UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RUSSELL NATION, individually and as parent and next friend of J.N., a minor; CAROL NATION, individually and as parent and next frien d of J.N., a minor, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. PIEDMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22; HOLLY NOELLE MORRIS, Defendants - Appellees. No. 21-6123 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-01090-R) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Russell and Carol Nation filed this suit on behalf of themselves and J.N., their minor child. J.N., who is autistic and nonve rbal, was one of eight or so students in Holly Morris’s special-education class at Piedmont Middle School in Piedmont, Oklahoma, during the school years of 2016–1 7 and 2017–18. It is undisputed that during the 2017–18 school year, Morris physical ly and verbally abused J.N. and other students. Morris reportedly sl ammed J.N.’s head against a bathroom wall, punched

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 6, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 12 him, knocked him out of his desk, pulled hi s hair, and made disparaging comments to him. The Nations filed suit against Piedmo nt Independent School District No. 22 (the District) seeking da mages under 42 U.S.C § 1983 on multiple grounds, including failure to train and superv ise its employees, and under Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act on various state-law claims. After denyi ng as untimely the Nations’ motion to amend to add claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma entered summary judgment for the District on the § 1983 claims, stating that there was insuffic ient evidence of violations of J. N.’s constitutional rights after the District was made aware of Morris’s pattern of abuse. It also held that the District was not liable for negligence under state law. The Nations appeal these deci sions. We affirm the distri ct court’s denial of the Nations’ motion to amend. We also affirm the summary judgment for the District on the § 1983 claim, but on a ground different from that relied on by the district court. Even if there was sufficient evidence of injury after the District was put on notice, the Nations nevertheless faile d to demonstrate that the Di strict acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of fu rther injury to J.N. As fo r the negligence claim, after summary judgment was granted on the § 1983 claims the district court should have declined to exerci se supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. We therefore remand with instructions to dism iss the neglig ence claim without prejudice. Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 23 I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION Although neither party raises a jurisdic tional objection to our review, we have an “independent duty” to ensure our jurisdiction. Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc. , 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 ( 10th Cir. 2001). After the Nations filed a petition in Oklahoma state court, the case was removed to federal court. Their first ame nded complaint alleged claims against the District under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Title IX of the Educati onal Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; and (3) various st ate-law causes of action; it also alleged state-law claims against Morris. The district court had juri sdiction to hear the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1 and had supplemental juri sdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district court granted in part the Dist rict’s motion to dism iss, the District’s motion for summary judgment, and Morris’ s motion for partial summary judgment, leaving only a state-law claim for assault and battery against Morris and a state-law respondeat superior claim ag ainst the District. The cour t did not address whether it should have declined jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after disposi ng of the federal claims. See generally Smith v. City of Enid By & Through Enid City Comm’n , 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”). Five days later the parties filed a join t stipulation to dism iss without prejudice the remaining state-law claims. A moti on for reconsideration of the summaryAppellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 34 judgment order disposing of the § 1983 clai ms was denied and the Nations appealed to this court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we generally have jurisdiction to hear only appeals from final decisions of the district courts. See Amazon , 273 F.3d at 1275. Thus, the question arises whether th e disposition below—where the jurisdiction-supplying federal claims have been adjudicated and the lingering supplemental state-law claims have been voluntarily dism issed without prejudice—reflec ts a final decision allowing review of the adjudicated cl aims. We hold that it does. As a general matter, when some claims in an action have been dismissed with prejudice, a dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice does not create a final appealable decision because the di strict court’s job may not be over. See Jackson v. Volvo Truc ks N. Am., Inc. , 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (“Our general rule is that a party cannot obtain appellate jurisdic tion where the district court has dismissed at least one claim without pr ejudice because the case has not been fully disposed of in the lower court.”); Cook v. Rocky Mounta in Bank Note Co. , 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen a plaintiff voluntarily requests dismissal of her remaining claims without prejudice in order to appeal from an order that dismisses another claim with prejudice, we conclude th at the order is not ‘final’ for purposes of § 1291.”). In particular, when the claims dismissed without prejudice are federal claims or between diverse parties, the plain tiff may be free to refi le those claims in federal court at a later time. Thus, permitti ng an appeal would enable the plaintiff to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 54(b), which perm its entry of final Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 45 judgment (which could be appealed) as to so me but not all claims only if the district court “expressly determines that th ere is no just reason for delay.” See Cook , 974 F.2d at 147–48 (voluntary di smissal without prejudice of two federal claims did not create finality regarding a third claim pr eviously dismissed with prejudice, because the plaintiff “remain[ed] free to file another complaint ra ising those same [federal] claims”; plaintiff had “atte mpted to subvert the require ments of Rule 54(b) by voluntarily dismissing” her federal claims). But we have recognized necessary exceptions to this general rule, particularly when there would otherwise be no aven ue for appeal in federal court. See Jackson , 462 F.3d at 1238 (noting that the rule outlined in Cook “does not apply in every circumstance”). For example, th e same freedom to refile in federal court is usually not available for supplemental state claims dismissed wit hout prejudice. Accordingly, in Amazon , 273 F.3d at 1275, we held that a case had been finally disposed of when a district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over s upplemental state-law claims after adjudication of all relate d federal claims, as is genera lly the expectation in this circuit, see Smith , 149 F.3d at 1156. We explained: Although a dismissal without prejudic e is usually not a final decision, where the dismissal finally disposes of th e case so that it is not subject to further proceedings in federal court, the dismissal is final and appealable. The critical determination as to whether an order is final is whether plaintiff has been effectively excluded from federal court under the present circumstances

. Id. (brackets, citations, and internal quot ation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Otherwise, “a district court’s order di smissing federal clai ms . . . would be Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 56 effectively unreviewable.” Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council , 226 F.3d 1207, 1209 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000). We have applied this “eff ectively excluded” principle even where the parties, rather than the cour t, initiate a dismissa l without prejudice. See, e.g., Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC , 887 F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 2018) (plaintiffs “effectiv ely excluded” from federal c ourt when their voluntarily dismissed state claims were resolved in arbitration); Hyatt v. Bd. of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges , 659 F. App’x 522, 524 (10th Cir. 2016) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice of § 1983 cl aim was not a bar to appellate review because the statute of limitations for refiling the dismis sed claim had passed). Here, there is no way for the state-law claims between the nondiverse parties to return to federa l court—unless we reverse on the jurisdiction-supplying federal claim. The practical effect of the stipulat ed voluntary dismissa l in this case is therefore the same as th e court’s dismissal in Amazon . As in Amazon , it is of no moment that the supplemental claims might be revived if the jurisdiction-providing claims were to be reinstated after appeal. See Est. of Smart by Smart v. City of Wichita , 951 F.3d 1161, 1177 (10th Cir. 2020) (“ [W]hen we reverse a district court’s dismissal of a federal law clai m, we often also direct the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemen tal jurisdiction over any stat e law claims it dismissed along with the federal claim.”); see also 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.8 at 623 (2d ed. 1992) (“The threat to finality posed by voluntar y or invited dismissals depends on the Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 67 question whether a plaintiff who loses the subsequent appeal is permitted to recapture the matters relinquished to establis h finality.” (em phasis added)). We see no compelling reason to treat the situation here as different from the one in Amazon . Treating the judgment below as final does not circumvent the requirements of any rule of procedure; on the contrary, it furthers the general policy of dismissing state-law claims without prejudice when the c ourt has entered a pretrial dismissal of the claims upon wh ich federal jurisdiction is predicated. We hold that there is a final judgment here a nd that we have jurisdiction. II. ANALYSIS “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the district cour t. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc. , 497 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the Nations as the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable infe rences in their favor. See id.
A. Section 1983 Liability The Nations argue that the District’s fa ilure to adequately train and supervise its employees resulted in violations of J.N.’s right to due process. 1 First, they claim

1 The District’s appellate brief failed to argue that Morris’s abuse did not rise to the level of a due-process violation. Although counsel brie fly mentioned during oral argument that any injuri es that occurred after the Di strict was on notice may not Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 78 that the District lacked a written policy for reporting teach er abuse and that it failed to train its staff to report misconduct after it became aware of Morris’s treatment of the students. Second, they claim that the District failed to increase supervision or follow-up on various complaints it received about Morris. Because Defendant is a public-school district, the municipal-liability framework applies. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad. , 602 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Ci r. 2010). “Municipal liability unde r § 1983 attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choi ce to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by city policymakers.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal entity cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees; it is liable only for its own acts—that is, “when the execution of [its ] policy or custom in flicts the injury.” Id. at 385 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to promulgated policies or decisions, a “polic y or custom may take the form of . . . failure to adequately train or supervise employees , so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.” Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City , 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fau lt, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action .” Connick

qualify, “[i]ssues raised for the first time at oral argument are considered waived.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co. , 157 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 1998). Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 89 v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal entity is deliber ately indifferent if it has “actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Id. at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it “may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees,” when “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and th e inadequacy so lik ely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” the policym akers’ failure to train or supervise “may fairly be said to represent a policy for whic h the [municipality] is responsible.” Canton , 489 U.S. at 390. “A municipality’s culpability fo r a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick , 563 U.S. at 61. The requisite notice can be established by “proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct” or, in some cases, without such a pattern “if a violation of federal rights is a highl y predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Bryson , 627 F.3d at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Canton , 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. It is not enough to show that more or better training or supe rvision may have helped avoid the injury. See Canton , 489 U.S. at 391. The training deficiency must have been the “moving force behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g. , Carr v. Castle , 337 F.3d 1221, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2003) (even if police officers were inadequately trained to Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 910 respond to an aggressive suspect, “[t]hey were not trained . . . to shoot [the suspect] repeatedly in the back after he no longer posed a threat”). The District’s liability therefore depe nds on what its relevant policymakers knew about Morris’s conduct, when they kn ew it, and how they responded. Whether a school administrator is considered a policym aker (a final decisionmaker on relevant matters) depends on the specific circumst ances of the case and it may be hotly contested. See Brammer-Hoelter , 602 F.3d at 1189–90 ; Brown v. Gray , 227 F.3d 1278, 1288–89 (10t h Cir. 2000). But here the partie s appear to a ssume that the District is not liable for the actions or inaction of the pa raprofessionals and teachers, but that it may be liable fo r the conduct of higher author ities, such as the directors involved or the school principals. The Dist rict makes no distinct ion between various administrators in its brief nor does it argue that liabil ity cannot be based on their decisions. We therefore assume , without deciding, that the District could be liable for the deliberate indifference of those admini strators. Even with this assumption, however, we affirm dismissal of the § 1983 claims because of the absence of evidence that any administra tor acted with deliberate i ndifference. We limit our discussion to McDonald becau se there is no evidence that another administrator had more relevant information than he did or took relevant action beyond what he took. We summarize the various complaints made about Morris’s classroom and the steps taken by McDonald in response: There appear to have been no complaints about Morris during the 2016–17 school year, Morri s’s first year at Piedmont; and Carol Nation testified that she was happy with Morri s as J.N.’s teacher during that year. At Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1011 the end of the school year, however, a de parting paraprofessi onal (or aide) who worked in Morris’s cl assroom told Lynda White, the Di strict’s Director of Special Services, that she “didn’t lik e how some of the language was and how the kids were being treated” in Morris’s class. Aplt. App., Vol. III at 75 2. But her complaints were not specific and did not mention any inappr opriate contact. White suggested to then vice principal Andrew Graham that he do some “unannounced walk-throughs” to see if he heard anything. Id. at 752. That summer, Graham was replaced by Nadia DeKoch, but no one relayed th ese complaints to her. Less than a month into the following scho ol year, in early September of 2017, Tanya Caraballo, a paraprofessional in Morri s’s class, approached Principal Clay McDonald with concerns about the classr oom. She testified that she was “kind of vague” and told McDonald that they needed additional staff. Id. at 593. McDonald testified that they talked generally about the “int ensity” and “volatility” of the classroom and D.O., one par ticularly difficult student. Id. at 633–34. McDonald told Caraballo he would speak with Morris. Ac cording to Caraballo, Morris held a team meeting the next day and told the paraprofes sionals that “if [they] didn’t like the way that she was doing things, . . . [they] could fi nd another job.” Id. at 594. McDonald testified that during the fall semester some employees shared “how intense that room was,” and that it was crowded and need ed more support. Id. at 620. Morris herself told McDonald she fe lt her classroom was understaffed. And McDonald testified he was well -aware of the staffing concer ns: “I’m in there four to five times out of the week, . . . I know, and . . . the upper administration would come Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1112 over sometimes and help, . . . and we just knew it was just a very difficult situation.” Id. at 623. The employees mentioned that Mo rris seemed stressed, got upset, or was “having it rough right now,” but no one reported that she was making improper physical contact. Id. at 622. The District hired an additional paraprofessional in September, brought in behavi or specialists to work with D.O. and provide additional training to the class staff, and, according to McDonald, he or DeKoch walked by the classroom daily to provide support. On September 15, 2017, the Nations met with Morris to discuss bruising around J.N.’s collarbone and J.N.’s behavior. Morris se nt McDonald, DeKoch, and Dr. Courtney Lockridge, Executive Director of Educational Services, an email to notify them about the meeting, explaining that she “did not have an answer for” the bruising and that she and the Nations discussed J.N.’s in creased aggression at school, which the Nations said they did not see at home. Aplt. App., Vol. II at 441. She also recounted a “fright[ening]” episode with J.N. that day when he grabbed her neck, and she included photos of her neck. Id. Also in mid or late September, Ca raballo approached McDonald again. 2 This time she shared explic it concerns about Morris’s c onduct, saying that she once saw Morris “slam[] [J.N.’s] head against the wa ll” when they took him to the bathroom

2 Caraballo first contacted White for a dvice about how to approach her second complaint with McDonald. White advised her to be as specific as possible with him. Nothing in the record i ndicates what details Cara ballo provided to White. Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1213 together; that she had flipped his desk, causing him to fall; and that she made disparaging remarks to him. Id. at 603. The district court ruled that this mee ting was sufficient to put McDonald, and therefore the District, on notice of Morris’ s unconstitutional behavior. We agree. The reports before this meeting about staffi ng and the intensity of the class did not suggest that Morris was abusi ng students, even if they ma y have indicated the class was dysfunctional. Without notice that trai ning or supervision is “deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to ha ve deliberately chosen” a form of training or supervision likely to cause constitutional violations. Connick , 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added); Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 932 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019) (reports of inmate injuries, without indi cation that injuries were related to officers’ use of force, “fail to suggest any deficiency in Denver’s excessive-force training”). We therefore c onsider only the involved administrators’ conduct after this point to determine wh ether the District acted with deliberate indifference. According to Caraballo, after her s econd meeting with McDonald he said, “That doesn’t seem like [Morri s], but I’ll talk to her.” Ap lt. App., Vol. II at 387. McDonald testified that it was “hard to navigate what was really happening” and he wondered if Caraballo was “trying to get [M orris] in trouble” be cause she was telling him “stuff [he] had never witnessed or . . . heard from anybody el se at that point.” Id. , Vol. III at 724. He said, “[I] was just trying to figure out the best way to handle it because [Caraballo and Morris] did have a very close interworki ng relationship . . . , Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1314 and so [I] wanted to make sure we kept th at relationship going for the benefit of the class.” Id. McDonald then met with Morris about this complaint; the specific contents of this meeting are not revealed in the record but Morris presumably denied the allegations, as she did during her depositi on. After this meeting, according to Caraballo, Morris again told th e paraprofessionals that if they did not like how she ran her class, they could find new jobs. There is no evidence that Caraballo told McDonald, or that McDonald was otherwise aware, that Morris ha d been threatening the paraprofessionals. In October the Nations met with Morri s and McDonald about a cut on J.N.’s head and why he continued to be “so much more aggressive that year than he ever had been.” Id. , Vol. II at 363. Morris to ld them that J.N. slipped in the bathroom and scratched his head. They also “exchanged id eas of things to tr y” to resolve his aggression. Id. at 364. On October 12 the Nations sent McDonald a follow-up email, suggesting that J.N. be allowed to walk outsi de or go to P.E. class to help calm him. McDonald replied that they had tried th is and it seemed to work. There is no evidence the Nations reported any issues to the school after this time. The next week, on October 19, McDonald created a document outlining certain procedures for Morris’s classroom, titled “E xpectations for paraprofessionals” (EFP). Id. at 444. He testified that the EFP was intended to put in place procedures for specific students and remind everyone of proper classroom protocols. The EFP required, among other things, th at “[t]wo staff members must be with [J.N.] when he is taken to the restroom”; that “[i]f the number of staff is short or the ability to have Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1415 all eyes on students in the room is not avai lable, staff members must call the office immediately for help”; and th at “[s]taff members are not to be on their cell phones while they are supervising students.” Id. McDonald met with Morris and each paraprofessional individually to review and sign the expectations; there is no evidence that anyone shared examples of abuse or mentioned fear of Morris during these meetings. DeKoch said in her affida vit that she and McDonald “regularly visited Morris’ classroom and observed [Morris],” and that she performed evaluative observations of Morris in September, November, and December, id. at 282; McDonald testified he was in Morris’s classroom “at least four to five days out of the week,” id. at 254. Neither DeKoch nor McDonald saw Morris violating any po licies or mistreating the students, and she received high marks on her formal evaluation in December. Caraballo and another parapr ofessional said that Morris changed her behavior when the principals were around. Morris acknowledged that McDonald st opped by the class often and would spend about five minutes either talking to students or observing. Caraballo, on the other hand, said he came to the classroom “[o]nly whenever [they] called for help.” Id. , Vol. III at 595. But she also said that McDonald began observing the class more often in late November. On January 16, 2018, Morri s was seen forcefully dr agging D.O. down the hall, causing several employees to approach McDona ld the next day with allegations about Morris’s increased aggression and abuse of the students. Morris was suspended that Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1516 morning. At the District’s request th e special-education staff submitted written statements to the District and the police about their obs ervations. These statements revealed that staff had s een Morris push J.N. agains t the wall; punch him in the genitals to get him to stop masturbating; and “yank his ha ir to get him to do work on occasion,” App. Vol. III at 463. They al so reported that Morris was increasingly taking J.N. to the bathroom alone, often when she was upset with him, and that J.N. returned with marks after one or more of th ese bathroom trips. As part of the police investigation, the Nations pr ovided photos on January 23 of scratches on J.N.’s head that “occurred not long after Christmas Break.” Id. at 671. In light of this evidence we are not as certain as th e district court that the Nations could not show injury after Caraba llo’s second complaint. Regardless, this evidence does not demonstrate de liberate indifference to the risk of fu rther injury to J.N., even if McDonald could have done more to protect the students. The failure of remedial measures does not establish deliber ate indifference. See Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. , 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[t]he fact that [the principal] misr ead the situation and ma de a tragic error in judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she acted with deliberate indifference” when she spoke with the accused teacher and determined the student’s abuse allega tions were untrue); cf. J.M. ex rel. Morri s v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29 , 397 F. App’x 445, 45 3 (10th Cir. 2010) (in Title IX case, finding that, unlike the principal in Doe who took steps to corrobor ate allegations, a principal who failed to even question the alleged perpet rator or victim afte r hearing allegations Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1617 of sexual abuse may be deliberately indifferent)

. For example, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist. , 511 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff claimed that the school district had “a custom of acquiescing to student sexual harassment” because it knew of co mplaints about sexual harassment by the students who assaulted plaintiff’s daughter and had previously disciplined one of those students for sexual harassm ent. But, we said, these steps indicated that “the district was aware of several discrete problems and was working to remedy them— which only raises an issue of the district’s negligence, not its deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1125. And there, the school district was aware of multiple complaints of harassment, which had been corroborated. By contrast, here, McDonald had recei ved only one complaint that Morris had physically abused a student. And afte r Caraballo’s report, which McDonald reasonably took with a grain of salt (because it was inconsis tent with all his previous knowledge of Morris), he met with Morris a nd she apparently denied the allegations. Nevertheless, he formalized procedures for the class th at would ensure there was always another member of the staff with Morris and J.N. and sufficient support staff in the classroom (that is, “ey es on all the students” at a ll times); otherwise, staff members were to call the offi ce immediately, Aplt. App., Vo l. II at 444; he discussed those expectations with Mo rris and each of the paraprof essionals individually and they signed a document memorial izing those expectations. In addition, McDonald and his vice principal increased their personal observations of Morris’s classroom ye t observed no misconduc t. Although the Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1718 Nations argue that McDonald’s short visits were not designed to catch misconduct, McDonald spent longer periods of time in the classroom helping out when it was short-staffed and DeKoch performed evalua tions of Morris in September, November, and December. Thus, from McDonald’s perspective, the remedial measures appeared to be effective, or Caraballo’s observations represented one-o ff incidents. He received no other complaints until January, the princi pals had not observe d any inappropriate behavior, and Morris received high mark s on her evaluations. Once McDonald learned that Morris was violating classroom policies and abusin g students, she was suspended the very same day. Further, McDonald had no reason to belie ve that employees were not reporting Morris’s abuse. The staff was in structed that “if there was something that was off, to report it to your principal. ” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 593. And several employees other than Caraballo had approached McDonald with a va riety of concerns about Morris’s class environment and her stre ss levels. It was hardly obvious that those employees would decline to report more eg regious misconduc t and abuse. In retrospect, one might wish that M acDonald had believed Caraballo rather than Morris at the outset. But we do not th ink that a reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence presented to the district court that McDonald was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Morris might pose to J.N. We therefore affirm the summary judgment in favor of th e District on the § 1983 claims. Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1819 B. Negligent Failure to Investigate The district court also granted judgm ent for the District on Plaintiff’s negligent-investigation claim under the Ok lahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act on the same grounds as the § 1983 claim. Ordinarily, thoug h, the court should dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice once it grants pretrial motions dismissing all the claims on which federal jurisdiction is based. See Smith , 149 F.3d at 1156. We therefore reverse with instructions to the district court to do so on remand.
C. Denial of Motion to Amend “We review for abuse of discretion a di strict court’s deni al of a motion to amend a complaint after the scheduling order’s deadline for amendments has passed.” Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc. , 812 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Ci r. 2015). The party seeking to amend must generally show good cause —for example, learning new facts during discovery. See id. “Courts have denied leave to am end . . . where the moving party cannot demonstrate excusable ne glect, . . . [such as] where [i t] was aware of the facts on which the amendment was based for some time prior to the filing of the motion to amend.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp. , 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987). In March 2021—almost a year after th e time to submit amended pleadings expired—Nations moved for leave to amend their complaint to add claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Re habilitation Act of 1973. They asserted that “[t]hrough discovery in this case, the Nations learned new details about the underlying facts,” citing pr oduction of documents by th e police on October 1, 2020 (in response to the Nations’ subpoena), which included District employees’ Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 1920 statements to police. The district cour t denied the motion: “This case has been pending for over two years. Allowing th e proposed amendments would in many respects start the case over. [The Nations] have failed to cite the discovery of new facts that could not have b een [discovered] earlier with due diligence.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 177. This was not an abuse of discretion. Th e Nations did not explain in district court what new facts supported the existence of an ADA claim beyond the information already available to them, or why that information could not have been discovered earlier. We have held undue delay alone to be reason enough to deny a motion to amend. See Hayes v. Whitman , 264 F.3d 1017, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001). III. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of su mmary judgment for the District on the § 1983 claim and its denial of the Nations’ motion for leave to amend. We REVERSE summary judgment for the District on the state-law negligence claim and REMAND with instructions to dismis s the claim without prejudice.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 20