ALD-118 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-4595

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MICHAEL G. RYAN,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-94-cr-00127-001)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon

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Submitted for a Decision on the Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability

and for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 24, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 12, 2012)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM.

In 1995, Michael G. Ryan pled guilty to several federal drug trafficking and 

money laundering offenses. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ryan was sentenced to 

twenty years of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a 

$200.00 special assessment. The plea agreement further provided that Ryan was not 
2

required to pay “the costs of prosecution, imprisonment, probation, or supervised 

release.” (Judgment, Dist. Ct. dkt # 185.) 

On July 5, 2011, after fifteen years of extensive post-conviction litigation, Ryan 

filed in the District Court a “Motion for Clarification” of the terms of his plea agreement. 

In the motion, Ryan alleged that, on May 11, 2010, the United States Federal Bureau of 

Prisons [BOP] attempted to coerce him into signing an agreement to pay a subsistence 

charge for part of the cost of residence at a Residential Reentry Center (RRC). Ryan 

claimed that the terms of his plea agreement exempted him from paying this cost, and 

moved the District Court to “clarify” those terms to confirm his interpretation of the plea 

agreement. The District Court denied the motion. 

We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. For substantially the reasons 

given by the District Court, we agree that it did not have the authority to grant the 

“motion for clarification.” First, contrary to Ryan’s contention, neither 18 U.S.C. § 3583 

nor Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for the District 

Court to issue an order interpreting the terms of the 1995 plea agreement. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583 (governing terms of supervised release); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (governing 

procedure for revoking or modifying probation or supervised release). Moreover, as the 

government noted below, Ryan previously challenged the BOP’s actions in a purported 

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and was denied relief. Ryan v. Scism, No. 11-cv00748, 2011 WL 2393493 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 13, 2011), aff’d Ryan v. Scism, 445 F. App’x 

580 (3d Cir. 2011). Finally, to the extent that Ryan seeks clarification of the plea 
3

agreement because he is “unsure if the government will try again, during the remainder of 

his sentence, to force him to waive those benefits of his plea agreement,” (Motion for 

Clarification, Dist. Ct. dkt # 331, ¶ 8), we note that his challenge is not ripe for judicial 

review.1 See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (explaining that a claim is 

not ripe for adjudication if it rests on “contingent future events that may not occur as 

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 

summarily affirm the District Court’s order.2 See Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. 

 

1

It appears that, since filing his Motion for Clarification in the District Court, 

Ryan began his term of supervised release. He argues to this Court that he “remains 

exposed, during supervised release, to a breach similarly related to costs.” (Arg. in 

Opposition to Summary Dismissal, p. 3.)

2 We deny a certificate of appealability as unnecessary.