Filed 5/13/24 In re R.R. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the

Juvenile Court Law. 

_____________________________________

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

R.R.,

Defendant and Appellant,

 D082543

 (Super. Ct. No. J244872)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Affirmed. 

Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

After denying R.R.’s motion for an order continuing the proceedings 

and placing him on informal supervision pursuant to Welfare and 
2

Institutions Code1 sections 654 and 654.2, the juvenile court held a contested 

hearing and found true the allegation that R.R. attempted to commit robbery. 

It declared R.R. a ward of the court and ordered that he be placed under 

probation department supervision and maintained in the home. 

R.R.’s court-appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues but seeking 

our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). 

We find no arguable issues and affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In February 2023, O.L. was walking home with his girlfriend M.R. 

While passing a middle school, the couple noticed that a group of four boys, 

including R.R., walked behind them and then passed them. After the couple 

passed the group of boys, the group again started following the couple. The 

couple crossed the street several times as the group followed them. 

Ultimately, as the couple walked past the group, someone grabbed O.L. from 

behind by his backpack. He lost his balance but M.R. pulled him back before 

he fell. 

The boy who grabbed O.L. laughed and said, “ ‘What’s up?’ ” R.R. said,

“ “Give me all your shit.’ ” O.L. saw R.R. unzip his fanny pack and reach 

inside for something but did not see what it was. This action scared O.L. 

M.R. also saw R.R. open his fanny pack to display the handle of a firearm 

before saying, “ ‘Give me your f’ing stuff.’ ” This terrified her. When O.L.

took a step to advance, the boys started laughing, quickly backed down, and 

ran across the street. O.L. recognized R.R. from the neighborhood. After 

verifying R.R.’s identity, he reported the incident to the middle school.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
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R.R., aged 13, was charged by petition with attempted robbery. (Pen. 

Code, §§ 664 & 211.) He moved for an order continuing the proceedings and 

placing him on informal supervision under sections 654 and 654.2. The court 

denied the motion finding informal supervision would not give it adequate 

information to ensure R.R. did not have weapons or elicit substances, given

R.R.’s history of carrying weapons and controlled substances. It also 

expressed concern about its ability to supervise R.R. informally, citing the 

need for drug testing and a waiver of Fourth Amendment protections.

At a contested hearing, the court heard testimony from O.L. and M.R. 

about the incident. Another student at the middle school testified that he 

asked R.R. if he did it, referring to the attempted robbery, and R.R. answered 

affirmatively. This student twice saw R.R. with a gun. The assistant 

principal at R.R.’s middle school testified that she twice counseled R.R. about 

violating school policy and believed R.R. knew right from wrong. 

The court found R.R. knew his conduct was wrong and found true the 

allegation. At the disposition hearing, R.R.’s counsel submitted based on the 

probation department’s recommendation that R.R. be adjudicated a ward 

pursuant to section 602 and placed with his mother. The People sought

commitment to Urban Camp 85. The court declared R.R. a ward of the court 

and ordered him placed under the supervision of the probation department

and maintained in his home. 

DISCUSSION

Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief summarizing the facts and 

proceedings below. Counsel presented no argument for reversal but asked

this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende, supra, 25

Cal.3d 436. Counsel identified the following issues that “might arguably 

support the appeal” (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744) whether: (1) the court 
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erred in denying R.R.’s motion for informal supervision; (2) sufficient 

evidence existed showing R.R. knew right from wrong and (3) committed 

attempted robbery; and (4) the court abused its discretion in adjudicating 

R.R. a ward of the court. We granted R.R. permission to file a brief on his

own behalf. He has not responded.

Once a juvenile wardship petition has been filed, the court is

authorized to grant informal probation in lieu of declaring the minor a ward 

of the court. (§ 654.2, subd. (a); Kody P. v. Superior Court (2006) 

137 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1033.) We review an order denying section 654.2 

diversion for an abuse of discretion. (In re Armondo A. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 

1185, 1189.) We will reverse such an order only if the court “has exceeded 

the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently 

absurd determination.” (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 881.) 

The court reviewed R.R.’s motion, attached exhibits, R.R.’s grades in 

school, and the People’s response before it denied the motion. The court was 

clearly familiar with the issues underscoring R.R.’s background, including a 

school disciplinary record showing R.R. previously punched a fellow student 

in the face, possessed a pocketknife, marijuana, a vape charger, and vape 

pens. Given R.R.’s history, the court appropriately concluded he required 

additional monitoring unavailable on informal supervision, such as drug 

testing and a Fourth Amendment waiver, to ensure he did not use controlled 

substances or carry any weapons. This issue is not arguable. 

To assess whether there is ample credible evidence supporting the 

conclusions made by the juvenile court we interpret the evidence favorably 

toward the prosecution and assume the existence of every reasonable fact 

deduced from it. (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.) While we 

consider logical inferences drawn by the court, we disregard those solely 
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based on suspicion or speculation. (Ibid.) We will reverse only if no 

substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. (Ibid.) 

A statutory presumption exists that a child under the age of 14 is 

incapable of committing a crime. (Pen. Code, § 26.) To overcome this 

presumption, the prosecution must show by clear and convincing evidence 

that the child understood the wrongfulness of the charged act at the time of 

its commission. (Ibid.; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 863.) In making 

this determination, the court may consider the child’s age, experience, and 

understanding. (In re Gladys R., at p. 864.) The closer children are to the 

age of 14, the more likely they will appreciate the wrongfulness of their 

conduct. (In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 53.) R.R. was 13 years old

at the time of the incident. The testimony of the assistant principal at R.R.’s 

school who counseled R.R. twice on disciplinary matters constituted

substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that R.R. knew his

conduct was wrongful. 

“An attempted robbery consists of two elements: (1) the specific intent 

to commit the robbery, and (2) a direct, unequivocal, overt act (beyond mere 

preparation) toward its commission.” (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 

367, 382.) Here, M.R.’s testimony that R.R. stated, “ ‘Give me your f’ing 

stuff’ ” as he displayed the butt of a firearm established R.R.’s intent to 

commit a robbery. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [testimony 

of a single witness suffices to support a conviction unless it is “physically 

impossible or inherently improbable”].) These substantial evidence issues are 

not arguable. 

Finally, adjudicating R.R. to be a ward of the court is not arguable. 

The court may proceed in one of three ways when the minor is a person 

described in section 602. It may: (1) declare the minor a ward of the court; 
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(2) order probation without declaring the minor a ward of the court; or 

(3) order probation after declaring the minor a ward of the court. (§§ 725, 

subds. (a) & (b), 727.) In deciding the appropriate disposition, the juvenile 

court must consider the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed 

by the minor in addition to other relevant factors and material evidence.

(§ 725.5.) Additionally, the court must be mindful of the purpose of the 

juvenile delinquency laws. “A fundamental premise of delinquency 

adjudication is that the court must focus on the dual concerns of the best 

interests of the minor and public protection.” (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 

50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) Here, R.R.’s disciplinary record and the facts of 

the incident support the court’s conclusion a wardship would serve the best 

interests of R.R. and the public. 

Our review of the record pursuant to Wende, including the possible 

issues listed by counsel pursuant to Anders, has disclosed no reasonably 

arguable issues on appeal. Competent counsel has represented R.R. on this 

appeal. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.