maybe make an inflammatory point, I’d say things like, “Well, I don’t want to 

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see gulags on Mars.” It is overly narrow to say that there are not values associated with who we decide to cooperate with. The Space Station, for example, is 

a cooperation of democratic countries, some more than others, but nonetheless democracies who engage in mixed-market economies and some sense 

of a standard of respect for human rights. Again, one can debate that in the 

case of individual countries, but nonetheless that is a common aspect of the 

advanced countries.

When we look at cooperation going out there, and we look at what values 

we have, are we going to promote values of a market economy? Are we going 

to promote values of a liberal, tolerant, democratic culture? Are we going to 

just go with people who have technical capabilities, never mind what values they represent, or are we going to try to behave and act in ways on the 

space frontier that are not only consistent with our science and exploration 

objectives, but consistent with our social ideals as well, however imperfectly 

expressed? That will be the challenge going forward.

What are your thoughts on the importance of aeronautics within NASA?

Aeronautics, interestingly, is also reflective of what I said earlier about 

responding to what are the priorities of the country. The NACA [National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics], NASA’s predecessor, was founded in 

1915 in part as a result of concern—an earlier version of the Russian satellite 

Sputnik, if you will—that Europe was advancing beyond the United States 

in aeronautical capabilities. Even though the first flight had occurred in the 

United States with Orville and Wilbur Wright in 1903, by the period before 

World War I, European countries had advanced quite beyond us. There was 

a concern that we were losing our advantage, and NACA was one of the 

responses; later, when Sputnik had its political impact, NASA was a response 

to that, absorbing NACA.

Aeronautics is a relatively smaller part, certainly, of the Agency’s budget 

today, and should it be more? Yes, there are certainly some things that they could 

do more in, but it’s not the same environment. The technical challenges are not 

the same as space. The issues that aeronautical research has to face are not quite 

the same as they were in the environment of World War I and II, where people 

see as some of the golden age of aeronautical research and advance.

On the other hand, there are very important foundational questions that 

aeronautics can and should answer. The experience I think of is in STS-114, 

where we had the gap filler protruding out from underneath the vehicle, 

and some of the nation’s best hypersonic aerodynamicists could not tell you 

whether or not that would disturb the flow field and change the flow on reentry from laminar to turbulent with the consequent heat pulse change at Mach 

23 or Mach 16 or Mach 8. There were lots of debates about it. What seemed to 

be a very simple question did not have an answer from the best minds, and 

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therefore in order to minimize risks, we put someone out on EVA [extravehicular activity] on the end of an arm to pull the gap filler out, a somewhat 

sporty maneuver, but this was seen as the lowest-risk thing to do in light of 

our ignorance about hypersonic reentry.

We’ve landed a couple of Rovers on Mars with air bags. We landed Viking 

on Mars, which is a hefty-sized vehicle but did an all-propulsive landing. 

When you start scaling up and think about landing humans on Mars, 30-, 

40-metric-ton vehicles, it’s fairly clear that we don’t know how to do that. An 

all-propulsive landing would be very, very expensive in fuel. It’s hard to see 

how that would be practical. On the other hand, the Martian atmosphere is so 

thin that parachute systems would be the size of a football stadium if we were 

going in that way. So Mars is large enough to have a gravity field that makes 

a propulsive landing difficult. It’s small enough that its atmosphere is so thin 

that the kind of aerodynamic entries that one might do on Earth are not really 

practical as you go up in weight.

Here is an area where, in order for us to carry out space exploration on 

planets with atmospheres—and there are several bodies in the solar system, 

such as Titan, which do have atmospheres—that we need to have advances in 

aerodynamics. These advances are in difficult, esoteric areas such as hypersonics, which don’t have immediate commercial issues but are really fundamental 

research. So aeronautics still has a strong role in NASA, but it’s in more in the 

foundational work.

NASA is an organization that responds to the needs of the country, and 

there are clearly problems in air traffic control systems. The Federal Aviation 

Administration doesn’t have the necessary R&D [research and development] 

capability. They are very, very involved in operational issues. People are looking 

to NASA to do this, to help. But we have not been really given the resources necessary to fully do that. What people are seeing with aerodynamics is that there 

are foundational issues that we should be working on. There are other issues 

people would like us to work on but are not able to provide the resources. We 

are seeing a debate over what priority aeronautics should have.

Now, with the presidential policy on aeronautics—for the first time one has 

come out—perhaps that will help in this priority setting. But in an era of constrained resources, which is almost always the case, we will have to do triage 

and set priorities, and people will not like those results. This is the democratic 

conversation I referred to earlier. There are useful things for us to do. There are 

not adequate resources for us to do with all of them. Therefore, decisions need 

to be made. By what logic will we make those resources allocations?

What we’ve tried to do so far is to focus on those things which are really 

unique to NASA, such as the foundational research, rather than those things 

which could be done by others, such as some of the air traffic control system 

changes. Now, we might get the assignment. We might get told to do that, and 

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if we get the resources, we will. Again, NASA responds to the discretionary 

will of the President and Congress. But it’s not clear that that will really happen, so right now we’re trying to find those areas where there is consensus 

for us to be working and not operate in those areas where there is not yet a 

democratic consensus.

What would you say to someone who wanted to build a career with NASA?

I guess one of the things I would ask is, do they want a career in the space 

business, or do they want a career in NASA? There are all kinds of ways to 

participate in the space business. It wasn’t until 2001 that I came and actually 

joined NASA, but I had been in the space business for 25 years. I had worked 

on NASA contracts. I worked in FFRDCs for NASA. I worked on policy issues 

that affected NASA, but I was not formally part of NASA.

The question people should ask is, what is it about space that’s interesting, 

aside from thinking it’s cool. Sometimes you go to space because that’s the only 

way to answer other questions that you’re interested in. If you’re a biologist or 

interested in advanced materials or you’re interested in astrodynamics or something, you wind up in space as a means to an end, not as an end in and of itself.

I was interested and continue to be interested a lot in commercial space 

policy issues, because they are at this intersection between public and private 

interests that I find very interesting. They have particularly interesting expression in policy debates between these public and private interests over space 

issues. Greater growing commercial space activities are good for the nation, 

not only economically but also as part of U.S. leadership in the world. It has 

an additional benefit that by encouraging growth of the commercial sector, you 

could ironically put pressure on NASA to rethink what things it should be in 

versus what it should not be in.

I recall debates in the 1980s, quite bitter, between NASA and the Commerce 

Department where NASA deeply resented the intrusion of other agencies into 

what it saw as its realm. It was willing to tolerate the military world, off in its 

own separate realm, and that goes back to the beginning of the space program 

really with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. But the intrusion of these 

upstart agencies such as Transportation and Commerce was not welcomed.

Those debates are largely gone now. They’re completely water under the 

bridge and, as a result, NASA makes a bit more intelligent decisions about how 

to involve the private sector. We still have lots to do, as with the Commercial 

Orbital Transport System, in buying commercial services. We’re still not at the 

point of buying microgravity aircraft services the way we probably ought to be. 

We still don’t utilize as much of the commercial sector as we could.

But nonetheless, we can have those debates, whereas if you go back in the 

’80s, the idea of commercial space being anything other than a NASA contract 

was almost an oxymoron outside of the satellite communications world.

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Having a richer ecosystem in the space business allows for NASA to have 

some healthy competition. It allows it to really think what are its fundamental 

core capabilities that it wants to work on, which is, in my view, exploration 

and science, not operating things. We’ve gotten out of the aeronautics business 

in many areas, large assets like wind tunnels. Four of our 10 Field Centers are 

aeronautics based, but 40 percent of our budget is not aeronautics based.

For those Field Centers, if they are to be viable and healthy, have to do 

those things that the President and the Congress are paying NASA to do, which 

in large part is exploration and science. They have to get into the exploration 

and science business, not just the aeronautics and R&D business. Other Centers 

that have been operational and R&D Centers like Johnson Space Center, their 

task in this new world is to become more involved in doing spacecraft development work. That’s work that they have not done in almost a generation.

There are major, major cultural changes that have to happen, even at 

the manned space flight Centers, which on the surface look like they’re well 

funded and healthy and large, but on the other hand are facing fairly wrenching cultural changes that they’re just now realizing.

Where we’re going with the future is that there are many different possibilities for young people to be involved, not just as civil servants in a system, and 

they have to ask questions about what business they want to be in. I was interested in space business and then chose, because I thought it was important 

for the nation and part of national interest and power and so forth, to focus 

on commercial issues as a counterpoint, intentionally not NASA, in order to 

stimulate changes that I thought would be healthier for the nation as a whole.

Now with the Vision for Space Exploration, I came back into NASA to work 

on those parts which I think the Agency needs, which are better management 

systems, better analytical systems—bringing analysis to making decisions in a 

constrained environment so that you can preserve and advance the Vision, but 

in ways that are sustainable and logical and that will have a buy-in for a long, 

long period of time. It is not enough simply to have an inspirational speech 

and for people to be inspired, because that can go when they walk out the 

door. You have to build the mechanisms and the processes and the relationships in to sustain those sorts of visions for a long period of time, because 

emotion just is not enough.

The obvious things for young people are to have some literacy in math 

and science, but you don’t have to be a scientist or engineer to be involved 

and to contribute to space systems. But it is important to have some degree of 

self-knowledge as to why you’re involved in this, and sometimes that takes a 

while to answer for many people.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 8

William H. Gerstenmaier

Associate Administrator for Space Operations

Bill Gerstenmaier began working for NASA in the Wind Tunnel and Flight Division at the Lewis 

Research Center, now the Glenn Research Center. As part of that job, he had his first experience 

in the Shuttle world assisting on a couple of projects during the early days of the Space Shuttle 

Program. That was in 1977. Three years later, his propulsion background interested the teams 

at Johnson Space Center, and he decided that if he really wanted to get into the space business, 

Houston was the place to be. He became a flight controller, serving on the first STS mission, doing 

thermal analysis. 

 Gerstenmaier continued to work in the Shuttle Program, becoming its program manager, as well 

as the program manager for the International Space Station. He started the interview, conducted at 

the Johnson Space Center on 10 January 2008, by talking about his experiences with the space 

agency that eventually led to the role of Associate Administrator for Space Operations.

On the first flight of Columbia, some of the tiles were damaged and we 

analyzed whether we thought it would be safe to return with that tile damage. 

What’s curious about that is here, in my recent career, we had the blankets peel 

up on a Shuttle flight, and the analysis was almost identical to the analysis that 

I did back in 1981 at STS-1. 

I was an orbit flight controller on about the first 17 Shuttle flights, did 

ascent entries towards the end of that; then moved off and did payload 

activities for the payloads that flew on the Shuttle. I ran the project office and 

systems division on the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, and in 1992 I decided 

that I wanted to go back to school and get retooled again technically. So I went 

back to Purdue University to pursue a Ph.D. for about two years. I didn’t get a 

Ph.D., but I completed all the coursework and got through the qualifiers. When 

I came back to the Johnson Space Center, for about a year, I worked again on 

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the Shuttle side looking at the software that controls the Shuttle, the orbital 

mechanics, the ascent software. 

Then I went to Russia in 1995 to be the ground support person for astronaut Shannon Lucid while she was aboard the Russian Mir space station. At 

that point, the team in Russia was very small. Myself and maybe five or six 

contractor folks were there supporting that mission. The Russians had not 

seen anybody really come for an extended period of time. I stayed for about 

a six- to seven-month period of time over there. So they really adopted me as 

a flight controller. We bonded really well, and I had a great experience. They 

sensed the love of spaceflight; the love of engineering that I have is the same 

that they have.

I returned in 1996 and worked in the Orbiter Project area and went to 

Palmdale to see some orbiter modifications there. I don’t remember exactly 

when, but about 1999 I came to the International Space Station Program as 

deputy and worked there until I became Station Program Manager. I was 

Station Program Manager until I got my present job in Space Operations at 

Headquarters. 

If you look at my career, I didn’t really plan any of these moves. But from 

where I started to where I am now, I have the privilege of gaining a tremendous background. I have a lot of firsthand international experience by working 

with the Russians, and when I became Station Program Manager, I was treated 

with a lot of respect. I was already a known quantity so during the negotiations, 

although very difficult after the Columbia tragedy, the Russians had a tremendous respect for me because I had spent that time and they knew who I was. 

So I couldn’t have planned it that way, but the way it worked out was just 

super. And if I look back at my career, I’m truly blessed. I’ve worked with 

phenomenal people throughout my career. It’s all been in Shuttle, Station, 

human spaceflight activities, and it’s just been amazing. It all fits together, and 

now my job, where I lead both Shuttle and Station from Headquarters, is fitting. 

I know what happens in the Shuttle Program. I know what happens in the 

Station Program. I know the problems. 

What are your current job responsibilities?

My primary job in Headquarters is to keep all the congressional folks and 

other folks out of their hair and let the program people go do what they really 

need to go do. 

Probably one of the biggest challenges will be that as we’re retiring the 

Shuttle to make sure that each Shuttle flight is just as safe as the last Shuttle 

flight and that we keep our focus on what we’re doing. It’s very difficult, if you 

look at other programs NASA phased out, to keep them strong until the end. 

My other challenge is to take each Shuttle flight and make sure we get 

maximum advantage out of it, so we can get the Space Station completed, or 

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at least get the major elements launched, as well as put up a large number 

of spares to be prepared until the next vehicle comes online that can start 

providing routine cargo transportation to Space Station. The big challenge 

strategically is how do I lay out a plan that supports this effort but meets with 

the constraints that I’m given from the environment in Washington [DC]. I get 

some guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. I get some guidance from the Executive Office of the President. I sometimes get conflicting 

guidance from the congressional side. So then, how do I make sense of the 

two conflicting things but yet craft it into a plan that meets constraints and is 

still technically reasonable so we can then move forward?

Then, the challenge is to convince the folks in Houston that do the real 

work why this plan really makes sense, and why—even though in the real 

world I wouldn’t necessarily pick this plan, but with the constraints and budget 

limitations we’ve got—this is the best we can do with the parameters we’re 

given. To explain that to them and get them not only to understand it but then 

to embrace it and be ready to move forward and make continued sacrifices to 

do that, those are my challenges.

It’s very hard in the Washington environment. I’m trained as an engineer. 

I’m trained as a manager. It’s hard to convey sometimes to folks not in our 

business how difficult our business is, what the challenges are. They don’t 

understand the motivation of my workforce. They don’t understand the love 

that the folks really have of this business. For me to try to convey that to 

someone that doesn’t understand either the technical piece or the managerial 

piece is sometimes very, very difficult. I spend a lot of time with them trying 

to explain and get them to understand how we think and what we think and 

why we’re doing what we’re doing, because they sometimes see it as being 

very confusing. As engineers, we sometimes get so much into minutiae that 

we’re talking all the fine details and they don’t really care about the details; 

they want to understand the big picture and how it fits together. 

So I have to avoid the engineer tendency and try to craft it in a language 

and with a motivation that they can understand, and that’s been a big 

challenge for me. The challenge is to find out what motivates them and then 

to cast what we want to go do in terms that they can respond to. Then, I know 

when I talk to my engineers I cannot use that same language or that same 

motivation, because they will not understand that. I recraft that same direction 

back into a language that the engineers can understand and the managers 

can understand. 

My job is to have the split personality of dealing with the extreme technical 

side to the extreme lawyer, political side, and figure out how to make sure that 

as the interface between those two groups, all is clear. The communication 

from the politician-lawyer to the engineer-technician on the floor must be clear 

and understandable to each.

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You have a vital role in helping to make the Vision for Space Exploration a 

success. Tell us how the 2004 announcement from President [George W.] 

Bush had an impact on the plans of your office.

We really have a Vision now that takes us beyond low-Earth orbit. If you 

ask most folks in the human spaceflight world, they really want to get beyond 

low-Earth orbit. We’re meant to explore. We’re meant to go out. We’re meant 

to go do things. So having a plan where we go to the Moon and then have 

extended stay times on the Moon is great. Then, that leads next to Mars, which 

is even more demanding.

For a long time we talked about going to Mars first. I don’t think we’re 

technically ready to go to Mars. To go to Mars would require a spacecraft about 

the size of the Space Station. The Space Station when it’s completed will weigh 

about 900,000 pounds. We would have to construct in orbit a spacecraft about 

the size of Space Station, then have the three- or six-month journey to Mars, 

about a week’s stay, and then return. So we’re not really quite ready from a 

technology standpoint to make that big leap to Mars. 

But we can use the Space Station to learn about long-duration spaceflight. 

We can learn how to operate and live and work in space. Then we can take 

that knowledge, apply that to the Moon, permanently stay on the Moon for 

a period of time, learn what it takes to operate on the Moon, and then get 

ready to go to Mars. The way I look at it is in Space Station terms, if you mess 

something up you’re hours away from returning back to the surface of Earth. 

So it’s a bad day, but it’s not all that bad a day. You can still get back in hours.

When you’re at the Moon, you’re now days away. You have a little more 

of a constraint, but it’s still manageable in the big scheme of things. If you 

don’t have the right spares, or the simple things such as food or water are not 

what they need to be, or there’s contamination in the water supply, you’ve 

still got several days, and you can get back. But then when you go to Mars, 

it’s now months. So the criticality is now kicked up where it’s not a forgiving 

environment. So you’d better learn from Space Station, learn from the Moon, 

to enable you to be successful on Mars. So there’s a natural, nice progression 

that goes forward as we go do that.

The problem for us in Shuttle and Station a little bit is that, in a sense, 

we’re transients. We’re retiring Shuttle because we need another vehicle that 

can take us beyond low-Earth orbit. We would ideally like to be able to fly both 

the Shuttle and the new vehicle, but we’re not given funds to go do that. We 

have to end one to pick up the next to go where we want to go. That’s what I 

try to convey to folks. It makes sense if you look at it and then you look at that 

natural progression of stepping-stones from Station, to Moon, to Mars. Again, 

the plan is there. We’re ready to go execute that.

What we need to do now is figure out how we can keep this Vision that 

we’ve got. Our job at Headquarters is to figure out is how best the Vision 

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can be changed that doesn’t destroy the entire Vision, but yet lets the new 

presidential administration and Congress have ownership and make it their 

plan. We’re consciously now trying to figure out which things can be changed 

or, conversely, which things shouldn’t we change that would so disrupt and 

where we lose this momentum that we’ve got. 

That’s our challenge now, to look to the new administration and try to 

determine what things strategically are nice to have but not critical to the 

overall Vision—how we use the international community on the surface of the 

Moon, how we develop new hardware, how we put things together, how do 

we take Shuttle hardware and use it to advance the Constellation Program. For 

example, in Florida, Firing Room 1, which used to be a Shuttle firing room, has 

now been given to Constellation, and they’re going to start using that firing 

room. The A-1 Test Stand at Stennis [Space Center] has been turned over, and 

they’re testing J-2X engines now in that test stand. 

We’re flying a demonstration flight for Constellation in April 2009. It’s 

going to launch off one of our mobile launch platforms with our four-segment 

solid rocket boosters underneath. Our flight control team that does Shuttle and 

Station will be the flight control team that will oversee that launch and see that 

suborbital flight for Constellation. So that natural transition is there.

The way I see my Directorate interface with the Exploration Directorate 

is the Exploration Directorate is building the hardware, they’re designing the 

new hardware, but then when it comes time to operate it, it comes back to the 

Mission Operations Directorate, and we will go operate that hardware. 

What is NASA’s impact on society? 

NASA gives us a chance to think about things in ways that we don’t 

normally think about things. As a kid growing up, probably my most compelling 

memory was from the Apollo era—the picture of the Earth, Earthrise from the 

Moon. That gave us as a species a whole new perspective on what the Earth 

was. Here’s this little blue ball. As a kid I used to look at that and say all of us 

are in that picture. Then today I look at the images from the Cassini spacecraft 

with the Saturn rings and that little tiny dot that is the Earth, that’s us. So NASA 

has allowed us to rise above our day-to-day problems and our day-to-day crisis 

and look at our world and our lives in a whole new perspective that we would 

never be able to imagine any other way. We realize how small we are in the 

big scheme of things, how precious the Earth is in a sense.

When you look at the pictures from Space Station, you’ll see that thin little 

blue line—that’s our atmosphere, and that’s all. I was at a conference once and 

some remarked that the space budget was so much more than the aeronautics 

budget. My first picture on my slide presentation was Space Station, so I 

showed them that little blue line, and I said, “Well, see all that little blue stuff? 

That’s aeronautics, that’s why your budget is so small. You see all that vast 

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darkness out there? That’s space, that’s why my space budget is so big.” Again 

in a simple way, our job allows us to see a different perspective.

It is hard for us to explain our jobs to folks. When I was Station Program 

Manager, I used to challenge my people all the time to try to explain to their 

neighbors why they worked all these ridiculous hours and why we did all 

this hard work. They really can’t explain it. But they’re part of a thing that is 

bigger than them—there’s a spirit that it’s so complex and it requires everyone 

to work together as a team or it can’t be successful. In a sense that really is 

an unbelievably great way to motivate a team and to move forward. If I look 

back through my career, the hardware’s neat and cool, and as an engineer I 

like that, but I think I carry more memories of people that I’ve worked with, 

and in very difficult times. 

After the Challenger disaster and the Columbia disaster, those were really 

hard times, because you lost your friends who were astronauts that you really 

knew as friends, and then it also impacted your work. You, in a sense, had 

failed in your job. So then the double problem, or double calamity, was just 

hard to take. 

We have a great business. There are tremendous highs when things are 

happening and years of work come together, such as seeing Space Station 

assembled and as we see the international partner modules get launched. That’s 

exciting, to see what you’ve worked on for 10 years, 15 years, come to fruition.

But then, the other side is that sometimes we have tremendous downs, 

when we have a Columbia or a Challenger tragedy. That’s part of our business. 

It has both extremes. But the people in this business are what I carry as the 

most memorable; to have the privilege and pleasure of working with all these 

folks throughout these years has just been great.

You’ve spent 30 years so far with NASA. Tell us how NASA’s changed through 

this time period.

Yeah, boy, it’s definitely changed. It’s hard to reflect on the change, because 

I’ve seen it come so incrementally. I’ve seen this change in the way we do business. I’ve had a tremendous privilege of working with some great managers, 

and today’s management style is a little bit different than then. In the earlier 

days, it was a pretty hard environment; you were challenged very up front. You 

either knew your stuff or you weren’t even permitted to give presentations 

and you were done, whereas in today’s world we’re probably more forgiving.

The other thing that’s changed is the technology. In the Mission Control 

Center today, the new computer systems and the new software they have for 

the Space Station Flight Control Team is dramatically different than what I had 

as a flight controller, which was really rudimentary, very simple compared to 

the complex software and complex operation that the new flight controllers 

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William H. Gerstenmaier

have. Now the technology and some of the meeting styles and some of the 

management controls, those things have changed over time. 

But that underlying drive, that underlying spirit has been there since 

throughout my career. Occasionally I’ll sneak over and sit next to the flight 

controllers in the Space Station Program and just watch what they’re doing 

and just talk to them about their job. They don’t quite know who I am, but it 

works out just great, to see that the same joy, the same excitement, the same 

really love of their job is there that I’ve shared throughout my life. So it’s neat 

that that same spirit, that same deep internal motivation that was there in my 

beginning days at NASA, even in the aeronautics side, is still within NASA 

today. So that aspect of NASA has remained consistent.

What are the lessons you have learned that you have taken to your 

current position?

One, definitely, is that everyone’s position really has merit. Early on I was 

doing a project and one of the guys in the Avionics Division was thought of 

as not very productive within the division, and he was assigned to not very 

good jobs. I didn’t know that. Then I came in from the operations side and he 

explained to me how some things ought to be wired and put together in the 

avionics system. I would take what he told me and then I would feed it back to 

his own division, and they thought I was some kind of genius because I could 

do all this electronic stuff. Well, it wasn’t really me; it was actually this person 

within their own division that they had written off as not being valuable. 

What I learned out of that was that some folks don’t present very well, 

and they get branded as not being a strong contributor. They may not be in all 

areas, but they still have something that they can really contribute. I learned to 

listen extra hard. When my initial reaction is maybe not to listen to a comment 

from somebody or to dismiss something, I want to make sure the little red flag 

goes off in my head and says, “Okay, listen extra hard, because this person 

really is trying to tell you something and you need to value what they’re trying 

to tell you.” It may not be exactly what you want to hear, or it may not be 

exactly on target, but it has meaning and it can help you do a better job. I’ve 

learned to really value and pull data and information from a whole variety of 

different sources. 

I’ve also learned that you have to balance your life a little bit. You can do 

so much work stuff that you don’t have another life. So occasionally you need 

to find things where you get grounded and you get back to being a real person. 

Whenever I start thinking that I am somewhat smart or gifted, then I go talk 

to my family and they definitely put me back in the right perspective. I think 

that’s really good, because we’re not all that great, but you get this inflated 

attitude where people are nice to you, and they’re treating you well because 

of your position, and that doesn’t really matter. Go back to your family and 

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let them chew at you for a little while, and then you get regrounded back to 

where you need to be. 

I think there’s a balance between the home life and the work life that 

has to occur. Especially in today’s world, it’s tough for some of the new folks 

coming in to find that right balance because the work can be very addictive, 

because you’re getting very strong positive feedback from what you’re doing. 

You can read about what you do in the paper. That tends to make you get a 

big head, and you start thinking that you’re better and you’re more gifted than 

somebody else, and in reality you’re not.

I’ve also learned that people will really rise to the challenge if you can put 

the challenge in front of them in the right way. There’s really nothing this team 

can’t do if you put the challenge in front of them in the right way and you 

give them resources to go do it, you help enable them, and you’re consistent 

in walking the talk, that when you ask somebody to do something, you need 

to be willing to do it yourself or to show it. Folks look a lot at your actions. 

You can have all these great platitudes and all these great words about how 

you ought to do something, but the simple things that you do every day that 

they’re watching and they see happening are stronger motivators than all the 

right words that you talk about. 

One day in Building 1 at JSC, somebody had spilled some coffee. I got a 

paper towel and got down on my knees and wiped it up and threw the paper 

towel in the trash can. I didn’t think anything about it. Then we’re having 

safety day, and somebody brought up the fact that they saw me get down and 

wipe up this spill on the floor, and they said, “Holy cow, he is really concerned 

about safety and is really doing the right thing.” I didn’t think anything about 

it when I was cleaning it up. But my action carried a stronger motivation for 

my folks than anything I could have ever said in terms of motivational lectures 

or speeches or e-mails or writings. So again we’re always being looked at as 

managers and leaders. It needs to be natural, but you need to really walk the 

talk and not just pontificate on how things ought to be.

Part of the Vision for Space Exploration includes human and robotic 

spaceflight. Tell us about the important relevance between them.

It’s unfortunate that a lot of times in the media robotics get pitted against 

human spaceflight. That’s really not the case. The motivation that the robotic 

folks have is the same motivation that we do. If you look at the Mars team at 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, they had that same drive and motivation that 

we do on the human spaceflight side. We get characterized as either it needs 

to be robotic or it needs to be human. I don’t think that’s right. It’s really the 

combination of both makes a much stronger team. 

We’re starting to see some of that in the new Exploration Vision. There 

will be some lunar lander potentially here. There’s going to be some mapping 

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experiments done on the Moon. Those will provide information that is needed 

for the human, and then the human can come and expand on those findings. 

We’re learning that a little bit on Space Station as we have new Special-Purpose 

Dexterous Manipulators, the two-armed robot from Canada that will allow us 

to do tasks that we could only do EVA [extravehicular activity], now we’ll be 

able to do robotically. At first the crews and the flight controllers may not want 

to accept that new robotic device, they’ll want to continue to do it the way 

we’ve done it before, but then they’ll learn how advantageous that can be to 

them and how it can actually augment and help them do their job. 

You see the same thing in some of the undersea repair activities. They have 

little remotely operated vehicles, and at first the divers didn’t really want those 

things around. Then when they figured out the vehicles could actually help 

them by providing tools, being a camera platform and a light platform, and 

it actually made their job easier, they started accepting those robotic vehicles 

next to them. We’ll see the same thing in space. You’ll start seeing a natural 

blending between robotic and human. There’s a place for both, and there’s a 

place where they can both cooperate together, and the real strength is when 

we work together.

How will aeronautics be utilized in the next years within NASA?

Aeronautics has a pretty strong future. We didn’t use the Shuttle quite as 

much as we should have throughout its history. We declared it an operational 

vehicle, and we didn’t continue to use it for research. Recently on the Shuttle, 

we’ve had some problems where we had some gap-fillers, the little pieces of 

material that sit between the tiles that keep them from chattering together. 

Those have popped out, and when they come out, the flow of air over the 

bottom of the Shuttle gets interrupted by that little piece of felt or plastic that’s 

sticking out. Then the flow behind that becomes turbulent, and when the 

flow becomes turbulent the heat transfer increases, and it can actually melt or 

damage the tile. 

But we don’t really know exactly at hypersonic speeds like Mach 25 when 

that transition occurs or how it occurs, because there’s not very much air when 

we’re flying Mach 25. Throughout the Shuttle’s career probably we should have 

done some more tests of aerodynamic capability. We looked at things such as 

how the Shuttle flies. We did detailed test objectives where we looked at the 

stability in terms of roll maneuvers and pitch maneuvers and how the Shuttle 

flies, but we didn’t look at the fundamental aeronautics things that we could 

have done on the Shuttle. We should have figured out some way include some 

of those. We’re going to try on these last Shuttle flights to actually do some of 

this. We’re going to try to put a known trip indicator in and then some instrumentation behind. The problem is the instrumentation isn’t quite as good as the 

aeronautics guys want. But I think it’ll still give us some good information. 

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We’re going to also try to take the new tile material that’s going to fly on 

the Ares vehicle, the Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator tile, we’re going to 

replace a Shuttle tile with a tile of the new Ares design to see how it performs. 

So we’re going to use the Shuttle over these remaining number of flights to 

try to do a couple of these things, but it’s a shame that throughout the Shuttle 

history we didn’t have a chance to do more of that, because there’s a natural 

tie between the Aeronautics Directorate and what we do. 

We need their aerodynamic code, their software to analyze things on the 

Shuttle or spaceflight. They need us to essentially provide some experimental 

data back for them to improve the codes and understandings. Things have 

changed a lot from when the Shuttle was first designed. We had the recent 

failure where we had a piece of foam hit the bottom of the Shuttle and it dinged 

out or removed a piece of the tile. We were able to use aerodynamic code 

to really analyze that cavity and how hot it would get. When we did the first 

Shuttle designs, we couldn’t do it with near the fidelity that we’re able to now. 

Technology has gotten better. We need to apply that technology to the 

Shuttle and then take some of that data from the Shuttle experience and feed 

that back into the technology, and then both of those move in parallel, they 

leapfrog each other, and we continue to improve both in the basic technology 

as well as in the applied technology.

Why would you encourage someone to join NASA as a career for the future?

Look at all the amazing and wonderful things I’ve had a chance to go 

do. As a new student out of college, I was at Lewis Research Center with the 

researchers that wrote my aerodynamics books. To sit with them in the same 

office and then have them teach me how the code works and how the analysis 

works, it was phenomenal. At that time we hadn’t hired many folks within 

NASA for a while, so I was one of the first new employees in several years. So 

they adopted me as their son. Then they gave me all kinds of experiences in 

the wind tunnel. I got to do tremendous things in terms of testing and analysis 

and building hardware and running computer codes, and what a tremendous 

breadth of experience I got in that field. 

Then I got to come to Houston and be in a flight control team to do the 

procedures for the Shuttle. I participated in satellite retrieval, satellite repair, 

I’ve done refueling demonstrations, I worked hand-in-hand with the crews in 

the simulators, I’ve taught astronauts how to fly ascents and entries. This is 

stuff that people dream about. I got to do all that. 

I got to go back to school, which was tremendously important, because 

again I had this engineering problem that I have to stay technically sharp. I was 

able to go do that; NASA allowed me to go do that. They told me it wasn’t such a 

good thing to do, but they still let me go do it, because not many folks had done 

that. But that was a great thing to go do. Then to get a chance to go to Russia, 

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experience that aspect, it’s just been amazing. So as a new person coming in, to 

know that that opportunity is there within this Agency is just great.

Then if you look at our future and you look at where we’re going to go, if 

you want to be part of getting out of the planet, I would say in my career we 

used to go to space, but we never really stayed in space and we never really 

worked in space. I would say now that we’ve had a permanent crew presence on 

board Space Station for almost eight years, we have now made that bridge where 

we can now work in space. We’ve assembled this phenomenal Space Station. It’s 

amazing to see all this hardware from around the world come together. 

So, to have a chance to work in the next phase that will be to go beyond 

low-Earth orbit, and that will be to start moving out to the Moon and then out 

to Mars—what a great, great, great opportunity that is for somebody new to 

coming in. Then even on the science side or in the robotic side, it’s the same 

thing, to be able to be working on a probe that’s going to Pluto or is going 

to fly to an asteroid, those things are once-in-a-lifetime kind of things that 

you can work on, it’s stuff that other folks dream about. That is the beauty of 

working for NASA.

The Shuttle transition to exploration provides us with a tremendous 

opportunity. It’s a chance for us to reinvent and revitalize NASA a little bit. 

We are a government agency and we are a bureaucracy, and especially in my 

Washington world I see us as an aging bureaucracy. Therefore, we’ve gotten 

maybe more sluggish and not quite as nimble as we were back in the Apollo 

days. But this new move from Shuttle and then, eventually, as Station retires 

in 2020 or some later date, we’ll get a chance to reinvent NASA a little bit, to 

reinvigorate us a little bit, to do some things like we used to in the older days. 

This is a very unique opportunity within NASA at this time of change. 

Change is scary and change is tough, but it’s going to allow us to not only 

transition but also, in a sense, allow us to reinvent ourselves and essentially 

reengage us or get us motivated again to do those things that are hard, as we 

were challenged in the beginning. We don’t do this work because it’s easy; we 

do it because it’s hard. 

The Vision and this transition here at 50 years has given us a chance to 

essentially move forward and essentially experience maybe a new birth, not 

a midlife crisis for the Agency—a chance to really reinvent ourselves and get 

ready for the next 50 years. 

The next 50 years provide the Agency with challenges even greater than 

the first 50 years.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 9

Scott J. Horowitz

Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems

Starting in September 2005, Scott “Doc” Horowitz took the lead in the development of spacecraft 

that in the future would send astronauts to the Moon, to Mars, and to other destinations in the solar 

system. When he agreed to become NASA’s Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems, he found 

himself in a management role far from that of his first days with NASA, which began in 1992 as a pilot 

with the Astronaut Corps. He served on four Shuttle missions and was commander on his last flight. 

 When not preparing for a mission, Horowitz worked with a number of NASA programs including 

one called Advance Programs. With his background in aerospace engineering, rocket and aircraft 

design, and flight experience, Horowitz provided a unique perspective to the groups preparing and 

reviewing concepts on how to travel to Mars. 

 Horowitz resigned from his position in the summer of 2007, but prior to his departure he shared 

his experiences on being a leader of the program central to achieving the goals of the Vision for 

Space Exploration. The following interview was conducted on 20 March 2007 at his office at NASA 

Headquarters in Washington, DC. 

When NASA received the Vision for Space Exploration, I and a couple of 

other people were working ideas on the concept of operations for the Orbital 

Space Plane. This was after the Columbia accident [STS-107], and we had a 

few ideas on how to make the next generation of spacecraft safer to do the 

mission we needed. The concept that we came up with was one that we called 

safe, simple, and soon. In order to be safer, you need a simpler vehicle, and 

the country probably needed it sooner than later.

This was a small group of people including astronauts John Grunsfeld, 

Marsha Ivins, and myself, and our discussion included a lot of very deep soul 

searching after the Columbia accident as to how did NASA end up where 

we are today. The real basic realization is we had built a very, very complex 

vehicle (the Space Shuttle) that no matter how hard we worked on it, chances 

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of making it or not making it on a mission was on the order of about one in a 

hundred, and that was as good as it was going to get.

We realized there was a need for somebody to pursue a safe, simple, sooner 

approach to getting people to and from low-Earth orbit. Looking at this concept, 

I actually came up with an idea for a vehicle that would meet the performance 

requirements of going to the Moon and came up with a concept that utilized 

a solid rocket booster first stage and an upper-stage-LOX [liquid oxygen]-

hydrogen engine, which was eventually to become the Ares I launch vehicle. 

I couldn’t sell that concept inside of NASA. In fact, I even submitted information to the JSC [Johnson Space Center] Legal Office for a patent on that idea; 

they saw no useful application for the idea, and I have that letter today. Pretty 

much out of frustration, I finally decided to leave NASA at the end of 2004 to 

pursue other opportunities and ended up, through a whole series of events, 

eventually working for ATK Thiokol in Utah. They were interested in helping 

me develop the idea of the concept further, which I did. 

Eventually, Mike Griffin took over NASA and the Agency conducted the 

ESAS [Exploration Systems Architecture Study]. ESAS concluded that the right 

answer was a vehicle similar to the one I had sketched, with a heavy launch 

vehicle. Several of us had come to the same conclusion that you needed a 

heavy launch vehicle.

Then I was contacted if I’d be interested in applying for the job as ESMD 

[Exploration Systems Mission Directorate] Associate Administrator. I applied 

and was offered the job to come to Headquarters and basically gave up living 

in a ski resort, making a lot of money, working real hours, to come to work 

in Washington, DC, which is the 64-square-mile logic-free zone, and work 

ridiculous hours at half the pay. But I was happy to do so, because it’s in the 

pursuit of a worthy goal. 

How has NASA changed during the years since you began?

When I showed up at NASA in 1992, there was very little change. It was 

what I called a fully matured bureaucracy. NASA had been around a long time, 

and we got set in our ways. A lot of processes and a lot of thinking processes 

were kind of set in the way we had done business, which is a problem. When 

you’re doing something new, you don’t know everything, and it’s exciting and 

people are learning and developing, and the process is all changing.

The Shuttle was designed in the ’70s, we started flying in 1981, and it has 

been almost 30 years since we developed a new launch vehicle. We had gotten completely away from how to develop a human-rated spacecraft. If you go 

around NASA, it’s really tough to find people who think in the development 

mind frame. The people that developed Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo had 

developed the X-planes that were the first ones to go supersonic; there had 

been dozens and dozens of projects they cut their teeth on. 

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What’s happened in the last couple of years since Mike Griffin has come 

on board is to change the culture to start thinking like a group that’s going 

to design a new spacecraft. There’s been a huge amount of change in just 

the last couple of years. We have an Administrator who understands how a 

rocket works. We have an Administrator who is technically competent, and we 

have a vision, which is something NASA was lacking. For a long time NASA 

really was missing a high-level objective. The Shuttles are amazing vehicles; the 

International Space Station’s an incredible project. We’ve done amazing things 

in space, but there was no high-level, from-the-top goal for NASA to really 

sink its teeth into. It was more of, do this project, do that program, business 

as usual.

With the advent of the Vision for Space Exploration, and then with someone 

who understands the technical realities of what it takes to do a program and 

understands the type of organization that it needs to carry out that kind of a 

vision, there’s been a lot of change in the last couple of years. Before that, I saw 

a long period of very little change. In fact, there was more of digging in, same 

old, same old. Then, a couple of events in the last five years (the Vision for 

Space Exploration and Mike Griffin coming on board and changing the basic 

governance models of how we do business) have really started to turn the boat 

around, if you will, to get us vectored in the right direction to accomplish this. 

That’s not to say that it’s all perfect. We still have a long way to go. But it’s the 

most change I’ve seen at NASA in my career.

How do you take your scope of current responsibilities and move it into 

a strategic plan to fulfill the Vision with your leadership?

It’s kind of interesting being in this office at NASA Headquarters. I’m kind 

of a technical guy, just like my boss. I love technical design but also understand that there’s a need to explain what we’re doing to all of our stakeholders. One of the reasons we’re sitting in an office in Washington, DC, is that 

we have the Congress and the White House, and we keep them all informed 

as to what it is we’re doing and why we’re doing what we’re doing. And we 

are working really hard to improve our credibility. NASA has a problem with 

its credibility; it’s very low. A lot of people see a lot of programs and projects 

that we have started and not finished, a lot of budgets that have been overrun by huge margins, and a lot of it was due to people promising things that 

couldn’t be delivered.

My job is to make sure we don’t promise things we can’t deliver. I want to 

make sure I provide what I call the top cover for my program and project managers who focus on doing the real work. The way for a program, especially a 

program of this size and complexity, to succeed is it needs stable requirements. 

They need to make realistic assumptions on what technology they’re going 

to have, and not base things on “unobtanium” as we like to call it. A stable 

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environment means a stable budget to allow them to operate their programs 

in a manner that lets them produce the results that we want.

My leadership, if you will, is to help provide that environment—not allow 

high-level changes to the requirements, not allow them to base programs and 

projects on unobtanium technology, and to do everything I can to get them 

a stable budget environment. If things change in that environment, I make 

sure that the people who are paying the bills understand the consequences of 

changes to the budget, and not promise that I can deliver when those changes 

occur. If you change the amount of money available to do something, you 

either have to change the content or the time. Something has to change. You 

can’t keep promising, “Oh yeah, I’ll take a 25 percent cut and we’ll make it 

happen, thank you very much.” That’s not realistic. Part of my leadership is 

really just to provide a good environment for the people who do the real work 

to get the job done. 

How do you explain your development plan for the future? 

We’ve been to the Moon. We have the technology to go to the Moon. Now, 

are we going to use the same exact bolts and nuts and screws and computers? 

No, we’re not. We’re going to take advantage of the existing technology where 

it makes sense. The design of this new launch vehicle, the first stage of it is the 

solid rocket booster. We’re going to add another segment to it, but it’s basically 

the same technology as before. In fact, there was a larger version of it in 2003, 

so changes to that version are pretty minimal. This is a good, cost-effective 

solution, because this is a very safe, reliable solution for the first stage. We’re 

bringing back the J-2X engine that flew on Apollo. 

People say, “Well, we’ve been there, done that.” One of the ways I explain 

things is, it’s like looking at airplanes. At the airport, people fly aboard a 737, 

probably a 737-800. Well, the very first 737 flew back in 1967. If these two 

airplanes were parked on the ramp, unless you’re an aerospace engineer or an 

airplane buff, you probably couldn’t tell the difference except one’s got little 

funny things pointed up on the wingtips. Or, you might notice that the engine 

looks bigger in diameter on the new one versus the old one. Other than that 

you wouldn’t know the difference, but they are significantly different aircraft. 

They’re about the same shape, about the same size, they do the same thing, 

move people from point A to point B, but the new one does it much safer, 

much more fuel efficiently, and has much more technology embedded in the 

aircraft. That’s kind of what we’re doing here—the rocket is tall and skinny 

with multiple stages and a capsule on the top; that’s what physics drives you to. 

The physics hasn’t changed. We’re not doing anything earth-shattering. What 

we’re doing is we’re trying to do good engineering, good systems engineering, 

and so this is a big program. It’s a big project, but we’re not violating any of 

the laws of physics, and that’s why we have a high potential of success.

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Share your vision of where NASA will be in the next 50 years.

When you look at the Vision for Space Exploration, it talks about Moon, 

Mars, and beyond. It’s very clear about that. However, the Moon is not the goal. 

The Moon is a step along the way to further human exploration of the solar 

system, and eventually beyond. 

Some people ask, will we ever go to Mars? Absolutely. We’re going to Mars. 

It’s not a matter of if; it’s a matter of when. Looking at our current budget and 

looking at what we’ve accomplished, there’s no reason to suspect why in the 

next 50 years we wouldn’t be at Mars. In fact, given current spending rates, 

if we do it right, one could forecast that we might be at Mars in the 2030–35 

timeframe, if we don’t go off on a weird track somewhere and try to do 

something strange.

What you’ll see happen is in the next few years is that we’ll develop the 

Ares I and the Orion spaceship. We’ll start flying it to the International Space 

Station, and then we’ll prepare to go on to the Moon. We’ll build the Ares V, 

and the Ares V will really change the ability of the United States by allowing 

us to send a heavy-lift vehicle, which can put on the order of 260,000 pounds 

in low-Earth orbit. This is actually more than the Saturn V could do. We gave 

up a fundamental capability, the United States, when we stopped flying the 

Saturn V back in the ’70s. We lost 20 years.

So barring making another mistake like that, we will have the basic 

capability required to go anywhere, because we’ll be able to put up large 

objects required to go on to Mars and beyond, and beyond will depend on 

what technology we have to launch on this heavy-lift vehicle. You still have to 

do the first 50 miles. As was once told to me, the first 50 and the last 50 miles 

are the hardest.

What I see happening is by 2020, you’ll see us returning to the Moon, 

but it’s not going to be just to get there and that’s the goal. We will actually 

go with a capability we’re designing today that’s much more capable than 

the Apollo folks enjoyed. We’ll be able to send four astronauts down to the 

surface, and we’ll have a vehicle that can deliver large amounts of payload to 

the surface to be able to put some infrastructure in place. We won’t just go 

to the equator. We’ll probably start out at the poles, and we’re going to build 

an outpost. 

We’re also going to provide an opportunity for other countries to 

participate, that’s part of the whole strategy, and the commercial world will 

hopefully be providing us low-Earth orbit capability. Then eventually, the 

commercial world will find a reason to sell services to the Moon, so it will 

continue to follow as NASA explores. We will be hopefully opening the 

frontier for the commercial world to follow as they see markets, because if 

we can buy services from them more cost effectively, then we can concentrate 

on the next-harder thing.

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After we spend some time in the outpost and learn all the lessons we need 

to go on to Mars, then we’ll start seriously contemplating putting together a 

Mars mission. We have to solve some problems, like how do you deal with the 

long exposure of radiation to astronauts, because Mars missions are measured 

in many months and a couple of years, versus just a couple of days or months 

on the Space Station.

I fully expect that you’ll see us starting to go to Mars, particularly in the 

2030 to 2035 timeframe, and 50 years from now, you’ll see an established Mars 

outpost and us going to other interesting places in the solar system.

What do you believe is NASA’s most important role for the nation; how 

will it impact society and future generations?

We can look back in history and see what the Apollo program did. People 

try to put a dollar value on it. How do you measure the value of the motivation 

of a generation? One of the reasons that I’m sitting here today is I was 

motivated by watching NASA do great things. Everyone comes up with these, 

“Oh, we need a cute theme,” or “We need a cute poster,” or “We need some kind 

of a crazy saying to motivate people.” 

And my response is, “No. You just need to do great things. If you do 

great things, you will motivate people because they’re excited.” Putting an 

outpost on the Moon is exciting, and you don’t have to become an astronaut. 

There were thousands of people that went into the math and sciences and 

engineering disciplines during the Apollo program. At the end of that program, 

we saw that drop off in this country. 

The United States is losing its technological edge, and, in fact, in some 

segments people would claim we’ve lost it. Maybe one of the greatest things, 

greatest gifts that this nation can get out of its space program is the fact that 

we will inspire the next generation to do something that’s even grander than 

what we’re doing today or doing tomorrow or in the next few years.

One of my biggest fears growing up came as I watched the end of the 

Apollo program and people were talking about what they were going to do 

next. I truly believed that at the rate I watched NASA go, that by the time I was 

old enough to go to work for NASA that all the cool stuff would have been 

over, and we would have been on Mars and that would have been done. Little 

would I have guessed. 

If you had looked at the rate at where we were headed, there was nothing 

to say we shouldn’t have been on the Moon and off to Mars with a Space 

Station flying and everything by the ’80s. Those were the original projections, 

and I believed it as a kid. But there were some changes in policy and major 

decisions made that changed that course of history. So, I think by picking 

grand goals and doing exciting things, then we’ll motivate the next generation. 

That may be the biggest benefit of doing something like this.

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What is the importance of robotic spaceflight as you set the foundation 

for the next 50 years?

There’s always been this big feud, if you will, between the robotics and the 

human spaceflight capacity, and it’s just a silly feud to have. There are great 

things for robotic spacecraft to do, and there are great things for humans to do. 

For example, I could send a robot out today into a field to go look for fossils, 

and the chances of that robot finding a fossil are slim to none. It could spend 

days and days running around looking for fossils, and probably couldn’t figure 

them out. I could just take somebody who knows what to look for to find a 

fossil, either a trained geologist or just anybody who’s trained in a little bit of 

basic geology, and they could go out and find a bunch of fossils in an area 

that had them.

There are tasks that require the human mind to make decisions. There 

are dangerous things you’d rather send a robot to do. There are places where 

we can’t protect the crew and it’s better to send a robot to. There are robots 

working with people, and there’s a whole field of study going on there. 

Let’s fast forward 10 years. I fully expect on the Moon base that an astronaut is not going to jump in a suit and run outdoors every day to go do the 

million things that need to be done. There may be some robots, and a control 

panel there in the lunar outpost. A robot can be sent off to go look at some 

prospective, interesting areas, and do some surveying and all that. Then, a 

human can get in a suit and the rover, and go out to that area and do some 

detailed work with a robot helper. We’ll see the collaboration between humans 

and robots changing all the time, and people need to realize there are roles for 

both, but there are huge advantages to having a human in situ.

Before NASA there was NACA [National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics] with the primary focus on aeronautics. How will NASA be 

involved with aeronautics in the future?

NASA has four major Directorates. We have aeronautics and we have science, 

we have exploration and we have operations. I see NASA going forward with 

a balanced portfolio, and aeronautics has been kind of in the background for 

a few years and is starting to come around on its own again. There’s a lot of 

very important work that aeronautics needs to do to support both science and 

exploration. I’ll give an example. When we come back from the Moon, we’ll be 

going really fast. When we hit the atmosphere, we’ll have to design the spacecraft 

to have a heat shield that’ll be able to maneuver in the atmosphere and reenter. 

That requires the knowledge of how a vehicle reacts when it hits the atmosphere 

at a very high speed. It’s an aero-thermodynamics problem. Well, that expertise 

resides in aeronautics, so we need smart people in aeronautics to advance that 

state of the art in their ability to analyze that problem; they really haven’t done so 

in a lot of years. So there’s some basic aero work we need done now. 

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We’re going to send a Mars surface lab to Mars; it also has an atmosphere. 

We’re going to send people to Mars, and we’re going to need a large vehicle 

with a fairly good-size heat shield. Currently, the Exploration Systems Mission 

Directorate, the Aeronautics Research [Mission] Directorate, and the Science 

Mission Directorate are working together to instrument the heat shield for the 

Mars surface lab, to get data for all three directorates, and the aero people will 

be using that data to update their models and prediction capabilities so we can 

use them for future vehicles that we design for Mars.

We’re also looking in the field of hypersonics, which is a field that I’ve 

always been fairly interested in. It’s a very exciting field, and not a lot of work 

has been done in that field. In my estimation we could do a lot more. We’re 

working in aeronautics to help the Federal Aviation Administration by providing expertise in how to analyze systems that will affect the airplanes that fly 

in the future airspace. People are always going to want planes that are more 

efficient, that are quieter and safer, and that’s going to require the experts in 

the aeronautics that we used to think about in the old NACA. People forget 

that NASA is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the first A is 

for Aeronautics. There are great things for aeronautics to do.

What are some of the lessons that you’ve learned that apply in your position?

One of the basic lessons I’ve learned is communications is a problem, 

especially in large organizations. Most of the issues I deal with day to day can 

trace their roots to a breakdown in communications. It’s the old, “What we have 

here is a basic failure to communicate” line. It’s really tough in large organizations. 

Although we’ve had the advent of BlackBerrys and the Internet and all 

that, I’m not sure that’s helped. In fact, in some ways I think that has made it 

worse. People have gotten sloppy in their communications. One of our project 

managers came up with a great suggestion at our last quarterly. He’s instituted 

a rule for when you find yourself in the midst of an e-mail flail, as I call them, 

where suddenly you have 40 messages (and I’m not exaggerating) on a topic, 

and people are talking past each other and it’s getting out of control. He says 

at any point, someone can throw the e-mail flag and everyone has to stop 

sending notes and pick up the phone or call a meeting and talk face to face. 

What I’ve learned from being at different levels of the organization is that 

keeping people informed of what’s going on is really important. I’m not always 

successful at it, but I try to work hard at making sure information is going both 

ways, up and out to our stakeholders—they don’t like to be surprised, I don’t 

like to be surprised—and down and in to the people doing the work so they’re 

not surprised. What you usually find most people are upset about is they’ve 

been surprised, one way or another. Someone found out you were looking at 

something and they had no idea that you were concerned about this, so they’re 

surprised. So communications is one big lesson.

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Also, I’ve learned that this Agency needs people in leadership positions 

that have the technical background to understand what it is they’re leading. I 

don’t care what anybody says, you can’t just go to some school and learn how 

to be a manager and expect to be able to manage anything as complex as the 

space program. It just doesn’t work. And while I have a lot of lessons to learn 

in management, at least I understand what it is we’re trying to build. I don’t 

know everything about what we’re trying to build, but at least I know which 

end of the pointy rocket goes forward, and that F equals MA [force equals mass 

multiplied by acceleration]. 

You need that. You really do, or you’re not credible to your stakeholders, 

you’re not credible to people you work for, and you can’t decipher the reams 

of information that are being thrown at you, that mostly have a technical basis 

on which you’re going to make a decision. So I think technical competence in 

leadership positions is what this Agency needs, more than probably any other 

agency I know of, because of our particular mission, which is rocket science. 

It really is rocket science.

So those two things from management, the communications and technical 

competence in leadership, are really important.

What is your perception of NASA’s culture, and where would you like for 

it to be?

Everybody talks about culture. When talking about culture during 

Columbia, there wasn’t a good flow of information from the right people to 

the people who had to make the decisions. You can have people with good 

technical backgrounds in good decision-making roles, but if they aren’t presented with the right information at the right time, they can’t make the right 

decisions. I’ve seen that a lot.

NASA’s new governance model is actually very interesting. We have the 

programmatic chain of command, if you will, and we have the technical chain 

of command. It used to be Mission Directorates (which were then called codes) 

owned the Centers. There were Centers that worked for Code M, and there 

were Centers that worked for Code S, and there were Centers that worked for 

pick-your-code. That’s not the way NASA is organized anymore.

With the new governance model, we have Mission Directorates, and the 

Mission Directorates have programs. Like Exploration Systems is a Mission 

Directorate and we have programs like Constellation. I have a program manager, 

and that program manager’s job is to execute the program, and he is given 

budget and requirements and told, “This is what we need you to go do.” Now, 

they get technical help and technical expertise from the Centers, so the Center 

Directors own the bulk of the talent to actually do the job. And so the Center 

Directors don’t work for Mission Directorates anymore. In fact, they’re on the 

same level in the Agency. That’s the board of directors and includes the people 

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responsible for the programs and the people responsible for the technical work, 

which makes sense. I’ll give you an example of a situation that might arise. 

The program gets told by the Mission Directorate, “Program manager, I 

want to launch this rocket tomorrow.” And he goes, “Yes, sir, going to launch 

that rocket tomorrow.” Now one of his technical guys working for him goes, 

“Well, that’s the dumbest thing I ever heard. We’re not ready to launch that 

rocket for—,” pick a technical reason. So he goes to the program manager and 

says, “You’re full of baloney, don’t want to launch this rocket tomorrow.” And 

he goes, “You don’t understand. Senator fill-in-the-blank has told the ESMD guy, 

‘You’re going to launch this rocket.’ And he’s told his program manager, me, to 

tell you to go launch this rocket.” He goes, “Well, I disagree, so I’m going to go 

tell my management.” 

So now, in one or two phone calls, the Center Director is calling me and 

saying, “That’s a dumb technical solution.” And I say, “You don’t understand 

the program pressure I’m under.” And he says, “You don’t understand that’s a 

bad technical solution.” So within two or three phone calls, we are now meeting face to face to look at the programmatics versus the technical. If we can’t 

resolve the problem, it goes to the NASA Associate Administrator and the NASA 

Administrator. In less than half a dozen levels of communication, you’ve gone 

from almost any level in the organization to the top to resolve a serious issue. 

We always want to resolve the problems at the lowest level, but we need a way 

to elevate to upper management if required.

But if it cannot be resolved, people know there’s a path all the way to 

the top, where the NASA Administrator can make the final call, and that is a 

huge, huge difference. This is a huge benefit of the way we’re organized now, 

which is completely different than the way the organization worked before. 

Now, it doesn’t work perfectly, and we’re trying to instill in people that there 

is this chain of command. We are expected to be technically competent, we are 

expected to bring up issues, and so the challenge is teaching everybody their 

responsibility and how to use that responsibility correctly.

So that’s the big challenge now that we’ve given them the framework. It’s 

now getting everyone to learn how to use the framework. So, the cultural issue 

now is training people how to work in this environment. We want them to be 

the experts in their field, and we want them to speak up when they need to 

speak up.

If someone asked you, “Why would I want to work at NASA?” how would 

you respond?

For anybody who’s thinking of getting in this business, this is a good time 

to think about it. The next couple of years will be a little tough, because we’re 

in this transition, but we’re ready to open a whole new frontier. I truly believe 

in a few years that you’re going to see excitement like I was able to enjoy as a 

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kid growing up in the Apollo program. It’s going to only get more and more 

exciting as we start making progress towards the new Vision. 

The next few years will be the hardest. This will be a difficult time, because 

we’re transitioning out of 20-plus years of operating Space Shuttles into a 

new system. But once we get through that transition point, you know, it’s 

like, watch our dust. It’s going to be something, because we’re going to be 

developing a launch vehicle, the Ares I. We’re going to be developing the 

Orion spaceship, and then we’re going to be developing the Ares V Heavy 

Lift. Then, we’re going to be doing lunar landers, and we’re going to be doing 

outpost design, then we’ll be doing missions to Mars. The future is very bright, 

and we can do all that on the budgets that we have today.

What do you find to be the most challenging aspect of these next years?

The biggest challenge for us is to make sure that we can prove that we 

have credibility with our stakeholders. We have to deliver. We have to say what 

we’re going to do, and then we have to do what we say. If we do that, then the 

future will get a lot easier. 

But again I come back to the fact that NASA has a credibility problem. 

We haven’t delivered a lot of programs on cost and on schedule, and we’ve 

promised a lot of things because we thought it was in our best interest to 

promise things that we could never deliver. We have to stop doing that, and we 

have to be able to lay out a program like we have in the exploration program 

that is achievable, doesn’t require miracles, doesn’t use hope as a management 

tool, and gets back to our basic tenets of technical credibility and excellence, 

and deliver on the Vision for Space Exploration. That’s our biggest challenge.

I truly, truly think the next 50 years will be really exciting. We just have 

to provide stability and execute on the programs that we have, and the best 

way to show the naysayers that they are wrong is to prove it—getting launch 

vehicles on the pad, getting new spacecraft flying, executing the missions in a 

timely manner, and being honest.

What’s been lacking is real technical credibility and program credibility, 

because NASA either hasn’t been honest with itself or with all of its 

stakeholders. It’ll take time, but as we move forward it can only get more 

exciting as we execute these things. 

It’ll be tough. This is not easy stuff. It is rocket science, and technically 

that may be the least of our challenges. Dealing with the politics and trying to 

keep everybody interested and excited about the future, that’s probably our 

largest challenge.

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Chapter 10

S. Alan Stern

Associate Administrator for Science

Trained in physics and astronomy, Alan Stern earned a master’s degree in aerospace engineering 

and worked in the aerospace industry during the early 1980s on small scientific payloads. He found 

himself gravitating more and more towards science and became a project scientist and ultimately 

an instrument Principal Investigator (PI). After receiving his Ph.D. in astrophysics, Stern went into a 

full-time research career, built up a research group ultimately of about 70 people, and became a PI 

on a host of instruments and two NASA missions. 

 In April 2007, Stern was appointed as Associate Administrator (AA) for the Science Mission 

Directorate (SMD). He discussed the role and its responsibilities during an interview conducted on 

15 April 2008, shortly after he had resigned from his position. He began talking about the two NASA 

missions where he was the PI prior to joining the staff at Headquarters in Washington, DC.

One is called New Horizons. That’s the first mission in the New Frontiers 

series, and it is the initial reconnaissance of Pluto and the Kuiper Belt. The other 

is called The Great Escape (TGE). This is a Mars upper-atmosphere mission for 

which I was PI until I came to NASA. I handed that job off but kept New Horizons.

Before you came to NASA, what problems and challenges did you have 

as a PI for NASA?

Well, many of the usual ones. Cost, schedule, technical details. I would say 

those are the primary.

Explain the scope of the responsibilities as the AA for the Science Mission 

Directorate.

I was responsible for the conduct of the program, and the management of 

those programs, the strategic direction in terms of program content, and all the 

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things that go with being a boss in terms of personnel, floor space, day-to-day 

operations, through my leadership staff.

What was the approximate total budget that you had in your portfolio? 

The direct budget is $4.44 billion this year. You’ve seen the SMD from the 

outside and the inside over a period of years. Can you summarize how 

it’s changed over time? How have things evolved during the time you’ve 

been working with NASA?

I’ve probably been aware of the organization in a concrete way for about 

25 years now. But of course as one goes through their career, you gain a more 

and more mature understanding of what’s going on, and so it’s hard to really 

compare my impressions of the 1980s to today. I would say I had a much 

firmer grasp, a firmer understanding by the 1990s when I was on advisory 

committees and really interacting in a serious leadership way on missions and 

instruments and grants. 

I would characterize the changes in SMD as vast in that period of time. The 

scope of its programs is much broader. The flight program is much broader 

in content and depth. The business practices of SMD have improved dramatically. There were points in the late ’80s and early-mid-’90s when many of the 

processes were almost dysfunctional.

What do you mean when you say “business practices”?

SMD’s interface to the external community, in terms of how it executes its 

programs, both the research grants and also the flight programs.

How have those changed?

The software systems are much better. The quality of the personnel is generally better. The cycle times to get things done are now much quicker, much 

more responsive. The checks and balances that go with spaceflight are more 

formal. Really codified in place. The rate of success of SMD missions is a pretty 

good empirical measure of the fact that things are working pretty well. If you 

were to compare that to the much lower flight rates but more significant rates 

of mission failures or significant problems that occurred in the late ’90s, for 

example, I think you’d confirm that empirically.

What was your strategic vision when you came in as the AA? How did you 

want to shape your Directorate?

I had a number of big-ticket things that I wanted to accomplish. One was 

to reinvigorate the flight program. Secondly, I wanted to restructure both the 

processes and the content of the research and analysis [R&A] program, and to 

better connect the research and analysis program to its true motivation. 

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I also had specific goals to enhance our international collaboration portfolio; to make SMD a critical part of the success of the Agency with regard to 

the Vision for Space Exploration, now called the U.S. Space Exploration Policy; 

and to build better ties throughout Headquarters between the Directorate and 

the other organizations in Headquarters. 

I also set a goal of opening up human-tended suborbital science 

using the new generation of manned suborbital spacecraft that are being 

privately developed.

How does research and analysis fit in the scheme of what SMD does?

SMD supports about 3,000 research and analysis grants at any time, and 

this is really the bread and butter of how we make discoveries in SMD. That is, 

we pay for human capital, sweat equity if you will, for people to convert the 

ones and zeros that come out of spacecraft into discoveries. 

There’s an old saying that mathematicians are machines that turn coffee 

into theorems. It’s something like that. The value of a space science mission 

in terms of achieving its level one objective is, in my opinion, precisely zero 

if all we do is build it, launch it, fly it, collect the data, reduce it, and put it in 

a databank. Those ones and zeros are meaningless until a human being interprets them. It’s the actual doing of the science, which must necessarily come 

last, that the R&A program is about, and also the preparatory work for future 

missions so that we use our resources properly by understanding where the 

most important questions are, what precisely we need to measure, and how 

we need to go about that.

Oftentimes, the R&A program has been portrayed as something that provides stability to the scientific community. Now that may be so, but that’s not 

the reason for the R&A program. The reason for the R&A program is to actually produce discoveries, so that the missions have scientific value and that we 

deliver to the taxpayer what we said we would do. If we said we were going 

to determine the Hubble constant to X percent, that doesn’t happen until the 

data’s been interpreted and the results published. 

Unfortunately, the social welfare aspect of the R&A program is one that 

gained prominence in Washington in the last 20 years, and it’s about equivalent 

to saying that the purpose of your automobile is to provide four seats and a 

roof over your head. Well, it does that, yes, no doubt, but that’s not the purpose 

of the vehicle. That’s a misunderstanding of the purpose of the vehicle. The 

vehicle is supposed to go from point A to point B, and it just happens to do 

that with people sitting down and a roof over their head in most cases. 

The R&A program’s purpose is to generate scientific discoveries that either 

guide us towards the proper content of new missions or that interpret the data 

from the missions that we’re flying.

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What part of the budget is R&A?

Approximately a quarter of SMD’s budget.

Talk about your goal to do more international collaboration. 

One of the precepts of my administration of SMD was the phrase that “we 

were going to get more from the budget that we have.” What that means is first 

recognition that the budget that we have is the budget that we have; it’s not 

expected to go up over time at any substantial pace. So in that zero-sum situation, the way to move the ball faster downfield per unit time is to gain efficiencies in the program by preventing overruns and discarding less useful activities. 

International collaboration is another example of that, whereby, by doing 

things with another partner who provides part of the resources, we essentially 

leverage our resources into flying missions at lower cost or accomplishing missions that we otherwise could not.

There are some who say that, for example, Cassini couldn’t be done today 

because of the more stringent rules associated with export control and 

ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations]. What are your thoughts? 

I certainly don’t know whether if you ran the experiment, you could do 

Cassini. I expect you could do almost any mission ultimately. But ITAR has 

put in place a framework that provides great inefficiencies for apparently little 

value from the parochial standpoint of the space program. Even from the 

standpoint of national security, oftentimes it’s difficult for those in the program 

to see how the onerous ITAR regime, when applied to something like an astronomical ultraviolet detector or a dust impact detector made to go to the outer 

solar system, etc., really boils down to something that’s protecting our national 

security instead of just costing us money and time.

How do you see SMD as fitting within the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration?

There are a number of threads to that. They’re all very important. Let me 

start by saying in recent years, since the Vision for Space Exploration was first 

announced in 2004, SMD had undergone some really rough times. The morale 

of its four constituencies—the Earth, astronomy, planetary, and space physics 

communities—really was quite low, because SMD had not performed particularly well in terms of advancing those scientific fields, starting new missions, 

carrying forth on commitments, etc. 

Because this poor performance was in parallel with the initial development of the Vision, many scientists connected those two dots, as did policymakers, and concluded that the Vision equals bad times for space science, i.e., 

that one comes at the cost of the other. So one aspect of making SMD help the 

Vision succeed is to break that equal sign, to show that through improvements 

in the R&A program and improvements in the flight program, we could in 

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fact have a vigorous and healthy space and Earth science program, a growing 

space science program in conjunction with the Vision for Space Exploration. 

Now that’s part one, break the equal sign.

Part two is that in order to create a pull for the Vision in the scientific 

community, of which there was very little 18 months ago, my analysis was that 

we needed to build a lunar science community. There used to be a vigorous 

lunar science community in the 1970s, and when the funding went away so 

did that community. NASA had been very successful in building a vigorous 

Mars science community in the 1990s by putting in place a program of funded 

missions and research and analysis budgets. I set it as my task to build such 

a program for the lunar sciences, because where there are new datasets with 

sophisticated state-of-the-art sensors and the funding to analyze the data, scientists will come to help make their careers by making discoveries.

So, the first step was to break the equal sign and to effectively neutralize 

opposition to the Vision within the scientific community. The second was to 

create a constituency in the scientific community that actually wanted to pull 

the Vision forward. We were successful at both of those. 

When humans return to the Moon and are able to do field science on 

another world for the first time in almost 50 years, we need to be in a position as the Science Mission Directorate to exploit the capabilities that will be 

there. So we initiated a program of seven flight missions, initiated the NASA 

Lunar Science Institute, and started a variety of different grant and technology development programs, which when wrapped together provided a pretty 

comprehensive, even though small, lunar program within SMD that comprised 

a few percent of our planetary budget, but which very highly leveraged that 

few percent of our budget into large gains for the Vision in terms of its support.

The idea of a Lunar Science Institute is an interesting one. How much did 

that follow in the footsteps of the Astrobiology Institute?

One hundred percent. The central node is located at Ames Research 

Center. Later this year, NASA will solicit and select its first wave of research 

nodes around the country. Their budgets and program management will 

be run out of that central node at Ames, just like the parallel case of the 

Astrobiology Institute.

How important do you think astrobiology is for NASA’s mission?

It’s very important for a number of reasons. First of all, probably the most 

fundamental question that the average human being wants to know about the 

universe is whether it’s inhabited, and particularly whether it’s inhabited with 

other intelligent civilizations. So the search for extraterrestrial life, which is the 

basis of astrobiology, is a very important connection between the people who 

pay for the space program and the space program itself, those who carry it out. 

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Furthermore, I don’t think it would be easy to list very many discoveries that would be more fundamental to our understanding of the universe in 

which we live than to discover extant examples or even extinct examples of life 

having arisen independently of planet Earth, and then to go from zero examples to one or more, and ultimately to put in a framework some understanding 

of the general conditions and propensity for life to evolve in the universe. As I 

say, I can’t think of very many other things that are equally profound in terms 

of scientific endeavor for a space agency.

Would you say the search for life is one of the main drivers of the Mars 

program?

It is, absolutely. If Mars didn’t have an astrobiological potential, if it were 

just another Venus, I don’t think that our emphasis on Mars would be nearly 

as intense.

What is your feeling about funding resources for the Earth sciences?

My feeling at the time I began to architect this program, before I came in, 

was that we needed to move out more quickly on the Earth Science Decadal 

Survey than NASA had been planning. As a part of the FY09 budget request, 

we put together an Earth science initiative that added about $600 million to 

the Earth science program over the five years of the budget and allowed a 

number of new starts to accelerate that program. In fact, I thought that was so 

important that when our request for new funds was denied, I argued for and 

succeeded in asking Office of Management and Budget to allow us to take 

those funds from the space sciences so that the Earth science program could 

accelerate regardless.

Does that mean you take the problem of global warming and climate 

change as something real? 

Absolutely. From all the data that I’ve seen, it’s incontrovertible that the 

global environment has been warming over the last century and a half at an 

accelerating pace.

How about robotic and human spaceflight? There’s been a controversy 

about human spaceflight taking away funding from space science. What 

are your feelings about robotic and humans in the context of human 

spaceflight?

It’s not a choice of either-or. Rather, it’s as if someone were to ask you 

whether, over the next year, you’d rather eat or breathe. It is clear you need 

to do both. 

Further, in the 21st century, we will see a great blurring of this human and 

robotic dichotomy. In the Apollo program, humans did exploration of other 

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bodies in the solar system, and I’m quite convinced that that will be the case 

again in this century, beginning with the Moon and probably extending next 

to asteroids, Mars, and then on to other bodies in the solar system. Moreover, 

in SMD in the last year, we put in place a human program for suborbital science to parallel our robotic suborbital science program that’s been there for 

50 years. 

So whether you use humans or robots, you’re just asking which kind of 

tool you’re using to advance the science. Both tools have their strengths and 

weaknesses. Unfortunately, in the space science program, with the exception 

of Spacelab missions and some small amount of use of the International Space 

Station, humans really have not been involved in the scientific enterprise on 

orbit or in space since Apollo. That’s changing, and it is changing across the 

globe, and it will be forever changed—for the better. I don’t think it’s likely to 

reverse itself again.

What would you consider the most challenging aspect of your time as an AA?

Cost control. Part of getting more out of the budget that we have is the 

desire to reduce the rate and the magnitude of cost overruns on projects, to 

make them rare instead of routine. In fact, analysis that I had done early in my 

tenure at SMD showed that, on average, SMD had been spending about $1.2 

billion out of its roughly $3 billion flight program on mission costs that had 

not been anticipated at the beginning or initiation of flight programs. Now 

sometimes these are the Agency’s fault, sometimes these are the contractor 

or Center’s fault, sometimes they’re everybody’s fault, and sometimes they’re 

nobody’s fault. I literally mean that last bit, too, because sometimes an act of 

God happens; it hails on a Space Shuttle. 

So one will never reduce the rate of cost increases to zero, and in fact 

we’re in a business where we build ones of things, not many, and sometimes 

twos of things, and at the edge of technology. I am not naive. I do not expect, 

did not expect, cost overruns to go away. But in many cases they are controllable. Part of it is a psychology that simply allows cost increases, that we’re 

always going to write the check in the end, because of the sunk cost argument. 

Getting control over that is probably the single most important thing that SMD 

could do to improve its future posture because the return on that change 

in behavior is so great monetarily that it dwarfs any realistic expectation of 

budget increases. So it’s essentially an issue of running the engine of SMD at 

higher efficiency so that you get more bang per buck.

What do you consider your biggest accomplishment during your time as AA?

I would put two things on equal footing. It’s very difficult, having just left 

the Agency, to really judge, because I have not yet really gained a properly 

distant perspective. But there are quite a number of things that we really 

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turned heads doing. The two which have had the biggest immediate impact 

are reinvigorating the research and analysis program and reinvigorating the 

flight program. We started 10 new missions in a year, 3 of which were already 

in play, 7 of which are new initiatives in the FY09 budget, including the new 

lunar program, outer planet flagship, dark energy mission, astrophysics, a program of Earth science missions for the Decadal Survey, solar probe, etc. That, 

coupled with the strong reinvigoration of the research and analysis program, 

I believe is the highlight.

Looking down the road a few years, what will be the most difficult 

challenges SMD will face?

The first would be cost control. My analysis is that it really is a cultural 

change that has to take place, and that kind of thing doesn’t happen in a year 

or even two years, but probably takes several years to set in place something 

meaningful. We have to break the psychology that NASA will simply tolerate 

cost increases on its programs as a matter of course.

What would you see as NASA’s most difficult challenges in the coming years?

There are two. One is cost control across the Agency. This may be even 

more important for the human spaceflight program than it is for SMD. Secondly, 

to become more relevant and responsive to American society. 

Generally, there is a perception that NASA is a nice thing to have and that 

it does good work, but that it’s not necessary. That perception in the public’s 

mind is incorrect, but that the case for that has not been well made. While 

the public perceives NASA as icing and not cake in terms of the success of 

American society, it is in fact cake, and that needs to be better illustrated to 

the American people so that we can be as successful in the 21st century as we 

were in the 20th century. The “we” in that is the American nation. 

What you think is NASA’s most important role for the nation?

I don’t think there’s a very good answer to that. There are three or four 

equally important things that NASA does, and I wouldn’t place any one above 

the other. Other people might choose to do that, but I think inspiration, both 

in terms of psychology of the nation and inspiration of young people to go 

into technological and scientific careers, is a fundamental benefit of NASA. So 

is the value we provide in terms of understanding our home planet and the 

ways that it’s changing, the ways that it behaves, everything from the weather 

to global change to land use and oceanography. 

The quest for scientific knowledge, to understand our place in the universe, 

the evolution of our home solar system, the universe itself, how it originated, 

the question of extraterrestrial life—I would place that on an equal footing 

with the other two benefits that I just spoke to. 

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Then there are the technological benefits that come from the space program. There I don’t mean the spinoffs that people typically talk about, like 

Teflon or sports bras or what have you. I’m talking about the meta-spinoffs that 

come from the space program, such as the miniaturization of electronics that 

came in the 1960s, the communications revolution that came about as a result 

of having geosynchronous satellites, the great change in the way that we plan 

our lives because we have weather satellites. 

And on and on down the list, in terms of the really big scope, big picture 

changes, in which I would include ecological awareness, which really was very 

much intertwined with the first views of the Earth as an actual planet in space 

against the hostile environment on its own. Those pictures of the Earth as a 

globe made primarily by Apollo spacecraft really heightened awareness. This 

is a major benefit of the space program.

Are there any lessons learned based on your experience at NASA, or 

based on what you know about its history? 

I learned a great deal about the inner workings of NASA and its relationship with external stakeholders in the administration and Capitol Hill. Those 

are personal lessons learned in terms of the machinery and processes, how 

things work, so to speak. 

How about NASA’s future? Do you think it’s a bright future, or 

indeterminate, or a bleak future?

It’s indeterminate, but NASA certainly has the seeds of a very bright future. 

It really depends upon how NASA’s value is communicated to American society 

and how well NASA executes its programs. I do think that the future that NASA 

offers is undervalued and probably underinvested in by the nation. We could 

have a much larger positive impact with a somewhat greater budget.

Would you encourage someone to choose to work at NASA?

Absolutely. I’ve worked at NASA as a graduate student working as a summer intern, and as an AA. Those are two of the most valuable experiences in 

my life. Almost everyone I know that works at NASA feels special about their 

job and their contributions to society, and I know very few people who regret 

the time they spend there. So, I would certainly encourage people to come and 

spend part or all their careers at the Agency.

You are the Principal Investigator for New Horizons. Can you share your 

thoughts on what your hopes are for the New Horizons mission that gets 

to Pluto in 2015?

Narrowly speaking, my hopes are that we are good stewards of the spacecraft, it performs well, and that we have a successful encounter at the Pluto 

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system and then on into the Kuiper Belt. Speaking more broadly, this is the 

first mission to a new planet and a new kind of planetary body since the 

late 1980s. When New Horizons launched in 2006, it was the first launch of a 

spacecraft going to a new kind of place, a new planet, since Voyager launched 

in 1977, 30 years before. When New Horizons arrives at the Pluto system in 

2015, most Americans then will not have been alive or able to remember the 

first era of planetary reconnaissance. Yet, with this mission, this is the capstone 

of planetary reconnaissance, where we complete the basic inventory of the 

solar system. 

One of the great lessons of planetary science is that every time we go to a 

new kind of place—first giant planet, first icy satellite, Venus, Mars, Mercury—

we typically find out that we have to rewrite the textbooks, that our ideas were 

very naive, and that nature is much richer than our data led us to believe from 

an Earth-based vantage point. I really expect that the first reconnaissance of 

the Kuiper Belt and the Pluto system, this new kind of world and these dwarf 

planets that are the most populous class of planets in the solar system will 

revolutionize our knowledge of our home solar system.

Can you be more specific about what kinds of scientific questions you 

hope to have answered?

It is a reconnaissance mission, and so our objectives are codified in terms 

of things like mapping Pluto and its satellites at such-and-such a resolution 

with such-and-such a signal-to-noise; mapping surface compositions with 

various technical specifications; assay the temperatures and pressures in the 

atmosphere to such a level, those kinds of things. What we’re trying to do in 

reconnaissance, as is always the case, is to gain a basic first-order understanding of the characteristics and evolutionary history of the body or bodies that 

we’re exploring. In the case of the Pluto system, it’s Pluto and its three satellites, and any satellites we might discover that haven’t yet been found.

We know that Pluto and its cohort population of dwarf planets in the 

Kuiper Belt are objects that were growing towards much larger sizes but which 

were arrested at the smaller size in their formation. From a technical standpoint 

in computer models of solar system formation, Pluto and its cohort are the 

developmental equivalent of an embryo whose development was arrested in 

the midstages of gestation. We have an opportunity in studying these worlds 

to see something we have never seen before and to understand something new 

about planetary formation, by seeing not the finished end product or the initial 

building blocks—that is, large planets like the giant planets and the terrestrial 

planets, or building blocks like comets and asteroids—but an object that was 

in the process of growing piece by piece from comet after comet impact, but 

not yet to a large-scale planet. This midstage of planetary gestation is something that’s only been seen in computers, and here we will have an opportunity 

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to really study this kind of body and open up a whole new chapter in terms 

of our understanding of planetary formation.

What are your thoughts on Pluto’s status as a planet, especially with the 

whole International Astronomical Union [IAU] controversy over the last 

couple years?

I could talk to you about this for a long time! There are many aspects to it. 

Simply put—and I have had this discussion many times with colleagues—there 

is no characteristic that one can identify in the Earth or other bodies, which 

the IAU’s definition of a planet sanctions, that Pluto and its cohort do not 

have. Atmospheres, moons, geological activity, a core, a crust, all those things 

are there. There is no fundamental distinction between the dwarf planets and 

larger planets in terms of their characteristics, only an arbitrary distinction, 

which is just a distinction of size. In the same way that a Chihuahua is still a 

dog because it shares certain deep characteristics with the other things we 

call dogs, Pluto and these worlds and even still smaller ones are still planets; 

they’re simply dwarf planets. 

Now the second aspect of this difficulty I have with the IAU’s end result is 

that their definition of a planet depends upon where the planet is in its solar 

system. As one very simple example, the Earth is admitted as a planet in our 

solar system, but if you were to have a collection of identical Earths at farther 

and farther distances from the Sun, by the time you reached Pluto’s orbit those 

identical Earths would no longer be planets. 

This is patently absurd, and it goes against the grain of every other classification system in astronomy. There is no requirement, for example, that a star is 

only a star if it’s within a certain distance of another star or controls the space 

around the star or whatever. The same goes for pulsars and black holes and 

galaxies and everything else in astronomy. The IAU has essentially arranged, 

by a small number of people, an arbitrary definition whose goal was to keep 

the number of planets low so that people could remember the names of all 

of them. This is absurd. If that were the case, we would never have more than 

a countable number of rivers on Earth, or mountains, or many other things; 

maybe only have 10 species, for example. 

It’s just not the way science is done. We don’t figure out the answer we 

want and then arrange the algorithm to give us the answer. That’s dogma.

Would you argue that Pluto is a dwarf planet?

I coined the term “dwarf planet” in 1990 in the academic journal Icarus. 

It is a dwarf planet. But that’s a kind of planet, just like dwarf human beings 

are still human beings; they’re just smaller. The IAU went wrong saying that a 

dwarf planet is not a planet. Another place where the IAU went wrong—and 

I’m just going to finish my thought because it rounds out the three primary 

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arguments—first, no fundamental characteristic that’s different; second, the 

argument that I just espoused; and then, finally, the third error of the IAU was 

in voting. 

Science is not done by voting. If we collected the most eminent scientists 

of the world into a room and voted the sky was green, it would not make it 

so. We didn’t vote on relativity or continental drift or on recombinant DNA, 

because voting is a process that works very well in certain aspects of human 

culture, but it does not work for science, because the vote doesn’t change the 

way things work. 

I think that that picture of scientists voting and making it so was the greatest moment of pedagogical damage to science in many decades, if not the 

past century. It has undermined the scientific method and people who have to 

deal with whether global warming, for example, is a belief or a fact, whether 

evolution is a fact established by data or a belief, and on and on through other 

issues, were all undermined by this view, this widely publicized view, that 

scientists vote to make things so. By voting that certain objects are or are not 

planets does not change their characteristics.

Where do you think this issue is going? Will this issue be reversed? 

I hope we don’t vote again, that’s for sure. Science comes to consensus 

because eventually the facts constrain us to a model that explains all of them, 

and that scientists simply adopt because there’s no sense in working in a 

framework that doesn’t actually produce correct results. What I see is there 

was a lot of backlash after the IAU’s vote, petitions by astronomers that said, 

“I just won’t use that”; textbook authors that said, “Well that’s horse puckey”; 

and so forth. 

But now I see an increasing number of conferences, like the AAAS [the 

American Association for the Advancement of Science] this year in Boston, 

the European Geophysical Union last year in France, later in 2008 the meeting that’s taking place at Johns Hopkins, on planet definition, as empirical 

evidence that the issue is not well settled, or else there wouldn’t be a need for 

such meetings. 

I think that on a timescale of 5 or 15 or 20 years, this will settle out about 

where it started with astronomy recognizing that there is a wide variety of 

planets of all sizes, just like stars and other objects in astronomy, and then 

maybe the IAU will catch up someday. But I really think that the current IAU 

definition is almost universally accepted as so deeply flawed that it’s not workable. It doesn’t even encompass the exoplanets; this is part of the arbitrary 

nature of that definition, because again, the people in that room wanted to 

achieve a specific objective: small numbers of planets. They had to do something very antiscientific besides just voting. They had to construct the definition so narrowly that it only applied in our solar system. Of course, science is 

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a reductionist enterprise in which we try to generalize over a large number of 

facts and reduce them to a small number of concepts, so this goes against the 

grain of the way that science works. 

And it’s ultimately doomed, but I can’t tell you the timescale, that’s my 

opinion. Maybe at the 100th anniversary of NASA, when somebody reads 

these words, they’ll get a nice smile and they’ll know which year, or decade, 

in which the tide changed. I think it’s already changing. I suspect by the time 

we get New Horizons to Pluto, this will be a question from a Trivial Pursuit 

game at best. New Horizons won’t care whether it’s a planet or not. It doesn’t 

know to care.

Do you want to say anything in conclusion?

I’m very grateful and honored to have had the opportunity to work for 

NASA. SMD really shined in the way it performed. There was a lot of innovation and a lot of positive forward movement in both the science program and 

its connections to the Vision that I think are widely appreciated. I’ve been very 

touched by hundreds upon hundreds of e-mails from people in the scientific 

community, in the government, within NASA, about the progress that SMD 

made in the last year. I hope that that progress will continue.

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Chapter 11

Jaiwon Shin

Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research

In the summer of 2004, Dr. Jaiwon Shin was named as NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator 

for Aeronautics, and in February 2008, he became the Associate Administrator for Aeronautics 

Research. Prior to these positions, he had worked as a researcher in aircraft icing, as a manager, 

and as the person responsible for all aeronautics projects being conducted at the Glenn Research 

Center in Ohio. His technical background includes aerodynamics and heat transfer. He earned his 

doctorate in mechanical engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and his 

undergraduate degree is from Yonsei University, located in Korea, his native country. 

 He arrived in the United States in 1982. He said, “One thing led to another, and I’m still here,” 

including almost 20 years with the space agency. During an interview conducted 25 June 2008 at 

NASA Headquarters, Shin shared his goals for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate and 

began by explaining the mission of aeronautics both historically and currently.

Aeronautics research in NASA really has a long history dating all the way 

back to the days of the NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics]—

more than 90 years of tradition in doing aeronautics research. When NASA 

was formed in 1958, NACA was absorbed into NASA. The bulk of what NACA 

was doing in flight research and aero research became the NASA aeronautics 

that we know today. 

Our mission is to ensure that the United States stays at the leadership of 

the technology in aeronautics. That is the foremost mission for Aeronautics 

Research here. But at the same time, we work on technologies that will help 

space missions within the Agency, like access to space and entry/descent/

landing on any planet with some atmosphere, like Mars. We work on a lot 

of fundamental technologies to enable these capabilities. So I’ll say broadly 

there are two main missions: one is to work on all aeronautics technologies to 

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help U.S. industry, and the other is to work on technologies to enable space 

missions within the Agency.

You have stated that you want the aeronautics division of NASA to be the 

world’s best. How will you be able to gauge whether this goal is achieved?

We are the research and development [R&D] organization, and we are not 

the ultimate customer; space-side NASA is the ultimate customer for the time 

being. In the future, maybe the commercial space industry will boom a lot 

more, and maybe NASA will not be the sole customer in the space industry. But 

NASA’s aeronautics research has always been about supporting the external 

community. We don’t build airplanes; we don’t make any subsystems for NASA 

to use in aeronautics. In order to be the premier R&D organization, NASA needs 

to be on the cutting edge of research, rather than following the rest of the world. 

We will be leading all the technologies in aeronautics for the world. 

How do we measure that? Since we are doing research and development, 

it’s fairly simple to me that when our researchers are regarded as the technical authority around the world, that is the proof. I casually challenge our 

researchers that when they go to an international or domestic conference, I 

want their technical session to be standing room only, where people cannot 

get into the room to listen to our researchers talk. I want NASA researchers to be invited as the technical expert in any major technical forum or 

discussion and sought after by not only U.S. entities but also international 

entities, to have our technical experts’ opinions and viewpoints matter. It 

is a fairly simple-minded answer, and when I talk to technical people, they 

all understand what I mean, so I challenge our researchers that each one of 

them, in their own technical area, needs to strive to become like that. Then, 

in an aggregated sense, I can conscientiously say that we are number one 

in the world.

Why do you believe this to be an important goal for your division?

We are trusted to conduct about $500 million a year in aeronautics 

research. Some people say that’s not a significant amount of money when 

compared to the entire NASA budget, which is approximately $17 billion 

now; that’s not even 4 percent of the entire Agency budget. But if you think 

about what Europeans spend, or for that matter Asian countries, $500 million is still a lot of money for doing aeronautics research. I think that combined, all the European government agencies are just now approaching our 

level of investment, and for the many, many past decades, their investment 

has been far lower.

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I’m a simple-minded person, so when the nation gives us that kind of 

trust and gives us that kind of resource, there’s only one thing that we need 

to do, and that is to become number one in the world. I will challenge and 

push our researchers in NASA aeronautics to become number one, because 

it is not right when a country spends that much money—the most amount of 

money compared to the rest of the world—and we are not doing our job. So 

that’s my motivation. It’s as simple as that.

Share with us your ideas about NASA’s aeronautic partnerships with 

agencies, industries, universities, and the private sector.

NASA Aeronautics is not our only customer; we have to work with external partners. The challenge for us is we have a lot of different competing 

interests and motivations among the external stakeholders. It’s a daunting 

task to work across all sectors of industry, from major air framers, engine 

companies, helicopter communities, small airplane manufacturers, to avionics manufacturers. Just to work with the spectrum of the industry partners 

alone is a daunting task. Then you add government agencies, FAA [Federal 

Aviation Administration], DOD [Department of Defense], Department of 

Commerce—all these agencies, that’s another layer of challenge. Then you 

add universities into the mix, and you truly have very diverse constituents 

and customers.

Partnership is critical to NASA Aeronautics. So what I believe is we must 

be true to the notion of partnership, rather than just giving the lip service; we 

recognize that we are not working for ourselves, that we have to work with 

others. We know if there is no trust between the particular partner and with 

us, then we don’t go anywhere with that kind of situation. With a true notion 

of partnership, the customer will be honest and also sincere working with 

us. And we can come to consensus rather quickly based on that trust. They 

know we will deliver and we will work in most sincerity. Then the partnership really blossoms. 

My philosophy of partnership is critical for NASA Aeronautics and has to 

be built upon trust. If there’s no trust between us and our partners, then we 

get into this never-ending story of how to satisfy a thousand customers, and 

we’re just torn a thousand different ways and just not accomplishing anything. 

What lessons have you learned that you are applying in your current role?

There are several of them, out of 19 years of experience. One is we 

should never lose the sight of what NASA Aeronautics is supposed to do—

why were we created, and why has the nation given us that precious taxpayers’ resource and asked us to do research. In my view, our country is 

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asking us to put ourselves 10 or 20 years ahead of U.S. industry and work 

on revolutionary, fundamental research that at the present time industry 

may not even realize they actually need, or they cannot foresee the certain 

technologies needed for their market or product. We are responsible for 

having this vision that would put us way, way ahead of industry, and we 

will continue to work on achieving that. I believe that is our role and that 

is our mission, to stay ahead of everybody else in the world and continue 

to push the envelope of aeronautics technologies. Along the way, we kind 

of lost sight of that.

During the NACA days, we worked on a lot of fundamental aerodynamics issues, control issues, and propulsion issues. That’s how we introduced and made significant contributions to efficiency of the aircraft and 

brought forth the jet age, supersonic flight, and you name it. All these 

breakthrough technologies, NACA’s fingerprints were all over it. How did 

we do that? Because we stayed on the fundamental research and pushed 

the envelope continuously.

But over the past couple decades, in my view, we have swung too far in 

being too close to industry’s short-term needs. We got too close to industry, 

working with industry, and tried to be helpful—no malintention here—tried 

to be helpful, but we swung too far and started addressing their more nearterm needs. Then we started losing these talents and skills to be able to conduct far-reaching, fundamental, cutting-edge research. This is one big lesson 

learned, and it took a long time to recognize that we were losing that edge, 

and if you do it long enough, you’ll see that impact.

So two and a half years ago, we tried to go back to our roots, to doing 

more fundamental research and doing cutting-edge research. Two and a half 

years ago we completely restructured NASA Aeronautics under the leadership 

of Mike Griffin, and also my predecessor, Lisa Porter. I believe we are standing on very firm ground now, going back to our roots. I would say that’s one 

big lesson learned.

Explain the core principles that you believe will shape your Directorate.

There are three core principles. The number one principle is much like 

what I’ve been sharing with you, trying to be preeminent and also doing 

cutting-edge research. We consider, again, the country has bestowed its confidence in us to be the steward, of being the number one group of doing 

research in aeronautics. So the number one principle is, we will be the steward of keeping all the core competencies necessary to continue doing this 

cutting-edge research in aeronautics. This first principle means simply to me 

that if you are a mediocre researcher or research organization, no one will 

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give you that trust, no one will say, “Keep this, my treasure.” No one will think, 

“You are a mediocre person or group, and I still trust you, and you’ll do fine 

with this, my treasure.” No one will do that in their right mind. The first principle is simply, you have to become number one. You have to become number 

one in the world, not just in the nation, to get that honor of being a nation’s 

steward for all core competencies of aeronautics. So it just goes through the 

common thread that I’ve been talking about, being a world-premier R&D 

organization in aeronautics.

The second principle is we will do what we do best with the unique 

NASA capabilities and roles. We have limited resources, and I don’t have 

any false illusion that NASA Aeronautics’ budget will suddenly triple or 

quadruple in two years or three years, within the current NASA mission and 

current fiscal conditions in the country, I have no illusion like that. And I 

have no qualms about aeronautics being a lower priority than exploration, 

as an example. NASA is the space agency for the nation, and I don’t have 

any problem whatsoever in that perspective. So we have to do what we do 

best within the budget we have, which is about $500 million a year—still, 

an awful lot of money.

My second principle there is I challenge the researchers of my team that 

if you are not number one in your technical area, I’ll give you maybe a little 

bit of latitude to be number two while you are striving to become number 

one in a very short time, but remembering that at the moment you’re number 

two. That’s the minimum. If we are number three and number four, let’s get 

out of that area. We are not going to follow the pack because a certain area 

is fashionable at the time, and even in a technical area, there is such a thing 

as a fashionable thing to do. For example, since everybody’s jumping on the 

bandwagon, NASA should get into that as well. As long as I’m in this position, 

I will not allow that. We are not going to be a follower. 

The third principle is more specific, talking about the Next Generation 

Air Transportation System [NextGen], working a partnership with that group. 

However, I use NextGen as a representative of our commitment to the true 

partnership. So, with this principle, I actually mean a real partnership with 

our broad external communities. I mean real partnership, not lip service or 

just shake hands kind of partnership, but real partnership. The way I look at 

it is given the limited budget, the number one principle is our goal. And in 

order to get there, we have to do the second and third principles right. By 

concentrating on what we do best with the given budget, and then leveraging 

off with the partners doing real partnership, I think $500 million can go a 

long way. So that’s how I explain to our people how the three principles work 

together and why they are so important for us.

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How has NASA changed since you first arrived?

We have become somewhat demystified, if there is such a word in the 

dictionary. When I came to NASA, I really didn’t know what NASA did. It 

was a somewhat mystical entity. We had a lot of aura behind us. When 

you talked to your neighbor and said you worked for NASA, there was a 

big “wow” effect. Several years back, there was a newspaper article a bit 

on the critical side that questioned how many in the nation can remember 

the names of astronauts, whereas we all remember astronaut names from 

the Apollo days. Just about every educated or average U.S. citizen would 

remember that. But now, not many people remember even a single name 

of an astronaut. 

That article continued with an analysis of why that is the case. And as I 

recall, the number one analysis was, we are stuck. We are stuck in low-Earth 

orbit. We have become a sort of bus driver or ferry driver between Earth 

and the [International] Space Station. We just keep going back and forth, 

back and forth, and we never go beyond Station or never go beyond [Space] 

Shuttle. I don’t fully subscribe to that, but that’s the perception in the country, and I think there is a point. We have become somewhat demystified and 

have become somewhat commoditized. People have started taking NASA for 

granted. The only time they get the “wow” effect is when they see Shuttle 

launches, and sometimes some fantastic pictures coming from Mars, and that 

is too far in between. 

That’s why I welcome President [George W.] Bush’s Vision for Space 

Exploration, because NASA is all about providing inspiration and vision for 

the nation, and, I might add, pride. Pride for the nation. If people see NASA 

or talk about NASA, they should get this overwhelming emotion of, “How 

do they do that?” The question that should come to everybody’s mind in the 

nation is, “How do they do such wonderful and marvelous things? I just cannot comprehend, but they do some magical things.” That relates directly to 

national pride. No other country on this Earth can do what we can do through 

NASA funding. 

Our Administrator is the best person to lay out a sound and reasonable 

plan to achieve the President’s challenge and Vision. For the past four years, 

Mike Griffin has worked diligently to lay out that plan, and we are well on 

our way back to becoming mystifying. That’s what NASA’s all about—inspiring 

people and dreaming about impossible things, something that just cannot be 

comprehended by average people, even highly educated people. We should 

go back to that, so elementary kids will feel inspired, just like I was when 

I was 10 years old and watched, in Korea, the Apollo 11 Moon landing on 

black-and-white TV.

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How NASA has changed? Your own success sometimes becomes your 

enemy, and by building that tremendous safety record for Shuttle—which is 

still a complete experimental vehicle—people just take it for granted. People 

don’t understand and appreciate the difficulty of each one of those flights of 

the Shuttle. So we need to bring back that aura behind every one of us, and 

let people know how the wonderful things we are doing with the investment 

that the nation is making.

On the aeronautics side, the same principle can be applied—we have 

made a lot of contributions over the many, many decades to civil aviation and 

aeronautics industry as a whole. Now, we have to put ourselves 10, 20 years 

ahead and still provide the vision and challenges for the nation.

What advice would you give someone who wanted to join NASA?

I often tell young people that you have to really have a sense of patriotism. 

I really mean that. English is my second language, so sometimes I don’t get it 

right, but I know some people call a vocation a “calling,” and in this case, it 

is really fitting. You just don’t come to work at NASA simply to make a living. 

Every one of us could have gone to someplace else and could have made a 

lot more money. Coming to NASA, to me, is truly a calling. It is the most prestigious form of public service, in my view, the country can offer. You come to 

NASA out of pride and a sense of patriotism.

We do things that nobody can do, and it’s really not a matter of money. We 

have such a vision and capabilities that even if another developing country 

wants to pour gobs of money as that nation’s strategy, they will not be able 

to do what we are doing and what we have accomplished. It will take years 

for them to catch up.

If you are a technical person in aeronautics and space, this is the best 

place to be. We do deal with all kinds of bureaucratic, mundane things as 

well. It’s not all fantasy. So you will come and experience all that, but if you 

come with that sense of patriotism and a sense of calling, you will overcome 

that. I tell people that you shouldn’t come for money. If you come for money, 

you will not last. 

Any final thoughts?

NASA should be both the engine and the lighthouse for the nation in 

the technological leadership. Again, it applies both in aeronautics and space 

equally. We have to be the engine of the nation to propel this preeminent 

technological leadership that we enjoy. So much depends on this technological leadership that no one can copy or no one can follow or catch up any time 

soon. We shouldn’t lose that.

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I often compare the aeronautics industry with the auto industry. You 

don’t think about being patriotic when you buy an automobile anymore. It’s 

a commodity. It’s just like a computer. Any developed country can produce 

real high-quality automobiles. Detroit doesn’t own the auto industry anymore. How did that happen? They owned that industry several decades ago. 

I think we have become complacent. That’s probably what happened, much 

like any other areas and many other things in life. We must be careful, both 

in aeronautics and space, which feed a tremendous trade surplus for us and 

also military supremacy, not to lose that edge. But there are indications that 

that might be happening. 

Airplanes—at least the current configuration—are becoming a commodity. Many developed countries can produce airplanes and engines, and good 

ones. Our own manufacturers partner with foreign companies for their own 

strategic reasons. They need to sell their engines and airplanes to foreign 

countries, and our airlines need to fly to foreign countries, so they strategically buy foreign products. Mix them up. They’re mixing their fleet for political and market reasons, and they could not have done that if the products 

coming from foreign countries were far inferior to U.S. products. They would 

not have done that. These are business people, and they wouldn’t purchase 

purely out of a political reason or market-driven reasons if the bottom line 

doesn’t pan out. The reason why they’re doing it is now foreign products are 

able to compete with U.S. products. That’s the bottom line.

So that is a good indication and our alarm bell for us to wake up and 

think, “What is happening here? Are we walking down the same path the 

auto industry walked down two decades ago?” If we are not careful, we 

will be. This country doesn’t manufacture any regional jets; it’s all either 

Canadians or Brazilians. Why did we get out of that sector? We don’t know. 

But that’s a very attractive sector, and the Canadians and Brazilians are 

dominating this market. Boeing now is regaining the number one seat again, 

fortunately, but they fell behind Airbus for several years. So again, it’s not 

a given that U.S. aeronautics industry is always number one. We have to be 

very mindful. 

I’m not as familiar with space as with aeronautics, but I would maintain 

that China is coming on strong, and we have to realize that the Chinese government is a completely different government system. They can put whatever 

resources and people at their will, and they will get there. Mike Griffin has 

mentioned this several times at different venues, that we have to realize this 

difference in the government regimes. They are a communist country, and 

they can really set the goal and make it happen. So we have to be mindful 

about these things happening around the world. 

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Jaiwon Shin

You cannot always consider return-on-investment and business cases in 

some strategic areas, as a nation. I believe in a free-market economy, and I 

believe this country has done very well practicing that free-market economy 

principle. But we have to make government investment with those long-term 

strategies. Some government investment cannot be solely justified by business cases and return-on-investment analyses, and the aerospace sector is 

one of them. 

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Chapter 12

Michael F. O’Brien

Assistant Administrator for External Relations

Michael O’Brien spent 28 years in the United States Navy, where he earned a master’s degree in 

international relations; attended the French Naval War College; and, before the first Persian Gulf War, 

spent a couple of years working for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff negotiating agreements 

in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. All of that experience has assisted him during his years 

at NASA, where he has focused on international and interagency relations since the early 1990s. 

 As Assistant Administrator for External Relations, he is responsible for NASA’s interaction with 

the nation’s executive-branch offices and agencies, international relations for each NASA enterprise, 

administration of export control and international technology transfer programs, the NASA History 

Program Office, and the NASA advisory councils and commissions. On 21 March 2007, at NASA 

Headquarters, he discussed how his office “touches just about everything that NASA does” and its 

role for the Agency.

I’ve been at NASA now for 13 years, and in my current position for 31⁄2 

years; almost 10 years prior to that, I was the deputy in this office. I’ve probably got the best job in NASA, other than maybe the Administrator, and not 

too many people know that we’re involved in everything in a supportive way, 

because our little organization touches just about everything that NASA does, 

whether it’s international, interagency, the History Program Office, advisory 

committees, and so we’re involved in everything in a supportive way. We’re 

not in charge of anything. 

We only support the Mission Directorates and the execution of their programs by providing international expertise, and the contacts and the context, 

negotiation, and maintenance of agreements for the Mission Directorates, so 

that as they do their very difficult technical jobs, they don’t have to worry 

about some of these other things that we worry about. It’s a good division of 

labor for all of us, seems to have worked fairly well.

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How has NASA changed over the time since you’ve been here?

The biggest change has been the Vision for Space Exploration, announced 

by President George W. Bush on January 14, 2004. This represented a strategic 

shift in direction for NASA with a very significant aspect, in that for the first 

time in decades NASA was going to make plans to build vehicles to go beyond 

low-Earth orbit, and again go back to the Moon to establish an outpost, and 

then ultimately to explore beyond low-Earth orbit, not only with robots as 

we’re doing now, but with humans.

That change was brought about initially and sadly by the loss of the Space 

Shuttle Columbia. NASA, as a result of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board’s report, really had a soul-searching for several months during which 

it not only reacted to the recommendations of the report related to the accident itself, but also looked at its long-term strategic plan, and what should be 

its real mission in support of space activities, and ultimately support of the 

American people. That led to this change, and to me that’s the biggest change 

that’s taken place, and now it’s going to be with us for decades. It’s a pretty 

exciting place to be right now.

How did that Vision change your job specifically?

My job breaks down into four things: the NASA History Program Office, 

support for NASA advisory councils, interagency relations (relationships with 

the State Department, Department of Defense, the White House staffs, etc.), 

and international relations.

The international relations portion is about half of what I do, and this 

change in strategic direction came with a direction from the President to 

pursue international cooperation in this new Vision, this new set of activities. 

Since 2004 we have been very, very active going around the world explaining 

the details of this new plan, explaining the fact that the President has directed 

us to cooperate in the implementation of the plan, and trying to work out 

with basically 13 or 14 different countries the details of what that cooperation 

would mean.

I might add that that is new, because there are new things that we are 

going to do in the next several years or decades as we move off the surface of 

the Earth beyond low-Earth orbit to the Moon and Mars. It is new, but it is not 

necessarily different. NASA is extraordinarily international and has been since 

its inception 50 years ago. The National Aeronautics and Space Act that created NASA also had language in it that basically said, “NASA should cooperate 

internationally in the implementation of its vision.”

As a result, over the last 50 years, we have had about 4,000 international 

agreements, and this surprises people, I think, sometimes to hear those numbers. Now, I’d be hard pressed to produce all 4,000 of them, but for the last 

several years we’ve been doing a very good job of taking these agreements 

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and putting them in a database, and we know, for example, in the last 10 

years we have signed 900 agreements, with 75 percent of those coming from 

10 countries around the world, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, China, the U.K., 

Australia, India, etc., which leads us to today, where we have currently active 

256 international agreements, with the number of countries about 60.

So that’s in position, active right now, which keeps us very busy just either 

negotiating new agreements, updates to those agreements, or maintaining 

them. The fact that we’re going to have international cooperation in this new 

plan is exciting, and it allows us to do new things with partners we’ve had for 

a long time. It doesn’t represent much of a change in what I’m doing, just a 

change in emphasis.

You recently traveled to China with Administrator Mike Griffin. How do 

you believe those discussions will enter into NASA’s future?

It’s going to be a slow process. The Chinese have a space capability of 

some significance. They’re only the third nation in history to have launched 

and recovered human beings into orbit safely. The trip came about as a result 

of a summit between the two presidents a couple of years ago, during which 

President Bush basically said, as one of the many outcomes in the summit, that 

if the Chinese National Space Agency, CNSA, invited the NASA Administrator 

to visit, then we would consider that invitation and perhaps would accept it, 

which we did.

The idea was to have a visit without a firm agenda for cooperation. It 

was a get-to-know-you visit, during which we visited several locations of the 

Chinese space activities, both in Beijing and in Shanghai. Interestingly, we 

didn’t go to their human spaceflight launch facility in the Gobi Desert. We 

were going to go there, but at the last minute they told us that we were really 

only going to be allowed to see the launch pad, and we decided that we 

would do other things instead of being restricted, which was interesting. It’s a 

reflection of the fact that, unlike the United States, China organizes its space 

activities either under the military, which is where the human spaceflight 

activities take place, or under the civilian agency. We only saw what the civilian agency could show us.

Things have changed a little bit since our return. We came back, reported 

back to the President and his staff the results of the trip, and thought we 

would perhaps be having more visits, which we may very well, to look at ways 

we could cooperate, first on the easy things, data sharing etc., for Earth observation. But the Chinese in January destroyed one of their own satellites in an 

ASAT [Anti-Satellite test], which was a great concern not only to the United 

States, but to the rest of the world, because it created orbital debris that has 

increased the risk to satellites and even humans that—including Chinese—may 

be launched.

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So the U.S. government and the Chinese government are talking to one 

another about that. We’re not involved in those conversations. Even before the 

ASAT test, there are other existing issues having to do with nonproliferation, 

human rights, etc., at a government-to-government level, and we’re a technical 

agency. We don’t get involved in those discussions.

But the results of those discussions will have an impact one way or another 

on whether or not we can pursue cooperation. So for a variety of reasons, 

existing issues between the two governments, as well as the more recent issue 

of the Chinese ASAT test, tell me that we will be going rather slowly with the 

Chinese in terms of discussions about cooperation.

What do you believe to be NASA’s impact on society?

NASA is at the leading edge of technology development and exploration, 

and doing those types of things that no one else is doing, or can do, forces 

us to develop technologies in order to accomplish those tasks. As it turns out, 

many of those technologies are directly applicable to what humans do on Earth. 

Now, the argument is, and it’s a subjective one, maybe those things would 

have been developed anyway in the absence of a space program. They may be 

developed, but not as quickly, and some of them may never have been developed because we didn’t even know they were applicable to life on Earth until 

they were developed in space.

In terms of making life better for Americans and people around the world, 

there’s been a tremendous impact, if you just talk about products, if you talk 

about things that you can observe from space that we all take for granted now, 

such as weather satellites to have the ability to monitor the weather, that has a 

huge impact on the nation and on the world, as do communications satellites, 

some parts of which were developed by NASA, some of which were not developed by NASA. On occasion it’s difficult to draw a distinction between the two.

The other impact we have is even more subjective than things that have 

come from space technology that we use in our own lives. It is the exploration 

aspect, and that’s what we’re embarked on now. We came from explorers that 

immigrated to this country. We have an explorer spirit. There is always debate 

about how much is enough, and why are you spending money to go there 

when the money could be spent here to do other things. It wasn’t any different four or five hundred years ago, when this country was being explored and 

discovered.

There are benefits that will come from that, but you don’t know what you 

don’t know. It’s like performing research in a variety of areas that 99 percent of 

them don’t come to fruition, but the 1 percent that does changes everybody’s 

life for the better, and that’s an aspect of this exploration program that we’re 

on that will pay dividends when we get out there and see things that we don’t 

even know exist.

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NASA has a history of itself, and it’s not just been exploration. Share with 

us your thoughts of the other aspects included in the Vision.

NASA had been doing a lot of things for 48 years before the Vision 

changed our direction in a strategic sense, that we will continue to do. One 

group of these activities is very international, and I mentioned it a little earlier 

in another context, and that has to do with Earth observation, for a variety 

of reasons.

Our science program at NASA is split into two categories that used to be 

separate but have been joined together under the Science Mission Directorate. 

One of those has to do with planetary probes and planetary exploration, the 

rovers on the surface of Mars, for example. The other very important aspect 

of it that is within low-Earth orbit, close to the Earth—those spacecraft that 

observe the Earth for a variety of reasons, not just weather, but basically to 

understand the Earth as a system, so that we can understand the changes 

that take place that are caused or determined by the actions of man, or those 

that are natural phenomena like weather, for example, that is not necessarily 

caused by man, but we still need to understand.

Currently NASA has 44 missions on orbit, both interplanetary and those 

that are in low-Earth orbit observing the Earth. The reason I know that number is because 25 of those have a significant international component. Of 

those 256 agreements that we have, there are a subset of those that involve 

our cooperation on these 25 active missions that are either interplanetary or 

are some sort of Earth observation. These are very, very important for the 

nation and the world, either for the weather forecasting that comes from NOAA 

[National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] or for the understanding of 

the Earth, so that we can, we meaning the global we, can make good decisions 

based on our understanding of the Earth as an entire system.

The reason that international cooperation is so important in that respect 

is that you have to have buy-in from other countries, for a couple of reasons. 

One is, if you are taking measurements from space and you say that deforestation is taking place at a certain pace in the Amazon or in the Middle East, you 

need to be able to go into the country and calibrate those measurements from 

actual instruments on the ground so you know that what you’re seeing from 

space reflects reality on the ground. Therefore, the country that you’re interested in has to agree to let you come in and has to cooperate with you. That’s 

one aspect, so that you know that the measurements you’re taking from space 

do, in fact, reflect reality.

And then the second, maybe even more important aspect is if there 

are decisions to be made to counter those changes that are caused by the 

actions of humans, and these types of changes don’t respect national boundaries. Those countries, large countries, perhaps China and India and Brazil 

as very large countries, would have to agree to make some of those changes 

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as well as the United States. Otherwise the effect will not be as important, 

or it won’t be as effective if you’re trying to change a process that may be, 

in fact, negative, such as deforestation is one example, or pollution in the 

oceans, etc.

There’s a lot of ongoing activities that don’t really fall into the category of 

exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, but they’ve existed for a long time, and 

they will continue to exist and are, in fact, part of the Vision. The words are 

to the effect of an integrated plan of Earth observation and exploration and 

aeronautics as we move forward. The focus generally in the last couple of 

years has been on the new kind of interesting stuff, the new stuff we’re going 

to build, and the fact that we’re going to retire the Shuttle, etc., and it’s a much 

bigger program than that.

What are the lessons learned?

One aspect of lessons learned that is of great interest to me and that would 

be the next kind of big thing for NASA right now is the retirement of the Space 

Shuttle and the corresponding development and production of a replacement 

vehicle. That is going to, unfortunately, result in a four- or a five-year gap, 

similar to what we had between Apollo and the Space Shuttle, gap in human 

spaceflight capability for the United States.

We will get beyond that, and we will cooperate in the implementation 

internationally of this new exploration plan, so that we will hopefully end up 

on the surface of the Moon a decade or so from now, with an outpost of some 

sort that is constructed by some sort of international consortium. It could be 

2, could be 10 years. 

We have a lot of international experience in embarking on these types of 

activities. The International Space Station is a perfect example of that. What 

we are doing now is looking at lessons learned from a variety of past activities so that we can put our best practices forward in implementing whatever 

arrangement comes out of our plans to go to the Moon, not alone but with 

other partners. 

We need partners that have the interest in space exploration, the capabilities to partner with us, and the resources to do that. We have all three, and 

we have greater resources than anyone else in the world by a factor of two or 

three. We’re very, very lucky in that respect. What we’re looking for is other 

countries not as big as us, not to do the same things as us, but to do complementary things. 

We have a history with all of our potential partners, perhaps save a few 

such as China, if we can resolve the issues I mentioned earlier, and we will 

look at our history of operating both bilaterally and multilaterally in groups 

with these likely partners in order to avoid some of the mistakes of the past, 

but also capitalize on the good things that we’ve done.

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What about the importance of aeronautics in NASA?

Aeronautics is, of course, the first A in NASA. It is very important to NASA. 

From my perspective of the Mission Directorates that we have, science, space 

operations, exploration systems, and aeronautics, aeronautics is the least international. It’s probably the least international because it involves developments 

of technology that could be used for military purposes, of course, and jet 

aircraft, or could be used for or related to commercial aspects of civil aviation 

and competition. There are some studies that have to do with safety and things 

of that nature that would not impact our ability to apply those things that the 

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate does to either civilian, civil aviation 

capabilities, or could be related maybe to the military later on in some aspect. 

Aeronautics is an extremely important aspect of what NASA does, and this 

office has a relationship with the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, 

but not as much as others.

What is your perception of NASA culture?

There have been surveys done, and it ranges from “NASA is the best place 

in government to work,” which a year or two ago came out among 50 or so 

agencies, or to other surveys that have shown a large proportion of folks in 

NASA don’t believe what their bosses tell them, which is of great concern.

There’s a real problem when it gets to the point of, which I think we did 

get to with both the Columbia and Challenger accidents, where there was 

some reticence on the part of individuals in the chain of command or parallel 

to the chain, to use a military term, that were reticent and hesitated to mention safety concerns that they had, or did mention safety concerns and felt like 

they were discounted. It was pointed out as one of the causes of the accident 

by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that there was a failure to communicate at very specific times throughout that horrible incident that led to the 

launch and the failure of the wing when the foam came off the external tank.

There’s been a lot of effort to address the culture through a variety of 

mechanisms. For me, in an organization that has only 54 people, and less than 

50 are here in this building, it’s a little bit easier. I won’t say we do a good 

job; I’ll just say that it’s easier to communicate with folks when you’re only 

worried about 50 folks and people around this town that I communicate with 

as well, much easier to deal with that than it is to deal with 17,000 that the 

Administrator has to think about.

Now, one of the things that helps very much in our current environment 

with our current Administrator is that he answers questions very directly, makes 

it very clear what he wants to do and where we are going. That is helpful as 

you communicate down the chain of command, because generally speaking, 

his direct reports will tell you, they don’t have any doubt about what their 

objectives are and what their guidance is from the Administrator. That’s good 

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because that allows you to be more direct with your subordinates, so that this 

loss of a clear idea of objectives and the ability to transmit back up the chain 

of command becomes a little bit easier than it might have been in the past.

We’re in a pretty good situation from the point of view of leadership being 

clear, but it’s a tough, tough issue to deal with when folks that are working on 

the Space Shuttle or on other hardware feel like they can’t communicate with 

their supervisors. That’s a tough one. It almost needs constant supervision by 

others in the Agency to deal with strategic communications, for example. 

What do you believe the role of NASA will be in the next 50 years, and in 

your case not just in the nation but internationally?

Thankfully, the exploration Vision from the President directs NASA to “pursue international cooperation in the implementation of the Vision.” That’s a 

very powerful statement for a person in my position because I now have a 

piece of paper with the President’s signature on it that says that I need to go 

talk to people and give them the opportunity to come up with a mutually beneficial way to cooperate. Given that building a transportation system is going 

to be extremely expensive, and we are one of only a couple of countries in the 

world, Russia, Europe, maybe India and China, that have the capability to do 

that, not all of them have the resources. 

We’re going to expend such a large portion of the NASA budget on building a transportation system that it’s going to be almost mandatory to have 

cooperation on the international scale in order to be able to actually do something when we get to wherever we are going. So, part of it is just common 

sense. The sum of the parts is greater than the individual sum of the individual 

parts. We can rely on capabilities that others provide that we would not have to 

provide, and vice versa. All of the others will be relying on NASA, for example, 

to provide transportation. In return, we’ll get the use of some of the capabilities that they provide.

So it was laid down in the actual direction in 2004, the program is going to 

go for the next 20 or 30 years, so for a good portion of the next 50 years, NASA 

is going to be in the business of international cooperation for these exploration activities, and as I mentioned earlier, we’re already, in a very huge way, in 

the business of international cooperation with respect to robotic interplanetary 

probes and robotic spacecraft that are observing the Earth from low-Earth 

orbit. That I expect to continue as well, and probably even expand.

What would you say to someone interested in coming to work for NASA?

I’d tell them that this is a terrific place to work, and I’ve been doing this for, 

it’s hard to believe, 13 years now, and every day I get up I literally look forward 

to coming to work. Just look at what we do. You go down and watch a Shuttle 

launch once, and then realize that even if it’s only a small piece, that you have 

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had a piece of the action, you’ve had a part of that incredible achievement. The 

Shuttle is probably the most visible, but all of these other 41-some missions 

that I mentioned, very few of them launched on the Shuttle. They launch on 

other expendable launch vehicles of our country or of other countries.

You can really get a feeling for what the impact that you’re having on 

something that’s real, and you know, somebody that works for other parts 

of the federal government, I don’t think could possibly get the same feeling, 

although I’m sure they’re proud of what they’re doing. I know that myself, 

personally, I wouldn’t get the same feeling working for—I hesitate to give an 

example, but I will—for the IRS [Internal Revenue Service], for example, a 

very important organization, but I doubt that I would get the same day-to-day 

satisfaction that I get working for NASA.

So I’d give an unqualified endorsement on trying to work for NASA. It 

would also come with a caution; if it’s not a caution, it’s advice: if it’s a younger 

person in college or graduate school, it’s that you’d better do well, because it’s 

a high bar. 

I’ll give you an example. We have what we call desk officers, and about 

half of those that work here are international program specialists. They generally, a lot of them, have Ph.D.’s or significant international experience, speak 

languages, etc. When we were hiring a couple of years ago, we put out a call 

to fill three of those desk-officer billets. We got 400 applications. So that tells 

you that people want to work for NASA. We have no problem getting qualified 

people. The problem is finding enough space to keep all the qualified people 

that want to work here. It’s a neat place to work.

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Chapter 13

Robert W. Cobb

Inspector General for NASA

The Inspector General (IG) for NASA conducts objective oversight of NASA programs and operations 

and independently reports to the Administrator, Congress, and the public to further the Agency’s 

accomplishment of its mission. Attorney Robert Cobb came to this position in 2002 after 15 years 

in government service that included working for 9 years in the Office of Government Ethics and for 

15 months in the Office of the Counsel to the President. 

 After being confirmed by the United States Senate, Cobb was appointed to the position of Inspector 

General in April of 2002, where he remained until April 2009. In an interview on 20 March 2007 at 

NASA Headquarters, he explained the responsibilities of this position and the IG office.

The mandate under the Inspector General Act for Inspectors General is 

to root out fraud, waste, and abuse and promote the economy and efficiency 

of the agency where the Inspector General resides. That is an extraordinarily 

broad mandate, and so there’s a tremendous amount of discretion in terms of 

how the resources that are given to an Inspector General Office are applied. 

Organizationally, we have two fundamental business lines. One is audit, and 

the other is investigation.

The investigations focus primarily on violations of law, and that includes 

criminal laws. So our investigative team has law enforcement authority, pursuant to which they act as federal law enforcement officials, conducting investigations, coordinating investigations of violations of criminal statutes with the 

appropriate prosecutorial teams, which are usually the United States Attorneys’ 

offices for the various districts in which the investigations occur.

With respect to the Office of Audits, we have responsibilities in terms of 

carrying out the financial statement audit, which we use a contractor to perform, and we do that both under the IG Act, but also under the Chief Financial 

Officer’s Act. In addition, we conduct myriad performance audits, again with 

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respect to the broad mandate to promote the economy and efficiency of the 

Agency. We employ these audits really to see where we can add value in terms 

of the Agency’s execution of its mission.

How does the mission of this office historically compare to today’s mission?

The mission hasn’t changed. Fundamentally, the objective of providing 

independent and objective reviews of Agency programs and operations is the 

thrust of it. Since the Inspector General Act was passed in 1978, there have 

been some modifications and some additional mandates that are occasionally 

included in the IG Act or in other law.

It is an attempt under our constitutional framework to have an internal 

oversight function that can report not only to the Administrator for purposes 

of the benefit of the Agency, and that the Agency can respond to that internal 

oversight, but also to provide some sunlight and transparency into the government’s operations and the Agency’s operations to the elected officials on 

Capitol Hill, so that they may take such legislative and other action as appropriate in fulfillment of their oversight responsibility.

At various times there are some differences in philosophy in terms of how 

the mission is executed. Independence means different things to different 

people. From my perspective, it is critically important for us to carry out our 

mission to be able to credibly speak to the issues that face NASA. That requires, 

for example, technical talent in our shop; engineers, safety experts, contracting experts, information technology experts, with people with backgrounds in 

those areas. That hasn’t always been the case.

There are relatively minor philosophical approaches towards how business 

is conducted that can change from time to time, and I could go on and on with 

respect to how, similarly in the investigative sphere, there can be emphasis on 

major program fraud, which is something that we try to focus in on, as opposed 

to relatively petty criminal activities. For example, if your metric for success is 

numbers of indictments, maybe you’d focus on pursuing petty thefts of property, 

and maybe you’ll get more indictments than if you focus on major program 

fraud by NASA contractors, which may result in fewer indictments but much 

greater recoveries, and maybe a different type of deterrent than you’d get if you 

were pursuing the petty thefts. So there are different ways of approaching that 

field as well, but the mission has fundamentally remained the same.

Shortly after you started in 2002, the Columbia accident happened. Since 

that time, safety has been a focus. What is your relationship with the 

Office of Safety and Mission Assurance?

I’d say both before and after Columbia, starting out with my confirmation 

hearings, I’ve emphasized the importance of safety in connection with the 

value that our office could bring to NASA. There are different elements of how 

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that would play out, and it’s very complex in the context of how we execute 

our mission. We can conduct compliance audits where we focus in on whether 

or not certain boxes have been checked in terms of the execution of NASA 

policy and directive requirements. In those we can point to NASA’s failure to 

abide its own requirements.

Sometimes those compliance audits don’t get at whether or not there is a 

major, systemic problem in terms of that word culture that is frequently used in 

connection with Columbia. I emphasized when I came in as Inspector General 

that our safety audit staff had, in connection with its audit of Shuttle activities, a responsibility to communicate through me to the NASA Administrator 

whether or not we believed, based on our audit work, that there were any 

impediments to launching the Space Shuttle.

That perspective was something that was unfamiliar to the audit staff when 

I arrived. That staff had been focused on compliance auditing and felt very 

comfortable in connection with the scope of those particular audits to articulate the findings that had been previously made. They were, however, much 

more reluctant to step up to the plate and really be responsible for articulating 

from our perspective whether or not there were any such impediments. That’s 

something that, when I came in, as a first step prior to Columbia, I wanted to 

make sure that if we thought that there was a problem, we would communicate that to the Administrator.

Columbia resulted in a substantial redirection in resources of the Office of 

Inspector General’s auditing capacity, and in investigative functions, because 

there were a number of investigative matters that resulted from debris and the 

theft of debris from the recovery effort. So we dedicated some investigative 

resources there.

I became an observer to the activities of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board, emphasizing that this was the most important thing that had occurred 

at NASA in some time, and that the Office of Inspector General was going to 

be involved in seeing how the activities of the board and the analysis of the 

various issues relating to the accident were handled, and that was important to 

me. I made a recommendation to the Administrator that he appoint me as an 

observer to the board, which he did.

But in terms of the dedication of audit resources, we wanted to—and this 

reflects my overall philosophy of trying to be an impact player in terms of 

making recommendations and getting into the issues that are most significant 

to the management of the Agency, but also to those on the Hill with oversight 

responsibilities and ultimately the American taxpayer—that we were going to 

dedicate resources on how NASA was doing in connection with the Return to 

Flight activity.

Now, there was some overlap between our activities and ultimately the 

Stafford-Covey board that was convened for purposes of following up on the 

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Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report of investigation and recommendations that were included there. But we wanted to make sure, and we 

wanted to use some of our resources, to try to see whether or not there were 

any gaps; whether there was any additional value that we could bring to help 

ensure that the Agency was headed in the right direction after the Columbia

accident.

In terms of ultimately why would we do that, it gets back to this question 

of bringing a focus to issues relating to safety and really aligning the resources 

of our office to make sure that we could get on top of that.

At the same time that we were dedicating audit resources to Return to 

Flight, there was also, as part of the Columbia accident, a notion that there 

were deep cultural problems at NASA in terms of the ability of people to raise 

safety issues. So we also dedicated resources to outlining the circumstances, 

and this was at the same time Bryan O’Connor and the Office of Safety and 

Mission Assurance were also focused on this issue from his perspective. But 

we were examining, in effect, how issues should be raised to superiors, what 

are people’s rights associated with bringing whistle-blower type activities, and 

we published some guidance to NASA employees that can be utilized in connection with those types of issues.

In addition, we dedicated both audit and investigative resources to running down a great number of whistle-blower type concerns, where people had 

issues that they were raising they thought that the Agency should focus in on a 

certain issue, or that they weren’t being listened to in connection with a position that they had, and we dedicated substantial resources to looking at that.

So I’d say both before and after Columbia and to the current day, a substantial portion of our resources is dedicated to safety and mission success. 

I’ll give another example. Both before and after Columbia and before I was 

here, there would be any number of allegations that contractors had provided the Agency substandard parts, parts not in conformity with the contract, 

things that were purchased or manufactured not in accordance with specifications. We investigate these types of serious safety complaints and pursue 

them rigorously.

Another similar type of investigative action involves false certifications, 

where there’s hardware or software that has failed certain testing at a contractor, subcontractor level, and then subsequently is represented as having passed 

those tests. That’s the type of thing that we dedicate substantial resources to 

and, unfortunately, we have had substantial prosecutorial success in bringing 

about convictions of people who have defrauded NASA and the taxpayer in 

what represents a threat to safety.

Notably, in connection with those investigations, when we get allegations 

of product substitution, false certification of testing, that’s the type of thing 

that we would notify the appropriate folks within the Agency to ensure that 

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there are not ongoing safety issues in connection with products, so that we are 

assured of the safe, or as safe as reasonably possible, execution of the mission.

These are some of the types of safety focuses that we have in the Office 

of Inspector General.

Share your strategic vision.

We’ve got a very broad mandate to promote the economy and efficiency of 

the Agency as well as root out fraud, waste, and abuse. So to me—and maybe 

sports analogies are not ideal to use, but I’ll use one in any event. We have 

an opportunity to be a free safety for the Agency and independently roam 

and pick those areas that we think are most important for our dedication of 

resources, so that we can assist the Agency and bring value to the Agency in 

terms of helping the Agency execute its mission. It’s probably no more complex than that in terms of what the vision is.

Much of our focus is on how the Agency institutionally manages its 

resources. I’d say a great deal of our most significant contribution on the audit 

side relates to institutional management issues and how the Agency can utilize 

the resources that it has to most effectively carry out the mission.

How often do you report to Congress; is that a set time or when requested?

Under the Inspector General Act, there’s a semiannual report that our 

office issues, and that’s the primary vehicle. That’s the statutory vehicle pursuant to which we conduct our reporting both to the Agency and to Congress. 

Also a manner of communication is “as needed,” so that if, for example, we 

know that a committee or subcommittee that conducts oversight on NASA is 

interested in a particular issue, we will communicate with them about our 

body of work that addresses that issue, so it again is enabled to conduct the 

oversight responsibilities that it needs to.

There are certain other things that relate to the law enforcement and criminal investigations. That’s the kind of thing that we’re very sensitive to and it 

may, in fact, if there’s a grand jury, be illegal for us to be communicating to others about what is ongoing in connection with a criminal investigation. There 

are things that we feel comfortable communicating both to the Agency and to 

the Hill, and there are other things that we are not comfortable communicating.

There are many issues that we refer to management, and we inform management of, that don’t warrant an investigation or don’t warrant a full audit, 

or we may have preliminary insight to some issue that we think management 

would benefit from that we will communicate, that doesn’t rise to an importance level that it be communicated to Congress.

I’d say philosophically—and this is something I haven’t mentioned, but it’s 

worth talking about—from my perspective in connection with the manner in 

which we can best add value to the Agency, it’s to provide insight to problems as 

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early as we possibly can. That’s challenging, because everyone likes to wait until 

the ink is dry on the report and it’s not going to be subject to any subsequent 

revision before reporting. But in terms of allowing the Agency to take remedial 

action as early as it possibly can, sometimes you can’t wait for a report to be 

finally inked to communicate that there’s serious issues that need to be addressed.

The philosophy is sometimes if there’s an accident or a failure of the 

Agency, it’s not that difficult to come in after an accident or problem has 

occurred and deconstruct what it was that caused that problem. Many times 

when you do that, you’re coming in and you’re telling the Agency what it 

already knows, because it knows after the fact what it was that caused the 

problem. From an example from the home front, when my children are waving their hand around a glass of milk, one might say, “Stop waving your hand 

around the glass of milk, or you will knock it over,” which is a way of preventing a problem, as opposed to conducting an audit after the hand has hit 

the glass and knocked it over and you have spilt milk, and coming back and 

reporting at that point that waving the hand around the glass of milk is not 

particularly helpful in terms of saving the Agency from that particular problem, 

although it may be useful from a lessons-learned standpoint.

So that’s a philosophical approach that I have. If, to the extent we can, we 

can come and say, “Don’t wave your hand around a glass of milk, or it will get 

knocked over and you will have a problem,” that’s a much more effective and 

value-added way of doing business, and we try very hard to do that.

You’ve worked both with a Republican-controlled Congress and a 

Democratic-controlled Congress; does that have any effect on your office 

and in your dealings with the Administration or Congress?

It’s not going to have any effect as far as I can tell in terms of the deployment of our resources. I’ve already outlined for you in general terms what we 

consider to be important and how we deploy our resources to get after those 

types of things.

Of course, we’re very sensitive to congressional requests. If we receive a 

request that we deploy resources in connection with a particular issue that 

the elected officials believe is important, we’re going to consider that very 

closely. Obviously, those elected officials, they believe that it’s warranted that 

we deploy our resources in a certain way, and we’re going to listen to that very 

closely, but ultimately make the decision ourselves on what our responsibilities 

are and how best to deploy those resources.

What impact has NASA had on our society in the past and possibly for 

the future?

NASA represents the most exciting agency in the executive branch. It is a 

technological leader. It’s a leader in terms of what is possible, what can stretch 

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the human imagination and skill and execution of missions that are civil oriented rather than defense oriented. From that standpoint, to the American people and to the world, NASA represents a place where dreams of exploration can 

be executed, and that is, more than anything else, the great value that NASA 

brings to society.

Quite obviously part of that overall mission of exploration involves not 

only the human exploration of space but scientific exploration; for example, 

collecting information that could provide insight on global warming is part of 

that mission. Learning, in terms of scientific exploration—there’s any number 

of endeavors that mankind can devise to fulfill its need to explore and learn. 

That’s what NASA represents, that opportunity.

What do you believe to be the relative importance of human exploration 

and robotic exploration?

There are great debates on what the relative merit of scientific exploration, 

human exploration, robotic exploration, and they all mix and match in various 

ways and overlap. I have debates within my own mind. On the human exploration side, you’ll have a person like John Young articulate that there’s never 

been a successful one-planet species, and that’s sort of a thought-provoker. Of 

course, there is much exploration with the potential for great scientific return 

which can be done robotically that cannot be done at this point in time with 

humans. And there is exploration that could be done with humans, but is so 

much cheaper or involves so much less risk to use robots than conducting 

the exploration with humans that conducting the activity robotically makes 

best sense.

From my perspective, the point of human spaceflight is to put humans into 

space and to have them explore—to put humans into harm’s way to advance 

this notion that humankind is not static, that we’re not just ants. We’re going 

to explore, and I would agree with many who would believe that that is the 

essence of humanity, that we continue to explore and look outward rather than 

be content with a static manner of being. So there is a great balancing of factors to be done in making the trades between robotic and human exploration.

What do you believe to be lessons learned based on your experience 

with NASA?

First, complacency is something to be avoided; to constantly be critical and 

to ask questions of ourselves in terms of how are we doing at all times. There’s 

the Gene Kranz comment to be “tough and competent.” But also I’d say, as part 

of that, that notion of what is toughness and what is competence is to continually ask the difficult questions of what are we doing, why are we doing it, and 

how are we doing it, to assure ourselves that we are not being complacent in 

connection with our execution of the overall mission.

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In terms of preservation of the taxpayers’ resources, in carrying out the 

mission as effectively and efficiently as the Agency can, there are some inherent challenges to managing these overall mission objectives, in terms of the 

manner in which the Agency is organized, that just presents challenges. One 

is obviously the geography and having Centers dispersed around the country.

The other is in making sure that the institutional functions of the Agency, 

such as financial management, information technology, security, contract management, that these things are properly aligned with the missions, and that 

the missions are fully integrated with those institutional requirements which 

are important for purposes of preserving the public fisc. This is important in 

terms of the ability to accomplish the overall mission, because if, for example, 

the Congress or the American people believe that NASA can’t conduct its lofty 

missions effectively and efficiently, the Agency’s ability to do that would be 

at risk.

What is your perception of the NASA culture?

That’s an extremely difficult question, and it gets to what is a culture. A 

culture, I guess, in terms of this question, is how do people feel about the 

execution of the mission, and is the Agency fully dedicated to maximize the 

benefit that it gets from the taxpayer in terms of executing the mission.

I’d say there are a lot of different cultures. I’d say, overall, there’s a culture 

of people wanting to do what they think is right by the taxpayer in executing 

their vision of what NASA should be doing. So people are passionate. I think 

there’s a culture—and this may be another way of saying what I’m saying—

there’s a culture of passion about the business.

The problem with that is that people have different passions, and those 

passions conflict in terms of the battle for resources to effectuate those visions 

and that passion. So to an extent there isn’t a single, unified culture. There 

isn’t a single, unified vision for each person in terms of what should be done. 

There’s the President’s Vision as implemented by the Administrators at NASA, 

and that Vision gets coordinated with the laws of the United States, the Congress as the elected officials, so that people down the chain of command don’t 

always get what they want in connection with how the mission is executed.

So I think the fundamental point, and it’s positive, is that there’s a culture 

of great passion, talent, experience, smarts, at NASA, and there are great challenges in taking that passion and coordinating it and having it executed from 

the mission standpoint.

What would you say to someone considering a career with NASA?

There are a number of people who have contacted me and indicated they 

have a particular expertise that might fit in with NASA. I couldn’t encourage 

them more to come and join the NASA team, in part because I think that, one, 

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I’m a big fan of government service, but, two, I don’t think there’s a better 

place to come and learn and make contributions towards the advancement of 

these things that are really so great.

Any final thoughts?

I just express my thanks for your coming and talking to me. I’d say that 

I’m a big fan of not only the Agency but the role of the Office of Inspector 

General and the importance of it in terms of being able to step back and look 

at Agency operations and provide advice and counsel as to whether or not, 

from the independent perspective that the office has, in whether the Agency 

is proceeding down the right track. 

I think it’s an invaluable tool, and I also think, from the investigative side, 

it’s an absolutely necessary tool, because unfortunately there are those who 

will either breach the public trust or will defraud the United States and the 

taxpayer in connection with the spending of taxpayers’ money.

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Chapter 14

J. T. Jezierski 

Deputy Chief of Staff, White House Liaison

J. T. Jezierski went to work at NASA in July 2003. Prior to coming to the space agency, he had been 

in the Office of Presidential Personnel at the White House, where, as Deputy Associate Director, he 

assigned political appointees to the various agencies. When the position of White House Liaison to 

NASA came open, he joined the Headquarters staff. He coordinated all activities between the Agency 

and the White House, the offices of the executive branch, and its various departments. 

 Also, he coordinated and served as the liaison for the political appointees at NASA that include the 

Senate-confirmed appointees (the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator), the nonconfirmed, 

and the Senior Executive Service employees. In the fall of 2005, he also became the Deputy Chief of 

Staff of the space agency. He resigned from his position in June 2007. While with NASA, Jezierski 

served under two Administrators. He talked about their goals, their management styles, and his work 

during an interview on 20 March 2007 at NASA Headquarters. 

When I came on board, I worked with then-Administrator Sean O’Keefe 

and Chief of Staff John Schumacher, and then in 2005 when Administrator 

Mike Griffin came, I stayed on as the White House Liaison and was fortunate 

that fall to be able to add the Deputy Chief of Staff role. That allowed me to get 

more involved in the inner workings of the Agency. I would have other duties 

as assigned, but then I’m also someone who likes tasks so that the Chief of 

Staff, the Administrator, the Deputy Administrator can focus on the big-picture 

items, things they need to do. I have learned a tremendous amount from individuals, but also about our government, and what our Agency is trying to do, 

our mission. It’s been quite a learning experience for me.

What are some of the lessons that you’ve learned?

I arrived in July of 2003; this was at a time after the Columbia accident, 

of course, and during a very dark time for the Agency. A lot of uncertainties 

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abounded within the Agency of what we were going to do and what our mission was going to be.

One of my first projects, one of the first meetings that I was sitting in on, was 

how NASA was going to respond to the CAIB [Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board] Report, which was going to be coming out in the August/Labor Day/

September timeframe of that year. That was the first thing, so it was truly baptism 

by fire to come in here, be facing the release of the CAIB Report, and then to 

see the development, to witness the policy discussions that were going on that 

led to the wonderful announcement in January of 2004 of the Vision for Space 

Exploration by President George [W.] Bush here at NASA Headquarters.

I saw the back-and-forth, the discussions, the debate going on post-Columbia

throughout the summer of ’03, to the announcement of the Vision in January of 

2004. Then, I experienced throughout 2004 the back-and-forth within Washington 

and across this country about the merits of the Vision, whether it was sustainable, 

aspects of which we’re still dealing with, and then also the political environment 

that was going on, whether it would have legs beyond the presidential election, 

after the presidential election. Then to start seeing the budget fights that went on, 

seeing all that and how it related directly to NASA, was fascinating.

I’ve been very fortunate to work with two incredible individuals and mentors, Administrator O’Keefe and Administrator Griffin, both with different leadership styles, but I learned from them and respect them both tremendously. 

Obviously, everyone knows their biographies and their backgrounds were 

different, and those were clearly reflected in the way they managed the organization, and pros and cons to both, I’m sure. But to be able to witness and see 

how they managed and how they dealt with people, I’ll be able to look back 

at that for a long time to come. 

Administrator O’Keefe had such an amazing challenge post-Columbia to 

bring this Agency through, and the things that he was able to accomplish were 

admirable in terms of leading up to the Vision. Dr. Griffin with his incredible 

technical expertise, to harness that and put this Agency on a foundation for 

years to come—it’s just been incredible to watch that.

I’ve been able to watch how you get an agency of 18,000 civil servants 

across 10 Centers to coalesce around this Vision for Space Exploration, and 

that’s been, obviously, a challenge, but just to say, “This is what this Agency is 

going to be doing,” and everyone to get involved, it’s been amazing.

Share your insight of the leadership styles of these two Administrators.

Administrator O’Keefe was given the task of being the Comforter in Chief. 

He led us through one of the darkest periods of our Agency’s history, and he 

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had to prove and show that NASA was still competent, that NASA was still 

important, and the NASA family could rally and bring us through that dark 

time. And I believe he did so, so much so that that allowed the President to 

have the confidence in the NASA workforce to give us the challenge to implement the Vision for Space Exploration. 

When Dr. Griffin came on board, he brought the technical expertise and 

the passion, and the absolute firm belief that the Vision, technically and specifically, was the way this Agency needed to go. He spoke not just to the big 

picture of space exploration as important and those kinds of general themes, 

but really was able to connect deeply with the engineers, the scientists, to 

say, “Look. For many reasons, this is what America should be doing, for many 

reasons this is the path.” As he often says, “If America is going to have a space 

program, this is the space program we need to have.”

And they just relate to people in different ways. I’d see that personally in 

their dynamics, they related to people differently. Their leadership styles are 

different, but they’re both effective, and that’s what’s admirable to me. What 

that has taught me and what I’ve been able to learn is that when you’re a 

leader, it really is about the people you’re leading, and how you relate to them, 

and what you bring out in them, and to know who you’re leading. That’s the 

most important thing, and I think they both have that ability to do that.

Mr. O’Keefe knew that everyone needed to rally around what this Agency 

stood for, its existence. Dr. Griffin knows them because he’s been in their 

shoes, and so it’s a different perspective. But they both were able to rally and 

lead people, so that’s been fascinating. 

One of the greatest honors—I consider it an honor, an opportunity I had—was 

to be able to stay on board with this transition of Administrators, and I was with 

Dr. Griffin during his confirmation hearings. Just to be able to spend time with him, 

and see the vision that he had for NASA. He had been at NASA before, so to say he 

hit the ground running is an understatement to the nth degree. He knew what he 

wanted to do, and we really got going quickly because he didn’t have the time. We 

had a Return to Flight mission that we had to get going, had to fly.

So he was ready, and that was amazing to see, and I will cherish the two or 

so months that he and I worked throughout his confirmation process. To see 

someone lay out their vision—and when I say “vision,” I’ll use that vision as the 

lowercase v, as opposed to the capital-letter V, Vision for Space Exploration—to 

then see Mike Griffin’s lowercase vision for how he was going to implement. 

That was inspiring to see, and something that I needed too, because after you’re 

in DC you need to recharge your batteries after a while, and to see him come 

on board really with just guns blazing was exciting.

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How do you help reengage the Agency in the business of exploration in 

your positions?

In the communications I have with folks, particularly with the White House 

and also at other agencies, my job is to make sure that NASA’s on the radar 

screen and to make sure that what we do is understood and valued. Having 

worked in the White House, I’ve seen when you have issues of large significance, meaning the war on terror, economic considerations, or in Washington 

the headline of the day—in that environment, you just have to be a constant 

drumbeat for what we’re doing and to remind people that we’re here.

NASA doesn’t have as big a challenge as other agencies do because we, 

for good and bad, can get in the headlines very quickly. It’s a blessing and 

a curse in terms of getting folks in the business of exploration. Also one of 

the challenges we face is just to get people inspired in the building, in the 

building meaning within NASA, “This is what we’re doing.” And we faced 

that challenge in 2004 when the Vision was announced, and through today, 

although hopefully less and less, but just to make sure that folks know this 

is where we’re headed.

How will you communicate that there is more than the human spaceflight 

element of NASA?

One of the things that Dr. Griffin has said is that exploration is not just 

activities; it’s a mindset. This is what NASA should be doing. We should be 

always moving forward and exploring, doing the challenging things, and 

whether that be manned or unmanned, it falls under that category. 

Unique to NASA is that you have people who work here who have wanted 

to work here their entire lives. This is their life’s ambition. But those people are 

not necessarily astronauts. Those people are not necessarily Shuttle program 

managers, engineers even. These are people that work in Human Resources, 

these are the people that make this building run, who’ve wanted to work at 

NASA. You know the old cliché about working to put men on the Moon, that’s 

what they’re doing in their tasks. That’s an interesting challenge that management faces, too, because folks here have more of a vested interest, because this 

is their life’s work, this is what they’ve always wanted to do. And so people are 

very involved in what the Agency is doing. They have a stake in what’s going on. 

I tease my friends, my other colleagues in the White House Liaison world, 

to say NASA has the “cool factor” and that is important, and we have to recognize that. Whereas we can use that to inspire folks and get people to work 

really hard, you also have to be careful because you don’t want to dampen 

that, and you don’t want to do things that trample on somebody’s dream. 

That’s why they’re here working at NASA, so that’s part of the management 

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challenges that we have at NASA that I don’t think a lot of other places have. 

That’s always a consideration.

What do you believe to be NASA’s role in today’s society?

NASA should show, and be the leader in showing, the best of America in 

terms of the ability to define a mission, the ability to complete a mission, and 

the ability to inspire individuals of all backgrounds to be able to participate in 

that mission, and to say that at our best, this is what America and Americans 

can do. People are proud of NASA and people are proud of our achievements. 

We can’t take that for granted, and we have to continue to not rest on what 

happened before I was born, in 1969. We must say, “This is the agency that 

you should be proud of, and hopefully will continue to be proud of, because 

we’re moving forward.”

NASA should be a symbol of what is right about America and also about 

American government efficiency, results, productivity, those kinds of things. 

We’re a part of the government. We also shouldn’t forget that and should 

recognize that we should be always a good steward of the taxpayers’ money, 

resources, and trust. That’s what NASA should symbolize. It should symbolize to the American people, on a very technical level, that we’re money well 

spent, and also it should be an example to other government agencies of 

effectiveness.

What challenges do you foresee with budget and fiscal support to achieve 

the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration?

Our challenge is the same as any other agency, and that is to demonstrate 

our relative relevance compared to other issues. We are one of several federal agencies fighting for limited resources, and in an economic environment 

where budgets are being cut across the board, and while there’s a war going 

on, that’s our challenge. When you look at our budget and our requirements 

over decades, that’s the challenge. The challenge is simply just lack of money 

at NASA; there is considerable competition for the funds that are available. We 

don’t want to be an undue burden to the American taxpayer, generally speaking, because we know there are other things within the government that need 

to be done. We just have to show that what we are doing is important.

Do you expect your position to evolve over the next years?

I do because of a couple of reasons. One, because I deal with political 

issues and I’m a political appointee of the Bush administration, proudly so, 

knowing that the sand is running through the hourglass on the Bush administration, and there will be a lot of challenges. As this administration winds 

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down, and thus my tenure and a lot of our tenures wind down, that’s going to 

change the dynamics a lot. But also, my job has always been day to day. My job 

by definition as Deputy Chief of Staff has always been day to day, not in terms 

of the status of it, but in terms of my assignments and things. I do things as 

they come and as they’re assigned, which is neither good nor bad; that’s what 

I do. I don’t have the luxury to be able to set out a plan, you know, “I want to 

do this in two months.” 

Share some of the events and episodes that you’ve encountered since 

you’ve been here.

Working the transition between Administrators was definitely one of the 

highlights. And, just things within the building that happen. Whether it be personnel issues or “Go cover this meeting,” I’m here to provide support. In my 

role it trickles down, meaning that it’s not really about me. If the Administrator 

can’t do something and if it gets bumped somewhere else, I’m standing by ready. 

Regarding the White House, it is more of, “Hey, we need this information really 

quick.” It’ll come at odd times, too, to say, “We’ve got this issue coming up. Can 

you confirm this for me?” That happens pretty frequently, actually, and it’s usually 

in response to “Hey, we heard this, is this true?” that kind of thing. That’s my job.

What do you see as the most challenging aspect of what you face during 

the rest of your tenure?

I’ll speak to the Agency first, and obviously budget is number one. Also, 

just the technical aspects of launching successful Shuttle missions, obviously 

as we’ve seen, the victim of hailstorms and such. The challenge here for me 

will be to keep people engaged, keep people focused when individuals are on 

different timelines. We’re talking about the leadership of this Agency; as I mentioned earlier, the sand is running through the hourglass, and we’ve got a year 

and six months left to set the foundation for a vision that is going to last for 10, 

20, 30 years. So when you have people talking about setting program timelines 

that are decades long, presenting those plans to leadership that are only going 

to be here for a year and six months, that’s going to be a challenge, and it’s not 

unique to NASA, obviously. The President himself has to go through with this, 

but that’s going to be a challenge, no doubt about it, and it’ll be a question of 

what steps we take to alleviate that. So that’ll be our number-one challenge.

Prior to when you came here in July 2003, were you aware of the 

announcement for the Vision for Space Exploration?

No, not at all. The only policy statements that had been made at that time, 

a quasi-policy statement, was when the President made his remarks to the 

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nation after the Columbia accident, saying that the Shuttle would fly again and 

we would return to flight. That was the only one of that kind that you could 

hang your hat on—first of all, everyone waited to see what the CAIB said, and 

then the policy discussions really kicked in in the fall of ’03. I wasn’t privy to 

these meetings, but I heard over the Christmas holiday of ’03, and then the 

announcement in January of ’04. But it was not at all a foregone conclusion 

that the Vision would be announced at all, let alone when I came on board.

It’s just been a lot of events occurring, from when I came on board, 

to the CAIB, to the Vision announcement, to helping on the Aldridge 

Commission [President’s Commission on Implementation of United States 

Space Exploration Policy, June 2004], to Administrator O’Keefe leaving, to Dr. 

Griffin coming on board.

What would you say to those interested in working for the space agency?

To absolutely do it. The greatest thing about this Agency is that you never 

know whom you’ll meet and what you’ll learn because there are so many 

amazing people. I’ve tried to use my lack of technical experience as an advantage, to be able to just go to folks and say, “Can you tell me what you do? I 

don’t understand it. Could you explain this to me?” And some of the best conversations I have had are with people answering that.

That’s been inspiring on two levels, because first of all I’m able to learn, 

which I love. Secondly, in doing that, the people get excited, and you see their 

passion, and with that it inspires me, so that’s been incredible. NASA is full of 

people like that. In every Center and every office there are people like that. 

That’s the kind of environment you have here.

What do you believe to be NASA’s most important role for the nation?

NASA should be the Agency that Americans look to when we talk about 

exploration. That’s what we do, we’re in the business of exploration, and 

Americans should be able to be proud of our country and of our government 

by looking at NASA’s achievements. That’s what our role should be—to be the 

Agency that exemplifies that for the American taxpayer.

Are there other thoughts you would like to share about your NASA 

experiences?

Some people have preconceived notions about political appointees and 

who they are and what they do. Political appointees are individuals who are 

only here for a short amount of time, appointed by the President or his administration to work at agencies, and I am proud of the people who have served 

here and currently serve here as political appointees. I hope that people will 

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not look down upon political appointees, but know that we serve at the pleasure of the President, and we also want to work here at NASA.

I’ve not had to twist arms to get any of our political appointees to come 

here. There’s always been a double interest to serve, because, one, they want to 

serve this President, but then also work here at NASA, and I hope that people 

see that. We may not all be engineers or scientists, but we have a passion for 

what we do and want to work together and learn.

I’m very grateful, too, that both Administrators that I’ve worked for have 

been incredible mentors to me, and friends. I’ve learned so much from them 

and people like Courtney Stadd. I want to say this for history’s sake, that I 

couldn’t do my job without my friend Scott Pace, who is one of the smartest 

individuals I’ve ever known. I would say to Scott, and also to Dr. Griffin, but 

particularly to Scott, that he’s taught me everything I know about space, but 

he hasn’t taught me everything he knows about space.

I met Scott and Courtney the first day I came to NASA Headquarters when 

I was working in presidential personnel and did a visit to NASA, and I’m thankful now to call them both colleagues and friends. But people like that that I’ve 

worked with, that are just incredible. 

And I’d like to share something else, just to get the facts out there. President 

George W. Bush is a fan of NASA and also a fan of space. He definitely likes 

what we do, and it’s noticed at the White House. So we’ve seen that in a lot of 

the things that he’s done, and one of the ways that he’s done that is by making 

time for NASA. 

One of the things we do is we take astronaut crews over to the White 

House when they come back from their missions. The first activity I was 

involved with was in 2003. In October we took the International Space Station 

Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox and Don Pettit and their Russian counterpart Nikolai Budarin, over to meet with the President, and Administrator 

O’Keefe went over. These are just brief photo opportunities, but the pictures 

are released to the press, and I think it’s exciting for the astronauts, and it’s 

good because it shows that the President’s involved. It also gets us in front of 

him and in front of his staff, so that’s good. That was in 2003.

In January 2004, the President made a call to JPL [Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory], I believe it was January 6. He called Dr. Charles Elachi and the 

Mars Rover Team upon the successful landing of the first Mars Rover, talked 

with them from the Oval Office, and congratulated them on the successful 

mission. Then, of course, in mid-January, he made the Vision announcement 

here at Headquarters. That was exciting because I had not been involved in a 

presidential event before, and just all the work that went into it. Glen Mahone 

was the head of Public Affairs at the time. He and his team did a terrific job of 

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actually preparing. There were questions about where the event was going to 

be held, and it was decided to be held at NASA Headquarters. They built the 

stage up, set up the room, and all the preparations for it, it was pretty exciting 

to see.

The President came in; he met with a group of folks beforehand. Actually, 

he met with a group of astronauts beforehand, including John Young and Gene 

Cernan from the Apollo era, who the President quoted. And then Shuttle astronauts and those who had been on the International Space Station. He talked 

with them and he said, “I’m really excited to be here. I’m really excited to be 

announcing what I’m going to be announcing today.” 

But then he also added sort of a, “Let’s keep our focus also on winning this 

war on terror,” which was not prompted. He just sort of said it—and showed 

that it was not mutually exclusive that, yes, he was excited about what the 

announcement he was going to be making, but that we were still focused on 

winning the war on terror. So it showed that it was definitely a focus.

And then, afterwards, Dr. Ed Weiler and Orlando Figueroa showed him a 

model of one of the Mars Rovers. We presented him a model of the Mars Rover, 

which I’m told is in his personal study.

Actually, here’s a funny story. I was called, I think it was last year, by the 

President’s personal secretary, who said that they were doing some renovation 

in the Oval Office and in the West Wing, and they dropped the Mars Rover 

model. So I went and picked it up, got it fixed, took it back. Usually some of 

those things, those presentation items we call them, just go to the library or 

into a file—but that one is significant, that he’s proud of.

The Vision speech was just an incredible day. The President was down in 

Headquarters and now there’s a plaque downstairs where he announced the 

Vision, and that was just tremendously exciting for NASA. Later that summer, 

obviously in July, we celebrated the 35th anniversary of Apollo 11, and we 

were going to just take the crew of Apollo 11 over to the White House, but it 

ended up being an event over at the National Air and Space Museum, awarding the Ambassador of Exploration Awards with the lunar samples. All of the 

Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo astronauts and their spouses were invited to the 

White House. 

We maybe had about 20 Apollo-era astronauts go: Neil Armstrong, Buzz 

Aldrin, and Mike Collins, also Jack Schmitt was there, Mr. Cernan, and John 

Young. I don’t remember all the names at this point, but just seeing the three of 

Apollo 11 crew together was very exciting. They all went into the White House 

to meet with the President, and then afterwards the crew did a few interviews. 

They did a White House chat, and there’s a picture of Mr. Armstrong with 

Barney the dog that’s kind of interesting. 

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But just to see those three and the history—we were told they hadn’t been 

together at an event like that for quite a while. So that was very exciting, to 

be a part of that.

At that time I mentioned, part of the Vision was the creation of the Aldridge 

Commission, which looked at where we were going with implementing the 

Vision. I was a staff member as the White House Liaison, on that commission, and at the end, when the report came out, they presented it to the Vice 

President [Dick Cheney]. That was in early fall of ’04, presented to the Vice 

President in the Roosevelt Room. I helped coordinate that meeting.

It’s very difficult to get on the President’s schedule, obviously, and in 

2005 we took a set of Expedition crewmembers over, not each one after their 

individual mission. It’s easier that way, particularly when there’s only one 

American crewmember per Expedition. I feel it’s difficult but also feel it’s not 

a good use of the President’s time to be continually requesting for one person, 

so we combined the visit of Expedition 7, 8, 9, and 10. So they went over—Ed 

Lu and Leroy Chiao, Mike Foale, and their families went over to the White 

House and met with the President in the Oval Office.

Then we got to July, the launch of STS-114, Return to Flight mission, and 

the first mission when they had a lot of congressional interest and congressional delegations going. That launch was scrubbed, which was disappointing, 

but good in another aspect in that the day they rescheduled it, the First Lady 

was going to Orlando to give a speech, which led to her attending the launch, 

and I was able to help facilitate a little bit of that. We watched it from Banana 

Creek, and then Mrs. [Laura] Bush spoke to the launch team afterwards. I had 

heard also that she was very moved by it, and it was very powerful. And that 

was my first launch as well, to see, so that was exciting.

I helped with the President calling the STS-114 crew while they were on 

orbit. There was a video telecon between the crew and him. That was fun to 

help coordinate as well. Of course our folks at the Johnson Space Center did 

the work on that, but again, that speaks to what I do in my job, just kind of 

help facilitate paperwork.

It’s usually two waves for these visits to the Oval Office. One is when I 

put the request in, which is a lot of paperwork and background, which is fine. 

But then the week before and the day of, is just all about that, and it takes 

up all my time, because it’s back and forth between me and the White House. 

Questions like, “Does Michael Fincke want to be called Mike?” It’s all those 

little things. It’s just all-encompassing, which is fun because hopefully it pays 

off in that everyone has a good time and all goes well.

In February of 2006, the STS-114 crew went over to the White House for 

their visit, the first Shuttle crew we had taken over since Columbia. Commander 

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Eileen Collins and her crew and their families. Then for the STS-121 launch in 

July of ’06, the Vice President showed interest and was going to be at Daytona, 

Florida, that night for a NASCAR night race, and so he was going to come 

down. I went down early to help Pam Adams, who I have to mention is an 

angel and is one of the best people at this Agency at her job. We worked with 

the advance team and the Vice President came and walked around some of the 

facilities. Scott Thurston was his tour guide. He and his wife, Dr. Lynne Cheney, 

and some of their grandchildren were there. You could tell he was excited and 

enjoyed it. Unfortunately there was a scrub, but he came and showed his support for NASA, so that was good.

The President called the STS-121 crew as well, but that call was not video, 

and it wasn’t actually a public call, either. The 114 call was on C-SPAN; it was 

on the news; it was covered live; everyone got to see it. The 121 call was just 

personal; it was a “Hello, keep up the good work” kind of thing. 

Then, in October, we had a bunch of crews, a backlog of crews to go over 

to the White House for their visits. So it was STS-121, -115, and Expeditions 

11, 12, and 13. Jeff Williams, Expedition 13, had just come back maybe a week 

before because he couldn’t really stand for long periods of time. That event 

was so large, because it was so many crews and their families, that instead of 

being in the Oval Office, it was in the East Room of the White House. Unlike 

the other visits, I actually was able to peek my head in and watch as the 

President greeted them, and he’s just very enthusiastic and really enjoyed talking with the crews.

Then, in 2007, they requested astronaut presence at an event for Black 

History Month, and so Joan Higginbotham and Robert Curbeam, who had just 

come back from STS-116, went over to represent NASA and were recognized 

during the event. So those are kind of the presidential White House involvement of things that I wanted to share.

I wanted to add one other thing that I’ve been involved with. I’m extremely 

honored to have been a small part in helping with the Congressional Space 

Medal of Honor, presented by the President on behalf of Congress. I think 

13 had been presented when I came on board, and one of the things that 

Administrator O’Keefe told me in my first meeting with him when I was on 

board, he gave me a list of things and said, “I want these things done.” 

One of them was working the paperwork to submit for the Congressional 

Space Medal of Honor. It was for the crews, posthumously, of the Columbia

and Challenger. We had taken the Columbia families over to see the President. 

We took them over on the one-year anniversary. They were back in town, 

and at that ceremony they were told that the crew would be receiving the 

Congressional Space Medal of Honor, and so that was very moving that we 

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were able to do that. We actually then presented it here at NASA Headquarters, 

which was very, very powerful.

Then I was truly honored in July of that year that we did the same for the 

Challenger families. Personally, that was very moving to me because when 

I was growing up I was a big NASA fan, and I remember where I was when 

the Challenger accident happened, and that was one of those events in all 

of our lives that shapes you. I think my generation is a Shuttle generation, 

and that was truly a defining moment for my generation, and to then see the 

family members. 

We had a TV showing video clips of their training, of the Challenger training, and to be able to be a part of that was incredibly moving just on many 

levels. It was just very touching, and I was very honored to be a part of that, 

and honored to be in an agency that takes care of our own like that, remembers our history and learns from our history. That was exciting.

Then, finally, we got another one approved and signed off by the President 

for [Robert] Bob Crippen and presented at the 25th anniversary of STS-1 in 

April of last year. That was exciting, too, because he’s kind of a personal hero 

of mine as well, the pilot of STS-1, a true pioneer. 

I look up to so many folks that I’ve read about, and then to see them in 

the halls and have conversations with them has been quite an experience and 

quite an education. 

Are there some aspects of the job that you hope to accomplish before you 

leave this position?

I hope I’ve put some processes in place that it would be an easy transition for someone to come in and see what I’ve done, and I’ve put plans and 

procedures in place so things can just happen on their own. On a personal 

level, I’m one of those people that prefer to be in the background. I’m a staff 

person. That’s what I like to do. And whether this is good or bad, I’m one of 

those folks more noticed when I’m gone than when I’m here.

I should add, by the way, on a personal level, that being a part of NASA is 

an honor. I’m from West Virginia. There’s not a huge space contingent there, 

but there was a children’s book that a lady from my hometown wrote called 

No Starry Nights. It was about the fact that where I’m from is a steel-mill town, 

so you never could see the stars because there’s just the haze in the air. But I 

come from a family that says that you can see them even though they’re not 

there. They’re there. 

That kind of thing is important going forward. I mention the support of 

my family, it’s helpful to me, because a lot of times I’m very nervous going 

into meetings because I could get eaten alive. I don’t know the technical stuff, 

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I don’t know the engineering, but you’ve got to go in there and say, “This is 

what we’re all about, so let’s work together. Don’t try to overwhelm me with 

theories and stats, because you’ll get me, so let’s just figure this out.” That’s the 

challenge and the thrill of it all.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 15

S. Pete Worden

Center Director, Ames Research Center

As a young child in the 1950s, Pete Worden remembers watching the country’s first rockets being 

launched (and blowing up) with his elementary school classmates on very small black-and-white 

television sets. It was then he “got very excited about the space program.” During this time period, 

his great-aunt, who traveled widely throughout the world, returned from the United Kingdom with a 

book for him on astronomy. Although it was really a book for high school students, Worden read the 

book and then said he “got really, really excited” and decided to become an astronomer. 

 In 1967 at the University of Michigan, he found 119 others who were going to be astronomers 

largely because of the Apollo program. At the end of their studies, six received undergraduate degrees, 

three went on to graduate school, and two earned doctorates, including Worden. For the next 30 

years, his professional career as an officer with the United States Air Force (USAF) provided him with a 

number of opportunities to work with the nation’s space agency. In an interview on 3 December 2007, 

he talked about these experiences and his role as director of the Ames Research Center in California.

My true love was always space exploration and the interest really in a 

longer-term topic: are there Earth-like planets around other stars and other life 

on those? So that’s been a guiding interest. 

I had a slight detour of 29 years in the Air Force, and when I was an 

undergraduate we were involved in the Vietnam War. My father was an Air National 

Guard pilot and a corporate pilot as well, so I was persuaded to become an Air 

Force ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] cadet. During the late 1960s, I was at 

the University of Michigan as both a science officer and Air Force officer student. 

When I graduated in 1971, there was the option of going to pilot training 

or going off to graduate school. The Vietnam War was winding down. I really 

didn’t see they had a lot of need for pilots, so I chose to go to graduate school, 

which I was given what’s called an educational delay. I went to the University 

of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona. In 1975, I finished graduate work. It wasn’t 

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clear whether the Air Force needed me or not, but in the end they said they 

did. We wangled an assignment at the National Solar Observatory in New 

Mexico, where I’d done some of my dissertation work. That’s where I began to 

understand the power of political connections. 

Part of the reason that I got that assignment is the director of the National 

Solar Observatory in Tucson was a good friend of Senator Barry Goldwater, 

who at that time was the ranking minority member of the Armed Services 

Committee. He got ahold of the Air Force and helped get me an assignment 

to do astronomy. I spent the next few years as an astronomer, also as an Air 

Force officer. It worked out pretty well because my only other job offer was a 

postdoctoral position at Harvard, and a lieutenant in the Air Force gets paid 

more than a postdoctoral fellow. Also I was getting to do what I liked, which 

was really observational astronomy. 

I spent four years at that observatory and ended up marrying the librarian. 

I had no intention of really staying in the Air Force, and we came up with 

this clever ploy that I would move to Los Angeles and be an adjunct faculty 

member of astronomy at UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles]. 

But I had this day job as a captain in the Air Force at what’s now the Space 

and Missile [Systems] Center. I was excited about it because I got assigned to a 

highly classified program, which I still can’t tell you about. What was interesting about it is when I went in for an interview, it was at a place where one of 

these set of three or four vault doors would slam shut as you walked through, 

so it looked like Get Smart [1965 television program]. They wouldn’t tell me 

what they did other than it was really cool. It turned out to be really cool. 

One thing led to another, and I got involved in various exciting programs. 

I got promoted early to major; then someone decided I’d be good to go to 

the Pentagon in Washington, DC, to work on the Secretary of Defense’s staff. 

However, it turned out the day I showed up was the day that President Ronald 

Reagan had given the so-called “Star Wars” speech [Strategic Defense Initiative 

(SDI), 23 March 1983]. I got involved right at the beginning of that program, 

ended up being assigned as the military assistant to James Fletcher, who was 

running the study that we were going to do in missile defense. 

Fletcher had been the NASA Administrator during the latter part of Apollo 

program and was to be the Administrator again. Once again I had a connection 

with space science. I might add when I was in graduate school and at the 

[National Solar] Observatory, I was involved in a couple of NASA solar physics 

Spacelab missions as a coinvestigator. It was fun—I always had this strong 

interest in space science.

I’d spent time after that in missile defense, was on an arms control delegation 

in Geneva, Switzerland, for a year and a half. It was interesting—just like out of 

a movie, this big table, and on that side was the Soviets with the little Soviet flag, 

and the other side was Americans. You looked at yourself and said, “Well, this is 

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real, that’s the real Soviets, it isn’t a movie.” It was clear to me that space was a key 

part of that. But this got me more and more involved in a lot of the policy issues. 

I was the special assistant to the head of the Missile Defense Program, 

SDI Program, General James Abrahamson, who was the second Director of 

Space Operations at NASA with the Space Shuttle. He had been selected for 

an astronaut in the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program in the 1960s 

but never flew. I might add, when I was a captain, I was one of the Air Force 

nominees to be an astronaut but wasn’t selected for reasons I never understood. 

I thought I was great! I always felt a little bit of jealousy to the people that got 

selected and got to fly. It’s worked out well despite that.

At any rate, I spent most of the 1980s and ’90s involved in missile defense 

development policy. Probably the key job I had was because I knew various 

political types, including then-Senator, and soon-to-be Vice President, Dan 

Quayle. When he was elected Vice President, I was asked to serve on the 

National Space Council at the White House, which was reconstituted from the 

1960s National Space Council. I was the staff officer there for initiatives, and 

particularly the Moon-Mars initiative [Space Exploration Initiative]. 

You might recall President George H. W. Bush announced the Space 

Exploration Initiative, and so it was really exciting, although at that time I 

became a bit of a skeptic of NASA’s commitment to those kinds of things. 

Frankly, I fought with NASA and was particularly at odds with the NASA 

Administrator; our whole office was at the White House. We thought we ought 

to be able to get to the Moon a lot cheaper. In fact, I (and a couple of the other 

folks) wrote the speech where Vice President Quayle first used the words 

“faster, cheaper, better.” NASA Administrator Dan Goldin later perverted it to 

“faster, better, cheaper,” but it was faster, cheaper, and better.

I was there for about two years, and the initiative failed, basically, for a 

whole lot of reasons. But then Mike Griffin, a name we’re pretty familiar with 

today, was the head of technology in the Missile Defense Program and an old 

colleague of mine and friend. He wanted to go run the exploration program, 

so we had arranged to “outwork” him to NASA. I took his job as the head of 

technology in the Missile Defense Program and was there only two years, but 

it was a neat job. I was the world’s second richest colonel after [Muammar al-]

Qaddafi. I had $2 billion a year to spend. 

A fun program, we did a lot of space things. Two of them were particularly 

exciting. One was the mission called Clementine, the first U.S. mission back to 

the Moon in 20 years. And, basically, a sneaky space weapon test. But it was 

also a way to get to the Moon. We were originally supposed to go to an asteroid. 

The second one was the DCX Delta Clipper, a reusable rocket. Both of 

these had been started when Mike Griffin was the head of technology. I finished them. But particularly the Clementine mission, it wasn’t done by the 

time the election occurred. 

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The new [Clinton] administration was a little bit disorganized, so it wasn’t 

until late in 1993 that they finally got around to putting a new director into 

the Missile Defense Program. The new administration wasn’t very happy about 

space weapons or anything that smacked of that, but I was fairly hard over that 

we ought to go do that, so I eventually got fired over it, frankly. 

But the Clementine mission got launched and was the one that might 

have discovered ice on the Moon. It’s still an open issue, but it did discover 

something interesting. I feel that was a start of our current effort to refocus on 

going back to the Moon.

It was an interesting couple years. After that I was back in the Air Force, 

but some Air Force senior generals thought I was a good guy, so they made 

me a Wing Commander. I ran one of the four space wings. Our wing actually 

flew most of the military satellites, so I used to tell people for about a year 

and a half that I was the commander of the U.S. Star Fleet, 50th Space Wing. 

During that period, that wing took over this entire base here at Moffett 

Field, so this is the second time that I’ve had a senior position related to Moffett 

Field. Our headquarters were in Colorado Springs, Colorado; I was there for a 

few years in various staff jobs and got promoted to brigadier general.

Then 9/11 happened [2001]. I was well known to people like Defense Secretary 

Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary for Policy 

Doug Feith. They asked me to come and run the information war, basically. 

So in late October 2001, I was the minister of information, I guess some 

would say minister of propaganda, for the Defense Department. I worked with 

a number of folks that were quite impressive, including [former Speaker of 

the House] Newt Gingrich, and came up with a program which I still maintain 

was the right approach to understanding that the long-term problem with terrorism was an issue of an information war, war of ideas. We had a number of 

things involved, including providing direct broadcast radios and direct Internet 

connections to a lot of these areas that were denied that, help with education. 

At any rate, not everybody thought what I was doing was great, and I was 

accused by various folks, including I think some of the people that worked 

for the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in the Pentagon, that we were 

doing disinformation. I once again learned the negative power of the press. 

My picture appeared in the front page of the New York Times. My wife called 

me up and asked me why it was there, and I said, “Dear, it’s never good news 

for a government employee to be on the front page of the New York Times.” 

Within a few weeks, or a few days, actually, they disestablished the office, 

and I was sent back to the Air Force with pious promises, such as, “Oh, your 

career will be great.” It wasn’t. Within a few years, I was politely asked to retire, 

but as I like to tell people, that actually opened more options than it closed.

I ended up taking a job as a professor at the University of Arizona, professor 

of astronomy, and later optical sciences and planetary sciences. But I very quickly 

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turned around and went back to Washington to work as a congressional fellow for 

Senator Sam Brownback, who was at that time the chairman of the subcommittee 

in the Senate that does the NASA authorizing legislation. He basically brought me 

there because President George W. Bush was doing the Vision for Space Exploration. 

I got to spend about 10 months as a congressional staffer. I was a rather old 

congressional staffer, older than everybody in the office, including the Senator. 

But I gained new respect for the people that work in congressional staffs, and 

the members, and helped write a lot of the legislation that the next year got 

passed, that was our authorizing legislation for the Vision for Space Exploration. 

Then, I went back to the university. I think Senator Brownback threw my 

name in the hat to be the NASA Administrator. Wasn’t sure I really wanted it then, 

and when they picked Mike Griffin, I said, that’s the right guy, not me. He is the 

right choice. I talked to him several times, and he had me work on the ESAS 

study, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study, in 2005, in the summer after 

he came in. Once again I got very excited about space exploration and hardware.

Eventually Mike suggested that if I was interested in coming to be a 

Director of a NASA Center that he thought I would be very competitive. Initially 

he mentioned some other Centers, but he finally said he thought Ames was 

going to become open. When he asked, “Are you interested in that?” I said, “I’d 

be delighted.” This is an area I’ve always had a lot of excitement for.

I competed for the job and showed up here as the Director in May of 2006. 

That’s how I got here, and it’s been the most fun job I ever had.

I tell people never be afraid to push new things. You may lose a few jobs 

over it and people will be upset, but in the end, other opportunities will open. 

The vector tends to be in the right direction.

Ames Research Center always has been recognized for its cutting edge on 

flight research and aeronautics. Share with us your thoughts of what you 

believe today’s mission is. 

Ames, as I’ve told people, is the coolest part of the Agency. I’m sure the other 

Center Directors would disagree, but they’re wrong. This has always been—I’m 

going to use the word the “un-Center.” It’s always been the place that has the freest thinkers, some people would say the most out-of-control thinkers and doers. 

Our historian, for example, Jack Boyd, who by the way is a phenomenal 

individual and been a huge asset to me, says that Ames was founded in the 

late ’30s with the radicals from NASA’s Langley Research Center that wanted 

to have a different approach. I think that character has held true, that partly 

has to do with we’re here in Silicon Valley even long before it was Silicon 

Valley. California usually appeals to the more free spirits. That has obviously 

continued throughout all of its history.

Obviously, Ames started as an aeronautics center, but it became, over the 

last few decades, equally divided between aeronautics, exploration-related 

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advanced technology, and science. My objective is to build on that tradition of 

innovation, and there are a couple particular areas I really want to focus on.

We are in Silicon Valley. The Vision for Space Exploration has as one of 

its tenets that the private sector, private development, and expansion into 

space are essential. Our job is again to be in the entrepreneurial center of 

the world and to start making those connections. My predecessor has already 

done a pretty good job of that with Google, Incorporated, and others. We’re 

building on those connections, looking at other companies as well, things like 

the Google Lunar X PRIZE just announced. Google is going to finance going 

to the Moon from the private sector—which I played a small role in helping 

persuade some of the folks over there that was a good idea. I hope they think 

it’s a good idea. But that’s an example of what I mean.

The first and foremost is to be a place that can do entrepreneurial things. 

Again, this is in the best tradition of this Center, and probably the research 

centers in general, that grew out of NACA [National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics]. Our job was to midwife new industries, so our job is to midwife 

new space industries. This Center particularly is well situated to do that.

Second, Ames has always been a place that can come up with the 1 percent 

solution. During the ’60s, we did the Pioneer probes here that were the lowcost way to get early to the outer solar system and the inner solar system as 

well. In the 1990s, we did the Lunar Prospector mission, which was a novel 

private-sector approach. It was the next mission after Clementine, my mission 

in DOD [Department of Defense], that confirmed that there was something 

interesting at the poles of the Moon; whether it’s water or other hydrogen 

compounds still remains to be determined, but it was an interesting program. 

What I’ve tried to bring here is the idea that again following on the faster, 

cheaper, better effort of a decade or so ago that we could do low-cost missions. 

Low-cost missions, largely robotic, but not just robotic, throughout the solar 

system. We’ve set up a small satellite program here, which has huge promise. 

We’ve got a couple small satellite programs going now, including the LCROSS 

[Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite] mission, which actually got 

started before I was here, but it’s a $75 million capped mission that will be a 

secondary on the lunar reconnaissance orbiter mission going to the Moon in late 

2008. It’ll impact a polar crater and blow material 100 kilometers or so above 

the Moon that we’ll be able to assay and hopefully see evidence of water. It’s the 

kind of mission that is after my heart, and we hope to do a lot more like that.

Another objective is the Vision for Space Exploration, which is incredibly exciting. It will be the Vision that wraps everything NASA does together. 

Over the last decade or so, a lot of the things NASA did, because there didn’t 

seem to be this overarching vision, wandered off into different areas. I’d like 

to get this Center back integrated into a lot of things, and we’ve had a lot of 

help from the rest of the Agency, very positive help, to put us in critical paths 

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of some of the key exploration programs, thermal protection systems for 

example, software, human factors work. 

I’m quite excited about the role of the Center. We retain a central role 

in traditional areas of expertise like science, aeronautics, and that’s one to 

continue, but I’ve been really impressed since I’ve been here with the quality 

of the people. Ames really has and continues to attract the best and brightest 

from around the world.

Share with us your thoughts on the Lunar Science Institute.

One of the reasons I came here was to work on lunar missions. There was 

an unfortunate decision to take the management of the overall lunar robotics 

away from this Center. There might have been good reasons to do that. To 

use the military term, it was above my pay grade, but it was unfortunate 

and disappointing. In some sense, again, like most things that you look at as 

negative at the time, it might have turned out positive in the end. 

The real forte here at Ames is probably not building large-scale missions, 

but to do small, fast-paced creative things. A recognition of that was the decision recently made to place a Lunar Science Institute here, really modeled on 

the very successful Astrobiology Institute that is using 21st-century technologies of networking and so on to be the virtual center of scientific development 

of the Moon and science from the Moon, on the Moon, and about the Moon. 

We’re just in the preliminary stages of setting that up. We’re searching for 

a director. The number of people who will be here will be small, obviously, 

under 10 or 12. But the idea is to develop a new community of lunar scientists. 

In the ’60s there were hundreds of lunar scientists in the United States; there’s 

now probably a dozen or so, frankly, most of which are not spring chickens 

anymore. Neither am I, for that matter. But we need to have a focal point for 

developing the next generation of scientists. 

By having a virtual institute that will cover a number of universities and 

other research centers, we can develop 50 to 100 scientific experts at various places that can really make use of the science opportunities the Vision is 

going to afford. So we hope to have, by March of 2008, the institute up and 

running. Seems now we have a couple foreign partners interested in setting 

up parallel institutes. So this will really be a global institute, very much as the 

Astrobiology Institute is. So again, I’m delighted to see that here. I think this is 

the right place for it. It’s more than just a couple scientists here thinking about 

the Moon. It’s going to be really the center of a global effort.

What about the importance of aeronautics and the role for NASA? 

Aeronautics is a critical part of NASA. It always has been, and it always will 

be. There are really two areas that are particularly exciting to me. 

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NASA needs to retain its position at the forefront of aeronautics research, 

and I mean research, not just support. A lot of people can go help figure out 

how to do air traffic control and so forth, but very few people are able to do 

the research that’s necessary to support where we’re going in this next century. 

An example is the figuring out how to get a lot more traffic in the limited 

airspace, so a lot of the software capabilities are being developed here. That’s 

an example of aeronautics I think at its finest.

Another area, clearly, is that at some point we’re going to have hypersonic 

aircraft, aircraft that can take you anyplace in the planet in an hour or so. Time 

is incredibly valuable. It gets more valuable the older one gets, actually. Strictly 

from what the public would say is really important in aeronautics is taking care 

of both the research ends of current aeronautics things that includes advanced 

information technologies, as well as things like hypersonics.

Another area—and this is really something that I don’t think people 

understand to the degree that it’s important—is what the Vision for Space 

Exploration is all about, and that is we’re going to basically settle the solar system. 

We’re going to, if you will, settle Mars at some point. To get there, you have to go 

through atmospheres, and to get back, you have to get back into our atmosphere. 

That’s an aeronautics problem, not a space transportation problem. As we enter 

planetary atmospheres, either for science or eventually for settlement, we need 

to provide the technology and the basic research underpinning for that. 

I see aeronautics as really critical, and indeed the ability to build thermal 

protection systems is one of the things that we’ve always been an expert on, 

and that will be even more important in the future.

What do you believe to be the relative importance of the human and the 

robotic spaceflight and the interplay between the two to achieve success?

Humans and robots are going to settle the solar system hand in claw. 

We are linked to robots today and robotic systems. When I get in my car, that’s 

a robot. It gets more and more sophisticated, tells you which way to turn and so 

on, and if you’re going to get where you want to go, you are connected to a robot. 

The same thing is true in space. As we get more and more hostile environments 

and more and more difficult areas, from the initial exploration and science all the 

way to the settlement, we’re going to have to be linked with robots. In a second 

sense, frankly, as the century goes on, we will find that robotic systems are going 

to be more and more integrated in our human existence. 

We had a conference here this last week with Ray Kurzweil, who’s written 

extensively on this topic, called the singularity, and he believes eventually we’re 

going to be merged with artificial life. Now I don’t know whether that’s going to 

happen the way he suggests, but certainly more and more you see us walk around 

with these little wireless handheld devices, particularly if you’re a senior NASA 

official. Eventually, I see us being more and more integrated with computers and 

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more and more direct connection, so we are going to become one with the robots, 

particularly as we expand in the solar system. I don’t see it as either-or. It’s got 

to be together. Robots can go some places we can’t, but as we become more and 

more part of a virtual reality with them, then we’re going to travel with them.

Tell us how NASA has changed over time and how you see it changing in 

the future.

NASA is an interesting agency. I wouldn’t say it’s linear. It’s fairly circular. 

It’s a continuous circle. We started out as NACA as I mentioned, as our job was 

to midwife new industries. I think that’s going to be more and more important 

in the future. We might have gotten away from that a little bit with Apollo 

and through the ’70s and ’80s and ’90s, but I think we’re coming back to that, 

the new space industries, the private-sector development of systems to get 

to space such as the commercial orbital transport system, things like Virgin 

Galactic and other things that people are doing. Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin, his 

privately funded aerospace organization, and so on. It is our job not to run 

those things, nor to ignore them, but to assist them, assist them with expertise, 

assist them with customers, assist them with facilities and so forth. I see that 

we’re returning to that initial NACA mission.

Second, of course NASA meets the needs of the nation and the taxpayers. 

In the ’60s that was security. We were part of the national security apparatus. 

In the next decade we’re going to be part of the national security in a different 

sense. I would call it part of soft power. When I worked at the White House, it 

was interesting. Most of the people ignored the National Space Council until 

the President had to go someplace and talk to some leader, that he didn’t have 

anything else to talk about, and so they’d come down and say look, we can’t 

agree with President Whoever-It-Is of this country on anything, but we know 

they’re interested in space, so we got some space thing. 

You found that space was really a glue that had a lot of policy implications. 

I call it soft power. What NASA is doing in the next decade or two—and we’re 

already seeing that with the International Space Station—is that it becomes a 

means to bring countries closer together, instrument of influence or formidable 

capability. So the national security mission that we had in the ’60s is returning 

in a different way.

Finally, NASA is at the verge of its most fundamental mission, as I noted 

before, which is leading the settlement of the solar system. That’s an entirely 

new mission. It’s one that we’ve always talked about. In fact, we thought it was 

going to start in the ’60s, but is now real. We’re seeing that technology and the 

world economy has gotten to the point where this is an imperative. It’s going 

to happen regardless. NASA is in the best position to lead that. I don’t think 

I’d have been enthused about NASA if it was just midwifing new industries. I’d 

rather go work in those industries. Or if it was just some refurbished security 

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issue. But if you add on top of that the human imperative to expand, it is really 

incredibly exciting.

Last and certainly not the least, NASA has always been a science agency. 

The scientific returns from NASA are phenomenal, as a scientist. That continues unabated. If anything, it’s increased. But it’s really all four of those, where 

we’re going.

What lessons have you learned and what skills have you acquired that you 

apply in your leadership role here at Ames?

Obviously, with any organization there are good and bad things. Let me 

start with the good ones, which vastly outweigh the bad. In the good sense, I 

have never worked for an agency that is more competent. The people are both 

very competent and very dedicated. People don’t come to work for NASA to 

get rich or just because they didn’t have anything else to do, but because they 

believe in the things that we do, these things I mentioned. They’re also very 

good, it’s very competitive to become a NASA employee, it’s a great honor. From 

that perspective, it is really a fabulous agency.

The second point, I used to work for the Air Force, and you tended not to tell 

people, particularly if you were in the Middle East or something, that you worked 

for the U.S. Air Force. The second real point about NASA is that you can go around 

the world, you can tell people everywhere that you work for NASA. I was in Korea 

a month or so ago and was visiting some places, and I told one of my hosts. I said, 

“I forgot to bring my passport.” I had a NASA badge and a little pin on my lapel. 

He said, “You’ve got all the passport you need with NASA.” I found it’s 

really true that you go someplace, if people see that pin, and you say you work 

for NASA, they say come right this way, let’s show you this or that or whatever. 

NASA really is America’s brand. People can be mad at us over some policy issue 

or security issue or economic issue, but they all love NASA. That’s a second 

point. As I mentioned, we have the most exciting missions.

On the downside—NASA’s products are in the future; it’s hard to get the 

same level of immediacy that some of the other agencies have. If you’re in the 

Defense Department, somebody says if you don’t do your job, then some enemy 

army shows up, so that’s a very immediate thing. Or if you’re in the Education 

Department, if the young people don’t get educated, then our economy 

collapses and so on. Those are very immediate kinds of things. 

But you say, well look, if NASA doesn’t do its job, it means that somebody else will settle Mars 50 years from now. It’s a little harder. You find that 

although the support is very broad, it’s diffuse. It also means then that we’re a 

lot more susceptible to particular agendas, it might be congressional agendas, 

and I’ve always criticized that NASA is what I called “a self-licking ice cream 

cone,” that a lot of times you did things because it got the support, jobs and 

so forth. That’s a problem.

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This Administrator has done a fabulous job of undoing some of that. He’s 

changed the governance structure so that Center leadership is not involved 

in deciding programmatics. And secondly, he’s linked all the Centers into the 

Vision for Space Exploration, so it’s not an us versus them. That’s helped defray 

some of that. Although local political leaders are very excited about what we’re 

doing here, they always want to help you more than you want, with offering, 

“Can I take this program from somebody else and put it here?” Now I can 

legitimately say to them, “Well, that doesn’t help us, because if you take it from 

them, then you’re going to destroy an effort that we have other things in. So 

you need to work with us to help the overall program.” But that’s a challenge. 

It’s a lot more like living in a fishbowl, if you will.

Another thing is both positive and negative. The fact I can talk about everything I do is neat, but the fact is everybody knows what I’m doing. If we make 

some decision, within I think nanoseconds, it’s on the Web or something. You’re 

in that fishbowl. At least the Defense Department can count on a few days of 

secret things staying secret. But again, it’s a different environment. 

All in all, the downsides are pretty minor. Naturally, we don’t have enough 

money, but who does?

What do you believe to be NASA’s impact on society; what would you like 

it be in the next 50 years?

NASA’s central impact is really that it’s helped define America and Americans 

as a sense that we lead on frontiers, and that the frontier remains part of our 

psyche. There is nobody else that does that. Yes, there’s scientific frontiers and 

so on, but regarding real physical frontiers, NASA is continuing that character 

of America which makes it unique. 

America would obviously exist if NASA went away tomorrow, but it 

wouldn’t be America. The idea that others are now leading on frontiers would 

change our view of ourselves, and I think much to the worse. So that’s the 

single most important thing that we can do, is to say if you’re an American we 

are there, at the very edge of the known into the unknown.

Why would you encourage someone to begin a career with NASA?

First of all, you’ll have a lot of fun, and you’ll have the most interesting 

intellectual and stimulating job, and you’ll be part of the future of mankind and 

that’s worth a lot. You don’t come and work for the government for the pay. You 

certainly don’t come for all of the side benefits and the short hours. 

But in the end, it’s really that intellectual high that one gets for being again 

on the edge of the unknown. That takes a special person, but there’s a lot of 

them in America—especially with the Vision for Space Exploration we have no 

shortage of people, the very finest the country has to offer, and the world for 

that matter, wanting to come and work for us.

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Chapter 16

Kevin L. Petersen

Center Director, Dryden Flight Research Center

Kevin Petersen began his NASA career with the Dryden Flight Research Center in 1971 as a “coop,” a university cooperative education student. After graduating as an aerospace engineer, he 

became a permanent employee. During the first third of his career, he worked on various aspects 

of engineering research. His projects were primarily within the specialties of flight control and flight 

systems, as well as advanced flight software and hardware for experimental aircraft, including the 

F8 Digital Fly-By-Wire aircraft and the Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology projects. 

 Petersen acquired management experience at numerous levels and in 1993 moved to the “front 

office” to be Deputy Director. Then, in February 1999, he became the Director of the Dryden Flight 

Research Center after 28 years of service with the facility. He retired from the Agency in April 2009 

after working his entire career at the NASA Center located in Edwards, California. On 4 December 

2007, Petersen talked about how “growing up in this environment” helped prepare him for the 

leadership position. He began by explaining how both Dryden and NASA have changed over the years.

In the early years, the Center was focused more on experimental aircraft 

and aeronautics, and we had some space-related activities too, with the lifting 

bodies and other vehicles associated with that. Part of it may be because of 

my awareness of what has changed going through various jobs at the Center, 

but I think Dryden has always had this capability of being on the leading edge 

of some of the flight technology. As NASA’s primary Center for experimental 

flight and flight test and operations, this allows us to have that ability to operate in an environment of experimental test and risks. The understanding of 

how to do the risk management for those kinds of activities is a pretty important element.

Regarding what has changed, Dryden has migrated from being a Center 

focused primarily on aeronautical and aerospace type tests. Now we’re more 

involved with the science side of NASA. Over the last decade, we have been 

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operating some airborne science platforms that we didn’t have in the early 

years. Just recently, we got program responsibility for SOFIA, the Stratospheric 

Observatory for Infrared Astronomy, that also bolsters our mix of programs to 

include more and more science activities. 

We’re also more involved with the space exploration activity than we’ve 

ever been in the past. We have a major responsibility for the launch abort systems tests that are coming up in the next year, which is one of the first major 

demonstrations for the Constellation Program. So in contrast to some of the 

early years, where we were mostly focused on aeronautical technology and 

flight research, we now have got a more balanced portfolio of work which 

really supports all of NASA’s Mission Directorates. So we have work in all four 

Mission Directorates, including, of course, serving as a primary alternate landing site for the Space Shuttle.

The Center’s history is entrenched in the field of aeronautics. Where will 

the level of aeronautics be in NASA’s next 50 years?

It’s hard to predict the next 50 years. Just look back 50 years; things have 

changed tremendously. However, I believe there’ll be more engagement with 

the integration of aeronautical and aerospace technologies to where, 50 years 

from now, routine access to space easily could be a reality, not only for commercial or government, but also for the private sector. That could easily be one 

of the big changes. Another likely change in aeronautics is that there will be 

a lot more automation, a lot more automated vehicles, and a lot of unpiloted 

vehicles that will be mixed in with the piloted vehicles. The airplanes and the 

air traffic in the system 50 years from now are likely to be a lot different mix 

of vehicle types than what we’re seeing today.

Are these possible changes a part of your strategic vision for the future?

Our vision is first and foremost to support the Agency’s direction, which 

is really to get all Centers involved with the space exploration activity for the 

future. But in addition to that, we are preparing the Center for the technology, 

the types of programs that NASA and the nation will need for the future. For 

that, there will be less separation between aeronautics and aerospace and 

science, and it will be more of an integrated environment. Part of our job now 

is to prepare for that mix of responsibilities.

What are the lessons learned that you have acquired through the years 

that you are applying to move the Center into the future?

As far as the technical lessons learned, one that really hits home with me is 

that there is no substitute for experience and experienced people. Experience 

really counts in the business we are in, where you have to manage the various 

risks and accept the risks or mitigate the risks. Experience really counts. When 

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you lose a key talent or key people, it takes some time to replace that experience, and you can be vulnerable during that timeframe.

Another key lesson is really paying attention to the details, and this is 

probably true across most of NASA. But we’re in the high-tech end of the business, and there’s a real need to make sure that we understand the details to 

the point to where you can ensure safe and efficient operations and that things 

will actually work that you’re trying to develop.

We’ve learned over the years that you have to be wary of the routine operations. We tend to focus most of our attention and most of our efforts on the 

program or what we’re doing for this project or that project to advance the 

technology. Sometimes what gets left behind is what you have to do in the 

supporting side, the more routine things, or what you think of as being more 

routine, that are just supporting elements for being able to do that advanced 

technology work. Sometimes those routine things are the ones that become 

higher-risk because you’re paying less attention to them. Things you would 

think to be more routine are the things that might hurt somebody, versus one 

of your experimental test activities.

How does budget affect what you currently are doing and what you are 

planning to do in the future? 

There are always budget fluctuations, and you have to be prepared for the 

ups and downs of the budget. At Dryden, the budget primarily drives our staffing 

capabilities, in contrast to some of the larger Centers. The bulk of our budget 

really goes to our civil servants and to our on-site staffing, versus major big 

contracts on the outside. So the budget really drives the level of staffing at the 

Center, and that really drives what our capabilities and capacities are to do work. 

We try to spread our portfolio work across all the Mission Directorates 

within NASA. Then, if one area like aeronautics or exploration [systems] has a 

peak either up or down, the other areas where you have work can help you 

ride through that valley. That’s one thing we’ve done most recently. 

With [Administrator] Mike Griffin coming in and really asking every Center 

to step up to the space exploration side of things, that has helped. So our 

portfolio of projects is much more balanced than it has been in the past, and 

that helps from an overall budget volatility standpoint.

Will Dryden become more involved with the private sector as far as 

space travel?

That’s hard to predict. When and if NASA chooses to use some of those 

private space ventures, we want to be involved. For example, there’s already 

discussion from a scientific standpoint about getting involved with some of the 

early suborbital flights that might occur in the private side of things, and actually buying flights or buying time on those activities. It’s certainly reasonable 

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to expect that we would be involved with helping to plan that activity and 

fostering it. If NASA stays as it currently is, there will be a separation between 

the civil government side and the private side. But I think there’ll be more and 

more utilization of private capabilities, certainly on the space side as they look 

at using private transportation back and forth to space in the future. That could 

be true in other areas too.

What do you believe NASA’s most important role is for the nation?

Keeping the nation on the cutting edge and being able to stand out as 

a symbol for the country, as a symbol of innovation and excellence, where 

people can relate to NASA that we are the best in the world in some of these 

areas. I think people can be proud of that. It is that inspiration and that culture 

of excellence that works not only for those within NASA, but also helps rally 

people who want to work for NASA. It’s also for the general public when they 

see NASA and they think about what NASA can do; they take pride in that from 

a national standpoint.

What kind of impact do you think NASA has had on society? 

There’s certainly a lot of technical impact. Just look into airplanes that 

we fly every day and the airplanes that people fly to visit out here. There 

are a lot of features in those airplanes that were developed and fostered by 

NASA technology developments. But it’s not readily visible or recognizable to 

the public. Certainly, the technology side across the board, the spinoffs from 

the space technology areas, as well as major features of current modern-day 

military and commercial airplanes, were things that were fostered in NASA 

experiments decades ago. It’s really across the board, not just in aviation, but 

in all fields where certain impacts of technology have made life better on a 

day-to-day basis for people.

The other aspect of it is that NASA has a real role and an opportunity in 

the next generation of people in working with the students and the education 

side of it. People pay attention when they see NASA is behind something, and 

you can really turn the heads and maybe the turn the lives of some of the 

younger people through some of the education and outreach activities. That’s 

an important aspect that NASA should continue.

Are there other areas of programs you would like to add here at Dryden?

One of the strengths of Dryden is the fact that we’re one of the smallest 

Centers. That’s both a strength and a weakness in a certain sense. The fact that 

we’re small allows us to be quite agile on moving from one activity to another 

and to provide an environment for employees that allows them to work on the 

entire aspect of a project, not just one little piece of one little specialty. The 

fact that we’re an end-item organization, where we actually have to operate 

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machines and vehicles that other people may have invented or dreamed up 

and try to make them work, is a real inspiration for the folks that work here. 

That aspect of it makes Dryden a little bit different than some of the other 

Centers, in that we tend to have one primary mission, which is atmospheric 

flight research and test, whereas other Centers might have many different 

focused missions. It allows us to specialize a little bit more, but in that specialty 

it also allows people to have great breadth and responsibility for some of the 

activities that go on.

How has your role changed since you took on the role and responsibilities 

of Center Director? How do you see it even changing in the future?

The more you get involved with some of the senior management, you get 

a little bit more of an understanding on how things work and migrate. My role 

for the Center is one of trying to provide leadership in the direction of the 

programmatic activities we’re working on and trying to foster future work to 

make sure that three years from now, or five years from now, we have a healthy 

Center and an environment that people will want to work in. 

The Agency changes as administrations change and as Administrators 

change. The way Mike Griffin operates is clearly different than how [previous 

Administrator] Sean O’Keefe operated and clearly different than how [former 

Administrator] Dan Goldin operated. Each Administrator brings their imprint 

on how people want to operate. All the Centers and the employees have to 

adapt to a certain extent to different directions and focuses and where they 

want to steer both the technical side as well as the institutional side, or the 

Center and the Center management side of things.

Why would you encourage someone to have a career with NASA?

Just look at what’s in NASA’s future, going back to the Moon, going on to 

Mars, working on some of these things that you can only dream of right now. 

I think that’s a source of inspiration for young people to get into some of the 

fields that are required to be able to work on things like that. So, even if you 

reach 1 in 100, that student might see something that gets them thinking that 

“I want to go work on that” and gives them some dreams for the future.

From the standpoint of having had an entire career with NASA here at 

Dryden, from starting as a student to the position that I’m in now, it’s been 

quite a ride and quite an opportunity. I would certainly hope that others 

who follow will have the same kinds of opportunities that I’ve had over the 

years to move from technical responsibilities and developing a certain technical expertise to being able to manage and lead people and projects, and 

now manage and lead collections of projects and people. It’s been quite an 

opportunity for me, and hard for me to imagine how it might be better than 

working at a place like this.

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Chapter 17

Woodrow Whitlow, Jr.

Center Director, Glenn Research Center

Inspired by the space program in the 1960s, at a very impressionable young age Woodrow 

Whitlow, Jr., decided he wanted to grow up and work for NASA as an astronaut. When he 

went to college, Whitlow tailored his courses to result in three aeronautics and astronautics 

degrees. In 1979, he started with NASA’s Langley Research Center as a researcher in unsteady 

aerodynamics and aeroelasticity. He spent a year as part of the Professional Development 

Program at NASA Headquarters, then returned to Langley, where his roles included various 

positions of increasing responsibility before moving to the Glenn Research Center in 1998 as 

Director of Research and Technology. Five years later, he was assigned to the Kennedy Space 

Center as Deputy Director until the end of 2005, when he returned to Glenn Research Center 

as its Director.

 For more than 30 years, Whitlow has worked on almost every level of management 

(branch, division, directorate, Deputy Center Director, Director) at three NASA Centers. He 

has also earned a master of science and a doctor of philosophy degree in aeronautics and 

astronautics. He shared his views on the nation’s space agency during an interview on 9 May 

2007, conducted at the Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, and began explaining how 

NASA had changed.

When I first came to NASA, in my field (aerodynamics), we were still 

doing a lot of what we call approximate methods or things like panel methods or doublet lattice methods for aerodynamics, for aeroelasticity. We were 

just starting to do computational methods, and there was no such thing as a 

computer on every desk. I can remember we had four terminals in a common 

area, and you had to sign up to be able to use those terminals. Of course, now 

in those areas the computing power has increased drastically. We also had a 

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wind tunnel associated with the branch, and now we use the computer and 

computer simulations a lot more than we used to. We still rely on the test data, 

but that’s one of the changes.

So automation has changed a lot. I remember the first word processor 

we received in the branch, and I can remember days when, if I wanted to 

fax something, I had to get approval from the Division Chief before I could 

take the materials to a central location at the Langley Research Center to be 

faxed. Just the whole information technology, the computer capability, the 

automation that’s occurred is amazing.

The nature of the workforce has changed a lot. We still have some 

improvements we could make, but the diversity of the workforce has 

changed tremendously. I can remember talking to some of the more senior 

people at Langley when I got there, and there were African American 

women who, in some cases, didn’t have bathrooms in the buildings they 

could use. That whole arena has changed a lot, even to the point where 

I’m in this position.

When we look at the technical programs, we used to be an agency 

where we did space, we did the aeronautics, and we still do that significantly in both areas, but we’re now more focused on development than we 

have been in the past, and that’s because of the nature of the Vision that 

the national leadership has laid out for us. We now have a focus. When I 

came into the Agency in 1979, our big focus was Space Shuttle. I wouldn’t 

say that Space Shuttle is a vision; Space Shuttle is a tool that we use to carry 

out and accomplish a vision. We now have something that we’re all aimed 

at again, and so for me that’s been a big change.

How you will lead this Center to accomplish the goals for this new 

Vision for Space Exploration?

We are viewed widely as an aeronautics research center, but we have 

a very rich history in spaceflight systems development, from Space Station 

power to rocket upper stages to in-space propulsion. The whole concept 

of the ion engine was developed at the Glenn Research Center. Over the 

years, our research and development has been demonstrated as a primary 

propulsion system on the Deep Space 1 spacecraft. We’ve done over 130 

microgravity experiments that have flown in space, including many that were 

human-rated. So we have a very rich history in spaceflight systems development, but we are thought of as solely an aeronautics research center.

With the way the Agency is headed now, with a Vision for Space 

Exploration, it was necessary for me to make some significant changes 

at this Center, and that included our senior leadership. That included 

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restructuring and some retraining of the workforce. We have a new organizational structure, and including myself, there are 13 or 14 new senior-level 

managers at the Center.

The Center has goals in prioritized order: to be known for excellence in 

spaceflight systems development, to be recognized as a leader in program 

and project management, and to excel in aeronautics and space research. 

Then I like to say one of my favorites is to be more of an integral part of 

the northeast Ohio, and the Ohio national community, to have people know 

our capabilities, to have people know what we do, know what benefit NASA 

and NASA Glenn provides for the taxpayer dollars that we receive. These 

are just some of the things that I’ve managed to do in less than 18 months.

What type of challenges do you foresee on your way to accomplishing 

these goals?

I would think they’re the same as other Centers, but one of my challenges is having the right workforce, one with the right skills. Right now, 

with the work we have, sometimes we don’t have enough people to put on 

all the projects, and that’s because things have changed so quickly, and they 

changed faster than we were able to change the people. That doesn’t mean 

get rid of a lot of people. What that means is retraining. I have a threeprong retraining effort that we’ve put in place: one aimed at enhancing systems engineering skills, one aimed at enhancing our project management 

capability, and one enhancing our safety and mission assurance capability. 

So having the right workforce and enough workforce is one challenge.

Making sure we have the right infrastructure is another. We were 

established on January 23, 1941, so we have some facilities here that are 

a little older than maybe they ought to be, and maybe not in as good 

a shape as I would like for them to be. Getting the support and the 

resources to make sure we have appropriate facilities and appropriate 

infrastructure is a big challenge.

Making sure that we’re working well internally, that we’re all on the same 

page, and that everybody is thinking first what’s good for NASA, then what’s 

good for Glenn, and then what’s good for my organization. Sometimes that 

thinking gets inverted, what’s good for me and then what’s good for the 

Center and then what’s good for NASA. Those are a couple of challenges. 

Then I would say one other is we have a large research population, and 

sometimes in research, if you don’t get it done this year, you can get it done 

next year. But doing more development, then we have to be cognizant of 

the tempo at which we have to work and the tempo at which we have to 

deliver products. 

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If you had an unlimited budget, would there be new programs for 

the Center?

As the Center Director, in our governance model we have this separation of the institution and programs. I would love to see the Agency get an 

unlimited budget, and then maybe we could close some of the gaps we have 

in capabilities. The Agency and the nation are going to have some gaps, say, 

in access to space when the Space Shuttle stops flying in 2010, and it will, 

and we can’t bring the Crew Exploration Vehicle online until 2015. That’s five 

years when you’ve got this asset, the Space Station, up there that you’ve got 

to count on somebody else to get you there.

From a programmatic standpoint, I would love to see the Agency get 

enough money so we can do all the things that we know we can do, and 

we can do a lot of good things in science. There’s a lot more in aeronautics 

that we can do. Of course, there’s a lot more in space exploration that we 

can do, particularly in accelerating some of the programs, but we don’t have 

enough money.

Now, if I were given an unlimited institutional budget, I have a plan for 

the Center. I would like to see this Center get new buildings, and I’ve got 

a location picked out down the street where I’d like to have a new central 

campus. I would like to develop the property across the street in Fairview 

Park with new buildings and new places for the public to come and learn 

about what we do. I would like space research facilities in what we call our 

west area, which is down the hill. I would upgrade some of the facilities at 

Plum Brook Station to make it more accessible to people to bring in their 

test articles, and that could include a runway right on the property to make 

it accessible. There are lots of things I could do institutionally that I’d like 

to do to improve the quality of life for the people who have to spend more 

waking hours here than they do anywhere else. Those are just some of the 

things I’d do.

What do you believe to be NASA’s impact on society now and even in 

the future?

I’ll go back to the past before I start talking about now. And I’m talking about NASA, not NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics], 

NASA’s predecessor and the impacts it had on the war efforts. The reason 

NASA was formed was partly in response to Sputnik, and we had to beat the 

Russians. NASA has always been an intense source of national pride, and 

I’d say that’s the case even today. Back during the Cold War, when we were 

trying to beat the Russians, NASA could do no wrong. So we provided this 

national focus. We were, and we are, about discovery, and we discovered a lot 

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of new things. We learned a lot of new things as we were racing the Soviet 

Union to the Moon, resulting in a lot of I would say new products, probably 

new industries, and exceptional economic development. When you look at 

what we were trying to do and the resources we needed to do it, one of the 

big things we needed were people. So it provided inspiration for people to 

go into fields that would lead to innovation and discovery.

As I said, the reason I decided I’d have to be an aeronautical and astronautical engineer was so I could work for NASA, so that I could be an astronaut. And you get people who had that goal, so even if they didn’t become an 

astronaut, maybe they became this scientist or a medical researcher. Maybe 

this person is going to be the one that discovers a cure for cancer or a cure 

for heart disease.

I would think just the inspiration that NASA provided was valuable, 

because people want to be a part of what we do. Nobody goes out to try to 

do something else and says, “Well, I wanted to be x, but I ended up at NASA.” 

You don’t end up at NASA. You have to work hard to get here. So those are 

just some of my thoughts. The economic development and discovery and 

advances in science and technology, the spinoffs, those tremendous impacts. 

Then, just the national pride that we inspire.

Before I close this question, when you think of what happened with the 

Hubble Space Telescope, a decision was made that we weren’t going to service Hubble and when it died, it simply would be dead. When before have 

you heard of people in the heartland of America or just the common person 

rising up and saying you can’t let a telescope go away? So that’s unique, and 

just so many things that the Hubble Space Telescope has done are a source 

of pride for everybody.

What do you believe NASA’s role is for the future, for the next 50 years?

NASA’s role is to be the lead in discovery and exploration and figure out 

how to get us off the planet, how to get us to other destinations. To get us 

to Mars is going to take maybe 30, 35, 40 years from today, so that takes up 

60 to 80 percent of it right there. NASA will have to be the world’s leading 

agency in human space exploration. It’s more appropriate to say the world’s 

leader in exploration—period! We already have spacecraft that have left the 

solar system. We don’t have any humans that have done that, but exploration 

in general.

NASA will have a major role in advancing the aeronautical sciences. 

There’s so much we can do within the atmosphere, and when you think of the 

economic impact of the whole aerospace industry, that includes aviation. We 

have to lead in the mastery of aeronautical research. We’ve been stuck in this 

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rut for decades with the aviation system. Nearly every airplane is a metal tube 

with wings sticking out the side. The system is overcrowded and inefficient. 

How can we make it better? And that’s just, say, major-airport-to-major-airport 

transportation, but I’d count the entire trip. How long does it take for me to 

get from my house to the other person’s house, no matter where it is? How 

can we revolutionize our whole aviation system? I think NASA has a role to 

play in that; how to make safe, efficient air transportation available and convenient for everybody.

Why should NASA continue its work with the field of aeronautics?

We have the knowledge. We have the expertise to provide that technology development, though we have to be careful, at least right now, about 

not subsidizing industries. As a U.S. government agency, we still have lots to 

offer that private industry cannot, or will not, do. There are a lot of people 

depending on things that we can do that can advance the aviation or the 

aeronautics industry. So I would think we ought to remain in a major role in 

aeronautics research. I’ve said that one of the things that NASA could do in 

both aeronautics and in the space exploration is inspire our young people, 

provide something that’s visible, something we see every day that makes 

people say, “I could do that.” Not only “I can do that,” but “I want to do that. 

I want to be a part of that,” something that’s exciting, and there are just all 

kinds of intangible benefits that I can’t even begin to imagine or describe that 

comes from that.

What are your thoughts on using both humans and robotics to accomplish 

the goals for the Vision for Space Exploration?

We have to make sure we do not lose sight of the fact that the number one 

priority is to do exploration safely with minimal or no loss of human life. Until 

we develop systems that are qualified for humans to fly or to go to certain 

destinations, we could use robots or robotic spacecraft. We have spacecraft 

going to Mercury, spacecraft at Saturn, spacecraft at Mars learning things. We 

will send spacecraft to the Moon to learn all we can, or as much as we think 

we need to know, about these destinations before we send humans, so that 

when they get there we maximize the opportunity for safe mission success. To 

land a person on Mars would be great. To land a person on Mars and have the 

capability to bring them back safely, that would be mission success.

There are some places right now where maybe it’s not appropriate or 

safe to send people. Say if we wanted a probe that goes down through 

the atmosphere of Jupiter, it’s not a safe thing for humans to be doing. We 

don’t know how to do that yet, but we can try it with robotic spacecraft. 

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Or maybe it’s to traverse the rings of Saturn. There’s a lot of debris there, 

and you could collide with something and have catastrophic damage to a 

spacecraft. With robotic spacecraft you can learn a lot. We haven’t collided 

with anything, but if it happened with humans on board, that would be a 

catastrophe. If it happens to a robotic spacecraft, we’ve learned a lot before 

we’ve lost the mission.

You have spent almost three decades with NASA in a number of 

positions on a number of Centers. Share with us some of the lessons 

that you’ve learned.

Actually, I’ve spent more than three decades with NASA. I had 4 years 

supported by NASA as a graduate student, so add them up, that’s 32. But, yes, 

I have been at Langley three times; I’ve been at Headquarters twice, Glenn 

twice, and Kennedy once. I’ve learned that in terms of advancement, the 

ability to be flexible opens up a lot of opportunities. When I counsel people 

about career advancement, that’s one of the things that I tell them. If you only 

want to stay in one location, the opportunities are fewer than if you were willing to look at the nine locations.

Having been a lot of places, when I set the strategy for Glenn, I now 

personally know a lot of people, and that has helped me in recruiting and 

developing my leadership team. I’ve been able to use some personal contacts 

with people in places that I would not have had if I had not worked in several 

places. So that has helped a lot.

In terms of developing my strategy and my vision for the Center, I’ve 

been helped by seeing what goes on at Kennedy Space Center, what 

happens at Langley, or interactions I have with people at the Johnson 

Space Center and at Marshall Space Flight Center. One of the things that 

I learned as Deputy Director of Kennedy was the importance of partnerships—partnerships with other Centers and particularly partnerships with 

your stakeholders in your local communities, and that’s why I set a goal 

here for this Center as an entity to be more engaged with the local and the 

national community.

I learned a lot about communication, particularly in working with Jim 

[James W.] Kennedy, Director at the Kennedy Space Center, the importance 

and the value of timely and open communications. I actually have received 

quite a few compliments about people being surprised at some of the things 

that I share with the workforce and the timeliness with which I share information. That’s probably the most important element of leadership is communications, because if you don’t communicate with folks, they’ll make up 

their own story, and it’s usually a lot worse than the one that it actually is. 

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What are your thoughts on NASA’s culture and especially here at Glenn?

The NASA culture is certainly one that values knowledge. While people respect positions—they value and respect the people in those positions more if those people are viewed as experts or as knowledgeable in 

their chosen fields. NASA respects knowledge and capability, and that’s 

good. But they really will value and they will follow the person that has 

the knowledge.

At Glenn, we’ve been a research center, and in the research world in the 

old culture you advanced on what we call personal impact, which meant 

what did I do. Whereas now, and you see it in the spaceflight world, it’s more 

what did the team accomplish and how did I contribute. It’s more the team 

and not personal impact. So changing the culture at Glenn from less focus 

on personal impact, because people will do what they get rewarded for, to 

put more emphasis on team and team contributions, that’s one change. And 

that’s the way we’re going, and other parts of the Agency, particularly the 

human spaceflight part, are ahead of us in that respect.

Now, one of the things that came out after Columbia was an issue of 

communication or a reluctance to communicate for fear of reprisal. At Glenn 

we are far ahead in that area, in that our workforce is certainly not reluctant 

to share their opinions with management, and that’s good when people feel 

like they can be open and they can be honest. They can tell you if they think 

what you’re doing doesn’t hold water, and not have any fear of reprisal. It’s 

nothing that I’ve done, but the people of Glenn have always been willing 

to tell you what you should do or voiced their opinions of how they think 

you ought to do things. So I think that is a part of our culture that’s, rightly 

or wrongly, is beneficial.

What would you tell someone today considering NASA as a career choice?

I would tell any person, young or old, that the opportunities to do 

things at NASA are unlike any other place. There’s no other place you can go 

to work where you can say, “My company has put people on the Moon.” Or 

when I wake up in the morning and people ask me, “What are you doing?” 

“Well, I’m going to work to figure out how to put people on Mars.”

Nobody else can say that, and the work is exciting, is cutting-edge. You 

get to do things that nobody else gets to do, and you get to do things that 

you can’t do anywhere else.

I also tell people that, if I’m out recruiting, that I’m not just looking for 

anybody. I’m looking for a special person, that person driven and committed 

to aeronautics and space research or space exploration. You ought to come 

to work for NASA if, and only if, you have that same drive, that same passion, 

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if you want to do new things, if you want to do innovative things and not 

get stuck in a rut, and always have a challenge every day. So if that’s what 

you want to do, then come work for NASA.

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Chapter 18

Edward J. Weiler

Center Director, Goddard Space Flight Center

In 1976, Edward J. Weiler earned his Ph.D. in astrophysics from Northwestern University and began 

his first professional job with Princeton University as one of the senior astronomers working on 

a satellite project called Copernicus, located at the Goddard Space Flight Center. At that point in 

his career, little did Weiler know that his first boss, Dr. Lyman Spitzer, Jr., was to be known as the 

father of the Hubble Space Telescope and that he (Weiler) would champion this orbiting observatory 

project for more than three decades. 

 Two years later, Dr. Nancy Grace Roman, NASA’s Chief of Astronomy, approached him with the 

question, “How would you like to come to work for me at NASA Headquarters as a civil servant?” 

Weiler took the offer, and the following year when she retired, he became NASA’s next chief and, 

as he described, the “first male Chief of Astronomy, because Nancy had been in the job from the 

day NASA opened its gates.” He also became Chief Scientist for Hubble.

 From 1998 to 2004, Weiler was the Associate Administrator for Space Science and guided 

the development of a long list of successful missions including the Chandra X-ray Observatory, 

Mars Odyssey, the Mars Exploration Rovers, and the Spitzer Space Telescope. In August 2004, 

he became the Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, and served in 

that position until spring of 2008. He returned to NASA Headquarters to lead the Science Mission 

Directorate as the Associate Administrator and retired from the Agency in 2011. 

 This interview, conducted 31 October 2007 at Goddard, began with him talking about his 

experiences as Chief Scientist on Hubble.

I became Chief of Astronomy in 1980 or so, and Chief Scientist on Hubble. 

Basically, I was in that job through the launch of Hubble, through the bad 

days of Hubble. NASA has always in its history underestimated interest in 

the Hubble Space Telescope. Never fail to realize how much this Agency will 

underestimate public interest in Hubble. We certainly did in 1990, and the 

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press and public interest in the launch was just incredible. Astronomers like 

me, who had never done an interview in our lives, suddenly were on the 

Today show in the morning, Nightline at night, and interview after interview. 

There were hundreds of reporters there. We had microphones in our faces.

We launched the Hubble, and everybody was waiting for this flood of data. 

Of course, two months later we went from the top of Mount Everest to the 

bottom of Death Valley as we discovered we had a major flaw. For better or 

worse, I was elected to be the NASA chief spokesman for the flaw, and I got 

to do even more interviews. Every single day for about two months, we had 

press conferences talking about the problem, here at Goddard Space Flight 

Center. Little did I know then—I was at Headquarters but spending all my 

time at Goddard—that 20 years later I’d be the Center Director.

So we got through that, and we made promises that nobody believed 

that we would fix the Hubble. But we did. We met all the promises and the 

end of the story is that the great American tragedy became a great American 

comeback. It’s a great comeback story, redemption, so to speak, at least I call 

it redemption. And it’s been getting better every day.

To go on with the story, I was promoted to Director of the Origins 

Program at Headquarters in 1996, and director of missions like Kepler, missions like JWST [James Webb Space Telescope], or planet-finding missions, 

the search for life. That’s when I started my spiel for the search for life and 

how important that was, because I always thought NASA should be doing 

things that the American people might get interested in. I thought asking the 

question, “Are we alone?” was something that a lot of people might consider 

interesting, or “How did the universe begin?” or “How did we get here?” I like 

those questions, because they’re not science questions. They’re questions that 

anybody on the street might be interested in at some point in their life.

This was the whole theory of the Origins Program. It was built around 

four questions. How did the universe begin? How did we get here? Where are 

we going? And are we alone? We generated a lot of money with those questions. We generated a lot of new funding for NASA missions. That’s how JWST 

got started, the James Webb Space Telescope.

In 1998, Dan Goldin asked me if I wanted to be the Associate Administrator 

[AA]. I said no, and for two months as they were searching for another one, 

I changed my mind, because I felt maybe it would be better if I were the 

Associate Administrator than having to work for somebody I didn’t know. So 

in October of 1998 I was made the Associate Administrator for Space Science 

and Hubble was under that, so I continued my responsibility for Hubble.

A lot of good things happened from 1998 to 2004. We were able to double 

the Office of Space Science budget over that period from 2 billion to 4 billion [dollars], primarily because we were having successes. When I became 

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the Associate Administrator, one of my first acts was to go down to Kennedy 

Space Center to celebrate the launches of the Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars 

Polar Lander. What nobody told me was that we were launching two time 

bombs that were going to fail when arriving at Mars. So six months later, 

again I got to take the bullets for another international embarrassment, that 

is, the two craters on Mars called Mars 98. I had to basically explain the problems and why they happened to the press, to the public, and to the Congress.

But in true NASA fashion, we didn’t take that lying down. We didn’t go back 

to our caves and hide. We threw out the whole Mars Program that was left there 

by previous people, and Dan Goldin, myself, and Scott Hubbard and Orlando 

Figueroa, among others, basically put together a new Mars Program, which I’m 

proud to say has led to four successes in a row now: Mars Odyssey, the two 

Mars Rovers that are still chugging away, and, of course, Mars Reconnaissance 

Orbiter, which is up there now. We had four successes in a row; that’s not bad 

after two craters, so I’m very proud of that accomplishment.

In 2004, Administrator Sean O’Keefe asked me to become the Director of 

Goddard and replace Al Diaz, and he moved Al Diaz to replace me, so we did 

a sort of a trade between the Bears and the Redskins or something. I became 

Center Director in 2004; Hubble is at Goddard, so Hubble is still under me. 

And I’ve been Director ever since.

Explain your responsibilities as the Center Director for the Goddard Space 

Flight Center and the working relationship with NASA Headquarters.

It’s actually very simple. In today’s world, Associate Administrators at 

NASA Headquarters get to give out 4 or 5 or 6 billion dollars, and Center 

Directors and their Center people get to spend it. So it’s deciding the programmatics of something versus implementing the programmatics. Headquarters 

decides on the programs and what the programs are, what the level-one 

specifications are, what the programs must deliver. Then it’s a Center’s job to 

basically implement those programs, get contractors, civil servants, working 

to build the projects.

A Center Director has to worry about the institution, which is not the 

most fun job, of course—keeping the lights on, keeping the gas on, keeping 

the roads plowed, keeping the buildings from falling down. That’s one part 

of it. Hiring people to make sure that we can do the programs is another 

part. Training people so they can do the jobs Headquarters wants is another 

part. Also, even though the Associate Administrator has program responsibility in terms of program success, Center Directors are what are called 

the head of the Independent Technical Authority. It’s something that NASA 

Administrator Mike Griffin put in as a kind of checks-and-balances system. 

That is, Headquarters is responsible for directing projects, but sometimes, 

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hypothetically, they might want to save money here, reduce a test or something. It’s my job as Center Director and my engineers below me to say, “Hey, 

that’s not the NASA way of doing business. That’s too much of a risk.” Then 

I have the responsibility of going directly to my boss, Mike Griffin, and saying, “Hey, your Headquarters Division Director or AA is pushing us to the 

brink on something, and we’ve got to discuss this.” Then, the two heads get 

together and decide.

I think it’s a good system, because it’s worked for America for two or three 

hundred years; it’s called checks and balances, three branches of government. 

At NASA, we’ve got two branches—the program side and the technical authority side. That’s appropriate, because most of the technical smarts in NASA, the 

real engineers and scientists, are at Centers—they’re not at Headquarters—just 

by the sheer numbers. There are 1,000 people at Headquarters and 19,000 

people at the Centers.

So that’s it in a nutshell, what a Center Director does, besides go to meetings and do interviews.

Tell us about your strategic vision for Goddard; how does that compare 

to what’s been historically associated with the Center here?

Goddard was the first science center at NASA. In fact, it was one of the 

first Centers at NASA. It opened in 1959. And it’s been a science center ever 

since. It’s always been involved in science, but it’s not just a science center. 

To define science, it’s Earth science and space science. Space science includes 

astronomy, solar physics, particle fields in space, space physics, and planetary 

science. Earth science, of course, is the whole Earth system.

In addition to that—and this is something that continually amazes me, 

because I worked at Headquarters for 26 years—I come to Goddard and I find out 

things that go on at Goddard that I had no idea as a long-term NASA employee. 

For instance, I always thought that astronaut communications was at Johnson 

[Space Center]. You turn on the TV, and astronauts are talking to Johnson. Not 

quite right. Every human voice coming back from space from an American space 

vehicle, all the way back to Alan Shepard and John Glenn, has come through 

Goddard. We run the space communications system here at Goddard for NASA, 

so the backbone of the system is right here at Goddard, long before it gets to 

Johnson. For instance, we run the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, a 

system of seven very large satellites in equatorial orbit around the Earth, that 

basically is the backbone of our communication system for NASA and for other 

agencies. It’s not just NASA; it’s for some of the other very important agencies.

Then there’s the role we have with NOAA [National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration], the weather satellites. This is a test I like to 

urge people to do when they’re on a plane. Ask people who builds and 

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Edward J. Weiler

pays for weather satellites, and I’ll bet you a lot of people will tell you the 

Weather Channel. Right? I mean, after all, that’s where you see the weather 

pictures, right? The Weather Channel. How many people know that Goddard 

has managed or built some instruments for every single weather satellite 

ever launched by this country, all the way back to the Nimbus and TIROS 

[Television and Infrared Observation Satellite] satellites. I didn’t know that, 

and I’ve only worked at NASA 30 years.

So currently I’m going around Goddard giving talks to my staff so that 

when their neighbors ask them “You guys at NASA just burn up money in 

space. What do you do for me?” They can say well, do you think hurricanes 

are important? Do you think weather satellites are important? Do you think 

communicating with our satellites is important? Do you think global warming 

is important? That’s all done right here at Goddard. Hopefully, I’ve fired up a 

few thousand of our people—I’ve just recently finished a series of 12 all-hands 

lectures on what Goddard does for the country, and I think a lot of people had 

their eyes opened. I’m ashamed to say an awful lot of people at Goddard, not 

just Headquarters, didn’t have any concept of what we do for weather satellites, 

what we do for human spaceflight. So that’s where we are now.

I think NASA and the country are on the verge of a reawakening in the 

importance of Earth science. People are starting to wake up to the fact that 

the Earth is changing. We can argue about how fast. We could argue all day 

about who’s responsible. That’s not our job at Goddard. Our job is to collect 

the data and give it to the decision-makers. That’s what our job is in a nutshell, 

to build the satellites, collect the data, and give it out, and hopefully people 

will do the right thing with that data. I think we’re going to see more and 

more future in Earth science here at Goddard.

A big chunk of our future is in the James Webb Space Telescope. It’s no 

overstatement to say that Hubble has been the most successful scientific program ever launched by NASA, if not by this country, ground or space. I don’t 

think too many people in the public would disagree with that. The James 

Webb is going to be even better than Hubble, because if nothing else, it’s 10 to 

100 times better in terms of sensitivity. I have a feeling James Webb is going to 

be our next Nobel Prize, and it’s going to be looked at as our gift to the next 

generation. Hubble was a gift to this generation of kids. JWST is going to be 

the gift to the next generation of kids, of explorers.

Regarding President [George W.] Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration—

this is another thing that amazed me about Goddard. Too many people here 

would come to me and say, “What’s this new Vision? Goddard has no role in 

this. We’re a science center.” Not only do we have a role in it, we’re building 

the only piece of hardware that’s going to be launched before this President 

leaves office. Is that a role in the Vision? I think so. We’re launching the 

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Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter [LRO], and more importantly, we’re building 

it here at Goddard, inside the gates in Greenbelt, Maryland. What’s Lunar 

Reconnaissance Orbiter? Well, again, I like to put things in simple human 

terms. If you’re going to a place you haven’t been to in 30 years, with a lot 

of new roads, a lot of new interstates, what’s the first thing you do? You get a 

map. In so many words, that’s what Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter is. It’s getting a map of the Moon, because even though we’ve been to the Moon six or 

seven times, and we’ve driven SUVs [sport utility vehicles] around—the lunar 

rovers—we still don’t have a digital map of the Moon. Everybody’s got a digital camera, but that’s recent technology. We do not have a good, high-quality 

map of the entire surface of the Moon. In simple words, that’s basically what 

LRO is doing for us. It’s paving the way for our future astronauts to go make 

a permanent presence on the Moon.

We also are responsible in the Vision for running the space communication 

system for future lunar travelers, which is appropriate, considering we’ve been 

doing it for 50 years. And we have other bits and pieces of the Vision in terms 

of avionics, subsystem electronic components for the lunar landers that humans 

will use eventually. So that’s another part of the vision for the future. Our vision 

is we have a major role in the Vision. We’re not necessarily building rockets or 

space capsules, but we’re building a lot of the infrastructure to support those. 

The Vision talks about the Moon, Mars, and beyond, and beyond is a big place. 

The President—I know because I was in the audience in the first row, 

looking at him in January of 2004—specifically said, “Moon, Mars, and 

beyond.” Now, because when you’re trying to achieve a goal, you have to concentrate on the first part of that goal, you hear a lot of talk at NASA about the 

Moon. But the Vision is more than the Moon. It’s Mars and “beyond.” Besides 

the Earth and some Moon and some Mars, most of our [Goddard] science is 

astronomy, which is the “beyond,” and last time I checked, beyond is a really 

big place. So do we have a role in the Vision? I’d say so. A few hundred billion 

light-years, or cubic light-years.

You worked at Goddard in 1976 as a Princeton research astronomer. How 

has NASA changed since that time in general and in your specific area 

of expertise?

Well, let me speak first to astronomy and then go to the general. Space 

astronomy and space science was in its infancy in the late ’70s. We had 

the OAO-3 [Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3, Copernicus], which maybe 

involved 10 or 20 astronomers in the country. A few years after I got here, 

we launched IUE, the International Ultraviolet Explorer, a Goddard project, 

which involved thousands. I saw in my own field, astronomy—which is probably the oldest scientific field in human history, because the Greeks were 

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astronomers—go through a renaissance. Everybody was a ground-based 

astronomer when I was a graduate student. Now probably there aren’t very 

many people who would identify themselves only as a ground-based astronomer. Almost all astronomers on Earth now use one of our space missions.

NASA has really transformed a science, astronomy, into a space-based scientific field. I won’t say all the important science in astronomy is done in space, 

but most of the discoveries are made by the Hubbles and the Chandras and the 

Spitzers, and that will certainly be true with the James Webb. There’s no question ground-based astronomy is an important part of that, but space astronomy 

tends to be the one that leads the field in terms of where the problems are.

So if NASA wanted to take credit for only one thing, there’s no question 

in the science area that we’ve transformed the field of astronomy. You open 

a textbook today in astronomy, not just in the United States, anywhere on 

Earth, whether it’s in Chinese, Arabic, or Japanese, and every other picture is 

going to be a Hubble picture or a Spitzer picture or a Chandra picture. We’ve 

defined the science, and I don’t think I’m overstating one iota.

Also true in space physics, space physics by its nature is done in space. 

NASA brought solar physics to the American public. Until about 10 years 

ago, the average American would think that “the Sun, well, that’s that big yellow ball that never changes, and why do I care about it, as long as it keeps 

pumping out energy?” Well, Dan Rather and CBS news decided to put one of 

our small satellites called TRACE [Transition Region and Coronal Explorer] 

on television; it looked in the ultraviolet and extreme ultraviolet region, and 

there the Sun isn’t a nice, constant yellow ball. It varies by factors of a hundred, because in those wavelengths and energy regions, you see the storms 

that are going on. Sometimes those storms get all the way to the Earth, and 

that does affect our daily life, because it knocks out power grids; cell phones 

and BlackBerrys go haywire. Suddenly the Sun became part of our daily lives, 

and NASA did that for the American people, showed that the Sun does have 

an effect on the Earth.

We wouldn’t be where we are today in terms of understanding that our 

planet is changing if it weren’t for what NASA has done in the field of Earth 

science. You get a different view from space. Of course, philosophically, probably one of the most important pictures ever taken was taken by an Apollo 

astronaut who took a picture of that pale blue dot out in the distance, the 

island in space. Philosophically, that will be a picture that probably is in 

books hundreds and thousands of years from now, if we’re still on this planet, 

and not annihilating ourselves.

How has NASA changed? That’s a tough question, because I can’t think 

of any obvious ways. NASA constantly changes, but it’s like a sine wave. 

Centers have more power; Centers have less power. Headquarters has more 

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power; Headquarters has less power. It changes because it’s a human organization, and we get new Administrators every 1, 2, 5, 10 years. We get new 

Associate Administrators. We get new Center Directors. Despite what some 

people might think, people are different. They have different personalities. 

They have different ways of managing and leading.

So NASA has gone through many, many changes, but the changes haven’t 

been crazy. They’ve been little things like where is power and control centered or not centered, and who’s in charge of this versus who’s in charge of 

that. But as an organization, in terms of an engineering and science organization, our goals really aren’t that different. They’re to push frontiers. They’re 

human spaceflight. They’re to push scientific frontiers on the science side. 

They’re to support the nation’s weather satellite program.

Why is NASA here and what has been the impact on society? 

If NASA wasn’t here, we’d have to create it. NASA’s prime role in our society 

is not to allow what happened to the Romans to happen to America. What do I 

mean by that? The Romans went through a period where they went out exploring; regretfully, conquering, too, but primarily exploring. They went into northern Europe. They even got as far as Britain. And they established colonies. But 

then they stopped, and they kind of moved back to Rome; and then the center 

of attention was back to Rome with: let’s make life better, let’s have parties and 

coliseums and lions and shows. Instead of looking outward, they started to 

look back inward, and there are many other examples of this in human history. 

When a country has no frontiers, it atrophies. NASA is America’s way of pushing 

the frontier. We don’t have frontiers anymore in the United States. We’re at the 

level of the oceans now. I hate to quote Star Trek, but space is the final frontier, 

and humans need room to expand, both physically with their bodies and with 

their minds, with things like Hubble and JWST. If America loses its frontiers, we 

won’t be speaking English here much longer. Just a thought.

I like to learn from human history, and the famous saying is that those 

who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. I really believe that. 

And by the way, what’s not changed about NASA, which is why I’m still working here after 30 years, is that many of us could make enormously larger 

amounts of money outside of NASA. Why do we stay? We feel that we’re doing 

something that might be remembered in 10 years, 50 years, 100 years, or 10 

thousand years. Here’s the line I like to give people who are thinking of leaving and going to work for the other world out there, that world that makes 

money, “Yes, as a young engineer at NASA you can probably go off and go 

work for some cell phone company and make a lot more money. You may 

make a major breakthrough. You may make the first cell phone that broke the 

4-ounce barrier. You may make the first cell phone that’s 3.9 ounces. Great 

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accomplishment. But think about that. And you may make a million dollars 

for it.” A hundred years from now when your granddaughter asks, “What 

did my grandma accomplish in her life? What is she remembered for?” “Your 

grandma made the first 3.9-ounce cell phone.” Of course, 10 years later there 

was a 3.8 and then a 3.7 and then a 3.6, and of course, now you’re not using 

cell phones anymore.

Or you could stay at NASA. You could stay at NASA, and maybe at JPL [Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory], or Goddard and work on the first mission that’s got 

a big enough mirror or enough resolution to look at a planet around another 

star and see the lights come on at night, thus proving intelligent life in the 

universe for the first time in human history. “And that’s what your grandma 

did.” How do you want to be remembered to your granddaughter? That’s 

what’s not changed about NASA. If that ever gets lost from NASA, if that spirit 

of frontier, of pushing the boundaries, ever gets lost, then NASA will cease to 

exist and should cease to exist.

What are some of the lessons that you’ve learned working with NASA?

Always ask dumb questions. I wish I had been dumb enough to ask the 

following question before we launched Mars Climate Observer: “Are you sure 

that the contractor is using the same units that you are at JPL?” What a dumb 

question, right? I’ve learned a lot of lessons like that, and I’m a visiting lecturer 

at a lot of leadership courses, and you won’t believe the reaction I get when 

I talk to these young leaders. They’ll ask me questions like, “What have you 

learned?” I say, “Ask dumb questions.” There’s this thing at NASA—it’s not just 

at NASA; it’s in human society. It’s called groupthink. You saw it in the Space 

Shuttle Columbia [Accident Investigation Board] report. People sit around a 

table, and they all like to agree. They really like to reach consensus, and that’s 

really dangerous when you’re doing things like we’re doing at NASA.

So asking dumb questions, pushing the envelope, being devil’s advocates, 

those are really, really important lessons that I’ve learned and try to use. I 

drive project managers nuts with questions I ask, and sometimes you hit a 

home run. You ask a question they hadn’t thought of, or they had assumed 

was answered and you find out it wasn’t. So that’s one lesson. Another lesson 

is a lot of people at NASA really live in a world that I call PowerPoint nirvana. 

They like to dream up new missions and make viewgraphs and sell new missions. Sometimes they forget that to get those new missions, you’ve got to 

be damn sure that the ones you’re building now are launched and don’t fail, 

because we’re always just a hair away from being punished by OMB [Office 

of Management and Budget] or Congress. I saw it on the Hubble with the 

spherical aberration. I saw it on Mars 98. Be darned sure that you’re not shortchanging today’s mission for that beautiful viewgraph of the future. That’s a 

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lesson I’ve learned. I wish a lot more people would learn it. Make sure you 

aren’t penny-wise and pound-foolish, because you ain’t going to get that new 

mission if you aren’t sure that that other one succeeds.

Mike Griffin said this just a couple of weeks ago at a senior management meeting. The Mars Science Lander, the nuclear rover we’re going to 

launch in ’09, has to be successful. Forget the Vision; if that’s not successful, 

people are going to notice. That’s a huge mission. It’s hugely important. It’s 

like the Hubble repair mission coming up. We’ve got to succeed. We’ve got 

to fix Hubble one more time, because if we do that we’re going to get a lot 

of kudos, and people will notice. So don’t be penny-wise and pound-foolish, 

even though those PowerPoint viewgraphs are looking really tasty, really tasty. 

The hamburger on your plate is probably more important than the steak in 

the future. There’s a quote.

Since you are talking about fiscal responsibility, do you believe, based on 

current budget trends and past budget trends, that your Center will be 

able to meet those expectations? 

I think so. I don’t get to set the budget. We get to recommend budgets. 

The people at Headquarters get to set the budgets, and, of course, OMB has 

to approve them. And Congress is the ultimate authority on budgets. I think 

we’re doing pretty well. We’re stable. We’re not getting fat; we’re not getting 

lean. JWST is fully funded. Hubble is fully funded now. If the President’s 

budget is accepted by Congress, the Global Precipitation Mission, which 

is a critical mission to understand hurricane strength, is going to be fully 

funded. Our civil service workforce is fully funded now for the next five 

years. So we’re in a stable situation. Our institutional budget is very, very 

Spartan. We’re not exactly building new buildings and flying private jets 

here at Goddard, but we’re getting by. There’s nothing I can really complain 

about at this point.

Speaking of new buildings, you have one that’s coming online soon. And 

is very green.

First one in five or six years. It’s a new Science and Exploration Building. 

And very green. It’s going to be the greenest building in Goddard. We’re a very 

green Center. I’m very proud of this. Half of the natural gas we burn here is 

actually produced by trash, garbage. We made a contract many, many years 

ago with a local dump. They stopped dumping in the dump, and they covered 

it up, and we hooked gas lines into it. Of course when dumps decay, they 

put out methane, which, the last time I checked, is natural gas, which a gas 

furnace loves to burn. So half of the natural gas we burn here is basically free, 

and it’s produced by decaying trash, and we’re very proud of that.

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We had to cut through a forest to build a new road here. We planted two 

trees for every one we took down. We do as much as we can. We don’t use 

fertilizer here. The grass grows or it doesn’t grow; it depends on whoever 

controls those things. We’re pretty proud of our environmental effort here 

at Goddard.

You had a little help planting one of the trees from the Queen of England 

[Elizabeth II]. It would be remiss of us to talk about Goddard’s history 

without mentioning her recent visit.

The Queen, yes. Well, once every 50 years, we entertain guests like the 

Queen of England. I tell this story because I was responsible for the two 

Mars rovers, and the last 7 minutes of a 6-month journey to Mars is going 

through the atmosphere, when a lot of things happen; parachutes come out; 

rockets burn. Hopefully they don’t blow up. A lot of things happen. We used 

to call that intense period of planning “the 7 minutes from hell.” I thought 

that was the worst thing I’ve ever seen in terms of something planned in my 

career, until the Queen decided to come to Goddard. Then suddenly we’ve 

got 2 hours from hell squared, because we’ve got the British Secret Service, 

the American Secret Service, the British Embassy in Washington, the British 

Palace in London, Headquarters. They’re all telling us what we had to do, and 

everybody was a boss, and we had 42 leaders and no troops. 

Somehow we pulled that all together. Some of us had to exercise some 

authority at the appropriate times and tell people they weren’t in charge. Like 

if the U.S. Secret Service tells us to do something, we will do it; I don’t care 

what Joe Blow at Headquarters or Jane Doe at the Embassy says. There’s 

a higher authority. They want to have horses with police walking around 

Goddard, that’s fine. If you aren’t going to get your friend to be next to the 

Queen, that’s fine. So anyway, it took two months of planning, and 50 people 

probably touched us at various different times. It was planned out to the second. I have never seen a schedule that is hours, minutes, and seconds. “The 

Queen will arrive at 10:05:00. The Queen will get out of her car at 10:05:10,” 

you know. I never believed this could be pulled off. I just had nightmares 

about this being a total disaster, in front of the cameras of the world. Because 

of the hard work of people here, at Headquarters, all over the place, this thing 

went off like—no pun intended—clockwork. She arrived within seconds of 

when she was supposed to. She departed within seconds of when she was 

supposed to. It just went really, really smoothly.

We had our local “queens and kings.” We had Senator Barbara Mikulski 

here; [Congressman] Steny Hoyer, our “prince”; Senator Benjamin Cardin; 

and then a couple of our “counts,” Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger and 

Congressman Roscoe Bartlett. So that was great, having our delegation here. 

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Everybody had a great time. The “villagers” at Goddard behaved themselves—

which I was worried about, too—except for two villagers who happened to 

be scientists, who thought they’d get a better picture by climbing a tree. The 

Secret Service didn’t enjoy people up in trees with objects, so they escorted 

them downward.

That was just a glorious experience, and the greatest kudos were from the 

Palace, that said the Queen and the Duke [Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh] 

thought that Goddard was the highlight of their American trip. And considering the fact that they were traveling all over, to Williamsburg, Virginia, and 

the Kentucky Derby, that was a good kudo. So I think Goddard did proud by 

NASA, and frankly, it did proud for the country. Would I like to do it again? 

No. Fifty years is about the right interval. 

Talking about those scientists and engineers, it’s been said that Goddard 

has the largest collection in the nation. How challenging is it to manage 

all of these folks?

It does have the largest collection and, well, you can’t manage scientists. 

The only way you can manage scientists is like herding cats. You just move 

their food. They will follow their food, yes; so you move their money around, 

and they’ll follow it. That’s an old saying about scientists. It’s difficult managing scientists, because most scientists come from the university environment, and we all know there’s no management at universities. They’re used 

to a university-type atmosphere, and the government is not a university-type 

atmosphere. It’s more of a military atmosphere. Luckily, I’m one of the rare 

scientists who actually was in the military, so I understand what it means to 

have a chain of command and to follow orders, which is sometimes difficult 

to explain to my fellow scientists. But we manage. We manage.

We have 1,200 engineers in Code 500, which is our Engineering 

Directorate. I think that’s larger than three or four of our Centers, so it’s a 

huge engineering outfit. But that complement of 400 Ph.D. scientists and 

1,200 engineers enables us to do something that, really, only one other Center 

is capable of doing, and that’s JPL. That is, JPL and Goddard are unique at 

NASA. We have the ability to formulate, conceive of missions, design missions, 

build missions, launch them, and operate them. A lot of Centers have parts of 

that, but very few Centers have the ability to do the whole thing and do the 

system engineering, as we call it, for the whole thing, end to end, birth to the 

end of life, basically.

That’s a unique capability that very few places in the United States have. 

Other than JPL, maybe the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, the 

Naval Research Lab, and Goddard. Mike Griffin has said this himself; very few 

places in the United States still have the capability of building spacecraft from 

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the ground up and launching them, inside their gates, and that’s something 

this country needs to hold onto. So I take that as an important responsibility 

as the Center Director, to keep our competence to do that, because that’s not 

just a NASA thing. That’s a U.S. government capability we need to maintain.

What do you believe to be the relative importance of the human and 

robotic spaceflight and how they interact?

Excellent question, and I’ll probably give you a different answer than 

many scientists will give you. I don’t understand the continual head-bumping 

that goes on between the robotic side of NASA and the human spaceflight 

side of NASA, and maybe because I’m in a unique position. I’ve spent most of 

my career, if not my entire career, involved with the Hubble Space Telescope. 

The Hubble Space Telescope is a robotic scientific mission, the most important 

scientific mission the country has ever done, if not the world. However, I’m 

also capable of pointing out to my science colleagues that none of that would 

be true, Hubble would be a piece of orbiting space junk, if it weren’t for the 

human spaceflight side, because the robotic side of the Agency launched 

a mirror that was wrong. Hubble was built by the Marshall Space Flight 

Center and launched. It had the wrong prescription. It took the Johnson Space 

Center, Kennedy, and Goddard and Headquarters, working together with the 

contractors, to figure out how to fix this piece of junk that was up there and 

turn it into the great American comeback story. That was the ultimate merging 

of human and science. I can’t think of a better example in NASA’s history than 

the Hubble Space Telescope, in terms of ending that argument about human 

versus robots. It doesn’t have to be that way.

If astronauts go to Mars, hopefully they’re going to be doing more than 

just walking around. They’re going to be doing incredible science. They might 

pick up a rock and see a fossil. That’s science. You might call it human exploration; I call it both. Humans do science. Robots don’t do science; they enable 

humans to do science, whether they’re astronauts on Mars or whether they’re 

scientists sitting here looking at the data. The human spaceflight program 

and the robotic spaceflight program don’t necessarily have to be at odds. It’s 

human nature, so there’s always going to be, “Oh, you got my dollar. I want 

your dollar.” But they shouldn’t be at odds.

I see a day where our robotic spacecraft are going to get so big that they’re 

going to have to be built in space. I would predict that they’re probably built 

by humans, not Klingons or Romulans or other aliens. The last time I checked, 

the only people we have are humans. So if we’re ever going to build spacecraft 

large enough or telescopes large enough to see the lights go on on a planet in 

another solar system, I see humans as either having to build those things in 

space or to maintain them or to service them or whatever, 20, 30, 40 years out.

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But to have that capability, we have to do the human program now, going 

to Mars, going to the Moon, and building up the infrastructure. We’ve got to 

build space capsules. We’ve got to build bigger rockets. You need space capsules. So it’s the right thing to do. The Orion and the Ares are the right way 

to go. They may look like pure human now, but someday they’ll be used for 

doing science, I would argue. That might be a minority viewpoint among the 

scientists, but I lived it, so I have the right to talk about it.

You’ve been with NASA in one shape or form since 1976. Why would you 

encourage a person to choose NASA as a career?

When I joined NASA, it was easy to make that decision. The Russians were 

launching their Sputniks. My country was at the threat of Russia taking over 

the world. Everybody wanted us to be scientists and engineers. And what was 

competing with that kind of vision of the future? Well, we had three television stations in Chicago. If you were lucky, you had a 9-inch black-and-white 

screen. You didn’t have computers. You didn’t have Game Boys. You didn’t 

have the Xboxes. You didn’t have virtual reality. There wasn’t a lot of competition out there. There weren’t Star Wars movies or Star Trek. So it was easy 

to get inspired.

We’ve got a much tougher job now because we have a thousand television 

stations. We can land on Mars virtual reality through Xboxes and things. You 

have computers. It’s tougher to get young kids inspired by what we do. So it 

goes back to the very basic human thing to get kids to think long-term. What 

do you want to spend your career on? If you want to make money, become 

a lawyer or a doctor or a businessman or businesswoman. If you want to do 

something for culture, the human society, push the frontiers, then there’s only 

one choice.

It goes back to what I said. Is your goal in life to make the first cell phone 

that’s 3.9 ounces, or is your goal to be part of discovering life for the first time 

in human history? You can only do that once as a human culture. You don’t 

discover life the second time or the third time. It’s only once when you prove 

you’re not alone. It’s only once you pick up that rock as an astronaut and say, 

“Hey, here’s a fossil.” Or you dig down a hundred feet into the Martian soil, 

and you pick up water, and there are little things swimming around in it.

That only happens once in a human culture. You could be part of that, or 

you can make that cell phone 3.9 ounces, and you make the choice. That’s 

exactly the way I talk to young kids. We have a lot of interns come through 

here, college kids, high school kids. And you know something? I’m a great 

believer in body language. You’re not going to reach all of them, but you 

can see the light turn on in a few of their eyes, and maybe you reached 

that person. Maybe you turned a future CEO of Home Depot into the next 

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engineer. If a few of us do that at NASA today, we’re doing the right thing 

for the country.

How do you excite the next generation? I would argue—everybody has 

their own beliefs on how you get the next generation of explorers to come to 

NASA. I think it’s to get kids to think about the long term a little bit more and 

what do they want their mark to be. That’s tough, because kids don’t like to 

think about when they’re 50, 60 years old. They like to think about tomorrow. 

So I know it’s not easy; don’t get me wrong. I’m not a Pollyanna. The lure of 

a million-dollar salary is a tough thing to fight against. But life is about more 

than money. It should be.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 19

Charles Elachi

Center Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Charles Elachi grew up in the Middle East and earned his first degrees in Grenoble, France—one 

in physics, the second one in engineering (1968). Then from the California Institute of Technology 

(Caltech), Elachi earned a master’s degree (1969) and doctorate (1971) in electrical sciences. During 

his first summer in California, after learning about the connection between Caltech and the NASA 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), he applied for a job. Elachi said he liked it so much he worked as a 

part-time academic and then “liked it so much that when I got my Ph.D., I continued working at JPL 

supposedly for 1 year, then for 2 more years, and 37 years later I’m still here.”

 Elachi has served as the Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory since 2001. He is vice 

president of Caltech, where he is also a professor of electrical engineering and planetary science. 

In the past, he has been a Principal Investigator on numerous NASA-sponsored research and 

development studies and flight projects. As JPL’s director for space and Earth science programs 

from 1982 to 2000, he was responsible for the development of numerous flight missions and 

instruments for Earth observation, planetary exploration, and astrophysics. He has more than 

230 publications in the fields of active microwave remote sensing and electromagnetic theory, 

holds several patents in those fields, and taught the physics of remote sensing at Caltech from 

1982 to 2001. 

 During an interview on 23 April 2007 at JPL, Elachi talked about his life as a scientist, engineer, 

leader, and teacher and how his multifaceted career with NASA continues to provide additional 

opportunities for exploration and discovery. 

I first came to JPL because my interest was mostly in microwave and 

radar instruments and so on. My first job at JPL was to work on what 

became later the Magellan mission, which is to image Venus using synthetic 

aperture radar. In the meantime, because that took about 10 or 15 years to 

get approved and then flying, I got involved in the Seasat mission, which 

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was launched in 1978, the first Earth-orbiting satellite that JPL developed 

or managed, and that had a series of microwave instruments, including an 

imaging radar.

Then a major thing for me was when the Shuttle started flying in the 

early ’80s and I was the Principal Investigator on the first instrument which 

flew on the Shuttle, and that was on the second Shuttle flight, STS-2. That 

was the Shuttle Imaging Radar [SIR]-A, and that was the first time we actually 

used civilian space radar to do a certain kind of geologic mapping and so 

on. Then that led to a series of missions of SIR-B, SIR-C, SRTM [Shuttle Radar 

Topography Mission] for Shuttle radar, terrain mapping, and so on.

So it led to my personal research, other than management responsibility, 

being a series of imaging radars on the Shuttle, then radar on Magellan and 

then radar on Cassini, which was selected 15 or 20 years ago, but today we 

are getting the data from it 15, 20 years later. That’s my background on the 

technical side.

But then, as I was doing my technical research, I also got more responsibility 

in management, first heading the Science Division at JPL, then becoming a 

member of the Executive Council, overseeing all the instruments at JPL, and 

then, after that, becoming the Director of JPL in 2001.

Tell us how NASA has changed.

There are changes both on the positive and, let’s say, not-as-positive side. 

I’m giving a perspective mostly from robotic missions, because that’s where 

most of my personal experiences are. On the positive side, if we look at how 

many scientific missions are flying today, it far exceeds what was flying 15 

or 20 or 30 years ago, and that has enriched how we do science from space. 

I remember in the 1970s and ’80s, we used to be lucky if we had one or 

two missions flying at a certain time, particularly planetary or astrophysics 

missions. Now NASA has more than 50 missions flying.

So, in a sense NASA made space exploration more of a major tool for 

scientists to do their investigations, versus spaceflight being a curiosity. Now 

it’s becoming really part of the fabric in our country of doing exploration in 

science with the kind of mission that NASA has developed. That’s a major 

plus that I think has really changed how we do space science, be it in 

astronomy, planetary science, or Earth observation. Now it’s common that 

we’re on Weather.com and get the picture about the weather. That was not 

that common 10 or 15 years ago. I would say our whole way of how we do 

observation and learn about our planet and other planets has been changed 

fundamentally by NASA.

On the other side, I’ve seen NASA going up and down in what I would 

call bureaucracy, on how quickly you can get an idea approved. I’ve seen 

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eras where it was very quick. I remember after SIR-A flew and we got 

the exciting results, literally in a week we got the next mission approved, 

which was SIR-B. Well, that’s unheard of now. Now we go through a lengthy 

process and so on.

You could argue it both ways, that a lengthy process makes sure that we 

get the best ideas, but on the other hand, the spontaneity that I saw early in 

NASA is not there now. Now there are attempts at changes in that area, to bring 

more spontaneous ideas and be able to fund them. But that’s a big change 

from my early days in the ’70s and early ’80s.

Sometime in the ’90s, Administrator Dan Goldin arrived and announced a 

faster, better, cheaper way of doing things. How did that affect your work?

It affected the work in a major way, because up to that time, the focus 

was more on very large missions which take very long periods of time. So I 

think what happened when Dan Goldin came in is to really shake the system 

and say, “Okay, let’s step back and think about how we can we do things 

faster, can we take a little bit more risk and do more frequent missions, and 

so on.” Now, a number of people would say, “Well, we did that experiment, 

and there were a few failures.” But on the other hand, I would say, a lot of 

the missions flying now are the legacy of that era, and we see we have significantly more missions flying now. So I think there was a major positive 

benefit from it. People get attached too much to the saying “faster, better, 

cheaper.” It was an era where we were asked to look smarter, and people 

who took it literally of doing things cheaper, probably there was a backlash 

in the sense of we found that many of the missions that we do at NASA are 

very challenging, and therefore cutting corners to do things cheaper was not 

a good idea. But on the other hand, trying to do things smarter and therefore really question ourselves, can we do something in a different way? was 

a positive aspect of that era.

We need to say, yes, that era led to a couple of failures, but also it led 

to a large number of successes, and these have to be taken in balance. And 

we have to always remember that what we do at NASA, if we are always 

successful, then maybe we are not trying hard enough. Every once in a while, 

when you push the limit, you are pushing a new frontier; you are exploring 

something new; you do get setbacks. Even if you try everything you know 

how to try or do, every once in a while there would be a failure. Yes, we 

have to sit down and look at it and say, “What do we learn from it?” but that 

shouldn’t be a reflection that the way we are doing it was wrong. I wouldn’t 

say that that’s the case.

Sometimes people mix that with the “faster, better, cheaper.” The way I 

look at it, in all stages, sooner or later, you are going to trip when you are 

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pushing the frontier, so that’s not abnormal, those things happening. The key 

thing is to learn from them and keep the boldness of NASA, to stay bold and 

keep pushing the limit.

JPL has such a unique partnership with Caltech. Share with us how you 

manage all the different aspects on the academic side and on the technical 

side, as well as the day-to-day operations.

Being the Center Director for JPL is the same like any other Center Director. 

The key role of a Center Director is, one, to make sure to translate the vision 

that NASA has overall to what the Center people are doing, because most of 

the people at the working level don’t sit down and every day look at what’s 

happening in the nation. They have a job to do.

The key thing for the Center Director, the key role of the leadership, is 

to translate that vision and make sure that the employees see that there is a 

vision for them, and how does this individual work fit in that vision; make 

sure we hire some of the best employees and give them the environment to 

be successful; and then get out of the way.

A successful Center Director is not the person who will sit down and try to 

manage every detail and micromanage things. I’ll be honest with you. I have 

no idea how these rovers on Mars work, but I do create an environment for the 

experts to sit down and work and be successful on it. So the key role of the 

Center Director is really to create the right environment and lay out the right 

vision and keep communicating all the time to the employees.

In my mind, a leader is a failed leader if he or she tries to do everything 

himself or herself. They are a successful leader if they lay out the vision and 

when they charge, everybody charges behind them. They don’t have to force 

them or threaten them but have people who are inspired and passionate about 

what they are doing. And the goals of NASA are so exciting that it is easy to 

make them inspirational—or relatively easy—so it was easy to do that.

So, really, the role of the Center Director is to translate that inspiration and 

make sure all the employees are as inspired in doing that, and that they want 

to work harder; they look forward to coming every day to work, and they don’t 

have to be threatened in any way, form, or shape, by laying them off or firing 

them or something like this if they make an honest mistake; and create that 

kind of an environment of free thinking within the framework of the rules the 

experience that we have had from past missions.

That’s the key role that I play here now. The connection with Caltech, 

as you mentioned, has certain advantages, and certain issues. One thing for 

which I’m very grateful is that NASA really treats JPL like any other NASA 

Center, even though the employees are Caltech employees, we are treated 

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like any other NASA Center, except when it comes to some legality. We’re still 

on a contract.

One advantage we have with the Caltech connection is the exchange and 

the intercourse. We do a lot with the very distinguished university; getting faculty to be involved in our work; have a lot of interaction, particularly because 

they are close, and have interaction with the students. Also it gives us a fair 

amount of flexibility in the hiring and layoff. Now, layoff might sound somewhat negative, but I look at it more if somebody is not striving at JPL, they 

are better off for them and for JPL for them to go somewhere else. So having 

that flexibility, where we are not restricted by the civil service rules, really has 

played to our advantage. It makes it more flexible for us to reshape the kind 

of talent that is needed to achieve the job that we are doing now and what we 

are doing in the future.

Again going back to the changes I’ve seen, one thing is that in the early 

days of NASA we used to do a lot of hands-on across the board. Then we went 

through a period where there was a lot of reliance on the contractors. And now 

we are trying to bring in an in-house capability across all of NASA. Fortunately, 

at Goddard Space Flight Center and JPL, we kept a lot of in-house capability, 

but at some of the other NASA Centers that has been lost partially, and now it’s 

trying to be revived again, and that’s the right thing for NASA to do.

How do you translate the Vision for Space Exploration into what you’re 

doing here at JPL?

When we look at the President’s Vision, it basically lays out a spectrum 

of things that need to be done, from getting humans beyond Earth’s orbit to 

getting back to the Moon and so on, exploring planets, looking at neighboring 

solar systems. One thing which surprised me is that people talk only about 

going to the Moon and Mars, but the Vision was much broader than that, 

and the Vision was for robotic and human exploration, even though now 

everybody keeps associating it with the human program.

The Vision is much richer when we capture what President Bush, at 

least in the words, intended it to be, which is a close working relationship 

between humans and robots to explore and capitalize on the positive things 

from both elements, looking at neighboring solar systems and to see if there 

are other Earth-like planets. When you come to see what a place like JPL is 

doing, a lot of those elements fall in the kind of experience that JPL is bringing to the table.

In the case of robotic missions, we do a lot of those between us and 

Goddard Space Flight Center. In the case of the human missions, they are 

looking at the future. The human exploration of the future is going to be 

different than the past, for in the past everything was done by humans. Robots 

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have evolved significantly, and in the future we should look at the robot as 

an extension of humans. By doing that, we’ll have a much richer program. 

What JPL will bring to the table is, how do we capitalize on that robotic 

element working with the human element? It could be by scouting ahead of 

the humans. How do robots do things too risky for the human to do, or enable 

humans to do more things by having robots support them, be it in construction 

of permanent stations on the Moon, or being able to explore beyond in a cliff 

or in a crater?

We need to get a little bit away from the mindset that, gee, this is being 

done by astronauts. Well, it should be done by astronauts with robots going 

with them. You just have to look at what young people today think. They 

think very differently than us. When I talk with young people, they say, “Yeah, 

astronauts are important,” but for them a robot is as much as a human. They 

are accustomed to capitalizing on robots. So we need to get into the mindset 

that it’s really a team effort between the humans and the robots, and that 

will allow us to achieve future exploration. And that’s where places like JPL, 

Goddard, and Ames Research Center can play a significant role, even if we 

don’t have astronauts here.

How are you strategically meeting that vision? Will your budget need to 

expand or shift to meet those types of goals?

Yes. No, it’s redirecting, really. Now, clearly, everybody says we’ll need 

more budget. That’s the traditional thing to do. But the fact of life is we have a 

limited budget. The question is, how do we use most effectively those budgets 

to achieve those goals, and by laying out some specific goals and saying, okay, 

we don’t need to do everything, put priority on some of the goals, capitalize 

on the technology that is needed? It’s a question of how do you expand your 

funds or the funds that you have. As I said, clearly you can always use more 

funds, and you can be more aggressive.

The way it has to be done now is, basically, to move as fast as you can 

afford, so make sure you are streamlined and you are using your funds as 

effectively as possible. Always relook at your processes and the ways you are 

doing things and always ask the question, “Is every piece contributing to this?” 

If not, maybe push it out or delay it. That, in a sense, is how you have to make 

that judgment on a continuous basis.

Are there programs that you would like to add if you did have a 

budget increase?

Yes. One area, which I feel has been put aside for a while, is technology. 

NASA has to remain a very advanced technology organization. Unfortunately, 

with all the demands on NASA of phasing out the Shuttle, building the Crew 

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Exploration Vehicle, keeping the International Space Station, and keeping 

a strong science program, technology has gotten a backseat, and that’s 

unfortunate. We need to keep it viable so 10 years from now we’re not still 

using the technology of today. That’s one area I think has unduly suffered. 

Again, when you set priorities, there are many choices when you have 

limited budgets.

The other one is clear—there are always lots of scientific ideas for looking 

at neighboring solar systems or exploring our solar system that additional 

funds would enable. Then there is the whole issue of global change and 

what’s happening to our planet. There is concern that many of our assets are 

getting older and older, and if we really need a full understanding of what’s 

happening to our planet, we need to renew those assets in space or develop 

new capabilities or new techniques to do that.

I would say at this stage, with the kind of the capabilities that NASA can 

provide to the nation, be it in human or robotic exploration, scientific work, or 

Earth observation, that NASA is underfunded. I hope that the administration 

and the Congress really see that NASA can contribute significantly more to the 

dynamism, the economic and technological and educational capability of our 

country, and that NASA really deserves a significantly higher budget.

Now, again, we can argue, “Well, we have more Medicare and Medi-Cal and 

all of these things,” and I acknowledge that, but the return on the investment 

which will come from investing in the high-tech organizations like NASA or the 

National Science Foundation or National Institutes of Health is very important 

for our economy. Therefore, we’ll be making a mistake if we don’t invest more 

in organizations like NASA.

At one point in JPL’s history, the Center did a significant amount of work 

with the Department of Defense [DOD]. Do you believe that JPL will move 

into that role again?

In general, in all our history the amount of work for non-NASA customers 

ranged from about 5 to 15 percent and went up and down depending on the 

times. I don’t envision it to be any more than that because we are basically 

high-tech but also an open organization, like all of NASA, so there is a limit to 

what we can do for DOD.

Having said that, it turns out that the Department of Defense has basically the same technological objective NASA has. We use the same kind of 

technology for different purposes. NASA is for scientific and exploration; 

Defense is for defense purposes. But when you look at a telescope, they are 

the similar—we use them to look up; the DOD uses them to look down. Focal 

planes are very similar. The antennas are very similar. Telecommunications 

are very similar.

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What we found out is there is a lot of commonality, and in some places, 

if DOD is willing to invest in those technologies and they are of benefit to 

NASA, we think that’s the right thing for us to do here at JPL. We have been 

encouraged by NASA Headquarters to do that, because after all, we all work 

for the same government. 

If there are efficiencies where we don’t have to duplicate, that’s the right 

thing to do, and in a number of situations we’ve found that investment done 

by DOD benefited NASA, and in many places investment done at NASA has 

benefited DOD. Having that flexibility of working for both organizations but 

not changing the nature of our work, which is really in NASA, or the culture 

that we have here, is very important.

What do you believe is NASA’s most important role for the nation at 

this point?

The top role of NASA is to explore, and our nation is well-known to be a 

nation of explorers. What characterizes the U.S. more than any other place in 

the world is the spirit of exploration that the United States has, and exploration 

comes in a variety of things. It could be exploring the West in the case of 

Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, or exploring technology, or developing 

new ways of doing something or exploring the universe.

I look at exploration in a broader definition. In some cases, we do exploration to gain more knowledge. Sometimes we do exploration to do scientific 

discovery. Sometimes we do exploration for economic reasons. Sometimes 

we do an exploration just to feel good about ourselves, that the country feels 

proud of being a country which pushes the limit and looks at new things for 

human knowledge in general.

That’s where I think the contribution is, with a lot of side benefits. There 

are side benefits of technology and economic benefit. But I don’t think that 

NASA should be saying, “Well, our key role is economic benefit,” or “Our key 

role is to educate more people.” These are the side benefits which are coming 

from our exploration. NASA does exploration to lift the spirit of Americans, 

and we feel good about it as an important nation and a great nation. John F. 

Kennedy said it—we do these things because they are very hard to do and 

will expand our sphere of knowledge. Some people try to justify it on economic reasons or financial reasons or educational reasons. All of these are side 

benefits. One example I give to young people is when the nation invested in 

developing the Internet, we had no idea that 15 years later everybody is going 

to be on e-mail. We had no idea that’s the case. But the people had a vision. 

They said, “Okay, look, it’s new knowledge, new capability. Let’s go and invest 

in it,” and then the side benefit came after, changed the way how we do our 

economy, how we communicate, the efficiency, and so on.

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So I think we should not sit down and worry, “Gee, if I spend a dollar, 

am I going to get $10 downstream?” I think we should more say, “Look, if we 

invest a dollar in exploration, one out of 10 might work, but then when the 

thing which works is going to probably change our way and really change our 

economy, and keep us at the leading edge of the economic prowess of our 

country in doing that.”

In 2006, you were one of 20 selected as America’s best leaders by the 

U.S. News & World Report, honoring those who have defined leadership, 

achieved measurable results, and challenged established processes, as 

well as inspired a shared vision. What are some of the lessons learned that 

you can share with others based on your experience at NASA?

I was surprised when they told me I was selected one of the leaders. But 

I told them, “Look, the kind of things that NASA does and the kind of people 

who work at NASA, and particularly working at JPL, makes it easy to be a 

good leader.” Because, as I said earlier, the role of the leader is to lay out the 

vision for the institution, then provide the environment to enable everybody 

to be successful, and to accept every once in a while setbacks and failures, but 

learn from them. One of the things I always say, and I got it from my Deputy, 

“good news is given by the captains and bad news is given by the general.” In 

a sense, I’m expanding on that of saying, look, when there are successes, I put 

the project in the front. They are the guys who get the credit. But when there 

are setbacks, I will step on the podium to show that, yes, I’m behind the troops. 

We tell them, push the limit, take some risk, and so on, but I want them to 

feel also that when they get the setback, we are going to protect them. We are 

going to be there with them, saying, “Yeah, we knew the risk. We acknowledge 

it. But we still felt that it was worthwhile to take it.”

It’s creating that environment that is very important. That’s what was 

quoted a fair amount in that article, that a few years ago when we had the 

Mars failure, my first reaction was not who to blame. Never thought of that. 

My first reaction was, “Okay, how do we learn from this and how do we dig 

ourselves out of that hole or that setback?” When people said, “You should 

fire the people who—,” I said, “Heck, the reverse. Those are the people who 

gained a lot of experience, and they learned a lot of lessons.” I have to give 

credit to people at NASA, particularly Ed Weiler, who took the same attitude of 

saying, “Look—,” because I remember very clearly a press conference where 

people asked Ed Weiler, “Are you going to fire the people who did this?” His 

reaction, “I’m not going to fire them. These are the best people in the world 

who are doing that experiment.”

Creating that environment—that’s what they acknowledge in leadership, 

that a leader is not the person who will take credit for everything happening 

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in the organization or say, “Look how good I am.” This is a team effort, and 

the leader is the guy who really will energize an organization, pull all of them 

to work on that effort. As I said, it really is a credit for the whole organization, 

JPL and NASA, not only for me personally.

You have extensive expertise in the technical field, academic field, and 

organizational field. Do you believe that you’ve learned different lessons 

and useful information by being in each of those fields, and that together 

it helps you define these areas?

No question about that. Yes, I think that was a very great help, because 

having a technical organization like any NASA Center, it’s very important that 

you have the technical background and technical basis so that you understand 

the challenges to ask the right questions, but also for the people who are 

working under you to respect your technical ability so they trust that you are 

making the right decision. But also when you manage an organization, you 

need to have management talent, people talent, and so on.

It’s a challenging job being a Center Director because you have to have 

the technical respect, but also you have to have the people judgment and 

the management judgment to be able to do all of that. You have to have the 

communication skill so you can communicate to the broader public what your 

Center or your organization is doing.

Having had that background being a scientist and engineer and also a 

Principal Investigator, and then I got a degree in business administration 

and a degree in geology in addition to my double-E [electrical engineering] 

degree. You need to have that broad bandwidth so when you are talking 

with the different constituents, meaning your employees or the general public 

or people on the [Capitol] Hill and so on, that you’ll be able to talk in their 

language. I think that’s very important.

It doesn’t mean that if you are a specialist, you are not valued; but if you 

are a specialist, then Center Director is the wrong position for you. People 

see that if you love being a scientist, you are great and important for the 

organization. If you love being an engineer, that’s great. We need people 

like this, and you don’t have to be Center Director to get the credit. Many 

people tell me you get even maybe more credit being the project manager or 

Principal Investigator than being a Center Director, and that’s great. We need 

all those talents.

Share with us your perception of NASA’s culture.

Let me put it this way. First, when people tell me we need to change the 

culture—no, I like the culture. However, having said that I like the culture, we 

need to keep evolving it, because the world is changing; we learn new things, 

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and therefore we have to keep adjusting our culture to the new world and to 

the new challenges that we are facing. 

NASA is founded on one of the best cultures I can think about. It’s been a 

bold organization, an organization with high integrity, an organization which 

pushes the limit. That’s what the Apollo program started. The way I put it, we 

took something which is almost impossible and went ahead and did it. That’s 

the kind of culture we should continue.

Now, for a while it became a little bit bureaucratic, but we need to sit down 

and keep changing it. So it’s important, when we say we need to change the 

culture, to make sure we protect the key positive things about the culture of 

NASA but keep evolving it as we are doing different things, and to keep learning from our past lessons. The rules that we apply today are just the collection 

of our past mistakes.

We need to be thinking in our culture that there is nothing wrong in having rules, as long as these rules are always examined, and say, “Are these adding value, and are these really still valid lessons of our past mistake?” And we 

shouldn’t be embarrassed about having mistakes or past mistakes. That’s how 

you learn in the technological world. That’s how you learn is by sometimes 

trying, doing the best you can, and you find that it didn’t work; then you try to 

do something different or something better.

So, again we need to keep emphasizing that NASA has a culture of 

high integrity; a culture of openness that nobody is afraid of saying what’s 

on their mind, particularly when it comes to technical issues; the culture 

of being bold and willing to try things which are very hard, but to do it 

thoughtfully. One way I describe it to the employee, “One way of standing 

tall is to have your head in the clouds but keep your feet on the ground.” 

So you are anchored on solid technical background, but you are thinking 

beyond the box, what’s outside the box. That’s how you stand tall in an 

organization like NASA.

So in general I personally like the NASA culture, but we need to keep 

evolving it as the world changes and we learn new things.

Why would you encourage a person to have a career with NASA?

The way I put it to people is, “Where in the world can you go home that 

evening and say ‘Well, guess what? I just landed a spacecraft on Mars today’? 

Or ‘Guess what? I just brought a sample from a comet.’ Or ‘Guess what? Today I 

just did a flyby of Europa.’” I don’t think there is anyplace in the world that you 

can say that, other than a place like JPL or a place like NASA. So I would rather 

spend my life doing discovery than saying “Well, today I wrote 5,000 code of 

software,” or “I made my BlackBerry 1 pound lighter,” or “It’s consuming 10 

times less power.” I would rather be the first one on doing that. I’m not saying 

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anything negative about the other ones, but I think that’s the kind of thing 

which I find it very inspiring. I tell the young people, “I’ve been 37 years at 

JPL; I don’t recall a day that I didn’t look forward to coming to work, because 

every day I learn something new. I don’t remember a day where I didn’t look 

forward to going back home and tell my family the exciting things I did that 

day.” I tell them, “If you are looking for a job and you are here just because 

you want a job, this is the wrong place. But if you want to be part of the team 

exploring the universe, this is the right place.” And I use it in a broader sense—

not only JPL, but NASA in general.

I find young people are very excited about the kind of things that NASA 

does. Again, if people have different goals for like becoming a multibillionaire, yes, this is the wrong place to do that. They might go and start a new 

company. But I keep saying, “When I retire and I look back and say, ‘Well, 

I made $10 billion,’ or ‘I was part of a team that explored another universe 

or detected the first planet around a neighboring star,’ I would rather be the 

second one.”

Where would you like to see NASA in the next 50 years?

I hope that NASA is always looked at as the agency of high-tech and 

exploration for the country—and I’m using “exploration” in the broad sense, 

scientific as well as lifting spirits and so on. So that when we put a station on 

the Moon, that NASA is the agency which enabled that. When we are going 

to be detecting life on other planets, that NASA is the agency which enabled 

that. When we start imaging what I call family portraits of the neighboring 

solar systems, NASA is the agency which made that happen. My hope is NASA 

keeps the boldness that it has been characterized by, keeps the high integrity 

that it has been characterized by, keeps the openness that it has been characterized by, and keeps the high-tech spirit that NASA has really created in 

this country.

When I talk with people from outside the United States, they look at the 

NASA logo as something very positive and very uplifting for them because it 

reflects the positive things about our world. People outside look at the U.S., 

and you get a broad spectrum of opinion. “Oh, gee, the U.S. has got people in 

Iraq. The U.S. is a big bully,” or “The U.S. is the only big power in the world, 

and they don’t take our—,” you know, the small guy.

But then when you look at NASA, which is part of the U.S., that’s always 

something positive. You very rarely hear somebody commenting negatively 

about NASA. And I hope that over the next 50 years NASA is looked at by the 

world as a positive thing the United States does, which is increasing knowledge 

and doing it in a positive way, like our collaboration with the Russians on the 

Space Station, our collaboration with the French on TOPEX/Poseidon, our 

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collaboration with the Italians on Cassini, our collaboration with the Japanese 

on NSCAT [NASA scatterometer]. People look at NASA as a positive agency, 

and I hope that that will continue over the next 50 years.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 20

Michael L. Coats

Center Director, Johnson Space Center

On 16 January 1978, NASA announced the members of its newest group of astronauts, the first 

class specifically selected to fly the Space Shuttle. Thirty-five names were on the list, including 

Michael Coats, who received the news on his birthday. As an astronaut, he flew on three Shuttle missions: as pilot for the maiden flight of Discovery and as commander on two subsequent Shuttle missions. Before joining NASA, Coats was a distinguished U.S. Navy aviator, and in that role he logged 

more than 5,000 hours of flight time in 28 different types of aircraft. In August 1991, he retired from 

NASA and the Navy; subsequently, he worked in the space industry for almost 15 years. Then, in 

2005, Coats returned to the space agency to be the 10th Director of the Johnson Space Center (JSC). 

 In an interview held 4 January 2008, he shared experiences from his first years with NASA and 

its burgeoning Space Shuttle Program. From the Center Director’s Office in Houston, Texas, Coats 

explained his role during the final days of flying orbiters while at the same time assisting the nation’s 

space program in its transition to the newest era of exploration.

When NASA decided to pick another class of astronauts, it was to be the 

first class in about 12 years. I was fortunate not only to be at the right age at 

the right time, but also to be at the right place. In 1977, I was an instructor at 

the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School in Patuxent River, Maryland. I was a military test 

pilot. Almost all the pilot astronauts have been military test pilots, so they came 

around encouraging us to apply for this new class. This class was to be the first 

class of Space Shuttle astronauts, with the first women and the first minorities. 

I actually agonized about whether or not to apply. I really enjoyed what I 

was doing with the Navy, and my wife didn’t want me to apply to be an astronaut. 

The night before the deadline, I went ahead and decided to apply to the Navy 

first. They have a selection process, and then they forward the names to NASA 

for its selection process. Actually, I wasn’t terribly interested in the astronaut 

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program until I came down to Houston after being invited down to do a week 

of interviews and physicals in August of 1977. I fell in love with the place. 

Chris Kraft, who was the Center Director at the time, told us, “The week 

leaves a lot of free time to go talk to people. I encourage you to go talk not just 

to the astronauts, but also to the engineers and everybody here, and find out 

what they do and how they like their jobs here.” I thought, well, okay. I’m going 

to go find somebody that doesn’t like his job. That was my goal that week. So 

I really spent every spare moment walking into people’s offices around here 

introducing myself. A complete stranger, I asked, “What do you do, how do 

you like your job?” Everybody I talked to just loved what they were doing. That 

made a huge impression.

Remember, this was in 1977. It had been a year or two since we flew the 

last Apollo mission, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. It was going to be three or 

four more years before we flew the first Shuttle mission. It was a downtime 

for people. Yet morale was just sky-high. Everybody I talked to, from the taxi 

drivers to the janitors, engineers, and astronauts, really enjoyed what they 

were doing. So I thought, wow, being an astronaut would certainly be a cool 

thing to do, but working with a group of people that really enjoyed their jobs 

would be especially special. Then, I really wanted to be selected. They were 

interviewing in groups of 20, interviewed about 120, ended up picking 35. 

I was really anxious to be selected. Because they went alphabetically, I was 

in the first group interviewed and had to wait about five months before we 

heard anything. I was in graduate school at the time. January 16, 1978, on my 

birthday, they made the announcement. I was fortunate to be selected as one 

of the 15 pilot astronauts. I got to start with the class in July of 1978.

It was really a special time for us because this class had a real mixture for 

the first time. Most of the previous classes had either been pilot astronauts or 

scientist astronauts, including medical doctors. In our class, we had 15 pilot 

astronauts, six women, engineers, scientists, medical doctors—a real mixture 

of folks, and the age difference was pretty large too. It was fascinating to see 

the interaction of that class of 35 people, because nobody was really senior to 

anybody else, and we outnumbered all the astronauts that were already here. 

There were only 29 astronauts when we got here, and we were 35 more. 

Suddenly we dominated, but they were glad to see us, because they had a 

lot of work they needed us to do. It was really fun for us because there were 

enough Apollo astronauts still left over that they were able to mentor us, and 

we really enjoyed that. Of course, we were still developing the Space Shuttle 

and learning how the orbiter was going to operate. We got involved right away 

in developing operational procedures and flight rules for this amazing new 

vehicle; it was really a special time. Now, it was a lot of hard work for us back 

then, long hours. I immediately got assigned to the Shuttle Avionics Integration 

Laboratory, which was running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, trying to test 

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Michael L. Coats

out the avionics and software. We were literally working continually around 

the clock, and we thought it was important to do. It may have been a lot of fun, 

but it was a lot of hard work as well. 

We were preparing for the first Shuttle mission, and I was personally fortunate to be asked to be the family escort for the first Shuttle mission. I escorted 

John Young’s and Bob Crippen’s families during the activities for their Shuttle 

mission—both for launch and then during the mission, and for landing out at 

Edwards Air Force Base in California. This was precedent setting, if you will, 

and I really enjoyed that. It was fun to be right in the middle of all the “firsts” 

that were going on.

Then, soon after I got assigned to my first mission, which I flew as a pilot 

in 1984 on STS-41D, the 12th Shuttle mission. I flew that and then actually 

went in training for my first mission as a commander. We would have been up 

with the mission in the summer of 1986, but the Challenger accident happened 

in January 1986, and that delayed everything for about two and a half years. 

So I ended up flying as a crew commander for STS-29 in March 1989, and 

again on a third mission, STS-39, in April 1991. Between my second and third 

missions, I was the Acting Chief of the Astronaut Office for a little over a year. 

After my third mission, my wife said, that’s it. Actually, she said that after my 

second mission.

I’ll tell you a quick anecdote. She knew I had to go fly my first mission as 

a commander, because I’d been assigned, been through training and so forth. 

But she had insisted that after that one, that was it. The loss of Challenger was 

very difficult for her. Those were our classmates and friends, and we knew the 

families extremely well. In fact, I was the one that they asked to go in and tell 

the families after the accident that there wasn’t any possibility of search and 

rescue. So she had made me promise that second flight would be my last flight. 

Then, we’d go do something else. But it turned out that that mission was the 

first flight of President George H. W. Bush’s administration. My wife came up 

with this crazy idea at the last minute. “Oh, we’ve got to get ourselves invited 

to the White House. Let’s fly something for him, and he’ll invite us to the White 

House.” This was like a month before flight. 

The orbiter is on the pad, everything is stowed away, and this really wasn’t 

like my wife, who is pretty shy and retiring, but she was determined we were 

going to get invited to the White House. So she said look and see what we 

could fly for the new President. Well, it turned out he’d been Vice President 

during all the other Shuttle missions, and they’d flown everything under the 

Sun for him. So she thought about it for about a week, and finally she said, 

“Well, he’s not the only person in the White House; fly something for Barbara 

Bush.” I’m thinking, wow, she’s pretty serious about this. So I went to the rest of 

the crew, because we had everything stowed away in our personal preference 

kits. We were allowed 20 items in a personal preference kit, so I asked the crew 

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if they had anything that wasn’t assigned to anybody or committed to anybody. 

One of the crewmen had a little gold Shuttle charm that was available, so we 

all chipped in a few bucks and paid for that. 

So I told my wife, “Okay, now we got something we’re flying, it’s stowed, 

what do we do now?” She said, “When the President calls during the flight 

mention it to him, and he’ll invite us to the White House.” I’m thinking, boy, 

she really wants to do this. I said, “He’s not scheduled to call.” She said, “Well, 

he’ll call, trust me.” I’m thinking, yeah, yeah, okay, so anyway, I’m on orbit and 

I get this message saying the President’s going to call. I’m thinking, oh, this 

is spooky. During the conversation, they can see us; the crew families were 

over at our house watching this on TV. They can see us, and in a split screen 

they can see the President and the Vice President sitting behind him in this 

conversation. Of course, we couldn’t see anything, we’re just talking, and we’re 

passing around the microphone, and my wife tells me later that she’s saying, 

“Mike’s not going to say anything, he’s not going to say anything!” 

And as we were signing off, the President was saying, “We’re awfully proud 

of you,” and so forth, and I said, “Well, thank you, sir, and give our regards to the 

new First Lady, and tell her we’re flying something for her.” He got all excited 

right there on TV. He said, “Well, that’s fantastic, nobody’s ever flown anything for 

her. I want you to come to the White House as soon as you get back and give it 

to her.” So all the wives were jumping up and down. I’m thinking, I can’t believe 

my wife had this all planned out. Gets even better. Literally, two days after we 

landed, they flew us to [Washington,] DC. We were in a hotel the night before 

we were supposed to go over, and I get a call from Barbara Bush saying, “Would 

you mind coming a few hours early so I can give you a tour of the White House?”

I said, “I think I can make the time to do that.” She was just fantastic, just 

charming as she showed us around, and she spent all the time in the world. If 

you remember, Millie was their dog and had had puppies. Big headline. So my 

wife, who is a big dog lover, came up with the idea to make a doggie biscuit 

in the shape of a Space Shuttle to leave for Millie. As we were going through 

all the guard stations you had to go through to get in the White House, everybody would open the box, they’d look at it, they’d roll their eyes, and hand it 

back to her. She left it in one of the upstairs bedrooms that was Millie’s room. 

Just left it there. 

We got a wonderful tour, presented the gold Shuttle charm to Barbara Bush, 

and got to have pictures taken with the President in the Oval Office. I thought, 

well, that was really nice, that worked out just like my wife had planned. About 

two weeks later when I am back in the Astronaut Office, I get this message 

saying to please call the White House. I thought it was a joke. But they said, 

no, it really is a real message. So I called, and sure enough, it was the White 

House saying that I’ve been invited to a state dinner, just me and my wife. I 

thought, whoa, what’s this all about. The moral of this long story is when your 

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wife comes up with a crazy idea, listen, because you never know what’s going 

to happen. It turns out they had really been impressed with the doggie biscuit. 

We go to the reception. I’m all dressed up in my Navy dress uniform, and she’s 

in a floor-length formal, and we’re standing in the reception line between Audrey 

Hepburn and Bob Hope, two of our favorite people. So my wife is just going, oh, 

it can’t get any better than this. As the line is moving towards the President and 

the First Lady, and then to the Israeli Prime Minister and his wife, we were about 

five people away and I’m telling my wife, “He’s not going to remember who we 

are,” when President Bush looks up and says, “Mike, Diane.” He immediately starts 

telling the Prime Minister about the doggie biscuit. I felt sorry for the two or three 

people that were still in front of us, because they got completely ignored.

At the dinner, they split up couples and I’m sitting between Audrey Hepburn 

and Bob Hope’s wife, and the President’s on the other side of Audrey Hepburn. 

He was really interested in the space program, so he kept leaning in front of her 

to ask me questions. I think she was getting a little bit irritated, because he was 

ignoring everybody at the table, talking about space. At one point he says, “Well, 

when are you going to fly again?” I said, “Well, I promised my wife I would just 

fly that second flight.” He said, “Well, do you want to fly again?” I said, “Well, sure.” 

He said, “Let me see what I can do.” So he gets up, and walks across the room to 

where Diane was sitting. She was sitting between the White House Ambassador 

for Protocol and the wife of Vice President Dan Quayle. The President goes over 

and leans down and talks to her. At first she’s frowning, and then she smiles. He 

comes back and says, “I think it’s okay if you fly one more time.”

I said, “What in the world did you tell my wife to make me expendable?” 

He smiled knowingly and said, “That’s between me and her.” After the dinner 

I go up to her, and say, “I really get to fly one more time?” She said, “Just one 

more time.” I said, “What did the President of the United States tell you to 

make me expendable?” She said, “He promised to invite us back to the White 

House.” Which he did. But during the meal, I had said how nice it was that the 

families got to come up and visit. Remember, this was only the third flight after 

Challenger; there was a lot of pressure on the crews and the families. I said it 

was really special to be able to come up here and get a tour of the White House 

and added, “It’s a shame every crew can’t do that.” He said, “Well, why can’t 

they?” I said, “Well, you’re the President.” He said, “Well, so be it.” So during his 

four years, every crew and their families got an opportunity to tour the White 

House, which was really nice. So that’s how I got my third mission.

Sounds like you got a directive from the President of the United States, right?

Yeah, that was pretty good. But I had promised that would be the last one, 

so after the third mission I had to make a decision. I had offers from NASA, the 

Navy, and industry. I had three good choices to pick from, and I wanted to go 

out and learn more about the business world. So I did. For 14 years I worked 

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for two or three companies, all of which merged into Lockheed Martin, so the 

last 10 years I was with Lockheed Martin. I was up in Denver, Colorado, as vice 

president there, really enjoying that. Current NASA Administrator Mike Griffin 

had been my customer on my last Shuttle mission, when he was the Deputy 

for Technology for the Strategic Defense Initiative Office. That was 18 or 19 

years ago. I got to know Mike then and had tremendous respect for him. He is 

extremely knowledgeable, a terrific engineer, loves the space program, and is 

as honest as anybody you’ve ever met, and blunt. He called and made me an 

offer I couldn’t refuse to come back to Houston and take this job. 

My wife and I thought we’d live there in Colorado forever; I promised 

her that house would be our forever house, and she loved it up there. But it 

worked out really well, because our family is still here, the kids are here, now 

the grandkids are here, so she doesn’t have any regrets about coming back. So 

a little over two years ago, I became the Center Director. This is the best job 

in the world for me. I have what I think is a wonderful time, a unique time, to 

come back and work in the space business. We are trying to fly out the Shuttle 

Program, and since I was here for a few years before the first Shuttle flight, it 

will be nice to be around as we fly the last Shuttle mission. I think that I’d like 

to be able to tell people I did that. We’re building and finishing the International 

Space Station, and we’re making the decisions on the Constellation Program. 

Having three major programs in different stages of their life cycle is 

unprecedented. It’s pretty special to be a part of NASA and the space team as 

we’re doing all these things, these three major programs. Of course we’ve got 

some small programs as well. But the decisions we’re making nowadays on 

Constellation are pretty far-reaching. We’re going to live with these decisions 

for 50 or 75 years. It is great to have such a talented group of highly motivated 

people work in these programs. It’s a real privilege to be a part of the team 

here, because I think it’s the best team in the world. 

What is your vision for the Center?

I really do believe that the Johnson Space Center is the premier space center, 

and [Administrator] Mike Griffin has used the term. If you’re just looking at 

human spaceflight, that’s certainly true. The astronauts are here, they’re trained 

here, the Mission Control Center is here. We are here to fulfill the mission that 

both the administration and Congress have given us. Remember the Vision for 

Space Exploration initiative is not just the President’s initiative. The Congress 

made it the law of the land with the authorization bill two years ago. We’ve 

been directed by the government and Congress to go explore the solar system. 

The first step, of course, is to go back to the Moon. But we’re going to 

use both the Space Station and the Moon as a test bed to learn how to be selfsufficient and self-sustaining before we go blast off. Remember, we’ve never really 

had to be away from Mother Earth before. On the Space Station and the Space 

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Shuttle, if something bad happens like a meteorite pokes a hole in the vehicle or 

something, you’re an hour from home. You can do an emergency deorbit and be 

on the ground. On the Moon, you’re two and a half days from home, and with 

the new system, we’re going to have an “abort anytime” philosophy, which says 

you’re two and a half days from help. As soon as you fire the engines to go off 

to Mars or anywhere else in the solar system, you’re a couple years from home.

Now that’s a different way of thinking. For the first time in human history, 

you’re going to be truly self-sustaining. So we’ve got an awful lot of work to 

learn how to do it all—we’ve got to carry our own air and water and fuel and 

food and so forth, because we’re not going to find it anywhere out there. If 

we’re finding water throughout the solar system, and there are more indications there are, we might have air and fuel and water in place. But we’ve got 

to learn to be self-sustaining, and we’ve got to learn to exist for long periods 

of time in zero gravity and what that means to the human body. We’ve got to 

overcome some things, and we’re working hard on Space Station to do that. 

The bone loss and muscle loss, the radiation effects, what zero gravity does to 

the human body for extended periods of time, very important to understand 

it and develop countermeasures for that, because we’re not going to develop 

any artificial gravity any time soon out there. 

I believe it’s important for the human race to explore, and frankly get off 

Mother Earth. All of our eggs are in this one little basket, and we’ve got the 

capability to hedge our bets now, and we ought to be doing that. It’d be the 

ultimate shame if in fact a meteorite wiped out all life on Earth, which it does 

about every 65 million years. It may be another 65 million years, or it might 

happen tomorrow. But we’ve got the capability now to spread out through the 

solar system. We need to start doing that. 

It’s a critical time. We’ve got a lot to learn. I really believe that the Johnson 

Space Center will, in essence, lead the NASA team in doing that. We’ve got the 

expertise in human spaceflight. We don’t have the expertise in deep space 

operations, but we’re teaming up and working with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 

which does have that kind of expertise. We have to learn about robotics, we 

have to learn about deep space operations. They need to learn about human 

spaceflight. So we’re trying to team up with all the NASA Centers and choose the 

expertise that exists at each of the Centers and take advantage of that expertise. 

The Johnson Space Center has experience first of all in human flight, but 

also in large programs; other Centers have program management experience, 

but they’re smaller-scale than what we’ve got with the Shuttle and the Station 

and Constellation. We’re going to lead, and we’re going to be the integrator to 

pull it all together and make all the Centers work together. We won’t be the 

lead Center, but we’re going to say we have to be the ones to make sure the 

team works together to be successful. And it really has to be a team effort with 

all the Centers working together.

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We’ve made tremendous progress in the last couple years. Mike Griffin has 

stressed that more than anybody ever has. We’ve got to include our international partners as well. We certainly want our domestic access to space if we’re 

going to be a spacefaring country. We don’t want to abandon that capability for 

any extended period of time. But any space effort like the International Space 

Station, like Constellation, will be an international partnership. We’ve got that 

precedent set now with the International Space Station. 

In industry we worked a lot with international partners, because we’ve all 

become part of a global economy, and so we do that naturally. One of the things 

that’s delighted me coming back to NASA is seeing how far NASA has come 

in working with the European Space Agency, the Russian Space Agency, the 

Canadian Space Agency, and the Japanese Space Agency. They’re all partnering, 

and learning how to work with international partners is a skill and a core competency that you need to nurture and continue because it is extremely valuable. 

It doesn’t come naturally to us. You have to understand what’s important to them 

in order to work effectively as a team. We want their participation. The space 

program brings the world together and gives everybody a common cause and a 

common set of objectives. You don’t agree on everything, but everybody wants 

to be a part of this. It’s wonderful to be working together. 

Johnson Space Center will not only lead the Agency, if you will, pulling 

it together as a team, but all the international partners as well. We are well 

positioned to do that. Now that’s a huge responsibility. It really is. Somebody 

has to be the integrator, and you can move the work out to all the Centers. Of 

course, in industry you do it naturally. You have a lot of other contractors on 

any team, and invariably on a big effort you’re spread around the country. The 

prime integrator has to pull it all together and make sure nothing falls through 

the crack. All the pieces have to fit together. Well, that’s what JSC’s job is going 

to be in the future, is to make sure nothing falls through the crack, that it’s all 

pulled together and functions smoothly within the Agency and then with the 

international partners as well. I think we’ve got the talent to do that. We’ve 

got to make sure we train our people appropriately to do that, to be good 

program managers and project managers, and international partners, to pull it 

all together. The technical side of it I don’t worry about. We do that very, very 

well. The program management side of it, the political side of it, is something 

we’ve got to continue to work on very hard.

What changes have you seen in NASA since the time that you first started? 

What changes are occurring that will move NASA into the future?

There were a lot of stovepipes back then, a lot of rivalry between Centers. It 

got so bad after Challenger, you didn’t even talk to other Centers readily. Mike 

Griffin has tried very, very hard to break down those walls. I see the NASA team 

working better together, the Centers working better together, dramatically better 

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than I saw when I left NASA in 1991. Now I know all the Center Directors. 

I’ve known them all for years. I know most of the folks at Headquarters on 

Mike’s Headquarters team. We talk all the time. We have a monthly Strategic 

Management Council at some Center. We move it around. Everybody comes 

together face to face. It’s a lot of travel, it’s exhausting, but it really facilitates 

communication. You work as a team. I have no reservations about picking up 

the phone and calling any other Center Director, anybody at Headquarters, and 

say, “Hey, what’s going on here? This doesn’t make sense, let’s understand this.” 

That’s fundamental to communications. You have to have the relationship first 

so you can communicate. That hasn’t been the case in the past all the time. 

That teamwork is a dramatic change from the way it was in 1991 when I 

left. Now we’re still working it down. Middle-level managers are not as teamoriented as the senior managers, but I see it filtering down. Mike Griffin gets the 

credit for that. He has insisted on that. He has moved people between Centers, 

between Centers and Headquarters and so on. So you’re not quite as parochial. 

You can at least have an appreciation about what the other Centers do and what 

Headquarters does, and that’s good for teamwork. We’ve always emphasized mission success, and that’s one of NASA’s four core values, but teamwork is one of 

those four core values too, and they’re very serious about it. Safety and integrity 

are the other two. So a big change is the emphasis on teamwork that I didn’t see 

before. One Agency working together, and the teamwork again with the international partners.

It’s an appreciation of what other people can bring to the table. We’re trying 

to get rid of the “not-invented-here” attitude. We’re accused of being arrogant here 

at the Johnson Space Center. Sometimes that’s well deserved. But I see people 

opening up their minds and saying that they’d like to learn what else is going on 

out there. I came in and started emphasizing and requiring benchmarking against 

not only the other Centers, but outside NASA as well, emphasizing the value 

of diversity in a workforce, because I think it is more creative and innovative, 

and I see people starting to get much more excited about that, enthusiastic and 

accepting of that, which makes the team work better together.

What lessons learned do you apply to your current role as Center Director?

The biggest—and it’s a struggle—is you have to encourage people and 

create an environment where people feel free to speak up. I’ve been delighted 

at what I have found. I came back to NASA a couple years after the Columbia

STS-107 accident. The Agency had invested a huge amount of resources and 

emphasis on people to feel free to speak up and to feel a responsibility to 

speak up. We have a structure now, whether we’re talking about the Program 

Requirements Control Boards or the Flight Readiness Reviews or the Mission 

Management Teams—they’re very structured where you actually actively seek 

out dissenting opinions, asking, “Are there any alternate opinions? Let’s hear 

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them.” That’s good. This is tremendously time-consuming, but time well spent 

so we get all the opinions in there. On the tough decisions you’re always going 

to have—it’s a 51-49 type thing. There will be strong opinions on both sides of 

any argument, any difficult topic if you will. So you need to get people feeling 

like they can speak up and should speak up, have to speak up.

The other side of that is when you finally have to make a decision—and 

sometimes the decisions go all the way up to Mike Griffin—you also have a 

responsibility to explain your decision. If you don’t take the time to explain 

your thinking and your rationale, the people that spoke up and weren’t agreeing won’t speak up the next time. So I have to take the time to say why I’m 

making this decision. I’ve learned if you take that time, then the people that 

weren’t agreed with, or felt like they lost the argument, will speak up again the 

next time, as long as it was explained to them. They may not agree with your 

rationale, but at least you paid them the respect of saying here’s why I made 

that decision. That’s time-consuming. It’s hard to do. 

We’re still in a mode, post-Columbia, where people are taking the time, but 

I’ve seen it happen before Challenger, before Columbia: the pendulum swings 

back, and people get complacent. They try to expedite things and shortcut 

things, and they don’t give people the time to speak up. We’ll get there again. 

It’s probably inevitable. That’s just human nature. We need to fight that as 

much as we can. We need to emphasize an environment and a responsibility 

to speak up. It is about communications more than anything else.

Now I’ve seen it in industry. We had a period of time at Lockheed Martin 

back in 1999 when we had five different failures—two Mars missions, two Titan 

IV-B classified missions that cost the government billions of dollars, then another 

rocket failure. It was a disastrous year. We did a lot of soul-searching after that. It 

always came down to a failure of communications. Communications is the hardest 

thing we as humans do, especially when you’ve got a large team and especially 

when you’ve got very highly technical work that you’re trying to do. You’ve got 

to create an environment and a process where again, people feel a responsibility 

to speak up, not just an ability, but a real responsibility. I stress to the new hires 

when they come in, “You are now a professional, a space professional. You may 

be only 22 years old, straight out of college, but you’re right now a member of the 

team, and you have a responsibility to speak up. Ask dumb questions, because 

you’ve got a fresh perspective.” You’d be shocked how many times a young 

person will ask a question and we’ll go, “I don’t know.” We hadn’t thought about 

it that way, because we tend to get set in a way of thinking.

So we seek a fresh perspective. One of the things we’ve learned about 

diversity—and we’re trying to stress that here, is it’s not so much the gender, 

the color of the skin and so forth—it’s the way you’ve been trained to think or 

approach a problem. Engineers are trained one way, test pilots are trained a 

different way, scientists are trained a different way, medical doctors are trained 

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a different way. The thought process is different for each. So when there’s a 

problem, we have many ways to think, how do I solve this problem? That’s a 

wonderful thing, because I saw it work in my class of astronauts, where we 

had such a variety of differently trained thought processes and constantly 

people would just say, “Why? Why are you doing it that way?” 

Test pilots all tend to think alike. We’ve been trained alike, and there’s a 

reason you train test pilots to think alike—so there will always be a backup 

plan. The scientists have a different plan. The scientist would say, “Why are 

you doing it that way?” We’d answer, “Well, here’s why.” They’d said, “Well, how 

about this; have you thought about that?” We’d say, “No.” Because everybody 

was equal in the 1978 astronaut class and nobody was senior, there were times 

when the discussion was really a free-for-all. But it was fascinating to watch the 

interchange, the different ways of thinking. Right now, I think communications 

are very good. But it’s going to change. The challenge really is how do we fight 

that, how do we fight complacency. Success brings complacency. That’s human 

nature. I’ve seen it happen several times now. Trying to figure out how to fight 

that is our biggest challenge.

What do you think NASA’s role is in society? What is its impact?

I feel very strongly that the space program is important to our society for 

several reasons. 

Number one, all the polls indicate the public is very proud of NASA and 

the space program. Now, they don’t know what we do. When you ask them 

specifically what does NASA do, they don’t know. We had industry conduct a 

bunch of surveys, focus groups, at NASA’s request. What we learned is, well, a 

lot of people knew about the Hubble Space Telescope, a lot of people knew 

about the two Mars Rovers, very few people knew about the Shuttle. Fewer 

knew about Space Station, or knew that we even had one. Nobody knew about 

this Constellation Exploration Program. 

They don’t know what NASA does or what NASA is trying to do, but they 

have a very high opinion of NASA. We’re rated the highest in the public opinion of any government agency by far. They’re proud of what we do. They think 

we do that high-tech stuff, and that’s pretty cool. But we don’t do a very good 

job of educating the public about what we’re doing.

But I do believe that the economy grows and society improves because of 

technology. I was both a math and a history major, and I love history books. When 

you go back and read about the 1920s and ’30s, people had radios, but information 

was shared from “hand to mouth” for an awful lot of people. A neighborhood 

might have one radio. People would gather around to listen to that one radio. Well, 

now everybody’s got a TV. There are actually two TVs for every human being in 

this country. Food is cheaper. Believe it or not, energy is cheaper, even though we 

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complain about the price of oil and everything associated with it. Technology has 

made life cheaper and easier, even for the poorest sections of society. 

This is not to say that we’ve solved all the problems. We haven’t. But despite 

what you read in the media, by almost any reasonable measure, life is getting 

better. It’s getting better because of technology. We have things to solve, the 

energy problems, the global warming, things like that. Politics is always going 

to be a problem. But the fact is, the standard of living is rising for the vast 

majority of the population. You have to go back and compare to what it was 

75 years ago to really understand that. And the reason is because of technology.

Now NASA really is the example of what the country ought to be doing—

investing in technology, research, and development. I could talk forever about 

the spinoffs from the space program. Communication satellites, cell phones, 

Global Positioning Systems. We take them for granted now, but they’re spinoffs 

from the space program. The Apollo program, going to the Moon and the need 

to miniaturize everything, had a dramatic effect. Transistors, the computer 

chips, all that was really started because of the space program. 

We made a huge investment for the 40 years of the Cold War. We invested 

11 percent of our federal budget in research and development to one extent or 

another. The Apollo program was one example of that. It drove the Soviet Union 

into the ground. They couldn’t keep up. Our economy just skyrocketed. And it’s 

still robust. But in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and we weren’t racing 

anymore, we cut back to 3 percent of our budget in research and development. 

NASA’s budget is part of that 3 percent. Other countries figured out that that 

investment was a good deal. They’re making huge investments now. China. 

I’ll give you some statistics. In 2004, we graduated 70,000 engineers in 

this country, which is half of what we graduated back in the early 1990s. We 

graduated 70,000, India graduated 350,000, and China graduated 600,000 engineers. So between India and China, there are more than 10 times the number 

of engineers we graduated. Guess what? They’re staying home and working in 

those countries because the jobs now are there. 

Fifty-nine percent of the Ph.D.’s in this country go to foreign students. They 

used to stay here and work. They used to stay here, start new companies, create jobs, create whole new businesses, grow our economy. Guess what? Now 

they go home, back to their countries, and start those new technologies, new 

companies, new jobs in their countries, for a lot of reasons. One, the jobs are 

there in their countries, their countries are making the investments. Two, after 

9/11 [2001], it’s hard for a foreign student to get security clearances over here. 

We are in essence educating the global competition. We still have the best 

university system in the world. Most people send their kids over here to get a 

good technical education. Then they go back home. My point is the economy 

that we enjoy, the world’s most robust economy, is a result of the investments 

in technology that we’ve made, and the space program was a big part of that.

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To get kids interested in technology, you need to get them excited about 

something. They get excited about space. “I want to be an engineer, I want 

to be an astronaut so I can work in the space program.” You talk to a lot 

of the folks around here and they will tell you, “Oh yeah, I decided to be a 

mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, an aerospace engineer because of 

the space program. I wanted to work at NASA.” 

I talk to the young kids in school a lot and have over the years, once a 

month. This past year, I haven’t been able to, but for 25 years I’ve gone to 

schools about once a month, and I see the kids get really excited about the 

space program. But you don’t want to scare them off. Math and science and 

engineering can be scary. They’re not easy subjects and you want to get the kids 

excited about them. You have to make the kids comfortable and say, “Hey, this is 

an interesting thing, the space business is fascinating. Technology is fascinating. 

Don’t be scared of it. Don’t be afraid of it.” If we can make them comfortable 

with it so they take a serious look at it, we’ll be amazed at the number of them 

who say, “Wow, that’s really pretty good, that’s fun to do,” and we need kids to 

do that. You’ve got to reach them in the middle school years. You can’t wait till 

high school. That’s hard to do sometimes.

This is a pretty special place to work, and you need to transfer that feeling to 

the kids somehow. If these jobs aren’t available, if that attraction is not out there, 

people aren’t going to go into engineering. As a country, we are going to abandon 

the playing field to international competition, and watch their economies take off, 

and they are taking off. Ours will stall. It is just like night follows day. 

Right now, at current rates of growth, by 2025 China will have the world’s 

largest economy. They’ll pass us by like we’re standing still. We’re not growing 

like we used to because we’re not making the investments we used to. It’s really 

simple. But since we’re the only superpower and the world’s largest economy 

right now, nobody really cares. By the time they care, it’ll be too late. That 

worries me because I want my grandchildren to have the same opportunities 

that I’ve had here. The space program is just one example, but a very good one, 

of how you attract people into the engineering and sciences. If you don’t do 

that, the economy will suffer for it. It is really simple.

Why would you encourage someone to come to work for NASA?

The best thing a person can do for a career is find a group of people that 

enjoy doing what they are doing and work with them. And I really believe the 

folks here like what they are doing and believe it is something that’s important for 

the country. They’re really proud of what they’re doing. We don’t have a whole lot 

of space programs out there. NASA is the only one we’ve got in this country, and 

I believe this is the best group of people in the world. We all have tremendous 

pride in our space program and what we’ve done.

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Chapter 21

William W. Parsons

Center Director, Kennedy Space Center

Bill Parsons happened to be visiting family members in Cocoa Beach, Florida, when he had an 

opportunity to attend a Shuttle launch. At the time (November 1985), Parsons admitted he was 

not especially interested in going, but he finally relented and joined hundreds of others at the Cape 

Canaveral causeway viewing area. The experience of watching STS-61B changed his future. 

 A native of Magnolia, Mississippi, Parsons attended college on a Navy Reserve Officer Training 

Corps (ROTC) scholarship and holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the University of 

Mississippi. He spent four years with the U.S. Marine Corps, then worked in private industry in his 

hometown before joining NASA. He also has a master’s degree in engineering management from 

the University of Central Florida.

 In January 2007, Parsons became the Director of Kennedy Space Center (KSC), a position he 

held until October 2008. Prior to this position, Parsons served in numerous leadership roles including as the Director of Stennis Space Center and as the Agency’s Space Shuttle Program Manager. 

Parsons shared his thoughts about his career and NASA during an interview conducted on 1 June 

2007 in his office in Florida. He began with his memories of that first launch and explained how that 

experience impacted his life.

So they were doing the countdown, and I started feeling the excitement 

of the crowd, and I started getting into it. All of a sudden it began to kind 

of capture me. It was a dusk launch; it wasn’t quite dark, but the Sun was 

going down. The lights were on the Shuttle. It’s there on the pad, and you 

can feel the excitement going through the crowd. Then this thing lit off, and 

I’ll be honest with you, when the sound wave hit me and started vibrating my 

chest, the next thing I know, I was kind of jumping up and down. I even got 

tears in my eyes. It really affected me. I think it affected me because I didn’t 

realize how powerful the Space Shuttle was, and when I saw that, it was an 

awesome thing.

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The other part was how patriotic it made me feel. Having been a Marine 

and then going into private industry, I hadn’t felt that level of patriotism since I 

had left the Marine Corps. All of a sudden I’m watching this happen, and I was 

like, “It’s great to be an American. It’s great to do what we do and to have this 

kind of technology.” So when we returned to the house, I started talking to my 

father-in-law, who was the Executive Vice President of Pan American Airlines, 

and said, “You know, I think I’d like to come to work out here.”

He said, “Well, I’ll see what we can do. We’ll arrange some interviews.” I 

sent my résumé in, and I didn’t get an interview or anything. Then, of course, 

I’m back at the sawmill in Mississippi in January of 1986, when the Space 

Shuttle Challenger accident occurred. I came home early that day for lunch to 

watch the launch on TV. I watched it, and of course, the tragedy occurred. I 

thought to myself, “That’s kind of the end of that.” But I kept applying for jobs, 

and finally Pan Am called me back on the Air Force side. In late 1986, I went 

to work for Pan Am as a launch complex supervisor on the Air Force side for 

Complex 40 and 41—Titan 34D/Titan IV. I did that for a couple of years and 

really enjoyed it.

McDonnell Douglas Corporation approached me and said that they had 

some work in the Spacecraft Processing and Integration Facility [SPIF], which 

is for Department of Defense [DOD] spacecraft that flew on the Shuttle. They 

processed the Space Shuttle DOD spacecraft. So I accepted and worked for 

McDonnell Douglas for a couple of years. Turned out in the Marine Corps I 

had been a nuclear weapons courier, so I had the top-secret clearance. To do 

the work in the SPIF, you needed all these special clearances, and because I 

had a head start, mine went through really fast.

After a couple of years, apparently NASA had lost a number of people 

that had the clearances. They went to the DOD and said, “Do you have anybody you’d recommend to come over to NASA?” Apparently my name came 

up; NASA contacted me and asked if I’d be interested. At the time I said, “Not 

really. I like what I’m doing.” But we kept talking, and eventually I came over 

to NASA in 1990 to work DOD payloads for the Space Shuttle Program. So I 

was attached to the Space Shuttle Program payloads area, assigned specifically 

to the Department of Defense payloads. That started my NASA career.

From that point on, it’s just been one thing after another, mostly in Shuttle 

until about 1994. Then the DOD payloads were complete. I went to work in 

Space Station and eventually was assigned to the Node, which was the first 

U.S. piece of hardware. I helped to get it from the manufacturer down to the 

Kennedy Space Center, and we started getting it ready for launch.

At that time, I went to NASA’s Stennis Space Center to be Chief of the 

Engineering Division, and then I became Chief of Operations for Propulsion 

Tests. I eventually was assigned to the Johnson Space Center to do Center 

Operations. Around 2001, George Abbey asked me to be the Deputy Director 

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263

of the Johnson Space Center. In 2002, he was moved, and at that point in 

time Roy Estess, who I had worked for at Stennis, came over to be the Acting 

Director, and I was his Deputy Director for about six months.

One of the things that we talked about was, before the politics really 

captured me and threw me to the curb, he would send me back to Stennis. 

Eventually, he worked a deal where I went to Stennis; I was Director of Center 

Operations again. The move back to Stennis put me in line for possibly having 

an opportunity as the Director of the Stennis Space Center.

In 2002, NASA’s Administrator, Sean O’Keefe, selected me as the Director 

of the Stennis Space Center when Roy retired and that position was opened. I 

was doing that for almost 11 months when the Space Shuttle Columbia [STS107] accident happened, and for a couple of months we worked the recovery. 

Everybody just kind of threw their shoulder into working recovery operations.

Ron Dittemore had announced internally before Columbia occurred that 

he would be leaving the Agency, which did not change after Columbia. I was 

approached by Bill Readdy, and Sean O’Keefe contacted me and asked me to 

be the Program Manager for Shuttle for Return to Flight. The next two and a 

half years, I worked Return to Flight until we launched STS-114. By that time, 

Mike Griffin had come on board as NASA Administrator. Mike and I had a conversation, and I just said, “You know, it’s been two and a half years and I think 

it might be time for a change.”

As a side note, my family had decided not to move to Houston. They’d 

moved back here to Florida. My wife is from here. Her mother lived here and 

was elderly, and so we moved her back here, and I went to Houston. In addition, my children had environmentally induced asthma while living in Houston 

previously, and with the combination of the two circumstances, we had made 

the decision for my family to live in Florida. After two and a half years of that, 

I said, “You know, it’s probably time that we start working to get the family together.” He [Griffin] agreed and asked me if I would like to go back to 

Stennis as the Center Director, since I had left there after only 11 months. I 

said, “Absolutely, I would love to do that.”

The announcement was to be made, I think, the first week of September 

after Labor Day, and of course, that’s the weekend that Hurricane Katrina 

hit. On Monday—Labor Day, I think it was—Rex Geveden called me up and 

said, “We’d like for you to be the Agency’s lead in the recovery operations for 

Michoud [Assembly Facility, New Orleans, Louisiana] and Stennis.”

So I flew up to Washington, DC, and became involved in the Emergency 

Operations Center. By Friday, I had flown down to the Marshall Space Flight 

Center, where I thought we would run the operations, since the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast was so devastated. After one day at Marshall, I realized I needed to 

get to Stennis, so I flew down to Stennis on Saturday and spent the next seven, 

eight months doing recovery. I lived in an office space on a cot for about three 
NASA at 50

or four weeks and then moved into an RV that we had procured and lived on 

site for the next seven or eight months.

During that time, I had not discussed our plans with my wife because I 

was just so busy doing recovery, but when I finally got around to talking to her 

about it, I said, “Hey, when are you planning on moving to Stennis?” After a 

great deal of discussion, we realized that she just didn’t feel like it was the right 

thing to move the family into that devastation. She had a lot of friends there, 

because we had lived there a couple of times, and she just said, “I just don’t 

think it’s the right thing to do,” and I agreed with her. But I also agreed that 

we needed to get the family together. We’d been apart going on three years.

So I contacted Rex and Mike and stated what my situation was. That’s 

when Mike said, “Well, how would you like to be the Deputy Director at the 

Kennedy Space Center?” I said, “Well, that would probably work out.” We had 

to find the right person to take over Stennis, and we did. Rick Gilbrech is an 

old friend and good friend of mine. He was the Deputy Director of the Langley 

Research Center, and it was an opportunity for him to come to Mississippi, 

where his wife was from and where he had started. One of his goals was 

always to be the Director of Stennis, so he accepted that challenge.

KSC Director Jim Kennedy wanted me to come here. Mike talked to Jim, 

and they all said that it would work out, so I came here, with the thought that 

Jim would probably be here for two or three years after I got here. For whatever personal reasons, Jim decided after a few months that he was going to 

retire at the end of the year. At that point in time, not that it was public, but 

Mike Griffin asked me if I would be interested in being the Director, and I said, 

“Absolutely.” So for the next four or five months, nobody else knew it, but Jim 

and I knew that I was going to be the Director. Finally Jim announced that he 

was going to retire. Then, a few months after that, they announced that I was 

going to be the Director. So in January of this year, I took over as the Kennedy 

Space Center Director.

For me, it’s 1985, sawmill third shift, see a launch; 2003, in charge of the 

Shuttle Program; 2007, the Kennedy Space Center Director. It’s kind of like one 

of those, “Wow, how does a kid from Mississippi get to do all that?” I haven’t 

figured that one out yet, but it’s pretty cool.

Share with us how NASA has changed since you first came aboard.

When I first came on board, Admiral [Richard] Truly was the Administrator. 

I’ll just make a point: I’m from Mississippi, and so is Admiral Truly. I thought 

it was really neat. Here we had an astronaut in charge. We had a fellow 

Mississippian in charge of the Agency. He was a Navy test pilot. I thought 

this guy was great. Of course, [George H. W.] Bush, the first President Bush, 

had come out with a Vision for Exploration, and somehow they had gotten 

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sideways. I guess Admiral Truly moved on very quickly after that, and Dan 

Goldin took over as the Administrator.

Dan Goldin began making a lot of changes to NASA in the early part of 

my career, “faster, better, cheaper,” all these different things. Because I was an 

intern under Jay Honeycutt, I was getting the opportunity to mingle with some 

of the senior management of NASA, which was very interesting and offered 

me an opportunity to get a great deal of insight at an early part of my career 

as to what was going on in NASA.

My impression was that some of the longtime NASA executives were saying, “We’ll just wait this guy out. Administrators come and go. We’ll wait this 

guy out.” But Dan was making extensive changes to NASA in a lot of different 

areas. Let’s talk about some of them. There’s the “faster, better, cheaper” concept with a small spacecraft in the science arena. He was looking for more 

small spacecraft. Use your money and make spacecraft that you can launch 

quickly and that are maybe a little high risk, but cost a lot less, and so on and 

so forth.

In the Shuttle arena, he looked at moving away from some of the contractual strategies we had, acquisition strategies, to making USA [United Space 

Alliance]. Eventually, under Dan Goldin, USA was created, and the Space Flight 

Operations Contract, SFOC, was formed. I participated in that here at the 

Kennedy Space Center, in those changes that occurred.

Space Station had been a viewgraph program, and all of a sudden hardware was being built. I was thrown out into the manufacturing arena, and 

going out and helping to get that hardware built, and trying to pull it towards 

the Kennedy Space Center. Without that hardware getting here, we were never 

going to launch it.

So, from 1990 when I first came on board, we were doing DOD missions. 

All of a sudden the DOD missions dried up and went away, to the changes 

that Dan Goldin was making in how we contractually approached the Shuttle 

Program and making it more operational, to then the Space Station Program 

coming online and actually having hardware with overruns and the politics 

that came from those overruns. From 1990 to 2000, I saw a tremendous amount 

of change in human spaceflight, in particular, and NASA. Dan Goldin stayed 

for most of that entire time, so he kept influencing NASA for much longer than 

what the insiders anticipated.

Then, of course, Sean O’Keefe came on board after Dan left, and Sean was 

starting to try to give us credibility in the budget arena. We had lost a lot of 

that credibility with the overruns that had occurred during Dan Goldin’s time. 

We were really not being led by a technical individual but being led more by 

somebody that knew the politics and knew the budget arena and was trying 

to give us credibility in the political and budget arenas.

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Of course, in the middle of all that, Columbia happened. No matter what 

Sean’s focus was in the beginning, it really turned to Return to Flight, and that 

meant dealing with the CAIB [Columbia Accident Investigation Board]. I would 

say even though there were a lot of things going on, the entire Agency focused 

on Return to Flight.

As the Shuttle Program Manager, I had the resources of the entire Agency. I 

utilized Langley to a huge extent, and Ames Research Center, to do a lot of the 

modeling and the Arc Jet [Complex] testing. Glenn Research Center was looking at aerosurfaces and bearing surfaces and how they work in space. Langley 

was doing CFD [computational fluid dynamics] models for me. Not only the 

human spaceflight centers, but every part of this Agency focused in. Dryden 

Flight Research Center was doing testing for us, and so on and so forth. I had 

all the resources of this entire Agency kind of pointed at us, and this Agency 

was focused on Return to Flight. Of course, then we achieved Return to Flight 

and we had a little bit of an issue. We almost had to do it over again. We really 

had to focus on one particular area, which was the PAL [Protuberance Air 

Load] ramp, and we did. 

Hurricane Katrina hit, and to be honest with you, Mike Griffin, during 

Return to Flight, had a different view of NASA, a different view of what the 

CAIB recommendations said and how the implementation should be done. 

Sean had us headed down one path, which was this Independent Technical 

Authority. Mike took that and changed to model more of a matrix organization and a governance model that was slightly different from where Sean was 

headed, probably more like what NASA started out to be back in the old days. 

It was somewhat difficult for some of us to understand. Because Mike spent 

so much time with me in those four months before STS-114, I had the great 

opportunity for Mike to explain that to me in great detail many, many nights 

in a row.

So when I went to Stennis, I understood the governance model that Mike 

Griffin was bringing to NASA and what his expectations were. I do believe that 

having the opportunity to spend that time with Mike helped me understand 

it a lot better. I think other people that didn’t have that opportunity struggled 

with it a little bit. They’re getting there, but they didn’t have the in-depth 

insight that I was able to gain by having all those conversations with Mike 

about Return to Flight. I was able to then implement some of that at Stennis 

when I got there, even during the Katrina recovery kind of operations. I was 

also able to bring some of that to the Kennedy Space Center when I got here.

At the Kennedy Space Center, one observation would be engineering 

was embedded in the programs and projects. Mike’s vision of the governance 

model says that engineering is a central institutional organization that then 

gets matrixed out to the various programs and projects. We’ve had to implement that at Kennedy, and that’s a cultural change but also an organizational 

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change, that’s probably 30 years in the making, and we’re kind of changing that whole approach. We’ve done it. We’ve completed the organizational 

change. We’re working on the cultural part of that, and it’s going to take us 

a while. We implemented the change late last year, and it’s going to take us a 

couple of years to really change the culture of how we operate. But we’re on 

our way to doing that.

Tell us about your strategic vision for this Center.

Mike Griffin has established a strategic vision. He’s given us the overarching governance model and the strategic vision, and that’s for us for implementation. So I look at my role as not being as much strategic as it is tactical, in a 

way. My goal is to go in now and take that strategic vision he’s laid out, and 

then put forth a Kennedy Space Center implementation plan, a tactical plan 

that will take us over the next five years. So that’s what we’ve done. We went 

and got the senior staff together. We sat down, and I had three tenets. I wanted 

us to be innovative, credible, and accountable.

We need to be innovative, and what that means is flexible, being able to 

pick up on new and better ways to do things. Take this governance model and 

go implement it in innovative ways, not just plug and chug and make it like 

everybody else. Look at it from an innovative kind of way.

I wanted to be credible with our stakeholders, our programs and projects 

located here, the programs that are being run out of Johnson and Marshall, so 

when they look to Kennedy Space Center, we’re credible in what we’re doing 

and how we’re doing it, and they believe that we are competent to do that. I 

also want to be credible to NASA Headquarters. We don’t want to tell them 

we can do something that we can’t, and when we say we can do it for this 

budget in this amount of time, we want to have the credibility with our NASA 

Headquarters folks and our programs and projects that they believe we can 

pull that off.

“Accountable” means that once we say we’re going to do something, then 

we have to go do it. That means you’re accountable for what you have told 

people that you can go do.

We took those three tenets, and we then got together, and each program, 

project, and institutional mission support directorate looked at what they had 

to do to map to the governance model and the strategic vision that Mike Griffin 

has given us. You put together your credible, innovative, accountable plan to 

go do that, and make sure that it maps directly to what Mike Griffin has said 

we’re going to go do. We’re about ready to come out with that plan. We’ve 

worked on it for a few months here. It’s just about a week or two from prime 

time. It’s just about ready to come out, 10 or 15 pages of KSC’s implementation 

plan. I think we call it “Plan Guidance,” because seriously I don’t think I set 

where this Agency is going. This Agency has established where it’s going, and 

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Kennedy is just a piece of that. We’ve got to figure out how we put together an 

implementation plan that matches up to that.

What do you believe to be the greatest challenges of meeting the goals 

of that plan?

Trying to run three or four programs here at the Kennedy Space Center 

and all at the same time. This is probably more than we’ve ever done. We have 

the Launch Support Program. That’s a program that was moved here in the 

past 10 years, and it does expendable launch vehicles. What they do is actually buy the expendable launch vehicles for the various spacecraft that JPL 

[Jet Propulsion Laboratory] and Goddard Space Flight Center and others fly. 

Then they integrate that spacecraft with that expendable vehicle, and ensure 

that that vehicle is as risk-free as it should be to go fly that spacecraft and 

make sure that the spacecraft gets to where it’s supposed to be and can do 

the mission it’s supposed to do. Then we have the Space Station, where we’re 

processing the hardware. We have Shuttle, which we’re trying to process and 

fly the next 15 or 16 missions, then retire. There is a whole workforce involved 

in that. Then we’ve got the Constellation Program trying to build up, and the 

budget challenges that go with that with the gap.

The Launch Support Program is working extremely well. I think we have 

our arms around that, but we do have some challenges there, some new things 

that we’ve got to do, like securing some new vehicles. Space Station, they have 

work to do even after we retire the Shuttle, but it’s going to be less, and we 

know that. But they’ve got work out through 2016 and beyond, so they’re not 

feeling large effects of this transition.

We’re retiring the Shuttle in 2010. That workforce has got to transition 

to Constellation, and it’s already obvious that it’s not going to take as many 

people on Constellation as it did on the Shuttle Program. So dealing with that 

transition, dealing with the facilities that are going to become available that 

I’m either going to have to mothball or find different users for, dealing with 

the fact that there’s a fairly significant amount of the workforce that will not 

be picked up on the new program, and how does that impact our ability to 

fly the Shuttle safely up to 2010. Then figuring out also, working with Mike 

Griffin and Headquarters and Rex Geveden and all those folks, what work 

might come here to fill that gap so we don’t have a large layoff like we did 

in the Apollo program. Mike Griffin has committed to me that he’s going to 

work with us to make sure that some work does come here to where we 

don’t lose a huge amount of our workforce and all these skills. Then trying 

to bridge that gap between 2010 and now 2014 or so when we fly the first 

Ares I mission.

Those are fairly significant challenges for the Kennedy Space Center 

and for the Agency overall. But for Kennedy, it’s going to be very noticeable, 

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because the design Centers like Marshall and Johnson are just going to be 

designing away. An operational Center like us, what we do is process, test and 

verification, and launch. From 2010 to sometime in 2014/2015, we’re not going 

to do that. How do you keep that skilled workforce connected and here to 

bridge that gap? It’s going to be a challenge for us and for the Agency.

What are some of the lessons learned that you will be applying as you 

look to the future?

You pick up so many things along the way, and you don’t realize that you 

know these things until the opportunity arises where you have to go apply 

them. I’ve had such a great opportunity to be mentored by some of the top 

people in NASA. I had the opportunity to meet Dr. Chris Kraft, who was the 

Center Director at Johnson Space Center, get to know him, and he has offered 

me a great deal of advice. When I became the Shuttle Program Manager, he 

walked in with a white paper, sat down with me for 2 hours, and said, “Let me 

tell you what I think about what your challenges are and what your opportunities are and what I think you can do to overcome some of this.” So, I’ve had 

Dr. Kraft as someone that has called on me and mentored me and talked to me.

Jay Honeycutt, who was the Center Director here at the Kennedy Space 

Center, is still a very good friend and mentor and someone that still calls me 

on a fairly regular basis, and we have conversations. Roy Estess, who had 

been the Acting Deputy Administrator and the Center Director at Stennis, is 

an icon within NASA who took me under his wing and shared with me a lot 

of the challenges they’ve had through the years and ways that they’ve dealt 

with those. George Abbey—I was his Deputy, and he may be a somewhat controversial individual in some people’s eyes, but also probably one of the finest 

gentlemen I’ve ever worked for. No one could have given me more responsibility at an earlier part of my career than George Abbey did. Not only that, 

he didn’t even question me. He’d let me go do things, allowed me to make a 

few mistakes, and then brought that back to me. I can go on, Sean O’Keefe 

and Dan Goldin and Mike Griffin and so on and so forth. The thing I bring to 

the table is all those dots get connected with all these mentors and all these 

people that I’ve had the opportunity to work with that have shared with me 

so many of their lessons, and the opportunity to pick up the phone and call 

any of them at any point in time. I still have those connections even today.

So even beyond the 1990 timeframe when I came to work for NASA, I’ve 

had all this opportunity to sponge off the brains of all these guys that worked 

from the early 1960s on. What I bring to the table is a history that I’ve gained 

from these great people, and then utilizing what I’ve learned from them and 

making my own mistakes along the way and getting put into positions of 

great responsibility by this Agency, that helped me get through those hard 

times, because I didn’t do that all by myself.

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I had a lot of support from a lot of different individuals in this Agency, and to 

be able to then utilize all of that as we develop this new program, as we retire the 

Shuttle, and as we bring on this new Constellation Program. I don’t know how to 

describe it, but it’s this mentorship and support and all of that history that I think 

I bring to this opportunity to apply and, hopefully, continue to learn from as well.

What do you perceive to be NASA’s impact on society as a whole? 

I’m such a patriot. I was a part of the United States Marine Corps, which is 

probably one of the finest organizations that you can ever be a part of. When I 

left the Marine Corps, I did so because I thought, “Well, I need to go pursue other 

things.” I didn’t realize when I left the Marine Corps that I was leaving an organization that was this high-performing organization. I thought other organizations 

would be a lot like the Marine Corps, and it turned out they’re not. So you leave that, 

and you look back, and you go, “I’ll never be a part of something that great again.” 

Then I had the opportunity to come to work for NASA, and what I’ve realized is 

NASA is just as high-performing an organization as the Marine Corps. I feel connected once again to people that do great things, that “quit” is not in their vocabulary, “can’t” is not in their vocabulary. Adversity, when they run up against it, and 

I’m talking about the people at NASA, they overcome it, and they always find ways 

to solve any problem that’s in front of them, any problem that’s in front of them.

So here I am; once again, I’m a part of an organization that’s just the finest 

of the finest. I guess I would want the American people to know that. I don’t 

think they realize that sometimes. I still think that NASA has a trademark, or 

name recognition, beyond other organizations. I think they’ve seen the movie 

Apollo 13, and they realize that we can solve problems. I’d still like for the 

American public to know that’s the NASA of today. It still is the NASA of today, 

after Challenger, after Columbia, and this new vehicle that we’re going to 

develop, all these things we’ve done. We’ve overcome all those kind of “failure 

is not an option” kind of things, and we continue to do that.

I believe that what we provide to the American public is this organization 

that can solve technical problems in the peaceful pursuit of exploration. I’d use 

what Roy Estess has said to me a number of times. He said, “We could kill the 

human spaceflight program. The American people could decide to do that and 

just cut the funding off, and it would end, and our grandkids would declare us 

idiots and restart the program in a couple of generations.” I truly believe that. I 

believe it is important to the United States to be leaders in the peaceful pursuit 

of exploring space, because we could go do it in the military and do it from a 

militaristic kind of view, and I don’t believe that is the best thing for the world. 

For us to control space peacefully with international partners makes the world 

a much better place, and we need to continue to understand that.

I hope our political leadership understands the impact that has on the 

world. So I guess what I would want the American people to know is, yes, it’s 

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William W. Parsons

a little bit about exploration. It’s a little bit about technology development. 

It’s a little bit about what we bring back to you with this small investment 

that you make, in the cell phones and the other things that maybe come 

from some of the technology we develop. But probably more important is 

the impact NASA has on the world in the peaceful pursuit of international 

cooperation of exploring space. NASA makes the world a better place, more 

internationally capable, and I guess I would want the American people to 

understand that’s very important, and I don’t think we have stressed that 

importance enough, how important that really is.

As the Vision for Space Exploration starts to develop, how will the space 

agency balance the use of robotics and humans?

First of all, the Vision says we’re going to do it with both, robotics and 

human exploration, and I truly believe robotics plays a huge part in setting 

the path. Robotics is going to be the first thing that gets us the information we 

need to make sure we can get there with the humans and do the right things. 

So the robotic missions are extremely important to the pursuit of the Vision 

to then allow the humans to get there and have the knowledge they need to 

survive and do what they need to do on the Moon, or even Mars. So we need 

to continue to do those robotic missions.

Right now, we’re planning some robotic missions of the lunar surface, and 

that’s going to be important to set up where we establish our habitats and 

determine what’s the best place to do that, and even though we have some 

knowledge of the Moon, getting us better prepared. From that point, then 

you’ve got to continue the robotic missions of Mars, because there’s still an 

awful lot to learn about Mars, and we’re learning something every day with 

missions we’re sending towards Mars.

Kennedy Space Center plays a part in that. First of all, we’re going to have 

a lot of skills that are going to be displaced as we retire the Shuttle. These are 

aerospace skills that have been built up over 25 or 30 years. We can capture 

some of those skills with new work, not only with the facilities that are going 

to be made available when the Shuttle retires, but a workforce that’s very capable of doing aerospace and spacecraft hardware kinds of work. They’re going 

to be available here, and some of that work could very easily be done here.

Now, whether it works out that way or not, it remains to be seen, but I 

know the state of Florida is committed to that. They’re willing to invest. I don’t 

know if you know, but the Operations and Checkout Building was made available to the Orion spacecraft manufacturers. The state of Florida put $35 million 

towards that end and brought that work here. That’s work that we wouldn’t 

have captured without that kind of investment, so the state of Florida, with what 

they call Space Florida, is pursuing other investments like that in facilities and 

other things here at the Kennedy Space Center to kind of draw that work here.

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So I truly believe that we will have an opportunity, whether it’s robotics or 

other kinds of work not traditionally done at Kennedy Space Center. But we can 

do these things at the Kennedy Space Center because of our skilled workforce 

and the facilities that can be available and the investment that the state of Florida 

is willing to make and that the Agency wants to see us stay as level as we possibly can and not have a huge dropoff of our workforce. You put all that together, 

and Kennedy Space Center has an opportunity to pick up nontraditional kind of 

work and maybe even work on robotic spacecraft and things like that. We have 

some opportunities there. It remains to be seen. It all has to come together, and 

we have to be prepared when that opportunity arises.

NASA started out as NACA with a focus on aeronautics. What do you feel 

the future is going to be for that aspect of NASA?

First of all, aeronautics hasn’t grown at the rate that they had intended to 

grow because of the exploration vision. It sounds like a cut, and it’s not a cut. 

It’s really they just haven’t grown at the rate they intended to grow. Aeronautics 

is still a major investment within NASA, but I think we needed to get focused 

on what it is NASA’s role is in the aeronautics area.

We had a briefing from Lisa Porter, the Associate Administrator for 

Aeronautics, at the last Senior Management Council meeting. It’s one of those 

things, we in human spaceflight don’t look over the fence very often. But Lisa 

came in and explained what she’s doing in the area of priorities for NASA and 

what she thinks the roles of NASA are in aeronautics and how they’re going to 

connect with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and other agencies like 

the Department of Defense. She’s a part of this community that’s put together 

this team that’s looking at how NASA plays in and the overarching strategic 

goals of the U.S. as far as aeronautics goes.

NASA has a part to play. The FAA has a part to play. The Department of 

Defense has a part to play. There are other agencies out there that have a part 

to play in this. So what I think Lisa Porter and Mike Griffin have actually done 

is they’ve been able to say, “This is NASA’s role,” and “this is how we’re going 

to participate, and these are the dollars that we’re going to put into that.”

So we have a plan, we have a role, we have enough, maybe not as much 

as some people would like, but enough funding and resources to apply to that. 

Not only that, we have the skills at Langley, Dryden, Glenn, and other areas 

to apply to that as well, and at Ames. So we have skills, we have funding, we 

have a plan, and we have a role to play in the overarching U.S. strategic goals 

in aeronautics. We have a path forward. It looks promising. I think what Lisa 

Porter had to say was, “We’re not going to do these things,” and she took away 

some of the things that we were doing because they were distracting, really, 

to the overall “this is where we should be going.” And with the money that we 

have, you can only do so many things.

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That’s one of the things that I’ve really liked about Mike Griffin. He’s willing to stop certain things due to the fact that there’s only a certain amount of 

resources. So he says, “Even though we’ve been traditionally in these areas, 

those aren’t areas that I think NASA should be doing. We’ll let other agencies 

or other government agencies pick that up, or the commercial sector pick that 

up, and we’re going to focus on what I think NASA should be doing.” In the 

world of politics, that’s not always easy, but he’s been able to do that better 

than some of the other Administrators have done in the past.

Why would you encourage a young person to join NASA and have NASA as 

a career?

Well, I have encouraged a young person, and he’s called my son. I have a 

24-year-old son who’s a NASA engineer over here in the International Space 

Station. He’s smart enough to have done a lot of different things. Back when 

he was in the seventh grade, he came out here for a “Come to Work with Your 

Dad Day.” He was somewhat interested, but he was still more interested in 

money. As he went through college, he was still looking at “What’s going to 

get me the best job and I can make the most money?” He called me up one 

day, and he said, “Hey, I’m thinking about Co-op, and what do you think 

about that?” I said, “Well, I think it’s a great program, and I think you ought 

to contact NASA.” This is when I was at Stennis. I said, “You ought to contact 

KSC and see if you can get in the Co-op Program,” and he did that. He got in 

the Co-op Program, and he came out here and what he found out was what 

we all find out when we come out here—this is noble work. This is work that 

people throw their life into, and it’s tough. It’s not easy work, and it’s stretching the bounds of technology in all different kinds of ways.

You work around some of the greatest people you could ever imagine. The 

people that you are in contact with on a daily basis are some of the best, and 

they’re not doing it for the money. They’re doing it because they love technical 

issues and problems and solving problems, and because they like to be a part 

of human spaceflight. So my son, when he graduated, could have gone off and 

probably done a lot of other things, and he chose to come to work for NASA, 

and I couldn’t be more proud that he’s doing that.

I just say that if you want to be a part of something great, if you want to be a 

part of something difficult, if you want to be a part of something that can make 

you feel like a true American contributing to our greatness, then come work for 

NASA. I have a friend who’s not in this business, and what he keeps saying is 

with the exploration Vision, why would an engineer want to work anywhere 

else? He’s a political science major, but he keeps telling me that. It reminds me 

that if you are an engineer coming out of school and you want to be a part of the 

cutting edge, why would you want to work anywhere else but at NASA? 

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Chapter 22

Lesa B. Roe

Center Director, Langley Research Center

Lesa Roe says she came into her current position after a journey through NASA. During college, she 

first worked with NASA as a cooperative education student; after graduating as an electrical engineer, 

she spent a brief time in industry before returning to the space agency at the Kennedy Space Center. 

She quickly gained experience in the area of payloads, working with projects such as the Space 

Radar Laboratory, the Hubble Space Telescope, ATLAS-1, and the Russian-made docking module 

delivered to Mir by the Space Shuttle Atlantis. 

 Her expertise includes managing the International Space Station Research Program from the 

Johnson Space Center. In 2003, the journey led to a position in Center management at the Agency’s 

oldest site, Langley Research Center. Two years later, she was named as the Center Director. In a 1 

November 2007 interview, she talked about the scope of her responsibilities.

I manage all aspects of the institution that we call the Center of Langley, so 

that means everything from making sure that the facilities are up and running 

and maintained to making sure that we have the right workforce balance that 

we’ll need to support the missions. It’s truly making sure that we implement 

the Agency’s missions, so we’re the folks that make sure it happens. It takes 

facilities, skilled people, researchers, engineers, scientists, business functions—

procurement, legal, human resources, financial—all those things come together 

in Center management.

Your Center has a very long tradition. In fact, you just noted its 90th 

anniversary with a celebration this past weekend. How does your strategic 

vision for the next years tie in with traditionally what has been done here, 

and then how is it different?

Well, our history has been very exciting. We started off as primarily an 

aeronautical Center. We were the first civil aeronautical facility, starting with 

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around 11 folks working here, and the focus was solving the problems of flight. 

That was our challenge, and quite frankly, as you think about that today, that 

is still our challenge, to solve the problems of flight, whether it’s through and 

in our atmosphere or in other planetary atmospheres. So it’s interesting how 

that thread has been there through all these years. But the Center itself has 

had many missions over time, and that aeronautical base actually led to us into 

being the Center where the Space Task Group started; so our space program 

actually started here. I actually heard a quote from Jack Schmitt, Harrison 

Schmitt, when he was down here; he said he really feels like our ability to get 

to the Moon in such a short timeframe came out of that base of knowledge of 

that 40 years of experience in aeronautics here at Langley. So that was really 

positive, and that also led to the first orbiter and lander on Mars, with Langley 

leading the Viking Project. We’ve had kind of a broad experience where aeronautics has been the base all the way through those 90 years that we’ve existed.

How does that play into today? I see that aeronautics will always be the 

core that leads us forward as we move forward. But once again, we’ve diversified into space development while maintaining our fundamental aeronautical 

research. The research actually takes us further out. We look at more revolutionary approaches, and then those play into space development. We bring that 

knowledge into development of spaceflight including scientific missions and 

instruments, so it’s a nice marriage that works very well together.

Budget is always on the minds of Center Directors. Do you feel in the 

future that your budget will allow you to expand into new areas as well?

Yes, budget is always a challenge. The balance that we have at Langley will 

allow us to expand into new areas. Our fundamental research in aeronautics 

provides new knowledge in those far-reaching technologies that we’re going 

to need for the next-generation air transportation system that the nation must 

have. In the exploration arena, there is a technology program that’s actually 

managed here at NASA Langley, and that budget is focused on the technologies that we’ll need for the future in space. So I think it will take a few years as 

we’re working through Shuttle retirement to actually get to where we’re able 

to have more funding in some of those far-reaching technologies, but I do see 

that as something that will happen over the next few years.

You have a Center here that has experts that deal with the structures and 

materials as part of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center. How does 

that bridge the past and the future of what you’re doing?

The structures and materials competency really has been a core of Langley 

since the beginning. It is a base of our aeronautical expertise as well, so a part 

of our expertise in aerosciences truly stems out of our knowledge of structures 

and materials. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center utilizes that expertise 

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in structures and materials, and also the Agency utilizes that knowledge in 

structures and materials. The recent roles that the Agency just rolled out this 

week show Langley as the lead for the lunar lander from a structures and 

mechanisms standpoint. We’re also leading structures and mechanisms for 

surface systems in exploration, so again, that base is being called to help the 

Agency move forward as we head on back to the Moon.

You’ve been involved with NASA since the early 1980s, and as we’ve 

mentioned, the tradition here at Langley is far beyond that. What do you 

believe that NASA’s impact on society has been through these years? And 

what do you believe it will be in the future?

There’s the more simple answer, of course, we have had economic impact. 

The impact of a Center like Langley is $2.3 billion across the nation. But more 

importantly, the impact of technology is the largest societal impact. As we 

advance our mission and continue to explore, challenges arise. Technology solutions to these challenges help the nation as a whole in the end. They change the 

nation into something greater. It’s something you can’t promise or know exactly, 

but as you’re going through that development, some of those things we call 

spinoffs will occur. This advances our nation and helps to make our nation the 

leader in the world of these kinds of technologies.

There’s something in NASA that goes beyond that. I feel like it is truly the 

spirit of exploration. What our nation looks to NASA for is to make dreams a 

reality. We actually live the dreams of our nation. If our nation can dream it, if we 

can dream going out beyond the stars, NASA actually makes that happen, makes 

that a reality. So we inspire. We inspire the nation, and that’s an important role, 

the most important role. It’s something that’s difficult to measure; for example, 

how many children, how many engineers working all across the nation, were 

actually first inspired because they watched the first footprints on the Moon 

being made? You can’t measure that, but there is a national spirit, and there is 

something that comes out of that that just truly raises us to the next level.

Speaking of inspiring, you are in a very unique position in the NASA 

management level as one of the few female Center Directors in the history 

of NASA, as well as the only female Center Director at the moment. Can you 

share with us what the challenges and, of course, some of your successes 

have been, and about the experiences of being in this very unique position?

It’s quite an honor to be in this position and to be able to be in the key leadership role of such a wonderful Center like Langley Research Center, which is the 

mother Center and goes back 90 years. Now, to be in that role as the first woman 

Center Director of Langley in its 90-year history, and quite frankly, I think the 

second woman Center Director ever across all 10 Centers, is kind of interesting. 

I don’t think about that on a daily basis, because I’m just one of the 10 Center 

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Directors that are trying to make our mission happen. I’m working together with 

my peers, and so the fact that I’m a woman doesn’t really come into play, or it 

doesn’t even come into the thought process. I’m one of the folks that’s in there 

working hard to make a difference, and I’m not treated any differently.

But when I do think about it, I am proud that young women out there, or 

women across the Agency, see that they can do it. In a sense I’ve become a role 

model that folks can say, “Hey, she did that, and that means I can do that.” In 

the future, I fully expect that we’ll have many more women that will be Center 

Directors, and we’re already seeing many women now as Mission Directors. 

So I think that it’s breaking some glass ceiling that many feel exist and breaking those myths. It is proving there really isn’t a glass ceiling anymore, and 

anybody can do it. If you want to do it, don’t think that you can’t.

What are some of the lessons learned that you’ve been able to apply in 

your leadership position and some management principles as well?

I’ve learned too many lessons to mention! What I have learned along the 

way is that all of the NASA Centers have a unique capability to offer for our missions, and it truly is a remarkable capability. If you are in an individual Center 

all of your career, you don’t always see that capability. What I’ve learned as I’ve 

worked at each Center is we are stronger when we utilize all of these talents, 

so much farther than we would by focusing on one individual Center alone. I 

have also learned that great leaders are viewed as great from above their position and from below their position. I have learned a lot about the character of 

individuals by talking to people they supervise. 

NASA Administrator Mike Griffin implemented a new governance model 

emphasizing that Centers provide for the programs and not the other 

way around, and also new management communication levels. Do you 

believe these will help people understand that the Centers are all working 

together to accomplish the Vision for Space Exploration?

I think it will help people understand that we’re working together. It’s 

important that there’s a check and balance, and so there shouldn’t be an 

Agency where Centers have the overall power and, quite frankly, develop capabilities that the missions may not need. We just don’t have that kind of money 

within the Agency where a single Center should go off and develop something 

just based on their own desires. But in the same way, the missions need the 

institutional capabilities to be able to get the missions done. The missions typically are more near-term focused. A lot of times programs are focused on the 

here and now, and they don’t want to pay for anything above and beyond what 

their individual project or program needs. So sometimes they may be willing, 

inadvertently, to sacrifice a capability that would be needed in the future. So 

you have to have that—some call it “healthy tension”—to really be able to have 

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all the capabilities you need, and getting rid of capabilities that you don’t need, 

but carefully assessing those along the way so that we always have the right 

capabilities that we’ll need, not just now but for future programs and projects.

How would you emphasize to someone the importance of keeping the 

Agency involved in the field of aeronautics?

Aeronautics has been dramatically reduced over the years. However, it is very 

important for our future. We must continue to study the problems of flight for our 

nation; it is crucial for space exploration. We’re going to need that as we go to other 

planets and need to get large masses for human exploration to the surface. We also 

need that knowledge as we develop new space vehicles which must fly through 

our atmosphere. So all of that, the base knowledge that we have in aeronautics, is 

fundamental to all of our missions, and it’s also fundamental to the nation, because 

we have key challenges in the air transportation system for the future. The challenges we face today in air transportation are as large as any we have faced in history. We’re going to need to revolutionize our air transportation system to be able to 

deal with those challenges, and that includes revolutionizing our air vehicles with 

dramatic reductions in noise, emissions, and dramatically improved fuel efficiency. 

So these advancements must occur and that is why NASA was created.

How will there be changes in the partnerships with private and public 

sector, and how those will affect Langley even more in the future?

There’s always been strong partnership at Langley with other agencies and 

with academia; that’s how we have been successful. We’re even more focused 

on that as budgets are more flatlined in aeronautics: we must pull on the capabilities of our partners. They bring something to the table, and we bring something to the table, and together we’ll have a greater outcome in aeronautics, 

so I see more partnerships as we move forward. We’re already starting to see 

that increase and moving back to that. That was a key part of NACA [National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics] before Langley was NASA. We’ll continue 

to stress the importance as we move forward. It will be key.

You have had an opportunity to move from one place to the other within 

the Agency. How has NASA changed over the time that you’ve been here, 

and in your own area of expertise, how has NASA changed?

From a Center perspective, we have seen a dramatic change from a research 

focus to a balanced research and development focus. We’re close to being equal 

between space and aeronautics. So I’ve seen a broad change with regard to our 

work. As I look at what has happened in my own career, the greatest change 

that I’ve seen is really in human spaceflight. As I came in, Shuttle was just starting to fly, and the focus was very much on low-Earth orbit and flying Shuttles 

and building an International Space Station. I feel that the consistent thing is 

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the people and the excitement of the people that work in NASA. However, I 

think our workforce and the nation needed the vision to take humans further—to continue to explore outward. Where was the next step? So the greatest 

change has truly been having this Vision for Space Exploration.

We haven’t lacked that in the science arena. Science has continued to expand 

and reach out and go farther and farther, and that has always been the vision in 

the science mission. Now we’re taking humans there as well, and so I think that’s 

really reinvigorated and reinspired all of our engineers as we continue to reach, 

and I think that’s made a huge difference. That’s been the biggest change that I’ve 

seen during my career—moving from near space to truly expanding our reaches 

to the Moon and beyond, with humans, with human exploration.

Following that trail of thought, what are your thoughts on the relative 

importance of human and robotic spaceflight, and how that will impact 

what you’re doing here at the Center?

You have to have both. You cannot just suddenly decide, “I’m going to send 

humans to Mars,” and think you don’t need precursor robotic-type missions. 

The robotic missions must go first to study. We must learn more about the 

atmosphere, radiation protection, and learn more about getting large masses 

down to the surface of Mars, and we’re playing a role in that at Langley. We’re 

working on the Mars Science Laboratory to make sure that we are instrumenting that flight so that we can expand the knowledge base of getting large 

masses down to the surface of Mars. We are working on radiation protection. 

There is much to understand, many challenges to solve, before we can just 

suddenly embark on sending a human crew to Mars. 

Because you have worked at a number of the Centers and on many different 

projects, can you give us your perception of NASA’s culture and how has 

it changed?

There’s always a can-do spirit; that has not changed. I think if you can dream 

it, our folks feel we can do it, and that’s always been a part of NASA. I have seen 

change, especially dramatically after Columbia. What I see with that is the way that 

we get ready for our missions, get ready for our launches, where there is more of 

an openness to bring forward technical problems, to challenge. I’ve seen that in the 

last couple of Flight Readiness Reviews, where there is clear ability of engineers to 

bring forward concerns, get those presented, and talk through those. Then certainly 

there always has to be a decision made, but a more careful weighing of those risks. 

I think within NASA we’ve always looked at all the problems, but I think with the 

NASA Engineering and Safety Center there is a more careful, independent look 

along the way at all of those technical problems and make sure we’re studying 

them. There is a place for someone to ask for another look from experts, making 

sure that there’s more of a check and balance than I’ve ever seen in the past.

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Share with us why you would encourage someone to begin a career with NASA. 

There’s nothing like what we do in NASA anywhere. It is exciting work. 

When we talk about our work with other people, our eyes light up and so do 

the people that you talk to. I’ve had the privilege of going to training where 

I’m at universities and other people are there, and I have shown videos of 

some of our work, and everybody in the room was just, “Wow, you have a cool 

job.” So it’s an exciting job, and it’s an exciting job every day. Again, reflecting 

on everything for our 90th anniversary here and hearing many stories, people 

don’t come here for the money. It’s truly the personal satisfaction of doing 

something that we thought was impossible, and expanding our knowledge, 

the human knowledge, of what is out there in our universe and beyond and 

other galaxies. So it’s a dream job, and it’s something that I’ve been very, very 

fortunate to have spent an entire career doing what others dream. I would just 

highly recommend it to anyone, and I do. I talk to kids about it all the time. I 

try to share that excitement with them. Plus the teamwork and the camaraderie 

and the accomplishment when you do that, when you land that vehicle on Mars, 

when you make a discovery. There’s nothing like it. So that’s why I would tell 

them to come to NASA.

Langley has programs providing educational opportunities for students.

We do. We have a number of programs here, from kindergarten through 12 

and then on into graduate school. We have preservice teacher programs which 

help teachers to learn to teach STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics cooperative education). We started the distance-learning program 

which reaches schools in the most remote locations and lets them interact with 

our engineers. This helps them visualize themselves as engineers or scientists. 

Some of our folks go out to [NASA] Explorer Schools and utilize technology 

to bring NASA into the classrooms and help them grasp, “Well, what is a wind 

tunnel test?” or “Why do you do that?” So by actually talking to the folks that 

are doing that work here, the students can have a conversation and ask questions. We’ve seen schools turn around, schools that were in the bottom of the 

pack. Principals tell me stories about how getting involved with NASA moved 

the school to the top in the state because kids realize that that’s not something 

just somebody else does. They think, “That’s something I can do, and here’s 

how I do that.” So that’s another thing that’s just a huge point of satisfaction.

Before we close, is there anything else that you would like to reflect on as 

NASA enters its next 50 years of discovery and exploration?

I look forward to being part of a leadership team that’s going to make the 

next dreams a reality and inspire the next generation in making history. It is 

pretty cool to realize “I’m making history—we are making history.” Not many 

can say that as they go to work each day.

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Chapter 23

David A. King

Center Director, Marshall Space Flight Center 

Dave King refers to his NASA career as “an interesting road.” He started in the areas of Space 

Shuttle main propulsion systems and main engines at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in December 

1983. After about six years, he worked as an intern for six months with the Director of Shuttle 

Processing. Moving to the operations world, King became a vehicle manager and flow director for 

a couple of different vehicles; his missions included the inaugural flight of Endeavour and several 

significant missions for Discovery. For one year, he was in the Center Operations Directorate, where 

he learned how to run a Center from “security to roads to utilities.” 

 In the mid-1990s, King served in a number of roles in the Space Shuttle Program at KSC: 

Deputy Director for Shuttle Processing; launch director for six missions in a three-year period; and 

processing director for a few years. Then, in 2002, he moved to Alabama to be the Deputy Director 

at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Just a few months later, the STS-107 accident occurred and 

King was assigned to lead the Space Shuttle Columbia (ground operations) recovery efforts in Texas 

until May 2003. When returning to Marshall, King took on the responsibilities of Center Director and 

remained in that position until March 2009.

 On 4 May 2007, the Indiana native who grew up in South Carolina talked about how NASA has 

changed during the last few decades and how the mission of the spaceflight center in Alabama will 

impact the space agency’s future.

When I went to work for NASA, I loaded everything I owned into the 

back of a Honda Civic hatchback with no air conditioning and moved to 

Florida. I was pretty wide-eyed. The first day on the job, they brought me in 

to the Space Shuttle Columbia and—wow!—what an experience that was. It’s 

been a great experience ever since. It’s just been extraordinary. I’ve seen it 

from a wide perspective over the last 23 years that I’ve been in the Agency. 

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Originally, I saw things from a technical perspective, trying to learn how to 

process and get vehicles ready to fly, to ensure that they would perform in the 

proper ways—to now overseeing one of the larger space centers. Back then, 

I was just totally in awe of what the Agency was doing and could do, and the 

successes that it had. It had its challenges then, clearly, but a whole different 

set of challenges.

Then, over the middle part of my career through middle management, I 

saw us go through a phase where we were trying to get out of operations. 

We spent a great deal of time on consolidating contracts and trying to save 

the Agency money so that it could then go do other things. Anytime you go 

through transitions like that, it’s difficult for the people culturally, and there 

are good things that happen and not-so-good decisions that are made. That 

got us away from our core, the thing that made us great as an Agency—and 

that is designing, building, and flying launch vehicles and spacecraft. We got 

away from the core engineering that needed to be done and relied more on 

our contractors. We have an incredible contractor capability, but what made 

NASA great was that it had many of those engineering skills resident inside 

the Agency, and we got away from that over the years. Over the last few years, 

we have been trying to build that in, and Mike Griffin has brought that clearly 

to the table as something that he wants to accomplish under his tenure as 

NASA Administrator. We’re working hard to do that, taking a slightly different 

tack on how we move forward and how we implement the programs that we 

have under Mike’s leadership, and I believe it will serve the Agency well for 

a long, long time.

Clearly, technology has changed dramatically in some ways and not so 

dramatically in others. The physics of going to the Moon hasn’t changed. The 

vehicles we’re going to use this time around will be very similar but very different. And we have a great deal of experience that we are hoping to apply 

because of the evolved nature of the vehicles that we’re using today, using 

the experience that we built on from Saturn and, more specifically, Shuttle.

We’ve had some tragedies along the way and some major successes, and 

it’s been said before, by many, that those tragedies and triumphs define the 

Agency. I think that’s true. It changes you and defines how you go about 

doing your business. I think the transition of the workforce throughout all of 

those different things has been healthy and good, and we have huge capabilities within the Agency—I’m looking forward to our future.

Tell us about your vision for your Center.

Marshall has a very rich heritage in spaceflight in many different areas. 

It began in 1960, when Wernher von Braun was named as first Center 

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Director here at Marshall. He came over from the Army, Redstone Arsenal. So 

there were numerous contributions that Marshall made—from the Mercury 

Redstone Project to the Saturn V, which was the biggie early on, obviously—

to provide the launch vehicle to get us to the Moon. Then Shuttle propulsion elements, external tanks, solid rocket motors, and the Space Shuttle 

main engines were all huge development projects that we provided for the 

Shuttle Program.

But Marshall has also been very diverse in the kinds of products and 

services that we provide for the Agency in the science world, in the habitat world. When you look at the contributions Marshall made to Skylab, 

Spacelab, SPACEHAB, Shuttle, International Space Station, the Chandra X-ray 

Observatory, Hubble Space Telescope, and all the concepts for space transportation across the history, it’s been quite diverse.

Obviously, what we have on our plate today is to rebuild the infrastructure we had with Saturn V, and I believe it’s unfortunate that we got away 

from that infrastructure and that ability to do those kinds of things. We now 

have to build the capability for a crew to go to low-Earth orbit—to finish 

building the International Space Station first, but then to build the new vehicle that will replace Shuttle so we can get a crew to low-Earth orbit. Then we 

have to build the heavy[-lift] launch vehicle so we can really explore, go back 

to the Moon and then beyond.

Putting that infrastructure back in place is going to be the real key for 

Marshall, and I believe the Agency’s success will be defined by that. And 

Marshall is well positioned to make that happen. We certainly are working 

hard at it, and we’re excited about that future. There will be many other areas 

where Marshall will be able to contribute, but the launch vehicle—putting 

that infrastructure, those enabling functions in place—will define Marshall 

over the next 10 or 15 years, and that’s our primary goal and objective for 

the Agency.

What type of challenges do you foresee in order to accomplish the goals 

that you want?

Marshall has really developed two launch vehicles over the last 40 years, 

and we have two to develop over the next 10 to 15 years. The challenge—the 

volume of work that’s going to be required to get those enabling systems 

in place so that we can explore—is huge. We have a lot to learn. We have 

the capabilities and we can do this, but we have some things to relearn. 

Fortunately, we have a lot of history and a lot of experience on our side, having designed and built Saturn and then been a major player in the Shuttle propulsion systems as well, and I’m convinced we can do it. But just the enormity 

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of a program, all of the elements that have to go into it, and the integration 

of all of those elements so that you get everything just right—it can be a little 

bit overwhelming and will be a real challenge for us.

We are challenged by all the details associated with that and making 

good decisions along the way to ensure that these systems cost less than 

the Shuttle does today, so the Agency can do other things beyond just the 

transportation system. This is not just about having a transportation system. 

You have to have the transportation system to enable these things, but we 

also have to do it in a way that it won’t take the entire NASA budget or a big 

portion of the NASA budget. Accomplishing this work within the constraints 

of lowering the operational cost so that we can proceed with the exploration and science—that will be a key to our success in the future and will be 

a huge challenge for us.

Are there other programs or areas that you would like Marshall to be 

involved in during the next years?

We are involved in a number of other programs. We’re involved in a 

rather big way in the Space Station Program, and we’ll continue to be. We’re 

excited about finishing the Station successfully. That program is an unbelievable engineering feat in and of itself. Most people don’t understand how 

complex this system is to design, build, and then operate. We are learning 

so much from the Station, and our continued involvement is very important 

so we can learn the lessons we need to enable us to explore for longer periods of time. It is essential, and that is one of the primary benefits we have 

from the Station Program. The international component of the Station has 

taught us much as well. In any exploration program, there’s going to be an 

international component, so Station has brought us many lessons that are 

absolutely invaluable.

We are also involved in a number of science programs. We manage the 

Discovery and New Frontiers Program for Science Mission Directorate. We are 

about to get data back on the Gravity Probe B mission that we flew a couple 

of years ago to test [Albert] Einstein’s general theory of relativity, and that will 

be very interesting. We have a heritage in those programs, and we want to stay 

involved. We do not have the breadth of experience in science programs that 

Goddard Space Flight Center or JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] do. However, 

we have some very specific skills in some very specific areas that I think can 

make a huge contribution to the Agency, and we have to line those up with 

what the Agency wants to do. So we’re looking at some areas in which we 

think we can continue to help and make a major difference in the way Science 

Directorate does business, and we’re looking forward to that.

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What lessons have you learned along the way that you are applying in 

your leadership role?

We’ve learned many lessons from our successes and failures over the 

years. My personal experiences have made me who I am; our experiences 

make us who we are. I learned a lot of things from Columbia; the most 

recent learning experience we had was just the rigor that needs to come 

to everything we do, attention to detail. The devil is always in the details 

and paying attention to every detail. Integrating those lessons at a very 

high level and understanding your risk is so very important. I learned a lot 

about how to manage risk and how to get people to speak up and ask that 

next question beyond just, “Here’s where we think we are.” It’s important 

to bring that rigor to every process we have, to be curious to ask that next 

question about why things are as they are, and to evaluate the data and 

the reasons. 

I learned how important testing is to anchor the models and the analysis 

that you do as engineers and scientists. I learned that bringing experts to the 

table is extremely valuable. Differing views, differing perspectives, and an 

open culture of dialogue are critical. I learned to value those differing views 

and the rigor that comes with it. I’ve also learned a lot about the people 

aspects regarding the Agency. We can accomplish so much, and have accomplished so much, and it really is about the people and their perseverance. 

We face so many challenges and struggles daily, yet somehow we are able to 

persevere through them. That is a characteristic way underrated—just sheer 

perseverance toward a particular goal. Staying diligent about what we know 

we need to do day by day and staying true to what we have learned over the 

years is a real key.

We learn constantly from every Failure Review Board that you cannot 

communicate too much. Putting accountability in place is a huge key, so that 

people feel personal responsibility toward things. And then learning from 

our experiences, both successes and failures, is critical for us. I believe you 

can learn as much from successes as you can from failures. Just because 

you had success doesn’t mean you did everything right. We have to judge 

those successes very objectively to ensure that we learn everything we can 

because there are indicators in everything we do that will help us learn and 

get better.

I’ve learned a great deal about how important it is to work together, how 

the ability to work together means so much to this Agency. We sometimes have 

difficulties when we are in different states or different regions, but we all wear 

the NASA badge and we all are part of that team. The contributions everyone 

makes are important and vital toward meeting our goals and objectives.

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What do you believe the culture is, and are there areas that you would 

like to improve here at Marshall?

There are always areas you want to improve on. We have a number of initiatives in place to try to deal with some of those things. I believe we have a 

healthy environment today to work in. We’ve had a somewhat painful impetus 

for change over the last four years, but that’s not a bad thing if you look at it 

the right way. We’ve learned much about personal responsibility. We’ve learned 

an awful lot about some of the things I was discussing earlier—being curious, 

asking the next question, being rigorous in all the things we do, and being 

open to other people’s views and perspectives and different kinds of experts.

We’ve added a lot of rigor into our processes to be able to come to the 

proper conclusions and take the time to listen to other folks and use their 

experiences to assess the risks we have before us. This approach enables us 

to make good decisions about when we’re ready to fly and when we’re ready 

to accept the level of risk that we have, or when to not fly and to buy that risk 

down further by doing more. We’ve worked very hard to change the culture, 

to put the checks and balances in place that are necessary among Engineering, 

Safety and Mission Assurance, and the projects, as well as the institutional 

side. There are checks and balances that are required to hold people accountable and elicit the right questions.

We’ve put a very good governance structure in place, with specific responsibilities for specific people who look at things from different perspectives, 

and we end up with a much better product as a result. I think we’ve made 

great progress. We still have a way to go in accepting other people’s views, 

and process rigor can always be improved. But we’ve put a rigorous process 

in place, and we’ve put the governance structure in place with the checks 

and balances that will allow us to be successful—these processes were much 

softer in former years.

What do you believe to be NASA’s impact on society as a whole?

We’ve done some recent surveys that help us to understand that people 

have a very positive view of NASA, but they don’t know why sometimes. 

There are all the typical answers: It gives us national pride. NASA does the 

hard things. There’s economic and technological advantage that comes from 

what we do. We serve as a catalyst for many things that make us better as a 

society. I think all those things are true and meaningful, but I really believe 

it’s even more about allowing people to dream and then make those dreams 

come true. People are just in awe of the things we are doing.

When you say, “This is what we are doing. We are going to Mars. We are 

going to Pluto. We have probes all over the place. We are living in space. We 

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are going back to the Moon to live there for periods of time, and then we are 

going on to Mars”—it just boggles people’s minds. We don’t understand it 

as a people; even those of us who are involved in trying to make it happen 

don’t really have a sense of it—for this is difficult and hard and it is dreaming big. I believe that’s what NASA brings to our country. I think that may 

be the most important aspect of what we do—that national pride and that 

ability to dream and then make those dreams come true are hugely important 

to a country such as ours. We have to believe we can do these hard things; 

otherwise, we never will. Sometimes we succeed and sometimes we have setbacks, but we have to look at those setbacks as stepping-stones to the future. 

That’s what this Agency has done, and I think that’s the way the country has 

overall dealt with it. I see it as a huge opportunity to inspire people to do 

more and better. NASA has played a large role in that, and I hope that will 

continue in the future.

Share with us your ideas about future work between human and robotic 

exploration and how you and your Center will be involved in making 

that work.

It is hugely important that we integrate science and exploration because 

there should not be two parts of NASA. It needs to be integrated. One of the 

benefits that Marshall has is that it’s been involved in both aspects. Many 

other Centers are involved in one or the other, or primarily in one area or 

the other, but not both. We’ve done a lot of thinking about how to integrate 

this. A big part of our success in the future will be defined by our ability to 

integrate science with exploration. It can be done. There are many ways in 

which science will inform exploration, and exploration will make us ask more 

questions from a science perspective.

So integrating science and exploration is essential to a vibrant future for 

the Agency. Clearly, they are related and they should be related in a much 

bigger way than we have been able to do in the past. The two areas have 

their own programs and projects, and those probably need to stay distinct 

and different. But at least in the planning and in what we do, they need to be 

integrated in a much more structured way than they have been in the past. I 

look forward to trying to play a role in that.

Do you see robotics working along with the science and exploration 

effort as well?

Absolutely. Robotics will be a big part of enabling humans to explore. I 

see no other way. There are things robots can do better than humans, and so 

we should use robots to do those things and not take the risk with humans. 

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There are things humans need to do that robots cannot, and so we have to 

utilize those strengths toward our goals in science and exploration.

Do you find that aeronautics will continue to be a part of NASA in its future?

I think so, and I think it should. It has definition today like it has not 

had before. We now have an aerospace policy from a national perspective. 

We have defined roles for what NASA does, what the FAA [Federal Aviation 

Administration] does, and what others do in a way that we have not before. 

That will be very helpful in aeronautics and will help the nation to move 

forward in a more consistent and efficient way. But I do see aeronautics as 

something that the Agency needs to continue to do, but only in the areas that 

have been defined for the Agency. That has been clarified recently, and I think 

that will help us move forward.

Would you encourage someone to start a career with NASA?

NASA is an incredible organization that takes on some of the most difficult challenges imaginable to humankind and has successes toward those 

challenges. If someone wants a huge challenge in life, I can think of no better place than the Agency to get that and to be able to contribute toward the 

betterment for humankind. You get to work with the smartest people in the 

world—some of the most competent people you will ever run into. You get to 

do some of the grandest things you can ever imagine, beyond your imagination in many cases. And you get to do it across Centers that are all good places 

to live and with good people across this Agency.

There are huge challenges. We have many constraints that you have to 

learn to work within, but, overall, it is an amazing opportunity to learn and 

grow and contribute to a goal this nation has. I think the world is beginning 

to see the challenges that are there and what can come from efforts in space. 

So I would say, absolutely, that it’s been an awesome opportunity for me. I’ve 

learned so much and feel like I’ve contributed. We have incredible people 

who have made sacrifices to contribute to this end, and I’m proud to be a 

part of that.

Is there anything else that you’d like to add?

Fifty years—you know, there are times when you look back at that and 

you say, “Look at how much we’ve accomplished,” and then there are other 

ways to look at it and say, “We could have done more.” But I think that’s the 

spirit that’s embodied and that people love in the Agency. We have much to 

do. We have a vision today that we haven’t had for a number of years, and I’m 

excited about that. I’m excited about being a part of this vision, and I have 

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many colleagues who are very excited about it. I think we will accomplish 

it. I’m hopeful that the public and our government stakeholders will support 

the Agency’s goals in a way that will allow us to accomplish them quickly, 

because there are a lot of people who are committed to making that happen, 

and it’s exciting to be a part of it.

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NASA at 50

Chapter 24

Richard J. Gilbrech

Center Director, Stennis Space Center

When he was seven years old and fresh out of first grade, Rick Gilbrech stayed awake the night of 20 

July 1969 so he could watch the first Apollo Moon landing. Since that time, he has been “hooked” on the 

space program. He geared his whole life towards trying to be an astronaut, but as he grew older, Gilbrech 

had to change his direction, but not his path—he was still determined to work in the area of spaceflight.

 He achieved his goal of working with the nation’s space agency, serving in various leadership positions at several Centers, including as the Director of the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi (2006–07). 

He went to NASA Headquarters to work as Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission 

Directorate before returning to Stennis in April 2009 to be the Center’s Associate Director. 

 On 6 March 2007, while he was the Stennis Center Director, Gilbrech participated in an interview 

to talk about his experiences and his thoughts on NASA as it neared its 50th anniversary. He began 

by sharing how his lifelong interests in aeronautics and aerodynamics led him to work for NASA.

I grew up on a farm in Arkansas, and we had crop dusters. I was basically 

a human flagman for the crop dusters at the time, which meant you would 

hold the flag, and the airplane would fly over. You’d walk so many paces, and 

then they’d fly over again. I got to see these beautiful patterns that the wings 

would make with the chemicals, and I’m healthy today, I’m glad to say.

But I really got hooked on aeronautics and aerodynamics at that time, 

watching the spray pattern of trail-edge vortices. Also, the pilots would take me 

up when the winds were too high to fly the different chemicals, and I just fell 

in love with aeronautics. I had wanted to be a fighter jet pilot, but my eyesight 

was too bad, and I knew I wouldn’t get to fly jets or go up in space as a flying 

(pilot) astronaut. I felt my only other option was to be a scientific astronaut. 

So I set my sights on a first-class education and decided that I would go all the 

way through a doctorate program and then try to get on with NASA and know 

the system and then apply for the Astronaut [Candidate] Program.

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That led me to Mississippi State, where I got my undergraduate degree in 

aerospace engineering. Then I shot out to the West Coast after that and got my 

doctorate in aeronautics from Caltech, the California Institute of Technology. 

I also had a little bit of space flavor there. I minored in planetary science and 

had some really neat experiences. It always spurred my interest in NASA, 

knowing what they were doing. We were right next to the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory. I also got to work with Gene Shoemaker, of comet ShoemakerLevy 9 fame. He told me stories about astronaut [Harrison] Jack Schmitt, the 

future Senator Jack Schmitt; and Gene actually took one of our classes out to 

Meteor Crater in Arizona. We spent the night there looking for meteorites, and 

he explained all the things they’d done when training the astronauts. So I just 

built on the motivation to join NASA and see if I could get a slot.

I finished up my doctorate and then, with my degree in hand, came 

straight out to Stennis Space Center in 1991. I signed on here as a fresh Ph.D. 

and went to work here. I had not really had any experience in rocket engine 

testing, which is one of Stennis’s two main missions, but learned quickly about 

cryogenic fluids and rocket engines and that whole test side of the business. 

I pursued my astronaut dream right up to the point I found out I had a heart 

murmur, and that pretty well put an end to that trail, but it opened up some 

more trails that have been very fruitful for me. 

I’ve been able to have a wonderful experience and know a lot of the astronauts and have gotten the inside scoop of that whole line of what NASA does 

and get to be involved in all the Shuttle preparation and Shuttle launches, so 

that’s how I meandered my way into my current position.

In 1991 I started, and 10 years fast forward—worked a lot of programs 

during my tenure here, the X-30 Program that NASA was working with the Air 

Force, the Orient Express during President Reagan’s term. Then transitioned 

into the X-33 Program, which was going to be another one of the Shuttle 

replacement concepts. I had never really worked in the Space Shuttle Program 

proper. Even though we tested the Space Shuttle main engines here, and I was 

around in all those years, I was always on the developmental side, working 

the new X vehicles, the X-30, the X-33, and had never really directly worked 

with the Shuttle Program.

So I wanted to jump right into the middle of it and had an opportunity to 

go to the Johnson Space Center in Houston and do a detail with Ron Dittemore, 

the Shuttle Program Manager at the time. That was an offshoot from the experiences that I’d had here. Had a wonderful six-month experience where I got 

fully immersed in Shuttle. Even though I was familiar with NASA and thought 

I knew every acronym in the book, it was a whole other language when you 

entered into the Shuttle Program. It was a baptism by fire with Dittemore. He 

liked to throw you in the middle of it, give you some loose direction, and 

expected results.

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But that was a great experience. JSC was a wonderful place to work. The 

workforce was extremely focused on the mission, and that was a contrast to 

what I had done here and all the research that we had done and the developmental testing, as opposed to mission support. Everybody there knew what 

the next launch was, when it was supposed to be there, what activities had to 

take place before you could do the Flight Readiness Review, and they pared 

their focus down on those milestones and made sure that they did everything 

they could to meet them, as opposed to a lot of the development work that 

we had before that was looser or not as stringent disciplined milestones that 

everybody was pulling towards.

It was definitely a contrast to me as to how the research and development 

side of NASA works, as opposed to the operational side. But there were a lot 

of great takeaways from that whole experience, and I made good relationships 

that have really been invaluable to me.

After that detail was over, I did a little bit of struggling. I was very tempted 

to stay on at Johnson, and they were trying to draft me into the Shuttle Program, 

but my wife and family were back here. I’d also kind of had made a commitment 

to the Center Director at the time to come back here, and I just felt like it was the 

way, to come back here. I came back here in 2001, and then about two years later 

Columbia, STS-107, came along. That, of course, was a major event for anybody 

in NASA, especially those that had been close to the Shuttle Program. After that 

period, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board released its report, and they 

recommended the NASA Engineering and Safety Center [NESC] as a way to put 

some of the technical discipline or technical insight back into the Agency and 

some independence. A good friend of mine, Ralph Roe, who I had worked with 

during the detail at the Shuttle Program, was tasked to go and start up the NESC.

He called me up and said he needed some help, and it was going to be up at 

the Langley Research Center in Virginia, and wanted me to come on board and 

help him start it up. I had a world of respect for Ralph and a good friendship 

with him, and so I answered the call and packed the family up again and went up 

to Virginia. I was able to take part in the building of a new organization, which 

was really fascinating, and got to see Ralph in action firsthand, which was pretty 

impressive. I had never been to Langley, either. And even though I’d grown up 

and trained in aeronautics, I had not really done anything in classical aerodynamics and wind tunnels and things like that, so it was exciting for me to get to go to 

Langley. We lived in Williamsburg, which is also a nice place to call home, and I 

thoroughly enjoyed Virginia. We were up there about three years. My kids loved 

it. My wife loved it. I like to joke, because when we left here there were tears and 

sadness. “How can you pull me away?” It’s my wife speaking, of course. So we 

get up to Virginia, and immediately she settles in, falls in love with it, and then 

when I get the call to come back here to Stennis, it’s tears again. I said, “Now we 

can rewind, and you’ll see that everything works out. It’s just the way of a career.”

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At any rate, I had a great time at the Engineering and Safety Center in 

Virginia. I think the thing that that really brought to me was getting to have 

insight and experience and involvement in all the other areas of NASA. I kind 

of had had a myopic view of NASA because of being at Stennis and Johnson 

and dealing mainly with Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, 

and the human spaceflight arena.

I had not really gotten to taste the aeronautic side, the Earth science, the 

space science side of what NASA does, so that was really enriching for me to 

be able to—because the NESC, everything was fair game. We got requests from 

all over the place that all different areas of NASA was working on, so that was 

probably one of the neatest things to me was to be able to go there and get 

insight into spacecraft and airplanes and all kinds of issues there. It was just a 

great group to work for, and it kind of brought me back into a technical arena. 

I had gotten out of that with project management, and it was kind of nice to 

get an infusion of real technical experience again.

About probably two years after I’d signed on and had been doing that, I 

had worked my way up to be Ralph’s Deputy in the NESC. Then his wife Lesa 

[B. Roe] had been selected to replace Roy Bridges as the Center Director at 

Langley, and she needed a Deputy, and she asked me to step up and be the 

Deputy. Both great experiences, different and unique, and I spent about four 

months working under Lesa. It was kind of an intense initiation into that level 

of management at NASA. Within the first month we both took our inaugural 

visit to Capitol Hill, and we learned the ins and outs of going to Senators and 

Congressmen and trying to be prepared for what their constituency interests 

were, and also to know what your NASA message was, what your issues in 

their particular districts would be.

It was just a real education for me. I didn’t realize at the time how valuable it would be to me. I thought I was going to be Lesa’s Deputy for quite 

some time, but four months down the road, Bill Parsons, who was the Shuttle 

Program Manager post-Columbia, had been asked to come to Stennis, but then 

he had moved on to Florida. I got the call that they needed somebody to come 

back here and take over the reins. So after four short months of enjoying the 

deputyship at Langley under Lesa, they gave me the call, and I was thrilled to 

accept the position to come back here as the Center Director.

Actually, I can remember in 1991, about two months after I started with 

NASA, I was sitting at this very table with the Center Director at the time, Roy 

Estess. He was sitting in this seat looking at me across the table, and he says, 

“Well, you know, you’re a bright young engineer. What do you want to do with 

your career?” I said, “I want your job someday.” It took me about 15 years, but I 

finally got to take over his seat. I’ve been back here a year now. I came in after 

Hurricane Katrina, so it was a different Stennis than what I had remembered. 

But it’s been a real pleasure to be back, and it feels like home to me. Twelve 

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out of my 15 NASA years have been at Stennis; I know the people, I know the 

business, and I know the area, so it’s been a great homecoming for me. That’s 

a roundabout way of how I got to where I am.

What has changed about the space agency through your years?

When I started, [Richard] Dick Truly was the Administrator at the time. He 

was only in there for a short period as I came on board, and actually Roy Estess, 

the Center Director, had been called up to Headquarters by Admiral Truly to 

help him, and then Roy actually rode through the transition into the Dan Goldin 

years. I just remember that time as being exciting, because you had a new leader, 

and people didn’t quite know him. Goldin was very dynamic, but you also had a 

lot of angst, because he kind of had a reputation as—I wouldn’t call it a hatchet 

man, but an agent of change. So people were a little nervous, and he had this 

“faster, better, cheaper” philosophy, and really it was a pretty hard-nosed style.

From where I was at the ranks, I didn’t really get a lot of exposure to that, 

but over the years while he was in tenure, as I worked my way up, I got more 

and more insight into his leadership styles. It was a downsizing period, at least 

in the Shuttle Program. They were constantly being told, “You need to do more 

with less. We need to cut back, and we’ve got to make room for a new vehicle, 

and so you’ve got to take cuts.” I just remember feeling that kind of pressure 

all during those years struggling with where do we draw the line? How much 

cutting is going too far? That was always a dilemma that the people within the 

program struggled with.

But it was also a time of interesting new development. The X-30 was in full 

swing at the time, and I was in the middle of working with that. Then we also 

had the X-33 and the Reusable Launch Vehicle Program that was supposed 

to replace the Shuttle. That era was exciting. I always wanted to be in on an 

Apollo-scale development of a new vehicle, and I missed Apollo. I missed the 

Shuttle development years. So I got to see the X-30. That one, unfortunately, 

was just a little too ambitious. It was also one of the last joint Department 

of Defense–NASA programs, at least that I can recall, and that one probably 

makes both agencies cautious as to going back into joint development programs. It was a wonderful program, but I think it was a bridge too far for the 

amount of technology that they had to deliver. We went through that era, and 

still weren’t able to come out the other side with a successful vehicle. So we’re 

back to the Shuttle Program. It has to keep doing its job for a lot more years.

The Space Station had evolved over paper designs from Freedom to the 

International Space Station, and that was an era when George Abbey and 

Dan Goldin had crafted this Russian element and were bringing international 

partners in. To me—call it what you like, but that was probably the only thing 

that saved the Station Program. I think it was insightful of them to do that, 

and certainly it’s a great thing right now, especially when we had such a down 

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period with Columbia. If we wouldn’t have had the Russian partners to serve 

the Station, we’d have been in a very different position right now.

Then enter Sean O’Keefe. We had poor standing with Congress. Our relationship with the White House wasn’t that great, and they brought in Sean 

O’Keefe, who was from the Office of Management and Budget, was an insider 

with the administration, had a reputation as an austere budgeteer, had been a 

critic, and had worked a lot of NASA issues. So he got the call to be our new 

Administrator. I think he did a great job with what he was tasked to do. He was 

told to come in and fix the budget credibility, clean up the accounting systems, 

get the programs to deliver more on what they’re promising, and keep costs 

under control. For the three or so years that we had Sean, it was basically “get 

your accounting in order.” Then, of course, Columbia came along on his watch, 

and we all responded to that and then tried to figure out what happened and 

how to fix it and how we were going to get back to flight. Then, at the tail end 

of his tenure, President George Bush came to Headquarters in 2004 with the 

Exploration Vision, and that really jazzed me up, because here was my Apolloscale effort that I’ve always dreamt of.

In the beginning, it was worrisome, because you had Admiral Craig Steidle 

on board, and he had one concept of how he was going to do exploration. To 

most of us who wore civil servant badges, it was a nervous time, because it 

didn’t include a lot of NASA involvement. It was basically let’s go out and buy 

exploration the way the Department of Defense buys advanced fighters, which 

was Admiral Steidle’s background. So I felt like even though we had this great 

opportunity, I was going to watch the contractors do everything, and we were 

going to be on the other side of the glass.

I will say that it was refreshing when Mike Griffin came in; now enter our 

true rocket scientist at the helm of NASA, one of the smartest people I’ve ever 

run across. Also, I really like Mike, not just because he’s hired me to do this job, 

but I have always admired him during the times I’ve had acquaintances with 

him or heard him speak at conferences or read his words in print. He just is a 

no-nonsense guy, he’s brutally frank and honest, and there’s no guesswork as 

to where you stand.

That was a drastic change from Dan Goldin to O’Keefe to Mike, where it’s 

very clear where you stand, where he’s going, what he needs of you, and what 

he thinks. There’s not much that has to be left to the imagination. I really like 

his style, and I’ve enjoyed working for him in this first year. He’s got a great 

leadership team in place, and it’s been a real privilege to work with him.

It’s very exciting in the exploration arena to be heading where we are. 

We’ve seen a few gyrations in that program even since Mike Griffin’s come 

on board. We’ve changed the architecture pretty drastically about a year ago 

to make it more feasible and achievable with the budget constraints we were 

handed by the Congress and the White House.

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What part will Stennis have in achieving the Vision for Space Exploration? 

When I was at Langley, aeronautics was being cut, job future was uncertain, 

and we were having to retool the Center to go from a classical aeronautics 

research center to how to get more exploration business. Then I come here 

and they’re struggling, trying to keep up, continue the Space Shuttle main 

engine testing, and gear up and figure out which test stand they’re going to 

use for exploration work that’s coming. So it was kind of the opposite; it was 

the flip side of the coin. Here it was kind of a worry about how are we going 

to fit all this work in, as opposed to where I had just left, where it was a lot of 

discord about what’s our job future, what is our Center’s future.

When I showed up here as Center Director in February 2006, there were 

already a lot of plans on the books about testing new rocket engines. As I had 

mentioned, they started out with an architecture that had Space Shuttle main 

engines as the primary engines for the first and the second stages. So it was 

going to be just a lot more of the same. We knew how to test Space Shuttle 

main engines. We were just going to be testing them in different flight environments than we were used to, or to simulate different flight environments. So 

that was a bright future.

Then they changed gears to the J-2X architecture with the upper stage and 

the RS-68 Delta IV engine for the Ares V first stage. The RS-68, of course, we 

had been testing here, or the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne Company has been 

testing that as a commercial entity, basically has been leasing one of our big 

stands, and they did all the development here. We’re very familiar with that, so 

it’s a comfortable place to be. It kind of anchors you in the future for at least 

that part of the program, that they’re going to continue to test and supply those 

engines to the Air Force’s expendable launch vehicles, but also would look 

towards developing and adding a little more technology for NASA’s needs in the 

2010, 2014 timeframe when we start looking at the big booster for a Moon shot.

But again, the J-2X was chosen for the upper stage, and it has a lot of developmental testing, even though it’s a heritage engine. It’s an engine that was 

used in the Apollo program as a second-stage engine; this is an evolved piece 

of that puzzle. I had some personal experience with the J-2 engine because we 

had used those pumps, with some modifications, for the X-33 Program, and 

I was the X-33 Program Manager at the time here. We had actually taken the 

pumps off of old Apollo—I think it was the Apollo 18 flight set—and they had 

used those for the development of the X-33 linear aerospike engines. We had 

some recent history experience with the J-2 evolved pumps and the linear aerospike. So now we’re going into kind of the third installment of J-2X hardware, 

so it’s kind of familiar ground, but it’s exciting new technology that has to be 

developed, and a lot of testing. We recently handed over our A-1 Test Stand 

to the J-2X Program; took it out of the Shuttle bullpen and turned it over to 

Exploration. Now we’re modifying it to start on to the J-2X engine development.

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Then our B-2 stand has classically been where we do large stage-type testing, and it’s right now slated to do sea-level upper-stage testing for the Ares 

I vehicle, and then eventually we’ll do the first stage of the Ares V, the big 

booster that will be down the road that it will take for Moon shots.

What do you see as your vision for your Center, and how are you beginning 

to shape those tasks?

One thing I’ve learned as I’ve gone up through the ranks is to try to think 

at a broader level. I always try to take the test of, “what would Mike Griffin 

do,” or Rex Geveden, our Associate Administrator, or Shana Dale, our Deputy 

Administrator. We have had a second mission here ever since I started in ’91. 

Although rocket testing has always been the bread-and-butter prime mission 

of Stennis, we also had a pretty relevant piece of remote sensing work in the 

Earth science arena. So we’ve always had a toehold into the Earth science part 

of NASA’s portfolio. It was never one I was ever too engrossed or mired in. I 

didn’t really work on that side of the business. I was always on the rocket side. 

But I am now fully immersed in both camps, by necessity of where I am, leading the Center. We’ve worked hard with Headquarters and the Science Mission 

Directorate to try to figure out what our niche is in Earth science and make 

sure we’re doing the types of things they want to do.

I also am looking to try to diversify. Outside of just the Earth science and 

the Science Mission Directorate, we’re working a new start in the small satellite 

arena, where we can take what’s been done with the Earth-observing platforms, 

all those satellites that are up there that look at the oceans, look at the land, look 

at the atmosphere, and figure out how can you apply some of that to a lunar 

environment. Can you do remote sensing on the Moon, and can you do it with 

small satellites that are much cheaper and simpler and faster to produce? So 

we’re trying to branch into that arena, working with the Exploration Program.

I’m also trying to look at opportunities that we can collaborate on with 

a lot of our friends that are also resident on the base here. We actually are a 

unique NASA Center in that we have over 30 resident agencies. The National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] has a big presence here. 

We’ve got a big U.S. Navy contingent. The U.S. Navy Meteorology and Oceanic 

Command is located here. We’ve got all kind of oceanographers and hydrologists with a lot of ocean-theme-educated people here. Part of that is trying to 

figure out how we can work with them and collaborate on some of these Earth 

science projects. Being close to the Gulf of Mexico, coastal management is an 

area that’s probably ripe for us to be—we’ve worked in that area for a while, 

but I’m looking to expand that role. So part of my vision is to diversify our science applications, to get involved with collaborations with NOAA, with other 

universities that are in there; maybe branch into the small satellite arena and 

help that whole side of our business work.

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The other side, on the rocket tests, is trying to help NASA make smart 

decisions in its test plans. Part of the testing will involve altitude testing of this 

upper stage, and one of the roles we have here at Stennis is as NASA’s overall 

manager of the rocket test facilities that NASA has—and that involves not only 

Stennis but also facilities at Marshall Space Flight Center—to do rocket tests 

and do cryostructural testing. It also involves the White Sands Test Facility in 

New Mexico, where they do hypergolic testing for the Shuttle engines. And it 

involves NASA Glenn’s Plum Brook Station out in Sandusky, Ohio, where they 

have a facility that can do large-scale altitude testing of rocket engines.

One of the things that I’m proud of in my first year is trying to make sure that 

the Exploration Program had accurate facts on the table when they were trying 

to make decisions on where can we test this upper-stage engine and this full-up 

upper-stage vehicle in this altitude-simulation environment. I’ve been pressing 

on a lot of technical studies for Plum Brook’s capabilities. There’s another facility at the Arnold Engineering Development Center [AEDC]; it’s the J-4 facility 

that did a lot of testing in the Apollo days with altitude simulation. Then, when 

the numbers start getting to the level we’ve been seeing, in the hundred million 

plus, to just make these facilities capable of testing these new engines, you start 

scratching your head and saying, “Well, what can we do with a green-field facility, 

one that we’ve built today, instead of taking a 40-year-old facility and trying to 

modify it and make it last another 25 or 30 years in the future?” So we’ve kind of 

gotten all three of those stories. Plum Brook, can it technically do it? Can AEDC? 

Have we overlooked something they might be able to do with a facility that’s 

bigger and probably is more tailored to what we would need for Exploration’s 

engine testing? Or, this green-field facility that uses modern technology and has 

no rust falling off of it, like a lot of our 40-year-old stands, we have experience 

in? So all that’s been laid at the program’s feet, and right now they’re in the final 

throes of trying to decide what’s the best answer for the Agency.

If things go well and it turned out to be the right answer, part of my legacy 

could be adding one new, major test stand to Stennis’s Rocket Testing bullpen. 

We’ve got basically three major test stands that were built in the Apollo days, 

and we haven’t built a large engine stand since then, not really, in this whole 

Agency. To do that would be a proud legacy for me to have added, to help add 

to one of the big capabilities we’ve got here.

If budget wasn’t an issue, what programs would you increase or what 

additions would you make?

With unlimited money you can have unlimited ideas. That’s a pretty open 

question. But I think we’ve always had a niche here at Stennis for the rocket 

engine world. I’ve washed away my colloquial viewpoints after being around so 

many different Centers, so I really am thankful that I’ve tried to gravitate towards 

what’s best for NASA instead of what’s best for Stennis or what’s best for Langley. I 

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really do believe that this new test stand, if it comes about, would be the preferred 

answer from my viewpoint, just from my years of experience in rocket engine 

testing and dealing with the limitations you put on the engine developers when 

they have to fit what they want to do into facilities that are available, as opposed 

to being able to reset the clock with modern-day facilities. So for exploration, that’s 

what I would do if I had more money. I would build that new test stand.

I would unencumber the rocket engine developers from having to make 

all these trades and compromises in what they want to do with tests, because 

in the test world, we’re always at the end of the food chain, and I’ve seen it 

time and again where the engine developers are worried about their hardware 

schedules: how do we build this engine; how can we get enough hardware? 

Then they always have grand test plans, but as schedules slip and costs grow, 

they start nibbling away at the test program.

Dr. Wernher von Braun, who was the Apollo original rocket scientist and 

created the Mississippi Test Facility where we are, was a firm believer in a very 

robust test program and basically built this site so that he could bring out all 

of the first and second stages of his Apollo rockets. That’s one thing. If I had 

more money, I would pump it into the most amount of hardware that we could 

produce, the most engines, the most stages, and the most robust test program 

that NASA could possibly do, given the balance of getting something flying in a 

timeframe that the President and the public can accept, versus having so much 

good test data under our belt before we go do the live stuff.

Since the Columbia accident, a lot has been discussed about NASA’s culture. 

Share with us your thoughts about the culture at Stennis.

I don’t think I’ve really observed a culture problem at Stennis. It’s been 

known as “the little Center that could.” It’s a small Center, so you have a real 

family-oriented environment. Everybody knows everyone. It’s a fairly closeknit group. So most of the culture clashes I’ve seen over the years involved 

conflicts and headbutting in the test arena.

When I was here in the 1990s, we had some major bloodbaths with Marshall 

Space Flight Center because we were both competing after the same test business, and there wasn’t a lot of it. At some of the points in our history, there 

wasn’t a lot of testing to go around, and so everybody was in a survival mode, 

and we found ourselves at each other’s throats, competing over the same test 

business and trying to underbid. It was just a very unhealthy thing for NASA.

One of the things that came out of that was the Center Directors at Marshall 

and Stennis at the time decided that they really needed to get out of the competition business and figure out how do we divvy up our respective expertise 

and start complementing each other instead of fighting with each other over 

this business. So there was a lot of pain and a lot of frank discussions that went 

on in the ’90s, but coming out of that there was a Test Management Board.

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There was an organization that included these four sites, and they had 

hard discussions on what exactly is the baseline role of each of these four 

facilities, and this is how we’re going to funnel the work. If it’s in your baseline role, you’re going to be the primary site to do that. That involved moving 

equipment, and that was a lot of shutting down some test positions, some test 

areas. That’s never a pleasant thing when you’re watching trucks roll out with 

all your equipment on it, but I think in the end NASA was much better off 

because of that. So anyway, that’s kind of one culture conflict that I’ve seen.

What do you think NASA’s role is for the nation?

We’ve had a lot of discussions about this at the senior-management level 

because we’ve typically never done a good job of communicating, capturing the public’s interest the way it was done in the Apollo days. In my view, 

the Apollo program was about exploration, but it was also about fear of the 

Russians and a time race against who’s going to be the ruler of space, and challenging and conquering that technology. To me, the public wants to know that 

there is an agency or some entity in the United States pushing the frontiers of 

discovery, that is out there discovering all kinds of neat new things that are 

going to explore strange new worlds—like we go to Jupiter and all the planets 

with those probes, we go to Mars with our Spirit and Opportunity and the 

other Mars rovers. But I think the public also wants to know that there is an 

agency that embodies the ability to do the near impossible.

I think from the Apollo program, everybody views NASA as having that 

capability, but they don’t really know exactly what we do anymore. They see 

the Shuttles go up. They know the Space Station is getting built. They’re excited 

about NASA, but I don’t think they really know why. Everybody wants to believe 

that we’re a world leader in technology, we’re an exploring nation, we’re a 

pioneering nation, and we have people that can do these near-impossible technological feats. But again, if you try to put it in day-to-day terms to the average 

taxpayer, they probably can’t go much beyond we went to the Moon. We made 

this Shuttle that goes up and flies around the Earth. They probably know that 

we have a Space Station up there, but aren’t really quite sure what it’s doing. So 

that’s part of the challenge that we have is letting them know why exploration is 

important and what exploration does to the other sides of what NASA’s involved 

in, that it does benefit aeronautics. There is a lot of science opportunity that 

comes with going and doing exploration.

One of the things that really hit home with me was a speech Mike Griffin 

had given, and it was even more impressive to me because he did it off the cuff. 

After I’d read this well-articulated speech that hit home with me, he admitted 

that his speech writers were off and unavailable, and he had to kind of put this 

together on the fly and gave a very elegant talk on why we do exploration. He 

couched it as “there are acceptable reasons, and there are real reasons why we 

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do it.” His acceptable reasons are the ones that can be talked in the Congress 

and in the White House and that are measurable things that the public can 

understand, but it doesn’t really grab their attention. They’re things like economic benefit; things like national security, contributing to national security 

with satellite systems and technologies and things like that. There’s also scientific discovery, which includes images from the Hubble Space Telescope and 

pictures from Mars and aeronautics research and things like that. But again, 

those are acceptable reasons that aren’t very grabbing.

He went off to say the real reason, if you boil it down to the nonlogical 

part of what we do, it’s because of competition; that we as a human species 

have this compelling need to compete and be the best. It’s like, why does a 

Tiger Woods want to beat a Jack Nicklaus? At any rate, they don’t do it, at some 

point, for the money. They want to set records that withstand some test of 

time, and they want to win. They want to be the best. I think that’s one of the 

reasons why America wants us to be number one at what we do in NASA and 

be the world leader in technologies and pushing those frontiers.

Then the second one is curiosity. Just by nature, we’re a curious species. 

We always want to know what’s over the next hill. We climb mountains. We 

go places, to the depths of the ocean, all the things because we want to know 

what’s there. That’s another reason why America wants us to keep exploring 

these areas that no one’s ever explored before.

Then the third reason was monument building. It doesn’t sound like 

one that would roll off your tongue when you’re thinking about why do you 

explore, but it’s a corollary to how the European cathedrals got built and the 

commitment nations made to go about those real expensive projects. They 

take years, sometimes decades, sometimes multiple generations to complete. 

But the whole sense was that you had a country or a whole European mindset 

back then that wanted to leave things that in hundreds and hundreds of years 

down the road, people would still want to go see and visit.

So it was kind of that sense of monument building, and that, to me, is what 

people always remember, that first footprint on the Moon. It’s similar that they 

would always remember that first footprint on Mars or that first permanent 

outpost on the Moon where people are going to be living for a year or so or 

longer at a time. That’s what we bring to the nation, and if we don’t do it as a 

country, some other country will, and I just don’t think the American people 

would want to lose that element of what we do here and what we’re proud of.

Do you believe there is still a place within NASA for the field of aeronautics?

I think so. A lot of the facilities that you need to do aeronautics research 

are not geared towards the bottom line of a corporate accounting system. We 

bring a lot of capability that industry will not sustain. We’ve reshaped the 

aeronautics program to go back towards more fundamental research, to try to 

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find new areas and new techniques and new physics that will help develop, 

help benefit, the whole aeronautics line of business. But it’s a successful model 

of how NACA evolved, and they did all the development and passed it on to 

commercial industry. There’s a smaller realm for NASA to contribute in the 

aeronautics side, but there’s still a relevant one, and exactly what that is is 

hard to say. They’re really retooling the whole aeronautics portfolio of what 

NASA’s doing and trying to do, pulling back away from flight demonstrations 

and developing a lot of hardware, into more fundamental research that is not 

the things that a typical Boeing or an aircraft outfit would do.

Do you see an opportunity for Stennis to be a part of the robotic spaceflight 

era? Do you believe this involvement is vital or integral to what NASA 

wants to do for its future?

It is a hand-in-glove partnership that robotic missions can play with human 

missions. Some of the first forays to the Moon were from robotics that went 

there to survey sites, take data on what are acceptable landing sites. I really do 

believe that they’re very much essential in partnerships, that you can’t really do 

one without the other. Robotic missions can get you a lot of information, but 

they also don’t have the capabilities of a human to think and react and take 

care of situations that you just can’t plan for in a robotics mission. I very much 

believe both need to be present in any exploration program, and they are now 

in the current one we’ve got.

As far as Stennis’s role, we are involved in the Small Satellite Program, which 

is the early lunar attempt at “can you do remote sensing on the Moon that can 

help establish an outpost or an eventual base?” Also looking at “can these cheap, 

small satellites become a communication network for you the way we have the 

communication networks around the Earth?” We might have a niche in that arena 

for Stennis. It’s probably not nearly as prominent as just the base smoke and fire 

that we typically contribute to any space program, getting them out of the atmosphere. There is potential there, but probably not nearly as big as the rocket side.

Share with us some of the lessons that you’ve learned, both organizationally 

and technically, that you want to apply here at Stennis.

I’ve been doing a lot of research back in the Apollo days—von Braun is 

kind of a hero of mine—trying to see how NASA was developing in the early 

days. One of the lessons is that you have strong personalities; it takes strong 

personalities to develop new rockets and new vehicles and things. So I see 

some of the struggles that they had and which Center got what piece of the 

development work. I can see that again today. It’s not quite as prominent as 

it was then, but that’s just one thing I’ve learned—there’s always going to be 

some amount of strife, and I don’t know if you’d call it healthy tension, but 

there’s always a little bit of competition and turf wars that go on until things 

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settle out and you know where things will be assigned. That’s just something 

I’ve learned that is going to be the nature of the business. When you’ve got a 

lot of exciting work and there’s multiple places that could do it, there will be 

competition and some power struggles. That is not necessarily bad; it’s just 

something that comes along with it.

Also, NASA over its history has been really valuable in developing system engineering expertise and integration. There are certain capabilities that 

industry either won’t maintain, or, if they take a break, it erodes and you never 

recover it. We were talking at the last Senior Management Council about a lot 

of difficulties in the science arena they’ve been having with space optics. It’s 

really just an observation that either that has eroded in the contractor base in 

the country, or the people who used to know how to do that have retired and 

not passed that on to their successors. But Goddard Space Flight Center up in 

Greenbelt, Maryland, has been actively developing and building spacecraft for 

the last 20, 30 years, and they are current, fresh, and doing that, and they know 

all the hard-earned lessons. Yet when they task a contractor to go build an 

instrument, or you might even have another agency that builds an instrument, 

you see that they make just some basic critical flaws in basic design. You begin 

to realize that that corporate knowledge has eroded, and that’s one of the real 

valuable things that NASA does and probably other federal agencies do. But 

at least in the space arena, we are the keepers of the flame for a lot of hardearned lessons in doing things like building spacecraft and rocket engines 

and launch vehicles and things like that. That’s one lesson I think I’ve learned.

We ought to not commit to do programs that we know are underbudgeted 

from the get-go. That’s one of the mistakes we made in the Shuttle Program; 

we kept getting budget pressures, and we kept evolving and compromising on 

the designs. I don’t fault them. They certainly had to deal with the realities they 

were handed, and that’s why we wound up with the Shuttle system that we’ve 

been flying. But they were always constantly trying to recover from promising something, taking hits and cuts, and then maintaining that commitment to 

deliver something when they probably knew they were underfunded.

That’s one thing we’re trying to keep from falling into that trap with exploration, is not overselling what we can deliver to the Congress and the people, 

and then looking like we’ve failed when we just weren’t given the money we 

asked for to do what we were asked to do, and then have to explain why it’s 

not working on the schedule. It’s basically, don’t overpromise when you know 

that they’re not giving you the funds or the time that’s needed to do it the way 

you need to. That’s another lesson.

One other lesson I joke about is that NASA never learns lessons. I don’t 

mean that to sound flippant, but it is hard—we try to capture our lessons 

learned in the system, and it’s just hard to get designers to go in and really look 

at what failed in previous programs. It’s just human nature that you think you 

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know best, and you don’t want to go and do what the other of those guys did, 

because you think you’re smarter than that or for whatever reason. But we just 

got a lesson, a repeat of a mistake that was made in the Apollo program. We 

learned something in the Apollo program when we launched through lightning with Apollo 12, and so NASA went through this whole thing where they 

made up rules on what weather you should and shouldn’t launch in. Then you 

get into the Shuttle Program, and somehow or another that gets convoluted, 

and the weather rules turned into something not really directly traceable to 

that. Then you’ve got the new weather rules for how we launch things out of 

Cape Canaveral and Kennedy Space Center.

Then in, I think it’s the ’97 or ’98 timeframe, we launched an Atlas into a 

thunderstorm, and lightning hit it, and the rocket wound up being destroyed. 

It was just one of those things where a well-thought-out rule that we had 

developed in the Apollo program because of the Apollo 12 lightning strike 

got somehow or another convoluted into a rule where it was interpreted as an 

icing concern instead of lightning. Just a lot of misinterpretations and misconceptions, and we wound up launching an Atlas into another thunderstorm, and 

it failed. So the intent was there, but the execution of how you kept that lesson 

crisp and clear throughout history seems to have broken down.

It’s a challenge, and that to me is just one thing I’m constantly on the alert 

for, because we do better in some areas than others, as far as learning our lesson and actually going back and not recreating those hard knocks from the past.

The Constellation Program is evolving. Some of the Centers have called 

in some previous employees, bringing back some of their heritage folks. 

Will Stennis do that as well?

Actually, we were a little ahead of the program, because even when we 

were looking at the Space Shuttle main engine concepts here, we brought a 

bunch of the old Rocketdyne crew back that had done the original engine 

development for the Apollo program. The effort was actually called “On the 

Shoulders of Giants,” a little nomenclature we put on it, but it was really to 

bring in all those people who had lived through a lot of the test failures and 

the design problems and what the things to keep your eyes out for would be 

when you’re going off into a new development program. We had gathered that 

brain trust of the rocket-development world and had them come here and 

share a two-day seminar where they talked about all their experiences, how 

they learned this thing that they never would have dreamed would have been 

an outcome, and the value of testing, and things like that. It’s very important 

to bring them in, and we’re lucky.

A lot of the public scratches their head about why we’re building something 

that looks a lot like Apollo, and thinking, didn’t we do that? Didn’t we fly one 

of these rockets that looks close to this before, and what’s exciting about that? 

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They don’t see that we’re putting a lot of new technology in it, but we also are 

not reaching so far, like we did with the X-30 and the X-33 programs. We’re 

much more likely to fail with those approaches than we are with this one that’s 

just a small evolution away but also affords you the luxury of having the people 

that learned all those lessons and that are still alive that can come and talk to 

you and say, “This is why we wound up going this way, and these are the other 

two things we tried, and this is why they didn’t work.” That’s one of the real 

values of the current approach that we’re taking, and the real value of being 

able to go talk to these people and really pick their brains at what worked and 

what should raise the hairs on the back of our neck like it did in their day.

What was their reaction to returning to the Moon?

Oh, they were as jazzed as any of our youngest college fresh-out engineers. 

That’s one thing that’s so great about this whole business is people don’t get 

in it for the glory and money. They get into it for the love of exploration and 

discovery and excitement of a brand-new program. So you could just see 

the original excitement they must have had in those early days after John 

Kennedy’s speech just if it was yesterday.

What do you believe to be NASA’s impact on society? 

We constantly get asked that. The public wants to know, “Why should I give 

my tax dollars to NASA? What do I get for it?” You can fold out a big sheet that 

shows all the things that NASA has brought to the public that they’re probably 

not even aware of. The ability to put satellites in orbit: everybody can’t live without a cell phone. That cell phone wouldn’t be working if NASA hadn’t worked 

with the Air Force and gotten the ability to loft payloads into low-Earth orbit. 

Plasma TVs. Technology in computers and technology in power tools. Just a 

wealth of things that we brought into the home that people probably aren’t really 

aware of. But again, I don’t think that’s the main heart of what we do. It’s the fact 

that we go and look at things that are risky and try to do things that are risky 

and try to do things that no one else really sees an immediate bottom line for.

A lot of companies have these research and development budgets, which 

are a small part of their overall operating budget, but that’s their seed money 

as to how they stay ahead of their competitor, how they develop new things 

that are going to be the next Google or the next gadget that’s going to keep 

them one step ahead. Whereas for basic research and development, universities really can’t fill that role with large programs. NASA really has a niche in 

our areas of science, aeronautics, exploration, and space operations; we sustain a whole line of expertise that I don’t think the American people would 

enjoy if it weren’t for NASA being here. It’s a hard one to articulate, but I just 

feel like our $15-billion-a-year budget is really pushing a lot of frontiers in 

these different areas. It’s one of those things that might take a few years, but 

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if you shut NASA down, I think the public would feel a sense of loss. Then, 

they would start to see that suddenly you don’t have all these neat things that 

are being developed in air traffic control or airplanes and fuel efficiencies and 

new material being spit out because you have to solve these problems for the 

harsh environment of space. And, oh, by the way, it makes your car lighter, and 

you’ve got a different container in your kitchen cabinet because of some development that NASA had to solve to be able to provide that to the astronauts or 

to a spacecraft. That’s just kind of a general viewpoint that I’ve had on that.

Why would you encourage anyone to work for NASA?

Because there’s no other place to go to do the types of things we do. For 

me it was the excitement of spaceflight. I always knew in aeronautics that 

NASA was a world leader and in airplanes and hypersonic vehicles. I knew we 

were eventually going to have to retire the Shuttle, and I knew we were going 

to have to come up with some other way to go beyond the Shuttle, and I just 

had been a space buff. It is amazing to me. We never have a problem getting 

people to hire on with NASA, and I’ve had people that have taken tremendous 

pay cuts to come and work for NASA because they love what we do. It’s beyond 

what’s in their checking account. It’s that they want to be part of that. We have a 

tremendous brand with NASA and what we do, and I just think that it’s a great 

place to work, and people get a lot of freedom to take risks and follow some of 

their wilder ideas to see if it pans out. The people are great to work with. That’s 

probably one of the most enjoyable things. Everybody takes pride in what they 

do. You get a real sense that people enjoy coming to work, that they’re excited 

about it. That’s probably as big a part of it to me as anything else.

Is there anything you’d like to add?

I’ve been privileged to work with some great mentors. People that have 

taken me under their wing and helped me get to the point I am today. I’ve 

really tried to learn from the people that I admired, their leadership styles 

and the guy who was sitting in this chair before me, Roy Estess, has been one 

of my greatest mentors and aids in helping advise me throughout my career. 

That’s been one of the biggest things, the quality of the people you work with. 

I think NASA people do it because they really not only feel a sense of pride, 

but there’s kind of a selfless dedication they have that there’s something bigger than themselves that they want to be a part of and contribute to. There’s 

a lot of sacrifice that goes on with people, in terms of the time away from 

their family, the travel that they have to do, the long hours that are sometimes 

required, and all that’s done willingly, because they feel like they’re part of a 

higher, noble achievement.

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Index

A

Abbey, George, 262–63, 269, 297

Abrahamson, James, 191

accident prevention and safety, 61–62

Adams, Pam, 185

Advance Programs, 119

AEDC (Arnold Engineering Development Center), 

301

aeronautics

advancements in, 84, 147–48, 151, 202

Ames Research Center focus, 193–95

Ares launch vehicle design and, 116

budget and funding for, 16, 102, 105, 111–12, 

146–47, 149, 210, 272–73

collaboration between Directorates, 125–26

DOD programs, 147, 272

Langley Research Center focus, 272, 275–76, 

299

Mars entry vehicle research, 16

Mars surface lab heat shield, development of, 

126

NASA research role, 16–17, 26, 55, 69, 82–83, 

102–4, 115–16, 125–26, 145–49, 161, 

195–96, 208, 211–12, 272–73, 279, 290, 

304–5

partnerships and collaborative relationships, 

279

presidential policy on, 103

Shuttle design and, 102–3, 115–16

structures and materials competency, 276–77

technological leadership, 151–53, 211–12

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate

budget and funding for, 146–47, 149

core principles, 148–49

goals and mission of, 145–49

partnerships with agencies, industries, and 

universities, 147, 149

Air Force, U.S.

Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, 191

Space and Missile Systems Center, 190

Star Fleet, 50th Space Wing, 192

Airbus, 152

airplane manufacturing, 152

Aldridge Commission, 181, 184

Aldrin, Buzz, 48, 183–84

Altair, vii

American Association for the Advancement of 

Science, 142

Ames Research Center

aeronautics research programs at, 272

commercial/private sector, working with, 194

commercial space business partnerships, 

28–29

history of, 193–94

Lunar Science Institute, 135, 195

research focus at, 193–95

Return to Flight activity, 266

Worden role, 193–99

Ansari, Anousheh, 49

Apollo program

Apollo 11 anniversary, 183

Apollo 12 and lightning strike, 70, 307

Apollo 13 mission, 34

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 52, 97, 248

astronauts and spouses, White House invitation 

for, 183–84

budget, resources, and funding for, 7, 16, 18, 

96–97

Bush meetings with astronauts, 183

communication satellites, 81

design of vehicles for Moon missions and, 

10–12

Earthrise photograph, 111

end of, 6–7, 8

311
NASA at 50

fire incident, 61, 62, 70

impact of on society, 124

interest in space and, 49, 150, 303

legacy of NASA, 46

management of, 4

space science research, 137

Ares launch vehicles

aeronautics and design of, 116

Ares I vehicle, vii, 11, 12, 120, 123, 300

Ares V vehicle, 12, 123, 299, 300

Constellation Program element, vii

design of, 10–12

gap between programs, 33

Argentina, 85

arms control policy, 190–91

Armstrong, Neil, 7, 48, 183–84

Army Redstone Arsenal, 285

Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC), 

301

Associate Administrators

organizational structure of NASA, 4, 26–27

skills and competence of, 5–6

astrobiology, 135–36

Astrobiology Institute, 135, 195

astronauts

Coats role as, 247–251

communication system, 220

diversity of backgrounds, 256–57

meetings with and calls from presidents, 182, 

183–86, 250–51

White House invitation, 250–51

astronomy

classification systems in, 141

planets, definition of, 141–43

space-based astronomy, 222–23

ATK Thiokol, 120

Atlas V vehicles, 11–12

Atlas vehicle failure and lightning strike, 70, 71

Augustine, Norm, 15, 90

Augustine Commission on the Future of the U.S. 

Space Program, 90, 91

Australia, 157

automation and computing power, 207–8

automobile industry, 152

B

Bartlett, Roscoe, 227

Bezos, Jeff, 49, 197

Blue Origin, 197

Boeing, 152

Bowersox, Ken, 182

Boyd, Jack, 193

Branson, Richard, 49

Brazil

agreements and cooperation with, 159–160

airplane manufacturing, 152

human spaceflight program, value of, 49

satellite programs with, 85

Bridges, Roy, 296

Brownback, Sam, 193

Budarin, Nikolai, 182

budget

aeronautics programs, 16, 102, 105, 111–12, 

146–47, 149, 210, 272–73

Apollo program, 7, 16, 18, 96–97

cost control challenges, 2, 137, 138, 265

credibility of NASA and, 2, 121–22

discretionary budget and NASA funding, 17–18, 

30, 179

Dryden Flight Research Center, 203

exploration and discovery programs, 42, 53, 

105

financial management, 27, 34, 54

for Centers, 105

Glenn Research Center, 210

Goddard Space Flight Center, 226

Hubble Space Telescope, 226

human spaceflight programs, 13, 16, 96–97

increase in, 13

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 238–39

Kennedy Space Center, 96–97

Langley Research Center, 276

low-Earth-orbit funding, 6

NASA budget, 146

312
Index

PA&E function and, 90–91

planning and, 54

priority of programs and funding for, 16–17, 54, 

96–99

process for, changes in, 10

Safety and Mission Assurance office, 66

science programs and Science Mission 

Directorate, 9, 13, 16, 42, 96, 98, 132, 134, 

136, 137, 210, 218

scrutiny of, 2

Space Shuttle Program, 8, 43, 96, 97

Space Station Program, 7, 54, 96

spaceflight program funding, 7–8, 54, 111

Vision for Space Exploration funding, 22, 42, 98, 

105, 110

Bush, Barbara, 249–250

Bush, Laura, 184

Bush administration and George H. W. Bush

astronauts and families, meetings with and 

calls from, 249–251

Millie, dog biscuit for, 250–51

space initiatives, 89–90, 191, 264–65

Bush administration and George W. Bush

as NASA fan, 182–83

astronauts and families, meetings with and 

calls from, 182, 183–86

exploration, desire for, 55

NASA transition team, 91

Vision for Space Exploration, vii, 1, 26, 40, 150, 

156, 180–81, 182–83, 193, 222

C

California Institute of Technology (Caltech), 233, 

236–37

Camille, Hurricane, 48

Canada

agreements and cooperation with, 254

airplane manufacturing, 152

complexity of missions and teamwork, 85

robotic systems for Space Station, 115

Cape Canaveral, 43, 307

Cardin, Benjamin, 227

Carter administration and Jimmy Carter, 99–100

Cassini spacecraft and program, 111, 134, 234, 245

cell phones, 224–25, 230

Center Directors

authority of, 64–65

organizational structure of NASA, 4–5, 34–35, 

44–45

role and responsibilities of, 236, 242

skills and competence of, 5–6, 236, 241–42

women as, 277–78

Center Operations Directorate, 283

Centers

authority, oversight, and independence of, 

64–65, 76–79, 219–220, 223–24

budget, resources, and funding for, 105

complexity of missions and teamwork, 84–85

contractors, relationship with, 236–37

cooperation, partnerships, and rivalries 

between, 35, 78, 213, 253–55, 277–79, 

287, 302–3

cultures at, 44, 55–56, 96, 214, 254–55, 

266–67, 280, 288, 302–3

focus of programs at, 105, 268–69

Headquarters, relationship with, 52, 219–220, 

254–55

IT systems, 35

Lead Center concept, 40

management positions, decision-making by, 

95–96

on-site work at, 52

organizational structure of NASA, 34–35, 40, 

127–28, 199, 223–24

role of, 75

safety and mission assurance offices, 61–64, 

78–79

support for programs, 53

workforce capabilities and competence, 228–

29, 237, 278–79

workforce size, 220, 228

Cernan, Gene, 183

313
NASA at 50

Challenger (STS-51L) accident

accident investigation panel, 59, 63

Congressional Space Medal of Honor for crew, 

185–86

delays in program following, 249

impact on workforce and families, 112, 249

management decision-making and loss of 

Shuttle, 2

oversight of systems and processes and 

accident, 60

safety and mission assurance deficiencies, 63

workplace culture and, 161

Chandra X-ray Observatory, 217, 223

Cheney, Dick, 184, 185

Cheney, Lynne, 185

Chiao, Leroy, 184

China

agreements and cooperation with, 157–58, 

159–160, 162

Anti-Satellite test, 157–58

engineering graduation rates, 258

human spaceflight capabilities, 32, 46, 49, 101, 

157, 258

space and aeronautics research, 152

class-A mishaps, 66

class-B mishaps, 66

Clementine mission, 191–92, 194

climate change/global warming, 18–19, 136, 142, 

221, 239

Climate Orbiter mission, 219

Clinton administration and Bill Clinton, 21, 100, 192

Coats, Diane, 247, 249–251, 252

Coats, Michael L.

background and career of, 247–252

changes at NASA, 254–55

Griffin, relationship with, 252

interview with, 246–259

Johnson Space Center role, 247, 252–59

NASA career, value of, 259

White House invitation, 249–251

Cobb, Robert W.

background and career of, 165

interview with, 164–173

lessons learned, 171–72

NASA career, value of, 172–73

NASA impact on society, 170–71

role and responsibilities of, 165–170, 173

workplace culture, 172

Code Q, 63. See also Safety and Mission Assurance, 

Office of

Cold War, 99, 100, 210–11, 258

Collins, Eileen, 185

Collins, Mike, 183–84

Columbia, inaugural flight of, 100, 107

Columbia (STS-107) accident

audit and investigation process following, 166–68

Congressional Space Medal of Honor for crew, 

185–86

impact on workforce, 112

lessons learned, 175–76

management decision-making and loss of 

Shuttle, 2

oversight of systems and processes and 

accident, 60

recommendations following, 156

recovery operations, 283

vehicle concepts following, 119–120

workplace culture and, 44, 161, 280

Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)

Cobb as observer to, 167

findings of, 4, 156, 176, 181, 266, 295

spaceflight program goals, 21, 100–101, 156

workplace culture findings, 44, 161

Commerce, Department of, 30, 89–90, 104, 147

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) 

agreements, 22, 28, 104

commercial/private-sector space business

coordination with and establishment of 

standards, 78

emergence and growth of, 49, 89–90, 197

encouragement of and support for, 22–23, 41, 

194

human spaceflight programs, 49

international partners, collaboration with, 254

314
Index

low-Earth-orbit capabilities, 123

Moon exploration and commercial service 

opportunities, 123

partnership opportunities, 22, 28–29, 104–5, 

147, 149, 203–4, 279

policy issues, 104

public interest in, 49

role of, 22–23, 28–29

tourism, space, 101

viability of, 6

communication

breakdowns in, 126

clear and open, 85, 213

engagement with American public, 32

importance of, 126, 128

questions, asking dumb, 225

safety, workplace culture, and, 44, 161–62, 

214, 255–57, 280, 287

communication satellites, 81, 86, 220

competitive spirit, 304

complacency, 171, 256, 257

computing power and automation, 207–8

Congress, U.S.

House Science and Technology Committee, 100

House Science Committee, 37

House Subcommittee on Space and 

Aeronautics, 25

Inspector General, relationship with, 166, 

169–170

oversight of programs by, 2, 298

peaceful purposes of NASA programs, 19

priorities of, 9–10

Public Works and Transportation Committee, 37

support for NASA and programs, 21, 31–32, 

36–37, 100, 109

understanding of operations and workforce, 109

Vision for Space Exploration Authorization Act, 

21–22, 33, 193, 252

Congressional Space Medal of Honor, 185–86

Constellation Program

aeronautics research and, 82–83

collaboration between Centers, 35

flight research and testing, 111, 202

gap between programs, 33, 210, 268–69

goals and mission of, vii

hardware development, 111

workforce transition to, 268, 271–72

See also Ares launch vehicles; Orion (Crew 

Exploration Vehicle, CEV)

contractors

capabilities, skills, and competence of, 306

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229

organizational structure of NASA and, 265

relationship between Centers and, 236–37

role of, 52, 284

safety complaints and substandard parts, 

168–69

testing certifications, 168–69

Cook, James, 8–9

Copernicus (Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3, 

OAO-3), 222

Core Values, 72, 255

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). See Orion (Crew 

Exploration Vehicle, CEV)

Crippen, Robert “Bob,” 186, 249

Critical Technologies Institute, 91

culture/workplace culture

adjustment of to new challenges, 243

bureaucracy, 36, 94–96, 234–35, 243

can-do spirit, 33–34, 61, 280

Centers, cultures at, 44, 55–56, 96, 214, 

254–55, 266–67, 280, 288, 302–3

collaboration, importance of, 94–95

conflicting passions and battle for resources, 

172

Core Values, 72, 255

dedication and commitment of workforce, 

35–36, 52, 72, 109, 112, 113, 151, 172, 

178, 198, 214–15, 295, 309

inspiration and environment of success, 236, 

241–43

integrity, 72, 85, 243, 244, 255

315
NASA at 50

leadership and management role in, 40–41, 

44–46, 94–96, 121, 127–28, 161–62

merchants and guardians, 94–96

morale, 40, 41, 248

personal impact, 214

respect for knowledge and capabilities, 214

safety, communication, and, 44, 161–62, 214, 

255–57, 280, 287

survey of, 72, 161

teams and teamwork culture, 84–85, 114–15, 

214, 255

vision and culture, choice between, 97–99

Curbeam, Robert, 185

D

Dale, Shana L.

background and career of, 25, 31–32, 35–36, 37

challenges facing NASA, 36–37

commercial space business role, 28–29

Deputy Administrator position, 25–27, 51–52

financial management role, 27, 34, 54

interest in space, basis for, 37

interview with, 24–37

leadership and management style of, 3, 26–27, 

300

NASA impact on society, 29–30, 33–34

dark energy and dark matter, 15

DCX Delta Clipper mission, 191

Deep Space 1 spacecraft, 208

Defense, Department of (DOD)

aeronautic interests, 147, 272

coordination with and establishment of 

standards, 78

joint programs, 297

JPL, relationship with, 239–240

minister of information, Worden as, 192

mission assurance concept, 63

PA&E function, 90–91

SPIF spacecraft processing, 262

Delta IV vehicles, 11–12

Dextre (Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator), 

81, 115

Diaz, Al, 219

Dick, Steve, 72

direct broadcast audio systems, 90

Discovery, 283

Discovery Program, 286

Dittemore, Ron, 263, 294

Dryden, Hugh, 3

Dryden Flight Research Center

aeronautics research programs at, 272

budget and funding for, 203

Petersen role, 201–5

private space ventures, relationship with, 

203–4

research focus at, 201–2, 204–5

Return to Flight activity, 266

size of, 204–5

dwarf planet, 141

E

Earth science, 26, 84, 135, 136, 159–160, 220, 

221, 223, 300

Earth Science Decadal Survey, 136, 138

Earthrise photograph, 111

ecological awareness, 139. See also global 

warming/climate change

EELVs (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles), 

11–12

Elachi, Charles

background and career of, 233–34

best leader, recognition as, 241–42

call to by Bush, 182

changes at NASA, 234–35, 237

interview with, 232–245

Jet Propulsion Laboratory role, 233–244

NASA career, value of, 243–44

Elizabeth II, Queen, 227–28

Endeavour, 283

Energy, Department of, 30, 78

engine development and testing

Glenn Research Center/Lewis Research Center, 

208, 301

J-2X engines, 12, 111, 122, 299

316
Index

Marshall Space Flight Center, 284–85, 301

RS-68 Delta IV engine, 12, 299

Stennis Space Center, 111, 294, 299–300, 

301–2, 307

von Braun role in, 284–85, 302

engineering graduation rates, 258

ESAS (Exploration Systems Architecture Study), 120

Estess, Roy, 263, 269, 270, 296, 297, 309

Europe

aeronautics research programs, 102, 146

agreements and cooperation with, 162, 254

cargo capabilities, 28

Space Station role, 85

European Geophysical Union, 142

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), 

11–12

Exploration, Office of, 91

exploration and discovery

budget and funding for, 42, 53, 105

can-do spirit, 33–34, 61, 280

discretionary nature of, 99

goals for, 41

human spaceflight and, 69, 136–37, 171, 

229–230, 237–38, 289–290, 305

importance of, 29–30, 48–49, 68, 99–102, 

303

interest in and support for programs, 31–32, 

42, 49, 52–53, 99–100, 178–79, 204, 244, 

258–59, 281

mission success and future missions, 225–26

mission successes and failures, 235–36, 256, 

287

NASA as premier agency for, 48, 104, 211

public exploration spirit and NASA, 29–30, 34, 

54–55, 85, 158, 170–71, 181, 199, 224–25, 

230–31, 240–41, 277, 304

robotic systems for, 69, 80–82, 114–15, 124, 

136–37, 171, 212–13, 229–230, 237–38, 

289–290, 305

science and exploration, integration of, 289

solving problems on Earth first, 30, 48–49

technological developments from, 34, 47, 

81–82, 158

transition from Shuttle to, 117

Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), 120

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

collaboration between Directorates, 125–26

development plan for programs, 122

Gilbrech role at, 293

Horowitz role, 119, 120, 121–22

Mars surface lab heat shield, development of, 

126

organizational structure of NASA, 127–28

program planning and success, role in, 121–22

External Relations

desk officers, 163

international partners and agreements, 156–58, 

159–160

O’Brien role, 155, 156–57

Vision for Space Exploration and, 156–57

extraterrestrial life, search for, 135–36

F

FAA (Federal Aviation Administration), 103, 126, 

147, 272, 290

failure mode and effects analysis, 67 

Failure Review Board, 287

failures and lessons learned, 69–72, 243, 256, 

287, 306–7

faster, better, cheaper concept, 191, 194, 235–36, 

265, 297

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 103, 126, 

147, 272, 290

Feith, Doug, 192

Figueroa, Orlando, 183, 219

Fincke, Michael, 184

Fisk, Len, 5

Fletcher, James, 190

Flight Readiness Reviews, 255–56, 280, 295

Foale, Mike, 184

France, 157, 244

Fuqua, Don, 100

317
NASA at 50

G

Gagarin, Yuri, 80

Gehman, Harold W., Jr., 21

Gemini program, 49, 183

Germany, 85, 157

Gerstenmaier, William H.

aeronautics research programs, 115–16

background and career of, 107–8

balance in life, 113–14

challenges, rising to, 109, 114

changes at NASA, 112–13

interview with, 106–17

leadership commitment to safety, 114

lessons learned, 113–14

NASA career, value of, 116–17

NASA impact on society, 111–12

robotic systems and exploration, 114–15

Russians, relationship with, 108

Space Operations role, 108–9

Vision for Space Exploration role, 110–11

Geveden, Rex D.

background and career of, 39

challenges facing NASA, 41–42

interview with, 38–49

leadership and management style of, 3, 300

NASA career, value of, 47–48

organizational structure of NASA, 39–40, 

44–46

Parsons role at NASA, 263, 264

workforce transition with end of Shuttle 

Program, 268

workplace culture, 40–41, 44–46

Gilbrech, Richard J. “Rick”

background and career of, 293–97

changes at NASA, 297–98

interest in space, basis for, 293

interview with, 292–309

Johnson Space Center role, 294–95

Langley Research Center role, 264, 295–96

lessons learned, 305–7

NASA career, value of, 309

Roe, Lesa B., relationship with, 296

Stennis Space Center role, 264, 293, 294, 

296–309

Gingrich, Newt, 192

Glenn, John, 80

Glenn Research Center/Lewis Research Center

aeronautics research programs at, 55, 272

budget and funding for, 210

challenges facing, 209

de-icing research, 55

facilities and infrastructure at, 209, 210

Gerstenmaier role, 116

NASA Safety Center, 66, 67

organizational structure of, 208–10

Plum Brook Station, 210, 301

research focus at, 208–10

Return to Flight activity, 266

Scales role at, 51

Shin role at, 145

Whitlow role at, 207–14

workplace culture, 55–56, 214

Glennan, Keith, 40

Global Positioning System (GPS), 47, 91, 92

Global Precipitation Mission, 226

global warming/climate change, 18–19, 136, 142, 

221, 239

Goddard Space Flight Center

astronaut communication system, 220

budget and funding for, 226

facilities and infrastructure at, 226–27

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229

Queen of England visit to, 227–28

research focus at, 220–22, 237, 286

Scolese role at, 78

Vision for Space Exploration role, 221–22

Weiler role at, 217, 219–224, 226–29

workforce capabilities and competence, 228–

29, 237, 306

workforce size, 228

Goldin, Dan

administrative role of, 40, 218, 219, 235, 265

faster, better, cheaper concept, 191, 235–36, 

265, 297

318
Index

leadership and management style of, 205, 297

organizational structure of NASA, 265

Goldwater, Barry, 190

Google Lunar X PRIZE, 194

government agencies

aeronautic interests, 147

dedication and commitment of workforce, 35–36

partnerships with Centers, 147, 149, 279, 300

pride of working for different agencies, 163

GPS (Global Positioning System), 47, 91, 92

Gravity Probe B mission, 39, 286

The Great Escape (TGE) mission, 131

Griffin, Michael D. “Mike”

administrative role of, 1–2, 263, 264

background and career of, 1

budgets and budget process, 7–8, 10, 16–18

challenges facing NASA, 2

Coats, relationship with, 252

commercial space business role, 22–23, 28

decisions made by and impact on NASA, 4–6

ESAS and vehicle concepts, 120

exploration, importance of, 100

interest in space, basis for, 1, 37

interview with, 1–23

Jezierski, relationship with, 175, 182

leadership and management style of, 2–4, 

26–27, 34–35, 176–77, 205, 254–55, 

266–67, 273, 298, 300

lectures by, 32

mission success and future missions, 226

NASA impact on society, 20–21

NASA programs, opinion about, 13

national security and NASA role in, 19–20

“The Next 50 Years in Space,” 7

Office of Exploration role, 91

opinions about, 26, 40, 150, 176–77, 182, 298

organizational structure of NASA, 4–5, 26–27, 

34–35, 39–40, 44–46, 121, 219–220, 

266–67, 278–79, 284

policy decisions and NASA capabilities, 6–9

public interest in NASA programs, 303–4

Space Shuttle Program, opinion about, 6–7

technical credibility of NASA, 5, 77–78

Worden, relationship with, 191, 193

workforce capabilities and competence, 228

workforce transition with end of Shuttle 

Program, 268

workplace culture, 121

Grissom, Gus, 80

Grunsfeld, John, 119

guardians and merchants, 94–96

H

Headquarters, NASA

Centers, relationship with, 52, 219–220, 

254–55

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229

organizational structure of NASA, 4–5, 39–40, 

92–94, 219–220, 223–24

workforce size, 220

workforce transition with end of Shuttle 

Program, 268

workplace culture, 56, 96

health and health environment, 62

Hepburn, Audrey, 251

Higginbotham, Joan, 185

homeland security, 52

Honeycutt, Jay, 265, 269

Hope, Bob, 251

Horowitz, Scott J. “Doc”

background and career of, 119–120, 121–22

challenges facing NASA, 129

changes at NASA, 120–21

credibility of NASA, 129

interview with, 118–129

lessons learned, 126–27

motivation and doing great things, 124

NASA career, value of, 128–29

NASA impact on society, 124

organizational structure of NASA, 127–28

vehicle concepts following Columbia accident, 

119–120

vision for NASA, 123–24

workplace culture, 121, 127–28

319
NASA at 50

Hoyer, Steny, 227

Hubbard, Scott, 219

Hubble Space Telescope

budget and funding for, 226

development of, 217

exploration and discovery with, 15, 76, 223, 

229

flaw in and fix for, 90, 218, 226, 229

success of, 221

support for program and public interest in, 80, 

100, 211, 217–18, 257

technological developments, 34

Weiler role in, 217–18

human spaceflight

budget and funding for, 13, 16, 96–97

commercial programs, 49

exploration and discovery and, 69, 136–37, 

171, 237–38, 289–290, 305

flight safety and development of systems and 

equipment for, 60–61

gap between programs, 33, 160, 210, 

268–69

goals and objectives of new programs, 43–44

goals for, 41

importance of, 80–82, 270

interest in, 49

international programs, 32, 46, 49, 101, 157

justification for and value of, 15

Mars exploration, 229–230

reliability-based approach to, 44

risky missions and use of robotic systems, 

14–15, 69, 80–82, 125, 212–13

robotic and human alliance, 15, 69, 80–82, 

83, 114–15, 125, 196–97, 229–230, 

237–38, 280, 289–290, 305

self-sufficiency and self-sustainability for 

missions, 252–53

technological developments from, 47, 81–82

value of programs, 46–47, 49

world power status and, 32, 210–11, 258

hypersonics, 126, 196

I

IAU (International Astronomical Union), 141–42

Independent Technical Authority, 266

India

agreements and cooperation with, 157, 

159–160, 162

engineering graduation rates, 258

human spaceflight capabilities, 32, 46, 49, 101

industrial safety, 61–62, 68, 114

information technology (IT), 34, 35

Inspector General (IG)

audit and mishap investigation process, 

166–170

Cobb as, 165

Congress, relationship with, 166, 169–170

major program fraud focus, 166

role and responsibilities of, 165–170, 173

Safety and Mission Assurance office, 

relationship with, 168

Inspector General (IG) Act, 165, 166

inspiration and national pride, 20–21, 33–34, 55, 

101, 111, 124, 138, 150, 162–63, 204, 210–11, 

257, 261–62, 270–71, 277, 288–89

integrity, 72, 85, 243, 244, 255

International Astronomical Union (IAU), 141–42

international partners

agreements and international cooperation, 

156–58, 159–160, 254

cargo capabilities, 28

collaboration with, 29, 244–45, 254

commercial space business and, 28, 29

future programs and cooperation with, 160

positive feelings about NASA, 198, 199, 

244–45

satellite programs, 85

Space Station Program, 84, 85, 100, 102, 115, 

197, 244, 297–98

Vision for Space Exploration and, 162

International Space Station (ISS). See Space Station 

Program and International Space Station (ISS)

International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 134

320
Index

International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE), 222

Iran, 46, 49

Italy, 157, 244

ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulation), 134

IUE (International Ultraviolet Explorer), 222

Ivins, Marsha, 119

J

J-2X engines, 12, 111, 122, 299

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 218, 221, 

223, 226

Japan, 28, 85, 245, 254

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)

budget and funding for, 238–39

Bush call to, 182

Caltech, relationship with, 236–37

DOD, relationship with, 239–240

Elachi role at, 233–244

inspiration and environment of success for 

workforce, 236, 241–43

Mars team, motivation of, 114–15

Pace role at, 89, 97

research focus at, 237–38, 286

technological developments, 238–39

Vision for Space Exploration role, 237–38

workforce capabilities and competence, 

228–29

Jezierski, J. T.

background and career of, 175

challenges facing, 180

interest in space, basis for, 186

interview with, 174–187

leadership and management styles of 

administrators, 176–77

NASA career, value of, 181

White House Liaison role, 175, 178, 179–180, 

181–87

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory, 1, 228

Johnson, Sandra, vii

Johnson Space Center (JSC)

as premier space center, 252, 253–54

astronaut communication system, 220

Bush calls to astronauts, role in, 184

Coats role at, 247, 252–59

focus of programs at, 105, 269

Gerstenmaier role at, 107–8

Gilbrech role at, 294–95

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229

international partners, collaboration with, 254

Mission Control Center, 252

Parsons role at, 262–63

Roe role at, 275

Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance office, 

62

workplace culture, 44, 255, 295

Jupiter, 83, 86, 212

K

Katrina, Hurricane, 48, 263–64, 266, 296

Kennedy, James W. “Jim,” 213, 264

Kennedy administration and John F. Kennedy, 90, 

99

Kennedy Space Center (KSC)

budget, resources, and funding for, 96–97

capabilities of and missions from, 48

challenges facing, 268–69

Constellation Program activities, 111

focus of programs at, 268–69

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229

King role at, 283

launch rules, 307

Parsons role at, 261, 264–273, 296

robotic spacecraft and systems, 271–72

strategic vision for, 267–68

Vision for Space Exploration role, 271–72

Whitlow role at, 207, 213

workforce at, 268, 271–72

workplace culture, 266–67

King, David A.

background and career of, 283–84

failures and lessons learned, 287

interview with, 282–291

Kennedy Space Center role, 283

321
NASA at 50

Marshall Space Flight Center role, 283, 284–291

NASA career, value of, 290

Kraft, Chris, 248, 269

Kranz, Gene, 171

Kuiper Belt, 131, 140

Kurzweil, Ray, 196

L

L5 Society, 101

Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Title 2 (1992), 

89–90

Langley Research Center

aeronautics research programs at, 272, 

275–76, 299

Ames Research Center founding and, 193

budget and funding for, 276

economic impact of, 277

educational opportunities for students, 281

Gilbrech role at, 264, 295–96

history of, 275–76

partnerships with agencies, industries, and 

universities, 279

research focus at, 279–280

Return to Flight activity, 266

Roe role at, 275–281, 296

structures and materials competency, 276–77

Whitlow role at, 207, 208, 213

workforce diversity at, 208

workplace culture, 280

launch architecture. See spaceflight/launch 

architecture

Launch Support Program, 268

LCROSS (Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing 

Satellite), 194

leadership and management

competence and skills of, 5–6, 26, 31–32, 127, 

236, 241–42

decision-making by, 9–10, 95–96

governance and management issues, 94–96, 

127, 172, 198–99

workplace culture, role in, 40–41, 44–46, 

94–96, 121, 127–28, 161–62

lecture series, 32

lessons learned

balance in life, 113–14

challenges, rising to, 114, 305–6

collaboration, 94–95

Columbia accident and, 175–76

communication and questions, 85, 126

communication, workplace culture, and safety, 

255–57, 280, 287

complacency, avoidance of, 171, 256, 257

experience of workforce, 202–3

failures and, 69–72, 243, 256, 287, 306–7

future programs and international cooperation, 

160

governance and management issues, 94–96, 

127, 172, 198–99

integrity, 85

mission success and future missions, 225–26

never learning lessons, 306–7

overpromising, trap of, 306

questions, asking dumb, 225

routine operations, 203

technology and hardware, trust in, 84

value of every individual, 113

with Space Station, 110

workforce capabilities and competence, 306

Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS), 70

Lewis Research Center. See Glenn Research 

Center/Lewis Research Center

lightning strikes, 70–71, 307

LLIS (Lessons Learned Information System), 70

Lockheed Martin, 252, 256

Low, George, 4, 5

low-Earth orbit

budget, resources, and funding for, 6

commercial capabilities, 123

future beyond, 6, 83, 100–101, 110, 117, 160

heavy-lift vehicles for, 123, 285

missions and operations, 83, 159

simplest way to get to, 6

Lu, Ed, 184

Lucid, Shannon, 108

322
Index

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) program, 194, 

222

Lunar Science Institute, 135, 195

M

Magellan mission, 233, 234

Mahone, Glen, 182–83

management. See leadership and management

Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, Air Force, 

191

Marine Corps, U.S.

O’Connor service in, 59, 60, 69

Parsons service in, 261, 262, 270

Mark, Hans, 5

Mars

aeronautical research for entry vehicles, 16

aeronautics and landing systems for missions, 

103

challenges of missions to, 110

craters on, 219

extraterrestrial life on, 136

The Great Escape mission, 131

heat shield for Mars surface lab, 126

human spaceflight and exploration, 229–230

JPL team, 114–15

length of missions to, 124

mission events, excitement of working with, 

56–57

missions and exploration of, vii, 34, 41, 83, 

123–24, 212

policy decisions and capability to fly to, 7–8

public interest in NASA programs, 80

robotic systems and exploration, 48, 69, 80, 81, 

82, 212, 229–230, 271, 280

settlement of, 196

solving problems on Earth first and missions 

to, 49

Soviet-U.S. joint mission, 101–2

support for programs, 100

timeframe for human missions to, 123, 124

von Braun support for program, 7

Mars Climate Orbiter mission, 219

Mars Odyssey mission, 217, 219

Mars Polar Lander mission, 219

Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission, 219

Mars Rover missions, 100, 103, 182, 183, 217, 

219, 227, 257, 303

Mars Rover model, 183

Mars Science Laboratory, 280

Mars Science Lander, 226

Mars Viking program, 16, 89, 103, 276

Marshall Space Flight Center

focus of programs at, 269, 284–86

Geveden role at, 39

Hubble Space Telescope project, 229, 285

Hurricane Katrina and recovery operations, 263

King role at, 283, 284–291

Scales role at, 51

science and exploration, integration of, 289

Space Station Program role, 286

workplace culture, 55–56, 288, 302–3

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 262

McNamara, Robert, 90

merchants and guardians, 94–96

Mercury (planet), 83, 212

Mercury program

astronauts and spouses, White House invitation 

for, 183

interest in space and, 49

Marshall Space Flight Center role, 285

Meteorology and Oceanic Command, U.S. Navy, 

300

Michoud Assembly Facility, 263–64

Mikulski, Barbara, 227

military satellites, 192

military space business, 6, 19

Millie, dog biscuit for, 250–51

Mir space station

Gerstenmaier role with program, 108

Shuttle-Mir Program, 59

U.S. astronauts on, 108

mishap investigation process, 66–68, 166–170

missile defense policy, 190–91

Missile Defense Program, 190–92

323
NASA at 50

Mission Directorates

authority, oversight, and independence of, 91

collaboration between Directorates, 125–26

complexity of missions and teamwork, 84–85

External Relations support for, 155

organizational structure of NASA, 34–35, 

44–45, 127–28

role of, 75

safety and mission assurance audits and 

assessments, 63–64

women as Mission Directors, 278

Mission Management Teams, 255–56

Mission to Planet Earth, 91

Moffett Field, 192

monument building, 304

Moon

Apollo missions to, 7

base/outpost on, 7, 34, 124, 156, 160, 304

Clementine mission, 191–92, 194

commercial opportunities, 123

communication satellites and missions to, 81, 

222

impact of decision to go to, 99

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) program, 

194, 222

mapping of, 222

Prospector missions, 194

return of humans to, vii, 41, 123, 252, 308

robotic systems and exploration, 80, 81, 

114–15, 271, 305

science research, 135

self-sufficiency and self-sustainability for, 

252–53

solving problems on Earth first and missions 

to, 48–49

spaceflight/launch architecture for missions to, 

10–12, 122

Morrell, Paul, 27

Morton Thiokol, 67

Mueller, George, 4, 5

Musk, Elon, 49

N

NACA (National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics)

NASA formation and, 102, 145

research role of, 16, 102, 145, 148, 279

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration)

50th anniversary conference, vii

50th anniversary of, vii

as premier exploration agency, 48, 104

careers at, value of, 47–48, 56–57, 72–73, 

86–87, 104–5, 116–17, 128–29, 139, 151, 

162–63, 172–73, 181, 199, 205, 214–15, 

230–31, 243–44, 259, 273, 281, 290, 309

challenges facing, 2, 36, 41–42, 129, 138

changes at over time, 52, 60–61, 83–84, 

96–99, 112–13, 120–21, 150–51, 156, 

197–98, 207–8, 222–24, 234–35, 237, 

254–55, 264–67, 279–280, 297–98

creation of, 102, 145, 156

credibility of, 2, 5, 77–78, 121, 129, 265–66, 

298

future of, 85–86, 100–101, 139, 162, 197–98, 

211–12, 244, 303–4

Griffin decisions, impact of, 4–6

history and policy decisions, 8–9

legacy of, 46–47

NACA and formation of NASA, 102, 145

organizational structure of, 4–5, 26–27, 34–35, 

39–40, 44–45, 92–94, 121, 127–28, 176, 

198, 219–220, 223–24, 265–67, 278–79, 284

oversight of programs, 2, 13, 76–79, 165–66

policy decisions and capabilities of, 6–9

positive feelings about and NASA as America’s 

brand, 198, 199, 244–45, 257, 270–71

public support for, 31, 32, 36–37, 99–101, 

138, 303–4

purpose of, 15

risky portfolio, 42

support for programs, 7–8, 9–10, 21–22, 

41–42, 109

324
Index

technical credibility of, 5, 77–78, 129, 265–66

technological leadership from, 151–53, 179, 

204, 248–49, 303, 304

vision and culture, choice between, 97–99

NASA Advisory Council, 13

NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), 79, 

276–77, 280, 295–96

NASA Policy Directives (NPDs), 63

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs), 63

NASA Safety Center, 66, 67

NASA’s First 50 Years, vii

National Academy of Sciences, 13

National Aeronautics and Space Act (1958), 31, 

156

National Aero-Space Plane, 98

National Institutes of Health, 239

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), 76, 78, 81, 159, 220–21, 300

national pride and inspiration, 20–21, 33–34, 55, 

101, 111, 124, 138, 150, 162–63, 204, 210–11, 

257, 261–62, 270–71, 277, 288–89

National Science and Technology Council, 25

National Science Foundation, 30, 239

national security, 19–20, 52, 197

National Solar Observatory, 190

National Space Council, 90, 191, 197

National Space Policy, 91

National Space Society, 101

Navy, U.S.

Coats service in, 247

Meteorology and Oceanic Command, 300

Naval Air Systems Command, 59, 60, 62, 

65–66

Naval Research Lab, 228

Naval Test Pilot School, 247

O’Brien service in, 155

Scolese service in, 86

NESC (NASA Engineering and Safety Center), 79

New Frontiers Program, 131, 286

New Horizons mission, 131, 139–141, 143

“The Next 50 Years in Space” (Griffin), 7

Next Generation Air Transportation System 

(NextGen), 149

Nixon administration and Richard M. Nixon, 7, 8

NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration), 76, 78, 81, 159, 220–21, 300

Node, 262

NSCAT (NASA scatterometer), 245

O

OAO-3 (Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3, 

Copernicus), 222

O’Brien, Michael F.

background and career of, 155

changes at NASA, 156

External Relations role, 155, 156–57

interview with, 154–163

NASA career, value of, 162–63

NASA impact on society, 158

workplace culture, 161–62

occupational safety, 61–62, 68, 114

Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA), 68

O’Connor, Bryan D.

aeronautics research programs, 69

background and career of, 59–60

changes at NASA, 60–61

Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance role, 59, 

61–66

exploration, importance of, 68

failures and lessons learned, 69–72

interview with, 58–73

mishap investigation process, 66–68, 168

NASA career, value of, 72–73

NASA impact on society, 67–68

Scolese, cooperation with, 79

workplace culture, 72

Odyssey mission, 217, 219

O’Keefe, Sean

administrative role of, 219, 263, 265–66

Congressional Space Medal of Honor, role in, 185

credibility of NASA and, 265, 298

325
NASA at 50

Jezierski, relationship with, 175, 182

leadership and management style of, 176–77, 

205, 266, 298

opinions about, 176–77, 182, 298

organizational structure of NASA, 92

Olsen, Greg, 49

“On the Shoulders of Giants” effort, 307

Opportunity, 14, 69, 85, 303

oral history recordings and transcripts, vii

Orbital Space Plane, 119

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3 (OAO-3, 

Copernicus), 222

Origins Program, 218

Orion (Crew Exploration Vehicle, CEV)

aeronautics research and, 82–83

Constellation Program element, vii

design and development of, 10–12, 41, 123

facility for at KSC, 271

gap between programs, 33, 210

OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration), 68

P

Pace, Scott N.

aeronautics research programs, 102–4

background and career of, 89–92

changes at NASA, 96–99

interview with, 88–105

JPL role, 89, 97

lessons learned, 94–96

NASA career, value of, 104–5

NASA impact on society, 99–102

opinions about, 182

PA&E function, 89, 90–91, 92–94

Pan American Airlines, 262

Parsons, William W.

background and career of, 261–64, 270

changes at NASA, 264–67

Hurricane Katrina and recovery operations, 

263–64, 266

interview with, 260–273

Johnson Space Center role, 262–63

Kennedy Space Center role, 261, 264–273, 

296

lessons learned and influences on, 269–270

NASA career, value of, 273

Space Shuttle Program Manager, 261, 266, 

269

Stennis Space Center role, 261, 262, 263, 296

Petersen, Kevin L.

background and career of, 201

Dryden Flight Research Center role, 201–5

interview with, 200–205

NASA career, value of, 205

Petroski, Henry, 70

Pettit, Don, 182

Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, 228

Phillips, Sam, 4

physics, space and solar, 223

Pioneer probes, 194

planetary science, 140–41, 159, 196, 220

planets

definition of, 141–43

number of, 141

Pluto status as, 141–43

understanding of, 223

Plum Brook Station, 210, 301

Pluto

missions and exploration of, 83, 131, 139–141, 

143

planet status of, 141–43

Polar Lander mission, 219

political appointees, 181–82

Porter, Lisa, 69, 272

Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne Company, 299

Principal Investigators (PIs), 42, 131

private sector. See commercial/private sector space 

business

Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) function

budgeting and, 90–91

formation of, 89, 92

organizational structure of, 92–94

purpose of, 89, 90–91, 92–94, 105

Program Requirements Control Boards, 255–56

326
Index

project management, 76–79

Prospector missions, 194

public and society

commercial space business, interest in, 49

engagement with and support for NASA 

programs, 31, 32, 36–37, 99–101, 138

interest in and support for NASA programs, 31, 

32, 36–37, 80, 99–101, 138, 150, 303–4

legacy of NASA, 46–47

student interest in space and science, 31, 204, 

244, 258–59, 281

public and society, impact of NASA on

ecological awareness, 139

economic impact of NASA, 277

exploration spirit, 29–30, 34, 54–55, 85, 

158, 170–71, 181, 199, 224–25, 230–31, 

240–41, 277, 304

inspiration and national pride, 20–21, 33–34, 

55, 101, 111, 124, 138, 150, 162–63, 

204, 210–11, 257, 261–62, 270–71, 277, 

288–89

motivation and doing great things, 124

NASA as America’s brand and positive feelings 

about NASA, 198, 199, 244–45, 257, 

270–71

presidential policy and, 99–100

safety and mission assurance processes, 

development of, 67–68

technological developments, 67, 80, 85–86, 

100, 138–39, 158, 204, 224–25, 257–58, 

277, 308–9

technological leadership, 151–53, 179, 204, 

248–259, 303, 304

weather information and satellites, 221

Q

Quayle, Dan, 191

R

RAND Corporation, 89, 91, 98

Rather, Dan, 223

Readdy, Bill, 263

Reagan administration and Ronald Reagan, 

99–100, 190–91

Reconnaissance Orbiter mission, 219

Redstone Arsenal, Army, 285

reliability and redundancy, 44, 65

reliability engineering, 61–63, 79

remote sensing satellite systems, 89–90, 300

research and analysis (R&A) grants and program, 

132, 133–35, 138

Return to Flight activity, 60, 168

Reusable Launch Vehicle Program, 297

robotic spaceflight and systems

applications for, 14–15, 69, 82

complexity of missions and teamwork, 84–85

exploration and discovery and, 69, 80–82, 

114–15, 124, 136–37, 171, 212–13, 237–

38, 289–290, 305

human and robotic alliance, 15, 69, 80–82, 83, 

114–15, 125, 196–97, 229–230, 237–38, 

280, 289–290, 305

Kennedy Space Center role, 271–72

Mars exploration, 48, 69, 80, 81, 82, 212, 

229–230, 271, 280

Moon exploration, 80, 81, 114–15, 271, 305

on Space Station, 115

risky missions, humans, and, 14–15, 69, 

80–82, 125, 212–13

Venus exploration, 69

Roe, Lesa B.

background and career of, 275

changes at NASA, 279–280

interview with, 274–281

Johnson Space Center role, 275

Kennedy Space Center role, 275

Langley Research Center role, 275–281, 296

NASA career, value of, 281

organizational structure of NASA, 278–79

women as Center Directors, 277–78

Roe, Ralph, 79, 295

Rogers Commission, 59, 63

Roman, Nancy Grace, 217

Rome, 224

327
NASA at 50

routine operations, 203

Rover missions, 100, 103, 182, 183, 217, 219, 

227, 257, 303

Rover model, 183

RS-68 Delta IV engine, 12, 299

rules, failures, and lessons learned, 69–72, 243, 

306–7

Rumsfeld, Donald, 192

Ruppersberger, Dutch, 227

Russia and Soviet Union

agreements and cooperation with, 157, 162, 

254

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 52, 97, 248

arms control policy discussions, 190–91

cargo capabilities, 28

Gerstenmaier relationship with Russians, 108

human spaceflight program, value of, 46, 49

human spaceflight program and world power 

status, 32, 210–11, 258

Soviet-U.S. joint Mars mission, 101–2

Space Station role, 85, 100, 244, 297–98

S

safety and health official, 62

safety and mission assurance

audits, assessments, and mishap investigation 

process, 63–64, 66–68, 166–69

communication, workplace culture, and safety, 

44, 161–62, 214, 255–57, 280, 287

engineering and cooperation with, 78–79

flight safety, 59–61

leadership commitment to, 114

occupational and industrial safety, 61–62, 68, 

114

process for, development of, 67–68

routine operations, 203

rules, failures, and lessons learned, 69–72, 

243, 306–7

Space Shuttle Program and deficiencies, 63

Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of, 59, 61–66, 

168

satellite programs

communication satellites, 81, 86, 220, 222

international partners, 85

LCROSS (Lunar CRater Observation and 

Sensing Satellite), 194

military satellites, 192

remote sensing satellite systems, 89–90, 300

Seasat mission, 233–34

Stennis Space Center role, 300, 305

weather information, 48, 80, 81, 84, 86, 159, 

220–21

Saturn (planet)

missions and exploration of, 83, 86, 212, 213

photographs of, 111

robotic systems and exploration, 82, 212, 213

Saturn/Saturn V vehicles, 12, 96, 123, 285

Scales, Charles H.

aeronautics research programs, 82–83

Associate Deputy Administrator position, 51–52

background and career of, 51, 52–53, 55–56

changes at NASA, 52

financial management role, 54

interview with, 50–57

NASA career, value of, 56–57

workplace culture, 55–56

Schmitt, Harrison “Jack,” 183, 276, 294

Schumacher, John, 175

science

advancements in, 83, 84

budget and funding for programs, 9, 13, 16, 42, 

96, 98, 210, 218

definition of and types of, 220

Earth science, 26, 84, 135, 136, 159–160, 

220–21, 223, 300

exploration and science, integration of, 289

Goddard Space Flight Center research role, 

220–21, 286

Jet Propulsion Laboratory research role, 286

Langley Research Center research role, 280

Marshall Space Flight Center research role, 286

NASA research role, 198

328
Index

planetary science, 140–41, 159, 196, 220

space science, 16, 26, 133, 134–35, 136–37, 

208, 220, 222–23, 234

success of, 26, 132

support for programs and interest in, 31, 42, 

204, 258–59, 281

Vision for Space Exploration role, 133, 134–35

voting on, 142–43

Science and Technology Policy, Office of (OSTP), 13, 

25, 91–92

Science Mission Directorate (SMD)

budget and funding for, 132, 134, 136, 137

business practices, 132

challenges facing, 137, 138

changes at over time, 132

collaboration between Directorates, 125–26

flight program, 132, 134–35, 137, 138

goals and vision, 132–35

international collaboration, 134

Mars surface lab heat shield, development of, 

126

research and analysis grants and program, 132, 

133–35, 138

science research and programs, 159, 286

Stern role, 131–32

success of, 143

science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 

(STEM) education programs, 31, 258–59, 281

scientists

management of, 228

training of, 256–57

Scolese, Christopher J. “Chris”

background and career of, 75, 78

changes at NASA, 83–84

interview with, 74–87

leadership and management style of, 3, 26–27

NASA career, value of, 86–87

NASA impact on society, 85–86

O’Connor, cooperation with, 79

project management and oversight role, 76–79

Seamans, Robert C. “Bob,” 3

Seasat mission, 233–34

SEI (Space Exploration Initiative), 21, 90, 91, 97, 

98, 191

SFOC (Space Flight Operations Contract), 265

Shea, Joe, 4

Shepard, Alan, 80

Shin, Jaiwon

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate goals 

and mission, 145–49

background and career of, 145

changes at NASA, 150–51

interview with, 144–153

NASA career, value of, 151

on technological leadership, 151–53

Shoemaker, Gene, 294

Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, 248–49

Shuttle Imaging Radar (SIR)-A, 234, 235

Shuttle Imaging Radar (SIR)-B, 234, 235

Shuttle Imaging Radar (SIR)-C, 234

Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), 234

Skylab program, 52, 100

Snoopy Program, 72

SOFIA (Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared 

Astronomy), 202

solar physics, 223

solar system

missions into and exploration of, 29–30, 103, 

137, 140, 194, 196–97

planet, definition of, 141–43

self-sufficiency and self-sustainability for 

missions, 253

settlement of, 47, 84, 196, 197–98, 253

Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force, 190

space business

military space business, 6, 19

NASA role in, 6

technological developments from, 47

See also commercial/private sector space 

business

Space Communications Office, 92

Space Exploration Initiative (SEI ), 21, 90, 91, 97, 

98, 191

Space Flight Awareness Program, 72

329
NASA at 50

Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), 265

Space Flight Safety Panel, 59

Space Florida, 271–72

Space Launch Initiative, 98

space science, 16, 26, 133, 134–35, 136–37, 

208, 220, 222–23, 234

Space Science, Office of, 218–19

Space Shuttle Program

aeronautics and Shuttle design, 102–3, 

115–16

astronauts and families, meetings with and 

calls from presidents, 182, 184–86, 250–51

budget, resources, and funding for, 8, 43, 96, 

97

complexity of vehicle and missions, 44, 119–

120, 151

Congressional Space Medal of Honor for crews, 

185–86

design of vehicle and program, 43, 119–120

emergencies and deorbit option, 252–53

end of, vii, 34, 41, 97, 108–9, 110, 268

family escorts for missions, 249

final flights and Space Station assembly, 108–9

flight safety improvements, 59–60

inaugural launch of Shuttle, 100

launch of Shuttle, powerful experience of, 

261–62

management decision-making during, 2

oversight of systems and processes, 60

policy decisions about, 6–7, 13–14, 98–99

reliability-based design, 44, 65

replacement of, 6, 297

Return to Flight activity, 60, 168, 263, 266

safety and mission assurance deficiencies, 63

Shuttle-Mir Program, 59

support for programs, 100

technology from, utilization for Vision program, 12

understanding of operations and capabilities 

of, 60–61

waivers/critical items list, 65

See also Challenger (STS-51L) accident; 

Columbia (STS-107) accident

Space Shuttle Program Manager, 261, 266, 269, 

294

Space Station Program and International Space 

Station (ISS)

assembly of, 34, 41, 108–9

astronauts, meetings with and calls from 

president, 182, 183, 184, 185

budget, resources, and funding for, 7, 54, 96

complexity of and teamwork, 84–85

dedication and commitment of workforce, 113

emergencies and deorbit option, 252–53

evolution of Station designs, 297

fights on Capitol Hill about, 31–32

Gerstenmaier role, 108, 112

hardware development, 265

international interest in, 48

international partners, 84, 85, 100, 102, 115, 

197, 244, 297–98

launch vehicles for deployment of, 12, 13–14, 54

lessons learned with, 110

logistics market, 22

Marshall Space Flight Center role, 286

Node, 262

O’Connor role, 59

partnerships for access to, 54

robotic systems, 115

Roe role, 275

space science research, 137

support for program, 14, 41–42, 100

technological and software developments for, 

112–13

weight of Station, 110

Space Task Group, 276

Spacecraft Processing and Integration Facility 

(SPIF), 262

spaceflight

budget, resources, and funding for, 7–8, 54, 111

complexity of and teamwork, 84–85

failures and lessons learned, 69–72, 256, 287

goals and mission of, vii, 6, 21, 100–101, 156, 

234

interest in, 49

330
Index

launch rules, 70–71, 307

priority of programs, 16–17, 54, 96–99

program planning and success, 121–22, 235

technological developments from, 34

world power status and, 210–11

See also human spaceflight

spaceflight/launch architecture

decisions about, 2, 10–12

for Moon missions, 10–12, 122

for Vision for Space Exploration, 10–12

heavy-lift vehicles, 123, 285

post-Shuttle decisions, 6

self-sufficiency and self-sustainability for 

missions, 252–53

skills and competence to develop, 120–21, 

228–29

vehicle concepts following Columbia accident, 

119–120

Spacelab program, 137

Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (Dextre), 

81, 115

Spinoff, 67

Spirit, 14, 69, 85, 303

Spitzer, Lyman, Jr., 217

Spitzer Space Telescope, 217, 223

Sputnik, 49, 102, 210, 230

SRTM (Shuttle Radar Topography Mission), 234

Stadd, Courtney, 91–92, 182

Stafford-Covey board, 167–68

Star Fleet, 50th Space Wing, U.S., 192

Star Wars (Strategic Defense Initiative) program, 

190–91

State, Department of, 41

Steidle, Craig, 298

STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics) education programs, 31, 258–59, 

281

Stennis Space Center

Gilbrech role at, 264, 293, 294, 296–309

Hurricane Katrina and recovery operations, 

263–64, 266, 296

“On the Shoulders of Giants” effort, 307

Parsons role at, 261, 262, 263, 296

partnerships with agencies, industries, and 

universities, 300

satellite programs, 300, 305

test stands and engine/rocket testing, 111, 

299–300, 301, 302

Vision for Space Exploration role, 299–300, 

307–8

workforce capabilities and competence, 307–8

workforce size, 302

workplace culture, 302–3

Stern, S. Alan

accomplishments of, 137–38

background and career of, 131–32

challenges facing NASA, 138

challenges facing Science Mission Directorate, 

137, 138

interview with, 130–143

NASA career, value of, 139

New Horizons mission, 131, 139–141, 143

on Pluto and mission to, 139–143

Science Mission Directorate goals and vision, 

132–35

Science Mission Directorate success, 143

Strategic Capability Asset Program, 53

Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) program, 

190–91

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy 

(SOFIA), 202

Sun

robotic systems and exploration, 82

solar physics, 223

T

TDRSS (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System), 

81, 220

teams and teamwork culture, 84–85, 114–15, 214, 

255

technical excellence, 77–78

technological developments

capabilities for advanced technological 

developments, 238–39

331
NASA at 50

from exploration and discovery missions, 34, 

47, 81–82, 158

impact of NASA on society, 67, 80, 85–86, 100, 

138–39, 158, 204, 224–25, 257–58, 277, 

308–9

technological leadership, 151–53, 179, 204, 

248–259, 303, 304

Test Management Board, 302–3

test pilots, 256–57

Thurston, Scott, 185

Titan, 81, 82, 103

Tito, Dennis, 49

Titov, Gherman, 80

To Engineer Is Human (Petroski), 70

TOPEX/Poseidon program, 244

tourism, space, 101

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), 

81, 220

Transition Region and Coronal Explorer (TRACE), 

223

Transportation, Department of, 104

transportation system, 162, 279, 286

Truly, Richard, 40, 264–65, 297

U

United Kingdom

agreements and cooperation with, 157

Queen Elizabeth II visit to Goddard Space Flight 

Center, 227–28

United Space Alliance (USA), 265

United States Space Exploration Policy, 133. See 

also Vision for Space Exploration

United States Space Exploration Policy, President’s 

Commission on Implementation of (Aldridge 

Commission), 181, 184

USA (United Space Alliance), 265

U.S. News & World Report, 241–42

V

Venus

interest in, 136

Magellan mission, 233, 234

robotic systems and exploration, 69, 80

Vietnam War, 7, 8, 49, 189

Viking program, 16, 89, 103, 276

Virgin Galactic, 197

Vision for Space Exploration

announcement of, 1, 180–81, 182–83, 222

Authorization Act, 21–22, 33, 193, 252

budget and funding for, 22, 42, 98, 105, 110

capabilities, skills, and competence for, 278–79

changes at NASA with, 121

External Relations and, 156–57

gap between programs, 33, 210, 268–69

Gerstenmaier role, 110–11

goals and mission of, vii, 2, 21–22, 25–26, 40, 

110–11, 117, 123, 156, 160, 162, 194–95, 

196, 208, 222, 237–38, 299–300

Goddard Space Flight Center role, 221–22

implementation of, 10, 41, 52–53

inspiration and national pride through, 150

international partners and, 162

Kennedy Space Center role, 271–72

policy decisions about, 110–11

priorities of, 9–10, 180

science role in, 133, 134–35

spaceflight/launch architecture for, 10–12

Stennis Space Center role, 307–8

support for, 21–22, 176

Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), 68

von Braun, Wernher, 7, 284–85, 302, 305

Voyager mission, 140

VPP (Voluntary Protection Program), 68

W

Washington, George, 20

weather

failures and lessons learned, 70–71, 307

Global Precipitation Mission, 226

public interest in NASA programs, 80, 86

robotic systems and information about, 81

satellites and information about, 48, 80, 81, 84, 

86, 159, 220–21

technological developments, 48, 84

332
Index

Weather Channel, 221

Web site, NASA, 32

Webb, James E. “Jim,” 3, 4, 26, 95

Weiler, Edward J.

background and career of, 217–19, 230

changes at NASA, 222–24

Goddard Space Flight Center role, 217, 219–

224, 226–29

Hubble Space Telescope role, 217–18

interview with, 216–231

Mars Rover model, 183

NASA career, value of, 230–31

White House Liaison

astronauts and families, meetings with and 

calls from president, 182, 183–86

Jezierski role, 175, 178, 179–180, 181–87

White Sands Test Facility, 301

Whitlow, Woodrow, Jr.

background and career of, 207–8, 213

changes at NASA, 207–8

facilities and infrastructure at Glenn Research 

Center, 209, 210

Glenn Research Center role, 207–14

interview with, 206–15

NASA career, value of, 214–15

robotic systems and exploration, 212–13

workplace culture, 214

Williams, Jeff, 185

Wolfowitz, Paul, 192

Worden, S. Pete

Ames Research Center role, 193–99

arms control and missile defense policy role, 

190–91

background and career of, 189–193

changes at NASA, 197–98

DOD minister of information role, 192

Griffin, relationship with, 191, 193

interest in space, basis for, 189

interview with, 188–199

lessons learned, 198–99

Missile Defense Program role, 190–92

NASA career, value of, 199

workforce

capabilities, skills, and competence of, 120–21, 

202–3, 209, 228–29, 237, 278–79, 284, 

306, 307–8

career advancement opportunities, 213

dedication and commitment of, 35–36, 52, 72, 

109, 112, 113, 151, 172, 178, 198, 214–15, 

295, 309

diversity of, 208, 255, 256–57

end of Shuttle Program and transition to 

Constellation, 268, 271–72

inspiration and environment of success for, 236, 

241–43, 255–57

size of, 220, 228, 302

Wright, Rebecca, vii

X

X-30 Program, 294, 297, 308

X-33 Program, 99, 294, 297, 299, 308

Y

Yardley, John, 5

Young, John, 171, 183, 249

333
.
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Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of an American Space 

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Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephen P. Waring. Power to Explore: A History of 

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Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years at the NASA Ames Research 

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Schultz, James. Crafting Flight: Aircraft Pioneers and the Contributions of the 

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Arrighi, Robert S. Revolutionary Atmosphere: The Story of the Altitude Wind 

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Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958–1968: A Historical Summary. 

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Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie Karegeannes. Origins of NASA 

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Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 

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Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight. NASA 

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Logsdon, John M., ed., with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius. Exploring 

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Logsdon, John M., ed., with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen 

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Logsdon, John M., ed., with Stephen J. Garber, Roger D. Launius, and Ray A. 

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Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: Journey into the History of 

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Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: Journey into the History of 

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Hogan, Thor. Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative. 

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Launius, Roger D., and J. D. Hunley, comps. An Annotated Bibliography of the 

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Launius, Roger D. Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 3, 1994.

Hansen, James R. Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of 

the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept. Monographs in Aerospace History, 

No. 4, 1995.

Gorn, Michael H. Hugh L. Dryden’s Career in Aviation and Space. Monographs 

in Aerospace History, No. 5, 1996.

Powers, Sheryll Goecke. Women in Flight Research at NASA Dryden Flight 

Research Center from 1946 to 1995. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 

6, 1997.

Portree, David S. F., and Robert C. Trevino. Walking to Olympus: An EVA 

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Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Act of 1958: Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 8, 1998.

Rumerman, Judy A., comp. U.S. Human Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 

1961–1998. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 9, 1998.

Portree, David S. F. NASA’s Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age. Monographs 

in Aerospace History, No. 10, 1998.

Logsdon, John M. Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Cooperation 

in the Space Station. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1998.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey in Aeronautical Research: A Career at NASA 

Langley Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 12, 1998.

Braslow, Albert L. A History of Suction-Type Laminar-Flow Control with 

Emphasis on Flight Research. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 13, 

1999.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned 

from Apollo. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 14, 1999.

Perminov, V. G. The Difficult Road to Mars: A Brief History of Mars Exploration 

in the Soviet Union. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 15, 1999.

Tucker, Tom. Touchdown: The Development of Propulsion Controlled Aircraft 

at NASA Dryden. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 16, 1999.

Maisel, Martin, Demo J. Giulanetti, and Daniel C. Dugan. The History of the 

XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft: From Concept to Flight. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 17, 2000. NASA SP-2000-4517.

Jenkins, Dennis R. Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A Concise History of the X-15 

Research Airplane. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 18, 2000. NASA 

SP-2000-4518.

Chambers, Joseph R. Partners in Freedom: Contributions of the Langley 

Research Center to U.S. Military Aircraft of the 1990s. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 19, 2000. NASA SP-2000-4519.

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Waltman, Gene L. Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at 

NASA’s Flight Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 20, 

2000. NASA SP-2000-4520.

Portree, David S. F. Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950–

2000. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 21, 2001. NASA SP-2001-4521.

Thompson, Milton O., with J. D. Hunley. Flight Research: Problems Encountered 

and What They Should Teach Us. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 22, 

2001. NASA SP-2001-4522.

Tucker, Tom. The Eclipse Project. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 23, 

2001. NASA SP-2001-4523.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Deep Space Chronicle: A Chronology of Deep Space and 

Planetary Probes, 1958–2000. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 24, 

2002. NASA SP-2002-4524.

Merlin, Peter W. Mach 3+: NASA/USAF YF-12 Flight Research, 1969–1979. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 25, 2001. NASA SP-2001-4525.

Anderson, Seth B. Memoirs of an Aeronautical Engineer: Flight Tests at Ames 

Research Center: 1940–1970. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 26, 

2002. NASA SP-2002-4526.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Bibliography Commemorating 

the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 

1903. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 27, 2002. NASA SP-2002-4527.

No monograph 28.

Chambers, Joseph R. Concept to Reality: Contributions of the NASA Langley 

Research Center to U.S. Civil Aircraft of the 1990s. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 29, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4529.

Peebles, Curtis, ed. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History, The Early 

Years. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 30, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4530.

Jenkins, Dennis R., Tony Landis, and Jay Miller. American X-Vehicles: An 

Inventory—X-1 to X-50. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 31, 2003. 

NASA SP-2003-4531.

347
NASA at 50

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Chronology Commemorating 

the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 

1903. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 32, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4532.

Bowles, Mark D., and Robert S. Arrighi. NASA’s Nuclear Frontier: The Plum 

Brook Research Reactor. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 33, 2004. 

NASA SP-2004-4533.

Wallace, Lane, and Christian Gelzer. Nose Up: High Angle-of-Attack and Thrust 

Vectoring Research at NASA Dryden, 1979–2001. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 34, 2009. NASA SP-2009-4534.

Matranga, Gene J., C. Wayne Ottinger, Calvin R. Jarvis, and D. Christian Gelzer. 

Unconventional, Contrary, and Ugly: The Lunar Landing Research Vehicle. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 35, 2006. NASA SP-2004-4535.

McCurdy, Howard E. Low-Cost Innovation in Spaceflight: The History of the 

Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) Mission. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 36, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4536.

Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 37, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4537.

Lambright, W. Henry. NASA and the Environment: The Case of Ozone Depletion. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 38, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4538.

Chambers, Joseph R. Innovation in Flight: Research of the NASA Langley 

Research Center on Revolutionary Advanced Concepts for Aeronautics. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 39, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4539.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey into Space Research: Continuation of a Career at 

NASA Langley Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 40, 

2005. NASA SP-2005-4540.

Rumerman, Judy A., Chris Gamble, and Gabriel Okolski, comps. U.S. Human 

Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 1961–2006. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 41, 2007. NASA SP-2007-4541.

Peebles, Curtis. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History Beyond the 

Sky. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 42, 2011. NASA SP-2011-4542.

348
The NASA History Series

Dick, Steven J., Stephen J. Garber, and Jane H. Odom. Research in NASA History. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 43, 2009. NASA SP-2009-4543.

Merlin, Peter W. Ikhana: Unmanned Aircraft System Western States Fire Missions. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 44, 2009. NASA SP-2009-4544.

Fisher, Steven C., and Shamim A. Rahman. Remembering the Giants: Apollo 

Rocket Propulsion Development. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 45, 

2009. NASA SP-2009-4545.

Gelzer, Christian. Fairing Well: From Shoebox to Bat Truck and Beyond, 

Aerodynamic Truck Research at NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 46, 2011. NASA SP-2011-4546. 

Arrighi, Robert. Pursuit of Power: NASA’s Propulsion Systems Laboratory No. 1 

and 2. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 48, 2012. NASA SP-2012-4548.

Goodrich, Malinda K., Alice R. Buchalter, and Patrick M. Miller, comps. Toward 

a History of the Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography, Part 2 (1992–

2011). Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 49, 2012. NASA SP-2012-4549.

Electronic Media, NASA SP-4600:

Remembering Apollo 11: The 30th Anniversary Data Archive CD-ROM. NASA 

SP-4601, 1999.

Remembering Apollo 11: The 35th Anniversary Data Archive CD-ROM. NASA 

SP-2004-4601, 2004. This is an update of the 1999 edition.

The Mission Transcript Collection: U.S. Human Spaceflight Missions from 

Mercury Redstone 3 to Apollo 17. NASA SP-2000-4602, 2001.

Shuttle-Mir: The United States and Russia Share History’s Highest Stage. NASA 

SP-2001-4603, 2002.

U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission Presents Born of Dreams—Inspired by 

Freedom. NASA SP-2004-4604, 2004.

Of Ashes and Atoms: A Documentary on the NASA Plum Brook Reactor Facility. 

NASA SP-2005-4605, 2005.

349
NASA at 50

Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Rocket Interactive CD-ROM. 

NASA SP-2004-4606, 2004.

Fueling Space Exploration: The History of NASA’s Rocket Engine Test Facility 

DVD. NASA SP-2005-4607, 2005.

Altitude Wind Tunnel at NASA Glenn Research Center: An Interactive History 

CD-ROM. NASA SP-2008-4608, 2008.

A Tunnel Through Time: The History of NASA’s Altitude Wind Tunnel. NASA 

SP-2010-4609, 2010.

Conference Proceedings, NASA SP-4700:

Dick, Steven J., and Keith Cowing, eds. Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea and 

the Stars. NASA SP-2005-4701, 2005.

Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Critical Issues in the History of 

Spaceflight. NASA SP-2006-4702, 2006.

Dick, Steven J., ed. Remembering the Space Age: Proceedings of the 50th 

Anniversary Conference. NASA SP-2008-4703, 2008.

Dick, Steven J., ed. NASA’s First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives. NASA 

SP-2010-4704, 2010.

Societal Impact, NASA SP-4800:

Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Societal Impact of Spaceflight. NASA 

SP-2007-4801, 2007.

Dick, Steven J., and Mark L. Lupisella. Cosmos and Culture: Cultural Evolution 

in a Cosmic Context. NASA SP-2009-4802, 2009.

350