Rel: 07/03/2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance

sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,

Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-

0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

SPECIAL TERM, 2014

____________________

1130053

____________________

Fleetwood Trucking Company, Inc.

v.

Cahaba Resources, LLC, and Crawford Enterprises, LLC

____________________

1130074

____________________

Cahaba Resources, LLC

v.

Fleetwood Trucking Company, Inc.

Appeals from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court

(CV-13-900811)

MAIN, Justice.
1130053, 1130074

1130053 –- AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.

Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,

concur. 

Moore, C.J., concurs specially.

1130074 –- AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.

Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and

Bryan, JJ., concur.

2
1130053, 1130074

MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially in case no.

1130053).

Fleetwood Trucking Company, Inc. ("Fleetwood"), sued

Cahaba Resources, LLC ("Cahaba"), and Crawford Enterprises,

LLC ("Crawford"), in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, seeking

indemnity for black-lung benefits the United States Department

of Labor ordered Fleetwood to pay a former employee under the

Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. The

Department of Labor's ruling is currently on appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The

Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissed Fleetwood's action against

Cahaba and Crawford, subsequent employers of the employee, on

the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the

indemnity claim. Fleetwood now appeals to this Court.

I concur in affirming the judgment of the Tuscaloosa

Circuit Court. I write separately because I do not believe the

Tuscaloosa Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over a common-law indemnity claim. Rather, the proper ground

for the judgment for Cahaba and Crawford and against Fleetwood

was Fleetwood's failure to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted because its claims, given the procedural

3
1130053, 1130074

posture of this case, are premature. See Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.

R. Civ. P.

Alabama courts retain subject-matter jurisdiction over

indemnity claims. Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors,

Inc., 135 So. 3d 953, 960 (Ala. 2013)("Under Alabama law, an

indemnity claim is a tort claim ...."); Amerada Hess Corp. v.

Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 627 So. 2d 367, 370 (Ala.

1993)(noting that "'indemnity should be granted in any factual

situation in which, as between the parties themselves, it is

just and fair that the indemnitor should bear the total

responsibility, rather than leave it on the indemnitee'"

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B (1977), cmt.

c)). This Court has explained that subject-matter jurisdiction

"concerns a court's power to decide certain types of cases."

Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006). Subjectmatter jurisdiction refers to "[j]urisdiction over the nature

of the case and the type of relief sought." Black's Law

Dictionary 983 (10th ed. 2014)(emphasis added). 

"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to

hear and determine cases of the general class to

which the proceedings in question belong. The

principle of subject matter jurisdiction relates to

a court's inherent authority to deal with the case

4
1130053, 1130074

or matter before it. The term means not simply

jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying

the attention of the court but jurisdiction of the

class of cases to which the particular case

belongs."

21 C.J.S. Courts § 11 (2006). The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over Fleetwood's claims asserting

common-law indemnification even if it did not regard those

claims as meritorious. Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama,

[Ms. 1120439, October 4, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

2013)("There are ... no problems with subject-matter

jurisdiction merely because a party files an action that

ostensibly lacks a probability of merit."). Therefore, my

concurrence should not be taken as upholding the Tuscaloosa

Circuit Court's determination that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Fleetwood's indemnity claims. I believe

Fleetwood's action is premature because Fleetwood has appealed

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

for relief from the Department of Labor's ruling that, if

granted, would render the present indemnification action moot.

Should the Court of Appeals rule against Fleetwood,

Fleetwood's action for common-law indemnity would be viable.

5
1130053, 1130074

In light of the foregoing, I concur to affirm the judgment of

the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. 

6