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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ex rel 

MAZYN BARASH, 

 Plaintiff, 

and 

MAZYN BARASH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 30, 2016 

v No. 327524 

Oakland Circuit Court 

SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR 

REGIONAL TRANSPORT (SMART), 

LC No. 2013-135379-AV 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

ROY SHECTER & VOCHT PC, 

 Intervener-Appellee. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this action regarding attorney fees, plaintiff Mazyn Barash appeals as of right the trial 

court’s April 30, 2015 order requiring that the law firm Roy, Shecter & Vocht, P.C., (RSV) be 

paid $83,925, plus statutory interest, out of a check paid by the Suburban Mobility Authority for 

Regional Transport (SMART) in satisfaction of an award based on a discrimination claim by 

Barash against SMART. We affirm. 

 This case concerns a dispute regarding payment of attorney fees that is connected to, but 

distinct from, a discrimination claim brought by Barash and the Michigan Department of Civil 

Rights (MDCR) against SMART. RSV represented Barash for some time in the department’s 

administrative proceedings; however, after RSV ceased representation, Barash hired Akeel & 

Valentine (AV) to represent him. Barash obtained a favorable judgment from the Michigan Civil 

Rights Commission, and in case number 2012-127264-AV, the trial court affirmed the 
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commission’s May 25, 2012 final order. The order stated that SMART must cease its 

discrimination, pay Barash certain amounts of damages, pay certain amounts of attorney fees and 

costs to RSV and AV, and pay statutory interest on all amounts. In the portion relevant to this 

appeal, the order specifically directed that SMART “shall remit $83,925.00 to the Schechter Law 

Firm [RSV] for attorney fees.” 

 In case number 2013-135379-AV, the case now before this Court on appeal, Barash and 

the MDCR sought entry of a decree ordering SMART to pay the damages and fees identified in 

the order. After exhausting its appellate remedies, SMART issued a tri-party check to Barash, 

AV, and RSV. However, after RSV endorsed the check, Barash and AV refused to pay RSV the 

$83,925 plus interest that it was allocated in the May 25, 2012 order, claiming that there was a 

contract between RSV and AV that entitled RSV to only 30% of the attorney fees paid by 

SMART. On March 25, 2015, RSV moved to intervene and moved the trial court to order 

enforcement of the May 25, 2012 judgment by ordering Barash or AV to pay it the amounts 

stated in the May 25, 2012 order. After hearings held on April 1, 2015 and April 29, 2015, the 

trial court granted RSV’s motion to enforce judgment and ordered that RSV be paid $83,925 plus 

statutory interest out of the award paid by SMART, resulting in entry of the April 30, 2015 order 

at issue. 

 Barash’s first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by ordering that RSV be paid 

$83,925 plus statutory interest because there was a contract between RSV and AV that entitled 

RSV to only 30% of the total attorney fees paid by SMART. We disagree. 

 “The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo.” 

Kloian v Domino’s Pizza LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). Similarly, the 

interpretation of a court order involves questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Silberstein v 

Pro-Golf of America, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 460; 750 NW2d 615 (2008). 

 According to Barash, a contract was formed when, after several emails were exchanged 

between the law firms, an attorney from AV sent an email on January 25, 2011 to an attorney 

from RSV that in relevant part stated “[f]or the civil rights claim, your firm would be entitled to 

30% of fees awarded from the Commission,” and the attorney for RSV replied, in relevant part in 

a January 28, 2011 email, “Yes.” On this basis, Barash argues that the $83,925 in attorney fees 

awarded to RSV and the $37,325.75 in attorney fees awarded AV should be summed, after 

which RSV should receive 30% of the total and AV should receive 70% of the total. 

 Although the parties do not raise the issue, we note that Barash lacks standing under 

Michigan law to adjudicate this issue because he is not a proper party to attempt to enforce an 

alleged fee-splitting agreement between AV and RSV. Lansing Schools Educ Ass’n v Lansing 

Bd of Educ, 487 Mich 349, 355; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (“The standing inquiry focuses on 

whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether 

the issue itself is justiciable.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under MCR 2.201(B), an 

action “must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” The real party in interest 

rule “is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of 

another.” In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355; 833 NW2d 384 

(2013). Although Barash purportedly brought this appeal against SMART to challenge the trial 

court’s order enforcing Barash’s judgment against SMART, neither Barash nor SMART have an 
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interest in the subject or outcome of the appeal—the only question Barash is seeking to have 

decided is how the attorney fees should be divided between RSV and AV based on the terms of 

their fee-splitting agreement. Thus, it appears that Barash is bringing the appeal on behalf of AV 

exclusively for AV’s interests. Accordingly, it is improper for Barash to attempt to enforce 

AV’s alleged contract rights. 

 Similarly, because Barash is not a party to the alleged contract, he would only be able to 

enforce the contract if he were a third-party beneficiary to the contract. See MCL 600.1405.1 

“This rule reflects the Legislature’s intent to ensure that contracting parties are clearly aware that 

the scope of their contractual undertakings encompasses a third party, directly referred to in the 

contract, before the third party is able to enforce the contract.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 

664-665; 790 NW2d 629 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Barash was not a thirdparty beneficiary of the alleged contract between AV and RSV regarding how they would split 

any statutory attorney fees awarded in the proceeding, as he received no benefit from the contract 

and was not referred to in the contract. Nonetheless, Barash attempts to use enforcement of that 

contract as a reason RSV should not be paid according to the May 25, 2012 order. Although 

Barash’s claim on appeal supposedly deals with the trial court’s order regarding the award 

SMART was required to pay, Barash’s claim appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to act on AV’s 

behalf to enforce its alleged contract against RSV. 

Moreover, the parties do not dispute that the May 25, 2012 order was a final order for 

which avenues of possible appellate relief were exhausted. In general, “judgments are final and 

binding and, absent reasons such as fraud, preclude relitigation of matters already decided and 

reduced to judgments.” Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 572; 616 NW2d 219 (2000). The 

existence or nonexistence of a fee-sharing contract between AV and RSV has absolutely no 

bearing on the final order directing SMART to pay certain amounts of money to Barash, AV, and 

RSV. Neither AV nor RSV were parties to the case that resulted in the award of attorney fees to 

them from SMART, and neither firm had any obligation under the May 25, 2012 order. The 

order directed SMART to take several actions, including paying specific amounts of money to 

Barash, AV, and RSV. Barash fails to explain how or why an alleged contract between AV and 

RSV could affect the final and binding order of May 25, 2012, and this Court finds no reason to 

conclude that it could. The trial court appears to have reached the same conclusion—when it 

ordered Barash and AV to pay RSV, it did not refer to the alleged contract at all, but instead 

indicated that affirmation of the May 25, 2012 order required payment to RSV of the amount 

indicated in the order, notwithstanding any of Barash’s claims to the contrary. Therefore, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering that RSV be paid $83,925 plus statutory 

interest from the judgment paid by SMART, regardless of Barash’s attempt to enforce an alleged 

contract between AV and RSV. 

 

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 “Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way of contract, as hereinafter defined, 

has the same right to enforce said promise that he would have had if the said promise had been 

made directly to him as the promisee.” MCL 600.1405. 
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 Barash also claims on appeal that the trial court erred in granting substantive relief to 

RSV without first expressly granting RSV’s motion to intervene. Because Barash did not raise 

this issue in the trial court until his motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order directing 

payment to RSV, he did not preserve the issue for appellate review. Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen 

Ins Co of Michigan, 284 Mich App 513, 519; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). Further, we find the claim 

to be without merit. 

 “[I]t is fundamental that a party may not create error in a lower court, and then claim on 

appeal that the error requires reversal.” Clohset v No Name Corp (On Remand), 302 Mich App 

550, 566; 840 NW2d 375 (2013). To do so “ ‘would permit the party to harbor error as an 

appellate parachute.’ ” Id., quoting Dresselhouse v Chrysler Corp, 177 Mich App 470, 477; 442 

NW2d 705 (1989). Barash did not contest RSV’s motion to intervene and did not raise the issue 

of the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion to intervene until his motion to reconsider 

brought after the trial court granted RSV’s motion to enforce the May 25, 2012 order. At a 

hearing held on April 29, 2015, after RSV had filed its motion to intervene but the trial court had 

not formally granted the motion, the trial court stated “what motions we have; a motion to 

intervene by Ms. Sheeter? [sic]” In response, the attorney appearing on behalf of Barash, stated 

“No, actually I think just to settle the order--.” Therefore, because counsel for Barash 

represented to the trial court that no further action was necessary on RSV’s motion to intervene, 

Barash cannot now claim that the trial court erred by failing to formally grant the motion. 

Clohset, 302 Mich App at 566. To do so would improperly allow Barash to harbor error as an 

appellate parachute. Id. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola