[Cite as State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697.] 

THE STATE EX REL. JEAN-BAPTISTE, APPELLANT, v. KIRSCH, JUDGE,

APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 

2012-Ohio-5697.] 

R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)—Juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacks 

jurisdiction to proceed with classifying juvenile-offender registrant—

Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of prohibition reversed. 

(No. 2011-0934—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided December 6, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 10CA3338, 

2011-Ohio-3368. 

_____________________ 

LANZINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals denying 

the claim of appellant, Pression Jean-Baptiste, for a writ of prohibition to prevent 

appellee, Judge James W. Kirsch of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, 

Juvenile Division, from classifying him as a juvenile-offender registrant in a 

delinquency case after he turned 21 years old. Because the juvenile court patently 

and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed with classifying Jean-Baptiste, 

we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition. 

I. Facts 

A. Juvenile-Delinquency Case 

{¶ 2} Jean-Baptiste was born in Haiti on January 18, 1989. According to 

Jean-Baptiste, he was brought to the United States from a Haitian orphanage in 

1996 and was placed with Paula Kessler in Portsmouth, Ohio. There were no 

legal proceedings regarding his custody until December 2004, when the juvenile 

court placed him in the legal custody of Kessler. 
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{¶ 3} On October 19, 2006, a Scioto County assistant prosecuting attorney 

filed a complaint in the Scioto County Juvenile Court alleging that Jean-Baptiste, 

then 17 years old, appeared to be a delinquent child for committing a rape of a 

ten-year-old child on August 19, 2006, an offense that would be a felony of the 

first degree if committed by an adult. In January 2007, Jean-Baptiste admitted the 

allegations of the complaint, and on the day after Jean-Baptiste turned 18 years 

old, Judge Kirsch adjudicated him to be a delinquent child. On February 5, 2007, 

following a dispositional hearing, Judge Kirsch ordered that Jean-Baptiste be 

committed to the permanent custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services 

(“DYS”) for placement in an institution for a minimum of one year and for a 

maximum period not to extend beyond his 21st birthday—January 18, 2010. The 

judge also classified Jean-Baptiste as a sexual predator and ordered him to meet 

the registration requirements of that classification upon his release. 

{¶ 4} On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the juvenile court’s sexualpredator classification based on its holding that because the court committed JeanBaptiste to a secure facility as part of its dispositional order, the court could not 

classify him as a sexual predator under R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) until his release from 

the secure facility. In re P.B., 4th Dist. No. 07CA3140, 2007-Ohio-3937. No 

appeal was taken from this decision. 

{¶ 5} On May 23, 2008, the United States Department of Homeland 

Security placed an immigration detainer on Jean-Baptiste to assume custody of 

him. On July 17, 2008, DYS released Jean-Baptiste from its institution, and he 

was held in the Seneca County Jail until hearings could be conducted to determine 

his citizenship. In December 2009, DYS notified Judge Kirsch, the county 

sheriff’s office, and the county prosecutor that on January 18, 2010 (JeanBaptiste’s 21st birthday), he would be discharged from the department’s legal 

custody. Judge Kirsch had scheduled a status conference in the case for January 

15, but continued it because Jean-Baptiste was still in the Seneca County Jail and 
January Term, 2012 

3 

would not be released until January 26, 2010. Judge Kirsch ordered that JeanBaptiste’s juvenile-offender classification hearing be held on February 8, 2010. 

When Jean-Baptiste was released from the Seneca County Jail, he was placed by 

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Faith Mission 

residential facility. 

B. Prohibition Case 

{¶ 6} On February 2, 2010, Jean-Baptiste filed a complaint in the court of 

appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Kirsch from proceeding to 

classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant. Jean-Baptiste claimed that the 

juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because 

no statute authorized the court to conduct a classification hearing after he had 

turned 21 years old on January 18, 2010. After the court of appeals denied Judge 

Kirsch’s motions to dismiss and for relief from judgment and for leave to renew 

his motion to dismiss, the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 

{¶ 7} Jean-Baptiste raised the following arguments: (1) Judge Kirsch does 

not have jurisdiction to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant, because he 

is over 21 years old and is thus not a “child” as defined in R.C. 2152.02, (2) the 

juvenile court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is over 21 years 

old, and (3) Judge Kirsch lacks jurisdiction to classify him because the judge 

failed to hold a classification hearing within a reasonable time of his release from 

DYS. Judge Kirsch argued in part that the court of appeals should not consider 

Jean-Baptiste’s last argument, because it was not raised in his complaint. 

{¶ 8} On April 18, 2011, the court of appeals denied the writ of 

prohibition. Jean-Baptiste appealed, and after briefing, we sua sponte held the 

case for our decision in In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 

1203, which was decided on October 30, 2012.1

 State ex rel. P.J. v. Kirsch, 131 

 

1. Because of the factual differences between J.V. and the present case, we do not look to J.V. for 

guidance here. 
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Ohio St.3d 1478, 2012-Ohio-955, 963 N.E.2d 156. This cause is now before the 

court for our consideration. 

II. Legal Analysis 

A. Oral Argument 

{¶ 9} Jean-Baptiste has filed a motion for oral argument. He claims that 

oral argument is appropriate because this case involves a matter of great public 

importance, complex issues of law or fact, and a conflict between courts of 

appeals. 

{¶ 10} In cases in which oral argument is not mandatory—such as direct 

appeals from cases originating in a court of appeals, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.2(A)—we 

have discretion to grant oral argument, and “in exercising this discretion, we 

consider whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex 

issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts 

of appeals.” State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 

118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 11} Jean-Baptiste contends that this appeal involves a matter of great 

public importance because this court has pending cases that relate to the 

application of 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”), Ohio’s version of the 

federal Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq., see, e.g., In re D.J.S., case No. 

2008-1624,2

 and its related cases, and because we recently held that S.B. 10, “as 

applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates 

Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General 

Assembly from passing retroactive laws.” State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 

2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, syllabus. Yet in his motion, Jean-Baptiste 

concedes that the litigants in In re D.J.S. and its related cases “have not raised 

 

2. In re D.J.S. is no longer pending; it was decided on October 20, 2011. 130 Ohio St.3d 257, 

2011-Ohio-5342, 957 N.E.2d 291. 
January Term, 2012 

5 

issues” similar to those involved in this appeal. And he does not suggest that the 

holding in this case is governed by either Williams or In re D.J.S.

{¶ 12} Moreover, Jean-Baptiste does not specify in what respect this direct 

appeal in a prohibition case involves either complex issues of law or fact or what 

purported conflict exists between courts of appeals on the claims he raises here. 

{¶ 13} Finally, the parties’ briefs are sufficient for the court to resolve this 

appeal. See, e.g., State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2011-

Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 14} For all of these reasons, we deny Jean-Baptiste’s motion for oral 

argument and proceed to address the merits. 

B. Prohibition 

{¶ 15} To be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition, 

Jean-Baptiste had to establish that (1) Judge Kirsch was about to exercise judicial 

power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and (3) denying 

the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the 

ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-

Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 7. It is uncontroverted that by ordering the 

February 8, 2010 juvenile-offender classification hearing, Judge Kirsch was about 

to exercise judicial power when Jean-Baptiste filed his prohibition action. 

{¶ 16} For the remaining requirements, “[i]n the absence of a patent and 

unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 

jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that 

jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 

119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Pruitt v. 

Donnelly, 129 Ohio St.3d 498, 2011-Ohio-4203, 954 N.E.2d 117, ¶ 2. 

“Prohibition will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 

128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 9. The dispositive issue 
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is thus whether Jean-Baptiste established that the juvenile court patently and 

unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile-offender classification 

hearing. 

C. Continuing Jurisdiction Did Not Extend to Jean-Baptiste After He Turned 21 

{¶ 17} In his first proposition, Jean-Baptiste asserts that he established that 

the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct the 

February 8, 2010 classification hearing because he had turned 21 on January 18, 

2010. 

{¶ 18} Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court have basic statutory 

jurisdiction over the delinquency case under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which provides 

that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction “[c]oncerning any child 

who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is 

alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.” See also R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) 

(for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, “child” generally “means a person who is 

under eighteen years of age”). The complaint filed in the juvenile court alleged—

and Jean-Baptiste subsequently admitted—that he was a delinquent child based on 

a rape he committed when he was 17 years old. 

{¶ 19} However, although the juvenile court had jurisdiction over JeanBaptiste’s delinquency case, Jean-Baptiste argues in his first proposition of law 

that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over the disposition once it had been fully 

satisfied and once he was no longer a “child” relative to that disposition. He 

points to R.C. 2152.02(C), which has eight subparts and defines the word “child” 

for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2152: 

(C)(1) “Child” means a person who is under eighteen years 

of age, except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(2) to (8) of 

this section. 
January Term, 2012 

7 

(2) Subject to division (C)(3) of this section, any person 

who violates a federal or state law or a municipal ordinance prior 

to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a “child” 

irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with 

respect to that violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is 

held. 

(3) Any person who, while under eighteen years of age, 

commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult 

and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until 

after the person attains twenty-one years of age is not a child in 

relation to that act. 

(4) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(5) and (7) 

of this section, any person whose case is transferred for criminal 

prosecution pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code shall 

be deemed after the transfer not to be a child in the transferred 

case. 

(5) Any person whose case is transferred for criminal 

prosecution pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code and 

who subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in 

that case, unless a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence 

is imposed on the child for that offense * * * and the adult portion 

of that sentence is not invoked * * *, and any person who is 

adjudicated a delinquent child * * * who has a serious youthful 

offender dispositional sentence imposed * * * and whose adult 

portion of the dispositional sentence is invoked * * * shall be 

deemed after the conviction, plea, or invocation not to be a child in 

any case in which a complaint is filed against the person. 
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(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is 

adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to 

attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one 

years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that 

adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a 

person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic 

offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twentyone years of age. * * * 

(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over any person 

whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution solely for the 

purpose of detaining the person * * * unless the person is 

convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in the adult court. 

(8) Any person who, while eighteen years of age, violates 

division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2919.27 of the Revised Code by 

violating a protection order issued or consent agreement approved 

under section 2151.34 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code shall be 

considered a child for the purposes of that violation of section 

2919.27 of the Revised Code. 

(Emphases added.) 

{¶ 20} Jean-Baptiste argues that the definition of “child” in R.C. 

2152.02(C)(2) is limited by R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) to persons under the age of 21 

and that the extension of jurisdiction for a “hearing on the complaint” in R.C. 

2152.02(C)(2) is limited to matters of adjudication. We disagree with the first 

point, and hold that R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) and (3) are independent, but we agree 

with the second argument. 

{¶ 21} The court of appeals in this case stated that “R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) 

does not limit the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to only the ‘hearing on the 
January Term, 2012 

9 

complaint,’ i.e., the adjudication and disposition.” State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. 

Kirsch, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3338, 2011-Ohio-3368, ¶ 12. In concluding that the 

trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste, the court of appeals 

relied upon our decision in State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-

Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) and 2152.02(C). 

Jean-Baptiste at ¶ 14-16. 

{¶ 22} The facts of N.A., however, differ from those in Jean-Baptiste’s 

case. N.A. arose out of a reversal of a delinquency adjudication because the 

juvenile court had failed to properly record the hearing, and N.A. had sought a 

writ of prohibition to prevent the juvenile court judge from proceeding with an 

adjudicatory hearing on remand. The juvenile court had begun its rehearing 

before the day that N.A. turned 21, but then continued the hearing to a date after 

his 21st birthday. See id. at ¶ 4. In affirming the court of appeals’ denial of the 

writ, we concluded that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction to proceed on the 

delinquency case: 

Judge Cross does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction 

to proceed with the delinquency case even though N.A. turned 21 

years old before the case concluded. And notwithstanding N.A.’s 

argument to the contrary, even though the latest hearing in the 

matter was precipitated by the court of appeals’ remand for a 

rehearing, that proceeding is still a “hearing on the complaint.” 

(Emphases added.) Id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 23} We agree with Jean-Baptiste that his case is distinguishable from 

N.A. Unlike the rehearing in N.A., the juvenile-offender classification hearing in 

this case is not a hearing on the complaint. Jean-Baptiste’s adjudicatory and 
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dispositional hearings took place in 2007. Because this case involves a 

classification hearing, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, N.A. is not controlling. 

{¶ 24} We recognize that the court of appeals relied in part upon the 

following language from N.A.: 

[T]he delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is 

adjudicated a delinquent child based on the rape offenses, N.A. 

would still be subject to the juvenile-offender-registration 

provisions. See R.C. 2152.82(C) (if an order classifying a child as 

a juvenile-offender registrant is issued, “the child’s attainment of 

eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate 

the order”); see also R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (juvenile court has 

exclusive original jurisdiction to “conduct the hearings, and to 

make the determinations, adjudications, and orders authorized or 

required under sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 * * * of the Revised 

Code regarding a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent 

child”). 

N.A., 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 13. This language, 

however, is also irrelevant to Jean-Baptiste’s case. It is true that N.A. may have 

been subject to registration if the court adjudicated him delinquent; however, the 

court’s ability to classify in that case arose from the clause of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) 

granting the court jurisdiction to issue an order classifying the child as part of the 

dispositional order. This portion of the statute was applicable in N.A. because in 

that case, the juvenile court maintained continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate 

N.A.’s delinquency. In this case, Jean-Baptiste’s delinquency proceeding was 

concluded when the juvenile court issued its 2007 order committing him to the 

custody of a secure facility. Because the juvenile court concluded the 
January Term, 2012 

11 

delinquency proceeding, the portion of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) at issue in N.A. is 

inapplicable here. 

{¶ 25} The statute that controls the procedure for juvenile sex-offender 

classification is R.C. 2152.83. The dissent argues that the majority conflates 

Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition of law with his second. But the dissent fails to 

recognize that Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition of law includes the argument that a 

court lacks jurisdiction to classify a child once the disposition has been fully 

satisfied. In Jean-Baptiste’s merit brief, he specifically argues that a juvenile 

court has no jurisdiction over a disposition that has been fully satisfied or over a 

person who is no longer a child relative to that disposition. This argument is 

included under his first proposition of law, which asserts that a juvenile court is 

without subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to conduct an initial 

juvenile sex-offender classification hearing for an adult. 

{¶ 26} The dissent also argues that Jean-Baptiste waived any claim related 

to the timing requirement in R.C. 2152.83 by failing to raise it in his complaint in 

the court of appeals. We note that Jean-Baptiste did raise this issue in his 

complaint. The complaint asserts that Judge Kirsch “patently and unambiguously 

lacks jurisdiction to proceed,” that if Judge Kirsch “had validly classified [JeanBaptiste] before [Jean-Baptiste] attained twenty-one years of age, the court’s 

order would remain valid beyond [Jean-Baptiste’s] twenty-first birthday pursuant 

to R.C. 2152.83(E),” that “there is no existing order classifying [Jean-Baptiste] 

and there is no statute extending the jurisdiction of the court past [Jean-Baptiste’s] 

twenty-first birthday,” and that because “no statute authorizes a juvenile court to 

conduct a classification [hearing] after a person has turned twenty-one, any action 

by Judge Kirsch would be void ab initio.” 

{¶ 27} The statute relating to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to conduct a 

classification hearing for juvenile sex offenders is R.C. 2152.83(A)(1): 
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The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall 

issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the 

child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall 

issue at the time of the child’s release from the secure facility, an 

order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and 

specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04, 

2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code * * *. 

(Emphasis added.) We must thus look to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) to determine the 

validity of the argument raised in Jean-Baptiste’s complaint that “there is no 

statute extending the jurisdiction of the court past [Jean-Baptiste’s] twenty-first 

birthday.” 

{¶ 28} Because Jean-Baptiste was adjudicated a delinquent child and was 

committed to a secure facility, the statute is clear that the court must issue the 

order classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time the child is 

released from the secure facility—not afterward. The statute is logical, given that 

the juvenile-offender registrant may be subject to certain registration requirements 

upon his or her release into the community. Because Jean-Baptiste was released 

on the day that he turned 21 and because R.C. 2152.83 specifies that classification 

must occur when a child is released from a secure facility, the juvenile court 

patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste after his 

21st birthday, when he was no longer a child. 

{¶ 29} This conclusion is in accord with In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258. There we held, “A juvenile court does not 

have the jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a Department of 

Youth Services facility after a juvenile has been released from probation.” Id. at 

syllabus. In so holding, we noted a distinction between a juvenile court’s 

extended jurisdiction over abused, neglected, or dependent children and a juvenile 
January Term, 2012 

13 

court’s more limited jurisdiction over delinquent children, stating, “The criminal 

aspects of juvenile delinquency proceedings require greater constraints on 

juvenile courts.” Id. at ¶ 25. We also explained: 

While this court has held, in In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 

63, 748 N.E. 2d 67, syllabus, that a juvenile court proceeding 

generally is a civil action, this court also noted that “there are 

criminal aspects to juvenile court proceedings” and that “the 

United States Supreme Court has carefully imposed basic due 

process requirements on [the juvenile justice system].” Id. at 66 

and 65, 748 N.E.2d 67. 

Id. at ¶ 21. In keeping with these principles, we concluded that “[w]hen the court 

ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to 

Cross on th[e] delinquency count.” Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶ 30} The reasoning behind Cross also applies to Jean-Baptiste’s case. 

Because this case arises out of a delinquency adjudication, Jean-Baptiste is 

entitled to basic due process protections. R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) plainly states that 

the court shall issue the classification order at the time of the child’s release from 

a secure facility. This is a clear expression of the legislature’s intent that juvenile 

courts lose their ability to hold classification hearings after that time. 

{¶ 31} Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, this conclusion is not in 

conflict with either State v. Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 714 N.E.2d 381 (1999), 

or In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999). Both Bellman and 

Davis were decided before the enactment of R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and therefore did 

not contemplate the specific statutory language at issue today. Bellman, 

moreover, concerned former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), a statute that dealt with adult 

offenders rather than juveniles. Although Davis is a juvenile case, it specifically 
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dealt with the question whether the seven-day time frame within which a juvenile 

court must enter its disposition of a child adjudicated as abused, neglected, or 

dependent under R.C. 2151.35 also applied to motions for permanent custody 

filed by an agency under R.C. 2151.414 prior to the September 1996 amendment 

to that statute. As mentioned above, we noted in Cross that a juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction in a delinquency case is more limited than in an abuse, neglect, or 

dependency case. Davis is accordingly inapplicable to this case. 

{¶ 32} R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) requires that the court issue an order 

classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time of the child’s 

release from the custody of a secure facility. Because the juvenile court lacks 

statutory authority to classify Jean-Baptiste after he was released and the court’s 

delinquency disposition has been fully satisfied, we agree with Jean-Baptiste’s 

first proposition of law as applied to this case and hold that the juvenile court 

lacks jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste, who is now no longer a “child” under 

the applicable statute. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 33} In this case, the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacks 

jurisdiction to proceed with classifying Jean-Baptiste. We therefore reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition. 

Judgment reversed 

and writ granted. 

 O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 

_____________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 34} It is a fundamental tenet of jurisprudence in extraordinary-writ 

cases that the scope of review by this court and courts of appeals is less expansive 

than in cases that arise in the ordinary course of law. This is a sensible corollary 
January Term, 2012 

15 

to the “ ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide 

more, it is necessary not to decide more.’ ” State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of 

Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 34, 

quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 

F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in 

judgment). Consequently, in cases seeking extraordinary relief in prohibition, 

courts should not address the merits of a jurisdictional claim, because their duty is 

limited to determining whether jurisdiction in the lower court is patently and 

unambiguously lacking. See State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 

2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 12 (court does not rule on merits of 

jurisdictional claim, “because our duty in prohibition cases is limited to 

determining whether jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking”); State 

ex rel. Davet v. Sutula, 131 Ohio St.3d 220, 2012-Ohio-759, 963 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 3 

(court of appeals did not need to address the merits of jurisdictional claim, 

because its jurisdiction in writ case was limited to determining whether 

jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking). 

{¶ 35} Although the majority opinion in this case parrots the general 

standard applicable to Jean-Baptiste’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition, 

it fails to apply it, and instead it erroneously conflates Jean-Baptiste’s properly 

raised prohibition claim with a claim that he waived in the court of appeals and 

then decides the merits of the prohibition claim based largely on the waived 

jurisdictional claim. 

{¶ 36} Jean-Baptiste raises two distinct claims in this appeal—his primary 

one challenging the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to conduct a classification 

hearing for a delinquent child over 21 years of age and his secondary claim 

contesting the juvenile court’s alleged failure to hold a classification hearing 

within a reasonable time after he was released from a secure facility. It is the 
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second of these two claims that relies on R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and that is not 

properly before this court. 

Failure to Hold Classification Hearing Within Reasonable Time 

{¶ 37} In his second proposition of law, Jean-Baptiste claims that the court 

of appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition because the juvenile court 

patently and unambiguously lost jurisdiction under R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) to classify 

him as a juvenile-offender registrant by failing to hold a classification hearing 

within a reasonable time after he was released from a DYS facility on July 17, 

2008. It is this claim that the majority finds to be dispositive. 

{¶ 38} R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)3

 provides that under circumstances such as 

those in the underlying delinquency case here, the juvenile court “shall issue at 

the time of the child’s release from the secure facility an order that classifies the 

child a juvenile offender registrant and specifies that the child has a duty to 

comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised 

Code.” 

 

3. R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) provides: 

The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the 

dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the 

custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child's release from the 

secure facility an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and 

specifies that the child has a duty to comply with sections 2950.04, 2950.041, 

2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code if all of the following apply: 

(a) The act for which the child is or was adjudicated a delinquent child is a 

sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense that the child 

committed on or after January 1, 2002. 

(b) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of 

committing the offense. 

(c) The court was not required to classify the child a juvenile offender 

registrant under section 2152.82 of the Revised Code or as both a juvenile 

offender registrant and a public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant 

under section 2152.86 of the Revised Code. 
January Term, 2012 

17 

{¶ 39} Jean-Baptiste failed to raise this claim in his complaint and did not 

seek leave to amend his complaint to raise the claim. The parties then submitted 

evidence based on the allegations of the complaint, and in his court-of-appeals 

merit brief, Judge Kirsch objected to Jean-Baptiste’s raising the claim in his brief 

when he had failed to raise it in his complaint. Notwithstanding the majority’s 

claim that no waiver occurred, the fact remains that his complaint did not cite 

R.C. 2152.83(A)(1), which the majority now finds to be dispositive, as a basis for 

the writ of prohibition. Under these circumstances, Jean-Baptiste waived this 

jurisdictional claim in his prohibition case. See State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 87 

Ohio St.3d 159, 160, 718 N.E.2d 428 (1999) (court declined to address merits of 

claim on appeal from dismissal of prohibition complaint when appellant did not 

raise the issue in his complaint or amend the complaint to include the claim, and 

appellees did not expressly or implicitly consent to litigation of it). 

{¶ 40} Moreover, for the following reasons, even assuming that JeanBaptiste’s claim was not waived by his failure to properly raise it in the court of 

appeals, he did not establish that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously 

lacked jurisdiction to conduct his classification hearing within a reasonable time 

after he was released from custody. 

{¶ 41} First, R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) does not specify that if a juvenile court 

fails to hold a hearing at the time specified in the statute, its jurisdiction to hold 

the hearing is terminated. “ ‘As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the 

performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for 

performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for 

convenience or orderly procedure.’ ” State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. 

Farrar, 146 Ohio St. 467, 66 N.E.2d 531 (1946), paragraph three of the syllabus; 

see also State ex rel. Madsen v. Jones, 106 Ohio St.3d 178, 2005-Ohio-4381, 833 

N.E.2d 291, ¶ 8. 
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18

{¶ 42} Significantly, in State v. Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 714 

N.E.2d 381 (1999), the court held that former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), which 

provided that the judge “shall conduct the [sexual predator] hearing prior to 

sentencing,” id. at 210, did not impose any jurisdictional restriction based on a 

judge’s failure to comply with the timing requirement to hold the classification 

hearing. See also In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999) 

(time requirement for juvenile court to make disposition order is directory and not 

jurisdictional). Similarly, R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) includes no expression of 

legislative intent to restrict the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to hold a juvenileoffender classification hearing for failure to hold a classification hearing at the 

time of the child’s release from a secure facility. 

{¶ 43} Second, Jean-Baptiste cites two appellate decisions in support of 

his claim, but these cases were resolved in the ordinary course of law by appeal 

rather than in an extraordinary-writ action. See In re McAllister, 5th Dist. No. 

2006CA00073, 2006-Ohio-5554 (juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to classify 

person as a juvenile sex offender 13 months after his release from a secure 

facility); In re B.W., 2d Dist. No. 1702, 2007-Ohio-2096, ¶ 13-14 (although 

classification hearing was not held until more than two months after the juvenile’s 

release from a secure facility, it was held within a reasonable time after release 

“given docket constraints and appropriate time for evaluations appurtenant to 

classification”); see also State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 

76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 21 (affirming sua sponte dismissal of 

complaint for a writ of prohibition because the appellant’s argument was one 

normally raised in ordinary course of law rather than in an action for 

extraordinary relief and so did not establish a patent and unambiguous lack of 

jurisdiction). 

{¶ 44} Third, Jean-Baptiste was not released from a secure facility in July 

2008; instead, he was released from DYS to the custody of the United States 
January Term, 2012 

19 

Department of Homeland Security pursuant to an immigration detainer and was 

placed in another secure facility—the Seneca County Jail. Jean-Baptiste was not 

released from this federal custody until January 26, 2010, and Judge Kirsch then 

promptly scheduled his classification hearing for February 8, 2010. 

{¶ 45} Fourth, I note that that the Tenth District Court of Appeals, in an 

appeal in the ordinary course of law, resolved the substantive issue concerning 

R.C. 2152.83(A) in favor of the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. We 

allowed an appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment in that case, and oral 

argument is scheduled for January 13, 2013. See In re J.B., 10th Dist. No. 11AP243, 2011-Ohio-6134, appeal allowed, 131 Ohio St.3d 1483, 2012-Ohio-1143, 

963 N.E.2d 824. We should not decide an issue in the context of an appeal in an 

extraordinary-writ case in which the issue was not properly raised; this is 

especially true when the same substantive issue is before the court in a pending 

discretionary appeal in the ordinary course of law. 

{¶ 46} Finally, the majority’s emphatic reliance on In re Cross, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258, is misplaced for three separate 

reasons. First, that case was decided in the ordinary course of law and not in the 

context of an action for extraordinary relief. Second, Jean-Baptiste cites Cross in 

support of his first proposition, but not in support of his waived second 

proposition regarding R.C. 2152.83(A)(1), for which the majority cites it. Third, 

as the Tenth District Court of Appeals persuasively reasoned in J.B., our holding 

in Cross, which is limited to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to reimpose a 

suspended commitment to a DYS facility after a juvenile has been released from 

probation, does not govern a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a sex-offender 

juvenile-delinquency case: 

 The juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a sex-offender 

adjudication is different from its jurisdiction with respect to other 
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adjudications. While a juvenile court ordinarily “relinquishes 

control” over a child committed to DYS, the court does not 

relinquish control over a child adjudicated delinquent for 

committing a sexually-oriented offense. R.C. 2152.22(A). And, 

while a child may only be held at DYS until the age of 21, R.C. 

2152.83(E) provides that an order issued under R.C. 2152.83(A) 

“and any determinations included in the order shall remain in 

effect for the period of time specified in” R.C. Chapter 2950. 

Compare R.C. 2152.16 (provisions precluding juvenile court from 

committing a child to DYS for a period exceeding age 21). The 

child’s attainment of age 18 or 21 “does not affect or terminate the 

order, and the order remains in effect for the period of time 

described in this division.” R.C. 2152.83(E). 

J.B. at ¶ 45. 

{¶ 47} Therefore, Jean-Baptiste’s second proposition, which is based on 

R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and which the majority holds to be dispositive of this case, 

does not warrant reversal of the court of appeals judgment denying the writ of 

prohibition. 

Jurisdiction to Conduct Classification Hearing for Delinquent 

Child over 21 Years Old 

{¶ 48} In his first proposition, Jean-Baptiste asserts that he established that 

the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct the 

February 8, 2010 classification hearing because he had turned 21 on January 18, 

2010. 

{¶ 49} Jean-Baptiste’s assertion lacks merit. As the majority concedes, 

Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court have basic statutory jurisdiction over the 

delinquency case under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and 2151.011(B)(6), and they have 
January Term, 2012 

21 

exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct the juvenile-offender classification 

hearing at issue here. 

{¶ 50} Under R.C. 2152.02(C)(2), subject to a provision that is 

inapplicable here, “any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal 

ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a ‘child’ 

irrespective of that person’s age at the time the complaint with respect to that 

violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is held.” See also Juv.R. 2(D) 

(“ ‘Child’ has the same meaning as in sections 2151.011 and 2152.02 of the 

Revised Code”). Jean-Baptiste committed the rape before he was 18 years old, 

and as the court of appeals concluded, the “language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) does 

not limit the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to only the ‘hearing on the complaint,’ 

i.e., the adjudication and disposition.” State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 4th 

Dist. No. 10CA3338, 2011-Ohio-3368, ¶ 12. In fact, it is arguable that the 

classification hearing constitutes a hearing on the complaint for purposes of the 

statute because it is a hearing that is required after the adjudication and 

disposition for certain sex-oriented or child-victim-oriented offenses. 

{¶ 51} Therefore, the juvenile court does not patently and unambiguously 

lack jurisdiction to conduct the required hearing to classify Jean-Baptiste as a 

juvenile-offender registrant. 

{¶ 52} This holding is supported by precedent. In State ex rel. N.A. v. 

Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, we affirmed a 

judgment dismissing a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent a juvenile 

court judge from proceeding with an adjudicatory hearing in a delinquency case 

after the alleged delinquent child had turned 21 years old. We held that the 

juvenile court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. In 

so holding, we emphasized that “even though N.A. is now over 21 years old, the 

delinquency proceeding is still important because if he is adjudicated a delinquent 

child based on the rape offenses, N.A. would still be subject to the juvenile-
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22

offender-registration provisions.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) and 

2152.82(C). Similarly, Jean-Baptiste, who has been adjudicated a delinquent 

child based on his rape of a ten-year-old boy, is subject to the juvenile-offenderregistration provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950. And he should be. The public has a 

right to be notified of his prior offense. 

{¶ 53} Although N.A. is distinguishable in certain particulars, it provides 

support for the juvenile court’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction here. The 

appellate cases that have relied on N.A. have applied our holding in that case to 

rule that juvenile courts have jurisdiction to conduct classification proceedings 

after the juvenile reached 21 years of age. State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch,

2011-Ohio-3368; In re B.D., 5th Dist. No. 11-CA-27, 2012-Ohio-2223, 970 

N.E.2d 1178 (court affirmed juvenile court’s decision to conduct sex-offender 

classification hearing after juvenile reached 21 years of age). These courts did not 

act unreasonably in so holding. 

{¶ 54} Finally, this case has been held for several months for a decision in 

J.V. Our recent holding in In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 

N.E.2d 1203, however, does not require a different conclusion than that reached 

by the court of appeals. In J.V., we held that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction 

to correct its original disposition to impose postrelease control after a delinquent 

child turned 21 years old. In that case, we interpreted R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which 

provides: 

The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is 

adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to 

attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one 

years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that 

adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a 

person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic 
January Term, 2012 

23 

offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twentyone years of age. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 55} R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), which is not relied on by the parties in this 

appeal, does not apply here, because Jean-Baptiste was not adjudicated a 

delinquent child before he was 18 years old. See N.A., 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-

Ohio-1471, 925 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 11 (“R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), however, is 

inapplicable because N.A. was not adjudicated a delinquent child before he was 

18 years old”). Consequently, our holding in J.V. does not address JeanBaptiste’s claim. 

{¶ 56} Therefore, Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition also lacks merit. 

Conclusion

{¶ 57} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 

Jean-Baptiste’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition. Jean-Baptiste failed 

to establish that Judge Kirsch and the juvenile court patently and unambiguously

lack jurisdiction to conduct a hearing to classify Jean-Baptiste as a juvenileoffender registrant in accordance with R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) and the pertinent 

provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950. Jean-Baptiste thus had an adequate remedy in 

the ordinary course of law to raise his jurisdictional claims, and the court should 

affirm the well-reasoned decision of the court of appeals. Because the majority, 

in reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, instead conflates Jean-Baptiste’s 

arguments on appeal, credits a jurisdictional claim that Jean-Baptiste waived by 

not properly presenting it in the court of appeals, and ignores our well-established 

axioms restricting the scope of our review in extraordinary-writ cases and 

extolling judicial restraint, I respectfully dissent. 

LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP,JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Danielle M. 

Parker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

_____________________