United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-1828

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeffrey Garret Roads

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central 

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Submitted: January 11, 2024

Filed: April 4, 2024

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Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

This Court previously vacated Jeffrey Roads’s sentence and remanded to the 

district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether former defense 

counsel’s conflict of interest may have affected Roads’s substantial rights. United 

States v. Roads, No. 20-3410, 2021 WL 5561023, at *1 (8th Cir. 2021) 

(unpublished). In its prior opinion, the Court noted the district judge’s recusal may 

be warranted but left that decision to the district court’s discretion. Id. 
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Approximately a month after the mandate was issued, Roads’s case was 

reassigned to a different judge in the district. Several weeks later, an Assistant 

United States Attorney from the District of Nebraska entered his appearance and 

later the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Iowa formally 

withdrew from Roads’s case. The district court1 denied Roads’s motion for 

disclosure of information to assess grounds for disqualification and recusal, denied 

Roads’s motion for recusal and reassignment to a judge outside the Southern District 

of Iowa, and denied Roads’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court 

re-sentenced Roads to the same sentence previously imposed, which was a total term 

of imprisonment of 324 months. Roads appeals the district court’s decisions related 

to his motions to recuse and to withdraw his guilty pleas and also challenges the 

district court’s application of a two-level obstruction enhancement at sentencing. 

We affirm. 

I. INTRODUCTION

After Roads pled guilty to transportation of child pornography, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1) (Count I), and accessing with intent to view child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) (Count II), he 

sat for a proffer interview. During the interview, he informed law enforcement 

officers that Justin Fletcher, another inmate who also had a pending case in the 

Southern District of Iowa, had made statements about hiring someone to harm 

several federal officials, including the district judge who at that time was assigned 

to preside over both Roads’s and Fletcher’s cases. Shortly before sentencing, Roads 

moved to recuse the district judge because of her status as a victim in Fletcher’s case. 

Roads’s motion was denied, he was sentenced, and he appealed. During the first 

appeal, the Court took no position on the district court’s denial of Roads’s motion to 

recuse or the issues Roads raised regarding his sentence. 

1

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of Iowa. 
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On remand, Roads filed a motion seeking disclosure of information regarding 

the relationships the judge now assigned to his case had with each of Fletcher’s 

victims, and a motion seeking not only the judge’s recusal but the recusal of all the 

judges in the district. The district judge denied both motions, explaining that her 

relationships with Fletcher’s victims were solely professional. Roads also moved to 

withdraw his guilty pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the 

motion to withdraw. 

At re-sentencing, the government asked the district court to apply a two-level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The government

offered evidence that when law enforcement seized Roads’s personal and work cell 

phones, Roads asked if he could delete something embarrassing off his phone and 

claimed he only remembered the passcode for one phone. Later that evening, Roads 

attempted to deactivate the application he used to access and distribute child 

pornography. The next day Roads provided to law enforcement the forgotten 

passcode, which was the same passcode used to access his other phone. 

After finding the evidence was sufficient to support a two-level upward 

adjustment for obstruction of justice, the district court determined that Roads’s

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 360 to 480 months. The court considered 

the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and recognized its authority 

to vary from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, to sentence Roads to the top 

of the statutory range, and to sentence Roads to fully consecutive imprisonment 

terms or impose a sentence at the statutory minimum of five years on the 

transportation charge. The district court sentenced Roads to a term of 240 months’ 

imprisonment on Count I and a term of 240 months’ imprisonment on Count II, to 

be served partially concurrent for 156 months and partially consecutive for 84 

months, for a total term of imprisonment of 324 months. On appeal, Roads contends

the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying his motion for disclosure of 

information related to recusal and in denying his motion for recusal; (2) erred in 

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (3) erred in applying the twolevel obstruction enhancement. 
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II. DISCUSSION

a. Motions for Disclosure of Information and for Recusal 

We review the district court’s denial of a recusal motion for abuse of 

discretion. Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 953 (8th Cir. 2005). “Because 

a judge is presumed to be impartial, a party seeking recusal bears the substantial 

burden of proving otherwise.” United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878, 883 (8th 

Cir. 2006). 

After reciting the applicable standards and rules set forth in both the Code of 

Conduct for United States Judges and 28 U.S.C. § 455, the district court noted it did 

not need an invitation to make disclosures regarding disqualification or recusal 

because it was aware of its independent, sua sponte obligation to disclose any 

grounds for disqualification or recusal. Because there were no grounds supporting 

disqualification, the district court found no disclosure was required. Dissatisfied 

with the court’s ruling, Roads then filed a motion for recusal and reassignment to a 

judge outside of the Southern District of Iowa. He also took issue with the court’s 

prior order declining to disclose information Roads had requested. After noting the 

court was under no obligation to disclose information that did not provide grounds 

for disqualification, the court did more than it was required to do when it outlined 

its relationships with several individuals in response to Roads’s assertion of untrue

statements. In conclusion, the court found that Roads’s reasons for recusal were 

based on inaccurate “facts” and further explained: “Beyond mere speculation, Roads 

has not proffered any information suggesting the issue on remand—whether Roads’s

attorney operated under a conflict of interest affecting Roads’s substantial rights—

or any subsequent necessary proceedings are such that a reasonable person familiar 

with all relevant circumstances would conclude I could not be impartial.” 

Roads contends a reasonable person would question the court’s impartiality 

solely because of the alleged personal relationships with federal officials or court 

employees who were threatened by Fletcher and the court’s knowledge of those
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threats. Notably, after the reassignment and withdrawals by counsel following our 

remand, no one involved in Roads’s case has been threatened by Fletcher. Nothing 

about the district court’s relationships with the people whom Fletcher threatened, 

which the court described as professional and limited to work hours and work-related 

activities, provides a basis for a reasonable person to conclude the district court could 

not be fair and impartial in Roads’s case. That a different judge imposed the same 

sentence on remand does not demonstrate bias or partiality. Dossett, 399 F.3d at 953 

(stating that adverse judicial rulings rarely “constitute a valid basis for recusal”). 

With no showing that the court had a relationship with any party in Roads’s case that 

presented a conflict or basis that would cause a reasonable person to question the 

court’s impartiality, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Roads’s motion 

to recuse all judges in the Southern District of Iowa.

b. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Sharp, 879 F.3d 327, 332-33 (8th Cir. 2018). Under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw his 

guilty plea by showing a “fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 

“Defense counsel’s performance can serve as the requisite ‘fair and just reason’ for 

withdrawal,” United States v. McMullen, 86 F.3d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1996), under 

the “two-part Strickland v. Washington test,” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 

(1985). This requires the defendant to “demonstrate[] both that his attorney’s 

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by it.” McMullen, 86 F.3d at 

137.

Roads asserts that his attorney rendered deficient performance because his 

first attorney had a conflict of interest prior to Roads entering his guilty plea. “In 

this circuit, it is unclear whether this sort of alleged conflict of interest requires a 

defendant to show deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. 

Washington,” Sharp, 879 F.3d at 333, or whether the defendant need only show that 

the conflict “adversely affected his lawyer’s performance,” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
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U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Roads cannot satisfy either standard because his attorney’s

conflict did not arise until after Roads entered his guilty pleas. 

Roads contends his attorney acted deficiently when he knew that Roads 

wanted to cooperate against Fletcher but did not negotiate a favorable plea 

agreement with the government. The district court credited Roads’s attorney’s 

testimony that he did not know Roads wanted to cooperate until three months after 

Roads rejected the government’s plea offer. Roads rejected the government’s plea 

offer dismissing the second count because he was “adamant” about his innocence, 

not because of a willingness to cooperate. Roads maintained his innocence even 

after the government made it clear that any resolution would require Roads to plead 

guilty to both counts. Roads only decided to plead guilty after the government 

shared previously undisclosed evidence. We generally do not disturb a trial court’s 

credibility findings, see United States v. Moore, 212 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2000), 

and will not do so in this case, especially when the record supports the findings.

An email from defense counsel to the prosecutor confirms that counsel was 

not aware Roads wanted to cooperate against Fletcher until February 10, 2020. 

Defense counsel notified the prosecutor of Roads’s desire to cooperate the same day. 

Roads’s sequence of events is further undercut by his affirmance at the change-ofplea hearing that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance. United States v. 

Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The failure to assert objections to 

counsel’s performance at the change-of-plea hearing refutes any claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel as a basis for withdrawing the plea.”). The day after the 

change-of-plea hearing, defense counsel failed to accompany Roads to a proffer 

interview. It is at this point that a conflict of interest arose. Roads has failed to show 

a conflict of interest existed prior to his decision to plead guilty to both counts. 

Roads also asserts that the prosecutors appearing at the change-of-pleahearing had a conflict of interest because they knew he planned to cooperate against 

Fletcher. The prosecutors are too attenuated from the Fletcher threats to give rise to 

a conflict. Neither was a victim in Fletcher’s or Roads’s cases. State v. Iowa Dist. 
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Court for Dubuque Cnty., 870 N.W.2d 849, 857 (2015) (finding that a prosecutor 

“does not have a disqualifying conflict of interest” when he is not the victim). Only 

one attorney within the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 

Iowa was a victim of Fletcher and he was not involved in Roads’s prosecution. 

Roads has failed to present a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his pleas. 

c. Sentencing – Obstruction Enhancement 

Lastly, Roads contends the district court erred in applying an obstruction of 

justice enhancement at sentencing. We review a district court’s sentencing 

guidelines findings for clear error. United States v. Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d 1052, 

1061 (8th Cir. 2009). We are deferential to the district court’s application of the 

obstruction of justice enhancement and will reverse only when the district court’s 

findings are insufficient. United States v. Cunningham, 593 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 

2010). 

The obstruction enhancement applies when a defendant willfully obstructs or 

attempts to obstruct the administration of justice with respect to the investigation or 

prosecution of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Attempting to destroy material 

evidence qualifies as obstruction. Id. cmt. 4(D). 

Before the enhancement may be applied, “[t]he district court must find the 

predicate facts supporting an enhancement for obstruction of justice by a

preponderance of the evidence[.]” Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d at 1061. The evidence

in the record shows that Roads was evasive with law enforcement about the contents 

and passcode of his phones and that he attempted to deactivate the application he 

used to send child pornography less than 24 hours after his phones were seized. The 

district court did not clearly err in finding these facts sufficient to apply the 

obstruction enhancement. It does not matter that the government ultimately accessed 

the application, as Roads argues, because the enhancement for destroying evidence 

applies equally to an attempt to destroy evidence. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; see United 

States v. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 365-66 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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