IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sekema Gentles, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 452 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: September 14, 2018

City of Philadelphia, Matthew Kalita, :

Thomas Hayes, and Linda Green :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: February 25, 2019

Sekema Gentles (Appellant), proceeding pro se, appeals from the order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying his

motion for post-trial relief to remove a compulsory nonsuit entered in favor of the

City of Philadelphia, two City Police Officers, Matthew Kalita and Thomas Hayes

(City Appellees), and private citizen, Linda Green (collectively, Appellees). 

Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by removing a malicious prosecution 

claim from the jury, entering a compulsory nonsuit as to the remaining claims, and, 

concomitantly, violating the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and 

coordinate jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I. Background

On March 18, 2014, Appellant filed a Complaint against Appellees for 

an incident that occurred on November 6, 2011. According to the Complaint, 
2

Appellant’s mother owns rental property, which Appellant managed and Green 

(Tenant) leased. 

Appellant alleged that, on November 6, 2011, he visited the property to 

address a maintenance issue. Tenant’s son let Appellant in. Once Tenant discovered 

Appellant in her home, she told him to leave and assaulted him. Appellant called 

the police and Officers Hayes and Kalita arrived at the scene. Tenant accused 

Appellant of entering her rented premises without permission and assaulting her. 

Officers arrested Appellant. At the time of his arrest, Appellant was on parole after 

a ten-year sentence for attempted murder, and as a result, he served seven months in 

jail until freed on a writ of habeas corpus on the new charges. Appellant was

acquitted of all charges brought against him on June 1, 2012. 

In his Complaint, Appellant asserted three causes of action against 

Appellees: 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION [(Count I)]

40 Defendant City of Philadelphia employees, defendants 

Hayes and Kalita acting under color of state law acted 

arbitrarily and negligently when they arrested [Appellant] 

without reasonable investigation; wantonly disregarding 

the facts provided them by [Appellant] and corroborated 

with documentation by the landlord. 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION [(Count II)]

41 Defendant City of Philadelphia employees, 

Defendants Hayes and Kalita, under color of law, acted in 

concert with a private citizen, Defendant [Tenant], to 

deprive [Appellant] of his right to be free of unreasonable 

seizures, effected by official negligent failure to conduct a 

reasonable investigation into the facts known to them at 

the time of arrest, deliberate indifference and a fraudulent 

utterance to authorities in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[]

[§]4904.
3

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION [(Count III)]

42 Defendant [Tenant] successfully designed and 

executed an elaborate scheme to defraud and incarcerate 

plaintiff with fraudulent sworn and unsworn utterances to 

authorities in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] [§]4904, 

maliciously abusing civil processes (including Civil 

Complaint at No. 131001019) for unlawful purposes and 

ill-gotten financial gains.

Original Record (O.R.) at 257-58.1 

Tenant filed preliminary objections (POs) objecting to the service of 

process, rule violation and scandalous material in the Complaint and demurring on 

the basis that Appellant failed to allege facts that would set forth a cause of action 

for false arrest, which Judge Mary Colins of the trial court denied. 

Thereafter, City Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment as to

Counts I and II on the basis that these causes of action, which they interpreted as a 

false arrest claim and assault and battery claim, respectively, were time-barred. O.R. 

at 207-08. Judge Ellen Ceisler2 of the trial court partially granted the motion as to 

Count I of the Complaint (false arrest) on the basis it was barred by the two-year 

statute of limitations, but denied the motion as to Count II.

3

 

From there, the case moved to non-binding arbitration. The arbitrators 

found in favor of City Appellees, but ordered Tenant to pay Appellant $10,000. 

Appellant and Tenant both appealed and requested a jury trial. The parties filed pretrial motions, including Appellant’s motion in limine, in which he asserted that he 

 

1 Because the Original Record was e-filed, the page numbers reflect electronic pagination.

2 As of January 2018, Judge Ceisler now serves as a commissioned judge of this Court. 

3

Judge Ceisler did not explain her reasoning. Appellant does not challenge this ruling on 

appeal. 
4

pled a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The trial court did not rule on the 

motion prior to trial. 

In November 2016, the matter proceeded to trial on Counts II and III. 

Judge Michael Erdos of the trial court presided over the three-day jury trial, which 

was held on November 1-3, 2016. On day one, the trial court heard argument on 

Appellant’s motion in limine. The trial court denied the motion, finding that 

Appellant did not plead this claim. O.R., Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 11/1/16, at 5-

6. 

After the presentation of Appellant’s evidence, Appellees moved for 

compulsory nonsuit. The trial court granted nonsuit for want of timeliness per the 

statute of limitations for the causes of action asserted in Count II and for lack of 

evidence for claims asserted in Count III. The trial court interpreted Count II’s 

“unreasonable seizure” claim as a claim asserting assault and battery, false arrest or 

even false imprisonment, all of which have a two-year statute of limitations that had 

run. N.T., 11/3/16, at 31-32. To the extent that Count II contained a negligence 

claim for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, the trial court ruled that this 

too was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 32. With regard to Count 

III, the trial court found that there was no allegation or evidence that Tenant made a 

false statement. Id. at 32-33.

Thereafter, Appellant timely filed a motion for post-trial relief to 

remove entry of the nonsuit,

4 which Judge Erdos denied. Appellant timely 

 

4 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(2)(2) requires a party to file written posttrial motions within ten days after notice of a nonsuit. Pa. R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2). 
5

appealed.5 Appellant filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 

1925(b), as directed by the trial court. However, because Appellant did not request

the trial transcript in a timely manner, the trial court did not file a 1925(a) opinion.6

II. Issues

In this appeal,7 Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion in limine and removing his malicious prosecution claim from the jury. 

 

5 Appellant filed his appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which transferred the 

matter to this Court. See Superior Court Order, 3/10/17. 

6 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1911, Pa. R.A.P. 1911, requires an appellant

to “request any transcript required under this chapter” and provides that the trial court may take 

such action as it deems appropriate, including dismissal of the appeal, if an appellant fails to 

comply. The trial court opined it could not write an adequate opinion without the trial transcript 

and requested the dismissal of his appeal for failure to comply with Rule 1911. Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/7/17, at 2. This Court directed Appellant to request and pay for the trial transcripts. 

Commonwealth Court Order, 11/14/17. Thereafter, we directed the trial court to transmit a 

supplemental record containing the missing transcripts of the proceedings, which it did. 

Commonwealth Court Order, 11/2/18. Because the record on appeal is complete, we decline to 

dismiss the appeal on this basis.

7 The well-settled standard of review we apply when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a 

motion in limine is as follows:

When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, this Court applies 

an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. It is wellestablished that the admissibility of evidence is within the discretion 

of the trial court, and such rulings will not form the basis for 

appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion. Thus, [we] may 

reverse an evidentiary ruling only upon a showing that the trial court 

abused that discretion. A determination that a trial court abused its 

discretion in making an evidentiary ruling may not be made merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or 
6

He also argues that the trial court erred by entering nonsuit in favor of Appellees on 

his other causes of action. Finally, he claims that the trial court violated principles 

of law, namely, res judicata, collateral estoppel and coordinate jurisdiction. 

III. Discussion

A. Malicious Prosecution

First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by removing his

malicious prosecution claim from the jury. Although Appellant did not specifically 

plead a malicious prosecution claim, he contends that when Count II is read with the

Complaint in its entirety, a malicious prosecution claim was made. Because 

Appellant represented himself, he argues that the trial court should have construed

his Complaint liberally. 

 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to 

be clearly erroneous. Further, discretion is abused when the law is 

either overridden or misapplied.

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations, ellipsis, and quotation 

marks omitted). 

Our standard of review regarding the entry of nonsuit is also well settled:

On appeal, entry of a compulsory nonsuit is affirmed only if no 

liability exists based on the relevant facts and circumstances, with 

appellant receiving the benefit of every reasonable inference and 

resolving all evidentiary conflicts in appellant’s favor. The 

compulsory nonsuit is otherwise properly removed and the matter 

remanded for a new trial. 

Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, 57 A.3d 582, 595-96 (Pa. 2012) (citations and quotations 

omitted). The appeal lies not from the entry of the judgment itself, but rather from the court’s 

refusal to remove it. Murphy v. International Druidic Society, 152 A.3d 286, 289 (Pa. Super.

2016). We review the evidence to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law when granting a nonsuit. Barnes v. Alcoa, Inc., 145 A.3d 730, 735 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). 
7

Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state. Bricklayers of W. Pennsylvania 

Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott’s Development Co., 90 A.3d 682, 695 n.14 (Pa. 2014). 

The complaint must apprise the defendant of the claim being asserted and summarize 

the essential supporting facts. Id. at 694. Pennsylvania Civil Rule of Procedure

1019(a) provides that “[t]he material facts on which a cause of action or defense is 

based shall be stated in a concise and summary form.” Pa. R.C.P. No. 1019(a). 

Further, “[e]ach cause of action and any special damage related thereto shall be 

stated in a separate count containing a demand for relief.” Pa. R.C.P. No. 1020(a).

A plaintiff is not required to state the legal theory or theories underlying 

his complaint. 412 N. Front Street Associates, LP v. Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C., 

151 A.3d 646, 656 (Pa. Super. 2016); DelConte v. Stefonick, 408 A.2d 1151, 1153 

(Pa. Super. 1979). Rather, Rule 1019(a) merely requires a plaintiff to plead only 

allegations of the “material facts on which a cause of action . . . is based.” DelConte, 

408 A.2d at 1153 (quoting Pa. R.C.P. No. 1019(a)). “The obligation to discover the 

cause or causes of actions is on the court: the plaintiff need not identify them.” 

DelConte, 408 A.2d at 1153. In that regard, the complaint must be read as a whole. 

Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. 1983). 

Moreover, the “‘allegations of a pro se complainant are held to a less 

stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by attorneys.’” Rosario v. 

Beard, 920 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Danysh v. Department of 

Corrections, 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 

2005)). A court will examine the allegations of the pleading, “however inartfully 

pleaded,” to determine if a pro se plaintiff would be entitled to relief if the facts 

averred are proven. Commonwealth ex rel. Saunders v. Creamer, 345 A.2d 702, 706 

n.5 (Pa. 1975). “Where these allegations are adequately set forth, a pro se complaint 
8

will not be dismissed just because it is not artfully drafted.” Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 

186, 189 (Pa. Super. 1993). 

Generally, a cause of action for malicious prosecution must assert three 

elements. Kelley v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union 249, 

544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988). “The defendant must have instituted proceedings 

against the plaintiff 1) without probable cause, 2) with malice, and 3) the proceedings 

must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. The statute of limitations for a 

malicious prosecution claim, which is two years,8 does not begin to run until the 

plaintiff is acquitted, rather than arrested. Sicola v. First National Bank of Altoona, 

170 A.2d 584, 586 (Pa. 1961).

“Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by 

circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in 

believing that the party is guilty of the offense.” Tomaskevitch v. Specialty Records 

Corp., 717 A.2d 30, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), appeal denied, 740 A.2d 236 (Pa. 1999) 

(citing Hugee v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 101 A.2d 740, 742 (Pa. 1954)). 

“‘Absence of probable cause is an indispensable element of the [malicious 

prosecution] action and it is not conclusively established by an adjudication of [not 

guilty] in the prior proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 824 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), appeal denied, 647 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1994)). Conversely, “[t]he 

showing of probable cause is an absolute defense to a charge of malicious 

prosecution.” Id. “Malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause.” 

Kelley, 544 A.2d at 941.

Here, Appellant stated his third cause of action as follows: 

 

8 Section 5524(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(1).
9

Defendant [Tenant] successfully designed and executed an 

elaborate scheme to defraud and incarcerate plaintiff with 

fraudulent sworn and unsworn utterances to authorities in 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] [§]4904, maliciously abusing 

civil processes (including Civil Complaint at No. 

131001019) for unlawful purposes and ill-gotten financial 

gains.

O.R. at 258. The trial court found that Appellant did not plead a malicious 

prosecution claim and denied Appellant’s motion in limine. N.T. at 4.

Upon review, we agree that the necessary elements of a malicious 

prosecution claim were not pled in Count III or elsewhere in the Complaint. Viewing 

the Complaint as a whole, Appellant does not invoke the phrase “malicious 

prosecution” nor does he make any assertion that Appellees acted without probable 

cause and with malice. Although Appellant asserts that the arrest was made solely 

on false statements made by Tenant, as the trial court pointed out, there are no 

statements alleged in the Complaint that Tenant actually made to the officers. N.T., 

11/3/16, at 103-04. Moreover, the allegations pertain to the arrest, not the 

subsequent criminal prosecution or post-arrest conduct. Upon review, the trial court 

did not err in determining that Appellant did not plead a cause of action for malicious 

prosecution. 

Even assuming a malicious prosecution claim can be gleaned from 

Appellant’s Complaint, Appellant presented no evidence at trial to support such a 

claim. There was no evidence that the police officers did not have probable cause, 

i.e., reasonable grounds of suspicion supported by the circumstances sufficient to 

warrant an arrest. See Tomaskevitch, 717 A.2d at 33. 

Officer Hayes testified that he arrived at the scene, briefly spoke to 

Appellant, and then entered the premises. Inside, he observed Tenant “very upset,”

“crying,” “shaking,” and “in disarray.” N.T., 11/2/16, at 63. Officer Hayes testified 
10

that “she was crying hysterically. Her clothes was [sic] in disarray, the house was 

in disarray. It appeared she was involved in a physical altercation.” According to 

Officer Hayes, “[i]t appeared to us that a struggle ensued. It appeared to me during 

my initial response there and during my training and experience that [Tenant] was 

assaulted.” Id. Tenant stated that Appellant “assaulted her, punched her in the chest. 

I initiated an arrest.” Id. Officer Hayes continued: 

We base our arrests on statements from a complainant and 

an offender. Now, these statements that are given by each 

of the people, are going to be in conflict. We have to use 

facts and circumstances to initiate arrests. Any reasonable 

person would agree with me that there was a physical

altercation between these two folks, okay? He is six-foot. 

She is five-foot, okay? She is crying. He is not. Her shirt, 

you could see it was stretched wrinkled. It was obviously 

[sic] that a physical altercation occurred. [Tenant] stated 

that he did this to her. There was an arrest.

Id. at 63-64. According to Officer Hayes, Tenant told the officers that Appellant 

came into her home unannounced and a verbal dispute ensued, which escalated into 

a physical altercation. She also told officers that Appellant assaulted her. Officer 

Hayes testified that he had no reason not to believe Tenant. Id. at 85. 

Similarly, Officer Kalita recalled the events on November 6, 2011, that 

Appellant entered Tenant’s property and they had a verbal argument about the heater 

not working properly, which escalated into a physical altercation. Id. at 154. Tenant 

told officers that Appellant assaulted her. Id. Officer Kalita observed that Tenant 

was “very upset” and had “a pull on her shirt.” Id. at 166-67. 

In addition, Tenant testified that, on the day of the incident, she awoke 

after hearing a noise. Upon investigating, she discovered Appellant in her basement, 

doing maintenance work. She confronted him, arguing that he should not be in her 
11

home. At which point, Appellant punched her in the chest and “pinned her on the 

steps,” while she was doing everything she could to get him off of her. N.T., 11/2/16, 

at 97, 126-30. She reported the same to the officers when they arrived. Id. at 137.

Upon review, the foregoing evidence demonstrates probable cause for 

Appellant’s arrest. The fact that Appellant disagreed with Tenant’s account of the 

altercation does not defeat probable cause.9 Although Appellant was later acquitted, 

an acquittal does not conclusively establish a lack of probable cause. See 

Tomaskevitch, 717 A.2d at 33. We conclude that the trial court did not err in 

determining that Appellant did not sufficiently plead a claim for malicious 

prosecution, and even if he had, he presented no evidence to maintain that cause of 

action. Thus, the trial court properly removed this claim from the jury. 

B. Compulsory Nonsuit

Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by entering 

compulsory nonsuit in favor of Appellees based on the statute of limitations and lack 

of evidence. 

“A trial court may enter a compulsory nonsuit on any and all causes of 

action if, at the close of the plaintiff’s case against all defendants on liability, the 

court finds that the plaintiff has failed to establish a right to relief.” Scampone, 

 

9 By Appellant’s own account, he initiated eviction proceedings against Tenant and had 

attempted to access the property to address an issue with the heating system. O.R., Complaint 

¶¶25-26. Tenant denied Appellant access to the property. Id. ¶27. Appellant sought a police 

escort to enter the property, but was advised he needed a Writ to Enter, which he did not obtain. 

Id. On November 6, 2011, Appellant visited the property and was admitted by Tenant’s son. Id.

at ¶28. Appellant checked the heating system and determined it was functioning properly. Id.

¶¶28-29. Tenant entered the basement, grabbed Appellant, told him to get out of her house, and 

struck him. Id. ¶30. When officers arrived at the scene, Appellant identified himself as an 

authorized agent, there to fix the heating system. Id. ¶32. Appellant testified that Tenant assaulted 

him. N.T., 11/3/16, at 61. 
12

57 A.3d at 595; accord Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.1. The purpose of a motion for 

compulsory nonsuit is to allow the defendant to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 

evidence. Harnish v. School District of Philadelphia, 732 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. 1999). 

Entry of a compulsory nonsuit is proper where the plaintiff has not introduced 

sufficient evidence to establish the necessary elements to maintain a cause of action. 

Id. The trial court must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences 

arising from the evidence. Scampone, 57 A.3d at 595; Harnish, 732 A.2d at 597.

The statute of limitations may form a basis for compulsion of nonsuit. 

See Henry v. Allegheny County, 169 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1961) (recognizing the statute of 

limitations may form the basis for nonsuit or its removal); McCauley v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 715 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1998) (same). In 

Pennsylvania, an action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or false arrest must 

be commenced within two years. Section 5524(1) of the Judicial Code, 

42 Pa. C.S. §5524(1). Similarly, a cause of action for negligence also carries a 

statute of limitations of two years. Section 5524(2) of the Judicial Code, 

42 Pa. C.S. §5524(2). 

Here, at the close of Appellant’s evidence, Appellees moved for 

compulsory nonsuit under Pa. R.C.P. No. 230.1, by renewing their statute of 

limitations challenges and asserting insufficient evidence to establish a right to relief. 

The trial court considered the causes of action asserted, the applicable statute of 

limitations for those actions, and the evidence presented, extending to Appellant all 

favorable inferences. Ultimately, the trial court entered nonsuit in favor of Appellees 

on Counts II and III. N.T., 11/3/16, at 99-104. 

With regard to Count II, Appellant claimed that Appellees, acting in 

concert “to deprive [Appellant] of his right to be free of unreasonable seizures, 
13

effected by negligent failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into facts known 

to them at the time of arrest, deliberate indifference and fraudulent utterance to 

authorities in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] [§]4904.” O.R. at 258. The trial court 

interpreted this cause of action as asserting assault and battery, false arrest, or even 

false imprisonment, all of which have a two-year statute of limitations. N.T., 

11/3/16, at 100. The trial court also determined that, insofar as Appellant asserted a

negligence claim for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, it was likewise 

barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 101. The incident occurred on 

November 6, 2011. However, Appellant did not file his Complaint until March 18, 

2014 – more than two years after the statute of limitations had run. Thus, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing all possible claims in Count II

as untimely. We discern no error in the trial court’s refusal to remove the nonsuit. 

As to Count III, Appellant claimed that Tenant designed and executed 

a scheme to defraud and incarcerate Appellant by making fraudulent utterances to 

authorities in violation of Section 4904 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. §4904.

10

 

 

10 This section provides:

(a) In general.—A person commits a misdemeanor of the second 

degree if, with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his 

official function, he:

 (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe 

to be true;

 (2) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to 

be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in authenticity; or

 (3) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, 

boundary mark, or other object which he knows to be false.

18 Pa. C.S. §4904.
14

This appears to state a claim for abuse of process. “The tort of ‘abuse of process’ is 

defined as the use of legal process against another ‘primarily to accomplish a purpose 

for which it is not designed.’” Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. 

1998) (quoting Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. 

1993)). “To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the 

defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish 

a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to 

the plaintiff.” Id. 

The statute of limitations for malicious abuse of process is two years, 

42 Pa. C.S. §5524(1), and accrues on the date the alleged abuse occurred. P.J.A. v. 

H.C.N., 156 A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1019 (Pa. 2017). 

Setting aside apparent statute of limitations problems, Appellant made no allegation 

to support his claim that Tenant abused any legal process by knowingly providing

false information to authorities. As the trial court pointed out, there are no 

statements alleged in the factual averments that Tenant actually made. N.T., 

11/3/16, at 102, 104. “In other words, there isn’t an averment here that she said 

certain things to police officers.” Id. at 103. Upon review, the entry of a compulsory 

nonsuit was proper, and there is no basis to remove it.

C. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel and Coordinate Jurisdiction

Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court violated principles of res

judicata, collateral estoppel and coordinate jurisdiction. More particularly, 

Appellant challenges Judge Erdos’ removal of the malicious prosecution count and 

entry of nonsuit, despite prior rulings by different judges on the same bench 

overruling POs and partially denying summary judgment. Appellant asserts that co-
15

equal judges of the same court cannot overrule one another, where the parties, facts, 

issues and relief sought are identical, without intervening materially relevant 

circumstances. Appellant believes these principles precluded Judge Erdos from 

removing the malicious prosecution claim from the jury at trial and entering nonsuit 

on the other claims. 

Res judicata encompasses two related, yet distinct principles: res 

judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Robinson v. 

Fye, 192 A.3d 1225, 1231-32 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). As this Court has explained: 

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies only when there 

exists a “coalescence of four factors: (1) identity of the 

thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the causes of action; 

(3) identity of the persons or parties to the action; and (4) 

identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or 

being sued.”

Id. at 1231 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 794 

A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), appeal denied, 818 A.2d 506 (Pa. 2003)). Res 

judicata precludes future suit between the parties for the same cause of action. Id.

Res judicata encompasses claims actually litigated and those that could have been 

litigated. Id.

Under collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, issues of fact or law may 

not be relitigated in a subsequent suit if, in a prior suit, these (1) same issues were 

(2) necessary for a final judgment on the merits, and the party against whom 

collateral estoppel is asserted (3) was a party to the prior action, and (4) had a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Robinson, 192 A.3d at 1231-

32. The purpose of collateral estoppel is to protect litigants from relitigating the 

same issue with the same party and to promote judicial economy. Id. at 1232. 
16

Under the rule of coordinate jurisdiction, “upon transfer of a matter 

between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter 

resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge.” Zane 

v. Friends Hospital, 836 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 2003). “[C]onsistent with the law of the 

case doctrine, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves to protect the expectations of 

the parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, 

to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation.” Id.

Although Appellant properly recites the above principles in his brief, 

he misapplies them to his case. Appellant appears to argue that because one trial 

court judge overruled POs in the nature of demurrer to his false arrest claims, and 

another trial court judge denied summary judgment as to Count II, that this precluded 

the third trial court judge on the same court from removing a malicious prosecution 

claim from the jury and entering nonsuit. 

As our Supreme Court has held, different judges may rule on different 

motions, explaining: 

Where the motions differ in kind, as [POs] differ from 

motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ from 

motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later 

motion is not precluded from granting relief although 

another judge has denied an earlier motion. However, a 

later motion should not be entertained or granted when a 

motion of the same kind has previously been denied, 

unless intervening changes in the facts or the law clearly 

warrant a new look at the question.

Goldey v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 675 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 1996) 

(emphasis in original). 

In this case, the motions were different and occurred at different points 

in the proceedings. First, Tenant filed a demurrer on the basis that Appellant failed 
17

to allege facts that would set forth a cause of action for false arrest in Count III, 

which Judge Colins overruled. Next, City Appellees filed a motion for summary 

judgment to Counts I and II. They asserted that Count I set forth a claim for false 

arrest and Count II appeared to bring a claim for assault and battery. They argued 

that both claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Ceisler granted 

summary judgment in favor of City Appellees regarding Count I of the Complaint 

because that claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, but denied the 

motion with respect to Count II, without explanation. Notably, City Appellees did 

not move to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim, and Judge Ceisler did not rule 

that Appellant pled a malicious prosecution claim. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, these prior rulings on these motions 

did not preclude Judge Erdos from ruling on the nonsuit. See Goldey. Following

the presentation of Appellant’s evidence at trial, Appellees moved for nonsuit. Judge 

Erdos, after considering potential claims asserted and hearing the evidence 

presented, determined that Appellant did not set forth a cause of action for malicious 

prosecution and entered nonsuit in favor of Appellees with regard to the remaining 

claims. Judge Erdos’ ruling did not implicate or violate the principles of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel or coordinate jurisdiction. Judge Erdos ruled on a different 

motion at a different point in the proceeding. Because it did not appear with certainty 

in the preliminary stages whether the law would permit no recovery, the trial court 

resolved any doubt in Appellant’s favor and allowed the case to proceed to trial. See 

Ford v. American States Insurance Co., 154 A.3d 237, 244 (Pa. 2017) (stating the 

standard for ruling on motions for summary judgment); Pennsylvania Independent 

Oil & Gas Association v. Department of Environmental Protection, 135 A.3d 1118, 

1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d, 161 A.3d 949 (Pa. 2017) (stating the standard for 
18

ruling on POs). However, in the trial stage, Judge Erdos concluded that Appellant 

failed to present a malicious prosecution claim and failed to establish any right to 

relief on the other plausible causes of action contained in his Complaint. Thus, he 

properly entered nonsuit. Upon review, we conclude that Judge Erdos did not violate 

the principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel or coordinate jurisdiction by 

entering nonsuit in favor of Appellees. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm. 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sekema Gentles, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 452 C.D. 2017

: 

City of Philadelphia, Matthew Kalita, :

Thomas Hayes, and Linda Green :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 25th day of February, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dated December 21, 2016, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge