RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-1470-MR

CITY OF COLD SPRING APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00926

CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF 

EDUCATION APPELLEE 

OPINION

REVERSING

AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This case involves the proper exercise of the power of eminent 

domain. At issue is whether a school board possesses the right to invoke that 

power in order to acquire real property owned by a city.

 The Appellant, the City of Cold Spring (the City), appeals the 

interlocutory order of the Campbell Circuit Court that concluded that the Campbell 
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County Board of Education (the Board of Education or the Board) was entitled to 

exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire real property located at U.S. 27 

North and Industrial Road in Cold Spring, Kentucky. Because there is no express

-- or necessarily implied -- statutory authority permitting a Board of Education to 

condemn property owned by the City, we are compelled to reverse. 

The Board of Education sought to acquire property for the purpose of 

developing a new public middle school to serve students in the northern half of the 

Campbell County school district. A new school was expected to alleviate the 

substantial enrollment strain on the existing middle school. 

The Board located suitable property and communicated with its 

owner, Disabled American Veterans, Inc. (DAV), throughout 2020. While it had 

owned the property since the 1960’s, DAV representatives indicated that it 

intended to relocate its national headquarters to a new facility in Erlanger. On 

September 16, 2020, a special meeting of the Board of Education was conducted to 

allow members to tour the property. Its interest in acquiring the property was 

made public. 

On October 2, 2020, the Board of Education made an offer to 

purchase the property within the range of estimated value communicated to it by 

DAV’s real estate agent. After receipt of the offer, DAV’s agent advised that 

multiple parties were interested in purchasing the property and encouraged the 
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Board to submit its best offer. On October 30, 2020, the Board of Education 

submitted a second and higher offer, explaining that it would prefer to obtain the 

property through negotiated purchase rather than through eminent domain 

proceedings. 

On November 30, 2020, DAV informed the Board of Education that it 

would not sell the property to the Board. The Board of Education believed that 

DAV preferred to sell the property to a private developer, A1. Neyer, LLC 

(Neyer), instead. The Board was convinced that the City intended to buy the 

disputed property in order to thwart its condemnation of the property and that the 

City would then transfer it to Neyer for private development. However, without 

the knowledge of the Board, DAV and Neyer had already executed a purchase 

agreement with respect to the disputed property a couple of weeks before on 

November 13, 2020.

On December 10, 2020, the Board of Education posted the agenda for 

its regularly scheduled December 14, 2020, meeting. The agenda indicated a need 

for executive session to discuss exercising its power of eminent domain to acquire 

the DAV property. At this meeting, the Board of Education approved acquisition 

of the disputed property through condemnation proceedings. 

On December 17, 2020, the City conducted a special meeting and 

authorized its mayor and city attorney to negotiate the purchase of the DAV 
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property. Within a matter of days, the City Council approved the plan in executive 

session. 

On December 20, 2020, Neyer assigned its purchase agreement with 

DAV to the City. In exchange, the City agreed to grant to Neyer the exclusive 

right to develop the disputed property and to own the private investment made to 

that end. The City agreed to collaborate with Neyer to secure government 

financing of the development and to cooperate with Neyer in any zoning and 

permitting matters that might arise. The City agreed that “the future uses of the 

Property, along with all development plans, designs, budgets, schedules and other 

requirements of such development shall be determined by [Neyer], in [Neyer’s] 

sole and absolute discretion.” Finally, the City agreed to assign back to Neyer its

rights under the purchase agreement if it decided not to purchase the property or if 

it defaulted on the terms of the underlying purchase agreement.

On this same date, December 20, 2020, the Board of Education filed 

its petition for condemnation pursuant to the provisions of KRS1 162.030. The 

Board of Education alleged that despite its good faith efforts to purchase the 

property through negotiation, it had been unable to secure a satisfactory contract to 

acquire the real property from DAV. It sought an order: (1) concluding that it had 

a right to condemn the subject property and (2) appointing commissioners to 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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determine the value of the property and to award an amount of compensation 

required for the taking. It recorded a notice of lis pendens the following day. 

On December 23, 2020, pursuant to the provisions of KRS 416.580, 

the Campbell Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to report on the amount 

of compensation to be awarded for the taking of the disputed property. Also on 

this date of December 23, 2020, the City filed an “ex parte motion to intervene.” It 

asserted a legal interest in the property as reflected in the assignment of the 

purchase agreement between DAV and Neyer. The Board of Education challenged 

the City’s authority to intervene in the condemnation proceeding, arguing that it 

was a summary, expedited proceeding that did not envision intervention by other 

parties. 

The City nevertheless tendered an intervening complaint on January 

15, 2021. The court took the matter under submission. On January 21, 2021, the 

commissioners submitted their report and award. 

By order entered on February 10, 2021, the Campbell Circuit Court 

granted the City’s motion to intervene in the eminent domain proceeding. The 

tendered complaint was ordered filed. In its complaint, the City acknowledged that 

DAV remained the record owner of the disputed property but described its (the 

City’s) equitable interest in it. 
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While there is no indication that a motion to dismiss is permitted in 

condemnation proceedings, DAV nonetheless filed just such a motion in lieu of an 

answer on February 15, 2021. It argued that the Board of Education could not 

exercise the right of eminent domain because it had failed to secure final site 

approval from the Kentucky Department of Education. The Board challenged 

DAV’s motion to dismiss. In addition, the Board filed a motion for a more definite 

statement with respect to the City’s intervening complaint.

Thereafter, the City filed an amended intervening complaint and a 

motion for declaration of rights. It asked the court to authorize its purchase of the 

disputed property and to order the Board to remove the lis pendens. It contended 

that the condemnation action violated its rights. 

On April 8, 2021, DAV deeded the disputed property to the City by 

special warranty deed. Excepted from the usual covenants and warranties was any 

claim related to the pending condemnation proceedings. The City immediately 

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Board of Education could not condemn 

public property. The Board of Education responded and disputed the underlying

premise of the motion. 

On June 24, 2021, this case was transferred to a different division of 

the Campbell Circuit Court. The court set the matter for oral argument to hear the 

parties’ positions on the outstanding motions to dismiss. 
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In an order entered on September 10, 2021, the circuit court denied 

the motions of both the DAV and the City to dismiss the eminent domain 

proceedings. The matter was finally set for the hearing required by the provisions 

of KRS 416.610 to determine the right of the Board of Education to take the 

disputed property. The hearing was scheduled to be conducted on October 6, 

2021. 

Meanwhile, the City filed its answer to the Board of Education’s 

petition. Once again, the City argued that the disputed property could not be the 

subject of eminent domain proceedings because it was public property. 

Upon oral motion of the Board of Education, DAV was dismissed 

from the action before the court’s proceedings began on October 6, 2021. The City 

stipulated that it had sought to purchase the disputed property in order to prevent 

the Board from exercising its power of eminent domain to acquire it and that as 

record owner of the property, the City’s rights would be adjudicated by the 

eminent domain proceedings. 

Following the evidentiary hearing, the Campbell Circuit Court found 

that the disputed property:

is the most promising because of its location, topography, 

condition, and multiple access points. The location 

would allow students that are currently transported from 

the North end of the County to have a shorter bus ride. 

Buses and parents could enter and exit in a different 

location from each other. Buses could potentially be 
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stored on site, saving additional travel time. In addition, 

based on . . . calculation prepared following the tour, 

renovating the Property versus building a new school 

would save the Board approximately 7 million dollars. 

* * * *

The City purchased the Property in an effort to 

circumvent the Board from acquiring the Property by 

eminent domain. The Property was purchased for 

economic development, but the City intends to sell the 

Property to Neyer or another private developer. There is 

no evidence that the City intends to use industrial 

revenue bond or other government funding to finance the 

Property. 

After the filing of the condemnation action, the Board 

began the process of complying with the KDE [Kentucky 

Department of Education] requirements, set forth under 

702 KAR[2] 4:050, to acquire the Property. KDE is the 

state regulatory agency for all public K-12 schools in 

Kentucky. To acquire property for a school, a school 

board must get approval from KDE. The Board does not 

need permission from KDE to file an eminent domain 

action. The Board has funds to purchase the Property 

without borrowing money. 

* * * *

The Board worked with KDE to acquire the Property. 

One requirement was a title search, which a 60-year title 

search was conducted and was satisfactory to KDE. . . . 

On October 5, 2021, the Kentucky Board of Education 

. . . gave the Board approval to acquire the Property. 

2 Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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The circuit court rejected the City’s contention that the disputed 

property was being used or held for public purposes and that it could not, therefore, 

be taken through the exercise of the Board of Education’s power of eminent 

domain. The court concluded that the Board had demonstrated a need for a new 

middle school and the need to condemn the disputed property specifically; that it 

had negotiated for the purchase of the property in good faith; that there was 

reasonable assurance that the school project would be completed; and, 

parenthetically, that use of the property would promote economic development for 

the City. It concluded that the Board of Education was entitled to condemn the 

property pursuant to the provisions of KRS 416.540-416.670 and authorized the 

Board to take possession of the property upon payment into court the amount of 

compensation awarded by the commissioners. Its order was entered on November 

23, 2021. 

On November 29, 2021, the Board of Education paid the award into 

court and demanded possession of the property. On December 2, 2021, the court

entered its interlocutory order and judgment (including the legal description of the 

property taken). 

On December 10, 2021, the City filed its notice of appeal. On 

December 17, 2021, the funds paid into court by the Board were released to the 

City. 
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On appeal, the City argues that the circuit court erred by concluding 

that the Board could take its property through eminent domain proceedings 

because the General Assembly authorized the Board to take only private property. 

It contends that its public property is not subject to the Board’s power to take 

through condemnation. We are compelled to agree.

We begin by noting that the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS 

416.540-416.670, does not expressly provide for an appeal of a trial court’s 

interlocutory order concerning a condemnor’s right to take. However, in Ratliff v. 

Fiscal Court of Caldwell County, Kentucky, 617 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1981), the 

Supreme Court of Kentucky held that constitutional considerations require that an 

immediate appeal be afforded to a condemnee. 

The right of eminent domain is necessarily inherent in a sovereign 

authority, which may choose to delegate the power of condemnation. “It is within 

the authority of the General Assembly to define the limits of the right of eminent 

domain and to establish the specific terms under which the condemning authority 

may exercise such power.” Kelly v. Thompson, 983 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky. 1998). 

“[T]he general rule is that a condemnor to whom the power of eminent domain has 

been delegated may not condemn public property unless authority is expressly or 

impliedly granted by statute.” Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board 

v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 648 S.W.3d 76, 88 (Ky. App. 2022) (citing 29A 
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C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 61 (2022)). Statutes delegating the authority to exercise 

the right of eminent domain are to be strictly construed. Bell’s Committee v. Board 

of Education of Harrodsburg, 192 Ky. 700, 234 S.W. 311 (1921). Because the 

scope of the Board’s condemnation authority is a matter of statutory interpretation, 

we review the trial court’s conclusion of law de novo. 

The authority of the Board of Education to exercise the power of 

eminent domain is expressly set out in provisions of KRS 162.030. The statute 

provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

Each board of education may, when unable to make a 

contract satisfactory to the board with the owner for the 

purchase of real estate to be used for school purposes, 

initiate condemnation proceedings pursuant to the 

Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky (KRS 416.540 to 

416.670) . . . . 

KRS 162.030. The title to all property acquired by a school district is vested in the 

Commonwealth for the benefit of the district board of education. KRS 162.010. 

 In considering this statutory delegation of the right to eminent 

domain, we note the reasoning of a relevant case. In Jefferson County By and

Through Hollenbach v. South Central Bell Telephone Company, 555 S.W.2d 629 

(Ky. App. 1977), this Court considered the provisions of KRS 76.110(1) conferring 

the power of eminent domain upon sewer districts. The statute provides that a 

sewer district may utilize the power of eminent domain in order to acquire real or 

personal property necessary for its purposes “whether or not the same are owned or 
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held for public use by corporations, associations, or other persons having the 

power of eminent domain, or otherwise held or used for public purposes.” KRS 

76.110(1). We observed that this language expressly provides that the sewer 

district’s power of eminent domain extends to public property. Separately, the 

statute provides that the “method of condemnation of such property shall be 

pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.” KRS 76.110(2) (emphasis 

added). 

As noted above, KRS 162.030 provides the statutory basis for the 

power of eminent domain exercised by the Board of Education. The provision 

empowers the Board to initiate condemnation proceedings where it is unable to 

make a satisfactory contract for the purchase of real property “with the owner.” 

The Board isolates the phrase “with the owner” and construes it broadly to 

encompass the owner of public as well as private property. However, the statute 

further directs that “the proceedings,” and not merely the method by which the 

condemnation is effected, are to be undertaken “pursuant to the Eminent Domain 

Act of Kentucky. . . .” Id. Proceedings undertaken pursuant to the provisions of 

the Eminent Domain Act are limited to takings of private property. KRS 

416.540(1) expressly provides that to “[c]ondemn means to take private property

for a public use under the right of eminent domain. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
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In Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board, we considered 

the nature of the power of Louisville Gas and Electric Company to exercise its 

right of eminent domain. 648 S.W.3d 76. We analyzed the provisions of KRS 

278.502 granting to utility companies providing gas in public service the authority 

to condemn needed property where “it is unable to contract or agree with the 

owner” and directing that the “proceedings for condemnation shall be as provided 

in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.” (Emphasis added.) Reading the 

limitations imposed by the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act along with the 

provisions of KRS 278.502, we acknowledged, without deciding, that the gas 

company’s “power of eminent domain may ordinarily be limited to private 

property[.]” Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board, 648 S.W.3d at 

88. 

The provisions of KRS 162.030 do not expressly, or by necessary 

implication, expand the boundaries of the power of eminent domain delegated to 

the Board of Education to encompass the taking of public property. Instead, the 

statutory authority confines the terms under which proceedings may be initiated by 

reference to those contained in the Eminent Domain Act limited to the taking of 

private property. Consequently, we are persuaded that the Board’s right to 

exercise the power of eminent domain does not extend to the taking of public 

property. 
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The Board of Education characterizes the City’s purchase of the 

disputed property as a ruse and challenges the nature of the City’s intended use of 

it. However, we are restricted by law to addressing only relevant matters -- not 

peripheral or speculative issues. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the City 

had an interest in the disputed property on the date that the condemnation action 

was filed; i.e., it had been assigned the purchase agreement between Neyer and 

DAV. The holder of an equitable interest in land clearly has an interest that is 

compensable in a condemnation proceeding. It was the record owner of the 

property prior to the court’s hearing conducted expressly to determine the Board’s 

right to exercise its power of eminent domain. Public property is not converted to 

private property -- even where the municipality owns it in a proprietary capacity. 

The nature of the ownership of the disputed property -- not its use -- controls in 

this case. 

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the disputed property was 

conveyed to DAV by the Campbell County Business Development Corporation 

(CCBDC) subject to deed restrictions aimed at promoting economic growth at the 

site. These restrictions were implemented as a result of a 1963 agreement between 

CCBDC and the City. In the agreement, the City agreed to a zone change sought 

by CCBDC in exchange for the City’s continued interest in regulating development 
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of the property. The City maintains that its purchase of the disputed property helps 

it to maintain the agreement’s provisions and aims for the public benefit. 

The Board argues that the City’s contemplated use of the property 

does not constitute a “public use” as that phrase is commonly used in 

condemnation jurisprudence. However, the analysis suggested by the Board is not 

necessary where the City is not seeking to take property through eminent domain.

It already owns the property. We have concluded that the Board of Education has 

not been delegated the power to condemn public property. And the City is not 

required to prove that the disputed property will be devoted to public use. The 

City’s property is subject to its control, and it may authorize its use as it sees fit. 

The Board of Education also argues that its right of condemnation 

must necessarily extend to the taking of public property; otherwise, its ability to 

provide for an efficient system of public education is compromised. It is true that

the General Assembly is charged by Section 183 of our State Constitution with 

providing for public education. However, in delegating the right of eminent 

domain to the Board of Education, the legislature did not expand that power to

condemn public property -- even for the laudable purpose and mandatory duty of 

providing for public education. Consequently, this argument is best directed to our 

General Assembly as it is beyond our purview. 
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We reverse the order of the Campbell Circuit Court and remand this 

case for entry of an appropriate order.

LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS. 

TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE 

OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Brandon N. Voelker

Covington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jason V. Reed

Debra S. Pleatman

Covington, Kentucky