SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1342 

CA 15-00460 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, VALENTINO, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

ALEX C. MILLER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KIRK HOWARD, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, 

AMORE’S USED CARS & REPAIRS, INC., 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 

AND COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS, 

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

FRANCIS M. LETRO, BUFFALO (RONALD J. WRIGHT OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

RUPP BAASE PFALZGRAF CUNNINGHAM LLC, BUFFALO (WILLIAM K. KENNEDY OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

BARCLAY DAMON LLP, BUFFALO (VINCENT G. SACCOMANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme

Court, Cattaraugus County (Paula L. Feroleto, J.), entered May 20,

2014. The order and judgment granted the motion of defendant County

of Cattaraugus for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint and

all cross claims against it. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from

is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries he sustained when he was a passenger in a motor vehicle

operated by Kirk Howard (defendant). Plaintiff alleged in the

complaint, inter alia, that defendant County of Cattaraugus (County)

was negligent in maintaining the county road where the accident

occurred and that defendant Amore’s Used Cars & Repairs, Inc.

(Amore’s) was negligent in repairing defendant’s vehicle. Amore’s

asserted a cross claim against all defendants for contribution and

indemnification. Supreme Court granted the County’s motion for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against

it. Plaintiff and Amore’s appeal, and we affirm. 

At the outset, we reject Amore’s contention that the court was

required to deny the County’s motion based on its failure to submit

Amore’s answer with its initial moving papers. Amore’s answer was

submitted by the County in its reply papers, was before the court when
-2- 1342 

CA 15-00460 

it decided the motion, and is part of the record on appeal (see Dale v

Gentry, 66 AD3d 1469, 1469). 

Although we agree with plaintiff “that there may be a triable

issue of fact whether [the County] was negligent in allowing the

[markings] on the road to become faded . . . , we further conclude

that [the County] met its initial burden on the motion by establishing

as a matter of law that any such negligence was not a proximate cause

of the accident and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact

with respect thereto” (Endieveri v County of Oneida, 35 AD3d 1268,

1269). “The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts

established by [the County] is that the accident would have occurred

regardless of the condition of the [road markings]” (id.). In

opposition to the motion, plaintiff’s expert did not address the speed

at which defendant was driving when he entered the curve, defendant’s

admitted intoxicated and fatigued state, his failure to notice earlier

traffic signs informing motorists of the curve’s presence and, most

importantly, how the “faded lines caused or contributed to [the]

accident” (Taylor v County of Onondaga, 139 AD2d 906, 906, lv denied

72 NY2d 807; see Ether v State of New York, 235 AD2d 685, 686-687). 

Indeed, defendant testified that, prior to the accident, he “was

looking forward at the road and . . . noticed the yellow lines and

the[n] [the] crash happened.” “Because there is no evidence in the

record that the faded . . . [road markings] were a causative factor, a

jury making that finding would impermissibly have to resort to

speculation or conjecture” (Endieveri, 35 AD3d at 1269). 

Contrary to plaintiff’s further contention, plaintiff is

precluded from asserting a theory of liability based on the County’s

negligent design and construction of the road because he failed to

include that theory of liability in his notice of claim, and we note

that “a late notice of claim asserting such [a] theor[y] would in any

event be time-barred” (Clare-Hollo v Finger Lakes Ambulance EMS, Inc.,

99 AD3d 1199, 1201; see Crew v Town of Beekman, 105 AD3d 799, 800-

801). 

Entered: December 31, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court