FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 2, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 09-6069

DENNIS EMERSON GONZALEZ,

 Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 5:CR-04-00179-R-1/5:CV-08-01182-R)

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,

for Defendant-Appellant.

Leslie M. Maye, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, Acting

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, SEYMOUR, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Dennis Gonzalez, currently serving a thirty-year sentence in

connection with multiple drug-trafficking convictions arising out of his role in an

Oklahoma City-based methamphetamine distribution operation, appeals from the

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district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm

the judgment of the district court and deny Gonzalez’s request for a certificate of

appealability on additional issues.

I

Factual and procedural history

The underlying factual and procedural history of Gonzalez’s case was

outlined by this court on direct appeal:

 After his arrest in the summer of 2003, Jason “Joker” Lujan

cooperated with an Oklahoma City Police Department narcotics

investigation. Mr. Lujan told the police that, beginning in early

2002, several members of a Hispanic gang from California, later

identified as the Compton Varrio Tortilla Flats, moved to Oklahoma

City to set up a methamphetamine-dealing operation. Mr. Lujan

explained to the police that the members of the group included

“Boxer,” one of his confederates later identified as Mr. Gonzalez,

who ran the operation from Florida; “Lalo,” later identified as

Eduardo Verduzco, who delivered the drugs to Oklahoma City at Mr.

Gonzalez’s direction; and Jennifer Lujan, his sister-in-law, who

distributed the methamphetamine in Oklahoma City with the

assistance of Mr. Gonzalez’s girlfriend “Mousey,” later identified as

Maria Ginez. With Mr. Lujan’s assistance, the police eventually

seized over 2,800 grams of methamphetamine from participants in

the drug ring and obtained indictments against twelve participants,

including Mr. Gonzalez. Most of the defendants pled guilty and

cooperated with the government. Along with two associates, Mr.

Gonzalez–accused of being the group’s ringleader–pled not guilty

and proceeded to trial.

 In his opening statement before the jury, counsel for Mr.

Gonzalez, Charles Kilgore, denied Mr. Gonzalez’s involvement in

“any kind of drug conspiracy.” Tr. of Opening Stmt. at 27. The

government, however, proceeded to present substantial evidence of

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Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt from more than a dozen cooperating witnesses,

as well as 16 law enforcement officers, agents, and employees. The

evidence at trial adduced that Mr. Gonzalez left Oklahoma for

Florida in February 2003, after one of the members of the drug

organization was arrested. According to testimony presented, Mr.

Gonzalez continued to direct from Florida the

California-to-Oklahoma drug operation, and, after his move,

proceeds of various drug transactions were wired to Florida.

 Responding to the proof presented by the government, Mr.

Kilgore took a different tack in closing, admitting Mr. Gonzalez’s

involvement in the drug conspiracy but seeking to diminish it by

suggesting that he participated only until February 2003, when he

moved to Florida, and that Mr. Verduzco was the true ringleader. 

Thus, for example, Mr. Kilgore told the jury that “I’m not going to

ask you to find [Mr. Gonzalez] not guilty on all of those counts,

because if I did, I think you’d probably tune me out from the very

beginning and just go somewhere else.” Tr. of Closing Arg. (vol. 4)

at 30-31. Likewise, Mr. Kilgore stated that Mr. Gonzalez’s

“involvement stopped in February of 2003,” id. at 34, and that Mr.

Gonzales [sic] was “a lieutenant . . . working for Lalo,” id. at 35. 

And when discussing the particular counts charged, Mr. Kilgore

submitted, for example, that “now, Count 1 is the conspiracy . . . . 

We’ll submit . . . . Dennis [Gonzalez] was involved . . . . He wasn’t

the head, but he was involved. But I will argue that he was only

involved . . . until he took off to Florida.” Id. at 67.

 After Mr. Kilgore’s closing argument, the district court asked Mr.

Kilgore if it should issue a conspiracy-withdrawal instruction to the

jury. Id. at 75; see Docket Entry No. 382 (instruction titled

“AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM A

CONSPIRACY”). The government agreed with the district court that

such an instruction was appropriate. After reviewing the proposed

instruction overnight, however, Mr. Kilgore declined the instruction,

and the government did not request it. Tr. of Closing Arg. (vol. 4) at

106. The district court then generally instructed the jury, including

an instruction indicating the vicarious liability of co-conspirators for

the actions of others in the drug ring. See Docket Entry No. 382

(instruction titled “VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF

CO-CONSPIRATORS”). Though there is no mention of it in the

record before us, the parties’ briefs represent that the district court

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also sought and held additional meetings in chambers to discuss

questions submitted by the jury. Apparently, either during or shortly

after one of these conferences, the district court made some type of

inquiry to Mr. Kilgore regarding whether his client had agreed to his

change in tactics and concession of guilt. No transcript of the

meeting seems to exist but the government represents that Mr.

Kilgore said he altered his trial tactics with Mr. Gonzalez’s

permission. Mr. Gonzalez stresses that there is no indication in the

record to confirm the accuracy of this representation and denies that

he was ever informed of the pertinent chambers meeting or that he

waived his right to be present during this proceeding.

 Ultimately, [on July 25, 2005,] the jury found Mr. Gonzalez

guilty of 63 of the 65 counts with which he was charged and, by

means of a special verdict form, indicated that Mr. Gonzalez’s

conspiracy involved more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. See

Docket Entry No. 385.

 At sentencing [on November 21, 2005], the district court began

its analysis with the advisory Guidelines’ suggested sentencing range

of ten years to life in prison and then proceeded to review the various

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the ultimate upshot: Mr.

Gonzalez was sentenced to 30 years on each of 12 separate counts; 5

years each on 2 separate counts; 20 years each on 48 separate counts;

and 30 years on a single remaining count at issue in this appeal. The

district court indicated that its sentences would run concurrently, for

a total of 30 years’ imprisonment.

United States v. Gonzalez, 238 F. App’x 350, 351-53 (10th Cir. 2007) (footnotes

omitted).

Gonzalez’s direct appeal

Gonzalez filed a direct appeal asserting two claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel, as well as a separate claim that his sentence on Count 29, for

conspiracy to commit money laundering, was in violation of law. This court, in

an unpublished order and judgment issued on June 25, 2007, deferred the

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ineffective assistance claims to collateral proceedings, found merit to Gonzalez’s

sentencing challenge, and remanded for resentencing. On August 6, 2007, the

district court, in accordance with this court’s mandate, issued an order amending

the judgment to reflect a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment on Count 29, to

run concurrently with the sentences imposed on the other counts of conviction.

Gonzalez’s § 2255 motion

On August 31, 2007, Gonzalez filed a pro se motion asking that counsel be

appointed “to represent him in connection with the filing of a motion pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 336. The district court granted Gonzalez’s

motion on September 11, 2007. 

On November 4, 2008, Gonzalez, through appointed counsel, filed a § 2255

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. Gonzalez’s motion asserted five

grounds for relief: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and call two witnesses, Marlene Gonzalez and Eduardo Verduzco, to

support the theory of defense at trial, i.e., that Gonzalez withdrew from the

charged conspiracy in February 2003 when he moved to Florida; (2) that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to accept the trial court’s proposed jury

instruction on the defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy; (3) that his trial

counsel’s closing argument concession that Gonzalez was guilty of conspiracy

caused a breakdown in the adversarial process and violated Gonzalez’s

constitutional rights; (4) that Gonzalez’s absence from an in-chambers conference

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during which counsel and the trial court discussed whether Gonzalez consented to

his trial counsel’s concession of partial guilt to the conspiracy charge violated his

right to be present under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and

the Due Process Clause; and (5) cumulative error.

The district court, after allowing the parties to fully brief the issues raised

by Gonzalez, issued an order on February 25, 2009, denying Gonzalez’s motion in

its entirety. Final judgment was entered that same day. 

Gonzalez filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 2009. On March 30, 2009,

Gonzalez filed a request for a certificate of appealability (COA) on the five

substantive issues asserted in his § 2255 motion, as well as a sixth issue of

whether the district court erred in denying his § 2255 motion without first

conducting an evidentiary hearing. On April 2, 2009, the district court issued an

order granting Gonzalez a COA with respect to the second and third substantive

issues asserted in his § 2255 motion, and denying his request for COA on the

other four issues. 

Gonzalez has now filed an appellate brief addressing the two issues on

which the district court granted a COA. Gonzalez also requests that we grant him

a COA with respect to the other four issues identified in the motion for COA he

filed with the district court.

II

A) Issues on which the district court granted COA

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As noted, the district court granted COA on two of the substantive issues

identified in Gonzalez’s § 2255 motion. In considering those two issues on

appeal, “[w]e review the district court’s legal rulings . . . de novo and its findings

of fact for clear error.” United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir.

2006).

1. Trial counsel’s failure to accept proposed instruction on withdrawal

Gonzalez argues that his “[t]rial counsel’s failure to accept the [trial]

court’s proposed jury instruction on the defense of withdrawal from the

conspiracy fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced

[him].” Aplt. Br. at 21. According to Gonzalez, “[w]ithdrawal from the

conspiracy was the only viable defense and refusing the instruction left the jury

no choice but to convict on all counts.” Id. Further, Gonzalez argues, “[t]his

error was aggravated by the fact trial counsel conceded guilt to the conspiracy

charges in his closing argument,” which “[b]y law . . . amounted to a concession

of guilt on every count alleged.” Id. Gonzalez asserts that “[t]he result was a

breakdown in the adversarial process and a corresponding violation of [his] right

to the assistance of counsel and due process of law.” Id. at 21-22. Gonzalez also

argues he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s conduct in this regard because “[i]f

the jury would have heard evidence of and been instructed on withdrawal from the

conspiracy and returned a verdict in conformity with that theory, the factual basis

for [the trial court’s] application of the weapon enhancement and role in the

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offense adjustment would be undermined,” Aplt. Br. at 20, and “the total offense

level could have been reduced to as low as 35 resulting in a guideline range of

imprisonment of 168 to 210 months, the minimum of which is less than one half

of [his] current sentence.” Id. at 20-21. 

“A claim for ineffective of assistance of counsel presents a mixed question

of fact and law, which we review de novo.” Orange, 447 F.3d at 796. To

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must

demonstrate: (1) that his trial counsel was deficient such that he was deprived of

“reasonably effective assistance”; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced his case, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). It is

permissible for a reviewing court, if it so chooses, to proceed directly to the

prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Id. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of

an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); see Romano v. Gibson,

239 F.3d 1156, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) (“This court can affirm the denial of habeas

relief on whichever Strickland prong is easier to resolve.”).

The district court rejected Gonzalez’s claim of ineffective assistance,

stating:

 Defendant’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

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assistance by failing to accept the Court’s proposed instruction (or

any instruction) on the defense of withdrawal from a conspiracy is

without merit. By refusing the instruction, Defendant’s counsel was

able to argue Defendant’s withdrawal from the conspiracy without

having to prove the legal requirements for that defense, of which

there was no evidence. To have established the affirmative partial

defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy charged in Count 1,

and/or Count 29, Defendant would have had to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that “he took some definite, decisive

and affirmative action to disavow the conspiracy or to defeat the

purpose or goal of the conspiracy, either by reporting to the

authorities or by communicating his intentions to his coconspirators.” 

Court’s Proposed Affirmative Defense of Withdrawal from a

Conspiracy. See United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2s [sic] 1374, 1384

(10th Cir. 1978). See also Tenth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury

Instructions 2.22. 

 By rejecting the withdrawal instruction, Defendant’s counsel

avoided having to place his client on the stand to attempt to prove the

defense, prevented the Government from countering the defense in its

case-in-chief or otherwise and hoped to persuade the jury in closing

argument that Defendant should not be convicted of any offenses

committed by his coconspirators after Defendant moved to Florida,

without having to prove the defense of withdrawal. In short,

Defendant’s trial counsel sought jury nullification of the Court’s

instruction on Vicarious Liability of Co-Conspirators for offenses

committed by coconspirators after Defendant moved to Florida. 

Defendant’s trial counsel’s rejection of an instruction on withdrawal

was clearly trial strategy. In any event, Defendant cannot show that

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s refusal to accept a withdrawal

instruction because in view of the fact that there was no proof at trial

of the necessary legal requirements for withdrawal, see above, there

is no reasonable probability that the jury would have found that

Defendant withdrew from the conspiracy charged in Count 1 and/or

Count 29 when he moved to Florida in February of 2003 and

acquitted him of the substantive counts committed thereafter by his

coconspirators in furtherance of that conspiracy.

ROA, Vol. 1 at 458-59.

In his appellate brief, Gonzalez offers five reasons why the district court’s

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ruling was erroneous. First, Gonzalez asserts that, contrary to the conclusion

reached by the district court, “[e]vidence was adduced at trial that supported the

theory that . . . Gonzalez was no longer involved in the conspiracy after February

2003.” Aplt. Br. at 24. In support of this assertion, Gonzalez cites to, but does

not otherwise detail, testimony contained on fifteen pages of the nearly twothousand page trial transcript. Id. 

In addressing this argument, we note, as did the district court, that “[t]he

defense of termination by withdrawal requires that the defendant show that he or

she has done ‘some act to disavow or defeat the purpose’ of the conspiracy.” 

United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 817-18 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hyde v.

United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912)). “Affirmative acts inconsistent with the

object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to

reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish

withdrawal . . . .” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65

(1978). With these legal requirements in mind, we conclude, having examined

the cited testimony, as well as the entire trial transcript, that the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to have allowed the jury to reasonably find that

Gonzalez withdrew from the conspiracy. In particular, we reject, for the reasons

outlined below, each of the portions of testimony cited by Gonzalez:

• Transcript pages 651-52. These pages contain the cross-examination

testimony of co-defendant Jennifer Lujan. Ms. Lujan testified for the government

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on direct examination that she was a major distributor of methamphetamine

during the years 2002 and 2003, and that Gonzalez was her main supplier during

that time period. On the transcript pages now cited by Gonzalez, Ms. Lujan

conceded that a photograph shown to her by Gonzalez’s trial counsel was taken in

September 2003 at a fair in Oklahoma City, and that Gonzalez “wasn’t there . . .

.” ROA, Vol. 7 at 652. Although Ms. Lujan’s testimony in this regard perhaps

implicitly confirms that Gonzalez was not present in Oklahoma City in September

2003, it says nothing about Gonzalez’s involvement in, or withdrawal from, the

charged conspiracy.

• Transcript page 795. Alex Figueroa, who went by the street name of

“Toker,” testified for the government that he met Boxer in 1991 in Southern

California when each of them were members of different street gangs. Figueroa

testified that he personally moved to Oklahoma City in early 2002, and that

Gonzalez moved to Oklahoma City and began living with him in March or April

of 2002. According to Figueroa, Gonzalez used at least two people, i.e., “Vago”

and “Japo,” to transport methamphetamine from California to Oklahoma City, and

that, in turn, Gonzalez used a group of other people, including Jennifer Lujan, Liz

Campos, and himself (Figueroa), to distribute the methamphetamine. On page

795 of the trial transcript, Figueroa testified on direct examination that he was

arrested in February 2003, had remained incarcerated since that time, had not

talked to Gonzalez after his arrest, and was not aware of whether or not Gonzalez

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stayed in Oklahoma City after Figueroa’s arrest. Nothing about this testimony

would have remotely allowed the jury to find that Gonzalez withdrew from the

charged conspiracy.

• Transcript pages 1175-76. Rafael Gamboa, who went by the street name

of “Crook,” testified at length on behalf of the government regarding Gonzalez’s

drug-trafficking activities. Gamboa testified at the outset that he had known

Gonzalez all of his life and that the two of them were members of the Compton

Varrio Tortilla Flats gang. Gamboa testified that in late 2002, he spoke with

Gonzalez by telephone and agreed to become a partner in Gonzalez’s Oklahoma

City drug business. Following that conversation, Gamboa testified, he moved to

Oklahoma City and became involved in the distribution of narcotics. Gamboa

described, in detail, how Gonzalez obtained and in turn distributed drugs. 

Gamboa testified that when Gonzalez first left Oklahoma City and moved to

Florida, “everything was falling apart,” which is why Gonzalez wanted Gamboa

to help out in Oklahoma City. ROA, Vol. 9 at 1083. On the transcript pages

cited by Gonzalez, Gamboa testified on cross-examination that he personally

escorted a load of methamphetamine from California to Oklahoma City in

February or March 2003, and did not escort any other loads after that time. This

testimony, considered either alone or collectively with the rest of Gamboa’s

testimony, is far from sufficient to have allowed the jury to find that Gonzalez

withdrew from the charged conspiracy.

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• Transcript page 1354. Maria Ginez, a co-defendant in this case,

testified on behalf of the government against Gonzalez. Ginez explained at the

outset that she had pled guilty to renting an apartment for use by conspiracy

members Eduardo Verduzco and Elizabeth Serrano, and for laundering drug

proceedings by way of Western Union wire transfers. Ginez also testified that she

had a personal relationship with Gonzalez and that he was the father of her child. 

According to Ginez, she lived with Gonzalez in Miami and, while there, Gonzalez

would take her to Western Union offices to pick up wire transfers of money from

Oklahoma City. On trial transcript page 1354, Ginez testified that “[a]fter [she]

got arrested, [she] didn’t join [Gonzalez] in Miami anymore,” but that, prior to

her arrest, she also lived with Gonzalez in Washington, D.C. ROA, Vol. 10 at

1354. We see nothing in this cited testimony that would have supported a finding

by the jury that Gonzalez withdrew from the conspiracy.

• Transcript page 1427. Mark Danner, an Oklahoma City Police

Department officer assigned to work with a Drug Enforcement Administration

task force, testified during the government’s case-in-chief that he participated in

the October 24, 2003 search of Maria Ginez’s apartment in Oklahoma City, and

he identified various items seized from Ginez’s apartment that linked Ginez to

Gonzalez. On the transcript page cited by Gonzalez in his appellate brief, Danner

testified, on cross-examination, that Gonzalez left Oklahoma City on

approximately February 28, 2003, and that their investigation had not identified

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any money or accounts held by Gonzalez in Florida, California, or the

Washington, D.C. area, where Gonzalez moved after living in Florida. Although

Danner’s testimony in this regard lends marginal support to Gonzalez’s

withdrawal theory, it is clearly insufficient, by itself, to fully establish the

defense. More specifically, Danner’s testimony does not establish either that

Gonzalez completely withdrew from the conspiracy or that Gonzalez took some

affirmative step to renounce or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. E.g., United

States v. Gonzalez, 797 F.2d 915, 916-17 (10th Cir. 1986). 

• Transcript pages 1444-45. On these two cited transcript pages, Danner

testified, on cross-examination, that the investigating law enforcement officers

performed no wire taps during the time period from February 28, 2003, until

October 28, 2003, because, at that time, they “[d]idn’t even know that the

organization existed for most of that time period.” ROA, Vol. 10 at 1444-45. 

Importantly, the government’s other testimony overwhelmingly established that

the conspiracy did, in fact, continue between February and October 2003. Thus,

as with the other Danner testimony discussed above, this testimony neither

establishes that Gonzalez completely withdrew from the conspiracy nor took some

affirmative step to renounce or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. 

• Transcript page 1560. Elizabeth Serrano, another co-defendant in the

case, pled guilty to money laundering and one additional count, and agreed to

testify on behalf of the government. Serrano testified that she and Eduardo

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Verduzco (aka Lalo) first arrived in Oklahoma City in June or July 2003 while en

route to Miami to visit Gonzalez. Serrano testified that she and Lalo stayed with

Gonzalez in Florida for approximately one month, during which time Lalo and

Gonzalez discussed using different names and obtaining false identification cards

for those names. Serrano admitted that Lalo and Gonzalez were partners in

selling drugs. According to Serrano, she and Lalo left Miami and began living in

Oklahoma City in August of 2003. Thereafter, Serrano testified, Lalo engaged in

the distribution of methamphetamine in Oklahoma City, and regularly conducted

telephone conversations with Gonzalez. On the transcript page cited by

Gonzalez, Serrano identified, on cross-examination, an exhibit memorializing a

wire transfer to her on February 24, 2003 in the amount of $999. ROA, Vol. 11 at

1560. Clearly, this testimony does not support Gonzalez’s withdrawal defense.

• Transcript pages 1695-99. Bob Summers, a special agent with the

Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division, became involved in

the investigation of the conspiracy in December 2003, and tracked the pattern of

wire transfers from Western Union locations in Oklahoma to Western Union

locations in California and Florida. On the transcript pages cited by Gonzalez in

his appellate brief, Summers testified on cross-examination that the majority of

the wire transfer money (totaling approximately $245,000) went to California,

that records indicate Jennifer Lujan wire-transferred money to Florida after

Gonzalez moved there, that it was possible that Gonzalez made money as a tattoo

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artist but didn’t report it to the IRS, and that it would not be unusual for a person

on the run from law enforcement officers to fail to file a federal tax return

(Gonzalez did not file a federal tax return for the tax year 2003). Notably,

Gonzalez makes no attempt to explain how any of this evidence would have

supported his withdrawal defense, and we conclude none of it would have allowed

the jury to reasonably find the necessary elements of withdrawal.

Thus, in sum, we agree with the district court that the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to allow the jury to reasonably find that Gonzalez withdrew

from the conspiracy.

Gonzalez next argues, relatedly, that “[t]he district court’s holding on post

conviction [that] there was no evidence to support a withdrawal from the

conspiracy instruction is contrary to the court’s view at the time of trial.” Aplt.

Br. at 25. Gonzalez is, however, mistaken in this regard. A review of the trial

transcript indicates that the district court suggested the possibility of a withdrawal

from conspiracy instruction only after hearing the closing arguments of

Gonzalez’s counsel. In those closing arguments, Gonzalez’s counsel asserted that

Gonzalez, after leaving Oklahoma City in February 2003, was unaware of what

was happening regarding methamphetamine trafficking in Oklahoma City, and

that Eduardo Verduzco was the person responsible for running the conspiracy. 

Importantly, at no time during the trial proceedings did the district court rule on

whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to find that

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 The district court recognized this principle when it instructed the jury that

“[s]tatements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the case.” ROA, Vol.

1 at 183.

17

Gonzalez in fact withdrew from the conspiracy. Moreover, a defense counsel’s

closing argument suggesting withdrawal, in the absence of supporting evidence,

provides no basis for a jury to find withdrawal.1

 See United States v. Atencio,

435 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (characterizing as “standard” an instruction

“emphasizing that ‘any statements, objections, or arguments made by the lawyers

are not evidence.’”).

In his third argument, Gonzalez argues that, “contrary to the district court’s

holding, accepting the withdrawal from conspiracy instruction could not have

altered the government’s case in chief, the government’s examination of

witnesses, or Mr. Gonzalez’s decision not to testify.” Aplt. Br. at 25. Although

Gonzalez is correct, that does not alter the fact that the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to allow the jury to reasonably find that Gonzalez withdrew from

the conspiracy. 

In his fourth argument, Gonzalez challenges as “flawed” “[t]he district

court’s conclusion that rejecting the instruction was ‘clearly trial strategy’

because ‘trial counsel sought jury nullification of the Court’s Instruction on

Vicarious Liability of Co-Conspirators for offenses committed by coconspirators

after [Gonzalez] moved to Florida . . . .’” Aplt. Br. at 25 (quoting ROA, Vol. 1 at

459). According to Gonzalez, “[i]t is not ‘trial strategy’ to seek jury nullification

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because it is improper for counsel to promote such a result.” Id. 

Although the legal premise of Gonzalez’s argument is correct, in that we

disapprove of the encouragement of jury nullification, e.g., United States v.

Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir. 1983) (“While we recognize that a jury may

render a verdict at odds with the evidence or the law, neither the court nor

counsel should encourage jurors to violate their oath.”), we disagree with the

factual premise of his argument. More specifically, we are not persuaded, after

reviewing the record on appeal, that Gonzalez’s trial counsel was encouraging

jury nullification. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented by the

government, Gonzalez’s trial counsel was quite limited in what he could argue to

the jury, and obviously realized that Gonzalez could not, based upon the available

evidence, satisfy the legal requirements of the withdrawal defense. As the district

court concluded, trial counsel’s best strategic choice, indeed perhaps his only

choice, was to argue that Gonzalez no longer had any involvement with the

conspiracy after he moved to Florida, but without specifically arguing the legal

requirements of a withdrawal defense. In other words, trial counsel, rather than

taking on the insurmountable burden of establishing the legal defense of

withdrawal, simply attempted to put the government to its burden of proof by

relying on the district court’s general instructions on conspiracy and arguing that

he was no longer part of the conspiracy after a certain date. Although Gonzalez

now takes issue with this strategy, he fails to point to any evidence from which

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the jury could reasonably have found the existence of the legal requirements of

the withdrawal defense.

Finally, and relatedly, Gonzalez argues that his counsel’s “refusal to accept

the instruction prevented the jury from deliberating” whether Gonzalez remained

criminally responsible for the post-February 2003 actions of his coconspirators

“and deprived [him] of the opportunity to present the only possible defense under

the law and facts.” Aplt. Br. at 27. Although we agree that trial counsel’s

rejection of the withdrawal instruction prevented the jury from considering the

legal elements of the withdrawal defense, we readily conclude that Gonzalez was

not prejudiced as a result thereof, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt

and the complete lack of evidence that he withdrew from the conspiracy or took

some affirmative step to renounce or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy.

In conclusion, we agree with the district court that Gonzalez failed to

establish that his counsel’s rejection of the district court’s proffered withdrawal

instruction deprived him of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel.

2. Trial counsel’s concession of Gonzalez’s guilt

In the second issue on which the district court granted a COA, Gonzalez

argues that his trial counsel’s concession of guilt to the conspiracy charge, “a

count that encompassed every other count in the indictment,” effectively “caused

a breakdown in the adversarial process and, correspondingly, violated [his] right

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to the assistance of counsel.” Aplt. Br. at 29. In addition, Gonzalez argues, his

counsel’s concession of guilt “relieved the government of its burden of proving

[him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” “thereby violating [his] right to due

process of law.” Id.

a. Right to assistance of counsel

In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the United States Supreme

Court “recognized a limited exception to Strickland,” Crawley v. Dinwiddie, 584

F.3d 916, 922 n.8 (10th Cir. 2009), by holding that “if counsel entirely fails to

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has

been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself

presumptively unreliable.” 466 U.S. at 659. In other words, “Cronic held that a

Sixth Amendment violation may be found without inquiring into counsel’s actual

performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had on the trial, when

circumstances [exist] that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of

litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified . . . .” Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted; brackets in original). Importantly, the Court has since “made

clear that . . . ‘the attorney’s failure [to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing] must be complete.’” Id. at n.* (quoting Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002)). Thus, although we have held that “the

admission by counsel of his client’s guilt to the jury . . . represents a paradigmatic

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example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a

presumption of prejudice” under Cronic, United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d

1500, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995), it is clear that, in order to implicate the Cronic

presumption, any such admission by counsel must be complete. E.g., Hale v.

Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1323 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Cronic was not

implicated where defense counsel “made a reasonable strategic decision to

concede some guilt by [petitioner], given the overwhelming evidence presented at

trial, and focused on the extent of [petitioner’s] involvement and whether others

could have been involved.”); Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (10th Cir.

1999) (same). We “have found a complete absence of meaningful adversarial

testing only where the evidence overwhelmingly established that [the] attorney

abandoned the required duty of loyalty to his client, and where counsel acted with

reckless disregard for his client’s best interests and, at times, apparently with the

intention to weaken his client’s case.” Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1208

(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original).

Whether a complete admission of guilt “actually occurred is necessarily

fact-intensive.” Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1511. “The focus must be on whether, in

light of the entire record, the attorney remained a legal advocate of the defendant

who acted with undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to the

defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court in this case properly acknowledged these principles, and

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2

 Gonzalez also argues that “[a]ny possibility the jury might reach a

different conclusion was destroyed when [defense counsel] declined the Court’s

offer to instruct the jury on his only defense,” and “[i]f the jury had been

instructed on the defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy, there would have

been a possibility of [him] being acquitted on the counts involving conduct that

occurred after he moved to Florida in February 2003.” Aplt. Br. at 32. For the

(continued...)

22

in turn concluded

that the Cronic presumption of prejudice d[id] not apply, that

Defendant’s trial counsel’s concession of Defendant’s guilt of Count

1, at least up to the point he moved to Florida, was reasonable trial

strategy in light of overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt as to

Count 1. Defendant’s counsel was present in the courtroom,

conducted cross-examination, made evidentiary objections and gave

opening and closing arguments. Hence, Defendant’s counsel did not

abandon his duty of loyalty to Defendant or act in reckless disregard

of his client’s best interest, triggering the Cronic presumption. 

Moreover, Defendant’s counsel’s concession of Defendant’s guilt on

Count 1 at least until, as counsel argued, Defendant moved to

Florida, in light of overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s

membership and participation in the conspiracy, so as to gain

credibility with the jury and attempt to persuade them Defendant was

not guilty of at least some of the substantive offenses, particularly

those that occurred after February of 2003, was reasonable trial

strategy.

ROA, Vol. 1 at 463-64.

Gonzalez argues that the district court’s conclusion was erroneous because,

in light of the jury instructions, particularly one discussing the vicarious liability

of coconspirators, defense counsel’s “concession that Mr. Gonzalez was guilty of

conspiracy, the overarching and most serious charge in the indictment, had the

practical effect of denying Mr. Gonzalez his right to a jury determination, on all

of the counts in the indictment.”2

 Aplt. Br. at 32. We disagree.

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(...continued)

reasons already discussed above, these arguments have no merit.

3

 The district court also instructed the jury that “[e]ach crime or offense as

charged and the evidence applicable thereto, should be considered separately, and

the guilt or innocence of a Defendant as to each count or offense should likewise

be considered separately.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 232.

23

To be sure, the district court instructed the jury that “[e]very conspirator is

guilty of the illegal acts that are done as part of and in furtherance of the

conspiracy even though those acts are done solely by coconspirators.” ROA, Vol.

1 at 249. There was more, however, to the vicarious liability instruction. In

particular, that instruction stated:

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time an

alleged offense was committed, a Defendant had entered into and

continued to be a member of an unlawful conspiracy as charged in

Count 1 and as I have defined that for you and if you further find

beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged acts charged in any of

Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29

and 30 through 79 were committed while the conspiracy continued to

exist and in furtherance of that unlawful conspiracy or as an object of

that conspiracy, then you may find that Defendant guilty of the

offense or offenses charged in such count or counts even though he

was not the person who actually committed or personally aided and

abetted in the commission of that offense or those offenses.

Id. (emphasis added).3

 

Gonzalez’s trial counsel obviously attempted to take advantage of the

highlighted phrase in the vicarious liability instruction by arguing that Gonzalez

was merely a “lieutenant” in the conspiracy, ROA, Vol. 16 at 35, that Lalo

(Eduardo Verduzco) was the one actually in charge of the conspiracy, id., that

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Gonzalez ceased to be a member of the conspiracy after he moved to Florida in

February of 2003, id. at 70 (“Once Boxer [Gonzalez] leaves Oklahoma, Lalo

[Verduzco] is not keeping him up to speed on the day-to-day business. Boxer

[Gonzalez] doesn’t know what’s going on in Oklahoma.”), and that, necessarily,

Gonzalez was not responsible for any of the substantive offenses that occurred

after February of 2003. In other words, as the district court concluded,

Gonzalez’s counsel clearly attempted, by way of his cross-examination of the

government’s witnesses and his closing arguments, to challenge Gonzalez’s guilt

on the post-February 2003 substantive counts, and did not, as asserted by

Gonzalez, effectively concede Gonzalez’s guilt on those counts.

 Gonzalez also complains, in passing, that his trial counsel’s opening

statement, which denied guilt as to any of the charges, was inconsistent with trial

counsel’s closing arguments (which, as noted, conceded guilt to the conspiracy

charge). Aplt. Br. at 32-33. For the reasons already discussed, however, we

conclude this inconsistency does nothing to bolster his Cronic claim.

b. Due process

Gonzalez also argued that his trial counsel’s concession of guilt to the

conspiracy charge, during closing arguments, violated his due process rights by

relieving the government of its burden of proof. The district court rejected this

argument, stating:

 Whether Defendant’s counsel’s concession of his client’s guilt as

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to Count 1 amounted to a violation of the Due Process Clause is

determined by the standards set forth above [i.e., Strickland and

Cronic]. See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th

Cir. 1991). It is only when “a defense attorney concedes that there is

no reasonable doubt concerning the only factual issues in dispute,

[that] the Government has not been held to its burden of persuading

the jury that the defendant is guilty.” Id. That is not what occurred

here and the disposition of Defendant’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, based on his

concession of Defendant’s guilt of Count 1, governs the disposition

of that claim under the Due Process Clause.

ROA, Vol. 1 at 465.

On appeal, Gonzalez does not specifically challenge the district court’s

ruling. Instead, he argues simply that his counsel’s “concession of guilt on the

conspiracy charges amounted to a concession of guilt on all charges pursuant to

the vicarious liability principles governing conspiracy,” and thereby “relieved the

government of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Aplt. Br. at

34. 

As the district court noted, however, the disposition of Gonzalez’s Cronic

claim also effectively disposes of his due process claim. More specifically,

because the record indicates that Gonzalez’s trial counsel challenged Gonzalez’s

guilt on the post-February 2003 substantive counts, it is apparent that the

government was not wholly relieved of its burden of proof.

B. Issues on which Gonzalez seeks a COA

Gonzalez seeks a COA on four additional issues. The issuance of a COA is

a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from the denial of an issue raised in a §

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2255 motion. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A COA may be

issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2553(c)(2). To make such a showing, an

applicant must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for

that matter, agree that) the [particular issue raised in the] petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issue[] presented w[as] adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. Trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence

In the first issue on which he seeks a COA, Gonzalez contends that his trial

counsel failed to investigate and call at trial Marlene Gonzalez (his ex-wife) and

Eduardo Verduzco, both of whom Gonzalez asserts would have testified in

support of his defense theory of withdrawal from the conspiracy. Gonzalez

argues that if the jury had been persuaded that he withdrew from the conspiracy in

February 2003, his advisory guideline range of punishment would have been

reduced by half. 

The district court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to call these two

witnesses was not prejudicial:

The Court agrees with the Government that the testimony of

Defendant’s ex-wife, as proffered by defense counsel, would not

have assisted or had any real impact on Defendant’s theory of

defense that he withdrew from the conspiracy in February of 2003. 

While the testimony of Edward Verduzco, had he been called as a

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witness, as set forth in the Declaration of Eduardo Verduzco, would

have supported Defendant’s theory of defense, it was contradicted by

overwhelming evidence. While the evidence at trial was that Dennis

Gonzalez a/k/a Boxer left Oklahoma City in February 2003 after the

arrest of one of his associates, Alex Figueroa a/k/a Toker, Gonzalez

maintained control of drug trafficking in Oklahoma, even though he

had moved to Florida. Couriers continued to bring crystal

methamphetamine and other controlled substances to Oklahoma City

for distribution at the direction of Dennis Gonzalez.

 Fourteen cooperating witnesses testified at trial concerning their

knowledge of Defendant’s role in arranging for large amounts of

methamphetamine and other drugs to be brought from California to

the Oklahoma City area for distribution and the transfers of funds

obtained from that enterprise. Sixteen law enforcement officers,

agents or employees and numerous business records custodians

testified to corroborating evidence that included telephone records,

airline and other travel records, employment records, documents and

photographs obtained in searches of co-conspirators and their

residences, Western Union wire transfer records, photographs

provided by cooperating witnesses and large quantities of crystal

methamphetamine seized from Jennifer Lujan and thrown out a

window by Eduardo Verduzco on October 23, 2003.

 The testimony of witnesses was corroborated by documents

introduced at trial, including an address book with the name of “Box

on it that also contained drug ledgers and a drug ledger that showed

money beside the name “Box,” all of which were found during a

search of the apartment occupied by Eduardo Verduzco and Elizabeth

Serrano on October 23, 2003. The apartment had been rented for

Verduzco by Maria Ginez, Defendant’s girlfriend, at Defendant’s

direction.

 Moreover, there was significant evidence that after Defendant

moved to Florida in February 2003, transfers of money totalling [sic]

$69,972 from drug trafficking were sent by Oklahoma conspirators to

Florida. Defendant’s girlfriend, Maria Ginez, testified that while she

was living in Florida after February of 2003 and before her arrest in

October of 2003, Ms. Ginez would pick up money sent by Western

Union wire transfer and give it to Defendant.

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 In the face of this evidence, which also led to Defendant’s

conviction on money laundering counts that occurred after March,

2003, Defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that the result

of the proceeding would have been different with respect to the

substantive counts committed after February of 2003 for which

Defendant was vicariously liable as a coconspirator.

ROA, Vol. 1 at 455-58.

The district court’s conclusions are well-supported by the record on appeal,

particularly the trial transcript. As the district court expressly noted, the evidence

of Gonzalez’s guilt on the charges at issue was overwhelming. In turn, Gonzalez

simply cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to

present either his ex-wife or Eduardo Verduzco as witnesses on his behalf. We

therefore conclude that Gonzalez has failed to establish his entitlement to a COA

on the issue.

2. Defendant’s right to be present at in-chambers conference

In the second issue on which he seeks a COA, Gonzalez contends that his

absence from an untranscribed, in-chambers conference during which his counsel

and the trial court discussed whether he consented to his trial counsel’s

concession of partial guilt to the conspiracy charge violated his right to be present

under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process

Clause.

The district court concluded this claim was “without merit.” ROA, Vol. 1

at 465. More specifically, the district court stated:

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 The Court’s inquiry to Defendant’s counsel occurred at one of the

in-chambers conferences the Court held to consider written responses

to be made to written questions received from the jury during their

deliberations. At such conferences, the Court reviewed his proposed

response with all counsel to ascertain their agreement or objection or

conferred with counsel to reach an agreed response to a jury

question. None of these conferences was on the record because there

was no disagreement on the responses to be sent back to the jury. 

Defendant was not present at any of these conferences. During one

of these conferences, while the judge and counsel waited for a

drafted response to a jury question to be typed, the court and counsel

engaged in a general conversation regarding the trial and the use of

computer and power point aids at trial. It was during such general

conversation that the court inquired of Defendant’s counsel as to

whether Defendant had consented to counsel’s discussion in closing

argument of Defendant’s guilt to a portion of the conspiracy charge. 

The Court was not obligated to make this inquiry. And Defendant

did not have a right under Rule 43, F.R.Crim.P., or the Due Process

Clause to be present at the Court’s conferences regarding questions

received from the jury during their deliberations. Such conferences

may be considered an extension of jury instruction conferences and

deal with questions of law or administrative matters. See

F.R.Crim.P. 43(b)(3); Esnault v. Colorado, 980 F.2d 1335, 1337

(10th Cir. 1992) (defendant does not have a due process right to be

present when counsel and the court confer on a question from a

deliberating jury or when a type-written response is given to that jury

question); Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1990)

(rarely can a defendant establish that a jury instruction conference

which traditionally addresses purely legal issues, is a conference for

which his presence is essential to his opportunity to present a

defense).

Id. at 465-66. 

In our view, reasonable jurists could not debate whether Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 43 afforded Gonzalez the right to be personally present

during the in-chambers conference at issue. To be sure, Rule 43(a)(2) provides

that a criminal defendant “must be present at . . . every trial stage, including jury

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impanelment and the return of the verdict,” and the Supreme Court has held that

this provision guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have a jury’s question

“answered in open court” and for his counsel to be “given the opportunity to be

heard before the trial judge respond[s]” to the question. Rogers v. United States,

422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975). Subsection (b)(3) of Rule 43 also provides, however, that

a criminal defendant “need not be present” if “[t]he proceeding involves only a

conference or hearing on a question of law.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3). Here, the

in-chambers conference concerned only a legal question of how to properly

respond to a jury question. Thus, under Rule 43(b)(3), Gonzalez’s presence was

not necessary. Moreover, according to the district court’s uncontroverted factual

findings, the conversation at issue between the trial judge and Gonzalez’s trial

counsel occurred during a lull in the conference, and thus was arguably not even a

pertinent part of the in-chambers conference. Although Gonzalez asserts that “the

proceeding shifted from a hearing on a question of law to one that involved a

question of fact directly affecting [his] right to a fair trial,” Aplt. Br. at 43, there

is no factual support for that assertion. Indeed, the district court specifically

found that the conversation at issue occurred while the court and parties were

waiting for the agreed response to the jury’s question to be transcribed, and there

is no indication that the conversation had any impact whatsoever on the

proceedings.

Similarly, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate whether

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Gonzalez had a due process right to be present during the in-chambers

conference. In United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985), the Supreme Court

noted that a criminal “defendant has a due process right to be present at a

proceeding ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the

fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge,’” and that “‘[t]he presence

of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just

hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” Id. at 526

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). Applying those

principles to Gonzalez’s case, it is clear that a fair and just hearing on the jury’s

question would not have been thwarted by his absence, and thus Gonzalez did not

have a due process right to be present at the in-chambers conference on the

question. Further, the discussion that occurred between the district court and

defense counsel had no impact on the district court’s response to the jury’s

question, or to any other matter at issue before the district court. Gonzalez has

thus failed to establish his entitlement to a COA.

3. Cumulative error

Gonzalez contends he is entitled to a COA on the cumulative error issue he

raised below. We disagree. Because we have found no merit to any of the issues

raised by Gonzalez, there is no basis for applying a cumulative error analysis. 

See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“a

cumulative-error analysis aggregates only actual errors to determine their

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cumulative effect”). 

4. Failure to conduct evidentiary hearing

Finally, we reject Gonzalez’s contention that he is entitled to a COA on the

question of whether the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on any of the issues raised by Gonzalez in his § 2255 motion. Having

carefully examined the record on appeal, we readily conclude that there were no

relevant, disputed issues of fact that needed to be resolved, and in turn no need

for an evidentiary hearing. Thus, his request for a COA on this issue is rejected.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Gonzalez’s request for a

COA on additional issues is DENIED.

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