SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

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KA 06-03433 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, FAHEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHAWN HUNTER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (MATTHEW J. CLARK OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NICOLE M. FANTIGROSSI

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County

(Francis A. Affronti, J.), rendered July 18, 2006. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a

controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a

controlled substance in the third degree. The judgment was affirmed

by order of this Court entered February 11, 2010 in a memorandum

decision (70 AD3d 1343), and defendant on July 15, 2010 was granted

leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order of this Court

(15 NY3d 774), and the Court of Appeals on June 2, 2011 reversed the

order and remitted the case to this Court for consideration of issues

raised but not determined on the appeal to this Court (17 NY3d 725).

Now, upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals and having

considered the issues raised but not determined on the appeal to this

Court,

It is hereby ORDERED that, upon remittitur from the Court of

Appeals, the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the

law, the plea is vacated, that part of defendant’s omnibus motion

seeking to suppress evidence seized by the police from the apartment

in which defendant was arrested is granted, and the matter is remitted

to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings on the

indictment. 

Memorandum: In a prior appeal, we affirmed the judgment

convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of criminal sale of a

controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]) and

criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§

220.16 [1]) on the ground that Supreme Court properly refused to

suppress the evidence seized from the apartment where he was arrested

(People v Hunter, 70 AD3d 1343). Defendant had contended that the

court erred in relying upon the doctrines of hot pursuit and exigent
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circumstances in refusing to suppress the evidence, but we concluded

that defendant “failed to establish that he had standing to challenge

the search of the apartment in which he was arrested, and thus Supreme

Court properly refused to suppress the evidence seized therefrom,”

i.e., the buy money seized from defendant’s person in the apartment

(id. at 1344). In reversing our order and remitting the matter to

this Court to consider defendant’s contentions raised but not

addressed by us, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the People are

required to alert the suppression court if they believe that the

defendant has failed to meet his burden to establish standing”

(Hunter, 17 NY3d 725, 727-728). 

Upon remittitur, we agree with defendant that the court erred in

refusing to suppress evidence seized by the police as a result of

their entry into the apartment. The record of the suppression hearing

establishes that an undercover officer purchased narcotics from

defendant in front of a small apartment building in the City of

Rochester. As the officer left that location, he signaled to a second

officer who was nearby that the sale had been completed, and he

provided the second officer with a description of the seller. Upon

driving past the location where the sale took place, the second

officer observed defendant, who matched the description of the seller

provided by the undercover officer. The second officer then sent a

radio broadcast of defendant’s description and location to other

officers. As those officers left their vehicle, defendant ran into

the building, where the pursuing officers lost sight of him. The

officers then set up a perimeter and began searching the interior of

the building for defendant after the perimeter officers failed to

indicate that he had exited the building. The officers were unable to

find defendant upon a search of all but one of the apartments in the

building, and they concluded that he must be in that apartment, i.e.,

apartment #2. They consulted the officer in charge, who authorized an

entry into that apartment. Approximately 25 minutes after the sale,

the officers forcibly entered and found defendant in the bathroom of

that apartment. The buy money was recovered from defendant after he

was placed in custody. 

The warrantless intrusion into defendant’s apartment was

presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional unless it was

justified by one of the “ ‘carefully delineated’ exceptions to the

Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause” (People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328, 331;

see generally People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-179, cert denied 426

US 953). At the suppression hearing, the prosecution contended that

defendant’s mother, the tenant of the apartment, consented to the

police entry, and that the entry was justified pursuant to the

doctrines of hot pursuit and exigent circumstances. The People failed

to address in their brief on appeal any issues with respect to the

mother’s purported consent, and thus they are deemed to have abandoned

any contentions with respect thereto (see generally People v Butler, 2

AD3d 1457, 1458, lv denied 3 NY3d 637). We agree with defendant that

the doctrines of hot pursuit and exigent circumstances do not justify

the warrantless entry into the apartment.

Under the doctrine of hot pursuit, “a suspect may not defeat an
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arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is

therefore proper under [United States v Watson, 423 US 411, reh denied

424 US 979], by the expedient of escaping to a private place” (United

States v Santana, 427 US 38, 43; see People v Levan, 62 NY2d 139,

145). “On the facts of this case, however, the claim of hot pursuit

is unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit

of [defendant] from the scene of a crime” (Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US

740, 753). To the contrary, the police did not know in which

apartment, if any, defendant was located, and they forcibly entered

apartment #2 as a last resort in an attempt to locate him. “There was

certainly no evidence that the police were in hot pursuit of a fleeing

felon” (People v Ramos, 206 AD2d 260, 261; cf. People v Johnson, 193

AD2d 35, 36, affd 83 NY2d 831; People v Thomas, 164 AD2d 874, lv

denied 77 NY2d 883).

“In determining whether exigent circumstances are present, both

the federal and state courts have applied a number of different

factors. These factors include ‘(1) the gravity or violent nature of

the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the

suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of

probable cause . . . to believe that the suspect committed the crime;

(4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being

entered; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly

apprehended; and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry’ ”

(People v McBride, 14 NY3d 440, 446, cert denied ___ US ___, 131 S Ct

327). Furthermore, “the ultimate inquiry a suppression court must

make is ‘whether in light of all the facts of the particular case

there was an urgent need that justifies a warrantless entry’ ” (id.). 

Applying those factors to this case, we conclude that there was no

such urgent need.

Although there was strong probable cause to believe that

defendant committed the serious crime of criminal sale of a controlled

substance in the third degree, all of the other factors lead to the

conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances. No evidence was

introduced at the hearing tending to establish that defendant had

acted violently in this case, or that he had a history of violence. 

At least one of the perimeter officers did not take his position,

which was behind the building, until after defendant entered the

building, and thus there was no strong likelihood that he was still

inside the building when the police entered the apartment. 

Conversely, the perimeter was fully established when the police

entered the apartment, and thus there was virtually no chance that he

would escape after that time. Further, the entry was not peaceful,

and there was no evidence indicating that defendant was armed. 

Finally, “there was no testimony indicating that it would have been

especially burdensome for the officers to have obtained a warrant

before effecting the arrest on this weekday afternoon” (Ramos, 206

AD2d at 261-262).

Consequently, we conclude that the warrantless entry into the

apartment was not justified by any exception, and thus the court erred

in refusing to suppress the buy money. We therefore reverse the

judgment, vacate the plea, grant the motion, and remit the matter to 
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Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment. 

Entered: February 17, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court