COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DONNA G. REECE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0946-95-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 APRIL 30, 1996 

WILLIAM M. REECE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 Andrea R. Stiles (Kelly Harrington Johnson; 

Williams, Mullen, Christian & Dobbins, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Murray J. Janus (Deanna D. Cook; Bremner & 

Janus, on brief), for appellee. 

 Donna G. Reece (wife) appeals the trial court's decision to 

reduce William M. Reece's (husband) monthly spousal support 

obligation. Wife contends that husband became voluntarily 

underemployed when he lost his job and failed to find comparable 

employment in the Richmond, Virginia area or when he refused to 

accept comparable employment in Tampa, Florida. Finding that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm its decision. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 Wife and husband married on January 24, 1968, separated on 

July 1, 1993, and divorced on December 7, 1994. Until October 

1993, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company employed husband in Richmond 

as a regional accounts manager, paying him approximately $145,000 

per year. Unemployed during most of the marriage, wife found 
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employment after the separation, which paid her $11,600 per year. 

 On July 28, 1993, the trial court ordered husband to pay 

pendente lite spousal support to wife in the amount of $1,000 per 

month. 

 Although R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company eliminated husband's 

position in October 1993, it offered him an equivalent paying 

position as a senior chain accounts manager in Tampa, Florida. 

Husband declined the employment offer. In October 1993, R.J. 

Reynolds Tobacco Company gave husband a severance package worth 

approximately $110,000 per year. The package terminated in March 

1995, seventeen months later. After the separation and divorce, 

wife continued to earn approximately $11,500 per year. On 

December 7, 1994, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, 

accepted the commissioner's spousal support recommendation, and 

ordered husband to continue to pay wife $1,000 per month in 

spousal support. 

 On February 6, 1995, two months after the trial court's 

order, husband filed a motion to decrease his spousal support 

payments based on a material change in circumstances. At the 

time of the trial court's hearing on husband's motion, husband 

was employed as a real estate agent in Ashland, Virginia. 

Husband testified that his gross income had decreased to $1,752 

per month, which gave him insufficient funds with which to pay 

wife $1,000 per month in spousal support. Husband also testified 

that his severance pay from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ended 
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in March 1995. Finally, husband testified that he believed it 

could take three years "to really get to the point where [he 

could be] making some money." Wife presented no evidence showing 

other comparable jobs were available to husband. The trial court 

found that husband sustained his burden of proof and reduced the 

amount of monthly spousal support owed to wife from $1,000 to 

$430 per month. 

 II. 

MODIFICATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below. Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 399, 

424 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1992). A presumption exists that the trial 

court based its decision on the evidence presented and properly 

applied the law. Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 221, 415 

S.E.2d 252, 254 (1992). Furthermore, a trial court's judgment 

will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Jennings v. Jennings, 12 Va. App. 1187, 

1189, 409 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1991). 

 Code § 20-109 states that "[u]pon petition of either party 

the court may increase, decrease, or terminate spousal support 

and maintenance that may thereafter accrue, whether previously or 

hereafter awarded, as the circumstances may make proper." "The 

moving party in a petition for modification of support is 

required to prove both [1] a material change in circumstances and 
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[2] that this change warrants a modification of support." 

Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 

30 (1989). See Furr v. Furr, 13 Va. App. 479, 481, 413 S.E.2d 

72, 73 (1992); Code § 20-109. 

 Husband satisfied the first prong by a preponderance of the 

evidence, when he proved that his financial circumstances had 

materially changed following the trial court's last decree after 

he had involuntarily lost his job. See Edwards v. Lowry, 232 Va. 

110, 112, 348 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1986). Husband testified that in 

October 1993, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company eliminated his job as 

a regional accounts manager, which paid him $145,000 per year. 

At the time of the trial court's support modification hearing, 

husband no longer received his severance pay from R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Company. Instead, husband was employed as a real estate 

agent, earning a substantially reduced monthly income of $1,700. 

 Wife did not dispute any of this evidence, which, when viewed as 

a whole, demonstrated a material change in husband's financial 

circumstances. 

 Aside from having to prove a material change in 

circumstances, husband had to prove that this change warranted a 

support modification. In discharging this burden, one of the 

circumstances that the chancellor must consider is whether the 

changed circumstances arose from his own voluntary 

underemployment. Edwards, 232 Va. at 112-13, 348 S.E.2d at 261. 

 A trial court may use its broad discretion in deciding whether a 
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material change in circumstances warrants a modification in the 

amount of support.1

 Both parties agree that husband did not voluntarily choose 

to leave his job as a regional accounts manager; rather, R.J. 

Reynolds Tobacco Company eliminated his position through no 

apparent fault of husband's. Both parties also agree that 

husband voluntarily elected not to relocate in order to accept 

comparable employment in Tampa, Florida. Wife argues that as a 

consequence the trial court was required to impute income to 

husband because he became voluntarily underemployed when: (1) he 

refused to market his skills and locate comparable employment in 

the Richmond, Virginia area, and (2) he declined R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Company's offer of comparable employment in Florida. 

 The parties agree that a supporting spouse has the right to 

change employment voluntarily or embark upon a new career. 

Nothing in the record rebuts the contention that husband's 

acceptance of a job as a real estate agent in the Richmond area 

was a "bona fide and reasonable business undertaking" entered 

into after he involuntarily lost his prior employment. Rawlings 

v. Rawlings, 20 Va. App. 663, 669, 460 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1995). 

Although at the time of the hearing, husband was making less 

money per year than his former position paid, he expected his 

 

 1 Unlike spousal support cases, in cases involving the 

modification of child support obligations, a trial court must 

calculate child support according to the presumptive amounts 

outlined in Code § 20-108.2. Such presumptive amounts do not 

exist in cases involving spousal support. 
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income to increase within three years. 

 Furthermore, the record does not show that husband refused 

comparable employment in Richmond merely for his personal 

convenience and without consideration of his family. Cochran v. 

Cochran, 14 Va. App. 827, 830, 419 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1992). There 

is nothing in the record to show that such employment existed in 

Richmond. The trial court specifically asked wife if she had 

"any evidence to show that [husband] had an opportunity to have 

employment other than [the Tampa job]?" Wife responded that she 

did not have any such evidence. Neither did wife introduce any 

evidence to show that husband, in accepting employment as a real 

estate agent, deliberately minimized his income for the purpose 

of reducing his ability to support wife, who was not living under 

necessitous circumstances. Therefore, husband met his burden of 

showing a material change in circumstances that warranted a 

support modification. 

 Whether a supporting spouse is voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed when he or she refuses to accept comparable 

employment in another geographical area is a question of first 

impression in Virginia. After reviewing the law of this state 

and other jurisdictions, we find no authority for a per se rule 

which would hold that a supporting spouse always becomes 

voluntarily underemployed or unemployed when he or she refuses to 

accept an offer of comparable employment in another geographic 
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location.2

 We decline the invitation to adopt a bright line 

rule. A trial court shall consider factors in addition to 

refusing comparable employment in another locale when deciding 

whether either spouse is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 

See O'Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 964, 420 S.E.2d 246, 249 

(1992). 

 As explained above, the trial court made the factual finding 

that husband, through no fault of his own, became involuntarily 

unemployed when his employer eliminated his position. The trial 

court also found that husband voluntarily elected not to accept 

comparable employment in Tampa, Florida. These two findings of 

fact, by themselves, did not allow the trial court to determine 

whether to impute income to husband. This case, therefore, 

differs from Antonelli and other cases that are factually similar 

to Antonelli. In Antonelli, the trial court made a factual 

 

 2 None of the cases cited by wife supports her contention 

that because husband refused his employer's transfer offer, he 

became voluntarily underemployed. For example, in Butler v. 

Butler, 217 Va. 195, 227 S.E.2d 688 (1976), the Supreme Court 

held that the physician-husband's voluntary decision to remain in 

a lower-salaried, career-oriented, staff position sacrificing 

immediate income for future expectations could not be permitted 

to penalize his former wife by reducing her support payments. In 

Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 156, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119-20 

(1991) the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision that 

the husband, who voluntarily left his position as a salaried 

stock broker to become a commissioned stock broker, only to 

suffer a decrease in income, was not allowed to reduce his child 

support payments to his former wife. Similarly, in Taylor v. 

Taylor, 203 Va. 1, 121 S.E.2d 753 (1961), the Supreme Court 

held that the husband, who voluntarily left his job to accept a 

lower-paying job, was not allowed to reduce his support payments. 

See also Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 427 S.E.2d 209 

(1993). 
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finding that the supporting spouse voluntarily chose to leave his 

existing job to pursue other employment and therefore declined to 

grant the supporting spouse's petition to reduce support. 

Antonelli, 242 Va. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 119-20. Here, because 

husband involuntarily left his job, the trial court's inquiry 

differed from the onset. Trial courts, in cases such as this, 

must exercise their discretion in determining whether the 

obligor's actions after being involuntarily terminated constitute 

voluntary underemployment and whether income should therefore be 

imputed. 

 In deciding whether failure to relocate constitutes 

voluntary unemployment or underemployment to justify imputing 

income, the trial court shall consider all the evidence in each 

case. In exercising its discretion, a trial court should 

consider a number of factors, including but not limited to: (1) 

the supporting spouse's business ties to the community; (2) the 

supporting spouse's familial ties to the community; (3) whether 

the supporting spouse's relocation would have an undue 

deleterious effect upon his or her relationship with his or her 

children or other family members; (4) the length of time in which 

the supporting spouse has resided in the community; (5) monetary 

considerations which would impose an undue hardship upon the 

supporting spouse if he or she were forced to relocate; (6) the 

"quality of life" in the respective communities; (7) the 

geographic distance between the respective communities; and (8) 
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the severity of the burden which a failure to relocate would have 

on the obligee spouse. 

 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in not imputing income after finding that husband did not become 

voluntarily unemployed or underemployed when he refused to 

relocate to Tampa, Florida. The record reveals that the trial 

court had before it sufficient facts to make such a 

determination. First, the record reveals that husband, who was 

forty-nine years old, had strong familial ties to Richmond. 

Husband supported one daughter, who attended a local college and 

lived with husband in Richmond, and he had another grown daughter 

who also lived in the area. Second, husband had substantial 

business ties to Richmond. He worked for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 

Company for an extended period of time while operating a small 

golf supply business, and then took a job as a real estate agent 

in nearby Ashland, Virginia. Third, wife was not destitute nor 

did she suffer from health problems that necessitated a greater 

amount of financial support. Finally, the great geographic 

distance between Richmond and Tampa was a relevant consideration 

for the trial court. 

 In light of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

Affirmed.
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Baker, J., concurring in result. 

 I join with the majority only because I believe that, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, the 

evidence supports the trial court's decision; therefore, I cannot 

say that its decision was plainly wrong. If the trial court had 

held on this same evidence that husband had become voluntarily 

underemployed, I believe that, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to wife, we would have found evidence to support 

that decision and we could not have said that it was plainly 

wrong or that an abuse of discretion had been shown. 

 In matters of this nature, with this kind of evidence, 

generally, the decision of the trial court that views the 

witnesses must be upheld.