alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 1 A1 07 0 . THERI AN W I M BUSH et a l . v . THE STATE.

In 2 0 1 7

, Th eri an W i m

b u s h was co n v ict ed of t h ree co u nt s o f cru el ty t o ch i l d ren

i n t h e fi rs t d eg ree an d sen ten ced t o 3 0 ye a r s t o serv e 20 y ears

. W e affi rm ed h er

co n vi ct i o n s i n 2 0 1 8

. W

i mb u s h v. St a t e

, 3 4 5 Ga. Ap p. 54 (8 1 2 SE2 d 4 8 9 ) (2 0 1 8 ). On

Decem b er 4, 20 2 0

, W i m

b us h fi l ed a “ J o in t A m en d ed N o t i ce of Ap p eal ,” s t at i n g t h at

b o t h sh e an d Ri card o W i m b u s h s e e k to ap peal t h e t ri al co urt ’ s Decem b er 4

, 2 0 1 4

o rd er d en y in g t h ei r d em an d fo r s p eed y t ri al

. 1 Becau se we hav e al read y rev i ewed t h at

o rd er, we l ack ju ri s d ict i o n t o d o s o ag ai n

.

We r e j e ct ed W i m

b us h ’ s ch al l en g e t o th e s am e t ri al co u rt o rd er in h er p ri o r

ap p eal

, W i mb u s h

, s u p ra, 3 4 5 G a. Ap p

. at 6 1-6 6 (2 ), t h us t h e cu rren t ap p eal i s b arred

b y t h e law o f t h e cas e. See Ro s s v. S t a t e

, 3 10 G a. Ap p

. 3 2 6, 3 2 7 (7 1 3 SE2 d 4 3 8 )

(2 0 1 1) (“ [A] n y i s s u e t h at w as rai s ed an d res o l ved in an earl i er ap peal i s t he l aw o f t h e

cas e an d i s b in d i n g o n t h is Co u rt

. . . .”) (p u n ct u at io n o m i t t ed ); s ee al s o Ja cks o n v.

S t a t e

, 2 7 3 Ga. 3 2 0

, 3 20 (5 4 0 SE2 d 6 1 2) (2 0 01 ) (a p art y “ i s no t en t i t l ed t o an o t h er b i t e

at t h e ap p l e b y way o f a s eco n d ap p eal ”). Co n s eq u en t l y, t h i s ap p eal i s h ereb y

DISM ISSED fo r l ack o f ju ri s d i ct i o n

.

1 Th e ord er o n ap peal n am es o n l y Th e r i a n Wi m bu s h as a defen d an t

. Ri card o

W i m b u s h i s n ei th er an at t o rn ey n o r a p art y t o th e i n s t an t ap p eal

, t h u s h e m ay n o t fi l e

an ap peal o n b eh al f o f Th eri an W i m b u sh

. April 08, 2021C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 04/08/2021
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dynacq
Healthcare, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended November 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Philip S. Chan, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                      
|--------------------------------------
|                                      
|/s/ Philip S. Chan                    
|Philip S. Chan Chief
Financial Officer

January 11, 2011
- NASA Advisory Council
- Members
- Committee Chairs
- Meetings
- Council Recommendations

# 							Committee Chairs						

						NASA Advisory Council (NAC)					

## NAC Committee Chairs

### Dr. John-Paul Clarke, Chair Aeronautics Committee

Professor and Ernest Cockrell, Jr. Memorial Chair in Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin

More About Dr. Clarke

### N. Wayne Hale, Chair Human Exploration and Operations Committee

​NASA (Ret.), Consultant, Special Aerospace Services

More About N. Wayne Hale

### Dr. Ellen Williams, Chair Science Committee

 Distinguished University Professor and Director, Earth Systems Science Interdisciplinary Center, University of Maryland

More About Dr. Williams

### Daniel L. Dumbacher, Chair STEM Engagement Committee

Executive Director, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)

More About Daniel Dumbacher

### Michael Johns, Chair Technology, Innovation and Engineering Committee

Senior Vice President, Kratos SRE

More About Michael Johns

## Discover More Topics From NASA

Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
Space Technology Mission Directorate
Space Technology Mission Directorate. Technology drives exploration and the space economy.

Space Operations Mission Directorate

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
Exhibit 32





Certifications Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Guggenheim Credit Income Fund 2016 T on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"), each of the undersigned officers of Guggenheim Credit Income Fund 2016 T , does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's knowledge and belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended, that:


|   |                                                                                                                                         
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

|   |                                                                                                                                                                                    
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofGuggenheim Credit Income Fund 2016 T.

Date:March 14, 2018/s/ Matthew S. BloomMATTHEW S. BLOOMChief Executive OfficerDate:March 14, 2018/s/ Paul S. Saint-PierrePAUL S. SAINT-PIERREChief Financial Officer
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 25, 2009 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

A. BURNS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 09-5091 (D.C. No. 09-CV-00271-GKF-PJC) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , BRISCOE , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant A. Burns is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). “[I]n order to succeed on a motion to proceed IFP, the movant must show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees, as well as the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts.” Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury , 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005). We review the district court’s- 2 - denial of leave to proceed IFP for abuse of discretion. Id. The district court below denied leave to proceed IFP on the basis that Mr. Burns has $3,000 in his checking account. R. Doc. 7. Mr. Burns now appeals the district court’s order. R. Doc. 9. In his financial disclosure to this court, Mr. Burns has not shown that he is unable to pay the fees relating to his suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Rather, as the district court noted, Mr. Burns’ own financial disclosure form shows that he has funds available to pay the necessary fees. Mr. Burns has given us no indication why the district court’s determination that he is able to pay was incorrect, let alone an abuse of discretion. Further, we note that Mr. Burns does not appear to advance a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument,” as he must in order to proceed IFP. See Lister , 408 F.3d at 1312. Accordingly, Mr. Burns’ motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                            1623
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                            9325
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 17000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     187719
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         298556
<ALLOWANCE>                                       1267
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  544052
<DEPOSITS>                                      343160
<SHORT-TERM>                                     25000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                504
<LONG-TERM>                                     134384
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            23
<OTHER-SE>                                       38722
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  544052
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                   5804
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                 2168
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   552
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                  8524
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                3872
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                6146
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                             2378
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       45
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                    147
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    846
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         846
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       548
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .23
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.78
<LOANS-NON>                                         55
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                     55
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                  1222
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                 1267
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                              1267
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Cox *v.*Kirkpatrick.

In a declaration for malicious prosecution, an allegation that the defendant “falsely and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, charged the plaintiff with having feloniously stolen a certain horse of the defendant’s,” is sufficient to show that the crime of larceny was imputed to the ‘ plaintiff, and that the justice before whom the charge was made, was authorized to issue a warrant against him.

APPEAL from the *Tippecanoe*Circuit Court.

Dewey, J.

This was an action for a malicious prosecution. General demurrer to the declaration sustained, and judgment for the defendant.

The only part of the declaration objected to is that which alleges the manner of laying the complaint against the plaintiff before the justice. It is as follows, that the defendant “falsely and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, charged the said plaintiff with having feloniously stolen a certain horse of the defendant’s.”

It is contended the charge does not describe any criminal offence, and did not authorize the justice to issue a warrant, and that therefore the action cannot be sustained.

There is no foundation for the objection. The crime of larceny is substantially described and imputed to the plaintiff. The technicalities in describing the offence, which would be requisite in an indictment, are not necessary in a complaint laid before a justice of the peace, for the purpose *38of procuring the arrest of the accused person. This is shown .by a reference to the books of forms and reported cases, which fully sustain the form of the complaint in this case. 2 Chitt. Pl. 607. — 2 Chitt. Pr. *568.*— Tempest v. *Chambers,*1 Stark. R. *67.*— Davis v. *Noak, Id. 377.*— Elsee v. *Smith,*1 D. & R. 97. The case last cited not only sanctions a more general description of the offence than that contained in the record, but seems to establish the doctrine, that if a magistrate illegally ^rant a warrant upon an insufficient complaint, an action will lie against the person who procures the warrant, if his charge be maliciously made, and without reasonable or probable cause. We have, however, no occasion to settle that point at present, as we conceive the charge as above stated to be sufficient to authorize the warrant and arrest. The demurrer should have been overruled.

*D. Mace*and *A. M. Crane,*for the appellant.

*R. C. Gregory,*for the appellee.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
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#### STEPHEN GIDDIO, ET UX. v. LINCROFT INN, INC.

May 19, 1987.

Petition for certification denied.
#### The State *v.*M’Whinney.

It is not material' to the offence of failing to file a certificate of the solemnization of a marriage, &c., that a marriage license should have issued.

*Tuesday, July*28.

ERROR to the *Wayne*Circuit Court.

*W. J.*Peasley,'for the state.

*J. S. Newman,*for the defendant.

Blackford, J.

Indictment against a justice of the peace for not filing a certificate of the solemnization of a marriage, &c. The Circuit Court, on the defendant’s motion, quashed the indictment.

. Two objections are made to the indictment. 1. It'does not state that the marriage license was sealed; 2. It does not give the name of the clerk who issued the license.

These objections are not well founded. The offence is for not filing in the clerk’s office a certificate of the solemnization of the marriage,, within the proper time. It is riot material to the offence; that a license should have.issued.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
Document

LIMITED WAIVER OF BASE SALARY AGREEMENT
This Limited Waiver of Base Salary Agreement (this “Agreement”) is entered into as of this 25th day of March 2020 by and between Liquidity Services, Inc. (the “Corporation”), and the undersigned executive officer of the Corporation (the “Executive”).
WHEREAS, the Corporation is taking numerous proactive steps to mitigate the negative financial and operational impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic;
WHEREAS, these business contingency plans include, among other steps, implementing remote and virtual work plans, cancelling non-essential travel and spending, reducing the pay of employees, shortening work weeks, and furloughs; 
WHEREAS, the undersigned Executive and the Corporation have entered into an Executive Employment Agreement; and
WHEREAS, the undersigned Executive has voluntarily agreed to allow the Corporation to reduce his prorated monthly base salary by Fifty Percent (50%) for the period of time from April 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020 (the “Covered Period”).
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Corporation and the Executive agree to the following:
1.  Term. This Agreement shall be in force and effective throughout the Covered Period.
2.  Reduced Base Salary During the Covered Period. The Executive hereby voluntarily agrees to the Corporation reducing his prorated monthly base salary by Fifty Percent (50%) for the Covered Period.  Such a reduction shall not be deemed a breach of Executive’s Executive Employment Agreement.  Executive and the Corporation further agree that the foregoing does not lower base salary for any other purpose under Executive’s Executive Employment Agreement with the Corporation, including, without limitation, the calculation of any severance payment in the event of a termination.
3.  Miscellaneous. To the extent not subject to federal law, this Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties and each of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns. This Agreement is not intended to amend or otherwise change or modify the terms of Executive’s Executive Employment Agreement with the Corporation except as expressly set forth herein.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation and the Executive have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.








																					
							
	EXECUTIVE				LIQUIDITY SERVICES, INC.		
							
	/s/ Mike Lutz
						
	

Name: Mike Lutz                     _____________
				By:		/s/ William P. Angrick, III

				



		 William P. Angrick, III
 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 10.25

                          BUSINESS CONSULTING AGREEMENT


     Agreement  made this 21st day of  February,  2001 by and between  Digi Link
Technologies, Inc, having its principal office at 75 Lincoln Highway, Iselin, NJ
08830 (hereinafter  "Client"),  and Ronald Pilatsky having his office at 143 Bay
20th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11214 (hereinafter "Consultant").

     WHEREAS,   the  business  of  the   Consultant  is  to  advise  and  assist
corporations or other business entities with regard to certain business matters,
and

     WHEREAS, the Client desires to retain the services of a business consultant
in regard to a proposed venture project.

     IT IS HEREBY agreed as follows:

     1. Retention: Client retains Consultant to advise and assist it.

     2. Term of Agreement: The term shall be for the term of one year.

     3.  Compensation  - The  Consultant  shall  receive  as a fee an  option to
purchase  200,000  shares of common stock at the  purchase  equal to the closing
price of the shares on February 21, 2001.

     4.  Non-Affiliation:  Nothing  herein  shall be  construed  as  creating  a
relationship of partners,  joint ventures or other such or similar  relationship
between the parties hereto.

     5.  Confidentiality:  In the  course  of the  performance  of  Consultant's
duties,  it is expected that  Consultant  will receive  information  that may be
considered  material  inside  information.  Consultant  will not  disclose  this
information  to others except as authorized by Client and necessary in order for
Consultant  to  perform  its  duties and  comply  with such  Federal,  State and
Municipal laws, rules and regulations or other regulatory body.

     6. Entire  Understanding:  This Agreement contains the entire understanding
between the parties and may not be modified  except in writing and signed by the
parties hereto.

     7. Notices:  All notices  required  under this  Agreement  shall be sent by
registered or certified mail, return receipt  requested,  addressed as set forth
herein or to such other address as the parties may have notice.

                                       79
<PAGE>

     8.  Governing  Law:  This  Agreement  shall be governed by and construed in
accordance  with the laws of the State of New Jersey  and to which  jurisdiction
the parties hereto consent for the adjudication of all disputes.

     9.  Signatures:  Signatures  transmitted  by  facsimile  shall  be  legally
binding.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date
first above written.


                                                Digi Link Technologies, Inc.


By: /s/: Ronald Pilatsky                        By: /s/: Peter Jegou
------------------------                        --------------------------------
         Ronald Pilatsky                                 Peter Jegou, President

                                       80
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 20770 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

MICHAEL ALLEN HEAVIN ,
Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:19

- CR

- 760

- 1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Michael Allen
Heavin has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Heavin h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed
counsel’s brief and the rel evant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set f orth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 15, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-20770 Document: 00515418585 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2020No. 19

- 20770

2 issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further respo nsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 19-20770 Document: 00515418585 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/15/2020