United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 13-2285

 13-2289

 13-2291

 13-2320

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

PEDRO LUIS RAMÍREZ-RIVERA, a/k/a Peter Pai;

JOSÉ LAUREANO-SALGADO, a/k/a Geo; and

ISMAEL E. CRUZ-RAMOS, a/k/a Chapu,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge,

Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Thompson, Lipez, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Henry E. Marines, with whom Law Offices of Henry E. Marines, 

Claudia Ima, and Law Offices of Claudia Ima were on brief, for 

Pedro Luis Ramírez-Rivera and José Laureano-Salgado.

Ruth M. Liebesman, with whom Law Office of Ruth M. Liebesman

was on brief, for Ismael E. Cruz-Ramos.

Victor O. Acevedo-Hernandez, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States 

Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Chief, Appellate Division, and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, 

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Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for the United 

States.

August 26, 2015

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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. After a jury convicted 

Defendants-Appellants José Laureano-Salgado, Pedro RamírezRivera, and Ismael Cruz-Ramos (collectively, "the Defendants")1 of 

numerous drug and gun crimes, a district court judge sentenced

them all to life in prison. The Defendants now ask us to overturn 

their convictions and sentences, or, at the least, send their case 

back for a new trial. 

For the reasons discussed below, we reverse Cruz-Ramos's 

conviction and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. We 

 

1 Laureano-Salgado and Ramírez-Rivera filed a joint brief, 

and Cruz-Ramos filed a separate brief. Laureano-Salgado and 

Ramírez-Rivera sought to join Cruz-Ramos's arguments and viceversa. But Laureano-Salgado and Ramírez-Rivera attempted to do so 

only by stating (in their reply brief) that "to the extent they 

are applicable" they "join the arguments raised . . . [by] coappellant Cruz-Ramos." 

While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i) permits coappellants to "adopt by reference a part of another's brief," as 

we have reminded litigants in the past, "[a]doption by reference 

cannot occur in a vacuum and the arguments must actually be 

transferable from the proponent's to the adopter's case." United 

States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 16 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012). Therefore, 

where, as here, an appellant "offer[s] no explanation as to why 

[his co-appellant's] arguments pertained to him," such "textbook 

perfunctory" treatment waives the appellant's attempts to adoptby-reference his co-appellant's arguments. Id. (emphasis 

omitted); see also United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 

599 n.9 (1st Cir. 2012) (a criminal defendant's mere statement 

that he "joins in any and all other arguments raised by the other 

criminal co-defendants that are applicable to his case" is not 

sufficient (alterations omitted)). 

Because we find that none of Laureano-Salgado and RamírezRivera's arguments are meritorious, we need not address whether 

Cruz-Ramos (who did a little more than a bare-bones statement) 

effectively joined his co-Defendants' arguments. 

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affirm Laureano-Salgado's and Ramírez-Rivera's convictions and 

sentences. 

BACKGROUND

To give a lay of the land, we start with only a brief 

overview of this case. We fill out relevant portions of the story 

-- in, as we invariably explain, whatever light our law demands, 

and relying on whatever record support is appropriate -- as they 

are needed throughout our analysis of the various issues the

Defendants have raised. 

How It Began2

Until 2004, the majority of street-level drug sales in 

the San Juan-metropolitan area of Puerto Rico were controlled by 

gangs operating out of public housing projects. Sales in each 

housing project were generally controlled by each project's own 

drug gang. 

The name of the game back then was control of the drug 

points, and the gangs fought for decades to maintain and grow their 

territories. The violence that accompanied their disputes 

naturally drew the attention of both local and federal authorities. 

As a result, drug sales took a hit, and large conspiracy 

indictments were handed down. 

 

2 Because we provide this basic factual background only to 

frame the case, we pulled some of these particular facts from the 

allegations made in the indictment, while other facts we gleaned 

from pre-trial and trial testimony. 

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Around 2004, nearly all the drug gang leaders from the 

area reached an agreement that to reduce the inter-project 

conflicts and keep the cops away, they would form an alliance. 

They named it "La Organización de Narcotraficantes Unidos" 

(Spanish for "The Organization of United Drug Traffickers"), or 

"La ONU" for short. The leaders agreed that if a conflict arose 

among La ONU members, they would meet to discuss it (as opposed to 

immediately resorting to shootouts). Under the new regime, La ONU 

members would be permitted to visit other La ONU-affiliated housing 

projects (and to also sell drugs there), so long as they got 

permission from that project's leader. The La ONU leaders also 

met regularly to discuss drug-related issues and to resolve 

conflicts. 

While the alliance operated "for a time," for reasons 

unknown it "weakened" as certain gangs grew "disgruntled" with La 

ONU and "sought to break off." Sometime around 2008, La ONU ended 

up breaking into two groups -- La ONU and "La Rompe ONU" (known as 

"La Rompe" for short, which translates to "the break"). Each 

project-gang went all-in with either La ONU or La Rompe. La ONUcontrolled projects included Las Dalias, Las Gladiolas, El Prado,

and Los Jardines de Selles, while La Rompe-controlled projects 

included Trujillo, Cupey, and Alturas de Cupey. The two factions 

soon became equally sized and eventually, they became bitter 

rivals. 

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With the rising of La Rompe, La ONU's direction changed. 

Its mission became to "maintain control over the drug points in 

their housing projects by force and to kill La Rompe members and 

leaders in order to expand." The organization's "unwritten" rules 

required that La ONU members remain loyal to each other, while 

relentless to the enemy. La ONU members could not kill other La 

ONU members without go-ahead from the leadership; nor could they 

overtake La ONU-owned drug points. Not only were La ONU members 

forbidden from associating with La Rompe members, they were also 

required to kill them on-sight. La ONU members were not permitted 

to cooperate with law enforcement. And breaking any of these rules 

meant death to the traitor (and/or his family members). 

LA ONU leaders continued to meet with each other to 

resolve internal conflicts and discuss strategy for overtaking 

drug points at other (La Rompe-controlled) housing projects. They 

regularly pooled resources to buy weapons and cars. When attacks 

on La Rompe members would go down, each La ONU project contributed 

an enforcer (i.e., hit man). 

La ONU also continued to traffic drugs (crack, cocaine, 

heroin, and marijuana) and committed various violent acts 

(including murders) to enforce its rules and grow its territory. 

For instance, La ONU put hits out on La Rompe leaders. La ONU 

launched machine-gun shootouts in La Rompe projects. During one 

such shootout near Trujillo Alto Bridge, two women -- a police 

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officer and librarian -- were killed. La ONU was also connected 

to the May 2010 shooting take-down of a police helicopter, 

allegedly committed by Edwin Bernard Astacio Espino ("Bernard"), 

a La ONU member. 

Betraying La ONU called for an equally devastating fate. 

For instance, when a La ONU member stole a gun and gave it to a La 

Rompe member, he too, was killed. So was a La ONU leader who got 

caught stealing drugs from the organization, and a member who 

cooperated with police. 

After the helicopter shooting, an arrest warrant was 

issued for Bernard (whom the police apparently could not find). 

The police caught a lucky break in August 2010, when an informant 

tipped them off that Bernard was hiding out at Cruz-Ramos's house, 

stashing weapons and drugs. Afraid they would miss the chance to 

arrest Bernard if they waited any longer, the police searched CruzRamos's house (without a warrant), found Bernard, arrested him 

(and the several other people in the house, including Cruz-Ramos), 

and seized the drugs and guns they found at the home. Police also 

arrested other La ONU members for various crimes around 2010 to 

2011. 

The Crackdown

With that, in March 2012, a grand jury indicted 33 people 

for their alleged involvement in La ONU from 2004 through March 

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2012.3 The charges included drug trafficking, firearms crimes, 

murder, and attempted murder. The indictment accused all the 

Defendants of being members of La ONU. 

Amongst the indictment's 33 counts, the Defendants here 

were charged with five: 

 Count 1: racketeering conspiracy from 2004 through 

March 2012, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(d); 

 Count 2: conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846 and 860;

 Count 3: conspiracy to possess firearms during and in 

relation to narcotics trafficking offenses, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o);

 Count 29: violent crime in aid of racketeering 

activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) 

(specifically, for the August 2010 murder of Christian 

Toledo-Sánchez, known as "Pequeque"); and

 

3 The original indictment named 32 people, but a few months 

later the government filed a superseding indictment and added an 

additional defendant. 

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 Count 30: use and carry of a firearm in relation to a 

crime of violence (i.e., Pequeque's murder), in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(j)(1).4 

Pre-Trial Motions

Puerto Rico District Court Judge José A. Fusté was 

assigned to preside over the 33-person case, but at some point the 

indicted defendants were split up into two groups for purposes of 

trial (one group being the defendants who were facing the death 

penalty, and the other group being the defendants who were not). 

Judge Fusté presided over the trial of the death-eligible 

defendants, and Judge William E. Smith, a Rhode Island district 

judge, sat in designation to preside over the trial of the noncapital defendants (including Cruz-Ramos, Laureano-Salgado, and 

Ramírez-Rivera).5 Judge Smith also addressed many of the numerous 

pre- and post-trial issues that arose for the non-capital group. 

 

4 The Defendants were also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the 

aiding and abetting statute, for each of these counts. It 

provides:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the 

United States or aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces or procures its commission, 

is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done 

which if directly performed by him or another 

would be an offense against the United States, 

is punishable as a principal.

5 Par for the course, most of the indicted defendants pleaded 

out prior to trial.

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As motion practice took way, and as jury selection in 

the Defendants' case lingered imminent, the government asked the 

district court to empanel an anonymous jury because the Defendants 

were "part of an organized crime ring that is both willing and 

able to intimidate and harm jurors."6 Over the Defendants' 

constitutional objections, Judge Fusté (who was in charge of jury 

selection, even though he did not preside over the non-capital 

Defendants' trial) allowed the motion in-part, and resolved to 

place the seated jurors' names, addresses, and places of employment 

under seal because the Defendants in fact had "shown that they are 

part of an organized crime ring that is both willing and able to 

intimidate and harm jurors." The judge also ordered the jurors 

not to divulge information during voir dire that would disclose 

their identities. 

Shortly after that motion was resolved, the government 

notified the Defendants and the court that it intended to offer as 

evidence at trial the firearms and drugs that police seized from 

Cruz-Ramos's home in August 2010. Cruz-Ramos moved to suppress 

all that evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his home 

 

6 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) allows district courts to empanel 

anonymous juries "where the interests of justice so require."

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was illegal. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, Judge Smith 

denied in-part the motion to suppress.7 

Jury Empanelment 

Judge Fusté empaneled the jury for the non-capital trial 

on January 23, 2013, several days before the trial was scheduled 

to start.8 The instant Defendants and their attorneys were present 

for jury selection. 

During voir dire (i.e., the process during which the 

court questions the potential jurors to determine whether they are 

fit to sit on the jury), Judge Fusté informed the potential jurors 

that their names, addresses, and places of employment would be 

kept anonymous, and that they would each be assigned an identifying 

number to "ward off curiosity and seekers of information that might 

otherwise infringe on [their] privacy." 

The judge asked the jurors numerous questions during 

voir dire, and instructed them to raise their hands if the answer 

was "yes" to any of the questions, after which point the court 

would individually address their concerns. Among numerous other 

topics, the judge asked a question about the jurors' familiarity 

with the 2010 police helicopter shooting. He informed the jurors 

 

7 Judge Smith announced his decision on the motion to suppress 

at the Defendants' pre-trial conference and later issued a detailed 

written ruling. 

8 Judge Smith was listening in remotely, but did not 

participate during the jury selection. 

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that while La ONU was "associated" with the incident, the shooting 

would not come up during the trial because the Defendants were not 

charged with that shooting. Some of the jurors raised their hands 

in response to the question, and the judge followed up with them 

individually. 

After voir dire concluded, the jury (including 

alternates) was selected. But a few days before the start of 

trial, Juror No. 30 wrote a letter to the court asking to be 

excused because she was experiencing anxiety from having to sit on 

the jury. In response, the Defendants asked the court to conduct 

further voir dire of all the empaneled jurors, contending that

Juror 30 could have "infected" the other jurors "by creating bias 

against" them. 

Judge Fusté decided to interview Juror 30 (outside of 

the Defendants' presence, though their lawyers were allowed to be 

there) and concluded that she was unfit to serve on the jury for 

mental health reasons (essentially, she was intimidated by the 

Defendants). After the interview, Judge Fusté dismissed the juror 

and replaced her with an alternate. He also denied the Defendants' 

request to individually poll the other empaneled jurors. 

The Trial and Sentencing

Judge Smith got started with the Defendants' trial on 

February 7, 2013. Among the evidence the government presented was 

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testimony from law enforcement and cooperating La ONU members, as 

well as physical evidence police seized, like guns and drugs. 

After seven days, the jury convicted the Defendants on 

all counts. The Defendants then moved for either an acquittal or 

a new trial based on lack of sufficient evidence, pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29(a) and 33. Judge Smith 

denied the motions, finding that the government's presentation of 

witness testimony and physical evidence "strongly supported" the 

convictions. In October 2013, Judge Smith sentenced all the 

Defendants to life in prison.9

Now on appeal the Defendants argue that numerous errors 

occurred prior to and during the trial, such that their convictions 

should be vacated -- or at the least that they should get a new 

trial. Assuming those arguments do not convince us, the Defendants 

further argue that their sentences were improper for various 

reasons. 

We address each of the Defendants' many arguments in 

turn. 

 

9 The judge gave Cruz-Ramos and Laureano-Salgado the same 

sentence -- 40 years on Count One, 10 years on Count Two, 20 years 

on Count Three, and life on Count 29, to run concurrently. He 

also imposed 20 years to run consecutively on Count 30. 

Ramírez-Rivera got the same sentence, with the only 

difference being a 25-year term on Count 30. 

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DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We begin our task by addressing whether the evidence put 

before the jury was sufficient to convict the Defendants. We 

tackle this issue first because if the Defendants are right, the 

remedy is about as drastic as they come -- we would have to throw 

out their convictions, and because of the Double Jeopardy Clause 

of the Fifth Amendment, the government would not get another shot 

at re-trying them on these charges. See United States v. NegrónSostre, 790 F.3d 295, 306-07 (1st Cir. 2015). Of course, a 

successful sufficiency challenge would then render all the 

Defendants' other claims (of reversible trial and sentencing 

error) moot. 

We review sufficiency challenges de novo. Id. at 307. 

We consider all the direct and circumstantial evidence in the light 

most flattering to the government, "drawing all reasonable 

inferences consistent with the verdict, and avoiding credibility 

judgments, to determine whether a rational jury could have found 

the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted). Essentially, "we will 

reverse only if the verdict is irrational." United States v. 

Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

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In reviewing sufficiency challenges, we consider whether 

all the evidence offered by the government and admitted by the 

court was sufficient for a guilty verdict, even if the court 

erroneously admitted some of that evidence.10 Lockhart v. Nelson, 

488 U.S. 33, 34, 40-41 (1988). 

Turning now to the evidence, there's no question that 

the government's case against the Defendants (particularly when it 

came to Laureano-Salgado and Ramírez-Rivera) heavily relied on 

testimonial evidence from three cooperating witnesses who were 

arrested around 2011 for their involvement with La ONU -- Christian 

Figueroa-Viera, a hit man and "leader" for La ONU; José GutierrezSantana, known as "El Domi," who sold drugs for the organization; 

and Wesley Figueroa-Cancel, also known as "Hueso," who was also a 

La ONU leader. 

The allegations in the indictment largely ended up 

panning out at trial. According to the witnesses' testimony, from 

around 2007 to 2011, La ONU operated as a "union" or "gang" of 

 

10 The logic behind this rule is that "a reversal based solely 

on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different 

implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based 

on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection 

of evidence." Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). That is, "[w]hile the former is in 

effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case

against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to 

the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a 

determination that [he] has been convicted through a judicial 

process which is defective in some fundamental respect." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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drug dealers from several housing projects (including Las Dalias, 

Las Gladiolas, El Prado, and Los Jardines de Selles), which had 

the goal of "control[ling] the other housing projects and thus 

have more power." La ONU's main rival was La Rompe, which 

controlled projects like Trujillo, Cupey, and Alturas de Cupey. 

The two gangs were at "war" over the "control of the 

drug points." Dominating the drug points was important to La ONU 

for a simple reason: by eliminating the competition in the La 

Rompe-controlled projects, La ONU could earn more drug money. 

To effectuate its goals, La ONU had rules. If you see 

an enemy, kill him. Don't cooperate with police. And don't 

associate with the enemy. The punishment for breaking a rule was 

death. 

The evidence showed that La ONU walked the walk, and not 

only were La Rompe members attacked and killed, disloyal La ONU 

were in fact punished by death. For instance, around 2008 or 2009, 

a La ONU member stole a rifle and gave it to a La Rompe member. 

After he confessed to giving the rifle to the enemy, La ONU members

killed him. In 2009, a La ONU leader was killed for stealing drugs

from the organization. And yet another La ONU member was killed 

for cooperating with police. The witnesses testified that it was 

important to participate in these types of violent acts to maintain 

their status with La ONU, even though that might mean killing 

police officers. It was necessary for members to maintain their 

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positions in La ONU because "once you join the organization, you 

can't get out." 

The testimony also demonstrated that Defendant RamírezRivera was the heroin point owner in both Las Gladiolas and Las 

Dalias, as well as a La ONU leader. Ramírez-Rivera was so high up 

in the organization that without his permission, "nothing could be 

done," according to Gutierrez-Santana. And Ramírez-Rivera ordered 

other La ONU members to kill La Rompe associates. In addition to 

supplying heroin, weapons, and ammunition to the organization, 

Ramírez-Rivera also provided the cash to buy weapons and cars. And 

he sometimes lent his own gun to La ONU members when they went to 

other projects for a shooting. 

From around 2008 to 2011, Defendant Laureano-Salgado

served as Ramírez-Rivera's drug runner (meaning he brought product 

to drug points and picked up the money the drug points earned), 

and was a cocaine point owner at Las Gladiolas. 

Defendant Cruz-Ramos was a heroin point owner at Las 

Gladiolas and provided firearms to the La ONU members who were 

from Las Gladiolas. He also lent weapons, including an AK-47, to 

other La ONU members. 

To prepare for shootouts, La ONU generally held 

meetings, which were always conducted by the same people (including 

Cruz-Ramos, Ramírez-Rivera, and Laureano-Salgado). 

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The government also elicited testimony about several La 

ONU-sanctioned murders, but at trial the Defendants were only 

directly implicated in one -- the murder of La Rompe boss Christian 

Toledo-Sánchez, a.k.a. Pequeque. The testimony reflected that in 

August 2010, La ONU put a hit out on Pequeque. A meeting (which

the Defendants participated in) was held to hash out the details 

of the murder with the for-hire hitman, whose grandmother was 

Pequeque's neighbor. During the attack on Pequeque (who was, in 

fact, killed), the hitman was injured, and the Defendants were 

part of the extraction team that went in to rescue him. 

A. RICO Conspiracy (Count One)

Given that evidentiary backdrop, we first address the 

sufficiency of the evidence as to the Defendants' RICO conspiracy 

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 

or "RICO," makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or 

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of 

which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 

enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 

collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 

1962(d) also prohibits any person from conspiring to violate 

§ 1962(c). "The major difference between a violation of § 1962(c) 

itself and a violation of § 1962(d) based on § 1962(c) is the 

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additional required element that the defendant knowingly joined a 

conspiracy to violate § 1962(c)." United States v. Shifman, 124 

F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation and alterations omitted). 

Thus, "[f]or a defendant to be found guilty of conspiring

to violate RICO, the government must prove (1) the existence of an 

enterprise affecting interstate [or foreign] commerce, (2) that 

the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy to participate in 

the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, (3) that the 

defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of the 

enterprise, and (4) that the defendant did so through a pattern of 

racketeering activity by agreeing to commit, or in fact committing, 

two or more predicate offenses." Id. (internal quotation marks 

and alteration omitted). 

Here, the Defendants argue that the evidence was not 

sufficient for elements one, three, and four.11 For the reasons 

discussed below, we find no merit to this claim. 

 

11 It's not clear from the Defendants' briefing which RICO 

elements they actually grieve, but we interpret the substance of 

their arguments to concern elements one, three, and four. To the 

extent the Defendants did intend to dispute the second element 

(knowledge), "[a]ll that is necessary to prove this element of the 

RICO conspiracy is to prove that the defendant agreed with one or 

more co-conspirators to participate in the conspiracy." United 

States v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Our overall discussion 

of the RICO count makes abundantly clear why this argument would 

have failed in any event.

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Enterprise Affecting Foreign Commerce

To start off, the Defendants' argument that the 

government presented insufficient evidence that La ONU was a RICO 

enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce carries no 

water. RICO defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership, 

corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 

group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 

entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Thus, an enterprise "need only be 

a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of 

engaging in a criminal course of conduct," and "need not be a 

legitimate business or a form of organization sanctioned by state 

law." United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Still, even though such an "association in fact" 

suffices to satisfy the "enterprise" requirement, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(4), the law is clear that "the government nonetheless must 

prove that the enterprise existed in some coherent and cohesive 

form." Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 32. "It follows that the 

enterprise must have been an 'ongoing organization' operating as 

a 'continuous unit.'" Id. (citation omitted). Put simply, a RICO 

enterprise "possesses some goal or purpose more pervasive and more 

enduring than the instant gratification that can accrue from the 

successful completion of each particular criminal act." Id.

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Here, the government presented more than sufficient 

evidence that La ONU operated as an enterprise. Even if the 

Defendants are correct that La ONU started off as a truce between 

the different housing-project gangs, those groups concertedly 

combined their efforts for a specific, ongoing purpose -- in the 

beginning, to sell drugs, and later, to also stomp out the 

competition (specifically, La Rompe). This super-gang, if you 

will, although a merging of smaller gangs that still operated their 

existing drug points, became "ongoing and identifiable" by its 

name; the organization even had a special hand gesture (i.e., gang 

sign). See United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 

2001) (finding that an enterprise existed where the "gang was 

ongoing and identifiable" by name and gang sign). La ONU also had 

rules and structure. Truant members and enemies were killed, but 

not before leaders first signed off on the killings. Before

committing acts of violence on behalf of the organization, members 

had to get permission from La ONU leaders, who hosted meetings to 

discuss shootouts before they were carried out. See id. (taking 

into account that the enterprise "had 'sessions' where important 

decisions were made, including decisions about taking action 

against rival drug dealers"). 

Therefore, while the Defendants urge that the La ONU 

organization did not have all the traditional indicia of a typical 

street gang (e.g., use of colors, initiation rites, and a formal 

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hierarchy), as the Supreme Court has pointed out, RICO's 

"enumeration of included enterprises is obviously broad, 

encompassing 'any . . . group of individuals associated in fact.'" 

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(4)). "The term 'any' ensures that the definition has a 

wide reach, and the very concept of an association in fact is 

expansive." Id. (citation omitted). As we fleshed out above, La 

ONU "exhibited group cohesion over time; its membership pooled and 

shared resources; the individuals involved had a sense of belonging 

and self-identified as [La ONU] members; and the group had a wellhoned set of goals." Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 33. We deem that 

more than enough for a RICO enterprise. See id.

Further, we also easily find that La ONU engaged in or 

conducted activities that affected foreign commerce.12 See 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(c). We have said before that an enterprise's effect 

on commerce need only be de minimis, given that the commerce 

requirement is only jurisdictional. United States v. Marino, 277 

F.3d 11, 35 (1st Cir. 2002). Gutierrez-Santana testified that 

during his time as a La ONU member from about 2009 until his arrest 

in 2011, he imported kilos of heroin from the Dominican Republic 

to provide to La ONU drug points (and in particular to Ramírez-

 

12 The Defendants argued this point in their briefing, but 

this was one of many arguments the government ignored. Even 

without help from the government, though, we conclude that the 

commerce element was easily satisfied. 

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Rivera). This activity is sufficient to satisfy RICO's foreign 

commerce requirement. 

Participation

RICO also requires the government to prove that the 

Defendants participated in the conduct of the enterprise's 

affairs. According to the Supreme Court, that means "participation 

in the operation or management of the criminal enterprise." 

Shifman, 124 F.3d at 35-36 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 

U.S. 170, 184-85 (1993)). It suffices for this element that a 

defendant be "plainly integral to carrying out the enterprise's 

activities." Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Despite the Defendants' attempts to dilute the rather 

damning evidence of their active leadership roles in La ONU, we 

find that this element was also clearly satisfied. As we discussed 

above, the testimony reflected that all three Defendants owned 

drug points in La ONU-controlled projects. Of course, drug-point 

ownership was a vital component to the La ONU conspiracy, given 

that the whole point of the enterprise was to maintain control of 

as many drug points as possible to earn more money. On these facts

alone, we conclude the jury had abundant reason to find that the 

Defendants were integral parts of the enterprise's activities. 

Pattern of Racketeering

Finally, the Defendants contend that there was 

insufficient evidence that they participated in the conspiracy by 

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agreeing to commit (or actually committing) a pattern of 

racketeering activity. Not so.

To satisfy the "pattern" element for a RICO conspiracy, 

the statute requires that "a defendant agreed with one or more 

others that two predicate offenses be committed." Shifman, 124 

F.3d at 35 (internal citation and alteration omitted). RICO 

specifically enumerates what counts as a "predicate offense," and 

includes (among many other crimes) murder and drug dealing. See

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). "Aiding and abetting one of the activities 

listed in § 1961(1) as racketeering activities makes one punishable 

as a principal and amounts to engaging in that racketeering 

activity." Shifman, 124 F.3d at 36 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2). 

RICO also requires that the defendant commit the two 

racketeering acts within 10 years of one another. 18 U.S.C. § 

1961(5). Additionally, the Supreme Court has said that the "acts 

must be related and 'amount to or pose a threat of continued 

criminal activity.'" Shifman, 124 F.3d at 36 (quoting H.J. Inc.

v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). 

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the 

jury to find that each of the Defendants participated in La ONU by 

agreeing to engage in a pattern of racketeering. First, despite 

the Defendants' representation to the contrary, there was witness 

testimony that all the Defendants were part of the 2010 planning 

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meeting for Pequeque's murder.13 The jury heard testimony that 

during the planning meeting, which Cruz-Ramos and Laureano-Salgado 

attended and Ramírez-Rivera participated by speakerphone, the 

leaders decided that Pequeque would be killed by a particular 

hitman with $10,000 of La ONU funds, as well as a La ONU-provided 

pistol and car. The jury could easily infer, given the body of 

testimony they heard, that the reason for Pequeque's murder was to 

enforce La ONU's ongoing mandate that La Rompe members be executed, 

so that La ONU could expand its territory.14 

Second, as we noted above, the record reflected evidence 

that each Defendant, as drug point owners, engaged in drug 

trafficking for La ONU-controlled drug points between 2007 and 

2011. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing "dealing in a controlled 

substance" as a RICO predicate). The Defendants do not seriously 

 

13 The Defendants do not (nor could they successfully) argue 

that planning a murder is not a RICO predicate. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(1). 

14 The Defendants argue that the witnesses' testimony about 

the Defendants' attendance at the meeting was inconsistent, and at 

best questionable, as none of the witnesses were present during 

Pequeque's shooting. But Figueroa-Cancel unequivocally testified 

that he was at the planning meeting and relayed the details of the 

planned hit. The jury also heard that Pequeque was, in fact, 

killed by the hitman after the meeting, and that the Defendants 

were part of the team to extract the injured hitman from the scene. 

Even assuming the other witnesses' testimony was inconsistent with 

this account (or even if Figueroa-Cancel's other testimony 

conflicted with this account), "[w]hen there are two conflicting 

versions of a single event, it is for the jury to decide which 

version, if either, should be given credence." United States v. 

Williams, 717 F.3d 35, 40 n.2 (1st Cir. 2013). 

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dispute this point either, arguing only that their drug-selling at 

the individual drug points "did not contribute to La ONU's 

objectives" because the drugs were sold only for the benefit of 

the individual gangs at each housing project. 

We have already rejected the Defendants' notion that 

selling at the individual housing projects did not contribute to 

La ONU's mission to take over the drug market, but even if the 

Defendants' sales did not directly financially benefit La ONU, 

their claim would still fail. It suffices that "the defendant was 

able to commit the predicate acts by means of, by consequence of, 

by reason of, by the agency of, or by the instrumentality of his 

association with the enterprise." Marino, 277 F.3d at 27. "[T]he 

defendant need not have channeled the proceeds of the racketeering 

activity into the enterprise," and "[i]t is unnecessary for the 

pattern of racketeering to have benefitted the enterprise in any 

way." Id. at 28. Particularly given the ensuing "war" with La 

Rompe over the drug points, the jury could have reasonably inferred 

that the Defendants' drug-trafficking success (i.e., their ability 

to survive) was attributable to their alliance with, allegiance 

to, and high-ranking status in La ONU.

All in all, the RICO conviction stands.

B. VICAR (Count 29)

In a similar vein, the Defendants unconvincingly argue 

that the jury heard insufficient evidence to sustain their 

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conviction for Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering Activity 

("VICAR") under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).

VICAR prohibits murder (or conspiracy to commit murder) 

"for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or 

increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering 

activity."15 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). The predicate offense for the 

Defendants' VICAR conviction was Pequeque's murder (which the 

indictment charged as a violation of Puerto Rico law), and the 

Defendants once again argue that there was insufficient evidence 

that any of them were involved in that murder. But for the reasons 

discussed earlier we reject that argument, as the jury could have 

reasonably inferred that the Defendants themselves planned 

 

15 VICAR, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), provides, in relevant 

part:

Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, 

or as consideration for a promise or agreement 

to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an 

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, 

or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or 

maintaining or increasing position in an 

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, 

murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a 

dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in 

serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to 

commit a crime of violence against any 

individual in violation of the laws of any 

State or the United States, or attempts or 

conspires so to do, shall be punished—

(1)for murder, by death or life imprisonment, 

or a fine under this title, or both.

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Pequeque's murder. And that is sufficient for a murder conviction 

under Puerto Rico law. See Puerto Rico Penal Code Articles 105

and 106 (respectively, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, §§ 4733, 4734 

(2004).16 

As to the second VICAR element, the Defendants have 

provided no developed reasoning as to why the trial evidence would 

not suffice to show at least part of their motive for the murder 

was to "advance or maintain their position within" La ONU. See

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting 

that undeveloped arguments are waived).17 

We need not tarry on this point. The VICAR conviction 

stands. 

 

16 Article 105 defines murder as "kill[ing] another human 

being with intent." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4733. First-degree 

murder, Article 106, is (in relevant part) "[a]ny murder committed 

. . . with premeditation." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4734. "Any 

other intentional killing of a human being constitutes second 

degree murder." Id. 

Liable as a principal under Puerto Rico law is anyone who

"participates directly in the commission of a crime," "forces, 

provokes, abets or induces another person to commit a crime," or 

"cooperates before, simultaneously or after the commission of a 

crime, and without whose participation the crime could not have 

been perpetrated." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, §§ 4671(a), (b), (d). 

 

17 Perhaps this omission was intentional, as it would be 

meritless on this record. See United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 

206 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the government need not prove 

that advancement in the enterprise was a defendant's sole motive 

for committing the VICAR crime and that the government need only 

show that defendant committed the acts because "he knew it was 

expected of him by reason of his membership or that he committed 

the acts in furtherance of that membership" (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted)). 

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C. Conspiracy to Possess Firearms (Count 30)

For the Defendants' last sufficiency challenge, they 

urge that they were improperly convicted of conspiring to possess 

firearms because none of the guns that were introduced or mentioned

at trial actually belonged to La ONU. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(o) provides that "[a] person who 

conspires to commit an offense under [18 U.S.C. § 924(c)] shall be 

imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or 

both; and if the firearm is a machinegun or destructive device, or 

is equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, shall be imprisoned 

for any term of years or life." And 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 

provides a minimum imprisonment term for 

any person who, during and in relation to any 

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 

(including a crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime that provides for an 

enhanced punishment if committed by the use of 

a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for 

which the person may be prosecuted in a court 

of the United States, uses or carries a 

firearm, or . . . in furtherance of any such 

crime, possesses a firearm. 

The Defendants argue that there was no evidence 

presented that they used or carried firearms "in furtherance" of 

a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, and that "mere 

presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal act occurs" does 

not suffice. See United States v. Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d 26, 

35 (1st Cir. 2014). Again, the Defendants miss the mark. "For 

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purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), we have understood 'in 

furtherance of' to demand [a] showing [of] a sufficient nexus 

between the firearm and the drug crime [or crime of violence] such 

that the firearm advances or promotes the drug crime [or crime of 

violence]." United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, even if the guns 

put into evidence during the trial did not belong to the 

Defendants, the jury heard evidence that all the Defendants carried 

firearms and/or supplied them to the organization from 2008 to 

2011. And the jury could easily conclude that given La ONU's 

mission to protect its drug territory, and its tendency to do so 

through gun violence, the firearms that drug point owners carried 

or provided to other members either advanced or promoted their 

drug-trafficking businesses. Thus, that no weapons were ever 

seized directly from Laureano-Salgado or Ramírez-Rivera is of no 

consequence when it comes to our sufficiency analysis --

"[t]estimony from even just one witness can support a conviction." 

Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In sum, we find that the evidence was abundantly 

sufficient to convict the Defendants of the contested crimes. 

II. Reversible Trial Errors

Because we find that the evidence presented to the jury 

was sufficient to support the Defendants' convictions, we now turn 

to the Defendants' allegations regarding supposed errors that 

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might warrant a new trial. Specifically, Cruz-Ramos argues that 

the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress the 

August 2010 search of his home that led to his arrest, the seizure 

of numerous guns and large amounts of drugs, and the arrest of 

Bernard and several other people in the house. The Defendants 

also collectively argue that the district court erred during jury 

selection and in making certain evidentiary rulings at trial. 

A. Cruz-Ramos's Motion to Suppress

To start us off, Cruz-Ramos claims that the district 

court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the fruits of the 

2010 police search of his home (and the car garaged there), as the 

police had no probable cause to enter his home without a warrant, 

let alone to search. He also argues that the statements he made 

to police after the search (and his subsequent arrest) should also 

be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous search. 

Because we agree with Cruz-Ramos that probable cause was 

lacking and therefore the search of the home and car violated the 

Fourth Amendment, we find that the evidence seized during the 

search should have been suppressed. We also conclude that 

including the erroneously admitted evidence at trial was not 

harmless, given the lack of other compelling evidence linking CruzRamos to drug crimes, and thus, a new trial for Cruz-Ramos is 

warranted. 

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District Court Decision

Based on the testimony from three law enforcement agents 

(the only witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing), the 

district court made the following factual findings. See United 

States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) ("In reviewing 

the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, we recite 

the facts as found by the district court to the extent they are 

not clearly erroneous.").18 

On August 28, 2010, Puerto Rico Police Department 

Officer Carlos A. Jimenez-Rolon showed up at Las Dalias housing 

project around 2:30 a.m. to conduct a "preventative round" (Las 

Dalias had one of the highest crime rates of the island's housing 

projects). During the round, Officer Jimenez-Rolon saw a man 

walking. The Officer got out of his (marked) car and told the man 

to stop. 

Instead of complying, the man took off running. Officer 

Jimenez-Rolon gave chase. The man reached into his pocket and 

threw an unidentified object toward the second story of the nearby 

building. 

 

18 While Cruz-Ramos additionally argues that some of the 

district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, see

United States v. Brown, 621 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2010), we need 

not address that argument, as we conclude that even adopting the 

court's findings as-is, there was no probable cause to search.

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Office Jimenez-Rolon realized he wouldn't be able to 

catch the fleer, so instead went to investigate what the man had 

purged from his pocket. Officer Jimenez-Rolon went up to the 

second floor of the nearby building and discovered a different man 

lying down (presumably in the hallway), with a firearm at his side. 

Officer Jimenez-Rolon arrested this man and took him to the police 

station.19 

At the police station, Officer Jimenez-Rolon began to 

interview the arrested man. The arrestee told Officer JimenezRolon that if the police could provide security to his family, he 

would tell them where to find Bernard, one of Puerto Rico's mostwanted fugitives for allegedly shooting down the municipal 

helicopter. Officer Jimenez-Rolon brought his supervisor, 

Lieutenant Luis David Flores-Ortiz, into the loop, and Lieutenant 

Flores-Ortiz agreed to the deal and continued with the interview. 

Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had not met or spoken to the man prior to 

this encounter, and as far as the Lieutenant knew, the man had 

never previously served as an informant to the Puerto Rico police. 

The arrestee (who we'll call from now on "the Informant") 

told Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz that Bernard was hiding at a house in 

 

19 Among the other details that are difficult to gather from 

the police officers' story, it is unclear why the police arrested 

this man. The record does not reflect that he was charged with 

any crime (i.e., unlawful possession of a firearm), or that his 

tip, which we discuss shortly, was provided in exchange for 

prosecutorial leniency. 

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the Berwind Estates housing subdivision in Rio Piedras with at 

least four other people -- Cruz-Ramos, two females, and perhaps 

other unidentified males. Bernard would have on him "many weapons, 

firearms, and controlled substances," the Informant warned. Four 

rifles would also be hidden in a flower box on the terrace, and 

sidearms (like Berettas and Glocks) and drugs would be in a hidden 

compartment in a red Ford Expedition. The Informant did not 

provide any further details concerning what police would find at 

the home, nor a description of the house. 

The Informant said Bernard wouldn't stick around for 

long and would depart at sun-up through the back of the house. 

The Informant further warned that Bernard would open fire at the 

police as soon as he saw them. Upon leaving the Berwind Estates 

home, Bernard would head for the Las Dalias housing project, the 

Informant claimed, "at which point the PRPD would lose their 

opportunity to arrest him" that night. 

The brief interview ended sometime between 3:30 and 4:00 

a.m. Despite the fact that neither the Puerto Rico police nor 

Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had any prior relationship with the 

Informant, the Lieutenant deemed him reliable based on the fact 

that both the Informant and Bernard "came from the Las Dalias 

housing project, and thus the Informant could likely be part of 

Bernard's 'close-knit' group and know Bernard's whereabouts." 

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With that, shortly after the interview ended, Officer 

Jimenez-Rolon drove the Informant to the house where Bernard was 

supposedly located. After they reached Berwind Estates and passed 

a manned security hut, the Informant pointed out a "good-sized 

residence" with "lots of vegetation" behind and to the side of it. 

The vegetation was relatively thick, but someone hiding in the 

bushes could still be seen from certain angles. A terrace with a 

flower box was also visible. 

Apparently satisfied with what he had observed, Officer 

Jimenez-Rolon took the Informant back to the police station, and 

around 5:00 a.m., the police returned to the house to arrest 

Bernard. They did not attempt to obtain either a federal or local 

search warrant to enter or search the home. 

After the police secured the home's perimeter (and 

extended the perimeter out to the guardhouse), an "entry team" 

comprising six officers "entered through the property through the 

vegetation on the side of the house, crossed over the terra-cotta 

floored portion of the carport driveway, and proceeded to the door 

located on the side terrace." To enter the carport, the officers 

"had to jump a cement wall," and to enter the terrace, they opened 

a closed gate. 

From the terrace, the officers saw through a window an 

unidentified female sitting in the kitchen. They told her they 

were police, instructed her to stay silent, and asked her to open 

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the door. She complied. They asked the woman where Bernard was, 

and she said he was in the bedroom. 

While the police made their way to the bedroom, other 

men (including Cruz-Ramos) appeared out of adjacent rooms. The 

officers detained them. The police continued into the bedroom, 

where they found Bernard in a bed "either asleep or just halfawake." Close by Bernard was a pistol. They arrested him. All 

of the detained people were also arrested for harboring a fugitive. 

With everyone under arrest and the house secure, Officer 

Jimenez-Rolon searched the flower box on the terrace, where he 

found hidden under the dirt four rifles. Then he went in the 

house, walked through the foyer and through a glass door that 

opened into the carport, where a red Ford Expedition was parked. 

In the car, Officer Jimenez-Rolon found a hidden compartment with 

weapons, ammo, and drugs. Officer Jimenez-Rolon seized all of the 

drugs and guns he found. 

Cruz-Ramos, along with the other arrestees, was taken to 

the police department following his arrest. Sometime between 10:30 

a.m. and noon, Cruz-Ramos was placed in a "small room" with three 

federal agents for an interview, which was not recorded. CruzRamos was verbally apprised of his constitutional rights 

(particularly, his right to remain silent and his right to an 

attorney), and while he acknowledged that he understood them, he 

refused to sign any paperwork waiving his rights. 

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The police proceeded to interview Cruz-Ramos anyway, and 

he told the agents that he lived in the house where he and Bernard 

were arrested, but that he was originally from the Las Gladiolas 

housing project. He admitted to being "affiliated with a group of 

housing projects that were partners and supported each other." 

Cruz-Ramos also admitted to carrying a gun for personal defense 

and to having numerous rifles "hidden or buried somewhere." He 

told the agents that he knew Bernard because they hung out together 

in different bars, and Bernard was acquainted with his 

stepdaughter. Cruz-Ramos said he knew Bernard was wanted by the 

police and had tried to arrange for Bernard to find a lawyer and 

surrender himself. 

Based on all these facts, the district court concluded 

that the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home 

without a warrant. Specifically, the court found that "[a]lthough 

the Informant had never provided information before, and only 

offered the information upon his arrest and interrogation, all of 

the other facts and circumstances support the [police's] 

conclusion that the Informant was indeed truthful and reliable." 

Those facts were: the Informant was arrested in Las Dalias, "a 

housing project that Bernard was associated with"; the Informant 

provided very detailed information; the Informant agreed to travel 

with Officer Jimenez-Rolon to "point[] out the precise residence, 

which matched the description he had already provided"; and the 

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Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. The court 

also found that exigent circumstances were present, namely, 

Bernard's risk of escape and the threat he posed to public safety. 

Additionally, the court concluded that the warrantless 

search of the Ford Expedition was legal, as the Informant had 

provided a basis for probable cause that guns and drugs were hidden 

in it. While the court found no exigency, it nonetheless denied

suppression of the car-search based on the "auto exception" to the 

warrant requirement. See United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 

42 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that under the "auto exception," if 

"there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of 

criminal activity, agents can search without a warrant any area of 

the vehicle in which the evidence may be found" (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Even if the automobile exception didn't apply 

though, the police made a "good faith error" because based on their 

"legal presence on [the] property, the probable cause known to 

them at the time, and the automobile exception, it was entirely 

reasonable for them to believe that the warrantless search of the 

Expedition was justified," the district court concluded. See

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987) (recognizing that 

evidence resulting from a Fourth Amendment violation should only 

be suppressed "if it can be said that the law enforcement officer 

had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 

search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment" (internal 

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quotation marks omitted)). The court did, however, exclude the 

search of the flower box, on the grounds that even though the 

police had probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances to 

justify searching there because Bernard had been arrested and the 

house was secure, rendering safety a non-issue. The court likewise 

excluded the fruits of the flower-box search (four rifles found 

under the dirt) because they dropped from a poisonous tree (the 

illegal search of the flower box), and no "good faith" exception 

applied.20 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) 

("[E]vidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute 

proof against the victim of the search."). 

As for Cruz-Ramos's statement to the police, the court 

found that it could not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 

search because the search of the house was not poisonous (i.e., 

illegal). The court likewise rejected Cruz-Ramos's argument that 

his statement was not given voluntarily, which he said violated 

the Fifth Amendment. 

No Probable Cause

As we hinted at above, the focus of our analysis here is 

on whether the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's

home. Cruz-Ramos argues that since the sole basis of probable 

 

20 The government does not dispute the suppression of the 

flower-box evidence.

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cause was the uncorroborated tip from an unknown informant, the 

police needed more than just his word to search without a warrant. 

"[W]e review de novo the district court's conclusions of 

law, including its application of the law to the facts, its 

probable cause . . . determination[], and the district court's 

ultimate legal decision to grant or deny the motion to suppress." 

United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011). In 

assessing whether there was probable cause for a search, "our task, 

like that of the . . . district court, is simply to make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." United 

States v. McLellan, No. 14-1561, 2015 WL 4071914, at *4 (1st Cir. 

July 6, 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

We first provide a little background on the relevant law 

before diving into our analysis. The Fourth Amendment instructs 

that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 

be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. Based on this constitutional tenet, the law clearly 

establishes that even when police have a warrant to arrest someone, 

a search warrant is still "ordinarily required to enter the home 

of a third person to arrest an individual who is believed to be 

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inside the home." Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 49 

(1st Cir. 1999). 

"Nevertheless, a warrantless entry into a person's 

dwelling may be permitted" to effect an arrest, United States v. 

Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2005), so long as two 

conditions are met: one, the police had probable cause to enter 

the home, and two, "exigent circumstances" existed, like a 

fugitive's threat to public safety. Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 

F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (1st Cir. 1995). And probable cause only 

"exists when the totality of the circumstances suggests that there 

is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place." United States v. Gifford, 727 

F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As was the case here, police often rely on tips from 

confidential informants to underlie probable cause. But the 

principle is long-standing that "[e]ven where a search warrant is 

obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the 

mere fact of an assertion by an informer." Recznik v. City of 

Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169 (1968). It follows then that "[a]t least 

as much is required to support a search without a warrant." Id.

at 169-70. Therefore, when, as here, "the primary basis for a 

probable cause determination is information provided by a 

confidential informant," law enforcement must "provide some 

information from which a [court] can credit the informant's 

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credibility." Gifford, 727 F.3d at 99. In other words, a 

"probable cause finding may be based on an informant's tip so long 

as the probability of a lying or inaccurate informer has been 

sufficiently reduced." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To help assess an informant's reliability, we look to a 

"nonexhaustive" list of factors: 

(1) . . . the probable veracity and basis of 

knowledge of persons supplying hearsay 

information; (2) whether an informant's 

statements reflect first-hand knowledge; (3) 

whether some or all of the informant's factual 

statements were corroborated wherever 

reasonable and practicable (e.g., through 

police surveillance); and (4) whether a law 

enforcement [officer] assessed, from his 

professional standpoint, experience, and 

expertise, the probable significance of the 

informant's provided information. 

United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) 

(citations, internal quotations marks, and alterations omitted).

Applying these factors to the instant case, we find that 

there is simply no indication on this record that the police 

explored the Informant's basis of knowledge for the information he 

relayed, or that the police bothered to corroborate any of the 

information that actually suggested that criminal activity was 

afoot at Cruz-Ramos's home. Even if we were to agree with the 

district court that the information the Informant provided was 

detailed, we find that because the police did not sufficiently

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test the reliability of the detailed information, the denial of 

the motion to suppress cannot stand.

Specifically, nothing in the district court's factual 

findings "indicates the informant's basis of knowledge," such as 

whether the informant had firsthand knowledge of Bernard's 

whereabouts (i.e., he had seen Bernard at the house), or just 

"heard about it as hearsay" or "through rumor." See Gifford, 727 

F.3d at 100; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) ("[An 

informant's] explicit and detailed description of alleged 

wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed 

firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise 

be the case."). Notably, the only basis Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz 

articulated for trusting the Informant was that because he "came 

from" the same housing project as Bernard, "[h]e could form a part 

of [Bernard's] close-knit group." That inference could implicate 

every resident in the complex, yet Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz 

apparently never bothered to ask the Informant whether he actually

was part of Bernard's crew. The Informant could have been relaying 

a rumor he overheard on the street, or even fabricating the 

information. It is also undisputed that the police here had no 

"past history with the informant to establish that informant's 

credibility." See Gifford, 727 at 100; cf. United States v. Dixon, 

787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (that informant had given police 

"fruitful tips in the past" and police had met with the informant 

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before "in person on several occasions" supported the informant's 

reliability). 

Furthermore, while the district court credited the 

police for corroborating the Informant's tips, our review shows 

that the only information the police actually corroborated before

they entered the premises was the Informant's (very general) 

outside description of the house. Indeed, all the police did here 

before entering the premises was drive by the home and confirm the 

readily apparent details the Informant described -- that the home 

was in the gated community the Informant identified and had a 

flower box. 

But this kind of information, indeed, the kind that is 

immediately visible to anyone who passes the house, is not --

without more -- useful information when it comes to making a 

probable cause determination. True, "corroboration of even 

innocent activity reported in [a] tip may support a finding of 

probable cause," at least when "[c]orroboration of apparently 

innocent activity can establish the reliability of the informant 

because the activity might come to appear suspicious in light of 

the initial tip." Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d at 12 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But the information must be at least marginally 

useful in establishing that criminal activity is afoot. See

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that it is "also 

important that . . . 'the anonymous tip contained a range of 

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details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions 

existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third 

parties ordinarily not easily predicted.'" (quoting Gates, 462 

U.S. at 245)). Here, the police did not corroborate any of the 

information that might actually have suggested suspicious 

activity. For instance, one could find it curious to see multiple 

adults (at least one the Informant even identified by name) coming 

in and out of a single-family home. Or perhaps if the police had 

staked out the house, they might have seen someone protectively 

guarding or manipulating the flower box in an unusual way. Cf.

id. at 11 (police conducted surveillance to corroborate much of 

the informant's information, including the fact that the informant 

had, multiple times, been in and out of the house where the 

purported drug operation was going down). In sum, we find that 

the police did not do enough to confirm the unknown Informant's 

story such that probable cause could issue.21 

 

21 The fourth Tiem Trinh factor, whether the police officer 

assessed from his professional standpoint the "probable 

significance" of the tip, 665 F.3d at 10, is arguably met here 

because Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz did surmise that the Informant was 

reliable. However, we give his assessment little weight because

the police knew nothing about the Informant other than his 

affiliation with Las Dalias and still did not inquire into the 

Informant's source of knowledge. Thus, the officer had no real 

basis for making his assessment. 

The district court, relying on an out-of-circuit case, also 

emphasized that the Informant put himself in danger by providing 

the tip. See United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 

F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1983) (considering as a factor in the 

reliability analysis that "[t]he information was given to the 

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Our outcome should be no surprise, given our precedent. 

In addition to the test we laid out in Tiem Trinh, we have 

emphasized on multiple occasions that an informant's reliability 

must be vetted. For instance, in United States v. Jordan, we 

carefully weighed the police's efforts to corroborate a hearsay 

tip, and specifically noted some of the "various means" by which 

an informant could be corroborated, such as "direct surveillance 

or circumstantial evidence," "vouchsaf[ing]" by a "highly 

experienced law enforcement officer," "independent corroboration" 

(i.e., conducting controlled drug buys), and most particularly, 

the informant's history of providing "reliable information and 

investigative assistance to the police in the past." 999 F.2d 11, 

13-14 (1st Cir. 1993). We found that on balance, all of these 

efforts on the part of the police sufficed to corroborate the 

informant's tip. In Dixon, the police officer took similar 

measure, meeting with the informant face-to-face "on several 

occasions," "independently corroborat[ing] facts," including not 

 

government in circumstances subjecting the informants to possible 

personal or penal risk" (alterations omitted)). But even if we 

took into account the risk of retaliation the Informant faced, the 

record does not reflect that La ONU knew or would have been able 

to figure out that the (confidential) Informant was the one talking 

to police. If the Informant had heard the information through a 

rumor or eavesdropping, there would be no reason -- at least not 

one we can discern from this record -- to think the gang would 

suspect him. And we reiterate that the officers here did not probe 

the Informant's basis of knowledge (e.g., whether the Informant 

knew the information because he was in the gang and thus would be 

in danger because he cooperated). 

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only "innocent facts" like the defendant's phone number and cartype, but also by conducting controlled drug buys that "were 

carefully monitored and regulated to minimize the chance that the 

[informant] could have falsely implicated" the defendant. 787 

F.3d at 59. Further, the informant in that case also had given 

"fruitful tips in the past." Id.

In contrast, anyone driving by Cruz-Ramos's home could 

parlay the generic description the Informant gave, and confirming 

only those innocuous details is not, on its own, sufficient to 

corroborate a tip from an unknown confidential informant. The 

Informant did not even say that the house was the only one in the 

area with a flower box, meaning that the flower box's existence 

did not make for a distinguishing characteristic. Given the lack 

of other indicia of the Informant's reliability, the police had an 

obligation to corroborate something of the tip before entering 

Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. See Recznik, 393 U.S. at 

169 (finding that police did not have probable cause to enter a 

home when no "effort was made to show that either the petitioner 

or the apartment was at that time connected with" criminal 

activity, and the police did not "even attempt to establish that 

the informers were reliable"). In sum, there was no probable cause 

to search Cruz-Ramos's home. 

Cruz-Ramos further asserts that the search of his car 

was also illegal for lack of probable cause. As we discussed 

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above, the Informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable on its 

own, and we agree with Cruz-Ramos that the same reasoning extends 

to the search of the Expedition. See United States v. Dickerson, 

514 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that police may only 

conduct "a warrantless search of a car if there is probable cause

to believe" the car has "contraband or evidence of a crime" 

(emphasis added)). Contrary to the district court's decision, we 

conclude that the initial entry into the home was illegal, and so 

the police could not form probable cause from what illicit activity 

they observed once they entered the home. See Silverthorne Lumber 

Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of a 

provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way 

is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before 

the Court but that it shall not be used at all."). Thus, there

was no basis for probable cause to search the Expedition.

For the same reason, the so-called "automobile 

exception" to the Fourth Amendment does nothing to save the search 

of Cruz-Ramos's car (assuming the exception even applies to a car 

parked within the curtilage of a defendant's home, as was the case 

here). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). 

Sure, "the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile 

is significantly less than that relating to one's home," such that 

"warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in 

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circumstances in which a search of a home . . . would not."22 South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). However, police 

still need "probable cause to believe that the automobile contains 

contraband" before conducting a warrantless search. United States

v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014). As with a home-search, 

in this context "[p]robable cause exists when the facts and 

circumstances as to which police have reasonably trustworthy

information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that evidence of a crime will be found." 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). As we 

discussed, the police did not probe the Informant's basis for his 

claims that weapons and drugs were in the car and therefore had no 

reasonable basis for believing the Informant's tip, such that 

probable cause could issue on the tip alone. 

One final point on probable cause -- that the police 

actually did end up finding guns, drugs, and, of course, Bernard 

in Cruz-Ramos's home cannot enter our calculus, as "[a] search 

unlawful at its inception may [not] be validated by what it turns 

up." United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 69 (1st 

 

22 The logic behind this automobile exception is that "[o]ne 

has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its 

function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence 

or as the repository of personal effects." South Dakota v. 

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (internal quotation mark 

omitted).

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Cir. 2015) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Based on these facts,23 we conclude that there was no 

probable cause to enter Cruz-Ramos's home or car. Thus, while we 

certainly understand (though we do not address whether) exigency 

may have been a legitimate concern here because of Bernard's status 

as a dangerous fugitive, the Constitution does not permit the 

police to forego a search warrant in situations like this based on 

exigency alone. Rather, as we have discussed, they also need 

probable cause. See Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1373-74. 

The Seized Physical Evidence

We must next consider whether the evidence seized as a 

result of the illegal search should also have been suppressed at 

trial. It is well established under the "exclusionary rule" that 

generally, "evidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not 

constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun, 371 

U.S. at 484. That is, the government "may make no use of evidence 

illegally seized." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). It's 

clear, then, that per the plain language of the exclusionary rule,

 

23 To the extent additional facts came out during the two-day 

evidentiary hearing that the district court did not address in its 

decision, the government did not point them out to us. Indeed, 

the government's curiously scant brief did not provide any 

developed argument as to the motion to suppress (as well as several 

other issues the Defendants raised), instead choosing to simply 

regurgitate large chunks of the district court's factual findings.

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the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home (including the car and flower box), should have been 

suppressed. The district court said as much when it determined 

that if the initial entry into Cruz-Ramos's home was illegal, "then 

everything subsequently discovered by the [police] would be 

subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree."24

Like most rules, however, the exclusionary rule has 

exceptions. We examine their applicability next. 

Good-Faith Exception 

"Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of 

exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful 

deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the 

justice system." Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 

(2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This 

"good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule dictates, then, 

that even when the seizure of evidence results from a Fourth 

Amendment violation, that evidence should only be suppressed "if 

it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or 

may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 

unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Krull, 480 U.S. at 

348-49 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 

24 The government does not dispute this conclusion in its 

briefing.

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We conclude that the good-faith exception does nothing 

for the government here. For one, the government did not ask us 

to invoke the exception. Cf. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 

13 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that a good-faith argument can be 

waived, at least when the government fails to raise it below); 

United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(declining to address the good-faith exception where it had not 

been "raised, preserved, or argued by the government"). In fact, 

the government makes no argument concerning the good-faith 

exception at all, even though it "bears the heavy burden of proving 

that the good-faith exception applies." Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Regardless, the good-faith exception would not help the 

government in this case. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz admitted at the 

evidentiary hearing that the reason the police did not try to get 

a warrant was because "to get a warrant, PRPD must 'conduct several 

surveillances over a period of days, a lot of photographs, videos; 

and the process gets complicated. It's a process that takes a 

great deal of time.'" Cruz-Ramos urges us to interpret this 

testimony as an admission that the police specifically knew that 

corroboration was generally necessary for probable cause, did not 

want to put in the work required to get it, and decided to barge 

into Cruz-Ramos's home anyway. And the government makes no 

argument that we should interpret the testimony differently. Based 

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on Cruz-Ramos's interpretation of the testimony (which is not 

contradicted by the district court's findings, and, again, 

importantly, was not disputed by the government), the officers'

disregard of the lack of probable cause was certainly deliberate, 

such that excluding the evidence would have "[r]eal deterrent 

value," Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28, in discouraging future 

intentional and unlawful police practices. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 

348-49; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (noting 

that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is "deterring 

Fourth Amendment violations in the future").25 

The Supreme Court has also said, however, that "[f]or 

exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of 

suppression must outweigh its heavy costs." Davis, 131 S. Ct. at

 

25 We note that the record in this case, as it was presented 

to us, reflects that the good-faith exception does not apply 

because the police acted in deliberate disregard of the Fourth 

Amendment. Thus, we need not address today the full extent of the 

exception's applicability to warrantless searches in general. See

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., 

dissenting) (listing scenarios where the good-faith exception has 

been applied and noting that the good-faith exception has not 

generally been applied to warrantless searches). Nor need we 

address whether the exception applies to negligent police 

mistakes. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) 

(stating that negligent police mistakes could also be sufficiently 

culpable to bar application of the good-faith exception, at least 

"[i]n a case where systemic errors were demonstrated," such that 

"it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable . . . 

system"); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., 

dissenting) (noting that if courts "apply the exclusionary rule 

only where a Fourth Amendment violation was deliberate, reckless, 

or grossly negligent, then the good faith exception will swallow 

the exclusionary rule" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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2427. We recognize (indeed, regret) the "substantial social costs" 

that might come to bear as a result of the vacation of Cruz-Ramos's 

conviction and his resulting re-trial. See id. As we noted above, 

the police found several guns in the car, along with an 

extraordinary amount of drugs (specifically, more than 1,000 decks 

of heroin, 80 baggies of cocaine, 21 containers of marijuana, 740 

vials of crack, and almost 1,000 vials of crack), and it's a hard 

pill to swallow that none of that evidence can be introduced at 

Cruz-Ramos's trial.

But the law instructs us that "[w]hen the police exhibit 

deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth 

Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and 

tends to outweigh the resulting costs." Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). So is the case here, as we cannot overlook the 

egregious Fourth Amendment violation that occurred. At the end of 

the day, law enforcement simply cannot cut corners at the cost of 

a person's constitutional privileges. 

We conclude that the exclusionary rule bars the 

admission of evidence obtained from the illegal search of CruzRamos's house and car.

Harmless Error

Even if the evidence was illegally obtained (and even if 

the police had no good-faith reason to seize it), we will only

remand for a new trial if letting in the evidence was not harmless.

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United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 114 (1st Cir. 2015). 

While the government does not address this issue in its brief,26

we conclude that the introduction of the seized evidence in this 

case was not harmless. 

Since the error here "rises to the level of 

constitutional," we must assess whether "we can consider the error 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Trenkler, 

61 F.3d 45, 60 n.22 (1st Cir. 1995). We must find, then, that 

beyond a reasonable doubt, it is "highly probable that the result 

would have been the same" if the error had not occurred. United 

States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). "We are not concerned here with whether 

there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have 

been convicted without the evidence complained of." United States

v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 789 (1st Cir. 1987). Instead, "[t]he 

question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 

evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 

Id.

 

26 We have the discretion to address harmless error sua sponte

in certain situations, but we remind the government that it "bears 

the burden of persuasion with respect to showing that the error 

was harmless." United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st 

Cir. 1997). We will not fret over whether it is appropriate to 

exercise our discretion to address harmlessness here despite the 

government's failure to raise it because the argument would have 

failed anyway. 

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Cruz-Ramos points out (and the government does not 

dispute) that the evidence seized from Cruz-Ramos's car -- seven 

guns, and more drugs than we care to recount -- was the only 

physical evidence at trial that directly connected Cruz-Ramos to 

La ONU activities (or to any drug trafficking). As far as we can 

tell, without this physical evidence the only other evidence 

connecting Cruz-Ramos to anything illegal was the testimony of the 

cooperators, which they provided in exchange for leniency in their 

own cases. Further, as Cruz-Ramos points out, even if we take the 

witnesses at their word, their testimony did not make for a slamdunk for the government by any means -- for instance, while 

Gutierrez-Santana initially said that Cruz-Ramos was at the 

planning meeting for Pequeque's murder, he later (unequivocally) 

testified on cross that Cruz-Ramos was not there. See United 

States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978) (considering 

that the "government's case consisted primarily of the testimony 

of admitted accomplices, whose credibility was attacked" in 

finding that a constitutional error was not harmless); United 

States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2008) (in 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis, considering that no 

physical evidence tied defendant to drug activity); Coppola v. 

Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1571 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that there was 

"no conclusive evidence that tie[d] petitioner tightly to the 

crime," and that it did not suffice that "it [was] probable that 

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petitioner committed the crime"). Thus, we simply cannot say 

beyond a reasonable doubt it is "highly probable" that the jury 

would have reached the same verdict without the wrongly admitted 

physical evidence. See Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d at 112; cf. United 

States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding 

harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence "pale[d] in 

light of the other evidence introduced at trial"); United States

v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding harmless error 

where drug residue was illegally obtained, but the government 

"presented a wealth of other evidence," including bags of drugs, 

drug paraphernalia, and the defendant's confession that he used 

and possessed drugs). 

All in all, neither the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule nor the harmless-error doctrine apply here. 

Therefore, Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial, and the evidence 

that was illegally seized from his home cannot be introduced. 

Cruz-Ramos's Statement

We are left with one unresolved issue concerning the 

motion to suppress. While, as we discussed above, it's clear that 

the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home should have been suppressed, whether Cruz-Ramos's 

statements to the police should have been too is a tad trickier 

since the statement was provided after the search of the house. 

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In examining this more complicated question, we 

generally look at "whether, granting establishment of the primary 

illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 

been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 

sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

district court did not undertake this inquiry, given its finding 

that the search was legal. Further, the government does not 

address this issue (along with numerous others) at all in its brief 

(meaning it is likely waived). However, because this question 

"depends primarily upon weighing the facts in the particular case, 

. . . and is thus a matter especially suitable for resolution by 

the district court in the first instance," United States v. AcostaColon, 157 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), we think it appropriate that the district court address 

this issue on remand. See id.; United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 

786 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2015).

For the reasons discussed, we must reverse in-part the 

district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacate CruzRamos's conviction, and remand his case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. Because we find that Cruz-Ramos is 

entitled to a new trial based on suppression error, we need not 

address his other allegations of reversible trial or sentencing 

errors. 

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We move on to the grievances pressed by his cohorts.

B. Jury Issues

Having resolved Cruz-Ramos's appeal, we turn now to the 

issues raised by Laureano-Salgado and Ramírez-Rivera. We start 

with their qualms with jury selection.

Anonymous Empanelment

First up, the Defendants claim that the district court 

erred in empaneling an anonymous jury, arguing that it violated 

their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial before an impartial 

jury. 

We review this claim for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1998). "Our review 

takes into account not only the evidence available at the time the 

anonymous empanelment occurred, but all relevant evidence 

introduced at trial." Id.

Let's review the legal backdrop for the Defendants' 

claim. "It is constitutional bedrock that '[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 

public trial, by an impartial jury.'" Sampson v. United States, 

724 F.3d 150, 163 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend VI). 

To protect this important right, certain safeguards are generally 

put in place during jury selection. For instance, jurors' names 

and some other identifying personal information are made available 

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to the parties (and sometimes to the public). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1863(b)(7). 

However, "a district court may empanel an anonymous jury 

in any case in which 'the interests of justice so require.'" 

United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 776 (1st Cir. 1998)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)). Because "empanelment of an 

anonymous jury should be recognized as an extraordinary protective 

device, especially if it tends to suggest that the jurors may have 

something to fear from the accused, thereby conceivably 

encroaching upon the presumption of innocence," DeLuca, 137 F.3d 

at 31, we have held that empaneling an anonymous jury "is a 

permissible precaution" only when two requirements are satisfied:

"(1) there are strong grounds for concluding that it is necessary 

to enable the jury to perform its factfinding function, or to 

ensure juror protection; and (2) reasonable safeguards are adopted 

by the trial court to minimize any risk of infringement upon the 

fundamental rights of the accused." Id.

Considering both of these factors, we find that the 

district court acted well within its discretion to empanel an 

anonymous jury in this case. On the "strong grounds" prong, we 

have considered a variety of factors in looking at whether this 

standard has been satisfied. For instance, we have chewed over 

the defendants' link to organized crime, "a factor which strongly 

indicate[s] that clandestine outside assistance might be brought 

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to bear in any effort to intimidate or punish jurors"; the 

defendants' involvement in violent crime; their attempts to 

witness tamper; and the potential for "mandatory lifetime 

sentences upon conviction, which surely provide[s] a strong 

inducement to resort to extreme measures in any effort to influence 

the outcome of their trial." Id. at 32 (alterations omitted). 

Ultimately, though, we assess whether the "record as a whole 

affords sufficient foundation for empaneling an anonymous jury 

both as a prudent safety precaution and a means of ensuring 

unfettered performance of the factfinding function." Id. 

Here, the indictment alleged -- and the evidence proved 

-- that the Defendants were part of an organized drug-trafficking 

ring that freely used violence (read: murder) to get its way.27 

See Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d at 776 (noting that "[t]he indictment 

charged the appellant and his coconspirators with membership in a 

sprawling drug ring that often resorted to violence in its pursuit 

 

27 We note that the Defendants do not take issue with the 

district court's factual findings in this regard, but only with 

the manner in which the court weighed the facts and the source of 

the facts (i.e., the indictment). To that end, while the 

Defendants argue that the district court improperly relied on 

allegations the government made in the indictment to empanel the 

jury anonymously, as we noted above, in reviewing this claim we 

look to all the evidence introduced at trial -- not just the facts 

that were available at the time of empanelment. The Defendants 

simply ignore that legal principle. Further, the judge may 

consider a variety of other sources of information, including the 

indictment and evidence proffered by the government. See United 

States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 776 (1st Cir. 1998). 

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of profits"). Not even police were excepted, and La ONU certainly 

did not look kindly on people who cooperated with the government 

(remember, one of the organization's rules was to kill anyone who 

cooperated with the police). Further, the government proffered to 

the court that incarcerated La ONU members were able to call people 

on the outside using phones they had illegally obtained in prison, 

meaning, as the district court found, that "the reach of La ONU 

extend[ed] outside the federal correctional facilities and 

present[ed] a real risk to jurors." In addition, the Defendants 

faced mandatory life sentences if convicted. These facts provided 

ample fodder for the district court's reasoning that "strong 

grounds" called for anonymous empanelment.

The district court also adopted reasonable safeguards to 

minimize infringement on the Defendants' constitutional rights. 

Rather than bring up any concern for the jurors' safety, the judge 

told the jurors that they would remain anonymous to avoid media

interference. He instructed the jurors that the Defendants were 

to be presumed innocent no fewer than four times during the course 

of jury selection. He also informed the jurors that while he would 

read portions of the indictment to give them a flavor of the case, 

the indictment was not "evidence of guilt or of anything else." 

See id. (finding that Judge Fusté, the same judge who empaneled 

the jury in this case, "took satisfactory precautions to protect 

the defendants' rights" when he "did not mention any threat to 

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juror safety, but, rather, informed the jurors that they would 

remain anonymous during the trial because of publicity concerns.

He then instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, and 

periodically repeated that instruction as the trial progressed.").

Finding no error in the district court's decision to 

empanel an anonymous jury, we move on to the next issue.

Voir Dire

The Defendants' next claim is that the district court 

mishandled voir dire, insofar as the court did not appropriately

probe into the jurors' possible biases. Specifically, the 

Defendants refer to three supposed problems: (1) Juror No. 56, 

who, according to the Defendants, raised her hand when the court 

asked about the jury's familiarity with the helicopter shooting, 

was not asked any follow-up questions; (2) after the jury was 

seated, the court disclosed that one juror lived in Trujillo Alto 

municipality, which was nearby the 2010 La ONU-La Rompe shootout 

that led to the death of a police officer and civilian bystander;

and (3) the court did not sufficiently vet whether all the jurors 

could speak and understand the English language. Essentially, 

then, the Defendants raise two separate issues -- one, should the 

court have asked additional questions during voir dire? And two, 

should certain jurors have been excused for bias? We assess each 

of these questions in turn. 

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Additional Questioning

We review the first issue -- the district court's 

handling of voir dire -- for abuse of discretion.28 See United 

States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33, 44 (1st Cir. 2000) 

("Because voir dire determinations rely largely on immediate 

perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in 

determining how best to conduct the voir dire." (internal quotation 

marks and alteration omitted)). 

Upon assessing the record, we find that no abuse of 

discretion occurred here simply because the court declined to ask 

the jurors more voir dire questions to appease the Defendants. 

While "[a] probing voir dire examination is [t]he best way to 

ensure that jurors do not harbor biases for or against the 

parties," Sampson, 724 F.3d at 163-64 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), "a district court need not . . . pose every voir dire 

question requested by a litigant." Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 

44 (internal quotation marks omitted). "It is more than enough if 

the court covers the substance of the appropriate areas of concern 

by framing its own questions in its own words." Id. 

 

28 The parties do not address whether the Defendants 

sufficiently contemporaneously objected to the grievances with 

jury selection they now press on appeal. While generally we review 

unpreserved objections for plain error, because the government did 

not ask us for plain error review (and because the Defendants' 

claims fail under either standard anyway), we will review the 

Defendants' claims for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2004).

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Here, the district court asked the potential jurors 

whether any of them had knowledge of the helicopter shooting. The 

court followed up with each person who raised his or her hand in 

response. While the judge indicated that he was taking notes as 

to which jurors raised their hands, when defense counsel stated 

that he thought the court had missed the fact that "Juror 54" had 

raised her hand,29 in an abundance of caution, the judge asked the 

jurors again whether any of them had heard of La ONU, La Rompe, 

the helicopter shooting, or the Trujillo Alto bridge shooting. No 

hands were raised. Asking the question again was sufficient remedy 

for ensuring that the judge did not miss any hands (particularly 

because this was precisely the remedy the defense asked for during 

voir dire).30 

 

29 While neither side addresses this in their briefs, we assume 

that it was later clarified that the juror who raised her hand was 

actually Juror 56, not Juror 54.

30 Contrary to Cruz-Ramos's counsel's representation at oral 

argument, our review of the record shows that the district court 

did not improperly pose the helicopter-shooting question. After 

expressing reservation about asking a question about the incident, 

the judge consulted with counsel to get their take on the issue. 

Upon deciding to ask the question, the judge clarified with the 

jurors that the Defendants were not charged with the helicopter 

shooting, but because La ONU was "associated . . . with that 

incident," anyone who had "read or seen anything touching about 

the group of people known as La ONU or . . . La Rompe ONU" should 

raise their hands. Indeed, one juror indicated that she had read 

or heard about the case in the news and that the name "La ONU" 

"rings a bell." 

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As to the juror who lived in Trujillo Alto, the 

Defendants contend that the court should have asked prior to 

seating the jury where each juror resided, because people who lived 

near the area of the Trujillo Alto shooting "would have been 

greatly affected and scared by the . . . incident." As we noted 

above, the court asked the jurors whether they had heard of the 

Trujillo Alto shooting -- a much more appropriate question to ask 

if the concern is that people who were aware of the shooting would 

be afraid of the Defendants.

Concerning the jurors' language abilities, the court did 

not abuse its discretion by declining to further inquire into the 

jurors' English-language skills. When defense counsel expressed 

concern that one particular juror had trouble understanding 

English, the court probed further with the juror, who answered all 

of his questions in English. In particular, when the judge asked 

what kind of jury service that juror had done in the past, the 

juror explained, "[o]ne criminal case." When the Defendants later 

raised the juror's language skills again with the court (a generous 

assumption, given that all the attorney actually said was, "I was 

having a hard time understanding her"), the judge indicated that 

he "understood her perfectly." Given the "special deference" we 

afford to the trial court's conclusions that are drawn from its 

face-to-face interactions with jurors during selection, we find 

that the court did not abuse its discretion in so determining. 

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See United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2008); see 

also United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 592 (1st Cir. 2002) 

("Our cases make clear that the judgment of the trial judge, who 

can appraise the jurors face to face, deserves great weight." 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). The 

Defendants also have not directed us to any other jurors for which 

they had language-comprehension concerns. See Orlando-Figueroa, 

229 F.3d at 45 (finding no abuse of discretion where "defendants 

do not point to any evidence that any juror's ability to understand 

English was deficient").

Bias

To the extent the Defendants argue (however sparsely) 

that Juror 56 and the juror from Trujillo Alto should have been 

dismissed because of their bias against the Defendants, we reject 

that claim as well.31 As we discussed above, a defendant is 

guaranteed by the Constitution an impartial jury. And to be sure, 

a defendant's right to be tried by "an impartial jury is an 

integral component of a fair trial" that "must be jealously 

 

31 Neither side bothers to try to clarify this confusion for 

us, but our review of the jury selection transcript shows that 

Juror 56 was initially excused. Then, while the court was in the 

process of selecting the jurors who would be seated, one of the 

attorneys asked why Juror 56 was excused. For reasons the 

transcript doesn't reflect, the juror was brought back and seated 

as an alternate. According to the Defendants, however, Juror 56 

ended up deliberating. 

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safeguarded." Sampson, 724 F.3d at 160 (internal quotation marks 

and alteration omitted). But "[o]ur usual standard of review once 

the trial judge has made an appropriate inquiry is an abuse of 

discretion standard, which recognizes that the district court has 

wide discretion in deciding how to handle and how to respond to 

allegations of juror bias and misconduct that arise during a 

trial."32 United States v. Martí-Lón, 524 F.3d 295, 300 (1st Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). As to 

Juror 56, as we discussed above, the district court sufficiently 

probed with the jurors whether they were familiar with the 

helicopter shooting, despite the fact that the defense was not 

even sure that the juror had raised her hand (and the judge's notes 

did not reflect that she had). Still, the court provided a 

cautionary remedy -- the very remedy the defense asked for -- when 

this issue came up during voir dire, that is, to ask the jurors 

the question again. No one raised a hand. "[W]e give great weight 

to the judgment of the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors 

face to face, as to whether the juror can be impartial," id.

(internal quotation marks omitted), and the Defendants have given 

 

32 "Bias" means that a "reasonable judge," considering all the 

facts and circumstances, would determine that "the juror lacked 

the capacity and the will to decide the case based on the evidence 

(and that, therefore, a valid basis for excusal for cause 

existed)." Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165-66 (1st 

Cir. 2013). 

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us no reason to stray from that principle here. Likewise, as we 

noted above, the Defendants have provided no explanation for why 

we should assume the juror from Trujillo Alto would be biased 

against them simply because she lived in Trujillo Alto (even though 

she had not heard of the bridge shooting). The district court did 

not abuse its discretion during voir dire. 

Right-to-be-Present and Juror Misconduct

Next, the Defendants argue that the district court 

committed per se reversible error in its handling of Juror 30, who 

asked to be excused prior to the start of trial because of her 

fear of the Defendants. They argue that the court should not have 

prohibited them from being present during the juror's in camera

interview. They also say that the district court should have 

polled the other jurors to ensure Juror 30 did not taint them with 

her bias. 

We review the right-to-be-present claim de novo. United 

States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 32 (1st Cir. 2012). Further, "the 

exclusion of a defendant from a trial proceeding should be 

considered in light of the whole record." United States v. Gagnon, 

470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985). We review the denial of the jury 

polling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Villar, 586 

F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Connolly, 341 

F.3d 16, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[T]he district court's response 

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to an allegation of juror misconduct is generally reviewed only 

for abuse of discretion.")). 

We first address whether the district court erred by

excluding the Defendants from the in camera interview. A 

defendant's constitutional right to be present during his trial 

proceedings largely derives from the Sixth Amendment, which, as we 

noted above, guarantees the defendant a "speedy and public trial, 

by an impartial jury," as well as the right "to be confronted with 

the witnesses against him." See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526. However, 

the Supreme Court has "recognized that [the] right [to be present 

during trial proceedings] is protected by the Due Process Clause 

in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting 

witnesses or evidence against him," id., such as jury empanelment. 

This due process protection exists only when "a fair and just 

hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence, and to 

that extent only." Id.

Thus, the high Court has articulated that a defendant 

only "has a due process right to be present at a proceeding" when

"his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 

fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, "[a] criminal 

defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all stages 

of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 

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proceedings." United States v. Fernández-Hernández, 652 F.3d 56, 

65 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Of course, jury empanelment falls into this category. 

See id. (noting that "defendant must be present at 'every trial 

stage, including jury impanelment,' except at stages where . . . 

'[t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a 

question of law'" (quoting Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43(a)(2), (b)(3) 

(citation omitted))). But contrary to the Defendants' position 

that an exclusion from a court's in camera interview is a per se

constitutional violation, both the Supreme Court and this court 

have held that a defendant's temporary exclusion during an in 

camera questioning of a juror, where defense counsel is present,

does not automatically offend a defendant's constitutional rights. 

Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (noting that the "defense has no 

constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a 

judge and a juror" (internal quotation marks omitted)); FernándezHernández, 652 F.3d at 65-67 (finding that a defendant's absence 

from a bench conference during voir dire did not "deprive him of 

any constitutional right"). Here, the fairness of the proceedings 

were not frustrated by the court's decision to exclude the 

Defendants from the in camera conference with Juror 30. While the 

Defendants argue that they could have consulted with their 

attorneys on "possible questions to present to the Court so it 

could ask Juror #30 on the possible contamination of other jurors," 

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as the district court noted in its decision on this issue, the 

jury had not yet convened such that the juror could contaminate 

the other jurors. In addition, the court asked the juror whether 

she knew any of the other jurors, or had even interacted with any 

of them, and she "indicated in clear and decisive terms that she 

did not communicate her fears or anxieties to any other member of 

the jury." The Defendants have presented us nothing that might 

refute that finding. They also have provided no indication that 

their interests were not sufficiently protected by their counsel's

presence during the interview.33 See id. Thus, the court did not 

err in excluding the Defendants from the in camera conference.34 

 

33 While the court invited all of defense counsel to be present 

at the interview, one attorney (Cruz-Ramos's) did not show because 

of a scheduling conflict. This fact does not change our holding. 

The attorney's position on this issue (as submitted in writing) 

did not differ from his co-counsel's, and the attorney did not 

submit any additional questions for the court to ask the juror 

during the interview. Further, the Defendants have not argued 

that the attorney's inability to be at the interview warrants 

reversal -- only that their own does. 

The Defendants also fail to address what they "could have 

done . . . had they been at the conference," or how they would 

"have gained anything by attending." United States v. FernándezHernández, 652 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). As we discuss below, the Defendants were not 

entitled to an individualized questioning of each juror. And given 

that the district court ended up dismissing Juror 30, the 

Defendants do not tell us what other relief they would have wanted.

34 The Defendants also argue that allowing the juror's husband 

to be present during the interview was also reversible error 

because it is possible that he "might have a chilling effect" on 

the juror's responses. We are troubled by a practice of allowing 

a relative of the juror to attend an in camera conference when 

other members of the public, and the Defendants themselves, were 

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We also reject the Defendants' claim that the court 

should have individually questioned each juror to determine 

whether Juror 30's bias against the Defendants contaminated the 

other jurors. "When a non-frivolous suggestion is made that a 

jury may be biased or tainted by some incident, the district court 

must undertake an adequate inquiry to determine whether the alleged 

incident occurred and if so, whether it was prejudicial." United 

States v. Ortiz–Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993).

But "the trial judge is vested with the discretion to fashion an 

appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether 

misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial." Id.

at 443. "Substantial deference is due the trial court's exercise 

of its discretion," United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1185 

(1st Cir. 1990), and the "deference due the court's ultimate 

finding on the issue of continued juror impartiality is enhanced 

because this determination is a question of fact," United States 

v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1307 (1st Cir. 1997).

Even assuming (without deciding) that the Defendants' 

suggestion that Juror 30 biased the rest of the jury is nonfrivolous (a point we seriously doubt, given the fact that the 

jurors had not yet sat together at trial), we find that the 

 

excluded. But still, the Defendants have provided no law (or 

otherwise developed argument) that the district court violated 

their constitutional rights. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.

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district court probed enough to assure itself that Juror 30 did 

not taint the other jurors. As we noted above, the Defendants 

have provided no suggestion even that Juror 30 communicated or 

interacted with the other jurors, let alone that she had 

communicated to them her anxiety about sitting on the jury. See

United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that 

the "the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice or jury 

bias"). Furthermore, the Defendants have not shown (or suggested) 

that even if Juror 30 communicated her anxiety to the other jurors, 

the other jurors actually became biased as a result, such that 

they would have to be excused from the jury. See Sampson, 724 

F.3d at 165 ("Jurors normally are subject to excusal for cause if 

they are biased or if they fail to satisfy statutory 

qualifications.").

Seeing no merit in the Defendants' claims regarding jury 

selection, we turn to their next set of arguments. 

C. Evidentiary Rulings

Next on the list, the Defendants dispute a number of the 

district court's evidentiary rulings made during the trial, 

arguing that they amounted to reversible error. 

We review a trial court's objected-to evidentiary 

rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. RodríguezBerrios, 573 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2009). Likewise, a trial 

court's determination of whether evidence is more probative than 

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prejudicial is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 229 (1st Cir. 2011). We stay 

"mindful that the trial judge has savored the full taste of the 

fray, and his considerable discretion must be respected so long as 

he does not stray entirely beyond the pale." United States v. 

Rodríguez, 215 F.3d 110, 121 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Figueroa-Viera Impeachment

Say Defendants, the district court should have allowed 

them to impeach the government's star witness (Figueroa-Viera) 

with evidence that he was untruthful during his plea negotiations. 

Specifically, the Defendants refer to Figueroa-Viera's testimony 

that after he was arrested for his drug-trafficking activities 

with La ONU, he pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him. 

He signed a plea and cooperation agreement with the government in 

exchange for a reduced-sentence recommendation. The cooperation 

agreement required that Figueroa-Viera disclose "all information 

known to [him] regarding any criminal activity." It also required 

that he "agree[] to provide truthful, complete and accurate 

testimony, information on a continuing basis and as required by 

[the] United States." 

On cross, defense counsel attempted to question 

Figueroa-Viera about his plea agreement. The attorney asked:

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Q: And the fact is that during that 

interview [with the government], you 

didn't tell [law enforcement] all of the 

murders that you have committed in Puerto 

Rico? 

The government objected, which the court sustained, 

letting defense counsel know that he could try again if he could 

lay a foundation for the question. 

The defense showed the witness a copy of his plea 

agreement and continued:

Q: And, in fact, in that document, you 

agreed to cooperate with the government 

and to provide all information known to 

the defendant regarding any criminal 

activity, including but not limited to 

the offense described in the pending 

indictment; is that right?

A: Yes.

. . .

Q: So I ask you now whether it isn't true 

that you were not completely truthful in 

providing the agent all of the 

information regarding your past criminal 

activities, including murder, or 

anything about murder in Puerto Rico?

A: Yes. 

Before continuing with his questions, and to head-off 

another round of objections, the attorney asked for a sidebar to 

proffer the foundation for his next line of questions. The 

attorney explained that defense investigators had uncovered that 

Figueroa-Viera had killed someone during a 2011 bakery hold-up, 

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which he did not disclose to the government in violation of his 

plea agreement. The government objected, arguing that this line 

of questioning was forbidden by Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), 

as evidence that the witness committed a murder was a specific 

instance of conduct not probative of the witness's truthfulness 

(more on Rule 608(b) in a little bit). 

The court, however, acknowledged that if the witness had 

not adhered to the plea agreement's requirement that he provide 

accurate information to the government, his failure to disclose 

his criminal activity could go to his credibility. Thus, the court 

ruled that the defense could "ask the witness whether he has 

complied with this agreement and answered all the questions 

truthfully and provided accurate answers to the government 

investigators." Per Rule 608, however, the defense could not ask 

questions about the bakery murder because it constituted a 

"specific instance of conduct" that the defense was attempting to 

use to impeach the witness. Also acknowledging that the witness's 

answer to the last-asked question was unclear (the court 

interpreted the witness's "yes" to mean that he was not completely 

truthful to the government, while the government interpreted the 

witness to mean the opposite), the court also allowed the defense 

attorney to go back and clarify that particular question.35 

 

35 Despite this confusion, the defense attorney apparently did 

not think it was necessary to ask the question again, asserting 

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Now Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) says that "[e]xcept 

for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is 

not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct 

in order to attack or support the witness's character for 

truthfulness." However, the rule says that the court may, "on 

cross-examination, allow [the specific instances of conduct] to be 

inquired into if they are probative of the character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the witness." The 

Defendants argue that the court should have allowed further crossexamination because "[a] witness' response to a question whether 

he told the truth on a previous occasion could well be probative 

of his character for truthfulness." 

But the Defendants do not tell us what more they wanted 

to ask Figueroa-Viera to probe his truthfulness. Whether FigueroaViera committed the bakery murder does not tell anything of his

tendency to be truthful, unless he was required to tell the 

government about the murder and did not. Indeed, the district 

court allowed the defense to ask about whether Figueroa-Viera 

disclosed to the government all the murders he committed in Puerto 

Rico, and this question goes right to the heart of whether the 

 

that the government should "clarify that in the redirect, not me," 

since "it's the government that's alleging there's some confusion 

in the record." The government did not accept the invitation. 

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witness was truthful in his dealings with the government.36 Thus, 

while Rule 608 leaves the court the discretion to allow the 

specific instances of conduct to be probed, the Defendants do not 

tell us how the specific details of the murder -- as opposed to 

the details of the witness's communications with the government 

-- would be probative of the witness's character for truthfulness. 

See Tigges v. Cataldo, 611 F.2d 936, 938 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[S]ince 

the past conduct was not, in and of itself, 'probative of 

truthfulness or untruthfulness,' plaintiff could not have crossexamined [the witness] directly on the subject of the [past] 

incident." (citation omitted)). Furthermore, while acknowledging 

that Rule 608 makes discretionary the district court's choice to 

allow cross-examination on specific instances of conduct, the 

Defendants made no developed argument as to why the court was 

required to do so here. See id. at 939 ("The court . . . has 

considerable discretion to exclude avenues of cross-examination 

 

36 To be sure, whether the witness intended to disclose that 

he was not totally forthcoming with the government remains a 

mystery, given the way the defense attorney asked the question. 

But we suspect the witness meant to testify that he was truthful 

-- during a carefully worded re-direct, the government asked the 

witness whether the plea agreement required him to "tell the 

complete truth" (to which the witness responded "yes") and "what 

would have happened" if he did not "say the complete truth." The 

witness responded: "Everything I said would be used against me," 

and "I couldn't cooperate anymore." 

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which promise to lead far afield from the main controversy.").37 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in restricting 

this particular line of questioning.

Uncharged "Pep Boys" Murder

Next, the Defendants claim that the district court 

should not have let in testimony about a murder that the Defendants 

were not charged with. The Defendants claim that this evidence 

was introduced only to rile up the jury. 

Specifically, Defendants refer to testimony regarding a 

murder that occurred in January 2010 behind a Pep Boys auto parts 

store, when two La ONU leaders ordered the killing of a La Rompe 

boss. As far as we can tell, none of the Defendants were personally 

involved in that murder. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is 

relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

 

37 The Defendants also claim that the prosecutor improperly 

vouched for Figueroa-Viera's testimony when he asked about the 

terms of Figueroa-Viera's plea agreement by suggesting that the 

information the witness provided to the government had been 

verified. But Defendants concede that this objection was not 

preserved below, and is therefore subject to plain-error review. 

See United States v. Pulgarin, 955 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992). 

Still, the Defendants do not attempt to show how they have 

satisfied the plain-error standard, particularly given that 

Defendants have provided no caselaw from our circuit on the point. 

See United States v. Correa-Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) 

(describing a plain error as "an indisputable slip up on the 

judge's part, given controlling precedent" (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

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that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."

And we have previously held that when the scope of a RICO 

conspiracy includes murder as a tool to further the enterprise, a 

"murder [is] still relevant to the RICO counts as it tended to 

prove the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise and 

conspiracy," even when all the indicted defendants are not charged 

for the particular killing. United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 

36, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, cooperating witness Figueroa-Cancel 

testified that the reason he participated in the Pep Boys murder 

was because La ONU leaders instructed him to, and "if the leader 

ordered us to kill anybody, we had to do it." This testimony was 

relevant to framing the structure of the La ONU enterprise (i.e., 

that La ONU did, in fact, have leaders and that subordinate members 

were to obey their orders), and corroborated the other testimony 

regarding the rules and mission of the enterprise (i.e., that La 

Rompe members were to be killed on-sight). Thus, we do not agree 

with the Defendants that the Pep Boys evidence was not relevant to

the RICO count.

Even relevant evidence may be excluded sometimes, 

though, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 

the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

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The Defendants launch a Rule 403 attack on the Pep Boys evidence 

based on unfair prejudice, but we reject that argument too. 

"Usually, courts use the term 'unfair prejudice' for evidence that 

invites the jury to render a verdict on an improper emotional 

basis." United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir. 

2000). The Defendants have made no effort to explain to us why 

the Pep Boys evidence was unfairly prejudicial. See id. ("We 

stress 'unfair' because by design, all evidence is meant to be 

prejudicial." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). 

Given the nature of this violence-infested case, we see no reason 

why testimony about an additional murder would cause the jury an 

improper emotional reaction, and the Defendants have not provided 

any reason. We find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in letting in this evidence.38

 

38 Defendants additionally argue that the testimony of the Pep 

Boys murder should not have been allowed under Rule 404(b). But 

that rule bars introduction of "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act" introduced "to prove a person's character in order to 

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 

with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Given that the 

Defendants were not personally involved in the Pep Boys murder, 

such that the Pep Boys murder would constitute one of their prior 

bad acts, it is not readily apparent to us (and the Defendants do 

not explain) how Rule 404(b) would apply here. 

We also note that while the Defendants describe witness 

testimony of other uncharged murders and violent crimes in their 

factual recitation, they only argue that the Pep Boys murder was 

impermissibly introduced, and so it is the only uncharged act we 

address.

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In sum, we find that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in making the contested evidentiary rulings.

III. Multiple Conspiracies v. Single Conspiracy

Turning now to the jury charge, the Defendants argue 

that the district court erred in declining to give a "multiple 

conspiracies" instruction. Similarly, they argue that the 

indictment varied from the government's case at trial, as the 

indictment charged only a single conspiracy. 

Jury Instruction

"This court reviews a district court's refusal to give 

a requested jury instruction of this nature for abuse of 

discretion." United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st 

Cir. 2008). "The trial court's failure to give a proffered 

instruction will not be reversed unless that instruction is (1) 

substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the 

charge actually given; and (3) concerned an important point such 

that the failure to give it seriously undermined the defendant's 

ability to present a particular defense." Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). "Under this third requirement, reversal is not 

required unless a defendant suffers substantial prejudice." Id.

Here, the Defendants requested that the district court 

instruct the jury that it was possible to find that multiple 

conspiracies existed in this case, since, according to the 

Defendants, the evidence indicated that the Defendants were 

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involved in different schemes within their individual housing 

projects.39 The court declined, noting that besides the fact that 

the Defendants had not submitted any proposed jury instructions 

for the court to consider, the evidence did not support giving the 

instruction in any event.40 

"A trial court should grant a defendant's request for a 

multiple conspiracy instruction if, on the evidence adduced at 

 

39 Apparently the Defendants did not actually submit a 

proposed instruction to the court. But generally, a defendant's 

proposed multiple-conspiracies instruction would go something like 

this:

Where persons have joined together to further 

one common unlawful design or purpose, a 

single conspiracy exists. By way of contrast, 

multiple conspiracies exist when there are 

separate unlawful agreements to achieve 

distinct purposes.

In deciding whether a single overall 

conspiracy as charged in the indictment has 

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt you 

should look at whether there were multiple 

agreements reached, whether there were 

additions or withdrawals of alleged 

conspirators, and most significantly, whether 

the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt 

that all of the alleged conspirators directed 

their efforts toward the accomplishment of a 

common goal or overall plan.

See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 449 n.68 (1st 

Cir. 1994) (alterations omitted).

40 While the government suggested at oral argument that it 

opposed a multiple-conspiracies instruction, the written record is 

silent on whether the government objected to the Defendants' 

request for the instruction. 

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trial, a reasonable jury could find more than one such illicit 

agreement, or could find an agreement different from the one 

charged." United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 449 (1st Cir. 

1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, "[a] single 

conspiracy exists where the totality of the evidence demonstrates 

that all of the alleged co-conspirators directed their efforts 

towards the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan." Id.

at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Determining the number 

of conspiracies in a particular case depends on a variety of 

factors including the nature, design, implementation, and 

logistics of the illegal activity; the participants' modus 

operandi; the relevant geography; and the scope of coconspirator 

involvement." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Problematic for the Defendants is that even if we assume 

without deciding that the district court should have given the 

instruction, they have not shown us how they suffered substantial 

prejudice from the court's failure to do so. "In the context of 

alleged multiple conspiracies, the defendant's main concern is 

that jurors will be misled into attributing guilt to a particular 

defendant based on evidence presented against others who were 

involved in a different and separate conspiratorial scheme." Id. 

"The prejudice we must guard against, therefore, is evidentiary 

spillover resulting from trying defendants en masse for distinct 

and separate offenses committed by others." Id. Thus, while the 

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Defendants insist that the evidence showed the existence of an 

individual conspiracy within each housing project, and that the 

Defendants' conduct went to benefit those smaller conspiracies and 

not La ONU, the prejudice we examine is not whether a defendant's 

conduct might be attributable to a different conspiracy, but 

rather, whether the conduct of a person from that different 

conspiracy would be attributable to the defendant. The Defendants 

do not at all address this prejudice standard; nor do they provide 

any developed argument as to what specific conduct of other drug 

dealers (who were involved in other drug conspiracies) might have 

been attributed to them, such that the jury would not have 

convicted them without such evidence.41 To the extent the 

Defendants intended to argue that all the drug-trafficking 

activities that came up at trial must be attributed to an 

organization other than La ONU (with the reason being that La ONU

did not engage in its own drug trafficking), we have already 

rejected their position that La ONU was not a drug-trafficking 

conspiracy. The Defendants continuously overlook the overwhelming 

 

41 The only specific conduct the Defendants point out is a 

couple of murders committed by a person named "El Jincho." They 

claim that Jincho acted on his own in committing those murders and 

that they were not La ONU-sanctioned. However, the Defendants do 

not explain why we should assume that Jincho was not acting on La 

ONU's behalf. As they conceded earlier in their brief, there was 

trial testimony that Jincho was a La ONU leader and that he ordered 

that at least one of the murders be committed in retaliation for 

someone stealing drugs from the organization. 

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evidence that members of La ONU-controlled housing projects 

collaborated with each other for the benefit of the greater La ONU 

good. As we concluded above in our discussion of the RICO count, 

"the evidence convincingly indicates the existence of a single, 

unified conspiracy in which all the defendants participated." See

Brandon, 17 F.3d at 450. 

Variance

In a similar vein, we reject the Defendants' argument 

that the trial evidence impermissibly varied from the indicted 

charges. "A variance occurs when the crime charged remains 

unaltered, but the evidence adduced at trial proves different facts 

than those alleged in the indictment." United States v. 

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 116 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). "When a defendant asserts a claim of variance 

premised on the notion that multiple conspiracies existed and that 

his activities were not part of the charged conspiracy, the initial 

question is one of evidentiary sufficiency." Id. (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). And we have already 

explained that the evidence was sufficient to find these Defendants 

guilty of the single La ONU conspiracy. 

On to the last issue.

IV. Sentencing

Finally, we reach the Defendants' inevitable claims of 

sentencing error. Surprisingly there is only one -- the Defendants 

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argue that the district court should not have concluded that they 

were subject to mandatory life sentences on Count 29 (the VICAR 

count) because the jury did not specifically find that they were 

guilty of a particular statutory element of that offense. 

Recall that the Defendants were convicted on Count 29 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, 

that:

Whoever . . . for the purpose of gaining 

entrance to or maintaining or increasing 

position in an enterprise engaged in 

racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, 

maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, 

commits assault resulting in serious bodily 

injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of 

violence against any individual in violation 

of the laws of any State or the United States, 

or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be 

punished —

(1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, 

or a fine under this title, or both.

Based on this provision, the district court concluded that life 

sentences on this count were compulsory, since the jury found the 

Defendants guilty of murdering Pequeque under Puerto Rico law. We 

review the "district court's application of law at sentencing de 

novo." United States v. García-Ortiz, 528 F.3d 74, 82 (1st Cir. 

2008). 

However inarticulately, the Defendants essentially argue 

that because VICAR does not define "murder," given the statute's 

relationship to RICO, we should apply RICO's definition of 

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mandatory-life-imprisonment-eligible murder to determine what 

counts as mandatory-life-imprisonment-eligible murder under VICAR. 

That is, since the only type of murder that is subject to mandatory 

life imprisonment under RICO is murder "for which the maximum 

penalty includes life imprisonment," 18 U.S.C. § 1963, the same 

should apply for VICAR. And since the jury here only found the 

Defendants guilty of "murder," and not necessarily murder for which 

the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment, the court could 

not have applied VICAR's mandatory life sentence.42

However, the Defendants have not provided any argument 

as to why we should assume that when applying § 1959(a)(1), we are 

supposed to adopt the definition of "murder" provided in § 1963; 

while related to RICO, VICAR is still a separate statute. Thus, 

we deem this argument waived for lack of development.43 See

Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. 

 

42 While the Defendants do not explain this in their brief, 

the backdrop for this argument is that all murder under Puerto 

Rico law does not appear to be punishable by life imprisonment. 

Specifically, "first-degree murder" (i.e., premeditated murder) is 

punishable by 99 "natural years," while all other intentional 

killings (classified as generic "murders") are punishable by a 

maximum of 25 years. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, §§ 4733-4735, 

4694(a), (c).

43 Consequently, given that the jury specifically found the 

Defendants guilty of murdering Pequeque, we need not address the 

parties' wrangle about whether the verdict form should have further 

specified whether the jury was finding the Defendants guilty of 

murder or first-degree murder (as those terms are defined by Puerto 

Rico law), or murder as otherwise defined therein. 

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CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, we vacate Cruz-Ramos's 

convictions and remand his case for further proceedings, 

consistent with this opinion. We affirm Laureano-Salgado's and 

Ramírez-Rivera's convictions and sentences.

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