J-A16023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KYLIEFF BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 264 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001138-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 05, 2018

Kylieff Brown appeals, nunc pro tunc, from his judgment of sentence, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after a jury 

convicted him of one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance (PWID).1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the findings of fact as follows:

This case arises out of a chance meeting between the complaining 

witness, Kevin Slaughter, and the [d]efendant, Kylieff Brown, at 

the SugarHouse Casino. Upon observing the complainant’s good 

fortune at the blackjack tables, [Brown] solicited [Slaughter] to 

engage in a drug and gun deal. [Slaughter’s] assent to this 

request initiated a series of events culminating in the kidnapping 

for ransom, robbery, and attempted murder of [Slaughter]. The 

four co-defendants were connected to each other and to the three 

crime scenes through cell phone messages and cell site analysis. 

This is an abridged version of the facts pertinent to this appeal 

since [Brown] was solely convicted of PWID.

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1 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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[Slaughter] testified that he was on parole in December 2013 for 

a prior drug conviction. On the evening of December 8, 2013, at 

approximately 8:00 P.M., [Slaughter] went to the SugarHouse 

Casino to play blackjack. He ran into [Brown], whom he met in 

prison. The two sparked a conversation about drugs and a gun. 

[Slaughter] indicated to [Brown] that he could sell him both. 

[Brown] stated to [Slaughter] that his cousin in Delaware was 

looking for 31 grams of cocaine. [Brown] also wanted a gun. 

[Slaughter] told [Brown] that he could sell him a .380 caliber 

firearm. [Brown] indicated that he wanted to do the deal 

immediately. Video surveillance from the casino shows [Brown] 

and [Slaughter] at the cashier at 9:13 P.M.

[Slaughter and Brown] drove in [Slaughter’s] black Cadillac DTS 

from SugarHouse to South Philadelphia to pick up the drugs and 

the gun. [Brown] arranged for them to meet his cousin at 49th

Street and Baltimore Avenue. [Slaughter] pulled over at 49th

Street and Springfield Avenue. He told [Brown] to tell his cousin 

to meet him there instead of 49th Street and Baltimore Avenue.

[Slaughter] was abducted at that time. He was eventually 

ransomed to his wife approximately fifty minutes after the time of 

the initial abduction. He was removed from the van in Northeast 

Philadelphia at approximately 11:30 P.M. on December 8, 2013.

Jonathan Moore testified that he observed the abduction and 

called 911. He pointed out a gold vehicle which was parked at the 

scene to the responding officers. Mr. Moore testified that he 

observed a man pick up something near [Slaughter’s] black 

Cadillac and get into the gold vehicle.

Officer Christopher Sweeney testified that the gold vehicle[, which 

had Delaware tags,] was parked on Springfield Avenue with three 

occupants inside. The rear driver’s side passenger was identified 

as co-defendant, Kareem Cooley. The male seated in the driver’s 

seat was identified as Derrick Hagains. The front passenger was 

identified as Anthony McCray. A fourth male, later identified as 

[Brown], was detained in the back of a police cruiser when Officer 

Sweeney arrived at the scene.

Four clear plastic bags containing an off-white chunk[y] substance 

were recovered from inside of the gold vehicle. One of the bags 

was recovered under the lining of the vehicle near the back 

passenger’s side window. That bag weighed 25.246 grams. The 
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other three bags weighed 13.921 grams in totality. It was 

determined that the substance in each bag was crack/cocaine.

Trial Court Opinion, at 2-4.

On July 13, 2016, Brown was found guilty of PWID after a jury trial, 

presided over by the Honorable Rose Marie DeFino-Natasi. On September 9, 

2016, Brown was sentenced to forty to eighty months’ imprisonment. Trial 

counsel, Shawn Page, Esquire, did not file a notice of appeal. On December 

18, 2016, Brown filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal. David Barrish, 

Esquire, was appointed appellate counsel and, on November 21, 2016, filed a 

petition for reinstatement of Brown’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On 

December 5, 2016, this Court quashed Brown’s pro se appeal as untimely. On 

December 16, 2016, the trial court granted Brown’s petition. Brown filed a 

timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal on February 28, 2017.

On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

his conviction. As a preliminary matter, we note that the Commonwealth 

urges us to find that Brown has waived his sufficiency claim because he did 

not present it with the requisite specificity in his Rule 1925(b) statement. It 

is well-settled that an appellant’s concise statement must specify the error to 

be considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 

(Pa. Super. 2011). “[A Rule 1925(b)] [s]tatement which is too vague to allow 

the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent to 

no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 

911 (Pa. Super. 2002) quoting Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 
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686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001). However, this matter is a single-count drug 

conviction and the trial court has thoroughly addressed Brown’s claim in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver and will review 

Brown’s sufficiency claim. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058, 

1060 (Pa. 2007) (declining to find waiver for alleged failure of Rule 1925(b) 

statement to adequately develop sufficiency of evidence claim where matter 

was “relatively straightforward drug case,” evidentiary presentation spanned 

“mere thirty pages of transcript,” and trial “court readily apprehended 

[defendant’s] claim and addressed it in substantial detail”).

We now turn to the merits of Brown’s sufficiency claim. Our standard 

of review is well-settled:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court 

is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted). 

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support a criminal conviction . . . does not require a court to 

ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must 

determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder 

was sufficient to support the verdict.
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Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235-36 (Pa. 2007) (internal 

citations omitted).

To prove the offense of possession with intent to deliver, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant both 

possessed a controlled substance and had the intent to deliver it. 

Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293, 297 (Pa. Super. 2005). In narcotics 

possession cases, “the Commonwealth may meet its burden by showing 

actual, constructive, or joint constructive possession of the contraband.” 

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767-68 (Pa. Super. 2016)

quoting Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quotations omitted). 

This Court has previously stated that constructive possession is a legal 

fiction. Constructive possession is essentially an inference arising from the 

facts and circumstances that possession of the contraband was more likely 

than not. Roberts, supra, at 768. “The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. The intent to deliver 

can be inferred from a large amount of a controlled substance; conversely, 

possession of a small amount of a controlled substance implies absence of the 

intent to deliver. Id. Other facts may be considered in addition to the quantity 

of the controlled substance, including the way the contraband was packaged 

and the behavior of the defendant. Id. 

The trial court summarized the evidence adduced at trial as follows:
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Testimony at trial established that [Brown] solicited [Slaughter] 

to engage in a drug deal with his cousin from Delaware. The two 

then went to South Philadelphia to pick up the drugs and gun, 

then went to make a delivery of the contraband in Southwest 

Philadelphia. [Brown] was arrested on the scene of the initial 

abduction in Southwest Philadelphia. Based on Officer Sweeney’s 

testimony regarding the location of each of the persons inside the 

gold vehicle with Delaware tags, the jury could infer that [Brown] 

was sitting in [the] rear back passenger’s seat at the time of his 

arrest.

Detectives seized four clear plastic bags containing crack/cocaine 

from inside of the gold vehicle. One of the bags weighed 25.246 

grams. That bag was recovered near the back passenger’s side 

window. The three other bags weighed 13.921 grams in totality. 

The jury was free to accept the inference that [Brown] took the 

drugs from [Slaughter’s] vehicle at the time of the abduction and 

brought them into the gold vehicle. The evidence was sufficient 

to prove that [Brown] had control and possession of the drugs, 

i.e. constructive possession, and that he possessed the 

crack/cocaine with the intent to deliver.

Trial Court Opinion, at 6-7.

We agree with the trial court’s analysis. The record supports findings of

both Brown’s constructive possession of narcotics as well as his intent to 

deliver them, through a drug deal that he coordinated. Accordingly, Brown’s 

sole appellate claim is meritless. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/5/2018