2004 Annual Report

Engineering Excellence

NASA Engineering and Safety Center
“The talented and dedicated men and women working for the NASA Engineering and Safety Center are doing exactly 

what we had hoped when we initiated this important Center last year. Through an uncompromising attitude toward 

safety, the NESC is helping NASA to raise the safety bar in everything we do. The results of NESC-led in depth independent engineering assessments, testing, analyses, and evaluation can be seen today in our progress toward returning 

the Space Shuttle safely to flight, in the flights of the record-breaking hypersonic X-43A research aircraft, and in the 

history making exploration journeys of the Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity. I am confident that the 

NESC will play a prominent role in helping to advance NASA’s activities to implement the Vision for Space Exploration in the months and years ahead.” 

Sean O’Keefe

Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

.
Table of Contents

Messages from Senior Leaders 2

Message from the NESC Director 3

NESC Overview 4

Major Technical Assessments Completed 11

Status of NESC Work in Progress 21

Lessons Learned 28

Education and Collaboration 31

NESC Honor Awards 32

NESC Leadership Team 34

Contact NESC 43

page 5

page 12

page 18

page 22

page 33

NESC 1
Theron M. Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer

“It’s one thing to pledge engineering excellence, it’s another to deliver it. The 

NESC has some of the top discipline experts from around the Agency and beyond working on Agency priorities. One of the keys to the success of NESC 

is that these experts are not somewhere in an ivory tower, they are distributed 

throughout the Agency—forming a vibrant network of ready expertise. This 

world-class technical team has already conducted or helped conduct numerous assessments representing each NASA Mission Directorate. The NESC has 

quickly developed into a valuable resource for program managers, engineers, 

and scientists throughout the Agency.”

Bryan D. O’Connor 

NASA Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer

 “Among the things we learned during the investigation of the Columbia tragedy 

was the need to dedicate Agency resources to independently assess technical issues 

for NASA programs and projects. This was the purpose of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center. In its first year of operation the NESC has worked with 

people across the Agency, from individuals with a concern about mission safety 

to program managers challenged with complicated technical issues. As we move 

forward with our return to flight efforts and other Agency flight projects, the 

NESC is helping us focus on the future of our technical and safety imperatives. 

We have a responsibility to make our programs as safe and as sound as possible. 

The realization of the NESC raises our commitment to unprecedented levels.”

Roy D. Bridges, Jr.

Director, NASA Langley Research Center

“Last year, when NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe announced plans to 

create an independent Engineering and Safety Center, he charged its leadership with improving the Agency’s ability to share technical information, 

practices and talent, and independently ensure that we are in the best position to achieve mission success. Today, after the first 12 months of operation, the NESC has substantially achieved that goal. A strong team has been 

assembled, programs and projects around the Agency have benefited from 

NESC consultations and in depth assessments, and the demand for NESC 

assistance is rapidly growing. I look forward to the next 12 months, as the 

NESC is now poised to provide an informed look at our high-risk, high-payoff initiatives and to do so more proactively.”

2 NESC
Ralph R. Roe, Jr.

Director NESC

This year has seen one of NASA’s newest organizations grow into an accomplished technical team supporting the Agency’s 

high-risk endeavors. On July 15, 2003, Administrator Sean O’Keefe announced plans to create the NASA Engineering 

and Safety Center (NESC) at Langley Research Center with the purpose of providing a central location to coordinate and 

conduct robust, independent engineering and safety assessments across the Agency. Within its first year of operation, the 

NESC has demonstrated its ability to perform independent, in depth, value-added technical assessments, analyses, and 

tests. We have received nearly 100 requests for involvement from all across the Agency, as well as from external sources. 

While our priority this year has been the Space Shuttle and International Space Station Programs, we have been involved 

with each NASA Mission Directorate.

The NESC performs all of its activities using a diverse mix of talent from across the Nation. Our success is due in large 

part to the impressive team that we have established by drawing from the best and brightest at each Center. We owe a 

debt of gratitude to the Centers for allowing their technical experts, and future leaders, opportunities to help meet the 

Agency’s overall goals. The NESC has demonstrated the true spirit of One NASA and has reaped the benefits that come 

from sharing our knowledge, experiences, and resources. 

As we begin our second year of operation, we will look for innovative ways to proactively uncover problems and issues 

within NASA projects and programs. We will continue to communicate our broadly applicable lessons learned to the 

Agency’s senior leadership and the entire NASA community. We will also establish new ways to share the tremendous 

knowledge that is resident in our expert teams.

As the NESC team evolves and our processes mature, we will continue to set an example of technical rigor, open communications, and perseverance in meeting our goal of safety through engineering excellence—we will not settle for less!

NESC 3

NESC Team - Fall 2004 Conference.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is chartered to 

serve as an Agency-wide technical resource focused on engineering 

excellence. The NESC’s objectives are to improve safety by performing in depth, independent engineering assessments, testing, 

and analysis to uncover technical vulnerabilities and to determine 

appropriate preventive and corrective actions for NASA’s high-risk 

programs, projects, and institutions. 

Historically NASA’s safety philosophy has had three tenets: (1) 

strong in-line checks and balances, (2) a healthy tension between 

design and operations organizations, and (3) value-added independent assessments. The NESC strives to set an example for a strong 

safety culture by providing knowledgeable leadership to perform 

value-added technical independent assessments in an open environment while attacking problems and issues with unequaled tenacity.

NESC Background 

N E S C

The NASA Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer and the 

NASA Chief Engineer jointly establish direction and provide guidance for the NESC. The NESC gains its independence through 

two means. First, the NESC is funded through the Chief Safety 

and Mission Assurance Office. Second, the NESC provides an independent line of communication to ensure all NASA employees 

have an alternate path to report technical concerns and to encourage consideration of all points of view regarding critical technical 

issues.

To accomplish its goals, the NESC draws upon the best engineering expertise from across the Agency and utilizes partnerships with 

other government agencies, national laboratories, universities, and 

industry. In addition, the NESC operates as a true One NASA 

organization, engaging all NASA Centers and Headquarters in the 

mutual goal of increasing safety through engineering excellence.

4 NESC

LaRC 21

KSC 5

Outside hires 2

JSC 6 SSC 2

MSFC 3

GRC 1

GSFC 5

HQ 2

ARC 2

DFRC 2

JPL 1

The NESC is a true One NASA organization with members selected from all 

NASA Centers and external to the Agency (as of September 30, 2004).

On July 15, 2003, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe announced plans to 

create the NESC.
NESC Discipline Experts 

Office

Principal Engineers

Office

NASA HQ Senior SMA

 Integration Manager

NASA HQ Chief 

Engineer Representative

NESC Chief Engineers

Office

Systems Engineering

Office

Management & Technical

Support Office

Office of the 

Director

O v e r v i e w

The NESC model is based on best practices from the U.S. Navy’s 

Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) program, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and the Board of Inspection and Survey, which 

has been performing inspections of the Navy fleet for over 135 

years. The NESC model consists of a decentralized organizational 

structure reaching across all NASA Centers and reporting to the 

NESC management office at Langley Research Center (LaRC). 

NESC Chief Engineers, resident at each Center, provide insight 

into their Centers’ programs and projects. The NESC Discipline 

Experts lead Super Problem Resolution Teams, which are made up 

of discipline experts across the Agency, industry, and academia. 

This concept positions the technical experts where the problems 

are so that they stay sharp.

NESC Principal Engineers provide leadership for teams of discipline specialists performing independent technical reviews, assessments, tests and analyses of complex, multidisciplinary systems. 

The Management and Technical Support Office is responsible for 

all business management and administrative support to the NESC. 

The Systems Engineering Office is responsible for conducting independent systems engineering reviews and for providing proactive 

trending and identification of problem areas before failures occur.

The NESC relies on matrixed personnel support from the NASA 

Centers to conduct its activities. The use of these “ready experts” 

is negotiated with each Center. In addition, collaborations with 

external organizations including other federal agencies, national 

laboratories, universities, and expert consultants supplement the 

NESC work force, as appropriate.

The NESC’s unique insignia has its roots in the early Mercury 

Program.

“ ... I named my spacecraft Sigma Seven. Sigma, a Greek symbol 

for the sum of the elements of an equation, stands for engineering excellence. That was my goal—engineering excellence. I would 

not settle for less ... .” 

—from “Schirra’s Space” by Wally Schirra 

For the NESC, the Sigma also represents engineering excellence. 

While Wally Schirra’s spacecraft represented the seven Mercury 

astronauts, the ten in the NESC insignia represents the ten NASA 

Centers. The NESC draws upon the resources of the entire Agency to ensure engineering excellence.

NESC Model

NESC 5

NESC leadership team offices.
NESC requests for involvement are typically implemented through 

one of four NESC activity categories:

Technical Assessments include the testing, analysis, and evaluation to determine appropriate preventive and corrective actions for 

recognized problems, trends, or issues within NASA programs. A 

multidisciplined team of experts conducts each technical assessment. This approach has been modeled after the “tiger team” concept often used by programs to solve the most challenging problems.

NESC Activities 

The NESC remains active by participating in major program reviews and control boards to gain insight into program decisions 

and technical rationale. This insight is used to determine if a situation warrants an independent technical assessment or analysis of 

known risk areas. The NESC also accepts requests for involvement from all across the Agency, as well as from numerous external 

sources.

The NESC reviews and processes all requests for involvement in 

a timely manner. The NESC Systems Engineering Office first reviews the request to determine if the concern is within the scope 

of the NESC’s charter. If not, the request is referred to another 

organization for further action, with concurrence from the NESC 

Director. Requests within scope are assigned to an NESC Chief 

Engineer (NCE) for further evaluation. The NCE will investigate details regarding the concern, evaluate actions taken by the 

project, and assess relative risks to safety, mission assurance, and 

national importance. The NCE will then present the findings to 

the NESC Review Board, which reviews and approves all requests 

based on a selection and prioritization process. 

Once the review board approves a request, a team is assembled 

to address the specific issue at hand. The NESC’s goal is to provide engineering data to back up its judgments and positions. As 

a result, many NESC activities include independent testing and 

analysis. 

The NESC Review Board is made up of the NESC leadership team 

and represents all NESC organizational offices. In addition to initial request approvals, the NESC Review Board also provides peer 

reviews of ongoing assessments; ensures consistency and technical 

adequacy of all reviews prior to release to the customer; determines 

if any follow-up activity is required after the review; and provides 

direction for use of all resources including critical skills, facilities, 

testing, and analysis.

The final product of all official NESC technical activities is a report or position paper. The technical discipline and rigor that 

peer-reviewed formal documentation achieves are important to the 

NESC in its mission to provide engineering excellence.

NESC Operations 

The NESC uses many methods to determine where technical issues exist.

NESC Systems

Engineering Analyses

NESC Chief Engineers

Board Participation

Engineers & Scientists 

Other Independent

Assessment Organizations 

Safety & Mission

Assurance Organizations 

NASA Senior Managers Phone Calls

Memos

E-mails

NESC

NESC gains insight and receives

requests from a number of sources Via different media

Disposition Process

Alternative

Viewpoints

Anonymous

Inputs

Web-Based

System

6 NESC

Technical Inspections are used to proactively evaluate the technical adequacy of a particular area within a program, even if a 

problem has not yet been detected. Examples of potential inspection areas include math models, analytical tools, manufacturing 

procedures, test procedures, vehicle processing, troubleshooting 

techniques, manufacturing tooling, ground support equipment, or 

special test equipment. 

Technical Consultations are provided when the scope of a problem or concern does not warrant a full assessment. A technical 

consultation can also be provided when an NESC member joins an 

existing review team or monitors an existing operation or process. 

Technical Support is provided by making the NESC’s network 

of experts and catalog of resources available to programs, projects, 

and NASA Centers. The requesting organization funds the effort, 

which is not considered an NESC endorsed activity. The NESC remains independent of the activity, and any individuals called upon 

by the requesting program or NASA Center would not be available 

to perform a Technical Assessment on the same issue.

Through the aforementioned activities, the NESC provides technical advocacy and encourages alternate viewpoints. The NESC 

serves as a technical advocate by providing technical expertise, 

testing, or analysis in support of SMA organizations, institutional 

engineering, and programs and projects as deemed necessary. The 

NESC is also refining the skills of key personnel to provide the 

Agency with individuals qualified to lead mishap investigations.
The NESC promotes the positive actions taken by individuals, 

programs, or projects to correct identified technical inadequacies. 

The NESC has established a disciplined process to encourage this 

open environment and to solicit alternate perspectives. As a matter 

of practice, each Independent Technical Assessment will seek out 

alternate viewpoints for review and evaluation. Each report and 

briefing will document and address these viewpoints.

Currently, there are multiple independent efforts underway within 

NASA to improve trending and data collection; however, without 

uniform requirements, new and dissimilar standards are evolving. 

Therefore, the NESC has assumed the lead for independent technical data mining and trending in the Agency. The goal is to 

find unknown indicators of future problems, not to duplicate the 

program-specific trending efforts. The data critical for detecting 

these indicators exist in a plethora of dissimilar nonconformance 

databases without a common format or taxonomy. However, one 

common database is not required if the right standards and electronic tools can be employed. 

The NESC began its trending effort by hosting a workshop for 

trending experts from industry, academia, and government in the 

spring of 2004. Current efforts are focused on the Space Shuttle 

and International Space Station Program Recurring Anomalies review and the evaluation of electronic tools to facilitate trending. 

Near-term plans include holding workshops to review best practices and pitfalls in the areas of data mining and trending, developing a common data taxonomy to facilitate trending objectives, and 

benchmarking electronic tools to enable these activities.

The NESC’s Super Problem Resolution Teams are working to advance the level of knowledge within their disciplines by proactively 

engaging in issues across the Agency, reviewing trends, and seeking out opportunities to develop new technologies. The NESC will 

also test and analyze critical issues that no particular program is 

currently working. 

The Agency has chartered the NESC with performing independent 

trend analysis, not only within programs but also across programs, 

to identify potential concerns before they become major problems. 

Proactive Nature of NESC

LaRC technician William T. Howard examines the results of a new testing method developed by the

NESC to detect microscopic cracks in a specific area of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Main Propulsion System. 
Following NESC activities, lessons learned are submitted to NASA 

knowledge management systems. Working with the Office of the 

Chief Engineer and the SMA community, the NESC ensures that 

implementation plans are developed and executed for the most 

important broadly applicable lessons learned. A compilation of 

NESC lessons learned is included later in this report.

The NESC has also instituted biannual Leadership Briefings. 

These briefings are based on a similar model used by the U.S. 

Communication – Lessons Learned 

and Leadership Briefing

Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey that formulates inspection 

results into summary reports and presents them to commanders 

and managers at periodic Leadership Briefings. The NESC Leadership Briefings target senior leadership within the Agency, communicating broadly applicable lessons learned to those who can 

implement change within their organizations. The NESC held the 

first Leadership Briefing on May 12, 2004, at NASA Headquarters. Subsequent briefings will be conducted in conjunction with 

Agency Administrator Retreats.

E x c e l l e n c e
The NESC’s major product line in its portfolio is Independent 

Technical Assessments. A significant portion of the NESC’s funding goes directly to conducting these assessments. Over the first 

year, experience shows that these assessments vary widely in duration and cost. NESC funding is also dedicated to establishing 

the underlying capability to manage and support these assessments 

along with numerous other products. 

During its first year of operation, the NESC has seen a steady 

increase in requests for its technical expertise with nearly 100 

requests processed by September 30, 2004. While a majority of 

the NESC’s efforts in FY04 have been in support of the Space 

Shuttle and International Space Station Programs, the NESC has 

also assessed high-risk programs across all Mission Directorates, 

including CALIPSO, Cassini, Genesis, Hubble Space Telescope, 

and X-43A.

First Year Metrics and Budget

NESC Requests by Mission Directorate Sources of NESC Requests 

NESC FY 2004 Expenditures ($45M)

External to

Agency

23%

Science

16%

Aeronautics

Research

8%

Exploration 

Systems

2%

Space 

Operations

62%

General (across

multiple mission

 directorates)

12% 

NESC

20%

Office of

Chief Engineer

2%

Office of Safety

and Mission 

Assurance

5%

Program

Management

14%

Safety

and Mission 

Assurance

at Centers

9%

Anonymous

4%

Center

Management

5%

Engineering 

and Science 

Community

18%

GSFC

10%

JPL

2%

MSFC

9%

SSC

2%

JSC

4%

KSC

2%

LaRC

54%

DFRC

1%

GRC

7%

ARC

9%

NESC 9

Major Technical Assessments Completed 

The Space Shuttle Orbiter rudder/speed brake system provides 

steering and braking for the Orbiter during landing. After the 

decision was made to replace Orbiter Discovery’s rudder/speed 

brake actuators with spares that had been in storage, concerns 

were raised over effects of potential grease degradation because 

storage time exceeded the original certified life. The NESC conducted extensive testing and performed analyses to determine that 

while separation of the grease did occur, it did not adversely affect its lubrication properties. Furthermore, analysis showed that 

the chemical breakdown of the grease into acidic components, and 

Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed 

Brake Braycote® Grease

Lesson: Programs should periodically review hardware components 

to ensure that they are operating within qualification and certification limits. When hardware exceeds these limits, testing or analysis 

should be performed to properly envelop the actual operational environment.

resultant corrosion, could not occur during static storage. The 

NESC recommended that the stored actuators were safe for use on 

the Orbiter Discovery.

Space Operations 

NESC 11

Rudder/speed brake and parachute fully deployed.

Wedeven Associates Machine test apparatus simulates rolling and sliding 

wear conditions in the rudder/speed brake actuator gears.

Looking up at an Orbiter’s vertical stabilizer. Three rudder/speed brake 

actuators are visible.
Each Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) burns liquid hydrogen 

and liquid oxygen to develop over a half-million pounds force of 

thrust. Inspections revealed cracks in the gimbal joint flowliners 

that direct liquid hydrogen into the low pressure fuel turbopump 

of the SSME. Each gimbal joint has a mated pair of 12-in. diameter thin walled flowliners (upstream and downstream) to facilitate 

flow through the movable joint. The cracks were located at the 

flowliner slots that facilitate cleaning during manufacturing and 

allow release of trapped propellant. Flight critical issues included 

loss of flowliner structural integrity and metallic foreign object debris ingestion by the SSME. All detectable cracks were repaired 

through welding and all slot edges were polished to remove defects 

that could start new cracks. Subsequent ground tests conducted 

in the SSME test stand at the Stennis Space Center resulted in 

measured strains considerably higher than expected in two different flowliner test articles. These results cast doubt on long-term 

validity of the postrepair flight rationale. 

Responding to a request from the Orbiter Project Office, the NESC 

determined that the most likely root cause of the cracks was high 

cycle fatigue due to flow-induced vibration. Stress concentrations 

due to slot geometry and surface defects from the manufacturing 

process accelerated crack initiation and growth. The NESC conOrbiter Main Propulsion System 

Liquid Hydrogen Feedline Flowliner

Lesson: Ground testing should be conducted in a configuration as 

close to flight as possible. Where differences between ground and 

flight configurations or environments are necessary, every effort to 

correlate the ground test data to actual flight situations must be 

made. Complex subsystems like propulsion may require ground test 

articles to be maintained throughout a program’s lifetime.

Scott Willard of LaRC identifying cracks in the Space Shuttle Main Engine flowliners. Flowliner slot surface

replicas are made (right inset) and then examined under a scanning electron microscope.

cluded that repair actions taken in 2002 rendered the Orbiters safe 

to fly but required postflight inspections of the flowliners. The 

most difficult challenge to overcome in the NESC assessment was 

the high degree of uncertainty in loads acting on the flowliner. 

This uncertainty was due to differences between the ground test 

article and the flight hardware. To analyze flowliner issues, the 

NESC developed fatigue loading spectra for nominal flight conditions and refined three-dimensional fracture mechanics analysis 

methods that couple crack growth kinetics directly to the structural dynamics. The NESC also developed a high fidelity inspection 

method for in situ examination of the flowliner slots. The NESC 

qualified the edge replication method, which can detect fatigue 

cracks down to 0.005-in. in length and characterize the flowliner 

slot surface finish. The NESC used results of these efforts to establish a strategy for developing a flight rationale for the flowliner 

flight certification.

12 NESC
Four avionics boxes on each Orbiter, known as Reaction Jet Drivers (RJDs), control the six vernier and 38 primary reaction control thrusters used to maneuver the vehicle. A failed-on primary thruster for as little as two seconds during mated operations 

with the International Space Station could be catastrophic. An 

NESC assessment of this scenario focused on two RJD failure 

modes: shorting of the RJD Darlington pair transistor switch and 

a “smart” wire-to-wire short between a power wire and an RJD 

thruster command wire. 

New failure mechanisms, such as age degradation and latent manufacturing defects, were identified during the assessment. Whereas 

some transistors and wires in the Orbiter fleet are over 25 years old, 

no data exist on aging effects and no known test is currently available to assess age degradation of the Space Shuttle’s Kapton® wiring. The various probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) performed 

by both the Space Shuttle Program and the NESC produced a wide 

range of results. All transistor PRAs used MIL-HDBK-217 as an 

absolute source for field (in-service) failure prediction, despite the 

handbook’s known limitation as a design trade tool.

Due to uncertainty in the various PRAs, the NESC, in coordination with the Space Shuttle Program, is conducting electrical 

Space Shuttle Reaction Jet Driver

Lesson: Effects of aging, operation, and environmental exposure 

should be factored into expected operational life of new vehicle designs. Reliability prediction methods should include aging effects.

Lesson: MIL-HDBK-217 is not suited as an absolute quantitative tool 

to predict the likelihood of electronic part failures in space systems 

and does not include parts aging, leading to potential overestimations 

of part reliability.

Lesson: Programs that share physical interfaces, and therefore risks, 

should ensure that responsibility for integrated hazards is clearly defined and that the system requires periodic reviews of these hazard 

reports.

RJD electronic components and wiring (inset) are undergoing analysis. Endeavour’s 

forward thrusters are visible. 

characterization testing and destructive physical analysis of RJD 

transistors from flight assets to determine the potential effects of 

aging and manufacturing defects. The NESC recommended adding a new preflight leakage current test to assess transistor health 

and replacement of RJD command wires with new, better protected wiring that would be separated from power wires. Both recommendations are under consideration by the Space Shuttle Program 

and will be discussed jointly with the International Space Station 

Program for final disposition.

NESC 13
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) SMA organization requested 

that the NESC assess an analytical approach developed to evaluate 

and retire Space Shuttle data corruption Critical Item List (CIL) 

items. Many CIL items resulted from a System Assurance Analysis 

(SAA) performed on the KSC engineering advisory tool PCGOAL 

(Personal Computer Ground Operations Aerospace Language). 

This computer system is used to verify test requirements, make 

critical launch commit criteria violation calls, and support realtime decisions during hazardous testing. Space Shuttle Program 

requirements drove a quantitative look at undetected errors and 

the risk of data corruption inherent in network equipment. In response, the KSC engineering community developed a method of 

assessment intended to eliminate CIL items entirely by classifying the failures as “not credible.” Resolution of this issue has the 

potential for wide application to many additional data corruption 

SAAs.

The NESC was in general agreement that the method and analyses 

proposed by the KSC engineering community are consistent with 

good engineering practice. The assessment team identified some 

areas for additional work and recommended independent verificaKennedy Space Center PCGOAL 

Data Integrity 

Lesson: The existing CIL process is not well suited to complex data 

processing networks. Programmatic requirements to allow alternate 

approaches may require further discussion.

tion and validation of PCGOAL. It was noted that a small possibility of undetected errors can always exist in networked systems. 

To classify undetected errors as “not credible” requires that clear 

metrics and reliability or availability criteria be defined and agreed 

upon. While quantitative requirements for the PCGOAL system 

were not provided, performance is continually monitored and has 

been acceptable. The NESC concurred with the validity of higher 

level network provisions, such as error detection and correction 

and standard packet transmission protocols, as appropriate mitigations for transmission errors. The NESC concluded that it would 

be technically acceptable, and in fact preferred, to include the entire network path as a single item on the CIL for the purpose of 

assessing data integrity risks. Individual components need not be 

identified and tracked as critical items as the CIL process currently 

requires, but are subject to appropriate performance monitoring 

and tracking by a network problem reporting and corrective action 

system.

14 NESC

PCGOAL is used to support engineering analysis during testing and launch operations at the KSC Launch Control Center.
The Cloud-Aerosol LIDAR and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation (CALIPSO) spacecraft is a joint science mission among 

the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, Langley Research Center, and Goddard Space Flight Center. The Earth Science satellite 

mission is scheduled for launch on a Boeing Delta II rocket from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base in 2005. Concerns raised about the hydrazine-fueled spacecraft propulsion bus led to the NESC providing a review of the bus design and an assessment of the potential 

for personnel exposure to hydrazine propellant. During the NESC 

review of the propulsion bus design, it became evident that concerns about early design decisions were still prevalent, even though 

the bus assembly was already complete. Contributing to these lingering concerns were the different interpretations by each organization involved of an ambiguous requirement for fault tolerance. 

Following assessment, the NESC issued a final report outlining 

11 requirements for the CALIPSO Project to address in order to 

ensure the risk to personnel is acceptable.

CALIPSO

Lesson: NASA must establish unambiguous requirements for fault 

tolerance.

Lesson: In a project’s design phase, a thorough risk assessment must 

be performed to ensure the final design presents the overall minimum 

risk to personnel, the mission, and the environment. While current 

NASA policy does require a risk assessment, it is important that an 

assessment consider potential hazards through the project’s entire life 

cycle, including ground processing and integration.

Lesson: At the beginning of a project involving outside partners, 

NASA must clearly define and document its expectations, including 

the standards, specifications, and processes that should be followed 

by all parties.

Science 

. The NESC Safety and Mission Assurance Working 

Group

The NESC Deputy Director for Safety chairs a Safety 

and Mission Assurance (SMA) working group, which 

includes membership from each Center’s SMA organization. The working group meets to discuss NESC 

activities and communicate information on significant 

program problems or issues under SMA review at 

each Center. The working group provides an independent avenue for SMA organizations to bring their 

problems forward to the NESC.

NESC 15

The CALIPSO satellite, an international partnership with the French Space Agency,

CNES, is prepared for environmental testing in Cannes, France.
The Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs), Spirit and Opportunity, 

were designed to geologically explore the surface of Mars. Prior to 

Rover landings on Mars, the NESC provided technical expertise 

in support of two MER reviews. The first included a human factors review of ground operations. Because Martian and Earth days 

differ in length, the staff and mission scientists must cover work 

periods around the clock that change in start time by 40 minutes 

each day. In preparation for Opportunity’s landing, the NESC also 

supported the MER data review process of Spirit’s entry, descent, 

and landing phase. Deviations from the expected angle of attack 

of the entry vehicle during entry, descent, and landing for Spirit 

and Opportunity raised several issues potentially relevant to future 

planetary missions. Instrumentation currently flown (or planned 

for future missions) is not adequate to distinguish the separate effects of density and drag coefficient value errors on aerodynamic 

forces encountered during entry, descent, and landing.

Mars Exploration Rovers

NESC team members, with expertise in systems engineering, 

guidance, navigation and control, and propulsion, supported the 

Cassini Critical Events Readiness Review and subsequent meetings that led to the Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI) maneuver. While 

the team agreed that the project was well prepared for the Saturn 

Orbit Insertion maneuver, the NESC and Cassini Project Team 

boards identified several items that needed to be addressed prior 

to SOI. The consultants expressed concerns over the SOI fault 

protection logic and recommended that an independent review 

team pour through this logic to ensure it is robust. They also recommended hiring a dedicated lead for the Operations Readiness 

Team to improve operations simulations and contingency planning prior to SOI. 

Cassini Saturn Orbit Insertion

Lesson: NASA should implement and enforce the work time limits for 

critical operations across the Agency as outlined in NASA Procedural 

Requirement 1800.1.

Lesson: Future planetary missions should include instrumentation to 

assess entry performance and adequately characterize the environment encountered during entry, descent, and landing.

16 NESC

 Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity looks back at its lander in the Eagle 

Crater and the surrounding plains of Meridiani Planum, Mars.

An illustration of the Cassini spacecraft performing its Saturn Orbit 

Insertion maneuver.

. “The NASA Engineering and Safety Center is an important resource to have for both the hardware development and on-orbit 

operations of the International Space Station”.

William H. Gerstenmaier

Manager, International Space Station Program 
NESC team members attended the Genesis Systems Risk Review 

and two Critical Events Risk Reviews prior to the reentry activities. They provided guidance to the Genesis team that proved 

invaluable during the entry operations. In particular, the NESC 

members’ recommendation to flesh out a more stringent reentry 

contingency plan put the Genesis team in a better preparedness 

state for the unfortunate events that were to come. The unexpected 

hard landing of the Sample Return Capsule required engagement 

of landing site contingency procedures that the NESC stressed 

during these reviews. Other NESC findings from these reviews 

helped produce more robust nominal and contingency operations 

procedures. These procedures enabled the team to clearly articulate how navigation predictions relate to expected vehicle landing 

sites. 

Genesis Reviews 

Reentry of the Genesis Sample Return Capsule on September 8, 

2004, was the first reentry occurring at superorbital speed since 

the Apollo Program. Several others will follow at such speeds over 

the next decade. The NESC was approached with a proposal to 

use a U.S. Air Force aircraft outfitted with instrumentation and 

expertise provided by the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence 

(SETI) institute to observe the event and acquire spectroscopic 

data (optical, infrared, and ultraviolet) as well as high-definition 

television imaging. Imaging of the reentry segment of the Genesis 

Sample Return Capsule could provide highly leveraged data for 

the design, analysis, and risk management of future entry systems. 

The data would be particularly relevant to the Exploration Mission 

Office, which will have Earth return segments from the Moon and 

Mars. The NESC funded a spectrographic observation campaign 

to obtain spectral intensity of the high temperature gas flowfield 

around the vehicle. The NESC could then compare total radiative 

intensity with existing models used for aerothermodynamic design 

to either validate or refine prediction methods.

Genesis Sample Return Capsule Reentry Data 

NESC 17

. “The NESC’s purpose is to provide independent technical expertise for engineering, safety, and mission assurance to augment 

the capabilities inherent in NASA’s programs.”

Sean O’Keefe, NASA Administrator
The X-43A is a prototype hypersonic aircraft mounted on a modified Pegasus booster rocket that accelerates the X-43A to its test 

speed and altitude. The modified Pegasus/X-43A stack is launched 

from the NASA B-52B aircraft. The NESC received a dissenting 

opinion concerning validity of the aerodynamic database used for 

flight control design with a potential consequence of vehicle control loss during flight and failure to achieve mission objectives. 

Working in conjunction with the X-43A project, the NESC ensured that the aerodynamic issues were properly addressed through 

the program’s existing independent Flight Readiness Review 

(FRR) process. The role of the NESC was to confirm that the independent FRR committee adequately reviewed, investigated, and 

responded to the dissenting opinion. The NESC concluded that 

the FRR process used by Dryden Flight Research Center for the 

X-43A provides a more robust review process than the single meeting method used by many programs.

Committee membership is established independently of the project 

and comprises the necessary technical expertise required to provide 

a thorough assessment. The committee reviews project readiness at 

several stages prior to flight, allowing adequate response time for 

FRR initiated actions and appropriate follow-up of identified technical issues. This process also provides a mechanism for receiving 

and resolving dissenting opinions and can draw upon expertise 

and skills from across the Agency. Adequate and thorough assessment of dissenting opinions can produce a better understanding of 

engineering data, leading to either modification or reaffirmation of 

risk assessment for safety and mission success.

. 

X-43A Prediction of Transonic Aerodynamics 

Lesson: Dryden Flight Research Center’s Flight Readiness Review process (Dryden Handbook DHB-X-001) provides for a robust, independent review of a project’s readiness for flight and should be adopted 

across the Agency. 

Lesson: The NESC is implementing a strategy for addressing dissenting opinions. Other organizations within NASA need to develop strategies for handling dissenting opinions.

Aeronautics Research 

18 NESC

The second X-43A research vehicle is prepared for its record setting flight.
The Agency is investigating alternate servicing for the Hubble 

Space Telescope (HST). Two efforts in support of this activity 

involved NESC assessments of the nickel-hydrogen (Ni-H2) battery remnant life and overall system health of the HST. These 

assessments generated recommendations that aided in an Agency 

decision to continue with the robotic service mission concept to 

the Critical Design Review phase.

The assessments identified several observations. One observation 

resulted from the fact that the battery bays were not redesigned to 

accommodate generation of additional charging heat when nickelcadmium batteries were replaced with Ni-H2

 batteries. This change 

resulted in a narrow heat dissipation margin, which constrained 

the options for battery capacity maintenance. Another observation 

was that while a total ionizing dose exposure level evaluation was 

performed for the 15-year design life of the original HST electronic components, it was not readily verifiable that an updated 

analysis was performed for the extended 2013 end-of-life.

NESC assessments generated recommendations involving improved battery life predictions and potential reconditioning protocol to minimize additional capacity losses. In addition, the system 

health evaluation identified several subsystems that require further 

examination for potential life reduction impacts and made recommendations to the servicing manifest. 

The NESC also recognized the HST Program’s foresight in maintaining skilled operations and sustaining engineering experts capable of observing subtle performance changes, in generating inventive work arounds and in preparing multilevel contingency plans. 

The HST Program’s commitment to retain engineering units and 

test facilities enabled verification of proposed enhancements and 

proved invaluable in demonstrating the robotic servicing concept.

. 

Hubble Space Telescope Battery and System 

Health Assessment

Lesson: Capability of a system’s original hardware requires verification following any changes in operating environments from planned 

performance and life extension upgrades.

Lesson: Design changes occurring late in the development phase 

should be thoroughly evaluated by all engineering disciplines to minimize the risk for unforeseen operational constraints and limitations.

Lesson: Maintenance of high fidelity engineering units and mockups 

is vital to developing and certifying hardware and software improvements on the ground before implementation on-orbit.

Lesson: Proper selection, preservation, and development of an operations and sustaining engineering work force is critical to identification of emerging performance trends and generation of innovative 

corrective actions. 

HST batteries (flight spares).

Exploration Systems 

NESC 19

The HST is expected to remain operational through 2008.

All final reports and position papers from completed NESC 

activities can be found at <http://www.nesc.nasa.gov>.

The NESC formed a multidiscipline team to review recurrent 

Space Shuttle and International Space Station technical problems 

and to ensure that the program understands and addresses identified risks. 

Space Shuttle and International Space Station 

Recurring Anomalies Review Team

This section highlights several activities the NESC is currently 

evaluating. As with the majority of NESC endeavors, experts from 

all NASA Centers, other government agencies, national laboratories, academia, and industry are involved in conducting these 

activities.

Status of NESC Work in Progress

The NESC Recurring Anomalies Review Team is organized 

around eight discipline-centered subteams whose members review 

and assess program problem reports, corrective actions, and flight 

rationale. As the Space Shuttle Program data review nears completion, the review team has identified a number of issues for further 

program action. The NESC has initiated in depth investigations 

into several of these identified areas of concern, including solid 

rocket booster hold-down post stud hang-ups and reusable solid 

rocket motor nozzle ply lifting, both of which are described in 

greater detail subsequently.

After completion of the Space Shuttle review, the NESC Recurring 

Anomalies Review Team will begin assessing the International 

Space Station Program. Future activities will include the development of tools and techniques for long-term data mining and trending across all NASA programs.

NESC 21

. “The independent evaluation of the NESC provides a different 

perspective on issues. This additional dimension helps us arrive 

at better decisions.”

William H. Gerstenmaier

Manager, International Space Station Program 
The NESC Recurring Anomalies Review Team identified the Space 

Shuttle solid rocket booster (SRB) hold-down post stud hang-ups 

as an area requiring further investigation. Each SRB is secured to 

the launch pad with four large studs and explosive nuts. The explosive nuts are fired at lift-off and the stud drops into a container 

within the mobile launch pad. Over the Shuttle Program’s history, 

a number of missions have experienced stud hang-ups during liftoff. The NESC is conducting a thorough set of tests to determine 

the root cause of the problem. Statistical analysis and computational techniques will guide this test program, which is using the 

resources of multiple NASA Centers.

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Hold-down 

Post Stud Hang-up

Ply lifting is characterized by separation and lifting of carbon cloth 

plies in the aft exit cone of the reusable solid rocket motors. This 

phenomenon has been observed periodically in solid rocket motor 

static tests and has likely also occurred during flight. The NESC 

Recurring Anomalies Review Team’s assistance was requested by 

the Space Shuttle Program to determine if this issue is a benign 

design deviation or if it has the potential to create a more serious 

problem.

Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor Nozzle 

Ply Lifting 

During the NESC’s assessment of Braycote® grease separation on 

the spare Orbiter rudder/speed brake actuator gears, the discovery 

of corrosion and associated pitting and cracking in the gear teeth 

put into question the flight rationale for existing inventory. Most 

hardware affected has already been replaced, but plans are to reuse 

selected gears and bearings. The NESC has reproduced observed 

damage in the laboratory, confirming the prevailing hypothesis 

that most corrosion and pitting occurs during ground handling 

operations. Tests are now in progress to measure any performance 

degradation that might be attributable to the corrosion and pitting 

under both static and fatigue loading conditions.

Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake Gear 

Margins

22 NESC

. “Among the things we learned during the investigation of the 

Columbia tragedy is the need to independently verify our engineering and safety standards.” 

Sean O’Keefe, NASA Administrator

Solid rocket booster hold-down stud and explosive nut.

Ply lifting of reusable solid rocket motor nozzle. 

(courtesy of ATK Thiokol Inc.)

Dr. Wilfredo Morales gathers grease samples from a gear for analysis of 

grease degradation.
NASA is currently implementing recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). One CAIB recommendation, R3.3-2, requires “determination of the actual impact resistance of current materials and the effects of likely debris strikes.” 

Along with establishing impact resistance of the reinforced carbon 

composite (RCC) wing leading edge panels, structural integrity 

of the wing leading edge spar and the metallic substructure that 

attaches the RCC to the spar must be verified for debris impact 

loads. This is the scope of the Technical Assessment the NESC 

is conducting. In addition, this assessment is addressing potential 

effects of service life (aging) that may reduce the design allowables 

below values used in the original wing certification or that would 

result in a failure mode that was not included in the original certification. 

Structural Integrity of Space Shuttle Orbiter Wing 

Leading Edge Attachment Hardware 

NESC participation was requested in technical discussions aimed 

at determining the associated risks, and potential acceptance rationale, of not performing postproof nondestructive evaluation 

of five International Space Station modules manufactured in Europe. The NESC has recommended additional safe-life analyses 

and simulated service materials testing in order to assess both the 

module’s as-designed and nonconformance conditions. This approach is also being augmented with a statistical examination of 

applicable inspection data from other spacecraft elements.

International Space Station Structural Assessment 

of European Modules

The International Space Station internal active thermal control 

system provides coolant to the U.S. Laboratory and airlock modules. Since early 2002, the on-orbit coolant chemistry has deviated 

from specification limits. This deviation is a result of high onboard 

carbon dioxide levels that permeated through the system’s flexible 

Teflon® hoses. Further investigation into this coolant water instability raised a concern over increased microbial levels and biofilm 

development. An ideal solution would be the identification and 

implementation of one antimicrobial that would not pose additional material compatibility, toxicity, or result in increased fouling of the coolant loop. It was recognized, however, that a suite 

of antimicrobials may be required for use in cooling systems to 

combat the ultimate development of resistant microbes.

International Space Station Internal Active Thermal 

Control System Coolant Water Chemical Stability

NESC 23

Orbiter RCC wing leading edge (gray) is secured to the wing spar (green) via 

attachment hardware.

ISS Node 2 module.

Astronauts James Voss and Scott Horowitz in the International Space Station 

Destiny module (STS-105).
BUMPER II is the primary software program used to assess Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MM/OD) risks for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and a number of other missions. 

The NESC was asked to perform an independent verification and 

validation of BUMPER II MM/OD software in response to an 

independent study of MM/OD critical risk assessment practices 

performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses. The NESC will 

independently verify and validate both Space Shuttle Orbiter and 

International Space Station versions of the code as well as examine 

and analyze the BUMPER II environmental models.

BUMPER II Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris Analysis 

Software Stability

24 NESC

As part of the overall Space Shuttle return to flight effort, the Space 

Shuttle Program established an Independent Technical Assessment 

Team to provide technical oversight, independent analysis, and advice. The NESC is currently assisting this team in specific areas

Space Shuttle External Tank Technical Assessment 

BUMPER II risk assessment of micrometeoroid and orbital debris impact to a 

multi-purpose logistics module (MPLM).

NESC Human Factors Discipline Expert Dr. Cynthia Null evaluates an 

improved method for the hand spraying of foam on specific areas of the 

external tank.

such as investigation of human factors in foam spraying, nondestructive evaluation, and statistical assessments. The NESC is 

also providing independent technical expertise to critical design 

reviews and technical interchange meetings. 

Good lighting is essential for the accurate application of external tank foam 

and the performance of inspections. Photographs taken before and after 

NESC involvement.
The Cassini/Huygens mission is a joint program of NASA and 

the European Space Agency (ESA) to explore Saturn and its satellites. The Cassini/Huygens spacecraft is currently in orbit around 

Saturn following the successful Saturn Orbit Insertion burn on 

July 1, 2004. As currently scheduled, the Huygens probe will 

separate from the Cassini spacecraft on December 25, 2004. On 

January 15, 2005, Huygens will enter the atmosphere of the satellite Titan, descend on parachutes, and land on Titan’s surface. 

The NESC is currently assessing the Huygens entry, descent, and 

landing flight phase using analytical tools that are readily available 

within NASA. This assessment will entail the development of a 

full entry, descent, and landing simulation model for Huygens, 

the results of which will be shared with the Cassini program and 

with ESA, thus providing an independent check on the currently 

accepted entry, descent, and landing solution. The NESC will 

provide recommendations to the Cassini project and ESA regarding any modifications to areas such as flight trajectory, entry flight 

path angle, and communications plan.

Cassini/Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, and Landing 

Cassini spacecraft with Huygens probe just visible behind the gold foil covered 

heat shield.

The NESC is funding a 2-year study into potential applicability 

of software development and testing methodologies to independent verification and validation of Programmable Logic Devices 

(PLDs), which are like Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). 

This study will examine whether existing software development, 

verification, and validation techniques, like formal inspections, 

will add value to the development of PLDs/FPGAs, or whether 

completely new techniques need development and adoption. Many 

PLD/FPGA problems resemble software problems, and this study 

will also determine if the resemblance is deep enough for application of software techniques to the independent verification and 

validation of device designs.

Field Programmable Gate Array Independent 

Verification and Validation

Commercial use FPGA (left) and a space use FPGA (right). 

NESC 25
The NESC is funding an independent test program to evaluate the 

reliability of 0.25-micron technology FPGAs in typical application 

environments. The SX-S series of FPGAs are space-grade devices 

used in NASA flight electronics in a wide variety of manned and 

robotic missions, many of which are mission and safety critical. At 

the test program’s initiation, there were approximately one dozen 

confirmed failures in user applications in the SX-S/SX-A series of 

FPGAs. In response to these failures, the FPGA manufacturer has 

revised its antifuse programming algorithm, which is believed will 

either eliminate or significantly reduce the size and/or sensitivity of 

the outlier population. NESC sponsored independent testing will 

determine the effectiveness of the modified SX-S programming algorithm in reducing or eliminating outlier antifuses through a rigorous program evaluating a statistically significant number of SXS series FPGAs. Additionally, the testing will determine whether 

any unintended side effects have been introduced.

Independent Testing of Field Programmable Gate 

Arrays

In addition to the activities described above, the NESC is currently 

engaged in numerous other efforts across the Agency. A sampling 

of these efforts includes work in such areas as Kevlar® and graphite epoxy composite overwrapped pressure vessels, Shuttle ascent 

debris transport analysis review, reinforced carbon-carbon impact 

team, Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 

acoustical resonance investigation, and support to the Genesis mishap investigation board. These activities represent various levels of 

involvement by the NESC. Along with standard assessments, the 

NESC has also engaged in several real-time troubleshooting activities, namely the Soyuz 7 propulsion system helium leak and the 

International Space Station control moment gyroscope failure.

Other NESC Technical Activities

26 NESC

FPGAs are used in the MER cameras.

Space Shuttle composite overwrapped pressure vessels being pressure tested.

Soyuz 7 in a predocking maneuver with the International Space Station.
NESC 27

. “Establishment of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center has been invaluable in providing an expert assessment of the challenging 

issues facing us as we move closer to Return to Flight,” 

“The dedication, perseverance and support of the NESC to make the Shuttle fleet safer than ever before shows that an organization 

not even in existence about a year ago, can provide an independent evaluation, where appropriate, of the ongoing work throughout 

the Program.” 

William Parsons, 

Space Shuttle Program Manager

The NESC is focused on the potential for acoustic resonance generated by the infrared telescope cavity in the side of the NASA 747SP aircraft.
Cloud-Aerosol LIDAR and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite 

Observation (CALIPSO)

Lesson: NASA must establish unambiguous requirements for fault 

tolerance.

Lesson: In a project’s design phase, a thorough risk assessment must 

be performed to ensure the final design presents the overall minimum risk to personnel, the mission, and the environment. While 

current NASA policy does require a risk assessment, it is important 

that an assessment consider potential hazards through the project’s 

entire life cycle, including ground processing and integration.

Lesson: At the beginning of a project involving outside partners, 

NASA must clearly define and document its expectations, including the standards, specifications, and processes that should be followed by all parties.

As part of the semiannual NESC Leadership Briefings, the NESC presents broadly applicable lessons learned to Agency leaders. In 

conjunction with the Office of Chief Engineer and the Safety and Mission Assurance community, the most significant lessons are then 

tracked through implementation. Listed below is a synopsis of the broadly applicable lessons learned identified by the NESC in its first 

year of operation, and as presented at the first two Leadership Briefings.

Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake Actuator 

Grease 

Lesson: Programs should periodically review hardware components to ensure that they are operating within qualification and 

certification limits. When hardware exceeds these limits, testing 

or analysis should be performed to properly envelop the actual operational environment.

X-43A Prediction of Transonic Aerodynamics 

Lesson: Dryden Flight Research Center’s Flight Readiness Review 

process (Dryden Handbook DHB-X-001) provides for a robust, 

independent review of a project’s readiness for flight and should be 

adopted across the Agency. 

Lesson: The NESC is implementing a strategy for addressing dissenting opinions. Other organizations within NASA need to develop strategies for handling dissenting opinions. 

Mars Exploration Rovers 

Lesson: NASA should implement and enforce the work time limits 

for critical operations across the Agency as outlined in NASA Procedural Requirement 1800.1.

Lesson: Future planetary missions should include instrumentation 

to assess entry performance and adequately characterize the environment encountered during entry, descent, and landing.

Space Shuttle Orbiter Main Propulsion System Liquid 

Hydrogen Feedline Flowliner

Lesson: Ground testing should be conducted in a configuration as 

close to flight as possible. Where differences between ground and 

flight configurations or environments are necessary, every effort to 

correlate the ground test data to actual flight situations must be 

made. Complex subsystems like propulsion may require ground 

test articles to be maintained throughout a program’s lifetime.

Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver

Lesson: Effects of aging, operation, and environmental exposure 

should be factored into expected operational life of new vehicle designs. Reliability prediction methods should include aging effects.

Lesson: MIL-HDBK-217 is not suited as an absolute quantitative 

tool to predict the likelihood of electronic part failures in space 

systems and does not include parts aging, leading to potential 

overestimations of part reliability.

Lesson: Programs that share physical interfaces, and therefore 

risks, should ensure that responsibility for integrated hazards is 

clearly defined and that the system requires periodic reviews of 

these hazard reports.

28 NESC

NESC KSC Chief Engineer Mr. Timmy Wilson discusses the CALIPSO activity.

L e s s o n s 
Kennedy Space Center PCGOAL Data Integrity 

Lesson: The existing CIL process is not well suited to complex 

data processing networks. Programmatic requirements to allow 

alternate approaches may require further discussion.

Hubble Space Telescope Battery and System Health Assessment 

Lesson: Capability of a system’s original hardware requires verification following any changes in operating environments from 

planned performance and life extension upgrades.

Lesson: Design changes occurring late in the development phase 

should be thoroughly evaluated by all engineering disciplines to 

minimize the risk for unforeseen operational constraints and limitations.

Lesson: Maintenance of high fidelity engineering units and mockups is vital to developing and certifying hardware and software 

improvements on the ground before implementation on-orbit.

Lesson: Proper selection, preservation, and development of an operations and sustaining engineering work force is critical to identification of emerging performance trends and generation of innovative corrective actions.

General Lessons from NESC Activities 

Lesson: Performance of data mining and trending analysis across 

NASA programs is difficult due to numerous and dissimilar nonconformance databases. These databases exist without a common 

format and taxonomy.

Lesson: Engineering organizations should use reports to document 

technical results.

Lesson: Emphasis should always be on content, not format, regardless of whether a PowerPoint presentation or an engineering report 

is used for communication.

General Lessons from Establishment and Operations of 

NESC

Lesson: Diversity in experience can result in the ability to overcome many problems. Programs and Centers should take advantage of all Agency resources and not be limited to what is available 

within their own organizations.

Lesson: For One NASA organizations to operate more efficiently 

and effectively, improvements to Agency support functions should 

continue.

NESC 29

Former NESC Deputy Director Dr. Paul Munafo discusses the Space Shuttle 

Orbiter Braycote® grease assessment.

NESC Flight Sciences Discipline Expert Mr. Steve Labbe discusses the X-43A 

activity.

L e s s o n s 

NESC Academy 

The NESC is working to capture the extraordinary amount 

of knowledge resident in the Super Problem Resolution Teams. 

Many team members have decades of experience in solving technical problems and this knowledge would be of immense benefit 

to NASA’s junior engineers in carrying on the NASA tradition of 

engineering excellence. 

Work is underway to create an academy wherein the NESC experts can teach and mentor junior NASA engineers. Participation 

by universities will help inspire the next generation of engineers 

and scientists. The concept involves not only classroom training, 

but also hands-on training and a Web-based system that will have 

lectures, lessons learned, and practical examples from the discipline expert’s field.

Education and Collaboration

External Collaboration

A major focus in the NESC’s creation was to benchmark the U.S. 

Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and the SUBSAFE programs. The NESC has incorporated into its processes many best practices from this benchmarking effort. Subsequently, the NESC began discussions with 

the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations with the goal of sharing 

lessons in promoting a strong safety culture.

To provide specialized training opportunities for NESC employees, 

agreements with the National Transportation Safety Board and the 

Aviation Safety Office at the Naval Postgraduate School are being 

established. The NESC has also worked with the National Institute of Aerospace (NIA), which includes the University of Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Maryland, North Carolina 

State University, and North Carolina Agricultural and Technical 

State University. The NIA has sponsored several NESC workshops 

and has facilitated participation from academia on several NESC 

assessment teams. The NESC has also established a contract with 

The Aerospace Corporation to provide independent and objective 

technical support for NESC activities.

NESC 31

. “We need to have our best technical expertise available when 

and where it is needed most. The NESC will help to make that 

possible.” 

Ralph R. Roe, Jr.

Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center

The NESC has incorporated a number of best practices from the U.S. Navy into its processes.

Opposite page: NESC Chief Astronaut Jerry L. Ross, STS-110 mission specialist, works to install 

the International Space Station’s Airlock Spur while anchored to the Canadarm2.
NESC Honor Awards

In addition to other incentive awards and recognition programs, 

the NESC created four honorary NESC awards in its first year 

of operation. These honorary awards formally identify individuals internal and external to NASA who have shown remarkable 

leadership and commitment in promoting engineering excellence 

and safety, made an outstanding contribution to the NESC’s technical activities, and demonstrated characteristics the NESC holds 

in high regard.

• Engineering and technical excellence

• Promotion of an open environment

• Attacking problems with unequalled tenacity

The Four NESC Honor Awards

NESC Director’s Award: Recognizes individuals who take personal accountability and ownership in initiating clear and open 

communication on diverse and controversial issues. A key component of this award is based on the process of challenging engineering truths.

NESC Engineering Excellence Award: Recognizes accomplishments of NESC job-related tasks of such magnitude and merit to 

deserve special recognition.

NESC Leadership Award: Recognizes individuals who have had 

a pronounced effect upon technical activities of the NESC.

NESC Group Achievement Award: Recognizes a team of employees comprising both government and nongovernment personnel for 

outstanding performance through the coordination of individual 

efforts that have contributed substantially to the accomplishment 

of the NESC mission. 

The first NESC Honor Awards were presented at the Leadership 

Briefing on May 12, 2004, at NASA Headquarters. NESC Director Ralph R. Roe, Jr., and Chief Safety and Mission Assurance 

Officer Bryan D. O’Connor gave opening remarks. Space Shuttle 

Commander Eileen Collins and STS-114 Mission Specialist 

Charles Camarda presented awards to the following individuals:

NESC Director’s Award

Mr. Richard M. Wood, LaRC

Honored for personal commitment to advocating further assessment of the aerodynamic risks associated with the flight of the 

modified Pegasus/X-43A launch vehicle.

Mr. Erwin V. Zaretsky, GRC

Honored for exemplary contributions and personal leadership in 

advocating further inspection and testing of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake actuators.

NESC Engineering Excellence Award

Mr. Timothy R. Jett, MSFC

Honored for extraordinary leadership that contributed to engineering excellence in support of the Rudder/Speed Brake Independent 

Assessment Team.

NESC Leadership Award

Mr. Luat T. Nguyen, LaRC

Honored for exceptional leadership in responding to a dissenting 

opinion regarding the modified Pegasus/X-43A launch vehicle 

aerodynamics.

Dr. Michael G. Ryschkewitsch, GSFC

Honored for exceptional leadership in promoting an environment 

wherein technical concerns are brought forward and appropriately 

addressed.

Mr. and Mrs. Michael Massie accept the NESC Director’s Award from NESC

Chief Astronaut Jerry Ross.

32 NESC
A second NESC Honor Awards ceremony took place on October 

26, 2004, at the fall NESC Conference in Los Angeles, California. 

NESC Director Ralph Roe, Jr., and NESC Chief Astronaut Jerry 

Ross presented awards to the following individuals:

NESC Director’s Award

Mr. Michael Massie, The Boeing Company

Honored for exemplary contributions and technical rationale for 

corrective action on the Space Shuttle’s zero fault tolerant Reaction 

Jet Driver design.

Dr. Jeffrey D. Scargle, ARC

Honored for exceptional contributions in support of the statistical 

analysis of the external tank foam dissection data. 

NESC Engineering Excellence Award

Mr. Phillip B. Hall, MSFC

Honored for extraordinary leadership that contributed to engineering excellence on the Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake and Body 

Flap Actuator Team.

Dr. Paul M. Munafo, MSFC

Honored for outstanding direction, technical leadership, and engineering excellence regarding the Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake 

System.

Dr. Robert S. Piascik, LaRC

Honored for engineering excellence in providing inspection methods and determining the root cause of original cracks in the Orbiter liquid hydrogen feedline flowliners.

NESC Honor Awards May 12, 

2004 at NASA Headquarters.

From left to right:

Bryan O’Conner,

Charlie Camarda, 

Luat Nguyen (LaRC), 

Michael Ryschkewitsch (GSFC), 

Timothy Jett (MSFC),

Mike Gilbert accepting for 

Richard Woods (LaRC), 

Erwin Zaretsky (GRC), and 

Eileen Collins.

NESC Honor Awards October 26, 

2004 (Los Angeles, California).

From left to right, Ralph Roe (NESC 

Director), Phillip Hall (MSFC), Dr. 

Paul Munafo (MSFC), Dr. Jeffrey 

Scargle (ARC), Michael Massie 

(Boeing), Jerry Ross (NESC Chief 

Astronaut), not pictured is Robert 

Piascik (LaRC).

NESC 33
NESC Leadership Team

Ralph R. Roe, Jr.

Director

NASA Engineering and Safety Center

Ralph R. Roe, Jr., serves as NESC Director at Langley Research Center. Mr. Roe has over 21 years experience 

in human space flight program management, technical management, and test engineering. Mr. Roe previously 

held several key positions in the Space Shuttle Program, including Vehicle Engineering Manager, Launch Director, and Kennedy Space Center Engineering Director.

NESC Office of the Director

Dr. Paul M. Munafo

Deputy Director

NASA Engineering and Safety Center (former) 

Dr. Paul M. Munafo was the first Deputy Director of the NESC at Langley Research Center. Dr. Munafo 

came to the NESC from the NASA Materials, Processes, and Manufacturing Department. Dr. Munafo has 

over 40 years experience with materials science, fracture mechanics, and stress corrosion control in many 

NASA programs, including Saturn, Apollo, and Space Shuttle.

Dr. Richard J. Gilbrech

Deputy Director

Dr. Richard J. Gilbrech is the Deputy Director of the NESC and is resident at Langley Research Center. Dr. 

Gilbrech came to the NESC as a Principal Engineer from Stennis Space Center where he served as Manager 

of the Program Integration Office responsible for NASA’s rocket propulsion test facilities. Dr. Gilbrech has 13 

years combined experience in NASA propulsion, propulsion testing, and the Space Shuttle Program.

. “My first priority is establishment of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center that will enhance and reinvigorate safety 

through independent assessment and analysis.

Comprised of the best technical experts in the Agency and in the nation, the NESC will act as a ‘fresh set of eyes’ to look at 

systems and processes associated with the Agency’s high-risk, high-payoff initiatives.” 

Roy D. Bridges

Director, NASA Langley Research Center

34 NESC
Dr. Steven A. Hawley

Chief Astronaut (former) 

Dr. Steven A. Hawley served as the first NESC Chief Astronaut. Dr. Hawley came to the NESC from the 

NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate where he served as Associate Director for Astromaterials Research 

and Exploration Science. Dr. Hawley is a veteran of five space flights: STS-41D in 1984, STS-61C in 1986, 

STS-31 in 1990, STS-82 in 1997, and STS-93 in 1999.

NASA Headquarters liasons

Jerry L. Ross, Colonel, USAF, Ret.

Chief Astronaut 

Mr. Jerry L. Ross is the NESC Chief Astronaut and is resident at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Mr. Ross 

joins the NESC and will continue in his current position as Chief of the Vehicle Integration Test Office at 

JSC. With over 34 years of flight, technical, and managerial experience with the U.S. Air Force and Shuttle 

Program, Mr. Ross is a veteran of seven Shuttle flights, including nine extravehicular activities, and was Flight 

Test Engineer prior to joining NASA in 1979.

Larry Crawford 

Deputy Director for Safety (former) 

Mr. Larry Crawford was the first NESC Deputy Director for Safety. Mr. Crawford came to the NESC at 

Langley Research Center from his position as Director of the Research Engineering Directorate at Dryden 

Flight Research Center. Mr. Crawford has over 34 years experience in Department of Defense and NASA 

programs in system safety and engineering management.

Dr. David Leckrone

Chief Scientist

Dr. David Leckrone is the NESC Chief Scientist and is resident at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). 

Prior to joining the NESC, Dr. Leckrone served as the Senior Scientist for Large Aperture Telescopes at GSFC 

and currently is the Senior Project Scientist for the Hubble Space Telescope Program. Dr. Leckrone has over 

34 years experience in NASA astrophysics programs.

NESC 35
John E. Tinsley

NASA Headquarters Senior SMA Integration Manager (Former)

Mr. John E. Tinsley currently serves as a Senior Safety and Mission Assurance Manager in the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), represents the NESC at Agency-level meetings, and serves 

as a liaison between the NESC Director and the OSMA Associate Administrator. Prior to joining the NESC, 

Mr. Tinsley was a Senior Advanced Systems Engineer with the Office of Space Flight Advanced Systems Office. 

Mr. Tinsley has over 24 years experience in systems and safety engineering and engineering management in 

Shuttle processing and upgrades and spacecraft mission planning.

NASA Headquarters Liaisons

Keith L. Hudkins 

NASA Headquarters Office of the Chief Engineer Representative

Mr. Keith L. Hudkins is the representative from the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer to the NESC. Mr. 

Hudkins is resident in the Office of the Chief Engineer at NASA Headquarters where he serves as the NASA 

Deputy Chief Engineer. Mr. Hudkins has over 34 years experience in systems engineering and engineering 

management, served as the Chief Engineer for the Shuttle Program, and was the Shuttle Orbiter Program Director. 

Kenneth D. Cameron

Principal Engineer

Mr. Kenneth D. Cameron is the NESC Principal Engineer serving at Langley Research Center. Mr. Cameron 

came to the NESC after 7 years in private industry and a career in the U.S. Marine Corps. Mr. Cameron has 

over 24 years experience in aeronautics and astronautics as a Naval Aviator, Test Pilot, and Astronaut and is the 

veteran of three Space Shuttle missions: Pilot of STS-37 and Commander of STS-56 and STS-74. 

Clinton H. Cragg 

Principal Engineer

Mr. Clinton H. Cragg is a Principal Engineer with the NESC at Langley Research Center. Mr. Cragg came to 

the NESC after retiring from the U.S. Navy. Mr. Cragg served as the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Ohio

and later as the Chief of Current Operations, U.S. European Command. Mr. Cragg has over 26 years experience 

in supervision, command, and ship-borne nuclear safety.

NESC Principal Engineers

36 NESC
Dr. Charles E. Harris

Principal Engineer

Dr. Charles E. Harris is a Principal Engineer in the NESC at Langley Research Center (LaRC). Prior to joining 

the NESC, Dr. Harris was the Director of the National Institute of Aerospace Management Office at LaRC. 

Dr. Harris has over 32 years experience in aerospace engineering, structures and materials, and structural mechanics.

Management and Technical Support Office

Stan C. Newberry

Manager, Management, and Technical Support Office (former) 

Mr. Stan C. Newberry was the former Manager of the Management and Technical Support Office at Langley 

Research Center prior to becoming the Deputy Center Director at Ames Research Center. Mr. Newberry came 

to the NESC from his position as NASA Representative to the Headquarters Air Force Space Command. Mr. 

Newberry has spent much of his career with NASA managing high-value programs.

Systems Engineering Office

Dawn M. Schaible

Acting Manager, Systems Engineering Office

Ms. Dawn M. Schaible is Acting Manager of the NESC Systems Engineering Office at Langley Research Center. Ms. Schaible is detailed to the NESC from her position as Technical Assistant to the Director, International 

Space Station/Payload Processing Directorate at Kennedy Space Center. Ms. Schaible has over 17 years experience in systems engineering, integration, and ground processing for the Space Shuttle and International Space 

Station Programs.
Derrick J. Cheston

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Derrik J. Cheston is the NESC Chief Engineer for Glenn Research Center (GRC). Mr. Cheston joined the 

NESC from his prior position as Chief of the Thermal/Fluids Systems Branch. Mr. Cheston has 20 years experience in aerospace engineering and management, including mechanical design and testing and thermal/fluids 

analysis.

Dr. Michael S. Freeman

NESC Chief Engineer

Dr. Michael S. Freeman is the NESC Chief Engineer at Ames Research Center (ARC). Dr. Freeman joined the 

NESC from ARC where he served as the ARC Primary Representative to the NASA Software Working Group. 

Dr. Freeman has spent his NASA career primarily engaged in developing the International Space Station.

NESC Chief Engineers Office

T. Randy Galloway

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. T. Randy Galloway is the NESC Chief Engineer at Stennis Space Center (SSC). Mr. Galloway came to the 

NESC from SSC where he led the Propulsion Test Operations Division. Mr. Galloway has 18 years experience 

in space flight hardware, primarily in the International Space Station.

Dr. Michael G. Gilbert

NESC Chief Engineer

Dr. Michael G. Gilbert is the NESC Chief Engineer at Langley Research Center (LaRC). Before joining the 

NESC, he was Head of the LaRC Systems Management Office. Dr. Gilbert has over 27 years of engineering, 

research, and management experience with aircraft, missile, spacecraft, Space Shuttle, and International Space 

Station Programs.

38 NESC
Michael Hagopian

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Michael Hagopian is the NESC Chief Engineer at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Mr. Hagopian 

came to the NESC from his position as Associate Chief of the Mechanical Systems Division at GSFC. Mr. 

Hagopian has over 20 years experience in the development of space and Earth science satellites.

David A. Hamilton

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. David A. Hamilton is the NESC Chief Engineer at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Mr. Hamilton came to the 

NESC from JSC where he served as Chief of the Shuttle/Station Engineering Office and also as the Chairman 

of the Shuttle Chief Engineers Council. Mr. Hamilton has over 37 years combined experience in NASA manned 

space flight programs, including Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, ISS, Shuttle, and Mir.

Danny D. Johnston

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Danny D. Johnston is the NESC Chief Engineer at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Prior to joining 

the NESC, Mr. Johnston was a Senior Staff Engineer in the Engineering Directorate at MSFC. Mr. Johnston 

has over 37 years combined experience in NASA programs, including Apollo J2 engines, guidance, navigation 

and control in Apollo and Skylab, Hubble Space Telescope, Chandra, and Space Shuttle.

Michael W. Kehoe

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Michael W. Kehoe is the NESC Chief Engineer at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). Prior to joining 

the NESC, Mr. Kehoe served at DFRC as the Center Chief Engineer and System Management Office Director. 

Mr. Kehoe has over 30 years experience in aeronautical engineering, primarily in experimental flight test.

Matthew R. Landano

Acting NESC Chief Engineer (former) 

Mr. Matthew R. Landano is the NESC Chief Engineer at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Mr. 

Landano came to the NESC from the Office of Safety and Mission Success where he served as Director. Mr. 

Landano has over 35 years at JPL where he worked on Viking, Voyager, and Galileo spacecraft design and 

management.

NESC 39
Timmy R. Wilson

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Timmy R. Wilson is the NESC Chief Engineer at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Prior to joining NESC, 

Mr. Wilson served as Deputy Chief Engineer for Shuttle Processing at KSC. Mr. Wilson has over 23 years of 

engineering and management experience supporting the Space Shuttle Program.

NESC Discipline Expert Office

Frank H. Bauer

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Frank H. Bauer is the NESC Discipline Expert for Guidance Navigation and Control (GNC) systems and 

is resident at Goddard Space Fight Center (GSFC). Mr. Bauer came to the NESC from the Mission Engineering 

and Systems Analysis Division at GSFC where he served as the division’s Chief Engineer. Mr. Bauer has 25 years 

experience in GNC as well as extensive experience in space borne applications of global positioning systems.

Dr. Edward R. Generazio

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Edward R. Generazio is the NESC Discipline Expert for Nondestructive Evaluation and is resident at 

Langley Research Center (LaRC). Dr. Generazio came to the NESC after serving as the Branch Head of LaRC 

Nondestructive Evaluation Sciences Branch and also was responsible for executing the NASA Office of Safety 

and Mission Assurance Agency-wide Nondestructive Evaluation Program. Dr. Generazio has over 21 years experience in Nondestructive Evaluation.

George D. Hopson

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. George D. Hopson is the NESC Discipline Expert for Propulsion and is resident at Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC). Mr. Hopson came to the NESC from the Space Shuttle Main Engine Project Office where 

he served as Director. Mr. Hopson has over 42 years combined experience in Space Shuttle main engine, space 

propulsion, space systems dynamics, and project management.

40 NESC
Robert A. Kichak

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Robert A. Kichak is the NESC Discipline Expert for Power and Avionics and is resident at Goddard Space 

Flight Center (GSFC). Mr. Kichak came to the NESC from the Electrical Engineering Division at GSFC where 

he served as the division’s Chief Engineer. Mr. Kichak has over 35 years experience in spacecraft power, electrical, and avionics systems.

Julie A. Kramer White

NESC Discipline Expert

Ms. Julie A. Kramer White is currently the NESC Discipline Expert for Mechanical Analysis and is resident at 

Johnson Space Center (JSC). Prior to the NESC, Ms. Kramer White served as the Chief Engineer for Orbiter 

Maintenance Down Period in the Orbiter Engineer Office at JSC. Ms. Kramer White has over 13 years combined experience in Shuttle and International Space Station structures and mechanics.

Steven G. Labbe

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Steven G. Labbe is the NESC Discipline Expert for Flight Sciences and is resident at Johnson Space Center 

(JSC). Prior to the NESC, Mr. Labbe served as Chief of the Applied Aeroscience and Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch at JSC. Mr. Labbe has over 20 years experience in aerodynamics research applied to programs 

that include Space Shuttle and X-38.

John P. McManamen

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. John P. McManamen is the NESC Discipline Expert for Mechanical Systems and is resident at Johnson 

Space Center (JSC). Prior to the NESC, Mr. McManamen served in a dual role capacity as the Engineering 

Directorate’s Chief Engineer of the International Space Station and as Deputy Chief of the Shuttle/Station 

Engineering Office. Mr. McManamen has over 17 years experience in mechanical systems of the Orbiter and 

International Space Station.

Dr. Cynthia H. Null

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Cynthia H. Null is the NESC Discipline Expert for Human Factors and is resident at Ames Research 

Center (ARC). Prior to the NESC, Dr. Null was a scientist in the Human Factors Division and Deputy Program Manager of the Space Human Factors Engineering Project. Dr. Null has 18 years experience lecturing 

on Human Factors and another 13 years experience in Human Factors applied to NASA programs.

NESC 41
Dr. Robert S. Piascik

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Robert S. Piascik is the NESC Discipline Expert for Materials and is resident at Langley Research Center 

(LaRC). Dr. Piascik came to the NESC from the LaRC Mechanics of Materials Branch and the Metals and 

Thermal Structures Branch where he served as a Senior Materials Scientist. Dr. Piascik has over 20 years experience in the commercial nuclear power industry and over 14 years experience in basic and applied materials 

research for several NASA programs.

Dr. Ivatury S. Raju

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Ivatury S. Raju is the NESC Discipline Expert for of Structures and is resident at Langley Research Center 

(LaRC). Dr. Raju was the Senior Technologist in the LaRC Structures and Materials Competency prior to 

joining the NESC. Dr. Raju has over 29 years experience in structures, structural mechanics, and structural 

integrity.

Henry A. Rotter

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Henry A. Rotter is the NESC Discipline Expert for Fluids, Life Support, and Thermal Systems and is resident at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Mr. Rotter joined the NESC from the JSC Crew and Thermal Systems 

Division and the Space Launch Initiative Program, where he was Engineering Manager and Orbital Space Plane 

Team Leader for the life support and active thermal control teams. Mr. Rotter has over 37 years of life support 

and active thermal control systems experience during the Apollo, Shuttle, and Orbital Space Plane Programs.

Steven S. Scott

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Steven S. Scott is the NESC Discipline Expert for Software and is resident at Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC). Prior to joining the NESC, Mr. Scott served as the Chief Engineer in the Applied Engineering and 

Technology Directorate at GSFC. Mr. Scott has over 14 years experience in satellite software engineering.

42 NESC
Additional information can be found at <http://www.nesc.nasa.gov>.

All general questions and requests for NESC technical reviews should be sent to: nesc@nasa.gov

If you would like to submit a technical request anonymously, please mail it to:

NESC

NASA Langley Research Center

Mail Stop 118

Hampton, VA 23681

Media inquiries should be directed to:

Keith Henry

H.K.Henry@nasa.gov

NASA Field Center Contacts

Each NASA Field Center has a local NESC representative who serves as a point of contact for Center-based issues 

related to the NESC. Find information for your local contact through the NASA X.500 directory.

.

Future Opportunities within NESC

NASA employees interested in supporting the NESC can also contact the NESC Chief Engineers located at each 

Center to inquire about NESC opportunities.

When new positions are made available within the NESC, you can find out about them through the NASAJobs 

Web site located at <http://nasajobs.nasa.gov/>.

NASA Ames Michael S. Freeman 

NASA Dryden Michael W. Kehoe

NASA Glenn Derrick J. Cheston 

NASA Goddard Michael Hagopian

Jet Propulsion Laboratory Brian Muirhead 

NASA Johnson David A. Hamilton

NASA Kennedy Timmy R. Wilson

NASA Langley Michael G. Gilbert

NASA Marshall Danny D. Johnston 

NASA Stennis T. Randy Galloway

NP-2004-11-51-LaRC