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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 9, 2014 

v No. 317594 

Wayne Circuit Court 

CHANTON LEWIN BLACKSHIRE, LC No. 12-003666-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and TALBOT and SERVITTO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Chanton Lewin Blackshire appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of unlawfully 

driving away an automobile (UDAA).1 Blackshire was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender,2

to 46 months’ to 10 years’ imprisonment, with 490 days’ jail credit. We affirm. 

I. BLACKSHIRE’S BRIEF ON APPEAL 

 Blackshire contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his UDAA 

conviction. We disagree. 

 “We review de novo a challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence.”3 Due 

process requires sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.4

 “In reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”5

 

1

 MCL 750.413. Blackshire was originally charged with carjacking, MCL 750.529a(1), but was 

only convicted of the lesser offense of UDAA by the jury. 

2

 MCL 769.12. 

3 People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). 

4 People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999) (citation omitted). 

5 People v Kosik, 303 Mich App 146, 150; 841 NW2d 906 (2013). 
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 MCL 750.413 provides, in pertinent part: 

Any person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and 

drive or take away, and any person who shall assist in or be a party to such taking 

possession, driving or taking away of any motor vehicle, belonging to another, 

shall be guilty of a felony . . . . 

Thus, the essential elements of UDAA are: “(1) possession of a vehicle, (2) driving the vehicle 

away, (3) that the act is done wilfully, and (4) the possession and driving away must be done 

without authority or permission.”6

 Further, “it is well settled that identity is an element of every 

offense.”7

 Identity can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.8 “The 

credibility of identification testimony is a question for the trier of fact that we do not resolve 

anew. Moreover, this Court has stated that positive identification by witnesses may be sufficient 

to support a conviction of a crime.”9

 Blackshire only challenges the element of identity. Blackshire merely argues that the 

victim’s testimony was not credible given her inconsistent statements and her emotional state 

during the theft of her van, and that the victim’s memory of Blackshire as the perpetrator was 

formed during the police officers’ suggestive identification processes.10 Essentially, Blackshire 

does not claim that the prosecution failed to set forth evidence identifying him as the perpetrator 

of the offense; he merely argues that the victim was not credible and her identification of him 

should not be accepted by this Court. We may not, however, interfere with the jury’s role of 

determining the credibility of identification testimony.11 Blackshire and his daughter both 

testified that it was a man named Winston, not Blackshire, who drove off with the victim’s van. 

Though this testimony contradicted the victim’s unequivocal testimony that she saw Blackshire 

drive away in her car, this Court will not disturb a jury’s determination of the credibility of 

witnesses.12 Also, this positive identification by a witness is sufficient to support the 

conviction.13 Therefore, the prosecution proffered sufficient testimony identifying Blackshire as 

the perpetrator of the UDAA. 

II. BLACKSHIRE’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF ON APPEAL 

 

6 People v Hendricks, 200 Mich App 68, 71; 503 NW2d 689 (1993), aff’d 446 Mich 435 (1994). 

7 People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). 

8 People v Kern, 6 Mich App 406, 409; 149 NW2d 216 (1967). 

9 People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000) (citations omitted). 

10 The issue of the victim’s identification of Blackshire will be addressed infra, Section II.E. 

11 Davis, 241 Mich App at 700. 

12 Kosik, 303 Mich App at 150. 

13 Davis, 241 Mich App at 700. 
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 In a brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4, 

Blackshire alleges several additional errors. 

A. SIGNING OF THE FELONY COMPLAINT 

 Blackshire first contends that his due process rights were violated because the trial court 

never had jurisdiction over him, due to defects in his felony complaint. We disagree. 

 “Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo on appeal.”14 Also, 

“[i]nterpretation of a court rule is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.”15 In 

interpreting a court rule, this Court applies “the same rules as when [it] engage[s] in statutory 

interpretation.”16

 “The primary function of a complaint is to move the magistrate to determine whether a 

warrant shall issue.”17 “The complaint must include the substance of the accusation against the 

accused and the name and statutory citation of the offense.”18 It “must be signed and sworn to 

before a judicial officer or court clerk.”19 In addition, “[a] complaint may not be filed without a 

prosecutor’s written approval endorsed on the complaint or attached to it . . . .”20 Under MCR 

6.104(D), if an accused is arrested without a warrant, the prosecutor must file the complaint “at 

or before the time of arraignment.” “On receiving the complaint and on finding probable cause, 

the court must either issue a warrant or endorse the complaint . . . .”21

 Blackshire’s claim that the felony complaint was never signed and sworn to is without 

merit. Blackshire was arrested on March 27, 2012, shortly after the victim called the police to 

report the theft of her van. He was arraigned before the district court on March 30, 2012. 

Contrary to Blackshire’s assertion, the felony complaint in Blackshire’s file was signed by the 

 

14 People v Morales, 240 Mich App 571, 575; 618 NW2d 10 (2000). 

15 People v Buie, 285 Mich App 401, 416; 775 NW2d 817 (2009) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). 

16 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

17 People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 443; 625 NW2d 444 (2001) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted); see also MCR 6.102(A) (“A court must issue an arrest warrant . . . if presented 

with a proper complaint and if the court finds probable cause to believe that the accused 

committed the alleged offense.”). 

18 MCR 6.101(A). 

19 MCR 6.101(B). 

20 MCR 6.101(C); see also MCL 764.1(1) (stating that a magistrate shall not issue an arrest 

warrant unless “the authorization is signed by the prosecuting attorney”). 

21 MCR 6.104(D); see also MCL 764.1c(1)(b) (providing that if a defendant is in custody after a 

warrantless arrest, a judge, upon finding reasonable cause, can endorse the complaint). 
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district court judge, the complaining detective, and the prosecutor, and indicates that it was 

sworn to before the judge, on that same day. 

 Blackshire additionally claims that the felony complaint was defective because it was 

stated in conclusory terms, did not provide the underlying facts, and did not indicate that it was 

based on personal knowledge. The felony complaint contained the following allegations: 

COUNT 1: CARJACKING 

[Blackshire] did in the course of committing a larceny of [a] 1987 GMC SAFARI 

VAN, a motor vehicle, use force or violence against, or use the threat of force or 

violence against, or put in fear [the victim], a person in lawful possession of the 

motor vehicle; contrary to MCL 750.529a. 

Therefore, the felony complaint satisfied the statutory requirement that it “include the substance 

of the accusation against the accused and the name and statutory citation of the offense.”22 

Further, a complaint need not contain a detailed factual account of the offenses23 and may be 

based on “information and belief.”24 Blackshire has not proffered, and the lower court file is 

vacant of, any procedural defects related to his felony complaint. Further, this Court has held 

that a conclusory complaint “does not oust jurisdiction.”25 Thus, Blackshire’s argument lacks 

merit. 

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Blackshire next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective on the basis of numerous 

omissions and failures. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we disagree. 

 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is preserved by a motion for a new trial or a 

Ginther26 hearing.27 Blackshire never requested a new trial or a Ginther hearing below. 

Therefore, this issue is unpreserved for appeal. 

 “Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law.”28 Generally, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear 

 

22 MCR 6.101(A). 

23 MCL 764.1d. 

24 MCL 764.1a(3). 

25 People v Mayberry, 52 Mich App 450, 450-451; 217 NW 2d 420 (1974). For these reasons, 

Blackshire’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to this issue also fail. 

26 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 

27 People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). 

28 People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 
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error and the questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo.29 Unpreserved claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel can still be reviewed; however, this “review is limited to errors 

apparent on the record.”30

 In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

that: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

the result of the proceedings would be different; and (3) the result that did occur was 

fundamentally unfair or unreliable.31 “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the 

defendant bears the heavy burden of proving otherwise.”32 This Court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of trial counsel on matters of strategy, nor will it employ the benefit of 

hindsight to assess the competence of counsel.33

 Blackshire first bases his claim of ineffective assistance on trial counsel’s failure to visit 

him in jail to discuss his case or to investigate the case properly. Limiting our review to the 

record, however, there is no evidence to support Blackshire’s claim that trial counsel failed to 

investigate the case or meet with him. As the trial court noted early on the second day of trial, 

Blackshire had consistently complained that each of the three attorneys that he had been assigned 

throughout the lengthy pretrial process was not visiting with him in jail, despite evidence that 

they had gone to discuss the case with him. Further, as the trial court pointed out, trial counsel 

sought an investigator and subpoenaed witnesses related to the case. Therefore, there is no 

evidence on the record to support Blackshire’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to meet with him or properly investigate the case. 

 Blackshire next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the witnesses 

he requested, ask the witnesses the questions he wanted asked, and present cell phone records 

that were in his possession. Whether to call or question witnesses,34 and what evidence to 

present,35 are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. This Court will not second-guess such 

strategy with the benefit of hindsight.36 Furthermore, the failure to call witnesses or present 

evidence can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when it deprives the defendant of a 

substantial defense.37

 

29 Id.

30 People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

31 People v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 187; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). 

32 Id. 

33 Payne, 285 Mich App at 190 (citation omitted). 

34 People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 716; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). 

35 People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 589-590; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). 

36Id. 

37 Id.; Payne, 285 Mich App at 190 (citation omitted). 
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 Blackshire claims that his trial counsel failed to contact an unnamed witness that would 

have allegedly testified that Winston was the driver of the van and that Winston had a 

relationship with the victim. The record, however, does not support the existence of the 

unnamed witness or what the testimony of the unnamed witness would have been. Blackshire 

also claims that his trial counsel failed to call Detective Michael Maurier, who made numerous 

false statements and was in possession of a video tape that showed a person getting in the 

allegedly stolen vehicle who was taller than Blackshire. Detective Maurier did, however, testify 

at trial and there is no evidence in the record of the alleged video tape. Blackshire also fails to 

point out the alleged false statements made by Detective Maurier. Blackshire further claims that 

his trial counsel failed to impeach the victim and another witness at trial. Based on the record, 

Blackshire, however, fails to overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s conduct was sound 

trial strategy38 and has not shown that he was deprived of a substantial defense.39 Trial counsel 

called both Blackshire’s daughter and Blackshire to testify to his version of events on the day in 

question. Blackshire was able to testify that he never stole, or even drove, the victim’s car, 

despite the testimony to the contrary. Finally, Blackshire argues that trial counsel failed to 

obtain cell phone records showing that Winston called the victim. The record does not support 

the existence of any cell phone records that would have “proved this whole case was a lie.” 

Thus, Blackshire’s claims fail. 

 Blackshire next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “file valid motions” 

that he needed. Blackshire, however, gives no indication which, if any, motions he asked trial 

counsel to file. Without any indication what motions Blackshire would have liked trial counsel 

to file, Blackshire has not overcome the strong presumption of trial counsel’s effectiveness.40

 Blackshire also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the issue of 

his unsigned and unsworn felony complaint. As discussed above, Blackshire’s felony complaint 

was properly signed on the day of his arraignment, and there was no procedural violation. Trial 

counsel was not required to advocate a meritless position.41 Therefore, trial counsel was not 

ineffective on this basis. 

 Next, Blackshire contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

trial court instructing the jury on the uncharged offense of UDAA, depriving him of his due 

process right to notice. In closing argument, trial counsel suggested to the jury that Blackshire 

was, at most, guilty of UDAA, not carjacking. The trial court then, upon request by the 

prosecutor, decided to instruct the jury on the offense of UDAA. Trial counsel did not object 

and, as discussed below, waived the issue. This Court has stated that it “will not second-guess 

counsel’s trial tactic of admitting guilt of a lesser offense.”42 Further, declining to raise 

 

38 Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 589-590; Russell, 297 Mich App at 716. 

39 Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 589; Payne, 285 Mich App at 190 (citation omitted). 

40 Lockett, 295 Mich App at 187. 

41 Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201. 

42 People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994). 
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objections can be sound trial strategy.43 Here, the prosecution provided substantial evidence, in 

the form of the victim’s testimony, that she saw Blackshire drive off in her car and threaten her 

with a screwdriver. It was reasonable trial strategy for trial counsel to assume that the jury was 

unlikely to completely acquit Blackshire, and, therefore, allow instructions on a lesser offense, 

which could lessen Blackshire’s conviction and sentence. Therefore, Blackshire fails to 

overcome the presumption that counsel’s assistance was effective.44 Moreover, Blackshire fails 

to establish that the result was fundamentally unfair.45 The felony information gave Blackshire 

sufficient notice of the need to defend against UDAA and Blackshire fails to argue how any lack 

of notice prejudiced his defense.46

 Finally, Blackshire argues that his trial counsel failed to object when the victim testified 

at trial that she identified Blackshire next to a white van. Blackshire claims that he was never 

next to the van. The record does not support Blackshire’s assertion that he was never identified. 

At trial, Blackshire’s testimony suggested that he was identified while standing next to the police 

car. Even if the victim’s testimony was inconsistent with Blackshire’s version of events, 

Blackshire fails to overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s failure to object was sound trial 

strategy.47

C. NOTICE OF CHARGES/JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

 Blackshire contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

instructed the jury on UDAA, despite never having been arraigned on that charge or otherwise 

having any notice of it, and where the instruction on UDAA was inaccurate. We disagree. 

 “A party must object or request a given jury instruction to preserve the error for review. 

Absent an objection or request for an instruction, this Court will grant relief only when necessary 

to avoid manifest injustice.”48 Where counsel expresses satisfaction with the jury instructions, 

however, any claim of error is deemed waived, leaving nothing for this Court’s review.49 

Blackshire never objected to the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury on UDAA, as well as 

 

43 People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). 

44 Lockett, 295 Mich App at 187. 

45 Id. 

46 See People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 601-602; 585 NW2d 27 (1998). See also People v 

Apgar, 264 Mich App 321, 327; 690 NW2d 312 (2004) (“Although defendant was convicted of 

an uncharged crime, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of due process because all the 

elements of the uncharged crime were proved at the preliminary examination and trial without 

objection, providing defendant adequate notice.”). 

47 Unger, 278 Mich App at 242. 

48 People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 657; 620 NW2d 19 (2000) (citations 

omitted). 

49 People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). 
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carjacking. Further, defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury instructions at their 

conclusion, waiving appellate review of this issue. The trial court explicitly asked the parties if 

they were “satisfied with the instructions,” to which defense counsel replied, “Yes, your Honor.” 

Defense counsel’s explicit expression of satisfaction waived any error in the jury instructions.50 

Further, the trial court only decided to include instructions on UDAA because of defense 

counsel’s closing arguments indicating that, at most, the prosecution had offered evidence to 

support UDAA. “[A] party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate 

parachute . . . .”51 Therefore, defendant has waived this issue, and cannot obtain appellate 

review.52

D. NOTICE OF HABITUAL SENTENCING 

 Blackshire next contends that his sentence as a fourth habitual offender was invalid 

because of the prosecution’s failure to have the felony complaint signed and sworn to and the 

reliance on invalid prior convictions. We disagree. 

 “For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and 

decided by the lower court.”53 Because Blackshire failed to argue below that he had never 

received notice of his sentencing enhancement or challenge the validity of the prior convictions 

listed in the habitual-offender notice, this issue is unpreserved for appeal and our review is for 

plain error affecting substantial rights.54

 A prosecuting attorney can seek a sentencing enhancement under the habitual-offender 

statutes by filing written notice within 21 days after arraignment or, if arraignment is waived, 

within 21 days after the information is filed.55 The lower court record contains both a felony 

complaint and a felony information, which include fourth-offense habitual offender notices, both 

dated March 30, 2012. Blackshire’s arraignment also occurred on March 30, 2012. Therefore, 

the notice was properly and timely filed.56

 With regard to the validity of the prior convictions, a defendant “may challenge the 

accuracy or constitutional validity of 1 or more of the prior convictions listed in the notice by 

 

50 Id. 

51 People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726; 790 NW2d 662 (2010). 

52 People v Hall (On Remand), 256 Mich App 674, 679; 671 NW2d 545 (2003). 

53 People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). 

54 People v Marshall, 298 Mich App 607, 625-626; 830 NW2d 414 (2012), vacated in part on 

other grounds 493 Mich 1020 (2013). 

55 MCL 769.13(1). 

56 It is unclear what Blackshire is referring to by his statement that he “never received an 

acknowledgment of receipt.” He, however, fails to argue that he was not served with the notice, 

as required under MCL 769.13(2). 
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filing a written motion with the court and by serving a copy of the motion upon the prosecuting 

attorney.”57 The existence of a defendant’s prior convictions is determined by the court based on 

any evidence that is relevant for that purpose, including information contained in the presentence 

report.58 Blackshire never challenged the accuracy or validity of his prior convictions in a 

motion. Moreover, Blackshire does not dispute that the two prior convictions that he claims 

were invalid were supported by information in the presentence report.59 Rather, Blackshire 

claims that the information in the presentence report was incorrect and that his trial counsel 

failed to raise numerous errors in the presentence report. Based on the record before us, 

however, there is no evidence, other than Blackshire’s assertions, that the prior convictions were 

improper or invalid. Thus, Blackshire has failed to establish plain error affecting his substantial 

rights.60

E. IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 

 Blackshire next contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s 

admission of his improper and highly suggestive identification. We disagree. 

 “On review, the trial court’s decision to admit identification evidence will not be reversed 

unless it is clearly erroneous. Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”61

 A defendant is generally entitled to have counsel present during an identification 

procedure.62 Counsel is not required, however, at an on-the-scene corporeal identification 

conducted before the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.63 “[P]rompt, on-the-scene 

identifications are reasonable, ‘indeed indispensable, police practices because they permit the 

police to immediately decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the suspect is 

connected with the crime, and subject to arrest, or merely an unfortunate victim of 

circumstance.’ ”64

 

57 MCL 769.13(4). 

58 MCL 769.13(5)(d). 

59 We note that the complete presentence report was not provided on appeal. Additionally, in a 

motion to preclude cross-examination regarding his prior convictions, Blackshire admitted that 

he had three prior convictions. 

60 See Marshall, 298 Mich App at 625-626. 

61 People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993) (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.) 

(citations omitted); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

62 People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 723; 571 NW2d 764 (1997). 

63 People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 611; 684 NW2d 267 (2004); Winters, 225 Mich App at 727. 

64 People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 359; 650 NW2d 407 (2002), quoting Winters, 225 Mich 

App at 728. 
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 “A lineup can be so suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification that it 

denies an accused due process of law.”65 “In order to sustain a due process challenge, a 

defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the 

totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.”66 The 

remedy for an impermissibly suggestive pretrial procedure is the exclusion of testimony 

concerning that identification at trial.67 “However, in-court identification by the same witness 

still may be allowed if an independent basis for in-court identification can be established that is 

untainted by the suggestive pretrial procedure.”68

 Here, the victim was brought by police officers to the scene of Blackshire’s arrest shortly 

after she was originally accosted by Blackshire, in order to attempt to identify him as the man 

she saw take her car. While still in the police car, and approximately 100 feet away from 

Blackshire, his girlfriend, and their children, the victim stated, “those are the people that were in 

my car,” and identified Blackshire as the person who took her car. According to the victim, once 

on the scene of Blackshire’s arrest, she was told to identify the man who stole her van, if he was 

present. The victim saw Blackshire standing next to a white taxi van with a woman and three 

kids, and she identified Blackshire as the man who stole her van. The victim further noted that 

Blackshire had changed his shirt between when she first saw him stealing her van and when she 

identified him with the officers, but the victim told the officers about the shirt and still had no 

doubt in her mind that Blackshire was the man she saw stealing her van. Again, no counsel is 

required at an on-the-scene corporeal identification conducted before the initiation of adversarial 

judicial proceedings,69 and there is nothing in the record to show that this particular identification 

was unduly suggestive.70

 Blackshire essentially argues that the victim was lying or not credible when she testified 

that she identified Blackshire while he was standing in front of the taxi van because he was 

already placed in a police car before the victim arrived on scene. There is no support in the 

record below for Blackshire’s assertion, however, and this Court will not resolve the credibility 

of identification testimony on appeal.71

 

65 People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). 

66 Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 302 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). 

67 Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 303 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). 

68 Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 303 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.); id. at 318 (BOYLE, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). 

69 Hickman, 470 Mich at 611. 

70 See Libbett, 251 Mich App at 363. 

71 Davis, 241 Mich App at 700. For these reasons, Blackshire’s suggestion that trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to address this issue also fails. 
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F. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Finally, Blackshire contends that his due process and equal protection rights were 

violated by numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Again, we disagree. 

 A claim of prosecutorial misconduct generally must be preserved with a 

contemporaneous objection and a request for a curative instruction at trial.72 Blackshire never 

objected to the prosecutor’s conduct, except with regard to the felony complaint, nor did he 

request any curative instructions at trial. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved for appeal. 

 “Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed de novo to determine whether the 

defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. Further, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct 

are considered on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must consider the prosecutor’s 

remarks in context.”73 We review unpreserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct “for plain 

error affect substantial rights.”74 “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the 

conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Further, [this Court] cannot find error requiring 

reversal where a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect.”75

 Blackshire first contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by “continu[ing] a 

case where they had no jurisdiction legally to do so,” because his felony complaint was never 

signed and sworn to. Again, Blackshire’s felony complaint was properly signed at his 

arraignment, and there was no procedural violation in that regard. Therefore, it cannot be said 

that the prosecutor committed misconduct in continuing Blackshire’s prosecution. 

 Blackshire next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to disclose 

exculpatory evidence, i.e., a videotape that showed a man “a lot taller than” Blackshire getting 

into the victim’s van. The prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory or material evidence in 

its possession constitutes a due process violation regardless of whether the defendant requested 

the evidence.76 The elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the prosecution has suppressed 

evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) viewed in its totality, is material.”[77]

 Despite Blackshire’s appellate claim that the prosecution failed to disclose a videotape 

that showed a different man getting into the victim’s car, a review of the lower court record 

shows no mention by either party of this videotape’s existence. Blackshire has not offered any 

 

72 People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). 

73 Id. (citations omitted). 

74 Id. 

75 Id. at 475-476 (citations and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 

76 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963); People v Jackson, 

292 Mich App 583, 590-591; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). 

77 People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 155; 845 NW2d 731 (2014). 
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proof beyond mere speculation that the videotape exists, let alone that the prosecution concealed 

or destroyed the videotape. Thus, Blackshire has not shown either a Brady violation or 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

 Third, Blackshire argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by impeaching him 

with an inadmissible, illegally seized, and unauthenticated letter. Before trial, Blackshire mailed 

two letters from jail to the victim, one dated April 13, 2012, and the second dated May 15, 2012. 

The letters were intercepted by one of the victim’s coworkers, who then opened one of the letters 

and turned both over to the police. Once the letters were turned over to the police, an officer 

opened the second letter and then obtained a warrant to arrest Blackshire for witness tampering. 

On August 30, 2012, one of Blackshire’s previous attorneys filed a motion to suppress the letters 

based on Blackshire’s Fourth Amendment rights. On March 27, 2013, the parties appeared 

before the trial court for a pretrial hearing and to argue Blackshire’s motion. At the hearing, 

Blackshire’s trial counsel argued that the police officer had no right to open the second letter 

without a search warrant. The trial court found that the police officer violated Blackshire’s 

Fourth Amendment rights when he opened the second letter, but because the first letter had been 

opened by “a private citizen,” it did not need to be suppressed. Therefore, the trial judge allowed 

the use of the first letter at trial, but barred admission or mention of the second letter. At trial, 

the prosecution cross-examined Blackshire regarding the letter he sent to the victim on April 13, 

2012. “This is essentially an evidentiary issue framed as prosecutorial misconduct. A 

prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit evidence does not constitute misconduct.”78 The 

prosecutor was acting in good faith, pursuant to the trial court’s order allowing the admission of 

the April 13, 2012 letter. Therefore, his actions do not constitute misconduct. 

 Blackshire also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing, and not 

correcting, perjured witness testimony. A prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony to 

obtain a conviction.79

A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is 

violated when there is any reasonable likelihood that a conviction was obtained by 

the knowing use of perjured testimony. Accordingly, a prosecutor has an 

obligation to correct perjured testimony that relates to the facts of the case or a 

witness’s credibility. When a conviction is obtained through the knowing use of 

perjured testimony, a new trial is required only if the tainted evidence is material 

to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. So whether a new trial is warranted 

depends on the effect the misconduct had on the trial. The entire focus of the 

analysis must be on the fairness of the trial, not on the prosecutor’s or the court’s 

culpability.[80]

 

78 People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 70; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). 

79 People v Aceval, 282 Mich App 379, 389; 764 NW2d 285 (2009). 

80 People v Gratsch, 299 Mich App 604, 619-620; 831 NW2d 462 (2013), vacated in part on 

other grounds 495 Mich 876 (2013) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). 
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Blackshire contends that the prosecutor allowed the victim to testify at trial to a story that was 

“totally different from what she [said] happened at the pre-liminary [sic] exam.” Other than 

Blackshire’s blanket assertions, there was no evidence that the prosecutor knowingly admitted 

false testimony. Defense counsel cross-examined the victim and had the opportunity to question 

her regarding any inconsistencies in her testimony, which would have presented an issue of 

weight, not admissibility, for the jury to resolve.81

 Finally, Blackshire contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making 

numerous improper arguments to the jury. “Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and 

evaluated in the light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence 

admitted at trial.”82 Blackshire first alleges that the prosecutor improperly and repeatedly 

asserted that Blackshire was guilty. Prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences arising from it as they relate to their theory of the case, but may not express their 

personal opinion regarding a defendant’s guilt.83 “Such comments during closing argument will 

be reviewed in context to determine whether they constitute error requiring reversal.”84 Despite 

Blackshire’s contention, the prosecutor actually stated at the end of his closing argument, “I ask 

you, remember Mr. Blackshire is innocent until proven guilty.” The only time the prosecutor 

mentioned Blackshire’s guilt was at the conclusion of his rebuttal argument. The prosecutor’s 

single statement alleging Blackshire’s guilt was a reasonable inference arising from the evidence 

he mentioned, and does not require reversal, particularly in light of the trial court’s instruction 

that the lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence.85

 Blackshire next contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the victim’s 

credibility, but does not point to any specific statements. “A prosecutor may not vouch for the 

credibility of his witnesses by suggesting that he has some special knowledge of the witnesses’ 

truthfulness.”86 However, “a prosecutor may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during 

closing argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the 

defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.”87 Further, “the prosecutor may 

argue from the facts that a witness should be believed.”88 In this case, the prosecution and 

Blackshire each provided starkly different stories regarding the events on the day in question. 

 

81 People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 624; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). 

82 People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 135; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). 

83 People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282-283; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (citation omitted). 

84 Id. at 283. 

85 Unger, 278 Mich App at 237. 

86 People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 22; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). 

87 People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). 

88 Seals, 285 Mich App at 22 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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Because Blackshire’s guilt depended upon which evidence the jury believed, the prosecutor was 

permitted to comment on the victim’s credibility in closing.89

 Blackshire finally contends that the prosecutor improperly “[e]xpressed to the jury how 

many years [he has] been a successful prosecutor.” It is true that a prosecutor may not use “the 

prestige of the prosecutor’s office to inject personal opinion.”90 While the prosecutor did 

mention during his opening statement that he had been a prosecutor for 33 years, he did not use 

the prestige of his office to in any way inject his personal opinion regarding the case. Reading 

the prosecutor’s comments as a whole,91 his statements did not rise to the level of prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

 

89 Thomas, 260 Mich App at 455. 

90 Bahoda, 448 Mich at 286. 

91 Brown, 279 Mich App at 135.