alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                  5
       
<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                         SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               753,739
<SECURITIES>                                         2,905,474
<RECEIVABLES>                                        000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         000
<INVENTORY>                                          000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     000
<PP&E>                                               000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       37,398,774<F1>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                247,127<F2>
<BONDS>                                              000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                000
<PREFERRED>                                          000
<COMMON>                                             000
<OTHER-SE>                                           37,151,647
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         37,398,774
<SALES>                                              000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     169,951<F3>
<CGS>                                                000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     280,426<F4>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      000
<CHANGES>                                            000
<NET-INCOME>                                         (1,350,058)<F5>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (26.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        000
<FN>
<F1>Included  in total assets:  Investments in Local Limited  Partnerships  $33,466,652,  Restricted cash $232,951,
Organizational costs, net $14,167 and Other current assets of $25,791.
<F2>Included  in current  liabilities:  Accounts  payable to  affiliate  $210,753,  Accounts  payable  and  accrued
expenses $36,374.
<F3>Total revenue includes: Investment $103,118 and Other $66,833.
<F4>Included  in Other  Expenses:  Asset  Management  fees  $137,652,  General  and  Administrative  $119,859,  and
Amortization $22,915.
<F5>Net loss reflects:  Equity in losses of Local Limited Partnerships of $1,239,583.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of WNC  California
Housing Tax Credits III, L.P. (the "Partnership") for the quarter ended June 30,
2005 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof
(the "Report"),  and pursuant to 18 U.S.C., section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  I,  Wilfred N.  Cooper,  Jr.,
President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc., general partner
of the Partnership, hereby certify that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  except to the extent
          that such  provisions  requrie the filing of an opinion of registiered
          public  accountants to accompany the  Partnership's  annual  financial
          statements; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Partnership.




/s/WILFRED N. COOPER, JR.
-------------------------
Wilfred N. Cooper, Jr.
President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc.
November 18, 2005
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 21, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: 

FRANK LOUIS SINDAR,

Petitioner.

No. 10-4073

(D.C. No. 2:10-CV-9999-NC)

(D. Utah)

ORDER

Before TACHA, LUCERO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

Frank Louis Sindar petitions for a writ of mandamus asking us to order the

district court to assign a case number to a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition that

he claims to have filed on September 27, 2009. Mr. Sindar has not provided us

with a copy of that petition or any evidence that he in fact mailed it to the district

court. Nor has he attached copies of his alleged correspondence with the district

court and Utah Attorney General’s office relating to the petition. Instead, he

relies on his own bare statements and a one-line entry in his prison account

history indicating that he wrote a five-dollar check to the district court on October

7, 2009. This is insufficient to justify issuance of a writ of mandamus, which

requires the petitioner to show that his right to such relief is clear and

Appellate Case: 10-4073 Document: 01018444783 Date Filed: 06/21/2010 Page: 1 
-2-

indisputable. In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir.

2009). 

Mr. Sindar’s petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED. His request to

proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-4073 Document: 01018444783 Date Filed: 06/21/2010 Page: 2
#### FRANK J. DANIELLO v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM.

May 16, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 19, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE

COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; WARDEN OF THE

STERLING CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-1008

(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01549-ZLW)

(D. Colorado)

ORDER

Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

In a September 9, 2009 Order and separate judgment, district court dismissed Plaintiff

Martinez’s civil rights action. And, in an October 1, 2009 Order, the court denied his timely

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeals. We dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction. The notice of appeal is untimely.

In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007), the Supreme Court made “clear that

the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” In this

Appellate Case: 10-1008 Document: 01018370087 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Page: 1 
-2-

case, the deadline for filing a timely notice of appeal expired on November 2, 2009, which

was thirty days after entry of the October 1, 2009 Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was filed in the district court on January 12, 2010, which

was seventy-one days past the thirty-day filing deadline. Although Plaintiff is entitled to

application of the prisoner mailbox rule, he cannot avail himself of this rule because he failed

to comply with the rule’s mandatory requirements. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Prince v.

Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1165-67 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the “certificate of service” in

the notice of appeal contains a date of January 10, 2010, which is well-beyond the filing

deadline. Pro se appellants must comply with the requirements of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure that govern all litigants. See Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452,

455 (10th Cir. 1994).

The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court,

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Kathleen T. Clifford

Attorney - Deputy Clerk

Appellate Case: 10-1008 Document: 01018370087 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Page: 2
#### J. Wingfield et al. *v.*Commonwealth.

Criminal Law — -Setting up Lottery — Indictment — -Constitutionality of Act.

The offense charged in the indictment is the setting up, promoting, and managing a lottery for money, etc., which is sufficient.

Constitutionality.

In view of the very large discretion given to the court and jury, the act is not within the inhibition of section 17, of article 13 of the Constitution.

APPEAL FROM MUHLENBURG CIRCUIT COURT.

June 14, 1867.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Peters:

By section 1, article 21, chapter 28, 1 Rev. Stat. 405, it is provided that whoever shall set up, draw, manage, or otherwise promote any lottery for money or other thing, or dispose of, or promote the disposing of any money, or thing of value by way of lottery, or aid in the doing of either of said offenses, shall be fined from $100 to $10,000.

The offense charged in this indictment is the setting up, promoting, and managing a *lottery*for money, property, and other things of value. In the subsequent part of the indictment, the manner in which the offense was committed is described with some particularity, and is not in direct terms stated in the indictment that all the tickets drawn did not represent prizes equal in value to the prices paid for them; nor was it necessary that it should contain such a statement; for the offense, denounced by the statute, was complete by setting up, or promoting, or managing a lottery for money, or other thing, without regard to the disparity that might exist between the price paid for a ticket, and the value of the prize it would draw. One, if not, the principal object of the statute, being to protect the community from the evil influences and demoralization of lotteries.

Nor can we, in view of the very large 'discretion given to the court and jury under fhe act now under consideration; decide the same to be within the inhibition of section II, of article 13, of the Constitution of Kentucky, which declares that excessive bail shall *586not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted. As the history of the trial is not preserved and presented in a bill of exceptions, thereby limiting the inquiry to the single questions of the sufficiency of the indictment, and the constitutionality of the act, *supra,*and perceiving no available objections on either of these grounds, we feel bound to affirm the judgment.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-7080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

ROBERT JAMES GADSEN, a/k/a Axe-Head, a/k/a Robert James, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District 

Judge. (2:97-cr-00274-PMD-1) 

Submitted: November 10, 2009 Decided: December 10, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert James Gadsen, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Kittrell, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Robert James Gadsen seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order treating his petition for a writ of error audita 

querela as a successive 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) 

motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006); 

Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 2004); Reid v. 

Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating 

that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gadsen has 

not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability 

and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

2 
3 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ No. 00-30518 Summary Calendar

_____________________ MARTHA ANN FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus CALDWELL PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (USDC No. 98-CV-430)

_______________________________________________________ October 19, 2000 Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * 

### Plaintiff-appellant Martha Ann Fitzgerald appeals from summary judgment against her on her claim for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 292



### U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (FLSA). We agree with the district court and defendantappellee Caldwell Parish School Board that she is an exempt employee under the short test promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.207(a), 541.214; see also Heidtman v. County of El Paso , 171 F.3d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying the short test). As Office Manager, Fitzgerald prepared a multi-million dollar budget, provided advice regarding the investment of school monies, and managed the school system’s payroll. As a matter of law, her position’s primary duty was directly related to the school system’s management policies and general business operations, and it required the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. Thus, her position is exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. AFFIRMED.
S. 1718

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the seventh day of January, two thousand and three

An Act

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 3710 West

73rd Terrace in Prairie Village, Kansas, as the ‘‘Senator James B. Pearson Post

Office’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SENATOR JAMES B. PEARSON POST OFFICE.

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal

Service located at 3710 West 73rd Terrace in Prairie Village,

Kansas, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Senator James

B. Pearson Post Office’’.

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation,

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference

to the Senator James B. Pearson Post Office.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2043

AN ACT

To designate a Federal building in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,

as the ‘‘Ronald Reagan Federal Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. RONALD REAGAN FEDERAL BUILDING.

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Federal building located at

5 228 Walnut Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, shall be

6 known and designated as the ‘‘Ronald Reagan Federal

7 Building’’.

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United

10 States to the building referred to in subsection (a) shall

11 be deemed to be a reference to the Ronald Reagan Federal

12 Building.

Passed the Senate March 12, 2004.

Attest:

Secretary.
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2043

AN ACT

To designate a Federal building in Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania, as the ‘‘Ronald Reagan FederalBuilding’’.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Laurel Capital Group, Inc.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Laurel Capital Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John A.
Howard, Jr., Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.



/s/ John A. Howard, Jr.
-----------------------
John A. Howard, Jr.
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
February 17, 2004
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-4658

_____________________________

CHRISTOPHER DELAINE BRYANT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

David Rimmer, Judge.

April 24, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, MAKAR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Frank X. Moehrle, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________

DARREL E. DOWNING, 

 Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

MIKE MULLIN, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 10-5018

(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00182-TCK-TLW)

(N.D. Okla.)

_______________________________

ORDER

_______________________________

The captioned appeal is dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 

42.1.

A copy of this order shall stand as and for the mandate of this court.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 25, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 10-5018 Document: 01018447970 Date Filed: 06/25/2010 Page: 1
Filed 5/14/14 P. v. Cosby CA4/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

KEITH COSBY, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 D064512 

 (Super. Ct. No. CR84617) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Howard H. Shore, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 Keith Cosby was convicted in 1988 of numerous counts, including two 

counts of murder, and was sentenced to 33 years to life consecutive to a term of life 

without the possibility of parole. In 2013, the court denied a motion by the 
2 

prosecution seeking an order imposing a victim restitution order in favor of the 

victim's wife under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), but did impose a 

restitution fine of $200 under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Cosby 

timely appealed the order imposing a restitution fine. 

FACTS 

 In 2013, the wife of one of the murder victims sent a letter to the prosecutor 

seeking a restitution payment of $12,516.25. The prosecution then filed a motion 

seeking victim restitution in the amount of $10,000. The court ordered a restitution 

fine of $200 under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). 

DISCUSSION 

 Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and 

proceedings below. Counsel presents no argument for reversal, but asks this court 

to review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Counsel identifies as a possible, 

but not arguable, issue: whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose a 

restitution fine. 

 We granted Cosby permission to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, 

but he has not responded. A review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende, 

supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738 has disclosed 

no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Cosby has been competently represented 

by counsel on this appeal. 
3 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

McDONALD, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

NARES, Acting P. J. 

IRION, J.
#### Hutchinson *v.*Irvin’s Trustee.

Mortgage — Deed of Trust.

To constitute a mortgage or deed of trust the right of property must be changed and the title vested in the grantee or vendee.

APPEAL PROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT.

December 17, 1863.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Peters:

The only question presented by this record is, what is the proper construction of the writing executed by Irvin to appellant?

It is contended by the counsel for appellant that the instrument ought either to be considered as a mortgage or deed of trust, and that it created a prior lien on the property of Irvin in favor of appellant in preference to other creditors of Irvin.

After careful examination of the instrument we are of opinion that it can neither be considered a mortgage nor deed of trust. To constitute either the right of property must be changed, and the title vested in the grantee or vendee.

In the case before the court no particular property is named or described in the instrument, and, indeed, the parties do not *349seem to have intended to change or transfer the right of any property whatever from Irvin to Hutchinson; but the writing is only an acknowledgment that Hutchinson was Irvin’s surety in the replevin bond mentioned, and that Irvin would not incumber his property, but would surrender it to satisfy said debt — the title to the property was certainly left in Irvin — and Hutchinson had no power over it even if Irvin failed to pay the debt, or to surrender his property in satisfaction thereof. The instrument, therefore, has none of the characteristics of a mortgage or deed of trust.

The exceptions were properly sustained to the evidence of Durham.

Judgment affirmed.