UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. DARYL LEE INGRAM, a/k/a Black, a/k/a Clacc, a/k/a Ninety Black, a/k/a BJ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 16-6221 (D.C. No. 5:15- CR-00093-M-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , PHILLIPS , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal is one of two in which Daryl Lee Ingram challenges the drug and money-laundering convictions that landed him concu rrent life-without-release sentences in federal prison. Here, Ingram di sputes the district c ourt’s denial of two pre-trial motions: (1) a motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his home and (2) a motion for a Franks v. Delaware hearing. At bottom, Ingram makes a single cont ention: that the Fourth Amendment required the suppression of the ev idence seized from his home. (A Franks hearing, after all, is just another way to gain the protection of the Fourth Amendment’s

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 22, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 exclusionary rule.) Yet after reviewing th e search warrant and underlying affidavit, we conclude that even if the affidavit fail ed to prove that crim inal activity was afoot at Ingram’s home, law enfo rcement was entitled to rely on the warrant in good faith, to search the house, and to seize the ev idence found there. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we thus affirm. BACKGROUND In November 2014, Detective Matthew McRorie of the Ok lahoma City Police Department submitted to the Oklahoma County District Court a probable-cause affidavit requesting authority to sear ch a house located at 11009 North Miller Avenue, where Ingram and hi s girlfriend allegedly reside d, for evidence of a drugtrafficking conspiracy run by the Rollin’ 90’s gang. This affidavit was only a piece of “Operation Rollin’ Rock,” a multi-agency investig ation into the gang. See R. Vol. 2 at 503. But the affidavit led to a search warrant, and th e execution of that search warrant culminated in the seizure of (a mong other things) $10,388.25 in cash, a handwritten ledger itemizing $4 8,200 in drug debts, tax returns in the name of Ingram’s girlfriend, and paperwork from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections in Ingram’s name. The government, in turn, used this (and much other) evidence at two jury trials (the first in June 2015, the second in April 2016), eventually securing Ingram’s convictions for one count of possession with intent to distribut e cocaine base, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, one count of aiding and abetting the manufacture of coca ine base, one count of conspiracy to3 launder money, and two counts of aiding a nd abetting money launde ring. And in July 2016, the district court sentenced Ingram to two concurrent life-without-release prison terms, one for the possession-with-int ent-to-distribute charge and one for the conspiracy-to-possess-with-int ent-to-distribute charge, plus concurrent, term-ofmonths sentences on the remaining charges. 1 Ingram now challenges Detective McRo rie’s affidavit—its sufficiency and truthfulness—in an attempt to suppress the evidence seized at 11009 North Miller and, ultimately, win the reversal of his c onvictions. The affidavit therefore lies at the heart of this appeal, so we t horoughly review its contents. The affidavit begins by identifying th e single-family home at 11009 North Miller Avenue in Oklahoma City. It then a sserts the presence, inside the house, of items subject to seizure under Ok lahoma’s drug laws, specifically:

 “Documents related to a conspiracy to distri bute Controlled Dangerous Substances to include but not limite d to letters for coconspirators, photographs depicting coconspirators , telephone records.” R. Vol. 2 at 424.

 “Items associated with membership in the 90’s street gang to include but not limited to blue bandanas , blue clothing , University of North Carolina Chapel Hill apparel, letters from othe r 90 [sic] gang members, photographs with other 90’s gang members.” Id.

 “Documents related to the distributio n of illegal drugs to include but not limited to: records, ledgers, address books , telephone books, telephone

1 Ingram had three prior convictions fo r felony drug offenses. Thus, because the jury in this case found that Ingram conspired to possess (and possessed) with the intent to distribute at least 280 grams of “a mixture or s ubstance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base,” R. Vol. 1 at 353, federal law required that he be sentenced to “a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release” on each conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).4 bills, telephone records, rent receipts, rental car agreements, mini-storage receipts, cellular telephone agreements , pager rental agreements, bills and receipts related to cellular telephone s and pagers, and an y property and/or U.S. currency being proceed s of or related to th e distribution of illegal narcotics.” Id.

 “Also ledgers containing quantity of na rcotics possessed, ledgers of money owed to the suspects for narcotics th ey have provided to co-conspirators, ledgers of money owed by the suspects to their suppliers, transportation and distribution instructions for the narc otics being sold, and other types of documentation regarding th e sale of narcotics.” Id.

 “Cellular phones, sim cards, and device s capable of storing digital media (to include but not limited to smart phones, personal data assistants , hard drives and USB drives).” Id.

 “Financial documents rel at ed to the distribution of controlled dangerous substances to include but not limited to stored valu e cards, wire transfer receipts , bank account statements, bank de posit slips, documents showing purported income.” Id.

 “And articles of personal property te nding to establish the identity of the person or persons in cont rol or possession of the place or vehicle, including, but not limited to, utility company recei pts, rent receipts, canceled mail envelopes, vehicle registration, cr edit card receipts, repair bills, photographs, keys, and articles of clothing[.]” I d. Next, the affidavit lays out the facts supporting these assertions. First, the affidavit desc ribes Detective McRorie’s background as an Oklahoma City police officer, including his traini ng and experience related to “[c]riminal [s]treet [g]angs,” id. at 426, and “[d]rug [o]rganizations,” id. at 428. Based on his participation in other investigations, he knew, for instance, that “drug dealers maintain books, records, re ceipts, notes, ledgers, money orders, and other papers relating to the transportation, ordering, sale and distribu tion of controlled substances.” Id. at 428. And “[t]he most likely pl ace for documents associated with5 drug trafficking” to be found, according to th e detective, “is at the primary residence of the person involved in the trafficking.” Id. at 430. Second, the affidavit provides an ove rview of the organization that law enforcement dubbed the “90’s St reet Gang Drug Conspiracy.” Id. at 432. From the late 1980s, when the gang began operating in Oklahoma City, through the present day, Detective McRorie cl aims that gang members ha ve been involved in drug distribution. Id. Furthermore, at the time of the affidavit, the ga ng’s leadership comprised Ingram and his several “lieutenants.” Id. Third, the affidavit provides the details of Detective McRorie’s investigation, starting with the statements of three cooperating witnesse s, two of whom were gang members and all of whom were convicted felons either trading information for money or hoping to receive “cons ideration” on pending charges. Id. at 433–35. (The non-gang member, Detective McRorie noted, had provided information in the past that had led to the arrest and felony-cha rging of five people.) Between March and October 2014, all three informants ha d told police, based on their personal observations, that Ingram headed the gang and distributed “kilogram quantities” of cocaine base in Oklahoma City. Id. at 434–35. One of the informants, a gang member who asserted that Ingram “c all[ed] the shots” for the ga ng, also claimed to have observed Ingram and a lieutenant in a car w ith “more crack in th e center console . . . than [the informant] had ever seen at one time.” Id. at 434–35. A nd the other gang member–informant, who had “a close personal relationshi p” with Ingram and “an intimate knowledge of the inner working of Ingram’s drug orga nization,” professed6 to have seen Ingram give another gang member two ounces of cocaine at a mall where, the informant said, Ingram “often” sold drugs. Id. at 435–6. The affidavit then discusse s law enforcement’s indepe ndent investigation into the informants’ statements, pr imarily surveillance of cars tied to Ingram and other members of the gang, as well as a known “stash apartment.” Id. at 437–39. “Almost every day” after police installed a pole came ra outside the stash apartment in October 2014, police saw a car parked nearby that I ngram had previously been seen driving. Id. at 437. And throughout October and ear ly November, cars associated with gang members traveled to and from the stash apartment and other locations affiliated with the gang. On October 30, for example, one gang member’s car left the stash apartment, drove to 11009 North Miller, a nd returned to the stash apartment. Four days later, police watched as Ingram and two others left a motel room in the “Meridian corridor,” a place associat ed with “rampant drug activity.” Id. at 439. In addition, the affidavit lists and describes six other search warrants associated with the ca se that were executed between Ap ril and October 2014. At each of the places searched, police found drug s and ties to the gang (such as photographs depicting members, including Ingram, displa ying gang hand signs). Often, officers found large amounts of cash, a nd sometimes guns, too. In list ening to jail phone calls following the searches, police also hear d several incarcerated gang members ask people on the outside whether Ingram would bail them out. Finally, the affidavit notes eight earlier drug arrests involving gang members, four involving Ingram. The earliest occurre d on September 20, 1998, when the police7 “made contact” with Ingram and two other gang members sitting in a car. Id. at 443. Officers arrested one of the other gang members on a gun charge, and an inventory search of the car turned up 26.5 grams of cocaine base, 5.5 grams of marijuana, and “one marijuana blunt.” Id. Then, about six years later, Ingram arrived by cab at a house where officers had just detained his girlfriend. Insi de the house, officers had seized 3.4 grams of cocaine base, baki ng soda, a bowl coated with cocaine HCl residue, three pistols, and close to $50,000. Ingram tried to speed away when the officers approached but wa s eventually stopped and arrested. Similarly, law enforcement seized “a large amount of cocaine,” dishes and a hand-mixer with “residue,” and over $20,0 00 in cash from a hotel room where Ingram had been staying. Id. at 444. This incident happened only three mont hs after police found Ingram, several other gang memb ers, and 13.6 grams of crack inside a house, as well as a pistol in a car parked outside. The remaining searches (t he most recent in February 2012) turned up similar amounts of cash, drugs, and guns, as well as Rollin’ 90’s members other than Ingram. After summarizing these fact s, the affidavit states, [Y]our affiant believes there has been an ongoing conspiracy by members of the 90’s street gang to distribute controlled dangerous substances since at least September 20, 1998. . . . Leadership of the gang is responsible for ta king actions to further the goals of the drug conspiracy such as bonding members out of jail and contributing monies to incarcerated members [sic] inmate trust accounts. Despite incarceration of various members of the conspiracy, the conspiracy has been able to thrive. Id. at 446.8 Under the heading, “Nexus to 11009 Nort h Miller,” the affida vit then attempts to connect the Rollin’ 90’s gang’s crimin al activity to the house at 11009 North Miller and to Ingram. Id. at 446. Citing the inform ants’ statements and law enforcement’s “independent investigation,” th e affidavit claims th at Ingram headed the gang’s drug conspiracy. Id. Then, the affidavit recite s the following facts linking Ingram to 11009 North Mille r: (1) paperwork placed the house’s utilities in the name of Ingram’s girlfriend, (2) an informant as serted that the house was Ingram’s primary residence, and (3) an officer observed a car that Ingram was known to drive parked inside the garage. Based on these facts, the affidavit concludes that 11009 North Miller was Ingram’s primary residence. Id. The affidavit then repeats Detective McRorie’s belief that “the most likely place for a drug trafficker to keep records pertaining to th eir [sic] criminal activity and conspiratorial evidence is at their [sic] primary residence.” Id. at 446. In support of this conclusion, the affidavit notes, among other th ings, that (1) “to thwart law enforcement” from tying them to contraband, “[h]igh level drug traffickers” typically don’t keep drugs in their homes but that (2 ) at the same time, traffickers typically don’t destroy documentary evidence of dr ug distribution unless they think that a search is imminent, both b ecause such eviden ce is necessary for their business’s continued operation and because the traffickers think that it ’s less incriminating than “readily apparent contra band,” such as drugs. Id. at 446–47. Finally , “[a]ll reasonable inferences [as] to where a criminal woul d likely keep such evidence,” based on the9 “hundreds” of searches th at the detective had conduc ted, pointed to the drug trafficker’s primary residence. Id. at 447–48. The affidavit then states, “Based on the above informati on, in [Detective McRorie’s] opinion, there is probable cause to believe that [Ingram, his girlfriend, and others] are involved in illegal activities, such as drug trafficking” and that “the aforementioned objects” (pre sumably, the evidence discus sed at the beginning of the affidavit) could be foun d at 11009 North Miller. Id. at 448. The affidavit thus requests a search warrant for the house. Detective McRorie presented the affida vit to the Oklahoma County District Court on November 6, 2014. The court issued it that same day, and police executed it the next. As mentioned above, they foun d the predicted documentary evidence, including large amounts of cash, a drug ledge r, and paperwork li nking Ingram and his girlfriend to the house. Ingram moved to suppress this evidence, to set a Franks v. Delaware hearing, and to suppress an arrest warrant issued by the Okla homa County District Court. The federal district court denied all three requests, concluding that (1) the search-warrant affidavit contained sufficient probable cau se, (2) the items se ized from Ingram’s house should not be suppresse d, and (3) Ingram’s motion to suppress the arrest warrant was moot because the warrant was never executed (police arrested Ingram during a traffic stop). Ingram now argues that the district c ourt erred in refusing to suppress the evidence discovered at 11009 North Miller.10 DISCUSSION In arguing that the evid ence discovered during the search of 11009 North Miller should have been suppr essed, Ingram attacks bot h the sufficiency and the truthfulness of Detective McRorie’s affidav it. As to sufficiency, Ingram claims that the affidavit failed to provide a nexus be tween the suspected cr iminal activity (drug trafficking) and the place to be sear ched (11009 North Miller). And as for truthfulness, Ingram conte nds that Detective McRorie misled the Oklahoma County District Court by failing to mention (1) that Ingram had spent eight of the nine years leading up to the search in prison and (2) that simultaneously, two other members of the alleged drug-trafficking conspiracy ha d also been imprisoned for considerable periods. In response, the government defends the stat e court’s probable-cause determination and, in the a lternative, contends that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. 2 On review of a district court’s suppre ssion ruling, we accept the court’s factual findings unless they are clea rly erroneous and review que stions of law de novo. United States v. Gonzales , 399 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005). The pertinent questions here—Was the search warrant supported by probabl e cause? Did the goodfaith exception apply?—are both questions of law. Id. But if we determine that the good faith exception applies, then we need not decide whether the search-warrant

2 In an alternative to its alternative argument, the government urges us to hold that any error in admitting the evid ence seized from 11009 North Miller was harmless given the overwhelming weight of evidence against Ingram. Because we resolve the good-faith issue in the government’s favor, we don’t reach this alternative argument.11 was supported by probable cause. Thus, we have discretion to skip the probablecause question and proceed directly to good faith. Id. We choose to follow that path here, so we evaluate Ingram’s clai ms under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
In United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in t hose unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary ru le.” When an officer acts in objective good faith in obtaining a search wa rrant from a detached, neutra l magistrate, and then acts within the scope of that warr ant, no police illegality occurs that the exclusionary rule would deter. Leon , 468 U.S. at 920–21. Thus, evid ence seized through such means shouldn’t be suppressed. Id. at 921; accord United States v. Nolan , 199 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999). But our deference to wa rrants isn’t “boundless.” Leon , 468 U.S. at 914. In
Leon , 468 U.S. at 923–24, the Supreme Cour t described four exceptional instances when an officer can’t rely on a warrant in good faith. Two of those are at issue here. A. The “Bare Bones” Exception to the Exclusionary Rule First, Ingram contends th at the search-warrant affi davit was completely devoid of probable cause because it lacked any in formation suggesting th at illegal activity (specifically, “drug trafficking or drug storage”) was afoot at 11009 North Miller. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20. So, he cont ends, the police shouldn’t have been able to rely on the search warrant in good faith.12 An officer doesn’t manifest objective good faith in relying on a search warrant based on an affidavit “so la cking in indicia of probabl e cause”—so “bare bones”—as to render official belief in the existen ce of probable cause “entirely unreasonable.”
Leon , 468 U.S. at 915, 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). The que stion isn’t the legal sufficiency of the affidavit—the issuing court has already ma de that determination, and we owe it deference. United States v. Cardall , 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985). The question is “whether a ‘reasonably well tr ained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite th e [court’s] authorization.’” Gonzales , 399 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). In this c ontext, that means asking whether officers’ reliance on the underlying doc uments was “wholly unwarranted.” Cardall , 773 F.2d at 1133. Only then is good faith absent. Id. ; Gonzales , 399 F.3d at 1230. In practice, we’ve used this standa rd to suppress evid ence seized with a warrant that contained “not hing more than a hunch.” See, e.g. , United States v. Cordova , 792 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Boiled down, the affidavit at issue here indicated nothing more than that a high-volume drug deliv ery was set to be made to a vehicle parked in front of Cordova’s former home nearly two years before officers sought a warrant for his current hom e and that one party to that drug deal was present at Cordova’s current residen ce on one occasion four months before the warrant was executed.”); Gonzales , 399 F.3d at 1230–31 (conclu ding that an affidavit whose only attempt at connecting the susp ect to the criminal activity was a detective’s assertion that “i n his experience, ‘firearm [s ic] are often kept at the13 residence,’” didn’t set forth even a minimal nexus to criminal act ivity (alteration in original)). Here, Detective McRorie’s affidavit ma y have provided only a tenuous nexus between the Rollin’ 90’s ga ng’s criminal activity and 11009 North Miller, but it amounted to more than a hunch. As we have often stated, it’s “merely common sense that a drug supplier will keep evid ence of his crimes at his home.” United States v. Sanchez , 555 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g. , United States v. Windrix , 405 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sparks , 291 F.3d 683, 689–90 (10th Cir. 2002); accord 2 Wayne R. LaFave & David C. Baum, Search & Seizure § 3.7(d) (5th ed., Oct. 2017 update) (“[I]t is commonly held that this gap [between probable cause that a person has committed a crime on the street and probable cause that evidence of the crime exis ts at his house] can be fille d merely on the basis of the affiant-officer's expe rience (or, for that matter, th e magistrate’s own common-sense judgment) that drug dealers ordinarily k eep their supply, records and monetary profits at home.”). And Detective McRori e’s affidavit provided ample evidence that Ingram dealt drugs, including the three informants’ statem ents, the police’s surveillance of Ingram, and Ingram’s hist ory of drug activity and arrests. When combined with the assertion, based on the detective’s training and experience, that a high-level drug trafficker like Ingram pr obably kept incriminating records at his primary residence, this ev idence warranted good-faith re liance from the officers who executed the search.14 In reaching this conclusion, we note th at this case diffe rs from cases like Sanchez , Windrix , and Sparks insofar as the affidavits in those cases asserted the presence of illegal drugs at the suspected d ealer’s house, while the affidavit here did

not. See Sanchez , 555 F.3d at 913, Windrix , 405 F.3d at 1153, Sparks , 291 F.3d at 690–91. Even Professor LaFave’s gap-fi lling shortcut, whic h recognizes that experience and common sense can someti mes substitute for “definite proof,” presumes either (1) that “the seller keeps his supply at hi s residence” or (2) that “the on-the-street dealer has his necessary p ackaging and weighing equipment at home.”
See LaFave, supra , § 3.7(d). But according to Dete ctive McRorie, Ingram was no onthe-street dealer; he was a high level drug trafficker. Det ective McRorie thus expressed doubt that Ingram kept illegal drugs at his primary residence. And the pieces of evidence that the de tective sought to find ther e—ledgers, cash, evidence of gang-membership—were not themselves cont raband. Instead, police sought the listed items as evidence of Ingram’s criminal activity, ledgers reflecting drug debts, cash from drug sales, and gang-affiliation evidence tied to the drug-trafficking conspiracy and Ingram’s role in it. But while we do not announce a broad ru le making a suspected drug dealer’s house fair game for searches absent eviden ce of contraband there, we can’t say that the affidavit in this case was so devoid of factual suppor t as to render police reliance on the state-court judge’s determination of probable cause objectively unreasonable. Cf. Nolan , 199 F.3d at 1185 (concluding that an affidavit establis hing (1) that the defendant dealt crack, (2) that he “was ca reful not to sell drugs to anyone from his15 residence,” and (3) “that dr ug dealers sometimes maintain records and quantities of drugs in easily accessible locations” wasn’t so bare bones as to make officers’ reliance on the search warrant unreasonable). Accordingly, we reject I ngram’s contention that th e affidavit was so bare bones as to subject the ev idence seized at 11009 North Miller to the exclusionary rule. And we turn from Ingram’s sufficie ncy attack to his truthfulness attack. 3
B. The Franks v. Delaware Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Ingram claims that Detective McRorie de liberately lied (or act ed with reckless disregard for the truth) when he omitted Ingram’s and his alleged co-conspirators’ incarceration from the search -warrant affidavit. Thes e omissions, according to Ingram, were material to the Oklahoma Di strict Court’s probable-cause finding. He says that if the detective ha d stated that Ingram and his co-conspirators were in state custody from 2005 until 2013, then the judge w ouldn’t have believed that “Ingram had been involved in a continuous drug-tra fficking conspiracy for the last [sixteen] years [i.e., since 1998].” Appe llant’s Opening Br. at 56.

3 Ingram also challenges Detective McRo rie’s reliance on the statements of the three confidential informants, but he does so only in the context of arguing that the affidavit lacked probable cause . Because we resolve this appeal on the basis of the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception, we don’t delve into the existence of probable cause and, therefore, need not addr ess the informants’ ve racity. Even so, the same concerns that throw probable cause into doubt may do the same to good faith. Accordingly, we note that the district cour t found the informants’ statements reliable, both because the informants corroborated each other and because other evidence (including surveillance) s upported their assertions. Cf. United States v. Mathis , 357 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004) (concl uding that an officer’s obligation to corroborate information received from an in formant requires only that the officer “have knowledge of other matters that reasonably corroborate the informant’s statements”). The district court’s findings in this context were n’t clearly erroneous.16 Suppression remains an av ailable remedy if the a ffiant misled the judge issuing the warrant with information “that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his r eckless disregard of the truth.” Leon , 468 U.S. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). But Franks announced a tough-tomeet test for affiants’ alleged lies. First, Franks cloaks affidavits in “a presumption of validity.” Franks , 438 U.S. at 171. Establishing a lack of good faith based on the omission of information from an affidav it requires proof that the affiant acted intentionally or recklessly, not with me re negligence or by an innocent mistake. Gonzales , 399 F.3d at 1229. Second, Franks doesn’t extend to “immaterial omissions.” Stewart v. Donges , 915 F.2d 572, 583 (10th Cir. 1990). If “a warrant would have issued in a but-for world where the attesting officer faithfully represented the facts,” then we can dismiss th e contested omission as immaterial. United States v.
Herrera , 782 F.3d 571, 575 (10th Cir. 2015). Here, Ingram can’t overcome even the first hurdle, th e presumption of validity. Rather than hide Ingram’s eight-year inca rceration, Detective McRorie’s affidavit suggested that Ingram had served time. Acco rding to the affidavit, police had arrested Ingram on drug charges four times betw een 1998 and 2005 (jus t over nine years before the warrant’s execution). Though th e affidavit didn’t provide charging or sentencing information about these incidents, the amounts of drugs and guns seized augured prison time. Further, the affidav it expressly described the gang’s ability to “thrive” despite the incarceration of it s members, by contributing money to incarcerated members’ inmate trust accounts and bondi ng members out of jail. At17 worst, Detective McRorie might have acted negligently by not specifying the dates of Ingram’s incarceration. At best, the affida vit read as a whole shows the conclusory nature of Ingram’s assertion. Either way, Ingram can’t s how the kind of deliberate or reckless falsity that woul d entitle him to relief under Franks

. 4
But even if Detective McRo rie had acted with deliberat e or reckless disregard for the truth in omitting Ingram’s and his alleged co-conspirators’ periods of incarceration, the omission wasn’t material . Nothing in the affidavit suggests that Ingram was on the streets when in fact he was in prison or that he was in prison when in fact he was on the streets. Instead, the bulk of the drug-trafficking described in the affidavit happened in 2014, when Ingram was, by his ow n admission, out of prison. Thus, even if Detective McRorie had in cluded Ingram’s and his co-conspirators’ incarceration periods in the affidavit, it wouldn’t have undermined the Oklahoma County District Court’s probable-cause finding. Herrera , 782 F.3d at 575; cf.
Stewart , 915 F.2d at 581–83 (concludi ng that a detective’s failure to disclose that the victim had recanted his accu sation and admitted to an in surance scam was “highly material” because “the affida vit would not suppor t probable cause if it were modified so as to include that exculpatory evidence”).

4 On appeal, Ingram argues both that th e district court erred in refusing to grant him a hearing on his Franks claim and, more generally, that under Franks , law enforcement couldn’t rely on the search wa rrant in good faith. Ou r analysis doesn’t differentiate between the prelim inary showing needed to get a Franks hearing and the preponderance-of-the-eviden ce showing needed to obtain suppression because, under either standard, Ingram isn’t entitled to relief. See United States v. Corral-Corral , 899 F.2d 927, 933 (10th Ci r. 1990) (describing the st andard at each stage); see also Herrera , 782 F.3d at 576 (“A Franks hearing sometimes ma y be a matter of grace rather than right.”).18 Accordingly, we conclude that th e state-court judge’s probable-cause determination wasn’t based on a deliber ate or reckless om ission by Detective McRorie, so we decline to apply Franks to defeat the Leon good-faith exception. Instead, we affirm the district c ourt’s refusal to grant Ingram a Franks hearing.
* * * Applying Leon ’s generous standard, the police in this case acted in good faith in executing the search warrant on 11009 North Miller. And because no exception to the good-faith exception applies, we conclude that this is not one of “those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule” and decline to suppress the evidence se ized during the search. See Leon , 468 U.S. at 918. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s refu sal either to suppress the evidence seized from 11009 North Miller or to hold a Franks v. Delaware hearing.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge