[Cite as State v. Mapes , 2021-Ohio-257.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-20-28

v. PETER B. MAPES, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Lima Municipal Court Trial Court No. 19CRB01421 Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded Date of Decision: February 1, 2021

APPEARANCES: 

### Zachary D. Maisch for Appellant 

### David Osborne, Jr. for AppelleeCase No. 1-20-28

-2- ZIMMERMAN, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Peter B. Mapes (“Mapes”), appeals the June 10, 2020 judgment entry of sentence of the Lima Municipal Court con victing him of misconduct at an emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13(A)(1). For the reasons that follow, we reverse. {¶2} On May 28, 2019, at approximately 7:36 p.m., Lieutenant Shawn C ook (“Lieutenant Cook”), of the Ohio State Highway Patrol responded to a one-vehicle accident involving Bonnie Juras (“Juras”) in the northbound lan es of I-75, near the State Route 65 overpass, in Allen County, Ohio. (Dec. 10, 2019 Tr. at 5, 8). According to Lieutenant Cook, “this particular area is * * * kn own to have quite a few crashes. It’s kind of * * * a dangerous area * * * [a]nd t his particular day it was raining, so the roads were wet.” ( Id. at 8). Lie utenant Cook testifie d that his “f irst priority” when arriving at an accident scene is “to protect the scene” by ensuring no “secondary crashes happen.” ( Id. at 8-9). “[D]ue to the unique location of this particular crash, it was important for [Lieutenant Cook] to kee p [his] patrol car south of the crash area due to the incline of the roadway [because] v ehicles * * * traveling northbound can have a difficult time seeing a crash that is on the overpass or just north of it.” ( Id. at 9). Lieutenant Cook further testified that he “actually ha d to act as a traffic agent * * * to assure traffic was getting over [an d] it was important for [him] to maintain * * * scene * * * control to ensure a ll of th is traffic was going toCase No. 1-20-28

-3- the right lane and staying in the right lane. So, what that re quired [him] to do was keep [his] patrol car near the exit ramp and [he] actually had to walk towards the bridges deck, so he was sort of another traffic control device [himself], with [his vest on with [his yellow] reflective vest * * * .” ( Id. at 9). {¶3} According to Lieutenant Cook, his “intention was to get [Mapes] offscene as quickly as possible” “to maintain scene security” beca use “this particular

stretch of road is * * * very dangerous when there is a crash [and he could recall] many scenarios where this same exact sequence of events has occ urred and [Ohio State Highway Patrol] officers have nearly gotten hit where [Ma pes] was parked at.” (Emphasis added.) ( Id. ). Indeed, Lieutenant Cook testified that his “idea is to get people out as quickly as possible” because he does not “wan t anyone to be north of that bridge deck because in [his] experience * * * cars [in] in that situation have become crash victims themselves.” ( Id. at 11-12). {¶4} Lieutenant Cook testified that he requested dispatch to have Ju ras “walk back to [him],” but that Mapes “said that [Juras] was not going to come back to [him].” ( Id. at 11). He testified that Mapes did not want Juras to walk ba ck to him on I-75 over the State Route 65 overpass based on Mapes’s “medi cal field experience and injuries and * * * knowing that it was unsafe fo r [Juras] to walk back to [him].” ( Id. at 17). He further testified that he again “asked [his] dispat ch to tell [Mapes] to have [Juras] walk back to” him and “that request hap pened two or threeCase No. 1-20-28

-4- times and [Juras] never walked back to [him].” ( Id. at 14). Thereafter, Lieutenant Cook and Mapes “had a conversation that was a long distance awa y” (while Lieutenant Cook was “still acting as sort of a * * * traffic co ntrol device”) during which Mapes told Lieutenant Cook that “he [was] going to take o ff * * * with [Juras] and come back around.” ( Id. ). He agreed that Mapes’s actions “add[ed] additional time * * * to complete [his] investigation of the scene[.]” ( Id. at 21). {¶5} On cross-examination, Lieutenant Cook testified that there was a distance of approximately 400 feet between his cruiser and Mape s’s vehicle and that it was raining. ( Id. at 25). Lieutenant Cook agreed “the danger was there inherent in the way that the design of that bridge was made, because it was in an area where there are many accidents.” ( Id. at 28). Lieutenant Cook testified that, after Mapes returned, he parked “right behind [him].” ( Id. ). In sum, Lieutenant Cook testified that the accident scene “was pretty volatile and pretty extreme ”; that Mapes “refused to let Mrs. Juras walk on her own back to [his] cruiser; and th at Mapes “left and came back and parked behind [his] cruiser [and] ma[d]e sure tha t Mrs. Juras was safe.” ( Id. at 35-36). However, when asked if Mapes’s “misconduct” could be summarized as “not listening to what [he] wanted him to do,” Li eutenant Cook disagreed and provided the following explanation: When officers are dispatched to a scene there are multiple thin gs that must be done. * * * [S]cene security. I need to protect the i ntegrity of the crash. Protecting the integrity of the people involved. * * * People can hide evidence. * * * [P]eople can put open container s someCase No. 1-20-28

-5- place. They can put drugs places. Paraphernalia. * * * [T]he y can switch drivers. * * * I have to protect the integrity of the i nvestigation. * * * [I]t’s not just about what Mr. Mapes [sic] intentions wer e * * * to provide safety. I ha[d] intentions too. And my intentions [were] to keep a crash scene safe. * * * [T]o protect the integrity of t he crash scene. So, while * * * I understand * * * what he was doing, h e was wrong. * * * I believe I have [sic] the conversation about the weather, it’s not a substantial point to me because I’m standing there t oo. * * * He didn’t present any qualifications about being a meteorolog ist. * * * So, those particular things don’t necessarily * * * dictate how I solve and investigate this particular crash [and] those aren’t the only things to protect at a crash scene. * * * [T]here’s a whole bun ch of things that aren’t safe but you have to mitigate safety and * * * getting her to me quickly, and in my patrol car and safe is better than having someone else get hit on the side of the road. ( Id. at 36-37). {¶6} On re-direct examination, Lieutenant Cook testified that the ac cident did not shut down all lanes of travel on I-75. ( Id. at 40). {¶7} Mapes testified in his defense that he is a medical doctor and that he found Juras “standing on the other side of the wire barrier” of I-75 after her “vehicle had impacted the bridge abutment on the left side of the overpa ss.” ( Id. at 52). Mapes testified that he assisted Juras with contacting 911 for emergency assistance and permitted her to wait inside his vehicle until law enforcem ent arrived. ( Id. at 52-53). {¶8} When Lieutenant Cook arrived at the scene, Mapes exited his veh icle to see if Lieutenant Cook “require[d] anything”; however, “[a]s [he] got about halfway across the bridge * * *, [Lieutenant Cook] shouted ‘key s’,” but MapesCase No. 1-20-28

-6- could not understand him because of the noise from the traffic and the rain. ( Id. at 56-57). Once Mapes understood that Lieutenant Cook wanted the keys to Juras’s vehicle, Mapes obtained Juras’s keys and gave them to Lieutenan t Cook but did not “have any discussion w ith him,” “ just gave him the key s, said h ere you go, and * * * went back and sat in [his] car.” ( Id. at 57). Thereafter, according to Mapes, the dispatcher called him and said “you need to bring [Juras] back to [Lieutenant Cook].” ( Id. at 58). In response, Mapes testified that he had a duty to tell [Lieutenant Cook] * * * that [he] could not walk her back. So, [he] got out of the car, [he] trotted back to [Lieut enant Cook], who was holding a broom and was trying to clear the * * * debris out of the street. [He] got within 4 feet of him and [h e] said [he] could not bring her back because it wasn’t safe. And at t his point, he goes into a tirade, * * * with a raised voice shouting at [h im] saying that he would not tell [him] what to do in [his] emergency room and that [he] should not tell him what to do at the scene of an acc ident. ( Id. at 58-59). According to Mapes, he told Lieutenant Cook, “‘Unl ess you have any objection, I’m going to drive Mrs. Juras up to the next exi t, drive her back-down south and bring her over to you * * *,” to which Lieutenant Coo k did not respond. ( Id. at 59-60). Mapes testified that—had Lieutenant Cook listened to him—he

would have told him that he had three concerns. The first concern was that we already had one accident at this location and that traffic was still flowing th rough at 65 miles an hour and that we could run the risk of a second accide nt. * * * The second concern * * * was that * * * there was lightenin g * * * very close to the scene. * * * Lastly, * * * Mrs. Juras showe d evidence of shock and her actions were delayed [and he] was wor riedCase No. 1-20-28

-7- that if [he] brought her back to the scene or back past the sce ne towards the officers [sic] car that she would freeze. ( Id. at 60-61). {¶9} Mapes called Juras to testify in his defense who testified that she “hit a dip right before the overpass[, which] was filled with water be cause it had just started to downpour” and caused her to hit the bridge embankmen t. ( Id. at 66).

Juras testified that she was “in shock” after the accident and stranded in the median (unable to call 911 for emergency assistance and her insurance representative because her cell-phone battery was too low) when Mapes stopped to offer her assistance. ( Id. at 68). According to Juras, she never spoke with Lieutenant C ook until Mapes drove her to the rear of his cruiser. ( Id. at 69). {¶10} On June 3, 2019, Mapes was charged with misconduct at an emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13(A)(1), a fourth-degree m isdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). On June 6, 2019, Mapes appeared and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. Nos. 4, 6). {¶11} After a bench trial on December 10, 2019, the trial court found Mapes guilty on June 9, 2020 of the misconduct-at-an-emergency charge and ordered him to pay a $50.00 fine and court costs. (Doc. No. 15). 1

1 The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 1 0, 2020.Case No. 1-20-28

-8- {¶12} Mapes filed his notice of appeal on July 7, 2020. (Doc. No. 17 ). He raises four assignments of error for our review. We will begin by addressing his first assignment of error, followed by his second, third, and f ourth assignments of error together. Assignment of Error No. I The trial Court erred by finding against the weight of the evid ence that the defendant knowingly hampered the lawful operations of a law enforcement officer. {¶13} In his first assignment of error, Mapes argues that his misconduct-atan-accident-scene conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mapes argues that weight of the evidence shows th at he did not hamper the lawful operations of a law enforcement officer at the scene of an accident. We

agree. Standard of Review {¶14} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest wei ght of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibi lity of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, th e [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). ACase No. 1-20-28

-9- reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropri ate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibil ity of the witnesses.

State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where t he evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court over turn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter , 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. Analysis {¶15} Mapes was convicted of misconduct at an emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13(A)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that “[n] o person shall knowingly” “[h]amper the lawful operations of any law enforceme nt officer * * * engaged in the person’s duties at the scene of a * * * accident , * * * or emergency of any kind.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain r esult or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). {¶16} On appeal, Mapes argues only that weight of the evidence shows that

he did not hamper Lieutenant Cook’s investigation at the accident scene. Becaus e it is the only element that Mapes challenges on appeal, we will review the weight of the evidence supporting only whether Mapes hampered the lawful operations of a law enforcement officer engaged in his duties at the scene of a n accident.Case No. 1-20-28

-10- {¶17} The term “hamper” is not defined by the statute. “Any term lef t undefined by statute is to be accorded its common, everyday mea ning.” State v.

Blocker , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-313, 2007-Ohio-144, ¶ 51. A com mon dictionary definition of “hamper” is “to interfere with.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 564 (11th Ed.2003). The term “interfere” commonly means “to interpose in a way that hinders or impedes.” Id. at 652. See also State v. Stephens , 57 Ohio App.2d 229, 230 (1st Dist.1978) (applying the plain m eaning of the words “hamper” and “impede” to define the obstructing-offic ial-business statute); State v. Buttram , 1st Dist. Ha milton No. C-190034, 2020-O hio-2709, ¶ 19 (defining impeding as a synonym of hampering under the obstruct ing-officialbusiness statute). {¶18} Our sister appellate district observed that “[t]here are only a handful

of decisions that have discussed this offense. The common thre ad they share is that the defendant acted-out in a way that interfered with an offici al’s investigation of an accident or emergency.” State v. Bryant , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009736, 2011-Ohio-4555, ¶ 12. In sum, the Ninth District Court of Appe als (after reviewing the way in which courts applied the offense) concluded that—to be guilty of misconduct at an emergency—“the defendant [must] engage[] in so me meddlesome or obstreperous conduct.” Id. at ¶ 21.Case No. 1-20-28

-11- {¶19} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trier o f fact lost its way in concluding that Mapes hampered Lieutenant Cook’ s duties at the accident scene. That is, we conclude that the weight of the ev idence shows that Mapes did not interfere with (or impede) Lieutenant Cook’s inve stigation by not complying with Lieutenant Cook’s order in the way suggested bec ause such would have potentially put Juras in peril, but, instead, found an alt ernative way to comply that was safer under the facts presented. Specifically, the ev idence demonstrates that Lieutenant Cook encountered Mapes—who was already assistin g Juras—after she had been involved in a one-vehicle accident on I-75, near t he State Route 65 overpass. In other words, Mapes was not the “‘bystander [or] c uriosity seeker[] at [an] emergency scene’” for which the rule is sought to be used “as ‘a specific tool for crowd control at emergencies.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting R.C. 2917.13, Legislative Service Commission Note (1973). {¶20} Moreover, the evidence in the record reflects that Mapes and Ju ras were subject to significant danger from the specific stretch of roadway—as revealed by Lieutenant Cook’s testimony—and Mapes’s rational decision to comply with Lieutenant Cook’s request in an alternative way that did not pu t Juras in potential peril was prudent under the facts presented. Specifically, the evidence in the record reflects that Lieutenant Cook ordered Juras to walk nearly 400 feet from Mapes’s vehicle—across the State Route 65 bridge without the safety of a median—againstCase No. 1-20-28

-12- moving traffic on I-75 during questionable weather conditions, which had produced heavy rainfall. Instead of permitting Juras to traverse the po tential gauntlet— without the aid of the yellow-reflective vest of which Lieutena nt Cook was equipped—Mapes drove Juras safely to the rear of Lieutenant Coo k’s cruiser. {¶21} Based on our review of that evidence, we cannot conclude that t he conduct of which Mapes is accused of violating is the conduct p rohibited under the statute considering Mapes complied with Lieutenant Cook’s order —albeit in a different manner—by ensuring the safety of Juras. See id. at ¶ 24. Mapes’s conduct in this case is not the meddlesome or obstreperous conduct soug ht to be prevented by the statute. Indeed, much like the obstructing-official-bus iness statute—which requires a defendant to have hampered or impeded a public official in the performance of his or her lawful duties—“[b]oth * * * definitio ns make clear that there must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progre ss before one can say he was hampered or impeded.” Stephens , 57 Ohio App.2d at 230. {¶22} Based on our review of the record, the evidence presented in th is case weighs against the conclusion that there was some substantial s toppage of Lieutenant Cook’s progress in his investigation. See Bryant at ¶ 24 (concluding that “Bryant’s allegedly false answers given well after the emergenc y had abated, however, did not knowingly hamper the operations of a law enfor cement officer engaged in his duties at the scene of a fire”). See also Stephens at 230. In particular,Case No. 1-20-28

-13- there is no evidence in the record that Mapes caused any distur bance or was disruptive at the scene. Compare Bryant at ¶ 23 (noting that “there was no evidence that she caused any disturbance or was disruptive”). Likewise, the evidence in the record weighs against the conclusion that Mapes interfered with (or impeded) Lieutenant Cook’s accident investigation in any way. Specifica lly, Lieutenant Cook’s testimony reflects his primary concern of accident-scene safety and the actions that he took to implement that concern. In other words , Lieutenant Cook’s testimony does not support that he was involved in the investig atory stage when Mapes drove Juras to his cruiser instead of permitting her to t raverse I-75 on foot. {¶23} For these reasons, we conclude that the trier of fact clearly l ost its way in concluding that Mapes hampered the lawful operations of a la w enforcement officer engaged in his duties at the scene of an accident. Acc ordingly, we are persuaded that Mapes’s misconduct-at-an-emergency conviction mu st be reversed. {¶24} Therefore, Mapes’s first assignment of error is sustained. Assignment of Error No. II The trial Court erred by finding against the weight of the evid ence that the defendant had not proven the affirmative defense of necessity. Assignment of Error No. III The trial Court erred by denying the defendant due process and prohibiting defendant from testifying about his observations an d conclusions the accident scene.Case No. 1-20-28

-14- Assignment of Error No. IV The trial Court erred by applying Crim. R. 16(K) in an unconstitutional manner that violated the defendant’s right to remain silent pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the United State s Constitution prior to trial. {¶25} In his second assignment of error, Mapes argues that his convic tion is against the manifest weight of the evidence because he acted ou t of necessity. In his third and fourth assignments of error, Mapes argues that th e trial court erred by prohibiting him “from testifying about his medical opinion rega rding the condition of [Juras]” under Crim.R. 16(K). (Appellant’s Brief at 9). {¶26} In light of our decision to sustain Mapes’s first assignment of error, his second, third, and fourth assignments of error are rendered moot, and we decline to address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). See State v. Copeland , 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-80-14, 1981 WL 6707, *4 (Nov. 2, 1981); Cleveland v. Schumann , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95530, 2011-Ohio-741, ¶ 15. {¶27} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the p articulars assigned and argued in his first assignment of error, we revers e the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur. /jlr