J-A02024-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.E.-R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.V., MOTHER

No. 2413 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered July 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000287-2013

 CP-51-DP-0123503-2009

 FID: 51-FN-471006-2009

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2015

B.V. (“Mother”) appeals the July 17, 2014 order that involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her daughter, S.E.-R. (“Child”), born in 

June 2008. After review, we affirm.

The trial court, per the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko, J., summarized 

the procedural history of this case and made the following findings of fact:

On August 25, 2009, [Child] was admitted to St. Christopher’s 

Hospital for Children due to feeding aversion, gastroenteritis, 

and failure to thrive. [Child] was discharged from the hospital 

on September 17, 2009.

On December 1, 2009, the Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) Report 

stating that [Child] had a significant history of failure to thrive 

and had been hospitalized at least 12 times. [Child’s] medical 

team was unable to determine the cause of her failure to thrive. 

The report further stated that on December 1, 2009, Mother was 

contacted regarding [Child’s] tolerance for food and her speech 

was slurred. Mother at the time was manic, quoting Bible 

verses, and read letters from previous doctors. According to the 
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report, there were concerns regarding Mother’s mental stability 

and her ability to properly care for [Child]. It was determined 

that [Child’s] condition worsened due to Mother’s lack of care.

On December 7, 2009, DHS met with Mother at her home, where 

she informed DHS that her speech was slurred and she was 

manic because a family member died. Mother has a history of 

using drugs and alcohol.

On December 14, 2009, [Child] was admitted to St. 

Christopher’s Hospital for Children. [Child] began to gain weight 

while hospitalized and was discharged to Mother’s care. Mother 

failed to keep follow[-]up medical appointments.

On December 22, 2009, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (“OPC”) for [Child.] DHS placed [Child] in a medical 

foster home. Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit 

(“CEU”) for a dual diagnosis assessment and screen.

At the shelter care hearing on December 24, 2009, the OPC was 

lifted and the temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to 

stand.

At the adjudicatory hearing on December 29, 2009, held before 

the Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the temporary commitment to

DHS was ordered to stand. The court deferred adjudication with 

DHS supervision. The court referred Mother to CEU for a dual 

diagnosis assessment and a forthwith drug and alcohol screen. 

The [court] further ordered weekly two[-]hour supervised visits 

at the agency, which could be modified by agreement of the 

parties.

The initial Family Service Plan (“FSP”) Meeting was held on 

January 4, 2010, at which time the goal for [Child] was 

reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother were stated as: 1) 

to participate in a dual diagnosis assessment and comply with all 

treatment recommendations; 2) to participate in drug and 

alcohol screening; 3) attend parenting classes; 4) keep all visits 

and maintain regular contact with [Child]; 5) participate in 

[Child’s] medical appointments; and 6) to avoid interfering with 

the provision of medical supplies to [Child’s] foster parents. 

Mother participated in the meeting.

On June 8, 2010, DHS held an FSP meeting, and the goal for 

[Child] remained reunification. The FSP objectives remained the 

same. Mother participated in the FSP meeting.
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At the adjudicatory hearing on June 29, 2010, held before the 

Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the temporary commitment to DHS 

was discharged, and [Child] was adjudicated dependent and 

committed to DHS.

At the permanency review hearing on October 21, 2010 held 

before the Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the court ordered Mother 

be referred to CEU for a dual diagnosis assessment and urine 

drug screens. The court also ordered Mother to submit to three 

drug screens prior to the next court hearing and to comply with 

recommended drug and alcohol and mental health services.

In February 2011, [Child] was reunified with Mother and court 

supervision was terminated.

On May 12, 2011, Mother received a comprehensive 

biopsychosocial evaluation though Intercommunity Action, Inc. 

Mother was diagnosed with cocaine dependence, mood disorder 

NOS, post[-]traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and 

generalized anxiety disorder. Mother admitted to using alcohol 

and cocaine and reported that she was receiving inpatient 

substance abuse treatment at least three times in the past five 

years.

On June 4, 2011, [Child] was admitted to Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia (“CHOP”) for feeding intolerance and constipation. 

[Child] gained weight and thrived while hospitalized.

On June 13, 2011, DHS received a Child Protective Services 

report providing that Mother stated that [Child] had been 

vomiting for the past one to two weeks and refusing to be fed by 

mouth. The report further stated that [Child] did not vomit while 

in the presence of staff at CHOP, and that there was no medical 

reason for [Child’s] vomiting. In addition, it was reported that 

Mother failed to attend an intensive feeding program offered by 

CHOP and that she missed nine appointments for [Child] to be 

seen at the CHOP Care network.

DHS obtained an OPC on June 15, 2011 for [Child.]

On June 28, 2011, DHS held an FSP meeting, and the goal for 

[Child] was reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother were 

stated as: 1) to attend a psychiatric evaluation and comply with 

recommendations; 2) to complete a parenting capacity 

evaluation; 3) to meet with a therapist on a regular basis; 4) to 
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comply with previously developed FSP objectives; and 5) to 

meet regularly with [Child’s] agency social worker.

At the adjudicatory hearing on August 29, 2011, held before the 

Honorable Donna M. Woelpper, the court ordered Mother to have 

supervised visitation, and to have a forthwith drug screen, drug 

and alcohol assessment and monitoring by CEU.

At the adjudicatory hearing on September 16, 2011, held before 

the Honorable Donna [M.] Woelpper, the temporary commitment 

to DHS was discharged, and [Child] was adjudicated dependent 

and reunified with Mother. In-home protective services were 

implemented in Mother’s home to monitor [Child’s] safety. The 

court further ordered Mother to continue with the mental health 

treatment plan, comply with feeding programs at CHOP, comply 

with all evaluations and appointments, and complete all FSP

objectives.

At the permanency review hearing on November 1, 2011, held 

before the Honorable Donna M. Woelpper, the court referred 

Mother to BHS for psychiatric evaluation and any other 

necessary psychological evaluations.

On November 21, 2011, DHS held a FSP meeting, and the goal 

for [Child] remained reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother 

[were] stated as: 1) to attend a mental health evaluation and 

comply with recommendations; 2) to meet with a therapist on a 

regular basis; 3) to provide [Child] with nutritious meals; and 4) 

to comply with previously developed FSP objectives. Mother 

participated in the meeting.

On December 21, 2011, the case aide responsible for 

transporting [Child] to medical day care at Lauren’s House 

reported that Mother had a bleeding cut on her face that she 

wiped off while talking to her.

On January 5, 2012, the case aide reported that Mother 

appeared to be under the influence, slurred her words, and kept 

repeating herself.

On January 11, 2012, pursuant to DHS’s emergency relist 

request, the case was held before the Honorable Donna M. 

Woelpper. The court ordered Mother to produce a urine drug 

screen. The court further ordered that DHS place [Child] if

Mother did not ensure she attended medical day care daily at 

Lauren’s House, or if her urine screen was positive. The court 
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also ordered Mother to have three random drug screens prior to 

the next court hearing, and to comply with [Child’s] feeding 

clinic.

At the permanency review hearing on March 26, 2012 held 

before the Honorable Edward C. Wright, the court removed 

[Child] from Mother’s care. In addition, the CHOP feeding 

program reported Mother missed 23 of 48 mandatory meals with

[Child].

On May 17, 2012, DHS requested Mother submit a urine drug 

screen within one day. Mother submitted a urine screen on May 

25, 2012.

On May 24, 2012, Mother was referred to the Achieving 

Reunification Center.

On June 4, 2012, Mother tested positive for cocaine.

On June 22, 2012, Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from 

her drug treatment program at Interac.

On October 2, 2012, Mother appeared under the influence of 

drugs at DHS.

On November 9, 2012, Mother tested positive for drugs.

At the permanency review hearing on December 20, 2012, held 

before the Honorable James Murray Lynn, the court referred 

Mother to CEU for monitoring and 12 random screens prior to 

the next court hearing. The court ordered Mother to have 

supervised visits at the agency for one hour, and that if she 

misse[d] one visit, visits [would] be decreased to bi-weekly for 

one hour, and to be suspended if she misse[d] two visits.

Mother reported to CEU in March 2013 to produce a screen on a 

date of her own choosing. She did not submit to three random 

screens.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 9/15/2014, at 2-11 (citations to record 

omitted; modifications to capitalization).
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On May 9, 2013, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights.1 The trial court (per Judge Tereshko) held hearings on the petition 

on November 21, 2013 and February 19, 2014. On July 17, 2014, the trial 

court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Also on July 17, 2014, the trial court 

changed Child’s goal from reunification with Mother to adoption.

On August 15, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On September 15, 2014, the trial court filed its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Mother raises four issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), where the evidence 

showed that [Mother] substantially complied with the Family 

Service Plan goals established by the Department of Human 

Services of the City of Philadelphia (DHS), and further that 

DHS failed to provide adequate services to assist [Mother] in 

remedying the conditions that brought [Child] into care?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b), where [DHS] 

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

involuntar[ily] terminating [Mother’s] parental rights would 

best serve the emotional needs and welfare of [Child]?

____________________________________________

1 DHS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the unknown 

father. The trial court’s July 17, 2014 order terminated the unknown 

father’s parental rights. 
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3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights without fully considering the impact of termination of 

the emotional needs and welfare of [Child]?

4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by changing the permanency goal of [Child] from 

reunification to adoption where [DHS] failed to provide 

sufficient evidence that such a goal change would be best 

suited for [Child’s] needs and welfare?

Mother’s Brief as 2-3 (citations modified).

In her first three issues, Mother challenges the termination of her 

parental rights. We address those issues together. Our scope and standard 

of review for the termination of parental rights are as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even 

though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have 

adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not 

evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible 

evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and 

deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve 
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errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial 

court’s sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Mother’s rights were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In pertinent part, these statutory 

provisions provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the 

parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 
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an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree that grounds to do so have been established pursuant to any one 

subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, although the trial court found grounds 

to terminate pursuant to multiple subsections, we will only address section

(a)(8). In doing so, we must consider that:

In a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the 

burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to 

establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. The standard of “clear and convincing” 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue. 
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In re Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 299 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(citations omitted).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time 

frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the 

[child’s] removal by the court. Once the 12-month period has 

been established, the court must next determine whether the 

conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist, 

despite the reasonable good faith efforts of [the child welfare 

agency] supplied over a realistic time period. Termination under 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a 

parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions 

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of 

[the child welfare agency’s] services.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some citations 

omitted).

Mother argues that she has stopped her drug use, offering evidence in 

the form of clean drug screens. Mother contends that the evidence did not 

support the trial court’s conclusion that she did not comply with the drug 

screening requirements. Mother also argues that she was compliant with 

her mental health goals and that she, in fact, attended outpatient therapy. 

Mother asserts that she “substantially complied with her visitation plan” and 

attended fifty-five out of seventy-four visits between March 2012 and 

November 2013. Further, Mother argues that Child does not suffer from the 

same medical issues that led to the dependency and, therefore, there is no 
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evidence that Mother could not care for Child. Finally, Mother argues that 

the record did not support the conclusion that Mother and Child do not share 

a strong bond. Rather, Mother asserts that the evidence demonstrated that 

Mother and Child share a bond and a loving relationship. Mother’s Brief at 

11-19, 21-26.

There is no question that Child had been out of Mother’s care for more 

than twelve months prior to the hearing. Further, in assessing Mother’s 

conduct, the trial court could not consider any post-petition conduct. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Therefore, like the trial court, we may not consider 

Mother’s conduct after May 9, 2013.2 The trial court found that Mother had 

failed to comply with her drug and alcohol treatment, had failed to comply 

with random drug screens, had failed to attend Child’s medical 

appointments, and had failed to comply with her mental health treatment. 

T.C.O. at 13. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the conditions that 

led to Child’s placement had not been remedied. Id. at 14. Our review of 

the record finds that there is sufficient evidence to support those findings 

and conclusions.

____________________________________________

2 Most of the progress that Mother relied upon in her brief occurred after 

the petition was filed. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 11/21/2013, at 63-

64 (citing November 21, 2013 report that Mother was complying with mental 

health treatment and had a clean urine screen); N.T., 2/19/2014, at 14 

(discussing negative drug screens).
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Cathy Rosber, the current DHS social worker, testified that, when she 

was assigned the case in November 2011, Child was living with Mother. 

Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 11/21/2013, at 6. A safety plan was in place 

that required Child to attend a medical day care and a feeding program 

without any absences. Id. at 7. However, Child had absences from both 

programs. The bus drivers reported that, on various occasions, Mother was 

erratic, had slurred speech, and cursed at the bus drivers. Id. at 8-9. 

Although Mother sometimes took Child to the CHOP feeding clinic, Mother 

and Child missed half of the appointments and Mother missed the parenting 

training provided. Id. at 56. Mother had been discharged from her drug 

and alcohol treatment due to non-compliance with the program. Id. at 16. 

Ms. Rosber testified that Mother never completed her FSP goals and 

objectives. Id. at 18. Mother did not participate in all of the random 

screens ordered by the court. Often she was difficult to reach for screens 

because her phone number kept changing or messages could not be left on 

her phone. Id. at 34-37. Ms. Rosber opined that there was no reasonable 

prospect that Child would be reunited with Mother at that point due to 

Mother’s “non-compliance with the [drug and alcohol] program or inability to 

remain in contact with DHS and comply with the order for the random 

screens.” Id. at 39. Ms. Rosber admitted that Mother had attended some 

visits with Child. Id. at 38. Between March 2012 and December 2012, 

Mother attended twenty-four of thirty-seven visits, and December 2012 

through May 2013, Mother attended nine of twelve visits. Id. at 86-87.
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Karen Wells, Mother’s therapist, testified that Mother’s attendance at 

therapy was inconsistent. N.T., 2/19/2014, at 47. Although Mother’s drug 

and alcohol treatment groups were scheduled every weekday, Mother only 

attended one or two per week. Id. at 47-78. Mother was discharged in May 

2013 without completing the drug and alcohol component of treatment. Id.

at 50. Mother was referred to a mental health treatment program that met 

less often. Id. at 52. Thus, based upon this record, the trial court had 

sufficient support for its conclusions that Mother had not met her FSP goals,

and that the conditions that led to placement continued to exist. 

Next, we must review the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in 

Child’s best interest. Both subsections (a)(8) and (b) require an analysis of 

Child’s needs and best interest. However, the trial court must be satisfied 

that termination serves a child’s needs pursuant to (a)(8) before engaging in 

a best interest analysis pursuant to subsection (b). In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008). The trial court concluded that termination 

was in Child’s best interest. T.C.O. at 17. From the record developed, and 

as we have discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion.

Pursuant to subsection (b), the trial court must also consider whether 

termination would best serve “the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of” Child. “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, 

and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the 

child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted). The trial court also must consider the nature and status of the 
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parent-child bond, particularly the effect upon the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id.

The court may prioritize the safety needs of the child. See In re 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (affirming involuntary 

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where 

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A] 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her 

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential 

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 

856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

In making its decision, the trial court considered the following. Ms. 

Rosber testified that Child is bonded with her foster family and foster 

siblings. N.T., 11/21/2013, at 41. Anne Schloneker, the foster care agency 

social worker, testified to the same effect. Id. at 80-81, 85. Child calls her 

foster parents “Mom” and “Dad.” Id. at 41, 80-81. However, she also calls 

Mother “Mommy.” N.T., 2/19/2014, at 108. At the time of the November 

2013 hearing, Child had been in her foster placement for nineteen months. 

N.T., 11/21/2013, at 41. Ms. Schloneker testified that the foster family

meets all of Child’s needs and that Child is healthy. Id. at 81-82. Child was 

enrolled in kindergarten and was involved in extracurricular activities in the 

foster family’s community. Id. at 42. Ms. Rosber opined that, because 

Child considers herself part of the family, she would be harmed if removed 
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from her foster family. Id. at 44. Ms. Schloneker concurred with Ms. 

Rosber’s opinion. Id. at 82-83. Leslie Archer, a Child Advocate social 

worker, also testified that she believed that Child would be harmed if she 

were removed from the foster family because she had bonded with her 

foster parents and the foster siblings in the home. Id. at 100-01.

Ms. Schloneker testified that, although Child’s visits with Mother go 

well, Child usually has no trouble separating from Mother or going back to 

her foster family. Id. at 84. Child is excited to return to her foster family 

after visits with Mother. Id. at 85. Ms. Archer testified that Child is hesitant 

with Mother during visits and is less comfortable with Mother than with her 

foster family. Id. at 101-02.

Stephen Miksic, Ph.D., performed a parenting capacity and bonding 

evaluation. N.T., 2/19/2014, at 58. Dr. Miskic opined that there was a 

positive, but insecure, bond between Mother and Child. Id. at 64-65. Dr. 

Miskic believed that Child had a strong bond with her foster family. Id. at 

65-66. Dr. Miskic opined that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 69-70.

While there was evidence that Mother and Child had a bond, and that 

Child would miss Mother should the visits end, the trial court is free to 

believe all, some, or none of that evidence and to give that evidence the 

weight that the trial court believes that it deserves. See In re M.G., supra. 

Based upon the record, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s conclusions that termination was in Child’s best interest.
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Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred in changing Child’s 

goal from reunification to adoption. Mother contends that the goal must be 

in Child’s best interest and argues that adoption is not in Child’s best 

interest, because Child will be adversely affected by the termination of a 

beneficial relationship between Mother and Child. Mother’s Brief at 26-27.

At each permanency hearing, the trial court must consider, among 

other things, whether the current placement goal for the child is still 

appropriate. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). In making that determination, the trial 

court must consider the following:

In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, 

and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, 

and the parent’s rights are secondary. The burden is on [DHS]

to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best interests.

In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1173 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

[T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including change of 

goal proceedings, must be on the safety, permanency, and wellbeing of the child. The best interests of the child take 

precedence over all other considerations, including the conduct 

and the rights of the parent. . . . [W]hile parental progress 

toward completion of a permanency plan is an important factor, 

it is not to be elevated to determinative status, to the exclusion 

of all other factors.

In re M.T., 101 A.3d at 1175 (citation omitted; modifications in original).

Here, as discussed above, although there was evidence of a bond 

between Mother and Child, the evidence also indicated that Child’s primary 

bond was with her foster family. Thus, there was ample evidence from 
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which the trial court could conclude that adoption was in Child’s best 

interest. We find no abuse of discretion in the goal change.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/30/2015