alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hiram Kelly *v.*Daniel Kelly.

Counterclaim.

A counterclaim must be a cause of action.

License to Enter on Land.

A license from a stranger to enter on land is not a cause of action against the actual occupant but is only matter of defense against an action for having entered.

Adverse Possession — Occupancy by Enclosure.

Where there is no actual adverse possession an actual possession by the occupant is constructively coextensive with the defined limits of his claim of possession.

Deeds Evidence of Boundary.

Though a deed may pass no title it may be admitted as evidence of boundary.

APPEAL PROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT.

December 6, 1865.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Peters:

Tbe amended answer does not set up any counterclaim. A counterclaim must be a cause of action; and a mere license from’ a stranger to enter on land is not a cause of action against tbe1 actual occupant, but is only matter of defense against an action for having entered.

the patent to M. Kay describes the land as lying in Madison. the deed from M. Kay to Iiacket describes the parties as residing in Madison. Estill county was then not established. the deed,, therefore, was legally recorded in the County Court office of Madison, and consequently the copy was authenticated by the official certificate of the clerk of the County Court of Madison, and there was no error in admitting it as evidence of boundary. Nor, even though some of the admitted deeds may have passed no title, was there any error in admitting them for defining the actual possession.

Occupancy by enclosure, when there is no actual adverse possession, is an actual possession by tbe occupant, coextensive with tbe defined limits of bis claim of possession. Fox *v.*Kenton, 4 Bibb, —.

*329Wherefore, according to the testimony, the instructions given by the Circuit Court were neither abstract nor erroneous. They were all hypothetical, sufficiently included the whole law of the case, and rendered those moved by the appellant superfluous and misleading.

It was not the duty of the court *sua sponte*to define actual possession.

The evidence as to the appellee’s actual possession justified the verdict. Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<RECEIVABLES>                                    87663
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           123340
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                2379
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  30788
<INCOME-TAX>                                     12600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              18188
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.63
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 23



Consent of Independent Accountants



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (nos. 333-81601, 333-66128, 333-63364 and 333-56588) and Form S-8 (nos.
333-43550 and 333-51928) of Newtek Capital, Inc. (now Newtek Business Services, Inc.) of our report dated February 28, 2004 related to the financial statements, which appears in this Form 10-K. We also consent to the reference to us under the
heading Experts in such Registration Statements.



|                               |  |  |  |  |  | 
|------------------------------ |  |  |  |  |  | 
|/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |  | 
|                               | 
|PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     |  | 
|                               | 
|New York, New York             |  | 
|                               | 
|March 30, 2004                 |  |
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6696** 

JAMES STROUSE , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. BUREAU OF PRISONS; K. KIDDY, Unit Manager; BLACKBURN, Counselor; BERNARDO, SIS; BENNETT, DHO; WHITLEY, Trust Fund Supervisor; E. D. WILSON, Warden; NEGRONE, SIA , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond

. Robert E. Payne , Senior District Judge. ( 3:13

- cv - 00044

- REP )

Submitted : July 23, 2015 Decided: July 28, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

James Strouse, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

James Strouse appeals the district court ’ s order d ismissing his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , without prejudice in part and with prejudice in pa rt . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Strouse v. Bureau of
Prisons , No. 3:13

- cv - 00044

- REP (E.D. Va April 21, 2015) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Jul-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Aug-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jul-31-2000
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  14,896
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    202,775
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               276,833
<PP&E>                                         340,287
<DEPRECIATION>                                 227,569
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 487,710
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          496,427
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1,661,704
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,790,784
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   487,710
<SALES>                                        173,942
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               173,942
<CGS>                                          65,710
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  65,710
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               792,165
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             22,140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   706,073
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW 

MEXICO, 

 Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY; GINA 

McCARTHY, Administrator, United States 

Environmental Protection Agency,

 Respondents.

------------------------------

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS; DINE 

CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR 

ENVIRONMENT; NATIONAL PARKS 

CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION; NEW 

ENERGY ECONOMY; SAN JUAN 

CITIZENS ALLIANCE; SIERRA CLUB,

 Intervenors.

------------------------------

THE NAVAJO NATION; AMERICAN 

COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL 

ELECTRICITY; PACIFICORP; UTILITY 

AIR REGULATORY GROUP, 

 Amici Curiae.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

SUSANA MARTINEZ, Governor of the 

State of New Mexico; NEW MEXICO 

ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, 

No. 11-9557

(EPA No. EPA-R06-OAR-2010-0846)

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 19, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 11-9557 Document: 01019478006 Date Filed: 08/19/2015 Page: 1 
2

 Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY; GINA 

McCARTHY, Administrator, United States 

Environmental Protection Agency,

 Respondents.

------------------------------

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS; DINE 

CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR 

ENVIRONMENT; NATIONAL PARKS 

CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION; NEW 

ENERGY ECONOMY; SAN JUAN 

CITIZENS ALLIANCE; SIERRA CLUB, 

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW 

MEXICO, 

 Intervenors.

------------------------------

THE NAVAJO NATION; AMERICAN 

COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL 

ELECTRICITY; PACIFICORP; UTILITY 

AIR REGULATORY GROUP, 

 Amici Curiae.

No. 11-9567

(EPA No. EPA-R06-OAR-2010-0846)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

These matters are before the court on the environmental intervenors’ July 29, 

2015, status report, which we construed as a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds. We 

Appellate Case: 11-9557 Document: 01019478006 Date Filed: 08/19/2015 Page: 2 
3

also have the response to the motion, as construed, and the reply the environmental 

intervenors filed on August 18. Upon consideration, and noting no opposition, these 

proceedings are dismissed, with all parties to bear their own costs. See 10th Cir. R. 

27.2(A)(1)(b). A copy of this order shall stand as the mandate of the court. 

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 11-9557 Document: 01019478006 Date Filed: 08/19/2015 Page: 3
#### Commonwealth *v.*W. H. Gray.

Partnership — Authority of One Partner to1 Bind the Other.

Although the law will not imply authority in one partner to bind his copartner by contract beyond the prescribed sphere of their joint business, yet extraneous facts may sufficiently show a recognition of such authority.

APPEAL PROM PRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT.

June 26, 1866.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Robertson :

Although the law will not imply authority in one partner to bind his copartner by a contract beyond the prescribed sphere of their joint business, yet extraneous facts may sufficiently show a recognition of such authority.

ThejEacts proved by the Commonwealth in this case, while they did not *prove*a constructive recognition by the appellee, Gray, of the authority of his copartner, George, to bind him by his signature of the firm name to Page’s official bond, certainly, in some degree, conduced to that conclusion; and whether in a sufficient degree to bind Gray the jury had, in our opinion, the right to decide. We do not think that there was such a distribution of evidence as to have justified the court in sustaining a demurrer to it or in per-emptorily instructing the jury, as the court did, to find a verdict for Gray. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the Circuit Court erred, to the prejudice of the Commonwealth, in giving that instruction.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
#### PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL TURF CLUB, INC. v. BANK OF WEST JERSEY.

July 11, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
JIMMY SCOTT

,

Petitioner,

v.

JULIE L. JONES, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

,
Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR RE HEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 15

- 4496

Opinion filed May 4, 2016.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

-- Original Jurisdiction

.
Jimmy Scott, pro se , Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits

.

WOLF, WETHERELL, and KELSEY, JJ.

, CONCUR.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ERNEST TREMPER.

May 16, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4557-19

DAVID HOOK and MODERN

METHOD DEVELOPMENT, 

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

BOHDAN SENYSZYN, 

MODERN METHOD TRUST, 

and MODERN METHOD 

LEASING,

Defendants-Respondents,

and 

KELLY SENYSZYN,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted April 27, 2021 – Decided May 14, 2021

Before Judges Haas and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0296-04.

Kelly Senyszyn, appellant pro se. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4557-19

Coughlin Duffy, LLP, attorneys for respondents David 

Hook and Modern Method Development (Jason A. 

Meisner, of counsel and on the brief; Joseph P. Fiteni, 

on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendant Kelly Senyszyn appeals from a February 25, 2020 order 

denying her motion to appoint a new arbitrator in this long-running dispute with 

plaintiffs David Hook and Modern Method Development. We affirm.

The parties contracted for binding non-appealable arbitration and agreed

to bear the arbitrator's fees equally. When they could not agree on an arbitrator,

the motion judge selected one who arbitrated the case and rendered an "[i]nterim 

[o]rder." Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to appoint a new arbitrator 

because the arbitrator would not adjudicate her counterclaims as she did not pay 

him. Her motion also sought the motion judge's disqualification, alleging the

judge engaged in ex parte communications separately with plaintiffs' counsel

and the arbitrator. Notably, defendant's notice of motion waived oral argument.

The motion judge rendered an oral decision in which he addressed and 

rejected each of defendant's claims. The judge found the fees issue was for the 

arbitrator to decide, particularly because the matter was not yet final. The judge 
3

A-4557-19

found defendant provided "no substance to her allegations [of ex parte 

communications and there was] no basis to disqualify" himself.

Defendant repeats her claims on this appeal. In addition, she asserts the 

motion judge did not consider her claims, made no findings, and deprived her of 

a fair hearing by deciding the motion without oral argument. 

Defendant's arguments are bald assertions, unsupported by the record, and 

lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 23, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

TERRY L. STRINGFELLOW, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 09-7087

(D.C. No. 6:08-CR-00052-FHS-2)

(E.D. Okla.)

ORDER

The matter of appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal is before the court. The

motion is granted.

A copy of this order shall stand as and for the mandate of this court.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 09-7087 Document: 01018372227 Date Filed: 02/23/2010 Page: 1
Exhibit 31.2

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Dean L. Cash, certify that:

1.  I  have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report  on  Form  10-QSB  of  ATEL  Cash
Distribution Fund V, LP;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and  I  are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material  information  relating to the registrant is made known
     to us by others within the entity,  particularly during the period in which
     this report is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls and
     procedures  and  presented  in  this  report  our  conclusions   about  the
     effectiveness of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of
     the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
     over financial  reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
     fiscal  quarter that has  materially  affected or is  reasonably  likely to
     materially   affect  the  registrant's   internal  control  over  financial
     reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,  based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a) all significant  deficiencies  and material  weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
     likely to adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability to record,  process,
     summarize and report financial information; and

     b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls
     over financial reporting.


Date:
August 11, 2004


/s/ Dean L. Cash
--------------------
Dean L. Cash
President and Chief Executive
Officer of General Partner
108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1895

AN ACT

To temporarily extend the programs under the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of

1958 through March 15, 2004, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
 †

2

S 1895 ES

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PROGRAM AUTHORITY.

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Any program, authority, or provi3 sion, including any pilot program, authorized under the

4 Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.) or the Small

5 Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.)

6 as of September 30, 2003, that is scheduled to expire on

7 or after September 30, 2003 and before March 15, 2004,

8 shall remain authorized through March 15, 2004, under

9 the same terms and conditions in effect on September 30,

10 2003.

11 (b) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding subsection (a),

12 section 303(g)(2) of the Small Business Investment Act

13 of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 683(g)(2)) is amended by striking

14 ‘‘1.38 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘1.46 percent’’.

Passed the Senate November 19, 2003.

Attest:

Secretary.
108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1895

AN ACT

To temporarily extend the programs under the

Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 through March 15, 2004,and for other purposes.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-18-00162-CR

George Guadalupe Quintanilla

v.

The State of Texas

On Appeal from the

93rd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CR-1283-16-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

August 22, 2019
F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 8, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS,

INC., a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff ! Appellee,

v.

JUN YANG, an individual; LONNY

BOWERS, an individual; WIDEBAND

SOLUTIONS, a Massachusetts

corporation,

Defendants ! Appellants,

ANDREW CHIANG, an individual;

BIAMP SYSTEMS, an Oregon

corporation,

Defendants,

DIALHD, INC.,

Interested Party ! Appellant.

No. 10-4035

 (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00037-TC-DN)

ORDER

This matter comes on for consideration of the parties’ responses to this

court’s order of February 17, 2010. In their response, the appellants move to

Appellate Case: 10-4035 Document: 01018399013 Date Filed: 04/08/2010 Page: 1 
2

withdraw their appeal. The appellee does not object. Accordingly, this appeal is

dismissed. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Ellen Rich Reiter

Deputy Clerk/Jurisdictional Attorney

Appellate Case: 10-4035 Document: 01018399013 Date Filed: 04/08/2010 Page: 2
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CIERRA LYNN CARTER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-2498

[October 13, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; William L. Roby, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

562019CF002402AXXXXX.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender and Ross Frank Berlin, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

LEVINE, CONNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.