J-S10034-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICHARD ALAN BROADUS JR.

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 652 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 1, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000006-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: June 14, 2024

Richard Alan Broadus, Jr. (“Broadus”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his negotiated guilty plea to possession with intent 

to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

We briefly summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows. On September 1, 2021, the trial court accepted Broadus’ 

negotiated guilty plea to PWID based on his arrest for delivering 5,027 stamp 

bags of fentanyl, weighing 98.6 grams, to a confidential informant. See N.T. 

9/1/21, at 2-17. Further, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse all 

remaining charges. Id. at 3, 17. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial 

court sentenced Broadus to three to six years of imprisonment with credit for 

time served. Id. at 32-33. The trial court found that Broadus was ineligible 

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1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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for both the Recidivism Risk Reduction Initiative2 (“RRRI”) and the State Drug 

Treatment Program3 (“SDTP”). Id. at 20-32.

Broadus did not file a post-sentence motion or appeal the sentencing 

order. However, Broadus filed petitions pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”)4in which he claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a post-sentence motion and sought reinstatement of his post-sentence 

and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court granted the requested 

relief and reinstated Broadus’ post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc pro 

tunc. On January 27, 2023, Broadus timely filed a post-sentence motion 

challenging the denial of RRRI and SDTP. See Broadus’ Post-Sentence Motion, 

1/27/23, at 5. The trial court denied the motion on May 8, 2023. See Trial 

Court Order, 5/8/23. Thereafter, Broadus filed a timely notice of appeal 

expressly appealing the trial court’s May 8, 2023 order, and the trial court 

ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal. Broadus complied, and in his concise statement he raised the 

following claim of error: “The PCRA court erred in denying relief where trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions and a direct 

appeal to challenge the legality of Broadus’s sentence, where he is eligible for 

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2 See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4504.

3 See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4105.

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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RRRI and SDTP.” Concise Statement, 7/5/23, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

In his appellate brief, however, Broadus frames his issue on appeal as 

follows: “The trial court erred in denying the post-sentence motion because 

Broadus was eligible for RRRI and SDTP.” Broadus’ Brief at 5 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

Preliminarily, we must determine whether Broadus preserved his issue 

for our review. Generally, when a trial court directs a defendant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b), 

any issues not raised in that statement will are waived. See Commonwealth

v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(vii)

(providing that “issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived”). 

However, a challenge which implicates the legality of an appellant’s sentence

is an exception to the issue preservation requirement. See Commonwealth 

v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 2022) (holding that “an appellate court

can address an appellant’s challenge to the legality of his sentence even if that

issue was not preserved in the trial court; indeed, an appellate court may

[even] raise and address such an issue sua sponte”).

In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Broadus frames his issue as one of

ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failure to file a post-sentence motion

challenging the trial court’s denial of eligibility under RRRI and SDTP. Clearly,

Broadus’ issue was improperly framed in the Rule 1925(b) statement, as he
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successfully sought PCRA relief in the form of reinstatement of his postsentence and appeal rights and, therefore, was no longer claiming

ineffectiveness of counsel. Instead, although not indicated in his concise

statement, Broadus intended to appeal the trial court’s denial of his postsentence motion in which he specifically argued that his sentence should be

modified to make him eligible under both RRRI and SDTP.

This omission was noted by the trial court, which observed in its Rule

1925(a) opinion that the only error raised in Broadus’ concise statement

“directly implicates the [trial c]ourt’s January 20, 2023 [order granting PCRA

relief and reinstating Broadus’ post-sentence and appeal rights] from which

no appeal was taken.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/23, at 3-4. Nevertheless, the

trial court went on to address the merits of the issue that Broadus intended

to raise, i.e., whether he “was ineligible for either RRRI or SDTP at the time

of sentence.” Id. at 3-4.

Although the issue was incorrectly framed by counsel in the Rule

1925(b) statement, the trial court was able to ascertain the issue being raised

by Broadus in the appeal from the denial of his post-sentence motion and

rendered an opinion addressing the merits of the issue. Hence, appellate

review has not been hindered in this case and we shall address the merits of

Broadus’ SDTP sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d

1209, 1225 (Pa. 2021) (holding that appellant’s claim as set forth in the

concise statement, although brief, represented a good-faith attempt to comply
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with Rule 1925 and did not prevent meaningful appellate review; thus, the

Superior Court should have considered merits of the issue since the purpose

of a concise statement “is to assist the trial judge in apprehending the issues

and authoring an opinion accordingly for the benefit of the parties, the

appellate court, and the public”).

Broadus’ claim that the trial court erred in not making him eligible for 

participation in SDTP presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. However, because Broadus pled guilty, we must examine the effect 

of his guilty plea upon his discretionary sentencing claim. “Generally, a plea 

of guilty amounts to a waiver of all defects and defenses except those 

concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the sentence, and the 

validity of the guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 

(Pa. Super. 1991) (citations omitted). It is well-settled when the plea 

agreement contains a negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by 

the sentencing court, there is no authority to permit a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence. Id. If either party to a negotiated plea 

agreement believed the other side could, at any time following entry of 

sentence, approach the judge and have a sentence unilaterally altered, neither 

the Commonwealth nor any defendant would be willing to enter into such an 

agreement. Id. Permitting a discretionary appeal following the entry of a 

negotiated plea would undermine the designs and goals of plea bargaining and 

would make a sham of the negotiated plea process. Id.
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In the instant case, Broadus agreed to plead guilty to possession with 

intent to deliver a controlled substance in exchange for a sentence of three to 

six years’ incarceration followed by a term of probation to be set by the trial 

court. See N.T., 9/1/21, at 2-3. Broadus now takes issue with this sentence 

by arguing that the trial court erred by imposing “a sentence of total 

confinement, which was unduly excessive and harsh, by focusing solely on the 

seriousness of the crime, without consideration [of] Broadus’ unique 

circumstances and rehabilitative needs”. Broadus’ Brief at 8. However, 

Broadus agreed to the terms of his guilty plea, including the specific duration 

of the sentence which he now claims was “unduly excessive and harsh.” After 

accepting Broadus’ plea, the trial court sentenced him to the agreed-upon 

sentence. See N.T., 9/1/21, at 32. Broadus did not challenge the validity of 

the plea proceedings or move to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, Broadus 

waived his discretionary sentencing claim. See Reichle, 589 A.2d at 1141.5

We next address Broadus’ challenge relative to the trial court’s failure 

to apply a RRRI minimum presents a non-waivable illegal sentencing claim. 

See Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 249 A.3d 903, 908 (Pa. 2021); see also 

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5 Even if the issue were not waived, the able trial court correctly determined 

that Broadus was ineligible for participation in SDTP. See Trial Court Opinion, 

8/7/23 at 4-5 (Finding that the unambiguous language of the SDTP statute 

provides that “[t]he judge shall exclude the person from eligibility if the 

prosecuting attorney opposed eligibility”, 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 4104(a)(1); the 

Commonwealth opposed Broadus’ entry into the SDTP at the time of 

sentencing; and Broadus was statutorily ineligible based on prior and current 

convictions for drug trafficking as defined in 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 4103).
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Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663, 670 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that 

a challenge to a court’s failure to impose an RRRI sentence implicates the 

legality of the sentence and cannot be waived). Therefore, we may address 

Broadus’ claim that the trial court erred in denying a RRRI minimum sentence.

This Court’s standard of review when reviewing an illegal sentencing 

claims is well-settled. Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are 

questions of law, as are claims raising a court’s interpretation of a statute. 

See Commonwealth v. Ausberry, 891 A.2d 752, 754 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Diamond, 945 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

The RRRI Act, set forth at 61 Pa.C.S.A §§ 4501, et seq.(“RRRI Act”), 

provides for a reduced RRRI minimum sentence for certain eligible offenders, 

and states, in relevant part, as follows:

This chapter seeks to create a program that ensures appropriate 

punishment for persons who commit crimes, encourages inmate 

participation in evidence-based programs that reduce the risks of 

future crime and ensures the openness and accountability of the 

criminal justice process while ensuring fairness to crime victims.

61 Pa.C.S.A § 4502; see also Commonwealth v. Chester, 101 A.3d 56, 57 

(Pa. 2014).6

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6 Although Broadus plead guilty and received a negotiated sentence in this 

case, he was still potentially eligible for an RRRI sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 7 A.3d 868, 875 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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“At the time of sentencing, the court shall make a determination 

whether the defendant is an eligible offender.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(a). If 

the defendant is an eligible offender, then the sentencing court is to impose 

an RRRI minimum sentence, which is a fraction of the ordinary minimum 

sentence. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c).

In order to be eligible for an RRRI minimum sentence, the RRRI Act 

provides that a defendant must satisfy each of the following requirements. 

Specifically, a defendant must establish that he:

(1) Does not demonstrate a history of present or past violent 

behavior.

(2) Has not been subject to a sentence the calculation of which 

includes an enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon . . . or 

was convicted of an offense involving a deadly weapon . . ..

(3) Has not been found guilty of or previously convicted of 

. . . a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9714(g) . . . 

(4) Has not been found guilty or previously convicted or 

adjudicated delinquent for violating any of the following . . 

. 

* * * *

Drug trafficking as defined in section 4103 (relating to 

definitions).

(5) Is not awaiting trial or sentencing for additional criminal 

charges, if a conviction or sentence on the additional charges 

would cause the defendant to become ineligible under this 

definition.

61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503 (emphasis added).
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The definition of a “crime of violence” includes robbery. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(g). The definition of “drug trafficking” includes convictions 

for PWID, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), where the controlled substance in 

question is more than ten grams of fentanyl. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103.

Broadus argues that his 2004 robbery conviction, his 1995 firearm 

conviction, and his instant PWID conviction do not disqualify him from 

eligibility for an RRRI minimum sentence. See Broadus’ Brief at 23-24. 

Broadus asserts that “relying upon decades old convictions contravenes the 

spirit and purpose behind the implementation of RRRI minimum sentences, 

when an individual has not exhibited violent conduct for decades.” Id. at 24-

25. Therefore, Broadus argues that he is eligible for an RRRI minimum 

sentence and should be resentenced accordingly.

In its opinion, the trial court concluded that Broadus’ undisputed prior 

conviction for robbery made him ineligible for RRRI because it is a personal 

injury crime and therefore violates eligibility criterion of section 4503(3). See 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/23, at 6. Furthermore, the trial court found that 

Broadus’ instant conviction for PWID constitutes a drug trafficking offense, 

violating the eligibility criteria under section 4503(4). Id.

We find Broadus’ arguments unconvincing for several reasons. Broadus’ 

current conviction for PWID, involving over ninety grams of fentanyl, and his 

past conviction for robbery disqualify him from eligibility to receive an RRRI 

minimum sentence pursuant to section 4503(3) and (4). See 42 Pa.C.S.A § 
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9714(g) (defining robbery as a “crime of violence”); see also 61 Pa.C.S.A § 

4103 (defining “drug trafficking” as including convictions for possession with 

intent to deliver more than ten grams of fentanyl). Broadus’ appeal to the 

spirit of the law fails in light of the plain wording of the statute, which does 

not include a time limit for past convictions. Furthermore, Broadus does not 

dispute that his current conviction for PWID, standing alone, makes him 

ineligible for RRRI independently of his past conviction for a crime of violence.

Accordingly, as Broadus was not RRRI eligible, his illegal sentencing 

claim merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 06/14/2024