No. 2-09- 0743 File d: 9-23-10

_____________________________________________________ _____ ______________________ _ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

_____________________________________________________________ _____ ______________

_ THE CITY OF ROCKF ORD, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f Win ne ba go Co un t y. Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 08-- TR--43355 ) MATTHEW C. CUST ER, ) Ho no r ab le ) Mar y Linn Gree n, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________ _____ _____________

_ JU STI CEMc LA

RE N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: The Cit y o f Ro ck fo r d ( Cit y) c ha r ge d d efe nd an t , Ma t t he w C
. Cu st er , wit h sp ee din g in vi ol ati on of a m unici pal ordinan ce (see Rockf

ord Code o f Ordi

nan ces §16--194 (eff

. February

2, 1971) ). Fo llo win g a be nc h t r ial, de fen da nt wa s fo un d g uilt y and t he t r ial c o ur t imp o se d fin es a nd
costs i n the total

am ount of $400. D ef

endan t appea l s, pro se , ar gu in g t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in per mitt ing t he off

ic er who ticketed hi

m to testify

that he m

easured def

endan t's speed usi

ng a radar devi ce. We reverse. At trial, Rockford po li

ce offi cer Robert Woodfor d test if ied that on August 26, 2008, he was
co nd uc t in g speed en f

orcem en t on Eas t State Street. Woodford was s i tuated on North Rockf

ord Avenue, wh

i ch f orm s a "T " i n ter se cti on wi th Sta te S tre et. So ut h R o ck fo r d A ve nu e ( wh ich als o fo rms a "T ' i n ter se cti on wi th St at e S t r ee t ) is l oca

ted j us t ea st o f

th e i n ter se cti on of Sta te S tre et a

n d N orth Rockf ordAv en ue. W oodf

ord wa s f ac i n g s outh and was m

onitorin g the speed of wes

tbound veh

ic le sNo. 2-- 09--0743

-2-

on S t at e St re et . Wo od for d t est ifi ed t hat he observed

de f en da nt' s v eh i cl e tra ve l i ng at a hi gh rate of speed. Usi

ng a ra dar device , Wo od for d meas ur ed t he speed of def endan t's veh ic le as i t pro ceeded through the in

tersection of State St reet and Sout h Rockf ord Avenue . Woodford determin ed that defend ant 's veh

ic le was travel

in g at 45 mil

es p er hou r. The posted s

peed l i m i t was 3 0 m

i l es p er hour. Woodf ordt es t if ie d t hat, based on h

is experience, he bel

ie ved that the veh

ic le was speedi

ng even be f ore he measu re d it s sp eed elect ro nically . D efenda nt t est ifi ed t hat he di

d n ot exceed the 30-m

ileper-h our sp ee d l i m i t. We i n i ti al l y n ote t hat , be cau se d efenda nt was pr os ecu t ed u nder a municipal o rd inance a nd t he alle ged vi ol ati on wa s pun i sh ab l e on l y by "a f i ne ora pe nalty, " t he pr oc eed ing "is civil i n for m, and t he cause is tried and revi

ewed as a civi

l proceeding." Vil

la ge of Ki lde er v. LaRocco , 237 Ill . App. 3d 208, 211 (1992). Thus, the City was not required t o pr o ve d efe nd an t 's g uilt be yo nd a r ea so na ble doubt, b ut onl y by a prep onderance of

the evi den ce. LaRocco , 237 Ill . App. 3d at 211. Sec ti on 11- -60 4(b) of

the Illi nois Vehi cle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5 /11--6 04(b) (West 2008) ) gr an ts a m un i ci pal i ty th e a uth ori ty to rais e or lower the speed l im it thatwo uld o t he rwis e b e a pp lica ble under the Code (see 625 ILCS 5/11--601 (West 2008)) along an y pa rt o r zone of a street or hi

ghway wit hin t he mun ic ipa li ty's corpo rate li

mi ts. The altered

spe ed limit t ake s effect "whe n app ro pr iate signs givingnotice of the l

im it are erec ted at t he pr op er place or along t he pr op er par t or zo ne o f the hi ghway o rst r ee t . " 6 25 I LC S 5 /1 1-
- 60 4( b) ( We st 20 08 )
. Of s pe cia l s igni f i ca nc e h ere , se cti on 11- -6 04( b) f

ur th er pr ov i de s, "E l ectron

i c s pe ed-d ete cti

n g dev i ce s s h al l n ot be used wi

thin 500 feet beyond any suc h sign in the direction of travel ; if s o used in violation of

this Section ev

ide nce obtaine d thereb y sha ll be inadmissible in any pro sec ut ion fo r sp eed ing." 625 ILC S 5 /1 1- -6 04( b) (We st 2008 ).No. 2-- 09--0743

-3-

A t tri al, the C i ty succ es sf ul l y ob j ected to defend ant 's at t empt s t o int ro duc e evide nce o f the dis tance bet wee n t he inte rse ct ion o f St at e St re et and S ou t h Ro ckfo rd Avenue and a sign re duc ing t he speed li mi t from 35 m

il es per hour to 30 mil

es pe rho ur . On ap pe al, de fen da nt ha s a pp en de d t o his bri ef photo graphs, m

aps, and di

agrams showi ng that t he inte rse ct ion is less t han 50 0 feet beyond t he sp ee d- limitsi

gn i n d ef en da nt' s d i recti on of trav el (we st). Non

e of t he se mat er ials weread

m i tted i n to ev ide nc e. Ho we ve r , alt ho ug h it is axi omatic that documents that are deh ors t he re co rd may not be considered

on appe al (see , e.g. , Kn

app v. Bul

un , 392 Ill . App. 3d

10 18 , 10 27 -2 8 ( 20 09 )), th e C i ty hasex pr es sly

in dic ated t hat it has no o bject ion t o d efenda nt 's re liance o n t hese mate rials. Thu s, t he Ci ty does not dispute that defen dant's v ehi cl e was wit hin 500 feet of t he speed-lim it si gn. Instead, t he Ci ty arguest hat t he us e o f an elect ro nic spe ed- det ect ing device oc cur s whe re t he de vic e it se lf is located. The St at e po ints o ut t hat defend ant 's ma ps, diagram

s, and ph ot ographs show that the radar
un it wa s l

oca ted more th an 500 f eet f rom the si gn i n q ue sti on . We di sagree wit h t he St at e's i nte rpreta ti on of t he st at ut e. The legislat ive intent underl yi ng the 500-f

oot rule was

"to give a driv er t ime to adjust

to th e s pe ed l i m i t b ef oresu b j ecti n g h i m to radar det ection." People v . Johannsen , 126 I ll. App. 2d 3 1, 34 ( 197 0) . U nder t he Cit y's inter pr et at ion, a sp eed -d et ect ion d evice w ith a ran geof 500 feet or mor e co uld be use d o n a veh ic le as soon as i

t passed the speed-l

im it si gn. A si mi la r li teral
re ading of t he st at ut e wa s ar gue d by t he defend ant in Johannsen . There, the defen dant contended that t he lan guage t hat radar shal

l n ot be used withi

n 500 feet bey

ond "any such

sign " mea

n t th at radar
co uld no t be u se d w it hin 5 00 fee t o f a si gn , re ga rdl es s of wh et he rt he sa me s pe ed limitwa s p r ev io us ly posted f or th e s am

e di recti on of trave l . The

courtst at ed , "S t at ut es mus t be r ea so na bly co nst rue d in accordance wit h pr act ical app licatio n. Wh ere two co nstructions of

a l awar e p r o po se d, t his c o ur t will
av o id th e on e w h i ch pr oduce s a

b su rd re su l ts and ren ders the law di ff

icul t o f operat ion." Johannsen ,No. 2-- 09--0743

-4-

126 Ill. App . 2 d at 34. The co ur t fou nd t he de fendant 's ar gument base d o n a liter al rea ding o f the sta tute to be un reas onab l e. Johannsen , 12 6 I ll. Ap p. 2d at 34
. T he sa me un r ea so na ble r es ult wo uld f ol l owin ou r c ase base d up on t he dis sent's a nal ys is . A m ot orist faci

ng a speed reduction to 25 o r 35 mi le s per h our wou l d h av e th e ben efi t o f a 500-f

oot buf fer to reduce hi s or her speed, whi le a moto rist who fac es a speed reduction to 30 mi le s per hour in

an urban dis t r ict wo uld b e req

ui re d to sl owhi s or her veh

ic le im me dia tely . Such a resul

t would cle arly

frustrate the legi

slative in ten t . Ac co r di ng ly, we

ag re e wi th defendan t t hat the evidence obtained f rom the use of the radar devi ce was in adm is si ble. Citing Peop l e v . Ha

m pton , 96 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 72 8 (198 1), t he City al ternativel y a rgues that defend ant ' s convi

ction m ay be sustaine d based on W oodford's testimony

that (1) defendan

t was dr iving at a " hi gh rate of speed," an

d (2) based on h

is experience, he bel

ie ved that defe

ndan t was spe eding befo re he measu re d de fendant 's sp eed wit h t he r ada r u nit. In Ha m pton , an of f i cer' s e sti mate of a ve hic le' s s pe ed wa s c o nsid er ed su fficie nt t o pr o ve be yo nd a r ea so na ble do ubt t hat t he de fendant had violat ed t he applic abl

e speed l im it. The Ci ty arguesth at W

oodf ord ' s te sti mon y wa s s uf f i ci en t to sa t isfy the l ower s tan

da rd of pr oo f--by a p re po nder ance of t he evi den ce--that appl

i es h ere. Ha m pton di f f ersfro m this ca se, how ever , inasmuc h as t he o ffi cer in Ha m pton di d n ot mere l y of f er th e op i ni on that the defe

ndan t was speedi

ng, but al so offered an

estim ate of how fas

t t he def endan t was traveli

ng. Acco rd ingt o t he officer in Ha m pton , the defen

dant "was travel

in g 'around 40, probabl

y 45 o rso ' in
a 30-milespe ed li

mi t zo ne." Ha

m pton , 9 6 I ll. App. 3d a t 729 . Wo od for d, in cont ra st , d id no t quantif y de fen dant's estim

ated speed. This d istinct ion is an impo rt ant one . I n Stat e v. Estes , 148 Idaho 345, 223 P.3d 287 ( App. 2009) , t he co ur t sur veyed c ase s fro m ot her jurisd ictio ns ad dr essing t he que sti on of whether a pol

ic eNo. 2-- 09--0743

-5-

officer 's estim

ate of a veh

ic le 's spe ed

is sufficient t o s ust ain a co nvictio n. While so me co ur t s have
ca t eg o r ica lly

he l d that a

n of f i cer' s s pe ed es ti mateei the r i s or i s n ot suf f i ci en t to sus t ain a co nvictio n, ot her cou rtsconsi de r th e q ue sti on on a c as e-b y-ca se basis, f ocu si ng on "the off ic er's train

in g and t he
amou nt by

whi ch the esti ma ted speed exceeded the posted l im it, or t he m

agni tude of the variance as a p e r ce nt ag e o f t he po st ed sp ee d limit ." (Em phasi s ad ded.) Estes , 148 Idaho at ___, 223 P .3d at 289; see St at e v . Ali , 679 N.W.2d 359 (Min n. App. 200 4) (u pho ldingco nvictio n wher e de fendant
was ci ted for drivi

ng 41 m il es per hour

in a 30-mi le -per-hour zone by

an off ic er who had b een

trained to visu ally

est im at e t he spee d o f a vehicle within 5 m il es pe r ho ur) ; Ci

ty of K ansas Ci ty v. Ox le y , 579 S.W.2d 11 3 ( Mo. 19 79 ) (rev

er si n g c on v i cti on w her e t he off

ic er estim ated that t he def

endan t was t ra veling only 10 mi le s per hour in

excess of the 35-m

il e-per-hour spee d lim

it); Sta te v. Ki me s , 234 S.W.3d 584 , 58 8-9 0 (M o. App. 200 7) (su st aining co nvictio n base d o n 75% var iance be t wee n officer 's
esti mate that defenda

nt was travelin

g at 35 mi

le s per hour and posted speed l im it of 20 m il es per hour); People v . Olse

n , 22 N.Y.2d 230, 239 N.E.2d 354, 292 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1968) (although poli ce officer 's est imate t hat defend ant was t ra veling 50 to 55 mi

le s per hour in

a 30-mi le -per-hour zone was sufficient to sustain

a convi ction of s peedi ng, testim ony tha t t he vehi cl e was proceedi

ng at 35 to 40 mi le s per hou r might not have s ufficed) . I n Estes , t he de fendant was cha rged with travel

in g 65 mi le s per hou r in a55- mil

e- per -ho ur zo ne. The co ur t re ver sed t he de fendant 's conv i cti on, n otin g, int er alia , th at th e d i f f eren ce b etw een th e e sti mate d s pe ed an d th e s pe ed l i m i t wa s n ot grea t. Rec og nizing

th at a po lice o ffice r 's a bilit y t o es t imat e t he sp ee d o f a mo ving ve hic le is subj ect to erro r, t hesecourts h

av e su stai ne d con vi cti ons on l y wh ere the of

f i cers ' e sti mates were at least 10 mi le s per hour overt he ap plicable sp eed lim its. We no t e t hat altho ugh Ha m pton di d n ot ex pr es sly
em pl oy t his ap pr o ac h, t he r es ult in Ha m pton i s c onsi stent w

i th i t. Here, however, W oodf ord d i d n otNo. 2-- 09--0743

-6-

su pp ly an es ti mateof de f en da nt' s actu al sp ee d, s o i

t i s i m pos si bl e to s ay whether a

con vi cti on of spe eding could be

sustai ne d un der an appropri ate m arg i n of error. Unde r t he circ umst ance s, t he evi dence not onl y f ai l s to est ablish defend ant 's gu ilt beyo nd a r eas ona ble do ubt , bu t is also insufficient to me et even the Ci

ty's lower burden

of proof by

a preponderance of

the evi dence. For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, t he judg ment of the ci rcuit court o f W

in neb ago County i s reversed. Reversed. BURKE, J., co ncurs. PRESIDING JUSTICE ZENOFF, dis senti ng: I r es pe ct fully

di ss en t. The m aj ori ty agree s wi

th d ef en da nt th at the evi denc e obtai

ne d f rom Off ic er Woodford's radar

devi ce was in

admissi ble under section 11-- 604(b) o f the Code (625 I LCS 5/ 11- -6 04( b) (We st 2008 )). A clos er re ading o f the st at ut e in que st ion r evea ls tha t bot h defend ant and the maj ori ty f ocu s on t he wr ong sign; and thu s, s ec ti on 1 1-- 604 (b ) of the Code a nd i ts p rohi bi ti on on electronic speed-detec ting devi ces does n

ot even appl y he re. The trial

court properly

adm itted the radar evi

dence. Sec ti on 11--601(c) o f the C ode (625 ILCS 5/11--601(c) (West 200 8)) provides that, in an urban dis trict, the max

im um s peed lim it f or all veh ic le s i s 30 mi

le s per hour, unl ess som

e other speed
res tricti on is est ab li she d. T he map s, dia gr ams , an d p ho t o gr ap hs u po n w hic h d efe nd an t ba se s his
ar gument sh

owthat he was op er at ing his vehicle in an ur ban dist rict , w hich is defined a s "[ t ]he terri tory contiguous to an

d i n cl udi n g a n y street wh i ch i s b ui l t upwi th str uc tures dev oted to busi ness, i ndustry o r d we lling ho us es sit ua t ed at int er vals o f less t han 10 0 fe et fo r a dis t anc e o f a q ua rt er o f a
m i l e or m ore." 62 5 ILC S 5/1--2 14 (W est 200 8). Section 11-- 604(b) o f the Code pro vides, in pertinen t par t, as foll

ows:No. 2-- 09--0743

-7- "W he ne ve r an y *** ci ty *** de term

i ne s, u pon t he ba sis o f an en gin ee r ing o rt r affic invest igat ion co ncer ninga hi ghway or str eet *** that a maxi mum speed l im it prescri bed in Sec ti on 11- -60 1 ** * i s g

rea ter or les s t ha n is r ea so na ble or safe w ith r esp ect t o t he co ndit ions fou nd to exi st at any

pla ce o ralo ng an y pa r t o rzo ne o f su ch hig hw ay o rst r ee t , t he [ cit y] s ha ll determi ne an d decl are by

ordinan ce a r eas ona ble and saf

e absol ute max im um s peed lim it at
suc h place or along suc h par t or zo ne, which:

( 1) De cr ea se s t he limitwit hin an urban dis trict, but not to le ss than 20 m il es per h our; or (2) Increases the

li mi t withi n an urban di strict, but not t o more than 55 m il es per h our[.] * * * Alimit so det er mined and d eclar ed * ** be co mes effect ive, a nd su spe nd s the appl i ca ti on of th e l i m i t pres cri b ed i n Se cti on 11 --6 01 of

th i s Ch ap ter , w

h en appropri ate

signs giving no t ice o f the l i

m i t are ere cte d a t the prop er p l ac e or

al ong the prop er p art or

zon e of the h i ghway or street. E lec t r o nic spe ed- det ect ing devi ces sh all n ot be used wi

thin 500 feet beyond any

such si gn i n the direction of travel; i

f so us ed i n v i ol ati on of this Section ev

ide nce obtaine d t her eby shall be in

adm is si ble i n an y prosecuti on for speedi

ng. " (Em phasi s ad ded.) 625 IL CS 5/1 1--604 (b) (W est 200 8). The tri al cou rt sustai ne d the C i

ty's obj ec ti on to defen

dant's attempt

t o p ro ve t hat t he sign

at Da ws on Avenue reduci

ng the speed l im

it on State St reet from 35 m il es per hour (set by

the sign posted at Vale A

ven ue) to 30 mi

le s per hour was located l es s th an 500 f eet f rom the lo ca t io n o f his
ve hic le when hi

s vehi cle' s speed was measured. On appeal, defen dant relies on photog raphs, maps,No. 2-- 09--0743

-8-

and dia gr ams that w er e n o t ad mit t ed int o ev ide nc e a t t r ial. As t he majo r it y no t es , alt ho ug h it is
ax io mat ic that documents that are deh ors the record m ay not be cons i dered

on ap peal (see , e.g. , Kn app v. Bul

un , 392 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 18, 102 7-28 (2 009)), the Ci ty i ndicates tha

t i t has n o obj ec ti on to de f en da n t' s rel i an ce on th es e m ate rials. In an y ev en t, e v en i f th e fa ct s ar e as re pr ese nt ed by defend ant in t he no nr ec o r d ma t er ials , I wou l d subm i t tha t, b y i ts terms, s ec ti on

11- -60 4(b) doe s n

ot appl y h ere. Wh en a statute is cl

ear and un

am bi guous, a court mus

t give e ff ect t o t he plain and ordi

na ry meaning of

th e l an gu ag e wi th out res ort to ot her

tools of statutory constructi on. Gal l aghe

r v . Un i on Squar e Condomi

ni um Ho meow ner 's Ass'n , 397 Ill . App. 3d 1037, 104 1 ( 201 0) . S ect ion 1 1- -6 04( b) authorizesa

ci ty to al ter th e statu tory 30 -m i l e- per-h our sp ee d l i m i t i n an ur b an di str i ct. The al

tered speed li mi t t akes ef fect "wh en appropriate si

gns gi vi ng notice of the l im it are erected." 62 5 I LCS 5/ 11- -6 04( b) (Wes t 200 8) . S ect ion 1 1- -6 04( b) fur t her pr ohibit s t he us e o f elect ro nic spe ed- det ect ing devi ces wit hin50 0 f

ee t be yo nd "a ny such

sign ." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) 625 ILCS 5/1 1--604 (b) (West 2008)
. The us e o f t he ad

jec t ive "s uc h" pla inly ind ica t es t ha t t he 50 0- fo o t rule ap plie s o nly in the case of a si gn e rected to modi f y the statutory

speed l im it set forth i

n section 11--601 . I t do es no t , by it s terms, ap ply

t o s igns posting the standa rd speed l im it set by section 11--601, even

where the se cti

on 11--60 1 li mi t is a red uc ti on fr o m the s ection 11- -604(b) m odi f i ed l i m i t. A n e xa m i na ti on of se cti on 11--601 reveals no l anguage restri cting the use of electro nic speed-det ecting devi ces. Un der s ec ti on 11--601 , t he sp ee d limit at t he int er se ct io n o f E as t St at e S t r ee t an d S o ut h R o ck fo r d A ve nu e- - in an urban dis trict--was 30 mi

les per hour unless m

odifi ed by the City. Thus, the 30-mi le -per-hour sign at Da ws on A ve nu e di d n ot gi ve noti ceof a special speed l im it establ is hed by the Ci ty un der s ec ti on 11--6 04(b ); i t merel

y ga ve n ot ic e of the standard speed l im it prescri bed b y s tatut e for veh

ic le sNo. 2-- 09--0743

-9-

t ra veling in an urban dis trict. The 35-mi

le -per-hour speed-lim

it si gn at Val e Avenue was the one that modifi ed the 3 0-m i l e-per-hour s

tandard spe ed limit pr esc ribed in section 11--601 for urban districts. Defend ant 's fi

gure 3, att ached to hi s brief, m akes i t clear that he was

measu ring the dist ance fro m the 30- m i l e-p er- hou

r s i gn to the l oca ti on of his car when

hi s speed was c locked. He states on fi gure 3 at "B, " "t he inte rse ct ion [where he was when hi s speed was

cl ocked] is

therefore wel

l wi thin an area 500 feet be

yond the speed l i m i t sign ( a sig n t ha t r ed uc es t he sp ee d limit o n S t at e S t r ee t )
. " Ap pa r en t ly de f en da n t, an d t he majo r it y, t hink

tha t se cti on 1 1-- 604 (b ) prohi

bi ted the us e of the el ectronic speedde tec ti on device wit hin 500 feet of t he 30-mi le -per-hour sign

b ec au se i t red uc ed the sp ee d l i m i t f rom 35 to 30 mi

le s per hour
. Howev

er, as di scu sse d ab ove, a

cl ose readin

g of the statute makes i

t clear that t he r es t r ict io n o n e lec t r o nic de vic es is r eferen ced onl y w ith res pect to a speed-l

im it si gn that modifi es the standard speed
. The word "s uch " ref ers b ack to a s i gn, d

esc ribed in the p re ced ing sentence , that "s

uspe nds the a ppl i cation of the l i m i t prescri be d i n Se cti on 11- -601." 625 ILCS 5/11-- 604 (b) (We st 2008 ). Ac co r din gly , if the sign at

Vale ha d bee n for a 30 -mile-pe r- hou r limi t , a nd t he
one at D aw son

f or 25 m i l espe r hour, the

n b y vi rtue of the sta tutory l an gua gei n s ec ti on 11--60 4(b ), t he 500-foot st atuto ry restri ction would h ave b een appl

ic abl e to and measured f

rom the si

gn a t Daw so n. Be ca

us e th e s i gn actual l y poste d at Vale (35 m

i l es p er hour) signaled an incre ase in the stan dard speed, and the one at Dawson, a return to t he section 11--601 urban l im it (30 miles p er hour), the reduction i

tself does not render the electroni c speed-detecting-dev ic e restriction a

ppli cabl e. Ce r t ain ly if that had be en t he inte nt of t he legislat ur e, sec t ion 1 1- -6 04( b) would ha ve b een drafted di ffe r en t ly. Clear ly, the pr ot ect ion o f sect ion 1 1- -6 04( b) d oe s no t app ly here and the radar evi dence
wasadm i ssi bl e.No. 2-- 09--0743

-10-

It i s tru e th at " [a ] lite ra l inter pr et at ion [ of a st at ut e] is not co nt ro lli ng whe re t he sp irit a nd in tent of the General

Asse mbly in enacti ng a statut e are cl early

expresse d, its obj ects and purposes
areclear ly set fo rt h, an

d a l i tera l i nte rpreta ti on of a par t icular claus e wo uld d efeat t he o bviou s inte nt [ci tation ]; whe re l i

tera l en f orce men t of a s tatute

wi l l res ul t i n g rea t i njus ti cetha

t wa s n ot contem plated b y the G eneral

As sem bl y [ci tation ]; o rwh er e a lit er al int er pr et at io n w o uld le ad to an ab surd result [citat ion]." Gr ever v. B oa rd of T ru st ees of t he Illinois Municipa l Ret irement Fund , 353 I ll. App. 3d 263, 266-67 (2004). In my view, no ne o f t he se cr it er ia fo rde pa r t ing fr o m t he pla in statutory la nguage are presen

t here. De f

enda n t ar gu es t ha t t he limit at io n o n t he us e o f ele ct r o nic spe ed- det ect ingdevi ces withi n 500 feet of a speed-li

mi t sign prot ects moto rists f rom speed tr aps. Giv en a l iteral inter pr et at ion, the

sta tute s erv esthi s purp ose by pre ve nti ng l ocal govern men ts f rom set t ingup speed traps i

n a reas wh erethey

have exercised thei

r authority to establish a s peci al speed limitlower than the st atut ory li mi t. In such cases, even

consci entious m

ot orists could b e taken
unawares by the chan ge. It does

n ot n ec es sa

ri l y f oll ow, h owev er , that m

otorists are en ti tl ed to t he
sa me pr ot ect ion o n ro ads wher e t he spe ed limit is fixed at t he stan dard l ev el establ i shed b

y statute-- even if the sign postin

g the standard level

constitutes a reduction f

rom a si gn posti n g a modi f i ed l i m i t. It canbe argu ed

th at m otorists sh oul d al wa y s b e p repa

re d to s l ow th

ei r veh i cl es to th e a pp rop riate s tatutory spe ed l i m i t and ne ed n ot be af f orded 50 0 f

eet of l eewa y to do so. See 625 IL CS 5/11-
- 601(a) (West 2008) (stat in g that moto rists have a duty to decr ease the i r spe ed f rom t he po st ed limit under certain

ci rcumstances such

as when approa ch i ng i nte rs ec ti ons , cu

rv es , or hills)
. T hu s, a r ule
re gulat ing the use of el

ectronic speed-detectin

g devi ces onl y w here a spec ia

l s peed limitapplie s does not pro duce absurd results. Moreover, requirin g a poli ce off ic er to in ve stigate wh

ethe r a 30-m i l e-perhoursign i

n an urban di strict is one that represents a return to the sta nd ard l i m i t f rom a precedi ng si gnNo. 2-- 09--0743

-11-

th at modifi

ed i t would be an

undue b urden on lawenfo rc ement and inco nsist ent wit h enhanc ement of pub l i c saf ety . T he Gen

eral A ssem bl y h as not clearl

y e xpressed an

i n ten t to provide

motorists wi th 500 feet of l

eeway t o r ed uc e t he ir s pe ed in a ll ci rc um sta n ce s, an d th e G en eral A ss em b l y' s f ai l ur e to do so do es not, in m

y v ie w, result i n a great in

jus tice. Because I w ou ld co nclude t hat intr od uct ion o f the radar evidenc e wa s no t pr ohibit ed by
se cti on 11- -60 4(b), i

t i s n ot n ec es sa

ry to ad dr es s th e p ar ti es ' di spute

reg ard i ng ei the r th e l oca ti on of t he us e of the rad ar d ev i ceorthe su f f i ci en cy of t he o ffi cer 's t est imony alone t o s ust ain the spe eding
conv i cti on. I w oul d a f f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e tr i al cou rt.