[Cite as Longo v. Longo, 2014-Ohio-4880.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO 

CHARLES V. LONGO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, :

CASE NO. 2013-G-3175

 - vs - :

JOY E. LONGO, :

 Defendant, :

(JEFFREY T. ORNDORFF, :

 Appellee). :

Civil Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 01 DC 

000861. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Charles V. Longo, pro se, and Matthew D. Greenwell, Charles V. Longo, Co., L.P.A., 

25550 Chagrin Boulevard, #320, Beachwood, OH 44122 (For Plaintiff-Appellant). 

Jeffrey T. Orndorff, pro se, Jeffrey T. Orndorff Co., L.P.A., 117 South Street, P.O. Box 

1137, Chardon, OH 44024 (Appellee). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Charles V. Longo, appeals from the judgment of the Geauga 

County Court of Common Pleas awarding appellee, Jeffrey T. Orndorff, fees for his 

services as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to appellant’s children during the course of 
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custody proceedings involving appellant and his former wife, Joy E. Longo (“Joy”). For 

the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm. 

{¶2} Appellant and his former wife were divorced on December 23, 2003. 

While custody proceedings were pending before the trial court, appellant moved the 

court to appoint a GAL for the Longo children. On January 28, 2009, the trial court 

appointed appellee GAL. The order of appointment stated appellee would be paid $125 

per hour and further provided appellant would be responsible for 67% of appellee’s fees 

and Joy would be responsible for 33%. The order required the parties to make their 

respective payments when bills were submitted by appellee. The record does not 

indicate either party objected to these terms. 

{¶3} In August 2009, appellee submitted his preliminary written report, 

recommending termination of an existing shared parenting plan and proposed that sole 

custody be awarded to Joy. The record indicates that, after the report was filed, 

appellant became somewhat abrasive with appellee. After a hearing at which the report 

was apparently discussed, appellant approached appellee and admonished the GAL by 

alerting him he was “f _ _ _ _ _ _ with the wrong guy.” Appellant ceased payment to 

appellee in early 2010. 

{¶4} In March 2010, appellant filed a motion to remove appellee as GAL. On 

May 21, 2010, the magistrate issued his decision denying appellant’s motion to remove 

the guardian ad litem. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

Thereafter, appellant filed a supplemental motion to remove the guardian ad litem. On 

October 15, 2010, the trial court denied the supplemental motion to remove guardian 

filed by appellant. In a second entry, dated October 15, 2010, the trial court overruled 
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appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. Appellant appealed the trial court’s 

judgment, but this court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. See 

Longo v. Longo, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2010-G-2998, 2011-Ohio-1297 (“Longo I”). 

{¶5} After litigating the custody issue for another two years, appellant and Joy 

reached a settlement of all outstanding motions in August 2012; the settlement was 

reduced to an agreed judgment, filed September 7, 2012, which resolved all remaining 

issues in the custody case. The record indicates Joy continued to pay the portion of the 

fees for which she was responsible throughout appellee’s tenure as GAL. Appellant, 

however, still owed appellee fee payments pursuant to the order appointing him. 

Because the settlement did not set forth a provision for outstanding GAL fees, appellee 

filed a motion for guardian ad litem fees on August 21, 2013. At the time appellee 

submitted his bill, appellant allegedly owed appellee $8,212.35 in fees. Appellant 

contested the motion and, after appellant deposed appellee, a hearing was held on 

June 17, 2013. 

{¶6} At the hearing, appellee submitted exhibits itemizing the time he spent as 

GAL and the fees he was requesting. Appellant did not contest the percentage 

allocation, the hourly rate, or the fact that he had not paid his purported share of the 

fees since January 2010. Instead, appellant primarily challenged appellee’s 

effectiveness as guardian, the adequacy of appellee’s billing procedures, and his 

purported failure to comply with various aspects of Sup.R. 48. After the hearing, the 

magistrate approved appellee’s fees and costs in the amount of $8,966.73. The amount 

was premised upon the work in which appellee engaged while advocating for 

appellant’s and Joy’s children as well as the additional work he was required to do 
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preparing documents, at appellant’s behest, for the post-motion deposition appellant 

conducted. 

{¶7} Appellant subsequently filed multiple objections to the magistrate’s 

decision. In particular, appellant argued: (1) the decision was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence; (2) the decision ignored the law set forth under Sup.R. 48; (3) 

the GAL admitted he did not keep records of his time; (4) the guardianship was 

terminated on September 19, 2012, but the magistrate awarded fees for time appellee 

billed after that date; (5) the magistrate ignored pleadings filed previously demonstrating 

appellee’s purported incompetence, fraudulent behavior, and other misrepresentations 

of fact to the court; and (7) the time itemized on the bill did not accurately reflect the 

amount to which appellee was supposedly entitled. 

{¶8} After reviewing and analyzing each argument, the trial court adopted the 

magistrate’s decision in full. Appellant now appeals and assigns two errors for our 

review. His first assignment of error provides: 

{¶9} “The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove the guardian ad 

litem where the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence established that he failed to 

fulfill his statutory and common law duties.” 

{¶10} Initially, we point out that appellant’s initial appeal of the trial court’s denial 

of his motion to remove appellee was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order in 

Longo. This conclusion was premised upon the recognition that other issues were 

pending before the trial court at the time and appellant would be able to obtain 

appropriate relief in a later appeal from a final judgment. Longo I at ¶19. Appellant and 

Joy, however, entered into a settlement agreement pertaining to the remaining issues in 
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the custody proceeding. The agreement was reduced to an agreed judgment on 

September 7, 2012, which settled all outstanding issues relating to the custody of the 

children and expressly stated appellee’s services as GAL were terminated as of that 

date. The appointment of appellee as GAL was a function of issues relating to custody 

of appellant’s and Joy’s children. 

{¶11} A settlement agreement is a form of a contract entered to terminate 

existing claims thereby ending litigation. Mentor v. Molk, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L138, 2013-Ohio-3975, ¶7. In Molk, this court emphasized: 

{¶12} “A party to a consent decree or other judgment entered by consent 

may not appeal unless it explicitly reserves the right to appeal. The 

purpose of a consent judgment is to resolve a dispute without 

further litigation, and so would be defeated or at least impaired by 

an appeal. The presumption, therefore, is that the consent 

operates as a waiver of the right to appeal. It is because the 

parties should not be left guessing about the finality and hence 

efficacy of the settlement that any reservation of a right to appeal 

should be explicit.” Id. at ¶8, quoting Assn. of Community Orgs. For 

Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d 261, 262 (7th Cir.1996). 

{¶13} In light of the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to remove, appellee 

remained GAL and continued to serve in that capacity, doing work until appellant and 

Joy voluntarily entered their settlement agreement. With the exception of the issue of 

GAL fees, the settlement agreement did not reserve a right to appeal any particular 

issue. Moreover, the settlement specifically stated that all prior orders of the court “shall 
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remain in full force and effect.” Thus, the prior order denying appellant’s motion to 

remove the GAL remained operative and, without reservation to appeal that issue, the 

settlement rendered any underlying issues relating to the custody matter moot and 

waived appellant’s right to appeal any of those issues. 

{¶14} Had appellant and Joy decided to continue the litigation and appellant 

received an adverse judgment, he could have appealed the denial of his motion along 

with any other issues attendant to that judgment. When the matter was settled, 

however, the custody litigation and any issues internal to those proceedings were 

terminated. We therefore hold appellant’s agreement to the terms of the settlement 

operated to waive any previous issues relating to the custody proceedings, including the 

denial of his motion to remove appellee as GAL. 

{¶15} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶16} Appellant’s second assignment of error provides: 

{¶17} “The trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees to the guardian ad 

litem, Jeffery Orndorff, where the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence clearly 

established that the fee amount requested was clearly excessive in light of the 

circumstances of the case.” 

{¶18} When evaluating an order for compensation to a guardian ad litem, a 

reviewing court shall consider whether the trial court abused its discretion. Bayus v. 

Bayus, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0062, 2012-Ohio-1462, ¶15, citing Davis v. 

Davis, 55 Ohio App.3d 196, 200 (8th Dist.1988). The phrase “abuse of discretion” is 

one of art; it connotes judgment exercised in a manner that comports with neither 
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reason nor the record. In re V.M.B., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0112, 2013-Ohio4298, ¶26. 

{¶19} Appellant’s second assignment of error asserts appellee’s GAL bill was 

clearly excessive. Appellant takes issue with specific aspects of the GAL fee bill. 

Specifically, appellant first asserts the bill is improper because it includes 19 calls for 9.7 

hours of time to Joy, yet includes no billing for phone calls to appellant. In appellant’s 

view, this demonstrates his fees do not reflect a fair representation of the children as it 

demonstrates appellee was unwilling to approach both parents to ascertain the 

children’s best interests. We do not agree. 

{¶20} The record demonstrates that, after appellee issued his initial report in 

August 2009, appellant became adversarial toward appellee. As the parties left the 

court house, appellee was speaking with Joy. Appellant confronted appellee and 

advised him: “Just to let you know, Jeff, you are f _ _ _ _ _ _ with the wrong guy.” 

Later, in January 2010, appellant advised appellee he would no longer be paying his 

fees. Then, in March 2010, appellant sought an order removing appellee as GAL. 

{¶21} Following a hearing on that motion, the magistrate determined between 

August 2009 to August 2012, appellee spoke on the phone only twice; however, dozens 

of written communications were exchanged between appellee, appellant, Joy, and other 

individuals to assist appellee in discharging his duties as GAL. The magistrate found 

that appellant disagreed vehemently with appellee’s findings, opinions, and 

recommendations. Nevertheless, the magistrate determined that appellant advanced 

no credible evidence that appellee failed to act in the best interests of the children. And, 
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he further found, appellee’s services were reasonably necessary, under the contentious 

circumstances of the case, to discharge his duties as GAL. 

{¶22} With the foregoing points in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that, even 

though appellee spoke on the phone more with Joy, he still communicated with 

appellant, among other individuals, in writing. And, given the record, it is also 

reasonable to conclude that appellee’s lack of phone communication with appellant may 

have been premised upon appellant’s less than amicable posture he took toward 

appellee after the initial GAL report was filed. Nevertheless, the fee statement 

demonstrates appellee communicated regularly with individuals relevant to his work as 

GAL. As a result, we fail to see how his 19 phone calls with Joy over the three-year 

period rendered him incapable of fairly and objectively ascertaining the best interests of 

the children. Thus, we conclude the fees billed for the 19 phone calls were reasonable 

vis-à-vis appellee’s role as GAL. 

{¶23} Appellant next asserts appellant spent 5.2 hours reviewing e-mails 

exchanged on 20 separate occasions between appellant and Joy. Although appellant 

recognizes it is necessary for a GAL in a custody case to be aware of the interactions of 

parents, he alleges appellee was unnecessarily “delv[ing] into the divorce proceedings.” 

He therefore maintains that reading these e-mail exchanges were unnecessary to make 

an informed recommendation regarding the children’s best interests. Again, we do not 

agree. 

{¶24} Appellant’s argument is premised upon speculation. Nowhere does the 

record suggest appellee was interested in appellant’s and Joy’s personal relationship 

except to discharge his duty to ascertain the children’s best interests. To make a 
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recommendation relating to children’s best interests, it would be necessary for a GAL to 

observe, whether in person, teleconference, or via e-mail, the general dynamic of the 

relationship between the parents. In doing so, a GAL can familiarize him/herself with 

any potential problems the parents might have amongst themselves or individually that 

might impact the children’s best interests. Appellant appears to concede this. We 

therefore conclude the hours billed for reviewing the e-mails were reasonable and within 

the scope of appellee’s duties. 

{¶25} Next, appellant argues that appellee failed to keep accurate records and 

failed to file an itemized statement and accounting with the court, in violation of Sup.R. 

48(D)(17). Appellant, however, fails to support this statement with any specific 

argument. The final, itemized bill was filed with the motion for outstanding fees; 

appellee later filed an itemized statement prior to a hearing on the motion which 

included additional hours he incurred accumulating documentation relating to his 

services at the request of appellant. Nothing, other than appellant’s ipse dixit 

allegations, suggests that the itemized statement is inaccurate or misleading. A GAL’s 

primary duty is to investigate a child’s situation and request a court to act in accordance 

with the child’s best interests. In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229 (1985). The 

statement offered by appellee purports to establish the time spent working in 

accordance with this general duty. The statement was filed in accordance with Sup.R. 

48 and appellant has failed to establish it was inaccurate or fraudulent. 

{¶26} Appellant finally asserts that the trial court did not afford him the 

opportunity to challenge the basis of appellee’s fees; instead, he claims the trial court 
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focused upon appellant’s character, rather than appellee’s billing statement supporting 

the fees. We do not agree. 

{¶27} At the hearing on the fees, there is no evidence the magistrate assailed 

appellant’s character. The magistrate presided impartially over the case, received 

evidence, ruled on objections, and asked relevant questions when necessary. 

Appellant was given the opportunity to specifically challenge the fees. He did not, 

however, attack, with any particularity, the fees appellee was requesting. For the most 

part, appellant contested appellee’s compliance with GAL duties, as set forth by rule 

and statute, and attempted to establish appellant was biased, engaged in fraudulent 

misrepresentation, and was generally incompetent to serve as GAL. Appellant was 

given an opportunity to be heard and the court did not compromise this opportunity. 

Instead, in his decision, the magistrate observed: 

{¶28} The parties never tried this case. They settled it. Plaintiff never 

attacked the Guardian’s recommendations in the course of a full 

hearing on the merits. The Court never had the opportunity to hear 

the guardian’s testimony and whatever evidence Plaintiff might 

have offered, either to rebut the Guardian’s conclusions and 

recommendations or to support Plaintiff’s own view of the issues. 

The Court has before it only the Guardian’s unrebutted testimony 

that he performed the services his invoice describes, and that in so 

doing[,] he acted in and represented the best interest of the parties’ 

children. The mere fact that Plaintiff disagrees with the Guardian’s 
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conclusions and recommendations does not mean that the 

Guardian failed to perform his duties. 

{¶29} We acknowledge the fees requested were significant; a review of the fee 

statement, however, facially demonstrates that appellee provided services relating to 

the case for the time accounted. Appellant requested the GAL and the parties agreed 

to the hourly rate at which the GAL would be compensated. The custody proceedings 

appeared to be somewhat acrimonious until the settlement was entered. Accordingly, 

without some evidence to refute or otherwise rebut the fee statement, we conclude the 

magistrate was correct in awarding the fees in this case. Therefore, given the limited 

and speculative nature of the challenges appellant advances on appeal, as well as the 

relatively thorough fee statement submitted into evidence by appellee, we conclude the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellee the fees he requested. 

{¶30} Appellant’s second assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶31} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Geauga 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., concurs, 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion. 

_______________________ 

 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion. 

{¶32} This writer finds no fault in the GAL’s performance based upon existing 

law. The essence of Father’s complaint is his inability under the existing law to 

challenge effectively the actions, conclusions or fees of a court-appointed guardian ad 
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litem. According to Father, the guardian’s opinion trumps that of the child and the child 

in effect becomes an object without voice or self-determination. 

{¶33} The present GAL model is essentially flawed and the literature is ripe with 

support for the abolition of this model. It does not give a child a voice in proceedings.1

 

Under the existing rules in Ohio, a guardian ad litem is immune from malpractice, 

malfeasance and essentially unaccountable (legally or financially) to the litigants. A 

guardian ad litem’s purpose is to give some sort of lay/expert opinion to the court of 

his/her idea of “best interest of the child.” This subjective opinion, usually made by 

someone without any psychological training, often leads to a custody determination with 

little regard for the preference of the child. This is absurd. 

{¶34} The guardian is well compensated at an hourly rate by the parties, per 

court order, and the parties are liable to a threat of contempt if the fees are not satisfied. 

The system lacks a set of objective criteria to guide the family, the court, the mental 

health professionals and the guardian. This model is not conducive to determining the 

best interest of the child. 

{¶35} The guardian ad litem is only accountable to the judge. The rules are so 

broad, and afford so much discretion, that there is effectively no criteria for determining 

if the guardian ad litem is truly representing the best interest of the child or 

inappropriately discounting a child’s preference. Absent from the statutes and case law 

are clear definitions of the rights of a child in a custody dispute. Ohio law is antiquated 

and replete with examples of children being treated as less-than-equal citizens. The 

 

1. Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 Yale L. & 

Policy Rev. 168 (1984); Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on 

Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041 (1991); Federle, Chidren’s Rights and the Need for 

Protection, 34 Fam. L.Q. 421 (2000). 
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case law denies them basic rights based upon their vulnerability as a means of 

protecting them. In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 572, 2014-Ohio-2597, ¶61. This defies 

logic as vulnerable populations deserve more rights – not less. 

{¶36} Many families and children are held hostage, financially and emotionally, 

in the limbo of a broken domestic litigation cottage industry. Short of a constitutional 

challenge and extensive work by the legislature, determining the rights of children to be 

treated equally as parties and participants in domestic litigation, this writer does not find 

a remedy to address the structural deficiencies brought to light in Father’s appeal. The 

few tools available to appellate courts in reviewing these cases, are an abuse of 

discretion standard; an anemic statute (R.C. 3109.04(B)); and Sup.R. 48. None of 

these tools give this court, nor families in distress, a solution, as they are completely 

subjective and do not provide a definitive remedy. 

{¶37} Therefore, I reluctantly concur.