United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-3298

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Jacquie Albright, As Parent and Next Best Friend of Child Doe

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Mountain Home School District; Debbie Atkinson, Director of Special Education;

Susanne Belk, BCBA Consultant

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Harrison

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Submitted: December 13, 2018

Filed: June 12, 2019

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Jacquie Albright alleges that her daughter Child Doe, a young student with

autismand significant intellectual deficits, was not provided a free appropriate public

education (FAPE) by Mountain Home School District (the District), as required by

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et

seq. When her administrative challenge wasrejected, Albright appealed that decision
in federal district court and brought additional claims for constitutional violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, disability discrimination and retaliation under § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), and violations of Arkansas law. The district court affirmed 1

the administrative decision, granted summary judgment to the District on the

remaining federal claims, and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Albright’s state law claims. We affirm.

Child Doe has been educated within the District from kindergarten to the

present in accordance with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) formulated

pursuant to the IDEA. The IEP sets forth the educational accommodations approved

for Child Doe, as well as a behavior intervention plan (BIP) to address any

problematic behaviors. An IEP team periodically discusses and revises Child Doe’s

IEP as needed. Albright and appellee Susanne Belk, a Board Certified Behavior

Analyst employed as a consultant by the District during the relevant period, are

members of Child Doe’s IEP team. The highly contentious relationship between

Albright and the District, complicated further by Albright’s employment with the

District, has made it difficult for Albright and the remainder of the IEP team to agree

on many aspects of Child Doe’s IEP.

Albright has filed four due process complaints against the District challenging

Child Doe’s education. The first two complaints were resolved by settlement

agreements in August 2012 and March 2014. On October 20, 2014, early in Child

Doe’s fourth-grade year, Albright filed the due process complaint at issue, alleging

that the District had denied Child Doe a FAPE between November 15, 2013, and

October 17, 2014. Events after October 17, 2014, are the subject of a separate due

process complaint.

The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Arkansas.

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After Albright filed the third due process complaint, the parties proceeded to

an eleven-day hearing held between March and September of 2015. A hearing officer

employed by the Arkansas Department of Education presided and heard testimony

from witnesses, including Albright, Belk, and an expert hired by Albright. The

hearing officer thereafter issued a forty-page decision setting forth findings of fact

and conclusions of law. Relevant here, the hearing officer addressed whether

Albright was denied the opportunity to participate in developing the IEP, whether

Child Doe benefitted academically from the IEP, and whether the BIP adequately

addressed Child Doe’s behaviors or exacerbated them by permitting the use of

sensory integration techniques. 

The hearing officer found that Albright had not been denied the opportunity to

participate in the IEP process, citing the following facts: During the period in

question, Albright attended all IEP conferences until September 2014, when she

chose not to attend a meeting, and there was no evidence to substantiate Albright’s

claims that other IEP conferences were held in her absence. Although the District did

not agree to or satisfy all of Albright’s requests regarding Child Doe’s education,

there was no evidence indicating that the District had hampered Albright’s active

participation in developing Child Doe’s IEP. Hundreds of pages of emails and

transcripts of IEP meetings demonstrate that Albright actively participated in the IEP

process. 

The hearing officer also found that the IEP itself was working. More

specifically, he found that in light ofChild Doe’s significant disabilities, the evidence

showed that the IEP did provide her with educational benefits. The hearing officer

also found, however, that Albright believed that Child Doe was capable of greater

academic achievementsthan indicated by the assessments. Nevertheless, he credited

Belk’s testimony that Child Doe had shown academic improvement during the

relevant period. 

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To complicate matters, Child Doe’s disability was originally identified as

intellectual deficits, but was changed to autismduring the period in question. Despite

the changed diagnosis, the hearing officer found that the BIP in place at the time

addressed the same maladaptive behaviors identified by the psychologist who had

diagnosed Child Doe with autism. Albright’s expert testified that the BIP was

inadequate, but the hearing officer found that his testimony was refuted by the

District’s behavior data and Belk’s testimony regarding her understanding of Child

Doe’s behaviors. 

In sum, the hearing officer determined that after “reviewing the elicited

testimony and the evidence in this case it is clear that the District attempted to focus

on what they believed to be the unique needs of [Child Doe] even prior to changing

the primary handicapping condition fromintellectual deficits to autism.” The hearing

officer concluded that the District “recognized and accepted the additional challenge

of addressing the maladaptive behaviors [Child Doe] exhibited as a consequence,

more likely than not of her autism, as well as her intellectual deficits and the

challenges that she presented to the educators,” and it thus did not deny Child Doe

a FAPE. 

Albright appealed the hearing officer’s decision in federal district court (Count

I) and brought several related claims under federal and state law (Counts II-VI),

which were subsequently bifurcated. In her IDEA appeal, Albright specifically

contested three of the hearing officer’s conclusions: that she had participated

meaningfully in the IEP process, that it had been unnecessary to develop a new BIP

for Child Doe, and that the District had used evidence-based practicesin Child Doe’s

IEP. The district court decided the appeal on the briefs, affirming the hearing

officer’s decision on each issue, and “wholeheartedly agree[ing]” with the hearing

officer’s determination that Albright had participated meaningfully in the IEP

process. D. Ct. Order of July 5, 2017, at 6 [hereinafter July 5 Order]. The court also

found that “the BIP that was already in place was working well.” Id. Finally, the

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court determined that it “ha[d] not found any evidence in the record that sensory

integration treatment is not based on peer-reviewed research, nor . . . that the

District’s use of sensory integration treatment somehow prevented the District from

utilizing services that are based on peer-reviewed research.” Id. at 8. 

Albright moved to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that the district court

had made manifest errors of law or fact. The court denied Albright’s motion,

concluding that any errors it had made did not affect its disposition and that

Albright’s motion raised new arguments that she had not raised in her initial appeal

brief. 

At the close of discovery, the District moved for summary judgment on Counts

II through VI. Under local rules, Albright’s response was due fourteen days after the

District’s motion was filed on April 28. Albright moved for leave to file an amended

complaint on May 4. The next day, she requested an extension of time to file her

2

summary judgment response, contending that the motion for summary judgment

would be moot if the court allowed her to file an amended complaint. The court

denied her motion for an extension on May 7. On May 10, Albright requested

another extension, asserting that her counsel had obligations in other cases and that

her counsel would need to attend to family medical issues over the following weeks. 

The court denied the motion that same day. On May 22, ten days after the deadline

had passed, Albright began filing her summary judgment response, accompanied by

a motion to accept her response out of time. 

In its summary judgment order, the district court denied Albright’s out-of-time

filing request, struck her filingsfrom the record, and granted the District’s motion for

summary judgment. In her motion to alter or amend the judgment, Albright

contended that the court had applied the incorrect standard when evaluating her outThe district court denied this motion as moot in its July 5 order. 2

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of-time motion. Although the court agreed that it had applied the wrong standard, it

concluded that the motion failed under the correct standard. Albright thereafter filed

this appeal.

Albright first appeals the district court’s order affirming the hearing officer’s

determination that Child Doe was provided a FAPE. We review de novo whether the

District provided Child Doe with a FAPE. See I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple ValleyEagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 2017). In so doing, we must afford due

weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, see id., and accept the

district court’s factual findings unlessthey are clearly erroneous, see Gill v. Columbia

93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000). “Our duty is to interpret and

apply the law, not to substitute our own notions ofsound educational policy for those

of the school authorities which we review.” Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis

Pub. Sch. v. R.M.M. ex rel. O.M., 861 F.3d 769, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 

The IEP is “the centerpiece of the [IDEA]’s education delivery system for

disabled children.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). Albright asserts that

the District denied Child Doe a FAPE by implementing an IEP that was inadequate,

in no small part because Albright herself was denied the opportunity to meaningfully

participate in the formation process. The district court and hearing officer thought

otherwise. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that Albright

has failed to show that Child Doe’s IEP was inadequate. 

“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP

reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the

child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE–1,

137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017). “The Act contemplates that this fact-intensive exercise

will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the input of

the child’s parents or guardians.” Id. “Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the

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question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” 

Id. 

At the due process hearing, and again before the district court, Albright argued

that the IEP’s behavior intervention plan was not working. She asserted that the BIP

included the use of pseudoscientific practices prohibited under the IDEA, such as

“sensory integration techniques,” and that the BIP required revision in light of Child

Doe’s apparently escalating patterns of behavior. Quoting Belk’s testimony, the

district court found that “the BIP that was already in place was working well.” July

5 Order, at 6. Albright argues that this finding was clearly erroneous in light of her

expert witness’s testimony that the plan in place would not improve Child Doe’s

behaviors. As proof ofChild Doe’s worsening behaviors, Albright notes that between

January 2013 and October 2014 the BIP was updated to include a revised and slightly

longer list of “problem behaviors.” 

The hearing officer found Belk’s testimony credible, giving her testimony

greater weight than that of Albright’s expert. See Bradley ex rel. Bradley v. Ark.

Dept. of Educ., 443 F.3d 965, 974 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We recognize that the hearing

officers ‘had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,’ and we are

mindful that it is not the place of the courts to ‘substitute [our] own notions of sound

educational policy for those of the school authorities that [we] review.” (alterations

in original) (quoting Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 210 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir.

2000))). The hearing officer and district court both credited Belk’s testimony thatshe

believed the IEP was working. The lists of problembehaviors alone do not contradict

Belk’s testimony, because they do not include important information, such as the

behaviors’ frequency, that would be relevant in determining whether Child Doe’s

behavior was worsening. Nor do the lists themselves purport to be exhaustive

chronicles of Child Doe’s behaviors. In light of Belk’s testimony, which was based

on her extensive experience working with Child Doe, we conclude that the district

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court did not clearly err in finding that the BIP was “working well” or that it was

adequate.

Albright also argues that sensory integration techniques are pseudoscientific

treatments that violate the IDEA’s requirement that services be “based on peerreviewed research to the extent practicable.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). The

district court found no evidence “that sensory integration treatment is not based on

peer-reviewed research, nor [did] it f[ind] any evidence in the record that the

District’s use of sensory integration treatment somehow prevented the District from

utilizing services that are based on peer-reviewed research.” July 5 Order, at 8. 

Albright contends that this finding was clearly erroneous, again citing the testimony

of her expert witness and asserting that “the opportunity cost ofthe District’s decision

to use a pseudoscientific practice is that it foregoes use of other, peer-reviewed

treatments.” Appellant’s Br. 19. Albright does not object to the district court’s

finding that “it is abundantly clear from the record that the District made extensive

use of evidence-based practices to educate Child Doe.” July 5 Order, at 7. Even

putting aside the question whether sensory integration techniques are based on peerreviewed research, the district court’s other findings, which are not clearly erroneous,

are sufficient to refute Albright’s claim. Alongside the “extensive” use of peerreviewed practices, the use ofsensory integration techniques, which were specifically

recommended by Child Doe’s occupational therapist, did not deny Child Doe a

FAPE. Cf. Bradley, 443 F.3d at 975 (“[T]he Act does not require ‘the furnishing of

every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential.’”

(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982))).

Albright next argues that the IEP’s failure to produce any academic progress

denied Child Doe a FAPE. Albright notes that despite being in fourth grade, Child

Doe was still instructed on kindergarten-level subject matter. She also argues that

Child Doe’s score in IQ testing had decreased between 2010 and 2014. As a

preliminary matter, Albright’s due process complaint concerns the period between

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November 2013 and October 2014. Evidence pertaining to Child Doe’s performance

over a four-year period is thus overbroad and does not establish that she was denied

a FAPE during the period in question. Belk testified that Child Doe appeared to be

improving academically. The Districtsupports her testimony with standardized tests

administered periodically throughout 2014 thatshow Child Doe’s progress during the

period at issue. The testing revealed that Child Doe’s scoresin English, Reading, and

Math increased between January 2014 and August 2014. Although the test scores

varied within the period, in total they demonstrate academic improvement. See

Bradley, 443 F.3d at 973 (upholding factual finding of academic improvement based

on standardized test scores). Tests on first-grade subject matter administered in

October 2014, however, revealed that Child Doe was not yet prepared to advance to

more complex material. 

The hearing officer observed in his decision that Albright believed Child Doe

was capable of greater academic achievements than the assessments indicated. The

district court echoed thatsentiment, finding that “[i]t is also undoubtedly true that Ms.

Albright disagrees with other members of Child Doe’s IEP team about what Child

Doe’s true academic potential is.” July 5 Order, at 9. However regrettable the

disagreement between Albright and the remainder of the IEP team on this matter, the

IDEA requires that an IEP be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make

progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at

999. The “IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential

or provide the best possible education at public expense.” Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist.

v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 1997). Based on the results of the District’s

testing, Child Doe made progress in a curriculum that was appropriate in light of her

circumstances. 

Finally, Albright contendsthatshe was denied the opportunity to meaningfully

participate in the formation of Child Doe’s IEP. “The Act contemplates that [IEP

drafting] will be informed not only by the expertise ofschool officials, but also by the

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input of the child’s parents or guardians.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. Although

parents generally must be afforded the opportunity to participate in every IEP

meeting, a meeting may be conducted without them “if the public agency is unable

to convince the parents that they should attend.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(d) (2006); see

Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 2010). As the district

court found, voluminous evidence in the record demonstrates Albright’s extensive

involvement throughout the IEP process. Albright argues, however, that the IEP team

conspired to hold an IEP meeting without her on September 15, 2014. But as the

record clearly reveals, Albright chose not to attend the September 15 meeting despite

the District’s efforts to persuade her to attend. Moreover, to the extent there was a

technical violation of the Act’s notice requirements, “it did not affect the IEPs or

otherwise deprive [Child Doe] of educational benefit.” Id. The District did not

prevent Albright’s active participation in the IEP process.3

In sum, “a profoundly toxic lack of trust” between Albright and the District has

rendered it nearly impossible for the parties to agree on an education program best

suited for Child Doe’s needs, despite both parties’ seemingly earnest desire to provide

just that. July 5 Order, at 9. Nonetheless, having found no clear error in the district

court’s factual findings and having given due weight to the hearing officer’s

credibility determinations, we conclude that Child Doe was not denied a FAPE.

Although Albright also appearsto argue that the District withheld information

3

from her, she does not point to anything in the record to which she was entitled but

which was originally withheld from her. She seems to argue instead that the District

failed to keep adequate records regarding Child Doe’s behavior, thus denying her

access to information. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 19 (“This caution points to the

District’s real failure – it never gathered any data to evaluate the effectiveness of

sensory integration or the January 2013 BIP.”). In light of our conclusion that Child

Doe’s IEP was adequate, the District’s record-keeping practices did not result in the

denial of a FAPE. 

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Albright appeals the district court’s denial of her motionsfor extensions oftime

and her motion to accept her summary judgment response out of time. A district

court has “considerable discretion” to grant or deny a party’s motion for an extension

of time to file a summary judgment response. See Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920,

921-22 (8th Cir. 2005). A court may grant a party’s timely motion for an extension

upon a showing of good cause, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A), or may for good cause

grant a party’s request for an extension of time “after the time has expired if the party

failed to act because of excusable neglect,” id. 6(b)(1)(B). The district court found

that Albright had not shown good cause for an extension prior to the deadline, instead

finding “contumacious . . . disregard for deadlines and procedural rules” in light of

Albright’s repeated failure to meet deadlines throughout the case. D. Ct. Order of

September 15, 2017, at 4 (quoting Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781,

784 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “[w]e have rarely, if ever, excused”

contumacious disregard for deadlines)). “The primary measure of good cause is the

movant’s diligence” in attempting to meet deadlines. Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d

813, 822 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering motion to amend pleadings under Rule 16(b)). 

“We generally ‘will not consider prejudice [to the nonmovant] if the movant has not

been diligent . . . .’” Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir.

2012) (first alteration in original) (quoting Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532

F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2008)). 

Albright argues that she had established good cause by providing evidence of

her counsel’s busy work schedule and her counsel’s need to attend to family health

concerns. Albrightrequested a three-week extension after twelve of her fourteen days

to respond had elapsed, explaining, in part, that her counsel had many upcoming

obligations in other cases. She did not explain, however, why she could not have

completed her response in the preceding twelve days, nor did she provide evidence

of any diligent efforts on her counsel’s part to meet the original deadline, such as

attempting to reschedule upcoming obligations. The district court thus did not abuse

its discretion in denying Albright’s motions prior to the deadline.

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Although Albright’s counsel thereafter attempted with some diligence to

complete her response, her filing it ten days after the deadline did not create good

cause where none previously existed. Nor could Albright establish excusable neglect

if good cause were found. Excusable neglect encompasses four factors: prejudice to

the non-moving party, the length of the delay, the movant’s good faith, and the reason

for the delay. See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.,

496 F.3d 863, 866-67 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick

Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The reason for the delay is a key

factor in the analysis. Id. at 867. Albright argues that “[w]hat the district court

describes as a lack of diligence could just as easily be described as a ‘mistake’ by

counsel in managing her caseload, and thus, should be considered excusable neglect.” 

Appellant’s Br. 35. We disagree, as we have previously held that preoccupation with

other hearings does not constitute excusable neglect. See Hawks v. J.P. Morgan

Chase Bank, 591 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010). In addition, the district court

found that Albright had not acted in good faith, having made little effort to meet the

original deadline despite the court’s repeated warnings. We conclude that Albright’s

late filing was not excusable, notwithstanding the relative insubstantiality ofthe delay

and of the danger of prejudice to the District. The district court thus did not abuse

4

its discretion in denying Albright’s motion and striking her response. 

The district court concluded that Albright had failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with regard to the majority of her allegations that arose

outside the period covered by her third due process complaint. The claims arising

before November 2013 had been resolved by settlement agreement, rather than by

way of a due process hearing. Albright argues that settlement constitutes exhaustion

Albright argues that the district court should have explicitly analyzed the

4

Pioneer factors. Such a failure “does not mandate an automatic reversal.” Guidant,

496 F.3d at 866 n.3. The district court’s decision to focus on the reason for delay and

Albright’s bad faith was “reasonable under the facts of this case.” Gibbons v. United

States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).

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under the IDEA, or, in the alternative, that exhaustion in her case would have been

futile. We have not heretofore decided whether settlement constitutes exhaustion 5

under the IDEA. We review de novo whether exhaustion of administrative remedies

was required. See J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir.

2017). 

The IDEA requires a claimant to exhaust her administrative remedies at the

state level before filing a civil suit under its provisions. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A). Had Albright sought to sue only under the IDEA, subsection (i)

would have required that she be “aggrieved by the findings and decision made under

subsection (f).” Id. Subsection (f) sets forth the requirements for impartial due

process hearings. Because Albright filed suit under other laws in addition to the

IDEA, however, she was required to exhaust the administrative procedures “under

subsections (f) and (g) . . . to the same extent as would be required had the action

been brought under [the IDEA].” Id. at § 1415(l). Subsection (g), which governs

6

state administrative appeals, does not apply here.

Albright wasthusrequired to exhaust the proceduresset forth in subsection (f)

to the same extent required by subsection (i), which by its plain language permits

appeals only from “the findings and decision” resulting from a due process hearing. 

Id. at § 1415(i)(2). It necessarily follows that like-extent exhaustion requires the

Albright also argues that even if her pre-November 15, 2013, claims are barred 5

for failure to exhaust, materials in the record fromthat period nonetheless support her

remaining claims because those materials would be admissible at trial. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). We need not consider this argument, because once it struck Albright’s

summary judgment response, the district court considered only the record materials

cited by the District. 

Albright does not contest the district court’s determination that her allegations

6

concerned the denial of a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); Fry v. Napoleon Comm.

Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017).

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entry of administrative findings and a decision. A pre-decision settlement thus fails

to satisfy the IDEA’s requirements.

Albright argues that this reading is inconsistent with Congress’s purported

intent to encourage settlement, particularly in light of the IDEA’s 2004 amendment

allowing claimants the option of mediating their claims. As the Tenth Circuit held,

however, when rejecting this same argument in A.F. ex rel. Christine B. v. Española

Public Schools, 801 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2015), “the terms of the statute are clear and

unambiguous.” Id. at 1249 (quoting United States v. Sprenger, 625 F.3d 1305, 1307

(10th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, “there is nothing remotely implausible about the

‘policy’ result the plain language dictates.” Id. at 1250 (“[W]e can easily imagine a

rational Congress . . . taking one of many possible intermediate positions by requiring

those who wish to forego a mediated IDEA settlement to exhaust (or prove futile) all

of the administrative grievance processes available to them before bringing any

related federal lawsuit.”);see also Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (“By the time any

dispute reaches court, school authorities will have had a complete opportunity to

bring their expertise and judgment to bear on areas of disagreement.”). 

Although we have recognized the futility exception to administrative

exhaustion requirements, see J.B. ex rel. Bailey v. Avilla R-XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d

588, 594 (8th Cir. 2013), we do not address its application here because Albright did

not attempt to raise the issue before the district court. See Kountze ex rel. Hitchcock

Found. v. Gaines, 536 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2008) (refusing to consider issue raised

for the first time on appeal where the record on the claim was not developed below). 

Because we conclude that Albright’s claims are barred for failure to exhaust, we

likewise do not address the District’s argument that those claims were released by the

settlement agreements, nor Albright’s argument that the District breached the

settlement agreements.

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Finally, Albright appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

District on her claims of retaliation against herself and Child Doe in violation of

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We review de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Anderson v. DurhamD & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir.

2010). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 504, Albright must show

that she was “engaged in protected activity, the School District took some adverse

action, and a causal connection between the activity and the District’s action.”

Bradley, 443 F.3d at 976. 

Albright argues that she provided evidence of twelve adverse actions taken

against her and three taken against Child Doe, in support of which she cites materials

contained in her stricken summary judgment response. Moreover, many of her

allegations fall outside the due process period and have not been exhausted. The

district court determined that Albright’s complaintraised only six allegations of harm

against her or Child Doe that were properly exhausted or did not require exhaustion. 

Those six allegations were:

(1) District personnel filed false allegations of child abuse against Ms.

Albright; (2) District personnel subjected Child Doe to strip searchesfor

recording devicesthat Ms. Albright had hidden on her; (3) Ms. Atkinson

generally endeavored to discredit Ms. Albright with District personnel

and filed false police reports against her; (4) Ms. Belk failed to

implement evidence-based practices when designing behavioral

interventions and strategies for Child Doe; (5) Child Doe was denied

access to remedial instruction on account of her disability; and (6) the

District held a meeting on September 5, 2014, at which the [D]istrict

attempted to change Child Doe’s IEP without Ms. Albright attending or

having been given notice.

July 5 Order, at 21-22 (citations omitted). Having struck Albright’s summary

judgment response, the district court deemed admitted or undisputed all factual

assertions made by the District in support of its summary judgment motion.

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Albright’s first three allegations are refuted by the District’s undisputed factual

assertions that no false reports of child abuse were filed against Albright, that Child

Doe was never strip-searched, and that no false police reports were filed against

Albright. The latter three allegations are simply restatements of Albright’s IDEA

claims. Because of our decision that the District did not violate the IDEA, “a

retaliation suit under § 504 based on IDEA violations is precluded.” Bradley, 443

F.3d at 977. The District was thus entitled to summary judgment on Albright’s

retaliation claims. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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