The Space Shuttle's First Flight: STS-1

by Henry C. Dethloff

The first mission of the space transport system (STS-1) or Space Shuttle,
flew on April 12, 1981, ending a long hiatus in American space flight.
The last Apollo lunar mission flew in December 1972, and the joint American
Russian Apollo-Soyuz Earth orbital mission closed in July 1975. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) intended that the shuttle make
that permanent link between Earth and space, and that it should become
part of "a total transportation system" including "vehicles, ground facilities,
a communications net, trained crews, established freight rates and flight
schedules and the prospect of numerous important and exciting tasks to
be done." It was to be "one element in a grand design that included a Space
Station, unmanned planetary missions, and a manned flight to Mars."1

Awarded the Collier Trophy (in a tradition that began in 1911), the
flight of STS-1 represented the greatest achievement in aviation for 1981.
NASA, Rockwell International, Martin Marietta, Thiokol, and the entire
government/industrial team responsible for the design, construction, and
flight of the spacecraft, as well as the crew of the shuttle, John Young,
Robert Crippen, Joe Engle, and Richard Truly, were all recipients of that
award. Since 1962, NASA aerospace projects, including Mercury, Gemini,
Apollo, Landsat, and Skylab, had received ten of the twenty Collier awards.
Now, the eleventh in twenty years went to a NASA team that had designed
and flown something remarkably different from those previous craft. For
the Space Shuttle was a true aerospace craft, a reusable vehicle that could
take off from the Earth, enter and operate in space, and return to an Earth
landing. N. Wayne Hale, a missions flight director for the shuttle, likened
it to a battleship, which while it may have only a few aboard, nevertheless
had a crew of thousands stationed around the world and linked by Mission
Control. Owen Morris, the Engineering and Systems Integration Division
head for the shuttle Program Office, described the shuttle as a particularly
complex, integrated machine and an enormous engineering challenge.2

Although it flew its maiden voyage only in 1981, NASA's shuttle program
began many years earlier and predated Apollo. In the late 1950s, as human
space flight began to be seriously considered and planned, most scientists
and engineers projected that if space flight became a reality it would
build upon logical building blocks. First, a human would be lofted into
space as a passenger in a capsule (project Mercury). Second, the passengers
would acquire some control over the space vehicle (project Gemini). Third,
a reusable space vehicle would be developed that would take humans into
Earth orbit and return them. Next, a permanent Space Station would be constructed
in a near-Earth orbit through the utilization of the reusable space vehicle.
Finally, planetary and lunar flights would be launched from the Space Station
using relatively low-thrust and reusable (and thus lower cost) space vehicles.
The perception of what became the shuttle as that reusable space vehicle
associated with an orbiting space station held fast well into the vehicle's
developmental stages.



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278 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

One of the known quantities in space flight was that the velocity required
for a vehicle to escape earth's gravitational pull was only 1.41 times
the velocity required to achieve earth orbit. The great costs associated
with space flight included the cost of fuel used to achieve orbit, the
cost of the expendable boosters and fuel tanks used to drive a space vehicle
into orbit or into space, and the effective loss of the inhabited capsule
or vehicle which, while it returned, could not be reused. Space quickly
came to be an expensive business, and as it developed, the shuttle, more
so than previous projects, was cost-driven, both in its incentives and
in its construction. But because the nation's mission in space came to
be to put an American on the Moon within the decade of the sixties, NASA's
Apollo lunar program preempted both the Space Station and the shuttle.
And, when the shuttle appeared without a Space Station to build and service,
it appeared emasculated and detached from its intended purpose to some
extent an aerospace plane without a space mission.

When did the Space Shuttle begin?
At what Point was it Created?

It could have been in March 1966, when a NASA planning team developed
a statement of work for a "Reusable Ground Launch Vehicle Concept and Development
Planning Study." Or it could have been at an Apollo applications conference
held at the Manned Spacecraft Center (later the Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center) in Houston on October 27, 1966, when leaders of the Marshall Space
Flight Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center agreed to pursue independent
studies of a shuttle system along the lines of a March 1966 statement of
work. Or most certainly a point of inception would be January 23, 1969,
when George E. Mueller, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, approved contract negotiations for initial shuttle design work
.3 Or it could have been even much
earlier.

Under the authority of House Resolution 496, approved March 5, 1958,
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, chaired by Senator Overton
Brooks, Democrat of Louisiana, convened hearings designed to provide direction
and guidance for the creation of a new Federal agency that would head America's
space program. During those hearings many "experts" described the development
of space stations and "controlled space flight" as the prerequisites for
expeditions to the Moon and beyond. Brigadier General A. H. Boushey, Air
Force Director of Advanced Technology listed the development of spacecraft,
piloted by humans, as "the most important" of the goals which must receive
attention before there could be true exploration of space:

> By piloted spacecraft, I refer to a vehicle wherein a pilot
> operates controls and directs the vehicle. This is quite a different concept
> from the so-called man-in-space Proposal which merely takes a human 'along
> for the ride' to permit observation of his reactions and assess his capabilities.4

Boushey believed that by the end of the decade of the 1960s, a large
Space Station could be assembled by piloted "space tugs," that would remain
in orbit throughout their useful life and operate only outside the atmosphere.
"In addition to the 'tugs,' manned



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 279

resupply and maintenance spacecraft will shuttle from the Earth's equator
to the orbiting satellites." Subsequently, a piloted spacecraft that would
refuel at the Space Station in Earth orbit, "will land on the Moon."5

T. F. Morrow, vice president of Chrysler Corporation, thought that space
stations or platforms might come in later decades, but that by 1969 one
could expect "space trips encircling the Earth and the Moon." Dr. Walter
R. Dornberger, rocket expert for Bell Aircraft, expected to see "manned
and automatic space astronomical observatories; manned space laboratories;
manned and automatic filling, storage, supply and assembly space facilities;
manned space maintenance and supply and rescue ships-all climaxed by the
first manned flight to the Moon."6

Roy K. Knutson, Chairman, Corporate Space Committee for North American
Aviation, offered a much more exact definition for a "winged" space vehicle.
While a piloted capsule (such as Mercury) would take a person into space
and provide important physiological data, "Ultimately ... consideration
must be given to the problem of reentering the Earth's atmosphere from
orbit in a winged vehicle capable of landing at a designated spot under
control of a pilot."7 He viewed North
American Aviation's X-15 (then under development) as a forerunner of an
aerospace craft, and believed solving the reentry problem would be the
most crucial engineering task associated with developing a reusable shuttle.
He offered, in 1958, a remarkably clear description of what would one day
become the shuttle:

> A large rocket booster would be used to boost the vehicle
> to high altitudes. Then a rocket engine installed in the ship itself would
> be ignited to provide further acceleration to the 25, 000 miles per hour
> required for orbiting. In a low trajectory, the vehicle would pass halfway
> around the Earth in 45 minutes. A retrorocket would start the ship out
> of orbit at perhaps 10, 000 miles from the landing point. As the vehicle
> enters the denser atmosphere, the nose and edges of the wing and tail will
> glow like iron in a blacksmith's forge. The structure will be built to
> withstand this extreme condition, however, and the pilot glide down to
> a dead stick landing.8

If not a point of inception, there was at least in 1958 a sense
of direction for the development of a reusable aerospace craft.

Even earlier, before the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite, scientists
and engineers seriously discussed the construction and operation of space
craft. Krafft A. Eriche, for example, presented "Calculations on a Manned
Nuclear Propelled Space Vehicle" to the American Rocket Society in September
1957. In January 1957, NACA engineers on the staff of the Ames Aeronautical
Laboratory at Moffett Field, California, filed a secret report on their
"Preliminary Investigation of a New Research Airplane for Exploring the
Problems of Efficient Hypersonic Flight." It was to be an aircraft considerably
exceeding the performance levels of the X-15 with "a rocket boost ... to
Mach numbers of the order of 10 and altitudes of the order of 140,000 feet."9



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280 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

With the insight and direction provided by Congress, the experiences
of National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and the American
(and Canadian) aircraft industry, NASA set about after its inception in
1958 to provide the United States leadership in space exploration, space
science, and space technology.10 But
American successes in space seemed painfully gained, and slowly realized.

Not only had the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into orbit
on October 4, 1957, but in 1959 Soviet rocket scientists launched three
successful interplanetary craft into space. The second, Luna II
impacted on the Moon in September; Luna III flew behind the Moon
in October 1959. On April 12, 1961, Major Yuri Gagarin became the first
person to "leave this planet, enter the void of space, and return." By
1961, with the encouragement of the Democratic Party campaign for the presidency,
Americans had begun agonizing over the "missile gap." After the elections
and the inauguration, on May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy and Congress
set a new course for NASA, preempting existing developmental programs and
schedules. The United States, before the decade is out, should land "a
man on the Moon" and return him safely to Earth.11

The Apollo program became the leading effort. An orbital Space Station
and Earth-to-orbit spacecraft, while they might contribute to a continuing
presence in space and provide a platform for further lunar or planetary
exploration, did not contribute to the short term goal of an American lunar
landing within the decade. NASA readjusted its schedules and priorities
to accommodate Apollo. The Space Station and the reusable aerospace craft
remained viable, but future, options. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),
in particular, continued to study the reusable vehicle concept and as early
as January 1963, developed a statement of work for a fully reusable rocket-powered
vehicle that could carry civilian passengers, and a sizable payload. Marshall
awarded independent contracts to Lockheed Aircraft and North American Aviation
for design and development studies. But the NASA focus continued to be
on Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. By the end of 1963, the Mercury program
ended. The last Gemini mission flew on November 11, 1966. NASA scheduled
the first Apollo flight for December 5, 1965. An Apollo with a Saturn booster,
which was to send Apollo on its lunar voyages, flew an unpiloted test on
February 26, 1966. 12 It appeared
likely through most of 1966 that the Apollo-Saturn lunar program was on
schedule. Should NASA complete its mission to land a man on the Moon within
the decade, what would happen next?

NASA began to address that issue by establishing an Apollo Applications
Office, in 1966, that would devise programs to utilize Apollo technology
in non-lunar programs. In October 1966, the annual meeting of the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics focused on the question, "After
Apollo, What Next?" And, in 1966, just as the Apollo-Saturn program seemed
on the verge of success, Congress and the American public began to divert
attention and public funds from space and NASA to the more urgent business
of a growing war in Vietnam. The war, and money, began, even in the midst
of Apollo, to turn NASA's attention to the "more practical" approach to
space.13 More practical meant more
efficient, less costly, more economic. Discussion of an orbital space platform
or station, and a reusable Earth-to-orbit supply vehicle revived.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 281

Thus, in March 1966, a special NASA planning team developed a statement
of work for a reusable ground launch vehicle, and in October Marshall Space
Flight Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center agreed to pursue independent
study and research on such a spacecraft. NASA budgets, however, were becoming
increasingly constrained, and at a January conference at NASA Headquarters
administrators reluctantly agreed that there should be no new launch vehicle
development in order to reduce the budget problems. The year, 1967, passed
without any real progress in the development of a reusable spacecraft,
but financial pressures became greater rather than less. In January 1968,
George Mueller rekindled sentiments for work on a reusable spacecraft as
potentially a cost-saving measure:

> Where we stand now is the feasibility generally has been
> established for reusability. And we have much data on many concepts. We
> have an uncertain market demand and operational requirements. The R&D
> costs for fully reusable systems, including incremental development approaches,
> appear high. Personnel and cargo spacecraft seem to dominate Earth-to-orbit
> logistics costs. R&D costs for new logistics systems are in competition
> with dollars to develop payloads and markets (dollars are scarce).14

Nevertheless, NASA put a decision for the development of a reusable
vehicle on hold.

Meanwhile, in collaborative sessions with the Air Force, which was independently
studying orbiting laboratories and aerospace planes, NASA and Air Force
engineers agreed on the need to develop a logistics space vehicle with
a payload range of 5,000 to 50,000 pounds for use with a Space Station.
Marshall and Manned Spacecraft administrators again conferred in October,
and agreed to issue a request to NASA Headquarters for a joint Phase A
(concept definition) study for a logistics space vehicle. Headquarters
tentatively agreed to award a study contract, but withheld approval pending
the results of the Apollo 8 flight.15

Apollo 8 was the first Apollo flight carrying "human cargo" powered
by the Saturn rocket. Its original flight plan was to go into Earth orbit,
but again MSFC and MSC combined to convince leaders at NASA Headquarters
that Apollo 8 should be a circumlunar flight. Although perceived
to be a "high risk" effort, Apollo 8, launched on December 28, 1968,
put astronauts Frank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr. and William A. Anders
into ten orbits about the Moon, and returned them safely to Earth. That
flight provided greater assurance of the probability of completing a lunar
landing within the decade, and accelerated the need to commit to a post-Apollo
program. On January 23, 1969, George Mueller approved contract negotiations
for design work on what would become the Space Shuttle.16
Touchdown by Apollo 11 on the Moon's surface in July 1969 brought
work on the shuttle into sharper focus. The question, "After Apollo, What
Next?" needed to be answered soon.

President Richard M. Nixon appointed a Space Task Group to study the
problem and offer options. Internal NASA studies complemented the work
of the task group. On January 29, NASA awarded Phase A study contracts
for elements of an "integral launch and reentry vehicle" (ILRV). Lockheed
Missile & Space Company studied clustered or modular reusable flyback
stages. General Dynamics/Convair examined expendable fuel tanks and solid
propulsion stages. Both contracts were administered by Marshall. The Manned
Spacecraft Center in Houston directed a study by North American Rockwell
for expendable tank configurations coupled with a reusable spacecraft.
McDonnell Douglas,



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282 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

working under Langley Research Center supervision, examined tank, booster,
and spacecraft ("triamese") configurations. Martin Marietta conducted an
independent design study also submitted to NASA.17
Concurrently, a joint DOD/NASA study began on space transportation which
would also go to the President's Space Task Group.

In October 1969, Congressman Olin E. Teague, Chairman of the House Committee
on Science and Astronautic's subcommittee for NASA oversight, asked the
Director of each NASA Center involved directly in the manned space flight
program to review various "levels of effort" as they might affect future
programs when measured against the Space Task Group recommendations. He
requested an evaluation of the Space Task Group's preliminary recommendations
that NASA focus on a reusable space craft and a permanent space station.
And he requested personal letters from Dale D. Myers (Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight), Robert R. Gilruth (Director of the Manned Spacecraft
Center), Kurt H. Debus (Director of Kennedy Space Center), Eberhard Rees
(Director of Marshall Space Flight Center), and Wernher von Braun (Deputy
Associate Administrator), "setting forth their views on the importance
of moving forward with the Manned Space Flight Program at this time."18

Dale Myers described the changing focus of the mission in space from
the single purpose pursued in the Apollo program, to a broader effort to
use space technology for the benefit of man. "In earth orbit, a space station
supplied by the reusable shuttle will provide additional economic gains
and practical benefits." They would facilitate a considerable expansion
in space activities and increase the number of visitors into space.19

Robert R. Gilruth, Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center, responded
that he firmly believed "that the reusable Space Shuttle and the large
Space Station are vital elements which must be developed." He described
the "earth-to-orbit shuttle" as "the keystone to our post-Apollo activities."
Kurt Debus described the broad technology advances required for the development
of a shuttle and Space Station, and noted that one cannot always identify
the total utility of an innovation. Throughout history, he noted, innovations
have been made without identifying all the uses and applications-he named
the wheel, the telephone, the car, and the airplane as good examples. He
advised proceeding now with the development of a fully reusable Space Shuttle,
and the initiation of Phase B studies. Eberhard Rees wrote that the answer
to the high costs of space transportation is to develop a system "which
operates much like the cargo and passenger airlines, namely a Space Shuttle
System."20

Wernher von Braun reviewed the accomplishments of the past decade, noting
that the space program thus far "brought renewed strength in national leadership,
in security, in education, and in science and technology, and in the will
of America to succeed."

> ... the key to our future accomplishments in space will
> be willingness to undertake the developments that will advance this nation
> to new plateaus of operational flexibility and will give us the technological
> advances needed to assure economical operations in space. No one would
> question the justification for a jet aircraft that can be flown over and
> over again instead of just once. With the Space Shuttle and the Space Station
> we will have the space age equivalent of the jet liner.21

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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 283

|Drawing of early shuttle concepts including: capsule, lifting body, winged  first-stage with winged or rocket second-stage, and winged with external-tank designs.
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Possible configurations considered for the Space Shuttle
as of 1970. (NASA photo).                                                                                



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284 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

Robert F. Thompson, who became the Manned Spacecraft Center's Space
Shuttle Program Director in April 1970, explained that the emphasis in
the initial Phase A and DOD studies was to develop a fully reusable system,
which he perceived at the time as the most cost-effective configuration,
because of anticipated lower operating costs. However, as early as May
1969, the costs of developing fully reusable systems became ominous. By
the end of the year NASA Headquarters shifted the Phase A studies to an
emphasis on a combination of expendable and recoverable boosters coupled
with reusable spacecraft. The Phase A reports were received in November
1969, and the DOD/NASA joint studies were completed in December 1970. Both
the NASA internal studies and the DOD/NASA study continued to support a
fully reusable spacecraft.22

In May 1970, NASA awarded Phase B contracts to a North American Rockwell
and General Dynamics team and to a McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta
team for definition studies of a fully reusable shuttle. But in June, contracts
were awarded to the Grumman Aerospace and Boeing partners for studies of
various expendable and reusable booster and fuel tank designs, to Lockheed
to examine an expendable fuel tank for the orbiter, and to Chrysler for
design study of a single stage reusable orbiter. There were other contracts
to study various assemblies through the remainder of 1970.23
The year ended without a decision as to the design of the shuttle, but
with a number of interesting options.

But the estimated costs of developing a fully reusable shuttle were
rising, and costs soon became the decisive element, not only in the shuttle
design, but in determining future NASA programs.

The development of a fully reusable shuttle was conservatively estimated
to "require more than a doubling of NASA's budget, unrealistic at any time
and particularly so in the light of increasing military expenditures in
Southeast Asia." During congressional hearings on the FY 1971 NASA budget,
NASA Comptroller Bill Lilly responded to questioning that if choices had
to be made, the shuttle had to precede the Space Station because, "if they
could not be developed concurrently, the shuttle in extended sortie, could
act as a surrogate Station and the long term future of space flight lay
in reducing the cost of all operations, but foremost in the cost of delivery
to low Earth orbit."24 As will be
seen, funding was tenuous throughout the development program. The decision
on a fully, or even a partially, reusable shuttle apparatus was still pending.

Finally, on April 1, 1971, NASA directed that the Phase B contracts
shift the emphasis from "fully reusable" to consider an "orbiter" with
external expendable hydrogen tanks. James C. Fletcher, who had replaced
NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine in April, believed that whatever the
technical merits of a fully reusable space vehicle might be, the $10.5
billion price tag currently assigned shuttle development simply would "not
fly" with Congress. In June 1971, Max Faget, who headed MSC's Advanced
Missions Program Office, presented an alternate configuration, that is,
a two-stage shuttle with a drop tank orbiter. Administrator Fletcher accepted
the configuration as NASA's choice, and on June 16, 1971, sent Congress
a letter of decision. Studies of the new configuration with a fully reusable
orbiter, and expendable or reusable external booster rockets and tanks,
subsequently lowered estimated R&D costs to about $5 billion, or one-half
that of the fully reusable vehicle. 25

The new partially reusable configuration involved the lowest development
costs, but also enhanced the aerodynamics of the shuttle's orbiter, and
safety. An internal tank



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 285

|Four drawings show the shuttle design changing from 1972-1974. Steering engines enlarge, the conning tower gets lost, and sudden transitions along the body get smoothed out.
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Shuttle Design Evolution 1972-1974.                                                                                                                                          

design required heavy insulation of the spacecraft, much heavier launch
weights, and flight difficulties resulting from tank torsion and "slosh."
The very high pressure required in the fuel tanks also created higher risks
and engineering and maintenance problems. 26
Refinement of the proposed new configuration took yet another two years.
For the time, the solution seemed the best in terms of costs and technical
development.

Despite NASA's June 1971 commitment to a reusable orbiter launched by
an expendable or partially reusable propulsion system, there was no specific
congressional funding for shuttle R&D. Shuttle funding came from general
NASA spaceflight operations programs through FY 1973. Moreover, shuttle
program expenditures had risen from $12.5 million in 1970 to $78.5 million
in 1971 .27 Clearly, formal approval
had to be secured or study on the shuttle project had to be terminated.

In June 1971, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight,
Dale D. Myers, who had managed North American Rockwell's shuttle development
work before he replaced George Mueller at NASA headquarters, assigned Marshall
responsibility for development of the shuttle main engine and boosters,
and the Manned Spacecraft Center responsibility for developing the orbiter.
Throughout 1971 and into 1972, NASA extended the Phase B contracts, and
awarded new ones to examine variously the use of existing Titan and Saturn
rockets as shuttle launch vehicles, the feasibility of using liquid or
solid propulsion boosters, and methods of recovering boosters and external
tanks. In January 1972, Marshall Space Flight Center awarded contracts
to Aerojet-General, Lockheed Propulsion Company, Thiokol Chemical, and
United Technology Center to study the possibilities of using



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286 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

existing 120-inch and 156-inch solid rocket motors as part of the shuttle
booster system. 28 Preliminary and
final reports confirmed the lower costs of the new shuttle configuration.

On January 5, 1972, Administrator Fletcher and Deputy Administrator
George Low met with President Nixon and his staff assistant, John Erlichman,
for a review of the shuttle program. Nixon approved the revised and less
costly shuttle program, and wanted to stress both the civilian and the
international aspects of shuttle development and future missions.29

Nixon's support for the shuttle, however, became hoisted on the petard
of the growing difficulties in Vietnam, the proposed Air Force supersonic
transport plane (SST) cancelled by Congress the previous year, and party
politics. On January 7, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), a Democratic candidate
for the presidency, told Florida audiences while campaigning there that
the Space Shuttle was an extravagance and should be shelved. Reflecting
the sentiments of many Americans, the greater priorities of the nation,
he said, were "hungry children, inadequate housing, decaying cities, and
insecure old age." He accused President Nixon of practicing "pork barrel
politics" by supporting the $5.5 billion space program. 30

Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN), another aspirant for president, called
the Space Shuttle program "ridiculous" on a nationally televised debate.
"At the present and known levels of space activity, to produce the Space
Shuttle would be like buying a fleet of goldplated Cadillacs to go out
and repair the tire of a Pinto.... It is not a new exploration weapon.
It is simply a truck-a very expensive truck that is not worth the money."31

Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who successfully led the fight against
the SST in 1971, called Nixon's decision to go ahead with what he estimated
to be the "$15.5" billion shuttle project, "an outrageous distortion of
budgetary priorities." The President, Proxmire said, had chosen the Space
Shuttle over schools, public health, housing, mass transit, open space,
environmental needs and other vital programs.32
The space program also had powerful advocates in Congress, including Texas
Congressman Olin E. Teague (and the entire Texas delegation), Mississippi
Senator John C. Stennis, and Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, among
others. Nevertheless, the administrative decision to proceed with shuttle
development rested upon Congressional approval and budgets. The future
of the Space Shuttle seemed particularly tenuous in 1972 as Congress began
the budget debates near the end of January.

Meanwhile, NASA increased its allocation for shuttle spending from $78
million in 1971 to $100 million for 1972 from its internal operations funds.
In March 1972, Myers assigned the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston "lead
center" authority for overall Space Shuttle Program Development management
and control. Robert F. Thompson, a member of the original Space Task Group
at Langley Research Center (which became the nucleus of the Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston, Texas) continued as manager for the NASA-wide Shuttle
Program Office. Thompson previously headed the Manned Spacecraft Center's
Apollo Applications Program Office, concerned with postApollo planning.33

During 1971 and 1972, the Manned Spacecraft Center and Marshall Space
Flight Center began to fold personnel from Apollo offices into the shuttle
program. Under the duress of budget cutbacks, and tenure, and with the
successful close of the Apollo program, many NASA administrators and engineers
began to leave NASA. Wernher von Braun relinquished



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 287

the post of Director of Marshall Space Flight Center to Eberhard
Rees in 1970. Robert Gilruth stepped down as Director of the Manned Spacecraft
Center in January 1972. Chris Kraft, formerly head of Apollo flight operations,
replaced him.34 At the very height
of Apollo successes, NASA seemed to be imploding, while at the same time
it redirected personnel and funds into the shuttle program. There were
concurrent reductions in force and organizational realignments among NASA's
aerospace contractors.

Although NASA had some 14 years of space flight experience behind it
by 1972, the shuttle was something very new and very different from what
had gone before. As Aaron Cohen, manager of the Orbiter Project Office
in Houston explained, the "orbiter, although similar to Apollo in that
it goes into space, is very different." The shuttle orbiter (which is usually
identified in the public mind as the shuttle) is not simply a spacecraft,
but a launch vehicle, a spacecraft, and an airplane combined. The transition
from Apollo to shuttle, Cohen said, represented a transition of technology
spanning ten years. There were major technological advances over Apollo
in terms of materials, electronics, propulsion, and software. The launch
configuration of the Space Shuttle was also different than had ever flown
before. With Apollo the thrust was through the center of gravity, but with
the shuttle the thrust was through the orbiter with an offset external
tank. That configuration raised enormous problems with the structural dynamics
of the assembly. In addition, whereas Apollo, Gemini, and Mercury launched
from series burns, the shuttle utilized a parallel engine burn.35
Most significantly, perhaps, the shuttle engines, unlike the Saturn or
Titan engines, were "throttlable," having a controlled engine burn.

Cohen stressed that certain technical elements of the shuttle were so
advanced they were outside the existing state of the art." The controlled
burn and the high pressures and temperatures at which the engines operated
were an engineering challenge. Even to test the apparatus required innovative
testing equipment and procedures. The thermal protection system involved
the development of a heat-resistant tile that had never previously existed.
Each individual tile fitted on the orbiter nose and underbody had to be
individually designed and tested.36
One of the most highly sophisticated and advanced systems was the avionics
(guidance, navigation, and control) system which fused electronics with
aviation (hence avionics) and made the guidance and control systems responsive
and complementary to human direction.

"The avionics system synchronized four centralized computers and had
a single computer independent of the other four." The fifth computer was
on standby to step in should there be a software problem in one of the
other computers. The four synchronized computers, the "heart and brains"
of the shuttle, "communicated with each other 440 times per second." One
computer was the lead computer, the other three "voted" on the input and
output of each other. "Should the three other computers disagree with the
lead computer, it was voted out of the system." Air data, microwave sensors,
gyros, accelerometers, star trackers, and inputs from ground based laboratories
all fed into the avionics system.37
The shuttle avionics system represented revolutionary advances in electronics,
computer technology, and guidance and control in the few short years since
Apollo. Similarly, Apollo communications systems (using a unified S band)
were inadequate to support shuttle missions.

Shuttle avionics systems were so advanced that special laboratories
were required to design and develop them. NASA constructed a $630 million
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) at Johnson Space Center
for the job. A special Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) trained crews to
use the shuttle and fly missions in what is now popularly



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288 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

termed a "virtual reality" setting. Astronauts returning from shuttle
missions reported that the simulations were so accurate they felt they
had flown the mission many times.38
Despite the advanced technologies used by the shuttle as compared to Apollo,
Cohen believed that a permanent presence in space, that is the establishment
of a Space Station, would require yet again major advances in new technologies.

New technologies were expensive. Research and development costs (R&D)
grew rapidly. Inflation, which peaked at almost 13 percent in 1973, diminished
appropriated funds and budgets proportionately. NASA and other government
agencies were particularly affected by inflation because appropriations
were approved in a previous year at fixed dollar levels. NASA found itself
spending dollars that bought much less than anticipated. Congressional
appropriations for NASA R&D declined by almost $450 million (15 percent)
in 1971, and were reduced again in 1972 by another $40 million. R&D
appropriations improved by about $80 million in 1973, but collapsed by
over $400 million in 1974. During the most critical years of shuttle development,
from 1971 through 1977, R&D appropriations remained remarkably stable.
But the value of the dollars appropriated declined by about 50 percent
in those five years. Budget stresses caused "slippage" and delays in development
and production, and those in turn, raised the final costs of developing
the shuttle.

Table 1, below, provides an overview of total NASA R&D funding and
designated shuttle funding during the developmental stage of the shuttle.39

Table I

NASA Appropriations, 1969-1978
(in thousands of dollars)

|Fiscal
Year                                                      | Research &
Development                                                                                                             | Space Shuttle
Funding                                                                                          
|---------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 | $3,530,200
2,991,600
2,630,400
2,623,200
2,541,400
2,421,600
2,420,400
2,748,800
2,980,700
2,988,700
3,138,800
3,701,400
4,223,000 | $ -0-a9,000b160,000c115,000
200,000
475,000
805,000
1,206,000
1,288,100
1,348,800
1,637,600
1,870,300
1,994,700

---

b for a space station only.

c for shuttle and station; $6 million requested for station
definition. [Source: NASA Pocket Statistics (January 1994), and
for shuttle funding, 1969-1977, see Linda Neuman Ezell, ed., NASA Historical
Data Book, 3:69.]



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 289

That funding should be viewed in light of NASA's overall budget which,
based on the value of 1992 dollars, dropped sharply from the FY 1965 peak
in excess of $22 billion, to a 1974-1979 average of only $9 billion, as
adjusted for inflation using 1994 constant dollars.

Although shuttle-specific funding by Congress did not begin until 1974,
in 1972 and 1973 NASA began to move from the planning and study stage of
shuttle development to the design and production stage. One of the great
achievements of shuttle development had to do with the production (and
business) management of complex disparate systems and integrating those
systems or machines into one wholly integrated greater machine. There were
many (in fact all) of the NASA centers involved in the creation of the
Space Shuttle. There were far more, literally hundreds, of independent
private manufacturers involved in its development. NASA, in effect, was
the management team assembled for the production of a single machine by
hundreds of diverse private manufacturers. NASA did not build the shuttle,
private industry did. Thus, the Space Shuttle continued the peacetime mobilization
of American science, engineering, and industry, begun at the inception
of NASA and America's entry into the space age albeit, perhaps, at a lower
level.
The general NASA management structure was, of course, inherited from
the Apollo and earlier programs, but there were important refinements.
In 1971, NASA Headquarters assigned Marshall Space Flight Center responsibility
for developing the booster stages and the shuttle main engines. Marshall,
of course, had basic propulsion (engine) responsibilities from the beginning.
Engine testing was assigned to Stennis Space Center, which had begun as
Marshall's testing laboratory for the Apollo-Saturn engines. The Manned
Spacecraft Center had responsibility for developing the orbiter, or piloted
vehicle. Such had been Houston's basic responsibility since its establishment
in 1961. Kennedy Space Center, formerly the Cape Canaveral Launch Operations
Directorate under Marshall, had responsibility for launch and recovery
of shuttle flights as it had throughout the program. The technical, developmental
work on the shuttle at all the NASA centers was coordinated through the
shuttle Program Office located at MSC in Houston. (Under the Apollo program,
many collaborative management decisions were reached informally between
the Manned Spacecraft Center and Marshall, or were coordinated or passed
through the Manned Space Flight Office in Washington.) The Shuttle Program
Office, in turn, reported to the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA
Headquarters in Washington.40

The command and control management structure resembled the Apollo management
systems, but there were some important differences. Production management
was more decentralized than before, but control (integration) was more
centralized. The shuttle program did rely (even more heavily) on Apollo-type
Integration Panels which coordinated design and construction projects so
that the pieces literally fit together and worked together. Integration
was the critical element in shuttle production-which, as Owen Morris noted,
was a so much more complex machine than Apollo. The Integration Panels
reported to the Systems Integration Office in the Shuttle Program Office
at the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Systems Integration Office reported
to a Policy Review Control Board chaired by NASA Headquarters.41

Shuttle management became a "state-of-the-art" system for very large-scale
industrial production. There were, of course, important precedents, such
as the construction of the Panama Canal, a battleship, hypersonic aircraft,
and Apollo. None of those systems, however,



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290 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

involved the complexity of machinery, electronics, computers, and materials
as entered into shuttle construction.

Within the three basic management levels for shuttle development technical
engineering and management decisions flowed from the bottom up. The "bottom"
consisted of the Level III project offices, such as the Orbiter Office
at the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Booster Office at Marshall Space
Flight Center. The Level III offices managed the production contracts.
Level III offices maintained a Resident Office (or engineer) at the primary
contractors production site, and often co-located a manager with the appropriate
Level II division. The Level II office was the Shuttle Program Office.
It had responsibility for systems engineering and integration, configuration,
and overall design and development, or as Dale Myers stated: "program management
responsibility for program control, overall systems engineering and system
integration, and overall responsibility and authority for definition of
those elements of the total system which interact with other elements."
The Level II office established "lead center" authority for engineering
and development management. Headquarters, or Level I, in turn had overall
program responsibility and primary responsibility for the assignment of
duties, basic performance requirements, the allocation of funds to the
Centers, and control of major milestones.42

The management structure created a very decentralized, independent production
system-very compatible, if not necessary, to the very diverse and autonomous
private entities that made up the manufacturing or production base of the
NASA program. One of the great achievements of the space program, contrary
to the tendency in large scale bureaucratic enterprises, was to harness
the basic strengths of American industry through decentralized management
and production.

Although it was not designated "Level IV," the real production base
of the shuttle program was private industry. The basic management tool
was the NASA contract, and effectively, competition for the contract. It
was the contract (and the primary contractor's subcontracts) that mobilized
American industry in support of the space program.

The preliminary study, design, and feasibility contracts (Phases A &
B), mentioned earlier, with in-house study and tests produced the technical
parameters for issuing an RFP or Request for Proposal. NASA began issuing
RFP's for shuttle procurement in the spring of 1971. Aerojet Liquid Rocket
Company, Pratt & Whitney, and Rocketdyne were invited to submit proposals
for the development of the shuttle main engines. Soon after, the Manned
Spacecraft Center issued an RFP for a shuttle thermal protection system,
to protect the orbiter and its occupants during the critical reentry phase.
In July 1971, MSFC selected Rocketdyne as the primary contractor for the
production of thirty-five shuttle main engines. Pratt & Whitney challenged
the Rocketdyne award and during a GAO (General Accounting Office) review,
Rocketdyne was given an interim contract. In March 1972, MSC issued an
RFP for the development of containerized shuttle payload systems, and NASA
issued an RFP for the development of the shuttle, with the design due in
May.43

North American Rockwell (later Rockwell International), McDonnell Douglas,
Grumman, and Lockheed submitted proposals for the shuttle. NASA approved
an interim letter contract with Rockwell in August 1972, and issued a final
contract on April 16, 1973. Rockwell, in turn, subcontracted major components
of the shuttle orbiter to other aerospace firms. Fairchild Republic Division
of Fairchild Industries constructed the vertical tail unit; Grumman, the
delta wings; General Dynamics' Convair Aerospace Division subcontracted
for the mid-fuselage section, and McDonnell Douglas had responsibility
for



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 291

|Photo of STS-1 lifting-off from Pad 39A                                                                                                                                                                                                       
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|The Space Shuttle rises from Launch Pad 39A at Kennedy
Space Center Florida, a few seconds after 7 a.m., April 12, 1981. This
first flight was flown by astronauts John Young, Commander and Robert Crippen,
Pilot. (NASA photo no. 81-H-285).



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292 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

|Drawing of Shuttle Mission Profile shows lift-off, solid-booster and liquid-tank seperation, orbit, mission, re-entry, and splashdown.
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|The Space Shuttle Mission Profile. (NASA photo).                                                                                      

the orbital maneuvering system.44
The contractor and subcontractors, in turn, had subcontracts and suppliers
from the very broad gamut of American industry. Electronics, ceramics,
metal fabrications, plastics, and chemicals were all heavy contributors
to the shuttle. The shuttle was to be a composite creation of American
industry, technology, and labor.

The shuttle grew and changed even as it came into being. New problems,
new concerns, and new technologies altered the configuration and the engineering
as the shuttle took shape. Each new alteration, in turn, often affected
the design, performance, and configuration of other systems. The shuttle
offers a classic study of "systems engineering." For example, the decision
to utilize a "returnable" external fuel tank rather than build the tank
as part of a fully integrated reusable vehicle, did not solve the fuel
tank problem. Similarly, although NASA opted for a fully reusable orbiter,
the decision as to how to build or equip the orbiter to resist the extreme
reentry temperatures came later. And while the major function of the shuttle
was to carry "payloads" into space, the design of the payload bay continued
to change. Changing payloads altered flight characteristics and changed
flight plans. Building an aerospace craft unlike anything built before,
and one that could never be "test" flown in an unmanned version (unlike
Apollo), placed engineering and design work on the creative edge.



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 293

Robert F. Thompson, the Space Shuttle Program Manager from 1970 through
1981, credits "the decision to abandon the 'fully reusable' ground rule
and employ expendable tankage for the orbiter main rocket engines propellant
was perhaps the single most important configuration decision made in the
shuttle program." And it occurred late in the definition stage of shuttle
development. Through most of 1972, NASA intended to launch the shuttle
into orbit with two solid rocket boosters fueled by an external propellant
tank, which package would then be deorbited using smaller solid rocket
motors, retrieved, and reused. On June 5, 1972, Howard W. (Bill) Tindall,
John Mayer's deputy and data coordination chief for Apollo mission planning,
flagged a critical problem in returning the fuel tank from orbit. "It's
becoming increasingly evident that a probable major problem area and operations
cost driver will be the HO tank separation and retrofire." It appeared,
he said, that a very expensive, complex, and expendable attitude control
system would be required for the tank to return it from orbit. The problem,
he suggested, should be given high priority.45
It was.

The problem was directed to a team from the Advanced Mission Design
Branch of the Mission Planning and Analysis Division in the office of the
Director of Flight Operations at the Manned Spacecraft Center. The team
reported in August that the fuel tank could be "staged" (dropped) prior
to orbit. That would solve the expensive and difficult tank reentry problem.
The idea was rejected, however, because for the orbiter to achieve orbit,
it would need to do so with its own engines, and that would require additional
internal liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen fuel tanks. That would mean a heavier
lifting body, higher risks, and redesign of the entire shuttle configuration.
The Advanced Mission Design Branch restudied the problem and discovered
that the existing orbital maneuvering system could accelerate the orbiter
into orbital velocity after separation of the external tank.46

Thompson rejected the idea because the orbital maneuvering system would
require more fuel and larger tanks. This was September. In December, new
studies and a "resizing exercise," revealed that orbital maneuvers could
be accomplished on less fuel than originally planned-meaning that additional
fuel would be available for the use of the orbital maneuvering system to
achieve orbital velocity. The Advanced Mission Design Branch passed this
Information on in their Weekly Activity Report (January 29,1913) and in
March the Advanced Mission Design Branch team planned a launch to include
suborbital staging of the external propellant tank with a recovery in the
Indian Ocean. It also became apparent that not only could the suborbital
staging work, but it would give the orbiter an additional 5,000 pound payload
capacity. NASA elected, however, to retain the previous 32,000 pound payload
requirement, and use the savings to reduce the thrust of the solid rocket
boosters, and substantially lower flight costs. NASA subsequently estimated
total program savings of $238 million.47
Costs remained a compelling ingredient in shuttle design.

At almost every step design and development options constantly appeared.
Thompson pointed out that NASA selected the more advanced, higher performance
main liquid rocket engine over lower pressure but less costly engine as
used in the upper stages of the Apollo program. Despite its higher developmental
costs, the higher pressure engine could drive a larger orbiter, created
maximum launch acceleration, and improved abort capabilities, and in total
seemed to offer better capabilities at reasonable costs. Once the expendable
tank design was accepted, NASA restacked the launch, enabling the use of
the high



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294 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

performance orbiter engines throughout the launch phase, and gained
the protective margin of orbiter engine start and thrust verification before
the main booster ignited. Another "developmental" decision had to do with
attempting a crewless test flight. The guidance, navigation and control
systems on the shuttle, however, were constructed for human control. Such
a shuttle flight, if it could be accomplished, would not truly test the
shuttle flight controls. The first flight of the shuttle then, would be
a piloted flight. 48

One problem that seemed to defy a wholly satisfactory solution had to
do with insulating the orbiter adequately for its return into the atmosphere,
a journey that generated temperatures on its outer body of 3,000° F
(1,650°C). Designers recognized two basic approaches to the problem.
One was to use conventional aircraft materials such as aluminum, titanium,
and composites for the body and then insulate over the external skin with
silicate materials. Another was to build a "hot structure" of metals that
could withstand the high temperatures and absorb and disperse the temperatures
throughout the external skin. This entailed the development of new metals.
NASA chose the more known quantities-that is building the shuttle of basic
aircraft metals, and overlaying the leading edges with thermal protective
coatings.49

There were, however, no thermal protective materials in use that could
adequately insulate against the high temperatures. Those had to be developed.
A task group of NASA engineers, working with Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas,
Battelle/Columbus laboratories and university scientists and engineers,
developed a silicone type tile (high purity foamed silica coated with borosilicate
glass) that could withstand the temperatures. But once developed, the tile
created new problems. For one, it was extremely fragile. The tile was tested
by simply firing missiles (such as a .22 slug) at the material to simulate
an impact by a meteorite. The prototype tile crumbled. The tiles were then
thickened and redesigned with a ludox (silicon-boron) base. That seemed
to work. Then, the next problem involved attaching the tiles to the leading
edges of the orbiter. That required the creation of new glues, several
of them in fact, before a suitable adhesive could be found. Finally, 31,000
tiles, each independently cast to fit the appropriate location on the shuttle,
had to be hand glued to the leading edges. The job required 670,000 hours
of labor (or 335 person-years).50
While tile development might euphemistically be called "leading edge" technology,
the work did reflect the fact that building a Space Shuttle required invention
and new technology ranging from flush toilets that would work in the environment
of space and the development of adhesives and insulating materials, to
the creation of intricate life support, avionics, and computer systems.
One of the important and enduring elements of shuttle development relates
to the inception of new technology and the application of that technology
to other areas. Conventional airplane construction, air safety, navigation,
and flight control have been rich recipients of NASA shuttle technology,
as have human medicine, computers, plastics and metallurgy. The shuttle
and space flight have had a much more pervasive and profound influence
on Americans than is evidenced by the construction of the vehicle, or by
its flights into space. Its greatest impact has been on Earth, rather than
in space.

The significance of the Space Shuttle lay not in its flight per se,
but in its payload, that is the freight, cargo, laboratory, or experiments
delivered from the earth into space, and returned safely to earth. Shuttle
payloads became one of NASA's most complex problems, as much in the social
and political context as in the technical realm. Because of the changing



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 295

payloads to be carried by the shuttle, each flight involved unique technical
preparations and refitting. But the social and organizational structuring
required for payload delivery proved most troublesome.

A special Ad Hoc Shuttle Payload Activities Team, headed by Charles
J. Donlon, manager of the Shuttle Program Office, concluded that what would
be needed in NASA would be "a radical change in thinking ... to meet the
vastly different "ferris wheel" mode of operation ... required in the shuttle
operational period." NASA must disassociate the transportation system from
the hardware. Authorization for shuttle payloads within and without NASA
must be carefully defined. The authority of the payload project manager
and the transportation operator must be carefully delineated, and the flight
people must be out of the "payload approval loop." Science payloads cannot
be given lower priority than commercial payloads. Lead times for the development
of payloads and the boarding of payloads need to be short in order to make
the system work. And the committee particularly (and repeatedly) warned
of the problem of competition among NASA Centers for control over payload
operations and decisions. There was considerable skepticism that NASA could
ever truly become a service organization, which would be required for effective
shuttle operations, as opposed to its traditional mode of operation as
a research and development agency.51
Thus, the effort to build and launch the first shuttle involved some very
basic social and philosophical re-evaluations, as well as technological
innovation.

Despite the problems, and continuing financial constraints, NASA anticipated
the first shuttle flight could occur in 1978. But budget pressures and
technical problems continued to cause "slippages." As early as 1972, Dale
Myers believed that cost overruns being experienced in the Skylab program
would delay shuttle development and possibly cause it to be cancelled:
"The Shuttle Program will live or die based on our capability to keep it
reasonably on schedule, and this first schedule impact caused by funding
limitations will cause an increase of cost at completion which cannot now
be estimated'' Delays did increase costs, and technical problems as with
the tiles, the tanks, and the rocket motors did so as well.52

For example, Rockwell engineers working on the Orbiter's Thermal Protection
System (the insulating tiles) complained that funding shortages caused
work on the thermal protection system to be performed out of sequence and
later than planned. Budget constraints often led to deferring quality testing.
Problems were identified much later than they should have been. More work
had to be done (at additional costs) simply to try to minimize the impact
of performing tasks out of sequence. Design work on the thermal protection
system originally required 18,750 drawings-by 1981 the required engineering
drawings had increased to 25,456 (a 35 percent increase) because of delays
and changes. Rockwell sought a "Program Adjustment," that is more money
to compensate for the additional Costs.53

Wayne Young, whose job was management integration in the Shuttle Program
Office at the Johnson Space Center, explained that the shuttle came into
being in "an austere budget environment." NASA had to first look at the
budget, and then decide what could be done within that financial framework.
Decisions sometimes had to be made on the basis of costs, rather than on
the basis of engineering, As costs rose, scheduling and integration became
even more critical .54



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296 THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S FIRST FLIGHT: STS-1

|Photo from chase plane of Columbia landing on Rogers Drylake Runway 23.                                                                                                           
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|The orbiter Columbia is seen in the final approach
prior to landing on Rogers Drylake Runway 23 at NASA's Dryden Flight Research
Center April 14, 1981. (NASA photo no. 81-H-342).

In 1977 the fuselage of orbiter 101, designated the Enterprise
(which would not be the first shuttle to be launched), had been completed
and the Columbia neared completion. Congress authorized, before
the end of the decade, the construction of five shuttles (including the
Challenger,
Discovery,
and Atlantis) estimated at a cost of $550 to $600 million each.
Each finally exceeded $1 billion. During the year, NASA conducted five
unpowered glide tests by dropping the craft from a Boeing 747. Rockwell's
Rocketdyne Division began testing the Space Shuttle main engine at the
National Space Testing Laboratory (formerly the Mississippi Test Facility,
and soon to be Stennis Space Center) in March. Tests on the engine terminated
after 70 seconds when a fire erupted in the engine causing damage to the
A-1 test stand. Rockwell and NASA engineers conducted over 650 test firings
between 1977 and 1980 before the first shuttle flight in 1981.55
The problems most often encountered had to do with the use of conventional
valves and fittings in a very unconventional 6.5 million pound thrust hydrogen-oxygen
engine.

By the time the Columbia fired its engines on the launch pad at Kennedy
Space Center in Florida, on April 12, 1981, the Space Shuttle already had
experienced a long and



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FROM ENGINEERING SCIENCE TO BIG SCIENCE 297

difficult history. Simply being there, on the launch pad, was something
of a triumph. The greater achievement lay ahead. The three main shuttle
engines fired in rapid sequence. Then the twin solid rocket boosters, each
generating 2.65 million pounds of thrust, ignited. Columbia lifted
off. just short of leaving the Earth's gravitational pull, the solid rocket
boosters burned out, separated from the orbiter, and parachuted into the
Atlantic where they were retrieved. The shuttle main engines continued
to burn, taking fuel from the external tank. The main shuttle engine cut
off, and the external tank detached and disintegrated as it reentered the
atmosphere. The Columbia then fired its two orbital maneuvering
system engines. The first burn put it into orbit, a second bum stabilized
the circular orbit about the earth. Twelve minutes had elapsed since launch.56

The shuttle carried mission commander John W. Young, a Georgia Tech
aeronautical engineer and a space veteran who made his first space flight
aboard Gemini 3, and then was command module pilot for Apollo
10 and commander of the Apollo 16 flight. Robert L. Crippin,
a native of Beaumont, Texas, and graduate of the University of Texas, had
come into the astronaut training program by way of an aborted Air Force
Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program. During the launch his heartbeat rose
from 60 to 130 per minute. He described it as "one fantastic ride!"57

The Columbia changed orbits, and for most of the flight flew
in a tail-forward upsidedown position, relative to the Earth, giving the
crew a better view of Earth and its horizon. Young and Crippin checked
all systems, the computers, navigational jet thrusters, and huge cargo
bay doors. The ship began the return at 12:22 EST on April 14. Young and
Crippin fired the orbital maneuvering rockets for two minutes and twenty-seven
seconds to reduce their speed to less than the orbital velocity of 17,500
miles per hour. Gravity would do the rest. They began an hour-long descent.
They fired their attitude control thrusters to turn Columbia right
side up and nose forward. Thrusters were fired again to keep the nose up
so that the thermal protective tiles could absorb the heat of reentry.
The Columbia lost speed as its altitude dropped, and over Rogers
Dry Lake in the Mojave Desert, Crippen and Young banked the ship sharply,
looped back into a landing pattern, and touched down at a speed of 215
miles per hour, about twice that of a commercial airliner. "The touchdown
marked the successful conclusion of STS-1, 2 days, six hours, twenty minutes
and fifty-two seconds after lift-off from Florida." President Ronald Reagan
greeted the returning crewmen, "Today our friends and adversaries are reminded
that we are a free people capable of great deeds. We are a free people
in search of progress for mankind."58
That search for progress, in the form of a reusable spacecraft, involved
not only NASA, and the industries and astronauts who were identified as
the recipients of the 1981 Collier Trophy, but reflected more fully the
past and present energies, initiatives, technologies, aspirations, and
capital investments of the American people.



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