### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 23 -C R

______________________________ AL L EN RAY SHI PP, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 336th J udicial District Court

Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 22669

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Op ini on by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss2 O P IN I O N I n the af termath of his a

rre st f or attempting to pa ss a forg ed Wal-Mart rec eipt and while he was be ing pr ocesse d into jail in Fa nnin County , Allen R ay Shipp was sea rche d, and off

icer s found in his wallet an item that appe are d to be a tempor ary Texas driver' s license be ari n g the name D an B utn e r a nd a lic e ns e numbe r b e lon g ingto a pe rs on name d M ue lst e in f

ro m T e rr e ll, Te xas. As a result, Shipp was char g ed with forg ery of a g overnme nt instrument, that is, a driver' s license. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 32.21 (Ve rnon S upp. 2008). I n this case (trial cour t case number 22669), Shi pp wa s c on vic te d, his se nte nc e wa s e nh anc e d w ith pr ior c on vic tio ns, and he wa s se nte nc e d to twenty -five y ear s' imprisonment. I n companion ca ses, Shipp w a s c harg ed and c onvicted of two othe r offe nses: in our ca se numbere d 06-08-00122- CR (trial court ca se number 22668) , Shipp was

c on vic te d o n a

c ha rg e of po sse ssi on of a c on tr oll e d sub sta nc e in a dr

ug -f re e zon e and

se nte nc e d to six ty y ear s' imprisonment, while i n our ca se numbere d 06-08-00124 ( trial court c ase numbe r 22670), Shi pp wa s c on vic te d on a c ha rg e of fo rg e ry of a c omm e rc ia l ins tr ume nt and se nt enced to tw e nty y ear s' imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00. F rom the benc h, the t ri al court initially order ed Shipp's sentenc es to be ser ved conc urre ntly , but later c hang ed the r uling a nd order ed the se ntence s to be serve d consec utively

. I n points of error

common to all three a

ppeals, Shipp asserts that runningthe three sentenc es

c on se c uti ve ly

wa s e rr or and a vio la tio n of his du e pr oc e ss r ig hts . We ov e rr ule Shi pp ' s d

ue pr oc e ss po int of e rr or . F or

the re a so ns state d in our op ini on in our c a us e numbe r 06 -0 8- 00 12 2- CR, that is ,3

fo r l a c k o f p ro of

of a dr ug -f re e -zo ne vio la tio n in tha t ca se , we re fo rm the jud g me nt in this c a se to pr ov ide that Sh ipp ' s se nte nc e fo r fo rg e ry of a g ov e rnme nt ins tr ume nt sh a ll r

un c on c ur re ntl y wi th h is sentenc e in that companion c ase. In the third ca se, our c ause numbe r 06-08- 00124-CR, we ar e

re ve rs ingShi pp ' s ju dg me nt o f c on vic tio n a nd re nd e ri nga

jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. I n this case, Shipp' s appea l attacks the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support his conviction on the elements of proof that the " temporar

y license" was a

forg ed instrument and that he possessed t h e license with intent to harm or def raud a nother or w ith intent to ut ter the lice nse. F ind ingle g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt those e le me nts of pr oo f, we ov e rr

ule those points of err or. As modified, the judg ment of the trial c ourt in this case is af firmed. I n this opini on, we a ddress Shipp's point of err or unique to this appea l: his attack on the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to suppor t his conviction for forg er y o f a go v ernmental ins tr ume nt. I n r e vie wi ngthe le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we vie w a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict and de termine whe ther a ny rational trier

of fa ct co u l d have f

ound the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1 97 9) ; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n a fac tual sufficie ncy revie w,

we r eview a ll the evidence , b ut do so in a neutral lig ht and deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so wea k or i s so outweig hed by

the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that the jury ' s verdict is cle arly wrongor manife stly

unjust. Ro be rts v . S

tat e , 220 S.W .3dWe find the trial cour t's c harg e to the jury

used in this case to have bee n in substantial if not 1 complete c ompliance with the a pplicable law , and thus, t he equiva lent of a hy pothetically

corr ect char g e. (A ) t o a lte r, make , c omp le te , e xec ute , o r a uth e nti c a te any

wr iti ngso 2 that it

purp or ts: (i ) t o b e the a c t of

ano the r w ho did

no t a uth or ize that a c t; (ii) to have be en executed at a time or plac e or in a numbere d sequenc e other than w as in fac t the case ; or (iii) to be a c opy

of an or igina l when no such or igina l exi sted; T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 32.21. 4 52 1, 52 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cle wis v . S

tat e , 922 S.W .2d 126, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We ma y use a hy pothetically

corr ect jury char g e to eva luate both the leg al a n d fa ct ual suffic iency of evide nce. Gr ott i v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 273, 280–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 1 Th e ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d Sh ipp did with intent to de

fraud or harm anothe r , p os se ss with i ntent to utter a writing t hat had be e n ma de so that it

purp or te d to be the a c t of

ano the r w ho did

no t a uth or ize the a c t, and said wr iting was a temporary Texas driver' s license purported to be is sued by the T e x a s D e p art m e n to f

P u b l i c S a f e t y. (Emphasis adde d.) The e lements of for g ery

by possession with intent to utter are (1) a person ( 2) " forg es" (3) a writing (4) with intent to defr aud or har m (5) anothe r. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 3 2. 21 (C ); Burks

v . S tat e , 6 93 S.W. 2d 93 2, 93 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ). I n "p os se ssi on " c a se s, the te rm " fo rg e " in Section 32.21(C) mea

ns "to possess a writing t hat i s forg ed withi n the m eaning of P ara g raph ( A) 2"( B) to issue, transfe r, re g ister the tra nsfer of, pass, publish, or otherwise utter a wr iting that 3 is for ged wi th in th e me ani ng of P aragraph (A). " T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 32.21. We refe r the re ader to our opi nion in cause number 06-08-00122-CR for a de tailed re citation 4 of a c tiv iti e s le a din g to S hip p' s arr e st. 5 with intent to utt er it in a manner specifie d in Parag raph ( B) of this subsection." While evidenc e 3

o f a p as s i n g o r at t em p t ed p as s i n g o f a fo rge d i n s t ru m en two u l d

ce rt ai n l y ai d t h e S t at e i np ro v i n g a

case of possessing a for g ed instrument, such evidence is not absolutely essential. Burks , 693 S.W .2d at 936. B e c a

us e e vid e nti ary

su ff ic ie nc y is q ue sti on e d, we s et out, h e re , mo re of the sa lie nt f

a c ts be fo re our a

na ly sis of

the iss ue s. B on ham po lic e arr e ste d Sh ipp fo r atte mpt in g to pa ss a forg ed Wal-Mar

t rec eipt as he w as leaving the store with a c omputer and computer desk; the forg ed

rec eipt purported to e vidence proof of pay ment for the two items. Offic ers pe rfor med a se arc h of 4 Shipp's ca r incident to the a

rre st. In the cente r console of the car , office rs found methamphetamine and drug para

pherna lia, a temporar

y driver' s license bear ing the name of Carol Shipp (Shipp's wife , wh o w a s a lso pr e se nt a

t th e sc e ne ), and a " pe rm ane nt" Te xas d ri ve r' s li c e ns e be ari ngShi pp ' s n a me and picture. Offic er J osh Walker descr ibed that license as having "c erta in items

. . . g rou n d o ff." The uppe r rig ht corne r of the lice nse wa s cut awa y ; Walker said he believed the corne r was c ut off by the Depa rtment of Public Safety

(DPS) to invalidate t he li cense . Around the same ti me that Shipp was be ing de tained and a rre sted for the false Wal-Ma rt rec eipt, Carol was also arr ested for having g iven B onham police a d ri v er' s license that a ppear ed fa lse. That license appea red to have bee nWit h the Shipps at W al-Mar t was their daug hter, Courtney Butne r. Ther e is no indication 5 that there was a

ny relation between Courtne y Butne r and a

ny one name d Dan B utner. I nitially , Walker said whe n he ra n Carol' s temporar

y license, it pointed to someone na med 6 Mu e lst e in i n Te rr e ll; he la te r i nd ic a te d to so me c on fu sio n, bu t th a t, i n f a c t, i t w a s th e B utn e r l ic e ns e fr om A lle n' s w a lle t tha

t ha d the numbe r that po int e d to Mu e lst e in, and that Wal ke r wa s no t sure if h e e v er ra nt h e n umb er

o nC ar o l 's t em p o ra ry l i ce n s e. Bo h l er s ai d t h at s h e r an t h e n u mb er o nC ar o l 's perma nent license and it pointed to a woman f rom Houston. 6 "a ltered . . . [t] he num ber w as ra ised, wasn' t flat like a norma l driver[' ]s l icense . I t had clea r tape over it." Offic er Ta

mmy Bohle r, who made co n t ac t wi t h Carol and r ece ived her license, sa id she chec ke d th e n u mb e r o n Ca r o l' s li c e n s e . I n s te a d o f b e lo n g in g to Ca r o l, th e n u mb e r b e lo ng ed to a

wom an i n Ho us to n. Ca rol was arres ted for "alt eri ng a dri ver[ ']s li cens e." Duri ng the bo ok -i n pr oc e ss a t the B on ham ja il, Wal ke r fo un d a te mpo ra ry dr ive r' s lic e ns e in Allen Shipp's wa llet. This temporar y license, how ever , did not bear Shipp' s name. Rather , it was issued to one Dan B utner. Walker s ai d t hat when he chec ked the identify ing numbe r on that 5 temporar y license, thoug h, the number be longe d to ne ither Butne r nor Shipp, but to a person name d Mu e lst e in f

ro m T e rr e ll. 6 Wal ke r t e sti fied to ot her

thi ng s h e fo un d s us pic iou s a bo ut t he te mpo ra

ry lic e ns e fo un d in Shipp's wa llet. I n Walker' s experience , Texas temporary licenses hav e p er fo rate d edg es, as contra sted with this one, which had smooth edg es as if cut by "sc issors or a knife , some sharp e dg ed instrument

. " W al k er also thoug ht the authorizing sig nature on the license appea red to be photocopied or smea

red:7

Q [ State ]: N o w , f

r o m yo u r e xp e r ie n c e w it

h te mp o r ar

y D L s , w h e na

D PS o f f ic e r or employ ee, w hoever

signs them, is that a pr inted signature or is that - - A [W alker ]: No. Q: How is that done? A: No, it's a

n actua l printed signa

ture, I believe. Wal ke r a lso sai d the lic e ns e on wh ic h th e te mpo ra

ry lic e ns e wa s p ri nte d w a s " no t of the same weig ht" a nd felt " lighter " tha

n other tempora

ry licenses he had handle d. At trial, Shipp presented te stimony from Sheila F ay e Jacobs, his mother

. She told the jur y that a we ek and a half or two wee ks befor e the events at Wal-Mart, Shipp broug ht ove r a use d car he ha d ju st p ur c ha se d, the Che vy Eq uinox Sh ipp wo uld

la te r h a ve a t th e Wal -M art pa rk inglot

. S h i p p b ro u gh tt h e c ar

t o s h o w hi s m o t h er , an d as J ac o b s wa s l o o k i n g ar o u n d , s i t t i n g i nt h e d ri v er 's seat, she f ound a paper driver' s license stuck betwee n the seat and the cente r console. J acobs r eca lled the license was issued to " a Don or Dan or Donald, something like that." She said she advise d Shipp to turn the license in whe n he finished the p ap erwork attenda nt to purchasingthe vehicle , and the license did not look to be alter ed to her

. We f ind the re is l e g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to su

pp or t the jur y ' s fi nd ing of

g uil t for the char g e of forg ery of a g overnme nt instrument. We ha ve summarized some of the suspicious ci rc u m s t an ce s s u rr o un d i n g S h i p p 's p o s s es s i o n o f th i s t em p o ra ry l i ce n s e. I nad d i t i o nt o t h e l i ce n s e's inconsistent name and ide ntify ing numbe r information, the "B utner" license misspells t he city of B on ham. T he c lari ty

of the se a l is no tic e a

bly le ss t ha n th e se a l on Caro l' s te mpo ra ry lic e ns e ; and

in8

addition to W alker ' s opinion that the DPS signature appea rs not to be an or igina l, we note that the signature c ross es t h e p ri nted " DL EMPL OYEE" in exactly the same spot as on Car ol's te mporary license. The re are s ev er al items of information which a re ide ntical betwe en the two tempor ary licenses. And on the "B utner" license, the re is a notice able inconsistency in the line of the date of birth, where the y ear

is slightly

highe r than the month and date. Th e re wa s su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e fr om w hic h th e jur y c ou ld c on c lud e the te mpo ra ry lic e ns e in Shipp's wa llet was for g ed: there are visible in c o n s istencies in the docume nt, plus W alker ' s testimony that the name a

nd identify ing numbe r on the doc ument do not coincide. There ma y b e , h o w e v e r , s o me qu e s ti o no f w h e th e r th e e v id e n c e s u f

f ic ie n tl y p r o v e s Sh ipp possessed the lice nse with intent to harm or de fra ud or to utter. The State offe rs no ca selaw to a rg ueThere is a provision in Section 32.21 t h at p rovides a pr esumption of intent to harm or 7 defr aud: A p ers on is pr e su me d to int e nd to d e fr a ud or ha rm ano the r i f t

he pe rs on a c ts w ith respe ct to two or more w ritings of the same ty

pe and if e ach w riting is a g overnme nt rec ord listed in Section 37.01(2)(C). T EX . P E N A L C ODE ANN . § 3 2

. 2 1 ( f )

. T h e S t a t e a s s e rt s , w i t h o u ts u b s e qu e n tar g u m e n to r

a u t h o r i t y, that this presumption applies. Neither pa rty to the instant appea l addre sses whethe r a temporary and perma nent license constitute "two or more writings of the s ame ty pe," and we have f

ound no case s a d dr e s s in g th is d e f

inition. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 3 2. 21 (f ). I t is tr ue that Sh ipp wa s in po sse ssi on

of tw o d ri ve r' s li c e ns e s, on e " pe rm a ne nt, " or a ty pic a l pl a sti c ide nti fi c a tio n c ard wi th h is name and pic tur e , bu t wh ic h a

pp e are d to have inf

or ma tio n " g ro un d of

f" ; and the te mpo ra

ry lic e ns e in the name of a person named Butner, but with an identification number c orre sponding to a third person. I t is also true that the tempora ry license in Carol' s name, found in the cente r console, ha d muc h d a ta

ide nti c a l to that on

the " B utn e r" te mpo ra

ry lic e ns e . Be c a

us e we fi nd le g a lly

and fa c tua lly sufficie nt evidence to establish Shipp's intent to defr aud or har m another, w e do not find it nece ssary to e va luate wh e the r t

he pr e su mpt ion

a pp lie s. T h e S t a t e ' s qu e s t i o na t t h a t p o i n ti nt h e t e s t i m o n y w a s a c tu a l l y, " T h a tw a s n ' tyo u r s t o r y a 8 c ou ple of da y s a g o, wa s it ? " Ho we ve r, thr ou g ho ut t he re st o f t

he qu e sti on in g o f Ca rol , mult ipl e re fe re nc e s we re ma de to he r te sti mony a t he r ple a he ari ng on or aro un d M ay 1, 20 08 , a

pp ro xima te ly two wee ks befor e Shipp's tria l. 9 the evidenc e wa s sufficient to sho w S hipp had intent to harm or de fra ud, or intended to utter the 7 temporar y license. Shipp offe rs no authority to question whether intent wa s proven. I n argument befor e the tria l court, the State c laimed that Carol had testified that Shipp had "f org ed for her" the alter ed drive r' s license Car ol presente d to Bohler

. Actually , though, at trial Carol said that her p e r

ma n e n t d r iv e r ' s li c e n s e " h a d

an o th e r n u mb e r o v e r th e to p o f

it

. " A s f o r h o w that label ca me to be pre sent, she said, " I t was printed out on a la bel. I put it on top of it ." She de nied falsifying a

ny other lice nses, and c laimed t h at shortly befor e Allen' s trial, when she pled to two 810

felony char g es, she then falsely acc used S hipp of having falsified he r driver ' s license. We point out t h at t h i s i s o n e o f t h e n u m er o u s t i m es i nC ar o l 's t es t i m o n y wh er e, fr o m t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e S t at e's questioning a

nd her a nswers, she appea

red to contra dict if not ref ute s tatements she had made at her plea he aring two wee ks befor e testifying at Shipp's trial. Obviously , the jury was in the be st positi on to weig h Carol' s cre dibilit y and to believe some, all, or none of her testimony

. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.13 (Ve rnon 2007), art. 38.04 (Ve rnon 1979) (stating jury is e x clusive judge of fa c ts a nd of we ig ht g iven

to t e sti mony

); Lan c on v . S

tat e , 253 S.W .3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The i n t en t to defra ud or har m another ma

y be esta blished by

circ umstantial evidence

. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 688 S.W .2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Here , there wer e ample suspicious circ umstances on whic h a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shipp possessed the tempora

ry license w ith intent to harm or defr aud: both Shipp's possessi n g two forg ed or suspicious licenses, th e similarities in the temporar y licenses, the pr esenc e of f org ed Wal-Mar

t

re ce i p t s , an d

t h e d ef ac e d o r al t er edap p ea ra n ce s o f b o t h C ar o l 's an d S h i p p 's p er m an en tdri v er 's licenses. Similarly , despite the testimony of Shipp's mother

as to the origin of t he tempora ry license,

we c annot say

that the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is so weak or is so outweighe d by the g reat

we ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e jur y ' s v e rd ic t is cle arl y

wr on g or

manif e stl y unjust.11

As for Shipp' s possessing the license with intent to utter it, ne ither side offe rs authority one

wa y o r a n o t h er . W e h av e f

o u n d n o ca s es ad dre s s i n g t h e i n t en tt o u t t er as i tp er t ai n s t o dri v e r 's licenses or

simil ar ide ntification documents. B ut just as intent to harm or defr aud ca n be prove n by

c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e , in te nt t o u tte r c an b e pr ov e d in the same mann e r. Ju st as the re is, in t his

rec ord, ample e vidence of intent to harm or defr aud, the same evidenc e is a mple evidenc e of intent to utter. The c ontrary

evidenc e does not outwe igh the evidenc e tendingto prove intent to utter. We f in d th e e v id e n c e to b e b o th

le g a ll y an d f a c tu a ll y s u f f ic ie n t t o s u

p p o rt t h e v e r d ic t, a nd

overr ule Shipp's points of er

ror c halleng ing the evidenc e. As mod if ie d to pr ov ide that th e se nte nc e wi ll run c on c ur re ntl y wi th t he se nte nc e in c a

us e number 06-08- 00122-CR, we af firm the judg ment in this case.

J o s h R

. M o r

r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: April 27, 2009 Date D ecide d: J uly 23, 2009 Pub lis h