2017 UT App 66

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CORA USA LLC,

Appellee,

v.

QUICK CHANGE ARTIST LLC,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20150504-CA

Filed April 13, 2017

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie

No. 130901898

Chance McClain, Attorney for Appellant

Richard F. Ensor and Michael C. Barnhill, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 Quick Change Artist LLC (Quick Change) appeals the 

district court’s award of damages and attorney fees to CORA

USA LLC (CORA) in connection with its breach of contract claim 

against Quick Change. Quick Change argues the court erred 

when it granted three of CORA’s motions in limine and asks us 

“to vacate or set aside the Final Judgment and reverse and 

remand for a new trial.” Because Quick Change has “failed to 

address the trial court’s detailed ruling, failed to develop [its]

citation to authority, and failed to provide any reasoned analysis 

based on that authority, we conclude that [it has] failed to carry 

[its] burden of persuasion on appeal.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT 

App 48, ¶ 84; see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 

1226 (explaining that “our adequate briefing requirement . . . is a 
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20150504-CA 2 2017 UT App 66

natural extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore 

affirm.

¶2 “It is well established that an appellate court will decline 

to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately 

brief.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998)

(plurality opinion). To be adequately briefed, an “argument shall 

contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 

to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, 

statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 

24(a)(9). An adequately briefed argument requires more than 

“bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 

reasoned analysis based on that authority.” State v. Thomas, 961 

P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

¶3 In its appeal, Quick Change asserts several arguments 

over a scant six pages. It takes issue with the district court’s 

decision to grant two of CORA’s motions in limine, which 

barred Quick Change “from using evidence or testimony prior to 

October 28, 2012,” and excluded a number of unproduced 

exhibits Quick Change used in its deposition of CORA. In 

support of these two arguments, Quick Change cites Tschaggeny 

v. Milbank Insurance Co., 2007 UT 37, 163 P.3d 615, for the bare 

proposition that “a trial court is free, in the exercise of sound 

judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,” and 

asserts that it should have done so in this case. Id. ¶ 16 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Quick Change also cites

Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51, 82 P.3d 1076, for the 

proposition that “[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude 

evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is 

harmful.” Id. ¶ 100 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Quick Change claims it was harmed by the court’s 

decision to grant the motions in limine and “was not able to put 

on a proper defense” as a result. But this is the beginning and 

end of its legal analysis. “Analysis of what [these authorities] 
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20150504-CA 3 2017 UT App 66

require[] and of how the facts of [the] case satisfy these 

requirements [is] wholly lacking.” See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.

¶4 Quick Change’s third claim consists of one paragraph in 

which it argues the district court erred in awarding CORA

attorney fees. Quick Change cites Stewart v. Utah Public Service 

Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that, in 

general, “attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party 

unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award.” Id. at 782. 

According to Quick Change, “the original contract [between the 

two parties] was no longer controlling” and therefore the court 

erroneously awarded CORA attorney fees. But Quick Change 

does not demonstrate how the original contract was superseded 

or, more importantly, cite any authority to support its argument

that in such a situation the decision by the court to award the 

prevailing party its attorney fees is an abuse of discretion.

¶5 Quick Change’s final two claims—that its expert and

accompanying expert report should not have been excluded and 

that it should have been awarded damages on its counterclaim—

each span one paragraph and lack any citation to authority. We 

note that “[w]hile failure to cite to pertinent authority may not 

always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the 

overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 

research and argument to the reviewing court.” See Thomas, 961 

P.2d at 305. Such is the case here.

¶6 In sum, “[w]hile there is no bright line between adequate

and inadequate briefing,” we conclude that Quick Change has

not “developed an argument sufficient to carry [its] burden of

persuasion.” See Heslop v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, 

¶ 47, 390 P.3d 314; see also Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 

¶ 12 (“[A]n appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue will 

almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore 

affirm.
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20150504-CA 4 2017 UT App 66

¶7 As a final matter, we address CORA’s request for its 

attorney fees and costs on appeal. In general, “when a party who 

received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also 

entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.” Utah Dep’t of 

Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 

see also Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 

P.2d 406, 408–09 (Utah 1980) (explaining that a prevailing party 

may receive attorney fees on appeal where it is permitted by 

statute or contract). Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the 

district court awarded CORA its attorney fees and costs. 

Accordingly, CORA “is entitled to an award of attorney fees 

reasonably incurred on appeal” and we remand for calculation 

of those fees. See Adams, 806 P.2d at 1198.

¶8 Having concluded that Quick Change has failed to meet 

its burden of persuasion on each of the issues it raises, we affirm 

the district court’s rulings and remand for the limited purpose of 

determining the amount of attorney fees and costs CORA

reasonably incurred on appeal.