IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1909

Filed October 1, 2014

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DEBORAH CATHERINE RHINEHART

AND RICHARD SCOTT RHINEHART

Upon the Petition of

DEBORAH CATHERINE RHINEHART,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

RICHARD SCOTT RHINEHART,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Kathleen A. 

Kilnoski, Judge. 

An ex-husband appeals the district court’s order that awarded trial 

attorney fees to his ex-wife and the court’s orders regarding the appeal bond. 

AFFIRMED.

Elizabeth A. Rosenbaum of Elizabeth A. Rosenbaum, P.C., Sioux City, for 

appellant.

Stanley E. Munger and Jay E. Denne of Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, 

L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
2

MULLINS, J.

This is the fourth time this dissolution of marriage case has been before 

our court. See In re Marriage of Rhinehart, No. 12-0287, 2013 WL 530838, at 

*1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013) (recounting the history of this dissolution 

case). Following the last appeal, we remanded the case to the district court to 

determine the “amount of fees applicable to the retrial only.” The district court 

awarded Deborah $70,920.00 in trial attorney fees, expert witness fees, and 

expenses. Scott now appeals that order claiming most of the time billed by 

Deborah’s attorney and experts did not relate to the retrial because their work 

focused on events occurring after the initial trial. He asserts Deborah, as a lay 

person, was not qualified to assert the fees and expenses were fair and 

reasonable. Scott attacks as unreasonable Deborah’s attorney’s use of and 

charges for a private airplane to meet with experts. He asserts some of the fees 

and expenses claimed by Deborah to be related to the retrial were previously 

submitted to this court as related to the prior appeal. Finally, he claims he should 

have been allowed to testify regarding a prior attorney fee claim submitted by 

Deborah’s attorney that contained errors. 

We review a district court’s decision to award trial attorney fees and 

expenses for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 

255 (Iowa 2006). We have reviewed the district court’s decision, which 

addresses almost all of Scott’s appellate claims,1and we find no abuse of 

 

1 Scott claims that $28,555.93 in attorney fees claimed by Deborah to be related to the 

retrial were previously submitted to this court as related to the prior appeal. He asserts 

Deborah should be precluded by the law of the case doctrine from presenting these 
3

discretion. We therefore affirm the district court’s attorney fee award pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d) and (e). 

Scott also asserts on appeal the court erred in not ordering a stay of 

execution of the attorney fee judgment pending appeal. Scott sought to sell his 

house while this appeal was pending despite the fact Deborah and her attorney 

had judgment liens against the house. In order to clear up title and permit the 

sale to go forward, Scott sought an emergency order to require Deborah and her 

attorney to sign release of lien documents. He also sought the court’s approval 

of an appeal bond for the attorney fee judgment. The court approved a bond, but 

also in a separate order directed Deborah and her attorney to sign release of lien 

documents, the closing agent for the home to transfer to the clerk of court the 

amount due to Deborah and her attorney, and the clerk to then remit those 

amounts to Deborah and her attorney and not apply those amounts to the bond. 

Scott asserts these two orders are conflicting and in error,2but he does not 

indicate how such an error can be or should be corrected at this time. Because 

 

charges again to the district court. This claim was not presented to the district court, and 

as such, Scott has failed to preserve error. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 

537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must 

ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on 

appeal”). Based on the lack of error preservation, we decline to address this claim. 

2 While an appeal bond will stay execution of a judgment while an appeal is pending, see 

Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.601, the appeal bond has no effect on the validity of 

a judgment lien during the appeal. See Edge v. Harsha, 334 N.W.2d 741, 742 (Iowa 

1983) (finding an appeal bond maintains the status quo and keeps a creditor at bay until 

the appeal is decided but the bond does not deprive the judgment of its force). We note 

it was Scott who voluntarily sought to sell his house while he appealed the attorney fee 

judgment entered against him. He was not simply asking to maintain the status quo to 

keep Deborah and her attorney from executing on the attorney fee judgment, but he was 

seeking to dispose of an asset that had a valid judgment lien attached to it. The court 

could not force Deborah and her attorney to release that lien, so Scott could sell the 

house, absent that lien being satisfied. See id. (finding the district court was without 

power to order the discharge of a judgment lien upon the posting of an appeal bond). 
4

we have affirmed district court’s decision regarding the amount of trial attorney 

fees due, the liens have been released, the house has been sold, the amount 

remitted to Deborah and her attorney, and no appeal bond posted, we consider 

this appeal issue moot. See Crowell v. State Pub. Defender, 845 N.W.2d 676, 

681 (Iowa 2014) (“If an appeal no longer presents a justiciable controversy 

because the disputed issue has become academic or nonexistent, the appeal is 

ordinarily deemed moot.”).

Finally, both Scott and Deborah seek an award of appellate attorney fees. 

An award of appellate attorney fees rests in our discretion. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 

at 255. We consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the 

other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. After considering 

these factors and the substantial award which we affirm on this appeal, we award 

Deborah $2000 in appellate attorney fees. 

Costs on appeal are assessed to Scott.

AFFIRMED.