SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

881 

CA 12-02346 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

MICRO-LINK, LLC, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWN OF AMHERST, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

PHILLIPS NIZER LLP, NEW YORK CITY (DAVID A. PELLEGRINO OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

E. THOMAS JONES, TOWN ATTORNEY, WILLIAMSVILLE (ALAN P. MCCRACKEN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John A.

Michalek, J.), entered February 8, 2012. The order, among other

things, denied the amended motion of plaintiff for summary judgment

and granted defendant summary judgment on its counterclaim.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the order insofar as

it concerns the counterclaim is unanimously dismissed and the order is

otherwise affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking payment

based on a performance contract pursuant to which plaintiff managed a

wastewater treatment plant on defendant’s behalf. Supreme Court

(Curran, J.) previously granted in part defendant’s motion to dismiss

the amended complaint by dismissing in part the first cause of action,

for breach of contract, and the second cause of action, for an account

stated, and on a prior appeal, this Court modified that order by

denying the motion in its entirety and reinstating those causes of

action in their entirety (Micro-Link, LLC v Town of Amherst, 73 AD3d

1426). Plaintiff thereafter moved for, inter alia, summary judgment

on the first two causes of action and defendant cross-moved for

summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint, among other relief. 

In appeal No. 1, plaintiff appeals from an order of Supreme Court

(Michalek, J.) denying its amended motion for summary judgment,

denying defendant’s “[cross] motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claims . . . as moot,” and purportedly granting

defendant’s “[cross] motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim.” 

In appeal No. 2, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the same court

entered on defendant’s counterclaim in the amount of $251,442.67.

Because that part of the order in appeal No. 1 purportedly granting

defendant’s “[cross] motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim”

is subsumed in the judgment in appeal No. 2, we dismiss plaintiff’s
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CA 12-02346 

appeal from that part of the order in appeal No. 1 concerning the

counterclaim (see Hughes v Nussbaumer, Clarke & Velzy, 140 AD2d 988;

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v Roberts & Roberts, 63 AD2d 566, 567; see

also CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

With respect to appeal No. 1, the court properly denied that part

of plaintiff’s amended motion seeking summary judgment on the cause of

action for an account stated. “ ‘An account stated represents an

agreement between the parties reflecting an amount due on a prior

transaction . . . An essential element of an account stated is an

agreement with respect to the amount of the balance due’ ” (Seneca

Pipe & Paving Co., Inc. v South Seneca Cent. Sch. Dist., 83 AD3d 1540,

1541). Here, plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden on the

motion of establishing the existence of an account stated inasmuch as

plaintiff’s own submissions contain evidence of defendant’s repeated

objections to plaintiff’s invoices and disputes between the parties

with respect to the provisions of the contract relating to plaintiff’s

compensation (see Abbott, Duncan & Wiener v Ragusa, 214 AD2d 412, 413;

Construction & Mar. Equip. Co. v Crimmins Contr. Co., 195 AD2d 535,

535). Furthermore, the court properly concluded in appeal No. 1 that

plaintiff’s own submissions raise triable issues of fact whether it is

entitled to further compensation pursuant to those contractual

provisions, and thus the court also properly denied that part of

plaintiff’s amended motion seeking summary judgment on the cause of

action for breach of contract (see Andrews, Pusateri, Brandt,

Shoemaker & Roberson, P.C. v County of Niagara, 91 AD3d 1287, 1287-

1288). 

The court erred, however, in denying that part of plaintiff’s

amended motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim

based upon defendant’s lack of legal capacity to sue (see CPLR 3211

[a] [3]), and we therefore vacate the money judgment in appeal No. 2

entered on defendant’s counterclaim and modify the order entered

February 8, 2012 accordingly. The counterclaim is “in effect a

separate and distinct action brought by defendant[] against plaintiff”

(New York Trap Rock Corp. v Town of Clarkstown, 299 NY 77, 80), and

defendant does not have capacity to assert that counterclaim except

upon a resolution of its Town Board (see Town Law § 65 [1]; Town of

Claverack v Brew, 277 AD2d 807, 809; Town of Thompson v Alleva, 76

AD2d 1022, 1022, appeal dismissed 53 NY2d 839). Defendant’s Town

Board declined to adopt a proposed resolution that would have

authorized defendant to initiate an action against plaintiff, as well

as a second proposed resolution that would have authorized a

counterclaim. Thus, defendant’s Town Board had expressly withheld

authorization for the counterclaim at the time defendant interposed

the counterclaim (cf. Town of Caroga v Herms, 62 AD3d 1121, 1123, lv

denied 13 NY3d 708, rearg denied 13 NY3d 931). Although defendant’s

Town Board adopted a resolution purporting to authorize the

counterclaim retroactively, more than two years after defendant

interposed its counterclaim, we conclude that the counterclaim cannot

“be legitimized through an after-the-fact[,] or nunc pro tunc,

legislative enactment” (Town of Hempstead v Board of Appeals of Town

of Hempstead, 15 Misc 3d 1116[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50706[U], *3 [Sup
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CA 12-02346 

Ct, Nassau County 2007], citing Bright Homes, Inc. v Weaver, 7 AD2d

352, 358, affd 6 NY2d 973; Mohrmann v Kob, 291 NY 181, 186). 

Finally, we note that, in any event, the court erred in granting

summary judgment to defendant on the counterclaim inasmuch as

defendant did not request that relief in its cross motion and, apart

from the issue of capacity, “[t]he counterclaim was not a ‘subject’ of

[plaintiff’s amended] motion for summary judgment” (Ajay Glass &

Mirror Co., Inc. v AASHA G.C., Inc., 90 AD3d 1615, 1616-1617; see

Dunham v Hilco Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 425, 430; Baseball Off. of Commr.

v Marsh & McLennan, 295 AD2d 73, 82). 

Entered: September 27, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court