NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL JOHN SANCHEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0373

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-003526-002

The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kathryn L. Petroff

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maurice Portley and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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2

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 Gabriel John Sanchez appeals his conviction and sentence for 

one count of aggravated assault, a class 5 felony. Sanchez’s counsel filed a 

brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State 

v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), stating that she has searched the record and 

found no arguable question of law and requesting that this court examine 

the record for reversible error. Sanchez was afforded the opportunity to file 

a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 

530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 “We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions.” State v. Powers, 200 

Ariz. 123, 124, ¶ 2 (App. 2001). On May 13, 2013, Detention Officer T. was 

working laundry duty with his partner, Officer A., at the Fourth Avenue 

Jail in Phoenix. Officer T. alerted to multiple inmates huddled together on 

the second floor walkway, whereupon he saw one inmate bend down and 

pick up “something white or beige.” Officer T. suspected the item was a 

weapon or other form of contraband so he and Officer A. went to the 

inmate’s cell to investigate. After Officer A. signaled to the officer in the 

tower to open the cell door, Officer T. requested twice that the inmate open 

his left hand. The inmate, standing inside the cell doorway, gave no 

response and started to walk away from Officer T. After initially turning

away, the inmate turned back and punched Officer T. in the face with a 

closed fist. At trial, Officer T. identified the inmate as Gabriel Sanchez.

¶3 After being struck, Officers T. and A. entered the cell to 

contain Sanchez. As they were putting Sanchez in handcuffs, Sanchez’s 

cellmate “jumped up and started punching [Officer A.] on the side of the 

face.” The officers used pepper spray to defend themselves and were 

eventually able to place both inmates in custody. Sanchez’s cellmate was 

later identified as Jonathan Fields, who is African-American and taller than 

Sanchez, who is Hispanic.

¶4 There were discrepancies in the Incident and Disciplinary 

Action Reports as to the two inmates’ identities and respective roles in the 

altercation. The Incident Report was offered but not admitted into 

evidence; the parties stipulated to admission of the Disciplinary Action 

Reports. As part of the administrative proceedings levied against Sanchez 

and Fields, the Disciplinary Action Reports identify Fields as the original 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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3

assailant of Officer T., though the Incident Report and witness testimony 

positively identify Sanchez as the inmate who initially punched Officer T.

¶5 Prior to trial, Sanchez filed a motion to dismiss based on the 

State’s untimely disclosure of exculpatory evidence—the Disciplinary 

Reports. The trial court granted Sanchez’s motion in part, explaining that 

“the State clearly violated its disclosure obligations” pursuant to Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1. But it also explained that “the Court must 

impose a sanction proportionate to the harm caused . . . and that sanction 

should affect the merits of the case as little as possible.” Accordingly, 

Sanchez was able to introduce the exculpatory Disciplinary Reports at trial

and the jury was informed that the reports had been untimely disclosed.

¶6 Following the State’s case in chief, Sanchez moved for a

directed verdict pursuant to Rule 20. His position was “that reasonable 

minds could come to one conclusion,” given that “all the reports say that it 

was Fields that hit [Officer T.].” The trial court denied the motion, declaring 

the discrepancies between the Disciplinary Reports and the testimony to be 

“a classic case of facts for the jury to decide.”

¶7 The eight-member jury convicted Sanchez of aggravated 

assault. A trial on prior convictions was held as part of the sentencing 

hearing, and Sanchez stipulated to two prior felony convictions. He was 

sentenced to a presumptive term of five years’ imprisonment to run 

consecutively to his release from three prior 2011 convictions. Sanchez was 

credited with 264 days of presentence incarceration.

¶8 Sanchez appealed his conviction and sentence. This court has 

jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 

13-4033. 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Sanctions for non-disclosure will be reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion, though a trial court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion for acquittal is 

reviewed de novo. State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 353–54, ¶ 40 (2004); 

State v. Bon, 236 Ariz. 249, 251, ¶ 5 (App. 2014).

¶10 We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings 

regarding the State’s disclosure obligations and sanction. The Deputy 

County Attorney made a good faith effort to obtain the requested records 
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from the detention division of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the 

appropriate sanction must be proportionate to the prejudice placed upon 

Sanchez. Jimenez v. Chavez, 234 Ariz. 448, 452, ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2014). 

Admitting the exculpatory Disciplinary Reports into evidence and 

stipulating to the State’s late disclosure of those reports was well within the 

court’s discretion as a proportionate cure for any prejudice suffered by 

Sanchez.

¶11 The trial court also appropriately denied Sanchez’s Rule 20 

motion for acquittal, as we agree that the contrast between the Disciplinary 

Reports and the detention officers’ testimony at trial was a “classic case of 

facts for the jury to decide.” “[A] directed verdict should not be granted if 

the evidence is such that reasonable minds may differ on the inferences to 

be drawn therefrom.” State v. Paoletto, 133 Ariz. 412, 416 (App. 1982). A 

directed verdict of acquittal is not required simply because an inference of 

innocence exists. State v. Ortiz, 9 Ariz. App. 116, 118 (App. 1969). Here, the 

detention officers testified they observed Sanchez striking Officer T., and 

there was testimony as to possible administrative error in preparing the 

conflicting Disciplinary Reports. The jury verdict is supported by 

substantial evidence.

¶12 Sanchez, through his counsel, also “asserts that the jurors 

were prejudiced in favor of police witnesses.” “Because the trial court 

observes firsthand a juror’s demeanor and credibility,” we will not set aside 

that court’s assessment of a juror’s fairness and impartiality absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 12–13 (1997); see also State v. 

Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 75–76, ¶ 5 (App. 2010). Furthermore, the party 

challenging the jury’s fairness and impartiality has the burden of 

establishing juror bias. Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 13.

¶13 We note initially that Sanchez has not identified any portion 

of the record that demonstrates juror bias. Our own review of the record 

has revealed no such bias. During jury selection, the trial court expressly 

asked the prospective jurors if anyone “would be concerned that they 

would believe a police officer over any other witness?” The court then 

identified eight jurors with possible biases favoring law enforcement, but 

none of these people were selected for the jury.

¶14 Moreover, the final written jury instructions explained that

“[t]he testimony of a law enforcement officer is not entitled to any greater 

or lesser importance or believability merely because of the fact that the 

witness is a law enforcement officer.” Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 
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21.3(d) mandates that “a copy of the instructions shall be furnished to each 

juror before being read by the court.” The record indicates the final jury 

instructions were read to the jury, but the trial court — according to the 

transcript — apparently did not read the “testimony of law enforcement” 

instruction. However, in the absence of a reason in the record to conclude 

otherwise, we assume the jury was provided with the written instructions 

and followed the court’s oral and written instructions. Juror prejudice “will 

not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record.” Trostle, 

191 Ariz. at 13. 

¶15 Furthermore, “no party may assign as error on appeal the 

court’s giving or failing to give any instruction . . . unless the party objects 

thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

21.3(c). Sanchez did not object to the trial court’s failure to read a particular 

jury instruction, so we review only for fundamental error. State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 607, ¶ 19 (2005). Having reviewed the record, we 

conclude that no fundamental, reversible error occurred with respect to any 

alleged juror bias or prejudice in favor of the testimony of the law 

enforcement officers. 

¶16 Having considered defense counsel’s brief and examined the 

record for reversible error, see Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, we find none. The 

evidence presented supports the conviction and the sentence imposed falls 

within the range permitted by law. As far as the record reveals, Sanchez

was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings, and these 

proceedings were conducted in compliance with his constitutional and 

statutory rights and the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶17 Pursuant to State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984), 

counsel’s obligations in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do no more 

than inform Sanchez of the disposition of the appeal and his future options, 

unless counsel’s review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the 

Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. Sanchez has thirty days 

from the date of this decision in which to proceed, if he desires, with a pro 

se motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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CONCLUSION

¶18 The conviction and sentence are affirmed.