United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 11, 2009

Decided March 12, 2009

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

                  DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2474

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

NEVILLE WILLIAMS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

Hammond Division.

2:07 CR 60 PS

Philip P. Simon,

Judge.

O R D E R

Neville Williams was indicted on three counts of distributing crack, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), one count of possessing a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one

count of possessing marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).  In a plea agreement the government

agreed to drop the last four counts and to recommend a sentence at the bottom of the

guidelines range; in return, Williams agreed to plead guilty to one count of distributing

crack and to waive his right to appeal.  The district court accepted the government’s

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2474 Page 2

sentencing recommendation and imposed a term of 151 months’ imprisonment under the

career‐offender guideline, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Williams appealed, but his appointed

counsel have moved to withdraw because they cannot discern a nonfrivolous basis for

appeal.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We invited Williams to respond to

counsels’ submission under Circuit Rule 51(b), but he declined to do so.  We limit our

review to the potential issues counsel identify.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐

74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Because Williams does not wish to set aside his guilty plea, counsel properly refrain

from examining the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea.  See United States v. Knox,

287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).  

Counsel consider one potential issue not foreclosed by Williams’s appellate waiver:

whether the district court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor in calculating

Williams’s sentence. See United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).  They

ask whether the judge, at sentencing, may have expressed an inappropriate “personal

stake” in the case.  While reviewing Williams’s criminal history, the judge remarked that

Williams’s prior conviction for threatening another judge was “an extremely serious

offense” that “not surprisingly, I take personally.”  Any such claim of unconstitutional bias

would be frivolous.  First, although due process requires a fair proceeding before an

unbiased judge, a claim of bias rises to the level of constitutional significance only in an

extreme case, such as where the judge has “‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary

interest’” in the outcome.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821‐22, 824 (1986)

(quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); see Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904‐05,

909 (1997).  But more importantly, the judge’s comment taken in the context of the record as

a whole does not reflect any kind of bias.  It came in the midst of the judge’s extensive

discussion of William’s history and characteristics, his lengthy criminal record, the

circumstances of his offense, and the “positive road” that he appeared to be on.  The judge

even remarked that he was “rooting for [Williams]” and wished him the best of luck.

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.