No. 1-96-0899AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,           )    APPEAL FROM THECOUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,         )    CIRCUIT COURT OFCOUNCIL 31, AFL-CIO, RUSSELL            )    COOK COUNTYLADSON, ADELE TRASS, DANY               )ST. PREAX,                              )                                        )     Plaintiffs-Appellees,              )                                        )     v.                                 )    No. 94 CH 11503                                        )THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL               )MANAGEMENT SERVICES, MICHAEL S.         )SCHWARTZ, Director of Central           )Management Services, THE CIVIL          )SERVICE COMMISSION,                     )    THE HONORABLE                                        )    LESTER D. FOREMAN     Defendants-Appellants.             )    JUDGE PRESIDING.     PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs, a labor organization and three State of Illinoisemployees, filed a complaint against the Department of CentralManagement Services (CMS), its Director, and the Illinois CivilService Commission for administrative review from the IllinoisCivil Service Commission (the Commission).  The complaint wasbased on the Commission's approval of revisions to the jobclassification plan that created the "Public ServiceAdministrator" classification (PSA).  The PSA classificationreplaced approximately 240 other job classifications.  The trialcourt dismissed the labor organization from the suit withprejudice and later issued a writ of certiorari in favor of theindividual plaintiffs.  The court ordered the defendants toreinstate the plaintiffs to the classifications they had beenassigned to prior to the revision of the plan. On appeal,defendants contend that:  (1) the Commission's approval of theclassification plan was not subject to review by writ ofcertiorari; and (2) assuming arguendo that the Commission'sdecision was reviewable using a writ of certiorari, theCommission's approval of the revision was not arbitrary orcapricious.BACKGROUND     In September 1993, the Governor's Human Resources AdvisoryCouncil (the Council) issued its final report entitled"Recommendations for Change in Illinois." One of the Council'srecommendations was that the number of classifications of statejobs subject to the provisions of the Illinois Personnel Code(the Code)(20 ILCS 415/1 et seq. (West 1992)) be "dramaticallyreduced." The Council stated that, in the past, a classificationwas defined with such "excruciating detail that it could alsoserve as the actual job description" and that such detailed typeof system had resulted in 1,679 job classifications.     In the Council's opinion, career development would beexpanded by the new broad-banded classification system because itwould encourage extended career opportunities for workers who mayhave been locked into one or two agency specific series andlocked out of very similar jobs in other agencies. The Councilalso noted that the change would encourage state agencies toupdate job descriptions as a routine measure in the work place,thus eliminating the "cumbersome and difficult" requirement ofhaving to obtain the approval of the Civil Service Commission forauthorization of a position classification change.     In August 1994, the Illinois Department of CentralManagement Services published a notice in the Illinois Registerof the proposed amendment to the position classification payplan. The proposed amendment revised the heading of section310.495 of the rules in the Administrative Code from "SeniorPublic Service Administrator Class Series" to "Public ServiceAdministrator Series." 80 Ill. Adm. Code �310.495 (1994).     The notice of proposed amendment stated that the new serieswould include the following classifications: "Public ServiceAdministrator" (PSA); "Senior PSA, Level I"; and "Senior PSA,Level II." The notice also stated that the new PSA class wouldreplace most job titles assigned to the merit compensation systemsalary ranges of MC-08 to MC-11 and would be assigned the salaryrange of $28,680 to $59,500. The proposed amendment providedthat any incumbent in the MC-08 to MC-11 salary range prior toclassification in the PSA class would be placed into the rangewith no change in salary. Also, the proposed amendment providedthat salary increases of between 5% and 10% may be given to thosein the PSA class who were assigned additional responsibilities.     On November 15, 1994, Stephen Schnorf, former director ofCMS, approved a change in the classification plan to add the PSAclassification. The classification plan review report that wascompiled by CMS stated that the new classification applied tocertain managerial supervisory or confidential state employeeswhose positions were at the salary ranges MC-08 through MC-11.Employees whose positions were affected by the new PSA classwould move into the class at their existing salaries.     The report stated that the PSA class was "created in orderto consolidate a large number of senior managementclassifications to result in a more effective classificationsystem."  The report also stated that the narrowly definedclasses that previously were used restricted management's abilityto assign duties and functions to positions. According to thereport, the "establishment of the Public Service Administratorclass is consistent with a broad banding approach toclassification and will enable management flexibility in theassignment of duties and creation of positions."     Common to all PSA positions is the management nature of thework. PSA positions are "full line supervisors" or administratorswho assist higher level managers. Other PSA positions may act ina confidential labor relations capacity. The PSA classencompasses those jobs where the scope of the operation andassociated administrative and managerial duties is not as greatas that of the Senior PSA, but where work performed is higherthan that of first level management positions.      The minimal requirements for the PSA class include theknowledge, skill, and mental development equivalent to thecompletion of four years of college, preferably with courses inbusiness or public administration, and prior experienceequivalent to three years of progressively responsibleadministrative experience in a public or business organization.Specific requirements vary by position option and relate to thespecific position's duties and responsibilities.      On November 17, 1994, the Illinois Civil Service Commission held a special meeting to determine whether to approve thecreation of the PSA classification, as required by the PersonnelCode. 20 ILCS 415/8a (West 1992). Gilbert Feldman, attorney forthe American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,Council 31, ALC-CIO (AFSCME), attended the meeting and voiced hisopinion that the PSA class did not comply with section 8a(1) ofthe Personnel Code, which requires that a classification plan be  "based upon similarity of duties performed, responsibilitiesassigned, and conditions of employment so that the same scheduleof pay may be equitably applied to all positions in the sameclass." 20 ILCS 415/8a(1)(West 1992). Mr. Feldman stated hisopinion that the reclassification would encompass job titles sodisparate that they rationally could not be placed in the sameclassification.     Mike Murphy responded on behalf of CMS at the Commission'sopen meeting by stating that the commonality in the classconsists of the supervisory responsibility of each employee.Murphy also stated that the decision to create the PSA class wasin response to the Human Resource Advisory Committee's suggestionthat the number of classifications be reduced. Murphy said thatthe PSA class would create a career ladder for employees.     At the special meeting, the Commission unanimously approvedthe PSA class specification and abolished approximately 240classifications. On November 17, 1994, Bruce J. Finne, ExecutiveDirector of the Commission, sent a letter to Feldman notifyinghim of the Commission's decision.     After the Commission approved the PSA class, CMS sentletters to state employees affected by the change. A letter sentby Julie L. Moscardelli in CMS's bureau of personnel managementstated that the change would make the classification plan moreunderstandable and the system more "'user friendly.'" The letteralso stated that the new position title includes a broadened payrange and may enhance career opportunities.  The letter alsodelineated eight option designations for the new class:  (1)general administration/business/marketing/labor/personnel; (2)fiscal management/accounting/budget/internal auditinginsurance/financial; (3) management information systems/dataprocessing/telecommunications; (4) physical sciences/environmental; (5) agriculture/conservation; (6) healthand human services; (7) law enforcement/correctional/publicsafety/inspection and compliance; and (8) special license(attorney, pharmacist, registered engineer, etc.).     On December 22, 1994, the plaintiffs, AFSCME, and threestate employees, Russell Ladson, Adele Trass, and Dany St. Preax,filed a complaint for administrative review, naming CMS, DirectorSchnorf, and the Commission as defendants. The complaint statedthat AFSCME is the certified bargaining representative of manycivil service state employees and that it was the petitioner inpending representation case proceedings before the Illinois StateLabor Relations Board involving state employees who were inclassifications abolished and now in the PSA class. The complaintalso said that the individual plaintiffs were in classificationsthat had been abolished by and replaced by the PSA class. AFSCMEwas identified as a "participating party" before the Commission.     The plaintiffs claimed that the Commission's approval of thenew PSA class was contrary to law because the class fails tocomport with the statutory standard specified under section 8a(1)of the Personnel Code. 20 ILCS 415/8a(1)(West 1992). Theplaintiffs also alleged that the Commission's approval of the PSAclass was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence andadversely impacted them. The plaintiffs asked the circuit courtto reverse the Commission's decision.     The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint withprejudice based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thedefendants argued that the Commission's approval of the positionclassification was not an administrative decision subject toreview under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 etseq. (West 1992)) and that the plaintiffs did not have the rightto seek review of the Commission's decision. In a memorandumfiled in support of their motion, the defendants stated thatneither AFSCME nor the individual plaintiffs had shown how theywere aggrieved by the Commission's approval of the PSAclassification. Additionally, the defendants argued that theindividual plaintiffs were not parties to the administrativeproceedings.     On March 24, 1995, the circuit court ordered that theplaintiffs' complaint for administrative review be stricken andallowed the plaintiffs 28 days to file an amended complaint. On March 28, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaintfor administrative review and for a writ of prohibition. In countI, which sought review under the Administrative Review Law (735ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1992)), the plaintiffs alleged thatAFSCME "was a participating party at [the Commission] hearing onbehalf of itself and the State employees under the pay planrepresented by AFSCME." The individual plaintiffs alleged thatthe Commission's decision deprived them of their "basic civilservice rights under the Personnel Code which the aforesaidstatutory standard was designed to protect." The individualplaintiffs did not identify which job classifications they hadprior to the revision of the plan and did not state for whichagency or agencies they worked.     AFSCME alleged that it was deprived of its "derivativeinterest as legal representative of the individual Plaintiffs andother State employees similarly situated."  AFSCME also claimedthat the Commission's decision would have an adverse impact on itin pending representation proceedings before the Illinois StateLabor Relations Board. In count II of the first amendedcomplaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ ofprohibition to prevent the Commission from abolishing theclassifications and replacing them with the PSA class.     The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amendedcomplaint, alleging that the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction under the Administrative Review Law and that theplaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could begranted regarding the writ of prohibition.     On August 4, 1995, the court dismissed count I of the firstamended complaint with prejudice, ordered count II stricken, andallowed the plaintiffs 28 days to file an amended complaint. At ahearing on the motion to dismiss, the court found that theplaintiffs lacked standing to bring an administrative reviewaction. The court also stated that "AFSCME is out as far as I amconcerned. So I want you to plead a cause of action by way of awrit of prohibition" as to the individual plaintiffs.     On August 16, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a second amendedcomplaint for a writ of prohibition, writ of certiorari, anddeclaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint noted that theprior administrative review count had been dismissed by thecourt. In addition to reiterating the claim for the writ ofprohibition, the individual plaintiffs asked the court to reviewthe action of the Commission pursuant to a writ of certiorari, todetermine that such action was contrary to law, and to quash theaction and proceedings of the Commission. The plaintiffs alsoasked the court to declare that the Commission acted in violationof its statutory authority, to declare that the CMS'sadministration of the Personnel Code was illegal, and to enjointhe defendants from implementing the action of the Commission.     The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West1992)), claiming that counts II and IV for a writ of prohibitionand for declaratory relief and injunction, respectively, shouldbe dismissed for failure to state claims upon which the requestedrelief may be granted and that count III for writ of certiorarishould be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.      After a hearing held on December 4, 1995, the circuit courtdenied the defendants' motion to dismiss, ordered theCommission's previously filed record to stand as the defendants'answer to count III of the second amended complaint relating tothe writ of certiorari, and stayed counts II and IV of the secondamended complaint. Thereafter, the parties filed briefs insupport of their positions as to count II.     At a hearing on February 7, 1996, the circuit court statedthat it understood the state's attempt to simplify matters interms of the classification plan, but wondered how employeeswould be able to advance competitively with only one broad jobclassification. The court noted that the plaintiffs had assertedthat they had been deprived of their "right to advancement incareer service" and that the defendants claimed that theplaintiffs were not entitled to a writ of certiorari because theyhad not shown that they had been injured by the creation of thePSA class. The court stated that it was going to "attribute aninjury to the plaintiffs as a consequence of this change because"I think it does, in fact, deprive them of their right to careerservice under some form of merit approval." The court also statedthat it did not see how the new class was based on a similarityin the types of employment because many of the abolished classes"have no coordination one with the other *** and many of theseare totally different one from another."     While the court ordered that the writ of certiorari shouldissue, the court made clear that it was ruling only in favor ofthe three plaintiffs because "[t]his was not a class action." Thecourt said that it was ordering the defendants "to reinstatethese people to the positions that they had previously been [in].I'm asking them to reinstate these categories of MC-8, MC-9, MC-10, and MC-11."     Counsel for the plaintiffs stated that he would voluntarilydismiss the remaining counts of the second amended complaint. Thecourt's order states that a writ of certiorari will issue infavor of the individual plaintiffs, that counts II and IV arevoluntarily dismissed without prejudice, and that "this is afinal and appealable order."  The court granted the defendants'oral motion for stay of the court's ruling, pending defendant'sappeal, stating that "[t]his is a case that the Appellate Courtmust decide."     For the reasons which follow, we quash the writ ofcertiorari and its proceedings.ANALYSIS                                     I     Defendants first contend that the Commission's approval ofCMS's proposed change in the classification plan was not subjectto review by a writ of certiorari.  Plaintiffs initially arguethat this argument is waived because defendants failed to raisethis issue before the trial court.  It is true that issues raisedfor the first time on appeal may not normally be considered by areviewing court.  People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp.,146 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 585 N.E.2d 51 (1991). However, this rule isnot rigid and inflexible.  Hebb v. Beegle, 135 Ill. App. 3d 157,481 N.E.2d 846 (1985).  The question in the case sub judice isone of law and has been fully briefed and argued by the parties. People ex rel. Daley, 146 Ill. 2d at 27.  Furthermore, the waiverrule is an admonition to litigants, not a limitation upon thejurisdiction of the reviewing court.  As such, we recognize thatthe responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and forthe maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent maysometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem fromthe adversarial nature of our system.  American Federation ofState, County, & Municipal Employees Council 3 v. County of Cook,145 Ill. 2d 475, 480, 584 N.E.2d 116 (1991).  We believe that theinstant case presents such an occasion.     The common law writ of certiorari was developed to provide ameans whereby a petitioner who was without avenue of appeal ordirect review could obtain limited review over an action by acourt or other tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d413, 427, 551 N.E.2d 640 (1990).  Where the Administrative ReviewLaw has not been expressly adopted, the writ of certiorari servesas an available method of reviewing the actions of agencies andtribunals exercising administrative functions.  Stratton, 133Ill. 2d at 427; Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 673N.E.2d 251 (1996). The purpose of the writ is to have the entirerecord of the inferior tribunal brought before the court todetermine, from the record alone, that the inferior tribunalproceeded according to the applicable law.  Stratton, 133 Ill. 2dat 427; Tanner v. Court of Claims, 256 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1092,629 N.E.2d 696 (1994).  "If the circuit court, on the return ofthe writ, finds from the record that the inferior tribunalproceeded according to law, the writ is quashed; however, if theproceedings are not in compliance with the law, the judgment andproceedings shown by the return will be quashed."  Tanner, 256Ill. App. 3d at 1091.     However, there is no absolute right to review by certiorari. The issuance of a writ of certiorari is within the sounddiscretion of the trial court.  Tanner, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. A writ is properly denied if, as a matter of law, the court isable to determine plaintiff cannot prevail or he is not entitledto the review he seeks.  Tanner, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. Furthermore, the writ should not issue where it would operateinequitably or unjustly, or in the absence of substantial injuryor injustice to the petitioner.  Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 428.      Defendants argue that the Commission's approval of thereclassification plan was a quasi-legislative action and,therefore, not subject to review by a writ of certiorari.  Theplaintiffs argue that the instant case is reviewable by writbecause the Commission's powers and decision in the instant casewere quasi-judicial.     The United States Supreme Court has stated there is "arecognized distinction in administrative law between proceedingsfor the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards,on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputedfacts in particular cases on the other."  United States v.Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245, 35 L. Ed. 2d 223,239, 93 S. Ct. 810, 821 (1973).  Quasi-judicial hearings concernagency decisions that affect a small number of persons onindividual grounds based on a particular set of disputed factsthat were adjudicated.  On the other hand, quasi-legislativeactions involve general facts affecting everyone.  No individualrights are at stake in a quasi-legislative proceeding. SeeAdvanced Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 126 Ill. 2d 484, 506-07, 535N.E.2d 797 (1989).     For example, in People ex rel. Narczewski v. Bureau CountyMerit Comm'n, 154 Ill. App. 3d 732, 506 N.E.2d 402 (1987), themerit commission sought to hold a public meeting to review awritten reprimand issued by a sheriff to his deputy.  The courtheld that this action was quasi-judicial. Narczewski, 154 Ill.App. 3d at 735.  Also, in People ex rel. Olin Corp. v. Departmentof Labor, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 420 N.E.2d 1043 (1981), the courtheld that the Department of Labor's action was quasi-judicial innature where the Director of the Department sought to hold ameeting to determine whether union employees received propernotice of a hearing regarding the eligibility of unemploymentbenefits.  The court stated that a determination of the existenceof proper notice requires an interpretation of "[t]he mostfundamental requirement of the constitutional guarantee containedin the due process clause." Olin Corp., 95 Ill. App. 3d at 1110.     Conversely, in Advanced, our supreme court held that theDepartment of Revenue's determination of the tax multiplier is alegislative function and the required multiplier hearing wasintended to be an information-gathering forum in pursuit oflegislative facts.  As such, the court noted that the nature ofthe required hearing was similar to a rule-making orinformational proceeding that affected all taxpayers in the city. The court stated that no individual rights were at stake at themultiplier hearing.  Advanced, 126 Ill. 2d at 507.  See also, Tyska v. Board of Education of Township High School District 214,117 Ill. App. 3d 917, 927, 453 N.E.2d 1344 (1983)(where courtheld that the board's decision to close school and reassignstudents was tantamount to the quasi-legislative power to makeprospective regulations and orders and involved a public policyquestion concerning the school system and district as a whole,and not an adversarial adjudication of the rights of theindividual).     In the instant case, because the Commission is anadministrative agency created by the legislature, it has quasi-legislative as well as quasi-judicial powers.  See Granite CityDivision of National Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution ControlBoard, 155 Ill. 2d 149, 161, 613 N.E.2d 719 (1993).  Here, thelegislature has granted the Commission explicit authority toapprove, maintain, prepare and revise the classification plan (20ILCS 415/8a(1), 10(4)(West 1992)) and to approve personnel rulesand amendments to the rules submitted to it by the Director ofCMS (20 ILCS 415/10(3)(West 1992)).  The Commission also has theauthority to hear and determine written charges seeking thedischarge, demotion, or suspension of employees (20 ILCS415/10(6)(West 1992)) and to hear appeals of employees who do notaccept the allocation of their position under the positionclassification plan (20 ILCS 415/10(5)(West 1992)).     As stated earlier, plaintiffs argue that the Commissionacted in a quasi-judicial manner when it approved the revision ofthe position classification plan because the plan deprived themof the right to future promotions.  We disagree.  Although theCommission has quasi-judicial powers, the Commission's requiredapproval of the reclassification plan was a quasi-legislativefunction. The nature of the hearing on the reclassification planwas similar to rulemaking.  Although the legislature allows theCommission to hear appeals of employees who do not accept theallocation of their positions, the view of individuals presentedat the hearing in the instant case was allowed to provideinformation to the Commission.  No facts or individual rightswere adjudicated at the hearing.  In fact, the plaintiffs'classifications at the hearing were not revealed and there is noevidence in the record of the plaintiffs' classifications priorto or after the Commission approved the reclassification plan. There is also no evidence in the record as to what affect, ifany, the reclassification plan had on the plaintiffs.  Inparticular, the record does not reflect whether some or all ofthe plaintiffs, prior to the reclassification, were in categoryMC-8, MC-9, MC-10, or MC-11. Additionally, we hold that, becausethe Commission's approval of the reclassification plan was aquasi-legislative action, the hearing was not subject to reviewby a writ of certiorari.                                    II     Plaintiffs further argue that, assuming arguendo theCommission's decision was quasi-legislative, the Commission actedin an arbitrary and capricious manner.  When an administrativeagency such as the Commission exercises its rule-making powers,it is performing a quasi-legislative (as opposed to a quasi-judicial) function, and, therefore, it has no burden to supportits conclusions with a given quantum of evidence.  Illinois StateChamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board, 177 Ill. App. 3d923, 928, 532 N.E.2d 987 (1988).  This fundamental principleexplains the discrepancy in the standards of judicial review ofeach type of proceeding; that is, when dealing with anadjudicatory proceeding, a reviewing court may only set aside theagency decision if it is clearly against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.  When reviewing administrative rules andregulations, on the other hand, a court may not invalidate theregulation unless it is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable orcapricious.  Shell Oil Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 37 Ill.App. 3d 264, 270-71, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976).  As a reviewingcourt, we must employ this standard of review becauseadministrative agencies are inherently more qualified to decidetechnical problems and the mechanics of dealing with them. Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 928. Because the courts lack the expertise possessed by administrativeagencies, they should hesitate to find a regulation unreasonable. Shell Oil, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 271.     Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the Commission hasfailed to comply with the statutory requirements in approving thereclassification plan.  Section 8a(1) of the Personnel Codestates that the revision of the classification plan must beconsistent with the Code's standard that positions in aclassification must have similarity of duties performed,responsibilities assigned, and conditions of employment so thatthe same schedule of pay may be equitably applied to allpositions of the same class.  20 ILCS 415/8a(1)(West 1992). Plaintiffs argue that the reclassification is in contravention tothe Code's standards and the system of merit employment.     We recognize that a fundamental purpose of a civil servicesystem is to remove employment from the patronage system.  Glennv. City of Chicago, 256 Ill. App. 3d 825, 628 N.E.2d 844 (1993). Instead, it seeks to offer the employee the inducement ofpromotion for conscientious, faithful, honest, and efficientservice.  Glenn, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 833.  "The evils, sought tobe remedied by legislation of this character, are well known andwell understood.  These evils are such as grow out of what isgenerally called 'the spoils system' ***. [And, they] *** havebeen fitly characterized as inefficiency, extravagance *** andpolitical assessments."  People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 Ill.44, 58-59, 49 N.E. 229 (1897).  However, the need to protectemployees against layoffs and demotions made solely on the basisof political patronage must be balanced against the correspondingneed of that administration to implement measures designed tosave costs and promote greater efficiency in governmentadministration.  Glenn, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 833.  Therefore, anadministration may reclassify employees, or even abolishpositions and lay off workers, if such steps are taken in goodfaith to promote greater economy and efficiency.  Glenn, 256 Ill.App. 3d at 833.  This policy allowing reclassification recognizesthat an administration should not be unduly hampered in theperformance of its managerial responsibilities.  Glenn, 256 Ill.App. 3d at 834.     Plaintiffs concede that the Commission is empowered underthe statute to change plaintiffs' classifications.  However,plaintiffs contend that the action taken was not in conformitywith the terms of the statute.  However, plaintiffs' contentionis not convincing.  Defendants have cited cases from otherjurisdictions that are more instructive. In Heyne v. Mabrey, 178Ind. App. 610, 383 N.E.2d 464 (1978), the Indiana Court ofAppeals held that plaintiffs were not injured by reclassification where the plaintiffs' salaries had not beenreduced nor had their duties changed.  In addition, the Indianacourt held that the plaintiffs did not have any "property rights"in the possibility of step increases in pay because the stepincrease is a mere expectancy which falls short of a legitimateclaim of entitlement.  Heyne, 178 Ind. App. at 613, 383 N.E.2d at467.     Defendants also cite Carls v. Civil Service Comm'n, 17 N.J.215, 111 A.2d 45 (1954). In Carls, the New Jersey Supreme Courtheld that the reclassification of employees was neither arbitrarynor capricious where neither the plaintiffs' duties nor theirsalaries changed.  The court also held that the plaintiffs didnot have a vested right in their former classifications becausethey were, at all times, subject to the broad reclassificationpowers that had been delegated by the legislature to theCommission.  Carls, 17 N.J. at 223, 111 A.2d at 49.     Defendants further cite Schultz v. Regents of the Universityof California, 160 Cal. App. 3d 768, 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1984). In Schultz, the court held that the plaintiff did not have aprotectible property interest where his salary was frozen afterreclassification until the salaries of others in the new classrose to equal his salary.  The court concluded that plaintiff'sexpectation of a step increase was not supported by any promisesor "mutually explicit understandings" between him and theUniversity regarding the step increase and that plaintiff hadnothing more than a "unilateral expectation" that he wouldreceive an increase in salary.  Schultz, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 777-78, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16.     We also believe Glenn v. City of Chicago, 256 Ill. App. 3d825, 628 N.E.2d 844 (1993), is apposite.  In Glenn, theplaintiffs, a class of current and former career serviceemployees of the City of Chicago, challenged the validity of thecity's personnel rule that reclassified their positions, thatreduced their salaries and eliminated their accrued seniority. The plaintiffs contended that the reclassification system wasinvalid because it did not protect the seniority and salary ofthe reclassified job holder.  The court held that the rule inquestion did not provide for the right to seniority, but onlyprovided for the right to reclassify to further efficiency andeconomy in government.  The court noted that seniority and thevalues of career service were not synonymous, and to require thatseniority and wages be protected in the event of reclassificationwould greatly dilute and undercut the economic and administrativereform that would warrant good-faith classification in the firstinstance.  Glenn, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 835.     In the case sub judice, we are mindful that the trial courtstated: "And I do attribute an injury to the plaintiffs as aconsequence of this change because I think it does, in fact,deprive them of their right to career service under some form ofmerit approval.  And I don't see how that merit approval is inany way systematically capable of being administered under asystem where everybody regardless of what their particular jobdescription is all get put into one category."  However, in ourview, this statement by the trial court has no factual support inthe record. Rather, we agree with the defendants that theplaintiffs have failed to articulate how application of the newpay grade adversely affects them, especially considering that allemployees entered the PSA classification at the same salary theyhad prior to the change, all employees moved into a salary rangewith at least as great a maximum salary as their previous range,and that most employees realized an increased maximum range withthe change. Based on the record, we cannot say that thereclassification was arbitrary or capricious.     Accordingly, the writ of certiorari and its proceedings arequashed.     Writ quashed.