Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Murillo v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143002

Appellate Court 

Caption

ARCADIA MURILLO, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant and CrossAppellee.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-14-3002

Filed August 2, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 10-CH-36826; the 

Hon. Patrick F. Lustig, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Stephen R. Patton, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth 

Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Jonathon D. Byrer, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.

Matthew J. Piers, Joshua Karsh, and Christopher J. Wilmes, all of 

Hughes Socol Piers Renick & Dym, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Neville and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 This case asks us to interpret a section of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 

5/2-103(A) (West 2014)) that prohibits employers from “[using] the fact of an arrest” as a basis 

to discriminate in employment. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff Arcadia Murillo, after about three years working as a janitor at a Chicago police 

station, was required to submit to a background check to keep her job. The background check 

revealed a 1999 arrest for a drug charge, which had been dismissed for lack of probable cause. 

The City of Chicago (City), however, refused to give Murillo security clearance, and 

eventually she was fired. The trial court held the City violated the Act by using the fact of 

Murillo’s arrest to alter the terms of her employment. 

¶ 3 We affirm; the City did indeed use the fact of Murillo’s arrest in violation of the Act. 

Further, we remand to the trial court (i) to reexamine the reductions of time spent by Murillo’s 

attorneys on the case and give reasons for any reductions, (ii) to adjust the fee calculation in 

light of the attorneys’ hourly rates, and (iii) to determine additional fees (and costs) for 

defending this appeal and the City’s section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)) petition. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On February 5, 1999, police officers spotted a man outside The Friendly Tap, a Chicago 

bar. The man was carrying drugs, and the police arrested him. The police then went inside the 

bar to inspect the premises and saw a clear plastic bag hanging from the rafters. The bag 

contained individual bags of cocaine, and the police arrested the bartender, Arcadia Murillo. 

¶ 6 The arrest report cited Murillo for possession of a controlled substance and “illegal conduct 

on premises” (a municipal offense). The report stated that “above arrested in that she was a 

bartender at the Friendly Tap, a licensed premise in which was found a quantity of a controlled 

substance, cocaine. The above was in actual control of the premises at the time of the 

violation.” The officers’ “case report” contained slightly more detail about the man arrested 

outside the bar but did not give any details of Murillo’s conduct during this incident, simply 

stating that “the bartender [Murillo] was placed into custody and read rights per [Miranda].” 

The trial judge promptly dismissed the charges against Murillo for lack of probable cause. 

¶ 7 In 2006, Murillo got a job with a contractor as a janitor at the first district station of the 

Chicago police department. Murillo continued this employment without incident until Triad 

Consulting Services (Triad) took over the contract to clean city facilities. The City asked Triad 

to submit its employees for background checks so that each employee could be issued a 

security badge. 

¶ 8 The Chicago police fingerprinted Murillo in January 2009, and the check of criminal 

records revealed her 1999 arrest. Police sergeant Raymond Gawne conducted the background 

checks and obtained state and FBI records related to a person’s fingerprints. This “criminal 

history report” reflected Murillo’s 1999 arrest (for possession of a controlled substance and 

failing to “cooperate with police re illegal activity in licensed premise”) and that the case had 

been dismissed for lack of probable cause. Gawne retrieved the abstract of Murillo’s arrest 

report (which contained the same information as the original report but without the arresting 

officer’s signature) and the case report. 
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¶ 9 When asked what made Gawne believe that Murillo had engaged in criminal conduct, he 

responded, “There is possession of a controlled substance *** according to the arrest report, 

and I believe there’s some additional information in the case report ***. [She] was a bartender 

and was aware of the trafficking that was going on and then refused to cooperate in the 

investigation.” Gawne did not recall the nature of this “additional information.” Gawne also 

did not recall trying to contact the officers who arrested Murillo or consulting with anyone. 

When asked why he denied Murillo clearance, Gawne responded “based on the fact that there 

was possession of a controlled substance and a refusal to cooperate with the police in the 

investigation.” 

¶ 10 Murillo’s supervisor from Triad told her that the police had said that Murillo could no 

longer work at the police facility. The police would not give Murillo’s supervisor any 

information as to why, and Murillo was terminated on February 10, 2009. 

¶ 11 On August 25, 2010, Murillo filed suit against Triad and the City. She alleged that the City 

coerced or compelled Triad to segregate or terminate Murillo’s employment based on the fact 

of her arrest. Murillo alleged that this violated the Act, which prevented employers from using 

the “fact of an arrest” as a basis to discriminate in employment.

¶ 12 In 2011, Triad settled with Murillo by giving her back her job; in exchange, Murillo agreed 

to dismiss her claims against Triad with prejudice. Murillo was again assigned to the first 

district police station. 

¶ 13 Murillo moved for partial summary judgment, and the trial court granted Murillo’s motion. 

The court found that the City had caused Triad to change the terms and conditions of her 

employment by removing her from the police station. Sergeant Gawne had only relied on the 

arrest report in preventing Murillo from getting a security badge to clean. The trial court 

transferred the case for jury trial to assess damages for the terms-and-conditions claim and to 

determine liability on whether the City coerced Triad to either segregate or terminate Murillo 

based on the fact of the arrest. Murillo prevailed at trial, and the jury awarded her damages for 

lost wages, pension benefits, and emotional distress in the sum of $87,227.75. 

¶ 14 Following trial, Murillo’s attorneys filed an extensively documented motion for attorney 

fees, asking for a total of $300,497.50. The trial court reviewed the memoranda of both 

plaintiff and the City and decided $320 to be a fair and reasonable hourly billing rate for 

Wilmes (the lead attorney) and reduced the rate of two senior attorneys, Karsh and Piers, to 

$320, saying that they were not entitled to any more than Wilmes and had no particular 

expertise warranting a higher rate. The remaining attorneys were granted a rate of $250 per 

hour, and the paralegals were granted a rate of $125 per hour. 

¶ 15 The court also, and appropriately, reviewed the billing entries of all the work performed by 

Murillo’s counsel and deleted or reduced time billed that “appeared to be excessive time for the 

task, duplicative, or unnecessary” but otherwise gave no specifics. The trial court granted 

additional fees of $15,661.17 for responding to the City’s posttrial motion, applying the same 

hourly rate to each attorney and reducing hours “for matters that again appeared to be too much 

time for a task, duplicative, or unnecessary for some internal conferences or advising the status 

of the case to the client, delivery of courtesy copies, things of that nature, that would be 

overhead items.” The trial court awarded $183,796.83, which included work on the fee 

petition. 

¶ 16 The trial court awarded costs of $11,208.10 and prejudgment interest of 6% on the award 

of back pay and pension to Murillo. On September 26, 2014, the City filed a notice of appeal; 
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Murillo filed a cross-appeal on October 7, 2014. 

¶ 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶ 18 We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Argonaut Midwest 

Insurance Co. v. Morales, 2014 IL App (1st) 130745, ¶ 14. Summary judgment may be 

granted where there is no triable issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). Genuine issues of material fact exist 

where the material facts are disputed or, if undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different 

inferences from those facts. Argonaut Midwest Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (1st) 130745, ¶ 14. 

¶ 19 We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Richardson v. Haddon, 375 

Ill. App. 3d 312, 314-15 (2007). 

¶ 20 ANALYSIS 

¶ 21 The Trial Court’s Grant of Partial Summary Judgment

¶ 22 The Act prohibits employers from “[using] the fact of an arrest” as a basis to discriminate 

in employment. 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A) (West 2014). The next section of the Act backtracks 

slightly by allowing employers to “[obtain] or [use] other information which indicates that a 

person actually engaged in the conduct for which he or she was arrested.” 775 ILCS 

5/2-103(B) (West 2014). 

¶ 23 The City argues that Sergeant Gawne’s use of the arrest reports was permissible under 

subsection (B) because those reports were “other information” and indicated that Murillo 

“actually engaged in the conduct” for which she was arrested. Therefore, according to the City, 

the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment. Murillo counters that subsection (B) 

required Sergeant Gawne to investigate Murillo’s arrest beyond the bare police reports to 

determine whether Murillo actually committed the crimes and, because Sergeant Gawne did 

not do so, the City’s actions against her were based only on the fact of her arrest and violated 

subsection (A). 

¶ 24 We strive to carry out legislative intent as embodied in a statute’s plain language. In re 

A.A., 2015 IL 118605, ¶ 21. We give undefined statutory words their natural and ordinary 

meaning. People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, ¶ 13. The word “indicate” means “to 

serve as a sign, symptom, or token of; signify.” American Heritage Dictionary 892 (4th ed. 

2006). The main problem with Sergeant Gawne’s use of the arrest reports was that these 

reports did not actually “indicate” or “serve as a sign” that Murillo possessed the drugs or 

committed any municipal offense (either illegal conduct on the premises or failure to cooperate 

with police investigating that conduct). The evidence shows that the City had to be relying on 

the “fact of the arrest” because there was nothing else on which it could rely. While the word 

“indicate” in subsection (B) does not mean “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”; it equally does 

not mean “unsupported assumption of guilt.” 

¶ 25 Murillo’s arrest records (the original arrest report, the “case report,” and the “criminal 

history report”) provide no information she actually engaged in criminal conduct. Nothing in 

the arrest records shows she failed to cooperate with police, other than the fact that the criminal 

history report listed one of the charges as failing to cooperate with police. The City alleges that 

Murillo violated the municipal code, which prohibits a bar employee from “allow[ing] any 

illegal activity on the licensed premises” and requires such employees to report promptly any 
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illegal activity. Chicago Municipal Code § 4-60-141 (added May 17, 1995). But the arrest 

report does not tell us whether Murillo was “allowing” sales of drugs or not reporting it—the 

report does not describe Murillo doing, or failing to do, anything at all. As for the possession 

charge, the arrest report merely stated that Murillo was in physical proximity to some narcotics 

at her place of employment; there was no statement from her, no physical evidence, and no 

witness statements. On finding the drugs, the arresting officers apparently proceeded on the 

theory that Murillo must be guilty because she was tending the bar. That conjecture was so 

weak and unsupported that the criminal court judge dismissed the charges as lacking in 

probable cause. 

¶ 26 Gawne’s deposition testimony reveals that he concluded that Murillo actually had 

committed these offenses because she had been arrested for them. When asked why he denied 

Murillo a security clearance, he recited the charges against her: “there was possession of a 

controlled substance and a refusal to cooperate with the police in the investigation.” The 

outcome of the criminal charges—outright dismissal for lack of probable cause—should have 

raised immediate doubts on Gawne’s part. And this information appeared on the first page of 

her criminal history report. Gawne’s use of the arrest report was not permissible under 

subsection (B) because it did not “indicate” Murillo actually committed the offenses, only the 

fact of her arrest. 

¶ 27 This is not to say that an arrest report could never qualify as “other information,” because 

an arrest report can include a wealth of detail on which an employer might rely. For example, 

the arrest report here could have included Murillo’s confession to possessing the drugs, 

statements from witnesses that they had purchased drugs from Murillo, or a police officer’s 

description of seeing Murillo holding or selling the drugs. This information could be 

sufficiently persuasive to “indicate” that the person actually engaged in the conduct for which 

he or she was arrested. 

¶ 28 Nor does the statute prevent an employer from firing employees who were arrested even 

though their actions did not result in a legal penalty. A person could be arrested for criminal 

conduct without the State pursuing a criminal case against them, such as when a victim refuses 

to testify against a defendant or inculpatory evidence is suppressed. Certainly, an employer 

might gather sufficient “other information” indicating a person actually committed a crime 

even though they were never formally charged or convicted. See, e.g., Decatur Police 

Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Labor Committee v. City of Decatur, 2012 IL App (4th) 

110764, ¶ 35 (employer did not rely only on fact of arrest for domestic violence where 

arbitrator found by preponderance of evidence that event occurred); Sroga v. Personnel Board, 

359 Ill. App. 3d 107, 114 (2005) (permissible for employer to disqualify employee based on 

employee’s confession to law enforcement about employee’s conduct). 

¶ 29 Both parties have argued that the legislative history supports their position. But the plain 

language establishes the legislative intent—that the Act protects a person whose arrest is not an 

accurate signifier of their character or potential, who was arrested without probable cause or 

was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. See In re C.R.M., 372 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734 

(2007) (legislature intended section 2-103(A) to “prevent an inquiry into mere charges or 

allegations of criminal behavior” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A well-meaning police 

officer can mistakenly arrest an innocent—but that innocent should not suffer the 

consequences of the mistake. Those consequences can be dire, as here for Murillo. See Utah v. 

Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (once 
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arrested, “[e]ven if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million Americans with an arrest 

record and experience the ‘civil death’ of discrimination by employers, landlords, and whoever 

else conducts a background check”). Because the evidence shows that Sergeant Gawne used 

the fact of Murillo’s arrest to deny her a security clearance, causing Triad to change the terms 

of her employment, the trial court did not err in granting Murillo partial summary judgment. 

¶ 30 Attorney Fees 

¶ 31 Both parties challenge the trial court’s award of attorney fees. The State argues that the 

assessed attorney fees are too high; Murillo contends that they are too low. Both parties urge us 

to remand to the trial court for further explanation of its decision. We agree in part; the trial 

court did not sufficiently explain its rationale as to the reductions in time. Richardson v. 

Haddon, 375 Ill. App. 3d 312, 314-15 (2007) (trial court should explain why it is reducing the 

amount from what was requested in a fee petition). 

¶ 32 As to billing entries, the trial court deleted time it considered “excessive ***, duplicative, 

or unnecessary” but did not specify which entries it was deleting. Trial courts may not 

arbitrarily reduce time; reductions require “a clear and concise explanation.” Advocate Health 

& Hospitals Corp. v. Heber, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1078-79 (2005). The trial court did not 

provide this, and the parties should not need to divine the trial court’s reasoning. We remand 

for the trial court to reconsider its reductions and enumerate reasons for a general percentage 

reduction or specific adjustments and write-offs. Wendy & William Spatz Charitable 

Foundation v. 2263 North Lincoln Corp., 2013 IL App (1st) 122076, ¶ 42.

¶ 33 Courts expect attorneys in fee-shifting cases to voluntarily exercise billing judgment, as 

attorneys are prohibited from charging unreasonable fees. Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) 

R. 1.5(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“In the 

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an important component in fee setting.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.)). Prudent billing judgment involves writing off or adjusting “excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” time. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Attorneys should inform 

the court by affidavit that they exercised billing judgment as well as how and in what amounts. 

On remand, the trial court should take into account whether Murillo’s attorneys exercised such 

judgment. 

¶ 34 Further, the trial court granted Wilmes his requested billing rate (at the 2013 rate) but 

reduced that of others with a meager explanation. The trial court abused its discretion in 

reducing those rates in an arbitrary fashion. Along with the time sheets for work on Murillo’s 

case showing the hours expended and type of work done, Murillo’s attorneys submitted billing 

records showing rates charged to clients and individual affidavits explaining why their 

experience entitled them to their requested rates. Further, they submitted affidavits from local 

civil rights attorneys explaining the market rate for this kind of work. Precisely the type of 

evidence needed for a trial court to decide whether requested rates are reasonable. See Palm v. 

2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 401 Ill. App. 3d 868, 880 (2010) (in addition to 

services performed and amount of time expended, trial court should also consider skill and 

standing of attorney and “the usual and customary charges for comparable services”). In 

arguing against granting those rates, the City did not submit evidence to the contrary. 

¶ 35 In reducing Karsh’s and Piers’ rates, the trial court said only that they had not done 

anything entitling them to a higher rate and did not have any more expertise than Wilmes. This 

is contrary to the record evidence showing that both had been practicing law for a considerably 
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longer time than Wilmes and had much more experience litigating civil rights cases in 

Chicago. We expect attorneys to staff cases efficiently, but we also expect a more junior 

attorney to take advantage of the knowledge and skills of his or her superiors, even if their time 

costs more money. The rates should reflect these differences. See Verbaere v. Life Investors 

Insurance Co. of America, 226 Ill. App. 3d 289, 300 (1992) (“Certainly, a senior partner and a 

new associate would not be billed out at the same hourly rate.”). As for the other six attorneys 

(who spent much smaller amounts of time on Murillo’s case), the trial court did not explain 

why it was reducing their rates to $250 per hour. Again, absent evidence to the contrary, it was 

an abuse of discretion for the trial court to arbitrarily set lower rates for seemingly no reason. 

¶ 36 Finally, we grant Murillo’s request for a remand to the trial court for consideration of 

Murillo’s attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. Demitro v. General Motors 

Acceptance Corp., 388 Ill. App. 3d 15, 25 (2009). The court should also consider Murillo’s 

fees for defending against the City’s section 2-1401 petition (which is not contained in the 

record before us). 

¶ 37 Because we affirm the trial court’s judgment, we need not address Murillo’s cross-appeal 

issue regarding jury instructions given at trial. 

¶ 38 We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Murillo. We remand to the 

trial court (i) to reexamine the reductions of time spent by Murillo’s attorneys in light of this 

opinion and give reasons for any reductions, (ii) to adjust the fee calculation based on the 2013 

rates of each attorney, and (iii) to determine additional fees and costs for Murillo addressing 

the City’s section 2-1401 petition and defending this appeal. 

¶ 39 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.