2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-13-2014

Ronald Dandar v. Attorney General Pennsylvania

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 14-1712

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Recommended Citation

"Ronald Dandar v. Attorney General Pennsylvania" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 1157.

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CLD-020 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1712

___________

RONALD G. DANDAR,

 Appellant

v.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-00330)

District Judge: Honorable J. Frederick Motz

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and Consideration 

of Whether a Certificate of Appealability is Required

October 30, 2014

Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 

(Filed: November 13, 2014)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Ronald Dandar appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). We will affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 

(2008); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Dandar instituted this action by submitting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 

the District Court along with a motion for leave to proceed IFP. The filing fee for the 

habeas petition is $5.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A Magistrate Judge denied the IFP 

motion because Dandar’s prison account statement showed that he had sufficient funds to 

pay the fee. Dandar filed a motion for reconsideration, captioned, “Motion as to Whether 

Denial of In Forma Pauperis was Constitutional.” The District Court, apparently 

construing the motion as an appeal from the Magistrate Judge’s order, denied Dandar’s 

motion. Dandar timely appealed.

The denial of a motion for leave to proceed IFP is final and appealable, and we 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d 

Cir. 2003).1 We review the denial of leave to proceed IFP for abuse of discretion. See

Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985). “In this circuit, leave to proceed 

[IFP] is based on a showing of indigence.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 

n.5 (3d Cir. 1995). 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Dandar to pay the $5.00 

filing fee. Dandar had a balance of over $1000 at the time he submitted his IFP 

 

1 We have not decided whether a certificate of appealability is necessary to appeal the District Court’s denial of 

leave to proceed IFP in a habeas proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To the extent that a certificate of 

appealability might be required, we deny it for the reasons discussed herein.
3

application to the District Court. His account balance never fell below $100 in the six 

months prior to the filing. Thus, requiring Dandar to pay the $5.00 filing fee did not 

impermissibly “‘force [him] to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order to 

spare himself complete destitution.’” Jones, 752 F.2d at 79 (quoting Adkins v. Dupont 

Co., 335 U.S. 331, 340 (1948), and holding that District Court abused its discretion in 

requiring prisoner to pay $5.00 fee from an account balance of only $17.39). 

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Our ruling is without 

prejudice to Dandar’s right to refile his habeas petition with the $5.00 filing fee or 

resubmit it with another motion for leave to proceed IFP, as his circumstances may 

warrant.2

 

2 We granted Dandar leave to proceed IFP on appeal, but our action is not inconsistent with the denial of his IFP 

motion at the District Court level because the $505.00 fee for filing a notice of appeal is far higher than the $5.00 fee 

for filing a habeas petition.