# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 15-0073

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4


# K E N 

# P A X T O N 

# , A T T O R N E Y 

# G E N E R A L O F 

# T E X A S 

# , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v.


# C IT Y O F 

# D A L L A S 

# , R E S P O N D E N T

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T S O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## T H I R D A N D 

## T H I R T E E N T H 

## D I S T R I C T S O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued Septem ber 14, 2016

J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F 

## J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## G R E E N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## joined.

J U S T I C E 

## B O Y D 

## filed a dissenting opinion, in which J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## joined.

Recog nizi ng that g overnme nt is founded on the authority of t he pe o p l e an d “instituted for
their benef

it,” the Texas Public I nformation Act (PI A) favor s an open and transpar ent g overnme nt 1



## to ensure the people “re tain control over the instruments they h av e cr eated.” But the PI A 2


## simult aneously rec og nizes that public interests are best ad v ance d by shielding some information

T E X

. C O N S T

. a r t

. I , § 2

. 1

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a )

. 2

## from public disclosure. The L eg islature, in its considere d judgme nt, has excepted from disclosure 3



## more than six ty cate g ories of information, including information protec ted by the att o rn ey -c l i ent privileg e. The issue in this case is whether the g overnme ntal body must disclose its attorney -client-

4 

## privileg ed communications even though the parties ag ree the information is cate g orica lly excepted
from public disclosure under the Act. The controve rsy exis ts beca use (1 ) the g overnme ntal body
missed a ten-business-da

y statutory deadline to reque st a Texas Attorney Gene ral decision aff irming

a cate g orica l exception to disclosure appl i es , an d (2) an untimely reque st for an attorney g ener al 5


## decision g ives rise to a presumption that the information must be disclosed abse nt a “compe lling

rea son to withhold the information.” The crux of our inquiry conce rns the meaning of “compe lling 6



## rea son.”
The PI A does not define , delineate , or restric t the rea sons that may be “compe lling” enoug h

to withhold reque sted info rm at i o n fol lowing an untimely reque st for a decision. As a statutory -construc tion issue of first impression, we must therefor e dete rmine whe ther the inter ests
protec ted and advanced by the attorney -client privileg e are imperative enoug h to overc ome the public’s interest in having g overnme ntal bodies promptly reque st a deter mination from the attorney

g ener al’s office when they seek to p r o te c t c o n f id e n ti a l in f

o r ma ti o n f r o m p u b li c - in formation reque sts.
I n other words, we must asce rtain wh et h er the PI A mandates public dissemination of otherwise

S e e i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 1

- . 1 5 6

. 3

I d

. 4

S e e i d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 1

. 5

S e e i d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. 6


## 2

## confide ntial attorney -client communications solely beca use a g overnme ntal body missed a statutory
deadline.

We hold that, absent waiver , the interests protec ted by the attorney -client privileg e are
sufficie ntly compelling to re b u t the publ ic-disclosure presumption that arises on expiration of t he

PI A’s ten-da

y dead l i n e. T he attorney -client privileg e ref lects a foundational tenet in the law: ensuring the fre e fl ow of information betwee n attorney and client ultimately serve s the broade r
soci et al i n t erest of eff

ective administration of justice. The L eg islature’s choice to exempt 7


## information protec ted by the attorney -client privileg e embodies the fundame ntal understanding that,
in the public sector, maintaining candid attorney -client communication direc tly and significantly

serve s the public interest by fa ci litating acc ess to leg al advice vital to formulation and implementation of g overnme ntal policy

. Full and fra nk leg al discourse also protec t s the

g overnme nt’s interest in litigation, business trans ac t i ons, and other matters aff ecting the public. 8 

## Depr iving t h e p ri vileg e of its forc e thus compromises the public’s interest at both discrete and

sy stemic levels. 9



## Be cause failing to meet the PI A’s deadline to asser t a statutory exception to disclosure does
not, in and of itself, constitute waiver of the attorney -client privileg e, reque sted information does not automatically lose its con fi d ential s tatus and is not subject t o compelled disclosure under the PI A

S e e F o r d M o t o r C o

. v

. L e g g a t , 9 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 , 6 4 7 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 5 )

. 7

S e e I n r e C t y

. o f E r i e , 4 7 3 F

. 3 d 4 1 3 , 4 1 8

- 1 9 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 7 )

. 8

S e e , e

. g

. , I

n r e G r a n d J

u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d 5 2 7 , 5 3 4 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 5 )

. 9


## 3

## solely on that basis. We there fore aff irm the lower- court j u d g ments holding the attorney -client
confide nces a t issue need not be disc losed to the public-informa tion requestors.

I. The Texas Public Inf

orm ation Act’ s Requirem ents
The PI A embodies the State’s policy that “ea ch person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the aff airs of g overnme nt and the officia l acts of public of

ficials and e mploy ees.” 1 0


## Under the PI A, the public has a rig ht of acc ess to “public information,” a broadly define d 1 1



## term. A g overnme ntal body must “promptly ” produce public information afte r rec eiving a reque st 1 2 

## for disclosure, meaning “as soon as poss ible under th e ci rc u m s t an ces, that is, within a reasonable time, without delay .” The prompt production of pub l i c i n formation further s the “funda mental 1 3 

## philosophy ” that “g overnme nt is the servant a nd not the master of

the people.” 1 4


## The rig ht to acc ess is not absolute, howeve r; the L eg islature incorporated into the PI A more
than six ty exceptions to the public-disclosure require ment. Statutory exceptions rang e from very 1 5


## broad to more specific cate g ories o f i n formation, including “informa tion considere d to be

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a )

. 10

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 0 2 1

. 11

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 0 0 2 ( a ) ( “ P u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n ” m e a n s “ i n f

o r m a t i o n t h a t i s w r i t t e n , p r o d u c e d , c o l l e c t e d , a s s e m b l e d , 12

o r m a i n t a i n e d u n d e r a l a w o r o r d i n a n c e o r i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o f o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s ” b y a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y , b y i t s e m p l o y e e s o r o f f i c e r s i n t h e i r o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i t y i f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n s t o o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y , o r “ f o r a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y ” i f i t o w n s , h a s a r i g h t o f a c c e s s t o , o r s p e n d s o r c o n t r i b u t e s p u b l i c m o n e y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f w r i t i n g , p r o d u c i n g , c o l l e c t i n g , a s s e m b l i n g , o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n )

.
I d

. § 5 5 2

. 2 2 1 ( a )

. 13

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a )

. 14

I d

. § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 1

- . 1 5 6

. 15


## 4

## confide ntial by law, either co n s t itutional, statutory , or by judicial decision,” attorney -client 1 6 

## information, cer

tain rar e books and orig inal manuscripts, various cate g ories of rec ords conta ining 1 7 1 8



## persona l information of public employ ees or private citizens, and sensitive crime- scene imag es. 1 9 2 0 

## “[The PI A’s] e x ceptions embra ce the understanding that the public’s rig ht to know is te mpere d by
the individual and other inter ests at stake in disclosing that information.” 2 1


## Consist ent with the PI A’s fundame ntal prec ept that “[t] he people, in deleg ating authority , do

not g ive their public serva nts the rig ht to decide what is g ood for the people to know and what is not

g ood for them to know,” a g overnme ntal body cannot unilatera lly deter mine that reque sted 2 2


## information is exempt from disclosure. Rather, a g overnme ntal body must reque st a decision from
the Texas Attorney Gene ral confirming the claimed exception applies to the reque sted information, unless the Attorney Gene ral has previously made a deter mination that the information falls within
a cla imed exception. 2 3



## I n harmony with the policy underlying the PI A’s prompt-produc tion require ment, th e
g overnme ntal body asser

ting an exception to disclosure must reque st an attorney g ener al decision

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 1 0 1

. 16

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 1 0 7

. 17

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 1 2 0

. 18

E

. g

. , i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 2 , . 1 1 4 , . 1 1 5 , . 1 1 7 , . 1 1 7 6 , . 1 2 3 5 , . 1 2 4

. 19

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 1 0 8 5

. 20

T e x

. D e p ’ t o f P u b

. S a

f e t y v

. C o x T

e x

. N e w s p a p e r s , L

. P

. , 3 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 1 )

. 21

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a )

. 22

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 1 ( a )

. 23


## 5

## “within a rea sonable time b u t n o t l at er than the 10th business day afte r the date of rec eiving the

written reque st.” I f a reques t fo r decision is untimely , “the information reque sted in writing is 2 4 

## presumed to be subject to require d public disclosure and must be rele ased unless there is a

compe lling reason to w ithhold the infor mation .” 2 5



## To secur e compliance with the statute, the PI A p r o v id e s c iv il

- e n f o r c ement mecha

nisms when

a g overnme ntal body “re fuses to reque st an attorney g ener al’s decision” or “re fuses to supply public
information or information that the attorney g ener al has deter mined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure.” I n such case s, either the reque stor or the Attorney Gene ral can instit ute 2 6 

## mandamus proceeding s to compel acce ss to the i nformation. The PI A furthe r authoriz es certain 2 7


## local or state officia ls to seek decla ratory or injunctive relief based on a complaint by “a person who
claims to be the victim of a [P I A] violation,” but only afte r the g overnme ntal body is aff orded notice
and fails to timely cure the alleg ed violation. Subject to limit ed ex ce p t i o ns, the trial court shall 2 8



## awa rd costs of l itigation and rea sonable attorney fee s to a plainti ff who substantia l l y p re v ai l s in a
civil-enfor ceme nt suit aga inst the gove rnmental body

. 2 9

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 1 ( b )

. 24

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 25

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 ( a )

. 26

I d

. 27

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 5

. 28

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 2 3 ( a )

. 29


## 6

## The PI A also provides criminal penalties for (1) destruction, remova l, or altera tion of public information, (2) distribution or misuse of “informa tion considere d confide ntial under the [P I A’s] terms,” a nd (3) c riminally

neg lige nt failure to pr ovide ac cess to or c opies of public informa tion. 3 0



## I n c o mp a r is o n , “ [t ]h e o n ly s uit a g overnme ntal body may file seeking to withhold information
from a reque stor is a suit

. . . seek[ing] decla ratory relief from compliance with [an attorney g ener al]
decision.” Attorney fee s and costs may be awa rded to a party who substantially preva ils in a suit 3 1


## instit uted by

a g overnme ntal body

. 3 2



## II. Th e Dispute

I n this consolidated appea l, the City of Dal l as s ee ks relief from two attorney g ener al
decisions concluding the City must disclose confide ntial attorney -client communications pursuant

to public-informa tion reque sts the City rec ei v ed reg arding the McCommas Bluff L andfill (the

L andfill cas e) and a convention-c enter hotel (the Hotel case ). The parties ag ree the reque sted
information const i t utes “public information” under the PI A, but beca use the information is undisputedly subject to the attorney -client privileg e, the City contends the information is excepted
from disclosure under PI A s ections 552.101 (the confidential-by -law ex ception) and 552.107 (the
attorney -client e x ception).
Section 552.107 applies to “informa tion that the attorney g ener al or an attorney of a political
subdivision is prohib i t ed from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the Texas Rules of

I d

. § § 5 5 2

. 3 5 1

- . 3 5 3

. 30

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 2 4 ( a )

. 31

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 2 3 ( b )

. 32


## 7

## Evidence or t he Tex as Discipli nary Rules of Professional Conduct.” Section 552.101 applies t o 3 3


## “informa tion considere d to be confide ntial by law, eit her constitutional, statutory , or by judicial
d ec i s i o n
. ” Acc ording to the City , section 552.101 encompa sses the attorney -client privilege

3 4


## beca use the pri v i l ege d er i ves from the common law and is also memorialized in judicially promulg ated r

ules.
The parties ag ree the PI A excepts attorney -client communications from public disclosure, althoug h they disag ree about whether protec tion is aff orded under the confide ntial-by -law exception

or the attorney -client exception. The dispute is not about whether the PI A excepts the reque sted
information from public disclosure—the parties ag ree it does. Nor does the City contend that it may
unilatera lly make that deter mination. Rather, the dispu t e ar i s es beca use the City failed to timely

reque st an attorney

g ener al dec ision affirming that the information fa lls withi n one of the asser ted exceptions, as require d by section 552.301 of the PI A.

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 1 0 7

. T h e e v i d e n c e a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l

- c o n d u c t r u l e s “ e x p r e s s l y d e e m c e r t a i n a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t 33

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o b e ‘ c o n f i d e n t i a l

. ’ ” I

n r e C i t y o f G e o r g e t o w n , 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 8 , 3 3 3 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. T e x a s R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 5 0 3 ( a ) ( 5 ) d e f i n e s a c o m m u n i c a t i o n a s “ c o n f i d e n t i a l ” i f i t i s “ n o t i n t e n d e d t o b e d i s c l o s e d t o t h i r d p e r s o n s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e t o w h o m d i s c l o s u r e i s m a d e t o f u r t h e r t h e r e n d i t i o n o f

p r o f e s s i o n a l l e g a l s e r v i c e s t o t h e c l i e n t ; o r r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o t r a n s m i t t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
. ” U n d e r R u l e 5 0 3 ( b ) , a c l i e n t “ h a s a p r i v i l e g e t o r e f u s e t o d i s c l o s e a n d t o p r e v e n t a n y o t h e r p e r s o n f r o m d i s c l o s i n g c o n f

i d e n t i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m a d e t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e r e n d i t i o n o f p r o f e s s i o n a l l e g a l s e r v i c e s t o t h e c l i e n t , ” s u b j e c t t o l i m i t e d e x c e p t i o n s
. T e x a s D i s c i p l i n a r y R u l e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t 1

. 0 5 ( b ) i m p o s e s a d u t y o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y a n d p r o h i b i t s a l a w y e r f r o m k n o w i n g l y r e v e a l i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n
. R u l e 1

. 0 5 ( a ) d e f i n e s “ [ c ] o n f

i d e n t i a l i n f

o r m a t i o n ” t o i n c l u d e “ p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n ” t h a t i s p r o t e c t e d b y T e x a s R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 5 0 3 a n d “ u n p r i v i l e g e d c l i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n
. ” T h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l h a s r u l e d t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d c o n f

i d e n t i a l s o l e l y u n d e r R u l e 1

. 0 5

— i n c l u d i n g “ u n p r i v i l e g e d c l i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n ”

— i s n o t c o n s i d e r e d
c o n f i d e n t i a l u n d e r t h e P I A b e c a u s e R u l e 1

. 0 5 “ p e r m i t [ s ] d i s c l o s u r e o f c l i e n t i n f

o r m a t i o n ‘ [ w ] h e n t h e l a w y e r h a s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o d o s o i n o r d e r t o c o m p l y w i t h

. . . o t h e r l a w
. ’ ” T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O p
. O R D

- 6 7 6 a t 2 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g T E X

. D IS C IP L IN A R Y R

. P R O F ’ L C O N D U C T 1

. 0 5 ( c ) ( 4 ) )

. T h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l h a s t h u s c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y ’ s i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s o t h e r w i s e m a d e c o n f i d e n t i a l s o l e l

y u n d e r r u l e 1

. 0 5 i s s u b j e c t t o t h e r u l e ’ s ‘ o t h e r l a w ’ e x c e p t i o n t o c o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y w h e n i t i s r e q u e s t e d u n d e r t h e [ P I A ]

. ” I d

. T h i s c a s e d o e s n o t i n v o l v e u n p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n p r o t e c t e d f

r o m d i s c l o s u r e u n d e r R u l e 1

. 0 5

.
T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 1 0 1

. 34


## 8

## The City reque sted an attorney g ener al decision twenty -six business day s afte r rec eiving the

written reque st in the L andfill ca s e an d forty -nine business day s afte r rec eiving the reque st in the
Hotel case
. The City ’s proff ere d rea son for the delay was inadver tence

. Be cause the reque sts for

3 5



## an open-r ecor ds ruling wer e untimely , the City conce des the reque sted information is pr esumed to
be subject to disclosure unless “a compelling rea son to withhold the information” exis ts. Thus, the 3 6


## deter minative issue is whether the City met its burden to rebut the public-disclosure presumption in
section 552.302 that was trig g ere d when the City failed to timely seek an attorney g ener al decision.
The City asser

ts a number of statutory excep tions to disclosure and adama ntly arg ues that important policies underly ing the attorney -client privileg e prese nt a compelling rea son to withhold
disclosure of confi d e n

ti a l a ttor ney -client communications. The City also claims a compelling rea son

to withhold the requ es t ed l andfill information beca use disclosure would prejudice its barg aining position i n a long -term tra nsaction with milli ons of dollars at stake

. Thoug h attorney -client communications are not intended to be fre ely acc essible to the public
under the PI A or available to third parties in proce edin gs o u t side the PI A, the Attorney Gene ral
deter mined the City must rele ase the reque sted information. The Attorney Gene ral’s letter ruling s 3 7



## wer e based on ag ency prec edent limit ing the “compe lling rea son” standard to (1) information falling
under an exception the Attorney Gene ral considers to impose “manda tory ” confide ntiality , meaning

T h e C i t y d i d n o t a s s e r t a r e a s o n f o r t h e u n t i m e l i n e s s i n p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w , b u t a t o r a l a r g u m e n t b e f o r e t h i s 35 C o u r t , t h e C i t y ’ s a t t o r n e y s a i d “ w e m i s s e d t h e d e a d l i n e s i n b o t h o f t h e s e i n s t a n c e s
. I t w a s i n a d v e r t e n c e I b e l i e v e
. T h e r e ’ s

. . . n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e a n y t h i n g e l s e
. ” O r a l A r g
. N o
. 1 5

- 0 0 7 3 , 2 0 1 6 W L 4 9 9 2 6 4 7 , a t * 6 ( T e x
. S e p t

. 1 4 , 2 0 1 6 )

.
S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

.

36

S e e T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R 2 0 0 8

- 0 8 8 5 9 ( H o t e l c a s e ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R 2 0 1 0

- 0 8 2 8 5 ( L a n d f i l l c a s e )

. 37


## 9

## the g overnme n t al b o d y is prohibited by law from disclosing the information and could not

voluntarily disclose the information without being criminally san ct i o n ed under the PI A, and 3 8 

## (2) information that could jeopar dize third parties if disclosed. The latter circ ums t an ce i s not 3 9 

## implicated by the public-informa tion reque sts at issue, and the Attorney Gene ral asser ts the former
does not apply beca

use the attorney -client pri v i l eg e can be waived voluntarily , making
confide ntiality “discre tionary ,” not “manda tory .” Taking a constraine d view o f t h e s tatutory lang uag e, the Attorney Gene ral has d et er m i n ed that the mere ability to waive the attorney -client privileg e automatically and cate g orica lly prec ludes the privileg e from constitu t i ng a compelling

rea son to withho ld c o n f

id e n ti a l a tt o r n e y -client communications, even if the privileg e has not actually
b ee n waived. Acc ording ly , the Attorney Gene ral ruled that neither the confide ntial nature o f

A c c o r d i n g t o t h e O f

f i c e o f t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , m a n d a t o r y e x c e p t i o n s i n c l u d e t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l

- b y - l a w 38

e x c e p t i o n a n d t h o s e c o v e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n m a d e c o n f

i d e n t i a l u n d e r t h e P I A , i n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n s 5 5 2

. 1 0 2 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n P e r s o n n e l I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 0 9 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n P r i v a t e C o m m u n i c a t i o n s o f a n E l e c t e d O f f i c e H o l d e r ” ) , . 1 1 0 ( “ C o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y o f T r a d e S e c r e t s ; C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n C o m m e r c i a l o r F i n a n c i a l I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) ,

. 1 1 3 ( “ C o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y o f G e o l o g i c a l o r G e o p h y s i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 1 4 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f S t u d e n t R e c o r d s ” ) , . 1 1 5 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f B i r t h a n d D e a t h R e c o r d s ” ) , . 1 1 7 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n A d d r e s s e s
. . . a n d P e r s o n a l F a m i l y I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 1 8 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f O f

f i c i a l P r e s c r i p t i o n P r o g r a m I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 1 9 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n P h o t o g r a p h s o f P e a c e O f f i c e r s ” ) , . 1 2 0 ( “ C o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n R a r e B o o k s a n d O r i g i n a l M a n u s c r i p t s ” ) , . 1 2 1 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n D o c u m e n t s H e l d f o r H i s t o r i c a l R e s e a r c h ” ) , . 1 2 3 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f N a m e o f A p p l i c a n t f o r [ C E O ] o f I n s t i t u t i o n o f H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n ” ) , . 1 2 4 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f R e c o r d s o f L i b r a r y o r L i b r a r y S y s t e m ” ) , . 1 2 6 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f N a m e o f A p p l i c a n t f o r S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f P u b l i c S c h o o l D i s t r i c t ” ) , . 1 3 1 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 3 3 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f P u b l i c P o w e r U t i l i t y C o m p e t i t i v e M a t t e r s ” ) , . 1 3 4 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n I n f o r m a t i o n R e l a t i n g t o I n m a t e o f D e p a r t m e n t o f C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e ” ) , . 1 3 5 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n I n f

o r m a t i o n H e l d b y S c h o o l D i s t r i c t ” ) , . 1 3 6 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f C r e d i t C a r d

. . . N u m b e r s ” ) , . 1 3 8 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f F a m i l y V i o l e n c e S h e l t e r C e n t e r
. . . I n f o r m a t i o n ” ) , . 1 3 9 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f G o v e r n m e n t I n f o r m a t i o n R e l a t e d t o S e c u r i t y o r I n f r a s t r u c t u r e I s s u e s f

o r C o m p u t e r s ” ) , . 1 4 0 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f M i l i t a r y D i s c h a r g e R e c o r d s ” ) ,

. 1 4 2 ( “ C o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y o f

R e c o r d s S u b j e c t t o O r d e r o f N o n d i s c l o s u r e ” ) , . 1 4 5 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f T e x a s N o - C a l l L i s t ” ) ,

. 1 4 8 ( “ C o n f

i d e n t i a l i t y o f C e r t a i n P e r s o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n M a i n t a i n e d b y M u n i c i p a l i t y P e r t a i n i n g t o a M i n o r ” ) , . 1 5 1 ( “ C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f I n f

o r m a t i o n C o n c e r n i n g I n f o r m a t i o n R e g a r d i n g S e l e c t A g e n t s ” )

. S e e O F F IC E O F T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L , P U B L IC I N F O R M A T I O N H A N D B O O K 4 2

- 4 3 & n
. 1 5 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) ( c i t i n g A c t o f M a y 3 0 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 2 2 9 , § § 3

- 2 1 , 2 3

- 2 6 , 2 8

- 3 7 )

.

E

. g

. , T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 6 7 7 a t 1 0 ( 2 0 0 2 )

. 39


## 10

## attorney -client communications nor the City ’s particula rized alleg ation of prejudice to its business
interests constitutes a c ompelling r eason to withhold the re quested infor mation.
The City challeng ed the letter ruling s in separ ate trial-cour t proc ee d i n g s and achie ved conflicting results. I n the Hotel case , the trial court held the City did not have a compelling rea son

to withhold the reque sted information. But in the L andfill case , the trial court found the information
is excepted from require d public disclosure, explaining the attorney -client privileg e is an inhere ntly “compe lling rea son to withhold information” beca use it is vital to our adver sarial sy stem of justice
and no authority s u p p o rt s compelling disclosure of information protec ted by the attorney -client privi l ege b as ed solely on a missed deadline. The City and the Attorney Gene ral appea led the 4 0



## respe ctive adve rse r

ulings.

I n the L andfill case , a divided Third Court of Appea ls aff irmed the trial court’s judgme nt in
the City ’s favor, holding attorney -client communications are excepted from disclosure under the
confide ntial-by -law exceptio n a n d , considering the privileg e’s purposes and the protec tions aff orded
under the law, a compelling rea son to withhold the info rm ation nece ssarily exis ts and rebuts the public-disclosure pr esumption in section 552.302. 4 1



## Th e Ho t el ca s e was transfe rre d to the Thirteenth Court of Appea ls pursuant to a docketequalization order

. Appl y i n g t h e appellate decision in the L andfill case as prec edent, the court 4 2

C f

. T E X

. R

. C IV

. P

. 1 9 3

. 3 ( d ) ( a c t u a l d i s c l o s u r e o f p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n o r m a t e r i a l s d o e s n o t w a i v e t h e 40 p r i v i l e g e a b s e n t d i s c l o s u r e w i t h i n t e n t t o w a i v e t h e p r i v i l e g e o r f a i l u r e t o c l a i m t h e p r i v i l e g e w i t h i n t e n d a y s a f t e r t h e p a r t y a c t u a l l y d i s c o v e r s t h e d i s c l o s u r e o c c u r r e d )

.

4 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 5 8 0 , 5 8 7

- 8 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 5 )

. 41

S e e T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 4 1

. 3 ( “ [ T ] h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s t o w h i c h t h e c a s e i s t r a n s f e r r e d m u s t d e c i d e t h e c a s e i n 42

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r e c e d e n t o f t h e t r a n s f e r o r c o u r t u n d e r p r i n c i p l e s o f s t a r e d e c i s i s
. . . . ” )

.



## 11

## rea ched the same conclusion, reve rsing the trial court’s ju d gm en t and rende ring judgme nt for the

City

. 4 3 

## On appe al to this Court, we consolidated the Attorne y Gene ral’s a

ppeals for arg ument and dispositi on. 4 4



## III. Discussion The parties ag ree that, had the City timely re q u es ted an attorney g ener al decision, the P I A
does not r equire public disclosure of attorney -client confide nces in e ither the L andfill or the Hote l

case
. Nor is t here any dispute that the City ’s untimely reque sts activate d a presumption that the

reque sted information must be disclosed absent a “compe lling rea son to withhold the information.” Thus, the dispositi ve issue is whether a “compe lling rea son” exis ts to rebut the public-disclo s u re presumption.
The resolution of that issue does not turn on whether the attorney -client privileg e falls within

one statuto ry ex ce p t i on or another , or whether confide ntiality is at the g overnme ntal body ’s
discretion rathe r than co m p u l s o ry , as asser ted by the Attorney Gene ral. Such extra-textual
distinctions are not decisive beca use the statute p rescribes “a compelling rea son to withhold the
information” a s the deter

minative and only

standard. 4 5

2 0 1 5 W L 6 0 1 9 7 4 , a t * 5 ,

_ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 1 5 )

. 43

I n t h i s a p p e a l , w e h a v e r e c e i v e d a m i c u s c u r i a e b r i e f s f r o m t h e F r e e d o m o f I n f o r m a t i o n F o u n d a t i o n o f T e x a s , 44

w h i c h s u p p o r t s t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ’ s p o s i t i o n ; a n d t h e T e x a s M u n i c i p a l L e a g u e , T e x a s C i t y A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d T e x a s A s s o c i a t i o n o f C o u n t i e s , w h i c h a r e a l i g n e d w i t h t h e C i t y o f D a l l a s
.

S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. 45


## 12

## I n resolving the dispute at hand, we aff irm that even under the compelling -re ason standard,
information cannot be with h eld unless a statutory exception applies, beca use public information

rema ins public unless i t i s ex p ressly excepted from disclosure. But mere ly establishing an 4 6 

## exception cannot alway s be sufficie nt to rebut the public-disclosure presumption, beca use if the

statute wer e so construe d, the compelling -re ason re quirement would be rende red a nullity

. We reje ct, howeve r, the notion that statutory ex ce p tions are cate g orica lly distinct from compelling rea sons and that something more is alway s require d to rebut the presumption that arises
from a g overnme ntal body ’s failure to timely reque st an attorne y g ener al decision. I n some instances, important policies and interests that animate a statutory exception are compelling in their

own right

. We hold the attorney -client privileg e, whi ch is protec ted by one or more statutory exceptions to public disclosure, protec ts and ad v an ce s interests that provide independe ntly 4 7 

## compelling rea sons to withhold privi leg ed informa tion unless confidentiality has bee n waived.
A. “Com pellin g Reason”
The controlling issue in this case involves the proper construction and ap plication of the
“c o m p elling rea son” standard in section 552.302 of the PI A, which is implicated when a
g overnme ntal body seeks to withhold information from public disclosure but fails to make a timely

S e e i d

. § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a ) ( u n d e r t h e P I A , “ e a c h p e r s o n i s e n t i t l e d , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d b y l a w , a t 46

a l l t i m e s t o c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e a f

f a i r s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e o f f i c i a l a c t s o f p u b l i c o f

f i c i a l s a n d e m p l o y e e s ” ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ) ; s e e a l s o D o e v

. T a r r a n t C t

y

. D i s t

. A t t o r n e

y ’ s O f f i c e , 2 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 7 , 1 5 3

- 5 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 0 8 , n o p e t

. ) ; S i m m o n s v

. K u z m i c h , 1 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 2 , 3 5 0 ( T e x
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t

. )

.

B e c a u s e t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t e x c e p t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e r e q u e s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n , w e n e e d n o t 47

c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r p r i v i l e g e d a n d c o n f i d e n t i a l a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a l s o p r o t e c t e d b y t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l

- b y - l a w e x c e p t i o n
. S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 1 , . 1 0 7

. 

## 13

## reque st for an attorney g ener al decision. Statutory construction prese nts a question of law that we 4 8


## deter mine de novo under

well-e stablished principles. 4 9



## As alway s, our mandate is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the L eg islature’s intent as expressed
in the statutory lang uag e. Fur ther, by statutory direc tive, we must liberally construe the PI A to 5 0 

## promote the policy

of open g overnme nt. 5 1


## The PI A does not define the phrase “compe lling rea son” or its constituent term s ; a c c o rding ly , those words bear their common, ordi n ar y m ea n i ng unless a differe nt or m ore precise definition is

appar ent from the statutory context or the plain meaning y ields an absurd result. Thoug h neither 5 2


## of those qualify ing exceptions applies, the Attorney Gene ral relies on ag ency -def ere nce and leg islative-ra tification doctrines t o support a restric tive construction of the compelling -re ason
standard.

L ong befor e the “compe lling rea son” safe g uard was added to section 552.302, the Attorney
Gene ral authorized g overnme ntal bodies to withhold information from public disclosure despite an untimely reque st for an open-r ecor ds decision, if a “compe lling rea son” or a “compe llin g

S e e i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 3 0 1

- . 3 0 2

. 48

T I C E n e r g y & C h e m

. , I

n c

. v

. M a r t i n , 4 9 8 S

. W

. 3 d 6 8 , 7 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 )

. 49

I d

. 50

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( d e m a n d i n g l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n t o i m p l e m e n t t h e s t a t e ’ s p o l i c y o f o p e n 51 g o v e r n m e n t a n d t o f

a v o r d i s c l o s i n g i n f

o r m a t i o n a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t a l a f f a i r s )

.
G r e e n e v

. F a r m e r s I

n s

. E x c h

. , 4 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 1 , 7 6 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 )

. 52


## 14

## demonstration” rebutted the statutory presumption of openness. Bu t the Attorney Gene ral 5 3



## rec og nized only two circ umstances that could s ati s fy that standard: “[1] the asserted ex ception is
‘manda tory ,’ i.e. , the information is confide ntial b y l aw and the g overnme ntal body there fore is prohibited from rele asing it, or [2] if the rele ase of the information implicates third party interests.” 5 4


## Citi ng leg islative history and rely ing on ag ency prec ede n t , t h e At torney Gene ral asser ts the

L eg islature intended a simil arly constraine d construction of section 552.302’s compelli n g -re ason
standard. As so construed, the At t o rn ey Gene ral contends the City cannot rebut the public-

5 5 

## disclosure pre sumption because ne ither condition exist s.
We decline the Attorney Gene ral’s invitation to imp o rt re s t ri ctions that alter the plain lang uag e of the statute at issue here

. We have long held a statute’s unambig uous lang uag e controls
the outcome. When a s t at ute is clea r and unambig uous, like section 552.302, we do not resor t to
extrinsi c int erpr etive aids, such as leg islative history , “bec ause the statute’s pl ain l ang uag e ‘is the

surest g uide to the L eg islature’s intent.’” Moreove r, al t h o u gh we may consider an ag ency ’s 5 6


## construction of a statute, “ deferring to an ag ency ’s const ru ct i on is appropr iate only when the

S e e , e

. g

. , T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 6 3 0 a t 3 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 5 5 2 a t 1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. 53 O R D

- 3 1 9 a t 1

- 2 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 1 5 0 a t 2 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 3 4 a t 2 ( 1 9 7 4 )

.

T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 6 7 7 a t 1 0 ( 2 0 0 2 )

. T h e P I A e x p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t s a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y f r o m r e l e a s i n g 54 i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s “ c o n f

i d e n t i a l u n d e r l a w ” a n d i m p o s e s c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y w h e n a p e r s o n d i s t r i b u t e s i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s c o n s i d e r e d c o n f

i d e n t i a l u n d e r t h e P I A

. S e e T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 6 7 6 a t 2 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( c i t i n g T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 0 0 7 ,

. 3 5 2 )

.
S e e A c t o f M a y 2 5 , 1 9 9 9 , 7 6 t h L e g
. , c h

. 1 3 1 9 , § 2 1 , s e c
. 5 5 2

. 3 0 2 , 1 9 9 9 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 4 5 0 0 , 4 5 0 9 ; s e e a l s o

55 T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 6 3 0 a t 3 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 5 5 2 a t 1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 3 1 9 a t 1

- 2 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 1 5 0 a t 2 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n
. O R D

- 3 4 a t 2 ( 1 9 7 4 )

.

S u l l i v a n v

. A b r a h a m , 4 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 4 , 2 9 9 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( q u o t i n g P r a i r i e V i e w A & M U

n i v

. v

. C h a t h a , 3 8 1 56 S

. W

. 3 d 5 0 0 , 5 0 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) )

. 

## 15

## statutory lang uag e is ambig uous.” I n like manne r , le g is la tive ratification applies only to ambig uous 5 7



## statutes. We reje ct the limit ations the Attorney Gene ral champions beca use they are not text ually 5 8 

## supportable. I nstead, we must apply the plain meaning of the phrase “compe lling rea son to withhold the information,” w hich is not as circ umscribed a s the Attorney Gene ral a dvocate s.
The meaning of the term “compe lling” is of vi t al i m p o rtanc e to our analy sis beca use it

repr esents a qualitative limit ation on the justifications that permit withholding information from public disclosure. Neither a rea son nor even a good rea son would be sufficie nt to rebut the publicdisclosure pre sumption. The rea son must be “compelling .”
Our ex amination of di ctionarie s, trea tises, and judi cial constructions of si mil ar l an guag e 5 9



## reve als the term “c o mp e ll in g ” c o n n o te s u r g e n c y , f o r c e f u ln e s s , a n d s ig n if ic a n tl y d e ma nding conce rns. “Compelling” means “[u] rg ently requiring attention” and “[d] riving ly forc eful”; “not able to be 6 0 

## resisted; overw helming” and “not able to be ref uted; in s p i ri n g conviction”; and “ca lling for 6 1

S w

. R o y a l t i e s , I

n c

. v

. H e g a r , 5 0 0 S

. W

. 3 d 4 0 0 , 4 0 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ; s e e a l s o B o e i n g C o

. v

. P a x t o n , 4 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d 57 8 3 1 , 8 3 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 5 ) ( “ W h i l e t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e [ P I A ] i s e n t i t l e d t o d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a s w i t h
o t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n s , s u c h d e f e r e n c e m u s t y i e l d t o u n a m b i g u o u s s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e
. ” )

.
T e x

. D e p ’ t o f P r o t e c t i v e & R e g u l a t o r y S e r v s

. v

. M e g a C h i l d C a r e , I n c

. , 1 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 1 7 0 , 1 7 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 4 ) 58 ( “ I f a n a m b i g u o u s s t a t u t e t h a t h a s b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d b y a c o u r t o f l a s t r e s o r t o r g i v e n a l o n g s t a n d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n b y a p r o p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r i s r e - e n a c t e d w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s p r e s u m e d t o h a v e b e e n f a m i l i a r w i t h t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t o h a v e a d o p t e d i t

. ” ) ; s e e a l s o P r e t z e r v

. M o t o r V

e h i c l e B d

. , 1 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 9 0 8 , 9 1 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( “ [ N ] e i t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e r a t i f i c a t i o n n o r j u d i c i a l d e f e r e n c e t o a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n w o r k a c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f p l a i n s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e
. ” )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , G r e e n e v

. F a r m e r s I n s

. E x c h

. , 4 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 1 , 7 6 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 ) ( l o o k i n g t o d i c t i o n a r i e s , t r e a t i s e s , 59

a n d s t a t e - a n d f

e d e r a l

- c o u r t c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n s i m i l a r c o n t e x t s )

.
T H E A M E R IC A N H E R IT A G E D IC T IO N A R Y ( 5 t h e d

. 2 0 1 6 )

. 60

N E W O X F O R D A M E R IC A N D IC T IO N A R Y ( 3 d e d

. 2 0 1 0 )

. 61


## 16

## ex amination, scrutiny , considera tion, or thought.” A need is “compe lling” if it is “so g rea t t h at 6 2 

## irrepa rable harm or injust ice would r esult if it is not met”; a reason may be “compelling” if time 6 3


## is of the essenc e; a g overnme ntal interest “is compelling when the balanc e weig hs in its favor ”; 6 4 6 5


## and the public interest in maintaining confide ntiality of information may be “compe lling” if th e
interest advanc ed b y the promise of confide ntiality would be “evisc era ted” by compelled
disclosure. 6 6 

## Thoug h not authoritative, we may , as this Court has often done, look to federal case s for

g uidance on the meaning of terms not otherwi s e define d. Fe dera l courts have employ ed a 6 7 

## “compe lling rea son” standard to deter mine whether information should be withheld from the public
in an analog ous context involving sealing judicial rec ords. Much like the policies underly ing the 6 8

W E B S T E R ’ S T H IR D N E W I N T ’ L D IC T IO N A R Y ( 2 0 0 2 )

. 62

B L A C K ’ S L A W D IC T IO N A R Y ( 1 0 t h e d

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o m p e l l i n g n e e d ” )

. 63

S t a t e e x r e l

. A n g e l i n i v

. H a r d b e r g e r , 9 3 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 9 , 4 9 0 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( h o l d i n g e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s 64 p r e s e n t a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n f o r t h i s C o u r t t o e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n t o d e c i d e a q u o w a r r a n t o w i t h o u t p r i o r p r e s e n t m e n t t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t )

.

B a r r v

. C i t

y o f S i n t o n , 2 9 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 8 7 , 3 0 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 ) ; s e e a l s o G o n z a l e s v

. O C e n t r o B e n e f i c e n t e U n i a o 65 d o V e g e t a l , 5 4 6 U

. S

. 4 1 8 , 4 3 1

- 3 2 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; B L A C K ’ S L A W D IC T IO N A R Y ( 1 0 t h e d

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o m p e l l i n g - s t a t e i n t e r e s t t e s t ” a s a m e t h o d “ w h e r e b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a w a n d i t s p u r p o s e a r e b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t a n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t h a t i s a f f e c t e d b y t h e l a w ” )

.
E l i L i l l y & C o

. v

. M a r s h a l l , 8 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 5 , 1 6 0 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 3 )

. 66

S e e , e

. g

. , G r e e n e v

. F a r m e r s I n s

. E x c h

. , 4 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 1 , 7 6 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 )

. 67

R u d d E q u i

p

. C o

. v

. J

o h n D e e r e C o n s t r

. & F o r e s t r y C o

. , 8 3 4 F

. 3 d 5 8 9 , 5 9 3 ( 6 t h C i r
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ ‘ [ O ] n l y t h e m o s t 68

c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s c a n j u s t i f y n o n - d i s c l o s u r e o f j u d i c i a l r e c o r d s
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g I n r e K n o x v i l l e N e w s
- S e n t i n e l C o

. , 7 2 3 F

. 2 d 4 7 0 , 4 7 6 ( 6 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 3 ) ) ) ; U

. S

. v

. K r a v e t z , 7 0 6 F

. 3 d 4 7 , 5 9 ( 1 s t C i r
. 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ ‘ O n l y t h e m o s t c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s c a n j u s t i f y n o n - d i s c l o s u r e o f j u d i c i a l r e c o r d s t h a t c o m e w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e c o m m o n - l a w r i g h t o f a c c e s s
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g I n
r e P r o v i d e n c e J

o u r n a l C o

. , I

n c

. , 2 9 3 F

. 3 d 1 , 1 0 ( 1 s t C i r
. 2 0 0 2 ) ) ) ; L u g o s c h v

. P y r a m i d C o

. o

f O n o n d a g a , 4 3 5 F

. 3 d 1 1 0 , 1 2 3 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( “ ‘ [ D ] o c u m e n t s u s e d b y p a r t i e s m o v i n g f o r , o r o p p o s i n g , s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t s h o u l d n o t r e m a i n u n d e r s e a l a b s e n t t h e m o s t c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g J o y v

. N o r t h , 6 9 2 F

. 2 d 8 8 0 , 8 9 3 ( 2 d C i r
. 1 9 8 2 ) ) ) ; K a m a k a n a v

. C i t y 

## 17

## PI A, a court’s discretion to seal rec ords is “bounded by a ‘long -established leg al tradition’ o f the

‘pre sumptive rig ht of the public to inspect and copy judicial documents and files.’” To deter mine 6 9


## whether “compe lling rea sons” exis t to shield information in court rec ords fr o m p u blic exposure,
fede ral courts employ a balanc ing test, weig hing t h e i n tere st the public has in acc ess to judicial

rec ords ag ainst the interest of a party seeking to make judicial re cords c onfidential. 7 0



## We simil arly conclude that section 552.302’s compelling -re ason standard require s an

assessment of the rela tive importance of a rea son for withholding information in rela tion to the presumption of openness. I n that reg ard, a rea son to withhold i nformation will be “compelling” 7 1 

## only when it is of such a pressing nature (e.g ., urg ent, forc eful, or demanding ) that it outweig hs the
interests favoring public acc ess to the information and overc omes section 552.302’s presumption
that disclosure is re quired. 7 2

& C t y

. o f H o n o l u l u , 4 4 7 F

. 3 d 1 1 7 2 , 1 1 8 0 ( 9 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( a p a r t y s e e k i n g t o s e a l “ d o c u m e n t s a t t a c h e d t o a d i s p o s i t i v e m o t i o n m u s t m e e t t h e h i g h t h r e s h o l d o f s h o w i n g t h a t ‘ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s ’ s u p p o r t s e c r e c y ” ( c i t i n g F o l t z v

. S t a t e F a r m M u t

. I n s

. C o

. , 3 3 1 F

. 3 d 1 1 2 2 , 1 1 3 6 ( 9 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 3 ) ) )

.
R u d d E q u i

p

. , 8 3 4 F

. 3 d a t 5 9 3 ( q u o t i n g K n o x v i l l e , 7 2 3 F

. 2 d a t 4 7 4 )

. 69

S e e i d

. a t 5 9 4 ( “ [ I ] n m a k i n g t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a c o u r t m u s t b a l a n c e t h e l i t i g a n t s ’ p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t 70 t h e p u b l i c ’ s r i g h t o f

a c c e s s , r e c o g n i z i n g o u r j u d i c i a l s y s t e m ’ s s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o r o f o p e n n e s s
. ” ) ; K r a v e t

z , 7 0 6 F

. 3 d a t 5 9 ( “ [ A ] c o u r t m u s t c a r e f u l l y b a l a n c e t h e p r e s u m p t i v e p u b l i c r i g h t o f a c c e s s a g a i n s t t h e c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s t h a t
a r e a t s t a k e i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e
. ” ) ; N a t ’ l O r g

. f o r M a r r i a g e v

. M c K e e , 6 4 9 F

. 3 d 3 4 , 7 0 ( 1 s t C i r
. 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ D e c i s i o n s o n t h e s e a l i n g o f j u d i c i a l d o c u m e n t s r e q u i r e a b a l a n c i n g o f i n t e r e s t s , a l t h o u g h t h e s c a l e s t i l t d e c i d e d l y t o w a r d t r a n s p a r e n c y
. ” ) ; L u g o s c h , 4 3 5 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 0 ( “ [ A ] f t e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w e i g h t o f t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f a c c e s s , t h e c o u r t m u s t

‘ b a l a n c e c o m p e t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t i t

. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g U

. S

. v

. A m o d e o , 7 1 F

. 3 d 1 0 4 4 , 1 0 5 0 ( 2 d C i r
. 1 9 9 5 ) ) ) ; K a m a k a n a , 4 4 7 F

. 3 d a t 1 1 7 9 ( “ [ T ] h e c o u r t m u s t ‘ c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y b a l a n c e [ ] t h e c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s ’ o f t h e p u b l i c a n d t h e p a r t y w h o s e e k s t o k e e p c e r t a i n j u d i c i a l r e c o r d s s e c r e t

. ” ( q u o t i n g F o l t z , 3 3 1 F

. 3 d a t 1 1 3 5 ) )

.
C f

. G o n z a l e s v

. O C e n t r o B e n e f i c e n t e U n i a o d o V

e g e t a l , 5 4 6 U

. S

. 4 1 8 , 4 3 1

- 3 2 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t i n 71

a p p l y i n g t h e c o m p e l l i n g - i n t e r e s t t e s t “ c o n t e x t m a t t e r s ” a n d “ r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s ” s h o u l d b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t ( q u o t i n g G r u t t e r v

. B o l l i n g e r , 5 3 9 U

. S

. 3 0 6 , 3 2 7 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , a n d A d a r a n d C o n s t r u c t o r , I n c

. v

. P e ñ a , 5 1 5 U

. S

. 2 0 0 , 2 2 8 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ) )

.
S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. 72


## 18

## B. Th e At torney- Client P rivilege P rote cts Signif icant Intere sts Privilege s “re prese nt society ’s desire to protec t cer tain rela tionships.” The attorney -client 7 3 

## privileg e holds a specia l place among privileg es: it is “the oldest and most vener ated of the common
l aw p ri v i leg es of confide ntial communications.” As “the most sacr ed of all leg ally rec og nized 7 4 

## privileg es,” “ its preservation is essential to the just and orderly opera tion of our leg al sy stem.” 7 5


## The privileg e rests on “the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that rela tes to the
client’s rea sons for seeking repr esenta tion if the profe ssional mission is to be car ried out.” “[T] he

7 6 

## privileg e exists t o protec t not only the g iving of profe ssional advice to those who ca n act on it but
also the g iving of information to the lawy er to enable him to g ive sound and informed advice .” The 7 7 

## privileg e’s purpose could not be more evident: “to encour ag e clients to make full disclosure to their
attorney s” and, in r eturn, to allow clients to obtain full, fair, and candid counsel. By promoting

7 8 7 9


## “full and fra

nk communications betwee n attorney s and thei r cl ients,” the privileg e “promote[s]
broade r public intere sts in the observanc e of la w and a dminist ration of justice.” 8 0

R e p u b l i c I n s

. C o

. v

. D a v i s , 8 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 8 , 1 6 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 3 )

. 73

U

. S

. v

. E d w a r d s , 3 0 3 F

. 3 d 6 0 6 , 6 1 8 ( 5 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 2 )

. 74

U

. S

. v

. B a u e r , 1 3 2 F

. 3 d 5 0 4 , 5 1 0 ( 9 t h C i r
. 1 9 9 7 )

. 75

T r a m m e l v

. U

. S

. , 4 4 5 U

. S

. 4 0 , 5 1 ( 1 9 8 0 )

. 76

U p j o h n C o

. v

. U

. S

. , 4 4 9 U

. S

. 3 8 3 , 3 9 0 ( 1 9 8 1 )

. 77

F i s h e r v

. U

. S

. , 4 2 5 U

. S

. 3 9 1 , 4 0 3 ( 1 9 7 6 )

. 78

S e e , e

. g

. , U

p j o h n C o

. , 4 4 9 U

. S

. a t 3 9 0

. 79

I d

. a t 3 8 9

. 80


## 19

## I n the g overnme ntal context, the attorney -client p ri v i leg e applies with “spec ial forc e.” 8 1



## “[P] ublic officia ls are duty -bound to understand an d respe ct constitutional, judicial and statutory
limit ations on their authority ; thus, their acc ess to candid leg al ad v i ce direc tly and signific antly

serve s the public interest.” 8 2


## The notion that “sound leg al advice or advoca cy serve s public ends” is not rationally
debata ble. After all, the g overnme nt conducts its business on behalf of the public (re sidents, voters, 8 3


## taxpay ers, and rate pay ers) , and a fully i n fo rm ed serva nt is a more capa

ble serva nt. The 8 4


## attorney -client privileg e “enc ourag [es] g overnm en t officia ls formulating policies in the public’s
interest to consult with counsel in conducting that public business.” The privileg e also protec ts the 8 5 

## public fisc when the gover nment is participa ting in litigation, negotiating billion -d o l l ar contracts, and per forming reg ulatory acts unde r complex reg ulatory scheme s.
Fundamentally , the promise of confide ntiality fosters “a culture in which consultation with

g overnme nt lawy ers is ac cepte d as a nor mal, desirable , and eve n indispensable par t of conduc ting

I n r e C t y

. o f E r i e , 4 7 3 F

. 3 d 4 1 3 , 4 1 9 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( q u o t i n g I n r e G r a n d J

u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d 5 2 7 , 81 5 3 4 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 5 ) )

.

I d

. a t 4 1 8

- 1 9

. 82

U p j o h n C o

. , 4 4 9 U

. S

. a t 3 8 9

. 83

S e e I n r e G r a n d J

u r y S u b p o e n a D u c e s T

e c u m , 7 3 1 F

. 2 d 1 0 3 2 , 1 0 3 6

- 3 7 ( 2 d C i r
. 1 9 8 4 ) ( “ [ T ] h e a v a i l a b i l i t y 84

o f s o u n d l e g a l a d v i c e i n u r e s t o t h e b e n e f i t n o t o n l y o f t h e c l i e n t

. . . b u t a l s o o f t h e p u b l i c w h i c h i s e n t i t l e d t o c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e e v e r g r o w i n g a n d i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p l e x b o d y o f p u b l i c l a w
. ” )

.

G u i d i v i l l e R a n c h e r i a o

f C a l

. v

. U

. S

. , N o
. 1 2

- c v - 1 3 2 6 Y G R , 2 0 1 3 W L 6 5 7 1 9 4 5 , a t * 2 ( N

. D

. C a l

. D e c
. 1 3 , 85 2 0 1 3 )

. 

## 20

## public business.” And though t he dissent dismiss es the importance of the privileg e in the 8 6



## g overnme ntal context as mere hy perbole , aff

ording weig ht to the policies and interests that drive 8 7


## the privileg e’s application cannot be disreg arde d so handily

. At a bare minimum , sound judgme nt
tells us that the people are best serve d when g overnme nt officia ls, “who are expected to uphold and

execute the law and wh o m ay fa ce criminal prosec ution for failing to do so,” opera te in an atmosphere that encour ag es them “to see k out and re ceive fully informed leg al advice .” 8 8


## The attorney -client privileg e exis ts—and has been a cornerstone of our leg al sy stem for

near ly 500 y ear s —beca

use the interests protec ted and secur ed by the promise of confide ntiality are 8 9



## not mere ly signific ant; they are quintessentially imperative. Safeg uarding the p ri vileg e is important—indeed, compelling —beca use th e conseque nces of disclosure are far from inconseque ntial. Once information has been disclosed, loss of confide ntiality is irreve rsible. The 9 0


## bell cannot be unrung , and neither dissemination no r u s e can be eff ectively restra ined. 9 1 

## Unsurprising ly , the ramifica tions a re not limited to particula rized matters, but a

re also wroug ht on

G r a n d J u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d a t 5 3 4 ; s e e a l s o U

. S

. v

. J i c a r i l l a A p a c h e N

a t i o n , 5 6 4 U

. S

. 1 6 2 , 1 6 9

- 7 0 86 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ ‘ T h e p r i v i l e g e a i d s g o v e r n m e n t e n t i t i e s a n d e m p l o y e e s i n o b t a i n i n g l e g a l a d v i c e f o u n d e d o n a c o m p l e t e a n d
a c c u r a t e f

a c t u a l p i c t u r e
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g R E S T A T E M E N T ( T H IR D ) O F T H E L A W G O V E R N IN G L A W Y E R S § 7 4 c m t

. b ( 2 0 0 0 ) ) )

.
P o s t a t 3 ( B O Y D , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g )

. 87

G r a n d J

u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d a t 5 3 4

. 88

8 J O H N H

. W IG M O R E , E V ID E N C E § 2 2 9 0 ( M c N a u g h t o n r e v
. 1 9 6 1 ) ( “ T h e h i s t o r y o f [ t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] 89 p r i v i l e g e g o e s b a c k t o t h e r e i g n o f E l i z a b e t h I , w h e r e t h e p r i v i l e g e a l r e a d y a p p e a r s a s u n q u e s t i o n e d

. ” ( c i t i n g B e r d v

. L o v e l a c e , C a r y 8 8 , 2 1 E n g
. R e p
. 3 3 ( C h

. 1 5 7 7 ) ) )

.

S e e P e a r s o n v

. M i l l e r , 2 1 1 F

. 3 d 5 7 , 6 4 ( 3 d C i r
. 2 0 0 0 )

. 90

S e e C o m p e l l i n g N

e e d , B L A C K ’ S L A W D IC T IO N A R Y ( 1 0 t h e d

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( a n e e d i s “ c o m p e l l i n g ” i f i t i s “ s o g r e a t 91 t h a t i r r e p a r a b l e h a r m
. . . w o u l d r e s u l t i f i t i s n o t m e t ” )

. 

## 21

## a sy stemic level. The PI A rec og nizes this by cate g orica lly excepting privileg ed information from 9 2


## the public-ac cess require ment. More to the point, howeve r, signific ant interests independe nt of the

PI A’s exce p ti o n s f

a v o r w it h h o ld in g c o n f

id e n ti a l a n d p r iv il e g ed attorney -client communications from compelled disclosure

. Thoug h the prec ise issue prese nted in this case i s one of first impression under the PI A, analog ous authority from this Court confirms that the attorney -client privilege is inhere ntly compelling

. For example, in In re Ge orge , we e x amined the attorney -client privilege in a dis pute involving the client’s acc ess to attorney work product. After the client’s at t o rn ey s h ad been 9 3 

## disqualified from repr esenting her based on their prior repr esenta tion of an opposing party , the client

soug ht possession and control of the attorney s’ work product. We h eld that maintaining
confide ntiality of the opponent’s attorney -client communications—which had been the basis for the disqualification order

—provided a “compe lling rea son” t o deprive the client of her signific ant

proper ty rig ht to the work produc t ge nera ted by her f ormer c ounsel. 9 4



## I n Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat , we c onsidered w hether to apply Michig an’s more expansive
protec tions of the attorney -client privileg e in lieu of Texas’s narr ower attorney -client privileg e in a
conflict-of

-laws analy sis. We held t h at “[t] he purpose of the attorney -client privileg e and the 9 5

S e e s u p r a n
. 8 9

. 92

2 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1 1 , 5 1 2

- 1 3 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 93

I d

. a t 5 1 6

- 2 0 ; s e e a l s o i d

. a t 5 2 5 ( B R IS T E R , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( “ I a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t t h a t M s
. A n d e r s o n s h o u l d 94

n o t b e d e p r i v e d o f h e r p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n , b u t a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y i s a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n
. ” )

.
9 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 , 6 4 6

- 4 7 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 5 )

. 95


## 22

## relianc e place d by the client on the confide ntial nature of the communications create [d] special

reasons ” to apply

the broa der a

ttorney -client privileg e. 9 6



## I n a differ ent context involving simil ar tensions betwee n public acc ess and the need for
confide ntiality , fede ral courts have affir med t hat t he need t o prese rve the attorn ey -client privilege
is compelling

. Apply ing a compelling -re ason standard to deter mine whether to seal judicial rec ords,
fede ra l co urts g ener ally acc ept the attorney -client privileg e as a “compe lling rea son” justify ing a
motion to seal even when balanc ed ag ainst the public’s substantial rig ht to acc ess the information:

9 7 

## “When privi leg ed materials must be filed in a ca s e, an d t h e privileg e has not been waived, courts

g ener ally find compelling rea sons to overc ome the strong presumption in favor of public acc ess exis t
sufficie nt to warra

nt sealing those materia ls.” 9 8

I d

. a t 6 4 7 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 96

S e e H a n s o n v

. W

e l l s F a r g o H o m e M o r t

g

. , I n c

. , N o
. C 1 3

- 0 9 3 9 J L R , 2 0 1 3 W L 5 6 7 4 9 9 7 , a t * 3 ( W

. D

. W a s h

. 97 O c t

. 1 7 , 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ C o u r t s g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a n d t h e w o r k

- p r o d u c t d o c t r i n e a s a ‘ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n ’ j u s t i f y i n g a m o t i o n t o s e a l

. ” ( c i t i n g L u g o s c h , 4 3 5 F

. 3 d a t 1 2 5 ) ) ; T r a v e l e r s I

n d e m

. C o

. v

. E x c a l i b u r R e i n s u r a n c e C o r p
. , N o
. 1 1

- C V

- 1 2 0 9 ( C S H ) , 2 0 1 3 W L 4 0 1 2 7 7 2 , a t * 5 ( D

. C o n n
. A u g
. 5 , 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ [ I ] t i s w e l l

- s e t t l e d w i t h i n t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e m a y b e a s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o d e f e a t t h e p u b l i c ’ s r i g h t o f a c c e s s t o j u d i c i a l d o c u m e n t s
. ” ) ; T r a v e l e r s P r o

p

. C a s

. C o

. o

f A m

. v

. C e n t e x H o m e s , N o
. 1 1

- 3 6 3 8

- S C , 2 0 1 3 W L 7 0 7 9 1 8 , a t * 2 ( N

. D

. C a l

. F e b

. 2 6 , 2 0 1 3 ) ( a c c e p t i n g a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o a l l o w a p a r t y t o r e f i l e r e d a c t e d
v e r s i o n o f d o c u m e n t a t t a c h e d t o s u m m a r y - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n ) ; T

r i Q u i n t S e m i c o n d u c t o r , I n c

. v

. A v a g o T

e c h s

. L t d

. , N o
. C V 0 9

- 1 5 3 1

- P H X

- J A T , 2 0 1 1 W L 6 1 8 2 3 4 6 , a t * 5 ( D

. A r i z
. D e c
. 1 3 , 2 0 1 1 ) ( a c c e p t i n g a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g s e a l i n g c o u r t r e c o r d s ) ; A s d a l e v

. I n t ’ l G a m e T

e c h

. , N o
. 3 : 0 4

- C V

- 7 0 3

- R A M , 2 0 1 0 W L 2 1 6 1 9 3 0 , a t * 5 ( D

. N e v
. M a y 2 8 , 2 0 1 0 ) ( a c c e p t i n g a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a n d t h e w o r k

- p r o d u c t d o c t r i n e a s p r o v i d i n g b o t h g o o d c a u s e a n d a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o s e a l n o n d i s p o s i t i v e a n d d i s p o s i t i v e m o t i o n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y )

.

W i l c o x v

. B i b i n , 2 : 1 5

- C V

- 0 0 2 6 1

- E J L

- R E B , 2 0 1 6 W L 7 4 0 3 9 6 , a t * 3 ( D

. I d a h o F e b

. 2 4 , 2 0 1 6 ) ; s e e a l s o R u d d 98 E q u i p

. C o

. v

. J

o h n D e e r e C o n s t r

. & F o r e s t r y C o

. , 8 3 4 F

. 3 d 5 8 9 , 5 9 4

- 9 5 ( 6 t h C i r
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ [ O ] n l y t r a d e s e c r e t s , i n f o r m a t i o n c o v e r e d b y a r e c o g n i z e d p r i v i l e g e ( s u c h a s t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e ) , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d b y s t a t u t e t o b e m a i n t a i n e d i n c o n f i d e n c e ( s u c h a s t h e n a m e o f a m i n o r v i c t i m o f a s e x u a l a s s a u l t ) , i s t y p i c a l l y e n o u g h t o o v e r c o m e t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f a c c e s s
. ” ( q u o t i n g B a x t e r I n t ’ l , I n c

. v

. A b b o t t L a b s , 2 9 7 F

. 3 d 5 4 4 , 5 4 6 ( 7 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 2 ) ) ) ; A n c i e r v

. E g a n , C V N o
. 1 4

- 0 0 2 9 4 J M S

- R L P , 2 0 1 5 W L 6 7 5 7 5 2 8 , a t * 2 ( D

. H a w
. N o v
. 4 , 2 0 1 5 ) ( “ G e n e r a l l y , c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s t h a t a r e s u f

f i c i e n t t o o v e r c o m e t h i s s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n e x i s t w h e n c o u r t f i l i n g s c o n t a i n a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
. ” ( c i t i n g C r e a t i v e T

e n t I n t ’ l I n c

. v

. K r a m e r , N o
. C V

- 1 5

- 8 0 0 5

- P C T

- S M M , 2 0 1 5 W L 4 6 3 8 3 2 0 , a t * 3 ( D

. A r i z
. A u g
. 4 , 2 0 1 5 ) ) ) ; G u i d i v i l l e R a n c h e r i a o f C a l

. v

. U

. S

. , N o
. 1 2

- c v - 1 3 2 6 Y G R , 2 0 1 3 W L 6 5 7 1 9 4 5 , a t * 9 ( N

. D

. C a l

. D e c
. 1 3 , 2 0 1 3 )



## 23

## As the P I A and the common law both bear witness, the a ttorney -client privileg e protects a

rela tionship that is integ ral to the administration of justice as well as a g overnme nt that functions for
the bene fit of the people

. C. Waiver Despite advanc ing and protec ting important interests, the attorney -client privileg e could not
be a “compe lling rea son to withhold the [requested] information” if confide ntiality has been waived. Thus, befor e balanc ing the interests protec ted by the privileg e ag ainst those serve d by the PI A, we

must consider whether noncompliance with section 552.301’s ten-day d eadline waives the
attorney -client privileg e. We hold that a g overnme ntal body does not forf eit the attorne y -c l i en t privileg e by

failing to timely

reque st an attorney

g ener al dec ision under sec tion 552.301.
“Ge nera lly , ‘wa iver’ consists of the intentional relinquishme n t o f a k n o w n r ig h t o r in te n tional
conduct inconsistent with claiming that rig ht.” Mere ly missing a statutory deadline does not mirror 9 9



## any of the conduct our rules and case law rec og nize as wai v i n g a privileg e. Nor does the PI A’s lang uag e support the conclusion that the privileg e may be waived by inaction or delay

. We elabor ate on both points as follows.
Rule 511 of the Texas Rules of Evidence g overns waiver of evidentiar y pri v i l ege s by voluntary dis cl o s u re
. Subsection (a) of Rule 511 sets forth the g ener al rule that evidentiar y privileg es are waived if the privileg e holder voluntarily discloses the privileg ed matter, consents to

( “ [ T ] h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e
. . . e s t a b l i s h e s c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s f o r s e a l i n g
. ” )

.
I n r e N a t i o n w i d e I

n s

. C o

. , 4 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 0 8 , 7 1 2 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 99


## 24

## disclosure, or place s the matter at issue. The circ umstances Rule 511(a) rec og nizes as waiving a 1 0 0 

## privileg e are materia lly dissimi lar to those prese nted in this case
. Subsection (b) of the rule applies only to the attorney -client privileg e and imposes limitations on the g ener al waiver rule to pr eser ve
the privileg e despite actua l d isclosure. Under subsection (b), the attorney -client privileg e is 1 0 1


## aff orded a dditional protection ag ainst waiver

. The attorney -client privileg e may also be waived by inadver tent disclosure during litigation,
if the disclosure is acc ompanied by conduct inconsist en t wi t h claiming the privileg e of
confide ntiali t y
. “[ T]he essential function of the privileg e is to protec t a confide nce that, once

reve aled by any means , leave s the privileg e with no l egi t i m at e function to perf orm.” 1 0 2 

## Notwithstanding actua l disclosure, howeve r, Texas Rul e of Civil Procedur e 193.3(d) prese rves a
claim of privileg e if the privileg e h o l d er (1) did not intend to waive the privileg e and (2) takes
prompt action to claim the privileg e afte r “ac tually discover[ing ]” the disclosure was made. Rule 1 0 3 

## 193.3(d) “wa s desig ned to ensure that important privileg es are not waived by mere inadver tence or
mistake.” But when inadver tence is coupled with fail u re t o t ak e prompt reme dial action afte r 1 0 4

S e e T E X

. R

. E V ID

. 5 1 1 ( a )

. 100

I d

. 5 1 1 ( b )

. 101

1 M C C O R M IC K O N E V ID E N C E § 9 3 ( 7 t h e d

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 102

T E X

. R

. C IV

. P

. 1 9 3

. 3 ( d ) ; s e e a l s o T E X

. R

. E V ID

. 5 1 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( “ W h e n m a d e i n a T e x a s s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g , a n 103 i n a d v e r t e n t d i s c l o s u r e d o e s n o t o p e r a t e a s a w a i v e r i f t h e h o l d e r f o l l o w e d t h e p r o c e d u r e s o f R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 1 9 3

. 3 ( d )

. ” )

.
I

n r e C h r i s t u s S

p o h n H o s

p

. K l e b e r

g , 2 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 4 , 4 3 9 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; s e e a l s o T E X

. R

. 104 C IV

. P

. 1 9 3

. 4 c m t

. 4 ( “ T h e f o c u s i s o n t h e i n t e n t t o w a i v e t h e p r i v i l e g e , n o t t h e i n t e n t t o p r o d u c e t h e m a t e r i a l o r i n f o r m a t i o n
. A p a r t y w h o f a i l s t o d i l i g e n t l y s c r e e n d o c u m e n t s b e f o r e p r o d u c i n g t h e m d o e s n o t w a i v e a c l a i m o f p r i v i l e g e
. ” )

. 

## 25

## discovering actua l disclosure of privileg ed i n fo rm at ion, the privileg e is waived beca use inaction
under suc h circ umstances is inconsistent with claiming the privileg e.
Citi ng Rule 193.3(d) by analog y , the Attorney Gene ral sug g ests sections 552

. 3 0 1 and
552

. 3 02 should be construed as eff ecting a waiver by inaction or omission. But the scena rio
descr ibed in Rule 193.3(d)—a ctual disclosure followed by delay ed action results in waiver —is the

conver se of the que stion presented he re: doe s delay waive the privileg e and c ompel disclosure?
Rule 193.3(d) contemplates waiver of confi d en t i al i t y in the context of an inadver tent, but
actual , disclosure. I n this case , there has b ee n no disclosure, and the issue is whether the PI A 1 0 5 

## compels disclosure despite the absenc e of actua l disclosure and without regard to the City ’s eff orts to maintain confidentiality under se ction 552.302. Rule 193.3(d) is substantively inapposite.

I n addition to actua l disclosure, the atto rn ey -client privileg e may be waived by “off ensive
use” of the privilege. Of fensive use occur s when a party seeking aff irmative relief “attempts to
protec t outcome-de terminative information from any discovery .” Thoug h we have rec og nized the 1 0 6 

## vitality of the offe nsive-use doctrine, we have explained that “an offe nsive use waiver of a privileg e
should not l i g htly be found” beca use privileg es “re prese nt society ’s desire to protec t cer tain

S e e T E X

. R

. C IV

. P

. 1 9 3

. 3 ( d ) ( “ A p a r t y w h o p r o d u c e s m a t e r i a l o r i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o w a i v e a 105

c l a i m o f p r i v i l e g e d o e s n o t w a i v e t h a t c l a i m u n d e r t h e s e r u l e s o r t h e R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e
. ” ) ; T E X

. R

. E V ID

. 5 1 1 ( b ) ( “ N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g p a r a g r a p h ( a ) , t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s a p p l y , i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e t o u t , t o d i s c l o s u r e o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r i n f

o r m a t i o n c o v e r e d b y t h e l a w y e r - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e o r w o r k

- p r o d u c t p r o t e c t i o n
. ” )

.
I n r e M

- I L

. L

. C

. , 2 0 1 6 W L 2 9 8 1 3 4 2 , a t * 7 , _

_ S

. W

. 3 d
_

_ ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ; s e e R e p u b l i c I n s

. C o

. v

. D a v i s , 8 5 6 106 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 8 , 1 6 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( “ I n a n i n s t a n c e i n w h i c h t h e [ a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] p r i v i l e g e i s b e i n g u s e d a s a s w o r d r a t h e r t h a n a s h i e l d , t h e p r i v i l e g e m a y b e w a i v e d

. ” )

. 

## 26

## rela tionships.” An untimely reque st for an attorney g ener al decision under section 552.301 does 1 0 7 

## not impli cate conce rns equivale nt to those underg irding the offe nsive-use doc trine. Finally , and most decisively , section 552.302’s lang uag e cannot rea sonably be construed as
effec t i ng a waiver of confide ntiality

. Some PI A sections expli citly ref er to waiver , but section

1 0 8



## 552.302 does not. Rather than waiving interests that are protec ted b y a s t at u tory exception to disclosure, section 552.302’s express lang uag e cre ates a presumption that disclosure is require d. 1 0 9



## Be cause the presumption is rebuttable , we conclude that missing the statutory deadline in section
552.301 does not waive the attorne y -client privileg e.
D. Balancin g Com peting Interest s Our inqui ry does not end with establish i n g that the i ntere sts secur ed by the attorney -client privileg e are inhere ntly compelling and that mere delay in seeking an attorney g ener al decision does

not waive the privileg e. Those deter minations impact only one side of the balanc ing equation. We

must also consider whether the signific ant interests the attorney -client privileg e advanc es outweig h competing interests fa

voring disclosure a

nd the statutory

presumption that disclosure is re quired.

We b eg in our analy sis by observing that, under the PI A, (1) the public is not entitled to
information the L eg islature has chosen to except from require d public disclosure, and (2) section 1 1 0



## 552.302’s “compe lling rea son” safe g uard applies only to information the PI A alre ady excepts from

R e p u b l i c I n s

. C o

. , 8 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 6 3

. 107

S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 0 0 3 8 ( f ) , . 0 0 8 ( b ) , . 1 3 4 ( d ) , . 1 5 6 ( d )

. 108

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. 109

I d

. § § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 , . 1 0 1

- . 1 5 6

. 110


## 27

## disclosure. Acc ording ly , a reque stor’s gen er al ri gh t of acc ess to public information is not a 1 1 1 

## competing interest to be we ighe d under the compelling -re ason bala ncing test. 1 1 2



## I nstead, the failure to timely reque st an attorney

g ener al dec ision under sec tion 552.301 of
the PI A implicates the public’s interest in the “p ro m p t ” production of public information. The 1 1 3



## PI A’s deadlines help ensure g overnme ntal bodies do not impede the public’s acc ess t o p u b l i c
information. Compli ance with statutory deadlines further s important interests in avoiding delay and

preve nting g amesmanship and obstruc tionism

. These interests are undoubtedly signific ant, but the PI A expressly contemplates they may be

overc ome by counter

vailing interests of utmost importance

. We conclude the interests protec ted 1 1 4 

## by the attorney -client privileg e surpass that high threshold. When weigh ed aga i n s t the need for expediency , the interests protec ted by t h e at t orney -client privileg e—and the irreme diable

conseque nces of

disclosure—a

re de monstrably

more c ompelling.
Under the PI A, the public has no rig ht of acc ess to privileg ed information in the first instance
and only a reb u t t ab l e p resumpti on of acc ess in the second. We must also consider that the 1 1 5

S e e i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( a ) , . 0 2 1 , . 3 0 1

- . 3 0 2

. 111

S e e T e x

. D e p ’ t o f P u b

. S a

f e t y v

. C o x T

e x

. N e w s p a p e r s , L

. P

. , 3 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 1 ) ; c f

. U

. S

. v

. 112 K r a v e t z , 7 0 6 F

. 3 d 4 7 , 5 9 ( 1 s t C i r
. 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ ‘ T h o u g h t h e p u b l i c ’ s r i g h t o f a c c e s s i s v i b r a n t , i t i s n o t u n f e t t e r e d

. I m p o r t a n t
c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n t e r e s t s c a n , i n g i v e n i n s t a n c e s , o v e r w h e l m t h e u s u a l p r e s u m p t i o n a n d d e f e a t a c c e s s
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g S i e d l e v

. P u t n a m I

n v s

. , I n c

. , 1 4 7 F

. 3 d 7 , 1 0 ( 1 s t C i r
. 1 9 9 8 ) ) )

.
T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 2 2 1 ( a )

. 113

S e e i d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. 114

S e e , e

. g

. , i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 7 ( c a t e g o r i c a l l y e x c e p t i n g a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m t h e s t a t u t e ’ s 115 p u b l i c - d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t ) , . 3 0 2 ( r e b u t t a b l y p r e s u m i n g o t h e r w i s e e x e m p t i n f o r m a t i o n i s o p e n t o t h e p u b l i c ) ; c f

. I n
r e L i n d s e

y , 1 5 8 F

. 3 d 1 2 6 3 , 1 2 6 9 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 8 8 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e f e d e r a l F r e e d o m o f I n f

o r m a t i o n A c t ( F O I A ) “ [ d i d ] n o t i t s e l f c r e a t e a g o v e r n m e n t a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e [ , ] ‘ C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t h a t a g e n c i e s s h o u l d n o t l o s e 

## 28

## attorney -client privileg e i s afforded to the g overnme nt for the public’s benefit ; acc ording ly , the

public’s interest is not one-sided in this context. Be cause the privileg e benef its b o t h the

g overnme ntal body and the people it repr esents, the public’s interest in maintaining confide ntiality

must be fac tored into the analy sis. Among other share d benef its, the privileg e shields confide ntial
information from t h i rd parties whose litigation or business interests are adver se to the public’s interest, promotes a culture that incentivizes g overnme ntal bodies to se ek leg al advice , and allows
the fre e flow of information betwee n attorney and client without fea r of co m p ell ed public
disclosure. 1 1 6 

## Protecting privileg ed attorne y -client c ommunications is also more urg ent than promptness
beca use the PI A provides disincentives to g amesmanship that might otherwise rewar d dilatory conduct, intentiona l o r o t h erw ise. Under the PI A, there is no benef it to by passing the Attorney
Gene ral a ltoge ther, a

nd delay bear s its own consequenc es.

t h e p r o t e c t i o n t r a d i t i o n a l l y a f f o r d e d t h r o u g h t h e e v i d e n t i a r y p r i v i l e g e s s i m p l y b e c a u s e o f t h e p a s s a g e o f F O I A ’ ” ( q u o t i n g C o a s t a l S t a t e s G a s C o r p

. v

. D e p ’ t o f E n e r g y , 6 1 7 F

. 2 d 8 5 4 , 8 6 2 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 8 0 ) ) ) ; R E S T A T E M E N T ( T H IR D ) O F T H E L A W G O V E R N IN G L A W Y E R S § 7 4 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( “ U n l e s s a p p l i c a b l e l a w o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e s , t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e e x t e n d s t o a c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f a g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n
. . . a n d o f a n i n d i v i d u a l e m p l o y e e o r o t h e r a g e n t o f a g o v e r n m e n t a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a c l i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s o r h e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t

. . . . ” )

.

S e e I n r e G r a n d J

u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d 5 2 7 , 5 3 4 ( 2 d C i r
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ A b r o g a t i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e u n d e r m i n e s 116 t h a t c u l t u r e a n d t h e r e b y i m p a i r s t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t

. ” ) ; c f

. U

. S

. v

. J

i c a r i l l a A p a c h e N

a t i o n , 5 6 4 U

. S

. 1 6 2 , 1 6 9 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ [ T ] h e o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a p p l y t o g o v e r n m e n t a l c l i e n t s
. ” ) ; G r a n d J u r y I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 3 9 9 F

. 3 d
a t 5 3 3 ( “ T h e r e i s , t h e n , s u b s t a n t i a l a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e v i e w t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l e s u p p o r t i n g t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a p p l i c a b l e t o p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s h a s g e n e r a l r e l e v a n c e t o g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s a s w e l l

. ” ) ; R o s s v

. C i t y o f M e m p h i s , 4 2 3 F

. 3 d 5 9 6 , 6 0 2 ( 6 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ W e s e e n o r e a s o n t h a t [ t h e ] f u n c t i o n [ o f p r o m o t i n g f u l l a n d f r a n k c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d
e n c o u r a g i n g o b s e r v a n c e o f l a w ] i s n o l o n g e r s e r v e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e c o r p o r a t i o n i s a m u n i c i p a l i t y o r , m o r e b r o a d l y , t h a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o r a g e n c y i s a g o v e r n m e n t e n t i t y
. G o v e r n m e n t s m u s t n o t o n l y f o l l o w t h e l a w s , b u t a r e u n d e r a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h e i r c i t i z e n s
. T h e p r i v i l e g e h e l p s i n s u r e t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n s b e t w e e n m u n i c i p a l o f

f i c i a l s a n d a t t o r n e y s w i l l b e h o n e s t a n d c o m p l e t e
. I n s o d o i n g , i t e n c o u r a g e s a n d f a c i l i t a t e s t h e f

u l f i l l m e n t
o f t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s
. ” ) ; 8 J O H N H

. W IG M O R E , E V ID E N C E § 2 2 9 1 ( M c N a u g h t o n r e v
. 1 9 6 1 ) ( “ T h e p o l i c y o f t h e p r i v i l e g e h a s b e e n p l a i n l y g r o u n d e d s i n c e t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f t h e 1 7 0 0 s
. . . . I n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e f r e e d o m o f c o n s u l t a t i o n o f l e g a l
a d v i s e r s b y c l i e n t s , t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f c o m p e l l e d d i s c l o s u r e b y t h e l e g a l a d v i s e r s m u s t b e r e m o v e d ; h e n c e t h e l a w m u s t p r o h i b i t s u c h d i s c l o s u r e e x c e p t o n t h e c l i e n t ’ s c o n s e n t

. ” )

. 

## 29

## For one thing, the interests protec ted by some statutory exceptio n s wi l l not independe ntly

satisfy the compelling -re ason standard; thus, f ailing to timely asser

t a n applicable exception c ould
result i n mandatory disclosure that might otherwise have been avoided. Be ca u se section 552.302 provides only

a limited safeg uard, missing the dea dline in section 552.301 is a risky endea vor. Refusing to reque st or comply with an attorney g ener al decision car ries the additional risk
of a civil-enfor ceme nt action that—win or lose—would surely be costly

. But if lost, obtaining and rely ing on an attorney g ener al decision under section 552.301 prec ludes an a war d of attorne y

fee s
and litigation costs to the preva iling plaintiff. The PI A’s fee -shifting provisions thus provide both

a ca rrot and a stick.

F in a ll y , a g o v e r

n me n tal body ’s only way to avoid disclosing public information to a reque stor
i s a suit that “see ks decla ratory relief from compliance with [an attorney g ener al] decision i s s u ed
under Subchapter G [sections 552.301 to 552.309].” This provision also helps secur e the Attorney 1 1 7



## Gene ral’s ove rsig ht as contemplate d by the L eg islature.

To require public disclosure of confide ntial at t o rn ey -client communications as an
automatic—and irreme diable—sanc tion for missing a statutory deadline is not nece ssary to achie ve
the PI A’s objective of an open g overnme nt and would be a jurisprudential course fra ug ht with peril. Compelled forf

eiture of the privileg e under such circ umstances nece ssarily undermines its underpinning s and threa tens the foundation of a justice sy stem that thrives on full and candid leg al

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 2 4 ( a ) ( 2 )

. 117


## 30

## repr esenta tion. Most importantly , howeve r, such an outcome is not supported by a plain rea ding of

the statutory

text

. The P I A’s ex ception for attorney -client communications aff irms the i m p o rtanc e of honest
and candid conver sation s b et wee n g overnme ntal bodies and their leg al counsel. Eviscer ating the privileg e by compelling disclosure in pursuit of “promptness” ma y h a v e a wide-r eac hing and chilling
eff ect on communications betwee n g overnme ntal bodies and their counsel. When a privileg e as 1 1 8



## sacr osanct as the attorney -client privileg e is irretr ievably lost under th e u n e xc e p ti o n al fac ts prese nted
here , “g overnme ntal entities might well choose to fore g o fruitful self-a naly sis and decide not to seek
neede d leg al advice .” 1 1 9


## Robotic perf

ection by a g overnme ntal body ’s public information office r is a statutory ideal,

not an absolute requ i re m en t

. To err is human, but to conduct a City ’s leg al aff airs without the

occa sional err or would re quire divinity

. The safe g uard the L eg islature ena cted in sec tion 552.302
exis ts to prevent such a

scena rio.
E. Section 552.302 Does Not R equire Disclosure
When balanc ed ag ainst the PI A’s promptness require ments, the interests safe g uarde d by the
attorney -client priv i l ege prese nt compelling rea sons to withhold information protec ted by the privileg e. The harm from compelled dissemination of confide ntial attorney -client communications
is irreme diable, and the conseque nces are visited on both the g overnme ntal body and the taxpay ers

I n r e L i n d s e

y , 1 4 8 F

. 3 d 1 1 0 0 , 1 1 1 2 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( “ W e m a y a s s u m e t h a t i f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t 118 p r i v i l e g e d o e s n o t a p p l y i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s t h i s m a y c h i l l s o m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s a n d g o v e r n m e n t l a w y e r s
. ” )

.

I n r e C i t y o f G e o r g e t o w n , 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 8 , 3 3 3 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 119


## 31

## it repr esents. Mandating discl o s ure would further undermine the attorney -client privileg e’s

fundame ntal purpose by impairing fra nk discourse betwee n a g overnme ntal body and its counsel. 1 2 0



## I n contra st, allowing a g overnme ntal body to withhold attorney -client communications afte r

an u ntimely reque st for an attorney g ener al decision bear s less onerous consequenc es t hat m ay b e
ameliora ted by sever al statutory incentives an d d i s incentives. Stated summarily , even when a 1 2 1 

## compelling rea son exis ts to withhold disclosure, the PI A incentivizes g over n me n ta l b o d ie s to reque st

an attorney g ener al decision (1) to ensure the attorney -client privileg e cover s all the information the

g overnme n t al b o d y desires to withhold, (2) to asser t additional exceptions for withholding
information for which no “compe lling rea son to withhold information” exis ts, (3) to avoid a costly

S e e U p j o h n C o

. v

. U

. S

. , 4 4 9 U

. S

. 3 8 3 , 3 8 9 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ [ T h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] p r i v i l e g e ‘ i s f o u n d e d u p o n t h e 120

n e c e s s i t y , i n t h e i n t e r e s t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e , o f

t h e a i d o f p e r s o n s h a v i n g k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l a w a n d s k i l l e d i n i t s p r a c t i c e , w h i c h a s s i s t a n c e c a n o n l y b e s a f e l y a n d r e a d i l y a v a i l e d o f w h e n f r e e f r o m t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o r t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f d i s c l o s u r e
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g H u n t v

. B l a c k b u r n , 1 2 8 U

. S

. 4 6 4 , 4 7 0 ( 1 8 8 8 ) ) ) ; I n r e L i n d s e

y , 1 5 8 F

. 3 d 1 2 6 3 , 1 2 7 6 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( “ W e m a y a s s u m e t h a t i f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e d o e s n o t a p p l y i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s t h i s m a y c h i l l s o m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s a n d g o v e r n m e n t l a w y e r s
. ” ) ; C o a s t a l S t a t e s G a s C o r p

. v

. D e p ’ t o f E n e r g y , 6 1 7 F

. 2 d 8 5 4 , 8 6 3 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 8 0 ) ( w h e n “ t h e G o v e r n m e n t i s d e a l i n g w i t h i t s a t t o r n e y s a s w o u l d a n y p r i v a t e p a r t y s e e k i n g a d v i c e t o p r o t e c t p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s , ” i t “ n e e d s t h e s a m e a s s u r a n c e o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y s o i t w i l l n o t b e d e t e r r e d f r o m f u l l a n d f r a n k c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h i t s c o u n s e l o r s ” ) ; M e a d D a t a C e n t

. , I n c

. v

. U

. S

. D e

p ’ t
o f A i r F o r c e , 5 6 6 F

. 2 d 2 4 2 , 2 5 2 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 7 7 ) ( “ T h e p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e o f [ t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] p r i v i l e g e i s c e r t a i n l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e o f [ a n e x e m p t i o n ] i n t e n d e d t o p r o t e c t t h e q u a l i t y o f a g e n c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b y p r e v e n t i n g t h e d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e [ F r e e d o m o f I n f o r m a t i o n A c t ] f

r o m c u t t i n g o f

f t h e f l o w o f i n f

o r m a t i o n t o a g e n c y d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s
. C e r t a i n l y t h i s c o v e r s p r o f e s s i o n a l a d v i c e o n l e g a l q u e s t i o n s w h i c h b e a r s o n t h o s e d e c i s i o n s
. T h e o p i n i o n o f e v e n t h e f i n e s t a t t o r n e y , h o w e v e r , i s n o b e t t e r t h a n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h h i s c l i e n t p r o v i d e s
. I n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t a c l i e n t r e c e i v e s t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e l e g a l a d v i c e , b a s e d o n a f u l l a n d f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n w i t h h i s a t t o r n e y , t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s s u r e s h i m t h a t c o n f i d e n t i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o h i s a t t o r n e y w i l l n o t b e d i s c l o s e d w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t

. ” )

.
E

. g

. , T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 ( r e q u e s t o r o r a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s u i t f o r w r i t o f m a n d a m u s ) , . 3 2 1 5 ( a c t i o n 121 f o r d e c l a r a t o r y o r i n

j u n c t i v e r e l i e f a g a i n s t a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y f o r v i o l a t i n g t h e P I A ) , . 3 2 3 ( f e e - s h i f t i n g p r o v i s i o n s f a v o r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e v a i l i n g p l a i n t i f f s )

. 

## 32

## civil-enfor ceme nt action, and (4) to avoid assessment of litigation costs and rea sonable attorney fee s

if the plaintiff substantially preva ils in such an action. 1 2 2 

## Although we must construe the PI A liberally in favor of g ranting reque sts for information, 1 2 3



## we hold that the signific ant interests supporting withholding confide ntial and p ri vileg ed
attorney -client comm u nications outweig h the competing interests supporting disclosure. We
there fore conclude a “compe lling rea son” to withhold confide ntial attorney -client communications
exis ts and, absent waiver , rebuts the presumption that the information protec ted by the privileg e is “subjec t to required public disc losure.” 1 2 4



## F . Response to the Dissent Thoug h quibbling here and there about the actua l importance of the attorney -client privileg e
in the public sector, the dissent’s an al y s i s fundamentally depends on the fiat that exceptions and compelling rea sons are mutually exclusive under the sta t u t e. But no authority —statutory or 1 2 5 

## otherwise—suppor

ts the conclusion that compelling interests motivating a statutory exception are

cate g orica lly disqualified from constituting a “compe lling rea son” to withhold information from

S e e i d

. § § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 , . 3 2 1 5 , . 3 2 3

. 122

I d

. § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1 ( d e m a n d i n g l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n t o i m p l e m e n t t h e s t a t e ’ s p o l i c y o f o p e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t o 123 f a v o r d i s c l o s i n g i n f

o r m a t i o n a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t a l a f f a i r s )

.
S e e i d

. § 5 5 2

. 3 0 2

. I n l i g h t o f t h i s h o l d i n g , w e n e e d n o t a d d r e s s t h e C i t y ’ s a l t e r n a t i v e a r g u m e n t t h a t 124

“ s u b s t a n t i a l h a r m ” t o i t s b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a “ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n ” f o r w i t h h o l d i n g t h e r e q u e s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n
.
P o s t a t 3 6

- 3 7 ( B O Y D , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( “ B e c a u s e t h e A c t r e q u i r e s b o t h t h a t a n e x c e p t i o n a p p l y a n d t h a t a 125

c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n e x i s t , n e i t h e r t h e A c t ’ s e x c e p t i o n s n o r t h e p r i v i l e g e s a n d c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y t h a t t r i g g e r a n e x c e p t i o n a r e s u f f i c i e n t a l o n e t o e s t a b l i s h a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n
. ” ) ; i d

. a t 3 0 ( “ [ N ] e i t h e r a n e x c e p t i o n n o r t h e i n t e r e s t s i t s u p p o r t s c a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y q u a l i f

y a s a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t h a t o u t w e i g h s t h e p u b l i c ’ s i n t e r e s t i n p r o m p t a c c e s s t o p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n u n d e r t h e A c t

. ” )

. B u t s e e i d

. a t 3 3 n
. 2 0 ( a g r e e i n g t h e C o u r t c o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e “ ‘ p o l i c y o f p r e v e n t i n g b i o t e r r o r i s m ’ ” t h a t
u n d e r l i e s s e c t i o n 5 5 2

. 1 5 2 ’ s e x c e p t i o n f r o m p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e “ w h e n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n e x i s t s ” )

.



## 33

## public disclosure. The dissent’s procla mation pay s lip serv i ce t o o u r fundame ntal obliga tion to

construe sta tutes as written, but is text ually unsupportable a

nd, fra nkly , preposter ous. First, the L eg islature has place d no restric tions on the compelling -re ason standard. I ndeed,

as the dissent rea dily acknow ledg es, the “ac tual lang uag e” in section 5 5 2

. 3 0 2 applies to “ any ‘compe lling rea son.’” Second, the statute betra y s no L eg islative in

te n t to ig n o r e p o li c ie s embodied 1 2 6



## in and int ere sts protec ted by statutory exceptions in determ i n i n g whether a “compelling rea son to
withhold the information” ex ists. Not a si ng le word in the P I A s upports a construction of sec tion
552.302 as rende ring irrele vant, for example, the policy of preve nting bioterror ism that underlies
section 552.151 or the interest in avoiding a “substantial threa t of phy sical harm” to an employ ee or
office r as advanc ed by section 552.152. I n this case, o u r re s p o nsibili ty to deter mine whether a 1 2 7 

## compelling rea son exis ts require s that we consider the interests protec ted b y t he attorney -client privileg e—intere sts the dissent ignor es entirely —and not disreg ard them out of hand mere ly beca use they wer e important enoug h for the L eg islature to protec t in the first instance. 1 2 8


## This is not, a s the dissent sa y s, “a distinction without a differ ence ” beca use not a ll of the 1 2 9



## p o l i ci es and interests animating a statutory exception will nece ssarily be compelling in their own

I d

. a t 3 3

- 3 4

. 126

S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 1 5 1 , . 1 5 2

. 127

T h e d i s s e n t ’ s c l a i m t o “ a c k n o w l e d g e t h e p r i v i l e g e ’ s i m p o r t a n c e ” f a l l s f l a t b e c a u s e t h e a n a l y s i s d o e s n o t 128

r e c o g n i z e o r e v a l u a t e t h e i n t e r e s t s u n d e r l y i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e i n d e c l a r i n g t h o s e i n t e r e s t s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y o v e r c o m e b y d e l a y a n d n e c e s s a r i l y o v e r p o w e r e d b y t h e p u b l i c ’ s i n t e r e s t i n p r o m p t n e s s
. P o s t a t 3 n
. 1 , 3 0 ( B O Y D , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g )

. T h e d i s s e n t , i n s t e a d , r e l i e s o n t h e c i r c u l a r a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e e x c e p t e d p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m d i s c l o s u r e t o p r o t e c t i m p o r t a n t i n t e r e s t s , b u t t h o s e i n t e r e s t s c a n n o t b e “ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n [ s ] t o w i t h h o l d i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m d i s c l o s u r e ” b e c a u s e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e e x c e p t e d p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m d i s c l o s u r e t o t h e p u b l i c
. S e e i d

. a t 1 6

- 1 7

.
I d

. a t 1 6

. 129


## 34

## rig ht—in whole or part. We cannot, howeve r, ignor e those that are
. The statutory support for this 1 3 0


## construction of the statute is, quite simply , the co m p el l ing- rea son standard articula ted in section
552.302. 1 3 1


## The dissent’s theory to the contra ry turns on an interpre tation of section 552.302 that require s privileg e plus other compelling circ umstances. Aside from eng raf ting restric tions that do not exis t
in t h e s t atutory lang uag e, the dissent offe rs few para meters as to what would qualify

. We are left only with the dissent’s view that a compelling rea son (1) will usu al ly addre ss the g overnme ntal body ’s “re asons for its failure to timely and proper ly asser t the privileg e,” and (2) “mig ht exis t if 1 3 2


## the g overnme ntal body establishes that substantial harm would re s u l t i f t he information is
rele ased.” 1 3 3



## I n summarily concluding that the interests protec ted by the attorney -client privileg e are not signific ant enough to rebut the public-disclosure presumption, the di ssent g ives short shri ft t o t h e compelling interests underly ing the attor n e y - c li e n t p r iv il e g e , c it e s no authority supporting compelled
disclosure of attorney -client privileg ed information due to tardiness or inaction, and overlooks the

S e e , e

. g

. , T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 1 0 6 ( a ) ( e x c e p t i n g f r o m m a n d a t o r y d i s c l o s u r e “ a d r a f t o r w o r k i n g p a p e r 130 i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p o s e d l e g i s l a t i o n ” ) , . 1 2 2 ( e x c e p t i n g f r o m m a n d a t o r y d i s c l o s u r e a t e s t i t e m d e v e l o p e d b y a n e d u c a t i o n a l a g e n c y f u n d e d b y s t a t e r e v e n u e , a l i c e n s i n g a g e n c y , o r a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y )

.
P o s t a t 1 3 ( c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t “ t h e C o u r t c a n p r o v i d e n o s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r d e c i d i n g w h e n t h e i n t e r e s t s t h a t 131

a n e x c e p t i o n p r o t e c t s a r e c a t e g o r i c a l l y c o m p e l l i n g a n d w h e n t h e y a r e n o t ” )

.

I d

. a t 3 0

. T h e d i s s e n t i n t i m a t e s t h a t a n u n t i m e l y r e q u e s t f o r a n a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l d e c i s i o n e q u a t e s t o “ f a i l u r e 132 t o t i m e l y a n d p r o p e r l y a s s e r t t h e [ a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] p r i v i l e g e
. ” I d

. W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e C i t y d i d n o t t i m e l y a n d p r o p e r l y a s s e r t a s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n t o d i s c l o s u r e , t h e C i t y h a s j e a l o u s l y g u a r d e d i t s a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e , a s s e r t i n g i t a s a “ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o w i t h h o l d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n ” f

r o m d i s c l o s u r e
. T h e r e i s n o s t a t u t o r y d e a d l i n e f o r a s s e r t i n g t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e o r f o r c l a i m i n g a “ c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o w i t h h o l d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
. ”

I d

. a t 3 1

. 133


## 35

## public interest in maintaining confide ntiality of attorney -client communications. As a substitut e for

these inquiries, the dissent’s analy sis eleva tes promptness to near conclusive importance

. The PI A
does not, howeve r, require a compelling rea son for “untimeliness” or “lac k of diligenc e”; it require s

a “compe lling rea son to withhold the information” from public disclosure. The signific ant interests
advanc ed and pr otected by the attorne y -client privileg e mee t that standard.
The dissent’s analy

tical g aps are not overc ome by the host of boilerplate open-r ecor ds
decisions the dissent offe rs to “prove [] ” that routinely depriving the attorney -client privileg e of forc e

over the last twenty -two y ear s has not preve nted g overnme ntal bodies from seeking leg al advice or
chilled full and fra

nk leg al communications. No matter how many open-r ecor ds decisions have 1 3 4 

## applied the Attorney Gene ral’s unduly restric tive interpre tation of section 552.302—the underlying
rationale of which the dissent corr ectly repudia tes —proof that a rule has been applied is no proof 1 3 5


## of the rule’s impact. The rea lity is we do not know how twenty -two y ear s of routinely adver se leg al ruling s have shaped internal discourse; whether ethical and leg al violations have occur red that may
have been preve nted under a proper construction of the PI A; or how the public fisc has been aff ecte d.

We do know, howeve r, that the attorney -client privileg e exis ts beca use the sy stemic harm from deny ing it is rea l e ven if it is not quantifiable. We also know that the privileg e’s purpose is w ell 1 3 6

I d

. a t 3 , 2 6

- 2 9

. 134

I d

. a t 1 4 & n
. 1 1

. 135

S e e s u p r a , n n
. 8 8

- 9 2

. 136


## 36

## established and enduring , and that it applies with “spec ial forc e” to the go vernme nt beca use it
advanc es the public’s be st interests. 1 3 7



## I pse dix it, howeve r, is not proof of any thing—one way or the other—a nd is no substitut e for
500 y ear s of prec edent. I f it wer e, the same open-r ecor ds decisions the dissent relies on would 1 3 8 

## “prove [] ” and debunk the dissent’s own “par ade of horribles” by demonstrating that even under the Attorney Gene ral’s restric tive construction of the statutory standard, g overnme ntal bodies continued
to eng ag e the PI A’s over sight proc ess af ter missing the statutory

deadline. 1 3 9



## As a final rejoinder , we addre ss the dissent’s ref rain that we are substitut ing our judgme nt,

our pref ere nces, and our rules for the L eg islature’s. When we endea vor to asce rtain the meaning of

an undefine d statutory term that is integ ral to a statutory inquiry , we are not overstepping the bounds
of our authority mere ly beca use our colleag ues disag ree with our analy sis or conclusions. “[T] o
admit that disag ree ments do and will alway s exis t over hard and fine questions of law doesn’t mean
those disag ree ments are the products of persona l will or politics rathe r than the products of diligent
and hon es t eff

orts by all involved to make sense of the leg al materia ls at hand.” But if that 1 4 0


## criticism wer e fairly l o d ged i n any direc tion, it would be toward those who, in the g uise of

S e e s u p r a , n n
. 8 1

- 8 8 , 1 1 6

. 137

8 J O H N H

. W IG M O R E , E V ID E N C E § 2 2 9 0 ( M c N a u g h t o n r e v
. 1 9 6 1 ) ( “ T h e h i s t o r y o f [ t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] 138 p r i v i l e g e g o e s b a c k t o t h e r e i g n o f E l i z a b e t h I , w h e r e t h e p r i v i l e g e a l r e a d y a p p e a r s a s u n q u e s t i o n e d

. ” ( c i t i n g B e r d v

. L o v e l a c e , C a r y 8 8 , 2 1 E n g
. R e p
. 3 3 ( C h

. 1 5 7 7 ) ) )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , p o s t a t 2

- 3 ( B O Y D , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( “ U n d e r t h e C o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g , e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e e x c e p t i o n w i l l 139

a l w a y s c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n
. . . . o b l i t e r a t [ i n g ] t h e s o l e m e t h o d b y w h i c h t h e A c t c o m p e l s t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o t i m e l y a n d p r o p e r l y a s s e r t t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e
. ” )

.

H o n
. N e i l M

. G o r s u c h , L a w ’ s I r o n y , 3 7 H A R V

. J

. L

. & P U B

. P O L ’ Y 7 4 3 , 7 5 2

- 5 3 ( 2 0 1 4 )

. 140


## 37

## interpre ting a statute, invent a standard that imposes limit ations that are more re s trictive than the

plain lang uag e allows while simult aneously denouncing a party ’s construction of the statute on the

very sa me basis. By substitut ing inflammatory rhetoric for analy sis, the dissent confirms the adag e

1 4 1 

## that, when ne ither the law nor the fa cts are in y our fa vor, pound the table

. IV. Conclusion
The P I A promotes and advanc es the public’s interest in g overnme ntal transpar ency and

openness, but not at the expense of the public’s equally signific ant interest in ensuring public
officia ls pursue and obtain leg al advice and repr esenta tion in aff airs of g overna

nce. The signific ance
of the interests p ro t ec t ed by the attorney -client privileg e and the need to protec t attorney -client
confide nces from compelled public disclosure wer e not lost on the L eg islature in enac ting the PI A.

T h e P I A addre sses the competing values of transpar ency and the need for confide ntiali t y b y excepting confide ntial attorney -client communications from mandatory public disclosure. I n doing

so, the PI A rec ogn i z es t h e importance of the attorney -client privileg e and aff irms that the public
interest i s b est serve d when those sworn to protec t it are g uided by fully informed leg al advice in conducting public aff

airs. Thoug h the PI A must be construed liberally in favor of g ranting a reque st for public information, the “compe lling rea son” inquiry require s us to weig h th e p u b lic’s interest in expeditious

a s s e r ti o n of a statutory exception ag ainst the invaluable rig ht to have attorney -client communicati o n s protec ted from compelled public disclosure. Meeting statutory deadlines is cer tainly important, but

P o s t a t 1

- 3 , 6

- 8

. 141


## 38

## as the PI A plainly articula tes, is not deter

minative. Weighing ag ainst the need for prompt action is
the irre mediable conseque nce of compelling disclosure; once privileg ed information is disclosed,
confide ntiality is lost for all times and all purposes. When the interests are balanc ed, the compelling

nature of the attorney -client privileg e is manifest. Be cause there is a compelling rea son to withhold
information cover ed by the attorney -client privileg e, we aff irm the lower- court judgme nts holding the City of Da llas need not disclose tha t information to the reque stors.

___________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: Fe bruar y 3, 2017

39