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An essential phase in NASA’s performance management cycle is to evaluate Agency performance against 

its plans. Managers assess performance throughout the year and pay particular attention when NASA’s 

performance falls short of its goals. They seek explanations, develop plans to improve performance, and 

track results for as long as necessary. NASA leadership also evaluates trends across the portfolio of 

programs and over longer periods of time to identify and resolve persistent issues.

The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 reinforced NASA’s approach 

to performance management by introducing requirements for unmet program performance. Specifically, 

Congress required agencies and the Office of Management and Budget to provide analysis of trends in 

unmet performance targets. When a NASA program does not meet its commitment as stated in the annual 

performance plan, responsible program officials must explain the performance shortfall and provide an 

improvement plan for correcting the issue. This section provides the explanations and performance 

improvement plans for any unmet performance measures in FY 2012 and, where applicable, the link to 

the prior year’s performance. For FY 2012, NASA discusses performance trends in the following 

categories:

• Cost and Schedule Performance,

• Commercial Spaceflight Development, and

• Diversity. 

To provide better performance improvement plans, NASA assesses the explanations for unmet 

performance and looks for trends in root causes. The results of this root cause analysis inform senior 

management when crosscutting corrective actions are warranted. In addition, NASA uses information on 

management and performance challenges, as identified by NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to better understand root causes and to guide setting 

improvement plans.
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Addressing Management Challenges

The Agency relies on internal and external evaluations of its policies and performance to improve 

performance management. Three such external evaluations deliver valuable insight into areas for 

improvement: 

• The GAO High Risk Series; 

• GAO’s Major Management Challenges and Program Risks, also referenced as the Management 

and Performance Series; and 

• OIG’s annual Letter on NASA’s Top Management and Performance Challenges.

While the individual GAO and OIG reports provide a snapshot of the challenges at one- to two-year 

intervals, NASA examined the topics highlighted in the reports over a longer timeframe for additional 

insight. NASA looked for trends in the GAO reports over a 20-year span and in the OIG reports a 12-year 

span (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Trends in GAO High Risk and OIG Management Challenges, 1991-2012

Category

Report Year

1991/19921993/19941995/19961997/19981999/20002001/20022003/20042005/20062007/20082009/20102011/2012

Financial Management ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ■

Contract Management ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■

Program and Project 

Management/Cost and 

Schedule Performance

▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ▲ ■

IT Governance and 

Security ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Infrastructure and 

Facilities Management ▲ ▲ ▲ ■ ▲ ■ ■

Human Capital 

Management ▲ ▲ ▲ ■ ■ ■

Human Spaceflight 

Transition and Future ■ ■ ■ ■

Safety and Mission 

Assurance ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Legend: ▲– GAO High Risk/Major Management Challenges

■ – OIG Management Challenges
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NASA identified eight categories where GAO and OIG predominately highlighted challenges. The 

primary categories of interest to both sets of evaluators center on NASA’s financial management, contract 

management, and program and project management, particularly in the area of cost and schedule 

estimation. In each of these categories, NASA has made significant progress at addressing the weaknesses 

as outlined by GAO and OIG, as discussed below. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

NASA has made significant improvements to the integrity of its financial management systems, 

processes, and reports. In the early 1990s, GAO reported that NASA was not in compliance with the 

Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 requirements for a single integrated financial management system, 

and had accounting systems that were costly and outdated. NASA accelerated its efforts to develop an 

integrated system, but experienced delays in development, along with financial controls and reporting 

challenges along the way. The Agency continued to address each of these challenges and overcame them 

in FY 2011 to achieve an unqualified audit opinion. In FY 2012, NASA focused on maintaining the 

unqualified opinion while improving efficiencies and reducing costs. For example, NASA reduced 

administrative spending on travel, printing, supplies, and advisory services. These savings, which are 

associated with the Administration’s management agenda to “Promote Efficient Spending,” enabled the 

Agency to increase funding for research and development contracts, facilities enhancements, and grants. 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

NASA contracts over 80 percent of its budget to acquire goods and services. Hence, the Agency has 

invested a significant effort in developing robust processes and procedures that ensure a strategic 

approach to acquisition planning and contract management. The Agency continues to address challenges 

in acquisition management and to build on these processes and procedures. For example, NASA 

continues to improve its earned value management capabilities, which started with initial codification of 

contract management policies in 1999, and now includes an expansion of requirements to measure 

performance of in-house efforts. These improvements will provide a holistic picture of the Agency’s 

projects, which include both contractor and civil servant work. NASA also instituted senior leadership 

forums to ensure that contracting approaches are reviewed as part of the Agency acquisition process, and 

that acquisition decisions are integrated with budget and strategic planning. NASA will continue efforts to 

improve contract management, and is revisiting the measures that are currently within the annual 

performance plan to further characterize and monitor progress in areas of challenge.

The third area of interest, program and project management, particularly in the area of cost and schedule

estimation, is discussed in the “Highlighted Performance Trends” section.

OTHER CATEGORIES

NASA remains diligent in addressing any current challenges in the other five categories of interest: 

human capital management, infrastructure and facilities management, safety and mission assurance, 

human spaceflight transition and future directions, and information technology governance and security. 

Below is a brief discussion of the status of these categories.
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Human Capital Management 

When GAO identified human capital management as a high-risk area, their concern was that Federal 

agencies were not strategically planning for their human capital needs. NASA has been off GAO’s list 

since 2003/2004. Beginning in 2005/2006, OIG also identified Shuttle and Constellation workforce 

transition as a management challenge. To help with transition, OHCM provided a range of tools and 

assistance to civil servants and contractors, including job seeking training sessions, career counseling, 

retention pay, and workforce sharing. OIG removed Shuttle and Constellation workforce transition as a 

management challenge as of 2011/2012. In 2011, NASA’s Office of Human Capital Management 

(OHCM) released its Workforce Plan, which ensures that OHCM’s priorities are aligned with NASA’s 

future directions. 

Infrastructure and Facilities Management 

For years, GAO and OIG have highlighted issues with aging and underutilized infrastructure at NASA, 

including the scheduling and funding of facilities maintenance and repair, and NASA continues to address 

these issues. In 2011, NASA began developing its first integrated, Agency-wide real property Master 

Plan. NASA intends to use the Plan to coordinate resources across the Agency, link real property needs

with projected funding to support NASA programs and strategic objectives, and gain efficiencies by 

eliminating facilities that no longer benefit the Agency. The development of an Agency-wide Master 

Plan is the result of NASA's efforts to revise its facility strategy to reduce the Agency’s infrastructure 

footprint. In response to the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA prepared a strategy document 

that describes the facilities renewal approach adopted in 2009 by the Agency, known as the

“similar/smaller strategy,” with a goal to reduce each Center’s current replacement value by 10 percent 

by 2020 and 15 percent by 2050. NASA continues efforts to identify and reduce the Agency's unneeded

and duplicative research and development facilities.

Safety and Mission Assurance 

In 2003, OIG reported the Space Shuttle as a material weakness after the Columbia accident on 

February 1, 2003, and identified a range of safety and management assurance management challenges that 

would hinder return to flight. NASA corrected these issues in 2005. As NASA worked to complete ISS 

and retire the Shuttle fleet, OIG noted the additional risks to people, equipment, and mission that would 

result from the associated schedule pressures, technical challenges, and budgetary constraints. OIG 

removed this area as a management challenge two years before NASA safely flew out the Shuttle 

manifest and retired the fleet. 

Human Spaceflight Transition and Future Directions 

Over the past four years, this category has included retiring the Shuttle fleet, utilizing ISS safely, 

obtaining commercial cargo and crew services to low Earth orbit, and developing the next-generation 

Space Launch System (SLS). In FY 2011, NASA flew the last Shuttle mission, delivering the last major 

ISS component, and retired the fleet, one year later than the planned target. NASA’s focus is now on fully 

utilizing ISS. A significant factor in achieving this is the amount of time the crew can commit to research. 

NASA has increased average crew research time from 23.9 hours per week in 2010 to 35 hours per week 

in 2012.
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The need for domestic access to space places has placed emphasis on NASA’s support for commercial 

space services. In FY 2012, the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program partner SpaceX 

conducted a demonstration flight to ISS and its first resupply mission. NASA continues to tackle the 

challenges of developing requirements and certifying vehicles, particularly for commercial crew 

transportation services. Additionally, NASA continues to develop new spaceflight capabilities to move 

beyond low Earth orbit, through the development of SLS and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), 

expected to have their first uncrewed demonstration in 2017. As these systems successfully develop, 

NASA expects that this management challenges area will be retired.

Information Technology Governance and Security 

Over the past five years, OIG issued 21 audit reports containing 69 IT-related recommendations. OIG 

investigators conducted more than 16 separate investigations of breaches to NASA networks, several of 

which resulted in the arrests of foreign nationals. To improve the Agency’s capability to detect and 

respond to cyber attacks and unauthorized access to its computers, in November 2008 NASA created a 

single, Agency-wide computer security incident response capability. An August 2012 OIG audit 

determined that this was providing an effective system for managing and reporting most IT security 

incidents. In FY 2012, NASA’s IT security program began providing full-disk encryption on notebook 

computers and other mobile computing devices distributed to employees, with the target of Agency-wide 

protection by March 31, 2013. The audit also provided recommendations for enhancing NASA’s 

detection and prevention capabilities, and the Agency is in the process of implementing these 

recommendations. NASA will continue to show improvements into the future in this area.
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Highlighted Performance Trend: Cost and Schedule 

Performance

COST AND SCHEDULE CHANGES TO PROJECT BASELINES: PERFORMANCE 

IMPROVEMENTS SEEN

This section provides a detailed look at the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s programs and 

projects, as demonstrated in the FY 2013 Major Program Annual Report (MPAR), which only includes 

projects in development with a lifecycle cost baseline of $250 million or more, and through annual 

performance goals in the FY 2012 Agency Performance Report. It discusses progress and corrective 

actions that NASA has taken in response to growth in both cost and schedule baselines. NASA also 

provides evidence of improvement, demonstrating that Agency policies lead to cost and schedule 

performance that meets Agency commitments across its portfolio. 

Taking Corrective Actions Has Led to Performance Improvements 

In the last five years, NASA fundamentally transformed how it manages its programs and projects, 

acquisition strategies, and procurements. This included strengthening program and project management, 

establishing more rigorous cost estimation practices, and revising procurement practices and systems. 

These efforts are now yielding demonstrated results for projects that were initiated under the new policies

four to five years ago and have completed development in the last one to two years.

Trends in Annual Performance Goals Reflect Improvements 

NASA established annual performance goals to measure cost and schedule performance. For example, the 

Agency created several measures that track completion of development projects to 10 percent over their 

cost and schedule baseline. Exceeding this threshold results in a rating other than Green. Figure 3.2 shows 

that over the last three fiscal years the number of cost and schedule annual performance goals (APGs) 

rated Yellow or Red has decreased, both in actual numbers and as a portion of the total number of APGs.
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Figure 3.2: Cost & Schedule APGs by Rating, FY 2010-FY 20121

0% 

20% 

40% 

60% 

80% 

100% 

FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 

53% 

67% 73% 

37% 

24% 18% 

10% 10% 9% 

Percentage of C&S APGs 

Changes to Cost and Schedule Estimating Policy Strengthened Performance 

The Joint Confidence Level (JCL) policy has improved cost performance of NASA projects. NASA 

demonstrates the effectiveness of the new JCL policy by comparing the cost performance of projects 

confirmed using a JCL to projects confirmed under previous Agency policies, such as the Cost 

Confidence Level and Pre-Cost Confidence policies. Figure 3.3 shows that there is less variation from the 

estimated development cost baseline as NASA refined and implemented acquisition policies.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   1 NASA revised the rating for OSIRIS-REx from White to Yellow after the Congressional Justification was printed. 

Therefore, this chart is different from the printed version.
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Figure 3.3: Cost Performance of NASA Projects Versus Cost and Schedule Estimating Policies2

Since mid-2011, six NASA missions (Juno, GRAIL, NPP, MSL, Van Allen Probes (formerly known as 

RBSP), and LDCM) launched without experiencing significant development cost growth from their 

Agency baseline commitments. All except NPP and MSL were launched under their original baseline 

budget. NASA confirmed NPP and MSL prior to many of the current program management 

improvements; adoption of these management practices as part of their rebaseline stabilized their cost 

performance.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   2 NASA rebaselined the development costs of the NPP, Glory, MSL, SOFIA, and JWST projects. Figure 3.3 provides 

the cost changes from both the rebaseline and the original baseline, set at Key Decision Point-C. As reported in 

NASA’s FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification, due to a second Taurus-XL launch vehicle failure, NASA 

delayed the source selection and launch services preparations, integration, and testing for the OCO-2 project,

resulting in a schedule delay and additional cost.
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Six space missions that remain in development are below the Congressionally prescribed fifteen percent 

cost threshold and six-month schedule threshold from their confirmation or rebaselined cost numbers; 

IRIS, LADEE, MAVEN, GPM, MMS, and JWST. OCO-2 is the single mission in development that has 

experienced cost growth since the FY 2013 Congressional Justification. The cost growth is due to 

selection of a more expensive and reliable launch vehicle, a NASA-directed change following two 

consecutive launch vehicle failures. While risks remain for all projects yet to launch, overall cost 

performance has prevented budgetary disruptions to other projects. 

A History of Corrective Actions to Improve Cost and Schedule Performance 

NASA’s spaceflight projects are generally complex missions that require cutting edge scientific research 

and technology development. To effectively manage these acquisitions, NASA requires the integration of 

fundamental program and project management tools and sound acquisition practices. Ineffective project 

planning and controls can impact NASA’s ability to understand and address challenges in a manner that 

either recognizes or mitigates cost and schedule growth. Specifically, effective lifecycle cost and schedule 

management requires:

• Instituting good lifecycle cost-estimating policy and processes (set good baselines); 

• Instituting tracking and trending methodologies and using “best practice” tools to predict lifecycle 

estimate changes (proactively mitigate drift from and violation of the baseline); 

• Establishing effective risk identification and planning for the costs to mitigate and deal with risks 

if they manifest (manage threats to lifecycle cost/schedule changes); 

• Establishing clear reporting requirements and responsibilities (ensure accountability); and

• Making budget planning and allocation decisions based on lifecycle cost and schedule estimates 

and the performance toward these (ensure alignment of funding needs to lifecycle needs).

Since 2007, NASA has improved program and project management, lifecycle cost estimation, and 

procurement practices to address challenges in acquisition management. The Agency uses the information 

on management and performance challenges, including reports from the NASA OIG and GAO, to help 

guide these actions. Notable corrective actions include:

• Implementing new cost and schedule analysis and estimation processes, beginning with the Cost 

Analysis Data Requirement in 2005. In 2009, NASA introduced the use of an integrated 

probabilistic assessment of cost and schedule estimates, yielding a JCL;

• Revising Agency policy to identify and mitigate risks early in the formulation phase of a project 

to improve performance during the implementation phase, including establishment of the 

Formulation Agreement, development of Maturity Matrices, and a requirement to baseline some 

products earlier in the life cycle;

• Establishing a pilot program to address leading technical indicators to assess a project’s maturity;

• Developing and implementing NASA Policy Directive 1000.5A, “Policy for NASA Acquisition,” 

in 2008 to provide a framework to link budget decisions to achieving specified confidence levels 

for lifecycle cost and schedule baselines;

• Instituting senior leadership forums to ensure the Agency acquisition process is integrated with 

budget and strategic planning. These forums are the Strategic Implementation Planning meeting 
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and the Acquisition Strategy Meeting, as well as the redefined existing Procurement Strategy 

Meeting; and,

• Improving NASA’s earned value management capabilities.

Two of the corrective actions are discussed in more detail below.

Improvements to Cost and Schedule Estimating Policy 

Estimating cost and schedule baselines for NASA projects is complex and challenging. NASA must 

account for risks introduced by many factors. Factors in the industrial base include launch vehicle 

availability, vendor capabilities, and counterfeit parts. Long development cycles can be affected by 

factors such as instability of funding, delays in funding, or a misalignment of resources and schedules. 

Acquisition management introduces additional risk factors, such as protests on a vendor award, to project 

cost and schedule baselines. Ineffective project planning and controls can impact the ability to understand 

these factors and to address them in a manner that mitigates cost and schedule growth. Project risks, if 

realized, can contribute to cost and schedule growth.

In January 2009, NASA strengthened estimation practices by adopting a new acquisition strategy policy, 

which improves the Agency’s ability to manage performance risk. The new policy requires space flight 

projects and programs to develop JCLs that address both cost and schedule risks. A JCL builds on 

traditional cost and schedule estimating practices by providing a probability that a project will meet its 

cost and schedule targets. The policy requires a JCL to inform NASA’s baseline commitments. As NASA 

has become more experienced in using JCLs, it is modifying its processes to utilize this management tool 

for projects with lifecycle costs greater than $150 million (currently, only projects with lifecycle costs of 

$250 million or more are required develop JCLs as part of their management strategy). Additionally, the 

policy requires separate probabilistic range estimates for cost and schedule at an early key decision point 

to support adequate long-term budget planning. 

Mitigating Risks in the Project Formulation Phase 

During the formulation phase, key decisions are made that will affect a project through development and 

operations. NASA is mitigating risks during the formulation phase by formalizing project parameters and 

addressing technical maturity. NASA is revising its policy to require a formulation agreement, which 

ensures stakeholders have a clear understanding of the work to be performed with associated cost and 

schedule requirements. Such an agreement was not typically required until a project entered the 

development phase.

Additionally, NASA has focused on adequate technical maturity, not only in support of preliminary 

design reviews, but also throughout the life cycle. The Agency recognizes that sufficient technical 

maturity is essential to improve cost estimation during the formulation phase and to set robust cost and 

schedule baselines for the development phase. 

In response to direction regarding “Cost Control” in House Report 112-169, accompanying the NASA 

FY 2012 appropriation (H.R. 2596), NASA is codifying an approach to ensure appropriate technical 

maturity in NASA’s program and project management policies in the NASA Procedural Requirements 

(NPR) 7123, “NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements.” Specifically, the Agency
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created a set of “Maturity Matrices” that clarify expected design maturity objectives at lifecycle reviews 

and key decision points. NASA has established and is piloting a set of technical leading indicators for 

both the preliminary design review and the critical design review to enhance leadership’s understanding 

of the project’s maturity. Finally, NASA currently is developing a common set of programmatic and 

technical indicators to support trending analysis of the design maturity throughout the life cycle. NASA 

included the indicators in the Program and Project Plan templates found in the appendix of NPR 7120.5, 

“NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements.” 

FY 2012 COST AND SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE DETAILS AND TRENDS

2013 Major Program Annual Report Summary 

The 2013 MPAR is provided to meet the requirements of section 103 of the NASA Authorization Act of 

2005 (P.L. 109-155; 42 U.S.C. 16613). The 2013 MPAR consists of this summary and FY 2014 

Congressional Justification pages designated as “Projects in Development,” for the projects outlined 

below. These project pages constitute each project’s annual report, or if this is the first year for which it is 

in reporting, the baseline report. The MPAR summary also includes the confidence level of achieving the 

commitments as requested in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 2010 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117). As required by section 1203 of NASA 2010 Authorization Act (P.L. 

111-267; 42 U.S.C. 18301), the corrective action plans for GPM, OCO-2, JWST and SOFIA can be found 

in the respective project pages in the FY 2014 Congressional Justification.

Changes in MPAR Composition since the FY 2013 NASA Budget Estimates 

Two new projects with estimated lifecycle costs greater than $250 million received authority to proceed 

into the development phase since NASA submitted its 2012 MPAR in the FY 2013 NASA Congressional 

Justification: 

• ICESat-2, with a baseline development cost of $558.9 million at a joint confidence level of 70 

percent; and

• SMAP, with a baseline development cost of $485.7 million and a greater than 70 percent joint 

confidence level.

The 2012 MPAR in the FY 2013 NASA Congressional Justification included two projects that are no 

longer in MPAR reporting. NASA successfully launched the Van Allen Probes (formerly known as 

RBSP) spacecraft on August 30, 2012, and the LDCM spacecraft on February 11, 2013. NASA launched 

the Van Allen Probes within three months of the project baseline launch date and below the baseline 

development cost. NASA launched LDCM four months before the project baseline launch date and below 

the baseline development cost. 

There are no other changes to the MPAR composition to report. Refer to Figure 3.4 for the full list of 

reportable projects.
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Changes in Cost and Schedule Estimates from the 2012 MPAR 

No projects exceeded a cost or schedule threshold since the 2012 MPAR. This report includes updates to 

the OCO-2 project cost and schedule, previously reported as “under review” due to uncertainty regarding 

which launch vehicle NASA would use for the mission. NASA completed the threshold reporting 

requirements for the GPM project, which resulted from the project’s schedule delay, and submitted the 

reports to the White House and appropriate Congressional committees.

MPAR Summary Table 

Figure 3.4 provides cost, schedule, and confidence level information for NASA projects currently in 

development with lifecycle cost estimates of $250 million or more. NASA records the estimated 

development cost and a key schedule milestone and then measures changes from them. NASA tracks one 

of several key milestones, listed below, for reporting purposes:

• Launch Readiness Date (LRD);

• Full Operational Capability (FOC); or

• Initial Operating Capability (IOC). 

As a note for clarification, LRDs are not typically the launch dates on the NASA launch manifest, but are 

the desired launch dates as determined by the payload mission and approved by the NASA Flight 

Planning Board (FPB). A launch manifest is a dynamic schedule that is affected by real world operational 

activities conducted by NASA and multiple other entities. It reflects the results of a complex process that 

requires the coordination and cooperation by multiple users for the use of launch range and launch 

contractor assets. The launch dates shown on the NASA FPB launch manifest are a mixture of confirmed 

range dates for missions launching within approximately six months and contractual/planning dates for 

the missions beyond six months from launch. The NASA FPB launch manifest date is typically earlier 

than the reported schedule date, thereby allowing for the operationally driven fluctuations to the launch 

schedule that may be outside of the Project’s control. The NASA FPB launch manifest is updated on a 

periodic basis throughout the year.

The confidence level (CL) estimates reflect an evolving process as NASA improves its probabilistic 

estimation techniques and processes. Each estimate reflects the practices and policies at the time it was 

developed. Estimates that include combined cost and schedule risks are denoted as Joint Confidence 

Level (JCL) estimates; all other CLs reflect cost confidence without necessarily factoring the potential 

impacts of schedule changes on cost.

Additional explanations for the data in the summary table are provided here:

• The joint confidence level percentage for GPM reflects the KDP-C Replan JCL, approved in 

October 2011. 

• The FY 2013 Congressional Justification established the JWST rebaseline, which is reflected 

in the table below. JWST’s MPAR Cost Estimate includes Construction of Facilities funds. 

• For MMS, the confidence level estimates include the partners’ contributions, while the 

development cost reflects only the NASA portion of project costs. 
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• MAVEN’s JCL included schedule risk of the launch vehicle but used the Headquartersprovided launch vehicle cost as a pass-through number per agreement with the Standing 

Review Board (SRB). 

• The current year development cost and key milestone date for OCO-2 would become the new 

project baseline after Congressional reauthorization pursuant to sec. 103 of P.L. 109-155. The 

JCL was performed for Phases C and D, excluding project managed unallocated future 

expenses, JPL fees, launch services, and low-level fixed cost activities at GSFC. 

• The confidence level estimate performed for TDRS K/L addresses the full partner 

contribution, while the development cost reflects only the NASA portion of project costs. The 

current baseline costs are solely for TDRS K/L.

Additional information on the projects shown in the table below can be found in their individual program 

and project pages in the main body of the Congressional Justification. 

Figure 3.4: MPAR Summary and Confidence Levels

Project Base 

Year

JCL 

(%)

Development Cost 

Estimated ($M) Cost 

Change 

(%)

Key 

Milestone

Key Milestone Schedule 

Change 

(months) Base 2013 Base 2013

GPM 2010 70 555.2 509.3 -8.3 LRD Jul 2013 Jun 2014 11

ICESat-2 2013 70 558.9 556.5 -0.4 LRD May 2017 May 2017 0 

JWST 2012 66 6,197.9 6,190.4 -0.1 LRD Oct 2018 Oct 2018 0 

LADEE 2011 70 168.2 176.1 4.7 LRD Nov 2013 Nov 2013 0 

MAVEN 2011 70 567.2 550.5 -3.0 LRD Nov 2013 Nov 2013 0 

MMS 2010 70 857.3 856.8 -0.1 LRD Mar2015 Mar 2015 0 

OCO-2 2011 70 249.0 371.6 49.2 LRD Feb 2013 Feb 2015 24

SMAP 2013 >70 485.7 484.8 -0.2 LRD Mar 2015 Mar2015 0 

SOFIA 2007 70 919.5 1,127.8 22.7 FOC Dec 2013 Dec 2014 12

TDRS K/L 2010 75 (CL) 209.4 184.6 -11.8 LRD K: Dec 

2012

L: Dec 

2013

K: Jan 

2013

L: Feb 

2014

1 

2 

COST AND SCHEDULE ANNUAL PERFORMANCE GOALS

NASA reviewed its annual performance measures where performance fell short due to cost and schedule 

issues. In FY 2010, 14 APGs indicated cost or schedule growth in NASA’s projects. In FY 2011, there 

were seven. As of FY 2012, there were only five such APGs. Root causes presented in these tables 

include development partner challenges, vendor quality parts and processes, launch vehicles, funding 

instability, program planning and control, and acquisition management.
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10IT11

Accountable Organization: Office of the Chief Information Officer

Complete all development projects within 110% of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2010

Red

Why Measure 10IT11 Was Not Met: All but one project finished within the required 110 percent of cost and 

schedule baselines. The Security Operations Center (SOC) implementation (Phase-2) project has undergone 

schedule slips, due to delays in facilities power modifications resulting in delays of receiving IT Security event data 

from numerous sources across the Agency. The delay in having adequate power to the facility kept the SOC from 

being able to capture data, thereby not allowing testing and not being ready to complete the ORR. The extra power 

lines and resultant coordination were not planned for when the project was initially scoped and were beyond the 

initial project plan estimates. The final SOC implementation plan will increase cost to 145 percent and schedule to 

161 percent of the initial project scope. NASA reviewed this project during implementation, and given the 

importance of IT security, approved additional time and funding for the project.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: There are no options to achieving this goal. NASA determined the 

IT Security Operations Center project implementation fits into the CyberSecurity scope and needed to be 

accomplished to protect NASA’s IT vulnerability.

10HE09

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Heliophysics Division

Complete all development projects within 110% of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2010

Red

Why Measure 10HE09 Was Not Met: NASA did not complete the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) within 110 

percent of cost and schedule baselines. SDO initially slipped from its 2008 firm slot in the launch manifest due to 

late delivery of avionics boxes and instruments and problems with electronics parts and the high-speed data bus. 

SDO then experienced difficulty obtaining a new slot in the launch manifest, as no firm slots were available until 

2010 due to multiple Atlas V launch vehicle issues and associated launch queue delays.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA launched SDO in February 2010. This exceeded the original 

schedule by 48 percent, but the mission’s lifecycle cost remains within seven percent of the original cost baseline.

10ES17

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete all development projects within 110% of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2010

Red

Why Measure 10ES17 Was Not Met: 

of their cost and schedule baselines.

NASA did not complete the Glory and Aquarius missions within 10 percent 

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The Glory mission experienced significant cost and schedule growth 

due primarily to the failure of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) Taurus XL launch vehicle and issues with 

the vendor’s production of acceptable boards for the Maxwell Single Board Computers. Glory’s current projected 

lifecycle cost is 68 percent higher than the baseline established at Confirmation Review. The mission is tentatively 

scheduled for a February 2011 launch readiness date, a 72 percent increase in schedule. The Aquarius launch 

readiness date has been rescheduled for April 2011 due to delays in the development of the international partner’s 

Mission Operations System. The schedule for the mission has increased by 60 percent, but the lifecycle cost 3 remains within 15 percent of the baseline.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

3 In March 2011, Glory was lost due to a failure of the Taurus XL launch vehicle. Aquarius launched in June 2011.
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ES-11-19 (Efficiency Measure)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete all development projects within 110 percent of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2011

Red

Why Measure ES-11-19 Was Not Met: This annual performance goal was not met, due to cost and schedule 

growth that exceeded 10 percent of their estimated baseline for the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), Glory, and 

Aquarius missions. The NPP mission experienced delays due to the restructure of the project management and ongoing development issues with an instrument, contributed by one of NASA’s partners. The Aquarius mission was 

delayed by NASA’s international partner, after the successful delivery of NASA’s instrument contribution. The 

Glory mission had both instrument and spacecraft technical issues, across its development.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA’s new 70 percent CL requirements include consideration of the 

risks of partnership. These and other procedures subsequently put in place are improving cost and schedule 

performance.

ES-12-20 (Efficiency Measure)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete all development projects within 110 percent of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2012

Red

Why Measure ES-12-20 Was Not Met: NASA did not achieve this annual performance goal due to cost and 

schedule growth that exceeded 10 percent of the estimated baseline for the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), 

which launched in FY 2012. The NPP project experienced delays due to on-going development issues with 

instruments provided by NASA’s government partners.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA successfully launched the NPP spacecraft on October 28, 2011, 

ending the project’s development phase. No further performance improvement activities are necessary. 

PS-12-14 (Efficiency Measure)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Science Division

Complete all development projects within 110 percent of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2012

Red

Why Measure PS-12-14 Was Not Met: NASA did not achieve this annual performance goal due to Mars Science 

Laboratory (MSL) cost growth that exceeded 10 percent of the estimated baseline at the Confirmation Review. 

MSL has demonstrated spectacular technical success, but it launched after a two-year delay and nearly 55 percent 

lifecycle cost growth from its originally confirmed baseline.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: MSL launched on November 26, 2011, ending the project’s 

development phase. The Curiosity rover has been successfully operating on Mars since August 6, 2012. NASA’s

risk-based approach to budgeting and planning has proven to be successful, as evidenced by cost and schedule 

performance on the Juno and GRAIL missions. These missions, which also launched in FY 2012, remained within 

their cost and schedule baselines. No further performance improvement activities are necessary. 

AS-12-6 (Efficiency Measure)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Astrophysics Division

Complete all development projects within 110 percent of the cost and schedule baseline.

FY 2012

Why Measure AS-12-6 Was Not Met: NASA did not achieve this annual performance goal due to schedule growth Yellow

that exceeded 10 percent of the estimated baseline at the Confirmation Review. The NuSTAR project realized 17 
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percent schedule growth due to delays in the launch provider's validation of flight software associated with the new 

launch vehicle flight computer and subsequent launch site availability issues. Based on these factors, the NuSTAR 

launch slipped from March to June 2012. Project costs, however, remained well within the threshold, at three 

percent growth from the confirmed baseline.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: The NuSTAR spacecraft successfully launched on June 13, 2012, 

ending the project’s development phase. No further performance improvement activities are necessary.

Development Partner Challenges

10ES02

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by completing Aquarius Operational Readiness 

Review (ORR).

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10ES02 Was Not Met: Due to delays in the development of the international partner’s Mission 

Operations System, the ORR was not completed in FY 2010.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: A specific date has not been identified, but NASA estimates this to be 

in early 2011. However, any delays to the overall mission schedule could cause the ORR to move further.

FY 2011 Update: The Aquarius Operational Readiness Review was completed April 28, 2011.

Vendor Quality, Parts, and Processes

10ES21

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by completing the 

Performance Test for Glory.

Pre-Ship Comprehensive 

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10ES21 Was Not Met: The Glory Pre-Ship Comprehensive Performance Test began on September 

17, 2010, but was not completed until October 4, 2010. The test was delayed primarily due to resolution of 

spacecraft hardware anomalies.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The test was completed successfully on October 4, 2010.

10AS07

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Astrophysics Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by completing the first competed Early Science 

observations on the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA).

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10AS07 Was Not Met: Technical problems with the telescope cavity door actuator on the SOFIA 

aircraft, due to quality control issues at the vendor of the actuator, led to increased time required for flight testing 

and certification for open-door flight at the altitude required for Early Science. NASA worked directly with the 

vendor to address and resolve the quality control issues.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: Flight testing of the full flight envelope has been completed, and the 

first image has been acquired by the telescope in flight. The program is currently on track for the first Early 

Science observation by December 2010.
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FY 2011 Update: SOFIA completed the first of three science flights on Wednesday, December 1, 2010.

ES-11-3 (Performance Goal 2.1.1.2)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Initiate the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) Instrument and Spacecraft System-Level Testing.

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure ES-11-3 Was Not Met: The OCO-2 instrument system-level testing was scheduled to begin in 

August 2011, but has been delayed to October due to technical issues. Technical issues included a coating adhesion 

issue on multiple parts that was introduced by contamination during the vendor’s process, and a misalignment 

along an optical path on the instrument, which was seen during vibration testing and could impact performance. 

Additionally, the spacecraft-level system testing is scheduled to begin in December 2011, due to late deliverables 

from subsystem vendors. At this time, the overall delivery of the spacecraft remains unchanged for March 2012, 

but the instrument delivery has been delayed by one month to April 2012, and NASA continues to work with its 

vendors to address these issues and prevent further delays.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: To address the coating adhesion issue, a decision was made to proceed 

with an alternate vendor and process (black anodizing) for the parts. The change was implemented and all parts 

now meet specification. Additionally, the optical path misalignment issue was addressed and appears to be 

resolved, but it will remain open until confirmed during instrument-level vibration testing (scheduled for December 

2011). These two issues have resulted in an approximately a one month delay in delivery of the instrument (now 

April 2012). This delay is not expected to impact the overall delivery schedule of the observatory or the launch 

readiness date (LRD). The Spacecraft System-Level Testing has been scheduled for December 2011 due to the late 

subsystem vendor deliveries. However, the spacecraft remains on plan to be delivered in March 2012, with no 

impact to the launch readiness review.

FY 2012 Update: NASA completed the OCO-2 Systems Integration Review, which signifies the beginning of the 

testing and integration phase of spacecraft development, in May 2012. System-level testing for the OCO-2 

instrument and spacecraft both began in FY 2012. NASA completed instrument system-level testing and continues 

spacecraft system-level testing. The mission is on track for launch in 2014.

ES-11-6 (Performance Goal 2.1.2.2)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Systems Integration Review

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure ES-11-6 Was Not Met: Both the NASA spacecraft and instrument developments are experiencing 

challenges in subsystem deliveries. These development challenges are resulting from various issues including 

defects discovered in flight parts, component manufacturing throughput issues and workmanship issues at supply 

vendors. In addition, the delivery of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)-provided Dual-frequency 

Precipitation Radar (DPR) instrument has been delayed due to disruptions at, and damage to, the test facility 

resulting from the March 2011 earthquake. Technical issues with the DPR were also identified during 

environmental testing. It is currently estimated that these challenges will result in a launch readiness delay of 

eleven months, from July 2013 to June 2014. 

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA and JAXA are working together to replan the program to 

accommodate these delays. NASA and JAXA have taken actions that include implementing extended 

shifts/weekend work and integration and testing workarounds (for NASA, the use of engineering test units in 

of flight subsystems) to recover schedule where feasible. Completion of the Systems Integration Review is 

scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2012.

place 

FY 2012 Update: NASA completed the GPM Systems Integration Review in February 2012, and as of December 

2012, the integrated spacecraft was in system-level thermal vacuum testing. The mission is on track for launch in 

2014.
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Launch Vehicle Availability &and Reliability/Manifest Issues

10ES10

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by completing the SMAP Preliminary Design 

Review (PDR).

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10ES10 Was Not Met: The Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP) mission PDR is currently 

scheduled for March 2011, consistent with the schedule presented at the mission’s Initial Confirmation Review.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: Currently, all pre-cursor events (i.e., peer reviews, sub-system PDRs) 

are proceeding on or ahead of plan. However, a launch vehicle has not yet been selected for SMAP, and this could 

impact the scheduling of PDR. NASA is addressing this issue, but it is not expected to be resolved until after 

March.

FY 2011 Update: The Preliminary Design Review for the SMAP mission occurred in October 2011.

ES-11-10 (Performance Goal 2.1.4.2)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete the Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) Confirmation Review.

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure ES-11-10 Was Not Met: The SMAP Confirmation Review was delayed to FY 2012 because of 

difficulties in identifying an acceptable launch vehicle for the mission. NASA’s Earth Science program has been 

impacted by the current limited availability of launch vehicles in the medium size range that is appropriate for most 

of its missions.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: The SMAP Confirmation Review has been rescheduled until the 

second quarter of FY 2012. The Science Mission Directorate (SMD) plans to conduct a Directorate-level Program 

Management Council (DPMC) review in November 2011 to assess project status and establish near-term 

observatory development guidelines and constraints following the recent Preliminary Design Review. To conduct 

PDR, SMD management requested the project assume use of a Minotaur IV+ launch vehicle. This DPMC will also 

assess a plan to establish a project baseline cost and schedule, that is independent of a confirmed launch vehicle 

(which is not expected until mid 2012). This plan forward will consider analysis of observatory design, cost and 

schedule risks, and any additional required reviews. In parallel with these activities, SMD will continue to work 

with the Human Exploration and Operations Directorate to pursue launch vehicle options for SMAP.

FY 2012 Update: NASA completed the SMAP Confirmation Review in May 2012. 

Funding Instability and Limitations

ES-11-14 (Performance Goal 2.1.5.3)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete the ICESat-2 Spacecraft System Requirements Review.

FY 2011

Yellow Why Measure ES-11-14 Was Not Met: The date for the ICESat-2 Spacecraft Systems Requirements Review has 

been delayed to December 2011. This review was rescheduled from March 2011 to revisit the mission design and 

requirements to align with the estimated available budget, moving forward.
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FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: The mission design and requirements have been revised to align to the 

available funds. As part of the realignment, the mission is moving forward based on a co-manifested launch 

solution, with shared launch costs, with the Air Force. The Spacecraft System Requirements Review is scheduled 

for December 2011. The mission’s baseline plan is to be manifested with the Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program Flight-20 (DMSP F-20) on an Atlas V launch vehicle that has already been purchased by the U.S. Air 

Force (USAF). NASA will be responsible for funding the Dual Spacecraft System (DSS) development and flight 

unit qualification. The DSS will represent a new capability for U.S. Government payloads using the EELV launch 

system. The USAF will procure the launch service and provide overall mission assurance related to the launch 

vehicle and dual payload accommodation. This interagency arrangement provides significant cost savings for 

NASA, allowing the mission to proceed within its allocated budget.

FY 2012 Update: NASA completed the ICESat-2 System Requirements Review in January 2012. Subsequently, 

the Air Force determined that they would not be able to proceed with the planned partnership. NASA made the 

necessary program adjustments to provide the funding for the procurement of a dedicated launch vehicle, which 

was to have been contributed in the partnership.

ES-12-13 (Performance Goal 2.1.5.3)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete the Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2) Preliminary Design Review.

FY 2012

Yellow

Why Measure ES-12-13 Was Not Met: NASA delayed the date for the ICESat-2 Preliminary Design Review from 

July 2012 to October 2012 so the project could revisit the mission design and requirements in order to align with 

the estimated available budget, moving forward in fiscal years 2014 and 2015.

The ICESat-2 project has received three Yellow ratings during the four years it has been in performance review. 

The project has received all of these during its formulation phase. The first Yellow rating occurred early in the 

project’s formulation, when the Earth Systematic Missions Program was conducting the advanced concepts study. 

The other two Yellows have been the result of NASA’s difficulty in acquiring a launch vehicle. This challenge has 

resulted in changes to the project budget and schedule delays. NASA remains dedicated to the ICESat-2 project 

because the spacecraft will be an integral part of NASA’s Earth-observation fleet of satellites. It will provide 

estimates of ice sheet thickness and help scientists determine ice sheet contributions to recent sea level change. The 

first mission, ICESat, successfully completed operations in 2009, and NASA has been conducting observations 

from aircraft, through the IceBridge project, in the interim between ICESat missions.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA completed the preliminary design review in October 2012. 

Mission confirmation followed in December by mission confirmation, which established a baseline cost and 

schedule commitment. No further performance improvement activities are necessary.

Program Planning and Controls

10IT06

Accountable Organization: Office of the Chief Information Officer

Complete Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the NASA Security Operations Center.

FY 2010

Red

Why Measure 10IT06 Was Not Met: The Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation Project was 

scheduled to have the ORR this year, but has undergone schedule slips due to delays in facilities power 

modifications and further delays in receiving IT Security data from numerous sources across the Agency. These 

delays have negated the ability to complete the testing required in preparation of the Operational Readiness 

Review.
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FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The SOC Implementation Project will move forward with IT Security 

event data collection in fall 2010. As the data is obtained, the project will complete final system integration and 

validation testing. Upon completing validation testing and user training the project will precede to ORR currently 

scheduled for November FY 2011.

FY 2011 Update: The SOC ORR was completed March 2011.

10SFS07

Accountable Organization: Space Operations Mission Directorate, Space and Flight Support

Complete TDRS K/L Project Mission Operations Review (MOR).

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10SFS07 Was Not Met: The TDRS project had originally scheduled the K/L MOR for September 

2010 but was delayed to resolve minor conflicts involving resources.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The MOR will be held in November 2010.

FY 2011 Update: The Mission Operations Review was held in November 2010.

10PS06

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Science Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by completing the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 

flight hardware builds and flight system assemblies.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10PS06 Was Not Met: The flight hardware build and flight system assembly of the Sample Analysis 

at Mars (SAM) instrument were not completed during the designated fiscal year, due to complications in the 

development of the Wide Range Pump (WRP) components of the instrument. The materials originally specified as 

the primary component of a high-speed, high-performance bearing proved to be inadequate to provide the 

necessary performance on the surface of Mars, and alternative bearing materials and components had to be 

researched and developed.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The development of the new bearing designs has been completed and 

implemented, and the finalization of the flight hardware build has resumed. The final flight units are on schedule to 

be delivered in early December 2010.

FY 2011 Update: The work was completed by redesigning the primary bearings on the pump from alternate 

materials that provided the required performance for the Mars environment. Design, fabrication, testing, validation, 

and installation of the new bearings were completed according to the revised schedule. The pump was completed 

and delivered to the flight project as scheduled in December 2010.

Performance Goal 2.4.2.2

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, James Webb Space Telescope Program

Design and assemble James Webb Space Telescope (JWST).

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Performance Goal 2.4.2.2 Was Not Met: The measure was placed in the FY 2012 Congressional Justification 

prior to the project’s replan. Based on this, the baseline assumption for the measure was that the project was still 

operating under the original baseline. The new estimated baseline, which was approved late in the fiscal year, 

resulted in a 78% increase in the estimated life cycle cost from the original baseline. The new estimated baseline 

has been endorsed by the NASA Administrator, all reporting required by Section 103 of the NASA Authorization 

Act of 2005 has been completed, and 95% of the FY 2011 planned activities were accomplished, indicating that it 

is likely to stay on track for the new estimated cost. Specifically, JWST achieved 19 of its 21 planned FY 2011 
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milestones on or ahead of schedule, one milestone was achieved one month late and one milestone was delayed due 

to design changes, and is on track to achieve its FY 2012 milestones. The one planned FY 2011 milestone that was 

achieved a month late and the one that has been delayed do not impact the critical path.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA has taken many steps to address the challenges seen on the 

JWST Project. In FY 2010, an independent panel concluded that the problems causing cost growth and schedule 

delays on the JWST project were associated with cost estimation and program management. To address these, 

NASA made several important changes in JWST program and project management and in the interaction with the 

prime contractor. All the JWST senior management at both Headquarters and at Goddard Space Flight Center have 

been replaced. The program has been taken out of the Astrophysics Division and now reports programmatically to 

the NASA Associate Administrator, and is an Agency priority. NASA also embarked on revising the cost and 

schedule estimates. The replanning activity is complete, has been approved within the Agency. The Agency will 

continue to monitor the progress on the development of this project, as highlighted above.

FY 2012 Update: Not applicable.

ES-12-5 (Performance Goal 2.1.2.2)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Complete the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Pre-Environmental Review.

FY 2012

Yellow

Why Measure ES-12-5 Was Not Met: The GPM Pre-Environmental Review (PER) was delayed from September 

to October 2012 due to multiple integration and test issues. NASA allowed the extra time so the project could 

investigate High Gain Antenna System mechanical interference and GPM Microwave Imager (GMI) Radio 

Frequency interference. The delay also allowed the project to closeout several subsystem test Problem Reports and 

complete installation of the remaining Thermal Control System components. All of these activities were necessary 

prior to NASA conducting the Comprehensive Performance Test (CPT), which is required prior to conducting the 

PER.

Throughout the GPM project, NASA has had to adjust the schedules as a result of challenges in component 

deliveries, delivery of the partner-provided instruments, and system integration and test, which are often 

encountered during the development of space flight hardware. However, subsequent to a replan, the project has 

maintained its budget and launch date commitments, despite additional delays to interim milestones.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA resolved GPM’s integration and test issues. All required work 

was completed and the CPT was completed on October 16, 2012. NASA completed the GPM PER on October 22-

23, 2012. No further performance improvement activities are necessary.

Acquisition Management Challenges

10SFS08

Accountable Organization: 

Navigation

Space Operations Mission Directorate, Space Communications and 

Complete SN Ground Segment Sustainment project (SGSS) Mission Definition Review.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10SFS08 Was Not Met: 

on-going contractor protest.

The SGSS Mission Definition Review did not occur as planned due to an 

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA will develop a new plan and schedule for 

Mission Definition Review once the protest is adjudicated.

completing the 

FY 2011 Update: The SGSS contract award was upheld in FY 2011. After the contract was initiated, it was 

determined that dividing the Mission Definition Review into two parts, with the first part focused on the technical 
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review and the second part focused on budget, was the appropriate approach. The technical review, 

successful, was held in July 2011; the second review is scheduled to be held in December 2011.

which was very 

10PS05

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Science Division

Develop missions in support of this Outcome, as demonstrated by selecting concept studies for the Discovery 12 

mission.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10PS05 Was Not Met: The acquisition timeline for the Discovery 12 mission was extended due to 

the complexity of the Announcement of Opportunity, which includes the potential use of radioisotope power 

systems.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: 

studies is scheduled for mid-FY 2011.

Twenty-eight proposals have been received. Selection of concept 

FY 2011 Plan Update: In May 2011, NASA selected three mission concepts 

for study from the 28 proposals received. After a detailed review of the three

selected as the 12th Discovery Program mission.

(GEMS, TiME, and Comet Hopper) 

concept studies in 2012, one will be 

AMO-11-12 (Performance Goal 5.2.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Office of the Chief Information Officer

Achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for five Service Offices (Web Services, Communications, Enterprise 

Service Desk, End User Services, and NASA Enterprise Applications) as part of the NASA Information 

Technology Infrastructure Integration Program (I3P).

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure AMO-11-12 Was Not Met: Four of the five planned service offices achieved Initial Operating 

Capability (IOC). The End User Services (ACES), Enterprise Applications (EAST), Enterprise Service Desk 

(ESD), and Communications (NICS–Networking) services all have their office structures in place, are managing 

the transition to these new services, and continue to operate the current services. The one service office that did not 

reach IOC in FY 2011 is the one for the Web services (WEST). The implementation of this initiative has been 

delayed to resolve some issues with the contract award. NASA remains on track for the consolidation and 

centralization of these services and capabilities by 2014.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA will continue to work through the issues with the contract 

award of the web services capability. The implementation of the WEST will be revisited once these issues are 

resolved.

FY 2012 Update: NASA resolved issues with the contract award for WEST. Under the resolution, the originally 

planned Web Services were restructured and NASA has released a solicitation for WESTPRIME. NASA currently 

is evaluating the proposals received from the solicitation. 

PS-12-2 (Performance Goal 2.3.1.2)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Science Division

Complete New Frontiers 3 Preliminary Design Review.

FY 2012

Yellow

Why Measure PS-12-2 Was Not Met: At the time of the performance plan update, NASA had not completed the 

final negotiation on the procurement the Origins Spectral Interpretation Resource Identification Security Regolith 

Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) mission. The final agreement resulted in a proposed extended Phase B for the OSIRISREx project, which moved the Preliminary Design Review (the APG milestone) beyond fiscal year 2012, with the 

planned completion of the Mission Definition Review in FY 2012 instead. NASA made this change to reduce risk 
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to cost and schedule performance for the project.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA has completed the Preliminary Design Review. No further 

performance improvement activities are necessary.
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Highlighted Performance Trend: Commercial Spaceflight 

Successfully Reaching the International Space Station

In FY 2012, NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services partners, Space Exploration 

Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital), continued to make 

progress toward developing systems to provide cargo resupply services to the International Space Station 

(ISS). Leveraging commercial partners for these tasks is a new way of doing business for NASA, and the 

activity continues to be a learning experience for both NASA and the partners. As the partners 

transitioned from development to integration and testing, they encountered technical challenges, as is 

common in the development of any major space system. The resolution of these challenges has caused 

delays to the partners’ demonstration flights.

Outcome 5.2

Accountable Organization: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Constellation Systems

By 2010, demonstrate one or more commercial space capabilities for ISS cargo and/or crew transport.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Outcome 5.2 Was Not Met: Both partners, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and 

Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital), are making progress in demonstrating their respective transportation 

capabilities. The partners moved their initial demonstration flights to FY 2011 due to technical issues encountered 

during development efforts.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: SpaceX is planning for its first ISS demonstration flight in late fall 

2010, with remaining flights scheduled for later in FY 2011. Orbital currently is planning its demonstration flight 

for fall 2011.

FY 2011 Update: NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) partner SpaceX successfully 

completed their Demonstration 1 mission on December 8, 2010.

10CS07

Accountable Organization: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Constellation Systems

In FY 2010, have at least one partner demonstrate flight proximity operations with ISS.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10CS07 Was Not Met: Both partners, SpaceX and Orbital, made progress in demonstrating their 

respective transportation capabilities. The partners moved their initial demonstration flights to FY 2011 due to 

technical issues encountered during development efforts and are continuing toward demonstrating flight operations 

with ISS in FY 2011.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: The second SpaceX flight, in June 2011, will demonstrate flight 

proximity operations with ISS. Orbital currently anticipates scheduling its demonstration flight for FY 2012.

FY 2011 Update: APG 10CS07 was not completed in FY 2011 due to development challenges. Partner 

experienced delays as their program transitioned from design to integration and test; however, they continue to 

make technical progress toward their development and demonstration milestones. These challenges continue to be 

resolved, and NASA continues to work with our partners.
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10CS08

Accountable Organization: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Constellation Systems

By the end of FY 2010, conduct one or more demonstration flights to, and berth with, the ISS.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10CS08 Was Not Met: Both partners, SpaceX and Orbital, made progress in demonstrating their 

respective transportation capabilities. The partners moved their initial demonstration flights to FY 2011 due to 

technical issues encountered during development efforts and are continuing toward demonstration flights to, and 

berthing with, ISS in FY 2011.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: SpaceX is planning for its third demonstration flight to, and berth with, 

ISS in late FY 2011. Orbital currently anticipates scheduling its demonstration flight for FY 2012.

FY 2011 Update: APG 10CS08 was not accomplished due to development challenges. Partner experienced delays 

as their program transitioned from design to integration and test, they both continue to make technical progress 

toward their development and demonstration milestones. These challenges continue to be resolved, and NASA 

continues to work with our partners.

In FY 2011, NASA augmented funding for the COTS Space Act Agreements with additional milestones 

for risk-mitigation, including a first flight of Orbital’s Taurus II launch vehicle. NASA worked with its 

partners to ensure success of the COTS development through completion of demonstration flights and 

start of commercial resupply services to ISS in FY 2012. In May 2012, SpaceX launched its first 

demonstration of its COTS capabilities and then successfully reached ISS with the first commercial 

resupply mission in October 2012. In Spring 2013, Orbital plans to demonstrate proximity operations and 

ISS berthing to complete the COTS milestones and prove maturity of the systems for ISS commercial 

resupply services.

NASA reviewed its annual performance goals (APGs) related to commercial spaceflight development 

from FY 2010 to FY 2012. The APGs below demonstrate the technical challenges inherent to 

development of major space systems. In FY 2010, the Agency rated Yellow one outcome and two annual 

performance goals; in FY 2011, NASA rated two APGs Yellow. NASA and its partners continue to 

address these challenges while progressing toward success. As of FY 2012, NASA rated Green its two 

APGs related to commercial spaceflight development. These APGs reflect the success of SpaceX’s

demonstration flights in 2012.

CS-11-2 (Performance Goal 1.2.1.1)

Accountable Organization: Human Exploration and Operations, Commercial Spaceflight

Conduct a minimum of one commercial cargo demonstration flight of proximity operations with ISS.

Why Measure CS-11-2 Was Not Met: This annual performance goal was not met in FY 2011 and is planned to 

occur in FY 2012. This performance target was not accomplished due to development challenges by NASA’s 

partners. These partners experienced delays as their programs transitioned from design to integration and test, and 

they both continue to make technical progress toward their development and demonstration milestones. FY 2011

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: SpaceX and Orbital continue to make progress, mitigating risk and 

Yellow

solving technical challenges, and plan a demonstration of proximity operations with ISS in FY 2012. During 

FY 2011, NASA negotiated additional risk mitigation milestones with each partner. The additional milestones help 

to improve mission success by (1) augmenting ground and flight testing; (2) accelerating development of enhanced 

cargo capabilities; or (3) further developing ground infrastructure needed for commercial cargo capabilities.
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FY 2012 Update: SpaceX successfully conducted proximity operations with ISS during its commercial cargo 

transportation system demonstration mission to ISS in May 2012. The SpaceX demonstration flight was originally 

planned as two flights during FY 2012, one that would demonstrate proximity operations and another that would 

safely berth with ISS; however, SpaceX requested, and the ISS Program approved, combining the two flights into 

one flight.

CS-11-3 (Performance Goal 1.2.1.1)

Accountable Organization: Human Exploration and Operations, Commercial Spaceflight

Conduct a minimum of one safe berthing of commercial cargo transportation systems with the ISS.

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure CS-11-3 Was Not Met: This annual performance goal was not met in FY 2011 and is planned to 

occur in FY 2012. This performance target was not accomplished due to development challenges by NASA’s 

partners. These partners experienced delays as their programs transitioned from design to integration and test, and 

they both continue to make technical progress toward their development and demonstration milestones.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: SpaceX and Orbital continue to make progress and plan to conduct a 

minimum of one safe berthing of commercial cargo transportation systems with the ISS in FY 2012. During 

FY 2011, NASA negotiated additional risk mitigation milestones with each partner to help improve mission 

success.

FY 2012 Update: SpaceX demonstrated a safe berthing with

in early calendar year 2013.

ISS in May 2012. Orbital is expected to do the same 

ISS-12-3 (Performance Goal 1.1.1.3)

Accountable Organization: Human Exploration and Operations, International Space Station

Complete at least two flights to the ISS by U.S. developed cargo delivery systems.

FY 2012

Green

SpaceX launched its first demonstration flight on May 19, 2012, berthed to ISS, and returned successfully on May 

31. SpaceX conducted a second flight, providing cargo to ISS, in October 2012. The SpaceX demonstration flight 

was originally planned as two flights during FY 2012; however, SpaceX requested, and the ISS Program approved, 

combining the two into one flight. The SpaceX-1 cargo flight was planned for September 2012, but occurred in 

October due to a crowded on-orbit schedule. The first Orbital flight is planned for Spring 2013.

CS-12-1 (Performance Goal 1.2.1.1)

Accountable Organization: Human Exploration and Operations, Commercial Spaceflight

Perform Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) cargo demonstration missions and continue 

commercial crew transportation systems development.

FY 2012

Green

On May 31, 2012, SpaceX successfully completed its final COTS demonstration mission to ISS, completing all test 

objectives. NASA continues to partner with multiple companies on commercial crew development activities and is 

nearing completion of the second phase of Commercial Crew Development agreements. For the next phase, NASA 

signed crew development Space Act Agreements in August 2012 for the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability 

initiative.
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Highlighted Performance Trend: Improved Performance 

Measurement Helps Identify Diversity Challenges

NASA values its workforce and strives to improve its productive environment. The ultimate goal is to 

ensure the workplace allows employees from diverse backgrounds, ethnicities, and genders to reach their 

potential and contribute to NASA’s mission. Multiple offices work together to this end, including the 

Office of Human Capital Management and the Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity. NASA 

reviewed its APGs where performance fell short in the areas of workforce, workplace, and diversity. The 

APGs below demonstrate the results of NASA’s continuing efforts to improve the workforce environment 

for all employees through multiple initiatives. 

The Office of Education also contributes to developing a diverse science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics (STEM) workforce, one that NASA can draw upon to support future missions. Multiple 

factors can impact these efforts, including funding delays, imperfect data collection methods, and midyear changes to priorities. In FY 2012, NASA modified its methodology for assessing progress toward the 

targeted participation of its higher education programs in the Office of Education, to improve insight and 

visibility into each program’s contribution. As planned, NASA also took the first step to include data 

from other mission organizations beyond NASA headquarters. Implementing the new methodology 

highlighted additional challenges across multiple programs that will require corrective actions to reach 

NASA’s targets. Specifically, past data collection mainly pointed to the Space Grant Program, the single 

greatest contributor; however, under the new methodology all programs’ impacts are being factored. To 

achieve greater participation at an Agency level for underserved and underrepresented populations and 

women, NASA plans to set a holistic strategy for greater contribution across the entire portfolio of 

projects.

The following tables list APGs from FY 2010 to FY 2012 that NASA rated Yellow: two in FY 2010, four 

in FY 2011, and one in FY 2012. Additionally, NASA rated one APG Red in FY 2012. 

Continual Improvement of the Workforce Environment

AMO-11-6 (Performance Goal 5.1.1.4)

Accountable Organization: Mission Support Directorate, Office of Human Capital Management

Identify and address at least two topics that employees identified in the latest Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey.

Why Measure AMO-11-6 Was Not Met: Many of the planned activities were completed but several have been 

delayed into FY 2012. Specifically, the identified areas to be addressed, and their corresponding action plan, are as 

follows: 

FY 2011

1) Continue focus on teamwork/working together to ensure mission success. Planned actions included continual Yellow

monitoring of Shuttle workforce concerns through regular surveys; and instituting a team-building focus in Agency 

leader development programs. The activities toward this topic were completed in this fiscal year.

2) Ensure that recognition and rewarding of employees is fair, consistent, and based on results-oriented 

performance. The planned actions included educating and training supervisors, through Agency supervisory 
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training courses; and implementing recommendations for enhancing the Agency’s Honor Awards Program. Both of 

these planned actions were delayed into FY 2012. This year’s funding level removed the option for conducting 

further Agency supervisory courses in FY 2011. Additionally, the development of new policies surrounding the 

Agency Honor Awards Program, is taking more time than planned, resulting in a delay until FY 2012.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: These actions will be completed in fiscal year 2012. OHCM will 

continue focus on teamwork and working together to ensure mission success. Actions include continual monitoring 

of Shuttle workforce concerns through regular surveys; and team-building focus in Agency leader development 

programs. OHCM will also ensure that recognition and rewarding of employees is fair, consistent, and based on 

results-oriented performance. Actions include educating and training supervisors through Agency supervisory 

training course and to implement recommendations for enhancing the Agency’s Honor Awards Program.

FY 2012 Update: In FY 2012, NASA continued to focus on teamwork to ensure mission success. OHCM worked 

with the Labor Union to improve the performance management process for General Schedule employees by 

developing process improvements to the current system, many of which were implemented in the current 

performance cycle (2012/2013). Informed by the results of a survey on leadership training needs for first line 

supervisors, OHCM addressed the role of a NASA supervisor, as well as placed an increased emphasis on assuring 

greater accountability for supervisors through the performance management process. OHCM implemented an 

improved, streamlined Agency Honor Awards process that provides more opportunities to award individuals for 

excellent work in a timelier manner.

AMO-11-7 (Performance Goal 5.1.1.5)

Accountable Organization: Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity

Complete FY 2011 actions described in the NASA Model Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Agency Plan.

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure AMO-11-7 Was Not Met: NASA made significant progress on many of 57 activities, contained in 

the Model EEO Agency Plan for FY 2011-2013, which have efforts in fiscal year 2011, but did not complete all the 

planned actions. NASA sought to complete 40 of the 57 actions in the first year of the Plan alone. NASA 

completed 14 of these actions (35 percent). In addition, NASA completed five actions not targeted for completion 

until FY 2012. Of the other actions targeted for completion in FY 2011, NASA has partially completed 19 (48 

percent). NASA has completed key actions related to the Agency’s Anti-Harassment Program, Conflict 

Management Program, and the Functional Review Program is on track for completion of its actions. However, as a 

result of recent Executive Orders that required development of action plans in FY 2010-2011 for Asian Americans 

and Pacific Islanders, Individuals with Disabilities, and Veterans, NASA had to add multiple actions to the Model 

EEO Agency Plan. The initial development of these plans, dispositioning of community group comments, and 

introduction of approximately 20 new actions, mid-year, did not allow time for full progress to be made. All efforts 

continue to progress, and are expected for completion before the end of the plan’s timeframe.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA is committed to continuing the efforts to remove barriers to a 

diverse and inclusive workplace, conducive to employees reaching their potential. In order to fully meet the 

objectives of the Plan, in FY 2012, NASA will: 1) undertake a careful review of the remaining actions and their 

target dates, taking into account new information, such as recent Government-wide initiatives relating to EEO and 

diversity; and 2) revise the Plan accordingly.

FY 2012 Update: NASA reviewed progress toward the planned FY 2011 actions and their target dates in the 

Model EEO Agency Plan. NASA also revised FY 2012 plans to assure that the outstanding actions were completed

in the fiscal year. NASA made significant progress toward the completion of FY 2011 actions and expects to 

complete them by the end of FY 2013.
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An Inclusive and Diverse STEM Workforce

10ED03

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Serve 8,500 under-represented and under-served students in NASA higher education programs.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10ED03 Was Not Met: In FY 2009, 6,743 higher education students self-reported as being part of 

an underserved and underrepresented race or ethnicity. This represents 40.6 percent of the total number of higher

education students served by NASA in FY 2009, an increase from 28 percent of all higher education students 

similarly reporting in FY 2008. Of all higher education students served by the Agency, 43 percent self-reported 

being women, an increase from 41 percent in FY 2008. These figures are well above national averages for 

participation of minority students according to the National Science Foundation’s report, Women, Minorities, and 

Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering, released in April 2010. The reduction in the number of 

minority higher education students served (6,743 students rather than the goal of 8,500) also reflects an increased 

emphasis on institutional awards for education and research, and a corresponding decrease in individual student 

awards. The overall reduction in direct support to all higher education students in turn affects the total number of 

higher education underserved and underrepresented students reached by NASA. In FY 2007, the total number of 

higher education students reached was 34,493; in FY 2008, the number dropped to 24,362, in FY 2009, it dropped 

further to 24,168. Higher education projects are adjusting to address this trend, but there is significant lag time 

before results are available (e.g., new course development time, time to execute activities, grant reporting lag time). 

Another factor adversely influencing the number of individual student awards is the increasing cost of education. 

To offer individual awards that remain competitive with those of other federal programs and industry, NASA 

grantees must increase award amounts that meet cost increases in tuition, travel, and other expenses. In a flat or 

reduced budget environment, an increase in award size means that fewer direct support awards can be made.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA higher education projects are actively working to increase the 

participation of underrepresented and underserved students. Future efforts include plans to work more closely with 

community colleges and institutions that tend to serve large numbers of underserved students. The Space Grant 

Program, which works with affiliates in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, has actively 

encouraged state consortia to better engage minority-serving institutions in their networks. The consortia are 

accountable for improving the participation of underserved students in their programs, determined as a percentage 

of their audience base. The strategy has been successful, as participation of racially and ethnically underserved and 

underrepresented students in the Space Grant Program has increased from 15 percent in FY 2007, to 21 percent in 

FY 2008, and to 29 percent in FY 2009.

FY 2011 Update: The performance improvement plan was successful, and NASA was able to work more closely 

with community colleges in FY 2010. In doing so, NASA increased its overall reach to underrepresented and 

underserved populations. However, the number of underrepresented and underserved students reported for FY 

2010 does not reflect the increases seen in previous years, due to the availability of data associated with Space 

Grant activities. NASA released a supplemental competition, not in the first round of competitions, to the Space 

Grant Consortia to assist in strengthening linkages with Minority Serving Institutions, but this data will not be 

available until the end of the 2011 calendar year. The competition was released in late FY 2010 due to on-going 

continuing resolutions which delayed funds. As a result, the currently available FY 2010 results only reflect 

underrepresented and underserved participation resulting from the standard Space Grant awards. The additional 

Space Grant awards, are expected to yield additional underrepresented and underserved participants, but will not be 

available until the grant performance period has concluded and grant reporting is completed. 
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ED-11-1 (Performance Goal 5.1.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Achieve 40 percent participation of underserved and underrepresented (in race 

education projects.

and/or ethnicity) in NASA higher 

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure ED-11-1 Was Not Met: This annual performance goal was not met. Out of the 15,947 participants 

in NASA higher education programs who self-reported their race and ethnicity, 35 percent, reported being a 

member of an underserved or underrepresented race or ethnic group. NASA’s aggressive goal of 40 percent, 

exceeds the national averages for underserved and underrepresented participation in higher education, and was a 

challenge that the Agency chose to undertake. The participation in NASA’s programs did meet or exceed the 

percentages of underrepresented minorities pursuing higher education studies in STEM fields nationwide (between 

11 to 21 percent of these degrees, at the bachelor level, according to the National Science Foundation Report, 

Women, Minorities and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: 2011). 

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: The cultivation of diversity is a core value for all NASA education 

efforts, and NASA will challenge itself to continually improve. The performance improvement plan, that addressed 

the last fiscal year’s performance, was successful in that NASA was able to work more closely with community 

colleges in FY 2010, which reflected in increases seen in FY 2011 measures. In doing so, NASA increased its 

overall reach to underrepresented and underserved populations, moving from one year to the next. NASA has 

refocused several projects within the Agency’s higher education portfolio during FY 2011 in pursuit of this goal, 

including the announcement of two new grant opportunities targeted at minority serving institutions and 

community colleges, which tend to have larger populations of underserved and underrepresented students. In FY 

2012, NASA will seek to improve the percentage of underrepresented and underserved students, that participate in 

its higher education programs by placing increased emphasis on inclusion and participation by these populations in 

the projects that reach the largest numbers of undergraduate and graduate students, such as the Space Grant Project. 

Additionally, NASA plans to take a more holistic look, across the Agency, where activities in the mission 

organizations, may be encouraging participation, and factor in this data for a more complete picture.

FY 2012 Update: In FY 2012, NASA placed an increased emphasis on inclusion and participation in the Space 

Grant Program, which funds approximately 80 percent of the participants in the Office of Education's higher 

education programs. Specifically, NASA released a solicitation, through the Space Grant Program, focused on 

serving undergraduate and K-12 educators who are traditionally underrepresented in STEM fields. Additionally, 

NASA modified its methodology for assessing progress toward the targeted participation, to improve insight into 

each higher education program’s contribution. NASA also took the first step at inclusion of the data from the 

mission organizations, the results of which are outlined in the explanation for ED-12-1.

ED-12-1 (Performance Goal 5.1.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Achieve 40 percent participation of underserved and underrepresented (in race and/or 

education projects.

ethnicity) in NASA higher 

FY 2012

Red

Why Measure ED-12-1 Was Not Met: Out of the 15,585 participants in NASA higher education programs who 

reported their race and ethnicity, 24 percent reported being a member of an underserved or underrepresented race 

or ethnic group. NASA removed from the calculation the participants who did not report race or ethnicity. In an 

effort to better understand the percentage of all participants who may be from underserved or underrepresented 

populations, NASA also calculated the percentage of self-reported out of the total participants. Under this latter 

methodology, the participation is reduced to 21 percent. NASA estimates the actual percentage of underserved and 

underrepresented participants to be between these two figures. Additionally, NASA took a more holistic look 

across the Agency, where activities in the mission organizations may be encouraging participation, and factored 

this data. This reduced the overall percentage by one percent.
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FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: Based on the insights the changes in methodology highlighted, NASA 

is creating individual targets for each of its higher education programs, both in the Office of Education and in the 

mission organizations. These targets will ensure strategic contributions from all of the higher education programs, 

to achieve greater participation Agency-wide. Additionally, in FY 2013, NASA will seek to improve the 

percentage of underserved and underrepresented groups that participate in its higher education programs by 

continuing the One Stop Shopping Initiative (OSSI) for NASA Internships, Fellowships, and Scholarships 

opportunities. OSSI is a NASA-wide system for the recruitment, application, selection, and career development of 

undergraduate and graduate student participants. The OSSI Broker-Facilitator Corps will enhance the recruitment 

of students from all higher education institution types, including Hispanic-Serving Institutions, Predominately 

Black Institutions, including Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and Tribal Colleges and Universities. 

All of the Agency's education, internship, fellowship, and scholarship programs and projects will be encouraged to 

utilize OSSI.

NASA will continue to improve its data collection strategies by striving to collect raw data as the events occur, and 

then verify and validate it on a quarterly basis to move the community towards process improvement practices 

through the year.

ED-11-2 (Performance Goal 5.1.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Achieve 45 percent participation of women in NASA higher education projects.

FY 2011

Yellow

Why Measure ED-11-2 Was Not Met: This annual performance goal was not met. Out of the 15,568 participants 

in NASA higher education programs who self-reported their gender, 39 percent, reported being female. Albeit a 

greater number of women currently pursue higher education studies in the United States, men pursue a higher 

proportion of the degrees in science and engineering fields. For example, compared with men, women earn degrees 

at medium to low levels in physical sciences and mathematics (between 30 to 44% of these degrees), and at low 

levels in computer science and engineering (between 18 to 27% of these degrees). Despite the statistics, NASA still 

chose to set an aggressive goal of 45 percent, and fell just short of the challenge.

FY 2011 Performance Improvement Plan: In FY 2012, NASA will seek to improve the percentage of women that 

participate in its higher education programs by placing increased emphasis on inclusion and participation by these 

populations in the projects that reach the largest numbers of undergraduate and graduate students, such as the 

Space Grant Project. NASA currently conducts a significant number of K-12 and informal STEM education 

projects that specifically target participation by pre-college girls. By stimulating interest in STEM among young 

females in the Agency’s education pipeline, NASA expects that many of these students will remain engaged and 

continue to participate in NASA programs upon entering college.

Additionally, NASA plans to take a more holistic look, across the Agency, where activities in the mission 

organizations, may be encouraging participation, and factor in this data for a more complete picture.

FY 2012 Update: In an effort to provide a more comprehensive view of education performance within the Agency, 

NASA took the first step at inclusion of education project data from the mission organizations and NASA Centers, 

the results of which are outlined in the explanation for ED-12-2. Also in FY 2012, the Space Grant Program 

prepared a solicitation focused on serving groups traditionally underrepresented in STEM fields in the 

undergraduate and K-12 educator communities. NASA will release this solicitation in FY 2013.

ED-12-2 (Performance Goal 5.1.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Achieve 45 percent participation of women in NASA higher education projects.

FY 2012

Yellow Why Measure ED-12-2 Was Not Met: Of the 17,454 participants in NASA higher education programs who 

reported their gender, 35 percent reported being female. NASA removed from the calculation the participants 

did not report gender. In an effort to better understand the percentage of all participants who may be women, 

who 
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NASA also calculated the percentage of self-reported women out of the total participants. Under this latter 

methodology, the participation is reduced to 21 percent. NASA estimates the actual percentage of woman 

participants to be between these two figures. Additionally, NASA took a more holistic look across the Agency, 

where activities in the mission organizations may be encouraging participation, and factored this data. This made 

no appreciable difference to the overall percentage.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: Based on insights highlighted by the changes in methodology, NASA 

is creating individual targets for each of its higher education programs, both in the Office of Education and in the 

mission organizations. These targets will ensure strategic contributions from all of the higher education programs, 

to achieve greater participation Agency-wide. 

10ED04

Accountable Organization: Office of Education

Achieve 60% employment of student participants in FY 2009 NASA higher education programs by NASA, 

aerospace contractors, universities, and other educational institutions.

FY 2010

Yellow

Why Measure 10ED04 Was Not Met: In FY 2010, NASA’s education workforce development target was 60 

percent of students from NASA’s higher education programs entering into NASA-related careers. Of the 1,343 

students who self-reported employment data, 625 students (or 46.5 percent) reported working for NASA, aerospace 

contractors, universities, or other educational institutions. One project, Motivating Undergraduates in Science and 

Technology (MUST) was used as a prototype for more closely mapping an Office of Education project directly to 

the NASA Early Career Hiring Initiative. This collaborative approach succeeded in placing 22 of 29 graduates with 

NASA and JPL. The overall drop in employment rate in these specific sectors, relative to previous years, may be a 

result of uncertainty in NASA’s plans (e.g., retirement of Space Shuttle Program, future of the Constellation 

Program), and overall poor health of the U.S. economy in 2008/2009. However, 38.6 percent of graduates (in 

addition to those hired by NASA, aerospace industry and educational organizations) chose STEM-related careers. 

One might conclude that NASA in-depth education experiences are indicative of STEM workforce preparation.

FY 2010 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA organizations with a stake in developing the future workforce 

will continue to work collaboratively with each other and industry partners to identify future workforce trends and 

needs. New efforts in the One Stop Shopping Initiative include closer collaboration between NASA’s hiring 

managers and mentors for higher education students.

FY 2011 Update: The performance plan was successful. In the year following, of the graduates who participated in 

NASA Higher education programs and self-reported employment data, 60.3 percent reported working for NASA, 

aerospace contractors, universities, or other educational institutions. NASA organizations have worked 

collaboratively with each other, as well as industry partners, to meet their respective workforce needs. 

Additionally, closer collaboration between NASA’s hiring managers and mentors for higher education students 

have yielded positive results.
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Performance Improvement Plans for Unmet FY 2012 

Measures, Non-trended

NASA reviewed its FY 2012 performance measures where performance fell short. These measures were 

not evaluated as part of a broader trend in performance. The following tables list performance measures 

that NASA rated Yellow or Red in 2012.

ERD-12-6 (Performance Goal 3.3.2.1)

Accountable Organization: Human Exploration and Operations, Exploration Research and 

Development

Complete tests of Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) Portable Life Support System (PLSS) subsystem in a vacuum 

chamber environment.

FY 2012

Yellow

Why Measure ERD-12-6 Was Not Met: NASA rescheduled the test of the PLSS in a vacuum chamber to FY 2013 

based on a realignment of funding to other priorities. Assembly of the device also was delayed due to component 

technology development timelines that were greater than anticipated.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: NASA currently is assembling the second generation PLSS and 

preparing it for testing in FY 2013. NASA tested the first generation of the PLSS in FY 2011. The new technology 

components, which experienced a delay in FY 2012, have been completed and are being integrated into the system. 

NASA expects to assemble a third generation PLSS in 2014. This evolutionary approach allows for rapid and 

affordable development of prototype spacesuits, and design changes can be made in each generation to improve 

performance. The EVA project is still on track to demonstrate a new spacesuit on ISS by 2020.

Performance Goal 5.2.2.4

Accountable Organization: Mission Support Directorate

By 2015, reduce data center energy consumption by 30 percent.

FY 2012

Yellow

Why Performance Goal 5.2.2.4 Was Not Met: NASA continued to meter all of the Agency’s data centers to allow 

measurement of energy consumption and the subsequent effects of any improvements. NASA’s models estimate 

that a reduction of approximately three percent has been realized to date, based on the closure of data centers. 

Congruent with data center closures, other activities were planned to contribute to energy savings: facility upgrades 

and improvement; replacement of old inefficient mechanical and IT equipment; and virtualizing underutilized IT

infrastructure. Based on current plans, in the fiscally constrained environment, these latter activities will not be 

completed in a timeframe to achieve the targeted energy reduction.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: In FY 2013, NASA plans to revisit this performance goal and to set 

targets more in line with its plans and other reporting. This performance goal is not consistent with the metrics 

being reported under the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) and the NASA Strategic 

Sustainability Performance Plan. Additionally, NASA recognizes that improvements are needed to its predictive 

models and methodology, which will also be improved in the coming year.
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ES-12-23(Performance Goal 2.1.5.3)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Earth Science Division

Reduce time within which 80 percent of NASA Research Announcement (NRA) grants are awarded, from proposal 

due date to selection, by four percent per year, with a goal of 180 days.

FY 2012

Red

Why Measure ES-12-23 Was Not Met: The Earth Science Division (ESD) completed 80 percent of FY 2012 

selections within 236 days, a small improvement from FY 2011's 240 days. The magnitude of solicitations, based 

on coverage of the diversity of scientific disciplines, and the number of proposals received continues to provide a 

challenge to meeting the targeted reductions. Additionally, staff workload is a factor. The small improvement was 

the result of the development of an integrated plan for the year ahead outlining the solicitations, the expected 

proposal numbers, and scheduling of review panels, while taking staffing into consideration. However, the 

planning effort was only starting to take effect in the selections for the current review cycle.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: The Earth Science Division will continue to implement its integrated 

plan in FY 2013 and will measure the impact at the end of the year.

PS-12-17(Performance Goal 2.1.5.3)

Accountable Organization: Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Science Division

Reduce time within which 80 percent of NASA Research Announcement (NRA) grants are awarded, from proposal 

due date to selection, by four percent per year, with a goal of 180 days.

FY 2012

Red

Why Measure PS-12-17 Was Not Met: The Planetary Science Division completed 80 percent of their selections 

within 258 days, which represented a significant improvement from the FY 2011 performance of 290 days. The 

division did not achieve further improvement due to uncertainty in what level of funds would be available for 

award. The division delayed selections until the uncertainty was resolved.

FY 2012 Performance Improvement Plan: The Planetary Science Division plans to adopt a strategy employed by 

the Astrophysics Division to improve the timeline for making selections, while still accounting for any funding 

uncertainties. Specifically, the division plans to provide partial funds early in the fiscal year for rapid selection of 

only the best proposals, ensuring that even if there are budget cuts, enough funds will remain for selections in 

programs scheduled later in the year. This partial funding in the fall will result in a low selection (acceptance) rate 

early in the year, but will speed overall selections. Later in the year, when the total budget is known, the division 

will make appropriate adjustments that may allow for more selections in these "early" programs.
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Performance Results Inform Planning

The preceding assessment of NASA’s performance shortfalls in FY 2012 and larger trends across the 

portfolio highlights the areas for continued monitoring in FY 2013 and beyond. As part of NASA’s 

performance management cycle, the evaluation phase links to both the reporting and planning phases. 

Performance results are reported to Agency leadership and a wide range of stakeholders, including the 

White House, Congress, and the public. Equally important, performance results are a key factor in 

planning future activities. NASA takes advantage of the time between the end of the fiscal year and the

release of the Congressional Justification to adjust performance plans for the current and next fiscal years.

Actions that NASA can take to improve performance include policy or procedural changes, increased 

oversight and assessments, and changes to a program’s direction and plans. Based on the evaluation of 

FY 2012 performance, NASA: 

• Made changes to the FY 2013 and FY 2014 plans, which are reflected in the enclosed 

versions;

• Reaffirmed that the cost and schedule estimation policy changes have been successful and 

have led to improved performance; and 

• Planned more evaluation for on-going trends in areas like diversity and equal opportunity in 

STEM education activities. 

NASA has already begun its performance management cycle for FY 2013 and will strive to improve 

performance at all levels of the Agency. NASA also will continue to plan, evaluate, and report in 

streamlined and more effective ways to provide the underpinning elements to drive this improvement.