### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON REQUEST F OR EN BANC HEARING

NO. 03-0 5 -00 585 -CR NO. 03-05-00586- CR

Ex pa r te Ja m e s W . El lis

NO. 03-05-00589- CR NO. 03-05-00590- CR NO. 03-05-00591- CR NO. 03-05-00592- CR NO. 03-05-00593- CR NO. 03-05-00594- CR NO. 03-05-00595- CR NO. 03-05-00596- CR NO. 03-05-00597- CR NO. 03-05-00598- CR NO. 03-05-00599- CR NO. 03-05-00600- CR NO. 03-05-00601- CR NO. 03-05-00602- CR NO. 03-05-00603- CR

Ex parte John Dom inick Colyan dro

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS. 90 4056 4, 9040 565, 90 4056 6, 9040 567, 90 4056 8, 9040 569, 90 4057 0, 9040 571, 90 4057 2, 9040 573, 9040 574, 90 4057 5, 9040 576, 90 4057 7, 9040 598, D -1-DC -2005 -9041 21, & D -1-DC -2005 -9041 22

HO NORAB LE B OB PERK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG2 D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N Given the troubling proce dural history o f t his case, I dissent from this Court’s decision not to hear

the ca se en ba

nc. The Texas Rules of Appellate Proc edure allow a justice of the court of a ppeals t o re q u est a vote to dete rmine whe ther a case will be hear d en banc

. See Te x. R. App. P

. 41.2(c)

. I n the pre sent ca se, a vote was re quested be fore the pane l’s opinion was issued, and a majority of the c ourt’s member s voted ag ainst hear ing the case en banc. “Any justice on the cour t

may fi le an o pin ion

in c on ne c tio n w itha

de nia l of a he ari ng. . . e n b anc .” Te x. R. A pp . P. 47 .5 ; see als o O’ Con no r v . F

irs t Co ur t of

Ap pe als , 837 S.W .2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1992) (holding that “a c ourt of appea ls has a duty

to allow a nonpane l justi ce to fi l e a dissent f rom the cour

t’s denial of a

motion for e n banc c onsideration”) . “[T] he prospe ct of a dissenting opinion by a nonpane l member of the court of appea ls ‘heig htens the opinion writer’ s incentive to g et it rig ht.’” O’Connor , 837 S.W .2d at 96 (c iting Ruth Ba der G insburg , Re ma rk s o n W rit ing Se pa ra te ly , 6 5 W ash. L . Rev. 133, 144 (1990)) . “De nial of re hear ing e n banc doe s not forec lose the opportunity t o p o i n t out where the opinion dist orts what the dist rict court did, to underline certa in difficulties the opinion cre ates, a nd finally to point out alternative avenue s that the opinion does not cut off.” O’Connor , 837 S.W .2d at 9 6 -9 7 (q u o t i n g Golden Eagle D istrib. C orp. v. Burroughs Corp. , 809 F.2d 584, 585 (9th Cir. 1987)).

I n a c a se wh e re the pa

ne l ha s b e e n una

ble to r e so lve pr e tr ia l pr oc eedin g s in thi s

acc eler ated c ase in e ven a r emotely rea sonable pe riod of time, ef fec tively ty ing the hand s of the prosec ution for seve ral y ear s an d d elay ing the resolution of cha rg es of public c orruption that undermine the very core of our political sy stem, the nee d for e n banc r eview is e vident. The pa nelI n the two y ear s since oral a rg ument was he ard in this case , the cur rent pa nel member s have 1 authore d opinions in over 150 case s—most of which wer e non-a cce lerated—that wer e filed aft e r the oral a rg ument in the prese nt case , which wa s fi l ed as an acc eler ated a ppeal due to its procedura l posture as a

pretria l habea s proce eding

. By prioritizi ng non-ac cele rate d case s over the pr esent c ase, t h e p an el ca l l s i n t o qu es t i o nt h e c o n s i s t en cy o f t h i s C o u rt ’s ap p ro ac h t o re s o l v i n g h ab eas proce ed i n gs as ac cele rate d appea ls. En banc revie w is appropr iate whe n nece ssary to “maintain uniformity

of the court’s de cisions.” Tex. R. App. P. 41.1(c). See Th ir d Court of Ap pe a ls R e le a se d O rd e rs /O pin ion s, http:// www.3r dcoa.c ourts.state.tx .us/opinions/ docketsrc h.asp. 3 has ig nored the clea

r mandate of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedur e 31.2, which states, “ An appe al in a habeas corpus or bail proce eding will be hear d at the earliest practicable time .” Te x . R. App. P. 31.2 (emphasis adde d). The r ule furthe r states, “The sole purpose of the appe al is to do substantial justice to the parties.” Id. I n the present case , a dela y of over two y ear s has pre cluded substantial justice to the parties, resulting in what can onl y be desc ribed a s a de- acc eler ated a ppeal. The notices of appe al for the se pre trial proce eding s were filed i n September 2005, the parties’ briefs were filed by J anuar y 2006, and ora l arguments were hear d in Aug ust 2006. The delay betwee n oral a

rg ument and the issuanc e of the p an el ’s opinion sugg ests that this case pr esents leg al questions of such mag nitud e an d co m p lexi ty that en banc revie w must surely be wa rra nted. Otherw ise, the dela y 1

rema ins unjusti fied, ser

ving only to hamstring the working s of our justice sy stem. Whil e en ba nc consideration should be used sparing ly , it is di fficult to fathom when a more appr o p ri at e ca se for en banc revie w could ar ise.

Even more troubling tha

n the delay in resolving these pretrial proceeding s is the fa ct that the opin i o n is overbroa d and rife with dicta. B y stating, “ We are of the opinion that the term

‘ f u n d s ’ i nt h e 2 0 0 2 v e r s i o no f t h e m o n e y

l a u n d e r i n g s t a tu t e c an n o tb e f a i r l y r e a d t o h a v e t a c itl y inc lud e d c he c ks ,” the pa ne l r e a c he s th e me ri ts o f a n is su e tha

t is no t p ro pe rl y

be fo re thi sWhil e the panel r epeatedly ref ers to Ellis and Coly andro’ s vag ueness a rg ument as a f

acia l 2 constitutionalit y

challeng e, this Court ma

y not, in its zeal to rea ch the mer its of a ca se that has not y et bee n to trial, echo the proclamation of L ewis Carr oll’s Humpty Dumpty , “When I use a w ord, it means just what I choose it t o mean.” Carroll, Thr ou gh theLoo k

ing -G las s (Gre at B ritain 1871). 4 Court

— E l lis and Coly andro’ s “as a pplied” cha lleng e to the money launder ing statutes. See, e .g. , Ex pa rteHo war

d , 19 1 S.W. 3d 20 1, 20 3 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 20 05 , no pe t.) (“ A p re tr ia l w ri t of habe as cor

pus . . . may

not be used to addr ess an ‘ as applied’ challeng e to a statute.” ). Gra nted, the pane l claims to “express no opinion with respe ct t o the viability or re solution of an ‘as a

pplied’ challeng e” to the mone y

launder ing statute. Howeve r, they proce ed to do exactly that, addre ssing the merits of Ellis and Coly andro’ s ar gu ment, which, no matter how it is labeled, re mains an “a s applied” c halleng e. I n re je c tin g the State ’s c on te nti on that Ellis and Col y and ro are makin g a n “ a s- 2 applied” c halleng e that may not be addr essed in this pretria l habea s corpus proc eeding , th e panel state s, “ Th e State ’s c ha

ra c te ri zat ion of the Ap pe lla nts ’ ar g ume nt pr e su

pp os e s a pa rt ic ula r a ns we r t o it—i.e., that the statute should be construed i n the m anner the S tate contends and if it is, Ellis and Col y and ro ’s a tta c k c an o nly

be mou nte d a s an ‘ a s app lie d’ c ha lle ng e .” What th e pa ne l op ini on

fa ils to rec og nize, however , is that Ellis and Coly andro also pr e su pp os e thi s p art ic ula

r a ns we r t o th e ir

va g ue ne ss a

rgume nt, a s th e y

c on c e de that the statut e is no t vag ue if the State’ s interpre tation of the statut e is i nc or

re c t. A c c or din g to E lli s a nd Col y and ro , th e State ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f t he statut e mus t be correc t i no r d e r

f o r th e ir v a g u e n e s s c h a ll e n g e to s u c c e e d

. T h e r e f o r e , E ll is an d

Co lyan dr o ’s vag ueness a

rg ument rema ins an “a s applied” c halleng e, albe it in sheep’s clothing

. I n pretria l habea s corpus procee dings such as t hese, a n “as a pplied” cha lleng e to the statu t e is not y et ripe f

or appe llate re view bec ause the evidenc e has not be en deve loped. See5

Ex parte M

anrique , 40 S.W .3d 552, 554 n.4 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (“N o fac tual

re c or d h a s b e e n d e ve lop e d, the re fo re , a ny c la im that th e statut e is u nc on sti tut ional as par

tic ula rl y applied to [the appellant] is premature and bey ond the s cope of the present revie w.”)

. Th e re fo re , th is Court’s revie w must be limi ted to the facial constitutionalit y

of the statutes that the de fenda nts are

acc used of violating

. Se e Ex pa rteW e ise , 55 S. W.3 d 6 17 , 6 20 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ) ( ho ldi ngthat, wh ile “ ha be a s c or pu s is g e ne ra lly

no t ava ila

ble be fo re tr ia l to te st s uf fi c iency of th e co mpl a int , inf or ma tio n, or in di ctme nt, ” an e xce pti on e xists wh e n th e a

pp lic ant a lle g e s th a t th e statut e is

un c on sti tut ion a l on its face ). B eca use the pa

nel refu s es t o acknowledg e that Ellis and Coly andro’ s argument is in fact an “ as applied” challeng e and to limi t its review a ccor dingly , I believe this case prese nts the t y pe of “extraordinary

circ umstances” that merit en ba nc conside ration. Tex. R. App. P . 41.1(c)

.

I n order to sustain a fac ial constitutionalit y challeng e, Ell is and Coly andro must show that there is no set of circ umstances unde r which the statute would be valid, United States v. Salerno , 841 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), by demonstrating that the statute is va g ue in a ll of its applications, Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 4 5 5 U. S

. 4 8 9 , 4 9 5 (1 9 8 2 ). “A fa ci al ch al l en ge to a leg islative Act is, of cour se, th e most difficult challeng e to mount succe ssfully , since the challeng er must e stablish that no set of circ umstances e x ists under which the A ct would be va lid.” Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745.

El lis and Col y and ro c on c e de that “f

un ds ” a s use d in th e 20 02 ve rs ion of the statut e pla inl y inc ludes c a shor

c ur re nc y and that th e re fo re the mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e c ou ld

c on sti tut ion a lly

be a pp lie d to a

pe rs on wh o e ng a g e s in

a tr ans a c tio n invo lvi ngthe c ash o r c a sh

e qu iva le nt p ro c e e ds of

c ri min a l ac tiv ity . B e c a

us e any fa c ia l c on sti tut ion a lity

c ha lle ng e to t

he statut e6

ne c e ssa ri ly fa ils on thi s b a sis , the inq

uir y sh ou ld e nd the re . Th e pa ne l, h ow e ve r, pr oc e e ds to a dd re ss the me ri ts of El lis and Col y and ro ’s c la im that the mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e do e s n ot i nc lud e c he c ks , de sp ite the fa c t th a t th is i ssu e is n ot o nly imp ro pe r i n a pr e tr ia l pr oc e e din g , b ut w ho lly ir re le va nt i n light of the fac t that Ellis and C oly andro are unable to s ustain a prope r fa cial cha lleng e to the statute. Gi ve n th e pa

ne l’ s r e fu sa l to lim it i tse lf

to the a pp ro pr ia te iss ue s, e n b anc re vie w i s n e c e ssa ry to a ssi st this Court i n issuing an opinion that complies with the re quirements of a ppellate r eview. Be cause Ellis and Coly andro’ s “as applied” challeng e is not ripe at this stag e of the proce eding s, the pane l’s exte n s iv e d is c u s s io n of whe ther the 2002 mone y launder ing statute included chec ks in the definition of “funds” is dicta, at best, and ove rstep s t h e b o u n d aries of this Court’s authority to reviewpretria l matters. S e e E xp a r t e S mi th , 1 7 8 S

. W .3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating that appellate courts ar e “c are ful to ensure that a pre trial writ is not misused ‘ to secure pretria l appellate r eview of matters that in ac tual fac t should not be put befor e appellate courts at the pretria l stag e’” ) (ci t at ions omit ted). The panel, howe ver, ha s chosen to issue an a dvisory opinion on the meaningof the wor d “funds” —a question that this Court need not a nd should not a ddress at this ti me. See B rown v. De La Cruz , 156 S.W .3d 560, 566 (Tex. 2004) (stating that the separationof-powe rs provision, article I I , section 1 of the T exas Const itution, forbids advisory opinions). Unfortunately , the problems do not stop there, sinc e not only has the pane l included a stagge ri n g am ount of dicta in its opinion, but i n doing so ha s applied the re asonable -per son standard in a

manner that rende rs this important lega l standard devoid of m eaningand subjec t to the whims of the judiciary . For example, t h e o p i n i on states, “We find that the te rm ‘funds’ in the 2002 money

launder ing statute did not include chec ks.” In Le e v . S tate , 29 S.W .3d 570, 575 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, no pe t.) , ho we ve r, our sis te r c ourt fo un d th e e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o u ph oldThe pa nel also states, “ The pa

rties her e quit e rightly declined to cite, re ly on, or brief

the 3 Lee and Da v is ca s es i n t h i s case .” This statement is not entirely true, howe ver. I

n the State’s

“ Pos t- He ari ngB ri e f, ” fi le d a ft e r oral ar g ume nt, it s ta te s, “ I n th e or de r d e nyingthe a pp e lla nts ’ m o t i o n s t o qu a s h t h e i n d i c t m e n t s t h a tt h e y s h ar e w i t h f o r m e r C o n g r e s s m anT o m D e L a y, J udg e Pat P riest concisely articulated why ‘funds’ includes chec ks. A copy of the re levant portion of that or de r i s atta c he d h e re to a s App end ix A. ” Ap pe nd ix A to the State ’s br ie f i nc lud e s a discussion of the Texas money la u n d e r in g s ta tute, including the statement, “The courts of Te x as have repe atedly aff

irmed convictions in c ases whe rein c hecks ha ve under lain the transa ctions,” followed b y ci t at i o n t o b o th Lee and Da v is

. I r e a d th e St a te ’ s a tt a c h me n t o f A p p e n d ix A to it s b r ie f a s an incorpora tion by ref ere nce of the ca se citations included ther ein.

7 a convic tion for m oney launder ing ba sed on a tra nsaction involving a

fra udulently obtained che ck. There fore , Idisag ree with the panel’s statement t hat “[ i] t is too much of a lea p for us to conc lude that

a re asonable person of

ordinary intelligenc e would look at the 2002 ve rsion of sec tion 34.01 and be

awa re that i t i n t en d ed to criminalize the ‘launder ing’ of che cks,” be cause the Dallas Court of Ap p eals did exactly

that in Lee

. See id. ; se e als o D av is v . S tat e , 6 8 S. W. 3 d

273, 277 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 2, pe t. r e f’ d) (f in di ng th a t e vid e nc e wa s f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o u

ph old

co nviction where “five chec ks form[ed] t he basis of the money launder ing of

fense s”). E nbanc revie w i s nece ssary in this case , if only to clar ify that this Court does not consider the Dallas Court of Appe als to fall short of the r easona ble-pe rson-of- ordinary -intellige nce sta ndard. See O ’Connor , 837 S.W .2d at 95 (“U nless a court of appeals chooses to hear a case e n banc, the decision of a panel constitutes the decision of the w hole cour t.”). Whil e the panel notes that the prec ise issue of whether chec ks were c o n s i dere d “funds” under the money

launder ing statute was not bef ore the court in Lee or Da v is (just as it is not befor e this Court in the prese nt c ase) , the fac t r emains that the exis tence of two published ca ses by a Te x as appe llate cour

t, upholding money

launder ing c onvictions based o n checks, might c ause a

re a so na ble pe rs on

of or din ary int e lli g e nc e to e xpect the Te xas m on e y la un de ri ngstatut e to

c ri min a lize the la

un de ri ngof

c he c ks

. To survive a

voi d fo r v agu eness challeng e, a statutory 3This de finition was in effe ct prior to the 2002 amendment of the Te x as money -launde ring 4 statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (West 2000). 8 provision “nee d only

g ive fa ir war

ning in lig ht of common understa n d i n g and pra ctices.” Sta te v . W

off or d , 34 S.W .3d 671, 679 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). Simi larly , the fe dera l mo n ey l aundering statute, which c lear ly criminalizes the launder ing of

chec ks, further

calls into question the pane l’s conclusion that no re asonable person of ordinary intelligenc e would interpr et forme r sec tion 34.01 to include chec ks in the definition of “funds.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c )(5) (West Supp. 2008) (including “ coin or c urre ncy of the United States or of a

ny other c ountry , trave lers’ c hecks, personal checks, bank chec ks, and money order s” in definition of “mone tary instruments,” the launde ring of which is prohibited). Fe dera l 4 courts have upheld convictions for money launder ing based on a ctivities involvi ng chec ks, see, e .g. , United States v. Valuck

, 2 86 F .3 d 22 1, 22 7- 28 (5 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; United States v. Paramo , 998 F.2d 12 12 , 1217 -1 8 ( 3d

Cir . 1 99 3) ; United States v. Montoy a , 9 4 5 F

. 2 d 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 7 ( 9 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 1) (upholding money

launder ing c onviction based on c hecks r elated to br ibery offe nses and other inc ide nts of po lit ic a l c or

ru pti on ), and have int e rp re te d the fe de ra l mo ne y la un de ri ngstatut e br oa dly in rejec ting c onstitut ional vag ueness c halleng es, see, e .g. , United States v. Ak intobi , 159 F.3d 401, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1998) (“ Whil e this particular ty pe of tra nsaction may

not fit the common understandingof what is money launder ing, the statute rea ches a broa d r a n g e o f financ ial activities”); Un ite d Sta te

s v . E sta c io , 6 4 F .3 d 4 77 , 4 80 (9 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; United States v. J ackson , 935 F.2d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1991). While the lang uag e of the fe d er al m oney launder ing statute differ s from the Texas statute, the very

exis tence of fe d er al l aw c riminaliz ing the money launder ing of

chec ks

su g g e sts that it

wo uld no t be , a s th e pa

ne l be lie ve s, “ too muc h o f a le a p f or us to c on c lud e ” that a9

rea sonable person might ex pect such activity to be prohibit ed by the Texas statute as we ll. Rather, this body of fe dera l law might indicate to a re asonable person of ordi n ar y i n t el l ige nce that the Texas statute, whi ch does not limit the def inition of “funds” but mere lyprovides a list of nonexclusive ex amples, mig ht also be int erpr eted broadly to criminalize money -launde ring transac tions inv olv ingc he c ks in a

wi de va ri e ty of c on te xts, inc lud ing po lit ic a l cor ru pti on , ra the r tha

n n arr ow ly applied so that only

drug deale rs conduc ting tra nsactions in cash ma

y be convic ted of money launder ing. The pa nel also ig nores the pla in meaning of the statute in c oming to its conclusion that no rea sonable pe rson would expect che cks to be c onsidered “ funds.” A statute “must be re ad in context and construed ac cordingto the rules of g rammar and common usag e.” Ex parte M orales , 212 S.W .3d 483, 499 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref ’d). Sec tion 34.01(2) of the pe nal code , as it e x isted in 2002, stated that the ter m “funds” includes the forms of m oney descr ibed in subsections (A ), (B ), and (C ). As the pa ne l a c kn ow le dg e s, we are bo un d to int e rp re t th e wo rd “ inc lud e s” a s a term of e nlarg ement, rather than limitation or exclusive enumeration. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 3 11 .0 05 (1 3) (We st 2 00 5)

. Th e wo rd “ inc lud e s” do e s no t c re a te a pr e su mpt ion

that c omp on e nts not expressed are excluded. Id.

The pa nel cites tre atises and leg islative history at leng th in an attempt t o interpre t fo rm e r s e c tio n 3 4. 01 (2 ) t o e xclu de c he c ks fr om t he de fi nit ion

of “ fu nd s. ” B ut wh e n a tte mpt ingto dis c e rn le g isl a tiv e int e nt, we are bo un d by the lit e ra l te xt of

the statut e be c a

us e it i s th e on ly definitive evidenc e of what leg islators had in mind when the statute wa s enac ted. Bo y k in v . S tat e ,When attempting to disce rn this collective leg islative in te n t or 5 purpo s e , w e n e c e s s ar il y f o c u s o u r a tt e n ti o n o n th e li te r a l te xt o f the statute in question and attempt to disc ern the fair, obje ctive mea ning o f th a t t e xt at t

h e ti me o f

it s e n a c tm e n t. We d o th is b e c a u s e th e te xt of the statut e is the law i n th e se ns e that it is th e on ly thi nga c tua lly adopted by

the leg islators, probably th ro u gh compromise, and submitt ed to the Gover

nor for her signature. We focus on the litera l text also bec ause the text is the only definitive evide nce of

what the le g isl a tor s ( and

pe rh a ps the Go ve rn or ) h a d in

min d w he n th e statut e w a s e n a c te d in to la

w . T h e r e r e a ll y is n o o th e r c e r ta in me th od for deter mining the c ollective legislative int ent or purpose at some point in the past, even assuming a single intent or purpose w as dominant at the tim e of

e na c tme nt. Bo y k in v . S tat e , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 10 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We m ay loo k b e y on d th e statut or

y te xt onl y if it i s 5 ambig uous or if the a

pplication of t he st atute’s plain languag e would lea d to an absurd r esult that the l egi s lature c ould not possibl y have intende d. Id. “ A s ju r is ts , w e ar e o b li g e d

to im p le me n t t he expressed will of our leg islature, not the will it keeps to itself.” Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 829 S.W .2d 796, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). There fore , “the plain lang uag e of a statute, not the leg islative history behind it, dictates our inter pretation of that statute.” State v. Johnson , 939 S

. W

. 2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

There is no ambiguity

in t h e l egi slature’ s use of “ includes” in the de finition of

“ fu nd s. ” B y de fi nin g “ fun ds ” to “i nc lud e ” c a sh , th e le g isl a tur e pla inl y did no t de fi ne “ fu

nd s” to

mean only cash, a

nd neither the statut e nor the context compels a diffe rent unde rstanding of the definition. See State v . Vasilas , 187 S.W .3d 486, 490 (Tex. Cri m . Ap p . 2 0 06) (holding that by defining “g overnme ntal rec ord” to “ includ[e] a court rec ord,” leg islature plainly did n o t exclude other doc uments). Texas a ppellate courts have repe atedly construed “ includes” a

nd “including ” asThe pa nel further re l i es on l eg islative history to sugg est that the leg islature intended the 6 money launder ing sta t u t e to apply primarily

to illega l drug transac tions. W ithout considering whether there might be a

constitutional iss ue involved if the leg islature had in f act de cided that dr

ug deale rs could be pr osecute d for money launder ing w hile individuals invol ved in white-c ollar cr imes could not , we no te th a t c h a p te r 3 4 o f th e p e n a l c o d e ma

k e s n o me n ti o no f

li mi ti n g th e mo ney launder ing statute to the “illicit dr ug trade ,” as the panel sug g ests. Fur thermore , the pa nel’s dis c us sio n le a ds us to t

he c on c lus ion

that, hy po thet ica ll y , if

a dr ugde a le r w e re to d e po sit c a sh proce eds of illicit activity in a bank i n Miami and then use a chec k to deposit these funds in a Texas bank, t here would be no rec ourse to prosecute this individual for money launder ing unde r the penal c ode in ef

fec t in 2002. 11 terms of enlar g ement, as require d by section 311.005(13) of the g overnme nt code. See, e .g. , Vasilas , 18 7 S. W.3 d at 48 8- 92 ; B e a s l e y v . Stat e , 9 02 S.W .2d 452, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Gr un sfe ld v. Sta te , 843 S.W .2d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). More importantly , thi s Court has interpre ted “include s” and “ incl uding” to signify a non-e x clusive list. See H .G. Sledge, Inc. v . ProspectiveInv. & T r a ding Co., L td. , 36 S.W .3d 567, 603 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pe t. d e nie d) ; W

ilb ur n v . S tat e , 824 S.W .2d 755, 762 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (holding that wher e statute states that direc tors and off icer s’ liability

“includes” fra

nchise taxes, leg islature did not impliedly intend to exclude all items not l isted). The pa nel deviates from thi s Court’s prec edent by int erp reting the statute to exclude che cks bec ause it “inc ludes” c ash and othe r items without sp e c if ic a lly namin gc he c ks , u sin g le g isl a tiv e his tor y to i nte rp re t a statut e that is unambi g uo us on its fac e. See Vasilas , 187 S.W .3d at 490 (“[T]he word ‘including ’ is unambig uous and the leg islature 6 has assig ned it a particula r meaningof enla

rg ement”) . En banc consideration is appropriate w hen “nec essar y to secure or maintain uniformity of the c ourt’s dec isions.” Tex

. R. App. P. 41.2(c). There fore , en banc revie w is warr anted in the prese nt case to maintain the uniformity of the c ourt’s decisions re g ardingthe prope r statutory construction of the term “inc ludes.”12 F u r thermore , the pane l applies the e jus de m ge ne ris ca n o no f c o n s t ru ct i o n , s t at i ng that a ter m may “be e nlarg ed only

as to items of the same kind, c lass, or nature as the other items on the list,” in concluding (unnec essar ily) that t he term “funds” in section 34.01 could not possibly include chec ks. Howeve r, in applying this ca non, the panel draw s a distinction so fine that it takes five pa g es of the opinion to expl ain why chec ks are not “of the same k i n d , cl as s , o r nature ” as the other

enumer ated items. This appli cation of e jus de m ge ne ris essentially require s the rea sonable pe rson

o f a v e r a g e i n t e l l i g e n c e t o c o n c l u d e , u p o nr e a d i n g t h e s t a tu t e , t h a tt h e l i s t e d i t e m s ( c u r

r e n c y, U.S. silver certificate s, U.S. Trea sury notes, Fe dera l Reserve Sy stem notes, fore ign ba nk notes, and fo re ig n b ank

dr a ft s) are no t, in fa c t, m e ant t o r e pr e se nt t ho se mon e tary

ins tr ume nts tha

t c ou ld potentially

constitute the proceeds of criminal activity , but to repre sent only those forms of pa

y ment that are no t “c on tin g e nt o n th e dr awe r’ s o rd e r t o p ay be ingho no re d b y

the dr awe e a t so me po int in the future .” This conc lusion stretches the r ule of e j u s d e m g e n e r is mu c h to o f

ar. I n it s atte mpt

to come up with a “kind, class, or nature ” that includes all of the items listed in the pre -2005 statute but excludes chec ks, the pane l simpl y descr ibes subtle distinctions t hat bea r no re lationship to t he purpose of

the statute and c alls them “fundamental diffe renc es.” The pa nel also ar g ues that the l egis lature’ s 2005 amendment to sec tion 34.01(2), which adde d subsection (D) , demonstrates that the orig inal definition of “f unds” did not include chec ks. Subsection (D) a dds to the list of items included in the m eaning of “funds”: “cur renc y or it s e qu iv a le n t, in c lu d in g an e le c tr o n ic f u n d , p e r s o n a l c h e c k , b an k c h e c k , tr a v e le r ’ s c h e ck, money order , bear er ne g otiable instrument, bear er inve stment security , bear er se curit y , o r c e r ti f ic a te o f stock in a form that a llows tit le to pass on deliver y .” Te x . P en al C ode Ann. § 34.01( 2)(D)13

(West Supp. 2007). The panel rea sons that the leg islature must be presumed to ha v e int ended this amendment to chang e, rather than me rely clar i fy , t he mea

ning of “funds.” But subsection (D) includes at least one form of pay ment, curr ency , that the pane l opinion it self states was include d within the orig inal definition. In light of the inclusion of curr ency , it is clear that subsection (D) both chang ed and c lari fi e d the pr e vio us de fi nit ion of fu nd s. Withre g ard

to c he c ks , the addition of subsec tion (D) did not signify a chang e in the s tatute, but mere ly made ex plicit what was already

implicit i n the def

inition of “funds.” See Lee , 29 S.W .3d at 576 (a ffirming conviction fo r m on e y

la underi ng wh e re tr ans a c tio n invo lve d f ra ud ule ntl y ob ta ine d c he c k) ; se e als o La wy e rs Sur. Corp. v. Royal Chevrolet, I nc. , 847 S.W .2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (i n h old ingthat st a tut or

y te rm “ ba

nk dr a ft s” inc lud e d c he c ks fo r p ur po se s o f m oto r v e hic le de a le rs ’ bonds, stating that “[t] his inter pretation is consistent with the subsequent ame ndment to [th e s tatute ], which conditions pay

ment of cla ims on a bond on the purcha sing de aler ’s pay ment of all valid bank draf ts, including chec ks ”) ( emphase s added)

.

I n discussing the 2005 amendment to the s t atut e, the pa nel re lies on the g ener al presumption that a leg islative amendment sig nifies a c hang e, rather than a clar ification, of the exis ting statute. “ Howeve r, the time and c ircumstance s surrounding th e en ac t m en t of the amendment may

indicate that the c hang e wr o u gh t b y the amendme nt was for

mal only —that the leg islature int ended merely to interpre t the orig inal act.” 1A Norma n J . Singer , Su the rla nd

Sta tutor y Construction § 2 2. 30 (6 th e d. 20 02 ). I f an a me ndme nt “ wa s e na c te d so on a ft e r c on tr ov e rs ie s aro se as to the interpr etation of the or igina l act, it is lo gi ca l t o re g ard the amendment a s a leg islative interpre tation of the orig inal act.” Id. § 22.31. As noted in the pane l opinion, Ell is and Coly andro14

wer e initially

indicted in Septe mber 2004, a nd the amendme nt to section 34.01 was passe d by the le g isl a tu re in 20 05 . T he fa c t th a t th e mon e y la un de ri ngsta

tut e wa s ame nd e d in

the ve ry fi rs t leg islative session after

Ellis and Coly andro’ s indictment sug g ests that the 2005 amendme nt “was adopted f or the purpose of m aking plain what the leg islation had been a ll along f rom the time of the statute’s orig inal enac tment,” id.

Whil e I strong ly disagree with th e p an el ’s re ad i n g o f s ec t i o n3 4

. 0 1 (2 ), t h ei r d i s cu s s ion of whe ther c hecks a

re c onsidered “ funds” unde r the statut e re m ai n s p ure dic ta, as Ellis and Col y and ro have fa ile d to e sta

bli shtha t th e statut e is unc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue on its fa c e . I

wo uld h av e a ff i rm edt h e t ri al co u rt ’s o rd er d en y i n g h ab ea s co rp u s re l i ef wi t h o u ti s s u i n g an ad v i s o ry opinion that no t on ly

re a c he s th e me ri ts o f a

n is su e that is no t pr op e rl y be fo re thi s Cour

t, but ig no re s th e pla in meaningof the statute in doing so. I n light of these iss ues, I respe ctfully dissent from the Court’s de c isi on no t to a ff or d th is c a se the e n b anc re vie w that it re qu ir e s.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Filed: August 29, 2008 Pub lis h