UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RUSSELL NATION, individually and as 

parent and next friend of J.N., a minor; 

CAROL NATION, individually and as 

parent and next friend of J.N., a minor, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

PIEDMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT NO. 22; HOLLY NOELLE 

MORRIS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 21-6123 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-01090-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Russell and Carol Nation filed this suit on behalf of themselves and J.N., their 

minor child. J.N., who is autistic and nonverbal, was one of eight or so students in 

Holly Morris’s special-education class at Piedmont Middle School in Piedmont, 

Oklahoma, during the school years of 2016–17 and 2017–18. It is undisputed that 

during the 2017–18 school year, Morris physically and verbally abused J.N. and other 

students. Morris reportedly slammed J.N.’s head against a bathroom wall, punched 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 6, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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him, knocked him out of his desk, pulled his hair, and made disparaging comments to 

him. 

The Nations filed suit against Piedmont Independent School District No. 22 

(the District) seeking damages under 42 U.S.C § 1983 on multiple grounds, including 

failure to train and supervise its employees, and under Oklahoma’s Governmental 

Tort Claims Act on various state-law claims. After denying as untimely the Nations’ 

motion to amend to add claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the United States District Court for the Western District 

of Oklahoma entered summary judgment for the District on the § 1983 claims, stating 

that there was insufficient evidence of violations of J.N.’s constitutional rights after 

the District was made aware of Morris’s pattern of abuse. It also held that the District 

was not liable for negligence under state law. 

The Nations appeal these decisions. We affirm the district court’s denial of the 

Nations’ motion to amend. We also affirm the summary judgment for the District on 

the § 1983 claim, but on a ground different from that relied on by the district court. 

Even if there was sufficient evidence of injury after the District was put on notice, 

the Nations nevertheless failed to demonstrate that the District acted with deliberate 

indifference to the risk of further injury to J.N. As for the negligence claim, after 

summary judgment was granted on the § 1983 claims the district court should have 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. We 

therefore remand with instructions to dismiss the negligence claim without prejudice. 

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I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

Although neither party raises a jurisdictional objection to our review, we have 

an “independent duty” to ensure our jurisdiction. Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 

273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001). 

After the Nations filed a petition in Oklahoma state court, the case was 

removed to federal court. Their first amended complaint alleged claims against the 

District under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 

1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; and (3) various state-law causes of action; it also alleged 

state-law claims against Morris. The district court had jurisdiction to hear the federal 

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and had supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

The district court granted in part the District’s motion to dismiss, the District’s 

motion for summary judgment, and Morris’s motion for partial summary judgment, 

leaving only a state-law claim for assault and battery against Morris and a state-law 

respondeat superior claim against the District. The court did not address whether it 

should have declined jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3) after disposing of the federal claims. See generally Smith v. City of Enid 

By & Through Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all 

federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to 

exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”). 

Five days later the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss without prejudice 

the remaining state-law claims. A motion for reconsideration of the summaryAppellate Case: 21-6123 Document: 010110734017 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 3
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judgment order disposing of the § 1983 claims was denied and the Nations appealed 

to this court. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we generally have jurisdiction to hear only appeals 

from final decisions of the district courts. See Amazon, 273 F.3d at 1275. Thus, the 

question arises whether the disposition below—where the jurisdiction-supplying 

federal claims have been adjudicated and the lingering supplemental state-law claims 

have been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice—reflects a final decision allowing 

review of the adjudicated claims. We hold that it does. 

As a general matter, when some claims in an action have been dismissed with 

prejudice, a dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice does not create a 

final appealable decision because the district court’s job may not be over. See

Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Our 

general rule is that a party cannot obtain appellate jurisdiction where the district court 

has dismissed at least one claim without prejudice because the case has not been fully 

disposed of in the lower court.”); Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 

147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen a plaintiff voluntarily requests dismissal of her 

remaining claims without prejudice in order to appeal from an order that dismisses 

another claim with prejudice, we conclude that the order is not ‘final’ for purposes of 

§ 1291.”). In particular, when the claims dismissed without prejudice are federal 

claims or between diverse parties, the plaintiff may be free to refile those claims in 

federal court at a later time. Thus, permitting an appeal would enable the plaintiff to 

circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which permits entry of final 

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judgment (which could be appealed) as to some but not all claims only if the district 

court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” See Cook, 974 

F.2d at 147–48 (voluntary dismissal without prejudice of two federal claims did not 

create finality regarding a third claim previously dismissed with prejudice, because 

the plaintiff “remain[ed] free to file another complaint raising those same [federal] 

claims”; plaintiff had “attempted to subvert the requirements of Rule 54(b) by 

voluntarily dismissing” her federal claims). 

But we have recognized necessary exceptions to this general rule, particularly 

when there would otherwise be no avenue for appeal in federal court. See Jackson, 

462 F.3d at 1238 (noting that the rule outlined in Cook “does not apply in every 

circumstance”). For example, the same freedom to refile in federal court is usually 

not available for supplemental state claims dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, 

in Amazon, 273 F.3d at 1275, we held that a case had been finally disposed of when a 

district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims 

after adjudication of all related federal claims, as is generally the expectation in this 

circuit, see Smith, 149 F.3d at 1156. We explained: 

Although a dismissal without prejudice is usually not a final decision, 

where the dismissal finally disposes of the case so that it is not subject to 

further proceedings in federal court, the dismissal is final and appealable. 

The critical determination as to whether an order is final is whether plaintiff 

has been effectively excluded from federal court under the present 

circumstances. 

Id. (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

Otherwise, “a district court’s order dismissing federal claims . . . would be 

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effectively unreviewable.” Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 

1209 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000). 

We have applied this “effectively excluded” principle even where the parties, 

rather than the court, initiate a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., Spring Creek 

Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (10th 

Cir. 2018) (plaintiffs “effectively excluded” from federal court when their voluntarily 

dismissed state claims were resolved in arbitration); Hyatt v. Bd. of Regents of 

Oklahoma Colleges, 659 F. App’x 522, 524 (10th Cir. 2016) (voluntary dismissal 

without prejudice of § 1983 claim was not a bar to appellate review because the 

statute of limitations for refiling the dismissed claim had passed). 

Here, there is no way for the state-law claims between the nondiverse parties 

to return to federal court—unless we reverse on the jurisdiction-supplying federal 

claim. The practical effect of the stipulated voluntary dismissal in this case is 

therefore the same as the court’s dismissal in Amazon. As in Amazon, it is of no 

moment that the supplemental claims might be revived if the jurisdiction-providing 

claims were to be reinstated after appeal. See Est. of Smart by Smart v. City of 

Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161, 1177 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[W]hen we reverse a district court’s 

dismissal of a federal law claim, we often also direct the district court to reconsider 

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims it dismissed 

along with the federal claim.”); see also 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, 

& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.8 at 623 (2d ed. 1992) 

(“The threat to finality posed by voluntary or invited dismissals depends on the 

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question whether a plaintiff who loses the subsequent appeal is permitted to recapture 

the matters relinquished to establish finality.” (emphasis added)). 

We see no compelling reason to treat the situation here as different from the 

one in Amazon. Treating the judgment below as final does not circumvent the 

requirements of any rule of procedure; on the contrary, it furthers the general policy 

of dismissing state-law claims without prejudice when the court has entered a pretrial 

dismissal of the claims upon which federal jurisdiction is predicated. We hold that 

there is a final judgment here and that we have jurisdiction. 

II. ANALYSIS 

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same standard used by the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate only if 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1114 

(10th Cir. 2007) (ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). We view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Nations as the nonmoving party, 

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. See id. 

A. Section 1983 Liability 

The Nations argue that the District’s failure to adequately train and supervise 

its employees resulted in violations of J.N.’s right to due process.1

 First, they claim 

1

 The District’s appellate brief failed to argue that Morris’s abuse did not rise 

to the level of a due-process violation. Although counsel briefly mentioned during 

oral argument that any injuries that occurred after the District was on notice may not 

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that the District lacked a written policy for reporting teacher abuse and that it failed 

to train its staff to report misconduct after it became aware of Morris’s treatment of 

the students. Second, they claim that the District failed to increase supervision or 

follow-up on various complaints it received about Morris. 

Because Defendant is a public-school district, the municipal-liability 

framework applies. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 

1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010). “Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and 

only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among 

various alternatives by city policymakers.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 389 (1989) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A municipal entity 

cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees; it is liable only for its 

own acts—that is, “when the execution of [its] policy or custom inflicts the injury.” 

Id. at 385 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to promulgated 

policies or decisions, a “policy or custom may take the form of . . . failure to 

adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from 

deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.” Bryson v. City of 

Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick 

qualify, “[i]ssues raised for the first time at oral argument are considered waived.” 

Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 1998). 

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v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

A municipal entity is deliberately indifferent if it has “actual or constructive notice 

that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional 

violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” 

Id. at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it “may seem contrary to 

common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking 

reasonable steps to train its employees,” when “the need for more or different 

training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights,” the policymakers’ failure to train or supervise “may fairly be 

said to represent a policy for which the [municipality] is responsible.” Canton, 489 

U.S. at 390. “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most 

tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. 

The requisite notice can be established by “proving the existence of a pattern 

of tortious conduct” or, in some cases, without such a pattern “if a violation of 

federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a 

municipality’s action or inaction.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. It is not enough to show that more or 

better training or supervision may have helped avoid the injury. See Canton, 489 U.S. 

at 391. The training deficiency must have been the “moving force behind the injury 

alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 

(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 

1231–32 (10th Cir. 2003) (even if police officers were inadequately trained to 

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respond to an aggressive suspect, “[t]hey were not trained . . . to shoot [the suspect] 

repeatedly in the back after he no longer posed a threat”). 

The District’s liability therefore depends on what its relevant policymakers 

knew about Morris’s conduct, when they knew it, and how they responded. Whether 

a school administrator is considered a policymaker (a final decisionmaker on relevant 

matters) depends on the specific circumstances of the case and it may be hotly 

contested. See Brammer-Hoelter, 602 F.3d at 1189–90; Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 

1278, 1288–89 (10th Cir. 2000). But here the parties appear to assume that the 

District is not liable for the actions or inaction of the paraprofessionals and teachers, 

but that it may be liable for the conduct of higher authorities, such as the directors 

involved or the school principals. The District makes no distinction between various 

administrators in its brief nor does it argue that liability cannot be based on their 

decisions. We therefore assume, without deciding, that the District could be liable for 

the deliberate indifference of those administrators. Even with this assumption, 

however, we affirm dismissal of the § 1983 claims because of the absence of 

evidence that any administrator acted with deliberate indifference. We limit our 

discussion to McDonald because there is no evidence that another administrator had 

more relevant information than he did or took relevant action beyond what he took. 

We summarize the various complaints made about Morris’s classroom and the 

steps taken by McDonald in response: There appear to have been no complaints about 

Morris during the 2016–17 school year, Morris’s first year at Piedmont; and Carol 

Nation testified that she was happy with Morris as J.N.’s teacher during that year. At 

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the end of the school year, however, a departing paraprofessional (or aide) who 

worked in Morris’s classroom told Lynda White, the District’s Director of Special 

Services, that she “didn’t like how some of the language was and how the kids were 

being treated” in Morris’s class. Aplt. App., Vol. III at 752. But her complaints were 

not specific and did not mention any inappropriate contact. White suggested to then 

vice principal Andrew Graham that he do some “unannounced walk-throughs” to see 

if he heard anything. Id. at 752. That summer, Graham was replaced by Nadia 

DeKoch, but no one relayed these complaints to her. 

Less than a month into the following school year, in early September of 2017, 

Tanya Caraballo, a paraprofessional in Morris’s class, approached Principal Clay 

McDonald with concerns about the classroom. She testified that she was “kind of 

vague” and told McDonald that they needed additional staff. Id. at 593. McDonald 

testified that they talked generally about the “intensity” and “volatility” of the 

classroom and D.O., one particularly difficult student. Id. at 633–34. McDonald told 

Caraballo he would speak with Morris. According to Caraballo, Morris held a team 

meeting the next day and told the paraprofessionals that “if [they] didn’t like the way 

that she was doing things, . . . [they] could find another job.” Id. at 594. 

McDonald testified that during the fall semester some employees shared “how 

intense that room was,” and that it was crowded and needed more support. Id. at 620. 

Morris herself told McDonald she felt her classroom was understaffed. And 

McDonald testified he was well-aware of the staffing concerns: “I’m in there four to 

five times out of the week, . . . I know, and . . . the upper administration would come 

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over sometimes and help, . . . and we just knew it was just a very difficult situation.” 

Id. at 623. The employees mentioned that Morris seemed stressed, got upset, or was 

“having it rough right now,” but no one reported that she was making improper 

physical contact. Id. at 622. The District hired an additional paraprofessional in 

September, brought in behavior specialists to work with D.O. and provide additional 

training to the class staff, and, according to McDonald, he or DeKoch walked by the 

classroom daily to provide support. 

On September 15, 2017, the Nations met with Morris to discuss bruising 

around J.N.’s collarbone and J.N.’s behavior. Morris sent McDonald, DeKoch, and 

Dr. Courtney Lockridge, Executive Director of Educational Services, an email to 

notify them about the meeting, explaining that she “did not have an answer for” the 

bruising and that she and the Nations discussed J.N.’s increased aggression at school, 

which the Nations said they did not see at home. Aplt. App., Vol. II at 441. She also 

recounted a “fright[ening]” episode with J.N. that day when he grabbed her neck, and 

she included photos of her neck. Id.

Also in mid or late September, Caraballo approached McDonald again.2

 This 

time she shared explicit concerns about Morris’s conduct, saying that she once saw 

Morris “slam[] [J.N.’s] head against the wall” when they took him to the bathroom 

2

 Caraballo first contacted White for advice about how to approach her second 

complaint with McDonald. White advised her to be as specific as possible with him. 

Nothing in the record indicates what details Caraballo provided to White. 

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together; that she had flipped his desk, causing him to fall; and that she made 

disparaging remarks to him. Id. at 603. 

The district court ruled that this meeting was sufficient to put McDonald, and 

therefore the District, on notice of Morris’s unconstitutional behavior. We agree. The 

reports before this meeting about staffing and the intensity of the class did not 

suggest that Morris was abusing students, even if they may have indicated the class 

was dysfunctional. Without notice that training or supervision is “deficient in a 

particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen” a 

form of training or supervision likely to cause constitutional violations. Connick, 563 

U.S. at 62 (emphasis added); Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1286 

(10th Cir. 2019) (reports of inmate injuries, without indication that injuries were 

related to officers’ use of force, “fail to suggest any deficiency in Denver’s 

excessive-force training”). We therefore consider only the involved administrators’ 

conduct after this point to determine whether the District acted with deliberate 

indifference. 

According to Caraballo, after her second meeting with McDonald he said, 

“That doesn’t seem like [Morris], but I’ll talk to her.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 387. 

McDonald testified that it was “hard to navigate what was really happening” and he 

wondered if Caraballo was “trying to get [Morris] in trouble” because she was telling 

him “stuff [he] had never witnessed or . . . heard from anybody else at that point.” 

Id., Vol. III at 724. He said, “[I] was just trying to figure out the best way to handle it 

because [Caraballo and Morris] did have a very close interworking relationship . . . , 

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and so [I] wanted to make sure we kept that relationship going for the benefit of the 

class.” Id. McDonald then met with Morris about this complaint; the specific contents 

of this meeting are not revealed in the record but Morris presumably denied the 

allegations, as she did during her deposition. After this meeting, according to 

Caraballo, Morris again told the paraprofessionals that if they did not like how she 

ran her class, they could find new jobs. There is no evidence that Caraballo told 

McDonald, or that McDonald was otherwise aware, that Morris had been threatening 

the paraprofessionals. 

In October the Nations met with Morris and McDonald about a cut on J.N.’s 

head and why he continued to be “so much more aggressive that year than he ever 

had been.” Id., Vol. II at 363. Morris told them that J.N. slipped in the bathroom and 

scratched his head. They also “exchanged ideas of things to try” to resolve his 

aggression. Id. at 364. On October 12 the Nations sent McDonald a follow-up email, 

suggesting that J.N. be allowed to walk outside or go to P.E. class to help calm him. 

McDonald replied that they had tried this and it seemed to work. There is no 

evidence the Nations reported any issues to the school after this time. 

The next week, on October 19, McDonald created a document outlining certain 

procedures for Morris’s classroom, titled “Expectations for paraprofessionals” (EFP). 

Id. at 444. He testified that the EFP was intended to put in place procedures for 

specific students and remind everyone of proper classroom protocols. The EFP 

required, among other things, that “[t]wo staff members must be with [J.N.] when he 

is taken to the restroom”; that “[i]f the number of staff is short or the ability to have 

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all eyes on students in the room is not available, staff members must call the office 

immediately for help”; and that “[s]taff members are not to be on their cell phones 

while they are supervising students.” Id. McDonald met with Morris and each 

paraprofessional individually to review and sign the expectations; there is no 

evidence that anyone shared examples of abuse or mentioned fear of Morris during 

these meetings. 

DeKoch said in her affidavit that she and McDonald “regularly visited Morris’ 

classroom and observed [Morris],” and that she performed evaluative observations of 

Morris in September, November, and December, id. at 282; McDonald testified he 

was in Morris’s classroom “at least four to five days out of the week,” id. at 254. 

Neither DeKoch nor McDonald saw Morris violating any policies or mistreating the 

students, and she received high marks on her formal evaluation in December. 

Caraballo and another paraprofessional said that Morris changed her behavior when 

the principals were around. 

Morris acknowledged that McDonald stopped by the class often and would 

spend about five minutes either talking to students or observing. Caraballo, on the 

other hand, said he came to the classroom “[o]nly whenever [they] called for help.” 

Id., Vol. III at 595. But she also said that McDonald began observing the class more 

often in late November. 

On January 16, 2018, Morris was seen forcefully dragging D.O. down the hall, 

causing several employees to approach McDonald the next day with allegations about 

Morris’s increased aggression and abuse of the students. Morris was suspended that 

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morning. At the District’s request the special-education staff submitted written 

statements to the District and the police about their observations. These statements 

revealed that staff had seen Morris push J.N. against the wall; punch him in the 

genitals to get him to stop masturbating; and “yank his hair to get him to do work on 

occasion,” App. Vol. III at 463. They also reported that Morris was increasingly 

taking J.N. to the bathroom alone, often when she was upset with him, and that J.N. 

returned with marks after one or more of these bathroom trips. As part of the police 

investigation, the Nations provided photos on January 23 of scratches on J.N.’s head 

that “occurred not long after Christmas Break.” Id. at 671. 

In light of this evidence we are not as certain as the district court that the 

Nations could not show injury after Caraballo’s second complaint. Regardless, this 

evidence does not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the risk of further injury to 

J.N., even if McDonald could have done more to protect the students. 

The failure of remedial measures does not establish deliberate indifference. 

See Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 

1998) (“[t]he fact that [the principal] misread the situation and made a tragic error in 

judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she acted with 

deliberate indifference” when she spoke with the accused teacher and determined the 

student’s abuse allegations were untrue); cf. J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. 

Sch. Dist. No. 1-29, 397 F. App’x 445, 453 (10th Cir. 2010) (in Title IX case, finding 

that, unlike the principal in Doe who took steps to corroborate allegations, a principal 

who failed to even question the alleged perpetrator or victim after hearing allegations 

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of sexual abuse may be deliberately indifferent). For example, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. 

Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008), the 

plaintiff claimed that the school district had “a custom of acquiescing to student 

sexual harassment” because it knew of complaints about sexual harassment by the 

students who assaulted plaintiff’s daughter and had previously disciplined one of 

those students for sexual harassment. But, we said, these steps indicated that “the 

district was aware of several discrete problems and was working to remedy them—

which only raises an issue of the district’s negligence, not its deliberate indifference.” 

Id. at 1125. And there, the school district was aware of multiple complaints of 

harassment, which had been corroborated. 

By contrast, here, McDonald had received only one complaint that Morris had 

physically abused a student. And after Caraballo’s report, which McDonald 

reasonably took with a grain of salt (because it was inconsistent with all his previous 

knowledge of Morris), he met with Morris and she apparently denied the allegations. 

Nevertheless, he formalized procedures for the class that would ensure there was 

always another member of the staff with Morris and J.N. and sufficient support staff 

in the classroom (that is, “eyes on all the students” at all times); otherwise, staff 

members were to call the office immediately, Aplt. App., Vol. II at 444; he discussed 

those expectations with Morris and each of the paraprofessionals individually and 

they signed a document memorializing those expectations. 

In addition, McDonald and his vice principal increased their personal 

observations of Morris’s classroom yet observed no misconduct. Although the 

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Nations argue that McDonald’s short visits were not designed to catch misconduct, 

McDonald spent longer periods of time in the classroom helping out when it was 

short-staffed and DeKoch performed evaluations of Morris in September, November, 

and December. 

Thus, from McDonald’s perspective, the remedial measures appeared to be 

effective, or Caraballo’s observations represented one-off incidents. He received no 

other complaints until January, the principals had not observed any inappropriate 

behavior, and Morris received high marks on her evaluations. Once McDonald 

learned that Morris was violating classroom policies and abusing students, she was 

suspended the very same day. 

Further, McDonald had no reason to believe that employees were not reporting 

Morris’s abuse. The staff was instructed that “if there was something that was off, to 

report it to your principal.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 593. And several employees other 

than Caraballo had approached McDonald with a variety of concerns about Morris’s 

class environment and her stress levels. It was hardly obvious that those employees 

would decline to report more egregious misconduct and abuse. 

In retrospect, one might wish that MacDonald had believed Caraballo rather 

than Morris at the outset. But we do not think that a reasonable factfinder could infer 

from the evidence presented to the district court that McDonald was deliberately 

indifferent to the risk that Morris might pose to J.N. We therefore affirm the 

summary judgment in favor of the District on the § 1983 claims. 

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B. Negligent Failure to Investigate 

The district court also granted judgment for the District on Plaintiff’s 

negligent-investigation claim under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act on 

the same grounds as the § 1983 claim. Ordinarily, though, the court should dismiss 

supplemental state-law claims without prejudice once it grants pretrial motions 

dismissing all the claims on which federal jurisdiction is based. See Smith, 149 F.3d 

at 1156. We therefore reverse with instructions to the district court to do so on remand. 

C. Denial of Motion to Amend 

“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to 

amend a complaint after the scheduling order’s deadline for amendments has passed.” 

Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2015). The party seeking 

to amend must generally show good cause—for example, learning new facts during 

discovery. See id. “Courts have denied leave to amend . . . where the moving party 

cannot demonstrate excusable neglect, . . . [such as] where [it] was aware of the facts 

on which the amendment was based for some time prior to the filing of the motion to 

amend.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In March 2021—almost a year after the time to submit amended pleadings 

expired—Nations moved for leave to amend their complaint to add claims under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They asserted 

that “[t]hrough discovery in this case, the Nations learned new details about the 

underlying facts,” citing production of documents by the police on October 1, 2020 

(in response to the Nations’ subpoena), which included District employees’ 

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statements to police. The district court denied the motion: “This case has been 

pending for over two years. Allowing the proposed amendments would in many 

respects start the case over. [The Nations] have failed to cite the discovery of new 

facts that could not have been [discovered] earlier with due diligence.” Aplt. App., 

Vol. I at 177. 

This was not an abuse of discretion. The Nations did not explain in district 

court what new facts supported the existence of an ADA claim beyond the 

information already available to them, or why that information could not have been 

discovered earlier. We have held undue delay alone to be reason enough to deny a 

motion to amend. See Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001). 

III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the District 

on the § 1983 claim and its denial of the Nations’ motion for leave to amend. We 

REVERSE summary judgment for the District on the state-law negligence claim and 

REMAND with instructions to dismiss the claim without prejudice. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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