IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON,

E.J.J., D.O.B. 11/29/93 Respondent,

v.

Appellant. DIVISION ONE No. 67726-8-I UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: March 4, 2013 Dwyer, J. — E.J.J., a juvenile at the time of his adjudication, was found guilty by the trial court ofobstructing a lawenforcement officerbased upon an 

### incidentin which police officers were called by his mother to their home due to ^ 

### thebehaviorofE.J.J.'s highly intoxicated sister. On appeal, E.J.J, contends that? ^CJ--i £3 <•" O

-_J i— _*: the obstruction statute, RCW 9A.76.020(1), isfacially overbroad because, he f- r£TM'd

^ ciCO asserts, it prohibits constitutionally protected speech. He further contends that ^ ^^ insufficientevidence supports his adjudication of guilt. Finally, E.J.J, asserts that the obstruction statute is unconstitutional as applied because, he alleges, his actions were protected by various constitutional provisions. Because our Supreme Court has construed the obstruction statute to require conduct in addition to pure speech, E.J.J.'s facial overbreadth challenge fails. Moreover, based upon the evidence presented, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements ofthe offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. T.-_-MNo. 67726-8-1/2 Thus, sufficient evidence supports E.J.J.'s adjudication of guilt. Finally, with regard to his as-applied challenge, E.J.J, did not raise in the trial court the 

### alleged constitutional infirmities that he asserts on appeal; nor did he challenge the lawfulness of his arrest or seek to exclude the presentation of any evidence that was admitted. On appeal, his contention is limited to his assertion that his words and actions could not result in a constitutionally valid conviction. 

### Accordingly, in reviewing E.J.J.'s as-applied challenge, we determine whether the obstruction statute is unconstitutional as applied to those ofE.J.J.'s actions 

### the evidence ofwhich was necessary to establish the elements of the offense. In other words, we examine whether the challenged statute was applied so as to 

### criminalize speech or conduct that could notconstitutionally be criminalized. Aftersuch consideration, we conclude that E.J.J.'s as-applied challenge lacks merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's disposition.
I Geraldine Johnson called the police to her home on the evening of 

### February 14,2011. Herjuvenile daughter, R., was attempting tofight with Johnson and to break the windows ofthe home with rocks. Officers Barreto, Jenkins, and Mullins responded to the scene, where, Officer Barreto later 

### testified, theyfound R. to be "highly intoxicated" and "very belligerent." For several minutes, the officers attempted "to calm her down while [they] worked out the situation between her and her mother." 

### According to OfficerJenkins, "just as things kind of started to settle," E.J.J., R.'s 17-year-old brother, stepped outside ofthe home and approached R.
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and the officers. Officer Jenkins informed E.J.J, that the officers were "in the 

### middle of an active investigation" and asked him to go back inside the house and close the door. Although the officer repeated this request "four orfive times," E.J.J, refused to comply. Indeed, E.J.J, became "hostile" when the officer made this request. According to Officer Barreto, E.J.J.'s presence made it "very difficult" to calm his sister, and, as a result of his presence, the scene "escalated 

### veryquickly into a veryhostile situation." OfficerJenkins similarly testified that, although R. had become calm, she "began to escalate" when E.J.J, came outside. Officer Jenkins described E.J.J, as "irate" during this exchange, calling 

### the officers names, yelling, and using profanity. E.J.J, was advised by the officers that he could be "arrested for obstructing" if he refused to comply with
their orders. 

### Eventually, OfficerJenkins, without touching E.J.J., escorted him backto the house. The officerthen asked E.J.J, multiple times to close the door to the 

### house, and E.J.J, repeatedly refused. Severaltimes, OfficerJenkins closed the door, and E.J.J, reopened it. The home hadtwo doors, an outer "wrought iron door" that someone inside the home could see through and an inner "solid door." Officer Jenkins wanted E.J.J, to close the solid door because, when only the 

### wrought iron doorwas closed, E.J.J, "was still able to see whatwe weredoing." This concerned the officer because ifE.J.J, "chose to harm us, he'd have the 

### ability to do so without us knowing." Theofficers had searched neither E.J.J, nor the home for weapons. Several feet away from the doorway was a window 

### through which someone standing inside the homecould see the area in which
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the officers and R. were located. 

### The exchange between the officers and E.J.J, lasted forapproximately 20 minutes before Officer Jenkins arrested E.J.J. E.J.J, was thereafter charged with 

### obstructing a lawenforcement officer in violation ofRCW 9A.76.020(1). 

### An adjudication hearing was held onAugust 23, 2011. E.J.J, testified that 

### he approached R. and the officers afterseeing an officertake out a "nightstick," with which E.J.J, thoughtthe officer was going to hit his sister. He stated that he wasn'ttrying to "intervene" in the situation, but that he wanted to "observe" and 

### "supervise" to ensure that his sister was safe. E.J.J, did notdenycalling the officers "inappropriate names," but he stated that the officers were also shouting profanities at him. 

### Following theadjudication hearing, thetrial courtentered findings offact and conclusions of law. The court concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of obstructing a lawenforcement officer and, 

### accordingly, determined E.J.J, to be guilty as charged. E.J.J, appeals.
II E.J.J, contends that the statute criminalizing obstructing a law enforcement officer, RCW 9A.76.020(1), prohibits a substantial amount of 

### constitutionally protected speech and, accordingly, isfacially overbroad. However, our Supreme Court has construed the obstruction statute to require conduct, in addition to pure speech, in order to avoid such a constitutional 

### infirmity. State v. Williams. 171 Wn.2d 474, 251 P.3d 877 (2011). Thus, E.J.J.'s
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overbreadth challenge fails. "Astatute is overbroad if it chills or sweeps within its prohibition 

### constitutionally protected free speech activities." State v. Hahn, 162 Wn.App. 885, 900, 256 P.3d 1267 (2011). rev'don other grounds. 174Wn.2d 126,271 

### P.3d 892 (2012). Suchoverbreadth, however, must be "substantial"; the United States Supreme Court has "repeatedlyemphasized that where a statute 

### regulates expressive conduct, the scope ofthe statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only 'real, but substantial as well, 

### judged in relation to thestatute's plainly legitimate sweep.'" Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112, 100 S. Ct. 1691, 109 L Ed. 2d 98 (1990) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L Ed. 2d 830 (1973)). Thus, 

### we have held that, "[w]hen analyzing a statute for overbreadth, the key determination is 'whetherthe enactment reaches a substantial amount of 

### constitutionally protected conduct.'" Statev. Dvson, 74Wn. App. 237, 242, 872 P.2d 1115 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citv ofSeattle v. Huff. 111 Wn.2d 923, 925, 767 P.2d 572 (1989)). See also Hahn. 162Wn. App. 

### at901 (holding that criminal solicitation statute is not overbroad because it "does not prohibit a substantial amount ofspeech"). "Even where a statute atits 

### margins infringes on protected expression, 'facial invalidation is inappropriate if the remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range ofeasily identifiable and 

### constitutionally prescribable
. . . conduct."' Osborne, 495U.S. at 112 (alterations 

### in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982)).
-5-No. 67726-8-1/6 Moreover, a statute may survive overbreadth scrutiny where the state 

### supreme court has placed a limiting construction upon the statute, thus restricting itsscope to unprotected conduct. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112-14. In Osborne, the defendant challenged his conviction pursuant to an Ohio statute prohibiting the 

### possession ofchild pornography, asserting that the statute was overbroad under the First Amendment. 495 U.S. at 107. However, as the United States Supreme 

### Court noted, the OhioSupreme Court, relying on statutory exceptions, read the statute "as onlyapplying to depictions ofnudity involving a lewd exhibition or 

### graphic focus on a minor's genitals." Osborne. 495U.S. at 107. Accordingly, the state supremecourt affirmed Osborne'sconviction. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107. 

### Evaluating the statuteas construed by the state supreme court, the United States Supreme Court similarly rejected Osborne's FirstAmendment arguments, 

### holding that"Osborne's overbreadth challenge, in anyevent, fails because the statute, as construed by the Ohio SupremeCourt on Osborne'sdirect appeal, 

### plainly survives overbreadth scrutiny." Osborne. 495U.S. at 112-13. TheCourt explained that it has "long respected" the ability of state supreme courts "to
narrow state statutes so as to limit the statute's scope to unprotected conduct." Osborne. 495 U.S. at 120. 

### Here, E.J.J, challenges the constitutionality of our state's obstruction statute, which provides: "A person is guilty of obstructing a lawenforcement 

### officer ifthe person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties." RCW 

### 9A.76.020(1). Heasserts that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad
-6-No. 67726-8-1/7 because, he contends, it prohibits a substantial amount ofprotected speech. Our Supreme Court, however, has construed the obstruction statute to avoid such a constitutional infirmity, adhering to its "jurisprudential history of 

### requiring conduct in addition to pure speech in order to establish obstruction of
an officer." Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 485. There, Williams was convicted of obstructing a lawenforcement officerwhen, in an apparent attempt to prevent a 

### police officerfrom discovering an outstanding warrant, he gave his brother's name, instead of his own, to the officer. Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 475. Williams 

### appealed from hisconviction, asserting that legislative history and decisional authority demonstrate that the statute requires some conductin addition to making false statements. Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 475. 

### Following an extensivereview ofcase law interpreting the former and current obstruction statutes, the court concluded that conduct is required in 

### addition to pure speech to support a conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer. Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 478-86. The court determined that, in enacting 

### RCW 9A.76.020, our legislature was aware that "in order to find obstruction 

### statutes constitutional, appellate courts ofthis state have long required conduct." Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 485. Our courts have required such conduct, the court 

### explained, in part due to "concern thatcriminalizing pure speech would implicate freedom of speech." Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 485: see also State v. Budik. 173 Wn.2d 727, 735-36, 272 P.3d 816 (2012) (citing Williams in holding that mere false disavowal of knowledge was insufficient to support a conviction for 

### rendering criminal assistance and, instead, an affirmative act was required);
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State v. Grant. 89 Wn.2d 678, 685-86, 575 P.2d 210 (1978) (holding that former obstruction statute, the language of which is almost identical to that of the current statute, "focuses on conduct other than speech"). Thus, the court held that, "[i]n order to avoid constitutional infirmities, we require some conduct in addition to making false statements to support a conviction for obstructing an officer."
Williams. 171 Wn.2d at 486. Nevertheless, E.J.J, contends that the statute is overbroad because it "criminalizes any speech, so long as that speech, together with conduct, 'hinders, delays, or obstructs' a lawenforcement officer." Appellant's Br. at 28 (quoting RCW 9A.76.020(1)). This contention, however, fails to recognize that conduct 

### may be constitutionally regulated "even though intertwined with expression and association." Cox v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S. Ct. 476, 13 L. Ed. 2d 

### 487 (1965) (holding that statute prohibiting "picketing and parading" near a courthouse did not infringe upon the constitutionally protected rights of free 

### speech and free assembly). Indeed, the "examples are many ofthe application" by the United States Supreme Court "ofthe principle thatcertain forms of conduct mixedwith speech may be regulated or prohibited." Cox. 379 U.S. at 563. "'[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom ofspeech or 

### press to make a course of conduct illegal merelybecause the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means oflanguage, either spoken, written, or printed.'" Cox, 379 U.S. at 563 (quoting Gibonev v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.. 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L Ed. 834 (1949)). Moreover, the case to which E.J.J, cites in support of his overbreadth
-8-No. 67726-8-1/9 challenge, Cityof Houston. Tex, v. Hill. 482 U.S. 451, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987), is inapposite. There, Hill challenged as overbroad a city ordinance making it "'unlawful for any person to ... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty.'" Hill, 482 U.S. at 461 (quoting Code ofOrdinances, City of Houston, Tex., §§34-11(a) 

### (1984)). The evidence showed that the ordinance had been employed to make arrests for "'arguing,' '[tjalking,' '[interfering,' '[f]ailing to remain quiet,' '[rjefusing 

### to remain silent,' '[v]erbal abuse,' 'cursing,' '[v]erbally yelling,' and '[tjalking loudly, 

### [w]alking through the scene.'" Hill, 482 U.S. at 457 (quoting Hill v. City of 

### Houston. Tex.. 789 F.2d 1103, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1986)).1 TheSupreme Court invalidated the ordinance, determining that the ordinance, which prohibited 

### "verbal interruptions ofpolice officers," dealt "not with core criminal conduct, but 

### with speech." Hill, 482 U.S. at460-61. Importantly, the Court determined that the ordinance at issue in HiH had "'received a virtually open-ended interpretation'" 

### and, thus, was "susceptible of regularapplication to protected expression." 482 

### U.S. at 466-67 (quoting Lewis v. City ofNew Orleans. 415 U.S. 130, 136, 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result)). Moreover, the Court concluded that the ordinance was unambiguous and, thus, not susceptible to a 

### limiting construction: "The enforceableportion ofthis ordinance is a general prohibition of speech that 'simply has nocore' ofconstitutionally unprotected expression to which it might be limited." Hi!!. 482 U.S. at 468-69 (quoting Smith

1Indeed, Hill himselfwas arrested for"'wilfully or intentionally interrupting] a city policeman
... by verbal challenge during an investigation.'" HjM, 482 U.S. at 454.
-9-No. 67726-8-1/10

v. Goquen. 415 U.S. 566, 578, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974)). Thus, the Court held that the ordinance "criminalize[d] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech" and, accordingly, was unconstitutionally overbroad. Hi, 482 U.S. at 466. In contrast, the obstruction statute challenged here has been construed by


### our Supreme Court to require conduct in addition to speech in order to establish the offense.2 Williams, 171 Wn.2d at 485. As in Osborne, this construction
narrows the obstruction statute "so as to limitthe statute's scope to unprotected conduct." 495 U.S. at 120. Moreover, a statute is not rendered unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is both real and substantial in relation to its "'legitimate 

### sweep.'" Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at615). Because the obstruction statute does not reach a substantial amount of 

### constitutionally protected conduct, it isnot, as E.J.J, contends, unconstitutionally overbroad.3
2E.J.J, asserts that "the caselaw shows that speech is frequently criminalized under [the obstruction] statute when thespeech accompanies conduct." Appellant's Br. at25. E.J.J, cites to only two cases in support ofthis assertion, State v. Contreras. 92Wn. App. 307, 966 P.2d 915 (1998), and Statev. Williamson. 84Wn. App. 37, 924 P.2d 960 {1996), andneithercase demonstrates thatspeech is"frequently criminalized" pursuantto RCW 9A.76.020(1). In Contreras. the court held that the defendant's refusal to answer questions was not sufficientto support his obstruction conviction; rather, the courtupheld the conviction based upon Contreras's conduct ofdisobeying theofficer's ordersto puthis handsin view, exitthe carin which he was sitting, andkeep hishands ontopofthecar, andgiving theofficer afalse name. 92Wn. App. at 316. In Williamson, the court did not address the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because the court reversed the obstruction conviction on the basis of a defective information. 84 Wn. App. at 46. 3To the extent that the obstruction statute may interfere with an individual's constitutionally protected rightto free speech, wenote that"the exerciseofthatright, evenin public forums, is subjecttovalid time, place, and mannerrestrictions." Citv of Seattlev. Abercrombie. 85Wn. App. 393, 399, 945 P.2d 1132(1997) (upholding the City of Seattle's obstruction ordinance against an overbreadth challenge). Such restrictions are valid so long as they "'are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored toserve a significant government interest, and leaveopenample alternative channelsofcommunication.'" Citv ofSeattlev. Huff, 111 Wn.2d
-10-No. 67726-8-1/11

E.J.J, additionallycontends that there was insufficient evidence to support 

### hisadjudication ofguilt for obstructing a law enforcementofficer. Because, 

### based upon the evidence presented, anyrational trier offactcould havefound the essential elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt, we disagree. 

### Whenreviewing a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we must determine "whether, afterviewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the 

### prosecution, anyrational trieroffact could have found theessential elements of thecrime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560(1979). This standard ofreview is so oft

### repeated that lawyers andjudges infrequently considerthe meaning ofitswords. The purpose ofthe standard is to ensurethatthe factfinder "rationally applped]" theconstitutional standard required by the due processclause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, which allows for conviction ofan offense only upon proofbeyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-18. In other words, the Jackson 

### standard is designed to ensure thatthe defendant's due process right in thetrial courtwasproperly observed. Pursuantto theJackson standard, we look neither to the particularfactfinder in the case norto the specific theory ofthe case 

### presented by theState.4 Rather, we lookto theevidence admitted attrial to
923, 926, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 222, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)). 4Whether the trierof fact was ajury or, as here, a judge "isof noconstitutional 

### significance." Jackson, 443 U.S. at317 n.8. Indeed, in Jackson itselfthe Supreme Court
-11

-No. 67726-8-1/12 determine whether, viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, E.J.J, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his adjudication 

### ofguiltfor obstructing a police officer. The obstructionstatute provides that "[a] person is guilty of obstructing a lawenforcement officer ifthe person willfully 

### hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcementofficer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties." RCW 9A.76.020(1). "The statute's essential elements are (1) that the action or inaction in fact hinders, delays, or obstructs; (2) that the hindrance, delay, or obstruction be of a publicservant in the midst of discharging his [or 

### her] official powers orduties; (3) knowledge by the defendant that the public servant isdischarging his [orher] duties; and (4) that the action or inaction be done knowingly by the obstructor!.]" 

### State v. Contreras. 92Wn. App. 307, 315-16, 966 P.2d 915 (1998) (quoting State v. CLR, 40 Wn. App. 839, 841-42, 700 P.2d 1195(1985)). Because a rational fact finder could determine that these elements were proved beyond a 

### reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient to support E.J.J.'s adjudication of guilt. 

### The State presented evidence, through the testimony ofOfficers Barreto and Jenkins, that E.J.J, approached the scenejust as the officers were beginning 

### to successfully calmR. from her agitated state. E.J.J, did notsimply stand near R. and the officers; rather, he was "irate," yelling, using profanity, and calling the
reviewed a conviction resulting from a benchtrial. 443 U.S. at 317 n.8. On the other hand, in the first Washington case toapply the Jacksonstandard, theconviction at issueresulted from ajury's verdict. State v. Green. 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
-12-No. 67726-8-1/13 officers names. According to the testimony, E.J.J.'s presence caused R. to again 

### become agitated, resulting in the escalation ofthe situation into a "very hostile"
one. E.J.J, then refused to complywith Officer Jenkins' repeated requests that 

### he go back inside the house. Finally, Officer Jenkins was compelled to escort E.J.J, back to the house. 

### Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence 

### supports a determination that, at thispoint, E.J.J, had hindered ordelayed the officers in performing theirofficial duties. Accordingly, based upon thisevidence, 

### anyrational factfinder could determine beyond a reasonable doubtthatE.J.J, was guilty ofobstructing a law enforcement officer in violation ofRCW 9A.76.020(1). E.J.J, was, therefore, not denied due process oflaw. Whether additional evidence was admitted is of no moment to the determination of the 

### sufficiency oftheevidence.5
IV 

### Finally, E.J.J, asserts that theobstruction statute isunconstitutional as applied. Specifically, he contends that hisadjudication was based in part on constitutionally protected speech, that he cannot be penalized for conduct occurring within hisown home, and that hisadjudication violates an alleged substantive due process right to observe police officers performing theirofficial

5E.J.J, challenges the conduct of the officers after he was escorted back to the house. However, application oftheJackson standard does not necessitate thatweconsider evidence other than that pertinent to the question of whether the standard was met.
-13-No. 67726-8-1/14 

### duties.6 But E.J.J, neitherasserted these purported constitutional infirmities in the trial court nor sought to exclude the admission ofrelated evidence. Neither did he challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. Thus, we review his as-applied challenge by determining whetherthe statute is unconstitutional as applied to evidence of his actions that was necessary to establish the elements of the offense. Because, upon such review, we determine that no speech or conduct
was criminalized that could not constitutionally be criminalized, we find E.J.J.'s as-applied challenge to be without merit. We review de novo challenges to a statute's constitutionality. State v. Steen. 164 Wn. App. 789, 809, 265 P.3d 901 (2011V review denied. 173Wn.2d 

### 1024 (2012). "An as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is characterized by a party's allegation that application of the statute in the specific 

### context ofthe party's actions orintended actions is unconstitutional." Citv of Redmond v. Moore. 151 Wn.2d 664, 668-69, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). "Adecision that a statute is unconstitutional as applied does not invalidate the statute but, rather, prohibits the statute's future application in a similar context." Steen, 164 Wn.App. at 804. On appeal, E.J.J, contends that his adjudication of guiltwas based upon constitutionally protected speech and conduct, and, thus, that the obstruction statute is unconstitutional as applied. He asserts that his adjudication of guilt cannot constitutionally be based upon his speech, conduct occurring while he 6E.J.J, does not cite to materialcase lawauthority in support of his contention that such a constitutional righthas been found to exist. We need not examine that question in order to decide this appeal.
-14-No. 67726-8-1/15

was inside his home, or his "observation" ofthe police officers while they 

### performed their official duties.7 Neither E.J.J, nor the State, however, briefed on appeal the question, "as applied to what?" Stated differently, to which ofE.J.J.'s "actions or intended actions," Moore. 151 Wn.2d at 668-69, was the statute unconstitutionally applied? To answer this question, we must look to how the case was litigated and briefed by the parties. E.J.J, made no challenge in the trial court to the lawfulness of his arrest; nor did he allege that an unlawfulsearch or seizure had occurred. Moreover, no motion was made and no reliefsought to exclude the 

### presentation of the evidence that we have set forth herein. E.J.J, did not 

### challenge the admission ofevidence of his speech or hisconduct occurring within his home. Nor did E.J.J, assert a substantive due process right to observe 

### the police officers while performing theirofficial duties. Thus, there was no contentionin the trial court—nor explicitly on appeal—that due process standards

were not observed in the admission of evidence. Based on the manner in which this case was litigated inthe trial court and 

### briefed on appeal, the answer to the question "as applied towhat?" isclear— E.J.J.'s only viable as-applied challenge iswith respect to the sufficiency ofthe 

### evidence tosupport his adjudication ofguilt.8 Thus, we review his challenge by
7E.J.J, contends that his speech is protected by the FirstAmendment, that conduct occurring within his home isprotected by theFourth Amendmentandarticle I, section 7 ofour state's constitution, and that his "observation" of the policeofficers is subject to the alleged substantive due process right to observe policeofficersperforming theirofficial duties. 8"'[Sufficiency oftheevidence is a question ofconstitutional magnitude and can be raised initially onappeal.'" Statev. Alvarez. 128Wn.2d1, 10, 904 P.2d 754 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Citv of Seattlev. Slack. 113Wn.2d 850, 859, 784 P.2d 494(1989)).
-15-No. 67726-8-1/16 determining whether, as applied to those ofE.J.J.'s actions evidence ofwhich
was necessary to establish the elements of the offense, the obstruction statute is unconstitutional. In other words, we determine whether the statute was applied in such a manner that evidence ofconstitutionally protected speech or conduct 

### must necessarily be relied upon in order to satisfy the Jackson test forsufficiency
of the evidence. As explained above, our Supreme Court held inWilliams that the statute 

### lawfully criminalizes conduct in addition to speech. 171 Wn.2d at 485. 

### Accordingly, so long as it iscoupled with conduct, a defendant's speech can be considered in determining whether sufficient evidence supports an adjudication
or conviction of obstructing a lawenforcement officer. Considering evidence 

### allowed byWilliams to meet the sufficiency standard setforth in Jackson is not 

### constitutionally prohibited, given that, pursuant toWilliams, constitutionally protected conduct is not prohibited by the obstruction statute. At a bare minimum, the following facts supportthe trial court's determination that E.J.J, was guilty of obstructing a lawenforcement officer: 

### E.J.J, approached the officers and his sisterwhile the officers were engaged in calming R. in order to defuse the situation between R. and hermother. E.J.J.'s presence escalated the situation with R. E.J.J, was "irate," calling the officers names, yelling, and using profanity. E.J.J, refused the officers' repeated 

### requests to leave the scene. Due to E.J.J.'s refusal to comply, an officerwas eventually required to escort E.J.J, away from R., back to the house, thus hindering and delaying the officers' ability to calm R. and defuse the situation.
-16-No. 67726-8-1/17 The admission of none of this evidence was prohibited by Williams. This 

### evidence is properly referenced to evaluate the evidence at trial in accordance with the Jackson standard. Thus, the challenged statute was not 

### unconstitutionally applied to the evidence attrial. E.J.J.'s assertion of error must
fail. Affirmed.

We concur: 

### /



# W,/vw^rX

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