alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Exhibit 31.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Norman F. Swanton, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
of Warren Resources, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have:  (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,
as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting;  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over the financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
registrants board of directors:  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting. /s/ Norman F. SwantonNorman F. Swanton,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
 November 29, 2004 A signed original of this original statement required by Section 302 has been
provided to Warren Resources, Inc., and will be retained by Warren Resources,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request. 3
#### E. D. Prewitt *v.*Henry Kroop.

New Trial — Newly-discovered Evidence.

The newly-discovered testimony was parol and was to the only point litigated on the trial, and consisted of statements made by the party on his examination as a witness on a public trial, and was thereby rendered less difficult to discover.

APPEAL EROM JEEEERSON CIRCUIT COURT, COMMON PLEAS DIVISION.

“ The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the brick were bought by King, and for his benefit and use, and that Prewitt promised verbally to pay for them they must find for defendants.”

*8.*Harney, for Appellant.

January 21, 1867.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Peters:

The principle of law involved in this controversy was correctly presented to the jury in the instruction given, there being but one, and although we might incline to the opinion that the evidence preponderated against the verdict, still it certainly is not so clearly against the weight of evidence, which was conflicting, as to authorize us to reverse the judgment after the appellant’s motion for a new trial had been overruled by the judge who presided.

The newly-discovered testimony was parol, and was to the only point litigated on the trial. Moreover, it consisted of statements made by the party on his examination as a witness in a public trial, and thereby rendered less difficult to discover.

The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
#### Jas. Miller *v.*Geo. Poffinger.

Estoppel by Assertion Made in Answer, in Another Case — 'Explanatory Proof.

An assertion made in an answer, in another case, that the party held the absolute title to the property may be used against him in another action involving the same property, on which he claimed to hold a mortgage instead of an absolute title. But it does not operate as an estoppel, so as to conclude all explanatory proof to the contrary.

APPEAL EROM LARUE OIROUIT COURT.

February 1, 1867.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Kobertson :

The trial in this case seems to have been conducted on the principles, defined in the former opinion of this court, remanding the cause for a new trial. That opinion authorized the instructions given on the last trial for the appellee, and there was no error in refusing the appellant’s instruction No. 6 to the effect that the appellee’s answer claiming, in another case, to be a *iowj, fide*purchaser of Talbot’s slaves estopped him from now claiming only as mortgagee. Such an assertion of absolute title made in his answer, like any other declaration, made in any way to the same effect, was certainly evidence against him and was so used on the trial. But it did not, any more than an assertion or admission otherwise made by a party, operate as an estoppel and conclude all explanatory proof to the contrary.

There was no available error, therefore, in giving or withholding instructions.

*568
      *Read,*for Appellant.

*Johnson,*for Appellee.

Nor can we set aside the verdict as unauthorized by the evidence, which was of such character as to have authorized the jury to find for either party.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Judge Hardin did not sit in this case.
#### Damon Wesley WHITEHEAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Caroline MUDD, Warden; John Doe; Mary Ann Mudd, Nurse; Hayes, Officer; Jane Burns, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-5232.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Sept. 10, 2003.

Damon Wesley Whitehead, LaGrange, KY, pro se.

Before SILER, BATCHELDER, and-COOK, Circuit Judges.

*ORDER*

Damon Wesley Whitehead moves this court for the appointment of counsel on appeal from a district court judgment that dismissed his civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(l), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).

Whitehead filed his complaint in the district court alleging that unnamed people subjected him to physical abuse and psychological control. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivo*601lous or otherwise without merit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, plaintiff has submitted a brief including allegations similar to those he made in his complaint.

Upon de novo review, see *McGore v. Wrigglesworth,*114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.1997), we affirm the judgment for the reasons stated by the district court in its memorandum opinion entered January 22, 2003. Plaintiffs complaint is frivolous because he failed to present a claim with an arguable or rational basis in law or in fact. *See Neitzke v. Williams,*490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall,*898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir.1990).

Accordingly, the motion for counsel is denied, and the district court’s judgment is affirmed. *See*Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
#### The State, on the Relation, &c., *v.*Harvey and Others.—In error.

IN debt on bond conditioned for the performance of duties, the breaches must, by the act of 1847, be assigned in the declaration. Acts of 1847, p. 112.

*528But previously to that act, the plaintiff in such suit declared _ as on a common money bond, and assigned breaches in the replication, or suggested them on the record, as the case _ required. *The State*v. *Leonard et al.*6 Blackf. *173.*— The *State*v. *Votaw et al. May*term, 1846.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 24, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41516

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALVARO PRADO-ORTIZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:05-CR-349-ALL

--------------------

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Alvaro Prado-Ortiz (Prado) appeals the sentence he received

for illegally reentering the United States after deportation, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Prado argues that the district

court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines by characterizing

each of his prior state felony convictions for possession of

controlled substances as “aggravated felonies” for purposes of

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Prado’s argument is unavailing in

light of circuit precedent. See United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez,

130 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1997). Prado argues that this
No. 05-41516

-2-

circuit’s precedent is inconsistent with Jerome v. United States,

318 U.S. 101 (1943). Having preceded Hinojosa-Lopez, Jerome is

not “an intervening Supreme Court case explicitly or implicitly

overruling that prior precedent.” See United States v. Short,

181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999).

Prado also challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b) in

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Prado’s 

constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Prado argues

that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a

majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in

light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on

the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United

States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Prado properly concedes that his

argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit

precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further

review.

AFFIRMED.
#### Albert Edward GLINES, Appellee, v. James L. WADE, Commander 349th Material Airlift Wing; Major General Gonge, Commander 22nd Air Force; John L. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force; James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Appellants.

No. 76-1412.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

May 5, 1980.

Before GOODWIN and HUG, Circuit Judges, and PALMIERI*, District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Edmund L. Palmieri, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

ORDER

The above action is remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for further proceedings consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Brown, et al. v.*Glines, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 594, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980).
Exhibit 32.1 Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350 As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 I, Edward J. Quilty, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Derma Sciences, Inc., hereby certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2012 of Derma Sciences, Inc. (the Form 10-Q), based upon my best knowledge and belief, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Derma Sciences, Inc.  Dated: August 13, 2012

          

          /s/ Edward J. QuiltyEdward J. Quilty Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of BPK Resources, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 1) for the period ended December 31,
2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Cecile T. Coady, Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial   condition  and  result  of
               operations of the Company.


                                                 BPK RESOURCES, INC.



                                                 By:  /s/ Cecile T. Coady
                                                      -------------------
                                                        Cecile T. Coady
                                                        Treasurer

                                                 Date: April 12, 2004
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Commission of Fine Arts

The next meeting of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts is scheduled for 18 November 2010, at 10 a.m. in the Commission offices at the National Building Museum, Suite 312, Judiciary Square, 401 F Street, NW., Washington DC, 20001-2728. Items of discussion may include buildings, parks and memorials.

                    Draft agendas and additional information regarding the Commission are available on our Web site:                     *http://www.cfa.gov.*                     Inquiries regarding the agenda and requests to submit written or oral statements should be addressed to Thomas Luebke, Secretary, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, at the above address; by e-mailing                     *staff@cfa.gov;*                     or by calling 202-504-2200. Individuals requiring sign language interpretation for the hearing impaired should contact the Secretary at least 10 days before the meeting date.                

Dated: October 27, 2010 in Washington DC.

Thomas Luebke,

AIA Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2010-27616 Filed 11-1-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6330-01-M
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3046

_____________________________

CURTIS LEON RICHARDSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Marianne L. Aho, Judge.

June 11, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and RAY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Curtis Leon Richardson, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
No. 115.

#### Joseph J. Printup, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Daniel R. Mitchell, defendant.

[1.] At one term of a Court, a judgment was rendered against a party to which he did not except. At the next term, he moved that a different judgment should be entered, *nunc pro tunc,*in place of that judgment:: *JIM,*that the motion was properly over-ruled.

*587•[2.] Continuances for “ Providential causes,” are not to be charged against either party.

Motion, in Floyd Superior Court. Decided by Judge 'Trippe, December Term, 1855.

In this case, on the same being called in its order, plaintiff moved to charge against the defendant on the docket, a continuance which had been granted at the preceding term, and which the plaintiff had then insisted should be charged to him, but rvhich was not charged to him on the docket. The Court ■■refused the motion.

The plaintiff having announced himself ready, the defend-ant moved a continuance from Providential cause, on account of the absence of Warren Akin, Esq. one of his Counsel, ■from sickness.

The plaintiff not resisting the continuance of the case insisted, that as Mr. Akin ivas not the loading Counsel for the defendant, and as he had other Counsel, that the continuance . should be charged to the defendant.

The Judge remarking that he knew the value of Mr. Akin’s services in the case, and that he knew, personally, of his sickness, refused so to charge it, saying that it was the practice of that Court not to charge continuances for Provi- . dential cause.

To all these rulings of the Court, plaintiff excepts.

Underwood, for plaintiff in error.

Alexander, for defendant.

*By the Court.*

Benning, J.

delivering the opinion.

In respect to the continuance first granted, it seems that the plaintiff, at the time when it was granted, insisted that it should be charged against the defendant, but that the i-Oourt charged it against neither party. This was a decision. *588And if it was an erroneous one, and the plaintiff wished it corrected, he should have excepted to it and brought it before this Court, within the regular time allowed by law. No excuse is offered for' the failure to bring the case, thus, before this Court.

The motion made at the next term, to have the continuance charged *nunc pro tunc*against the defendant, and the exception to the refusal of the Court to grant that motion, were but an attempt to bring the decision of the preceding term in review before this Court. That is what they amount to.

[1.] Such a motion the Court was, of course, right in refusing.

Ought the second continuance to have been charged to the defendant ?

[2.] We think not. The ground of that continuance, was the absence of Mr. Akin, one of the Counsel for the defendant, and Mr. Akin’s absence was occasioned by illness; that is, the ground was “ Providential.” And the Act of 1854 declares, that continuances for Providential cause, shall not be charged against either party. *(Acts of*1854-’52.)
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MARION JACOBS.

May 2, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
No. 53.

#### Charles Clements, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Wm. P. Maloney, administrator, *&c.*defendant in error.

[1.] Where the verdict of a Jury is against an administrator, in his representative character, a judgment for costs should be entered against him in the same character.

Motion, in Fayette Superior Court. Decision by Judge O. 'Warner, September Term, 1854.

Maloney, as administrator of Phebe Ryle, filed a,bill against •one Nixon, as administrator of James Ryle, to have titles perfected to certain negroes, and for a distributive share of the estate. Nixon died, and Clements, as his administrator, was ■made a party. On the trial, the Jury decreed that titles to the negroes be considered as made, “ and that defendant pay the costs of said suit.” The answer of Clements, as administrator of Nixon, denied having any assets of Ryle’s estate in his hands. On the verdict of the Jury, judgment was entered •against Clements, individually, for the costs. A motion was made to set aside this judgment, and have it entered against him, in his representative character. The Court refused to' :grant the order, and this decision is assigned as error.

Tidwell & Fuller, for plaintiff in error.

Hiñe *k*Conner, for defendant in error.

*By the Court.*

Starnes, J.

delivering the opinion.

A very limited record presents the issue for our consideration in this case.

[1.] So far as we are capable of judging from that record, the verdict was obtained against the plaintiff in error, in his character of administrator. In that character, he had been .made a party to the bill, after the death of his intestate, and *290in place and stgad of the latter. He found the case in Court, and was not responsible, individually, for the acts or conduct which made it necessary for it to appear there. In the discharge of his duty, after he had been made the party defendant, he pleaded *plena administravit.*Under these circumstances, without negativing this plea and finding assets in his hands, the Jury, after decreeing title in the complainant to the negroes, claimed, find and decree “ that defendant pay the costs of said suit.”

The legal character of such a verdict is and can be nothing else, but a finding against Charles Clements in his representative character: for in such character he was made the defendant ; and as we have seen, the proceedings and the verdict show no other liability.

To have been in conformity with the verdict, the judgment for costs should have been entered up against the defendant in his representative character. But this was not done; and we think that the Court, ’ therefore, erred in refusing to set that judgment aside, and in not directing the judgment for costs to be entered *mine pro tunc*against the defendant in his representative character.

That this may be done, we reverse the judgment.