alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 10/9/96 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THOMAS FRANK DISTEFANO, Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-1178 (D.C. No. 95-M-3163) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. ** Mr. Distefano moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and sought the return of forfeited property on double jeopardy grounds. We have reviewed the district court’s order, which is further supported by United States v. Ursery , 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) and our decision in United States v. German , 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996), and find no reversible error. We deny Mr. Distefano a certificate of appealability now- 2 -

required by statute and dismiss the appeal for want of a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), (2); Lennox v. Evans , 87 F.3d 431, 433-34 (10th Cir. 1996). APPEAL DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. Entered for the Court Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 17, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL D. LOWERY; JAMES

ERNEST LANE; ELCO Q. PIERCE, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney General

State of Oklahoma; JUSTIN JONES,

Director Oklahoma Department of

Corrections; DEBBIE L. MORTON; LEO

BROWN, Religious Coordinator; BILL

BOYD, Assistant Warden/Religious

Director; CORRECTIONS

CORPORATION OF AMERICA; DAVIS

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-7103

(D.C. No. 6:09-CV-00286-RAW-SPS)

ORDER

The court construes Appellants-Plaintiffs’ letters received on January 8, 2010, January

14, 2010, and January 28, 2010 as a motion under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) to voluntarily

dismiss this civil appeal. 

Appellate Case: 09-7103 Document: 01018368712 Date Filed: 02/17/2010 Page: 1
-2-

Upon consideration, Appellants’ motion to voluntarily dismiss is GRANTED. This

appeal is DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court

Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk

Kathleen T. Clifford

Attorney - Deputy Clerk

Appellate Case: 09-7103 Document: 01018368712 Date Filed: 02/17/2010 Page: 2
FILED: January 4, 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7066

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KEANAN DEQUEZ BOND, a/k/a Sticks,

 Defendant – Appellant.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed on January 3, 2023, as follows:

On the cover page, the decided date is corrected to read January 3, 2023.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7066 Doc: 42 Filed: 01/04/2023 Pg: 1 of 1
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 99.2




                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Atlas Pipeline Partners, L.P. (the
"Partnership") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Steven J. Kessler, Chief Financial Officer of the Partnership's general partner,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Partnership.



/s/ Steven J. Kessler


Steven J. Kessler
Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner
March 28, 2003
#### The State *v.*Woolverton.

An indictment for perjury cannot be maintained where the supposed perjury depends upon the construction of a deed.

*453ERROR to the *Vermillion*Circuit Court.

Perkins, J.

Indictment for perjury. Indictment quashed in the Circuit Court. •

The indictment charges that a suit was pending before two justices of the peace wherein *Stephen S. Collett*was plaintiff and *Abel Woolverton*was defendant, in which suit said *Wool*verton, who is the defendant to the indictment, filed the following plea: “And for a further and second plea the said defendant says that the title of lands is in controversy in this cause; that a deed of defeasance was made to this defendant by the said plaintiff, *Collett;*and that by the outstanding title in this cause, he will be enabled to show that said *Collett*has no right to the possession of the lands set forth in said *Collett's*complaint; and that the title to lands is in issue, in this cause; and this he is ready to verify. *Abel Woolverton."*This plea is charged to have been sworn to before competent authority. The assignment of perjury upon i,t is as follows: “Whereas, in truth and in fact at the time the said *A bel Woolverton*took his oath and made his affidavit as aforesaid, the title of lands was not in issue in the said cause, nor was the title of lands in controversy in the said cause at the time of making the said affidavit and taking the said oath by the said *Abel Woolverton,”*&c.

It will be observed that the existence of the deed of defeasance is not denied, and it is very clear to us that the assertions in the plea upon which the perjury is assigned, “that the title of lands is in controversy,” and “ that the title to lands is in issue in this cause,” are but the mere opinions of *Woolverton*as to the legal effect of said deed of defeasance, and being so, they will not support an indictment for perjury. The case of *Rex*v. *Crespigny,*1 Esp. R. 280, is directly in point. That was an indictment for perjury, founded upon an affidavit of *Crespigny,*that he had not authorized one *Dickinson*to use his name in suing one *Utterson,*upon a claim which, among many others, he, *Crespigny,*had transferred by a certain deed of assignment to said *Dickinson.*Whether he had authorized such use of his name depended upon the construction given to that deed of assignment, and Lord *Kenyon*held that an indictment for perjury could not be maintained where the supposed perjury depended upon the *454construction of a deed, and directed the jury to acquit the defendant.

*A. A. Hammond*and *J. H. Bradley,*for the state.

*W.*P. *Bryant*and /. *A. Wright,*for the defendant.

In this case, the whole of the affidavit being set forth in the indictment, the question on the construction of the oath is presented upon the motion to quash.

Per *Curiam.*

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION



<PAGE>



                                  Exhibit 32.1



                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  accompanying  annual  report  on Form  10-K of  Medina
International  Holdings,  Inc.  for the year ended  April 30,  2010,  I,  Daniel
Medina,  President  of  Medina  International  Holdings,  Inc.,  hereby  certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

a)   such annual report on Form 10-K of Medina International  Holdings, Inc. for
     the year ended April 30, 2010,  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

b)   the  information  contained  in such  annual  report on Form 10-K of Medina
     International  Holdings,  Inc.  for the year ended April 30,  2010,  fairly
     presents, in all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
     operations of Medina International Holdings, Inc.


Date:  July 29, 2010

                           /s/ Daniel Medina
                               -------------------
                               Daniel Medina,
                               President



This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
# Astronaut Frank Culbertson works inside the Destiny laboratory module

ISS003-328-003 (23 August 2001) --- Astronaut Frank L. Culbertson, Jr., Expedition Three mission commander, works at the Biotechnology Specimen Temperature Controller (BSTC) for the Cellular Biotechnology Operations Support System (CBOSS) in the Destiny laboratory on the International Space Station (ISS).

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-  									Page Last Updated:								  								Dec 13, 2023								 
-  									Page Editor:								  									Mark A. Garcia								 
-  								Responsible NASA Official:							  								Abigail Bowman
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEPTEMBER
30, 1996 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          55,337
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   34,284
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,355
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                99,302
<PP&E>                                          18,162
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (5,683)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 112,243
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,764
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        77,182
<OTHER-SE>                                        (903)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   112,243
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                17,555
<CGS>                                            3,547
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,371
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   683
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,867
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,514
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,353
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,353
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.07
        

</TABLE>
#### Hunt *v.*Butcher.

A bond for costs, filed by a non-resident plaintiff, was for the payment of * the costs which had or might accrue in the case, *provided judgment be given against the plaintiff.*Held, that the bond was insufficient.

*Monday, June*8.

ERROR to the *Putnam*Circuit Court.

Sullivan, J.

Debt. The only question in this case arises on the judgment of the Circuit Court, dismissing the suit for want of security for costs. The plaintiff was a non-resident, and at the commencement of the suit had given a bond with security for the costs, but the surety became insolvent, and *342at *November*term, 1838, the Court made an order requiring the plaintiff to give other security within 120 days, and on failure to do so, that the suit be dismissed. The plaintiff failed to give the security required, and at the next term, the defendant moved to dismiss the suit. The plaintiff thereupon tendered a bond in the following words, viz. “I hereby acknowledge myself held and firmly bound unto *James Butcher,*for the payment of the costs which have or may accrue in the case of *Absalom Hunt*against him in the *Putnam*Circuit Court, *provided judgment be given against said Hunt.*Witness, &c.” The Court refused to receive the bond, and dismissed the cause. This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse that judgment.

*A. Kinneij*and *S. B. Goohins,*for the plaintiff.

*C. P. Hester,*for the defendant.

It is not necessary in the present case to determine, whether the failure of the plaintiff to file a bond with security within the 120 days was a sufficient cause for dismissing the suit. Independently of any question arising on that point, we think the judgment should be affirmed. The statute requires that, in suits commenced by a non-resident, bond with security shall be given for the payment of all costs that may accrue in consequence thereof, either to the opposite party or to the officers of the Court. By the bond tendered, the surety obligated himself to pay the costs only in the event of judgment being given against the plaintiff. This does not meet the statute, for whether judgment be given against the plaintiff or not, he is liable to the officers of the Court for his own costs, and they are taxed against him. If successful in his suit, he recovers judgment against the defendant for the amount expended by him, and by that means is reimbursed. The Circuit Court, therefore, did right in rejecting the bond.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is affirmed with costs.
#### NORTHERN TELECOM, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.

No. 78-1044.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 4, 1980.

*422William N. Ozier, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for petitioner.

Elliott Moore, Michael S. Winer, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Ann McNerney, R. Michael Smith, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, PECK, Senior Circuit Judge and FEIKENS,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Northern Telecom, Inc., in this case has sought this court’s review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board reported at 233 NLRB No. 203. The Board has filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order. After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, the NLRB entered an order affirming the findings and conclusions of the ALJ with certain modifications.

The Board found that company discipline of four employees and its discharge of employee Lee in connection with all five employees leaving work at approximately the same time on a Saturday morning, constituted violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board also found that there had been other violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by illegal interrogation of employees.

The principal issue argued before this court concerned whether the ALJ and the Board had correctly found the existence of a company practice permitting night shift employees, like the ones involved here, to work until the preceding midnight but, when called in for Saturday morning overtime work starting at 6:00 a. m., to leave work early without the specific permission of a supervisor.

While we note that this issue is strongly disputed, we conclude that there is substantial evidence on the whole record to support the Board’s findings.

For the reasons outlined above, enforcement of the remedial orders of the National Labor Relations Board in this case is granted.

*

 Honorable John Feikens, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

7-ELEVEN AND AMERICAN PROTECTION 

 INSURANCE COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 3041-00-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JUNE 5, 2001 

LAURA M. SMITH 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Linda M. Gillen (Andrew R. Blair, on brief), 

for appellants. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 7-Eleven and its insurer (hereinafter referred to as 

"employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation Commission 

erred in finding that Laura M. Smith's (claimant) May 6, 1996 

change-in-condition application was properly filed and not 

abandoned by claimant. Because we find that the full 

commission's November 20, 2000 opinion did not constitute a 

final award appealable to this Court, we dismiss employer's 

appeal. 

 Code § 65.2-706 provides that "[n]o 

appeal shall be taken from the decision of 

one Commissioner until a review of the case 

has been had before the full Commission, as 

provided in Code § 65.2-705, and an award 

entered by it. Appeals shall lie from such 

award to the Court of Appeals . . . ." 
"[T]he words 'such award' . . . [contained 

in § 65.2-706] mean final award, that is, a 

decision of the . . . Commission granting or 

denying, or changing or refusing to change, 

some benefit payable or allowable under the 

. . . Act and leaving nothing to be done 

except to superintend ministerially the 

execution of the award." 

Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Harper, 26 Va. App. 522, 527, 495 

S.E.2d 540, 543 (1998) (citation omitted). 

 The full commission's November 20, 2000 opinion affirmed 

the deputy commissioner's determination that claimant's May 6, 

1996 change-in-condition application was properly filed and not 

abandoned. The full commission then referred this matter back 

to the hearing docket for a determination of the substantive 

issues surrounding claimant's change-in-condition applications. 

Thus, the commission's November 20, 2000 opinion did not dispose 

of the merits of the claims, leaving nothing further to be done. 

Accordingly, it did not constitute a final award appealable to 

this Court. See id.

 For these reasons, we dismiss employer's appeal. 

 Dismissed. 

- 2 -
EXHIBIT
4.3




Addendum
to the 8% Convertible Debenture




between









and




Scivanta
Medical Corporation





This
Addendum (this “Addendum”) to the 8% Convertible Debenture (as such term is
defined below), entered into as of the 31st day of January, 2010 (the “Addendum
Effective Date”), is by and between ______________ (the “Holder”) and Scivanta
Medical Corporation (the “Company”).  Capitalized terms used herein,
but not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meanings given to such terms in
the 8% Convertible Debenture issued as of February 1, 2007 (the
“Debenture”).




WHEREAS,
the Company promised to pay to the Holder, or its registered assigns, upon due
presentation and surrender of the Debenture, on or after January 31, 2010, the
principal amount of _______________ Dollars ($_________); and




WHEREAS,
the Company and Holder desire to modify the aforementioned Debenture for the
mutual benefit of both parties;




NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained
herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:




1.
            The
      modifications of the Debenture herein will be effective as of the Addendum
      Effective Date and will remain in effect for the duration of the Debenture
      unless further modified in writing by the parties
  hereto.





2.
            The
      original Maturity Date of January 31, 2010 shall be replaced with January
      31, 2012.





3.
            Other
      than as specifically modified in this Addendum, all other terms,
      conditions and covenants of the Debenture shall remain in full force and
      effect.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Addendum, effective as of
the Addendum Effective Date.




SCIVANTA
      MEDICAL CORPORATION
              
              HOLDERBy:Name:
              Thomas
      S. Gifford
              
              HolderTitle:
              Executive
      Vice President andChief
      Financial Officer
#### Ramsey *v.*Kochenour.

Debt for goods sold. Plea, that the goods had not been delivered. Replication, that the goods had been delivered, &e. *Held,*that the plea was bad, and the issue immaterial.

ERROR to the *Harrison*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

This was an action of debt commenced before a justice of the peace. The statement of demand is that the plaintiff, as constable, &c., sold to the defendant, by virtue of a certain execution, a certain mare and saddle for the sum of 50 dollars, &c.; and that the defendant had refused to pay, &c. Plea, that the plaintiff did not deliver the mare and saddle as alleged. Replication, that the mare and saddle were delivered, &c. There was a second plea which need not be further noticed, it being a mere nullity. Verdict and judgment before the justice for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Circuit Court, the defendant obtained a verdict and judgment.

This was a suit for the price of goods sold, not for the price of goods sold and delivered. The plea, therefore, denying a delivery of the goods, was no answer to the declaration. The issue was immaterial, and the defendant, who made the *326first fault in pleading, has obtained a verdict. There must be a repleader.

*W. A. Porter,*for the plaintiff.

*J. W. Payne,*for the defendant.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed. Cause remanded, &c.