IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40118

Summary Calendar

SHADDONNA DIANE MILES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF TEXARKANA, TEXAS; VICKI NELSON, 

Employee, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CV-37

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Shaddonna Miles filed suit against Defendants–

Appellees Housing Authority of Texarkana, Texas, (HATT) and Vicki Nelson, 

alleging that HATT discriminated against her under the Fair Housing Act 

(FHA). The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-40118

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because Miles failed to allege facts supporting a prima facie case of 

discrimination. We agree and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

HATT, a government entity in Bowie County, Texas, operated the

Affordable Homeownership Program (the Program) to allow qualified 

applicants to buy or build a new home in a specified neighborhood. The 

Program received funding through the Hope VI grant provided by the United 

States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Eligible 

applicants for the Program must obtain a first mortgage to purchase a home

from an independent lender, and then the Program provides a second mortgage 

for the difference between the first mortgage and the price of the home. As the 

district court noted, the Program requires applicants, in addition to satisfying 

other requirements, to “have sufficient creditworthiness to be able to secure a 

30-year fixed market rate loan from a private lender at the maximum level 

commensurate with [the applicant’s] income and the lender’s underwriting 

criteria.” Miles enrolled in the Program in 2008, and Nelson began working 

for HATT in 2013. In May 2014, Nelson informed Miles that she was ready to 

begin the process of being prequalified for a mortgage through an independent 

lender. However, Miles was denied a loan for a home by Farmer’s Bank, the 

independent lender, because of Miles’s low credit score. 

On April 27, 2015, Miles filed suit against HATT and Nelson, asserting 

a discrimination claim based on Miles’s disability. In her complaint, Miles 

alleged that she has a disability—though she never identified that disability—

and that HATT failed to provide assistance to her through the Program, 

resulting in damages of $5,000,000. The defendants moved to dismiss Miles’s 

complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that they did not discriminate 

against Miles because she failed to satisfy all of the criteria for home-buying 

assistance through the Program and that Miles failed to identify a qualifying 

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handicap under the FHA. Nelson also moved for dismissal based on qualified 

immunity. 

The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge who 

recommended dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for two reasons. The magistrate judge found that because Miles never disputed 

that she failed to meet all of the eligibility criteria for assistance under the 

Program—she never received a mortgage from an independent lender—the 

defendants had not discriminated against her. The magistrate judge further 

found that Miles had failed to allege that her disability constituted a handicap 

under the FHA. The magistrate judge also concluded that Nelson was entitled 

to qualified immunity, as Miles alleged no “acts indicating Nelson violated a 

clearly established right or that her actions were objectively unreasonable.” 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations 

and dismissed Miles’s cause of action with prejudice. Miles timely appealed.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 

180, 185 (5th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This court 

“accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” United States ex rel. 

Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2014). 

In her complaint, Miles alleged that HATT and Nelson discriminated 

against her based on her disability by denying her assistance in purchasing a 

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home.1 Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), “it [is] unlawful . . . [t]o discriminate in 

the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 

buyer . . . because of a handicap” of the buyer. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford 

House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 (1995) (“The . . . FHA . . . prohibits discrimination 

in housing against, inter alios, persons with handicaps.”). The FHA defines a 

handicap as “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one 

or more of [a] person’s major life activities, . . . a record of having such an 

impairment, or . . . being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 3602(h). Although Miles stated throughout her complaint that she has a 

disability, she never identified this disability, alleged that this disability has 

any effect on her major life activities, alleged that there was a record of a 

qualifying impairment, or alleged that she was regarded as having a qualifying 

impairment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, we agree with the district 

court that Miles failed to state a claim for discrimination under the FHA 

because she failed to allege that she has a handicap as defined by the FA. 

We further agree with the district court that Miles failed to state a 

discrimination claim because she failed to establish that she was qualified to 

receive assistance under the Program. In Petrello v. Prucka, 484 F. App’x 939, 

942 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished), this court explained that one of 

the elements of “a prima facie claim of housing discrimination under . . . the 

FHA” is that the plaintiff “applied for and was ‘qualified to purchase’ the 

housing.” Here, the district court determined that Miles could “not establish a 

claim . . . based on discrimination [because] she never qualified for assistance.” 

 

1 In her briefing on appeal, Miles alludes to an intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim against Nelson and a negligence claim against HATT. “Although we liberally 

construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that arguments must be briefed to be 

preserved.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Price v. Digital Equip. 

Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988)). Miles has not sufficiently briefed these 

arguments, so they are waived. 

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We see no error in this determination. Obtaining a first mortgage from an 

independent lender was a stated condition of assistance under the Program, 

and Miles alleged nowhere in her complaint that she satisfied this condition. 

Because she has not alleged that she was qualified to purchase the housing, 

she has failed to state a claim of discrimination under the FHA. 

Finally, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Nelson 

was entitled to qualified immunity. Nelson pleaded qualified immunity, and 

once a defendant has pleaded a good-faith entitlement to qualified immunity, 

“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut it.” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 

312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials 

from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. 731, 735 (2011). As we discussed above and as the district court correctly 

recognized, Miles “fail[ed] to allege any specific facts indicating that Nelson 

violated a clearly established right.” Therefore, Miles has not abrogated 

Nelson’s qualified immunity. 

Because Miles failed to state a claim against HATT or Nelson and 

because Nelson is entitled to qualified immunity, the district court committed 

no error in dismissing Miles’s cause of action. The judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED.

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