NO. COA13-251

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 January 2014

KRISTIN BERRIER, individually and 

in her capacity as Administrator 

of the Estate of JACOB ALEXANDER 

BERRIER, deceased, and JUSTIN 

BERRIER, in his capacity as 

Administrator of the Estate of 

JACOB ALEXANDER BERRIER, deceased,

Plaintiffs,

v. Guilford County

No. 11 CVS 10349

CAREFUSION 203, INC., CAREFUSION 

CORPORATION, LINCARE INC. d/b/a 

PEDIATRIC SPECIALISTS, LINCARE 

HOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a PEDIATRIC 

SPECIALISTS, JONMARK MAYES, 

SHELLEY R. BOYD, MASIMO 

CORPORATION, MASIMO AMERICAS, 

INC., and QUALITY MEDICAL RENTALS, 

LLC,

Defendants.

Appeal by defendant Quality Medical Rentals, LLC from order

entered 14 November 2012 by Judge James C. Spencer in Guilford

County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 

2013.

Van Laningham Duncan PLLC, by Alan W. Duncan, and Smith Moore 

Leatherwood LLP, by Richard A. Coughlin and Corinne B. Jones, 

for plaintiff-appellees.

Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Robert N. Young, Richard L. 

Vanore, and Michael J. Allen, for defendant-appellant.
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BRYANT, Judge.

Where Quality Medical does not challenge the applicability of 

our long-arm statute in the exercise of personal jurisdiction and 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and 

conclusion of law that Quality Medical maintained minimum contacts 

with North Carolina such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

does not offend the notion of due process, we affirm the order of 

the trial court.

On 29 September 2011 and later on 3 April 2012, plaintiff

Kristin Berrier, both individually and in her capacity as 

administrator of the Estate of Jacob Alexander Berrier, and Justin 

Berrier, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Jacob 

Alexander Berrier, filed and then amended a complaint against 

defendants CareFusion 203, Inc.; CareFusion Corporation; LinCare 

Inc. d/b/a Pediatric Specialists; LinCare Holdings, Inc. d/b/a 

Pediatric Specialists; Jonmark Mayes; Shelley R. Boyd; the Masimo 

Corporation; Masimo Americas, Inc.; and Quality Medical Rentals, 

LLC. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs sought relief on the 

basis of negligence from CareFusion, Pediatric Specialists, Mayes, 

Boyd, Masimo and Quality Medical. Plaintiffs claimed that

CareFusion, Pediatric Specialists, Mayes, Boyd, and Masimo were

liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Claiming
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breach of an implied warranty of merchantability and unfair and 

deceptive trade practices, plaintiffs sought relief from 

CareFusion, Pediatric Specialists, and Masimo. Plaintiffs claimed

that Pediatric Specialists, Mayes, and Boyd committed medical 

malpractice. Plaintiffs asked that punitive damages be assessed 

against CareFusion, Pediatric Specialists, Mayes, Boyd, and 

Masimo.

The allegations set forth in the complaint assert that in 

December 2007, Jacob Berrier, born 23 September 2007, was diagnosed 

with spinal muscular atrophy and placed on a ventilator. Other 

than for short periods of time, Jacob was unable to breathe on his 

own and was unable to move his head or extremities. On 5 November 

2008, Pediatric Services became Jacob’s supplier for medical 

equipment, products, respiratory supplies, and associated home 

ventilator program services. Pediatric Services provided Jacob 

with an LTV 950 ventilator and pulse oximeter. The LTV 950 

ventilators were designed, manufactured, tested, inspected, 

marketed, and distributed by CareFusion. In June 2009, Pediatric 

Specialists entered into a service contract with Quality Medical 

Rentals, LLC, (Quality Medical) to service and repair LTV 950 

ventilators. Quality Medical is a Florida corporation with its 

principal place of business in Largo, Florida.
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Plaintiffs asserted that on 15 June 2009, Pediatric 

Specialists shipped an LTV 950 ventilator to Quality Medical from 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The LTV 950 ventilator was 

identified by its serial number – C15775 Ventilator. Quality 

Medical performed service and maintenance on the C15775 Ventilator 

on 22 June 2009 and then shipped the C15775 Ventilator back to 

Pediatric Specialists in Winston-Salem. On 18 July 2009, Pediatric 

Specialists employee and Center Manager Jonmark Mayes provided the 

C15775 Ventilator to Jacob. On 8 October 2009, the C15775 

Ventilator malfunctioned – it stopped breathing for Jacob and 

failed to alarm. Jacob’s mother was able to provide manual 

ventilation pending the arrival of EMS, and Jacob was then taken 

to a hospital where, for several days, he was treated for 

respiratory distress. The C15775 Ventilator was collected and 

returned to CareFusion which then returned the C15775 Ventilator 

to Pediatric Specialists reporting that it was in good mechanical 

and serviceable condition. Shelley Boyd, an employee of Pediatric 

Specialists, again delivered and set-up the C15775 Ventilator for

Jacob at his home on 29 January 2010. That evening, the C15775 

Ventilator once again malfunctioned; it stopped operating. The 

C15775 Ventilator alarm failed to sound, and the pulse oximeter 

failed to indicate by alarm that the C15775 Ventilator had stopped
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operating. When found, Jacob was not breathing and was without a

pulse. He was admitted to Moses Cone Hospital’s pediatric critical 

care unit in Greensboro where he died four days later.

On 8 June 2012, Quality Medical filed a motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. In an accompanying memorandum of law, 

Quality Medical argued that it did not have sufficient minimum 

contacts with North Carolina in order for the trial court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over it in this matter. Following 

a 19 September 2012 hearing, the trial court entered an order

denying Quality Medical’s 12(b)(2) motion. In its 14 November 

2012 order, the trial court concluded that North Carolina’s long 

arm statute authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction and 

that plaintiffs’ assertions established the minimum contacts 

necessary to satisfy the standards of specific jurisdiction. As 

such, the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

Quality Medical comported with constitutional standards of due 

process. Quality Medical appeals.

_______________________________

On appeal, Quality Medical raises the following issues: 

whether the trial court erred by (I) including specific findings 

of fact in its order denying Quality Medical’s motion to dismiss; 
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and (II) concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

comports with due process.

Right to appeal

Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 1-277, 

“[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal 

from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over 

the person or property of the defendant or such party may preserve 

his exception for determination upon any subsequent appeal in the 

cause.” N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 1-277(b) (2011); see also Bruggeman v. 

Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 614, 532 S.E.2d 215, 

217 (2000) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction is immediately appealable.” (citation omitted)).

I

Quality Medical argues that in the order denying Quality 

Medical’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 

trial court erred in making certain findings of fact. More 

specifically, Quality Medical contends that the trial court erred 

in making findings of fact based upon (1) unverified allegations 

in the amended complaint, (2) incompetent deposition testimony, 

and (3) service and maintenance records not relevant to the 

ventilator central to this case. We disagree.

Standard of review
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The standard of review to be applied by 

a trial court in deciding a motion under Rule 

12(b)(2) depends upon the procedural context 

confronting the court. Typically, the parties 

will present personal jurisdiction issues in 

one of three procedural postures: (1) the 

defendant makes a motion to dismiss without 

submitting any opposing evidence; (2) the 

defendant supports its motion to dismiss with 

affidavits, but the plaintiff does not file 

any opposing evidence; or (3) both the 

defendant and the plaintiff submit affidavits 

addressing the personal jurisdiction issues.

Banc of Am. Sec. LLC v. Evergreen Int'l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. 

App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005).

Quality Medical submitted a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ 

amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion 

was supported by an affidavit from Quality Medical manager Donald 

Perfetto and a memorandum of law contending that Quality Medical

lacked sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina for the 

trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

[I]f the defendant supplements his motion 

to dismiss with an affidavit or other 

supporting evidence, the allegations in the 

complaint can no longer be taken as true or 

controlling and plaintiff cannot rest on the 

allegations of the complaint. In order to 

determine whether there is evidence to support 

an exercise of personal jurisdiction, the 

court then considers (1) any allegations in 

the complaint that are not controverted by the 

defendant's affidavit and (2) all facts in the 

affidavit (which are uncontroverted because of 

the plaintiff's failure to offer evidence).
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Id. at 693-94, 611 S.E.2d at 182-83 (citations and quotations

omitted).

Where, as here, the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing 

including depositions and arguments of counsel, “the trial court 

[is] required to act as a fact-finder, and decide the question of 

personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Deer 

Corp. v. Carter, 177 N.C. App. 314, 322, 629 S.E.2d 159, 166 (2006)

(citation omitted).

When this Court reviews a decision as to 

personal jurisdiction, it considers only 

whether the findings of fact by the trial 

court are supported by competent evidence in 

the record; . . . [w]e are not free to revisit 

questions of credibility or weight that have 

already been decided by the trial court.

Id. at 321, 629 S.E.2d at 165 (citation and quotations omitted).

(1) Unverified allegations

Quality Medical first argues that the unverified allegations 

in plaintiffs’ amended complaint are not competent evidence and 

should not have been considered by the trial court.

“Where unverified allegations in the complaint meet 

plaintiff's initial burden of proving the existence of 

jurisdiction ... and defendant[s] ... d[o] not contradict 

plaintiff's allegations in their sworn affidavit, such allegations 

are accepted as true and deemed controlling.” Inspirational 
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Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 

758 (1998) (citation and quotations omitted).

Quality Medical specifically notes the trial court’s finding 

of fact number 10, which states “the allegations of the Plaintiffs 

in the Amended Complaint, if proven, would constitute a clear 

source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts of 

Quality Medical.”1 Quality Medical argues that the trial court 

impermissibly relied upon the allegations of the amended complaint 

as the key factor in deciding the “source and connection of the 

cause of action to the contacts.” 

In the amended complaint, plaintiffs assert that “[u]pon 

information and belief, at all times relevant herein, Quality 

Medical serviced products, materials, and things, including but 

not limited to the C15775 Ventilator that is the subject of this 

action, that were used within North Carolina in the ordinary course 

of business.” In its motion to dismiss the amended complaint and 

the accompanying documents, Quality Medical acknowledges that it 

 

1 The trial court gave careful consideration to the existence of 

minimum contacts with the forum state in determining specific 

jurisdiction based on the following factors:

(1) quantity of the contacts;

(2) the nature and quality of the contacts;

(3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the 

contacts;

(4) the interest in the forum state; and 

(5) convenience of the parties.
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is a limited liability company located in Florida, that “the vast 

majority of [its] business is servicing medical equipment,” and 

that it receives medical equipment and service requests from 

Pediatric Specialists. It also states that “[i]n July 2009 

Pediatric Specialists provided Plaintiffs ventilator # C15775 . . 

. [and that] Quality Medical serviced ventilator C15775 in Florida 

in June 2009.” The amended complaint alleges that “[a]s a result 

of the C15775 Ventilator failure, Jacob [Berrier] suffered severe

hypoxic injury and brain damage, including hypoxic-ischemic 

encephalopathy and diffuse cerebral edema, and remained in the 

Pediatric Critical Care Unit at the Hospital for four days, and 

then died.” On this record, it is clear that the uncontroverted

allegations of the amended complaint along with certain 

acknowledgments in Quality Medical’s motion to dismiss and 

documentation in support thereof provide competent evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding of fact number 10: “[I]f proven, 

[the allegations] would constitute a clear source and connection 

of the cause of action to the contacts of Quality Medical.” See 

Banc of Am. Sec., 169 N.C. App. at 693-94, 611 S.E.2d at 182-83; 

Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at 235, 506 S.E.2d at 758.

Quality Medical also challenges other findings of fact on the 

basis that the trial court relied heavily on unverified allegations
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in the amended complaint. In challenging these findings of fact, 

Quality Medical argues that “there is no evidence in the record 

that [it] had any knowledge of who the final user of any medical 

equipment would be or where the equipment would be used.”

The trial court made pertinent findings of fact that Quality 

Medical performed service and repairs to medical equipment 

designed for home oxygen care and respiratory therapy; that some 

requests for Quality Medical’s services came from Pediatric 

Specialists, which sent equipment from North Carolina to Quality 

Medical in Florida; and that Quality Medical returned the medical 

equipment from Florida to Pediatric Specialists in North Carolina. 

Though the trial court acknowledged Quality Medical’s contention 

that when returning repaired medical equipment Quality Medical had 

no knowledge of the end user’s identity, the trial court found 

unreasonable if not incredible the proposition that Quality 

Medical did not know the identity of the end user or that there 

would be an end user in North Carolina.

9. The [Trial] Court does find that the 

nature and quality of the contacts . . . 

establish a reasonable expectation on the part 

of Quality Medical that the serviced and 

repaired medical equipment received from and 

returned to North Carolina would be used by 

medically dependent consumers within the 

State.
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Therefore, the uncontested allegations of the amended 

complaint in conjunction with the averments of the affidavit 

provide a sufficient basis to uphold the challenged findings of 

fact. See Banc of Am. Sec., 169 N.C. App. at 693-94, 611 S.E.2d 

at 182-83; Inspirational Network, 131 N.C. App. at 235, 506 S.E.2d 

at 758.

(2) Deposition testimony of Shelley Boyd and Jonmark Mayes

Next, Quality Medical argues that the deposition testimony of 

Pediatric Specialists employee Shelley Boyd and former employee

Jonmark Mayes was not competent to establish personal jurisdiction 

over Quality Medical.

In her deposition testimony, Shelley Boyd, an employee of 

Pediatric Specialists at the time of her deposition on 29 August 

2012, testified that while the center for which she worked sent

broken or malfunctioning equipment for repair to Quality Medical, 

she was unaware if Pediatric Specialists used Quality Medical for 

repair and maintenance services in 2009 and the beginning of 2010.

Jonmark Mayes, a former employee and center manager of 

Pediatric Specialists, stated in his deposition testimony that

Pediatric Specialists used Quality Medical “the majority of the 

time” for periodic maintenance of ventilators but failed to be 

specific as to what period he was referring.
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We agree with Quality Medical that the deposition testimony 

of Boyd and Mayes is not competent standing alone to support the 

trial court’s findings of fact as to personal jurisdiction. 

However, Quality Medical does not allege and we do not find that 

the trial court made any finding of fact solely predicated upon 

the deposition testimony of Boyd or Mayes. Therefore, we review 

additional evidence that might be deemed competent to support the 

trial court’s findings of fact as to personal jurisdiction.

(3) Service records of ventilators

Quality Medical next argues that the trial court erred in 

making findings of fact based upon evidence retrieved from the 

maintenance records of ventilators serviced by Quality Medical 

that were not related to the cause of action.

The record reflects four maintenance or repair records from

Pediatric Specialists of ventilators serviced by Quality Medical

between 2008 and 2010. Of the four records, Quality Medical 

acknowledges and does not otherwise contest the record relating to 

its service of Ventilator C15775 in June 2009 but contends that 

the remaining three service reports, which relate to Ventilator 

C02515, are not relevant to the cause of action against Quality 

Medical. Quality Medical bases this contention on plaintiffs’
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failure to claim negligence in the maintenance of Ventilator 

C02515.

We point out that the question presented is whether competent

evidence exists to support the challenged findings of fact. While 

the maintenance records do not support one finding, exclusively, 

the maintenance records do support the trial court’s finding of 

fact number 1:

1. . . . [O]n at least four separate 

occasions between September of 2008 and May 

[2010], [Quality Medical did] receive LTV950 

ventilator medical devices from co-defendant 

Lincare [(Pediatric Specialists)] sent from 

North Carolina, on which Quality Medical 

performed service, maintenance and/or repair 

in Florida and then returned to Lincare 

[(Pediatric Specialists)] in North Carolina.

Quality Medical further contends that the service records for 

LTV950 ventilator serial number Ventilator C02515 are not

competent evidence to support findings that in turn support the 

trial court’s conclusion that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Quality Medical based on specific jurisdiction

does not violate due process. We consider this argument more fully 

in our discussion of issue II.

We note that on appeal, Quality Medical listed findings of 

fact 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 14 as findings it intended to 

challenge as made in error. In its argument to this Court, Quality 
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Medical directly challenged findings of fact 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10

for the following reasons: lacking sufficient basis; incompetent

deposition testimony (though it failed to direct our attention to 

any finding of fact predicated on the testimony); and relevancy 

(but, again, failed to direct the attention of this Court to any 

finding of fact made in error as a result). To the extent that 

findings of fact 1, 2, and 5 are unchallenged by Quality Medical, 

those findings are binding on appeal.2 See In re Schiphof, 192 

 

2 In its 14 November 2012 order, the trial court made the following 

findings of fact:

1. [(A)] The Court does find from the evidence presented 

that at least two Lincare personnel in North Carolina were of 

the opinion that Quality Medical provided maintenance 

services for Lincare’s ventilator medical devices and that 

Quality Medical did, on at least four occasions between 

September of 2008 and May of [2010], receive LTV950 ventilator 

medical devices from co-defendant Lincare sent from North 

Carolina, on which Quality Medical performed service, 

maintenance and/or repair in Florida and then returned to 

Lincare in North Carolina.

(B) The nature and quality of the contacts – Plaintiffs do 

not suggest that Quality Medical had direct contact with, or 

even knew the identity of, the ultimate users of the medical 

equipment which it serviced for its co-defendants Lincare, 

Inc. and Lincare Holdings, Inc., both d/b/a Pediatric 

Specialists, providers of home oxygen care and other 

respiratory therapy services. . . . There is no evidence of 

Quality Medical having any offices, employees, sales 

representatives or other agents in North Carolina (its only 

office is in Florida); it has no property (real or personal) 

in North Carolina; it has not actively or specifically 

solicited business or advertised in North Carolina, although 

it has a website which describes the services it performs at 
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N.C. App. 696, 700, 666 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2008) (“Unchallenged 

findings of fact are presumed correct and are binding on appeal.”

(citation omitted)). Finding of fact 14 states in pertinent part 

that “specific jurisdiction exists, the cause of action having 

arisen from or being related to Defendant Quality Medical’s 

contacts with the forum.” We will consider this finding as it 

relates to Quality Medical’s arguments presented in issue II.

II

Quality Medical argues that the trial court erred in 

concluding the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with 

constitutional standards of due process. Specifically, Quality 

Medical contends that it did not purposefully avail itself of the 

opportunity to do business in North Carolina and that it lacked 

 

its Florida location; it is not licensed or registered to do 

business in North Carolina; and it has never previously been 

involved in litigation in North Carolina; and

2. The Court does find the above-referenced facts to be 

established by a preponderance of the evidence.

However, there likewise appears to be no serious dispute 

as to the following additional facts, which the Court also 

finds to be established by a preponderance of the evidence:

. . .

5. Some of the service requests came from Lincare locations in 

North Carolina[.]
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sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy the standard of 

specific jurisdiction. We disagree.

In its 14 November 2012 order denying Quality Medical’s motion 

to dismiss, the trial court drew the following conclusion:

Having considered the five factors used in 

determining the existence of the minimum 

contacts necessary to properly allow the 

exercise of that statutory jurisdiction, the 

Court finds that Quality Medical, having 

delivered the repaired and serviced medical 

equipment into the stream of commerce in North 

Carolina with the reasonable expectation that 

the equipment would be used by medically 

dependent consumers within the State, was 

“fairly warned” that litigation might result

from injuries that were alleged to have arisen 

out of or were related to its activities in 

servicing or repairing the equipment and the 

Court further finds that specific jurisdiction

exists, the cause of action having arisen from 

or being related to Defendant Quality 

Medical’s contacts with the State.

(emphasis added). “When this Court reviews a decision as to 

personal jurisdiction, it considers only whether the findings of 

fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the 

record; if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial 

court.” Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 

183 (citation and quotations omitted).

In addressing a challenge to personal jurisdiction over a 

non-resident defendant, a trial court must employ a two-step 

analysis. “First, the transaction must fall within the language 
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of the State's ‘long-arm’ statute. Second, the exercise of 

jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the 

fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.” Tom Togs, 

Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 

785 (1986) (citation omitted). Quality Medical does not contest 

whether a basis for jurisdiction exists under North Carolina’s 

long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 1-75.4 (2011), instead 

contending only that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it

offends constitutional standards of due process.

Long-Arm Statute

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized pursuant 

to our long-arm statute, General Statutes, section 1-75.4, 

in any action claiming injury to person or 

property within this State arising out of an 

act or omission outside this State by the 

defendant, provided in addition that at or 

about the time of the injury either:

. . .

 b. Products, materials or thing 

processed, serviced or manufactured by the 

defendant were used or consumed, within this 

State in the ordinary course of trade[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 1-75.4(4)(b.) (2011). “Under our ‘long arm’

statute, North Carolina courts may obtain personal jurisdiction 

over a non-resident defendant to the full extent permitted by the 

Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Saxon v. 
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Smith, 125 N.C. App. 163, 173, 479 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1997) (citation 

omitted).

Due Process

“To satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, there 

must exist ‘certain minimum contacts [between the non-resident 

defendant and the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit 

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786 (citing 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 

“The concept of ‘minimum contacts’ furthers two goals. First, it 

safeguards the defendant from being required to defend an action 

in a distant or inconvenient forum. Second, it prevents a state 

from escaping the restraints imposed upon it by its status as a 

coequal sovereign in a federal system.” Skinner v. Preferred 

Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122, 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006) (citation 

omitted). When evaluating whether minimum contacts with the forum 

exists, a court typically evaluates “the quantity and nature of 

the contact, the relationship between the contact and the cause of 

action, the interest of the forum state, the convenience of the 

parties, and the location of witnesses and material evidence.” 

Saxon, 125 N.C. App. at 173, 479 S.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted).3

 

3 While we acknowledge Quality Medical’s cited authority supporting 
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The trial court found that Quality Medical received repair 

requests for two of the ventilators referred to in the amended 

complaint, serviced those devices in Florida, and returned the 

devices to Pediatric Specialists in North Carolina. The trial 

court found implausible the proposition that Quality Medical did 

not know what the end use of the ventilators would be or that the 

end user – a medically dependent consumer – would be located in 

North Carolina. Based on the record before us, we uphold this 

finding. The trial court further found that, if proven true, the 

allegations of the complaint – namely that Quality Medical’s 

negligence in servicing ventilator model LTV950, serial number 

C15775, resulted in injury, damage, and death – form the basis of 

the action. This Court has previously acknowledged that our State 

has a powerful public interest in protecting its citizens against 

out-of-state tortfeasors. See id. at 173, 479 S.E.2d at 794 (“In 

light of the powerful public interest of a forum state in 

protecting its citizens against out-of-state tortfeasors, the 

court has more readily found assertions of jurisdiction 

constitutional in tort cases.”); see also Cooper v. Shealy, 140 

 

its position that it did not purposefully avail itself of the 

privilege of conducting business in North Carolina, we recognize 

that the cases cited regard contractual relations, not tortious 

conduct.
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N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000) (holding the exercise of 

jurisdiction did not offend due process where the defendant engaged 

in tortious conduct: alienation of affection and criminal 

conversation). Though on appeal Quality Medical asserts that North 

Carolina would be an inconvenient forum in which to litigate this 

action, it provides no support for this assertion.

Specifically, given the quality and nature of the contacts 

between Quality Medical and North Carolina, the connection between 

Quality Medical’s contacts with the State and the cause of action, 

and the interest of North Carolina in protecting its citizens from 

tortfeasors, the maintenance of the suit in North Carolina does 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. See Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786; see 

also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605, 609, 334 S.E.2d 

91, 94 (1985) (“It was clear that the alleged tort would have its 

damaging effect in North Carolina. Simply because defendant was 

able to cause the injury without physically coming to this state 

does not defeat jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly,

we overrule Quality Medical’s challenge to the trial court’s 

exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.