[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12563

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

AKEEM MUHAMMAD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JULIE L. JONES, 

individual capacity, 

JOHNNY FRAMBO, 

in his official and individual capacity Florida Department of Corrections State Chaplain,

SHANE PHILLIPS, 

in his individual capacity, 

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

CHIEF, BUREAU OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND 

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12563

MONITORING, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00212-HLA-JBT

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Akeem Muhammad, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 

a complaint bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, against Florida Department of Corrections 

(FDOC) and Florida State Prison (FSP) officials, alleging violations 

of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the RLUIPA. His claims centered around the timing and 

nutritional adequacy of meals and medication provided to inmates 

during Ramadan. He appeals the district court’s orders: (1) granting in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss; (2) entering summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants on his First Amendment and 

RLUIPA claims; and (3) denying his motion to reimburse service 

costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Although we partially affirm

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22-12563 Opinion of the Court 3

based on qualified immunity, we reverse and remand in part for 

further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Muhammad has been a practicing Muslim since 1996. As 

part of his faith, he observes Ramadan, an annual month-long period of prayer and fasting. Muhammad believes he must abstain 

from consuming food, water, and medication during the day during Ramadan. Importantly for this case, Muhammad believes the 

fasting period begins at astronomical twilight, which precedes sunrise. He must consume a nutritionally adequate, meatless, Kosher 

diet during two meals each day—one pre-fast meal before astronomical twilight and one post-fast meal after sunset. Muhammad 

also takes medication for several medical conditions, which is typically provided by prison officials in the morning after astronomical 

twilight and in the afternoon. He must take his medication in presence of medical staff, and his doctor will discontinue treatment if 

he refuses his medication for three days. 

When Muhammad filed this prisoner civil rights action in 

February 2018, he was being detained at FSP. He alleged prison 

officials provided his pre-fast meal and medication before sunrise 

but not before astronomical twilight, leaving him to choose between his religious beliefs and receiving adequate nutrition and 

medical care. As a result, he stopped fasting 17 days into Ramadan

in 2017 and has allegedly been unable to fast in the years since then. 

He alleged that his qualitative religious experience was destroyed,

and he suffered serious physical injuries, including “exacerbated 

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hypertension, exacerbated [Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS)], severe dehydration, severe physical pain, severe fatigue, and severe 

lethargy.”

Muhammad sued four FSP employees in their official capacities: Food Service Director Jeffery Andrews; two vocational instructors, R. Davis and H. Sellers; and a correctional officer, A. 

McGregor. Muhammad also sued four FDOC employees in their 

official and individual capacities: Julie Jones, the FDOC’s Secretary; 

Johnny Frambo, Chaplaincy Services Administrator; Shane Phillips, Chief of the Bureau of Contract Management and Monitoring; 

and Craig McCormick, Public Health Nutrition Program Manager. 

Three of the FDOC defendants were later substituted in their official capacities: Mark Inch for Jones; Angela Gaskins for Phillips; and 

Brenda Patterson for McCormick. 

As for relief, Muhammad sought (1) an injunction against 

Jones in her official capacity only; (2) a declaratory judgment that 

Frambo, Phillips, McCormick, and the FSP defendants violated the 

RLUIPA in their official capacities; and (3) compensatory, nominal, 

and punitive damages from the original FDOC defendants in their 

individual capacities—Jones, Frambo, Phillips, and McCormick—

for violating his First Amendment rights. Muhammad did not seek 

monetary damages under the RLUIPA, nor did he seek monetary 

damages against any defendant in an official capacity.

A month after filing the operative complaint, Muhammad 

informed the district court that he had been transferred from FSP 

to another state facility and conceded the transfer mooted his 

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official capacity RLUIPA claims against the four FSP defendants—

Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor. In response to that stipulation and the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims against Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor

as moot. It also denied qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim, but it dismissed Muhammad’s claim for compensatory 

damages based on the physical injury requirement under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(e).

The defendants answered, again asserting qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to all monetary damages, and moved 

for summary judgment. 

In March 2022, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. It found they were entitled to 

qualified immunity as to nominal damages and that Muhammad 

was not entitled to recover punitive damages because it found the 

“Defendants’ statements made under penalty of perjury to be more 

credible than Plaintiffs unsubstantiated claims that these Defendants ‘maliciously participated’ in refusing to accommodate his religious beliefs during Ramadan in 2017.” With respect to the FDOC 

defendants on the RLUIPA claim, the district court concluded: 

Statements made by the plaintiff are insufficient to establish that that plaintiff’s religious practice has been 

substantially burdened. . . . Because Defendants have 

provided support that they made substantial efforts to 

accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and Plaintiff 

has not met his burden to support that his religious 

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exercise was substantially burdened—that his physical health was detrimentally affected by not being

able to fast in the periods as required to observe Ramadan—and having no material facts at issue, judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants.

After the court denied Muhammad’s motion to alter or 

amend the judgment, the defendants moved for taxation of costs. 

Muhammad then appealed from the final judgment, and the district court stayed the costs motion pending the outcome of this appeal.1

II. DISCUSSION

We take the following issues in turn: (1) whether Muhammad’s transfer from FSP to a different Florida prison mooted his 

claims and, if not, whether the defendants’ policies substantially 

burdened his religious exercise under the RLUIPA; (2) whether 

qualified immunity precluded Muhammad’s First Amendment 

claim; and (3) whether Muhammad was entitled to reimbursement 

for service costs.2

1 We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings on the merits, so Muhammad’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction for the district court to 

rule on the defendants’ motion for costs is DENIED AS MOOT. In any event, 

the motion to relinquish jurisdiction was unnecessary because this appeal did 

not prevent the district court from ruling on collateral matters. See Weaver v. 

Fla. Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1999).

2 Our review of these issues is largely de novo. See CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. 

City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (mootness); Baker v. City of 

Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023) (motion to dismiss for failure to 

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A. RLUIPA Claim for Prospective Relief

(i) Mootness

First, Muhammad contends his transfer from FSP did not 

moot his claims, and we agree to the extent he seeks prospective 

relief on the FDOC’s statewide policies. “The general rule is that a 

prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim 

for declaratory and injunctive relief,” even when “there is no assurance that he will not be returned to the jail.” McKinnon v. Talladega 

Cnty., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an inmate’s 

claim was moot where he challenged “unconstitutional conditions 

in a single jail where [he] is no longer incarcerated”). But a transfer 

between state prisons does not moot a request for injunctive relief 

against the head of the state prison system. See Hardwick v. Brinson, 

523 F.2d 798, 799-801 (5th Cir. 1975).3 

As Muhammad acknowledged in the district court, the 

claims against the FSP defendants were mooted by his transfer 

state a claim); Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022) (summary judgment based on qualified immunity); Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 

934, 942 (11th Cir. 2015) (legal conclusion that a prison policy comports with 

RLUIPA). We also review the legal interpretation of Civil Rule 4 de novo, see

Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 

920 (11th Cir. 2003), but we review the denial of a motion for costs for abuse 

of discretion, see Cochran v. EI duPont de Nemours, 933 F.2d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir. 

1991). 

3 The decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 

1981, are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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from FSP.4 See McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363. But injunctive relief 

can still be granted with respect to the FDOC defendants because 

an injunction against them would apply to any state prison in Florida. See Hardwick, 523 F.2d at 800-01. We read the district court’s 

order to be consistent with this understanding. Because there is 

still a live controversy as to injunctive relief against the FDOC defendants, we turn to whether summary judgment was proper.

(ii) Summary Judgment Order

Muhammad argues that, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to him, the district court erred by finding the 

FDOC’s refusal to accommodate his Ramadan beliefs did not place 

a substantial burden on his religious exercise. We agree.

The RLUIPA protects inmates “who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the 

government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their

religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005). “While the 

First Amendment requires only that prison restrictions be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” Davila v. Gladden, 

777 F.3d 1198, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015), “[t]he RLUIPA provides 

greater religious protection than the First Amendment,” Dorman v. 

Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022).

4 Muhammad sued the FSP defendants only in their official capacities and for 

declaratory judgment. His claims for monetary damages, which are addressed 

below, were limited to the FDOC defendants.

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To make a claim under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff must first 

show that a government rule, regulation, practice, or policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion. Id. If successful, it becomes the defendant’s burden to show that the challenged directive is the “least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 

government interest.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). A plaintiff’s religious exercise is substantially 

burdened when the prison’s policy makes him choose between violating that policy—and risk facing disciplinary action—or violating his religion. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). While 

a “substantial burden must place more than an inconvenience on 

religious exercise,” “modified behavior, if the result of government 

coercion or pressure, can be enough” to show a substantial burden 

on religious exercise. Thai Meditation Ass’n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821, 829-31 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

When considering summary judgment motions, “courts 

must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the 

nonmoving party’s version.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 

F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). While 

an affidavit may not be conclusory, nothing prohibits an affidavit 

from being self-serving, and a litigant’s self-serving statements 

based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat a summary 

judgment motion. United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 

2018) (en banc). “Even if a district court believes that the evidence 

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presented by one side is of doubtful veracity,” “[a] case should be 

put to the jury if there is any genuine issue of material fact, including one created solely by the testimony of a party.” Feliciano, 707 

F.3d at 1247, 1252 (quotation marks omitted). 

First, the district court improperly weighed evidence at summary judgment. See id. at 1247, 1252. When construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Muhammad, there is more 

than enough for his RLUIPA claim to survive summary judgment.5 

No one disputes the sincerity of Muhammad’s religious belief that 

he must begin his Ramadan fast at astronomical twilight. Moreover, Muhammad stated in a sworn affidavit that he was woken up 

for his morning meals and medication during Ramadan between 

5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., which was after astronomical twilight, and 

this forced him to forgo his medication and eat only the dinner 

meal. This is also consistent with Jones’s interrogatory response, 

which stated the 2017 Ramadan accommodations for Muslim inmates included “providing them with prescribed medications (single dose) and a pre-fasting meal between astronomical twilight and 

civil twilight or at approximately 60-80 minutes before sunrise.”

(emphasis added). 

More fundamentally, the district court “misunderstood the 

analysis that RLUIPA demands.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. For a person 

5 Muhammad did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, so we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to him and express no opinion 

about whether Muhammad might have prevailed had he moved for summary 

judgment.

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holding the sincere religious belief that he must begin fasting at astronomical twilight, an FDOC policy and practice of providing

pre-fast meals and medication after astronomical twilight pressured Muhammad to choose between adhering to his religious beliefs and receiving adequate nutrition and medication. See Thai 

Meditation Ass’n of Ala., Inc., 980 F.3d at 829-30; Dorman, 36 F.4th at 

1314. That is enough to satisfy his burden under the RLUIPA. The 

district court found the defendants provided Muhammad “a reasonable opportunity” to practice his religious beliefs and that the 

institutional guides and memoranda “reflects recognition of [Islam]’s requirements . . . during Ramadan.” But this “improperly 

imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’ First 

Amendment rights.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. Even if the FDOC’s 

policies satisfied the religious needs of some Muslim inmates during Ramadan, that does not rebut Muhammad’s showing that his

religious beliefs were substantially burdened by those policies. See

id. at 362. 

The FDOC defendants then needed to show that providing 

pre-fast meals and morning medication after astronomical twilight 

is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. See Dorman, 36 F.4th at 1313; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). 

The district court concluded that the defendants “have demonstrated that the policy at issue” met that standard, and it previously 

alluded to “the prison officials’ interests in providing safety and order.” But the court did not identify any specific interest raised by 

the FDOC defendants, explain why that interest would be compelling, or explain how its policies were the least restrictive means of 

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furthering that interest. And, as in the district court, the FDOC 

defendants have failed on appeal to identify any such compelling 

interest. See Holt, 574 U.S. at 364 (noting our obligation to consider 

whether exceptions are required under the RLUIPA without unquestioning deference to a state’s department of corrections). 

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the FDOC defendants on Muhammad’s RLUIPA claim and

remand for further proceedings. We now turn to Muhammad’s 

request for monetary damages.

B. First Amendment Claim for Monetary Damages

Muhammad also sought monetary damages from the 

FDOC defendants in their individual capacities on his First Amendment claim. The district court rejected (a) compensatory damages 

for failure to satisfy the physical injury requirement under 

§ 1997e(e); (b) punitive damages because the defendants’ sworn 

statements about a lack of malicious intent were “more credible”

than Muhammad’s “unsubstantiated” claims; and (c) nominal damages based on qualified immunity.

On appeal, Muhammad contends he suffered more than a de 

minimis injury under § 1997e and that the district court erred in 

finding then-Secretary Jones and Chaplaincy Services Administrator Frambo6 were entitled to qualified immunity because it

6 Muhammad has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s qualified immunity analysis as to the other defendants. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. 

Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a party on appeal 

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resolved factual disputes against Muhammad at summary judgment. Even if we agree that the district court improperly weighed 

evidence at summary judgment, we can affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record. See Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1251-54 

(affirming on other grounds after holding the district court improperly weighed evidence).

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Christmas 

v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation 

marks omitted). It is undisputed that Jones and Frambo were acting within their discretionary authority, so the burden shifts to Muhammad to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. at

1354. The Supreme Court has outlined four factors that frame our 

First Amendment inquiry, but the fundamental issue is whether 

the prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests. Rodriguez v. Burnside, 38 F.4th 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2022) 

(citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)). Unlike the 

RLUIPA framework, which provides for a “focused inquiry” assessing “whether a prison policy as applied to an individual prisoner is 

the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest,” the First Amendment inquiry under Turner “makes no 

abandons a claim if he fails to plainly and prominently raise it, such as by devoting a discrete section of his argument to that claim).

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comparable, individualized demands.” Id. at 1332-33 (quotation 

marks omitted). 

“Even if the prison’s policies were improper, the prison officials would be entitled to qualified immunity” “unless it is shown 

that they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established 

at the time of the challenged action.” Id. at 1134-35 (quotation 

marks omitted). It is clearly established that a prisoner is entitled 

to reasonably adequate food, that is “[a] well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.” Hamm v. 

DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). And a prison

should accommodate an inmate’s religious dietary restrictions, 

subject to budgetary and logistical limitations, when a belief is truly 

held. See Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), abrogation recognized by Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503 (11th Cir. 

1996); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) 

(explaining prison regulations should be judged under a reasonableness test, not the more stringent least restrictive means test). 

We need not decide whether there was a violation because 

Muhammad has not met his burden on appeal of identifying decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, or the Florida Supreme Court that would “make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant’s place,” that establishing FDOC 

policies and guidance providing for pre-fast Ramadan meals and 

medication before sunrise but after astronomical twilight violated 

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federal law.7 Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 977-78 (11th Cir. 

2008) (quotation marks omitted); see Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 

561 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009). Turner does not ask “courts 

to fine tune a prison’s policy to accommodate a prisoner’s individual request,” and Muhammad “has not shown that a reasonable official would have had fair and clear warning that his particular conduct was unlawful and unconstitutional.” Rodriguez, 38 F.4th at

1334 (quotation marks omitted). 

In short, “qualified immunity, pled by [Jones and Frambo] as 

an affirmative defense, should have been the analysis used to grant 

them summary judgment,” and we can affirm as to all monetary 

7 Muhammad largely failed to argue that the officers violated any clearly established law, and he may have “forfeited any such argument—which is reason enough to affirm the district court’s qualified-immunity finding.” Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1354, n.4. At most, Muhammad included a string citation for

the proposition that “[t]he RLUIPA and First Amendment give Muslim prisoners the right to fast daily during Ramadan[] and require prison officials to 

accommodate those daily Ramadan fasts.” The only case he cites from this 

Court is Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 1989). Saleem is not 

relevant, but it attached an unpublished opinion from Diaab v. Green, 794 F.2d 

685 (11th Cir.1986) (table). Even if an unpublished opinion attached to a published opinion could show a clearly established right, the Diaab panel remanded for further proceedings because the district court should not have dismissed the case without service on the defendants and a hearing on the sincerity of the plaintiff’s alleged religious beliefs and the state’s justification for regulating the manner in which those beliefs are practiced. Id. at 1317-18. Notably, on remand, the district court in Diaab granted the prison officials qualified 

immunity from damages, which we affirmed. Id. at 1314 n.2. Neither Saleem

nor Diaab support reversal on qualified immunity in this procedural posture.

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damages on that basis. Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1288 

(11th Cir. 1998). 

C. Service Costs

Finally, Muhammad contends the district court erred in 

denying his motion for reimbursement of the costs to serve Jones, 

Frambo, Andrews, Sellers, and McGregor after they refused to 

waive service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

Civil Rule 4 distinguishes between serving individuals, Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(e), and “[a] state, a municipal corporation, or any other 

state-created governmental organization,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j). The

distinction is relevant in this case because Rule 4(d)(2)’s mandatory 

waiver provision8 generally applies to individuals—thereby shifting 

service costs to individual defendants—but not state and local governments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County 

Comm’rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). 

In opposing Muhammad’s motion for costs, the defendants 

conceded that he “complied substantially” with the procedures to 

shift costs of service but argued they had good cause not to cooperate because Muhammad failed to state a claim against them. 

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides: 

If a defendant located within the United States fails, without 

good cause, to sign and return a waiver requested by a plaintiff 

located within the United States, the court must impose on the 

defendant: (A) the expenses later incurred in making service; 

and (B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of 

any motion required to collect those service expenses.

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Instead of addressing good cause, the district court reasoned that 

the defendants were sued in their official and individual capacities, 

so Muhammad’s claim was against the state, and the state is not 

required to waive service under Rule 4(j). Muhammad disagrees, 

contending those defendants needed to be served individually under Rule 4(e) and should be required to reimburse his costs to serve 

them pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2).

We have not directly addressed whether, as Muhammad argues, a state official sued in an official capacity for prospective relief 

should be served under Rule 4(e) or (j).9 But we need not reach 

that issue in this appeal because we have held that plaintiffs asserting § 1983 claims against a city and individual officers needed to 

properly serve each within the time provided by Rule 4(m). 

Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1281. That is, the plaintiffs needed to 

serve the city pursuant to Rule 4(j) and serve the individual defendants pursuant to Rule 4(e). Id. 

9 The First Circuit has held that a state officer, whether sued in an individual 

or official capacity, must be served under Rule 4(e) because the officer is bound 

by the judgment and can be held in contempt for disobeying a court order. 

Caisse v. DuBois, 346 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Echevarria-Gonzalez v. 

Gonzalez-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Fifth Circuit “disagree[d] with the First Circuit’s reading of rule 4, at least insofar as the First 

Circuit’s reasoning subjects state officers to the mandatory waiver provisions 

of the rule.” Moore v. Hosemann, 591 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 2009). Based on 

the 1993 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(d), the Fifth Circuit held that a 

state official sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief “is not subject to 

the mandatory waiver-of-service provisions of rule 4(d).” Id.

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Although we did not address costs of service in Lepone-Dempsey, it follows that individual state defendants served under Rule 

4(e) are subject to the failure-to-waive provision of Rule 4(d)(2)

even if they are also sued in an official capacity. This is consistent 

with how Rule 4 treats federal employees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3) 

(providing that a United States officer sued in an individual capacity 

in connection with their official duties “(whether or not the officer 

or employee is also sued in an official capacity)” must be served 

under Rule 4(e)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 

2000 amendment (explaining that it was making explicit the understanding that federal employees sued individually must be served 

as individuals, invoking subdivision (e) and the waiver-of-service 

provisions of subdivision (d)). 

Jones, Frambo, Andrews, Sellers, and McGregor were sued 

in their individual capacities, so they were subject to service under 

Rule 4(e) and the cost-shifting provision of Rule 4(d)(2). Because 

they have not shown good cause for the failure to waive service, 

the court “must impose” the expenses Muhammad incurred in 

making service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4

advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (explaining that 

“sufficient cause should be rare” and a claim being “unjust” does 

not qualify as good cause for failure to waive service). Accordingly, 

we reverse the denial of Muhammad’s motion for reimbursement 

of service costs and remand for the district court to award costs 

under Rule 4(d)(2).

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III. CONCLUSION

Muhammad has alleged Florida prison officials forced him 

to choose between observing his religious beliefs during Ramadan 

and receiving adequate nutrition and medication. The FDOC defendants sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 for First 

Amendment violations are entitled to qualified immunity. On that 

basis, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jones 

and Frambo as to monetary damages. But we reverse the grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the FDOC defendants on Muhammad’s RLUIPA claim for prospective relief and the denial of Muhammad’s motion for costs of service. We remand to the district 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

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