IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah, in the interest of

A.M. and K.A.M., persons under

eighteen years of age.

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K.D.,

Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,

Appellee. )

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) AMENDED PER CURIAM DECISION 1

Case No. 20110963

‐ CA

F I L E D

(April 19, 2012)

2012 UT App 115

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Fourth District Juvenile, Provo Department, 1034509

The Honorable Suchada P. Bazzelle

Attorneys: D. Grant Dickinson, Provo, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. Peterson, Salt Lake

City, for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem

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Before Judges McHugh, Davis, and Christiansen.

¶1 K.D. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to

his children, A.M. and K.A.M. Father argues that the district court erred in failing to

1. This Amended Per Curiam Decision replaces the Per Curiam Decision in Case No.

20110963

‐ CA issued on March 29, 2012.20110963

‐ CA 2 require the State to provide him with certain information regarding the mother of the

children during her reunification services. Father asserts that the failure to provide him

with such information resulted in a denial of his due process rights.

¶2 Utah Code section 78A

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‐ 317(5)(a) sets forth that “notwithstanding any other

provision of law

. . . counsel for all parties to the action shall be given access to all

records, maintained by the division or any other state or local public agency that are

relevant to the abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A

‐ 6

‐ 317(5)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). Father argues that under this provision the Division

of Child and Family Services (DCFS) was required to provide him with all information

in its possession concerning the mother’s reunification efforts, including all references

to the mother’s mental health and drug treatment records. He further argues that

DCFS’s failure to provide him with such information prejudiced him because if he had

been provided with such information he would have taken more substantial efforts to

obtain custody of the children. As a result, Father asserts that the district court erred in

denying his eve

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‐ trial motion to compel the production of the records and to continue

the trial.

¶3 Even if this court were to assume for the sake of argument that DCFS could

produce the requested documents without violating federal or state law concerning the

protection of the mother’s confidentiality, the records were not relevant to the petition

to terminate Father’s parental rights. The petition was based upon Father’s conduct

regarding both the circumstances that led to the children being adjudicated as abused

and neglected and the lack of progress he made to remedy those circumstances. The

mother’s mental health records are not relevant to that determination. Father argues

that the records were relevant because, had he known that the mother was at risk for

not regaining custody of the children, he might have worked harder to comply with the

suggestions set forth for him in the service plan. Father’s argument is misplaced for

two reasons.

¶4 First, it is axiomatic that once a child is placed into DCFS’s custody due to the

abuse or neglect of the child’s parents, it is incumbent upon each parent, individually,

to take those steps necessary to cure the problems that led to the loss of his or her

custody. One parent’s success or failure does not necessarily affect the success or

failure of the other parent. Cf. In re A.K.

, 2008 UT App 423, ¶ 4, 198 P.3d 1001

(mem)(per curiam) (holding that court of appeals had jurisdiction to review an order

terminating the mother’s parental rights even though the petition to terminate the20110963

‐ CA 3 father’s parental rights had not yet been adjudicated). As such, it is entirely possible

that one parent may successfully regain custody of the child, while the other parent’s

rights to that child are terminated, especially when the parents are not married and

there is a history of domestic abuse. Accordingly, Father knew or should have known

from the date the children were removed that he was at risk of losing his parental rights

regardless of the mother’s independent efforts in seeking reunification.

¶5 Second, the timing of Father’s request for the records made them even less

relevant to the proceedings. Father’s argument for access to the records is premised on

his position that if he been given access to records allegedly showing that the mother’s

mental health would have made it difficult for her to regain custody of the children, he

would have taken more steps to regain custody of the children himself. However, by

the time Father requested the documents, a few scant weeks before trial, the mother had

died, thereby putting Father on notice that he must make independent efforts to gain

custody of his children. Consequently, by the time Father sought the records, they were

irrelevant to his decision to make the efforts necessary to become an adequate parent.

¶6 Because we agree with the juvenile court that the mental heath records of the

children’s deceased mother were irrelevant to Father’s fitness as a parent, we conclude

that neither the statute nor Father’s due process rights were violated. The juvenile

court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.

____________________________________ Carolyn B. McHugh,

Presiding Judge

____________________________________ James Z. Davis, Judge

____________________________________ Michele M. Christiansen, Judge