FILED

May 12, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JANUARY SESSION, 1999

LARRY SNEED, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9803-CC-00117 

)

Appellant, )

) MAURY COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. JIM T. HAMILTON, JUDGE 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Appellee. ) (POST-CONVICTION)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

LARRY SNEED, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

919 Myers Avenue Attorney General & Reporter

Columbia, TN 38401

KAREN M. YACUZZO

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

T. MICHAEL BOTTOMS

District Attorney General

ROBERT C. SANDERS

Assistant District Attorney General

JESSE DURHAM

Assistant District Attorney General

P.O. Box 1619 

Columbia, TN 38401-1619

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Petitioner, Larry Sneed, appeals as of right the trial court’s dismissal of

his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner contests the trial

court’s order rescinding its decision to expunge his record, and he claims that he

was unaware of the nature of the charges against him when he entered his guilty

plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 17, 1994, Petitioner pled guilty to 11 counts of passing worthless

checks, one count of theft, and one count of vandalism.. Petitioner subsequently

filed a post-conviction petition challenging that plea which the trial court dismissed.

Petitioner appealed to this Court and a panel of the Court rejected the majority of

Petitioner’s claims. See Sneed v. State, 942 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996),

perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1997). However, this Court did remand the case so

the trial court could enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 569.

This Court was particularly interested in whether Petitioner understood the nature

of the charges against him. Id. On remand, Petitioner informed the post-conviction

court that he had served his prison term and was no longer incarcerated and the

court therefore found that the issues concerning his plea were moot. The trial court

then issued an order expunging Petitioner’s record. The court subsequently decided

that it did not have the authority to enter such an order, and it rescinded the order

and entered an order in compliance with this Court’s request for findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal.

I. Expungement
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In his prior appeal, this Court rejected all but one of Petitioner’s claims, and

remanded the case on the one narrow issue, stating:

The petitioner also complains that the trial court did not

state on the record or set forth in its order its findings of

fact and conclusions of law as required by T.C.A. § 40-30-

118(b) (1990 Repl.) (repealed 1995). While we

acknowledge that this failure ‘does not necessarily

constitute reversible error,’ Swanson v. State, 749 S.W.2d

731, 736 fn. 3 (Tenn. 1988), it does pose a problem here

because of the issue concerning the petitioner’s

understanding of the nature of the charges against him, as

set forth above. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment

below with respect to this sole issue and rem and this

matter to the court below with instructions to enter its

written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required

by statute. Either party shall have the right to appeal as of

right to this Court from the findings of the court below on

the sole issue of whether the petitioner understood the

nature of the charges against him. As to all other issues

raised in this appeal, the judgment below is affirmed.

Sneed, 942 S.W.2d at 569-70.

At the hearing on remand, the post-conviction court learned that Petitioner had

served his sentence and was no longer incarcerated. After erroneously concluding

that the issue before the court was moot due to Petitioner’s release, the court issued

an order expunging Petitioner’s record on the charges at issue in this appeal. The

court subsequently rescinded that order and stated the following:

The Order of Expungement of February 17, 1998 must be

set aside. T.C.A. 40-32-101 does not provide for the

Expungement of records of convictions that have not been

reversed and dismissed. The convictions in these cases

have not been reversed and dismissed.

The Post Conviction Judgment was remanded to the trial

court for a ‘written order of findings of fact and conclusions

of law to be entered.’ The Court did not find that there had

been reversible error in the guilty pleas and convictions.

Therefore, the records of convictions in the case numbers

7749, 7940 and 8165 are not to be expunged.
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In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in rescinding its order

of expungement. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(a)(1) provides in

pertinent part that a trial court may expunge the record “of a person who has been

charged with a misdem eanor or a felony, and which charge has been dismissed, or

a no true bill returned by a grand jury, or a verdict of not guilty returned by a jury or

a conviction which has by appeal been reversed . . . .” After concluding that

Petitioner’s convictions did not fall within any of these provisions, the court

appropriately rescinded its order of expungement. 

Furtherm ore, the court had the jurisdiction to rescind its erroneous order. A

trial court’s judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a timely notice

of appeal or specified post-trial motion is filed. See State v. Moore, 814 S.W.2d 381,

382 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). The court generally loses jurisdiction to amend an

order once it has become final. Id. In this case, the court entered its expungement

order on February 17, 1998, and its order rescinding that order on March 6, 1998.

Therefore, the court had not yet lost jurisdiction. This issue is without merit.

II. Guilty Plea

Petitioner argues in this issue that the post-conviction court erred in

concluding that he understood the nature of the charges against him. In compliance
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with this Court’s opinion, the post-conviction court made the following factual and

legal findings regarding this issue:

The record shows that the [Petitioner] was advised by the

Trial Court of the charges against him and the [Petitioner]

acknowledged that he understood the charges. He was

also advised of his right to a jury trial, that the State had to

prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

[Petitioner] did not have to testify in the trial, that he could

subpoena witnesses for his defense and could be

represented by counsel.

The [Petitioner] was represented by counsel in his plea

and plea negotiations and signed a Petition to Plead

Guilty, which was entered into the record, in which were

set out the [Petitioner’s] right[s] includ[ing] those cited

above. The Petition contained the terms of the agreement

and a statement that the [Petitioner] was offering his guilty

plea freely, voluntarily, and of his own account. It also

recited that his attorney had explained the matter to him,

and that he understood them.

The Trial Court did not advise the [Petitioner] of the fact

that the convictions that he was agreeing to could be used

to enhance punishment for any convictions in the future.

Based on the entire record the Court concluded that the

[Petitioner] had freely, voluntarily, and knowingly entered

his guilty plea, and that there were no constitutional

violation[s] in the proceeding to form a basis for a Post

Conviction Relief. Therefore under the law the

[Petitioner’s] Petition should be and was denied.

We agree with the trial court’s findings, despite the fact that Petitioner’s written

plea agreement was not made part of the record on appeal. It appears from the

record and Petitioner’s brief, that the only conviction Petitioner specifically contests

is the one he received for the offense of theft. At the first post-conviction hearing,

the trial court asked Petitioner what he did not understand about the charges at his

guilty plea hearing and Petitioner gave the following response: “Your Honor, I

pleaded guilty to a charge and received a four year sentence. I have absolutely no

idea what that charge was for.” Petitioner’s indictm ent on that charge alleged in
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relevant part that Petitioner “did unlawfully and knowingly obtain property, to-wit:

cash money, over the value of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, of First Farmers

& Merchants Bank, John Cotham, agent, without his effective consent, with the intent

to deprive the said First Farmers & Merchants Bank, John Cotham, agent thereof,

in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-14-103 . . . .” At the guilty plea

hearing, the following colloquy took place regarding this charge:

The Court: In Case No. 7940, you’re entering a Plea of

Guilty to one (1) count of Theft: Class D, because you are,

in fact, guilty of that offense?

Petitioner: Yes, Sir.

 Based on the foregoing, we find that the proof is sufficient that Petitioner did

in fact understand the charges against him, specifically the theft conviction he

contests. First of all, the indictments in this case set forth the elements of the

offenses and the factual basis for each charge. Secondly, Petitioner admitted at the

guilty plea hearing that he had discussed the charges with his attorney and that he

understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty. Finally, Petitioner stated

to the trial court that he was in fact guilty of the charges and that he freely and

voluntarily chose to plead guilty. We find that the record does not preponderate

against the trial court’s findings. See McBee v. State, 655 S.W.2d 

191, 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). The factual findings of the trial court in hearings

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgment.

See State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). This issue is

without merit.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

___________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, Judge