C7 . \._/ 

NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL USERS' ADVISORY GROUP APRIL 8 1 201 9 

NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL 

USERS' ADVISORY GROUP 

April 8, 2019 

Broadmoor Hotel International Center 

Colorado Springs, CO 

MEETING MINUTES 

Adm. James Ellis (USN, Ret.), Chair 

Mr. Brandon Eden, Executive Secretary 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

National Space Council Users’ Advisory Group 

Broadmoor Hotel International Center 

Colorado Springs, CO 

Minutes of the Third Meeting 

April 8, 2019 

Table of Contents 

Opening Remarks 3 

Committee Business 3 

Emergence of the Space Force 5 

Space Spectrum: Challenge and Opportunity 9 

Public Comment and Closing Remarks 12 

Appendix A Agenda 13 

Appendix B Committee membership 14 

Appendix C Meeting attendees 16 

Appendix D List of presentations 22 

Appendix E Original signed attendance records 23 

Meeting Report prepared by 

Mary Beth Saffo 

Zantech 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Opening Remarks 

At 1:00 pm MDT, Mr. Brandon Eden, executive secretary and designated federal officer for the National 

Space Council Users’ Advisory Group (UAG), welcomed attendees to the 3rd meeting of the UAG. Mr. 

Eden noted that the UAG was formally chartered by NASA December 6, 2017, and that NASA sponsors 

the UAG at the request of and on behalf of the White House. The purpose of the UAG is to ensure that the 

interests of industry, other non-federal entities, and other persons involved in aeronautical and space 

activities are represented in the National Space Council. Meetings are open to the public; its proceedings 

are part of the public record. and all comments by UAG members are on the record. 

The UAG consists of two categories of members, each appointed by the NASA administrator, James 

Bridenstine: (1) representatives of particular industry sectors or entities and (2) special government 

employees (SGEs) to serve as subject matter experts. All SGEs undergo mandatory ethics training and 

should recuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest with the topic at hand. 

Mr. Eden then introduced UAG Chair Admiral James Ellis, who called the meeting formally to order. 

Adm. Ellis expressed his appreciation to the Space Foundation for providing time and space at the 35th 

Space Symposium for the UAG meeting and introduced the afternoon’s agenda. 

Before turning to other speakers, Adm. Ellis expanded briefly on Mr. Eden’s overview of UAG activities. 

The UAG, he said, provides subject matter expertise to the NSpC, submits reports with findings and 

recommendations to the Council, and submits an annual report to the Council on UAG activities. 

Admiral Ellis stressed that the UAG belongs to all users of space. In the deliberations and proceedings of 

the NSpC, the UAG thus has both the opportunity and the obligation to represent the interests of all users, 

not only those of the UAG members themselves. 

Committee Business 

The UAG includes 6 subcommittees, each devoted to a distinct topic related to the space mission: 

•Exploration and discovery 

•National security 

•Economic development and industrial base 

•Technology and innovation 

•Outreach and education 

•Space Policy and International Engagement 

Two of the subcommittees – Exploration and Discovery and National Security – were able to provide 

updates at this meeting. 

Gen. Lester Lyles, chair, summarized the work of the Exploration and Discovery subcommittee. 

The chief focus of the subcommittee’s most recent discussions has been to examine the current 

architecture of the lunar initiative, the mechanisms for flexibility embodied in the current plan, and 

possible alternatives to that plan. The subcommittee is also considering a recommendation for external 

assessment of the lunar exploration architecture by the National Academies or other independent group. 

The subcommittee has defined a list of key questions essential for assessment of the current lunar 

exploration plans: 

•What is the goal of the lunar exploration program? What assumptions have been made in 

defining that goal? (This question was recently answered by the Vice President, who 

announced at the end of March an accelerated goal of returning astronauts to the Moon by 

2024). 

•What tradeoffs have been examined in the process of developing the plan? 

•What alternative funding possibilities, with respect to government, international, or commercial 

resources, have been explored, to best achieve the goals of the program? 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

•The subcommittee also expressed the need for greater knowledge of legislative and budget 

concerns in order to provide a realistic analysis of the program. 

Gen. Lyles offered his personal recommendation that the UAG form a task force to act as a “red team” to 

assess the revised lunar exploration plan, as well as possible alternatives to that plan. He proposed to 

populate the task force with UAG members or with designated subject-matter experts from the sectors 

represented by UAG members. Gen. Lyles also suggested reaching out to entities such as the National 

Academy of Engineering, which has expertise in space architecture, or to the NASA Advisory Council 

(NAC), also chaired by Gen. Lyles, as additional sources of external expertise. 

The proposed red team would work to align its assessment plans with NASA activities, and to provide 

added value to, rather than to distract from, its mission. Gen. Lyles noted that NASA has already started 

to address some of these questions, and that the task force would plan to keep in communication with 

NASA as their plans progressed, with the goal of providing useful advice before plans are finalized. 

Mr. Salvatore (Tory) Bruno expressed his full support for Gen. Lyles’ task force recommendation and 

stated that he would fully commit resources to realizing this proposal. Adm. Ellis commented that the 

most effective red teams are small and focused, and made up of members with deep expertise with the 

issues at hand. As NASA wrestles with the aggressive schedule for lunar exploration, the proposed red 

team would have to be prepared to move at a fast pace, with regular meetings, to match the pace of 

NASA’s own accelerated deadlines. He also emphasized the need for developing clear goals for the task 

force, and he cautioned the group about the potential for conflicts of interest between the goals of the task 

force and the individual priorities of the red team members or external experts. Gen. Lyles reassured the 

UAG members that he was very mindful of the need to keep the missions and activities of the UAG and 

NAC distinct. 

Fatih Ozmen, who also offered his support to the proposed task force, suggested that the group consider 

adopting the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) approach used by DOD as a methodology for objective 

assessment of possible alternatives to the current plan for realizing the 2024 goal of returning humans to 

the Moon. Gen. Lyles affirmed that NASA’s approach thus far incorporates at least the general principles 

of AoA methodology. 

As an action item, Adm. Ellis proposed refinement of Gen. Lyles’ task force proposal, followed by 

submission of that proposal to the UAG for discussion and final approval. Noting that the initial concepts 

are promising, he reiterated the need to precisely define both the goals of the task force and the processes 

to be used to achieve those goals. 

As chair of the National Security subcommittee of the UAG, Adm. Ellis updated the meeting attendees on 

the subcommittee’s recent activities. The subcommittee met on April 5 to discuss the request by the 

National Space Council that the subcommittee examine the organizational construct of the newly defined 

Space Force. More specifically, the subcommittee has been asked to assess and to recommend options for 

the organizational structure of the uniformed Space Force, including a future Department of the Space 

Force. The subcommittee has been promised access to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other 

relevant organizations to facilitate completion of this task. The goals of the Space Force are ambitious 

and wide-ranging, and there is much work to be done to create from its general goals an efficient and 

effective functioning entity, including resolving the special challenges of massive organizational change. 

In order to provide appropriate and useful advice, it will be important for subcommittee members to have 

access to, and continuing conversations with, those staff members at DOD and elsewhere who are doing 

the hard job of bring these ambitious goals to fruition. 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Gen. Lyles stressed the importance of subcommittee access to DOD, especially for those members 

without military experience who may not already have special access privileges with DOD. Adm. Ellis 

agreed, noting that the promise of DOD access has yet to be tested. He also added that many of the nonmilitary members of the National Security subcommittee have themselves created or led large companies; 

these members thus bring to the subcommittee deep experience with effecting or managing organizational 

change that will be very important to carrying out this task. 

The Emergence of the Space Force 

Mr. Doug Loverro (Loverro LLC; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy) and 

Marc Berkowitz (Vice President for Space Security, Lockheed Martin) 

After recounting the rich careers of Mr. Berkowitz and Mr. Loverro, Adm. Ellis asked the speakers to 

offer their views of the emerging Space Force, especially with regard to the questions: what have the 

organizers got right, what aspects need improvement, and what features of the Space Force still need to be 

defined. 

Mr. Berkowitz outlined the DOD plan to establish the Space Force as the 6th branch of the armed services. 

Citing his long service, he noted his participation in almost every review of management organization, 

including the transition study that discussed implementation of the Space Commission’s 

recommendations for security in space. Mr. Berkowitz emphasized that he would be speaking only as a 

private citizen, and stressed that his views did not necessarily reflect those of Lockheed Martin, DOD, or 

any other organization with which he has been affiliated. 

National security management and organization in space has been a recurring issue. Common concerns 

about national security management have included fragmented management and widely distributed and 

misaligned channels of authority, responsibility and accountability. Symptoms of these problems include 

inadequate stewardship; inadequate personnel management; cumbersome decision-making; budget 

instability; lack of a war-fighting ethos; insufficient integration of defense and intelligence activities; and 

inadequate unity of command. This situation has had profound consequences for U.S. readiness in space. 

In the last 3 or 4 decades, there have been numerous studies of the problem; but none of these studies 

have yet yielded the necessary change. 

In 2001, the Space Commission summarized the need for changing the status quo, with a statement that 

continues to be relevant today: 

History is replete with instances in which warning signs were ignored and change resisted until an 

external, “improbable” event forced resistant bureaucracies to take action. The question is whether 

the U.S. will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerability. 

Or whether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people—a “Space Pearl 

Harbor”—will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. Government to act. 

Report of the Commission to Assess United States Space Security Management and Organization, 

2001 

Nearly two decades later, the international security environment is characterized by renewed great-power 

competition and challenges to the rules-based established international order. China and Russia seek to 

reshape the international system along authoritarian models, to dominate their regional spheres of 

influence, and to expand their global reach. They have studied our military training and methods closely. 

They understand America’s strategic advantage in space, and the leverage we gain by integrating space 

assets with capabilities in all domains to achieve U.S. national security objectives, and they know that we 

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rely on space systems to achieve decision superiority and to project our power with precision, speed, and 

lethality. 

Consequently, China and Russia are aggressively seeking to undermine our leadership position in space. 

Both countries regard space as a war-fighting domain in which they can coerce the United States and they 

are developing weapon systems that could threaten our access to space, jeopardize U.S. and Allied 

military forces, and endanger our national security. Unlike the space threats we faced in the Cold War, 

we currently face sophisticated, fast-paced, multidomain threats from multiple great powers. Attacks on 

space assets can be made both rapidly and ambiguously, simultaneously making rapid response essential 

while also increasing the challenge of the equally essential task of correctly identifying the attacker. 

Because of our reliance on space assets in many domains of life, the stakes of space warfare are especially 

high, with the potential for attacks on political and economic assets, as well as conventional military and 

intelligence targets. 

Today, the U.S. is world’s greatest space-faring nation. The U.S. government has long recognized that 

unimpeded access to space is vital to our national interests, including everyday functioning of our society 

as well as military and intelligence capabilities. Disruption or loss of critical space assets could be 

decisive to the outcome of international conflicts. The renewal of Great Power competition, including 

renewed threats to space assets, has prompted needed policy debates about the readiness of the military 

establishment to address these threats, and provides a once-a-generation opportunity to implement a 

government structure that will protect and advance our interests in space. 

The central question is whether the Department of Defense plan is either an improvement over the status 

quo or superior to alternative approaches. Sustaining and expanding upon the actions of previous 

administrations, the Trump administration has moved to address space security challenges on several 

fronts. It has been formulating strategy, prioritizing investments in modern defense and intelligence 

capabilities, continuing to emphasize the development of the National Defense Center, revitalizing the 

National Space Council, reestablishing the U.S. Space Command creating the Space Development 

Agency, and, if Congress legislation is approved, establishing the Space Force. 

The DOD plan addresses several concerns about the status quo: 

1. Fragmentation: Creating the space force as an independent service within the Dept. of the Air Force is 

a fiscally responsible approach, and the unified direction of specialized space force training and 

combatant and command operations provided by this place reflects a prudent awareness of the need for 

military readiness for conflicts in space. Despite these improvements, it should be noted that the current 

plan does not consolidate all space defense operations, many of which will still be scattered among 

several DOD offices and agencies. In addition, the creation of the Space Development Agency seems 

likely to be an additive initiative to existing DOD space-oriented offices, rather than one that can unify 

operations, clarify responsibilities, or streamline decision-making. 

2. Insufficient Advocacy: The Secretary of the Air Force, the Undersecretary of Space, the Space Force 

Chief of Staff, the Commander of Space Command, and other senior-level military and civilian staff will 

have the stature and experience to argue forcefully and effectively for Space Force requirements and 

resources. They will also be well-positioned to advocate for Space Force requirements at the highest 

levels of government. 

3. Alignment of authority, responsibility, and accountability. The establishment of the Space Force and 

reestablishment of the Space Command will require reorganizational efforts, and alignment of authority, 

responsibility, and accountability. No organizational structure can be perfectly optimized for every 

purpose, but the right culture and people can often overcome suboptimal organizational design. Treating 

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the Space Force as a separate, unified service will allow the development of the distinct institutional 

values and practices necessary for the training, recruiting, and professional development of a group of 

world-class space scientists, engineers, and warriors prepared to handle the special strategic and tactical 

challenges of defending national security in space. 

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Berkowitz noted that the details of implementation are critical and that 

many aspects of the DOD plan are still opaque or undetermined. For this reason, effective evaluation of 

the plan is essential, to assess whether the plan is succeeding in its goal of reversing the erosion of our 

country’s strategic advantages in space and addressing military readiness in space. Metrics of success 

might include streamlined decision-making processes; breadth and depth of personnel in the space field; 

educational and certification procedures; promotion rates; discipline and efficiency of procurement 

programs; maturity and effectiveness of joint command and control arrangements, warning systems and 

intelligence support, war plans, and combined operational practices. 

Mr. Douglas Loverro opened his presentation with a quote from Paul W. Beck, one of the first advocates 

for an air service separate from the U.S. Army. Beck offered an opinion in 1911 that remains relevant 

today: “Necessity for a permanent organization is recognized, but no one wants to work out the problem. 

All our legislation has been piecemeal. We are all by habit and training fearful of the results of new 

legislation, particularly as it relates to the creation of new organizations.” The nation, said Mr. Loverro, 

needs a Space Force, and needs one now. If we are truly serious about keeping the U.S. in the lead in 

space; if we are truly serious about protecting space for the good of our nation and its peaceful use for all 

the world; if we are truly serious in assuring that U.S war fighters never lose the advantage in space, then 

we must move forward, for several reasons. First, it is important to understand the problems that we are 

trying to solve. The first of these problems is the fact that the threat to U.S space activities is growing and 

spreading, and the U.S. must be prepared to defend its use of the space domain in the future. To address 

this threat, the U.S. needs an organization focused on training, planning, and exercising in the space 

domain. The U.S. Space Command, which enjoys broad popular support, is a necessary element in 

resolving this threat. A combatant command creates war planning and strategy; it creates necessary 

alliances and partnerships to defend its domain. All of these capabilities are missing from current policy, 

which, thus far, has treated military defenses in space as secondary to nuclear warfare. Because space 

capability is so central to all aspects of military readiness, development of military defenses in space must 

be first priority. 

A second criticism is that space acquisition is too slow and too invested in legacy priorities. DOD has 

tried to address this problem by continuing to add more organizations and units devoted to space. 

Although some analysts view these multiple agencies as providing unnecessary and possibly conflicting 

duplications of effort, Mr. Loverro viewed these multiple agencies as different sides of the same 

experiment. In the long term, the U.S. will need to reconcile the duplication, to resolve possibly 

conflicting priorities of the separate agencies, and to create a simpler organizational framework where 

individual units ideally work in synergy. But in the short term, each of these agencies has the potential to 

offer valuable lessons, and there is merit to letting that learning process take its course. 

In the meantime, development of the Space Force is essential. The central question – how to train, 

organize, and equip space forces (that is, development of the personnel) is an urgent priority, and it is also 

the driving rationale for creation of a Space Force. Answering this question will provide the people, the 

culture, the organizational identity, the advocacy, and the technical and operational arts necessary to 

support the other dimensions (addressing the threat, and processes of space acquisition) of the problem. It 

is also the crucial element for maintaining U.S. leadership in space. Among other benefits, the Space 

Force provides the people and doctrine necessary for developing strategy and war plans. It provides a 

pipeline of technical and operational thinkers to conceive of the necessary systems to acquire. It provides 

the capacity for rapid response to threats and changes in strategy as new situations arise. Since the 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

beginning of the 21st century, it has become clear that space capability is essential for military success on 

Earth, that the military cannot fully carry out its functions without access to and use of space, and that 

only an organization fully devoted to those ends – the Space Force – is capable of carrying out these 

essential functions. 

Dr. Harrison Schmitt asked each of the speakers to identify one unique characteristic required of the 

Space Force that is not currently provided in other services. Mr. Loverro replied that a career path for 

space professionals is currently lacking and urgently needed; development of that career path (already 

mandated by 2003 law) is the job of the Space Force. Mr. Berkowitz agreed, adding the perspective that 

the history of development of submarine forces, especially nuclear professionals, might provide a model 

for how to develop a new class of technically proficient professionals. Mr. Loverro noted that the Space 

Force is even more technical than the Air Force, and that technical degrees should be a requirement for all 

space acquisition professionals. 

Mr. Stuart Witt suggested that, given the clear need for education and training of space personnel, it might 

be useful to add the Secretary of Education to the National Space Council. 

Reminding UAG members of the recommendations of the Allen Commission on the role of the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in space reconnaissance, Gen. Lyles noted that there has been, thus far, no 

specific mention of intelligence, including especially the NRO, in the Space Force. Mr. Loverro agreed 

that the role of intelligence in the Space Force is an important issue, but recommended that, at this initial 

stage, he was inclined to give highest priority to addressing the most serious deficiencies, rather than 

devote energy to the reorganization of operations, such as the NRO, that were working reasonably well. 

He did note, however, a limitation of the current personnel system of the NRO: that only the 

approximately 25% of the NRO made up of Air Force employees can be allowed to transfer back and 

forth between the NRO and the Space Force. The remaining 75% of the NRO are all civilians, who are 

currently blocked by the nature of their appointment from transferring to the Space Force. He suggested 

revision of the personnel structure for civilian appointments to allow the potential for civilian NRO-Space 

Force transfers in the future, which would have the added benefit of merging civilian and military culture 

in the Space Force. Dr. Peterson agreed that transferability of civilian personnel would be essential for 

operations, acquisition, and intelligence, but also noted that doing so even within current DOD structures 

is already a significant challenge. Although the intelligence community is already working to assure unity 

of effort across agencies, highly functional operational relationships are crucial. A future space conflict 

would demand a synchronized, unified approach to intelligence. 

In response to Dr. Mandy Vaughn’s question about the role of commercial architecture in the Space 

Force, Mr. Berkowitz replied that commercial goods and services can be used as much as possible, except 

where issues of public safety and national security preclude that use. It is also essential to make use of 

international alliances and partnerships in operating in the space domain. Mr. Loverro noted that the 

Army distinguishes between three kinds of services: “combat arms” (not commercially adaptable), 

“combat support” (more peripheral activities, with lower military requirements), and “combat services” 

(the most ancillary activities, most easily outsourced to commercial operations). The Space Force needs to 

start distinguishing its activities in much the same way. Col. Pamela Melroy observed that space is 

inherently global, and that international partnerships will be an essential element of the Space Force. 

Noting the significant differences between interoperability from an aviation perspective and from a space 

perspective, she asked whether there are any special statutory authorities needed by the Space Force in 

order to be successful in global partnerships. Mr. Berkowitz replied that this authority is already 

embodied in Title 10, although it will still be important to include explicit provisions on such issues in the 

Space Force charter. Mr. Loverro agreed, but noted that there are two kinds of international partnerships: 

training and equipping forces (easily handled by current regulations) and operational partnerships. It is the 

responsibility of commanders to create alliances within their area of responsibility (AOR). It will be the 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

job of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine who will be responsible for building alliances with our 

spacefaring allies. 

Mr. Eric Stallmer asked the speakers for suggestions on how to better articulate the importance of the 

Space Force to overcome skepticism on Capitol Hill. Mr. Loverro agreed that there is an especially strong 

need to explain the rationale for the Space Force itself, and why an organized training program for the 

Space Force is so necessary a part of its mission. The need for a Space Force preceded the security 

threats by at least a decade. The threat only makes the creation of the Space Force that much more urgent 

a priority. 

Colonel Eileen Collins asked how development of the Space Force would affect the evolution of space 

situational awareness and space traffic management, as highlighted in Space Directive 3 (SD-3). Mr. 

Loverro replied that, just as we need a civilian (FAA) and a military (Air Force) air-traffic control system, 

we also will need separate systems for control of commercial and military space traffic. Mr. Berkowitz 

added that the continued growth of commercial space activities will encourage a phased transition to 

separate commercial and military space traffic control systems, to allow the military to focus on its core 

job of national defense. 

Mr. Tim Ellis asked about possible incentives to build a distinct culture in the Space Force, especially 

with regard to space acquisition. Mr. Loverro expressed a need for space acquisition officers who can 

adapt the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) procedures for space acquisition, which is less oriented 

toward production, and more towards research, than acquisition in other services. 

Space Spectrum: Challenge & Opportunity 

Jennifer Warren (Vice President for Technology Policy & Regulation, Lockheed Martin) and Jennifer 

Manner (Senior Vice President for Regulatory Affairs, EchoStar) 

Ms. Warren and Ms. Manner made a joint presentation. 

Adequate spectrum is essential for maintenance of U.S. global leadership in space, for commercial and 

scientific activities, and for national security. Space Policy Directive 2 (SPD-2) correctly focused on the 

importance of international spectrum access to the space domain. The recent Dept. Commerce 

recommendations for needed incremental improvements in spectrum policy are a welcome response to 

that directive. Drawing on decades of experience in both government and commercial aspects of spectrum 

management and regulation, Ms. Warren and Ms. Manner highlighted three areas: 

1) The role of national and international spectrum policy in defining the future of space opportunity. 

2) The importance of predictable and stable national and international regulatory frameworks for 

spectrum, especially given the long lead times required for deploying and operating systems 

in one of the harshest and unforgiving environments. 

3) The need for reform, and approaches to leverage spectrum policy to advance, rather than hinder, 

national priorities. 

Spectrum management policy is of fundamental importance to space activities and can affect the future 

direction in space. There is, however, no such thing as a “space spectrum.” While there are allocations for 

space, there is not an interchangeable pot of spectrum that can be used by every space user. Every 

category of spectrum use– earth exploration, navigation and positioning, communication, and remote 

sensing, among other applications– uses a different sliver of spectrum in which they seek to operate. 

Spectrum is managed at both the national and global level, and the table of spectrum allocation of the 

International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has treaty status. Under ITU treaty obligations, each 

country is free to use their allocated spectrum in any way it wishes, but it must not interfere with any 

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other country’s use of that spectrum, provided that the other country’s spectrum use is in compliance with 

the treaty. The inherently global nature of space highlights the importance of global harmonization of 

spectrum regulation. Scientific, commercial and national security interests have worked together for 

decades to secure and maintain significant blocks of spectrum in which present and future applications 

can develop. But these same spectrum building blocks, which have enabled a recent explosion of new 

satellite applications, are also the targets for disruption and are of regulatory interest. 

The technological and economic realities of space also affect spectrum allocations. In terms of 

technology, there is little recognition by regulatory bodies that development of space architecture requires 

a much longer lead time than standard technology, because of the special technical challenges of 

operating in the harsh environment of space. There is also a good deal of regulatory impatience in space; 

spectrum adjustments that involve a launch are a much complicated and costly proposition than 

adjustments to terrestrial systems. 

A key economic factor is the fact that space is inherently a risky enterprise, which makes financing 

particularly difficult. The financial risks of space enterprises only highlight the importance of regulatory 

certainty and clarity. Unlike terrestrial networks, which can realize financial return incrementally, spacebased networks have a long lead time before they can earn a dollar. A third issue is licensing. Most 

satellite systems cover multiple countries and need to use that capability. This capability requires not only 

a licensing administration, but also market access to the countries in question. 

Thus, the regulatory principles necessary for spectrum use in space are threefold: stability, predictability, 

and reliability. The viability of space-communication missions depends strongly on international 

harmonization of regulatory policy. Lack of adherence to these principles can lead to operation 

complications, business model disruption, and increased cost. 

Regulatory problems can be exacerbated by the different constraints of terrestrial and satellite networks. 

Sharing is also an important issue for the commercial satellite industry. Although satellite industries have 

successfully shared spectrum with each other for years, it is more difficult to share spectrum with 

terrestrial services, especially because satellite services are more heavily regulated than their terrestrial 

counterparts. 

Two issues concerning the use of 5G networks in terrestrial and satellite networks illustrate the kinds of 

problems that can arise with sharing spectra between satellite and terrestrial networks when regulatory 

principles are not consistently applied. 

The history of the KA (28-gigahertz) band provides one example. First allocated for satellite use in 1995, 

the first broadband satellite designed for use of that band was launched in 2008. Now, there are hundreds 

of satellites, with millions of customers, using this very successful band, and it is very important to 5G 

service, especially in bringing service to developing countries that are difficult for terrestrial systems to 

reach. In 2015, the WRC (World Radiocommunication Conference) decided to not make the KA band 

available to terrestrial systems. After the 2015 conference, the U.S. decided nevertheless to allocate a 

portion of the KA band to terrestrial 5G systems; since that time, other countries have followed suit. 

There is concern that this topic may come up again in the 2019 WRC. If successful, this decision will 

strand billions of dollars of investment, stop innovation in space and block the ability for secure 

communication as well as the global reach that satellite systems require. International customers of U.S.-

manufactured satellites are also concerned about the effects of changing regulations on their own systems. 

This kind of unpredictability and inconsistency in regulatory policy can render business models obsolete 

even before systems are launched. 

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A similar 5G-related problem has occurred with the V-band (millimeter-range wavelengths), which was 

first made available about a decade ago. Several companies, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and 

SpaceX, have licenses or applications pending for access to this band. But these companies were 

dismayed to discover, in preparation for the 2019 WRC that the U.S. policy for 5G offers protections for 

domestic use, but none for satellites, putting satellite systems at huge risk. 

US technological leadership requires US regulatory leadership as well. The U.S. has considered itself a 

spectrum management leader over the last decade. However, that innovation has focused more on ways 

to make technological options more successful, rather than on exploration of more innovative use of 

spectrum. For the U.S. to remain a leader in this field, U.S. regulatory processes have to adapt to the 

broadening and intensifying uses of spectrum in space, 5G wireless, unmanned systems, and more. 

Despite the changes in spectrum use over the last 20 years, the decision-making process for spectrum use 

has not changed over the last 20 years, Perhaps it is time to consider whether U.S. regulatory policy is 

still adequate for today’s needs. In theory, the National Telecommunications and Information Agency 

(NTIA), which is the voice of presidential priorities, and the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC), an independent agency that is not responsible for implementing presidential priorities, share 

spectrum management. But in truth, authority for spectrum allocation rests with the FCC. Although there 

are consultations and coordination between the two agencies, the effectiveness of such coordination and 

communication is dependent on the personalities and cultures managers of the respective agencies; 

bifurcated management of this sort, without formal shared authority, seems less than ideal. Currently, 

different sets of space users report to two different authorities in two different branches of government: 

those in the scientific and national security sectors are under NTIA authority, and wireless and 

commercial users are under the FCC. This situation increases the difficulties of spectrum sharing 

between sectors. International decision-making becomes even more complicated; for international 

negotiations, the NTIA and FCC are used as merely technical advisors to the Dept. of State. At minimum, 

the current decision-making and authority structure for spectrum regulation seems outdated, and warrants 

review to incorporate the technological innovations and changes in spectrum usage over the last few 

decades. 

In summary, to be successful in spectrum as a nation, the U.S. needs a predictable, stable, global 

regulatory regime and an international harmonized spectrum. Ms. Warren and Ms. Manner recommend a 

review of spectrum management authorities, in both domestic and international arena. 

Adm. Ellis thanked the speakers for their informative presentation, especially for clarifying the criticality 

of spectrum issues for U.S. efforts in space. Adm. Ellis asked the speakers to offer some general 

principles that might define a perfect regulatory world. One goal worth some effort, offered Ms. Warren, 

would be creation of incentives for the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to build in sharing 

capability into an unknown environment, so that ubiquitous uses could co-exist in a trusted manner. Ms. 

Manner added the need for technology neutrality- that is, a recognition that each technology has its 

strengths and weaknesses, and usefulness in different contexts. As 5G and future technologies are 

introduced, it is important to provide certainty and resources for each of the technologies in question. 

Dr. Schmitt congratulated the two speakers for their excellent treatment of a complex subject. He 

recommended to the UAG that they invite the current U.S. ambassador to the ITU plenipotentiary 

congress to educate the UAG further on these issues. He also pointed out one effort that has in the past 

contributed to international cooperation: an effort by Ambassador Mickey Gardner in the 1970’s, in 

concert with industry, to create The International Telecommunications Training Institute. Still active 

decades later, and supported by Congress and the Department of State, the institute has made a 

tremendous difference, especially in our relationships with developing countries. Today, the majority of 

international attendees at ITU congresses have been trained at this institute. 

11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Dr, Dittmar asked the speakers to characterize the urgency of regulatory reform and harmonization, 

especially as they relate to 5G. Ms. Manner and Ms. Warren replied that the problem is indeed very 

urgent and needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. 

Mr. Ellis asked for clarification of the consequences of the inability of satellites to switch spectra in 

space, and wondered whether there are any technological solutions on the horizon. Ms. Warren replied 

that, in the near future, there are only regulatory solutions. But one reason for optimism is the fact that the 

space community collaborates very well; commercial satellite industries continue to collaborate well even 

as they compete with each other. 

Returning to the speakers’ opening remarks, Adm. Ellis asked whether spectrum users outside the U.S. 

may be using spectrum building blocks to block U.S. operations. Ms. Warren replied that competitors 

come in all shapes and sizes, and noted that several large space-faring nations are also large 5G players. 

Public Comments and Closing Remarks 

No public comments were received. 

Adm. Ellis once again thanked the speakers for their excellent presentations. 

He adjourned the meeting at 3:00 pm MDT. 

12 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

APPENDIX A 

Agenda 

National Space Council 

Users’ Advisory Group 

Public Meeting Agenda 

April 8, 2019 

Broadmoor Hotel International Center 

Colorado Springs, CO 

1:00 – 1:30 Opening Remarks & Committee Business 

Jim Ellis, Jr. 

UAG Chairman 

Selected Subcommittee Chairs with proposed Findings & Recommendations 

1:30 – 2:15 The Emergence of the Space Force 

Doug Loverro 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy 

Marc Berkowitz 

Vice President for Space Security, Lockheed Martin 

2:15 – 2:50 Space Spectrum: Challenge & Opportunity 

Jennifer Warren 

Vice President for Technology Policy & Regulation, Lockheed Martin 

Jennifer Manner 

Senior Vice President for Regulatory Affairs, EchoStar 

2:50 – 3:00 Public Comment & Closing Remarks 

Jim Ellis, Jr. 

UAG Chairman 

All times Mountain Time 

13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Appendix B 

National Space Council Users’ Advisory Group Membership 

Adm. James Ellis, Chair 

Retired 4-star Admiral, former head of STRATCOM 

Buzz Aldrin 

Apollo 11 Astronaut 

Salvatore Bruno 

President and CEO of United Launch Alliance 

Wesley Bush 

CEO of Northrop Grumman 

Dean Cheng 

Scholar at the Heritage Foundation 

Col. Eileen Collins 

Retired U.S. Air Force; Four-time Shuttle Astronaut 

Steve Crisafulli 

Former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives 

Mary Lynne Dittmar 

President and CEO of the Coalition for Deep Space Exploration 

Tim Ellis 

CEO of Relativity Space 

Marillyn Hewson 

CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation 

Homer Hickam 

Author of “Rocket Boys” and former NASA Marshall Spaceflight Center engineer 

The Honorable Kay Ivey 

Governor of Alabama 

Fred Klipsch 

Founder and Chairman of Hoosiers for Quality Education 

14 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Gen. Lester Lyles 

Retired 4-star Air Force General and Chair of the NASA Advisory Council 

Col. Pamela Melroy 

Retired U.S. Air Force; Three-time Shuttle Astronaut; and former Deputy Director of the Tactical 

Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 

Dennis Muilenburg 

CEO of the Boeing Company 

Fatih Ozmen 

CEO of the Sierra Nevada Corporation 

G.P. “Bud” Peterson 

President of the Georgia Institute of Technology 

Eric Schmidt 

Google and MIT Media Lab 

The Honorable Harrison “Jack” Schmitt 

Former U.S. Senator and Apollo 17 Astronaut 

Gwynne Shotwell 

President and COO of SpaceX 

Bob Smith 

CEO of Blue Origin 

Eric Stallmer 

President of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation 

David Thompson 

Founder and CEO of Orbital ATK 

Pamela Vaughan 

Board Certified Science Teacher 

Mandy Vaughn 

President of VOX Launch Company 

Stuart Witt 

Founder of Mojave Air and Spaceport, former Navy pilot, former Chairman of the Commercial 

Spaceflight Federation 

David Wolf 

Four-time Shuttle Astronaut and Physician 

15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Appendix C 

Meeting Attendees 

UAG Membership 

Adm. James Ellis, UAG Chair 

Mr. Salvatore T. Bruno 

Dean Cheng (teleconference) 

Col. Eileen Collins (U.S. Air Force, ret.) 

The Honorable Steve Crisafulli (teleconference) 

Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar 

Mr. Tim Ellis 

Mr. Homer Hickam (teleconference) 

Mr. Fred Klipsch 

General Lester Lyles (U.S. Air Force, ret.) 

Col. Pamela Melroy (U.S. Air Force, ret.) 

Mr. Fatih Ozmen 

Dr. G.P. (Bud) Peterson 

Dr. Eric Schmidt (teleconference) 

The Honorable Harrison Schmitt 

Ms. Gwynne Shotwell 

Dr. Robert H. Smith 

Mr. Eric Stallmer 

Ms. Pamela Vaughan 

Dr. Mandy F. Vaughn 

Mr. Stuart O. Witt 

Dr. David Wolf (teleconference) 

Brandon T. Eden, UAG Executive Secretary 

Non-UAG Attendees 

(transcribed from handwritten sign-in sheets; see Appendix E for original record) 

Kyle Acierno Ispace, Inc. 

Andrew Acio Jacobs Engineering Group 

Meghan Allen Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Tim Anderson Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Larry Barrett Space Foundation 

Michael Barton A.I. Solutions 

Arthur (Bill) Beckman Boeing 

Paul Behan NATCA (National Air Traffic Controllers 

Association) 

Lutz Bertling OHB 

Jay Bookbinder NASA-Ames Research Center 

Natalia Borotkanych EOS (Earth Observation System) 

Jason Bourquet NIWC (Naval Information Warfare Ctr)-Pacific 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Ken Bowersox NASA 

Harriet Brettle SGAC 

Lou Brogden? (looks like Lew Bringle) Gingrich 360 

Jim Bridenstine NASA 

Anderson Bruscad Brazilian Space Systems 

Josh Brost Relativity Space 

Jeff Brown Trax/Indiana 

Jeff Burchfield Sonalysts, Inc. 

Daniel Burkett VOX Space 

Lisa Callahan Lockheed Martin and Space Foundation 

Tom Campbell Harris Corporation 

Chris Carpenter ANSER (Analytic Services, Inc.) 

Carol Carroll NASA 

Richard Carter U.S. Strategic Command 

Victoria Carter-Cortez European Space Agency 

Sarah Chapman U.S. Air Force 

Arfan Chaudry UK Space Agency 

Jim Chilton Boeing 

Dennis Clark U.S. Air Force 

Tom Codella Evince Analytics 

Richard Coleman Space Transportation Association 

Samantha Condie Global Affairs Canada 

Alberto Conti Ball Aerospace 

Ariane Cornell Blue Origin 

Ivan Couronne Agency France-Presse (AFP) 

Rebecca Cowen-Hirsch Inmarsat Government 

Tom Cremins NASA 

Todd Cress Artel 

Randy Cruz NASA 

Carl Cumm ANSER (Analytic Services, Inc.) 

Suzy Cunningham NASA 

Richard DalBello Virgin Orbit 

Hoyt Davidson Near Earth, LLC 

Craig Day AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics) 

Clementine Decoopman SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Samu Eshima SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Pascal Faucher CNES (Centre national d’études spatiales: French 

National Centre for Space Studies) 

Gen. William Fraser Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Martin Frederick Northrop Grumman Corporation 

Sally Frodge Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

Marco Fuchs OHB 

Dearn Fulmer The Mitre Corporation 

John Gaine NASA 

Sumedha Garud NASA_Ames SimLabs 

William Gattle Harris Corporation 

William Gerstenmaier NASA 

Suzanne Gillen NASA 

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National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

G. Gillinger U.S. Air Force – 14th Air Force 

Adam Gleason A28 Design Services 

Jodi Goldberg EchoStar 

Alexandra Gravereaux Astroscale Ltd. 

Loren Grush The Verge 

Jon Harrison Dept. of State (Oceans and Environmental and 

Scientific Affairs) 

Brooke Hart Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Phil Heaver Lockheed Martin Corporation 

Curtis Hernandez National Space Council 

Catherine Hofacker Aerospace America (AIAA) 

Clint Hunt United Launch Alliance 

Christopher Ingraham International Space Station U.S. National Lab 

Peggy Irwin Ball Aerospace 

Arthur Jacques NASA- Goddard Space Flight Center 

Edgar Johansson LASP (Laboratory for Space and Atmospheric 

and Space Physics, University of Colorado 

Boulder). 

Nathan Johnson Astro Executive Consulting, LLC 

Rafael Jordá Siquier Open Cosmos 

Jordan Joseph Relativity Space 

Janet Karika NASA 

Michael Kelly U.S. Strategic Command 

Matthew Kerley ION Communications 

Maik Kammermann Bundeswehr 

M.G. Kenny SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Trevor Kilpatrick United Launch Alliance 

Paul Korell NIWC 

Swetha Kotichintala SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Chris Kunstadter AXA XL 

Jim Kuzma Space Florida 

Bhavya Lal IDA STPI (Science & Technology Policy Instit.) 

Cornell Lashbrook Space Foundation 

Cody LeBlanc Office of Rep. Ken Buck (Colorado 4th district) 

Glen Liebig NASA- Goddard Space Flight Center 

Amanda Lomas Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Michael Long U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Douglas Loverro Loverro Consulting, LLC 

Kimberly Lusk Relativity Space 

Makenzie Lystrup Bell Aerospace 

Kate Maliga Aerojet Rocketdyne 

John Marshall Rumsford Engineering 

Cindy Martin-Brennan ISS National Laboratory 

Wade McElroy VOX Space 

Shawn McEniry LSINC Corporation 

Nate McIntyre NASA 

Naomi McGill Rainbow Centres 

Sean McClain HQ AFSPC (Air Force Space Command) 

18 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Kevin McLoughlin UK Space Agency 

Jolene Meidinger NASA 

Fritz Merkle OHB SE 

Brian Miller [undecipherable] 

Erin Miller National Cybersecurity Center 

Kyle Montgomery Air Force Research Lab 

Peter Montgomery Jacobs Engineering Group 

Jim Morhard NASA 

Mark Mozena Planet 

Santos Munoz NRO (National Reconnaissance Office), U.S. Air 

Force 

George Nelson NASA 

Neal Newman NASA 

Marcus Nichols United Launch Alliance 

George C. Nield Commercial Space Technologies, LLC 

Carson Owens U.S. Air Force 

Tim Owens U.S. Air Force - NORAD 

Eren Ozmen Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Carson Owens US Air Force 

Regina Peldszus German Aerospace Center (DLR) 

David L. Pierce NASA 

Arnau Pons SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Tasman Powis Princeton University 

Richard Pym Dept. of State 

Lon Rains Northrop Grumman Corporation 

William Readdy NASA (ret) 

Camilo Reyes SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Josh Rickey Northrop Grumman Corporation 

Jana Robinson Prague Security Studies Institute 

Rob Ronci Secure World Foundation 

Louis Rousmaniere Planet Labs 

Antonino Salmeri SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Jose Santos Brazil DAO (Dept. of Defense) 

Luigi Scatteia PwC Advisory France 

Kristin Shahady Ball Aerospace 

Manny Shar Bryce Space and Technology 

Simon Shuham Blue Origin 

Jeray Simms L3 Technologies 

Stewart Smith US Air Force 

Jordan Sotudeh NASA/JPL 

Ed Spitler Artel 

Antonio Stark SGAC (Space Generation Advisory Council) 

Johnny Stephenson NASA 

Olga Stelmakh-Drescher International Institute of Space Commerce 

Timo Stuffler OHB 

Richard Sypniewski ENPULSION 

Gary Talbott no affiliation given 

Will Theunissen Facebook Connectivity Lab 

Eric Thoemmes Lockheed Martin Corporation 

19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Kathryn C. Thornton Space Foundation Board 

Jeff Trauberman VOX Space 

Demos Tsairides NASA 

David A. Turner U.S. Dept. of State -OES/SAT (Oceans and 

International Environmental and Scientific 

Affairs/ Space and Advanced Technology) 

W.B. Tutt Space Foundation Board of Directors 

Maj. Gen. José Vagner Vital CCISE-Brazil (Space Systems Coordination and 

Implementation Commission) 

David Van Buren L3 Technologies 

Julie Van Kleeck Aerojet Rocketdyne 

Scott van Sant U.S. Strategic Command 

Natalia Vargas-Cuentas INTI-Lab (Image Processing Research 

Laboratory) 

Gary F. Vaughan No affiliation given 

Xuyen T. Vuong Artel 

John Wagner Sierra Nevada Corporation 

Bob Walker Moonwalker Associates 

Taylor Weeks NASA 

Amber Whittington U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 

Ben Wilking Atec, Inc. 

Leslie Wilkins MEDB 

Josh Wolny Secure World Foundation 

Nathaniel Yiitalo U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

Halil Yonter Raytheon 

Zheng Wenjing [indecipherable] 

5 additional attendees with indecipherable signatures 

Teleconference attendees 

Baker Allen Office of the Governor of Alabama 

Gale Allen American Society for Gravitational and Space 

Research 

Eric Berger Ars Techica 

Emily Boster Lockheed Martin 

Kent Bress NASA HQ 

Laura Canadee Public 

Keith Cowing NASAwatch.com 

Nicolas Cummings SpaceX 

Kate Cron-Miller Jacobs Engineering Group 

Laura Delgado-Lopez NASA 

Elizabeth Esther NASA 

Karen Feldstein NASA 

Richard FIscher NASA - Marshall Space Flight Center 

Mary Floyd Electrosoft 

Valerie Green Ligado Networks 

20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Jamison Hawkins Lockheed Martin 

Janelle Kasper-Wolfe Marshall Space Flight Center 

Theodore Kronmiller Attorney, Great Falls, VA 

Michael Lapidus SpaceX 

James Lochner Universities Space Research Association 

David Lubar Aerospace Corporation 

Jim Luckner Universities Space Research Association 

Tim Maclay OneWeb 

Meredith McKay NASA 

Laura Montgomery Ground Based Space Matters 

David Newman Unaffiliated 

Bob Pauljola Lockheed Martin 

Diane Rausch NASA headquarters 

Steve Rhyne NuGen 

Mary Beth Saffo Electrosoft/NASA 

Frank Slazer Aerospace Industries Corporation 

Marcia Smith SpacePolicyOnline.com 

Joel Wallace NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center 

Jeremy Westmoreland NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 

Ashley Wilkins US House of Representatives 

Rodney Womack NASA 

Philip Zion General Dynamics 

Ann Zulkosky Lockheed Martin 

5 additional registrants with indecipherable information 

21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

National space council users’ advisory group April 8, 2019 

Appendix D 

List of Presentations 

Opening Remarks – Mr. Brandon Eden and Adm. James Ellis 

Exploration & Discovery Subcommittee Report – Gen. Lester Lyles 

National Security Subcommittee Report – Adm. James Ellis 

The Emergence of the Space Force – Mr. Doug Loverro and Mr. Marc Berkowitz 

Space Spectrum – Ms. Jennifer Warren and Ms. Jennifer Manner 

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