1 The Honorable Laurie S. Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-1553

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff – Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Solomon L. Coffey, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Defendant – Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 8, 2008 Filed: December 15, 2008

___________ Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Solomon Coffey challenges the district court's 1 denial of his motions for a new trial, for an evidentiary hearing on this motion, and to suspend ruling on this motion pending submission of an additional supporting affidavit. We affirm.-2- I
On February 20, 2003, Coffey was charge d with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine ba se, i.e., crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. During trial, the government presented its case through the testimony of one police officer and five co-conspirators. The co-conspirators, including Roderick Jennings, all testified pursuant to cooperati ng plea agreements. The jury found Coffey guilty. The district court sentenced Coffe y to 324 months imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, and a $100 sp ecial assessment. Coffey appealed his conviction and sentence. We affi rmed. United States v. Coffey , 415 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) ( en banc ).
On December 11, 2006, Coffey filed motions for a new trial, for an evidentiary hearing on this motion, and to suspend ruling on this motion pending submission of an additional supporting affidavit. As gr ounds for the motion for a new trial, Coffey argues Jennings recanted his trial testimony. As support, he submitted an affidavit by an inmate, referred to herein for anonymity purposes as "C." C was told by Tony Alexander, another inmate, that Jennings to ld him he had fabricated his testimony at Coffey's trial. Coffey also asked the court to suspend ruling on the motion for a new trial until an additional affidavit could be provided from another witness "who can provide additional evidence in favor" of the motion for a new trial.
On February 22, 2008, the district court denied Coffey's motions. The court found, even assuming Jennings recanted his testimony, substantial evidence existed to support the guilty verdict. This appeal followed.

II
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Coffey's motion for a new trial. To the extent C's affida vit would be offered to impeach Jennings's-3- testimony, such impeachment is insufficien t to warrant a new trial. In addition, Jennings's recantation is not likely to produ ce an acquittal because of the strength of the evidence against Coffey.
In order to prevail on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Coffey must demonstrate: "( 1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial, (2) the defendant di d not lack diligence in attempting to uncover it, (3) the newly found evidence is material , and (4) the evidence is likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is gr anted." United States v. Grover , 511 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2007). "[I]n order to meet the materiality requirement , newly discovered evidence must be 'more than merely . . . impeaching.'" United States v. Baker , 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2007) (e llipses in original) (quoting United States v. Dogskin , 265 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2001)). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rojas , 520 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir. 2008).
Assuming it could avoid the hearsay probl em, C's affidavit would be offered merely to impeach Jennings's testimony, whic h is insufficient to warrant a new trial. See Baker , 479 F.3d at 577 (collecting cases). Mo reover, Jennings's alleged post-trial admission to Alexander constitutes recanted te stimony, so "we view it and its potential evidentiary value at a new trial with suspicion." United States v. Holmes , 421 F.3d 683, 688 (8th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Rouse , 410 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The stability and finality of verd icts would be greatly disturbed if courts were too ready to entertai n testimony from witnesses who have changed their minds, or who claim to have lied at the trial.") . Although "recanted testimony that bears . . . directly on the defendant's guilt will warrant a new trial if it would probably produce an acquittal upon retrial," Dogskin , 265 F.3d at 685, Jennings's recantation is not likely to do so, given the substantial eviden ce demonstrating Coffey's guilt. The other co-conspirators' testimony sufficiently de monstrated Coffey bought and sold large quantities of crack cocaine. SeeUnited States v. Coffey , 395 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2005) (vacated on other grounds) (relying on testimony by co-conspirators other than-4- Jennings to conclude the "the government's evidence show ed that Coffey was deeply involved in a conspiracy to distribute crack").
Coffey has thus failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.

III
Because the judge who ruled on the motion for a new trial also presided over Coffey's trial and Coffey has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting an evidentiary hearing, the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by denying Coffey's request for an evidentiary hearing.

We review the denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discreti on. United States v. Rojas , 520 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir. 2008). "Absent exceptional circumstances, a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be decided on affidavits without a hearing." Baker , 479 F.3d at 579 (quoting Dogskin , 265 F.3d at 687). Furthermore, "[t]he necessity for a hearing is lessened in cases involving cha llenged testimony where the trial judge has had the opportunity to observe the demeanorand weigh the credibility of the witness at trial." Id.
Having conducted Coffey's trial, the district court knew the facts of the case and had observed the witnesses and evidence. Th erefore, the district court was able to determine the impact of the newly disc overed evidence on Jennings's testimony and the strength of the government's case against Coffey. Because Coffey does not present exceptional circumstances, the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial.-5- IV

The district court did not abuse its di scretion when it denied Coffey's motion to suspend ruling on his moti on for new trial. Coffey a sserts he has a witness who could provide evidence in favor of his new trial motion; however, he needs additional time to secure the person's affi davit. He provided no other de tails to the district court (or this Court). In addition, although hi s motion to suspend ruling was ultimately denied, Coffey had over six months to providethe district court with the affidavit of the alleged additional witness, and did not so do. Accordi ngly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

V

We affirm.

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