* This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating

Procedure 6(b).  After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); CIR. R. 34(f).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2009*

Decided October 23, 2009

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

    RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2535

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JERMAINE C. INGRAM,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:98‐CR‐40034‐003

Michael J. Reagan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jermaine Ingram pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

and was sentenced to 169 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.  In

March 2008, the district court reduced Ingram’s prison sentence to 136 months based on the

2007 amendment to crack‐cocaine sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  Ingram was then

released from prison and commenced the term of supervised release, but in November 2008,

his probation officer petitioned for revocation for, among other grounds, possessing crack

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 09‐2535 Page 2

with intent to distribute.  At his revocation hearing Ingram admitted possessing crack but

denied intending to distribute it.  The district court revoked his release and ordered him to

serve another 28 months’ imprisonment.  Ingram appeals, but his appointed counsel has

moved to withdraw because he cannot identify any nonfrivolous argument to pursue.  See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Ingram has not accepted our invitation to comment

on counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We confine our review to the potential issues

outlined in counsel’s adequate brief.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir.

2002).

Counsel first considers whether Ingram could challenge the district court’s decision

to revoke his supervised release.  A district court may revoke a term of supervised release if

it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of his

release.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2007).  Here,

Ingram admitted possessing crack, which constitutes a Grade A violation, and therefore

violated a condition of his release.  The violation also made revocation of his release

mandatory.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1); U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.3(a)(1); United States v. Israel,

317 F.3d 768, 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1154 (7th Cir.

2001).  We agree with counsel that it would be frivolous for Ingram to challenge the district

court’s decision to revoke his supervised release.

Finally counsel considers whether Ingram might argue that his term of

reimprisonment is unreasonable.  We will uphold a term of reimprisonment imposed on

revocation of supervised release unless it is “plainly unreasonable,” a very deferential

standard.  United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007).  Before settling on 28

months, the district court adequately considered the seriousness of Ingram’s violation, the

need for deterrence, the policy statements in the guidelines, see U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. B, and the

sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438

(7th Cir. 2008).  Thus, we agree with counsel that any challenge to Ingram’s term of

reimprisonment would be frivolous.

   Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.