****Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONon the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident****
**[**225**-**256**] **Appendix D: Supporting Charts and Documents Referred toDuring The Commission Investigation and Report****
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****Table of Contents****

 

1. Relevant Organization Charts of NASA andMorton Thiokol.

NASA

-  NASA   Headquarters  (incumbents as of   January 28, 1986). 
-  Office of Space   Flight  (incumbents as of January   28, 1986). 
-  Lyndon B. Johnson Space   Center  (incumbents as of January   28, 1986). 
-  John F. Kennedy Space   Center  (incumbents as of January   28, 1986).  George C. Marshall Space Flight Center   Organization Charts: 
-  Center   Organization  (incumbents as of   January 28, 1986). 
-  Science and Engineering   Directorate  (incumbents as of   January 28, 1986). 
-  Shuttle Projects   Office  (incumbents as of January   28, 1986). 
-  Key Marshall Personnel Related   to the Solid Rocket Booster . 

Morton Thiokol 

-  Morton Thiokol,   Inc.  (incumbents as of January 28,   1986). 
-  Morton Thiokol 27 Jan 1986   Meeting Participants . 

 

2. Temperature Definitions (as applicable tothis report)

| Parameter                                  | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| .                                          |
| Field Joint (O-ring)         Temperature | A calculated temperature for the         surface of the Solid Rocket Booster in the vicinity of the         tang/clevis joint. The O-ring temperature is assumed to be         the same. Calculations are based on a thermal model which         includes ambient temperature among the variables. (See         references 1 and 2.)                                                                                                                                      |
| .                                          |
| Ambient Temperature (at         launch)  | Measured atmospheric temperature at:         (See reference 3)
- Camera Site 3, approximately            1,000 feet, bearing 150 degrees from Launch Pad 39B (36            degrees Fahrenheit at launch.) 
- At a weather observation site            approximately 3,000 feet east of the Kennedy Shuttle            Landing Facility; (reported minimum of 24 degrees            Fahrenheit and maximum of 43 degrees Fahrenheit for            January 28, 1986). |

> 
References:
- 1. Report, "Accident Analysis   Team Report, Solid Rocket Motor Working Group, NASA, April 1986",   pages B-105 through B-114.    2. Commission Panel Work Session   (Solid Rocket Booster matters) Design and Production Panel;   Brigham City, Utah, March 18, 1986, pages 392 through 403.
  - 3. Report, "Accident Analysis   Team Report, Space Shuttle Systems Working Group. NASA, April   1986", pages 18 through 23, Tables B.1 and B.2.

Note: A comparison of atmosphericenvironmental data (wind, temperature, precipitation) for FlightsSTS-1 through STS-61C in included in Tables B.5 and B.6 of reference3.

 

3. Early Marshall documents and memorandaraising design objections.

- This  briefing chart  is the earliest known indication that the joint   design was unacceptable. Leon Ray, in a 1977 briefing on a planned   Structural Test Article test indicates that no changing the design   is unacceptable since the tang can move outboard and cause   excessive joint clearance resulting in seal leakage. 
- This  memorandum , written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q. Miller,   strongly urged that the clevis joint be redesigned. 
- This  memorandum , also written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q.   Miller, strongly questions the clevis joint design. It is the   earliest known official document which questions the redundancy of   the seal. 
- This Leon Ray    memorandum  documents his visits to two O-ring manufacturers,   both of whom expressed concern relative to the O-ring performing   properly in the joint design. 

 

4. Documents relating to the change fromCriticality 1R to 1, and the waiver of the redundancy requirementsfor the Solid Rocket Motor seal.

- This  original Critical Items List   entry  for the Solid Rocket Motor   case joint seals establishes them as Critically 1R   (redundant). 
- In late 1982, Marshall   Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance engineers reviewed test   and analysis results and determined that the case joints should be   reclassified as Critically 1 (not redundant).  This form  was signed by Maurice (Bud) Parker, a local Thiokol   Reliability engineer, beginning the process of management approval   of the Criticality change. 
- On January 21, 1983, the   Marshall Configuration Control Board, chaired by Lawrence Mulloy,   approved  the   change  from Criticality 1R to   Criticality 1 and approved it for forwarding to Level II. 
- After receiving written   concurrence from certain Johnson organizations, Glynn Lunney, the   Shuttle Program Manager, approved the Criticality change, based on   a telephone conversation with Lawrence Mulloy, the Solid Rocket   Booster Project Manager. The action was taken without convening a   meeting of the Program Requirements Control Board. This action   authorized submittal of a waiver of the "fail-safe" design   requirement to Level I.  Glynn Lunney signed this request for Level I to approve for the field joint a waiver   of the "fail-safe requirement" for Shuttle component, in that the   joint had been reclassified as Criticality 1 (no redundancy). The   waiver was approved for Level I by L. Michael Weeks on March 28,   1983. 

 

5. Memoranda written following the field jointO-ring erosion on STS 41-B (flight 10).

- This internal Marshall    note  was written by John W. Miller after the O-ring   erosion experience on STS 41-B (flight 10), indicating concern   that the leak check procedures may displace putty ("blow-holes")   leading to O-ring burning ("erosion"). STS 41-B was the first   flight for which a 200 psi leak check stabilization pressure was   used. 
- In this  memorandum  to Lawrence Mulloy, George Morefield compares the   Titan joint with the Shuttle joint and assesses a higher failure   probability for the shuttle joint, indicating concern that putty   may cause "single point pressurization" of the primary   O-ring. 

 

6. Marshall urgent request for briefing afterthe STS 51-C mission (flight 15).

- Following the discovery   of the STS 51-C (flight 15) O-ring erosion and blow-by, Lawrence   Mulloy sent this  "Certified Urgent"   message  to the Solid Rocket Motor   manager, Larry Wear. This message was passed on to Thiokol as   direction to prepare a detailed briefing on O-ring problems for   the next Flight Readiness Review. 

 

7. Internal NASA Headquarters memorandum aftervisit to Marshall.

- This  memorandum  to Level I describes a visit to Marshall by Irving   Davids of NASA Headquarters. Davids' visit was prompted by the   nozzle O-ring problems suffered on STS 51-B (flight 17). 

 

8. Thiokol letters and memoranda written afterO-ring concern escalates.

- Roger Boisjoily's    first   attempt  after STS 51-B (flight 17)   to convince his management of the seriousness of the O-ring   erosion problem. 
- In this  memorandum  to S.R. Stein, A.R. Thompson indicates the O-ring   seal problem is acute and short-term measures should be taken to   reduce flight risk. 
- In this  weekly activity   report , Robert Ebeling attempts   ("Help!") to draw management attention to the difficulties   experienced by the seal task force in getting adequate support,   indicating "This is a red flag." 
- S.R. Stein  echoes the   concerns  about the seal task force   not getting full support. 
- In this  activity report , Roger Boisjoly expresses his frustration with the   slow progress of and lack of management attention to the seal task   force. 

 

9. Marshall internal memorandum in the fall of1985.

- In this  memorandum , J. E. Kingsbury informs Lawrence Mulloy that he   places high priority on the O-ring seal problem and desires   additional information on plans for improving the   situation. 

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