### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 18
- 00224
- CR

Terrence Roberts, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COUR T AT LAW NO. 1 OF CO MAL COUNTY NO. 2014CR1155, THE HONORABLE RANDAL C. GRAY, JUDGE PRESIDIN G

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted a ppellant Terrence Roberts of the class A misdemeanor offense
of forgery

. See Tex. Penal Code § 32 .21

. Th e trial court sentenced him to 365 days ’
confinemen t and a $ 3 ,00 0 fine but suspen ded imp osition of sentence and placed him on

comm unity supervision for twelve months. In one issue , appellant contends that the evid ence was insufficient to prove the elements of forgery as pleaded in the info rmation

. Beca use we conclude that the evidence was sufficien t , w e affirm the judgment of con viction

. Background
T he State ’ s case against appellant arose f rom an investigation by the Texas Depart ment of Insurance (TDI) concer ning a claim mad e by Scott R a per , w h o wa s the president of Central Insurance Agency (CI A )

. Rap e r reported to T DI that he had been presented with a copy of a Certificate of L iabi lity Insurance ( t he C ertificate) that purported to have been issued by2

CIA . Although it was a “ proper certificate form, ” Raper testified that he did not authorize i t , and
it ha d been forged

. Foll owing the TDI investigation , the State charged app ellant by information , alleging that on or about March 3, 2013, appellant forged th e signature of Scott Raper and alte r ed the policy effective a nd policy expiration dates th a t were listed on the Certificate wit hout the
authorization of C IA , “ being represented by Scott Raper. ”

A copy of the C ertificate was admitted as an exhibit at the November 2017 jury
trial . It refle ct s on its face that it was issued on March 3, 2013 ; th a t Raper purportedly sig ned it ; that “ Terrence Roberts Electric Terrence Roberts DBA ” w as the insured ; that the effective dates
of the listed insurance policies were Mar ch 3 , 201 3 , to Marc h 3, 2014; an d appellant ’ s current address and phone num ber s were pr o vi ded below his name

. Ra per testified at trial that a certificate of l iab i lity is a “ snapsh ot in time as of the d ay it was produced ” of insurance coverage
that wa s in force ; that C IA did not issue the Certificate ; that Rap e r did not sign it or authorize t he use of his stamped signature ; and that appellant previously had “ [ m ] ultiple policies over se vera l
years ” w ith CI A but that the last insuranc e that C IA had provided to him was “ over ten
year s prior

. ” A certificate of liability insurance that CIA had issu ed in 2001 and a forgery
af f id avit from Rap e r also w ere admitted as exhi bit s
. Raper attested that he did not si gn or authorize another to sign the Certificate and that the signature affi xed to the C ertifi cate was not
his “ genui ne signature and [was] a for gery of such. ” Th e 2001 certifi cate reflects an issu ance date of August 10, 2001 ; lists “ Robert s , Terrence Elect ric Terrence Roberts Electric ” as the
insured and the same address for appel lant as the Certifi cat e ; but it does not include his p hone

num be rs
. During his test imony at trial , Rap e r compare d and poi nted out simi lar itie s and discrepancies in the tw o forms

. A mong the similarities , both included the same policy a mounts3

and listed “ A ssociation Casualty Ins ur ance ” as an in su rer . Rap e r t es tified t hat CIA had n ot

“ represented American Ca sualty for a goo d 10 to 15 years

. ”

In addition to c alling Raper, t he State called Sharon Goodman, who was an employee at the corporate office of Rio Resources ; Dale Yate s, who was th e general manager

a n d CEO of R io Re sources ; and Robert Parchman, w ho was the investigator from the TDI fra ud
unit assigned to investigate the Certificate

. The j ury heard evi dence that a ppellant was an electrician who was working as a subcontrac tor for R io Resou rces on a project in M id land,
Tex as, when Ya tes asked him and the other sub contractor to provide proof of insurance to comply with bank financing requireme nt s ; that the only other su bcontractor “ packed up and left ”
when asked to pr ovide proof of insurance; that Ya tes r out inely tr an sp o rt e d documents from the job site in Midland to the office in a folder as the standard p ractice ; 1 a nd that appellant had given
documents to Yates that Yates transp ort ed to the office

. Specifica l ly as to this case, Goodman
testified that Yates delive re d a f older f rom the job si te tha t co ntained the Ce rtificate alo n g with
other docume nts includ ing appellant ’ s W

- 9 form

. Because th e policy period in the Certificate

1 When asked , “ What was the means you will get docum entation from the field to the corporate office, ” Goodman answered, “ When daily [Yates] w oul d go ba ck and forth, h e would bring an y invoices, any requested documents

. ” S he also confirmed that this was the “ normal ” prac tice. Y ates testified c onsistently to th is practice of transporting documents from the field to the office and that he had r ece ived documents from ap pellant to transport to the office : Q. Do you reg ularly receive documents from contractors out in the field in Midland? A. Traditionally I do. I tr ansport documents between the fi eld and our office. Q. And have you ever re ceived do cuments from the Defen dant in this case, [appellant] ? A. Yes.
When asked the “ normal method ” that he received documents from appellant, he testified that “ [s] ometimes [he] would receive paperwork from him that [Yates] w ould transport to the office in a f

older, d i ffere nt statem ents and thi ngs.
. . . ”4

w as about to ex pire , Good man testified that she n otified appellant “ multiple times ” “ via e
- mail and phone and left voice messag es ” that he “ w ou ld need to s ubmit an updated Certificate of
Insura nce ” an d that she e
- mailed a copy of the Certifi cate as an attach ment to appellant , but he did not provide an updated c ertificate

. Yates also talked to a ppell ant about the need for a curren t policy a fter the stated p o licy period in the Certifi cate had expired

.

A fter the policy period in the Certifi cate expired , Goodman contacted CIA to ask them to forward an updated c ertificate , but CIA did not have a po licy that matched the p olicy
numbe r re flected on the Certific a te

. Good man then p rovided a copy of the C ertificate to CIA

. After re ce iving the copy , Ra per contacted the TDI to report the for ged Certificate

. As p art of his investigation, Parchman cont ac ted app ellant, Raper, Goo dman, and Y ates

. P a rc hma n tes tified

t h at h e identified appellant as the s uspect and sc heduled a meeting with appellant by phone but
did not have further cont act wit h appellant despite numerous a ttem pts to do so , that appellant

w as the on ly person who benefited from the C ert ific ate , and that appell a nt did not provide an expla nation to him during the four years that the ca se was pending

. Parchman believed that appellant was avoiding him

.

The def ense theory was that appella nt d i d not have knowle dge of the Certificate
and that he provided insurance from a different company other t han CIA when Rio Reso urces asked him to do so. A ppellant testified on his own behalf , denying that he had possess ion of the
Certificate or kn ew of its e xi stence u n ti l he was provided with a copy during the case. Although
he confirmed t hat he “ put packets together to send back to Midland or the y were dropped off at
th eir office a nd there was [sic] numerous documents in th e packet, ” he denied that he incl ud ed
the Ce rtificate in any packet. He t estified that the “ first time [ he ] had ever seen [ the Certi fica te ]

wa s when S haron Good man sent it to him. ” He denied that he had c reated or provided the5

Cer tificat e to Rio Resources

. The evidence was u ndisputed t ha t no clai ms were filed on the purporte d insurance policy reflected in the Cert i ficate and that appellant sub s equently provided
insurance from another c ompany for the project , but that he worked on the project and received
compe nsation durin g the time per io d that th e Cer tifi cate was on file wit h R i o Resources a nd he
did not have other insurance . A ppellant testified that he event ually left the project because of
issues that he had with Good man
.

The jur y found appellant guilty of the cla ss A misdemeanor o ffense of f org ery
. See Tex. Penal Code § 32.21

. The trial court sentenced appellant to 365 day s ’ confinement and a $ 3 ,00 0 fine but suspen d ed impositi o n of sentence and placed him on comm unity superv is ion for
twelve months

. T he trial c ourt d enied a ppel la nt ’ s motion fo r new trial , and this appea l followed.

A na lysis
Standard o f Re view

Under t he legal sufficiency standard of review , we conside r the evide nce in the light most favorable to the verdict a nd determine whether “ any rational trier of fact coul d have
found t he essential elements of th e crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Nisbett v. State , 5 52 S.W.3d 2 44, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under

t his standard, w e defer to t he jury ’ s r esolution of conflicts in testimony , we ighing o f the

e vidence , a n d drawing of reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State , 330 S.W. 3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; s ee Nisbett , 552 S .W.3d at 262 (explaining that
standard of sufficienc y review “ g iv e s full play t o the respon sib ility of t h e factfinder ” and that

“ court ’ s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against rare occurr ence when the factfinder does not act rationally ” ) ; Ramsey v. State , 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ( “ The trie r of6

fact is t he exclusive judge of the c r edibility and weight of the evidence and is permitted to draw any reasonabl e inference from the evidence so long as it is supported by the record. ” )

.

We apply the same standard to direct and c ircumstanti al evid en ce. Isass i , 3 30 S.W.3d at 638. “ It is not necessary that the evid ence directly prove the defend ant ’ s gu ilt;

c ircumstantial evidence is a s probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant ’ s guilt, and
circumstantial evidence can alone be suffici en t to establish guilt. ” Nisbett , 552 S. W .3d at 262.

“ Each fact need not point di rectly and independently to the defendant ’ s guilt if the cu mu lative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. ” Id.

“ Furthermore, th e trier of fact may use common sense and a pply common knowledge, observation, and e xperience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from
the evidence

. ” Acosta v. State , 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; see Kitzmiller

v. State , No. 0 2

- 14

- 00309

- CR, 2 015 Te x. App. LEXIS 7681 , at *8 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 2 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designate d for publication) ( “ A juror is not required to
check his or her common sense at the door. ” )

. Sufficiency of Evidence to S u pport Forgery C o nviction

A pe rson commit s the of fen s e of forgery “if he forges a writing with inte nt to
defraud or harm another. ” See Tex. Penal Code § 32.21(b). “ Forge, ” in relevant part, means “ to alter, make, complet e, execute, o r authenticate any writing so th at it purports : (i ) to be the act of

anot h e r who did not authorize that act. ” Id. § 32.2 1 (a) ( 1)(A)(i)

. To prove the requisite intent to
ha rm or defraud another in a forgery case, “ the trier of fact must b e able to reasonably infer that Appellant knew th e instrument was fo rged beyond a reasonab l e doubt. ” Ramsey , 473 S.W.3d at
809 ; see Okonkwo v. State , 398 S .W.3d 689, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ( “ [T]he State7

necessarily had to prove that [ a ppellant] knew that the bills were forged. ” ). The intent to defr au d or harm may be established by circums t a ntial evidence, Leroy v . State , 512 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) ( citing Williams v. State , 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 85) ), altho ugh the “ mere possession, passage, or pr ese ntment of a fo rged
instrument does n o t support an inference of inten t to defraud , ” id. (citing Parks v. State , 746 S .W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987))

.

In his sole iss ue, appellant argues that the evidence w as insuffi cient to pr ove that
he commi tt ed the offense of forgery as pleaded in t he inform ation

. Appellant concedes that the
evidence was s ufficient to suppor t a finding that Rap e r ’ s signature on the Certifi cate was not
authorize d but argues that the e vi dence was insu fficient “ to prove who pl ac ed it on the
d ocu ment ” and that there w a s no evidence that the policy effective and expiration dat es on the
Certificate had been alter ed . He further argues that there was no evidence that he altered the
Certifi cate or that he ha d the intent to defraud o r harm. He a rgu es that his “ only connect i o n ”
with the Certifi cate wa s that “ his name, address and phone number were on the ‘ header ’ of the
do cume nt ” and tha t Good m an

— a person with whom he “ did not have a g ood relationship ”

—

“ was the only witness who claime d to hav e re ceived th e allegedly fo rged docume n t from
A ppe llant

— but through their boss, Mr. Yates

. ” Goodm an testified that she re ceive d th e Cert ifica te in a folder that Ya tes delivered from the jo b site

.

Appellant also focuses on the evidenc e of his c o n t inued employment o n the project , the ins u r ance that h e obtained from a n other agency in response to Rio Resources ’ request , and Yates ’ s equivocal testimony as to whether he de live red th e Certificate to the office

. Yates testified t hat he ha d r e c eived do cu ments from appella n t that he transported to t he office
and that he “ [ s ] ometimes ” lo oked at the document s tha t he transported to the office , but that he8

did not recall if he looked at the Cer tificate , other than “ [nothing] if any, at more th a n a casual gl an ce
. ” He later tes t ified that he “ [d id] not r ecall on e way or the other on that

— on the [Certificate ] t ransfer, ” although he “ [was] sure ” that he transported a W

- 9 form from appellant

. A ppellant ar gue s that his conti nued employment showed that “ he was in no d anger of losing h is job ” and “ th ere was n o benefit to [him] to for ge [the Certificate], especially since he secured a policy f rom a different agency. ” The jur y , however, reasonably could have credited the evidence that : (i) R io Resources required app el lant to provide pr oof of insura nce; (i i ) ap p e lla nt admitted to del iver ing
docume nts to Yates to t ake to the offi ce , whic h was the routine practice for transporting
documents from the field to the office ; (ii i ) the Certificate was among the docume nts that Y ates
delivered to the office ; (i v ) after Good man and Yates contacted him ab out the insu rance policy

e xpirin g and Good ma n sent h im a copy of the C e rtificate , appellant did not disclaim or deny that he had provided the Certificat e to Rio Resources ; 2 ( v) ap pe llant previously h ad “ multiple ”
po l icies with CIA but had not had a policy with CIA for over ten years ; (vi) the Cer tif icate was a

“ proper certi f

i cate form ” ; (v i i ) the Certificate reflect s the effective dates of the purporte d CIA poli c y to be from March 3, 201 3, to March 3, 2014; (v i i i ) appellant receive d compensation from the project w hile the Certificate was on file with Rio Reso urces ; and ( ix ) a p pellant ’ s compensation from the project w as his primary source of income

. The jury also h ad the two
forms t o compar e

— the 2 001 c ertificate that showed appellant ’ s previous i ns urance coverage

2 Yates testified that he discussed the expire d i nsurance policy with appellant an d explained to him the need for a current poli cy : Q. Did you speak to the D efendant about his p ol icy? A. Yes, I said t hey h ad to have a current po licy

. Q. What was his response? A. He would get me one.9

with CIA and his address and th e Certificate that contained his current ph o n e numbers in
addition to his address

.

This evidenc e s uppo r t s that appella nt had a motive for p roviding the Certific ate to
Rio Resources

. See Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 265 ( “ Whi le motive is not by it s elf enoug h to

es t ablish guilt of a cri me, i t is a significant ci rcums tance indic a ting guilt. ” ); Russo v. State , 228 S.W.3d 779, 794 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2 007 , pet. ref ’ d) ( expla ining that evidence of motive

“ is releva nt as a circumstance tend ing to prove guilt ” )

. The jur y al so could have found signi f i cant the evidence of appellant ’ s response s and conduct when asked about the Certificate

. According to Yate s a nd Good man , appellan t did not d eny the existence of the Certifi c ate or disclaim that he had gi ven it to Rio Res ources w hen they asked him about i t , and Parchman
testified that appellant avoided him and did not pro vide an ex planation d uring the f our year s t hat the case was pen ding

. See Rachal v. State , No. 14

- 07

- 00410

- CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7258,
at *14

– 16 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1 4th Dist.] Sept. 11, 2008, n o pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( c oncluding that de f endant ’ s silence in face of inc riminating comment s was significa nt because comments wer e of ty pe th at “ reasonable person could be expected to deny or
refu te if untrue ” ); see also Elizon do v. State , No. 14

- 98

- 00493

- CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2058, at *3 (Tex . App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] M ar. 30, 2000, pet. re f ’ d) (not designated for pub lication) ( “ To gi ve silence the effect of an admission, the statement must be one w hich a normal person woul d be moved to deny if untrue. ” ). Although appellant denied th at he had provided the Certificate to Ri o Resour ces du rin g h is test imony at trial , the jury was free to
d isbelieve him

. See Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 262; Bustamante v. St ate , 106 S.W.3d 738, 741 ( T ex. Crim. App. 2003) ( explaining that it is withi n jury ’ s discretion to disbelieve witness ’ s

“ sel f

- s erving ” testimony ).10 Although th e above

- re cited eviden ce does not cons t itute direct evidence of forgery , viewed in the light mos t favor able to the verdic t , it constitute s c ircumstan tial evidence from which a rational jury could draw reasonable inferenc es that appellant forge d Raper ’ s

s ignature and al tered the policy effective and expirat ion dates on the Certificate w ith the intent to
defraud or harm. S ee R a msey , 473 S.W.3d at 8 11 (concluding that defendant ’ s forgery conviction was supported by c ombined an d cumulative force o f all evidence ); De La Paz

v. State , 279 S.W.3d 336, 350 n.46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ( “ While it is hypothetic ally possible
that a case o f for gery could be established by direct evidence, such as eyewi tn ess testimony,
most cases of fo rge ry rest on circumsta ntial evidence. ” )

.

Appellant argues that “ [t ]he state of the evidence in this case is like that found in
Jo hnson v. St ate , 425 S.W.3 d 516, 521 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist. ] 2012 , no pet.). ” We
f ind that case factually disti nguish abl e. In that case , t h e a ppellant , who d id not testify at trial,
was listed as the payee on a forged money order and cas hed it , but there was no evidence of h ow

a ppellant obtain ed possession o f the money order or about the p ayor identified on the money

or der

. Id. at 518 , 522

. Ou r sister court reversed the forgery conviction, concluding that th e State
fa il ed to present evidence to sh ow th at the appellant kne w the money order was forged or possessed the intent to defraud or harm. Id. at 524. In reaching its conclusion, o u r sis ter court expla ined that the State did not inv estigate “ the existence, identity, or whereabouts of the money
order ’ s payor ”

— “ [ t]here w a s no evidence that the payor on the money order did not exist, or testimony from the pay or disclai min g a relationship wit h app ellant. ” Id.

In contrast to the facts before our sister court in Jo hnson , the State ’ s evidence in

t his case included the tes t i mony from Raper , w hos e signat ure was forged on the Certificate

. The undisputed evidence showed t hat appellant had “ mul tip le ” insuran ce policies with CIA b ut that11

the last insurance CIA had provided to him was “ over ten years pri or ” and that Rap e r di d n o t have communication s with appellant

. See Tucker v . State , N o. 05

- 06

- 00746

- CR,
2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 1 0742, at * 5

– 6 (Tex. Ap p.

— Dallas Dec . 18, 2006, n o pet .) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that evide nce was sufficient to prove that d e fendant forged check w ith intent to defraud or harm another ; e xplaining that t here was “ no p lausi ble legitimate explanatio n for appellant ’ s possession and presentment of the check ” ; a nd l isting
evidenc e that check was produce d to resemble v ictim ’ s busine s s checks, appellant ’ s name an d address were typed on check, victim always hand wrote checks, victim di d not know appellant, and victim did not sign or authorize check)

. 3

A ppellant also argues that the State failed to prove an int ent to d efraud or harm
be c a use “ there is no clearly identifiable person t oward whom Appellant ’ s purported intent to
defraud or harm could have been d irected. ” The State , howe ver, was not re quired to prove that appellant intended to defraud or harm a speci fic person

. See Ford v. S t ate , 282 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex . App.

— Austin 2009, no pet.) ( explain ing that “ the State had only to pr ove that appellant

3 We also co n c l ude that the other cases that appellant cites to support his challenge to the sufficiency of the evid ence are factually distinguishable or unhelpful to appe l l ant ’ s position

. See , e.g . , Burks v. Stat e , 693 S.W .2d 932, 93 8 (T ex. Crim. App. 1985) ( conclud i n g cir cums tantial eviden ce was sufficient to support conviction for forgery by possession ) ; Williams v. State , 688 S.W.2 d 486, 488

– 90 (Tex. Crim. App . 1985) ( di scussin g evide nce that su pported defendan t ’ s kno wledge that check was forg ed and con cluding tha t “ inte nt to harm or defraud was proved circumstantially by the testimony of the State ’ s witnesses ” ) ; So lis v. State , 611 S.W. 2d 433 , 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981 ) (finding that evi dence wa s insuffi cient t o s upport convicti on for forgery by passing where ther e was n o evidence to show that appellant knew that instrument was forged or that she passed it with intent to defraud or harm ); P fleging v. State , 572 S.W.2d 5 17 , 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 78) (finding tha t evidence was insu fficient to support con viction for f o rgery because there was no evidence to show defendant ’ s k nowledge that check was forged or that check was “ passed with intent to defraud or harm ” ) ; Colburn v

. S ta te , 501 S.W.2d 680 , 68 2 (Te x. Crim. Ap p. 1973) ( concludi ng that circumstantial evid ence supp o r t ed t hat def e ndant knew that check was forged when he passed it ); Lossman v. State , 66 8 S.W. 2d 504 , 506

– 07 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1984, no p et.) ( same)

.12

int ended to defraud or harm another , ” not particular victim ). We also observe that the State in
this case d id not allege a spe cific p e rson wh om appellant intended to defraud or harm , but that appellant “ did then and there with intent to d efraud or harm anoth er
. ”

We conclude that the combined and c umulative force of all the evidence a t trial,
view ed in the l ight most favorable to th e jury ’ s conviction, was sufficient to allow a rational jury
to find th e elem ents of forgery as ple ad ed in the in formation beyon d a reasonable doubt. See
Jacks on , 443 U.S . at 319; Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 262 ; Ramsey , 473 S.W.3d at 811

. We overr ule appella n t ’ s sole issue.

Conclusion

Having overrule d appellant ’ s sole issue , we affirm the tr ial court ’ s ju dgme nt
of conviction.

__________________________ ________________ Melissa Goodwin , Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly
Af f ir med
Filed: October 11, 2019
Do Not Pub lish