FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH APR 13 2005 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED ST ATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

V. 

ROGELIO TRUJILLO-TERRAZAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 04-2075 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. CR. 03-1997 RB) 

Submitted on the briefs.• 

Carlos Ibarra-Aguirre, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and Norman Cairns, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. 

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge. 

• After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). 

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Mr. Trujillo appeals his sentence of 41 months imprisonment for illegally 

entering the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1326(a). Mr. Trujillo argues that his sentence is unconstitutional in light of 

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). We evaluate this claim now that 

the Supreme Court has issued its decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 

738 (2005). We conclude that the district court committed plain error in 

sentencing Mr. Trujillo-Terrazas, and we VACATE his sentence and REMAND to 

the district court for resentencing in accordance with Booker. 

I. 

On October 8, 2003 a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Mr. 

Trujillo, charging him with illegal reentry after deportation. He pled guilty to the 

indictment without the benefit of a plea agreement on December 2, 2003. The 

probation officer assigned a base offense level of 8, see USSG § 2L l .2(a), and 

applied a 16-level enhancement because Mr. Trujillo had a prior Oklahoma 

conviction for arson, a crime of violence. See USSG § 2L 1.2(a)(l)(A)(ii). Mr. 

Trujillo received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, USSG § 

3E 1.1, resulting in a total offense level of 21. The district court followed the 

government's suggestion of sentencing Mr. Trujillo to 41 months of incarceration, 

the low end of the sentencing range. 

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At sentencing, the district court judge expressed reservations about 

imposing the sentence required by the then-mandatory Guidelines. A potential 

source of this hesitation was the comparatively innocuous nature of Mr. Trujillo's 

prior conviction in Oklahoma for third degree arson. Mr. Trujillo was upset that 

an ex-girlfriend had begun seeing someone new, and he acted on his frustration by 

throwing a lit match into a 1980 Oldsmobile belonging to his ex-girlfriend's new 

love interest. The Oklahoma state court determined that the appropriate 

compensation for the fire damage was the paltry sum of $35.00. After hearing 

Mr. Trujillo-Terrazas 's plea for leniency, the district court judge explained that 

while he was sympathetic to the defendant's argument, he was bound by the 

Guidelines. The judge explained: 

Mr. Trujillo, you suggested that this is a lot of time that I want to 

give you. You know what? I don't want to send anybody to jail, 

and I wish that I didn't have to. And the fact is, as [your attorney] 

has explained to you, I'm sure, these Sentencing Guidelines are 

something that we're all struggling with, but they say what the 

minimum is that you have to do. And I'm sorry, you know, under 

the circumstances, that I have to do what I have to do. 

Sentencing Transcript, R. Vol. 3 at 5-6. Mr. Trujillo argues that the district 

court's expressed reluctance to impose the sentence required by the Guidelines 

demonstrates the plain error in his sentencing. 

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II. 

Mr. Trujillo did not raise the constitutional challenge during sentencing. 

Consequently, we review the decision of the district court for plain error. United 

States v. Hurlich, 348 F.3d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003); cf Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 

769 ("[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, 

determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it 

fails the 'plain-error' test."). To establish plain error, Mr. Trujillo must 

demonstrate (1) that the district court committed error, (2) that the error was 

plain, and (3) that the plain error affected his substantial rights. United States v. 

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). If the error meets all these conditions, the 

reviewing court may exercise discretion to correct the error if it would seriously 

affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings to let 

the error stand. Id. at 631-32. The analysis is relaxed when applied to potential 

constitutional error. United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 

2001 ). 

1. Error 

The district court erred in sentencing Mr. Trujillo. In Booker, the Court 

extended the logic of Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, holding that 

"[a]ny fact ( other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 

sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of 

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guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt." Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756. To remedy the 

constitutional infirmity created by applying judge-found facts to mandatory 

sentencing guidelines, the Court severed the provision of the federal sentencing 

statute making application of the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 756-57 ( excising 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(l)). The effect of the remedy in Booker was to render the 

Guidelines advisory. Id. This rule applies to all cases on direct review, id. at 

769; thus it was erroneous for the district court to treat the Guidelines as 

mandatory in sentencing Mr. Trujillo. 

We stress, however, that the error in this case was not constitutional in 

nature. Nothing in Booker-or in the logic of the Sixth Amendment or the Due 

Process Clause-suggests that it is unconstitutional for Congress to establish a 

sentencing scheme that does not entail judicial discretion. The Booker majority's 

holding that the Guidelines are not mandatory was remedial in nature. See id. at 

756-57 (Breyer, J.). The Court severed the provisions of the statute making the 

Guidelines mandatory not because mandatory sentencing ranges are 

unconstitutional but because allowing judges to decide contested questions of 

fact, pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence standard, is unconstitutional 

when such fact-finding leads ineluctably to a higher sentence than would be 

warranted by the facts found by the jury. By rendering the Guidelines 

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discretionary, the Court saved the process of judicial factfinding from 

unconstitutionality under the Sixth Amendment. In this case, the sentencing 

court did not resolve contested questions of fact; the enhancements to the 

sentence were purely a product of prior convictions. The error here was 

therefore not constitutional in nature. 

2. Plain 

There is no doubt that the error here is plain. To be plain, an error must be 

"clear or obvious" under "well-settled law." United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 

1296, 1309 (10th Cir. 2000). An error is plain "where the law at the time of trial 

was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal." Johnson v. 

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). That is the situation here. Because the 

district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory, Mr. Trujillo's sentence is 

contrary to Booker. This observation does not, of course, reflect negatively on 

the district court, which was simply applying the law in effect at the time. 

3. Affects Substantial Rights 

The third prong of plain error analysis inquires whether the error in 

sentencing Mr. Trujillo affected his substantial rights. For an error to have 

affected substantial rights, "the error must have been prejudicial: It must have 

affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. at 725, 734 (1993). The burden to establish prejudice to substantial 

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rights is on the party that failed to raise the issue below. See United States v. 

Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63 (2002). To demonstrate that the mandatory application of 

the Guidelines affected substantial rights, a defendant must show a "reasonable 

probability" that the defects in his sentencing altered the result of the 

proceedings. Cf U.S. v. Dominguez-Benitez, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2339 (2004) ("In 

cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice ... is on the defendant 

seeking relief, we have invoked a standard ... requiring the showing of 'a 

reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the 

proceeding would have been different."') ( quoting United States v. Bagley, 4 73 

U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion ofBlackmun, J.)). Mr. Trujillo can make this 

showing by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court 

applied the post-Booker sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser 

sentence. 

Prior to Booker, district courts were closely tethered to the Guidelines 

when sentencing. Section 3553(b)(l) permitted sentences outside the range 

determined by the Guidelines only in a narrow set of circumstances defined by 

the Sentencing Commission. After Booker, district courts have a freer hand in 

determining sentences. While the Guidelines still exert gravitational pull on all 

sentencing decisions-district courts must "consult" the Guidelines, and 

sentences that unreasonably depart from the suggested sentencing range are at 

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risk of reversal on appeal, Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 767-district courts now have 

more discretion to tailor sentences to the individual circumstances of a 

defendant. Booker suggests that the sentencing factors articulated in § 3553(a), 

which the mandatory application of the Guidelines made dormant, have a new 

vitality in channeling the exercise of sentencing discretion. See id. at 765-66; 

United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005) (accord); 

United States v. Rodgers, 2005 WL 600356 *1-2 (8th Cir, 2005) (applying§ 

3553(a) to find a sentence unreasonable). Applying the sentencing factors listed 

in § 3553(a) to Mr. Trujillo's case provides a strong indication that had the 

district court applied the Booker framework, his sentence would have been lower 

and this lower sentence would be reasonable. 

In addition to considering the sentencing range suggested by the 

Guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), § 3553(a) requires district courts to 

consider the "history and characteristics of the defendant," id. § 3553(a)(l), and 

"the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," id. § 3553(a)(6). 

The relatively trivial nature of Mr. Trujillo's criminal history is at odds with the 

substantial 16 level enhancement suggested by the Guidelines for this conduct. 

With respect to his third degree arson conviction, the state court assessed 

restitution of a mere $35.00, suggesting a quite minor offense. The Guidelines, 

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however, look only to the conviction itself rather than the actual conduct 

underlying the conviction. This blunter approach means that the Guidelines do 

not distinguish between tossing a lighted match through a car window, doing 

minor damage, and a more substantial crime of violence such as an arson 

resulting in the complete destruction of a building or vehicle. To punish this 

prior conduct in the same manner could be seen to run afoul of§ 3553(a)(6), 

which strives to achieve uniform sentences for defendants with similar patterns 

of conduct. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757 (the Booker remedy endeavors to 

maintain "a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's 

real conduct"). The disconnect between the newly relevant§ 3553(a) factors and 

the sentence given to Mr. Trujillo leads us to believe that there is a reasonable 

probability that he would receive a lesser sentence under the new sentencing 

regime. 

While the § 3553(a) analysis suggests that a departure from the Guideline 

range would be permissible post-Booker, the district court's expression of 

sympathy for Mr. Trujillo also implies the district court is inclined to depart. 

The district court expressed dissatisfaction with the mandatory character of the 

Guidelines, stating that "these Sentencing Guidelines are something that we're 

all struggling with, but they say what the minimum is that you have to do. And 

I'm sorry, you know, under the circumstances, that I have to do what I have to 

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do." Sent. Tr., R. Vol. 3, at 6. The judge's expression of regret provides another 

reason to believe that the plain error here prejudiced Mr. Trujillo. Accordingly, 

we conclude that has carried his burden of demonstrating the plain error affected 

his substantial rights. 

4. Integrity, Fairness, or Public Reputation 

If a plain error affects the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings, it is in the discretion of the reviewing court to correct the 

error. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467. Our analysis under this fourth prong when an 

error is non-constitutional is not flippant or perfunctory; the standard is 

formidable, as we will only exercise our discretion when an error is "particularly 

egregious" and the failure to remand for correction would produce a "miscarriage 

of justice." United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702,704 (10th Cir. 1997). 1 A 

plain error affecting substantial rights cannot, "without more," satisfy the fourth 

prong. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737. 

In a run of the mill case with non-constitutional Booker error, for example 

where a defendant pleads guilty and there is nothing remarkable about his 

1 The Supreme Court has noted that the term "miscarriage of justice" does 

not mean the same thing in the plain error context as it does in the collateral 

review context. In Olano, the Court explained that in habeas cases "miscarriage 

of justice" is synonymous with the defendant's actual innocence. 507 U.S. at 736. 

However, a defendant can satisfy his burden of meeting the fourth prong short of 

demonstrating that he is actually innocent of the alleged crime. Id. 

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criminal history, the defendant will often not be able to satisfy this requirement. 

In such a case, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, and there 

is no reason to suppose that the Guidelines sentence is anything but fair and 

reasonable. Indeed, a non-constitutional Booker error is "error" at all only as the 

serendipitous consequence of the severability analysis the Supreme Court 

employed to correct the constitutional infirmity created by the combination of 

judicial fact finding and mandatory application of the Guidelines. Even if a 

defendant can demonstrate that the district court felt particular sympathy for him, 

and might impose a lesser sentence on remand, failing to correct this type of 

plain error would not impugn the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of 

judicial proceedings. Indeed, a remand might do quite the opposite because 

another defendant convicted of an identical crime under identical circumstances 

could receive quite a different sentence from a less sympathetic judge. Cf 

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (arguing that correcting a plain error when confronted 

with overwhelming evidence of guilt would harm rather than further the fairness 

and integrity of the judicial system). 

In contrast to many cases involving non-constitutional Booker error, 

correcting the plain error in Mr. Trujillo's sentence would not denigrate the 

fairness and integrity of the judicial system by magnifying the whim and caprice 

inherent in less restricted sentencing determinations. On the contrary, Mr. 

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Trujillo presents a compelling case that objective consideration of the § 3553(a) 

factors warrants a departure, and perhaps a significant departure, from the 

sentence suggested by the Guidelines. To allow the mismatch between the 

sentence suggested by a principled application of the post-Booker sentencing 

framework and the actual sentence given to Mr. Trujillo would call into question 

the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. We thus 

believe that it is a sound exercise of our discretion to remand this case for 

resentencing despite Mr. Trujillo's failure to assert error below. 

II. 

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico is VACATED and REMANDED. 

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