Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30977

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANTHONY W JETER, also known as Bug,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:01-CR-50070-5

Before DAVIS, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Anthony W. Jeter was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute 500 or more grams of powder cocaine and five or more grams

of crack cocaine, and the district court sentenced him to serve 132 months in

prison and a five-year term of supervised release. This sentence was lower than

the guidelines range of 188-235 months in prison and was the result of a

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion filed by the Government. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 17, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 08-30977 Document: 00511053959 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/17/2010
No. 08-30977

2

We are now presented with Jeter’s appeal from the district court’s denial

of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction of sentence based on the

retroactive amendments to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the Sentencing Guideline

pertaining to crack cocaine offenses. A district court’s denial of a reduction

under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Evans,

587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Jeter argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his

request for a reduction in sentence comparable to the reduction he received when

he was originally sentenced. This argument lacks merit because a district court

has the discretion to grant a comparable reduction in sentence such as that

requested by Jeter, but “it is not compelled to do so.” See United States v. Cooley,

590 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Next, Jeter contends that the district court should have applied the

principles enunciated in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), when

considering his motion. This argument has previously been rejected by this

court, which has held that Booker and the reasonableness standard that springs

from Booker do not apply to proceedings under § 3582(c)(2). Evans, 587 F.3d at

671-72; United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130

S. Ct. 517 (2009). 

Finally, Jeter avers that the district court abused its discretion by failing

to make specific findings in connection with its denial of his motion. “[A] court

is not required to state findings of facts and conclusions of law when denying a

§ 3582(c)(2) motion.” Evans, 587 F.3d at 674 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The record in the instant case shows that the district court

gave due consideration to the motion as a whole and implicitly considered the

§ 3553(a) factors. Consequently, no abuse of discretion arises from its choice not

to give specific reasons in support of the motion. See Cooley, 590 F.3d at 298;

Evans, 587 F.3d at 672-73.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 08-30977 Document: 00511053959 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/17/2010