Aerospace Safety

Advisory Panel

Annual

Report

for 2012

NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair

January 9, 2013

The Honorable Charles F. Bolden, Jr.

Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

Dear Mr. Bolden:

Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2012 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

This report is based on the Panel’s 2012 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; “insight” visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA 

operations and decision-making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences.

In our report we highlight issues related to: a.) Commercial Crew Program (CCP), b.) Exploration Systems Development, c.) Funding 

Uncertainty, d.) International Space Station, e.) Technical Authority, and f.) Risk Management. Of these, the Funding Uncertainty and 

Commercial Crew Program are interrelated and of the most concern. Reprinted from the body of the report is a chart depicting the funding 

history of the CCP:

51

500

312

850

406

830

0

200

400

600

800

1000

$M

2009/2010 2011 2012 2013

??

President's Budget Request Appropriated

For the last two years, the CCP appropriation has been approximately one half of the budget request. Informal communications with 

congressional staffs indicate this will probably be the case again in Fiscal Year (FY) 13. 

In carrying out our responsibilities, the ASAP hears both sides of the story. The NASA program team highlights inability to execute the 

program of record and grapples with the necessity to modify acquisition strategy to adjust for the funding shortfalls. The Congress notes the 

lack of credible cost estimate, the absence of an integrated schedule, and “program instability.” In the Panel’s opinion, a consensus between the 

Congress and NASA will be required to resolve this conundrum. 

In FY13, we predict this planning-funding disconnect will again drive a change to acquisition strategy, schedule, and/or safety risk. The ASAP 

is concerned that some will champion an approach that is a current option contained in the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) 

agreement. There is risk this optional, orbital flight-test demonstration with a non-NASA crew could yield two standards of safety—one 

reflecting NASA requirements, and one with a higher risk set of commercial requirements. It also raises questions of who acts as certification 

authority and what differentiates public from private accountability. Separating the level of safety demanded in the system from the unique and 

hard-earned knowledge that NASA possesses introduces new risks and unique challenges to the normal precepts of public safety and mission 

responsibility. We are concerned that NASA’s CCiCap 2014 “Option” prematurely signals tacit acceptance of this commercial requirements 

approach absent serious consideration by all the stakeholders on whether this higher level of risk is in fact in concert with national objectives.

NASA’s senior leaders and staff members offered significant cooperation to support the completion of this document. I submit the ASAP 

Annual Report for 2012 with respect and appreciation.

Sincerely,

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.)

Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Enclosure
NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair

January 9, 2013

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden

President of the Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2012 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

This report is based on the Panel’s 2012 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; “insight” visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA 

operations and decision-making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences.

In our report we highlight issues related to: a.) Commercial Crew Program (CCP), b.) Exploration Systems Development, c.) Funding 

Uncertainty, d.) International Space Station, e.) Technical Authority, and f.) Risk Management. Of these, the Funding Uncertainty and 

Commercial Crew Program are interrelated and of the most concern. Reprinted from the body of the report is a chart depicting the funding 

history of the CCP:

51

500

312

850

406

830

0

200

400

600

800

1000

$M

2009/2010 2011 2012 2013

??

President's Budget Request Appropriated

For the last two years, the CCP appropriation has been approximately one half of the budget request. Informal communications with 

congressional staffs indicate this will probably be the case again in Fiscal Year (FY) 13. 

In carrying out our responsibilities, the ASAP hears both sides of the story. The NASA program team highlights inability to execute the 

program of record and grapples with the necessity to modify acquisition strategy to adjust for the funding shortfalls. The Congress notes the 

lack of credible cost estimate, the absence of an integrated schedule, and “program instability.” In the Panel’s opinion, a consensus between the 

Congress and NASA will be required to resolve this conundrum. 

In FY13, we predict this planning-funding disconnect will again drive a change to acquisition strategy, schedule, and/or safety risk. The ASAP 

is concerned that some will champion an approach that is a current option contained in the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) 

agreement. There is risk this optional, orbital flight-test demonstration with a non-NASA crew could yield two standards of safety—one 

reflecting NASA requirements, and one with a higher risk set of commercial requirements. It also raises questions of who acts as certification 

authority and what differentiates public from private accountability. Separating the level of safety demanded in the system from the unique and 

hard-earned knowledge that NASA possesses introduces new risks and unique challenges to the normal precepts of public safety and mission 

responsibility. We are concerned that NASA’s CCiCap 2014 “Option” prematurely signals tacit acceptance of this commercial requirements 

approach absent serious consideration by all the stakeholders on whether this higher level of risk is in fact in concert with national objectives.

NASA’s senior leaders and staff members offered significant cooperation to support the completion of this document. I submit the ASAP 

Annual Report for 2012 with respect and appreciation.

Sincerely, 

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.)

Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Enclosure
NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair

January 9, 2013

The Honorable John A. Boehner

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2012 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

This report is based on the Panel’s 2012 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; “insight” visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA 

operations and decision-making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences.

In our report we highlight issues related to: a.) Commercial Crew Program (CCP), b.) Exploration Systems Development, c.) Funding 

Uncertainty, d.) International Space Station, e.) Technical Authority, and f.) Risk Management. Of these, the Funding Uncertainty and 

Commercial Crew Program are interrelated and of the most concern. Reprinted from the body of the report is a chart depicting the funding 

history of the CCP:

51

500

312

850

406

830

0

200

400

600

800

1000

$M

2009/2010 2011 2012 2013

??

President's Budget Request Appropriated

For the last two years, the CCP appropriation has been approximately one half of the budget request. Informal communications with 

congressional staffs indicate this will probably be the case again in Fiscal Year (FY) 13. 

In carrying out our responsibilities, the ASAP hears both sides of the story. The NASA program team highlights inability to execute the 

program of record and grapples with the necessity to modify acquisition strategy to adjust for the funding shortfalls. The Congress notes the 

lack of credible cost estimate, the absence of an integrated schedule, and “program instability.” In the Panel’s opinion, a consensus between the 

Congress and NASA will be required to resolve this conundrum. 

In FY13, we predict this planning-funding disconnect will again drive a change to acquisition strategy, schedule, and/or safety risk. The ASAP 

is concerned that some will champion an approach that is a current option contained in the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) 

agreement. There is risk this optional, orbital flight-test demonstration with a non-NASA crew could yield two standards of safety—one 

reflecting NASA requirements, and one with a higher risk set of commercial requirements. It also raises questions of who acts as certification 

authority and what differentiates public from private accountability. Separating the level of safety demanded in the system from the unique and 

hard-earned knowledge that NASA possesses introduces new risks and unique challenges to the normal precepts of public safety and mission 

responsibility. We are concerned that NASA’s CCiCap 2014 “Option” prematurely signals tacit acceptance of this commercial requirements 

approach absent serious consideration by all the stakeholders on whether this higher level of risk is in fact in concert with national objectives.

NASA’s senior leaders and staff members offered significant cooperation to support the completion of this document. I submit the ASAP 

Annual Report for 2012 with respect and appreciation.

Sincerely, 

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.)

Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Enclosure

I. Introductory Remarks. 

A. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)  

B. ASAP Observations on NASA Accomplishments in 2012  

1. Milestones in Commercial Transportation of Cargo and Crew to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). 

2. Milestones in Exploration Systems Development (ESD). 

3. Safe ISS Operations and Utilization. 

4. NASA Safety Metrics. 

5. Science Mission Launches and Landings. 

6. Progress on ASAP Recommendations. 

II. Issues and Concerns  

A. Commercial Crew Program (CCP)  

B. Exploration Systems Development (ESD)  

C. Funding Uncertainty  

D. International Space Station (ISS)  .

E. Technical Authority (TA)  .

F. Risk Management  .

1. Accountability and Documentation of Rationale for Risk Acceptance. .

2. Balancing Risk and Reward (Value). .

3. Communication/Transparency Concerning Risk. .

4. Robotics and Risk Mitigation. .

III. Conclusion. .

Appendix A: Summary and Status of ASAP 2012 Recommendations  .

Appendix B: Closure Rationale for Recommendations Closed in 2012  .

CD Table of Contents

Attachment 1: Charter of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Attachment 2: ASAP 2012 Recommendations, NASA Responses, and Status

Attachment 3: ASAP 2012 Quarterly Meeting Minutes

Attachment 4: 2012 Activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Attachment 5: Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Members and Staff

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 v

I. Introductory Remarks 

A. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)

The ASAP was established by Congress in 1968 to provide advice and make recommendations to the 

NASA Administrator on safety matters.1 The Panel holds quarterly fact-finding and public meetings and 

makes “insight” visits to NASA Field Centers or other related sites. It reviews safety studies and operations 

plans and advises the NASA Administrator and Congress on hazards related to proposed or existing 

facilities and operations, safety standards and reporting, safety and mission assurance aspects regarding 

ongoing or proposed programs, and NASA management and culture issues related to safety. Although the 

Panel may perform other duties and tasks as requested by either the NASA Administrator or Congress, the 

ASAP members normally do not engage in specialized studies or detailed technical analyses. This report 

highlights the issues and concerns that were identified or raised by the Panel during its activities over the 

past year. The Panel’s recommendations submitted to the Administrator during 2012 are summarized in 

the Appendix at the end of this report.2 They are based upon the ASAP fact-finding and quarterly public 

meetings; “insight” visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA operations and decision-making; 

discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ expertise.

B. ASAP Observations on NASA Accomplishments in 2012

1. Milestones in Commercial Transportation of Cargo and Crew to Low Earth Orbit (LEO)

During 2012, a number of significant milestones were reached in the development of a commercial 

transportation system to LEO. In May, the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Dragon spacecraft was 

launched from Cape Canaveral. Dragon successfully docked and undocked from the International Space 

Station (ISS) and returned to Earth. Following that demonstration flight, SpaceX accomplished the first 

Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) mission to the ISS in October. Also in October, Orbital Sciences 

Corporation began Antares rocket operations at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport and is preparing for 

the maiden test flight in spring 2013. Progress has been made in maturing the design and development of 

the launch vehicles and spacecraft for the U.S. crew transportation systems. Sierra Nevada Corporation 

completed the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) of its Dream Chaser orbital crew vehicle in June and 

has successfully completed the captive carry test and the nose landing gear test. Boeing completed the 

thruster tests for its crew capsule. Blue Origin achieved a successful pad abort test. Three companies—

Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, and Boeing—were selected to move forward into the next phase, which should 

culminate in a system level of maturity approximately equivalent to a Critical Design Review (CDR).

2. Milestones in Exploration Systems Development (ESD)

NASA has achieved several important milestones in development of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew 

Vehicle (MPCV), the Space Launch System (SLS), and the Ground Systems Development and 

1 The ASAP Charter is included as Attachment 1 on the enclosed CD.

2 The full text of all the 2012 recommendations is included as Attachment 2 on the enclosed CD.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 1
Operations (GSDO). NASA has seen successful tests of Orion’s entry, descent, and landing (EDL) 

parachutes as well as successful splashdown tests of the Orion test article. The Orion spacecraft is 

currently undergoing integration at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The SLS core stage moved 

from concept to design after major technical reviews were successfully completed. The basic command 

and control hardware and software capability for the Spaceport Command and Control System 

has been delivered, and the ground system is proceeding with infrastructure refurbishment and 

multi-user preparations.

3. Safe ISS Operations and Utilization

The ISS continued its excellent safety and mission assurance record in 2012. There were four Soyuz crew 

transports to ISS: Soyuz Transport Modified Anthropometric (TMA)-04M in May; Soyuz TMA-05M 

in July; Soyuz TMA-06M in October; and Soyuz TMA-07M in December. In addition to the Soyuz 

crew transports and four Progress logistics flights, there were four successful visiting vehicle dockings: 

the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) Edoardo Arnalki in March; the commercial Dragon capsule in 

May and October; and the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) in July. During 2012, the ISS crew performed 

three safe extravehicular activities (EVAs) to make repairs.

4. NASA Safety Metrics

The NASA Safety Center has developed a comprehensive record maintenance system for safety metrics. 

It is faster and less labor-intensive and serves as a useful tool for Center and NASA senior management. 

They have progressed from limited centralized analysis to robust and comprehensive centralized 

analysis. The accident rate continues to decrease, and core metrics are improving. NASA continues to 

improve the manner and speed of mishap investigations.

5. Science Mission Launches and Landings

There were two noteworthy successful launches in 2012: the Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array 

(NuSTAR), a mission to study black holes and other exotic objects in our galaxy and beyond, launched 

in June; and the Radiation Belt Storm Probes (recently renamed the Van Allen Probes), the first twinspacecraft mission designed to explore our planet's radiation belts, launched in August. The Curiosity

rover ended its 36-week flight in August with a successful landing on Mars to begin a two-year mission 

to investigate whether the Gale Crater region ever offered conditions favorable for microbial life.

6. Progress on ASAP Recommendations

NASA has continued to improve its response to ASAP recommendations. Eighteen recommendations 

were open at the end of 2011. The ASAP has received responses to all of these and has closed out 15 

of them. In 2012, the ASAP generated 11 new recommendations and has received responses to all but 

one. Five of the 2012 recommendations have been closed out. At the end of 2012, there were a total of 

9 open recommendations.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

2 Annual Report for 2012
II. Issues and Concerns 

Note on color bars: ■ Red highlights what the ASAP considers to be a long-standing concern or 

an issue that has not yet been adequately addressed by NASA. ▲ Yellow highlights an important 

ASAP concern or issue, but one that is currently being addressed by NASA. ● Green indicates a 

positive aspect or a concern that is being adequately addressed by NASA but continues to be followed 

by the Panel.

The ASAP offers the following color-coded summary assessment on the issues and concerns discussed 

in this Report:

▲ A. COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM (CCP) —Much progress has been made over the last 

year, but many challenges remain that will require resolution at the earliest possible time.

▲ B. EXPLORATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT (ESD) —Work is progressing; there are 

ongoing discussions regarding safety-relevant roles and accountability, safety and mission assurance 

requirements for the developers, as well as risk management and risk tolerance for the assigned and 

potential future mission(s).

■ C. FUNDING UNCERTAINTY —For several years, there has been a significant gap between 

what NASA is attempting to do and what it is funded to do. This funding-planning mismatch, and in 

particular the uncertainty about future funding stability, has the potential to introduce new risks above 

and beyond those previously inherent in space travel.

● D. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION (ISS) —Significant progress has been made in ISS 

Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) tolerance and in planning for ISS deorbit. NASA 

should complete the planning as quickly as possible, especially for unplanned ISS deorbit, in view of the 

unpredictable timing of potential malfunction scenarios.

▲ E. TECHNICAL AUTHORITY (TA) —The current process may be working, but it is resting 

on the strength of key individuals. General processes should be established that do not depend on the 

personalities of the people involved for success.

▲ F. RISK MANAGEMENT —Risk targets must be prudently selected, as well as explicitly 

articulated to all stakeholders, based upon an assessment of an acceptable level of risk specific to the 

mission and its counterbalancing value (reward).

▲ A. Commercial Crew Program (CCP)

Of all of the topics reviewed by the ASAP this year, the one receiving the most time and attention 

was unquestionably the Commercial Crew Program (CCP). NASA provided a status briefing on the 

program at every quarterly meeting. We also had an opportunity to visit several CCP partners, where we 

saw hardware being developed and discussed the progress being made and the challenges still remaining. 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 3
In September, the ASAP Chairman was invited to share his perspective on the program during a public 

hearing held by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

NASA’s stated goal for the CCP is “to facilitate the development of a U.S. commercial crew space 

transportation capability, with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective access to and from 

low-Earth orbit (LEO) and the ISS.” In the future, NASA plans to purchase “transportation services” 

from one or more suppliers to meet its personnel transportation needs for ISS operations and other 

LEO missions. Although there are many important aspects to the program, the ASAP has primarily 

focused on three specific areas: the development and communication of design requirements; coming 

to an agreement on what certification process should be used prior to the flight of NASA astronauts or 

personnel on NASA-sponsored missions; and the selection of an appropriate acquisition strategy, both 

during the development phase and for the eventual purchase of Crew Transportation Services (CTS).

Although NASA has been flying its astronauts to orbit for more than 50 years, it was only in August 

2012 that the Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT)-1100 Series documents were updated to 

identify and communicate the processes, requirements, interfaces, and design standards that NASA 

wants commercial providers to use in developing and operating future human space transportation 

systems for NASA missions. The challenge that NASA faced was compiling the lessons learned 

from decades of human spaceflight, while trying to avoid being overly prescriptive and limiting 

industry’s ability to develop innovative approaches. While the ASAP was pleased to finally see the 

release and update of these requirements documents, we note that all of the commercial partners had 

already performed considerable design work prior to their official publication. In an ideal world, the 

requirements would have been established prior to designing and building the hardware. Nevertheless, 

it is our understanding that industry has accepted and is supportive of most of NASA’s requirements. 

There are a few specific requirements, however, to which one or more of the developers object. Therefore, 

it will be very important for NASA and the developers to quickly come to an agreement on whether 

or not those specific requirements can be safely modified or waived or whether alternative approaches 

would be considered acceptable.

Before NASA crew or personnel on NASA-sponsored missions will be allowed to fly on commercially 

provided spacecraft, the systems will need to be certified. NASA is still refining the details of the certification process, but as part of the recently awarded Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) 

Space Act Agreements (SAAs), the partners were asked to provide NASA with recommendations for 

what they believe it would take to complete a certification milestone, including an “option” to conduct 

an orbital flight-test demonstration (demo)—under the SAA (outside of a NASA contract)—with a 

non-NASA crew. Although there is plenty of precedent for contractor test flights in government aviation developments, such flights are always under the certification authority of the government (either 

the contracting agency, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], or both). For this NASA option, the 

demo flight would be outside of NASA’s acquisition authority, thus raising several safety-relevant questions: (1) Would the SAA partner’s demo flight be conducted outside of NASA’s launch and entry certification authority? (2) To the extent that the required FAA license would not cover crew safety systems 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

4 Annual Report for 2012
and procedures (FAA authority is limited by statute), would any other government agency step in to 

certify flight crew safety? (3) If not, would NASA be legally obligated to certify for crew safety? (4) If 

the answers to (1) through (3) leave a gap in government crew safety certification, would Agency stakeholders perceive NASA as irresponsible in its sponsorship/facilitation or tacit acceptance of a high-risk 

activity? Even if the demo flight is successful, the statistical relevance of one flight (or even a few successful flights) is almost negligible without a thorough understanding of every aspect of the flight data. 

NASA should be looking for ways to maximize its insight into what will most likely be a short flight-test 

program, regardless of how it is contracted, incentivized, or facilitated. When asked about the potential 

exercise of the option, the CCP program manager informed the ASAP that there was no current plan to 

exercise the option. The ASAP was on one hand encouraged that the option would not be invoked but 

is concerned that NASA would continue to maintain the option if it truly had no intention of using it. 

Such a “mixed message” serves to add unnecessary confusion and attendant risk to the program.

A key aspect of the CCP is the acquisition strategy. NASA originally planned to implement a two-part 

certification process using Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based contracts, with the first part 

being an integrated design contract and the second part focusing on development, test, evaluation, and 

certification. However, because the funding provided was only about half of the requested level, NASA 

decided to use SAAs for the first part, CCiCap. The second part, involving the actual certification 

work, was still to be performed under a FAR-based contract. Based on concerns expressed by the ASAP 

and others that there could be a major disconnect between the systems developed under SAAs and the 

systems needed to meet NASA’s certification requirements under a contract, NASA recently modified 

its acquisition strategy to add a Certification Products Contract (CPC) in parallel with the development 

work being accomplished under CCiCap. This new certification approach (see Figure 1), carried out 

under FAR-based contracts, will be executed in two phases: the first phase, the CPC, will allow earlier 

formal discussions between NASA and the partners on exactly what deviations from NASA certification 

requirements, if any, would be requested and allowed; and the second phase, the Certification Contract, 

will provide the validation, verification, testing, and final certification in order to complete the process. 

We believe that the Phase 1/Phase 2 certification approach helps to clear the certification “fog” and is a 

significant step forward.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 5
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18

PDR CDR Cert Review Industry 

Design 

Maturity Phase 1 Cert Phase 2 Cert

CPC Certification	
  Contract

Cert,	
  V&V	
  	
  Plans

Alternate	
  

Standards

If	
  cert	
  and	
  V&V	
  activities	
  do	
  not	
  start	
  until	
  

after	
  CDR	
  (Phase	
  2)	
  then	
  performing	
  Phase	
  

2	
  work	
  will	
  be	
  delayed	
  or	
  some	
  activities	
  

will	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  repeated	
  if	
  the	
  contractor	
  

proceeds	
  at	
  risk

Establishing	
  technical	
  

standards	
  	
  supports	
  base-­‐

lining	
  a	
  design

Hazard	
  Analyses	
  prior	
  to	
  CDR	
  

avoids	
  re-­‐work	
  later	
  due	
  to	
  

late	
  identification	
  of	
  risks	
  and	
  

controls	
  that	
  warrant	
  design	
  

mitigations

Hazard	
  

Analyses

Actual Schedule 

will be 

Commercial 

Provider Specific Procurement	
  &	
  fabrication	
  of	
  long	
  lead	
  items

Produce	
  &	
  integrate	
  flight	
  systems

Interim	
  certification	
  and	
  verification	
  activities

ISS	
  integrated	
  testing

Validation	
  activities,	
  such	
  as	
  flight	
  demonstrations

Qualification	
  testing

Acceptance	
  testing

CCP/ISS	
  verification	
  and	
  hazard	
  report	
  closures

Certification	
  Data	
  Package	
  

Examples	
  of	
  activities	
  occurring	
  during	
  

Phase	
  2	
  Certification	
  Contract	
  that	
  are	
  

influenced	
  by	
  work	
  done	
  in	
  Phase	
  1

Interim

Cert Review

Final	
  Certification	
  and	
  Services	
  dates	
  are	
  notional

Earlier	
  dates	
  are	
  possible	
  subject	
  to	
  funding

Figure 1: NASA Certification Strategy 

The ASAP believes, and NASA concurs, that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 must be FAR-based contracts. 

The Panel believes the fixed-price contracting approach that is now in place for Phase 1 is satisfactory, 

where establishing technical standards is the objective. Although there are some uncertainties about 

the work to be accomplished in Phase 1, NASA has said that rather than modify the contract to handle 

unforeseen problems, they would most likely defer problematic activities into Phase 2. NASA has 

not yet decided upon a contract type for Phase 2, which encompasses certification, verification, and 

validation, as well as any unfinished work from Phase 1. The ASAP strongly believes that a cost type 

contract is appropriate for Phase 2. Fixed-price type contracts are appropriate for low-risk undertakings 

where the requirements are clearly understood by both the government and the contractor. Much of 

Phase 2 is neither, and we believe both schedule and safety would be at risk in a fixed-price environment 

because of the relative inability to defer or apply resources to problem areas that will inevitably develop. 

Some sort of hybrid mechanism could be appropriate with fixed price provisions for low-risk products 

and services and cost type provisions for the higher-risk work.

In summary, NASA has clearly communicated to the commercial partners that NASA certification is 

a fundamental requirement prior to transporting NASA astronauts and personnel in NASA-sponsored 

missions into space. Several aspects are improving with the advent of the CPC and the Certification 

Contract acquisition strategy: the establishment of solid requirements; the tailoring of those requirements for each concept; and how the Agency will verify that requirements are being met. The validation plan that will confirm the required capability is less mature and occurring later in the process than 

it should be, but it is scheduled to be produced under the CPC. However, NASA has yet to lay out a 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

6 Annual Report for 2012
process for the contractors to follow on the path to certification, e.g., how waivers and deviations will 

be approved, who is accountable, and how the process will be administered. The ASAP is pleased to 

see that progress has been made with the CCP over the last year, but many challenges remain that will 

require resolution at the earliest possible time. While SAAs may have stimulated new companies to enter 

the business and have moved the design work forward, by their very nature SAAs cannot contain specific enforceable requirements (beyond ISS proximity operations and public safety for ascent and entry). 

NASA should resist the temptation to implement SAAs for safety-critical work related to ascent, entry, 

and landing as a mechanism for accommodating any further budget shortfall. The ASAP plans to continue with our insight activities during the coming year, with particular attention being given to the 

maturation and communication of requirements, the development of additional details on the plans for 

certification (including the potential use of SAAs for flight demos), and the acquisition strategy that is 

actually funded and implemented in the months ahead. 

▲ B. Exploration Systems Development (ESD)

To provide the capability for human exploration beyond LEO, NASA plans to develop the launch 

system, the crew vehicle, and the ground systems under the authority of three program offices: the 

Space Launch System (SLS) Program hosted by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); the Orion 

Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program hosted by the Johnson Space Center (JSC); and the 

Ground System Development and Operations (GSDO) Program hosted by Kennedy Space Center 

(KSC). These three programs report to the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division, which 

is part of the recently reorganized Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate located at 

NASA Headquarters.

The Panel came into 2012 with no formal recommendations specific to ESD or its elements, but with 

several ongoing questions relating to the following: (1) safety-relevant roles and accountability; (2) safety 

and mission assurance requirements for the developers; and (3) risk management and risk tolerance for 

the assigned and potential future mission(s). The ESD Director, the Program Managers, and the Centerbased Engineering and Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorates helped the Panel to better 

understand these issues. As is normally the case for newly emerging programs, new questions were 

raised as the year progressed.

1. With respect to roles and accountabilities, the NASA Headquarters–based ESD Division performs 

the system integrator role, with the Division Director accountable to the Directorate Associate 

Administrator for integrated system safety risks. ESD does, however, plan to delegate to the Centerhosted program offices the authority to accept some (element unique) catastrophic and critical 

residual risk issues that on past major human spaceflight programs would have been owned by the 

total systems integrator. ESD also plans to allow the contractor to accept some lower-level risks 

traditionally owned by the government—an area of continued ASAP concern as it violates the 

precepts of the traditional check and balance system of oversight and management. It also transfers 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 7
what has traditionally been an inherently governmental function—acceptance of risk to government 

personnel—to a contractor. Therefore, this idea opens a path for considerable unanticipated and 

unknown risk to enter the system. Finally, because Headquarters is not an engineering Center, 

ESD has enlisted the aid of various Center Engineering and SMA Directorate personnel to provide 

systems engineering and integration for a new Cross-Program Systems Integration (CSI) office. For 

the near future at least, CSI will do this Agency-wide work in-house with no near-term plans to 

contract for a prime integrator. To the extent that this organizational approach appears to contradict 

some NASA lessons learned from previous large programs and appears to run the substantial risk of 

resulting in systems integration by committee, the ASAP will continue to request that the Agency 

show how this approach will properly protect both safety and mission success. 

2. Regarding requirements, the ESD completed its Cross-Program Systems Requirements Review 

(C-SRR) in the first quarter of the fiscal year. The ESD began last year with some uncertainty in 

mission (the Moon, Lagrange points, near-Earth asteroid rendezvous, etc.), so it was not surprising 

that some requirements validation work will continue as the missions are further defined. These 

developments include some of the driving performance requirements such as crew size, Earth 

re-entry velocity, Loss of Crew (LOC)/Loss of Mission (LOM) parameters, and others. The current 

plan out to the 2020 time period is to fly Exploration Flight Test (EFT)-1 as a high-elliptical, Earthorbital mission to test such things as the heat shield and Orion/Upper Stage separation. This flight 

test will validate heat shield performance at ~80 percent lunar return velocity. The data from this test 

will be used as part of the Orion CDR. Exploration Mission (EM)-1 will fly to the Moon to test the 

heat shield for trans-lunar re-entry velocities as well as most major subsystems. For these missions, 

the Cross-Program Systems Design Review (C-SDR) is on track for the second quarter of FY13. In 

support of this C-SDR schedule, all three programs conducted their own Systems Requirements 

Reviews (SRRs) during 2012, which included safety, reliability, and quality requirements that 

flowed down from ESD. These were successfully completed, and all the programs are now moving 

toward their Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) in 2013. They have completed several critical path 

system and subsystem demonstrations and tests as noted in Section I.B. of this report. It was noted, 

however, that near-Earth asteroid or interplanetary missions still require technology developments, 

especially in the area of heat shielding, to allow for higher re-entry speeds.

3. In the area of risk management, the Panel reviewed the processes that Engineering and SMA use 

for element (program) and ESD hazard analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA), and other analyses designed to characterize requirements for safety and mission 

success and/or residual risk. A change that concerned the Panel was combining the system safety 

and engineering review panels in an attempt to streamline risk decision-making. NASA explained 

the safety analysis process and where accountability resides. The question that remains, however, 

is how the combined panels might affect the independent thinking that is inherent when the two 

organizations hold separate reviews and sometimes present alternate views at the program level 

change boards.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

8 Annual Report for 2012
Another risk topic that extended through the year was the development of LOC/LOM requirements. The Panel questioned whether and how safety parameters such as LOC/LOM probability 

had played into the 2010/2011 architecture studies for the SLS, as well as the ongoing system design 

work. NASA stated that safety was a key parameter in the trades and that the two final concept candidates—heritage liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen (LOX/LH2) and liquid oxygen/refined petroleum 

(LOX/RP)—both met the placeholder threshold of 1/700 (SLS ascent only). For several reasons, 

primarily near term affordability, the Agency picked the LOX/LH2 concept for the early exploration test missions and decided to continue development of LOX/RP technologies for potential later 

booster upgrades. More recently, the Agency proposed LOC requirements for the design team that 

covered pre-launch, ascent, entry, descent, and landing for the EM-2 (crewed lunar orbit mission) 

configuration. The LOC requirements were distributed among the system elements, but when combined, they totaled ~1/245. The total mission LOC and LOM are listed as “tbd” based on mission 

analysis. NASA expects the launch, ascent, entry, descent, and landing values to remain the same for 

this architecture regardless of mission destination, with each specific mission having its own transit/

proximity operations and entry risk values.

■ C. Funding Uncertainty 

The ASAP’s primary function is to review all aspects of the NASA mission, both programmatic 

and technical, that have safety implications and provide assessments and recommendations for 

improvements. One of these aspects is how funding and budgets impact the safe accomplishment of the 

NASA mission. In its 2012 quarterly meeting minutes and recommendations, the ASAP highlighted 

several areas of concern. One of these was funding, both in terms of facility/infrastructure safety as 

well as program or mission safety. In the ASAP’s opinion, these funding levels, and in particular the 

uncertainty about their future stability, have the potential to introduce new risks above and beyond 

those previously inherent in space travel.

1. Regarding facilities and infrastructure, NASA has defined the strategy, plan, and metrics to 

modernize its facilities and sustain its capabilities; however, there is still a large funding shortfall 

in the facilities repair budget line. Funds needed for preventive maintenance have been used to 

ease budget shortfalls elsewhere. Centers have been maintaining their facility prioritizations based 

on mission and safety, but eventually the backlog of needed work must be accomplished or the 

facility becomes useless, if not unsafe. The ASAP has encouraged NASA to review its metric for 

both mission success and safety to be certain that it reflects reality, to ensure a regular review of 

the correlation between the two as budgets decrease, and to make adjustments as needed to ensure 

continued safe mission accomplishment.

2. Regarding human spaceflight safety, the ASAP specifically focused on the CCP, ISS, and ESD. As 

the Space Shuttle Program was brought to a close, NASA embarked on a bold new effort to place 

humans in LEO at much lower cost. That effort relies on commercial partners to innovate with new 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 9
approaches that might be more efficient than systems designed using traditional NASA acquisition 

models. From its inception, this program has been funded at levels far below what would be 

expected for a traditional program. The rationale has been dependent on “commercial partnerships.” 

Although they are showing promise as cost savers, they have yet to be validated as safe and effective 

for human spaceflight development.

NASA’s original acquisition strategy for the CCP was predicated on receiving the $850 million that 

was in the President’s Budget Request (PBR) in 2012. As described in the CCP section above, it 

featured a two-part acquisition approach for development and certification, which was subsequently 

modified when the funding provided was only about half the requested level. To mitigate the risk 

of delayed certification, NASA is now moving forward with certification activities under the twophase approach, as depicted in Figure 1, to minimize technical risks and cost or schedule impacts. 

If NASA were to delay certification activities, the development work could eventually reach the 

point where any changes necessary to meet NASA requirements might not be technically feasible or 

affordable. This could potentially extend reliance on foreign systems for crew transportation to the 

ISS or result in the decision to waive or reduce requirements in order to accept less expensive or more 

readily available designs that otherwise would not have been accepted as safe. 

NASA plans to have at least two contractors through Phase 2 to ensure a safe and affordable ISS 

CTS through competition. The ultimate number of awards will be driven by technical maturity, 

funding availability, and mission needs. The ASAP agrees that having two adequately funded 

contractors through Phase 2 is advantageous; however, absent an independent cost estimate, we are 

uncertain as to affordability. Even with the new approach, NASA’s ability to successfully complete 

the certification process as currently planned and to begin flying ISS CTS missions by FY17 will 

require increased funding for the program starting in FY13. It is important that the program’s 

budget be stabilized at a level sufficient to execute the plan, which is shown in Figure 2.

FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18

Certification Contract

RFP Certification Products Contract

RFP

Certification to

include at least

one Crewed ISS

Mission

ISS Services Contract ...ISS Service

missions every 6

months

Certification for ISS Crew Transportation

RFP

Phase 1 Phase 2

Alignment with NASA

certification requirements

AFP Integrated Capability SAA (iCap)

NTE 2.5 awards

Likely 2-4 awards

Likely 1-2 awards

ISS Crew Transportation Services

Verification, validation, test and

final certification

Likely single award

Optional Milestones

Commercial Crew Transportation System Development

Final Certification and Services dates are notional

Earlier dates are possible subject to funding

Figure 2: CCP Roadmap 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

10 Annual Report for 2012
Figure 3: CCP Funding History—Requests & Appropriations

Given the past budget trend shown in Figure 3, the ASAP is concerned about what tradeoffs NASA 

and the SAA partners will take to accommodate future budget shortfall.

There appear to be few options available to NASA when the budget is reduced. These include 

stretching the schedule, reducing performance, and/or obtaining additional funding. Given NASA’s 

budget history, it is unlikely there will be additional funding. The likely option will be to make 

tradeoffs and changes to performance measures that would include accepting additional safety 

risk. Such changes are allowed under SAAs and are not under NASA’s control. NASA would 

have limited visibility into and no oversight of those tradeoffs and changes, which could lead to 

unknowingly accepting substantial increases in risk to the safety of crews. NASA would have no 

way to adequately evaluate and address the critical tradeoffs, which could lead to unknown risks and 

safety implications. As budgets are reduced and funding uncertainty increases, it is essential that 

NASA increase its awareness of possible safety implications and address those immediately. 

ESD is a program with wide support. The ASAP anticipates that the funding level and rationale for 

FY13 will be similar to those of FY12. Unlike CCP, ESD funding levels have remained relatively 

constant. However, ESD has a “flat budget” that by nature causes phasing and integration compromises for a program that needs a classic skewed bell curve for development. NASA should continue 

to monitor the funding going forward and be prepared to mitigate any mission and safety concerns 

should future NASA budgets be significantly reduced due to the prevailing fiscal environment.

In conclusion, for several years now, we have seen gaps between what NASA is attempting to do and what 

it is funded to do. The result has been goals, requirements, schedules, and missions that are ever-changing 

to fit available budgets. With the current budget uncertainties, major manned spaceflight programs are 

being conducted at a “Level of Effort” to fit available budgets rather than targeted to a firm mission with a 

firm schedule. Large scale, high-risk programs are being undertaken using untried acquisition approaches 

to meet available budgets. In the view of the ASAP, it is time for all stakeholders to reach a consensus on 

what the Nation is attempting to accomplish in human spaceflight and then fund that effort adequately and 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 11
consistently. This disconnect is seen by the ASAP as a major risk driver in human spaceflight, which is why this 

area is color coded red.

● D. International Space Station (ISS)

1. Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) damage has been identified by both NASA and the 

ASAP as a major safety risk for ISS with respect to LOM and LOC. As recently as 2011, NASA had 

supplied information to the ASAP that described the chance of LOM due to MMOD over a 10-year 

period as being greater than 30 percent. Should such an event occur, in addition to the LOC and 

LOM issues, the situation could arise where the ISS would have to be abandoned—potentially without the possibility of a return to nominal operation. A premature ISS deorbit is one potential outcome. Such a probability represented more than an outside chance and deserved serious examination 

to ascertain ways that this risk could be mitigated. Since this issue was identified, NASA has taken a 

number of steps that have mitigated the risks stemming from MMOD. These actions have included 

activities that range from hardening the ISS against MMOD impact to a more sophisticated analysis that takes into account other improvements in ISS system operational robustness. These improvements also mitigate the overall operational effect an MMOD impact would have. Examples of 

shielding additions for the Soyuz and Progress vehicles are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Enhanced Shielding for Soyuz and Progress

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

12 Annual Report for 2012
In total, these actions reduce the probability of MMOD-induced LOC to approximately 5.1 percent 

and the probability of an evacuation to 13.7 percent over a 10-year period. These are substantial 

improvements. The progress on reducing MMOD risks is shown in Figure 5.

PNCF: Probability of No Crew Fatality PNevac: Probability of No Evacuation PNP: Probability of No Penetration

Figure 5: Projected ISS MMOD Risk

While these improvements have reduced the chance of an unplanned ISS deorbit, this eventuality 

still does exist. Unfortunately, the MMOD risk to all spacecraft, including the ISS, is expected to rise 

dramatically in the future as more and more launches take place around the world. 

2. NASA celebrated a major milestone last year when, after thirteen years of construction, the assembly 

of the ISS was completed. At nearly 900,000 pounds, travelling at over 17,000 miles per hour, it is the 

most massive and energetic object mankind has ever placed in orbit around the Earth.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 13
Figure 6: ISS in Orbit

While current plans are to continue ISS utilization through at least 2020, it will eventually fall back 

to Earth, potentially presenting a significant risk to public safety if it is not done in a controlled 

manner. It must be recognized that this event could occur much sooner than the planned End Of Life 

(EOL) if there is a major malfunction that forces the Station to be abandoned. The most likely threat 

that could cause such an event is critical component penetration by MMOD, as discussed above, 

but other failure causes are also possible. Built-in redundancies, as well as recently added shielding, 

greatly reduce the probability of such failure; however, the existing potential threat to public safety 

must be recognized. 

As explained in our 2011 report, neither NASA nor our international partners had in place a 

comprehensive plan for how to address the safe deorbit of the ISS. We are now able to report that over 

the last year, NASA and Russia have made significant progress in planning for ISS deorbit, whether it 

is at the nominal EOL or earlier in a contingency case. Analyses indicate that even without crew, the 

ISS can safely remain in a stable orbit for up to six months, provided control systems are not damaged. 

That would provide a window to launch vehicles with the capability to dock and drive the ISS into a 

controlled and safe deorbit. Initial analyses indicate that up to three Russian Progress vehicles may 

be required to adequately guide this entry. We are encouraged that work has begun on assessing 

options for this contingency, but we urge NASA and our partners to complete the required planning 

as quickly as possible in view of the unpredictable timing of potential malfunction scenarios.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

14 Annual Report for 2012
▲ E. Technical Authority (TA)

Clear objectivity and an effective process to deal with problem-resolution are paramount to the safety 

and success of any endeavor, especially in the case of pioneering space programs such as the CCP and 

ESD. A systematic process that enables the identification of a safety issue, even if it halts all work until 

the safety issue is resolved, is a key to long-term success. Such a process should reflect organizational 

cultural values where reporting a safety issue becomes an obligation rather than an “act of courage,” 

especially in high-risk space endeavors. Based on a Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 

report recommendation, such a process, Technical Authority (TA), was instituted to provide a means to 

encourage and maintain the independence of technical perspectives and concerns and enable concerns 

to be raised to appropriate management levels for resolution. A fiscally austere environment, coupled 

with hard deadlines and milestones, will lead to cost reduction initiatives, and safety margin can be 

considered for reduction. The independent TA role is critical to maintaining the balance between 

preserving safety processes in their true spirit and intent and the demands to maintain cost and schedule. 

It ensures that decisions in controversial areas are made objectively at the proper organizational level. 

The term “authority” can have several interpretations ranging from subject matter expert to an entity 

responsible and accountable for resolution of competing viewpoints. The ASAP considers the TA 

concept to mean the latter.

Over this past year, the ASAP considered three TA issues that have their roots in the CAIB report: 

1) schedule and cost management, and the technical expertise to solve questions or concerns; 2) the 

maintenance of an independent TA chain of command and organization; and 3) the growth or insertion 

of climatic and cultural impediments.

After the conclusion of Shuttle operations in 2011, the ASAP was concerned about the outflow of 

NASA expertise in many areas, including both management and technical personnel. While such a 

large personnel disruption cannot take place in any organization without some expertise loss, we salute 

NASA for making a proactive and involved effort to sustain the workforce wherever possible. It is a 

compliment to the many hardworking and involved individuals that the workforce did not suffer the 

massive losses that many predicted. After our reviews at JSC in the latter part of 2011, and at MSFC 

and KSC in 2012, we believe that the retention of technical expertise, crucial to the TA program, had 

been well handled so far, but there are significant challenges to some Agency-level TA budget areas. The 

ASAP formally recommended that NASA provide a budget line for these technical support functions 

that is independent of the institutional overhead accounts and more closely aligned with the programs 

they support. In the case of the other two areas, the concerns were policy related.

The ASAP believes that the clear and independent TA lines have been blurred somewhat in the NPR 

7120.5E revision, in which the Center Directors have been inserted into the TA process and hierarchy 

for hosted programs. Center Directors are the single most powerful management officials in the 

professional lives of the TA. If the Center Director is responsible for both the technical execution of 

the work as well as the administrative management of the Center workforce, an inherent or perceived 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 15
conflict of interest could be created. Such conflicts must be addressed to ensure that they do not 

inappropriately impact the TA decision. Most importantly, we must assure that pressure to change a 

stance on an issue, perceived or otherwise, is avoided.

In its response, NASA’s view is that including Center Directors in the TA process in the TA hierarchy 

revision, especially across multi-Center programs, strengthens the process because the issues can be 

addressed by the Center Director before they flow to NASA Headquarters. The ASAP would agree 

that this can be positive; however, the ASAP’s major concern is that the new policy could provide an 

avenue for bypassing the requirement for decision elevation in resolving an issue. This could lead to 

safety ramifications.

NASA has been assigning well-qualified and strong personnel to the TA positions that mitigate potential 

undue influence. In the ASAP’s opinion, this is currently working in large measure due to the people 

that have been assigned to the process. However, the TA needs a systemic process with a formal written 

policy and should not depend on the personalities of assigned personnel. Should there be a conflict or 

weakening of the placement of strong individuals in the TA position, the system should prevent the 

introduction of greater risk into the program. It is ASAP’s opinion, in accordance with the way we 

understand the spirit and intent of the CAIB report’s TA recommendation, that the TA is the authority 

and must be considered an equal at the table when discussions are undertaken. Without TA concurrence 

on matters within their authority, actions should not go forward unless higher authority adjudicates the 

issue and formally records the decision and reasoning. 

In ESD, the roles of TA are not as clear as they were in previous programs hosted at JSC. As noted 

earlier in this report, the ESD integration is managed from NASA Headquarters, and the assigned 

TAs come from JSC and MSFC, which have no host role for ESD other than providing people to the 

Headquarters effort. One key to effective TA is a strong technical organization to back the TA up. No 

single TA can be technically capable to deal with all the discipline issues that arise in a major program; 

they are dependent on their home directorate for discipline support. For ESD, it is still unclear to ASAP 

how this high-stakes, complex, Headquarters-hosted, and “tightly coupled” program of programs will 

function, and how its assigned TAs will support it effectively. 

In summary, the ASAP agrees that the current process may be working, but it is resting on the strength 

of key individuals with whom we have great confidence. We remain strong advocates of putting general 

processes in place that do not depend on the personalities of the people involved for success. We understand that in the current fiscally austere environment, there will be many well-intended actions and 

necessary cost reductions that are suggested and considered. NASA is the organization with the most 

experience by far in putting people into space and returning them to Earth; however, the Agency must 

remain vigilant in safeguarding initiatives, such as CCP and ESD, from impacting safety. A sound safety 

culture is paramount where NASA’s sacred values and principles must be made known and adhered to 

throughout the Agency. Value-based over purely fiscally based decisions allow the organization to stay 

the course, providing drive and direction to an envisioned conclusion and, most importantly, avoiding 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

16 Annual Report for 2012
the very real and high safety risk of allowing guiding principles and regulations to be overcome by austere fiscal and schedule pressures. A value mismatch can open opportunities for increased, undesired, 

and perhaps unrealized risk. The Panel will continue to monitor and discuss this subject in order to 

trend the revised TA structure’s effectiveness.

▲ F. Risk Management

System safety is fundamentally based on managing risks. There are three primary elements: (1) identifying the potential hazards, their consequences, and their likelihood; (2) eliminating, controlling, or 

mitigating those hazards to the extent feasible with respect to their potential impact on loss of human 

life, budgets, and mission accomplishment; and (3) perhaps the most important, the formal process for 

deciding if a residual risk is worth accepting based on the calculated and perceived value to be gained. 

The ASAP continues to believe that risk targets must be prudently selected as well as explicitly articulated to all stakeholders based upon an assessment of an acceptable level of risk specific to the mission. 

1. Accountability and Documentation of Rationale for Risk Acceptance

There is a need to clearly understand overall mission risk and the subsequent tradeoffs between 

risk and reward as programmatic decisions are made, especially those that involve the acceptance 

of risk. When performance trades are made due to budget and schedule constraints in managing 

the program, it is important to understand the impact of the tradeoff and why it was made, to be 

explicit about the decision made, and to revisit the tradeoff periodically to confirm the validity of 

the decision. 

The ASAP was pleased to see that NASA’s ESD was developing a risk matrix that established the 

organizational level that will have the decision authority to accept a risk. Although it is not yet 

clear whether the element programs will have authority to approve catastrophic risk hazards and 

criticality 1 failure modes that are not designated as “integration” issues, ASAP will continue 

to address this question in the next year. Beyond that, there will be a challenge in resolving the 

accountability for lower categories of risk so as to not encumber the entire system with hundreds, 

or even thousands, of risks to be adjudicated. One approach under consideration is to allow the 

contractor developer to make the decision on risk acceptability. The ASAP cautions that there may 

be problems with this approach.

2. Balancing Risk and Reward (Value)

We have, to some extent, a classic debate. On one side, or “bookend,” is the need for a significant 

margin of error to mitigate against the “unknown-unknowns” to create a robust design, but the 

level of insight and/or the amount of testing that NASA requires could be so expensive that it cannot be adequately funded. The result is a situation that leaves the U.S. without any human spaceflight capabilities far into the future. On the other end is a design and testing program which 

is scaled back and is more affordable, but potentially unsafe, inadequate, and high-risk. To be 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 17
successful, especially now when dealing with commercial partners, it is important to strike the 

right balance between insight and oversight so that a well-informed risk decision can be made. 

There must be a balance of accepted risk with respect to the reward (value) which is acceptable to 

all stakeholders, including taxpayers, and this risk and value must be communicated in ways that 

the various stakeholders can understand. 

Regardless of the best plans and efforts, safety standards generally are the result of iteration. In 

the process of formulating an architecture, it is essential to set clear, firm requirements as early as 

possible to guide future decisions on safety factors, reliability, and failure tolerance. Uncertainty is 

a source of delay, waste, and potential compromise of capability. A target is needed, and the target 

needs to be a reasonably challenging one that is based on the risk/reward/value proposition.

Problems can arise if NASA sets a standard but has not furnished the standard in a timely manner 

or has not specified how the vendor will demonstrate that their system can achieve the required 

safety standard in a manner acceptable to NASA. Such demonstration of capability may require 

not only end item inspection and testing, but may require a variety of tests and inspections prior 

to actual completion of a flight-ready system. Early standards definition and the means for their 

verification is essential so that all parties can come to a consensus on what needs to be done to 

protect the health and safety of the crew and how to best verify that those requirements are met. 

For the Certification Products Contract (CPC) effort to be successful, it must tread a delicate line 

that defines how safe the system in question has to be and a method for assuring that it does so 

without placing so many obstacles in place that the entire endeavor is not doable from an overall 

value perspective.

Finally, the government needs to do all it can to enable the development of multiple, independent 

systems for safe crew transport to and from LEO. Competition not only helps to keep costs down, 

but in the event of an accident or a complex problem that is uncovered, having other available 

alternatives allows the use of a different rocket or spacecraft, rather than waiting out a lengthy 

grounding as we did with Shuttle.

3. Communication/Transparency Concerning Risk

Space transportation, like all other modes of transportation, involves risk. In 2009, the most 

recent year for which data is available, 547 people lost their lives in aviation accidents, most of 

which involved general aviation aircraft. Accidents related to trains and railroad systems killed 695 

people. Recreational boating claimed the lives of 736 participants. On our nation's highways, we 

experienced 33,868 fatalities involving cars, trucks, buses, and motorcycles. It is not very realistic 

to assume that space transportation will be able to eliminate accidents completely, no matter how 

much emphasis we place on safety and mission assurance.

NASA must to do a better job of helping its stakeholders, which include senior political leadership, 

the news media, and the general public, to understand and manage expectations about the risks 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

18 Annual Report for 2012
and benefits (the value) involved in human spaceflight. As Congress itself pointed out in the 

Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, “spaceflight is inherently risky.” Spaceflight 

will never, in the foreseeable future, be truly routine, nor will it ever be “safe” when that word is 

used in the context of our everyday life. Discussions of risk without concomitant discussions of the 

associated value to be gained are superficial, misleading, and do not permit those involved to arrive 

at a well reasoned judgment concerning the appropriateness in undertaking this risk. The ASAP 

recommends that NASA clearly and consistently communicate the hazards involved, their risk of 

occurrence, and why the value of the goals to be realized warrant taking such risks. This practice 

will enable the programs to better pursue innovative paths forward to achieve safe, reliable, and 

cost effective space transportation.

At its heart, the reticence to discuss problems is exacerbated by a failure to proactively explain 

the risk versus reward—in other words, the net value of the undertaking. It is not surprising that 

without a clear mission whose importance is understood and is explicitly articulated, stakeholders 

would be less likely to support an activity which is perceived as having problems without any countervailing benefits that offset the risks. NASA should develop a focused strategic communication 

plan covering priorities, risks, costs, and benefits.

4. Robotics and Risk Mitigation

Recognizing the potential of robotics to minimize the risk to humans, the ASAP has emphasized 

this technology area. The Panel noted in a 2009 recommendation that there seemed to be a lack of 

an integrated focus on robotics across NASA. It is clear that much has improved in the last three 

years. NASA has now made this a focus area. There is a roadmap that is tied to projected missions 

and a program that is managed and resourced as an integrated entity across the Agency. There is a 

balance between technology push and mission pull that is resulting in robotic technology successes 

in operational roles, such as Mars Exploration vehicles and the Robonaut that is now onboard the 

ISS. Robotics technologies are proving to be sufficiently effective to do real work and safe enough 

to work side by side with humans. One change that the ASAP appreciated seeing is the movement 

from “humans versus robots” to “humans plus robots.” There has been a clear philosophical shift 

that is very positive.

ASAP commends the leveraging of partnerships with industry as well as with other agencies 

through the National Robotics Initiative and cooperation with the academic world. The structures 

of many of the efforts were non-traditional in terms of government programs—there were a lot 

of partnerships, collaborations led by other agencies, and work with industry and other federal 

agencies. It seemed to be a very successful approach, and the ASAP believes that it might be useful 

to think about whether this kind of approach could be used in other areas.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 19
III. CONCLUSION

NASA is making progress toward reestablishing U.S. provided transportation to the International 

Space Station (ISS) and to low Earth orbit (LEO) by 2017. The funded Commercial Crew Program 

(CCP) partners (Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, and Boeing) are working under Space Act Agreements (SAAs). 

Implicit in the SAA approach is an “arm’s length” agreement whereby NASA gains “insight but not 

oversight.” This distance has spurred diverse approaches and has potential to foster competition and 

cost reduction. It has, however, yielded a complex and sometimes uncertain management interface. 

Foremost among the uncertainty is: How will NASA intelligently and confidently certify commercial 

crew systems safe for NASA astronauts and personnel on NASA-sponsored missions? NASA took an 

important step forward in answering this question with the award of the Commercial Crew Integrated 

Capability (CCiCap) SAAs in August 2012, and in December 2012, selection of contractors for 

the Certification Products Contract (CPC), the first phase of certification that will yield hazard 

analyses, requirements validation and verification, and flight testing needed to certify the system for 

ISS transport.

NASA is developing the launch system, the crew vehicle, and the ground systems that will provide 

the capability for human exploration beyond Earth orbit. NASA’s approach has spurred discussions 

related to safety-relevant roles and accountability, safety and mission assurance requirements for the 

developers, and risk management and risk tolerance for the future missions.

NASA’s budget is the “elephant in the room” both for commercial space and for longer term exploration. 

NASA’s CCP reflects a funding plan for FY13 that is approximately twice the appropriations currently 

being supported in the House and the Senate. This planning-funding disconnect will drive a change to 

acquisition strategy, schedule, and/or safety risk. 

The ASAP is concerned that some in NASA will champion an uncertified approach that is a current 

option contained in the CCiCap agreement. This could yield two standards of safety—one reflecting 

NASA requirements, and one with a higher-risk set of commercial requirements. It also raises questions 

of who acts as certification authority and what differentiates public from private accountability. 

Separating the level of safety demanded in the system from the unique and hard-earned knowledge 

that NASA possesses introduces new risks and unique challenges to the normal precepts of public 

safety and mission responsibility. NASA’s continued retention of the SAA flight demo option raises 

questions in our minds about the government’s safety obligations as well as how such an option would 

move NASA any closer to a certified system. It could also lead NASA down the slippery slope of being 

forced to curtail their certification program for NASA crewmembers merely because of a small number 

of possibly lucky, non-certified flights. We do not understand the full implication of the optional 

approach and are concerned that it increases risk. We intend to pursue much deeper insight of this 

subject in the coming year.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

20 Annual Report for 2012
The ASAP charter includes counsel regarding NASA’s safety culture. As in all organizations, lessons learned in the past dim with time. In this regard, the ASAP is concerned that the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendation for the Agency to always have an independent 

Technical Authority is being weakened in the implementation of new organizational and acquisition/

investment processes.

There is a need to clearly understand overall mission risk and the subsequent tradeoffs between risk and 

reward as programmatic decisions are made, especially those that involve the acceptance of risk. When 

performance trades are made due to budget and schedule constraints, it is important to be explicit 

about the decisions made, to understand the impact of the tradeoff and why it was made, to document 

the risk acceptance and the underlying value-based rationale, and to revisit the decision periodically to 

confirm its validity. Space systems design and risk tolerance are inextricably linked. As in prior years, 

we call out to NASA to determine what level of risk is acceptable, as a first-order function, and to 

clearly communicate that risk in tandem with the value to be derived to all stakeholders.

We share the Agency’s pride in the important accomplishments during 2012. Prime achievements 

include safe ISS operations and utilization, the incredibly exciting landing of Curiosity on Mars, 

and the first U.S. commercial supply mission to the ISS. The progress directly related to improving 

safety includes contingency planning for ISS de-orbit and improvements to ISS Micro-Meteoroid and 

Orbital Debris (MMOD) tolerance.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 21

Appendix A:

Summary and Status of ASAP 2012 Recommendations
Rec. # Description of Recommendation St

2012-01-01 Standardizing and Funding NASA Wellness Facilities: NASA 

should develop a standardized wellness program approach that 

ensures that all employees have an equal opportunity for access 

to NASA’s wellness facilities. NASA should examine ways to 

standardize and control the level of support for the facilities to a 

higher degree. The ASAP encourages NASA to explore the funding streams and consider whether they should be centralized.

Report received. 

Funding 

will remain 

de-centralized.

CLOSED.

2012-01-02 International Space Station (ISS) Deorbit Capability:

(1) To assess the urgency of this issue, NASA should develop 

an estimate of the risk to ground personnel in the event of 

uncontrolled ISS reentry. (2) NASA should then develop a 

timeline for development of a controlled reentry capability that 

can safely deorbit the ISS in the event of foreseeable anomalies.

NASA response 

& briefing 

received. OPEN 

pending updates 

as plan matures.

2012-01-03 Extension of Soyuz Lifetime: NASA should actively pursue 

with the Russians the plan to extend the Soyuz on-orbit lifetime 

from six months to twelve months.

NASA response 

& briefing 

received. 

CLOSED. 

2012-01-04 Commercial Crew Safety Certification Process: NASA should 

define the safety certification process and standards, down to 

levels 3 and 4, as quickly as possible. NASA should provide the 

ASAP forthwith the schedule by which these requirements will 

be developed and promulgated.

NASA responses 

received. 

CLOSED.

ASAP will 

continue 

periodic review.

2012-01-05 Maintaining NASA Pilot Proficiency: NASA should investigate the risk of reliance on its historical approach for maintaining pilot proficiency considering anticipated further budget 

reductions, including an assessment of the need to develop a 

centrally-funded flight training budget so as to ensure all NASA 

pilots maintain flight proficiency.

NASA passed 

their Level 

2 Safety 

Management 

System (SMS) 

with no 

discrepancies. 

CLOSED.

2012-03-01 Software Assurance and Capability Maturity Model 

Integration (CMMI) Requirements: All NASA internal 

safety-critical software development groups should achieve 

CMMI Level 3 (or an equivalent as established by external validation agent) by the end of FY 14.

NASA response 

received 10/9/12. 

OPEN.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

24 Annual Report for 2012
Rec. # Description of Recommendation St

2012-03-02 Software Assurance Metrics: NASA should provide metrics 

and trends that demonstrate whether the software assurance 

provisions are working and provide return on investment.

NASA response 

received 10/9/12. 

OPEN.

2012-03-03 Software Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) 

Requirements: NASA should establish a standard identifying 

the level of criticality that requires software IV&V, i.e., at 

what risk level must IV&V be required and therefore either be 

resourced, or if that is not possible, a formal waiver process be 

in place for an accountable individual to accept the associated 

risk and document it.

NASA response 

received 10/9/12. 

OPEN.

2012-03-04 Revised Estimate of Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission 

(LOM) for the International Space Station (ISS): Revised 

estimates for both LOM and LOC for ISS due to both MicroMeteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) and other causes 

through 2020 (based on the current configuration) should be 

determined and compared to the data previously supplied in 

this regard which predated any of the recent MMOD hardening 

that has been implemented on ISS. 

NASA response 

received. 

CLOSED.

2012-03-05 Five Year Roadmap for Continuous Improvement of the 

Agency’s Mishap Investigation Process: Link status reports of 

the five year mishap investigations process plan with progress 

reports on the NASA drug and alcohol policy development. 

Also, continue to report on the training of the Mishap 

Investigation Team (MIT) and the investigation Board Chairs 

in greater detail to include the method, consistency, and quality 

of training for MIT members and Board Chairs.

NASA response 

received 

11/21/12. 

OPEN pending 

update.

2012-04-01 Alignment of Technical Authorities’ Budgets with Line 

Authority: NASA should review and determine the appropriateness of having the Technical Authorities—Office of Safety 

and Mission Assurance (OSMA), Office of Chief Health and 

Medical Officer (OCHMO), and Office of Chief Engineer 

(OCE)—in a non-safety-aligned budget line item and office. 

NASA response 

not yet received. 

OPEN.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 25

Appendix B:

Closure Rationale for Recommendations Closed in 2012 
2006-03-04

Random Drug and Alcohol Testing: Recent mishap investigation revelations indicate that there does not 

seem to be an Agency-wide requirement for random drug and alcohol testing among contractors. ASAP 

recommends that expanding both random pre-incident and targeted post-incident testing would be well 

advised for contractors as well as NASA civil servants.

Closure Rationale 

NASA has decided not to implement the recommendation and accepted the risk in this area. 

2008-01-06 follow-up

NASA Headquarters Mishap Investigation: ASAP has recommended that NASA re-evaluate its 

mishap investigation process with an eye to producing report results in a timely manner and utilizing the 

appropriate experts for determining root cause. NASA should consider a 30-day hard number for delivering 

at least a preliminary mishap report to enable dialogue to begin within the affected organizations. 2008-

01-06 Follow-up: ASAP Letter dated Nov 16, 2010 requested that a briefing be provided at the 1st quarterly 

meeting at NASA Headquarters on February 3, 2011, relating to the status of the NPR and changes to it. 

Now that the immediate changes required to effect near-term process improvements have taken place, it 

is appropriate to begin a strategic review of the mishap investigation process. Request that NASA discuss 

their five year strategic plan to effect continuous improvement.

Closure Rationale 

The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has written a 5-year strategic plan/roadmap for 

continuous improvement. The NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) is being rewritten to increase the 

efficiency and improve the quality of the Mishap Investigation Program (MIP). The ASAP believes that 

the action has several positive aspects: it is designed to improve the efficiency and quality of the process; 

it defines a public release/endorsement timeline; it involves a mechanism to resolve endorsements and 

disputes; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and commercial entities are accounted for (and this 

will continue to evolve as time goes on).

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

28 Annual Report for 2012
2009-03-04

Integration of Robotics: The Panel continues to be disappointed in what it sees as a lack of integration 

of robotics across NASA. Most Centers have some robotic activity because they want to be “in the game”. 

There appears to be a loss of momentum and opportunity in this area. The Agency needs to examine 

the benefits of developing a consolidated and integrated robotics research program to capitalize on the 

numerous independent programs that have been developed and more fully exploit robotics utilization 

throughout all missions.

Closure Rationale 

NASA has now made this a focus area. There is a roadmap that is tied to projected missions and a program 

that is managed and resourced as an integrated entity across the Agency. There is a balance between 

technology push and mission pull that is resulting in robotic technology successes in operational roles, 

such as Mars Exploration vehicles and the Robonaut that is now onboard the ISS. Robotics technologies 

are proving to be sufficiently effective to do real work and safe enough to work side by side with humans. 

The ASAP commends the leveraging of partnerships with industry as well as with other agencies through 

the National Robotics Initiative and cooperation with the academic world.

2010-01-03

OSMA Analyze Changing Work and Skills Needed for the Future: NASA OSMA should take a 

leadership role in beginning to analyze how the SMA work is going to change and what kinds of skills are 

going to be needed in the future.

Closure Rationale 

NASA Safety Center (NSC) has developed an SMA Leadership and cross discipline track for Safety and 

Mission Assurance Technical Excellence Program (STEP). Rollout by OSMA Chief to all NASA Centers 

was made on July 11, 2012.

2010-01-04(a)

Integration of Crew Requirements Into Design—Vibration Limits: Research should be initiated to 

establish and codify crew vibration limits for various phases of flight for future space vehicles.

Closure Rationale 

NASA incorporated vibration safety requirements into The Standard and Human Integration Design 

Handbook (HIDH).

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 29
2010-01-07

Methodology for Performing Integrated Abort Risk Analysis and Development of Supporting Tools:

NASA should prescribe the methodology for performing an integrated abort risk analysis and develop the 

supporting tools as needed so that these types of analyses are performed uniformly across the industry.

Closure Rationale 

Chapter 14 of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures Guide was released in January 2012. 

There is linkage to the new PRA Procedures Guide in Section 3.6 of the NPR 8705.2B and into the 

Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT)-REF-1121 PRA methodology document.

2010-01-08

Leading Indicators for Industrial Safety: The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) SMA organization 

should spend some time looking at leading indicators that other industries and organizations are using.

Closure Rationale 

MSFC SMA developed and implemented six new metric indicators that were approved by MSFC 

Safety, Health, and Environmental (SHE) Committee and the Center’s Institutional Management 

Systems Council.

2010-02-02

Mishap Investigation Process and Plan: Each of the Center Directors should exercise leadership to make 

sure other Centers get mishap information. (Related to 2008-01-06 regarding mishap investigation process 

improvements and 2010-02-03 regarding codification of lessons learned from recent mishap reports.)

Closure Rationale 

OSMA has written a 5-year strategic plan/roadmap for continuous improvement. The NPR is being 

rewritten to increase the efficiency and improve the quality of the Mishap Investigation Program (MIP). 

The ASAP believes that the action has several positive aspects: it is designed to improve the efficiency and 

quality of the process; it defines a public release/endorsement timeline; it involves a mechanism to resolve 

endorsements and disputes; the FAA and commercial entities are accounted for (and this will continue to 

evolve as time goes on).

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

30 Annual Report for 2012
2010-02-03

Taurus XL Mishap Documentation: ASAP recommends that NASA examine these eleven Orbiting 

Carbon Observatory (OCO) findings and determine which of them can be codified in some way that 

can benefit other future programs. NASA should then expand the process used to do that and integrate 

it into mishap investigation procedures to ensure that there is a process for sharing the results of mishap 

investigations and corrective actions across all programs, both NASA and commercial.

Closure Rationale 

OCE looked at the three most recent Type A mishap reports including OCO, Glory, and the STS-124 Pad 

39A Flame Trench Damage and found none of the recommendations in those reports lend themselves to 

incorporation into a new standard that would have had a likely beneficial impact.

2010-04-01

Workforce Wellness: NASA should consider the alternatives that are available within the legal and personnel system and examine the best efficiencies to encourage a regular exercise regimen among the workforce.

Closure Rationale 

NASA Administrator implemented NASA 2012 Wellness Campaign where employees were given 

administrative leave to work out for 30 minutes three times a week for 30 days to help employees establish 

fitness programs.

2010-04-02(a)

Commercial Transportation Documents—Expression of Loss of Crew (LOC) Limits: NASA should 

publish threshold limits, objective limits, and goal limits to let commercial providers know what the 

ultimate number is. The goal limit should be put into the contract documents and agreements.

Closure Rationale 

On December 8, 2011, NASA baselined the commercial crew requirements in document 1130, ‘ISS Crew 

Transportation and Services Requirements Document’. Section 3.2.1.1 describes the Loss of Crew Risk and 

section 3.2.1.2 describes the Loss of Mission Risk. Details of these requirements were briefed to the ASAP 

at CY12 Qtr 1 meeting.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 31
2010-04-03

NASA Alcohol Use and Testing Policy: The lead Headquarters organization responsible for developing 

the alcohol policy is requested to provide a formal briefing on the status of the policy at the ASAP’s first 

quarterly meeting in 2011. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) should be invited to participate in the 

briefing. The status report should include a schedule showing a targeted completion and implementation 

date for the policy.

Closure Rationale 

NASA has decided not to implement the recommendation and accepted the risk in this area.

2011-01-01

NASA Alcohol Use and Testing Policy: NASA should implement a post-mishap blood alcohol and drug 

testing program for all personnel in sensitive positions that are involved in Class A and B mishaps. That 

includes NASA contractors, civil servants, political appointees, and all affected visitors. This investigative 

tool will support key organizational learnings and is in line with many legal requirements in the various 

jurisdictions in which NASA operates. It should be noted that this is NOT a recommendation for a random 

test program. It is a test for cause after a serious mishap has occurred.

Closure Rationale 

NASA has decided not to implement the recommendation and accepted the risk in this area.

2011-02-04

SMA Software Assurance: The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) should do an analysis 

on what the impact is to NASA’s critical programs by not doing 100 percent IV&V for software assurance.

Closure Rationale 

ASAP received a briefing during 3rd quarterly meeting on NASA’s approach to IV&V for software 

assurance and its impact to NASA’s critical programs. OSMA clarified the processes and criteria used to 

prioritize safety-critical software for IV&V as well as put IV&V in the overall context of software assurance. 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

32 Annual Report for 2012
2011-03-02

Partner Integration Team Rotation: The Panel recommends that the CCP develop a written policy 

specifying team rotation schedules based on tour of duty, milestones, or other appropriate criteria, to ensure 

a fresh set of eyes are always protecting the government’s interest for the insight portion of the acquisition 

strategy. [NASA letter concurred however after discussion at Oct 20, 2011 meeting, Brent Jett agreed 

to document a policy or procedures involving current practices, e.g. TIL meetings, supervision, SME 

involvement, by which objectivity is assured.]

Closure Rationale 

NASA has outlined policy and expectations to the PIT members including: “warning signs” list and topic 

at the mid-term and annual performance review, Partner Managers (and deputies) must be home based at 

their center (no long term co-location at partner sites), policy that the CCDev2 Partner Managers and teams 

will not automatically transition into similar roles for CCiCap and the engineering teams that evaluate the 

partners’ work at major milestones is significantly larger than the PIT core team.

2012-01-01

Standardizing and Funding NASA Wellness Facilities: NASA should develop a standardized wellness 

program approach that ensures that all employees have an equal opportunity for access to NASA’s wellness 

facilities. NASA should examine ways to standardize and control the level of support for the facilities to 

a higher degree. The ASAP encourages NASA to explore the funding streams and consider whether they 

should be centralized.

Closure Rationale 

The NASA Mission Support Council determined that funding of NASA wellness (fitness) facilities should 

remain decentralized. OCHMO provided a report to the ASAP that showed the results of surveying all 

Centers and component facility fitness centers to determine the core operations that are currently in place 

Agency-wide as well as answered specific ASAP questions.

2012-01-03

Extension of Soyuz Lifetime: NASA should actively pursue with the Russians the plan to extend the 

Soyuz on-orbit lifetime from six months to twelve months.

Closure Rationale 

NASA response and briefing received.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2012 33
2012-01-04

Commercial Crew Safety Certification Process: NASA should define the safety certification process and 

standards, down to levels 3 and 4, as quickly as possible. NASA should provide the ASAP forthwith the 

schedule by which these requirements will be developed and promulgated.

Closure Rationale 

Commercial Crew Program has laid out the requirements for certification in their Certification Products 

Contract (CPC). The certification contracts will be where the verification, validation, test, and final 

certification efforts are documented. The ASAP requests to see the details as the program moves forward.

2012-01-05

Maintaining NASA Pilot Proficiency: NASA should investigate the risk of reliance on its historical 

approach for maintaining pilot proficiency considering anticipated further budget reductions, including an 

assessment of the need to develop a centrally-funded flight training budget so as to ensure all NASA pilots 

maintain flight proficiency.

Closure Rationale 

NASA passed their Level 2 Safety Management System (SMS) with no discrepancies.

2012-03-04

Revised Estimate of Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) for the International Space 

Station (ISS): Revised estimates for both LOM and LOC for ISS due to both MMOD and other causes 

through 2020 (based on the current configuration) should be determined and compared to the data 

previously supplied in this regard which predated any of the recent MMOD hardening that has been 

implemented on ISS.

Closure Rationale 

The program has been continuing to harden the ISS structure for MMOD, including both the U.S. and 

Russian modules. They are now predicting a cumulative 5.1 percent chance of LOC and a 13.7 percent 

evacuation risk over a ten year period. This is substantially below what it was just six to twelve months ago. 

If there is a need for a total Station evacuation, the program would have a 180-day dwell time to determine 

what action to take. This adds considerable flexibility in the response time requirement and allows for 

deliberate planning.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

34 Annual Report for 2012

Goodbye, Space Shuttle Program—it’s been an incredible ride!

Aerospace Safet y Adv isory

Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair 

Dr. James P. Bagian 

The Honorable Claude M. Bolton, Jr.

Captain Robert E. Conway, USN (Ret.)

Mr. John C. Frost 

Dr. Donald P. McErlean 

Dr. George C. Nield

Mr. Bryan D. O’Connor

Dr. Patricia A. Sanders