COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ROBERT LYLE YINGLING 

v. Record No. 1149-94-1 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DECEMBER 5, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Norman Olitsky, Judge 

 Dianne G. Ringer, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Robert Lyle Yingling (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of an escape by "Furlough Violation," conduct proscribed by 

Code § 53.1-37(D). On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin 

v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

The judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled 

to the same weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id. 

 The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Defendant, then an 

inmate at the Southampton Work Release Center (Southampton),1

 was 

 

 1An institution of the Virginia Department of Corrections. 
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approved for a thirty day "furlough" pursuant to Code § 53.1-37(C), 

which authorizes the Director of the Department of Corrections 

(Director) to "permit a prisoner a furlough when the prisoner has 

been approved for release on parole by the Parole Board and thirty 

days or less remain to be served by the prisoner prior to his date 

of release on parole." Such furloughs "extend the limits of 

confinement of any prisoner . . . to permit . . . visiting . . . 

home or family," subject to "rules and regulations" prescribed by 

the State Board of Corrections. Code § 53.1-37(A). A willful 

failure by a "prisoner . . . to remain within the limits of 

confinement set by the Director" shall constitute an "escape . . . 

as though he left the state correctional facility itself." Code 

§ 53.1-37(D). 

 As a condition to his furlough, defendant executed an 

"Extended Furlough Agreement," which required, inter alia, that he 

report to the "Chief Probation and Parole Officer, Probation and 

Parole District #3[,] . . . Portsmouth, Va." within "one working 

day" after his release. The agreement further directed that 

defendant thereafter "report to the supervising Probation and 

Parole Officer as he/she may require . . .[,] follow any other 

instructions the officer may give," "obey all . . . laws and 

ordinances," and "not use, possess or distribute illegal drugs."2

 

Supervision of defendant's furlough and enforcement of all related 

conditions were assigned to Portsmouth parole officer Albert 

 

 2Defendant agreed to provide "urine or blood samples if 

required." 
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McCloskey, with the understanding that violations would be reported 

to officials at Southampton for appropriate action. 

 Shortly after defendant's furlough commenced, he submitted a 

required urine specimen to McCloskey which tested "positive for 

marijuana use." McCloskey immediately requested instructions from 

Southampton and ordered defendant to report to the Portsmouth 

parole office the following morning. Defendant appeared as 

instructed, acknowledged using the drug while on furlough, and 

McCloskey directed that he "sit in the lobby, . . . remain in the 

lobby until further notice," warning that "if he left the building 

. . . he could be charged with escape." McCloskey allowed 

defendant to "smoke a cigarette" "on the steps in front of the 

building," provided "he let the receptionist know before he did 

that," but denied his request to "get something to eat." 

 At approximately 1:05 p.m., McCloskey learned that defendant 

"was no longer in sight" of the parole office. McCloskey searched 

for defendant both inside and outside the office without success, 

and defendant "never came back" or made further contact with the 

parole office. He was arrested four days later in the City of 

Portsmouth on a warrant charging the subject offense. 

 Because the Commonwealth did not establish that defendant 

"left the City of Portsmouth while on furlough," defendant contends 

that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he willfully 

exceeded the prescribed "limits of confinement" in violation of 

Code § 53.1-37(D). 

 "When statutory construction is required, we construe a 
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statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an 

interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used." 

Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 

(1994). "The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is 

always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction." 

Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 

(1992). "Although penal laws are to be construed strictly [against 

the Commonwealth], they 'ought not to be construed so strictly as 

to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.'" Willis v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1990) 

(citation omitted). Moreover, "a statute should never be construed 

so that it leads to absurd results." Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839, 

419 S.E.2d at 424. 

 Assuming, without deciding, that the statutory language 

"limits of confinement" contemplates only geographical or 

territorial considerations, the "Extended Furlough Agreement" 

required that defendant "report to the supervising . . . Parole 

Officer as he/she . . . may require and follow any other 

instructions the officer may give." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the 

Director clearly authorized the supervising parole officer, 

McCloskey in this instance, to assume institutional control of 

defendant. When McCloskey thereafter ordered defendant to remain 

in the lobby of the parole office, warning that noncompliance could 

result in a charge of "escape," he specifically established new and 

more restrictive "limits of confinement" governing defendant's 

furlough. Defendant's subsequent departure from the premises 
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therefore constituted an escape in violation of Code § 53.1-37(D). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.