Unlimited

Horizons Design and Development of the U-2

Peter W. Merlin
Unlimited

Horizons Design and Development of the U-2

Peter W. Merlin
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Merlin, Peter W., 1964–

 Unlimited horizons : design and development of the U-2 / Peter W. Merlin.

 pages cm. — (NASA aeronautics book series)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-1-62683-025-7

1. U-2 (Reconnaissance aircraft)—History. 2. U-2 (Reconnaissance

aircraft)—Design and construction. I. Title.

 UG1242.R4M4675 2015

 623.74’67—dc23

 2014045191

Copyright © 2015 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Government or of 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

This publication is available as a free download at

http://www.nasa.gov/ebooks

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC
iii

Table of Contents 

Introduction: A Cold War Necessity v

Chapter 1: Designing for High Flight ...................................................................1

Chapter 2: Aquatone and Oilstone .................................................................... 27

Chapter 3: Design Evolution ............................................................................. 53

Chapter 4: The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of ..................................................... 101

Chapter 5: Life Above 50,000 Feet.................................................................. 129

Chapter 6: Flight Operations and Performance .............................................. 153

Chapter 7: The NACA and the U-2 .................................................................. 167

Chapter 8: NASA and the U-2 ......................................................................... 179

Chapter 9: ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons ...................................................... 197

Conclusions 209

Appendix 1: Aircraft Specifications 212

Appendix 2: Production Summary 216

Appendix 3: U-2 Timeline 238

Appendix 4: U-2 Space Shuttle Photography 240

Appendix 5: The Skunk Works Method 242

Bibliography 254

Acknowledgments 263

About the Author 264

Index 265
iv

 A U-2 pilot gazes at the horizon from high altitude. (U.S. Air Force)
v

INTRODUCTION 

A Cold War Necessity 

“There is a certain feeling of courage and hope when you work 

in the field of the air. You instinctively look up, not down. You 

look ahead, not back. You look ahead where the horizons are 

absolutely unlimited.”

– Robert E. Gross, Lockheed Chairman/CEO 1932–1961

On a summer day in 1955, ominous clouds darkened the skies over a remote 

desert valley in the Western United States, reflecting international tensions 

between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In what had 

become known as the Cold War, the two superpowers vied for supremacy in 

the wake of World War II, waging a high-stakes game of brinksmanship as 

each strove to discover the other’s strengths and weaknesses through overt and 

covert means. The next bold step for the U.S. involved a spindly silver airplane, 

innocuously designated U-2, undergoing preparations for its maiden flight in 

the skies above central Nevada. Although this event took place without fanfare 

and in utter obscurity, it heralded the beginning of an aeronautical technology 

program that spanned more than six decades and showcased innovative aircraft 

design and manufacturing techniques. Little did anyone realize at the time that 

what had begun as a tool of Cold War necessity would evolve into a versatile 

reconnaissance and research aircraft.

The U-2 program originated with a national requirement, an unsolicited 

proposal, and studies championed by a panel of notable scientists tasked with 

advising President Dwight D. Eisenhower on how the Nation might defend 

itself against the threat of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. To do this required as 

much intelligence as possible on Soviet capabilities, but the Russian-dominated 

USSR was a closed society that was virtually inaccessible to the outside world.1

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, 

wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.”2

1. Chris Pocock, “Early History of the U-2 Dragon Lady,” Code One Online, February 2002, http://

www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=103, accessed January 15, 2013.

2. Winston Churchill, Maxims and Reflections (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 55.
Unlimited Horizons

vi

The most promising avenue toward solving this riddle was through observation from high above. In a November 1954 memorandum to Allen W. Dulles, 

director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Dr. Edwin Land, founder of 

the Polaroid Company, advocated for development of a reconnaissance aircraft 

to be operated by the CIA with Air Force support. The vehicle, already under 

development by Lockheed Aircraft Company, was described as essentially a 

powered glider. It would accommodate a single pilot and require a range of 

3,000 nautical miles. It would carry a camera capable of resolving objects as 

small as an individual person. To ensure survivability against Soviet surface-toair missiles, the airplane would need to attain altitudes above 70,000 feet. Such 

a platform, he suggested, could provide locations of military and industrial 

installations, allow for a more accurate assessment of the Soviet order of battle, 

and allow estimates of Soviet ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. 

Land recognized that the airplane’s apparent invulnerability was limited. “The 

opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years,” he wrote, “because 

the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses 

for the 70,000-foot region.”3

Designed as a stopgap measure to provide overhead reconnaissance capability during the early years of the Cold War, the versatile U-2 has since evolved to 

meet changing requirements well into the 21st century. Though many authors 

have documented the airplane’s operational history, few have made more than 

a cursory examination of its technical aspects or its role as a NASA research 

platform. This volume includes an overview of the origin and development of 

the Lockheed U-2 family of aircraft with early National Advisory Committee 

for Aeronautics (NACA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) involvement, construction and materials challenges faced by designers and builders, releasable performance characteristics and capabilities, use of 

U-2 and ER-2 airplanes as research platforms, and technical and programmatic 

lessons learned.

3. Edwin H. Land, memorandum to Allen W, Dulles, November 5, 1954, http://www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf, accessed January 23, 2013.

viii

The Martin RB-57D was based on the B-57 light, twin-engine bomber, but with improved 

engines and a longer wingspan. (U.S. Air Force)
1

Designing for High Flight

Air Force officials had been pursuing the idea of high-altitude reconnaissance 

since January 1953, when Bill Lamar and engine specialist Maj. John Seaberg 

of the Wright Air Development Center (WADC) in Ohio drafted a request for 

a design study to develop a highly specialized aircraft that would be produced 

in small numbers. Surprisingly, they recommended bypassing such prominent 

aircraft manufacturers as Lockheed, Boeing, and Convair and instead focusing 

on Bell Aircraft Corporation and Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. 

Their superiors at Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) headquarters agreed that because a relatively small production run was envisioned, 

these smaller companies would likely give the project a higher priority. In order 

to provide an interim, near-term option, they also asked officials at the Martin 

Company to study the possibility of modifying the manufacturer’s B-57 light 

jet bomber with a longer wingspan and improved engines. The three companies were asked to submit results by the end of the year. The study project, 

dubbed Bald Eagle, called for a subsonic aircraft with an operational radius of 

1,500 nautical miles that would be capable of attaining an altitude of 70,000 

feet and carrying a single crewmember and a payload of between 100 and 700 

pounds. It was to be equipped with available production engines (modified, if 

necessary) and have as low a gross weight as possible.1

All three companies had submitted their respective studies by January 1954. 

Martin’s modified B-57 (designated Model 294) featured lengthened wings, 

accommodations for cameras and sensors, and uprated twin engines. Fairchild’s 

M-195 design was powered by a single engine and featured an over-the-fuselage 

intake and stub-boom mounting for the vertical and horizontal tail surfaces. 

Bell offered a delicate-looking, lightweight, twin-engine airplane called the 

Model 67.2

1. Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005), pp. 10–11.

2. Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45 (Hinckley, U.K.: Midland Publishing, 2001), pp. 207–208.

CHAPTER 1
Unlimited Horizons

2

Martin Model 294

In order to expedite construction and testing of an interim reconnaissance 

platform, the Model 294 was built using the standard Martin B-57 light, 

twin-engine bomber as a starting point. Under project Black Knight, designers 

at Martin replaced the stock J65-W-5 engines with two 10,000-pound-thrust 

Pratt & Whitney J57-P-9 turbojets. The airplane’s wingspan was extended 

from 64 feet to 106 feet, expanding the gross wing area to 1,500 square feet. 

By April 1955, the Model 294 had been officially designated the RB-57D and 

an initial order for six airframes had been increased to 20. Three versions were 

built, including the first 13 airframes as a single-seat model equipped with 

several cameras and additional sensor gear located in a bay behind the pilot’s 

station. Martin also built a single RB-57D-1 capable of carrying the AN/

APQ-56 high-resolution, side-looking radar for both daylight and nighttime 

radar-mapping reconnaissance. The final six airframes, designated RB-57D-2, 

carried a second crewmember to operate sensors for gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) data.3

Martin engineers designed an innovative aluminum honeycomb wing structure that was both strong and lightweight. Unfortunately, it proved vulnerable 

to water seepage and wing stress. An accelerated flight-test program in 1955 

and 1956 revealed that the wing spar and some of the skin panels were prone 

to cracking and needed strengthening. The spar was not designed for long 

service life of high dynamic loads, and engineers initially estimated the fatigue 

life of the RB-57D to be fewer than 1,000 flight hours. In fact, several aircraft 

were retired after their wings separated following landing. Fortunately, no such 

incident occurred in flight.4

Fairchild M-195

During the General Configuration Study, designers at Fairchild initially considered a wide variety of possible configurations, from subsonic turboprop-powered 

airplanes with high-aspect-ratio wings to supersonic rocket and ramjet-powered 

vehicles. The supersonic configurations were quickly eliminated due to the 

projected length of time required for design and development. In a preliminary analysis, Fairchild engineers narrowed wing loading to between 10 and 30 

pounds per square foot, and they studied configurations powered by two J57, 

3. Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, TX: Aerofax, 1983), p. 16.

4. Ibid., pp. 16–17.
 Designing for High Flight

3

J67, or J73 engines. This resulted in designs with straight, high-aspect-ratio 

wings and an operational ceiling between 65,000 and 67,200 feet.5

Taking into consideration overall structural weight versus aerodynamic 

gains, the design team ultimately chose a single-engine, J57-powered configuration. It was to be constructed from aluminum using conventional methods 

and as many off-the-shelf components as possible for use with internal electrical 

and environmental control systems. The M-195 featured a pressurized cockpit 

equipped with an ejection seat. A sensor bay was designed to accommodate two 

36-inch equivalent-focal-length (EFL) oblique cameras and two 6-inch EFL 

oblique cameras. The two main landing gear wheels retracted into the wing 

roots in typical fashion, but instead of a nose wheel, the airplane was equipped 

with a steerable tail wheel. The wings, set low on the fuselage, were equipped 

with a gust relief system to elevate the flaps and ailerons when necessary. The 

powerplant installation was highly unconventional for the time, incorporating 

a dorsal inlet just behind and above the cockpit. This arrangement minimized 

intake and exhaust duct lengths to maximize use of available thrust, and at the 

same time, it permitted short pressurization ducts to the cockpit and sensor 

bay, reducing weight and improving efficiency.6

5. Ibid., p. 15.

6. Ibid.

Fairchild M-195. (Jay Miller collection) 
Unlimited Horizons

4

Weight remained a critical factor. Fairchild engineers estimated the empty 

weight of the airframe, including payload and powerplant, to be 10,943 

pounds. Including crew, fuel, and lubricants, the total gross takeoff weight was 

approximately 19,000 pounds. This would allow the M-195 to follow a mission profile that called for initial ascent to 61,100 feet at 150 knots indicated 

airspeed over a distance of 139 miles. The pilot would then climb to an operational cruising altitude of 65,000 feet over a distance of 161 miles. After leveling off and setting a cruise speed of 390 knots true airspeed, the airplane would 

have a range of 1,200 miles to its target. The return trip would be at cruising 

altitude, followed by a spiraling descent as close to home base as desired. The 

landing weight was projected to be approximately 12,106 pounds.7

Bell Model 67

The third entry in the design study was Bell’s Model 67, which eventually came 

to be known as the X-16. Though the Martin RB-57D offered a rapid, low-risk 

response to the need for high-altitude reconnaissance, it was only intended to 

fill the gap until a more capable new design could be fielded. Fairchild’s M-195 

met the proposed requirements, but it was neither as capable as Bell’s entry nor 

less risky than the RB-57D. The X-16 soon emerged as the leader of the pack.

Following official approval by the Air Force in May 1954 and the signing 

of a contract in September, Bell prepared to complete a prototype within 18 

months, followed by production of 27 additional airframes. Led by the company’s chief project engineer, Richard Smith, the Bell team designed the X-16 

to cruise at 70,000 feet with an unrefueled range of 3,300 miles. A payload 

of two 12-inch EFL cameras or two 36-inch EFL cameras would permit photography of everything along a flight path 50 miles wide and up to 795 miles 

long. The extremely lightweight airframe featured high-aspect-ratio wings and 

was powered by two Pratt & Whitney J57-P-31 turbojet engines modified 

for enhanced performance at high altitudes. To reduce weight, the airplane 

had a centerline bicycle landing gear configuration with outrigger wheels to 

provide balance on takeoff and landing. Weight restrictions necessary to support altitude and range requirements further resulted in an extremely flexible 

airframe. This meant that the X-16 had an extremely low structural-dynamic 

envelope that was rated between +3 g’s and –1 g during maneuvering flight. 

Due to structural flexibility, engineers predicted that the wings—spanning 

nearly 115 feet—would suffer aeroelastic divergence as they reached critical 

7. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
 Designing for High Flight

5

Mach number.8 The designers attempted to mitigate this concern by giving 

the wings a quarter-chord sweep angle of 15 degrees and moving the ailerons inboard from the wingtips. The pressurized cockpit was equipped with 

standard instruments, an ejection seat, a periscopic sextant for navigation, a 

control stick like in a fighter plane, and all necessary equipment for operating 

the reconnaissance systems. Empty weight was expected to be 23,330 pounds, 

with a gross takeoff weight of 36,200 pounds fully fueled.9

Construction of the X-16 prototype progressed smoothly for the first 12 

months, but events in Washington, DC, and Burbank, CA, were about to have 

a profound effect on the airplane’s future and that of Bell. First, CIA officials 

had learned of the Air Force study and argued that clandestine reconnaissance 

over denied territory should be a function of a civilian intelligence agency 

rather than of a military service. Second, Lockheed chief designer Clarence 

L. “Kelly” Johnson had also learned of the project and decided to submit an 

unsolicited proposal of his own.10

8. The lowest Mach number at which local airflow over some point on the airfoil reaches the speed 

of sound, even though the aircraft itself has an airspeed less than Mach 1.0.

9. Miller, Lockheed U-2, pp. 17–18.

10. Miller, The X-Planes, pp. 208–209.

A model of the Bell X-16 with an F-86 fighter for comparison. (Jay Miller collection)
Unlimited Horizons

6

Lockheed CL-282

Shortly after Lamar and Seaberg drafted their request, someone at the Pentagon 

informed Johnson of the Air Force study and Lockheed’s exclusion from it. He 

managed to get a copy of the program requirements and quickly developed 

a concept for an airplane capable of attaining a maximum altitude of 73,000 

feet with an operating radius of 1,400 miles from the beginning of a cruise 

climb starting at about 65,000 feet. Gross takeoff weight was to be just 13,768 

pounds, including a 600-pound camera payload. To reduce weight, the airplane 

would have no undercarriage, taking off from a ground cart and landing on 

a skid attached to the lower fuselage. In December 1953, Johnson assigned 

engineers Phil Coleman and Gene Frost to develop procedures for lightening 

the airframe and increasing its wing area for maximum altitude capability.11

They were soon joined by Henry Combs, a talented structural engineer and 

accomplished sailplane pilot.12

Johnson’s new design, called the CL-282, was based on his XF-104 fighter 

interceptor. Although the fighter was optimized for high-speed flight in the 

Mach 2 range, Johnson realized that he could save time and expense by maximizing use of the original XF-104 design and manufacturing experience. He 

simply eliminated all unnecessary requirements such as fighter load factor, 

armament, and landing gear, while retaining the general fuselage and tail 

configuration. Johnson completely redesigned the wings and shortened the 

fuselage, but this resulted in only minor local changes to the loft lines, and 

it was possible to reuse all of the basic XF-104 tooling jigs as well as most 

of the detail jigs.13

The greatest challenge was reducing overall structural weight in order to 

allow the airplane to perform the desired mission while carrying a 600-pound, 

non-jettisonable payload. Structurally, the CL-282 fuselage was virtually identical to that of the XF-104 except for the deletion of a 62-inch section of the 

fuselage behind the cockpit. Since the CL-282 was designed for a maneuvering 

load factor of 2.5 g’s as compared to 7.33 g’s on the XF-104, fuselage strength 

requirements were reduced, allowing for reduced material gauges (i.e., aircraft 

11. Kelly Johnson, “Log for Project X,” Lockheed California Company, December 1953. This was the 

designer’s personal diary of activities during design and development of the U-2. All information 

is from the author’s copy, retyped from a copy in the Chris Pocock collection.

12. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 11–12.

13. Jay Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1993), p. 213. 

Appendix I of Miller’s book contains the entire text of Kelly Johnson’s “CL-282 High Altitude 

Aircraft,” Lockheed Report LR-9732, 1954.
 Designing for High Flight

7

skin and structural members could be manufactured from thinner aluminum 

stock). Shortening the fuselage eliminated 3,990 pounds of fuel weight and, 

along with the removal of armament, necessitated moving the engine forward 

562 inches to compensate for the change in the center of gravity. With the 

powerplant located in line with the wings (which also contained the fuel load), 

the 1-g bending moments of the fuselage were well below those of the XF-104, 

and tail loads were reduced. Elimination of landing gear bays also made it easier 

to shift the engine forward, but it was necessary to alter the shape and position 

of the inlet ducts to accommodate the change in engine position and improve 

airflow efficiency at lower airspeeds. The forward bulkhead of a 75-gallon sump 

tank between the inlet ducts also served to transfer fuselage shear loading to the 

outside contour of the duct assemblies. Basic fuselage joints, including those 

for mating the wings and tail, remained the same as on the XF-104, and the 

CL-282 retained the fighter’s T-tail empennage configuration. The speed brakes 

were also retained. In place of landing gear, the airplane was equipped with an 

abrasion-resistant scuff strip approximately 15 inches wide and extending the 

full length of the bottom of the fuselage.

In the forward fuselage, the crew accommodations were radically revised. 

The original XF-104 cockpit included a downward ejection seat that, in the 

event of an emergency, could be jettisoned through an escape hatch. Because 

bailout velocities were expected to be low for the CL-282, the ejection seat 

The Lockheed CL-282 was based on the F-104 Starfighter but had a significantly longer wingspan. (Lockheed Martin)
Unlimited Horizons

8

and escape hatch were eliminated altogether and replaced with a simple 

bucket seat. This meant that the pilot would have to open the hinged canopy 

and climb out. The cockpit was pressurized to provide an equivalent pressure 

altitude of 25,000 feet when the airplane was operating above 70,000 feet. 

Pressurization was supplied by bleed air from the engine. Since a cockpit altitude of 25,000 feet necessitated the pilot’s use of a pressure-demand oxygen 

system throughout the flight, the pilot was equipped with a partial-pressure 

suit and a 7-hour supply of oxygen.14

Johnson conducted a limited study of wing configurations in search of 

the optimum planform. While considering the airplane’s overall weight and 

balance characteristics, he sought to determine the minimum area and aspect 

ratio necessary for achieving a maximum altitude of 75,000 feet. The result 

was a configuration featuring thin, straight, high-aspect-ratio wings spanning 

70 feet, with a total area of 500 square feet. Unlike in most conventional 

designs, the wings lacked a carry-through structure and were simply bolted 

onto the fuselage ring frames. This limited the airplane’s maneuver load 

factor considerably, but Johnson included an innovative span-load distribution control system. When flying at higher speeds or in turbulent conditions 

at altitudes up to 35,000 feet, the wing control surfaces could be raised (4 

degrees for flaps and 10 degrees for ailerons) to reduce bending moments and 

tail loads by moving the wing’s center of pressure inboard. Otherwise, the 

wing was of a conventional two-cell construction with the beam located at 

approximately 48 percent of chord. It was designed to resist bending moment 

in each surface by way of spanwise stringers originating at the main fuselage 

frame joints. A structural rib in the wing root distributed wing torsion to 

the fuselage frames. The wings also contained nylon bladder fuel tanks with 

internal ties to prevent deformation of the airfoil with changes in vapor 

pressure. Small, replaceable wingtip skids provided protection for the ends 

of the wings, and the ailerons, during landing.

Three engine candidates were considered in lieu of the stock General 

Electric J79 turbojet. The General Electric J73-X-52 weighed 3,150 pounds 

and produced 8,920 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption (pounds per hour/pounds of thrust) of 0.917. At 75,000 feet and 

Mach 0.75, it would have provided 398 pounds of thrust and a specific fuel 

consumption of 1.377, giving the airplane a maximum speed of 495 knots 

at cruise altitude. The Rolls Royce Avon RA.14 weighed 2,897 pounds and 

produced 9,500 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption 

of 0.840. At maximum cruise conditions, it would have provided 385 pounds 

14. Ibid.
 Designing for High Flight

9

of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.372. Finally, the Wright TJ3B1 

weighed 2,720 pounds and produced 7,800 pounds of thrust at sea level, with 

a specific fuel consumption of 0.880. At cruise, it would have provided 339 

pounds of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.340. Although the Rolls 

Royce engine demonstrated superior performance on the basis of sea level static 

ratings, Johnson selected the J73-X-52 because of its superior performance at 

altitude and ease of adaptation to the XF-104 fuselage.15

Johnson submitted his CL-282 design study to Col. Bernard Schriever at 

the Pentagon in March 1954. Schriever expressed great interest and requested 

a more specific proposal. A month later Johnson met with senior Pentagon 

officials, including several Air Force generals who were not particularly enthusiastic. ARDC Commander Lt. Gen. Donald Putt and his staff had completed an 

evaluation of industry studies that had been generated by the Bald Eagle project, and they agreed with Maj. Seaberg’s recommendation that the proposed 

airplane be equipped with two engines. The CL-282 had only one, as did the 

Fairchild M-195. Shortly after the April meeting, Martin was given immediate 

approval to proceed with the RB-57D. In early June 1954, despite lobbying by 

advocates within the Air Force Development and Advanced Planning office, 

Air Force Headquarters rejected the Lockheed proposal because it was too 

unconventional and had only a single engine, and they were already committed to the Martin program.16

All was not lost, however. Trevor Gardner, assistant secretary of the Air 

Force for Research and Development, had been most impressed with Johnson’s 

CL-282 presentation. In May 1954, Gardener and two colleagues briefed leading CIA intelligence analyst Philip Strong on the CL-282 and the Bald Eagle 

designs. They asked him if the CIA might be interested in the CL-282 even if 

the Air Force was not. Strong subsequently discussed the idea with members 

of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 

some of whom thought the RB-57D was too heavy and that a lighter, singleengine design might be better suited to the proposed mission. With Cold 

War tensions high, the Eisenhower administration commissioned a panel of 

top-level experts to study the Soviet threat. The intelligence subpanel chaired 

by Edwin Land included Jim Baker of Harvard University Observatory and 

physics Nobel Laureate Ed Purcell from Harvard. Strong briefed the Land 

Panel on the CL-282 and soon found allies.17

15. Ibid.

16. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 13.

17. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
Unlimited Horizons

10

In September, Bell Aircraft received a contract to build the X-16. During 

a visit to the Bell plant, Baker and Allen Donovan from Cornell Aeronautical 

Laboratory were not impressed. Donovan felt that, by comparison, the 

Lockheed design offered the same or better overall performance at almost onethird the gross weight. Meanwhile, Land lobbied aggressively for the CL-282 

while encouraging innovative ideas for reducing payload weight. Every extra 

pound meant 2 feet of altitude lost.18

Donovan briefed members of the Intelligence Systems Panel on the merits 

of the CL-282 and defined three requirements for a high-altitude spy plane: a 

single engine, a sailplane-type wing, and low structural load factors. Air Force 

proponents of the X-16 had argued that a second engine would allow the pilot 

to keep the plane aloft in the event of a single engine failure, but Donovan 

argued that it could only do so at an altitude that made it vulnerable to hostile ground fire. Single-engine aircraft were both lighter and historically more 

reliable than multi-engine aircraft. Stressing the absolute need to fly above 

70,000 feet in order to avoid intercept, he noted that in the thin upper atmosphere, the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6 percent of its 

sea-level thrust. The solution, he said, was to incorporate a high-aspect-ratio, 

low-induced-drag wing of the type used on sailplanes. Finally, he added that 

low structural load factors would reduce the airplane’s overall gross weight. 

Donovan explained that aircraft built to military standards were engineered 

for combat maneuvers. Strengthening wings and other structures to withstand 

high speeds and sharp turns would add extra weight to the airframe and would 

be unnecessary considering the proposed mission profile. In short, a successful design required a delicate balance of thrust, lift, and weight. The Air Force 

study had resulted in designs that were altogether too conventional to meet 

the necessary requirements. The only viable candidate, Donovan insisted, was 

Lockheed’s CL-282.19

Donovan’s arguments won support for the CL-282, but that did not generate funds for Lockheed to pursue the concept. The Air Force was already 

committed to the Martin and Bell programs, so funding for Lockheed had to 

come from another source. The Land Panel offered a solution.20

Land and Gardner met with CIA Director Allen Dulles in late October in 

an effort to convince him that not only was it imperative that the CL-282 be 

built, but that its development and operation should not be entrusted to the 

18. Ibid., p. 16.

19. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974 

(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 25–26.

20. Ibid., p. 26.
 Designing for High Flight

11

Air Force. Dulles was initially skeptical that the agency should involve itself 

with such a major technical development effort, but Land insisted that the CIA 

had a right to pioneer scientific techniques for intelligence collection. Further, 

he emphasized that the civilian agency would be better suited to conducting 

covert reconnaissance missions. Land noted the urgency of proceeding swiftly, 

since “the opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, because the 

Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for 

the 70,000-foot region.”21

Next, Land and Presidential science advisor James Killian met with 

President Eisenhower. Despite knowing of the Air Force commitments, the 

president approved development of the CL-282. Eisenhower agreed that the 

new reconnaissance program should be controlled by the CIA and stipulated 

that it should be handled in an unconventional way so as to avoid bureaucratic 

entanglements and interservice rivalries. The strong advocacy of Killian and 

the distinguished scientists of the various advisory committees, combined with 

Eisenhower’s support, ultimately won over Dulles, but some Air Force officials 

feared the decision to build the CL-282 put both the RB-57 and X-16 in 

jeopardy. The Air Force had already rejected Lockheed’s design because of its 

single engine and because the X-16 offered a more conventional configuration 

as well as a more versatile platform that could be used in multiple military roles. 

Following additional discussions with Allen Donovan, Gen. Putt met with 15 

scientists from the Technological Capabilities Panel and Maj. Seaberg from 

WADC, who briefed the group on all four aircraft proposals. Comparing their 

capabilities, Seaberg noted that the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were 

comparable aerodynamically and that Martin’s modified airframe was somewhat less capable overall. He stated that in his opinion, the CL-282’s General 

Electric J73 engine would be insufficient for attaining the necessary altitude. 

Replacing the J73 with the Pratt & Whitney J57, however, would make the 

CL-282 competitive with both the Bell and Fairchild entries. One significant 

advantage of Lockheed’s design was that Kelly Johnson had promised that his 

airplane would be flying by August 1955. Bell was not expected to deliver the 

first X-16 until the spring of 1956. Ultimately, Johnson was authorized to go 

ahead with the CL-282, but the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 until 

Lockheed’s airplane completed its first flight.22

21. Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward The Unknown (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2000), p. 17.

22. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 33–35.
Unlimited Horizons

12

Building the Team

On November 26, 1954, Allen Dulles assigned his special assistant, Richard 

Bissell, to take charge of the CL-282 development effort, which was designated 

Project Aquatone. Among Bissell’s first tasks were arranging for money from 

the CIA’s Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project started and finding ways 

to divert Air Force materiel to the program. Because security was paramount, 

he made the Aquatone project staff self-sufficient with its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistical, communications, and security 

personnel. Col. Osmond J. 

Ritland was assigned as Air 

Force liaison to the project and worked closely with 

Bissell. With Ritland’s help, 

a number of J57 engines procured by the Air Force for use 

in the B-52, KC-135, F-100, 

and RB-57 were diverted for 

use in the CL-282 in order 

to prevent a separate contract with Pratt & Whitney 

from jeopardizing program 

security.23 Kelly Johnson 

had promised Bissell that 

he could deliver the first airplane in just 8 months, but he 

had also been pressured into 

making significant design changes. The final configuration had been scaled up 

from the original CL-282 and now included landing gear. The sharply pointed 

XF-104 nose had been blunted and the XF-104’s T-tail replaced with a more 

conventional arrangement. The new design eventually received a deceptive 

designation identifying it as a utility aircraft: U-2.24

In early December, Johnson began assembling a team of engineers and 

manufacturing personnel. He assigned Dick Boehme to assist him as project 

engineer and supervisor, and together they selected two dozen engineers for 

specialized design work. The task was made more difficult because they had 

to pull these workers from other Lockheed projects without being able to tell 

23. Ibid., p. 40.

24. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 18.

The CIA placed Richard Bissell in charge of the 

Aquatone program. (CIA)
 Designing for High Flight

13

their former supervisors why.25 Each worker was selected for a particular specialty. Chan Engelbry worked out the aerodynamics while Carl Allmon and 

Alvin Jensen drafted the airplane’s loft lines. Henry Combs, Ray McHenry, and 

Richard Hruda were tasked with calculating stress, and Lorne Cass calculated 

loads. Bob Wiele, Bill Bissell, Robert Kelly, and Royal Dow designed the wing 

structure. Two men were assigned to design the tail assembly, Herb Nystrom 

(vertical stabilizer) and Rod Kreimendahl (horizontal stabilizer). Ed Baldwin, 

Leroy English, Jack Painter, and Ray Kirkham designed various parts of the 

fuselage with additional help from Dave Robertson, who also developed the 

fuel system. Dan Zuck designed the cockpit. Cornelius Gardner designed the 

airplane’s unique landing gear. The systems group included Vern Bremberg 

(hydraulics), Cliff Rockel and Sam Murphy (electrical), Vic Sorenson and 

George Ellison (controls), Ed Martin (reconnaissance systems), Doug Cone (air 

conditioning), and Elmer Gath (propulsion). Pete Gurin, John Henning, and 

Richard Lutz performed static testing. Leon Gavette designed various ground 

handling equipment, and Bob Charlton wrote the first technical manuals. Art 

Vierick was in charge of the manufacturing group, which included assembly 

foreman John Wanamaker, Bob Hunter, Charles Van Der Zee, and Tommy 

McCoy.26 Johnson’s team initially toiled 45 hours per week, but even after the 

staff grew to more than 80 people, work increased to 65 hours per week.27

Due to the need for extreme secrecy, the original U-2 manufacturing team 

worked within Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects division, informally known as the Skunk Works.28 This elite organization had been established 

during World War II to develop the P-80 Shooting Star, one of the Nation’s 

first jet aircraft, and eventually served as the company’s rapid prototyping and 

development unit. Its early success was due in large part to Kelly Johnson’s insistence that his engineers and draftsmen be located not more than 50 feet from 

the assembly floor. Construction difficulties and other problems could then be 

immediately brought to the attention of the appropriate design or manufacturing personnel. Paperwork was kept to a minimum, with no emphasis on neatly 

typed memorandums. In order to keep the project moving quickly, engineers 

simply made pencil notations directly on their original drawings. As a result, 

25. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 43.

26. Henry G. Combs, “U-2 Design and Fabrication,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, 

the U-2 History Symposium, National Defense University, Fort McNair, DC, September 1998, pp. 3–5.

27. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 43.

28. The Skunk Works was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known as the Skonk Works in 

Al Capp’s Lil’ Abner cartoon strip. The nickname, coined by Lockheed engineer Irv Culver, was 

altered slightly to avoid copyright infringement.
Unlimited Horizons

14

Kelly Johnson, center, believed that managers, engineers, and shop personnel should interact as 

closely as possible in order to solve problems quickly. (Lockheed Martin)

Manufacturing crews assemble U-2 components. For security reasons, staffing was kept to a 

minimum. (Lockheed Martin)
 Designing for High Flight

15

problems could be resolved in a matter of hours rather than days or weeks.29

This management technique was ideally suited to the U-2 design effort and 

became a hallmark of Lockheed’s future programs.

Performance and payload were the driving factors behind the U-2 design. 

To ensure that the airplane would meet required specifications, for example, 

Al Robinson had to address challenges of reducing airframe and equipment 

weight. The U-2 configuration’s higher gross weight compared to that of the 

original CL-282 threatened altitude performance. Lamenting this problem, 

Johnson once told his engineering staff that he would trade his grandmother for 

a 10-pound weight reduction. Subsequently, Robinson and the other engineers 

started referring to pounds as “grandmothers,” as they struggled to eliminate 

unnecessary weight from the airframe and systems.30 The desired gross weight 

needed to be 1.5 times the weight of the powerplant. Ultimately, even with 

the addition of a drag chute for landing, a 300 percent increase in the oxygen 

supply capacity, improved brakes, and an autopilot, the final gross takeoff 

weight was within 10 pounds of the original proposal.31

Henry Combs was impressed by the skill and efficiency demonstrated by 

various team members. To keep things moving, estimates were used when 

firm data were unavailable. As soon as more accurate data became available, 

work based on the estimates was modified as necessary. Staffing was kept to 

the absolute minimum necessary to accomplish any given task, and workers 

were allowed to do their jobs with as little interference as possible. Combs also 

admired the supervisory skills of Johnson’s “backup genius,” Dick Boehme, 

noting that his “engineering judgment was excellent and his ability to keep 

everyone in harmony with Kelly was extremely important.”32

Building the Plane

Having promised delivery of 20 flyable airframes to the CIA at a cost of $22.5 

million, Johnson next addressed challenges posed by the need for secrecy and 

the logistics involved in constructing the revolutionary airplane. Program security was ensured through various means. First, the original U-2 manufacturing 

29. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 45.

30. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 18.

31. Don Downie and Jim Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel, a 16-millimeter film documentary 

produced by Hycon Mfg. Co. for the CIA in April 1957. Declassified in 2006, Roadrunners 

Internationale collection.

32. Combs, “U-2 Design and Fabrication,” pp. 3–5.
Unlimited Horizons

16

and development team was segregated in a remote corner of the Lockheed 

plant in Burbank, CA. Production facilities there were limited, so when the Air 

Force ordered 25 airframes, a second manufacturing plant was established at 

Oildale, near Bakersfield. Security constraints meant that normal subcontracting procedures were virtually impossible. Procurement of materials involved 

using sterilized drawings (with certain information redacted) and purchase 

orders; deliveries were routed to various inconspicuous locations.33 Financing 

was handled under a special account separate from normal Lockheed channels. Dummy company names were established for use when dealing with 

outside vendors. Depending on what was being purchased, vendors might 

sign a contract with C&J Manufacturing Company (using Kelly Johnson’s 

initials), J.E. Ramsey Company (named for Lockheed’s purchasing manager), 

or B.V. Ward (named for Dick Boehme, Art Vierick, and George Welty). Only 

a senior executive from each vendor had been briefed to know the real identity 

of the customer. Specially cleared drivers picked up items from vendors using 

33. Ibid., pp. 2–5.

The first 20 airframes were built at Lockheed’s plant at Burbank Airport. (Lockheed Martin)
 Designing for High Flight

17

unmarked trucks, delivering them to Burbank or Oildale. Correspondence was 

handled through a post office box outside of Burbank, and all communications 

with the customer took place via secure comlink.34

Approximately 87 percent of each airframe built in Burbank was fabricated 

within a single building. Metal components were fed through the company’s 

main presses at night and on Sundays, then hidden from day-shift workers not 

cleared into the program. At peak production of the first 50 airframes, only 600 

people were involved at both the Burbank and Oildale plants.35 The designers 

and builders employed unorthodox methods with regard to engineering drawings and procedures. Typical company standards were abandoned—sometimes 

resulting in oversize drawings more than 20 feet long—and military specifications (Mil-Spec) served only as a design guide, but were not strictly followed. 

If a part had to be sent to an outside machine shop, accompanying drawings were sanitized of any information revealing the airplane’s configuration. 

Personnel had access only to the minimum knowledge necessary to do their 

jobs. At the lowest level, vendor employees knew only that they were building 

an airplane, but they knew nothing about its configuration or mission. The 

midlevel included those who assembled partial or complete airframes and saw 

them loaded aboard cargo planes bound for unknown destinations. At the 

highest access level, there were only a few people who knew the identity of the 

customer, the test location, operational capabilities, and the overall mission. 

Workers were briefed to tell no one, not even family members, what they were 

doing. At Johnson’s direction, no paperwork or blueprints were ever marked 

SECRET lest the label call attention to the documents in the event they fell 

into the hands of unauthorized persons. According to one former worker, 

“Kelly said that marking a document Top Secret was telling the enemy exactly 

what was most important to steal. Documents and drawings had no company 

or security markings. Everything was done within physically secured areas. We 

never talked about the program away from work.”36

Every morning, Johnson met with each member of his team to discuss any 

problems from the previous day and take any necessary corrective action.37 In 

order to streamline manufacturing operations, there was no formal configuration control board. Engineering drawings were released directly to assembly or 

functional system supervisors who were responsible for planning any necessary 

34. Ray Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” Star Dusters Newsletter, September 

2003, p. 9.

35. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.

36. Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” pp. 9–10.

37. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
Unlimited Horizons

18

work and making a bill of material (a list of raw materials, subassemblies, 

intermediate assemblies, subcomponents, parts, and quantities of each needed 

to manufacture an end product). Each supervisor followed the design process 

from the beginning and maintained close contact with designers, thus ensuring that each component or assembly could be produced in volume (known 

as a producibility function) and providing greater opportunity to review or 

check engineering drawings before final release. As a result of schedule pressure 

and philosophical differences, engineering and manufacturing personnel often 

engaged in heated discussions, but always with mutual respect. Tooling and 

assembly supervisors coordinated an informal system for tool design. Throughout 

the manufacturing process, mockup and development mechanics were responsible for fabricating parts as well as assembling them. One noted that, “Some may 

say that this can only work for a prototype or small number of aircraft, but this 

was successful for production of more than 50 of the original U-2s.”38

Johnson’s U-2 design, finalized by January 1955, was a model of simplicity 

and innovation. The airframe was constructed primarily of aluminum alloys 

machined to the thinnest gauges allowable within structural strength requirements. Skin thickness varied from just 0.020 to 0.063 of an inch. Structural 

stiffening consisted of the fewest possible number of ribs, stringers, and doubler 

38. Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” p. 10.

Lockheed established a second U-2 production line in Oildale to build airframes for the Air 

Force. (Lockheed Martin)
 Designing for High Flight

19

plates. All skin panels were flush riveted and the control surfaces aerodynamically 

balanced, with virtually no gaps at any of the hinge points. All aerodynamic control surfaces were cable operated. To further reduce weight, the hydraulic system 

was simplified and none of the primary flight controls were hydromechanically 

boosted. Johnson spent 2 days designing lightweight landing gear consisting of 

a bicycle arrangement with a double-wheel main gear and a small tail wheel, 

The final U-2 design configuration was a study in elegant simplicity and technical innovation. (CIA)
Unlimited Horizons

20

both mounted along the centerline.39 The landing gear assembly weighed just 

257 pounds. By comparison, conventional tricycle gear on a comparable aircraft 

would typically weigh about 750 pounds and occupy valuable space inside the 

wings that, on the U-2, was used to increase fuel capacity. This careful engineering of weight and space considerations resulted in an extra 1,500 feet of altitude 

capability and an additional 100 miles of cruising radius.40 To maintain lateral 

balance during takeoff, the wingtips were equipped with mid-span outriggers, or 

pogos—small rubber wheels on the ends of curved steel legs that dropped away 

as soon as the plane became airborne. Skid plates on the wingtips protected the 

airfoils during landing.

The single J57 engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system. With 

the engine located at mid–wing chord for balance, the main gear well had to be 

placed between the air intake ducts, which was further forward than desirable. 

Engineers faced a challenge in designing the ducts because at cruise altitude the 

engine needed near perfect ram-air distribution in order to function. After trying 

a variety of options, the final duct configuration provided airflow comparable 

to that of a ground-based engine test cell.41

39. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 19.

40. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.

41. Ibid.

U-2 forward fuselage assemblies under construction. (Lockheed Martin)
 Designing for High Flight

21

To expedite flight testing, early U-2 flights were made with a 10,500-poundthrust J57-P-37 engine designed for use in the B-52. Pratt & Whitney engineers 

spent 12 months developing the 11,500-pound-thrust J57-P-31 specifically 

for the U-2 in an accelerated program that normally would have taken up to 

3 years. The new engine had a 16-stage compressor and operated at full power 

for the duration of flight. Fuel consumption was 9,000 pounds per hour at 

sea level, dropping to 700 pounds per hour at 70,000 feet cruising altitude. 

The J57-P-31 was designed to operate at up to nearly 74,600 feet before succumbing to oxygen starvation. With the earlier J57-P-37, the U-2 sometimes 

experienced as many as six flameouts at cruise altitude in a single flight. Louis 

Setter, one of the first U-2 instructor pilots, recalled that, “There were literally 

hundreds of high-altitude flameouts with the P-37 engine during early test and 

pilot training flights, but nearly all of these culminated in successful airstarts.” 

Setter also observed that on one memorable day, “I had two students coming 

in with flameouts and one Lockheed test pilot still at altitude with a flameout, 

all at the same time.”42

With the improved fuel system and turbine design of the J57-P-31, the 

flameout problem virtually ceased. An improved ignition system also allowed 

for restart at high altitude, eliminating the need to descend to a lower altitude, 

where the U-2 would be vulnerable to hostile fire. Even with the J57-P-37, 

there were only two forced landings due to engine failure in the first 20 months 

(more than 5,000 flight hours) of U-2 operations.43

The fuselage interior was plain and uncluttered. A pressurized compartment just forward of the main gear, known as the Q-bay, contained reconnaissance equipment. Ed Martin devised a system for installing and removing 

payloads using pallets mounted on interchangeable hatches that fitted flush to 

the bottom of the Q-bay. A second hatch on top of the Q-bay allowed access 

for maintenance and installation/removal activities. With the Q-bay consisting 

largely of empty space, only the mid-fuselage spar supported the cockpit and 

nose section. The small, cramped crew station looked like a fighter cockpit—a 

holdover from the XF-104/CL-282 design—but featured a control yoke of the 

type used in bombers and transports. Cables and pulleys linked the yoke to the 

ailerons, and a similar arrangement connected the rudder to two pedals. The 

instrument panel contained an assortment of conventional dials and switches, 

but it was dominated in the center by a hooded driftsight—a downward-looking periscope that allowed the pilot to see beneath the aircraft.44 Designed by 

42. Louis C. Setter, correspondence with author, March 22, 2014.

43. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.

44. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 19–20.
Unlimited Horizons

22

James Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, this optical system 

served as a navigational aid, enabling pilots to spot and recognize landmarks on 

the ground.45 By turning a knob on the instrument panel, the pilot could flip a 

mirror and convert the periscope to a sextant, viewing the sky through a small 

glass hemisphere on the airplane’s nose, just ahead of the cockpit. Celestial 

navigation was routinely used by U-2 pilots and was quite accurate at high 

altitudes, as long as the autopilot was operational.46 The lightweight canopy 

(stressed to handle a pressure differential of 5 pounds per square inch [psi]) 

was hinged on the left side and operated manually. There was no ejection seat 

or canopy jettison system. In the event of emergency, the pilot was expected to 

manually unlatch the canopy and bail out. The airplane’s empennage was built 

as a single unit that included the aft fuselage, vertical tail with rudder, and two 

horizontal stabilizers. For ease of assembly, the entire setup was joined to the 

forward fuselage using just three 5/8-inch tension bolts.47

When Johnson calculated new specifications for the wings, including a 

2.5-g load limit and an aspect ratio of 10.67, it resulted in a wingspan of 80 

feet and a total area of 600 square feet, a 20-percent increase over the original 

CL-282 specifications. The new wing featured three-spar construction and 

45. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 56.

46. Setter, correspondence with author.

47. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 20.

Workers assemble U-2 wings in Oildale. (Lockheed Martin)
 Designing for High Flight

23

retained Johnson’s gust control feature, but Bob Wiele replaced conventional 

rib stiffeners with an unusual latticework of aluminum tubing. The gust control 

system, which allowed the flaps to tilt upward 4 degrees and the ailerons to tilt 

10 degrees, was designed to reduce tail loads and wing bending in turbulent 

conditions by completely changing the airfoil characteristics.48 The long, thin 

wings were among the most efficient in the world, with a lift-to-drag ratio 

of 25.6:1, better than many competition sailplanes. From an altitude of 

70,000 feet, the U-2 could glide approximately 300 miles.49

Four integral fuel tanks—two leak-proof compartments in each wing—

carried a total of 1,335 gallons, which fed into a fuselage sump tank before 

reaching the engine. The outer 6 feet of wing was not used for fuel storage. 

In 1957, the U-2 was equipped with two 100-gallon slipper tanks that 

could be installed on the wings when a mission called for additional range 

capability. Weight and balance during flight were among the most important considerations when designing the fuel system. A complex system of 

feed lines and valves enabled the pilot to transfer fuel to maintain aircraft 

trim as fuel was consumed. Unfortunately, this made it impossible to provide the pilot with a standard full-to-empty type of quantity gauge in the 

cockpit. Instead, the first 49 U-2 aircraft came equipped with a mechanical 

fuel totalizer/counter. Prior to engine start, counters were set to indicate the 

amount of fuel in each wing, and a flow meter then subtracted the actual 

number of gallons of fuel consumed during the flight. A warning light 

came on when the quantity was down to 50 gallons in the sump tank. As 

standard practice, the pilot maintained a plot of fuel and oxygen remaining 

versus elapsed time.50

Proper fuel was also critical. Ordinary jet fuel, JP-4, had such a low 

vapor pressure that it would boil off during operation at high altitudes. 

Fortunately, help came from retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, a 

vice president of Shell Oil Company and also a member of the Technological 

Capabilities Panel. Thanks to Doolittle’s intervention, Shell set to work to 

develop a low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure, kerosene-based fuel that met 

specifications.51 The result, known variously as LF-1A and as JP-TS, was a 

broad mixture of aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbon compounds with an 

initial boiling point of 315 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) at sea level and a freezing 

48. Ibid.

49. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.

50. Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing Company, 

2001), pp. 61–62.

51. Ibid., p. 62.
Unlimited Horizons

24

point of 164 °F.52 Production of LF-1A had an unintended consequence to U.S. 

consumers in the spring and summer of 1955. Manufacturing the special fuel 

required the use of petroleum products that Shell normally used to make the 

company’s Flit insect repellent spray. In order to supply the U-2 program with 

several hundred thousand gallons of LF-1A, Shell had to limit production of Flit, 

causing a nationwide shortage.53

The tendency of liquids to boil at high altitudes also had a significant effect 

on the design of life-support systems for the U-2. Fluids in the human body 

will vaporize at altitudes above 63,000 feet unless the body is kept under pressure. Without special life-support garments, reduced atmospheric pressure at 

typical cruise altitudes also threatened to place considerable stress on the pilot’s 

cardiovascular system and prevent adequate oxygenation of the blood. During 

cruise, the U-2 cockpit was pressurized to the equivalent of 28,000 feet above 

sea level. Since symptoms of hypoxia can be experienced when as low as 12,000 

feet, the pilot was required to wear a partial-pressure suit (i.e., a garment that only 

52. E.R. Kinkead, C.L. Gaworski, C.D. Flemming, et al., “Tumorigenic Evaluation of Jet Fuels JP-TS 

and JP-7,” U.S. Air Force, AL-TR-1991-0020, April 1991, pp. 11–12.

53. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 62.

Two workers prepare to attach the vertical tail, foreground, while others inspect the engine and 

tailpipe assembly. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
 Designing for High Flight

25

pressurizes certain critical parts of the body) that provided oxygen to the helmet at 

all times and inflated if cockpit pressure altitude increased to above 28,000 feet.54

By the third week of May 1955, the fuselage assembly was out of the jigs, but 

the wings were way behind schedule. Johnson was worried about instability due 

to bending, and Bob Kelly had not yet completed his design for the ailerons. In 

an effort to make up for lost time, Johnson drove his people harder than ever 

and had shifts working round the clock. By early June, the static test article was 

complete. Stress analysis of the fuselage, landing gear, and wings indicated that 

predicted critical load limits were fairly accurate. The horizontal tail required 

strengthening, but otherwise Johnson’s design had passed the first test. In July, 

after the wings were completed and installed, Johnson spent 3 days inspecting 

the prototype, which was known simply as Article 341.55 Workers then removed 

the wings and tail, carefully packed the various components, and loaded them 

into a C-124 transport.56 The Article was nearly ready to fly.

54. Ibid., pp. 62–63.

55. Lockheed gave each airframe a three-digit production serial number, known as the Article number. 

This was completely separate from Air Force serial numbers or civilian registration numbers.

56. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 24–25.

A C-124 transport ferried the U-2 to the test site for final assembly. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
26

After being completely reassembled, Article 341 was ready for testing. (Lockheed Martin)
27

Aquatone and Oilstone 

While the airplane was being built, key personnel sought to establish a 

secure test site. In April 1955, Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier flew Johnson, 

Richard Bissell, and Ritland to a dry lakebed adjacent to the Atomic Energy 

Commission’s (AEC) proving ground north of Las Vegas, NV. With its remote 

location, excellent year-round flying weather, and the fact that the airspace 

overhead was already governed by AEC security restrictions, it was ideally 

suited to the U-2 project. Upon returning to Washington, Bissell and Ritland 

took immediate steps to have the lakebed and its environs added to the proving 

ground. Johnson drew up a plan for a small, temporary facility with a 5,000-

foot asphalt runway, a control tower, three hangars, an aircraft parking apron, 

miscellaneous support facilities, and rudimentary personnel accommodations. 

Construction of what became known as Watertown Airstrip began the following month and, shortly thereafter, Lockheed, CIA, and Air Force personnel 

began moving in. Arrangements were made to acquire a C-47 transport and 

two T-33 jet trainers as support aircraft.1

Early development and operation of the U-2 was a joint effort. Lockheed 

was exclusively responsible for construction and developmental testing. The 

CIA had overall control of the program, which was codenamed Aquatone, 

as well as responsibility for developing security protocols and paying for airframes and camera equipment. The Air Force provided support in myriad 

ways, including supplying engines, ground support equipment, maintenance 

and training personnel, air traffic controllers, and transportation for workers 

to the test site. Air Force officials chose to name their part of the program 

Oilstone.2 This was but a foreshadowing of the future. Throughout its service 

life, the U-2 program would have many different nicknames and codenames.

1. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 56–57.

2. Ibid., pp. 60–61.

CHAPTER 2
Unlimited Horizons

28

First Flights

Kelly Johnson assigned Skunk Works foreman Dorsey Kammerer to oversee preparations at the test site and Frank “Red” Harvey to supervise the 

various personnel. Ernie Joiner served as chief of flight testing, assisted by 

flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson. Others included instrumentation specialist Paul Deal, analysis engineers Mich Yoshii and Bob Klinger, and radio 

technician Jack Reedy. Tony LeVier was the first test pilot assigned to the 

project. Maintenance personnel responsible for Article 341 included crew 

chief Fritz Frye, mechanics Leroy Flynn and Bob Murphy, and electrician 

Vernon Buckner. If any special components needed to be manufactured, the 

test site had a metal shop staffed by Carl Herman, Bob Johnson, and Pop 

Christman. Any work on the airplane was thoroughly checked by inspectors Dick Padjet and Pete Wilkerson. Radioman Frank Cruz was in charge 

of communications. Gene Cuthbert oversaw supply stock. Paul Smith did 

double duty as both clerk and photographer. Utility electrician Dick Hough 

and painter Frank Harvey rounded out the shop personnel.3

As Johnson had promised, the disassembled components of the first U-2 

arrived at the test site on July 25, less than 8 months after Lockheed received 

a go-ahead on the contract. After reassembly, the airplane was subjected to 

ground vibration testing to measure structural modes and frequencies for three 

different fuel load configurations. To undergo these tests, Article 341 was 

mounted on a ground transport dolly and shaken at various frequencies, some 

as low as a half-cycle per second. To prevent deformation of engine bearings 

during ground vibration tests, the engine was motored by blowing compressed 

air directly onto the front compressor with a hose and by blowing air into 

the starter to turn the rear compressor. The results were satisfactory and no 

problems were noted with coupling of structural modes.4 Next, technicians 

prepared the prototype for its first engine run. At first, the J57 would not start 

with the special fuel, so the ground crew improvised. Someone found several 

5-gallon drums of conventional JP-4, linked them together, and ran a hose 

to a fuel valve on the J57. Technicians got the engine running with the JP-4, 

then disconnected the hose and ran the remainder of the test using LF-1A. 

Mechanics later traced the problem to the spark plugs, which were too short.5

3. “Original U-2 Flight Test Crews - 1955,” Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame historical collection, 

courtesy of author.

4. Robert T. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” Lockheed Aircraft 

Corp. paper SP-109, November 4, 1958, p. 29.

5. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 25.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

29

Final assembly took place in a hangar at the test site. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
Unlimited Horizons

30

Once this discrepancy was corrected, the Lockheed crew was able to complete 

engine testing and prepare for taxi trials.

On August 1, 1955, Article 341 was towed onto the dry lakebed. Tony 

LeVier got the engine running well on his second attempt then began a lowspeed taxi run to the north. At about 45 miles per hour (mph), the wingtips 

began to lift but the pogos were locked into place and remained attached, 

although they were no longer touching the ground. LeVier found that he 

needed to apply a little rudder to keep the nose straight. He noted that the pogo 

wheels trailed satisfactorily and absorbed small lateral loads very smoothly. 

Maximum speed was about 50 knots, just sufficient to make the ailerons 

slightly effective. LeVier found the performance of the wheel brakes to be 

very poor. At the end of the 2-mile run, he made full 90-degree deflections of 

the tail-wheel steering system in both directions before turning 180 degrees 

and coming to a stop.6

Ernie Joiner inspected the brakes prior to the second taxi test. This time, 

LeVier made his run to the south—accelerating to 70 knots in about a quarter 

mile—and then pulled the throttle to idle. “It was at this point that I became 

aware of being airborne,” he wrote in his post-test report, “which left me with 

utter amazement, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying.”7 He immediately 

started back toward the ground but had difficulty judging his altitude because 

there were no markings on the lakebed. LeVier gunned the throttle in an effort 

to accelerate and avoid stalling, but the J57 engine was slow to respond. From 

a height of approximately 35 feet, the U-2 dropped and made contact with 

the ground in a 10-degree left bank. The impact was hard enough that Article 

341 bounced back into the air. The second touchdown was gentler, allowing 

LeVier to regain control, but he found the brakes ineffective in slowing the 

aircraft. After rolling for some distance and finally veering to the left, the U-2 

came to a stop with the main wheel tires on fire directly beneath the fuel sump 

tank. The chase crew promptly extinguished the blaze. LeVier later noted that 

it would have been best to remain airborne, but with the throttle in idle, he 

felt that he probably would not have been able to accelerate to full power in 

time to avert the hard landing.8 The unplanned flight hinted at the plane’s 

airworthiness, foreshadowing its tendency at low speeds to remain in ground 

effect while gliding for great distances above the runway.

To prevent delays, the brakes and tires were replaced that same afternoon. 

An inspection revealed no significant damage from the fire so another taxi test 

6. Skip Holm, “Article Airborne,” Air Progress Aviation Review, June 1986, p. 25.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. Ibid.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

31

was scheduled for the following day. In the meantime, LeVier and Bob Murphy 

painted some black stripes on the lakebed surface north of the asphalt runway 

to provide a visual reference. “Although this runway was far from adequate in 

regards to markings,” LeVier noted, “it was a big improvement.”9

In the morning, Article 341 was towed back onto the lakebed and LeVier 

climbed into the cockpit. “Engine start, OK.” A few minutes later, he radioed, 

“Rolling.” To preclude a repetition of the inadvertent takeoff, he held the control yoke forward and attempted to raise the tail. At 55 knots, the tail wheel 

lifted off the ground, and he completed a 1-mile run to evaluate directional and 

lateral control. The results were satisfactory, and with the tail up, the airplane 

reached 85 knots without taking off. LeVier eased off a bit on the yoke, and 

felt the airplane become very light, and it might well have lifted off had he not 

pulled the throttle to idle. He then activated the gust controls, allowing the 

tail to settle back to the ground. As the airplane slowed to 70 knots, he applied 

light wheel braking with little or no effect. Approximately 3 miles down the 

runway, rapidly approaching the edge of the lakebed, he chopped the power 

and the U-2 rolled to a stop. The brakes were extremely hot and might have 

caught fire again if not for quick action by the chase crew.10

While allowing the brakes to cool down, LeVier told Ernie Joiner that he 

had been bothered by unsatisfactory reflections on the windscreen from some 

light-colored material forward of the instrument panel. He felt it might have 

contributed to the visibility problems he experienced during previous tests. 

He also noted that the cockpit was extremely hot and recommended installing 

some sort of sunshade inside the canopy. After the ground crew had turned 

the airplane around, he made a low-speed run to the south with the flaps set 

at 35 degrees. This time the U-2 attained a maximum speed of 50 knots, and 

LeVier didn’t bother with the wheel brakes. He simply allowed the airplane 

to coast to a stop. Afterward, he concluded that tail-wheel steering was of 

little use and might even be prone to inducing a ground loop. He and Kelly 

Johnson both agreed that the wheel brakes should not be used at speeds 

above 30 knots until the airplane’s overall gross weight had been considerably 

reduced. LeVier’s final comment in the postflight debriefing was, “I believe 

the aircraft is ready for flight.”11

The test team spent the morning and early afternoon of August 4 preparing for the maiden flight. Johnson kept a close watch as Ernie Joiner, Glen 

Fulkerson, Bob Murphy, and several others readied the airplane while LeVier 

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 27.
Unlimited Horizons

32

checked his test plan. In earlier conversations with the test pilot, Johnson 

insisted that the U-2 should be landed with the main gear making initial contact with the runway, followed by the tail wheel. “I disagreed,” LeVier later 

recalled, “and told him it should be stalled-in with the tail wheel touching 

first.”12 Otherwise, he believed, the airplane would bounce. Johnson, however, 

felt that the U-2’s high-aspect-ratio wing would have a significant effect on 

its landing characteristics, differentiating it from other bicycle-gear-equipped 

airplanes like the B-47. LeVier had, in fact, interviewed a number of B-47 

pilots in preparation for his U-2 flight, but he agreed to make the first attempt 

using Johnson’s suggested method.

For the final preparations, Article 341 was towed to the north end of the 

lakebed and aligned with the runway. As during taxi tests, the pogos were 

locked in place to provide balance during touchdown. There was a flurry of 

activity as support personnel and equipment were moved into place. LeVier—

using call sign Angel 1—climbed into the cockpit and began preflight checks. 

Bob Matye took off in the C-47 with Johnson and Henry Combs on board as 

observers. Their first task was to check local weather conditions and winds aloft 

because a storm was moving in. Ernie Joiner (call sign Ground Hog) prepared 

to monitor the test from his position on the lakebed. Apparently no one had 

12. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 79.

Chase cars follow the U-2 as it rolls across the dry lakebed. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
 Aquatone and Oilstone

33

thought to secure the airspace in advance of the test flight. A few minutes 

after the C-47 departed, he observed an Air Force F-86 making a fairly close 

gunnery pass overhead. Ray Goudey took off in a T-33 to serve as safety chase, 

and a fire truck was positioned 1 mile to the south, adjacent to the runway. All 

of the months of preparation had led to this moment. LeVier initiated engine 

start. Nothing happened.13

After two failed attempts to start the engine with LF-1A, Joiner decided 

they should refuel the airplane with JP-4 and try again. Nearly an hour was 

lost during this delay, and the observation and chase airplanes had to land to 

conserve fuel. Rain was already falling north of the lakebed and a crosswind 

blew in from the southwest, forcing LeVier to taxi the U-2 to a new starting 

point further to the east than originally planned. Finally, it was time, and he 

began his takeoff roll using approximately 85 percent revolutions per minute 

(rpm). He held the nose down until the airplane reached 100 knots, at which 

point it lifted off the ground. “The initial climb out felt very good,” he reported 

later, “with what appeared to be satisfactory longitudinal stability and control.” 

He noted that the right wing felt heavy, and Johnson told him to hold the 

wing up to balance the fuel. As he circled the lakebed at an altitude of 5,000 

feet and a speed of around 160 knots with the landing gear still down, LeVier 

declared, “This thing flies like a baby buggy.”14

“Try gear up if you want,” Johnson suggested. LeVier raised the gear, 

climbed to 8,000 feet, and continued to explore the airplane’s handling qualities through a variety of gentle maneuvers, including stalls. “Yaws right slightly, 

very sensitive at 100 knots. Right wing still heavy at 90. Aileron input at 85 

knots. Lots of stall warning. Recovering.” LeVier activated the speed brakes at 

approximately 140 knots, resulting in moderate tail buffet. He made six stalls, 

beginning in a clean (flaps up) configuration and gradually increasing the flap 

angle. He concluded that the airplane had normal buffet characteristics prior 

to full stall, with a very mild downward pitch. He noted that the wings were 

bowed slightly upward and that he was picking up a little bit of rain on the 

windscreen. After 15 minutes of flight, he descended, lowered the gear and 

flaps, and started his landing approach from 5,000 feet. “It wasn’t difficult to 

realize that this was no ordinary aircraft,” he later recalled. “With the power 

lever in almost idle, the wing flaps partially down and dive brakes extended, 

the aircraft had a very flat glide angle and a long float on flaring out.”15

13. Holm, “Article Airborne,” p. 28.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
Unlimited Horizons

34

Attempting to touch the main wheels down first while pushing forward 

on the control yoke to lower the nose produced an erratic and uncontrollable 

porpoise maneuver. As the U-2 bounced into the air, Johnson yelled, “Go 

around!” LeVier added power and circled around for another attempt. He 

made a shallower approach this time, but the airplane just floated in ground 

effect approximately 10 feet above the lakebed. “Boy, for more drag,” he 

lamented. After several more approaches and go-arounds with similar results, 

LeVier finally achieved a two-point landing with both the main gear and tail 

wheel touching down simultaneously. He also activated the gust control system 

to further reduce lift.16 Johnson was forced to agree that LeVier had been right. 

It was best to land with the tail wheel touching the ground at the same time or 

just ahead of the main gear. The entire flight lasted less than 40 minutes. The 

storm broke 10 minutes later, flooding the lakebed with 2 inches of water.17

LeVier worked to perfect his landing technique during a second flight 2 

days later, with Bob Matye flying chase in a T-33. Rolling north across the 

lakebed, the U-2 lifted off at 70 knots and immediately began to porpoise. 

LeVier added power and pulled up, resulting in a mild stall buffet, but this 

16. Ibid., p. 29.

17. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”

A summer storm flooded the lakebed minutes after Article 341 landed. (Lockheed Martin)
 Aquatone and Oilstone

35

was less alarming than the porpoising. Matye thought a slight tailwind might 

have been a factor. After climbing to nearly 7,000 feet, LeVier began the first 

of several touch-and-go landings. His first approach was long and shallow, 

but he aborted when it began to seem hazardous. On the second approach, 

he employed the speed brakes and 10 degrees of flap, with the engine at 70 

percent rpm. At 5 feet above the ground, he established the landing attitude 

in mild stall buffet and let the airplane settle in. This resulted in a two-point 

touchdown with a forward lunge and mild porpoising. He later described this 

second attempt as “successful and a reasonably good landing. I used the gust 

control and except for being awful slow, it certainly is a useful aid to [flying] 

this aircraft.” LeVier then raised the flaps, set power to 85 percent rpm, and 

held the control yoke forward. The plane started porpoising again on takeoff, 

and he attributed this motion to low pressure in the main landing gear shock 

strut.18 The third and final landing was about the same.

Following the flight, LeVier had several recommendations. First, he suggested adjusting the shock strut pressure. He also speculated that using the 

gust controls during takeoff might reduce the porpoise motion, as well as 

pitching and stall buffet during the initial climb. He further recommended 

that some method be devised to allow the pilot to establish a proper landing 

attitude that would result in a two-point touchdown every time. Finally, he 

recommended fitting the seat with a back cushion. “I’m still using a regular 

bed pillow,” he fumed. “I believe we should make up a few slightly tapered 

back cushions of two or three-inch thickness.”19

Having proven the basic airworthiness of the U-2, and having solved the 

difficult challenge of developing a successful landing technique, Johnson scheduled the official first flight for August 8. This time, representatives of the CIA 

and Air Force had been invited, along with high-ranking Lockheed executives. 

After briefing his guests on the day’s schedule, Johnson donned a parachute 

and climbed into the back of Matye’s T-33.20 The U-2 was readied for flight, 

remaining in the same configuration as during the previous tests, with the 

pogos locked into the wings.

Matye and Johnson took off first, circling the lakebed while LeVier taxied 

into position for departure to the north. They caught up as the U-2 started 

its roll. Takeoff was smooth this time, probably as a result of adjustments 

mechanics had made to shock strut pressure. LeVier made a gentle climb to the 

left, raising the gear when he had attained a speed of 130 knots. He brought 

18. Holm, Article Airborne, pp. 30–31.

19. Ibid., p. 96.

20. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
Unlimited Horizons

36

the plane around in a wide circle 

and made a pass at moderate altitude—around 8,000 feet—over 

the spectators before starting a 

series of planned test maneuvers. Johnson recorded airspeed 

calibration data during a climb to 

30,500 feet, but Matye had difficulty keeping up with the U-2 

even though LeVier reported that 

his engine was practically idling. 

Soon, the U-2 was nearly 1,000 

feet above the T-33. During the 

climb, LeVier noted that his cabin 

pressure fluctuated as much as 500 

feet in 2-second cycles. After leveling off, he accelerated to 260 

knots and detected some aileron 

buzz and possibly a slight rumble 

in the air intake ducts. The roughness was noticeable even with the 

engine in idle, so LeVier increased rpm, lowered the landing gear, and extended 

the wing flaps. Johnson informed him that the right pogo was shaking a little 

and advised terminating the speed run.21

The tail wheel failed to come down on the first attempt. Descending at a 

rate of 1,500 feet per minute, LeVier took a moment to perform a stall using 

30 degrees of flap. He began to feel slight buffeting at around 80 knots, and 

the airplane stalled at 72 knots, pitching down and to the left. “It sort of crabs 

around,” he noted. “You can feel it.” He recovered quickly and actuated the 

speed brakes, at which time the tail wheel finally extended. The duct rumble 

began to ease at 20,000 feet. He had no difficulty setting up his approach angle, 

but judging the airplane’s height above the lakebed remained a problem. As 

touchdown seemed imminent, he actuated the gust control mechanism and 

set power to idle, but he was still a bit too high. The aileron lost effectiveness, 

causing the left wing to drop suddenly. LeVier realized too late that he should 

have waited until touchdown to activate the gust controls. The left wingtip 

struck the ground fairly hard, but with sparing application of the wheel brakes, 

he managed to bring the airplane to a halt directly in front of the viewing 

21. Holm, Article Airborne, pp. 96–97.

Tony LeVier completed the first phase of 

contractor testing in the U-2. (Lockheed Martin)
 Aquatone and Oilstone

37

area.22 The VIP guests were then allowed to inspect the airplane, and Johnson 

declared that he had successfully achieved his self-imposed 8-month deadline.23

Developmental Testing

Over the next several weeks LeVier completed 16 additional flights, exploring 

the airplane’s stall characteristics, taking the U-2 to its maximum stress limits 

(+2.5 g’s and –1.5 g’s) and expanding the performance envelope. He flew the 

U-2 to its maximum speed of Mach 0.85, or around 560 miles per hour (487 

knots), and in preparation for cruising at altitudes never previously reached 

in sustained flight, the 42-year-old LeVier became the oldest test pilot to 

complete Air Force partial-pressure-suit training. He expanded the low and 

medium altitude flight envelopes and by August 16, he had reached an altitude of 52,000 feet. He then left Project Aquatone and returned to Burbank 

to serve as the company’s director of flying.24 Before LeVier left, he checked 

out two more pilots, Bob Matye and Ray Goudey, who began making at least 

one flight nearly every day. As the pace of testing increased, Robert Sieker and 

Robert Schumacher joined the team to help expand the airplane’s performance 

capabilities and test the reconnaissance systems. Goudey performed in-flight 

structural tests, and Schumacher was instrumental in clearing the U-2 for 

maximum altitude operation as well as for testing sensor systems. Kelly Johnson 

paid Sieker a $25,000 bonus for performing an intentional deadstick landing 

during one test flight.25 By September 8, the U-2 had been flown to 65,600 

feet (approximately 12 miles above the ground), but engine flameouts at high 

altitude were becoming a significant problem.

The second and third airframes were delivered in September and October, 

and the test program was proceeding fairly smoothly. On December 1, Johnson 

noted, “We have built four flying airplanes, have the ninth airplane in the jig, 

and have flown over our design altitude any number of times.”26 By March 31, 

1956, the U-2 fleet consisted of nine airplanes with a combined total of 1,042 

flight hours. The pilots were routinely flying at altitudes that would have been 

considered incredible in 1955. Three consecutive flights by Matye exceeded, by 

significant margins, the world altitude record of 65,890 feet that had been set 

22. Ibid.

23. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”

24. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 71.

25. Miller, Skunk Works, p. 80.

26. Ibid.
Unlimited Horizons

38

in August 1955 by British pilot Walter Gibb in an English Electric Canberra 

(the original version of the Martin B-57).27 The test pilots devoted a great 

deal of effort to studying the problems of engine performance. The J57-P-31 

powerplant was still not available, and the J57-P-37 had significantly poorer 

combustion characteristics and a tendency to flame out at cruising altitude. 

Combustion problems most often manifested at altitudes between 57,000 and 

65,000 feet, within a portion of the performance envelope that the pilots called 

the “badlands.” In one typical example, the airplane was cruising at 64,000 

feet when flameout occurred. The pilot briefly restarted the engine, but it quit 

again at 60,000 feet. He was ultimately forced to descend to 35,000 feet before 

regaining successful engine operation.28 During a test flight this was merely an 

inconvenience, but if a similar event occurred in the course of an operational 

mission over hostile territory it would place the pilot in deadly peril.

As engineers struggled with the flameout problem, logistical difficulties threatened to slow Lockheed’s production progress. Pratt & Whitney 

announced that the J57-P-31 engines would not be available until the spring 

27. Ibid.

28. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 71.

Lockheed test pilot Ray Goudey receives a weather briefing prior to a U-2 flight. (Laughlin 

Heritage Foundation)
 Aquatone and Oilstone

39

of 1956, and even the interim J57-P-37 was becoming scarce because the 

company had committed its full production capacity for these engines to the 

Air Force for use in F-100 fighters and KC-135 tankers. In order to keep U-2 

production on schedule, Col. Leo Geary (who had replaced Ritland) arranged 

for the diversion of a number of engines that had been destined for Boeing’s 

KC-135 production line to the U-2 production line.29 This kept the program 

running until the first J57-P-31 engines arrived, at which point the airplane’s 

performance increased significantly. The new engine had greater thrust, lower 

weight, and consumed very little oil. Most important, flameout at altitude was 

almost impossible.30 By June 1, 1956, the J57-P-31 engine had propelled the 

U-2 to 74,500 feet.31

Structural demonstrations, initially conducted with the aircraft restricted 

to 80 percent of design limit loads, included wind-up turns to 3 g’s. A camera 

mounted atop the fuselage was used to measure wingtip deflections. Flight data 

29. Ibid.

30. Benedict J. Koziol, “The U-2 Aircraft Engine,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, U-2 

History Symposium, National Defense University, Fort McNair, DC, September 1998, 

pp. 7–8.

31. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”

A U-2A climbs to altitude during a test flight. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

40

were then correlated with static test data prior to extending static testing to 

ultimate loads using the ground-test article. Ray Goudey tested the structural 

limit loads in an orderly fashion despite schedule pressures, and Lockheed 

engineers were pleased to learn that the airframe proved stronger than many 

had thought. Although Lockheed engineers measured ultimate loads of as 

much as 4 g’s, flight limit loads remained at 2.5 g’s, as originally specified, so 

as not to overstress any of the airplanes.32

Since the beginning of the project, the U-2 prototype had served as the 

flagship of the test fleet, and it was the most extensively instrumented airframe. 

Technicians installed strain gages in Article 341, using the same locations 

where measurements had been taken on the structural test article. The developmental test program lasted 7 months and included basic aircraft and engine 

performance assessments, stability and control evaluations, structural demonstrations, and operational testing of aircraft systems. By February 29, 1956, 

Article 341 had made 83 flights and logged 150 flight hours. Subsequently, this 

airplane was used primarily for testing modifications to the J57-P-37 engine 

and development of the improved J57-P-31 engine, as well as for other miscellaneous tests. Article 342 was also instrumented for testing, although not as 

extensively as Article 341, and was primarily dedicated to testing various reconnaissance camera systems. This airplane was flown 22 times (logging 33 flight 

hours) during this demonstration then released for use in the pilot training 

program. Instrumentation used in Article 342 was transferred to Article 344, 

and the majority of camera testing was accomplished with the latter. Article 

344 was also used for autopilot development testing and weather research 

flights, eventually accruing 250 flight hours over the span of 85 sorties before 

being released for use in pilot training. A fourth airplane, Article 351, was 

used for testing System I, a radar detection and recording system; System II, 

an advanced high-frequency navigation and communication system; System 

III, a VHF radio transmission recording system; and the AN/APQ-56 radar 

mapping system, as well as the J57-P-31 engine.33

Lockheed engineers in Burbank subjected the ground-test article to static 

loading to destruction in order to establish safe flight limitations for a series of 

structural demonstrations. During five sorties with Article 341, the airplane 

underwent pull-ups, pushovers, stalls, and roll and yaw maneuvers at gross 

weights between 15,900 and 16,800 pounds. Tests were conducted with gust 

controls and flaps faired and extended, landing gear down, and speed brakes 

retracted and extended. The pilot performed the aileron roll test by starting 

32. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 29.

33. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 4.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

41

from a 45-degree left bank and rolling into a 45-degree right bank at a speed 

of 150 knots. Wingtip deflection was measured during level and maneuvering 

flight, and researchers found that upward deflection could be reduced as much 

as 5 inches by shifting the flaps and ailerons up for gust control. The most difficult aspect of measuring wing deflection turned out to be the need for very 

precise piloting technique. It was found that g-loading had to be increased as 

gradually as possible while maintaining the planned test airspeed. Otherwise, 

if g-loading increased too rapidly, dynamic overswing resulted in erroneous 

measurements, particularly at high negative-g conditions where pilots had a 

tendency to maneuver rapidly.34

Prior to in-flight structural demonstrations, technicians made reinforcements to portions of the airplane’s structure. These changes were based on 

the results of the ultimate static load tests performed earlier. Subsequent 

flight-testing proved these modifications airworthy and all U-2 airplanes were 

strengthened accordingly. Other reinforcements were implemented in response 

to incidents that occurred during flight-test and training operations. During 

one sortie with Article 342, the pilot slowed the airplane by extending the 

speed brakes in level flight at 260 knots. As the plane decelerated to 250 knots 

(Mach 0.56) at 20,000 feet, an elevator tab support bracket failed and tore 

loose from the web of the rear stabilizer beam. To prevent reoccurrence of this 

type of failure, the bracket was redesigned to be tied into the top and bottom 

beam caps. This modification was incorporated into the entire U-2 fleet and no 

further trouble was experienced. Another modification resulted from discovery 

of fuselage skin wrinkles at the aft end of the tail wheel well. These wrinkles 

were only evident when the airplanes were sitting on the ground with a heavy 

fuel load. Although this was not considered a flight hazard, doubler plates were 

installed to alleviate load concentration while on the ground.35

Lockheed engineer Robert T. Klinger remarked in a November 1958 report 

that “The U-2 project was unique in practically all aspects; the design, testing, production, pilot training and service deployment [were] conducted on 

a ‘crash’ basis, by a relatively few number of people, while maintaining the 

highest order of security.” In fact, the entire developmental flight-test program 

was conducted by just four engineers and five test pilots, assisted by a small 

cadre of about 20 maintenance, supply, and administrative personnel. Unlike 

in conventional aircraft procurement programs, the U-2 was not subjected to 

the formal eight-phase test program then in use by the Air Force. Instead, the 

34. Ibid., pp. 152–156.

35. Ibid., pp. 156–161.
Unlimited Horizons

42

airplane’s operational suitability, reliability, and other factors were evaluated 

concurrently with the developmental testing and pilot training programs.36

In the spring of 1957, two decades before the advent of what has come to 

be known as low observable—or stealth—technology, the CIA sought to make 

the U-2 less vulnerable to radar detection. For this pioneering effort, known 

as Project Rainbow, Lockheed engineers Luther McDonald, Mel George, and 

Ed Lovick teamed up with Harvard physics professor Ed Purcell and Frank 

Rodgers, associate head of the Radar Division at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, to 

reduce the airplane’s radar signature through two vastly different approaches. 

One method, nicknamed “trapeze,” involved stringing copper-plated steel wires 

with ferrite beads across the aircraft’s outer skin at specific distances from the 

fuselage, wings, and tail. As applied to Article 343, the wires were strung across 

laminated wood stand-offs that bristled from the fuselage, tail, and the leading 

and trailing edges of the wings.37 In the second approach, Article 341 received 

a coating of high-frequency radar-absorbent material (RAM) on the underside 

of the fuselage. The RAM, varying in thickness from a quarter-inch to about 1 

inch, consisted of a fiberglass honeycomb topped by layers of Salisbury Screen, 

a conductive graphite grid on canvas sheets. It was nicknamed “wallpaper” 

because of the circuit grid pattern on its surface. Additionally, the RAM coating 

prevented the dissipation of engine heat through the aircraft’s skin, earning it 

the nickname “thermos.” With the addition of RAM or wires, the U-2 suffered 

from excess weight and drag, making it aerodynamically “unclean.” Hence 

Article 343 and Article 341 were known as “Dirty Birds.” These modifications 

reduced the airplane’s maximum altitude by as much as 5,000 feet and cut its 

range by 20 percent.38

During one of Robert Sieker’s Rainbow test flights in Article 341, the 

insulating properties of the coating surrounding the engine bay caused the 

hydraulic system to overheat and reduce pressure to the fuel boost pump 

motor. The result was a flameout at 72,000 feet and loss of cabin pressure. 

Ordinarily, this would not have been a serious problem because the pilot was 

wearing his partial-pressure suit. Unfortunately, as his suit inflated, the clasp 

on his faceplate failed, causing loss of consciousness when the air rushed out 

of his helmet. The airplane stalled and entered a flat spin. Descending into 

the lower atmosphere, Sieker finally regained his senses and attempted to 

bail out. It took search teams several days to locate the wreckage, which was 

36. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

37. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 50.

38. Peter W. Merlin and Tony Moore, X-Plane Crashes (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 

2008), p. 84.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

43

Engineers attempted two very different approaches to reducing the airplane’s radar signature. 

One involved stringing ferrite beads on wires along the fuselage and wings while the other 

required coating parts of the aircraft with radar-absorbent material. (CIA)
Unlimited Horizons

44

largely intact. Sieker’s body was found nearby with his parachute only partially deployed.39 Investigators determined that had his life-support system 

not malfunctioned, he would have most likely been able to bring the plane 

home safely. Kelly Johnson called for a redesign of the faceplate latch, a dual 

oxygen regulator, and an ejection seat that could be used interchangeably 

with the existing bucket seat.40

Testing continued despite the loss of Article 341 and a valued member 

of the team. Several months later, the entire test operation was moved to the 

North Base auxiliary airfield at the edge of Rogers Dry Lake on Edwards Air 

Force Base. “I hesitate to say that this was an easy flight test program,” recalled 

Ernie Joiner during a presentation in 1998, “for there were some challenging 

elements. It must be said, though, that the U-2 program was unique in that 

we overlapped flight test development with training and with deployment. 

This was historic and would have been impossible without a good airplane 

and a reliable engine.”41

39. Ibid.

40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.

41. Ernie L. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, p. 21.

Article 341 crashed in a flat spin following a flameout at 72,000 feet. Lockheed test pilot Robert 

Sieker was killed. (CIA)
 Aquatone and Oilstone

45

Pilot Training

Even as developmental testing continued, the time had come to begin training 

CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots. Members of the Air Force training cadre began 

arriving in early November 1955. Col. William R. Yancey, handpicked by 

Gen. Curtis Lemay, chief of Strategic Air Command (SAC), was tasked with 

representing SAC’s interests in the program. He had been specifically instructed 

to evaluate the Lockheed flight-test effort, verify that the airplane and reconnaissance equipment performed as expected, and report his findings directly to 

Lemay as soon as possible. Should the results prove satisfactory, Yancey was to 

train a specified number of pilots for operational missions. Shortly after delivery of the third U-2, the Air Force activated the 4070th Support Wing with 

Yancey as commander. His staff included deputy commander Col. Herbert 

Shingler, navigator and classroom instructor Maj. Robert E. Mullin, navigation 

officer and mission planner Jack Delap, logistics and supply officer Maj. Art 

Lien, development and flight-test officers Maj. Louis A. Garvin and Lt. Col. 

Phillip O. Robertson, flight instructors Capt. Hank Meierdierck and Capt. 

Louis Setter, and three airmen. Ray Goudey and Bob Matye gave the pilots 

ground instruction and checkout before allowing them to make familiarization 

and proficiency flights around the local area.42

Teaching Yancey’s group how to fly the U-2 was particularly challenging 

because there was as yet no two-seat model of the U-2. The unique handling 

characteristics of the single-seat plane could only be experienced firsthand in 

solo flight. The student pilot first underwent extensive ground training, as well 

as practice in the T-33. For his initial U-2 flights, the student took off with 

an instructor pilot flying chase in the T-33 and providing instructions and 

encouragement over the radio. Each U-2 was built by hand, and slight variations in construction contributed to differences in aircraft behavior. This was 

especially noticeable when stalling the airplane during landing approach. One 

airplane might regularly fall off to the right and another to the left. Lockheed 

flight-test engineers took note of this and added small fixed metal strips to the 

leading inboard edge of the wing to modify the airplane’s stall characteristics 

as necessary.43

All CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots were initially selected from veterans of SAC 

F-84 fighter squadrons scheduled to be disbanded and to have their personnel 

reassigned. Those chosen for the CIA program had to resign their Air Force 

42. William R. Yancey, undated letter (circa 2007) to Hank Meierdierck regarding early U-2 training 

operations, Roadrunners Internationale historical reference collection.

43. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 31.
Unlimited Horizons

46

commissions, effectively becoming civilians for the duration of their assignment. The selection process was rigorous. Because U-2 pilots were expected to 

endure the stress of flying at extremely high altitudes for extended periods of 

time, every effort was made to exclude those who might be unable to handle 

the claustrophobic conditions of the pressure suit and the airplane’s cramped 

cockpit. In preparation for high-altitude operations, each man underwent 

thorough physical and psychological examinations at the Lovelace Clinic in 

Albuquerque and fitting for partial-pressure suits at the David Clark Company 

in Worcester, MA. Another challenge involved teaching the pilots the proper 

way to handle the delicate U-2. Former fighter pilots accustomed to flying 

fast and making abrupt maneuvers needed to understand the limitations of a 

lightweight airframe not designed to handle the stresses of loops, barrel rolls, 

or even a hard pull-up.44

The first group of pilot trainees arrived at Watertown Airstrip on January 

11, 1956. Two more classes soon followed, resulting in a total of 28 student 

pilots. Yancey’s flight instructors devised a syllabus consisting of ground school 

and flight checkout. Before being allowed to solo in the U-2, each student 

first flew a number of analog sorties in the T-33 to simulate high-altitude 

flameouts and restarts, practice U-2 landing approach techniques, and demonstrate near-stall landings. An instructor pilot shadowed the U-2 when each 

student made his first solo, a flight to 20,000 feet followed by five practice 

landings on the lakebed. Students didn’t wear the pressure garment until the 

third solo flight, which was typically a 3-hour flight to 60,000 feet. The next 

nine sorties introduced trainees to high-altitude navigation and photography, 

long-duration flight (upward of 8 hours), night flying, and landings on the 

paved airstrip. Each pilot was declared mission qualified after logging at least 

58 flight hours in the U-2 and completing a final 8-hour check ride.45 Francis 

G. “Frank” Powers, who was assigned to the second group of trainees, was most 

impressed by the attention paid to the flying portion of the syllabus. “While at 

Watertown we flew the U-2 far more than we would have if we’d been in the Air 

Force and checking out in a new aircraft,” he wrote in his memoir. “As a result, 

on completing our training we had the utmost confidence in its reliability.”46

Once a sufficient number of pilots had completed training, they were 

tasked with an operational checkout of the U-2, including the planes, ground 

and flight crews, navigation systems, life-support systems, cameras, and other 

44. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 74–75.

45. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 32.

46. Francis Gary Powers and Curt Gentry, Operation Overflight (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 

1970), p. 36.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

47

equipment. During a 5-day training exercise in April 1956, U-2s took off from 

Watertown on eight cross-country sorties for the purpose of testing various 

camera systems. The entire exercise was conducted in the manner of a standard 

Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection, with Col. Yancey and his detachment serving as observers. They carefully examined all aspects of the U-2 unit’s 

performance, including that of maintenance personnel, flight crews, camera 

technicians, and mission planners. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported 

that the detachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level 

Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of 

Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey’s determination that the U-2 

was ready to become operational.47 As the CIA detachments began departing 

for overseas duty, Air Force pilot training began in earnest.

By mid-1956, the U-2 had been flown on several missions lasting more than 

10 hours and covering over 5,000 statute miles. Airplanes equipped with the 

J57-P-31 engine had attained altitudes up to 74,500 feet.48 Not surprisingly, 

the intensive training program resulted in a number of mishaps, some fatal. 

In his March 21, 1956, diary entry, Kelly Johnson noted that Article 342 had 

47. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 77–78.

48. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”

Ground crews prepare U-2s for training flights. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
Unlimited Horizons

48

been “wrecked” when Carmine Vito made a rough landing.49 This apparently 

sounded much worse than it actually was, as the airplane was soon repaired 

and flying. But there were more serious mishaps to come.

One incident with deadly results was a consequence of the unusual landing gear arrangement. As originally designed, the pogo outriggers were to be 

dropped during or shortly after takeoff using a manual release system. “We soon 

learned that any delay by the pilot in dropping them would often cause them to 

hang up,” Ernie Joiner recalled. “When that happened, it was wise to stay clear 

of the airplane’s flight path.” On May 15, CIA pilot Wilburn S. “Billy” Rose 

had just taken off for a training flight in Article 345 when he noticed that one 

of the outriggers had failed to separate. He tried to shake it loose while flying 

low over the lakebed but the airplane, heavy with fuel, stalled and crashed. 

Rose became the first CIA fatality of the program. To prevent a reoccurrence of 

the problem, the pilot actuation system was removed so that the pogos would 

fall away automatically as soon as the wings started to lift, while the airplane 

was still on the runway. A spring was installed on the upper end of the pogo 

to push it away from the wing as soon as the weight of the aircraft was lifted.50

The trainees continued to suffer a variety of landing mishaps. On June 1, Bill 

Strickland somehow allowed Article 344 to run out of fuel. He landed 392 yards 

short of the lakebed, miraculously without damaging the airplane. Another pilot 

was not so lucky, damaging Article 355 in a rough landing just shy of 8 weeks 

after the airplane had been delivered. Fortunately, it was repairable.51

Takeoff could be equally hazardous. During a night training flight in Article 

354 on August 31, Frank G. Grace, Jr., tried to climb too steeply during takeoff. 

Apparently failing to maintain a proper climb angle, he stalled with insufficient 

altitude for recovery. Grace died when his airplane plummeted 50 feet to the 

ground, cartwheeled on its left wing, and struck a power pole near the runway.52

On September 17, 1956, Article 346 lost part of its right wing shortly after 

Howard Carey took off from Lindsey Air Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. 

The aircraft disintegrated in flight, killing the pilot. The exact cause was never 

determined. Kelly Johnson believed it resulted from overpressure in the wing 

tanks during a steep climb, but it was also noted that the U-2 might have been 

caught in the jet wash from a flight of four Canadian F-86 fighters that had just 

passed by. The U-2 airframe was not stressed to withstand severe turbulence. 

One of Carey’s fellow pilots theorized that the accident could have been caused 

49. Ibid.

50. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 22. 

51. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”

52. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 79–80.
 Aquatone and Oilstone

49

by an unintentional extension of the flaps. The flap switch was located alongside 

the throttle, where it could be easily bumped to the down position during the 

climb. As long as the gust alleviation system was activated—as it routinely was 

during takeoff—this would have no adverse effect, but once the pilot deactivated 

the gust controls, the flaps would revert to the commanded position.53

The loss of Article 357 on December 19, 1956, resulted from pilot hypoxia 

after Robert Ericson took off from Watertown on a cross-country flight over 

northern Arizona. As the U-2 climbed to altitude, a small leak slowly depleted 

his oxygen supply. Hypoxia gradually set in, impairing the pilot’s judgment. 

As his reaction time slowed and he lost track of the aircraft’s speed, the U-2 

exceeded the placarded 190-knot maximum. The delicate airframe quickly 

approached its load limits and finally disintegrated when it reached 270 knots. 

Ericson somehow managed to jettison the canopy and was sucked out of the 

aircraft at an altitude of 28,000 feet. Fortunately, his chute opened automatically at 15,000 feet, and he touched down without injury.54 The aircraft was 

a total loss, its wreckage strewn across part of the Navajo Indian Reservation 

south of Ganado.

53. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 338. 

54. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 80.

Some of the most challenging aspects of the U-2 resulted from the airplane’s unusual landing 

gear configuration. (Laughlin Historical Foundation)
Unlimited Horizons

50

Training continued unabated despite these mishaps. The first operational 

mission occurred just 18 months after program go-ahead and was conducted 

over Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe on June 20, 1956. By mid-June 1957, 

three CIA detachments had been deployed around the world, Air Force U-2 

personnel were assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and 

based in Del Rio, TX, and test operations were transferred to Edwards Air Force 

Base. As director of Project Aquatone, Richard Bissell was very pleased with 

the outcome. “The active participation and support of the Air Force continued 

throughout the life of the program,” he wrote in his memoirs, “and without 

its many contributions the project could not have been carried through.”55

55. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Jonathan E. Lewis, and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: 

From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 97.

A U-2A is slowed by a drag chute during landing. (Laughlin Historical Foundation)

52

The U-2C had fluted inlets to accommodate increased airflow to the J75 engine and a dorsal spine 

housing additional equipment. Note the 100-gallon slipper tanks on each wing. (Lockheed Martin)
53

Design Evolution 

Over the years, the U-2 family of aircraft spawned two major design variants 

and a host of specialized models. These changes enhanced survivability and 

increased operational effectiveness. The basic design parameters and performance characteristics have remained largely unchanged except for those resulting from improvements in propulsion and avionics technology. Despite its 

planned short-term obsolescence, the airplane’s versatility ensured that descendants of the original U-2 would remain in service well into the 21st century.

The First Upgrade

Beginning in late 1958, Lockheed embarked on a program to retrofit the CIA 

fleet with more powerful engines to increase operational altitudes. This first 

major upgrade to the airplane was dubbed U-2C. It featured a new powerplant 

and larger inlets for improved performance. Kelly Johnson selected Article 

342 to serve as the prototype, and Lockheed technicians replaced its J57-P-31 

engine with a Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13 axial-flow turbojet weighing 4,900 

pounds and providing 15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Seven years later, 

the U-2C fleet would be equipped with more powerful J75-P-13B engines 

with a 17,000-pound-thrust rating. In order to improve airflow to the engine’s 

compressor face, the inlets were widened and fluted, allowing a greater mass of 

air to enter.1

 Greater thrust meant that the airplane reached operational altitudes more quickly and reduced time spent in the tropopause (the atmospheric 

band between 45,000 and 55,0000 feet), where contrails typically formed. This 

reduced the chances of visual detection. Use of the more powerful J75 also 

enabled the U-2 to carry a larger payload. The J75 engines were in short supply 

in 1959 due to Pratt & Whitney’s commitments to the Air Force for F-105 

production, but the CIA managed to obtain an initial supply of 12 engines. 

The Air Force never equipped its U-2 fleet with the J75.2

1. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 399.

2. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 149–152.

CHAPTER 3
Unlimited Horizons

54

Developmental testing of the U-2C was expedited to meet operational 

requirements for the airplane. Article 342 was thoroughly instrumented for 

airplane and powerplant performance evaluations, autopilot development, 

stability and control, and operational systems testing. Ray Goudey made the 

maiden flight of the U-2C on May 13, 1959, at Edwards. Soon thereafter, 

Article 358 and Article 351 joined the program as the second and third U-2C 

models. These airframes were used primarily for testing aircraft systems and 

reconnaissance equipment. All three were used for accelerated service testing 

to demonstrate operational reliability and collect cruise performance data. All 

testing was complete by July 24, 1959, just 10 weeks after the first flight. The 

three airplanes completed 106 sorties totaling 381 flight hours. Articles 351 

and 358 were deployed with an operational detachment on August 12, but 

Article 342 remained at Edwards for further performance testing and development of an electrical power system and the System IX Granger Deceptive 

Repeater installation.3

Designers made a number of significant changes to the basic airplane. The 

U-2C was approximately 1,450 pounds heavier than the U-2A, with the new 

J75 engine accounting for 1,100 pounds of the increase. The landing gear and 

associated structure had to be strengthened, and heavy-duty tires installed, to 

accommodate the heavier gross takeoff weight. The fuselage sump tank was 

slightly larger, holding 95 to 100 gallons of fuel—about a 10-pound increase. 

The total area of the engine air inlets was increased to accommodate the greater 

airflow requirements of the new powerplant. Lockheed engineers redesigned 

the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, making it more rounded and 

increasing the camber. The operating speed of the gust control system was 

reduced 50 percent to provide a smoother response. Numerous internal systems 

were modified to improve engine and hydraulic oil cooling, autopilot performance, fuel flow, electrical power, and environmental controls. Much attention 

was devoted to improving heat shielding around the engine to provide adequate 

aircraft structural cooling.4

Based on lessons learned with the U-2A, Lockheed engineers made several 

changes to improve U-2C controllability. The elevator trim tab operating speed 

was doubled, downward elevator travel was increased from 11.5 to 20 degrees 

to offset a nose-up pitching tendency resulting from a rapid increase in power, 

and gust control system response was slowed by half to decrease the rate of 

change in elevator stick force. The modified airplane demonstrated improved 

3. Robert T. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2C Airplane,” Lockheed Aircraft 

Corp., SP-179, July 1, 1960, pp. 6–7.

4. Ibid., pp. 14–18.
 Design Evolution

55

altitude performance, but its center-of-gravity limits were significantly narrower. On one early test flight, Bob Schumacher reported that the center of 

gravity was so far forward that the airplane might become uncontrollable if 

the autopilot disconnected before the fuel supply from auxiliary slipper tanks 

on the wings was exhausted. In order to mitigate this problem, the horizontal 

stabilizers were subsequently modified to balance the aerodynamic load with 

increased camber and more rounded leading edges. For most operational configurations, ballast had to be added to the tail. The U-2C upgrade initially 

raised the airplane’s maximum altitude to more than 74,600 feet (and later to 

75,000 feet with the J75-P-13B) and improved the compressor stall margin. 

Unfortunately, increased altitude capability corresponded with a decrease in 

range from 4,000 to 3,300 nautical miles when the pilot flew a maximumpower cruise profile. Mission planners favored this profile because the U-2C 

entered cruise climb at 67,000 feet, and nearly two-thirds of the entire mission 

was flown at altitudes above 70,000 feet.5

A combination of higher thrust and greater compressor stall margin gave 

the U-2C more operational flexibility at high altitudes than had the U-2A. The 

engine could be operated anywhere between minimum fuel flow and maximum power, increasing maximum altitude capability and providing the pilot 

with a wide range of reduced power cruise altitudes as desired. Range could 

be increased with the addition of two 100-gallon slipper tanks on the wings, 

but the additional weight resulted in an altitude penalty of 500 to 1,200 feet. 

At maximum power, use of slipper tanks gave the U-2C a range of 3,350 

nautical miles to zero fuel. The U-2 pilot could achieve a more economical 

relationship between gross weight and altitude by leveling off and cruising at 

constant altitude and airspeed. For a level 70,000-foot-cruise mission with 

slipper tanks, the range was 3,800 nautical miles. Reducing the level cruising 

altitude to 68,000 feet increased the range to 4,050 miles, and the maximum 

slipper tank range was estimated to be 4,600 nautical miles.6

A U-2 Built for Two

In early 1957, Lockheed received a contract to modify a U-2A with an infrared sensor mounted in one of two configurations. When installed below the 

fuselage just aft of the cockpit, it could be used to detect the heat signatures 

of jet aircraft flying at lower altitudes. From atop the fuselage, it would be 

5. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 152.

6. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2C Airplane,” pp. 24–25.
Unlimited Horizons

56

used to scan for rocket and missile exhaust plumes. The sensor, designated 

AN/AAS-8, was co-developed by Lockheed and Baird Atomic. In December 

1957, the sensor package was installed on the lower fuselage of Article 389 

in what became known as the AIRSearch configuration. The equipment was 

housed in a rotating barrel that was pressurized by nitrogen gas. Immediately 

aft of this cylindrical assembly, an aerodynamic fairing was installed to smooth 

the airflow around the sensor package. The cylinder contained mirrors that 

could be tilted as necessary to focus the infrared energy onto a lead sulfide 

detector. The optical path for the navigational sextant was modified to include 

an infrared oscilloscope, combining one display into two so that additional 

instruments did not need to be added to the already cramped cockpit. In 

order to allow the U-2 pilot to identify aircraft detected at lower altitudes, 

driftsight magnification was doubled. The modified airplane was delivered 

to Edwards in March 1958. As originally envisioned, this technology would 

have supplemented airborne early warning aircraft and ground-based Ballistic 

Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar stations in detecting inbound 

enemy aircraft. But U-2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union had 

produced information that diminished fears that Russian long-range bomber 

fleets posed a significant threat. On the other hand, the Soviets were making 

great progress in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Fears of 

a U.S.-Soviet “missile gap” spurred military leaders at the Pentagon to develop 

plans for a Missile Defense and Alarm System (MIDAS) early warning satellite, 

but it was not expected to be operational before 1961 at the earliest.7

The AN/AAS-8 was first tested in the spring of 1958 during Project Low 

Card. Capt. Hugh “Pat” Hunerwadel flew Article 389 to Ramey Air Force 

Base, Puerto Rico, to assess the sensor’s performance during observations of 

test launches of U.S. ballistic missiles from Cape Canaveral, FL. These tests 

ended prematurely in early June when the U-2 ran off the runway, badly 

damaging the downward protruding sensor. Article 389 was airlifted back to 

Edwards for repairs and since the priority had shifted to missile detection, the 

sensor package was moved to the upper fuselage. Project Low Card resumed in 

September with another pilot. By the end of this deployment, the AN/AAS-8 

had been used to track 11 of 12 launches over the Atlantic Missile Range 

between April and November, despite the 4-month interruption caused by 

the runway mishap.8

In light of the spectacular success of the AN/AAS-8, which detected missile plumes at ranges in excess of 1,000 miles, Lockheed and Baird Atomic 

7. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 362.

8. Ibid., pp. 362–363.
 Design Evolution

57

produced two separate reports. Kelly Johnson and Walter Baird presented these 

documents at the Pentagon along with a proposal that a fleet of as many as 

15 sensor-equipped U-2 aircraft should be kept on constant airborne patrol 

around the borders of the Soviet Union to provide early warning of missile 

attacks against the U.S. or its allies. Johnson recommended building 84 additional U-2 airframes with provisions for the AN/AAS-8 as well as a second 

crew position behind the cockpit. The new model, designated U-2B, would 

have been equipped with an astroinertial navigation system and a UHF data 

link for line-of-sight communication between the aircraft and monitoring 

stations on the ground. The U-2B was expected to be at least 1,500 pounds 

heavier than the standard U-2A, cutting the airplane’s range by 25 percent 

but without significantly reducing altitude capability. To mitigate the risk of 

losing an airplane due to engine failure, Johnson provided an option to install 

a small Pratt & Whitney JT12 turbojet for emergency return-to-base capability 

if the primary engine could not be restarted. The inlet and exhaust ducts for 

the JT12 were to have been covered by jettisonable aerodynamic fairings when 

not in use. A final notification called for replacing the bicycle landing gear with 

a conventional tricycle arrangement. Although this added 884 pounds to the 

The final configuration of what came to be known as the U-2D. Note the cylindrical sensor 

housing between the canopies. (Lockheed Martin)
Unlimited Horizons

58

airframe, Lockheed’s reported noted, “the expected gain in overall operations 

by lessening landing accidents outweighs this.”9

Although Pentagon officials liked the concept, they had doubts about the 

reliability of the communications links and navigational accuracy, especially 

since the aircraft would be operating within the Arctic Circle. Johnson was subsequently authorized to modify three additional prototypes for further testing. 

Capitalizing on lessons learned from project Low Card, Skunk Works engineers 

designed a compartment behind the cockpit to accommodate a sensor operator. It had become clear that the pilot could not effectively fly the airplane and 

operate the sensor equipment simultaneously. The first airframe to receive 

this modification was Article 377. Technicians converted the Q-bay into a 

crew station with sensor control panels, an entry hatch on top of the fuselage, 

and a downward ejection seat similar to those used in early model F-104 

Starfighters. The sensor barrel was mounted between the pilot’s canopy and 

the observer’s hatch, which itself was topped with the aerodynamic fairing 

that fit just behind the sensor. Bob Schumacher made the maiden flight on 

January 7, 1958, with flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson in the observer’s 

9. Ibid., pp. 363.

A second crew station had to be built to accommodate the sensor operator. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

59

seat. Unfortunately, this airplane was lost 8 months later in a crash that took 

the life of Pat Hunerwadel. A second prototype was ready by early 1959. 

Article 394 was the first U-2 purpose-built in the two-seat configuration. 

In an improvement over the first version, the downward ejection seat was 

replaced with a more conventional upward-firing escape system.10

As the early warning panel of the Presidents Science Advisory Committee 

(PSAC) reviewed progress on MIDAS and BMEWS, it was clear that operational deployment of a satellite system was still a long way off. Johnson had 

promised to have the three squadrons of U-2B aircraft operational within 2 

years, with the first in service just 18 months after start of production. The 

PSAC panel recommended immediate procurement of the U-2B as a complement to the BMEWS, but critics were skeptical that the Soviets were indeed 

planning to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S. and felt that 

there were already other, more reliable technologies for early detection of 

missile launches. The U-2B proposal did not immediately receive approval 

as Johnson had hoped, but testing of the infrared sensor system continued 

with a second two-place airframe, Article 388, which joined the test fleet 

in late 1959. In time, senior Government officials downgraded the Soviet 

missile threat, and the BMEWS radar sites became operational. Johnson’s 

U-2B proposal was eventually discarded, but the two test bed aircraft, officially designated U-2D in 1961, continued to be used for sensor technology 

development and a variety of other test projects. In at least one instance, the 

U-2D was flown parallel to the flightpath of NASA’s X-15 in order to track 

the rocket plane’s exhaust plume as it soared to the edge of space.11 Article 

394 was eventually converted into a single-seat U-2C and transferred to SAC. 

Article 388 remained at Edwards until its retirement in 1978.12

Increased Range

Anticipation of long-duration sorties highlighted the need to increase the airplane’s operational range beyond that which could be obtained with the addition of external fuel tanks. The logical solution was to give the U-2 in-flight 

refueling capability. This merely required the addition of a dorsal receptacle 

to accommodate the extendable refueling boom of a KC-135 Stratotanker. 

Although this modification promised a useful capability, many feared it could 

10. Ibid., pp. 363–364.

11. Ibid., p. 366.

12. Ibid., p. 368.
Unlimited Horizons

60

An aerial refueling receptacle was installed in a dorsal spine on U-2E and U-2F models. 

(U.S. Air Force)
 Design Evolution

61

not significantly extend overall mission length, which was a function of 

human endurance. For operational purposes, pilot fatigue constraints limited 

mission duration to a maximum of approximately 10 hours. Upon approval 

of the project in May 1961, Lockheed began modifying six CIA airframes 

into what became known as the U-2F configuration.13 Air Force interest in 

the U-2F resulted in a decision to convert six SAC airplanes for refueling. 

This order was eventually reduced to three, which were delivered in the fall 

of 1962 under the designation U-2E.14

Article 342 was once again selected to serve as prototype for a new configuration. It was equipped with a pressurized dorsal fairing atop the mid fuselage 

to house the refueling receptacle along with a 400-watt single-side-band radio 

that permitted voice communications at ranges of more than 3,000 miles. Bob 

Schumacher conducted the first simulated refueling trials, easing in behind 

a KC-135 and closing to the requisite distance without actually hooking up. 

Initial tests indicated that refueling rendezvous could be easily accomplished 

at an altitude of 35,000 feet and indicated air speed of 220 knots. For the lowaltitude rendezvous trial, Schumacher had been wearing a standard flight suit 

and helmet. Later pilots discovered that wearing the partial-pressure suit and its 

specialized helmet resulted in significantly reduced visibility while maneuvering 

13. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 198–199.

14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 153 and 190.

 A U-2F during refueling trials. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

62

toward the refueling boom. Another challenge was posed by the fact that the 

in-flight refueling capability meant missions could be extended beyond the 

imposed 10-hour limit. Even without concern for pilot fatigue, practical mission 

endurance was inherently limited by the onboard oxygen supply. Eventually, 

an extra oxygen bottle was added, extending the pilot’s air supply for a 14-hour 

mission if required.15

Refueling trials began with dry hook-ups followed by the first transfer of fuel 

from the KC-135 to the U-2. Testing was completed over the span of several 

weeks, and two more airframes were already undergoing modification. Soon, 

operational pilots began practicing the delicate art of in-flight refueling. The 

KC-135 could transfer as much as 900 gallons to the U-2 in just 5 minutes. 

The main tanks were fed first, followed by sump tanks, and finally the slipper tanks (if attached). Center-of-gravity requirements necessitated development of a cross-transfer system between the tanks. This consisted of a series of 

motorized and solenoid-operated valves that operated automatically. A manual 

override was provided and the pilot had to keep an eye on transfer rates and 

15. Ibid., pp. 146–147.

The view from the tanker boom operator’s station while refueling a U-2F. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

63

valve operations so as to prevent structural failure resulting from overpressure 

of displaced air if the tanks filled too fast. This, however, was only one of the 

potential hazards of in-flight refueling.16

Ordinarily, the aircraft receiving fuel closes on the tanker from behind, but 

because the U-2 had such a narrow speed envelope, the KC-135 had to make 

adjustments during rendezvous. First, the U-2 pilot stabilized his aircraft at 

the proper altitude and airspeed. It was then overtaken by the tanker about a 

quarter-mile off the right side and at the same altitude. After passing the U-2, 

the KC-135 pilot reduced speed as the U-2 moved down and left to take its 

position below the refueling boom. After the boom was lowered, the U-2 pilot 

slowly climbed into final position, careful to avoid the tanker’s wake vortex or 

jet-wash from the tanker’s engines, either of which could flip the U-2 into a 

deadly roll. After refueling, the pilot had to reset the fuel counter and delicately 

disengage from the tanker. The U-2 pilot achieved separation by decreasing 

power and descending approximately 100 feet below the tanker before sliding 

away to the left or right. Only when completely clear of the tanker’s vortices was 

it safe to climb away.17 These hazards were not to be taken lightly. On March 

1, 1962, Capt. John Campbell perished during a nighttime refueling mission 

over Edwards. As he maneuvered his U-2F behind the KC-135 at an altitude 

of 35,000 feet, it flipped and tumbled out of control. Campbell apparently 

attempted to eject, but his seat never left the plane. Aerial refueling operations were suspended as Lockheed engineers once again evaluated the loads 

imposed on the U-2 airframe while maneuvering behind the KC-135. Some 

suggested that if jetwash were the problem, it might be safer to refuel from the 

prop-driven KC-97, though this would require rendezvous at lower altitudes 

and slower speeds. The KC-135 was ultimately retained as the primary tanker 

for the U-2.18

The U-2 Goes to Sea

Early in the development program, some had suggested operating the U-2 

from an aircraft carrier to provide additional mission flexibility. This idea was 

even briefed to President Eisenhower in May 1957, but critics rejected the 

idea because the carrier capability would add little to the coverage of Soviet 

Bloc countries reachable by the U-2 from land bases. Acting CIA Director 

16. Ibid., p. 347.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 156–157.
Unlimited Horizons

64

Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell acknowledged that flexibility and independence of 

foreign jurisdiction would generally enhance U.S. reconnaissance capability 

with respect to areas outside the Soviet Bloc, but he felt the benefits would 

be too limited to justify the expense of modifying the aircraft. Additionally, 

since the CIA and Air Force jointly administered the U-2 program, any such 

modification required the concurrence of both for final approval. The Air 

Force chief of staff decided that there was no need to develop a carrier capability, and he disapproved of the proposal. Navy officials attempted on several 

occasions over the next 3 years to obtain a joint agreement between the CIA 

and Air Force, but development of a carrier-based U-2 did not gain impetus 

until 1963, when deputy CIA Director Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter became 

interested in the idea.19

Carter discussed the concept with Kelly Johnson, who assured him that the 

aircraft could be modified with relatively minor engineering changes and at 

reasonable cost. Carter then directed Col. Jack Ledford, assistant director of the 

Office of Special Activities, to investigate the feasibility of U-2 carrier operations and determine how to implement such a program. To begin, Ledford’s 

deputy, James A. Cunningham, Jr., assembled a team of representatives from 

19. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” CIARDP75B00446R000100210015-3, December 1964, approved for release September 30, 

2003, pp. 1–3.

The U-2G fit easily inside the hangar deck of the USS Kitty Hawk. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

65

Lockheed and the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to visit several aircraft 

carriers and naval air stations. The purpose of these survey trips was to identify 

and resolve any potential problems that might affect development and operational deployment of the U-2G. Cunningham then assembled the team’s findings and recommendations into a report for Gen. Carter in which he addressed 

the question of whether the U-2G could be economically adapted to operate 

from carriers within acceptable safety parameters, with sufficient frequency to 

be effective, and without adversely affecting the Navy’s operational commitments. Cunningham concluded that “present engineering analyses confirm 

that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier 

capability for reconnaissance purposes.”20

As soon as Carter approved Cunningham’s recommendations, on July 23, 

1963, Lockheed began working to modify the first of several airframes to the 

new configuration. Adapting the U-2 to its new environment posed multiple 

challenges. The types of aircraft typically flown from carriers required a catapult to launch from the deck and arresting gear to bring the aircraft to a halt 

upon landing. These operations imposed structural stresses on the airframe and 

landing gear beyond those the U-2 had been designed to withstand. Necessary 

changes to the U-2 would undoubtedly affect the airplane’s range and altitude 

characteristics. The addition of an arresting hook, beefed up landing gear, and 

other equipment promised unavoidable weight penalties, but there were no 

significant aerodynamic changes. Concurrently, the CIA coordinated with the 

Navy to arrange for U-2 carrier suitability tests and to develop a pilot training 

program. There were a great many questions regarding the airplane’s behavior 

during approach and landing. The U-2 normally landed tail-high, which would 

make snagging the arresting cable with the hook nearly impossible without a 

skillful power-on approach just above stall speed. Additionally, wind patterns 

over the stern of a fast-moving carrier typically produced a downdraft immediately to the rear of the stern, followed by an updraft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft 

of the carrier. Specialized landing techniques had to be developed to overcome 

the adverse effects of these phenomena.21

In designing the U-2G, Lockheed engineers made several major changes to 

the basic airframe. The most obvious external difference was the addition of 

an arresting hook installed beneath the aft fuselage and covered with a plastic 

aerodynamic fairing that would be jettisoned in preparation for landing. A 

reinforced main landing gear strut more than doubled the original design 

specification for maximum deceleration speed. The tail wheel strut was also 

20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. Ibid., pp. 3–6.
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reinforced and protected by the addition of a metal plate to deflect the arresting 

cable. Engineers added thicker pressure bulkheads in the landing gear bay and 

augmented longerons in the fuselage at the wing’s trailing edge to enable the 

aircraft to withstand the added stresses of arresting-hook engagement. With a 

full fuel load, the U-2G would necessarily be above its maximum gross landing weight at takeoff. In order to quickly reduce aircraft weight in the event 

of an emergency requiring immediate landing, the U-2G was equipped with 

a mechanically operated fuel jettison system. Because of the critical need to 

reduce lift at touchdown, mechanical spoilers were added to the outboard trailing edge of the wings. Activated by a simple switch on the throttle quadrant 

at touchdown, these caused the wing to stall almost immediately, enabling 

the pilot to make a precision landing. For obvious structural reasons, catapult 

launch of the U-2G was not feasible, but the airplane’s normal takeoff characteristics were deemed more than sufficient.22

There were, of course, logistical challenges involved in loading the U-2 

aboard a carrier and handling the airplane on deck. Using a standard fuselagehandling cart as a starting point, Lockheed manufactured a special sling for 

lifting the airplane to place it on board or remove it from the ship. The hangar 

deck offered adequate space for maintenance work or fueling, but moving 

the airplane up to the flight deck required Lockheed engineers to design a 

specialized handling cart because the ship’s elevator was not large enough to 

easily accommodate the U-2.23 James Cunningham noted that “the handling, 

launching, and retrieval will always be a special operation, requiring considerable technical skill from both ground support personnel and pilots.”24

Carrier suitability trials began in August 1963. These preliminary tests, 

dubbed Project Whale Tale, used an unmodified U-2C flown by Bob 

Schumacher from the USS Kitty Hawk approximately 50 miles off the coast 

of California. Although security was considered paramount, it was impossible 

to conceal the airplane from the multitude of personnel at the Navy port in 

San Diego and onboard the carrier itself. Schumacher had flown Article 352 

into Naval Air Station North Island under cover of darkness, and the U-2 was 

hoisted aboard the Kitty Hawk after midnight. Navy personnel involved in the 

loading operation included firefighters, security guards, crane operators, and 

numerous others.25 Despite the most stringent precautions by both Navy and 

CIA security personnel to prevent unwitting persons gaining knowledge of the 

22. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

23. Ibid., p. 5.

24. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 201.

25. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 9.
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operation, Kelly Johnson was horrified to see unexpected crowds of spectators. 

As he later noted in his diary, “I don’t think more than 2,000 or 3,000 people 

saw the aircraft go aboard, as they kept coming back all night from a carnival 

that was held adjacent to the loading docks!”26

After dawn, the Kitty Hawk steamed westward into the Pacific Ocean to 

a point approximately 20 miles south of San Clemente Island. The ship was 

under way at 20 knots into a 10-knot headwind. The combined 30-knot wind 

across the flight deck posed a challenge for the deck crew as they positioned the 

lightweight airplane for takeoff. When given clearance, Schumacher advanced 

the throttle and began rolling down the deck. He was airborne within a mere 

321 feet, the pogos dropped to the deck, and by the time the U-2 cleared 

the carrier’s bow it had already climbed 1,000 feet. After initially making a 

steep climb, Schumacher circled around and made several low approaches 

to the flight deck at speeds between 75 and 78 knots to evaluate the airplane’s handling qualities in the crosswinds and turbulence surrounding the 

carrier. On the third approach, he briefly touched down but bounced, striking 

the right wingtip against the steel deck plating before reapplying power and 

26. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 201.

U-2 pilot attempts to snag the arresting cable during landing aboard the Kitty Hawk. 

(Lockheed Martin)
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going around. After a final pass that allowed observers to check for damage, 

Schumacher flew the U-2 to Lockheed’s facility in Burbank. The test was considered a complete success that furnished Lockheed engineers with valuable 

data for use in further developing the U-2G design changes.27

Kelly Johnson and his team mulled over many questions still not fully 

answered. They briefly considered using a parachute and speed brakes to arrest 

the airplane on landing instead of the tailhook and cable system, because 

repeated arrested landings might overstress the tail-mounting bolts. There was 

concern that shock effects of carrier landings and associated twisting moments 

might eventually cause wing fatigue or fuel leaks or even damage sensitive 

reconnaissance and navigational equipment. Most carrier-based aircraft were 

designed for landing deceleration speeds of 15 to 20 feet per second, but 

Johnson was only confident that he could beef up the landing gear to withstand a 10-foot-per-second deceleration. All the while, Johnson worked to 

keep modification costs as low as possible. One cost-saving innovation was 

his recommendation to transfer two Air Force U-2A airframes to the project 

since they had already been scheduled for overhaul and conversion to U-2C 

standards. Accordingly, articles 348 and 362 were converted to G models 

along with articles 382 and 385. After Article 362 was lost in July 1964, it 

was replaced with Article 349, which had been transferred from the Air Force. 

Originally built as a U-2A, Article 349 now received the J75 engine, the carrier 

landing modifications, and in-flight refueling capability, and it was designated 

the sole U-2H model. It seemed like the perfect combination of characteristics 

for mission flexibility. Unfortunately, the excess weight considerably reduced 

maximum altitude. Consequently, the refueling receptacle was removed less 

than a year later, returning the airplane to the standard U-2G configuration.28

For the arresting gear, Johnson ultimately settled on a modified version of 

the tailhook used on the T-2A. On the U-2, it was mounted ahead of the tail 

wheel and attached to the same structural framework that included the wing 

attach points and engine mounts. Small fairings surrounded the hook to reduce 

aerodynamic drag, and although the jettisonable fairing had been eliminated, 

there was provision for a plastic cover to hide the hook from view when it was 

not in use. A shield assembly ahead of the tail-wheel doors was installed to 

deflect the arresting cable in the event that the hook failed to connect. Johnson 

studied several lift-reduction systems before settling on the spoilers. Fixed slots 

in the flaps offered the simplest solution and the least weight penalty but would 

have required a much steeper angle of attack on final approach. A proposed 

27. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 11.

28. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 201–206.
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leading-edge slat would have required borrowing space from the fuel tanks to 

accommodate actuators, resulting in a 400-nautical-mile loss in range. With 

the addition of the spoilers and fuel-dump system, the total weight penalty 

resulting from the modifications was around 350 pounds.29

CIA project staff and Naval Training Command personnel formulated a 

three-phase training syllabus known as Whale Tale II. Phase One of the short 

but comprehensive carrier qualification course included initial flight checkout 

in the Navy’s T-2A and simulated carrier landings under the supervision of a 

highly qualified landing signals officer (LSO) at Naval Air Station Monterey, 

CA. In Phase Two, trainees completed additional practice landings at Naval 

Air Station Pensacola, FL, followed by actual carrier landings aboard the 

USS Lexington in the Gulf of Mexico. Phase Three consisted of carrier-type 

approaches and landings in the U-2G on a specially prepared lakebed runway 

at Edwards and, finally, actual carrier landings in the U-2.30

The first four pilots began Phase One training in November 1963 under 

the supervision of Lt. Cdr. John Huber. After 2 weeks, the group moved to 

Pensacola for Phase Two and completed initial carrier qualification. A second 

group of four CIA pilots plus Schumacher and Detachment G Comm. Bill 

Gregory began training in January 1964 and completed Phase Two on 

February 15. Phase Three commenced with the delivery of the first U-2G to 

the Edwards detachment. Bob Schumacher tested the spoiler system during 

initial field carrier-landing practice sorties, discovering a variety of minor 

problems that included airframe buffeting, tail vibration, and a rolling tendency at stall. Once these minor problems were resolved, each detachment 

pilot had the opportunity to fly numerous practice sorties. In developing 

landing techniques based on experience with both the T-2A and U-2G, 

they agreed that an ideal carrier landing required approximately 40 knots 

wind speed across the deck. Since the U-2 typically landed at 70 knots this 

resulted in an actual touchdown speed of about 30 knots. The ultimate key 

to success was complete trust in the LSO. Observing from the deck, Huber 

signaled the U-2 pilot with regard to last-minute altitude adjustments and 

the precise moment for chopping the throttle to idle.31

With simulated carrier-landing practice completed, the stage was now set for 

Whale Tale III deployment aboard the USS Ranger. Like the previous training 

project, this effort was divided into three parts. Phase One was devoted exclusively to Lockheed testing of U-2G carrier-landing characteristics and operational 

29. Ibid., p. 202.

30. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 11.

31. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 202–203.
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suitability. As soon as these tests were completed, the airplane was turned over 

to Detachment G personnel for Phase Two, which consisted entirely of carrier 

takeoff and landing practice. In Phase Three, the Edwards detachment evaluated 

the airplane’s operational capabilities. The results provided valuable lessons with 

regard to piloting techniques and operational procedures.32

On February 29, 1964, Bob Schumacher began Phase One with a series of 

touch-and-go landings in Article 362, which had been specially instrumented 

for the tests. This part of the testing went well, but he reported turbulence 

on approach requiring significant throttle adjustments. When Schumacher 

attempted his first arrested landing, he approached too fast and a little high. 

The airplane bounced and the hook engaged the cable while the U-2G was still 

airborne, causing it to slam back to the deck and nose over. Minor damage to 

the nose section was easily repaired aboard ship, but afterward Schumacher flew 

the plane to Burbank so engineers could study the instrument readings and 

add a steel skid beneath the forward fuselage to prevent a similar mishap. Once 

carrier-landing techniques had been perfected, this additional modification 

was no longer required. In order to solve the turbulence problem, the carrier’s 

32. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” pp. 11–12.

Lockheed test pilot Bob Schumacher makes a successful arrested landing on March 2, 1964. 

(Air Force Flight Test Museum)
 Design Evolution

71

speed had to be reduced until the wind over the deck dropped to 25 knots and 

the updraft behind the ship flattened out below the U-2’s approach path.33

Schumacher returned on March 2 in Article 348 and completed Phase One 

with four successful arrested landings. The airplane was then turned over to 

Gregory’s detachment for Phase Two. That same day, Robert Ericson made several touch-and-go landings but was unable to successfully perform an arrested 

landing. His plane ran short of fuel while the USS Ranger maneuvered away 

from a foreign vessel that had entered the operational area, and he eventually 

had to land at North Island. Jim Barnes flew Article 348 back to the carrier 

on March 3, but on his first touch-and-go, he allowed the right wing to drop. 

The right wing skid became entangled with the arresting cable and tore off. 

Barnes gunned the throttle, gained some altitude, and flew the airplane to 

Edwards for repairs. These incidents delayed completion of Phase Two by 

another week, which allowed project pilots to refine their approach techniques 

based on experience gained up to that point. Once flight operations resumed, 

all pilots qualified for carrier operations without further incident. The end of 

Phase Three signaled the detachment’s operational readiness.34

The U-2’s carrier capability was put to the test a few months later during 

Operation Fishhawk. This called for a flight over the French nuclear test site 

at Mururoa Atoll in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. So remote was the test 

site that the USS Ranger and her escort had to sail more than 3,000 miles just 

to get within range for the U-2 mission. All necessary support equipment and 

personnel and one of three pilots were aboard the carrier when it departed San 

Diego. On May 12, two additional pilots ferried their U-2G aircraft to the ship 

from Edwards via Hawaii. One week later, when the Ranger was within 800 

nautical miles of Mururoa, one of the airplanes took off on a maximum-range 

sortie covering more than 1,000 miles. Since additional photographic coverage 

was required, a second mission was launched on May 22.35

Detachment G pilots continued to receive carrier qualification in the T-2A 

and perform practice touchdowns in the U-2 at Edwards. Over time, the 

pilots discovered that each of the airplanes had unique flying qualities. Article 

382, for example had a tendency to drop off to the left in a stall. On April 26, 

1965, Buster Edens, a 9-year veteran of the U-2 program, was briefed on this 

phenomenon before taking the airplane up for a series of simulated carrier 

landings. After taking off and climbing to 13,000 feet to check stall characteristics, which appeared normal, he returned to the landing pattern and made 

33. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 202–203.

34. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” pp. 13–15.

35. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 204.
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an approach to the runway. At touchdown, the left wing dropped, dragging 

the skid for about 50 feet as Edens added power and struggled to get aloft. He 

managed to level the wings and become airborne, making a left turn to reenter 

the downwind leg. A ground observer advised him to check the wing balance 

again, which he apparently did at an altitude of 3,000 feet. At this point, the 

airplane dipped to the left into a descending spiral. Edens extended the speed 

brakes to arrest the spin but never regained control. He ejected at extremely 

low altitude and was killed because his parachute did not fully open.36

Accident investigators recommended that in the future, stall checks be 

conducted with sufficient altitude available for spin recovery or, at the very 

least, safe egress. They also suggested that efforts be made to ensure symmetrical stall characteristics for all U-2 aircraft and that necessary modifications 

be made to prevent fuel from moving from one wing to the other when the 

pump was not operating.37 In his diary, Kelly Johnson lamented the stall and 

trim problems and the stall strips on the wings that had to be hand tailored 

for each aircraft individually. “If we put the stall strips where they give us 

good landing and takeoff characteristics,” he wrote, “then we run into buffeting and pitching at altitude.”38

Although the overall results of the Whale Tale effort were highly successful, there was substantial Navy opposition to conducting additional U-2 carrier missions. Operation and deployment of an aircraft carrier was extremely 

expensive and required an entire flotilla of support vessels. Moving an entire 

carrier battle group quickly or in secret was virtually impossible, and senior 

Navy leadership complained that the U-2 operation was interfering with other 

fleet priorities.39 In 1969, all surviving U-2G airframes were placed in flyable 

storage, but this was not the end of U-2 operations at sea.

The First Trainer

Other than the U-2D, there had never been a two-seat U-2. Unlike most 

military airplanes, there was no trainer model with provisions for an instructor 

pilot and trainee. Student pilots received instruction and checkout in the T-33 

before making their first solo flight in the U-2. Although the idea of building 

a U-2 trainer had been raised many times, the idea failed to gain traction until 

36. Ibid., p. 207.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 208.

39. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 251.
 Design Evolution

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the early 1970s. In the wake of several landing accidents, 15th Air Force commander Gen. Paul K. Carlton sent the SAC U-2 unit operations officer, Col. 

Tony Martinez, to Lockheed to discuss the possibility of modifying one of the 

damaged airframes into a two-place trainer. Kelly Johnson offered to rebuild 

the U-2C for $1 million but estimated it would cost $5 million to $6 million to convert it into a trainer. Air Force officials approved the expenditure 

and Johnson assigned Ed Baldwin to lead the conversion team at the Skunk 

Works facility in Palmdale, CA. Maj. George Worley of the 100th Strategic 

Reconnaissance Wing advised Baldwin on what controls and instruments 

would be needed for the instructor’s cockpit.40

Baldwin began with Article 393, which had been badly damaged during 

a landing accident in May 1972. Using parts of other crashed airframes, his 

team installed a second cockpit for the instructor pilot above and directly 

behind the student’s cockpit. The conversion was completed just 5 months 

after receiving the go-ahead. Lockheed chief test pilot Bill Park made the 

maiden flight of the U-2CT on February 13, 1973. He found that the oddlooking configuration handled well and apparently had no adverse effect on 

the airplane’s aerodynamics. Eleven days later, after the U-2CT had been 

painted gloss white with SAC markings, Worley flew the trainer to DavisMonthan Air Force Base near Tucson, AZ. Crew chief TSgt. Jose Ortiz rode 

40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 349.

The U-2CT had an instructor’s station above and behind the student’s cockpit. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

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in the front cockpit during the ferry flight, becoming the first enlisted crewman to fly in a U-2.41

Based on a new training syllabus written by Worley, new U-2 pilots first 

received an hour of taildragger experience in a Bellanca Decathlon. They 

would then need to make five flights with an instructor in the U-2CT before 

being allowed to solo. The new trainer soon proved its worth and was very 

popular with student pilots. A second U-2CT was built from Article 359 in 

the summer of 1975 and delivered in January 1976. Both trainers remained 

in service until 1987.42

Second Generation

The number of U-2s operated by the CIA fluctuated over the course of the 

airplane’s first decade of service. By 1963, nearly half of the 55 airframes built 

had been lost to attrition and others were swapped back and forth between 

the agency and the Air Force. Although Kelly Johnson recognized the need to 

put the U-2 back into production, he was reluctant because the Government 

was already heavily invested in the airplane’s successor, the A-12, and variants 

including the YF-12 and R-12 (later redesignated SR-71). So, rather than 

restart the production line, Johnson assigned several of his engineers to develop 

a simple modification to improve the U-2’s capabilities. Merv Heal and his 

team proposed adding two 30-inch fuselage plugs, one aft of the Q-bay and one 

aft of the wings, adding 60 inches to the airframe. This would give the airplane 

more room for equipment, a refueling receptacle, and carrier arresting gear. 

Johnson was so enthusiastic about the improved capabilities that in September 

1963 he recommended building a new batch of 25 aircraft, designated U-2L, 

at a cost of approximately $1 million apiece.43

Air Force and Navy officials expressed interest in the basic U-2L, but the 

CIA requested a capability for installing an upward-facing optical sensor to 

take images of Soviet satellites. Johnson subsequently sought a 240-inch focal 

length camera that could fit in the nose of the U-2, pointed upward. He then 

proposed a rotating nose assembly that would allow the camera to take pictures of the ground as well. This version of the airplane was dubbed U-2M. 

But getting approval for production was no longer as easy as it once had been. 

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established in 1960, now had 

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 236.
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procurement approval authority for all overhead reconnaissance programs, and 

despite the fact that the NRO was a joint organization between the CIA and 

military services, there was a significant amount of bureaucratic infighting. In 

September 1964, the NRO rejected Lockheed’s U-2L and U-2M proposals in 

favor of less costly upgrades to the existing fleet.44

In March 1965, NRO Director Brockway McMillan directed the Air Force 

and CIA to study future requirements for the U-2. He also asked for comparison of U-2 intelligence collection capabilities versus the A-12/SR-71 and 

reconnaissance satellites, as well as an estimate of the future role of airborne 

reconnaissance platforms in the face of improved hostile air defense systems. 

Three months later, McMillan received a recommendation to procure more 

U-2 airplanes. This gave Kelly Johnson the opportunity to propose yet another 

improvement. Up to this point, he had yet to alter the U-2’s wing configuration, but he began investigating new high-lift NASA airfoils, swept wings, and 

changes in aspect ratio. In July, he pitched a proposal for building 27 U-2N 

airframes with a longer wingspan and increased lifting surface. Unimpressed, 

McMillan rejected the proposal on the basis that “Although a new version 

would have somewhat improved performance, it would still be highly vulnerable to both ground and air missiles.”45

Johnson’s team continued to work despite this setback. In an effort to 

improve the wing configuration, Lockheed spent $250,000 on designing and 

wind tunnel testing a new wing with a NASA-developed flap, designed by 

Richard Whitcomb of Langley Research Center, that would increase critical 

Mach number, the lowest Mach number at which airflow over some point of 

the aircraft reaches the speed of sound. Initial test results were disappointing. 

Although the new flap arrangement delayed the onset of transonic drag rise, 

the airplane’s overall profile drag increased by 30 percent. As Johnson noted 

in his diary, “When we combined this with the extremely heavy weight of the 

new wing and its controls we obtained a very discouraging outcome.”46

In the meantime, Pratt & Whitney engineers were working on improvements to boost climb performance. The result was the J75-P-13B with 17,000 

pounds of thrust at sea level. The NRO ordered 24 of the new engines to 

upgrade the existing U-2 fleet, but flight testing demonstrated a clear need 

for widening the air inlet to optimize performance. Johnson saw this as an 

opportunity to press his case for a wholly revised U-2 design, and he directed 

Merv Heal to conduct another design study. The U-2R featured an enlarged 

44. Ibid., pp. 236–237.

45. Ibid., p. 237.

46. Ibid.
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fuselage with additional equipment space and provisions for interchangeable 

nose assemblies to carry a variety of cameras and sensors, depending on mission requirements.47 As Johnson later wrote, “We made a complete circle and 

ended up merely enlarging the present U-2 to take advantage of a 20 percent 

power increase.... Going back to the original concept, where we can fly with 

a lift coefficient of 0.6 to 0.7, gives us an airplane with a 7,000 mile range 

unrefueled and a few thousand feet more altitude.”48 As it turned out, Johnson’s 

range estimate was overly optimistic, but there was significant improvement.

He pitched his proposal in January 1966, offering to build the first two 

aircraft for just $12.5 million. The Air Force expressed little interest at the time, 

giving higher priority to the SR-71 program, but the CIA funded a 3-month 

study contract for basic engineering. Lockheed spent a nearly equivalent sum 

of company money on wind tunnel–model testing. Additional testing was 

undertaken to determine the airplane’s vulnerability to radar tracking and 

surface-to-air missiles.49 By August 1966, the original U-2 fleet had dwindled 

to 15, and several of these were undergoing repairs at Lockheed. To increase 

the number of available aircraft and lengthen the fleet’s service life, Director 

of Central Intelligence Richard Helms initially approved an order for eight 

airframes. Within 6 months, he and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 

jointly placed an order for another four.50

Johnson assigned Ed Baldwin and Fred Cavanaugh to spearhead the engineering effort, and he gave their 30-person team 12 months to refine the design, 

build the aircraft, and fly the prototype. Apart from enhanced performance, 

design goals included a better electrical system along with improved maintainability and servicing provisions. The enlarged fuselage not only offered 

substantially increased internal volume for additional equipment but also 

achieved better overall weight distribution. Other improvements included 

the elimination of protruding oil cooler intakes (to reduce drag), enlarged 

horizontal and vertical tail surfaces, hydraulically actuated roll and lift spoilers, 

enlarged retractable leading-edge stall strips, strengthened landing gear, a zerozero ejection seat, proper stressing for arresting gear, and folding wingtips for 

ease of storage on the ground or inside an aircraft carrier. A mockup review on 

November 29, 1966, resulted in very few recommendations for design changes. 

Johnson’s engineering team had taken thorough advantage of prior experience 

and lessons learned from the earlier U-2 production program. One problem 

47. Ibid., pp. 237–238.

48. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 89.

49. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.

50. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 251.
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that had been addressed was that the first-generation U-2 had become so heavy 

that the margin between stall buffet and compressibility at high altitudes was 

only 6 knots. With improved wings and engine, the U-2R had a comparatively 

generous 20-knot window, greatly improving the airplane’s flying qualities.51

The original U-2 had an 80-foot span with 600 square feet of wing area. 

By contrast, the U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet of lifting 

surface. Bob Wiele, who led the wing design team, retained the original NACA 

64A airfoil and reduced wing loading to the values attained with the U-2A. 

The airplane’s lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, its lift coefficient was 0.6 to 0.7, and 

the aspect ratio was 10.667. The unconventional wing structure weighed just 3 

pounds per square foot and included planks (eight per wing) milled from large 

aluminum billets, rather than being built up using riveted sheet metal, I-beams, 

and U-channels. The larger wing also gave the U-2R increased internal fuel 

capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement was altered. In the early U-2 models, 

having the main tank forward and the auxiliary tank aft resulted in considerable 

changes in center of gravity as fuel was consumed. This problem was eliminated in the U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 

239-gallon auxiliaries outboard. Fuel from the main tanks was exhausted first 

so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped dampen 

51. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 92.

With its lengthened fuselage and wings, the U-2R, right, was significantly larger than the U-2C. 

(Lockheed Martin)
Unlimited Horizons

78

wing bending and torsional loads. An additional 99 gallons in the sump tank 

gave the U-2R a total capacity of 2,915 gallons, enough to remain airborne 

for 15 hours, though it was impractical to expect a pilot to endure flying solo 

in a pressure suit for such an extended length of time.52

Herb Nystrom led the team that designed the empennage and tail assembly. 

Following a series of engineering studies, he opted to include an all-moving 

tailplane similar to the one Kelly Johnson developed for the Lockheed JetStar. 

This configuration most effectively distributed pitch forces across the entire 

horizontal stabilizer assembly, widened the airplane’s center-of-gravity limits, 

and eliminated the need for both ballast and trim tabs.53

Ed Baldwin’s team was responsible for designing the fuselage assembly. 

With wide, flaring inlets, it had a Coke bottle shape and was wider and 25 

percent longer than that of earlier models. A surplus of internal volume accommodated navigation and communications equipment, defensive avionics, and 

other items. Mission equipment occupied both the enlarged Q-bay and the 

nose compartment. Total payload capacity was 1,050 pounds. The cockpit 

was 45 percent larger than that of the U-2C, allowing the partial-pressure suit 

to be abandoned in favor of bulkier but more comfortable full-pressure suits. 

It also accommodated a new ejection seat that could be safely used at even 

extremely low altitude. Seven experienced U-2 pilots contributed to the design 

of the cockpit arrangement. Fitted with pressure suits, they took turns sitting 

in the mockup and evaluating visibility instrument placement and operability 

of controls and switches.54

Although the remaining U-2C airframes had been equipped with the new 

J75-P-13B engine, the U-2R was powered by an upgraded model that had 

improved dependability and increased thrust, allowing it to achieve speeds up 

to 410 knots (Mach 0.72), or about 12 knots faster than the U-2C. Although 

the U-2R could exceed 74,000 feet, it had a shorter range at maximum altitude 

than the U-2C. One significant improvement was that in the event that the 

P-13B engine quit during flight, it could be restarted at 54,000 feet, roughly 

10,000 feet higher than the earlier P-13A.55

Assembly of the first U-2R began in early 1967. Johnson was very satisfied 

with his team’s workmanship, but by mid-March 1967, he was concerned that 

construction of the prototype was progressing slowly. “This is basically because 

I have insisted on much better tooling than on prior models,” he wrote in his 

52. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.

53. Ibid., p. 239.

54. Ibid.

55. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 251–252.
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diary, “and, while it will take us longer to get started, we will get much better 

airplanes.” By April 19, the wings were taking shape and the forward fuselage 

and cockpit structure were nearly complete. Johnson marveled at the size of the 

U-2R and lamented that the airframe was about 800 pounds heavier than originally specified, about half of which was due to added customer equipment.56

In accordance with Kelly Johnson’s schedule, the completed prototype, 

known as Article 051, was delivered to Edwards in August. Following static 

ground testing and taxi trials, the unpainted U-2R was prepared for its maiden 

flight. On August 28, with Bob Schumacher and Johnson flying chase in a 

Beech Twin Bonanza, Bill Park took off from Rogers Dry Lake and soared 

into the sky. He found the airplane generally similar to its predecessors. As 

testing continued over the ensuing months, Park and other test pilots gained 

an appreciation for the various design improvements. Larger control surfaces 

and an increased critical Mach number significantly improved the overall flying 

qualities. Improved margins between stall and Mach buffet at cruising altitudes 

56. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 92.

Bill Park piloted the maiden flight of the U-2R on August 28, 1967. (Lockheed Martin)
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80

allowed more reliable autopilot control, and the U-2R had better longitudinal 

pitch trim than earlier models.57

A second U-2R was delivered in December. Results of flight testing indicated that range and altitude performance was as desired. Maximum altitude 

was a function of gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature, but a U-2R 

with a gross takeoff weight of 34,750 pounds (including 12,250 pounds of 

fuel and a 3,000-pound payload) could fly a 7.5-hour, 3,000-nautical-mile 

mission, with most of the flight above 70,000 feet. The test team discovered a 

number of small problems with the air conditioning system, engine oil cooling, fuel-feed system, and tail vibration, but these were easily fixed. A more 

serious problem was the airplane’s tendency to veer to the left during takeoff 

roll due to nonaxisymmetric thrust. Testing had to be delayed 2 months while 

Lockheed engineers devised a solution. Their first attempt involved adding a 

5-inch extension to the tailpipe, but this caused serious vibration. Ultimately, 

the original U-2R tailpipe was extended 12 inches and bypass doors were added 

adjacent to the engine compressor face. These doors provided cooling air to 

the engine compartment and secondary airflow to the exhaust ejector. During 

57. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 240–241.

By mid-1968, five U-2R airframes were being flown at Edwards for testing and training. 

(Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

81

ground operations, when nacelle pressure was higher than at the compressor 

face, they remained closed to prevent the compressor from drawing air away 

from the ejector. During flight, the doors opened when pressure at the engine 

face was higher.58

Production airframes rolled off the assembly line at the rate of approximately 

one per month. By the end of May 1968, five airplanes were flying and two of 

those were being used for operational pilot training. The U-2R proved to be a very 

stable platform for reconnaissance sensors and featured better camera-window 

glass than had been previously used. Kelly Johnson presented test results and 

touted the airplane’s enhanced capabilities in the hope of attracting customers 

and keeping the U-2R production line open beyond the 12-unit initial run. He 

emphasized the reliability and flexibility that built upon prior experience with 

a family of aircraft that had logged more than 135,000 flight hours since its 

introduction in 1955. The J75 engine, already in use throughout the fleet, was 

well proven and capable of enduring 1,200 hours of operation before requiring overhaul. With a multitude of built-in access panels, the U-2R had been 

designed for ease of maintenance and servicing. It also had a comprehensive 

suite of communication and navigation equipment, as well as multiple backups 

for the electrical power system.59

Johnson succeeded in impressing senior Air Force leadership, though not as 

he had intended. Instead of placing a new order that would keep the production 

line running, they instead tried to acquire all 12 of the existing airframes for 

use by SAC. For a while, this pitted Director of Central Intelligence Richard 

Helms against Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Eventually, they came 

to an agreement to split the disposition of the U-2R production between the 

CIA and Air Force. In November 1968, 1 month prior to the delivery of the last 

U-2R, the NRO Executive Committee ordered most of the remaining U-2C 

and U-2G airframes placed in flyable storage to be used later for replacement 

of any U-2R models lost to attrition. 

After the new model was declared operational in January 1969, pilots who 

had previously flown the U-2C underwent a 20-hour conversion course while 

transitioning to the U-2R. For reconnaissance sorties, the airplane could be 

equipped with a variety of different cameras, but with a 24-inch-focal-length 

stereo design and 12-inch resolution, the Itek IRIS II became the sensor 

of choice. This panoramic camera had a 140-degree scan angle and carried 

10,500 feet of film to cover a 60-mile swath from 70,000 feet. An optical 

bar system in which the entire mirror-lens assembly rotated continuously 

58. Ibid., p. 241.

59. Ibid.
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82

eliminated vibration problems that reduced resolution in cameras with reciprocating shutters and lenses.60

Developmental and experimental testing at Edwards continued as the U-2R 

was placed into service elsewhere. Some of these experiments were quite innovative if not terribly successful. One of these, dubbed Chameleon, involved the 

application of paint that changed color as temperature varied with altitude. It 

was hoped that paint that appeared light blue at low altitudes would change to 

dark blue in the cold upper atmosphere, and then back again during descent, 

to better camouflage the airplane throughout the course of a mission. Wailing 

Wall was an experiment to determine whether specially designed intake duct 

linings and various exhaust nozzle shapes would reduce the airplane’s acoustic 

signature, preventing detection during missions at low altitudes. Lockheed 

engineers hoped to make the U-2 inaudible as low as 500 feet above the ground, 

but the effort failed. For additional mission flexibility, one proposal involved 

development of a probe-and-drogue buddy refueling capability that would 

allow one U-2 to refuel another in flight. There was also a study to develop a 

night-vision driftsight to allow the pilot to navigate from high altitudes using 

terrain features after dark. By far the most practical effort involved an attempt 

to provide the U-2R with a high-altitude engine restart capability. This worked 

consistently at 50,000 feet, 10,000 feet above the normal J75-P-13B relight 

altitude, but worked only occasionally at 56,000 to 58,000 feet. Some test 

projects were almost surreal. One involved a method for dropping propaganda 

leaflets from 70,000 feet. Another, called Fortune Cookie, called for launching modified AQM-37 supersonic drones from wing pylons. Under the initial 

concept, the rocket-powered drone would be equipped with a camera and 

recovered at the end of its flight. Later, it was proposed that an expendable 

drone would collect electronic intelligence data, which could then be relayed 

to the U-2 or another airborne platform within range. Although test results 

were promising, no operational missions were undertaken.61 Kelly Johnson also 

pursued the concept of arming the U-2 with bombs and missiles. This would 

have required the addition of hard-points on the wings for attaching weapon 

pylons and replacing the original landing gear with a tricycle arrangement 

consisting of two main gear in mid-wing pods and a nose wheel. This concept 

never went beyond testing of a wind tunnel model.62

In the summer of 1969, despite continuing Navy opposition, the U-2R 

was scheduled for carrier trials under project Blue Gull. Things went a little 

60. Ibid., p. 245.

61. Ibid., pp. 255–257.

62. Jenkins, Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady, p. 19.
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smoother this time because the U-2R had been designed to accommodate 

removable arresting gear and the outermost 6 feet of each wing folded upward, 

allowing the airplane to fit more easily onto the carrier’s elevator and inside 

the hangar deck. The first phase of testing involved 2 days of practice using 

a mock carrier runway at Naval Air Station Lakehurst, NJ. Thanks to the 

improved flap configuration and a more responsive throttle, pilots found the 

carrier landing characteristics of the U-2R much more benign than those of 

the U-2G. Next, Lockheed test pilot Bill Park, along with two American and 

two British pilots assigned to the U-2 project, underwent carrier qualification 

in the T-2B at Pensacola. This time, Lt. Cdr. Lonnie McClung served as the 

project’s resident LSO.63

In November 1969, following additional landing practice in the U-2R at 

Edwards, the team headed east for Blue Gull V carrier trials aboard the USS 

America. Two U-2R aircraft were ferried to NASA’s Wallops Island facility on 

63. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 257.

For carrier operations, the U-2R was equipped with arresting gear and wingtip skid extensions. 

(U.S. Air Force)
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84

Virginia’s Eastern Shore, and on November 21, Park flew out to the carrier. He 

made his first approach at a speed of 72 knots with a 20-knot wind over the 

deck but had to abort when the tailhook failed to deploy. He returned to shore 

where it was found that someone had forgotten to remove the locking pin prior 

to takeoff. His second and third attempts resulted in successful full-stop landings on the carrier deck. Park also demonstrated lightweight and heavyweight 

takeoffs. Overall, he was very satisfied with the airplane’s handling characteristics, and he remarked that he scarcely needed to use the arresting gear at all.64

Each of the four remaining pilots earned their carrier qualifications in the 

U-2R, but debate still raged as to whether the Navy would permit operational 

missions to be carried out. The Blue Gull V exercise had demonstrated that 

the airplane fit onto the elevator and could be easily moved from hangar deck 

to flight deck and that flight operations could be easily accomplished with 

repeated success. Besides the obvious reconnaissance applications, there had 

been some interest in using the U-2R as a high-altitude communications relay 

for the carrier air group. Some high-ranking Navy officials, however, still felt 

that these were not sufficient reasons to take up valuable deck and hangar space 

and that it was simply too expensive to commit a carrier deployment to what 

would likely be a single U-2 sortie.65

64. Ibid., p. 258.

65. Ibid.

Deck crewmen prepare the U-2 for takeoff from the USS America. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

85

This didn’t stop Kelly Johnson from pursuing other potential naval applications for the U-2R, particularly in the field of maritime surveillance. Up 

to this point, any airborne platform that relied on photographic means for 

obtaining imagery was constrained by inclement weather and limited daylight. 

By the early 1970s, significant advancements in high-speed integrated solidstate circuits made it possible to digitally process radar imaging signals in real 

time. The resulting increase in coverage and resolution this afforded spurred 

a revolution in the development of such sensors as synthetic-aperture radar 

(SAR), in which the airplane’s flightpath was used to make a relatively small 

antenna perform like an extremely large antenna electronically. Collected data 

could then be processed to generate high-resolution imagery. In 1971, the 

NRO sponsored Project Senior Lance—flight tests of a prototype imaging 

radar built by Goodyear Aerospace in Phoenix. When installed in the nose of 

the U-2R, the sensor provided a commanding view from high altitude. Targets 

as far as 100 miles away could be identified in all weather conditions, day or 

night, even when concealed beneath foliage or camouflage netting. Flights 

made over the ocean provided imagery in which the wakes of individual ships 

were distinguishable even at great distances.66

In the initial phase of testing, Article 061 was equipped with a radar sensor 

that simply collected and stored all data for later processing. In March 1972, a 

66. Ibid., p. 281.

There was little clearance between the airplane’s wingtip and the carrier’s superstructure. 

(Lockheed Martin)
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86

data link was installed in the airplane so that radar returns could be transmitted 

to the ground for immediate processing and then sent as quickly as possible to 

military commanders to provide vital, current intelligence. A 3-month test of this 

capability, dubbed Senior Dagger, took place at McCoy Air Force Base, FL, that 

summer, with U-2 radar imagery being downlinked to a ground station at Rome 

Air Force Base, NY. Following completion of these tests, Article 061 was bailed to 

the Navy for a 6-month, $5.5 million program to evaluate a configuration called 

Electronics Patrol Experimental (EP-X). Under Project Highboy, the U-2R was 

equipped with forward-looking radar in the nose compartment and wing pods 

to contain additional sensors. The nose-mounted system was a variant of the AN/

APS-116 X-band weather radar, modified to detect surface vessels or submarine 

periscopes protruding above the waves.67 The left pod contained a return-beam 

vidicon camera, a high-performance electronic imaging sensor capable of making 

continuous or discrete exposures with performance matching or exceeding that 

of film, particularly with low-contrast imagery. An AN/ALQ-110 radar signal 

67. Ibid., p. 282.

A U-2R was fitted with radar systems to detect oceangoing vessels for the Navy EP-X test 

program. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

87

receiver was installed in the right pod along with a tracker camera that would 

normally have been mounted in the nose.68

During EP-X tests in early 1973, the U-2R was flown off the coast of California 

to provide near-real-time information on shipping. The sensors were controlled 

from the ground and all data were downlinked to analysts at Lockheed’s facility 

in Sunnyvale, CA. In another test, dubbed Outlaw Hawk, sensors aboard the 

U-2R were downlinked to surface ships including the USS Kitty Hawk. In this 

exercise, the U-2R was flown from Palmdale while the carrier group sailed from 

San Diego to Pearl Harbor, HI. Despite promising results, the EP-X concept 

was ultimately abandoned in favor of a combination of more conventional 

aircraft, such as the EP-3E, and ocean surveillance satellites.69

Kelly Johnson’s hopes for restarting the U-2R production line under 

Navy contract were dashed when NRO leadership recommended terminating the CIA portion of the U-2 program. Under this plan, the U-2R fleet 

would be consolidated within SAC and two airframes could be loaned to 

the Navy for further EP-X testing. Johnson continued to propose new ideas 

for his beloved U-2, including a capability to carry two laser-guided bombs 

68. Michael J. Cantella, “Application of the High Resolution Return Beam Vidicon,” Optical 

Engineering 16, no. 3 (June 1, 1977): 163257, http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.7972141, 

accessed July 7, 2013.

69. Norman Polmar, “When the U-2 Went to Sea,” Air Force Magazine 84, no. 2 (February 2001): 62.

Under Project Highboy, the EP-X test bed carried a variety of sensors. (Lockheed Martin)
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88

or anti-ship missiles and a U-2RL with a lengthened Q-bay and a refueling 

probe mounted at the tip of the vertical tail fin. Unfortunately, by this time 

a series of bribery scandals, as well as developmental and financial problems 

involving the L-1011 Tristar, threatened to bankrupt the company. The Navy 

showed no further interest in EP-X, and in 1974, the CIA put an end to the 

agency’s U-2 operation. Johnson retired the following year to be replaced by 

his deputy, Ben Rich.70

Over the next several years, the Air Force sought expanded capabilities for 

the U-2R, including improved cameras and the Advanced Synthetic Aperture 

Radar System (ASARS), which had resolution comparable to that of film cameras. Use of interchangeable nose assemblies, the Q-bay, and wing pods made 

it possible to conduct multisensor missions for simultaneous collection of both 

imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Lockheed eventually contracted 

with Texas-based E-Systems to combine multiple SIGINT sensors within two 

24-foot-long superpods mounted at midspan on each wing. Each superpod 

was capable of containing 800 pounds of equipment and was three times larger 

than the instrument pods used during the EP-X trials. As in the early days of 

the U-2, the airplane could also be fitted with particulate samplers for collecting 

debris from foreign nuclear tests; although such tests took place underground, 

radionuclides were sometimes vented into the atmosphere.71 This capability 

was also put to use after a nuclear-powered Soviet ocean surveillance satellite 

reentered Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrated over Canada’s Northwestern 

Territories in January 1978. Five U-2 high-altitude aerial sampling sorties 

were flown during a joint U.S.-Canadian search-and-recovery effort known 

as Operation Morning Light.72 The SAC U-2 fleet was also occasionally called 

upon to assist with flood control and tornado-damage assessment, hurricane 

surveillance, and geothermal-energy monitoring. Many such missions were 

accommodated during routine training sorties.73

By the mid-1970s, the Air Force had recognized the value of remotely 

piloted vehicles (RPVs) for airborne reconnaissance and was seriously considering investing in an extremely long-duration, high-altitude RPV. Drones 

used during the war in Vietnam produced imagery and other intelligence 

comparable in quality to that collected by crewed platforms but at considerably lower risk. In a fighter-sized RPV, space normally used for crews and 

70. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 283.

71. Ibid., pp. 283–290.

72. Mahlon E. Gates et al., “Operation Morning Light: Northwest Territories, Canada, 1978: A Nontechnical Summary of United States Participation,” U.S. Dept. of Energy NV-198 (1978), p. 30.

73. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 95.
 Design Evolution

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life-support systems could be allocated to additional fuel and sensor equipment. Alternatively, such an airframe might be built with a strong, lightweight 

structure for improved altitude and range. Funding of engineering studies and 

testing of prototypes bled funding from other programs, including the U-2R. 

In one such effort, called Compass Cope, both Boeing and Teledyne-Ryan 

submitted competing designs for a high-altitude, long-range RPV designed 

for long-endurance photographic reconnaissance and electronic surveillance 

missions. Sensing an opportunity, Ben Rich proposed that Lockheed develop 

a remotely piloted version of the U-2R. He argued that since it was based 

on proven technology, the RPV would be less expensive to produce and be 

available sooner that either the Boeing or Teledyne-Ryan entries. Moreover, 

it would have equal or better performance and payload capabilities. It became 

a moot point when the Compass Cope program was canceled in July 1977 

because of difficulties in developing sensor payloads for the aircraft and 

because Air Force officials apparently had no interest in a U-2 RPV.74

74. Ibid.

Advanced synthetic aperture imaging radar and wing-mounted SIGINT equipment expanded the 

U-2’s capabilities. (U.S. Air Force)
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90

New Production

To the surprise of many, Kelly Johnson’s dream of restarting the U-2 production 

line eventually came true with congressional approval of the fiscal year 1979 

defense budget. In 1977, Lockheed proposed upgrading the U-2R to carry 

side-looking radar and the latest ASARS, sensor packages considered ideal for 

the type of standoff tactical reconnaissance mission that military planners considered vital for future conflicts. Upon accepting this proposal, the Air Force 

signed an initial $10.2 million contract with Lockheed to refurbish the original 

U-2R tooling that had been in storage since 1969 and to create whatever new 

tooling might be required for constructing the new airframe. This was followed 

with a $42.4 million production contract to build the first three airframes, two 

trainers for the Air Force and a single-seat model for NASA to be used as an 

Earth resources science platform. By the time full-scale production ended, a 

total of 37 new airframes had been built, including another for NASA and an 

additional trainer. In keeping with the airplane’s new tactical reconnaissance 

role, the Air Force changed the designation from U-2R to TR-1A for the singleseat model and TR-1B for the trainer.75 The NASA plane was initially called 

the ER-1 but was later redesignated ER-2, perhaps to further distinguish the 

research plane from its military counterpart.

After 12 years of dormancy, restarting the assembly line proved more difficult than anticipated. Lack of experienced labor necessitated enticing some earlier U-2 production veterans out of retirement to augment the less-experienced 

workforce. The learning curve was steeper than it should have been but shot up 

dramatically over the first 2 years. Delays resulted from the need for Lockheed 

to reestablish relationships with vendors and subcontractors. Documentation 

became a nightmare. Whereas before the Skunk Works team had been able to 

streamline and minimize paperwork, the Air Force now demanded strict adherence to military specifications (better known as Mil-Spec) that governed procedures and processes. Throughout earlier production runs, Lockheed frequently 

disregarded Mil-Spec in order to meet the unique design requirements of the 

U-2, such as the need to minimize structural weight. With the new production, Air Force officials insisted on conformation to regulations. Eventually, the 

company and the Government reached a compromise that allowed Lockheed 

to work to the intention, rather than to the letter, of Mil-Spec regulations. 

There were also a few turf battles. A bureaucratic tug-of-war erupted between 

the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) and Air Force Logistics 

Command (AFLC) over which organization should have overall responsibility 

75. Ibid., p. 96.
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for program management; it was settled only after AFLC successfully pressed 

the argument that the TR-1 was essentially a continuation of the earlier U-2R 

program. Then, the general in charge of Tactical Air Command sought to 

wrest ownership of the TR-1 from SAC, since it was at least nominally to be 

used for tactical reconnaissance rather than strategic reconnaissance. SAC 

commander Gen. Richard H. Ellis prevailed, contending, “There is absolutely 

Lockheed workers build a new version of the U-2, now redesignated TR-1. (Lockheed Martin)
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no reason why SAC cannot continue to support the tasking requested by 

theater commanders.”76

It took 3 long years before TR-1 production began coming in under budget 

and ahead of schedule. This eventual success was largely due to the program’s 

greatest asset: strong teamwork among Lockheed, ASD, AFLC, and the TR-1 

System Program Office. According to ASD commander Lt. Gen. J. Michael 

Loh during an acceptance ceremony for the final airframe, “Each successive 

year we got smarter about writing incentives for the TR-1 contracts, Lockheed 

got better at building it, and AFLC got better at integrating subsystems.” This 

teamwork ultimately resulted in a $26 million savings on budget over the final 

6 years of production.77

First to roll off the assembly line was the NASA ER-2. Lockheed test pilot 

Art Peterson made the first flight on May 11, 1981, and NASA pilot Marty 

Knutson delivered it to Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA, on June 

10.78 This occurred with surprisingly little fanfare compared to the subsequent 

debut of the TR-1. Unlike its predecessors, which had been born in secrecy, the 

first TR-1A was unveiled publicly during a media event at Lockheed’s Palmdale 

76. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 294–295.

77. Ibid., p. 295.

78. Ibid., p. 374.

The TR-1 was publicly unveiled in July 1981. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

93

facility in July 1981. Company test pilot Ken Weir made the first flight on 

August 1, and by April 1982, six aircraft were flying. Low-rate production 

continued until the final delivery in early October 1989.79

Several airframes were delivered under the designation U-2R and the second 

trainer as a U-2RT. In October 1991, the TR-1 designation was dropped 

altogether and the airplanes were once again all referred to as U-2s. By the 

time the final airframe rolled off the assembly line, the U-2R had evolved 

into a flexible, multipurpose platform for electro-optical, SIGINT, and radar 

reconnaissance. It was also considerably less expensive to maintain and operate 

than its putative successor, the SR-71. Sensor payloads included the ASARS-2 

improved imaging radar and the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance 

System (SYERS). Both payloads could be installed in the interchangeable nose 

sections. In addition, the U-2R was capable of serving as a data relay and, when 

called for, could still carry high-resolution film cameras that were considerably 

more flexible and reliable than those used in the early days of the program. To further enhance its capabilities, the airplane was equipped with a data link to provide 

reconnaissance products in near real time. Early versions required the transmitter 

to be within 200 to 250 miles of a ground station for the line-of-sight downlink 

to work, otherwise data had to be recorded onboard until the U-2 was within 

range of the receiver. To escape this limitation, a satellite communications system 

was developed for the U-2R. Known as Senior Span, it consisted of a steerable 

79. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 96–97.

 A trainer variant designated TR-1B was similar in configuration to the U-2CT. (U.S. Air Force)
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94

30-inch parabolic antenna housed in an unpressurized dorsal radome. Skunk 

Works engineers faced the challenge of designing the 17-foot-long antenna dome 

so that it would not add excessive weight to the airframe or affect the center of 

gravity. The result was one of the most unusual looking U-2 configurations yet.80

Into the 21st Century

In the 1990s, the U-2 fleet received the first of several significant upgrades that 

modernized the airplane for a new era. Preproduction testing began in 1991 in 

preparation for retrofitting the fleet with General Electric F118-GE-101 nonafterburning turbofan engines; the antiquated J75-P-13B turbojet engines were 

becoming increasingly costly to maintain. Evaluation of the new powerplant 

included engine-airframe integration, basic operation, and demonstration of 

the airstart system. The new engine was rated at 18,300 pounds of thrust, and 

flight-test results indicated it would provide the U-2 with a weight savings 

of 1,300 pounds and use an average of 16 percent less fuel than the J75. The 

engine’s size (39 inches shorter than the J75) and weight improved the airplane’s 

center of gravity. Digital engine controls ensured linear thrust throughout 

the flight envelope and virtually eliminated the chance of compressor stalls 

and flameouts.81 In addition to being 30 percent lighter than the old engine, 

the F118 was more fuel efficient, more reliable, and easier to maintain, only 

requiring overhaul every 2,500 hours instead of every 800. The new engine 

increased the airplane’s range by 1,220 nautical miles and increased altitude 

80. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 303–305.

81. Ibid., pp. 314–315.

A NASA ER-2 equipped with the Senior Span pod. (NASA)
 Design Evolution

95

performance by about 3,000 feet.82 Production modifications began in 1994, 

and the entire fleet was retrofitted over the course of scheduled major overhauls 

that were due every 3,400 hours of operation. As each U-2R was modified, it 

was redesignated a U-2S, and the final engine installation took place in 1998.83

The F118 was not immune to problems. One U-2 was lost after a bearing 

failed, causing the engine to seize and rendering the restart system useless; 

subsequent dual battery failure and loss of altitude through inclement weather 

doomed the airplane. Another U-2 suffered repeated malfunctions, causing 

momentary power loss and severe engine vibrations, forcing the pilot to make 

an emergency landing.84

In 2000, Lockheed embarked on a 6-year, $140-million effort called the 

Power-EMI upgrade that called for equipping the U-2S with an updated electrical system that produced less electromagnetic interference. At the same time, 

the airplane was equipped with improved GPS navigational capability, a singlepiece windscreen for better visibility and de-icing capability, and provisions for 

integrating an improved SIGINT package. As with engine installation, these 

improvements were added during scheduled depot maintenance.85

There was some consideration given to redesigning the SYERS package to fit 

inside the Q-bay, thus allowing the U-2S to carry both it and the ASARS-2 sensors simultaneously. This proved impractical, so instead, efforts were focused on 

upgrading the SYERS multispectral capabilities. The SYERS-2 had seven collection wavebands compared to two with SYERS-1. The sensor now detected 

three visible, two shortwave infrared, and four medium-wave infrared wavebands, making it easier to detect and identify targets in daylight or at night, 

even through layers of haze. Improved data links enabled transmission of the 

increased data streaming from the sensor.86

Up to this point, the U-2S was still equipped with a control panel characterized by round dials and a multitude of switches and knobs, just as it had been 

since 1967. A new so-called “glass cockpit” was introduced in December 2000, 

replacing conventional analog instruments with electronic displays. Difficulty 

maintaining and replacing older components and the need to establish a better 

interface with modern equipment and sensors drove the $93 million U-2 

Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP). Antiquated cockpit panels crowded with approximately two-dozen gauges were replaced by 

82. William E. Burrows, “The U-Deuce,” Air&Space/Smithsonian (March 2005): 24.

83. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 315.

84. Ibid., p. 329.

85. Ibid., p. 324.

86. Ibid., p. 325.
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three 8- by 6-inch flat-panel, multifunction color screens. An avionics processor converted analog signals to digital. Vital switches were conveniently 

grouped together on an upfront display panel within easy reach of the pilot. 

Many of the old-style switches were replaced with touch controls that were 

In 2000, the U-2 fleet was equipped with modern cockpit instruments, right, to replace antiquated control panels that had been in use since 1967. (Lockheed Martin)
 Design Evolution

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spaced so that they could be easily operated while wearing bulky pressure suit 

gloves. Such attention to the human-machine interface was a major breakthrough over the old cockpit configuration in which some radio and navigation 

controls were located in awkward, out-of-the-way places, and critical information such as fuel quantity was not accurately portrayed. The new cockpit layout, 

along with such features as an angle-of-attack indicator that provided aural as 

well as visual warnings, provided the U-2 pilot with substantially improved 

situational awareness.87

As the U-2 entered the 21st century, defense planners began preparations 

to retire the fleet and replace it with the RQ-4 Global Hawk in an effort to 

expand the use of remotely piloted and autonomous platforms. The Global 

Hawk had no need for onboard crew accommodations or life-support systems 

and could remain aloft for more than 30 hours. Unfortunately, it also had a 

smaller payload than that of the U-2, less electrical power to operate the sensors, 

and a lower operational ceiling. Nevertheless, by August 2011, the Air Force 

was ready to announce that the U-2 would cease flying within 4 years. In a 

statement at the National Press Club, Global Hawk program manager Lt. Col. 

Rick Thomas expressed confidence that the RQ-4 would soon be able to match 

the capabilities of the U-2. In order to do this, engineers had to find a way to 

successfully integrate the U-2’s massive Optical Bar Camera (OBC) with the 

Global Hawk’s composite airframe. This was easier said than done, as it became 

clear that it would require substantial modifications to both the airplane and 

sensor package. Another stumbling block to the fleet replacement schedule 

was proposed congressional legislation that would require the Department 

of Defense to certify that sustainment costs for the Global Hawk were less 

than those of maintaining the U-2. At the time, it cost just $31,000 per U-2 

flight hour compared to $35,000 for the RQ-4, though Thomas promised that 

operating costs for the Global Hawk were dropping. Critics acknowledged the 

Global Hawk’s endurance capabilities but lamented that sensors carried by the 

autonomous aircraft provided less range, less resolution, and less collection 

capability than those of the U-2.88

Once it became clear that the Global Hawk would not be a viable replacement for the U-2 in the near term, the Air Force embarked on another 

series of upgrades for the venerable platform. Most of the proposed improvements involved sensors carried by the U-2, starting with the OBC, which 

87. Ibid., p. 326.

88. Dave Majumdar, “Global Hawk to Replace U-2 in 2015,” Defense News, Digital Edition, August 

10, 2011, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110810/DEFSECT01/108100302/GlobalHawk-Replace-U-2-2015, accessed July 23, 2013.
Unlimited Horizons

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was upgraded to provide better resolution at lower altitudes. Additionally, 

the U-2 was to be equipped with a hyperspectral sensor package called the 

Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition Testbed (SPIRITT), which 

had been previously tested on NASA’s WB-57F. The SPIRITT package was 

designed to fit into the U-2’s Q-bay in place of the OBC, and it could be carried simultaneously with the nose-mounted SYERS-2 high-resolution digital 

camera. As with other sensor packages, the SPIRITT would be controlled 

remotely via a data link from a Distributed Common Ground System intelligence analysis station. Other U-2 upgrades included the Cabin Altitude 

Reduction Effort (CARE), designed to increase air pressure inside the U-2 

cockpit to mimic pressures at lower altitudes. Aerospace medical specialists 

hoped that CARE would reduce instances of decompression sickness and 

shorten a pilot’s recuperation time between sorties. Increased operational 

tempo due to operations in southwest Asia had resulted in greater numbers 

of reports of altitude sickness. Even under the best of circumstances, a U-2 

pilot was required to spend 3 to 4 days recuperating between flights. With 

the increased cabin pressure provided by CARE, the same pilots could fly 

every other day, increasing squadron capabilities. Finally, defense planners 

began looking into the possibility of replacing the U-2’s special fuel with 

less expensive JP-8, which had become standard for all other Air Force 

aircraft. To do so would require modifying the kerosene-based JP-8 with 

an additive to prevent the fuel from freezing at temperatures below –80 °F; 

Although the RQ-4 Global Hawk can remain aloft for 30 hours at a time, it has not yet 

demonstrated sensor capabilities comparable to those of the U-2. (U.S. Air Force)
 Design Evolution

99

standard JP-8 freezes at around –50 °F. Fortunately, such an additive had 

already been developed.89

According to Maj. Bill Evans, U-2 program element monitor at Air 

Combat Command Headquarters, Hampton Roads, VA, the only foreseeable 

problem is parts obsolescence that eventually plagues all aircraft. Although 

the current fleet was built in the 1980s, from a structural standpoint, the U-2 

is in excellent shape. “Right now, the airframe itself is viable though 2040,” 

Evans said. “Structurally, the aircraft is sound for the next 30 years, at least.”90

89. Dave Majumdar, “Notebook: Plans for Reinvigorated U-2 Include Hyperspectral Sensor,” Defense 

News, Digital Edition, March 22, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120322/

C4ISR02/303220012/Notebook-Plans-Reinvigorated-U-2-Include-Hyperspectral-Sensor, 

accessed July 23, 2013.

90. Ibid.
100

The U-2 is divided into several major assemblies. (U.S. Air Force) 
101

The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of 

Although the overall design configuration of the U-2 was extremely innovative, the materials and construction methods used to build it were fairly 

conventional. In its outward appearance, the airplane looked like a typical jet, 

with the exception of its long, thin wings and bicycle landing gear. Most of 

the airframe was made from ordinary aluminum alloys, with titanium used 

sparingly in areas that required additional strength or which were subject to 

higher temperatures. What set it apart from other craft was Kelly Johnson’s 

elegantly simple design that maximized fuel and payload capacity while minimizing gross weight. The airplane’s major assemblies included the forward 

fuselage, wings and mid-fuselage, tail group, landing gear, and powerplant.

Most of the airframe was constructed from aluminum alloys. With the 

exception of welded assemblies, extrusions, and machined fittings, all aluminum sheet metal parts were manufactured from clad material. These included 

2024 or 7075 sheet varying in thickness from 0.005 to 0.190 inches. Machine 

parts were typically made from 2024 or 7075 aluminum plate or bar stock. 

Extruded parts were made using both 2024 and 7075 aluminum. Other 

components were constructed from 6061-T4 or T6 using a fusion welding 

process. Wherever necessary, components requiring additional strength were 

fashioned from stainless steel or carbon steel of varying hardness. For protection against corrosion, aluminum parts were coated with zinc chromate primer 

or a similar equivalent. Carbon steel components were cadmium plated, but 

stainless steel parts needed no additional paints or coatings.1 The airplane 

included small amounts of titanium alloys in selected areas. Forward flap 

edges, exhaust ejector skin panels, and miscellaneous fittings and details were 

made from A110 AT. Parts of the empennage support ring, longeron, other 

fittings, the main gear piston, and the cylinder consisted of B120 VCA, and 

the wing-to-fuselage attach bolts were machined from C120 AV.2

1. NASA, “U-2 Investigators Handbook,” NASA Ames Research Center, pp. VI-6–VI-10.

2. Michael A. Alexander, “TR-1A/TR-1B/U-2R/ER-2 Handbook,” U.S. Air Force, 1986, p. 13–15.

CHAPTER 4
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Forward Fuselage

The forward fuselage included the nose, cockpit, and a space for camera and 

sensor payloads known as the Q-bay. Many features were common to all U-2 

variants while some were specific to certain models. To reduce weight while 

retaining structural strength, components were machined to the thinnest 

Titanium was used in select areas that required additional strength or protection from heating. 

(U.S. Air Force)
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103

gauges allowable. Builders used the minimum possible number of ribs and 

stringers, and flush-riveted skin panels were a mere 0.020- to 0.063-inches 

thick.3

 Engine air inlet scoops were located on the sides of the fuselage just 

aft of the cockpit. These scoops featured built-in boundary-layer bleed ducts. 

Air from the left-hand duct cooled the D.C. generator, and air from the 

right-hand duct was routed through the air conditioning refrigerator to cool 

cabin air bled from the engine compressor.4

 Article 341 was originally built 

using 75-ST aluminum sheet for inlet duct interiors. This material was hand 

formed, a process that included hammering the thin sheets into the proper 

shape. Maintenance crews found that the aluminum skin started to crack 

after about 90 hours of operation. As a result, later airplanes used 24-ST 

stretch-formed aluminum skin that was less susceptible to cracking. Even so, 

it was recommended that high-power static ground runs be limited to about 

2 minutes to avoid putting too much stress on the inlet skin.5

The nose assembly on the early U-2 models had a slender ogival cross 

section. Internal space was extremely limited and typically served to accommodate various antennas and electronic gear. A special nose assembly was 

installed during the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). It featured a 

circular aperture at the tip, with filters to collect airborne particulates. Later 

U-2R/S and ER-2 models were equipped with a variety of interchangeable 

nose assemblies capable of carrying a variety of cameras and sensors. Attached 

to the fuselage with four quick-release latches, the standard nose cone provided a payload volume of 47.8 cubic feet. The 101-inch-long nose compartment was built to accept payloads of up to 650 pounds on custom-built racks. 

Other nose cones of varying size were available for specialized payloads. Due 

to forebody weight limits, payloads in the nose section reduced payload weight 

in the Q-bay on a pound-for-pound basis. At cruise altitudes, the environment 

inside the nose area was maintained at 27,000 to 30,000 feet pressure altitude. 

A pilot-operated valve controlled pressurized air in the nose compartment, 

but the rate of air exchange was solely regulated by the leakage rate of the nose 

structure, as there were no overboard dump valves. Temperatures inside the 

nose compartment during flight varied between 68 and –40 °F.6

The cockpit compartment was separated from the nose section by a bulkhead and was pressurized to approximately 25,000 feet pressure altitude. 

The pilot’s control panel had a conventional layout with many standard 

3. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 19.

4. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 8.

5. Ibid., p. 161.

6. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” August 2002, p. III-4.
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instruments to provide fundamental information of aircraft 

systems, speed, altitude, and navigation. Engine power was controlled by a single throttle lever 

of the same type used in contemporary single-engine jet fighters 

such as the F-100.7

 Unlike in a 

fighter, the U-2 pilot used a yoke 

rather than a stick to make flight 

control inputs. Otherwise, the 

controls were conventional. All 

surfaces (ailerons, rudder, etc.) 

were directly connected to the 

yoke and pedals by cables with no 

hydraulic boost power. An electrically driven system provided trim 

in pitch and roll. Although there 

was no provision for directional 

trim from the cockpit, the autopilot effectively provided yaw trim 

when operating.8 Conventional 

pedals controlled the rudder, 

permitting 30 degrees of travel in 

either direction. These pedals were 

adjustable fore and aft to accommodate pilots with differing leg 

lengths; but more importantly, 

the upper portion of each pedal 

could be rotated to a horizontal 

position. This feature allowed the 

pilot to extend and stretch his 

legs, thus reducing fatigue during 

long flights.9 The most unique 

flight control system feature was 

the gust alleviation system. This 

7. CIA, “U-2 Utility Flight Handbook,” March 1, 1959, p. I-10.

8. Ibid., p. I-21.

9. U.S. Air Force, “Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft,” p. I-27.

The nose was designed to be lightweight yet capable 

of supporting mission payloads. (U.S. Air Force)
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105

device made it possible to raise both ailerons up 10 degrees while simultaneously raising both wing flaps by 4 degrees, thus reducing structural loads on 

the wings and tail assembly. Use of the gust controls was necessary when flying 

in turbulent air or when flying at higher speeds in smooth air.10 Because cloud 

cover below the airplane’s flightpath often prevented the pilot from locating 

navigational points on the ground through the driftsight periscope, the U-2 

was also equipped with a small sextant for making celestial navigation. When 

clouds were not a factor, however, the driftsight proved highly accurate, and 

pilots found that they could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less 

than 1 nautical mile over a 1,000-nautical-mile course.11 Much later U-2 

models were equipped with an angle-of-attack indicator, which provided the 

pilot with a visual and aural warning of approach-to-stall. Because the U-2 

was designed to operate very close to stall during most phases of flight, this 

instrument greatly increased pilot safety. Lack of stall warning on earlier variants was indicated as a possible contributing factor in several mishaps.12

10. Ibid., p. I-26.

11. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 76.

12. Tim Williams, NASA ER-2 pilot, interview with author, April 30, 2014.

 U-2 pilots found the driftsight, a downward-looking periscope, extremely useful for navigation. (NASA)
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The cockpit was enclosed beneath a lightweight canopy, hinged on the 

left side. The uppermost portion of the canopy was coated with either white 

or black paint to provide a sun shield. Although this feature enhanced crew 

comfort, it also somewhat reduced visibility. In an emergency, the pilot pulled 

a handle to jettison the canopy and fire a rocket-propelled ejection seat that 

was qualified for use in zero-speed/zero-altitude ejections. A spur-and-cable 

arrangement restrained the pilot’s legs during ejection to prevent flailing. 

Life-support equipment included dual normal oxygen systems, an emergency 

oxygen system, and a pressure garment. Primary breathing air came from a pair 

of 2.6-gallon liquid-oxygen converters, each providing gaseous oxygen to the 

pilot’s helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. The 

emergency oxygen system consisted of two gaseous oxygen cylinders located 

in the survival kit and was used only in the event of ejection or malfunction 

of the two primary oxygen sources. Activated automatically, the emergency 

system provided suit pressurization and 15 minutes of breathing oxygen.13

The environmental control system (ECS) delivered pressurized and environmentally controlled air to the cockpit, nose, Q-bay, and (on NASA aircraft only) the forward two-thirds of the wing pods. Air in the payload areas 

and cockpit remained unprocessed below 7,900 feet pressure altitude. As the 

13. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” pp. II-5 

and IV-7.

A painted sunshade limited visibility through the lightweight canopy. (NASA)
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107

aircraft climbed higher, the ECS switched to an isobaric control mode, maintaining a pressure altitude of 7,500 feet. Once the U-2 climbed above 18,300 

feet, the ECS established a pressure differential of 3.88 pounds per square 

inch between the ambient atmospheric pressure and that of the cockpit and 

payload areas. This resulted in a cockpit pressure altitude of approximately 

28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. Engine bleed air for pressurization was passed through a heat exchanger, mixing muff, and a turbine, 

though at altitudes above 25,000 feet, the turbine was bypassed. Fans with or 

without additional heat were used in the cockpit and payload areas to circulate 

air for the dual purpose of reducing condensation from windows or optics, 

and to distribute heat. Although relative humidity was low at stratospheric 

cruise altitudes, relative humidity could reach 100 percent during descent 

and landing, allowing condensation to form on surfaces that had been coldsoaked at altitude.14

The pressurized equipment bay, or Q-bay, just behind the cockpit, was 

designed to be the principal location for special equipment packages. Top 

and bottom access hatches, removable by means of external latches, made 

it possible to install and remove delicate cameras and sensors quickly and 

easily. Typically, instrumentation and other equipment was installed on rack 

assemblies, hoisted upward, and secured to several mounting points. In early 

model U-2 aircraft, the Q-bay was 67 inches long and 55 inches high, varying in width from top to bottom. This space accommodated payloads weighing between 500 and 750 pounds. Additional equipment could be carried 

in wing-mounted pods (up to 300 pounds each) and inside a dorsal fairing 

with a 100-pound capacity.15 Later model airframes were capable of carrying 

up to 2,550 pounds of equipment distributed between the Q-bay, nose, and 

wing pods. Weight distribution between payload areas affected the center of 

gravity of the aircraft, resulting in reduced allowable payload in some areas. 

Aside from these primary areas, provisions for instruments were available in 

several smaller areas, including the aft fuselage, tailcone, wingtips, and spaces 

on the left and right sides of the forward fuselage. Instrument integration 

required evaluation of all payloads for weight and balance concerns, aerodynamic effects that might alter the airplane’s stability characteristics, and 

total electrical power consumption.16 In the U-2R/S and ER-2, the Q-bay 

provided 64.6 cubic feet of volume and, like earlier models, featured removable upper and lower hatches. Hatches for all models could be configured 

14. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-4.

15. NASA, “U-2 Investigators’ Handbook,” vol. 1, NASA Ames Research Center, pp. I-1-I-7.

16. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-2.
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to accommodate a wide variety of specialized sensors. The combined weight 

carried in the forward fuselage area (Q-bay and nose assembly) was normally limited to 1,300 pounds including payload mounting racks, electrical 

Technicians install a camera package in the Q-bay of a U-2A. (Lockheed Martin)
 The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of

109

interface panels, and the 

payload itself.17

Payloads carried by 

the U-2 were subjected to 

a range of environmental 

conditions resulting from 

the airplane’s extremely 

high cruising altitudes. 

Two regulator valves, 

located at the bottom of 

the cockpit aft pressure 

bulkhead, allowed pressurized air to enter the 

Q-bay. Available airflow 

was dependent upon the 

amount of air bled from 

the engine’s compressor 

stages, but it typically 

varied from 0.5 pounds 

per minute at idle to 

3.0 pounds per minute 

at cruise power settings. 

Though the compartment’s pressure altitude 

was normally maintained 

at around 30,000 feet, 

safety considerations 

required that payloads 

be designed to withstand 

pressure altitudes of up to 70,000 feet in the event of a pressurization system 

failure. Bleed air from the engine was cooled by a heat exchanger to a nominal 

temperature of 60 °F. Actual temperatures within the Q-bay depended upon 

the incoming air temperature, ambient temperature, amount of insulation 

used on the equipment package, air circulation inside the Q-bay, cockpit 

controlled heaters and blowers, and the instrument’s heat output. At cruise 

altitude, air temperatures inside the compartment could vary from 10 °F to 

17. Ibid., p. III-1.

Simple, lightweight construction was the hallmark of 

the forward fuselage assembly. (U.S. Air Force)
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110

50 °F, though in the summer temperatures could rise above 120 °F during 

ground operation prior to takeoff.18

Wings and Wing Pods

Due to requirements for high aspect ratio and low drag ratio, the wings proved 

to be among the most challenging design features of the entire airplane. For 

optimum lift, they needed to be long and narrow with a thin airfoil. They 

had to be extremely lightweight to reduce overall aircraft gross weight, but 

for mission endurance, they needed to be capable of carrying most of the 

airplane’s fuel supply. The wings were attached to the rearmost portion of the 

forward fuselage, at the airplane’s center of gravity. In order to meet weight 

restrictions, the U-2 designers chose an unusual arrangement for attaching 

the wings to the fuselage. Unlike on conventional airplanes, the U-2’s main 

wing spar did not pass through the fuselage to give the wings continuity and 

strength. Instead, each wing assembly was entirely separate, attached to the 

sides of the fuselage with tension bolts as on a sailplane. Absence of a carrythrough wing spar left room inside the fuselage for the Q-bay between the 

cockpit and the engine compartment, improving the aircraft’s center of gravity 

and contributing to overall weight reduction.19

As originally designed, the wings were configured with integral fuel tanks 

extending from the leading edge to the beam at the 48-percent chord line. 

Spanwise, each main tank extended from the wing root to wing station 440. 

Auxiliary wing tanks were located from 48 to 65 percent of the chord and 

extended from the root to wing station 300. The trailing edges consisted of 

flaps and ailerons that were only unconventional in that they also served to 

alleviate structural loads on the wings and tail in turbulent air and at high 

speeds. The gust alleviation system worked by raising the flaps upward 4 

degrees while simultaneously shifting the neutral point of the ailerons 10 

degrees up. This moved the spanwise center of pressure inboard, reducing 

the wing’s bending moment. This also effectively reduced the wing camber, 

which reduced the required balancing tail load.20

The wing had a mean aerodynamic chord of 100.8 inches. Designers selected 

an NACA 63A409 airfoil with 9 percent thickness-to-chord ratio for the wing 

root and an NACA 63A406 airfoil with a 6 percent thickness-to-chord ratio 

18. Ibid., p. III-3

19. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.

20. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 8.
 The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of

111

for the tip. Incidence varied from 4 degrees at the root to 2 degrees at the tip. 

The dihedral was 0 degrees, and sweepback at 25 percent chord was 6 degrees. 

The ailerons had a total area of 35.2 square feet, and the flaps had a combined 

area of 97.5 square feet.21

The wings on the original U-2 spanned 80 feet with 600 square feet of wing 

area. By contrast, the larger U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet 

of lifting surface. Bob Wiele, leader of the U-2R wing design team, ensured 

that the wing structure did not exceed 3 pounds per square foot. For maximum performance, he retained the original NACA airfoils while reducing 

wing loading for the heavier airframe to the same values attained with the 

U-2A. The resulting lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, with a lift coefficient of 0.6 

to 0.7 and aspect ratio of 10.667. Larger wings allowed for a greater internal 

fuel capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement had to be altered. Pilots of the 

early U-2 models discovered that having the main tank forward and the auxiliary tank aft resulted in considerable center-of-gravity changes as fuel was 

consumed during flight. Wiele and his team eliminated this problem in the 

U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 239-gallon 

auxiliaries outboard. This allowed fuel from the main tanks to be exhausted 

first so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped 

dampen wing bending and torsional loads.22

Wing pods for the TR-1/U-2R and ER-2 provided approximately 86 cubic 

feet of payload capacity. Each pod accommodated payloads up to a maximum 

weight of 600 pounds. The pod structure consisted of five individual segments: 

21. Ibid., p. 16.

22. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.

For maximum lift and high-altitude performance, Lockheed engineers designed the U-2 wing 

using the NACA 64A airfoil. The internal structure was built to be as light as possible while 

providing sufficient strength. (U.S. Air Force)
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Most of the wing interior spaces were occupied by integral fuel tanks. External wing-mounted 

tanks, or pods, provided additional space for mission equipment. (Lockheed Martin)
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113

nose cone, forward pod, mid-body, aft pod, and tail cone. Latches at the forward and aft ends of the pod mid-body provided easy access for equipment 

servicing and installation. For the ER-2, the forward two-thirds of each pod 

was pressurized, but as in the aircraft nose area, there were no overboard dump 

valves in the pods; the rate of air exchange was a function of the leak rate of 

the structure and associated pressure sealing. Interior temperatures inside the 

empty wing pods varied from –40 °F to 20 °F at cruise altitudes. Internal heat 

sources were normally installed in the pods to produce warmer local temperatures for sensitive equipment. Aeroelastic effects caused the wings to deflect 

upward during flight. Deflection of the pods was measured to as much as 0.86 

degrees from horizontal, though deflection angles tended to vary slightly with 

altitude, payload weight, fuel load, and atmospheric conditions.23

Smaller pods, or tanks, could be pylon-mounted on the wings or along the 

fuselage centerline, aft of the main landing gear. Unpressurized and lacking 

temperature control, each tank offered a payload volume of 14 cubic feet and 

a maximum weight of 350 pounds. Instruments in these tanks were subjected 

to greater vibrations and more extreme temperatures than elsewhere on the 

airframe. Centerline installation provided an unobstructed nadir view, but 

viewports required protection from debris, water, or ice thrown up by the 

main gear during takeoff and landing. When attached to wing pylons in 

symmetrical pairs, the tanks were not susceptible to debris from the landing gear. Additional instruments could be accommodated in a fairing called 

the System 20 pod on the right wing, as well as within the left wingtip, but 

instrument weight had to be carefully evaluated for its effect on the aircraft’s 

trim condition.24

Tail Group

Herb Nystrom and Rod Kreimendahl designed the original U-2A tail assembly. This included the aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer and rudder, and horizontal 

stabilizer airfoils. These components were constructed almost entirely of aluminum alloys and assembled using the minimum number of parts required 

for structural strength. The most unusual feature of the tail group was the 

fact that the aft fuselage was joined to the forward fuselage using just three 

tension bolts, thus reducing weight and easing assembly.25

23. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” pp. III-6–III-7.

24. Ibid., p. III-7.

25. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.
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114

The tail-fuselage interface was designed for ease of assembly and maintenance. (Laughlin 

Heritage Foundation)

As with the fuselage and wings, the U-2 empennage was constructed from lightweight aluminum alloys. (U.S. Air Force)
 The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of

115

The fixed horizontal tail had a total area of 90 square feet, the elevators 

totaled 20 square feet, and the vertical tail had an area of 49 square feet plus a 

9.5-square-foot rudder. As originally configured, the horizontal stabilizer had 

zero incidence, but this was later increased to 1.5 degrees.26

On later models such as the U-2R, the tail group retained the basic configuration, but it was enlarged as necessary to match the new airframe. The tail 

assembly, or empennage, primarily accommodated the stabilizer airfoils and 

housed the engine exhaust duct. There was also room for ballast to trim the 

airplane’s center of gravity, and additional space within the fuselage aft cavity 

and the tail cone to carry small instrument packages.27 Two speed brakes, 

each about 7 square feet in area, were installed just aft of the fuselage break. 

These hydraulically actuated drag devices were used to slow the aircraft. They 

were hinged at the forward end and capable of opening to approximately 50 

degrees. For additional landing deceleration, a 16-foot-diameter ribbon chute 

was housed in a compartment at the top aft end of the fuselage, at the base of 

the vertical tail fin.28

Landing Gear

The airplane’s hydraulically actuated, bicycle-type landing gear consisted of a 

single oleo strut with two lightweight wheels toward the front of the airplane 

and two small solid-mount wheels under the tail. Both sets of wheels retracted 

forward and upward into the gear wells. The entire assembly weighed just 208 

pounds yet was capable of withstanding touchdown forces imparted by the 

7-ton airframe during landing. The gear was hydraulically operated, but an 

alternate cable-operated free-fall system was provided in case the normal gearextension mechanism malfunctioned. For braking, the pilot applied hydraulic 

pressure equally to both main wheels through toe pressure to the rudder 

pedals. There was no differential braking. In the event of normal hydraulic 

system malfunction, an emergency-brake accumulator supplied sufficient 

pressure for up to five applications of the brakes.29

Several landing gear deficiencies were corrected during early testing. 

Originally, Article 341 was equipped with two brake pads, one on the 

inboard side of each main wheel; but pilots found this configuration provided 

26. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 16–17.

27. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. III-7.

28. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 13.

29. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-10.
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unsatisfactory braking and caused the brake mechanism to overheat. To resolve 

the problem, an additional brake pad was installed on the outboard side of 

each wheel. Another problem was the tendency of the airplane to porpoise 

when the pilot touched down on the main gear first. To prevent the U-2 from 

bouncing, technicians installed a valve in the main gear strut with two orifices 

of different sizes for metering the hydraulic fluid. The larger orifice helped 

absorb shock loads while the smaller one prevented rapid springback. This 

solution proved very effective. Finally, the tail-wheel steering was found to be 

deficient in early tests. In the original configuration, the steering cables were 

attached to the rudder horn and then routed to the tail wheel. The design 

called for 6 degrees of travel in either direction, but due to cable stretch, the 

most steering that could be obtained was between 3 and 4 degrees. To correct 

this, the system was revised so that the steering cables were attached directly 

to the rudder cables and then routed to a bell crank at the tail wheel.30

The two wingtip pogo outriggers used for lateral balance during takeoff 

were made from flat steel bars, curved like the leaf spring on an automobile to 

absorb shocks during takeoff roll. The lower end of each pogo was equipped 

with two small wheels with solid rubber tires.31 These auxiliary gears were 

30. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 259.

31. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.

The bicycle landing gear included a set of main wheels and a smaller set of tail wheels. 

(U.S. Air Force)
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117

originally designed to be released electrically during the takeoff roll. If released 

early enough, this method proved fairly reliable, but if the pilot waited until 

airspeed had increased to 60 or 70 knots, the pogos hung on due to air loads. 

This created a hazardous situation; in fact, one airplane was lost in a fatal 

accident while the pilot tried to shake loose a hung pogo. Lockheed designers 

tried several methods to allow the auxiliary gear to drop at higher airspeeds, 

including springs, external kickers, and olive-shaped rollers instead of round 

rollers in the release mechanism. None proved satisfactory. Eventually, they 

adopted a free-fall system that allowed the pogos to drop out as the wings 

lifted during the takeoff roll. For training flights where it was desired to retain 

the pogos to be used for lateral balance during landing, safety pins could be 

installed to lock the gear in place. The modified system proved highly successful. Occasional subsequent instances of hung pogos were traced to rough 

or battered pogo heads that hung up in the sockets.32

Powerplant

The U-2A was powered by a single J57-type non-afterburning engine featuring an axial flow, twin-spool compressor, and a three-stage turbine. The 

32. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 260.

Senior Airman Jordan Mihm installs an outrigger pogo on a U-2R. (U.S. Air Force) 
Unlimited Horizons

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forward compressor was a nine-stage, low-pressure unit connected to the 

second and third stage turbine wheels by a through-shaft. The seven-stage 

aft (high-pressure) compressor was mechanically independent of the forward 

compressor and was connected by a hollow shaft to the first-stage turbine 

wheel. This arrangement permitted the low-pressure rotor to turn at its most 

efficient speed and allowed high compression ratios. Engine performance 

varied depending on which model of the engine was installed. The J57-P31 developed 11,200 pounds of static thrust at sea level and weighed 3,820 

pounds, providing a power-to-weight ratio of 2.9:1. Until the J57-P-31 

engines were available, the first U-2 aircraft used J57-P-37 engines, which 

were 415 pounds heavier and delivered only 10,500 pounds of thrust at sea 

level, resulting in a power-to-weight ratio of 2.5:1, almost 15 percent less 

efficient than the P-31. Because the P-31 engine had been designed specifically 

for high-altitude operation, it offered better thrust and fuel consumption than 

the P-37, as well as wider operating margins.33

The engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system; two external 

ducts opened on either side of the fuselage just behind the cockpit and merged 

into a single internal duct at the compressor face. For weight and balance purposes, the engine was installed at mid–wing chord. Fuel consumption varied 

from 9,000 pounds per hour at sea level to 700 pounds per hour at cruising 

33. “U-2 Utility Flight Handbook,” p. I-3.

Cutaway of J57 engine. (CIA)
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altitudes.34 As Lockheed engineers refined airframe-powerplant integration 

during the first year of flight testing, it was only necessary to make a few small 

changes to the aircraft design. As Ernie Joiner recalled, “The engine tailpipe 

operated inside an ejector in order to induce cooling air low through the aft 

fuselage. We were robbing the engine thrust because the jet stream was striking 

34. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.

Cutaway of a J75 engine. (U.S. Air Force)
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the ejector lip. Cutting one inch off the ejector lip solved this.” Another change 

involved engine oil coolers. “We started with one fuel-oil cooler and two airoil coolers,” Joiner noted, “but we found it possible to eliminate one of the 

air-oil coolers and its outside scoop.”35

Removing the oil-cooler scoop decreased cooling airflow on the left side of 

the airplane. This necessitated installation of heat shields inside the fuselage 

to prevent electrical wiring and hydraulic system components from overheating. Additionally, with the J57-P-31 engine installed, there was overheating of bulkheads at fuselage stations 495 and 504 on the left side and high 

temperatures at the rear engine mount. The highest temperatures were in the 

vicinity of the engine turbine nozzle where the exhaust gas temperature was 

hottest. On the J57-P-31 engine, this area was covered with a single layer of 

skin that permitted greater thermal radiation than on the J57-P-37, which 

had a double skin layer in the same area. Lockheed technicians installed an 

engine-mounted heat shield that lowered temperatures within the aft fuselage 

to acceptable levels.36

To improve performance, the U-2C was equipped with the J75-P-13 

powerplant, a 15-stage axial-flow, non-afterburning turbojet that provided 

15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Larger, fluted air inlets improved airflow 

to the compressor face.37 Eventually, the U-2C fleet was equipped with more 

powerful J75-P-13B engines rated to 17,000 pound of thrust. The U-2R was 

powered by an upgraded model of the P-13B that improved dependability 

and increased thrust under climb and cruise conditions. Engine performance 

was enhanced through changes to turbine vanes, improved turbine disks and 

compressor blades, and enlargement of the compressor inlet case to increase 

airflow.38 An engine-driven fuel pump supplied pressure for both normal and 

emergency fuel systems. This pump supplied sufficient fuel to maintain flight 

even if the normal and auxiliary boost pumps failed.39

In 1984, the U-2R/TR-1 fleet was grounded following a series of accidents 

involving the engine exhaust system. In the first mishap, on May 22, Capt. 

David Bonsi had just taken off in a U-2R when he heard and felt an explosion 

behind him, and the entire tail section separated from the airframe. Bonsi 

ejected safely, and although accident investigators were uncertain of the exact 

cause, they suggested that the explosion might have resulted from a small 

35. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” pp. 23–24.

36. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 161–162.

37. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 399.

38. Koziol, “The U-2 Aircraft Engine,” pp. 9–10.

39. U.S. Air Force, “Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft,” p. I-4.
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fuel leak inside the engine compartment. Less than 2 months later, a similar 

accident occurred in which the tail section of a TR-1 crumpled immediately 

after takeoff. Capt. Todd Hubbard escaped unharmed after being forced to 

eject at low altitude. This time, investigators suspected a hydraulic leak, but 

on October 8 another U-2R was lost. Capt. Tom Dettmer ejected as his 

airplane broke apart just 1,500 feet above the ground. By now, an inescapable pattern was emerging, and investigators turned their attention to the 

long cylindrical duct connecting the engine to the exhaust ejector. The duct 

comprised a forward adaptor section (approximately 4 feet long) that connected the J75 engine to the 12-foot-long tailpipe. The adaptor/tailpipe link, 

consisting of a U-shaped clamp and two 1⁄4-inch bolts, had apparently come 

loose and allowed the tailpipe to slip out of alignment. When subjected to 

increased pressure from takeoff thrust, the tailpipe crumpled, and trapped 

exhaust gases blew the tail assembly off at its mounts. To fix the problem, 

Lockheed engineers devised a new clamp and added more bolts to secure it in 

place. Speculation remained as to why this problem had only manifested after 

many years of trouble-free operation. Some thought that engine modifications to improve fuel consumption had resulted in more compressor surges, 

putting added strain on the tailpipe connection. Others suspected inadequate 

maintenance or assembly procedures.40

By the late 1980s, Lockheed was considering potential replacements for the 

antiquated J75 engines. The leading candidate was General Electric’s F101-

GE-F29 bypass ratio (0.8:1) mixed-flow turbofan featuring aerodynamically 

coupled low- and high-pressure rotors. The low-pressure compressor section 

consisted of a three-stage fan, driven by a two-stage low-pressure turbine. The 

high-pressure section was composed of a nine-stage compressor; annular combustion chamber; and a single-stage, air-cooled high-pressure turbine. The 

engine control system combined electronic and hydromechanical elements 

to achieve stall-free operation throughout the flight envelope regardless of 

the pilot’s throttle input. It was designed for completely automatic operation 

from start to shutdown.41

This engine was redesignated F118-GE-101 prior to the start of preproduction testing in late 1991. The F118 was rated at 18,300 pounds static sea 

level thrust, which represented a significant improvement over the J75. It was 

easier to install and remove than older powerplants, hydraulic components 

were easier to access, and the new gearbox was mounted on the airframe. 

Known as an airframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD), this gearbox drove 

40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 299–300.

41. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-1.
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the airplane’s secondary power accessories such as alternating current (ac) and 

direct current (dc) generators, hydraulic pump, and air turbine starter. The 

engine powered the AMAD mechanically through a flexible power transmission shaft. A dedicated oil system independent of the engine oil system 

provided lubrication and cooling for the AMAD and associated accessories, 

gears, and bearings.42

To ease engine maintenance, General Electric developed improved troubleshooting capabilities and provided sophisticated new test equipment. One 

of the greatest advantages was that the airplane’s hydraulic and electrical systems could still be operated with the engine removed. The F118 suffered one 

notable disadvantage, however. Up to this time, U-2 pilots had responded to 

a flameout by using a procedure called a windmill restart, a maneuver that 

takes advantage of the airplane’s kinetic energy to force enough air into the 

engine inlets to spin the rotors and create sufficient pneumatic pressure for 

ignition. Unlike the J75 turbojet, the new turbofan could not be restarted in 

flight by windmilling. To remedy this deficiency, Lockheed engineers devised 

42. Ibid.

Technicians install a GE F118 engine in a U-2. (Lockheed Martin)
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an emergency airstart system that ignited a mixture of compressed air and 

jet fuel in a two-stage compressor. Because this system imposed a significant 

weight penalty, it was replaced with a lighter, hydrazine-fueled system capable 

of spooling the engine up to 45 percent core rpm. Use of hydrazine, which 

is colorless, odorless, and highly toxic, necessitated introduction of special 

handling procedures.43

Life-Support and Environmental Control Systems

The pilot’s life-support systems included dual normal oxygen systems, an 

emergency oxygen system, and a pressure suit. Two independent systems, each 

supplied by a 10-liter liquid-oxygen converter, provided breathing air to the 

pilot in the form of 100-percent oxygen. Gaseous oxygen was delivered to 

the pilot’s helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. 

An emergency oxygen system provided oxygen to the pilot in case of ejection 

or malfunction of the dual normal system. The emergency system (supplied 

by dual-redundant, gaseous-oxygen cylinders located in the survival kit) was 

designed to maintain pressure in the pilot’s suit after ejection and provide 

breathing oxygen for approximately 15 minutes during descent to the ground. 

Each U-2 pilot wore a pressure suit capable of providing a safe environment 

regardless of cockpit pressure conditions. A dual pressure/breathing regulator 

provided breathing oxygen upon demand in the helmet and automatically 

pressurized the suit in the event of cabin-pressure loss. A fire-retardant outer 

coverall and harness was worn over the pressure suit and contained a life 

preserver and fasteners for the parachute release latches.44

The environmental control system provided pressurization to the cockpit, 

equipment bays, and nose section. Engine bleed air passed through a heat 

exchanger, a mixing muff, and—below 25,000 feet—a turbine. Above 25,000 

feet, the turbine was bypassed. At altitude, cabin pressure was maintained at 

3.88 psi above atmospheric pressure. This produced a cabin-pressure altitude 

of approximately 28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. The pilot 

used a refrigerator bypass valve to regulate cockpit air temperature. An adjustment lever could be used to mix cold outside air and cockpit pressurization 

air to regulate suit temperature. The cockpit was also equipped with a duct to 

43. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 314 and 389.

44. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. IV-7
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provide warm air for defogging the canopy and windshield. On later models, 

windshield defrosting was augmented with an electrically heated element.45

The heated-air defroster originally consisted of a single manifold built into 

the forward end of the canopy. The manifold was perforated with forwardfacing holes to defrost the windshield and aft-facing holes to defrost the 

canopy. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, particularly for windshield 

defrosting. In an effort to improve system performance, a second manifold 

was added along the base of the windshield, and another was later installed 

at the top of the windshield where it joined the canopy. This system provided much more efficient distribution of heated air for defrosting both the 

windshield and canopy. An auxiliary defrosting system consisted of a small, 

rubber-bladed fan on the left-hand cockpit sill to circulate warm air. This 

was especially useful during engine-out descents, when the normal source of 

hot air for defrosting was unavailable.46

Cockpit temperature distribution in early model U-2 airplanes was quite 

inefficient. The pilot’s feet became very cold while the head and upper parts 

of the body were too warm. Eventually, floor-level heat outlets were added—

directing warm air at the rudder pedals—as foot warmers. The pilot could 

reduce heating at head level only by restricting use of the defroster or using 

the auxiliary fan to improve air circulation in the cockpit.47

Temperature control within the equipment bay was also critical. During 

early high-altitude testing, the Q-bay became too cold, with interior air 

temperature dropping to –4 °F. The glass in the camera windows sometimes dropped to as low as –29 °F and quickly frosted over if there was 

any moisture in the air. Lockheed engineers experimented with blowers, 

various types of insulation, and baffle curtains to control airflow within 

the Q-bay. A combination of curtains and insulation eventually yielded 

aft lower equipment bay temperatures of around 32 °F, which was deemed 

satisfactory. Window defrosting presented a more difficult problem. Liquid 

solutions caused blurring and deterioration of the optical qualities of the 

glass. Electrofilm heaters installed along the edges of the windows warmed 

the glass inefficiently and had a tendency to short out, resulting in a potential fire hazard. Eventually, a hot-air defrosting system was installed, but 

it was only used during the climb phase and turned off before operating 

45. Ibid., p. IV-6.

46. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 233.

47. Ibid., p. 235.
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the cameras. The camera window heater provided a secondary benefit by 

improving equipment-bay temperature distribution.48

Fuel System

Fuel flowed from the four integrally sealed tanks, one inboard and one outboard in each wing, and through a sump tank within the fuselage before 

reaching the engine. Bleed air from the engine provided pressurization for 

the wing tanks and, along with gravity, assured fuel flow from the wings into 

the sump. The engine consumed fuel from the inboard tanks first, leaving 

the weight of remaining fuel in the outboard tanks to alleviate wing bending. 

Two boost pumps fed fuel from the sump tank into the engine. To minimize 

structural weight, the U-2 designers did not include a single-point refueling 

system for ground servicing. Instead, each individual tank was equipped with 

its own filler cap. During flight, a cross-transfer system provided the pilot with 

a means to correct a lateral imbalance of wing-tank fuel. The transfer pumps 

allowed fuel to be moved between inboard and outboard tanks or to increase 

the rate of flow to the sump tank. In an emergency, the pilot could dump fuel 

from the inboard tanks at a rate of 90 gallons per minute or from the outboard 

tanks at a rate of 60 gallons per minute. Standpipes in the outboard tanks 

retained 150 gallons each. Later-model U-2 and ER-2 aircraft were designed 

to carry up to 19,175 pounds of fuel in the wing and sump tanks.49

One interesting characteristic of long-range endurance flights was the 

apparent ability of the U-2 to manufacture fuel. Robert Schumacher discovered this illusion in Article 344 during a February 1956 flight that lasted 

more than 91⁄2 hours. In preparation for the test, the airplane was fueled to 

full capacity (1,362 gallons) and the totalizer instrument was set to 1,335 

gallons in order to provide a safety margin. Schumacher’s U-2 departed the 

runway with a gross weight of 19,900 pounds, but this dropped to 11,155 

pounds by the end of the 9.58-hour sortie. Based on calculations from the 

totalizer, the airplane had consumed 1,386 gallons of fuel, 24 more gallons 

than had been loaded aboard prior to takeoff. More surprising, the mechanics drained an additional 15 gallons from the fuel tanks after landing. The 

mystery was solved when Lockheed engineers determined that the fuel, which 

had been cold-soaked for hours, expanded due to heating as it passed through 

48. Ibid., pp. 249–257.

49. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” 

pp. III-4–III-6.
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the fuel-oil heat exchanger, causing the gauge to indicate a larger volume. A 

subsequent series of tests consistently revealed an average increase in volume 

of approximately 3 percent during similar long-range flights.50

Although the special low-vapor-pressure LF-1A was selected as the standard fuel for the U-2, two alternate fuels were also evaluated. At the time, most 

U.S. military aircraft were fueled with JP-4, a 50-50 kerosene-gasoline blend. 

U-2 operations with JP-4 were restricted to 50,000 feet maximum altitude 

and 2,000 feet per minute maximum climb rate. Exceeding these limits risked 

damaging the airplane with excessive wing-tank pressures or possibly losing 

fuel through the vent system. Consequently, use of JP-4 was restricted to ferry 

missions or emergency operation when LF-1A was not available. Tests were 

also conducted using JP-1, a pure kerosene fuel with a high flash point and 

a low freezing point. Tank pressures were comparable between LF-1A and 

JP-1, range and fuel consumption were about the same, and both fuels were 

considered satisfactory for operational use.51

Miscellaneous Systems

For electrical power, the U-2 was equipped with a three-phase, 115/200-volt, 

400-Hertz ac system and a 28-volt dc system. These provided automatic, 

in-depth redundancy for flight and mission-critical power requirements. 

Two 50-ampere-hour silver-zinc batteries were installed to provide backup 

power to flight instruments and communications equipment and for engine 

restart capability, in case the main dc generator and transformer rectifier were 

offline. These batteries could supply power to the essential and emergency 

dc buses for approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, along with power to the 

emergency ac invertor.52

A single engine-driven pump supplied pressure to the hydraulic system. A 

normal pressure of 3,000 psi was used to actuate the wing flaps, speed brakes, 

roll and lift spoilers, wheel brakes, stabilizer trim system, and standby ac generator, as well as for extension and retraction of the landing gear.53

The U-2 was equipped with a variety of communication and navigation 

systems. Two-way voice communication during flight was accomplished via 

several installed UHF and VHF radio systems. An interphone system was 

50. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 61–62.

51. Ibid., pp. 108–111.

52. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-6.

53. Ibid., p. III-7.
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available for communicating with ground-crew personnel during preflight or 

postflight activities. For navigation, the aircraft was equipped with a standard 

military Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) ultrahigh-frequency system to 

provide continuous indication of bearing and distance from a transmitting station, as well as an automatic direction finder (ADF) radio navigation system. 

Depending on mission requirements, greater accuracy could be achieved using 

inertial navigation systems (INS), astroinertial navigation systems (ANS), 

or global positioning systems (GPS). The INS steered the aircraft toward 

each destination point through the autopilot. The ANS employed a highly 

accurate star tracker to limit position error, and it could be used in daylight 

and at night. GPS navigation was designed for near-pinpoint accuracy using 

transmissions from small groups of orbiting satellites. On approach to airfields 

equipped with ground-based instrument landing systems (ILS), the U-2 pilot 

simply homed in on a localizer near the runway; ILS receivers in the aircraft 

guided the U-2 along the proper glideslope to touchdown.54

54. Ibid., pp. IV-3–IV-6.
128

Lockheed test pilot Frank Powers models the MC-3 partial-pressure suit. (Lockheed Martin)
129

Life Above 50,000 Feet 

Among the greatest challenges of flying the U-2 was simply surviving the hostile environment of the stratosphere, the highest layer of Earth’s atmosphere in 

which aircraft can still fly using conventional aerodynamic surfaces. The unprotected human body cannot withstand the combination of extremely low ambient air pressures, diminishing with increasing altitude, and temperatures that 

drop as low as –112 °F. The human respiratory system is optimized for operation 

at elevations ranging from sea level to 10,000 feet. Supplemental oxygen or 

cabin pressurization systems are necessary for flight at higher altitudes, where 

humans are subject to hypoxia. Above 15,000 feet without such measures, one 

may experience such physiological symptoms as fatigue, headache, euphoria, 

decreased visual acuity, impaired memory, and faulty judgment. More extensive 

protection is required in the space-equivalent zone that extends from 50,000 

feet to the outer fringes of the atmosphere. Here, unprotected exposure quickly 

results in death. Crossing the Armstrong Limit at around 63,000 feet exposes 

humans to barometric pressure so low that water boils at normal body temperature. As dramatic as this sounds, only superficial bodily fluids are immediately 

affected, resulting in swelling of exposed tissues as water within the body changes 

into a gaseous vapor. Therefore, hypoxia and decompression sickness are greater 

concerns.1

 In order to survive this hostile realm, U-2 pilots were equipped with 

pressurized garments that protected them during normal operations, as well as 

in such instances when it became necessary to eject at high altitudes.

Partial-Pressure Suits

When CIA officials needed advice on equipment for high-altitude survival, they 

turned to Air Force medical experts Col. Donald D. Flickenger, ARDC director 

of human factors, and Col. W. Randolph Lovelace II. A graduate of Harvard 

Medical School, Lovelace had been studying high-altitude flight since 1938 and 

1. András Sóbester, Stratospheric Flight: Aeronautics at the Limit (New York: Springer-Praxis, 

2011), pp. 7–12.

CHAPTER 5
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130

he helped develop an oxygen mask that had become standard throughout the Air 

Force. He and Flickenger also conducted a number of high-altitude parachute 

jumps from B-47 bombers to test pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. 

When it came to developing environmental protection equipment for Project 

Aquatone, Lovelace and Flickenger suggested the David Clark Company of 

Worcester, MA, which had previously produced the MC-1 partial-pressure suit 

for use in the RB-36. Having developed the U-2 cockpit pressurization system, 

the Firewel Company of Buffalo, NY, provided oxygen regulators, valves, and 

other equipment, and made the company’s altitude chamber facilities available 

for testing the suit.2

David Clark’s Joe Ruseckas drew the first patterns for the new partial-pressure 

suit that came to be known as the MC-3. Assisted by John Flagg and about a 

half-dozen designers, pattern makers, and technicians, he strove to create a suit 

that would not only protect the U-2 pilot from the stratospheric environment 

but be sufficiently comfortable to be worn for prolonged periods and allow the 

pilot enough freedom of movement to control his airplane. When completed, 

the MC-3 represented a substantial improvement over earlier suits. As in the 

MC-1 and other early models, capstans provided mechanical counter-pressure 

on the limbs in the MC-3, but it was also fitted with a full-torso inflatable bladder extending from the shoulders to mid-thigh, completely surrounding the 

chest, abdomen, hips, and upper thighs. Instead of using separate hoses, as in 

all earlier suits, pressure leads to the torso bladder and capstans were simply 

an extension of the bladder system. Lacing, extending up the inner thigh and 

across the chest and small of the back, provided control of the torso bladder 

and allowed for more variation in circumferential fit than on previous suits. 

There were numerous zippers at the ankles, wrists, back, and across the chest 

from waist to neck. A zipper at the shoulder made the MC-3 easier to don 

and doff. Cords were sewn into heavy seams to break the continuity of waist 

and groin bladders, when inflated, to make it easier for the pilot to bend and 

sit. The suit included nylon pressure gloves with leather palms that had the 

pressure lead on the thumb side, using positive-lock bayonet connections. 

Laces on the back of the hand could be used to adjust the fit. The pilot wore 

standard flight boots because the feet were not included in the pressurization 

scheme. Breathing oxygen was fed into a Type MA-2 helmet, manufactured 

by ILC Dover, of Frederica, DE.3

2. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 63.

3. Dennis, R. Jenkins, Dressing for Altitude: U.S. Aviation Pressure Suits—Wiley Post to Space 

Shuttle (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2011-595, 2012), pp. 153–155.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

131

Since the suits were individually customized, each pilot made two trips 

to Worcester for fitting. During the first visit, each pilot was carefully measured so that Ruseckas could tailor the initial pattern for a comfortable fit. 

After the suit was completed, the pilot returned to try it on and determine 

whether alterations were necessary. Once it was confirmed that the suit was 

properly tailored, the pilot then journeyed to Buffalo to try it on in Firewel’s 

altitude chamber. After pilots complained that the restraint fabric connecting the helmet to the suit made it difficult to turn their heads, the David 

Clark Company developed a new Link-Net fabric for the neck section that 

allowed greater range of motion. Ultimately, the MC-3 became available in 

12 standard sizes, as well as in custom-fitted models. The suit was often worn 

with a protective outer layer to shield the capstans and laces against becoming entangled with switches or other objects in the cramped U-2 cockpit.4

The MC-3 served as the predecessor to a family of partial-pressure suits that 

included the MC-3A, MC-4, and S-100.

Lockheed officials contacted David Clark in early 1970 to ask for an 

improved partial-pressure suit for use with first-generation U-2 airplanes 

that were still in service. By this time, U-2R crews were wearing full-pressure 

suits, and although flight testing had proven that a pilot wearing such a 

garment would fit in the cockpit of a U-2C after certain modifications had 

been made, the Air Force was hesitant to make those changes. Joe Ruseckas 

agreed to develop a better partial-pressure suit based on the MC-3A suit and 

hardware but with a helmet from the A/P22S-6 full-pressure suit. The neck 

ring required for attaching the new helmet made the shoulder-zipper entry 

used on most partial-pressure suits impractical, so a rear-entry system was 

developed for the new suit, by now designated S-100. Integration of the A/

P22S-6 helmet with the S-100 suit considerably improved pilot comfort and 

mobility, which also helped reduce stress and fatigue during long missions.5

David Clark eventually fabricated 142 of the new suits for the Air Force 

and NASA. The S-100 consisted of a coverall much like that of the MC-3, 

with a restraint assembly, breathing bladder, and capstans extending down 

the back and along the arms and legs to provide counter pressure. Slide 

fasteners on the wrists and ankles and at the center of the back facilitated 

donning, and laces along the arms, legs, chest, and back permitted individual 

size adjustments. Pressure bladders at the waist and groin were designed to 

crease in order to facilitate sitting and standing. Wrapped completely around 

the torso, the breathing bladder was integrated with the neck seal and neck 

4. Ibid., pp. 155–158.

5. Ibid., pp. 316–318.
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132

ring and included a perforated inner liner that vented airflow around the 

wearer. For added protection and utility, a fire-resistant Nomex exterior cover 

could be worn over the suit, providing pockets and Velcro pads for checklists 

and other items. The partial-pressure gloves had suede leather palms, elastic 

cuffs, and lacings on the back of the hand to allow for personal adjustments. 

The helmet consisted of a Fiberglas shell with a movable visor and separate 

sunshade, oxygen regulator system, anti-suffocation valve, cushion assembly, and communication equipment. Channels distributed vent air around 

Each suit was custom fitted for maximum comfort. Donning the suit required assistance. 

(Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

133

the pilot’s head, and a spray bar around the inner edge of the visor opening 

delivered breathing oxygen and prevented visor fogging. A rubber face seal 

divided the breathing space from the rest of the helmet, and a spring-loaded 

valve allowed exhaled air to be exhausted from the breathing space to the 

pressure-suit breathing-bladder assembly. The system was designed to maintain pressure in the face area slightly higher than the suit pressure in order to 

provide the pilot with 100-percent oxygen at all times. The helmet was also 

equipped with a self-sealing drinking and feeding port through which a tube 

The S-100, worn here by NASA pilot Jim Barnes, was a hybrid of a partial-pressure suit and a 

full-pressure-type helmet. (NASA)
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could be inserted to enable the pilot to consume liquids and semi-solid foods. 

Air Force and NASA pilots began using the S-100 in 1972 and continued to 

do so until the last U-2C was retired in 1989.6

6. Ibid., pp. 319–322.

Lt. Col. Dee Porter demonstrates a prototype S1034 full-pressure suit at Palmdale in 1991. 

(Lockheed Martin)
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

135

Full-Pressure Suits

With significantly more available cockpit space in the U-2R and subsequent 

models, it was finally possible to equip pilots with full-pressure suits. Officials 

from the Air Force, CIA, David Clark, Firewel, and Lockheed met in Burbank 

in May 1967 to discuss the final configuration of the U-2R cockpit, pressurization system, escape system, and pressure suit. The David Clark Company was 

contracted to produce the S1010 full-pressure suit, but the first unit would not 

be ready until September. In the interim, several S901J suits of the type used in 

the A-12 were modified for use in the U-2R. When the S1010 finally became 

available, it was very similar to the S901J but with oxygen and electrical connections tailored for the U-2 cockpit. In the event of emergency egress, it included 

a fully integrated parachute harness, automatic water-activated flotation system, 

and an optional inflatable thermal-protective garment. For crew comfort during 

long-duration missions, it had a urine-collection system. In order to minimize 

pilot stress and fatigue during long sorties, the company designed an entirely 

new helmet, making every attempt to reduce the amount of weight supported by 

the pilot’s head. The designers achieved this by removing the breathing regulator and oxygen-supply system from the helmet and relocating them within the 

coverall garment, and by integrating the helmet-disconnect bearing assembly 

with the helmet via a soft neck section at the base of the Fiberglas shell. They 

also enlarged and reshaped the S1010 helmet shell to increase headroom over 

that of the S901J helmet assembly.7

At just 31 pounds, the S1010 was surprisingly lightweight; the suit and 

gloves weighed just 14 pounds, the exterior cover and harness 10 pounds, and 

the helmet 7 pounds. Without the helmet, the entire suit could be folded into a 

2.7-cubic-foot package. Although the coverall and gloves were custom tailored 

for each pilot, the helmet came in only one size. Interior cushions were used 

to accommodate individual head sizes. As with earlier David Clark suits, U-2 

pilots traveled to Worcester to be measured and fitted. The company produced 

the suit in two variants. On the S1010A, the oxygen regulator, communication 

gear, parachute harness, and flotation device were integrally mounted. For the 

S1010B, designers moved the regulator and communication equipment into 

the helmet and put the parachute and flotation gear into a separate harness 

worn over the suit.8

In 1978, the David Clark Company began development of a new helmet to 

replace the S1010 units when they reached the anticipated end of their service 

7. Ibid., pp. 334–337.

8. Ibid., pp. 337–338.
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136

lives 3 years later. In a continuing effort to minimize helmet-induced stress and 

fatigue, designers introduced a nonconformal dome helmet that completely 

eliminated head-borne weight and provided greater freedom of head movement 

within the helmet. The S1010D helmet provided excellent visibility and greatly 

reduced the rotational torque associated with neck stress. Instead of the usual 

conformal padding, the pilot now wore a skullcap that contained a microphone 

and earphones for the communication system. Testing yielded mixed results; 

although the helmet was more comfortable, pilots complained that foam cushions—inside the coverall, underneath the helmet neck ring—interfered with the 

parachute risers and shoulder harness and provided inadequate front-to-back 

stability for the helmet.9

This problem was solved within 3 years. The S1031 was nearly identical to 

the S1030 developed for the SR-71 except for the placement of oxygen and 

electrical interfaces, as dictated by each aircraft. In addition, special care was 

taken to limit bulk on the front of the chest to minimize interference with the 

U-2 pilot’s control yoke; this had not been a problem in the SR-71, which features a standard control stick. The S1031 came in 12 standard sizes and weighed 

about 35 pounds. It began replacing the S1010 in late 1982 and remained in 

use until 1996. Starting in 1991, some S1030 and S1031 suits were replaced 

with the S1031C, a common pressure suit that could be used interchangeably 

in either the U-2 or SR-71, thus reducing ground support and maintenance 

requirements. Such improvements and a desire to further improve wearer comfort eventually led to development of the S1034, an entirely new design based 

on lessons learned from years of crewmember and maintainer experience with 

earlier suits. For the S1034, designers studied myriad factors that affected crew 

performance, including comfort, mobility, visibility, tactility and dexterity, 

oxygen systems, altitude and thermal protection, drinking and feeding necessities, durability, maintainability, and survival characteristics in the event of 

emergency. The result was a suit with a bladder manufactured from Gore-Tex, a 

lightweight fabric that allowed perspiration to pass through in the form of water 

vapor while retaining air pressure. The S1034 was more comfortable and less 

bulky than earlier full-pressure suits and more durable and easier to maintain. It 

was easier to don and doff and had better mobility than the S1031. New gloves 

offered improved comfort, mobility, and dexterity, as well as improved gripping 

power and wear protection. The helmet was functionally identical to that of 

the S1031 but made of lighter materials. In 2002, the David Clark Company 

began development of an improved helmet called the S1034E that was slightly 

9. Ibid., pp. 338–339.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

137

larger and more comfortable to wear. This model was put into production in 

2006 to replace earlier helmets as they reached the end of their service lives.10

Physiological Support

Flying the U-2 would have been impossible without the assistance of a team of 

specialized physiological support technicians to help the pilot don and doff his 

pressure suit and ensure the proper attachment and operation of life-support 

equipment. With the exception of the specific types of personal equipment worn 

by flightcrews, the process of preparing for a U-2 flight has remained essentially 

unchanged since 1955.

To avoid decompression sickness during flight, U-2 pilots had to don their 

pressure suits and begin breathing pure oxygen at least an hour prior to takeoff 

so that their bodies would have sufficient time to dissipate nitrogen in the 

bloodstream. This procedure was known as pre-breathing. During high-altitude 

cruise, the cabin-pressure altitude was maintained between 28,000 and 30,000 

feet. The pilot’s suit automatically pressurized to 3 psi because breathing pure 

oxygen at 3 psi at 29,000 feet is equivalent to breathing ambient air at sea level. 

Without pressurized oxygen, the time of useful consciousness at 70,000 feet 

is only a few seconds. Typically, the pilot arrived at the ready room about an 

hour and a half before the flight for a quick examination by a flight surgeon. 

The preflight physical consisted of checking blood pressure, respiration, pulse, 

and recent diet. Only low-residue foods were consumed prior to a mission 

because gas expansion during ascent could cause gastrointestinal distress. Once 

the examination was complete, two suit technicians and a supervisor provided 

technical assistance as the pilot donned his suit coverall over long underwear and 

pulled on boots and gloves. The pilot then lay down for an hour prior to takeoff 

to pre-breathe pure oxygen for denitrogenation of his blood. This downtime 

also provided an opportunity for the technicians to integrate and inflate the 

suit, check out all systems and hardware, and check for leaks. Before leaving the 

ready room for the crew transport van, the pilot was connected to a portable 

oxygen system so as not to break the breathing cycle. At the aircraft, the pilot’s 

pressure suit was hooked up to the onboard oxygen system.11

Once cocooned within the pressure suit, simple tasks such as eating, drinking, and urination became major problems. To prevent pilots from becoming 

10. Ibid., pp. 348–361.

11. Ryan Ragsdale, interview with author, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (now, Armstrong 

Flight Research Center), August 27, 2013.
Unlimited Horizons

138

The pre-breathing ritual was the same regardless of whether the partial-pressure or fullpressure garment was worn. In upper photo, a life-support technician checks oxygen levels for 

Lockheed test pilot Robert Schumacher in 1957. In lower photo, TSgt. Shawn Hansen performs 

a similar task for Lt. Col. Brian Dickinson in 2008. (U.S. Air Force)
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

139

desiccated during long missions—a condition aggravated by having to breathe 

pure oxygen—provisions were made to allow the pilot to drink sweetened water 

by way of a tube inserted through a small self-sealing hole in the facemask. 

Ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers were also provided. Despite all 

precautions, U-2 pilots often lost as much as 3 to 6 pounds of body weight 

through dehydration during an 8-hour mission. To reduce waste elimination, 

pilots ate a low-bulk, high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of 

each mission. Early pressure suits made no provision for urination, but a subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized before donning his flying 

suit. This method to permit urination during flight proved very uncomfortable 

and was eventually replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made 

the catheter unnecessary.12

Ryan Ragsdale, a physiological support technician with more than 35 years 

of experience, started working with both partial- and full-pressure suits at Beale 

Air Force Base in 1979. He immediately noticed that there was a big difference between the cockpits of the U-2C and U-2R (the C cockpit was about 25 

percent smaller than that of the R) and the types of pressure suits worn in each 

model. At that time, the Air Force was employing a variety of suit configurations for use with the U-2C, U-2R, and SR-71, all aircraft that were stationed 

at Beale. “The U-2C at that time was not flying operational missions; it was 

only being used for initial training,” he recalled. “We had so few U-2R models 

that when a pilot came into the program we would first configure him with 

a partial-pressure suit to fly in the U-2CT trainer for initial certification and 

acceptance flights, and then for his solo flights in the single-seat U-2C. Once he 

got through that phase, we would transition him into the S1010 full-pressure 

suit assembly so he could start flying the U-2R.”13

Ragsdale first worked with the hybrid S-100 before being trained on the 

S1010 full-pressure suits. The oxygen regulator for the S1010 was mounted 

underneath the neck ring inside the suit, and oxygen entered through openings 

in the neck ring and passed into the helmet’s face cavity. “This was problematic,” said Ragsdale, “because the neck ring is a movable fixture, so now you 

had a movable fixture with seals that your oxygen system is going through. 

We spent a lot of time overhauling, continuously working to keep those suits 

functioning.” The later S1010B, with the regulator located inside the helmet 

instead of the suit, was a big improvement. But there were always new challenges, including the vexing problem of faceplate fogging. “There was a wire 

grid within the visor glass, a heating element for defogging. We tried battery 

12. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 63–65.

13. Ragsdale, interview with author.
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140

power packs, rechargeable power packs; it wasn’t very effective.” Alternatively, 

the pilot could insert a food probe into the helmet’s feeding port; the pressure 

change activated the regulator, causing oxygen to flow across the faceplate and 

evaporate any moisture on the glass. Ragsdale eventually mastered the art of 

assisting the U-2 pilot through the lengthy process of donning the pressure 

garment, pre-breathing, and integrating the suit with the airplane’s life-support 

systems. Doffing the suit after a mission was a quicker process as long as all of 

the systems functioned properly, but the pilot had to be observed for any signs 

of decompression sickness.14

Over the past three decades, suit designers and technicians have learned 

many lessons. As a result, pressure garments have been made lighter, with 

increased mobility, and have become easier and more comfortable to wear. 

Neoprene rubber suit bladders have been replaced with Gore-Tex assemblies 

that wick moisture away from the pilot’s body. “The pilots are coming back 

much drier than they used to, and the suits are more sustainable because acidic 

sweat had previously caused the suits to deteriorate faster.” There have been 

surprisingly few improvements in manual dexterity of the gloves, however. “The 

14. Ibid.

Physiological Support technicians perform a vital role in preparing U-2 flightcrews for their 

missions. (U.S. Air Force)
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

141

early partial-pressure suit gloves were better,” according to Ragsdale, “because 

they were thin and fit more tightly. Once you have to encase the entire hand 

in air, you can’t have the glove be a snug fit like that. They have tried Velcro on 

the palms and fingertips, and metal bars across the palms, but there hasn’t been 

a perfect solution.” When he first arrived at Beale, Ragsdale was told that he 

might not be trained to work with the U-2 because it was expected to be phased 

out of service. “Now here we are more than 30 years later, the SR-71 was retired 

not once but twice, and the U-2 is still going strong.”15

High Cuisine

Requirements for long-duration reconnaissance and research flights resulted in 

the development of special foods and equipment to deliver nourishment and 

liquid refreshment to the U-2 flightcrews. Pilots wearing bulky, fully pressurized 

suits have a limited range of motion for feeding themselves and cannot break 

the integrity of their pressurized environment by opening their helmet visors. 

In order to overcome this dilemma, the Air Force turned to the expert chefs 

and nutritionists at the Department of Defense Combat Feeding Directorate 

(CFD) at the Army’s Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering 

Center, Natick, MA. The result 

was “tube food”—meals in the 

form of a paste with the consistency of baby food. U-2 pilots 

are supplied with metallicfoil containers, similar in size 

to a large tube of toothpaste, 

each fitted with a plastic straw 

designed to slip through a 

sealed port on the pilot’s helmet. 

Breaching this port, which is 

also used for hydration, does 

not affect the suit’s internal pressure. The CFD has been supplying tube foods to U-2 pilots for 

more than half a century and has 

produced approximately 28,000 

tubes annually for a community 

15. Ibid.

Tube food comes in many flavors, including 

cinnamon applesauce. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

142

of only about 100 pilots. Each has a shelf life of approximately 3 years if stored 

at a maximum temperature of 80 °F. “We’ve been making these for years and 

years,” said Dan Nattress, a CFD food technologist, “and constantly adding 

new flavors.”16

Pilots usually consume one tube per hour. Although eating peach cobbler, 

Key lime pie, Chicken à la King, or truffle macaroni and cheese from a tube 

doesn’t compare to a home-cooked meal, U-2 pilots say they enjoy the tube 

meals while flying long missions. They typically request their favorites while 

being assisted into their pressure suits. “Depending on the duration of the 

flight, each pilot is different,” said suit technician SSgt. Suzzett Stalesky of the 

9th Physiological Support Squadron. “It just depends on the pilot preference. 

Some pilots take the same thing every flight, and some newer ones are still trying 

to find what agrees with their body during a flight.” While classic flavors such 

as beef stew or applesauce are popular, there are also more exciting options like 

chocolate pudding with enough caffeine to satisfy any coffee addict.17 Since 

some missions can last as long as 12 hours, caffeine is a popular ingredient 

among U-2 pilots. “The aircraft itself is very difficult to fly, and it’s actually very 

difficult to land,” Nattress said. “[The pilots] want to be very alert when they 

land. Fairly soon before they’re landing, they’ll open up a caffeinated product.”18

In 2010, Air Force officials decided the tube food menu needed a boost and 

asked the CFD to bring its products into the 21st century. “Things change,” 

said Nattress. “In the 1970s, expectations were different. We had no direct 

communication with the user prior to 2010.” To rectify that, Nattress and 

Deborah Haley, chef and physical science technician with CFD, visited Beale 

Air Force Base to gain a firsthand understanding of what the U-2 crews experience. “Things are a lot more difficult,” Haley said. “Once you’re fully suited 

and under pressure and connected to oxygen, there’s no movement inside the 

helmet, except when you breathe in and breathe out, so swallowing is a conscious effort. You have to actually think about that, because there’s no air movement. It’s a lot different sort of feeling to it.”19

16. Shawn Nickel, “Fueling the high flyers—U-2 tube food calms cravings in the cockpit,” Air Combat Command News, February 8, 2013, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.

asp?id=123335478, accessed August 30, 2013.

17. Ibid.

18. Bob Reinert, “Natick tube foods keep U-2 pilots flying high,” Army News Archives, January 18, 

2013, http://www.army.mil/article/94301/Natick_tube_foods_keep_U_2_pilots_flying_high/, 

accessed August 30, 2013.

19. Ibid.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

143

After surveying a number of U-2 pilots, Air Force officials asked the CFD 

to produce four popularly requested flavors including Peach Melba, Beef 

Stroganoff, Key Lime Pie, and a breakfast item, which became bacon with hash 

browns. These were added to a revamped 15-item menu, all made with fresh 

ingredients. “They didn’t want us to completely revise all of the products,” said 

Haley, “but we knew that there were things we could do to improve them that 

wouldn’t be major.” CFD technicians suggested developing layers of flavors to 

improve the meal experience. “Now the pilots are getting really excited about 

the food. It’s so much better.”20

Developing high cuisine for high-altitude flyers is not as easy as it sounds. 

There have been occasional failures and missteps along the way. In the early 

stages of developing the Peach Melba, for example, Nattress recalled that it 

had a “dirty sock kind of taste.” Eventually, after some additional tweaking, it 

became one of the more successful flavors. “It takes a while to find just the right 

balance,” said Haley, “so that when it comes out of the tube, you’ve hit just the 

right flavor profile.”21

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

SSgt. Suzzett Stalesky, 9th Physiological Support Squadron, demonstrates the proper method for 

inserting the feeding tube into the helmet. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

144

Hazards of High Flight

U-2 pilots have been subjected to a variety of hazards related to high-altitude 

flying, especially hypoxia (oxygen deficiency) and dysbarism (medical conditions resulting from changes in ambient air pressure). These phenomena 

were not merely confined to the early days of the program and the use of 

partial-pressure suits but continued into the 21st century despite advances 

in aerospace physiology and the development of improved technology for 

personal survival equipment.

Two fatal U-2 accidents on successive days in July 1958 resulted from 

hypoxia. The first, on July 8, occurred 6 hours into a high-altitude navigation 

training flight when Squadron Leader Chris Walker, a British exchange pilot, 

reported that his aircraft was descending out of control. Although he ejected at 

a safe altitude, Walker never separated from his seat and perished. The following 

day, Capt. Al Chapin, Jr., was killed during a similar training sortie. Both were 

highly qualified pilots. Walker was fully qualified in the U-2 and had hundreds 

of hours of flight experience in the Canberra (British forerunner to the B-57). 

Chapin had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for safely landing a 

disabled U-2 1 year earlier, after a power failure and loss of pressurization at high 

altitude. The U-2 fleet was grounded following Walker’s and Chapin’s accidents, 

while investigators initially focused on suspicions that autopilot failures led to 

loss of control. This line of thought was abandoned after excessive moisture 

was discovered in the oxygen systems of other U-2s, leading to the conclusion 

that ice may have formed in the oxygen systems of the two mishap aircraft. The 

commander of SAC restricted U-2 operations to a maximum altitude of 20,000 

feet until corrective actions were implemented.22

That same year, Col. Jack Nole suffered hypoxia while attempting a highaltitude bailout after his U-2 broke apart following inadvertent extension of the 

wing flaps. As his airplane dove toward the ground, Nole extended the landing 

gear and speed brakes and reduced engine power to idle, but it was no use. 

Airframe stresses eventually snapped the bolts holding the tail assembly in place 

and Nole was battered about inside the cockpit as the plane tumbled end over 

end. Struggling mightily, he released his harness and was immediately slammed 

into the canopy, which came loose and sailed away. Nole’s survival pack snagged 

on something, and he found himself pinned halfway out of the cockpit, bent 

backward against the tumbling fuselage by the powerful slipstream. He eventually wrenched free but soon came to the realization that he had failed to initiate 

his emergency oxygen feed. As he depleted his remaining air, Nole felt the onset 

22. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 339–341.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

145

of hypoxia and determined that he had two choices. “The first,” he later recalled, 

“was to let myself fall until my parachute opened automatically at the preset 

14,000 feet. But it would take more than two minutes to free-fall those seven 

and a half miles; by that time, there was a good chance I’d have suffocated.”23

His second choice was to immediately open his parachute and hope he could 

find and activate his emergency oxygen bottle. Tempting though this was, it 

carried a number of risks. The first stemmed from the fact that a human body 

could accelerate to as much as 375 miles per hour in the thin atmosphere. Even 

if his shroud lines did not become tangled, the force of the parachute snapping 

open at such speed could shred the fabric or cause great bodily harm due to 

sudden deceleration. Successful chute deployment did not guarantee survival 

either since it might take up to a half-hour to descend to the ground from 

53,000 feet. Nole decided to chance it and pulled his ripcord. He was pleasantly surprised when the parachute opened gently, without the slightest shock, 

possibly as a result of his being propelled upward during egress and, by chance, 

opening the chute while at the apex of his arc. Nole managed to activate his 

emergency oxygen but then had to contend with wild oscillations beneath the 

parachute canopy, exacerbated by the thin air, which provided little resistance. 

“Each time I swung, I was afraid that air would spill from the chute’s high side, 

and that it would collapse, dropping me like a stone.” At 20,000 feet and still 

swinging wildly, he opened his faceplate and was violently airsick. Finally, 22 

minutes after exiting the cockpit, he touched down safely on a gently rolling 

Texas prairie. He later learned that his descent should have lasted at least another 

10 minutes, but air spillage during his oscillations sped his fall, allowing him to 

more quickly reach warmer, thicker air before his emergency supply ran out.24

In another incident, Capt. Pat Halloran suffered oxygen deprivation due to 

faulty connection of his life-support equipment by technicians prior to takeoff. 

After his oxygen hose came loose during cruise at around 64,000 feet, Halloran 

began to feel warning signs of hypoxia, including flushing and hyperventilation. 

His helmet bladder collapsed around his head and he had difficulty breathing 

as the pressurized oxygen feed suddenly ceased. He was now breathing only 

the ambient cockpit air, which was pressurized to around 30,000 feet pressure 

altitude. His vision dimming, he checked the airplane’s oxygen controls and 

found nothing amiss, but when he looked in a rearview mirror, he noticed the 

hose dangling loose from its connector. Working quickly, he re-established the 

proper connection and felt immediate relief as oxygen began to flow into his 

23. Ibid., p. 340.

24. Ibid.
Unlimited Horizons

146

helmet. The ensuing investigation resulted in modifications to prevent accidental disconnection during flight.25

Later U-2 pilots equipped with full-pressure suits were likewise vulnerable to 

the vicissitudes of high-altitude flight. In 2006, a 47-year-old pilot began feeling various aches and pains 21⁄2 hours into a long-endurance sortie. He tried to 

alleviate discomfort in his knees and ankles by adjusting his rudder pedals and 

then by increasing the pressure in his suit. The situation became increasingly 

worse over the next 2 hours as he experienced confusion, headache, fatigue, 

and degraded ability to concentrate. Eating, drinking, and adjusting his oxygen 

supply gave no relief, and only after another 4 hours had passed did he report 

his problems to ground control. He was immediately instructed to return to 

base, but he almost did not make it. He was sick in his helmet several times, and 

his mental and physical capacities (including hearing and vision) deteriorated 

until he could no longer communicate via the radio. Upon arrival at his home 

base, he attempted to land on the wrong runway three times before finally 

touching down safely. Following a thorough physical examination, the pilot 

was diagnosed with severe decompression sickness with neurological symptoms 

25. Ibid., p. 341.

Ground crewmen assist Col. Jack Nole with last-minute preparations for a U-2 flight. 

(Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

147

and incipient cardiovascular collapse. Although investigators found no technical 

problems with the airplane’s environmental systems, the pilot’s symptoms had 

apparently been brought on by the pressure changing from that experienced 

on the airfield before takeoff to that of the minimum ambient pressure in the 

cabin of the U-2 in cruise. Decompression sickness, known to divers as the 

bends, results from the formation of tiny bubbles from gases (mainly nitrogen) 

dissolved in body tissues due to a reduction in the environmental pressure. It 

can strike aviators exposed to altitudes above 18,000 feet or so, and the symptoms can range from a mild case of the bends to serious neurological problems. 

In this case, the U-2 pilot seemed to recover within a few months, but he was 

eventually found to have suffered permanent brain damage severe enough to 

end his flying career.26

In the first decade of the 21st century, according to Lt Col. Edward 

“Tadd” Sholtis, the Air Force’s deputy director of public affairs at Air Combat 

Command Headquarters, a higher operations tempo for the U-2 coincided 

with an increased number of pilots suffering from neurologic decompression 

sickness (NDCS). In fact, between 2006 and 2010, the number of reported 

NDCS incidents increased from 0.076 percent to 0.23 percent of missions 

flown. “By late 2010, officials believed there was enough cause for concern to 

initiate a study,” said Sholtis in an interview with Air Force Times. “What we 

knew or suspected about the problem was briefed to decision makers in early 

2011, and the study was authorized in March 2011.” By October 2012, the 

Air Force had conducted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests on more 

than 100 U-2 pilots, ranging in age from 26 to 50, said Dr. Stephen McGuire, 

a neurologist and retired Air Force colonel who led the study. Of those pilots 

examined, 75 percent had more brain lesions than they should have for their 

age and health status. McGuire noted that these were the same type of lesions 

normally associated with repeated head trauma.27

The study, published in Neurology in August 2013, compared MRI images 

from 102 Air Force pilots assigned to U-2 squadrons with 91 brain scans from 

a control group matched by age, health, and education. Citing previous research 

from other scientists, McGuire and his colleagues showed that high-altitude 

pilots’ exposure to low-air-pressure environments can lead to NDCS, affecting the central nervous system. Symptoms include slowed thought processes, 

26. Sóbester, Stratospheric Flight: Aeronautics at the Limit, pp. 13–14.

27. Jeff Schogol, “Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain lesions in pilots,” 

Air Force Times, August 28, 2013, http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130828/

NEWS04/308280019/Air-Force-re-pressurizes-U-2-cabin-prevent-brain-lesions-pilots, 

accessed August 30, 2013.
Unlimited Horizons

148

anomia (impaired ability to name things), confusion, unresponsiveness, and 

permanent cognitive decline. The researchers who performed the study found 

a link between clinical NDCS and white-matter hyperintensity brain lesions, 

possibly related to microbubbles of predominantly nitrogen gas formed during 

high-altitude flying. In testing whether the entire U-2 pilot population might 

exhibit significantly more lesions than members of the control group, they discovered a 375 percent increase in the volume of lesions among the pilots and a 

295 percent rise in the number of white-matter hyperintensities. Lesion volume 

and count are important markers of cerebral integrity and have been previously 

used to measure age-related cognitive decline as indicated by declines in executive functioning, processing speed, and general cognitive ability. Brain scans of 

the U-2 pilots indicated white-matter damage different from that occurring in 

normal aging, further bolstering the hypothesis that the pilots’ lesions resulted 

from microemboli (tiny gas bubbles) in the brain tissue.28

Interestingly, pilots with the most U-2 flight time did not always have the 

highest number of brain lesions. Instead, the main contributing factors to lesion 

formation included the amount of nitrogen the pilots were able to get out of 

their system while breathing 100 percent oxygen before flying, mission duration, and the amount of recovery time pilots were given before making another 

high-altitude sortie. In order to alleviate the risks of NDCS, the Air Force took 

steps to improve cockpit pressurization in the U-2 and minimize hypobaric 

exposure. The Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort reduced the pressure altitude 

U-2 pilots were exposed to during operational missions from 29,000 to 15,000 

feet. This was a significant improvement as research has shown that the risk of 

developing decompression sickness becomes virtually nonexistent below 18,000 

feet. “What we’ve done is bring the pilots down below what is commonly 

thought to be the threshold for DCS and we think that will prevent any further 

occurrence of lesions,” McGuire subsequently reported. Technicians completed 

CARE upgrades to the fleet in June 2013 along with other cockpit modifications, including reinforcement of frames, bulkheads, and the canopy. McGuire 

acknowledged that it is unknown whether U-2 pilots would be at greater risk 

of having health problems later in life as a result of hypobaric expose. “In all 

other neurological disease, these types of lesions are associated with cognitive 

impairment,” he said. “We have not seen any clinical impairment in any of 

our U-2 pilots, and they are all still flying. But, being conservative, the commanders rightly made the decision [to implement CARE], ‘Let’s not push the 

28. Markus MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots,” Medical News 

Today, August 21, 2013, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/265036.php, accessed 

August 30, 2013.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

149

envelope; let’s protect our pilots.’”29 As an additional precaution, according to 

Sholtis, “The Air Force is in the process of reviewing flight operations guidance 

to potentially increase downtime between high flights longer than nine hours, 

as well as limiting the length of deployments.”30

Even flight at lower altitudes can carry the risk of hypoxia. In December 

2011, veteran U-2 and ER-2 pilot Denis Steele was flying a NASA sortie from 

Palmdale when his oxygen regulator failed. Since the maximum planned cruise 

altitude for the mission was only 45,000 feet, Steele was not wearing a pressure 

suit. His oxygen supply was delivered through a standard mask and regulator of 

the type used in fighter-type aircraft such as the F-15 and F-18. Typically, regulator failure results from a rupture of one of two diaphragms within the assembly. 

The regulator is designed to fail in the full open position, providing a continuous 

flow of oxygen. According to Ryan Ragsdale, “It’s going to be uncomfortable 

breathing because now it’s going to be equivalent to pressure breathing, but 

at least you still have oxygen, which gives you time so you can safely descend 

to a lower altitude.” Steele’s incident was unusual in that his regulator ceased 

to function, leaving him with no oxygen flow whatsoever. He could not even 

activate his emergency oxygen,” Ragsdale said, “because it all went through the 

29. Schogol, “Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain lesions in pilots.”

30. MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.”

To reduce the chance of decompression sickness, cockpit upgrades have improved cabinpressure altitude. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

150

same regulator.”31 At that point in the flight, the ER-2’s cockpit had a pressure 

altitude of 23,000 feet, which gave the pilot approximately 3 minutes of useful 

consciousness before he was unable to fly the airplane. Steele needed to reduce 

his altitude quickly before he succumbed to hypoxia, but he had to be careful 

not to descend too quickly and risk overstressing the airframe. He declared 

an emergency, engaged the autopilot, and attempted to balance his need to 

get down quickly enough to remain conscious with a requirement to descend 

slowly enough to keep his airplane intact. During his long descent, he felt the 

onset of hypoxia and worried that he might become so cognitively impaired 

that he would lose control of the airplane. As his symptoms worsened, he even 

considered the possibility that he might have to eject. Frustration mounted as 

air-traffic controllers tried to convince Steele to descend more slowly in order 

to avoid commercial air traffic in the flight corridor above Palmdale. They did 

not seem to grasp the severity of his predicament. Somehow, he managed to 

retain control of the airplane and remain conscious long enough to reach a lower 

altitude, where his hypoxic symptoms subsided and he was able to safely land 

the airplane. For these actions, Steel was later awarded the NASA Exceptional 

Bravery Medal. Investigators determined that the faulty regulator had been used 

well past its service life.32

Another hazard of high-altitude flight comes from ionizing radiation. Earth’s 

atmosphere shields humans and other life forms living at ground level from 

galactic cosmic rays (GCR); the denser the atmosphere, the greater the protection. The intensity of atmospheric background radiation levels varies with 

altitude, latitude, and phase of the solar cycle, which ranges from minimum to 

maximum about every 11 years. When solar activity is at a minimum GCR, 

levels are at their highest, and vice versa. GCR consist of energetic nuclei of all 

naturally occurring elements, interacting with atmospheric constituents, primarily through atomic and nuclear collisions. At flight altitudes above 10,000 

feet, the dominant contributor to the effective dose comes from secondary neutrons. GCR exposure approximately doubles with every 6,000 feet of increased 

altitude. At sea level, the exposure rate is a miniscule 0.03 microsieverts per 

hour (μSv/h). At altitudes of 30,000 to 40,000 feet, typical of those used for 

commercial airline traffic, the exposure rates increase to approximately 5 to 10 

μSv/h. At typical operating altitudes for the U-2, and those of proposed future 

high-speed commercial passenger aircraft (59,000–65,000 feet), the estimated 

dose equivalent rates range from 10 to 20 μSv/h. As an example, measurements 

31. Ragsdale, interview with author.

32. Jim Smolka, Director of Flight Operations, remarks during the NASA Honor Awards ceremony, 

Dryden Flight Research Center, August 6, 2013.
 Life Above 50,000 Feet

151

taken aboard the Concorde supersonic transport in October 1996 averaged 

14.1 μSv/h. In the future, commercial aircraft may be developed that fly higher, 

faster, and farther than currently possible. This will result in increased effective 

doses of atmospheric radiation for aircrews and passengers.33

In order to more accurately characterize radiation levels at high altitudes, 

scientists from the NASA High Speed Research Project Office at Langley 

Research Center conducted a study in 1997 with assistance from Johnson Space 

Center, Ames Research Center, the Department of Energy’s Environmental 

Measurements Laboratory, Canadian Defense Research Establishment, U.K. 

National Radiological Protection Board, Boeing Company, and several researchers from domestic and foreign universities. For the Atmospheric Ionizing 

Radiation (AIR) project, a NASA ER-2 aircraft conducted five high-altitude 

sorties from Moffett Field to measure galactic cosmic radiation during a solar 

minimum. On flights ranging over the Pacific Ocean, southwestern U.S., and 

western Canada, the ER-2 carried 14 different instruments in the nose, Q-bay, 

and wing pods. These included a multisphere neutron spectrometer, ionization 

chamber, scintillation counters, two spherical tissue-equivalent proportional 

counters, and two particle telescopes. Data from the AIR program are potentially useful in developing not only more accurate radiation models for highaltitude flight but also for planning human exploration of the planet Mars, 

which has a radiation environment very similar to that of Earth’s atmosphere 

at 70,000 feet.34

Flight operations in the stratosphere have proven challenging and hazardous 

to U-2 flightcrews but have immeasurably increased knowledge of aerospace 

physiology and aided in the development of improved life-support systems. 

Many lessons came at a high cost, but despite heavy losses in the early days of 

the U-2 program, Air Force officials are quick to point out that the airplane 

has a pretty good overall safety record. According to Sholtis in an August 2013 

interview, “[During] U-2 operations since 1963, for every 100,000 hours flown 

there were eight mishaps that resulted in the death of the pilot.” Analysis of 

these mishaps resulted in a variety of procedural, educational, and technological 

changes made to improve safety. “We have reduced the fatality rate to 0.1 per 

100,000 hours over the past 10 years.”35

33. Lawrence W. Townsend, “Radiation exposures of aircrew in high altitude flight,” Journal of 

Radiological Protection 21, no. 1 (March 2001): pp. 5–8.

34. Susan Bailey, “Air crew radiation exposure—An overview,” Nuclear News, January 2000, 

pp. 32–40.

35. MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.”
152

Pilots learn to fly the U-2ST trainer before going solo. (U.S. Air Force)
153

Flight Operations and 

Performance 

The U-2 has always been a difficult airplane to fly, challenging even the best 

pilots. Lightweight construction and long, thin wings give it terrific soaring 

ability but also make it hard to land. As the airplane approaches the ground, 

it floats on a cushion of air—known as ground effect—that causes the U-2 to 

remain airborne even at idle. The pilot almost has to force it down using spoilers 

to extinguish any remaining lift. A safe touchdown is further complicated by 

the unusual landing gear configuration. Near or on the ground, the U-2 appears 

to be a clumsy beast. The mysterious Dragon Lady seems at ease only when 

soaring to altitude or cruising through the stratosphere. Even there, danger 

lurks within the thin margin between Mach buffet and stall speed, the dreaded 

“coffin corner” of the flight envelope. Technological improvements have eased 

such problems as high-altitude engine flameouts and balky autopilots, but only 

a select few can hope to admire Earth’s curvature from more than 12 miles 

above the surface in what has been dubbed the Near-Space Plane.

Crew Selection and Training

U-2 pilots come from every type of military flying background—fighters, 

bombers, tankers, transports, and trainers—and have included inter-service 

transfer officers from the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Candidates for crew 

selection must submit an extensive application package. Finalists undergo a 

formal interview with several commanders at Beale Air Force Base, home of 

the 9th Reconnaissance Wing. 

Those selected for interview generally possess a strong flight-evaluation 

history and solid officer-performance evaluations and exceed minimum flight 

experience requirements. Because the U-2 does not meet military specifications 

for handling qualities, selectees must also pass a demanding three-sortie profile 

in the two-seat U-2ST to determine their suitability for further training. If all 

goes well, they are soon inducted into a very select community. Trainee pilots 

are initially assigned to the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, a unit that traces its 

CHAPTER 6
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154

origins to the earliest days of military aviation. Training lasts approximately 

10 months, including about 3 months for inprocessing and qualification in 

the supersonic T-38. This is followed by a 22-sortie U-2 training syllabus that 

includes Basic Qualification and Mission Qualification prior to operational 

assignment. Line pilots typically alternate between 2-month deployments flying 

operational missions and 2 to 3 months at Beale for continuation training.1

Pilots fly the T-38 to maintain basic qualifications and proficiency in aerobatic maneuvering and instrument flying. The trainer is less expensive to 

operate than the U-2 and does not require use of a pressure suit. Operational 

pilots typically fly the T-38 twice a week and the U-2 two to three times 

per month. Flying the U-2, even during training flights, is largely a solitary 

affair. According to Capt. Neal Hinson, a U-2 pilot assigned to the 99th 

Reconnaissance Squadron, “You train mostly on your own after the initial 

solo flight and instructors monitor the pilot’s objectives using GPS.”2

Flying the Mission

Flying the U-2 requires a great deal of teamwork and coordination. While pilots 

are honing their flying skills, life-support technicians prepare pressure suits 

and survival gear, and maintainers keep the airplanes flyable, and the mission 

planners develop all the necessary material required to complete each mission. This group consists of about a dozen inactive pilots who use their flying 

experience to create flight route plans and other information for the current 

U-2 pilots prior to each sortie. Among the products they create are items such 

as navigation plans, fuel-consumption tables, and radio frequency communication cards mounted on cardboard so they can be handled more easily by 

a pressure-suited pilot. After a flight is completed, charts and flight plans are 

collected and stored for possible use in future missions. “Mission planners,” 

said 99th RS Mission Planning Flight Commander Lt. Col. Eddie Efsic, “are 

hired to transform distributed ground systems products into something pilots 

can use to efficiently and safely collect [imaging] targets.”3

1. U-2 Pilot Application, June 14, 2012, http://www.beale.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.

asp?id=5077, accessed July 27, 2013.

2. Chuck Broadway, “A U-2 Dragon Lady Pilot: From interview to altitude,” Air Combat Command 

News, April 3, 2009, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123142867, accessed August 

26, 2013.

3. Ibid.
 Flight Operations and Performance

155

Following a mission briefing and preflight physical examination, the pilot 

is helped into the pressure suit and spends the next hour pre-breathing pure 

oxygen. Shortly prior to takeoff, the physiological support crew switches the 

pilot to a portable oxygen system and boards a van for transport to the flightline. Entering the cockpit is a difficult task while wearing a bulky pressure 

suit. Additional time is consumed with connecting the oxygen hoses, communications cables, seat harnesses, and boot stirrups. The pilot then taxies to 

Senior airmen David Sivixay, left, and Allen Smith assist Lt. Col. Brian Dickinson with donning his 

pressure suit. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

156

the runway and pauses while the ground crew removes locking pins from the 

outrigger pogos.4

A normal mission profile begins with a short takeoff roll followed by a 

steep initial climb angle in the first 25,000 feet and a high rate of climb to 

altitude. Depending upon total gross takeoff weight, the U-2 will usually attain 

an intermediate cruise altitude of 60,000 feet within 30 to 45 minutes. At 

this time, the pilot initiates cruise climb and engages the autopilot to hold a 

constant Mach number. Altitude increases as fuel is burned off and the weight 

of the aircraft decreases. Depending on payload weight, the U-2 may climb 

to cruising altitudes above 70,000 feet. Local air conditions can affect cruise 

climb performance; colder air allows a more rapid climb whereas warmer air 

reduces climb performance. In standard cruise climb, the U-2 normally flies 

at a zero pitch (level) angle, though this varies approximately ±1 degree as the 

autopilot seeks a constant Mach number. Pitch attitudes during takeoff and 

climb can reach 20 degrees nose up, 10 degrees nose down during descent. 

Bank angles are a function of desired turn radius but are normally held to less 

than 30 degrees. At cruise altitude, the pilot holds the airplane at a constant 

Mach number of about 0.70, equivalent to a true airspeed of approximately 

410 knots. A normal 6.5-hour mission will cover a range of approximately 

2,400 nautical miles, spending about 5.5 hours at altitudes above 60,000 

feet. An 8-hour mission can cover a distance of 3,000 nautical miles with 

about 7 hours time at altitude.5

 The automatic flight control system provides 

4. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 395.

5. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-2.

U-2 pilot glances out the left side of the cockpit while making a turn. (U.S. Air Force)
 Flight Operations and Performance

157

stability augmentation in yaw, pitch, and roll and also incorporates autopilot 

functions including Mach hold and automatic navigation via the inertial 

navigation system (INS).6

According to the flight plan, the pilot navigates between waypoints using 

any of several navigation systems. The INS operates by sensing accelerations 

from a gyro-stabilized, all-attitude platform and using a digital computer to 

integrate this information to provide an indication of present position (latitude 

and longitude), attitude data (pitch and roll), and course-line computation 

referenced to great circle routes. A control display in the cockpit allows the 

pilot to store navigation waypoints and to change the flight track en route. An 

update function allows for GPS updating of the INS with accuracy typically 

better than ±20 meters. A backup or secondary navigation system allows for a 

safe return to base or to an alternate landing site should the primary INS fail. 

Additionally, the U-2 is equipped with several systems that enable navigation 

with respect to ground-based radio beacons, and the optical viewsight offers the 

pilot visual coverage of the terrain beneath the aircraft for navigation purposes.7

Approximately 30 minutes prior to landing, the pilot initiates descent 

from high altitude by bringing the throttle to idle, opens the speed brakes, 

and extends the landing gear. This results in a descent rate of approximately 

2,000 feet per minute. Sometimes, several 360-degree turns may be required 

to bleed off altitude. At 1,500 feet, the pilot sets trim for landing. The 

6. Ibid., pp. I-1–I-6.

7. Ibid., pp. II-1–II-2.

A mobile chase car follows a U-2 down the runway during landing. (U.S. Air Force)
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158

U-2 crosses the runway threshold with a speed of approximately 75 knots.8

Now comes the most challenging and difficult phase of flight: the landing. 

Typically, pilots are fatigued after long hours of flying in a pressure suit, so 

to make landing easier, a chase car follows the U-2 down the runway. Using 

a radio, a qualified U-2 pilot riding in the car communicates the plane’s altitude during the last few feet before touchdown. As airspeed drops, the pilot 

works to keep the wings straight and level until the U-2 tilts to one side on 

its bicycle landing gear with one wingtip dragging on the ground. Ground 

crew then reinsert the pogo wheels so that the U-2 can taxi to a hangar. Chase 

cars, known as mobiles, have been used since the earliest days of U-2 operations. The Air Force initially used Chevy El Caminos then later switched to 

Ford Mustangs. More recently, these were replaced with the Chevy Camaro 

Z28. According to Capt. Spencer Thomas, a pilot who previously served as 

a U-2 crew chief, “The driver is always a U-2 pilot. That ensures identical 

mindsets. When I’m not flying a mission, I’m ‘mobiling.’”9

Performance Characteristics

Flying the U-2 has always been a challenge because its unusual handling qualities require precision and skill. In adapting to the airplane’s peculiar flight 

characteristics at altitude, early U-2 test pilots developed several standard flight 

profiles. One of these, for reaching maximum altitude, required a stair-step 

approach. Following takeoff, the pilot began a rapid climb to 55,000 feet at a 

specified speed schedule. After slowly gaining another 10,000 feet, the pilot set 

power for a cruise climb for the remainder of the flight, with the airplane rising 

slowly higher as fuel was depleted. Maximum altitude depended on a number 

of variables, such as aircraft gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature.10

Early U-2 pilots routinely exceeded world altitude records but were unable 

to take credit for these feats due to secrecy concerns. A number of tests were 

conducted to obtain true altitude in order to calibrate the altimeter used in 

the U-2 and to collect data required for camera development. These checks 

were made by placing targets of known dimensions on a dry lakebed and 

photographing them from an indicated pressure altitude of 70,000 feet. The 

surveyed elevation of the lakebed was 4,440 feet above sea level. The airplane’s 

true altitude above the ground was determined by two methods, first by scaling 

8. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 396.

9. John B. Dendy IV, “Crouching Airmen, Hidden Dragon,” Airman 46, no. 7 (July 2002): p. 20.

10. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 27.
 Flight Operations and Performance

159

the target size from the pictures and then checking the altimeter reading by 

correcting for instrument error, static location error, and deviations from standard pressure and temperature. The agreement between these two independent 

methods proved quite good, differing only 200 feet between the true altitude 

as measured from the photographs and that calculated from the indicated 

pressure altitude.11

As altitude increased, the margin between the aircraft’s stalling speed and 

its maximum speed quickly diminished. This created a hazardous situation 

because poor aerodynamic control-surface response in the thin upper atmosphere made stall recovery difficult. Excess speed could be a serious problem. 

The sleek U-2 had been designed to slice through the air with very little drag, 

but this beneficial characteristic could also pose a danger. At low altitudes, 

the early model U-2 airframes were restricted from exceeding 190 knots in 

smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational cruising altitudes, where 

the atmosphere was less dense, later models of the airplane had a maximum 

cruising speed of 410 knots (Mach 0.72). Speeds in excess of these limits would 

subject the airplane to structural failure. U-2 pilots had to be extremely careful 

to keep the airplane in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at operational 

altitudes. If the nose dropped as little as a few degrees into a nose-down attitude, the airplane gained speed at an alarming rate, exceeding the maximum 

permitted speed within a matter of seconds. Since there was no physical sensation of speed at 65,000 feet due to the lack of nearby objects to provide visual 

reference, the pilot had to pay close attention to the airspeed indicator. In 

fact, airspeed was such a critical factor that the difference between stall speed 

and never-to-exceed speed differed by only 6 knots at maximum altitude for 

the early U-2 models and 20 knots for later models. Pilots called this narrow 

range of acceptable airspeeds the “coffin corner” because it represented the 

point at which the U-2 was constantly on the brink of falling out of the sky. 

Too little speed could result in stalling, and the sudden drop might overstress 

the airframe to the point of structural failure. The same could happen at speeds 

high enough to induce Mach limit buffet.12 If a pilot turned too sharply, the 

airplane might be subjected to both conditions simultaneously as the inside 

wing entered stall buffet while the outside wing experienced Mach buffet. The 

fact that these two sources of buffet feel very much the same made it difficult 

for the pilot to make a proper corrective response.13

11. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 38–39.

12. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 76–79.

13. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 23.
Unlimited Horizons

160

One example of exceeding the speed envelope occurred on February 25, 

1966, while Robert E. “Deke” Hall was flying Article 342 on an aerial-refueling 

training mission. Hall completed a series of nine dry hookups with a KC-135 

tanker as planned, terminating the exercise with a practice emergency breakaway from the tanker. Flight conditions were smooth with no noticeable turbulence. After the final breakaway, Hall dropped back, then pulled up alongside 

the KC-135, about 200 to 300 feet off the tanker’s right wingtip. He then 

retracted the U-2’s speed brakes and began a steep, climbing turn to the right. 

As soon as he began the maneuver, Hall felt a slight shudder and heard a loud 

crunching noise. Crewmembers on board the tanker watched in horror as the 

U-2’s left wing snapped off. Its right wing came off as well, and the airplane 

disintegrated into several pieces, including the cockpit and nose section, aft 

fuselage, tail, and engine. Hall managed to eject despite being battered inside 

the tumbling wreckage. He parachuted to safety while pieces of the U-2 fell 

around him.14

The demanding requirements of flying the U-2 made use of an autopilot 

almost a necessity, particularly during long flights. Without the benefit of 

an autopilot during initial flight trials, test pilots found flying the airplane 

14. CIA, “Aircraft Accident Investigation, U-2F N800X (342), 25 February 1966,” CIARDP74B00447R000100010064-1 (March 1966), approved for release June 18, 2002,.

A U-2A makes a steep initial climb during ascent to cruise altitude. (Lockheed Martin)
 Flight Operations and Performance

161

excessively challenging. Lockheed eventually provided an autopilot that could 

hold the airspeed to within a few knots, but it was still incumbent on the 

pilot to ensure that the aircraft remained within the proper speed regime.15

Ernie Joiner recalled one of the first long-duration test flights, in which Ray 

Goudey was aloft for 6 hours: “He didn’t have an autopilot and was really 

tired when we helped him out of the cockpit.”16 Flying without the autopilot 

was not advisable, according to test pilot Robert Schumacher: “It was as difficult as hell, especially around 70,000 feet, where you are near the Mach and 

stall buffets and must fly precisely.” On one occasion he flew the aircraft for 

4 hours without using the autopilot and found it very challenging to control 

the airplane while simultaneously peering through the driftsight, activating the 

camera controls, and attempting to carry out a variety of other tasks. It was 

particularly difficult “because your hands must be on the [control] column...

you can’t let it alone for a second.”17

For operational purposes, the three most important flight characteristics 

were altitude, range, and endurance. The original J57-P-37 engine limited the 

15. Jenkins, Dressing for Altitude: U.S. Aviation Pressure Suits—Wiley Post to Space Shuttle, p. 

151.

16. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 23.

17. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 27.

 A U-2D, foreground, and a U-2A make a graceful turn over Edwards Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons

162

U-2A to maximum operational altitudes between 65,000 and 73,000 feet. 

It had a range of 3,775 nautical miles and an endurance of about 9 hours. 

Improved performance with the J57-P-31 increased the altitude capability 

to around 72,500 feet with a 4,000-nautical-mile range and 10-hour endurance. The U-2C, equipped with the J75-P-13B engine and slipper tanks, had 

a maximum range of 4,600 nautical miles and could stay aloft for more than 

11 hours at altitudes up to 76,000 feet. These early models of the U-2 had a 

maximum gross takeoff weight of between 20,000 and 24,000 pounds. The 

much heavier U-2R and TR-1 family weighed in somewhere between 35,000 

and 40,000 pounds depending on aircraft configuration. The U-2R in a 

clean configuration (no wing tanks or pods) could climb above 75,000 feet 

and fly for 15 hours with a range of 6,300 nautical miles. The later TR-1, 

ER-2, and U-2S were all capable of exceeding 70,000 feet altitude; but with 

its GE-F118-GE-101 turbofan engine, the U-2S had a range of more than 

7,000 nautical miles and a maximum flight duration exceeding 14 hours.18

Maximum range was determined by conducting several test flights during 

which the pilot cruised at normal speeds until the low-fuel warning light came 

on. Airspeeds selected for maximum endurance flights were chosen for ease of 

flying and minimum fuel consumption. The J57-P-31 engine demonstrated a 

10 percent improvement in fuel economy over the J57-P-37. It was possible 

to fly the airplane at idle above 40,000 feet with the P-37 and above 50,000 

feet with the P-31.19 At high altitudes, the U-2 was capable of gliding for vast 

distances in the event of engine failure. During readiness exercises in the spring 

of 1956, a westward-bound U-2 experienced a flameout over the Mississippi 

River near the Tennessee border. After restarting the engine, the pilot reported a 

second flameout and violent engine vibrations that caused him to abort further 

attempts to start the engine. It was clear that he would be unable to return to 

the test site, so he began preparations for landing at a contingency airfield. By 

now, he was over Arkansas and, given the prevailing winds and the airplane’s 

glide ratio, he believed that he could safely reach Albuquerque. Pentagon officials who had been monitoring the flight’s progress called the commander of 

Kirtland Air Force Base, informing him that an airplane would make a deadstick landing at his airfield within abut 30 minutes and would require special 

security. After a half-hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to 

inquire as to the status of the crippled aircraft. As he was speaking, the U-2 

glided silently to a landing on the Kirtland runway. Security police officers were 

startled to see what looked like a “man from Mars” emerging from the cockpit 

18. Ibid., p. 399

19. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 69.
 Flight Operations and Performance

163

wearing a “space suit.” The pilot later reported that from the beginning of the 

first flameout through landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had flown more than 

900 miles, including more than 300 miles by gliding.20

Stability and Control

Early flight tests indicated that the U-2 had no inherent stability, control, or 

handling problems. The airplane’s flight characteristics generally proved to be 

about as expected, though the U-2 was susceptible to the same tuck and buzz 

tendencies associated with most subsonic aircraft. Mach tuck results from an aft 

shift in the center of lift that causes the airplane’s nose to pitch down. Usually 

not dangerous, aileron and rudder buzz is a very rapid oscillation encountered 

at certain critical airspeeds and often caused by shock-induced boundary layer 

separation. Tests of the U-2A were conducted in cruise condition with the 

gust controls both faired and shifted. The airplane’s center of gravity was kept 

between 26 and 28 percent mean aerodynamic chord in accordance with design 

parameters for the primary mission: aerial photography. Lockheed engineers 

anticipated that equipment bay loading would range from a minimum of 450 

pounds to a maximum of 760 pounds.21

The airplane configuration initially had a zero stabilizer incidence, but this 

was later changed to a positive 1.5-degree incidence to reduce elevator deflection at cruise speeds and altitudes, thus reducing trim drag. The airplane had 

positive stability with both settings, but with positive incidence, less downward 

elevator was required throughout the speed range. At high altitudes with gust 

controls faired, the elevator angle was close to neutral between 110 and 130 

knots indicated airspeed. Test pilots also reported that the U-2 felt more stable 

at higher Mach numbers when the elevator had a positive incidence.22 Mach 

number characteristics were evaluated for both the faired and shifted configurations at various altitudes up to 70,000 feet. In order to obtain necessary data, 

the pilot gradually increased Mach number while maintaining approximately 

constant altitude. The maximum Mach number was determined by the severity of the tuck, buffet, or buzz phenomena encountered, and each test was 

terminated at the pilot’s discretion before the condition became excessive.23

20. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 78–79.

21. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 118.

22. Ibid., p. 125.

23. Ibid., p. 130.
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164

At lower altitudes, between 35,000 and 50,000 feet with gust controls 

shifted, pilots noted excessive rudder buzz but only slight tuck at Mach numbers varying from 0.78 to 0.83. Fairing the gust controls and increasing speed 

to between 0.83 and 0.85 Mach number resulted in moderate tuck and buffet. 

At altitudes between 60,000 and 65,000 feet and Mach numbers between 0.80 

and 0.84, the airplane experienced moderate tuck and buffet and some aileron 

buzz, although fairing the gust controls resulted in milder tuck phenomena. 

Tests conducted at 70,000 feet at Mach numbers from 0.80 to 0.82 indicated 

better performance with the gust controls shifted. Some data were also obtained 

during high-speed descents. It was during such tests that the U-2A attained a 

maximum speed of Mach 0.87 at 62,000 feet. The pilot noted both excessive 

aileron buzz and Mach tuck under these conditions. Ultimately, the U-2A was 

placarded to a nominal Mach number of 0.80, though it was possible with 

some configurations to extend the maximum speed to Mach 0.85 with only 

moderately adverse effects. At altitudes below 35,000 feet, no difficulties due 

to Mach effects were experienced up to the placarded airspeed of 260 knots.24

24. Ibid., pp. 130–134.

166

A U-2A painted in spurious NACA markings at the test site. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
167

The NACA and the U-2 

Use of the U-2 as a civilian research platform had its dubious start in February 

1956. Anticipating a surge in off-range training sorties and eventual deployment overseas, the CIA devised a cover story to explain the airplane’s unique 

capabilities and disguise its true mission from the world. This necessary fiction did, however, contain elements of truth that served as a foundation for 

later research efforts.

Initially, there was some debate as to whether the Air Force’s Air Weather 

Service or the NACA—NASA’s predecessor—should be named as the airplane’s 

prime sponsor for cover purposes. Ultimately, Bissell felt it best to use the 

civilian agency and to paint the project aircraft in NACA markings.1 NACA 

officials then drafted a press release at the request of CIA Headquarters, and 

on May 7, 1956, NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announced a program in 

which U-2 aircraft would conduct high-altitude weather research with Air 

Force support while operating from Watertown Strip, NV. In order to explain 

the presence of U-2 operations elsewhere, Dryden added that “USAF facilities 

overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable gathering research 

information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude 

air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world.”2

 This statement was timed 

to coincide with deployment of the U-2 to Europe and emphasized the use of 

civilian planes with civilian pilots conducting meteorological studies.

In June 1956, the initial operational detachment, masquerading as Weather 

Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional) One, or WRSP-1, was deployed to 

Lakenheath, England, where its stated purpose was met with skepticism. 

Two sarcastic editorials in the British Flight magazine belittled the weather 

research cover story and questioned the excessive security surrounding the U-2 

1. Memorandum for Project Security Officer, “Cover Meeting with AWS and NACA,” CIARDP33-02415A000200390051-1 (March 20, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA 

April 11, 2000.

2. Hugh L. Dryden, “NACA Announces Start of New Research Program,” May 7, 1956, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters Washington, DC.

CHAPTER 7
Unlimited Horizons

168

operation.3 A spokesman for the NACA announced on July 9 that preliminary 

data-gathering flights had been made from Lakenheath. He also reported that 

the initial high-altitude weather data gathered by the U-2 had been processed 

and that it had proved the value of the aircraft as a research tool.4

 The most 

significant element of the cover story was the fact that the airplanes actually carried NACA weather instrumentation during training and proficiency flights. 

Real data were being collected within a flight regime previously unattainable 

by conventional aircraft. Transferring these data to scientists would not only 

bolster the cover story but also yield a treasure trove of information applicable 

to civil and military aviation.

Turbulent Relationship

Not everyone at the NACA seemed enthusiastic about supporting the U-2 

cover story. In August, the Aquatone project cover officer expressed some 

concern to Richard Bissell over the need for publication of NACA research 

papers based on data collected at altitudes within the range that had been 

admitted. Such documents would serve as unimpeachable proof that the 

U-2 was being used in a research capacity. But Harry Press, chief aeronautical research scientist of NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory’s 

Gust Loads Division, had shown a pronounced lack of enthusiasm with 

regard to publishing such material. The CIA officer recommended putting 

pressure on NACA Headquarters to “emphasize to Mr. Press the need for his 

taking immediate action toward preparing our much needed research study 

with completion at a very early date.” Agency officials subsequently drafted 

a letter for the NACA assistant director for research, Richard V. Rhode, to 

emphasize the need “for a counterpropaganda weapon for use in the event 

of a compromise to one of our aircraft.”5

The Aquatone Project assistant security officer met with Rhode on November 

16 to request that he expedite publication of NACA research studies being prepared with data obtained during U-2 weather research missions and to request 

additional instrumentation for use in project aircraft. The CIA provided Rhode 

3. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.

4. Peter W. Merlin, “U-2 Cover Story Timeline,” NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center historical 

reference collection, July 2004.

5. Memorandum for Project Director, “Cover Research Releases (NACA),” SAPC-8675, CIARDP33-02415A000200390031-2 (August 22, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA 

April 11, 2000.
 The NACA and the U-2

169

with all weather data accumulated thus far by the various U-2 detachments 

for inclusion in the planned research papers. During the meeting, the project security officer also suggested that U-2 pilots “should carry some NACA 

documentation else their story would not hold up when they are required to 

identify their association with NACA to friends, military establishments, etc.”6

The NACA cover story was put to its first test when a deployed U-2 crashed 

near Wiesbaden, Germany, on September 17, but the incident caused little 

sensation in the media. When CIA pilot Robert J. Ericson was forced to bail out 

over Arizona 3 months later, he was identified to inquiring reporters as “Robert 

J. Everett, a civilian pilot for NACA.” As with the earlier Wiesbaden incident, 

an Air Force spokesman stated that the plane was owned by the NACA and 

was “engaged in high altitude research jointly with the Air Force studying air 

turbulence and the jet stream.”7

First Research Data

In January 1957, Richard Bissell and his staff coordinated plans to publicly 

surface the U-2 for the first time. This entailed the release of photos and publication of research data. After discussions with CIA officials, Hugh Dryden 

arranged for the first official picture to be released by the NACA in early 

February.8 In order to further support the cover story, the photo depicted 

the airplane with the tail number NACA 320 painted below a yellow and 

black band with the NACA’s winged shield insignia. The following month, 

Langley gust loads researchers Thomas L. Coleman and Jack Funk published 

NACA Research Memorandum No. L57A11, “Preliminary Measurements of 

Atmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration 

6. Memorandum for the Record, “Cover Discussions with NACA,” CIA-RDP33-

02415A000200390025-9 (November 19, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA 

April 11, 2000.

7. “Research Plane Explodes; Altitude Pilot Bails Out,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 20, 1956, p. A2, Clotaire Wood files, NASA Headquarters Historical Reference 

Collection.

8. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Deputy Project Director, “Arrangements with 

NACA and Kelly Johnson re Release of U-2 Photographs,” SAPC-12313, CIA-RDP33-

02415A000200390023-1 (January 26, 1957), declassified and released by the CIA

April 11, 2000.
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170

Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane.”9 Several months later, Coleman 

wrote a second report with Emilie C. Coe, this time comparing turbulence 

data taken over the United States with that collected over England and 

Western Europe.10

These reports included an analysis of turbulence data obtained using velocity, gravity, and height (VGH) recorders carried aboard the U-2. Developed 

at Langley for collecting gust-loads data, these instruments provide timehistory records of airspeed (velocity, or v), acceleration (measured in g units), 

and altitude (indicated as height, or h) for continuous periods up to 100 

hours. A strip of photographic paper moved through each VGH recorder 

at sufficient speed to permit statistical determination of gust distribution 

and also provide, on a condensed time scale, general operational data. VGH 

data collected during flights over England and Western Europe indicated a 

substantial reduction in the number and intensity of atmospheric gusts with 

increasing altitude. These results were in agreement with atmospheric turbulence models developed using data previously obtained with other airplanes 

and balloon-borne instrumentation.11

Up to this point, the collection of detailed scientific information on atmospheric turbulence and other meteorological conditions had been limited by 

aircraft performance to altitudes below approximately 45,000 feet. Use of balloons permitted limited measurements up to about 60,000 feet. In addition 

to altitude limitations, previous methods (particularly balloon-borne instruments) were limited in regard to geographic areas covered and were largely confined to the United States. With the U-2, NACA scientists now had access to 

information on turbulent conditions around the world and at higher altitudes 

than previously available. Such data were useful for aircraft design studies and 

operational analysis, especially in regard to structural loads and stability and 

control problems.12 Unfortunately, as long as the U-2 was acknowledged to be 

capable of reaching only 55,000 feet, researchers were unable to use any data 

collected at the airplane’s maximum cruising altitudes (upward of 70,000 feet).

9. Thomas L. Coleman and Jack Funk, “Preliminary Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence at 

High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” NACA 

Research Memorandum L57A11 (March 1957).

10. Thomas L. Coleman and Emilie C. Coe, “Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence for 

Altitudes Between 20,000 and 50,000 Feet Over the Western Part of the United States,” NACA 

Research Memorandum L57G02 (August 1957).

11. Ibid., p. 1.

12. Ibid.
 The NACA and the U-2

171

Initial research missions had taken place over the United States during 

training flights, and then over England and Western Europe in conjunction 

with the first operational deployments. Data collected during these operations 

included measurements covering approximately 22,000 flight miles. VGH 

measurements were obtained on 17 flights between May and September 1956. 

A typical flight profile consisted of an initial climb to 45,000 feet followed by 

a slower ascent to higher altitudes as fuel load decreased, and then descent to 

landing. Research flight opportunities were dictated entirely by operational 

priorities, and no attempt was made to schedule flights to sample turbulence 

associated with specific meteorological conditions. U-2 pilots avoided adverse 

weather, such as heavy cumulus clouds or thunderstorms, meaning that the 

VGH data represented only clear-air turbulence. “Although this sample is 

small,” Coleman wrote, “the initial results appear to be of sufficient interest to 

warrant publication.”13

The U-2 not only provided a platform for gathering badly needed 

high-altitude meteorological data, but it also gave NACA and Air Force 

researchers the opportunity to test new, lightweight instrumentation packages under operational conditions. The NACA-developed VGH recorder 

took continuous readings of airspeed, altitude, and acceleration. Another 

13. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

The U-2 was ideally suited to collecting data on high-altitude turbulence. (Lockheed Martin)
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172

instrument traced peak acceleration values and a turn-meter recorded 

pitch and yaw rates. Instrumentation provided by the Air Force Wright Air 

Development Center included a turbulence recorder, a vortex temperature 

probe, temperature and humidity sensors, and an infrared hygrometer for 

accurate measurement of dew point.14

Throughout the spring of 1957, NACA officials continued to promote 

the U-2’s research capabilities. Dryden released a statement announcing 

publication of the first research paper and claiming that the Gust-Loads 

Research Panel of the NACA’s Technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads 

had originally recommended using the high-altitude research program for 

statistical studies of turbulence. He explained that the primary goal was 

collection of data on turbulence associated with the jet stream, convective 

clouds, temperature variations at different altitudes, wind shear, and other 

weather phenomena. Such a program, he said, would not have been possible 

without substantial cooperation from the Air Weather Service, which had furnished state-of-the-art meteorological instrumentation, and the Geophysical 

Research Directorate, which would use the data for developing methods 

of forecasting meteorological phenomena important to high-altitude flight. 

Dryden also described expected future benefits to commercial air travel. 

“Research which we are gaining on a global basis,” he said, “will make it 

reasonable for tomorrow’s air traveler to expect degrees of speed, safety, and 

comfort beyond the capabilities of today’s air transport.”15

In July, Dryden and NACA Public Information Officer Walter T. Bonney 

met with CIA officials to discuss modifications to the U-2 cover story, which 

now included details of the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). This 

effort, sponsored by Strategic Air Command and the Armed Forces Special 

Weapons Project (AFSWP), involved the collection of atmospheric particulate 

samples from radioactive fallout resulting from testing of nuclear weapons. The 

modified U-2 cover story stated that operationally ready facilities of NACA 

would be used for HASP activities. “Rather than for HASP to establish their 

own facilities and organization in areas where NACA has been conducting its 

meteorological research, AFSWP has arranged for use of these facilities overseas 

to collect data as required for HASP. AWS will remain, as before, the executive 

14. CIA, “Proposed NACA Press Release,” CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390018-7 (April 24, 1957), 

declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–4.

15. Ibid., p. 2.
 The NACA and the U-2

173

agent. The pilots for the U-2 will continue to be civilians under contract with 

NACA, but will be reimbursed by AFSWP funds.”16

Bonney had previously received a memo outlining a cover story for the 

unusual appearance of U-2 aircraft that bore the Project Rainbow anti-radar 

treatments, as some of those had been deployed despite the associated aerodynamic penalties. The unclassified nickname, Thermos, was to be used in lieu 

of the classified code word, Rainbow. If queried, Bonney was to say that the 

unusual configurations were part of “a data gathering program...designed to 

measure...certain physical phenomena which could be affected by nuclear 

explosions.” The high-frequency-band radar-absorbent material was described 

as a special impregnated, plasticized coating applied directly over various 

parts of the aircraft to reduce the effects of glare, blast, and radiation damage 

from nuclear explosions. The cover story accounted for the wires associated 

with the low-frequency-band anti-radar system by describing it as a unique 

antenna system to record thermal phenomena under varying conditions at 

high altitude. The project was said to be a joint effort involving participation by the ARDC, AFSWP, and NACA. Associating the project with ARDC 

16. Chairman of the Planning Group, Memorandum for Project Director, “Planning Group Report,” 

CIA-RDP33-02415A000400040001-9 (July 15, 1957), p. 3.

For the HASP mission, the U-2 was configured with a particulate sample in the nose and other 

instruments. (U.S. Air Force)
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174

organizations at Edwards Air Force Base served to explain the presence of the 

U-2 at the Edwards North Base facility. To explain the presence of the specially 

configured U-2 aircraft at overseas detachments, the Rainbow cover story also 

asserted that the location of overseas units afforded a wide range of climatological and other desirable environmental conditions for study.17

Despite these and other misleading statements regarding the U-2’s mission 

and capabilities, the airplane continued to serve as an occasional platform 

for bona fide meteorological research. On November 14, 1957, a CIA pilot 

assigned to Detachment C, known for cover purposes as the 3rd Weather 

Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional), flew over the eye of Typhoon Kit in 

the western Pacific Ocean north of the Philippine island of Luzon. He used a 

Perkin-Elmer Model 501 tracking camera to photograph the storm, producing, for the first time, photos of a tropical cyclone from directly overhead. Lt. 

Col. Robert C. Bundgaard of the Air Weather Service publicized the results in 

a magazine article several months later.18

Breaking Cover

The U-2 cover story could not last forever and, in fact, began to erode as 

early as May 1957, when the North American Newspaper Alliance published 

a syndicated article stating that Lockheed U-2 aircraft routinely operated at 

ceilings above 65,000 feet and were being used by the U.S. Air Force to map 

large areas of Earth’s surface for use in guided-missile warfare. This was the first 

reasonably accurate description of the airplane’s capabilities published by the 

news media. The article’s unnamed writer also claimed that the “Air Force is 

reliably reported to be using the Lockheed U-2 in West Germany to monitor 

the stratosphere for evidence of Soviet nuclear tests, and presumably in the 

cartography project.”19 By the end of the month, the London Daily Express

had reported, “Lockheed U-2 high-altitude aircraft of the U.S. Air Force have 

been flying at 65,000 feet, out of reach of Soviet interceptors, mapping large 

areas behind the Iron Curtain with revolutionary new aerial cameras. They are 

making mathematically precise maps essential to bombardment with missile 

17. Memorandum describing Project Rainbow cover story, Walter Bonney files, NASA Headquarters 

Historical Reference Collection, June 21, 1957.

18. Robert C. Bundgaard, “The First Flyover of a Tropical Cyclone,” Weatherwise 11, no. 3 (June 

1958): pp. 79–83.

19. North American Newspaper Alliance, “U.S. Mapping World for Missile War,” May 19, 1957, NASA 

Headquarters historical reference collection.
 The NACA and the U-2

175

weapons.” Despite this exposure, U.S. officials stubbornly refused to admit any 

connection between the U-2 and airborne reconnaissance.20

At CIA Headquarters, Aquatone administrative officer James Cunningham 

reacted strongly to suggestions that more information be made public regarding the airplane’s altitude capabilities. “I am inclined to believe,” he wrote in 

one memo, “that while having considerable value in theory, a move of this 

sort...would ultimately involve us in a series of inquiries which would be difficult to handle without giving away the fact that our capability was in excess 

of the announced record altitude figure.” He noted with some alarm that 

Kelly Johnson had apparently told NACA officials at the Lewis Propulsion 

Laboratory in Cleveland that the U-2 was capable of reaching 70,000 feet. 

Cunningham further noted that releasing an altitude figure greater than previously admitted but less than the actual capability could lead to some embarrassment and might still not have the desired effect. Intelligence sources had 

suggested that the Soviet air defense radar was capable of tracking the U-2 with 

sufficient accuracy that the new cover altitude would fail to deceive “the only 

opposition activity that we are basically attempting to defraud.”21

20. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.

21. James A. Cunningham, Memorandum for Project Director, “Proposed Cover Modifications,” 

SAPC-18216, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390016-9 (August 6, 1957), declassified and 

released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–2.

Some U-2s deployed to Atsugi, Japan, bore NACA markings and others Air Force weather 

squadron insignia. The airplanes carried special weather research instrumentation during 

training flights. (Lockheed Martin)
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176

Another matter under consideration was whether to make available to 

researchers any data collected at altitudes above 55,000 feet. Richard Bissell sent 

a memorandum to the Aquatone Project Cover Officer stating that he could 

not agree to the “declassification or general dissemination of data obtained at 

altitudes from 55,000 to 70,000 feet or to the granting of Aquatone clearances 

to a wider circle of individuals who might be interested in having access to this 

data.” He suggested instead downgrading the data from Top Secret to Secret 

and making the information available to a limited number of contractors 

who might make good use of it, providing that “a suitable explanation can be 

devised of the way in which the data was collected which will attribute it to 

some source or sources other than the U-2.” As an example, Bissell suggested a 

story in which a variety of NACA research aircraft were instrumented to collect 

turbulence data. This new story would make it clear that such data resulted 

from aircraft flights rather than from balloons or rockets; but stating that a 

number of different aircraft were involved “would tend to divert attention away 

from speculation concerning what particular aircraft was used.”22

Propaganda and stories of the deception surrounding the U-2 operation 

tend to overshadow the very real scientific and technical accomplishments of 

22. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Project Cover Officer, “Release of NACA Top Secret 

Research Data to Select Contractors,” SAPC-25666, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390014-1 

(March 25, 1958), declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–2.

Two images of Super Typhoon Ida taken from a U-2 near Taiwan in July 1958. (National 

Hurricane Center)
 The NACA and the U-2

177

the program. While officials in Washington debated how much information to 

release, U-2 pilots flying out of Atsugi, Japan, took advantage of opportunities 

to collect weather data and photos unlike any previously taken. In July 1958, 

several flights were made over Super Typhoon Winnie off the coast of Taiwan 

(then known as Formosa). Winnie’s powerful winds exceeded 175 mph, causing severe damage to the western end of the island. From a perch high above 

the raging storm, a U-2 pilot took pictures as Winnie tore across the Taiwan 

Strait and struck the southeastern coast of mainland China. A few months later, 

while awaiting clear weather in which to conduct tactical reconnaissance coverage of Chinese troop movements and naval operations, additional missions 

were flown over Super Typhoons Ida and Helen. Photographs of spectacular 

cloud structures and the aircraft’s capacity to look straight down into the eye 

of each storm bolstered the weather reconnaissance cover story while providing 

a credible reason for the presence of the U-2 in the region.23

23. David Reade, “U-2 Spyplanes: What You Didn’t Know About Them!,” http://www.roadrunnersinternationale.com/u-2/u-2_science_3.html, accessed April 4, 2013.
178

Francis G. “Frank” Powers, right, discusses U-2 performance with Kelly Johnson. (Lockheed Martin)
179

NASA and the U-2 

After the NACA became the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

in October 1958, the Agency continued to maintain the U-2 cover story. A 

NASA press release issued in June 1959 reaffirmed that the airplane was being 

used for weather research missions. In order to provide an explanation for 

U-2 operations in Turkey, which happened to be a CIA staging area for overflights of the Soviet Union, NASA published Memorandum No. 4-17-59L, 

“Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 

20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas,” by Thomas Coleman 

and May T. Meadows. This report built upon the two previous NACA reports, 

adding data collected during missions flown from Japan and Turkey.1

 The fact 

that U-2 missions had produced very real weather data fooled no one as to 

the airplane’s true mission. George Carroll, aviation editor of the New York 

Journal-American, wrote in the November 1959 issue that the U-2 was being 

used for reconnaissance over Russia, and the following month an article in 

Soviet Aviation discussed U.S. strategic reconnaissance with the U-2 and gave 

some design details of the aircraft. But the worst was yet to come, as the cover 

story was soon to be irrevocably blown in one of the most infamous incidents 

of the Cold War.2

Secrets Exposed

In the spring of 1960, the CIA detachment at Incirlik, Turkey, attempted 

the most ambitious U-2 mission yet. Article 360 was deployed to Peshawar, 

Pakistan, to begin a nonstop flight over Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush, Aral 

Sea, Baikonur Cosmodrome (the primary Soviet space launch complex), 

Chelyabinsk, Sverdlosvk, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk, 

1. Thomas L. Coleman and May T. Meadows, “Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence 

for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas,” NASA Memorandum 

4-17-59L (June 1959).

2. Merlin, “U-2 Cover Story Timeline.” 

CHAPTER 8
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180

and eventually land in Bodø, Norway. With a planned duration of approximately 9 hours, the flightpath would cover some 3,800 miles, a true test of 

the airplane’s range. Logistical and technical difficulties aside, there was also 

significant risk involved because more than three quarters of the route was 

over the Soviet Union.3

Frank Powers flew the mission on Sunday, May 1, 1960. At first, all went as 

planned, but while making a turn southeast of Sverdlovsk, there was a bright flash 

and a dull thump, and the airplane lurched forward. Powers instinctively grabbed 

for the throttle and scanned his instruments. The engine was functioning normally and the ailerons seemed effective, but the nose began to drop precipitously. 

Aerodynamic loads increased until the wings snapped and the airplane began 

to tumble wildly, shedding parts. The pilot’s suit inflated as the airplane’s cabin 

depressurized, and Powers activated his emergency oxygen supply. The cockpit 

was now pointed upward and spinning. Centrifugal force made ejection nearly 

impossible because Powers could not completely retract his legs into escape position. Instead, he jettisoned the canopy manually and bailed out.4

When the U-2 failed to arrive at Bodø as expected, the recovery crew began 

to worry. After waiting 5 hours, they finally called CIA Headquarters to report 

that Powers was missing. It was assumed that the U-2 had crashed or been 

shot down over Russia, and by Monday morning, officials were scrambling to 

modify the cover story. The details were revised to make a convincing claim 

that a NASA weather reconnaissance mission had strayed off course after the 

pilot reported having difficulties with his oxygen system somewhere in the 

vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey. Officials backstopped the story by providing a 

flight plan for release to the media and by deploying search aircraft to the Lake 

Van area. Representatives of the CIA and Department of State also discussed 

preparing a question-and-answer brief, principally for use by NASA in the 

event of Soviet disclosure, but designed to be circulated to all affected parties. 

This consisted of answers to hypothetical questions that might be asked by 

the press regarding the airplane and the NASA upper atmosphere research 

program, and it also provided details supporting the cover story mission for 

Powers’s flight.5 By Wednesday, the Soviets had yet to make any announcement 

acknowledging the incident.

3. Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight, pp. 73–74.

4. Ibid., pp. 82–84.

5. Memo from Acting Deputy Director of Plans, “Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 

Incident,” CIA-RDP33-02415A000300300007-7 (August 10, 1960), declassified and released 

by the CIA August 21, 2000, pp. 1–5.
 NASA and the U-2

181

The following day, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that an 

unmarked American aircraft had crossed into Russian airspace and had been 

shot down. He gave no further details and did not mention the fate of the 

pilot. Afterward, CIA and State Department officials met and decided that 

President Eisenhower should not be personally involved and that the State 

Department would handle all publicity regarding the incident. White House 

Press Secretary James C. Hagerty had already drafted a release stating that 

Eisenhower had ordered an investigation of the entire matter, and he suggested 

to Walter Bonney that NASA hold a press conference as soon as possible. 

Unfortunately, notification that press relations were to be handled entirely 

by the State Department did not reach NASA in time to prevent the press 

conference from taking place. Bonney reiterated the cover story and included 

a brief description of the flight plan, the pilot’s alleged oxygen problems, and 

the search for the missing plane. He also said that the remaining U-2 aircraft 

had been grounded for equipment checks, which subsequently resulted in 

emergency messages being sent to all U-2 detachments to stand down until 

further notice. In response to reporters’ queries, Bonney—apparently unaware 

that Powers was flying an unmarked plane—described the aircraft’s NASA 

markings in great detail. With the airplane accounted for, the dummy air 

search was called off.6

As a result of arrangements made by the CIA with Lockheed to meet insistent press demands for detailed information on the plane and to further support the innocuous uses of the airplane, a U-2 assigned to the CIA was painted 

with a fictitious serial number and NASA markings and shown to news media 

representatives at the NASA Flight Research Center at Edwards on May 6. That 

same day, the State Department held two radio and press briefings. In one, 

State Department spokesman Lincoln White stated that there was “absolutely 

no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace, and there never has been.”7

This seems to be precisely what Khrushchev had been waiting for. In a 

speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 7, he announced that the American 

pilot had been captured and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet 

Union. He also produced identifiable parts of the U-2 and the pilot’s equipment, clearly exposing the true nature of Powers’s mission. As CIA Director 

Allen Dulles later testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the cover 

6. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

7. Ibid., p. 4.
Unlimited Horizons

182

story had been masterfully outflanked.8 Under the circumstances, President 

Eisenhower decided to suspend U-2 fights over the Soviet Union indefinitely.

At a meeting of senior CIA, NASA, and State Department officials later 

that month, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan said that NASA “would 

be well advised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible.”9

Dulles, however, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

lauded the scientific value of the weather data collected with the airplane and 

justified NASA’s interest. “NASA was very much concerned with the scientific 

advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes.” He asserted 

that the aircraft had “undertaken many weather and related missions and their 

functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has 

been distributed freely to the world.”10

NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden testified in executive session 

before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the NASA relationship to the U-2 program. “In this program which began in 1956, there have 

been 200 weather flights of U-2 aircraft with NASA and Air Weather Service 

8. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, “Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee,” May 31, 1960, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000009190.pdf, accessed April 21, 2013, p. 18.

9. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, note 39, p. 182.

10. Dulles, “Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” p. 16.

One of the CIA U-2s from Detachment G, painted in fictitious NASA markings, was displayed to 

the press to bolster the cover story. (NASA)
 NASA and the U-2

183

instrumentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles,” he said. 

Dryden admitted knowledge of classified intelligence operations involving the 

U-2, but he said that the NACA (and later NASA) saw an opportunity to take 

advantage of technical capabilities that were not otherwise available to the 

agency.11 As might be expected, NASA subsequently received harsh criticism 

for its role in the U-2 affair. Robert Hotz, a senior editor of Aviation Week & 

Space Technology magazine, wrote that NASA researchers had “their hard-won 

reputation for scientific integrity shredded overnight by exposure of their role 

as unwitting dupes of the Central Intelligence Agency.” He further asserted 

that the “damage to NASA’s scientific integrity may count for little in the calloused calculations of CIA supersleuths, but it will do irreparable harm in the 

international scientific community....”12

11. Jeremiah A. O’Leary, “NASA Issued U-2 Cover Story on CIA Advice,” Washington Star, June 1, 

1960, p. 1.

12. Robert Hotz, “Lockheed U-2 Over Sverdlovsk: A Study in Fabrication,” reprinted in Congressional 

Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 86th Congress, Second Session, vol. 106, Part 9 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1960), p. 11,976.

In this humorous cartoon, NASA graphic artist Jerry Lyons brilliantly captured the awkwardness 

of the U-2 cover story’s exposure. (NASA)
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184

Such dire predictions proved unfounded, however, as NASA suffered no 

long-term consequences from the incident. Administrator Glennan and the 

Agency as a whole were spared intimate involvement in the U-2 affair by 

Dryden’s assumption of full responsibility for his role in originating the cover 

story. Nor did the Powers debacle end the Agency’s association with the U-2. 

In 1968 and 1969, U-2 aircraft were tasked with photographing portions of 

the Western United States for comparison with pictures taken by the Apollo 

astronauts, and eventually NASA would have its own small fleet of U-2 airplanes to conduct dedicated research missions.13

A U-2 for NASA

By the late 1960s, Government officials were looking at ways to transfer U-2 

technology to civil applications. Thus far, both CIA and Air Force U-2 airplanes 

had supported civilian agencies only occasionally, when schedules permitted. 

The CIA did sometimes provide a limited amount of classified overhead photography to other Government agencies, and in 1968 Arthur C. Lundahl, 

director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, recommended 

creating a new center to provide declassified imagery for emergency management purposes.14 This idea gained further traction as it became apparent that 

the U-2R attrition rate was less than had been predicted. A number of older 

U-2C and U-2G models retained in storage for use as replacements were now 

considered surplus.15

In early 1970, two study groups chaired by Dr. F. Robert Naka, deputy 

director of the National Reconnaissance Office, reviewed requirements and 

utilization of the U-2R. These studies concluded that the existing fleet of 12 

U-2R airframes was sufficient to meet both NRO and Air Force requirements. 

There were at that time a total of eight U-2C/G airframes in both flyable and 

nonflyable storage conditions. The annual cost for storing these aircraft was 

relatively low, but the analysts recognized that the Government had made a 

substantial investment with regard to acquisition of the early model U-2 aircraft, along with ground support equipment, spare parts, and miscellaneous 

hardware. Estimates from the maintenance depot indicated that there were 

13. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 254.

14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 370.

15. Bernard L. Bailey, draft memo to NASA from John L. McLucas, Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office, “Subject: U-2C/G Aircraft,” May 16, 1970, http://www.nro.gov/foia/

declass/NROStaffRecords/1055.pdf, accessed April 2, 2013.
 NASA and the U-2

185

ample stocks on hand to support the entire U-2C/G fleet for between 6 and 9 

months without any additional purchases. At least one study indicated a potential requirement for two of the aircraft to be used for transitional training and 

test purposes in support of the U-2R fleet. Otherwise, they determined that 

there were no known NRO, CIA, or Air Force requirements with sufficiently 

high priority to warrant reactivating the stored aircraft in the near future. Based 

on the aircraft’s unique capabilities, possibility of future utilization, low annual 

upkeep support costs, and the substantial investment in depot stocks, the study 

groups recommended exploring the possibility of transferring the airplanes and 

associated materiel “to another agency such as NASA.”16

On March 16, 1970, Col. Bernard Bailey, director of operations for 

NRO aerial reconnaissance programs, drafted a memo to be sent to NASA 

Headquarters by NRO Director John L. McLucas. The memo outlined the 

status of the U-2C/G fleet and suggested that by virtue of the airplane’s unique 

altitude, airspeed, and loiter capabilities, the U-2 might serve as a valuable collection platform for the NASA Earth Resources program.17 NASA officials were 

eager to take advantage of the offer, and they drafted a plan to take responsibility for two of the aircraft. Carl Duckett, CIA deputy director for science and 

technology, reviewed the plan and found that it lacked a proper appreciation 

for how complicated it could be to conduct U-2 flight operations. He subsequently approached Marty Knutson, a 15-year veteran of the agency’s U-2 

program who had accumulated 4,000 hours of flight time, to request that he 

lend his expertise to the NASA project. Knutson had been planning to retire, 

but he was soon persuaded to sign on as project manager. He helped NASA 

officials redraft their plan and made arrangements for Lockheed to overhaul 

two U-2G models. Additionally, Lockheed was contracted to provide pilots and 

field maintenance, including physiological support. Kelly Johnson immediately hired three of Knutson’s former colleagues, Jim Barnes, Bob Ericson, and 

Ivor “Chunky” Webster. Frank Powers also applied, but he was turned down 

due to his notoriety from the U-2 incident in 1960. Senior NASA officials 

wished to downplay the U-2’s reputation as a spy plane as much as possible.18

The two airplanes, articles 348 and 349, were moved from storage at 

Edwards to Lockheed’s Palmdale facility. There, technicians removed the 

special carrier landing modifications peculiar to the U-2G along with other 

16. Frank W. Hartley, Jr., draft of memo to John L. McLucas, Director, National Reconnaissance 

Office, “Subject: U-2C/G Storage Costs,” February 26, 1970, http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/

NROStaffRecords/1056.pdf, accessed April 2, 2013.

17. Bailey, draft memo to NASA from John L. McLucas.

18. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 370.
Unlimited Horizons

186

unnecessary items, reducing the airplane’s empty weight to 13,800 pounds. 

Now reconfigured as U-2C models, the Air Force serial numbers on the tails 

were replaced with civil registrations. Webster flew functional checkout flights 

on each airframe and then delivered them to Ames Research Center at Moffett 

Field, CA, in early June 1971. By midsummer, they were ready for operational 

missions and, following a number of familiarization sorties, the first data flight 

occurred on August 31.19

 By 1978, the two airplanes were flying an average of 100 sorties annually 

and had logged more than 4,000 flight hours. Although based at Ames, they 

routinely flew Earth Resources missions from NASA’s facility at Wallops Island, 

VA, as well as being deployed to Hawaii, Alaska, Texas, Maine, South Dakota, 

and Panama. The versatile U-2 provided a wide range of capabilities including 

resource studies, disaster assessment, land-use surveys, sensor development, 

stratospheric sampling, and satellite support. For example, during drought 

years, the California Department of Water Resources used photos taken from 

the U-2 to measure water levels in rivers and reservoirs. Similarly, high-altitude 

19. Ibid.

Marty Knutson spearheaded the effort to acquire two U-2 airplanes for use as NASA research 

platforms. (NASA) 
 NASA and the U-2

187

aerial imagery of the San Francisco Bay aided the U.S. Geological Survey in a 

study of tidal patterns and water movement. Firefighters used infrared imagery 

for faster containment of wildfires, more efficient use of personnel and equipment, and protecting forest watersheds and wildlife habitat. Survey pictures of 

areas affected by floods and earthquakes were useful in assessing damage and 

assigning repair priorities. In another experiment, researchers used U-2 imagery 

to develop a land-use-management database for both the public and private 

sectors. Such data have been valuable for evaluating urban growth, traffic patterns, and pollution, as well as in preparing environmental impact statements. 

Sensors on board the U-2 were used to measure the distribution of gases and 

aerosol particles at altitudes up to 65,000 feet to develop a better understanding 

of the effects of natural and humanmade actions on the atmosphere’s protective ozone layer. Additionally, comparison of U-2 imagery to that taken with 

NASA’s Landsat satellites supported investigations in forestry, water management, coastal-zone processes, rangeland management, and land use.20

Sensor Platform

NASA researchers routinely used the U-2 to carry a variety of sensors, including aerial mapping cameras, electronic scanners, and atmospheric sampling 

20. NASA Ames Research Center staff, High Altitude Perspective (Washington, DC: NASA SP-427), 

1978, pp. 2–3.

A U-2C during deployment to Wallops Island, VA. (NASA)
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devices. Taking advantage of the airplane’s original design characteristics, the 

NASA U-2 aircraft were also used extensively to carry out photographic missions. There were several different camera configurations, affording researchers 

the opportunity to employ a variety of focal lengths, film types and formats, 

and multispectral capabilities. Additionally, the U-2 could carry a range of nonphotographic sensors. Most equipment was palletized to allow technicians to 

easily switch payloads in or out of the aircraft or from one aircraft to the other.21

During the 1970s, NASA maintained an inventory of cameras at Ames 

that had been used extensively in Earth observation studies. Much of this 

equipment had been used in support of satellite missions such as Landsat, 

which eventually became the longest-running enterprise for the acquisition 

of space-based Earth imagery. Ground coverage and resolution are functions 

of lens focal length and film format. Higher-resolution imagery was obtained 

using large-format (9- by 9-inch or 9- by 18-inch) film and 6-inch, 12-inch, 

24-inch, or 36-inch focal-length lenses. A single frame taken from an altitude 

of 63,000 feet with a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 camera using a 12-inch focal 

length lens covered 80 square miles at resolutions ranging from 59 to 157 

inches. The highest resolution was provided by the Research Camera System, 

21. Ibid., p. 7.

The U-2C was capable of carrying a variety of research instruments and cameras. (NASA)
 NASA and the U-2

189

which was equipped with a 24-inch, 3.5 focal ratio lens capable of resolving 

objects significantly less than 40 inches across. Depending on the intended use 

of the resulting imagery, the cameras were equipped with standard or infrared color or black-and-white film. Infrared imagery highlights details that are 

beyond the range of human vision and effectively penetrates atmospheric haze 

by filtering out blue light. Color infrared film is sensitive to the green, red, 

and near-infrared portions of the spectrum, which makes it particularly useful 

for aerial and space photographic surveys for land-use and vegetation studies. 

Researchers used infrared images to distinguish between healthy vegetation 

and that which was diseased or stressed.22

Nonphotographic sensors were typically supplied and funded by outside 

researchers and organizations. All such equipment was installed in specific 

areas of the airplane subject to load factors, safety standards, and technical 

constraints (size, weight, materials, power requirements, etc.). Most of these 

sensors fit within several categories. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center 

in Greenbelt, MD, and the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley 

Laboratory (LBL) sponsored astronomy and astrophysics research with the 

U-2. LBL physicists supplied two microwave radiometers for mapping the 

temperature of deep space and examining fundamental questions about the 

origin of the universe. Investigators at Goddard installed an instrument 

for measuring solar spectral radiance and its variation with the solar cycle. 

Scientists at Goddard and Ames used the U-2 as a workhorse for Earth 

observation studies and to evaluate instrumentation that would later be used 

on spacecraft. The Heat Capacity Mapping Radiometer was used to evaluate 

thermal pollution, wetlands environments, and soil moisture. An instrument 

called the Ocean Color Scanner, forerunner of the Nimbus satellite’s Coastal 

Zone Color Scanner, was a multispectral imager for detecting subtle variations in upwelling spectral radiance of seawater.23

A multispectral scanner made available through a cooperative agreement 

between NASA and the Environmental Protection Agency gave scientists an 

11-channel digital system with 10 channels in the visible to near-visible spectral 

region and 1 in the thermal infrared. This device was primarily used in support 

of Landsat investigations. Ames also supplied a thermal infrared roll-stabilized 

line-scanner video system and a line-scan camera visible-imaging system that 

provided real-time imagery to a ground receiving station via telemetry link 

for use in disaster response. Finally, the U-2 served as a platform for conducting stratospheric and atmospheric studies with a variety of sensors. The Ames 

22. Ibid., pp. 9–16.

23. Ibid., pp. 17–20.
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Stratospheric Air Sampler used chemiluminescent reactions to measure seasonal 

variations in atmospheric gases. Another instrument contained four cryogenically cooled samplers plus two whole-air samplers for measuring ozone-depleting compounds such as halocarbons, nitrous oxide, and carbon tetrachloride. 

Other methods for measuring atmospheric pollutants included use of an infrared scanning spectrometer and a high-speed interferometer. Samples of halogen 

compounds and aerosols were also collected using a variety of filters exposed 

to the airstream by pilot command. Scientists from the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) analyzed data collected with a radiometer in order to determine the total amount of atmospheric water vapor above 

the U-2 at cruise altitude. A downward-looking infrared radiometer measured 

By 1978, the two NASA U-2s were flying an average of 100 missions annually and had 

logged more than 4,000 flight hours. (NASA)
 NASA and the U-2

191

atmospheric non-uniformities in order to better understand convective instabilities and atmospheric mixing processes.24

One NASA research effort with the U-2C involved acquiring small-scale, 

low-resolution, multispectral photography over selected representative ecosystems to simulate the Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) data system then being 

developed for the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS, later named 

Landsat 1). Instrumentation technicians installed four 70-millimeter framing 

cameras in the airplane’s Q-bay to take simultaneous images of the same target 

area on the ground. Three cameras were equipped with 1.75-inch-focal-length 

lenses and black-and-white emulsion film, spectrally filtered to image the green, 

red, and near-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The fourth 

camera carried color infrared film. Researchers selected five target areas: Feather 

River Basin in Northern California was chosen as representative of western U.S. 

forests, mountainous, and agricultural areas; the San Francisco Bay region and 

Los Angeles Basin as representative of urbanized areas; Phoenix and Tucson in 

southern Arizona as characteristic of arid regions; and the Chesapeake Bay region, 

representing wetland ecosystems. Survey missions were flown over each target 

region every 18 days to simulate the ERTS’s planned orbit cycle. In early 1972, 

the research team added a single 24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch Type A-1 

film camera, along with an accompanying trimetragon array of 6-inch-focallength cameras. A multispectral scanner built at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 

Center was also integrated into the aircraft, providing complete ERTS sensor 

simulation capability. Concurrent integration of a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 film 

camera into the satellite simulation package resulted in a five-instrument system 

that saw extensive use on later research flights.25

In the summer of 1972, scientists at NASA and the United States Geological 

Survey (USGS) initiated a cooperative program with the state of Arizona to 

produce improved mapping imagery for developing a land-use-management 

database. The primary goal of the Arizona Land Use Experiment was the 

acquisition of cloud-free black-and-white panchromatic metric photography 

in addition to the standard ERTS simulation multispectral photography. The 

USGS used this imagery to produce 7.5-minute, 1:24,000-scale orthophoto 

quadrangle sheets. Unlike standard topographic maps that represent terrain elevation with contour lines and depict humanmade features with simple graphics, the orthophoto maps show land features using either black-and-white or 

color-enhanced photographic images that have been processed to show details 

24. Ibid., pp. 17–20.

25. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History,” http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/

AirSci/ER-2/history.html, accessed July 8, 2013.
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in their true positions. Such imagery depicts terrain and cultural features in a 

more true-to-life manner than conventional line maps. This was the first demonstration of the use of high-altitude aircraft data for quadrangle map production over large areas. With the launch of ERTS-1 on July 23, 1972, investigators 

began requesting that the U-2 overfly specific target sites, often simultaneously 

with the satellite overpass. Most of these flights carried a Vinten/RC-10 system 

This infrared image shows flood damage following a break in the California Aqueduct on October 

12, 1971. The rupture released 100 million gallons of water, damaging roads, farm fields, and 

widely scattered homes west of the city of Lancaster. (NASA)
 NASA and the U-2

193

that provided small-scale satellite simulation data along with larger-scale, largerformat data. Throughout the remainder of the year, NASA expanded the scope of 

the U-2 project. Flights over the eastern and western regions of the United States 

were flown in support of crew training for the Skylab space station. Resulting 

imagery was used in the Skylab simulator in Houston. Additionally, the U-2 was 

flown for disaster-assessment missions, with data-collection flights over areas 

damaged by hurricane and wildfire.26

In early 1973, researchers equipped the U-2 with a trimetragon array of 

24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch film format cameras called the A-3 configuration. Mounted vertically, the A-3 provided a multi-emulsion, multispectral photographic capability. This system was employed over Roseville, CA, 

following a munitions train explosion in a railroad classification yard, as well 

as over a number of wilderness fires in support of firefighting efforts by the 

California Department of Forestry. Later that year, researchers embarked on 

the first systematic development of a global stratospheric model. In the summer 

of 1974, NASA deployed a U-2 equipped with two specialized instruments, 

the Stratospheric Air Sampler and the Aerosol Particulate Sampler, to Eielson 

Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, AK. From there, six flights were made over 

the northern polar region to collect air samples and to acquire high-altitude 

26. Ibid.

Infrared image of San Diego taken from an altitude of 65,000 feet. (NASA)
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photographic data over a number of Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems in support of ERTS investigations. Additional stratospheric sampling missions took 

place near equatorial latitudes with a deployment to Hickam Air Force Base, 

HI, in October. These two deployments, along with local sampling flights over 

California, provided scientists with the first comprehensive sampling of stratospheric constituents in the northern hemisphere and aided in the development 

of latitudinal distribution models of the upper atmosphere. In late 1974, NASA 

acquired additional instrumentation for the U-2. This included an Itek Optical 

Bar Camera, a 120-degree-field-of-view, 24-inch-focal-length panoramic camera 

similar to the Lunar Mapper instrument carried aboard the Apollo spacecraft; a 

thermal scanner developed by HRB-Singer; and Goddard Space Flight Center’s 

Heat Capacity Mapper. The following year, further stratospheric air-sampling 

deployments were conducted from Eielson and Hickam and from Wallops 

Island, VA. Sampling missions were expanded in 1976 to include deployments 

to Howard Air Force Base, Panama, and Loring Air Force Base, ME, further 

widening the database.27

Sensor development continued in 1977 with integration of the Aether 

Drift astrophysics experiment. The instrument package consisted of a pair of 

27. Ibid.

Exclusive homes in the Hollywood Hills as seen from 12 miles above the ground. Some California 

citizens saw U-2 imagery as an invasion of privacy. (NASA)
 NASA and the U-2

195

upward-looking microwave antennae and associated processing and recording 

systems that were carried to altitudes well above terrestrial sources of radiation. 

During numerous missions flown over the span of 2 years, scientists observed 

background radiation differentials from the two antennae in order to validate 

or reject a catastrophic evolutionary (Big Bang) theory of the formation of the 

universe. The project entailed multiple deployments over several years, including 

flights from Lima, Peru, to collect data in the southern hemisphere.28

In 1978, the NASA U-2 aircraft took part in the Alaska High-Altitude 

Photography Program. Faced with responsibility for the administration, mapping, surveying, and conveyance of Federal lands to the state and to native 

corporations, a consortium of Federal and state agencies requested NASA’s 

assistance in acquiring both black-and-white and color infrared imagery of the 

entire state of Alaska. This program spanned 8 years and resulted in 95-percent 

coverage of the state’s total area. Most impressive was the fact that the imagery 

was accomplished with less than 10-percent cloud cover. Technicians at Ames 

integrated the Daedalus Multispectral Scanner onto one of the aircraft in 1979, 

providing the U-2 for the first time with a digitally recorded multispectral instrument. Stratospheric sampling continued in 1979 and 1980 from Ames, Alaska, 

and Panama, along with continued efforts in support of Landsat. Additionally, 

the NASA U-2 was used to collect photographic data for the National Wetlands 

Inventory. This covered the Prairie Potholes region within portions of Minnesota, 

Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana, an important breeding habitat for migratory birds and other wildlife.29 All imagery collected by the NASA 

U-2 was available for public inspection at Ames via a computerized data retrieval 

system, and anyone could purchase high-resolution prints of any frame through 

the USGS in Sioux Falls, SD. Not everyone was happy about this development. 

Images commissioned by the Coastal Conservation Commission for a wetlands 

survey also revealed unlicensed construction in the coastal zone. Citizens of the 

town of Bolinas, north of San Francisco, saw the U-2 imagery as an invasion of 

privacy. “I do have this gut reaction to this eye in the sky able to look at all the 

little things in people’s backyards,” said one local attorney.30

By this point, NASA had been flying the U-2C for nearly a decade and 

would continue to do so until the late 1980s. But as soon as Lockheed received 

a contract to restart U-2 production, NASA officials were quick to order one 

of the new models.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 373.
196

An ER-2 and U-2C fly over San Francisco Bay and the Golden Gate Bridge. (NASA)
197

ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons 

NASA’s high-altitude capabilities expanded after Marty Knutson delivered 

the first ER-2 to Ames Research Center, on June 10, 1981. While technicians 

readied the new airplane to join the science fleet, the older models remained 

engaged in important work. For example, the U-2C was employed in a multiyear cooperative effort among NASA, the U.S. Forest Service, and several 

eastern seaboard states to detect and monitor Gypsy Moth caterpillar infestations in the northeast region of the country and assess the effectiveness of 

insecticide-spraying programs. Researchers used high-resolution color infrared 

photography to evaluate the severity of infestation from New York to North 

Carolina on an annual basis. Data had to be acquired within a narrow biological window dictated by latitude, elevation, and annual weather conditions in 

order to successfully discriminate the severity of defoliation attributable to the 

Gypsy Moth.1

NASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft also took part in a variety of missions in support of Department of Defense projects, most notably Teal Ruby, a satellite 

designed to detect and track aircraft from space by measuring their infrared signatures. The greatest challenge was separating these signatures from the normal 

background signal. In order to build a database of background measurements, 

the ER-2 was equipped with a multiwavelength infrared sensor similar to that 

to be carried by the spacecraft. Throughout the yearlong Highly Calibrated 

Airborne Measurements Program (Hi-CAMP), researchers used the special 

instrument to collect precise measurements of infrared background clutter 

caused by atmospheric, terrestrial, and oceanic phenomena. During a series 

of highly coordinated missions over the Western United States and Europe, 

they also tested the Hi-CAMP sensor’s capabilities for tracking aircraft ranging in size from a T-38 trainer to a C-15 cargo transport.2

 The results assisted 

engineers in developing data-processing algorithms and provided useful information for future programs. Unfortunately, following a string of management 

problems, cost overruns, and delays, the planned launch of the Teal Ruby 

1. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”

2. Ibid., pp. 374–375.

CHAPTER 9
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198

satellite was postponed and eventually canceled altogether. In the absence of 

Teal Ruby, the Hi-CAMP database became the single most comprehensive 

source of infrared air-vehicle detection data for designing and testing detection algorithms, selecting spectral passbands, and sizing air or missile defense 

systems that operate within the relevant spectral regions.3

A Hi-CAMP deployment to Alconbury, England, in 1985 was followed 

in early 1987 with a deployment to Darwin, Australia, for the StratosphereTroposphere Exchange Project (STEP), a continuation of earlier atmospheric 

sampling efforts using the U-2C. NASA and NOAA jointly funded STEP to 

obtain more data on the mechanisms and rate of transfer of particles, trace 

gases, and aerosols from the troposphere into the stratosphere. That same year, 

scientists from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA, oversaw 

engineering and integration test flights of the Airborne Visible and Infrared 

Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS). The ER-2 served as a convenient and costeffective platform for testing the instrument, a 224-band multispectral scanner 

designed primarily for use on satellites.4

With its unique capabilities, the ER-2 was ideally suited to play an important role in Earth Science research focused on the study of ozone depletion 

over Antarctica and the Arctic. In late summer 1987, the aircraft was deployed 

to South America for subpolar stratospheric sampling over the Antarctic continent while operating from Punta Arenas, Chile. The most significant data 

collected during these missions confirmed the existence of an “ozone hole” over 

the southern polar region and provided information suggesting that humanmade chemical compounds, specifically chlorofluorocarbons, were primarily 

responsible for ozone depletion over the Antarctic region. The data also repudiated long-held theoretical polar symmetry models of the upper atmosphere. 

Researchers moved their efforts to the opposite side of the globe in January 

1989, when the ER-2 was deployed to Stavanger, Norway, in support of the 

Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition. This stratospheric sampling program 

included multiple flights over northern Europe.5

Researchers at Ames also employed the ER-2 in a continuing NASA effort 

to leverage high-altitude, long-range, and sensor capabilities for fighting wildfires. In 1988, wilderness fires devastated much of Yellowstone National Park 

as several different blazes merged into a single conflagration that became the 

3. Richard H. Van Atta, Sidney G. Reed, and Seymour J. Deitchman, “IR Surveillance: Teal Ruby/

Hi-CAMP,” DARPA Technical Accomplishments Vol. II: An Historical Review of Selected DARPA 

Projects, chapter 9, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991, pp. 1–7.

4. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”

5. Ibid.
 ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons

199

largest wildfire in U.S. history. In a groundbreaking moment in fire-management strategy, Chief Naturalist George Robinson requested that NASA provide 

high-altitude imagery of the region. In response, NASA tasked Landsat-4 to 

collect images from orbit while additional types of aerial surveillance were 

accomplished from high and medium altitudes using the ER-2 and C-130B 

aircraft. Both aircraft were equipped with infrared sensors capable of penetrating smoke and haze to assist in delineating and mapping the multiple fire 

complexes. Operating from Moffett Field, the aircraft flew multiple missions 

over the greater Yellowstone area, relaying thermal and near-infrared imagery 

data in real time to a ground receiving station in West Yellowstone, WY.6

Resulting data provided firefighters with their first comprehensive view of the 

multiple fire fronts and their interrelationships. Detailed information about 

the fire’s location, size, rate of spread, and intensity allowed incident commanders to battle the blaze while simultaneously protecting firefighters on the 

ground from what had proved to be an aggressive and unpredictable fire. This 

effort served as the blueprint for future programs such as the Western States 

Fire Missions in 2006 and 2007, which employed NASA’s Altair and Ikhana 

remotely piloted aircraft.

As the ER-2 received an expanded role on such vital missions, the two U-2C 

models were rapidly approaching the end of their 30-year flying careers. The 

first NASA U-2C was retired at Moffett Field in mid-1987 after logging 10,000 

6. Ibid.

The ER-2 can accommodate payloads in nose and fuselage compartments as well as within 

wing and centerline pods. (NASA)
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200

hours of service. It was immediately replaced with a former TR-1A, on loan 

from the Air Force and temporarily converted to an ER-2. The second NASA 

U-2C—that last of the original U-2 models still flying—was retired in the 

spring of 1989, but not until Lockheed secured permission to attempt two last 

recordbreaking flights. Jerry Hoyt took off from Edwards on April 17, 1989, 

with only 395 gallons of fuel on board. Reaching 9,842 feet in 52 seconds, and 

eventually attaining 49,212 feet within 6 minutes 15 seconds, the U-2C easily 

broke previous world time-to-climb records and sustained altitude records for 

its weight category. This was three times faster than a previous record set with 

a Learjet that had ultimately topped out at 54,370 feet. Hoyt passed through 

65,617 feet in a little over 12 minutes. A mere 16 minutes after takeoff, the U-2 

reached a maximum altitude of 73,700 feet. The following day, Ron Williams 

broke records in a higher weight category, taking off with the aircraft fueled to 

a gross weight of 20,900 pounds. Observers from the Federation Aeronautique 

Internationale (FAI) verified the records, and the airplane was subsequently 

returned to Lockheed in Palmdale, where it was painted black for its final role 

as a museum exhibit. Shortly afterward, Doyle Krumrey flew the final sortie 

in an original U-2 while delivering the aircraft to Robins Air Force Base, GA, 

for permanent display.7

Meanwhile, research missions with the Airborne Science fleet continued 

at a blistering pace. An ER-2 deployed to Alconbury in June 1991, bringing 

the AVIRIS, Thematic Mapper Simulator, and RC-10 Camera to Europe. 

Multiple sorties were flown over Iceland, Wales, England, France, Italy, Spain, 

Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. After returning to the United States, 

the aircraft was used to conduct stratospheric sampling from Alaska to the 

North Pole.8 Next, the airplane was equipped with the Moderate-resolution 

Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS), a modified 

Daedalus Wildfire scanning spectrometer designed to provide spectral information similar to that which was to be provided by the MODIS, then scheduled 

for launch aboard the EOS-AM satellite. Researchers conducted initial testing in coordination with other aircraft and satellites over Coffeyville, KS, and 

along the Texas and Louisiana coast in November 1991. The modified wildfire 

instrument was converted to MAS configuration in January 1992 and was then 

flown over portions of the Atlantic Ocean in the region of the Azores. Each 

mission combined coordinated satellite, airborne, and surface observations 

7. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 377–378.

8. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”
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201

with modeling studies to investigate cloud properties and physical processes 

of cloud systems.9

Several ER-2 research projects in 1992 and 1993 contributed to the development of commercial aeronautics. At the time, NASA was investigating 

whether emissions from future fleets of supersonic transports (SSTs) might 

deplete the ozone layer. During one project, an ER-2 carried instruments to 

measure known ozone depletion catalysts along projected air routes for the 

SST. In another, an ER-2 flew through the wake of an Air France Concorde 

to collect particulate samples. Researchers concluded that there would be little 

impact on the ozone layer as a result of additional SST traffic. In an unusual 

low-altitude mission for the ER-2, the aircraft was used to measure the effect 

of the world’s growing fleet of subsonic airliners on cirrus cloud formation.10

Perhaps ironically, the ER-2 was used to gather significant data for weather 

research. In early 1993, one aircraft was deployed to Townsville, Australia, to 

9. Michael D. King and Paul Menzel, “First ISCCP Regional Experiment (FIRE) NASA ER-2 

Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS) Langley 

DAAC Data Set Document,” Atmospheric Data Science Center, October 1996, https://eosweb.

larc.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/project/fire/guide/base_fire_ci2_er2_mas_dataset.pdf, 

accessed July 27, 2013.

10. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 378.

The U-2C resided at Ames Research Center for nearly two decades. (NASA)
Unlimited Horizons

202

carry a suite of nine sensors over a warm region of the Pacific Ocean northeast of 

Papua New Guinea where tropical storms frequently developed. Research results 

were intended for application in development of future satellite sensor systems 

for predicting storm formation and movement. In 1994, researchers at Ames 

equipped an ER-2 with the Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment (LASE), 

a 1,000-pound instrument built by NASA Langley at a cost of $20 million. 

The LASE system fired a 20-megawatt burst of laser energy straight downward 

to analyze water vapor in the atmosphere. During sorties from Wallops Island, 

researchers conducted coordinated experiments using lidar instruments on the 

ER-2, the Space Shuttle, and aircraft at lower altitudes to characterize water vapor 

levels throughout the atmospheric cross section.11

For a time, NASA was operating three ER-2 aircraft simultaneously. One 

was returned to the Air Force in 1995 and the other two eventually received 

new F118 engines while undergoing routine maintenance over the next 2 years. 

Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin, following a March 1995 merger with Martin 

Marietta) provided four pilots under contract to NASA, along with maintainers and physiological support personnel. In 1998, as part of a cost-saving effort 

to consolidate NASA aircraft fleets, both remaining ER-2s were transferred to 

NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (now NASA Armstrong Flight Research 

Center) at Edwards. Later that same year, the ER-2 was used to set a new world 

altitude record in the mid-weight class, with a gross takeoff weight totaling 

between 26,455 and 35,274 pounds. The previous record of 62,500 feet had 

been set 10 years earlier using the Russian P-42, a stripped-down version of the 

Su-27 twin-engine jet fighter that had been built specifically to beat time-toclimb records. The new record was set on November 19, during a scheduled 

airborne science mission to measure water vapor, ozone, and other atmospheric 

particles. Although the ER-2 routinely operated at 70,000 feet and above, this 

flight to 68,700 feet was the first time the aircraft’s performance was documented 

by the FAI and made public. While emphasizing that the science mission was the 

flight’s primary goal, pilot Jim Barrilleaux expressed his opinion that “achieving 

the world altitude record verifies all of the outstanding efforts by the people who 

have worked on the NASA ER-2s and U-2s throughout the years—designers, 

builders, operators, maintainers and scientists.”12

The following winter, the NASA Airborne Science team deployed an ER-2 

to Kiruna, Sweden, north of the Arctic Circle, as part of the SAGE III Ozone 

Loss and Validation Experiment (SOLVE). Besides investigating the processes 

11. Ibid.

12. NASA, “NASA Aircraft Sets New World Altitude Record,” ScienceDaily, November 24, 1998, 

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm, accessed July 27, 2013.
 ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons

203

that control polar and mid-latitude winter and spring ozone levels, scientists 

hoped to validate measurements from the satellite-based Stratospheric Aerosol 

and Gas Experiment (SAGE) instrument. Although SAGE III was not launched 

on schedule, researchers were able to take advantage of other satellite assets. 

Managed by the Upper Atmosphere Research Program of NASA’s Office of Earth 

Science, the intensive effort also involved a DC-8 flying science platform and 

was the largest international field experiment ever conducted to measure ozone 

in the Arctic stratosphere. Scientists hoped that stratospheric measurements collected during the SOLVE campaign would provide a better understanding of the 

complicated chemistry involved with ozone loss. Unusually low levels of ozone 

over the Arctic during previous winters raised concerns that an ozone hole was 

developing just as in the Antarctic region. Research teams included more than 

350 scientists from the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and Canada.13

13. NASA, “NASA ER-2 Flies Over Russia on Ozone Research Mission,” News Release 00-14, 

January 27, 2000, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/NewsReleases/2000/00-14.

html, accessed August 1, 2013.

During the early 1990s, NASA operated three ER-2 aircraft simultaneously. One was returned to 

the Air Force in 1995. (NASA)
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204

The first SOLVE mission was a flight from Kiruna to the North Pole and 

back, a dangerous feat in a single-engine plane over an extremely hostile environment. In order to reduce potential risks, the ER-2 was equipped with 

backup communications systems, and the JP-TS fuel was specially refined for 

extreme cold weather use. Arctic survival instructors assured pilot Dee Porter 

that if he had to eject at altitude, where the air temperature was expected to 

be approximately –117 °F, survival would not be an issue because he would be 

frozen long before reaching the ground. Porter made the entire flight in total 

darkness, successfully accomplishing all science goals without experiencing any 

technical problems with the aircraft.14

The most unusual aspect of the SOLVE campaign was that it required 

multiple ER-2 sorties over Russia. Since this was to be the first flight of a U-2-

type aircraft through Russian airspace since the downing of Frank Powers in 

1960, the missions were closely coordinated with Russian observers. While 

preparing for his first such flight Dee Porter asked a Russian Air Force general 

for assurance that all air traffic control centers and air defense sites along the 

planned route would be notified in advance. The general told him not to worry, 

insisting, “There will not be a second incident.”15

Porter piloted the first 6-hour sortie across Russia on January 27, 2000, 

flying a straight line from the Finnish border southeast past Moscow to the 

Ukrainian border and back. Per prior agreement, he had to enter and exit 

Russian airspace at strictly defined navigational waypoints. The airplane was 

loaded with more than a ton of scientific instruments that would be used to 

perform 17 different environmental experiments. A second flight on February 

5 lasted 8 hours and required a more complicated route across the Barents Sea 

and over northern Russia. Jan Nystrom piloted additional flights over Russia 

in March during the third and final phase of the campaign.16

The ER-2 team was deployed to warmer climes in the summer of 2000 for the 

Southern African Regional Science Initiative (SAFARI), based in Pietersburg, 

Republic of South Africa. This time, researchers used the MAS multispectral 

scanner in an effort to increase understanding of southern African ecological 

and climate systems. After returning to the U.S., the airplane prepared for 

deployment the following summer to Jacksonville, FL, for the Convection And 

Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX). This series of field research investigations 

focused on the study of tropical cyclone development, tracking, intensification, and landfall impacts. Measurements of cloud microphysics were aimed at 

14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 379–380.

15. Ibid., p. 380.

16. Ibid., pp. 380–381.
 ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons

205

improving hurricane predictions. A similar campaign in July 2005 was based 

in Costa Rica, with the ER-2 carrying instruments to measure the buildup 

and behavior of tropical storm systems over Mexico and Central America, and 

in the eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. During the 

course of CAMEX-4, researchers had the opportunity to fly the aircraft over 

several hurricanes, including Emily and Dennis, both violent Category 4–5 

storms, and collect information on their entire vertical structures. Additional 

data were collected regarding the temperature, humidity, precipitation, and 

wind related to tropical cyclones and other phenomena that lead to the development of powerful storms at sea.17

The ER-2 also served as a test bed for direct detection Doppler lidar systems. 

In September 2009, researchers at Dryden integrated the Tropospheric Wind 

Lidar Technology Experiment (TWiLiTE) into the ER-2 to measure vertical 

wind profiles. The primary objectives of the TWiLiTE program were to develop 

technologies and subsystems for a future space-based Global Wind Mission, 

conduct engineering flight tests of a fully autonomous airborne Doppler lidar, 

and demonstrate tropospheric wind profile measurements from a high-altitude, 

downward-looking, moving platform to simulate spaceborne measurements 

using similar instruments.18 The following December, the ER-2 carried the 

Multiple Altimeter Beam Experimental Lidar (MABEL) to simulate instruments to be carried by the second Ice, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite 

(ICESat-2). In a second series of tests, in March 2011, the MABEL instrument, 

developed at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, was again mounted in the 

airplane’s nose for flights over a variety of different terrains. In April 2012, 

the ER-2 carried MABEL to study Greenland’s ice sheet, glaciers, and sea ice. 

The deployment, based at Keflavik, Iceland, included more than 100 hours of 

flying during 16 sorties, including 14 data collection flights over Greenland 

and surrounding sea ice areas. Several missions were conducted concurrently 

and on the same flight tracks as flights of other NASA environmental science 

aircraft involved in the Arctic IceBridge campaign in order to compare data 

being recorded by the MABEL with instruments on the other aircraft. This 

challenging effort ended on April 27 with a lengthy transit flight from Keflavik 

to the Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility in Palmdale. Pilot Stu Broce landed 

17. NASA, “ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft,” NASA Fact Sheet FS-2007-4-046-DFRC, 

2007, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf, 

accessed July 27, 2013.

18. Bruce Gentry et al., “Flight Testing of the TWiLiTE Airborne Molecular Doppler Lidar,” http://

ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100026400_2010028473.pdf, accessed 

July 27, 2013.
Unlimited Horizons

206

the ER-2 in California after being airborne for nearly 10.5 hours, during 

which time he collected MABEL data over the broadleaf deciduous forests 

of Wisconsin.19

In a continuing effort to develop instruments for space-based platforms, the 

ER-2 was configured for the Polarimeter Definition Experiment (PODEX) in 

January 2013. The primary goal was the development of instruments for use 

with the Aerosol-Cloud-Ecosystem (ACE) satellite mission. During the course 

of seven flights over 3 weeks, research teams collected data using a new class 

of polarimeters, instruments that provide detailed information about clouds 

and their interaction with tiny airborne particles from a variety of sources, 

including automotive emissions, dust, and sea spray lofted by the wind. These 

aerosols can remain suspended in the atmosphere for up to a week, affecting 

human health, cloud formation, precipitation, and Earth’s radiation budget.20

Similar particles and their behavior were investigated in the summer of 

2013. During the Studies of Emissions, Atmospheric Composition, Clouds 

and Climate Coupling by Regional Surveys (SEAC4RS) campaign, more than 

19. Alan Brown and Beth Hagenauer, “NASA’s ER-2 Completes MABEL Validation Deployment,” May 

1, 2012, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/ER-2_completes_MABEL_deployment.

html, accessed July 24, 2013.

20. Kathryn Hansen, “PODEX Experiment to Reshape Future of Atmospheric Science” January 16, 

2013, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/qa-starr.html, accessed July 29, 2013.

The icy expanse of Greenland seen from 62,000 feet during a MABEL research mission on April 

2, 2012. (NASA)
 ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons

207

250 scientists, engineers, and flight personnel examined the ways in which air 

pollution and natural emissions affect atmospheric composition and climate. 

ER-2 and DC-8 aircraft involved in SEAC4RS carried sensors to probe the 

atmosphere from top to bottom at a critical time of year when weather systems 

were sufficiently strong and regional air pollution and natural emissions were 

prolific enough to pump gases and particles high into the atmosphere. The 

results may provide new insights into the effects of gases and aerosol particles 

on Earth’s atmosphere and climate. The mission targeted two major regional 

sources of summertime emissions: intense smoke from wildland fires in the 

Western United States and natural emissions of isoprene, a carbon compound, 

from forests in the Southeast.21

Over the years, NASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft have supported airborne 

research in the United States and around the globe. Worldwide deployments 

have made it possible to acquire extensive digital multispectral imagery and 

aerial photography from altitudes achievable by no other aircraft. U-2 and 

ER-2 missions tested prototype satellite-imaging sensors and acquired Earth 

resources data for application to projects sponsored by NASA and Federal agencies such as the Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and 

Wildlife Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers. By using airplanes like the 

U-2 and ER-2 for high-altitude research, NASA scientists gained knowledge of 

advanced aircraft capabilities and technologies and aerospace physiology, and 

they expanded their understanding of how humans interact with the environment. Research results may yield improved weather forecasts, tools for managing agriculture and forests, information for fisheries and local planners, and the 

ability to predict how climate will change in the future. Additionally, engineers 

will use lessons learned in future designs for aircraft and aerospace vehicles.22

21. NASA, “NASA SEAC4RS Mission Targets How Pollution, Storms And Climate Mix,” June 6, 2013, 

http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/seac4rs_2013.html, accessed August 1, 2013.

22. NASA, “ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft,” NASA Fact Sheet FS-2007-4-046-DFRC, 

2007, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf, 

accessed July 27, 2013.
208

Contrary to popular belief, the U-2 is not yet ready to fly off into the sunset. (U.S. Air Force)
209

Conclusions 

Over the span of more than six decades, the U-2 evolved from a relatively 

basic, high-altitude camera platform for performing clandestine reconnaissance missions into a complex, multisensor platform that has been adapted 

for a multitude of civil and military roles. Variants in more than a dozen 

configurations have been used for intelligence gathering, strategic and tactical reconnaissance, communications relay, battle-damage assessment, treaty 

monitoring and verification, disaster relief, environmental and Earth resources 

studies, and a wide variety of scientific research. Born of a Cold War necessity 

to maintain the balance of power between East and West, the U-2 now serves 

equally well as a high-altitude tool for tracking terrorists in the mountains of 

Afghanistan or for tracking the migration of destructive spruce bark beetles 

through the forests of Alaska.

Perhaps most surprising is the seemingly unending span of the U-2’s service 

life. Those who conceived of and designed the airplane anticipated that it would 

remain viable for only a few years at most, but it has surpassed expectations with 

relatively modest changes to the basic configuration. Since its earliest days, the 

U-2 was consistently characterized as a delicate aircraft, designed for minimal 

aerodynamic stress. The airframe had been manufactured for optimum altitude performance at the expense of strict adherence to military specifications. 

Surprisingly, up until the late 1990s, no systematic study had been made to 

determine the consequences of this engineering approach. So, to ascertain 

the fatigue life of the U-2S, strain gauges and accelerometers were installed in 

several aircraft. The astonishing results of these measurements indicated that 

the U-2S could likely withstand 750,000 hours of operation. At the time of 

the study, those airframes with the most flight time had less than 30,000 hours. 

This meant that if the flight rate remained unchanged, the airplanes would be 

flyable for another 150 years. This low airframe wear can be attributed in part 

to the relatively benign high-altitude environment, where stresses from gusts 

and turbulence are minimal. But the most important factor ensuring the U-2’s 

longevity may be its innovative design. Fred Carmody, a Lockheed field service 
Unlimited Horizons

210

manager who spent 25 years helping to maintain the U-2, said in 1994, “The 

key is good initial design, maturity of the design, and proper maintenance.”1

At one time, the Air Force slated the U-2 for retirement in 2015, but 

Department of Defense cutbacks and rising costs of its proposed replacement, 

the RQ-4, gave Kelly Johnson’s angel a new lease on life. The Global Hawk’s 

price tag had gradually risen to $176 million per airframe, according to Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter at a January 2012 news conference, and 

Pentagon analysts determined that continuing to operate the U-2 would be less 

expensive for the foreseeable future. Through the various upgrade programs 

(engine, electrical, cockpit, etc.), the Air Force has already invested a substantial sum—at least $1.7 billion since 1994—to modernize the U-2, so it makes 

sense to leverage this investment rather than spend money on a new platform.2

Not surprisingly, officials from Northrop Grumman, builder of the Global 

Hawk, contested this decision, arguing that by flying into hostile airspace, 

the U-2 exposes pilots to danger, and that the airplane has limited mission 

1. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 334–335.

2. William J. Hennigan, “U-2 spy plane to linger overhead a bit longer,” Los Angeles Times, January 

28, 2012.

U-2 imagery of an SA-2 missile site at La Coloma, left, provided valuable intelligence during 

the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962; pictures of a collapsed freeway interchange helped 

California officials plan disaster-relief efforts following the Sylmar Earthquake in February 

1971. (CIA)
 Conclusions

211

endurance and limited sensor capacity. Nevertheless, U-2 pilots have flown 

more than 95,000 hours since 2003, providing vital intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance data to military planners and soldiers in the field. Each 

year, the Air Force trains approximately 18 new U-2 pilots and 60 new RQ-4 

operators. “They might want to start training more U-2 pilots,” said Lexington 

Institute defense policy analyst Dr. Loren B. Thompson in a 2012 interview 

with the Los Angeles Times. Thompson estimated that the U-2 would probably 

not be retired before 2023. “There’s still a lot of fight in that aircraft.”3

Indeed there is. Pentagon officials have expressed a desire to continue flying 

the U-2 beyond 2040, and, presumably, NASA will fly the ER-2 as long as possible. Six decades after its conception, the U-2 remains a viable reconnaissance 

and research platform, but it will inevitably succumb to obsolescence. Perhaps 

somewhere in a windowless building at Palmdale, Skunk Works engineers are 

brewing up the next high-altitude craft to probe the sky’s unlimited horizons.

3. Ibid.
212

Aircraft Specifications 

U-2A/C/G

Length: 50 feet

Span: 80 feet

Wing Area: 600 square feet

Height: 15 feet

Zero-Fuel Weight: 13,071–14,250 pounds

Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 22,542–24,150 pounds

Max. Unrefueled Range: 2,500 nautical miles

Cruise Duration: 8.0 hours

Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet

Cruising Speed: 400 knots (460 mph) at 65,000 feet

APPENDIX 1
 Aircraft Specifications

213

Early model U-2 general configuration. (U.S. Air Force)
214

U-2R/TR-1/U-2S/ER-2

Length: 62 feet

Span: 103 feet

Wing Area: 1,000 square feet

Height: 15 feet

Zero-Fuel Weight: 14,900–17,800 pounds

Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 30,700–41,000 pounds

Max. Unrefueled Range: 4,270 nautical miles

Cruise Duration: 10.4 hours

Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet

Cruising Speed: 413 knots (475 mph) at 65,000 feet
 Aircraft Specifications

215

Late model U-2 general configuration. (Lockheed Martin)
216

The U-2 fleet was produced in several batches. The first production run was 

built for the CIA with 20 airframes constructed at Burbank, CA, under contract SP-1913. A second batch of 29 airframes was constructed at Oildale, 

CA, under contract SP-1914. An additional airframe was built as part of this 

batch, possibly using parts from crash-damaged airframes. Each U-2 airframe 

was identified by a three-digit Lockheed construction number, called an article 

number. Air Force serial numbers were assigned in 1956. The original prototype (Article 341) never received a U.S. Air Force serial number. Article 390 

was allocated a serial number that had been previously assigned to Article 357, 

which was lost in a nonfatal accident. The Air Force ordered a supplementary 

batch of five airframes in 1958. In 1967 and 1968, the CIA and Air Force 

received 12 U-2R airframes, four of which survived to be converted to U-2S 

configuration. Between 1981 and 1989, a total of 37 new airframes were built 

under the designations TR-1A, TR-1B, U-2R, and ER-2. The TR-1 series 

aircraft were redesignated U-2R in October 1991 and later converted to U-2S.

Original Production Batch

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

341 N/A U-2A Lockheed

CIA

Prototype was delivered to 

the test site on July 25, 1955, 

for test and development 

flights. First flight on August 1, 

1955. Crashed April 4, 1957, 

killing Lockheed test pilot 

Robert Sieker.

Production Summary 

APPENDIX 2
 Production Summary

217

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

342 56-6675

N800X

U-2A

U-2C

U-2F

Lockheed

CIA

Delivered to test site on 

September 11, 1955. Used 

for developmental testing. 

Converted to U-2C prototype 

and first flown in new 

configuration on May 13, 1959. 

Converted to U-2F prototype 

in May 1961. Deployed to CIA 

operating locations overseas 

and at Edwards Air Force Base. 

Crashed February 25, 1966, 

following refueling practice. 

CIA pilot Robert “Deke” Hall 

ejected safely.

343 56-6676 U-2A

U-2F

CIA

USAF

Delivered to test site on 

October 16, 1955. Used for 

training in 1956–57, and then 

for test and development. 

Converted to U-2F in 1961. 

Loaned to USAF during Cuban 

Missile Crisis and shot down 

over Cuba on October 27, 1962, 

killing Maj. Rudolph Anderson.

344 56-6677

N315X

U-2A

U-2F

CIA

USAF

Delivered to the test site on 

November 20, 1955. Used 

in test and development 

work though most of 1956. 

Converted to U-2F by October 

1961. Crashed near Edwards 

AFB during refueling trials on 

March 1, 1962, killing Capt. 

John Campbell.

345 56-6678 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 

December 16, 1955. Crashed 

during training flight on May 

15, 1956, killing Wilburn 

“Billy” Rose.
Unlimited Horizons

218

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

346 56-6679 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 

January 13, 1956. Deployed 

to Europe with Detachment 

A. Crashed near Wiesbaden, 

Germany, killing Howard Carey.

347 56-6680 U-2A

U-2E

U-2F

U-2C

CIA

USAF

Delivered to the test site on 

February 8, 1956. Transferred 

to SAC in late 1957. Converted 

to U-2E in mid-1962. First SAC 

U-2 to be painted all black in 

1964. Converted to U-2F in 

1966. Placed in flyable storage 

in 1969. Converted to U-2C 

for Advanced Location Strike 

System project in 1972. Stored 

in 1980 and transferred to 

the National Air and Space 

Museum, Washington, DC, 

in 1985.

348 N801X

56-6681

N708NA

U-2A

U-2G

U-2C

CIA

USAF

Lockheed

NASA

Delivered to the test site on 

March 5, 1956. Deployed with 

Detachment A in April 1956. 

Returned to U.S. in November 

1957. Transferred to SAC but 

retained by Lockheed for testing 

through January 1959. Returned 

to CIA in 1963 for conversion to 

U-2G. Placed in flyable storage 

in 1969. Transferred to NASA 

in 1971 and returned to U-2C 

configuration. Retired in August 

1987. Initially displayed at Ames 

Research Center, Moffett Field, 

CA. Later transferred to Moffett 

Field Historical Society Museum.
 Production Summary

219

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

349 56-6682

N709NA

U-2A

U-2H

U-2G

U-2C

CIA

USAF

NASA

Delivered to the test site on 

March 29, 1956. Damaged 

in April 1960 forced landing 

in Thailand. Repaired and 

transferred to Air Force Flight 

Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA. 

Returned to CIA in 1964 for 

conversion to U-2H. Converted 

to U-2G in August 1965. 

Placed in flyable storage in 

1969. Transferred to NASA in 

1971. Retired in April 1989 

and transferred to Museum of 

Aviation, Robins AFB, GA.

350 56-6683 U-2A

U-2F

CIA

USAF

Delivered to the test site on 

April 24, 1956. Transferred to 

SAC in 1957. Used in flight-test 

activity in 1962. Returned to 

CIA in 1963 for conversion to 

U-2F. Loaned to SAC for Cuba 

reconnaissance. Crashed in the 

Gulf of Mexico on November 

20, 1963, killing Capt. Joe 

Hyde, Jr.

351 56-6684 U-2A

U-2C

CIA Delivered to the test site on May 

18, 1956. Converted to U-2C 

by 1959. Crashed at Taoyuan, 

Taiwan, on March 19, 1961, 

killing Maj. Yao-Hua Chih.

352 56-6685

N315X

U-2A

U-2C

CIA

Lockheed

Delivered to the test site on 

June 13, 1956. Converted to 

U-2C by September 1959. Used 

for test and development by 

Lockheed and Detachment G 

at Edwards in 1963. Crashed 

near Taiwan on October 22, 

1965, killing Maj. Cheng-Wen 

“Pete” Wang.
Unlimited Horizons

220

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

353 56-6686 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on July 

6, 1956. Moved to Detachment 

G in June 1957. Destroyed in 

crash landing at Edwards on 

September 14, 1961. Buster 

Edens escaped unharmed.

354 56-6687 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on July 

27, 1956. Crashed on August 

31, 1956, during a training flight, 

killing Frank Grace.

355 56-6688 U-2A

U-2C

CIA Delivered to the test site on 

August 16, 1956. Damaged in 

landing accident on August 30, 

1956. Converted to U-2C by 

September 1962. Shot down over 

China on November 1, 1963. Maj. 

Chang-Di “Robin” Yeh survived.

356 56-6689 U-2A

U-2F

CIA

USAF

Delivered to the test site 

on September 5, 1956. 

Transferred to SAC in 

November 1957. Damaged 

by typhoon at Guam in late 

1962. Transferred to CIA for 

conversion to U-2F in 1963. 

Crashed in Taiwan Straits on 

March 23, 1964, killing Maj. 

Teh-Pei “Sonny” Liang.

357 56-6690 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 

September 21, 1956. Crashed in 

Arizona on December 19, 1956. 

Robert Ericson survived.
 Production Summary

221

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

358 56-6691 U-2A

U-2C

CIA Delivered to the test site on 

October 8, 1956. Returned 

to Lockheed in September 

1958 for conversion to U-2C 

and to be used in flight-test 

and development activity. 

Returned to CIA in August 

1959. Shot down over China 

on January 10, 1965. Maj. 

Li-Yi “Jack” Chang survived 

but was captured.

359 56-6692 U-2A

U-2F

U-2C

U-2CT

CIA

USAF

Lockheed

Delivered to the test site on 

October 22, 1956. Transferred 

to SAC in December 1960. 

Returned to CIA in July 

1962 for conversion to U-2F. 

Loaned to SAC for Cuba 

reconnaissance in 1963. 

Used for testing in support 

of U-2R development from 

1965 to 1967. Transferred to 

Air Force Flight Test Center in 

July 1968. Modified for Project 

TRIM in 1972. Converted to 

U-2C configuration in 1974. 

Returned to Lockheed in 

1975 for conversion to U-2CT 

trainer and redelivered to 

SAC in January 1976. Retired 

in December 1987. Used as 

battle-damage-repair training 

airframe at Royal Air Force 

(RAF) Alconbury, England, 

in 1988. Restored to U-2C 

configuration, and transferred 

to Imperial War Museum, 

Duxford, England in 1992.
Unlimited Horizons

222

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

360 56-6693 U-2A

U-2C

CIA Delivered the test site on 

November 5, 1956. Used for 

test and development activities 

until May 1959. Converted 

to U-2C. Shot down near 

Sverdlovsk, Russia, on May 1, 

1960. Frank Powers survived 

but was captured.

Second Production Batch

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

361 56-6694 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 

September 1956. Moved 

to Laughlin AFB, TX, in 

June 1957. Crashed during 

maintenance flight on 

September 26, 1957. Col. Jack 

Nole bailed out.

362 56-6695 U-2A

U-2G

USAF

CIA

Delivered to the test site in 

November 1956. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Transferred to CIA in 1963 for 

conversion to U-2G. Shot down 

over Fujian, China, on July 7, 

1964, killing Lt. Col. Nan-Ping 

“Terry” Lee.

363 56-6696 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 

December 1956. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Crashed near Tucson, AZ, 

on March 22, 1966. Capt. 

Huang-Di “Andy” Fan ejected.

364 56-6697 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site 

in January 1957. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Crashed near Del Rio, TX, on 

August 6, 1958, killing Lt. Paul 

L. Haughland.
 Production Summary

223

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

365 56-6698 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site 

in January 1957. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Crashed near Tucumcari, NM, 

on July 9, 1958, killing Capt. Al 

Chapin, Jr.

366 56-6699 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 

February 1957. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Crashed near Abilene, TX, 

on June 28, 1957, killing Lt. 

Leo Smith.

367 56-6700 U-2A

U-2C

USAF

CIA

Delivered to the test site in 

February 1957. Transferred 

to the CIA in June 1957. 

Returned to SAC in 1960. 

Converted to U-2C in October 

1966. Placed in flyable 

storage in 1969. Returned to 

flight status in 1972 for the 

Advanced Location Strike 

System (ALSS) project. 

Crashed May 29, 1975, near 

Winterberg, Germany. Capt. 

Robert T. “Terry” Rendelman 

escaped unharmed.

368 56-6701 U-2A

U-2C

USAF Delivered to the test site in 

March 1957. Transferred to 

ARDC at Edwards in June 

1957, and then to SAC in 

1966. Converted to U-2C 

by November 1966. Placed 

in flyable storage in 1969. 

Returned to flight status in 

1972 for ALSS project. Retired 

to SAC Museum, Offutt AFB, 

NE, in 1980.

369 56-6702 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 

March 1957. Moved to Laughlin 

AFB in June 1957. Crashed near 

Abilene, TX, on June 28, 1957, 

killing Lt. Ford Lowcock.
Unlimited Horizons

224

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

370 56-6703 U-2A

U-2E

USAF Delivered to the test site 

in April 1957. Moved to 

Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 

Modified for SIGINT mission 

by mid-1959. Converted 

to U-2E in August 1962. 

Destroyed in crash landing 

at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, 

on September 18, 1964. Maj. 

Robert L. Primrose perished.

371 56-6704 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 

April 1957. Moved to Laughlin 

AFB in June 1957. Crashed 

near Del Rio, TX, on November 

28, 1957, killing Capt. Benedict 

A. Lacombe.

372 56-6705 U-2A

U-2F

USAF

CIA

Delivered to the test site in 

April 1957. Moved to Laughlin 

AFB in June 1957. First U-2 

equipped for High-Altitude 

Sampling Program. Transferred 

to CIA in 1964. Converted to 

U-2F by May 1965 and 

assigned to Detachment G. 

Transferred to Detachment H 

in November 1965. Crashed at 

Taichung, Taiwan, on February 

17, 1966, killing Capt. Tse-Shi 

“Charlie” Wu.

373 56-6706 U-2A

U-2C

USAF

CIA

Delivered to test site in May 

1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB in 

June 1957. Transferred to CIA in 

August 1966 and converted to 

U-2C. Shot down over China on 

September 9, 1967, killing Maj. 

Jung-Bei “Denny” Hwang.
 Production Summary

225

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

374 56-6707 U-2A

U-2E

U-2F

U-2C

USAF Delivered to test site in May 

1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB 

in June 1957. Modified for 

SIGINT mission by mid-1959. 

Converted to U-2E in 1962. 

Converted to U-2F by November 

1966. Placed in flyable storage 

in 1969. Converted back to 

U-2C for ALSS project in 1972. 

Stored at Lockheed Palmdale 

in 1980. Later transferred to 

Laughlin AFB for static display.

375 56-6708 U-2A

U-2C

USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

June 1957. Converted to U-2C 

in March 1966. Crashed near 

Pineville, LA, on July 1, 1967. 

Capt. Sam Swart ejected.

376 56-6709 U-2A Lockheed 

USAF

Ready for delivery by June 

1957 but retained at factory 

until November for SIGINT 

modifications. Crashed near 

Picayune, MS, on January 

2, 1962. Capt. Charles 

Stratton ejected.

377 56-6710 U-2A

U-2D

USAF Delivered to ARDC in June 1957. 

Modified to U-2D by January 

1958. Crashed at Edwards on 

September 11, 1958, killing 

Capt. Hugh P. “Pat” Hunerwadel.

378 56-6711 U-2A

U-2C

CIA Delivered to Detachment G in 

July 1957 and used for test 

and development. Converted to 

U-2C in 1962. Shot down over 

China on September 9, 1962, 

killing Lt. Col. Huai-Sheng Chen.
Unlimited Horizons

226

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

379 56-6712 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

July 1957. Moved to DavisMonthan AFB in 1963. Crashed 

on December 18, 1964, near 

Tucson after Capt. Shih-Li 

“Steve” Sheng ejected.

380 56-6713 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB 

in July 1957. Crashed July 

8, 1958, near Wayside, TX, 

killing RAF Sq. Ldr. Christopher 

H. Walker.

381 56-6714 U-2A

U-2G

U-2C

USAF

CIA

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

August 1957. Transferred to 

CIA in 1965 and converted 

to U-2G. Later transferred to 

SAC and eventually placed 

in flyable storage in 1969. 

Converted to U-2C in 1972. 

Damaged beyond repair in 

crash near Oroville, CA, on 

January 31, 1980. Capt. 

Edward Beaumont survived. 

Aircraft was later rebuilt for 

display at Beale AFB.

382 56-6715 U-2A

U-2G

USAF

CIA

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

August 1957. Transferred to 

CIA in 1964 and converted to 

U-2G in 1965. Crashed near 

Edwards AFB on April 26, 

1965, killing Buster E. Edens.

383 56-6716

N805X

U-2A

U-2C

USAF

CIA

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

September 1957. Transferred 

to CIA in June 1965 and 

converted to U-2C. Transferred 

to SAC in 1971. Placed in 

storage in May 1980. Later 

transferred to Davis-Monthan 

AFB for permanent display.
 Production Summary

227

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

384 56-6717 U-2A

U-2C

USAF

CIA

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

September 1957. Transferred 

to CIA in June 1964 and 

converted to U-2C. Crashed 

near Taiwan on June 21, 1966, 

killing Maj. Ching-Chang 

“Mickey” Yu.

385 56-6718 U-2A

U-2G

USAF

CIA

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

September 1957. Transferred 

to CIA in August 1964 and 

converted to U-2G. Crashed 

into Yellow Sea on January 

5, 1969, killing Maj. Hseih 

“Billy” Chang.

386 56-6719 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB 

in October 1957. Crashed in 

Bolivia on July 28, 1966, killing 

Capt. Robert Hickman.

387 56-6720 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

October 1957. Crashed near 

Uvalde, TX, on July 14, 1960. 

Maj. Raleigh B.J. Myers ejected.

388 56-6721 U-2A

U-2D

USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

October 1957. Damaged in 

forced landing at Cortez, CO, 

on August 5, 1959. Repaired 

and transferred to ARDC and 

modified to U-2D. Delivered to 

Edwards AFB in 1960. Retired 

in 1978 and moved to March 

Field Air Museum and later to 

Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale, 

CA, for display.

389 56-6722 U-2A USAF Delivered to USAF in November 

1957. Assigned to ARDC as 

first aircraft to carry IR sensor. 

Used for numerous test and 

development projects. Retired 

in 1978 and moved to National 

Museum of the U.S. Air Force at 

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.
Unlimited Horizons

228

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

390 56-6690 U-2A

U-2C

USAF Assigned serial number 

previously used for another 

airframe that crashed. 

Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

December 1957. Converted to 

U-2C in 1966. Crashed in South 

Vietnam on October 8, 1966. 

Maj. Leo Stewart ejected.

Supplementary Production Batch

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

391 56-6951 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

December 1957. Crashed 

at Davis-Monthan AFB on 

October 17, 1966. Capt. Leslie 

White survived.

392 56-6952 U-2A

U-2C

USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

January 1958. Converted to 

U-2C in 1966. Destroyed in crash 

landing on November 18, 1971, 

killing Capt. John Cunney.

393 56-6953 U-2A

U-2C

U-2CT

USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

February 1959. Converted to 

U-2C in 1966. Placed in flyable 

storage in 1969. Reactivated 

in 1971 as training aircraft. 

Damaged in landing accident 

in 1972. Rebuilt as U-2CT 

trainer in 1973. Retired in 1987. 

Converted back to single-seat 

U-2C and displayed in Cold 

War Museum, Bodø, Norway, 

in 1994.

394 56-6954 U-2D

U-2C

USAF Delivered to Edwards AFB 

as U-2D in March 1959. 

Transferred to SAC in 1966 and 

converted to U-2C. Crashed 

near Benson, AZ, on May 31, 

1968. Maj. Vic Milam ejected.
 Production Summary

229

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

395 56-6955 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 

March 1959. Transferred to 

Davis-Monthan AFB in 1963. 

Crashed near Boise, ID, on 

August 14, 1964. Capt. Shih-Li 

“Steve” Sheng ejected.

Original U-2R Production

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

051 N803X

68-10329

U-2R

U-2S

Lockheed

CIA

USAF

Prototype U-2R. First flight 

at Edwards AFB on August 

28, 1967. Used for test and 

development. Configured 

to production standard and 

delivered to CIA in March 

1969. Reallocated to flight 

testing in 1974. Transferred to 

Beale AFB in 1981. Converted 

to U-2S in 1995.

052 N809X

68-10330

U-2R USAF

Navy

First flight December 29, 1967. 

Delivered to Davis-Monthan 

AFB July 25, 1968. Test bed for 

Senior Lance and Navy EP-X 

trials. Transferred to Beale AFB 

in 1976. Crashed at Akrotiri, 

Cyprus, on December 7, 1977, 

killing Capt. Robert Henderson.

053 N800X

68-10331

U-2R

U-2S

CIA

USAF

First flight February 17, 1968. 

Delivered to CIA on November 

22, 1968. Transferred to DavisMonthan AFB in 1974 and to 

Beale AFB in 1976. Converted to 

U-2S in August 1996.

054 N810X

68-10332

U-2R CIA

USAF

First flight March 29, 1968, and 

subsequently delivered to CIA. 

Transferred to Davis-Monthan 

AFB in 1975 and to Beale AFB in 

1976. Crashed off Korean coast 

on January 15, 1992, killing 

Capt. Marty McGregor.
Unlimited Horizons

230

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

055 N812X

68-10333

U-2R CIA

USAF

First flight May 8, 1968, and 

subsequently delivered to CIA. 

Transferred to Davis-Monthan 

AFB in 1974 and to Beale AFB 

in 1976. Crashed at Osan, 

South Korea, on May 22, 1984. 

Capt. David Bonsi survived.

056 N814X

68-10334

U-2R USAF First flight May 18, 1968. 

Delivered to Davis-Monthan 

AFB on June 10, 1968. 

Crashed in Gulf of Thailand on 

August 15, 1975. Capt. Jon 

Little survived.

057 N815X

68-10335

U-2R CIA

USAF

First flight July 30, 1968. 

Delivered to CIA on August 29, 

1968. Crashed at Taoyuan, 

Taiwan, on November 24, 

1970, killing Maj. Chi-Hsien 

“Denny” Huang.

058 N816X

68-10336

U-2R

U-2S

USAF First flight August 20, 1968. 

Delivered to Davis-Monthan 

AFB on August 29, 1968, 

and to Beale AFB in 1976. 

Eventually transferred to 

test activities at Palmdale. 

Converted to U-2S in 1996.

059 N817X

68-10337

U-2R

U-2S

USAF First flight on September 9, 

1968. Delivered to DavisMonthan AFB on September 

21, 1968, and to Beale AFB in 

1976. Converted to U-2S in 

June 1998.

060 N818X

68-10338

U-2R USAF First flight on October 2, 1968. 

Delivered to Davis-Monthan 

AFB on October 17, 1968, 

and to Beale AFB in 1976. 

Became first U-2 to reach 

20,000 flight hours, in August 

1994. Crashed at Fairford, 

England, on August 29, 1995, 

killing Capt. David Hawkens.
 Production Summary

231

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

061 N819X

68-10339

U-2R USAF First flight October 22, 1968. 

Retained at Palmdale for 

testing until delivered to 

Davis-Monthan AFB in 1972. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

1976. Crashed at Beale on 

December 13, 1993, killing 

Capt. Rich Snyder.

062 N820X

68-10340

U-2R USAF First flight November 26, 1968. 

Delivered to Davis-Monthan 

AFB on December 19, 1968. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

1976. Crashed in Korea on 

October 5, 1980. Capt. Cleve 

Wallace survived.

Later Production

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

063 80-1063

N706NA

N806NA

ER-2 NASA First flight May 1, 1981. 

Delivered to NASA Ames 

Research Center in June 1981. 

Transferred to NASA Dryden 

Flight Research Center in 1998.

064 80-1064 TR-1B

U-2RT

U-2ST

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1B in March 1983. 

Redesignated U-2RT in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2ST in October 1994.

065 80-1065 TR-1B

U-2RT

U-2ST

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1B in May 1983. 

Redesignated U-2RT in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2ST in August 1995.
Unlimited Horizons

232

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

066 80-1066 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF First flight August 1, 1981. 

Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in September 1981. 

Redesignated U-2RT in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2S in November 1997.

067 80-1067 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in July 1982. Transferred 

to flight test in Palmdale in 

1989. Redesignated U-2R in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2S in 1998.

068 80-1068 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

U-2ST

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1A in July 1982. 

Transferred to RAF Alconbury, 

England, in February 1983 and 

to Beale AFB in April 1987. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

July 1998. Converted to U-2ST 

in 2004.

069 80-1069

N708NA

TR-1A

ER-2

U-2S

USAF

NASA

Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1A in July 1982. 

Transferred to Alconbury in 

July 1983 and damaged in 

ground accident 3 months 

later. Eventually repaired 

and loaned to NASA as ER-2 

in March 1987. Returned 

to Beale AFB as U-2R in 

1995. Converted to U-2S in 

September 1997.

070 80-1070 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in October 1982. 

Transferred to Alconbury in 

February 1983. Returned 

to Beale AFB in May 1988. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

February 1995.
 Production Summary

233

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

071 80-1071 U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in November 1983. 

Transferred to flight test in 

Palmdale in 1985. Returned 

to Beale AFB in 1988. 

Redelivered as first U-2S 

production conversion on 

October 28, 1994.

072 80-1072 TR-1A USAF Delivered as TR-1A to 

Alconbury in November 1983. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

March 1984. Crashed at Beale 

on July 18, 1984. Capt. Tom 

Hubbard survived.

073 80-1073 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in February 1984. 

Transferred to Alconbury in 

January 1991. Redesignated 

U-2R in October 1991. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

September 1992. Converted to 

U-2S in February 1996.

074 80-1074 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in February 1984. 

Transferred to Alconbury in 

December 1990. Redesignated 

U-2R in October 1991. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

October 1992. Converted to 

U-2S in May 1996.

075 80-1075 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1984. Crashed in 

Korea on October 8, 1984. 

Capt. Tom Dettmer survived.

076 80-1076 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1984. Converted to 

U-2S in August 1997.

077 80-1077 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in March 1985. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

November 1989. Converted to 

U-2S in June 1996.
Unlimited Horizons

234

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

078 80-1078 TR-1A

U-2ST

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in March 1985. 

Damaged on April 24, 1990, 

and returned to Palmdale for 

storage. Converted to U-2ST in 

October 1994.

079 80-1079 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in March 1985. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

January 1991. Redesignated 

U-2R in October 1991. 

Converted to U-2S in 

May 1997.

080 80-1080 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1A in May 1985. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

March 1997.

081 80-1081 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 

TR-1A in October 1985. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

August 1991. Redesignated 

U-2R in October 1991. 

Converted to U-2S in 

October 1996.

082 80-1082 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in November 1985. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

January 1997.

083 80-1083 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in March 1986. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 

in December 1991. Converted 

to U-2S in September 1996.

084 80-1084 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in April 1986. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

1988. Redesignated U-2R in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2S in March 1998.
 Production Summary

235

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

085 80-1085 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 

TR-1A in August 1986. 

Transferred to Beale AFB 

in February 1991. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

June 1997.

086 80-1086 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A in 1986. Transferred 

to Alconbury in April 1987. 

Returned to Beale in August 

1991. Redesignated U-2R in 

October 1991. Converted to 

U-2S in December 1997.

087 80-1087 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as TR-1A in May 1987. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Converted to U-2S in 

February 1998.

088 80-1088 TR-1A

U-2R

USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 

TR-1A in December 1987. 

Transferred to Beale AFB in 

August 1991. Crashed near 

Oroville, CA, on August 7, 

1996, killing Capt. Randy Roby.

089 80-1089 U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1988. Converted to 

U-2S in December 1995.

090 80-1090 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Built as TR-1A in 1988 and 

retained at Palmdale for test 

and development. Served as 

U-2S prototype in May 1989 

and subsequently delivered to 

Beale AFB.

091 80-1091 U-2RT

U-2ST

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 

as U-2RT in March 1988. 

Converted to U-2ST in 

December 1998.
Unlimited Horizons

236

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

092 80-1092 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in April 1988. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 

in December 1991. Converted 

to U-2S in September 1998.

093 80-1093 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury 

as TR-1A in June 1988. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 

in April 1992. Converted to 

U-2S in June 1995.

094 80-1094 TR-1B

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 

TR-1B in September 1988. 

Redesignated U-2R in October 

1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 

in December 1991. Converted 

to U-2S in June 1995.

095 80-1095 U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1988. Converted 

to U-2S in January 1996. 

Crashed near Seoul, South 

Korea, on January 26, 2003. 

The pilot ejected.

096 80-1096 U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1989. Converted to 

U-2S in April 1996.

097 80-1097

N709NA

N806NA

ER-2 NASA Delivered to NASA Ames 

Research Center in 1989. 

Transferred to NASA Dryden 

Flight Research Center 

in 1998.

098 80-1098 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

U-2R in 1989. Crashed on 

landing at Osan, South Korea, 

in August 1994. Capt. Cholene 

Espinoza survived.
 Production Summary

237

Article No. Serial No. Model User History

099 80-1099 TR-1A

U-2R

U-2S

USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 

TR-1A on October 3, 1989. 

Transferred to Alconbury in 

March 1990. Redesignated 

U-2R in October 1991. 

Converted to U-2S in 

August 1995.
238

Milestone dates in the history of the U-2

Date Milestone

May 18, 1954 Lockheed submits unsolicited proposal to Air Force for CL-282

June 7, 1954 Lockheed notified that Air Force rejected the CL-282 proposal

November 19, 1954 Kelly Johnson discusses CL-282 with CIA

November 24, 1954 U-2 project approved by President Eisenhower

December 9, 1954 Lockheed receives $54 million contract for U-2 production 

(first 20 airframes)

June 10, 1955 USAF and CIA sign agreement on Project Aquatone

July 1955 First U-2 (Article 341) delivered to test site

August 1, 1955 Unofficial first flight of U-2 to 35 feet altitude following 

inadvertent takeoff during taxi test

August 4, 1955 First planned flight of U-2 to 8,000 feet

August 8, 1955 Official first flight for VIP visitors (third planned flight)

September 1955 Second U-2 (Article 342) delivered to test site, Phase I 

(Contractor) testing completed

October 18, 1955 U-2 achieves design altitude of 73,000 feet

December 1955 Lockheed approved to build 30 additional airframes

May 7, 1956 NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announces existence of U-2 

aircraft, same date as first operational CIA detachment deployed

June 20, 1956 First flight over Eastern Bloc countries

July 4, 1956 First flight over Russia

August 20, 1956 Second CIA detachment deployed

September 11, 1956 First U-2 flight over Middle East

U-2 Timeline 

APPENDIX 3
 U-2 Timeline

239

Date Milestone

February 1957 Third CIA detachment deployed

June 11, 1957 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron receives first six 

aircraft at Del Rio, TX

November 14, 1957 First high-altitude weather photos (Typhoon Kitt)

May 13, 1959 First flight of U-2C

May 1, 1960 Last flight over Russia, Frank Powers shot down in Article 360

October 26, 1960 First flight over Cuba

October 5, 1962 50th and final CIA U-2 flight over Cuba

May 20, 1964 First operational mission from aircraft carrier

September 1966 Lockheed receives order for 12 U-2R airframes

August 28, 1967 First flight of U-2R

December 1968 Final U-2R airframe delivered

June 3, 1971 NASA receives first U-2C for Earth Resources research

August 1, 1974 CIA U-2 program comes to an end. Remaining assets 

transferred to USAF

November 16, 1979 Production line reopens to build ER-2, TR-1, and additional 

U-2R airframes

May 11, 1981 First flight of ER-2 and delivery to NASA

August 1, 1981 First flight of TR-1

April 1989 NASA retires U-2C

October 1991 TR-1 is redesignated U-2R

August 12, 1994 First flight of U-2S (new engine)

December 2000 Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP) 

upgrades initiated

April 15, 2002 First RAMP U-2 delivered to Beale AFB

June 2013 Introduction of Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE)
240

These two photos of the Space Shuttle Atlantis were among those taken from an 

Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying high above Kennedy Space Center, 

FL, on May 4, 1989. The need for such pictures arose after the Shuttle suffered 

an unusual number of debris strikes during mission STS-27 in December 

1988. After landing, technicians discovered more than 700 instances of damage 

to the orbiter’s thermal protection tiles. Because this was approximately seven 

times the normal number of hits, NASA engineers wanted to know if the 

damage was unique to Atlantis or was part of a fleet-wide trend that began 

with STS-27. They needed to identify debris sources (ice, insulation from 

the external tank, ablative material falling off the solid rocket boosters, etc.), 

determine how much material was lost, and identify the point at which the 

damage occurred during flight. Residual material on the damaged tiles from 

STS-27 included traces of ablator and paint from the solid rocket booster 

(SRB) forward assemblies, but viewing the SRB nose caps during the first few 

minutes of flight was nearly impossible because ground-based tracking cameras 

were aimed only at the aft end and sides of the vehicle. In response to a NASA 

request, the Air Force provided a U-2 from a detachment at nearby Patrick Air 

Force Base to take high-resolution black-and-white photos during the first 2 

minutes after liftoff. The first attempt was made during the launch of STS-29 

on March 13, 1989. The pilot flew a racetrack circuit at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet at a standoff distance of about 5 miles to keep clear of the 

Shuttle’s flightpath. Timing was crucial because the spacecraft climbed very 

quickly following SRB ignition, and a wide-angle lens had to be used because 

there was no way for a telescopic camera to rapidly track the Shuttle. Due to 

a launch delay, the U-2 was not at the optimal point at liftoff and the photos 

were not very useful. A second attempt during STS-30 on May 4 was more 

successful. The U-2 pilot was able to achieve a better position and optimum 

slant angles for photography, but the resolution was still not sufficient to resolve 

enough detail to determine what was happening to the nose cones.1

1. Glen Swanson, photo caption, Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 4, no. 3 (summer 

1995): p. 1.

U-2 Space Shuttle Photography 

APPENDIX 4
 U-2 Space Shuttle Photography

241

U-2 imagery of Space Shuttle Atlantis taken on May 4, 1989. The resolution was insufficient for 

determining the source of debris from the SRB nose caps. (U.S. Air Force)
242

The Skunk Works Method 

Since the early 1940s, the Skunk Works (now a division of Lockheed Martin) 

has become synonymous with innovative aerospace design and manufacturing techniques. In the beginning, this was due in large part to Kelly Johnson’s 

unique management approach. Designed to foster creativity and innovation, 

his method established principles for the development and production of 

highly complex aircraft in a relatively short time and at as low a cost as could 

be practically achieved. Johnson’s successor, Ben Rich, and others who followed 

in their footsteps continued to use and refine the Skunk Works methods. 

Although not easily applied in the corporate world of the early 21st century, it 

is worthwhile to study this innovative business model. If implemented, it can 

be used to reduce development and life-cycle costs for acquisition programs 

involving rapid prototyping or low-rate production.

APPENDIX 5

In 1975, Ben Rich, left, succeeded Kelly Johnson as head of the Advanced Development 

Projects division. (Lockheed Martin)
 The Skunk Works Method

243

Kelly’s Rules

Johnson often summed up his method in just seven words: Be quick. Be quiet. 

Be on time. Eventually, however, he wrote a set of 14 rules addressing program 

management, organization, contractor/customer relationships, documentation, customer reporting, specifications, engineering drawings, funding, cost 

control, subcontractor inspection, testing, security, and management compensation. These became the Basic Operating Rules of the Skunk Works:

1. The Skunk Works manager must be delegated practically complete control of his program in all aspects. He should report to 

a division president or higher. (It is essential that the program 

manager have authority to make decisions quickly regarding 

technical, finance, schedule, or operations matters.) 

2. Strong but small project offices must be provided, both by the 

customer and contractor. (The customer program manager 

must have similar authority to that of the contractor.)

3. The number of people having any connection with the project 

must be restricted in an almost vicious manner. Use a small 

number of good people: 10 to 25 percent compared to the socalled normal systems. (Bureaucracy makes unnecessary work 

and must be controlled brutally.)

4. A very simple drawing and drawing release system with great 

flexibility for making changes must be provided. (This permits early work by manufacturing organizations, and schedule 

recovery if technical risks involve failures.)

5. There must be a minimum of reports required, but important 

work must be recorded thoroughly. (Responsible management 

does not require massive technical and information systems.)

6. There must be a monthly cost review covering not only what 

has been spent and committed, but also projected costs to 

the conclusion of the program. Don’t have the books 90 days 

late and don’t surprise the customer with sudden overruns. 

(Responsible management does require operation within the 

resources available.)
Unlimited Horizons

244

7. The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than 

normal responsibility to get good vendor bids for the subcontract on the project. Commercial bid procedures are very often 

better than military ones. (Essential freedom to use the best 

talent available and operate within the resources available.)

8. The inspection system as currently used by the Skunk Works, 

which has been approved by both the Air Force and Navy, meets 

the intent of existing military requirements and should be used 

on new projects. Push more basic inspection responsibility back 

to subcontractors and vendors. Don’t duplicate so much inspection. (Even the commercial world recognizes that quality is in 

design and responsible operations – not inspection.)

9. The contractor must be delegated the authority to test his final 

product in flight. He can and must test it in the initial stages. 

If he doesn’t, he rapidly loses his competency to design other 

vehicles. (Critical, if new technology and the attendant risks 

are to be rationally accommodated.)

10. The specification applying to the hardware must be agreed 

to in advance of contracting. The Skunk Works practice of 

having a specification section stating clearly which important 

military specification items will not knowingly be complied 

with and reasons therefore is highly recommended. (Standard 

specifications inhibit new technology and innovation, and are 

frequently obsolete.)

11. Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor 

doesn’t have to keep running to the bank to support government projects. (Rational management requires knowledge of, 

and freedom to use, the resources originally committed.)

12. There must be mutual trust between the customer project 

organization and the contractor with very close cooperation 

and liaison on a day-to-day basis. This cuts down misunderstanding and correspondence to an absolute minimum. (The 

goals of the customer and producer should be the same – get 

the job done well.)
 The Skunk Works Method

245

13. Access by outsiders to the project and its personnel must be 

strictly controlled by appropriate security measures. (This is a 

program manager’s responsibility even if no program security 

demands are made – a cost avoidance measure.)

14. Because only a few people will be used in engineering and 

most other areas, ways must be provided to reward good 

performance by pay not based on the number of personnel 

supervised. (Responsible management must be rewarded, 

and responsible management does not permit the growth 

of bureaucracies.)1

This management approach offers a proven, efficient method for developing new technologies, executing engineering and manufacturing development 

programs, procuring limited production systems at low rates, and upgrading 

current systems.

Ben’s Rules

Ben Rich became head of the Skunk Works in 1975. A highly capable engineer 

in the field of thermodynamics and propulsion, he had been with Lockheed 

since 1950. After joining the Skunk Works in 1954 as a senior design engineer 

on the U-2, he worked on the A-12 and SR-71 and oversaw pioneering development of stealth aircraft. Although Rich followed the Basic Operating Rules 

of the Skunk Works, he also developed his own management philosophy:2

1. Strong leadership. Maintain awareness of the big picture. Rely 

on key staff to describe the situation and alternatives. Ask 

appropriate questions, weigh the alternatives, and make a decision. (Be a benevolent dictator.)

2. Teamwork. Select people who can work well together Assemble 

the team and allow it to work with minimum interference.

1. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 210–211.

2. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” in Ben R. Rich Papers, The Huntington Library, San 

Marino, CA, July 25, 1990, p. 11.
Unlimited Horizons

246

3. Learn to delegate both authority and responsibility. Give 

people a job to do and then let them do it. (You’ll be surprised 

at the results.)

4. Manage by charisma; be flexible, and allow people to show 

their capability. Provide goals and objectives, not step-by-step 

procedures. Let workers have a say in what is going on.

5. Be both practical and tolerant. Don’t take too big a step. (Walk 

before you run.) Expect mistakes and learn from them when 

they occur. (Sometimes a mistake is just the wrong approach 

at the time.)

6. Maintain a tight schedule because time is money. (Give yourself less time than you think you’ll need.)

7. Demand and expect results. Rely on people who know how to 

prioritize. Workaholics don’t make the best employees. Hire 

people who can organize their work and communicate to subordinates how to make the most of their time. (You can’t make 

up in time what you don’t have in brains.)

8. Always be ethical. Demand integrity of yourself and those who 

serve under you. (No one is smart enough to lie.)

9. Always reward good performance, and never take credit for 

other people’s work. (A boss who is not stingy with praise will 

have a team of loyal employees.)

10. Don’t tolerate mediocrity and non-performance. Don’t tolerate unprofessionalism. Tell non-performers what they are 

doing wrong – you owe it to the rest of the team and to them. 

(Mistakes happen. Give people a chance, but if they repeat 

their errors, get rid of them.)

11. Enjoy your work. Take satisfaction in the results of your labor. 

Learn not to take your work home. Take vacations to rejuvenate both mind and body. (If you work hard, play hard.)

A comparison of the management styles of the first two Skunk Works chiefs 

reveals distinct similarities and differences. Kelly Johnson’s strong leadership 
 The Skunk Works Method

247

molded the Skunk Works into a lean, efficient organization. As a talented 

engineer, he was a technical leader as well as a manager. When engineering 

problems arose, Johnson took personal responsibility for addressing them. 

He motivated his staff through the strength of his personality, but he had a 

legendary temper and a tendency to micromanage. He succeeded because he 

encouraged creativity and rewarded accomplishments.3

Ben Rich was careful to preserve the essential character of Johnson’s operating 

philosophy, but since he lacked Johnson’s breadth of technical expertise, Rich 

tended to delegate more responsibility to his subordinates. Nevertheless, he had 

learned many things from his mentor. “Kelly taught me that integrity was the 

most important thing in all my dealings with people,” he said at his retirement 

from Lockheed in July 1991, “don’t do anything or build anything that you 

don’t believe in, and communicate with everyone from top to bottom.”4

Wisely, none of the later Skunk Works chiefs ever tried to mimic Johnson, 

who was truly one of a kind. Instead, successive new leaders have integrated 

personal perspectives with a healthy appreciation for the Skunk Works legacy. 

According to Al Romig, who led the Skunk Works from June 2011 through 

July 2013, “The real secret to maintaining innovation is simple; it’s the 

people.” National imperatives of the Cold War spurred Kelly Johnson’s genius 

and that of the people gathered around him to produce a unique culture that 

continues to resonate within the company. The unique management structure 

empowers engineers and fosters a willingness to take prudent risks. “By allowing that creative culture to perpetuate, the Skunks of today have been indoctrinated by the generations that have preceded them,” Romig acknowledged on 

the occasion of the Skunk Works’ 70th anniversary. “In a technical sense, our 

culture encourages doing things that have never been done before.”5

Lessons Learned

The Skunk Works management approach offers a proven way to develop new 

technology quickly and efficiently, execute engineering and manufacturing 

3. David C. Aronstein and Albert C. Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A: Evolution of the Stealth 

Fighter (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1997), p. 225.

4. Ben R. Rich, “B.R. Rich Retirement Speech,” in Ben R. Rich Papers, The Huntington Library, San 

Marino, CA, January 17, 1991, p. 2.

5. “Interview with Al Romig, Chief Skunk,” Skunk Works Celebrates 70 Years of Innovation, 

July 2013, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2013/roming-interview.html, 

accessed July 30, 2013.
Unlimited Horizons

248

development programs, procure production systems in limited quantities, and 

upgrade current systems. Any manufacturer can implement a Skunk Works 

management philosophy providing that both corporate leadership and the 

customer agree to abide by the rules. Otherwise, this approach will not work.

Success of this method is dependent on establishing cost as the number 

one priority. Current fiscal realities demand that every acquisition dollar be 

spent as wisely and efficiently as possible. Program cost estimates should not be 

based on historical precedents. Demand for enhanced performance capabilities 

should not be allowed to drive costs upward as this will inevitably push the 

program over budget and behind schedule.6 Expenditures should be tightly 

controlled, and unexpected cost overruns should not be tolerated. In order 

to avoid unpleasant surprises, the customer should be immediately informed 

of any cost growth as it is discovered. Managers should always adhere to a 

strict schedule but plan for some flexibility. If delays occur, it is important to 

identify the cause and implement corrective action expediently. Honest, open, 

and early communication between the contractor and the customer regarding 

any potential delays will provide opportunities for joint problem solving and 

maintain trust between both parties.7

According to Ben Rich, a successful engineering/production development 

program must have three things. First, the product must be able to perform 

the required mission. Second, it has to be delivered on schedule, as promised. 

Finally, the cost must stay within the anticipated funding. Aircraft performance 

requirements need to be well defined, reasonable, and stable. Constant changes 

can lead to failure by pushing the project behind schedule and driving up costs. 

Essential performance requirements must be separated from wish lists (i.e., 

those performance characteristics that are merely desirable, but not necessary). 

Any technical problems that arise should be identified as early as possible and 

solved quickly. Customer and contractor personnel should work together to 

find the best solution after examining any potential tradeoffs or alternatives.8

People are the most important asset. Managers should put the most qualified available personnel on the program and keep the team as small as possible. 

The benefits of keeping both management and total personnel at a minimum 

include greater individual responsibility and satisfaction, improved communications, higher productivity, and reduced costs. According to Ben Rich, “A 

6. Leland M. Nicolai, “Skunk Works Lessons Learned,” in Strategic Management of the Cost 

Problem of Future Weapon Systems, AGARD Conference Proceedings (AGARD-CP-602), 

September 1998, pp. 6–7.

7. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” p. 8.

8. Ibid., p. 7.
 The Skunk Works Method

249

large part of the success of the Skunk Works comes in the ability to develop a 

team and an attitude which favors getting the job done by jointly overcoming 

problems as they arise.”9

In order to give designers and managers as much freedom as possible, it 

is important for the manufacturer to tailor mission requirements, acquisition requirements, and manufacturing specifications. Only the most critical 

performance parameters should be specified as requirements. Whenever possible, peripheral standards and specifications should serve only as guidelines. 

Documentation should be streamlined and technical and program reviews kept 

to a minimum. Although held regularly, formal contractor-customer program 

reviews should be keyed to the pace of the program. Small program offices and 

close, regular communications minimize the need for formal reports, documentation, and more frequent reviews.10

Manufacturing personnel should influence the design from the very beginning. The manufacturing group should be responsible for material and process 

specifications, establishing tolerances, and adopting best commercial practices. 

The design should be as simple as practical with a minimum part count and 

minimum necessity for touch labor. Assembly processes that most frequently 

result in rejected parts (such as drilling holes) should be minimized if possible. Components should have left-hand/right-hand interchangeability or selflocating features for ease of installation. Room-temperature processes should 

be used as much as possible. Use of off-the-shelf components will reduce both 

acquisition and development costs.11

An aircraft should be designed for ease of maintainability. This includes 

sensible installation of equipment, adequate access panels, and a minimal 

requirement for unique tools. Designers should give consideration to future 

modifications and upgrades and provide easy access, extra volume (if possible), 

and growth power capability.12

Early design development can be achieved through the use of technology 

demonstrators or full-scale development (FSD) prototypes. A demonstrator 

may be a subscale version of the proposed design or a close approximation. 

Its sole purpose is to prove a concept or validate a critical system feature. FSD 

airframes more closely match the final production structural design and may 

9. Ibid., pp. 1–2.

10. Nicolai, “Skunk Works Lessons Learned,” pp. 7–9.

11. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

12. Ibid., p. 10.
Unlimited Horizons

250

be used to validate fabrication and assembly techniques and to verify structural 

weight and production costs.13

Keys to Success

Under the Skunk Works philosophy, a project should be organized around 

a manager who has total control of all aspects of the program, thus giving 

the manager the ability to control costs and meet rational milestones and 

objectives. Other functional organizations within the company such as human 

resources, information services, facilities, environmental health and safety, legal 

and other specialty areas provide on-demand support to the program manager.

The program’s organizational structure should be as simple as possible and 

contain built-in checks and balances. Overall staffing must be kept to a minimum to provide clear lines of responsibility and maintain program security. The 

Skunk Works approach calls for the use of a small number of skilled personnel 

who are given broad responsibility and a substantial, but reasonable, workload. 

Keeping management and total staffing to a minimum results in greater individual responsibility and job satisfaction, improved communications, higher 

productivity, and reduced costs.14

Success is dependent upon a cohesive team working closely together to 

achieve well-defined objectives. Tasks and responsibilities are clearly defined, 

and progress is measured and tracked using integrated plans and schedules. 

Managers of various subgroups must have a clear understanding of how their 

role contributes to the success of the overall program. Formal weekly program 

reviews track the program’s progress while smaller meetings provide a forum for 

ironing out differences of opinion or improving operating procedures. If the 

program involves development of new or unique capabilities, participants must 

be willing to accept failures and incorporate changes based on lessons learned.

The Skunk Works approach works only if the customer is committed to 

working in a similar manner. This starts with a small, high-quality, highly 

responsive customer program office, and a small supporting organization as 

needed. Like the contractor program manager, the customer program manager 

must also be given singular authority and broad responsibilities, reporting to a 

senior decision-capable management level. The contractor and customer teams 

should maintain open communications on program issues in order to foster 

teamwork, rapid joint problem solving, and mutual trust, rather than adversarial 

13. Ibid., p. 11.

14. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 210–211.
 The Skunk Works Method

251

relationships. Small program offices and regular communications minimize 

the need for formal reports, documentation, and frequent program reviews.15

If possible, contracts should be tailored to the specific procurements and 

eliminate restrictive and nonessential provisions while conforming to statutory and regulatory requirements. Increasing demands by Government agencies, however, for contract provisions requiring extensive reporting, prior 

Government approvals, and new administrative systems reduce a contractor’s 

ability to tailor contracts in such a fashion.

Specifications should be as simple and brief as possible. Skunk Works practice emphasizes what is to be accomplished rather than how it is to be accomplished, specifying only critical performance parameters as requirements. The 

original U-2 specification document was just 35 pages long. The later SR-71 

specification totaled 54 pages, relatively small and highly tailored compared 

to average procurement programs.

Manufacturing and quality assurance personnel should be involved early, 

working closely with design, structures, and materials engineers to ensure 

product criteria are met. An integrated product development process ensures 

the contractor will meet performance, quality, production, and affordability 

requirements. The engineering drawing system should readily accommodate 

change, and designers should be able to directly interface with manufacturers if 

changes are required. Modern computer-aided design techniques (not available 

when the U-2 was built) can reduce the need for full-scale mockups, and tooling should be kept to a minimum, especially for prototype programs. During 

fabrication and flight test, critical inspections verify compliance of processes 

with engineering requirements.16

Flight-testing of prototype and full-scale development aircraft is conducted 

under the direction of a flight-test manager reporting directly to the program 

manager. Duties for this position include test planning, ground and flight testing, data acquisition and analysis, flight vehicle maintenance and support, and 

test-data documentation. The primary objective is to get test results as quickly 

as possible and apply lessons learned. The contractor is entirely responsible for 

testing prototype vehicles. During FSD testing, the work is accomplished by 

an integrated team of contractor and customer personnel.

Historically, Skunk Works programs have met very stringent security 

requirements. Development of the Blackbirds began as a covert special-access 

program, and only personnel with a strict need to know were briefed in. This 

policy not only protected national security but also prevented interference 

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.
Unlimited Horizons

252

from outsiders and thereby increased productivity. A restrictive access policy 

can be similarly implemented on unclassified programs to improve efficiency 

and reduce costs.

By following these practices, the Skunk Works has consistently demonstrated the ability to design, develop, and produce highly advanced aircraft 

at low cost and in a minimal amount of time. The Skunk Works management principles allow a contractor to shorten the acquisition cycle and 

increase efficiency.17

Any organization can apply these principles, but of course applying the 

principles does not guarantee success. Historically, Skunk Works projects succeeded through a combination of factors including personal leadership, strong 

Governmental support, organizational momentum, and a solid reputation 

based on a long history of achievement.

Growing Pains

Implementing a classic Skunk Works management policy has become increasingly difficult. During a 1990 speech at the Air Force Academy, Ben Rich said, 

“I don’t honestly believe that you can take the Skunk Works approach and 

bottle it up and sell it as a cure-all for the acquisition problems of the DoD 

[Department of Defense]. I do believe that you can apply these basic principles 

in select acquisitions where all parties agree that the conditions are right. This is 

not limited, in my opinion, to covert programs. But, it does require a willingness to create a small team and keep it small; to choose the right people, give 

them clear, stable requirements, and a job to do; and to be willing to let them 

alone to do that job, and to provide them with stable funding.”18

Such conditions are not easy to achieve. When Lockheed merged with 

Martin Marietta in March 1995, the new Lockheed Martin Corporation 

retained the Skunk Works as a company within a company in order to pursue 

innovative design and development work, but the once fiercely independent 

business unit had to adjust to a new corporate culture. Within the Skunk 

Works, there was movement away from simple, brief specifications, particularly 

whenever a program transitioned from the specialized management procedures 

used during the prototype/demonstrator phase to conventional production 

management procedures. This occasionally resulted in difficulties, as with the 

F-22 and F-35 fighter production programs. Alan Brown, former program 

17. Ibid.

18. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” p. 12.
 The Skunk Works Method

253

manager and chief engineer on the F-117A, suggested that the time it takes to 

get from initial design to operational use of a new airplane is directly proportional to the size of the customer oversight committee responsible for guiding 

the design. “For the F-117 the Air Force team was a colonel and six other 

experts. The corresponding team on the F-22 was 130, and if you ratio the 

130 over seven, you’ll get just about the ratio of the time it took from starting 

the airframes to getting them in service.” Bob Murphy, who joined the Skunk 

Works in 1954, managed U-2 flight testing and was eventually promoted to 

deputy director of operations, laments the increased bureaucracy. “Once you 

get all these organizations involved, all the different Air Force bases across the 

country and every contractor that makes a screw for the airplane, everybody 

comes to every meeting and nothing ever gets settled.”19

Despite these growing pains, the Skunk Works continues to develop 

some of the most innovative aircraft ever built. Lockheed Martin’s Advanced 

Development Programs division has evolved from Kelly Johnson’s small shop 

in Burbank to some 2,000 people working on more than 600 programs in the 

company’s complex in Palmdale.20 Since approximately 90 percent of all work 

at the facility is classified, little is known about the group’s recent accomplishments, but its legacy continues.

19. Angus Batey, “Inside The Skunk Works,” Classic Aircraft 45, no. 11 (November 2012).

20. William J. Hennigan, “Skunk Works: Developing top-secret weapons in SoCal for 70 years,” Los 

Angeles Times, June 20, 2013.
254

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Unlimited Horizons

260

Coleman, Thomas L., and Jack Funk. “Preliminary Measurements of 

Atmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration 

Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane.” NACA Research Memorandum 

No. L57A11, March 1957.

Coleman, Thomas L., and May T. Meadows. “Airplane Measurements of 

Atmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 55,000 Feet for 

Four Geographic Areas.” NASA Memorandum No. 4-17-59L, June 1959.

Cunningham, James A. Memorandum for Project Director. “Proposed Cover 

Modifications.” CIA SAPC-18216, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390016-9. 

August 6, 1957. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.

Downie, Don, and Jim Jarboe. The Inquisitive Angel. A 16-millimeter film 

documentary produced by Hycon Mfg. Co. for the CIA. April 1957. 

Declassified in 2006. Roadrunners Internationale collection.

Dryden, Hugh L. “NACA Announces Start of New Research Program.” NASA 

Historical Reference Collection, May 7, 1956.

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence. “Statement to the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee.” May 31, 1960. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/

default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000009190.pdf.

Hansen, Kathryn. “PODEX Experiment to Reshape Future of Atmospheric 

Science.” January 16, 2013. http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/

qa-starr.html.

Hartley, Frank W., Jr. Draft of memo to John L. McLucas, Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office. “Subject: U-2C/G Storage Costs.” February 26, 

1970. http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/NROStaffRecords/1056.pdf.

Johnson, Kelly. “Log for Project X.” Lockheed California Company, Advanced 

Development Projects Division.

Land, Edwin H. Project 3, Technological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense 

Mobilization, Executive Office of the President. Memorandum to Allen W. 

Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency. November 5, 1954. http://www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf.
 Bibliography

261

Lockheed Martin. “Interview with Al Romig, Chief Skunk.” July 2013. http://

www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2013/roming-interview.html.

Lockheed Martin. “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System 

Description.” Lockheed Advanced Development Company, March 27, 1991. 

Merlin, Peter W. “U-2 Cover Story Timeline.” NASA Armstrong Flight 

Research Center historical reference collection, July 2004.

NASA. “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook.” August 2002. 

NASA. “ER-2 Program History.” NASA Fact Sheet. Rich, Ben R. “B.R. Rich 

Retirement Speech.” Ben R. Rich Papers. The Huntington Library, San 

Marino, CA, January 17, 1991.

NASA. Memorandum describing Project Rainbow cover story. Walter Bonney 

files. NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection. June 21, 1957.

NASA. “NASA Aircraft Sets New World Altitude Record.” Science Daily. November 

24, 1998. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm.

NASA Ames Research Center staff. High Altitude Perspective. NASA SP-427, 1978.

NASA. “NASA ER-2 Flies Over Russia on Ozone research Mission.” News 

Release 00-14. January 27, 2000. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/

NewsReleases/2000/00-14.html.

NASA. “ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft.” Fact Sheet FS-2007-

4-046-DFRC, 2007. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_

FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf. 

NASA. “NASA SEAC4RS Mission Targets How Pollution, Storms And 

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seac4rs_2013.html.

Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame. “Original U-2 Flight Test Crews—1955.” 

Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame historical collection.

North American Newspaper Alliance. “U.S. Mapping World for Missile War.” 

NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection. May 19, 1957. 
Unlimited Horizons

262

Rich, Ben R. “The Skunk Works Approach.” Ben R. Rich Papers. The 

Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, July 25, 1990.

U.S. Air Force. “Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft.” U.S. Air 

Force AF(C)-1-1, May 10, 1967.

U.S. Air Force. “U-2 Pilot Application.” June 14, 2012. http://www.beale.

af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5077.

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ER-2/history.html. 

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Headquarters Historical Reference Collection. 
263

Acknowledgments 

The author would like to thank the many people who helped us make this book 

possible. First of all, thanks to Tony Springer, NASA Aeronautics Research 

Mission Directorate, Office of Education and Communications, for sponsoring this project. I am grateful for the efforts of many people at NASA 

Armstrong Flight Research Center including Jim Sokolik, Steve Parcel, and 

others. Thanks to Barbara Bullock and Ben Weinstein at Media Fusion for 

preparing the manuscript for publication. Special thanks to the subject matter 

experts who reviewed the material for technical accuracy—and, especially, to 

Sarah Merlin for copyediting the final manuscript.
264

About the Author 

Peter W. Merlin has been an aerospace historian under contract to NASA 

at Armstrong Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA, since 1997. He has 

authored a variety of books, including several NASA Special Publications on 

aeronautical research projects, as well as two volumes on aerospace safety. 

He served as co-author of research pilot Donald Mallick’s autobiography, The 

Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’s Odyssey, and with Tony Moore co-wrote X-Plane 

Crashes—Exploring Experimental, Rocket Plane and Spycraft Incidents, Accidents 

and Crash Sites. He has also authored several technical papers for the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics as well as numerous journal articles 

on aerospace history and technology. In addition, he serves as a contributing 

editor for historical publications at Armstrong and has appeared in more than 

a dozen documentary television programs for Discovery, the History Channel, 

National Geographic, and others. He holds a bachelor of science degree in 

aviation management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
265

Index

Page numbers in bold indicate pages with illustrations.

A

A-12 aircraft, 74, 75

accidents and mishaps

aerial refueling mission, 63, 160

aircraft carrier operations, 70, 71–72

engine exhaust system–related accidents, 

120–21

excessive speed and structural failure, 49, 

159–60

hypoxia-related accidents, 49, 144–45

Rainbow project flight, 42, 44, 44

rate per flight hour flown, 151

safety improvements based on analysis of, 

151

serial numbers for aircraft and, 216

training flights, 47–50

Wiesbaden crashes, 48, 169, 218

acoustic signature, experiments to reduce, 83

Advanced Location Strike System (ALSS), 218, 

223, 225

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System 

(ASARS), 88, 89, 90

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System-2 

(ASARS-2), 93, 95

aerial refueling capabilities and operations, 

59–63, 60, 61, 62, 68, 160

aeroelastic divergence, 4–5, 5n8

Aerosol-Cloud-Ecosystem (ACE) satellite 

mission, 206

Aerosol Particulate Sampler, 193–94

Aether Drift astrophysics experiment, 194–95

ailerons

Article 341 official first flight, 36

CL-282 aircraft, 8

gust control system, 23

structural limit loads testing, 40–41

U-2 design, 25, 110

Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition, 198

Airborne Visible and Infrared Imaging 

Spectrometer (AVIRIS), 198, 200

air conditioning system, 13

aircraft

maintenance, designing for ease of, 81, 249

time from design to operational use, 253

aircraft carriers

accidents and mishaps, 70, 71–72

carrier suitability trials, 64, 66–68, 69–71

catapult launch and arresting hook landing 

operations, 65–66, 67, 68–69, 70–72, 

70, 76, 83–84, 83

loading and handling of aircraft aboard, 66

modifications for carrier capabilities, 65–66, 

68–69

operational readiness, 71

operation and deployment of, 72

pilot training for, 69, 83–84

survey for carrier capabilities, 63–65

U-2R Blue Gull carrier trials, 82–84, 83, 

84, 85

U-2R design for carrier capabilities, 76

Air Force, U.S.

Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), 90–92
Unlimited Horizons

266

Article 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 35–37

Bald Eagle project, 1–9

CL-282 development and operation, Land 

opinion about, 10–11

eight-phase test program, 41–42

Logistics Command (AFLC), 90–92

Mil-Spec requirements, 90

program management responsibilities, 

90–92

reconnaissance aircraft for, development 

of, vi

RPVs, interest in, 88–89

Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 4080th, 50

support for U-2 program, 50

Support Wing, 4070th, 45

U-2 program responsibilities, 27

Air Force fleet

aircraft production for, 216

flood control and damage assessment 

missions, 88

J75 engine upgrade and, 53

order for aircraft for, 76

production facility for, 16, 18

serial numbers for, 216

U-2F aerial refueling capabilities, 61

U-2R aircraft for, 81, 87–88

Air Force Flight Test Center, 219, 221

Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection, 47

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Intelligence 

Systems Panel, 9, 10

airframe

design and construction materials, 18–19

excessive speed and structural failure, 49, 

159–60

fatigue life of, 209

fighter pilot maneuvers and limitations of, 46

materials and construction methods, 101, 

102

pilot hypoxia, speed, and load limits of, 49

strengthening based on structural load limits 

testing, 39–41

turbulence and strength of, 48–49

viability of, 99

airframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD), 

121–22

Air Research and Development Command 

(ARDC), 1, 173–74, 223, 225, 227

AIRSearch configuration, 55–56

Air Weather Service (AWS), 167, 172–73, 

182–83

Alaska High-Altitude Photography Program, 195

Allmon, Carl, 13

Altair, 199

altitude

badlands, 38

CL-282 aircraft, 6, 15

developmental testing flights and expansion 

of flight envelope, 37, 39

effects on human body and need for lifesupport systems, 24–25, 129

engine restarts at high altitude, 21, 38, 78, 

82, 122–23, 162–63

engine thrust and, 10

hazards of high flight, 144–51

high-altitude engine flameouts, 21, 37–39

M-195 aircraft, 4

maximum altitude, 158–63

payload weight and, 10

pilot-training flights, 46, 47

profile of normal mission, 156

radar and interceptor development by 

Soviets and, vi, 11, 175

radar signature–reduction research and, 43

reconnaissance aircraft design study 

requirement, 1

requirements for survivability of 

reconnaissance aircraft, vi, 10

stall checks, 71–72

true altitude and calibration of altimeter, 

158–59

turbulence research, 169–74, 171

U-2 aircraft capabilities, 20, 161–62
Index

267

U-2 aircraft capabilities, release of 

information about, 175–76

U-2 weight and, 15

U-2C aircraft, 54–55

U-2R aircraft, 75, 80

U-2S aircraft, 94–95

world altitude record flights, 37–38, 158, 

200, 202

X-16 aircraft, 4

America, 83–84, 84, 85

Ames Research Center

atmospheric radiation level research, 151

display of aircraft at, 218

ER-2 based at, 186

ER-2 delivery to, 92, 186, 197

ER-2 research programs, 195

testing and flight operations at, 231, 236

Ames Stratospheric Air Sampler, 189–90

AN/AAS-8 infrared sensor, 55–59, 57, 58

AN/ALQ-110 radar signal receiver, 86–87

AN/APQ-56 radar, 2, 40

AN/APS-116 X-band weather radar, 86–87

Anderson, Rudolph, 217

AQM-37 drone, 82

Aquatone, Project, 12, 27, 50

Arizona Land Use Experiment, 191–92

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

(AFSWP), 172–74

Armstrong Flight Research Center, 202

Armstrong Flight Research Center (Dryden Flight 

Research Center), 202, 236

Armstrong Line, 129

Army Corps of Engineers, 207

Article 051

construction of, 78–79

history summary, 229

maiden flight, 78–79

Article 052, 229

Article 053, 229

Article 054, 229

Article 055, 230

Article 056, 230

Article 057, 230

Article 058, 230

Article 059, 230

Article 060, 230

Article 061

EP-X trials, 86–88, 86

history summary, 231

radar system research, 85–86

Article 062, 231

Article 063, 231

Article 064, 231

Article 065, 231

Article 066, 232

Article 067, 232

Article 068, 232

Article 069, 232

Article 070, 232

Article 071, 233

Article 072, 233

Article 073, 233

Article 074, 233

Article 075, 233

Article 076, 233

Article 077, 233

Article 078, 234

Article 079, 234

Article 080, 234

Article 081, 234

Article 082, 234

Article 083, 234

Article 084, 234

Article 085, 235

Article 086, 235

Article 087, 235

Article 088, 235

Article 089, 235

Article 090, 235

Article 091, 235
Unlimited Horizons

268

Article 092, 236

Article 093, 236

Article 094, 236

Article 095, 236

Article 096, 236

Article 097, 236

Article 098, 236

Article 099, 237

Article 331, 219

Article 341

assembly of, 25

engine modifications, testing of, 39–40

engine testing, 28, 30

final assemble and readiness for flight 

testing, 26, 28, 29

ground vibration testing, 28

history summary, 216

inspection of, 25

maiden flight, 31–34, 34

number of flights and flight hours, 39–40

official first flight, 35–37

radar signature–reduction research, 42, 43

Rainbow project flight and loss of, 42, 44, 

44

static testing, 25

structural limit loads testing, 40–41

takeoff and landing techniques, 32, 34–35, 

36–37

taxi test, 30–31

transport of in C-124 transport, 25, 25

unplanned first flight, 30

wheel brake and tire issues, 30–31, 115–16

Article 342

aerial refueling mission mishap, 160

aerial refueling modifications, 61–63

elevator tab support bracket modification, 41

history summary, 217

number of flights and flight hours, 40

pilot training mishap with, 47–48

pilot-training program use of, 40

reconnaissance systems testing, 40

U-2C upgrades to, 53–55

Article 343, 42, 43, 217

Article 344

autopilot developmental testing flights, 40

history summary, 217

number of flights and flight hours, 40

pilot training mishap with, 48

pilot-training program use of, 40

reconnaissance systems testing, 40

Article 345, 48, 217

Article 346, 48–49, 218

Article 347, 218

Article 348

carrier capability configuration, 68

carrier suitability trials, 71

history summary, 218

modification to ER-2 platform, 185–86

Article 349

aerial refueling modifications, 68

carrier capability configuration, 68

history summary, 219

modification to ER-2 platform, 185–86

U-2H configuration, 68

Article 350, 219

Article 351

communication system testing, 40

navigation system testing, 40

reconnaissance systems testing, 40

U-2C upgrades to, 53–55

Article 352

carrier suitability trials, 66–68

history summary, 219

Article 353, 220

Article 354, 48, 220

Article 355, 48, 220

Article 356, 220

Article 357, 49, 220

Article 358, 53–55, 221

Article 359, 74, 221
Index

269

Article 360, 222

Article 361, 222

Article 362, 68, 222

Article 363, 222

Article 364, 222

Article 365, 223

Article 366, 223

Article 367, 223

Article 368, 223

Article 369, 223

Article 370, 224

Article 371, 224

Article 372, 224

Article 373, 224

Article 374, 225

Article 375, 225

Article 376, 225

Article 377, 58–59, 225

Article 378, 225

Article 379, 226

Article 380, 226

Article 381, 226

Article 382

carrier capability configuration, 68

carrier landing accident, 71–72

history summary, 226

Article 383, 226

Article 384, 227

Article 385, 68, 227

Article 386, 227

Article 387, 227

Article 388, 59, 227

Article 389, 55–56, 227

Article 390, 228

Article 391, 228

Article 392, 228

Article 393

accident with, 73

history summary, 228

U-2CT trainer configuration, 73

Article 394

conversion to single-seat U-2C, 59

history summary, 228

two-seat configuration, 59

Article 395, 229

assembly and manufacturing of aircraft. See

production of aircraft

astroinertial navigation systems (ANS), 127

Atlantis Space Shuttle, 240, 241

atmospheric and stratospheric sampling 

missions, 189–91, 193–94, 198, 200–201, 

202–4, 206–7

Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation (AIR) project, 151

atmospheric radiation level research, 150–51

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 27

automatic direction finder (ADF) radio navigation 

system, 127

autopilot, 15, 22, 40, 156, 160–61

avionics

glass cockpit, 95–97, 96

improvements in, 53

U-2R aircraft, 78

Avon RA.14 engines, 8–9

B

B-47 bombers, 32, 130

B-52 bombers, 12, 21

B-57 bomber, viii, 1, 2, 38

Bailey, Bernard, 185

Baird, Walter, 22, 56–57

Baird Associates/Baird Atomic, 22, 56–57

Baker, James, 21–22

Baker, Jim, 9–10

Bald Eagle project, 1–9

Baldwin, Ed

trainer conversion role, 73

U-2 program role, 13

U-2R engineering study role, 76

U-2R fuselage design role, 78
Unlimited Horizons

270

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) 

radar stations, 56, 59

Barnes, Jim, 71, 133, 185

Barrilleaux, Jim, 202

Beale Air Force Base (AFB)

display of aircraft at, 226

physiological support for pilots at, 139–40, 

142–43

pilot selection activities at, 153

testing and flight operations at, 229, 

230–37

Beaumont, Edward, 226

Beech Twin Bonanza aircraft, 79

Bell Aircraft Corporation, 1

Bellanca Decathlon, 74

Bell X-16 (Model 67) aircraft, 1, 4–5, 5, 10, 11

Bissell, Bill, 13

Bissell, Richard, 12, 12, 27, 50, 168, 176

Blackbird aircraft, 251–52

Blackbird Airpark, 227

Black Knight project, 2

Boehme, Dick, 12, 15, 16

Boeing, 1, 89, 151

Bonanza aircraft, 79

Bonney, Walter T., 172–73, 181

Bonsi, David, 120–21, 230

brakes

design of, 15, 115

performance of wheel brakes, 30, 31

Bremberg, Vern, 13

Broce, Stu, 205–6

Brown, Alan, 252–53

Buckner, Vernon, 28

budgets, funding, and costs

approval for production, changes in process 

for, 74–75

CIA aircraft, 15

CL-282 funding, 10

Global Hawk costs and cost per flight hour, 

97, 210

Skunk Works management philosophy, 243, 

244, 248

TR-1 aircraft, 92

trainer conversion costs, 73

U-2 funding, 12

U-2L costs, 74

U-2 modernization costs, 210

U-2 operating costs and cost per flight hour, 

97, 210

U-2R engineering study costs, 76

U-2R maintenance and operating costs, 93

wing design research costs, 75

Bundgaard, Robert C., 174

B.V. Ward, 16

C

C&J Manufacturing, 16

C-47 transport, 27, 32

C-124 transport, 25, 25

C-130B aircraft, 199

Cabell, Charles P., 64

Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE), 98, 

148–49, 149, 239

California

atmospheric and stratospheric sampling 

missions, 194

emergency management and disaster-relief 

planning in, 193, 210

river and reservoir water level monitoring, 

186, 192

San Diego image, 193

tidal and water movement research, 187

cameras

CL-282 aircraft, 6

defroster for windows for, 124–25

developmental testing flights, 40

ER-2 cameras, 187–89, 188, 192–94

ERTS cameras, 191–92

installation of, 108

interchangeable nose assemblies for, 76, 103
Index

271

M-195 aircraft, 3

operational checkout pilot-training flights, 

46–47

Optical Bar Camera (OBC), 97–98, 194

optical bar system and vibration issues, 

81–82

RB-57D aircraft, 2

RC-10 camera, 188, 200

requirements for reconnaissance aircraft, vi

U-2R cameras, 81–82, 93

upward-facing camera, 74

for weather research, 174

X-16 aircraft, 4

camouflage, 83

Campbell, John, 63, 217

Canadian Defense Research Establishment, 151

Carey, Howard, 48–49, 218

Carlton, Paul K., 73

Carmody, Fred, 209–10

Carroll, George, 179

Carter, Ashton, 210

Carter, Marshall S., 64, 65

Cass, Lorne, 13

Cavanaugh, Fred, 76

celestial navigation, 22, 105

center of gravity

aerial refueling, cross-transfer system 

between tanks, and, 62–63

fuel usage and, 77

U-2C aircraft, 55

XF-104 conversion to CL-282 and, 7

Chameleon experiment, 83

Chang, Hseih “Billy,” 227

Chang, Li-Yi “Jack,” 221

Chapin, Al, Jr., 144, 223

Charlton, Bob, 13

chase cars (mobiles), 32, 158

Chen, Huai-Sheng, 225

Chevy Camaro Z-28, 158

Chevy El Camino, 158

Chih, Yao-Hua, 219

Christman, Pop, 28

Churchill, Winston, v

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

Article 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 35–37

CL-282 aircraft, interest in, 9–11

Contingency Reserve Fund, 12

deployment of U-2 personnel, 50

reconnaissance aircraft for, development 

of, vi

reconnaissance operations, responsibility 

for, 5, 11

reconnaissance operations, suitability for 

conducting, 11

termination of role in U-2 program, 87, 88

U-2 program responsibilities, 27

weather research cover story, 167–74, 171, 

179–84, 182, 183

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) fleet

aircraft production for, 216

cost of aircraft for, 15

engine upgrade for, 53

number of aircraft in, 74, 76

order for aircraft for, 76

production facility for, 15–16, 16

U-2F aerial refueling capabilities, 61

U-2R aircraft for, 81

CL-282 aircraft

advantages of, 10

Air Force role in development and operation, 

Land opinion about, 10–11

approval for development, 11

assignment of U-2 designation, 12

CIA interest in, 9–11

design of and proposal for, 6–9, 6n11, 7, 21

engine selection, 8–9, 11

funding for, 10

Land Panel interest in and support for 

development of, 9–11

rejection of proposal for, 6–9, 11
Unlimited Horizons

272

schedule for development and production, 11

See also U-2 aircraft

Coastal Conservation Commission, 195

Coastal Zone Color Scanner, 189

cockpits

back cushion for seat, 35

cabin pressure fluctuations, 36

canopy design, 22, 31, 106, 106

CL-282 aircraft, 7–8, 21

control panel and instruments, 103–4

defroster for windshield, 124

design and construction of, 103–6

glass cockpit, 95–97, 96

heat in, 31

layout of, update to, 97

M-195 aircraft, 3

pilot bailout technique, 22

pressurized cockpits, 8, 24, 98, 103, 107, 

123–24, 129, 137, 148–49, 149

SR-71 aircraft, 139

team for design and manufacturing, 13

temperature distribution in, 124

two-seat configuration, 57–59, 57, 58

U-2C aircraft, 139

U-2 design, 21–22

U-2R aircraft, 78, 139

windscreen and visibility issues, 31

windscreen upgrades, 95

X-16 aircraft, 5

Coe, Emilie C., 170

coffin corner of flight envelope, 153, 159

Cold War, v–vi, 9

Cold War Museum, 228

Coleman, Phil, 6

Coleman, Thomas L., 169–70, 171, 179

Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD), 141–43

Combs, Henry, 13, 15, 32

commercial aeronautics, contributions to, 201

communication system

data link communications, 93

design of, 126–27

developmental testing flights, 40

Senior Span, 93–94, 94

Compass Cope, 89

Concorde, 151, 201

Cone, Doug, 13

control surfaces

cable operation of, 19

CL-282 wing control surfaces, 8

structural limit loads testing, 40–41

Convair, 1

Convection And Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX), 

204–5

cooperation, trust, and goals of the project, 244, 

248, 250–51

Cruz, Frank, 28

Cuba and Cuban Missile Crisis, 210, 217, 219, 

221

Cunney, John, 228

Cunningham, James A., Jr., 64–65, 175

Cuthbert, Gene, 28

D

Daedalus Multispectral Scanner, 195

David Clark Company, 46, 130–37

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB)

display of aircraft at, 226

testing and flight operations at, 224, 226, 

228–31

U-2CT flight from, 73–74

DC-8 aircraft, 207

Deal, Paul, 28

decompression sickness, 98, 129, 137, 140, 

146–49, 146, 149

dehydration, 139

Delap, Jack, 45

demonstrators, technology, 249–50

Dettmer, Tom, 121, 233

Dickinson, Brian, 138

Dirty Birds, 42, 43
Index

273

Distributed Common Ground System station, 98

Donovan, Allen, 10, 11

Doolittle, Jimmy, 23

Dow, Royal, 13

drag chute, 15, 50

Dragon Lady nickname, 153

drinks and food, 133–34, 137, 139, 141–43, 

141, 143

drones, 82

Dryden, Hugh L., 167, 169, 172, 182–84

Dryden Flight Research Center (Armstrong Flight 

Research Center), 202, 236

Duckett, Carl, 185

Dulles, Allen W., vi, 10–11, 12, 181–82

dysbarism, 144

E

Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS)/

Landsat, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 

199

Edens, Buster E., 71–72, 220, 226

Edwards Air Force Base (AFB)

testing and flight operations at, 217, 219, 

220, 223, 225, 227, 229

test operations move to, 44, 50

U-2R testing and training activities, 80

Efsic, Eddie, 154

Eielson Air Force Base, 193–94

Eisenhower administration and Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, v–vi, 9, 11, 63–64, 181–82

ejection seats/escape systems

CL-282 aircraft, 7–8

M-195 aircraft, 3

Rainbow project flight and call for use of, 44

two-seat configuration, 58, 59

U-2 nonuse of, 22

U-2R aircraft, 76, 78

X-16 aircraft, 5

electrical system

design of, 126

development of, 54

Power-EMI upgrade, 95

team for design and manufacturing, 13

U-2R aircraft, 76

electromagnetic interference (EMI), 95

electronic intelligence (ELINT) data, 2

Electronics Patrol Experimental (EP-X) trials, 

86–88, 86

aircraft for, 86, 86, 229

ASARS for, 88

Highboy project, 86–87, 87

electro-optical reconnaissance, 93

elevator tab, 54

elevator tab support bracket modification, 41

Ellis, Richard H., 91–92

Ellison, George, 13

Engelbry, Chan, 13

engine air inlets

CL-282 configuration, 7

J57-P-31 engines, 118

for J75-P-13B engines, 75

for J75-P-13 engines, 52, 53, 54

U-2 configuration, 20

engine controls, digital, 94

engine exhaust tailpipes, 24, 80, 80–81, 

119–21

engines

altitude and thrust, 10

Bald Eagle project engine requirements, 1, 

9, 11

CL-282 engine placement, 7

CL-282 engine selection, 8–9, 11

high-altitude flameouts, 21, 37–39

restarts at high altitude, 21, 38, 78, 82, 

122–23, 162–63

single- versus multi-engine aircraft 

performance and requirements, 10

spark plug problems, 28, 30

U-2C aircraft, 53, 55, 78

U-2C heat shielding around, 54
Unlimited Horizons

274

U-2 engine procurement, 12

U-2 engines, 21, 24, 117–23, 118, 119, 122

U-2R aircraft, 75, 78, 81, 94

windmill restarts, 122

See also General Electric entries; Pratt & 

Whitney entries

English, Leroy, 13

environmental control systems (ECS), 106–7, 

123–25

Environmental Measurements Laboratory, 

Department of Energy, 151

Environmental Protection Agency, U.S., 189, 207

ER-1 aircraft, 90

ER-2 aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 162

atmospheric radiation level research, 151

cameras for, 187–89, 188, 192–94

delivery of, 92, 186, 197

design of, 90

hypoxia-related incident, 149–50

longevity and viability of, 211

number of aircraft configured as, 202, 203

number of flights and flight hours, 186, 190

payload capabilities, 199

photo of, 196

production of, 216

production summary, 231–32, 236

scope of research missions, 186–87, 

189–95, 192, 193, 194, 197–207

Senior Span, 94

sensors aboard, 187–95, 188, 207

specifications, 214, 215

world altitude record flights, 202

Ericson, Robert J. “Bob,” 49, 71, 169, 185, 220

Espinoza, Cholene, 236

Evans, Bill, 99

F

F-22 fighter program, 252–53

F-35 fighter program, 252–53

F-86 aircraft, 33

F-100 fighters, 12, 39, 104

F101-GE-F29 engines, 121

F-104 Starfighters, 58

F-105 fighters, 53

F-117A aircraft program, 252–53

F118-GE-101 engines, 94–95, 121–23, 122, 

162

Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, 1

Fairchild M-195 aircraft, 1, 2–4, 5, 9, 11

Fan, Huang-Di “Andy,” 222

Federation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI), 200

fire-management and wildfire research, 193, 

198–99, 200

Firewel Company, 130, 131

Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S., 207

Fishhawk, Operation, 71

Flickenger, Donald D., 129–30

flight controls

automatic system for mission flights, 

156–57

design of, 21, 104–5

simplicity of, 19

team for design and manufacturing, 13

flight testing

briefings before flights, 38

developmental testing, 37–44

Edwards AFB airfield, move of operations to, 

44, 50

maiden flight, v

number of aircraft available for, 37

number of flight hours, 37

number of personnel involved in 

development flight-test program, 41–42

secure test site acquisition, 27

securing airspace for, 33

Skunk Works management philosophy, 251

stripes on lakebed for visual reference, 30, 31

structural limit loads testing, 39–40

structure of program, 44
Index

275

test site preparations, 28

U-2C developmental testing, 54

U-2R maiden flight, 79

U-2R testing and experiment activities, 

79–81, 80, 82–87, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87

Watertown Airstrip for, 27

Flit insect repellent spray, 24

Flynn, Leroy, 28

food and drinks, 133–34, 137, 139, 141–43, 

141, 143

Ford Mustang, 158

Forest Service, U.S., 197, 207

Fortune Cookie experiment, 82

Frost, Gene, 6

Frye, Fritz, 28

fuel and fuel system

aerial refueling capabilities and operations, 

59–63, 60, 61, 62, 68, 160

CL-282 aircraft, 8

CL-282 sump tank, 7

cross-transfer system between tanks, 

62–63

design of, 23, 125–26

fuel capacity, 20, 111

fuel capacity and mission duration, 78

fuel consumption rates, 21, 118–19

fuel expansion and apparent ability to 

manufacture fuel, 125–26

fuel quantity, monitoring of, 23

fuel transfer system, 23

movement of fuel from one wing to the 

other, 72

probe-and-drogue buddy refueling 

capability, 83

running our of fuel mishap, 48

slipper tanks on wings, 23, 52, 55, 62, 162

tanks and tank placement, 23, 110, 111, 

125

team for design and manufacturing, 13

types of fuel, 23–24, 98–99, 126

U-2C aircraft, 54

U-2R aircraft, 77–78

weight and balance and, 23

Fulkerson, Glen, 28, 31, 58–59

full-pressure suits

A/P22S-6 suits, 131

comfort of, 78

custom fitting of for individual pilots, 135

S901J suits, 135

S1010A suits, 135

S1010B suits, 135, 139

S1010 suits, 135–36, 139

S1030 suits, 136

S1031C suits, 136

S1031 suits, 136

S1034 suits, 134, 136

U-2R cockpit and use of, 78

use of by pilots, 123

weight of, 135

full-scale development (FSD) prototypes, 

249–50

Funk, Jack, 169–70

fuselage

aerial refueling modifications, 61

CL-282 design, 6–7

dorsal spine on, 52

forward fuselage design and construction, 

102–10, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109

lengthening of, 74

Q-bay, 21

skid for CL-282 landings, 6, 7

skin panels, 18–19, 41, 102

skin wrinkles, 41

team for design and manufacturing, 13

two-seat configuration, 57–59, 57, 58

U-2 design, 21

U-2R design, 75–76, 77, 78

wing attachment to, arrangement for, 110
Unlimited Horizons

276

G

galactic cosmic rays (GCR), 150–51

Gardner, Cornelius, 13

Gardner, Trevor, 9, 10–11

Garvin, Louis A., 45

Gath, Elmer, 13

Gavette, Leon, 13

Geary, Leo, 39

General Electric F101-GE-F29 engines, 121

General Electric F118-GE-101 engines, 94–95, 

121–23, 122, 162

General Electric J73-X-52 engines, 8–9, 11

General Electric J79 engine, 8

Geological Survey, U.S. (USGS), 187, 195

Geophysical Research Directorate, 172

George, Mel, 42

Gibb, Walter, 38

glass cockpit, 95–97, 96

Glennan, T. Keith, 181–82

glide capabilities of U-2 design, 23, 33, 162–63

Global Hawk, 97, 98, 210–11

global positioning systems (GPS), 95, 127, 154, 

157

Global Wind Mission, 205

gloves, 97, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 140–41

Goddard Space Flight Center, 189, 194, 205

Goodyear Aerospace, 85

Goudey, Ray

briefings before flights, 38

developmental testing flights, 37

fatigue and mission duration, 161

pilot training role, 45

structural limit loads testing, 40

T-33 chase plane role, 33

test pilot role, 37

U-2C flight testing, 54

Grace, Frank G., Jr., 48, 220

Greenland, 205, 206

Gregory, Bill, 69, 71

ground effect, 30, 153

ground handling equipment, team for design 

of, 13

ground vibration testing, 28

Gurin, Pete, 13

gust control system

Article 341 taxi test, 31

design of, 23, 105, 110

landing technique and use of, 34, 35, 36

structural limit loads testing, 40–41

takeoff technique and use of, 35, 49

U-2C aircraft, 54

Gypsy Moth infestation research, 197

H

Hagerty, James C., 181

Haley, Deborah, 142–43

Hall, Robert E. “Deke,” 160, 217

Halloran, Pat, 145–46

handling characteristics

buffet characteristics, 33, 34–35, 159

challenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153, 

158–63

fighter pilot maneuvers and limitations of 

airframe, 46

glide capabilities, 23, 33, 162–63

hand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45, 

71

pilot training in single-seat aircraft, 45

porpoise maneuver, 34–35

stability and control, 163–64

U-2R modifications to improve, 77

Hansen, Shawn, 138

Harvey, Frank “Red,” 28

Haughland, Paul L., 222

Hawkens, David, 230

hazards of high flight, 144–51

Heal, Merv, 74, 75

Heat Capacity Mapping Radiometer, 189, 194

heat signatures, 55–59, 57, 58

Helen, Super Typhoon, 177
Index

277

helmets

A/P22S-6 helmets, 131

faceplate fogging, 133, 139–40

S901J helmets, 135

S1010D helmets, 135–36

S1010 helmets, 135

S1034E helmets, 136–37

Type MA-2 helmet, 130

Helms, Richard, 76, 81

Henderson, Robert, 229

Henning, John, 13

Herman, Carl, 28

Hickam Air Force Base, 194

Hickman, Robert, 227

High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP), 103, 

172–73, 173, 224

Highboy, Project, 86–87, 87

Highly Calibrated Airborne Measurements 

Program (Hi-CAMP) project, 197–98

High Speed Research Project Office, Langley 

Research Center, 151

Hotz, Robert, 183

Hough, Dick, 28

Howard Air Force Base, 194

Hoyt, Jerry, 200

HRB-Singer, 194

Hruda, Richard, 13

Huang, Chi-Hsien “Denny,” 230

Hubbard, Tom, 121, 233

Huber, John, 69

Hunerwadel, Hugh P. “Pat,” 56, 59, 225

Hunter, Bob, 13

Hwang, Jung-Bei “Denny,” 224

Hyde, Joe, Jr., 219

hydraulic system

design of, 126

simplicity of, 19

team for design and manufacturing, 13

hydrazine, 123

hypoxia, 24, 49, 129, 144–46, 149–50

I

Ice, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat-2), 

205

Ida, Super Typhoon, 176, 177

Ikhana, 199

ILC Dover, 130

Imperial War Museum, 221

inertial navigation systems (INS), 127, 157

instrument landing systems (ILS), 127

integrity, 246, 247

intelligence

comparison of collection platform 

capabilities, 75

ELINT data, 2

reconnaissance operations to gather, v–vi

SIGINT data, 2, 88, 89, 93, 95

Soviet missile threat to U.S., 56, 59

ionizing radiation, 150–51

Itek IRIS II sensor, 81

J

J57 engines

Article 341 engine testing, 28, 30

availability of engines, 38–39

CL-282 use of, 11

engine failures, 21

high-altitude flameouts, 21, 37–39

J57-P-9 engines, 2

J57-P-31 engines, 4, 21, 38–39, 40, 47, 

53, 118–20, 162

J57-P-37 engines, 21, 38–39, 40, 118–20, 

161–62

M-195 use of, 2–3

modifications for, testing of, 39–40

restarts at high altitude, 21, 38

U-2 engine procurement, 12

U-2 use of, 21, 117–20, 118

X-16 use of, 4

J65-W-5 engines, 2

J67 engines, 3
Unlimited Horizons

278

J73 engines, 3

J73-X-52 engines, 8–9, 11

J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines

engine exhaust system–related accidents, 

120–21

engine restarts at high altitude, 78, 82, 122

maintenance costs, 94

performance of, 120, 162

replacement of, 94

U-2C aircraft, 53, 55, 78

U-2R aircraft, 75, 78, 81, 82

J79 engine, 8

Jensen, Alvin, 13

J.E. Ramsey Company, 16

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 198

Johnson, Bob, 28

Johnson, Clarence L. “Kelly”

aircraft carrier modifications and trials, 64, 

67, 68–69

altitude capabilities, release of information 

about, 175

Article 341 official first flight, 35–37

assembly and manufacturing processes, 

17–18

Bald Eagle project, unsolicited proposal for, 

5–9

C-47 observer fight, 32

CL-282 design and development, 6–12, 

6n11

deadstick landing maneuver, 37

dummy company name based on, 16

evolution of design for changing 

requirements, 76

grandmother, trading for reducing weigh of 

aircraft, 15

infrared sensor system installation and twoseat aircraft, 57–59

landing technique, 32, 34

maiden flight preparations by, 31–34

management style and Basic Operating 

Rules, 13–15, 14, 242–45, 246–47

maritime surveillance capabilities, 

development of, 85

NASA use of U-2, role in, 185

personality of, 247

photos of, 14, 178, 242

Rainbow project flight and modifications to 

aircraft, 44

restarting production line, hope for, 74, 

87–88, 90

retirement of, 88

Rich as replacement for, 88, 242

schedule for development and production, 

11, 12, 25, 28, 37

secret documents, opinion about, 17

secure test site acquisition, 27

stall and trim problems, concern about, 72

success in meeting 8-month deadline, 37

tail design development, 78

trainer configuration, 73

turbulence and strength of airframe, 48

U-2R maiden flight chase plane role, 79

U-2 wing design, 22–23

wheel brakes, appropriate use of, 31

wing design modification, 75

work week schedule, 13, 25

Johnson Space Center, 151

Joiner, Ernie

Article 341 maiden flight role, 32–33

autopilot and length of flights, 161

flight test program, structure of, 44

Ground Hog call sign, 32

maiden flight preparations by, 31

pogo release and aircraft mishaps, 48

taxi test and brake inspection, 30

U-2 program role, 28

JP-1 fuel, 126

JP-4 fuel, 23, 28, 33, 126

JP-8 fuel, 98–99
Index

279

JP-TS (LF-1A) fuel, 23–24, 28, 33, 126, 204

JT12 engines, 57

K

Kammerer, Dorsey, 28

KC-97 aircraft, 63

KC-135 Stratotanker

aerial refueling operations, 59, 61–63, 61, 

160

engines for, 39

U-2 engine procurement, 12

Kelly, Robert, 13, 25

Kennedy Space Center, 240

Khrushchev, Nikita, 181

Killian, James, 11

Kirkham, Ray, 13

Kirtland Air Force Base, 162–63

Kit, Typhoon, 174

Kitty Hawk, 64, 66–68, 67, 87

Klinger, Robert T. “Bob,” 28, 41

Knutson, Marty, 92, 185, 186, 197

Kreimendahl, Rod, 13, 113

Krumrey, Doyle, 200

L

L-1011 Tristar, 88

Lacombe, Benedict A., 224

Lakehurst Naval Air Station, 83

Lamar, Bill, 1, 6

Land, Edwin, vi, 9–11

landing gear

arming U-2R with weapons, modifications 

for, 82

challenges of flying U-2 aircraft and, 153

CL-282 design and elimination of, 6, 7

M-195 aircraft, 3

team for design and manufacturing, 13

U-2 aircraft, 12, 19–20, 49, 115–17, 116, 

117

U-2B aircraft, 57–58

U-2C aircraft, 54

U-2R aircraft, 76

weight of, 20

wheel brake and tire issues, 30–31, 115–16

X-16 aircraft, 4

landings. See takeoffs and landings

Land Panel, 9–11

Landsat/Earth Resources Technology Satellite 

(ERTS), 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 

199

Langley Research Center

High Speed Research Project Office, 151, 

202

Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment 

(LASE), 202

Laughlin Air Force Base (AFB)

display of aircraft at, 225

testing and flight operations at, 222–25, 

226–29

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), University 

of California, 189

leaflet drop capabilities, 82

Ledford, Jack, 64

Lee, Nan-Ping “Terry,” 222

Lemay, Curtis, 45

LeVier, Tony

Angel 1 call sign, 32

Article 341 maiden flight, 31–34

Article 341 official first flight, 35–37

Article 341 taxi test, 30–31

developmental testing flights, 37

landing technique, 32, 34–35

Lockheed director of flying role, 37

partial-pressure-suit training, 37

photo of, 36

secure test site acquisition, 27

stripes on lakebed for visual reference, 

painting of, 31

test pilot assignment, 28

unplanned first flight, 30
Unlimited Horizons

280

wheel brakes, appropriate use of, 31

Lexington, 69

LF-1A (JP-TS) fuel, 23–24, 28, 33, 126, 204

Liang, Teh-Pei “Sonny,” 220

Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment (LASE), 

202

Lien, Art, 45

life-support systems

altitude effects on human body and need for, 

24–25, 129

operational checkout pilot-training flights, 

46–47

Rainbow project flight and malfunction of, 

42, 44

U-2 systems, 24–25, 106, 123

Link-Net fabric, 131

Little, Jon, 230

Lockheed Aircraft Company

Advanced Development Projects division, 13 

(see also Skunk Works)

Article 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 35–37

Bald Eagle project, unsolicited proposal for, 

5–9

contract pilots for NASA, 185, 202

infrared sensor development, 55–56

merger with Martin Marietta, 202, 252

reconnaissance aircraft design study, 

exclusion from request for, 1, 6

rejection of CL-282 proposal, 9

U-2 program responsibilities, 27

Lockheed CL-282 aircraft. See CL-282 aircraft

Lockheed JetStar, 78

Lockheed L-1011 Tristar, 88

Lockheed Martin Corporation

Advanced Development Programs, 253

contract pilots for NASA, 202

merger and formation of, 202, 252

security of programs at, 253

Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star aircraft, 13

Lockheed XF-104 fighter, 6–9, 12, 21

Loh, J. Michael, 92

Loring Air Force Base, 194

Lovelace, W. Randolph, II, 129–30

Lovelace Clinic, 46

Lovick, Ed, 42

Low Card, Project, 56–58

Lowcock, Ford, 223

Lunar Mapper instrument, 194

Lundahl, Arthur C., 184

Lutz, Richard, 13

M

M-195 aircraft, 1, 2–4, 5, 9, 11

maintenance, designing for ease of, 81, 249

March Field Air Museum, 227

Martin, Ed, 13, 21

Martin B-57 bomber, viii, 1, 2, 38

Martinez, Tony, 73

Martin Marietta, 202, 252

Martin RB-57D (Model 294) aircraft. See

RB-57D (Model 294) aircraft

Matye, Bob

Article 341 chase plane role, 34–36

C-47 observer plane role, 32

pilot training role, 45

test pilot role, 37

world altitude record flights, 37–38

McClung, Lonnie, 83

McCoy, Tommy, 13

McCoy Air Force Base, 86

McDonald, Luther, 42

McGregor, Marty, 229

McGuire, Stephen, 147–49

McHenry, Ray, 13

McLucas, John L., 185

McMillan, Brockway, 75

McNamara, Robert, 76, 81

Meadows, May T., 179

Meierdierck, Hank, 45

Mihm, Jordan, 117
Index

281

Milam, Vic, 228

military specifications (Mil-Spec), 17, 90, 209, 

244

Missile Defense and Alarm System (MIDAS) 

early warning satellite, 56, 59

missions and operations

activities related to planning and flying, 

154–58

aerial refueling and mission duration, 61–62

altitude performance, 47

deployments for flying, 154

duration of, 156, 161–62

first operational mission, 50

fuel capacity and mission duration, 78

number flight hours since 2003, 211

operational checkout exercises and 

operational status of aircraft, 47

pilot fatigue and mission duration, 61, 62, 

161

profile of normal mission, 156–57

mobiles (chase cars), 32, 158

Model 67 (X-16) aircraft, 1, 4–5, 5, 10, 11

Model 294 aircraft. See Martin RB-57D (Model 

294) aircraft

Moderate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer 

(MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS), 200–201

Moffett Field Historical Society Museum, 218

Morning Light, Operation, 88

Multiple Altimeter Beam Experimental Lidar 

(MABEL), 205–6, 206

Murphy, Bob, 28, 31, 253

Murphy, Sam, 13

Mururoa Atoll, 71

museum displays of aircraft, 200, 218, 219, 

221, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228

Museum of Aviation, Robins Air Force Base, 

200, 219

Myers, Raleigh B. J., 227

N

Naka, F. Robert, 184

Natick Soldier Research, Development and 

Engineering Center, 141–43

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA)/National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics (NACA)

Earth Resources program, collection 

platform for, 90, 184–86 (see also ER-2 

aircraft)

integrity and reputation of following Powers 

incident, 183–84

Office of Earth Science, 203

research papers based on data collection, 

publication of, 168–71, 179

role in U-2 research and development, vi

turbulence research, 169–74

U-2 aircraft for, 184–86, 186, 187

Upper Atmosphere Research Program, 203

weather research cover story, 167–74, 171, 

179–84, 182, 183

National Air and Space Museum, 218

National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, 227

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), 190

National Photographic Interpretation Center, 184

National Radiological Protection Board, U.K., 151

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 74–75, 

184

National Wetlands Inventory, 195

Nattress, Dan, 142, 143

navigation systems

design of and types of systems, 105, 

126–27

developmental testing flights, 40

navigational aids, 21–22

operational checkout pilot-training flights, 

46–47
Unlimited Horizons

282

profile of normal mission and use of, 157

U-2R aircraft, 78

U-2S aircraft, 95

Navy, U.S., 72, 84

Near-Space Plane, 153

neurologic decompression sickness (NDCS), 

147–49

night-vision driftsight, 83

Nimbus satellite, Coastal Zone Color Scanner, 

189

Nole, Jack, 144–45, 146, 222

Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, 97, 98, 

210–11

Norway, 180, 198

nose

design and construction of, 103, 104

interchangeable nose assemblies, 76, 93, 

104

rotating nose assembly, 74

U-2 design, 12

nuclear weapons, atmospheric sample collection 

to monitor radioactive fallout, 172–73, 173, 

174

Nystrom, Herb, 13, 78, 113

O

Ocean Color Scanner, 189

Oilstone, Project, 27

Optical Bar Camera (OBC), 97–98, 194

Ortiz, Jose, 73–74

Outlaw Hawk test, 87

oxygen system

altitude effects on human body and need for, 

24–25, 129

capacity of, 15

CL-282 oxygen supply, 8

design of, 106, 123

development of, 130

mission duration and oxygen supply, 62

oxygen quantity, monitoring of, 23

Powers flight and difficulties with, 180

Rainbow project flight and redesign of, 44

regulator failure, 149–50

ozone layer research, 187, 190, 198, 202–4

P

P-80 Shooting Star aircraft, 13

Padjet, Dick, 28

paint and coatings

camouflage schemes, 83

Chameleon experiment and color-changing 

paint, 83

NACA paint scheme and markings, 166, 

167, 169

radar signature–reduction research, 42, 43, 

173–74

weather research cover story and fictitious 

NASA markings, 181, 182

Painter, Jack, 13

Park, Bill, 73, 79, 79, 83–84

partial-pressure suits

CL-282 pilot use of, 8

concept of, 24–25

custom fitting of for individual pilots, 46, 

131, 132

development of, 129–30

faceplate latch failure, 42

faceplate latch redesign, 44

features of, 130, 131–34

helmet and visibility while maneuvering, 

61–62

MC-1 suits, 130

MC-3 suits, 128, 130–31

MC-3A suits, 131

MC-4 suits, 131

pilot training for use of, 37

Rainbow project flight and malfunction of, 

42, 44

requirement for, 24–25

S-100 suits, 131–34, 133, 139
Index

283

testing of, 130, 131

U-2R cockpit design and switch to fullpressure suit, 78

use of by pilots, 123

parts obsolescence, 99

Patrick Air Force Base, 240

payload

altitude and weight of, 10

CL-282 aircraft, 6

ER-2 capabilities, 199

Q-bay capacity, 107–9

reconnaissance aircraft design study 

requirement, 1

U-2C upgrades and increase in, 53

U-2R capacity, 78

U-2 requirements, 15

performance

challenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153, 

158–63

requirements and specifications, 251

requirements and wish lists, 246

stability and control, 163–64

U-2 requirements, 15

periscope, downward-looking, 21–22, 105

Perkins-Elmer Model 501 tracking camera, 174

photographs

availability of NASA U-2 images, 195

classified overhead photography, 184

emergency management use of, 184, 186, 

187, 193

land use planning and use of, 187, 191–92

scope of research using, 186–87

physiological support for pilots, 137–41, 138, 

140, 155

Physiological Support Squadron, 9th, 142–43

pilots

Air Force pilots, 50

altitude effects on human body and need for, 

24, 129

background and experience of, 153

briefings before flights, 38

chase car driver roles, 158

CIA pilots, 45–46

contract pilots for NASA, 185, 202

decompression sickness, 98, 129, 137, 

140, 146–49, 146, 149

fatigue and mission duration, 61, 62, 161

hazards of high flight, 144–51

hypoxia, 24, 49, 129, 144–46, 149–50

number trained each year, 211

partial-pressure-suit training, 37

physical and psychological testing, 46

physiological support for, 137–41, 138, 

140, 155

recuperation time between flights, 98

selection of, 45–46, 153

pilot-survival gear

testing of, 130

See also full-pressure suits; partial-pressure 

suits

pilot training

accidents and mishaps, 47–50

aircraft carrier training, 69, 83–84

aircraft for, 40

altitude of training flights, 46, 47

continuation training, 154

familiarization and proficiency flights, 45

ground crew preparations for training flights, 

47

length of, 154

length of training flights, 46, 47

location of, 46

operational checkout exercises, 46–47

organization and personnel for, 45

program for, 45

qualifications and proficiency, flying to 

maintain, 154

single-seat aircraft and, 45

solo flights, 46

squadron assignment for, 153–54
Unlimited Horizons

284

syllabus for, 46, 69, 74, 154

T-38 aircraft for, 154

U-2R conversion course for transitioning 

to, 81

U-2 training flights, 154

pogos on wingtips, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48, 116–17, 

117, 156, 158

Polarimeter Definition Experiment (PODEX), 206

porpoise maneuver, 34–35

Porter, Dee, 134, 204

Power-EMI upgrade, 95

Powers, Francis G. “Frank”

MC-3 suit use by, 128

NASA pilot, application to become, 185

photo of, 178

shoot down and capture of, 179–84, 204, 

222

training of, 46

Pratt & Whitney J57 engines. See J57 engines

Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines. 

See J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines

Pratt & Whitney JT12 engines, 57

pre-breathing procedure, 137, 138, 155

Press, Harry, 168

pressure suits

advances in design and materials, 140–41

altitude effects on human body and need for, 

24–25, 129

donning and doffing, 137, 139–40, 155

use of by pilots, 123

See also full-pressure suits; partial-pressure 

suits

pressurized cockpits, 8, 24, 98, 103, 107, 

123–24, 129, 137, 148–49, 149

Primrose, Robert L., 224

probe-and-drogue buddy refueling capability, 83

production of aircraft

article/construction numbers, 25n55, 216

CL-282 design and tooling and detail jigs, 6

contract numbers, 216

estimates and work modifications based on 

firm data, 15

first production batch summary, 216–22

later model production summary, 231–37

major assemblies, 100, 101

materials and construction methods, 101, 

102

military specifications (Mil-Spec), 17, 90, 

209, 244

number of personnel for, 17

original U-2R production summary, 229–31

production facility, 16–17, 16, 18

restarting production line, 74, 87–88, 90, 

195

second production batch summary, 222–28

security surrounding, 15–17

Skunk Works management philosophy, 

13–15, 14, 249, 251

supplementary production batch summary, 

228–29

tooling for new airframes, 90

U-2 aircraft, 14, 15–25, 20, 22, 24

vendor relationships and communications, 

16–17

work week schedule, 13, 25

propaganda leaflet drop capabilities, 82

propulsion

improvements in, 53

team for design and manufacturing, 13 (see 

also engines)

prototypes, 249–50

Purcell, Ed, 9, 42

Putt, Donald, 9, 11

Q

Q-bay

defroster for windows in, 124–25

design of and uses for, 21, 102, 107–10

environmental conditions in, 106–7, 

109–10, 124–25
Index

285

fuselage redesign and, 74

temperature control in, 124–25

two-seat configuration use of, 58

U-2R fuselage design, 78

R

R-12 aircraft, 74. See also SR-71 aircraft

radar

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System 

(ASARS), 88, 89, 90

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar 

System-2 (ASARS-2), 93, 95

forward-looking radar, 86–87

side-looking radar, 2, 90

synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), 85–86

U-2R platform for radar reconnaissance, 93

radar-absorbent material (RAM), 42, 43

radar signature, reduction of and Project 

Rainbow, 42–44, 43, 173–74

radiation levels at high altitudes, 150–51

Ragsdale, Ryan, 139–41, 149–50

Rainbow, Project, 42–44, 43, 173–74

range

aerial refueling capabilities, 59–63, 60, 61, 

62

CL-282 aircraft, 6

determination of, method for, 162

glide capabilities, 23, 162–63

M-195 aircraft, 4

radar signature–reduction research and, 43

reconnaissance aircraft design study 

requirement, 1

requirements for survivability of 

reconnaissance aircraft, vi

U-2 aircraft capabilities, 20, 161–63

U-2B aircraft, 57–58

U-2C aircraft, 55

U-2R aircraft, 75, 76, 80

U-2S aircraft, 94

X-16 aircraft, 4

Ranger, 69–71

RB-57D (Model 294) aircraft

approval for development, 9, 10

Bald Eagle project proposal, 1, 2

capabilities and performance of, 4, 9, 11

design of, viii, 2

RB-57D-1 aircraft, 2

RB-57D-2 aircraft, 2

U-2 engine procurement, 12

RC-10 camera, 188, 200

reconnaissance aircraft

altitude requirements for survivability of 

reconnaissance aircraft, vi, 10

development of, vi

range requirements for survivability of 

reconnaissance aircraft, vi

request for design study to develop (Bald 

Eagle project), 1–9

requirements for high-altitude spy planes, 

10

size of production run, 1

structural load factors and weight of aircraft, 

10

Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability 

Program (RAMP), 95–97

reconnaissance operations

breaking cover story about, 174–77

CIA suitability for conducting, 11

comparison of collection platform 

capabilities, 75

declassification and dissemination of data, 

176

intelligence from, v–vi

missions over Soviet Union, 179–84

newspaper article about, 175–76

responsibility for, 5, 11

U-2 development for, v–vi

U-2R platform for, 93

weather research cover story, 167–74, 171, 

175, 179–84, 182, 183
Unlimited Horizons

286

Reconnaissance Squadron, 1st, 153–54

reconnaissance systems

developmental testing flights, 37, 40

team for design and manufacturing, 13

U-2 design and components, 21–22

See also sensors

Reconnaissance Wing, 9th, 153

Reedy, Jack, 28

remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), 88–89, 97, 98

Rendelman, Robert T. “Terry,” 223

Research Camera System, 188–89

Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) data system, 191

Rhode, Richard V., 168–69

Rich, Ben

career and experience of, 245

management style and philosophy, 242, 

245–47, 248–49

photo of, 242

replacement of Johnson with, 88, 242

RPV version of U-2R, proposal for, 89

Ritland, Osmond J., 12, 27, 39

Robertson, Dave, 13

Robertson, Phillip O., 45

Robins Air Force Base, Museum of Aviation, 

200, 219

Robinson, George, 199

Roby, Randy, 235

Rockel, Cliff, 13

Rodgers, Frank, 42

Rolls Royce Avon RA.14 engines, 8–9

Rome Air Force Base, 86

Romig, Al, 247

Rose, Wilburn S. “Billy,” 48, 217

Royal Air Force (RAF) Alconbury, 198, 200, 221, 

232–37

RQ-4 Global Hawk, 97, 98, 210–11

Ruseckas, Joe, 130–31

S

SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment 

(SOLVE), 202–4

sailplanes, 10, 23

Salisbury Screen, 42, 43

satellites, reconnaissance operations with, 75. 

See also Earth Resources Technology Satellite 

(ERTS)/Landsat

Schriever, Bernard, 9

Schumacher, Robert “Bob”

aerial refueling trials, 61–62

aircraft carrier suitability trials, 66–68, 

70–71, 70

aircraft carrier training, 69

autopilot and length of flights, 161

developmental testing flights, 37

fuel expansion and apparent ability to 

manufacture fuel, 125–26

pre-breathing procedure, 138

test pilot role, 37

two-seat configuration maiden flight, 58–59

U-2C flight testing and center of gravity 

issues, 55

U-2R maiden flight chase plane role, 79

scientific and technical accomplishments of 

program, 176–77

Seaberg, John, 1, 6, 9, 11

security of programs, 12–13, 245, 250, 

251–52

Senior Dagger program, 86

Senior Lance program, 85, 229

Senior Span, 93–94, 94

Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance 

System (SYERS), 93, 95

SYERS-1, 95

SYERS-2, 95, 98

sensors

AN/AAS-8 infrared sensor, 55–59, 57, 58

aircraft for testing, 227

ER-2 aircraft, 187–95, 188, 207
Index

287

Global Hawk, 97

hyperspectral sensor package, 98

interchangeable nose assemblies for, 76, 

93, 103

TR-1 aircraft, 90

U-2R aircraft, 81, 93

U-2S aircraft, 95, 97–98

Setter, Louis, 21, 45

sextant, 22, 105

Shell Oil Company, 23–24

Sheng, Shih-Li “Steve,” 226, 229

Shingler, Herbert, 45

shock strut pressure, 35

Sholtis, Edward “Tadd,” 147, 149, 151

Sieker, Robert

deadstick landing maneuver, 37

death of, 216

Rainbow project flight and death of, 42, 44

test pilot role, 37

signals intelligence (SIGINT)

ASARS for, 88, 89

sensors for gathering, 2

U-2R platform for, 93

U-2S capabilities, 95

skin panels, 18–19, 41, 102

Skunk Works

assembly and manufacturing processes, 

13–15, 14, 249, 251

contractor responsibilities, 244

cooperation, trust, and goals of the project, 

244, 248, 250–51

culture of innovation at, 242–53

delegation of work at, 243, 246, 247

efficiency of development programs at, 252

growing pains and mergers, 252–53

history of, 13

inspection system, 244

Johnson management style and Basic 

Operating Rules, 13–15, 14, 242–45, 

246–47

lessons learned, 247–50

nickname of, 13n28

organizational structure of programs, 13–15, 

14, 250–52

reports, documentation, and reviews, 13, 15, 

17–18, 90, 243, 249, 250, 252–53

rewards for performance of personnel, 245, 

246

Rich management style and philosophy, 242, 

245–47, 248–49

schedules for projects, 246, 248

security of programs at, 12–13, 15–17, 

245, 250, 251–52

specifications and innovation, 90, 244, 251, 

252

staffing of programs, qualifications of 

personnel, and teamwork, 90, 243, 245, 

246, 248–49, 250, 252

success, keys to, 250–52

Skylab space station, 193

Smith, Leo, 223

Smith, Paul, 28

Smith, Richard, 4

Snyder, Rich, 231

Sorenson, Vic, 13

Southern African Regional Science Initiative 

(SAFARI), 204

Soviet Union (USSR) and Russia

ballistic missile threat to U.S., 56, 59

Churchill description of, v

intelligence on capabilities of, v–vi

Land Panel study of threat from, 9

nuclear threat from, v

radar and interceptor development and 

survivability of reconnaissance aircraft, vi, 

11, 175

reconnaissance missions over, 179–84

shoot down and capture of Powers by, 

179–84, 204, 222

SOLVE and flight through airspace over, 204
Unlimited Horizons

288

Space Shuttle

Atlantis photos, 240, 241

debris hits on, 240

solid rocket booster and nose caps, 240, 241

Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition 

Testbed (SPIRITT), 98

speed

coffin corner of flight envelope, 153, 159

developmental testing flights, 37

excessive speed and structural failure, 49, 

159–60

M-195 aircraft, 4

maximum speed, 159, 164

pilot hypoxia and training mishap, 49

profile of normal mission, 156

stall speed and maximum speed, margin 

between, 159

U-2R aircraft, 75

speed brakes

Article 341 maiden flight use, 33

CL-282 aircraft, 7

profile of normal mission and use of, 157

structural limit loads testing, 40–41

SR-71 aircraft

development of, 74, 245

intelligence collection capabilities, 75

maintenance and operating costs, 93

pressure suits for, 136

priority of program, 76

specifications document, 251

stability and control, 163–64

Stalesky, Suzzett, 142, 143

stall characteristics

concerns about problems related to, 72

flight testing for evaluation of, 33, 37

hand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45

landing technique and, 34–35

stall checks and carrier operations, 71–72

stall speed and maximum speed, margin 

between, 159

stall-warning system, 105

symmetrical stall characteristics, 71–72

U-2R modifications to improve, 77, 79–80

U-2R stall strips, 76

wing modifications for, 45

static testing

Article 341, 25

reinforcement of structure based on, 41

static loading to destruction demonstrations, 

40

structural limit loads testing, 40

team responsible for, 13

stealth aircraft, 245

Steele, Denis, 149–50

Stewart, Leo, 228

Strategic Air Command (SAC)

HASP activities, 172–73

program management responsibilities, 

91–92

U-2R aircraft for, 81

Strategic Air Command F-84 fighter squadrons, 

45

Strategic Air Command Museum, Offutt Air 

Force Base, 223

Stratosphere- Troposphere Exchange Project 

(STEP), 198

Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment 

(SAGE) instrument, 203

Stratospheric Air Sampler, 193–94

stratospheric and atmospheric sampling 

missions, 189–91, 193–94, 198, 200–201, 

202–4, 206–7

Stratton, Charles, 225

Strickland, Bill, 48

Strong, Philip, 9

structural limit loads testing, 39–41

Studies of Emissions, Atmospheric Composition, 

Clouds and Climate Coupling by Regional 

Surveys (SEAC4RS) campaign, 206–7

supersonic transport (SST), 201
Index

289

Swart, Sam, 225

Sweden, 202–4

synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), 85–86

System IX Granger Deceptive Repeater, 54

T

T-2A aircraft, 68, 69

T-2B aircraft, 83

T-33 trainers

acquisition of to support program, 27

Article 341 chase plane role, 33, 34–36

chase plane role during pilot training, 45

pilot training in, 45, 72

T-38 aircraft, 154

Tactical Air Command, 91

Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system, 127

tail

all-moving tailplane, 78

CL-282 design, 6, 7

team for design and manufacturing, 13

U-2 design, 12, 22, 24, 25, 113–15, 114

U-2R design, 76, 78, 115

tailpipes, 24, 80, 80–81, 119–21

tail-wheel steering system, 30, 31

takeoffs and landings

aircraft carrier catapult launch and arresting 

hook landing operations, 65–66, 67, 

68–69, 70–72, 70, 76, 83–84, 83

challenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153

chase cars and landing procedures, 158

deadstick landing maneuver, 37

descent and landing procedures, 157–58

drag chute for landing, 15, 50

ground cart for CL-282 takeoffs, 6

gust control system use during, 34, 35, 36, 

49

instrument landing systems (ILS), 127

landing technique, 32, 34–35, 36–37

pilot training mishaps during, 48

pogos on wingtips for, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48, 

116–17, 117, 156, 158

skid for CL-282 landings, 6, 7

skid plates on wingtips for landings, 20

takeoff procedures, 155–56

U-2R veer to left during takeoff, problem 

with and solution to, 80–81

taxi test, 30–31

Teal Ruby project, 197–98

technical and scientific accomplishments of 

program, 176–77

technical manuals, 13

technology demonstrators, 249–50

Teledyne-Ryan, 89

Thematic Mapper Simulator, 200

Thermos, 173

Thomas, Rick, 97

Thomas, Spencer, 158

Thompson, Loren B., 211

titanium alloys, 101, 102

TJ3B1 engines, 9

TR-1 aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 162

designation, dropping of, 93

design of, 92

engine exhaust system–related accidents, 

120–21

length of production, 92

production of, 91, 216

production summary, 231–37

program management responsibilities, 

90–92

specifications, 214, 215

success of program, 92

U-2R designation, reverting to, 93

weight of, 162

TR-1A aircraft

delivery and unveiling of, 92–93

design of, 90, 92

final delivery, 93
Unlimited Horizons

290

NASA use of, 200

production of, 93, 216

production summary, 232–37

TR-1B aircraft

design of, 90, 93

production of, 216

production summary, 231, 236

trainer configuration, 72–74, 73

TRIM, Project, 221

Tropospheric Wind Lidar Technology Experiment 

(TWiLiTE), 205

trust, cooperation, and goals of the project, 244, 

248, 250–51

tube food, 141–43, 141, 143

turbulence research, 169–74, 171

Turkey, 179, 180

two-seat configuration, 57–59, 57, 58, 72–74, 

73

U

U-2 aircraft

article/construction numbers, 25n55, 216

assignment of U-2 designation, 12

challenges of flying, 153, 158–63

civil applications for, 184

CL-282 proposal and design, 6–12, 6n11, 7

codenames and nicknames of program, 27

design of, 12, 18–25, 19, 209–10

evolution of for changing requirements, vi, 

53, 76, 209

first upgrade, 53–63

funding for, 12

hand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45, 

71

longevity and viability of, 208, 209–11

nickname of, 153

official picture of, release of, 169

operational checkout exercises and 

operational status of, 47

origination of program, v–vi

parts obsolescence as only problem for, 99

reports, documentation, and reviews, 17–18

retirement of, 210

schedule for development and production, 

11, 12, 25, 28, 37

scientific and technical accomplishments of 

program, 176–77

second generation modifications, 74–89

security of program, 12–13, 15–17

specifications, 209, 212–15, 213, 215

specifications document, 17, 251

team for design and manufacturing, 12–15, 

14

timeline of milestone dates in development 

of, 238–39

work week schedule, 13, 25

U-2A aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 57, 162

conversion to U-2C aircraft, 68

drag chute use by, 50

flight testing, 39

maximum speed, 164

photos of, 160, 161

production summary, 216–29

Q-bay camera installation, 108

specifications, 212

weight of, 54, 57, 162

U-2B aircraft, 55–59

U-2C aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 162

conversion of U-2A aircraft to, 68

developmental testing of, 54

modifications and upgrades, 52, 53–55

NASA use of, 184–86, 186, 197, 201

number of flights and flight hours, 199–200

photo of, 196

production summary, 217–28

recordbreaking flights with, 200

research missions with, 197–98

retirement of NASA aircraft, 199–200
Index

291

specifications, 212, 213

storage of, 81, 184–85

weight of, 54, 162

U-2CT aircraft

production summary, 221, 228

two-seat trainer configuration, 72–74, 73

U-2D aircraft

photo of, 161

production summary, 225, 227, 228

sensor technology research with, 55–59, 

57, 58

two-seat configuration, 57–59, 57, 58, 72

U-2E aircraft

aerial refueling capabilities, 60, 61

production summary, 218, 224–25

U-2F aircraft

aerial refueling capabilities, 60, 61, 61

production summary, 217–21, 224–25

U-2G aircraft

carrier capability configuration, 63–72, 64, 

67, 70, 185–86

NASA use of, 184–86

production summary, 218–19, 222, 226–27

specifications, 212

storage of, 72, 81, 184–85

U-2H aircraft

Article 349, 68

production summary, 219

U-2L aircraft, 74–75

U-2M aircraft, 74–75

U-2N aircraft, 75

U-2R aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 162

approval for production, 76

arming with bombs and missiles, research 

on, 82

attrition losses, aircraft to replace, 81, 

184–85

attrition rate, 184

Blue Gull carrier trials, 82–84, 83, 84, 85

cameras for, 81–82

conversion to U-2S aircraft, 94–95, 216

design of, 75–78

developmental and experimental testing, 82

engine exhaust system–related accidents, 

120–21

EP-X trials, 86–88, 86

fuselage design, 75–76, 77, 78

maiden flight, 79

maintenance and operating costs, 93

pilot conversion course for transitioning to, 81

production of, 81, 216

production summary, 229–37

prototype construction, 78–79

radar system for maritime surveillance, 

85–88, 86, 87, 89

reliability and flexibility of, 81

RPV version of, proposal for, 89

satellite communications system for, 93–94

specifications, 214, 215

stall characteristics, 77, 79–80

testing and training activities, 79–81, 80, 

82–87, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87

upgrade of and modifications to, 90, 93

veer to left during takeoff, problem with and 

solution to, 80–81

weight of, 79, 80, 162

U-2RT aircraft

delivery of, 93

production summary, 231, 235

U-2S aircraft

altitude, range, and mission duration, 162

conversion of U-2R aircraft to, 94–95, 216

production summary, 229–37

replacement of with Global Hawk, 97

sensor technology installed in, 95, 97–98

specifications, 214, 215

U-2ST aircraft

pilot training in, 152

production summary, 231, 232, 234, 235
Unlimited Horizons

292

University of California, Lawrence Berkeley 

Laboratory (LBL), 189

Upper Atmosphere Research Program, 203

urination, 137, 139

V

Van Der Zee, Charles, 13

velocity, gravity, and height (VGH) recorders, 

170–72

Vierick, Art, 13, 16

Vito, Carmine, 48

W

Wailing Wall experiment, 83

Walker, Christopher H. “Chris,” 144, 226

Wallace, Cleve, 231

Wallops Island facility, 83–84, 186, 194, 202

Wanamaker, John, 13

Wang, Cheng-Wen “Pete,” 219

Watertown Airstrip, 27, 46–47, 47, 167

WB-57F aircraft, 98

weapons

arming U-2R with bombs and missiles, 

research on, 82

nuclear weapons, atmospheric sample 

collection to monitor radioactive fallout, 

172–73, 173, 174

weather

publication of research papers and articles 

based on data collection, 168–71, 174, 

179

research flights and data collection, 40, 175, 

176–77, 176, 179, 182–83, 201–2

value of data collection about, 182

weather research cover story, 167–74, 171, 

179–84, 182, 183

Weather Reconnaissance Squadron 

(Provisional), 3rd, 174

Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional) 

One (WRSP-1), 167–68

Webster, Ivor “Chunky,” 185, 186

weight

CL-282 aircraft, 6, 7, 15

fuel system, balance, and, 23

grandmothers as unit of, 15

gross weight as ratio to powerplant, 15

landing gear weight, 20

M-195 aircraft, 4

radar-absorbent material and, 42

RB-57D aircraft, 9

reconnaissance aircraft design study 

requirement, 1

structural load factors and weight of aircraft, 

10

TR-1 aircraft, 162

U-2A aircraft, 54, 57, 162

U-2 altitude requirements and, 15

U-2B aircraft, 57–58

U-2C aircraft, 54, 162

U-2R aircraft, 79, 80, 162

U-2 requirements, 15

X-16 aircraft, 5

Weir, Ken, 93

Welty, George, 16

Western States Fire Missions, 199

Whale Tale, 66–72. See also aircraft carriers

Whale Tale II, 69

Whale Tale III, 69–71

Whitcomb, Richard, 75

White, Leslie, 228

White, Lincoln, 181

Wiele, Bob, 13, 23, 77, 111

wildfire and fire-management research, 193, 

198–99, 200

Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 camera, 188, 200

Wilkerson, Pete, 28

Williams, Ron, 200

windscreen and visibility issues, 31

wing flaps, 8, 23, 40–41, 110
Index

293

wings

altitude, engine thrust, and design of, 10

attachment to fuselage, arrangement for, 110

CL-282 wing design and construction, 6, 8

design and construction of, 110–13, 111, 

112

design research costs, 75

developmental testing flights and structural 

loads, 39–40

hard-points for weapons pylons, 82

high-lift, swept wing design modification, 75

M-195 wing design, 3

modifications for stall characteristics, 45

pogos on wingtips, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48, 

116–17, 117, 156, 158

RB-57D wing design and structure, 2

skid plates on wingtips, 20

span-load distribution control system, 8

team for design and manufacturing, 13

U-2R design, 77–78, 77, 111

U-2R folding wingtip design, 76

U-2 wing design, 22–23, 22, 25

wing pods, 111–13, 112

wingtip deflection, 39–41

wingtip skids, 8

X-16 wing design, 4–5

Winnie, Super Typhoon, 177

world altitude record flights, 37–38, 158, 200, 

202

Worley, George, 73–74

Wright Air Development Center (WADC), 1, 11, 

172

Wright TJ3B1 engines, 9

Wu, Tse-Shi “Charlie,” 224

X

X-15 rocket plane, 59

X-16 (Model 67) aircraft, 1, 4–5, 5, 10, 11

XF-104 fighter, 6–9, 12, 21

Y

Yancey, William R., 45, 46, 47

Yeh, Chang-Di “Robin,” 220

Yellowstone National Park, 198–99

YF-12 aircraft, 74

Yoshii, Mich, 28

Yu, Ching-Chang “Mickey,” 227

Z

Zuck, Dan, 13

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC

NASA SP-2014-620