*The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States District Judge forthe Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0104P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0104p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________TRUDYWILSON-SIMMONS,Plaintiff-Appellant,JOSEPHR.COMPOLI,JR.;JAMESR.GOODLUCK,Appellants,v.LAKECOUNTYSHERIFF’SDEPARTMENT;DANIELA.DUNLAP,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-3553Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.No. 96-02359—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.Argued: December 6, 1999Decided and Filed: March 24, 2000Before: RYAN and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges;BELL,*District Judge.2Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.No. 98-3553_________________COUNSELARGUED:Stephen W. Gard, Cleveland, Ohio, forAppellants. Michael P. Brown, LAKE COUNTYPROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Painesville, Ohio, for Appellees.ON BRIEF:Joseph R. Compoli, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, forAppellants. Michael P. Brown, LAKE COUNTYPROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Painesville, Ohio, for Appellees.Mark S. Telich, Cleveland, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae._________________OPINION_________________BELL, District Judge. The Plaintiff, Trudy WilsonSimmons, and her attorneys, Joseph R. Compoli, Jr., andJames R. Goodluck, (hereinafter collectively referred to as the"Appellants") appeal the order of the district court awardingattorney fees against Wilson-Simmons and sanctioning herattorneys by holding them jointly and severally liable for theaward on the grounds that the Plaintiff's racial discriminationand retaliation claims were frivolous, unreasonable andwithout foundation. We affirm.I.Wilson-Simmons has been employed as a correctionsofficer at the Lake County Sheriff's Department since 1990.On February 7, 1995, she complained to her supervisor, FrankLeonbruno, that she had been told by another co-worker thata corrections officer had sent a racist electronic mail ("email") about her to another corrections officer.Wilson-Simmons refused to identify the co-worker who hadgiven her this information. She requested to view the e-mailgenerated by every officer in the Lake County DetentionFacility for the month of January. Leonbruno informed herthat the e-mail records were not readily available and that they10Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.No. 98-3553Bad faith is not required to support a sanction under § 1927.Jones, 789 F.2d at 1230.Having reviewed the record, we concur with the districtcourt that it should have been patently obvious to Plaintiff'scounsel that the facts alleged did not, as a matter of law,support a retaliation claim. The district court did not abuse itsdiscretion by imposing sanctions upon counsel for pursuingan action based on a disgruntled employee's motleyassortment of grievances and perceived mistreatment.For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment ofthe district court awarding attorney fees against WilsonSimmons pursuant to § 1988 and imposing joint and severalliability for that award upon her counsel as a sanctionpursuant to § 1927.No. 98-3553Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.3would need to be reconstructed. That day, Leonbruno posteda notice to all employees prohibiting racial statements in emails. In the absence of further details fromWilson-Simmons, Leonbruno was unable to investigate theallegation. The next day, Wilson-Simmons submitted awritten request to view the e-mail of five corrections officersfor the month of January. She was advised that it would takethe Lake County Sheriff's Department's computer specialistone hundred forty hours to reconstruct the requested e-mailand that she would be responsible for the $2,500 cost.In October 1996, Wilson-Simmons commenced this actionagainst the Defendants, the Lake County Sheriff's Departmentand Daniel A. Dunlap, the Lake County Sheriff, allegingracial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.§ 1981, § 1983, § 2000e-2(a), § 2000e-3(a) and Ohio statelaw. The complaint alleged that the Defendants discriminatedagainst her because the fee to view the e-mail should havebeen $3.00, the price of a public record, and because theDefendants failed to investigate the alleged racial slur. Thecomplaint further alleged that following Wilson-Simmons'complaint and request for access to the alleged racist e-mail,the Defendants retaliated against her by: (1) assigning her tothe fourth floor which housed maximum security inmates; (2)losing her overtime paperwork, requiring her to refile it; (3)administering a written disciplinary warning for failing tomake a door check during her shift and for using white out onher log report; (4) instructing her to rewrite her explanationsof these events because her response was insubordinate; and(5) giving her a disciplinary warning for using officeequipment to advertise her Tupperware party. WilsonSimmons alleges that she suffered severe clinical depressionas a result of these incidents.The Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment.On October 22, 1997, the district court granted the motion.With respect to Wilson-Simmons' racial discrimination claim,the district court set forth the burden shifting framework ofMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.4Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.No. 98-35531817, 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973). The court firstnoted that thePlaintiff had no evidence that the allegedly racist e-mailexisted. She had learned of it from a co-worker who was toldby another corrections officer that still another correctionsofficers was responsible. The court further found thatWilson-Simmons had failed to show an adverse employmentaction related to her discrimination claims and that she hadproffered no evidence to suggest that she was treated worsethan similarly situated, non-protected employees. The courtconcluded that the Defendants were entitled to summaryjudgment because she had failed to demonstrate a prima faciecase of disparate treatment.The district court next reviewed each alleged incident withrespect to her retaliation claim. The court clarified that herassignment to the fourth floor with maximum securityinmates was part of her duties and that she had presented noevidence to demonstrate that she was singled out and given adisproportionate number of assignments to this area. Thecourt noted that other officers, including members of aprotected class, were assigned to this duty more frequentlythan she was. The court concluded that the loss of herovertime sheet was a single, isolated event that was nothingmore than a clerical oversight. As to the allegations that shewas unfairly reprimanded, the evidence revealed that she hadnot been disciplined but had merely received requests frommanagement to explain certain conduct. The courtaccordingly determined that she had failed to demonstrate thatshe suffered adverse employment action in retaliation for herprotected activity. Wilson-Simmons did not appeal the orderof the court granting summary judgment.On November 6, 1997, the Defendants moved for attorneyfees and costs against Wilson-Simmons pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. The district court referred the motion to a magistratejudge. On January 14, 1998, the magistrate judgerecommended that attorney fees be awarded against WilsonSimmons and that the district court issue an order to counselto show cause why sanctions should not be imposed againstNo. 98-3553Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.9that the district court rejected the magistrate judge'srecommendation that the court impose attorney fees onPlaintiff's counsel pursuant to § 1927 and/or the court'sinherent authority because the court only cited § 1988 asauthority in its opinion and adopted the magistrate judge'sreport "as modified."We reject such a tortured reading of the district court'sopinion. There is no text in the district court's opinion tosupport Appellants' claim that the court rejected themagistrate judge's recommendation that counsel be sanctionedpursuant to § 1927. Although the order imposing sanctionsdoes not specifically cite § 1927 as authority, both the districtcourt's order to show cause and the underlying report andrecommendation adopted by the court do. Reading the orderas a whole, it is evident that the district court relied upon§ 1927 as the basis for imposing sanctions against counsel.We further conclude that the district court's order imposingsanctions upon Plaintiff's counsel was a proper exercise of itsdiscretion. Sanctions under § 1927 are warranted "when anattorney has engaged in some sort of conduct that, from anobjective standpoint, 'falls short of the obligations owed by amember of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causesadditional expense to the opposing party.'"Holmes v. City ofMassillon, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir.) (quotingIn reRuben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987),cert. denied, 485U.S. 934, 108 S.Ct. 1108, 99 L.Ed.2d 269 (1988)),cert.denied, 519 U.S. 935, 117 S.Ct. 312, 136 L.Ed.2d 228 (1996)."An attorney's ethical obligation of zealous advocacy onbehalf of his or her client does not amount tocarte blanchetoburden the federal courts by pursuing claims that are frivolouson the merits . . . . Accordingly . . . when an attorney knowsorreasonably should knowthat a claim pursued is frivolous,or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct thelitigation of nonfrivolous claims, a trial court does not err byassessing fees attributable to such actions against theattorney."In re Ruben, 825 F.2d at 984 (quotingJones v.Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986)).8Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.No. 98-3553argument is a red herring. She presented no evidence that sheshould have been charged the fee for a public record of $3.00rather than the $2,500 cost of reconstructing the files. Neitherdid she present any evidence that the cost was in any wayracially based. Furthermore, the district court found that therewas no evidence to indicate that any of the five co-workersshe had identified were involved or that the alleged e-maileven existed. Wilson-Simmons proffered no evidenceregarding when the e-mail had been sent, who had sent it,who it was sent to, or whether her name was even mentioned.With respect to Wilson-Simmons' claim that the Defendantsfailed to investigate, the district court concluded that theevidence demonstrated that the Defendants took hercomplaint seriously and responded promptly by issuing amemorandum to all personnel prohibiting using e-mail tomake racial statements. The court further found that herclaims for retaliation were without factual foundation. Afterviewing the allegations and the evidence, the district courtdetermined that Wilson-Simmons had failed to set forth aprima facie case of racial discrimination or retaliation and thather claims were without foundation from the outset. Weagree with the district court's well reasoned analysis andconclude that the court did not abuse its discretion inawarding attorney fees against Wilson-Simmons pursuant to§ 1988. The remedial action was prompt and appropriate,seeHafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999),especially given that the Plaintiff refused to cooperate in heremployer's attempt to investigate the matter.SeePerry v.Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 1997).Moreover, the memorandum was apparently effective. ThePlaintiff does not claim that she ever saw, or heard rumorsabout, racist e-mails following the circulation of the memo.C.We next consider the Appellants' claim that the districtcourt was not authorized to impose attorney fees againstPlaintiff's counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. They argueNo. 98-3553Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.51Section 1927 provides:Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct casesin any court of the United States or any Territorythereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any caseunreasonably and vexatiously may be required by thecourt to satisfy personally the excess costs, expensesand attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of suchconduct.them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19271and/or the court'sinherent authority. According to the magistrate judge, thecomplete lack of substance and merit should have been sopatent to Plaintiff's counsel that their failure to either adviseher against pursuing the empty claims or terminate the actionwhen its futility should have been obvious called for them to"share the burden of the Plaintiff's folly." (J.A. 26).The district court issued an order directing Plaintiff'scounsel to show cause, in writing, why sanctions should notbe imposed against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. ThePlaintiff filed an objection to the magistrate's report andrecommendation and brief in opposition to sanctions. OnApril 7, 1998, the court awarded attorney fees of $17,131.95to the Defendants against the Plaintiff and held that thePlaintiff's attorneys were jointly and severally liable for theaward. In its order, the court incorporated its summaryjudgment by reference and adopted the magistrate judge'sreport and recommendation as modified. This appealfollowed.II.A.We first consider the Appellants' contention that the districtcourt improperly imposed monetary sanctions upon themwithout conducting a hearing.6Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.No. 98-3553In this circuit, there is no requirement that a full evidentiaryhearing be held before imposing sanctions.Cook v.American S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771, 774 (6th Cir. 1998). "Whatis required, however, is that before the imposition ofsanctions, the attorney must be given notice and anopportunity to be heard. . . . An order to show cause, alongwith an opportunity to respond to said order, can be sufficient,in certain circumstances, to provide the necessary proceduralsafeguards . . . ."Id.at 775 (citation omitted).As a preliminary matter, we note that no due processconcerns are present in this case. Both the magistrate judge'sreport and recommendation and the district court's show causeorder clearly put the Appellants on notice that the court wasconsidering imposing monetary sanctions upon both WilsonSimmons and her attorneys."It is within the discretion of the district court to determinewhether an evidentiary hearing would assist the court in itsdecision."Id.The magistrate judge reviewed WilsonSimmons' entire 361 page deposition testimony in preparinghis report and recommendation. The district court had beforeit the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, theAppellants' brief in opposition and response to the show causeorder, and the court's opinion granting summary judgment.The district court was familiar with the Plaintiff's allegationsand demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the factual andlegal issues in the case. Because nothing in the recordindicates that a hearing was needed to assist the court indetermining whether sanctions were warranted, we hold thatthe district court did not abuse its discretion in not conductingan evidentiary hearing.B.We next consider the Appellants' claim that the districtcourt improperly awarded attorney fees against WilsonSimmons pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because her claimswere not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.No. 98-3553Wilson-Simmons v. LakeCounty Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al.7We review a district court's award of attorneys fees under42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on an abuse of discretion standard.Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 469 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999). "Inlight of a district court's superior understanding of thelitigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellatereview of what essentially are factual matters, an award ofattorneys' fees under § 1988 is entitled to substantialdeference."Id.(quotingHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) (internalquotation marks omitted).Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may in itsdiscretion award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant upona finding that "the plaintiff's action was frivolous,unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not broughtin subjective bad faith."Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (quotingChristiansburg GarmentCo. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted),cert.denied, 514 U.S. 1127, 115 S.Ct. 2000, 131 L.Ed.2d 1001(1995). "[A] district court must resist the urge to engage inpost hoc reasoning and the hindsight logic of concluding asuit is without foundation because the plaintiff ultimatelydoes not prevail."Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d180, 183 (6th Cir.) (quotingChristiansburg Garment Co., 434U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700),cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906,105 S.Ct. 3530, 87 L.Ed.2d 654 (1985). A "plaintiff shouldnot be assessed his opponent's attorney fees unless the courtfinds the claim was groundless at the outset or 'that theplaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.'"Smythe-Cramer Co.,33 F.3d at 183. This "requires inquiryinto the plaintiff's basis for filing suit. Awards to prevailingdefendants will depend on the factual circumstances of eachcase."Id.The district court properly applied this standard. Assupport for her race discrimination claim, Wilson-Simmonsoffered as evidence the fact that she would have to pay for thecosts associated with reconstructing the e-mail files. This