Filed 4/24/14; pub. order 45/6/14 (see end of opn.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. HAKIMULLAH SARPAS et al., Defendants and Appellants. G047462
(Super. Ct . No. 30-2009-00125950)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Orange County, Andrew P. Banks, Judge. Affirm ed and remanded with directions. Law Offices of Murphy & Eftekhari, Thomas Murphy and Afshin Eftekhari for Defendants and Appellants. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Gene ral, Frances T. Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen and Sheldon H. Jaffe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plain tiff and Respondent.
* * *2 I NTRODUCTION Hakimullah Sarpas and Zulmai Nazarzai operated a scheme by which they promised customers they would obtain lo an modifications from lenders and prevent foreclosure of the customers’ homes. They operated this scheme through their jointly owned company, Statewide Financial Group, Inc. (SFGI), which did business as US Homeowners Assistance (U SHA). Sharon Fasela 1 was, among other things, the office manager of USHA and came up with the key misrepresentation that USHA had a 97 percent success rate. Customers paid US HA over $2 million but received no services
in return. There was no cr edible evidence that USHA obtained a single loan modification, or provided anything of value, for its customers. The Attorney General, on behalf of th e People of the State of California, 2 commenced this action in July 2009 by filing a complaint against SFGI, USHA, Sarpas, Nazarzai, and Fasela (collectively referred to as Defendants), seeking injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties under the California unfair competition law (UCL),
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., 3 and the California False Advertising Law (FAL), section 17500 et seq. Accompanying the complaint were declarations from 19 purported victims. SF GI was placed in receivership on the same day that the complaint was filed. In July 2012, follo wing a lengthy bench trial, the trial court issued a judgment and a 19-page statement of decisi on finding against Defendants. The court permanently enjoined USHA, Nazarzai, Sarpas, and Fase la, and ordered restitution be made to every eligible consumer reque sting it, up to a maximum amount of

1 Her legal name is Fasela Sheren, but we will use the name by which she was named in the complaint.

2 We refer to plaintiff and respondent as the Attorney General. 3 Further code references are to the Bu siness and Professions Code unless otherwise noted.3 $2,047,041.86. The court found USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai to be jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution, and Fase la to be jointly and severally liable with them for up to $147,869 in restitution. The court imposed civil penalties against USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,047,041, and imposed additional civil penalties against Fasela, USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, jointly and severally, in the amount of $360,540. In this appeal, Sarpas and Fasela challenge the judgmen t on six discrete grounds of error, each discussed in order in the Discussion section. (SFGI, USHA, and Nazarzai are not parties to this appeal.) As to each ground, we conclude (1) the trial court did not err by issuing a protective orde r limiting the Attorney General’s obligation to respond to thousands of special interrogatories; (2) th e trial court did not err by receiving in evidence portions of the deposition transcript s of six USHA customers; (3) the trial court did not err by ordering Sarpas and Fasela to pay restitution; (4) the award and amount of civil pena lties against Sarpas are prope r, the award of civil penalties against Fasela is proper, but the amount of penalties against her must be recalculated; (5) Sarpas and Fasela were not denied their due proc ess rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (6) the trial court did not e rr by receiving in evidence checks deposited into USHA’s bank account. Based on these conclusions, we strike the civil penalties awarded against Fasela only and remand for the trial court to recalculate those penalties, but, in all other respects, affirm the judgment.
F ACTS Sarpas was the 50 percent owner of SFGI, which did business as USHA. Nazarzai owned the other 50 perc ent. Sarpas and Nazarzai ea ch received 50 percent of the company profits. From March 2008 to April 2009, Sarpas received $490,000 in profits from SFGI. Sarpas also served as op erations manager of SFGI and oversaw the company’s day-to-day operations.4 Fasela worked as the office manager of SFGI for about one year, ending in July 2009. USHA paid Fasela $2,746 in 2007, $135 ,358 in 2008, and $ 11,611 in 2009. SFGI, through USHA, purported to offer loan modification services.
USHA ran a “boiler room” te lemarketing operation in wh ich sales representatives, working in a “pit area, ” cold-called potential customer s to offer assistance with modifying the terms of home loans. In additi on, sales representatives were available to receive calls from potential customers, usuall y people who were re turning calls made by USHA sales representatives. SFGI purcha sed the contact information of potential customers from a “lead-generating company. ” Every USHA sales representative had a quota of calls to be made based on those leads. Sales representatives were instructed to tell potential customers: “USHA is a full service loss mitigation and asset preser vation company based ou t of California and we essentially help homeow ners throughout the US who have fallen behind on their mortgage payment due to some unfortunate circumstance within their household or maybe a hardship situation, in which case our legal staff will negotiate with their current lender to reduce their overall payment and make it affordable to con tinue living in their home.” A sales representative might tell a potential customer that USHA “works with lenders to get the terms of their client’s current mortgage changed by forcing the lender to comply with the ne w federal program.”
The cost of USHA’s services varied. The service fee schedule of charges given to sales representatives set a fee of $1,800 for one out-of-state loan; $2,500 for two out-of-state loans; $2,500 for one California lo an; and $3,500 for two California loans. Sales representatives were in structed to charge as low as $1,000 for lower income customers with low-balance loans, and up to $4,500 for higher income customers with high balance/high payment loans. Sales repr esentatives also were instructed, “[i]f you
see that an out of state lead has money please charge them California fees.” Charges had to be paid in advance.5 To induce potential customers to pa y these fees, USHA made various promises, including (1) USHA would obtain a significant reduction in the principal balance of the loan, which would lower the amount of monthly payments; (2) USHA
would obtain a reduction in the interest rate on the loan, which would lower the amount of monthly payments; (3) USHA would get the lender to forgive any arrearages; (4) USHA would save the custom er from foreclosure; (5) th e loan modification process would not take long, from 90 days to eight weeks; (6) USHA woul d refund the money paid by the customer if it were unable to obtain a loan modification; (7) if USHA obtained a loan modification, the fees paid to USHA would be repaid to the customer by the lender or the government; and (8) USHA was an “ attorney backed company ” with a “legal team” working with it to get loan modifications. Most striking, USHA represented it ha d a 97 percent success rate, that it had a success rate of “over 95 percent,” or th at USHA never had a case in which a loan modification was not approved. Fasela came up with the 97 percent success rate figure “in the beginning.” One customer testifie d the sales representative guaranteed USHA
would obtain a loan modification. In addition, customers were told to stop making their mortgage payments because doing so would make obtaining a loan modification easier. As a result, customers often suffered ruined credit, additi onal fees, foreclosure proceedings, and even loss of the home USHA had promised to save. USHA made the representations orally in telephone calls from sales representatives and sometimes in letters pur porting to set forth a loan modification proposal. A typical letter would propose (1) a reduction of the principal balance to the current property value, (2) co nversion to a fixed rate loan, (3) a reduction of monthly payment, (4) forgiveness of arrearages, and (5 ) reporting the loan st atus as current to credit agencies. The letters requested the cu stomer to complete and return forms to “allow us to move aggressively in bringing these challenges to conclusion immediately.”6 USHA routinely sent these letters to customers. Several cust omers testified they believed
the letters reflected what USHA would obtain for them. These representations were effective. During the 18 months prior to June 30, 2009, USHA took in over $2.22 million. One cust omer testified, “I was convinced by the—the word of [the USHA sale s representative].” Another testified, “[t]he only reason I sent the money in is be cause he gave me a money back guarantee on
that.” After paying USHA’s fees, custom ers would have difficulty reaching anyone at USHA to find out the status of their loan modifi cations. Telephone calls and e-mails went unanswered; some times the customer could not even reach voice mail, and
when the customer was able to reach voice mail, the ca ll was not returned When customers did get hold of someone, they mi ght be told USHA was “still negotiating” or the matter was “in the hands of a negotiator.”
No credible evidence was presented at trial that USHA ever obtained a loan modification, or did anything of value, for any customer. USHA made no refunds to customers, despite its promises, and despite customer demands. Not only did USHA not have a legal team, it had no attorneys what soever working on loan modifications. The case of Jerry Walton, a disabled man living in Mississippi, is a typical, and telling, example of how USHA operated its scam. Walton, wh o lives on a disability pension, was cold-called by John Kanpur of USHA. Kanp ur told Walton that for a payment of $1,000, USHA would obtain a reduc tion in the interest rate on his home loan and that he would get his m oney back if USHA did not get the loan modification. Kanpur also told Walton, wh o was current on the loan, to stop making payments. As instructed, Walton sent USHA $1,000 and st opped making payments on his home loan.
When the lender contacted Walton about missed payments, he directed it to USHA. Jean Lute, who worked as a collector for the lend er bank, twice called USHA to inform it that foreclosure proceedings were about to commence and that it was important for USHA to7 return her call. No one from USHA called he r back. Walton had to pay about $1,000 in extra costs to save his home from foreclosure, and never received a loan modification or a
refund from USHA. After receiving five complaints fro m Ohio residents, the consumer protection section of the Ohio Attorney Ge neral’s Office launched an investigation of USHA. As part of the investigation, cons umer protection investigator Sheila Laverty called USHA and posed as a potential customer. In the phone call, La verty said she lived in Columbus, Ohio, was behind on her mortgage payments, and was interested in learning about USHA’s services. A sales representativ e named Ian told Laverty that due to the Home Affordable Mortgage Program, “ba nks are now forced to work out loan
modifications with borrowers that have a hard ship,” and that if Laverty qualified, she would get a lowered interest rate and “could get rid of an y late payments and second mortgages.” Ian told Laverty that USHA “wor ks with lenders to get the terms of their client’s current mortgage changed by forcing the lender to comply with the new federal program,” that USHA did “about 200 loan modifications a month,” and that USHA worked with a legal team. The quoted fee for USHA’s services was $3,500. Ian later e-mailed Laverty several docum ents, including a letter, similar to the one described above, purporting to set fo rth a loan modification proposal. Laverty
understood the letter as reflecti ng what USHA was offering to do for its customers. Also, according to Laverty, USHA had not complied with Ohio law requiring telephone solicitors to register with the Oh io Attorney General’s Office.

D ISCUSSION : P REFACE Sarpas and Fasela identify six argum ents by which they challenge the judgment. We start by addressing an issue wh ich, though not expressly identified as one of those six arguments, underlies their challe nge to the order of restitution and civil penalties. Only a handful of USHA customers testified at trial, and the deposition8 testimony of only six customers was read into evidence. Sarpas and Fasela argue (in the context of other issues) that the amount of restitution and ci vil penalties must be limited
to those witnesses and cannot be ordered for USHA customers whose live testimony was not presented at trial. 4

Section 17203 authorizes an order of restitution as a remedy for violations of section 17200. In part, section 17203 read s: “The court may make such orders or judgments, . . . as may be n ecessary to restore to any pers on in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Section 17535 likew ise authorizes an order of restitution for a violation of section 17500. “The restitutionary remedies of section 17203 and 17535 . . . are identical and are construed in the same manner.” ( Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 177, fn. 10.)
“In a suit for violation of the unfair competition law, ‘ord ers for restitution’ are those ‘compelling a UCL de fendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134 ( Kennedy ).) The trial court has broad discretion to order restitution. ( Cortez v. Purolator Ai r Filtration Products Co. , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 180.)
Restitution under the UCL and FAL may be ordered without individualized proof of harm. ( In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [“‘California courts have repeatedly held that relief under th e UCL [(including restitution)] is available

4 For example, Sarpas and Fasela argue: “Fasela and Sarpas proceeded to trial believing that sixteen customers would testif y adversely about defenda nts in general, and perhaps, some about them. They entered tria l knowing that at one violation per customer, civil penalties were limited to 16 x $2,500 as was restitution, pe r court order, only 16 consumers could testify against them.” They also argue: “Three a lleged violations and three only were proven. Even were the awar d of civil penalties [c]onstitutional . . . , it must be reduced to $7,500.”9 without individualized proof of de ception, reliance and injury’”]; People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4t h 1219, 1255 [restituti on under the FAL]; People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 532 ( Fremont Life ) [restitution under the UCL]; Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1288; Prata v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144; People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App. 3d 1, 25-26); see Bank of the West v. Superior
Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267 [the Legi slature considered UCL deterrence “so important that it authorized courts to orde r restitution without in dividualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury”].)
The defendant in Fremont Life , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at page 531, argued that “across-the-board restitution may not be ordered without proof that all consumers were deprived of money or property as a re sult of an unfair business practice.” The Court of Appeal rejected that argument as contra dicting California Supreme Court authority and “the rule that restitution under the UCL may be ordered without individualized proof of harm.” ( Id. at pp. 531-532.) The court in People v. Toomey , supra , 157 Cal.App.3d at pages 25-26, likewise rejected an argument th at restitution under th e UCL was limited to
victims who testified at trial. Because individualized proof of ha rm was unnecessary, the Attorney General was not required to present testimony from each and every USHA customer for whom restitution and civil pe nalties were being sought. Sa rpas and Fasela faced no surprise when they wa lked into trial because the law wa s settled that restitution and civil penalties under the UCL and FAL could be ordered against th em without individualized proof of harm. The Attorney General pr esented evidence suffi cient to support a reasonable inference of deception and harm as to all USHA cust omers, and, therefore, the restitution and civil penalties as to all USHA customers were lawful.10 D ISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Issuing the Protective Order.
A. Background Sarpas and Fasela argue the trial cour t erred by issuing a protective order limiting the Attorney Genera l’s obligation to respond to thousands of special interrogatories. The trial court did not err by issuing the protective order.
1. First Motions to Compel Eleven days after the comp laint was filed, Sarpas and Fasela each served the Attorney General with a se t of 83 special interrogatories (the first sets of special interrogatories). The first sets of special interrogatories asked generally whether the Attorney General made certain contentions and, if so, to state all facts supporting those contentions. The Attorney General served responses to the first sets of special interrogatories in September 2009. The re sponses in total were about 400 pages. Sarpas and Fasela each brought a moti on to compel further responses to every interrogatory of the first sets of special interrogatories (the first motions to compel). In April 2010, the trial court denied the first motions to compel, stating in a minute order: “Plaintiff . . . was proper in its Responses. Plaintiff can only provide and only need[] provide the information that it ha s at the time it responds to particular discovery. Plaintiff apparently did this here with as much sp ecificity to a particular Defendant as the information it had would allow. The objections that Plaintiff made were proper and were not tested by the Motions Defendants br ought, in any event. As time goes on, supplemental discovery may well develop more particularized responses as to some of the defendants, victims, dates etc.”
2. Second Motions to Compel On the same day that the trial court denied the first mo tions to compel, Sarpas and Fasela propounded a request for supplemental responses to the first sets of11 special interrogatories. The A ttorney General serv ed responses totaling about 900 pages, accompanied by five exhibits. On June 17, 2010, after discussion between counsel about the responses, the Attorney Genera l served supplemental responses. Sarpas and Fasela each brought a motion to compel further responses to the request for supplemental responses (the second motions to compel). They argued: “Time and again, Plaintiff provides an evasive and generalized response that totally fails to answer the question posed. After reading an d reviewing each response, no individual Defendant has any inkli ng of what specifically it, he or she allegedly did, to whom, or when. The only information provided is a generalized and sweeping summary of the charges set forth in the Comp laint. In this discovery, Defendants sought specific information as to what, wher e, when, and to whom they each, individually, allegedly did wrong. Absent proper responses, Defendants cannot possibly defend themselves against the generalized allegations brought.”
3. Second Sets of Special Interrogatories In the responses to the first sets of special interrogato ries, the Attorney
General identified hundreds of USHA custom ers, including 585 customers identified by the court-appointed receiver. In June 2010, each Defendant se rved a second set of special interrogatories (the second sets of special interrogatories) propounding eight interrogatories for every one of about 55 0 of the USHA customers identified by the Attorney General. 5

5 The eight interrogatories were: “1. As to [name of USHA customer ], do you contend that this propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s)? “2. As to [name of USHA customer], if you conte nd that propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s), se t forth the Code(s)/Statut e(s) allegedly Violated. “3. As to [name of USHA customer], if you conte nd that propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s), and for each alleged violation, describe in detail all conduct allegedly committed. “4. As to [name of USHA customer], if you conte nd that propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s), and for each alleged violation, st ate the date of each violation.12 In February 2011, each Defendant served a third set of special interrogatories, with each set containing 1,2 48 interrogatories. Each set propounded the same eight questions from the second sets of special interrogatories in regard to about 156 USHA customers. About 5, 328 questions in these third se ts of special interrogatories
were directed to the USHA customers who we re also the subject of the second sets of special interrogatories. In Ma rch 2011, each Defendant serv ed a fourth set of special interrogatories, with each set containing 400 questions.
4. Motion for Protective Order In March 2011, the Attorn ey General filed a motion for a protective order “that Plaintiff need not respond to Defe ndants’ second and third sets of special interrogatories.” In the moti on, the Attorney General argued : “[T]hese interrogatories
reflect a fundamental misunders tanding of what the People ne ed to prove at trial to prevail on their claims, and what the People are obligated to provide in discovery. The People are not obligated to prove each and every specific individual harm suffered by every one of the hundreds of victims of Defenda nts’ illegal acts. If th at were the case, the People would be required to br ing to Court the hundreds of vi ctims as part of a multi-year trial. Rather, the People will establish th at Defendants or those acting under their direction engaged in a pattern of illegal and deceitful behavior. While some victims will be called, the case will largely be base d upon expert testim ony, deposition testimony

“5. As to [name of USHA customer], if you conte nd that propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s), and for each alleged violation, describe in detail the damages allegedly suffered. “6. As to [name of USHA customer], if you conte nd that propounding party violated any Code(s)/Statute(s), and for each alleged violation, set forth all facts which support your contention. “7. As to [name of USHA customer] what fact(s) sp ecific to this propounding party does this individual possess as a potential witness? “8. As to [name of USHA customer] if you contend th at this propounding party owes restitution, set forth the amount allegedly owed.”13 (including the Depositions of Defendants), employee test imony, and Defendants’ own
admissions and documents.”
5. The Trial Court’s Order On April 1, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court issued a minute order denying the second motions to compel. The order stated: “Defendants have failed to show a reasonable and good faith attempt at meeting and conferring on the issues presented by these Motions. In addition, th e motions failed to comply with applicable rules regarding Separate Statements.” The trial court granted the Attorney Ge neral’s motion for a protective order. The order stated: “1. Plaintiff is only requ ired to respon[d] to each Defendants’ second and third set of special interr ogatories as they pertain to those individuals Plaintiff anticipates will be called at tria l; [¶] 2. As to the indivi duals Plaintiff does not anticipate calling at trial, Plaintiff is to (a) specifically state that it w ill not call those individuals, or (b) provide a specific date by which it will make the determination and then answer those interrogatories within 30 days of that date e ither stating that the particular individual will not be called or providing th e requested information.” The court ordered the Attorney General to provide to Defenda nts’ counsel, by May 16, 2 011, a list of those persons whom the Attorney General intended to call at trial, to provide additional names by June 16, and to serve interr ogatory responses as to a ny additional names provided by July 16.

B. Standard of Review The standard of review for a discovery order is abuse of discretion. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) We also review an order granting or denying a motion fo r a discovery-related protectiv e order under the abuse of discretion standard. ( Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286-1287.)14 The abuse of discretion standard has been described generally in these terms: “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” ( Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, “[w]here there is a [legal] basis for the trial court’s ruling and it is supported by the evid ence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court.” ( Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion. The legal basis for the protective order i ssued by the trial court is Code of
Civil Procedure section 2030.090: “When interrogatories have been propounded, the responding party, and any other party or affected na tural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (a).) “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natura l person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” ( Id. , § 2030.090, subd. (b).) A protective order may include the di rection that “the set of interrogatories, or particular interrogatories in the set, need no t be answered,” “the response be made only on specified terms and conditions,” or “the me thod of discovery be an oral deposition instead of interrogatories to a party.” ( Id. , § 2030.090, subd. (b)(1), (4), & (5).) “Oppression” means the ultimate effect of the burden of responding to the discovery is “incommensurate with the result sought.” ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) In cons idering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court take s into account “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of th e issues at stake in the litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030, subd. (a)(2).) Substantial evidence supported findin gs the second sets of special interrogatories and third sets of special inte rrogatories were unwarrantedly oppressive, or unduly burdensome or expensive. Each of the second sets of special interrogatories15 propounded about 4,400 interrogatories, and ea ch of the third sets of interrogatories propounded 1,248 interrogatories. Over 5,3 00 interrogatories prop ounded in the third sets of interrogatories were duplicative of interrogatories propounde d in the second sets of special interrogatories. The needs of the ca se did not warrant all of the interrogatories because, as we have explained, individualized proof of harm is not required for restitution under the UCL. ( Fremont Life , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) Thus, for example,
the basis for and the amounts of individual claims of restitution were unnecessary for defending the claims at trial. Much of the information sought by th e interrogatories had already been provided or could be obtain ed by other means. Attach ed to the complaint were
declarations from 19 USHA customers. The co mplaint and the declarations disclosed the Attorney General was asserting violations of sections 17200 and 17500, and described the conduct forming the basis for the alleged vi olations. In interrogatory responses, the Attorney General provided Sarpas and Fase la with the names and addresses of 585 USHA customers. Sarpas and Fasela had th e opportunity to interview, depose, or subpoena to testify at trial, any or all of those USHA custom ers, if Sarpas and Fasela had wanted to do so. As the trial court explaine d, “if [the deputy attorney general]’s given you the names of everybody else, you can incur the costs and effort to find out if any of them have good things to say . . . . Becaus e it appears to me it is an undue burden for them to go beyond giving you everybody’s name and, if they’ve got st atements from those people, copies of their statements.” In opposing the A ttorney General’s ex parte application for an order extending the time to answer in terrogatories, counsel for Sarpas and Fasela stated, “we’re really not interested in [the deputy attorney general] answ ering all these interrogatories unless he’s intending to bring these people to trial.” The trial court gave Sarpas and Fasela what they wanted by directing the A ttorney General to answ er the interrogatories
related to those USHA customers whom th e Attorney General intended to call as16 witnesses to testify at trial. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion by issuing the protective order. Finally, Sarpas and Fasela state in th e heading under “Ground 1,” on page 9 of their opening brief, that the trial court abused its discretion “in denying appellants’ motion to compel.” (Boldface & some cap italization omitted.) Although Sarpas and Fasela argue generally they were entitled to the information so ught by the special interrogatories, they never specifically addr ess the first motions to compel, the second motions to compel, or the grounds on which the trial court denied those motions. The trial court denied the first motions to compel because the Attorney General had provided
all information known at th e time the first sets of sp ecial interrogatories were propounded. The trial court denied the seco nd motions to compel because Defendants had not shown a reasonable and good faith a ttempt at meeting and c onferring and because the motions failed to comply w ith the applicable rules regard ing separate statements. We
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings.

II.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Receiving in Evidence Deposition Testimony of USHA Customers.
A. Introduction Sarpas and Fasela contend the trial court erred by receiving in evidence portions of the deposition transcripts of si x USHA customers for whom the Attorney General did not provide interrogatory resp onses. The excerpts came from properly noticed depositions of witne sses who lived more than 150 miles from the courtroom. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, s ubd. (c)(1).) Sarpas and Fasela do not contend otherwise. They argue instead that rece ipt in evidence of portions of the deposition transcripts violated the terms of the protective order, wh ich required the Attorney General to provide17 interrogatory responses to those USHA customers who “P laintiff anticipates will be
called at trial.” After the trial court issued the pr otective order, the Attorney General
answered the second sets of special interrogatories and the third sets of special interrogatories as to 16 USHA cu stomers. Of these 16, the Attorney General called five to testify at trial. In addition, the trial court received in evid ence portions of the deposition transcripts of six USHA customers 6 for whom the Attorney General had not provided interrogatory responses. Defendant s objected on the ground that use of the deposition transcripts at trial violated the te rms of the protective order. At the outset of trial, they had filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony from any USHA customer for whom interrogatory response s had not been served. Overruling the objection, th e trial court stated: “There’s no surprise when you set a person’s depo[sition]. . . . [I]n the c ourt’s mind that is the functional equivalent
of the notice to the other side about what—who you’re going to call. And because you’re deposing them live, you’re hearing the questions , and there’s just no prejudice. [¶] . . . [I]f the defendants then wanted to have interr ogatories directed to those people whose deposition was taken on these eight issues . . . , then they could have . . . . [¶] The idea that only the people identified in those in terrogatories and not people whose deposition you noticed could be called at trial just isn’t correct. I . . . don’t see any prejudice. Everybody gets equal access to the person and the potential for their testimony to be used
at trial.”
The trial court also received in evidence portions of the deposition transcripts of bank collector Lu te and investigator Laverty. Defendants did not object to Laverty’s deposition transcript.

6 They were: Jerry Walton, Cheryl Hollis , Edith Johnson, John Ot ero, Larry Lee, and Brenda Miller.18 B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion. Trial court rulings on the admissibility of ev idence, whether made in limine or during trial, are usually reviewed u nder the abuse of discretion standard. ( Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) Whether the trial court erred by re ceiving in evidence the deposition transcripts of the six USHA customers depends on the meaning of the protective order. As relevant to this issue, it stated: “Pla intiff is only required to respon[d] to each Defendants’ second and third set of special interrogatories as they pertain to those individuals Plaintiff anticipates will be called at trial .” (Italics added.) The Attorney General argues the italic ized phrase refers only to those
witnesses who were to be called to provide live testimony at tria l. We agree. That is the plain meaning of the term “called at trial.” When a deposition transcript is read or
offered in evidence at trial in lieu of live te stimony the deponent is not being “called at
trial.” This meaning is consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure which, in describing the modes of taking witness testim ony, distinguishes between a deposition (“a written declaration, under oath, made upon noti ce to the adverse party, for the purpose of enabling him to attend and cross-examine” ) and oral examination testimony (“an examination in presence of the jury or tribunal which is to decide the fact or act upon it, the testimony being heard by th e jury or tribunal from the lips of th e witness”). (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2004, 2005.) A deponent is no ticed or subpoenaed to testify outside the presence of the trier of fact. ( Id ., §§ 2025.010, 2025.210, 2025.250, 2025.280, 2025.320.) In describing how a subpoena may be obtained, the Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes between using a subpoena “[t]o re quire attendance before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein” and “[t]o require attendance out of court . . . before a judge, justice, or other officer authorized to administer oaths or take testimony.” ( Id. , § 1986, subds. (a) & (c).) The Code of Civil Procedure refers to the “use” of a deposition at trial,19 refers to the “deponent” rather than the witness, and, in desc ribing the situations in which the deponent is unable to testify, refers to the deponent’s inability “t o attend or testify,” the inability “to compel the deponent’s a ttendance,” and the inability “to procure the deponent’s attendance.” ( Id. , § 2025.620, subds. (a), (b), (c )(2)(C), (D), & (E).) In sum, the Code of Civil Procedure consistently distinguishes between testimony of a deponent obtained by deposition and testimony by a witne ss at trial, and between attendance at a deposition and attendance at trial. The Attorney General points out that at the hearing on the protective order motion, the trial court, after hearing the A ttorney General’s propos al about identifying witnesses, stated, “[o]kay. So that would take care of live witnesses.” Later at the same hearing, the trial court stated it wanted th e Attorney General onl y “to turn over the answers to interrogatories as to the people he intends to call at trial.” These comments by the trial court support the interpretation of th e protective order as requiring the Attorney General to respond to inte rrogatories only for persons whom the Attorney General anticipated calling to provide live testimony at trial. Even if the protective order could be construed as requiring the Attorney General to provide interrogatory responses for the six USHA customers whose deposition transcripts were used at trial, Sarpas and Fase la can show no prejudice. As the trial court commented, the depositions were properly noticed, and counsel for Defendants could
have attended them and cross- examined the witnesses. Sarpas and Fasela argue their counse l made a calculated decision not to attend the depositions because “each such depo nent was outside of the protective order issued by the Court, rendering any such participation a waste of time.” Sarpas and Fasela cite to nothing in the record to show their counsel tried to clarify the meaning of the protective order or confirm their interpreta tion of it was correct. The argument that participation in the depositions would have been a waste of time is unconvincing. Sarpas and Fasela argue some witnesse s “did little to support [the Attorney General]’s case,”20 and, by participating in th e depositions, their counsel might have uncovered more unfavorable testimony to use in their defens e. To lower costs, counsel could have attended the depositions by telephone. (C ode Civ. Proc., § 2025.310, subd. (a).) Sarpas and Fasela’s reliance on Thoren v. Johnston & Washer (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270 is misplaced, for in that case the plaintiff deliberately excluded the name of a potential witness from interrogatory respons es. The appellate court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discre tion by barring the plaintiff from calling that witness from testifying at trial. ( Id . at p. 275.) The issue in this ca se is the meaning of the protective order, i.e., whether the phrase “individuals Plai ntiff anticipates will be called at trial” includes deponents whose deposition transcripts the Attorney General us ed at trial. The names of all the deponents whose deposition tran scripts were used at trial were disclosed in interrogatory responses a nd by the notices of deposition. Sarpas and Fasela also ar gue the trial court erred by receiving in evidence portions of the deposition transcripts of Lute and Laverty. Lute was not a USHA customer, was not a subject of the special in terrogatories, and, therefore, her testimony was not subject to the protective order. Sarp as and Fasela did not object to Laverty’s deposition transcript and thereby forfeited any challenge to its admission. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Sarpas and Fasela state there was “ne ither legal rhyme nor reason” why the
trial court excluded one of their witnesses on the ground they did not identify the witness in interrogatory responses, yet allowed the Attorney General to use the six deposition transcripts “in violation of both the Discovery Act and the Protective Order.” The only explanation for this result, Sa rpas and Fasela assert, is ju dicial bias. Accusations of judicial bias are serious, and we treat them as such. Our review of th e record leads us to categorically reject these accusations of bias. As we have explained, the trial court did not err by allowing the Attorn ey General to use the depositi on transcripts, one of which was not covered by the protective order, and another of which was used without21 objection. There is not so much as a hint of judicial bias from the trial judge, who presided in a fair and exemplary manner over a difficult case.

III.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Ordering Sarpas and Fasela to Pay Restitution.
A. Introduction Based on findings that Defendants viol ated sections 17200 and 17500, the trial court ordered USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, jointly and severally, “to offer and make restitution to each and every customer, client or person who paid a fee for loan modification services to USHA . . . , during the period beginning January 1, 2008 through and including July 14, 2009 an d who requests restitution in re sponse to the offer.” The
court determined the maximum amount of re stitution to be $2,047,041.86. Of that amount, Fasela was found to be jointly and severally liable for up to $147,869. Sarpas and Fasela challenge the res titution order on two grounds. First, they argue they cannot be or dered to pay restitution because neither of them received funds directly from USHA customers. Sec ond, they argue the evidence was insufficient to establish either actively participated in, or aided and abetted, a scheme to deceive.

B. Restitution Is Not Limited to Di rect Payment from Victims. Relying on Bradstreet v. Wong (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1440 ( Bradstreet ), Sarpas and Fasela argue they cannot be ordere d to pay restitution absent evidence either one received money directly from USHA custom ers. Although the trial court found that USHA received over $2 million from customers, Sarpas and Fasela ar gue neither of them personally received mone y directly, and “[l]egally, under California law, a defendant who has violated the UCL, cannot be made to restor e to a consumer that which he or she never directly received from the consumer.” (Italics a dded.) This argument is legally incorrect.22 In Bradstreet , the California Labor Commissione r filed a complaint against the shareholders, officers, and directors of several garment manufacturing corporations, seeking to hold them personally liable for the corporations’ failure to pay employee wages. ( Bradstreet , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444 .) The complaint alleged the failure to pay wages constitute d violations of the Labor Co de and sought relief from the defendants personally on the ground they came within th e relevant definition of employer. ( Id. at p. 1446.) A private associat ion and two former employees were permitted to file a complaint in intervention alleging viol ations of sec tion 17200 and seeking restitution from the defendants personally. ( Bradstreet , supra , at pp. 1444, 1446.)
The trial court found the common law definition of the word “employer” applied to the Labor Code vi olations alleged, the defend ants were not employers under that definition, and, therefore, the defendan ts were not personally liable for the unpaid wages. ( Bradstreet, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) The court found the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants were th e alter egos of the corporations. ( Ibid. ) On the section 17200 cause of action, the trial court found “an order requiring defendants to pay the wages owed by the . . . Corporations, was not an available remedy in a private action under the UCL, because defendants had not pe rsonally obtained any money or property from the plaintiffs.” ( Id. at p. 1448.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. On the Labor Code violations, the court stated: “The issue is whether defendants, as the shareholders, officers, or managing agents of the . . . Corporations, may be held personally liable for the many violations of
the Labor Code that occurred when these employees were not paid, and the corporations went out of business.” ( Bradstreet , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449.) After addressing relevant authority, the court concluded the common law definition of the word “employer” applied to the Labor Code provisi ons the defendants alle gedly violated and,23 under that definition, only the corporations, not the shareholde rs, officers, and directors, were the employers. ( Id. at p. 1454.)
On the section 17200 viol ations, the Court of App eal stated, “[a]lthough it
is well established that an owner or officer of a corporation may be individually liable under the UCL if he or she actively and di rectly participates in the unfair business practice, it does not necessarily follow that all of the remedi es imposed with respect to the corporation are equally appli cable to the individual.” ( Bradstreet , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.) If the defendants ha d directly and actively participated in an unfair business practice, there would be no di spute that they would be subject to civil penalties in a public action and that unpaid wages could be recovere d as restitution from the corporations. ( Id. at p. 1459.) “The issue in the ca se before us,” the court stated, “is whether these defendants, who were not the employers, and who we re not found to have required any employee to work for them pers onally, or to have misappropriated corporate funds for their own use, may also be requi red to pay the earned but unpaid wages as restitution.” ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal concluded the de fendants could not be held liable for
restitution because the interven ers did not perform labor for them personally: “In the absence of a finding that inte rvener performed labor for de fendants personally, rather than for the benefit of [the] Corporations, or that defendants appr opriated for themselves corporate funds that otherwise would have been used to pay the unpaid wages, we agree
with the trial court’s conclusion that an or der requiring defendants to pay the unpaid wages would not be ‘restitutionary as it woul d not replace any money or property that defendants took directly from’ intervener.” ( Bradstreet , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460.) The court distinguis hed cases cited by the intervener s on the ground that “none addresses the question whether th e corporate officer or owner co uld be directed to return money or property to the plaintiff that the corporation had obtained through an unfair24 practice, but that the individual defe ndant had not personally obtained or misappropriated.” ( Id. at p. 1461.) Here, the parties argue at length over whether Bradstreet is an “employment” case or a UCL case, whether Bradstreet remains good law, whether it was wrongly decided, and whether it is distinguishable. The trial court in this case concluded
Bradstreet “is an employment case based on a narrow employment-law doctrine since abrogated by the California Supreme Court.” Bradstreet is, however, both an “employment” case and a UCL case. Bradstreet addressed two distin ct issues, one being the definition of employer for purposes of the alleged Labor Code violations, and the other being whether the defe ndants could be pers onally liable for restitution under the
UCL. In Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 50, footnote 12, the California Supreme Court abrogated Bradstreet only on its definition of “employer” under the
relevant Labor Code section.
Whether or not Bradstreet is a UCL case or remains good law on the issue of restitution under the UCL ultimately is be side the point. We are not bound by
Bradstreet ( Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1193 [“there is no
horizontal stare decisis in the California Co urt of Appeal”]), and the case does not support Sarpas and Fasela’s position that restitution under the UCL and FAL is available only from those who receive money directly from the victims of the fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair practice. Significant to th e reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Bradstreet was the lack of evidence the defenda nts in that case had misapprop riated corporate funds that
otherwise would have been used to pay wages. ( Bradstreet , supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460.) Under this reasoning , the defendants might have be en held liable for restitution if they had indirectly benefitted from the failure to pay wages. In support of the argument they cannot be liable for restitution, Sarpas and Fasela also rely on th e following passage from Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1149 ( Korea Supply ): “Any award that plaintiff would25 recover from defendants would not be restituti onary as it would not replace any money or property that defendants took directly from plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Several cases explain why Sarpas and Fasela ’s reliance on this passage is misplaced and illustrate how, in particular circumstances, restitution unde r the UCL and FAL is available from those who did not receive money directly from the victims of the fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair practice. We next analyze each of these case s. All of them support restitution to the
victims in this case.
The trial court in Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314-1315, 1340 ( Troyk ), ordered the defendants, an insurance company and its corporate attorney in fact, to pay restitution under the UCL for unlawful service charges paid by the class memb ers to a billing company. On a ppeal, the defendants argued they could not be ordered to pay restitution becaus e the service charges were paid directly to the billing company, not to them. ( Troyk , supra , at p. 1338.) The defendants cited the same passage from Korea Supply , supra , 29 Cal.4th at page 1149 , on which Sarpas and Fasela rely. ( Troyk , supra , at p. 1338.) The Court of Appeal in Troyk rejected the defendants’ interpretation of Korea Supply because “that language was parsed from the facts and analysis in that case, which involved money in which the plaintiff never had a vested interest and for which the plaintiff, in effect, sought disgorgement, rath er than restitution, from the defendant.” ( Troyk , supra , 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.) The Troyk court concluded Korea Supply was inapposite and “does not hold that a plaintiff who pa id a third party money (i.e., money in which the plaintiff had a vested interest) may not seek UCL restitution from a defendant whose unlawful business practice ca used the plaintiff to pay that money.” ( Troyk , supra , at p. 1338.) After reviewing Ca lifornia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, the Troyk court stated: “Accordingly, case law does not support [the defendant]s’ argument that th ey cannot be liable for restitution under the UCL because26 [the billing company], rather th an [the defendants], was the di rect recipient of the service charges.” ( Id. at p. 1340.)

In Shersher v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4t h 1491, 1494-1495, the plaintiff sought restitution under the UC L from defendant Microsoft Corporation for a product he purchased from a retailer. Relying on Korea Supply , the trial court granted Microsoft Corporation’s moti on to strike the prayer for restitution on the ground
restitution under the UCL was limited to di rect purchasers and excluded those who purchased products fr om a retailer. ( Shersher v. Superior Court , supra , at p. 1494.) The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate to overturn that ruling. The Court of Appeal concluded: “[The] respondent court’ s ruling went beyond the holding in Korea Supply , which was that an individual private plaintif f in a tort action may not invoke the court’s equitable power under the UCL to seek the re turn of money or property in which the plaintiff never had an owners hip interest. Nothing in Korea Supply conditions the recovery of restitution on the pl aintiff having made direct paym ents to a defendant who is alleged to have engaged in false advertis ing or unlawful practices under the UCL.” ( Ibid. ) The plaintiffs in Hirsch v. Bank of America (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 708, 712 ( Hirsch ), were property owners who, in the course of completing real estate transactions, deposited money with escrow a nd title companies, which in turn deposited the plaintiffs’ funds in de mand deposit accounts with the defendant banks. Although federal law prohibited the banks from payi ng interest on demand deposit accounts, the banks could reward large depositors throu gh other lawful means, including “earning credits” or the purchase of “mont hly revolving credit facilities.” ( Id. at pp. 713-715.) The plaintiffs alleged those forms of reward were disguised interest payments and should have been paid to the plain tiffs rather than to the es crow and title companies. ( Id. at pp. 714-715.) In addition, th e banks charged the escrow a nd title companies a variety of fees to service the demand deposit account s, and those fees were “passed on to27 consumers as higher fees for separate servic es or higher fees for escrow services generally.” ( Id. at p. 721.) The Court of Appeal held the plaintiffs could not recover the “interest” payments as restitution because they would no t have been entitled to interest in the first place. ( Hirsch , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 712, 717-7 18, 721.) But, the court held, the plaintiffs had “stated a valid cause of action for unjust enrichment based on [the] Banks’ unjustified charging an d retention of excessive f ees which the title companies passed through to them. [The] Banks receiv ed a financial advantage—excessive fees charged to the title companies— which they unjustly retained at the expense of [the plaintiffs], who absorbed the over age. To confer a benefit, it is not essential that money be paid directly to the r ecipient by the party seeking re stitution. [Citation.]” ( Id. at p. 722.) The plaintiffs were entitled to relie f under the traditional equitable principles of unjust enrichment, “upon a determination that under the circumstances and as between the two individuals, it is unjust for the pers on receiving the benefit to retain it. [Citations.]” ( Ibid. ) Thus, “it is not essential that money be paid directly to [Defendants] by the party seeking restitution.” ( Hirsch , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 7 22.) Sarpas and Fasela received money indirectly fro m customers by having them pay USHA. The customers parted with property in which they had an ownership interest and are entitled to its return. The rule urged by Sarpas a nd Fasela would allow UCL a nd FAL violators to escape restitution by structuring their schemes to avoid receiving direct payment from their
victims. Sarpas and Fasela argue that, if Sarpas can be ordered to pay restitution, his
share of restitution must be limited to th e net profits he received from USHA. We disagree. “Where restitution is ordered as a means of redressing a statutory violation, the courts are not concerned with restoring the violator to the status quo ante. The focus instead is on the victim. ‘The status quo ante to be achieved by the restitution order was28 to again place the victim in possession of that money.’ [Citation.] ‘The object of [statutory] restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in
which he or she has an owners hip interest.’ [Citation.]” ( Kennedy , supra , 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134-135.) The evidence was suffi cient to support findings that Sarpas violated the UCL and FAL, and, as a result, customers were fraudulently induced to make payments to USHA, which was owned by Sa rpas and Nazarzai, for loan modification services they never received. As a remedy for those violations, Sarpas must restore money wrongfully taken from USHA customers to restore them to the status quo ante. In distinguishing Bradstreet , the trial court found that Sarpas and Nazarzai “drained substantial amounts of money from the corporation” and there was no evidence that either of them put fund s into the corporation. Sarp as and Fasela do not challenge those findings. Based on those findings and the evidence presen ted at trial, the trial court could exercise its equitable discretion to conc lude USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai acted as a single enterprise for the purpose of ordering restitution under the UCL and the FAL. ( Troyk , supra , 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1340, 1343.)

C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Establis h Sarpas and Fasela Violated the UCL and FAL. Sarpas and Fasela argue the evidence was insufficient to establish either one actively participated in, or aided and abetted, a scheme to deceive in violation of section 17200 or 17500. Liability under the UCL and FAL must be based on the defendant’s participation in or control over the unlawful practices found to violate section 17200 or 17500. ( Emery v. Visa Internat. Service Assn. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 952, 960.) Although a UCL claim cannot be predicated on vicarious liability ( Emery v.
Visa Internat. Service Assn. , supra , at p. 960), liability unde r the UCL may be imposed against those who aid a nd abet the violation ( Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 88, 93). Liability may be impos ed if the defendant “‘“knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach . . . and gives subs tantial assistance or encouragement to the29 other to so act.”’” ( Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. , supra , at p. 93; see People v. Toomey , supra , 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 15 [“if the evidence establishes defendant’s participation in the unlawful practices, either di rectly or by aiding and ab etting the principal, liability
under sections 17200 and 17500 can be imposed”].) Sarpas and Fasela argue the evidence at trial showed only that Sarpas was an owner and manager of SFGI and USHA and failed to show “any active involvement or participation on his part whatsoever.” The tr ial court found otherwise: “The evidence at trial established that Sarpas and Nazarzai were each active pa rticipants in the day-to-day operations of USHA, managed the business, jointly owned USHA, and split the profits from USHA. They are thus directly liable fo r the actions of the company and liable for their failure to present the de ceptive, illegal, and unfair acts of their agents, independent contractors, and employees. Substantial ev idence also established that Sarpas and Nazarzai aided and abetted each other, [Fas ela], and other empl oyees, independent contractors, and agents of USHA in th e violation of the UCL and the FAL.” Sarpas testified at his deposition, por tions of which were read into the record at trial, he formed SF GI in 2005, was a 50 percent ow ner of SFGI, and, starting in 2005, served as its operations manager. In that capacity, he ran and “oversaw” the company’s day-to-day operations. When, in 2008, SFGI started the loan modification business through USHA, Sarpas was “there pre tty much every day,” kept track of what was going on, and conti nued to manage the company. Sarpas and Nazarzai split the profits from SFGI. Nazarzai testified at his de position that “[Sarpas] was in charge of every particular department like some of th e processing department managers and things
like that.” This evidence supported the trial c ourt’s findings and is sufficient to impose liability against Sarpas under the UCL and FAL. An analogous case is People v. First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104 Ca l.App.4th 721 ( First Federal ). There, one of the defendants, Ida Lee Hansen, argued the finding she violated s ection 17500 was not30 supported by substantial eviden ce as her role was merely as a notary, office manager, and receptionist for the defendant company. ( First Federal , supra , at pp. 734-735.) The Court of Appeal rejected that argument b ecause the evidence show ed that Hansen was one of the two principals of the company, in a position of control over daily operations, and aware of the company’s unlawful practices. ( Ibid. ) “In view of Hansen’s position as one of the two principals of First Federal, she was in a pos ition of control, yet permitted the unlawful practices to continue despite her knowledge thereof.” ( Ibid. ) Sarpas, like Hansen in First Federal , tries to downplay his role in the unlawful practices. But Sarpas formed SFGI, was one of the two principals of SFGI, split its profits with Nazarzai, and, as operations manager, was in a position of control over its daily operations. Sarpas was in a position of control and permitted the known unlawful practices to continue. Sarpas and Fasela argue that, w ith the exception of three potential violations, liability against Fasela was predic ated entirely on vicarious liability. Sarpas and Fasela argue no evidence was presented to show Fasela participated in or aided and abetted UCL violations by others.
The trial court found: “The evidence at the trial es tablished that [Fasela] was an active participant in the violations of the UCL and FAL. She was the office manager and sales manager and held a number of other roles at the company. She had been a key player in USHA’s loan modification business from its inception, and in fact suggested that USHA cease work ing with the Firm and offe r its own loan modification services. She also came up with the decep tive assertion that USHA had a ‘97% success
rate’ in its loan modification business. S ubstantial evidence established that she aided and abetted Sarpas, Nazarzai, and other employe es, independent contractors, and agents
of USHA in the violation of the UCL and the FAL.” Substantial evidence supported the tr ial court’s findings, and they are sufficient to impose liability against Fasela unde r the UCL and FAL. Fasela testified at31 her deposition (portions of which were read in to evidence at trial ), she suggested USHA go into the loan modification business, was present when USHA wa s created, and, among other things, served as its o ffice manager. As the sales fl oor manager, Fasela monitored the sales force, and made sure the sales re presentatives “followed policy and procedure,” called leads, and met their quotas, answer ed customers’ questions, and handled customers’ complaints. Fasela also received leads and made sales calls herself. She communicated between the processing department and the sales force because she understood how both sides opera ted. Fasela oftentimes ra n the company meetings held every Wednesday and distributed the scripts for sales representatives to use. Fasela was a compliance officer for USHA and in that capacity had to a pprove new customers. She closed completed files, mainta ined records of loans modifi ed according to her definition of modification, and came up with the 97 pe rcent success figure used in USHA marketing and promotion. 7

When asked to describe her role at USHA, Fasela testified at her deposition (read into evidence at trial): “I was administration. I was helping the processing team. I was . . . helping with the sales floor, managing. I helped with the re ceptionist. I’d help with gathering payroll for agents. I was help ing with complaints if they came in.” Sarpas and Fasela argue that Fasela , at most, can be held liable for
restitution “to the 3 consumers who testified as to potential violations committed by her.” This argument ignores Fasela’s role in par ticipating in, and aiding and abetting, Sarpas, Nazarzai, and USHA in their overall scheme, which harmed hundreds of people. As compensation for participating in, and aidi ng and abetting, the sc heme constituting the UCL and FAL violations, Fase la received $147,869 from US HA. Although Fasela did

7 Fasela claimed that loan modifications, un der her definition of the term, were in fact completed by USHA; however, the trial court found not credible her “denials, explanations, assertions regard ing purported statements made to and benefits purportedly provided to USHA’s customers, a nd similar self-serving testimony.”32 not receive funds directly from USHA cust omers, she did rece ive compensation from
USHA’s income from victims of the scheme in which Fasela participated. Thus, Fasela received $147,869 from USHA custom ers, and is responsible, jointly and severally with USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, for re stitution up to that amount.

IV. The Award of Civil Penalties Imposed Against Sarpas Was Supported by the Law an d the Evidence; the Amount

of Civil Penalties Against Fa sela Must Be Recalculated.
A. Background and Relevant Law
Pursuant to sections 17206 and 17536, the tr ial court imposed civil penalties against USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,047,041, and imposed additional civil penalties against Fasela, USHA, Sarpas, and Nazarzai, jointly and severally, in the amount of $360,540. In setting the amount of civil penalties, the court considered (1) the purpose of civil penalties to punish and deter; (2) Defendants’ targeting of the elderly and the disabled; (3) the “enormous” number of UCL and FAL violations committed by Defenda nts; and (4) evidence establishing there were 1,259 “payors” checks depo sited into USHA accounts. Section 17206, subdivision (a) states in part that “[a]ny person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation.” Section 17536, subdivision (a) stat es in part that “[a]ny person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be liable for a civil pena lty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each viola tion.” UCL penalties ma y be increased by up to $2,500 per violation if the victim is el derly or disabled. (§ 17206.1.) Under both section 17206, subdivision (b) and secti on 17536, subdivision (b), the court should consider, in assessing the amount of civil pe nalties, one or more of the following: “the33 nature and seriousness of the mi sconduct, the number of viola tions, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” For the purpose of calculati ng civil penalties, what constitutes a violation of the UCL or the FAL depends on the circumst ances of the case, including the type of violations, the number of victims, and the repetition of the co nduct constituting the violation. ( People v. JTH Tax, Inc. , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251; Kennedy , supra , 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) We review the trial court’s imposition of civil penalties
under the UCL and FAL under the a buse of discretion standard. ( People v. JTH Tax,

Inc. , supra , at p. 1250.)

B. The Evidence Supported Impo sition of Civil Penalties. Sarpas and Fasela challenge the im position of civil penalties on the same grounds on which they challe nge restitution: They conte nd the evidence showed they violated the UCL or FAL at most only three tim es and there was no ev idence that either of them was an active particip ant in or aided and abetted a ny violations by others. We rejected those contentions when addressing res titution, and we reject them again now. As we have emphasized, individualized proof of each and every UCL a nd FAL violation is not required; from the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could draw the reasonable inference Sarpas and Fasela co mmitted hundreds, if no t thousands, of UCL
and FAL violations. In this regard, the trial court found: “Defendants made false and misleading statements to each and every consumer who ente red into a contract with Defendants. Further, Defendants used deceptiv e telemarketing scripts and other false and misleading marketing materials, and theref ore civil penalties are appropriate for each consumer who spoke with a USHA repres entative and/or received USHA marketing materials, even if they never became a client of USHA.” Sarpas and Fasela argue the amount of civil penalties is excessive in light of their respective financial situations. A court should consider a defendant’s assets,34 liabilities, and net worth in calculating the amount of ci vil penalties. (§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b).) But, “evidence of a de fendant’s financial condition, although relevant, is not essential to the im position of the statutory penalties, making the issue of a defendant’s financial inability a matte r for the defendant to raise in mitigation.” ( First Federal , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) Sarpas did not testify at trial. Fasela testified some about her financial situation, but she presented no documentary evidence in support, and the trial court found her testim ony on the subject was not credible. As to Sarpas, all the civil penalties are affirmed.
C. Amount of Civil Penalties Against Fasela Fasela alone argues there was no lega l basis for imposition of $360,540 in civil penalties against her. Sarpas does not make this argument. The only explanation for that amount, she claims, is “[t]he Tria l court found Fasela complicit in defendant
Nazarzai’s failure to turn over $360,540 to the Receiver.” The Attorney General does not address this argument. The trial court offe red no explanation or computation for coming up with $360,540, despite reque sts from Fasela to make factual findings. We agree the amount of civil penalties imposed against Fasela does not appear to be tethered to
sections 17206 and 17536. She is, however, subject to civil penalties. We therefore will strike the civil penalties awarded against Fa sela only and remand w ith directions to recalculate the amount of civil penaltie s under sections 1720 6 and 17536.

V. Sarpas and Fasela Were Not Denied Their Due Process Rights to Confront and Cross-examine Witnesses. Sarpas and Fasela contend the impos ition of civil penalties and restitution in the amounts set forth in the judgment violat ed their due process rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to receive notic e of the charges agai nst them. In civil actions, the right to confront and cross-ex amine witnesses is f ound in the due process35 clause rather than the confrontation clause. 8 ( People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 214;
In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383, fn. 16.) Sa rpas and Fasela were not denied the right to confront and cro ss-examine witnesses. They appeared at trial with counsel and cross-examined witnesses. They were pr ovided lawful notice of the depositions, but
chose not to attend them and cross-examine the deponents, either in person or by telephone. They were provided the names of hundreds of USHA customers, yet chose not to call any of them to testify at trial. Sarpas and Fasela contend their due process rights were violated because they were ordered to pay restitution to and civil penalties for hundreds of USHA customers who did not testify at trial. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses applies only to “‘witnesses’” who “‘bear testimony.’” ( Crawford v. Washington , supra , 541 U.S. at p. 51; see Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 823.) The USHA customers who did not testify were not witnesses bearing te stimony. Restitution was not dependent on their testimony b ecause, as we have emphasi zed, the UCL and FAL permit
restitution without individua lized proof of harm (e.g., People v. JTH Tax, Inc. , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; Fremont Life , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 532), and the testimony and evidence presented at trial was su fficient to draw an inference of classwide deception and injury. Sarpas and Fasela rely on Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 to support their claim of a due process violation. In that case, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the narrow issue whether the due process clause required an evidentiary hearing before a state terminates a recipient’s welfare benefits. ( Id. at p. 260.) The court
held that before welfare benefits can be te rminated, “a recipient ha ve timely and adequate

8 The confrontation clauses in the federal and state Constitutions are limited to criminal prosecutions and do not apply in civil proceedings. ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 42; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860-861; People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221.)36 notice detailing the reasons for a proposed term ination, and an eff ective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witne sses and by presenting hi s own arguments and evidence orally.” ( Id. at pp. 267-268.) Goldberg v. Kelly is inapplicable to this ca se, except for the broad and indisputable proposition that in governme nt enforcement actions a person has a due process right to notice, and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence and argument. ( Goldberg v. Kelly , supra , 397 U.S. at p. 270 [“‘where governmental action seriously injures an indi vidual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show th at it is untrue’”].) Sarpas and Fasela were not denied th ose rights. Their claim they did not receive adequate notice of the charge s against them borders on the absurd. 9 The Attorney General filed a lengthy complaint apprising De fendants of the charges and of the fact the Attorney General was seeking injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties. Attached to the complaint were decl arations from 19 USHA customer s. Sarpas and Fasela received lengthy interrogatory re sponses and were given the na mes of hundreds of USHA customers. The Attorney General disclosed the names of 16 potential trial witnesses, of whom five were called to testify at trial. Properly noticed depositi ons were taken, but Sarpas and Fasela chose not to participate in them. Nothi ng prevented Sarpas and Fasela from conducting their own investigation, interv iewing witnesses, ta king depositions, and calling witnesses to testify at trial. “In light of the foregoing we are satisfied that the UCL as applied to this case did not violat e the federal procedural due process notice requirement.” ( Fremont Life , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.)

9 Sarpas and Fasela make the exaggerated and patently incredib le claim that they “walked into trial on the first day without any inkling of what they were alleged to have done, to whom, when, and what.”37 Sarpas and Fasela also contend the judgment violates their due process rights because it allows the Attorney General to pay claimants “at its own discretion” and “affords no requirement that the claimant present its evidence before a Constitutional tribunal and no opportunity for Appellants to c onfront and cross-examine that claimant in a judicial or judicially supervised manner.” The judgment delega tes to the Attorney General’s Office the authority to administer and oversee the restitution process and provides: “[The Attorney General] is authorized to take any reasonable measure to insure the payment of restitution, in cluding, without limit ation: (1) hiring a third party administrator for the restitution process; (2) writing letters, e-mails, and telephone scripting to be used in cont acting the Eligible Consumers; (3) sending correspondence to the Eligible Consumers; (4) calling the Eligible Consumers; and (5) sending payment to the Eligible Consumers.” Sarpas and Fasela filed objections to the proposed statement of decision and the proposed judgment. Although they objected that the amount of restitution ordered in the judgment was improper and with out factual support, th ey did not object to the portion of the judgment addressing the Atto rney General’s authority to administer the restitution process. Accordingly, the objection has been forfeited.

VI.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Receiving in Evidence Checks Deposited into USHA’s Bank Account.
A. Introduction
The trial court received in evidence th e Attorney General’ s exhibit No. 1,
which consisted of the front and back sides of over 1,900 checks deposited into a USHA
account at Bank of America. The court rece ived the exhibit in evidence for the limited purpose of establishing “Ban k of America deposited into the account of the payee
defendant in this action the amount of m oney that appears on the face amount of the38 check based on his testimony of their busine ss practice with respect to how they handle
the checks.” The court stated it was not receiving exhibit No. 1 under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Elizabeth Mason, an associate govern mental program analyst employed by the Attorney General’s Office , testified she conducted a re view of exhibit No. 1 and, from the information contained in it, cr eated a spreadsheet showing a total of $2,224,113.86 was deposited into USHA’s Bank of America account and USHA had 1,259 customers.

B. The Checks Were Authenticated. Sarpas and Fasela argue the trial cour t erred by receiving exhibit No. 1 in
evidence because the ch ecks were hearsay and did not fa ll within the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the grou nd on which they objected at trial. The Attorney General does not cont end the checks comprising exhibit
No. 1 were Bank of America business records. Instead, the Attorn ey General argues the
checks were authenticat ed for the purpose for which the court admitted exhibit No. 1. We agree. “Authentication of a writing is requi red before it may be received in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a); see Continental Baki ng Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 525 [“Generally sp eaking, documents must be au thenticated in some fashion before they are admissible in evidence”].) “Authentication of a writing means (a) the
introduction of evidence suffici ent to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishmen t of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400 .) “As long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissibl e. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s we ight as evidence, not its admissibility.” ( Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321.)39 The Attorney General au thenticated the checks with testimony from a representative of Bank of America about ho w the checks were processed and the bank’s custom and practice in accepting and negotiating the checks. The trial court accepted this testimony as sufficient to authenticate the ch ecks for the purpose fo r which they were received in evidence. Sarpas and Fa sela do not challenge this testimony.
C. The Checks Were Used for the Proper Purpose. Sarpas and Fasela argue exhibit No. 1 was used for a purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was received; th at is, showing that Bank of America deposited into USHA’s account the sums appear ing on the faces of the checks. Sarpas and Fasela argue the tr ial court improperly used exhibit No. 1 in arriving at the total number of USHA customers, the total am ount received from USHA customers, the amount of restitution, and the amount of civil penalties. Th ey argue, “[a]ll the Trial Court knew was that Bank of America proce ssed a number of checks: not the payor of the check, whether th e payor was a customer; whether the payor was a victim, nor anything of relevance to the action.” The trial court could prope rly infer, from the totality of evidence presented at trial, the checks comprisi ng exhibit No. 1 were payments from USHA customers, and the total amount received by USHA from those customers was $2,224,113.86. In considering Sarpas and Fasela’s objection to exhibit No. 1, the trial court stated: “[I]f [the Attorney General] establish[es] throu gh the[] evidence this business model of how your clients’ company operated and allege dly defrauded 2 million plus dollars from people in a mortgage modification scam, if they establish that this was—how their business model worked, I, as the factfinder, can say I find it to be more likely to be true and not true that these people gave them this money to get lo an modification se rvices. [¶] Now, I don’t know what the evidence will be . But I’ve got a sneaking suspicion a big part of it’s going to be the only thing they provided as a service to people was loan modification services and maybe A, B or C. If that’s the only bu siness they’re in and40 they’re getting checks from people , a natural inference to be dr awn from those facts is . . . they were conducting business; these people we re trying to retain their services.” As the trial court suspecte d, the evidence at trial established that, during the relevant time frame: (1) USHA’ s business was primarily, if not exclusively, providing supposed loan modification services; (2) customers retained US HA to provide those services; (3) customers paid USHA by check for those services; and (4) $2,224,113.86 in checks were deposited in USHA’s Bank of America account. Sarpas and Fasela presented no evidence to show that any of USHA’s income —i.e., the deposits made into
the Bank of America accoun t—came from a source other th an the loan modification business. From the evidence, the trial court could draw the reasonable inference, which it expressed in the statement of decision, that “[a]s a result of [Def endants’] deceptive and misleading practices, USHA procured over $2 million in up-front payments from consumers.” It was equally r easonable for the trial court to set the maximum amount of restitution at $2,047,041.86. It could be true, as Sarpas and Fasela assert, that many of the payors on the checks were not victims, but those payors will not be able to obtain restitution, and Sarpas and Fa sela’s potential liability will be reduced correspondingly. (See Kraus v. Trinity Man agement Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 11 6, 137 [fluid fund recovery not permitted in UCL actions].)
Mason testified USHA had 1,259 different customers. Sarpas and Fasela objected to Mason’s worksheets (exhibit No. 558), but did not object to or move to strike Mason’s testimony of the number of USHA cust omers. Responding to the objection to that exhibit, the trial court stated: “[T]his is the backup for the grand total numbers as described, which have been testified to. So that testimony’s in evid ence as to what the
numbers are.” Based on Mas on’s testimony of the number of USHA’s customers, to which Sarpas and Fasela posed no objection, the trial court properly calculated the amount of civil penalties.41 D ISPOSITION The civil penalties in the amount of $360 ,540 as to Fasela, and Fasela only, are stricken, and the matter is remanded to the tr ial court with directions to recalculate the amount of civil penalties for which she may be lia ble. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.Filed 5/6/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. HAKIMULLAH SARPAS et al., Defendants and Appellants. G047462
(Super. Ct . No. 30-2009-00125950)
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

Housing and Economic Advocates, Nati onal Housing Law Project, the East Bay Community Law Center, and the Public G ood Law Center have requested that our opinion, filed April 24, 2014, be certified for publication. It appears that our opinion
meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, ru le 8.1105(c). The request is GRANTED. The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports.2 FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.