A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. H ill, Jr. Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Kelly A. Loy Andrew A. Kobe Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana

_______________________________________________________________ _______________ 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________ No. 82S00-1610-LW-576

C ARLTEZ T AYLOR , Appellant (Defendant),

v.

S TATE OF I NDIANA , Appellee (Plaintiff).

_________________________________ Appeal from the Vanderburgh C ircuit Court, No. 82C01-1512-MR-74 98 The Honorable David D. Kiely, Judge The Honorable Michael J. Cox, Magistrate

_________________________________ On Direct Appeal

_________________________________ December 5, 2017
Rush, Chief Justice. Seventeen-year-old Carltez Taylor was convicted of murder and c onspiracy to commit murder, and sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”). He appea ls his convictions, arguing that the State’s references to his nickname “Looney the Shooter” led to fundamental error, that the State untimely amended the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and that insufficient evidence supports his conspiracy to comm it murder conviction. He also ar gues that his LWOP sentence is2 inappropriate, violates the United States and Indiana Constitut ions’ proportionality requirements, and violates the Sixth Amendment because a jury never found a q ualifying aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject his first three arguments, revise h is sentence from LWOP to an aggregate eighty-year term, and d ecline to address his other ch allenges to LWOP.
Facts and Procedural History On the night after Thanksgiving in 2015, seventeen-year-old Car ltez Taylor went with a friend to hang out at D.G.’s house. D.G. and one of her friends —both teenage girls—were home on weekend passes from a juvenile detention center. D.G. knew T aylor as “Looney,” and introduced him that way to her mother, Lyn. Uncomfortable with Taylor and his friend, Lyn ordered the boys to leave. They w ent outside and smoked cigaret tes, but soon snuck back into the house and to the basement. Later that night, another teenag e boy arrived, bringing a 9mm H i-Point handgun. He handed it to one of the other boys, who removed the magazine an d handed the gun to Taylor. Taylor then put the magazine ba ck in the gun and stuck the Hi-P oint into his waistband. As the night wore on, D.G. texted J.W. (a recent fling) about h anging out and having sex. When Taylor found out, he called J.W. a “b****” and said he “wa sn’t s*** [and] wasn’t about nothing.” The three boys plotted about “b ing him” or “punki ng him out,” which D.G. described as fighting someone w ho does not want to fight. The rhetoric escalated. Taylor threatened to beat up D.G. unles s she got J.W. to come over. Afraid, D.G. began enticing J.W.—who was suspicious, repeatedly asking if it was a setup. But after D.G. lied that she was alone, J.W. ultimately agreed to m eet her at the corner near her house. J.W. and his nephew, T.S., met he r there shortly thereafter. D.G. asked J.W. and T.S. if they were “strapped” (had guns on t hem)—they did not. Then, D.G. kept them waiting at the corner for about ten minutes, sup posedly for her “sister.” But instead of a friend, a figure wearing blac k emerged from between two ho uses, with a hood snugly tied around his face. Seeing him, J.W. and T.S. walked the other way

. As the hooded person approached, D.G. recognized him as Taylor and watched him pull out the 9mm Hi-Point. When shots started flying—five or six in total—J.W. and T.S. took off3 running. They ran toward an alley, but when T.S. got there, he realized that J.W. was no longer with him. He returned to th e street and found J.W. lying on the sidewalk, shot in the back. T.S. then watched the shooter run past, recognizing him as Carl tez Taylor, an acquaintance he knew from playing basketball. As Taylor ran by J.W., he said “CTK b** **.” J.W. and his friends were known as the “cream team,” and “CTK” means “cream team killer.” Within minutes, J.W. died on the sidewalk fro m a single gunshot wound to the ba ck. Before learning J.W.’s fate, D.G. and Taylor ran back to her ho use. As they arrived, Taylor grabbed D.G., put the still-hot gun to her head, and told her t hat if she said anyt hing he would kill her. They returned to D.G.’s basement, where Taylor asked D.G. if he hit J.W. She told him that he did. Taylor then removed his hoodie and texted a friend to pray for him. He and the other teenage boys hid the gun and magazine in separate parts of the basement’s ceiling and made a large hole in the wall to hide inside. The next day, T.S.’s family told police that Taylor was the sho oter, and D.G. led detectives to the hoodie and the murder weapon. After DNA from the hoodie matched Taylor—leading to a warrant for his arrest—he turned himself in to police. Months l ater, when D.G. saw Taylor at juvenile court, he called her “t he police” and said he “should have killed [her] when he had the chance.” The State charged Taylor with murder, attempted murder, and con spiracy to commit murder. The State filed a sentencing enhancement for all three offenses based on Taylor’s use of a firearm, and sought LWOP based on the “committing murder by l ying in wait” aggravator. Just two days before trial, the State amended the conspiracy co unt to say that another teenager, not Taylor, supplied the handgun. Taylor objected tha t the amendment was untimely, but was overruled. Taylor also asked the trial court to prevent the State’s witnes ses from using his nickname “Looney the Shooter” because of its undue prejudice. The court preliminarily agreed, but offered to reconsider at trial. During trial, Taylor did not object whe n a detective referred to him as “Looney the Shooter,” nor when the State used the nickname in i ts closing argument.4 The jury found Taylor guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and not guilty of attempted murder. It also f ound him eligible for an enhanced sentence for using a firearm. At sentencing, the jury was specifically directed to consider T aylor’s age as a mitigating factor. Ultimately, the jury recommended a sentence of life wit hout parole. The court accepted the recommendation, sentencing Taylor to LWOP on the murder convict ion plus fifteen years for the firearm enhancement, and to a conc urrent thirty-five-year sente nce on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction. It then merged the enhancement and concurren t sentence into LWOP. Taylor now directly appeals both his convictions and his senten ce to this Court, raising six issues. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a).

Discussion and Decision

I. The State’s References to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” Did No t Lead to Fundamental Error. Taylor first argues that his trial was unfair because a State’s witness said that Taylor’s nickname was “Looney the Shooter” and because the State used th at nickname to argue that he shot J.W. Taylor didn’t object to either one of these uses at t rial, so he argues fundamental error. The State responds that fundamental error review doesn’t apply because Taylor may have decided not to object for strategic reasons. The State is right that we will not review claims, even for fun damental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objecti on. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678–79 (Ind. 2013). But that did not happen here. Taylor d id not agree to the State’s use of his “Looney the Shooter” nickname; he simply said nothing. With out evidence that this silence was strategic, we review for fundamental error. See id. at 679; Hitch v. State, 51 N.E.3d 216, 219 (Ind. 2016). To prove fundamental error, Taylor must “show that the trial co urt should have raised the issue sua sponte due to a blatant violation of b asic and elementary principles, undeniable harm or potential for harm, and prejudice that makes a fair trial impos sible.” Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017). Before trial, Taylor asked the trial court to bar the State’s w itnesses from calling him “Looney the Shooter.” He acknowledged that “Looney” was relevan t to his identity, but argued5 that “Looney the Shooter” was too prejudicial. The trial court granted Taylor’s request. Nonetheless, at trial the State asked its lead detective what T aylor’s nickname was, and he told the jury “Looney the Shooter.” The State then used the nickname during closing argument. It ar gued that “Carltez Taylor began firing bullets at [J.W.] and [T.S.]. . . . Carltez Taylor refers to himself as Looney the Shooter, that is for your consideration.” And later: “Is it reasonable t o believe that someone who identifies themselves as Looney the Shooter would even let someone pull th e trigger[?]” These references to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” were imprope r. True, calling him simply “Looney” was appropriate to prove Taylor’s identity—D.G. knew him only as “Looney,” that’s how she introduced him to her mother, and Taylor had “Lo oney” tattooed on his forearm. See McAbee v. State, 770 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind. 2002). But “Loon ey” sufficed for that purpose, so adding “the Shooter” merely ratcheted up the prejudice. See id. (questioning the admissibility of nicknames that carry an “imp lication of wrongdoing”). Then, the State used the nickname in closing to argue that Taylor acted in accordance with his “unsa vory or lawless character or reputation”—a prohibited use under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(a) (1). See id. But despite their impropriety, the State’s references to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” did not lead to fundamental error. Of the State’s eighteen witnesse s, only one included “the Shooter” in Taylor’s nickname. The State did bring up “Looney the Shoote r” four times in its closing argument, but avoided the “repeated reliance” that could lead t o fundamental error. Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 16 (Ind. 2015) (finding fundamental error a fter the State repeatedly relied on an inaccurate statement of law). Plus, the other evidence against Taylor was strong, minimizing the danger that the jury found him guilty based on his nickname. The only two witnesses to the murder identified Taylor as the shooter; he was closely tied to the murder weapon and th e clothes the shoot er wore; and he made incriminating threats afte rwards. This compelling evidence militates against fundamental error. See Blaize v. S tate, 51 N.E.3d 97, 102–03 (Ind. 2016). The strong evidence against Taylor, considered as a whole, also undercuts Taylor’s reliance on Oldham, where the Court of Appeals found fundamental error w hen the State used business cards and a novelty photograph “to paint Oldham as a dangerous criminal.” Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), t rans. denied. As the c ourt noted in Oldham, evidentiary6 errors like these are not fundamental error “when there is over whelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 1173. Again, eliciting Taylor’s “Looney the Shooter” nickname violate d the trial court’s order in limine, and the State’s closing argument was inappropriate unde r Evidence Rule 404. But these uses did not create undeniable harm or potential for harm, or m ake a fair trial impossible. Harris, 76 N.E.3d at 140. We thus see no fundamental error arising from the State’s references to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter.”

II. The State’s Amendment to Taylor ’s Conspiracy Charge Was Not Unt imely. Taylor’s second contention is tha t the State violated Indiana C ode section 35-34-1-5 (2014) by amending the conspiracy to commit murder charge just two day s before trial. Specifically, the State amended one of its twelve alleged overt acts to say that another teenager, instead of Taylor, supplied the handgun used to murder J.W. Taylor argues that bec ause this amendment was substantive, the State had to make it at least thirty days befo re the omnibus date. The State responds that the amendment was formal rather than substantive and was p ermissible because it did not prejudice Taylor’s substantial ri ghts. We agree with the State. Our recent precedent shows that this amendment was a matter of form, not of substance. In Erkins v. State, we held that simply amending which conspira tor performed an overt act was a formal amendment, because any conspirator’s overt act satis fies the element. 13 N.E.3d 400, 406 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2) ; see also Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ind. 2007) (“[A]n amendment is of substance only if it is esse ntial to making a valid charge of the crime.”). And that is exactly wha t happened here: the amendment ’s only change was alleging that a co-conspirator, instead of T aylor himself, brought the gun.
Since the amendment was one of form, the trial court could allo w it as long as it did “not prejudice the substantial ri ghts of the defendant.” I.C. § 35-34-1-5(c). These substantial rights “include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge.” Erkins, 13 N.E.3d at 405. “Ultimately, the question is whether the defe ndant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend again st the charges.” Id. at 405–06.7 We see no indication that the amendment threatened Taylor’s sub stantial rights. While the State offered the amendment only two days before trial, Taylor needed little notice because the amendment merely alleged that a nother teenager instead of Taylo r supplied the handgun. Nor did the amendment prejudice Taylor’s defense. The State all eged twelve separate overt acts and had to prove only one beyond a reasonable doubt; it’s unsurprising that Taylor declined to contest the overt act element at trial. Instead, he challeng ed identity, arguing that someone else pulled the trigger—a defense the amendment didn’t hurt, and per haps even helped. See Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Notably, Taylo r has not explained on appeal what he would have done with more time or how this amendment hindere d his defense. See Ramon v. State, 888 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In sum, because the amendment was neither untimely nor prejudic ial, it was not error for the trial court to allow it.

III. Sufficient Evidence Supports Tayl or’s Conspiracy to Commit Murd er Conviction. Taylor next contends that the State presented insufficient evid ence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Our standard of review is deferential to the factfinder: “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016) . We will reverse only if no reasonable factfinder could find Taylor guilty. See id. The State’s burden was to prove that Taylor, with the intent to commit murder, agreed with another person to commit murder and that Taylor or an accomplic e performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. I.C. § 35-41-5-2 (2014); Russell v. State, 743 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 2001). A formal agreement to kill J.W. is not required; circums tantial evidence implying such an agreement is enough. Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 2000). Here, ample circumstantial evidence implied a conspiracy to mur der J.W. When D.G. started texting J.W., Taylor and the other boys spoke of “b**** ing him” or “punking him out.” They also told D.G. to persuade J.W. to come over or else she w ould get beat up instead. This threat came shortly after the boys passed around a handgun, wit h Taylor loading the gun and8 tucking it into his waistband. Th ese facts show the seriousness of the situation, allowing the jury to infer that Taylor conspire d with the other boys to murder J. W. The jury also could have inferred that Taylor and D.G. agreed t o murder J.W. When Taylor wanted D.G. to get J.W. to come over, D.G. didn’t merely ask J. W. to drop by. Instead, she practically begged him to come, lying that she was alone and en ticing him with offers of sex. When J.W. finally agreed and they met, D.G. immediately asked whethe r he and T.S. had guns. After finding out they did not, she kep t them waiting in the open str eet for ten minutes, ostensibly waiting for her “sister.” Taylor took that opportunity—created by D.G. at his behest—to emerge from an alley between two houses and gun down J.W. The teenagers’ actions after t he shooting furth er support an ag reement to murder J.W. See Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 397 (Ind. 1999) (upholding a co nspiracy to commit murder conviction in part because the defendant helped dispose of the murder weapon). After shooting J.W., Taylor ran back to D.G.’s house, and D.G. followed only s teps behind. Taylor rejoined the other boys in the basement while D.G. threw off the police by d escribing the shooter as the “exact opposite” of Taylor. Together, the boys then hid the Hi-Point a nd its magazine in the basement’s ceiling tiles and ripped out drywal l so they could hide in the wall. This circumstantial evidence is enough to show an agreement to murder J.W. See Bonds v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ind. 1999); Isom v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1074, 1075 (Ind. 1986). And it is more than in Seketa v. State, where the Court of Appe als reversed a conspiracy to commit aggravated battery conviction be cause the most that could be in ferred was “an agreement to humiliate [the victim] or even to rough him up a little.” 817 N .E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Sufficient evidence thus supports Taylor’s conviction for consp iracy to commit murder.

IV. We Revise Taylor’s LWOP Senten ce to the Maximum Term of Years f or Murder. Fourth, Taylor argues that his L WOP sentence is inappropriate a nd should thus be reduced to a term of years.
Under Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution, we “hav e, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to . . . review and revise the sentence impose d.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 693 (Ind. 2009). We have implemented thi s power through Appellate Rule9 7(B), which allows us to revise sentences that are “inappropria te in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offe nder.” See Gibson v. State, 51 N.E .3d 204, 215 (Ind. 2016). Our “principal role” under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven outliers.” I d. We thus reserve our 7(B) authority for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 2 31, 241 (Ind. 2015), and have revised sentences only six times in the last five years. See Wa mpler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633, 635 (Ind. 2017); Eckelbarger v. State, 51 N.E.3d 169, 170 (Ind. 201 6); Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555–56 (Ind. 2014); Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 659 (Ind. 20 14); Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014); Kucholick v. S tate, 977 N.E.2d 351, 351–52 (Ind. 2012). While we apply our power under Rule 7(B) sparingly, we may revi se sentences “when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3 d 940, 947 (Ind. 2014). Sentence appropriateness thus turns on “myriad . . . factors that come t o light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). We begin this analysi s with “substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence,” then “independently examine” the d efendant’s offenses and character. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). Taylor’s LWOP sentence was lawful . During the sentencing phase, the State argued only one aggravating circumstance—that Taylor committed the murder b y lying in wait. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Supp. 2015). Taylor argued, and the State admitted, that his young age was a mitigating circumstance. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(7). The jury found that the State had proven the lying-in-wait aggravator and r ecommended LWOP, and the trial co urt accepted that recommendation.
But “[e] ven where a trial court has not abused its discretion in senten cing, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revisi on of a trial court’s sentencing decision.” Eckelbarger, 51 N.E.3d at 170. This includes sentences where—as here—“the trial court has been meticulous.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 –80 (Ind. 2006). Ultimately, our constitutional authority to revi ew and revise sentences “boils down to [our] ‘collective sense of what is appropriate.’” Brow n, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). LWOP is the harshest punishment the Constitution permits agains t any child. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eight h and Fourteenth A mendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”). It’s a denial of hope, a killer of behavior and character impro vement, and a10 guarantee—regardless of future potential—of a death behind bars . See Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8. As such, it “ is reserved for use in only the most heinous of crimes that so shock our conscience as a community.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 880 (Ind. 2012). Indeed, only four other juveniles in the State of Indiana have ever received such a sentence. Id. at 880 nn.6–8 (collecting cases ). One of those juveniles, D aniel Boyd, never appealed his sentence. Id. at 880 n.6. Two mor e, Larry Newton and Gregory Di ckens, never challenged the appropriateness of their sentences under Rule 7(B). See Newton v. State, 894 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. 2008); Newton v. State, 83 N.E.3d 726, 744 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Dickens v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2001); Dickens v. State, 997 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We have thus upheld the appropriate ness of LWOP for a juvenile onl y once. Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 880. With this background in mind, we consider Taylor’s offense s and character. For the nature of the offenses, Taylor recognizes that his crim es were tragic and senseless but argues that they were not the most heinous of offenses. For his character, Taylor admits that he has a juvenile record and relies primarily on his youth as a mitigating factor. The State responds by pointing to Taylor’s planning, manipulation, murder of a def enseless victim, and lack of repentance. We agree with the parties that Taylor’s crimes were both senseless and heinous. He lay in wait and murdered anothe r juvenile by shooting him in th e back as he ran away. Still, we consider many factors in weighing 7(B) revisions. “[M ]ost significantly” here, Taylor was only seventeen years ol d at the time of the crimes. See Brown, 10 N.E .3d at 6. As this Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, “chi ldren are different.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)). “[J]uveniles are less culpable than adults and therefore are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” I d. at 7 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). Three reasons bear this out. First, as compared to adults, chil dren lack maturity and have “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” Id. (citing Graham , 560 U.S. at 68). Second, they are more vulnerable to negative in fluences and pre ssures—including peer pressure—and thus lack control over and the ability to escape from crime-producing env ironments. Id. And third, their character is less developed than that of adults, so their actio ns are less likely to show “irretrievable depravity.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471).11 We see these factors’ influence on Taylor. He knew every part o n a car and ha d moves on the basketball court, but he was still growing up and trying to find his identity. As he fell out of church, he fell in with bad influences—other juveniles who, as already explaine d, were heavily involved in J.W.’s murder. Taylor also grew up fatherless, “lac king the all-important direction” a father provides. See Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 383–84, 254 N.E.2d 319, 324 (1970). And the neighborhood he’d always known as home had changed, with rising gang activity and alcohol and drug abuse. Taylor’s life story certainly does not absolve him of responsib ility for his heinous and senseless crimes. Bu t LWOP “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (emphasis added) (quot ing Miller, 567 U.S. at 473); see also Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18 (“The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation . . . .” ). It takes away from Taylor the opportunity to emulate his adopted uncle Chavis Jefferson, who described himself at seventeen as the good Dr. Jekyll around his pa rents but the evil Mr. Hyde ar ound his friends. Mr. Jefferson was incarcerated at a young age, but h as since “straightened up,” b ecoming a productive member of society for over forty years. Along with Taylor’s offenses and character, we consider our cas elaw in line with our principal role of leavening outliers. See Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 2010). While we have been clear that LWOP sentenc es are not always inappropriat e for juveniles, see Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 876–77, we also have “not been hesitant to reduce max imum sentences for juveniles convicted of murder,” Brow n, 10 N.E.3d at 7–8 (collecting cases ). In Fuller and Brown, two juvenile codefendants received 150-yea r sentences for a double murder. Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 655; Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 3. We unan imously revised fifteen-year-old Fuller’s sentence to eighty-five years and sixteen-year-old Bro wn’s sentence to eighty years because, while their crimes were “senseless and reprehensible,” no evide nce showed “that the victims were tortured, beaten, or lingered in pain.” Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 5). And “most significantly,” we considered their ages, as “[s]ent encing considerations for youthful offenders—particularly for juveniles—are not coext ensive with those for adults.” Id. (quoting Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6); see also Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. 1999) (reducing a sixty-year sentence for murder to fifty years becau se of the defendant’s “very youthful age”); Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Ind. 1995) (redu cing a sixteen-year-old’s double-12 murder sentence from 120 to eighty years); Widener v. State, 65 9 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind. 1995) (reducing seventeen-yea r-old’s felony murder sentence from sixt y to fifty years)

. Compare these cases with Conley, where we did not reduce Conley’s LWOP sentence after he murdered his ten-year-old brother with his bare hands. Conle y, 972 N.E.2d at 869–70, 880. Rather than “nearly instantaneous death by a bullet,” Conley co mmitted “a drawn out crime” of “unimaginable horror and brutality.” Id. at 876. Revising sentences by placing crimes “along a spectrum of heino us to horrific in no way diminishes the seriousness of a ny particular offense or the suf fering of any particular victim.” Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. 2011). But it does uphold important distinctions by reserving the harshest punishme nts for the most heinous crimes, see id.; Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 204 (Ind. 2014)—as shown by the exceptional rarity of LWOP sentences for Indiana children, see Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 880 nn.6–8. Our collective judgment is that Taylor’s character and the natu re of his offense—grievous as it was—do not warrant making hi m Indiana’s fifth juvenile se ntenced to a guaranteed death in prison. Instead, we revise his sentence to an aggregate eighty years: sixty-five years—the maximum term of years—for murder, plus a fifteen-year enhanceme nt for using a firearm. See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-3, -11 . We leave intact Taylor’s concurrent thirty-five-year conspira cy to commit murder sentence. 1

Conclusion We affirm Taylor’s convictions and remand to the trial court t o enter a sentencing order consistent with this opinion.
David and Goff, JJ., concur. Slaughter, J., concurs in part a nd dissents in part with separa te opinion in whic h Massa, J., joins.

1 Because of this revision, we do not address Taylor’s final two arguments: that his LWOP sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and that the jury failed to m ake required special findings supporting LWOP.Slaughter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to reduce Taylor’s sentence from life without parole to a term of years. There can be no doubt that reducing Taylor’s sentence is within the Court’s power. But sometimes the better use of power is to withhold its exercise. I would affirm Taylor’s LWOP sentence because he does not satisf y our longstanding test for granting relief under Appellate Rule 7(B), which looks to both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. On this record, Taylor fails both prongs.
Taylor’s offense was the lying

- in

- wait murder of another sevent een

- year

- old, J.W., whom Taylor gunned down by shooting him in the back as the victim tried to run away. It was, as the Court observed, a “tragic and senseless” crime. But it was more than that. It was also a depraved and heinous crime, perpetrated against an unarmed and vulnerable juvenile who was lured into a death trap, where Taylor ambushed him. His crime reflects an utter disregard for human life. Had it been an adult, and not Taylor, who shot J.W. in the back as he ran away, we would have no
occasion to find the offender deserving of a more lenient sentence; indeed, the adult offender would be eligible for the death penalty.

Nor , despite Taylor’s age when he murdered J.W.

— seventeen years , nine months, sixteen days

— is Taylor entitled to 7(B) relief un der the character

- of

- the

- offender prong. Taylor had a significant juvenile history that, as the State says, “escalated in violence” over time

. He was adjudicated a delinquent for criminal trespass ; for battery resulting in bodily injury ; and for theft of a firearm, dangerous possession of a firearm, and carrying a handgun without a license. Taylor was sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction and placed at a juvenile boot camp. He was released from the boot camp in November 2015, only weeks before killing J.W. later that
month. Moments after killing J.W. , Taylor threatened D.G. by pointing a gun at her head and telling her that she would face the same fate if she squealed: “bitch[,] if you say anything I’ll kill you.” Later, after Taylor had been implicated, arrested, and was being held on J.W.’s murder, Taylor encountered D.G. at the same juvenile facility where they were both being detained

. He told D.G. he should have killed h er when he had the chance. Taylor’s communicated threats and

“ re grets” to D.G. are not the words of a remorseful, repentant offender with a redeeming character deserv ing of judicial mercy.2

After hearing all the evidence, including evidence of Taylor’s age and upbringing, the jury unanimously recommended life without parole. The trial court then imposed that sentence, see I.C.
35

- 50

- 2

- 9(e)(2), and made findings amply supported by the record u nderscoring why Taylor is undeserving of 7(B) relief today, including:

• Taylor’s “true nature ... reflects irreparable corruption.”

• His “criminal history and his behavior before, during and after he shot the victim, is [sic] indicative of one who lacks consc ious [sic], who is unrepentant and who, if given another opportunity, would do exactly the same thing to another unwary victim.” Although I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the LWOP issue, I am not unsympathetic to its concern with leaving intac t a sentence that guarantees an offender will die in prison for acts committed as a juvenile. But Taylor is only the fifth juvenile in state history to receive an LWOP sentence

. The infrequency with which these sentences are given to minors suggests that both prosecutors and juries take their responsibilities seriously and proceed

ca utiously before seeking and recommending what for juveniles is the ultimate punishment. As the Court notes, we upheld an LWOP sentence i n Conley v. State , a case we descri bed as involving “‘a drawn out crime’ of ‘unimaginable horror and brutality.’” 972 N.E.2d at 876. I agree with that
characterization. But I disagree that Conley set a floor below which any juvenile whose offense is thought to be any less monstrous will obtain 7(B) relief. T hat is the trend and , I fear, the implication
of today’s decision. As the Court recognizes, the point of Rule 7(B) is to “leaven outliers”, not to achieve some perceived correct sentence, whatever that means. F our other juvenile

- LWOP

sentences are an insufficiently small sample size from which to draw any meaningful conclusions about which juvenile

- murder sentences are outliers and which are in the mainstream.

T he Court acknowledges that Taylor’s LWOP sentence was “ lawfu l ” , and that our 7(B) review of a sentence “boils down to [our] ‘collective sense of what is appropriate.’” I would affirm Taylor’s LWOP sentence both because it was lawful and because I prefer the jury’s “collective sense of what [sentence] is appropriate” to our own. From the Court’s decision to reduce Taylor’s sentence to a term of years, I respectfully dissent.

Massa, J., concurs.