* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### FEB 19 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARIE A. WALKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5134 (D.C. No. 95-C-354-M) (N.D. Okla)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Marie A. Walker appeals from the order of the district court which affirmed the final decision of the Secretary of the Social Security Administration denying her request for disability b enefits. The sole issue presented for our review is whether, under the circ umstances of this case, the ALJ erred in failing to obtain a consultative examinati on to ascertain the current state of claimant’s vision loss. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Inreviewing the Secretary’s decision, we determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary appl ied the correct legal standards. See Miller v. Chater , 99 F.3d 972, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantia l evidence is “adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mi nd might accept to support a conclusion.” Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388-89 (10th Cir. 1995). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion f or that of the Secretary. Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995). Claimant’s application, filed March 4, 1993, was de nied initially and on reconsideration. At the administrative hearing con ducted on July 20, 1994 by the1 We note, as did the district court, that no evidenc e in the record links the

iritis with claimant’s degenerative diabetic condit ion. Iritis is “an inflammation of the iris.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary802 (25th ed. 1990). Claimant’s medical records also use the term “uveitis,” which is an “inflammation of the uveal tract: iris, ciliary body and choroid.” Id. at 1678.

2 On appeal, claimant challenges only the ALJ’s findi ngs concerning her visual impairment, although she describes additiona l impairments. We note that the objective medical evidence does not bear out he r testimony on the extent of these impairments, either. At the hearing, claiman t stated that she could only lift 2 to 3 pounds. The records reflect that her sympto ms of weakness and pain in her hands were diagnosed and treated as probable osteoarthritis. However, X-rays failed to show evidence of fracture, dislocation orsignificant degenerative change. As to the foot problems that allegedly pre vented her from standing more than 35 minutes or walking more than one-half a blo ck, she was treated by a podiatrist in February and March of 1994 for a plantar ulcer on her left foot. The records indicate that the prognosis was “Very good with Orthotics and Orthopedic Shoes.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 139. -3- Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Claimant testified that she could not work because of impaired eyesight, severe problems with her feet, and arthritic pain and weakness in her hands. She stated that she cou ld not see well out of either eye and that the right eye “had an infection in it [in 1992] and it was iritis,” 1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 171, and the “left eye has gotten blurred pretty bad since I had the iritis,” id. Her testimony was that she could not see well eno ugh to clean and cook, read a newspaper, or watch telev ision. However, the objective medical evidence does not support claimant’s testimony as to the extent of her visual impairment

. 2Claimant was treated for acute iritis from May 29, 1992 to December 14, 1992 . The last report of Dr. Joe D. Cope, her treating optometrist, dated May 11 , 1993, stated that claimant-4-

was “doing quite niecly [sic] now” and that her vis ion had stabilized at 20/100 in her right eye and 20/25 in her left eye, although t he condition had a tendency to recur. Id . at 91. Dr. Cope opined that claimant’s performan ce would be limited by the decrease in binocularity, but that she shoul d be able to perform certain tasks well so long as her left eye retained its vis ual acuity. Id . On November 4, 1993, Dr. Steve P. Sanders, claimant’s treating phy sician, assessed her eye problems and noted that the iritis was stable. Id . at 101. Claimant herself told Dr. Sanders in November 1992 that her vision had “a lmost completely cleared up,” id. at 111, and in April 1993 that, although she still had difficulties with vision in her right eye, it appeared to be “improvi ng all the time,” id . at 104. The ALJ credited the objective medical evidence on claimant’s visual acuity, along with claimant’s earlier statements to Dr. Sanders, and discounted the subjective statements made at the hearing. He foun d that, although claimant’s residual functional capacity to perform the full ra nge of sedentary and light work of an unskilled nature was reduced by a lack of clo se binocular vision, she could still perform a significant number of jobs in the n ational economy. The ALJ denied benefits at step five of the five-part seque ntial evaluation process for determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.3 The parties consented to disposition of this case b y the magistrate judge.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).

4 Claimant asserts that the ALJ improperly assessed h er credibility and discounted her testimony because the ALJ failed to link her conclusions to the evidence. The assertion is not well taken. The AL J considered the relevant factors and properly identified the evidence on whi ch he relied in reaching his conclusions. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d at 391 (requiring express findings on an credibility determination, with reference to rel evant evidence). -5- 1988) (discussing the five steps). This decision w as upheld by the Appeals Council and the district court. 3 The record supports the ALJ’s evaluation of claimant’s visual capacity. Both the objective medical evidence and claimant’s own reports to her medical providers indicate that she had sufficient vision t o perform basic work activities. The only evidence to the contrary is claimant’s tes timony, which the ALJ disbelieved. “Credibility determinations are pecul iarly the province of the finder of fact.” Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv s. , 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990). 4 Contrary to claimant’s contentions, the ALJ was notrequired to order a consultative examination regarding the current exte nt of her visual impairment. The ALJ has broad latitude in ordering a consultati ve examination. Id . at 778. A consultative examination is required only if the re cord establishes that such an examination is necessary to enable the ALJ to make the disability decision. See Turner v. Califano , 563 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1977).-6-

In this case, the record on the nature and severityof claimant’s vision loss was adequate for the disability decision. It conta ined medical reports on the status of her condition not only from the twelve mo nths prior to the application date of March 4, 1993, but also from Dr. Cope as of May 1993 and Dr. Sanders as of November 1993. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d) (requiring a medical histo ry for at least the twelve months preceding the date of th e application); see also Kendrick v. Shalala , 998 F.2d 455, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1993) (commenting on the difficulty of having a “complete” record as “one may always obtain another medical examination, seek the views of one more con sultant, wait six months to see whether the claimant’s condition changes, and s o on.”). Claimant’s testimony that the vision in her left eye had blurred since s he had iritis does not change our analysis. We find no error in the ALJ’s not obtain ing a consultative examination. We have carefully reviewed the record and have cons idered claimant’s arguments in light of the record. We conclude thatsubstantial evidence supports the determination that claimant was not disabled wi thin the meaning of the Social Security Act. Therefore, the judgment of the Unite d States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge