1

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Melanie Burns-Herrera ) Docket No. 2021-06-0175

)

v. ) State File No. 107705-2019

)

State Industries, LLC, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded

The employee injured her right shoulder at work while lifting the shell of a water heater 

tank. After failing her initial conservative care, she was provided a panel of specialist 

physicians and underwent surgery but continued to complain of pain. The authorized 

physician diagnosed her with adhesive capsulitis due to the shoulder surgery. He advised 

the employee that her condition would improve with time, recommended no additional 

treatment, and placed her at maximum medical improvement. Thereafter, the employee 

sought a second opinion on her own regarding her condition and possible treatment, and 

that physician recommended surgery to address the adhesive capsulitis, which the 

employer declined to authorize. Following an expedited hearing during which both 

physicians’ depositions were entered into evidence, the trial court found the authorized 

treating physician’s medical opinion was not entitled to the statutory presumption of 

medical necessity. The court ordered that the employee be allowed to return to the 

authorized doctor for the recommended surgery, and should that doctor decline to perform 

it, the employer would be required to provide a new panel of physicians. The employee’s 

request to have her chosen physician deemed the new authorized physician was denied. 

The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial 

court’s order and remand the case.

Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.

Lee Anne Murray and Taylor R. Pruitt, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, 

State Industries, LLC

FILED

Sep 12, 2022

12:15 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD
2

Stephan D. Karr and Cindy E. Harris, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, 

Melanie Burns-Herrera

Factual and Procedural Background

At all times relevant to this matter, Melanie Burns-Herrera (“Employee”) worked 

for State Industries, LLC (“Employer”).

1

 On October 15, 2019, she was lifting a 30-pound 

shell for a water heater tank when she felt a cramp in her right arm. After reporting the 

pain to her supervisor, Employee was evaluated at Employer’s on-site clinic, where she 

was given ice and Biofreeze and told to return for physical therapy. During physical 

therapy, the therapist indicated Employee needed to have imaging of her shoulder 

completed.2 Employer provided a panel of physicians, from which Employee selected Dr. 

Shannah Steele. Dr. Steele obtained an MRI in December 2019 and referred Employee to 

an orthopedic physician. Employer provided a panel of orthopedists, and Employee 

selected Dr. Jason Haslam.

Employee first saw Dr. Haslam in January 2020, at which time he diagnosed her 

with impingement syndrome in the right shoulder and provided a cortisone injection. She 

returned a month later, complaining of ongoing pain and frustration with her lack of 

improvement. Dr. Haslam performed a repeat injection and recommended a right shoulder 

arthroscopy with subacromial decompression, debridement, and possible rotator cuff 

repair. Dr. Haslam performed the surgery on March 24, 2020, identifying “a partial 

thickness rotator cuff tear involving the supraspinatus tendon,” which “involved 

approximately 75% of the full-thickness of the supraspinatus tendon.”

Following surgery, Employee returned to Dr. Haslam with what he recorded as

“generalized improvement of her overall symptoms.” He was pleased with the outcome of 

her surgery and placed her on limited work status with no use of her right arm. Dr. Haslam

anticipated placing Employee at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) three months

later. However, at an April 2020 appointment with Dr. Haslam, she reported “significant 

pain and discomfort” despite “participating in physical therapy with general 

improvement.” He prescribed anti-inflammatory and pain medications, continued her 

work restrictions, and again indicated he anticipated placing Employee at MMI in three 

months. Employee continued to report no significant improvement at her May 2020 

appointment, and Dr. Haslam noted a limited range of motion due to pain. He ordered 

additional physical therapy, modified her work restrictions, and indicated she would be at

MMI in two months.

1 In various documents contained in the record, Employer is referred to as “A.O. Smith.” There is nothing 

in the record to indicate why Employer was later referred to as “State Industries, LLC.” We use the name

as reflected in the trial court’s Expedited Hearing Order.

2 The records from the clinic and the physical therapist are not contained in the record; however, Employee’s 

testimony as to her initial treatment was unrefuted at the hearing.
3

Employee returned to Dr. Haslam in June 2020 and reported continued pain. Dr. 

Haslam stated that her “[p]ain at this point is somewhat normal given the operative 

intervention.” He performed another injection during this visit and continued modified 

work restrictions. Employee returned to Dr. Haslam the next month and reported that she 

felt “like her symptoms were getting worse.” She complained of pain and “ongoing 

stiffness” in the right shoulder. Dr. Haslam noted “significant pain at the end range of 

motion” on his exam and ultimately determined she was demonstrating evidence of 

adhesive capsulitis of the right shoulder.3

 He transitioned Employee from physical therapy

to a home therapy program, prescribed pulleys for home exercises, and restricted her to 

lifting no greater than five pounds with no lifting above waist level.

Employee continued to report pain and stiffness at her August and September 2020 

visits. At the September appointment, Dr. Haslam noted Employee remained “quite 

symptomatic” but provided a cortisone injection and released her at MMI. Dr. Haslam

assigned permanent restrictions to Employee of no overhead use of the right arm, but all 

lifting restrictions were removed. He stated he had “no further treatment” to offer and 

would “see the patient back as needed.” Dr. Haslam subsequently completed a Form C30A Final Medical Report assigning a 7% impairment rating and marking that no further 

medical treatment was needed.

In October 2020, Employee returned to Dr. Haslam with continued pain and what 

she perceived as swelling in the right arm. Although Dr. Haslam did not see any significant 

swelling during his exam, he did provide another cortisone injection and stated, “I believe 

she should get a second opinion regarding possible treatment options.”

In December 2020, Employee went to the walk-in clinic at Tennessee Orthopedic 

Alliance (“TOA”). She was initially seen by Dana Duff, a Certified Physician Assistant, 

who referred her for an MRI. After the MRI was completed, Employee returned to TOA

and was seen by another physician assistant, Austin Bragdon. Both physician assistants

agreed with the diagnosis of adhesive capsulitis, and Mr. Bragdon noted it was visible on 

the MRI. Mr. Bragdon indicated he could provide further conservative care, but she 

declined, indicating she would rather proceed with a surgical option. The recommended 

surgery consisted of an “extensive debridement, capsular release, possible distal clavicle 

resection, biceps tenodesis and surgeries as indicated.”

Following these appointments, Employee returned to Dr. Haslam in January 2021. 

Dr. Haslam noted Employee had obtained “an outside second opinion which recommended 

surgical intervention” but repeated his belief that “she would not benefit from surgery.” 

3 Adhesive capsulitis, also known as “frozen shoulder,” can occur after periods of not moving the shoulder 

for some time, such as after an injury or surgery. See “Adhesive Capsulitis,” 

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/frozen-shoulder/symptoms-causes/syc-20372684 (last 

visited September 6, 2022).
4

He further stated that he had no further treatment to recommend. Dr. Haslam did not alter 

her MMI status or restrictions and again released her to be seen as needed.

In June 2021, Employee returned to TOA and was seen by Dr. Matthew Willis.4

 He 

agreed with the diagnosis of adhesive capsulitis and opined that it was “fairly clear that this 

is a direct result of her work-related injury and subsequent [rotator cuff repair] surgery.” 

He discussed the possible surgical alternatives at that time, stating she had “failed very 

extensive conservative measures since her last procedure.”

Dr. Willis was deposed on September 21, 2021. During his testimony, he confirmed 

that Employee initially saw two physician assistants in his practice who diagnosed 

Employee with adhesive capsulitis. Dr. Willis testified he trusted his staff and that “it’s 

got to be pretty cut-and-dried, a very clear case for him to talk to a patient, recommend 

surgery without, you know, me seeing them ahead of time.”

Dr. Willis testified he completed a questionnaire from Employee in May 2021, 

before he ever saw Employee personally, which stated the surgery was more than 50% 

related to work and was reasonable due to the failure of conservative care for her adhesive 

capsulitis. He testified he reviewed the medical records from Dr. Haslam and the 

subsequent MRI before completing the questionnaire. He further testified Dr. Haslam 

performed more injections than he likely would have before discussing surgery with 

Employee and that, as more than a year had passed with continued complaints despite 

therapy and injections, the capsular release was reasonable and necessary.5 Following his 

deposition, Employee returned to Dr. Willis in January 2022, at which time he reiterated 

his willingness to perform surgery and his medical opinion that surgery was reasonable, 

necessary, and primarily caused by her initial October 2019 work injury.

Dr. Haslam was deposed on February 9, 2022. He testified that the diagnosis of 

adhesive capsulitis was primarily related to work, as it was a result of the authorized 

surgery in March 2020. He testified he generally did not recommend surgery for frozen 

shoulder, although he had operated on them “over and over and over again.” He testified 

“the prognosis for frozen shoulder is good. If you do not do surgery, it’s good. If you do 

surgery, it’s pretty good.” He testified he recommended “treat[ing] with time. It gets 

better.” When asked how long the condition would last without surgery, he stated “bellshaped curve, one and a half years.” He further stated, “we can do surgery on it and you 

4 Dr. Willis had previously completed a causation questionnaire at Employee’s request on May 11, 2021. 

Although he had not personally seen Employee at the time he completed the questionnaire, Dr. Willis

answered in the affirmative to the question “[D]id the incident at work cause the injury to the right shoulder 

and her need for surgery by greater than 50% considering all causes?”

5 He testified that the recommended bicep surgery was “probably” related but that the clavicle resection, 

relative to the arthritis of the AC joint, was not.
5

may get your range of motion faster, but you may have a lot of pain for a very long time.” 

He went on to state:

It may take another year and half for your pain to get better. Will you get 

better motion? Probably, because we’re going to cut up the capsule, so yeah, 

you might get better motion. But I promise you, it’s a painful operation.

At the expedited hearing, Employee testified she had continued to work for 

Employer in various positions consistent with her restrictions since the accident of October 

2019. She testified that although she initially was happy with Dr. Haslam’s treatment, she 

did not feel he listened to her about her ongoing pain. She testified she still had pain and 

wanted to proceed with the surgery, as she could no longer do some activities of daily 

living with her right arm.

Following the hearing, the trial court found that Dr. Haslam’s recommendation not 

to undergo surgery to treat her work-related adhesive capsulitis was not entitled to the 

presumption of correctness described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

204(a)(3)(H). The court assigned greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Willis over that of 

Dr. Haslam and ordered Employer to authorize the surgery with Dr. Haslam. Although 

Employee asked that Dr. Willis be named her authorized treating physician, the trial court 

found that, under the circumstances, it had no authority to deem Dr. Willis the authorized 

physician. The trial court did, however, order Employer to provide a new panel of 

specialists to Employee if Dr. Haslam refused to provide the recommend surgeries. 

Employer has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing the trial court’s decision presumes that the 

court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2021). When the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 

considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. 

of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). Moreover, a trial court has the discretion 

to determine which testimony to accept when presented with conflicting expert opinions, 

and we review such determinations using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Johnston v. 

Siskin Steel & Supply Co., No. E2020-00799-SC-R3-WC, 2021 Tenn. LEXIS 241, at *30-

31 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Feb. 10, 2021). However, “[n]o similar deference need 

be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v. 

Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn. 

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of 

statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption 

of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone 

N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our 
6

obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in 

accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor 

either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2021).

Analysis

In its notice of appeal and brief, Employer raises three issues. We reorder and 

restate these issues as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in ordering a surgery not 

recommended by the authorized treating physician; (2) whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by accepting Dr. Willis’s opinion over that of the authorized physician; and (3) 

whether the trial court erred in conditionally ordering a new panel.

Presumption of Medical Necessity

To consider whether the court erred in ordering Employer to authorize a surgery not 

recommended by the authorized treating physician, we must first address whether Dr. 

Haslam’s recommendation not to have surgery is entitled to any type of presumption. 

Stated another way, we must consider whether a recommendation not to undergo treatment 

can be “presumed to be medically necessary.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(H). 

The presumption described in subsection 204(a)(3)(H) applies to “[a]ny treatment

recommended by a physician . . . selected pursuant to subdivision (a)(3).” (Emphasis 

added.) In declining to apply this presumption in the present case, the trial court cited our 

decision in Endsley v. Benchmark Contractors, LLC. Although we explained in Endsley

that the presumption attaches only to treatment recommended by the panel physician, our 

opinion in that case more specifically addressed whether the presumption of medical 

necessity applied to a panel physician’s opinion about another physician’s treatment 

recommendations:

The statute provides that treatment recommended by an authorized doctor is 

presumed to be medically necessary, but makes no mention of whether an 

authorized physician’s opinion about the medical necessity of treatment 

recommended by another doctor is entitled to that same presumption. Thus, 

by the express terms of this subsection, an opinion of one physician 

concerning treatment recommended by another physician does not qualify 

for the presumption described in subsection 204(a)(3)(H).

Endsley v. Benchmark Contractors, LLC, No. 2016-05-0743, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp App. 

Bd. LEXIS 47, at *7-8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 11, 2017).

In this case, Dr. Haslam offered no opinion on the reasonableness and necessity of 

the surgical treatment recommended by Dr. Willis. Rather, he simply stated that he would 

not recommend surgery in this case and had no treatment recommendation, other than 

stating, “[y]ou treat this with time.” As such, the circumstances of the current case are 
7

distinguishable from Endsley. Here, we conclude a statement by the authorized physician 

that he or she has no further treatment to offer is not, standing alone, “treatment” that is 

presumed to be medically necessary. Dr. Haslam made no treatment recommendation after 

placing Employee at MMI, stated he had no other treatment to offer Employee, and told 

her she could return to see him as needed. In essence, Dr. Haslam made no treatment 

recommendation to which the presumption of medical necessity could attach. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude Dr. Haslam’s opinion is not entitled to the presumption 

described in subsection 204(a)(3)(H).6

Weighing of Expert Opinions

We next consider whether the court erred in determining the recommended surgery 

was reasonable and medically necessary to treat a compensable work injury. It is wellsettled that a trial judge has the discretion to determine which opinion to accept when 

presented with conflicting expert opinions. Bass v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 

2016-06-1038, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 36, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. 

App. Bd. May 26, 2017). The court may consider, among other things, “the qualifications 

of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information available to them, 

and the evaluation of the importance of that information by other experts.” Id. We review 

such determinations under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Moore v. Beacon Transport, 

LLC, No. 2018-06-1503, 2021 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ 

Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 29, 2021). A trial court abuses its discretion when it causes an 

injustice to the party challenging the decision by applying an incorrect legal standard, 

reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or basing its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence. State v. Ostein, 293 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Tenn. 2009).

Dr. Haslam was questioned extensively regarding potential treatments for adhesive 

capsulitis in his deposition. He agreed that several treatments exist, including nonsteroidal 

inflammation medications, steroid injections, and physical therapy, all of which he had 

provided. He agreed that surgery was another treatment option, but he also stated that time 

itself was an acceptable treatment plan. Regarding the surgery as recommended by Dr. 

Willis, he testified as follows:

Q: [C]ertainly the capsular release is an appropriate . . . would be an

appropriate treatment option, would that be correct?

A: That’s the most common treatment that we surgically do for adhesive 

capsulitis.

6 We do not intend to suggest that, under other circumstances, a plan for conservative care that includes a 

period of time for healing is not entitled to the presumption of medical necessity found in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(H).
8

Q: And assuming . . . she doesn’t have that, it’s either medicine or live with 

the pain for the rest of her life, is that right?

A: No. I told you the prognosis is good, which means 95 percent of 

patients will recover without any long-terms deficits to their shoulder. 

The prognosis is good for frozen shoulder. That’s why I recommend it. 

Don’t do an operation. You treat this with time. It gets better.

Significantly, Dr. Haslam offered no testimony that the surgery recommended by Dr. Willis 

is not reasonable and necessary. In fact, he acknowledged that, while he did not “personally 

recommend it,” Employee could seek to have another doctor perform the surgery if she 

desired.

In his deposition, Dr. Willis disagreed that Employee’s adhesive capsulitis would 

continue to heal with time, stating “it’s been more than a year . . . so at that point, you 

know, basically, it’s either live with it or address it surgically in the form of a surgical 

release.” He further clarified that “[a]bout a half a percent of people will get postoperative 

capsulitis that’s so severe it requires a release, and she just happened, unfortunately, to fall 

in that category.” Dr. Willis testified that Employee’s prognosis was good relative to the 

recommended surgery.

The court considered the deposition testimony of both doctors in light of the factors 

listed in Bass, and it concluded Drs. Haslam and Willis are equally qualified. The court 

also determined that although Dr. Haslam had seen Employee more times than Dr. Willis, 

the doctors were equally well-positioned to provide an opinion regarding the necessity of 

surgery. Finally, the court noted that both doctors agreed that different conclusions could 

reasonably be reached by different physicians regarding whether the recommended surgery 

was the best treatment plan. After reaching these conclusions regarding the medical 

testimony, the court turned to the lay testimony of Employee.

It is well-settled that courts can consider the testimony of a lay witness when 

analyzing issues regarding medical treatment. See Caskey v. Powers Pizza, LLC, No. 2015-

04-0038, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 37, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. 

Bd. Oct. 7, 2015). “[A]n employee’s assessment as to his or her own physical condition is 

competent testimony that is not to be disregarded.” Limberakis v. Pro-Tech Sec., Inc., No. 

2016-08-1288, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 53, at *5-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. 

App. Bd. Sept. 12, 2017). Here, the trial court considered Employee’s testimony that she 

could no longer participate in some activities of daily living and that she could not enjoy 

some of her hobbies. Employee had complied with the conservative treatment provided to 

her with no improvement in her symptoms, and she has continued working for Employer 

in various positions despite her ongoing symptoms. She obtained a second opinion on the 

recommendation of Dr. Haslam. At the time of the hearing, it had been over two years

since the initial surgery, exceeding the typical 18-month window for recovery discussed 
9

by Dr. Haslam in his deposition. Considering her testimony, the surgical recommendation 

of Dr. Willis, and no countervailing recommendations for reasonable and necessary 

medical treatment by Dr. Haslam, the court ordered Employer to authorize the surgery. 

Based on our review of the expert depositions and witness testimony, we conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Dr. Willis’s opinion over that of Dr. 

Haslam’s.

Conditional Order for a New Panel

Although the court ordered Employer to authorize the requested medical treatment, 

it denied Employee’s request to have Dr. Willis named the authorized treating physician in 

place of Dr. Haslam. Employee did not appeal that portion of the order, although she did 

request that Dr. Willis be deemed the authorized physician in her brief on appeal. However, 

the record is clear that Dr. Haslam was duly selected from a panel, provided significant 

treatment, and has not refused to see Employee at any time. Employee has provided no 

support for the proposition that a trial court has the authority to order the replacement of 

the authorized physician with another of her choosing under these circumstances. We,

therefore, affirm the trial court’s order in that regard.

The court did, however, order Employer to allow Employee to return to Dr. Haslam 

to see if he is willing to perform the surgery. If he declines, Employer must offer Employee

a new panel of specialists. Employee argues the court has authority to order a new panel 

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(g)(2)(B). We agree with 

Employer that Employee’s reliance on that portion of the statute is misplaced. Under the 

plain language of that subsection, it only applies only in cases where a “judgment or 

decree” has already been entered by the workers’ compensation judge through settlement 

or compensation hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(g)(2)(B). Nevertheless, we affirm 

the court’s authority to order a new panel should Dr. Haslam refuse to provide reasonable 

and necessary medical treatment. The duties of a trial judge are set out in section 50-6-

238(a)(3) as follows:

It shall be the duty of a workers’ compensation judge to hear and determine

claims for compensation, to approve settlements of claims for compensation, 

to conduct hearings, and to make orders, decisions, and determinations.

Under subsection 204(a)(1)(A), an employer is obligated to provide medical and 

surgical treatment made “reasonably necessary” by the accident. We previously 

determined a treating physician’s refusal to continue to see an employee can trigger an 

employer’s obligation to issue a new panel to ensure an employee receives “reasonably 

necessary” medical treatment as required by the statute. See, e.g., Limberakis v. Pro-Tech 

Sec., Inc., No. 2016-08-1288, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 53, at *5-6 (Tenn. 

Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 12, 2017) (citing Carter v. Shoney’s, Inc., 845 S.W.2d 

740, 742-44 (Tenn. 1992)). However, we have also determined that, in circumstances 
10

where the treating physician remained willing and able to see the employee, the employer 

was not obligated to provide a new panel even though the employee was dissatisfied with 

the treatment. Baker v. Electrolux, No. 2017-06-0070, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. 

LEXIS 65, at *8-9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 20, 2017). Here, Dr. Haslam has 

indicated he remains willing to see Employee, but he has also indicated he does not 

recommend treatment the trial court has determined to be reasonable and medically 

necessary. Thus, if Dr. Haslam declines to provide the reasonable and necessary medical 

treatment ordered by the trial court, Employer must provide a new panel in order to fulfill 

its obligations under section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order in all aspects and remand 

for any further proceedings that may be necessary. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.
 

 

 

 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Melanie Burns-Herrera ) Docket No. 2021-06-0175 

) 

v. ) State File No. 107705-2019 

)

State Industries, LLC, et al. ) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 

Compensation Claims ) 

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced 

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 12th day 

of September, 2022. 

Name Certified 

Mail

First Class 

Mail

Via

Fax

Via 

Email

Sent to: 

Lee Anne Murray

Taylor R. Pruitt

X leeamurray@feeneymurray.com

trp@feeneymurray.com

Stephan D. Karr

Cindy E. Harris

X steve@flexerlaw.com

cindy@flexerlaw.com

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of 

Workers’ Compensation Claims

X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

 

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243 

Telephone: 615-253-1606 

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov