alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1745

To designate a Prisoner of War/Missing in Action National Memorial at 

Riverside National Cemetery in Riverside, California. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 16, 2003

Mrs. BOXER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL

To designate a Prisoner of War/Missing in Action National 

Memorial at Riverside National Cemetery in Riverside, 

California.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prisoner of War/Miss5 ing in Action National Memorial Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN 

7 ACTION NATIONAL MEMORIAL, RIVERSIDE 

8 NATIONAL CEMETERY, RIVERSIDE, CALI9 FORNIA. 

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
2

•S 1745 IS 

1 (1) The most reliable statistics regarding the 

2 number of members of the United States Armed 

3 Forces who have been held as prisoners of war or 

4 listed as missing in action indicate that more than 

5 586,000 members of the Armed Forces have been 

6 taken prisoner since the American Revolution and 

7 more than 89,000 members have been listed as miss8 ing. 

9 (2) The Department of Defense continues to lo10 cate and identify the remains of members of the 

11 Armed Forces who have been missing in action since 

12 the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 

13 (3) The United States currently lacks a na14 tional memorial dedicated to the bravery and sac15 rifice of those members of the Armed Forces who 

16 have been held as prisoners of war and listed as 

17 missing in action. 

18 (4) An appropriate memorial to former pris19 oners of war and members of the Armed Forces list20 ed as missing in action, including those who remain 

21 unaccounted for, is under construction at Riverside 

22 National Cemetery in Riverside, California. 

23 (5) The memorial will honor all those members 

24 of the Armed Forces who have been held as pris25 oners of war or listed as missing in action and is 
3

•S 1745 IS 

1 dedicated to the memory of those members who re2 main missing in action. 

3 (b) DESIGNATION.—The memorial to former pris4 oners of war and members of the Armed Forces listed as 

5 missing in action that is under construction at Riverside 

6 National Cemetery in Riverside, California, is hereby des7 ignated as the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action National 

8 Memorial. 

9 (c) EFFECT OF DESIGNATION.—The national memo10 rial designated by this section is not a unit of the National 

11 Park System, and the designation of the national memo12 rial shall not be construed to require or permit Federal 

13 funds (other than any funds provided for as of the date 

14 of the enactment of this Act) to be expended for any pur15 pose related to the national memorial.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7636

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY LAVONNE BERRY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:08-cr-00247-FL-1; 5:12-cv-00732-FL; 5:10-cv00227-FL)

Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: March 20, 2015

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Lavonne Berry, Appellant Pro Se. Edward D. Gray, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Lavonne Berry seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny 

relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

Limiting our review to the issues raised in Berry’s 

objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

and his informal brief, see Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 

845–46 (4th Cir. 1985); 4th Cir. R. 34(b), we conclude that

Berry has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 
3

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT
32.1














CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





PURSUANT
TO





18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,





AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO





SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2005








I,
Alexey A. Kim , Chief Executive Officer of Promotora Valle Hermoso,
Inc.  (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
amended Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-KSB for the year ended
December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






/s/ Alexey A.
      KimAlexey
      A. KimChief
      Executive OfficerDated:
      March 13, 2009
# James A. Bodron, P.E.

####         Director, Programs Directorate    

Mr. James A. Bodron serves as Director of Programs for the Mississippi Valley Division (MVD) and the Mississippi River Commission (MRC), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Mr. Bodron was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in August 2016, where he served as director of the Programs Directorate for MVD.

The Senior Executive Service (SES) is the civilian equivalent to the military rank of General Officer. SES leaders possess well-honed executive skills and share a broad perspective of government and a public service commitment which is grounded in the Constitution. Members of the SES serve in key positions just below the top Presidential appointees and are the major link between these appointees and the rest of the federal work force.

In his current position, Mr. Bodron serves as the principal advisor to the commander of MVD and president of the MRC for the development, defense, and execution of the Civil Works Program across twelve states served by the Mississippi Valley Division. He provides executive strategic leadership and supervision for the Programs Directorate and has regional staff oversight for programs, planning, operations, real estate and project management activities in the Division's six District offices located in St. Paul, Rock Island, Memphis, Vicksburg and New Orleans. 

Mr. Bodron previously served as deputy district engineer for Project Management for the Memphis District, USACE. Other assignments in the Memphis District include chief of Operations Division, assistant chief of Planning in the Programs and Project Management Branch, a project manager, and a senior study manager. In addition to working in the Memphis District, Mr. Bodron also held positions with USACE in the Little Rock, Tulsa, and Rock Island districts.

Mr. Bodron deployed to Afghanistan in November 2008, where he served as the deputy project manager and acting director of the Kandahar Program Office, Afghanistan Engineer District. He stood up this office and directed a budget of $900 million in military construction efforts in support of overseas contingency operations. He also worked with NATO and U.S. forces to design and construct a wide variety of facilities.

From 2002-2005, he served as the national liaison between USACE and the Natural Resources Conservation Service. He worked cooperatively with that agency’s leaders on watershed planning and project implementation efforts.

Mr. Bodron is a graduate of Tennessee Tech University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering in 1986, as well as, the University of Memphis, where he earned a master’s degree in civil engineering in 1994. He is a licensed professional engineer in the state of Tennessee, a past officer and director of the Society of American Military Engineers, Memphis Post, and a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 207 (Wednesday, October 27, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 66074]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-27327]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: 11 a.m., Friday, November 12, 2010.

PLACE: 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 9th Floor Commission 
Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance and Enforcement Matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Sauntia S. Warfield, 202-418-5084.

Sauntia S. Warfield,
Assistant Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010-27327 Filed 10-25-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

June 6, 2012

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

Nos. 08‐1879 & 08‐1880

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

AMIR HOSSEINI and HOSSEIN OBAEI,

Defendants‐Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 CR 254

Milton I. Shadur,

Judge.

O R D E R

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion dated May 7, 2012, shall be amended as

follows:

The last paragraph on page 6 and the following, full paragraph on page 7 are

amended to read:

This argument about the meaning of “proceeds” in the money‐laundering

statute is new on appeal. To preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a

defendant must move for a judgment of acquittal in the trial court. United States v.

Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2010). Both defendants did so here; they moved

for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

at the close of the government’s case, and they renewed their motions at the close of

evidence and again after the verdict. But they never raised the “proceeds” issue;
Nos. 08‐1879 & 08‐1880 Page 2

instead, their Rule 29 motions identified other grounds for acquittal. For example,

they argued that selling cars to drug dealers was not evidence of a RICO enterprise

or a RICO or money‐laundering conspiracy. Obaei also argued that the evidence was

insufficient to find him guilty of aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy.

As a general matter, and unlike its analogue in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require

specificity when moving for a judgment of acquittal. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 29

with FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2) (motions for judgment as a matter of law “must specify

the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment”).

But we have held that a defendant’s choice to raise specific arguments and omit

others in a Rule 29 motion has consequences on appeal. We have held that when a

defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence by motion for judgment of

acquittal and makes specific arguments in support of that motion, any arguments

omitted are thereby forfeited. See United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 324 (7th Cir.

2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen . . . a

[Rule 29] motion raises specific arguments, any claims not presented in the motion

are waived.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Young v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100

(2005)). We might alternatively construe the “proceeds” argument as a claim of

instructional error. But neither defendant raised the definition of “proceeds” as a

ground of objection to the jury instructions.
# F-15B – NASA

Official National Aeronautics and Space Administration Website

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- F-15B Aeronautics Research Test Bed NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California, uses a modified F-15B aircraft as a test bed for a variety of flight research experiments. Coupled with either a flight test fixture or a propulsion flight test fixture mounted underneath the aircraft, the F-15B provides a unique flight research capability. Aircraft Description Armstrong’s F-15B is a [&#8230;]
#### Doe, on the Demise of Cull and Another, *v.*Brown and Another.

If a widow having an estate in dower many, her husband, and those claiming under him, have a right to the enjoyment of the premises during the existence of the marriage.

If after such marriage, the wife be divorced *a vinculo matrimonii,*the estate is thereby restored to her.

*310Saturday, *May*30.

ERROR to the *Shelby*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

Ejectment for a tract of land in *Shelby*county. Plea, not guilty.

The following are the material facts. A widow being in possession of a tract of land as her dower, married one *Brown.*Afterwards, a judgment awarding execution against the goods and lands of *Brown,*was rendered by the Circuit Court, on the transcript of a judgment of a justice of the peace. On the same day on which the execution was awarded, *Mrs. Brown*obtained a divorce against *Brown a vinculo matrimonii.*• The land assigned to *Mrs. Brown*as her dower before she married *Brown,*was, after the divorce, sold on the execution awarded against *Brown.*The purchasers under the execution are the lessors of the plaintiff; and *Mrs. Brown*and her tenant are the defendants.

The Circuit Court, to which the cause was submitted, gave judgment for the defendants.

*•I*We think this decision is right. *Mrs. Brown,*previously to her marriage with *Brown,*had an estate for life in the land. The marriage gave *Brown*an estate in it which was. to continue during the coverture. It was an estate which he might 'sell, and which was subject' to any judgments rendered against him during its existence. 2 Kent’s Comm. 134. The lessors of the plaintiff, in the case before us, took, by their purchase, the same estate that the execution-defendant had; that is, a right to the enjoyment of the premises during the existence of the marriage.

It is said by *Colee,*that if a husband make a feoffment in fee of the lands which he holdeth in the right of his wife, and after they are divorced *causa prcecontractus,*yet the woman may enter within the purview of the statute of Henry the 8th, an(I is not driven to her writ of *cui ante divoriium,*as she was at the common law. Coke on Litt. 326. This shows, that if the wife were out of possession, and there had been a sale and conveyance of the land by *Brown,*she could — the marriage tie being dissolved — recover the land in an action at common law, or enter into possession of it under the statute of Henry the 8th. It follows, that the defence of *Mrs. Brown*and her tenant, under the circumstances of the present case, must be a good one.

*311
      *W. J.*Peaslee, for the plaintiff.

*P. Sweetser,*for the defendants.

The cases of *Kriger*v. *Day,*2 Pick. 316, and *Starr*v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541, relied on by the defendants’ sustain the defence. There is also a later case in the defendants’ favour. *Wheeler*v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn. 225. This last-cited case was one in which the husband was tenant by the curtesy *initiate;*and yet it was held, that the estate of a party claiming under the husband must yield, after a divorce *a vinculo*matrimonii, to the superior right of the wife.

*Per Curiam.*

the judgment is affirmed with costs.
#### John Woodward et al. *v.*F. W. Stimmell & Co.

Steamboat — Supplies — Answer — Want of Information — Demurrer.

As to the material averments of the petition (that the steamer R. *h.*Woodward, by her captain), at the time being owned by the defendant, bought the supplies of the plaintiff, the answer states that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief that the captain of said boat bought any supplies from plaintiff. *Eeld,*that this answer is not sufficient under section 125 of the Civil Code, as it does not deny that the defendants were the owners of the boat, nor that they controlled it.

APPEAL PROM m’cRAOKEN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 8, 1867.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Hardin :

The only question to be considered in tbis case arises on the «demurrer to the appellants’ answer. The petition alleges the sale .and delivery to the appellants for the use of their boat of supplies, which were reasonably of the value of $110.40', and that a bill of particulars was rendered.

The appellants, by their answer, deny that they received the alleged bill of particulars, and deny that any such supplies were furnished to them or that the account filed is just or correct. They also deny that they are indebted to the plaintiffs in said ■sum of $110 or any other sum, or that they promised to pay the ■debt. But as to the material averment of the petition, that the steamer R. L. AVoodward, by her captain, at the time being owned by defendants bought the supplies of the plaintiffs, “they state that *82they have no knowledge or information sufficient to found a belief that the captain of said boat bought any goods or supplies from plaintiffs for said boat, and they deny that he did, and call for full proof.”

It seems to us the answer is not sufficient under the rules prescribed by section 125 of the Civil Code.

It does not deny that appellants were the owners of the boat, nor attempt to repel the inference that they at the time had control of the boat. These' facts are, we think, sufficient to enable the court to see that the appellants had information or knowledge sufficient to enable them to found a belief *as to*the alleged purchase of the supplies, and we are constrained, therefore, to regard! the averment of a want of such knowledge or information as an evasion. Nor is this objection removed by the distinctive denial that the *captain*of the boat bought the supplies.

The answer to be sufficient should in direct terms have denied that the appellants, being the owners of the boat, purchased by themselves or others the supplies for her use or have furnished a more satisfactory explanation for their failure to do so.

Wherefore, being of the opinion that the demurrer was properly sustained the judgment is affirmed.
5 

NOTIFICATION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT NEGOTIATION OR 

AGREEMENT AND RECUSAL STATEMENT

Section 17 of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act) requires 

certain employees to file a statement notifying their agency ethics official of any negotiation for or 

agreement of future employment or compensation with a non-federal entity within three business days

after commencement of the negotiation or agreement. Employees who file this notification statement 

also must file with their agency ethics official a recusal statement whenever there is a conflict of 

interest or appearance of a conflict of interest with the entity. In any such case, the employee must 

recuse, unless the employee has first obtained a written waiver or authorization as discussed in 

5 C.F.R. § 2635.605, or qualifies for a regulatory exemption pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). 

NOTIFICATION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT NEGOTIATION OR AGREEMENT

Name of Employee

Agency/Office

Date Negotiation or Agreement 

Commenced 

Name(s) of Non-Federal Entity

or Entities

Disclose each non-federal entity 

with which you are negotiating for 

or have an agreement of future 

employment or compensation.

RECUSAL STATEMENT

For as long as I am negotiating for or have an agreement of employment or compensation with any 

entity listed above, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that has 

a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of that entity, unless I first obtain a written 

waiver or authorization consistent with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.605, or qualify for a regulatory exemption 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). 

Employee Signature Date Submitted

Agency Ethics Official Signature Date Received
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IP CO., LLC.,

Appellant

v.

EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1896

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2015-

01901.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

GREGORY J. GONSALVES, The Gonsalves Law Firm, 

Falls Church, VA, argued for appellant. Also represented 

by THOMAS F. MEAGHER, Meagher Emanuel Laks Goldberg & Liao, LLP, Princeton, NJ.

 DOUGLAS HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, Ropes & Gray LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented 

by JAMES RICHARD BATCHELDER, JAMES LAWRENCE DAVIS,

JR., East Palo Alto, CA.

______________________ 
 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (NEWMAN, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

August 29, 2018 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

 Date Peter R. Marksteiner

 Clerk of Court