65964 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

1 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006). 

2North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 

FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g & compliance, 117 

FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. 

v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

3NERC designates the version number of a 

Reliability Standard as the last digit of the 

Reliability Standard number. Therefore, original 

Reliability Standards end with ‘‘-0’’ and modified 

version one Reliability Standards end with ‘‘-1.’’ 

4 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2). 

5 In Order No. 672, the Commission found that it 

should order only the ERO to modify a Reliability 

Standard because the ERO is the only entity that 

may directly submit a proposed Reliability 

Standard to the Commission for approval. Rules 

Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 

Organization; Procedures for the Establishment, 

Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability 

Standards, Order No. 672, 71 FR 8662 (Feb. 17, 

2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, at P 423, order 

on reh’g, Order No. 672–A, 71 FR 19814 (Apr. 18, 

2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006). 

[FR Doc. 2010–27129 Filed 10–26–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 40 

[Docket No. RM09–15–000; Order No. 740] 

Version One Regional Reliability 

Standard for Resource and Demand 

Balancing 

Issued October 21, 2010. 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, DOE. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: Under section 215 of the 

Federal Power Act, the Commission 

hereby remands a revised regional 

Reliability Standard developed by the 

Western Electricity Coordinating 

Council and approved by the North 

American Electric Reliability 

Corporation, which the Commission has 

certified as the Electric Reliability 

Organization responsible for developing 

and enforcing mandatory Reliability 

Standards. The revised regional 

Reliability Standard, designated by 

WECC as BAL–002–WECC–1, would set 

revised Contingency Reserve 

requirements meant to maintain 

scheduled frequency and avoid loss of 

firm load following transmission or 

generation contingencies. 

DATES: Effective Date: This rule will 

become effective November 26, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Nick Henery (Technical Information), 

Office of Electric Reliability, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–8636. 

Scott Sells (Technical Information), 

Office of Electric Reliability, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–6664. 

A. Cory Lankford (Legal Information), 

Office of General Counsel, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–6711. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

Paragraph 

Nos. 

I. Background .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

A. Mandatory Reliability Standards ............................................................................................................................................... 3 

B. Western Electricity Coordinating Council ................................................................................................................................. 6 

C. WECC Regional Reliability Standard BAL–002–WECC–1 ....................................................................................................... 9 

II. Discussion .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 

A. Due Weight and Effect of Remand ............................................................................................................................................ 15 

B. Contingency Reserve Restoration Period ................................................................................................................................... 22 

C. Calculation of Minimum Contingency Reserve ........................................................................................................................ 31 

D. Use of Firm Load To Meet Contingency Reserve Requirement ............................................................................................... 42 

E. Demand-Side Management as a Resource ................................................................................................................................. 50 

F. Miscellaneous .............................................................................................................................................................................. 63 

III. Information Collection Statement .................................................................................................................................................... 67 

IV. Environmental Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................... 68 

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act ................................................................................................................................................................. 69 

VI. Document Availability ..................................................................................................................................................................... 70 

VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification .............................................................................................................................. 73 

Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, 

Chairman; Marc Spitzer, Philip D. 

Moeller, John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. 

LaFleur 

1. Pursuant to section 215 of the 

Federal Power Act (FPA),1 the 

Commission hereby remands a revised 

regional Reliability Standard developed 

by the Western Electricity Coordinating 

Council (WECC) and approved by the 

North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC), which the 

Commission has certified as the Electric 

Reliability Organization (ERO) 

responsible for developing and 

enforcing mandatory Reliability 

Standards.2 The revised regional 

Reliability Standard, designated by 

WECC as BAL–002–WECC–1,3 is meant 

to ensure that adequate resources are 

available at all times to maintain 

scheduled frequency, and avoid loss of 

firm load following transmission or 

generation contingencies. As discussed 

below, the Commission finds that the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

does not meet the statutory criteria for 

approval that it be just, reasonable, not 

unduly discriminatory or preferential, 

and in the public interest.4

2. The Commission remands the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

based on concerns that WECC has not 

provided adequate technical support to 

demonstrate that the requirements of the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

are sufficient to ensure the reliable 

operation of the Bulk-Power System 

within WECC. Specifically, WECC’s 

data indicates that extending the reserve 

restoration period from 60 to 90 minutes 

presents an unreasonable risk that a 

second major contingency could occur 

before reserves are restored after an 

initial contingency. Without further 

technical justification demonstrating 

that this less stringent requirement will 

adequately support reliability in the 

Western Interconnection, the 

Commission is unable to determine that 

the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential, and in 

the public interest. Accordingly, we 

remand WECC regional Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–WECC–1 to the ERO 

so that the Regional Entity may develop 

further modifications consistent with 

this final rule.5


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6 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3). 

7 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(4). 

8 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(7) and (e)(4). 

9 18 CFR 39.5 (2010). 

10 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2). 

11Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204 at 

P 290. 

12 Id. P 291. 

13North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 

FERC ¶ 61,060, at P 432 (2007). 

14North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 

FERC ¶ 61,260, at P 53 (2007). 

15 Id. 

16 Id. 

17 Id. P 55. 

18 Id. P 56. 

19See 18 CFR 39.5(a) (requiring the ERO to 

submit regional Reliability Standards on behalf of 

a Regional Entity). 

20The proposed regional Reliability Standard is 

not attached to the NOPR. It is, however, available 

on the Commission’s eLibrary document retrieval 

system in Docket No. RM09–15–000 and is on the 

ERO’s Web site, available at http://www.nerc.com. 

21A ‘‘reserve sharing group’’ is a group whose 

members consist of two or more balancing 

authorities that collectively maintain, allocate, and 

supply operating reserves required for each 

balancing authority’s use in recovering from 

contingencies within the group. See NERC Glossary, 

available at http://www.nerc.com/docs/standards/ 

rs/Glossary_2009April20.pdf. 

I. Background 

A. Mandatory Reliability Standards 

3. Section 215 of the FPA requires a 

Commission-certified ERO to develop 

mandatory and enforceable Reliability 

Standards, which are subject to 

Commission review and approval. Once 

approved, the Reliability Standards may 

be enforced by the ERO, subject to 

Commission oversight, or by the 

Commission independently.6

4. Reliability Standards that the ERO 

proposes to the Commission may 

include Reliability Standards that are 

proposed to the ERO by a Regional 

Entity.7 A Regional Entity is an entity 

that has been approved by the 

Commission to enforce Reliability 

Standards under delegated authority 

from the ERO.8 When the ERO reviews 

a regional Reliability Standard that 

would be applicable on an 

interconnection-wide basis and that has 

been proposed by a Regional Entity 

organized on an interconnection-wide 

basis, the ERO must rebuttably presume 

that the regional Reliability Standard is 

just, reasonable, not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential, and in 

the public interest.9 In turn, the 

Commission must give ‘‘due weight’’ to 

the technical expertise of the ERO and 

of a Regional Entity organized on an 

interconnection-wide basis.10

5. In Order No. 672, the Commission 

urged uniformity of Reliability 

Standards, but recognized a potential 

need for regional differences.11

Accordingly, the Commission stated 

that: 

As a general matter, we will accept the 

following two types of regional differences, 

provided they are otherwise just, reasonable, 

not unduly discriminatory or preferential and 

in the public interest, as required under the 

statute: (1) A regional difference that is more 

stringent than the continent-wide Reliability 

Standard, including a regional difference that 

addresses matters that the continent-wide 

Reliability Standard does not; and 

(2) A regional Reliability Standard that is 

necessitated by a physical difference in the 

Bulk-Power System.12

B. Western Electricity Coordinating 

Council 

6. On April 19, 2007, the Commission 

accepted delegation agreements between 

NERC and each of eight Regional 

Entities.13 In its order, the Commission 

accepted WECC as a Regional Entity 

organized on an Interconnection-wide 

basis. As a Regional Entity, WECC 

oversees transmission system reliability 

in the Western Interconnection. The 

WECC region encompasses nearly 1.8 

million square miles, including 14 

western U.S. states, the Canadian 

provinces of Alberta and British 

Columbia, and the northern portion of 

Baja California in Mexico. 

7. In June 2007, the Commission 

approved eight regional Reliability 

Standards for WECC including the 

currently effective regional Reliability 

Standard for operating reserves, WECC– 

BAL–STD–002–0.14 The Commission 

found that the current regional 

Reliability Standard was more stringent 

than the corresponding NERC 

Reliability Standard, BAL–002–0, since 

WECC required a more stringent 

minimum reserve requirement than the 

continent-wide requirement.15

Moreover, the Commission found that 

WECC’s requirement to restore 

contingency reserves within 60 minutes 

was more stringent than the 90 minute 

restoration period as set forth in NERC’s 

BAL–002–0.16

8. The Commission directed WECC to 

develop certain minor modifications to 

WECC–BAL–STD–002–0, as identified 

by NERC in its filing letter for the 

current standard.17 For example, the 

Commission determined that: (1) 

Regional definitions should conform to 

definitions set forth in the NERC 

Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability 

Standards (NERC Glossary) unless a 

specific deviation has been justified; 

and (2) documents that are referenced in 

the Reliability Standard should be 

attached to the Reliability Standard. The 

Commission also found that it is 

important that regional Reliability 

Standards and NERC Reliability 

Standards achieve a reasonable level of 

consistency in their structure so that 

there is a common understanding of the 

elements. Finally, the Commission 

directed WECC to address stakeholder 

concerns regarding ambiguities in the 

terms ‘‘load responsibility’’ and ‘‘firm 

transaction.’’ 18

C. WECC Regional Reliability Standard 

BAL–002–WECC–1 

9. On March 25, 2009, NERC 

submitted a petition (NERC Petition) to 

the Commission seeking approval of 

BAL–002–WECC–119 and requesting the 

concurrent retirement of BAL–STD– 

002–0.20 In that March petition, NERC 

states that the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard was approved by 

the NERC Board of Trustees at its 

October 29, 2008 meeting. NERC also 

requests an effective date for the 

regional Reliability Standard of 90 

calendar days after receipt of applicable 

regulatory approval. 

10. The proposed regional Reliability 

Standard contains three main 

provisions. Requirement R1 provides 

that each reserve sharing group 21 or 

balancing authority must maintain a 

minimum contingency reserve that is 

the greater of (1) an amount of reserve 

equal to the loss of the most severe 

single contingency; or (2) an amount of 

reserve equal to the sum of three percent 

of the load and three percent of net 

generation. Requirement R2 states that 

each reserve sharing group or balancing 

authority must maintain at least half of 

the contingency reserve as spinning 

reserve. Requirement R3 identifies 

acceptable types of reserve to satisfy 

Requirement R1: 

R3.1. Spinning Reserve; 

R3.2. Interruptible Load; 

R3.3. Interchange Transactions 

designated by the source Balancing 

Authority as non-spinning 

contingency reserve; 

R3.4. Reserve held by the other entities 

by agreement that is deliverable on 

Firm Transmission Service; 

R3.5. An amount of off-line generation 

which can be synchronized and 

generating; or 

R.3.6. Load, other than Interruptible 

Load, once the Reliability Coordinator 

has declared a capacity or energy 

emergency. 

In addition, compliance measure M1 

provides that a reserve sharing group or 

balancing authority must have 

documentation that it maintained 100 

percent of required contingency reserve 

levels ‘‘except within the first 105 

minutes (15 minute Disturbance 

Recovery Period, plus 90 minute 


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22Proposed WECC Reliability Standard BAL– 

002–WECC–1, Compliance Measure M1. 

23See NERC Petition at 8; and 16 U.S.C. 

824o(d)(3). 

24North American Electric Reliability Corp., 

NOPR, 75 FR 14,103 (March 24, 2010), FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 32,653 (2010). 

25See Appendix A, List of Commenters. 

26E.g., NERC, WECC, MISO, WIRAB, and Xcel. 

27E.g., NERC, WECC, Bonneville, Idaho Power, 

NV Energy, SCE, WIRAB, and Xcel. 

Contingency Reserve Restoration 

Period) following an event requiring the 

activation of Contingency Reserves.’’ 22

11. The NERC Petition explains that, 

because WECC developed the 

modifications to the regional Reliability 

Standard submitted in the instant 

proceeding, and the standard applies on 

an Interconnection-wide basis, NERC 

must rebuttably presume that the WECC 

Reliability Standard is just, reasonable, 

not unduly discriminatory or 

preferential, and in the public interest.23

NERC states that it agrees with WECC 

that the proposed WECC regional 

Reliability Standard establishes 

requirements that are more stringent 

than those provided in the 

corresponding NERC Reliability 

Standard. 

12. On March 18, 2010, the 

Commission issued a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) 

proposing to remand the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard to the ERO 

so that the Regional Entity may develop 

further modifications.24 The 

Commission’s proposal to remand the 

proposed Regional Reliability Standard 

was based on a lack of technical support 

for the adoption of less stringent 

requirements than those in the currently 

effective WECC regional Reliability 

Standard and out of concern that the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

is less stringent than the NERC 

continent-wide Reliability Standard 

pertaining to contingency reserves. The 

Commission expressed particular 

concern with respect to a provision in 

the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard that would permit a balancing 

authority, when an emergency is 

declared, to count ‘‘Load, other than 

Interruptible Load’’ as contingency 

reserve. The Commission understood 

this provision to allow a balancing 

authority to shed firm load when a 

single contingency occurs instead of 

procuring and utilizing generation or 

demand response resource held in 

reserve for contingencies to balance the 

Bulk-Power System. The Commission 

also proposed to direct WECC to 

develop certain modifications to the 

regional Reliability Standard that would 

explicitly allow demand-side 

management to be used as a resource for 

contingency reserves. 

13. In response to the NOPR, 

comments were filed by 16 interested 

parties.25 Several commenters, 

including WECC, opposed the proposed 

remand, while others supported it. In its 

comments, WECC included 

supplemental data to support the 

Commission’s approval of the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard. In the 

discussion below, we address the issues 

raised by these comments and, pursuant 

to section 215(d)(4) of the FPA, we 

adopt the NOPR proposal to remand the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard. 

II. Discussion 

14. Applying the principal of due 

weight to the technical expertise of 

NERC and WECC, the Commission finds 

that the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–WECC–1 does not 

meet the statutory criteria for approval, 

that it be just, reasonable, not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential, and in 

the public interest. In particular, the 

Commission is concerned that reliability 

would be reduced upon approval of the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

because WECC’s data indicates that 

extending the reserve restoration period 

from 60 to 90 minutes would create an 

unreasonable risk that a second major 

contingency could occur before reserves 

are restored after an initial contingency. 

There must be sufficient technical 

justification showing that the Western 

Interconnection can be operated reliably 

with the reduced stringency. The 

Commission finds that the NERC and 

the Regional Entity have failed to 

demonstrate that the proposal is 

adequate to ensure the reliability of the 

Bulk-Power System within WECC. 

Accordingly, under section 215(d)(4) of 

the FPA, the Commission remands 

regional Reliability Standard BAL–002– 

WECC–1 to the ERO with instruction for 

the Regional Entity to develop 

modifications, as discussed below. 

A. Due Weight and Effect of Remand 

15. Several commenters point out 

that, under section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, 

the Commission must give due weight 

to the technical expertise of the ERO 

and WECC as the Regional Entity 

organized on an Interconnection-wide 

basis.26 These parties argue that, 

applying the principal of due weight, 

the Commission should approve the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard. 

In addition, NERC states that it must 

rebuttably presume that a standard 

developed by WECC is just, reasonable, 

not unduly preferential, and in the 

public interest. NERC states that, as a 

Regional Entity organized on an 

interconnection-wide basis, WECC has 

exercised its technical expertise in 

regard to this interconnection-wide 

Reliability Standard, supplemented by 

the additional technical analyses 

provided in its response. Xcel agrees 

and states that the Commission has not 

allowed any deference to WECC and 

stakeholder experts that worked 

diligently to develop this Reliability 

Standard. 

16. Several commenters contend that 

the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard offers significant benefits over 

the current version.27 Sempra states that 

the proposed standard would advance 

three goals: It simplifies reserve 

accounting at balancing authorities by 

clarifying which party carries reserves 

for power imports and exports; it 

includes renewable resources; and it 

clarifies reserves responsibility. If the 

Commission decides to remand the 

proposed Reliability Standard, Sempra 

urges the Commission to require 

expedited procedures because of the 

importance of replacing the current 

regional Reliability Standard, which, 

Sempra contends, contains its own 

flaws and ambiguities. WECC argues 

that remand of the proposed standard 

would cause a greater probability of 

frequency-related instability, 

uncontrolled separation, or cascading 

outages because the current WECC 

standard does not take renewable 

resources, such as wind and solar, into 

account when calculating minimum 

contingency reserve requirements. 

17. By contrast, Puget Sound states 

that, while FERC is required to give due 

weight to the technical expertise of the 

ERO no deference is due when the 

action of the ERO and Regional Entity 

are patently unreasonable and arbitrary. 

Puget Sound contends that a regulatory 

decision based on a review of only eight 

hours of data, as provided by WECC, 

cannot be reasonably explained or 

considered to be supported by 

substantial evidence. Powerex and NV 

Energy agree that WECC provided 

insufficient data in its request for 

approval with respect to whether the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

is just and reasonable. 

Commission Determination 

18. Section 215(d)(2) of the FPA 

provides that the Commission ‘‘shall 

give due weight to the technical 

expertise’’ of the ERO or a Regional 

Entity organized on an Interconnectionwide basis ‘‘with respect to the content 

of a proposed standard or modification.’’ 

As the Commission explained in Order 

No. 672, the ERO or InterconnectionVerDate Mar<15>2010 15:25 Oct 26, 2010 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\27OCR1.SGM 27OCR1

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28Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204 at 

P 345. 

29Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204 at 

P 320–337. 

30Reliability Standard BAL–002–0, Requirements 

R4 and R6. 

31WECC regional Reliability Standard WECC– 

BAL–STD–002–0, Measure of Compliance WM1. 

32North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 

FERC ¶ 61,260 at P 53. 

wide Regional Entity ‘‘must justify to the 

Commission its contention that the 

proposed Reliability Standard is just, 

reasonable, not unduly discriminatory 

or preferential, and in the public 

interest.’’28 Thus, consistent with our 

explanation in Order No. 672, it is 

necessary for the ERO or Regional Entity 

to explain adequately a Reliability 

Standard or modifications to a 

Reliability Standard. 

19. The Commission has given due 

weight to the technical expertise of the 

Regional Entity as it is presented both 

in the NERC Petition and in WECC’s 

comments and supporting data and we 

have determined that WECC provided 

inadequate support for approval of the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard. 

In its petition, NERC provides a detailed 

explanation of why it believes the 

proposal satisfies the statutory criteria 

for approval based on the guidance 

provided by the Commission in Order 

No. 672 regarding the factors it would 

consider in making that 

determination.29 However, this 

explanation fails to adequately address 

the substantive modifications to the 

regional Reliability Standard. Moreover, 

WECC’s comments and supplemental 

data did not adequately address the 

Commission’s concerns expressed in the 

NOPR that the extension of the reserve 

restoration period will maintain reliable 

operation of the Western 

Interconnection. Without adequate 

explanation and technical justification, 

we are unable to determine whether the 

proposal satisfies the statutory criteria 

for approval and, therefore, remand the 

revised Reliability Standard to the ERO 

with instruction for the Regional Entity 

to develop modifications, as discussed 

below. 

20. The Commission does not take 

lightly its authority to remand a 

Reliability Standard. We understand 

that before a Reliability Standard 

reaches the Commission it must be 

vetted through an intensive standard 

development process. Nevertheless, 

despite the efforts of the different 

drafting team members who contributed 

to the development of this regional 

Reliability Standard, for the reasons 

discussed below, we believe that the 

statutory standard for approval has not 

been met on the record before us. 

21. We do not believe, as WECC 

suggests, that this remand will cause a 

greater probability of frequency-related 

instability, uncontrolled separation or 

cascading outages. WECC does not 

provide any supporting data or 

technical analysis to support this claim. 

By remanding the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard, the Commission is 

upholding the currently effective 

regional Reliability Standard. The 

Commission recognizes that the Western 

Interconnection is experiencing 

substantial growth in variable renewable 

generation. We believe that the current 

regional Reliability Standard has proved 

effective for many years and will 

continue to do so until WECC can 

modify as necessary, through the 

standards development process, this 

regional Reliability Standard to ensure 

adequate reserves to reliably 

accommodate this expansion. 

Furthermore, we decline to set 

expedited procedures for the 

development of a replacement regional 

Reliability Standard, but WECC is free 

to expedite its process to the extent 

WECC finds appropriate. 

B. Contingency Reserve Restoration 

Period 

22. The current regional Reliability 

Standard sets a maximum contingency 

reserve restoration period that is more 

stringent than the continent-wide 

requirement. NERC Reliability Standard 

BAL–002–0 provides that a balancing 

authority or reserve sharing group 

responding to a disturbance must fully 

restore its contingency reserves within 

90 minutes following the disturbance 

recovery period, which is set at 15 

minutes.30 The current WECC regional 

BAL Reliability Standard requires 

reserve sharing groups and balancing 

authorities to maintain 100 percent of 

required operating reserve levels except 

within the first 60 minutes following an 

event requiring the activation of 

operating reserves.31 In approving 

WECC–BAL–STD–002–0, the 

Commission found that WECC’s 

requirement to restore contingency 

reserves within 60 minutes was more 

stringent than the 90 minute restoration 

period set forth in NERC’s BAL–002– 

0.32 WECC now proposes to replace the 

current 60 minute restoration period 

requirement with a new provision that 

would require the restoration of 

contingency reserves within 90 minutes 

from the end of the disturbance recovery 

period (15 minutes), thus matching the 

continent-wide requirement. 

NOPR Proposal 

23. In the NOPR, the Commission 

proposed to remand the regional 

Reliability Standard BAL–002–WECC–1 

based on, among other things, a lack of 

any technical justification or analysis of 

the potential increased risk to the 

Western Interconnection resulting from 

the increase in the contingency reserve 

restoration period. The Commission 

noted that, without sufficient data and 

analysis, it is unable to determine 

whether the increase in contingency 

reserve restoration period is sufficient to 

maintain the reliable operation of the 

Bulk-Power System in the Western 

Interconnection. The Commission also 

noted that in the Western 

Interconnection a significant number of 

transmission paths are voltage or 

frequency stability-limited, in contrast 

to other regions of the Bulk-Power 

System where transmission paths more 

often are thermally-limited. 

Disturbances that result in a stabilitylimited transmission path overload, 

generally, must be responded to in a 

shorter time frame than a disturbance 

that results in a thermally-limited 

transmission path overload. The 

Commission stated its understanding 

that this physical difference is one of 

the reasons for the need for certain 

provisions of regional Reliability 

Standards in the Western 

Interconnection. 

Comments 

24. WECC, supported by Bonneville, 

Idaho Power, SCE, and Xcel, argues that 

additional studies are unnecessary 

because the proposed restoration period 

is identical to the continent-wide 

restoration period. WECC comments 

that the Commission should defer to 

WECC’s technical expertise in 

concluding that more stringent 

contingency reserve restoration period 

is no longer necessary. WECC also offers 

historical data that demonstrates that a 

second contingency involving the loss 

of a resource greater than 1000 MW 

between 60 and 90 minutes after a first 

contingency occurred six times in the 

last 15 years or 0.4 events on an annual 

basis, which, WECC argues, is 

insufficient to require rejection of a 

proposed standard on the basis of 

reliability impact. Bonneville and Xcel 

argue that increasing the contingency 

reserve restoration period will result in 

more efficient system operation without 

sacrificing reliability. Xcel adds that it 

will allow for more efficient 

communication among balancing 

authorities because the restoration 

period will be closer to the e-tagging 

system approval cycle. 


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33WECC’s analysis shows that, over the past 15 

years, the proposed increased contingency reserve 

restoration period would have resulted in 139 more 

events within the proposed 90 minute contingency 

reserve restoration period. Limiting the analysis to 

losses of generation greater than 500 MW, there 

were only 58 events occurring within the proposed 

extended contingency reserve restoration period. 

Limiting the analysis to losses of generation greater 

than 1000 MW, there were only six events during 

the extended contingency restoration period. WECC 

contends that losses of less than 1,000 MW of 

generation have a minimal impact on the system 

frequency response of the Western Interconnection 

and have minimal impacts on the reliability of the 

interconnected system. WECC May 24, 2010 

Comments at 13. 

34WECC May 24, 2010 Comments at 13 n.10. 

35WECC’s statement is consistent with a 

statement made in a 2007 compliance filing that 

‘‘WECC operates its system in such a manner that 

the system is at least two contingencies away from 

a cascading failure.’’ WECC Compliance Filing, 

Docket No. RR07–11–000, at 5 (filed July 9, 2007). 

Nevertheless, WECC is proposing to change its 

operating conditions by extending the reserve 

restoration period. Thus, it must provide adequate 

technical justification that the revised requirements 

will maintain reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 

System in the Western Interconnection. 

36NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,653 at P 37. 

37See NERC, Balancing and Frequency Control, at 

6–10 (Nov. 2009), available at http://

www.nerc.com/docs/oc/rs/NERC_Balancing_

and_Frequency_Control_Part_1_

9Nov2009_(Revision2).pdf. 

38WECC Disturbance Task Force, PacifiCorp East 

February 14, 2008 Detailed Disturbance Report 

stated in Conclusion 17 (Aug. 2008) available at 

http://www.wecc.biz/committees/BOD/081308/

Lists/Agendas/1/

PacifiCorp%20East%20Disturbance%20Board%20

presentation%20Aug%2008%20Final.pdf. 

25. MISO comments that it is 

imperative that the Commission give 

due consideration to approving 

modifications to Reliability Standards 

so that Regional Entities can implement 

changes as understanding grows and 

experience is gained. MISO contends 

that disallowance of reasonable 

modifications, such as those presented 

here, will have the unintended 

consequence of fostering a reluctance to 

develop other regional standards, or 

encouraging a minimalist approach 

when standards must necessarily be 

developed. WECC echoes these 

concerns and argues that there is no 

requirement that a regional Reliability 

Standard can only be modified in a 

manner that makes it even more 

stringent. Such a requirement, WECC 

contends, would create a ‘‘one-way 

ratchet’’ that would severely inhibit the 

ability to adjust Reliability Standards to 

meet changing conditions, would 

encourage proposed standards reflecting 

the ‘‘lowest common denominator’’ and 

would fail to provide deference to the 

technical expertise of an 

interconnection-wide Regional Entity. 

Commission Determination 

26. The Commission finds that the 

extension of the reserve restoration 

period has not been justified as an 

acceptable level of risk within the 

Western Interconnection. WECC’s own 

analysis shows that, based on historical 

experience, replacing the 60 minute 

requirement with the continent-wide 90 

minute requirement could result in a 

second major contingency before 

restoration of reserves would be 

required, and that a second major 

contingency occurred within WECC 

during this extended time frame six 

times in the last 15 years.33 WECC 

argues that in the Western 

Interconnection ‘‘instability and/or 

underfrequency load shedding normally 

would not occur in the absence of a 

third contingency of significant 

magnitude within the restoration 

period.’’ 34 WECC’s generalization, 

however, is unsupported by historical 

quantification or documentation in this 

record and, thus, does not persuade 

us.35

27. While it is not inevitable that the 

proposed extension of the contingency 

reserve restoration period would result 

in adverse reliability impacts in the 

Western Interconnection, the data 

provided shows that the Western 

Interconnection could be exposed to the 

potential for a major disturbance every 

two to three years that could result in 

frequency-related instability, 

uncontrolled separation or cascading 

outages. The Commission is particularly 

concerned about these potential events 

occurring in the Western 

Interconnection because, as the 

Commission discussed in the NOPR, it 

is our understanding that a significant 

number of transmission paths in the 

Western Interconnection are voltage or 

frequency stability-limited, in contrast 

to other regions of the Bulk-Power 

System where transmission paths more 

often are thermally-limited. 

Disturbances that occur in a stabilitylimited transmission path overload, 

generally, must be responded to in a 

shorter time frame than a disturbance 

that occurs in a thermally-limited 

transmission path overload.36 A thermal 

limit is determined by how much a line 

can overheat without damaging 

equipment; lines that are thermallylimited can have short-term emergency 

limits that are higher than the normal 

line rating, since heating occurs over a 

period of time. This is different from a 

stability limit, which is determined by 

a system-wide voltage or frequency 

stability constraint, and loading the line 

above this limit for any amount of time 

could result in instability and cascading 

outages. 

28. The reliance on stability-limited 

transmission paths becomes a concern 

during the contingency reserve 

restoration period because balancing 

authorities rely on imported power from 

external sources until the entity that had 

the disturbance replaces the resource 

lost during the disturbance.37 Since 

stability-limited lines do not have 

higher emergency ratings, as thermallylimited lines can, any disturbance that 

would result in increasing flows over a 

stability-limited line must be addressed 

in a shorter time-frame than a 

disturbance that only affects thermallylimited lines. There will be some 

situations in which imports stress 

stability-limited transmission lines. In 

those circumstances, extending the 

contingency reserve restoration period 

would extend the amount of time the 

imported power could stress the 

stability limited transmission lines, 

potentially leaving the Western 

Interconnection in a stressed condition 

that could result in adverse reliability 

impacts if another disturbance were to 

occur. On remand, we direct WECC to 

develop a modification to the reserve 

restoration period or provide evidence 

demonstrating that extending the 

reserve restoration period to 90 minutes 

and adding a disturbance recovery 

period of 15 minutes would not increase 

the risk of a major disturbance in the 

Western Interconnection. 

29. The fact that the proposed 

extension of the reserve restoration 

period would match the continent-wide 

requirement and, thus, would foster 

certain operational efficiencies through 

the use of the e-tagging system does not 

allay our concerns that the extension 

could be harmful to the reliable 

operation of the Western 

Interconnection. The e-tagging system is 

an efficient tool used for day-ahead and 

hour-ahead market accounting and as 

input for day-ahead and hour-ahead 

transfer capability analysis of scheduled 

interchange transactions and 

development of day-ahead and hourahead capacity and energy resource 

schedules. As such, it may allow for 

more efficient communication among 

balancing authorities during operational 

planning periods. However, in 2008, a 

WECC task force expressed concern that 

the ‘‘e-Tag and communications 

processes are time consuming and 

cumbersome when scheduling and 

tagging the large amounts of energy 

required to recover from system 

emergencies, particularly in midhour.’’38 Although adoption of the etagging system may result in more 

efficient communication among 

transmission operators and balancing 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 65969 

39 In its letter requesting approval of the current 

regional Reliability Standards WECC states: 

The WECC Operating Committee thereafter 

undertook a comprehensive review of all WECC 

criteria, policies, and guidelines in an effort to 

identify all unique (i.e., those not in NERC 

standards) and essential (i.e., necessary to protect 

WECC reliability) criteria that it believed critical to 

the reliability of the Western Interconnection. The 

Operating Committee concluded that eight regional 

standards, proposed for adoption here, are of the 

highest priority.’’ 

NERC, Request for Approval of Regional 

Reliability Standards, Docket No. RR07–11–000, at 

4 (filed March 26, 2007) (NERC 2007 Petition). 

40NERC Petition at 9. 

41 Id. at 14. 

42NERC 2007 Petition at 4. 

43E.g., WECC, NERC, Bonneville, Idaho Power, 

NV Energy, SCE, WIRAB, and Xcel. 

authorities for day-ahead and hourahead scheduling, this fact alone is not 

sufficient to justify the potential 

reliability impacts involved with 

extending the reserve restoration period. 

30. The Commission’s action in this 

proceeding does not create a ‘‘one-way 

ratchet’’ for the development of regional 

Reliability Standards. In specific 

circumstances, the Commission could 

approve retirement of a more stringent 

regional requirement if the Regional 

Entity demonstrates that the continentwide Reliability Standard is sufficient to 

ensure the reliability of that region. In 

this case, however, WECC argued only 

three years earlier that the added 

stringency of the current regional 

Reliability Standard was critical to the 

reliable operation of the Western 

Interconnection.39 We find that WECC 

provided insufficient technical detail 

and analysis for us to make a reasoned 

determination that the proposed 

requirement will adequately protect the 

reliability of the region. Regional 

Entities have the discretion to develop 

regional Reliability Standards and 

implement changes as understanding 

grows and experience is gained without 

concern that the Commission will 

always hold them to their more 

stringent requirements in all 

circumstances regardless of the 

provided justification. The Commission 

will evaluate such proposed changes, 

including those to a less stringent state, 

on their merit so long as adequate 

reliability is maintained. In this 

instance, given WECC’s prior statements 

and its own analysis that such an 

extended restoration period could lead 

to major system disturbances, WECC has 

failed to demonstrate that its proposal 

will maintain adequate reliability, and 

therefore has failed to demonstrate that 

its proposal is just, reasonable, and in 

the public interest. Consequently, we 

remand this proposal. 

C. Calculation of Minimum Contingency 

Reserve 

31. NERC’s Disturbance Control 

Standard, continent-wide Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–0, requires each 

balancing authority or reserve sharing 

group, at a minimum, to maintain at 

least enough contingency reserve to 

cover the most severe single 

contingency. Similarly, requirement 

WR1(a)(ii) of WECC’s current WECC– 

BAL–STD–002–0 requires balancing 

authorities to maintain a contingency 

reserve of spinning and non-spinning 

reserves (at least half of which must be 

spinning), sufficient to meet the NERC 

Disturbance Control Standard, BAL– 

002–0, equal to the greater of: (1) the 

loss of generating capacity due to forced 

outages of generation or transmission 

equipment that would result from the 

most severe single contingency; or (2) 

the sum of five percent of load 

responsibility served by hydro 

generation and seven percent of the load 

responsibility served by thermal 

generation. In approving the regional 

BAL–STD–002–0 Reliability Standard, 

the Commission noted that the regional 

Reliability Standard is more stringent 

than the NERC Reliability Standard, 

BAL–002–0, because WECC requires a 

more stringent minimum reserve 

requirement than the continent-wide 

requirement. 

32. As proposed, Requirement R1 of 

BAL–002–WECC–1 would require each 

reserve sharing group or balancing 

authority that is not a member of a 

reserve sharing group to maintain a 

minimum contingency reserve. NERC 

contends that the proposed minimum 

contingency reserve amount is more 

stringent than that required by the 

continent-wide Reliability Standard.40

NERC explains that, whereas 

Requirement R3.1 of BAL–002–0 

requires that each balancing authority or 

reserve sharing group carry, at a 

minimum, at least enough contingency 

reserve to cover the most severe single 

contingency, proposed Requirement 

R1.1 of BAL–002–WECC–1 requires that 

each balancing authority or reserve 

sharing group maintain, as a minimum, 

contingency reserves equal to the loss of 

the most severe single contingency or an 

amount of reserve equal to the sum of 

three percent of the load (generation 

minus station service minus net actual 

interchange) and three percent of net 

generation (generation minus station 

service).41

NOPR Proposal 

33. The Commission proposed to find 

that the eight hours of data provided by 

WECC in its initial filing is insufficient 

to demonstrate that the proposed 

minimum contingency reserve 

requirements are sufficiently stringent 

to ensure that entities within the 

Western Interconnection will meet the 

requirements of NERC’s continent-wide 

Disturbance Control Standard, BAL– 

002–0. The Commission noted that, in 

its March 2007 petition proposing the 

currently effective regional Reliability 

Standard, NERC stated that the eight 

proposed regional Reliability Standards 

‘‘were critical to maintaining reliability 

within the Western Interconnection.’’ 42

The Commission expressed concern that 

the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard was less stringent than the 

current regional Reliability Standard 

and that NERC had not demonstrated 

that the proposed regional requirements 

were sufficient to meet the requirements 

of NERC’s continent-wide Disturbance 

Control Standard, BAL–002–0. 

34. Although the proposed Reliability 

Standard offers some added clarity by 

eliminating reference to the term ‘‘load 

responsibility’’ and including renewable 

energy resources in the calculation of 

contingency reserves, the Commission 

proposed to find that NERC and WECC 

did not provide sufficient technical 

justification to support the proposed 

revised method for calculating 

contingency reserves. Thus, the 

Commission proposed to remand BAL– 

002–WECC–1 so that WECC could 

develop additional support and make 

modifications as appropriate for a future 

proposal. 

Comments 

35. Several commenters argue that the 

proposed calculation of minimum 

contingency reserve levels is more 

stringent than the continent-wide NERC 

requirements under BAL–002–0.43

WECC comments that the Commission 

has failed to explain how the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard, which sets 

minimum contingency reserve level as 

the greater of the most severe single 

contingency or a calculation of net 

generation and load, could be less 

stringent than the continent-wide 

requirement, which sets a minimum 

contingency reserve level as equal to the 

most severe single contingency. NERC, 

Bonneville, Idaho Power, NV Energy, 

SCE, WIRAB, and Xcel all agree that the 

proposed regional requirement for 

calculating minimum contingency 

reserve levels is more stringent than the 

current continent-wide requirement. 

NERC adds that, in addition to 

including a more stringent calculation 

of minimum reserve levels, the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

is more stringent than the current 


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65970 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

44See NERC Petition, Exhibit C at 1 (‘‘The 

estimated impact of these changes to the required 

level of reserves in the WECC is a reduction of 650 

MWs or less, a decrease of approximately 9 

[percent] at most.’’). 

45WECC May 24, 2010 Comments at 6 n.7. 

46See Powerex Comments at 4; Puget Sound 

Comments at 2. 

continent-wide Reliability Standard 

because it includes a requirement that 

half of the contingency reserves must 

immediately and automatically respond 

proportionally to frequency deviations, 

e.g., through the action of a governor or 

other control system. Moreover, WECC 

points out that nothing in the proposed 

Reliability Standard excuses any 

balancing authority or reserve sharing 

group from satisfying the requirements 

of the continent-wide Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–0. 

36. Several commenters argue that 

approval of the proposed Reliability 

Standard does not require any more 

technical justification to support the 

proposed calculation of minimum 

contingency reserve levels. WECC notes 

that the currently approved regional 

Reliability Standard was established 

through negotiations in the 1960s, and 

was based on engineering judgment, 

rather than on technical studies or 

simulations. Bonneville adds that the 

Commission did not require extensive 

data support when it approved the 

current regional Reliability Standard. 

NV Energy admits that NERC has 

provided insufficient data with respect 

to whether the requested revision is just 

and reasonable and that data may 

suggest that the proposed calculation 

may allow responsible entities to carry 

less contingency reserves than currently 

required under the existing regional 

Reliability Standard. Nevertheless, NV 

Energy argues that the Commission 

should approve the proposed Reliability 

Standard without requiring any further 

data because reserve levels required 

under the proposed Reliability Standard 

will be equal to or greater and, thus, 

more stringent than reserve levels 

required under the continent-wide 

Reliability Standard. 

37. Although WECC argues that it 

should not be required to provide any 

further technical justification, along 

with its NOPR comments WECC 

provided additional data from a 

frequency responsive reserve study as 

support for the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard. WECC states that 

the summary of data demonstrates that, 

based on stability simulations applied to 

varying load scenarios, a minimum of 

2,400 MW of response reserve is 

necessary to prevent underfrequency 

load shedding. Based on a review of all 

hours during 2007–2008, WECC 

contends that the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard would result in at 

least 2,927 MW of automatically 

responsive reserves; more than 500 MW 

above the amount required for stability 

purposes. 

38. Powerex and Puget Sound argue 

that the data provided by WECC in the 

NERC Petition are insufficient to 

support the proposed Reliability 

Standard and support the Commission’s 

proposed remand. Puget Sound 

contends that WECC’s reliance on only 

eight hours of data to support the 

proposed standard was unreasonable 

and arbitrary and, therefore, the 

Commission could not reasonably 

approve the proposed Reliability 

Standard. Powerex argues that the eight 

hours of data provided by WECC in the 

NERC Petition is insufficient to 

demonstrate that the proposed 

minimum contingency reserve 

requirements are sufficiently stringent 

to ensure that entities within the 

Western Interconnection will meet the 

requirements of the continent-wide 

Reliability Standard. Powerex reiterates 

a concern that it expressed during the 

standard development process that the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

assumes the existence of a liquid 

ancillary service market when no such 

market exists in WECC. Powerex 

comments that the proposed standard 

shifts the operating reserve 

responsibility away from the source to 

the load and will, thereby, result in 

significant increases in operating 

reserve requirements of a number of 

jurisdictions that are primarily loadbased and will, therefore, require them 

to procure operating reserves. 

Commission Determination 

39. We will accept WECC’s proposal 

on this issue. We believe that WECC’s 

proposed calculation of minimum 

contingency reserves is more stringent 

than the national requirement and could 

be part of a future proposal that the 

Commission could find to be just, 

reasonable, not unduly discriminatory 

or preferential, and in the public 

interest. In the NERC Petition for 

approval of the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard, WECC provided 

technical studies covering eight hours 

from each of the four operating seasons 

(summer, fall, winter, and spring, both 

on and off-peak). WECC acknowledges 

that this data illustrates that the 

methodology in the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard reduces the total 

reserves required in the Western 

Interconnection for each of the eight 

hours assessed when compared with the 

methodology in the current regional 

Reliability Standard.44 However, WECC 

also states that the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard does not excuse 

‘‘any non-performance with the 

continent-wide Disturbance Control 

Standard,’’ which requires each 

balancing authority or reserve sharing 

group to activate sufficient contingency 

reserve to comply with the Disturbance 

Control Standard.45 WECC’s proposal 

would require reserves equal to the 

greater of: (i) The most severe single 

contingency; or (ii) the sum of three 

percent of the load and three percent of 

net generation. Moreover, the 

deliverability of these contingency 

reserves would continue to be assured 

under Requirement R7 of Reliability 

Standard TOP–002. Any lack of 

deliverability would violate TOP–002 

regardless of whether the amount of 

contingency reserves is based on 

WECC’s current requirement or its 

proposed requirement. 

40. Should WECC resubmit its 

proposed calculation of minimum 

contingency reserves as part of its 

response to our remand on the issue of 

the restoration period, NERC and/or 

WECC could buttress its proposal with 

audits specifically focused on 

contingency reserves and whether 

balancing authorities are meeting the 

adequacy and deliverability 

requirements. This auditing could 

provide additional assurance to the 

Commission that the proposed 

requirement is just, reasonable, and in 

the public interest. This auditing also 

could address the concerns raised by 

some entities in WECC that the original 

eight hours of data provided in NERC’s 

petition is insufficient to demonstrate 

that the proposed minimum 

contingency reserve requirements are 

sufficiently stringent to ensure that 

entities within the Western 

Interconnection will meet the 

requirements of NERC’s continent-wide 

Disturbance Control Standard, 

BAL–002–0.46 Thus, the auditing could 

provide adequate technical justification 

to support the proposed modification. 

41. In response to Powerex’s 

concerns, we believe that a calculation 

of minimum contingency reserves that 

is based on three percent of net 

generation and three percent of net load 

would fairly balance the responsibilities 

of contingency reserve providers with 

the financial obligations of those who 

would benefit most from those services. 

Under the current regional Reliability 

Standard, the total contingency reserve 

that a balancing authority must 

maintain is based only on generating 

resources. By contrast, under the 

proposed requirement, the total 

contingency reserve that a balancing 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 65971 

47NERC Petition at 18. 

48BAL–002–WECC–1, Requirement R3.6. 

49Citing Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,204 at P 324 (identifying guidelines for what 

constitutes a just and reasonable Reliability 

Standard). 

50BAL–002–WECC–1, Requirement R3.6. 

51See NERC Glossary, available at http:// 

www.nerc.com/docs/standards/rs/ 

Glossary_of_Terms_2010April20.pdf. 

52EOP–002–2.1, Requirement R7. 

53BAL–002–WECC–1, Requirement R3.6. 

authority must maintain is based on a 

combination of the generating resources 

and the demand served within a 

balancing authority footprint. We agree 

with NERC that the equal split between 

load and generation represents a 

reasonable balance to moderate shifts in 

contingency reserve responsibility and 

costs among the applicable entities.47

D. Use of Firm Load To Meet 

Contingency Reserve Requirement 

42. Requirement R3 of proposed BAL– 

002–WECC–1 would require that each 

reserve sharing group or balancing 

authority use certain types of reserves 

that must be fully deployable within ten 

minutes of notification to meet their 

contingency reserve requirement. 

Requirement R3.6 of Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–WECC–1 would 

allow entities to use ‘‘Load, other than 

Interruptible Load, once the Reliability 

Coordinator has declared a capacity or 

energy emergency.’’ 48

NOPR Proposal 

43. In its NOPR, the Commission 

proposed to find that Requirement R3.6 

is not technically sound because it 

would allow balancing authorities and 

reserve sharing groups within WECC to 

use firm load to meet their minimum 

contingency reserve requirements ‘‘once 

the Reliability Coordinator has declared 

a capacity or energy emergency,’’ thus 

creating the possibility that firm load 

could be shed due to the loss of a single 

element on the system.49 The 

Commission stated that the currently 

effective regional Reliability Standard 

does not allow the use of firm load to 

meet minimum contingency reserve 

levels. 

Comments 

44. WECC, supported by Bonneville, 

Idaho Power, and SCE, contends that 

the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard treats firm load no differently 

than the continent-wide Reliability 

Standard. WECC states that the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

permits the use of load, other than 

interruptible load, to meet a 

contingency only if ‘‘the Reliability 

Coordinator has declared a capacity or 

energy emergency.’’ 50 By contrast, 

WECC comments, the continent-wide 

Reliability Standard provides that 

contingency reserve may be met by 

Operating Reserve-Spinning and 

Operating Reserve-Supplemental, which 

include ‘‘load fully removable from the 

system within the Disturbance Recovery 

Period following the contingency event’’ 

to be used to meet contingencies.51

WECC points out that the continentwide Reliability Standard does not refer 

to the declaration of an emergency. For 

the same reason, Idaho Power and Xcel 

state that the proposed provisions 

related to the use of firm load to meet 

contingency reserve requirements are 

more stringent than the continent-wide 

standards. They contend that, unlike the 

continent-wide Reliability Standard, the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

requires the declaration of an emergency 

prior to utilizing firm load to meet 

contingency reserve requirements. 

45. Idaho Power comments that if 

balancing authorities are unable to 

count firm load towards contingency 

reserve requirements, balancing 

authorities may have no choice but to 

shed firm load to remain in compliance 

with the continent-wide Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–0. Idaho Power 

explains that Requirement R6.2 of 

Reliability Standard EOP–002–2.1 

requires a balancing authority to deploy 

all available operating reserves if it 

cannot meet the Disturbance Control 

Standard. If the balancing authority 

deploys all available operating reserves, 

including interruptible loads pursuant 

to Reliability Standard EOP–002–2.1, 

but cannot declare firm load 

interruptible to satisfy contingency 

reserve requirements, Idaho Power 

contends that the balancing authority 

may have no choice but to shed firm 

load to maintain compliance with the 

continent-wide Reliability Standard 

BAL–002. Thus, Idaho Power argues 

that not all emergencies are created 

equal and the flexibility to count firm 

load toward contingency requirements, 

in limited circumstances, would 

promote reliability but avoid 

unnecessary outages. 

46. WECC also states that nothing in 

the proposed standard directs any entity 

to take action that would violate the 

requirements relating to alert levels 

prescribed in EOP–002–2.1. Bonneville 

agrees and states that the Commission’s 

concern is misplaced because the 

proposed Reliability Standard does not 

authorize an entity to interrupt firm 

load for contingency reserves during 

EOP–002–2.1 energy emergency alerts 1 

and 2. If the Commission believes that 

the proposed Reliability Standard 

should further qualify the circumstances 

under which loads may be used for 

contingency reserves, WECC contends 

that the issue should be addressed in a 

manner and at a time that does not 

preclude approval of the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard. WECC 

adds that it is prepared to participate in 

any efforts intended to address the 

Commission’s concerns in this regard. 

47. NERC agrees with WECC that a 

reliability coordinator must declare a 

capacity or energy emergency before 

firm load could be considered to 

maintain contingency reserves but also 

agrees with the Commission that greater 

specificity of the appropriate Energy 

Emergency Alert (EEA) level that must 

be declared would be helpful. Puget 

Sound argues that the proposed 

language could be interpreted to allow 

the use of firm load in a manner that is 

inconsistent with EOP–002–2.1. CDWR 

comments that reliability planning 

should not consider shedding firm loads 

as a contingency reserve. CDWR 

contends that balancing authority 

should plan for load interruption only if 

a customer voluntarily agrees to that 

specific use of its loads, and only upon 

clear terms and conditions. 

Commission Determination 

48. We will accept WECC’s proposal 

on this issue. The Commission finds 

that, similar to the current continentwide Reliability Standard, the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard does not 

allow balancing authorities or reserve 

sharing groups to curtail firm load 

except in compliance with NERC’s 

Reliability Standard EOP–002–2.1. 

49. The continent-wide Reliability 

Standard, BAL–002 does not 

contemplate the use of firm load as 

contingency reserve. In fact, it would be 

a violation of EOP–002–2.1 if balancing 

authorities or reserve sharing groups 

outside of WECC planned to shed firm 

load before the reliability coordinator 

issued a level 3 energy emergency 

alert.52 Similarly, although Requirement 

R3.6 of Reliability Standard BAL–002– 

WECC–1 would allow balancing 

authorities and reserve sharing groups 

to use ‘‘Load, other than Interruptible 

Load, once the Reliability Coordinator 

has declared a capacity or energy 

emergency,’’ 53 these entities would not 

be authorized to shed firm load unless 

the applicable reliability coordinator 

had issued a level 3 energy emergency 

alert pursuant to EOP–002–2.1. Thus, 

balancing authorities and reserve 

sharing groups within WECC are subject 

to the same restrictions regarding the 

use of firm load as contingency reserve 

as balancing authorities elsewhere 


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65972 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

54 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, 72 FR 16416 (Apr. 

4, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242, at P 330, 

order on reh’g, Order No. 693–A, 120 FERC 

¶ 61,053 (2007). 

55 Id. P 331, 335. 

56 Id. P 333. 

57 Id. P 334. 

58NERC Petition at 40. 

59NERC Petition at Exhibit C (Record of 

Development of Proposed Reliability Standard) 

WECC’s Written Response to NERC’s Written 

Comments, August 13, 2008 at page 4. 

60See NERC Glossary available at http:// 

www.nerc.com/docs/standards/rs/ 

Glossary_of_Terms_2010April20.pdf. 

operating under the continent-wide 

Reliability Standard. On remand, we 

direct WECC to develop revised 

language to clarify this point. 

E. Demand-Side Management as a 

Resource 

50. In Order No. 693, the Commission 

directed the ERO to submit a 

modification to continent-wide 

Reliability Standard BAL–002–0 that 

includes a Requirement that explicitly 

allows that demand-side management 

be used as a resource for contingency 

reserves, and clarifies that demand-side 

management should be treated on a 

comparable basis so long as it meets 

similar technical requirements as other 

resources providing this service.54 The 

Commission directed the ERO to list the 

types of resources that can be used to 

meet contingency reserves to provide 

users, owners and operators of the BulkPower System a set of options to meet 

contingency reserves.55 The 

Commission clarified that the purpose 

of this directive was to ensure 

comparable treatment of demand-side 

management with conventional 

generation or any other technology and 

to allow demand-side management to be 

considered as a resource for contingency 

reserves on this basis without requiring 

the use of any particular contingency 

reserve option.56 The Commission 

further clarified that in order for 

demand-side management to 

participate, it must be technically 

capable of providing contingency 

reserve service, with the ERO 

determining the technical 

requirements.57

51. In its petition, NERC states that it 

raised this concern with WECC, and 

WECC responded that the drafting team 

wrote the regional Reliability Standard 

‘‘to permit load, Demand-Side 

Management, generation, or another 

resource technology that qualifies as 

Spinning Reserve or Contingency 

Reserve to be used as such.’’ WECC 

further explained that demand-side 

management that is deployable within 

ten minutes is a subset of interruptible 

load, which is an acceptable type of 

reserve set forth in proposed 

Requirement R3.2.58 WECC previously 

commented that, in the proposed 

standard, ‘‘Loads and [demand-side 

management] were not allowed as 

Spinning Reserve because it is not 

permitted by the NERC Spinning 

Reserve definition.’’ 59

NOPR Proposal 

52. In its NOPR, the Commission 

stated that the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard does not explicitly 

address the use of demand-side 

management as a resource for 

contingency reserves. Accordingly, the 

Commission proposed to direct WECC 

to develop a modification to BAL–002– 

WECC–1 that explicitly provides that 

demand-side management that is 

technically capable of providing this 

service may be used as a resource for 

contingency reserves. Consistent with 

the Commission’s directive in Order No. 

693, the Commission explained that the 

modification should list the types of 

resources, including demand-side 

management, which can be used to meet 

contingency reserves. The Commission 

also stated that the modification should 

ensure comparable treatment of 

demand-side management with 

conventional generation or any other 

technology and allow demand-side 

management to be considered as a 

resource for contingency reserves on 

this basis without requiring the use of 

any particular contingency reserve 

option. 

53. In addition, the Commission noted 

a conflict related to the definition of 

Spinning Reserve as it is used in the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard. 

The Commission stated that 

Requirement R3.1 refers to the NERC 

Glossary definition of Spinning Reserve, 

which omits the use of demand-side 

management or other technologies that 

could be used as a resource because it 

limits acceptable Spinning Reserve 

resources to generation resources. The 

Commission proposed to direct WECC 

to develop a modification to the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard 

replacing the term Spinning Reserve 

with Operating Reserve-Spinning, 

which includes as part of the definition 

of Operating Reserve, ‘‘load fully 

removable from the system within the 

Disturbance Recovery Period following 

the contingency event.’’ Since the term 

Spinning Reserve was not used in other 

Reliability Standards, the Commission 

proposed to direct the ERO to remove 

the term from the NERC Glossary upon 

approval of a modified Reliability 

Standard using Operating ReserveSpinning. 

Comments 

54. WECC, supported by NERC, 

Bonneville, CAISO, Idaho Power, and 

SCE, contends that the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard is 

inclusive of demand-side management 

as a resource to be used in the 

calculation of contingency reserve 

because it provides for the use of 

Interruptible Load for contingency 

reserve. WECC points out that the NERC 

Glossary defines Interruptible Load as 

‘‘demand that the end-use customer 

makes available to its load-serving 

entity via contract or agreement for 

curtailment.’’ 60 Nevertheless, if the 

Commission issues a remand, CAISO 

urges the Commission to provide NERC 

an opportunity to resubmit BAL–002– 

WECC–1 to address any definitional 

concerns within 90 days. 

55. Xcel comments that the Reliability 

Standard should not be more explicit 

about the inclusion of demand-side 

management as a resource because the 

term demand-side management 

encompasses many types of 

technologies and services, including 

reduction of energy consumption by use 

of high-efficiency light bulbs. If 

demand-side management is more 

explicitly included in the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard, Xcel 

contends that such a revision might 

cause entities that are working to 

provide value to the end-use customers 

to claim that a customer could get 

revenue by providing reserves. 

56. By contrast, Puget Sound and 

CDWR comment that they agree with 

the Commission that technically 

qualified demand-based resources—as 

well as other qualified non-generation 

resources such as energy storage 

devices—should be allowed to provide 

ancillary services. CDWR suggests that, 

if Spinning Reserve is meant to connote 

two products—a contingency reserve 

and a frequency regulation reserve— 

then consideration should be given to 

better defining the services and the 

associated technical criteria. 

Nevertheless, CDWR comments that 

demand-based resources that agree to 

interruption for reliability purposes 

should receive reduced charges for 

lesser quality services, an exemption 

from charges associated with the same 

service that the demand-based resources 

are providing, and compensation for 

service they provide. 

57. Concerning the Commission’s 

proposal to direct the ERO to remove 

the term Spinning Reserve upon 

approval of a modified regional 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 65973 

61E.g., MISO, Puget Sound, WSPP, and Xcel. 

62As of July 28, 2010, this project has been 

merged with Project 2007–18—Reliability-based 

Controls and is now listed as new Project 2010– 

14—Balancing Authority Reliability-based Control. 

The new project page is available at http:// 

www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Project2010- 

14_Balancing_Authority_RBC.html. 

63 In the transmittal letter of its compliance filing 

to Order No. 719, CAISO explained that demandside management resources cannot currently 

provide regulation or spinning reserve services in 

its markets because of WECC’s definitions of 

regulation and spinning reserve, which are limited 

to generation resources. CAISO, Compliance Filing, 

Docket No. ER09–1048–000, at 28–30 (April 28, 

2009). 

64NERC defines Interruptible Load as ‘‘Demand 

that the end-use customer makes available to its 

Load-Serving Entity via contract or agreement for 

curtailment.’’ NERC Glossary available at http:// 

www.nerc.com/docs/standards/rs/ 

Glossary_of_Terms_2010April20.pdf. 

65NERC Glossary available at http:// 

www.nerc.com/docs/standards/rs/ 

Glossary_of_Terms_2010April20.pdf. 

66 Id. 

67We also note that WECC’s explanation that 

demand-side management that is deployable within 

ten minutes is a subset of interruptible load is not 

reflected in the definition of Interruptible Load. 

68 In Order No. 693, the Commission clarified 

that, in order for demand-side management to 

participate as a resource for contingency reserves, 

it must be technically capable of providing 

contingency reserve service. For example, not every 

end-user who curbs electricity usage is technically 

capable of providing contingency reserve service. 

The Commission expects that the ERO would 

determine what technical requirements demandside management would need to meet to provide 

contingency reserves. Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & 

Regs. ¶ 31,242 at P 334. 

69Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at 

P 333. 

70 Id. P 1896. 

71NERC Glossary, available at http://

www.nerc.com/docs/standards/rs/Glossary_

of_Terms_2010April20.pdf. 

Reliability Standard, NERC points out 

that there are two definitions for 

Spinning Reserve; one from NERC, the 

other from WECC. NERC suggests that 

the Commission retain the NERCdefined term and retire the WECC term. 

NERC states that the proposed standard 

uses the NERC-defined term in 

Requirements R1, R2, and R3. 

58. Several commenters oppose the 

removal of the term Spinning Reserve 

from the NERC Glossary.61 Puget Sound 

states that retaining the term in the 

NERC Glossary is helpful to the 

development of a capacity/reserves 

market by facilitating the purchase and 

sale of spinning capacity that is not 

contingency-based. Similarly, NV 

Energy states that the term Spinning 

Reserve is useful because it describes a 

type of reserve that must be 

synchronized, unloaded generating 

capacity, as this is the only product that 

can provide the essential service of 

frequency and governor response under 

dynamic system conditions and 

disturbances. WSPP argues that the 

Commission’s proposal is based upon a 

faulty understanding of the relationship 

between the terms Operating ReserveSpinning and Spinning Reserve. WSPP 

and MISO agree that Spinning Reserve 

is used in the definition of Operating 

Reserve, which appears more than fifty 

times in the NERC Reliability Standards. 

WSPP further explains that Spinning 

Reserve can be used for the spinning 

component of Operating Reserve but 

also for other critical system 

requirements. In addition, MISO argues, 

generally, that it is not appropriate for 

the Commission to effect changes to the 

continent-wide NERC standards by 

proposing a modification to the NERC 

Glossary within the context of a 

proceeding addressing a regional 

Reliability Standard. 

59. With respect to the Commission’s 

proposed revisions of the definitions of 

the terms Operating Reserve—Spinning 

and Operating Reserve—Supplemental, 

NERC agrees that greater clarity is 

necessary regarding the meaning of 

‘‘load fully removable from the system.’’ 

NERC states, however, that these 

modifications must be made through 

NERC’s Reliability Standard 

Development Process and are, in fact, 

currently being addressed in Project 

2007–05 Balancing Authority Controls, 

which is currently revising Reliability 

Standard BAL–002–0, as well as other 

standards.62

Commission Determination 

60. We find that the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard does not provide 

that demand-side management that is 

technically capable of providing this 

service may be used as a resource for 

contingency reserves. The WECC 

definition of Spinning Reserve, like the 

NERC definition of the same term, is 

limited to ‘‘unloaded generation which 

is synchronized and ready to serve 

additional demand.’’ Thus, neither the 

WECC nor the NERC definitions of 

Spinning Reserve are inclusive of 

demand-side management as a 

resource.63 Nevertheless, WECC argues 

that the proposed regional Reliability 

Standard is inclusive of demand-side 

management as a resource for 

contingency reserves because it lists 

interruptible load as an available 

resource for contingency reserve. The 

definition of interruptible load, 

however, is not inclusive of all forms of 

demand-side management.64 NERC 

defines demand-side management as 

‘‘all activities or programs undertaken by 

Load-Serving Entity or its customers to 

influence the amount or timing of 

electricity they use.’’ 65 This could 

include interruptible load but, as Xcel 

points out, demand-side management 

may encompass the use of many types 

of technologies and services. For 

example, according to the NERC 

Glossary, demand-side management 

includes controllable load, termed 

Direct Control Load Management, which 

is defined as demand-side management 

that is under the direct control of the 

system operator but does not include 

interruptible load.66 Thus, by simply 

listing interruptible load, the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard is not 

sufficiently inclusive of demand-side 

management as a resource.67

61. On remand, the Commission 

hereby adopts its NOPR proposal and 

directs the WECC to develop 

modifications to the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard that explicitly 

provide that demand-side management 

technically capable of providing this 

service may be used as a resource for 

both spinning and non-spinning 

contingency reserves.68 Consistent with 

the Commission’s directive in Order No. 

693, the modification should list the 

types of resources, including demandside management, which can be used to 

meet contingency reserves.69 The 

modification also should ensure 

comparable treatment of demand-side 

management with conventional 

generation or any other technology and 

allow demand-side management to be 

considered as a resource for contingency 

reserves on this basis without requiring 

the use of any particular contingency 

reserve option. For example, consistent 

with our determinations in Order No. 

693, the modification could replace the 

term Spinning Reserve with Operating 

Reserve—Spinning and Non-Spinning 

Reserve with Operating Reserve— 

Supplemental, since these glossary 

definitions are inclusive of demand-side 

management, including controllable 

load, in contrast to the current terms 

used in the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard.70

62. As commenters have pointed out, 

the term Spinning Reserve is used in the 

definition of Operating Reserve and in 

service agreements by and among 

certain WECC entities. Therefore, the 

Commission will not adopt its proposal 

to direct the ERO to remove the term 

from the NERC Glossary. However, as 

NERC points out WECC has maintained 

its own definition of the term Spinning 

Reserve. We find no substantial 

difference between the two terms. Both 

terms refer to ‘‘unloaded generation that 

is synchronized and ready to serve 

additional demand.’’ 71 In its order 

approving WECC’s current regional 

Reliability Standard, the Commission 

determined that regional definitions 


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65974 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

72North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 

FERC ¶ 61,260 at P 54. 73WECC’s interpretation of ‘‘Load Responsibility,’’ 

which was approved by the WECC Board of 

Directors September 7, 2007, places the 

responsibility on the balancing authorities to 

determine the amount of and assure that adequate 

contingency reserves are provided. See WECC 

Interpretation of Load Responsibility (Sept. 7, 

2007), available at http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/ 

Interpretations/Interpretation%20of%20Load%20

Responsibility.pdf. Likewise, the current regional 

Reliability Standard places the responsibility on the 

balancing authorities to determine the amount of 

contingency reserves and assure that adequate 

contingency reserves are provided. 

74Citing, Opinion No. 464, Docket No. ER98– 

997–000, at P 11 et seq., 38–40 (August 12, 2003). 

75 5 CFR 1320.11. 

76 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). 

77Regulations Implementing the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987). 

78 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii). 

79 5 U.S.C. 601–612. 80See 13 CFR 121.201. 

should conform to the definitions set 

forth in the NERC Glossary, unless a 

specific deviation has been justified.72

WECC has not justified the need for a 

separate, regional definition of Spinning 

Reserve. Accordingly, we direct WECC 

to remove this regional definition from 

the NERC Glossary. 

F. Miscellaneous 

Comments 

63. In its petition, NERC contends that 

the industry will benefit from the 

improved clarity of the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard. Among its 

revisions, NERC presents a proposal 

from WECC for an interpretation of the 

term ‘‘Load Responsibility.’’ 73 In the 

NOPR, the Commission stated its belief 

that any confusion regarding the term 

‘‘Load Responsibility’’ has been 

addressed by WECC and therefore does 

not have a reliability impact. Xcel states 

that it agrees that WECC’s interpretation 

is an improvement and that the standard 

is clearer without the term. 

Nevertheless, Xcel comments that more 

guidance on application is needed from 

both WECC and FERC before the 

western markets may operate efficiently. 

64. If the Commission decides to 

remand the proposed regional 

Reliability Standard, the QF Parties ask 

the Commission to direct WECC to 

define the term ‘‘net generation.’’ The QF 

Parties explain that the calculation of 

the amount of contingency reserves in 

the proposed standard is based, in part, 

on the amount of net generation, which 

is not defined. The QF Parties contend 

that, consistent with Commission 

precedent, the definition of net 

generation should not include 

generation used to serve load behind the 

meter.74

65. Regarding the applicability of the 

proposed regional Reliability Standard, 

NV Energy expresses concern that it 

does not assign any responsibility or 

obligations for generator owners and 

generator operators. NV Energy states 

that a balancing authority does not have 

ownership or operational control over 

significant shares of generating 

resources within its footprint. Thus, NV 

Energy contends, a balancing authority 

may be required to carry a 

disproportionate share of the 

contingency reserve obligation within 

the Western Interconnection. For this 

reason, NV Energy asks the Commission 

to direct WECC to address this issue on 

remand. 

Commission Determination 

66. The proposed regional Reliability 

Standard offers certain improvements 

over the current regional Reliability 

Standard as commenters point out. 

Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed 

above, we must remand the proposed 

regional Reliability Standard to the 

ERO. On remand, we direct WECC to 

consider the concerns raised by the QF 

Parties and NV Energy. 

III. Information Collection Statement 

67. The Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) regulations require that 

OMB approve certain reporting and 

recordkeeping (collections of 

information) imposed by an agency.75

The information contained here is also 

subject to review under section 3507(d) 

of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995.76 By remanding the proposed 

Reliability Standard the Commission is 

maintaining the status quo until future 

revisions to the Reliability Standard are 

approved by the Commission. Thus, the 

Commission’s action does not add to or 

increase entities’ reporting burden. 

IV. Environmental Analysis 

68. The Commission is required to 

prepare an Environmental Assessment 

or an Environmental Impact Statement 

for any action that may have a 

significant adverse effect on the human 

environment.77 The Commission has 

categorically excluded certain actions 

from this requirement as not having a 

significant effect on the human 

environment. Included in the exclusion 

are rules that are clarifying, corrective, 

or procedural or that do not 

substantially change the effect of the 

regulations being amended.78 The 

actions directed herein fall within this 

categorical exclusion in the 

Commission’s regulations. 

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

69. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 

1980 (RFA) 79 generally requires a 

description and analysis of final rules 

that will have significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. The RFA mandates 

consideration of regulatory alternatives 

that accomplish the stated objectives of 

a final rule and that minimize any 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The Small Business Administration’s 

Office of Size Standards develops the 

numerical definition of a small 

business.80 For electric utilities, a firm 

is small if, including affiliates, it is 

primarily engaged in the transmission, 

generation and/or distribution of 

electric energy for sale and its total 

electric output for the preceding twelve 

months did not exceed four million 

megawatt hours. The RFA is not 

implicated by this final rule because by 

remanding the proposed Reliability 

Standard the Commission is 

maintaining the status quo until future 

revisions to the Reliability Standard are 

approved by the Commission. 

VI. Document Availability 

70. In addition to publishing the full 

text of this document in the Federal 

Register, the Commission provides all 

interested persons an opportunity to 

view and/or print the contents of this 

document via the internet through 

FERC’s Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) 

and in FERC’s Public Reference Room 

during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. 

to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First 

Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 

20426. 

71. From FERC’s Home Page on the 

Internet, this information is available on 

eLibrary. The full text of this document 

is available on eLibrary in PDF and 

Microsoft Word format for viewing, 

printing, and/or downloading. To access 

this document in eLibrary, type the 

docket number excluding the last three 

digits of this document in the docket 

number field. 

72. User assistance is available for 

eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during 

normal business hours from FERC 

Online Support at (202) 502–6652 (toll 

free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail at 

ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the 

Public Reference Room at (202) 502– 

8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the 

Public Reference Room at 

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 

VII. Effective Date and Congressional 

Notification 

73. This final rule shall become 

effective November 26, 2010. The 

Commission has determined, with the 

concurrence of the Administrator of the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 65975 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a 

‘‘major rule’’ as defined in section 351 of 

the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. 

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40 

Electric power, Electric utilities, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

By the Commission. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

APPENDIX A 

List of Commenters 

Commenter name Abbreviation 

Western Electricity Coordinating Council ......................................................................................................................................... WECC 

North American Electric Reliability Corp .......................................................................................................................................... NERC 

Bonneville Power Administration ...................................................................................................................................................... Bonneville 

California Independent System Operator Corp ................................................................................................................................ CAISO 

California Dept of Water Resources, State Water Project ............................................................................................................... CDWR 

Idaho Power Co. ............................................................................................................................................................................... Idaho Power 

Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc .................................................................................................................................... MISO 

Powerex Corp ................................................................................................................................................................................... Powerex 

Puget Sound Energy, Inc ................................................................................................................................................................. Puget Sound 

Cogeneration Association of California and the Energy Producers and Users Coalition ................................................................ QF Parties 

Sempra Generation .......................................................................................................................................................................... Sempra 

Sierra Pacific Power Co. and Nevada Power Co ............................................................................................................................ NV Energy 

Southern California Edison Co ......................................................................................................................................................... SCE 

Western Interconnection Regional Advisory Body ........................................................................................................................... WIRAB 

WSPP Inc ......................................................................................................................................................................................... WSPP 

Xcel Energy Services Inc ................................................................................................................................................................. Xcel 

[FR Doc. 2010–27134 Filed 10–26–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

22 CFR Part 62 

[Public Notice: 7216] 

RIN 1400–AC56 

Exchange Visitor Program—Secondary 

School Students 

AGENCY: United States Department of 

State. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Department is revising 

existing Secondary School Student 

regulations regarding the screening, 

selection, school enrollment, 

orientation, and quality assurance 

monitoring of exchange students as well 

as the screening, selection, orientation, 

and quality assurance monitoring of 

host families and field staff. Further, the 

Department is adopting a new 

requirement regarding training for all 

organizational representatives who 

place and/or monitor students with host 

families. The proposed requirement to 

conduct FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

background checks will not be 

implemented at this time. Rather, it will 

continue to be examined and a 

subsequent Final Rule regarding this 

provision will be forthcoming. These 

regulations, as revised, govern the 

Department designated exchange visitor 

programs under which foreign 

secondary school students (ages 15– 

181⁄2) are afforded the opportunity to 

study in the United States at accredited 

public or private secondary schools for 

an academic semester or year while 

living with American host families or 

residing at accredited U.S. boarding 

schools. 

DATES: Effective November 26, 2010. 

Compliance with the new requirement 

for the State Department designed and 

mandated training module for local 

coordinator training, as set forth at 

§ 62.25(d)(1), will not become effective 

until the development of an online 

training platform implementing this 

requirement is completed. The 

Department anticipates a January 2011 

launch of this training platform. A 

subsequent Federal Register Notice will 

be published when development is 

completed. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Stanley S. Colvin, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Private Sector Exchange, 

U.S. Department of State, SA–5, 2200 C 

Street, NW., 5th Floor, Washington, DC 

20522–0505; or e-mail at 

JExchanges@state.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The U.S. 

Department of State has authorized 

Secondary School Student programs 

since 1949, following passage of the 

United States Information and 

Educational Exchange Act of 1948 and 

adoption of 22 CFR Part 62—Exchange 

Visitor Program, establishing a student 

exchange program (14 FR 4592, July 22, 

1949). Over the last 60 years, more than 

850,000 foreign exchange students have 

lived in and learned about the United 

States through these Secondary School 

Student programs. 

While the vast majority of the 

Department’s nearly 28,000 annual 

exchanges of Secondary School students 

conclude with positive experiences for 

both the exchange student and the 

American host families, a number of 

incidents have occurred recently with 

respect to student placement and 

oversight which demand the 

Department’s immediate attention. The 

success of the Secondary School 

Student program is dependent on the 

generosity of the American families who 

support this program by welcoming 

foreign students into their homes. The 

number of qualified foreign students 

desiring to come to the United States for 

a year of high school continues to rise 

and student demand is now placing 

pressure on the ability of sponsors to 

identify available and appropriate host 

family homes. The Department desires 

to provide the means to permit as many 

exchange students into the United 

States as possible so long as we can 

ensure their safety and welfare, which is 

our highest priority. 

A great majority of exchange students 

who come to the United States to attend 

high school enjoy positive life-changing 

experiences, grow in independence and 

maturity, improve their English 

language skills, and build relationships 

with U.S. citizens. As with other 

Exchange Visitor Program categories, 

the underlying purpose of the 


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