COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MARY WRIGHT JUARES, S/K/A 

 MARY JUAREZ 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 3106-96-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 DECEMBER 9, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Matthew T. Paulk, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Mary Wright Juares contends that the evidence at trial was 

insufficient to support her conviction for unreasonably or 

unnecessarily obstructing the free passage of others to and from 

private property open to the public and failing to cease such 

obstruction after having been requested to do so, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-404. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of 

a trial court sitting without a jury is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict 

and will not be set aside unless it appears 

from the evidence that the judgment is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 
- 2 - 

(1987) (citations omitted). 

 On July 6, 1996, City of Richmond Police Officer Shepard was 

working off-duty as a security guard at the Richmond Medical 

Center (Center). Shepard testified that, on several occasions 

between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., he saw Juares standing in the 

middle of the driveway that serves as the entrance to the Center. 

 She had "positioned herself in the center of the entranceway to 

the [Center]," and attempted to pass out brochures and to speak 

to people who were approaching the Center. 

 Juares stood in "the break in the sidewalk for the 

driveway," which was the only entrance to the Center. The 

sidewalk crossed over and merged with the driveway, which sloped 

down to the Center's parking lot. To enter the parking lot, 

vehicles were required to cross over the sloped sidewalk area. 

Because the entrance to the Center was adjacent to the driveway, 

people walked alongside the driveway to enter the Center. 

 On four different occasions, Shepard told Juares that she 

could not stand in the driveway. He advised her that she could 

stand on the sidewalk, that she could walk back and forth across 

the driveway, but that she could not stop and stand in the 

driveway. Each time, Juares had stood in the driveway for 

approximately two to three minutes. Shepard testified that 

"[h]er whole attitude the whole day was arrogant and very 

hostile." 

 Several people were required to walk onto the grassy area 
- 3 - 

next to the sidewalk to avoid Juares, who was standing in the 

driveway. Some of the people that she blocked were "just walking 

down the sidewalk," while others were going into the Center. 

Shepard estimated that twenty people entered and left the 

driveway that day. He was unsure how many vehicles entered. 

Once or twice, Shepard saw Juares go up to a car entering the 

Center's parking lot, "and actually put her hand on the car to 

hand the brochure or whatever it [was] that she was handing out 

to people coming into the [Center]." Shepard testified that had 

a car driven away with Juares' hand still on it, "[i]t's a 

possibility she could have been injured." 

 The last time Shepard approached Juares, he told her he was 

going to issue her a summons. In a bench trial, Juares was 

convicted of obstructing the free passage of others, in violation 

of Code § 18.2-404. 

 In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-404 provides that: 

 Any person or persons who in any public place 

or on any private property open to the public 

unreasonably or unnecessarily obstructs the 

free passage of other persons to and from or 

within such place or property and who shall 

fail or refuse to cease such obstruction or 

move on when requested to do so . . . shall 

be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 

(Emphasis added). 

 Contending that the evidence fails to support her conviction 

under Code § 18.2-404, Juares argues first, that her temporary 

presence in the driveway was necessary to permit her to share her 

views with the Center's patrons; and second, that any 
- 4 - 

inconvenience to motorists and pedestrians resulting from her 

conduct did not "unreasonably" obstruct the free passage of other 

persons. We find neither argument persuasive. 

 "Generally, the words and phrases used in a statute should 

be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a 

different intention is fairly manifest." Woolfolk v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). 

 The ordinary and plain meaning of "unreasonable" is "not 

governed by or acting according to reason" or "evincing 

indifference to reality or appropriate conduct." Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary 2507 (1986). See also Sydnor Pump & 

Well Co. v. Taylor, 201 Va. 311, 317-18, 110 S.E.2d 525, 530 

(1959) (defining "reasonable" as "just, fair, and suitable under 

the circumstances"). 

 "Necessarily" means "in such a way that it cannot be 

otherwise." Webster's, supra, at 1510. See also Scottsdale Ins. 

Co. v. Glick, 240 Va. 283, 288, 397 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1990). 

Conversely, "unnecessarily" means "not by necessity." Webster's, 

supra, at 2504. 

 The adverbs "unreasonably" and "unnecessarily" modify the 

verb "obstruct," and are an element required for conviction under 

Code § 18.2-404. The accused must be proven to have obstructed 

the free passage of other persons either unreasonably or

unnecessarily. Determining whether an obstruction is 

unreasonable or unnecessary requires an examination of the facts 
- 5 - 

and circumstances of each case. 

 Juares positioned herself so that people were required to 

walk around her, and vehicles were required to stop. She 

repeatedly refused Shepard's requests to cease blocking the 

driveway. She jeopardized her own safety and obstructed the free 

movement of other persons. As suggested by Shepard, she could 

just as well have proposed her views and tendered her brochures 

from the sidewalk without obstructing the driveway and the 

passage of other persons. She failed and refused to cease such 

obstruction when requested to do so by Shepard. Thus, the 

evidence supports the trial court's finding that Juares' actions 

were unnecessary and unreasonable obstructions. Accordingly, the 

evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of Code 

§ 18.2-404. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.