SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4531-14T4

NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AUTOTECH COLLISION

SERVICE,

Defendant-Appellant/

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL CRINCOLI,

Third-Party Defendant.

________________________________________

Argued November 10, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Lihotz, Hoffman and O'Connor. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. 

L-0850-14.

John W. Trimble, Jr., argued the cause for 

appellant (Trimble & Armano, attorneys; Mr. 

Trimble and Katrina M. Geary, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 9, 2017
A-4531-14T4

2

Robert M. Kaplan argued the cause for 

respondent (Margolis Edelstein, attorneys; 

Mr. Kaplan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant-third party plaintiff Autotech Collision Service 

(defendant) appeals from an April 30, 2015 order determining it 

was entitled to only $1276.79 of the $26,567.60 it sought for 

services it allegedly provided to third-party defendant, Michael 

Crincoli. Defendant also appeals from the provision in the 

order that denied it counsel fees. We affirm. 

I

On May 5, 2014, Crincoli struck a deer and damaged his 2008 

Jeep Liberty (Jeep). He reported the accident to his automobile 

insurance company, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company 

(NJM), the same day. The following day, Crincoli took the Jeep

to defendant, an auto body repair facility, and signed a form 

entitled "Authorization to Repair."

In pertinent part, this form stated: (1) defendant had the 

authority to dismantle the vehicle "as needed to prepare a 

comprehensive written estimate/blueprint for repair and to 

proceed with repairs"; (2) the cost of the estimate was fifty 

dollars, plus three percent of the estimated amount; (3) the 

failure to take possession of the vehicle more than three days 

after being notified the repairs were completed or terminated 
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3

might result in storage fees; and (4) storage fees may be 

charged if repairs are halted or terminated before the vehicle 

was repaired. 

Although this form stated Crincoli waived his right to a 

"detailed" written estimate, the form did not state he waived

any other rights. Significantly, this form did not, as required 

by N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14, provide any notice of what defendant 

charged for storage.

On May 7, 2014, an appraiser from NJM inspected the Jeep 

and advised defendant he would prepare an estimate. At that 

time, only the front bumper grill and left headlight had been 

removed. Thereafter, defendant disassembled the vehicle and, on 

May 8, 2014, generated a "preliminary estimate" stating the cost 

to repair the Jeep would be $11,726.55. Defendant claimed it 

needed to disassemble the vehicle to fully access and evaluate 

the damages and to render an accurate estimate. Defendant 

submitted its estimate to NJM on May 8, 2014. 

In the meantime, NJM's appraiser prepared his own estimate, 

concluding the cost to repair the Jeep would be $10,493.33.

Because the fair market value of the vehicle was only $11,900, 

the appraiser determined the damage to the vehicle caused a 

"total loss." NJM advised defendant it would not pay for 

repairing the vehicle. Importantly, the appraiser testified 
A-4531-14T4

4

there was no need to disassemble the vehicle to provide an 

estimate and, if it had not been disassembled, the vehicle could 

have been stored outside. The trial court found the appraiser's 

testimony credible.

On May 9, 2014, NJM informed Crincoli the car could not be 

repaired, and the two eventually agreed upon the amount NJM 

would pay Crincoli for the salvage value of his Jeep. On May 

14, 2014, Crincoli went to defendant's premises to remove his 

personal belongings from the vehicle and sign forms to enable 

NJM to take title to the car. While there, Crincoli signed an

"Authorization for Release of Vehicle" form, a "Selection of 

Storage Option" letter from defendant to Crincoli, and a 

"Client's Termination of Repair" form. The "Authorization of 

Release" form stated Crincoli was the legal owner of the Jeep,

but granted permission to defendant to release the vehicle to 

his insurance company. 

Although the only service defendant performed for Crincoli 

was to provide an estimate and there is no evidence defendant 

commenced any repair work on the Jeep, defendant gave Crincoli a 

letter, entitled "Selection of Storage Option." This letter 

suggested defendant had done some repair work on the Jeep and 

addressed storage fees. The letter stated in relevant part:
A-4531-14T4

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[T]he repairs on the . . . vehicle have been 

halted due to circumstances beyond our 

control. As a result, your vehicle has been 

removed from normal production until all 

outstanding issues have been resolved so 

that we may provide services to our other 

customers. 

Currently, we are awaiting further 

authorization from the insurer and/or 

direction from the customer for the 

resolution of remaining/outstanding issues 

regarding the pending repair. . . .

The vehicle . . . has been stored on our 

premises . . . since 5/6/14, and will 

continue to be until such time as all 

outstanding charges are paid in full and the 

vehicle is either removed from our facility 

or arrangements are made that will enable 

pending repairs to continue. 

During the storage of this vehicle, our 

facility will be charging storage fees on a 

daily basis. In the event of termination of 

repairs, storage charges will accrue from 

the date the vehicle arrived on our premises 

through the date it leaves our premises. 

. . .

Please accept this letter as a Notice of 

Claim Lien pursuant to New Jersey Statute 

N.J.S.A. 2A:44-21. . . .

At this time, we are requesting direction on 

the manner in which the vehicle will be 

stored until repairs are either reinstituted or whereas the repairs are 

terminated, all charges are paid in full, 

the authorization to release the vehicle is 

signed by the customer of record and the 

vehicle is removed from our facility. 
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The letter further stated it was providing the customer the 

option of choosing between storing the vehicle inside for $100 

per day or outside for $50 per day. The form provided that if 

the customer did not make a selection in writing, defendant 

would place the vehicle outside. Crincoli signed the letter; 

above his signature are pre-printed words, which state: "I have 

read and fully understand the proceeding and I hereby choose 

[the option for inside storage]. Crincoli chose this storage 

option because defendant removed the windows and one door on the 

Jeep to complete its estimate, and Crincoli was concerned the 

vehicle would sustain further damage if left outside. Crincoli 

assumed NJM was going to remove the Jeep within a matter of 

days. 

The "Client's Termination of Repair" form stated the 

"repair contract" previously signed and executed on May 6, 2014,

was terminated. It is not disputed the "repair contract" is the 

"Authorization to Repair." The "Client's Termination of Repair"

form further stated:

I understand fully that [defendant] had been 

previously authorized to proceed with 

repairs and have conducted limited 

activities in strict compliance with that 

request and authorization.

Furthermore, I understand that the charges 

owed for these completed activities are now 

fully due and payable. . . .
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I hereby accept this as a notice of existing 

mechanics/garage keeper's lien . . . .

I hereby terminate the contract of repair 

and ask that final billing be prepared at 

you're [sic] earliest for review and 

payment. . . .

Note to Customer: Our facility is not 

designed nor operated as a storage facility, 

and we request that arrangements be made for 

the vehicle to be removed as quickly as 

possible to avoid additional charges. We 

request that the insurer and the consumer 

come forward immediately and pay these 

charges to mitigate any future losses for 

storage and interest. . . .

Note: Vehicle will not be released until 

all billings are paid in full.

Defendant issued an invoice for $3099.57 for the conducting 

the estimate. On May 16, 2014, NJM forwarded a letter to 

defendant protesting the charge as unreasonable. NJM sought to 

retrieve the Jeep from defendant, but defendant refused to 

relinquish it until its bill was paid. On May 22, 2014, NJM 

offered to settle the bill for $1040, but defendant rejected the 

offer. In June 2014, NJM filed a complaint against defendant 

for wrongful detention of the Jeep. 

In August 2014, defendant filed a third party complaint 

against Crincoli, alleging, among other things, he breached the

Authorization to Repair by failing to pay the fee charged to do 

the estimate and to pay for storage of the Jeep at the rate of 
A-4531-14T4

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$100 per day, commencing May 6, 2014. Defendant also asserted 

it was entitled to a lien against the Jeep under the Garage 

Keeper's Lien Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:44-20 to -31, and thus was

lawfully detaining the Jeep.

Plaintiff forwarded a check for $1950 to defendant's 

attorney for deposit into his trust account, and the Jeep was

released to NJM. After a summary hearing, the court denied as 

moot plaintiff's complaint. The court also denied all but 

$1276.79 of the $26,567.60 defendant sought in its third party 

complaint. By the time of the hearing, storage fees had climbed 

to $22,550. Further, the court denied defendant counsel fees.

The specific fees to which the trial court found defendant 

entitled were (1) $401.79 to prepare the estimate, (2) $75 to 

dispose of hazardous waste, and (3) $800 in storage fees, 

representing the cost to store the Jeep from May 6, 2014 to May 

22, 2014, at the rate of $50 per day. Added together, these 

fees are $1276.79. 

After applying the formula provided in the Authorization of 

Repair, the trial court calculated defendant was entitled to 

only $401.79 for preparing the estimate. Although defendant 

charged more than the latter sum, the court found that, in 

accordance with N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.10(h), defendant's fee was 

limited to what defendant represented it would charge in the 
A-4531-14T4

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Authorization to Repair.1 Because the Authorization to Repair 

stated the cost of the estimate would be "$50.00 plus 3% of the 

total estimated amount," the court held defendant could not 

recover more than $401.79 for preparing the estimate.2 

The trial court permitted the hazardous waste fee, finding 

it was authorized pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.10(i). However,

the court disallowed other incidental fees, because the amount 

or the method to ascertain such fees was not properly disclosed 

in the Authorization to Repair in accordance with N.J.A.C.

13:21-21.10(h), or authorized by other regulations.3 

The trial court held defendant was entitled to only $800 of 

the $22,550 it sought for storage fees, because defendant was 

not required to retain the Jeep after May 22, 2014, in order to 

protect its claims. The court also determined defendant had a 

duty to mitigate its damages and, thus, was obligated to turn 

over the Jeep to NJM when NJM first sought possession of the 

 

1 N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.10(h) provides "[a]n auto body repair 

facility may charge a reasonable fee for making a written 

estimate. If a fee is charged for making a written estimate, 

then the auto body repair facility must disclose, in writing, 

the amount of the fee to the customer before the written 

estimate is prepared."

2 Three percent of $11,726.55, defendant's estimate to repair 

the Jeep, plus $50 is $401.79.

3 These other incidental fees were for code scanning, legal 

review, administrative work, and yard work. 
A-4531-14T4

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vehicle. Finally, the court found no basis to award defendant 

counsel fees. 

II

Defendant's principal contentions on appeal are: 

(1) the court improperly relied upon N.J.A.C 13:21-21.10(h) 

to disallow all but $401.79 for its fee to prepare the estimate, 

as N.J.A.C 13:21-21.11 and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2(a)(3)(i)(4) 

authorize defendant to charge a greater fee to prepare the

estimate; 

(2) Crincoli waived his right to a detailed written 

estimate; 

(3) the Authorization to Repair permitted defendant to 

dismantle the car to prepare an estimate;

(4) N.J.A.C 13:21-21.11 permitted defendant to charge 

administrative and yard fees; 

(5) defendant was entitled to storage charges pursuant to 

the contracts between defendant and Crincoli, as well as 

pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14 and the Act;

(6) the trial court improperly denied counsel fees.

We reject these contentions. 

"[F]actual findings of a trial court are reviewed with 

substantial deference on appeal" and are not to be overturned as 

long as "they are supported by 'adequate, substantial and 
A-4531-14T4

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credible evidence.'" Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 

N.J. 99, 115 (2014) (quoting Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of 

Warren, 169 N.J. 282, 293 (2001)). However, "[a] trial court's 

interpretation of the law" and any "legal consequences []

flow[ing] from established facts" are not afforded "any special 

deference[,]" and are reviewed de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. 

v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). 

Of the six points enumerated above, all but the fifth are 

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We turn to defendant's claim for storage fees subsequent to

May 22, 2014. First, defendant argues N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14

enabled it to charge storage fees. However, this regulation 

sets forth the very reason why defendant is not entitled to such 

fees. N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14 provides: 

Every auto body repair facility that charges 

a fee to store a motor vehicle on its 

premises shall disclose in writing, as soon 

as practicable, the amount of such storage 

charge to the customer on a per diem basis. 

Written notice of such storage charges shall 

be included in the repair authorization.

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

While the regulation states storage fees are permitted, the 

right to charge such fees is conditioned upon the fees appearing 

in the repair authorization. As even defendant's attorney 
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conceded during oral argument, the storage fees defendant 

charged were not included in the Authorization to Repair. 

Defendant contends the "contracts" between it and Crincoli 

authorized it to charge storage fees. As for the Authorization 

to Repair, this document states storage fees may be charged if 

the customer fails to take possession of his or her vehicle more 

than three days after being notified repairs have been completed 

or terminated. This document also states storage fees may be 

charged if repairs are halted or terminated before the repairs 

are completed. 

Here, both Crincoli and NJM sought to take possession of 

the Jeep when it was deemed to be a total loss, but defendant 

refused to release the vehicle. More important, defendant did 

not commence any repair work on the Jeep and, thus, there were 

no repairs that were completed, halted, or terminated before the 

repairs were finished. Thus, under the terms of the contract, 

there was no act to trigger the assessment of storage fees.

Further, we reject defendant's premise the preparation of the 

estimate is part of the repair process. The two acts are 

separate and distinct. In fact, it is the estimate that 

provides a customer with a basis to decide if he or she wants to 

go forward and authorize the repairs that are the subject of the 

estimate. 
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Although the Authorization to Repair states Crincoli waived 

his right to a "detailed" written estimate, the form did not 

provide he waived any other rights. Moreover, waiving a 

detailed written estimate is quite different from waiving the 

right to be advised in a repair authorization of the storage 

fees an auto body repair facility charges, as required by 

N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14. 

The "Selection of Storage Option" form is a notice from 

defendant to Crincoli. Among other things, the notice states 

(erroneously) repairs have been halted, the vehicle has been and 

will be stored until all charges have been paid in full, 

Crincoli will be charged for the storage of the Jeep, and the 

document is a notice of claim under the Garage Keeper's Lien 

Act. 

This document further provides that unless he wants the 

vehicle to be stored outside, Crincoli had to request the Jeep

be stored inside. Crincoli signed this document, but his 

signature merely acknowledged he read and understood the 

document, and that he chose the option of having the Jeep stored 

inside. As the trial judge noted in his written comments, 

Autotech's position completely ignores "the realities of the 

underlying transaction," which impacts the result. At this 

time, defendant was informed the vehicle was a total loss, would 
A-4531-14T4

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not be repaired, NJM would take possession of the car, and 

Crincoli executed a release of the vehicle to his insurer. The 

document inaccurately stated storage was required because 

repairs were interrupted because "defendant was awaiting further 

instructions." The judge found in fact, defendant unnecessarily 

dismantled the vehicle, including removing the windows and a 

door, thus creating the need for inside storage by its 

unwarranted conduct. We defer to these findings, in part 

resting on credibility of the witnesses.

Finally, as previously stated, a body shop repair facility 

may not charge for storage unless written notice of its storage 

charges are included in a repair authorization. See N.J.A.C.

13:21-21.14. This requirement is not insignificant. We note 

the subchapter of the regulations in which N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.14

appears begins with the following statement of purpose: 

(a) N.J.S.A. 39:13-1 et seq. provides for 

the licensure and regulation of auto body 

repair facilities by the Chief Administrator 

of the Motor Vehicle Commission. The 

purposes of this subchapter are to: 

1. Establish a system for the licensure 

of auto body repair facilities; and

2. Establish standards and procedures 

necessary to protect the public from 

dishonest, deceptive, and fraudulent 

practices in the repair of motor 

vehicles damaged by collision and to 

eliminate or exclude from licensing 
A-4531-14T4

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those persons who engage in such 

practices or who otherwise demonstrate 

unfitness. 

[N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.1.]

The "Client's Termination of Repair" form states Crincoli 

understood storage charges would accrue until the vehicle was

removed from defendant's premises, and the vehicle would not be 

released until all charges were paid. This document also states 

it is a "notice" of a garage keeper's lien. 

However, after wrongfully creating the circumstances 

necessitating indoor storage, defendant refused to release the 

vehicle, artificially increasing the storage charges. The trial 

judge determined defendant was not entitled to much of the 

claimed amount due. Moreover, the judge reasoned defendant did 

not have to retain the vehicle to protect its claim. Therefore 

its failure to release the vehicle until defendant received full 

payment of this inflated amount inappropriately resulted in 

excessive storage fees. Further, defendant's conduct failed to 

mitigate damages.

Defendant asserts he was entitled to storage fees under the 

Act. To be sure, "[i]ncluded among the services that can 

furnish the basis for a garage keeper's lien are 'storing' or 

'keeping' a motor vehicle." GE Capital Auto Lease v. Violante, 

180 N.J. 24, 29 (2004); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:44-21. However, 
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the Act only applies to charges resulting from work performed or 

a service provided "at the request or with the consent of the 

owner" of the vehicle. N.J.S.A. 2A:44-21; GE Capital Auto 

Lease, supra, 180 N.J. 33. "[A] lien [for storage] only arises 

after the owner or the owner's representative has requested or 

consented to the vehicle's storage." GE Capital Auto Lease, 

supra, 180 N.J. at 38.

Here, defendant did not obtain Crincoli's consent to store 

the Jeep in accordance with the applicable regulations. 

Therefore, the Act is unavailing to defendant. 

Affirmed.