IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2016

ERIC R. WRIGHT v. GRADY PERRY, WARDEN

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. CC-16-CR-44 Joseph H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2016-00341-CCA-R3-HC - Filed January 18, 2017

The pro se petitioner, Eric R. Wright, appeals the habeas court’s summary dismissal of 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging eleven reasons why the habeas court erred. 

After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN

and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Eric R. Wright, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

In January 1990, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner for one 

count of robbery with a deadly weapon and two counts of assault with intent to commit 

murder in the first degree, all committed on October 15, 1989. The petitioner was 

convicted by a jury of all counts. See Eric Wright v. State, No. W2009-00864-CCA-R3-

PC, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2010).

On September 20, 1990, the petitioner was sentenced as a Range III, persistent 

offender, to consecutive terms of thirty years for the robbery and sixty years for each 

assault, resulting in an effective sentence of 150 years. See Eric R. Wright v. Michael 

Donahue, No. 2:11-cv-03102-SHM-tmp, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136175, at *3 (W.D. 

Tenn. Mar. 31, 2015). Because the offenses were committed before the effective date of 
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the 1989 Sentencing Act but the petitioner was convicted after the effective date of the 

Act, the trial court was to calculate the appropriate sentence under both the 1982 and 

1989 sentencing law and impose the lesser sentence of the two. See Eric Wright, No. 

W2009-00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 11. The maximum effective sentence under the 

1982 law would have been 180 years with no parole, which was more than the 150 years 

at 45% the petitioner received under the 1989 law. See id. 

A brief summary of the evidence adduced at trial from an opinion of this court 

affirming the denial of one of the petitioner’s petitions for post-conviction relief is as 

follows:

This matter concerns the October 15, 1989 robbery of a Circle K 

service station on Lamar Avenue in Memphis, Tennessee. The evidence 

presented at the petitioner’s trial showed that, at approximately 4:50 a.m. 

that day, two black males entered the store, and one of them shot Ricky 

Coleman, the store clerk’s boyfriend, in the face without warning. The 

store clerk, Stella Oakes Coleman,

1

opened the register for the men, and 

they removed the cash from the drawer. Mrs. Coleman testified that there 

was approximately $20 in the register. The men demanded that she open 

the store’s safe, but she was not able to open the time-lock safe. Instead, 

the men pressed the button on the safe that allowed clerks to access the 

currency when they needed change. In this way, the men took $10 in $1 

bills from the safe. When Mrs. Coleman went to check on Mr. Coleman, 

who was lying on the floor, the shooter shot her twice.

See id. at 2.

The petitioner filed a direct appeal, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the 

convicting evidence, the legality of the verdict, and the trial court’s failure to grant a 

special jury instruction. State v. Eric R. Wright, No. 02C01-9107-CR-00152, 1992 WL 

1414, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 1992). This court affirmed the petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences by memorandum opinion on January 8, 1992. Id. The 

petitioner did not timely file an application for permission to appeal this court’s decision 

to the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Eric Wright v. State, No. W2001-00386-CCA-R3-

PC, 2001 WL 1690194, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2001). Evidently, the 

petitioner’s appellate counsel failed to inform the petitioner that his direct appeal had 

been denied, and his attorney never filed a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal 

or moved to withdraw. See id. This came to light when the petitioner, on April 27, 2000, 

filed a motion for appointment of counsel to file a Rule 11 application. See id. The 

 

1

The Colemans were married on October 19, 1989. 
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Tennessee Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel to 

file a Rule 11 application but indicated that the petitioner’s recourse was to file a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking a delayed 

appeal. See id.

On December 11, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 

See id. The post-conviction court denied the petition as untimely, but this court 

remanded the case to determine whether due process tolled the statute of limitations. See

id. at *2-3.2 On remand, the post-conviction court held that due process tolled the statute 

of limitations and granted permission for the petitioner to seek a delayed Rule 11 appeal. 

See Eric Wright, No. W2009-00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 3. The Tennessee Supreme 

Court denied the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. See id.; State v. Eric 

R. Wright, No. W1991-00016-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005) (order).

In May 2005, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction 

proceedings, as well as, contemporaneously, a second petition for post-conviction relief. 

See Eric Wright, No. W2009-00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 3. The petitioner alleged 

that his trial counsel failed to challenge a comment made by the trial court, properly 

investigate the case, or prepare for trial and that his sentence violated the prohibition 

against ex post facto laws because he was sentenced under the 1989 Act instead of the 

1982 Act. See id. at 7-12. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing, 

after which it denied the petition. See id. at 4-6. This court affirmed that denial. Id. at 

12. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on February 16, 2011. 

See Eric Wright v. State, No. W2009-00864-SC-R11-PC (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011) (order). 

The petitioner then filed for federal habeas corpus relief on December 15, 2011, in 

which he alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and 

prepare for trial, the trial court improperly commented on the evidence, and his sentence 

violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Eric R. Wright, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 136175, at *7, *13-14. The district court thoroughly analyzed each issue and then 

denied the petitioner’s claim for relief. See id. at *20-94.

The petitioner filed the present petition for state habeas corpus relief on January 

21, 2016. The petitioner included with his petition a document that he had sent to a 

Nashville attorney describing the five claims for relief he relied on in support of his 

petition and seeking the attorney’s insight. The five claims were: the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction because there was no arrest report, a single course of criminal activity cannot 

be separated into three separate charges, the indictment was void on its face, his sentence 

 

2 One appellate judge dissented, noting that the petitioner knew by April 1998 that his attorney 

had not withdrawn or filed a Rule 11 application, yet the petitioner did not seek redress until December 

2000. Eric Wright, 2001 WL 1690194, at *3 (Tipton, J., dissenting). 
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violated ex post facto laws, and the trial court illegally allowed an “unindictable” offense 

to proceed to trial. The habeas court summarily denied the petition on January 29, 2016, 

and the petitioner appealed. 

ANALYSIS

Initially, the State asserts that the petitioner provided no argument other than to 

reference an attachment to a letter the petitioner sent to a Nashville attorney, David 

Raybin, from which the petitioner asks this court to decipher the bases for his claims. 

However, the petitioner mentions in his brief that the habeas court clerk entered his 

documents out of order and that his arguments were listed as trust fund transactions 

instead of being attached to his habeas petition, so what the State refers to as an 

attachment to the letter to Mr. Raybin could possibly be the out-of-order documents. 

Because we give pro se petitioners greater latitude, we will look at the document to 

discern the petitioner’s arguments. 

It is well-established in Tennessee that the remedy provided by a writ of habeas 

corpus is limited in scope and may only be invoked where the judgment is void or the 

petitioner’s term of imprisonment has expired. Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 

(Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport, 980 

S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A void, as opposed to a voidable, judgment 

is “one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to 

render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007) (citing 

Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998)).

A petitioner bears the burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal 

confinement by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 

(Tenn. 2000). Furthermore, when a “habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a 

judgment is void, a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing.” Summers, 

212 S.W.3d at 260 (citing Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005)). Whether 

the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief is a question of law. Id. at 255; Hart v. 

State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000). As such, our review is de novo with no 

presumption of correctness given to the habeas court’s findings and conclusions. Id.

On appeal, the petitioner identifies eleven issues for this court’s review, even 

though he only raised five issues in support of his habeas petition below. 

The petitioner first asserts that the habeas court failed to rule on every issue 

presented in his petition because of the clerk’s erroneously filing the document describing 

his arguments as trust fund transactions. It is true the clerk placed the document 

describing the petitioner’s arguments as an attachment to the affidavit of indigency, but 
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there is no confusion in the record about which document is which. Moreover, the 

habeas court’s order denying relief specifically identifies each of the five issues the 

petitioner raised in the attached document, which were not identified elsewhere in the 

petition. This issue lacks merit. 

The petitioner next asserts that he is entitled to the relief sought. In support of this 

assertion, the petitioner provides no argument other than to reference two pages in his 

petition. On those pages to which he refers, the petitioner claims that the indictments 

were void because no one died and that there is no criminal statute for “assault to 

murder.” This issue is without merit. Although the summary of the charges on the 

indictment reads “assault to murder first degree,” the cited statute and code section are 

clearly for the offense “assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree.” This 

was a crime in existence at the time the petitioner committed the offenses, and it 

necessarily required that the victims survive.3 The habeas court properly concluded that 

the petitioner’s indictments were not defective.

The petitioner next argues that he is held under a pretense of law. The petitioner 

provides no explanation for this assertion except to refer to the entire eleven-page 

argument in the technical record that was presumably attached to his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. It thus appears that the petitioner claims he is being held under a pretense 

of law because he believes he is entitled to relief based on the five issues raised in his 

petition. As we either have already and/or will address below, the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief based on any of his claims. This issue is without merit.

 

3

The statute read: 

Assault with intent to murder. -- (a) Whoever shall feloniously and with malice 

aforethought assault any person, with intent to commit murder in the first degree, or shall 

administer or attempt to give any poison for that purpose, though death shall not ensue, 

shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not less than five (5) nor 

more than twenty-five (25) years.

(b) If bodily injury to the victim occurs as a result of such an assault in violation of 

subsection (a), the punishment shall be a determinate sentence of confinement in the state 

penitentiary for life or for a period of not less than five (5) years.

(c) In the case of bodily injury to the victim, the offense defined in subsection (b) of this 

section is a Class X felony.

[Tenn. Code Ann.] § 39-2-103 (repealed 1989).

State v. James Harris, No. 03C01-9901-CC-00007, 2000 WL 5040, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 

2000).
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The petitioner next argues that his indictment for assault with intent to commit 

murder is not “a valid law to indict, try as well convict any person.” In support of this 

argument, the petitioner refers to three pages in his petition that claim: robbery with a 

deadly weapon is a “non-existing” offense; there was no true bill of indictment, no proper 

arrest report, or waiver of Miranda rights; there was a violation of ex post facto laws; he 

was not sentenced to the “least restrictive amount of time”; and the indictments were “so 

fatally defective, as to render [the] trial court without jurisdiction.” The pages to which 

the petitioner refers do not support his argument on this issue. Moreover, as discussed 

above, the crime of assault with intent to commit murder existed when the petitioner 

committed the offenses. The indictment was valid, and there was nothing unlawful about 

the State indicting, trying, and convicting the petitioner for his crimes. The issue is 

without merit. 

The petitioner next argues that the court clerk “so fundamentally mixed up 

papers/documents filed by [him]” that it “denied him a fair hearing process and the due 

process of law.” To support this claim, the petitioner repeats verbatim his argument in 

support of his claim that the habeas court did not fully adjudicate his claims. As we 

determined above, there is no confusion in the record about which documents supported 

the affidavit of indigency and which documents were intended to support the petitioner’s 

claims for relief, and the habeas court identified in its order each of the issues the 

petitioner raised in his explanatory attachment. Moreover, the petitioner fails to cite any 

authority that would entitle him to relief based on the court clerk’s supposedly shuffling 

documents submitted with the habeas petition. This issue is without merit. 

The petitioner next argues that “a reasonable jurist could conclude that [the] 

[p]etitioner[’s] issues are valid . . . [and] he has a right to the relief sought” because 

“renowned” attorney, David Raybin, said that his issues were valid and that there is “no 

such crime/law as to assault to murder.” The pages to which the petitioner refers include 

a letter the petitioner sent to attorney David Raybin with a list of the issues he intended to 

present for habeas review, which letter Mr. Raybin returned to the petitioner with a 

handwritten note. The note reads: “I found your arguments most interesting – I think the 

issue regarding that there’s no crime as assault to murder is valid.” This court is 

obviously not bound by a handwritten note from an attorney to a prison inmate,4and the 

standard is not whether a “reasonable jurist could conclude” that the stated issues were 

valid. As the habeas court found, the petitioner’s sentence had not expired, the trial court 

had jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner, and the indictment was not defective. This 

issue is without merit. 

 

4

It does not appear that Mr. Raybin was aware that the petitioner was convicted of crimes 

committed in 1989 or that the petitioner was actually convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, 

not “assault to murder.”
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The petitioner next argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try, 

convict, and sentence him because there was “no arrest warrant-report.” In support of 

this claim, the petitioner provides no explanation other than referencing an unspecified 

number of pages from the eleven-page argument in the technical record that was 

presumably attached to his petition for writ of habeas corpus. This issue is waived for 

failing to provide an argument on the issue and, furthermore, there is no requirement that 

an arrest warrant issue in order to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Cf. Tenn. R. 

Crim. P. 5(a)(2). This issue is without merit.

The petitioner next argues that the State violated the prohibition against double 

jeopardy by “taking a single course of action/conduct/episode and illegally separating it 

into separate events.” He provides no argument on this issue other than to refer to two 

pages in his petition in which he asserts that the State violated the prohibition against 

double jeopardy when it charged him with three crimes arising out of one criminal 

episode and aligning his sentences consecutively. In support of his argument regarding 

multiple criminal charges, the petitioner selectively quotes from the indictment to prove 

that there was only one criminal episode and cites to two opinions from this court, State 

v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) and State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 

121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981), for the principle that “a defendant may not be convicted -

or- punished for two (2) crimes arising out of the same event.”5 However, these 

decisions stand for the proposition that the prohibition against double jeopardy protects 

criminal defendants against multiple punishments for the same offense, not that criminal 

defendants cannot be charged with multiple offenses arising from the same criminal 

episode. For example, in Franklin, this court found that the defendants could not be 

convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery where only one theft occurred, but they 

could be convicted of two counts of aggravated assault because the two victims were 

each threatened with a gun during the course of the robbery. See Franklin, 130 S.W.3d at 

798. The petitioner’s convictions align with Franklin: he was convicted of one count of 

robbery and there was only one robbery; he was convicted of two counts of assault with 

intent to commit murder because he assaulted two different people. There is no double 

jeopardy violation. 

The petitioner also asserts that his protection against double jeopardy was violated 

by his receiving consecutive sentences because such sentences were prohibited by an 

unspecified statute. The petitioner also cites two cases in support of his assertion that 

double jeopardy prohibits consecutive sentences, one of which does not mention the term 

“double jeopardy” and actually upheld consecutive sentences imposed by the court where 

the two defendants were convicted of “assault to commit murder in the first degree” and 

 

5

The language quoted by the petitioner does not appear in either opinion.
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“robbery with a deadly weapon.” See Grey v. State, 542 S.W.2d 102, 102-04 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1976).6 The other case, an en banc Sixth Circuit opinion, held that 

consecutive sentences were inappropriate where the defendant was convicted of assault 

with intent to commit felony murder and assault with intent to commit robbery with a 

deadly weapon because, in that specific situation, they were the same offense under the 

Blockburger analysis due to the trial court’s including felony murder in its charge to the 

jury, and the legislature had not clearly indicated that consecutive sentences were allowed 

in that situation. Pryor v. Rose, 724 F.2d 525, 529-31 (6th Cir. 1984); see Blockburger v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). However, the court noted that “[u]nder most 

circumstances, assault with intent to commit first degree murder and assault with intent to 

commit robbery with a deadly weapon are different offenses within the meaning of 

Blockburger,” Pryor, 724 F.2d at 530, and thus not subject to further inquiry before 

consecutive sentences could be imposed. There is no double jeopardy violation in this 

case. 

The petitioner next argues that the indictments against him “were so fatally 

flawed” as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. He provides no argument on this 

issue other than to refer to three pages in his petition in which he asserted that the 

indictments against him were void because he was indicted for “assault to murder,” 

which is not a crime, and no one was murdered. We have previously touched on this 

allegation above but will note again that, although the summary of the charges on the 

indictment reads “assault to murder first degree,” the cited statute and code section are 

clearly for the offense “assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree.” This 

was a crime in existence at the time the petitioner committed the offenses, and it 

necessarily required that the victims survive. The habeas court properly concluded that 

the indictment was not defective, and this issue is without merit. 

The petitioner next asserts that his sentence violated the prohibition against ex post 

facto laws. Again, the petitioner provides no argument on this issue other than to refer to 

four pages in his petition in which he asserted that his sentence would have been 

significantly less had the court sentenced him under the 1982 law, rather than the 1989 

law. He is correct that the trial court was required to calculate his sentence under both 

the 1982 and 1989 Sentencing Acts and then impose the lesser sentence. However, this is 

exactly what the trial court did, as described by this court on review of the denial of the 

petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief and the federal district court on consideration 

of the petitioner’s claim for federal habeas corpus relief. See Eric Wright, No. W2009-

00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 6, 11; Eric R. Wright, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136175, at 

*25-26, *76-91. The petitioner compares concurrent lesser sentences he theoretically 

 

6

Interestingly, the Grey court also found “no merit in plaintiffs-in-error’s argument that these 

four offenses were only one criminal event and should therefore result in one punishment.” 542 S.W.2d 

at 104.
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could have received under the 1982 Act with the consecutive maximum sentence he 

actually received under the 1989 Act and concludes that he should have been sentenced 

under the 1982 Act. However, the petitioner is not comparing apples to apples – had the 

court imposed the maximum sentence available under the 1982 Act, he would have 

received three consecutive life sentences of sixty years each with no chance of parole. 

See Eric Wright, No. W2009-00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 11. Instead, the trial court 

imposed a total effective sentence of 150 years at 45% release eligibility. He clearly 

received the lesser of the maximum sentences available under the two sentencing 

schemes. 

The petitioner also appears to argue that the offense of robbery with a deadly 

weapon either did not exist under the 1982 Act or it was a lesser grade of felony. 

However, the trial court would have accounted for the classification of each offense 

under each version of the law when it sentenced the petitioner and appears to have done 

so. See Eric R. Wright, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136175, at *84-88; see also Eric Wright, 

No. W2009-00864-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 11. The petitioner has not shown that his 

sentence is void. 

The petitioner lastly asserts that the trial court “acted in contravention of a statute, 

as well [as] upon an unindictable offense” in convicting him. Again, the petitioner 

provides no argument on this issue other than to refer to two pages in his petition in 

which he asserted, without explanation, that the trial court did not have a lawful 

indictment or arrest report, did not sentence him to the least restrictive amount of time 

and violated ex post facto laws, never provided the petitioner with his Miranda rights, and 

that the indictment was fatally defective. These pages only recap the petitioner’s 

arguments without additional analysis or support and, as discussed above, all of those 

arguments lack merit.

Even giving the petitioner a significant amount of leeway considering the huge 

insufficiencies in his brief and arguments, we conclude that none of the petitioner’s issues 

entitle him to habeas corpus relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the habeas court’s 

summary dismissal of the petition. 

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE