alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

ERIC FLORES , Appellant , V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 1 7 7

- C R

Appeal from the
120th District Court

o f El Paso C ounty, Texas (TC# 20110D01621 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION Eric Flores is attempting to appeal from a letter signed by the 120th District Court on
June 6, 2019 advising him that his conviction is final and “all Appellate relief must be pursued by the proper vehicle

. ” We dismiss the attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Texas Constitution provides that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over “all cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.” T EX .C ONST
. art. V, § 6 (a) . Article 44.02 provides that “[a] defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed

. . . .” T EX .C ODE C RIM .P ROC .A NN
. art. 44.02 . Under Rule 25.2(a)(2), a defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure A rticle
44.02 and the Rules of Appella te Procedure. T EX .R.A PP .P. 25.2(a)(2) . Generally, a court of appeals only has jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a criminal defendant where there has been a- 2

-

final judgment of conviction. See Apolinar v. State , 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) ;

see State v. Sellers , 790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (noting the well

- established rule that a defendant’s general right to appeal under Article 44.02 is limited to appeal from a final judgment). We have jurisdiction over other types of crim inal appeals only when “expressly granted by law.” McIntosh v. State , 110 S.W.3d 51, 52 (Tex.App

. — W aco 2002, no pet.) ; see Abbott v. State , 271 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ; Apolinar , 820 S.W.2d at 794

. On May 18, 2017, we issued an opinion and ju dgment affirming Appellant’s conviction of burglary of a building in cause number 20110D01621

. See Eric Flores v. State , No. 08

- 16

- 00025

- CR, 2017 WL 2180705 (Tex.App.

— El Paso May 18, 2017, pet. ref’d) . The trial judge’s letter informing that his conviction is final, and she could not give him legal advice or appoint counsel to represent him in post

- conviction proceedings is not an appealable order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

July 10, 2019 YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ. (Do Not Publish)
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 26 (Tuesday, February 9, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6416-6417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-2741]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

Upon Written Request; Copies Available From: Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Washington, DC 
20549-0213.

Extensions:
    Rule 12d1-3; OMB Control No. 3235-0109; SEC File No. 270-116.

    Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``Commission'') has submitted to the Office of Management 
and Budget this request for extension of the previously approved 
collection of information discussed below.
    Exchange Act Rule 12d1-3 (17 CFR 240.12d1-3) requires a 
certification that a security has been approved by an exchange for 
listing and registration pursuant to Section 12(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(d)) to be filed with the 
Commission. The information required under Rule 12d1-3 must be filed 
with the Commission and is publicly available. We estimate that it 
takes approximately one-half hour to provide the information required 
under Rule 12d1-3 and that the information is filed by approximately 
688 respondents annually for a total annual reporting burden of 344 
burden hours (.5 hours per response x 688 responses).
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information

[[Page 6417]]

unless it displays a currently valid control number.
    Written comments regarding the above information should be directed 
to the following persons: (i) Desk Officer for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Management and Budget, Room 10102, New Executive Office 
Building, Washington, DC 20503 or send an e-mail to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5c0f343d3b293a283d031d343139381c33313e7239332c723b332a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="52013a3335273426330d133a3f3736123d3f307c373d227c353d24">[email protected]</span></a>; and (ii) Charles Boucher, Director/CIO, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, C/O Shirley Martinson, 6432 General Green Way, 
Alexandria, VA 22312; or send an e-mail to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#401012011f0d21292c222f38003325236e272f36"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d08082918f9db1b9bcb2bfa890a3b5b3feb7bfa6">[email protected]</span></a>. 
Comments must be submitted to OMB within 30 days of this notice.

    Dated: February 1, 2010.
Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-2741 Filed 2-8-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 2, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY MASTERS,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOLENE C. BLAIR, Former Deputy

District Attorney for the Eighth Judicial

District, in her individual and official

capacities,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

TERENCE A. GILMORE, Former

Deputy District Attorney of the Eighth

Judicial District, in his individual and

official capacities; JAMES BRODERICK,

Lieutenant in the Fort Collins Police

Department, in his individual and official

capacities; MARSHA REED, Former

Detective in the Fort Collins Police

Department, in her individual and official

capacities; DENNIS V. HARRISON,

Chief of the Fort Collins Police

Department, in his individual and official

capacities; CITY OF FORT COLLINS, a

municipality; STUART VANMEVEREN,

Former District Attorney of the Eighth

Judicial District, in his individual and

official capacities; LARRY

ABRAHAMSON, District Attorney of the

Eighth Judicial District, in his official

capacity; EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF COLORADO, a political subdivision

of the State of Colorado,

Defendants.

No. 09-1483

(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-02278-LTB-KLM)

Appellate Case: 09-1483 Document: 01018375881 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 Page: 1 
-2-

ORDER

The stipulation filed by the parties to dismiss the captioned appeal is granted. See

Fed. R. App. P. Rule 42(b) and 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(9). Each party shall bear its own

costs.

A copy of this order shall stand as and for the mandate of this court.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 09-1483 Document: 01018375881 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 Page: 2
## This page has permanently moved.

### If redirect does not occur in 5 seconds, click the following link: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/experiments/explorer/Investigation.html?#id=197
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-2314MN

_____________

Tandem Products, Inc., a Minnesota *

corporation, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

New Hampshire Insurance Company, a * [UNPUBLISHED]

Pennsylvania corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: February 3, 1998

Filed: February 9, 1998

_____________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Tandem Products, Inc. (Tandem) appeals from the adverse ruling of the district

court in this diversity-based coverage dispute between Tandem and New Hampshire

Insurance Company (New Hampshire). New Hampshire denied coverage for damages

Tandem suffered from a defective heater provided by Lambert Industries, Inc., and the

district court held the terms of New Hampshire's policy did not provide coverage for

Tandem's loss. Having reviewed the record and having considered de novo the

questions of state law, we conclude no error of law appears in the district court's
-2-

judgment. We thus affirm the decision of the district court without further discussion.

See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Yandes *v.*Patterson.—In error.

*Saturday,*May 30.

THE points in this case were the same with those decided in *Braman*v. *Howk,*1 Blackf. 392, and *Naylor*v. Moody, 3 id. 92, and were decided in conformity with those authorities.
#### SKIPPY INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LIPTON INVESTMENTS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-1086.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 29, 2003.

Decided Sept. 12, 2003.

Mary Helen Sears, M.H. Sears Law Firm, Washington, DC, for Appellant. William M. Webner, Sughrue Mion, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Appellee.

*292Before WILKINSON, WIDENER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Skippy Incorporated appeals the district court’s order dismissing its complaint, among other reasons, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Skippy Inc. v. Lipton Investments, Inc.,*No. CA-02-1227-A (E.D.Va. Dec. 20, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 8, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

KARL GRANT LOSEE, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN TURLEY, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 10-4088

(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00188-TC)

(D. Utah)

ORDER

Before KELLY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

In a September 18, 2009 Order, the district court denied Karl Losee’s 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas petition. Petitioner Losee, proceeding pro se, appeals. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The notice of appeal is untimely.

Pro se appellants must comply with the requirements of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure that govern all litigants. See Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d

452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994). Because no separate judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58

was entered by the district court, the time to file a notice of appeal did not begin to run

until 150 days after entry of the September 18, 2009 Order, see Rule 58(c)(2)(B), plus an

additional 30 days under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In this appeal, the 150-day deadline

Appellate Case: 10-4088 Document: 01018437037 Date Filed: 06/08/2010 Page: 1 
2

expired on Tuesday, February 16, 2010, see Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C), and the 30-day

deadline expired on March 18, 2010. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal in the district

court on April 30, 2010, which was forty-three days past the March 18, 2010 filing

deadline. This court lacks authority to reopen the time to file an appeal. See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(6).

The time limit for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case is “mandatory and

jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 

Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely.

The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Entered for the Court,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Kathleen T. Clifford

Attorney - Deputy Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-4088 Document: 01018437037 Date Filed: 06/08/2010 Page: 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This exhibit contains summary financial information extracted from the
Registrant's financial statements for the period ended March 31, 2000, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.  This
exhibit shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 and Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise
subject to the liability of such Sections, nor shall it be deemed a part of any
other filing which incorporates this report by reference, unless such other
filing expressly incorporates this Exhibit by reference.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          25,468
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   37,490
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,109
<INVENTORY>                                     43,335
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               120,393
<PP&E>                                          93,675
<DEPRECIATION>                                  36,232
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 299,680
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,237
<BONDS>                                        108,723
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           164
<OTHER-SE>                                     102,713
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   299,680
<SALES>                                        122,850
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               122,850
<CGS>                                           84,790
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   84,790
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                46,925
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,167
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,222)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (4,955)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,267)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,267)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.38)


</TABLE>
#### Mary Lee JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael BENOV, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-15129.

D.C. No. CV-01-02965-WHA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 8, 2003.*

Decided Sept. 15, 2003.

Mary Lee Johnson, pro se, Adelanto, CA, Petitioner-Appellant.

Before PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Mary Lee Johnson, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition without prejudice to refiling as an exhausted civil rights complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, *see Tripati v. Henman,*843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988), and we affirm.

Johnson contends that the conditions of her confinement violate her constitutional *822rights because she is denied medical care, the prison refuses to transfer her, and she is being mistreated by the prison staff out of retaliation for filing a previous civil suit.1

The district court properly construed these issues as unexhausted civil rights claims, rather than 'challenges to the legality or duration of confinement. *See Badea v. Cox,*931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that habeas corpus petition is proper method to challenge legality or duration of confinement, but civil rights action is proper method of challenging conditions of confinement). Johnson’s frustration with administrative remedies does not excuse the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). *See Terrell v. Brewer,*935 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that generally, a federal prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights action).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The district court certified for appeal the issue of whether a challenge to conditions of confinement can be brought by way of a federal habeas petition. Johnson has abandoned this issue by not addressing it in her brief to this court. *See Petrocelli v. Angelone,*248 F.3d 877, 880 n. 1 (9th Cir.2001). To the extent that Johnson seeks to challenge her conviction, she did not include those claims in her § 2241 petition and they are not properly before us. *See Belgarde v. Montana,*123 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1997).
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1891 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1891

To amend title 11, United States Code, to establish a priority for the 
  payment of claims for duties paid to the United States by licensed 
          customs brokers and sureties on behalf of a debtor.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 19, 2003

 Mr. Graham of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. Durbin) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                            on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 11, United States Code, to establish a priority for the 
  payment of claims for duties paid to the United States by licensed 
          customs brokers and sureties on behalf of a debtor.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Customs Business Fairness Act of 
2003''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT.

    Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
            ``(10) Tenth, allowed unsecured claims of customs brokers 
        (as defined in section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
        1641)) and sureties (as provided in section 623 of the Tariff 
        Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1623)) for duties, taxes, or other 
        charges paid to the United States Customs Service on behalf of 
        the debtor arising out of the importation of merchandise 
        entered for consumption within one year before the date of the 
        filing of the petition.''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT.

    (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act 
and the amendment made by this Act shall take effect on the date of 
enactment of this Act.
    (b) Application of Amendment.--The amendment made by this Act shall 
apply only with respect to cases commenced under title 11, United 
States Code, on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>
                                  EXHIBIT 32.1


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the transition report of Nimbus Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Lucien
Lallouz, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date: December 11, 2003


/s/Lucien Lallouz
------------------------------
Lucien Lallouz
Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 16.1

                     [LETTERHEAD OF REEL & SWAFFORD, PLLC]


November 22, 1999


US Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street NW
Washington, DC 20549

RE: The Bighub.com, Inc. (Commission File Number 000-27107)

We have read Form 8K dated November 5, 1999, and received by us November 11,
1999, of the above referenced registrant related to the change of auditors
whereby the client-auditor relationship between registrant and Reel & Swafford,
PLLC has ceased.

This is to advise you that Reel & Swafford, PLLC has no matters of disagreement
with respect to the statements made in the aforementioned Form 8K of the
registrant except for the following with respect to Item 4:

     First paragraph - Reel & Swafford, PLLC were notified of their dismissal on
     November 11, 1999.

     Fourth and Fifth paragraphs - we are unable to agree or disagree with
     paragraph four because we have not seen a independent appraisal of "the
     Company's assets" as of a date that would give rise to an adjustment to the
     historical financial statements as of October 31, 1998. Nor have we been
     provided adequate support and documentation to form a conclusion whether a
     subsequent write-down under SFAS 121 is appropriate.

     Second, Sixth and Seventh paragraphs - these paragraphs discuss meetings
     and discussions to which we were not privy. Accordingly, we are unable to
     agree or disagree with those statements.


Reel & Swafford, PLLC

Certified Public Accountants

cc: The Bighub.com, Inc.
Attention: Chet Howard, CFO
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1929 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.1929

                       One Hundred Eighth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
           the seventh day of January, two thousand and three

                                 An Act

 
  To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the 
 Public Health Service Act to extend the mental health benefits parity 
                   provisions for an additional year.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Mental Health Parity Reauthorization 
Act of 2003''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF MENTAL HEALTH PROVISIONS.

    (a) ERISA.--Section 712(f) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1185a(f)) is amended by striking 
``December 31, 2003'' and inserting ``December 31, 2004''.
    (b) PHSA.--Section 2705(f) of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 300gg-5(f)) is amended by striking ``December 31, 2003'' and 
inserting ``December 31, 2004''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```