J-A18010-18 

2018 PA Super 325

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

RUTH WALLACE,

 Appellant

 v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

 Appellee

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2465 EDA 2017 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): September Term, 2008 No. 01840

BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER, J.**

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: Filed: November 30, 2018

Ruth Wallace appeals from the order entered June 30, 2017, wherein 

the trial court confirmed the arbitration award of January 19, 2015, and 

entered judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company (State Farm). We affirm the trial court’s order, but remand for the 

imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744.

The record reveals the following facts. In 2002, while insured by State 

Farm, Wallace was injured in an automobile collision with a vehicle driven by 

an underinsured motorist. Wallace’s State Farm policy contained an 

arbitration clause (Arbitration Clause). The Arbitration Clause required the 

parties to submit disputes over coverage to an arbitration panel composed of 

an arbitrator appointed by State Farm, an arbitrator appointed by Wallace, 

and a “competent and impartial third arbitrator” to be selected by mutual 
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agreement or judicial decision.1 January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit SF-5. 

Specifically, the Arbitration Clause empowered the arbitrators to decide 

whether Wallace was legally entitled to collect compensatory damages from 

the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle and the amount of 

damages. Id. Per the policy, the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927 

governed the arbitration, and the “written decision of any two arbitrators 

shall be binding on each party.” Id.

In 2008, Wallace filed a petition to appoint a neutral arbitrator and to

compel arbitration, averring that State Farm failed to pay all the proceeds to 

which she was entitled under the policy, and the parties could not agree on a 

third arbitrator.

2,3

 In support of her claim, Wallace averred that she had 

already appointed her arbitrator, but she did not name the arbitrator in the 

petition. Petition to Appoint Third/Neutral Arbitrator and to Compel 

Arbitration, 9/12/2008, at ¶ 22. After State Farm filed an answer to 

Wallace’s petition, the trial court appointed Shawn Ward, Esquire, as the 

 

1 There are references to a second insurance policy in the record. It is not 

clear whether only one or both of these policies apply. Nevertheless, the 

second policy contains a clause that is identical to the Arbitration Clause, so 

we shall refer only to the Arbitration Clause in the first policy for ease of 

reference. 

2 Wallace was represented by Jeffry S. Pearson, Esquire at this time. At 

some point prior to 2013, Elliot Tolan, Esquire began representing Wallace in 

place of Attorney Pearson.

3 The record does not reveal the reason for the gap in time between 2002 

and 2008 or details about Wallace’s claim to State Farm.
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neutral arbitrator, and ordered an arbitration hearing to occur within 60 days

of its February 20, 2009 order. Order, 2/20/2009, at 1. 

On July 19, 2013, State Farm filed a petition requesting that the trial 

court appoint a different neutral arbitrator in place of Ward, averring that 

Ward had never responded to the parties’ correspondence. State Farm 

contended that an arbitrator was especially needed to decide a dispute 

between the parties regarding State Farm’s motion to obtain medical 

records, work records, and an examination of Wallace under oath. In its 

petition, State Farm provided the name of its arbitrator, and averred that 

Wallace still had not named her arbitrator. Wallace filed an answer, 

agreeing that Ward should be replaced. Other than stating that her 

arbitrator was from Philadelphia, she still did not identify her arbitrator. Via 

an August 26, 2013 order, the trial court removed Ward as the neutral 

arbitrator, appointed Marc Rickles, Esquire in his place, and ordered that 

arbitration commence within 90 days of its order. Order, 8/26/2013, at 1. 

After continued disputes regarding State Farm’s requests, see January 

19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibits A-3–A-5, A-13, SF-1–SF-2, Arbitrator Rickles 

eventually scheduled an arbitration hearing for November 24, 2014, and 

requested that Wallace identify her arbitrator. January 19, 2015 Arbitration

Exhibit A-6 (September 22, 2014 letter from Arbitrator Rickles to Attorney 

Tolan and Joseph Hankins, Esquire, State Farm’s counsel). On November 

13, 2014, Arbitrator Rickles sent a letter to Attorney Tolan, which again 
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reiterated the scheduled date for the hearing, as well as stating that 

Arbitrator Rickles had not heard from Attorney Tolan or any arbitrator 

appointed by Wallace. January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-7. Attorney

Tolan replied to Arbitrator Rickles and requested that the hearing be 

rescheduled due to a scheduling conflict and his intent to withdraw from 

Wallace’s case.

4

 January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-8. In response, via 

a November 17, 2014 letter sent to Attorneys Tolan and Hankins, Arbitrator

Rickles notified the parties that he was rescheduling the hearing for Monday, 

January 19, 2015, and provided a deadline for requesting a new date if 

needed. January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-9. 

On January 16, 2015, the Friday before the scheduled arbitration 

hearing, Wallace and Allen Feingold5filed pro se a lawsuit against Arbitrator 

 

4 Attorney Tolan never withdrew and still represents Wallace on appeal.

5 The complaint alleges that Feingold “for a substantial period of time 

represented [Wallace] in these and other matters.” January 19, 2015 

Arbitration Exhibit A-10 at ¶ 1a. At the time Feingold and Wallace pro se 

filed the complaint, Feingold was disbarred from practicing law in this 

Commonwealth. Specifically,

[i]n 2006, [Feingold] was suspended from the practice of law for 

five years for several acts of misconduct which included: 

allowing a client to give false testimony, filing frivolous claims 

of fraud and civil conspiracy against opposing counsel, and 

assaulting a judge who ruled against [Feingold’s] client in an 

arbitration hearing. After [Feingold] failed to notify his clients of 

this disciplinary action and continued practicing law while 

suspended, [Feingold] was disbarred by our Supreme Court on 

August 22, 2008. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Rickles, State Farm, Attorney Hankins, the law firm of Attorney Hankins, and 

the attorney and law firm representing the underinsured motorist in 

Wallace’s third party tort action. See January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit 

A-10. The complaint raised claims of bad faith, breach of contract, 

“negligent misrepresentation,” “abuse of process,” fraud, and civil 

conspiracy, all of which purport to be related to the defendants’ conduct in 

Wallace’s underinsured motorists’ arbitration matter and the third-party tort 

matter. See id. 

On Sunday, January 18, 2015, Feingold sent a fax to Arbitrator Rickles 

and Attorney Hankins. See January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-11. In 

the fax, Feingold referenced the newly-filed lawsuit, requested that 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Feingold, 93 DB 2003; 92 DB 2005; Nos. 1093 and 1161 

Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis 

added); see also id. at 942-43 (reviewing Feingold’s pattern of filing 

vexatious and frivolous litigation against opposing counsel and defendant 

insurance companies).

We take judicial notice that the law license of Wallace’s original 

attorney in this matter, Attorney Pearson, was suspended for 20 months on 

June 28, 2011, for his assuming representation of Feingold’s former clients 

after Feingold’s suspension, and then assisting Feingold in Feingold’s 

unauthorized practice of law with respect to those clients. See Order, 

6/28/2011, in the matter of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pearson, 

No. 88 DB 2008; Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board of 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the matter of Office of Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Pearson, No. 88 DB 2008, January 26, 2011. Finally, we take 

judicial notice that the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania publicly reprimanded Wallace’s current counsel, Attorney 

Tolan, for his association with Feingold. See Public Reprimand, Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Tolan, No. 200 DB 2015, 4/13/2016.
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Arbitrator Rickles withdraw from the arbitration matter, and threatened to 

join State Farm’s arbitrator in the lawsuit as a defendant if he participated in 

the arbitration matter further. Id. He also stated that 

[o]ver the years, [he has] seen third arbitrators allow defense 

counsel to obtain discovery that they should not have be [sic] 

allowed to receive, but in this case, [Arbitrator] Rickles has 

crossed far beyond the line of fairness or neutrality and allowed 

the defense to obtain everything and anything they want 

providing an unfairness to this mater [sic] that violates the law, 

the case law, and shatters the discovery that is allowed in the 

State Farm policy to prevent the plaintiff, injured party, claimant 

from receiving a fair hearing, even before it starts. 

Id. In closing, Feingold stated that he “lost [his] law license trying to 

prevent injustice, but now, with no license, [he finds] that in a case where 

[he has] claims and old clients, [he] can do more to right those wrongs.” 

Id.

On the morning of the January 19, 2015 hearing,6 Wallace, Attorney 

Tolan, and the arbitrator purportedly appointed by Wallace failed to appear. 

Arbitrator Rickles attempted to reach out to Attorney Tolan multiple times. 

See N.T., 1/19/2015, at 4-5; January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-12.

After Arbitrator Rickles received no response, the arbitration hearing

proceeded without Wallace, Attorney Tolan, or Wallace’s arbitrator. 

Arbitrator Rickles and State Farm’s arbitrator, William Thomson, 

Esquire, began by addressing Wallace’s newly-filed lawsuit. They both 

 

6 State Farm attached the transcript of and exhibits from the January 19, 

2015 arbitration hearing to its Response to Petition to Strike, 3/10/2015, as 

Exhibit A.
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concluded that the lawsuit did not require recusal because each believed he 

could act impartially. N.T., 1/19/2015, at 41-44. Both declined to consider 

Feingold’s faxed request for recusal because Feingold was neither Wallace’s 

attorney nor a party in the case. Id. Thus, not only had Wallace failed to 

move for recusal, the arbitrators agreed that it was her burden “to produce 

evidence establishing bias, prejudice[,] or unfairness[,] which raises a 

substantial doubt as to the ... neutral party’s ability to preside impartially.” 

Id. at 40, 43-44. The two arbitrators then entered an award on January 19, 

2015, in favor of State Farm and against Wallace, noting that Wallace, 

Wallace’s attorney, and Wallace’s arbitrator had failed to appear. 

On February 18, 2015, Wallace, through Attorney Tolan, petitioned the 

trial court to set aside the arbitration award. Wallace averred that the 

neutral arbitrator had engaged in “bad faith antics” prior to the arbitration 

and unbeknownst to her, proceeded with a “sham arbitration hearing,” years 

after the August 26, 2013 order authorizing the arbitration, “with [Wallace’s] 

arbitrator out of the country and half way around the world and without 

[Wallace] or her counsel, all in spite of ... conflicts of interest” based upon 

the lawsuit filed by Wallace the business day before the scheduled 

arbitration. Petition to Strike Arbitration Award, 2/18/2015, at ¶ 14. 

The trial court initially granted Wallace’s request, see Trial Court 

Order, 4/6/2015, at 1, but in response to State Farm’s timely-filed motion 

for reconsideration, the trial court vacated the April 6, 2015 order pending 
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reargument. Trial Court Order, 4/13/2015, at 1. Following briefing and a 

rule-to-show-cause hearing on June 30, 2017, the trial court granted State 

Farm’s motion for reconsideration, vacated its April 6, 2015 order granting 

Wallace’s petition to strike the arbitration award, confirmed the January 19, 

2015 arbitration award, and entered judgment in favor of State Farm.

7

 Trial 

Court Order, 6/30/2017, at 1. Wallace timely filed a notice of appeal. Both 

Wallace and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Wallace sets forth three arguments in support of her 

contention that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition to strike the 

arbitration award. First, she baldly asserts that Arbitrator Rickles improperly 

allowed State Farm to access Wallace’s medical and third-party files, 

permitted State Farm to engage in “serial, repetitive improper discovery,” 

and banished Wallace’s arbitrator from participating in the process. 

Wallace’s Brief at 10. As a result, she claims she was denied due process 

and a “full and fair hearing.” Id. Second, Wallace claims that Arbitrators

Rickles and Thomson banished her arbitrator from participating in the 

hearing, panel deliberations, and fashioning of the award, and such 

banishment constitutes an “irregularity” that requires the trial court to strike 

the award. Id. at 11-13. Third, she argues that the award should be set 

aside based upon Arbitrator Rickles’s failure to recuse himself. Id. at 14-15.

 

7 The trial court attributed this lengthy delay to an erroneous administrative 

closure of the matter prior to the rule-to-show-cause hearing. Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/5/2017, at 2.
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As discussed on page 2, supra, the parties agreed to statutory 

arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Act of 1927. In 1980, the legislature 

repealed and replaced the Arbitration Act of 1927 with the Uniform 

Arbitration Act, 42 Pa. C. S. §§ 7301–7362. However, parties remain free to 

agree to proceed according to the 1927 Act. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Heintz, 804 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2002). Under these circumstances, the 

trial court must adhere to 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) in reviewing the 

arbitration panel’s award. Id. at 1214. Section 7302(d)(2) provides as 

follows:

(2) Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an 

arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall, 

notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify 

or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is 

such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have 

entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2). When the Arbitration Act of 1927 is applicable, we 

review the affirmance of an arbitration award using the following standard. 

“This Court may reverse a trial court’s decision to affirm ... an arbitration 

award arising from an insurance contract only if the trial court abused its 

discretion or committed an error of law.” Pantelis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 890 

A.2d 1063, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
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Before we address the merits of Wallace’s issues, we must address her 

failure to comply with our rules of appellate procedure.8 Wallace’s brief does 

not contain a single citation to the record, in violation of Rules 2117 and 

2119. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (requiring a narrative statement of “all the 

facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the points in 

controversy, with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in 

the record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be 

found”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring the argument in a brief to be 

accompanied by a reference to the place in the record where the matter 

referred appears). “We shall not ... scour the record to find evidence to 

support an argument; instead, we will deem [the] issue to be waived.” 

Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). Wallace also failed 

to compile a reproduced record that complies with Pa.R.A.P. 2152–2154. 

Compliance with the rules regarding the contents of reproduced records on 

appeal is mandatory, not directory. Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355, 

357 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

Even after State Farm pointed out Wallace’s failure to file a reproduced 

record or to cite to the record in any fashion, Wallace’s response was to file 

a reply brief with a section entitled “True History, Facts[,] and Improprieties 

Committed by [State Farm]” with 29 divided paragraphs that still failed to 

 

8 While we refer to Wallace because she is the party, we recognize that in 

reality, it is Wallace’s counsel, Attorney Tolan, who has failed to follow our 

rules. 
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comply with our rules of appellate procedure. See Wallace’s Reply Brief at 

1-4.

Wallace’s failure to abide by the rules of appellate procedure is all the 

more egregious given her broad and sweeping accusations of impropriety by 

Arbitrators Rickles and Thomson. Wallace’s counsel, Attorney Tolan, 

represented to this Court at oral argument that Wallace has had the same 

arbitrator throughout the case. However, despite Wallace’s argument that 

the other arbitrators banished Wallace’s arbitrator from the proceedings, the 

record contains no indication that Wallace ever named an arbitrator. In fact, 

the record is replete with documentation of unsuccessful efforts by the 

neutral arbitrator and State Farm’s attorney to ascertain the name of 

Wallace’s arbitrator.9 

 

9 See Exhibit B to Response to Petition to Appoint Neutral Arbitrator and to 

Compel Arbitration, 10/31/2008, at 1 (September 20, 2008 letter from State 

Farm’s counsel to Wallace’s counsel requesting that Wallace provide the 

name, address, and phone number of the arbitrator Wallace alleges she has 

appointed in paragraph 21 of her petition); Exhibit F to Petition to Change 

Arbitrator, 7/19/2013, at 1 (February 13, 2009 letter from State Farm’s 

counsel to Arbitrator Ward indicating that to its knowledge, Wallace had not 

appointed an arbitrator); Exhibit H to Petition to Change Arbitrator, 

7/19/2013, at 1 (February 20, 2009 letter from State Farm’s counsel to 

Wallace’s counsel and Arbitrator Ward requesting that Wallace provide the 

name of her arbitrator); Exhibit J to Petition to Change Arbitrator, 

7/19/2013, at 1 (April 23, 2013 letter from State Farm’s counsel to 

Arbitrator Ward indicating that to its knowledge, Wallace still had not 

appointed an arbitrator); January 19, 2015 Arbitration Exhibit A-11

(September 22, 2014 letter from Arbitrator Rickles to Attorneys Tolan and 

Hankins requesting the name of Wallace’s arbitrator). 
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Moreover, on appeal, Wallace repeatedly fails to identify where she 

objected to the participation of Arbitrator Rickles in the arbitration. See

Wallace’s Brief at 14 (claiming that Wallace requested that Arbitrator Rickles 

withdraw without citation to the record or any description of where the 

request was made); Wallace’s Reply Brief at 8 (same). This violates our 

rules of appellate procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring a statement 

regarding where the party preserved an issue in the trial court); 2119(e) 

(same). Wallace was similarly vague in her motion to strike regarding her 

alleged objection to the participation of Arbitrator Rickles. See Motion to 

Strike, 2/18/2015, at ¶ 13 (claiming that “[Wallace’s] counsel requested that 

the alleged neutral arbitrator not proceed with the arbitration...”). 

Indeed, the record belies her repeated assertions that she objected to 

the participation of Arbitrator Rickles. At hearing on the rule to show cause 

regarding State Farm’s motion for reconsideration, Attorney Tolan admitted 

to the trial court that he did not ask the trial court to appoint a new 

arbitrator, request a continuance, or appear at the hearing to place an 

objection on the record that the hearing was unfair. N.T., 6/30/2017, at 9-

10. The record reveals that Wallace never moved or objected to Arbitrator 

Rickles’s continued service as an arbitrator. Feingold’s fax demanding 

Arbitrator Rickles’s recusal simply does not constitute an objection by 

Wallace, as Feingold was neither a party to the arbitration nor counsel for 

Wallace.
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Wallace’s claim that she objected to Arbitrator Rickles’s failure to 

recuse himself is particularly troubling given the fact that her counsel, 

Attorney Tolan, also represented the appellant in State Farm Mutual Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). In Dill, this 

Court plainly held that even if an arbitrator “had an independent obligation 

to [disqualify himself voluntarily], such an obligation does not remove the 

onus from [the claimant] to object to the composition of the panel.” Id. at 

886. Failure to object to the composition of the panel results in a waiver on 

appeal of a claim that an arbitrator was biased. Dill, 108 A.3d at 886. 

Accord Sheehan v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 779 A.2d 582, 584–85 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (“[U]pon motion the arbitrator is the one to initially determine 

if a recusal request has merit[; i]t is the burden of the party requesting 

recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which 

raises a substantial doubt as to the [arbitrator’s] ability to preside 

impartially.”). Thus, Attorney Tolan is well aware that Wallace had to lodge 

an objection in order to preserve her claim. 

What is even more shocking is that it is Wallace who attempted to 

create a basis for recusal in this matter. Not only did Wallace file a lawsuit 

at the proverbial eleventh hour, she filed such a lawsuit along with Feingold, 

a disbarred former attorney who lacked standing, and did not plead “a single 

plausible cause of action that could possibly permit recovery under the law,” 

and made repeated “factually[-]unsupported accusations against [the 
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d]efendants,” which resulted in the complaint being dismissed as frivolous.10 

Feingold v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5478217, at *4 (Pa. Com. 

Pl. 2015), aff’d, 153 A.3d 1117 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished), petition 

for allowance of appeal denied, 160 A.3d 760 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam). 

Based on the foregoing, we hold that Wallace11 has waived all issues 

for appeal based both upon her failure to comply with our rules of appellate 

procedure and her failure to preserve her objection to Arbitrator Rickles’s 

participation in the first instance. Given Wallace’s failure to object to the 

composition of the panel in accordance with Dill, we have no trouble 

concluding that this appeal “has no basis in law and fact.” U.S. Claims, 

Inc. v. Dougherty, 914 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, we 

are compelled to impose sanctions sua sponte upon Attorney Tolan pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 274412 based upon his obdurate and vexatious prosecution of a 

 

10 Attorney Tolan’s continued reliance on this lawsuit as the basis for 

Arbitrator Rickles’s recusal is all the more concerning given Attorney Tolan’s 

public reprimand by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania for associating with Feingold, as mentioned supra.

11 Like the trial judge who decided Feingold, we question to what extent 

Wallace is aware of the conduct of Feingold and/or Attorney Tolan. See 

Feingold, 2015 WL 5478217, at *3 n.3.

12 An imposition of costs and fees is permissible under Pa.R.A.P. 2744 when 

this Court determines “that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or 

that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is 

dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744. “In determining the 

propriety of such an award, we are ever guided by the principle that an 

appeal is not frivolous simply because it lacks merit[; r]ather, it must be 

found that the appeal has no basis in law or fact.” Dougherty, 914 A.2d at 

878 (imposing sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744 based upon pro se 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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frivolous appeal despite his full knowledge that Wallace never preserved her 

objection to Arbitrator Rickles’s participation. We affirm the trial court’s 

June 30, 2017 order and remand to the trial court to determine an award of 

appropriate costs and attorneys’ fees to be imposed against Attorney Tolan 

in favor of State Farm.

Order affirmed. Case remanded for calculation and imposition of 

attorneys’ fees and costs occasioned by this appeal. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/18

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

appellant’s undeveloped arguments on appeal and “total inability to produce 

any evidence that fraud or misconduct resulted in the denial of a hearing or 

caused an inequitable [arbitration] award”). We may award sanctions sua 

sponte. Feingold, 15 A.3d at 943 (imposing sua sponte counsel fees 

against Feingold in wholly frivolous appeal of lawsuit filed pro se against 

defendants and opposing counsel for the purpose of harassment).