FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 21, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY COLLIER TAYLOR, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-6052

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 08-CR-00210-F-1)

Chris M. Stephens, Assistant U.S. Attorney, (and Robert J. Troester, Acting

United States Attorney and Wm. Lee Borden, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, on the

brief) Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Donald A. Herring, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Larry Collier Taylor, Jr. was convicted by a jury of

car jacking (count 1), bank robbery (count 2), and using a firearm during a violent

crime (count 3). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2113(a) & (d) and 924(c)(1)(A). He was

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sentenced to 181 months’ imprisonment (97 months on counts 1 and 2, and 84

months on count 3, to run consecutively) and five years’ supervised release. 1 R.

at 183-85. On appeal, Mr. Taylor challenges the denial of his motion to suppress

and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the car jacking conviction. 

Aplt. Br. at 10-11. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Background

We view this evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The

odyssey in this case began on May 4, 2008, in Lawton, Oklahoma when Dana

Wright returned home in her gray 2004 Pontiac Grand Am. 3 R. at 274-75, 277. 

Two men with covered faces approached. 3 R. at 275-76. One man had a gun

and pointed it at her. 3 R. at 276. They told her to get down and took her keys. 

3 R. at 277-78. The men drove off in the car. 3 R. at 278. Ms. Wright was

unable to identify her assailants. 3 R. at 285. 

On May 7, 2008, two masked men robbed the Peoples State Bank in

Lawton. 3 R. at 391-92. One robber brandished a pistol and took the cash from

the teller drawers. 3 R. at 392-94. A second robber pointed a gun at the bank

president’s head and told him to open the vault. 3 R. at 393-94. The president

opened the vault, and the second robber put cash into a pillowcase. 3 R. at 394-

95. The cash consisted of loose bills and strapped bundles of bills, and each strap

had the bank’s name on it. 3 R. at 397-98. The men fled. 3 R. at 394. A bank

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audit confirmed that approximately $78,000 was taken in the robbery. 3 R. at

398. 

That same day a police officer investigating the bank robbery found Ms.

Wright’s car parked blocks away from the bank. 3 R. at 278-79, 385-86. The 

car’s vehicle identification number (VIN) indicated it was manufactured outside

of Oklahoma. 3 R. at 388-89. 

On May 20, 2008, two Houston, Texas police officers were looking for

gang or criminal activity. 3 R. at 5-6. They saw a car run at least two stop signs

and then fail to signal while crossing three lanes of traffic. 3 R. at 6, 10. The

officers stopped the car and asked the driver, who later turned out to be Mr.

Taylor, for his driver’s license and proof of insurance. 3 R. at 10-12. Mr. Taylor

said that he did not have a driver’s license or other identification with him, that

the car was a rental car, and he did not know if it was insured or not. 3 R. at 12. 

He added that his girlfriend’s mother rented the car for him in El Paso and that

his name was not on the rental agreement. 3 R. at 12. He did not have a copy of

the rental agreement. 3 R. at 12. The officers arrested Mr. Taylor for his traffic

violations and for not having a license, all Class C misdemeanors. 3 R. at 13-14;

see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.025, 542.301, 543.001, 544.010, 545.104;

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.03. 

The officers next decided to tow the car. 3 R. at 16. Houston Police

Department policy provides that a vehicle owner arrested for a Class C violation

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can avoid impoundment by either leaving his car where it is parked or turning it

over to someone else. 3 R. at 18. The officers did not give Mr. Taylor this option

because he did not own the car. 3 R. at 18-19, 92. They could not release the car

to the car’s passenger because he also lacked a driver’s license. 3 R. at 15-16. 

The officers then began an inventory of the car. 3 R. at 16. The Houston

Police Department requires officers to list objects in a car at the time of

impoundment so as to avoid liability for missing items. 3 R. at 16-17. The

inventorying officer testified that it was his practice to search the car first and fill

out the inventory sheet afterwards. 3 R. at 59-61. In the car’s center console, the

officer found a number of loose bills and a bank strap. 3 R. at 19-20, 79. In the

trunk, he found a revolver and a backpack with a pillow case containing bundles

of money strapped and with the name of the Peoples State Bank, Lawton,

Oklahoma on the straps. 3 R. at 20-22, 332. In all, they found approximately

$17,000. 3 R. at 333. 

At this time, Mr. Taylor claimed ownership of the backpack and identified

himself. 3 R. at 23-25. After running his name through their database, the

officers discovered that Mr. Taylor had several outstanding warrants. 3 R. at 26. 

They decided not to issue citations but rather to hold Mr. Taylor on the warrants. 

3 R. at 24-26. Mr. Taylor then inquired as to why he had been stopped and

expressed surprise that his erratic driving had put an end to his flight. 3 R. at 80. 

The Houston officers then turned the investigation over to the FBI. 3 R. at

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65. The officers never finished the inventory, although the FBI completed a

written inventory. 3 R. at 62, 113. The car’s passenger consented to the search

of his apartment, in which Mr. Taylor had a bedroom. 3 R. at 99-100, 106. The

agents found several thousand dollars more in Mr. Taylor’s bedroom. 3 R. at 107,

115. 

Later, Mr. Taylor told his cellmate (and soon to be informant), John Clyde

Thomas, about a bank robbery and a car jacking he committed in Oklahoma. 3 R.

at 355, 358. Mr. Taylor told Mr. Thomas that he robbed a bank in Lawton and

used a Pontiac as the getaway vehicle, a car he stole from a woman. 3 R. at 359-

60, 362. 

Discussion

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Mr. Taylor argues that the district court should have suppressed all 

evidence obtained from his car and apartment, as well as any incriminating

statements Mr. Taylor made. Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471 (1963)). Mr. Taylor preserved this claim when he moved to

suppress this evidence before trial, 1 R. at 26-28, and when he objected to its

admission at trial, 3 R. at 294, 298, 326, 328-29, 331, 334. 

Mr. Taylor does not object to the legality of the traffic stop or his arrest. 

Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Instead Mr. Taylor

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contends that the search of his car was illegal because the officers searched it

without a warrant or probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. He maintains that the

search was not a lawful inventory search justified under an exception to the

warrant requirement. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. Inventorying the car was a pretext for

investigation, he argues, given that the officers could have chosen not to tow the

car and that the officers never produced an inventory. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. 

The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches or seizures. 

Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1602 (2008). The reasonableness of a search

or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo. 

United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009). The government

carries the burden of demonstrating reasonableness. White, 584 F.3d at 944. We

review the district court’s factual findings including the credibility of the

witnesses for clear error and the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government. Id. 

Police may inventory impounded property to avoid liability for missing

items. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). “[R]easonable police . . .

inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” 

Id. at 374. Granting police discretion over whether to impound and inventory a

vehicle is permissible so long as officers exercise that discretion according to

standardized criteria, and not “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of

investigation.” Id. at 372, 374-75. 

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The decision to tow the car was reasonable. Because Mr. Taylor did not

own the car, the Department’s policy did not allow the officers to either leave the

car where it was or release it to another. 3 R. at 18-19, 92. The alleged lessee of

the car was reportedly hundreds of miles away, so she could not claim the car. 

3R. at 51-52. Under these circumstances, the officers’ choice to secure the car

and tow it was reasonable. 

Once officers decide to tow a car, the Department requires them to make an

inventory to safeguard a defendant’s property. 3 R. at 16-17. The officers

therefore had sufficient, non-investigatory motives for the inventory search. 

Mr. Taylor contends that the inventory search was pretextual because the

original officer did not complete the inventory. However, this only happened

because the FBI took over the investigation, and the FBI completed the inventory. 

3 R. at 62, 113. There is nothing unreasonable about a state officer inviting a

federal law enforcement agency to assist given evidence of a significant federal

crime. See United States v. Loaiza-Martin, 832 F.2d 867, 868-69 (5th Cir. 1987). 

“A change of plans does not convert a reasonable search into an unreasonable

search.” Aplee. Br. at 17. 

Mr. Taylor challenges the admission of his statements and the search of his

apartment as fruit of the poisonous tree (derivative evidence). Wong Sun, 371

U.S. at 487-88. This doctrine does not apply where a search is legal. Therefore

the district court properly denied the motions to suppress. 

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Because we decide that the Fourth Amendment claim lacks merit, we need

not address whether Mr. Taylor has standing to challenge the search of the rental

car. See White, 584 F.3d at 956 n.12. We also need not consider whether the

officers could justify the search as a good faith search incident to Mr. Taylor’s

arrest. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1041-45 (10th Cir. 2009)

(discussing the good faith exception). Nor do we reach any other claims Mr.

Taylor advanced at oral argument that were not included in his brief-in-chief.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo, examining all

evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

government to determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v Oldbear, 568 F.3d 814, 822-23

(10th Cir. 2009). Credibility determinations are the province of the trier of fact.

We do not evaluate witness credibility or weigh conflicting evidence. United

States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1316 (10th Cir. 2009). 

Mr. Taylor argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction of car

jacking because no evidence linked him to Ms. Wright’s car. Aplt. Br. at 15-16. 

For a car jacking conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the government had to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Mr. Taylor took a motor vehicle from the

person or presence of another; (2) that he did so by force, violence or

intimidation; (3) that he intended to cause death or serious bodily harm; and (4)

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that the motor vehicle had been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or

foreign commerce. See United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.

2006). Ms. Wright identified the stolen gray Pontiac as hers and testified that two

men took her car after pointing a gun at her. 3 R. at 276-79. The Pontiac’s VIN

indicated that Pontiac manufactured the car outside of Oklahoma. 3 R. at 388-89. 

The testimony of Mr. Taylor’s cellmate links Mr. Taylor to the car jacking. 

Mr. Thomas testified that Mr. Taylor told him that he had car jacked a Pontiac

from a lady and used it as a getaway car in a bank robbery in Lawton. 3 R. at

355, 358-60, 362. The jury was free to credit Mr. Thomas’s testimony. Viewing

this testimony in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient

evidence of Mr. Taylor’s participation in the car jacking to support his conviction. 

AFFIRMED.

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