NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JORGE DE LOS SANTOS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50253 

D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00477-PA-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 30, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Jorge De Los Santos pleaded guilty to possession of child 

pornography and was sentenced to forty-six months imprisonment and a lifetime 

term of supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment and now seeks 

to modify a supervised release condition that restricts where he can reside. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 5 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

As part of his plea agreement, De Los Santos agreed to a supervised release 

term that prohibited him from “resid[ing] within direct view of school yards, parks, 

public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or other 

places primarily used by persons under the age of 18.” Shortly before his sentencing 

hearing, the district court informed the parties that it was considering imposing a 

residency restriction prohibiting him from residing within 2,000 feet of such venues,

rather than the direct view restriction they agreed on. Over De Los Santos’s 

objection, the district court imposed the 2,000-foot restriction. De Los Santos 

appealed, and our court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by imposing the 2,000-foot restriction. See United States v. De Los 

Santos, 827 F. App’x 757, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2020).

Roughly a month after completing his term of imprisonment, De Los Santos 

filed a motion to modify the terms of his supervised release, asking the district court 

to change the 2,000-foot residency restriction to a direct view restriction. The district 

court denied the motion, and De Los Santos now appeals that decision. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and review for an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2014). We 

affirm. 

De Los Santos first claims that the district court abused its discretion by 

refusing to modify the 2,000-foot restriction. When considering a motion to modify 
3 

a supervised release condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), a district court must 

consider relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A supervised release 

condition must be reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, “involve[] no greater 

deprivation of liberty than is necessary,” and be “consistent with the pertinent policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also 

United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court 

applied the correct standard and did not abuse its discretion. 

Relying on the particular facts of this case, the district court had a reasonable 

concern that De Los Santos should not reside at places where children would 

frequently walk by. De Los Santos admitted that he is attracted to children in public. 

He possessed a significant amount of child pornography, could not control his urges, 

and had a long history of viewing and collecting child pornography. And given the 

short period that he had been on supervised release, it was unclear how he would

perform on supervised release and what might cause him to reoffend. The district 

court reasonably believed that an objectively measurable 2,000-foot restriction 

would better protect children and provide better guidance to De Los Santos regarding 

where he can live than would a direct view restriction. 

Although the distance restriction makes housing harder to find, it does not 

infringe on De Los Santos’s liberty more than reasonably necessary to accomplish 

the sentencing goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation. Considering the 
4 

particular circumstances of this case, the distance-based restriction is not 

substantively unreasonable. See In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 1042 (2015); United 

States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Collins, 

684 F.3d 873, 892 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it determined that the 2,000-foot restriction should not be modified at this 

time.

1

 

De Los Santos also claims that the district court committed procedural error.2

Each of his arguments fail. First, the district court considered anew the § 3553(a) 

factors and whether the 2,000-foot restriction was substantively reasonable in light 

of existing caselaw and De Los Santos’s particular circumstances. The district court 

did not plainly err or prejudice De Los Santos by referencing our court’s previous 

decision. Second, it is not clear that De Los Santos had a right to allocution during 

his modification hearing, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c), but even assuming he did, he 

was not prejudiced by not having the opportunity to speak. And third, the district 

court did not plainly err by relying on undisclosed factual information provided by 

the probation office. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c).

1 As for Carrasco’s argument that the residency restriction is unconstitutional, 

“illegality of a condition of supervised release is not a proper ground for 

modification.” United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002).

2 Because he failed to raise these challenges before the district court, we apply the 

plain error standard of review. United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 
5 

Because De Los Santos has failed to establish that the district court abused its 

discretion or plainly erred when it denied his motion to modify his supervised release 

conditions, we

AFFIRM.3

3 De Los Santos’s motion asking this court to update the record and to take judicial 

notice is denied.