*

 District judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

1

REVISED FEBRUARY 17, 2003

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 01-51045

__________________________

DONNIE McMANUS and JUNE McMANUS,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

FLEETWOOD ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL,

 Plaintiffs,

FLEETWOOD ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

___________________________________________________

February 14, 2003

Before EMILIO M. GARZA and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges, and HUDSPETH, District Judge.*

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:

The district court certified a subclass of plaintiffs who purchased Class A motor homes in Texas

from defendant Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation, between 1994 and 1999.

Representative plaintiffsDonnie and JuneMcManus allege that Fleetwoodmisrepresented the towing
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capacity of its motor homes. They seek injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(2) and, in the alternative, damages under Rule 23(b)(3). The district court abused its discretion

in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3), except with regard to the McManuses’ claim for breach

of implied warranty of merchantability. The district court also abused its discretion in certifying the

class under Rule 23(b)(2). We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The McManuses purchased a Fleetwood motor home in Texas in 1997, with the intention of

towing a Jeep Cherokee behind it. Donnie McManus noticed a tag affixed to the wardrobe door

stating that the motor home could tow 3,500 pounds, and the sales representative assured him that

the motor home would be able to tow a Jeep Cherokee. The wardrobe door tag was titled

“CARRYING CAPACITY” and it listed variousstatistics, including an entry reading “GTW 3500

LBS .” The tag explained:

GTW (Gross Towed Weight): means the maximum permissible loaded weight of a trailer or

car that this motor home has been designed to tow. This cannot be increased by changing the

trailer hitch.

The bottom of the tag stated in large, bolt print:

CONSULT OWNER’S MANUAL FOR WEIGHING 

INSTRUCTIONS AND TOWING GUIDELINES

AFleetwood engineer contacted Fleetwood’s chassis manufacturersin 1994 and discovered that,

according to the chassismanufacturers, the motor homes would require supplementalbrakesto safely

tow 3,500 pounds. For example, Ford t old Fleetwood that its motor homes would require

supplemental brakes when towing anything above 1,500 pounds. The engineer concluded in a

company memorandum, “To assure safe operation of our products, the wardrobe door tag, owners
1Where General Motors was the chassis manufacturer, the relevant information was in the

service manual, not the chassis manufacturer’s manual. Fleetwood sent letters to purchasers of

motor homes equipped with a GM chassis to clarify any confusion.

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manualand advertisingmaterialshould reflect two GCW’s[gross combinationweight], one fortowed

loads without brakes and one for towed loads with brakes.”

The McManuses allege that the representation that themotor home could safelytow3,500 pounds

amounted to a representation that it could safely brake while towing 3,500 pounds. Their complaint

assertsthe following five claims: (1) violationCalifornia’s Consumers LegalRemedies Act, CALCIV.

CODE §§ 1750-1784; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty of

merchantability under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL CIV. CODE § 1792;

(4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) fraudulent concealment. They seek injunctive relief under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) to compel Fleetwood to provide each class member

information concerning the towing limitations, as well as supplemental braking equipment. In the

alternative, the McManuses seek money damages under Rule 23(b)(3).

Fleetwood counters, in short, that the wardrobe tag was accurate because it said nothing about

supplemental brakes, and because it conspicuously led the consumerto a papertrail that would reveal

the relevant information. The tag directed the consumer to the motor home owner’s manual, which

directed the consumer to the chassis manufacturer’s manual containing the relevant towing

limitations.1

The district court originally certified a nationwide class of all persons who purchased new, and

still owned, a Fleetwood Class A motor home manufactured between 1994 and 1999. On a motion

for reconsideration to take into account Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000), which

impacts class certification in cases dealing with multistate choice-of-law issues, the district court
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decertified the national class. Following oral argument on their supplemental motion for certification

of a nationwide class, the McManuses filed a motion indicating that they wished to proceed with

certification of a Texas-only subclass. The district court granted the post-hearing motion and

certified the subclass, with no apparent opposition from Fleetwood. Fleetwood then filed a motion

for reconsideration, prompting the district court to withdraw its previous order. After considering

Fleetwood’s new objectionsto the Texas-only subclass, the district court issued an order concluding

that a Texas-only subclass was proper under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). As a preliminary

determination in deciding that the Rule 23 class action prerequisites were met, the district court also

concluded, contrary to the McManuses’ assertions, that Texaslaw would govern the dispute instead

of California law.

II. DISCUSSION

The McManuses now concede that Texas law governs the dispute, so the only issue for this

interlocutory appeal isthe propriety ofthe district court’s certification decision, which we review for

abuse of discretion. Spence, 227 F.3d at 310-11. “The decision to certify is within the broad

discretion of the court, but that decision must be exercised within the framework of [R]ule 23. The

party seeking certification bears the burden of proof.” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,

740 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Although “the strength of a plaintiff’s claim should

not affect the certification decision,” the district court must look beyond the pleadingsto “understand

the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful

determination of the certification issues.” Id. at 744.

Under Rule 23, plaintiffs must first define the class with specificity and show they are members

of the class. Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993). They must then
2Fleetwood’s primary argument is that the class members’ claims are too dissimilar for

class treatment, particularly with respect to the issue of whether the class members relied on the

representations of the wardrobe tag. This argument could be construed as a challenge to two of

the Rule 23(a) requirements, (2) commonality and (3) typicality. However, since the thresholds

for commonality and typicality are not high, see James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 570-71

(5th Cir. 2001), we evaluate the argument as against the more exacting demands of Rule 23(b)(3)

and Rule 23(b)(2).

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establish allfour requirements of Rule 23(a). Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885,

890 (5th Cir. 1987). These requirements are: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims

or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(a). Fleetwood does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have met these

requirements.2In addition to satisfying the above requirements, the partiesseeking class certification

must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). FED.R.CIV. P. 23(b). We

consider the district court’s decision under Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2), in turn.

A. Certification is only proper under Rule 23(b)(3) for the McManuses’ claim for breach of

implied warranty of merchantability

Under Rule 23(b)(3), the district court may certify a class where it determines “that the questions

of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Fleetwood argues that the

common questions of fact do not predominate over individual matters. In particular, Fleetwood

asserts that since each of the plaintiffs’ claims requires a showing of reliance on the alleged

misrepresentation, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).
6

The McManuses respond that the district court may presume class-wide reliance because the same

information—that the motor homes could tow 3,500 pounds—was given to all ofthe class members.

1. Reliance may not be presumed under Texas law

The McManuses rely upon Life Ins. Co. of Southwest v. Brister, 722 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.

1986) and Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 917 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App. 1996) for the proposition

that Texas law permits a class-wide presumption of reliance. In each case, the appellate court

determined that the proposed class members had a “sufficient community of interest,” Brister, 722

S.W.2d at 774, to justify certification under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42. See Kirkland, 917

S.W.2d at 843-44; Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 773-75. The result was premised on the view that Texas

courts “should err in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action since the class

certification order is always subject to modification should later developments during the course of

the trial so require.” Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 774-75. The Texas Supreme Court has since overruled

those cases, explicitly “reject[ing] this approach of certify now and worry later.” Southwestern

Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).

The Bernal court emphasized that “[p]rocedural devices may ‘not be construed to enlarge or

diminish any substantive rights or obligations of any parties to any civil action.’” Id. at 437 (citing

TEX. R. CIV. P. 815). In a particularly instructive post-Bernal case, the Texas Supreme Court held

that issues of reliance defeated the predominance requirement of Rule 42 in a class action alleging,

among other things, that advertising for dental office management software wasfalse and misleading:

[T]he 20,000 class members in the present case are held to the same standards of proof of

reliance—and for that matter all the other elements of their claims—that they would be

required to meet if each sued individually. This does not mean, of course, that reliance or

other elements of their causes of action cannot be proved class-wide with evidence generally

applicable to all class members; class-wide proof is possible when class-wide evidence exists.
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But evidence insufficient to prove reliance in a suit by an individual does not become

sufficient in a class action simply because t here are more plaintiffs. Inescapably individual

differences cannot be concealed in a throng. The proceduraldevice of a class action eliminates

the necessity of adducing the same evidence over and over again in a multitude of individual

actions; it does not lessen the qualit y of evidence required in an individual action or relax

substantive burdens of proof. 

Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, ___ S.W.3d___, No. 00-1162, 2002 WL 31426407, at *13 (Tex.

Oct. 31, 2002).

We note additionallythat neither Brister nor Kirkland speaksto the substantive standard of proof

of the underlying causes of action; those cases are concerned only with the procedural standard to

justify certification under Texas procedural law. Since we are bound to follow Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23, not Texas’ corresponding Rule 42, Brister and Kirkland are not instructive to the

issue. As Bernal and Henry Schein make clear, Texas law does not permit the type of presumed

reliance urged by the McManuses.

2. Reliance issues are fatal to a Rule 23(b)(3) class for claims of fraudulent concealment and

negligent misrepresentation

“Claims for money damages in which individual reliance is an element are poor candidates for

class treatment, at best. We have made that plain.” Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 241 F.3d 417, 419

(5th Cir. 2001); see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 745 (“[A] fraud class action cannot be certified when

individualreliance will be an issue.”). Here, it is undisputed that class members would only be entitled

to relief under theories of fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation if they could show

they relied on the alleged misrepresentation. Reliance will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, depending

on the circumstances surrounding the sale. For instance, Donnie McManustestified at his deposition

that he read the wardrobe door tag and asked the salesperson about the towing capacity. June

McManus testified that she did not read the tag, nor did she draw any conclusion as to whether the
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motor home would be able to tow a Jeep Cherokee. The individual reliance issues are apparent even

as between the two representative plaintiffs. Other potential class members certainly may have read

the wardro be door tag as Fleetwood reads it—as being silent on the issue of supplemental

brakes—and certainly some class members may have actually known at the time of purchase that

supplemental brakes would be needed. At this point in the litigation, the McManuses have failed to

show that these potential variables are sufficientlyuniformto justify classtreatment, and we conclude

that the district court abused its discretion in finding that questions of fact common to the class were

predominant, for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3), with respect to the McManuses’ claims for fraudulent

inducement and negligent misrepresentation.

3. The McManuses’ claim, under Rule 23(b)(3), for breach of express warranty requires reliance

and is inappropriate for class treatment

The McManuses argue that their claimfor breach of express warranty does not require a showing

ofreliance, thereby avoiding the variable factual circumstances explained above. We disagree. Under

Texas law, an express warranty is created when a seller makes a representation or promise “which

relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain. . . .” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §

2.313 (emphasis added). There is a split of authority as to whether that wording (from the U.C.C.)

is meant to dispense with the common law’s requirement of reliance in express warranty cases. See

Charles A. Heckman, “Reliance” or “Common Honesty of Speech”: The History and Interpretation

of Section 2-31 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1987). The Texas

Supreme Court has concluded that “‘[b]asis of the bargain’ loosely reflectsthe common-law express

warranty requirement of reliance,” and that therefore an express warranty claim “requires a form of

reliance.” Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1997). (emphasis added).
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That court has recently characterized a breach of express warranty claim as requiring reliance “to a

certain extent.” Henry Schein, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 20002 WL 31426407, at *7 (emphasis added).

Although the precise level of reliance required under Texas law to recover for breach of express

warranty is unclear, purchasers who understood the towing limitations, or who did not read or

consider the wardrobe door tag, cannot be said to have relied on the allegedly misleading wardrobe

tag to any extent. Thus, the McManuses have failed to show that the representations were part ofthe

“basis of the bargain” to such a uniform extent that class certification is appropriate under Rule

23(b)(3) for the breach of express warranty claim.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the McManuses’ claim for breach

of implied warranty of merchantability under Rule 23(b)(3)

The McManuses argue that their claimfor breach ofimpliedwarrantyofmerchantability,seeTEX.

BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.314, does not require a showing of reliance. See Khan v. Velsicol Chem.

Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 319 (Tex. App. 1986). Fleetwood responds that the McManuses failed to

plead the claim, and in the alternative, that the claim is unsuitable for class treatment. We conclude

that the claims were properly pleaded, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

certifying a class for this claim under Rule 23(b)(3).

The McManuses complaint enumerates five causes of action under separate headings: (1)

violation California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CALCIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784; (2) breach of

express warranty;(3) breach of implied warranty ofmerchantability under California’s Song-Beverly

Consumer WarrantyAct, CALCIV.CODE § 1792; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) fraudulent

concealment. In a section of the complaint subtitled “CLASS ACTION” the McManuses state:

This is an action sought to be certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. This action involves Defendant’s violations of the state consumer
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protection laws, in particularCalifornia Consumer LegalRemedies Act and the Song-Beverly

Warranty Act, as well as, alternatively, the corresponding consumer protection laws of other

states, in the sale of motor homes to its customers.

Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 7 (emphasis added). The McManuses argue that Texas’ implied

warranty of merchantability provision is included in their broadly worded complaint as a

“corresponding consumer protection law[]” of Texas. Fleetwood points out that the Texas implied

warranty of merchantability claim would “correspond[]” only to California’s identical statute (both

from the U.C.C.)— a statute explicitly not pleaded. Compare TEX. BUS. &COM.CODE § 2.314 with

CAL. COM. CODE § 2314.

“The notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and case law do not

require an inordinate amount of detail or precision.” St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224

F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff need not correctly specify the legal theory, so long asthe

plaintiff alleges facts upon which relief can be granted. Id. Here, the McManuses pleaded a version

of implied warranty under a California statute. Now that it is agreed Texas law applies, the most

natural reading of the McManuses’ broadly-worded complaint would include some version of that

claim under Texaslaw. Moreover, the McManuses’ complaint allegesthat their motor home was not

“fit for the ordinary purposes for which those vehicles are used,” Second Amended Compl. at ¶ 44,

tracking the language of the relevant Texas statute. TEX.BUS.&COM.CODEANN. § 2.314 (“Goods

to be merchantable must be at least such as. . . are fit for the ordinary purposesfor which such goods

are used. . . .”).

We note also that the McManuses’ specifically mentioned Texas’ implied warranty

provision—and the fact that it does not require a showing of reliance—in its motion for certification

of a Texas-only subclass. Fleetwood failed to argue to the district court that the implied warranty
11

claim had not been pleaded properly, and the district court’s order mentions implied warranty of

merchantability under Texas law. We conclude that the claim is properly encompassed in the

pleadings.

The McManuses’theoryisthat the motor homes were not “fit for the ordinary purposesfor which

such goods are used.” TEX.BUS.&COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 . In other words, the motor homes are

not fit for the ordinary purpose of towing because they cannot safely tow a normal car without

supplemental breaks. Fleetwood argues that the motor homes are fit for their ordinary purpose.

Keeping in mind that “the strength of a plaintiff’s claim should not affect the certification decision,”

Castano, 84 F.3d at 744, we find this line of argument inapposite for purposes of this appeal. 

Under Texas law, “[a] plaintiff in an implied warranty of merchantability case has the burden of

proving that the goods were defective at the time they left the manufacturer’s orseller’s possession.”

Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1989). It is undisputed that

Fleetwood’s Class A motor homes were equipped with a hitch for towing, and whether or not the

alleged t owing limitations rendered the motor homes defective is a question for the jury. More

importantly, it is a question whose answer will not vary from plaintiffto plaintiff because the inquiry

is focused on “the time [the goods] left the manufacturer’s or seller’s possession.” Id. (emphasis

added).

Fleetwood asserts that the measure of damages will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, pointing out

that the McManuses, for example, were not damaged at all. Donnie McManus testified at his

deposition that he was able to tow his Jeep Cherokee behind his motor home without the use of

supplementalbrakes. Fleetwood emphasizes that the McManuses have not shown any classmembers
3We note, however, that Donnie McManus stated in an affidavit that on one occasion

when he was towing his Jeep Cherokee, the motor home’s brakes began to give way and

McManus was forced to downshift his motor home and pull over to the side of the road.

12

were act ually injured.3 These arguments misapprehend the nature of the implied warranty of

merchantability cause of action. In this contract cause of action, the McManuses seek the difference

in the actual value of the motor home and the value as warranted. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §

2.714(b). “Here, the damages sought by the [McManuses] are not rooted in the alleged defect of the

product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain.” Coghlan v.

Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, whether or not any member

of the class actually suffered any physical injury is immaterial. Likewise, it is immaterial whether or

not the class members even intended to use their motor homes for towing because all a jury need

determine is that the motor homes were defective with respect to a motor home’s

“ordinary purpose.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (emphasis added).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its “broad discretion,” Castano , 84 F.3d at 740,

in certifying the McManuses’ claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Rule

23(b)(3).

B. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is improper

Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate where “the party opposing the class has acted or

refused to act on grounds generallyapplicable to the class, therebymaking appropriate finalinjunctive

relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(b)(2). Fleetwood argues that, considering the variable purchasing scenarios, Fleetwood has not

“acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.” We disagree. Rule 23(b)(2)’s

requirement that a defendant have acted consistentlytowardsthe classis plainlymore permissive than
13

23(b)(3)’srequirement that questions common to the class predominate over individual issues. Here,

the McManuses assert that Fleetwood made the exact same allegedly misleading representation to

all the class members—i.e., that the motor homes could safely tow 3,500 pounds. We conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this constituted an action “generally

applicable to the class.”

Fleetwood next argues that Rule 23(b)(2) certification is not appropriate when the suit

predominately seeks money damages. See Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 975 (5th

Cir. 2000); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998). This Court in

Allison held that “monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to

requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.

Here, unlike Bolin and Allison, the district court certified the class under both (b)(2) and (b)(3),

and the plaintiffsseek injunctive relief and damages relief as alternative remedies. Thus, Allison and

Bolin are slightly off the mark. We need not ask whether damages “predominate”; we ask only

whether injunctive relief, to the exclusion of damages, is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). We

conclude that it is not.

“(S)ubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 primarily to facilitate the bringing of class

actions in the civil rights area.” Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506 n.6 (5th Cir.

Jan. 1981) (quoting 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 (1972)).

The advisory committee’s notes state that Rule 23(b)(2) would be appropriate in a case to enjoin

price discrimination, or in a case to enjoin illegal “tying.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory

committee’s note. Rule 23(b)(2) has also been used extensively to obtain injunctive relief against the

enforcement of various complex statutory schemes. See 7AC. Wright, et al., FEDERALPRACTICEAND
14

PROCEDURE § 1775, at 484 (2d ed. 1986).

Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), class members are not permitted to opt-out of a Rule 23(b)(2) class to

pursue their claims individually. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). “[B]ecause of the group nature of the

harm alleged and the broad character of the relief sought, the (b)(2) class is, by its very nature,

assumed to be a homogeneous and cohesive group withfewconflicting interests among itsmembers.”

Allison, 151 F.3d at 413. This Court has explained: 

Actions for class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief are intended for (b)(2) certification

precisely because they involve uniform group remedies. Such relief may often be awarded

without requiring a specific or time-consuming inquiry into the varying circumstances and

merits of each class member’s individual case. When it does, the relatively complex

calculationstypically required in class actionsfor money damages are unnecessary. For these

reasons, proposed (b)(2) classes need not withstand a court’s independent probe into the

superiority of the class action over other available methods of adjudication or the degree to

which common issues predominate over those affecting only individual class members, as

(b)(3) classes must.

Id. at 414.

The McManuses’ lawsuit is markedly different from the paradigm Rule 23(b)(2) class action.

First, the ordinary relief for their lawsuit would be money damages, not injunctive relief. See TEX.

BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.714(b) (“The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference

at the time and place of acceptance between the value ofthe goods accepted and the value theywould

have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a

different amount.”); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960

S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex. 1998) (“Texas recognizes two measures o f direct damages for common-law

fraud: the out-of-pocket measure and the benefit-of-the-bargain measure.”); Federal Land Bank

Ass’n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991) (“The damages recoverable for a

negligent misrepresentation are those necessary to compensate the plaintifffor the pecuniary loss to
4The McManuses’ request for a safety notice is inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) because

it is undisputed that the motor home purchasers have received the relevant information either by

letter from Fleetwood, or in their chassis owner’s manual.

15

him of which the misrepresentation is legal cause. . . .”).

Second, Fleetwood sold its motor homes over a limited period of time to a limited number of

purchasers and does not have an ongoing relationship with its purchasers. Third, Fleetwood would

have to provide individual relief, based on the various models of motor homes, to each individual

plaintiff having purchased a motor home between 1994 and 1999, as opposed to a “uniform group

remed[y],” Allison,151 F.3d at 414.

These sharp differences make the class-wide injunctive relief contemplated under Rule 23(b)(2)

inappro priate to this case. We could find no case where injunctive relief was awarded under

comparable circumstances. This result is unsurprising because damages would be the superior

remedy, especially considering that some class members may already own, or have no need for,

supplemental brakes. We emphasize that otherwise inappropriate injunctive relief does not become

appropriate for class treatment merely because the more permissive Rule 23(b)(2), as opposed to

(b)(3), contemplates injunctive relief. The district court abused its discretion in allowing the Rule

23(b) classifications to inform the appropriate remedy, instead of vice versa.4

Moreover, permitting this lawsuit to continue as a Rule 23(b)(2) class would undo the careful

interplay between Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). That is, the class members would potentially receive a

poor substitute for individualized money damages, without the corresponding notice and opt-out

benefits ofRule 23(b)(3); and defendants would potentiallybe forced to paywhat is effectivelymoney

damages, without the benefit of requiring plaintiffsto meet the rigorous Rule 23(b)(3) requirements.

Cf. Bolin, 231 F.3d at 976 (reiterating our concern that “plaintiffsmay attempt to shoehorn damages
16

actions into the Rule 23(b)(2) framework, depriving class members of notice and opt-out

protections”). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under

Rule 23(b)(2).

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.