1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JERRY W. JONES, 

Plaintiff

v.

JULIAN CASTRO, 

Defendant

Civil Action No. 15-310 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

(August 11, 2016) 

In this case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Plaintiff 

Jerry Jones asserts retaliation and discrimination claims regarding actions of his employer, the 

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Before the Court is 

Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Previously, the Court granted in part and 

denied in part Defendant’s [10] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court granted the 

motion with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and dismissed that claim with prejudice. The 

Court also granted the motion with respect to Plaintiff’s discrimination claims insofar as they 

were based on adverse actions other than the five-day suspension and reassignment of Plaintiff 

by HUD.

1

 The Court otherwise denied the motion. After the Court resolved that motion but 

before the Court held an Initial Scheduling Conference and set a period for discovery, Plaintiff 

moved to amend the complaint. Through that motion, Plaintiff seeks to (a) add a new retaliation 

claim based on an alleged conspiracy to coerce him to retire and (b) add additional allegations in 

support of the retaliation claim that the Court previously dismissed with prejudice. It is that 

 

1 HUD officials originally proposed to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Subsequently, the HUD 

decisionmaker, Patricia Hoban-Moore, determined that termination was not warranted. Instead, 

Plaintiff was suspended for five days and was reassigned to a different position within the 

agency.
2 

motion that is now before the Court. Upon consideration of the pleadings,2 the relevant legal 

authorities, and the record for purposes of this motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s [24] Motion 

for Leave to Amend Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the 

proposed amendment is futile, and therefore, the Court denies the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The pertinent background of this case, including the statutory and regulatory framework, 

the factual background, and the procedural background, were laid out previously by this Court in 

Jones v. Castro, No. CV 15-310 (CKK), 2016 WL 777917, at *1-*5 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2016). 

There is no need to do so here once again, and the Court reserves further presentation of the 

relevant background for the discussion below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “any order ... that adjudicates fewer 

than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... may be revised at 

any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and 

liabilities.” A motion to reconsider brought under Rule 54(b) may be granted “as justice 

 

2

 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: 

• Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 24; 

• Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 28; and

• Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 30. 

Because the Court will not follow the parties down the factual rabbit hole in which they seem to 

have fallen, and in light of the Court’s resolution of the issues presented in the motion to amend, 

the Court does not find Defendant’s proposed surreply to be of assistance in resolving the issues 

presented to the Court. The Court denies Defendant’s [33] Motion for Leave to File Surreply and 

denies as moot Plaintiff’s [34] Motion to Strike Proposed Surreply. 

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would 

not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
3 

requires.” Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Cobell 

v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004)). 

Under the “as justice requires standard,” it is appropriate to grant a Rule 54(b) motion 

“when the Court has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the adversarial 

issues presented to the Court by the parties, [or] has made an error not of reasoning but of 

apprehension.” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 241 F.R.D. 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting 

Singh, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 101). “Errors of apprehension may include the Court's failure to 

consider controlling decisions or data that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion 

reached by the Court.” Id. (internal formatting omitted). The Court has broad discretion to 

consider whether relief is “necessary under the relevant circumstances.” Lewis v. District of 

Columbia, 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its 

pleadings once as a matter of course within a prescribed time period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

Where, as here, a party seeks to amend its pleadings outside that time period, it may do so only 

with the opposing party's written consent or the district court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is entrusted to the sound 

discretion of the district court, but leave “should be freely given unless there is a good reason, 

such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1197 (1997). As the Supreme Court has observed: 

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 

subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the 

merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, 

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the 

leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.” 
4 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “[A] district court has discretion to deny a motion to 

amend on grounds of futility where the proposed pleading would not survive a motion to 

dismiss.” Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004), 

cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1104 (2005). Review for futility is practically “identical to review of a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the allegations in the amended complaint.” In re Interbank 

Funding Corp. Secs. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 215–16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). 

Because leave to amend should be liberally granted, the party opposing amendment bears the 

burden of coming forward with a colorable basis for denying leave to amend. Abdullah v. 

Washington, 530 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2008). 

III. DISCUSSION

The original Complaint in this case included a retaliation claim through which Plaintiff 

claimed that a variety of actions taken by HUD constituted retaliation for Plaintiff’s previous 

protected Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) activity. Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, 

¶¶ 113-121. The Court dismissed the retaliation claim in its entirety with prejudice. The Court 

concluded that none of the agency actions that were the purported basis for that claim other than 

Plaintiff’s five-day suspension and reassignment qualified as materially adverse actions that 

qualified legally as bases for a retaliation claim. Jones, 2016 WL 777917, at *9. The Court 

further concluded that, insofar as the retaliation claim was based on the five-day suspension and 

reassignment, the Complaint failed to state a retaliation claim because “Plaintiff ha[d] not 

plausibly alleged that retaliation for his protected activity was the but-for cause of his suspension 

and reassignment.” Id. at *12. As noted above, through the proposed amended complaint, 

Plaintiff now seeks (a) to add a new retaliation claim based on an alleged conspiracy to coerce 

him to retire and (b) to add additional allegations in support of the retaliation claim that the Court 
5 

previously dismissed with prejudice, specifically with regard to the five-day suspension and 

reassignment. 

Although both of these proposed changes relate in some fashion to Plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding a purported conspiracy to coerce him to retire, they raise distinct issues. Therefore, the 

Court first addresses the new retaliation claim that Plaintiff seeks to add to the operative 

complaint. The Court then addresses Plaintiff’s request to add new allegations in support of the 

previously-dismissed claim for retaliation, which Plaintiff seeks to have reinstated with regard to 

the five-day suspension and reassignment. 

A. Proposed Additional Retaliation Claim 

Plaintiff seeks to add a wholly new retaliation claim based on an alleged conspiracy by 

members of HUD’s Office of General Counsel to coerce Plaintiff into retiring prior to HobanMoore’s decision regarding the disciplinary proceeding as to Plaintiff. Defendant argues that the 

alleged retirement conspiracy does not qualify as a materially adverse action that could serve as 

proper basis for a retaliation claim. The Court agrees.3

As explained by the Court in resolving Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings, “[t]o prove unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he opposed a practice 

made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; 

and (3) that the employer took the action ‘because’ the employee opposed the practice.” McGrath 

v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “Materially adverse action would ‘dissuade[ ] a 

 

3 Because the Court concludes that the alleged retirement conspiracy was not a materially 

adverse action, the Court need not consider Defendant’s alternative argument that Plaintiff failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. The Court also need not 

consider Defendant’s argument that the proposed amended complaint does not allege facts that 

plausibly raise an inference of reprisal for Plaintiff’s EEO activity in connection with this 

proposed additional claim. 
6 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Bridgeforth v. 

Jewell, 721 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 

548 U.S. 53, 58 (2006)) (emphasis added). “To be materially adverse, the employer’s action must 

be more than ‘those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all 

employees experience.’ ” Id. (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68).

The Court reproduces here in full Plaintiff’s allegations supporting his claim that a 

purported conspiracy to induce him to retire was a materially adverse action: 

127.) HUD OGC was aware of Dr. Jones’ protected activity and was intimately 

involved in the disciplinary process involving him. By mid-November of 2011 

OGC learned that the third deciding official, Ms. Hoban-Moore, was not going to 

sustain the proposed removal against Dr. Jones and immediately thereafter 

orchestrated efforts to coerce Dr. Jones to retire before the disciplinary decision 

was issued. 

128.) It did so by providing him with false information that an unfavorable 

decision on the proposed removal was imminent, and that he would lose his 

retirement benefits if he were removed for misconduct. Defendant further 

suggested to plaintiff that only by retiring could he be completely cleared of any 

wrong doing. 

129.) Plaintiff was so concerned about the possibility of losing his retirement 

benefits that he agreed to retire, and began completing the paperwork to do so. 

Only through continued, repeated efforts by plaintiff was he able to determine that 

the information provided by HUD was false, at which time he rescinded his 

agreement to retire. 

130.) Defendant took materially adverse action against plaintiff that would 

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination when it gave him false information about Ms. Hoban-Moore’s 

impending disciplinary decision and the effect that a removal for misconduct 

would have on his retirement benefits, and pressured him to make an immediate 

decision to retire before the decision was issued. 

Proposed Am. Compl., ECF No. 24-2, ¶¶ 127-30. In addition, Plaintiff’s proposed amended 

complaint includes a new general allegation, outside of the context of the specific claims 

delineated, which mirrors the aforementioned allegations: 
7 

13.) HUD’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) was involved in the disciplinary 

process involving Dr. Jones, including by reviewing the proposal to remove Dr. 

Jones before it was issued, reviewing Dr. Jones’ written reply, becoming familiar 

with the substance of Dr. Jones’ oral replies, and advising each of the deciding 

officials. When OGC learned that the third deciding official had decided against 

terminating Dr. Jones, it immediately orchestrated an attempt to coerce Dr. Jones 

into resigning by knowingly giving him false information and suggesting that 

only by retiring could he be completely cleared of any wrong doing. Dr. Jones 

agreed to retire before learning that the information provided by HUD was false 

and rescinding his agreement. 

Id. ¶ 13. 

In short, Plaintiff claims that the agency provided false information suggesting (a) that 

Hoban-Moore’s decision was imminent and (b) that he would have to retire in order to ensure 

that he would not lose his retirement savings. As a result, Plaintiff began the process of 

completing the paperwork in order to voluntarily retire.4

 Plaintiff then abandoned this process 

after obtaining more accurate information regarding the impact of a potential termination on his 

retirement benefits.

Plaintiff characterizes representatives of the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development as “threatening” that he would be terminated and that he would lose his retirement 

savings if he did not retire voluntarily. See Pl.’s Rely at 6 (“Plaintiff has alleged that he was 

fraudulently threatened with being terminated for misconduct and losing his retirement benefits 

unless he immediately retired or resigned...”). However, this is not a fair characterization of the 

allegations in the proposed amended complaint. As noted above, the actual allegations only state 

that the agency provided false information regarding the Hoban-Moore’s forthcoming decision 

 

4 Plaintiff argues that the Court should not resolve factual disputes at this stage of the 

proceedings. The Court agrees that it is prudent not to descend into the factual morass entailed in 

assessing the materials attached by the parties and their various arguments regarding those 

materials. Accordingly, the Court will not consider materials outside of the proposed amended 

complaint in resolving the pending motion, which requires determining whether the proposed 

amended complaint would fail to state a claim.
8 

and false information regarding the ultimate objective consequences of being terminated. See

Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 128. That is, the proposed amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff 

was provided false information, allegedly knowingly, regarding the outcome of ongoing 

proceedings and the ramifications of those proceedings. The purported “threat” is actually a 

characterization by HUD employees of objective information, albeit information that turned out 

to be incorrect, not in any way a “threat” to take action against Plaintiff. Cf. THREAT, Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on 

another's property, esp. one that might diminish a person's freedom to act voluntarily or with 

lawful consent; a declaration, express or implied, of an intent to inflict loss or pain on another”). 

Moreover, the information provided by HUD employees regarding any impact of termination on 

his retirement benefits was verifiable through other sources, and Plaintiff ultimately resolved the 

questions he had regarding these factual issues. 

The Court concludes that these actions do not constitute a materially adverse action that 

can serve as the basis for a retaliation claim. As the Court noted in resolving the Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, “[a] long line of cases from this Circuit and others have held that 

threats, revoked disciplinary plans, and other such ultimately unconsummated actions are not 

materially adverse for purposes of retaliation claims.” McNair v. D.C., 903 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75-76 

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing cases); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (proposed suspension not materially adverse action). That is, actions that would have been 

materially adverse actions if consummated were not materially adverse actions because they 

were never ultimately consummated. So, too, here. Plaintiff was not, in fact coerced into retiring, 

with the attendant actual consequences. Plaintiff was only coerced into researching—perhaps 

anxiously—the ramifications of a termination, engaging in the thought process of considering 
9 

whether to retire, and beginning to fill out retirement paperwork. While perhaps undesirable, 

those actions do not rise to the level that would “ ‘dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making 

or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Bridgeforth, 721 F.3d at 663 (citation omitted).5

 

Notably, Plaintiff never alleges that the agency threatened to take some discretionary 

action if Plaintiff failed to retire voluntarily. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that the agency 

presented false information as to the objective consequences of Plaintiff’s ultimate choice. While 

Plaintiff alleges that this information was incorrect, he never claims that the agency threatened to 

harm him in any way. Moreover, because the agency simply was providing information about the 

consequences of retirement—albeit allegedly false information—it was possible for Plaintiff to 

verify that information through additional research, as he ultimately did, before making any 

definitive determinations regarding his retirement plans.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the allegations pertaining to the purported 

conspiracy to induce Plaintiff to retire do not rise to the level of a materially adverse action 

because it would not “ ‘dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.’ ” Bridgeforth, 721 F.3d at 663 (citation omitted). Because the purported 

conspiracy does not qualify as a material adverse action, the addition of this new retaliation 

 

55 Because of the posture of the pending motion, the Court does not consider materials outside of 

the four corners of the proposed amended complaint in determining whether the proposed 

amendment is futile. Plaintiff has availed himself of the opportunity to propose an amended 

complaint in light of the Court’s previous decision in this case, and the Court holds Plaintiff to 

the allegations that he chose to include in his proposed amended complaint. Therefore, the Court 

will not canvass the record more broadly, or attempt to resolve the factual issues raised by the 

parties, to determine whether the proposed amended complaint is futile. But even if the Court 

were to review material in the record identified by Plaintiff, it would not alter the Court’s 

conclusion that the purported conspiracy is not a materially adverse action. Specifically, because 

the standard for materially adverse actions is an objective one, Plaintiff’s description of his own 

subjective reactions cannot transform the purported conspiracy into a materially adverse action. 
10 

claim would be futile. Therefore, the amendment of the complaint to allow this new claim is not 

warranted.

B. Additional Allegations in Support of Dismissed Retaliation Claim

Before assessing Plaintiff’s proposal to add additional allegations in support of the 

retaliation claim that was previously dismissed with prejudice, it is useful to reiterate briefly the 

factual context for this claim. As a result of charges against him, a HUD official proposed to 

terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Jones, 2016 WL 777917, at *3. Ultimately, the HUD 

decisionmaker, Patricia Hoban-Moore determined that terminating Plaintiff’s employment was 

not warranted. Id. Instead, Plaintiff was suspended for five days and reassigned to work in a 

separate HUD division than the one in which he previously worked. Id. 

To the extent that the retaliation claim in the original Complaint was based on Plaintiff’s 

five-day suspension and reassignment—the only materially adverse action identified as the basis 

for that claim—the Court dismissed with prejudice the claim because “Plaintiff ha[d] not 

plausibly alleged that retaliation for his protected activity was the but-for cause of his suspension 

and reassignment.” Id. at *12. Plaintiff now seeks to add new allegations regarding causation in 

an attempt to show that the claim should be reinstated as to the five-day suspension and 

reassignment. The Court concludes that the new allegations do not provide a basis for allowing 

the proposed amendment—that is, for reinstating the retaliation claim as to the five-day 

suspension and reassignment. 

In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Hoban-Moore had “determined that 

HUD’s charges were unsubstantiated and that Dr. Jones had to be restored to active duty and 

reinstated in a suitable position” by “[n]o later than November of 2011.” Compl. ¶ 74. Plaintiff 

also previously alleged that “[i]n November of 2011, HUD notified Dr. Jones that Ms. Hoban-
11

Moore was about to issue a decision and that Dr. Jones should consider retiring or resigning 

before she did.” Id. ¶ 76. The Court recognized this series of events, see Jones, 2016 WL 

777917, at *3. Nonetheless, as a result of a thorough analysis of the entire series of events 

surrounding the only qualifying adverse action at issue—the five-day suspension and 

reassignment—the Court concluded that Plaintiff had not plausibly alleged a causal connection 

between Plaintiff’s protected activity and that adverse action. See id. at *10-*12. There is no 

need to repeat that analysis here, and the Court fully incorporates it into this Memorandum 

Opinion and Order. 

Plaintiff argues that the additional allegations show that the timeline of events that 

occurred in 2011 support an inference of causation regarding the suspension and reassignment. 

Plaintiff also argues that the additional allegations in the proposed amended complaint show a 

link between Plaintiff’s protected activity, Hoban-Moore, and the allegedly false retirement 

information that Plaintiff received from other HUD officials. See Pl.’s Mot. at 14-15. The Court 

agrees with Defendant that these additional allegations provide no basis to alter the Court’s 

previous conclusion that it was proper to dismiss the retaliation claim, as to the suspension and 

reassignment, because of the failure to plausibly allege causation. The Court first turns to 

Plaintiff’s argument regarding the timeline of events, followed by his argument regarding links 

between his protected activity, Hoban-Moore, and the retirement information that he received. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument regarding the timeline of events underlying the 

retaliation claim, little discussion is necessary. Despite Plaintiff’s tendentious suggestions to the 

contrary, the additional allegations regarding the timeline add nothing to the information that was 

before the Court in resolving Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, which addressed the original 

Complaint. The Court has already carefully considered that information in light of the applicable 
12 

legal standards. See Jones, 2016 WL 777917, at *10-*12. Accordingly, for the reasons stated at 

length in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion resolving the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

and incorporated here in full, these additional allegations cannot rescue the proposed amended 

complaint from futility. See id. Because the supposedly new allegations about the timeline add 

nothing to the allegations in the original Complaint, the amended retaliation claim would still fail

for the same reasons that it failed when the Court evaluated the original Complaint. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that the new allegations show a connection between 

Plaintiff’s EEO activity, Hoban-Moore, and the retirement information that Plaintiff received, 

this argument fails because the new allegations provide nothing beyond the original Complaint 

that shows that the EEO activity caused the five-day suspension and reassignment. A comparison 

of the original Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint is instructive. See generally

First Amended Complaint (Redline/Strike-out Version), ECF No. 25-1. The gravamen of the 

additional allegations in connection with this retaliation claim is the allegation that members of 

the HUD Office of General Counsel were aware that, in November of 2011, Hoban-Moore had 

already determined how she would ultimately resolve the proceedings against Plaintiff. See Pl.’s 

Opp’n (citing Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 73-81). However, these additional allegations do not 

in any way support an inference that Plaintiff’s EEO activity caused Hoban-Moore’s decision to 

impose a five-day suspension and reassignment. Taking the allegations as true, at most, they 

support an inference that the Plaintiff’s EEO activity, combined with knowledge of HobanMoore’s pending decision, contributed to the alleged conspiracy by the Office of General 

Counsel to induce Plaintiff into retiring. But the allegations in no way show the reverse—that the 

Office of General Counsel’s knowledge of Hoban-Moore’s plans and/or its role in the 

dissemination of false retirement information to Plaintiff caused Hoban-Moore’s decision. 
13 

Accordingly, because Hoban-Moore’s decision is the only adverse action still at issue in 

connection with this retaliation claim, the proposed additional allegations add nothing to the 

viability of that claim. This retaliation claim is no more viable than it was when the Court 

resolved the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dismissing the retaliation claim in all 

respects. That is, because the additional allegations do not add anything material regarding 

connections between Plaintiff’s EEO activity and the adverse action at issue (the suspension and 

reassignment) beyond the allegations encompassed in the original Complaint, the amended 

retaliation claim would fail for the same reasons that it failed when the Court evaluated the 

original Complaint.

In sum, none of the additional allegations allow an inference that Plaintiff’s EEO activity 

caused Hoban-Moore’s decision to impose a five-day suspension and reassignment. Therefore, 

there is no reason to disturb the Court’s prior conclusion that “Plaintiff ha[d] not plausibly 

alleged that retaliation for his protected activity was the but-for cause of his suspension and 

reassignment.” Jones, 2016 WL 777917 at *12. As a result, the Court concludes that the 

proposed amendment to the retaliation claim regarding the five-day suspension and reassignment 

is futile, and there is no basis to reinstate the retaliation claim as to the five-day suspension and 

reassignment.

* * * 

In sum, because all of the proposed amendments to the complaint would be futile, and 

because Plaintiff has provided no basis to alter its prior decision to dismiss the retaliation claim, 

the Court denies, in all respects, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. 

IV. CONCLUSION and ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Leave 
14 

to Amend Complaint is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s [33] Motion for Leave to File Surreply is 

DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s [37] Motion to Strike Surreply is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

As Defendant has already filed an Answer to the Complaint, the Court will set a date for

an Initial Scheduling Conference by a separate Order. 

Dated: August 11, 2016 

 /s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge