O n M a rc h 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , N .P . w a s p la c e d in the p h ysic a l cu sto d y o f P feffe r fo r a 9 0 -d a y t r ia l visit t o 1

e ff e c tua te N .P .’s t ra n sitio n into P feffe r’s le g a l c u sto d y. T h o u g h D C S fi le d a p e tit io n to ter m ina te M o the r’s a n d P feffe r’s par en t al r i g h t s ov er N

. P. on M ay 19, 2003, t h e t r i al cou r t awa r ded Pf ef fer l eg al cu s t ody of

N

. P. on J u l y 10, 2003, a n d,

(c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON N O V E MB E R 1 6, 200 4 S es sio n IN TH E M A TT ER

OF N
. P
. , W. N
. , A N D C
. N
. , C hi ld re n U nd ert he A ge of 18 Ye ars
Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Laud erdale County

No. J5-961 Rac hel Anthon y, Judge

No. W2004-00345-C OA-R3-P T - F iled Dece m ber 23, 2004

This appea l involves the termi n at i o n of the pa renta l rig hts of Mother and F ather to their children. After a hea ring , the L aude rd al e C o u nty J uvenile Court terminate d Mother’s pa renta l rig hts over W.N. and C.N. o n t h e gro unds of aba ndonment for f ailure to support a nd sever e child abuse

. Further, the tria l court found that termination of Mother’s pa renta l rig hts is in the best i ntere st of the c hil dr e n. Mo the r n ow se e ks re vie w b y thi s Co urt, andwe a ff

ir m.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Ba rbar a A. De ere , Dy ersbur g , TN, for Appellant
Paul G

. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral & Reporter , Doug las Earl Dimond, Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN, for Appellee
OP IN ION
F acts and P roce dural Hi story
Ai me e R. Pas c ha ll (“ Mo the r” or “ Ap pe lla nt” ) an d Mic ha e l Ne wb y (“ F a the r” ) ar e the pa re nts of W.N. (d.o.b. 3/27/1997) and C.N

. (d.o.b. 4/24/2000). Mother a nd Mark Pfe ffe r (“ Pfeff er” ) ar e the par ents of N.P. (d.o.b. 4/30/1995), who lived with Mothe r and Father. On September 23, 2002, 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

s ubs equen t l y , D C S vol un t ar i l y di s mi s s ed i t s pet i t i on t o t er mi nat e t he pare nt al r i gh t s wi t h r ega r d t o N .P

. T he r efore, P fef fer i s not a par t y t o t hi s appeal , an d t he pare nt al r i gh t s over N

. P

. ar e n ot at i s s ue.

F a the r w a ive d his r igh t t o a p p e a l t h is d e c isio n , an d , t h e re fo re , he is no t a p a rty b e fo re this C o u rt. 2
-2- Mother and F ather took C.N. to see a phy sician about an ear infection and a medical examination. During the cour se of the examination, the phy sician discovere d C.N. had g enital warts, a rec tal tear , and the skin on the e nd of C.N.’s penis wa s red a nd irritated. Additionally , C.N. had fa ded bruises on his back. On or about S eptember 23, 2002, Father was incar cer ated, and he wa s found g uiltyof one count of

felony child abuse r esulting in injury and two counts of misdemeanor child abuse a nd neg lect in the L auder dale County Circuit Court. He re ceive d one prison sentenc e of two y ear s and two prison sentenc es of e leven months and twe nty -nine day s, all to run consec utively

. Subsequently , on September 25, 2002, the Tenne ssee De partment of Chil dren’ s Services (“ D CS ” o r “ A p p e ll e e ” ) f il e d a p e ti ti o n f

o r te mp o r ar y c u s to d y o f N

. P. , W. N

. , a n d C.N . in the L auder dale County

J uvenile Court. On the sa me day , the lower court orde red that the three children be place d in D CS’s prote ctive custody

. On Marc h 17, 2003, a hea ring was he ld on the petition for temporary

custody filed by DCS. Mother, Father , and P fef fer wer e ea ch re prese nted by counsel a nd, afte r being informed of

their rig hts, Mother and F ather stipulated that th e t h re e children w ere sexuallyand phy sically

abused, amounting to “se vere child abuse” as d ef i n ed by section 37-1- 102(b)( 21)(B ) of the T ennesse e Code. Mother further stipulated that she knowing ly failed to protect the childre n from such a

buse.
On Ma y 19 , 20 03 , DC S fi le d it s p e tit ionto t e rm inate Mo the r’ s a ndF a the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts

. Prior to a h ea ri n g o n t his petition, on J uly 10, 2003, the lower

court he ld a hea

ring on Pfeff

er’ s petition to interve ne for

chang e of c ustody

of N.P. At such hea

ring , the lower

court a war ded Pfef

fer leg al custody

of N.P., order ed Mother to pay Pfeff er monthly

child support, and stated that Pfeffe r would supervise Mother ’s visits wit h N.P. On October 13, 2003, the juvenile court held a hea ring on DCS’s petition t o terminate Mother ’s and F ather ’s par ental rig hts ove r W.N. a nd C.N. The trial court terminated Father’s pa renta l rig hts on the g rounds that Father c ommitt ed seve re c hild abuse, he wa s sentenced for more than two y ear s of imprisonment for conduc t ag ainst the children, and pla c ing the c hil dr e n inF a the r’ s leg a l and ph y sic a l cus tod y wo uld po se a su bs ta nti a l r isk

of ha rm to the childre n’s ph y s i cal or psy cholog ical we lfare

. The juvenile c ourt also terminate d Mother’s 2 pare ntal rig hts on the g rounds t hat s he abandoned her children by

willfullyfailing to pay

support for them and for

sever e child abuse

. Additionally , the lower court found that termination of Mother’ s and F ather ’s par ental rig hts is in the best interest of W.N. and C.N. Mother appe aled this dec ision and pre sents the following issues, as we pe rce ive them, for our revie w:
I

. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

a dmi tte d e vid e nc e of

Mo the r’ s st ate ment

to police off icials on or about Septembe r 23, 2002, and de nied ev i d ence of a lleg ed state me nts ma de by

c ou ns e l f or DC S; I I

. Whether the trial court err ed whe n it determined ther e wa s clea r and c onvincing evidenc e to terminate Mother’s parenta l rig hts on the ground of se vere child abuse;-3-

I I I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed when it determined ther e wa s clea r and c onvincing evidenc e to terminate Mother’s pa rental ri ghts on the g round of a bandonment for willfullyfailing to support W.N. and C.N.; and I V. Whether the trial c ourt err ed whe n i t d et ermined that termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts is in t he best intere st of W.N. and C.N.
F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Stand ard of Review
W e r e v i e w f

i n d i n g s o f f a c tb y a tr i a l c o u r ts i t t i n g w i t h o u ta j u r y de novo up on the re c or d w ith a pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss, a nd , u nle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t the fi nd ing s, we mus t a ff ir m, a bs e nt an e rr or

of la w. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 13 (d ); In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); In re L.J

.C. , A .L. C., & J

.R .C. , 124 S.W .3d 609, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Further, w e revie w issues of law de novo w ith n o p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s
. Valentine , 79 S.W .3d at 546 (c i t i n g Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) ). We also note that a trial c ourt judg e holds a spec ial position:
Where the tria l judge has see n and hea rd the witnesse s, espec ially if issues of cre dibilit y

and we ight to be g iven ora l testimonyare in v o lv e d , c o n s idera

ble def ere nce must be acc orded those circ umstances on r eview, be cause it is t he trial c ourt which had the opportunityto observe the witnesses’ de meanor and to hea

r the in-c ourt t e s t i m o n y.
Moore v . Shoney’ s, Inc. , No. M2002-02635-WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. L EXI S 1123, at *2-3 (T enn. No v
. 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Long v. Tri-Con Indus., L td. , 9 96 S.W. 2d17 3, 17 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ); se e als o Sta te v . B lac k

we ll , No. W 2004-00509-COA- R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 739, at *11-12 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004). I n this case, the trial court found that only Mother wa s not credible.
Evid entiary Issues
Mother ar g ues t hat the trial c ourt err ed whe n it admitted evidence of a r eport a lleg edly taken b y a p o li c e o f f ic e r o n o r ab o u t S e p te mb e r

2 3 , 2 0 0 2 , w h ic h in c lu d e d a s tate me n t m a d e b y

M other, conce rning her know ledg e of w hether the childre n wer e abuse d by Father. Ad d i t i o n all y , Mother appea rs to arg ue that the trial court err ed when it r efuse d to pe rmit certa in testimonyby Burnett Alby (“A lby ” ) , a

c li n ic a l th e r ap is t f

o r Pr o f e s s io n a l C o u n s e li n g Se r v ic e s inD y e r s b u r g , T e n n e s see. ( A p p e ll a n t’ s B r ie f

p
. 9 )

. We b e g inb y

n o ti n g th a t “ th e a d mi s s io n o r e xc lu s io n o f

e v id e n c e a t t

r ia l is w ith in the so un d d isc re tio n of the tr ia l cou rt a ndwi ll n ot b e ov e rturne d a bs e nt a fi nd ing of

abu se of such discr etion.” Evans v. E vans , No. W2001-03037-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 25, at* 2 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. J an
. 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1992) ). Additionally , “[a]ppellate courts shoul d permit a discr etionary decision to stand if rea sonable judicial minds can dif fer conce rning its soundness.” W hite v. Vande rbilt Univ. , 21-4-

S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 5 , 2 2 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, I nc. , 4 S. W. 3 d 694, 695 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) ); see also Ev ans , 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 25, at *23.
F ir st, wi th r e sp e c t to the po lic e re po rt , we no te that suc h a re po rt is h e ars a y

a nddo e s n ot f

a ll wi t h i n the hea

rsay exception outlined in Tenn. R. Evid. 803(8), which a llows the admission of certain public rec ords and r eports. See M cBe e v. W illiams , 405 S.W .2d 668, 670-71 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1966). After

revie wing the re cord, it appe ars that suc h report was neve r admitted into evidenc e and it is not in the rec ord. Howe ver, w e note that there was testim ony conce rning Mother’s state ment in the po lic e re po rt , an d, a dd iti on a lly , the tr ia l cou rt re lie d upo n a portio n of Mothe r’ s st a te me nt t o establish that termination of Mot her’ s pare ntal rig hts is in W .N.’s and C.N.’ s best interest. It appea rs that such testimony

relates to the issue of whether Mother knew or should have known that Fathe r wa s p h y sically

and sexually

abusing the childre n. The trial c ourt found that such state ment was written by

Mother to the pol ice department. Such a statement would not constitute a police r eport but an admission by

a party opponent, which would make it admissibl e un d er Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2). The ref

ore, w e cannot say

the trial court abused its discr etion when it a dmitted testim ony conce rning the statement written by Mother.
Even if the e vidence at issue involved an inadmissible police r eport, we note that, pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b), such e rror would not c onstitut e reve rsible err or, beca use the a dmission of testimony conce rning the statement did not “more proba bly than not aff

ect[] t he judg ment or . . . result i n prejudice to the j udicial process.” Tenn. R. App. P

. 36(b) (2004). I n this case, ther e wa s ample evide nce to e stablish that Mother knew or should ha ve known that Father wa s phy sically and se xua lly abu sin g the c hil dr e n. F ir st, Yo la nd a Ly nc h (“ Ly nc h” ), on e of the c hil dr e n’ s f os te r p are nts , and Ly nch’s daug hter, Rheay Crowder (“Crow der” ), testified that N.P. and W.N. said that F ather had p h ys i c a l l y a n d s e x u a l l y ab u s e d t h e m a n d t h a t t h e y b o t h a l e r t e d M o t h e r t o th i s ab u s e
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, N.P. and W.N. eac h told Ly nch C rowde r t hat Father would pull down his pants and their pants, lay them down on their stomachs, put a pillow on their fac es, put socks on the ends of the ir hands, and then lie on top of eac h of them. Further, N.P. stated that he told Mother about the abuse inflicted by Father. The trial court pr operly determined that such t estimony was admissi ble pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 803(25). Addit ionally , Mother st ipulated in a prior c ourt order that she “know ingly

failed to protect the c hildren fr om [ sever e] abuse” a s defi n ed by section 37-1- 102(b)( 21)(B ) of the Tenne ssee Code. The ref

ore, e ven if testimony

conce rning Mother’s s t at em en t to the police we re excluded, the testimony

of Ly nch and Crow der and the prior tria l court orde r establish that Mother knew of the phy sical and se x ual abuse of the c hildren. Second, Mother a

rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed when it ex cluded portions of Alby ’s t e s t i m o n y
. W h e n c o u n s e l f o r M o t h e r c a l l e d A l b y t o t h e s t a n d , a s i d e b ar c o n f e r e n c e wa s h e ld wher e in c o u n s e l f

o r D CS ar g u e d th a t A lb y s h o u ld n o t b e p e r mi tt e d to te s ti f y to a nyalleg ed statements made by counsel for DCS to Mother in the proceeding s which led to the prior trial court order , dated April 17, 2003, finding Mother committed sever e child abuse . After our re view of the rec ord, we cannot say

that the trial c o u rt abused its discre tion when it narrow ed Alby ’s testimony to relevant evidence conce rning the issue of whe ther Mother ’s fa ilure to pay support was willful and whether Mother made a positive adjustment of circ umstances.-5- Gr ound s for Term ination
I n order to te rminate pare ntal rig hts, a trial court must find, by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that one of the g rounds for te rmination exi sts and that such termination is in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(c ). “Clea r and c onvin ci n g evidenc e” is de fined a s “evide nce in which there is no serious or subs tantial doubt about t he correc tness of the c onclusions drawn f rom the evidenc e.” Valentine , 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d at5 4 6 (q u o t i n g Hodges v

. S.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992) ). I n this case, the trial court found that termination was proper on the g rounds of (1) sever e child abuse , and (2) abandonme nt by willfully failing to support W.N. and C.N. Mother challeng es the trial c ourt’s finding t hat DC S car ried it s burden of proof on these g rounds. I n order to p re va il, Mo the r mus t de mon str a te that D CS f a ile d to c arry

its bu rd e n o f pr ov in g b ot h of the se g rounds since pr oof of one statutory g round will support the termination o f par ental rig hts. Id

. (c i t i n g I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). We will addr ess these g rounds and the f actor s determining the best intere st of W.N. and C.N. in turn.
Se ve r e Chi ld A buse
Mother first a

rg ues that DCS failed to prove the g round of sever e child abuse by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Section 36-1- 113(g )(4) of the T ennessee Code states that a g round for t er m i n at i o n o f p ar en t al ri gh t s i n cl u d es t h e f o l l o wi n g: (4 ) T he pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n h as been fou ndto h a ve c omm itt e d s e ve re c hil d abuse a s defined in § 37- 1-102, under any p ri o r order of a

court or is found by

the c ou rt he ari ng the pe tit ionto t e rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts or

the pe tit ionfo r a do pti on to have c ommitt ed seve re child abuse ag ainst the child who is the subject of the pe tition or ag ains t an y

sibling or ha lf-sibling of such child, or any

other c hild residing temporarily

or permanently

in the home of such pa

rent or g uardia n. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(4) (2003). I n t h i s case , Mother stipulated in a prior proce eding befor e the L auderd ale Count y J uvenile Court on DCS’s petition for temporary custody that N.P., W.N., and C.N. wer e sex ually and phy sically

abused, amounting to seve re c hild abuse under section 37 -1 -1 02 (b )( 21 )( B ) o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e . T hat se c tio n pro vid e s tha t “se ve re c hil d ab us e ” me a ns :

(B ) Specific brutality , abuse or neg lect towards a child which in the opinion of quali fi ed experts has c aused or will reasona

bly be expected to pr oduce se vere psy chosis, sever e neurotic disorder, severe depre ssion, severe developmenta l delay or re tard a tio n, or

se ve re imp a ir me nt o f the c hil d’ s a bil ity to func tio n a de qu a te ly

in the child’s envir onment, and the k n o wi n g failure to protect a child from such conduct. . . .
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 1- 10 2( b) (2 1) (B ) ( 20 03 ). Mo the r s tip ulate d th a t sh e kn ow ing ly faile d to pr ote c t th e c hil dr e n f

ro m th is a bu se . B e c aus e Mo the r w a s f ou nd to h a ve c omm itt e d s e ve re c hil d abuse a s defined in se ction 37-1-102 “ under [a] prior order of a c ourt,” in this case the-6-

L auder dale County

J uvenile Court, this gr ound for termination applies and is established by clea r and convinc ing e vidence . Be cause DCS must prove only one g round to terminate a person’ s pare ntal rig hts, the issue of whethe r DCS proved by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that Mother abandone d her c hildren by willfullyfailing to support them is pretermitted.
Best Inter est of the Children Finally , befor e a trial court may terminate a person’ s pare ntal rig hts, in addition t o finding a g round for

termination by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, it must also find that such termination of pare ntal rig hts is in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (c ) ( 2 0 0 3). Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 36 -1 -1 13 (i ) p ro vid e s: (i ) In d e te rm ini ng wh e the r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l or g ua rd ia ns hip ri g hts is i n th e be st interest of the child pursuant to this part, the court shall consider , but is not l imited t o , t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has made such an a djustment o f circumstance , conduct, or

conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s be st interest to be in the home of the pa

rent or g uardia n; (2) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has fa iled to effe ct a lasting adjustment af ter rea sonable e fforts by

available social ser vices a g encie s for such duration of time that lasting a djustment does not reasona bly appea r possible; (3) Whether the parent or g uardia n has maintained r eg ular visitation or other c ontact with the child; (4) Whethe r a meaning ful relationship has otherwise bee n established betwe en the pare nt or g uardia n and the c hild; (5) The eff

ect a chang e of car etake rs and phy sical environme nt is li kely to have on the child’s emotional, psy cholog ical and me dical condition; (6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other pe rson re sid i n g wi t h t h e par ent or g uardia n, has shown brutality , phy sical, sex ual, emoti onal or psy cholog ical abuse , or neg lect towar d the child, or a nother c hild or adult in the family or household; (7) W hether the phy sical environment of t he parent’s or g uardia n’s hom e is hea lthy a ndsa fe , w he the r the re is c ri min a l a c tiv ity in the ho me , or wh e the r the re is s uc h u se of a lc oh ol o r c on tr oll e d s ub stanc e s a s may re nd e r the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n c on sis te ntl y unable to ca

re f or the c hild in a safe and stable manne r; (8) W h et h er the par ent’s or g uardia n’s mental and/or emotional status would be detrimental to the child or preve nt the pare nt or g uardia n from ef

fec tively providing safe and stable c are and supervision for the child; or (9 ) Whe the r the pa

re nt or g ua

rd ia n h a s p a id c hil d s up po rt c on sis te nt w iththe c hil d support g uidelines promulg ated by the depa rtment pursuant to § 36-5- 101. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i) ( 2003). Mother a rg ues that termination of he r parental rights over W.N. and C.N. is not in t he childre n’s best intere st. W e disag ree
.-7-

Though therewas proof

that Mother re ceive d counseling afte r N.P., W.N., and C.N. wer e remove d by

DCS, she continued to deny that she had know ledg e of any phy sical or se x ual abuse by Father, de spite the testimony of Yolanda Ly nch reg arding statements m ade by N.P. and W.N. and Mother’s stipulation in the juvenile court or der dated April 17, 2003, that she kn ew o f t he seve re child abuse c ommitt ed ag ainst the children. Such evidenc e supports the t rial court’s determination that Mother failed to make an adjustment of circumstance . Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 1-113(i)( 1) (2003)

. Additionally , Mother failed to obtain employ ment until approx imately two wee ks befor e the he aring on DCS’s petition t o terminate parenta l rig hts in October 2003. Further, va rious witnesses testified that Mother chang ed re sidence s betwee n two and four occa sions in the y ear

prior to the hea

ring . The tr ia l cou rt a lso fo un d, su pp orte d b y the te sti mon y

a t tria l, that W.N . a ndC.N . h a ve be e n instate custody for ove r a y ear

and ar e thriving in their cu rr en t environment. The court de termined that W.N . a ndC.N . h a d s ta

bil ize d in th eir curre nt e nv ir on me nt andthat a c ha ng e of

c are take rs wo uld have a detrimental e ffe ct on W.N.’s and C.N.’s e mot i o n al, ps y cholog ical, and me dical condition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 5) (2003)

. Next, the trial court found, and it was undisputed, that Mother paid no c hild support for the children while they wer e in DCS’s custody . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(9) ( 2003). F inally , the trial court found that Mother’s me ntal or emotional state of mind would be detrimental to W .N. and C.N. a nd preve nt Mother from e ffe ctively providing safe and stable c are and superv i s i o n for W.N. and C.N. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(i)(8) (2003). Yolanda L

y nch testified that N.P. and W.N. indicate d to her that they b o th told Mot her of

the phy sical and se x ual abuse by Father. Additionally , Mother stipulated in a prior court order of the juvenil e co u rt that she knew of the seve re c hild abuse committed ag ainst the children. H oweve r, Mo the r c on tin ue d to de ny that sh e ha d a ny

kn ow le dg e of

a ny abu se a nddidno thi ng a t a ny po int in tim e prior

to r e mov a l to pr e ve nt any abu se . We c a nn ot s a y

that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it de te rm ine d that te rm inatio n of Mo the r’ s pa re nta l ri g hts ov e r W.N

. a nd C.N

. is in the be st i nter e st of the c hildren.
Conclusion
For the re asons stated a

bove, we aff

irm the dec ision of the trial court. Costs of this appe al ar e t a x e d t o A p p e l l a n t , A i m e e R

. P a s c h a l l , a n d h e r s u r e t y f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE