later, after the State sought permission to admit unfavorable evidence, 

Gillespie informed the court that he wanted to plead guilty pursuant to 

the negotiated agreement and had intended to do so all along. The State 

responded that the offer had lapsed, but noted that Gillespie was free to 

plead guilty to the charged crime without the negotiated benefits. 

Gillespie declined to do so, and the district court denied his request to 

plead guilty pursuant to the defunct agreement. 

First, Gillespie contends that his right to due process was 

violated because the district court rejected his plea to the reduced charge. 

Gillespie contends that the district court was required to accept his plea 

because the agreement never specified a time in which he had to enter the 

plea and he believed he could plead guilty at any time. See Sullivan v. 

State, 115 Nev. 383, 387, 990 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1999) ("A plea agreement is 

construed according to what the defendant reasonably understood when 

he or she entered the plea."). Gillespie also contends that he detrimentally 

relied on the agreement by pleading guilty in his other case. See State v. 

Crockett, 110 Nev. 838, 844-44, 877 P.2d 1077, 1080 (1994). We reject 

each assertion and conclude that Gillespie's right to due process was not 

violated. It was Gillespie's actions, not the State's, which precluded him 

from entering a plea pursuant to the terms of the negotiated agreement. 

His assertion that he never requested a trial and always intended to plead 

guilty is belied by the record. We conclude that no relief is warranted. 

Second, Gillespie contends that the district court erred by 

admitting testimony that he was on parole during the incident as res 

gestae. Evidence of an uncharged bad act is admissible as res gestae if "it 

is so closely related to the act in controversy that the witness cannot 

describe the act without referring to the other uncharged act or crime." 

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Belton v. State, 121 Nev. 436, 444, 117 P.3d 176, 181 (2005). The evidence 

underlying the charge in this case was discovered by Gillespie's parole 

officer while conducting a random search of his reported residence. 

During the search, Gillespie reached for a large envelope. The officer 

briefly looked through the envelope and saw that it contained letters to 

inmates, with whom contact was prohibited by the conditions of Gillespie's 

parole. Suspicions aroused, the officer took the envelope and searched it 

on a later date, wherein she discovered credit card information of another 

person that had been reported as compromised. Because the officer could 

not reasonably explain how she discovered the evidence without 

explaining that Gillespie was on parole, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion.' 

Third, Gillespie contends that the district court violated his 

right to due process and effective assistance of counsel by denying his 

requests for a continuance. "This court reviews the district court's 

decision regarding a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion." 

Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206, 163 13 .3d 408, 416 (2007). Gillespie 

asserted that a continuance was necessary because the decision to admit 

his parolee status required him to "reposition" his defense. The district 

court rejected Gillespie's assertion because he was aware that his parole 

status was an issue in the case. The district court also found that 

Gillespie's purportedly new defenses were essentially the same as those 

that existed before the evidence was admitted. We agree. Moreover, 

Gillespie fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the failure to 

"We also agree that this evidence was admissible pursuant to NRS 

48.045(2), as the State argued in the alternative below. 

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Pickering 

grant a continuance. See Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. „ 222 P.3d 648, 

653 (2010). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying his motion for a continuance. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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