2023 IL App (4th) 220982-U 

NO. 4-22-0982 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JATTERIUS L. YANKAWAY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Peoria County 

No. 20CF212 

Honorable 

Kevin W. Lyons, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Turner and Knecht concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Counsel was not ineffective for filing a speedy trial demand under the wrong 

statute because defendant could not show counsel’s deficient performance caused

prejudice. 

(2) Defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated 

battery violated the one-act, one-crime rule because the State treated the shooting 

as a single act by not apportioning the offenses among the shots fired in the 

charging documents or at trial. 

(3) The trial court’s misapprehension of the minimum sentence for attempted first 

degree murder did not arguably influence its sentencing decision. 

(4) The trial court did not demonstrate judicial bias during sentencing. 

¶ 2 In April 2020, defendant, Jatterius L. Yankaway, was charged with attempted first 

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(A)(1) (West 2018)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2018)), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) (720 

FILED

October 20, 2023 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). After a trial, which began on September 19, 2022, the jury found 

defendant guilty of the charged offenses and found the State proved a 15-year sentencing 

enhancement for possessing a firearm while committing attempted first degree murder.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) he received ineffective assistance when counsel 

filed a speedy trial demand under the wrong statute after agreeing to multiple continuances, 

(2) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery violated the one-act, 

one-crime rule, (3) the trial court misapprehended the applicable sentence for attempted first 

degree murder, and (4) the court showed judicial bias during sentencing. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On March 20, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court entered an emergency order 

permitting circuit courts to continue trials indefinitely to prevent the spread of the novel 

COVID-19 virus. Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 20, 2020). The stay remained in effect until 

October 1, 2021. Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021). 

¶ 6 On April 9, 2020, the State charged defendant with attempted first degree murder, 

aggravated battery, and UPWF. Count I alleged defendant “personally discharged a firearm at 

Robert Hunter *** with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to *** Hunter,” causing great 

bodily harm. Count II alleged defendant knowingly discharged a firearm in Hunter’s direction 

without legal justification while committing a battery, “thereby causing an injury to *** Hunter 

by means of the discharging of said firearm.” Count III alleged defendant “knowingly had in his 

possession a firearm” after being previously convicted of a felony. 

¶ 7 On April 13, 2020, the State charged defendant with UPWF in Peoria County case 

No. 20-CF-238. The State elected to proceed on case No. 20-CF-238, and defendant pleaded 
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guilty on September 28, 2020. The trial court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. 

Defendant remained in custody during the subsequent proceedings.

¶ 8 A. Pretrial Continuances 

¶ 9 Turning to the case at issue, the trial court initially set the trial for January 25, 

2021. However, on January 14, 2021, the State asked for a continuance due to an unavailable 

witness. The court moved the trial date to April 26, 2021, over defense counsel’s objection. On 

April 8, 2021, the State requested a continuance because “there is some ballistics work that still 

needs to be done on the items of evidence that were collected.” Defense counsel did not object, 

and the trial was moved to August 30, 2021. 

¶ 10 On August 19, 2021, the State asked for a continuance because a 

COVID-19-related lockdown at an Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) facility rendered 

one of its witnesses unavailable. Defense counsel objected, asserting, “My client was planning to 

go to trial.” The court moved the trial date to November 15, 2021. 

¶ 11 On November 15, 2021, the trial court had three trials scheduled, and defense 

counsel was the attorney of record in each of them. The court doubted all three would be 

completed that day, and it suggested continuing defendant’s trial. After conferring with the 

parties, the court scheduled the trial for February 28, 2022.

¶ 12 On February 24, 2022, one of the State’s witnesses was unavailable due to 

another COVID-19-related DOC facility lockdown, and the trial court moved the trial date to

July 11, 2022. The court entered an order showing the parties moved for a continuance. Defense 

counsel filed an objection, arguing he “did not approve” of the continuance and it “did not toll 

the Defendant’s speedy trial rights.” 
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¶ 13 On June 29, 2022, the State moved for another continuance because two witnesses 

were unavailable. Defense counsel objected to the continuance. The trial court tried to determine

whether the case’s speedy trial clock was running, and if so, when it would expire. After 

conferring with the parties, the court concluded the clock was running, but neither the court nor 

the parties could determine its expiration date. The court set the trial for September 19, 2022, but 

it scheduled a status hearing on August 10, 2022, to review the speedy trial issue. 

¶ 14 On June 30, 2022, defense counsel filed a speedy trial demand under section 

103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 

2020)).

¶ 15 At the status hearing on August 10, 2022, the trial court stated, “I don’t think 

there is a speedy trial issue because [defendant] can’t get out anyway,” and it left the September 

trial date unchanged.

¶ 16 B. Motion to Dismiss 

¶ 17 On September 15, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a 

speedy trial violation occurred. The motion argued the speedy trial clock began to run on 

October 1, 2021, and the continuances granted on August 19, 2021, February 24, 2022, and June 

30, 2022, were not attributable to defendant. It alleged that, of the time between October 1, 2021, 

and the trial date of September 19, 2022, 228 days were not attributable to defendant and those 

228 days exceeded the 120-day limit under section 103-5 of the Criminal Code. The trial court 

denied the motion, finding a 160-day speedy trial period applied pursuant to section 3-8-10 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections (Intrastate Detainers Statute) (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2020)), and 

the trial fell within that time frame.

¶ 18 C. Attempted First Degree Murder Sentencing Range 
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¶ 19 On September 19, 2022, prior to trial, the State advised the trial court the 

sentencing range for attempted first degree murder was 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment, with an 

additional 15 or 20 years possible, depending on which enhancement the State chose to pursue. 

The State asserted, “I believe that upon conviction the People would only be asking for a 15-year 

possession of a firearm [enhancement],” and “I can represent now that upon conviction I would 

be adding 15 years.” Based on the 15-year enhancement, defendant faced a sentencing range of 

21 to 45 years for attempted first degree murder, and the court admonished defendant 

accordingly. 

¶ 20 D. Jury Trial

¶ 21 At trial, the evidence showed defendant and his accomplice, Jafari Robinson, shot 

Robert Hunter, defendant’s cousin, multiple times during the early hours of July 26, 2019. 

Hunter testified he attended a party that night and he left the party in a vehicle with defendant, 

Robinson, and two other individuals. When Hunter exited the vehicle, he turned around and saw 

defendant and Robinson standing on either side of the vehicle, holding firearms. Hunter saw 

“flashes” and heard gunshots. Hunter suffered gunshot wounds to his “lower abdomen, left lower 

thigh, left groin, left thumb, left pinky and middle finger, left forearm, and left biceps.” Due to

his injuries, Hunter lost one of his fingers, he can no longer have children, and he cannot walk 

and must use a wheelchair.

¶ 22 Officers discovered five rounds of spent .40-caliber cartridge cases at the scene of 

the shooting. After defendant’s arrest, officers found a .40-caliber handgun in the vehicle 

defendant was driving. Testing showed “very strong support” that defendant contributed DNA to 

the handgun’s grip and trigger. Dustin Johnson, a forensic scientist who testified as an expert in 
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the field of firearm identification, said two of the spent .40-caliber rounds discovered at the scene 

were fired from defendant’s .40-caliber handgun. 

¶ 23 At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted first degree 

murder, aggravated battery, and UPWF. The jury also found the State proved the 15-year 

enhancement for possessing a firearm while committing attempted first degree murder.

¶ 24 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The court denied the motion. 

¶ 25 E. Sentencing Hearing

¶ 26 On October 26, 2022, the matter proceeded to sentencing. During defendant’s

statement in allocution, the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: [Y]ou have the opportunity to say something in your own 

behalf, if you’d like to, before you get a sentence. I’m not suggesting you should 

or should not say anything, but if there’s anything you would like to[ ] say now 

would be the time. 

 Anything you’d like to say? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, Your Honor.

I want to take the time to let my little brother know that he’ll see what I’m 

going through right now and just be mindful of who you keep around you and 

what you do out there. Even if you is innocent, there’s still people ain’t going to 

look at it the same with you having a reputation. 

 I know I ain’t a bad person. I know you all said a lot in this court. I know I 

ain’t no bad person. I know I did a lot of good out there. I changed a lot of people 

life [sic], and I’m going to continue to do that. I’m going to continue to strive. 
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 Yeah, my best friend [(the victim)] came in here and he told him—he told 

a lie. And if you all feel like that’s the truth, that’s on you all. It’s deeper than the 

trial.

THE COURT: No. It’s not on us all. It’s on you. 

[DEFENDANT]: It’s deeper than the trial to me. This was—this is losing 

a family member and losing more family. I mean, it might be entertaining to you 

all, but— 

THE COURT: I don’t find it the least bit entertaining.

Go ahead.

[DEFENDANT]: It was different. So I want to see—I want you all to 

see—to my little brother, I want you to see how many people love me knowing 

that I was innocent. Just for they own pride, for they own thing, and I want—I 

want you to just really focus and pay attention. I want you all to pay attention. 

Look how many people ain’t in this courtroom right now. How many people’s life 

I changed. Focus on that. No matter how good you do, there’s going to be an 

outcome like this if you play around with the wrong people. And to that I 

would—forever I would be my brother[’s] keeper.

 That’s all I got to say. 

 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.” 

¶ 27 Before delivering its sentencing decision, the trial court made the following 

comments:

“[Y]ou murdered your cousin. 
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 So to say that somebody has a bad view of you comes as a surprise to no 

one. When you murder your cousin and your best friend or try to, that has a way 

of sticking around. 

 *** 

[Y]ou said during your release that you were trying to spend time with your son 

and, quote, just trying to stay alive. 

 When the probation officer asked for you to expand on that, you know, 

what’s that all about, he said in 2015, when you were sentenced to the DOC, you 

kept hearing about friends of yours being killed and locked up for serious 

offenses. And you went on to say that this made you start feeling somewhat 

depressed and have anxiety about your own safety when back in the community. 

 You, [defendant], are the person that the community needs to be afraid of, 

but, worse than that, your own family, your own family, and your own friend 

needed to be afraid of you. 

 Now, maybe, maybe your view or maybe the way you cope with this is to 

say that he was going to kill me first. I don’t see any evidence of that, but, either 

way, as difficult as this if for me to say, you are the reason prisons are built.” 

The court concluded, “I can’t think of another case off the top of my head where the Defendant 

has been so cavalier, not in a rude way, I think you’ve not been rude, here you’ve been cordial, 

for the most part, but it’s a shame that you picked a life of prison and not a life of Peoria.” 

¶ 28 The trial court sentenced defendant to 70 years’ imprisonment—44 years for 

attempted first degree murder and 26 years for aggravated battery, to be served consecutively. It 
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did not sentence defendant for UPWF, saying, “A finding will be entered on the [UPWF] in 

Count 3, but judgment will not be entered.” In delivering its sentencing decision, the court stated: 

“[I]t’s the order and judgment of the Court that the Defendant *** be sentenced in 

Count 1, attempt first-degree murder, a Class X felony, to a term in [DOC] of 44 

years. That it be followed by a period of three years of mandatory supervised 

release known as parole. That it be served at its 85 percent rate.

 It will be mandatorily consecutive to Count 2 as a matter of law. 44 years 

being a 26-year minimum because it’s a 20-year tack-on with a six-year

minimum. 44 years in total. It should be served at the mandatory consecutive rate 

in Count 2. Judgment is entered on Count 1. 

 On Count 2, for aggravated battery, for 26 years, and that that be served 

with three years of mandatory supervised release as well.”

¶ 29 On November 7, 2022, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which 

the trial court denied. 

¶ 30 This appeal followed. 

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Defendant argues (1) he received ineffective assistance when defense counsel did 

not file a speedy trial demand until June 30, 2022, and he failed to file the demand under the 

Intrastate Detainers Statute; (2) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated 

battery violated the one-act, one-crime rule; (3) the trial court misapprehended the minimum 

sentence defendant faced for attempted first degree murder; and (4) the court denied defendant a 

fair sentencing hearing by demonstrating judicial bias. We disagree. 
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¶ 33 A. Defendant Cannot Show Defense Counsel’s Deficient Performance Caused 

Prejudice

¶ 34 While defendant possesses both a statutory and constitutional speedy trial right, 

this appeal involves only his statutory right. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2022); U.S. Const., 

amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 8. When an incarcerated individual faces more than 

one charge in the same county, they “shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus 

pending within 160 days.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) (West 2022). The 160-day speedy trial timeline

also applies “to persons committed to any institution or facility or program in the [DOC] who 

have untried complaints, charges[,] or indictments pending.” 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2022). 

Such a person must file an unambiguous speedy trial demand meeting the Intrastate Detainers 

Statute’s requirements. See People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 428, 639 N.E.2d 550, 555 (1994); 

People v. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d 57, 65-67, 923 N.E.2d 292, 297-98 (2010). “[A] mere objection 

to delay does not suffice to invoke the statutory speedy-trial right. Rather, the defendant must 

make an objection specifically by demanding trial.” People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 35, 

202 N.E.3d 890. 

¶ 35 Defendant argues defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he did not 

file a speedy trial demand under the Intrastate Detainers Statute or object on speedy trial grounds 

when the trial court granted continuances on August 19, 2021, November 15, 2021, February 24, 

2022, and June 30, 2022. Defendant insists that had counsel filed a timely speedy trial demand 

under the proper statute and objected to the State’s continuance requests, the 228 days allegedly 

not attributable to defendant between October 1, 2021, when our supreme court lifted the

emergency order, and trial date on September 19, 2022, would have constituted a statutory 

speedy trial violation. 
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¶ 36 Defendant was subject to the Intrastate Detainers Statute because he was 

incarcerated when the State proceeded on the charges in the case below. See 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 

(West 2022). Defense counsel did not file a speedy trial demand until June 30, 2022, and he filed 

it under section 103-5 of the Criminal Code rather than the Intrastate Detainers Statute. Because 

counsel did not file the demand under the proper statute, the 160-day limit did not begin to run. 

See Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428-30. 

¶ 37 When faced with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the 

two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Thomas, 

2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 10, 93 N.E.3d 664. “To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 

150815, ¶ 10. To establish deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate counsel’s 

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 

150815, ¶ 10. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that, “but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, 

¶ 11. “A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test and a failure to satisfy any one 

of the prongs precludes a finding of ineffectiveness.” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35, 

25 N.E.3d 601. 

¶ 38 We find instructive our decisions in People v. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d 732, 601 

N.E.2d 1317 (1992), and People v. Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 601 N.E.2d 1307 (1992). 

Jackson and Willis involved codefendants represented by the same defense counsel, both of 

whom argued counsel was ineffective for filing a speedy trial demand under section 103-5 of the 
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Criminal Code rather than the Intrastate Detainers Statute. See Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 736; 

Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. Both defendants were incarcerated for 210 days between 

counsel’s speedy trial demand and the trial’s start date. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 739; 

Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1068. Both insisted counsel’s allegedly deficient performance

prejudiced them because the 160-day speedy trial limit would have expired if counsel had filed a 

demand under the proper statute. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 736-40; Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 

1065-69. 

¶ 39 In both Jackson and Willis, we found counsel’s performance deficient. While 

counsel insisted he did not know the defendants were incarcerated when he filed his speedy trial 

motion, the record available to him showed they were. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 737; Willis, 

235 Ill. App. 3d at 1066. We determined “counsel should have known [the Intrastate Detainers 

Statute] governed [the defendants’] right to a speedy trial,” and therefore counsel’s actions “fell 

below a reasonably competent standard.” Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 738; see Willis, 235 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1067. 

¶ 40 However, we found the defendants failed to demonstrate prejudice because “the 

record [did] not support the conclusion that if defense counsel had filed the appropriate 

speedy-trial demand the State would not have brought defendant to trial within 160 days.” 

Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740; see Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. We emphasized that a 

prejudice finding would be wholly speculative, finding, “We cannot presume the State would not 

have prosecuted defendant within the required time. We simply do not know what would have 

happened had defense counsel filed a proper intrastate detainers motion.” Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 

at 1069; see Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740. 
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¶ 41 A notable factual difference exists between those cases and the one at issue. In 

Jackson, we observed, “The State’s brief indicates defendant’s trial was not delayed because of

case backlog.” Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740. We found the State chose not to try the 

defendants within 160 days “because [the State] knew defense counsel erroneously cited section 

103-5 of the Code, rather than [the Intrastate Detainers Statute], and did not fulfill the terms of 

the latter section in requesting a speedy trial.” Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740. We denounced 

the State’s decision as “an inappropriate reliance on the procedural requirements of [the 

Intrastate Detainers Statute], particularly when the information that would have been contained 

in a proper demand was already known to the prosecutor.” Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740. 

Here, neither the record nor the briefs suggest the State inappropriately exploited defense 

counsel’s mistaken belief regarding the applicable speedy trial time frame. Instead, the record 

suggests the State, defense counsel, and the trial court all operated under similar

misunderstandings regarding the speedy trial time frame during the hearing on June 30, 2022. 

¶ 42 Nevertheless, we reach the same conclusion here as we did in Jackson and Willis. 

Defendant was incarcerated for the duration of the proceedings below. Defense counsel’s 

performance fell below a reasonably competent standard because he should have known the 

Intrastate Detainers Statute governed defendant’s speedy trial right. See Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 

3d at 738; Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. However, the record does not support the conclusion 

that if defense counsel filed a speedy trial demand under the proper statute, defendant would not 

have been brought to trial within 160 days. See Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740; Willis, 235 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1069. We simply do not know what would have happened if defense counsel filed a 

proper intrastate detainers motion earlier in the process. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740; Willis, 

235 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. Therefore, defendant cannot satisfy Strickland’s second prong by 
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showing a reasonable probability exists the proceeding’s result would have been different but for 

counsel’s error in preparing defendant’s speedy trial demand. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 740; 

Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance argument fails. 

See Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35. 

¶ 43 B. Defendant’s Convictions for Attempted First Degree Murder and Aggravated x 

Battery Violated the One-Act, One-Crime Rule 

¶ 44 Next, defendant argues we must vacate his aggravated battery conviction for 

violating the one-act, one crime rule. While defendant forfeited this issue by not raising it during 

the proceedings below or including it in a posttrial motion, he contends it constitutes 

second-prong plain error. 

¶ 45 The plain error doctrine permits us to review unpreserved error in two instances: 

“(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely 

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the 

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or 

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of 

the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless 

of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48, 23 

N.E.3d 325. 

“Under the second prong of plain-error review, prejudice to the defendant is presumed because 

of the importance of the right involved, regardless of the strength of the evidence.” (Emphasis in 

original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 939 

N.E.2d 403, 413 (2010). “[O]ne-act, one crime violations fall within the second prong of the 
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plain error doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it challenges the integrity of the judicial 

process.” People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 10, 104 N.E.3d 1102. 

¶ 46 “[A] criminal defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses when those 

offenses are all based on precisely the same physical act.” Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. When 

conducting a one-act, one-crime analysis, we first “ascertain[ ] whether the defendant’s conduct 

consists of a single physical act or separate acts.” Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12. An act is “any 

overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.” People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 

551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (1977). If the defendant committed multiple acts, we must 

then “determine[ ] whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. [Citation.] If none of 

the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple convictions are proper.” Coats, 2018 IL 

121926, ¶ 12. We review de novo whether a one-act, one-crime violation occurred. Coats, 2018 

IL 121926, ¶ 12. 

¶ 47 1. The State Did Not Apportion the Offenses Among the Different Gunshots 

¶ 48 Defendant argues his attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery 

convictions were based on the same act, and he claims the State did not apportion the offenses 

into separate conduct. Relying on People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001), 

defendant contends we should not distinguish between the various gunshots because the State did 

not make that distinction in the charging documents or at trial. 

¶ 49 In Crespo, the defendant stabbed the victim three times, but the State did not 

differentiate between the different stab wounds when charging the defendant with armed 

violence and two counts of aggravated battery. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 342-43. Rather than 

apportioning the offenses among the three stab wounds, the indictment treated the stabbings as a 

single infliction of bodily harm and “charge[d] [the] defendant with the same conduct under 
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different theories of criminal culpability.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 342. After reviewing the 

indictment and the State’s closing argument to the jury, our supreme court determined “the 

State’s theory at trial *** amply supports the conclusion that the intent of the prosecution was to 

portray [the] defendant’s conduct as a single attack.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 343-44. The court 

found the defendant’s convictions for armed violence and aggravated battery with a deadly 

weapon violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine, and it vacated his conviction for aggravated 

battery with a deadly weapon. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 344-46. 

¶ 50 In People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685, 693, 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (2002), 

the Second District applied Crespo to an incident involving multiple shooters, after which the 

defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm. 

The Second District summarized Crespo’s finding thusly: “[A]lthough the multiple stabbings 

could have supported the separate convictions, the State did not apportion the crimes among the 

various wounds, either in the indictment or at trial. Because the State portrayed the defendant’s 

conduct as a single attack, multiple convictions were untenable.” Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 

693. The Second District found Crespo controlled because, while the defendant and his 

accomplice fired multiple shots at multiple victims, the State “did not specify which shot 

supported which charge” in the indictment or at trial. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693. The 

Second District concluded, “Thus, against each victim, defendant committed a single act that 

supported only a single conviction,” and it vacated the defendant’s aggravated discharge of a 

firearm convictions. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693. 

¶ 51 We find Crespo controls. While defendant and his accomplice fired multiple 

gunshots, which would have supported the different charges if distinguished in the charging 

documents or at trial (see Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 342, 345; Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693), the 
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State failed to apportion the offenses to the various gunshots fired, “and it is improper for this 

court to do so now on appeal.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345. On appeal, the State argues the 

shooting consisted of multiple acts because the jury was instructed on defendant’s accountability 

for his accomplice’s actions. However, the State fails to distinguish Crespo and Beltran, which 

require us to look to the proceedings below to identify how the State treated the conduct at issue. 

See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345 (“[T]he indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat 

the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained.”); 

Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693 (“Because the State portrayed the defendant’s conduct as a single 

attack, multiple convictions were untenable.”). Beltran also dealt with a shooting involving a 

defendant and an accomplice, finding the defendant’s accountability for his accomplice’s actions 

did not prevent his convictions from violating the one-act, one-crime rule. See Beltran, 327 Ill. 

App. 3d at 692-93. We agree with Beltran and reach the same conclusion.

¶ 52 During the proceedings below, the State treated the shooting as a single act of 

bodily harm, as it did not apportion the charged offenses to the gunshots fired or the multiple 

injuries inflicted. See Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693. Accordingly, defendant’s conduct 

constituted a single act, which cannot sustain multiple convictions. See Coats, 2018 IL 121926, 

¶ 11. We vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated battery, as attempted first 

degree murder is the more serious offense. See Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 693. 

¶ 53 2. Sentencing on Defendant’s UPWF Conviction 

¶ 54 The State contends we should remand this matter for defendant to be sentenced on 

his UPWF conviction if we find a one-act, one-crime violation occurred. Defendant does not 

challenge this contention. The jury found defendant guilty of UPWF, but the trial court did not 

impose a sentence for it. The final judgment in a criminal case is the imposition of a sentence, 
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and the sentence is a necessary part of a complete judgment of guilt. People v. Robinson, 267 Ill. 

App. 3d 900, 907, 642 N.E.2d 1317, 1322 (1994). “In the absence of a sentence, a judgment of 

conviction is not final.” Robinson, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 907. “The proper remedy for a failure to 

enter judgment is to remand to the circuit court for entry of judgment.” Robinson, 267 Ill. App. 

3d at 907. Because the court did not sentence defendant for his UPWF conviction, remand for 

sentencing on that count is necessary. See People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70, 78, 533 N.E.2d 802, 

806 (1988) (remanding the matter “for sentencing on the second conviction because sentencing 

is a necessary component of a judgment of conviction”). 

¶ 55 We quickly note remand for sentencing on defendant’s UPWF conviction raises 

no one-act, one-crime concerns, as defendant performed multiple acts by possessing a handgun 

and then firing it at Hunter. See King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. The State distinguished those actions in 

the charging documents, and neither attempted first degree murder nor UPWF is a 

lesser-included offense of the other. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(A)(1), 24-1.1(a) (West 2020); 

Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12. 

¶ 56 C. The Trial Court’s Misapprehension of the Sentencing Range Did Not Arguably 

Influence Its Sentencing Decision

¶ 57 Defendant also argues the trial court misapprehended the minimum sentence for 

attempted first degree murder, and the alleged misapprehension influenced the court’s sentencing 

decision. As with his one-act, one-crime claim, defendant acknowledges he did not properly 

preserve these arguments, but he asks us to review them for second-prong plain error. 

¶ 58 To establish second-prong plain error in the sentencing context, “a defendant must 

first show that a clear or obvious error occurred. [Citation.] Then, the defendant must show that 

*** the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” People v. 
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Fisher, 2023 IL App (4th) 220717, ¶ 29. “A misstatement of the understanding of the minimum 

sentence by the trial judge necessitates a new sentencing hearing only when it appears that the 

mistaken belief of the judge arguably influenced the sentencing decision.” People v. Eddington, 

77 Ill. 2d 41, 48, 394 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (1979). 

¶ 59 In Eddington, the trial court erroneously believed the minimum sentence 

applicable was 4 years’ imprisonment, though it ultimately imposed a 20-year sentence. 

Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 48; see People v. Eddington, 64 Ill. App. 3d 650, 655, 381 N.E.2d 835, 

839 (1978). In reaching its conclusion, our supreme court distinguished People v. Moore, 69 Ill. 

2d 520, 372 N.E.2d 666 (1978), where “the trial judge imposed a 4-year minimum sentence term 

on a defendant, thinking that the law required a 4-year minimum term.” Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 

48 (citing Moore, 69 Ill. 2d at 521-24). The Eddington court found, “Nothing like that occurred 

here. The [trial] judge here expressly stated that ‘this isn’t the minimal kind of situation.’ ” 

Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 48. Our supreme court affirmed the defendant’s sentence, finding, 

“Although the trial [judge] did refer, in his evaluation of the case for sentencing purposes, to his 

mistaken belief as to the minimum sentence required, there is no indication here that the 4-year 

minimum term was used by the trial judge as a reference point ***.” Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 48. 

¶ 60 Eddington applies here. The jury found the State met its burden regarding the 

15-year sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm while committing attempted first 

degree murder. Based on the 15-year enhancement, defendant faced a sentencing range of 21 to

45 years’ imprisonment for attempted first degree murder. However, after imposing a 44-year

sentence for attempted first degree murder, the trial court erroneously said defendant faced a 26-

year minimum for that offense “because it’s a 20-year tack-on with a six-year minimum.”

Notably, the court delivered its attempted first degree murder sentencing decision before 
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demonstrating its mistaken belief. It also expressed no intent to sentence defendant to the 

minimum or maximum sentence, nor did it seek to impose a sentence directly tied to either 

extreme. We find the court did not use its misapprehension of the applicable minimum sentence 

as a reference point, and its misstatement satisfied neither plain error prong. See Eddington, 77 

Ill. 2d at 48. 

¶ 61 Defendant analogizes this case to People v. Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 679 

N.E.2d 867 (1997). In Hausman, the trial court erroneously stated the applicable minimum 

sentence for aggravated battery was three years, rather than two years, and it imposed 

consecutive three-year prison terms. Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1070-71. In doing so, the 

court declared, “[E]ven though I think your record mandates a much longer sentence, I am going 

to impose the minimum sentence of three (3) years in the [DOC].” (Emphasis added.) Hausman, 

287 Ill. App. 3d at 1071. Based on the court’s statements, we vacated the defendant’s sentence 

and remanded for a new sentencing hearing because “it arguably influenced the judge’s 

sentencing decision.” Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. 

¶ 62 Hausman is distinguishable. There, the trial court’s statements clearly and 

undeniably influenced its sentencing decision—the court sought to impose the minimum 

sentence, it believed the offense carried a three-year minimum sentence, and thus it sentenced the 

defendant to three years’ imprisonment. See Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1070-71. The same 

was true in Moore, where the trial court imposed a four-year sentence because it believed that 

was the minimum. Moore, 69 Ill. 2d at 521. Conversely, the trial court here declared the 

incorrect minimum sentence for attempted first degree murder, but it did not use that incorrect 

minimum as a reference point when sentencing defendant. See Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 48. The 

court’s mistaken belief regarding the applicable minimum sentence for attempted first degree 
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murder did not arguably influence its sentencing decision. See Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d at 48. 

Accordingly, plain error did not occur. 

¶ 63 D. The Trial Court Did Not Demonstrate Judicial Bias During Sentencing 

¶ 64 Finally, defendant argues the trial court exhibited judicial bias against him, 

thereby denying him a fair sentencing hearing. “A sentencing hearing is fundamentally unfair 

when the proceeding is affected by judicial bias.” People v. Montgomery, 2023 IL App (3d) 

200389, ¶ 28. “Trial judges are presumed to be impartial, and the party claiming bias bears the 

burden of overcoming this presumption.” Montgomery, 2023 IL App (3d) 200389, ¶ 28. To 

prevail on a judicial bias claim, a defendant must show the court exhibited “animosity, hostility, 

ill will, or distrust” toward the defendant. People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 181, 390 N.E.2d 867, 

872 (1979). “Allegations of judicial bias must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in 

terms of the trial judge’s specific reaction to the events taking place.” People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 

2d 247, 277, 793 N.E. 2d 1, 19 (2001). We review de novo whether a trial court’s conduct 

constitutes bias and requires reversal. Fisher, 2023 IL App (4th) 220717, ¶ 31. 

¶ 65 As evidence of the trial court’s purported bias, defendant highlights comments 

made during sentencing. During defendant’s statement in allocution, defendant accused Hunter 

of lying during his testimony, saying, “[M]y best friend came in here and *** he told a lie. And 

if you all feel like that’s the truth, that’s on you all. It’s deeper than the trial.” The court briefly 

interjected, responding, “No. It’s not on us all. It’s on you.” When defendant countered, “I mean, 

it might be entertaining to you all,” the court replied, “I don’t find it the least bit entertaining.”

Before delivering defendant’s sentence, the court laid out the factors it considered in reaching its 

decision. In doing so, the court commented, “[Defendant is] the person that the community 
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needed to be afraid of,” “[defendant is] the reason prisons are built,” and “I can’t think of another 

case off the top of my head where the Defendant has been so cavalier.”

¶ 66 When viewed in context, these statements do not demonstrate bias against 

defendant. During his statement in allocution, defendant refused to accept responsibility for his 

actions and portrayed himself as a victim. Defendant blamed the trial court for believing 

Hunter’s testimony and suggested the court found the process “entertaining.” The court quickly 

refuted both assertions without belaboring either point. The court told defendant the community 

needed to fear him in response to defendant’s claim he experienced anxiety and feared for his 

own safety when in the community. After noting Hunter, defendant’s cousin, needed to fear 

defendant, the court declared, “[M]aybe the way you cope with this is to say that [Hunter] was 

going to kill me first. I don’t see any evidence of that, but, either way, as difficult as this is for 

me to say, you are the reason prisons are built.”

¶ 67 “The seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an 

appropriate sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 

200127, ¶ 50. Additionally, “trial courts may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse or lack of 

veracity in imposing a sentence, since those are factors which may have a bearing on the 

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Donlow, 

2020 IL App (4th) 170374, ¶ 84, 178 N.E.3d 1148; see People v. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 528, 499 

N.E.2d 422, 426 (1986) (“[A] continued protestation of innocence and a lack of remorse may 

convey a strong message to the trial judge that the defendant is an unmitigated liar and at 

continued war with society. Such impressions *** are proper factors to consider in imposing 

sentence.”). Here, the trial court responded to the seriousness of defendant’s crimes and the 

significance of his refusal to accept responsibility, which are proper considerations during 
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sentencing. See Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 50; Donlow, 2020 IL App (4th) 170374, 

¶ 84. 

¶ 68 Likewise, the record shows the trial court described defendant as “cavalier” 

because defendant’s record demonstrated a complete disregard for the law, as well as a 

preference for committing crimes rather than abiding by the rules of society. Specifically, the 

court said, “I can’t think of another case off the top of my head where the Defendant has been so 

cavalier, not in a rude way, I think you’ve not been rude, here you’ve been cordial, for the most 

part, but it’s a shame that you picked a life of prison and not a life of Peoria.” The court’s 

statements, in context, demonstrate it was responding to the offense’s seriousness, defendant’s 

commitment to a life of crime, and defendant’s refusal to take responsibility for his actions. They 

do not show “animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust” toward defendant. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d at 181. 

Accordingly, remand for a new sentencing hearing is not warranted. 

¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s attempted first degree murder 

conviction and sentence, vacate his aggravated battery conviction and sentence, and remand this 

matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of sentencing defendant for his UPWF conviction. 

¶ 71 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with instructions.