Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

GREGORY F. ZOELLER IAN O’KEEFE

Attorney General of Indiana Lafayette, Indiana

CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellant- Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 79A02-1111-CR-1067

)

BLAKE LODDE, )

)

Appellee- Defendant, )

APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Michael A. Morrissey, Judge

Cause No. 79D06-1011-FD-267

April 30, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Chief Judge
2

Case Summary and Issue

The State appeals the trial court order granting Blake Lodde’s motion to suppress 

evidence gathered during and after an investigatory stop of Lodde’s vehicle. The sole 

issue is whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 

Concluding that the trial court erred in applying the wrong standard in ruling on the 

motion to suppress, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History1

In late 2010, Deputy John Lendermon of the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s office 

was conducting routine status checks of several registered sex offenders assigned to him, 

one of whom was Lodde. While the two spoke at Lodde’s home, Deputy Lendermon 

smelled a “very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage” emanating from Lodde and 

observed bloodshot, swollen, and glassy eyes. Transcript at 6; Appendix of Appellant at 

11, 13. Deputy Lendermon later explained: “I just kind of put [my observations] aside, 

he was at home, he’s an adult. I didn’t really think a whole lot about it; I just kind of 

made a mental note of it.” Tr. at 6. When later asked if Lodde told the deputy that he 

woke up just prior to the deputy’s arrival, Deputy Lendermon conceded that Lodde “may 

have,” but he did not remember. Id. at 10. Deputy Lendermon did not notice any 

problem with Lodde’s balance or manual dexterity and did not recall Lodde slurring his 

speech.2 

 

1 We heard oral argument on March 29, 2012 at Ivy Tech Community College in Lafayette, Indiana. We 

thank Ivy Tech for its hospitality and counsel for their advocacy.

2 Deputy Lendermon testified that he did not recall Lodde slurring his speech, tr. at 10, however, the deputy 

contended in his probable cause affidavit that Lodde’s speech was slurred. App. of Appellant at 13.
3

Deputy Lendermon returned to his car to enter information regarding the status 

check into his computer, and saw Lodde enter his own car and begin to drive away. 

When Lodde turned from his driveway onto a street, the deputy pursued him and initiated 

an investigatory stop. Deputy Lendermon admitted he did not follow Lodde long enough 

to observe Lodde drive in a way that suggested he was impaired. He pulled over Lodde 

because: he “felt that [Lodde] was potentially intoxicated and . . . just wanted to make 

sure that [Lodde] was okay to drive,” id. at 8, “the possibility of there being an accident 

or something like that was too great to not intervene immediately[,]” and “the odor [of 

alcohol] was that strong” during their initial conversation. Id. at 11-12.

Upon being pulled over, Lodde admitted he drank five or six beers “a few hours 

ago.” App. of Appellant at 11 (quoting from the deputy’s report). Lodde also submitted 

to field sobriety tests and a portable breath test.3 Finally, he was transported to the jail 

for a blood draw, urine screen, and breathalyzer test, which indicated he had 0.10 grams 

of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

The State charged Lodde with operating while intoxicated and operating a vehicle 

with a blood alcohol content of greater than 0.08 and less than 0.15, both Class C 

misdemeanors, and operating while intoxicated with a prior conviction for operating 

while intoxicated within the last five years, a Class D felony. Lodde filed a motion to 

dismiss which the trial court treated as a motion to suppress evidence gathered upon 

pulling over Lodde. At the close of the suppression hearing, at which Deputy Lendermon 

testified, the trial court stated: 

 

3 Lodde passed the one leg stand and walk and turn tests but failed the gaze nystagmus test. The portable 

breath test indicated 0.92 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
4

[T]he ultimate question is, is the smell of alcohol and the eyes, does that 

reach a level where there is reasonable suspension [sic] to, you know,

conduct an OWI investigation in and of itself.

. . . [L]egally the issue is are those two factors alone sufficient to reach a 

level to be sufficient probable cause to make this stop . . . .

Tr. at 14. 

In a written order, the trial court granted Lodde’s motion to suppress, concluding: 

“While the Court does not question Deputy Lendermon’s reasoning for effectuating a 

traffic stop, the Court finds that probable cause did not exist for this stop . . . .” App. of 

Appellant at 20. The State now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we must 

determine whether substantial evidence of probative value supports the trial court’s 

decision. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006). Where a trial court granted a 

motion to suppress, the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the 

trial court’s grant of the motion was contrary to law. State v. Carlson, 762 N.E.2d 121, 

125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). We will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is 

without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the 

trial court. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence nor judge witnesses’ credibility, and 

will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Friedel,

714 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

II. Reasonable Suspicion

The trial court concluded the deputy did not have probable cause to stop Lodde, 

and therefore any evidence gathered after the stop must be suppressed. Lodde asserts this 
5

statement was, in part, “merely a scrivener’s error by the Court and that the Court 

intended to use the words ‘reasonable suspicion’ in it’s [sic] ruling.” Brief of Appellee at 

6 n.1. Lodde concedes that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard here. Id.; see

State v. Sickle, 792 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“Probable cause is not necessary; 

rather, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make an 

investigatory stop.”), trans. denied.

The principles governing the reasonable suspicion necessary for an officer’s brief 

investigatory stop are well-settled:

An officer has the authority to briefly stop a person for investigatory 

purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom would cause an ordinarily prudent person 

to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur. The facts 

supporting a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot must rise to 

“some minimum level of objective justification” for the temporary 

detention of a person to be valid. Although reasonable suspicion requires 

more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding 

standard than probable cause and requires a showing of “considerably less” 

proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-by-case basis by 

looking at the totality of the circumstances.

Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations 

omitted), trans. denied. Another consideration when determining whether reasonable 

suspicion exists is the “immediacy of the threat to public safety.” Kellems v. State, 842 

N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2006), reh’g granted on other grounds, 849 N.E.2d 1110 (2006). 

In short, “circumstances . . . justify[] a stop when a police officer is able to point to 

specific and articulable facts which, when considered together with the rational 

inferences drawn from those facts, create a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct on 
6

the part of a vehicle’s occupants.” Bogetti v. State, 723 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000).

We conclude that the record indicates the trial court erroneously applied the 

probable cause standard in ruling on Lodde’s motion. Although the trial court verbally 

referred to reasonable suspicion once at the close of the suppression hearing, the trial 

court also verbally referred to probable cause, and in its order it stated that Deputy 

Lendermon did not have probable cause. The trial court’s analysis in its denial of the

State’s motion to correct errors also relies on a case which concerned probable cause. 

Despite Lodde’s appellate contention, we do not believe this to be a scrivener’s error. 

Because the trial court applied the wrong standard, we reverse its order granting Lodde’s 

motion to suppress and remand with instructions for the trial court to apply the reasonable 

suspicion standard to the facts of this case.

Conclusion

The trial court erred in applying the wrong legal standard in ruling on the motion 

to suppress. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.