NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD SCOTT ELSMORE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DARIO A. CRUZ, in his personal capacity; 

DONALD R. WALKER, in his personal 

capacity; BRIAN S. GONSALVES, in his 

personal capacity; GREGORY A. PECK, in 

his personal capacity; RYAN B.

SHACKLEFORD, in his personal capacity; 

STUART J. BUCHANAN; LISA CRAVEN; 

DJ’S AUTO BODY AND TOWING, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56429 

D.C. No. 

5:15-cv-01556-RGK-MRW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: LIPEZ,*** NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the 

FILED

JUL 25 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Richard Elsmore appeals the district court’s order dismissing his first 

amended complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm 

in part and reverse in part.

1. Elsmore alleges that Officer Dario Cruz’s tow of his unregistered vehicle 

from his private driveway violated the Fourth Amendment. “The impoundment of 

an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 

Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). “An officer 

cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the 

vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a 

hazard to other drivers.” Id. at 866 (emphasis added).1 Because Elsmore’s vehicle, 

which was parked on his property, posed no hazard to other drivers at the time of 

 

First Circuit, sitting by designation.

1 The community caretaking doctrine allows for the towing of a vehicle that 

“is parked in the path of traffic, blocking a driveway, obstructing a fire lane or 

appears abandoned.” Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 

2008). A tow may also be appropriate where it “provides security for the payment 

of [a] fine,” but only where a vehicle has “no current registration stickers and 

police can’t be sure that the owner won’t move or hide the vehicle, rather than pay 

the fine for illegal parking.” Id. at 1094–95 (emphasis added). This is not an 

illegal public parking case. Here, according to the allegations in Elsmore’s 

complaint, the vehicle was located at a private residence and the officer knew the 

vehicle owner’s identity. Standing alone, these allegations undermine the fineavoidance justification for towing the vehicle. See id. at 1095 (finding that 

knowledge of the vehicle owner’s address minimized the likelihood “that the car 

owner would abscond without paying [a] ticket”). The district court, however, is 

free to reexamine qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
3 

the tow, Cruz is not entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we reverse the 

district court’s dismissal of Elsmore’s Fourth Amendment claim.

2. Elsmore alleges that the post-deprivation hearing violated the Due 

Process Clause. We disagree. According to the complaint, Elsmore had the 

“opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting City of Los 

Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003)). In any event, there is no clearly 

established law that requires post-tow hearings to be interruption-free. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim on the ground of 

qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Elsmore v. Cruz, No. 16-56429

OWENS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

While I join in affirming the dismissal of Elsmore’s Fourteenth Amendment 

claim, I respectfully dissent from the revival of his Fourth Amendment claim. In 

my view, a reasonable officer could have perceived our statement in Clement v. 

City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2008), that a “tow may . . . be 

appropriate where there are no current registration stickers and police can’t be sure 

that the owner won’t move or hide the vehicle, rather than pay the fine for illegal 

parking,” as having authorized the tow of Elsmore’s car. And because existing 

precedent had not placed the tow’s purported unconstitutionality “beyond debate,” 

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted), the 

defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See also Kisela v. Hughes, 

138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (“Specificity is especially important in 

the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is 

sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . .

will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” (alteration and citation

omitted)).

FILED

JUL 25 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS