The Honor able L esley Wells, S enior District Court Judge f or the Nor thern District of O hio, * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0190n.06 No. 09-5003 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. L ARRY AM MO NS, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : SUTTON and STRANCH, Circuit J udg es; WEL L S, District J udg e. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. B efor e his trial on five c ounts of being a felon in possession of a firea rm, L arr y Ammons moved to supp re s s the fire arms and r equeste d new c ounsel. The district court de nied both motions, and a jury convicted Ammons on all five c ounts. On appea l, Ammons urg es us to hold that the district court i nfring ed his Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel and that the two sear ches—one of a house , one of a truck—violated the Four th A mendment. We disa g ree and
a ff ir m.
I. Early one morning , Deputy

Sheriff H eath Walker

investigated a theft at a house in Newbe rn, Tenne ssee. When he arr ived, R obert and Billy Shanklin told Deputy Walker t hat t heir mot her, JudyNo. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 2 - Shanklin, owned the house ( though she was not living there at the t ime) and that her e x -boy friend, Ammons, lived in a campe r in the drivew ay and wa s remodelingthe hou s e. W hen the br others found some of their mother’s belong ings in the house, they conclude d that Ammons had stolen them and hidden them ther e. Judy Shanklin soon arrived a

nd asked Walker

to searc h the house for

other mis sin g thi ng s. A s e arc h tu rn e d u p mo re ite ms, pr omp tin g the po lic e to a rr e st A mmo ns fo r t

he ft
. After the p o li c e le f

t, B il ly Sh an k li nf

o u n d s e v e r a l p aw ns h o p r e c e ip ts , an d f u rth e r in v e s ti g a tion
reve aled that Ammons, a c onvicted fe lon, had pawne d three firea rms.
A w e e k late r, a

tr us te d in fo rm ant t old

the Te nn e sse e B ur e a

u of I nv e sti g a tio n th a t A mmo ns , by the n o ut o n b on d, wo uld be tow ing a sto le n tr a c tor to L a ud e rd a le County the ne xt d ay to se ll i t. When office rs saw A mmons towing a tra ctor into L auderdale County , they pulled him over. An of fi c e r s aw a

re vo lve r a

nd a pis tol bo x thr ou g h th e tr

uc k’ s w ind owand

se ize d th e m.
A fe dera l gr and jury

indic t ed Am m o n s o n five c ounts of being a fe lon in possession of a firea rm: three counts for the pawne d firea rms and two for the firea

rms found in the truck. Ammons moved to suppress the fi re ar m s , arguing that the sear ches violate d the Four th Amendment. A mag istrate judg e re commended de ny ing the motion
. Am mons’ counsel filed a motion for
rec onsideration, and A mmons filed a pro se motion for the appointment of newcounsel. The district court de nied the motion for new counsel, finding no g ood cause . After a sec ond suppression hea

ring and a supple mental re port from the ma g istrate judg e, t h e district cour t denied the suppre ssion motion. A jury

found Ammons g uilty

on all five counts, and the court sentenc ed him to 215 months in prison.No. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 3 - II.
“In all criminal prose cutions,” the Six th Amendment say s, “the acc used shall enjoy the rig ht

. . . to ha ve the Assistance of

Counsel for his defe nce.” U.S. Const. amend. VI . That includes the rig ht to repre sentation “by an otherwise qualified attorney
. . . willing to re prese nt the defe ndant,” United States v. Gonzalez- Lopez , 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006), and the rig ht to a “choic e of c ounsel,” id. at 142, though the latter is limited in “important respec ts,” W heat v. United States , 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988), and must be “bala nced a g ainst the court’ s authority to control its own docket,” United States v. Gree n , 388 F.3d 918, 921 ( 6th Cir. 2004).
Th e de fe nd ant b e ars the ini tia l bur de n to “br ing any se ri ou s diss a tis fa c tio n w ithc ouns e l to the attention of the district c ourt.” Benitez v. U nited States , 521 F.3d 625, 632 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Once that happens, the court may g rant a reque st for newcounsel if the de fenda nt establishes “good
cause ,” id. , an inquiry

that considers the timeliness of the defe ndant’s re quest, the extent to which the bre akdown in the lawy er- client relationship “pre vent[ed] an adequate defe nse” a nd “the public’ s interest in the prompt and e fficie nt administration of justice,” United States v. Mac k , 258 F.3d 548, 55 6 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 1 )
. We r e v ie w th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s a s s e s s me n t o f th e s e f a c to r s , along with the adequa cy of the district cour

t’s inquiry

into the matter, for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Cha mb e rs , 441 F.3d 438, 446 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pe rm iss ibl y re

je c te d Am mon s’ mot ion

fo r n e w c ouns e l. T he c ourt ini tia lly appointed the F eder al Public Defe nder to repr esent Ammons, but six months later Ammons retaine dNo. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 4 - private c ounsel, Charles Waldman. The district court pushed ba ck the trial date, origina lly set for Au g us t 20 06 , s e ve ra l ti me s w hil e Wal dma n g ot u p to sp eed and pr e pa

re d a mot ion to s up pr e ss. After the mag istrate judge rec ommended denying the suppression motion, W aldman filed a motion fo r r e c on sid e rat io n, a sk ingfo r a se c on d h e ari ngto a llo w Jud y Sha nk lin to t e sti fy on Am mon s’ beh a lf
. T h a t s a me d ay , A mm o n s f il e d th e f ir s t o f tw o p r o s e mo ti o n s to d is mi s s Wa ld ma n , a nd Waldman soon filed a motion to withdraw, prompting the cour t to hold a hear ing on the issue.
When the court a sked Ammons to expl ain his conce rn s , he complaine d about Waldman’s lack of communication: “The re [ wer e] months on end when I would say he needs to come se e me.

. . . He sa id he wo uld be the re Tu e sd ay , that we nt on fo r tw o mo nth s. Iwi ll b e the re Tu e sd ay , I wi ll be ther e Tue sday . He ha s never responde d to any

let t er ever written to him, ever .” R.145 at 8–9. Am mon s a lso ra ise d a

su bs tanti ve c on c e rn , th a t Wa ldm a n d id n ot c a ll J ud y S han kl in a t th e fi rs t
su pp re ssi on he ari ngand

that he fa ile d to pr od

uc e se ve ra l do c ume nts re la te d to t he tr a ff ic sto p. B oth
conce rns, the cour

t foun d , s t emmed fr om the stress of trial a nd unwelcome developments on the suppression motion, noting that “ther e was no indication of being unhappy with c ounsel until we had an adve rse de termination by the mag istrate judg e.” Id. at 15–16. Ag ainst these conc erns the district c ourt balanc ed its own conce rn that the c ase “ [had] been g oing on too long ” and that this second substitut ion of counsel would lea d to further delay s. Id. atNo. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 5 - 1 1 , 1 4
. T h e c o u rte x p l a i n e d t h a t s o m e d i s a g r e e m e n tw i t h c o u n s e l i s n e i t h e r u n u s u a l n o r

a l w a ys avoidable: [A] lot of times materials that par ties perc eive a s, quote, crit i ca l t o t h eir c ase or wi tne sse s th a t are c ri tic a l to the ir c a se are . . . n ot n e c e ssa ri ly e ve n u se fu l in

the c a se and may prese nt situations where t h ey ’re actua lly adver se in some way . I t’s as though the patient who has canc er g oes to the doctor and say s we need to do this and we ne e d to do this . . . an d the do c tor or may be a te a m of

do c tor s k no ws tha t th is i s not a n a p p r o p r iate th e r a

p e u ti c p r o c e d

ur e o r p r o c e s s , s o w h a t is in tu it iv e o r what appea rs to be a g ood idea or

wh at re ading the law books may sug g est to a lay

man may not be appr opriate or

even a dmissibl e in a c ourt of law. Id. at 10–11. The c ourt denied the motion, but assured Ammon s t h at , i f a criti cal strateg y issue
arose at the trial sche duled for the next m onth, they could “talk[] about” it then. Id. at 12.
None of this ex ceed ed the cour

t’s “broa d discretion.” United States v. Vasque z , 560 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). The re cord doe s not sugg est that the disag ree ment betwee n Ammons and Waldman was “total or ir

rec oncilable,” id. at 468, “pr eventingan ade quate de fense ,” Mack , 258 F.3d at 556. The hear ing, to the contrary , showed that Ammons communicated re g ularly with Waldman and that Waldman tried to a ccommodate his client’s wishes while “ bring [i ng ] t o bear [hi s] s kill and knowledg e” a s a def

ense attorney
. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Eve n befor e Ammons filed his motion for ne w counse l, Waldman had filed the re consideration moti on to remedy Ammons’ conce rn that J udy Shanklin should testify
. A defendant is not entitled to new c ounsel and the delay that comes with it ever

y time he disag ree s with counsel’s strate g ic judg ment.
Am mon s, it i s tr

ue , d id n ot w a it unti l the e ve of tr ia l to make the re qu e st, wh ic h c uts in h is favor
. But the reque st still came afte r earlier delay s and, in the district cour t’s judgme nt, would haveNo. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 6 - set the trial date back “ another six months.” R.145 at 14. Ammons insisted he wa s “askingonly for 30 day s,” id. a t 14 , b ut, us ingthe pa st s ub sti tut ion a s pr e c e de nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt re a so na bly c ou ld predic t that i t wo u l d take more time to bring ne w counse l up to speed. The c ourt not only g ave Ammons a full “opportunity to expl ain the base s for his alleg ed conf lict with counsel,” Cha mb e rs , 441 F.3d at 447, but also tried “to ea se the de fenda nt’s distrust,” United States v. Ile s , 906 F.2d 1122, 11 31 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso c on c lud e d, a g a in re a so na bly , that “ the pu

bli c ’s int e re st in the prompt and ef

ficient a dminist ration of justice,” Mack , 2 58 F .3 d at 55 6, we ig he d a g a ins t a substitut ion. That is all well and g ood, Ammons responds, but one mont h afte r t he dis trict court de nied the mot ion to wi thd

ra w, the g ov e rnme nt fi le d a su pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt. At that po int , h e e xpla ins , any conce rns about dela

y “melted a way” bec ause “[t] here was no way the case would proc eed to tria l as sche duled with Ammons facingnew a nd uninvestigated alleg ations.” Ammons B r. at 19–20. But the new indictment a dded no new counts. I nstead, the se rial number listed in Count 2 chang ed fr om “T10227703” to “T0127703” a nd in Count 3 from “131403834” to “B 1403834.” Compare R
. 1, w i th R.8 7. Th a t is a ll. Th e se “ ne w a nd un inv e sti g a te d a lle g a tio ns ” ha d n othi ng to d o w ithAm mon s’
c omp la int s, and

a s it tur ne d o ut t he c a se pr oce e de d p ro mpt ly to t ri a l. H a vin g he ard

Am mon s’
c on c e rn s and

havin g ru le d o n h is m oti on , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t ne e d to inq

uir e ane w i nto Ammons’ conce rns simply beca use the de fenda

nt wanted to try

ag ain base d on this inconsequential chang e to the indictment. No Six th Amendment violation occur red.No. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 7 - III
. The F ourth Amendment pre vents “unre asonabl e searche s and seizures” by fede ral law enfor ceme nt, and the F ourtee nth Amendment via incor poration pr ev ents the same by state law
en fo rc em ent. See A guilar v. Texas , 3 78 U. S. 1 08 (1 96 4) ; Mapp v . O hio , 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Ammons challeng es the sea rch of the Newbern house and the sear ch of his truc k. Neither sear ch, howeve r, cr ossed these c onstitut ional limit s.
TheSe ar c h o

f th e Ho us e . Offic ers ordinarily must obtain a warra nt befor e sea

rchinga house, Vale v. Louisiana , 3 99 U. S. 3 0, 34 (1 97 0) , a nd e vid e nc e re c ov e re d in

vio la tio n o f t

his ru le g e ne ra lly may not be used a g ainst someone with a r easona ble e x p ec tation of privac y in the house, W

eek s v. United States , 232 U.S. 391–93 (1914). One “we ll-delineate d exception” to this rule t u rn s on consent, a s “[a]n officer w ith consent” does not need a warrant “to conduct a c onstitut ional sear ch.” United States v. J

enkins , 92 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 1996). Offic ers ge nera lly may establish consent in on e of thr e e wa

y s: (1 ) t he de fe nd ant c on se nts ; ( 2) so me on e wi th “ joi nt a c c e ss o r c on tr ol f

or mos t purposes” over the are a conse nts, United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); or (3) the of fi c e rs “ c on du c t[] the se arc h in g oo d f a ithre lia nc e on the thi rd -p art

y ’s a p p a r e n t au tho rit

y to authorize the sear ch throug h her co n s ent,” Un ite d S tat es v . P ur c e ll , 526 F.3d 953, 963 ( 6th Cir. 2008 )
. A t th e v e r

y le a s t, th e o f

f ic e r s in th is in s ta

n c e s e ar c h e d th e h o u s e in g o o d f a ith r eliance on Judy Sha nk lin ’s a pp are nt a uth or ity to c on se nt.No. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 8 - When J udy

Shanklin told Deputy

Walk er t o s ea rch the house, he kne w she owne d it, and Shanklin’s sons had just tol d him that Ammons was li ving in the camper in t he drive way while the unoccupie d house under

went renovations. That suffice s to establish appare nt authority beca use the “fa cts ava ilable to the offic er” at the time of the se arc h supported a r easona ble “belief that the consenting party”—Shanklin—“had a uthority over the premises” as the owne r of the house
. Il lin ois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) ( quotation marks omitted). The r eality , it is t rue, w as more complicated. A s it turned out, Ammons had previously dated Judy

Shanklin and had stay ed at he r home in Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, for some period of time. He sold Shanklin the house in New bern, and the two made plans t o re n o v at e it. The roma ntic relationship fiz zled, but the ag ree ment
re ma ine d in ta c t, a

nd Am mon s mo ve d in to h is f or me r h ou se wh ile he c omp le te d th e re no vatio ns . R.96 at 3.
No do ub t, pr op e rt

y ow ne rs in so me c ir c ums tanc e s la c k a uth or ity , a

pp are nt o r o the rw ise , to consent to the s ear ch of proper ty occupie d by

others. See, e .g. , Sto ne r v . Ca lif or nia , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) ( hotel owner la c ke d a pp are nt a uth or ity to c on se nt t o s e arc h o f h ote l r oo m) ; Chapman v. United States , 3 65 U. S. 610 , 616 –1 7 (19 61 ) (p ro pe rt y ow ne r la c ke d ac tua l autho ri ty to co ns e nt t o
sear ch of r ented house ). B ut in arg uing that Shanklin was a “la ndlord” of the Newbe rn house, A m m o n s s t r e t c he s th os e case s and these f acts. Shanklin and Ammons, for one , did not have any thing a pproac hing a

traditional landlord-te nant relationship, whe ther in r eality or in appe ara

nce. And Deputy

Walker, for another , could readily believe that Shanklin had authority to consent underNo. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 9 - the c ir c u ms ta

n c e s p r e s e n te d

in v ie w o f h e r s o n s ’ s tate me n ts th a t s h e o w n e d th e h o u s e an d

th a t no
one wa s living in it at the time. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 188.
But even if Shanklin ha d appar ent authority to consent to the sea

rch of the house, Ammons adds, t hat would not overr ide hi s authority to object to it. See Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103 (2006) ( suppressing the results of a consent searc h wher e a pr esent c o-occ upant expressly ref used consent). T his a

rg ument, howeve r, founder s on the district court’s f actua l findings a

nd the standar d of re vie w. De pu ty Wal ke r te sti fi e d tha t Ammo ns “ [n]e ve r obj e c t[e d] at an y po int to [h is] b e ingin the house.” R.141 at 29. Following the two suppression hea ring s, the district court conc luded that “[t] here is no evidenc e . . . that Mr. Ammons objected to the se arc h.” R.96 at 6. On the se cond day of tri al (a s o pp os e d to the su pp re ssi on he ari ng ), Am mo ns too k th e sta nd and te sti fi e d th a t he tol d the Shanklin br others and the police to le ave the house in N ewbe rn on the mor n i n g o f t h e search. See R.1 31 a t 29 4– 96 . F oll ow ingthi s te sti mony , h ow e ve r, Am mon s d id no t r e ne w h is m oti on to
su pp re ss, and

a s a re su lt h e c ann ot us e his la te r t ri a l te sti mony

to a tta c k th e e arl ie r d e nia l of his suppression motion. See United States v. Thomas , 87 5 F .2 d 55 9, 56 2 n. 2 ( 6th Cir . 1 98 9) ; c

f. O rti z v. Jordan , __ U.S. __, 131 S. C t. 884, 889 ( 2011). Even if Ammons ha d rene wed the motion, the district cou rt at m o s t would have f ace d a conf

lict betwee n Deputy

Walker’s testimony

at the suppression heari n g an d Ammons’ testimony at trial. I t hardly

would amount to clear

err or, see Panak , 552 F.3d at 465, let alone plain er ror , to c re dit

the of fi c e r’ s v e rs ion

of e ve nts
.No. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 10 - The Search of the Truck . Ammons also challeng es the sea rch of the truck, c laiming that the office rs lacke d rea sonable suspi cion t hat Ammons had committed or wa s committi ng a cr ime. See Gaddis ex re l. Gaddis v. Redford Twp. , 364 F.3d 763, 770–71 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2004). We disag ree . The c onfidential informa

nt’s tip gave the of

fice rs re asonable susp ic io n to stop Ammons. The tip bore the re quisite “indicia of r eliability .” Fl or ida v . J .L. , 529 U.S
. 266, 270 (2000). The inf or mant w a s k

no wn to t he po lic e and

ha d p ro vid ed rel iab le inf or ma tio n in the pa st. See U

nited States v. Allen , 211 F.3d 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2000) (e n banc) ; Un ite d Stat es v. S mi th , 182 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 1999). His “re putation [ could] be assessed,” and he c ould “be he ld responsible if [the] alleg ations turn[ed] out to be fabr icated.” Fl or ida v . J .L. , 529 U. S
. at 270

. Th e inf or mant,
moreove r, g ave de tailed, not g ener al, i nformation, as he spoke specific ally about Amm ons, the truck and whe n and whe re A mmons would be the next day . Nor did Ag en t Bishop leave it at that. He “per sonally

verifie d ever

y fac et of the infor

mation” the next day , save f or the fa ct that the tra ctor wa s stolen, befor e stopping Ammons, p ro v iding “ rea sonable grounds” f or believingthe “r emaining unverifie d bit.” Draper v. U nited States , 358 U.S. 307, 313 (19 5 9 ). I n view of this universe of circ umstances, see I

llinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983), the tip supported the tr aff ic stop.
I t make s n o d if

fe re nc e wh a t “th e a c tua l motiv a tio ns of the ind ivi du a l off ic e rs ” ha pp e ne d to be at the time of

the stop. W

hren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). That the office rs may have mistake nly

believed that the parole office had obtained a war rant for Ammons’ arr est or had other misconce ptions about Ammons does not u ndermine the stop so long as the re othe rwise wa s
a re a so na ble ba sis fo r i t. T he re wa s.No. 09-5003

United States v. Amm ons

- 11 - I V.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.