[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-11577

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00072-LJA

KATHLEEN STRANG, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALBANY GEORGIA, 

The City of, 

WILLIE ADAMS, 

in his personal and official capacity, 

DOROTHY HUBBARD, 

in her personal and official capacity, 

CHRISTOPHER PIKE, 

in his personal and official capacity, 

ROGER MARIETTA, 

in his personal and official capacity, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

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(December 31, 2018)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kathleen Strang, a former assistant city attorney in Albany, Georgia, brings 

a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that her First Amendment rights 

were violated because she was terminated in retaliation for speaking about a 

handgun that her supervisor kept in his office. The district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants. Strang now appeals.

I.

Strang was hired as an assistant city attorney in 2006 by City Attorney C. 

Nathan Davis. Her official duties included ensuring “departmental compliance 

with all applicable City codes, laws, rules, regulations, standards, policies and 

procedures” and “initiating any actions necessary to correct violations.” As part of 

her duty to ensure compliance with applicable laws and rules, Strang made several 

reports to Davis regarding infractions by city employees. 

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In 2009 Shurell Byrd, a black city employee and friend of Strang’s, told

Strang about racism exhibited by Byrd’s immediate boss, who routinely used the 

“N” word.1

 Strang, who is white, orally reported Byrd’s account to Davis. 

Assistant City Attorney Jenise Shicole Smith, who is black, overheard Strang 

report to Davis “that this guy called black people ‘N*****s.’”2

 Afterwards Smith 

asked Strang not to use this word. Strang then became “furious,” entered a 

paralegal’s office, and “said the word ‘N r, N** **r, N r, N** **r, N r, 

N** **r, N****r.’” Strang later said that she did not mean to call Smith a racial 

slur, but was “ridiculing” the fact that Smith approached Strang as if Strang had 

used a slur out of racial animus even though Smith knew the context of Strang’s 

report.

In January 2010, the Board of City Commissioners — composed of the 

mayor and six commissioners — met with Davis to conduct an annual evaluation 

of his performance. During that meeting the Board expressed concern about 

Davis’ supervision of Strang, noting that “certain department heads” would not 

work with Strang due to her inappropriate behavior. The Board directed Davis to 

put Strang on an improvement plan and report back. Davis placed Strang on a 

 

1 Strang referred to the “N” word during her deposition, but testified that Byrd “said the 

word.”

2 Strang did not pronounce the word with asterisks; we have added them to avoid echoing 

the full racist force of the word.

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coaching plan that required her to: “(1) attend . . . a training class focused on 

conflict resolution or team building within 30 days and (2) develop a written 

strategy within 90 days to strengthen her ability to create a collegial atmosphere.” 

Strang was informed that failure to complete the coaching plan could result in 

disciplinary action, including termination.

Afterwards tensions in the City Attorney’s office continued to grow. In 

March 2010, Strang alleges that Davis — apparently concerned that Strang’s desk 

was too cluttered — entered her office and swept papers containing work product 

off of her desk and into the trash can. Strang decided that she was “going to teach 

[Davis] a lesson” by “find[ing] a document and mak[ing] it disappear.” After 

Strang entered Davis’ office she could not bring herself to follow through with her 

plan, but she did open Davis’ desk drawer where she discovered a handgun. 

Strang became “frightened, because [she] really thought that [Davis] had that gun 

there because he intended to point it at [her],” because “in [her] mind’s eye that 

man hated [her] guts, and he hated [her] guts so much that when [Strang] saw that 

gun there, [she] thought that that’s why it was there.”

Strang then brought Niger Thomas, the city’s equal employment opportunity 

manager, to Davis’ office to see the gun because Thomas “was a personal friend 

and she was the EEO person. . . . We shared viewpoints about certain senior city 

officials and about the way things were done, they were crazy.” Strang described

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feeling like she needed to get her discovery off her chest and that telling Thomas 

made the situation feel less dangerous. She asked that Thomas keep the incident a 

secret to avoid retaliation. Thomas did report Davis, who was suspended without 

pay for three days.

In April 2010, the staff of the City Attorney’s Office went to a professional 

development lunch. Strang did not attend. The next day Christine Washington, an

administrative legal secretary, told Strang that she was “required to attend a 

mandatory staff meeting” that afternoon. When Strang arrived at the meeting, 

Washington ordered her to apologize for embarrassing the office by reporting

Davis’ gun and repeatedly told Strang that she should be fired. Smith, the 

Assistant City Attorney who had earlier expressed concerns about Strang’s 

language, also “attacked” Strang for three hours by criticizing her work, her 

handling of a case, and for pretending to work long hours. Strang alleges that, 

although Davis was not present, he “authorized the staff meeting,” likely at the 

luncheon that Strang had missed.

On May 5, 2010, Davis “requested [Strang’s] immediate resignation, 

allegedly based on office discord.” On May 6, 2010, Thomas prepared a 

memorandum for the mayor concerning “the workplace environment in the City 

Attorney’s Office” including “poor staff relations and longstanding inter-office 

conflicts” and “palpable tension, mistrust and disrespect.” Five days later the 

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Board of Commissioners held a closed executive session, in which commissioners 

criticized Strang for paying her city-issued cellphone bill late, not getting along 

with her colleagues, and doing work outside of the City Attorney’s Office.

On May 25, 2010, Strang received a Notice of Recommendation of 

Dismissal from Davis. On June 22, 2010, Strang elected to have a pre-termination 

hearing before City Manager Alfred Lott, where she presented evidence for Lott to 

consider in determining whether to approve or reject Davis’ termination 

recommendation. Lott terminated her employment effective June 30, 2010. He 

determined that her behavior had created a hostile work environment, which was 

exacerbated by her use of racial slurs. Lott also noted instances in which Davis 

was unsatisfied with Strang’s legal work, and that Strang had not complied with 

her coaching plan because she failed to complete the course on interpersonal 

relationships or produce the written strategy document.

On May 10, 2012, Strang filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

the city, the mayor, the city commissioners, Lott, and Davis alleging that she was 

terminated in violation of the First Amendment in retaliation for reporting Davis’ 

gun. On March 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Strang litigated the case pro se and managed her own discovery. On April 29, 

2016, she filed a motion for discovery sanctions based on the alleged misconduct 

of Davis, City Commissioner Bob Langstaff, and defense counsel Donald Sweat. 

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The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 

denied Strang’s motion for discovery sanctions. Strang appeals both decisions.

II.

Strang first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendants. We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment, drawing “all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Summary judgment may be granted only if “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509–10 

(1986) (quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists when 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. 

The state may not discharge a public employee in retaliation for speech 

protected under the First Amendment. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 

1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). An employee makes out a prima facie case of First 

Amendment retaliation by establishing the following elements by a preponderance 

of the evidence:

(1) the employee’s speech is on a matter of public concern; (2) the 

employee’s First Amendment interest in engaging in the speech 

outweighs the employer’s interest in prohibiting the speech to promote 

the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees; 

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and (3) the employee’s speech played a “substantial part” in the 

employer’s decision to demote or discharge the employee.

Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d at 755, 759–60 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted). If a plaintiff successfully makes out a prima facie case then the burden 

shifts to the employer to show that it would have made the same decision even in 

the absence of protected conduct. Id.

The district court held that Strang failed to satisfy the first element of her 

prima facie case. We agree. In order for a plaintiff to meet this requirement the 

speech in question must be made by a government employee speaking as a citizen

on a subject of public concern. Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1342–43 (11th 

Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff cannot make this showing then “there can be no First 

Amendment issue, and the constitutional inquiry ends.” Id. at 1343. When speech 

is made pursuant to an employee’s official duties, it is not made as a private citizen 

for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 1342. “Deciding whether a government 

employee’s speech relates to his or her job as opposed to an issue of public concern 

must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 

revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 1343 (quotation marks omitted). The fact 

that information may be of general interest to the public does not in itself make 

speech regarding that information a matter of public concern. Id. at 1344. 

Here the record shows that Strang was not speaking as a citizen, but as an 

employee concerned about her job and her own personal safety in the workplace. 

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She spoke to Thomas, her friend and a city employee whose job is related to 

workplace grievances. Strang has said that she went to Thomas because she was 

afraid Davis might “point” the gun at her because he “hated [Strang’s] guts.” Not 

only that but speaking as she did was within the scope of her official duties. Part 

of her job was ensuring compliance with city rules, and she had previously taken 

multiple actions to address infractions by city employees. So Strang’s speech was 

not made as a private citizen and the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment to the defendants.

III.

Strang next challenges the district court’s decision to deny her motion for 

discovery sanctions against Davis, Langstaff, and Sweat. She argues that the 

district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact because Strang provided clear 

evidence showing that: (1) “Davis lied repeatedly under oath throughout his 

deposition regarding material facts under dispute,” (2) Langstaff engaged in 

dilatory tactics during his deposition, and (3) Sweat “fabricated” interrogatory 

responses without client input. We disagree.

“We review a court’s imposition of sanctions under its inherent powers for 

abuse of discretion.” Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 

F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). In making this determination we ask whether 

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the district court applied the wrong legal standard or made findings of fact that are 

clearly erroneous. See id.

Courts possess an inherent power to impose sanctions for litigation 

misconduct that derives from their need to “manage [their] own affairs so as to 

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 1306 (quotation 

marks omitted). This power must be “exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). “The key to unlocking a court’s inherent power is a 

finding of bad faith.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Conduct demonstrating bad 

faith includes “delaying or disrupting the litigation,” id., and making false 

statements during a deposition for a “harassing or frivolous purpose,” Byrne v. 

Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1125 (11th Cir. 2001) abrogated on other grounds by 

Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2011).

Strang attempts to demonstrate that Davis made false statements in bad faith 

during his deposition by pointing to evidence in the record that Strang contends 

contradicts Davis’ testimony. But she provides no evidence that Davis believed 

these statements to be untrue or that he made them for a harassing or frivolous 

purpose. Inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony alone are insufficient to make the 

finding of bad faith necessary to impose sanctions. See Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1125

(“Standing alone, a false or inconsistent statement in a deposition does not compel 

the conclusion of bad faith.”).

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Strang also points to conduct during Langstaff’s deposition that she alleges 

was abusive and dilatory. This conduct includes Langstaff questioning the 

authenticity of documents he was asked to review during the deposition, claiming 

not to recall his earlier testimony, and insisting that he be allowed to finish 

answering Strang’s deposition questions when she attempted to cut short his 

answers. Strang has not produced evidence that Langstaff engaged in this conduct 

in order to delay or disrupt the litigation. The district court was not requried to 

find that he acted in bad faith during his deposition.

Finally Strang argues that Sweat “fabricated” interrogatory responses 

without client input. As evidence of that she points to deposition transcripts in 

which Davis admits to not personally preparing or drafting responses to Strang’s 

interrogatories. But Strang has pointed to no authority indicating that parties are

required to personally draft responses to discovery requests, nor could she. Strang

has merely demonstrated that Sweat conformed with the common practice of 

drafting responses for his clients’ approval. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to impose sanctions.

AFFIRMED.3 

 3 Strang moves unopposed to supplement her appendix and supplemental appendix with 

pages inadvertently omitted from her original filings. We have reviewed these materials and 

they do not affect the outcome of this case. Strang’s motion is GRANTED.

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