### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-09-00115- CV

Texas Depart m ent of Public Saf ety, A ppellan t

v. Christopher Mason Wilki ns, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 2 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CV- 08- 0068 74, H ONO RAB LE ERIC SH EP P ERD, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

At about 1:00 a.m. on J une 22, 2007, Austin Police Offic er Knutson stopped appellee Christopher Mason Wil kins for running a red light and failure to maintain his lane of traff ic. During the stop, Offic er K

nutson decided to c all Offic er B rown to the sce ne so she c ould administer field sobriety tests. Offic er Br own conclude d from field sobriety tests that Wil kins was intox icated and

arr ested Wilkins, who refused to submit to an alcohol conc entra tion test. As a re sult of Wi lkins’s

r e f usal, appellant Texas Depa rtment of Public Safety suspended Wil kins’s driver’ s license. Wi lkin s 1
reque sted a hear ing on the license suspension and, following a hear ing at which Offic er Br own 2
testified and her repor

t was submitt ed as evidenc e, the Administrative L aw J udg e (“A L J ”) sustained the suspension. Wil kins appea led to the trial court, which reve rsed the administrative decision. The 3

See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.035 (West Supp. 2010). 1 See id . §§ 524.035, 724.041 (West Supp. 2010). 2 See id. § 524.041 (West 2007). 3Depa

rtment appea ls from the trial co u rt ’s decision. We reve rse the trial court’s order and rende r judgme nt affir

ming the A L J ’s deter

mination. When the Depa

rtment seeks to suspend a d river’ s license for failure to provide a blood or breath sample, and the person whose license is suspended req u es t s a h ear ing, the Depa rtment must show by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that ther e wa s rea sonable suspicion or probable cause to stop o r arr est the person; there was probable cause to believe the person was
opera ting a vehicle in a public place while intox icated; the person was arr ested and asked to submit
to a blood or brea

th test for alcohol; and the person ref used to provide the reque sted specimen. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 524.035, 724.042 (West Supp. 2010); Texas Dep’ t of Public Safety v. Torres , 54 S.W .3d 438, 440-41 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2001, no pet.). An AL J ’s deci s i on to suspend a driver’s l i ce n se is revie wed for substantial evidenc e and should be reve rsed only if the AL J ’s finding s are not supported by substantial evidenc e, considering the reliable and probative evidenc e

as a whole, and if the ag g rieve d party ’s substantial rig hts have been prejudice d. Texas Dep’ t of Public Safety v. Jenk

ins , 60 S.W .3d 304, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). A revie wing court
may not subst i t u t e i t s judgme nt for the AL J ’s. Railroad Comm’n v. Torch Operating Co. , 912 S.W .2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1995).

There is no dispute that Offic er Knutson had probable cause to stop Wil kins for failing to maintain a s i n gle lane and running a red light. Rather, the issue is Wil kins’s continued detention bey ond his immediate encounte r with Knu tson afte r Knutson witnessed the traff ic violations. The State arg ues that Wil kins had the burden of showin g t h at the detention was

unrea sonable; that the de tention was re asonable and that the trial court erre d in finding othe rwise;

2and that beca use Wil kins ref

used to provide a breath or blood sample for testing, the trial court err ed
in reve rsing the administrative suspension of Wil kins’s license. Wil kins insists that the Depa rtment did not show Knutson or Br own had probable cause or re asonable suspicion to detain him bey ond the scope of the traff

ic offe nses to investigat e wh ether Wil kins was driving while intox icated (“D WI ”). We disag ree . Ba sed on the evidenc e prese nted, the AL J could rea sonably have conclude d that Offic er Br own’s investigation and continuing detention of Wil kins was proper , and the t ri al
court e rre d in reve rsing the AL J

.

Whether a detention is “re asonable ” under the Four th Amendment is a fac t-intensive inquiry

. Kothe v. State , 152 S.W .3d 54 , 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). “Rea sonablene ss” is deter mined by looking to the totality of the circ umst an ce s o f t h e stop and “re quires a balanc e betwee n the public interest serve d and the individual’s rig ht to be fre e from arbitra ry detentions and intrusions.” Id. at 63. We should ask first whether the office r’s action was justified at its inception and second wheth er the scope of the detention was rea sonably rela ted to the fac ts that initially justified the stop. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968))

. Gene rally , a traff ic stop and investiga tion should last no longe r t han necessar y to effe ct the purpose of the stop. Id. Howeve r, during a routine traff

ic stop, the police may as k fo r information such as the driver’ s license and vehicle reg istration and may take t he time to run a chec k on that information. Id. Not until the backg round chec k is completed and the office r deter mines that the driver has a valid license, has no

o u t standing war

rants, and is driving a car that is not stolen is the traff ic-stop investigation full y resolved a

nd should the driver be allowed to le ave. Id. at 63-64. “ [O] nce the orig inal purpose f or the stop is exhausted, police may not unnece ssarily detain drivers solely in hopes of finding evidenc e

3of some o t h er cr i me.” Id. at 64. Howeve r, there is no set time-limit on a routine traff ic stop and “instead, the issue is ‘whe ther the police diligently pursued a means of investiga tion that was likely
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly , during which time it was necessary to detain the defe ndant.’” Id. at 64-65 (quoting United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985))

.

At the administrative hear ing , O f f ic e r B r o w n p r o v id e d th e only testimony , stating that Offic er Knutson stopped Wil kins for failure to maintain a single l an e an d running a red light and then called Br own to conduct a DW I investigation. She did not rec all how much time passed betwee n the initial stop and her arr ival, nor did she rec all what Knutson said about why he thought Wil kins might be intox icated. Br own testified that she noticed a strong odor of alcoholic bever ag e when she spoke to Wil kins, but when asked about other signs of intox ication, she said, “I don’t rec all exactly what I noticed rig ht there on the scene .” I n her report and probable c ause a ffidavit, which

wer e introduced into evidenc e, Br own stated: she smelle d a strong odor of alcoholic bever ag es; Wil kins’ ey es wer e g lassy and dilated; and he sway ed when walking and standing , showed three of four indicators of intox ication on the horizontal g aze ny stag mus test, and had problems perf orming the three other field sobriety tests she administered. Br own’s repor t also stated that Wil kins admitted
to drinking one beer

. I n the statutory war ning form , Br o wn s t at ed that she reque sted a blood or brea th sample but that Wi lkins refused to pr ovide a spe cimen or sig n the form.

“[T] here is no leg al authority stating that the DPS is require d to pr ove a connec tion betwee n the rea son for the stop and the rea son for [t he defe ndant’s] arr est. I t is well established that

once an office r has rea sonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, as i n t h i s case, he may conduct an investiga tive detention of ever y one in the vehicle.” Torres , 54 S.W .3d at 441 (c i ting Graham v.

4State , 893 S.W .2d 4, 7 (Tex. App.—Da l l as 1 9 9 4, no pet.)). I n this case , there is no evidenc e that

Kn u t s o n had finished his investigation into the traff ic offe nses at the time Br own arr ived o n t h e

scene , that the leng th of the detention was excessive, or that Knutson unreasonably delay ed the conclusion of the traff

ic stop to allow Br own time to arr ive. See Kothe , 152 S.W .3d at 66-67 (“the re is no testimony or insinuation that Deputy For sland was purposef ully prolongi n g M r. Kot he’s detention”) ; Caraway v

. State , 255 S.W .3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.) (“The re

was no evidenc e that Trooper Shea failed to diligently pursue his investigation or that he delay ed in writing the war

ning in a n eff ort to prolong the stop.”).
Ba sed on Offic er Brow n’s t estimony and the documents entered into evidenc e, the
AL J could have rea sonably inferr ed that Offic er Knutson, like Br own, had smelled a strong odor of alcoholic bever ag e when talking to Wil kins and had seen that he had g lassy , dilated ey es or sway ed when standing

. See Curtis v. State , 238 S.W

. 3 d 376, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (ra tional 4
infere nces may be draw n from fac ts); Hesske w v. Texas Dep’ t of Public Safety , 144 S.W .3d 189, 192 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2004, no pet.) (off icer ’s aff idavit should not be rea d in hy per- technica l sense; “Courts are permitted to draw rea sonable infere nces from t h e fac ts supporting a law enfor ceme nt office r’s swor

n statements.”) ; Jenk

ins , 60 S.W .3d at 309 (stateme nts on forms prepa red f ollowing

Wil kins relies on Texas Departme nt of Public Safety v. Rodriguez to support his arg ument 4 that beca use there was no direc t evidenc e of Offic er Knutson’s observa tions bey ond the infrac tions leading to the traff

ic stop, the continued d et enti on and DWI investigation wer e improper. 953 S.W .2d 362, 364-65 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ). Howeve r, in this case , Offic er Br own’s arr est repor

ts state that she smelled a strong odor of alcoholic bever ag es and saw that Wil kins’s ey es wer e g lassy and dilated. As we note ab o v e, t h e AL J could have conclude d that Knutson made simil ar observa

tions, which cause d him to call Br own for a DWI investigation. This is prec isely the link betwee n t h e i n i t i al stop and the DWI investigation and arr est that was lacking in Rodriguez , wher e the evidenc e did not ref lect si gn s o f intox ication until Rodrigue z was being g iven field sobriety tests. See id . at 363. 5arr est amounted to some evidenc e from which AL J could have conclude d that office r inferr ed driver

was intox icated)

. The AL J could reasonably have concluded that Knutson had proba ble ca use to 5 suspect that Wil kins might be intox icated based on Wil kins’s running a red light and drifting out of his lane and Br own’s observa tions of the smell of alcoholic bever ag e and Wil kins’s g lassy , dilated
ey es, observa tions that the AL J rea sonably could have inferr ed wer e made by Knutson as well. See
Curtis , 238 S.W .3d at 381 (cour t of appea ls shoul d h av e co nsidered lateness of hour, office r’s experience in de tecting intox icated dr ivers, and r ational infer ence s that could be dra wn from f

acts articula ted by offic er s ); s ee also Ruiz v. State , 907 S.W .2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) (off

icer who continued detention afte r depar ture of orig inal office r had probable cause
to continue detention beca use he had information from orig inal office r that defe ndant had committed traff ic offe nse and “ some suspicion” that def endant wa s intox icated)

. The AL J rea sonably conclude d t h at this was not a case wher e Offic er Knutson conclude d his traff

ic stop and then unrea sonably extended the traff ic stop as a “fishing expedition”
to look for evidenc e of other crimes. I nstead, the AL J could have conclude d that in the course of the

Fur ther, “whe n one office r, partic ipating among a team of office rs, observe s the 5 incriminating conduct of a defe ndant, the observing office r’s knowledg e, toge ther wi t h any information possessed by the team, can be collectively considere d in deter mining whether probable cause to arr est exis ts.” Sanchez v. State , 797 S.W .2d 951, 953 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (citing Pyles v. State , 755 S.W .2d 98, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); W illis v. State , 669 S.W .2d 728, 730-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); W oodward v. State , 668 S.W .2d 337, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh’ g )); see also Smith v. State , 58 S.W .3d 784, 792 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. ref

’d) (citing United States v. He n s ley , 469 U.S. 221, 230-33 (1985)) (“U nder the coll ec t i v e or imputed knowledg e doctrine, an arr est or sear ch is permissible wher e the actua l arr esting or sear ching office r lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or rea sonable suspi cion, but sufficie nt information to justi fy the ar rest or se arc h was known by other law enfor ceme nt officia ls initiating or involved with the investigation.”). We see no rea son why the imputed knowledg e doctrine should not apply in an evalua tion of whether there wa s rea sonable suspicion to transform the tra ffic stop into a DWIinvestigation. 6traff

ic stop, evidenc e of possible intox ication led Knutson to call Offic er Br own to conduct a DWI investiga tion. Be cause substantial evidenc e s u p p o rt s the AL J ’s conclusion that Offic er Br own’s investiga tion and continuing detention of Wil kins was proper , the trial court err ed in reve rsing that deter mination. See Jenk

ins , 60 S.W .3d at 308. Be cause of the evidenc e and the rational infere nces 6

t hat t he AL J could have made, the trial court erre d in substitut ing its own j udg ment for the AL J ’s and reve rsing the AL J ’s decision. See Torch Operating Co. , 912 S.W .2d at 792. We reve rse the trial
court’s order and reinstate the AL J ’s administrative decision authorizing the Depa rtment to suspend Wil kins’s driver’ s license.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and H enson Reverse d and Rende red Filed: Mar ch 31, 2011

The AL J found in her order that there was rea sonable suspicion to stop Wil kins for a traff ic 6 v i o l at i o n an d that there was probable cause to arr est Wil kins based on the odor of alcoholic bever ag e, glassy ey es, sway ing, a nd poor performanc e on the field sobriety tests. I n reve rsing the AL J , the trial court made no finding s or conclusions either during the hear ings or in its order , which stated only that, “The Court, ha ving considere d the administrative rec ord and hear ing arg ument of counsel, is of the opinion that the Administrative De cision should be REVERSED.” 7